International encyclopedia of human geography 9781780343785, 1780343787

Table of contents :
Front Cover......Page 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 6
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 8
SECTION EDITORS......Page 10
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 18
PREFACE......Page 52
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 54
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 96
A......Page 97
B......Page 373
Front Cover......Page 501
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 502
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 504
Copyright......Page 505
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 506
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 508
SECTION EDITORS......Page 510
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 518
PREFACE......Page 552
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 554
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 596
C......Page 597
Front Cover......Page 1035
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 1036
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 1038
Copyright......Page 1039
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 1040
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 1042
SECTION EDITORS......Page 1044
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 1052
PREFACE......Page 1086
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 1088
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 1130
Front Cover......Page 1537
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 1538
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 1540
Copyright......Page 1541
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 1542
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 1544
SECTION EDITORS......Page 1546
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 1554
PREFACE......Page 1588
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 1590
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 1632
E......Page 1633
Front Cover......Page 2019
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 2020
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 2022
Copyright......Page 2023
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 2024
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 2026
SECTION EDITORS......Page 2028
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 2036
PREFACE......Page 2070
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 2072
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 2114
F......Page 2115
G......Page 2367
Front Cover......Page 2457
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 2458
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 2460
Copyright......Page 2461
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 2462
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 2464
SECTION EDITORS......Page 2466
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 2474
PREFACE......Page 2508
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 2510
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 2552
H......Page 2839
Front Cover......Page 2945
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 2946
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 2948
Copyright......Page 2949
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 2950
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 2952
SECTION EDITORS......Page 2954
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 2962
PREFACE......Page 2996
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 2998
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 3040
I......Page 3185
Front Cover......Page 3467
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 3468
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 3470
Copyright......Page 3471
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 3472
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 3474
SECTION EDITORS......Page 3476
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 3484
PREFACE......Page 3518
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 3520
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 3562
K......Page 3563
L......Page 3615
M......Page 3815
Front Cover......Page 4019
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 4020
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 4022
Copyright......Page 4023
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 4024
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 4026
SECTION EDITORS......Page 4028
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 4036
PREFACE......Page 4070
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 4072
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 4114
N......Page 4335
Front Cover......Page 4543
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 4544
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMANGEOGRAPHY......Page 4546
Copyright......Page 4547
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 4548
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 4550
SECTION EDITORS......Page 4552
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 4560
PREFACE......Page 4594
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 4596
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 4638
O......Page 4639
P......Page 4671
Front Cover......Page 5039
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 5040
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 5042
Copyright......Page 5043
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 5044
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 5046
SECTION EDITORS......Page 5048
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 5056
PREFACE......Page 5090
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 5092
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 5134
Q......Page 5271
R......Page 5317
Front Cover......Page 5621
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 5622
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 5624
Copyright......Page 5625
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 5626
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 5628
SECTION EDITORS......Page 5630
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 5638
PREFACE......Page 5672
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 5674
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 5716
S......Page 5783
Front Cover......Page 6173
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 6174
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 6176
Copyright......Page 6177
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 6178
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 6180
SECTION EDITORS......Page 6182
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 6190
PREFACE......Page 6224
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 6226
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 6268
T......Page 6455
Front Cover......Page 6749
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 6750
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY......Page 6752
Copyright......Page 6753
EDITOR IN CHIEF......Page 6754
EDITORIAL BOARD......Page 6756
SECTION EDITORS......Page 6758
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS......Page 6766
PREFACE......Page 6800
CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES......Page 6802
PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 6844
U......Page 6845
V......Page 6999
W......Page 7051
Y......Page 7159

Citation preview

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY SECOND EDITION

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY SECOND EDITION EDITOR IN CHIEF

Audrey Kobayashi Department of Geography Queen’s University Kingston, ON, Canada

VOLUME 1

Elsevier Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, Netherlands The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1GB, United Kingdom 50 Hampshire Street, 5th Floor, Cambridge MA 02139, United States Copyright Ó 2020 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further information about the Publisher’s permissions policies and our arrangements with organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website: www.elsevier.com/permissions. This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the Publisher (other than as may be noted herein). Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers may always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-0-08-102295-5 For information on all publications visit our website at http://store.elsevier.com

Publisher: Oliver Walter Acquisition Editor: Oliver Walter, Andre Wolff Content Project Manager: Kate Miklaszewska, Natalie Bentahar, Laura Jackson Designer: Mark Rogers

EDITOR IN CHIEF Audrey Kobayashi is Professor of Geography and a Queen’s Research Chair at Queen’s University. A native of British Columbia, she completed a B.A. (1976) and M.A. (1978) at the University of British Columbia, and a PhD (1983) at UCLA. She taught in Geography and East Asian Studies at McGill University from 1983 to 1994, then moved to Queen’s, initially as Director of the Institute of Women’s Studies (1994 to 1999) and thereafter as Professor of Geography. Other positions include President of the Canadian Association of Geographers (1999-2001), and President of the Association of American Geographers (2011-2012). In 2011 she was inducted into the Royal Society of Canada, and in 2018 was appointed a Fellow of the Association of American Geographers. Her scholarship has always been strongly focused on issues of human rights. She has published widely on topics, such as anti-racism, citizenship, immigration policy, employment equity, and disability studies. Her publications are always matched, however, by participation in communities as a scholar activist. She is currently involved in several research projects that address the “Landscapes of Injustice” of the Japanese-Canadian uprooting, and the “Right to Remain” of people currently living in precarious housing in the downtown East Side of Vancouver. Her most recent project is to study the role of protest music in activism for the rights of homeless people in Dublin, Ireland and Vancouver. Major publications include Rethinking the Great White North: Race, Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada (co-edited with Andrew Baldwin and Laura Cameron, UBC Press, 2011), Immigrant Geographies of North American Cities (co-edited with Carlos Teixeira and Wei Li, Oxford University Press, 2012), and Geographies of Peace and Armed Conflict (Routledge, 2012), Racialization, Indigeneity, and Racism in Canadian Universities (UBC Press 2017), and The International Encyclopedia of Geography (editor 2017). She has received major awards from the Canadian Association of Geographers, the American Association of Geographers, the Canadian Association of University Teachers, as well as the Barnes teaching award from the Faculty of Arts and Science Undergraduate Society, and the Queen’s Award for Excellence in Graduate Teaching.

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EDITORIAL BOARD Mark Boyle Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place University of Liverpool Liverpool, United Kingdom Noel Castree Department of Geography Manchester University Manchester, United Kingdom Francis L. Collins National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis University of Waikato Hamilton, New Zealand Jeremy W. Crampton School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Newcastle University Newcastle, United Kingdom Sarah de Leeuw University of Northern British Columbia Prince George, BC, Canada Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho Department of Geography National University of Singapore Singapore Isaac Luginaah Department of Geography The University of Western Ontario London, ON, Canada Brij Maharaj Geography Discipline, School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences University of Kwazulu-Natal Durban, South Africa

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SECTION EDITORS Mark Boyle Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place University of Liverpool Liverpool, United Kingdom Mark Boyle worked from 2003 to 2007 at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow as Lecturer and then Senior Lecturer in Geography and from 2007 to December 2017 as Professor/Chair of Geography at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. From 2007 to 2012, he served as head of the Department of Geography at Maynooth and from 2013 to 2016 as Director of the Interdisciplinary National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analyses (NIRSA) at Maynooth. From January 2018 he serves as Chair or Urban Studies and Director of the Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, at the University of Liverpool, United Kingdom. He has authored two books, edited a book, edited nine special editions/sections of international peer reviewed journals and published over 90 scholarly papers and reports (including 44 in international peer reviewed journals).

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Section Editors

Noel Castree Department of Geography Manchester University Manchester, United Kingdom Noel Castree is a Professor of Geography at Manchester University, United Kingdom, and an Honorary Professorial Research Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He edits the journal Progress in Human Geography and is author of the book Making Sense of Nature (2014).

Section Editors

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Francis L. Collins National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis University of Waikato Hamilton, New Zealand Francis L. Collins is Professor of Geography and Director of the National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis at the University of Waikato. His research has explored international migration focusing on the experiences, mobility patterns and regulation of temporary migrants. Francis’ research includes work exploring: international students and urban transformation, higher education and the globalization of cities, labor migration, marginalization and exploitation, time and youth migration, and the role of aspirations and desires as driving forces for migration. Francis is the author of Global Asian City: migration, desire and the politics of encounter in 21st century Seoul (Wiley, 2018) and co-editor of Intersections of Inequality, Migration and Diversification (Palgrave, 2019), and Aspiration, Desire and the Drivers of Migration (Routledge, 2019).

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Section Editors

Jeremy W. Crampton School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Newcastle University Newcastle, United Kingdom Jeremy W. Crampton’s interests are in how and why geolocational technology affects urban and everyday experience and wellbeing. In particular, he studies the effects of surveillance on privacy, spatial Big Data and algorithmic decision-making. To address these questions, he analyzes how digital landscapes of algorithms and data are planned, mapped, and produced. He also has a recent interest in the geolocational implications of biometric platforms such as facial and emotional recognition technologies. Jeremy is an Editor of the journal Dialogues in Human Geography, and the author of Mapping: A Critical Introduction to Cartography and GIS (Wiley).

Section Editors

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Sarah de Leeuw University of Northern British Columbia Prince George, BC, Canada Sarah de Leeuw, a Professor in Canada with the University of Northern British Columbia’s Northern Medical Program, the Faculty of Medicine at the University of British Columbia, is a cultural–historical geographer and creative writer (poetry and literary non-fiction). Her research, writing, teaching, and activism focus on feminist anti-colonial social justice, especially in rural, northern, and marginalized places. She holds a Canada Research Chair in Humanities and Health Inequities and, in 2017, was inducted into the Royal Society of Canada as a member of the College of New Scholars, Artists, and Scientists.

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Section Editors

Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho Department of Geography National University of Singapore Singapore Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho is Associate Professor at the Department of Geography and Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore. Her research addresses how citizenship is changing as a result of multi-directional migration flows in the Asia-Pacific. She is author of Citizens in Motion: Emigration, Immigration and Re-migration Across China’s Borders (Stanford University Press), which received the American Sociological Association’s (ASA) award for “Best Book in Global and Transnational Sociology by an International Scholar” in 2019. Elaine is Editor of the journal Social and Cultural Geography, and serves on the journal editorial boards of Citizenship Studies; Emotions, Society and Space; and the Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography.

Section Editors

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Isaac Luginaah Department of Geography The University of Western Ontario London, ON, Canada Isaac Luginaah is a Professor and was a Canada Research Chair in Health Geography (200-2017) at the Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada. He is a graduate of the University of Cape Coast, Ghana (BSc. Hons), Queen’s University of Belfast, UK (MSc), York University (MES), and McMaster University (PhD), Canada. His research addresses how emerging epidemics are radically changing health landscapes in the face of increased burdens from environmental exposure in both developed and developing countries. He has led several projects on population, environment, and health. His work in Africa and North America has made strong theoretical and methodological contributions, addressing environmental hazards and deficiencies in health service provision.

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Section Editors

Brij Maharaj Geography Discipline, School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences University of Kwazulu-Natal Durban, South Africa

Brij Maharaj is a senior professor in geography who has received widespread recognition for his research on urban politics, segregation, displacement, local economic development, xenophobia, and human rights, migration and diasporas, religion, philanthropy, and development. He has published over 150 scholarly papers in renowned journals, such as Urban Studies, International Journal of Urban and Regional Studies, Political Geography, Urban Geography, Antipode, Polity and Space, Geoforum, Local Economy, and GeoJournal, as well as five co-edited book collections. He is co-editor of the South African Geographical Journal (Routledge), and serves on several international editorial boards. He is a B-Rated NRF researcher. He is a regular media commentator on topical issues as part of his commitment to public intellectualism.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Manuel B Aalbers KU Leuven, The University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Gunn Marit Aasvang Department of Air Pollution and Noise, Division for Infection Control and Environmental Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway M Abreu University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Patrick Adler School of Cities, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Adrian Guillermo Aguilar Institute of Geography, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico J Agyeman Tufts University, Medford, MA, United States Ola Ahlqvist Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States L Albrechts University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Jon Anderson School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom GJ Andrews McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Gavin J Andrews McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Roger Antabe Department of Geography, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Constantinos Antonopoulos Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Management, University of Patras, Patras, Greece Neil Argent Geography and Planning, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia Godwin Arku The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Derek H Alderman University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Knoxville, TN, United States

Frederick Ato Armah Department of Environmental Science, School of Biological Sciences, College of Agriculture and Natural Sciences, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana

Fiona Allon Department of Gender and Cultural Studies, The University of Sydney, NSW, Australia

C Arun-Pina Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Luis F Alvarez Leon Department of Geography, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States

James Ash School of Arts and Cultures, Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Claes G Alvstam School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

Sheena Asthana School of Law, Criminology and Government, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Jennifer Atchison Australian Centre for Culture, Environment, Society and Space (ACCESS), School of Geography and Sustainable Communities, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia PJ Atkins Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Rowland Atkinson Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Maoz Azaryahu University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States; and University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel Iwan J Azis Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Jen Bagelman School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United kingdom Elena Baglioni School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom AL Bain Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada W Andrew Baldwin Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Matthew D Balentine University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States Clare Bambra Institute of Health and Society, Faculty of Medical Sciences, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Brandon Barclay Derman University of Illinois Springfield, Springfield, IL, United States

Holly Barcus Department of Geography, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, United States Trevor J Barnes Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Clive Barnett University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom Jon Barnett School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia Timothy Barney Department of Rhetoric and Communication Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, United States Chris Barrett English Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States Leigh Barrick Geography Department, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Tanja Bastia Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Ranu Basu Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jane Battersby African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa Michael Batty Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London, London, United Kingdom Jamie Baxter Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Trycia Bazinet Carleton University, North Bay, ON, Canada David Bell School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Scott Bell University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada

List of Contributors

David Bennett Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Adam Bledsoe University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, United States

Aimee Benoit Department of Geography, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada

S Bodden School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Vincent Berdoulay Laboratoire Passages (UMR 5319), CNRS; and University of Pau and Pays de l’Adour, Pau, France

JS Boggs Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada

Christin Bernhold Department of Geography, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany Kathryn Besio Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo, Hilo, HI, United States Ling Bian University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Amherst, NY, United States Marcy Bidney American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, United States Roland Billen University of Liege, Liege, Belgium Mark Birkin School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Bradley Wade Bishop School of Information Sciences, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, United States Elijah Bisung School of Kinesiology and Health Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada M Jean Blair Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Ismael Blanco The Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain Sarah Blandy School of Law, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Joe Blankenship University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States

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JD Bohland Global Politics and Societies Department, Hollins University, Roanoke, VA, United States Sophie Bond School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand David Bonilla Institute of Economic Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico Marco Bontje University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Gary Bosworth School of Geography, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, United Kingdom William M Bowen Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, United States Sophie Bowlby University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom Mark Boyle Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Paul Boyle Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom Jordan P Brasher University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Knoxville, TN, United States Mark Brayshay School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom Daniel Brendle-Moczuk McPherson Library, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

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List of Contributors

S Brentjes Univeristy of Sevilla, Sevilla, Spain

RA Butlin University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Gary Bridge School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

Michael Buzzelli The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Gavin Bridge Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

Jason A Byrne Department of Geography and Spatial Sciences, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

John Briggs University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Jake Rom D Cadag University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines

James MR Brock School of Biological Sciences, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Catherine A Calder The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

Marc Brosseau Department of Geography, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada Aleid E Brouwer Faculty of Spatial Science, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands; and Academy of International Business Administration, NHL Stenden University of Applied Sciences, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands Kath Browne Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland Christopher R Bryant University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada John R Bryson City-Region Economic Development Institute, Department of Strategy and International Business, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Dirk Burghardt Institute of Cartography, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany Ryan Burns Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Richard Bustin Lancing College, Lancing, United Kingdom Colin D Butler Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia; and Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia Tim Butler Department of Geography, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom

Sydney Calkin Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom; and School of Geography, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom Liam Campling School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom Sébastien Caquard Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada Jordan Carlson Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jordan T Carlson Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Pádraig Carmody Department of Geography, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland; University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa; and Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Juliet Carpenter Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom Ricardo Carreon Sosa Posgraduate School of Engineering, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico

List of Contributors

Richard Carter-White Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

James Cheshire Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Denise M Carter University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

Lynda Cheshire School of Social Science, University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia

Irene Casas School of History and Social Sciences, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, LA, United States Emilio Casetti The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Heather Castleden University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada; and Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jose Esteban Castro Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom; and National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Buenos Aires, Argentina Filippo Celata Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Elizabeth Chacko The George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States Chad Chambers Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States GU Chaolin School of Architecture, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China Graham Chapman Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Eric Charmes RIVES, UMR CNRS EVS, ENTPE, University of Lyon, Lyon, France Sutapa Chattopadhyay Geography and Development Studies, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, NS Canada Jingfu Chen Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China Zhangliang Chen Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics and Regional Economics Applications Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States

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Simon Chilvers Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Frangton Chiyemura The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Vera Chouinard School of Geography and Earth Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Nicholas R Chrisman Bellingham, WA, United States Brett Christophers Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden Jonathan Cinnamon Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada; and Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada Gordon L Clark Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; and Department of Banking and Finance, Monash Business School, Monash University, Caulfield, VIC, Australia Nigel Clark Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom David B Clarke Department of Geography, College of Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom Keith C Clarke Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Nick Clarke Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom P Claval Paris-Sorbonne University, Paris, France John Clayton Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Hugh Clout University College London, London, United Kingdom

Ian Cook Department of Geography, University of Exeter, Exeter, United kingdom

Denise S Cloutier Department of Geography, and Research Affiliate Institute on Aging and Lifelong Health, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

Philip Cooke Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

Allan Cochrane Department of Geography, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Logan Cochrane Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada; and Hawassa University, Hawassa, Ethiopia Daniel Cockayne Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Thomas J Cooke Department of Geography, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States Meghan Cope Department of Geography, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, United States Jon Corbett Community, Culture and Global Studies, University of British Columbia-Okanagan, Kelowna, BC, Canada Jonathan Corcoran The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

Chris Cocklin James Cook University, Townsville, QLD, Australia

Helen Couclelis Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States

Neil M Coe Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

Rory Coulter Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Amy Cohen Department of Anthropology, Okanagan College, Kelowna, BC, Canada Peter Collier Department of Geography, University of Portsmouth, Southsea, United Kingdom; and University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom Damian Collins University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Francis L Collins National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand Michael Collyer University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Alex R Colucci Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States

Pauline R Couper Geography, School of Humanities, York St John University, York, United Kingdom Kevin R Cox Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Shaphan Cox Discipline of Geography, School of Design and Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia Sophie Cranston Geography and Environment, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom Thomas W Crawford Department of Geography, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, United States

Creighton Connolly National University of Singapore, Singapore

Noel Cressie The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

David Conradson School of Earth and Environment, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Tim Cresswell University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

List of Contributors

Verónica Crossa The College of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico David Crouch University of Derby, Epperstone, United Kingdom Graham Crow University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Gregg Culver Institute of Geography, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany Andrew Cumbers Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Nigel Curry Lincoln International Business School, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, United Kingdom Michelle Daigle University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Caoilfhionn D’Arcy Maynooth University Department of Geography, NUI Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Sandy Dall’erba Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics and Regional Economics Applications Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States Craig Dalton Hofstra University, Department of Global Studies and Geography, Hempstead, NY, United States Frances Darlington-Pollock Department of Geography and Planning, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Raju J Das York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Ebenezer Dassah United Nations University - International Institute for Global Health (UNU-IIGH), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Mark Davidson Clark University, Worcester, MA, United States Amanda Davies Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia Anna R Davies Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

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Wayne KD Davies Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Suzanne Davies Withers Department of Geography, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States Simin Davoudi Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Leith Deacon School of Environmental Design and Rural Development, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario David Delaney Amherst College, Amherst, MA, United States C Delano-Smith Institute of Historical Research, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom Vincent J Del Casino, Jr. California State University, Long Beach, Long Beach, CA, United States Carolyn NM DeLoyde Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Sarah de Leeuw Institute for Critical Indigenous Studies and Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, BC, Canada; and Northern Medical Program, UNBC, Faculty of Medicine, UBC, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada Eric M Delmelle Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, and Center for Applied Geographic Information Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States Carolyn NM DeLoyde Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jessica Dempsey University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Mark Denil sui generis, Washington, DC, United States Steve DeRoy The Firelight Group, Vancouver, BC, Canada Ben Derudder Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

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List of Contributors

Menusha De Silva Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore Michael R Desjardins Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, and Center for Applied Geographic Information Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States Pauline Deutz Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom Sarah Dickin Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, Sweden Catherine D’Ignazio Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States Martin Dijst LISER, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxemburg Mahmoudi Dillon University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, United States Alan V Di Vittorio Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, United States Deborah P Dixon School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Iain Docherty University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Klaus Dodds Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom; and University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, United States Bolesław Doma nski Jagiellonian Univeristy, Krakow, Poland Betsy Donald Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Clemens Driessen Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands Martine Drozdz Technologies, Territories and Societies Laboratory, CNRS, Paris, France Jessica Dubow University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom

Michelle Duffy School of Environmental and Life Sciences, Faculty of Science, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia Patrick J Duffy National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Rae Dufty-Jones Western Sydney University, Sydney, NSW, Australia Michael Dunford Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China; and University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Jim Dunn Department of Health, Aging and Society, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada William Durkan Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Andrew C Dwyer University of Bristol Cyber Security Group, Faculty of Engineering, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom Owen J Dwyer, III Indiana University School of Liberal Arts at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), Indianapolis, IN, United States R Earickson University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, United States LaToya Eaves Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN, United States Sally Eden University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom T Edensor Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, United Kingdom David W Edgington University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Charity Edwards Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia; and University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

List of Contributors

David C Eisenhauer Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States Stuart Elden Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom; and Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom Kajsa Ellegård Department of Thematic Studies, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden Susan J Elliott Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Sarah Elwood University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States

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David Fazzino Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, Catawissa, PA, United States Yongjiu Feng Tongji University, Shanghai, China Zhiqiang Feng Institute of Geography, School of Geosciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom David A Fennell Department of Tourism and Environment, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada Md Azmeary Ferdoush University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, United States

Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro Department of Geography, State University of New York at New Paltz, New Paltz, NY, United States

Eduarda Ferreira Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, NOVA University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

Marta Bivand Erdal Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway

Federico Ferretti School of Geography, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Christina R Ergler School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Joshua Evans University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Karen Falconer Al-Hindi University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, United States C Cindy Fan Department of Geography, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States Matthew Farish Department of Geography and Program in Planning, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada May Farrales Northern Medical Program, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada; and Environment and Community Health Observatory Network, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

Carolyn Fish Department of Geography, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, United States Robert Fish University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom Robert Flanagan Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, United States Richard Florida School of Cities, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Robin Flowerdew Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, United Kingdom Ronan Foley The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

Victoria Fast Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

Ken E Foote University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States; and University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

James R Faulconbridge Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom

Benjamin Forest McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

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List of Contributors

Peter J Forman Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom

Nick Gallent University College London, London, United Kingdom

Kelleann Foster Penn State, University Park, PA, United States

Juan Carlos García-Palomares Department of Geography, Faculty of Geography and History, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Coleen A Fox Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States Urbano Fra Paleo University of Extremadura, Caceres, Spain Derek France Department of Geography and International Development, University of Chester, Chester, United Kingdom Claire Freeman School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Cordelia Freeman School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom Christina Frendo Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Scott M Freundschuh National Science Foundation, Arlington, VA, United States

Emma C Gardner City-Region Economic Development Institute, Department of Strategy and International Business, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Gioacchino Garofoli Department of Economics, Insubria University, Varese, Italy Jay D Gatrell Office of Academic Affairs, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL, United States Franz W Gatzweiler Institute of Urban Environment, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Xiamen, China Raegan Gibbings University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Wardlow Friesen University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

David Gibbs Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

Louis Kusi Frimpong Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana

Chris Gibson School of Geography and Sustainable Communities, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

Kurt Fuellhart Geography-Earth Sciences, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, PA, United States

Emily Gilbert Canadian Studies Program, Department of Geography and Planning, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada; and University College, Toronto, ON, Canada

Simone Fullagar Griffith University, Nathan, QLD, Australia Lisa Funnell Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom; and University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, United States

Kathryn Gillespie Seattle, WA, United States Shea Ellen Gilliam Spatial Science Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States

Levi Gahman Power, Space, and Cultural Change Research Unit, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

Menelaos Gkartzios Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Carolyn Gallaher School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC, United States

Brendan Gleeson Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

List of Contributors

Charmian Goh Asia Research Institute, Singapore, Singapore John R Gold Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom Eric Goldfischer University of Minnesota, Department of Geography, Environment, and Society, Minneapolis, MN, United States Ricard Gomà The Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain Huiwen Gong Kiel University, Kiel, Germany Michael Frank Goodchild Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States D Goodman University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States MK Goodman King’s College London, London, United Kingdom Sucharita Gopal Department of Earth and Environment, Center for Remote Sensing, Boston University, Boston, MA, United States Gernot Grabher University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany Richard Grant University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, United States Dustin W Gray University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

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Martin Gren Department of Cultural Sciences/Human Geography, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Linnaeus University, Kalmar, Sweden Amy L Griffin School of Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Carl Griffin Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Daniel A Griffith School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States; and University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States Leonard Guelke University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Javier Gutiérrez Department of Geography, Faculty of Geography and History, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain Robert N Gwynne University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Jeff Hackett The Firelight Group, Vancouver, BC, Canada RR Hagelman, III Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, United States Roy Haines-Young University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom

Neil Gray Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Jouni Häkli Space and Political Agency Research Group, Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland

Andrew Greenhalgh-Cook School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom

Michael Haldrup Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

Adaeze Greenidge University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Keith Halfacree Department of Geography, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Edward Hall Geography, School of Social Sciences, University of Dundee, Dundee, United Kingdom

Matthew G Hatvany Department of Geography, Laval University, Québec, QC, Canada

Peter Hall University College London, London, United Kingdom

Eva Hauthal Institute of Cartography, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany

Sarah Hall School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom Tim Hall Department of Applied Social Studies, University of Winchester, Winchester, United Kingdom Trevor Hancock School of Public Health and Social Policy, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada Carolyn Hank School of Information Sciences, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, United States Gentry Hanks Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Neil Hanlon Geography Program, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada Torfinn Harding NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway Richard Harris School of Geography and Earth Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Stephan Harrison College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Penryn, United Kingdom Johannes Hartig DIPF Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Frankfurt, Germany Rudi Hartmann Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado, Denver, CO, United States Francis Harvey Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Institute for Geography, University Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany John Hasse Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, United States Robert Hassink Kiel University, Kiel, Germany

Harriet Hawkins Department of Geography, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom Billy Tusker Haworth Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Allison Hayes-Conroy Geography and Urban Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States Jessica Hayes-Conroy Women’s Studies, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY, United States Christine Haylett The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Kingsley E Haynes George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, United States Roger Hayter Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada Stephen Healy Institute for Culture and Society, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW, Australia Liam Heaphy School of Architecture, Planning and Environmental Policy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Katie Hemsworth Department of Geography, Nipissing University, North Bay, ON, Canada Martin Henning School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden Matthew Henry School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand Brita Hermelin Centre for Municipality Studies (CKS), Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden

List of Contributors

Andrew Herod Department of Geography, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States Rachel V Herron Department of Geography and Environment, Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada Martin Hess Department of Geography, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom John Hessler Library of Congress, Washington, DC, United States Geoffrey JD Hewings University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States Jennifer Hill Department of Geography and Environmental Management, Faculty of Environment and Technology, University of the West of England, Bristol, United Kingdom Sam Hind University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany Julian Hine University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, United Kingdom

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Rory Horner The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom; and University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Myriam Houssay-Holzschuch Sciences Po Grenoble, Pacte, University Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble, France Donna Houston Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW, Australia Alice J Hovorka Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jeremy RL Howells University of Kent, Cantenbury, United Kingdom Richard Howitt Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia Brian J Hracs Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Phil Hubbard Leicestershire University, Leicester, United Kingdom

Elaine LE Ho Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Ray Hudson Department of Geography, University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom

Steven Hoelscher Departments of American Studies and Geography, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, United States

Rachel Hughes School of Geography, University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC, Australia

Adam Holden University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom

Sarah M Hughes Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

Peter Holland University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Louise Holt University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

David W Hugill Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

P Hopkins Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

PJ Hugill Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States

Donagh Horgan Department of Architecture, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom

RP Huizinga University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Mark W Horner Department of Geography, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States

John S Humphreys School of Rural Health, Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia

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List of Contributors

Sarah Hunt Institute for Critical Indigenous Studies and Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, BC, Canada; and Northern Medical Program, UNBC, Faculty of Medicine, UBC, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada Margo Huxley Sheffield, United Kingdom Andy Inch Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Saratchandra Indrakanti Search Science, eBay Inc., San Jose, CA, United States Lisa Ingwall-King UN Environment World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, United Kingdom Carlo Inverardi-Ferri University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland Randall W Jackson West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, United States William A Jackson Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, United Kingdom Jane M Jacobs Yale-NUS College, National University Singapore, Singapore Dan Jacobson Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

William Jenkins Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Ole Jensen The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Bob Jessop Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Gunnar Thór Jóhannesson Department of Geography and Tourism, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland Corey Johnson University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States Lynda Johnston Geography Programme, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand Melissa NP Johnson Department of English Language and Literature, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Nuala C Johnson School of Natural and Built Environment, Queen’s University, Belfast, United Kingdom Peter A Johnson University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Ron Johnston School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

Deirdre Jafferally Georgetown, Guyana

Andrew EG Jonas Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

J Jäger University of Applied Sciences BFI Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Andrew Jones School of Arts and Social Sciences, University of London, London, United Kingdom

M Jay University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

John Paul Jones, III School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States

Mark Jayne School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom Brian Jefferson Department of Geography and Geographic Information Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; and Department of Geography and Geographic Information Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States

Martin Jones Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, United Kingdom Owain Jones Bath Spa University, Bath, United Kingdom Rhys Jones Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyt, United Kingdom

List of Contributors

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Roy Jones Discipline of Geography, School of Design and Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia

Evangeline O Katigbak National Institute of Education e Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

Tod Jones Discipline of Geography, School of Design and Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia

Adrian Kavanagh Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

H Jöns Geography and Environment, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom David Jordhus-Lier Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway Jin-Kyu Jung University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, United States K Kafkoula Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece Roger JP Kain School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom Athanasios Kalogeresis School of Spatial Planning and Development, Faculty of Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece Md Kamruzzaman Monash Art Design & Architecture (MADA), Monash University, Caulfield East, VIC, Australia Juan Miguel Kanai Department of Geography, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Joseph Kangmennaang Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada David H Kaplan Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States Emrah Karakaya KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Stockholm, Sweden Rajesh Kasturirangan Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, India

Aoife Kavanagh The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Daithí Kearney Department of Creative Arts, Media and Music, Dundalk Institute of Technology, Dundalk, Ireland Gerry Kearns The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Gordon Kee Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China PF Kelly York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Therese Kenna Department of Geography, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Judith Kenny University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Portland, OR, United States Andrew Kent The Antipode Foundation, Cardiff, United Kingdom Sara Beth Keough Saginaw Valley State University, University Center, MI, United States Fritz Connor Kessler Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States Sun-Bae Kim Department of Geography Education, Korea National University of Education, Cheongju, South Korea

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List of Contributors

Anthony D King State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, United States mrs c kinpaisby-hill Scott Kirsch Department of Geography, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, Unites States Priya Kissoon Department of Geography, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago Rob Kitchin Department of Geography, Maynooth University Social Sciences Institute, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Jasper Knight School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Richard D Knowles School of Science, Engineering and Environment, University of Salford, Manchester, United Kingdom Audrey Kobayashi Department of Geography, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada BJ Köbben Department of Geoinformation Processing, Faculty of Geoinformation Science and Earth Observation, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands Natalie Koch The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States L Koefoed Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Sin Yee Koh School of Arts and Social Sciences, Monash University Malaysia, Bandar Sunway, Malaysia Tristan Kohl Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Zoltán Kovács University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary Menno-Jan Kraak Department of Geoinformation Processing, Faculty of Geoinformation Science and Earth Observation, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands Thomas Krafft Metamedica, School for Public Health and Primary Care, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Frances Kremarik School of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom Sneha Krishnan School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom John Krygier Raleigh, NC, United States; and Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH, United States M Satish Kumar School of Natural and Built Environment, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom Matthew Kurtz Department of Geography, Environment, and Geomatics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada Vincent Kuuire Department of Geography, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada; and Social and Behavioural Health Science, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Alexey V Kuznetsov Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), Moscow, Russia Lois Labrianidis Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

Carmen Köhler DIPF Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Frankfurt, Germany

Eric W LaFary Peace Corps, Ghana

Benedikt Korf University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Suncana Laketa Institute of Geography, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland

List of Contributors

Nina SN Lam Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States Bart Lambregts Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand Wendy Larner Office of the Provost, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Soren C Larsen University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, United States Alan Latham Geography Department, University College London, London, United Kingdom Mickey Lauria Clemson University, Clemson, SC, United States Tracey P Lauriault Carleton University, Communication and Media Studies, Ottawa, ON, Canada E Laurier School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom David M Lawrence Virginia State University and Virginia Union University, Richmond, VA, United States Philip Lawton Geography Department, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland Jennifer Lea Geography, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom Philippe Le Billon Department of Geography, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Jay Lee Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States Jiyeong Lee The University of Seoul, Seoul, South Korea Sang-Il Lee Department of Geography Education, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea Richard Le Heron School of Environment, Faculty of Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

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Charlotte Lemanski University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Deborah Leslie Department of Geography, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Agnieszka Leszczynski Department of Geography, Western University, London, ON, Canada Yee Leung The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China; and The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Nathaniel M Lewis School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Nicolas Lewis School of Environment, Faculty of Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; and School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand R Lewis University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Sophie A Lewis Brooklyn Institute for Social Research, Philadelphia, PA, United States W Li University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States Johanna Lilius Aalto University, Helsinki, Finland Shaun Lin Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore Weiqiang Lin National University of Singapore, Singapore Peter Lindner Department of Human Geography, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany Denis Linehan University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Jo Little University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom David Littlewood Sheffield University Management School, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Min Liu Key Laboratory of Geographic Information Science, Ministry of Education, School of Geographic Sciences, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China; and Institute of Eco-Chongming (IEC), Shanghai, China Yan Liu The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Sally Lloyd-Evans Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom Lucia Lo Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jed Long Department of Geography, Western University, Social Science Centre, London, ON, Canada

Daniel L Mabazza Department of Geography, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Warren E Mabee Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Alan Mace London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom Key MacFarlane History of Consciousness Department, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States William A Mackaness Institute of Geography, School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland

PA Longley Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Julie MacLeavy School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

Becky PY Loo Department of Geography, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Gordon MacLeod University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom

Flor M López Guerrero Institute of Geography, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico Julia Lossau Institute of Geography, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany

Katherine Anne MacTavish Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, United States Avril Maddrell Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

John Lovering Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

Eric Magrane Department of Geography, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, United States

Murray Low London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom

Jacek Malczewski University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Mark Lucherini School of Geography, Geology and the Environment, Keele University, Keele, United Kingdom Timothy W Luke Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, United States

Anders Malmberg Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden V Mamadouh University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Steven M Manson University of Minnesota, South Minneapolis, MN, United States

Chris Lukinbeal School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States

Juliana Mansvelt School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

Sophia Maalsen School of Architecture, Design and Planning, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Carl Marklund Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden

List of Contributors

xxxv

Terry Marsden School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

John H McKendrick Scottish Poverty and Inequality Research Unit, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Alan Marshall School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Katharine McKinnon Department of Social Inquiry and La Trobe Rural Health School, La Trobe University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia

David Martin School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

Ethan McLean University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

Peter R Martin School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

Heather McLean School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Liz Mason-Deese Manassas, VA, United States

Jessica McLean Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Colin Mason Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Kate McLean Canterbury Christ Church University, Canterbury, United Kingdom

Elizabeth Mavroudi Geography and Environment, School of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom

Phil McManus School of Geosciences, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Eugene McCann Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

Kendra McSweeney Department of Geography, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

Andrew McCartan Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland

Kathleen J Mee Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia

J McCarthy Critical Geography, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom; and Bad Homburg, Germany

Tom Mels Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University - Campus Gotland, Visby, Sweden

Andrew G McClelland Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Derek P McCormack School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom K McCracken Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia Pamela McElwee Department of Human Ecology, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ, United States Jennifer McGarrigle Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (IGOT), University of Lisbon, Portugal

Sean Mendonca Georgetown, Guyana Jeremy Mennis Department of Geography and Urban Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States Peter Merriman Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom Paula Meth Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom David R Meyer Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, United States Frank Meyer Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany

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List of Contributors

William B Meyer Department of Geography, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, United States Christiana Miewald Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada Judith Miggelbrink Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany Elisabeth Militz Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Tina Miller Kelowna, BC, Canada Bruce V Millett South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD, United States Nate Millington Department of Geography, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

BE Montz East Carolina University, Greenville, NY, United States Graham Moon School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Katie Moon School of Business, University of New South Wales, Canberra, ACT, Australia Peter Mooney Department of Computer Science, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland M Morad London South Bank University, London, United Kingdom KM Morin Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, United States Bruno Moriset University Jean Moulin, Lyon, France

Claudio Minca Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Richard Morrill University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States

Jayalaxshmi Mistry Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom

Karyn Morrissey European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter Medical School, Exeter, United Kingdom

Clare JA Mitchell University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Lan Mu University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States

Paul Mkandawire Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Human Rights Program, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Sayani Mukhopadhyay Department of Geography, Asutosh College, Kolkata, India

Nalini Mohabir Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada Giles Mohan The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Patricia L Mokhtarian University of California Davis, Davis, CA, United States Malene Monka Center for Dialectology, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Marius Monsrud NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway

Darla K Munroe Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Alan T Murray Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Amber Murrey Department of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom D Mustafa Critical Geography, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom; and Bad Homburg, Germany Caroline Nagel Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, United States

List of Contributors

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Takashi Nakazawa School of Business Administration, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

Morton E O’Kelly The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

David P Nally University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, United States

AA Naseemullah King’s College London, London, United Kingdom

John O’Loughlin Department of Geography, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States

Catherine J Nash Department of Geography, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada Anoop Nayak School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom S Neal University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Roderick P Neumann Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States Andrea J Nightingale University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway P Nijkamp Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Padini Nirmal Columbia University, New York, NY, United States Becki Nookemis Department of Psychology, Vancouver Island University, Nanaimo, BC, Canada Glen Norcliffe York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Patricia Noxolo School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Neil Nunn University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Cian O’Callaghan Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Kevin O’Connor Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Nathaniel O’Grady Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

Phillip O’Neill School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW, Australia David O’Sullivan Department of Geography, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States Tor H Oiamo Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jonathan Oldfield University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Rachel Olsen The Firelight Group, Vancouver, BC, Canada Elizabeth Olson University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States Kenneth R Olwig Department of Landscape Architecture, Planning and Management, SLU-Alnarp, Alnarp, Sweden Elizabeth Opiyo Onyango Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Joseph R Oppong Department of Geography, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, United States Meghann Ormond Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands Mark Ortiz University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States David T Ory Federal Transit Administration, Washington, DC, United States Evaristus Oshionebo University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

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List of Contributors

Ulrich Oslender Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States Samuel M Otterstrom Department of Geography, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, United States Samuel Owusu-Agyemang Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, United States Francis Owusu Department of Community and Regional Planning, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, United States George Owusu Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), Centre for Urban Management Studies (CUMS), University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana Anssi Paasi Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland LC Pace Department for the Study of Religions, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, United States Michael Pacione Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom; and Geography, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland Antonio Páez McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Ben Page Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom Sam Page University College London, London, United Kingdom K Parker Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps, London, United Kingdom Christof Parnreiter Department of Geography, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Marianna Pavlovskaya Department of Geography and Environmental Science, Hunter College - CUNY, Ph.D. Program in Earth and Environmental Sciences, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, United States Linda J Peake York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jamie Pearce University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand Deborah Peel University of Dundee, Dundee, United Kingdom J Richard Peet Graduate School of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, MA, United States Tiina Peil Institute for Culture and Learning, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden Jan Penrose Institute of Geography, School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Chris Perkins School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom; and The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom George LW Perry School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Michael P Peterson University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, United States Aparna Phadke Department of Geography, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, India NA Phelps University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Michael Parnwell University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Catherine Phillips School of Geography, University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC, Australia

Jerry Patchell Division of Social Sciences, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

DR Phillips Lingnan University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

List of Contributors

Martin Phillips School of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

Valerie Preston Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Graham Pickren Roosevelt University, Chicago, IL, United States

John Preston Transportation Group, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

Jan Nederveen Pieterse University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Etienne Piguet Institute of Geography, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland Andy Pike Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom Steven Pinch Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom David Pinder Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Iva Maria Miranda Pires Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, NOVA University Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Paul Plummer Department of Geography, The University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia Lucas Pohl Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany Jane Pollard Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Colin G Pooley Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom

Georges Prévélakis University of Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Paris, France Linda Price Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom Russell Prince Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand B Pritchard School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia Carolyn Prouse Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Samantha Punch University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom Gita Pupedis School of Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Martin Purvis School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Junxi Qian Department of Geography, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Mike Raco Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, United Kingdom Pauliina Raento Tampere University, Tampere, Finland

Ate Poorthuis Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

Saraswati Raju Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Clive Potter Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom

B Ramírez Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Mexico City, Mexico

Marcus Power University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom Andy C Pratt London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom

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Maano Ramutsindela Department of Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

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List of Contributors

NM Rantisi Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada Samuel J Ratick Clark University, Worcester, MA, United States Laura T Raynolds Center for Fair and Alternative Trade, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, United States Jane M Read Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States Sertanya Reddy University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States Philip Rees School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Ludovico Rella Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Johannah-Rae Reyes University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Andrea Rishworth Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Paul Robbins University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States Guy M Robinson Department of Geography, Environment and Population, School of Social Sciences, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia Joseph S Robinson Department of Geography, The National Univesity of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Scott Rodgers Department of Film, Media and Cultural Studies, Birkbeck, University of London, London, United Kingdom Jean-Paul Rodrigue Department of Global Studies and Geography, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, United States Dallas Rogers University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia

Mark Alan Rhodes, II Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, United States

Fernanda Rojas Marchini University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Gareth Rice School of Media, Culture and Society, University of West of Scotland, Blantyre, United Kingdom

Reuben Rose-Redwood Department of Geography, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

Stian Rice University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, United States

Nancy A Ross McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

Pamela Richardson-Ngwenya German Institute for Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture, (DITSL GmbH), The Faculty of Organic Agriculture, University of Kassel, Witzenhausen, Germany Lizzie Richardson Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom; and Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Chantelle Richmond Department of Geography, Western University, London, ON, Canada Britta Ricker Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Jairus Rossi Community and Economic Development Initiative of Kentucky, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States Ugo Rossi Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning, University of Turin, Turin, Italy John Round University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Parama Roy Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India Stephen A Royle Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom Susan Ruddick University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

List of Contributors

Derek Ruez Space and Political Agency Research Group, Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Gerard Rushton The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, United States Jonathan Rutherford LATTS (Laboratory Technology, Territories and Societies), Ecole des Ponts Paris Tech, Marne la Vallée, France Tod D Rutherford Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States China Sajadian CUNY Graduate Center, Department of Anthropology, New York, NY, United States

Carolin Schurr Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Nadine Schuurman Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada Guido Schwarz The National University of Colombia, Bogota, DC, Colombia Darren M Scott McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Mark Scott University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland David Seamon Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States Anna J Secor University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States

Jennifer Salmond School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Gunhild Setten Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Nathan Salvidge Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

E Shantz Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Heywood Sanders University of Texas-San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, United States Rickie Sanders Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States RB Sarma Cotton College, Guwahati, India VR Savage RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Nathan F Sayre Department of Geography, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States Joris Schapendonk Geography, Planning and Environment, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Regina Scheyvens School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand Ted Schrecker Institute of Health and Society, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

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Elizabeth Shapiro-Garza Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States Joanne Sharp Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom Jon Shaw University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom Kate Shaw School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia Robert Shaw School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Jianfa Shen Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China; and Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

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List of Contributors

Eric Sheppard Department of Geography, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States

Mark W Skinner Trent School of the Environment, Trent University, Peterborough, ON, Canada

Mor Shilon TechniondIsrael Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

Astrid Ravn Skovse Center for Dialectology, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

HaeRan Shin Department of Geography, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea David Sibley University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Terry R Slater School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

James D Sidaway Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Tom Slater Institute of Geography, School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Julia Siemer Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada

Vanessa Sloan Morgan University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

Dragos Simandan Department of Geography and Tourism Studies, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada; and Geography Department, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada

Adrian Smith School of Geography, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom

Neil Simcock Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, United Kingdom David Simon Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom Paul Simpson School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom Alex Singleton Geography and Planning, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Srilata Sircar King’s College London, London, United Kingdom Alistair Sisson University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia Victor FS Sit University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Ronald Skeldon University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; and Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Tracey Skelton Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Christopher J Smith University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY, United States JM Smith Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States Karly B Smith School of Rural Health, Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia RG Smith Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom Susan J Smith Girton College and Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Chris Sneddon Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States Edward W Soja University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States; and London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom Martin Sokol Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom Michael Sonis University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States; and Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

List of Contributors

Matthew Sothern School of Geography and Sustainable Development, The University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland Basil Southey Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jacob Sowers Missouri State University, Springfield, MO, United States Hayley Sparks School of Environment, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Janet Speake Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool, United Kingdom Simon Springer Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, NSW, Australia Krithika Srinivasan Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Pranpreya Sriwannawit Lundberg Office of the National Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation Policy Council, Bangkok, Thailand Sophie L Stadler University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Jean-François Staszak Geography Department, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

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Fraser Sugden School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom D Sui Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States Juanita Sundberg University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Ekaterina Svetlova University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom John C Sweeney The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Erik Swyngedouw Geography/School of Environment, Education and Development, The Manchester University, Manchester, United Kingdom Ludek Sýkora Department of Social Geography and Regional Development, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic Marc Tadaki Cawthron Institute, Nelson, New Zealand LM Takahashi University of Southern California, Sol Price School of Public Policy, Sacramento, CA, United States Minna Tanskanen University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

Philip E Steinberg Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States

T Tasan-Kok University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Rolf Sternberg Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography, University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany

Adeline Tay University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

David Storey University of Worcester, Worcester, United Kingdom Elaine Stratford Institute for the Study of Social Change, College of Arts, Law and Education, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

Liz Taylor University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Riki M Taylor School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Kendra Strauss Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

Kees Terlouw Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Samuel Strong Homerton College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Jim E Thatcher Department of Urban Studies, University of Washington Tacoma, Tacoma, WA, United States

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List of Contributors

Karl-Heinz Thielmann Long-Term Investing Research, AG, Karlsruhe, Germany Deborah Thien California State University, Long Beach, CA, United States Jean-Claude Thill University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States Michael Thomas Research Department, Statistics Norway (SSB), Oslo, Norway C Thompson Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Daniel K Thompson Anthropology and Heritage Studies, University of California Merced, Merced, CA, United States Matthew Thompson Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Karen E Till Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Judit Timár Center for Economic and Regional Studies, Békéscsaba, Hungary; Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary; and Hungarian Acadey of Sciences, Békéscsaba, Hungary Jacqueline Tivers Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, United Kingdom Chetan Tiwari Department of Geography and the Environment, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, United States GA Tobin University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States F Tödtling Institute for Multi-Level Governance and Development, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria John Tomaney Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Marla Torrado Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States Ivan J Townshend Department of Geography, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada Charles Travis Department of History, University of Texas, Arlington, TX, United States Simone Tulumello Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal David Turnbull ACSIS, Melbourne University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia BL Turner, II School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning and School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, United States Jennifer Turner University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Sarah Turner Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada Markku Tykkyläinen University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland David J Unwin Birkbeck College, University College London, London, United Kingdom Tim Unwin Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom Ebru Ustundag Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada Joni T Vainikka RELATE Centre of Excellence Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland; and Department of Architecture, Design, and Media Technology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark JD van der Ploeg China Agricultural University, Beijing, China Nico Van de Weghe Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

List of Contributors

B van Hoven University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands Michiel van Meeteren Geography and Environment, School of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom Lindy Van Vliet Carleton University, North Bay, ON, Canada Eric Vaz Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jo Vearey African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Nagendra R Velaga Transportation Systems Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Bombay, Mumbai, India Luna Vives Department of Geography, University of Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada Louise Waite University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom G Waitt University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia Susan M Walcott Department of Geography, Environment and Sustainability, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States Gordon Walker Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Matthew Wallace Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden Katie Walsh Department of Geography, School of Social Sciences and Cultural Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom

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Charles Warren School of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom Stacy Warren Department of Geography and Anthropology, Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA, United States Elanor Warwick Clarion Housing Group, London, United Kingdom Doris Wastl-Walter Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Johanna L Waters Human Geography and Migration Studies, Department of Geography, University College London, United Kingdom Matt Watson University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Michael J Watts Department of Geography and Development Studies, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States Alex Wearing University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Sophie Webber School of Geosciences, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia Gerald R Webster University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, United States Kellynn Wee Asia Research Institute, Singapore, Singapore Tony Weis Western University, London, ON, Canada Sarah J Whatmore School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom David C Wheeler Emory University, Atlanta, GA, United States

Fahui Wang Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States

Robert K Whelan University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States

Barney Warf Department of Geography, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, United State

Madeline Whetung University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

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List of Contributors

George W White South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD, United States

Heather Winlow School of Sciences, Bath Spa University, Bath, United Kingdom

Peter White School of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Adam C Winstanley Department of Computer Science, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

M Whitehead Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom

Ben Wisner University College London, London, United kingdom

Adam Whitworth University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Janine L Wiles Social and Community Health, School of Population Health, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Glyn Williams Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom; and School of Planning and Architecture, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Michael Williams Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom

Charles WJ Withers University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland SD Withers University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States Dariusz Wójcik Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, United Kingdom David WS Wong Geography and Geoinformation Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, United States

Nina Williams School of Science, UNSW Canberra, ACT, Australia

Denis Wood Raleigh, NC, United States; and Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH, United States

Katie Willis Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, England, United Kingdom

Peter Wood Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Clancy Wilmott The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Kathi Wilson Department of Geography, University of Toronto at Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada Tom Wilson Charles Darwin University, Darwin, NT, Australia Robert Wilton McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

Michael Woods Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom Orlando Woods School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore Keith Woodward Department of Geography, University of WisconsinMadison, Madison, WI, United States Rachel Woodward School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Thomas Wimark Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

Chih Yuan Woon Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Gordon M Winder The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Nancy Worth University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Jamie Winders Department of Geography, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States

Sarah Wright Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia

List of Contributors

Willie J Wright Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States Neil Wrigley University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

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Junjia Ye School of Social Science, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore Brenda SA Yeoh Asia Research Institute, Singapore, Singapore

Fulong Wu Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Godfrey Yeung Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Ryan Wyeth Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

Y-M Yeung Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Elvin K Wyly University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Ningchuan Xiao The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Ankit Kumar Yadav Transportation Systems Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Bombay, Mumbai, India Lillian Yaffe University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, United States Ikuho Yamada University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, United States Takashi Yamazaki Department of Geography, Osaka City University, Osaka, Japan Xiaobai A Yao Department of Geography, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States Richard Yarwood School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom

May Yuan Geospatial Information Science, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States C Zhang University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States JJ Zhang Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore Jun Zhang University of Minnesota, Tacoma, WA, United States Yu Zhou Department of Earth Science and Geography, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY, United States Bianca Rosa Ziegler Department of Geography, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Karl S Zimmerer Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, United States Ping Zou School of Nursing, Nipissing University, Toronto, ON, Canada Melanie Zurba Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada

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HOW TO USE THE ENCYCLOPEDIA Structure of the Encyclopedia All articles in the encyclopedia are arranged alphabetically as a series of entries. There are four features to help you easily find the topic you are interested in: an alphabetical contents list, cross references, a full subject index, and contributors. 1. Alphabetical contents list: The alphabetical contents list, which appears at the front of each volume, lists the entries in the order that they appear in the encyclopedia. So that they can be easily located, entry titles generally begin with the key word or phrase indicating the topic, with any generic terms following. For example, “Small Intestine, Benign and Malignant Neoplasms of the” is the entry title rather than “Benign and Malignant Neoplasms of the Small Intestine”. 2. Cross references: Virtually all the entries in the encyclopedia have been extensively cross-referenced. The cross references which appear at the end of an entry, serve three different functions: i. To draw the reader’s attention to related material on other entries ii. To indicate material that broadens and extends the scope of the article iii. To indicate material that covers a topic in more depth

Example The following list of cross-references appears at the end of the entry “Geography and Public Policy”.

See Also: Activism; Activist Geographies; Applied Geography; Critical Geographies; Epistemology; History of Geography; Knowledge Exchange; Postpolitics and Post-Truth. 3. Index: The index appears at the end of volume 14 and includes page numbers for quick reference to the information you are looking for. The index entries differentiate between references to a whole entry, a part of an entry, and a table or figure. 4. Contributors: At the start of each volume there is a list of the authors who contributed to all volumes.

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PREFACE Ten years ago, Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, and a team of talented editors compiled the first edition of the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. I begin by thanking them for bringing together the most comprehensive collection of key issues at the time, both for the discipline of geography and for the planet. In this second edition, we have built upon that impressive body of knowledge, asking what has changed in the past decade, and how have geographers responded? Human geography is still one of the most vibrant university disciplines in the world. Human geographers continue to challenge themselves, their students, the public, and those who hold political power. Human geographers seek to understand how humans got to the world of now and how the human species can and must address the most pressing situations of violence, oppression, refugees, poverty, and injustice. We also understand that these conditions are interrelated, as often as not as a manifestation of the long road of colonialism. Perhaps most challenging, and certainly more pressing than a decade ago, is the issue of climate change, now affecting the planet as never before. In part, because of our increasing realization of the immanent effects of climate change, geographers are more than ever concerned about the welfare of the nonhumandplants, animals, entire ecosystemsdand with our relationships with the nonhuman world. We place greater emphasis not only on practical interventions, but also on our ethical responsibilities. Geographers continue to advance understandings, both theoretical and practical, of things that inform human relationships, such as gender, race, citizenship, class, and cultural/economic/political systems. Our concern is not only with violence and despair, although we are sometimes tempted to give in when difficulties seem insurmountable, but we also attempt to find resolutions. We try to see places where “progress” means better relations between humans and their surroundings, or when exciting new developments in technology, technique, or human understanding lead to improvement of the planetary condition. Geographers as a whole tend to be cautious about what passes for progress though, including about technological developments that often have fewer benefits than threats. We are also enthusiastic about advancing knowledge in areas such as healthcare and communication. This collection covers the gamut of cautions and enthusiasms. Geographers are more than ever committed to addressing the remarkably enduring effects of colonization. Historical geographers shed light on how systems set in place centuries ago continue to structure relations across the globe, affecting citizenship, migrations, inequality, and ongoing tensions over territory and belonging. Indigenous knowledge has become an important and increasingly interconnected aspect of how we understand the world. And respect for one another, while challenged, often violently, is increasingly recognized as a necessary human goal. Many geographers have found that cultural approaches to understanding lie in art, music, poetry, and other forms of expression. While geography remains an eclectic discipline around which it is difficult to place hard boundaries, the core concepts of spatiality and place remain as strong as ever. Everything is in relationship and every relationship is a complex and ever changing network of spatiality. Spatiality is the condition of being. Place is the constellation of relationships, made significant by degrees of structure, harmony, stability, or their opposites. Geographers attempt to understand spatial relations placed and in place as the manifestation of life on earth. Everything occurs in place. If such is the first principle conveyed to students through this collection, the examples are rich, diverse, and thought provoking. The editors of the first edition offered some challenges that remain, albeit with different dimensions. The first is the obvious and inevitable arbitrariness of any collectiondeven as large and comprehensive as this onedthat attempts to capture an entire discipline. Those issues have only deepened over a decade of expanding knowledge. Many scholars have also become tired of contributing to what seems an ever lengthening list of

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geographical collections. For the second edition, we had the advantage of being able to gauge readership of the first edition as a measure of the interests of scholars and students. The editors did not make light decisions over what to include, but we recognized that some topics no longer seem relevant. Other topics have risen to the top of interests. The degree of revision for each topic depended both on recent advances in the field and on the opinions of authors and editors about what constitutes important new understanding. Some broad areas, such as indigeneity, peace studies, healthcare, and migration received major expansion. Some, such as what we thought was an arbitrary distinction between the rural and the urban, were restructured. We also commissioned a large number of new entries, especially in the connections between geography and the creative arts, in the effects and uses of recent technology, and in the changing distributions of people as a result of migration, including the rise in climate refugees. Some shifts are lamentable. We found fewer people who were willing to write about historical topics, and as a result we have reprinted more articles in historical geography than in other fields. Overall, readers may see a significant blurring of subfield distinctions, where the political, economic, social, and cultural display less clear-cut boundaries and divisions. While it may frustrate some of the more conventional notions of the discipline, that blurring is probably both a practical representation of the real world, and a theoretical advancement in understanding of how everything is interconnected. Another challenge the previous editors identified was authorial. We hope that we have gone even further in including a diversity of voices that reflect a range of perspectives and a wealth of scholarly locales. We have also attempted to recognize the degree to which authority of voice remains concentrated in the Global North/West/ developed world because of longstanding scholarly traditions, the politics of publication, and the wealth attached to universities and other knowledge producing institutions. Notwithstanding that many authors of privilege attempt to acknowledge their own positions, we have done our best to go beyond what may seem as tokenistic recognition. We fully admit that the discipline has a long way to go in that regard. One perhaps controversial decision was to remove articles about individual scholars that were published in the first edition. Recognizing the previous editors struggled to come up with a list of the “most” important and influential scholars, the selection is always arbitrary and incomplete, and re-inscribes positions of privilege. Our decision here was aided by two facts. First, with few exceptions, the biographical articles in the first edition received few downloads, either because students or their professors nowadays tend to think more of concepts than of personalities. Second, although we did not wish to consign important scholars to obscurity, we felt that their work is better understood in context. We encouraged authors to personalize the concepts they were writing about, keeping ideas and their authors relevant, and to include the work that has influenced the discipline in lists of further reading. I hope that we have succeeded. Another major difference between the first and second editions is that we abandoned the attempt to divide the publication according to subfields (e.g., political, economic, urban, rural, regional, quantitative methods, people, etc.). There were nine editors for the current edition, all of whom worked across subfields, although each had one or two major areas of expertise (e.g., health, population, culture, economics, etc.). Editors worked closely with one another to ensure all topics were adequately covered. Quite often, by working closely the editors came up with entirely new topics that push disciplinary boundaries, while realizing that some important topics needed to be combined into one article in order to provide a more comprehensive coverage. Overall, the collection represents a great deal of collaboration and generous creativity on the part of both editors and authors. This collection is vast, an artifact of ideas from and about thousands of scholars from all over the world. Their collective voices certainly cannot capture all there is to know of our discipline. Still, the entries do a pretty good job of telling the world that geographers have much to offer. Our discipline as a whole is devoted to making a better world. We are a diverse and intellectually vibrant discipline with many exciting emerging scholars. Geographers are advancing scholarship that merges new technologies and old attendance to issues of social justice, oppression, violence, environmental change, and the ways these conditions shift and seemingly intensify in the 21st Century. We can be certain the world will continue to change. If the health of geographical scholarship is anything to go by, geographers will continue to be attuned to those changes. Geography has an important place in the world. Audrey Kobayashi

CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES Editor in Chief

v

Editorial Board

vii

Section Editors

ix

List of Contributors

xvii

How to use the Encyclopedia

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Preface

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VOLUME 1 A Accessibility Edward Hall

1

Action Research, Participatory mrs c kinpaisby-hill

9

Activism LM Takahashi

17

Activist Geographies Levi Gahman, Johannah-Rae Reyes, Tina Miller, Raegan Gibbings, Amy Cohen, Adaeze Greenidge, and Sutapa Chattopadhyay

23

Actor–Network Theory Gunnar Thór Jóhannesson and Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt

33

Aeromobilities Weiqiang Lin and Mor Shilon

41

Affect Trycia Bazinet and Lindy Van Vliet

47

Affective Mapping Clancy Wilmott

53

Agglomeration Anders Malmberg

61

Aging and Health GJ Andrews

67

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Aging and Migration Amanda Davies

73

Aging in the Developing World Andrea Rishworth and Susan J Elliott

79

Agrarian Transformations Fraser Sugden

83

Agriculture, Sustainable Terry Marsden

91

Agri-Environmentalism and Rural Change Clive Potter

99

Algorithmic Governance Joe Blankenship

105

Alternative Economies Stephen Healy

111

Anarchism/Anarchist Geographies Federico Ferretti

119

Animal Geographies Alice J Hovorka

127

Animal Welfare Kathryn Gillespie

133

Anthropocene Nigel Clark

139

Anthropogeography Julia Lossau

147

Anticolonialism Neil Nunn and Madeline Whetung

155

Antigeopolitics Ulrich Oslender

159

Antiurbanism Philip Lawton

165

Apartheid/Postapartheid Jane Battersby

169

Applied Geography Michael Pacione

177

Archives Matthew Kurtz

183

Art and Cartography Catherine D’Ignazio

189

Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems Yee Leung

209

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Arts-Based Methods Juliet Carpenter

217

Assemblage Theory Sam Page

223

Atlases Julia Siemer

229

Atlases, Online Sébastien Caquard

235

Autoethnography Kathryn Besio

243

Automation Luis F Alvarez Leon

249

Automobilities Gregg Culver

255

Aviation Daniel L Mabazza

265

B Becoming Derek P McCormack

277

Behavioral Geography John R Gold

283

Belonging Sarah Wright

293

Berkeley School Michael Williams

299

Big Data Mark Birkin

303

Big History John Hasse and Robert Flanagan

313

Biodiversity Roderick P Neumann

323

Biodiversity Mapping and Modeling James MR Brock, Riki M Taylor, and George LW Perry

329

Biopolitics Krithika Srinivasan, Rajesh Kasturirangan, and Clemens Driessen

339

Black Geographies Adam Bledsoe, Willie J Wright, and LaToya Eaves

347

Blockchain Ludovico Rella

351

Body Lynda Johnston

359

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Borderland Economies Markku Tykkyläinen

365

Borderlands Doris Wastl-Walter

373

Boundary Work, Art, and Place Soren C Larsen and Melanie Zurba

381

Brain Drain H Jöns and Sophie Cranston

385

Buffer Zone Georges Prévélakis

391

Business Services John R Bryson and Emma C Gardner

397

VOLUME 2 C Capital and Space Key MacFarlane

1

Capital Punishment Alex R Colucci

9

Capitalism Eric Sheppard

15

Capitalism and the Division of Labor Mark Brayshay

23

Carceral Geography Jennifer Turner

43

Care Ethics Elizabeth Olson, Mark Ortiz, and Sertanya Reddy

49

Care, Caregiving, and Caring Mark W Skinner and Rachel V Herron

55

Cartographic Animation Michael P Peterson

61

Cartographic Anxiety Chris Barrett

65

Cartographic Symbolism and Iconography Mark Denil

69

Cartography in Islamic Societies S Brentjes

77

Cartography, Electoral William Durkan, Adrian Kavanagh, and Caoilfhionn D’Arcy

89

Case Studies Liz Taylor

95

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Cellular Automata Yan Liu, Jonathan Corcoran, and Yongjiu Feng

101

Census Geography Wardlow Friesen

105

Census Mapping David Martin

113

Central Business District Gareth Rice

119

Central Place Theory Jacek Malczewski

127

Chaos and Complexity Graham Chapman and Michael Batty

133

Chicago School David Sibley and Audrey Kobayashi

143

Child Labor Samantha Punch

149

Children, Maps, and Mapping Christina R Ergler and Claire Freeman

155

Children/Childhood Sneha Krishnan

167

Chinese Medicine, Traditional Ping Zou

173

Choice Modeling Jean-Claude Thill

181

Chronic Disease E Shantz and Susan J Elliott

187

Circular Economy Pauline Deutz

193

Cities, Imperial Anthony D King

203

Citizen Science Victoria Fast and Billy Tusker Haworth

209

Citizenship Vera Chouinard

215

Citizenship and Governmentality Michael Woods and Lynda Cheshire

223

Citizenship Concepts Elaine LE Ho and Richard Yarwood

229

Citizenship, Extraterritorial Michael Collyer

235

City Marketing Eugene McCann

241

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City, Modern John R Gold

247

City–Region Simin Davoudi

255

Climate Change John C Sweeney

267

Climate Change Refugees W Andrew Baldwin

275

Climate Change; Adaptation David C Eisenhauer

281

Climatology, Cultural Jennifer Salmond and Marc Tadaki

293

Coastal and Marine Management and Planning David M Lawrence

297

Code/Space James Cheshire

303

Cold War Timothy W Luke

309

Colonialism Amber Murrey

315

Colonialism, Internal Raju J Das

327

Communist and Postcommunist Geographies Judit Timár

335

Community Ivan J Townshend, Aimee Benoit, and Wayne KD Davies

343

Complementary and Alternative Medicine GJ Andrews

351

Computational Human Geography Helen Couclelis

357

Concentrated Deconcentration Bart Lambregts

365

Conservation and Ecology M Jay and M Morad

375

Consumption Deborah Leslie

383

Content Analysis Jamie Baxter

391

Core–Periphery Models B Ramírez

397

Corporate Responsibilities David Littlewood

403

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Corridor and Axis Development L Albrechts and T Tasan-Kok

411

Cosmopolitanism Barney Warf

419

Countermapping Liz Mason-Deese

423

Counterurbanization Clare JA Mitchell and Christopher R Bryant

433

VOLUME 3 Creativity Peter Lindner

1

Crime Geography George Owusu and Louis Kusi Frimpong

5

Crime Mapping Brian Jefferson

11

Critical Agrarian Studies China Sajadian

17

Critical Cartography Denis Wood, John Krygier, Jim E Thatcher, and Craig Dalton

25

Critical Geographic Information System Mahmoudi Dillon

31

Critical Geographies Federico Ferretti

37

Critical Geopolitics Joanne Sharp

45

Critical Physical Geography Marc Tadaki

51

Critical Rationalism David Bennett

55

Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies Kevin R Cox

65

Critical Theory and Human Geography Martin Phillips

69

Cross-Cultural Research Tracey Skelton

83

Cultural Capital Johanna L Waters

91

Cultural Economy Andy C Pratt

95

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Cultural Geography Chris Gibson and G Waitt

99

Cultural Politics Benedikt Korf

111

Cultural Turn Sophia Maalsen and Jessica McLean

117

Culture Kathleen J Mee

123

Cumulative Causation William A Jackson

131

Cyber Security Nathaniel O’Grady and Andrew C Dwyer

135

Cyberspace and Cyberculture Denise M Carter

143

D Darwinism and Social Darwinism Heather Winlow

149

Data Analysis, Categorical Suzanne Davies Withers

159

Deathscapes Avril Maddrell

167

Debt David Simon

173

Decolonization Sarah Hunt and Sarah de Leeuw

181

Deconstruction Clive Barnett

187

Defensible Space Elanor Warwick

195

Deforestation Warren E Mabee

203

Deindustrialization Andy Pike

213

Delocalization Athanasios Kalogeresis and Lois Labrianidis

223

Democracy Clive Barnett and Murray Low

233

Demography Philip Rees

239

Desertification Audrey Kobayashi

257

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Development Katie Willis and M Satish Kumar

263

Development, Regional, Port–Industrial Complexes and Michael Dunford and Godfrey Yeung

271

Developmentalism Philosophy Michael J Watts

281

Dialectical Reasoning and Dialectical Materialism Erik Swyngedouw

289

Diaries, Handwritten, Online, Audio, or Video Paula Meth

295

Diasporas Elizabeth Mavroudi

301

Difference and the Politics of Difference Patricia Noxolo

307

Diffusion Emrah Karakaya and Pranpreya Sriwannawit Lundberg

311

Digital and Platform Economies Lizzie Richardson

317

Digital Curation Bradley Wade Bishop and Carolyn Hank

323

Digital Feminism Daniel Cockayne and Lizzie Richardson

329

Digital Geographies Jim E Thatcher, Ryan Burns, and Tracey P Lauriault

335

Digital Geohumanities Charles Travis

341

Digital Inequalities Tim Unwin

347

Disability Robert Wilton and Joshua Evans

357

Disasters Jake Rom D Cadag

363

Discourse Tim Cresswell

373

Discourse Analysis Melissa NP Johnson and Ethan McLean

377

Disease Diffusion and Mapping Chetan Tiwari and Saratchandra Indrakanti

385

Diseases, Emerging and Infectious Roger Antabe and Bianca Rosa Ziegler

389

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Distance Dragos Simandan

393

Dwelling Owain Jones

399

VOLUME 4 E e-Business and e-Commerce Bruno Moriset

1

Ecological Fallacy D Sui

11

Ecology Phil McManus

15

Economic Geography Richard Florida and Patrick Adler

25

Economic Geography, Relational NM Rantisi and JS Boggs

29

Economics and Human Geography James R Faulconbridge and Sarah Hall

35

Economy, Informal Sarah Turner

41

Ecosystem Services Pamela McElwee and Elizabeth Shapiro-Garza

45

Ecotourism David A Fennell

51

Edge Cities NA Phelps

57

Edge Effects Ikuho Yamada

61

Education Nicolas Lewis

69

Education, Internationalization of Johanna L Waters

77

Embeddedness Martin Hess

85

Emigration Brenda SA Yeoh, Charmian Goh, and Kellynn Wee

91

Emotional Geographies Mark Lucherini and Gentry Hanks

97

Empire Marcus Power

105

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Empowerment Regina Scheyvens

115

Energy Neil Simcock

123

Enlightenment Geography Charles WJ Withers

137

Environment Sally Eden

151

Environment and Migration Etienne Piguet

163

Environment, Historical Geography of Carl Griffin

169

Environmental Determinism William B Meyer

175

Environmental Geography Karl S Zimmerer and Kendra McSweeney

183

Environmental Geopolitics Shannon O’Lear

193

Environmental Governance Carolyn NM DeLoyde and Warren E Mabee

201

Environmental Hazards RR Hagelman, III, BE Montz, and GA Tobin

207

Environmental Health Susan J Elliott and C Thompson

213

Environmental Justice Gordon Walker

221

Environmental Policy Chris Cocklin and Katie Moon

227

Environmental Racism Leith Deacon

235

Environmental Regulation Phil McManus

241

Environmental Security Jon Barnett

247

Environmental Studies and Human Geography Chris Sneddon

253

Environmentalism Anna R Davies

259

Epidemiological Transition K McCracken and DR Phillips

265

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Epistemology Pauline R Couper

275

Equity Janine Wiles and Audrey Kobayashi

285

Error Propagation and Modeling Sucharita Gopal

291

Ethical Issues in Research JJ Zhang

299

Ethnic Conflict Carolyn Gallaher

303

Ethnic Economy Lucia Lo

307

Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of David P Nally

315

Ethnography Aoife Kavanagh and Karen E Till

321

Ethnomethodology/Ethnomethodological Geography E Laurier and S Bodden

329

Evolutionary Algorithms Ningchuan Xiao

335

Existentialism/Existential Geography David Seamon and Jacob Sowers

341

Experimental Design Sophie Webber and Carolyn Prouse

347

Exploration Stephen A Royle

351

Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis Sandy Dall’erba and Zhangliang Chen

357

Export Processing Zones Fulong Wu

367

Extended Metropolitan Region Victor FS Sit

373

Extensive/Intensive Methods Karen Falconer Al-Hindi

381

VOLUME 5 F Factor Analysis and Principal-Components Analysis Fahui Wang

1

Fair Trade Laura T Raynolds

9

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Famine PJ Atkins

15

Feminism and Work Jane Pollard

21

Feminism, Geographic Information System, and Mapping Marianna Pavlovskaya

29

Feminism/Feminist Geography Sydney Calkin and Cordelia Freeman

35

Feminist Economic Geography Kendra Strauss

43

Feminist Geography, Prehistory of Sophie Bowlby and Jacqueline Tivers

47

Feminist Methodologies Deborah Thien and Shea Ellen Gilliam

53

Feminist Political Economy RB Sarma

61

Fertility Katharine McKinnon

67

Festival and Spectacle Michelle Duffy

73

Feudalism and Feudal Society Simon Chilvers

83

Field Systems and Enclosure Carlo Inverardi-Ferri

91

Fieldwork Katie Hemsworth

97

Film and Cinema Chris Lukinbeal

107

Finance, Historical Geographies of Martin Purvis

113

Financial Centers, International David R Meyer

121

Financial Knowledge Gordon L Clark

131

Financial Risks and Management Ekaterina Svetlova and Karl-Heinz Thielmann

139

First World Katie Willis

147

Flâneur Alan Latham

153

Fluidity and Fixity John Paul Jones, III

159

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Focus Groups Anna J Secor

165

Food Networks Pamela Richardson-Ngwenya and Sarah J Whatmore

167

Food Networks, Alternative D Goodman and MK Goodman

175

Food Regimes B Pritchard

187

Food Security and Food Sovereignty Tony Weis

191

Foodscapes Christiana Miewald

197

Fordism Ray Hudson

203

Fordism, Postfordism, and Flexible Specialization John Lovering

209

Foreign Direct Investment Alexey V Kuznetsov

219

Fractal Analysis Nina SN Lam

229

Functionalism Jose Esteban Castro

239

Fuzzy Set and Fuzzy Logic Yee Leung

247

G Gardening and Gardens David Crouch

253

Gated Communities Rowland Atkinson and Sarah Blandy

259

Gay Geographies Nathaniel M Lewis

265

Gender and Health Janine L Wiles

269

Gender and Rurality Jo Little

275

Gender and the City Linda J Peake

281

Gender, Historical Geographies of Linda Price

293

Genealogy and Family History Samuel M Otterstrom

299

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Generalization William A Mackaness

305

Genetics Jairus Rossi

319

Genocide Stian Rice

327

Gentrification Dustin W Gray and Elvin K Wyly

335

VOLUME 6 Geodemographics Alex Singleton

1

Geodesign Kelleann Foster

7

Geodesy John Hessler

19

Geodesy Geographical Masking Spatial Data Infrastructure Ronan Foley

23

Geographic Information Science and Systems PA Longley and Michael Frank Goodchild

29

Geographic Information Systems and Cartography Michael Frank Goodchild

37

Geographic Information Systems, History of Nicholas R Chrisman

43

Geographic Information Systems, Overlay in Ola Ahlqvist

49

Geographic Information Systems; Ethics Jonathan Cinnamon

57

Geographic Information Systems; Public Participation Sarah Elwood

63

Geographical Masking Gerard Rushton

69

Geographically-Weighted Regression Antonio Páez and David C Wheeler

75

Geographies of the Night Robert Shaw

83

Geohistory P Claval

89

Geohumanities Harriet Hawkins

95

Geolocation Agnieszka Leszczynski

101

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Geopoetics Eric Magrane

107

Georeferencing and Geocoding Xiaobai A Yao

111

Geosimulation and Urban Modeling Michael Batty

119

Geospatial Intelligence Keith C Clarke

127

Geospatial Web, Participatory Jon Corbett and Logan Cochrane

131

Geotag Ate Poorthuis

137

Geovisualization Menno-Jan Kraak

141

Gerrymandering Richard Morrill and Gerald R Webster

153

Ghettos Tom Slater

161

Global Commodity Chains Christof Parnreiter and Christin Bernhold

169

Global Food Security David Fazzino

177

Global North/South Rory Horner and Pádraig Carmody

181

Global Positioning/GPS Jiyeong Lee

189

Global Production Networks Neil M Coe

199

Global Urbanism Sally Lloyd-Evans and Nathan Salvidge

207

Globalization and Health Ted Schrecker

217

Globalization of Communicable Diseases Joseph R Oppong

223

Governance, Corporate Dariusz Wójcik

229

Governance, Good Glyn Williams

235

Governance, Transport Iain Docherty and Jon Shaw

245

Governance, Urban Mike Raco

253

Contents of All Volumes

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Governmentality Jouni Häkli and Derek Ruez

259

Green Economy David Gibbs

267

Green Revolution John Briggs

275

Growth Poles and Growth Centers Ugo Rossi

281

H Habitus Gunhild Setten

287

Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge Dan Jacobson

291

Health and Development Sheena Asthana

297

Health and Environmental Risk Jamie Baxter

303

Health and Place, Political Economy of Clare Bambra

309

Health Geography Graham Moon

315

Health in the Anthropocene: From the Global to the Local Trevor Hancock

323

Health Inequalities Nathaniel M Lewis

329

Health Services and Service Restructuring Denise S Cloutier and Daniel Brendle-Moczuk

335

Healthcare Accessibility John S Humphreys and Karly B Smith

347

Hegemony Myriam Houssay-Holzschuch

357

Heritage and Culture Roy Jones, Tod Jones, and Shaphan Cox

363

Heritage and Economy Rudi Hartmann

369

Heritage and Identity LC Pace and JD Bohland

373

Heritage Diplomacy Andrew G McClelland

381

Heteronormativity David Bell

387

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VOLUME 7 High-Tech Industry Yu Zhou

1

Hinterland Development Judit Timár and Zoltán Kovács

5

Historical Geography, Evolution of Peter R Martin

15

Historical Geography, Rural Patrick J Duffy

21

Historical–Geographical Materialism Scott Kirsch

31

History of Geography Michiel van Meeteren and James D Sidaway

37

HIV/AIDS in Developed Countries Matthew Sothern

45

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries Roger Antabe and Paul Mkandawire

49

Home Tiina Peil

53

Homelessness Priya Kissoon

59

Housing Alistair Sisson and Dallas Rogers

69

Housing and Health Jim Dunn

75

Housing Policy in Developing Countries Godwin Arku

79

Hub Network Location Morton E O’Kelly

83

Human Geography Chris Gibson

89

Human Trafficking Louise Waite

101

Humanism and Humanistic Geography JM Smith

109

Humanitarian Mapping Jonathan Cinnamon

121

Hybridity and the Cyborg Sophie A Lewis

129

Hypothesis Testing Roy Haines-Young and Robert Fish

137

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I Idealism Leonard Guelke

145

Identity Politics Audrey Kobayashi

151

Ideology Kenneth R Olwig and Tom Mels

157

Immigration Johanna L Waters

169

Imperialistic Geographies Gordon M Winder

179

Indigeneity Michelle Daigle

191

Indigenous Geographies Richard Howitt

199

Indigenous Health Chantelle Richmond and Kathi Wilson

205

Indigenous Knowledge Jayalaxshmi Mistry, Deirdre Jafferally, Lisa Ingwall-King, and Sean Mendonca

211

Indigenous Mapping Jon Corbett, Jeff Hackett, Rachel Olsen, and Steve DeRoy

217

Industrial City Richard Harris

223

Industrial Districts Filippo Celata and Ugo Rossi

231

Industrial Organization Jerry Patchell

237

Industrial Parks Susan M Walcott

243

Industrial Restructuring Ray Hudson

249

Industrialization Dragos Simandan

255

Industry, Historical Geographies of R Lewis

261

Inequality Sin Yee Koh

269

Informal Sector Adrian Guillermo Aguilar and Flor M López Guerrero

279

Informal Settlements Katie Willis

289

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Informalization David Jordhus-Lier

297

Information Graphics Amy L Griffin

303

Informational City Jonathan Rutherford

315

Innovation Rolf Sternberg

321

Innovative Pedagogies Jennifer Hill and Derek France

331

Input–Output Analysis Geoffrey JD Hewings and Michael Sonis

341

Institutionalism/Institutional Geographies Danny Mackinnon

349

Interdisciplinarity Pauliina Raento

357

Intermediate Technology Michael Parnwell

365

International Medical Travel or Medical Tourism Meghann Ormond

373

International Organizations J Richard Peet

379

Internet Geographies Graham Pickren

389

Intersectionality Menusha De Silva

397

Interviews: In-Depth, Semistructured Leigh Barrick

403

Intimate Geographies Ebru Ustundag

409

Investment Promotion Torfinn Harding and Marius Monsrud

413

Irredentism George W White and Bruce V Millett

419

VOLUME 8 K Knowing, Emotional Jon Anderson

1

Knowledge and Education RA Butlin

7

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Knowledge Communities Brian J Hracs and Steven Pinch

17

Knowledge Economy Brita Hermelin

23

Knowledge Exchange Deborah Peel

29

Knowledge Intensive Business Services Peter Wood

37

Kriging and Variogram Models Catherine A Calder and Noel Cressie

45

L Labor Control Regime Andrew EG Jonas

53

Labor Geography Tod D Rutherford

59

Labor Market Pádraig Carmody

65

Labor Unionism Andrew Herod

71

Lamarckianism Heather Winlow

77

Land Change Science/Land System Science BL Turner, II and Darla K Munroe

87

Land Rent Theory J Jäger

93

Land Rights Richard Howitt

99

Landscape Jessica Dubow

105

Landscape Iconography Steven Hoelscher

113

Landscape Perceptions KM Morin

121

Landscapes of Fear Simone Tulumello

127

Language Rhys Jones

131

Language and Research Malene Monka and Astrid Ravn Skovse

139

Legal Geographies Brandon Barclay Derman

145

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Leisure Juliana Mansvelt

151

Lesbian Geographies Kath Browne, Catherine J Nash, and Eduarda Ferreira

159

Liberalism Emily Gilbert

165

Life Course Approaches Thomas Wimark

179

Literature Marc Brosseau

185

Livelihoods Francis Owusu

193

Local Economic Development Gioacchino Garofoli

199

Local Economic Development, Politics of Kevin R Cox

207

Local–Global Michael Haldrup

213

Locality Debates Philip Cooke

223

Location Analysis Mark W Horner

229

Location Theory Alan T Murray

237

Longitudinal Methods; Cohort Analysis, Life Tables SD Withers

245

M Malls/Retail Parks Gareth Rice

253

Map Interactivity Michael P Peterson

259

Map Libraries and Archives Marcy Bidney

263

Map Perception and Cognition Scott M Freundschuh

267

Mapping, Color Amy L Griffin and Gita Pupedis

273

Mapping, Open Source Peter A Johnson

285

Mapping, Performative Chris Perkins

291

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Mapping, Philosophy Chris Perkins

297

Mapping, Race and Ethnicity Heather Winlow

309

Mapping, Topographic Peter Collier

323

Mapping, Web BJ Köbben and Menno-Jan Kraak

333

Maps Denis Wood and John Krygier

339

Maps and Governance Francis Harvey

347

Maps and Mapping, History of C Delano-Smith, Roger JP Kain, and K Parker

353

Maps and Protest Martine Drozdz

367

Maps and the State Matthew Farish and Timothy Barney

379

Maps, Mental Scott Bell

391

Maritime Geographies Constantinos Antonopoulos

397

Markov Chain Analysis W Li and C Zhang

407

Marxist Geography Andrew Cumbers and Neil Gray

413

Masculinism AL Bain and C Arun-Pina

425

Masculinities B van Hoven, RP Huizinga, and P Hopkins

433

Material Adeline Tay

439

Material Culture Sara Beth Keough

445

Materiality; New Materialism Peter J Forman

449

VOLUME 9 Media David B Clarke

1

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Medical Geography R Earickson

11

Medieval Historical Geographies Rhys Jones

23

Megacities Y-M Yeung, Jianfa Shen, and Gordon Kee

31

Memorials and Monuments Derek H Alderman, Jordan P Brasher, and Owen J Dwyer, III

39

Memory Mark Alan Rhodes, II

49

Mental Health and Geography Christopher J Smith

53

Mess May Farrales

61

Metropole d’Equilibre Hugh Clout

65

Migrant Workers C Cindy Fan

73

Migration Caroline Nagel and Paul Boyle

81

Migration and Development Ronald Skeldon and Tanja Bastia

89

Migration and Health Jo Vearey

95

Migration Industry Joris Schapendonk and Sophie Cranston

99

Migration, Forced Marta Bivand Erdal

105

Migration, Historical Geographies of William Jenkins

111

Military Geographies Rachel Woodward

119

Mixed and Multiple Methods John H McKendrick

125

Mobile Mapping Sam Hind

133

Mobility Peter Merriman

141

Mobility, History of Everyday Colin G Pooley

149

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Modernity Denis Linehan

155

Modernization Theory Robert N Gwynne

163

Modifiable Areal Unit Problem Michael Buzzelli

169

Monte Carlo Simulation Samuel J Ratick and Guido Schwarz

175

Moral Economies AA Naseemullah

187

Moral Landscapes Gunhild Setten

193

Mortality Frances Darlington-Pollock and Matthew Wallace

199

Multicultural Cities Junjia Ye

205

Multiculturalism John Clayton

211

N Nation Jan Penrose

221

National Parks Gary Bosworth and Nigel Curry

229

Nationalism David H Kaplan

239

Nationalism, Methodological Natalie Koch

245

Natural Resources Gavin Bridge and Ryan Wyeth

249

Natural Resources, Political Economy of Liam Campling and Elena Baglioni

259

Naturalistic Inquiry Dan Jacobson

267

Nature Neil Argent

273

Nature and Gender Padini Nirmal

285

Nature, Historical Geographies of Peter Holland and Alex Wearing

295

Nature, History of Minna Tanskanen

301

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Nature, Performing Simone Fullagar

305

Nature, Social Neil Argent

309

Nature–Culture Juanita Sundberg, Jessica Dempsey, and Fernanda Rojas Marchini

315

Neighborhood and Health Nancy A Ross

325

Neighborhood Change Judith Kenny and Parama Roy

329

Neighborhood Effects Sang-Il Lee

335

Neighborhoods and Community Ole Jensen

341

Neocolonialism Michael J Watts

347

Neoliberalism Julie MacLeavy

353

Neoliberalism, Urban Wendy Larner and Heather McLean

359

Neoliberalism, Urban in the Global South Verónica Crossa

365

Networks Gernot Grabher

373

Networks, Neural Irene Casas

381

Networks, Urban Nick Clarke

387

New Municipalism Ismael Blanco and Ricard Gomà

393

New Regionalism Martin Jones

399

NIMBY Phil Hubbard

403

Noise and Health Tor H Oiamo and Gunn Marit Aasvang

409

Nonlinear Dynamic Spatial Systems David O’Sullivan

415

Non-Representational Theory Nina Williams

421

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VOLUME 10 O Oceans Philip E Steinberg

1

Oral History Mark Boyle

7

Organizations, Nongovernmental Saraswati Raju

13

Orientalism L Koefoed and Michael Haldrup

19

Other/Otherness Jean-François Staszak

25

P Parenting, Motherhood, and Fatherhood Johanna Lilius

33

Participant Observation Katie Walsh

39

Patriarchy Catherine J Nash

43

Peasant Agriculture JD van der Ploeg

49

People’s Geography Samuel Strong

55

Performance, Research as Heather McLean

61

Performativity Suncana Laketa

65

Peri-urbanization, Global South Aparna Phadke

71

Phenomenology and Phenomenological Geography Paul Simpson and James Ash

79

Philosophy and Human Geography Stuart Elden

85

Photogrammetry and Aerial Photography Peter Collier

91

Photographs/Photography Rickie Sanders

99

Photovoice Vanessa Sloan Morgan, Becki Nookemis, and Heather Castleden

103

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Physical Geography, Human Geography, and Geographies in the Anthropocene Jasper Knight and Stephan Harrison

113

Place Tim Cresswell

117

Place and Health Vincent Kuuire and Ebenezer Dassah

125

Place Names VR Savage

129

Place, Politics of Sophie Bond

139

Placemaking Donagh Horgan

145

Planetary Health Colin D Butler

153

Planetary Urbanization Juan Miguel Kanai

159

Plant Geographies Jennifer Atchison and Catherine Phillips

163

Point Pattern Analysis Eric M Delmelle and Michael R Desjardins

171

Policing Brian Jefferson

181

Policy Mobility Russell Prince

185

Political Borders Anssi Paasi

191

Political Geography David Storey

199

Political Representation Benjamin Forest

207

Polycentricity Peter Hall

213

Polyvocality Saraswati Raju

219

Popular Culture Klaus Dodds and Lisa Funnell

223

Population and Development Marco Bontje

229

Population Geography Keith Halfacree and Holly Barcus

235

Population Growth Tom Wilson

249

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lxxxi

Positivism/Positivist Geography David Bennett

255

Possibilism Vincent Berdoulay

271

Postcolonial Cities David W Hugill

279

Postcolonial Geographies Ranu Basu

283

Postcolonialism Luna Vives and Nalini Mohabir

289

Postdevelopment Jan Nederveen Pieterse

297

Post-Marxist Geographies Andrew Jones

303

Postmodern City Stacy Warren

315

Postmodern Turn in Geography Claudio Minca

323

Post-Phenomenology/Post-Phenomenological Geography Jennifer Lea

333

Postpolitics and Post-Truth Cian O’Callaghan

339

Postproductivist and Multifunctional Agriculture Neil Argent

347

Postsecularism Frank Meyer and Judith Miggelbrink

353

Postsocialist Cities Ludek Sýkora

357

Poststructural Political Economy Nicolas Lewis and Richard Le Heron

365

Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies Keith Woodward, Deborah P Dixon, and John Paul Jones, III

375

Post-Suburbia Eric Charmes

387

Poverty Francis L Collins

393

VOLUME 11 Pragmatism Susan J Smith

1

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Precarious Work Nancy Worth

5

Pregnancy and Childbirth Elizabeth Chacko

11

Privatization Phillip O’Neill

19

Privilege Hayley Sparks

25

Probabilism Robin Flowerdew

29

Probability Models Jed Long, Alan Marshall and Zhiqiang Feng

33

Projections Fritz Connor Kessler

41

Psychoanalysis Lucas Pohl

61

Psychogeography Denis Wood

65

Psychotherapy/Psychotherapeutic Geographies David Conradson

69

Public Geographies Betsy Donald, Christina Frendo, and Basil Southey

75

Public Geographies, Enacting Ian Cook and Jen Bagelman

79

Public Goods Kevin R Cox

87

Public Policy and Geography Mark Boyle, Tim Hall, Shaun Lin, James D Sidaway and Michiel van Meeteren

93

Public Spaces, Urban Damian Collins and Sophie L Stadler

103

Public Transport John Preston

113

Public–Private Divide Therese Kenna

121

Publishing in Geography Barney Warf

127

Q Q Method Analysis Paul Robbins

137

Qualitative Geographic Information Systems Meghan Cope and Jin-Kyu Jung

143

Contents of All Volumes

lxxxiii

Qualitative Spatial Reasoning Roland Billen and Nico Van de Weghe

149

Quantitative Economic Geography Eric Sheppard and Paul Plummer

157

Quantitative Methodologies Michael Frank Goodchild

163

Quantitative Revolution Trevor J Barnes

169

Questionnaire Survey Valerie Preston

175

R Race/Ethnicity Jamie Winders

183

Racism and Antiracism Anoop Nayak

191

Radical Geography J Richard Peet

197

Rational Choice Theory and Rational Choice Marxism Gary Bridge

207

Redlining Manuel B Aalbers

213

Refugees and Asylum Seekers Daniel K Thompson

221

Region John Tomaney

229

Regional Competition, Regional Dumping Iva Maria Miranda Pires

243

Regional Connectivity Martin Sokol

253

Regional Development and Noneconomic Factors Iwan J Azis

269

Regional Development and Technology Jeremy RL Howells

275

Regional Development Models Sayani Mukhopadhyay

281

Regional Development Theory P Nijkamp and M Abreu

297

Regional Development, Endogenous F Tödtling

303

Regional Geography Anssi Paasi

309

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Regional Inequalities Michael Dunford

321

Regional Planning and Development Theories Edward W Soja

331

Regional Production Networks David W Edgington

343

Regional Resilience Robert Hassink and Huiwen Gong

351

Regional Science Eric Vaz

357

Regional Uneven Development Ray Hudson

363

Regionalism John Tomaney

369

Regression: Linear and Nonlinear Jamie Pearce

373

Regulation Gordon MacLeod and Adam Holden

381

Relationality Martin Jones

387

Reliability and Validity Carmen Köhler and Johannes Hartig

393

Religion Orlando Woods

397

Remittances Ben Page

403

Remote Sensing Jane M Read, Chad Chambers, and Marla Torrado

411

Representation and Re-presentation Audrey Kobayashi

423

RepresentationdMapping Jeremy Mennis

427

Reproductive Rights Carolin Schurr and Elisabeth Militz

435

Residential Mobility Rory Coulter and Michael Thomas

443

Resilience M Jean Blair and Warren E Mabee

451

Resistance Sarah M Hughes

457

Resource and Environmental Economics Karyn Morrissey

463

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lxxxv

Resource Industries Roger Hayter and Jerry Patchell

467

Retail Geographies Neil Wrigley

479

VOLUME 12 River Basin Development Coleen A Fox

1

Rural Communities Katherine Anne MacTavish

9

Rural Development David Storey

15

Rural Geography Michael Woods

23

Rural Housing Menelaos Gkartzios, Mark Scott, and Nick Gallent

35

Rural Identity and Otherness J Agyeman and S Neal

43

Rural Populations Keith Halfacree

49

Rural Transport Ankit Kumar Yadav and Nagendra R Velaga

59

S Sampling Lucia Lo

67

Scale Nathan F Sayre and Alan V Di Vittorio

79

Scale, Analytical Thomas W Crawford

89

Scaling, Multidimensional William M Bowen and Samuel Owusu-Agyemang

97

Science and Scientism, Cartography David Turnbull

103

Scientific Method Robin Flowerdew

109

Second World Jonathan Oldfield

113

Segregation Rowland Atkinson and Jennifer McGarrigle

119

Segregation Indices David WS Wong

125

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Selection Bias Thomas J Cooke

133

Self–Other Joni T Vainikka

137

Semiotics Ken E Foote and Maoz Azaryahu

141

Sense of Place Jingfu Chen

147

Sensory Mapping Kate McLean

153

Sentiment Analysis Eva Hauthal, Dirk Burghardt, Carolyn Fish, and Amy L Griffin

169

Services, Rural Neil Hanlon and Mark W Skinner

179

Sexuality and Queer Geographies Kath Browne and Andrew McCartan

185

Sharing Economy Anna R Davies

195

Shift–Share Analysis Randall W Jackson and Kingsley E Haynes

199

Simulation Modeling Steven M Manson

207

Situated Knowledge, Reflexivity Audrey Kobayashi

213

Situationism/Situationist City David Pinder

219

Social Capital Neil Hanlon

227

Social Class Julie MacLeavy

233

Social Economy and Social Enterprise Matthew Thompson

239

Social Geography Elaine Stratford

249

Social Movements Maano Ramutsindela

257

Social Studies of Scientific Knowledge Liam Heaphy

263

Socialism and Communism Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro

271

Society–Space Susan Ruddick

281

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Soft Power Carl Marklund

291

Soundscapes Daithí Kearney

297

Sovereignty Matthew D Balentine and Corey Johnson

305

Space Stuart Elden

315

Space and Spatiality Rob Kitchin

321

Spaces/Spatialities of Exception Richard Carter-White and Claudio Minca

329

Space–Time Jay D Gatrell and Eric W LaFary

335

Space–Time Modeling 2: Geographic Information System Science Approaches May Yuan

345

Spatial Autocorrelation Daniel A Griffith

355

Spatial Clustering, Detection and Analysis of Alan T Murray

367

Spatial Data Models Ling Bian

375

Spatial Databases Adam C Winstanley and Peter Mooney

383

Spatial Division of Labor Adrian Smith

387

Spatial Expansion Method Emilio Casetti

395

Spatial Filtering/Kernel Density Estimation Gerard Rushton and Chetan Tiwari

399

Spatial Interaction Models Morton E O’Kelly

405

Spatial Interpolation Nina SN Lam

409

Spatial Ontologies Nadine Schuurman

419

Spatial Science Ron Johnston

425

Spatially Autoregressive Models Daniel A Griffith

443

Sport Gavin J Andrews

451

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VOLUME 13 State Martin Jones

1

State Theory Bob Jessop

7

Statistics, Descriptive Jay Lee

13

Statistics, Inferential Darren M Scott

21

Statistics, Overview Guy M Robinson

29

Statistics, Spatial David J Unwin

49

Street Naming and Power Reuben Rose-Redwood and Sun-Bae Kim

55

Structural Adjustment Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura

61

Structural Equation Models Patricia L Mokhtarian and David T Ory

71

Structural Marxism Andrew Kent

79

Structuralism RG Smith

89

Structuration Theory Md Azmeary Ferdoush

97

Studentification Takashi Nakazawa

105

Subalternity Srilata Sircar

111

Subjectivity Joanne Sharp

117

Suburbanization Alan Mace

121

Super Rich Sin Yee Koh

127

Superpower Takashi Yamazaki and John O’Loughlin

133

Surrealism David Pinder

139

Surveillance Matthew Henry

147

Contents of All Volumes

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Surveying Urbano Fra Paleo

153

Sustainability Warren E Mabee, M Jean Blair, Jordan T Carlson, and Carolyn NM DeLoyde

157

Sustainability Transitions Jordan Carlson and Warren E Mabee

165

Sustainability, Urban M Whitehead

169

Symbolic Interactionism Vincent J Del Casino, Jr. and Deborah Thien

177

Systems Thinking, Approach Frederick Ato Armah

183

T Technological Change Glen Norcliffe

187

Technology and Regional Development Jun Zhang

193

Technology Industries Martin Henning and Claes G Alvstam

199

Telecommunications Barney Warf

207

Territorial Production Complexes Bolesław Doma nski

213

Territory and Territoriality David Delaney

219

Terrorism D Mustafa and J McCarthy

233

Text and Textual Analysis Jamie Baxter

239

Therapeutic Landscapes Ronan Foley

245

Thiessen Polygon Lan Mu

251

Third Space Richard Bustin and Janet Speake

259

Time and Historical Geography Matthew Kurtz

265

Time Geographic Analysis Martin Dijst

271

Time Geography Martin Gren

283

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Time Series Analysis Guy M Robinson

291

Time–Space Diaries Kajsa Ellegård

301

Tourism T Edensor

313

Towns, New K Kafkoula

325

Trade Blocs Aleid E Brouwer and Tristan Kohl

335

Trade, International Richard Grant and Lillian Yaffe

341

Trade, Transport, and Communications, Historical Geographies of PJ Hugill

351

Transcribing, Coding, and Analyzing Qualitative Data Meghan Cope

357

Transitional Economies John Round

363

Transitional Justice Rachel Hughes

369

Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries Evaristus Oshionebo

375

Transnational Elites Andrew Greenhalgh-Cook

381

Transnational Ethnic Networks HaeRan Shin

389

Transnationalism Evangeline O Katigbak

395

Transnationalism and Labor Geography PF Kelly

401

Transport and Accessibility Javier Gutiérrez and Juan Carlos García-Palomares

407

Transport and Deregulation Peter White and Frances Kremarik

415

Transport and Globalization Kevin O’Connor and Kurt Fuellhart

421

Transport and Social Exclusion Julian Hine and Md Kamruzzaman

429

Transport and Sustainability David Bonilla and Ricardo Carreon Sosa

435

Transport Geography Richard D Knowles

447

Contents of All Volumes

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Transport, Urban Becky PY Loo

457

Transportation and Land Use Jean-Paul Rodrigue

463

Trend Surface Models David J Unwin

471

Triangulation Andrea J Nightingale

477

VOLUME 14 U Uncertainty Michael Frank Goodchild

1

Underclass Christine Haylett

7

Uneven Development Brett Christophers

13

Urban Age Charity Edwards and Brendan Gleeson

19

Urban Architecture Jane M Jacobs

25

Urban Citizenship Junxi Qian

33

Urban Design Creighton Connolly

39

Urban Ecology Jason A Byrne and Donna Houston

47

Urban Growth Machine Scott Rodgers

59

Urban Health and Systems Thinking Thomas Krafft and Franz W Gatzweiler

65

Urban Morphologies Terry R Slater

69

Urban Order Mark Jayne and David Bell

77

Urban Physical Geography Min Liu

83

Urban Planning Margo Huxley and Andy Inch

87

Urban Policy Allan Cochrane

93

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Urban Regeneration Kate Shaw and Tim Butler

97

Urban Regimes Mickey Lauria, Robert K Whelan, and Heywood Sanders

105

Urban Representation Nate Millington

111

Urban Village Graham Crow

119

Urbanism Gary Bridge

123

Urbanism, Comparative Charlotte Lemanski

131

Urbanism, New Eugene McCann

135

Urbanization GU Chaolin

141

V Venture Capital Colin Mason

155

Violence Simon Springer and Philippe Le Billon

161

Violence and Peace Chih Yuan Woon

167

Visceral Geography Allison Hayes-Conroy and Jessica Hayes-Conroy

171

Visuality Eric Goldfischer

175

Vital Geographies Gerry Kearns

181

Volunteered Geographic Information Britta Ricker

187

Vulnerability Ben Wisner

197

W Walking Methodologies Joseph S Robinson and Andrew G McClelland

207

War V Mamadouh

213

War, Historical Geography of Nuala C Johnson

219

Contents of All Volumes

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Waste Management Matt Watson

225

Water Resources Fiona Allon

233

Water Security Elijah Bisung and Sarah Dickin

241

Waterfront Development Mark Davidson

245

Welfare Geography Adam Whitworth

253

Welfare Reform David Conradson

259

Wellbeing in Place Elizabeth Opiyo Onyango and Joseph Kangmennaang

265

Wetlands and Reclamation Matthew G Hatvany

273

Wildness Charles Warren

281

World/Global Cities Ben Derudder

291

World-System Kees Terlouw

297

Writing Rae Dufty-Jones

309

Y Youth/Youth Cultures Louise Holt

315

Index

319

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PERMISSION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The following material is reproduced with kind permission of Taylor & Francis Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

4 in Memorials and Monuments 5 in Memorials and Monuments 9 in Time Geographic Analysis 12 in Time Geographic Analysis 1 in Therapeutic Landscapes 2 in Internet/Web Mapping 3 in Structuration Theory 3 in Sovereignty 2 in Space Time Modelling 3 in Space Time Modelling 6 in Space Time Modelling 3 in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 4 in Hinterland Development 5 in Hinterland Development 1 in Regional Resilience

www.taylorandfrancisgroup.com The following material is reproduced with kind permission of Oxford University Press Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

1 in 1 in 2 in 5 in 8 in 1 in 3 in 1 in 2 in

Epidemiological Transition Counterurbanization Counterurbanization Time Geographic Analysis Time Geographic Analysis Internet/Web Mapping Media BehavioralGeography Regional Resilience

www.oup.com The following material is reproduced with kind permission of American Association for the Advancement of Science Figure 10 in Epidemiological Transition www.aaas.org

i

A Accessibility Edward Hall, Geography, School of Social Sciences, University of Dundee, Dundee, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Autism spectrum A developmental disability that affects how a person communicates with and relates to other people, and their experience of the world. Ecohome A house that is designed to have a low environmental impact. Mobility impairment Includes many people with physical disabilities, affecting limb function. Neurotypical Term used by some people on the autism spectrum to describe those who are not on the autism spectrum. Nonrepresentational theory A human geography theory that is concerned with embodied and emotional experiences and practices. Reasonable adjustment The requirement for providers to make changes to buildings and services so that people with disabilities are not excluded. Sensory impairment Impairment to sight, hearing, or other senses. Sensory overload Overstimulation of an individual’s senses by noise, lights, etc. from the surrounding environment. Shared space Urban design that removes pavements and other features so as to desegregate different road users. Therapeutic landscape Natural and human-made environments that engender well-being. Universal design Design of environments so they are accessible to as many people as possible.

Accessibility is commonly understood as the ability to move into and through an environment to reach and use services and activities, including those to do with employment, healthcare, leisure, and retail. People with mobility and sensory impairments, including people with disabilities and older people, can experience significant barriers or delays to their ability to access such services and activities. These barriers can take the form of physical obstacles, such as narrow doorways, stairs, uneven surfaces, and inadequate lighting, as well as sociocultural attitudes, assumptions, and discrimination. Accessibility is important because it is widely acknowledged that the ability to move and access has a significant impact on the quality of life of people with disabilities and older people, and more fundamentally, it is recognized as a human right. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) has accessibility as one of its ’guiding principles’. Article 9 of the Convention states that, for people with disabilities to live independently, ’appropriate measures’ must be taken to ensure equal access to the physical environment, transportation, information and communications and facilities and services, including schools, housing, medical facilities and workplaces.

Accessibility in Urban Spaces Persons with a mobility or sensory impairment, and other groups such as parents with young children and older people, commonly face accessibility difficulties in urban and rural environments which are replete with obstacles and barriers to mobility and access. Inaccessible features in environments include steps or narrow entrances into buildings and onto buses and trains; sloped and uneven surfaces; poorly defined curbs and pedestrian crossings; inappropriate lighting and information; absence of suitable toilets; and discriminatory attitudes of staff and the public. Restrictions on people’s opportunities to participate manifest as spatial and social exclusion from sites and activities of the ’mainstream’, which over time result in a form of what Imrie and Kumar call ’design apartheid’. In the 1990s several studies in the emerging subdiscipline of the geographies of disability demonstrated how wheelchair users and people with visual impairments experienced obstacles and barriers as they sought to move through and access urban environments. A project in the city of Coventry, UK, highlighted the physical and social barriers to mobility that impaired individuals face, and how these go unnoticed by the majority population of people without disabilities. An exercise of route-finding across the city for wheelchair users and people without disabilities discovered that the central shopping area was deemed to be accessible (with flat surfaces, pedestrianization, and no curbs or crossings), while the older parts of the city, frequented by tourists, had poor or even zero

International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, 2nd edition, Volume 1

https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10157-X

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Accessibility

accessibility (with cobbles, slopes, steps, and medieval-era buildings). The barriers encountered were such that Vujakovic and Matthews noted the ’personal geographies’ and ’mental maps’ of the city for wheelchair users were quite different to those of people without disabilities. The study also showed how wheelchair users, over time, devised routes through the city which avoided steps and other barriers. Beyond the more obvious barriers such as steps, other design features that created mobility difficulties included ’street furniture’ high curbs, control buttons on pedestrian crossings and ATMs that were out of reach, inaccessible toilets, and pavement and road surface slopes and materials. Another study, by van Hoven and Elzinga, found that people with visual impairments use the same routes across the city, and blocked paths and diversions can cause temporary confusion. The study added that the common absence of appropriate signage, maps and other indicators were also barriers to mobility. Other studies have focused on how public perceptions and negative attitudes toward people with visual impairments are as impactful a constraint on people accessing the city. There have been significant improvements to accessibility in many urban environments in the 2000s and 2010s, as awareness heightened toward physical barriers in the city, and the needs and rights of people with disabilities and others, such as parents with children and older people, were recognized. Legislation and, just as importantly, the pressure of people with disabilities’ organizations have resulted in policy and practice regulations, in city planning and design (including the provision of accessible facilities). The UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995, now incorporated into the Equality Act 2010, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 included requirements to make streets, buildings, and facilities in cities accessible (so-called ’reasonable adjustments’). In many city centers in the UK, Europe, and North America, there are now automatic doors, ramps, and sloped entrances, some lower-level ATMs, accessible toilets, and ’bobble strips’ (tactile curb markings) at pedestrian crossings to assist those with visual impairments; there is also widespread pedestrianization of city centers, with smooth surfaces and absence of curbs. More people with disabilities are now present in city center spaces; however, once outside these central areas, barriers are common. Despite improvements, significant barriers to accessibility remain in cities. A 2017 study by Stephens et al of children with disabilities in Ontario, Canada, demonstrated that despite building and planning regulations to ensure accessibility, many homes, schools, and communities still have barriers that constrain children’s mobility and participation, meaning that many spend more time indoors and less time out and about. The survey, of children with disabilities (10–15 years), found that: (i) many of the children’s homes were not fully accessible, including the absence of handrails and accessible toilets; (ii) most of the schools they attended did not have accessible toilets, heavy doors were common, and they were often not included in exercise classes and playground games; and (iii) while shopping malls and hospitals were mostly accessible, parks (including the toilets there) and the homes of friends and relatives were often not. The everyday multiple barriers that young people with disabilities face, not only means physical and spatial exclusion from areas of the city, but also exclusion from mainstream society, with fewer opportunities to meet and mix with other young people. Less understood, and less studied by geographers, are the barriers to access for people on the autism spectrum in everyday sociospaces. What would be considered ’normal’ sounds, sights, and actions by someone deemed ’neurotypical’ can be difficult, painful, or overwhelming for a person on the autism spectrum, making it problematic to access and use many mainstream environments. In the same way as a high curb or stairs can be a barrier, loud noises and some forms of lighting (especially fluorescent), and touching certain materials, can mean a person on the autism spectrum would be denied access. In addition, a person on the autism spectrum can find it difficult when there are unexpected sensory events or changes which disrupt their movement routines. For many people with disabilities in countries in the Global South, accessibility of the built environment remains poor, despite many countries passing legislation and ratifying the UNCRPD. Owusu-Ansah et al, in a study of Kumasi, Ghana, showed how the central business district is very difficult for mobility impaired people to move around, due to the large volume of people and traffic, pavements full of stalls, and a lack of safe places to cross roads. In addition, there are few ramps and other facilities. Indonesia is another example of how aspirations for a ’barrier-free environment’ have been put into law, but are not realized in planning and development. This disjuncture is not simply due to financial constraints, but more often a result of social and cultural beliefs, and assumptions about the status and place of people with disabilities in everyday life and spaces. Komardjaja notes that in Indonesia, independent living, including presence in public spaces, is seen as unaligned with the country’s ’collectivist values’. New urban developments can present opportunities to design and build accessible infrastructure, including pedestrianization, level access, wide doors, and appropriate signage and information. For example, when there are major sporting events, and in particular ’Paralympic’ or similar games, proactive planning ensures that venues, accommodation, and mobility for athletes with disabilities and supporters are fully accessible for the period of the event. McGillivray et al have argued that the ’legacy’ of such events for ongoing accessibility and mobility of people with disabilities in the cities where the events are held is often emphasized; however, this multicountry study has suggested that while the short-term benefits are significant, improvements to accessibility are not necessarily sustained in the longer-term, as transport and other arrangements return to their earlier state, characterized by inaccessibility.

Transport Accessibility The accessibility of (public) transport is a major factor in shaping the everyday lives, independence of, and opportunities for, people with disabilities and older people. Importantly, the quality of access that people have to transport is related not only to their impairment, but also to other aspects of identity such as gender, age, income, and where they live. Studies have provided evidence of the disabling design and operation of the transport infrastructure, including at stations, on buses, travel information, and the support from staff. Terms such as ’transport-based social exclusion’ have been devised, such as by Taylor and Jozefowicz, to highlight the barriers that many people with disabilities face, and the resulting loss of independence. The study in Poland described how people

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with disabilities made fewer, shorter, journeys than did people without disabilities within the city area (to leisure activities); their behavior was determined in part by their income, activities that people wished to participate in, and where those activities took place (e.g., cultural and sporting events). There is also geographic work on the international movement of disabled people, and the barriers experienced in accessing transport, in particular airplanes and the associated immigration process. Maddern and Stewart showed that the biometric technologies increasingly used in airports, for example, facial recognition and eye scanning, often do not account for differences in the bodies of people with impairments. Notably, another study has identified how immigration systems, as enacted at airports and related sites, are excluded from the legal rights that people have access to in other spaces. The study by Wilton et al used the example of ’medical inadmissibility’ in Canadian immigration law, where disability and the alleged ’excessive burden’ it will put on the healthcare system are cited as reasons to refuse admission.

Housing and Home The design of housing is often such that a person with an impairment can find it very difficult to move around within his or her home and live an independent life. In many countries there is legislation regarding the accessible design of housing. Despite this legislation, the majority of homes are designed with a person without a disability as the assumed user, hence featuring narrow doorways, stairs, work surfaces at a ’standard’ height, bedrooms and bathrooms that are difficult to maneuver within, and toilets which are on a different level (often upstairs) to most other everyday activities. A 2014 survey conducted by a British charity, Leonard Cheshire Disability, reported that 72% of people with a mobility impairment in the UK stated that they lacked an accessible door into their building, 52% said the doors and hallways were not wide enough for a wheelchair, and 54% of those who looked for accessible homes found those difficult to secure. Such design features not only make everyday life challenging for persons with impairment, but also emphasize that their bodies do not ’fit’ with the ’normal’ design of the built environment. For some people with disabilities, poor housing design can mean not being able to see out of windows from a seated wheelchair position. Such difficulties faced by people with disabilities are commonly seen as a problem of the person, rather than the design of the house, with the person expected to adapt, rather than the house builder adapting the design of the house to the user’s needs. Inadequate internal maneuverability is often compounded by poor access in and out of houses (the person with a disability’s own house and those of family and friends), which one study showed had significant impacts on opportunities for everyday social interactions and maintaining friendships. Poor internal (and external) accessibility can also mean that people require others to come into their homes to support them, as they are unable to manage their own needs. Further, visibly adapted accessible entrances can result in stigmatizing by some people in the local community. More people with disabilities are now living independently, compared to 10–20 years ago when institutionalized accommodation was dominant. In addition, care homes and supported housing are now generally better equipped and more accessible for people with disabilities. For most, the shift toward independent living has been a positive change, with more opportunities for choice, control, decision-taking, and social participation. However, there are significant challenges, including the poor accessibility design of current housing stock. A 2018 report from the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission found that many people with disabilities live in homes which are unsuitable for their needs: 1 in 3 in private rental properties, 1 in 5 in public housing, and 1 in 7 in privately owned homes. The report further noted that, as the number of people with disabilities rises, there would be a persistent shortage of accessible homes; only 7% of English houses have basic accessibility features, such as level access and wide doors. The same report provided evidence of how many people with disabilities have significant waits for permission for and installation of adaptations to enhance access in their homes. A study of ’eco-homes’ in England, by Bhakta and Pickerill, showed that even with newly built properties, developed with an awareness of the needs of marginalized communities, inaccessible housing features are reproduced. Legislation to ensure accessible housing, including the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and the Lifetime Homes Standard 2010, were adopted by some of the house builders in the study, and meant that, for example, doorways would be level and wide enough to be accessible for a wheelchair user; however, the study also noted that these positive design and building features were often completed in the context of continuously changing policy, meaning that builders were often unaware of regulations and the needs of people with disabilities. There were also significant costs associated with adaptations. The term ’reasonable provision’ is included in building regulations, which can be variably interpreted by builders, often leading to inadequate accessibility. Examples include the design of small bathrooms or baths (to save water), and showers which do not provide access for a mobility impaired person; door handles that are challenging to use; and windows that are hard to access and open for people with hand strength and flexibility issues. In addition, this study and others emphasized that the focus on access into and within housing has perhaps resulted in less attention being paid to the immediate neighborhood and wider community spaces that people with disabilities wish to access and be mobile within. Housing is both about the internal features of the home and providing a base within a community.

Access to Rural and Natural Environments Accessibility is commonly associated with urban environments, perhaps because it is the human-made aspects of environment which are understood to be disabling. Rural and ’natural’ landscapes are often seen less as a product of human intervention,

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and hence less inherently disablist; however, there are very few, if any, environments which are unshaped by human intervention in some way, hence the disablism present in urban environments is very likely to be also found in rural and natural spaces. Studies have shown that people with disabilities can be deterred from using natural environments because of physical barriers, such as paths, gates, slopes, and poorly designed toilet facilities, as well as due to perceptions of the natural environment as risky, threatening, and even dangerous for some people with disabilities, who can be at greater risk of physical discomfort or injury, getting lost, or requiring support. One study by van Benzon focused on young people with a learning disability and found that their access to nature was only with their schools or other groups, and they were restricted to activities and spaces considered safe and appropriate for their use. In another study, by Horton, of children with learning disabilities in the UK pointed to the importance of children’s access to natural spaces for their physical and mental health, and social reasons (including play). Natural environments have been portrayed in human geography as ’therapeutic landscapes’ for people with disabilities and those with chronic health conditions. Conradson’s study of a respite care center in Dorset, UK, showed that ’natural’ environments have physical, social, and symbolic benefits for people with disabilities. Sites can be made accessible to those with a range of impairments, such as by constructing paths so that people using wheelchairs can explore on their own. Another study, by Macpherson, of people with visual impairments who take walks in the mountainous Lake District, UK, found that working in partnership with a sighted person can allow the visually impaired person greater access to the mountains, and additional benefits such as exploring nonurban and nonfamiliar routes; experiencing positive social interactions; gaining greater physical fitness; and attaining a sense of collective achievement (e.g., climbing to the top of the mountains). While inaccessibility is common in natural/rural spaces, there are powerful benefits to achieving presence in these spaces. The study of ecohomes discussed earlier (in section Housing and Home) also argued that while horticultural sites and activities were seen as an inherent part of the local natural and community environment, they were exclusionary for many. The paths, animal areas, and fruit orchard were all largely inaccessible for one of the residents of the community who used a wheelchair. The community assumed that people with disabilities would not need nor want to go to those spaces since they could not participate in the activities there, including digging and managing livestock. But being unable to fully participate in community activities, which involved physical tasks in inaccessible areas of the community, led some residents with disabilities to feel they were unable to contribute to community life and lacked equal status in the community.

Accessing Healthcare People with disabilities experience poorer health outcomes when they are unable to access healthcare services to the same extent as people without disabilities. In health geography studies, the accessibility of healthcare is determined not only by the location of the service relative to need, but also by availability and quality of the healthcare, and cost of transport. The challenges that people with disabilities face include costs of prescriptions which are not always met by subsidies; limitations to insurance cover in countries without universal healthcare; physical barriers into and within healthcare facilities; and assumptions about or a lack of understanding of the needs of people with disabilities, resulting in discrimination by healthcare professionals (e.g., people with disabilities being treated as a lower priority). Women with disabilities often face additional barriers related to attitudes, lower incomes, and family and caring responsibilities. For example, a study in the United States by Horner-Johnson et al, examined data for attendance at breast and cervical cancer screening by women with a range of impairments. The study found that women with disabilities were less likely to regularly attend screenings, and that this became more significant with higher levels and/or more complex impairments. Alongside disability, a range of factors simultaneously shape healthcare attendance, including levels of education and income, place of residence, and ethnicity. Access to healthcare for people with disabilities, and in particular women with disabilities, is exclusionary, complex, and damaging to health, affecting those who often need healthcare most. In another study, Mason and Scior showed that for people with learning disabilities, a lack of understanding and poor communication by health staff can lead to ’diagnostic overshadowing’ when all health issues are assumed to be linked to impairment. Issues of access to healthcare raise an important theme in broader accessibility debates, i.e., that physical barriers, while significant, are only one factor in determining access. More important are an individual’s social, economic, and cultural circumstances, as well as the system structures, and staff and public attitudes toward disability. The notion that a person with a disability is an ’excessive burden’ to a nation’s health system (see section Transport Accessibility), means that people with disabilities could be either denied access to healthcare or required to have the financial means to pay for what is freely accessed by the majority. Similar barriers are faced by people with disabilities in the Global South. In a study conducted by Ahmad in a rural area of Punjab, Pakistan, the physical barriers of the built environment, including absence of transport, distance to healthcare facilities, how healthcare was provided, and the cost of healthcare, were significant factors deterring people with disabilities from accessing healthcare. Moreover, among the significant number of people with disabilities who are migrants (estimated at 32 million in 2014 by Handicap International and HelpAge International), there is evidence that many of them are being denied access to healthcare.

Access in Changing Provision of Care Many people with disabilities in the UK, and other welfare states in the Global North, are now able to determine their everyday lives, get the support they need, and play more active roles in local communities. There is evidence of the benefits of independent living:

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in a study by Piat et al of people with mental health conditions, a move to independent or supported housing, and fewer restrictions on time/location and movement, meant that people could to move around the city, become physically active, and make connections with others, thus helping their recovery. The study areas (four Canadian cities) all had good quality and low cost public transport systems. Other studies have shown that such increasing access to support, opportunities, and participation has been constrained by widespread austerity and reform of welfare benefits. Fewer people with disabilities are now eligible for personal budgets and welfare benefits, and at the same time, local care and support facilities and services are being closed. In short, access to care and support is becoming increasingly difficult. Such access is commonly denied to people with disabilities who are migrants. People with disabilities in the Global South are also constrained in their access to services in the community. In one study of a Pacific island, by Hopf and McLeod, limits to state finances, and a small population dispersed across a large number of islands, made it hard to build adequate infrastructure to improve accessibility; moreover, flooding and storms damage facilities and transport, while embedded differences between social and cultural groups further constrain equality of access.

Enhancing Accessibility Through Technology Geographers have considered the role of technology in contributing to accessibility. Technology has the potential to facilitate access to places, information, and participation; yet its design is often inherently disablist. A Canadian study by Sierkierska et al describes the development of ’internet-based tactile and audio-tactile mapping’ for people with visual impairments, which are meant to facilitate improved mobility around the city by providing accessible information on locations of sites and routes, including ’GPS-based voice guiding systems’ for navigation. For many people with mental health conditions, D/deaf people, and those on the autism spectrum, virtual space provides opportunities to access information and enhance participation, and to aid the development of (a positive autism) identity. For many people on the autism spectrum, the Internet provides an effective and inclusive medium for communication that goes beyond face-to-face interaction and public spaces, which for some can mean ’sensory overload’ and a dialogue pace that is too rapid. Davidson has argued that the Internet has ’leveling’ qualities that can allow people to both ’pass’ as a person without a disability and to open up access to connections to other people on the autism spectrum. Further, it has been noted that ’real world’ social confidence and interactions are an additional product of online engagement. In one study, evidence from people on the autism spectrum suggested that the Internet might actually be more accessible to people on the autism spectrum because of the way it is designed, and whom it has been designed by, which counters the assumption that technology is inherently disablist. However, for people on the autism spectrum and with mental health conditions, the Internet can also be a challenging, inaccessible, exclusionary, and at times threatening, space, echoing, and amplifying discriminatory experiences in the material world.

Conceptualizing Accessibility Beyond detailing the nature and extent of accessibility, geographers have played a central role in theoretical developments that seek to understand how and why physical and social barriers are so prevalent. Through a small number of studies in the 1970s and 1980s, geographers have mapped and described the location and exclusion of people with disabilities. However, it was the emergence of the social model of disability in the mid-1990s that became the major turning point in understanding accessibility, and related notions of social barriers and exclusion. Prior to this, the medical model had dominated, characterizing the barriers and discrimination that people with disabilities faced as the product of their impairment. The social model, swiftly adopted by a small number of social geographers, turned attention to the physical and social environments within which people lived and, more crucially, to the assumptions and decisions taken when planning and constructing landscapes and systems. The urban (and rural) realm was a landscape of exclusion for many, one that did not take into account the interests and needs of people who were impaired by way of mobility, sensory, or cognitive conditions. The social model was central to the development of the disability political movement in the UK and elsewhere; campaigns to highlight the inaccessibility of transport, buildings (such as shops and workplaces), and public spaces and streetscapes were major features of the disability movement in the 1990s. The seminal text of that period, Michael Oliver’s The politics of disablement (1990), featured on its cover a wheelchair user who was unable to access a polling station. The image emphasized that inaccessibility not only excluded people with disabilities from everyday services and mainstream activities, but also prevented their voices (and needs) from being included in shaping the physical and social realms of society. The social model had a significant influence on policy and practice, most notably the passing of the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995, subsequently incorporated into the Equality Act 2010. Further, the social model perspective has been incorporated into central and local government, and business policy, and ultimately the adoption of the UNCRPD by countries around the world. The social model’s interpretation of accessibility is simple, captured in a quote from one of the key geography journal articles of the time, in relation to visual impairment: “The blind live in a world built by and for the sighted” (Butler, 1994, 368). Others have looked at how architecture and urban planning and design are practiced, and the sociocultural assumptions that underpin the decisions and actions of architects and planners. The term ’disablism’ was coined at this time to refer to assumptions of able-bodiedness; in particular, the physical environment and the systems that support it are socially (re)produced, and have ’built in’ discrimination

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and exclusion. Such inherent discrimination and exclusion are in large part a product of the absence of people with disabilities and their experiences and voices in decision-making (including architecture and planning), and more broadly in social discourse. Much academic research has been similarly exclusionary of the voices of people with disabilities; a major transformation that began in the 1990s, and continues today, is the expectation that people with disabilities, their views and experiences, must be included in how access and other issues are conceptualized. Importantly, the social model, while remaining dominant in the disability movement and disability studies, has not been immune to critique. The social environment, it has been argued, can undoubtedly be better designed to improve access, but cannot be changed so as to erase all impairment-related effects. There are two points here: first, whatever changes are made, people have impairments which impact their ability to do things and move around; and second, there is more to accessibility than improving the physical environment since sociocultural attitudes, embodiment, and emotion all play a role in how people with disabilities experience and navigate spaces. So while recognizing the inaccessibility of most environments, an alternative, relational conceptualization of disability has emerged in geography. Focusing on individual, embodied experiences of the home and public space, a relational geography sees both impairment and spatial context as acquiring meaningdincluding the form and degree of accessibilitydthrough the interaction of bodies and emotions in spaces. Hence, accessible environments are constituted by relations and are not fixed; rather they are changeable and ’emergent’, and able to be both exclusionary and inclusionary, depending on the form that those relations take over time. ’Non-representational theory’ (NRT) has received increasing attention in relational approaches toward studying disability, such as by Hall and Wilton. NRT-influenced scholarship pays attention to ongoing practices of embodied, emotional, and affectual interaction in everyday lives, and how these interactions shape the different parties involved. Through these interactions, subjects ’become’ who they are and identify as; the ’disabled’ identity of impaired persons is one of ongoing emergence, made sense of through relations with others, with and without disabilities, in social contexts which are not predeterminedly disablist, yet acknowledged as difficult to negotiate. Social and spatial contexts ’become’ accessible or inaccessible (in most instances a complex mix of the two), through an ongoing series of practices and relations between those present. Exclusionary and inaccessible environments exist and persist, but the focus shifts to the process by which these environments ’become’ inaccessible. In short, we cannot assume that certain environments are ’a priori’ accessible or inaccessible, or inclusionary or exclusionary; it depends on what happens in these spaces. A relational lens allows us to see accessibility as less about the material fabric of contexts and structures/systems, and more about how people do or do not interact and affect each other. This relational lens forces those designing and planning accessible environments to think more complexly about who matters and what makes a space inclusionary. The ’mobilities turn’ in geography has also influenced approaches toward accessibility. As the social model of disability developed in the 1990s, mobility or barriers to itdin everyday movement around city environments and transportdwas understood as a key component of how people with disabilities were excluded from mainstream environments. Thus the disability campaigning movement in the 1990s focused on the inaccessibility of public transport. Despite significant changes in many city center environments and transport systems, surveys of people with disabilities show that significant barriers to mobility remain. Health geographers, such as Andrews et al, have critiqued the burgeoning literature on ’walkability’, arguing that the concept reinforces assumptions about mobility, with its emphasis on flow and movement (and the achievement of a healthy body), and the technical ’fixes’ to enable mobility. For many people with disabilities, walking is not a preferred mode of movement, or it is one that requires assistance, in the form of a wheelchair, scooter, walking frame, or stick. Accessibility and the walkability of city spaces is commonly assessed by measures of flow and the movement of people without disabilities, not taking into account the relative slowness, need for rest, or immobility of many people with disabilities. People with disabilities’ experiences of movement highlight the embodied nature of being in and moving through space, including pavements and streets, slopes, and steps, the weather, and the looks and comments of other people. More positively, people with disabilities can also experience enjoyment and the energy of being in and moving through space, and claim the right to be present in public space. Adopting a NRT approach means thinking of mobility and accessibility as a relational or collective achievement of the individual person with disabilities, and the people and technologies that enable such flow and movement (e.g., prosthetics, communication devices, adapted transport). This view counters the neoliberal assumption that walkability and accessibility are necessary for full competent citizenship. From this perspective, accessibility becomes and is transformed through interactions between individuals and environments, whereby these interactions further consist of an assemblage of bodies, emotions, and technologies.

Making Accessibility Actions to address inaccessibility, while backed by legislation and technical design standards, remain largely limited to ’add-ons’ or ’adaptations’dknown in the UK and US legislation as ’reasonable adjustments’dto ’standard’ or ’normal’ practices and buildings. Such terminology reproduces dominant notions of impaired bodies as different and ’problematic’. Moreover, accessibility policies tend to be aligned to mobility and sensory impairments, which caters to wheelchair users in particular (that the universal symbol for disability is a wheelchair underlines this point), without properly addressing the needs of people with other impairments, including those on the autism spectrum. An adaptation approach to altering or adding to standard design has another consequence: In an era of welfare benefit and other funding cuts, people with disabilities have been subject to harassment, and in some instances violence; these actions are now termed ’hate crime’. Common targets of such actions are the access ramps into people’s houses, and parking spaces, and areas on buses and trains, reserved for people with disabilities.

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One often cited solution to the problems of inaccessibility is so-called ’universal design’, which seeks to produce an open, democratic set of spaces accessible to a diverse and dynamic society. Such design is concerned with not only the physical design of a space, but also with generating a social and embodied sense of inclusion. This change can be as simple as ensuring that everyone can enter a building through the same (front) door, and that internal layouts and communication technology are designed so that all can move around, and access people, services, and information. This democratic and inclusive approach to design seeks to include a wide range of people and bodies; reducing or removing barriers to access can lead to the empowerment of people with disabilities and others. As Imrie and Luck argue, universal design should be design that is flexible and creative so as to be usable by everyone, whatever their bodily shape and needs. Such design can create the opportunities for more equitable social relations and hence inclusion; however, as geographers and others have noted, there remains the question of who determines the meaning of ’universal?’ Would able-bodied norms still dominate? Despite claims that universal design considers the users of a space as central to the process of design, geographers argue that universal design has become overly focused on the technical understanding and solutions to design issues. What is required is a reconfiguring of the relationship between architects, planners and designers, and people with disabilities and their organizations, toward a collaborative or coproductive process of design that recognizes the wider sociocultural exclusion experienced by people with disabilities, and the expression of this in inaccessible environments. Imrie notes that ’shared space’ is an increasingly common street design concept that removes elements of design that separate traffic and pedestrians (i.e., there are no identified pavements and curbs, and few if any crossings). Advocates claim that shared space creates a more democratic and equal environment, where no-one and no-thing has priority, resulting in safer and more responsible behavior from all users of that space; however, this example of universal design has been critiqued for taking a person without a disability, or perhaps a mobility impaired wheelchair user, as the benchmark. The experiences and needs of those with other impairments, in particular people with a visual impairment, are not considered: shared spaces assume that users have sight, to judge where others are and what they intend to do, and to exchange looks to determine priority; such cues are not possible for most people with visual impairments. Moreover, the absence of pavements and curbs can make navigation challenging, and sharing the same space as cars can create a sense of vulnerability for people with other impairments. Shared spaces, while espousing universal design and equity/inclusion, commonly reproduce and deepen long-standing inaccessibilities and exclusions for many people with disabilities; ironically, shared spaces can result in some people with disabilities choosing to avoid those streets. Despite aspirations for inclusivity, universal design has been critiqued for routinely not involving people with disabilities in planning for new spaces, relying instead on an idealized notion of access and mobility (centered on speed, flow, and independence). Design and planning processes at the local government level may incorporate consultation, but the planners often approach the same few disability organizations, and the organization’s members’ involvement is commonly limited. Universal design and other access initiatives such as ’shared space’, involve the development of ’technical fixtures and fittings’, but these do not address the complexities of disabled people’s experiences of city spaces, nor sufficiently involve disabled people in planning and urban design decision-making. If people with visual impairments had been fully involved in coconceptualizing and codesigning shared spaces, such spaces would have likely developed differently. Involving people on the autism spectrum in designing for accessibility is likewise crucial. A ’relational approach to access’, according to Davidson, seeks to understand in embodied, sensory, and emotional ways ’how it feels’ to be on the autism spectrum, which can help to create environments that are open and inclusive. Such changes might include adjusting wall and floor colors, lighting types and levels, signage, and the volume of background music in shops and restaurants. It is just as important to recognize the various ’coping tactics’ that people on the autism spectrum use, including rocking and hand flapping, so that public spaces can be reconfigured in a way that acknowledges and respects difference.

Conclusion Evidence that physical and social environments are inaccessible to people with disabilities is significant, despite numerous legislative and policy/practice initiatives over the last 25 years. Many more people with disabilities are now present in, and able to move around, urban environments, and to a lesser extent in suburbs, small towns, and rural areas. There remains much to be done to improve accessibility for people with disabilities. Insights from relational thinking and NRT can help to broaden the accessibility debate, from merely improving the technical aspects of design and planning, to addressing the embodied experiences and emotions of people with disabilities, and involving them in design and decision-making, to build environments that are accessible to all.

Further Reading Ahmad, M., 2013. Health care access and barriers for the physically disabled in rural Punjab, Pakistan. Int. J. Sociol. Soc. Policy 33 (3), 246–260. Andrews, G., Hall, E., Evans, B., Colls, R., 2012. Moving beyond walkability: on the potential of health geography. Soc. Sci. Med. 75 (11), 1925–1932. Bhakta, A., Pickerill, J., 2016. Making space for disability in eco-homes and eco-communities. Geogr. J. 182 (4), 406–417. Butler, R., 1994. Geography and vision-impaired and blind populations. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 19 (3), 366–368. Chouinard, V., Hall, E., Wilton, R., 2010. Towards Enabling Geographies: ‘disabled’ Bodies and Minds in Society and Space. Ashgate, Farnham. Conradson, D., 2005. Landscape, care and the relational self: therapeutic encounters in rural England. Health Place 11 (4), 337–348. Davidson, J., 2008. Autistic culture online: virtual communication and cultural expression on the spectrum. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 9 (7), 791–806.

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Davidson, J., 2010. ‘It cuts both ways’: a relational approach to access and accommodation for autism. Soc. Sci. Med. 70, 305–312. Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2018. Housing and Disabled People: Britain’s Hidden Crisis. Equality and Human Rights Commission, London. Hall, E., Wilton, R., 2017. Towards a relational geography of disability. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 41 (6), 727–744. Hopf, S., McLeod, S., 2015. Services for people with a communication disability in Fiji: barriers and drivers of change. Rural Rem. Health 15 (3), 2863. Horner-Johnson, W., Dobbertin, K., Andresen, E., Iezzoni, L., 2014. Breast and cervical cancer screening disparities associated with disability severity. Wom. Health Issues 24 (1), 147–153. Horton, J., 2017. Disabilities, urban natures and children’s outdoor play. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 18 (8), 1152–1174. Imrie, R., 1996. Disability and the City; International Perspectives. Paul Chapman Publishing, London. Imrie, R., 2012. Auto-disabilities: the case of shared space environments. Environ. Plan. 44, 2260–2277. Imrie, R., Kumar, M., 1998. Focusing on disability and access in the built environment. Disabil. Soc. 13 (3), 357–374. Imrie, R., Luck, R., 2014. Designing inclusive environments: rehabilitating the body and the relevance of universal design. Disabil. Rehabil. 36 (16), 1315–1319. Komardjaja, I., 2001. New cultural geographies of disability: Asian values and the accessibility ideal. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 2 (1), 77–86. Leonard Cheshire Disability, 2014. The Hidden Housing Crisis. Leonard Cheshire Disability, London. Macpherson, H., 2009. The intercorporeal emergence of landscape: negotiating sight, blindness and idea of landscape in the British countryside. Environ. Plan. 41 (5), 1042–1054. Maddern, J., Stewart, E., 2010. Biometric geographies, mobility and disability: biologies of culpability and the biologised spaces of (post)modernity. In: Chouinard, V., Hall, E., Wilton, R. (Eds.), Towards Enabling Geographies: ‘disabled’ Bodies and Minds in Society and Space. Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 237–252. Mason, J., Scior, K., 2004. ‘Diagnostic overshadowing’ amongst clinicians working with people with intellectual disabilities in the UK. J. Appl. Res. Intellect. Disabil. 17, 85–90. McGillivray, D., McPherson, G., Misener, L., 2018. Major sporting events and geographies of disability. Urban Geogr. 39 (3), 329–344. Oliver, M., 1990. The Politics of Disablement. Macmillan, Basingstoke. Owusu-Ansah, J., Baisie, A., Oduro-Ofori, E., 2018. The mobility impaired and the built environment in Kumasi: structural obstacles and individual experiences. Geojournal 1–18. Piat, M., Seida, K., Sabetti, J., Padgett, D., 2017. Em)placing recovery: sites of health and wellness for individuals with serious mental illness in supported housing. Health Place 47, 71–79. Siekierska, E., Labelle, R., Brunet, L., McCurdy, B., Pulsifer, P., Rieger, M., O’Neil, L., 2003. Enhancing spatial learning and mobility training of visually impaired people – a technical paper on the internet-based tactile and audio-tactile mapping. Can. Geogr. 47 (4), 480–493. Stephens, L., Spalding, K., Aslam, H., Scott, H., Ruddick, S., Young, N., McKeever, P., 2017. Inaccessible childhoods: evaluating accessibility in homes, schools and neighbourhoods with disabled children. Child Geogr. 15 (5), 583–599. Taylor, Z., Jozefowicz, I., 2012. Intra-urban daily mobility of disabled people. J. Transp. Geogr. 24, 155–172. United Nations, 2006. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. UN, New York. van Hoven, B., Elzinga, M., 2009. Visually impaired people negotiating public space in Groningen. Eur. Spat Res. Policy 16 (1), 131–144. von Benzon, N., 2017. Unruly children in unbounded spaces; school-based experiences for urban learning disabled young people in Greater Manchester, UK. J. Rural Stud. 51, 240–250. Vujakovic, P., Matthews, M., 1994. Contorted, folder, torn: environmental values, cartographic representation and the politics of disability. Disabil. Soc. 9 (3), 359–374. Wilton, R., Hansen, S., Hall, E., 2017. Disabled people, medical inadmissibility and the differential politics of immigration. Can. Geogr. 61 (3), 389–400.

Action Research, Participatory mrs c kinpaisby-hill1 © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by S. Kindon, R. Pain, M. Kesby, volume 8, pp 90–95, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

The antiapartheid wisdom of “nothing about us, without us, is for us” resonates strongly with the commitment of participatory action research (PAR) to value knowledge that has been historically marginalized and produced through collaboration for action. Raising questions with regards to the purposes and publics of research PAR takes seriously the critique that unless we actively seek to democratize the academy, then our research risks reproducing intersectional hierarchies along class, race, gender, and other axes of difference. In this overview of PAR, we consider the theory and practice of engaging with communities to address injustice through collective knowledge production in geography. Grounded in commitments to democratic modes of knowledge production, PAR is a collaborative and integrative approach to research, education, and action that is explicitly oriented toward social change. Challenging the normative production of knowledge, PAR includes excluded perspectives, engaging those who are most affected by the issues under investigation in as much of the research process as possible from identifying the questions to be explored, interpreting the data, to deciding upon the intended actions (including the purposes and publics of the research). Working with the assumption that all research involves collaboration whether this is acknowledged or not, PAR decenters the lone scholar, contesting the individualized expertise fetishized by the neoliberal academy. PAR challenges traditional and positivist modes of research, which might be characterized as extractive, hierarchical, and even colonizing. Instead PAR builds upon and draws inspiration from feminist, critical race, indigenous theories, and grassroots organizing/research approaches committed to working “with” rather than “on” communities. It extends the logic of situated knowledges by regarding the subjects and agents of knowledge as multiple, heterogeneous, contradictory, embodied, and socially constructed. It also recognizes their capacity to engage actively in the research process, not simply to be its informants. Concerned with shifting power, in PAR collaborations, academic researchers and communities work together, engaging those who are too often “studied” but who do not usually benefit from the research. Valuing the process of collaboration, PAR is committed to democratizing the research process and building the capacity of all involved to analyze and transform their own lives and communities. Radically shifting how data are collected and to what end, PAR opens up new spaces for participatory knowledge production, not only reframing the “problem” but also exploring “solutions,” pushing scholarship and theory in new directions, and rethinking “impact” “beyond the journal article.” Participatory approaches have found increasingly wide support in geography and across the social sciences more broadly, offering a promising alternative for scholars who are interested in engaging in activist ways of doing and integrating research, learning, and teaching. However, while researchers often engage in PAR due to their commitments to social justice, doing so does not circumvent ethical dilemmas. We join critical scholars who raise significant concerns about how uncritical and broad applications of the term “participation” may mask tokenism and provide an illusion of consultation. As we shall discuss further, when PAR is presented as a “toolkit” or as a set of techniques rather than a commitment to working with communities, it may reproduce, rather than challenge, social inequities. In what follows, first we provide a brief history of PAR, outlining critiques as well as epistemological and ontological commitments. Next, we discuss significant debates and developments in the field of PAR. In conclusion, we discuss future directions and questions to address.

Origins The best way to understand something is to try to change it.

Lewin (1998, p. 19)

The silenced are not just incidental to the curiosity of the researcher but are the masters of inquiry into the underlying causes of the events in their world. In this context research becomes a means of moving them beyond silence into a quest to proclaim the world. Freire (1982, pp. 30–31)

1 mrs c kinpaisby-hill acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Caitlin Cahill (Pratt Institute, New York, United States), Mike Kesby (University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, United Kingdom), Sara Kindon (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand), and Rachel Pain (Newcastle University, Newcastle, United Kingdom), as well as the many community members we have collaborated with over the years.

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Tracing lineages from around the world, PAR draws from long-standing emancipatory histories across a range of disciplines and traditions. These have been connected with grassroots organizing, social movements, popular education, and community development approaches which place an emphasis upon collective action responding to urgent concerns. As there are several detailed collections that provide detailed histories of PAR across the social sciences and in geography (as noted in the further reading list), here we offer a brief overview. Mindful that identifying particular individuals contradicts the collective spirit (or ethos) of PAR, we argue that PAR is best understood within particular historical geopolitical contexts and as part of a complex web of relations that span the globe intersecting with social movements in countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas (in the global South and North). Within this broader field, at the risk of being simplistic, two traditions of PAR are often highlighteddKurt Lewin’s development of action research in the United States and the activist scholar tradition in Latin America, including Paulo Freire, Orlando Martín-Baro, Orlando Fals Borda, and others. Zeller-Berkman (2014) offers a detailed account of these movements. Fleeing German anti-Semitism in the 1930s, social psychologist Kurt Lewin (1946) coined the term “action research” to describe iterative cycles of action and reflection, something he called “spiral science.” Drawing upon his Marxist orientation, Lewin was committed to doing research to affect social change with community groups. Of note, in the context of World War II, Lewin’s research focused on questions of prejudice and discrimination impacting “minority groups”, responding to similar trends in Germany and the United States (that are still relevant today). Scholars from Latin America developed new approaches to research to challenge positivist research models that maintained the status quo, specifically the power of elites and international development policies. Within the context of the successful Cuban Revolution, and related social struggles in countries throughout South America, scholars understood their work as part of the fight against imperialism and colonialism, advocating for what Orlando Fals Borda called the “people’s science.” Brazilian radical educator and philosopher Paulo Freire, also working within a Marxist tradition, developed an epistemological approach engaging participants directly in knowledge production as a means of social transformation. Freire’s book Pedagogy of the Oppressed detailed his theory of conscientização (conscientization or critical consciousness), a process through which people come to terms with the “roots of their oppression,” engaging the contradictions of their everyday lives as a basis for social and political action. By the early 1970s participatory approaches proliferated across the Americas, Africa, and India, and in the years that followed, the foundations for PAR were laid, among others, by Marja-Liisa Swantz in Tanzania who first coined the term “participatory action research,” Rajesh Tandon in India, Mohammad Anisur Rahman in Bangladesh, Orlando Fals-Borda in Colombia, liberation theologist Ignacio Martin-Baro, Budd Hall in Canada, and many others. Around the world, grassroots organizers and practitioners working in community development and social movements, engaged in collaborative research toward social transformation (see, for example, the Highlander Center) to address urgent local concerns such as housing and environmental justice issues, as well as deep-rooted structural issues including colonialism, racism, and capitalism (cf Zeller-Berkman, 2014; Hall, 2005; Fals Borda, 2001). Within and outside of institutions, a multitude of approaches to PAR exist informed by these diverse overlapping traditions and lineages. In the academy, there is a rich historical trajectory of activist scholars, including feminist, critical race, postcolonial, and indigenous researchers, working with engaged and community-based research that is meaningful and beneficial to community partners, even if they have not identified it as PAR. Work by María Elena Torre et al. (2012) documents some of this understudied history. One example is the African-American scholar W.E.B. Du Bois, who over a hundred years ago worked in solidarity with Black communities to conduct research on their experience living in segregated Philadelphia. In another example, there is now renewed interest in early community-based investigations conducted by social workers in settlement houses (i.e., Jane Adams in Chicago) and community development practitioners who engaged in research with community members to address local issues (see the further reading list). In geography, the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute (DGEI), well known as an inspiring example of radical geography from the early 1970s, may also be understood as an example of PAR, in recognition of the significant role of young Black Detroiters who were key players in shaping the activist orientation of the research project (although much of this history was not known until recently). Addressing structural and racial inequalities including the desegregation of schools and educational concerns in the Black community, the DGEI offers many important insights into both the possibilities and potential problems of PAR, as well as its politics. Significantly, more recent scholarship coauthored by codirector, Gwendolyn Warren (Warren, Katz, Heynen, 2019), offers a meaningful corrective, shedding light on questions of power, race, and solidarity that are at the heart of critical PAR, as we shall discuss. Over the last several decades, the more recent “participatory turn” across the social and environmental sciences (including what is now known as “citizen science”) is a response to renewed calls for relevance and less hierarchical research practices. This turn is in keeping with the heightened interest for public scholarship and community-based research, and, in our field, “public geographies” (see, for example, mrs kinpainsby’s notion of “communiversity”). PAR is one way that scholars committed to social justice are challenging the neoliberal corporate university and what Bernal and Villalpando (2002) identify as an “apartheid of knowledge” production within academia. Destabilizing hierarchies of theory and practice, participatory praxis offers a vehicle for deepening understandings of the social relations informed and being constituted by spatial difference, while simultaneously addressing inequalities through collective action. In this respect, PAR praxis furthers the goals of critical social geographers and theorists who argue that we must draw upon radical theories and politics rooted in feminism, anarchism, Marxism, and other critical movements to help solve social problems rather than only studying them. Participatory praxis offers one very effective means to address, not only explain, the sociospatial injustices which are so often our focus. Participatory approaches to research have become increasingly prevalent within geography over the last two decades as evidenced by consistent programming at the American Association of Geographers and Royal Geographic Society annual meetings, special conferences dedicated to PAR, inclusion in key geography readers, and publication in established journals including Environment & Planning A, Gender, Place and Culture, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Area, ACME: An International Journal

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of Critical Geographies, Progress in Human Geography, among others. In addition, across the disciplines, there are many critical and useful overviews of PAR, including the influential text by Kindon, Pain and Kesby, Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods: Connecting people, Participation and Place. PAR theory and methods are often included in research methodology volumes, as well as in graduate course work. In addition, we note the establishment of the Participatory Geographies Research Group (PyGyRG) in the United Kingdom, and training centers/think tanks including the Public Science Project (www. publicscienceproject.org) in the United States, and the Centre for Social Justice and Action in the United Kingdom (https:// www.dur.ac.uk/socialjustice/), among others, that connect universities and communities through PAR.

Epistemological and Ontological Commitments and Critiques Critiques of participatory research highlight tensions between the theory and practice of participation that warrant our attention. Engaging with the problems of participation, we unpack epistemological and ontological commitments of PAR. In our discussion we draw upon feminist, intersectional, critical race, and decolonizing theories that inform PAR praxis and social justice orientation. “Participation” does not have an inherent or stable meaning (see, for example, Judith Butler on “queer”) and can be deployed in different ways to produce quite different effects. For example, within the neoliberal logic of “personal responsibility”, the imperative to “participate” shifts accountability for structural problems to individuals and communities. In this way the term participation may reinforce rather than challenge social hierarchies, emphasize normative consensus, and reproduce hegemony. For example the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, two bastions of global capitalism, use participatory research practices to pursue “development,” leaving questions about global restructuring and uneven power relations unaddressed in their work. However, even in work that imagines itself to be more radical, a latent liberal populism often favors local experiences/concerns and singular projects, and loses sight of how broader structural processes and inequalities interact at the local scale. Furthermore, while it may be legitimate to deploy participation at some stages of a research project (e.g., research design) and not others (e.g., reporting/ writingdif this is what participants choose or have the time to do), simply adopting one or more of the many innovative “participatory” research methods does not in itself constitute PAR. Projects using alternative techniques can still constitute “business as usual,” strengthening hierarchical and elite forms of knowledge production that are extractive and colonizing. Put simply, every use of the term “participatory” needs to be critically assessed for the work it is actually doing. Over 50 years ago planner Sherry Arnstein was among the first to tackle this issue. Her highly influential Ladder of Participation presented a linear representation of the relationship between power and participation (see also Roger Hart’s "Ladder of Children’s Participation"). More recently, Cooke and Kotari’s book, The Tyranny of Participation, offered a blistering post-structural critique focused primarily on participatory development (where methods like rapid and participatory rural appraisal [RRA and PRA] are widely used), that concludes that participation will always be entangled with power relations. In response to the recognition that participatory practices may be complicit with dominant policies and structural oppression there have been recent calls for Critical PAR, Decolonial PAR, PARentremundos, militant research, and -within geography- Solidarity Action Research (see further reading list). Reaffirming the critical underpinnings of PAR, critical scholarship and participatory praxis underlines the significance of the politics of representation, challenging what Foucault (1980) identified as the “subjectifying social sciences.” Critical PAR “documents the grossly uneven structural distributions of opportunities, resources, and dignity” and “troubles ideological categories projected onto communities (delinquent, at risk, damaged, innocent, victim)” (Torre et al., 2012, p.171). More than a method, PAR is an epistemological and ontological commitment to collaboration and praxis that takes seriously what it means to do social science (mrs. c. kinpaisby-hill, 2011). Foregrounding the explicit recognition that all knowledge is produced through relationships, a participatory epistemology is grounded in an ontology that affirms the capacity of all human beings for critical and creative thinking, analysis and reflexivity. Building on Gramsci’s (1999) understanding of “organic intellectuals” whose critical perspectives are developed from everyday experiences, PAR starts with the understanding that all people develop social theory in the course of their life experiences. As bell hooks (1990) articulated many years ago in her pivotal piece From Margin to Center, those whose perspective has been marginalized or otherwise erased have critical insights into processes of social exclusion. Paulo Freire (1970, p. 47) argues “discovery cannot be purely intellectual but must also involve action; nor can it be limited to mere activism, but must include serious reflection: only then will it be praxis.” Thus recognizing the connectedness of knowing, doing, and being, participatory praxis challenges the false binary of theory and practice and offers “an alternative ontology of theorizing.” As we have noted elsewhere, PAR “is a citational process, a relational bricolage of one’s own and other’s ideas, and it is an embedded and constantly ongoing praxis of coming to knowing through iterative cycles, moving between experiences of everyday social life, and individual and collective analysis and reflection” (kinpaisby-hill, 2011, p. 223). In this way, participatory praxis might be understood as a form of theoretically informed action on the one hand, and on the other, as a practical and grounded form of theorization. Such a perspective helps us to reflect upon, and challenge, some of the unexamined assumptions that too often frame the way researchers think about theorizing. Destabilizing the dualism between theory and practice, PAR explicitly recognizes and encourages iterative cycles of action and reflection within and during the research process. Working with participatory coresearchers’ theorizing of issues is inductive, emergent, and collective, rather than taking place after the fact. What this means in practice is that participatory researchers analyze problems and contradictions directly with multiple participants (who may have different interpretations) and together they make sense of (’theorize’) complex issues. This is not easy. The world is social, messy, contradictory, provisional, and structured by unequal power relations, and therefore so

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too is PAR. What is different about PAR is a commitment to engage collectively with this complexity as part of the research process and as part of theory building. María Elena Torre (2008) conceptualizes such a process as a “participatory contact zone.” Building on this, feminist geographers Kye Askins and Rachel Pain (2011) deepen our understanding of the participatory contact zone, theorizing the materiality of spaces of encounter. Placing emphasis upon how participatory research teams representing radically different standpoints might come together to engage in inquiry, participatory contact zones enable differential relationships to structural conditions and power to become an explicit part of the research process and analysis. By exploring our mutual implication in each other’s lives and explicitly engaging the “messiness” of interaction, participatory contact zones offer potential for building solidarities across intersectional differences of race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation. For geographers, PAR is especially well suited to research that explores human–environment and place-based relations as it foregrounds context and site-specific knowledge, and produces richly situated accounts. PAR offers a process for connecting relations of the body, state and nation, drawing upon feminist conceptualizations of scale as interconnected, challenging top-down understandings of power and reductive binaries of local–global and private–public. Theorizing how we collectively negotiate contradictions in everyday life and take action, participatory praxis moves between embodied, emotional spaces and broader structural forces. This work is informed by emotional, embodied, and affective geographies that offer insights into the experiences of participation, how it informs the development of new subjectivities, and how these might be a resource for social transformation. Through a participatory process of investigating everyday life and engaging in collective reflection, coresearchers identify their individual experiences as shared, as social, and then in turn, as political. In this sense, triangulation involves not only a conscious engagement of difference and multiplicity, but also the active situating of analyses in their relevant social and geopolitical contexts.

Ethics Debates about institutional ethics and policies are thrown into sharp relief when considering participatory practice. Questions of ethics often focus upon the potential harms and benefits of research, the rights of individual participants to information, privacy, confidentiality, and the integrity of researchers. While this is critically important, we join critical scholars who point out that institutional ethical procedures are at least as interested in protecting institutions as they are in protecting participants. Furthermore, they tend to demand a complete and final research design prior to research conduct, to collapse ethics into the moment of consent and to frame ethics as something that the researcher controls. These requirements not only make it difficult to obtain ethical clearance for emergent PAR projects but they also fail to recognize the profound implications that PAR has for rethinking our ethical practices associated with consent, protection, and vulnerability within larger sociopolitical contexts. Informed by an “ethic of care” in its most profound sense, participatory ethics reflect deep respect for relationships and humanity. Beyond doing no harm, “a PAR inspired understanding of social justice suggests that it is in fact unethical to look in on circumstances of pain and poverty and yet do nothing” (Manzo and Brightbill, 2007, p. 35). However, while researchers may choose to engage in PAR for ethical reasons and commitments to social justice, PAR does not evade ethical dilemmas. In fact, explicitly engaging PAR involves an ethical obligation to actively negotiate the politics of collaboration, positionality, power, and accountability. Rather than top-down, participatory ethics are emergent and negotiated with participants, culturally and contextually situated, and accountable to place and community. Participatory ethics are also increasingly informed by indigenous approaches that recognize the primacy of human and more-than-human relationships, including our relationship with the land, and within a context informed by history, the legacies of colonial violence, and unequal power relations (Tuck & Guishard, 2013). There is a burgeoning literature focused on participatory ethics that offers richly detailed accounts of ethical quandaries of participatory research, providing meaningful insights for practice and theory, including developing ethical protocols for communitybased research that affirm the epistemological and ontological commitments of PAR. This scholarship suggests that a participatory ethics might provide insights for reforming ethical review board structures in order that they encourage, rather than restrict community-based and collaborative research determined by the participants.

Engaging in the PAR Process: Methodological Considerations and Principles Engaging in PAR changes the doing of research in practical ways that inform the role of researcher, methodological designs and timelines, building coresearchers’ capacities to participate, and perhaps most importantly, creating the conditions for collaboration, as we detail below. A collaborative research process necessarily shifts the role of the academic researcher. In some contexts such as Latin America, the researcher is often identified as a “facilitator” or “animator,” to describe the role of supporting critical inquiry in a research collectives, with the goal of becoming unnecessary as proficiency in research is developed. In other contexts, participatory researchers may identify instead as “allies,” working in solidarity within social movements, joining existing collectives in service of existing political imperatives. The politics of these relationships are the subject of critical scholarship concerned with the challenge of how to produce

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a democratic space of radical inclusivity across differences of power and positionality. There is a need for more self-critical evaluations of PAR research processes that address these challenges, in particular to highlight and make explicit structural intersectional differences of race, class, gender, immigration status, etc. Placing an emphasis upon process involves an attention to temporality that connects with recent calls by feminist scholars for slow(er) scholarship. At its heart, PAR is about relationships and this takes time. It takes time to iteratively engage with coresearchers throughout the stages of a project, including collective reflection, analysis, and developing presentations of the findings for broader publics. There may also be temporal exigencies to address urgent concerns at the local level through the research and/ or activism (e.g., respond to a pressing policy issue), which may not be in sync with the relatively slower pace of academia’s calendar or the delays of the peer review process (notwithstanding the imperative to “publish or perish”). What this means is that participatory research involves a timeline that may require flexibility for both immediate local responses and long term engagement. With regard to methodological design, what distinguishes PAR is the commitment to open up the research process to collaboration and build the capacity of coresearchers to participate, not a particular method. PAR designs are eclectic and context-specific involving quantitative and qualitative approaches. In practice, the key is to develop methods that can be used by community partners/coresearchers who may have limited previous experience doing research. Some of the most creative methodological innovations have been developed by researchers working with young people and across language differences. Participatory methodologies may include (but are not limited to) surveys, interviews, focus groups, archival data, mapping (including GIS), oral histories, digital stories, drama, participatory video, photo-voice, participant observation, social media, guided tours, textiles, “stats in action,” and “sidewalk science.” Usually PAR projects engage multiple methods for documenting the interconnections between the personal, social, and geopolitical scales of the issues being studied. While PAR projects are methodologically quite diverse, what they share is an orientation to collective decision-making throughout the research process. What this means in practice is that participatory coresearchers may be involved in all stages of the research from shaping the questions to be investigated, designing the research, collecting the data, analyzing the findings, and developing presentations of research. Limitations on participation at any given stage might include the researcher’s willingness to contemplate it, the participants’ capacity or interest to engage, and any project-specific logistical obstacles that cannot be circumvented. While PAR projects may involve different degrees of participation, we argue that it is crucial to consider in which domains of research and action are participants involved in (or excluded from) and why? Reflecting upon the uncritical deployment of participatory research as a tool kit, rather than an epistemological commitment, we note that there is a significant difference between a project in which coresearchers are intimately involved in framing research questions and one in which they just assist in the collection of data (as in the World Bank example discussed earlier). Most significantly then, PAR projects are characterized by a dedication to creating conditions of collaboration within research collectives. The Public Science Project created a list of principles for participatory researchers that help translate the epistemological and ontological commitments of PAR into practice (see Box 1).

Action! Purpose and Publics What is the purpose of research and who is the intended audience (or public)? Much academic research has very few readers, and too often ends up being an exclusive conversation between “us” about “them.” PAR follows in a long tradition that urges researchers to make meaningful contributions to social change beyond an “armchair revolution” (Freire, 1970) and which, after Marx, suggests that “the point is to change the world, not only study it,” Patricia Maguire (1987). Informed by feminist, post- and decolonial research approaches, grassroots activism, and critical pedagogy, PAR raises from the start questions about who produces knowledge, and who will benefit from and use the research. Indeed, a PAR collective may

Box 1 Participatory Action Research principles (as identified by the Public Science Project, www.publicscienceproject.org). Across our work we agree:

• • • • • • • •

to include knowledges and expertise that have been historically marginalized and delegitimized; to exchange expertise and share resources within the research collective; to an ongoing negotiation of issues of power, and attention to vulnerability, within the participatory collective and created by the research and associated actions; to the creation of a research space wherein individuals and the collective can express their multiplicity and use this multiplicity to inform research questions, design, and analyses; to excavate and surface disagreements in the interest of consensus as a lens into larger social/political dynamics informing the research; to conduct intersectional analyses at the individual, social, historical, cultural, and institutional levels; to conceive multiple forms of action over the course of the PAR project; to an ongoing negotiation of conditions of collaboration.

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form in the first place to address urgent concerns as determined by those who are most affected by the issues. Throughout the research process, participatory researchers may revisit questions of purpose, as this informs the research design, intended publics, and desired outcomes. Lifting researchers’ gaze “beyond the journal article” (Cahill and Torre, 2007), PAR shifts accountability to how research might be useful to communities, PAR engages diverse publics (academics, policy-makers, community members), to rethink the way they understand and act in the world. Questions that PAR collectives may ask as part of the process include “what is the research trying to accomplish” and, “how might the research best communicate to a specific audience?” In Box 2 we include questions that might be raised throughout the PAR research process.

Box 2 Questions PAR researchers ask through the research process (as identified by Cahill and Torre, 2007): Who has the “authority” to represent a community’s point of view? Who should speak for whom? Who should we speak to? Is there a “we” within the community being represented, or within the participant research team that can be represented? In what language should research be communicated? What kinds of research products speak to what kinds of audiences? How do we engage new audiences with our research? Should some audiences be privileged? How might the research provoke action? And, further, do the methods and practice of participatory research create enough of a shift in traditional research to “dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde, 1984, p. 112) and contribute to social change?

Engaging these questions PAR collectives attend to the contextually specific parameters of their research, taking seriously the politics of knowledge production and potential impacts. Questions of representation are implicitly engaged as coresearchers negotiate the thorny and intertwined issues of purpose, publics, and presentations of the research. Presentations of research can take multiple forms including academic and public-facing products, such as scholarly articles, policy reports, testimonies at public hearings, data posters, infographics, websites, social media campaigns, documentaries, performances, archives, and maps. The exact nature of the presentations adopted will depend on earlier discussions about who is the intended audience, and what action/impact is sought.

Future Directions and Questions PAR offers an opportunity to engage as activist scholars within and beyond our universities. This activism can take place within our classrooms through the teaching and practice of PAR, and through our research collaborations with communities beyond the university. Disrupting the unhelpful boundaries between researcher and researched and between community and university, PAR opens spaces for new knowledge and ways of being in the communities we study. Significantly, PAR may also help facilitate transformation of the academy and our professional relations and practices as academics. Fulfilling the potential of PAR to address structural transformation involves addressing the political economic context of the neoliberal university. Participatory geographers have been prominent in recent debates urging colleagues to consider the ways in which they facilitate social justice and change in and through their labors within the academy. We join other critical scholars in underlining the significance of the epistemological and political commitments of PAR and resisting participation’s incorporation and deradicalization within current neoliberal regimes. PAR potentially offers a critical lens through which to view debates about what constitutes “good” research practice, but we remain wary of the danger that “impact” and community engagement may be commodified and subverted within neoliberal university audit frameworks in ways that undermine rather than recognize the contribution of PAR. Related to this, critical administrative and political issues of funding, tenure, promotion, and timetabling must be addressed within the university if PAR is to develop across the disciplines and in geography in particular. Although there is growing interest and enthusiasm for PAR, especially as it connects with the push for civic engagement initiatives as the public face of the university, there are obvious tensions between PAR’s commitment to collaboration (in the form of multiple-authored publications, such as mrs. c. kinpaisby-hill and community-based research products that are not in the form of peer-reviewed journal articles), and the neoliberal university’s individualized audit-regimes. This said, we note that the robust support for community-based PAR in the discipline of Public Health offers one promising model. As such, as PAR moves from the margins into mainstream research practice we suggest there is a need for ongoing vigilance around claims of participatory praxis in the academy, and a persistent need for critical reflexivity in relationships, processes and research outputs if PAR’s radical origins are to continue to provoke and support social justice and transformation. To conclude, as scholars, activists, and people in the world, we are urgently concerned about the ongoing intertwined crises of widening structural inequality, the devastating impacts of racial capitalism and related austerity policies, mass migrations around the planet, climate crisis, and the many ways that these issues take shape at the local level in communities. We believe that PAR may be one way to address the issues that we collectively face in our world and to engage and work with communities, each other, and our students to cocreate more grounded, democratically produced knowledge to respond to the social, spatial, and environmental injustices of this political moment.

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Further Reading Appadurai, A., 2006. The right to research. Glob. Soc. Educ. 4 (2), 167–177. Arnstein, S.R., 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. J. Am. Inst. Plan. 35 (4), 216–224. Askins, K., 2018. Feminist geographies and participatory action research: co-producing narratives with people and place. Gend. Place Cult. 25, 1277–1294. Askins, K., Pain, R., 2011. Contact zones: participation, materiality, and the messiness of interaction. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 29, 803–821. Autonomous Geographies Collective, 2010. Making strategic interventions: the messy but necessary world of scholar activism inside, outside, and against the neo-liberal university. ACME 9, 245–275. Banks, S., Armstrong, A., et al., 2013. Everyday ethics in community-based participatory research. Contemp. Soc. Sci. 8 (3), 263–277. Banks, S., et al., 2011. Community-Based Participatory Research: Ethical Challenges. AHRC Connected Communities. Brydon-Miller, M., Maguire, P., McIntyre, A. (Eds.), 2004. Travelling Companions: Feminism, Teaching and Action Research. Praeger, Westport, CT. Cahill, C., 2007. The personal is political: developing new subjectivities in a participatory action research process. Gend. Place Cult. 14 (3), 267–292. Cahill, C., Torre, M.E., 2007. Beyond the journal article: representations, audience, and the presentation of participatory research. In: Kindon, S., Pain, R., Kesby, M. (Eds.), Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods: Connecting People, Participation and Place. Routledge, London. Cameron, J., Gibson, K., 2005. Participatory action research in a poststructuralist vein. Geoforum 36 (3), 315–331. Cammarota, J., Fine, M., 2008. Revolutionizing Education: Youth Participatory Action Research in Motion. Routledge, New York. Cammarota, J., Berta-Ávila, M., Ayala, J., Rivera, M., Rodriguez, L., 2016. PAR entremundos: a practitioner’s guide. In: Growing Critically Conscious Teachers: A Social Justice Curriculum for Educators of Latino/a Youth, pp. 67–89. Chatterton, P., Fuller, D., Routledge, P., 2007. Relating action to activism: theoretical and methodological reflections. In: Kindon, S., Pain, R., Kesby, M. (Eds.), Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods: Connecting People, Participation and Place. Routledge, London, pp. 216–222. Cooke, B., Kothari, U. (Eds.), 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny?. Zed Books, London. Donovan, G.T., 2014. Opening proprietary ecologies: participatory action design research with young people. In: Gudmundsdottir, G.B., Vasbø, K.B. (Eds.), Methodological Challenges When Exploring Digital Learning Spaces in Education. Sense Publishing, Rotterdam. Du Bois, W.E.B., 1898. The Study of the Negro Problems. American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Durham Community Research Team, 2012. Community-Based Participatory Research: Ethical Challenges. Available from: https://ahrc.ukri.org/documents/project-reports-andreviews/connected-communities/community-based-participatory-research-ethical-challenges/. Elwood, S., 2006. Critical issues in participatory GIS: deconstructions, reconstructions, and new research directions. Trans. GIS 10 (5), 693–708. Fals-Borda, O., 2001. Participatory (action) research in social theory: origins and challenges. In: Reason, P., Bradbury, H. (Eds.), Handbook of Action Research: Participative Enquiry and Practice. Sage, London, pp. 27–47. Fals-Borda, O., Rahman, M. (Eds.), 1991. Action and Knowledge: Breaking the Monopoly with Participatory Action-Research. The Apex Press, New York. Fine, M., 2017. Just Research in Contentious Times: Widening the Methodological Imagination. Teachers College Press, New York. Foucault, M., 1980. In: Colin, G. (Ed./Trans.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–1977. Pantheon Books, New York. Fox, M., 2015. Embodied methodologies, participation, and the art of research. Soc. Personal. Psychol. Compass 9 (7), 321–332. Francis, P., 2001. Participatory development at the World Bank: the primacy of process. In: Cooke, B., Kothari, U. (Eds.), Participation: The New Tyranny? Zed Books, London, pp. 72–87. Freire, P., 1982. Creating alternative research methods. Learning to do it by doing it. In: Hall, B., Gillette, A., Tandon, R. (Eds.), Creating Knowledge: A Monopoly. Society for Participatory Research in Asia, New Delhi, pp. 29–37. Freire, P., 1997. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. Gramsci, A., 1971. Prison Notebooks. International Publishers, New York. Hall, B., 2005. In from the cold? Reflections on participatory research from 1970–2005. Convergence 38 (1), 5–24. Halvorsen, S., 2015. Militant research against-and-beyond itself: critical perspectives from the university and occupy London. Area 47 (4), 466–472. Hart, R., 2008. Stepping back from ‘the ladder’: reflections on a model of participatory work with children. In: Participation and Learning, pp. 19–31. Hooks, bell, 1990. Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics. Between-the-Lines, Toronto, Canada. Kesby, M., 2005. Retheorising empowerment-through-participation as a performance in space: beyond tyranny to transformation. Signs J. Feminist Theory 30, 2037–2065. Kesby, M., 2007. Spatialising participatory approaches: the contribution of geography to a mature debate. Environ. Plan. 39. http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id.a38326. Kindon, S., Pain, R., Kesby, M. (Eds.), 2007. Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods: Connecting People, Participation and Place. Routledge, London. kinpaisby, mrs, 2008. Taking stock of participatory geographies: envisioning the communiversity. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 33, 292–299. kinpaisby-hill, m. c., 2011. Participatory praxis and social justice: towards more fully social geographies. In: A Companion to Social Geography. Blackwell, Oxford. Lewin, K., 1946. Action research and minority problems. J. Soc. Issues 1–2, 34–36. Maguire, P., 1987. Doing Participatory Research: A Feminist Approach. Centre for International Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. Manzo, L., Brightbill, N., 2007. Towards a participatory ethics. In: Kindon, S., Pain, R., Kesby, M. (Eds.), Connecting People, Participation and Place: Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods. Routledge, London, pp. 33–40. Martín-Baró, I., 1994. Writings for a Liberation Psychology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Mason, K., 2015. Participatory action research: coproduction, governance and care. Geogr. Compass 9 (9), 497–507. McTaggart, R. (Ed.), 1997. Participatory Action Research: International Contexts and Consequences. State of New York, University Press, New York. Mohan, G., 2007. Participatory development: from epistemological reversals to active citizenship. Geogr. Compass 1, 779–796. Nagar, R., 2014. Muddying the waters: Coauthoring feminisms across scholarship and activism. University of Illinois Press, Chicago. Pain, R., Kesby, M., Askins, K., 2011. Geographies of impact: power, participation and potential. Area 43, 183–188. Participatory ethics. In: Cahill, C., Sultana, F., Pain, R. (Eds.), ACME An Int. E-J. Crit. Geogr. 6 (3) (special issue). Reason, P., Bradbury, H. (Eds.), 2006. Handbook of Action Research. Sage, London. Smith, L.T., 2013. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. Zed Books Ltd. Torre, M.E., Fine, M., Alexander, N., Billups, A.B., Blanding, Y., Genao, E., Marboe, E., Salah, T., Urdang, K., 2008. Participatory action research in the contact zone. In: Revolutionizing Education: Youth Participatory Action Research in Motion. Routledge, New York, pp. 23–44. Torre, M.E., Fine, M., Stoudt, B., Fox, M., 2012. Critical participatory action research as public science. In: Camic, P., Cooper, H. (Eds.), The Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology: Expanding Perspectives in Methodology and Design, second ed. American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, pp. 171–184. Torre, M.E., Stoudt, B., Manoff, E., Fine, M., 2017. Critical participatory action research on state violence: bearing wit(h)ness across fault lines of power, privilege, and dispossession. In: Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research. SAGE Publications, Inc, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington, DC and Melbourne, pp. 492–523. Tuck, E., Guishard, M., 2013. Uncollapsing ethics: scientifically based research and settler coloniality: an ethical framework of decolonial participatory action research. In: Kress, T., Malott, C., Porfilio, B. (Eds.), Challenging Status Quo Retrenchment, pp. 3–27. Warren G., Katz C., Heynen N., Myths., 2019. Cults, Memories, and Revisions in Radical Geographic History. In: Barnes T.J., Sheppard E., (Eds.), Revisiting the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute Spatial Histories of Radical Geography: North America and Beyond, Wiley, Oxford, UK, 59-85.

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Wynne-Jones, S., North, P., Routledge, P., 2015. Practising participatory geographies: potentials, problems and politics. Area 47, 218–221. Zeller-Berkman, S., 2014. Lineages: a past, present and future of participatory action research. In: The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research, pp. 518–532.

Relevant Websites http://www.pygywg.org Participatory Geographies Working Group (PyGyWG) of the Royal Geographical Society, UK Home page. www.dur.ac.uk/socialjustice/ Center for Social Justice & Community Action (Toolkits, Guides & Case Studies). http://www.publicscienceproject.org – The Public Science Project. https://justspace.org.uk/history/research-protocol/ Just Space.

Activism LM Takahashi, University of Southern California, Sol Price School of Public Policy, Sacramento, CA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Civil society Ordinary people, nongovernmental/nonprofit organizations, and/or businesses or private firms. Coalitions Partnerships, alliances, and collaborations among different groups working together to change specific social, political, or economic issues. Collective action Activities taken on by groups that focus on group or community-level outcomes rather than individual outcomes. Contentious politics Social movements and less sustained collective action that challenge government institutions and actions. Neoliberalism Political approach that assumes the market is better at managing economic activity than government, and consequently, aims at greater reliance on the market for governing and at reducing regulation and intervention by government at multiple scales. Nongovernmental organizations Institutions, agencies, and groups that provide services and advocate for resources and political change, but which are not formally part of local, regional, or national governments. Political opportunity structures Opportunities in the current arrangement of political institutions, rules, and practices for disruption and change. Spatial scale Units of spatial analysis (such as local, regional, national, international) and also processes whereby social action is facilitated or disabled.

Activism is most commonly associated with collective or group action by ordinary people, usually volunteers, who come together to change what they consider to be unacceptable or unfair circumstances. These individuals come together in a shared belief about the nature of the problem, and the means to best address the issue, using political opportunity structures to influence elected officials, policymakers, and institutions. Activism is also practiced by institutions and organizations, particularly in the nonprofit/nongovernmental and private sectors, as a means to apply economic, political, or moral pressures on communities, governments, and other organizations to stop specific practices or to encourage desired policies. Finally, geographers are also activists, both inside academic environments and in wider society. The focus of action of activism has spanned the political spectrum, from exclusionary efforts aimed at protecting property rights and the status quo (e.g., community opposition to homeless shelters and affordable housing in local neighborhoods) to inclusionary actions aimed at expanding access to political power (e.g., the US Civil Rights Movement), and from reformist aims (e.g., redefining legal parameters to prevent hate crimes directed at specific groups) to radical goals (e.g., overthrowing or taking over government). These foci also have varying substantive aims, from very local issue–based conflicts (e.g., trying to prevent evictions of renters from housing) to national-level controversies (e.g., strengthening or weakening environmental regulations). The conduits of activist communication have shifted from primarily face-to-face interaction to increasing use of the Internet (including websites, social media, and messaging/SMS texting). There are four primary reasons for the rising importance of activism in the 21st Century. First, governing has become less centered in formal government agencies, where the practical routines of managing political controversies, public financing, and resource allocation have moved increasingly into the realm of ordinary people, nongovernmental agencies, and private firms. Part of this trend globally is related to strong pressures from international donors and national governments for decentralizing decision-making to more local levels, making communities, cities, and regions more able to make their own decisions about resource allocation, regulations, and planning for the future. Second, and related to the first trend, is the increasing participation of civil society in public and private sector governing at the local, regional, national, and international levels. The expansion of civil society in public sector governing is due not only to the pulling back of formal government agencies in governing but also to the increasing sense by decision-makers that residents, groups, and businesses need to be involved in the design and implementation of policies to ensure their effectiveness. In the private sector, shareholder activism has become increasingly important in corporate governance since the 1980s and 1990s due to increased involvement of large institutional investors, especially pension funds for public sector employees. Third, activism has emerged as a challenge to larger economic and political pressures for decentralization and neoliberalism. Though the general notion of more autonomy by communities and cities by providing more responsibility for plans and policies may seem, in general, to be a way to make governing more responsive, there are drawbacks to this approach. The most important challenge is that resources (e.g., funding and authority) to implement local ideas are not often transferred from central or national governments even when local responsibility is increased, and consequently, local communities and cities are being expected to use the private market, or commercial activities, as the way to deal with economic, social,

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and environmental challenges. Finally, the rise of global communications, social media, and a 24-h news cycle has created opportunities (e.g., greater ability to reach like-minded individuals) and challenges (e.g., need to generate compelling narratives). The linkages between geography and activism are twofold and can be described as (1) the geographies of activism and (2) activist geographies. The geographies of activism consist of different examples of activism, the distinct goals of activism, and the scales of activism. Activist geographies consider the more active links between activism and geography through research that challenges conventional ways of thinking, and through political action engaged in by geographers and other social scientists to change political practices, and social and economic systems.

Geographies of Activism Types and Catalysts of Activism Activism centers on a variety of different issues, can be reformist or radical in its objectives, and consists of distinct methods ranging from peaceful civil disobedience to violence. The catalysts for activism often center on visible and substantial change in social values, political debates and decision-makers, economic activities, or urban land use patterns but require awareness or knowledge of the problem and an affinity with the political position and methods of the groups that aim to change the unacceptable situation, practice, or policy. Activism responding to such catalysts has distinct goals but often uses similar methods and processes, including mobilization and coalition building. Land use change often sparks local activism or collective action. At the very local level, the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) syndrome comprises one prevalent and highly visible example. NIMBY activities usually revolve around a controversial proposed land use or facility type that is seen by residents, businesses, and/or local governments as threatening local quality of life, property values, or property rights. NIMBY is generally seen as conservative in its politics, in its attempts to preserve the status quo, and usually consists of relatively peaceful though highly vocal political acts, including petitions, demonstrations, and vocal participation in local government planning processes. Economic shifts, such as industrial restructuring that has resulted in significant reductions in manufacturing jobs, downward pressures on wages, and reductions in benefits such as healthcare coverage, have led unions and community groups to engage in labor activism. Labor activism consists of collective efforts directed at businesses and government, such as worker strikes and organized marches, to strive for better working conditions, living wages, and expansions in benefits. With the decline in union membership nationally in the United States over the past few decades, labor activism has increasingly been spurred by community groups that are also working for affordable housing, income equality, and environmental justice rather than being solely or even primarily the purview of labor unions. In the Global South, trade unions have long challenged central governments, and some are formally recognized through enabling legislation to negotiate on behalf of workers. Changes in political debate or decision-making bodies, such as transitions to and from majority neoconservative to liberal political parties, may also spark activism on the part of organizations and groups concerned with the domination of political debate by specific political views. Political advocacy organizations and political parties are highly active in working to influence the results of elections through public media campaigns, door-to-door canvassing, and debates among political candidates. Judicial activism may also be activated by political debate and public controversies and is expressed through court decisions that enlarge or contract the powers of the government to manage public speech or activism. In other words, the courts may be activist in negative (preventing wrongs) and positive (promoting desirable outcomes) ways. Political disagreement is increasingly expressed through contentious politics. Such social activism, especially through social media, has centered on gender discrimination (e.g., #metoo in the United States and globally; #IWillGoOut in India), racial tension (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter), and immigration (e.g., the debates over DACA, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or Dreamers in the United States, and global debates concerning migration of refugees). Individuals and groups that are deemed to be undesirable or socially unacceptable by the mainstream have also worked collectively to improve material living conditions, to challenge discrimination and prejudice, to expand rights and capacity to engage in public debates, to facilitate economic advancement, and to promote self-determination. Such activism has been largely described as new social movements and identity politics. They are different from more classic social movements, which were largely based on worker or labor activism that focused largely on the uneven and unequal distribution of wealth. Instead, new social movements and identity politics activism include such diverse efforts as the Civil Rights Movement (e.g., political struggle by the African-American community and others to make racial segregation illegal and to challenge race-based discrimination), feminism and gender equality (e.g., activism in the United States to pass the Equal Rights Amendment and ongoing conflicts over Roe v. Wade, which legalized abortions in the United States; activism in the United States around sexual assault and harassment), immigrant rights efforts (e.g., Janitors for Justice, a largely immigrant movement in the United States striving for fair wages and better working conditions), and sexual identity activism (e.g., AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP), and gay, lesbian, and transgender antiviolence efforts). The interrelationships among issues driving activism lead many activist organizations and groups to form coalitions. Activist groups and organizations work to change existing social, political, and/or economic circumstances, but often, the issues are much larger than the individual organization’s ability to change. Mobilization of ordinary people, groups, and institutions bring to bear visible support so that governing bodies may be influenced by activism; however, sometimes even greater numbers and larger presence are needed to create adequate pressure. Coalitions provide the opportunity for different groups and organizations to work together on specific issues of concern to provide a larger, more organized, and coordinated voice. Coalitions among labor

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groups, legal organizations, and housing nonprofit organizations, for example, have been vital in addressing the negative social impacts of gentrification, where redevelopment and growth have spurred rapidly escalating housing prices, often displacing lowincome residents and workers. Coalitions have been effective at devising strategies such as community benefits agreements that require minimum wage levels and hiring of local workers. Coalitions have also been important at the national and international levels, especially for transnational issues such as environmental degradation. Climate change, habitat protection, and deforestation have engaged scientists, environmental nongovernmental organizations, and governments to develop partnerships to measure and cope with the complex issues of urbanization, industrialization, and negative environmental impacts.

Reformist and Radical Activism In all of these examples, what is clear is that activism is not solely reactionary or progressive, exclusionary or inclusionary, conservative or liberal, or peaceful or violent. Both disadvantaged and wealthy activists use the language of social movements, selfdetermination, victimization, and oppression in their efforts to change policies, procedures, and outcomes. Activism can take on different faces depending on its goals and strategies. In general, there are two basic approaches to activism: reformist and radical. Reformist activism sets out to redefine parameters within existing systems of governance, political interaction, or social practices, with the goal of incrementally changing these systems to address unacceptable or unfair circumstances, either in the processes or the outcomes of decision-making. Radical activism in contrast is focused on significant change to governance, social norms, or economic systems; the goal for radical activists is structural change, where current institutions, the framework of decisionmaking, social mores, or environmental conditions are seen as illegitimate or unacceptable. The goals of reformist efforts emphasize change in the processes of decision-making (such as expanding the number and types of participants in decision-making, or including more and different kinds of stakeholders in a planning or policy design process), with some focus on adjusting outcomes associated with decision-making (such as realigning funding priorities to alter resource distribution, shifting the distribution of negative impacts, or expanding the recipients of positive benefits). Examples of reformist efforts include shareholder activism (where owners of shares of corporations, especially large institutional investors who emerged as major corporate shareholders in the 1980s and 1990s, vote to change boards of directors, influence executive compensation, or alter investment patterns), neighborhood activism (where residents work together to improve local infrastructure conditions, or to expand government resources being invested in the community), judicial activism (where dissenting opinions of justices provide opportunities for questioning prevailing doctrine or legal precedents), or issue- or place-based activism (where organizations protest existing environmental policies, or advocate for expanded protection of sensitive habitat for endangered species). In essence, reformist activism aims at changing the processes that lead to particular emphases, beneficiaries, and distribution of costs or burdens associated with policies, economic activity, and social interactions without necessarily altering the basic or foundational structure of governance, economies, and social values. Because reformist activism does not aim at structural transformation, conflict and disagreement between activists and targeted decision-makers may be avoided or minimized through strategies such as mediation, negotiation, or compensation. Radical activism, in contrast, tends to not work within existing systems of dissent, such as political processes of debate and decision-making, because it seeks to alter the foundations underlying economic, social, and political life. Such activism is usually aimed at changing distributions of wealth and resources, environmental conditions, political power, and/or social mores. In contrast to reformist activism, the source of the problem for radical activism lies in the system itself rather than in particular individuals, procedures, regulations, or practices. In other words, rather than trying to identify specific people, rules, or issues as the source of economic, political, environmental, or social ills, radical activism sees the problem as one of systems and structures. Progressive social movements, such as the global anticapitalist movement, the environmental justice movement, and the animal rights movement, are critical of existing systems of governance, distributions of wealth and poverty, and relationships among people, economy, and the environment, and aim at fundamental shifts in the capitalist economic system, definitions of citizenship and rights within and across nation-states (where citizenship is related not only to the ability to access public resources and protection, but also more broadly as full acceptance as legitimate and valued participants in society), and existing distributions of wealth and privilege. Existing systems of governance are structured so that government agencies and middle- and upper-income communities benefit from understanding and using existing political, economic, and social institutions. The formal and informal rules of governance create advantage for those privileged groups, to the disadvantage of low-income, immigrant, low-skilled, and other marginalized groups. For some individuals and groups, only complete transformation of daily life to a new arrangement of governance and social interaction will be acceptable. Radical religious fundamentalism is an example of such activism, with often violent results.

Scale of Activism Activism is not just a social phenomenon, but it is also a spatial one. Different types or foci of activism may be more effective or difficult because of the spatial scale defining the problem being addressed and the methods of activism being used. For example, anticapitalist activism requires that actions be conducted at spatial scales that match the global reach of capitalist forces. Consequently, though protests against global capitalist expansion take place in particular places at specific times, these protests are often directed at international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (W TO), include coalitions of different activist organizations, and often consist of multicity protests activated around the world at the same time.

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Spatial scale is a process, as well as a characteristic. In other words, space and location are not static containers of activism, but rather, are dynamic features that interact in important ways and enable or obstruct activist efforts. While the Internet and widespread availability of cell phones and smart phones have reduced the constraint of distance in coordinating activist efforts, physical distance, urban form, and the built environment remain significant in both facilitating and disabling activism. Urbanization patterns, the siting of specific land uses, and growth have served, for example, as catalysts for action to protect property rights, manage urban growth, and protect natural resources and sensitive habitat. Proximity to rapidly growing urban, suburban, or peri-urban areas, the visibility of specific sites where controversial land uses and development are proposed, and the general increase in disamenities (such as traffic congestion and air pollution) are examples used by activist organizations to mobilize and expand participation by the populace for various purposes. Space also defines how ordinary people, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and governments understand and define the world around them, providing clues about what needs to be changed and how. Though the places where people live, work, and play provide the most readily available examples of the potential problems that might be influenced by activism, what is also important are the relationships between these familiar places and places that are unfamiliar, distant, and distinct. Those place relationships provide clear examples of inequality, marginalization, and oppression, and in so doing, become catalysts for action. In other words, the relational aspects of space serve to define inequality and marginalization, and in defining these inequities, space itself not only motivates action but also enables linkage among local efforts across the globe. There is a scaling up possibility to activism when this relational aspect is incorporated, providing opportunities for action to move from a grassroots, localized practice to a coordinated set of actions reliant on coalitions of individuals, communities, and organizations that take place at a transnational scale. This scaling up possibility is especially important in terms of issues that cannot be resolved in local places alone, because complex problems or issues are important at multiple spatial scales. For example, while issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, economic injustice, and immigrant rights are important for individual groups, cities, regions, and nations, they cannot be addressed by one group, city, region, or nation alone because these issues intricately link the economies, politics, environments, and social values of varying places. Such global-scale issues thus require scaling up of activism (or the transference of activism across spatial scales) as well as the coordination of activism across space (or the mutual planning and action across cities, regions, and nations) to have significant and sustainable impact. The rise of transnational activism, focused on issues such as global climate change, pollution and resource extraction, citizenship and migration, and economic justice, is linked to broader sociopolitical transitions. The global pressures for decentralization and neoliberalist policies in governance have highlighted the need for better understanding social relationships and resources available through such relationships. In contrast to activism, however, this emphasis by governments and nongovernmental agencies on what has been termed social capital (which has been seen to be a solution for a wide variety of urban problems, ranging from crime to inefficient government) emphasizes informal webs of relationships, the provision of needed monetary and other resources through these webs, and the addressing of community and regional problems through broader engagement and participation by the populace. For social capitalists, problem solving increasingly shifts from government to civil society, and communities that have more and better relationships within and outside their networks do better economically, socially, and politically across a myriad of measures. Activism, though also reliant on groups to solve problems, is fundamentally different from this social capital approach, in that actions are being taken to change the definition of problems and the ways that problems are solved.

Activist Geographies Geographers have been activists in two primary ways. First, geographers have constructed new theories and explanations for social phenomena that have both substantially altered the ways that students and researchers understand problems, and the ways that academia evaluates research. Geographers, and other social scientists, have challenged the status quo in scholarly approaches, methods, and substantive areas by offering conceptual frameworks that have highlighted the structural dimensions of social life (e.g., Marxist geographies), empowered the participants in research (e.g., feminist geographies), and shifted the topics of research to socially relevant issues (e.g., critical praxis). Second, geographers have engaged in political action aiming at redefining the nature of problems, appropriate processes to address these problems, and alternative visions for the future. For activist geographers, scholarship, teaching, and political action are all necessary for a critical praxis that fundamentally challenges imbalances in power relations and leads to significant social change. In developing new and innovative ways of understanding social life, politics, and economies, geographers have been on the forefront of highlighting social and spatial issues previously omitted from canonical scholarship and research. In focusing on the realities and experiences of marginalized groups and communities, activist geographers and other social scientists have not only brought new information to students and researchers, but have also expanded the ways in which such issues are studied by promoting new theories of oppression, marginalization, and justice. Many have also changed the way that issues are studied by promoting participatory action research, where the participants and academics together define the research questions and appropriate research methods, and together interpret the results of the research conducted. Geographers have used their research findings to promote public debate, to influence public policy and governance, and to realign public perceptions about poverty, oppression, and marginalization in order to help bring about social transformation. They have strived to open public arenas of political debate and decision-making to those who have been shut out of processes that directly affect their lives to promote a more just global society.

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For activist geographers, theory and practice go hand-in-hand, not only providing alternative approaches in the classroom and among academics but also bringing these approaches to bear in the political realm, advocating for justice, equity, and improved quality of life. For activist geographers, research and teaching alone are not sufficient for a critical praxis. Political action is also a central component, where research and teaching inform political action, and conversely, where activism defines research concepts, methods, and topics. There are multiple obstacles to such a critical praxis in the contemporary academic environment, due to broader social, economic, and political pressures brought by neoliberalism and globalization. Two obstacles are especially important and have affected academic institutions across the globe. First, there are rising pressures in colleges and universities to engage in applied research that is seen as beneficial by government agencies and businesses. Such applied research tends to support the current structure of governance and industry, striving for greater efficiencies in policy design and implementation. This focus on efficiencies clearly matches with neoliberalist governance approaches, tending to reinforce existing relations of power and privilege. Second, the expanding use of contract, part-time, and nontenure track lecturers and instructors in universities and colleges creates challenges for activist geographers seeking to link their research and political action. The lack of tenured faculty positions results in a higher-risk environment for nontenured activist researchers engaging in politically unpopular actions in academic and/or public contexts. Moreover, academic institutions, by enlarging cadres of temporary and nontenure faculty, create groups of instructors who must take on multiple teaching positions at different institutions to obtain living wages. Consequently, such instructors have little time to engage in nonpaid labor associated with political action. Even with these obstacles, geographers continue to make significant contributions to scholarly understanding of activism, and to provide clear and compelling linkages to researchers, students, communities, policymakers, and elected officials and broader society between scholarly work and political action.

See Also: Environmental Justice; Identity Politics; NIMBY; Neoliberalism; Resistance.

Further Reading Books Alinsky, S.D., 1947. Reveille for Radicals. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Mitchell, D., 2003. The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. Guilford, New York. Piven, F.F., Cloward, R., 1977. Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. Pantheon, New York. Pulido, L., 2006. Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Articles in Journals Kitchin, R.M., Hubbard, P.J., 1999. Research, action and ‘critical’ geographies. Area 31 (3), 195–198. Kobayashi, A., 1994. Coloring the field: gender, ‘race’, and the politics of fieldwork. Prof. Geogr. 46 (1), 73–80. Lake, R.W., 1994. Negotiating local autonomy. Polit. Geogr. 13 (5), 423–442. Leitner, H., Sheppard, E., Sziarto, K.M., 2008. The spatialities of contentious politics. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 33 (2), 157–172. Taylor, P.J., Frederick, H.B., 1992. How do we know we have global environmental problems? Science and the globalization of environmental discourse. Geoforum 23 (3), 405–416.

Relevant Websites http://www.aclu.org. American Civil Liberties Union. https://metoomvmt.org. #metoo movement. https://www.splcenter.org. Southern Poverty Law Center.

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Activist Geographiesq Levi Gahman, Power, Space, and Cultural Change Research Unit, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Johannah-Rae Reyes, University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago Tina Miller, Kelowna, BC, Canada Raegan Gibbings, University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago Amy Cohen, Department of Anthropology, Okanagan College, Kelowna, BC, Canada Adaeze Greenidge, University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago Sutapa Chattopadhyay, Geography and Development Studies, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, NS, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by P.Routledge, volume 1, pp 7–14, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Anarchism A praxis-oriented philosophy striving to achieve the abolition of hierarchy, domination, masters, and ruling classes. Anarchism seeks to eliminate all exercises of illegitimate and repressive authority, control, and discipline. It is also opposed to both the consolidated and exclusionary power of the state, and the inherent exploitation, alienation, and oppression generated by capitalist, colonial, racist, and heteropatriarchal norms, mores, and modes of governance. Anarchism, as a prefigurative set of ideals and source of emancipatory action, disobedience, and organization, envisions a world constituted by a plurality of diverse autonomous communities that are self-determined and free from stratification. Anarchism thereby works toward creating social relations that are characterized by free association, democratic process, voluntary cooperation, inclusive participation, just treatment for all, and mutual aid. Neoliberalism A constellation of economic, political, social, and cultural practices, policies, and logics, suggesting that private interests be privileged over public need, social welfare, and environmental protection. As a political-economic philosophy, neoliberalism asserts that competition, individual responsibility, and property rights should be granted supremacy over all else; that the state exercise discipline in the service of private capital and profit potential; and that austerity, deregulation, and privatization will accelerate both economic growth and personal self-reliance. Rooted in both colonial and liberal ideology, the capitalist-oriented principles of neoliberalism collapse notions of collectivity and interdependency while excluding and erasing “Other” or alternative worldviews. In short, neoliberalism promotes the commoditization of both the planet and time while seeking to transform, via the power of the state, people into docile capitalist–consumer–citizen subjects. Participatory/action research A research approach, design, and method in which individuals and communities, often in collaboration with academic researchers, cooperate to identify and solve major challenges, issues, concerns, and problems. This type of research typically sees research participants involved in the design, organization, and carrying out research. A key goal of participatory/action research is to place the results of research in the service of communities in order to address their needs and concerns. P/AR typically entails recognizing local knowledge, deliberative process, self-reflexivity, and solutions-oriented collaboration toward an end of effecting positive change. Reflexivity With respect to research practices, ethics, and methods, reflexivity is the exercise of critically and purposefully scrutinizing one’s own positionality, privileges, and social location in relation to those of the participants and communities with whom a researcher is working. Reflexivity is also comprised a researcher mindfully analyzing, taking seriously, and attending to the power relations, boundaries, politics, and expectations that exist among their project partners and collaborators while acknowledging that their presence as a researcher is not neutral. Reflexivity thus entails researchers acknowledging and reflecting upon how a they as researchers are situated within their projects, as well as what their presence is producing in any given context. Social movement An assemblage or network of actors and/or groups engaged in political struggle and processes aimed at widespread transformation and social, political, and/or cultural change. Typically, they employ a host of grassroots tactics and strategies including direct action, protest, collective organizing, civil disobedience, confrontation, subversion, policy critique, advocacy, care work, emotional labor, and even building new social relations and systems. Social movements are often characterized by participatory decision-making, rights-based politics, identity-oriented assertions of dignity, and extractiveattenuating actions. Social movements generally mobilize with a focus on correcting historical wrongs, effecting justice, repairing damage, and struggling for/with poor, dispossessed, oppressed, exploited, neglected, and/or targeted communities. The overarching aim of their work is thus to “move societies” forward into safer, more just, and health-enabling directions. Zapatistas Predominantly Indigenous Ch’ol, Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Tojolobal, Mam, and Zoque people who gained international attention due to their armed revolt in Chiapas, Mexico on New Year’s Day, 1994; the day the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect. While NAFTA and privatization appeared to provoke their revolt, the Zapatistas were formed in 1983 and began clandestinely organizing as a response to over 500 years of ongoing colonial domination, capitalist exploitation, and racist exclusion, which were being exacerbated by intensifying dispossessions and foreclosures of their land

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All guilty parties contributed equitably to this entry. In the spirit of mutuality, lead authorship, must it be attributed, is equally shared, and interchangeable.

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and freedom. Since their 1994 uprising, “for humanity, against neoliberalism,” the Zapatistas have focused their efforts on living a dignified and peaceful life of collective resistance. This entails recuperating land and practicing mutual aid, gender just social relations, food sovereignty, participatory democracy, and their Indigenous traditions/worldviews. In short, their aim is constructing what they refer to as Un Mundo Donde Quepan Muchos Mundos (A World Where Many Worlds Fit) via autonomous education, health care, governance, and moral economic systems.

Activist Geographies The world is undeniably in crisis. Neither the planet nor humanity is immune. The colonizer’s model of modernity has been in the making for over 500 years and is ostensibly operating in full effect. The consequences include alienation, exploitation, repression, and both human and nonhuman sufferingdnot to mention climate catastrophe and ecological ruin. All these realities, when considered, raise two crucial questions: Under what circumstances is continuing to live under such conditions our best option? And why are we accepting it?

Activist geographies emerged as a response or perhaps more appropriately as a multitude of responses to these precise queries. A response much like the ¡Ya Basta! (Enough!) rallying cry issued by Zapatistas to neoliberalism and state power over 2 decades ago, who declared that colonial–capitalist modernity, along with its attendant heteropatriarchal, racist, and xenophobic norms, would no longer be tolerated. The subfield also materialized because of a moral reflex and ethical intuition, that some researchers are instilled with, suggesting that academics have a responsibility (and arguably an obligation, given their access to resources, specialist training, public platforms, and privileges) to make a difference in the world. Likewise, the ethos surrounding activist geographies demands that academics ask better questions; with many of its practitioners contending that if teaching, research, and education are not put in the service of liberation, justice, freedom, and well-beingdthen what is the point? Indeed, activist geographies burst onto the academic scene as a way to assert that “things” (e.g., societies, economies, cultural mores, practices, policies, logics, relationships, worldviews, and conventions) must changedthat we must be reasonable and demand the impossible.

Foundations and Definitions As a subfield, activist geographies is as capacious and kaleidoscopic as it is kinetic and mutable. The subfield has thereby been notoriously hard to delimit due to the range of practices and possibilities it encompasses, not to mention the diverse array of practitioners who are organizing under its tent. It can perhaps be more readily thought of as a dynamic and heterogeneous niche in the process of becoming something, rather than a bounded and crystallized subdiscipline that is quantifiable and has arrived at maturity. As a case in point, most of the authors penning this entry label themselves neither “activist” nor “academic,” and most do not even readily identify as “geographer.” Yet, peculiarly enough, much of the work, research, and writing we engage in can fall under the classification activist geographies. We think there is something quite productive, as well as poetically subversive, in this paradox. This is especially true, given that rigid definitions of what “activism” is, as well as archetypal representations of who “activists” are, have resulted in no shortage of historiographical erasures and present-day exclusions. This same strident critique can also be levied against academia and Geography writ large. This is particularly the case, given Geography’s Euro-American-centrism, fraught imperial history, reprehensible racist trajectories, and paucity of first-generation scholars. Masculinist norms and class stratifications also continue to plague the discipline. Thus, it unfortunately goes without saying that both Geography and activist geographies have much work to do apropos inclusion, acceptance, and coming to terms with their colonial history and present. Activist geographies as a whole, fortunately, does provide researchers with an avenue to engage in this very type of reparative work nevertheless. Because despite all the contradiction and damage Geography has produced, the driving forces behind activist geographies are now, by and large, shared ethics, interdependency, and a will to transform. That is, researchers in the subfield have the opportunity to attempt to atone for the abuses of times past, confront those that are occurring in the present moment, and contribute to the building of a better world. Accordingly, activist geographies are marked by their tendencies, penchants, and passions for challenging conventions, unsettling orthodoxies, mending wounds, and constructing alternatives. Animating pathways out of violence (slow and structural) and seeking peace and harmony (discursive and material) are part and parcel of the activist geographies’ playbook. The spirit of activist geographies is characterized by its affinity for dissent, disruption, care, and revolutionary change even while the subfield is academically and pragmatically identifiable as politically conscious, theoretically driven, empirically rich, and evidence based. The subfield, along with the type of work that comprises it, carries, notably, a set of organic and variable guiding principles and requisite ethical responsibilities. And while these principles and responsibilities are neither strict doctrine nor policed dogma, for the most part, they entail getting organized, doing homework, listening closely, practicing empathy, showing up, being prepared, attending to power relations, active self-reflection, and not only earning but also sustaining trust.

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Notwithstanding the many scholarly and extra-academic exchanges about what an activist does, as well as the myriad dialogs refuting the false divide that is sometimes thought to exist between activism and academia, suffice it to say for the purposes of this entry we, as with many others, are taking an expanded, inclusive, and counter-canonical definition of activist geographies. That is, there are manifold ways to be an activist, as well as a geographer. Incidentally, sometimes people who appear to be activists or who are hired as geographers reject these trademarks outright because of the narrow archetypes they often signify (e.g., white, able-bodied, and male) or because of the limited and classist “scene” they may imply (Global North, cosmopolitan, urban, and liberal). It is merely a matter of the terms not quite working for them in some cases, which are refusals that everyone is entitled to with no explanations required. Importantly, one need not fit a mold, conform to convention, or pin themselves with any sort badge to be welcomed into the house of activist geographies: It is a home to all who struggle. In this vein, all people are arguably active and entwined in (re)producing, wittingly or not, the cultures, economies, ecosystems, discourses, political landscapes, workplace atmospheres, interpersonal dynamics, and social realities (i.e., geographies) they find themselves in. Moreover, the domestic and institutional conditions, circumstances, and spaces in which we live and labor, just as much as our research sites and fieldwork locales, all serve as terrains of political possibility where we can potentially engage in socially transformative, activist work. Performing emotional labor and tending to the injuries (be they physical, psychological, emotional, intergenerational, etc.) of the aggressed-against and afflicted at home, behind closed doors, and within the private and secluded spaces of our institutions and dwelling places is just as important as taking to the streets, factories, and fields to rage against the machines, policies, plantations, prisons, foot soldiers, functionaries, norms, and discourses causing anguish and inflicting trauma. Activist geographies necessitate a diversity of conscientious, cautious, and intentional actors, approaches, strategies, tactics, practices, and processes on all fronts. Let a thousand flowers bloom, without suppression. From this standpoint, the sites and situations that constitute opportunities where activist geographies can take root and blossom are opened up and widened. Academia is a product of and inseparable from “real world” phenomena, and vice versa, even though both academics and people outside of academia do not always perceive it this way. Thus, the possibilities for engaging in activist geographies are seemingly endlessdbe they through qualitative or quantitative methods and regardless of whether they are in the social, political, cultural, ecological, or digital realms. At their most basic level, activist geographies are defined as “writing/ describing the earth” (the “Geography” part) while simultaneously striving to change it (the “activist” element). There is neither a blueprint nor a prescription for how best to go about this, but there certainly are a host of things to be mindful of when doing it in academia.

Activism and Academia Activist geographies can serve as a pathway toward changing things for the better. The inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches to transformation “on the ground” that are emerging from activist geographies in further education have the ability to offer clear explanations of how and why the world has been arranged and is functioning the way it is, academia’s current regrettable limitations notwithstanding. The subfield of activist geographies, too, has the potential to beneficially intervene into and ameliorate many of the world’s most persistent and pressing problems. As scores of critical voices avow, academia and activism should not stand apart from one another. Each should be renowned for its plurality, dialectics, meaningfulness, and lasting contributions. There is some work to be done on all these counts. That being said, there are some individualsdoften dubbed “academic-activists” (distinct from those whom perform exclusively as either “academic” or “activist”) bridging the gap and aspiring to make academia (i.e., education) emancipatory, empowering, and health-enabling for communities, researchers, and students alike. Scholarship here stresses that academic–activist relationships that are ethics driven, nonimposing, and community-anchored lend themselves to developing viable and holistic solutions to the situated and unique challenges that particular places and specific groups face. Universities, thus, can be epicenters of revolutionary thought and radical change. They can be places where like-minded people and those with differing perspectives encounter each other; become better equipped with intellectual tools that will facilitate the unearthing of answers to the societal ills and environmental challenges that are currently distressing the planet; and reciprocally learn, dissect problems, and foster capacities for discernment together. Both universities and academics, whether warranted or not, are often held in high regard in the public imagination; they also carry a great deal of social currency vis-à-vis knowledge and informed judgment. This situation is as fraught as it is generative, and it confers a great deal of responsibility on those working in universities. Consequently, universities and researchers are well positioned to make influential and lasting contributions toward unsettling a repressive and colonial status quo through public policy, shaping discourse, and disseminating data and research findings. The pronounced influence of the industrial complex that is “higher” education thereby remains a reality, which is where activist geographies come in. Academics in the subfield recognize the pivotal roles research, teaching, and writing can play in shaping the future; hence, they are prompted to act and infiltrate the academy. Despite the calls being made for a bridge between academia and activism (with acknowledgment that many argue such a divide is fictive), numerous academic–activists often feel it compulsory to keep their “academic lives” separate from their “activist lives”da pressure felt much more acutely by precariously employed university workers and postgraduate students. The effect of pressure to keep activism out of professional practice is that many aspiring researchers have to downplay their community organizing work when applying to academic positions because they often correctly fear it might negatively affect their job prospects or performance evaluationdand even their day-to-day reputation among colleagues and peers. For instance, it is not uncommon for activists in the academy to confront and raise concerns about quotidian oppressions and systemic

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marginalizations that are occurring within university settings, that is, to become the “killjoys” that unsettle the room and status quo. These ruptures of silence and rockings of the boat are necessary and important, but there are (indefensible) repercussions they face as a resultdnegative ramifications that are disproportionately experienced by women, Indigenous scholars, people of color, queer folx, feminists, disabled workers, trans people, and anarchists. And while there is widespread recognition that the worlds of activism and academia are mutually constitutive and impossible to cleave, practicing activism freely and overtly within universities can, unfortunately, pose career risks and prompt daily anxiety. Moreover, practicing activism comes with a spate of practical challenges. Even if academic–activists are able to nurture strong bonds and shared trust with community collaborators and parallel activist collectives, carving out time, and finding the energy to stay consistently involved induces worry and stress. That is, committing to transformative action and social movement work outside the boundaries of an increasingly fast-paced and ever-neoliberalizing industry (academia) places a tremendous amount of strain on academics, given their institutionally mandated writing, administrative, teaching, marking, service, and grant capturing duties. Moreover, and despite no existing unambiguous bifurcation, it is not uncommon to see division, reticence, and shared skepticism between activist collectives on the one side and academic circles on the other. Activists sometimes question the motives of academics conducting research with marginalized populations and fear they may not deliver on their promises to communities. Conversely, academics sometimes devalue the work, effort, experience, and acumen of activists, feel they are unreasonable gatekeepers, or see their theoretical orientation as being either too “political” or an impediment to “unbiased” research. We offer this diagnosis, of course, with a recognition that there are many blurred lines and sundry shape-shifting among academics and activists. What admittedly does sometimes exist on the ground, though, is a lack of collaboration and communication between professional academics and grassroots activistsdat times, rightfully so. Disconcertingly, this separation can, in some circumstances, also lead to reductive essentialisms, stigmatization, heightened tensions, and even heated bickering, with no one side innately being more culpable than the other. That being said, it is arguable that the onus for initiating unpretentious and open-minded collaboration is on academics given that, in many cases, working together with noninstitutionalized and uncredentialed community organizers, researchers, and activists could be a force multiplier with respect to transformative change. And while no simple path forward exists to bring these two worlds together, we need to recognize the value of activism to the academy, and vice versa. Academics have access to information, resources, funding, networks, and their voices, or ability to amplify other voices, can be utilized to advocate for progressive change. Similarly, academics need to recognize the value that activists’ unique experiences can bring to university campuses and postsecondary education. Here, academic–activists should make a point of sharing their community experiences and grassroots engagement with students, in their classrooms, and with colleagues. Or alternatively, academic–activists should invite extraacademic activists to campuses, given the latter’s pivotal roles in serving communities and shaping local social geographies. University management, too, should take more earnest steps toward encouraging and incentivizing political research aimed at destabilizing and positively changing regressive norms, mores, and forms of knowledge production. Some academics argue that managers should take into consideration transformative community activism and volunteer work when hiring into new positions, reviewing tenure files, and adjudicating postgraduate applications, rather than dismissing this labor out of hand, willfully ignoring its impact, or even worrying about whether activist commitments will take away from outputs, deliverables, and impact. Further to this, why not have community members (especially those from negatively racialized, Indigenous, and/or marginalized groups) be included on hiring and tenure committees? Academic institutions could also allocate more internal funding to supporting research aimed at advancing social and environmental justice causes or they could require partnerships between researchers and grassroots organizations. The fact of the matter remains that universities are domesticating forces and disciplinary institutions for those who harbor dissident and emancipatory politics. Academics and researchers by extension, in signing contracts, performing labor, and following university rules, become complicit with and culpable for the reproduction and (re)instantiation of these institutions, relations, and structures, despite our reticence and reluctance to do so. Figuring out how to carve out space and time within universities to pursue radical change and operate unencumbered from domestication while circumventing complicity remains a crux for activist geographers. Clearly, within academia, there is no pure form of emancipatory praxis nor perfect place for resistance. Nevertheless, the desire to maintain revolutionary convictions, topple repressive structures, and spark hope, as well as given that many academic– activists feel education must be defended from colonial worldviews, capitalist logics, and androcentric knowledge, is what keeps numerous critically conscious researchers signing on and showing up to work in universities.

Principles and Characteristics In light of circumstances illustrated above, the work of activist geographers is twofold. First, they must be frequently concerned with (and active accomplices in) practices of resistance, confrontation, subversion, disruption, and contestation. Second, they must attempt to breathe life into processes of liberation, empowerment, communion, social transformation, and environmental wellbeing, to name a few. There is an emphasis, in both these obligations, on the collective, collaborative, creative, and empathetic tone that struggles for democracy, justice, freedom, and socioecological harmony necessitate. In turn, a potent concentration of defiance and dissidence as well as compassion and kindness are emblematic of activist geographiesdwith the radical and reflexive theories, ethics, methods, and tactics they employ varying tremendously across time, context, and scale. A prevailing concern for relevance, teamwork, and antihierarchical social relations, not to mention an appreciation for humor, irony, iconoclasm, and even playfulness, is also not uncommon among activist geographers.

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The repertoire of emancipatory perspectives that activist geographers draw from is diverse and often dialectical (e.g., anti-, post-, and de-colonial; feminist; socialist; Marxist; anarchist; poststructuralist; queer; crip; antiracist). Yet, their principles and practices are typically bound together by some common threads: 1. Fostering political education and collectivity: recognizing that political education is, as did Fanon, “a historical necessity”; and, understanding that nurturing a capacity for discernment, critical consciousness, and a sense of mutuality while working together cooperatively is, arguably, the lifeblood of revolutionary change; 2. Engaging in prefiguration and interdependency: imagining a world free from domination, oppression, and abusive exercises of power, control, and authority while understanding that histories, geographies, generations, communities, and memories are interconnected and never exist in isolation; 3. Centering praxis, relationality, and reciprocity: critically analyzing, acting, and reflecting upon one’s efforts and engagements, iteratively and concurrently, while engendering care, recognizing the dignity of others, and figuring out how to cultivate meaning, purpose, and self-efficacy for all involved; 4. Attending to power relations and positionality: being conscious about how one’s social identities, status(es), credentials, securities, and privileges (or lack thereof) mediate day-to-day interactions as well as how they influence the way we relate to or alienate others; 5. Focusing on the particular and place-based: rejecting grand theories, totalizing narratives, assertions of neutrality, and objective knowledge claims while recognizing the unique, situated, and idiographic differences of varying communities, contexts, people, and places. In short, many research efforts that fall under the remit of activist geographies begin with simple acts of sharing lived experiences, communicating respectfully with positive regard, and exchanging ideas about solving problems and building better things with research participants and community membersdwithout arrogance. Sacrifices of time, resources, energy, opportunities, and even ego is also ubiquitous among many practitioners of activist geographies, yet these sacrifices are not often recognized by managers and peers, as well as even sometimes by collaborators. Being cognizant of these values and realties while critically assessing and purposefully intervening when research circumstances and relationships become repressive or exploitative serve as touchstones of activist geographies. Interestingly, it is sometimes helpful to define, characterize, and think of something by what it is not. That is, as a subfield, activist geographies is not perfect, by any means. Dishearteningly, lateral hostility, (neo)liberal posturing, ideological arrogance, self-centric promotion, rank-pulling, blinkered gatekeeping, and an entire slate of abusive “isms” continue to be challenges that rear their oppressing heads within activist communities. Incidentally, as countless voices have noted and many readers can attest to, these abusive behaviors, relations, and systems also pose problems within universities (day-to-day institutional settings) and academic circles (global networks and insular cliques). In both spheres, there is a pressing need to unsettle, transgress, and transcend manufactured hierarchies, superiority complexes, and petty antagonisms that prevent inclusion and obstruct unity. This is especially true given how restrictive contrived typecastings of what activists and academics purportedly should be doing are, as well as how negligent narrow envisionings of what sites and spaces they must be operating in can be. Rigid constraints and essentialist stereotypes on “ways of being” are not only anathema to the spirit of revolt, freedom, and inclusion that many activists and academics purport to be imbued with, but arguably, are counter revolutionary. Internal rank-pulling and status-measuring have never served grassroots collectives, social movements, or tertiary/further education well. Avoiding these internecine tendencies within the ambiguous and fluid subfield of activist geographies is necessary toward ensuring its vitality and viability. More pointedly, what might activist geographies look like if divorced from hierarchy, ego, individualism, self-promotion, metrics-obsessions, and the performance of being either an edgy militant activist- or a learned bourgeois academic-subject? That is, if building a better world collectively is the ultimate aim, how might we work toward not being these atomized “liberal-colonial” beings? Or more simply, how can activist geographies write a different story, or stories, vis-à-vis what research is placed in the service of, whose ethics it is beholden to, what its politics of solidarity are, and how people are treated along the way? Here, the significance of stories must be mentioned. Many researchers, particularly those using qualitative, participatory, actionoriented, and creative methods, have a great deal of fondness for taking a storyteller approach to their fieldwork and writing. Stories are illustrative ways of sharing insights, realities, and histories. They are also entry points into relating to each other, and they provide fertile ground for gaining a mutual understanding and appreciation for each other, whether it be between researchers and participants, differing participants, or collaborating researchers. A story does not impose a perspective on the listener, nor does it shame listeners into thinking or behaving in particular ways. Rather, a story offers an opportunity to share a worldview, a lesson, an aphorism, and a vision. It also provides others with the option of listening and subsequently deciding how they will respond to (or ignore) the message. On this front, that is, listening, reciprocity enters the equation. Namely, for all the telling academics do, they do not always reciprocate with listening; nonetheless, when offered a story from others, irrespective of how off-topic, banal, or commonplace it seems, researchers must find themselves actively and attentively listening. In sum, while locking-in a quantifiable and defining set of characteristics regarding activist geographies is fraught and ultimately misses the point, academic–activist researchers are indeed undeniably well positioned to amplify subjugated voices and effect change. And, this is not even to mention their capacity to raise critical consciousness through the articles, books, outputs, and lecturers they deliver. But researchers would also do well to decenter and minimize themselves and listen to the stories, messages, and worldviews of those who have been excluded from the universities that they occupy. This is especially true when it comes to Indigenous communities, negatively racialized populations, and other groups who have been forced to the periphery,

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deliberately silenced, or directly targeted by colonial power, capitalist exploitation, heteropatriarchal scorn, and repression in general. Meaning, if the aim is to breathe life into a caring, diverse, vibrant, and uncompromising tomorrow, might it not prove efficacious to see these things represented and embodied in our collectives, communities, movements, and colleagues today? For activist geographies, the means is also the end.

Ethics, Care, Emotion Accountability and reflexivity are core considerations when engaging in research that falls under the umbrella of activist geographies that should permeate every move an academic makes. It is important to reflect upon and understand our motivations. It is crucial that researchers iteratively ask themselves: For whom am I doing this research? What is driving me to do this? What is my presence in this community/context producing? Whose priorities are being served here? And perhaps most vitally, what is in my heart? These are key queries because the answers to them determine intent, as well as provide invaluable insight into how to pre-empt potential negative consequences. A healthy dose of skepticism in the face of universal truths, grand theories, and claims to “objectivity” is also a part of the activist geographer’s ethical repertoire, as is one’s ability and commitment to pause for deliberation, examine their behavior, and think about not only how they are positioned with respect to the social, cultural, and political context they find themselves in, but also in relation to the hopes, desires, and objectives of those with whom they are working for or beside. Activist geographies are as much about humbly listening, learning, and demonstrating appreciation for others as they are about militantly combatting, upending, and demolishing repressive structures. There are various push and pull factors to consider when it comes to community engagement, activist work, and change-oriented scholarship. Reflecting upon the reasons we are “contributing” is therefore imperative toward ascertaining if we are engaging in conscientious, careful, and ethical practice. Doing so helps us decipher what our goals are in relation to those with whom we are working. Furthermore, this kind of reflection sheds light on whose ends are ultimately being served. It is wonderful when research arrangements are mutually beneficial; however, history shows us that academic research does not have a good track record (i.e., that it has an egregiously colonial one). Some may commit to a research project in order to bolster a curriculum vitae (CV), angle for a specific job, or better situate themselves in the labor market more broadly. Others may be passionate about and carry deep convictions for certain causes or particular struggles. Chances are it is a bit/lot of both. These components and considerations are all part of the research landscape; being mindful of them, as well as of our motivations, enables us to situate ourselves in a research context ethically, be transparent about why we are there, and even provide others with understanding (as well as perhaps something to relate to) when it comes to explaining ourselves. Notably, it is imperative for researchers to be able to explain themselves. Here, good intentions and altruism are not enough. Markedly, sometimes they even pave the way to worsened effects. Research is relational, power laden, and can result in the reproduction or even aggravation of the precise things we ourselves are at odds with and struggling against. Our research “impacts” cannot be predicted and do not exist in a vacuum. In other words, no matter how helpful or self-sacrificing we think we are being when collaborating, this may not be the shared perspective by the people with whom we are working. Attending to these possibilities, proceeding with caution, and being circumspect about the potential unintended consequences and problematic upshots that may arise as a result of our presence as researchers is necessary. Hence, it is important to be ever aware of accountability and engage in reflexivity along the way. Engaging in activist geographies, when approached in a self-reflective and conscientious manner, becomes as much about unlearning, rethinking, and unsettling what we feel we have expertise in as it becomes about acquiring, documenting, archiving, writing-up, publishing, and producing information and knowledge. The politics of epistemology and ontology, here, are obligatory nettles to grasp, given that colonial orthodoxy and Western worldviews have been homogenizing forces vis-à-vis academic research. There are strong arguments being made by Indigenous, displaced, and diasporic communities from all over the world that researchers are not “discovering” anything at all but are instead simply learning from people and land as they encounter each. This necessitates deliberate thought with respect to what discourses we engage in and who “owns” data. This is a particularly relevant consideration, given that most high-impact scholarly journalsdin which securing a publication increases one’s chances of getting a job and enables academics to socially reproduce themselvesdare behind paywalls that require authors to sign over copyright to private capital/corporations. How might “ownership” and control over knowledge be negotiated ethically? Or more readily, under Western worldviews, can it even be? This is especially complex if the knowledge being published is coproduced and coauthored by a community or land or if a researcher and/or community is concerned with making said information freely and widely accessible. Transparency must exist, disclosures must be offered, consent must be discussed, dialog must ensue, and researcher expectations must not only be managed but also be guided by communities. Activist geographies driven by emancipatory politics and theories are hammering home the point that researchers should be aiming to cocreate knowledge and magnify the critical insights of and with collaborators, on the terms and preferences of said collaborators, and via the principles and protocols of communities, not vice versa. Rather than “looking at” or diagnosing communities via the “god trick,” the goals of activist geographies often include offering service, bearing witness, horizontally accompanying the oppressed, and amplifying the voices of others. That is, the aims of those engaging in horizontalist and nonhierarchical activist geographies include researching not “from above” but “together and alongside.” The methods, processes, and final products involved in this scenario demand that we be consensual, transparent, and guided from the bottom up. They require that we recognize different

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ways of being, learning, and knowing, and that we generate information and outputs that are comprehensible, accessible, shared, and beneficial to all involved. This is particularly important on matters that are germane to collaborators. Here, the issue, practice, and politics of care, as well as the salience of emotion, cannot be stressed enough. Nearly everyone’s decision to engage in radical praxis stems from profound emotional responses they have to either injustices or joys they have felt, seen, or heard about in the world. In short, we are moved to action because we care. Acts and offerings of camaraderie, solidarity, and “back-having” are not typically things that emerge from wrestling with an especially abstruse scholarly text so much as they are sentiments and intuitions that spring forth because “we feel it.” While being inspired to lock arms with others and scrutinizing academic articles imbued with seemingly esoteric theory and specialist nomenclature are not mutually exclusive, the point is that how we feel about a particular phenomenon is typically what carries the day with respect to how we react, respond, and deal with it, for better or worse. Pointedly, there is no such thing as an objective agent or purely rational subject when it comes to social research and human behavior. The emotions of a researcher matter. They are undeniably generative, which can at once place researchers in kindred and inspired relationships and also in quite complicated and sometimes compromising entanglements. How researchers handle their emotions in a given scenario or research context, along with the degree to which they either maintain poise, unleash fury, stick to their righteously stubborn convictions or give ground, compromise, and defer are all situational and contingent. The feelings of researchers, as well as those of participants, will influence interpersonal dynamics and interactions in the field. Staying aware of our feelings, as well as being attuned to what they produce for others, is part of a caring, conscientious, and ethics-driven activist approach. To some degree and at any given moment, everyonedinclusive of collaborators and ourselvesdis coping with or healing from something. Being aware of, sensitive to, and guided accordingly by this reality is crucial toward ensuring harm is not exacerbated.

Complexities and Considerations There is no dearth of complexity or contradiction in academia and activism regarding ethics. It is not uncommon for institutionalized ethics, normalized “best practices,” and administrative protocols of universities to clash with the cultural ethics, customs, and processes of communities. This conflict leads to dilemmas and should prompt pause for deliberation among university researchers and managers alike. Put simply, researchers should avoid, at all costs, wielding bureaucratized bourgeois “convention” as a weapon and becoming a parasite, that is, flying/parachuting in, latching on, extracting what they want, busting out when they feel like it, and benefitting from doing so with no regard for either reciprocity or the relationships they were in. And while there is no fail-safe template to follow for avoiding doing so, listening and reflexivity are keys. One must be equally sensible and sensitive when interacting with communities as well as when writing, presenting, and speaking about them. Recognizing one’s situatedness, positionality, privileges, and permissions in relation to the boundaries, ambitions, and the rhythms of life of collaborators is thereby indispensable toward engaging in ethical practice. Being a university researcher, claiming “expertise” and “producing knowledge” beget asymmetries, complexities, and hierarchies apropos power relations, relationships, and representation; activist geographers need to be acutely aware of this. For example, there are myriad accounts attesting to the damage inflicted by “experts” who unwittingly engaged in neocolonizing assertions of power, domination, and extraction as a part of what they thought were helpful research projects and benign offerings of advice. There is also no shortage of stories from Indigenous organizations denoting the fact that non-Indigenous and/or outside collaborators simply are not in touch with the realities and worldviews of those they serve, which creates quandaries and impasses respecting trust. These same dynamics (e.g., rightful and justifiable [dis]trust issues) ring true for a host of other grassroots advocacy groups serving respective marginalized and/or targeted populations (e.g., queer, disabled, negatively racialized, Black, Brown, migrant/refugee, trans, and working class/ poor). Inevitably, working in the domain of activist geographies will put researchers in close proximity to unpredictability, power struggles, the realization that our actions are imperfect, and an awareness that we are often unavoidably contradictory. Moreover, it places us in scenarios in which we must figure out how to navigate interactions with entities and even collaborators who do not share our politics and perspectives. What, then, is to be done? The answer to this question is (in what is a less than desirable answer)–it depends. It is situational and contingent upon the aims, objectives, processes, and ethics (all or some of which may clash) of the researchers, collaborators, and organizations involved in the research. What can be stated quite readily, though, is that transformative research in the area of activist geographies is not always easy. There are stressors, deterrents, and difficulties in research, just as there are in all other areas of life. These take the form of time limitations, resource constraints, lack of enthusiasm, interpersonal tensions, human fatigue, unforeseen obstacles in the field, disagreements among collaborators, personality conflicts, folks not showing up, and sparse support from political and civil society, to name a few. These things happen, but many argue that carrying on, weathering the figurative storm, and persevering via conviviality, openness, patience, and flexibility is worth it. We tend to agree. Markedly, persevering through complications is also loaded with power relations and the potential to silence, ostracize, alienate, erase, essentialize, and treat unfairly those with whom we are working. Some guiding questions here, which can be embedded into the praxis of activist geographies as a means to circumvent the (re)entrenchment of unjust social relations and (re)inscriptions of power asymmetries are both necessary and helpful: How do we approach, relate to, and interact with communities? What are the desires of the participants? How can we make research relevant to community and participant needs? How do we explain our own limitations on what can be done vis-à-vis participant expectations? How do we nurture genuine relationships and establish and

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navigate interpersonal and professional boundaries? What viewpoints do participants hold, and how do they align or depart with ours? What do we do if participants’ politics and convictions run counter to ours? How do we reconcile our role in research that makes us complicit with unjust systems we are organizing against? How do we appropriately attend to the feelings of others without disrupting their lives and community relations? How do we raise issues when stumbling into scenarios that are startling, surprising, or troubling? How much do we disclose about our personal histories along the way? How do we express and take care of ourselves when we are exhausted, frustrated, or feeling helpless? How do we disseminate findings, and who is in charge of this? And finally, who “owns” and decides what will happen with the data, stories, and findings that are generated, and how will these discussions be broached? These questions merely scratch the surface of the bulk of reflections relevant to the dynamics at play in any given research endeavor. And while activist geographies privilege and defend the merit of community engagement, participatory methods, public outreach, and praxis-driven research, there remains potential fallout in the way of romanticization, essentialism, and even hubris if we are not critical of our own practices and assumptions. That is, in expressing an enthusiasm for engaged research, it is important that activist geographers do not undermine the efforts, methods, and approaches of work that is not activist, participatory, or in situ. Similarly, our presence in the field, with communities, and in the lives of participants is neither anodyne nor innocuous, just as there is nothing intrinsically remarkable or magnanimous about it. Moreover, it is crucial to avoid taking purportedly progressive approaches to research at face value, given the terms “engaged,” “participatory,” “transformative,” “collaborative,” and “community-driven” (to name a few) have all been co-opted and adulterated by a spate of neocolonizing entities, organizations, institutions, and actors. In addition, communities and participants (much like researchers themselves) are not inherently noble subjects, just as their situated perspectives and cultural norms are not necessarily impervious to repressive tendencies, nor exempt from critique. (We note this with, once again, full recognition that this statement is also applicable to researchers.) Appreciating that people (whether they be researchers or participants or participant researchers) are idiosyncratic, paradoxical, often flawed, multifaceted humans with feelings is vital to developing relationships that eschew reductive stereotypes. It is also key in mitigating the setting up of unfair expectations regarding researcher impressions and limited understandings of what communities and participants “are.” In sum, the realization that participants, researchers, activists, and academics themselves are “human,” that is, complex emotional beings with unique personalities and sometimes fickle yet sometimes unyielding values who can be contradictory, capricious, and unpredictabledfor better or worse–is one aspect of research and life that is both universal and paramount to pay heed to.

Looking Back, Going Forward To end, it is readily apparent when looking at the state of the world that there is a lot to be outraged about. A grim reality has befallen the planet as a result of humanity’s foray into empire-building, profit-seeking, and constructed “otherings” of those deemed “different” and inferior. Arbitrary constructions of hierarchy and race, unjustifiable exercises of authority, and consolidations of power and wealth across a wide array of differing places have become socially institutionalized, psychologically ingrained, and made status quo. The compulsion to accumulate, exclude, neglect, and dominate has seemingly been granted primacy over the ability to practice care, compassion, empathy, and solidarity. In turn, the subfield of activist geographies, not to mention hope, has never been more relevant than it is today. To return to the opening of this entry, activist geographies emerged as a response. One that was not dissimilar from the intuitive response of the Zapatistas to build Un Mundo Donde Quepan Muchos Mundos (A World Where Many Worlds Fit), and to do so juntos y a la par (together and side by side), through conviviality, relational accountability, and a continuity of thoughtfulness. That is, no matter how rapacious and repressive the powers-at-be or seemingly impossible the circumstances, the common struggle and ultimate aim shared among activist geographers is the wholesale reorganization, transformation, and revitalization of the world as we know it, as well as to echo Fanon, its redemption. And, to mutually work toward these ends–engendering tenacity, tenderness, humility, and resolve–from wherever we are.

See Also: Activism; Empowerment; Intersectionality; Participatory Action Research; Postcolonial Geographies; Radical Geography; Resistance; Social Movements.

Further Reading Amster, R., Deleon, A., Fernandez, L.A., Nocella, A.J., Shannon, D. (Eds.), 2009. Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy. Routledge, New York. Boyd, A., Mitchell, D.O. (Eds.), 2013. Beautiful Trouble: A Toolbox for Revolution. OR Books, New York. Collins, P.H., Bilge, S., 2016. Intersectionality. John Wiley and Sons, Cambridge. Crass, C., 2013. Towards Collective Liberation: Anti-racist Organizing, Feminist Praxis, and Movement Building Strategy. PM Press, Oakland. Fanon, F., 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. Grove Press, New York. Federici, S., 2012. Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle. PM Press, Oakland. Gibson-Graham, J.K., 2006. A Postcapitalist Politics. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Activist Geographies Lorde, A., 2012. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Crossing Press, Berkeley. Mohanty, C.T., 2003. Feminism without Borders. Duke University Press, Durham. Mullaly, B., 2010. Challenging Oppression and Confronting Privilege. Oxford University Press, Don Mills. Piper, W., 2005. The Little Engine that Could. Penguin Random House, New York. Smith, L.T., 2013. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. Zed Books, London. Sudbury, J., Okazawa-Rey, M., 2015. Activist Scholarship: Antiracism, Feminism, and Social Change. Routledge, New York. Tuck, E., Yang, K.W., 2012. Decolonization is not a metaphor. Decolonization: Indig. Educa. Soc. 1 (1), 1–40. Walia, H., 2012. Decolonizing together: moving beyond a politics of solidarity toward a practice of decolonization. Briarpatch Mag. January/February. Available from: http:// briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/decolonizing-together.

Relevant Websites Abahlali baseMjondolo: http://abahlali.org/. ACME: https://www.acme-journal.org/index.php/acme. AFAQ: http://anarchism.pageabode.com/afaq/index.html. Animal Justice Project: https://animaljusticeproject.com/. APWLD: https://apwld.org/. Beautiful Trouble: https://beautifultrouble.org/. Black Lives Matter: https://blacklivesmatter.com/. CrimethInc.: https://crimethinc.com/. Disabled People’s International: http://www.disabledpeoplesinternational.org/AboutUs. Extinction Rebellion: https://rebellion.earth/. Food Not Bombs: http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/. Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/topic/womens-rights. Idle No More: http://www.idlenomore.ca/. La Via Campesina: https://viacampesina.org/en/. Mindful Occupation: http://mindfuloccupation.org/publications/. MST: https://www.mstbrazil.org/. No One Is Illegal: https://toronto.nooneisillegal.org/. Student Activist Toolkit: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/student-activist-toolkit. 350.org: https://350.org/. Zapatista Army of National Liberation: http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/sdsl-en/.

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Actor–Network Theory Gunnar Tho´r Jo´hannesson, Department of Geography and Tourism, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt, Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Actor An actor is a relational effect continually emergent through relational ordering. The traditional subject of social science is the solid individual actor, usually a human being. ANT moves beyond this common notion of the actor. Hybrid According to ANT all things are hybrids in the meaning of composed by different relations. Importantly, the hybrid is not thought as a mix of two pure forms but simply as a condition of the world where nothing is thinkable outside relations. Network The network concept is different within ANT than in mainstream social science. A network is not like a system of pipelines but refers rather to the practices involved in establishing and sustaining relations that is networking. Ontological politics The notion that the reality is done and enacted and, if so, it is possible to enact it in different ways and choose to enact particular versions of reality rather than others. It highlights that practices, for instance research practices, have ontological repercussions. Topology Concept originating in mathematics and refers to how properties remain stable as things undergo movement through space. Topology in the social science focuses on spatial difference and how other than Euclidian spaces emerge and affects the perception of distance. As such, it seeks to unwrap how relations are stretched and folded in ways that changes the perception of nearness and farness and creates diverse spaces. It describes the ways in which objects may be moved through space but still hold some of their coherence and thereby denotes continuity through change. Translation The concept highlights how actors must constantly work in relations for assembling an order and render it durable in time and space. Translation in this sense is a process of making connections between actor–networks. Importantly, with every connection, actor–networks undergo some form of change.

The origins of actor–network theory (ANT) can be traced to science and technology studies (STS) and the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) in the early 1980s. The approach has from the start been especially associated with the figures of Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law, and Annemarie Mol, who are inspired by the French philosophers Michel Foucault, Michel Serres, Gilles Deluze, and Felix Guattari. ANT has spread to different areas of the social sciences and has, since the mid- and late-1990s, increasingly permeated some of the subdisciplines of human geography. From the outset, the central theme of ANT has been the emergence of societal order. Thus, many ANT studies have revolved around questions of how order is accomplished and made stable in time and space. In general, ANT can be described as a methodological device based on a particular worldview, which aims to trace the practices through which society is assembled. ANT can thus be framed as a practice-based perspective, but compared to other approaches it stands out due to its grounding in material relationalism or material semiotics, clearly expressed by the principle of “general symmetry.” This is a methodological principle that states that researchers should refute all pregiven distinctions between classes of possible actors (natural–social, local–global, and economic–cultural) and treat these categories as symmetrical effects of relational practices. Consequently, ANT approaches the world as consisting of heterogeneous relations and practices through which humans and nonhumans alike are treated as possible actors. This means that we cannot take order, structure, or actor as given, as everything is an effect of relational practices. Actors are assembled and structures are arranged in a recursive process of networking or translation. ANT approaches the world as a continuous becoming arrangement. It thus seeks to bypass and move beyond dichotomies or binaries that have served as organizing principles of the modernistic worldview, such as nature versus society and mind versus body. ANT has sought to highlight the frailty of this modernistic concept of the world and to underline how the making of society demands association of diverse elements that never exist as pure categories cut off from the wider fabric of relations. A characteristic term that casts light on this associational process is “immutable mobiles.” The idea of immutable mobile refers to the general term of inscription that describes how a particular entity may be transformed into a stable object that holds it shape in time and space. An example is a ship that works like immutable mobile as long as the relation between all its parts holds still. If the ship crashes into an iceberg its relational ordering may break down with devastating consequences. A more mundane example is a letter that is able to carry pieces of information as long as its (material) components hold together. The point is to underline the role of materiality for social ordering and that the process of moving between places or carving out connections takes an effort and demands that different components of any network hold their positions and play their parts. If not, the order may break down.

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To explicate the argument and the worldview of ANT, it is useful to place under scrutiny the meaning of the key concepts of ANT: actor, network, and theory. The principle of general symmetry is instrumental for a quite different understanding of each of the concepts from what is usual within the social sciences.

Actors In ANT, an actor is a relational effect. Hence, agency is a matter of accomplishment or a collective achievement produced through relational practices, but not an inherent trait of particular subjects such as humans. This point implodes the conventional distinction between subjects and objects. ANT views both as relational, instead of being cut off from each other. Objects are thereby not passive components of our world, they are “quasi-objects,” meaning that they are capable of agency as they affect all interaction. Most importantly, objects and materials are able to stabilize social interaction, rendering it more durable than pure social acts. Humans would only be naked bodies without their props and it is only through interactiondnetworkingdwith materials they become (human) actors. Hence, for ANT, the solid individual actor is nonexistent, rather it is continually emergent through relational ordering. This means that ANT treats all actors as hybrids and perceives agency as spun between different actants in networks.

Networks The conventional view on networks depicts them as a sort of channel between nodes stretched across Euclidian space. The nodes can, for example, be people connected through social networks or places linked through a network of transportation. Within those channels, reciprocal exchange or transport of various sorts can take place, for example, of information, trust, goods, and money. The network concept undergoes changes on two fronts within ANT. First, it is not either social or material but made up of series of heterogeneous actants. This means that networks are always actor–networks. Hence, the social is not some stuff that is transported along a system of pipelines but rather is a part of and an outcome of the relational practices of networking. Second, this means that the work inherent in networks, which are carried out by heterogeneous actants, is highlighted. Hence, networks cannot be thought as distinct from practices, as they necessarily emerge through practices. One of the implications is that it is not possible to trust networks as lines of transport. They emerge through series of transformative practices; they are translations. Actor–networks may be ordered in ways that make them capable of transporting objects intact over distance but that demand work and effort by diverse actors. This demand becomes obvious when such networks breakdown. An example is the global aviation system and how it is affected by volcanic eruptions and clouds of ash. An encounter between ash particles and jet engines in high-altitude disturbs the network order of aviation and may even dissolve it altogether as examples have shown in recent years. Actor–networks are thereby more fluid and insecure but also more material than most other networks conceived in the social sciences.

Theory The concept of theory does also shift its meaning in relation to ANT. The ANT approach should be understood as a theory of what to study rather than an interpretive framework of the world. The concept of translation can be used to cast light on this point. Within ANT, translation refers in general to the relational practices through which actors come into being, that is, the work involved in actor–networks. The concept highlights how actors must constantly work in relations for assembling an order, and render it durable in time and space. Translation in this sense is a process of establishing communication or making connections between actants. The theory of ANT is nothing more and nothing less: in order to gain some insights into the different ways actors use to order their lives, it is necessary to follow their actor–networks in the making, that is, their translations. Through translation actors (and networks) can grow by recruiting evermore actants under their power and can thus construct an order. Translation is a precarious process, which demands a lot of work if it is to create what appears as a solid order; and it follows that even though an order may seem durable, it should not be taken as permanent or ever reaching a full stabilization. The concepts of actor, network, and translation are central to ANT. ANT stresses an empirical investigation, the tracing and descriptions of relations between actors. As such, ANT seeks to illuminate the emergent patterns of order and/or disorder. Early ANT studies, because of this objective, sometimes had a penchant to functionalistic descriptions of relational configuration, where everything seems to turn into networks. In recent years, many students of ANT have sought to distance themselves from such inclinations and have given up the hope to reach the end point of network order.

Critical Remarks At least three critical points with regard to the merits of ANT have been raised. First, some would argue that ANT-inspired approaches are not the most obvious choice for studies of cultural imaginations, geographical imaginations, affect, and emotions. This can be said to be a weak point in early versions of ANT studies, where the focus was often on the process through which a particular order was accomplished rather than the affective qualities or experiences of those same actor–networks; however, ANT is both able and willing to connect to other approaches, and it is as such a weak and modest ordering. For example, some ANT-inspired

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studies have made links to material phenomenologyin order to grasp the poetics of life in an earthly world, where matter is in constant flux and order is not a result of tidy process of networking but rather an outcome of creative and at times contingent process of improvization. Second, somewhat along the same line, ANT has been criticized for not dealing with questions of power, domination, and oppression. This is in spite of the obvious inspiration from Michael Foucault, the familiarity with much work flowing from feminist studies on these matters, and the fact that some ANT researchers have worked explicitly with power relations. While ANT proponents are not known for any normative positions, there is an inherent interest in ontological politics, asking critical questions about the making of our world. Furthermore, Latour has increasingly engaged with political agendas, especially in relation to climate change, as evident in his (2018) Down to Earth. Third, there is the critique that ANT makes fluids a fetish, endorsing a flat ontology appealing to almost neoliberal notions of the freedom of movement and denial of suppressive power structures. This would entail that the actors bear the responsibility of their own situation for better or worse and thus to network a better lives for themselves. While there is a risk that ANT can be used this way, this does not need to be the case, as a variety of studies show. To state, as ANT does, that every order is accomplished through processes of translation and that there are no pregiven classification of actors, does not mean that societal structures are redundant. Simply, that they are not carved in stone and the reason for their existence is that they are enacted and performed in actor–networks. This point relates to continuing debates in geography on the concept of scale. ANT confronts the idea of scale as having an explanatory power. Rather, scale is in the same sense as the social, part of what needs to be explained. Scale is, according to ANT, first of all a manifestation of actor-networks. Importantly, this does not mean that ANT research would erase the idea of scale but rather would reinterpret it as emergent through networks, which enact topological spatiality, which again effects and affects possible practices. The notion of flat ontology does thereby not presume radical relativitism but urges the researcher to refute pregiven distinction between large and small, micro and macro, and focus instead on the practices through which differences in size are accomplished. During the last decade the main advocates of the approach, Latour and Law, together with others such as Annimarie Mol and Vicky Singleton, have emphasized the politics involved in research and partly moved into more normative approaches and general philosophical lines of thought. Latour has, for instance, in his Compositionist Manifesto (2010) called for research that takes the political task of composing a common world seriously. The notion of ontological politics implies that the reality is done and enacted and, if so, it is possible to enact it in different ways and choose to enact particular versions of reality rather than others. The political contribution of ANT may be said to provide tools to trace societal ordering, which gives possibility to question and engage in ontological politics that shape our lives in different ways.

Moves Into Geography Bypassing Dualisms The import of ANT into the subfields of human geography has mainly taken place along two interconnected routes, both of which were inspired by the principle of general symmetry, which offered a way to bypass what seemed to be insolvable dualisms in geographical research. First, during the mid-1990s, geographers turned to ANT as a source of inspiration for moving beyond the traditional dichotomy between society and nature. For many, the relation between society, culture, and nature seemed too complex and messy to be easily fit into the conceptual framework of modernity. Geographers in Britain working along these lines included, for instance, Jonathan Murdoch, Nigel Thrift, and Sarah Whatmore. The borderline between what was natural and what was social or cultural was construed as increasingly messy in times of global warming, increasing mobilities, expanding use of information technologies, evermore refined cyber-technology, and genetic sciences. The ANT approach promised a way to bypass the dualism between nature and society by shifting the focus away from a priori categories toward the associations and relations through which these were emergent. A very important element of ANT in this regard is that it sees nature and the material as integral to the social and the cultural; the material is already there but is not given the status of an add-in variable in a cultural explanation of society as human geographers were prone to do. Key concepts in this regard are the hybrid and quasi-objects. The argument made by ANT is that all things are relational or hybrids and if they seem to be solid bits and pieces, it is only the effect of networking. Importantly, the hybrid is not thought as a mix of two pure forms but simply as a condition of the world where nothing is thinkable outside relations. In the terminology of ANT, the world is like a seamless web and the challenge is to follow how this web is broken up and ordered in the form we recognize as, for instance, society and nature. A second point of entry for ANT into the realm of human geography was configured by a general debate on philosophies of science. Roughly put, this discussion drew its energy from a rift between those adhering to realism (especially the natural sciences) and those advocating social constructionism (especially the social sciences). As the making of scientific knowledge was one of the earliest domains of ANT research, ANT found itself somewhat caught in the eye of the storm. It did not, however, align easily with either side of the argument. The proponents of ANT framed the approach as much more material than social constructionism and much more discursive than realism. It thereby offered a middle way that could move beyond the realist–constructionist impasse. This offer was welcomed by human geographers who saw the realist–constructionist discussion as not fruitful. ANT highlighted that hardcore social constructionism was the flip side of hardcore realism. Risking oversimplification, it can be said that while the former had proclivity to use society and culture as explaining everything, the latter gave the power of explanation to natural laws or technical determinism. The principle of general symmetry is critical in this regard. In short, the theorem of general symmetry renders

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in principle all actants equal. ANT then aims at tracing the practical orderings underlying our society and hence the ways power relations and societal structures are formed and stabilized. It can thus be said that ANT suggests anontology with no taken for granted horizontal or vertical hierarchies; it seeks to trace the becoming of the ontological order we live by. Reality is thereby nothing one can think up independent of the crude and concrete effect of material presence. Cultural meaning is not inscribed in a straightforward way onto material objects but is emergent through relational practice, which is a political process. ANT thereby contends that reality is indeed constructed, but it shifts the focus away from the purely social to the practices of ontological construction, or what Latour has also described as composition of the world, which takes place through heterogeneous actor–networks.

Economic Geography One subfield which has been affected by ANT is economic geography. For economic geographers, the most interesting part of ANT has been the centrality of the concept of network. During the 1990s, economic geographers paid more and more attention to the ways the economic was situated in a wider fabric of social relations and networks of cultural institutions in a search for more nuanced accounts than were possible with the traditional macroapproach of political economy. The focus of analysis was increasingly on the interconnections between the cultural and the economic and how socioeconomic linkages worked to shape the spatial organization of the capitalistic market economy. Hence, relational concepts such as chains and network gained ground, for example, in research in Global Commodity Chains. As was explained above, ANT endorses a different kind of network view than is usual within the social sciences. ANT has thus not been taken on board by many economic geographers but it is increasingly accepted and appreciated. ANT made it possible to recast economy-relevant relations and their ordering in time and space, bypassing a clear distinction of scales (local, regional, global) emphasizing instead that networks are simply made in very different ways and have various forms, sizes, and durations. The implication is that ANT highlights the work and the processes underlying the more or less far-reaching networks comprising economic activities. This is not to deny the significance of scales but to highlight that discrete scales are accomplished and to focus on the local or the global, for instance, as source of spatial difference and differentiation may result in losing sight of an array of everyday activities that produce spatial difference. ANT thereby offers a perspective to study the work of localizing and globalizing, understood as practices and performances that render particular actor–networks so stabilized and robust that they can extend over long distances, even worldwide, while still remaining local at all points. This approach makes macrotheorizing of economic processes, conventional in political economy, problematic because that approach depends on a distinction between local life world and global world system logic in explaining place-specific effects of a globalized economy. The ANT approach also confronts the usual framework of analysis used by institutional economic geographers, which depends on a distinction between social interaction on the microlevel, often seen as unfolding within a bounded place, and macrolevel connections between places. The reason is that more attention is given to diverse forms of connectivity of places and regions that enacts topological space. Places are seen as coming into being through relations rather than taken as fixed points that stabilize economic networks. Similarly, markets are not taken for granted, but are understood as assembled, performed, and materialized through the process of network or process of economization. The geometric grid-like surface of the world on which economic life has been projected is thereby increasingly being disrupted. The main contribution of ANT to economic geography is that it offers more detailed empirical studies with qualitative analysis of how economic relations develop in practical details, which have been missing to date. The implication of these studies has for example been to question the validity of central concepts in economic geography but also policies of economic development, such as those focused upon the concept of the cluster. ANT-inspired analysis in some cases has shown how clusters, especially in experience-based industries, do not fit the expected conventional spatial organization of clusters as fixed and territorial. ANT has also contributed to understanding entrepreneurship in more nuanced ways, framing it as a relational accomplishment, thus destabilizing a conventional narrative of the independent and heroic entrepreneur.

Nature and the Anthropocene Bypassing the nature–society dualism has been instrumental in the contribution of ANT to environmental studies and Naturpolitik, most obviously propelled in relation to climate change. More than concrete detailed analysis, Latour with his Politics of Nature (2004), An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013), and Down to Earth (2018) has moved into political philosophy, challenging conventional understandings of who and what are to be counted as political actors. Along with other contributions, from pragmatism (the tradition from Dewey) to vital materialism (Bennett, Deleuze), Latour suggests a new conceptualization of nature, environmental politics, and the Anthropocene. This endeavor has been a cross-disciplinary, with geographers working alongside sociologists, anthropologists, and political philosophers. Much of the work is firmly situated in the field of science studies, Latour’s field from the beginning. Studies of this kind often operate with rather abstract conceptual ideas about organizing the political and working with diplomacy as a way to deal with environmental issues. The goal is to develop new forms of political ecology, which allow sciencesdrather than Sciencedto engage more constructively in the kinds of development of technology needed. In Down to Earth, Latour suggests new political orientations occupied with the “geo-social,” territories and the “earthbound.” Thereby he engages with the agendas of political ecology, but in other ways than in the work of critical Marxist geographers, Swingedouw and Erntson (2019) Urban Political Ecology in the Anthropo-obscene, focusing on the critique of capitalism.

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Geographers and fellow social scientists from other disciplines have taken Latour’s suggestion for a multinatural approach into concrete studies of, for example, animals and wild life, nature conservation and biodiversity, genetically modified organisms, and climate policy. Common to these studies are that nature can no longer be taken for granted and that it is imperative to look for multinatural alternatives where humans are situated as earthlings firmly on the ground alongside other living creatures. Since answers can no longer be found in single Nature, questions are raised about on what grounds decisions can be taken. This question opens the possibility to start with detailed empirical studies of, for example, biodiversity and to reach normative questions. Multinatural approaches suggest to view the future as open and include public experimental work for carving out coexistence with the planet. Another example is how ANT has inspired studies in topologies of climate change, investigating how particular scales and orderings are produced in the performance of professionals, drawing on social sciences in their practices. There is still plenty of room for critical scrutiny of the ways that economics and other social sciences are translated into ordering multiple natures. Here, the central role of ANT is to raise critical questions about the way so-called global challenges, such as climate change, are performed in particular scales. Thereby ANT can suggest how to reconsider the usual enactments of environmental issues, but we still need to see where ANT-inspired political philosophies can lead in practice. Meanwhile the cutting edge analytical contribution from ANT in works by among others Annemarie Mol is to study multiplicity in practice by tracing the diverse relational enactments of a given phenomenon. Thereby she seeks to overcome the view of perspectivism, common in social sciences, which traces multiple approaches to a single reality instead of multiple versions of reality.

Tourism and Experience In recent years, ANT has gained in prominence in studies of tourism geography, not least in relation to research on destination development and tourist experiences. The concept of tourismscapes refers to how destinations and experiences are accomplished through multiple actor-networks and along those lines tourism has been described as an ordering, which contributes to the (re) making of the world. The concepts of multiplicity and multiple worlds have especially been put forward in what has been called post-ANT. In simple terms, it can be said that post-ANT studies emphasize mess rather than order, building on concepts such as multiplicity, heterogeneity, and ontological politics. ANT’s traditional ethnographic solid analysis of the processes of networking has provided detailed studies on the “production” side of tourism, e.g., in studying how tourist destinations are enacted through enrolling numerous human and nonhuman actors, while the concept of multiplicity has been instrumental in providing alternative descriptions of emerging destinations as well as tourists’ experiences. Here the focus is more on following how tourism is done and enacted in different ways, tracing the connections and encounters that may produce controversies but are as such also creative events affecting the societal ordering. As such, tourism is seen as “a matter of concern”open for exploration and interference rather than a solid “matter of fact” that waits to be explained and criticized. Post-ANT approaches, inspired by the works of Deleuze and Ingold among others, have framed experiences as relational accomplishments beyond traditional dualisms between subject and object, mind and nature, and body and environment. Experiences are about how multiple worlds are connected and interfere with each other, how absence–presence is managed and how the virtual and the unexpected unfold often through nonconventional ways of spatial ordering. ANT’s contribution to research in tourism and experience comes with its ability to study in detail and to describe how tourism and experience come into being and work. This research is open-ended and open to combine with other approaches, such as ideas about, for example, “blank figures” and “cognitive actants.”

Urban Assemblages and Design The multiple and material configurations of cities is an obvious field for studies inspired by ANT. Some of the most central books in urban geography, such as Graham and Marwin’s (2001) Splintering Urbanism and Amin and Thrift’s (2002) Cities already hinted in this direction, and this orientation was further unfolded and exemplified in Farías and Bender’s (2010) Urban Assemblages collection. ANT’s significant contribution to urban studies and to urban geography in particular lies in its attention to how urban built environments are designed, engineered, and built. ANT became a lens to lead much more attention into the role of technology and nature in cities. The inspiration supported tracks of critical urban studies already engaged with the political ecologies of cities. It also challenged Marxists’ critical approaches in urban geography, where the structural powers of capital and the state left little room for multiplicity. ANT allows scholars to approach the urban as multiple, and only partially localized, assemblages, where domains overlap in surprising ways. Among others, Latour himself with Hermant showed examples of this capacity in the Paris ville invisible (1998) mosaic. ANT thus opens new alleys of research into the production of urban space. First and foremost, ANT invites students and researchers to recast any spatial assumptions previously attached to the city or the urban. As in other fields, in practice ANT’s crucial contribution to urban studies comes together with solid empirical work. It is through rich case studies that previously frozen conceptualized ideas of either spatial form, economic units, or cultural formation are overcome. Cities are not given entities, but messy and fluid, enacted through multiple practices, where different realities coexist. ANT’s attention to the making of cities comes together with its interest in architecture and design. While ANT emerges from ethnographic work in science labs, Yaneva took ANT into the architectural office, based on the assumption that architectural works cannot be understood without considering the design practices through which built architecture is accomplished. This research demonstrated how design processes are complex practices full of iterations and “meandering.” The ethnographic account

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documented how architects work with design together with models and other material representations, leading to results, also surprising to the designer These observations are valid for design in the broader sense, more than architecture. ANT is particularly helpful in design research, where designers and researchers come together, since ANT has long insisted that researchers are not only studying but also contributing to making the world. Concepts and studies do have real-life effects and ANT helps open the black boxes of designing, through making us aware of the heterogeneous actors involved in stabilizing societies through spatial designs. It does not suffice to study what designers (including architects) say, since we need to study what they do, and what they do is not only design, but how design works in practice. Situated uncertainty is thus a core characteristic of both design processes and designs, both of which are contingently depending on factors, which are unpredictable yet (somehow) irreversible, when built.

Concepts and Methodologies in Geography ANT can be said to be proposing a relational geography. There are two aspects of this proposal that need mentioning: first are the basic characteristics of the geographical imagination advocated by ANT, and second is the methodological implication of this perspective for geographical research.

Topological World Actor–networks necessarily depend on nonhuman actors for extension across space and durability in time. To trace the practices of actor–networks involves following the networks and associations that configure and shape the sociospatial landscape of the world. Attention to time and space has often been an implicit feature of ANT studies, although it has been central to the philosophies that ANT is based on, such as in the work of Serres. Questions of space and time are currently being increasingly addressed in ANT studies that express both an interest by practitioners of ANT in geography and by geographers in potential applications of ANT. Central to ANT is the process of translation, that is, transformative practices that describe the making of connections, assemblages, or associations. This is the productive force of actor–networks. When translation is studied, it is evident that it enfolds combinations and recombinations of diverse objects or actors. This is a process that plays withdand goes beyonddthe relation between proximity and distance. Actor–networks thereby render distant things seemingly proximate and conversely the inclusion or exclusion from actor–networks creates new distances between actors. These moves disturb the conventional geometric conceptualization of space. The world is no longer a grid-like surface on which it is possible to draw stable and enduring lines of proximities and distances. This kind of Euclidian geometry and the cartographic geography that builds on it is rather seen by ANT as one instance of “spacing” and “timing.” Euclidian space is a particular form of time-space that does not have a monopoly on spatial imagination. There are other possibilities, other ways of spacing and timing through which the sociospatial landscape emerges. ANT suggests a turn to topological ways of thinking. Topologies can describe the relational ordering of spaces for which geometry cannot give a good indication of proximity and distance. Topology is not dependant on linear time. It can deal with timespaces that manifest as fluid, mutable, or even flickering as fire. These are spatialities that emerge through enactment of complex and heterogeneous relations. Topology grasps sociospatial realities that are beyond measurement but which are all based on relations. A topological world calls for topological geographyda geography that can deal with complexity of relations and networks. A topological world is a world of multiple spaces where continuity is accomplished through change. The Euclidian space is not written off but only thought of as one possible way to order spatial configuration of relations enacted through actor-networks. Increasingly, the proponents of ANT and geographers alike are pursuing such a multiple approach that recognizes the interference between forms of time-spaces. That approach demands an apprehension of how any object or any actor is part of and coproducer of many timespaces. In other words, an actor is basically an intersection of multiple relations or, to cite one of the old mantras of ANT: Every actor is a network.

Methodologies ANT is characterized by emphasis on description, where stress is put on following the relational practices of actor–networks. Most often this has been done through ethnographic research methods but there are also studies using online techniques for tracing relational bundles of practices manifested on the Internet. In line with ethnomethodology, the researcher should trace the footsteps of the actors under study and describe their ways of ordering the world. It follows that one should trust the actors so as not to render them subject only to external explanations. The explanations coming from the study should be internal, emerging out of the field of practice under study. In this regard, it is important to highlight the relational worldview of ANT. The field is seen as always a relational achievement and many of the practices going on in every field revolve around its maintenance, or the continual enactment and reenactment of the field. This is a key point if the study is not to turn out to be a functionalistic exercise in filling up a blank field with descriptions of networks. It follows that the relations in and out of the field in question are as important as what goes on within it, as these constitute the field to a large extent and hence, the boundary of a field is primarily a practical achievement.

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This relational understanding of the field has come as an inspiration for geographers grappling with the geographical dimensions of the field and fieldwork. The commonsense notion of the field in human geography has been that of a bounded space, or at least a space that can be metrically defined and located in Euclidian space. Thinking of the field as an actor–network that draws on and enacts diverse time-spaces opens up new pathways for fieldwork. It becomes possible to move the focus from a description of the content of a fielddoften predefined by particular actorsdtoward the work and the contingencies involved in constructing the field. ANT is thus able to sensitize fieldworkers to their own role in constructing the field they are describing. This point underlines that an ever-present feature of fieldwork is that it partly creates the field it describes as it carves out situated knowledge of it thus underlining that method is performative. In continuation of an intensive debate with critical Marxist positions about the concept of scale in geography, which was only partly inspired from Latour and Law’s critique of scale, Woodward, Jones, and Marston (2010 in Area) proposed a new orientation toward the site. The main inspiration comes from Deleuze and not the least Schatzki. The site is an event space, somehow selforganizing and in ongoing movement with variation and difference. It is an approach, as critical to networks and flows as to scale, taking a particularistic stance, carving out specific materialities to be examined. The site has specificity and is not selected to test against any preordained problems or solutions. It embraces methodologies of engagement and participation, following events and objects from the inside and through experimentation. Although ANT is only a minor inspiration to this example, it is an indication of a kind of interest with the specific and with how things and processes that ANT has also contributed to come into being. In sum, ANT-inspired relational geography acknowledges the ontology of relational practices as a starting point of research. It also acknowledges that the implication is a slight confusion of ontology and epistemology, that is, what the world is like and what can be known about that world. Practitioners of relational geography partly assemble the time-spaces they describe, through their research practice. The aim of such practice is not to find a fit between an account of a field and its reality but rather to find ways to move on, keep on course, or change it, and thereby not least to reflect on alternative routes of “travel” through life. ANT has attained a place in the toolbox of contemporary human geography. It has spread widely into different subdisciplines often as a part of more general relational turn in the field. Taking the aforementioned critiques into consideration it seems, however, imperative not to link ANT too tightly to other network approaches, simply because it is about much more than networks in the conventional sense of the word. ANT is thereby an important part of the inspiration to a broader new tradition of relational geographies as it seeks to keep the concept of network fluid and mutable. ANT should also inspire geographers to let their concrete analyses combine with experimental engagements of codesigning our world together with others.

Conclusions ANT is not a single theory about the world, but a theory of what and how to study multiple topics. Bypassing dualisms between nature and societydand between the nonhuman and the humandit has increasingly influenced and inspired several subfields of geography. The inspiration from ANT blends with other sources of inspiration, for example from vital materialism, material phenomenology, and pragmatist philosophy. While ANT has been discussed in metalevel discussions about human geography in general, it seems that its adoption into human geography will become much more important in subfields through diverse concrete studies, where ANT has been an inspiration to develop new methodologies and conceptualizations. The more it is acknowledged that ANT is not a single or stable theory or worldview, the more it becomes obvious that ANT insistently inspires analytic work, rather than being part a philosophical debate. One indication is how recent development in the contribution from ANT may propel alternative ways to study climate change and policy in the Anthropocene. Latour’s Down to earth orientation to the specific compositions of “sites” suggests methodological development that also has political implications. This implies an acknowledgment of the specificities of particular sites, following and taking part in emerging and experimental processes. While situated knowledge has been discussed and advocated on the metalevel for long, there are potentials in human geography to cocreate situated knowledge in practical collaboration in- and outside of academia. This is not to stay with the particular itself, but we need to work site-specifically in order to cope with major societal change such as climate change. This way, the small and the large are not apart, they aredand must bedconnected in order to compose common worlds.

See Also: Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies; Cultural Turn; Networks; Regional Development and Noneconomic Factors.

Further Reading Bingham, N., Thrift, N., 2000. Some new instructions for travellers: the geography of Bruno Latour and Michel Serres. In: Crang, M., Thrift, N. (Eds.), Thinking Space. Routledge, London, pp. 281–301. Farias, I., Bender, T. (Eds.), 2011. Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies. Routledge, London. Latour, B., 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Latour, B., 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Law, J., Hassard, J. (Eds.), 1999. Actor-Network Theory and after. Blackwell, Oxford.

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Law, J., Singleton, V., 2013. ANT and politics: working in and on the world. Qual. Sociol. 36, 485–502. Michael, M., 2017. Actor-Network Theory: Trials, Trails and Translations. Sage, London. Mol, A., Law, J., 1994. Regions, networks and fluids: anaemia and social topology. Soc. Stud. Sci. 24, 641–671. Van der Duim, R., Ren, C., Jóhannesson, G.T. (Eds.), 2012. Actor-Network Theory and Tourism: Ordering, Materiality and Multiplicity. Routledge, London & New York. Whatmore, S., 2002. Hybrid Geographies. Sage, London.

Relevant Website Bruno Latour: http://www.bruno-latour.fr.

Aeromobilities Weiqiang Lin, National University of Singapore, Singapore Mor Shilon, TechniondIsrael Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Aerial warfare Military actions conducted with the help of airplanes, airships, and other flying objects developed since the early 20th Century. Bombing and ordnance are common practices of such military actions. Affects/affectivities Transpersonal forces and intensities that connect bodies as a result of contact or interaction. Affects are loosely related to ideas of feelings and emotions, though refer to deeper sensations in the body. Airspace The atmospheric interface or medium through which airplanes traverse. In some contexts, airspace may also refer to the spaces that are related to flying or flight. Code Computer software that encodes space and transforms it into a series of digital information for processing. Drones Unmanned aerial vehicles that are controlled and operated from a remote location on the ground. Geobody A concept coined in the 1990s typically to refer to the geographic substance of a nation-state, such as its delimitation, boundaries, and mappable extent. New mobilities paradigm A school of thought derived from the early 2000s which seeks to foreground mobilities and their inherent meanings as the basic foundation of social reality. This viewpoint seeks to complicate and nuance perspectives that concentrate solely on static categories, such as places, societies, and territories. Surveillance Refers to the active and visual monitoring of spaces and bodies, to the end that appropriation action can be taken against them to ward of dangers and perceptions of threat. Verticality Refers to the dimension that is perpendicular to the earth’s surface. It can encompass the space above ground as well as under the ground and sea. Thermal screening The process of using infrared technologies to screen temperature profiles of people and objects at airports.

Aeromobilities is a relatively new concept that entered into the lexicon of geography in the late 2000s. As of September 2018, a topical search on the Web of Science returns 55 distinct hits on the subject (starting from 2006), with several books published to address this concept exclusively, including titles such as Aeromobilities (2009) and Peter Adey’s seminal Aerial Life (2010). Making a distinction from earlier research on air transport, the study of aeromobilities follows after the broader “new” mobilities paradigm to delineate flight/flying as a sociocultural phenomenon that exceeds the provision of air services. In particular, this corpus of work is less concerned with the spatiality and distribution of airline networks and airports than with the culturally laden nature of, and the societal impacts resulting from, becoming mobile by air. The focus of aeromobilities not only is limited to modern-day commercial aviation but also encompasses military uses of air power and historical accounts of early flight. For proponents of this less economistic approach to understanding air travel, careful attention to genealogies and practices of air travel has contributed to a richer understanding of what it means to be airborne. It moves us from the realm of economics to politics. Tracing the sociocultural development of flight in this manner portends that new distinctive geographies are continually opened up and invoked in this research. Of these sites of inquiry, the airport (rather than nodes and hubs), airspace (rather than networks and lines), the aircraft (rather than models and ranges), and abject bodies (rather than untapped or unreached markets) have taken center stage in recent discussions. In particular, scholars seek to account for the intimate processes that materialize and signify aeromobilities at practical junctures of flight. Although these disparate geographies may not always seem to speak to each other as a coherent whole, they precisely shed light on the multiplicitous domains and spatialities that make up aeromobilities from the inside out. They impel a need to move away from monodimensional world geographies of air transport and its regional structures, to concentrate on the geographical worlds that usher in the air age as multifaceted and unique modes of living.

Airport One of the key sites of aeromobility research has been that of the international airport and its terminals. While many of these studies began as critiques of the design of airportsdas spaces created for surveillance, human control, and consumptiondmore recent work has drawn attention to the diverse subjectivities that give airports their differentiated texture. Structural shifts, including oversupply in the aviation industry, the entrenchment of the low-cost carrier model, and increased labor migration have meant that aeromobilities have become more diverse. The acceleration of global mobility has produced new subjectivities in-transit. Accordingly, scholars have begun to examine and analyze the varied practices of passengering and experiences of traveling through the air.

International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, 2nd edition, Volume 1

https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10359-2

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Although it might be expected that social differences based on ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and gender will determine people’s capacity to move through airports, new research has found that other social hierarchies can be spontaneously created to shape and differentiate people’s movement through airports. First, social differences outside of airports do not necessarily hold within them. In airports, the white male is not always the privileged seasoned traveler who is familiar with global places. Transnational migrants who often circulate between “home” and “away” can develop skills of extreme competency that help them navigate through certain airports, sometimes proving to be more literate at these airports compared to transnational elites. Second, moving through airport checkpoints, which entails close interactions with objects and subjects, makes social statuses unstable in airports. The highly skilled passenger who tends to move through airports easily and efficiently may find him/herself perplexed when a biometric machinedwhich usually speeds up his/her departureddoes not work, forcing him/her to stand last in line for passport control. Encountering different obstacles, the privileged passenger might find him/herself located at the bottom of the airport’s sociospatial hierarchydmoving slowly and unsurely. Finally, global transformations or personal life events can change the status of a passenger and yield different experiences of air-traveling. Whether a migrant on-the-move or a business person who often flies abroad, when a person does not fly for a long time, he/she loses up-to-date travel experience. For example, due to the evergrowing use of technology, a former frequent flyer used to ground staff assistance in airport facilitation may feel confused when he/she encounters self-check-in kiosks for the first time. Similarly, when a personal status is changed (e.g., a new father who flies with his newborn) the passenger can easily find him/herself with no pertinent travel experience to deal with new travel situations. Tracing scripts of flowing and dwelling, recent scholarship has also explored how the passenger is becoming “atomized” in the facilitation process, and the ethical consequences of this silent processing of humans as units and figures. While some call to attention the dehumanizing detachment of the passenger’s body from his/her individual self during security checks, others address the contingent coordination of body, luggage, and documents (BLD) in the daily assembling of air passengers. The latter is particularly pertinent in capturing the flexibility of airports in producing new subjectivities. Instead of reproducing or recreating familiar social differences (e.g., status, class, age, and gender), the coordination of the BLD at airports engenders unexpected and indeterminate configurations of personhood and identity each time people move through the airport’s checkpoints. Put in another way, in the process of making passengers out of people, the airport and the encounter of subjects with objects within it are highly generative of tentative social identities, working with people’s varied abilities to create a spectrum of “skillful” versus “illiterate” passengers. The airport thus produces new passenger subjectivities each time, at the interstices of the scripted coordination of flows in its terminals, and the passenger’s agency in navigating the process of BLD assembling. The quickening of aeromobilities has resulted in diverse social figures in transit and dynamic social orders in terminal spaces. In the process of “making” passengers, the airport produces a motley crew of users whose unstable statuses undermine prevalent social categories while creating impromptu social hierarchies that reflect people’s capacities and competencies in moving through the airport. Not only does the airport practically create new social categories, as a node filled with a mélange of subjects and objects, it also ensures that these categories are spontaneously regenerated and recreated while passengers course through its spaces. Recent aeromobilities research has thus teased out a more tenuous dimension of airport subjectivities, where flows do not occur in machinic ways, but rather as provisional assemblages and folds.

Airspace If airports represent a space of varied subjectivities and differentiation, airspacedin the sense of that literal medium extending above the Earth’s surfacedis, by contrast, a place largely dependent on preformulated and stable scripts. To be more precise, highly regulated and predictable rules govern this space, encompassing issues such as where aircraft can fly, how air traffic is to be controlled, and which airspace block a country has oversight of. As an often-forgotten, but vital, aspect of air transport, airspace is not simply an atmospheric void for airplanes to pass through but is a sociotechnical creation replete with particular logics and modalities of operation, requiring, most of the time, strict compliance and near-universal standardization. In other words, while the safe, efficient, and punctual production of airspace is a taken-for-granteddand expecteddpart of air travel culture today, it is highly contingent on the careful arrangement of airways, control zones, and vertical geographies, with the help of increasingly sophisticated software. Some authors have used the concept of “code” to shed light on a particular modus operandi in airspace production. They contend that modern aviation is predicated on a series of aircraft monitoring systems that are fitted onboard flight decks, to relay real-time computer simulations, statistics, and a myriad of multisensorial warning systems to alert operators to imminent dangers in anticipated futures. Insofar as these signals and preemptive readings direct the flight crew, airspace is also encountered by pilots not so much in its physical or material form anymore, but as a latticework of virtual data points, which guide navigation and the task of aviating. This is not to say that pilots are unable to override code and make independent decisions on the daily running of airspace. But the conjuration of airspace as a three-dimensional simulated reality to be acted upon, apart from its material exigencies (e.g., poor flying conditions), gestures to the advent of a new kind of space-making that aeromobilities have led and helped to propagate. The histories of simulations in commercial aviation strongly overlap with military practices. In fact, advancements made in the latter, including the use of radar and the implementation of aerial surveillance, have often crept into civil aviation and its design. A parallel development involving virtual technologies is the deployment of simulation in aerial warfare. Here, aeromobility takes on a more sinister guise, where it no longer simply transports but exerts geopolitical power through anticipatory targeting from above. Correspondingly, airspace ceases to be a travel space to safeguard from collisions and dangers, but a platform from which to

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eliminate “adversaries” on the ground. The use of drones to surveil “enemy” territories and to transform an earthbound target into an abstraction and rationality for killing has especially prompted scholars to critique the coupling of humans with aeromobile machines to destroy lives from a distance. Other authors have extrapolated this logic of abstraction to urban control, questioning the prevalent use of similar technologies to cast a pervasive eye on urban crime, thereby militarizing the city. Notwithstanding, although drones may be prone to mete out aerial violences in military or militarily inspired fashion, they have in other contexts looped back to cater to civilian (read: capitalist) needs. As if numbing the violences and injustices of drone warfare in those places discussed above, these remote technologies appear more innocuously as vehicles for goods delivery in retail, as well as virtual vertical vistas for everyday visual consumption. Scholars are also quick to note that airspace, however intricately designed and staged from above, is not infallible. While ground-based tactics such as camouflage, defense systems, and stealth attacks can blunt the effects of air power, environmental interferences and events have the potential to disrupt civil air travel, as evidenced by the multiple airspace closuresdand economic stoppagesdwrought by volcanic ash cloud incidents in Asia, Europe, and South America in the first two decades of the 21st Century. Even with the development of modern navigational and surveillance technologies, it would seem that the designers of aeromobilities have not completely secured an (air)space that is free from risks. They have held out the promise of extending human’s dominance in the sky but have also rendered the modern way of life commensurably more fraught.

Aircraft Flying machines and vehicles play an equally crucial role in conducting aeromobilities. In the incipient years of aviation, aircraft ranged from gliders to airships to balloons but, since the late 1920s, they have advanced to include more sophisticated heavierthan-air technologies. In aeromobilities research, the significance of these craft lies in the distinctive cultural sensibilities and (micro)geographies that they have opened up within “newly” mobile worlds. Historical accounts shed light on the unfamiliar kin/aesthetic, audiovisual, and olfactory experiencesdfrom feelings of fear to nausea to discomfortdthat early with which passengers in the 1920s and 1930s grappled. Going further back in time to the 18th and 19th centuries, others have discovered the affective and material relations expeditionists shared with air and atmospheres on aerostatic flights, pointing to an unprecedented form of environmental engagement that came with the invention of the balloon. Although most of these flight modes are no longer common today, studies provide momentous records of the shifting worlds introduced by early aeromobilities that continue to shape and inform the present. Work on the affectivities of modern iterations of flight has also populated aeromobilities research, serving as a foil to historical accounts of aircraft sensibilities. Aeromobilities scholars have found that air passengers today do not simply endure the peculiarities of being up in the air, but also endure new corporeal impositions and pressures that come with long-range, high-altitude, and mass jet travel. Auto-ethnographic reflections, such as those by David Bissell, on the experiences of long-duration airline travel in economy class immediately capture such modern-day maladies and affectivities. Specifically, the aeromobile body often undergoes dynamic changes and different qualities of movement as the journey wears on, seeing its capacities morph from a state of readiness and poise, to one of restlessness and (jet-lagged) clumsiness. In more subtle ways, today’s airline cabins are also characterized by strictures of discipline and control. The air passenger’s body is expected to comply with a variety of rules in the name of safety and security, resulting in a less palpable mood or atmosphere of tension and anxiety. The affectivities of modern air travel do not just press on passengers but can also have ramifications on crew members’ copresent bodies. In response to the stresses of air travel, some airlines have managed to differentiate themselves by intentionally injecting a sense of comfort through scripting the performances of their frontline workers, such as flight attendants. More often than not, female/feminized cabin crew members are employed to provide an emotional labor of care and comfort recovery to passengers, in the airline’s bid to soften the harsh realities of jet travel. While flight attendants are expected to suppress their emotions in their interactions with passengers, pilots and flight crew members are, on the other hand, trained to become ultra-vigilant beings who are intimate with their machines. Through practices that date back to the interwar period, trainers have continually sought to understand, correct, and eventually eradicate the susceptibility of pilots to lapses and mistakes. In the process, they seek to create particular safety cultures, and resilientdand often maledsubjects who are unfazed by risky aeromobilities. The aircraft, in its diverse forms and formats, has been an influential site in the fashioning of novel airborne abodes, bodies, and subjects. It has created, and is continuing to (re)create, entirely new cultures of moving that define and give rise to new ways of being in the world. These specially crafted affective, corporeal, and relational regimes do not matter only to affairs of the sky. Ground and air are mutually conversant interfaces, always holding the potential to bleed into each other. In fact, these air-ground exchanges are more pervasive than one often imagines, with the aircraft changing our view of the earth every time we fly, and communal air travel shaping people’s senses of identity, rights, and responsibilities in creeping, but no less impactful, ways. This silent power makes the aircraft such a significant space, capable of altering the way society feels, sees, and understands the terra firma it inhabits.

Abject Bodies A fourth line of inquiry in aeromobilities research pertains to issues of mobility justice or the inequalities of movement. Studying mobility justice with regard to air travel has led to a number of scholars critiquing the exclusions of certain “abject” bodies from

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a world of increasing air travel. Indeed, although “open skies” agreements have made air transport a crucial backbone of globalizationdproviding multiple economic opportunities while also incurring heavy environmental costsdnot everyone and everything is welcome to inhabit airspace. Recent studies have broadened these debates on (aero)mobility justice by inquiring about the processes by which some bodies (humans and nonhumans) are rendered incompatible with the air. The physical state of bodies has been a differentiating factor between those who can fly without impediment and those who are subject to further inspections. For instance, following the SARS outbreak and global transmission of the virus by air transport in 2003, airport authorities have concentrated their efforts in establishing sanitary borders to discriminate between the “sick” and the “healthy.” This discrimination was primarily established through a matrix of public health regulations, epidemiological data collection procedures, and surveillance systems such as thermal screening. Prospective travelers whose bodies are inscribed with low economic capital are furthermore routinely kept out of the air transport system altogether. Disasters are in this instance telling events that make apparent the differentiation of people who have access to mobility networks and those who are rendered “disposable”; it is mostly the poor, marginalized, and racialized sectors of society who find themselves immobile and unable to flee to save themselves. Following the January 2010 Haitian earthquake, for example, while humanitarian workers could draw on airports to enter post-disaster Haiti easily, many Haitian residents could not equally use aeromobility to evacuate. Aeromobility also excludes, and therefore renders flying difficult for some locales, by blocking populations of entire regions from participation. Although air traffic is increasing globally, it is still remarkably concentrated in a few main hubs and regions of the world, with the notable exclusion of a number of countriesdincluding those in sub-Saharan Africa, south and central Asia, and parts of the Middle East. Doreen Massey first broached this idea by describing the extremely uneven ways in which air transport networks cover the globe; more recent work is drawing attention to the technopolitical and discursive mechanisms by which such places come to be marooned and bypassed. Indeed, the exclusion of these zones is not merely a result of a lack of infrastructural investment on the part of local governments, but is bound up in “expert” knowledge and sanctions that denote these regions as difficult to navigate, or “unsafe.” In this instance, abjection spreads from individual bodies to the geobody of the nation, having a geopolitical effect on the asymmetries of aeromobility. Worldwide growth of aviation has meant that aeromobile passengers are now more diverse; the tourist, the migrant, and the business woman are all frequent flyers, flowing around the globe from one airport-node to another, making the world seem experientially smaller than ever. Nonetheless, the tremendous increase in movements around the world often bears negative impacts over human bodies, spaces, and environments that are being excluded from or disadvantaged by aeromobilities. Some are forced to stay in stillness, some are hindered, some are carrying the negative impacts of otherdextremely aeromobiledbodies, and some are not accounted for at all in the global network of aeromobility, being left outside of the new worldwide sociospatial order. As aeromobilities accelerate, these stratifications between the haves and have-nots are bound to become even more stark, spilling ontodand inducingdother socioenvironmental effects ranging from climatic change to resource competition.

Conclusion As the study of the sociocultural composition of flight/flying, aeromobilities research provides a promising vein of inquiry for geographers to extend beyond longstanding literature on airport location, air networks, nodes, hubs, and airline services. While concerned with issues of human cultures and practices, aeromobilities research has so far proven to be highly geographic in nature, spawning a series of new spatialities and viewpoints for geographers to contemplate on alongside planners and practitioners in the aviation/aerospace industry. In particular, this field of study has provoked new questions of how aeromobilities have changed societies, altered (geo)political landscapes, and affected human senses of equality and decency. Rather than a relentless pursuit of the growth and efficient functioning of the air transport industry, this scholarship usefully gives us pause, to consider ways to make aeromobilities a fairer and more humane endeavor for all, and not just the reserve of a select few.

Further Reading Adey, P., 2010. Aerial Life: Spaces, Subjects and Affects. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester; Malden, MA. Adey, P., Whitehead, M., Williams, A.J., 2011. Introduction: air-target – distance, reach and the politics of verticality. Theory Cult. Soc. 28, 173–187. Ali, S.H., Keil, R., 2010. Securitizing networked flows: infectious diseases and airports. In: Graham, S. (Ed.), Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails, first ed. Routledge, New York, pp. 97–110. Bissell, D., 2015. Virtual infrastructures of habit: the changing intensities of habit through gracefulness, restlessness and clumsiness. Cult. Geogr. 22, 127–146. Budd, L.C.S., 2011. On being aeromobile: airline passengers and the affective experiences of flight. J. Transp. Geogr. 19, 1010–1016. Budd, L.C.S., Adey, P., 2009. The software-simulated airworld: anticipatory code and affective aeromobilities. Environ. Plan. A 41, 1366–1385. Budd, L.C.S., Griggs, S., Howarth, D., Ison, S., 2011. A fiasco of volcanic proportions? Eyjafjallajökull and the closure of European airspace. Mobilities 6, 31–40. Bulley, D., Johnson, H.L., 2018. Ethics at the airport border: flowing, dwelling and atomising. Environ. Plan. D Soc. Space 36, 217–235. Cwerner, S., Urry, J., Kesselring, S. (Eds.), 2009. Aeromobilities, first ed. Routledge, London. Hirsh, M., 2016. Airport Urbanism: Infrastructure and Mobility in Asia, first ed. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Lassen, C., Galland, D., 2014. The dark side of aeromobilities: unplanned airport planning in Mexico City. Int. Plan. Stud. 19, 132–153. Lin, W., 2014. The politics of flying: aeromobile frictions in a mobile city. J. Transp. Geogr. 38, 92–99. Lin, W., 2017. Sky watching: vertical surveillance in civil aviation. Environ. Plan. D Soc. Space 35, 399–417. Sheller, M., 2013. The islanding effect: post-disaster mobility systems and humanitarian logistics in Haiti. Cult. Geogr. 20, 185–204. Shilon, M., Shamir, R., 2016. Becoming an airline passenger: body, luggage, and documents. Subjectivity 9, 246–270.

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Relevant Websites Boeing Training: https://www.myboeingtraining.com/Default.aspx. CAPA – Centre for Aviation: https://centreforaviation.com/. Civil Aviation Authority, UK: https://www.caa.co.uk/home/. Flight Global: https://www.flightglobal.com/. International Air Transport Association: https://www.iata.org. International Civil Aviation Organization: https://www.icao.int. US Federal Aviation Administration: https://www.faa.gov. Zodiac Aerospace: https://zodiacaerospace.com/en.

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Affect Trycia Bazinet and Lindy Van Vliet, Carleton University, North Bay, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by J. D. Dewsbury, volume 1, pp 20–24, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Affective economies A term put forward by Sara Ahmed, which refers to the doing, binding, and ordering work that emotions do in society. Here, emotions are not conceptualized as individual feelings or dispositions but as forces that align and involved both subjects and objects. Cartesian self An historically hegemonic and overarching conception of the self that is marked by the idea that the subject is divided between its material (body) and immaterial (mind) properties. Critical theories often deconstruct and track its influence in the different parts of society. Deleuzian Body of works influenced by French Philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who was partially influenced by Spinoza’s conception of immanence. Deleuzian thought is characterized by radical constructivism in which everything (including meaning) is always becoming in relations to one anotherdhence the name of one of his most influential concept, rhizomes. Transsubjectivity What lies beyond or beneath the domain of individual subjectivity. Transsubjectivity is concerned with the unconscious or not-directly-experienced elements that traverse and impacts the self and its environment.

Academic works on affect are diverse in disciplinary approaches and origins. Inconsistencies and gaps in the literature continue to fuel debates about the nature of affects, affective networks, their transmission, their political (mis)use, their relations to emotions, their historicization, and their potentialities and risks. Since the 1990s, writings on affect have been emerging within a primarily intellectual movement referred to as the emotional/affective turn, which is itself more broadly located in recent conversation around posthumanism and “new” materialism. The affective turn is more than a simple consideration of emotions in critical and cultural theory; it also includes the theoretical consideration of vitalism or intensities across entities and beings, process-based perspectives, movements, and the fleshliness of embodiments. Within dominant epistemologies, affect has been broadly defined as a body’s capacity to affect and to be affected. The nature or form of affect has been equated to intensities that usually have undetermined directions or form. Affects can be benign in the sense that they are intensities that accumulate and then surge in and out of our everyday lives; however, they matter because these intensities vary in the form they take through their surging trajectories. In simpler terms, affects have also been equated to what we understand as “flows” between bodies. Yet, an affect theorist’s idea of a body does not necessarily conform to the established norms surrounding the boundaries that understand the body as beginning and ending at the skin. The body in affect theory is considered porous and yet is not clearly permeable to the environment it is in. One way to imagine affects is as pulses through network circuits that are not free from sociality. These circuits are also shaped by processes that are assumed to be beside and different from the social, such as biological, neurological, and mitochondrial processes. Because affects flow and work in and through an entangled mix of forces that are indistinguishable between social or natural, material or immaterial, affect theory can be a useful way of challenging established binaries between social, natural, material, and immaterial. Affect theory allows us to look beyond the accepted constructions of the self, the body, and the social, but it does not escape them. Some say that affect is too “mysterious.” While affects are not usually understood as being primarily material and thus physically graspable or representable in content, they do not stand “outside materiality.” They are involved in materiality and processes of materialization at several scales. Affect theory understands affective processes as productive in that they play a role in the materialization of bodies. The bodies at play here are not restricted to human and/or animate bodies; nonhuman bodies and entities can also be involved in affective processes. Affect theory explores the ways in which these bodies (re)materialize within and through particular flows and intensities. Bodies are not neutral entities free of meaning; rather they become knowable through gendered, sexualized, ableist, objectified, animist, and racialized categorizations and entanglements. The realization that bodies are entangled with particular forms of classification leads to one of the major critiques against the affective turn, namely its posthumanist tendency to bypass modern categorizations that continue to organize the lives and deaths of beings. With that being said, there are promising critical interventions in affect theory that work precisely through these tensions. This article describes the conversations that remain unsettled in affect theory. In particular, this article will touch upon the question of embodiment, the relationship between affect and emotions, the paranoid, and the reparative approaches to affect theory, and the debate around the precognitive nature of affect. In conclusion, this article will provide insights into innovative and (re) emerging interventions in the affect field that will be of interest for human geographers.

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Affect and Embodiment Affects both complicate and expand understandings of the body and the processes of embodiment. One of the strengths of affect theory is its transdisciplinary nature, which enables theorists to use a diverse array of methods and insights that can help highlight and complicate the different materialities and temporalities of bodies. At its base, the study of affect problematizes the idea of skin as the boundary of the body because affects transcend skin (and other “known” bodily boundaries). That is because affect can travel through the established boundaries of the body, or despite them. Affects can engage multiple bodies at once, as if they are ambient or “in the air.” The study of affect has been influential in disrupting the western separation between the body and the mind (the Cartesian self). The separation between the mind and the body is crucial to the notion of the individual in classical liberalismdand consequently individual rights, property rights, and capitalist accumulation. Affects are not “owned” by individuals, but they traverse and connect multiple human and more-than-human entities. As Brennan (2004) notes, affect theory refuses and blurs the western dichotomies and boundaries between self/other and subject/object. It provides a language for understanding the “impact” of affective flows and intensities on bodies and relations beside the psychological approach to understanding the “impact” of emotions on an individual psyche. The study of affect has done more than destabilize the assumed boundaries between self–other and object–subject. New developments in the natural sciences such as in the field of genetics, quantum physics, psychoanalysis, biology, and neuroscience have also created space and language to examine how the matter that enables and forms embodiment self-organizes. One might understand this by beginning to think about the different forms of agencies beyond human ones. It is commonly accepted in affective theories that cognizant embodied feeling of humans is partial; meaning that it does not capture or comprehend the full realm of affective energies that the embodied self responds to and remains entangled in. While earlier poststructural thought taught the social sciences to view bodies as products or performances of culture and discourse, affect theory suggests that bodies are more than the product of particular cultures/languages; bodies are also entangled in and materialized within relations with nonhuman entities and intensities. Understanding human experiences as only partial does not mean affect theorists completely reject sociality; rather, sociality becomes an element that is integrated in affect theory. Working through entanglement means theorists blur the lines between what is matter and what is social. What we think of as matter has its own social life. What we think of social has very real material manifestations. As such, an affective charge can self-organize along and beyond human choices and what is considered matter. Questions around embodiment are not of interest to affect theorists in social sciences only. Some affect theorists are also interested in whether and how affects can be measured or represented in and on the matter that composes bodies, namely human ones. For example, while psychological, biological, and neuroscientific approaches have often stood in stark contrast to the social sciences, recent research in these fields is beginning to work through a similar paradigm shift that hints toward the inclusion of what could be called more-than-human energies and flows, and have sometimes been included in work on affect (and vice-versa). Affect theory also pushes geographers to reconnect the matter of the individual body to the subjectivity of an individual, since the latter is often understood to be an individualized experience separated from the materiality of the individual’s body. Affect theory has been influenced by the emerging idea of transsubjectivity, most commonly associated with psychoanalytic theory. Transsubjectivity pushes beyond the Freudian theory that an individual’s unconscious is the only noncognizant aspect of a person’s subjectivity and instead views the body as always “more-than-one.” In this field, emphasis is placed on the collectiveness of embodiment and understanding the body as a set of processes that resemble assemblages rather than a specific, unattached, and individual form. Affect theory situates the body as a series of entangled assemblages of matter and energies, revealing how some bodies are better able to affect and be affected through processes of racialization, animism, and gender. The variety of entities with unstable, porous boundaries and affective capacities that may constitute an assemblage (a collection of entities that become involved together, sometimes improbably) are infinitely diversedthey may be formed out of hormones, critters, changes in water constitution, ghosts, historical forces and memories, a textile, a market. Therefore, rather than seeing humans as singular, bounded entities that end at the flesh, affect theory creates the space to think about how diverse entities and entanglements materialize the body. Seeing affect as energies or intensities that flow across both spaces and bodies unsettles accounts of bodies as bounded and closed-off from an environment assumed to be “out there.” In sum, the study of affect enables exchanges of methods and insights between disciplinary gaps, resulting in renewed understanding of how bodies can be affected and what constitutes a body.

Emotions and Affect Affects and emotions are concepts that are often used interchangeably, but this does not mean that they are the same. There are several ways in which the relationship between affects and emotionsdor the “affect–emotion gap”dcan be analyzed. Besides narratives surrounding their respective natures, the histories of how the concept came to be understood, and their multiple meanings depending on the context of the research, a question of interest that remains in the context of human geography has to do with the directional and causal relationship between affects and emotions. Does one occur before the other? Does one cause the other? Do they translate into one another? There is no straightforward answer, since, as Hardt points out, affects simultaneously belong to both sides of a causal relationship. While the representations and the discourses that deploy emotions can be recognized, analyzed, and even tracked in scholarly fields, the existence of affects remains contested because they cannot be similarly “tracked” or named. Proponents arguing for a fundamental difference between affect and emotion argue that one of the main distinctions is the presence of a central human

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subject. For these theorists, affect can be differentiated from emotion in that it is not the result of a conscious human response or expression to a particular situation. Emotion, as an individual mode of being or “feeling,” can be more directly linked to a discursive or representational referent, and can usually be connected to a social signifier through language. Further, affect is not attached to a specific physical manifestation or discourse that enables its identification and interpretation. Because affects are not as easily tied to specific codes or representational boundaries, they have more mobility and arguably more autonomy than emotions in that they can be involved in a variety of processes, ideas, structures, times, and entities. For those who think of emotions and affect as distinct, affect, unlike emotion, is considered unmediated and thus unburdened by semanticsdthe process of acquiring meaning. Other scholars working with affect and emotion argue that using the two words synonymously risks limiting the field of study to the experiences of the individual because of the linguistic history of the term “emotion” and association with psychoanalytical theory. These theorists question how affects, as ontologically specific energies, create and/or impact the social and political spheres of possibility but also recognize how “affections” can be experienced at a personal level. Here emotion is not the personal experience of affections but one possible way in which affects are entangled with animate subjects. Alternatively, affects can be understood as the motion of emotions and emotions as the processes or “agents” through which affects and core affective states energize, materialize, and are perceived. For example, scholars such as Anderson and Johansen have studied how affective “structures of feeling” that resist representation can nonetheless create the possibility for specific material conditions and political possibilities. Finally, some theorists argue that there should not be a sharp distinction between emotions and affect. While language and category of emotions itself is not a historical or a natural given, some have begun to theorize emotions as public (like affects) rather than personal or internal states of being, as it was assumed in early psychology. If anything, this points to productive crossovers between the two concepts. The neat separation of emotion and affect risks falling into the western epistemological tradition of dichotomies and binaries that most theorists of affect refuse in the first place.

Beyond Stances of Paranoia and Reparation Since the affective turn in geography, most studies of affect fall into two main approaches: paranoid ones and reparative ones. Paranoid approaches critique affects rather than study or observe them. These approaches typically center power and domination in their analysisda stance that corresponds to paranoia because the adherents to this approach allegedly begin with a preexisting, suspicious incentive to reveal what is hidden and to debunk assumed truths. Ironically, proponents of this approach can forget that critiques of the alleged universal truths are also socially and culturally located. Critics of the paranoid approach argue that paranoid readings miss the points of affect theory since affects are not fields of study themselves, but rather dimensions of life that remain beyond representation and therefore cannot be deconstructed or critiqued away. The paranoid stance to scholarship on affect is described (and even dismissed) as stunting the effects of the reparative approach, which emphasizes the inventive potential and radical openness inherent to affects. The reparative approach is not concerned with revealing the truth of what research on affect might have missed out on. Rather, it tends toward enriching, creative, divergent, and even surprising readings. The well-meaning intention to focus on potentialities means that this approach has adopted the Deleuzian language of the virtual and the actual. The virtual take on affects emphasizes the potentialities of affect. Affects are those happenings in which the virtual and actual coincide and coexist, often traveling back and forth between both. The virtual is not limiteddbut the actual is. The virtual is real, but it is not experienced. It is synesthetic, and it is at best barely felt in its surges. The virtual aspect of affects denotes their unspeakable potential before they encounter the limits of embodiment. According to this perspective, our everyday emotional lives and landscapes (the actual) are part of the apparatus that ends up “limiting” the virtual. In such a view, affects can be spoken of as if they are beyond the realm of mere human experiences but also of politics. Despite their seeming unreachability, Thrift notes that affects can still be manipulated by power, which is why proponents of the reparative approach also speak of the need for an ethical and responsible engagement with the potentiality of affect. In the actual/virtual appraisal of affects, embodiments, meanings, representations, and significations are not accorded primary analytical importance. While it carries weight to be able to uphold the nonrepresentable intra-actions between entities, this understanding is sometimes said to leave out the dynamics of racialized relationality that makes certain bodies suffused with more and/or specific affects. Even virtual affects are not neutral or apolitical. As such, many scholars warn against a quasiromanticization of affect studies in which affects are proclaimed as potentially liberating in and of themselves, while the active effects of power become disregarded. Rather, the reparative approach argues that reducing affect to lived experiences by humans seriously hinders its analytical potential. The distinction between the two approaches is not always mutually exclusive or rigid. Scholars also propose that the distinction between reparative (positive) and paranoid (skeptical) research on affect should remain more ambivalent and less rigid in order to honor the complex and fluid reality of affective politics.

Before Sociality, Before Culture? It can be both useful and problematic to conceptualize affect as being and taking place before culture or before consciousness. Precultural or presocial theories view affects as sorts of flows or intensities that can autonomously exist outside of human-tohuman interactions. As discussed above, affect can impact without fully engaging individual consciousness or cognition because

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affects exist and surge in and through forces of life and entities that are beyond representation and discourse; however, one can still study the “tangibility” of affect by identifying and examining how affective patterns and energies disrupt or strengthen established patterns in our lives. For example, in studying patterns of affects, one can better understand the quasicyclical evocation of terror and security in our everyday and global politics. Brian Massumi argues that in the increasing securitization of all spheres of life post 9/11, the submerging power of threat as an affect can become an environmental or ambient power. Threat, as an affective environmental power, can influence the quality of objects and entities in particular time-spacesdfor example, in the case of white flour treated as a potentially and intentionally toxic substance when found in train stations or in parcels. Massumi is not suggesting that affect is presocial in this case because the ontology of terror that led the flour to be appraised as a threat is entangled with the social. He asserts, however, that the affective power of threat as an environmental power is stronger at the moment when there are no clear boundaries between a body and its environment. Massumi explains that studies of affect cannot only be phenomenological (i.e., only consider what consciousness considers) but that they must also be metaphysical (consider the cosmological and ontological worlds). Massumi, who remains a pivotal affect theorist, is not necessarily advancing an entirely presocial understanding of affect, but he is hinting toward a conceptualization of affect that precedes (human) consciousness. Preconscious understanding of affect is useful to understand contagion between several entities, such as the flow and transmission of fear. Massumi’s understanding does not sit well with theorists who are concerned with the risk of replicating the social systems they seek to study and disrupt. If affects are conceptualized as ungraspable and fully metaphysical, then what we name as affect can thus be considered impossible to change. While affects can be considered as partially presocial or preconscious, other approaches look at how social discourses influence affects. Some theorists propose that affects are controlled or “tamed” by social discourses. In this case, affects are partially ungraspable but their manifestations in the social spheres are identifiable. Wetherell asserts that discourses and discursive representations are what give energy or trajectory for the transmission of affect. In contrast to viewing affect as an environmental power, here affects are limited by particular “realms of potential” that are determined by the composition of things, beings, and structures that already exist or are knowable in the human, social, and cultural realms. Here, the social and cultural determine the potential of affect. When conceptualized as preconscious and precultural, affective movements may be indeterminate and understood as infinite in their potential; however, naming the infinite potential of affect runs the risk of turning the study of affects into a game of pseudoevolutionary psychology that works to justify and naturalize current realities. When theorists attempt to freeze affects as precultural or preconscious elements, they risk erasing differently embodied knowledge and obscuring the ways in which some bodies have greater ability to affect and be affected than others because of their particular entanglements and categorizations through processes of racialization, sexualization, animalization, and more. A clear-cut separation between what is conscious and what is not can normalize a type of universality in which the unconscious of the socially privileged is left unmarked and considered the neutral state of unconsciousness. For this reason, social constructivists remain wary of affect, even when they might long for ideas that would assist them in working with the materiality and somatic effects of sociality on and of the bodies and relations that they study. An important contribution has emerged out of the critique of affect theory’s tendency to view affect as precultural. This field of inquiry posits that affects are not just free-flowing energies or pushes and pulls in indeterminate directions, but that they are part of realms of possibility that are delineated by power. Sarah Ahmed uses the term “affective economies” to argue that emotions are not the psychological properties of an individual but instead flow around and “stick” to certain objects to create the effect of boundaries of bodies and worlds. Affective attachments to certain objects, bodies, and signs embed themselves along trajectories determined by racialized and capitalist sociopolitical economies. This process can take the form of wanting to “fix” people with disabilities because of society-wide affective attachments to what is assumed as a good quality of life, an assumption that is in turn tied to neoliberal ideals around individual productivity and individual control over their environment. Theorists here are saying that bodily matters, emotions, and impacting flows are all dynamically involved in ongoing process of racialization, sexualization, gendering, ableism, animalization, and more. In a nutshell, while it can be useful to consider affects as precultural in order to work with their nonrepresentational and extradiscursive elements, geographers should be cautious of renaturalizing the very elements they seek to disrupt. Without rigorous engagement, affect, like many conceptual tools, can be twisted around to “explain” and thus justify oppressive realities.

(Re)emerging Turns The discussions and theories on affect presented above emerge mostly from western epistemologies. Much of the work in the affective turn comes from the work of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who took up the older works of Henri Bergson and Baruch Spinoza. The Western epistemologies that affect theory emerged from are themselves categories that cannot be assumed to exist in isolation. Indeed, the separation between Western and non-Western is a project tainted by a political and theoretical purity reminiscent of what upholds coloniality and modernity itself (the belief that something is either and only western/colonial or not). In fact, heterogeneity thrives within the spilling legacies of what we refer to as “Western.” As such, many interventions on affect theory originate from epistemologies and worldviews that have differing entanglements and proximities to Western ones. This section turns to a handful of interventions that are not solely marginal critiques of affect theory but rigorous, stand-alone contributions that offer rich insights for the application and use of affect theory, while at times also questioning the legitimacy of established debates.

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Historicizing Ontologies of Affect The current study and understanding of emotional and affective spheres usually takes place without reference to the conditions of their historical emergence: through colonial, gender, and racial relations. Berg and Ramos-Zayas explain how racialization processes have been both integral to and constitutive of the concepts of “emotion,” “feeling,” or “sentiment” in ways that uphold dominant racial ideologies. They advocate for “racializing affect,” acknowledging that from the 20th Century on, deployments of emotive and affective modes of being were explicitly tied to racialized modernity. The assignment of emotional capacity and tendency was deployed in creating racial difference, which became fundamental to upholding modernity as we still know it. With the recognition of the coconstitution of affect and modernity comes the question of whether affect can be evoked and thought of outside of the ongoing formation of racialized modernity. Affect as presocial, mechanical, and universal is necessarily troubled through studies that historicize its genealogy (how it came to be).

Grappling With Abstraction The debates about the issue of a historicism discussed above can be tied to the issue of abstraction, which leads to the questions of whether affective processes take place regardless of an individual’s input and/or intentionality. The debates around abstraction also lead geographers to question assumptions about the universality of affective processes. This debate can be conceptualized as the “problem of abstraction” and is broadly composed of two different camps. As discussed above, the first group of authors inspired by Deleuze theorize affects as free-flowing energies that exist preconsciously, and therefore, they do not explicitly center individual agency or intentionality in their study of affects. This view can be useful in helping us understand the contagious nature of affects, such as the contagion of fear that spread in post-9/11 America. The second group, influenced by scholars like Leys and Berg, tend to rely on Ahmed’s work around affective economies, arguing that all affects are entangled in power. This group of theorists warns against the disconnections between agency, causality, and intentionality that might ensue when affect is assumed to be marginal or incidental to other recognized modes of political activity. Another effect of abstraction in affect theory is a potential attempt to move beyond and even discard the emotional landscapes of everyday life. In light of this risk, researchers encourage the use of fieldwork and ethnography to counter abstracted debates that might become frigid, homogenous, and disconnected from relations of power. Ethnographic work encourages researchers to grapple with a diversity of encounters that require innovative frames of observation, interpretation, and relationality while refusing potentially ungrounded theorization. Ethnographic work on affect promises interjections that can avoid the charges of a historicism and apoliticalness of what has been deemed as the more mechanical trends in affect theory.

Affect, Race, and Biopower Another distinct approach to affect theory is the biopower approach that diverges from an understanding of affect as intensities, flows, or movements that exist regardless of, or prior to, social, political, and economic forces. Instead, biopower approaches argue that affect and biopower (the management of life and death) are entangled in multiple ways. As described above, affects can create attachments to particular ideals, ways of life, or concepts (e.g., the desire for a good life), and these attachments can become targets of biopolitical control or domination (e.g., the desire for a good life can lead to self-regulation according to society’s ideals in order to avoid “rocking the boat” and losing position in society) but the attachments can also be the “conditions” or backgrounds through which different forms of biopower can materialize (e.g., the collective affect of fear and attachment to the concept of America led to increased securitization after 9/11). Anderson, for example, suggests that researchers look at the relationships between affects and biopower in order to trace liberal and democratic “race thinking” that remains tightly attached to postracial discourses (e.g., “racism is over”; “it is not about race”) while continuing to feed from racialization (e.g., “the effects of racism are lived and present”). When considering the entanglement of biopower and affect, one might suggest that the theories of social constructionism alone cannot account for the full-fledged reality of racism and its material consequences. In other words, one’s openness toward diversity and willingness not to participate in racist systems or racist beliefs cannot overcome the embodied and affective modes of being that are a result of living in racialized societies and environments. This intervention in affect theory allows us to map “certain logics of contradiction” inherent in racialized modernity and enable us to study how racism can be simultaneously denied and practiced as if it is a natural phenomenon. In particular, geographers can explore how certain affective economies and attachments such as xenophobia can stand in stark opposition to, yet simultaneously enable, liberal multiculturalism’s claims of tolerance and openness. Reading affect and biopower together allows researchers to consider how affective flows play a part in (re)establishing racialized difference on particular bodies and thingsdand consequently in life and death consequences. Following Ahmed the concept of affective economies allows for an analysis of how affective attachments operate as a form of capital, and how these attachments can be made to do things within capitalist orders. The racialization of one’s body can affect the power of one’s affective currency within racialized capitalism. The study of White affect, for example, or the study of what “prefigures and animates whiteness,” looks at how racialized bodily dispositions beside what are understood as social constructions (the law, media representation, national narratives) play their roles in the reification of modes of racialization. This theoretical orientation allows for an exploration of whiteness as an unconsciously embodied intensity or affective condition that emerges from an imagined originality that is understood as existing before or outside of difference and as before more explicit values of whiteness such as desires of “purity.” There are well-documented risks associated with exploring the psychobiological impacts of racialization, but by

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combining a historicized understanding of how colonialism enabled and refused particular affective dispositions through race, these conversations can lead us into the study of the unspeakability and value judgments automatically attached to the affective responses of racialized people. Through these conversations geographers can ask questions about whose affective responses are supported by society? Who is thought of as overreacting? This process enhances our understanding of unequal affective distributions and how the trajectories and impacts of affect are racialized at the psychobiological somatic scale. It helps us name the affective attachments that become targets of biopower. Thus, research focused on racialized affect or affective governmentality is an example of a productive ambivalence that lies beyond the paranoid and the reparative approaches as it begins to bridge the shortfalls of both.

Further Reading Anderson, B., 2012. Affect and biopower: towards a politics of life. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 37, 28–43. Baldwin, A., 2016. Premediation and white affect: climate change and migration in critical perspective. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 41, 78–90. Bargetz, B., 2015. The distribution of emotions: affective politics of emancipation. Hypatia 30, 580–596. Berg, U.D., Ramos-Zayas, A.Y., 2015. Racializing affect. Curr. Anthropol. 56, 654–677. Blackman, L., Venn, C., 2010. Affect. Body Soc. 16, 7–28. Gregg, M., Seigworth, G.J., 2010. The Affect Theory Reader. Duke University Press, Durham & London. Leys, R., 2011. The turn to affect: a critique. Crit. Inq. 37, 434–472. Navaro, Y., 2017. Diversifying affect. Cult. Anthropol. 32, 209–214. Pile, S., 2009. Emotions and affect in recent human geography. R. Geogr. Soc. 35, 5–20. Tait, P., 2016. Introduction: analysing emotion and theorising affect. Humanities 5, 70–77. Thien, D., 2005. After or beyond feeling? A consideration of affect and emotion in geography author(s): deborah thien. Area 37, 450–456. Tolia-Kelly, D.P., Crang, M., 2010. Affect, race, and identities. Environ. Plan. 42, 2309–2314. Wetherell, M., 2012. Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding. Sage Publishing, Los Angeles. Zembylas, M., Leonardo, Z., 2013. Rethinking race and racism as technologies of affect: theorizing the implications for anti-racist politics and practice in education. Race Ethn. Educ. 18, 145–162.

Affective Mapping Clancy Wilmott, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Affect For Spinoza, a bodily and a mental experience. Today a heterogenous terms referring to either an affective capacity, an intensity or feeling, a mood or an aura, a subjective capacity, a haunting or a memory, or an emotion. More-than-Representational A gamut of embodied, sensory, gestural, and emotional practices.

Affective mapping can be described as a combination of the emotional, felt, bodily and haunting aspects of mapping practice, and the more-than-representational mapping of affect and sensation themselves. Affective mapping therefore includes the representation of affectsdincluding emotions, feelings, sensations, intensities memories, or hauntings through maps, cartographic depictions (such as cartograms), and geographic information science. Since mappingdand cartographydis concerned with the representation, it may appear that affective mapping is paradoxical in nature: how can one map that which is beyond representation? Part of affective mapping is acknowledging that there is an entanglement between the material forces of the world, and the tools that we use to construct, represent and understand them. In general, affects have ongoing impacts in the world: while processes and intensities slip out of our ability to capture them through signs or symbols, words or things, the actions, practices, and productions that affects provoke point to their existence as forces or intensities. Affective mapping, then, is able to draw upon a gamut of embodied, sensory, gestural, and emotional practices, either personal or social, to trace ongoing forces and intensities in the world. For this reason, it is appropriate to understand affective mapping as mapping the more-than-representational rather than the solely representation or nonrepresentational. What affect meansdas a term and as a conceptdis hotly contested across the academy. There is no single reading of what affective mapping is, how it might work, or what precisely it is trying to express. This heterogeneity of expression and ambiguity of meaning is one of the most alluring and infuriating gifts that affective mapping offers. Generally, the theorization of affect dates back to Spinoza’s Ethics. From Spinoza, concepts of affect have taken divergent routesdvia Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and more recently, Brian Massumi and Erin Manning. Therefore, divisions on how affect might be understood, deployed, and theorized tend to be defined either by disciplinary or philosophical lines, with significant debate in between. It is therefore possible to understand affective capacity (or the ability to affect or be affected) simultaneously as a spatial, sociological, anthropological, mediated, ecological phenomenon. Similarly, it is also possible to understand affect as an intensity or feeling, a mood or an aura, a subjective capacity, a haunting or a memory, or an emotionddepending on the philosophical tradition of the writer. Therefore, affective mapping may seek to map a variety of different phenomena, sensations, or intensities, depending on how the cartographer understands affect.

Affect Traditional theories of affect are often drawn from Spinoza’s use of the term affectus in Part III and Part IV of his most well known writing, Ethics. Affectus (or affect) is both a bodily and a mental experience, which, in Spinoza’s case, often defies exactitude in description. Specifically, Spinoza disagrees with the Cartesians that the mind controls the body, and instead proposes a reading of affect that offers fluidity between the two. Affect is more-than-representational, but it does not quite equivocate with emotion. First, because language (or words) is limited in expressing the full range of possible emotions, and so, we may feel beyond our limited emotional vocabulary (or, in turn, our vocabulary may limit how we understand emotions). Second, affects may imprint themselves on the body, or, in Spinoza’s words, “retain impressions or traces of objects” for periods of duration, which may last longer than the emotions themselves. Therefore affective mapping encompasses more than emotional mapping. Different words are used to describe how affects are realized in the world, and how affect is conceptualized relates to how it might be mapped. Reading affect as an intensity, as did Gilles Deleuze, might see the accumulation or concentration of feeling in a particular space or time. Comparably, understanding affects as a capacity, as did Felix Guattari, there is also an argument that affective relationships go both ways: all beings and objects may affect, as well as be affected. In Kathleen Stewart’s writing, affects are held in memory and body, and might be encountered in ordinary spaces and places. For Massumi, affect is bound up with movement and sensation. There has been critiquedparticularly from those within the Marxist tradition of geographydthat research on affect and affective geographies signals a turn toward neoliberalism and the valorization of the individual within. Affect, understood in its theoretical and historical context, is political. Partly, this stems from Spinoza’s reading of ethics, but also from more recent philosophical traditions in feminist materialism, who argue that the governance of emotions, bodies and spacedeven at the most minute

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leveldrepresents a masculinist expression against feeling as a way of knowing, or being, political. Similar critiques have been leveraged by feminist critical cartographers at the masculinist hegemonies of cartographic techniques, and GIS more generally. The importance of wrestling with the intensities and impacts of more-than-representational mappings can be understood as a project that is as equally political as it is philosophical. Affective mapping acknowledges that there is a material and cartographic a priori to the moment of mapping, which may retain previous affects as impressions, traces or otherwise, which may then folded into the moment of mapping. In concrete terms, these affects might be historical (such as collective memories or social traumas), geographical (altered landscapes, poetics of space and place, geological, ecological or botanical), or paraepistemological (tacit knowledges, intuition, bodies and sensations, movement). The scale of affective forces is under debatedfrom the atomic, molecular or the minute to the social, collective or national. This acknowledgment results in affective mappings on a variety of scales, from the bodily to the global, depending on the mappers’ understanding of affect and affective capacities.

Emotion, Feeling and Mood There have been a number of attempts to map emotions, feelings, or moods. Techniques that have been used to collect data on the emergence (or absence) of affects (including unnamed emotions, feelings, moods and other microperceptions) have included the use of body sensors to collect biodata, narrative or storytelling and participatory mapping activities. Mapping emotions, feelings and moods, on the other hand, have deployed representational techniques which underscore vagueness and contingency, including blurred points, lines, and polygons, situational annotations, contouring, narrative accounts, and gradients. For instance, the San Francisco Emotion Map of San Francisco, USA (Fig. 1) uses gradients of color, large points and annotations to layer the spatial distribution of affects generated through a series of participatory mapping exercises. The close-up of the map in Fig. 2 reveals an overwhelming array of annotations. These range from memories such as Leo’s birthday party to actions like singing, enjoying moments and encounters with strangers with familiar faces. The underlying street

Figure 1

San Francisco Emotion Map by Christian Nold (2007).

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Figure 2

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Close-up of San Francisco Emotion Map by Christian Nold (2007).

grid has been removed, only indicated by the street names running in a column along the sides of the map, to allow the flow and structure of the affects to not be subdued by both the cartographic elements of mapping, but also the structure of the city itself. In fact, this the reading of this map, the city seems to be rebuilt through the collection of material and social manifestations of urban affects, especially emotions, feelings and moods. The Affective Cartographies project, comparably, used biosensors (brain waves, heart rate, skin moisture, and muscle tension) to map affect through large-scale and eventually real-time database of bioinformation provided by citizen sensors (Fig. 3). In doing so, they aim to map emotions and reactions to the hegemonic construction of space or “affective infrastructures.” While the data themselves are representational since the readings of the biosensors are measured, numerated and interpreted, the map of the journey of the body through space is an example of the more-than-representational, affective relationship between bodies and environments.

Figure 3

Screenshot of Affective Cartographies Demo Map by the Affective Cartography Society (2019).

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Figure 4

Map-Me of LancasterdPerceptions of Safety. Source: Huck et al. (2014).

The map directly takes on the affective link between movement and sensation, while also using the multiple layers of data to highlight what might be akin to intensities. It is possible to layer each bioelement over location using different colors, showing peaks and troughs to give an impression of affective space on a personal level. Electrodermal activity (EDA, skin moisture) is shown in red, electromyography (EMG, muscle tension) in blue, electrocardiography (ECG, heart rate) in green, and electroencephalogram (EEG, brain waves) in pink. Available online as a 3D model, the map allows the reader to swivel left and right and up and down for easier viewing of its dimensional capabilities. On the right-hand side of the screenshot, the layers of biodata can be seen, with relational highs and lows, linked together by location, suggesting an affective intensification at the top right of the map board. Fig. 4 illustrates an example mapping feelings and moods through a self-produced tool which uses a spray-can effect. “Map-Me” (short for Mapping Meanings) is a participatory GIS tool that is used to map the answers to questions without clearly defined spatial locationsdsuch as the religious territorialization of Belfast or safety in Lancaster. The map of Lancaster, United Kingdom demonstrates a clustering across three categories: safe, unsafe, and both. Rather than gradients, overlays are used to emphasis large spaces of ambiguity and clarity around the perception of safety. The map retains the underlying cartographic structure to give a sense of the geographical layout of Lancasterdfrom the center of the town in the north to the University in the south, but leaves the perception of safety specifically undefined. What causes the perceptions or feelings of safety is uncleardit may be bodily, environmental, or historical. If perceptions of safety are ambiguous and without clear boundaries, then this effect is mirrored by the impressionistic blurring of the typically clear segmentations caused by maps. The Affective Cartography Society and Map-Me employ different cartographic tactics to represent the spatialization of emotions, feelings or moods, and they exploit (rather than retreat from) the limits of mapping. Ambiguity is valorized in experimental techniques to trace the impacts of affects (either through emotion or feeling), while allowing the ambiguities and prehensility of the affects to remain largely intact.

Memory and Haunting A key form of affective mapping is how bodies have the capacity to affect and be affected by the world is through memory on both a personal and collective scale. Rather than memorization, remembrance, or memorialization, understanding memory from the

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standpoint of affect emphasizes the more-than-representational qualities of memory itself. These affects might emerge from the personal experiences of the individualdthrough bodies, materialities and senses, for instancedor collective spatial, social and cultural processes such as imaginaries, architectures, and spaces. Tina Richardson’s work using psychogeographic techniques are heavily influenced by the psychogeography of the Situationists, a group of European radicals who aimed to disrupt and critique the politics of urban form. Fig. 5, Guide Psychogeographique de Leeds shows a psychogeography of Leeds, as walked by Richardson, from the funeral of a friend to the feelings afterward. The similarities to Naked City (Fig. 6) by Guy Debord are evident. Debord’s map tears apart the urban map of Paris before piecing it back together based on a process of moving through the city, rather than mapping it from above: a psycho (or emotional) geography. This particular mode of mapping is encompasses both past memories as they emerge and present/contemporaneous memories as they are made, revealing the affective qualities of urban life as fragmented, with different types and levels of affective intensities. Both these maps use ambiguity to communicate the uncertainty and incompleteness of affective registers, as realized by their observable qualities. Beyond the impression of events on the body, there are also some threads of affect theory which move beyond the subjective and personal, toward a more social reading. While some argue that affects may be cultivated by state or government-led policies, particularly with regards to nationalism, major events, and security, there is also room to make the argument that such affects might also be present in forms of social or collective memory. Beyond the memorialization of heritage, histories or events, affects (in the sense that they might be collectively remembered) sit alongside state-condoned narratives of history, impressed from generation to generation of bodies who collectively bear that past. In indigenous mapping activities are often aimed at making visible and heard histories or pasts that have been suppressed or never recorded, or presents which are ignored or unacknowledged. These examples have less to do with an account of truth or scientific accuracy, than the expression of historical injustice, trauma, or wounding which often has no clear label, descriptor, or classification. In this sense, this process of mapping a collective affectation, and reaffecting through mapping, ties into what Avery Gordon has described as a haunting. Slightly different to Derrida’s hauntology, haunting is a collective unspoken that produces ghosts marking out the absences or “seething presences” within social groupsdfrom the individual to the nation. One interesting example of haunting is the mapping of the “Kent State shooting” by a team from Kent State University: Jennifer Mapes, Sara Koopman, and Christopher Willer, and Robin Burkhardt (Fig. 7). Returning to a series of oral histories collected by historians from witnesses who were present at the time, the team has identified spatial information within these stories, and

Figure 5

Guide Psychogeographique de Leeds. Source: Richardson (2009).

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Figure 6

Discours Sur Les Passions de l’Amour. Guy Debord (1957).

Figure 7

Close-up of Mapping the Kent State Shooting. Source: Mapes et al. (2019).

mapped excerpts onto the specific location. As several histories begin to overlap on the same space, the size of the marker grows larger, indicating toward intensities rendered at a collective level, as well as the capacity of particular space–times to affect people. By drawing from stories and histories rather than bodies, movements or sensations, this project wrestles with questions of affect and memory in multiple ways. In the first instance, our cartographic vocabulary (points, lines, and polygons) is demonstrably different from affective memories of space (“Right across from the city maintenance building on Cherry and Mogadore”).

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Figure 8

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The Names of Places by Judy Watson, Greg Hooper (2016) https://namesofplaces.maps.arcgis.com.

Yet, it also shows that howdin mapping difficult or traumatic eventsdaffects gather spatially as well as temporally, in place as well as in the body, through the concentration of segments or snippets tied together through lines and circles. It also underscores that affective spaces are politically charged, and the mapping of affect can and does occur in ways that are profoundly political. A final example of how mapping memory (rather than history) can both produce and be produced by affects is The Names of Places project in Fig. 8. This interactive map of Australia shows the sites of massacres of Aboriginal people. It asks people to contribute stories and histories through interactive performances or online communication, which can be view on an online map. Overlaying sites with historical documentation, the stylistic elements of the map create a palimpsest between 18th Century cartographic aesthetics with indigenous spatial storytelling. Meanwhile, the semiology used by the map is in the style of fingerprints. Thus, although still representational, it alludes to the imprint of intergeneration and cultural traumas on both body and landscape, as a kind of spatial ghostliness which haunts the nation. This style of mapping is not focused on the spatial analysis of phenomena or objects, but rather an affective telling of forgotten or repressed pasts. Therefore it is possible to see how despite the difficulties in representing the nonrepresentational, as the impacts, if not the affects themselves, mapping is able to bring forth both memory and haunting. Furthermore, this kind of affective mapping underscores the scalar implications of affect, from the deeply personal, situated and present, to the collective, national and past.

Mapping Affect, Affective Mapping, Affective Impacts There is an important critical distinction between the mapping of affects as they emerge on a personal or collective level, and the techniques of affective mapping, through the body, through collective participation or through emotion. This distinction is entangled in ongoing critique about the historical development of cartographic practice, from the collection of cartographic data to the ways and methods of representing that data in cartographic visualizations. In essence, this discussion is about the difference between the content of the map (i.e., its data) and the form of the map (i.e., its representational system). Mapping of affects can be considered, generally, as a critique of cartographic data collection practices that emphasize the visual, observable or nameable spatial phenomenadlike roads, nature reserves, or public amenities. By mapping affects, claims might be made about the ongoing influences and impacts that more-than-representational forces have on the production of space. Furthermore, maps of affects also underscore the invisibility of affective forces in classic cartographic practice, through established techniques and knowledge systems built upon scientific empiricism. Examples like The Affective Cartography Society, the Kent State project, The Names of Places or the Emotion Maps challenge the traditional model of cartographic data collection bycapturingor repurposing embodied, affective or remembered experiences to remap the qualities of space and place, often through more traditional models of mapping like geographic information systems or sensors.

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Affective mapping, however, leverages experimental or artistic strategies to represent cartographic information in affective ways. Rather than the mapping of affect, it is mapping with affect. This approach is particularly evident in more experimental forms of mapping like the Psychogeographie de Leeds or the fuzzy boundaries of the Map-Me project. Maps themselves also have affective impacts at personal, collective and, sometimes, national levels. Research has examined the aesthetic qualities of how maps convey information, how maps might be understood as nationalist or colonialist objects, the use of maps for touristic or exploratory purposes, or the way in which maps are deployed as authorities on ways of knowing space in environmental or territorial disputes. There is also debate about the relationship between cartography and geographic information sciencedor analogue and digital cartographic practicesdand the degree to which databases or machines can have affective capacities. At the same time, in recent research, it is generally accepted that the hybridity between humans and machines are entirely capable of affective exchange, and that computational maps (whether on a desktop computer or a mobile device) are situated, experienced, and affective objects. This field of work is often linked to research in performative or embodied mapping which claims that maps are constantly brought into being through the combination of the cartographic and the bodily, emotional or performed, known as “map-space.” Whether a project is mapping affects or undertaking affective mapping is not exclusivednor is it necessary to do both. Each asks different questions about the relationship between affect (and the nonrepresentational) and mapping (or the representational). Affects permeate both the content and the production of maps, regardless. Even where affect may not be the primary aim, the necessarily political practice of mapping still transmits affects into both the form and content of the map. Thus, when considering the relationship between affect and mapping, it is crucial to emphasize that the relationship occurs through the representation, as well as the making and the reading of a map.

Further Reading Debord G (1957) Discours Sur Les Passions de l’Amour. Gerlach, J., 2015. Editing worlds: participatory mapping and a minor geopolitics. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 40, 273–286. Gerlach, J., 2017. Mapping as performance. In: The Routledge Handbook of Mapping and Cartography. Routledge, London, pp. 114–124. Griffin, A., McQuoid, J., 2012. Affective Mapping. Kartographische Nachrichten 62 (6), 291. Huck, J., Whyatt, D., Coulton, P., 2014. Spraycan: a PPGIS for capturing imprecise notions of place. Applied Geography 55, 229–237. Iturrioz, T., Wachowicz, M., 2011. An artistic perspective for affective cartography. In: Kriz, K., Cartwright, W., Hurni, L. (Eds.), Mapping Different Geographies. Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. Nold 2007. Richardson T (2009) Guide Psychogeographique de University of Leeds. Mapes J., Koopman S., and Willer C. (2019). Mapping stories of the Kent State shooting: voices of the community.

Relevant Websites Affective Cartography Society - https://www.affectivecartographysociety.org/. Names of Places. ArcGIS. https://namesofplaces.maps.arcgis.com.

Agglomeration Anders Malmberg, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp 48–53, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd., with revisions made by the Editor.

The term agglomeration can be used both as a noun and as a verb. Dictionary entries of agglomeration as a noun will typically refer to a “collection or mass of things rudely or loosely thrown or huddled together,” an “unmethodical assemblage,” a “confused or jumbled mass,” or merely a “clustering or cluster.” As a verb, consequently, agglomeration refers to the act or process of collecting in a mass, of heaping together, or to combine mechanically without any adaptation of parts.

The Core Issue of Economic Geography In the context of economic geography, agglomeration may refer to a concentration in space of some entity, or the process by which such a spatial formation is created. While the dictionary definitions signal that agglomeration is to be understood as an unsystematic, haphazard process, where some entities pile up together in space but are not really affected in any particular way, economic geographers tend to think of agglomeration as something that can be explained by some sort of rationale on behalf of the actors involved, and with profound effect on economic outcomes in terms of productivity, competitiveness, or prosperity. There is reason to take the issue of agglomeration seriously. Much may be learned about the role of space and place in economic processes by trying to pinpoint the driving forces that make for agglomeration in space of economic activity. Indeed, many would argue that spatial agglomeration is the phenomenon that ultimately motivates and defines the existence of economic geography as an academic discipline. We would argue that the defining issue of economic geography is the need to explain concentrations of population and of economic activity: the distinction between manufacturing belt and farm belt, the existence of cities, the role of industry clusters. Broadly speaking, all these concentrations form and survive because of some form of agglomeration economies, in which spatial concentration itself creates the favorable economic environment that supports further and continued concentration (Fujita et al., 1999: 4). To complicate things, the concept of agglomeration has come to denote several sociospatial phenomena as the above quotation illustrates. It can refer to the tendency for people and economic activity in general to concentrate in big cities or economic core regions. Remarkably large proportions of global value creation take place in a limited number of highly concentrated core regions. It can also refer to the fact that firms within the same or closely related industries often tend to gather at certain places, to form specialized clusters or districts. Early attempts to define the economic advantages gained by agglomerative behavior were framed by a division into two sorts of agglomeration economies. Thus, urbanization economies came to denote those advantages to be gained by location in a large and dense urban area, while the notion of localization economies referred to advantages gained by locating close to other similar or related forms. While this distinction is well established, one should note that similar factors are often held to make up both mechanisms. It is the latter aspect of agglomerationdthe “birds of a feather flock together” phenomenondthat makes up the main focus of this article. This sort of spatial agglomeration of similar and related firms and industries is most easily illustrated by pointing to some world-known examples. Thus, most people cannot think of geographical notions like Hollywood, Silicon Valley, Detroit, or The City of London without associating them with the industries that define and dominate them (movies, information and communication technology (ICT), cars, and financial services, respectively). Indeed, in the most extreme cases, it is difficult to think of an industry or its products without thinking in parallel of the particular places where its core activities are assembled. Fig. 1 shows some more or less well-known leading regional agglomerations, or clusters, in Europe. Throughout the 20th Century, a literature proliferated which, taken together, contributes to the formulation of a theory of why industry agglomeration emerges, and in what ways location in proximity of similar or related firms contributes to the competitiveness of an individual firm. Among the “classics” in this field of research can be mentioned Alfred Marshall, Alfred Weber, Edgar Hoover, Gunnar Myrdal, and Allen Pred. After a period of relative neglect during the 1970s and 1980s, the period since the early 1990s has seen reemerging research efforts being devoted to analyzing and explaining localization economies. Major contributions to this revival have been signed by geographers like Allen Scott, alongside business strategists like Michael Porter and economists like Paul Krugman. Despite quite different points of departure and methodologies, they have all come to regard spatial agglomeration of similar and related economic activity as a key starting point for understanding the workings and transformations of the world economy: The endemic tendency in capitalism for dense localized clusters of productive activity to appear at different locations on the landscape has major implications for growth and productivity. These clusters are constituted as transactions-intensive regional economies which are in turn caught up in structures of interdependency stretching across the entire globe.

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Figure 1

Some major industry agglomerations in Europe. Source: European Cluster observatory (http://www.clusterobservatory.eu).

Today’s economic map of the world is dominated by (.) critical massesdin one placedof unusual competitive success in particular fields. Clusters are a striking feature of virtually every national, regional, state, and even metropolitan economy, especially in more economically advanced nations. Porter (1998: 78)

Agglomeration – the clustering of economic activity, created and sustained by some sort of circular logic – occurs at many different levels, from the local shopping districts that serve residential areas within cities to specialized economic regions like Silicon Valley (or the City of London) that serve the world market as a whole. Fujita et al. (1999: 1)

While being pursued by scholars who represent different academic disciplines and traditions, and analyze the role of geographical space in economic process as part of rather disparate wider agendas, the point of departure here is that there exists a common research agenda across various disciplines: that of understanding the role of space and place in industrial development in general, and the phenomenon of spatial agglomeration of similar and related economic activity in particular. A note on terminology should be entered here. The agglomeration phenomenon is dealt with in the literature under different headings. Alfred Marshall’s classicaldand still in many ways unsurpasseddcontribution to the topic uses the concept of localization to analyze the coming into existence of “industrial districts.” In recent years, clusters and clustering have been the most widely circulated terms, following the work by Michael Porter. It has been argued by some that the agglomeration concept would refer exclusively to the spatial concentration of firms and industries, while the cluster concept would refer to spatial collocation in combination with functional linkage between the parties involved. For the purpose of this article, however, the terms agglomeration, localization, and clustering are treated as synonyms.

False Paradoxes and “Circular Logics” The research problem attached to the agglomeration phenomenon may seem to be trivial. We have a phenomenon that can be observed in reality. Firms in the same or related industries oftendalthough far from alwaysdtend to colocate in space,

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and this should reasonably indicate that there should be some advantages connected to such a location pattern: agglomerations do exist and this may legitimately make us assume that such a spatial structure is in some sense efficient or rational. Still, the agglomeration phenomenon is often misconceived, and the concept of agglomeration economies remains elusive. A common misconception of the problem has to do with the relation between globalization and the spatial location of economic activity. All too often in contemporary economic geography, reference is being made to an alleged paradox: in an increasingly globalized world economy, localization seems to matter more, not less. The key to this alleged paradox can be found already in Adam Smith’s famous dictum in his Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations in 1776, however, stating that the division of labor is determined by the extent of the market. The extension of the market explicitly refers to the spatial extension of the producers’ market area. Smith’s statement has a strong bearing on recent work on the logic of industrial agglomeration. If globalization means the emergence of truly integrated global markets, it follows that it is increasingly possible to access these global markets from, in principle, any point of location. It should be easy to see the increased global economic integration opens up for more local/regional/national specialization. Thus, the structural effect of such globalization is that one or a few leading global production centers should in principle be able to supply the entire world market in each industry, where previously there were many of regional, national, or local production centers. In other words, increasing agglomeration of similar and related activity should be seen as a structural effect of globalization rather than some strange paradox. The circular logic referred to in the quotation by Fujita et al. incurs more serious problems, however. In the terminology of economists, the agglomeration phenomenon is intimately related to increasing returns. (Economic) geographers often prefer the concept of external economies of scale. Either way, we have a situation where initial events trigger subsequent action in a process of cumulative causationdor a circular logic, as Fujita et al. phrased it in the quote above. The existence of one or several firms in a certain place will lead to the attraction of more firms of the same kind, and the increased volume of activity will in turn exert an even greater attraction on further firms. Such processes tend to be self-reinforcing, at least until some countering diseconomies kick in. There are several potential problems with this line of reasoning. One is that, unless it can be specified in some detail what the mechanisms of agglomeration economies are, there is the risk of ending up in circular reasoning. Paul Krugman cites the remark of a sarcastic physicist who had just heard a presentation on increasing returns: “So you’re telling us that agglomerations form because of agglomeration economies.” Models of agglomeration have always run such a risk: the existence of agglomerations is explained by agglomeration economies. These agglomeration economies cannot really be specified or observed but their existence is proved by the existence of agglomerations! A related problem is that a proper explanation of the agglomeration phenomenon should also have to specify the limits of agglomeration economies. If we specify several reasons why it is advantageous for firms to locate close to other similar or related firms or in big citiesdwhich indeed many of them dodwe also have to be able to say something about why not all firms locate in such settings, or why in some case dense agglomerations seem to petrify and lose their dynamism. The following section summarizes the factors held to make up agglomeration (or localization) economies. The final section then discusses in schematic terms how we can understand the development of agglomerations over time, by adopting an evolutionary approach.

What Factors Make up Agglomeration Economies? Identifying and analyzing those advantages that may accrue to firms located in close juxtaposition to other similar and related firms, rather than being located in isolation, is one way to account for the agglomeration phenomenon. The concept of agglomeration economies (or localization economies) refers to these advantages. The basic understanding of this concept was in place already a century ago. Thus, Alfred Marshall identified already in 1890 three different mechanismsdrelated to interfirm linkage, labor skills, and knowledge spillover that are still more or less valid. A few decades later location theorists like Alfred Weber added a fourth, pointing to cost savings derived from shared infrastructure. Beginning with the latter, there are benefits to be gained from the possibility for agglomerated firms to share the cost for certain collective resources between several firms. This applies in particular to the cost of installing proper infrastructures (roads, sewage, electricity, and broadband networks) and institutions (education and legal systems). It need not be just a matter of cost savings, however. When an agglomeration of similar or related firms is established, there is also a potential to adjust the local infrastructure, the education system, and other types of collective goods after the needs of this particular industry. Second, firms in agglomerations can reduce their transport and transaction costs as interfirm transactions and shipments are simplified when the distance between firms is negligible. The customer firm that can place an order with a supplier located down the street will gain an advantage in relation to a competitor that has to travel long distances to see its supplier or, alternatively, place the order by means of some communications system and then wait for the shipment to take place. Reduced transaction costs for colocated trading partners may be the shorthand for this second mechanism. Third, agglomeration makes for the development of a local labor market for specialized skills. The establishment of a local pool of skilled labor has been proposed as a major element of the localization economies ever since Alfred Marshall more than a century ago wrote so elegantly about the advantages of being located in an industrial district:

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Again, in all but the earliest stages of economic development a localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good choice of workers with the special skill which they require, while men seeking employment naturally go places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where therefore it is likely to find a good market. Marshall (1890/1916: 271)

Thus, it can theoretically be argued that local labor markets function better, from the point of view of both firms and employees, if there are several similar and related firms around. Well-functioning markets for specialized labor skills can thus be added to the list of localization economies. Fourth, an agglomeration of related firms forms the basis of a local milieu that may facilitate knowledge spillovers and stimulate various forms of learning and adaptation. This is the aspect of industry agglomeration that has attracted the bulk of research interest since the early 1990s. The general argument is that agglomerations tend to trigger processes that create not only dynamism and flexibility in general, but also learning and innovation. In such milieus, chances are greater that an individual firm gets in touch with actors that have developed or been early adopters of new technology. The flow of industry-related information and knowledge is generally more abundant to the advantage of all firms involved. A local culture with specific norms, values, and institutions (formal and informal) makes it possible to transfer also more tacit forms of knowledge from one actor to another. Thus, agglomeration may also promote localized learning and knowledge spillovers between firms. To sum up: spatial proximity between similar and related firms does make easier not just interfirm transactions in general, but in particular those interactions and knowledge spillovers which form the basis for innovation and learning. The generation of wellfunctioning labor markets for specialized skills does also contribute both to efficiency and knowledge creation. Institutional and infrastructural factors add further to making location in an agglomeration beneficial for the individual firm.

How Do Agglomerations Emerge and Develop? Historical Approaches Spatial agglomerations of similar and related economic activity often have deep historical roots. An alternative way to understand the agglomeration phenomenon is to study real agglomerations historically in order to analyze their birth, growth, saturation, decline, and possible reinvigoration. The origin of the agglomeration in such accounts, that is, the event or action which triggered subsequent developments, sometimes turns out to be related to some more or less traditional factor of location, that is, some natural or social asset that at a certain point in time turned out to be an important location factor for a particular type of economic activity. Almost equally often, however, there seems to be a considerable amount of chance involved. Some entrepreneurial person did, for some reason, get the idea to start a certain type of economic activity. Analyses of Silicon Valley do almost without exception start out telling one particular story. This is the story of how Frederick Terman, who had moved from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston to a chair in electro-technology at Stanford University, encouraged his two students, William Hewlett and David Packard, to try to find a way to commercialize an instrument which Hewlett had designed as part of his work with his master thesis. Thus, in a garage in Palo Alto in the late 1930s, a business was set up that meant the start of a process which within a couple of decades had developed into the world’s without doubt most important agglomeration in the computers, electronics, and software industry. The fact that a young woman named Catherine Evans decided to make a wedding gift in 1895 was one of the reasons why Dalton, Georgia, half a century later had become the primary US agglomeration of firms producing carpets. The literature is rather silent of the mechanisms causing these rather random historical moments which sometimes trigger the development of agglomerations, except for the fact that most new firms start out at the place of residence of their founder. Once an activity has started in a particular place, other mechanisms come into play, contributing to subsequent developments. Thus, while agglomerations often originate in a rather random series of events leading to the start of a new firm at the place of residence of the entrepreneur, they are sustained by various forms of inertia and myopia, meaning that firms rarely relocate once they have been rooted in a place, but more importantly that a successful economic activity in one place is often followed by other similar or related activities. This could be the result from spinoffs, that is, former employees see a chance to start their own business, either as a competitor or a supplier to the original firm, but also through simple imitation. The fact that one firm succeeds is seen as a proof that this is a viable business in the particular location and it will inspire others in the neighborhood to try their luck in the same business. In addition to pioneering, imitation, and spinoffs, various processes will tend to follow: the creation of networks between local firms; the creation of a local culture, supporting infrastructures and institutions adopted to the proliferation industry; the establishment of the place as a brand of the industry and subsequent attraction on resources from the outside (people, capital, firms). Ultimately, agglomerations of many similar and related firms will also tend to go through phases of consolidationdat some stage some firms tend to take on leading roles and often this means that they take over other firms in the agglomeration such that an initially small-firm-based agglomeration often ends up being dominated by a limited number of larger firms. Also, history tells us that most regional agglomerations, sooner or later, run into phases of crisis. Elements of petrifaction are often revealed at points in history when technological or other developments call for rapid restructuring. This may mean that what was once a leading center of dynamism within a given line of business ends up as an “old industrial region,” facing problems of renewal and finding itself being

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outcompeted by firms located elsewhere. Then again, there are numerous examples of how industry agglomerations manage to reinvent themselves also in this phase, such that they can actually retrieve some of their former greatness. The above is not intended as a complete stage model of the rise and fall of industry agglomerations. It merely serves to establish as a fact that some of our knowledge on the agglomeration phenomenon comes from studying the historical development of agglomerations, and that it is possible through such accounts to gain insight into the processes which make for the evolutionary development of industry agglomerations. In addition, it is useful to keep in mind that the impact of agglomeration economies may vary considerably over time, throughout the life cycles of industry agglomeration.

Remaining Research Challenges The agglomeration phenomenon has been a core research issue in economic geography for many years. Still there are unresolved questions that remain challenges for further research in the field. One issue stands out as being particularly important in this context. Will the continuous development of ICT eventually reduce the need for face-to-face interaction not just for transmitting standard information but also when it comes to complex problem-solving and explorative activities? And will this in turn reduce the need for, and benefits following from, spatial agglomeration of similar and related activity?

See Also: Creativity; Innovation; Labor Market; Location Theory; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Badr, K., Rizk, R., Zaki, C., 2019. Firm productivity and agglomeration economies: evidence from Egyptian data. Appl. Econ. 1–17. Chauvin, J.P., Glaeser, E., Ma, Y., Tobio, K., 2017. What is different about urbanization in rich and poor countries? Cities in Brazil, China, India and the United States. J. Urban Econ. 98, 17–49. Fujita, M., Krugman, P., Venables, A.J., 1999. The Spatial Economy. Cities, Regions and International Trade. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Hoover, E.M., 1948. The Location of Economic Activity. McGraw-Hill, New York. Krugman, P., 1991a. Geography and Trade. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Krugman, P., 1991b. Increasing returns and economic geography. J. Political Econ. 99, 483–499. Krugman, P., 1995. Development, Geography and Economic Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Malmberg, A., Maskell, P., 2002. The elusive concept of localization economies: towards a knowledge-based theory of spatial clustering. Environ. Plan. 34, 429–449. Malmberg, A., Power, D.J., 2006. True clusters/A severe case of conceptual headache. In: Asheim, B., Cooke, P., Martin, R. (Eds.), Clusters and Regional Development: Critical Reflections and Explorations. Routledge, London, pp. 50–68. Marshall, A., 1916. Principles of Economics. An Introductory Volume (First Published in 1890), seventh ed. Macmillan, London. Martin, R., Sunley, P., 2003. Deconstructing clusters: chaotic concept or policy panacea? J. Econ. Geogr. 3 (1), 5–35. Myrdal, G., 1957. Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Regions. Ducksworth, London. Pflüger, M., Tabuchi, T., 2019. Comparative advantage, agglomeration economies and trade costs. J. Urban Econ. 109, 1–13. Porter, M.E., 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. Macmillan, London. Porter, M.E., 1998. Clusters and the New Economics of Competition. Harvard Business Review, Boston, MA. Power, B., Doran, J., Ryan, G., 2019. The effect of agglomeration economies on firm deaths: A comparison of firm and regional based approaches. Urban Studies p.0042098018817428. Pred, A., 1966. The Spatial Dynamics of US Urban-Industrial Growth, 1800–1914. Interpretive and Theoretical Essays. The Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Rigby, D.L., Brown, W.M., 2015. Who benefits from agglomeration? Reg. Stud. 49 (1), 28–43. Scott, A.J., 1988. New Industrial Spaces: Flexible Production Organisation and Regional Development in North America and Western Europe. Pion, London. Scott, A.J., 2006. Geography and Economy. Three Lectures. Claredon Press, Oxford. Tao, J., Ho, C.Y., Luo, S., Sheng, Y., 2019. Agglomeration economies in creative industries. Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 77, 141–154. Weber, A., 1929. Theory of the Location of Industries (First Published in 1909). The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

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Aging and Health GJ Andrews, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Aging in place The policy and practice priority to allow older people to stay in one form of accommodation for the longest possible duration and to avoid unnecessary relocation. Demographic transition The historical process of a population moving from high birth and high death rates to low birth and death rates. Gerontology The academic study of the biological, psychological, and social aspects of aging.

When considering the potential importance of the geographical study of older people and populations, some basic facts are well worth remembering. Older peopledtypically defined by governments and other officialdom as being more than 65 years of agedconstitute a significant and growing proportion of the general populations of both developed and developing world counties, notably set to grow threefold in the latter in the next 30 years. Although many characteristics and activities of older people and populations are similar to other age groups, they also face unique circumstances and challenges. Older age is a stage of life associated with specific physical and psychological changes and states, and of all demographic groups, older people experience most health and mobility problems, are the greatest consumers of health and social care, and face a great deal of negative stereotyping and stigmatization; however, contrary to some popular beliefs, they also hold valuable positions in society and can, of course, live diverse, rich, and fulfilling lives. Given this scale and distinctiveness of aging-related issues, human geography has long been, and continues to be, interested in studying older people in a variety of contexts from a variety of perspectives. Broadly defined, the geography of aging (or what, in disciplinary terms is occasionally termed geographical gerontology) is concerned with the spatial characteristics and contexts of aging. These range from the distributive features of older populations, to the ways in which places reflect older people and the ways in which places are experienced and negotiated by them. Not all of this field is focused on health issues, and many studies consider wider socialdand more recently culturaldaspects of older people’s lives; however, concerns for health are evident in some form, and to some extent, in a substantial majority of studies in this field. As a field of human geography, geographical studies of older people date back more than 30 years and crosscut the interests of a number of subdisciplines, including social geography, health geography, and more specialist varieties such as population geography and development geography. Not only have the empirical subjects studied mirrored the changing interests of these subdisciplines, but they have also changed in line with underlying paradigm shifts. As well as crosscutting various subdisciplines of human geography, geographical studies of aging have also drawn from, and contributed to, other recognizable bodies of research in human geography. For example, it is not unusual to see a particular geographical study of older people described as a welfare geography, a geography of caring, or an emotional geography. Notably, many studies are not identified explicitly as geographies of aging, perhaps because the author does not consider the age of their subjects to be particularly important and/or the dimension on which he/she wishes to focus. With such a long-standing and broad-based disciplinary history, and such a substantive body of work produced to date, it is perhaps surprising that geographies of aging do not possess a higher and more distinct profile in human geography. To speculate, this low profile might be due to the broad scope of the field. It arises right across human geography yet is not associated with, or essential to, any one single subdiscipline. Another reason might be because geographies of aging have generally followed or mirrored disciplinary progressions and innovations rather than forging them. A very different reason for a modest profile might simply be that, no matter how socially relevant and important aging is, it is not a particularly glamorous subject and indeed reminds all individualsdincluding geographersdof their own mortality. It is encouraging, however, to see review and position papers recently appearing in journals such as Social Science & Medicine, Geography Compass, and Progress in Human Geography and important venues that had not hosted them for a number of years. Outside human geography, reflecting the global importance of aging and health and the academic attention it accords, geographies of aging have also made strong and sustained contributions to, and have also drawn from, other disciplines. Some of these are squarely aging focused such as clinical gerontology and social gerontology, while others are more general health categories such as epidemiology, demography, and various professionally focused research disciplinesdincluding nursing and social work researchdwithin which aging is one empirical interest among others. While adding variety to the field, this interdisciplinarity has equally caused tensions among commentators. For example, while certain geographers have been eager for geographies of aging to draw on, contribute to, and reflect gerontology and the health sciences, others have been more concerned that connections are strengthened with human and cultural geography.

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Population Aging Since the 1950s, a long-standing strand of aging and health research has been concerned with population aging. It is an area of interest dominated by the work of demographers and population geographers who have particular expertise in handling and analyzing large population datasets that are essential sources for these studies. Researchers have identified the spatial patterning and characteristics of demographic transitions, including declining fertility (due to social change) and increasing life expectancy (due to improvements in diet, living conditions, and healthcare) that underpin demographic aging in particular areas. They have also identified the national, regional, and local consequences of population aging in terms of health, society, and economics. For example, research has highlighted the substantial challenges that lay ahead for governments, health services, and nongovernmental organizations in meeting even the most basic needs of those developing world populations, which are both growing and aging most rapidly. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region are particularly well researched. With respect to developed world countries, many of whose populations are not growing significantly yet are still aging, research has highlighted the continued need for policies and planning so that health, social care, and welfare services are funded, and provided to the necessary levels and standards. These inquiries inform popular political and public questions, and are often connected to specific issues such as pensions or access to medical treatments, how to handle the needs of an aging population, and who is ultimately financially responsible for older people. One by-product of this research is that, in demonstrating increasing life expectancy, it has highlighted the need to rethink older age. Most notably, instead of older adulthood being thought of as a single “third age,” increasingly it is now thought of in terms of being the third and fourth ages of life (i.e., older and most old). Other social scientific and geographical research has built on this recognition and has articulated how these groups have distinct qualities, needs, circumstances, experiences, and diversities. Indeed, rather than simply recategorizing older age, the idea of third and fourth stages of life helps recognize that many younger older people are active participants in labor markets, are active and powerful consumers in economies, and are a powerful force for social and cultural change. Notably, rather than being consumers of health and social care, they often themselves provide care to their parents, well into their 60s and 70s.

Movements of Older Population Over the last 20 years, a great deal of research has focused on movements of older population. At one level, research has focused on broad migration patterns. Other studiesdoften which are qualitativedhave investigated some important social contexts and consequences such as family networks and the pushes and pulls to and from different locations in migration decision-making, as well as the outcomes of such migrations on groups, individuals, and health and social care systems. This research has considered these issues in the context of semipermanent migrations between countries (such as British retirees to Spain) with respect to semipermanent migrations within countries (such as British retirement migration to coastal areas) and short-term migrations within, around, or between countries (such as North American “snowbirds”/seasonal migrants). A number of studies describe the factors that have led to the increasing distancing of older adults from their children. Underpinning this trend has been changing social attitudes with regard to the need for close geographical proximity between families and also changing attitudes regarding responsibilities for providing care and social support. Indeed, what is commonly known as “the loosening of family ties” is recognized to have a strong geographical dimension. At the same time, both older people and their children have been shown to be more actively mobile, due to their changed economic circumstances. For example, in comparison with previous generations, the current generation of older people has more money and resources that provide opportunities to relocate, while their children might be more likely to relocate for career purposes. Whatever the reason for increased distancing, however, research identifies decay in immediate interactions and social and caregiving support as distances increase between families. This does not necessarily have to lead to a complete breakdown of communication between families, and geographers and others have highlighted the concept and emerging reality of “intimacy at a distance.”

The Health of Older Populations Another long-standing strand of research is focused on the health of older populations. Population geographers and demographers, along with epidemiologists and health geographers, have played central roles. At the national scale, life expectancy in specific countries is an important consideration, and bodies such as the World Health Organization have produced a number of publications outlining rates and variations in expectancy. Health status and morbidity of older people in given locales is another important concern, and studies have considered rates of many health conditions related to aging, as well as their relationships to older people’s ethnicity, gender, affluence, and access to health and social care. For example, localized rates of age-related conditions such as dementia have been investigated. Mirroring current interests in health geography, in recent years a growing interest in place-effects on older people’s health has emerged, often at the neighborhood and community level. This work is particularly important with respect to older people because, more than any other group, they rely on local social support and facilities. Certain research explores the impact of social “composition” on health, that being the characteristics of people in given areas (including affluence, class, and family composition). Other research explores the impact of social “context” of health, that being the resources available to people locally (such as primary care facilities,

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various local shops, and services). Meanwhile, most recently, collective social dimensions to health have been explored, specifically the role of social capital and the ways communities work togetherdor notdfor common goals and gains for their older members.

Negotiating Environments Some of the earliest geographical research, which engaged with older people’s changing relationships with environments, drew heavily on environmental psychology published in the 1960s and 1970s and, in particular, on the path-breaking work of gerontologist Powell Lawton. Lawton’s ecological theory of aging was most famously articulated through his environmental docility hypothesis (also associated with terms such as aging and adaptation). Here older people are thought to adapt their behaviors to cope with the increasing challenges that negotiating the environment poses with increasing age (what is known as environmental press). Although these ideas provided popular frameworks for research for many years, along with psychologists, over time geographers began to question the assumption that older people assume a passive role in such adaptation. Following amendments to the theory forwarded by Lawton himself in the 1980s, geographers have begun to research and articulate older people’s proactivity in adaptive responses, specifically how older people use their environments as a valuable resource in their lives and experience and approach them positively. Developing these early considerations of environment, geographers have focused on many aspects of living environments from the scale of local communities to the scale of very specific forms of residential accommodation. In particular, one line of research asks how specific environmentsdwhether they be a dwelling, urban neighborhood, or rural areadcan be enabling or disabling. Much of this work is based on qualitative methodologies and presents a rich and critical understanding of people’s lives lived in, and through, places. With regard to rural living, research has focused on many everyday issues related to housing, transport, and broader socioeconomic change. With regard to urban living, research has focused on the design and negotiation of public spaces and facilities. Indeed, the various obstacles associated with negotiating urban life in older age are argued to include poor access to public transport, inadequate public signage, and a lack of alternatives to staircases. Research here has focused on their consequences, such as falls and increasing social isolation, but equally on design and planning solutions to assist older people. Indeed a particular strength of this research is that it moves beyond a traditional focus on older people’s functional limitations to find positive ways to make environments more enabling for them.

Residence and Care It is typical for studies in this field to simultaneously capture elements of older people’s residential (living) arrangements, and their health and social care, because many older people require both assistance with their everyday living activities and with various health and social services. Consequently many placesdincluding nursing homes, residential homes, assisted living arrangements, retirement communities, and even private dwellingsdcontain different elements and combinations of each. Concerned with longer-term movements between places of residence, the concept of “aging in place” has emerged in social and healthcare practice, policy, and research. As the term suggests, it articulates a priority to allow older people to live and be cared for in the place of their choice and to avoid their unnecessary relocation. Because of the concept’s obvious geographical dimensions, geographers have naturally engaged with it and have offered more critical and theoretically informed explanations of the dynamics between aging, health, and place. Indeed, research by geographers shows the many ways in which places of residence provide attachments, meaning, and current and historical identity. Geographers have engaged with the provision and experience of health and social care in a variety of ways. With an emphasis on the political economy of care, certain studies have indicated how policy changes, and the restructuring of health services, shift both the location of, and access to services, and older people’s experiences of services. Indeed, with regard to the latter, studies highlight the potential tensions between the management of health services and older people’s experiences of receiving them. In this way, commentators have been able to contribute to broader debates in the social and health sciences about what are, and what are not, the most appropriate places for older people to live and be cared for in. For example, the “residential care versus community care debate” is implicitly geographical and has involved contributions from geographers. On one side, the critique of residential homes has been twofold. One strand of criticism has focused on the inability of communal residential living environments to provide independence for residents and to protect their civil liberties, and the inability of regulating bodies to maintain adequate standards of environment and care. Meanwhile, a second strand of criticism views residential settings as places of stigma and social marginalization. Indeed, it is posited that regardless of whether quality standards can be improved, residential facilities will always carry negative associations that further marginalize older people through their association with them. In short, society will always dislike and think negatively of these settings as places of decay and decline. On the other side, studies that support residential settings highlight that much of the aforementioned antiresidential literature is underpinned by an incorrect assumption that residential care is irrevocably institutional while people’s homes are the only places to maintain personal control and freedom in older age. Moreover, commentators note that researchers who criticize residential settings often ignore the quality of older people’s lives prior to them moving into such places. They argue that institutionalization occurs due to need regardless of the care setting, and residential settings cannot be blamed for generating dependency in older age. Others challenge the negative stereotyping of residential care and suggest that the residents of these settings are not institutionalized victims separated from society. Rather, residential settings are held up by their advocates as positive options for older persons that can be experienced by their residents as friendly, reliable, and safe communities.

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Most recently, geographers have attempted to articulate the importance of place, to professional healthcare practices. Indeed, with respect to gerontological nursing, studies have attempted to identify the spatialities in everyday practice that have the potential to affect the experiences of older people. Drawing on Goffman’s ideas on the creation of “total institutions,” a number of publications articulate the roles of nurses and their actions in the making of institutional places and place experiences. Meanwhile, other research attempts to connect geographical concepts and ideas to some fundamental concepts that drive professional clinical practice (such as client-centeredness, autonomy, quality of care, and environment). Here, a geographical approach has helped rethink practices associated with physical and chemical restraint of people with dementia who often display challenging behavior. Various commentaries have articulated the spatial aspects and consequences of restraint and advocate the minimization of restraint and psychosocial interventions as practice solutions. Collectively, this emerging research not only connects the discipline of geography with health professional research disciplines but also constitutes an attempt at providing a direct contribution to the evidence base for professional clinical gerontological practice.

Emerging Critical Perspectives: From Humanist to Posthumanist Reflecting the emergence of critical perspectives in both social gerontology and human geography, research published since the mid1990s draws much more on humanism and social constructionism, focusing on representations of aging and challenges accepted social norms about aging. Several studies, for example, engage with aging and the concept of embodiment, and talk in depth with older people to explore their perceptions of health and aging and their negotiations and changing relationships with spaces and places. Other studies attempt to understand how places reveal social attitudes and values about aging. Commentators have begun to deconstruct “imagined landscapes of aging identity”; here geographical metaphors are explored including life’s late journeys, paths traveled, autumn years, and the sunsets of our lives. Interestingly the very latest form of critical research that has emerged in geographies of aging and health might be described largely as “posthumanist” in orientation (see work by Andrews, McHugh, Maclaren, Cutchin, Nettleton, Schwanen, Phoenix, and Bell, for example). As with posthumanist human geography more generally, this scholarship decenters “the human,” looking also to the nonhuman aspects of aging. In part this involves a reevaluation of older humans, from a view of them as autonomous, complete, and closed, to a view of them as dependent, incomplete, and open. In part this also involves rethinking particular facets of older humans (such as their fitness, mobility, and well-being) from being things that are within, known and verbalized (by them), to being distinctive facets of their existence produced through distributed processes involving many biological/natural and material/ technological actors and vital forces. Quite significantly, posthumanism not only lays the basis for a new research paradigm but also is demanded by what a number of scholars call an emerging “posthuman condition” in contemporary society. Scholars have argued that the idea of the “human subject” no longer accurately reflects the conditions of lived experience, there being a more horizontal and coequal, rather than top-down hierarchical, relationship between the human and nonhuman. A key claim is that, in the 21st Century, human beings increasingly live within diverse more-than-human assemblages of digital cultures, algorithmic computation, electronic media diffusion, and technological proliferation, including engineering and biotechnologies. These advances, it is posited, have produced a world where in many circumstances it is increasingly difficult to separate nature from culture, natural from artificial, flesh from technology, body from society, and medical from social, they often being too entangled and codependent. One example is social media use, where increasing numbers of older people emotionally express themselves through electronic interfaces with very definite conventions, parameters, and audiences. Indeed, the internet more generally has enabled many older people to communicate and gather all kinds of information (including on health). Another example is antiaging and life-sustaining interventionsdsuch as cosmetic treatments and surgeries, drugs and supplements, and implant technologiesdwhich involve the insertion of materials onto and into the aging body or the material manipulation of the aging body. These interventions represent the latest commercial and consumer iteration of the long-standing “scientific” objective of a technologically enhanced transhuman body that transcends natural limits. While many of these developments might result in specific incidences of prolonging, improving, and even creating life, and certainly increase well-being, the posthuman condition might also have negative health consequences. For example, it is associated with a dense materiality in society that, through outcomes such as pollution, environmental degradation, and climate change, has threatened older humans from individual to population levels. A range of theoretical orientations have come to inform posthumanist geographies of aging, including new materialisms, nonrepresentational theory, affect theory, and to some extent certain streams of metaphysical pragmatism. Moreover, posthumanist geographies of aging capture theoretical interests of science and technology studies, new mobilities, and sensory studies. Broadly speaking, although there are differences in their understandings, common understandings also exist, specifically that are as follows: (i) Aging emerges through relational material assemblages. Posthumanist theory recognizes that human and nonhuman entities are not only responsible for realities and experiences, but that they are on the same level of existence (understood according to a “flat” ontology), are both capable of agency, can evolve together, and can often lack clear distinction. Moreover, it recognizes that aging realities and experiences emerge through processes occurring in “assemblages” composed of these entities; the components in place; the many “mechanisms” (such as relations and events) operational in situ and within wider networks; and the excessive vital outcomes which are more than the sum of assemblage’s parts.

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(ii) Aging is enacted and performed by open vital bodies. Without ignoring them altogether, posthumanist geographies of aging shift the focus of scholarly attention away from physiological and biological changes in the body (the scientific understanding) and subjective opinions and judgments about the body (the humanistic understanding), toward the wider origins and character of the social, affective, and material expression of aging bodies. Attention is hence paid in research to the practices and performances that vital human and nonhuman biological bodies undergo with nonhuman/material objects, the efforts they exert, and the vital energies they create and experience together. Here a Deleuzian understanding of “affect” has been key to much of this work, an infectious phenomenon whereby affected human bodies interact with and affect further human bodies. An energy builds within, between, and beyond bodies, it being somatically registered as a vague sensation or feeling. (iii) Aging occurs in immediate, prepersonal, moving space-times. Posthumanist geographies of agingdparticularly those informed by nonrepresentational theorydlay emphasis on base practices and textures to aging life, through studies designed to animate what is happening in space-time in the creation of experiences, as in the case of affect, often evoking forms of movement and awareness and interbody solidarity that do not involve full contemplation, signification, or verbalization. Attention hence falls to practices and performances, foregrounds and backgrounds, impulses and habits, senses and sensations, and more generally to the ways human and nonhuman agents create distinct “pockets” of space-time, their speeds, rhythms, momentums, encounters, and changes of direction.

Summary Future geographical research on aging and health will need to be diverse. The development of traditional perspectives on older population healthdin terms of dynamics, distributions, and movementsdwill no doubt continue, while emerging postmodern and posthumanist perspectives will be needed to more sensitively and critically investigate the complex relationships between older people and the varied places within which they live and are cared for. The future research challenges that lie ahead will involve finding appropriate ways to study the increasingly diverse lives of older people and articulate new cultural practices, social processes, and social and spatial relations that are emerging for older people. To meet these challenges most effectively, there has to be greater collaboration and debate within and between those who study aging and health, their various disciplines, and diverse empirical interests. Given that people are living longer and leading increasingly active and diverse lives, the study of aging and health is necessarily a growth industry.

See Also: Epidemiological Transition; Health Geography; Medical Geography.

Further Reading Andrews, G.J., Grenier, A.M., 2015. Ageing movement as space-time: introducing non-representational theory to the geography of ageing. Prog. Geogr. 34 (12), 1512–1534. Andrews, G.J., Grenier, A.M., 2018. The ever-breaking wave of everyday life: animating aging movement-space. In: Katz, S. (Ed.), Aging in Everyday Life: Materialities and Embodiments. Policy Press. Andrews, G.J., Phillips, D.R. (Eds.), 2005. Ageing and Place: Perspectives, Policy and Practice. Routledge. Andrews, G.J., Cutchin, M., McCracken, K., Phillips, D.R., Wiles, J., 2007. Geographical gerontology: the constitution of a discipline. Soc. Sci. Med. 65 (1), 151–168. Andrews, G.J., Evans, J., Wiles, J., 2013. Re-spacing and re-placing gerontology: relationality and affect. Ageing Soc. 33 (8), 1339–1373. Cutchin, M.P., 2003. The process of mediated aging-in-place: a theoretically and empirically based model. Soc. Sci. Med. 57 (6), 1077–1090. Harper, S., Laws, G., 1995. Rethinking the geography of ageing. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 19 (2), 199–221. Hockey, J., Penhale, B., Sibley, D., 2001. Landscapes of loss: spaces of memory, times of bereavement. Ageing Soc. 21 (6), 739–757. Joseph, A.E., Hallman, B.C., 1998. Over the hill and far away: distance as a barrier to the provision of assistance to elderly relatives. Soc. Sci. Med. 46 (6), 631–639. King, R., Warnes, T., Williams, A., 2000. Sunset Lives: British Retirement Migration to the Mediterranean. Berg. Kinsella, K.G., Phillips, D.R., 2005. In: Global Aging: The Challenge of Success, vol. 60, No. 1. Population Reference Bureau, Washington, DC, p. 3. Laws, G., 1993. “The land of old age”: society’s changing attitudes toward urban built environments for elderly people. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 83 (4), 672–693. Maclaren, A.S., 2018. Affective lives of rural ageing. Sociol. Rural. 58 (1), 213–234. McHugh, K.E., 2009. Movement, memory, landscape: an excursion in non-representational thought. Geojournal 74 (3), 209–218. Nettleton, S., Buse, C., Martin, D., 2018. Envisioning bodies and architectures of care: reflections on competition designs for older people. J. Aging Stud. 45, 54–62. Phillips, D.R. (Ed.), 2000. Ageing in the Asia-Pacific Region. Routledge. Rowles, G.D., 1978. Prisoners of Space? Westview. Rowles, G.D., 1986. The geography of ageing and the aged: toward an integrated perspective. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 10 (4), 511–539. Skinner, M.W., Cloutier, D., Andrews, G.J., 2015. Geographies of ageing: Progress and possibilities after two decades of change. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 39 (6), 776–799. Skinner, M., Andrews, G.J., Cutchin, M. (Eds.), 2018. Geographical Gerontology: Perspectives, Concepts, Approaches. Routledge. Smith, G.C., 1998. Residential separation and patterns of interaction between elderly parents and their adult children. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 22 (3), 368–384. Warnes, A.M., 1981. Towards a geographical contribution to gerontology. Prog. Geogr. 5 (3), 317–341. Warnes, A.M., 1990. Geographical questions in gerontology: needed directions for research. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 14 (1), 24–56. Ziegler, F., Schwanen, T., 2011. ‘I like to go out to be energised by different people’: an exploratory analysis of mobility and wellbeing in later life. Ageing Soc. 31 (5), 758–781.

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Aging and Migration Amanda Davies, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Structural Aging Structural aging is an increase in the proportion of the older population. Structural aging is caused by declining fertility and increasing life expectancy. For some localities, population migration can also cause structural aging. Population Aging Population aging is the absolute increase in the number of older people in a population. Population aging results from improvements in life expectancy. Retirement Migration Retirement migration is as a type of voluntary migration undertaken at, or shortly after, retirement from the workforce. Amenity-led Retirement Migration Amenity-led retirement migration is a form of retirement migration where the decision to migrate is informed by the migrant’s desire to have their residence in a location that has the amenity characteristics they desire.

As recognition of the possible social and economic implications of the world’s aging population has grown, there has been an increased effort to understand this demographic transition. One important subject of inquiry has been where and why older people move. Knowing why people move is important as, in aggregate and over time, the moves that individuals undertake can affect the demographic profile and resource stocks of places. Migration flows have resulted in a spatial unevenness in the concentration of older people, which has implications for the social and economic functions of sending and receiving communities as well as broader health care and social support arrangements. Any change in residence from one location to another can be considered migration. While a migration is often viewed as a single move from an origin to a destination, migration can be far more complex and can involve a series of backward or onward moves. Constructions of who is a migrant and what is classified as migration are influenced by the spatial and temporal units used to form the constructions. Most commonly, migrants are thought of as permanent international migrantsdthose who move from their country of birth on a permanent basis. In these terms, it is estimated that 3.5% of the world’s population are international migrants; however, migrants also include those who move within countries, such as from rural to urban areas, as well as those who move on a nonpermanent basis, for example, to access seasonal work opportunities. Nearly all people, particularly in the most developed parts of the world, will be classified as a migrant at some point in their lives as they move residence from one location to another. Understanding why people move is complex. Migration decisions are influenced by spatial and temporal factors including political borders and sociocultural practices. Consideration needs to be given to the decision-making process as well as the process of selecting a residence. Researchers have identified that individuals continuously examine the suitability of the location of their residence. Consideration may be given to personal safety, comfort, accessibility to work or lifestyle opportunities, environmental factors, or the role of the residence as a financial investment. Decisions to move frequently result from a degree of dissatisfaction with the current residence, often triggered by a change in personal circumstance. Dissatisfaction with the current residence may also be influenced by perceptions of how other locations may satisfy their residential criteria. Perceptions of the suitability of other locations can be derived from direct personal experiences acquired from previous visits or by indirect contact such as through information passed on by family, friends, property retailers, and others. Many people may experience dissatisfaction with their residence, but not everyone has the resource or opportunity to change their residence. The decision to move and selection of destination can be influenced by, for example, political rulings that prevent the migration of citizens of one country from moving to another. Differences in acquired qualifications and financial resources also influence the ability of people to move and where they can move. Demographic factors, such as age, further affect the resources and ability of people to undertake migrations. For some, practices of intergenerational living and related caring and financial obligations will affect migration decisions. Therefore, developing universal statements about why people move, how they select a destination, and where they might move in the future is problematic. Instead, understanding historical and contemporary migration flows and the drivers of these is essential for gaining insights into probable future population movements and, in turn, the implications for resource distribution. Focusing on old age, this article considers the connections between migrations and aging. It examines how age relates to decisions to migrate, the selection of a migration destination, and how migrations affect the structural aging of places.

Migration and the Life Course Research has demonstrated a link between decisions to move residence and the life course. Most unforced migrations are prompted when someone transitions through one life course stage to another. Drawing significantly on the experiences of Western populations, commonly recognized migrations associated with life course stages include becoming independent from parents, starting

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a new career, progressing career opportunities, starting a family, and movements to access health-care services. Changes in economic circumstances over the life course are also associated with migrations. During the period known as “later life” or “old age,” which is frequently noted in the literature as commencing when individuals permanently transition out of the workforce, there are three recognized life course stage transitions associated with migrations. First, retirement from the workforce can trigger individuals to change residence. Retirement provides individuals the opportunity to restructure their daily routines, typically to incorporate more leisure activities, and it often also results in a change in economic circumstances. Therefore, migrations associated with retirement relate to increasing accesses to lifestyle opportunities. A change of residence might be used as a strategy to liquidate financial resources invested in a family home, to reduce time and financial costs associated with maintaining a family home, or to be located closer to desired amenities. Indeed, migration flows of older people to high-amenity localities, such as golfing estates and purpose-built retirement communities, are well recognized. A second life course transition in later life occurs when individuals are no longer able to maintain or remain comfortable with fully independent living due to physical or mental health considerations. Migrations associated with this life course transition include moves to be closer to family, moves to be nearer to health care and social welfare services, and moves to assisted living facilities or purpose-built retirement communities. The third migration typically associated with later life occurs after an individual experiences very poor health and requires substantial life-supporting assistance. In such cases, individuals move into fully assisted living facilities or hospice facilities. While there are three recognized migrations associated with old age life course transitions, simply transitioning through a life course phase does not necessarily mean an individual will undertake a migration. For some, multigenerational living arrangements may negate the need to move into assisted living or lower cost housing during old age. For others, there may be financial, cultural, or political constraints informing their migration decisions. However, in aggregate, and particularly within Western populations, dominant migration flows of older people have resulted in patterns of spatial unevenness in the concentration of older populations, which presents significant challenges for the provision of suitable housing and infrastructure as well as the stability of the workforce. With many older people on fixed incomes, it can also present challenges for overall economic stability of municipal or regional governments.

Retirement Migration Retirement migration is typically thought of as a type of voluntary migration that individuals undertake at, or shortly after, retirement from the workforce. Migrations are driven by the desire to change residence to a preidentified destination. Retirement migrations may also be influenced by need to move to lower cost housing or a lower cost destination. The destination may be somewhere they previously lived, somewhere they holidayed, or somewhere they recognize as offering a desired and affordable retirement lifestyle. The most recognized form of retirement migration is amenity-led retirement migration. Amenity-led retirement migration may involve a domestic or international move. Well-recognized contemporary international amenity-led retirement migration flows include northern European residents moving to high-amenity locations in South Africa and Southern Europe, United Kingdom residents moving to high-amenity locations in Southern Europe, and European and Australian residents moving to high-amenity localities in Southeast Asia. Research also provides evidence for established migration flows of older people for amenity reasons from China and Japan to parts of Southeast Asia. A popular theoretical approach to understanding domestic and international amenity-led retirement migration flows considers that migration results from each individual’s interpretation of push and pull factors operating in sending and receiving localities. This approach positions push and pull factors as fundamental to the migration decision-making process. Pull factors that typically operate in receiving localities include desirable climate and lifestyle options and lower costs of living, while language differences and local dialects are the main barriers that operate in receiving localities. Pull factors operating in sending localities against amenity-led retirement migration typically include the spatial fixity of established family and social networks. The main push factors operating in sending localities associated with amenity-led retirement migrations include high costs of living, feelings of social isolation, and undesirable climates. Existing data on international retirement migration flows of older people are unreliable in their ability to capture accurately the full extent of migration flows. Older international migrants, particularly those who are not in the workforce, typically face additional difficulties in securing visas as they have to demonstrate their capacity to support themselves financially as well as to provide proof of “adequate” travel and medical insurance. Travel and medical insurance can be difficult for older people to obtain as large insurers typically place age restrictions on their products. For some international migrants, these barriers strongly influence their destination selection, with choices limited to countries that offer reciprocal medical insurance or that allow visitors to subscribe to local insurance providers. Some countries only permit older people to visit on a short-term basis. Retirement migrants to these countries use a variety of short-term visa arrangements to support their migrations, resulting in precarity with retirement migrants unable to receive the benefits of permanent residence such as property rights. To mitigate the risks of insecure residence in a retirement destination, some retirement migrants may maintain a residence in their sending country for the purpose of maintaining access to financial and health care supports while living abroad on successive short-term tourist visas. As a result, there is likely an undercount of older out-bound retirement migrants in some sending countries, and an undercount of international retirement migrants in some receiving countries.

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A close relationship between domestic and international amenity-led retirement migration and tourism has been identified, with older people’s decisions to move, and selection of destination, influenced by previous tourist experiences; however, amenity-led retirement migrants distinguish themselves from tourists by creating distinctive social spaces for themselves, and they generate new settlement patterns and patterns of social and economic activity. Domestic retirement migrations can be promoted and assisted by property developers and realtors as well as by specialty businesses that cater to assisting older people to restructure their finances and lifestyle on retirement from employment. Indeed, over the previous two decades, there has been a rapid growth in the number of sophisticated businesses offering assistance to “Western” retirees to undertake international moves. These businesses offer support to migrants to secure visas and property. There has also been a growth in the number of blogs authored by expatriate retiree migrants designed to support “new” retirement migrations, or to develop distinct social networks and cultures among expatriate retirement communities.

Aging and Return Migration Return migration is an important type of elderly migration, which can include domestic and international moves. Much of the extant literature on return migration has focused on international labor migrants during the period when they transitioned out of the workforce. Researchers have considered how these workers navigate social, political, family, and economic pressures when deciding whether to move back to their “home” locality on retirement, to remain in their destination locality, or to move to another locality. In addition to labor migrants, other return migrants include those who moved from their home locations following a period of civil conflict, religious or cultural persecution, or economic depression, and who seek to return after those conditions that prompted them to leave have improved. For some, return migrations can be prompted when the conditions in their destination become less favorable when compared to those available in their sending locality. The recognition that return migration flows are highly complex and can be multidirectional challenges popular assumptions that migration from less developed regions (rural, global south) to more developed regions (urban, global north) are permanent and one-way movements. Return migration is particularly apparent in the Asia–Pacific region where there are large and established transnational labor migration flows. Across the region, workers who are typically from less prosperous localities move to access employment in more prosperous localities. The prominent practice of sending remittances suggests that many migrants maintain close networks with their home community. These migrants may seek to return to their home communities when they cease to be engaged in the workforce. For some, restrictive visa conditions limit their opportunities to remain in their destination community once they leave that workforce. Those who do remain in the destination country often have few legal protections. Return migration can be problematic for the individual and the home community, as some migrants return to unfamiliar social, economic, cultural, and physical settings. Some absence from their home community results in the breaking down of close social and cultural ties with their home community. It is common, therefore, for return migrants to create a hybridized form of cultural identification and belonging.

Aging and Seasonal Migration Seasonal migration is a form of return migration. As the term suggests, people move residence from one locality to another for the duration of a season, before returning to their place of origin. Seasonal migration is commonly associated with localities that offer seasonal employment, such as fishing, agricultural, horticulture, and tourism. Seasonal migration is also common in subsistence agricultural communities with migration regarded as life sustaining. The most recognized form of seasonal migration undertaken by older people is amenity-led retirement migration. Seasonal migrations are undertaken by people who move to maximize the leisure opportunities available in different seasons and who have the financial resources to support such moves. Some move to localities that offer relatively warm, temperate climates, while others seek the cooler climates of alpine environments on a seasonal basis. For some seasonal migrants, the decision to move temporarily is prompted by a desire to access seasonal tourism and leisure activities such as literary or music festivals, or seasonal sporting activities such as national or international sporting tournaments. It is also recognized that some older people undertake seasonal moves for religious or cultural reasons, with the move a strategy to be temporarily based in religiously significant localities. Seasonal migration flows affect property markets in receiving locations. Some seasonal migrants seek to return to the same location year after year. While some of these people will purchase a property in their destination location, others will seek to rent a property from year to year. Other seasonal migrants might choose to move to different localities year after year, typically renting properties to support each migration. For those undertaking international moves, property ownership rules in the destination country affect their strategy for property ownership and also return migration. In some parts of Asia, there are very restrictive rules related to foreign ownership of property. To navigate such barriers, frequently returning seasonal migrants have developed complex property ownership arrangements, often in partnership with local brokers. Typically, such arrangements afford the migrant very few legal protections should there be a dispute related to property access, maintenance, or ownership. Some seasonal migrants do not move to a single destination community; rather, they move their residence between multiple locations. Some may live in recreational vehicles with living quarters, such as motorhomes, camper vans, or caravans (or camper

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trailers). These seasonal migrants are not considered tourists as they culturally self-identify as separate from tourists. They also have different social and economic relationships with host communities compared with other short-term visitors. Seasonal migrations are used by some older people as a strategy to reduce their living costs, while maintaining or increasing their access to leisure opportunities. Older residents from Northern European countries, Australia, and New Zealand move on a seasonal basis to high-amenity localities within the Southeast Asian and Pacific regions, which offer comparatively lower living costs. For those individuals who are residents of a country with pension support for older citizens, seasonal migrations can enable them to maintain access to the government-provided pensions and health-care supports of their home country while they are living, on a short-term basis, in another country. To this end, seasonal migration to lower-cost localities has emerged as an important livelihood strategy for older people on fixed incomes. Seasonal retirement migration has been welcomed in many communities. For communities that are based on tourism, seasonal retirement migration can extend the tourism season, providing an important economic boost. Some older seasonal migrants also seek work on a short-term basis in host communities to support their migration and other living costs. For some places, this additional labor supply is welcomed, particularly if it coincides with a period of high visitor numbers; however, for some places the influx of older seasonal migrants can cause issues related to the increased demand on critical infrastructure and health services and the potential oversupply of skilled and unskilled labor. In these localities, unmanaged seasonal retirement migration can result in tensions between visitor communities and local residents.

Aging, Gender, and Migration Gender and age affect the migration opportunities, strategies, decisions, and experiences of migrants. Along with other characteristics, such as ethnicity, sexual orientation and religion, both gender and age inform who can migrate, when they can migrate, where they can migrate, and how they migrate (voluntary, forced, legal, illegal). Gender affects how individuals experience and navigate cultural, social, economic, and political factors that inform migration opportunities. In some cultural groups, women are expected to migrate away from their home community, and in other cultural groups, young men are expected to move away for work in order to provide monetary remittances to their family and community. Gendered differences in migration can readily be observed in many rural areas. For example, the gendered structure of employment in rural industries can mean that women find it more difficult than men to find suitable local employment and so move to urban centers. In other rural communities, it may be more common for women to undertake many of the duties associated with farming family plots and running the household while the men migrate away to earn an income. In this regard, there are gendered differences in the opportunities to participate in migration that operate in the sending and receiving communities, which can reinforce or extend gender inequalities. The gendered nature of migration has contributed to the structural aging of places, with, for example, some areas experiencing an overrepresentation of older women in the population due to the outmigration of working-age men. Other places can experience an underrepresentation of older women due to the in-migration of men of working age. The gendered patterns of migration along with their drivers affect the social, economic, and cultural resources of places and inform the lived experiences of older people. The experiences of migrants as well as the left-behind population can be hugely varied. In the context of population aging, the high rates of outmigration of young people coupled with the low rates of return migration experienced in many rural areas raises particular concerns for the welfare of the left-behind elderly rural population. In many societies, gendered expectations related to care for the left-behind elderly will inform the decisions of migrants to return, to sponsor further outward-bound family migration, or to provide financial support for their left-behind dependents to remain in their community. Obligations to return to provide direct care for elderly parents or relatives most commonly falls to women.

Conclusion Most countries have structurally aging populations, with all countries experiencing an increase in the number of people aged above 60 years. By 2050, the number of people aged above 60 years in the global population is projected to double. The age structure of a population is determined by three demographic processes: fertility, mortality, and migration. As such, the occurrence and implications of population aging are spatially uneven. It is important for development policies of countries and regions to understand the relationship between aging and mobility and the factors that drive older people’s migration decisions. The scholarship that examines aging and migration is contextually diverse and provides insight into local scale residential mobility, migration within countries and international migration. Attention has been given to examining how older people at different stages of old age make migration decisions. Researchers have considered how physical ability and reduced health influence both migration decisions and opportunities. Evidence exists that makes explicit that gender shapes migration decisions, opportunities, and experiences across the life course. However, there is a dearth of knowledge about how ethnicity and sexuality affect oldage migration decisions, opportunities, and experiences. Amenity-led retirement migration is a relatively recent phenomenon. With the numbers of retirees with the financial means to participate in this form of migration projected to increase rapidly in coming decades, there is a need to understand more fully the nature and implications of amenity-led retirement migration. While the processes that affect the initial decision-making process and

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selection of destination process have been documented for residents of some economically advanced countries, relatively little is known about migration flows occurring in other parts of the world. Furthermore, very little is known about what factors affect the migration decisions of amenity-led retirement migrants after they move. As amenity-led migrants reach late old age, suffer prolonged ill health, or experience a significant decline in their ability to maintain financial independence, there are considerable implications for sending and receiving localities. Increasing the depth and contextual diversity of knowledge about amenity-led migrants after their initial later-life migration could enable sending and receiving localities to provide better health care and social and housing support mechanisms.

See Also: Aging and Health; Demography; Immigration.

Further Reading Bradley, D.E., Longino, C., 2009. Geographic mobility and aging in place. In: Uhlenberg, P. (Ed.), International Handbook of Population Aging. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 319–339. Davies, A., James, A., 2011. Geographies of Ageing: Social Processes and the Spatial Unevenness of Population Ageing. Ashgate, Aldershot. Karl, U., Torres, S. (Eds.), 2016. Ageing in Contexts of Migration. Routledge, Abingdon. Ni Laoire, C., Stockdale, A., 2010. Migration and the life course in rural settings. In: Shucksmith, M., Brown, D.L. (Eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Rural Studies. Routledge, London, pp. 66–79. Skinner, M., Cloutier, D., Andrews, G.J., 2015. Geographies of ageing: progress and possibilities after two decades of change. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 39, 776–799. Skinner, M., Hanlon, N. (Eds.), 2016. Ageing Resource Communities: New Frontiers of Rural Population Change, Community Development and Voluntarism. Routledge, Abingdon. Stockdale, A., 2014. Unravelling the migration decision-making process: English early retirees moving to rural mid-Wales. J. Rural Stud. 34, 161–171. Walsh, K., Nare, L., 2016. Transnational Migration and Home in Older Age. Routledge, New York. Warnes, A.M., 2009. International retirement migration. In: Uhlenberg, P. (Ed.), International Handbook of Population Aging. Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 341–363. Warnes, A.M., 2010. Migration and age. In: Dannefer, D., Phillipson, C. (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Social Gerontology. SAGE Publications Ltd, London, pp. 389–404.

Relevant Websites Gapminder, https://www.gapminder.org/. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/index.shtml.

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Aging in the Developing World Andrea Rishworth and Susan J Elliott, Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Developed and developing countries There is no consensus definition of a “developed” or “developing” country, also often referred to as the “Global North” or “Global South” or low- and middle-income countries” (LMICs). Countries typically fall within one category or another based upon a range of characteristics such as the level of gross domestic product (GDP), access to water, sanitation and hygiene, and level of life expectancy and infant mortality. It is also important to recognize that these terms are dynamic, not static and vary over time and across space. In addition, it is important to note that these are contested constructs. For example, as of 2016 the World Bank made the decision to no longer distinguish between developed and developing countries, marking an evolution in the thinking about the geographic distribution of poverty and prosperity. For the purposes of this document, we continue to use this nomenclature but suggest geographers consider the implications of using these labels. Global aging When all countries are experiencing an increase in the median age of their population. Population aging When the median age of a nation-state increases.

Population aging is a global phenomenon marked by spatial variations between developed and developing countries (countries of the Global North/South). For example, populations 60þ are projected to increase from 962 million to 2.1 billion between 2017 and 2050, with developing countries seeing 80% of this growth. In essence therefore, by 2050, 1.7 of the 2.1 billion people aged 60þ will reside in developing countries and only 0.4 billion in developed countries. This differential is dictated by varying epidemiologic processes between developed and developing countries. That is, developed countries began seeing increases in life expectancy in the late 19th Century as a result of improvements in public health and the resultant declines in infant mortality and infectious diseases. Conversely, population aging in developing countries is a relatively recent phenomenon resulting from much later developments in health infrastructure and public health benefits from environmental changes (e.g., access to water/ sanitation). While aging is generally a period of life associated with specific physical and psychosocial changes, aging populations in developing countries experience greater socioeconomic hardship overall, are more vulnerable to environmental and human-induced disasters such as earthquakes, floods, armed conflict and war, and experience the most negligent governmental systems. And although global populations are aging, profound inequalities in life expectancy exist and continue to grow between developed and developing countries, with an estimated difference of 38 years. At the same time, while chronic conditions are the dominant cause of death in old age globally, chronic conditions not only occur earlier in developing countries, they also amplify the double burden of disease (i.e., chronic and infectious) in old age. Overall, while developed countries had decades to adjust to the gradual graying of their populations, those in developing countries have much less time to adjust with respect to social institutions, such as family structures, policies, economies, and cultural norms, all necessary to accommodate the rapid graying of populations. Geographers have been studying aging for several decades with a focus limited, to a large extent, on a developed world context. And yet there are such quintessentially geographical aspects of aging in the developing world that it behooves geographers to pay closer attention. The balance of this entry involves a world tour of the geographies of aging and concludes with a siren call for greater (research) attention beyond our own backyards.

Patterns of Aging in Developing Countries Asia-Pacific The Asia-Pacific region comprises over 52% of the world’s older population. China currently has the largest global elderly population (209 million) followed by India (116.6 million). Together, they comprise the largest global percentage of elderly populations (i.e., 36%). The Asia-Pacific region is projected to see its elderly population (60þ) more than double from 12% to 25% between 2015 and 2050, with the portion 80þ years quadrupling from 1 to 4% during the same time. Within these aging trends, however, are distinct differences in the timing and pace of this transition. Much variation in aging exists across the region depending on various sociodemographic, political, and geographical characteristics of a place. The region, for instance, has countries with some of the oldest populations in the world (i.e., Japan) who are facing challenges of slow or negative population growth. Yet at the same time, the region has some of the youngest global populations (i.e., Philippines, Bangladesh), where governments are more concerned with issues of family planning and reproductive health.

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These diverse regional demographic contexts have produced varied insight into the wide-ranging aging realities within and between countries. For instance, there are stark differences in life expectancy and disability between Myanmar and Thai seniors due to availability of health and social services across the life course. Comparing factors related to poverty, HIV/AIDS, and aging in Cambodia and Thailand reveals how different levels of economic development, standards of living, and government support produce drastically different experiences in each context. Likewise, segments of the elderly population (i.e., Thailand) are aging with HIV/AIDS, yet these health concerns remain neglected in public health and policy discourses. Characterizing much of the region’s aging population is a growing uncertainty surrounding values of filial piety and intergenerational support in the context of modernization, urbanization, and the long-term effects of the one child policy. As urbanization and capitalization result in growing wealth gaps, new social and residential space formations, social segregation, and other forms of inequality, the potential detrimental impacts on the well-being of the elderly are profound. Considering the government has traditionally provided limited support to elderly populations compared to other parts of the world, the future health and well-being of Asia’s growing numbers of elderly remains uncertain. Within the Indian context, 116.6 million people are currently considered old (60þ). The older population is projected to increase from 9% to 19% between 2015 and 2050, with the proportion 80 yearsþ tripling from 1% to 3% in the same time. This growth is occurring in contexts of changing family obligations, heightened rural–urban migration of young, and growing old age poverty. Just 28.9% of the older population receive any form of pension with at least one-third falling below the poverty line. With almost 90% of the total workforce employed in the informal sector, citizens retire without any financial security causing elderly populations to remain employed (i.e., 40%) or fully dependent on family members (i.e., 40%). Though the economic security and well-being of elderly individuals are largely contingent on the economic capacity of the family unit, these family units are increasingly under strain due to changing employment opportunities, industrialization, and changing societal values. Further, there is also increasing nuclearization of families with most elderly now living alone. Health and healthcare is a growing concern among the elderly as over half have at least one chronic disease or disability but over 90% have no form of health insurance. These changing realities are resulting in an increased prevalence of mental illness, psychological problems, and substance abuse disorders among the aged, exacerbated further given the majority (80%) live in households lacking running water or sewer systems. The feminization of India’s elderly in some segments of the country raises additional questions over how female widows will fare, particularly under traditional Hindu law, where women historically suffer social stigma, discrimination, and income insecurity due to inheritance traditions that favor sons. At the same time, it is important to recognize the increased portions of the elderly populations residing in slum settings and their enhanced risk of physical, verbal, and sexual abuse, particularly for elderly females.

Latin America and Caribbean The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region is undergoing widespread population aging. From 2015 to 2050 the population 60þ is expected to more than double from 11% to 26%. At the same time, those 80þ years are expected to quintuple from 1% to 4.5 %. Despite this large increase, the proportion of older people across and within LAC varies markedly. For example, Uruguay’s population 60þ years is currently 19% of the total population, while Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have only 7%, respectively. Similarly, the particular issues and experiences of the aging population differ within and between each country context. Due to government legislation and supportive policies, Chile, for instance, has a large share of their elderly (83%) receiving a pension, with the country touting a relatively low old age poverty rate (i.e., 12%). Regionally, Chile performs best in health with the highest regional life expectancy at birth (i.e., Average: 79.6; Male: 78.1; Female: 81.1) and at age 60. It also tops the region in educational attainment among older people at 48.2%. On the other hand, Haiti has one of the lowest life expectancies at birth (M: 60.2 and F: 64.4), highest old age poverty rates in the region (78%), and no form of social protection program in their aging demographic. Crosscutting the region are issues of growing poverty and inequality among the elderly populations as social security systems and intergenerational support systems come under growing stress. While older persons’ well-being has traditionally rested on the shoulders of younger generations, intergenerational support systems are gradually being subverted by norms regulating living arrangements and rapid fertility declines. At the same time, due to increasingly fragile institutional environments, sources that were once guaranteeing a safety net or minimum level of social and economic support for older persons are being reformulated, reformed, and often eliminated. Older women across the region are more likely to participate in care-giving and informal environments to generate an income due to inadequacies in state pension provision. Within some LAC countries (i.e., Costa Rica, Uruguay, Brazil), however, there is a growing awareness that elderly populations are now more likely to provide financial support to their adult children, contrary to other LMIC contexts where elderly depend on their children and family members. Further, unique health characteristics of Latin America Regions (LAR’s) aging populations have emerged revealing the region is in the midst of a diabetes epidemic, never before documented on such a regional scale among elderly populations. The increasing elderly population together with the growing demand for health services, precisely when access to healthcare is shrinking and becoming costlier under privatized schemes, creates a precarious situation.

Africa Africa, like other parts of the world, is undergoing rapid demographic change. Yet in contrast to the rest of the globe, Africa will remain the youngest by far (40% below 15 years). That is, the median age is currently 19.7 years and will rise to just 26.4 years by 2050, compared to approximately 40 or more in all other world regions. At the same time, the share of the older population

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(60þ) is only 5.5% and projected to rise to 9.8% by 2050, compared to 20%–30% in other developing countries. Nonetheless, Africa’s elderly population (60þ) is projected to quadruple from 40.6 million in 2015 to 215 million by 2050. This however, does not necessarily mean that everyone is living longer; in fact, life expectancy at birth currently ranges from 45 to 75 years. Rather it simply means that the proportion of the older population is becoming larger in absolute numbers. Yet, those who survive to the age of 60 can expect to live as long, if not longer, than older populations in other global regionsdthe number of those 80þ in Africa will increase to 22.5 million, five times more than in 2017. Marked geographic variation exists in the ways aging is unfolding across the continent, between, and within regions. Whereas South Africa’s elderly population is expected to double from 7.7% (4.2 million) to 15.4% (19.06 million) by 2050, North Africa’s elderly population is expected to almost triple from 6% to 20% by 2050dthe greatest proportion of aging adults within all of the continent. Aging in Western Africa will also increase from 5% in 2000 to 11% in 2050dmore than doubling over this period. The smallest increase will occur in Central Africa, increasing from 5% in 2000 to 8% in 2050. Be that as it may, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will see an overall 13-fold increase in the absolute size of its older population from the current 56 million to 716 million, by the end of this century. Across and within this diversity there exist a range of crosscutting themes, characterizing the experience of aging populations in SSA, growing income inequality, increasing burdens of both chronic and infectious diseases, civil strife, and corrupt governments. Older populations across the continent systematically have less availability of and access to healthcare and are relatively disadvantaged compared to young adults (29–59 years) in both wealth and health. The majority are often denied access to social services, with little recourse to any form of social safety net (e.g., pension, formal social security provision). Within the continent, fewer than 10% of the older population can claim a pension, though major variation exists from one country to another. In Morocco, for example, 16% of the 60þ receive a retirement pension. Yet of this, only 3% are women, compared with 30% of the men. While some countries, such as Kenya, have begun implementing noncontributory pension systems these are often inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living. This results in large numbers of elderly workingdoften in the informal economydin advanced ages (i.e., 90%) or dependent on family members for support.

Geography of Aging North Versus South Reflecting on these demographic dynamics reveals many similarities between aging in both developed and developing countries. Aging populations the world over are seeing changes in traditional family and intergenerational care systems due in part, to changing cultural values systems, increased female labor participation, and material resource constraints. Similarly, elderly in both regions are experiencing growing rates of chronic disease and mental health issues, yet often experience major barriers to access and utilization of health services. Likewise, elderly populations across the globe are experiencing pension cuts and growing income inequality within and between generations, exactly when their need for economic security is growing. Yet, a set of fundamentally different characteristics underpin aging in developing countries. For instance, classifications of “old” often vary geographically, especially between developed and developing countries. Whereas the United Nations defines older persons as 60 years and above, such definitions rarely apply in developing countries due to a lack of physical birth certificates and unknown dates of birth. Although definitions of old vary across and within developing countries, “old age” is commonly determined by one’s physical capacity or the sociocultural identities of an individual, especially in rural subsistence environments. Nevertheless, the lack of physical birth certificates or knowledge of one’s chronological age in developing countries restricts access to already minimal health, social, and political services (i.e., legal rights, property protection). Similarly, while elderly populations in developing countries are experiencing growing chronic diseases (i.e., chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, cancer) similar to developed countries, they are simultaneously challenged by infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, typhoid, malaria, dengue, atypical of developed countries. Equally, while women commonly live longer than men in both developed and developing countries, older women in developing countries face a disproportionate burden of violence (verbal and physical) and discrimination yet are commonly forgotten in international women’s rights agendas. These gendered issues raise particular concern since older women are increasingly becoming a larger share of the older population in developing countries. Clearly, some similarities exist between the processes of aging in developed and developing countries, but as geographers, it behooves us to recognize the uniqueness of places that shape the uniqueness of processes occurring across spaces. Although the geography of aging has rarely considered issues of aging in the developing world, it is now incumbent on geographers to begin thinking through these issues with more conceptual breadth and analytical rigor.

Future Geographic Inquiries As the world sees vast change in the age composition of developing countries, geographers will play key roles in exposing this landscape. Empirically, the diverse epidemiologic trajectories coupled with changing sociocultural and intergenerational realities offer opportunities to explore how older populations are responding and coping with, well, life. At the same time, the confluence of environmental and human-induced disasters (i.e., earthquakes, floods, armed conflict) along with weak social, health, and institutional support in developing countries raises important structural questions for geographers to consider. The rich geographic diversity of aging in developing countries requires a geographic sensibility to explain the ways in which space and place broadly affect older

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persons, their families, and the societies in which they live. Recognizing this diversity not only allows geographers to generate new insights, concepts, and theories, but also develop a more variegated, in-depth engagement with policy agendas and debates in these countries. Similarly, the geographical extensiveness of aging in developing countries necessitates an epistemological plurality capable of offering both robust generalizations into the specific spatial characteristics, trends, and patterns of aging populations while at the same time garnering nuanced place-based explanations of aging realities. As populations continue to age and experience vast inequalities in the developing world, geographers can no longer remain ignorant to changing demographic realities. The time has come for geographers to turn our attention beyond our own backyards.

Future Reading Aboderin, I., Beard, J.R., 2015. Older people’s health in sub-Saharan Africa. The Lancet 385 (9968), e9–e11. Agarwal, A., Lubet, A., Mitgang, E., Mohanty, S., Bloom, D.E., 2016. Population Ageing in India: Facts, Issues, and Options. Andrews, G.J., Cutchin, M., McCracken, K., Phillips, D.R., Wiles, J., 2007. Geographical gerontology: the constitution of a discipline. Soc. Sci. Med. 65 (1), 151–168. Beard, J., Biggs, S., Bloom, D., et al., 2012. Global Population Ageing: Peril or Promise. World Economic Forum, Geneva. Chant, S.H., McIlwaine, C., 2009. Geographies of Development in the 21st Century: An Introduction to the Global South. Edward Elgar Publishing. Harper, S., 2017. How Population Change Will Transform Our World. Oxford University Press. Harper, S., Hamblin, K. (Eds.), 2014. International Handbook on Aging and Public Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. Higo, M., Khan, H.T., 2015. Global population aging: unequal distribution of risks in later life between developed and developing countries. Glob. Soc. Policy 15 (2), 146–166. Kudo, S.M.E., Nagao, M., 2015. Population ageing: an emerging research agenda for sustainable development. Soc. Sci. 4 (4), 940–966. Palloni, A., Souza, L., 2013. The fragility of the future and the tug of the past: longevity in Latin America and the Caribbean. Demogr. Res. 29, 543. Phillips, D.R., Feng, Z., 2015. Challenges for the ageing family in the people’s Republic of China. Can. J. Age. 34 (03), 290–304. Potter, R.B., Binns, T., 2008. Geographies of Development: An Introduction to Development Studies. Pearson Education. Raju, S., 2011. Studies on Ageing in India: A Review, BKPAI Working Paper No. 2. United Nations Population Citation Advice: Fund (UNFPA), New Delhi. Rishworth, A., Elliott, S., 2018. Global environmental change in an aging world: the role of space, place and scale. Soc. Sci. Med. 227, 128–136. Rosero- Bixbury, L., 2009. Intergenerational economic transfers and population ageing in Latin America. In: Palloni, A., Pinto, G., Wong, R. (Eds.), Family Support Networks and Population Ageing, 13. Skinner, M., Andrews, G., Cutchin, M.P., 2018. Introducing geographical gerontology. In: Skinner, M.W., Andrews, G.J., Cutchin, M.P. (Eds.), Geographical Gerontology: Perspectives, Concepts, Approaches. Routledge.

Relevant Websites United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. World Health Organization Ageing and Life Course: http://www.who.int/ageing/en/. WHO Study on global AGEing and adult health (SAGE): http://www.who.int/healthinfo/sage/en/. Help Age International: http://www.helpage.org/.

Agrarian Transformations Fraser Sugden, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by J. Renes, volume 1, pp 58–64, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Agrarian transition in the most general refers to the process through which an agrarian society makes a transition from one mode of production to another. In the context of pre-capitalist societies this may include, for example, the transition from a seminomadic lineage based agrarian formation, to sedentary peasant farming, or from either of these formations to a more hierarchical feudal economy. However, debates over agrarian transition have usually been oriented around the processes through which precapitalist agrarian formations of any sort make the transition to capitalism. In its simplest sense, this transition entails a precapitalist “peasant” economy grounded in subsistence production, with privately/communally owned or rented land, being farmed by a family or clan unit, being replaced by larger capitalist farms producing a substantial surplus. Capitalist agriculture is most commonly understood to entail greater concentration in the ownership of agricultural land and machinery with a distinctive laboring class. Farms are oriented around producing commodities on the market to sell and make a profit (rather than being produced for home consumption), which can be reinvested to expand production either intensively (increasing per unit area output through technology and inputs), or extensively (expanding the cultivable area, usually through the purchase of land). As will be demonstrated though, this transition takes on complex forms, with multiple forms of precapitalist as well as capitalist agriculture.

The Agrarian Question and Classical Models of Transition One of the most important debates around agrarian transition by classical Marxian thinkers was the so-called “agrarian question,” which is associated in general terms with the future of the peasantry in the context of expanding capitalism. The actual “question” within these debates was, however, political in character. While Marx’s writings were focused on exposing the exploitative nature of capitalism, he also admired its capacity to achieve unprecedented development of technology and productivitydthe development of the “forces of production.” Marx therefore implied that the peasantrydwith its subsistence orientation and low productivity, would inevitably be dissolved by an expanding capitalism. To Marx, such a transformation in the forces of production was in fact necessary if one was to achieve an equitable yet prosperous socialist system. Equally important, however, was the revolutionary potential of this new class of disenfranchised workers, who were separated from the means of production (i.e., their land) and were free to sell their labor power. This group would become a “proletariat,” who would be capable of class mobilization, and their emergence was critical to the overthrow of capitalism. This created a political dilemma for Marx, as he believed the peasantry may oppose capitalist development, which in turn would be a barrier to the development of socialism. This emerges from the peasantry’s tendency to hold on to their land, even when their subsistence was pushed to a bare minimum. The process through which the transition to capitalism takes place was therefore of critical importance to Marx and other early revolutionaries. Marx’s most well known description of capitalist transition was based upon the English experience, whereby the enclosure of land by predatory landlords created a capitalist land owning class and alongside a vast class of agricultural laborers. Marx termed this forcible separation of peasants from the means of production and creation of agrarian capital and wage labor, “primitive accumulation.” Marx, however, was aware that there were other ways in which the transition to capitalist agriculture could take place. He noted that there was also a more gradual process of differentiation, whereby larger more productive farms edge out their less competitive producers as market relations take hold. Lenin went on develop these multiple models of transition in a more systematic manner. Marx’s agrarian question was important during the course of the Russian Revolution. Aside from the political question around the importance of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle, Lenin had concerns over the need for capitalist development in agriculture to support industrialization, which was believed to be a precursor for the successful transition to socialism. A free wage labor force is required to work in capitalist industry, yet a productive agricultural sector is needed to produce enough food to feed this labor forceda goal which cannot be met by peasant farming. Similarly, the breakdown in peasant farming would he argued, support the development of a home market for industrially produced commodities, as households would no longer meet their subsistence needs from their land. Driven by the importance of these questions, Lenin identified two main paths through which an agrarian society could make the transition to capitalism, drawn from historical experience. Not far from the English experience described by Marx, was what Lenin called the Junker Road, named after the landed nobility in Prussia. Lenin noted how feudal estates of the Junkers were transformed into capitalist farms as the landlords responded to the opportunities posed by expanding industry and global markets for food. Tenants who provided rent and corvee labor were gradually transformed into wageworkers, with surplus tenants being evicted, while the feudal landlords gradually emerged into profit maximizing capitalist farmers.

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Lenin also pointed to an alternative path, particularly in parts of Russia where there is an absence of serfdom and a predominance of free peasant farmers (Lenin, 1977). He drew parallels with the North American context, whereby capitalism emerged spontaneously from within the settler peasantry who were free from a legacy of feudalismdand terms this form of transition the “American path.” Under such contexts, the peasantry was composed of large farmers that are beginning commodity production, middle peasants, and land poor farm workers. It was argued that the middle peasants do not have the technology or assets to commercialize and produce just produce enough to survive. Being often heavily in debt and highly vulnerable, they are frequently forced into selling their land to emerging capitalists, thus entering the landless proletariat. The middle peasantry thus disappears gradually. There were variations to this model. For example, Lenin, along with other classical Marxist theorists such as Kautsky, noted that in the process of differentiation, wageworkers may hold onto small plots of landdthe so-called “allotment holding wage workers.” This may actually work in the favor of capitalist farms, as it provides some of the workers’ food needs, allowing wages to stay low.

Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism in Europe Marx’s classic models of agrarian transformation under capitalism were revisited in the 1950s and 60s in the so-called “Transition debate,” which was oriented around the shift from feudalism in Europe to capitalism. While the debate covered elements of Marx’s description of English transition out of feudalism, or Lenin’s Junker Road, the primary focus of these later debates was on the conditions that led to the transition in the first place. To Maurice Dobb, feudalism was defined by the presence of a particular form of exploitation or “serfdom,” whereby an individual provides labor services to an overlord through extra-economic coercion. The nature of these relations of production triggered an internal crisis in feudalism in the late middle ages. This was driven by low levels of technological development combined with ongoing taxation and extravagant consumption by the lords, with the severe exploitation driving serfs to desert the manors. The drive to appropriate surplus from the serfs combined with low levels of productivity meant the feudal system was unable to generate sufficient revenue, driving it to a crisis which stimulated the emergence of capitalist relations. Paul Sweezy took an alternative approach, focusing on the role of the changing market external to the feudal economydi.e., the relations of exchange. Sweezy defined feudalism as the production of commodities for use (self-consumption), rather than for exchange (as is present under capitalism), and thus production was oriented around meeting the known needs of the community. With expanding trade from the 11th Century onwards there was growing demand for commodities coupled with increasingly extravagant consumption patterns of the nobility. This fueled a process of monetization whereby feudal lords needed to produce more efficiently in order to generate sufficient revenue, triggering a drive to reorganize production. The growth in towns also encouraged peasants to leave the land. Both Dobb and Sweezy, however, argued that capitalism had not fully taken hold until the 16th Century, with a long transitional phase in between, although they differ over its character. In a counter critique, Dobb problematized Sweezy’s explanation for giving primacy to the relations of exchange, rather than the relations of production, with the latter approach, he argued, being closer to the spirit of Marxism. Later interventions such as those by H. K. Takahashi, were broadly supportive of Dobb’s theory of transition, emphasizing that any definition of feudalism should be based on the mode of exploitationdi.e., the property relationship and the form of labor power, and not the presence of money or commodities. Under feudalism, the laborer remains attached to the means of production (i.e., feudal landed property) and the appropriation of surplus takes place directly using coercion rather than the laws of commodity exchange. This paves the way for a more flexible analysis of transition, through acknowledging that surplus appropriation may occur through different forms under a “feudal” system, including serfdom (extraction of labor tax) or ground rent. At the same time, like Dobb they argue that trade and monetized social relationships may take place even under a feudal system. An associated debate in the 1970s and 80s sought to ask why England was the first country where capitalism took hold, and why it advanced faster than in other parts of Europe. Robert Brenner offered an influential critique of the prevailing “Malthusian” theories which gave precedence to population growth and the need for new ways of producing food. Instead, he points to the primacy of class struggle, which he notes was a decisive factor in explaining the discrepancy between England and some other parts of Europe. He argues that in regions of Europe where the peasantry enjoyed greater levels of political mobilization and a history of collective action, they were able to better defend their interests within the feudal system. This includes mobilization to retain favorable rents, communal control over land, and property rights to small-scale land holdings. This, alongside political instability and peasant alliances with the monarchy, served to perpetuate feudalism and impede the emergence of capitalist social relations. In regions such as England by contrast, the peasants lacked organization and the feudal power of the nobility was higher. When the nobility sought to enhance the efficiency of agriculture, they were better positioned to restructure the relations of production such as abolishing communal land or expropriating peasant property, paving the way for capitalist agriculture. While this provoked a broad debate over the drivers of change in agrarian transition, Guy Bois’ critique of Brenner was of particular importance in that it makes a break from overly linear and theory bound models of agrarian transition to offer a more nuanced approach. Bois critiques Brenner’s over emphasis on the role of class struggle as a dominant driver of change, using the example of Normandy. He argued that feudalism in Normandy as of the late 13th Century appeared to be relatively “advanced” in terms of the condition of the peasantry. Personal plots farmed by peasants on payment of a levy or rent, were increasingly more widespread than cultivation of the nobilities’ personal demesnes through forced labor. In his critique of Brenner (and in a separate work no Normandy “The Crisis of Feudalism”), he notes that this form of small-scale cultivation was bolstered due to technological improvements in plowing which favored cultivation of small plots, as well as the strong social institutions of the village. This gave the

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peasantry the upper hand, allowed the feudal levy to fall, triggering a crisis in the feudal system. With new tenures no longer compensating for the decline in the rate of surplus appropriation by the nobility due to demographic limits, the economic basis of the nobles’ power was in decline. This led to the intervention of the absolutist state to support the extraction of levies. After the 15th Century, following its restructuring feudalism in Normandy was able to enter a new period of growth. The nobility, who were protected by the state had few incentives to explore new production practices, while the peasantry resisted expropriation, not necessarily (as implied by Brenner) because they were better organized, but because they were already emerging as established proprietors of their land. In England by contrast, the feudal economy was more deeply entrenched and backward, with higher levies on the peasantry, widespread forced labor, and weaker peasant landholder rights. The crisis of revenue generation allowed the nobility to explore new forms of economic organization, paving the way for capitalism. Paradoxically, the English nobility was able to take advantage of the new methods of production developing in nearby France whereby feudal social relations had been fossilized (albeit temporarily) by the accommodation between the peasantry and nobility. Returning to Brenner’s thesis, Bois agrees on the importance of class struggle which is often neglected by economistic readings of history (i.e., the relatively greater political mobilization of French peasantry). He notes though that Brenner simply replaces Malthusian explanations with another form of dogma in the form of “political Marxism,” which divorces the analysis from the actual political economy of the mode of production on the ground. The emergence of capitalism emerged first in England not simply due to the peasantries weaker political power, but due to variations in the feudal relations of production themselves. These were influenced by political-economic changes at a regional scale (e.g., the spread of technology, trade, and demographic change itself).

Agrarian Transition in the Contemporary Global South There is broad acknowledgment from academics today that the classical Marxist debates around the agrarian question, as well as the debates over the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, offer useful conceptual tools, but do little to shed light on the pattern of change outside of Europe and North America, in particular, in the Global South. This is because, for the majority of regions in the Global South, few agrarian societies have followed the paths to capitalist transition set out by early Marxist thinkers. The persistence of the peasantry in spite of unprecedented capitalist expansion in industry has highlighted that the reality is far more complex. Take the family farm, for example. Far from being “dissolved” by capitalism, farms of less than 1 ha are estimated by the FAO (as of 2014) to account for 72% of farms globally. Over 90% relying predominantly on family labor and such farms are estimated to produce 80% of the world’s food. This reality does not, however, mean that there is no transition underway. What the recent agrarian studies literature does show, however, is that this process is drawn out and complex. This part of the chapter will go on to review some of these complex transitions which have been recorded throughout in the Global South. Some of share features with earlier European debates, while others display unique trajectories of change.

Capitalist Transition Through Differentiation One of the most widespread forms of capitalist transition identified in the extensive agrarian studies literature is the natural differentiation that takes place when capitalist markets become established in a peasant society, with echoes of Lenin’s “American Road.” This model was exemplified in early studies of the Green Revolution in India in the 1970s and 80s. Scholars such as Terrence Byres, for example, identified a process of proletarianization in Northwest India whereby land poor farmers lack capital to invest in improved inputs, and thus are unable to compete with their larger counterparts, who go on to buy up their plots. The latter emerges into a nascent capitalist farming class. This process of differentiation is perhaps even more important in the context of neoliberal restructuring since the late 1980s whereby greater export orientation, cuts in subsidies and price supports, the deregulation of land markets and greater commodification of the factors of production, pushes out more marginal producers who are often saddled with debt. Larger farmers meanwhile have the capacity to better absorb market risks, while also having the capital to invest in high value agricultural systems with high start up costs. Capitalist transition through peasant differentiation is arguably important in regions dominated by land owning peasants who are not experiencing what Bernstein terms “predatory landed property.” Indeed regions such as the Indian Punjab which have experienced some level of protocapitalist differentiation were not part of colonial zamindari system and did not experience the same level of preexisting inequality than regions such as eastern India. Other examples of capitalist differentiation include regions which experienced successful redistributive land reforms in the 1960s and 70s which abolished landlordism, as well as postsocialist countries. In the latter decollectivization would often result in a relatively equitable distribution of land, yet a number of studies have shown how over time, a process of differentiation has taken hold with an emerging class of rural laborers and protocapitalist farmers. These patterns of transition are arguably quite different though as in many countries such as China and Vietnam, the state still controls the allocation of land. Differentiation therefore takes place through better-situated producers leasing in land from poorer counterparts, investing in livestock or cottage industry, or intensifying agricultural production using high value inputs and mechanization to give them an edge over their poorer counterparts. While it is clear that “differentiation” is underway in many parts of the world, it remains to be seen as to whether this constitutes the emergence of “capitalist” class relations in the traditional Marxian sense, and more often than not one is observing a process of

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partial proletarianization. As noted above, both Lenin and Kautsky observed the tendency for peasants to engage in labor outside as well as working on their own land. Similarly, in the Global South, it is widespread for peasant farmers to hold onto small plots of land which are insufficient to meet their subsistence needs, yet act as a safety net in the context of menial off farm labor. In Latin America, this was referred to by de Janvry as “functional dualism.” As workers already have some security from subsistence farming, capitalist enterprises can pay less to their workers.

Accumulation by Dispossession and Primitive Accumulation An alternative model of agrarian transition is associated with the phenomena of land grabs and displacement. Under neoliberal globalization, the drive by capital to avert crisis sometimes requires the violent separation of peasants from their landdwith echoes of the global phenomena identified by Harvey as “Accumulation by Dispossession.” In the contemporary Global South, this is characterized by the appropriation of land for capitalist investment such as plantations. This has echoes of the original “primitive accumulation” identified by Marx in his discussions of the forced development of capitalism in Englanddbut in this case it is not feudal lords turned capitalists evicting the tenants from the land, but corporate agribusiness encroaching upon common lands or privately owned plots, often aided by the state. It is common for export oriented capitalist agriculture to coexist with smallholder peasant farming, yet research has shown how the latter is increasingly encroaching upon the former. This takes place through the forced appropriation of peasant land (often for minimal compensation), or the privatization of common or communal land which smallholders depend on for part of their livelihoods. Examples include the Ejidos of Mexico, some of which have been appropriated by commercial plantations. This latest wave of enclosure has been associated with the emergence of what Philip McMichael terms a corporate global food regime whereby under neoliberalism, governments are encouraged to open their economies to the international food trade, dismantle protections for farmers, and reorient agriculture around export led growth. As well as the production of food crops, often in association with supermarkets, emerging sectors which are driving these land grabs include the palm oil sector which is widespread in equatorial regions, particularly Southeast Asia, and biofuel production. Scholars such as McMichael argue that following the 2000–09 food crisis, there has also been a shift away from the traditional high value food crops which were hallmarks of the postcolonial economy, toward “bulk” crops, such as food grains, which can be produced at a substantially lower cost than in the Global North. This creates a strong imperative for agrarian corporations to expand spatially, encroaching upon the land of the peasantry. This contemporary proletarianization is releasing a global “reserve army” of migrant labor, engaged in increasingly insecure low wage employment. As well as releasing land, this process of dispossession provides a low wage labor force which can help avert the crisis in capitalism associated with falling rates of profit. Nevertheless, while dispossessed peasants can supply labor to these export oriented plantations, scholars such as Tania Li warn against assuming a functional relationship between the encroachment of peasant land and the processes through which the resultant “surplus” labor is mobilized. For example, many plantations displace peasants but do not absorb the surplus labor pool as they utilize labor saving technologies or bring in labor from outside. What instead is realized is the release of a dispossessed and “pauperized” population which is “surplus” to the requirements of capital, who reside in villages or urban centers without access to a living wage. This growing labor pool in the Global South, dispossessed of their land due to economic shocks or enclosure, often end up in urban centers where they lack access to basic workers’ rights, receive wages below subsistence wages, and remain tied into casual contracts without formal organizationdoften outside the agricultural sector.

Petty commodity production and subjugation through the market While the above two examples of agrarian transition in the Global South are focused on the proletarianization of the peasantry, a separate body of literature suggests that capitalism can still extract surplus from the peasantry without separating them from their land or employing them as wage labor. Scholars such as Jarius Banaji and Henry Bernstein have analyzed processes whereby peasant farms persist and become subservient to capital. This takes place when they shift to commercial production, with capitalist agribusiness controlling the inputs and outputs. In this context the price is manipulated and depressed through monopsony power so it essentially represents what Banaji calls a “concealed wage” which does not remunerate the farmer for the value of their labor power. The perpetuation of peasant mode of production through its articulation with capitalism is made possible through the tendency outlined by Marx, for peasant producers to accept lower prices than a capitalist firm as they are not driven by the profit motive and don’t place a value on their own labor time. They may work for more than is necessary to meet their minimum needs, with the surplus being appropriated through the price mechanism. Furthermore, even when output and input prices cause an erosion of households’ subsistence needs, peasant farms may already be dependent on commodity production and trapped in cycles of debt. They may continue to produce by using their labor more intensively, thus yielding high levels of surplus value for capitalist firms, a process Bernstein terms the “simple reproductive squeeze.” As one would expect, this form of petty commodity production appears particularly widespread in rural economies which were oriented toward commercial cash crop production during the colonial era and today remain dominated by smallholder production of commodities such as tobacco, tea, coffee or high value vegetables. It is not uncommon for this sector to exist alongside larger commercial plantations. Today, contract farming epitomizes this trend, whereby smallholders are institutionally linked through contracts to larger enterprises, with limited control over what is produced and the prices received. Surplus is appropriated by capitalism via the subcontractors who purchase seeds and supply inputs and credit at unfavorable rates.

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This mechanism of subordination has supported a line of thinking which suggests the agrarian question is of reduced relevance today as capital does not require access to land for accumulation, it instead requires the ability to control markets. In the context of India, for example, scholars such as Utsa Patnaik have moved away entirely from the traditional “agrarian question,” arguing that commercialization and market liberalization have left many farmers vulnerable to falling prices and exploitation by global agribusiness, regardless as to whether they control the means of production.

Bringing the Precapitalist Back and Articulation of Modes of Production The presence of commodity producing peasant farms who supply surplus to capitalism reminds one that agrarian transition toward capitalism does not necessarily depend on the “proletarianization” of the peasantry. There is, however, an implication in this literature that such farmers remain entirely subordinate to capitalism, even if they theoretically “own” their means of production. However, the peasantry does not originate in a vacuum, and are often integrated into complex noncapitalist economic formations with their own class interests, and mechanisms of surplus appropriation and redistribution, as well as the capacity to “resist” capitalist encroachment. A body of rich literature has identified some more complex patterns through which the peasantry interact with capitalism in particular temporal-spatial contexts, leading to far more complex and drawn out patterns of transition. Of particular importance in this regard is the Althusserian tradition, and the French radical anthropologists such as Meillassoux and Rey, who sought a more nuanced understanding of agrarian transition, acknowledging the uniqueness of each “noncapitalist” economic formation, and the associated interaction between economic, political and ideological processes. Central to this literature is the analysis of the Mode of Production itself. An understanding of this concept allows one to identify the diversity of mechanisms through which capitalism emerges, or fails to emerge in agriculture. To Althusser and Balibar, the mode of production is constituted by three functional “elements,” the means of production, the laborer, and the appropriator of surplus labor. These three elements are structured by two “connections”: the relation between the laborer and the means of production (the forces of production), and the property relation which defines the how surplus is appropriated and put to use (the relations of production). Importantly, multiple modes of production may coexist in a functional unity. Using this conceptual tool, the French radical anthropologists mobilized ethnographic research in West and Central Africa to understand the relationship between capitalism and the precapitalist “lineage mode of production.” This scholarship showed, for example, how during the early colonial period some lineage modes of production would exchange goods with capitalism, yet retain relative autonomy with cultural relations of exchange often discouraging accumulation. It was only the coercive mechanisms of colonialism such as taxation which were able to break the autonomy of the lineage system, and force it to supply labor. Even once a supply of labor had been secured, Meillassoux demonstrates how this represented not a dissolution of the lineage mode of production, but instead an articulation with capitalism. The preservation of the tribal social structure and other elements of the lineage mode of production could actually be highly profitable for capital, as it could keep wages low. This is because the migrants or temporary wageworkers which since the colonial era have supplied labor to the capitalist sector are only paid a wage which covers the laborer’s minimum subsistence needs. The costs of labor reproduction are provided by the lineage mode of production. This includes, for example, the costs of bringing up the laborer, and their “retirement,” including networks of social support. Harold Wolpe made a similar argument with regards to the Apartheid era “homelands” in South Africa whereby the kinship based units of production met the reproduction needs of labor power for the capitalist sector, with this articulation being reproduced through the political apparatus of the state and its racial ideologies. This is of broader relevance beyond West Africa, as “cyclical” labor migration becomes an increasingly important element of livelihoods in the Global South. Labor migration remains temporary rather than permanent for a number of reasons. Firstly, bilateral labor agreements between states usually dictate that laborers return after a certain period of employmentdthe most notable of which are the guest workers who migrate to the Gulf Cooperation Council region from countries such as Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Visa regimes are designed to ensure that migrants do not settledfor example, taking family members is very difficult. Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, the surplus labor pool in rural areas translates into low wages in migrant receiving areas (often cities), and insecure employment. This hinders migrants from placing down roots where they work, and the preferred option is for family members to stay at home while the migrant migrates seasonally or periodically. Both agriculture and migrant remittances therefore sustain the family. This dual livelihood strategy is evident across the Global South today, particularly in economies undergoing rapid economic change such as India and China, where vast numbers of household livelihoods combine migrant labor in growing cities, with agriculture at home. The former provides households with their cash needs while the latter provides their food needs. The implications for both forms of migration is that the cost of labor reproductiondwhich in advanced capitalism may be borne by higher wages or the welfare statedis instead being provided increasingly by an agricultural sector often still dominated by precapitalist relations of production. This articulation between peasant farming and capitalism raises important questions over when (if ever) transition to capitalist agriculture in the traditional sense, will take place.

Feudal Agrarian Relations and the “Mode of Production Debate” Another important debate in the context of agrarian transition in an era of globalization relates to the persistence of “feudal” modes of production, particularly in South Asia. Like the lineage modes of production in the early colonial period, feudal agrarian relations

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have been shown to retain some resilience. These debates came to the fore during the Mode of Production Debate in India during the 1970s and 80s which revolved around the question as to whether Indian agriculture was still feudal, or was in the process of making the transition toward capitalism. This was a complex debate with many diverse viewpoints. Arguments that Indian agriculture was “capitalist” generally based their arguments upon the fact that there were emerging classes of proletarianized wage labor and accumulating capitalist farmersdin line with some of the patterns of transition outlined above. Advocates for the “feudalism” position, however, cited the large areas (mostly in Eastern India) still dominated by feudal relationships such as sharecropping and usury, which were impediments to capitalist class formation and accumulation. As with the debates over transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, there have been competing understandings of what constitutes feudalism in postindependence South Asia. Scholars such as Pradhan Prasad and Amit Bhaduri created idealized models of “semifeudalism” whereby landlords controlled large estates which were farmed by sharecropping tenants. Surplus was appropriated through coercive meansdprimarily through the interlinkage of land, credit, and produce markets. Debt was shown to be used to bond tenants to money lending landlords, and even to merchants through “distress” commercialization. Landlords were argued to have few incentives to improve productivity, as improved yields would undermine farmers need for consumption loans. The unproductive “drain” of surplus by landlord-money lenders and merchants to meet the needs of simple reproduction only, blocks the development of the productive forces which is necessary for capitalist development to emerge. The inclusion of market forces is one reason why such modes of production are referred to as “semifeudal” rather than simply “feudal.” The concept of semifeudalism was easily critiqued. Scholars such as Tom Brass problematizes the concept over its weak conceptual definition and linear conceptualization of history whereby semifeudalism is defined by the presence of unfree agrarian relationships alone. The latter are interpreted as static relics of the past, when in fact such relationships are widespread under capitalism. Gillian Hart similarly notes that conditions of unfreedom can appear in the context of productive reinvestment as well as in apparently “backward” agrarian contexts. They can be viewed instead as a means through which dominant groups exercise social control, rather than being emblematic of feudalism or a transitional stage in the development of agrarian capitalism. In the context of labor migration and unprecedented expansion of capitalist markets in South Asia, a body of scholarship has suggested that these models of Indian semifeudalism from the 1970s and 80s are no longer relevant in an era of neoliberalism. However, a critique of overly economistic and static models of “feudal” or “semifeudal” agrarian relationships does not necessarily mean these concepts are unhelpful in the 21st Century, particularly if one uses a broader definition of what actually constitutes feudal agrarian relations. As noted by Takahashi and Bois during early debates over transition, feudal social relations vary considerably in different historical and geographical contexts so one cannot determine its presence on the basis of a single relationship (e.g., unfree labor or serfdom). In large areas of Eastern India and Nepal, for example, there are relations of production with limited capitalist accumulation, which persist alongside archetypal feudal relationsdsuch as concentration of the means of production among a landed minority, coercive appropriation of surplus, usually in kind, and the channeling of this surplus, not for productive reinvestment but for luxury consumption. What has changed, however, is that these modes of production cannot be considered “isolated” from capitalism, and are often in flux. Research has shown, for example, how in the Eastern Gangetic Plains, the heartland of the historic zamindari system, the interlinkage of landlordism and usury has declined. However, in spite of this, farmers remain in more debt than ever before, due to the increased influence of capitalist markets. The nature of money lending and the appropriation of rent are still very much feudal in character, with a small minority appropriating surplus in kind, and little sign of reinvestment. Similarly, many tenants farming under “feudal” conditions are also engaged in migrant labor. In these contexts one has an articulation of modes of production once again, yet one of great complexity, whereby surplus is shared between landlordmoney lenders and capitalist employers. Some interventions in the historic mode of production debate themselves acknowledged how semifeudalism interacts with capitalism, and acknowledged the potential for the two modes of production to coexistdmost notably through the concept of the “semicolonial” social formation. The latter is characterized by a national economy distorted by imperialism, with limited industrialization, orientation toward low cost primary exports, and a state dominated on a political level by a comprador bourgeoisie enriched by dependence on foreign capital. Against this backdrop of chronic underemployment, the distorted capitalist sector would not have the capacity to end the rural poor’s dependence on landlords. This allows for both capitalist and feudal modes of production to persist side by side, and even allows for an accommodation between the historically divergent interests of precapitalist and capitalist ruling classes.

Conclusion The discussion on above shows that there is no single model of agrarian transition. The mechanisms through which precapitalist or “peasant” agrarian formations interact with capitalism can include gradual or violent separation of peasants from the land. In other spatiotemporal contexts, it may entail the persistence of precapitalist agrarian relations, which are restructured to supply surplus to capitalism. This may involve the subordination of peasant producers to capitalist markets through cash crop production, or the supply of labor to the capitalist sector from various “precapitalist” modes of production which persist alongside the former. An important lesson from these multilinear paths again touches upon the Althusserian tradition, whereby the evolution of modes of production or the drivers of agrarian transition cannot be assumed to follow a predetermined logic identifiable at the level of theoretical abstraction. Instead, the underlying dynamics of transformation can be uncovered only through the historical analysis of empirical data on political, demographic, and economic change at geographical and historically specific conjunctures.

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Further Reading Akram-Lodhi, A.H., Kay, C., 2010. Surveying the agrarian question (part 2): current debates and beyond. J. Peasant Stud. 37, 255–284. Araghi, F., 2012. The invisible hand and the visible foot: peasants, dispossession and globalization. In: Akram-Lodhi, H., Kay, C. (Eds.), Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question. Routledge, London. Bernstein, H., 2003. Farewells to the peasantry. Transformation 52, 1–19. Bhaduri, A., 1973. A study in agricultural backwardness under semi-feudalism. Econ. J. 83, 120–137. Bois, G., 1978. Against the neo-Malthusian orthodoxy. Past Present 60–69. Byres, T.J., 1981. The new technology, class formation, and class action in the Indian countryside. J. Peasant Stud. 8, 405–454. Dobb, M., 1948. Studies in the Development of Capitalism. Routledge. Dupré, G., Rey, P.P., 1979. Reflections on the relevance of a theory of the history of exchange. In: Seddon, D., Lackner, H. (Eds.), Relations of Production: Marxist Approaches to Economic Anthropology. Frank Cass and Company Ltd, London. Hall, S., 1980. Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance. Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism. UNESCO, Paris. Lenin, V.I., 1977. The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907. Progress Publishers. Lerche, J., 2013. The agrarian question in neoliberal India: agrarian transition bypassed? J. Agrar. Change 13, 382–404. Li, T.M., 2010. To make live or let die? Rural dispossession and the protection of surplus populations. Antipode 41, 66–93. Luong, H.V., Unger, J., 1998. Wealth, power, and poverty in the transition to market economies: the process of socio-economic differentiation in rural China and northern Vietnam. China J. 40, 61–93. Mcmichael, P., 2012. The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring. J. Peasant Stud. 39, 681–701. Meillassoux, C., 1981. Maidens, Meal and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic Community. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Patnaik, U., 2006. The agrarian crisis and importance of peasant resistance. People’s Democr. 30. Sugden, F., 2017. A mode of production flux: the transformation and reproduction of rural class relations in lowland Nepal and North Bihar. Dialect. Anthropol. 41, 129–161. Sweezy, P., Dobb, M., 1950. The transition from feudalism to capitalism. Sci. Soc. 14, 134–167. Takahashi, H.K., Mins, H.F., 1952. The transition from feudalism to capitalism: a contribution to the Sweezy-Dobb Controversy. Sci. Soc. 313–345. Wolpe, H., 1982. Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartied. In: Wolpe, H. (Ed.), The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.

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Agriculture, Sustainable Terry Marsden, School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp 70–78, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd., with revisions made by the Editor.

Glossary Agri-industrialism A modernist conception and ideology of agriculture characterized by an emphasis on growth, specialization, intensity, mechanization, and increasing yields without concern for resource limitations or ecological impacts. Agroecology A framework for alternatives to industrialized agriculture that draws on peasant studies, ecology, environmentalism, and development theory among other disciplines to establish a natural and social scientific basis to avoid the resource-degrading tendencies of agri-industrialism. Ecological entrepreneurship A process whereby sustainable development is facilitated and encouraged through rewards for fragmentation, specialization, and other sustainable agricultural practices. Multifunctionality An approach to farming and rural society that emphasizes a diverse range of environmental, social, and economic functions. Retroinnovation Initiatives that center on revitalizing and normalizing agricultural and land-based practices that were used historically in particular locales.

High-Level Conceptualizations: Some Foundation Principles Since the 1960s the concept of sustainable agriculture has been increasingly used to denote a variable but significant rupture with what has been termed the more dominant agri-industrial model of agriculture and rural development. In general terms, sustainable agriculture can be defined as referring to the environmental or ecological soundness of the agricultural production processes or the wider agri-food commodity chain. This definition implies that with respect to renewable nutrient cycles, such sustainable systems are those that are capable of being continued indefinitely, or at least over considerable generational time. In many zones we might argue that agricultural systems have long been sustainable (since Neolithic times), in that while they may have been subject to considerable adaptation and technical changes, they have sustained in reasonable shape the main factors of production needed for the continuance of food production both “in” and “of” place. In addition, agricultural systems have managed to do so without significantly destroying the local and production-based ecologies on which they are based. It has also long been established that agriculture, as a production process, is quite distinctive in that it both produces and transforms nature, through the (re)production of livestock and plants, at the same time as being physically and geographically reliant upon nature as a “means” and “condition” of production (most notably soils, microclimate, topography, and vegetation complexes). Agriculture, and especially a sustainable agriculture, thus efficiently transforms, as well as recreates its space or terroir as part and parcel of the production process. Usually the indefiniteness of sustainable agriculture makes primary reference to a set of ecological principles, and it is also linked to not so much an endpoint, sui generis, but rather as a continual and increasingly“contested process.” In this sense, it needs to be recognized that there will always be ways in which agrofood systems can be adapted, making them more (or less) ecologically, economically, and socially sustainable. In general and abstract terms then, the “process” of sustainable agriculture must infer a coordinated relationship between humans, organisms, and environment, which is adaptive to location and season, creating biophysiologically or ecologically mutual benefits that give complementary status to the different components of the production system. Such explicit complementarities were a central part, for instance, of ancient Chinese classical works written about 3000 years ago. In such works, agriculture needed to be practiced as part of the harmony among heaven, Earth, and humans and in the careful utilization of the five key elements of the universe: that is, metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. These principles and adaptive techniques were passed down under systems of “inherited experience.” For instance, in the Tai Lake basin area of Southeast China, the grain– livestock–mulberry–fish integrated production system has existed for more than 1000 years by means of a cycle based on ecological food chains and synergies between the different but complementary production systems. In many cases, both now and in the past, therefore, we see examples of long-standing agricultural sustainability. Such established forms of agricultural sustainability, however, have increasingly been associated with those areas regarded as being geographically marginal to the productivist industrialization of agriculture. Sustainable agriculture is commonly associated in this general and abstract sense as being ecologically self-sustaining with low inputs, economically viable, of a sufficient scale and diversity to limit long-term changes to the environment, and ethically and aesthetically acceptable. More recent writers often tend to define it in oppositional terms with the agri-industrial model of development, involving a rejection of high external input systems and

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encouraging greater involvement of local farmers, protecting their unique knowledge systems, and in incorporating their active resource conservation techniques within a production framework. These oppositional definitions have grown since the 1970s, as the environmental, social, and economic problems associated with the agri-industrial model have come to the fore. Of particular importance here is the ability of sustainable agricultural systems to maintain levels of productivity in the face of periodic shocks or stress. Rather than using external inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, which usually have to be purchased at prices outside of the control of the farmer, internal resources on the farm or in the community provide the potential for being both renewable and ecologically more efficient. Such internal resources include natural parasites and pest predators, algae, bacteria, and green manure providing nitrogen, agroforestry and cropping systems reducing erosion, underexploited wild tree and fish species, and indigenous crop varieties with tolerance to salts and toxins. As these principles have reemerged, differing stances on agricultural sustainability have developed between, for instance, farmer groups (stressing especially the sustainability of the farm business and family farming), and a widening array of environmental interests who stress “deeper” ecological principles associated with reducing waste and enhancing systematic recycling and renewable practices. These divisions in thinking have led to different expressions of sustainable farming practice, from organic certified farming through to community-supported agricultures, short food supply chains, and the rapid development over the past decade of different types of farmer-driven “farmers markets.”

Widening and Grounding Key Principles and Concepts Up until the 1970s the agri-industrial model, which had been superimposed upon much of the advanced world both in its capitalist and state socialist variants, had managed to control and legitimize itself concerning its longevity and general societal acceptance. It was as if the ideology of growth, specialization, intensity, mechanization, and increasing yields were to be never-ending. From that point, however, and following Rachael Carson’s trenchant critique of pesticides and insecticides in her book Silent Spring in 1962, it became clearer to the public at large that the agri-industrial model, which had helped to produce “cheap foods” for the Fordist and urban growth machine, was largely about “sustaining the unsustainable” rather than an ecologically efficient way of food production. In ecological–economics terms it was increasingly being realized that the agri-industrial system was falling victim to the second law of thermodynamics (entropy law) in that it was becoming a highly wasteful system in energy terms, with a continuous degradation of free (usable) energy into bound (unusable energy). However, this did not mean that the agri-industrial model, as an unsustainable and entropy-maximizing system, does not have an enormous amount of resistance to change or “staying power.” Rather, as evidenced in the advanced economies over recent decades, and despite the depletion of the “natural capital” of agroecosystems, the agri-industrial/bioscience system has a remarkable longevity. Nevertheless, the slow realization of the agri-industrial system’s inherent unsustainability has been taken up by environmental nongovernmental organizations and different publics and consumer groups, and became gradually institutionalized into government bodies at national and supernational levels (e.g., the European Union’s series of Environmental Action Programmes from the 1970s onward). This period of “ecological modernization” was embodied in the World Commission on Environment and Development’s Bruntland report, Our Common Future, in 1987; agriculture was increasingly being seen as a threatened “renewable resource.” Writers have delineated several key features of the “sustainability of unsustainability” thesis, which is implicit within the agri-industrial model. These features include (1) the tendency toward monoculture/specialization of production systems and the creation of spatial homogeneity and subsequent declines in spatial- and biodiversity; (2) the intensification of production through expanded use of external chemical, energy, and irrigation inputs; (3) the concentration of livestock in space, and the spatial separation of crop and livestock production; and, (4) the overall supply chain tendency for the intensification of the cost-price squeeze on farming and land-based populations as a result of their increasing reliance, both upon upstream suppliers of external inputs and downstream buyers of farm gate products (especially corporate retailers). The result of these trends is important in the context of defining the more contemporary and increasingly contested notion of sustainable agriculture, for two related reasons. First, the profound implementation of the agri-industrial model has tended to distinguish with more clarity what is and is not sustainable; and second, it has acted to widen and encourage the contested vector of what constitutes sustainable forms of agriculture as an “oppositional concept,” as well as a concept in its own right. Sustainable agriculture debates have thus come to the fore and their political and geographical vector has both broadened and diversified into different strands of both agricultural practice (e.g., organics, fair trade, integrated farm management, ethical farming, and agroecology); and alternative agri-food supply chain geographies (including relocalized chains, farmers markets, organic box schemes, and slow food circuits). It is important to recognize that these movements have been given extra vibrancy because of “both” the longevity and continuous crisis tendencies inherent in the agri-industrial model. One recent example has surrounded the highly contested introduction of genetically modified crops into global food supply chains. It was introduced as the latest more “sustainable” panacea for the productivist–intensive system with regard to reducing costs of production, as well as removing some of the threats of pests and diseases. Genetically modified solutions have also acted to fuel the alternative sector, creating real boundary disputes between rival “sustainable systems.” Here, sustainable agriculture also becomes liable to various linguistic appropriations and regulatory pressures, which either attempt to continue to deny its existence or, where it becomes more accepted and entrenched, to attempt to “conventionalize” and dilute its central tenets. Increasing tensions have thus grown between the adherence to the basic principles of sustainable agriculture and serious attempts to dilute and generalize its very ontology. This battleground is seen, for instance, in the agriculturally productive state of California, USA,

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where growing consumer and producer demands have led to innovative and significant growth in a whole vector of sustainable agricultural developments (not least organics) since the 1980s. At the same time, many of these more successful initiatives potentially fall victim to economic and regulatory pressures to conventionalize and dilute their founding principles. At the same time as sustainable agriculture debates are becoming more vibrant and promoted (both by different groups of consumers, environmentalists, as well as producers), we also see new challenges and devaluation attempts to its overarching principles, as outlined in the first section of this article. The second part of this article will outline two related conceptual and methodological avenues of research and conceptual development that have been attempting to provide and to situate sustainable agriculture within a more robust and conceptually distinctive set of parameters: first, agroecological and ecological modernization debates; and second, more specific to the rural development domain, concern the development of what some scholars term the “new rural development paradigm.”

Agroecology and Ecological Modernization Perspectives A particularly forceful oppositional response to the conventionalizing and entropy-maximizing features of the agri-industrial system has been the growth and salience of agroecological approaches. Agroecology emerged in the 1980s as an important attempt to establish a natural and social scientific basis for alternatives to industrialized agriculture, which attempted to avoid its resource-degrading tendencies. Agro-ecological frameworks draw upon different intellectual traditions and disciplines, including peasant studies, ecology, environmentalism, and development theory. Originating in developing countries, agroecology has quickly spread to North American and European intellectual traditions. It provides some key conceptual building blocks for a much more normative direction to the analysis of human–nature relations and rural development, and potentially links more broadly to the (mainly European) policy debates surrounding ecological modernization. Several writers have attempted to synthesize some of its key principles and features. Here we can begin to summarize and build upon these within the contemporary context: 1. Alternative definitions of modernity. Here, the process of emancipation from the strictly economic sphere, and the gradual reembedding of ecology in the institutions of economy, is a central aspect across different spatial scales (e.g., local, regional, national, and international), creating the spaces for a socioecological, as well as economic rationality. This process involves aspects of coevolution, which incorporates the autonomous development of socioecological practices and principles within wider political and institutional structures. 2. Coevolution. Agroecology also refers to the reliant codevelopment or coevolution of society and natural factors. It is recognized that farming systems essentially result out of coproduction, that is, the ongoing interaction, mutual transformation, and dependency between humans, animals, and nature; and that the agri-industrial model has created a biotic, biological, and metabolic rift between these elements. The question then becomes how reversible processes can be put in place to regenerate interdependency over time, for instance, in recreating natural manuring, rearing, and feeding techniques. Also, more recently, coevolution also represents the new reconnections that groups of consumers are now making with coproduction at the farm level. 3. Local farmers’ knowledge and innovation systems. Local peasant or indigenous knowledge needs to be seen (both in the North and the South) as significantly different from standard scientific knowledge in that it is embedded in local ecologies and is encoded in local and regional cultures rather than more abstract, universalizing, and reductionist notions. Dominant notions of science tend to be independent of social and local contexts, yet agriculture is actually defined both by its biophysical context and its localized sociopolitical elements. It is based upon the interdependent accumulation of local, natural, and social knowledge resources and practices. These are not just about maintaining “old cultures,” but they involve the reshaping of knowledge systems around, for instance, new embedded entrepreneurial and social networking and marketing skills. 4. Endogenous potentialities. While all agroecological systems have their own endogenous potential, a major factor concerns how these potentialities can become articulated and valorized/commodified through social and political mechanisms. For instance, the role of the cooperative Chianti wine consortium in Tuscany serves as a major social and economic mechanism for over 30 key producers of Chianti wines, simultaneously protecting, regulating, promoting, and articulating the endogenous potential of the local producers. These potentialities and their realization are often social struggles involving local groups who attempt to resist, oppose, and actively construct alternatives to industrial standardization and modernization. Many examples in the South (in Kenya, for instance) involve local groups of farmers who are attempting to protect their rights and practices concerning the production of local seed varieties in the face of their appropriation by corporate seed firms. Creating and sustaining these endogenous potentialities becomes a key feature of agroecology, and it relies upon the development of levels of cooperation and collaboration within farming and rural communities. 5. Collective forms of social action. Agroecology, therefore, also relies upon new or recreated collective forms of social action, between not only producers but also producers and consumers, and producers and other key actors in the supply chains (such as processors and retailers). New associations are forged which enable reconnections between production and consumption, not only of foods but also of amenity and rural experience. 6. Systemic strategies. New and more holistic understandings between the broad range of biophysical factors, such as water, soil, solar energy, and plant and animal species, must be conceived in ways in which they interact not only among themselves but also

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with social actions and practices. This involves an understanding, for instance, of energy, material, cash, and knowledge flows generated in the processes of production and exchange of goods and services associated with the farm. Moreover, ethical decisions, for instance, concerning animal welfare, human diets, are at the heart of progressing more systemic sustainable systems. 7. Ecological, cultural diversity, and agricultural multifunctionality. Agroecology aims not only to celebrate cultural and natural diversity but also to progress and materialize it in new coevolutionary ways. It accepts that there are diverse pathways of agroecological development, based upon both local and regional forms of embeddedness, on the one hand, but complex social–natural relations and producer–consumer linkages on the other. This relationship places an emphasis upon both the multifunctionality of farming and related practices on the farm, at the same time as recreating multifunctional linkages between farms and the wider rural and urban communities. Such diversity and multifunctionality are seen as a central plank of moving toward a more sustainable society more generally. Moreover, taking much evidence from the South, they demonstrate the food security and ecological and social benefits of a much more diverse agriculture. It is now more easily accepted that agroecological methods do not necessarily result in lower yields. While global industrial agriculture serves the world’s population with 90% of its calories from a mere 15 species of crops, organic and agroecological farmers are providing a vital service in maintaining genetic diversity for the future. For instance, indigenous farmers in Peru cultivate more than 3000 different types of potatoes, and there are more than 5000 varieties of sweet potatoes cultivated in Papua New Guinea. In West Java, researchers have identified more than 230 species of plants within a dual cropping system, which includes “agroforestry,” home gardens, and outfields. In Mexico, the Huastec Indigenous peoples manage a number of plots in which up to 300 species are cultivated. Areas around the farmhouses may contain between 80 and 125 useful species, many with medicinal properties. 8. Encompassing the social ecology component. While agroecology embraces both de facto and certified organic, both of which are now rapidly growing in terms of both production systems and markets (globally there are more than 100 different organic certification systems in place, but this is only the “tip of the iceberg” with regard to de facto organic and agroecological farming systems, especially in the South), it contains a more explicit social component than does the strictly organic approach, where the focus is often more strictly tied to verifiable technical standards. Many agroecological movements do not provide internationally recognized standards and are culturally and locally more specific; often tied to a more “farmer first” approach. Nevertheless, it is important to view agroecological developments as complementary systems with the more rules-based organic approaches, as both form significant components of the widening vector of sustainable agriculture and agrifood. The systems share common methodological and theoretical ground also in their use of participative approaches to agricultural and rural research and development. While agroecological and multifunctional principles and practices have burgeoned in most advanced countries, including the United States, it has been in Europe, over the past two decades, where such principles have become more embedded into the formal institutional fabric and agricultural and environmental policy frameworks. It has been here that the benefits of a more diversified and “green” agriculture have been articulated in agricultural reform, and where more of a resistance through, for instance, the “green box” discussions in World Trade Organization negotiations has been at least articulated on the global stage; however, as will be shown below, these European ecologically modernizing trends have been associated more with the growing consumer/citizen concerns regarding the quality and provenance of food and a reconnected green amenity, as they have with a more positive and coherent farmer movement. Moreover, as we shall see, the particular expression of agricultural sustainability in a grounded and contemporary European context is much more embedded in reconnecting its agricultures back into a wider and more holistic notion of rural sustainable development more generally.

The Sustainable Rural Development Paradigm in Europe Since the 1990s, a fledgling, sustainable rural development model has been emerging, at least in the European context, which has incorporated many of the principles of sustainable agriculture, specifically, agroecology. While building upon the multifunctional assumptions, but also adapting many of the agroecological principles developed in Southern countries, this model attempts to reintegrate agriculture as a multifunctional set of practices. These can hold the potential to enhance the interrelationships between farms and people both in rural and between rural and urban areas. While accepting the realities of much of the cosmopolitan “consumption countryside” in a European context, the new rural development paradigm distinguishes itself in the emphasis and autonomy it promotes for a reconstituted and engaged agricultural and land-based rural sector. This paradigm is seen as a potentially new driving force for rural development, in both (some) policy as well as academic fora, and involves what Van der Ploeg, Marsden, and other scholars refer to as broadening, deepening, and regrounding of farm-based activities (including new on-farm activities like agritourism, energy production, value-added food chains, and a variety of environmental schemes). Recent studies in Europe estimate that at least 50% of all farmers are actively engaged in some of these new rural development practices. This pattern reasserts the socioenvironmental role of agriculture and other land-based activities as a major agent in sustaining rural economies and cultures. Farmer engagement with new practices also reconnects a renewed priority of agricultural production to the wider markets and social innovations, and possibilities (such as aspects of “retroinnovation” of agricultural practices, local embeddedness, and new forms of ecological entrepreneurship). These possibilities are based upon assumptions about the wider associational economics and institutional economics theories, which emphasize the significance of “trust and association-based” relationships in new forms of economic development. These new possibilities potentially place sustainable

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rural development in a more central role in understanding the mechanics and complexities of 21st-Century economic reorganization. In this context, agriculture acquires a more comprehensive meaning and displays high integrative potential in that it is recognized as a central feature of delivering real rural sustainable development benefits. This expanded scope for agriculture does not necessarily rely upon significant amounts of production subsidy and can engage the state in new and innovative ways (e.g., in aspects of marketing and procurement policies). To innovate in this way, it is necessary to create a radical rupture with agroindustrial processes. Sustainable agriculture must, in a variety of ways, attempt to find new political, social, and ecological platforms and spaces to distinguish (and exert energy for) itself from the conventional processes which tend to continue to devalue its base. Empirically, we see many examples of this process across Europe in what has been termed the “relocalization” of agrifood. While such reembedding tendencies have proliferated in some countries (such as Italy and France) more than others (such as the UK and the Netherlands), it is now clear that even in those countries where the agri-industrial model has historically had the most profound impact, that new “sociotechnical niches,” new spatially embedded networks and structures, are clearly developing. These developments are not just associated with the rise of (de jure) organic food production and consumption in Europe (which has indeed been significant). They are also associated with de facto (1) rises of both locality-based and new locally based short food supply chains and (2) the different responses and ruptures from the conventional system brought about by its periodic and severe crisis tendencies (such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, foot and mouth disease, and avian flu). For instance, in South West England new and more autonomous relocalized networks of locally and regionally based beef, dairy, and cheese production have developed partly as some producers have attempted to create a “rupture” with the past conventional systems. Rather than continue to struggle under the continual pressures of the (agri-industrial) conventional cost-price squeeze on the one hand, or face the burdensome regulatory costs of the hygienic-bureaucratic state on the other, these emerging networks have managed to detach themselves significantly from such“lock-in effects” by developing new sets of relationships both among themselves and with downstream buyers (such as retailers and caterers). It is also clear that these new networks begin to return considerable economic value added for the local rural economy. There are many critics of the new rural development paradigm given the resilient power of the agri-industrial and bioscientific orthodoxies both in research and policy circles. For instance, many agricultural economists still see it as really only another novel form of niche production in the global and World Trade Organization context of liberalization and continued agriindustrialismdan archipelago within the sea of corporate-inspired cost reduction. Some researchers question its more widespread benefits both socially and economically, arguing that such new networks are in themselves socially elitist and indeed display quite neoliberal tendencies of their own, or that they can also reflect the more sinister features of “defensive localism” and protected markets. More optimistically, some suggest that this movement begins to represent a sort of postmodern “repeasantization,” whereby networks of landholders begin to develop new organizational systems of autonomous and endogenous rural development and thereby recreate significant “room for maneuver.” It is an interesting question as to how the “peasant”doften regarded as a pejorative concept under the 20th-Century agricultural modernization projectdnow potentially reemerges as an empowered ecological entrepreneur within the new rural development paradigm.

Some Conceptual Building Blocks for the Sustainable Rural Development Paradigm One common mistake about the new rural development paradigm (within the contemporary European context, at least) is to assume that it is simply a return to localism, and/or that it falls victim to the “local trap” in general sustainability literature. This claim assumes that there is an unproblematic set of elisions between local embeddedness and overall sustainability. It is important to correct these sets of assertions by pointing out that a key feature of the rural development paradigm is the dual (i.e., with a strong agroecological root) socioecological process of rebuilding local resources (which might be called “countryside capitals”) at the same time as enlarging and deepening the interactions with the wider economy. Hence, it is not sufficient simply to read off socioeconomic or ecological actions from the particular geographical scale within which they may reside nor to assume that local actions by themselves are the panacea. Rather, it is important to examine how new local (endogenous) and external interactions, as processes and practices, become constituted and reconnected spatially. Nevertheless, this clarification does not deny the significance of local and regional scales as potentially becoming new sites of resistance and innovation for the development of more sustainable actions and processes which can then be enlarged and diffused. What is crucial though is that new social, economic, and ecological processes begin to be put in placedto be rebuiltdwhich then connects in multifarious ways with the wider layers of national and international economies. These are important points of definition, not least because highlighting “the local” also tends, by definition, to render it relatively marginal. In this sense the global and the macro market-based perspectives, including those based around notions of competitiveness, have for too long been appropriated by those who, by definition, see the local as “caged,” as the marginal. If we hypothesize, as many of the results of international comparative European research suggest, that the capacity for local and regional forms of sustainable rural development are dependent upon enlarging the intensity and quality of their interactions with the wider economy, we can take one further step, which then specifies this process with regard to some key, necessary parameters of embeddedness and interactiveness. Hence, we can suggest a set of key composite objectives, which are required and which need to be enlarged in order to create sustainable rural development:

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1. Defining rural development as an active structural and behavioral change in the rural economy, leading to a raising of its competitive capabilities in the face of “cost-price squeezes” and sustainability threats. 2. Creating new local and regional institutional frameworks both involving the supply and demand management of rural goods and services. 3. Raising the social and entrepreneurial capability for multiple resource use and synergy, that is the ability to generate different economic values from the same resource through coproduction, cooperation, and coevolution of the resource base; economies of scope rather than economies of scale. 4. Increasing the quality, skills, and trust base of interactions between local resources and the wider economy. 5. Increasing the number and density of the interactions between local resources and the wider economy. 6. Increasing the degree of local producer and marketing negotiating power residing in the interactions between local resources and the wider economy. It is clear that these objectives are still somewhat abstract concepts, which in combination (rather than separately), and in the aggregate rather than in the singular, begin to provide a basis for real shifts toward more sustainable rural development, taking many of the earlier agroecological principles as their point of departure. These bring together some of the main components identified in recent empirical rural and agrifood research. Of course, the objectives need to be grounded in and through particular rural spaces, given their inherent differentiation, and given the particularity of local agroecological and social conditions. Two redefined principles need to underpin these rural development objectives. First is a reconfigured notion of competitiveness. Competitiveness in this rural development context refers not only to price setting (although this can be both high and low depending on the variety of goods and services demanded by a growing quality-based wider economy), but also to particular “terms of trade” established between key actors and institutions in the supply and demand networks for these goods and services. In a world where markets, in a real sense, have been at least partially eclipsed by supply chain regulation, and where access to these chains becomes increasingly based around wider social and regulatory criteria, it follows that the overall competitiveness of any local rural economy is increasingly based around the two main infrastructural/competitiveness parameters (i.e., points 2. and 3. above). That is, real competitiveness of the local rural economy becomes increasingly dependent upon the robustness and inclusiveness of new institutional frameworks, on the one hand, and the social and practical capacity to generate multiple value chains and products from the same resource base, on the other. This latter point represents the second redefined principle: the extent to which particular local rural economies are able to engage in more than one activity simultaneously while drawing on the same, necessarily restricted, resource base. We should remember that all historical forms of agrarian capitalism have attempted to meet this challenge. Early capitalism did it through the enclosure movement; Fordism did it through creating an increasing range of products from a very restricted agricultural input base; more recently “post-Fordism” in agrifood, led by the internationalized retailers and processors, does it through the generation of over 25,000 food products in any one store and systems of logistics and category management which play havoc with our traditional (Fordist) notions of space–time. The new rural development model in this sense is no different however alternative and sustainable its overall objectives are. Based in and as part of a revised capitalist logic, at the very same time as attempting to create and wrest as much autonomy from it, a key condition for rural development needs to be the actual intensification of time–space in such a way as to create a variety of goods and services with the intent to service a wider variety of external and quality constructed markets. The central feature here is to create synergies between the heterogeneity of production with the heterogeneity of marketing and demand; to create economies of scope and diversity, rather than just of scale. This approach is the very antithesis to the monocultural tendencies of agriindustrialism. Giving shape to concrete and functioning activities in this rural development domain requires grasping revised notions of the competitiveness in which local rural economies are situated. In addition, it requires an improved understanding of how new horizontal and vertical institutional and entrepreneurial frameworks and platforms can be put into place. These parameters of new rural development processes have to be underpinned by the three key features of interaction between the local and the wider rural economy: that is, the quality, number/density, and the actual power geometries existing within these interactions. These are, of course, in interdependent relationships with the above more infrastructural factors, and they can be fostered and changed over time. In this sense this is a dynamic rather than a static parameterization. In-depth research in the rural regions of Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK exemplify and support the conceptualizations outlined here. In these studies, we see the differential processes of rural development occurring with, for instance, new synergies developing between agrifood, tourism, and locality food chain developments. Here the specified use of the term multifunctionality in the context of rural development and the reconfiguring of resource structures is important. In Tuscany, for instance, we have witnessed the importance of new forms of institutional frameworksdsuch as agricultural consortia and cooperativesdas important building blocks in enrolling producers and in managing the volatilities in quality supply and demand of new, or reconditioned local and (exportable) quality locality foods. To a lesser extent, and with weaker institutional development and weaker degrees of synergy, we have witnessed still significant levels of rural development impacts from our studies in South West England and Wales in the UK. Here, however, the still dominant and somewhat inert agri-industrial and postproductivist institutional structures and local/external relations can act as an impediment to the flourishing growth of real rural development alternatives. It is also clear more generally from these researches that there tends to be an inverse relationship between the degree to which the rural development parameters outlined above can really become

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embedded and scaled up, and the institutional power and regional and local dominance of the agri-industrial and postproductivist regulatory systems. Wales is a case in point here. Defined by the national state since World War II as a cheap producer of essentially three agrifood inputsdbeef, lamb, and liquid milkdWales has struggled to develop an alternative agrifood and rural development strategy based upon endogenous development and the principles and parameters of rural development identified above. Finding space for alternative rural development strategies is ironically somewhat easier in those regions and localities that the agri-industrial regulatory model tended to historically ignore or sidestep. Many upland and mountainous European regions, for instance, are becoming the centers for new forms of innovative rural development, while much of lowland North West Europe (e.g., Eastern England, Northwest Netherlands) struggles to disentangle itself from the “lock-in” effects of different combinations of agri-industrialism and postproductivism. The parameters outlined here serve as a way of theorizing and conceptualizing the inherent differentiation of the rural development model, as it confronts the still powerful forces of agri-industrialism and postproductivism. It has attempted to ask: what are some of the common parameters and principles involved in the process of rural differentiation? And, how might an improved theory and understanding be developed of this inherently differentiating and heterogeneous rural development process? What these studies illuminate, however, are that practices such as “retroinnovation”dbringing back agricultural and land-based practices from the pastdand“ecological entrepreneurship”dwhereby key actors begin to create and sustain new networks of actiondcan begin to build new supply chains and action spaces in which more value added can be captured at the local rural level. Moreover, it is clear that fostering urban-based forms of procurement, not least in foods, and linking these to their rural hinterlands could have a radical impact upon generating rural development benefits both in the Global North and the Global South. For instance, the city of New York requires 800,000 school meals per day. Innovations in bioenergy and renewable energy, as well as food procurement, are so far in their early stages. Thus, the recalibration of urban demands with the reconstitution of the rural resource base is an important area for development, and one which the rural development policy community needs to be attuned to. The parameters of sustainable rural development outlined in the latter part of the article begin to assemble some of the building blocks that are relevant in harnessing the internal and external potentialities of rural localities and regions in a more mobile social and economic context. These building blocks have their intellectual roots in the earlier discussions concerning agroecology and sustainable agricultural principles. What is clear (from research evidence in Europe, as well as beyond) is that it is possible to rebuild rural development in ways that increase the interactions with the external (urban and consumer-based) economy at the same time as maximizing the ways in which more economic and social value can be agroecologically fixed in specific rural spaces, in other words, to fit rural spaces more effectively into the mobile and consumer-based worlds in which they are now necessarily situated; however, this reconfiguration will not occur through market mechanisms alone; and it relies upon rural actors and institutions being proactive in both distancing and escaping themselves from many of the existing and devaluing aspects of rural life, at the same time as reassembling and redefining resources and infrastructures in ways that carve out new diversified niches of sustainable production of goods and services.

Conclusions: Prospects and Challenges for Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development For much of the latter half of the 20th Century, agricultural sustainability debates concentrated on both the recognition, definition, as well as the oppositional significance of what sustainability entails. This debate led to considerable vitality and energy in creative conceptual development. More recently, the political and economic vector for sustainable agriculture has dramatically widened and deepened into what some scholars have termed the “real green revolution.” There may now be a real shift occurring, not least in parts of Europe, from an emphasis on oppositional and ontological politics toward really embedding and “sustaining the sustainable” as opposed to “sustaining the unsustainable.” This shift entails focusing upon rebuilding new spatial and ecological configurations for sustainable rural and agricultural development sui generis. This eventuality is becoming more probable and realistic not only because of, as we have seen, the gradual moves toward ecological modernization by the state apparatus (especially in Europe). Agricultural sustainability, or rather agrifood sustainability (taking in whole complex supply chain factors rather than just the farm), is now recognized as a central dynamic in the broader political economy and governance of what we might call the macro eco-economy. In the first decades of the 21st Century, two processes of particular significances to sustainable agriculture are apparent. First, the real effects of the growing scarcity of the carbon-based resource are becoming clearer, and having both corporate and geopolitical effects. Second, the real effects of 150 years of the carbon-based economy are being realized with regard to climate change. In this changing context, the positioning and political power of sustainable agriculture, agroecology, and the rural development paradigm can only grow in ways that should see these principles become a more powerful vehicle for reintegrating both sustainable production and consumption, and also re-equating the fast-growing urban world with its diverse rural ecological hinterlands. In the face of reignited global concerns about food security, however, vast disparities in the volumes and types of food consumption, and the persistence of the agri-industrial model in attempting to find new technological “fixes,” we should not expect this journey to be easy or unproblematic.

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See Also: Environment; Peasant Agriculture; Postproductivist and Multifunctional Agriculture; Sustainability.

Further Reading Altieri, A., 1987. Agro-ecology: The Scientific Basis of Alternative Agriculture. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Gliessman, S.R., 1990. Agro-ecology: Researching the Ecological Basis of Sustainable Agriculture. Springer, New York. Guzman, E.S., Martinez-Alier, J., 2006. New social movements and agro-ecology. In: Cloke, P., Marsden, T.K., Mooney, P. (Eds.), Handbook of Rural Studies. Sage, London, pp. 472–483. Guzman, E.S., Woodgate, G., 1997. Sustainable rural development: from industrial agriculture to agro-ecology. In: Redlift, M., Woodgate, G. (Eds.), The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 83–101. Marsden, T.K., 2003. The Condition of Rural Sustainability, European Rural Development Series. Van Gorcum, Assen. Marsden, T., 2013. From post-productionism to reflexive governance: contested transitions in securing more sustainable food futures. J. Rural Stud. 29, 123–134. Morgan, K., Mardsen, T., Murdoch, J., 2006. Worlds of Food: Power, Place and Provenance in the Food Chain. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Parrott, N., Marsden, T.K., 2002. The Real Green Revolution: Organic and Agro-Ecological Farming in the South. Greenpeace Environmental Trust, London. Robinson, G., 2014. Geographies of Agriculture: Globalisation, Restructuring and Sustainability. Routledge. Rosin, C., Stock, P., Campbell, H. (Eds.), 2013. Food Systems Failure: The Global Food Crisis and the Future of Agriculture. Routledge. Tornaghi, C., 2014. Critical geography of urban agriculture. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 38 (4), 551–567. Van der Ploeg, J.D., 2003. The Virtual Farmer. Royal van Gorcum, Assen.

Agri-Environmentalism and Rural Change Clive Potter, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp 79–83, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) The CAP of the European Union was launched in 1962 and involves the provision of financial support to farmers, including to operate in relation to sustainable management of natural resources. Agri-environmentalism A term that refers to the policy concern that farming practices are environmentally sustainable, which involves a renegotiation of the relationship between the state and farmers. Multifunctionality An account of farming and rural society that emphasizes a diverse range of environmental, social, and economic functions.

The realization that modern, intensive agriculture could be environmentally damaging was slow to gain ground among policy elites in industrialized countries. Traditionally portrayed as environmental stewards engaged in the production of essential staples, farmers in most developed countries since the 1930s have received substantial levels of government support in order to achieve food security and public good policy goals. The conventional wisdom is that farmers as a group deserve state assistance, not merely because their incomes tend to be lower and more volatile than those of others in society, but also because, without them, many rural communities and environments would no longer be sustainable. During the 1970s and 1980s, mounting evidence that agricultural intensification and the production of food on an industrial scale was depleting biodiversity, eroding soils, and contaminating the wider environment brought about a profound questioning of the idea that the rural environment can safely be left to the care of farmers. The result has been a rethinking of policy models and approaches and arguably one of the largest-scale experiments in environmental regulation and incentivization ever attempted in places like the European Union (EU) and the United States. With this shift has come a substantial body of rural geographical research concerned with documenting the nature and extent of the environmental threat, contributing to debates concerning the public policy and regulatory implications and reflecting on the sociocultural–political repercussions of the associated shifts in public attitudes toward farmers and farming. “Agri-environmentalism” is now an established feature of public policy discourse in most developed countries, indicative of a concern to ensure that farming practices are environmentally sustainable in a practical and largely policy-driven sense. The term also refers, however, to a larger and much more politically charged renegotiation of the relationship between farmers and the state in a period of policy change and market liberalization.

Developing an Environmentalist Critique of Modern Agriculture Environmentalist critiques of modern farming first emerged in places like Western Europe, the United States, and Canada during the late 1970s. Mounting evidence of the biodiversity, soil erosion, and off-farm pollution impacts of agricultural intensification and specialization was brought to public attention by campaigning scientists and journalists, as well as by conservation groups, in both the EU and North America. In the classic former enclosed landscapes of lowland England and northwest Denmark and throughout the bocage landscapes of northern France and Belgium, for instance, the removal of hedgerows from the late 1960s onward to facilitate larger-scale farming operations had brought about dramatic visual change. Southern member states of the EU such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece underwent a transformation of their farm sectors following accession in 1986. Here, intensification of production on the best land was accompanied by the marginalization and decline of traditional farming practices, and geographers and ecologists reported a steady erosion of biodiversity and a growing threat from groundwater contamination, soil erosion, and fire due to a complex double movement, which saw the expansion of intensive arable production on irrigated land and the loss of longestablished and environmentally sympathetic dryland arable production systems elsewhere. Soil erosion had long been recognized as a major environmental threat in the United States before this date, but evidence published by the National Resources Inventory in the mid-1980s revealed a significant upswing in rates of soil loss since the early 1970s. Evidence marshalled by campaign groups like the Conservation Foundation suggested that off-site damage resulting from the sedimentation of watercourses and from pollution far outstripped the on-site costs of reduced soil productivity. By the late 1980s it was becoming increasingly clear that high levels of agricultural subsidy offered to farmers by governments, and directly coupled to production through price support, were a major driver of these and other reported types of agricultural change and environmental damage. In the United States, it was noted that environmental concerns have been little considered when farmers had been encouraged through the US Department of Agriculture’s commodity programs to “plant fence row to fence

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row” in pursuit of increased production and overseas markets. The result was an almost oceanic shift in land use that swept away many of the soil conservation practices previously in place and significantly exacerbated the soil erosion and diffuse pollution problem. Critics of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were by now offering a similar farm policy explanation for many of the environmental problems associated with European agriculture. The high price guarantees available to farmers under the CAP since the early 1960s had encouraged a widespread intensification of production as producers strove to increase output by bringing hitherto unfarmed land into production, by applying more bought inputs like fertilizer and pesticide to every hectare of land in production, and by stepping up stocking rates. This essentially policy-centric understanding of agri-environmental change prevailed in the public debates of the time, not least because it offered agri-environmentalists a policy target for their campaigns. Moreover, by attaching blame to policies rather than farmers this construction made possible a series of new alliances between agrarian and conservationist interests, and hence rendered politically feasible a series of attempts throughout the 1990s to green the farm policies of industrialized countries. In the event, progress toward a fully sustainable agri-environmental policy has been slow, reflecting the culturally embedded nature of agricultural support and the ability of farmers’ groups to defend traditional policy entitlements. As a case study in environmental governance and policy experimentation, however, agri-environmentalism offers geographers a rich object of study. Agrienvironmental policy development is interesting as much for what it tells us about the nature of the policy process and the still culturally embedded ways of constructing the countryside and the role of farming within it, as it is a route map for environmental reform.

Toward Greener Farm Policies? The idea that farmers deserve special treatment because they are farmers was never likely to be defensible as a long-term justification for state assistance. Policymakers have presented public good and social equity justifications for shielding farmers from world market forces for many decades, but it was not until the late 1980s that an environmental public-good rationale was articulated with any great persuasiveness. Conventional farm support, by now under challenge on grounds of its spiraling budgetary costs (the CAP was absorbing more than 70% of the total EU budget in 1985), its bias in favor of larger producers (20% of the largest European farm operators were receiving 80% of the subsidy), and its trade-distorting consequences for trading partners, began to look unsustainable in its current form. Farm policy critics, geographers among them, sensed that a new policy settlement was possible which would rebalance agricultural support away from production and farmer income support per se and toward green payment and rural development schemes of various complexions. The United States was among the first to experiment with this new approach, establishing a Conservation Title under the 1984 Farm Bill and creating a 20 million ha Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). This sought to tackle soil erosion and off-site damage by paying farmers to take highly erodible lands out of intensive agriculture use. In the EU, farmers were also being offered agri-environmental contracts that subsidized the adoption of agricultural stewardship and the management of landscapes and biodiversity. By 2000, one in every five European farmers was in receipt of an agri-environmental payment and more than 3 million ha had been enrolled in national programs. Rather than reserving land by taking it out of production, here the focus was on “working lands,” and a variety of subsidy schemes were deployed to influence the way farmers managed features like hedgerows, woodland, and semi-natural grassland. Despite important differences in emphasis and approachdEuropeans have been more concerned to encourage farmers, many of them economically marginal, to manage established agricultural landscapes and semi-natural habitats, whereas North Americans have sought to minimize the soil eroding and polluting effects of intensive productiondit has been observed that in both settings a “provider gets” rather than a “polluter pays” philosophy tended to prevail. Payments went to farmers as the client group because they possessed the property rights and occupied the land. They were also regarded as deserving recipients and the best people to manage and protect the habitats, landscapes, and resources of the countryside. Agri-environmental contracts proved successful in enrolling large numbers of farmers into a new land stewardship community, and this appeared to revive the public view of farmers as providers of first resort of rural environmental goods. Moreover, the agricultural policy community seemed convinced by the tactical argument that paying farmers to produce public goods offered a publicly more defensible basis for agricultural support than income support to a supposedly beleaguered occupational group. Under this new public goods model, the role of government is not to support agriculture for its own sake but rather to contract farmers and other land managers directly to supply the environmental goods and services that markets, if left to their own devices, will fail to deliver. Supporters of the agri-environmental turn in farm policy point to the huge expansion of environmental management on farms that the expedient of “paying farmers to produce countryside” has made possible. The EU, for instance, regards agri-environmental programs as one of the key mechanisms for achieving its biodiversity protection targets, while the United States continues to invest significant resources in the CRP and successor programs such as the Conservation Security Program. Australia, a relative newcomer in this field, appears similarly committed to a version of the stewardship model in its attempts to deal at state and regional level with a legacy of environmental degradation created by overexploitation and intensification (though see further discussion of the conflict with neoliberal priorities below). Agri-environmental policy is now an established feature of the international policy scene and the subject of a substantial academic literature devoted to better understanding and comparing how different incentive structures work, investigating the

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motives and behavior of the farmers who chose to be guided by them and assessing the environmental outcomes achieved as a result. Doubts remain, however, about the environmental effectiveness of the measures themselves and the advisability of continuing to pursue conservation goals within an agricultural policy setting. A long-standing criticism of agri-environmental policy measures is that they have been grafted onto an apparatus of state support that remains fundamentally productivist in the way it operates and is justified. The decoupling of agricultural subsidies from farmers’ production decision-making that has been the hallmark of the farm policy reforms of the 1990s has eased this contradiction somewhat. The substitution of direct income transfers for open-ended price support, for example, is generally agreed to have reduced the incentive for operators to maximize subsidy receipts by increasing output. Measures such as the EU’s single farm payment (introduced as part of the Agenda 2000 reforms of the CAP) present other difficulties, with a complex system of “cross-compliance” now in place designed to build environmental safeguards into a measure which is actually about maintaining farmers’ incomes rather than their environmental capacities. So far as agri-environmental contracts themselves are concerned, agriculture ministries continue to find it difficult to target incentives in ways that maximize environmental value for money and too many schemes have been operated as disguised income support measures for marginal farmers. Governments face a dilemma in deciding how strictly prescribed agri-environmental schemes should beddo they impose tightly prescribed entry and delivery conditions on payments and risk a reduced rate of uptake and a disproportionate burden of administrative costs under a “narrow but deep” strategy or do they opt for a “broad but shallow” approach which aims for maximum enrollments but seeks only modest changes to farming practice in return? This is one of many debates concerning the “fitness for purpose” of agri-environmental policy tools in a period of intensifying competition for resources and growing public scrutiny of spending decisions.

Contested Models of Agri-Environmental Governance At the same time, agri-environmental concerns have been swept into an increasingly international debate about the broad nature of agricultural sustainability and the role of farmers in delivering this. The restructuring and relocation of production that is likely within an increasingly globalized agro-food system may prove as damaging to habitats and landscapes as earlier periods of agricultural change, and there is a continuing debate about how far agri-environmentalism can be squared with the dismantling of state support and the establishment of market rule in agriculture. The convening of a new round of trade negotiations in 2000 under the auspices of the WTO’s Doha trade round has raised the possibility of a much more substantial liberalization of agricultural markets than might previously have been considered possible and led to an international debate about the trade-distorting effects of green payment schemes which operate by keeping farmers on the land. Agriculture had been brought into the international framework of multilateral trade negotiations for the first time under the Uruguay Round (1986–93). The resulting agriculture agreement committed signatories to a long-term agenda for agricultural trade liberalization that would entail the reform of domestic subsidies, improved market access, and the elimination of export subsidies. The successor Doha Round negotiations were unsuccessfully concluded in 2015 with particular disagreements around agricultural subsidies, although it seems unlikely that the neoliberal project for agriculture has yet run its course. The structural pressures on governments to further liberalize agricultural markets in any event remain immense. In particular, the globalization of food processing, distribution, and retailing that has come to define a global agro-food system means that a new set of corporate interests committed to a neoliberal agenda is exerting growing influence over an international policy agenda centered on the rules and procedures of the WTO. Representatives of these interests have emerged as fierce critics of the traditional model of state assistance to farmers and see the further liberalization of agricultural markets, particularly in places like the EU, as essential if they are to control costs and compete for new markets. Working separately and through country groupings such as the Cairns Group of agro-exporters, they have succeeded in constructing a powerful agenda for reform that has as its informing vision a global agriculture governed by market rule. These debates raise questions about the types of agri-environmental governance that would be feasible within the framework of such a policy settlement. The important debate about “agricultural multifunctionality” that dominated early stages of the Doha Round is motivated by a concern that the public good attributes of farming may become harder to defend if the market protection currently extended to large numbers of marginal producers in some industrialized economies has to be dismantled. A number of different understandings of the relationship between agriculture, rural society, and the environment are in play here, giving rise to a continuing debate about the extent to which the protection and management of rural environments should continue to be a statedirected project. Those who promote a multifunctional view appear to be advocating a “working lands” model of agricultural governance, which seeks to uphold a joint production view of the relationship between agriculture and the environment. This construction says that the landscapes and habitats valued by the public in places like the EU are essentially underpinned by the practice of farming, principally through the activity of grazing animals, as well as the different land management practices that are put in place in order to retain fertility and yields. Unless governments continue to underwrite agricultural incomes through state support, large numbers of vulnerable farmers will leave the land, extensive tracts of countryside risk being abandoned, and biodiversity values will decline. It is a model that has the support of many EU member states, notably France, which insists that it is agricultural production which defines the very qualities (or multifunctions) of rural space that most European citizens are interested in and willing to pay for as both taxpayers and consumers of food. With its affirmation of the importance of sustaining the territorial association between farming, food, and environment, this is a stance that suggests that the farming population is itself a public good. Despite strong

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criticism from trading partners, it is an approach that continues to be strongly defended in international and domestic policy forums and is arguably the informing concept behind the introduction of the EU’s single farm payment scheme in 2003, a system of income supports apparently designed to keep farmers in large numbers on the land. There are also supporters of a decoupled public goods model of agri-environmental governance who believe that the idea that governments need to support farming incomes and structures “in order” to achieve environmental goals rather than doing so directly has far too many spillover effects into production and, thus, into international markets to be acceptable in the WTO. Their prescription is for payments to be linked as directly as possible to the environmental outputs that farmers (and other land managers) achieve. They tend to be more optimistic about the ability of farmers to adapt to world market conditions and point to the European experience of large numbers of family farmers managing to remain on the land through income diversification and off-farm employment. This analysis and the policy prescriptions to which it gives rise have enjoyed the support of WTO members such as Australia and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Among European countries, the United Kingdom has come closest to advocating the decoupling of policy being implied here. The contention of the UK government in recent years has been that further reform of the CAP should achieve a situation in which the majority of support to farmers is delivered through rural development and agri-environmental policy programs. This is presented within a framework of rural policy which seeks to move away from a focus on farming as the keystone of the rural economy in favor of a much wider range of economic activities. A component of this “alternative paradigm” is a view of the countryside as an increasingly important consumption space in which the growing demand for quality products and the scope for branding goods, services, and places will create new income streams for farmers and their families and enable governments to withdraw from their traditional role as an income guarantor. Agri-environmentalists face a dilemma in deciding how far to give this latter, more decoupled model their full support. The idea that subsidies to farmers should be conceived more or less exclusively in public good terms is one that they have campaigned for since the beginning. However, there remain considerable uncertainties about the restructuring implications of such a radical policy shift and the inevitable net withdrawal of government support that would result. Australian governments have long struggled to reconcile neoliberal policy priorities with the need to tackle an agrienvironmental crisis that many critics believe requires some form of federal state intervention for their solution. The muchvaunted National Landcare Program, introduced in 1989, attempted to persuade farmers to undertake environmental management through better information and voluntary action. In the absence of financial support, and already substantially exposed to world markets, farmers favored measures which improved productivity and business viability such as tree planting for erosion control and shade or establishing permanent pasture. More radical options such as protecting biodiversity or revegetating saline groundwater recharge zones have been much less widely adopted. While some state level initiatives such as the Victoria’s Rural Land Stewardship Project suggest a move toward the European “public payment for public goods” model, Dibden and Cocklin argue that Australian farmers continue to lack the capital, knowledge, or income to generate effective change at the landscape scale. If, as James McCarthy suggests, struggles over multifunctionality are essentially about negotiating the revaluation of rural nature in the context of trade liberalization, then the issue at stake for policymakers in Europe particularly is how far it will be possible to perpetuate working farmed landscapes under world market conditions. Although interest is growing in the scope for “rewilding” upland landscapes in the wake of a contraction of farming activity, the idea that there may be other ways of working with nature than through farming has as yet been slow to appear in public debate.

Conclusions At one level, the invention of agri-environmental policy is arguably one of the most significant environmental policy achievements of recent years. Partly a reaction to the sweeping changes in farming practice of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the greening of agricultural policy reflects a profound public reassessment of the role of farmers as providers of public environmental goods. Rather than the use of regulatory instruments, however, the approach followed has been to subsidize farmers so that they can better fulfill their stewardship obligations. In the United States, programs like the CRP have brought about land use change on an unprecedented scale and a very significant degree of new investment in conservation capital; in the EU, a large-scale experiment is effectively in progress involving the use of environmental contracts in order to achieve landscape, biodiversity, and pollution control policy objectives. Critics point to the essentially second-best nature of these reforms, however, and the mixed results that have been achieved in terms of improved environmental outcomes and changes to the behavior and outlook of farmers. Having contributed both as advocates of domestic policy reform and as analysts of policy processes and implementation strategies, geographers are now increasingly interested in the way agri-environmental concerns are being drawn into an international policy debate centered on the liberalization of agricultural markets and the continuing globalization of agricultural production. Countries like Australia and New Zealand, where farmers are already significantly more exposed to world market forces than their more protected European competitors, are meanwhile closely studied for what they can tell us about the perils and opportunities of agri-environmental governance under more open market conditions. Further comparative work is increasingly valued for what it can tell us about the changing role of farmers and “the nature of nature” in what seems likely to be a period of unprecedented agricultural change.

See Also: Agrarian Transformation; Environmental Security; Rural Geography.

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Further Reading Brannstrom, C., 2011. A Q-method analysis of environmental governance discourses in Brazil’s northeastern soy frontier. Prof. Geogr. 63, 531–549. Burton, R.J., Paragahawewa, U.H., 2011. Creating culturally sustainable agri-environmental schemes. J. Rural Stud. 27, 95–104. Cocklin, C., Dibden, J., Mautner, N., 2006. From market to multifunctionality: land stewardship in Australia. Geogr. J. 172, 197–205. Dobbs, T., Pretty, J., 2004. Agri-environmental stewardship schemes and multifunctionality. Rev. Agric. Econ. 26, 221–237. Fish, R., Seymour, S., Watkins, C., 2007. Sustainable Farmland Management: New Transdisciplinary Approaches. CABI, Wallingford, CT. Hodge, I., 2000. Agri-environmental relationships and the choice of policy mechanisms. World Econ. 23, 257–273. Lobley, M., Potter, C., 1998. Environmental stewardship in UK agriculture: a comparison of the environmentally sensitive areas programme and countryside stewardship. Geoforum 29, 41–52. McCarthy, J., 2005. Multifunctional geographies: reactionary or radical? Prog. Hum. Geogr. 29, 773–782. Potter, C., Tilzey, M., 2005. Agricultural policy discourses in the European post-Fordist transition: neoliberalism, neomercantalism and multifunctionality. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 29, 1–20.

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Algorithmic Governance Joe Blankenship, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Artificial intelligence machine-based, algorithmic models intended to emulate or improve upon human cognitive models of space- and place-based processes Blackbox a term used to describe systems in which the internal functionality of software or hardware cannot be directly or transparently ascertained Blockchain a canonical record of digital transactions regulated by an algorithmically driven computer network Cloud computing computer-based processes that are executed on scalable data and compute infrastructures, but not directly managed or accessed by the system users Code/space spaces in which varying forms of software and hardware are essential in their definition and resultant manifestations of place Data derivatives small pieces of data that are used to inferred a larger picture of people, place, and space Hacker a person who examines systems with the intent to reengineer aspects of those systems for an alternative or unintended purpose Internet of things (IoT) sensor-based electronics that are designed to collect data across large networks of devices, facilitate data storage, and assist in the analysis of space

Algorithms are ever present in the spaces of modern human geographies. In the 20th and early 21st centuries, algorithms have progressed from the novel spaces of computer programmers and engineers to the daily places of technology users. Complex financial trading, asset management, and other economic tasks are accomplished through the implementation of several algorithmic designs. Voting, legislation, regulation, and other political spaces are mediated by algorithmic infrastructure. Algorithms have permeated the social fabrics of people all around the world, changing how we communicate and connect with one another. Algorithmic connections to people and practice draw out questions on the forms of power and control that algorithms may have, and may exert, on people. An error in the programming of a trading algorithm could easily crash parts of the global economy. A bias in the data put into a poorly designed algorithm could affect the parole of nonviolent offenders from prison. A person’s online activity can be aggregated by Internet service providers (ISPs) and corporations in order to target advertising and user experience. These types of operations produce practices that are governed by the design and access of these algorithm-based systems. Algorithmic governance is defined as the implementation of multiple interacting rule sets, dictating an order of operation, intended to guide the practices of people in everyday life. Algorithms as a form of governmentality are often adopted by social scientists to critique forms of algorithmic governance such as machine learning and artificial intelligence. Academic work in the areas of code/space, big data, and urbanization has exposed the increasing connection between algorithms and our practices. Examination of varying forms and functions of algorithmic assemblage have made possible studies on cloud computing, data practices, artificial intelligence, and blockchain technologies. These study areas hinge on the ability of geographers to understand and to expose the connection between humans and the technologies of everyday life.

Algorithms in Everyday Life Algorithms are increasingly present in our daily lives. Forwarded by the rapid development of hardware that is increasingly ubiquitous, affordable, and mobile, algorithms have been adapted to facilitate new forms of social behaviors and cultural norms around the world. Geographers have focused on the origins and history of these technologies in numerous ways. In economically advantaged and growing parts of the world, many see the uses of algorithm-enabled technologies as part of a utopian ideal where connectivity and sharing of knowledge is advantageous to themselves and society. Studies on the spaces of social media and mass communication have suggested that increased flows of data have been able to positively assist communities in an array of local issues stemming from much larger global problematics. Alternatively, there have been staunch critics of this pervasive technological reach into our lives, stating the faltering conditions of personal privacy and freedom. Geographers have found that many positive aspects of algorithm-based solutions have often led to increased surveillance and reification of existing geographic divides. These dialogs continue to develop with advancements and uses of algorithm-based systems, complicating the balance between the immediate utility of opaque technologies and how it governs their behaviors and actions.

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At larger scales of consideration, algorithms guide many practices in daily life. Economic algorithms can be found at all scales of global economy. At a personal level, algorithms affect personal finance, insurance, retirement, and communal investments. Local municipalities leverage algorithms for purposes of development, local infrastructure and utilities, taxation, and planning. State and national entities pursue agendas on zoning, taxes, trade, education, defense, and other public services using multiple, interacting algorithms. Regional and international organizations often use algorithms for determining financial assistance, emergency aid, and economic policy. Similarly, algorithms affect political geographies in a number of ways. Governments around the world utilize algorithms to pursue automation of legislative and executive functions including drafting of policy, administration of public entities, risk management, and varying forms of regulation enforcement. These forms of governance have direct effects on how particular types of data relate to populations they govern and the resultant actions taken on those populations over time. Governments have been keen to seize on opportunities in technological advancements such as cloud computing and data storage to aggregate massive datasets. These data are then used to trace the activities of populations, identifying their spatial patterns over time, and archiving them for persistent, long-term analysis. Geographers have often contextualized the aforementioned considerations on algorithmic governance in their studies on urban spaces. The concept of flow has proven useful in exposing how regulation of economic and physical material to and from urban areas is largely governed by algorithms. The motion and pooling of flows can elucidate how particular forms of data are collected through coded infrastructure, processed, and then enacted in regulation enforcement and risk management. These processes are often unevenly controlled and felt by different populations in urban areas. Matters such as development and regulation of transportation and communications infrastructure are managed in part by algorithms, resulting in unevenly stratified access and uncertain futures within increasingly fragmented urban spaces, which are continually studied through the concept of the smart city. It is this fragmentation that makes the study of algorithmic governance challenging in urban spaces. Cities are increasingly an assemblage of coded structures enabled by a complex array of intersecting algorithms. Code structures not only complicate the stratification of space, but often reify the conditions and imaginaries of underserviced and overpoliced urban areas. Moving beyond the urban, we can see similar effects in relationships between algorithms and rural areas. Geographers have studied sparsely populated areas that coincide with limited and lower quality communications infrastructure and service access; however, much less attention has been paid to the effects of algorithmic governance in rural spaces. This is potentially due to the acute responses and contestations of more highly concentrated urban populations within a more developed legacy of existing literature through which the effects of algorithmic governance can be better geographically defined. The intersection between algorithms and human geography often results in the study of the mechanization of social processes. As technologies continue to improve, people will find intersections with existing systems. When these intersections are identified, there are often efforts to automate those processes and practices, with direct effects on labor, business operations, and government regulation. Businesses often seek forms of algorithmic governance to increase efficiencies and profits at the cost of human labor. For governments, many forms of algorithmic automation have enabled policing and militarization of public spaces. The increasing presence of surveillance technologies in human spaces is a result of the demands for algorithms to produce a higher quality of life, but this pursuit of security can result in the uneven reduction of privacy and personal freedoms.

Algorithms and Data In consideration of how algorithmic governance emerges and affects human geographies, we should consider what drives and supports their operations in the spaces of everyday life. Geographers have studied algorithms and their effects from many positions and perspectives, most often in terms of flow and augmentation. Algorithmic functions vary greatly depending where they are being implemented and for what purpose. The goal to understand how algorithms cause shifts and modifications in practice has been dependent on knowledge of the structures through which actions occur. Cloud computing, data storage, interfaces, hardware, and their material foundations have led to understanding of how the structures of everyday spaces are affected and changed for the utility of people, companies, and governments. Smart classrooms and smart cities facilitated by cloud computing have made algorithms an essential part of how we approach and complete daily activities. The results of these algorithmic interactions such as audio, video, e-mail, and documents, can be stored in perpetuity and accessed through a number of interfaces for use by private and public actors. These actors can then use these data to guide activity, as seen in location-based advertising, and for surveillance of our daily lives, as seen with numerous violations of personal privacy though the manipulation of social media data. There have been calls and burgeoning efforts to delve deeper into the functionality and structure of algorithms. Algorithms are a complex product of human cognition and technical ability. To deconstruct the often complex facade, geographers must be able to interpret the origin, structure, and production of algorithmic code. Examinations of statistical models traditionally used in the analysis of spatial phenomena are increasingly being examined, while the concept of data derivatives is useful in connecting algorithmic application and technique to the outcomes of algorithmic structures. As a result, attention has been given to the manner in which data sources are collected and generated for an algorithm. The connections between computing and data infrastructure to the increasing number of mobile and Internet of things (IoT) devices have provided geographers with a point of critique for these systems, allowing them to connect practices to resultant forms of governance. Geographers have also focused on processing of data for use in algorithmic processes. Social media data are persistently examined in order to determine what can be obtained from increasingly deep and broad datasets using complex and interconnected

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algorithmic processes. Given the quantitative history in geography and the current schools of GIScience, geographers are more than familiar with the issues of data transformation and normalization prior to algorithmic modeling. With this knowledge comes the understanding of how particular manipulations of data can produce an array of intended and unintended effects. Geographers have dedicated a great amount of effort toward understanding the utility and effects of algorithmic outputs. Many studies have examined the application of algorithms for economic, political, and social purposes, which then result in particular forms of feedback and learning for the iterative advancement of an algorithm or set of algorithms. These studies have found that algorithms have led to more personalized experiences of social media, more geographically specific forms of political discourse, and economic markets increasingly guided through algorithmic trading and big data. Additionally, the study of algorithms in a highly technical manner has been limited to a blackbox understanding of the algorithmic entity itself. Research in geography suggests that the manner in which we interact with algorithmic infrastructure and processes influences analytic outputs and those outputs’ interpretations. In order to understand the algorithm from its inputs and observed outputs, geographers have developed several tools. Perhaps the most useful technique used to overcome blackbox algorithms is that of reverse engineering. In this process, the researcher attempts to reproduce a model that functions in the same way as the observed algorithm based on the known inputs and outputs. Geographers have also started to adopt programming and analysis techniques from computer science and data science such as code profiling and unit testing. These adoptions assist in understanding how the algorithm functions based on its implementation. These techniques are largely pursued within the theoretical scopes of code/space, systems theory, actor–network theory, and game theory.

Algorithmic Regulation Within government, there is often a lack of knowledge or care for the form or structure of algorithms that augment or supersede existing processes of governance despite their increased utilization. This absence of consideration for the full scope of algorithmic implementation is often reflected in the processes of lawyers who must balance changes to current rules and regulations with their limited knowledge of the technologies’ functionality and potential effects. Considerations include actual and unintended outputs, and how implementation of new algorithmic techniques may decouple existing processes or create new barriers inside of existing systems of governmentality. This relationship between governance and governmentality rooted much of the earliest geographic research on algorithmic governance and continues to provide a useful trajectory upon which the effects of algorithms on places of citizenry can be examined. For example, the US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 2018 case (Carpenter v. United States) that warrants for cellular phones were now required, and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) addressed individual data privacy rights. Governments are shifting how they approach algorithmic governance, on the other hand, and corporations are often geared toward optimizing profits and strategic viability of its businesses. Algorithms are driven by large amounts of data, which then enable decision makers to enact changes rapidly. Amazon Incorporated, which evolved from an online book reseller to one of the largest online markets in the world, implemented corporate policy that allowed companies to sell their goods online while using these companies’ price and product data to outbid and then purchase successful competitors. Policy shifts in government and businesses often include algorithmic processes, for example, in risk management. Modern militaries carry out surveillance and policing with satellite imagery and drone programs, supported by increasingly complex algorithmic logics. Risk management can affect people’s behavior because the perceived knowledge of surveillance, backed up by knowledge of data collection by governments and corporations, can lead to people policing their own actions. Geographic studies of CCTV surveillance in urban spaces and government data collection programs have shown that people are more aware of potential enforcement based on these near-real-time camera systems. Surveillance can have different geographical impacts. Studies have shown that algorithmic governance can decrease public interest in acting against these effects. There is also the potential to diminish individual rights, such as reduced informed consent and the isolating effects persistent surveillance may have on personal choices and actions. The decisions made through the use of algorithms may be the result of perceptions of aggregate data collected from numerous sources that may not accurately represent the person or group of people. Such effects are further complicated by how corporations and policymakers choose to define the value of these algorithmic outputs and their potential long-term costs. Ultimately, the question of accountability for algorithmic governance in government and corporate spaces falls to the courts, but legislation remains incomplete.

Algorithms and Ethics Geographical work on algorithmic ethics has followed critical GIS and sociotechnical critiques. Explicit measures of performance, agency, and responsibility may support fairness in algorithmic implementation. These measures include assessments of data methods and expected outputs based on the places of application. By asking who would review algorithms, it is hoped that a doctrine of responsibility toward algorithmic fairness could be developed. Transparency is not a panacea due to power dynamics of intellectual property rights, trade secrets, and data privacy protections. Where open-source software is used by the state or corporations, more transparency is possible on the effects of their

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algorithmic implementations. Yet, there are still systems that blackbox their source code and blacklist access to system audits. External threats such as hackers continue to be used to restrict access and transparency to systems and their underlying algorithms. Exposing algorithmic bias is potentially the most difficult and least explored by geographers. This lack of exposure is largely because exposing biases relies on complete access to the code and data that drive a particular form of algorithmic governance. Data bias and algorithmic bias also depend on the content of the space and place of application; bad data into an algorithm will result in insufficient outputs. There is also the problem of how human actors and nonhuman actants interact within the smaller context of algorithmic governance and the larger context of controlling algorithmic governance. The more complex the algorithmic system becomes, the more likely bias is to be inserted into processes and unknown effects to emerge. Exposing bias also depends on the material infrastructure through which the algorithms are executed and maintained. There are often questions of efficacy, transparency, and bias that arise due to the locations of servers and systems around the world. Concerns of government, corporate, military, or intelligence agency access of algorithmic outputs can often cause people to question the safety of their data and the privacy of their practices within a system. The discussion on algorithmic ethics is also situated within the discussion on the digital divide. Geographers have made efforts to include the considerations of algorithmic governance and its effects on people outside of North America and Europe in their research. Research has found that despite the increasing access to modern smartphone technology and access to the Internet, serious limitations still exist, such as uneven speeds of accessible Internet, unequal moderation of non-Western content, and government restrictions on online content. Matters of language and understanding are at the forefront of most geographic literature, but prove crucial in observation of algorithms and their places of utilization and mobilization. There is the language of the algorithm developers, the language of the code, and the language of those using the output of a given form of governance. Although much has been done to develop discussions on the uneven development and access to these systems, there is still more that must be done in connecting scales and degrees of divide to the implementation of their algorithmic regimes and populations who may be subject to, but disempowered by, a particular system of governance. In observation of the mobilities and politics of code, the understanding of how software sorts particular spaces of activity and how it shapes that activity over time is a useful geographic approach in algorithmic ethics research. The discipline of geography is potentially best poised to address issues of algorithmic governance, but will be challenged in the performance of research without methodological changes. The inclusion of computer science and engineering tools and techniques has already begun in many areas of geographic research; however, given the nature of human geography, these techniques have mostly been used and advanced through the GISciences. In order to advance beyond the current avenues of critical engagement with algorithmic governance, human geographers must seek to employ a variety of previously unexplored, highly technical methods with the goal of further demystifying the blackbox that is often encountered in existing literatures. This disciplinary challenge also draws out two additional points. The implementation of many computer science, engineering, and GIS techniques often requires a quantification of the elements of study. This quantitative problematic could be a complicating factor in the study of impact that is often more qualitative in nature. Studies of urban living, information access, and achieving systemic parity for a community are often measures that involve the quality of a condition and are not easily equated to a particular metric. With the increasing avenues of ubiquitous engagement with algorithms, their qualitative effects will have to be more rapidly addressed through a diversifying array of critical infrastructure and ubiquitous computing networks. Computer and data scientists are still struggling to find optimal scaling methods for analysis of massive datasets with the result that their solutions are often going to be more rapidly implemented and less actively documented to others. Geographers must also account for these systemic factors in future studies on algorithmic governance.

See Also: Big Data; Ethical Issues in Research; Evolutionary Algorithms; Governmentality; Spatial Data Models.

Further Reading Amoore, L., 2011. Data derivatives: on the emergence of a security risk calculus for our times. Theor. Cult. Soc. 28, 24–43. Amoore, L., 2016. Cloud geographies: computing, data, sovereignty. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 1–21. Amoore, L., Raley, R., 2017. Securing with algorithms: knowledge, decision, sovereignty. Secur. Dialog. 48 (1), 3–10. Christin, A., 2017. Algorithms in practice: comparing web journalism and criminal justice. Big Data Soc. 4 (2), 1–14. Danaher, J., Hogan, M.J., Noone, C., Kennedy, R., Behan, A., De Paor, A., Felzmann, H., Haklay, M., Khoo, S., Morison, J., Murphy, M.H., O’Brolchain, N., Schafer, B., Shankar, K., 2017. Algorithmic governance: developing a research agenda through the power of collective intelligence. Big Data Soc. 4 (2), 1–21. Graham, S., 2005. Software-sorted geographies. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 29 (5), 562–580. Graham, M., 2011. Time machines and virtual portals: the spatialities of the digital divide. Prog. Dev. Stud. 11 (3), 211–227. Kitchin, R., Dodge, M., 2011. Code/space: Software and Everyday Life. MIT Press, Cambridge. Leszczynski, A., 2016. Speculative futures: cities, data, and governance beyond smart urbanism. Environ. Plan. 48 (9), 1691–1708. Pickren, G., 2016. ‘The global assemblage of digital flow’: critical data studies and the infrastructures of computing. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 42 (2), 225–243. Yeung, K., 2017. Algorithmic regulation: a critical interrogation. Regulat. Govern. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12158. Zook, M.A., Blankenship, J., 2018. New spaces of disruption? The failures of Bitcoin and the rhetorical power of algorithmic governance. Geoforum 96, 248–255.

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Relevant Websites Algoaware, 2019. Algoaware: Raising Awareness on Algorithms. https://www.algoaware.eu/. AntipodeFoundation.org, 2017. Intervention Symposium: “Algorithmic Governance” (Organised by Jeremy Crampton and Andrea Miller). https://antipodefoundation.org/2017/05/ 19/algorithmic-governance/. Columbia University, 2019ColumbiaUniversity. Columbia-IBM Center for Blockchain and Data Transparency. https://cu-ibm-blockchain-data.columbia.edu/. European Parliament Panel for the Future of Science and Technology, 2019. A Governance Framework for Algorithmic Accountability and Transparency. https://www.europarl. europa.eu/stoa/en/document/EPRS_STU(2019)624262/. MIT Media Lab, 2019. Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence. https://www.media.mit.edu/groups/ethics-and-governance/overview/. Oxford Internet Institute, 2019. The Computational Propoganda Project: Algorithms, Automation and Digital Politics. https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/. The Programmable City, 2017. Slow Computing: A Workshop on Resistance in the Algorithmic Age. http://progcity.maynoothuniversity.ie/2017/12/video-slow-computingworkshop-session-1/.

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Alternative Economies Stephen Healy, Institute for Culture and Society, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW, Australia © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Alternative Economies (1) Processes of production, exchange, labor/compensation, finance, and consumption that are intentionally different from mainstream (capitalist) economic activity; and (2) an alternative representation of economy as a heterogeneous and proliferative social space. Class Process The form in which surplus (in labor, value, or product form) is produced, appropriated, and distributed. Class processes theorized by Marx and Resnick and Wolff include slave, feudal, capitalist, independent (ancient), and communal. Community Enterprise A market- or nonmarket-oriented economic organization concerned to improve community wellbeing. Diverse Economy Theoretical proposition that economies are intrinsically heterogeneous spaces composed of multiple class processes, mechanisms of exchange, forms of labor and remuneration, finance, and ownership. Economic Difference A representation of economy as radically heterogeneous. Performativity Theory that discourse participates in constituting the reality it purports to represent.

The relationship between neoliberal governance, globalization, and capitalist development continues to be a dominant focus in contemporary economic geography. This scholarship variously conceives of neoliberal capitalism as a singular force or as a term that describes the variegated connections between capitalism and an enabling state and society. Much of this scholarship charts how neoliberal capitalism has emerged over the past half-century through processes that govern economiesdthe privatization of state assets, economic deregulation, technologically assisted internationalization, financialization, and so forth. These processes are linked to the gradual expansion of a neoliberal governmentality, the way that institutions and individuals alike internalize its competitive spirit and metrological culture. The past decade, however, seems to suggest that the global order neoliberal theory attempts to name is beginning to fray. Just as neoliberalism is understood to have displaced the more interventionist state and a regulated global trade that followed World War II, there are signs that neoliberalism itself may be displaced. Scholars in multiple disciplines argue that the decade following the Global Financial Crisis might be better understood as a kind of global interregnum, setting the stage for a postneoliberal era. Over this same period of time, there has been an intensifying, global-scale interest in alternative economies, explored particularly in geography and other social science disciplines but also in wider civil society. The past decade has seen the rise in prominence of social movements that aim to transform both the relationships and normative commitments that define economic space. The name given to alterative economies has multiplied: degrowth, steady state and circular economies, peer to peer, community, cooperative, sharing, social and solidarity economies, buen vivir, and Ubuntu economies more prominent among them. Many of these movements are motivated by the perceived failures of Business as Usual (BaU)dmost prominently deepening economic inequality and increasingly dire ecological challenges that have become more stark over the past half-century. One common thread connecting these movements is an economics that departs from BaU: other ways of organizing production, labor, exchange, ownership, investment, consumption, and governance. Another thread that connects them is how these alternative economic spaces and practices provide salutary contexts for shared normative commitments to more inclusive, equitable, sustainable, and democratic economies. Within geography and cognate disciplines, there are two ways of understanding these alternative economies. The first is a realist approach in which the alternative economy is simply imagined to be something other than a presumptively dominant capitalism and its associated systems of neoliberal governance that enforce economic, policy, and cultural conditions felicitous to capitalist development. A second understanding of the alternative economy coalesces around an epistemic break, which posits the economy as an always already intrinsically heterogeneous space. This second approach not only represents the economy as a field of difference but possesses the potential to reconfigure scholarly research within economic geography. While the burgeoning social movements referred to earlier testify to the considerable excitement around the idea of alternative economies, it remains a marginal point of interest because of an underlying and frequently unnamed commitment to a scalar hierarchy that governs its academic (and popular) representation. In many representations, alternative is synonymous with selfconsciously intentional efforts undertaken on a local scale. This association renders what it describes as peripheral and relatively powerless, vulnerable to cooptation or even state repression, or, alternatively, as spaces of privilege populated by those who are blind to the “realities of power,” particularly the power ascribed to neoliberal capitalism. From the outset, many scholars see the alternative economy as socially insignificant and thus unworthy of attention. What is required to combat this double marginality is a theoretical framework that diverges from the conception of the alternative economy as local and intentional. The first step in developing such a framework is to recognize that the marginality of the alternative economy comes from defining something as alternative in the first place. The second step is to produce an ontology of

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economic difference that highlights the ubiquity (in place) of nonmarket and noncapitalist practices alongside the variety of capitalist formsdand in the context of economic geography diverse economies scholarship has made a decisive contribution. A third step is to then begin the task of developing a scholarship that explores the open-ended set of conditions that allow alternative economies to stabilize and endure as social relations. Insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and other traditions focusing on economic performativity have been particularly helpful in understanding the material, social, and practical conditions possibility of other forms of economies, but also in suggesting an entirely different mode of scholarship where both critical and imaginative faculties are repurposed for the enactment of other economies.

The Trouble With Alternatives The term “alternative,” by its very nature, underscores a foundational insight from modern linguistic theorydthat no term derives its meaning self-referentially. The existence of an “alternative” economy implies that there is a dominant or mainstream economy against which the alternative is defined. Moreover, the perceived spatial extent and viability of alternatives are shaped by how one understands the dominance of the mainstream economy. Not surprisingly, this issue is a principal point of contention among scholars interested in alternative economies. Those who understand dominance from a realist epistemological perspective believe that it is possible to gauge relative degrees of power and the extent of vulnerability or powerlessness. They therefore almost always see alternative economies and organizations as weak and likely to be short lived. Those who understand dominance as performative, on the other hand, see it as predicated upon and produced by the dissemination and repetition of knowledge. Neoliberalism, for example, has become hegemonic in large part because academic knowledge, policy discourses, protest movements, and bureaucratic technologies of enactment have made it the focus of belief and action, bringing it into being in both authoritarian and democratic settings. From this perspective, the continual interruptions, large omissions, and widening gaps in the performance of neoliberalism are openings for the other discourses and technologies that are always already participating in bringing different economies into being. The question that continues to be centrally important is this: whether the alternative economy really is a marginal set of activities or if it is performatively marginalized. The answer to this question will determine the future direction of research into alternative economies. One interesting feature of this debate is that adherents of the performative perspective are frequently regarded by those adopting the realist perspective as idealists who imagine that thinking differentlydan intellectual commitment to celebrating noncapitalist spaces and practicesdis all that is required to change the world. Celebration here is effectively a code word for an idealist naiveté that ignores the reality of capitalism and a devolved neoliberal state dedicated to its expanded reproduction. But what if the way in which this reality is invoked to rein in the potential study of something other than capitalism is itself part of what keeps capitalism dominant? Perhaps, the persuasiveness of the argument that capitalism is the real economy, while the alternative economy is fanciful celebration, is the ultimate confirmation of performativity. Research based on the realist vision of the alternative economy tends to focus on how self-consciously alternative economies are defined by their vulnerabilitiesdhow their marginal status undermines their normative commitments or how they are always in danger of being outcompeted by the mainstream or in coming to resemble BaU. Alternative food movement spaces such as farmer’s markets and Community Support Agriculture, food and consumer cooperatives are regularly treated by scholars as marginal food spaces that replicate forms of class privilege and racial exclusion, while longstanding successful experiments such as the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation are represented as having betrayed their principles through their strategic decisions around internationalization. The trouble here is not that the alternative food movement space can be exclusionary or that Mondragon may well have become a form of collective capitalism. Indeed, these are real possibilities, but when we read these particular outcomes as evidence of an intrinsic deficiency, the term alternative comes to signify inevitable compromise, cooptation, or failure. This a-priori assumption creates a theoretical blindness. When market forces, government institutions and cultural norms are presumed to be arrayed against alternative economies, we do not look for the circumstances where they might enable their development. And under those conditions, almost inevitably, alternativeness is reduced to sameness. The continued existence of alternative economic institutionsdcommunity-based credit unions, for exampledis seen as threatened by the dominant ideology that governs finance; the laws of local, state, and national government; and the market forces that favor large capitalist firms. At the same time, it is imagined that alternative economic practices and institutions, such as local economic trading systems exist only in spaces of deprivation where they are a necessity or, conversely, in spaces of privilege where they can be indulged in. The premise here is clearly a binary opposition in which superior qualities are ascribed to the capitalist-mainstream. While alternative economic institutions are conceived as existing only in contingent circumstances, the presumed dominance of mainstream financial institutions creates the appearance that they exist autonomously, independent of conditions. More recently, this same logic now presumes to tell us what will transpire in the domain of the online sharing economy: that platform capitalists like Uber, will live up to their name, inevitably triumphant. Foreseeing the term alternative as an epistemic bear trap, Gibson-Grahamin, The End of Capitalism, attempt to replace the binary opposition of mainstream and alternative with a conception of the economy as a space of difference. In this vision, self-consciously alternative economic activities constitute a fraction of the noncapitalist and alternative capitalist activity within a differentiated economic landscape. The economy is understood as being composed of many different processes of production, exchange, ownership, work, remuneration, and consumption without the presumption of necessary relations of dominance and subordination. The

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alternative economy as economic difference constitutes a distinct economic ontology that of diverse economies: a scholarship that centers community engagement and action research as the basis of its performative efficacy.

Theorizing Economic Difference The commonplace view is that economic alternatives are tiny islands awash in a sea of capitalism. To the extent that difference is recognizeddalternatives to capitalism or alternative forms of capitalismdthis difference is seen as contained within or conceptually subsumed to capitalism as such. The first problem facing theorists of economic difference is how to define capitalism so that it is no longer seen as that which contains and subsumes difference. Following Resnick and Wolff, Gibson-Graham turns to a close reading of Marx’s Capital in order to more precisely define capitalism. From her perspective, what distinguishes capitalism is the specific way in which surplus labor is produced and appropriated or what Resnick and Wolff term the “class process.” Capitalism involves the use of free wage labor in the production of goods and services, usually for a market. Wage laborers produce a surplus that is appropriated by nonproducersda sole proprietor or the board of directors of a capitalist firmdwho distribute this surplus in ways that they wish, though they are usually constrained to direct much of it to reproducing the firm and its exploitative class process. This minimalist definition of capitalism carries with it the implication that particular capitalist firms might operate under a variety of conditions. A capitalist enterprise may or may not accumulate capital (in other words, invest appropriated surplus in expanding plant, equipment, and workforce), may or may not own the means of production (plant and equipment may be leased or borrowed), may or may not be in a dominant position with respect to the wage laborers employed, and may or may not strive to maximize profits or market share. It is this minimal definition of capitalism that allows us to see capitalisms in all of their specificity and particularity at the level of the enterprise. With capitalism reduced from a systemic entity coextensive with the social space to a type of enterprise scattered (or perhaps concentrated) in a larger economic landscape, it is easier to see the other ways in which goods and services are produced and exchanged. In the United States, for example, it is possible to find instances of goods and services publicly provisioned or produced for exchange by people who labor without freedom of contract in what might be seen as a slave class process (prisoners, members of the armed forces, indentured migrants, and children). Likewise, as feminists inside and outside of geography have argued and demonstrated for quite some time, household-based, noncommodity production of goods, and services account for 30%–50% of total economic activity in both rich and poor countries. The understanding of economy as a space of difference is partially captured in the open-ended conceptualization of a diverse economy in Fig. 1: The Diverse Economy Framework. Just as productive activities can be read for difference in class terms, it is possible to theorize diversity in exchange relationships, forms of labor/compensation, types of tenure, and mechanisms for investment. While many goods and services are produced for exchange on markets, they are also allocated in other waysdvia gifts, state transfers, barter, theft, and so on. Similarly, many people in a society may be paid a wage for some of their labors, but likely do other work that is unpaid or alternatively compensateddfor example, by payment in kind or in a reciprocal labor exchange. While land, resources, and knowledge can be privately held, there are a wide variety of tenure practices in societies around the world including the common use and stewardship of resources from fisheries to open-source software. Likewise, innovations in digitally based peer-to-peer systems lending and finance are part of a long history of diverse forms of finance from equity investment to rotating credit schemes. Labor

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Figure 1

The Diverse Economy Framework.

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The diverse economy diagram is an evolving, open-ended catalog of diverse economic practices. Unlike the term alternative economy, the diverse economy is not to be understood in the first instance as a normative framework. It captures both desirable (cooperative) and undesirable (slavery) economic diversity. In the context of the diagram the performative function of the term “alternative” is specific, it serves to distinguish capitalism from activities and processes with which its frequently conflated. In turn, both capitalist and alternative are contrasted with noncapitalist relationships, practices, and organizational forms that are evident in economies around the world. In the past decade, theorists have made use of the diverse economy framework in other contexts, directed by different performative intentions. Diverse economies scholars working in the “monsoon Asia” region have documented forms of reciprocal exchange and labor practices that have allowed communities to survive the cyclical monsoon seasons and whose continuity may allow for more robust responses to climate change. Others have begun to use the diverse economies framework as a way of broadening conceptions of gender equality in contexts like the Solomon Islands, where people are defined, in part, by complex livelihood strategies. In each case, diversity lays out a different ontological framework for thinking about economic possibilities, in particular how different elements of a diverse economy can be combined or connected in potentially salutary ways that vary across space and time. This has enabled the diverse economies approach to track particular examples through the course of their development. For instance, in earlier work, the Community Economies Collective documented the role that gifts and other forms of finance played in enabling the formation of Collective Copies, a worker-owned enterprise borne out a struggle over unionization with its previous capitalist owners. In the past decade this cooperative has come to play a central role in developing a regional cooperative organization, the Valley Alliance for Worker Cooperatives, which advocates for cooperative development throughout the region. Elsewhere in the world, diverse economies scholars have documented the enabling relationship between diverse forms of finance, commoned resources, cooperative, and social enterprises in a range of settings from post-quake Christchurch New Zealand to indigenous diverse economies in Quebec. Two developments in contemporary social theory have enabled diverse economies scholars to produce this wide archive of diverse economic practice. The first is a reconceptualization of (economic) space in the context of a flat ontology where economic space is the product of negotiated relations between provisionally equivalent rather than hierarchically arrayed practices. The second is a corollary theoretical recognition that the viability and durability of any economic practice, relationship, or institution depends upon a larger assemblage of felicitous conditions. Diverse economies scholars, following on from the insights of STSs, reposition alternativeness by focusing attention on the specific ecological, material, and social conditions of possibility that attend any given economic practice, relationship, or institution.

Spatialities of Alterity and Difference For those who focus on neoliberalism as well as those who are interested in the self-consciously alternative economy, the economy is generally structured by a hierarchical spatial ontology in which the local is nested within the regional, national, and global scales. Viewed as containers, activities on a global scaledinternational financial markets, for exampledare assumed to have more determining power than local projects that appear to be containedda barter network, a worker cooperative, and so on. In this way, a hierarchically ordered space effectively affirms the dominance of (global) capitalism while consigning economic experiments to relative powerlessness. The metonymical pairing of global capitalism and local alternatives structures our understanding of economic space even when an alternative economic practice becomes global in scope. Alter-trade (or fair trade), despite its expanding presence in the global marketplace, is dismissed by its critics as small in relation to global trade as a whole (as, of course, are many sectors of international trade) and vulnerable to competition and cooptation. What is remarkable about this depiction is that alter-trade could just as easily be represented as a powerful innovation, one that has injected an ethical sensibility into trade that did not exist 20 years ago, where its rapid dissemination has been aided by advances in digital technology. Alter-trade is energized by an ethical dynamic of growth (rather than by a structural dynamic of competition and increasing market share) that works against cooptation, draws increasing numbers of products into fair-trade marketing, and links together more and more people. Perhaps in order to see the potential of alter-trade, what is required is a different spatial ontology that does not presume in advance the connection between scale, size, and power. If capitalism’s presumed dominance is a function of a scalar, hierarchical ontology then the visibility, political, and practical significance of the diverse economy is clarified in what Marston, Jones, and Woodward termed a flat spatial ontology. In the context of this ontology, site is a product of an unfolding materiality that constructs and reconstructs space through its often uneven and temporary connection to other (distant) sites. In this conception there are no spatial categories or containers that prearrange the world into ordered spaces, any relationshipdhierarchical, horizontal, cooperative, or exploitativedis a product of conjugation. Indeed, Doreen Massey, further developing this same ontology uses it to describe the unstable configuration of power geometries. Correspondingly, Gibson-Graham’s feminist political imagining of the diverse economy premised on a geography of ubiquity has a similar, flattening effect. Because women are everywhere, local and household-based feminist projects can be globally transformative; because diverse economies are everywhere, the projects of local economic activists can have world-changing effects. Linked semiotically rather than organizationally, these projects have the potential to configure a place-based global movement for economic transformation. When capitalist class relations are no longer to be regarded as necessarily dominant, it becomes more difficult to imagine that other social sites and processes (e.g., households) are bound to the task of capitalist reproduction or that economic alternatives are

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awash in a capitalist sea. Instead, we are all in the same soup. This flattened, feminist-inspired relational ontology allows us to see economic diversity as globally dispersed, while at the same time creating potential connections among disparate locations and processes. In the flat space of economic difference, economic geographers interested in contributing to alternative economies might play a constructive role in translating experiments from one location to another, formalizing lessons learned from experiments in one place for other places, and working imaginatively with individuals, communities, and regions to produce and disseminate economic innovation. Given the ubiquity of potential sites for these sorts of academic interventionsdhouseholds, enterprises, communities, and regionsdthey could conceivably be conducted on a global scale. This is precisely the agenda that has directed diverse economies scholarship over the past decade. But in conceptualizing this politics of research and the future direction of scholarly interest in alternative economies, it becomes crucial to return to the concept of performativity and the way that it differs from both idealism (simply “electing” to think differently) as well as realist understandings of difference (alternative economy).

Performativity, Economic Difference, and the Politics of Research A decade ago, Colin Williams observed that in the United Kingdom, nonmarket, reciprocal exchanges remained widespread and, in fact, were more entrenched in the sociality of middle- and upper-class communities than for people on the social and economic margins. This finding posed a significant challenge to the received wisdom that market exchange/commodification displaces other exchange relations in the course of capitalist development. As Williams notes, the commodification thesis circulates as a widely accepted idea, and yet it remains, essentially, an assertion that has yet to be theoretically or empirically substantiated. The crucial insight from Williams’ work is that the persuasive power of the commodification thesis is itself a testament to operations of performativity. The persistence and ubiquity of nonmarket exchange in the United Kingdom remain obscured because it has been configured discursively as subordinate. The persistence of diverse forms of exchange, even in so-called advanced postindustrial societies, has a particular pertinence in the present moment. The digital disruption now widely known as the sharing economy, in its infancy in 2008, has upended both the practice and understanding of exchange relations. For some, the quick rise of platform capitalist enterprises like AirB&B and Uber represents the apotheosis of individualized neoliberal capitalismdemployment reduced to contract that facilitates exchange, terms, and conditions in which risks are distributed to workers and consumers while profits accrue to the platform. Other voices, however, from within geography and in fields like critical legal studies, point out that the triumph of platform capitalism is far less certain. These larger players have inherent legal and fiduciary vulnerabilities while the platform model itself can (and in some cases has) accommodated other organizational forms including cooperative organizational forms. As a whole the platform economy underscores what STS scholars emphasize as a process of economic performationdhow a specific configuration of technologies, relationships, patterns of behavior, and shifting social norms around trust have managed to lift the sharing economy from obscurity in 2009 when the first edition of this encyclopedia was published into widespread use in cities and communities around the world. Each version of the sharing economydfrom Uber to platform cooperativesdrequire legal theorists, policy makers, union representatives, academics, and the broader public to rethink the meaning of fundamental economic categories. Contractual relations that define work, property ownership, schemes of taxation, allocation of public resources (like parking), the reach of tenancy covenants, zoning, and much else besides are all suddenly up in the air. Pretending to know in advance how all of these relational, legal, and practical concerns will play out, what will emerge and what will be preempted could also be a somewhat ironic testament to the performative power of theory to enact the reality it seeks to describe. It is in this sense that thinking economic difference in performative terms is not simply a process of understanding the conditions of possibility for any given economy but rather an invitation to consider the critical role that scholarship itself can play in either making or delimiting possibilities. In the open and indeterminate space of a diverse economy, the space of academic engagement is correspondingly enlarged; the question becomes how do we understand and engage with economic difference when it is no longer positioned as the subordinate term within a binary opposition? One answer might be to see the space of economic difference as a space of self-conscious and unconscious experimentation in becoming, where marginality or dominance, success or failure, cannot be known in advance. Viewing the economy as a space of experimentation/becoming has another important implication in that the recognition calls forth and depends upon a new form of activist scholarship. The goal of this scholarship is to examine economic practices that are potentially valuable but discursively subordinated, bringing them to light and engaging with the actors to build or strengthen diverse economies that are, indeed, alternatives to a present order. These scholarly interventions highlight the ethics and politics of language and representation, recognizing that acting differently requires thinking differently, and that conscious change begins with the recognition of possibility opening the space for more engaged, participatory and collaborative forms of research focused on experimentation and enactment of other economies. Kevin St. Martin’s work, for example, focuses on the discursive politics of resource management in the fisheries industry. Fisheries management is currently guided by the assumption that each individual fisher is a self-interested utility maximizer. As St Martin points out, this leads to a regulatory approachdlimits on days at seadthat generates more risk taking on the part of vessels and crews and produces the very behavior it presumes to control. Working closely with fishing communities themselves, St Martin et al have intervened using participatory GIS technologies to suggest that fishing communities themselves have both the knowledge and the requisite investment to play a role in the long-term management of the ocean’s resources. The language that St Martin et al

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have been able to introduce into fisheries science and fisheries policy in the United States and elsewhere begins to reconceive of fishing communities as custodians of the common resources upon which they depend. In another example, Healy et al have explored the potential of solidarity economy movements active in east coast US citiesdNew York, Philadelphia and Worcester, Massachusettsdto enact other econosocialities. Their work documents both the spatial distribution, economic impact, and cultural significance of a wide range of diverse economic practices that aim to organize more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable economies. This research was conducted in collaboration with civic organizations that supported the development of cooperatives and other solidarity institutions, and in the context of urban environments that grew more receptive to and supportive of these movements over time. These emergent economies were inspired by other movements, particularly in Brazil, where practices of cooperation, cogovernance at the municipal scale, and alliance building with other social movements are more developed. From a diverse economy perspective, alternative economies are performatively, experimentally, and iteratively enacted. The sharing of results and the borrowing of ideas are parts of this process, and it is in this context that economic geography and cognate disciplines might usefully lend a hand.

Conclusion Diverse economies researchers explore the economy as a space of experimentation and difference through a research process that involves them collaborative engagement with people in place. Far from being idealist, the performative dimension of these action research projects makes use of what already exists, hidden in plain sight, in order to develop political, ethical, and organizational potential. The performative theory of economic difference is not blind to the realities of power but emphasizes the power of representation and research in a context where all economies are “alternative”dcontinuously and differentially (re)enacted. The examples of Collective Copies, community-based fisheries management, and emergent solidarity economies suggest that the future of alternative economies research within economic geography might revolve around reconceptualizing research as a process of performatively enacting more-than-capitalist economies. Activist researchers could engage in disseminating and replicating such experiments in forming community economies, recognizing the powerful role these efforts might play in demonstrating how another economy might be possible. Ironically, we might turn to the success of the neoliberal project itself for inspiration. As David Harvey points out, the basic tenets of neoliberalism articulated by Friedrich Hayek operated on the margins of economic orthodoxy for decades until the economic crisis of the 1970s gave proponents an opportunity to widely disseminate them. In the same way, perhaps identifying alternative economic practices, conceived as part of a larger field of economic difference, might become a central part of an activist research agenda for economic geographers. Nearly 40 years after the economic crisis that propelled neoliberalism into a position of discursive dominance, it is neoliberalism that is now understood to be in crisis or terminal decline. When this failure is combined with a deepening awareness of global environmental contradictions, we may find ourselves in an ideal context in which to engage in a performative scholarship and politics of alternative economic development. The expanding presence of social movements interested in other economies as crucial to building other worlds cannot only be read as reflecting a tangible hunger for alternative economies but as a practical context for activists and activist scholars to engage in experimentation and dissemination.

See Also: Circular Economy.

Further Reading Calvario, R., Kallis, G., 2017. Alternative food economies and transformative politics in times of crisis: insights from the Basque Country and Greece. Antipode 49 (3), 597–616. Cameron, J., Gibson, K., 2005. Participatory action research in a poststructuralist vein. Geoforum 36 (3), 315–331. Cameron, J., Gibson-Graham, J.K., 2003. Feminising the economy: metaphors, strategies, politics. Gender Place Culture J. Femin. Geogr. 10 (2), 145–157. Gibson-Graham, J.K., 2006. A Postcapitalist Politics. U of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Gibson-Graham, J.K., 2008. Diverse economies: performative practices for other worlds. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 32 (5), 613–632. Gibson-Graham, J.K., Cameron, J., Healy, S., 2013. Take Back the Economy: An Ethical Guide for Transforming Our Communities. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Graham, M., Aspray, W. (Eds.), 2019. Digital Economies at Global Margins. International Development Rese. Graham, J.K., Roelvink, G., 2010. An economic ethics for the Anthropocene. Antipode 41 (s1), 320–346. Healy, S., Borowiak, C., Pavlovskaya, M., Safri, M., 2018. Commoning and the politics of solidarity: transformational responses to poverty. Geoforum (online) https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.geoforum.2018.03.015. Marston, S.A., Jones, J.P., Woodward, K., 2005. Human geography without scale. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 30 (4), 416–432. Martin, K.S., Hall-Arber, M., 2008. The missing layer: geo-technologies, communities, and implications for marine spatial planning. Mar. Policy 32 (5), 779–786. Marx, K., 1977. Capital, vol. 1. Random House, New York. Morgan, B., Kuch, D., 2015. Radical transactionalism: legal consciousness, diverse economies, and the sharing economy. J. Law Soc. 42 (4), 556–587. North, P., 2007. Money and Liberation: The Micropolitics of Alternative Currency Movements. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Ossewaarde, M., Reijers, W., 2017. The illusion of the digital commons: ‘False consciousness’ in online alternative economies. Organization 24 (5), 609–628. Pavlovskaya, M., 2004. Other transitions: multiple economies of Moscow households in the 1990s. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 94 (2), 329–351. Richardson, L., 2015. Performing the sharing economy. Geoforum 67, 121–129. Roelvink, G., Martin, K.S., Gibson-Graham, J.K., 2015. Making Other Worlds Possible: Performing Diverse Economies. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Alternative Economies

Relevant Websites Community Economies http://www.communityeconomies.org/. The Next System https://thenextsystem.org/. Peer to Peer Foundation https://p2pfoundation.net/. Shareable https://www.shareable.net/. Intercontinental network for the promotion of social solidarity economy http://www.ripess.org/?lang¼en. US Solidarity Economy Network: https://ussen.org/.

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Anarchism/Anarchist Geographies Federico Ferretti, School of Geography, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by M.M.Breitbart, volume 1, pp 108–115, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Other geographical traditions This definition includes the notions of “genealogy,” “anarchist roots of geography,” and “early critical geographies” and participates in a wider reassessment of plural and contested geographical traditions. While, in the last decades, the imperial past of geography has been one of the main targets of radical critics within the discipline, now early unorthodox and critical authors, including anarchist and anticolonialist ones, increasingly retain scholarly attention. Total Liberation Associated with ideas in intersectionality and relational interdependence of all kinds of freedoms, the theory of total liberation argues for the full emancipation of all sentient beings from all forms of oppression (considered as mutually interlinked) and applies particularly to the alliance of anarchism, intersectional feminism, and the broad field of veganism, vegetarianism, and animal rights. Transnational anarchism Based on transnational, multilingual, and relational approaches to the history of anarchist movements, this concept has been widely mobilized, in recent years, by spatial-sensitive scholarship on anarchism and social movements. This has fostered contextual readings of early critical geographies and geographers and awareness of the situatedness of knowledge production, both in its localizations and in its transcultural/transnational mobilities. Unschooling Based on ideas of radical pedagogies as instruments for societal transformation beyond the realm of former education and inspired by thinkers like Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich, current challenges to (state and private) education are often put into practice through experiences of home-schooling and alternative education. These concepts are widely mobilized by recent radical and anarchist geographies, constituting one of the main points of contact between theory and activism in the work of several of these scholars.

A new wave of geographical scholarship and activism from the date of the publication of the former entry on Anarchism/Anarchist Geography in the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, authored by Myrna M. Breitbart in 2009, very significant changes have occurred in this field of study. Breitbart’s contribution especially drew upon the rediscovery of early anarchist geographers and of anarchist approaches which characterized the circuits of English-speaking radical geography in the 1970s, eventually around the journal Antipode. Breitbart was one of the protagonists (with Gary Dunbar, Richard Peet and others) of this movement, with her works on anarchist decentralization and “anarchist landscapes” in 1936–1939 Spain and on Pyotr Kropotkin’s (1842–1921) intellectual legacy. Almost in the same years, around the French journal Hérodote, Yves Lacoste and Béatrice Giblin provided a first “rehabilitation” of the figure of Elisée Reclus (1830–1905) in the history of French geography, where the eminent anarchist geographer was almost completely forgotten. While these authors have provided a tremendous contribution, which still nourishes present-day works, it is possible to argue that the last decade has seen the rise of a spectacular new wave of “anarchist geographies,” internationally promoted by a heterogeneous array of activists and scholars, mostly at their early career stages. The explosion of this new generation of scholars is already an element of novelty, while the varied elements of their contributions’ originality will be further explained in this chapter. Yet, it is worth noting the elements of continuity which this new generation claims in relation to the critical and unorthodox components of what David N. Livingstone called “the geographical tradition,” especially the geographies of Kropotkin, Reclus, and their closest collaborators. These early works are experiencing a renewed and increasing interest, despite having been produced between the 19th and the 20th centuries. For this reason, this chapter will focus on the debates of the last decade rather than exhaustively defining what is anarchism or extensively discussing the historical and theoretical bases of its relationship with geography, topics on which readers can rely on an abundant and multilingual literature whose most updated samples are listed in the bibliography below. Instead, this text will offer a “work-in-progress” assessment of the new tendencies emerging in the last 10 years or so, arguing that the related authors and works call for a profound rethinking not only of the field of anarchist geography: they also provide fecund challenges and stimulations for the entire discipline (and beyond), entering in a number of relevant scholarly and activist debates. Albeit “new” authors generally recognize and respect the outcomes of the former generation of geographers interested in anarchism and only some specific points of the “older” works are eventually challenged, this scholarly wave differs from the former one under four aspects at least. First, it engages in disciplinary dialog with the new and varied theoretical tendencies in geography, generally poststructuralist driven, rather than with traditional Marxism, a theory which went widely out of fashion in the last years, although some debates between anarchists and Marxists are still been carried out. This was for instance the case with the 2015 public discussion between

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Simon Springer and David Harvey, which later inspired a special issue of Dialogues in Human Geography. The main theoretical approaches to geography engaged by scholars recently interested in anarchism can be defined as the fields of relational and more-than-human geographical scholarship, postmodern and poststructuralist thinking, intersectional feminism and gender studies, post- and de-colonial studies, the affective turn, and nonrepresentational theories. Second, this new wave is characterized, in an even stronger way, by a resolute commitment to historical and archival research in performing both archaeologies of knowledge and biographical approaches to early anarchist geographers like Kropotkin, Reclus, Charles Perron (1837–1909), Lev Mecnikov/Léon Metchnikoff (1838–88), Mikhail Dragomanov (1841–95), Elie Reclus (Elisée’s brother; 1827–1904), and others. While this extends former invaluable works by Breitbart, Gary Dunbar (1978), Martin Miller (1976), Mary Fleming (1988), Caroline Cahm (1989), and other authors, among the specificities of current “historical geographies of anarchism,” one can mention the importance of contextual and spatial-sensitive approaches, as well as studies on the network effects, which allow considering the collective aspects of these early authors’ work. Such collective dimension revealed at the same time elements of consistency between activism and geographical scholarship, which had not always been grasped by former authors, especially in France as I discuss below. Eventually, the ongoing exploration of Reclus’s archives in France, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland and of the huge Kropotkin’s collection in Moscow are an example of a renewed willingness to reconstruct the “anarchist roots” of geography through primary sources, adopting transnational and relational approaches to networks of scholars and activists and to worldwide mobilities of knowledge rather than to individual authors or “big men (or women).” Third, this new generation of scholars is not limited to English-speaking (or to any national) academy but comprises a cosmopolite and multicultural array of authors publishing in several languages including Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and Italian. Fourth, the promoters of this movement refuse to remain limited to academic work and promote active international networking involving both scholars and activists around initiatives such as the International Conference of Anarchist Geographers and Geographies (ICAGG) first held in Reggio Emilia (Italy) in 2017 and to be resumed in France in 2019 and established networks such as the Réseau des Géographes Libertaires (RGL) in the French-speaking circuits, the Rede Reclus-Kropotkin (ReKro) in South America and a number of similar endeavors. These include the regular organization of sessions related to anarchist problematics in the major geographical meetings such as the RGS-IBG, the AAG, and the IGU international conferences and some national ones including the 2017 Italian Geographical Congress in Rome and, in the same year, the German Geographical Congress in Tübingen. This also includes interdisciplinary collaboration with colleagues involved in research related to anarchism as political scientists, historians, sociologists, philosophers, anthropologists, and archaeologists (to only mention those belonging to humanities and social sciences), resulting in an increasing presence of geographical-driven sessions at the international conferences of the Anarchist Studies Network and the European Social Science History Conference. Some discussions arose on the legitimacy of definitions like “anarchist geography” or “geographies.” Several scholars interested in anarchist approaches to geography refuse to assume these labels, considering that anarchists do not recognize the Gramscian notion of the organic intellectual; therefore they do not conceive any “anarchist (or other political definition) geography” as the expression of a political party or something like so. Some also notice that, at the time of early anarchist geographers Reclus and Kropotkin, the definition of “anarchist geographies” did not exist, so it would be anachronistic to apply it to historical cases. For these reasons, I generally use the definition of “anarchist geographers” for defining early authors, and a loose definition of “anarchist geographies,” always in the plural, to indicate approaches to geography, which can be associated with anarchism, and which are not necessarily explicitly labeled as such, taking the risk of the interpretation. In this text, I provide a discussion of ongoing contributions and debates around the following outlines: undisciplining the discipline and unschooling; archives of Other geographical traditions; non-Anglophone academies; decolonial approaches; total liberation, veganism, feminism and intersectionality. The final bibliography, limited for editorial reasons, cannot fully account for the amount and variety of recent scholarly contributions on geography and anarchism, but it is possible to find further reading lists in the websites mentioned below.

Undisciplining the Discipline and Unschooling As especially put forward by one of the most active scholars in recent anarchist geographical scholarship, Simon Springer, presentday anarchist geographies generally have a strong poststructuralist inspiration, albeit they remain open to a plurality of theoretical and practical approaches, valuing activism as well in what has been called “a new burst of colors” in the rescuing of geographical anarchist traditions. Springer explicitly recalls the anarchist tradition in his manifesto “Anarchism; what geography still ought to be” (2012), explicitly quoting the “classical” Kropotkin’s paper “What geography ought to be” (1885). Springer’s manifesto calls for multiple and pluralistic approaches to domination corresponding to a range of intersectional practices of liberation, importantly arguing that anarchism is “a theory and practice”; therefore, it should not be limited to discussions carried out in an academic “ivory tower.” This constitutes another element of continuity with the anarchist tradition, whose most prestigious exponents like Errico Malatesta (1853–1932) claimed that anarchism was rather a series of conscious practices than a systematic theory. Even the activists most engaged in philosophical terrains, as it was the case with geographers, explicitly argued for the integration between manual and intellectual work, as Kropotkin famously did in some of his seminal works like The Conquest of Bread (1906). The insufficiency of theory alone and the need for contextualizing and historicizing ideas and practices in anarchism and other social movements is confirmed in the introduction of the book Theories of Resistance edited by Springer, Marcelo Lopes de Souza, and Richard White.

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In line with the ongoing rediscovery of the anarchist tradition, Springer also participates in the efforts to trace genealogies of anarchist geographies, collecting his main texts on this point in the volume Anarchist Roots of Geography (2016). On the occasion of a forum organized to discuss Springer’s book, James Sidaway highlighted these past, present, and future links by arguing that “unlearning the archist ideas” characterizing most of current academic practices through practices of solidarity is one of the indicators of the vitality and in-becoming evolution of anarchist geographies. Continuity between the anarchist tradition and current approaches is confirmed by Springer’s assessment of some historical inspirers of anarchist geographies in an ongoing effort to put anarchist historical contents in relation with a number of theories discussed in current geographical scholarship. On Reclus’s and Kropotkin’s works, Springer argues that their ideas challenged a long-lasting Western philosophical tradition putting humans at the top of naturalistic hierarchies, anticipating present-day relational ideas on hybridity, more than human interactions and even affectivity, which can be associated with theories on “total liberation” as I discuss below. In addition, Springer discusses extensively the possible conditions of a geography without hierarchies, eventually engaging with debates on flat ontology, on which Springer proposes a reconsideration of the notion of scale, arguing that scale is not necessarily synonymous with hierarchies and that it can be used as a tool for conceptualizing worldviews rather than uniquely to establish a political or conceptual domination on represented territories. Springer considers the emotional turn in geography as importantly connected with the anarchist tradition and associates Reclus with contemporary scholarship on “caring geographies.” This also talks to a long tradition in anarchist notions of “love,” “goodness” and compassion to all human (and in many cases nonhuman) beings, very frequent in the language of early propagandists like the Italians Malatesta and Pietro Gori (1865–1911). This commitment to ethical values also led Springer to participate in recent conversations on the “geographies of peace,” a topic obviously akin to classical anarchist critiques of states and militarism, but one which Springer integrates with his ideas on absolute nonviolence. While this last principle was far from being unanimously embraced in anarchist history, where violence for self-defense was generally considered as legitimate (while the principle of violence itself was harshly condemned), Springer eventually confirms the materialistic and atheistic features of anarchist morality, classical anarchist principles from Mikhail Bakunin (1814–76) onward. At the level of daily academic practices, an original and provocative application of “old-fashioned” anarchist theories is the idea, advanced by Springer, Myriam Houssay Holzschuch Levi Graham, and Claudia Villegas around ACME debates, that the process of the “peer-review” in scholarly publications can be considered as a form of mutual aid among researchers. Other scholars in the field of anarchist geographies have opened a dialog with literature in political geographies and geopolitics interested in delinking with statist analytical frameworks such as the commonplace assumptions, which were challenged by John Agnew under the definition of “territorial trap.” In this vein, Anthony Ince and Gerónimo Barrera de la Torre discussed ideas on “nonstatist geographies,” aiming to build new conceptual instruments for getting rid of the hegemony of the state form and of statist mindsets in geographical analyses, including discussions on indigenous and decolonial ways of thinking. At the level of philosophy and history of the discipline, “anarchist geopolitics” deployed in 1936 Spain to implement some redrawing of Iberian territorialities beyond statist concepts has been discussed by Ferretti and García-Alvarez as a way for enhancing current debates in critical, radical, and subaltern geopolitics. The interdisciplinary perspectives of anarchist geographical thinking emerge in several ways. In one of his most debated papers, “Why a radical geography must be anarchist,” Springer associates early anarchist thinkers like Bakunin, Malatesta, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65) with his notion of geographical anarchist tradition, in addition to the more obvious figures of Reclus and Kropotkin. This means that these discussions engage works going beyond those produced by canonized geographers: all these activists’ works are mobilized by Springer to provide examples of socialist proposals arguing for the consistency between means and ends in the revolutionary struggle. This matches the classical anarchist argument refusing the vanguard party entitled to “lead” the people and the subsequent need for the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” in overt polemic with Marxism. For the anarchists, freedom can only be reached by applying methods, which are not in contradiction with the final aims, starting from individuals’ daily lives. This historical antagonism between anarchism and Marxism also partially explains why scholars like Springer strongly engaged in international campaigns against neoliberalism, dedicating several works to fight this phenomenon, including the probably most famous piece in the genre, “Fuck Neoliberalism,” translated more than a dozen of languages. Although for “classical” anarchism, the main problems are state oppression and capitalist exploitation rather than the specific historical forms (more or less “liberal” or “neoliberal”), that these phenomena can assume, contemporary anarchist scholars considered necessary to tackle directly the challenge of neoliberalism both to maintain dialogs open with other components of critical and engaged scholarship and counter a classical Marxist argument that anarchism would be allegedly close to liberalism. That is, a “petit-bourgeois” ideology in the most classical Marxist jargon. The urgency of having a say on compelling political issues also pushed a collective of anarchist geographers to publish in ACME a sort of manifesto, “Anarchism and electoral democracy in a turbulent moment,” critically discussing antiauthoritarian solutions to the latest shortcomings of representative democracy, exemplified in that moment by the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit referendum, and the worldwide advancement of the Far Right in terms of both electoral numbers and street violence. Another similarity between present-day approaches and “classical” anarchism is the special attention, which is being paid to matters on education and pedagogy. Between the 19th and the 20th centuries, the alphabetization of adults from popular classes, often performed through the reading of anarchist pamphlets in the night, was considered as a key condition to spread individual consciousness among the proletariat to avoid the creation of a mass manipulated by formal or informal leaders. These concerns are still not limited to the realm of school or formal education, as they assume the importance of “learning freedom” and “unlearning archy” as a challenge to be extended to the entire society and all sectors of social and political engagement. Contemporary

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approaches are broadly inspired by radical theories in education such as Ivan Illich’s “de-schooling” and Paulo Freire’s conscientização (the act of being aware of oppression accompanied by direct action applied for liberation). Both these authors were associated with the radicalization of geography occurred from the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, regarding the experience of the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute revived and put in communication with anarchist approaches by Ronald J. Horvath in The Radicalization of Pedagogy. Kropotkin, Reclus and some of their fellows like Patrick Geddes (1854–1932) gave more specific interpretations of this commitment to widespread alphabetization, especially about its geographical version. They considered that this should be reached first by direct exploration of the world rather than from ideologized textbooks and maps, in most cases biased by nationalistic and conservative views. Therefore, early anarchist geographers considered geography as a discipline, which should first be taught on open air, favoring pupils’ unhampered physical exercise and spontaneous discovering of the environing realties, especially at the primary level. Known at Reclus’s time as the leçon des choses (learning by doing), these concepts inspired Springer’s claims for “unschooling” as a pragmatic and possible application of anarchist principles to primary education and daily life, including practices of homeschooling and self-education, as exposed in the conclusion to The Radicalization of Pedagogy. Finally, contemporary anarchist geographers call for an “undisciplined” geography to highlight their interdisciplinary openings and collaborations and to indicate that geography should go beyond academies and their limitations, committing to ethical, political, and social values rather than academic practices, merging with activism and broader social processes.

Archives of Other Geographical Traditions In 2005, the centenary of Elisée Reclus’s death was the occasion to open an international discussion on his legacy. International and multilingual conferences on Reclus’s life and work were celebrated in Lyon, Montpellier, Milan, Barcelona, and Mexico and led to the publication of abundant material under the form of proceedings, independent papers or even research monographs in the following years. This had the effect of a big push for studies on Reclus and other early anarchist geographers, including Kropotkin. Indeed, these studies definitively demonstrated that Reclus’s and Kropotkin’s activist and scholarly works were strictly interconnected and inserted in collective dynamics inaugurated in Switzerland during their redactional work for the New Universal Geography (Nouvelle Géographie universelle, 1876–94) between the 1870s and 1880s and were then continued in their common political and scholarly endeavors in France, Belgium, and Britain. In this vein, recent scholarship shows the consistency between anarchism and geography in these early authors’ works, which had not been always understood by commentators of the former generation, especially in France. As widely recognized today, some French works of the 1970s and 1980s lacked a contextual approach and, by way of consequence, a full appreciation of the political impact of Reclus’s geographical works, which they considered as somehow conventional, like the New Universal Geography, whose political relevance in fostering cosmopolitanism and anticolonialism has been only recently reassessed. These political aspects of geography were clarified by contextual readings using archives and correspondence as ways to analyze places and contexts of early anarchist geographers’ works, revealing the importance of the archive for fostering complex approaches to the history of science, going beyond internalist readings and mere discourse analysis. Eventually, primary sources did not only show the collective nature of the works carried out for the fabrication of the New Universal Geography: they equally revealed the material and historical links existing between this scholarly and editorial endeavor and the creation of the first anarchist organizations in Switzerland in the 1870s. For instance, the New Universal Geography shared almost the same editorial committee as the anarchist journal Le Travailleur, then published between Geneva and Lausanne, and the problematics concurrently discussed in both publications by Reclus et al. were quite similar. This rediscovery of primary sources was also facilitated by the availability of new public archives, especially the huge collection of the Kropotkin’s archives at the State Archive of the Russian Federation. Moreover, in the last 15–20 years, new materials became available in “classical” Reclus’s repositories such as the collections of the French National Library, the French Institute of Social History, and the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. New important collections were definitively or temporarily opened to researchers at the Hachette Archives in Caen (France) and at the Map Department of the Geneva Public Library (Switzerland). Research on these primary sources is still ongoing. These works are engaging a fruitful conversation with scholarship in historical geography, which is progressively rediscovering what Innes Keighren defines as the “admirable” sides of the geographical tradition. Historical geographers are noticing this renewed scholarly interest for exploring this kind of experiences, rather than only criticizing the “despicable” sides of the disciplinary history, such as the past geographers’ implication with imperialism, totalitarianisms, warfare, and exploitation. In this vein, the label “Historical Geographies of Anarchism” was launched recently, and the more general field of study investigating alternative geographical traditions, especially early critical and anticolonialist geographies, can be considered as one of the most promising research lines in the history of geography. Contextual readings in the history of ideas likewise participate in the so-called “biographical turn” in the history of geography, arguing that the study of lived experiences of activists and scholars is an indispensable device to help making sense of their intellectual production by considering places and material circumstances as consubstantial to the fabrication of knowledge. This is clearly exemplified in the works of French historian Christophe Brun, who tried recently to reconstruct Reclus’s biography through an almost day-by-day chronology, in Ronald Creagh’s work on Reclus’s private correspondence and in José Luis Oyon’s publications analyzing Reclus’s residential choices from his youth and connecting them with his mature urban thinking. Recently, authors such as Ferretti, John P. Clark, and Ernesto Mächler Tobar analyzed Reclus’s youth experiences of exile in Ireland, Louisiana, and

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Colombia from 1852 to 1857 as a decisive drive to direct his interest on matters of social justice and especially antiracism, anticolonialism, and anticapitalism. As further discussed below, recent trends in anarchist geographies also extend literature applying relational and transnational approaches to the history of anarchism to make sense of connections, which often escaped to national histories of anarchism and workers’ movements. Examples of this tendency are works by Constance Bantman or Pietro di Paola analyzing the cosmopolite networks of Italian and French exiled anarchists in London and Britain around the end of the 19th Century and by Davide Turcato on Errico Malatesta and transnational Italian-speaking anarchism.

Non-Anglophone Academies The most spectacular developments in the recent rediscovery of anarchist geographies occurred in the English-speaking literature, especially following the special numbers dedicated to anarchism by Antipode in 2012 and ACME in 2013, by collective works such as the trilogy The Radicalisation of Pedagogy, Theories of Resistance, and The Practice of Freedom edited by Springer, White, and Lopes de Souza and the announced volumes Anarchist Political Ecology by Springer and Martin Locret-Collet, Vegan Geographies: Ethics Beyond Violence by the Vegan Geographies Collective, and several other contributions. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this movement has some of its “strongholds” in other linguistic areas, including countries in the so-called “Global South.” Therefore, to date, anarchist geographies can be considered as a really transnational and cosmopolite phenomenon. In these circuits, multilingual publication is intended as a concrete way to tackle the challenges launched in international discussion on the problem of English monolingualism and the domination of Anglo-American academy, as widely discussed around the International Conferences of Critical Geographies in former years. While communication among different linguistic and cultural areas still presents challenges, it is worth noting the important role played by several scholars from Latin America in the current rediscovery of anarchist geographies from a historical ground. In 2011, an international conference on Elisée Reclus and the Geographies of the New World was organized at the University of São Paulo (USP) at the initiative of David Ramirez Palacios, with hundreds of attendants. This event also gave a strong impulse to the creation of the Brazilian Network on the History of Geography and its journal Terra Brasilis. In the same years, the ReKro (Rede ReclusKropotkin) was established around the Rio de Janeiro laboratory NUPED (Research Cluster on Socio-Spatial Development) and started the publication of the journal Território Autônomo, with a special emphasis on practices of self-organization and direct action in contemporary Latin-American social movements. Activities such as seminars on anarchism and geography were also realized in several Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America including Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, while in Spain, substantial works on Kropotkin’s ideas on mutual aid were published by Barcelona historian of science Alvaro Girón. Madrid geographers Jacobo García-Alvarez and Nicolás-Ortega Cantero studied Reclus’s impact on Spanish geographical scholarship and Iberian liberal milieus at the end of the 19th Century. In Frenchspeaking circuits, the 2005 conferences gave the impulse for a number of publications and dissertations realized in the following years and for the creation of the Réseau des Géographes Libertaires. Now, the RGL organizes periodical meetings and seminars in French-speaking countries and publishes a research blog, which includes materials especially discussing matters on environment, gender, and radical pedagogies. In French Switzerland, publisher Héros-limite recently printed a series of collected works by early anarchist geographers, in particular, the Reclus brothers, addressing matters on education and on cultural approaches to land and territories. In Italy, geographers from the University Milan-Bicocca Marcella Schmidt di Friedberg, Enrico Squarcina, and Stefano Malatesta especially worked on the relation between anarchism and geographical education, while anarchist political geographer Fabrizio Eva (University of Venice) promotes substantial debates on the possibility of anarchist geopolitics and anarchist political geographies. While I would find more difficult to assess what is going on in Asian or African languages, important studies are carried out in Japan on the encounters between early anarchist geographers, such as Reclus and members of his family, and Japanese scholars like Ishikawa Sanshiro. The cultural transfer of Reclusian ideas in the Japanese archipelago is likewise discussed in Anglophone scholarship, especially by Nadine Willems and Sho Konishi and by Pelletier in France.

Transnationalism and Decolonial Approaches The transnational approaches mentioned above did not only allow for crossing boundaries in scholarship: more broadly, they fostered interdisciplinary dialog between historians, geographers, anthropologists, political scientists, and others. In addition, they allowed understanding not only international and transnational but also transcontinental and transcultural exchanges promoted by anarchist activists from the end of the 19th Century onwards, countering former assumptions of an alleged euro or ethnocentrism of early anarchists. While historically these problems affected the entire workers’ movement and were not extraneous to anarchism, interdisciplinary works by Benedict Anderson, Steven Hirsch, Kirwin Shaffer, Lucien van der Walt, Raymond Craib, Arif Dirlik, Sho Konishi, and others demonstrated that anarchist activists of European origin were among the first socialists to engage with different cultures in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, including indigenous movements, producing forms of transcultural exchanges, which are under investigation now. Several authors highlight the role of non-European ways of thinking in creating forms of anarchism, which still contribute to key political and scholarly debates, for instance what Konishi considers as alternative (and non-European) “modernities.”

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These problematics have great potentiality to enhance dialogs between transnational histories and ideas on mobilities and localizations of knowledge mentioned above, now very popular in geographical scholarship, and with more general debates on the spatial turn in the social sciences. Among historians, works by Turcato, Carl Levy, and Andrew Hoyt on Italian anarchism, where migration and exile practices were the norm rather than the exception, have been especially effective toward a spatial understanding of anarchism as a social movement. Transnational anarchism can likewise shed light on issues of (early) anticolonialism by transnational anarchist militants following the pioneering works of Benedict Anderson, recently extended to the field of early critical and anarchist geographers by several of the contributions mentioned in bibliography. All these works revealed the radicality of anarchist anticolonial traditions, although anarchism hardly displayed the label of “anticolonialism,” to avoid being confused with nationalism. However, recent literature on the relation between anarchism and movements for national liberation, from European experiences of the 19th Century like the Italian Risorgimento and the Irish national movements to 20th-Century decolonization worldwide, highlights the complex relations between anarchism, nationalism, and ideas of situated rootedness, on which research is ongoing. Problematics on difference, cosmopolitanism, and decolonial thinking, including references to indigeneity, are well represented in the last wave of anarchist-driven geographical scholarship. New Zealand based researcher Navé Wald discusses anarchist approaches to ideas on development and participation with a special focus on Argentinian peasants and indigenous movements. Likewise, in Latin America, Erin Araujo’s works address educational and self-managing praxes in Zapatista communities. In Canada, anarchist-inspired scholar Vanessa Sloan Morgan addresses feminist and indigenous issues with a strong drive to decolonial thinking. Pioneering efforts in discussing the possible relations and cross-contaminations between anarchist geographies and the Modernity-Coloniality-Decoloniality movement represented by authors like Walter Mignolo are carried out by James Ellison, who considers the historical experience of the Flores Magón Brothers as an example of “border thinking,” providing insight to challenge present-day borders erected around the “fortress Europe.” Several contributions are also pioneering a field of research, which might be defined as “Anarchist Black Studies” in geography, one which had not been much frequented hitherto but whose development is envisaged by authors such as Nik Heynen and Patrick Huff. Of course, these are only partial examples of what is going on in anarchist geographies because it would be impossible to account for all the authors involved and all the themes raised in this space. It is possible to conclude this section by arguing that the present wave of anarchist geographies takes very seriously the challenges of difference, gender, race, and postcolonial and decolonial studies. However, instead of a polemical rupture with the anarchist tradition, most of contemporary authors find in it elements of continuity to nourish present-day approach in these problematics.

Total Liberation. Feminism, Veganism and Intersectionality One of the most vivid and promising fields in contemporary anarchist geographies is the challenge of what Anthony J. Nocella, Richard J. White, and Erika Cudworth have called “total liberation’,” eventually associated with the link between anarchism and critical animal studies. This concept is progressively merging with ideas on anarchafeminism and intersectionality, exemplified by Ophélie Véron’s idea that anarchism, feminism, and veganism should converge. Again, it is worth noting that all these notions present a consistency with anarchist geographical traditions on all or almost all these “axes.” While a certain number of early anarchist international leaders were women, such as Louise Michel (1830–1905), Emma Goldman (1869–1940), Voltairine de Cleyre (1866–1912), Charlotte Wilson (1854–1944), and later Federica Montseny (1905–94), Luce Fabbri (1908–2000), Marie-Louise Berneri (1918–49), and many others, recent works demonstrated that male anarchist geographers like the Reclus brothers were actively engaged in the early feminist networks in France from the 1860s. Likewise, ideas on total liberation are embedded in anarchist notions of human liberation beyond the emancipation of just one social class, including feelings such as “love” for all the others, which anticipates ideas on the necessity of challenging multiple oppressions, including those which occur at the levels of daily life and of what is called now the “microscale.” While veganism is a relatively recent ethical and political movement, it constitutes equally a very compelling case to trace some elements of continuity in anarchist and geographical traditions. An early vegetarian and advocate of animal rights, Elisée Reclus, is presented today by Richard White as a pioneer of total liberation, defined as “an expanded anarchist geographical praxis” embracing humans and nonhumans in common concerns for rights, justice, and solidarity by applying a common ethics rather than a speciesist hierarchy. Reclus’s article “On Vegetarianism,” published in 1900 by the Humane Review and later reprinted in several versions, including the classical Reclus’s collected writings by Clark and Camille Martin, is in course of rediscovering as a main inspiration for performing this agenda. Recent scholarship analyzing Reclus’s and Kropotkin’s scholarly and activist networks in the United Kingdom has demonstrated that these Reclus’s radical positions were inserted in a transnational circuit arguing for the extension of socialistic ideas of equality and solidarity beyond the human world. Today, anarchist geographies of human rights have clear potentialities for interacting with numerous studies inspired by more-than-human and hybrid approaches, especially animal geographies and ongoing debates on the Anthropocene and the place for humans in changing environments. This scholarly and activist movement is not devoid of problems and criticalities, as normal for all phenomena of this kind trying to introduce novelties in society and eventually also in the academy. As for the external problems, the international circuits of critical and radical geographies have received this new anarchist wave with a generally welcoming attitude but also with some (explicit or implicit) sense of superiority toward those contributions going beyond the hegemonic paradigms of English-speaking scholarship,

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especially non-Anglophone contributions and scholarship in the history of geography giving a strong emphasis to empirical work. As for the internal criticalities, it is worth saying that international and transcultural dialog is still a challenging matter in some cases, and in general some disagreements emerged on what should be the “correct” relation between academia and activism especially with reference to the choice of the places for discussion and dissemination of knowledge and of the ways for carrying out meetings and conferences. Yet, the assumed need for a plurality of voices is helping the experience of current anarchist approaches to geography and of anarchist geographies in further developing these promising international and original contributions to geographical and interdisciplinary scholarship.

See Also: Critical Geographies; Critical Theory and Human Geography; Feminism/Feminist Geography; History of Geography; Ideology; Marxist Geography; Postcolonial Geographies; Radical Geography; Resistance.

Further readings Breitbart, M.M., 2009. Anarchism/Anarchist geography, 2009. In: Kobayashi, et al. (Eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, pp. 108–155. Ferretti, F., 2014. Élisée Reclus: Pour une Ge´ographie Nouvelle. Éditions du CTHS, Paris. Ferretti, F., 2018. Anarchy and Geography. Reclus and Kropotkin in the UK. Routledge, Abingdon. Ferretti, F., Barrera de la Torre, G., Ince, A., Toro, F. (Eds.), 2017. Historical Geographies of Anarchism. Routledge, Abingdon. Hirsch, S., Van der Walt, L. (Eds.), 2010. Anarchism and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870–1940: The Praxis of National Liberation, Internationalism, and Social Revolution. Brill, Leiden/Boston. Ince, A., Barrera de la Torre, G., 2016. For post-statist geographies. Political Geogr. 55, 10–19. Nocella II, A.J., White, R.J., Cudworth, E. (Eds.), 2015. Anarchism and Animal Liberation. Essays on Complementary Elements of Total Liberation Jefferson. Mc Farland & Company. Pelletier, P., 2013. Ge´ographie et aAnarchie: Reclus, Kropotkine, Metchnikoff. Editions du Monde Libertaire, Paris. Ramírez Palacios, D., Skoda, A., 2016. Élisée Reclus e a Geografia dos Novos Mundos. Terra Brasilis (Nova Se´rie) 7. http://journals.openedition.org/terrabrasilis/1761. Souza, M.L., White, R.J., Springer, S. (Eds.), 2016. Theories of Resistance: Anarchism, Geography and the Spirit of Revolt. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. Springer, S., 2015. Violent Neoliberalism, Development, Discourse, and Dispossession in Cambodia. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstocke. Springer, S., 2016. The Anarchist Roots of Geography. Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis. Springer, S., 2017. The limits to Marx David Harvey and the condition of postfraternity. Dialogues in Human Geography 7 (3), 280–294. Springer, S., Barker, A.J., Brown, G., Ince, A., Pickerill, J., 2012. Reanimating anarchist geographies: a new burst of colour. Antipode 44, 1591–1604. Springer, S., White, R.,S.M.L. (Eds.), 2016. The Radicalisation of Pedagogy. Anarchism, Geography and the Spirit of Revolt. Rowman & Littlefield, New York. Véron, O., 2016. (Extra)ordinary activism: veganism and the shaping of hemeratopias’. Int. J. Sociol. Soc. Policy 36 (11/12), 756–773. White, R.J., Springer, S., Souza, M.L. (Eds.), 2016. The Practice of Freedom. Anarchism, Geography and the Spirit of Revolt. Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 2016.

Relevant Websites International Conference of Anarchist Geographies and Geographers, https://icagg.org/wp/. Reclus, http://reclus.raforum.site/. Brazilian Network of Historical Geography and History of Geography (Rede Brasilis) , http://redebrasilis.net/. Rede Reclus-Kropotkin de Estudos Libertários, https://rekro.webnode.com.br/apresenta%C3%A7%C3%A3o/. Réseau des Géographes Libertaires, https://rgl.hypotheses.org/.

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Animal Geographies Alice J Hovorka, Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by C.Wilbert, volume 1, pp 122–126, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Speciesism is a form of discrimination based on species membership. It reflects a failure to consider interests of equal strength to an equal extent and purports, for example, that being human is good enough reason for human animals to have greater moral rights than nonhuman animals. Animal geography is an innovative and thriving subdiscipline. Animal geographers seek to understand how humans think about, place, and engage with animals, how animals shape human identities and social dynamics, as well as how broader social cultural, political economic, and ecological processes influence animal distributions, circumstances, behaviors, experiences, and well-being. Animals now fully feature as distinctive objects or meaningful subjects of geographical study rather than lumped together with “nature” or backgrounded in human–environment explorations. Animal geographers have expanded the scope of geographical scholarship by challenging entrenched humanist ontologies and epistemologies and advancing multispecies theoretical and empirical understanding in the discipline.

Historical Overview Animal geographers of the early 20th Century engaged in zoogeographic perspectives to examine animal spatial patterns and distributions and environmental conditions shaping species adaptations. Several texts traced the evolution and movements of animals through space and time, while others offered faunal catalogs with regional descriptions and associated species. Other scholars opted for theorizing how animals live and adapt to different natural (or human) conditions. Notable scholars oriented to such endeavors include Marion Newbigin, as well as W.C. Allee and Karl P. Schmidt, respectively. This “first wave” of animal geography was subsumed by branches of biology that compiled traditional inventories of species, their distributions, and their ecologies. Animal geographers of the mid-20th Century engaged in culturally oriented perspectives. Most prominently, Charles F. Bennett’s 1960 call for a “cultural animal geography” urged merging zoogeographic perspectives with an emphasis on human impacts on animals and vice versa. He drew on the work of Carl Sauer and others engaged with ideas of “cultural landscape” to consider how animal domestication shapes local environments and to explore human kinship to and empathy for domesticated animals. Such cultural ecologists reflected on animals as symbolic (not only real and useful creatures) and questioned the privileging of solely economic-bases to human–animal relations. This “second wave” of animal geography was criticized for simplistic, apolitical, and superorganic approaches to culture. Ultimately, animals were deemed peripheral to human geography and retreated from the discipline later mid-century save for a smattering of cultural ecology research focused on domesticated animals and landscape change. During the late-20th-Century animals emerged once again as a focus of geographical inquiry, facilitated by environmental movements challenging speciesism and emerging intellectual currents that turned some scholars toward consideration of animals as a marginalized social group. Jennifer Wolch and Jody Emel’s themed issue for the journal Environment and Planning D: Society and Space in 1995 focused on “bringing animals back in” to the discipline. Their edited book Animal Geographies (1998), complemented by Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert’s Animal Spaces, Beastly Spaces (2000), launched a “third wave” of animal geography (also known in its early iterations as “new cultural animal geography”), which looks beyond conceptualizations of nonhuman animals as natural resources, units of production, or objects of study. It recognizes animals as essential in explanations of human–environment and spatial relations, given irrefutable interdependence between human and nonhuman species. Animal geographies during this phase brought to the fore several distinct yet interconnected focal points: the question of the animal and its implications for human identity and positionality; spatial ordering of animals by humans; and notions of animal agency. The subdiscipline has evolved during the early-21st Century by building meaningfully and substantively upon these foci that brought animals back into geography. In particular, animal geographers are delving deeper into the ways in which animals define and shape human lives, livelihoods, and landscapes, and increasingly how animals in and of themselves thrive and/or suffer on account of human–animal dynamics. As such, contemporary animal geographies reflect relational and materialist turns with scholars engaging notions of networks, hybridity, and “beastly pla” more explicitly. Aligning with these conceptual developments, animal geographers are expanding their methodological approaches and tools and engaging with a broader range of (sub-)disciplines to examine more holistically the lives of animals. Underlying these scholarly trajectories is a steadfast focus on ethical issues that remain central to the spirit, mandate, and praxis of animal geographies. Animal geographers raise vital questions as to the unjust boundaries and practices of human–animal relations, urging for moral consideration of animals and fundamental redirection of our engagements with them.

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Human–Animal Sociocultural Dynamics (“Animality”) Animal geography explores how ideas and representations of animals shape individual identities and collective human culture. This largely conceptual engagement with animals brings to the fore what it is to be human at the same time that it offers insights on the social constructions and hierarchical ordering of species. The relationships between animals, place, power, identity, and culture are foundational for animal geographers here, as are theoretical insights from feminist, critical race, Marxist, and poststructuralist scholarship that highlights relations of power among distinct social groups. Animal geographers critique modernist structures, divisions, and orderings to reveal how notions of animality establish and reinforce human differences based on identifiers including “race,” class, and gender. To this end, humans are working out relations with animals at the same time that humans are working out relations with each other as mediated through animals, both discursively and materially. Human–animal cultural identity, positionality, and practices are therefore inextricably linked. Animal geographers examine how colonial, racial, and cultural dynamics shape species constructions and human–animal relations in particular places. Colonial legacies of European modernity have entrenched absolute differences between humans and animals and the superiority of the former over the latter. This has extended into ideas of cultural hierarchies, racial distinctions, and ideas of progress that often pivot on the privileging of whiteness and Western ideals. Empirical work by animal geographers, for example, demonstrates how animal practices among immigrant communities in the United States are deemed “out of place” by dominant (white) groups, reinforcing racialized differences and monitoring national identity and cultural belonging. Other work examines patterns of animal-linked racialization grounded in religious and nationalist tropes in Malaysia that reproduce dominance of particular political and ethnic groups. Animal geographers further exposed the particularly unjust and racist associations between animality, savagery, and Indigenous societies around the world. They also reveal sociocultural constructions of civility and decency in urban contexts where wildness and animal bodies are deemed out of place or deviant. Animal geographers also examine intersections of gender and animals. Ideologically, they reveal how sexism and speciesism work together to marginalize women as “naturally affiliated” with animals along biologically inscribed destinies. Here women and animals are simultaneously oppressed and debased with significant implications for both. Further, animal practices and uses constitute and reinforce constructions of masculinity and femininity, shaping the treatment of both humans and nonhumans along gender (and other) lines. Empirical work by animal geographers, for example, illustrates how the representation of wolves and associated practices that led to their demise, in the United States during the 20th Century perpetuated sexist and racialized perspectives in the treatment of people who were deemed inferior to European-American males. More explicitly, animal geographers consider how animals are wrapped up with construction of gendered identities such as the production and performance of human–cougar relations in Canada or women–chicken versus men–cattle relations in Botswana. Other work details the lives of dairy cows and bulls in industrial agriculture, revealing routinized forms of violence they experience according to sex/gender associations that, in turn, reproduce gender-based inequalities entrenched in political economic structures and compromise animal health and well-being. Animal geographies thus focus on the roles of animals and animality in the construction and ordering of culture and individual humans, as manifested in linkages between human and animal identities in particular times and places. Animal geographers challenge anthropocentric historical, taxonomic, cultural, and moral placements of animals, and in particular animal “otherness.” The notion of “animal” as being somehow “out of place” reflects central tensions born out metaphors for human marginality, as well as transgressions of animals into human spaces and human conflict with animals.

Human–Animal Spatial Relations (“Animal Spaces”) Animal geographers explore in-depth human–animal encounters as related to space, place, location, environment, and landscape. Humans place animals in various imaginary, literary, psychological, and virtual spaces, and in diverse physical spaces including homes, fields, factories, zoos, and national parks. Humans organize animals into these conceptual and material spaces relative to themselves and to other animals. Such placements shape where animals belong, where they should go, how long they should stay, and how they should behave, often delineated by what use animals have to humans and how humans (wish to) interact with them. These sociospatial placements have consequences for the extent to which different animals are included and/or excluded from particular spaces. Certain types of animals are contested and excluded from human homes and neighborhoods because they are deemed wild, dangerous, or unhygienic; others are included because they are considered tame, clean, or charismatic. As articulated by influential geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, animals may be viewed as a social group bound up in relationships with humans that generate conflicting power dynamics ranging from dominance to affection, reverence to revulsion, and utilitarianism to disinterest. Social constructions of animals facilitate their geographical fixing into spaces different from those that humans occupy, or incorporation of animals into human spaces based on particular criteria or under certain conditions. Spatial expressions of human– animal relations and species hierarchies across the physical landscape reinforce ideas about the proper place of particular animals (and particular humans) and, more broadly, animals in relation to humans. Species relations of power are thus actively engaged through spatial dynamics. Animal geographers also draw attention to the fact that human–animal spatial dynamics are not one-directional, with human agents exerting power over animals. Indeed, animals exert their own power and agency through their actions (intended or otherwise) by accepting, evading, or transgressing human placements. While some can be taught which places are out of bounds, others

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will wander in and out of human spatial orderings, generating a relational negotiation with humans-based material boundaries and discursive imaginaries. Here animals themselves figure in sociospatial practices and are influential actors in human–animal relations. As influential actors and visible subjects, animals fashion the relationships in which they engage and the environments that they inhabit. Spatial inclusions and exclusions of particular animals by humans are bound up in the more symbolic dimensions of encounters between humans and animals, which animal geographers attempt to unravel by teasing out the numerous social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics shaping these relationships. In sum, human–animal relations may be understood and explained through attention to human conceptual placements (social), material placements (spatial), and everyday encounters (interaction) with animals. This sociospatial practice in turn has implications for the circumstances and experiences of both humans and animals. Empirical work by animal geographers highlights animal circumstances and experiences in various spatial contexts. Topically studies detail the lives that animals live in human homes, pointing out how our love-of-pets facilitates financial, emotional, and cultural investments in nonhumans and reflects broader processes of commodification and disengagement in postindustrial society. Other studies detail the lives that animals live in zoos, drawing them into institutions premised on ideas of nature abstracted from culture and expressed through spatial arrangements privileging spectacle over animal welfare. Studies also explore the lives of animals on farms, revealing how industrial agriculture has distorted a bucolic rural narrative into spaces that constrain, manipulate, and exploit animals for their flesh and other products; they illuminate how global dynamics and local expressions of animal-based food production operate to such ends. Further studies focus on the lives of wild animals, in particular highlighting the rise and dynamics of human–animal conflicts in the borderlands of protected areas and human settlements; they draw linkages to broader political economic processes associated with conservation or tourism agendas. Finally, studies investigate human–animal dynamics in the urban realm through attention to residents’ often contradictory and complex perceptions of and engagements with urban wildlife, livestock, “pests,” and companion animals.

Animal Agency and Subjectivity (“Beastly Places”) Animal geographers have led the way accommodating nonhumans within “human” geography. They have drawn on concepts of agency and subjectivity and associated notions of hybridity and networks to explore the “beastly places” that animals themselves, and in relation to humans and others, shape, negotiate, and embody as agential beings. Animal agency is a focal point for animal geographers beginning from their efforts to make more visible the role of animals in society and their plight within it and wishing to explore ethical possibilities for more just coexistence. As a concept, agency offers animal geographers opportunities to challenge ontologically what might be known about animals, epistemologically how we might get to know them more fully, and ultimately how animals might feature genuinely in our scholarship and practice. Animal geographers are thus delving deeper into how animals in and of themselves thrive and/or suffer on account of human–animal dynamics, in addition to longer-standing investigations of how animals define and shape human lives, livelihoods, and landscapes. Over the course of its evolution, the subdiscipline has moved firmly from “the animal” solely as a conceptual device to interrogate “the human” toward more active and intimate lived encounters with animal subjects. Arguably, attention to animal agency and subjectivity has offered some of the most innovative intellectual trajectories for geography in the contemporary period. By embracing animals as subjects (and social groups) in their own right, animal geographers have paved the way to conceptualizing animals as actors with the capacity to direct change. Animals as influential actors fashion the relationships in which they are engaged and the environments which they inhabit; animals shape cultures, societies, economic, and political dynamics, as well as the construction of space and knowledge. Further, animal geographers dismiss animals as mechanistic, passive, simple entities, embracing instead their subjective lived experiences as a way of investigating their own joys, sufferings, and becomings. Empirical works illustrating animal agency and subjectivities feature the lives of possums who occupy homesteads in Australia, grizzly bears shaping environmental politics and policies in British Columbia, donkeys who labor and shape landscapes on behalf of subsistence farmers in southern Africa, and an octopus in a California aquarium who seizes upon and creates opportunities to stretch beyond its tank. Notably, animal geographers have begun to more firmly investigate the lives of individual animals (e.g., a single octopus or a specific group of possums), as well as animals relative to other animals (e.g., donkeys relative to cattle or grizzly bears relative to other wild animals) so as to appreciate and interrogate the diversity of animal lives. Vital to these and other investigations is consideration of how animal agency is enacted. Animal geographers influenced by posthumanism, feminism, and actor–network theory (ANT) view this agential capacity in relational, materialist terms. Here animals are understood to act in concert with others, including humans, cultivating rooted networks of coexistence. More specifically, ANT treats all entities alike with agency accorded beyond-humans to animals, plants, microorganisms, and technologies. While challenging human exceptionalism and essentializing dualisms, ANT offers limited insights on power relations and associated differences and inequalities between and among entities. Hence animal geographers have largely opted to embrace ANT conceptually while theorizing through more critically oriented perspectives, be they feminist, structuralist, poststructuralist, postcolonialist, and posthumanist. Feminist perspectives in animal geographies are particularly useful in theorizing the ways in which animal “becoming” is borne out of animal-human agency coenacted and performed both materially and discursively. Structuralist perspectives reveal the intricate and intimate ways in which food animals are born into a globalized industry that relies on them at the same time that it exploits and marginalizes them for capitalist gain. Posthumanist perspectives offer clear grounding for animal geographers wishing to push firmly on nonanthropocentric visions of the subdiscipline and the knowledge it generates. Work by animal geographers

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illustrates how animals are key actors in conservation realms by shaping directly protected area boundaries through their range tendencies or industrial meat production by reacting defensively to invasive procedures. Taken together, these approaches contribute to dismantling a priori distinctions of essentialized categories of human/animal, nature/culture, material/discursive. Doing so allows animal geographers to push forward a nonanthropocentric frame offering animals equal (if not more) central billing of a hybrid or more-than-human geography. Empirically, animal geographers can bring explicit attention to animal livesdjoys and sufferingdborn out of multifaceted assemblages rooted in context and imbued with power. Work to this end details the global networks through which elephants become material and virtual entities shaping zoo breeding programs, ecotourist adventures, and local livelihoods of subsistence dwellers through their entanglements with humans and technologies around the world.

Methodologies Animal geographers methodologically draw from a robust range of approaches and tools from human geography. These include methods for investigating human perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, and experiences in their encounters with animals, methods for exploring symbolic or discursive representations of animals in sociocultural realms, and methods for considering the ways in which political economic institutions mediate human–animal relations in various spatial contexts. These human geography methods are grounded in various conceptual frameworks spanning the full continuum of critical social theory. Some argue, however, that a methodological imbalance exists in animal geographies such that much more is known about humans in multispecies encounters than animals. While human-centered methods are often used to examine the nonhuman, animal geographers arguably lack the knowledge, skills, and equipment to truly get to know the behaviors, mobilities, intentions, circumstances, and experiences of animals. Affective engagements with animals through empirical investigations is challenging, given their often speculative nature, lack of scientific evidence, anthropomorphic excessiveness, logistic hurdles, and methodological incompatibility. Addressing this imbalance would provide a more holistic understanding of human–animal relations, as well it would push further toward acknowledging and comprehending animals as agential subjects with life-worlds and worldviews. Animal geographers are increasingly applying, adapting, and innovating animal-focused or trans-species methodologies as they grapple with animal agency and the lives of animals in and of themselves. They are learning-to-be-affected to effectively explore animals’ geographies and lived experiencesdindeed those “beastly places” so central to animal geographies scholarship. Becoming acquainted with the more-than-human world and investigating its complexity requires bridging social and natural sciences, embracing diverse modes of inquiry, and supplementing humanist methodological repertoires with those less familiar. Some animal geographers are embracing biology, behavioral ecology, biogeography, geosciences, and ethology to investigate animals, as well as ethnoethology to promote symmetrical examinations of hybrid human–animal lifeworlds, communities, and encounters. Empirical work by animal geographers examines, for example, human–elephant relations in India through alignment of ethological, ecological, ethnographic, and political perspectives and methods revealing elephant spatial mobilities and behavioral traits tied directly to sociocultural tendencies of local human populations and broader political economic structures. Other work details dynamic cougar behavioral ecology in California in the context of human encroachment and other habitat pressures; animal mental maps reveal cougars keeping respectful distance from humans perhaps as a means of averting risk and sharing space in metropolitan border zones. Still other work provides in-depth insights into cow subjectivity through attention to animal mindfulness and resultant behavior; grounded in ethological and neurological evidence the study considers how introspective interpretation works in mammals, expressed through conscious, emotional, cognitive, and inner life of the cow and in relation to humans and the broader context. Further, learning by witnessing the lives of reindeer and seals brings forth these animals’ geographies through engagements with ethology, historical archives, observation, walking and running, and the occasional looks exchanged. Calls for further methodological innovation suggest that animal geographers might consider engaging with geographical subdisciplines beyond those that are necessarily human oriented. Specifically, human–environment geographers, physical geographers, and geoscientists have something to offer investigations of more-than-human worlds through areas of political ecology, global environmental change science, and biogeographies. More defined methodological tools have been identified as technologies for tracking and analyzing spatialities of animal behavior, inter-and intra-species communication, and for molecular markers reflecting historic mobilities and microbial ecologies within and between animal bodies. Ultimately, more animal geographers are striving for affective engagements with animals and recognize that animals do in fact speak, and it is not impossible to understand what they are saying. Cultivating more empathy in the study of animals requires familiarity with them; developing methodologies that allow animal geographers to move closer to the animals themselves as individual, subjective beings remains a vital trajectory for the subdiscipline. Indeed, necessarily “lively biogeographies” fostering constructive interdisciplinary collaborations and innovative methodological protocols are best suited to engaging animals as mindful, dynamic, and differentiated beings coevolving and coexisting with humans.

Ethics Animal geographers contribute to discussions of animal ethics, politics, and welfare. Indeed this trajectory drives much animal geographies scholarship, with explorations of human–animal relations unearthing the differential, inequitable, and unjust relations of

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power among and between species. At the same time, animal geographies often espouse a critical and normative bent that first questions the nature and implications of particular human–animal dynamics and second offers reflects on or suggests outright how humans might craft a more equitable realm of coexistence and flourishing with animals. Further, animal geographers themselves span a continuum of political perspectives and activist engagements with many connecting their scholarly pursuits with actionoriented agendas and activities to serve and enhance the lives of animals. Ethical concern for animals was touted explicitly with the emergence and subsequent expansion of “new cultural animal geography in the late 20th Century and onward.” Calls for addressing the deafening silence around nonhumans in social theory were paired with attention to remapping the moral landscape and building on the momentum of environmentalism, expanding rights claims of marginalized groups and animal advocacy attempts to revise the interspecies balance of power. Political agendas urged respect for the inherent territoriality bound into animal lives and questioning of associated representational politics, as part of re-envisioned modes of human–animal geographical coexistence. Core ethical concepts emerged as aspirational beacons to this end, emphasizing context-specific, place-based, and embodied encounters as part of moral assessments. American Bill Lynn’s “geoethics” argues that geography constitutes all ethical problems such that where you are matters for whether than action is conceived of as right or wrong. Place-based evaluations of moral problems require that we consider the individual animal and the larger ecosystems. When considering eating animals, for example, we must consider what is the impact of that animal’s life on the ecosystem compared with the scale of animals produced for consumption? Such types of questions allow for more nuanced approaches than trying to fit all human–animal relations into one value system. British geographer Owain Jones’ “ethics of encounter” urges us to consider the (in)direct encounters we have with individual animals recognize our shared spaces and dwellings (i.e., experiences of the world) and conduct a more balanced ethical inquiry with these intimate engagements in mind. This will allow us to grapple with the immense diversity of animal placements and their associated hidden geographies of often inconsistent and uneven ethical relations between humans and animals. Catherine Johnston’s “responsible anthropomorphism” purports repoliticizing animals as bodies and voices not merely ideologies or conceptual tools. Here knowing about and knowing with animals is based not on our shared sentience or our shared place in the world or any other abstract philosophical argument. Rather it is based on our actual relationships and our shared experience of being alive that happens among all species. Once we recognize this point, we can move into different relationships with animals. Broadly speaking, by recognizing animals as agential subjects with their own geographies, animal geographers offer animals a place for moral consideration within academia and scholarship. Animal geographies contribute to ethical debates given its focus on those animal spaces and beastly places, be they the body, the home, the zoo, the farm, the lab, the city, the greenspace, which provide a dynamic spatial frame and place-based narrative through which to consider ethical issues and open up novel moral practices moving forward. If ethics is about mattering, then animals matter to us in many different ways, in many different spaces, places, and contexts. Animal geographers reveal and question the ways in which ethics are established, performed, and negotiated through multispecies relations. Through its maturation, animal geographies have somewhat bifurcated along ethical positions (e.g., animal rights to animal welfare) and individual commitments (more or less activist; individual choices to eat meat, own pets, visit zoos and so on) of scholars themselves. A similar trajectory is evident more broadly in the animal studies community where distinctive groups of “critical” and “mainstream” animal scholars gather awkwardly around conference buffets searching for their respective vegan or animalbased coffee creamer. More seriously and substantively, however, self-labeled “critical animal geographers” call upon the subdiscipline to be more engaged, normative, and highly critical with respect to various aspects of humanity’s treatment and indeed domination of animals as food, as experiments, as entertainment, as companions. Aligning with liberationist or anarchist positions, they push forward transformative and emancipatory scholarship and praxis stemming purporting the need for radical critique and personal engagement as the foundational moral repertoire of animal geographies. Critical animal geographers ask the following question: how can humans and animals more justly share space? They attune themselves to acts of marginalization, dispossession, and oppression, revealing the haves and have nots that emerge from uneven and unjust political economic and social processes. They embrace engaged theoretical explorations of the lives of animals with the hopes of inspiring and achieving ethically sound human–animal relations.

Conclusion Animal geographies at their core explore human–animal relations through attention to animality, animal spaces, and beastly places as grounded in eclectic methodological approaches and ethical commitments to improving the lives of animals. In turn, animal geographers push geography as a discipline to be holistic, interdisciplinary, more-than-human, and justice oriented and further attuned to the often uneven and inequitable relations that result from human–environment (and indeed human–animal) encounters. Animal geographers have firmly joined the ranks of broader animal studies scholarship by infusing debates with contextspecific, place-based, and spatial frames that extend understanding and explanation of the ways in which humans and animals interact.

See Also: Space.

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Further Reading Bennett Jr., C.F., 1960. Cultural animal geography: an inviting field of research. The Professional Geographer 12 (5), 12–14. Buller, H., 2013. Animal geographies I. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 38 (2), 308–318. Buller, H., 2014. Animal geographies II: methods. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 39 (3), 374–384. Buller, H., 2015. Animal geographies III: ethics. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 40 (3), 422–430. Gillespie, K., Collard, R.C. (Eds.), 2015. Critical Animal Geographies: Politics, Intersections and Hierarchies in a Multispecies World. Routledge, London & New York. Hodgetts, T., Lorimer, J., 2015. Methodologies for animals’ geographies: cultures, communication and genomics. Cult. Geogr. 22 (2), 285–295. Hovorka, A., 2016. Animal geographies I: globalizing and decolonizing. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 41 (3), 382–394. Hovorka, A., 2017. Animal geographies II: hybridizing. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 42 (3), 453–462. Hovorka, A., 2018. Animal geographies III: species relations of power. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 43 (3). Philo, C. and Wilbert, C. (2000). Animal spaces, Beastly places: new geographies of human-animal relations. Routledge, London & New York Urbanik, J., 2012. Placing Animals: An Introduction to the Geography of Human-Animal Relations. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanhan Maryland. Wilbert, C., 2009. Animal Geographies. International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Elsevier, New York, pp. 122–126. Wolch, J.R., Emel, J., 1995. Bringing the animals back in. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 13, 632–636. Wolch, J.R., Emel, J. (Eds.), 1998. Animal Geographies: Place, Politics, and Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands. Verso, London & New York.

Relevant Website Animal Geography Specialty Group of the American Association of Geographers http://www.animalgeography.org/.

Animal Welfare Kathryn Gillespie, Seattle, WA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Anthropocentrism A human-centered point of view that can shape social, legal, political, and economic systems and relationships between human and nonhuman beings. Cruelty A term used to describe forms of unacceptable and nonnormalized harm to animals. Cruelty discourses can be used to normalize widely practiced majority practices and villainize practices of marginalized human communities. De-anthropocentric An approach that decenters human experience as the most important consideration and aims to consider more multispecies forms of care, living, and well-being. Welfare The emotional, psychological, and physical well-being of animals, with wide variation in how this is understood. Welfare can include basic needs, such as food, water, and shelter, or recognition of more complex needs, like companionship and kinship, feelings of safety, and freedom from harm. Welfarism An ethical-political position that fundamentally accepts human use of animals but tries to reduce the harmful effects of this use.

Since the late 20th Century, geographers concerned with the lives and labors of nonhuman animals have explored well-being, flourishing, care, and violence across socially constructed species boundaries. Animal geographers have studied the messy entanglements between humans and other species, and have interrogated the socially constructed boundaries between “the human” and “the animal” and the ethical questions that these boundaries generate. Globally, there is a much longer history of deeply fraught questions over the ethical and political positioning of nonhuman animals in relation to human societies. The five major world religions each, in their foundational texts and teachings, articulate a concern for nonhuman life and offer moral guidelines for how humans ought to care for other species. Intellectual traditions from philosophy to biology have ruminated over human–animal relations, what capacities of cognition and emotion nonhuman animals possess, as well as how other species experience and live their lives. Woven through these various perspectives is concern over the welfare of nonhuman animals and how their welfare should be defined. Definitions of animal welfare vary greatly, depending on the geographic context and who is framing the conversation. Within a tapestry of definitions, the concept and practices of animal welfare are also profoundly anthropocentric, especially in the ways that welfare gets instrumentalized and commodified to advance human interests and to perpetuate widespread animal use by humans. Animal welfare is also geographically contextualized, with ideas about how animals should be treated varying widely not only within geographic places but also across different kinds of spaces. Geographies of development, globalization, and political economy compromise animal welfare in zones of multispecies conflict and in industry practices that travel and take shape globally. Within a global context, animal welfare is mobilized in cultural and racial politics of exclusion and used as a tool to exclude, vilify, and marginalize already marginalized human communities. These insights reveal that animal welfare is frequently taken up as an anthropocentric project that is more interested in reproducing the status quo than in making meaningful and profound change in the lives and deaths of other species. The question is whether welfare is a viable framework going forward or whether another framework is better suited to multispecies flourishing.

Defining Animal Welfare At its most basic, animal welfare refers to the emotional, psychological, and physical well-being of nonhuman animals. A fluid and subjective concept, welfare does not universally define for all species the boundaries between harm and care, or minimum standards of care versus a sense of flourishing for both individuals and species. Welfare refers to how animals are responding to the conditions under which they live: Some definitions of welfare require only the most basic signals of physical well-being (e.g., adequate food, shelter, water), while others call for more robust understandings of “good” welfare that acknowledges that nonhuman animals have rich inner lives and emotions (e.g., ability to express species-specific behaviors, be in relationships with others of their kind, be free from fear and harm, etc.). Global perspectives on animal welfare vary widely through a range of religious, philosophical, intellectual, and practical frameworks. Legal mechanisms operate to define animal welfare laws around the world, legislating at the national, state, or regional level what constitutes “good” welfare, to whom it applies, and in what contexts, and how welfare laws should be enforced. Along with the institution of law, social norms in place-specific contexts often dictate the way welfare

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is conceptualized and practiced based on how certain species are positioned in cultural and religious beliefs and what kinds of practices get normalized. Governments, not-for-profit organizations, and animal use industries form a constellation of formal actors determining animal welfare globally. Governments write laws to govern how humans should treat animals, sometimes running inspections of spaces of animal use to ensure proper implementation of animal welfare standards. For the most part, animal welfare legislation tends to be lax in its coverage and is routinely insufficiently enforced. Nonetheless, government is a primary framework through which animal welfare is defined. Not-for-profit organizations dedicated to advocating for improved welfare for animals have sprung up around the globe in contexts where their lives are affected by human activity. Organizations like the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and local humane societies operate at local or regional levels to advocate for educational and practical implementation of certain welfare practices, and they are also often involved in lobbying for more stringent animal welfare laws. To complete this web of formal actors, industries themselves are involved in determining how welfare gets defined. Animal use industries operate powerfully to lobby governments to write industry-friendly legislation and to keep penalties and fines for violations minimal. Animal welfare is commonly discussed in contexts where nonhuman animals are domesticated and held captive in spaces of human design and use; for instance, animal welfare is widely debated in spaces of farming, laboratory research, the keeping of pets, and in zoos and aquaria. These are sites where animals are legally categorized as property, instrumentalized for human ends, and commodified in the accumulation of capital. Each of these contexts discursively constructs animals in distinct ways that justify the human control of their reproduction, movement, lives, labors, and deaths: as food or fashion, as research subjects, as family members and objects of affection, as subjects of conservation and education. Even so-called wild or free-living animals are often subjected to human control through hunting or trapping; management strategies of culling, sterilization, and control of their movements; and human incursion into their habitats. Because animals’ lives and deaths are so thoroughly shaped by human decision-making and behavior, their well-being and flourishing are regularly, profoundly compromised, subordinated to human interests and priorities. Animal welfare, then, becomes a coded way of talking about nonhuman animals’ well-being within the widely accepted frameworks of animal use and human encroachment on animals’ bodies and spaces.

Anthropocentrism and Welfare: Instrumentalization and Commodification The concept of animal welfare remains persistently anthropocentric, defined as it is (in practice and theory) by humans and situated as it is within taken-for-granted norms about animals’ place in human societies. Humans determine how welfare is defined for other species (for instance, what constitutes good welfare for a dog or a cow) and, at the same time, are in positions of significant power and control over how nonhuman individuals and species live and die. Furthermore, welfare is also often understood in relation to capacities (how animals think, feel, move, etc.), and these capacities are most often hierarchized in relation to normative human capacities. Those framed as “higher-order” species (like chimpanzees or cetaceans) will typically have more robust welfare guidelines attached to their care in spaces of captivity, while “lower-order” species (such as rats, mice, or chickens) will have few or no welfare guidelines or protections. In the United States, for instance, the Animal Welfare Act of 1996 (enforced by the United States Department of Agriculture) protects certain animals in spaces of human use; in research laboratories, the Animal Welfare Act sets minimum standards of care in the feeding, housing, and veterinary care of species like nonhuman primates, cats and dogs, and other warm-blooded species (with the exception of rats, mice, and birds who have fewer protections). Cold-blooded species, such as amphibians and fish, are excluded entirely from the Animal Welfare Act, reflecting their hierarchical positioning as distant from humans and other “humanlike” animals. The anthropocentrism of animal welfare is a cause for concern because of the myriad ways that animals are used and instrumentalized by humans; because humans have a vested interest in continuing to use other animals as they see fit, humans determining how welfare is understood in other species represent a profound conflict of interest. One result is the euphemistic or oxymoronic language that humans use to conceal violence against nonhuman animals and the well-established narratives humans construct to normalize this violence. The term humane slaughter in agricultural contexts, for instance, rebrands the act of killing an animal in their adolescence and claims that this killing (through legal regulatory mechanisms and certain practices of slaughter) can be made humane. In fact, raising animals for food results in premature death by slaughter, no matter how well they have been cared for during their lives, and this killingdno matter how normalizeddinvolves significant violence against the animal. In some farming contexts, the word euthanasia is used to refer to slaughter, euphemistically renaming as a “good death,” an inherently violent process that is not in the interest of the animal. Euthanasia, which is more often colloquially used to describe killing or death that is in the best interest of the being themselves, is also a common term to describe killing animals in laboratory settings. When animals are no longer useful as research subjects, either because a study has ended or because the animal has been used in a way that fundamentally compromises their well-being and survival, laboratories will most often kill them and dispose of their bodies as biomedical waste. Zoos, too, kill animals prematurely in the case of those termed surplus animals. Marius the giraffe at the Copenhagen Zoo in Denmark drew public attention to this common practice of killing animals in 2014 when he was killed and fed to the lions in front of a crowd of onlookers. Normalizing the killing of animals through discursive mechanisms of humaneness, euthanasia, and surplus is a key feature of constructing a powerful narrative of animal welfare in situations of animal use by humans. Premature death by killing is, in many ways, the most difficult site to maintain a strong sense of animal welfare, since it involves an irreparable and ultimate

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harm (killing), and so an enormous amount of energy in animal use industries is dedicated to normalizing and naturalizing this violent act. Practices of killing animals as well as how animals are raised in animal use industries such as agriculture, biomedical sciences, and zoos and other sites of entertainment reveal how these industries have instrumentalized notions of animal welfare to make various forms of animal use palatable and profitable. In some geographic and sociopolitical contexts, practices contributing to animal welfare in raising animals are commodified, used to help sell the commodities derived from the appropriation of animal lives. In the case of free-range or cage-free egg farming in the United States, for instance, the absence of cages or the ambiguous term free-range is used in marketing to appeal to consumers concerned with the well-being of farmed animals. Such animal welfare discourses used in marketing signal to the consumer that the company is concerned with the well-being of animals, and it signals that they have reflected on problems of poor welfare and responded to concerns through implementing animal welfare improvements. The consumer, then, is reassured and purchases that product over another without animal welfare marketing so that they continue their consumption and use of animals uninterrupted. The cage-free hen, however, although she might not be confined to a cage, is still raised in captivity, bred to lay an egg nearly every day, and will be slaughtered after a few years when her reproductive system begins to fail; welfare says nothing about the fundamental ways that she is instrumentalized and commodifieddkilled when she is no longer usefuldfor human ends. Welfare is also leveraged in the commodification of animal bodies through logics that highlight how good welfare results in better animal-based products. For instance, animals who are not beaten or harmed physically experience less bruising, which results in less damage to their flesh and thus less “waste” when they are slaughtered and dismembered for meat production. Stress hormones also alter the taste and quality of animals’ flesh consumed as meat, so from a business perspective, better welfare and less stress in animals leads to greater profits. This is a familiar discourse circulating within meat and dairy industries: Good welfare can increase profits. To illustrate, Temple Grandin, a US-based animal scientist involved in redesigning slaughterhouses, has committed to improving the experiences of animals (cows in particular) as they move into and through the slaughterhouse. Grandin’s designs reduce fearful responses that cause animals to balk in the moments leading up to slaughter, resulting in cows moving more efficiently through the slaughter line. With a reduction of stress and spatial designs of slaughterhouses oriented around the efficient movement of animals to their deaths, the meat industry can kill more animals in less time, driving profits up while simultaneously claiming improved welfare standards; however, this kind of instrumentalization and commodification of welfare, as it is oriented around profitability and efficiency, still denies the profound harm done to animals in food production and operates from the assumption that animal use is inevitable, necessary, and ethically justified in the first place. Welfare as a concept and a practice still reinforces the anthropocentric entitlement of humans to nonhuman animals’ lives, bodies, and reproductive outputs, entrenching an unquestioned hierarchy between humans and other animals.

Geographies of Animal Welfare Conceptions of animal welfare vary depending on their geographic context and the cultural, religious, and political positioning of each species within these contexts. Indeed, as geographers have aptly noted, the kinds of spaces (e.g., farms, zoos, laboratories) and geographic places (e.g., countries, cities, rural areas) where nonhuman animals are located largely determine how their welfare is conceptualized. This varied understanding of welfare is true of the geographic contextdfor instance, the country or state where the animal is located can shape in important ways how they are cared for, harmed, and understood in legal terms. Krithika Srinivasan illustrates how, in India and the United Kingdom, free-roaming dogs are understood and managed very differently: In the United Kingdom, dogs are legally categorized as property and therefore an unowned dog is understood as a stray (signaling their out-ofplaceness and their need to be managed through capture, sheltering, and sometimes killing). In India, by contrast, dogs who are not owned are understood as street dogs (not out-of-place but belonging to the street, and their care and management manifests differently, sometimes through feeding, or through trap, neuter, and release programs). Although, as Srinivasan notes, India’s animal welfare laws are at least partially modeled on those of the United Kingdom, dogs are one species differently conceptualized within an Indian cultural context. Even within a particular geographic place, a particular species inhabiting a particular space may prompt different welfare concerns than that same species located in a different space. To continue with the example of Indian dogs, domesticated canines are conceptualized both as pets and as street dogs; pet dogs in India are legally categorized as property, while street dogs are not framed as property. This framing of dogs as not always already defined as property highlights the spatial dimensions of animal welfare law. In a different geographic context, a cow used in biomedical research in the United States might be protected under the Animal Welfare Act of 1996, which offers protections for certain warm-blooded animals in research laboratory settings, but that same cow would be exempted from protections under the Animal Welfare Act if raised in an agricultural setting (where federal animal welfare laws do not apply). The way animals are categorized and regulated also shapes how they can enter spaces (or not): For instance, service dogs who are trained as companions for humans with disabilities are permitted into public spaces such as grocery stores, whereas free-living or pet dogs may not be. Geographic context, as well as categorizations of species, shapes the lives and well-beingdthe inclusions and exclusionsdof nonhuman animals in relation to spaces of human movement and life. As human sites of development expand and encroach on forests and wildlife habitats, debates over free-living or wild animals’ welfare proliferate, especially where this habitat loss results in human–animal conflict. Kalli Doubleday’s research focuses on how human[HYPHEN]carnivore conflict in India has made global news recently, as loss of habitat and human proximity to carnivores

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(such as leopards and tigers) result in violent clashes (carnivores killing or injuring humans or killing domesticated animals with violent responses by humans). The outcome is often killing of leopards or tigers by humans or capturing these animals and condemning them to a life in captivity. In the United States, coyotes have long been framed as a problematic species, first as threatening to farmed animals on ranches throughout the western United States, and more recently through coyotes’ presence in urban and suburban areas where they may kill domesticated pets such as cats and dogs for food. Coyotes are killed fairly indiscriminantly as a result, through trapping, poisoning, or hunting to protect other categories of animal life seen as more valuable (the profitability of farmed animals, and the cherished place of love that pets have in families). Recent international attention has turned toward multispecies conflict in palm oil production; orangutans and other forest animals have been killed, injured, and displaced by the destruction of habitats for the production of palm oil (a ubiquitous ingredient in many processed foods). These sites of encounter and conflict dramatically influence the welfare of wild species (leopards, tigers, coyotes, orangutans) as human interests, livelihoods, and well-being eclipse animals’ autonomy, survival, and flourishing. These are geographically specific sites of compromised welfare and require nuanced conversations about multispecies well-being in their resolution, especially so as globalized networks of trade, development, and markets expand. In an increasingly globalizing landscape, ideas and practices of welfare travel around the world, in effect globalizing notions of welfare and norms of animal use. Industry practices with real implications for animal welfare are innovated in one place and then travel across national borders, transforming the way animals are bred, live, and die globally. High intensity, industrial chicken factory farming practices, for instance, developed in the eastern United States, have been exported around the world to places like Peru where, in addition to being used as a model for Peruvian chicken farming, they have been adopted in the farming of other species, such as the guinea pig. Conceptualized in places like the United States as pet or research subject, guinea pigs (or cuyes) have also long been a traditional indigenous Andean food source. As María Elena García explores, guinea pigs have been co-opted in the globalizing efforts of Peru’s gastronomic boom, necessitating a scaling-up of production and a shift toward industrial models of guinea pig farming with deleterious consequences for both the guinea pigs themselves and for indigenous communities who traditionally raised them. Globalizing logics of efficiency, mass production and consumption, and commodification in human–animal relations utilize animal welfare to shape notions of civilization, progress, and development. These spatial dimensions of animal welfaredhow welfare is understood, how different species are included and excluded from particular spaces, and how welfare plays out in a shifting landscape of globalizing political economiesdare why geographic analyses of human–animal relations are so important. Differing conceptions of welfare, for instance, can highlight how context-specific normalization of violence occurs and how these norms become further naturalized as they spread to other places and cultural contexts.

Welfare or Cruelty? Cultural and Racial Politics in Animal Welfare Animal welfare is frequently caught up in highly contentious cultural and racial politics within and between human societies. Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson argue that animal welfare law is dependent on relationships between norms of animal treatment by majority groups and practices viewed as outside the norm (often practices of racialized and marginalized communities). They highlight how actions deemed cruel are legally framed as outside of norms of animal treatment; actions that are normalized by the majority cannot be legally categorized as cruelty because they are protected by the way the law itself is written. An example from the United States about the relationship between cruelty laws and normalization of violence against animals is embedded in the structure of federal and state laws: Farmed animals are protected at the federal level only by the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (which covers transport to the slaughterhouse and treatment of animals during slaughter); the only other protections they are afforded are under state anti-cruelty laws, but most states have what are termed common farming exemptions that exempt any practices deemed common or customary (i.e., normalized) by the industries themselves. Which practices get framed as norms and others as acts of cruelty are often, when it comes down to their impact on the animal, arbitrary and have more to do with the dominance of majority practices than animal well-being. Discourses of cruelty to animals are often used to further marginalize already marginalized communities by defining as “cruel” non-majority practices. In India, discourses of cow protectionism have been used by right-wing Hindu nationalists to incite strong anti-Muslim sentiments, resulting, for example, in the lynching of Muslims believed to be involved in cowtrading for beef. Yamini Narayanan highlights how Hindu cow protectionism is leveraged to ban beef and thus criminalize Muslims and “lower-caste” Hindus who may consume beef; this Islamophobia and casteism is couched in concern over the welfare of cows, ignoring the fact that the dairy industry (which is enthusiastically supported by Hindus throughout India) is implicated in the mass slaughter of cows for domestic beef consumption as well as to sustain a booming beef export economy. The violence inherent in dairy production, then, gets framed as a majority practice that involves good welfare considerations and cow protection, while a non-majority practice (beef consumption) gets framed as cruelty, and thus bad animal welfare. But dairy production relies on a thriving beef economy, since cows are slaughtered when their productivity and reproductive capacity declines; thus, violent objections to beef are less about actual animal welfare and more about cultural, religious, and political belief systems. Cultural beliefs about which animals are appropriate to eat proliferate around the globe. The ubiquity of consuming cows, pigs, and chickens in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, for instance, while keeping other species like dogs and cats as pets, is based on long-established norms (that are fairly arbitrary) about categorizing species. The arbitrariness of these distinctions is lost, though, in public outrage in the United States and United Kingdom over the routine consumption of dogs

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in places such as South Korea and parts of China. Dominant ideas about animal welfare rooted in industrialized agricultural models of pig, chicken, and cow farming are at odds with other cultural practices, involving other species. Public discourses in the United States and United Kingdom, then, will leave unquestioned majority practices of factory farming, while practices of raising dogs for meat are framed as cruel and barbaric, even though the actual practices do not differ drastically. Animal welfare organizations (like the Humane Society of the United States), that are concerned with many different animal welfare issues, regularly mobilize the widespread public outrage against events that celebrate the consumption of dogs. The Yulin Dog Meat Festival in Guangxi, China, for instance, has come under widespread scrutiny in the West, as racialized discourses of barbarity and cruelty are used to criticize the practice of eating dogs, while working to normalize the majority practice of eating pigs or cows. Similar racialized discourses emerge in the context of the dolphin drive hunt in Taiji, Japan, which has become another site of international scrutiny for animal welfare reasons. To be sure, it is not that these practices do not raise serious questions about violence and harm against nonhuman animals; rather, it is that there is a profound unevenness in which practices can harm animals and still be constituted as good welfare (farming pigs, cows, and chickens) and which are framed as inherently cruel (killing dogs or dolphins for meat). Even practices approved within animal welfare law can be taken up and leveraged in highly politicized ways that promote xenophobic and Islamophobic agendas. In Europe, for instance, ritual forms of slaughter, like Halal slaughter, that are approved in animal welfare laws have come under attack from right-wing anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim groups. Kymlicka and Donaldson explain how these groups have never before been concerned with animal welfare, but see ritual slaughter as a minority practice that can be coded as cruel and thus instrumentalized as an exclusionary tactic in immigration politics. Thus, animal welfare law, in how it is written and renegotiated, can be instrumentalized for human political ends that work to further marginalize and exclude already precarious human communities. Meanwhile, majority practices remain safely out of the realm of scrutiny through their normalization and comfortable legal positioning in animal welfare law, regardless of how thoroughly they may in fact compromise animal well-being. It is important, then, in considering animal welfare discourses and practices to think about how they advance racially and culturally fraught political positions.

From Welfarism to Liberation? One way to understand animal welfare is to think about the questions that notions of welfare or well-being prompt about how humans should treat, and be in relationship with, other animals. Are other animals here for humans to use as they wish? Should they be given rights, and should they be incorporated as co-citizens in what have thus far been predominantly conceptualized as human nations? Should nonhuman animals be considered kin, as some Indigenous ways of knowing suggest? Within a broad tapestry of ways that human–nonhuman relationships are understood or imagined, animal welfare has been taken up as a particular kind of political position. To call someone a welfarist in a global context generally signals their fundamental acceptance of the use of animals for human purposes and a concern over the impacts of this use on animals. Welfarists would concern themselves with the cage size for a hen raised for eggs, for instance, or how she was treated during her life, transport, and slaughter, but they would likely not object to the fact that her life and death were oriented arounddor, indeed, that she was brought into being fordcommodified egg production in the first place. Welfarism has been challenged for its tacit acceptance of nonhuman animals’ subordinate status in human hierarchies of care, and its complicity in ongoing structures of animal exploitation through making this exploitation appear more palatable. In contrast to the welfarist position, an animal rights approach fundamentally objects to animal use by humans by passing laws giving legal rights to animals that would protect them from harms caused by humans. Rights could also potentially prevent humans from exploiting animals for human ends in the first place, since many forms of animal use violate basic standards of rights to living on their own terms. In this vein, the Nonhuman Rights Project, for instance, has fought for legal rights for certain nonhuman animalsdthose closest to humans in normative human-based notions of intelligence (cetaceans, great apes, African gray parrots, etc.). Animal rights activists and scholars are dedicated to reformulating existing legal frameworks to accommodate a wide range of species, imagining how animals can become co-citizens or persons under the law. This approach involves legal reform and a broad expansion of how humans conceptualize their relationship to other species. For instance, animal rights perspectives fundamentally oppose a sense of human entitlement to the bodies and lives of other species and reject the categorization of animals as property. And yet, feminist and Indigenous scholars have criticized the rights framework for its persistent centering of a Western liberal intellectual and legal tradition. As Maneesha Deckha argues, law itself is an anthropocentric institution, thus urging the question of whether granting rights to nonhuman animals within a rights framework can make meaningful progress in humans’ treatment and ways of knowing other animals. If law is written by and for humans (and, importantly, particular kinds of humans, as critical race scholars have pointed out), can it meaningfully be expanded to include a multiplicity of nonhuman species (especially species less similar to humans)? Sharing similar concerns, Billy-Ray Belcourt locates a rights-based discourse about nonhuman animal liberation squarely within a settler colonial logic in the North American context; in its place, he advocates for a decolonial animal ethicdone that recognizes domesticated animals as colonized subjects and rights and welfare discourses as settler colonial projects in need of decolonizing. What can be learned from feminist and Indigenous animal studies scholars, then, is that neither a rights nor welfare approach to animal well-being is sufficient. A new paradigm is needed for de-anthropocentic multispecies flourishing that honors species alterity and imagines a more robust and radical framework of care.

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Further Reading Belcourt, B.-R., 2015. Animal bodies, colonial subjects: (Re)locating animality in decolonial thought. Societies 5, 1–11. Buller, H., Morris, C., 2003. Farm animal welfare: a new repertoire of nature-society relations or modernism re-embedded. Sociol. Rural. 43 (3), 216–237. Buller, H.J., Roe, E., 2013. Modifying and commodifying farm animal welfare: the economisation of layer chickens. J. Rural Stud. 33, 141–149. Deckha, M., 2013. Initiating a non-anthropocentric jurisprudence: the rule of law and animal vulnerability under a property paradigm. Alta. Law Rev. 50 (4), 783–814. Donaldson, S., Kymlicka, W., 2011. Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford. García, M.E., 2013. The taste of conquest: colonialism, cosmopolitics, and the dark side of Peru’s gastronomic boom. J. Lat. Am. Caribb. Anthropol. 18 (3), 505–524. Gillespie, K., Collard, R.-C., 2015. Critical Animal Geographies: Politics, Intersections, and Hierarchies in a Multispecies World. Routledge, London. Greenhough, B., Roe, E., 2010. From ethical principles to response-able practice. Environ. Plan. D Soc. Space 28 (1), 43–45. Kim, C.J., 2015. Dangerous Crossings: Race, Species, and Nature in a Multicultural Age. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S., 2014. Animal rights, multiculturalism, and the left. J. Soc. Philos. 45 (1), 116–135. Narayanan, Y., 2017. Dairy, Death, and Dharma: The Devastation of Cow Protectionism in India. Animal Liberation Currents June 18. Available: https://www. animalliberationcurrents.com/dairy-death-dharma/. Philo, C., Wilbert, C. (Eds.), 2000. Animal Spaces, Beastly Places. Routledge, London. Srinivasan, K., 2013. The biopolitics of animal being and welfare: dog control and care in the UK and India. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 38 (1), 106–119. Wolch, J., Emel, J. (Eds.), 1998. Animal Geographies. Verso, London.

Relevant Websites American Veterinary Medical Association, https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Reference/AnimalWelfare. Animal Welfare Board of India, http://www.awbi.org/. European Union Animal Welfare, https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare_en. Humane Society International, http://www.hsi.org. International Fund for Animal Welfare, https://www.ifaw.org. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, https://www.spcai.org/about-spcai/. United States Department of Agriculture Animal Welfare, https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalwelfare/. World Animal Protection, https://www.worldanimalprotection.us.org/.

Anthropocene Nigel Clark, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Critical threshold The boundary or “tipping point” between two different operating states of a system. Earth system The envelope of relatively mobile physical processes at, just beneath, or just above the Earth’s surface. It is composed of the interactions between the Earth’s “spheres”: including the atmosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and biosphere. Gaia hypothesis The theory proposed by James Lovelock in the 1970s that living organisms interact with the nonliving processes of the Earth in ways that help maintain and regulate planetary conditions so as to be conducive to the continuation of life. Geophilosophy Originally a derogatory term for thought anchored in a homeland or native soil, but recuperated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to refer to an understanding of thought as emerging with and through the complex, dynamic processes of Earth and life. Gradualism An idea prevalent in the late 18th- and 19th-Century natural sciences that transformation occurs through the slow, continuous accumulation of many small changes. Usually contrasted with catastrophism. Holocene The geological epoch that began approximately 11,700 years ago at the close of the last glacial period. It will be considered the current epoch pending formalization of the Anthropocene. Mononaturalism The ideadmost often attributed to modern Western thoughtdthat there is a single nature that operates according to the same laws in all places and times. It tends to be associated with multiculturalism and contrasted with notions of multiple worlds or a pluriverse. Negative feedback Interactions in a complex system that serve to dampen the impact of inputs or perturbation and help maintain the system in its current state Pluriverse The idea that reality is made up of a plurality of things, processes, and worldviews, usually seen to be partially connected rather fully connected or totally disconnected. Originally associated with William James, it is increasingly used in the context of the decolonization of modern Western notions of universality and mononaturalism. Positive feedback Interactions in a complex system that serve to amplify the impact of inputs or perturbation and may in this way contribute to the transformation of the system into a new or alternative state.

Much has been said about the “whole Earth” photographs taken by astronauts during the Apollo missions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It has often been observed that the contrast between the radiant blue-green planet and the dark void of space played a significant role in reimagining the Earth as a single integrated system: one in which life itself is a vital component. But lately, there has been a dawning recognition that these iconic images may have concealed as much as they revealed. While scientists are still taken with the idea that our planet operates as a unified system, they have become increasingly interested in the way that interconnectedness between components of the Earth system also makes it possible for Earth to transform itself from one state to another. In short, geoscientists are realizing that with planetary unity comes multiplicity, that the Earth is plural because of its oneness. This idea that the Earth contains difference within itselfdthat it has multiple possible operating statesdis at the core of the Anthropocene hypothesis. The headline-grabbing aspect of the Anthropocene is the claim that human activity is propelling our planet into a new operating state. This claim clearly draws attention to “us”draising questions about how humans conceive of ourselves and of the powers we have acquired. In another sense, what is most striking and original about the Anthropocene concept may not center on us at all. Arguably, the provocation of the Anthropocene lies more in the way that it poses questions about what kind of planet this is and what it might mean to be living on a threshold between different states of the Earth system. In other words, it serves to contextualize “the social” within a series of events, forces, and timescales that dramatically exceed any measure of the human. With the “geo” in its very nomenclature and a disciplinary structure made up of both human and physical components, geography appears well positioned to make a major contribution to Anthropocene debates. Human geographers have quickly mobilized in opposition to the way that Anthropocene science talks about the humandfocusing especially on the unevenness of social responsibility for impacting on Earth processes and the differentiated vulnerability to resultant changes. But should we be so confident that geography can respond to the incitements of the Anthropocene without also asking searching questions about our own disciplinary inheritance? Does human geography’s now deep-seated prioritization of sociospatial relationships really prepare us to speak about the variability and differential forces within the Earth itselfdor might our discipline itself be on the threshold of some significant transitions?

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After a brief account of the emergence of the Anthropocene idea in the Earth sciences, we consider the reception of the hypothesis by critical geographers. Having addressed the issue of who speaks for the Earth we turn to questions of how the Earth might speak or act through usdbringing us to the work of geographers who are beginning to experiment with new ways of thinking with and through planetary processes. This issue in turn opens up tricky questions about what close conversation with the geosciences might mean for the urgent task of decolonizing our thinking about the Earth.

The Coming of the Anthropocene According to the originary story of the Anthropocene, atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen exclaimed at a 1999 conference: “We’re not in the Holocene anymore. We’re in the . the . the Anthropocene” By Holocene, Crutzen referred to the relatively warm and stable 11,700-year-old interglacial epoch that, according to geological time scale, follows the turbulent glacial and interglacial oscillations of the Pleistocene. His suggestion of the “Anthropocene” as the name for a new epoch conveyed the idea that cumulative human impacts had pushed the Earth system out of the conditions defining the Holocene. The term caught on, and the Anthropocene emerged as one of the most influential and controversial scientific ideas of the new millennium. A working group, composed largely of geologists, was convened to gather evidence about whether human-induced changes in Earth processes were significant enough to qualify as a new geological epoch. From the outset scientists were aware that formal recognition could play a major part in publicizing the environmental risks posed by certain human activities and, therefore, in galvanizing political change. Crutzen and many early Anthropocene supporters are closely associated with Earth System science. An interdisciplinary field coming of age in the last decades of the 20th Century, Earth System Science is motivated by concern over human impact on Earth and life processes. Its main focus has been investigating how the different components of the Earth systemdincluding the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere, and lithospheredinteract. A key theme is the way complex physical systems are able to absorb stresses or pressures for changedup to a limit. Once this critical threshold is breached, stabilizing reactions in the systemd“negative feedbacks”dgive way to self-amplifying reactionsdor positive feedbacks”dwhich can result in rapid transition to a whole new regime or operating state. Earth system scientists are interested in this kind of nonlinear variability at every temporal or spatial scale, but they are especially concerned about systemic change at the planetary scale. Possible tipping points in global climate, leading to abrupt and irreversible climate change, are a now well-known example. But increasingly climate is viewed as just one aspect of a more encompassing set of possibilities for cascading, interconnected change in the Earth system. Along with climate tipping points, the Anthropocene has become the thematic through which much larger audiences have encountered the idea that we live on an unstable planet capable of shifting swiftly between alternate states. As Earth system scientists warn, on a densely settled globe with increasingly little uncommitted space such a transition could have catastrophic consequences for humans and many other species. We should not forget that for all their commitment to conventions of scientific objectivity, most scientists find this prospect terrifying. Whatever political issues are at stake, the geological time chartdmore formally, the International Chronostratigraphic Chartdis presided over by two rather formidable disciplinary bodies: the International Commission on Stratigraphy and the International Union of Geological Sciences, who will only consider revisions on the basis of rigorous and convincing evidence. To establish or shift boundaries in the geological time scale requires proof that a “geosynchronous” transition has occurred: a change of such magnitude that it leaves a lasting signature in the rocky strata right across the Earth’s surface. This means that responsibility for evaluating the Anthropocene hypothesis lies less in the hands of Earth system scientists and more with the much older field of geology specializing in the study of the Earth’s lithic strata. Among the many teams who are working on contentious boundaries across in the geological time scale, the Anthropocene Working Group is the first to include Earth system scientists. Their inclusion is indicative that the Anthropocene is more than just another geological boundary dispute. It is also the occasion for a new kind of geology–Earth system science collaboration and a new way of thinking about how transformation of the Earth takes place. What seems to be emerging from Anthropocene inquiry is a novel synthesis in which Earth systems scientists are becoming more interested in how past changes in Earth processes were inscribed in the lithic strata, while stratigraphic geologists increasingly consider how different strata express transitions in the Earth system. Clearly, it is a time of great change for the geosciences. Some geologists are uncomfortable with the political implications of the Anthropocene, and believe stratigraphy should avoid dealing with changes so recent that they are still in formation. The Anthropocene Working Group itself is aware that they are operating at exceptionally fine-grained timescalesdcenturies or decades as opposed to the millions of years typical of the geological time scaledraising questions about the suitability of conventional disciplinary methods. Even among supporters of the Anthropocene hypothesis there are major disagreements about the historical moment at which a geosynchronous signal was or will be laid down in the rocks. Some researchers favor an early Anthropocene linked to the ancient spread of agriculture, some prefer the cataclysmic post-1492 encounter between Europeans and the peoples of the Americas, and others vouch for the rise of fossil-fueled industrialization from the late 18th Century. The juncture chosen by the working group for its submission to the International Commission on Stratigraphy in 2016 was a set of changes associated with economic and technological globalization and population growth in the post-World War II decades. In the case that was submitted, it was proposed that only with the so-called “Great Acceleration” of the 1950s and 60s is the stratigraphic trace of human activity likely to be fully global rather than regional. At the time of writing, the evidence is still under consideration.

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Anthropocene Science in Context Before turning to human geography’s reception of the Anthropocene, it is worth considering the context from which the hypothesis emerged, which is somewhat broader than the tale of Crutzen’s famous outburst suggests. Prominent in this milieu was the International Geosphere–Biosphere Programme (1987–2015), an ambitious multidisciplinary project that helped consolidate Earth Systems science and brought concerted attention to the escalating role of humans as threats to the planetary “life support system.” More broadly, we can identify two convergent themes in the natural sciences of the latter 20th Century: the shift away from the gradualism that had predominated in thinking about Earth processes since the 19th Century and the growing anxiety about humans as agents of global environmental change. Over the last half century, a series of dramatic changes in the Earth and life sciences have made our planet appear a far more volatile place than earlier theories of gradual geological and evolutionary change had suggested. Historian John Brooke reminds us that the years 1966–73 alone saw the emergence of four major new perspectives on the dynamics of the Earth: (1) the confirmation of the theory of plate tectonics; (2) a new appreciation of the role of extra-terrestrial impacts in shaping Earth history; (3) the thesis that evolution is punctuated by catastrophic bursts linked to major geophysical events; and (4) the beginnings of the idea that the different components of the Earth function as an integrated systemdfirst expressed in the Gaia hypothesis that saw life and the nonliving components of the Earth as tightly coupled. While the latter contributed most directly to the emergence of Earth system science, all four developments paved the way for the idea the Earth is at once unified and capable of self-differentiation, that it is both singular and multiple. It should be noted that none of these new perspectives featured humans in a leading role. But the postwar years also saw an irruption of concerndoften but not always coming from scientistsdabout the human role in changing the face of the Earth. While many environmental anxieties were expressed in terms of incremental change, by the 1980s speculation about possible impacts of nuclear war were pointing in the direction of abrupt transitions in the Earth system. Scientists became concerned that widespread fire resulting from a thermonuclear exchange could trigger a rapid worldwide descent into cold, darkness, and devastating faminedor what became known as the “nuclear winter” scenario. Tellingly, the lead author of a groundbreaking 1982 paper on this topic was future Anthropocene exponent Crutzendwho went on to share a Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his contribution to understanding human threats to the Earth’s ozone layer. So we might see two very important things happening here that were soon to converge in the idea of abrupt climate change and then to come of age in the Anthropocene hypothesis. One is the idea that there is multiplicity in the Earth systemdthe notion that the Earth has thresholds that can be transgressed, leading to rapid, irreversible system change. The other is the claim that humankind might serve as the trigger of such planet-scaled systemic change. Just to be clear, these are not equivalent or symmetrical propositions: it requires multiple possible operating states of the planet for humans to be able to trigger Earth system change, but the existence of planetary multiplicity precedes the emergence of our species by billions of yearsdand is in this sense fundamentally independent of our existence. By this logic, the shift into the Anthropocene is not some human-instigated “end of nature” so much as it is one episode in a very long series of planetary transitions, each with their own triggers and trajectories. But in practical terms, the notion of a multistate Earth and of humans as Earth system agents arrived on the scene togetherdand their simultaneity can make it difficult for non-specialists to grasp their asymmetry, and their distinct temporal and spatial registers. Brought together, these two propositions offer a new understanding of possible human-induced, runaway Earth system change that we might think of as the event of the Anthropocene. Whatever decision the geological authorities arrive at over the fate of the Holocene epoch, it looks as though this scenario has firmly established itself in both scientific and popular imaginations. For scientists, sounding the alarm on nuclear winter and global climate change tended to involve an international framing of humankind. As a political act, especially during the Cold War years, de-prioritizing or challenging national interests in this way could be a career-threatening move. While often involved in research and advocacy at smaller scales, many geoscientists had come to the realization that certain processes could only be understooddand modeleddat the scale of the entire Earth systemdand this was the level at which they pitched their emergent political interventions. For these scientists and their younger colleagues, the Anthropocene is a way of extending the politicization of planet-scaled concernsdnow increasingly framed as the securing of a “safe operating space for humanity” that will help us avoid transgressing Earth system thresholds. In this light, many natural scientists also see the Anthropocene as an overture to the social sciencesdan acknowledgment of the significance of social processes that invites conversation and cooperation. While they have indeed found willing collaborators, scientists have also encountered considerable animosity from critical social thinkers over the Anthropoceneda response they can find confusing and disappointing. Human geographers have emphatically joined other social thinkers in this less-than-welcoming reception. As we shall see, to try to make sense of this situation requires us to address the recent history of human geographydand in this regard it may tell us as much about our own discipline as it does about the sciences with which it takes issue.

Geography Confronts the Anthropocene There are geographers among the social scientists who have been working closely with Earth system and Anthropocene scientists. Diana Liverman stands out, with her long-standing participation in the field of global environmental change and more recent contribution to major papers concerned with mapping planetary thresholds. Others, including Noel Castree, have made a strong

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case for human geographers to get more involved in this kind of bridge-building, interdisciplinary global change research. But the general tenor of responses to the Anthropocene in the discipline has been one of resistance and contestationdranging from constructive critique to outright hostility. It is notable that the more polemical approaches have focused on the theme of human geological agency and related questions of social power and positioning. In the main, radical or progressive geographers have taken issue with the assumption by scientists that they can speak authoritatively about the Earth and on behalf of humanity. There are at least four related and recurring points in this critique. The first pointdfor which the term “Anthropocene” is often taken as symptomaticdis the way the scientific literature takes as its object a unitary and undifferentiated conception of the human. Along with many other social scientists, geographers argue that the thesis neither accounts for the profound unevenness in historical responsibility for initiating the changes in question nor the deepseated inequality of exposure to the resultant environmental changes. Critics taking this angle rarely acknowledge that Crutzen, in the seminal “Geology of Mankind” paper made it very clear than only a quarter of humankind was culpable for the major impacts in questionda point reiterated in later Anthropocene publications. They are on stronger ground when they observe how evidence supporting the Great Acceleration argument is aggregated into a largely homogenous humankind. As we shall see, the lack of a discernible plurality of viewpoints and experiences in Anthropocene discourse has also been linked to western science’s long-standing tendency to exclude the voices of Indigenous, colonized, and other marginalized peoples. The second point is that Anthropocene scientists, in speaking “univocally” about Earth futures, insufficiently acknowledge their own social and historical positioning and the partiality that usually accompanies situatedness. In this regard, the geosciences are accused of perpetuating the modern scientific presumption of what is variously characterized as a “Gods-eye view,” a “view from nowhere,” or “mononaturalism.” A third charge is the failure of Anthropocene science to theorize adequately the societal dynamics that have given rise to the current planetary predicament. The objective of assessing human impacts in ways that are comparable to other components of the Earth system, critics argue, has led scientists to prioritize such easily quantifiable variables as demographic change and technological diffusion at the expense of identifying causal processes. In response, critical geographers have demanded that Anthropocene science address structured inequality and entrenched power relations, pointing to the necessity of engaging with capitalism, colonialism, class, race, and gender. In the absence of social structural analysis, it is claimed, Anthropocene politics and policy are likely to end up reinforcing the very sociospatial relations or power geometries that have destabilized the Earth system. A fourth point concerns questions of urgency around proposed institutional and policy changesdfor which the planetary boundaries literature is often targeted. Social critics argue that expediency itself seems to be being used as a way to circumvent more searching sociopolitical deliberation in favor of the kind of technical and managerial procedures that avoid questioning the existing social order. A variant of this argument contends that retorics of impending catastrophe could themselves be used to justify the suspension of existing political rights and to authorize risky, large-scale technological interventions. In summary, critical geographers seek to break with what they see as the prevalent top down, technocratic framing of Earth system change. In its place they wish to instigate an Anthropocene debate that is multivocal, inclusive, and willing to consider the possibility of radical sociospatial change.

SocioSpatiality and the Lost Planet Most radical or progressive geographers will find much to affirm in the drive to politicize the Anthropocene in directions other than those favored by most of its scientific proponents. But it is vital to recall that Anthropocene discourse is far more than a question of human agency. It is also matter of rethinking the variability, volatility, and potentiality of the Earth itself: a set of questions about what our planet has been before, what it might yet become, and where its thresholds lie. This means that the thematic of human impacts on Earth processes is nested within a much bigger set of issues and challenges. And yet, there seems to be a noticeable reluctance among critical geographers to press on and ask what new insights about planetary multiplicity might mean for our own disciplinary priorities and legacies. As issues signaled by the Anthropocene take hold, some humanities and social science scholars are becoming increasingly” or “planetary” turn. In an influential series of interventions, historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has explicitly questioned his own disciplinary inheritance. Chakrabarty reflects on the way that the critical social concepts, categories, and narratives he has been using throughout his career do not suffice to address the problems or possibilities being brought into relief by climate science and the Anthropocene. There is no making sense of the current planetary predicament, he argues, without following Earth processes into temporal and spatial depths where humans are not presentdwhich requires new ways of thinking with the Earth sciences. This claim has met with considerable resistance from fellow critical scholars. It is revealing that human geographers are among those who have taken Chakrabarty to task for his readiness to open up fully “inhuman” fields of inquiry where conventional social and historical critique loses its purchase. It’s worth pausing here and considering what a curious moment this is for human geography. Let us approach this situation by way of analogy. Imagine, if you will, that a “botanical turn” is taking place, in which scholars right across the social sciences and humanities are suddenly taking an intense interest in plant life. Now imagine that the discipline of botany, in the midst of this vegetative turn, produces a substantial textbook covering all of botany’s major achievements. Thumbing through the book, you discover that plants are only mentioned once or twice in a thousand or so pages. Strange, and highly unlikely, you might be thinking. But

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replace “botanical turn” with “geologic turn,” substitute human geography for botany, then observe how rarely the Earth or Earth processes are explicitly dealt with in most of today’s human geography textbooks. And this is a situation that few human geographers seem to find odd or disturbing. We need to ask what it is about the only social science with “geo” in its name that until very recently has made the Earth an almost unspeakable object. The centrality of the sociospatial in human geography since the 1970s has certainly fostered an active interest in a range of bodies, life forms, and materialities. Human geography has developed sophisticated ways of exploring how spacedincreasingly understood as more-than-humandis interconnected, mutually entangled, and coconstituted with social life. It is this interrelatedness of the spatial and the social that is the condition of geography’s “critical” stance: what makes it possible to see space as perpetually open to contestation, negotiation, or being done differently. So successful has this move been that it has become deeply suspect to conceive of any region or aspect of space that is immune to being collectively recomposed. It’s also important to remember that geography’s sociospatial turn was in part a repudiation of the discipline’s colonial associationsda context in which environmental determinism was closely linked to derogatory views of other-than-European peoples. It is this deep-seated investment in sociospatial “relationality” that seems to make it so difficult for human geographers to countenance domains that are not already or at least potentially entangled with the social. This limitation puts critical geographers in a strong position to take issue with the way Anthropocene scientists theorize human geological agency, just as it licenses them to read the end of the Holocene as evidence that there is no longer any nature that is outside of the social. But it also leaves them unwilling to delve deeper into Earth processes and histories that are beyond the reach of the socialdand to make them decidedly suspicious of those who do stray into these zones. So while sociospatial thinking is insistent that Earth science is opened up to the full force of social and political critique, there is a marked resistance to unsettling or contaminating the social from the other direction. Effectively, we are being commanded to socialize the geologic while being prohibited from geologizing the social. And this raises some searching questions about human geography’s potential role in responding to the volatility and the multiplicity that, as geoscientists would have it, inheres in our home planet. With its focus on questions of “who is the Anthropos?” and “who speaks for the Earth?” is critical geography adequately preparing us for life on a planet that may soon be radically different from the one with which we are familiar? Or are we missing the disciplinary opportunitydand responsibilitydof a lifetime?

Earthly Formations and Geologic Being Just as the Earth may be nearing a threshold, it could be that we are at a juncture every bit as significant as the one that prompted geography’s sociospatial turn almost half a century ago. If not yet mainstream, there are now promising moves in human geography in the direction of thinking and acting through the Earth. In the field of geopolitics, Simon Dalby and Deborah Dixon are among those who have begun to insist that the “geo” does real work: that it is taken as a dynamic and differentiating force rather than as the stable platform upon which the drama of the political is acted out. Dixon directs our attention to “Earthly formations”dthe shifting, excessive elemental groundings that both support and shake-up geopolitical subjects. Taking climate change and the Anthropocene as incitements, Dalby invites us to see the geopolitical acting on and through the turbulent, voluminous depths of the Earth. On other fronts in critical geographical thought there is evidence of a deepening of spatial thought into three dimensions. Geographers are tracking the way that political power and economic exploitation are being extended vertically into the depths of the Earth. In some cases, this work still cleaves to a sociospatial logic in which techniques of social power are projected down into the subterranean worlddresulting in mutual transformation of the social and the ever-expanding spaces of the subsurface. But the more substantial engagement there is with the energy and mineral-rich strata of the Earth, the more it becomes apparent that the properties, powers, and dynamics of the stratified Earth make a real difference. And the more that geological formations and Earth processes are ascribed qualities or forces in their own right, the harder it is to conceive of them as “effects” of the strategies or apparatuses that bring them into visibility. As well as looking downwards, human geographers are also looking upwards and outwards at the different physical elements of which terrestrial existence is composed. Water, air, fire, and life are increasingly being explored in ways that attend just as closely to their intrinsic attributes as to the ways in which they are entangled with social worlds. Again, as these elemental flows, the reservoirs they form, and the reactions they enter into are given full consideration, geological thought is stretched beyond the confines of sociospatial coenactment. While this kind of geographical inquiry does not necessarily engage directly with the Anthropocene hypothesis, it makes a valuable contribution to the broader geologic or planetary turn. There is also a sense in which human geography’s dual movement downwards into the subsurface and outwards in pursuit of elemental flows resonates with the way that Anthropocene science brings together knowledge of the “solid” geological strata and the study of the more “fluid” processes of the Earth system. But what is perhaps most significant is the growing willingness of geographers to venture beyond zones or regions where there is clear human presencedto pass through the realms of entanglementdand into the reaches of the incontrovertibly inhuman. What this discoverydor rather, reclaimingdof the “geo" opens up is a kind of geographical thought in which it becomes possible to ask what nonhuman processes, what planetary or cosmic powers, have made us the social beings we are today. It encourages an exploration of how forces that are far deeper, bigger, and older than we are have shaped us in various ways, and prompts speculation about how they might reshape us in the future. Understandably, human geographers doing this kind of work often engage closely with the geosciences, but rather than taking science for granted, they tend to extrapolate from and creatively

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repurpose scientific insights. Philosophy is also a source of inspiration, especially the geophilosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari that delves into the different ways that human agents tap into and join forces with the flows and strata that compose the Earth. Another important influence is feminist thought, particularly those theorists whose interest in embodiment has lead them to explore the opening of the living bodies to the nonliving Earth, and beyond this, to consider the openness of the body of the Earth to its own forms of differentiation and change. For geographer Kathryn Yusoff, drawing on feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz as well as Deleuze and Guattari, there is no living being, human, or otherwise that is not also an expression of “geologic life.” By this term she means that collective and individual bodies come into being over the long term by encountering, absorbing, and elaborating upon the geological forces of the Earth and cosmos. So while Yusoff is fully cognizant of the differential access that human groups have had to the benefits of fossil fuel, she is just as interested in the way that the excessive energies of the hydrocarbons some of us have been consuming have excited our desires, shaped our subjectivities, and transformed our bodies. We need to be clear that this is very different from environmental determinism. For, determinism of any sort works as a delimiting forcedit restricts us to a narrow range of preordained possibilities. In contrast, the idea of geologic being that Yusoff and others are proposing makes us aware of the potentiality of the Earth. It points us to inhuman powers and possibilities that always exceed whatever use humans or other living beings have so far made of them. And in this way, speculative questions are raised about those Earthly elements or processes with which we might yet join forces: the permutations of geologic life we have still to try. This joining entails more than just an impetus to new geological or planetary imaginations. As Jamie Lorimer demonstrates using the example of rewilding programs, it also involves open-ended, hands-on experiments with the living or nonliving matter of the Earth. Also advancing the theme of “wild experimentation,” Stephanie Wakefield asks what it might mean to inhabit the “back loop” of the Anthropocene. For ecologists, the back loop is where the accumulated energies and elements released by ecological collapse become available to be repurposed by opportunistic species: a possibility Wakefield extends to the difficult but hopeful improvisational work in which some humans may already be engaged as the Earth system begins to shift. Just as importantly, thinking through the Earth is also a reminder that there are real limits to our ability to influence planetary or cosmic processes. A world of dynamic and forceful becomings is also a risky world, one in which there are shocks as well as pleasant surprises, irrecoverable losses alongside emergent novelty. And such is especially the case with the rapid changes that may already be accompanying the end of the Holocene. As Lesley Head contends, these possibilities make the event of the Anthropocene as much as question of grieving for forms of life and existence that are being lost as it is a challenge of creating livable worlds.

Decolonizing Earth The opening up of sociospatial analysis to a more planetary or geocentric geographical thought leaves many questions unresolved. The issues raised by critics of Anthropocene science do not go away, although they may be subject to reformulation. Suspicions that Anthropocene geoscience takes a delocalized, universalistic perspective raise important questions about the situating of knowledge claims that need to be addressed. At the same time, such questions should not rule out taking a planet-scaled or deep temporal viewpoint. For contextualization does not limit us to a particular location or scale: it should not have a cut-off point. In the same way that it is vital to consider one’s social positioning or local environment when making theoretical or practical interventions, so too is it important that we do not to take for granted the kind of planet we inhabit or the moment in deep geological history at which we find ourselves. Handled carefully, a perspective from or through the Earth should sensitize us to the specific conditions and potentialities of this planet at this geohistorical momentdwhich is anything but a “view from nowhere.” How might such a planetary perspective play out in world jostling with other viewpoints? One of the most pressing questions raised by any conversation between human geographers and geoscience is how a western scientific view of the planet relates to other ways of studying, knowing, and experiencing the Earth. Because many scientific propositions about geological or geophysical processesdincluding the Anthropocene hypothesisdonly make sense at the scale of the whole Earth, it is often presumed that they leave no room for alternative visions, sciences, or ontologies. Geographers have joined anthropologists and other humanities scholars in challenging the mononaturalism of the Anthropocene by attesting to the value of Indigenous or traditional ways of knowing and inhabiting the Earth. There is now an important strand of critical and interpretive Anthropocene scholarship that goes beyond the idea of culturally different ways of experiencing the “same Earth” to speak of multiple ontologies that constitute their own distinct worlds. As Kyle Whyte proposes, one of the ways that a decolonizing impulse can speak back to the Anthropocene is by showing how climate and Earth system change perpetuates and deepens the damage inflicted by colonization. In this regard, Whyte argues, the passing of the familiar world of the Holocene has precedents in other experiences of destruction and loss. Indigenous scholars and others who have been colonized, enslaved, and exploited offer cogent reminders that the “end of the world” is something many peoples have already endured, sometimes repeatedly. These communities often have rich, complex, and disturbing narratives about what it is like to lose entire social and physical realities, as well as poignant and instructive accounts of what it means to live on after the world’s end. Such knowledges can unsettle the authority of the geosciences, as Heather Davis and Zoe Todd contend, not only by offering alternative ways of knowing, but by recasting the crisis of the Anthropocene as a kind of rebounding or homecoming of the catastrophes that the west has already inflicted on a world of others. In this light, is it possible to at once “geologize the social” and “decolonize the Earth?” It is important to keep in mind that western critical affirmations of deliberation, contestation, and pluralism do not necessarily create environments in which

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Indigenous or marginalized thought feels comfortable. But neither should we discount the diverse and intricate ways in which different Earthly ontologies are already conversing, coexisting and interchanging. It is also worth considering that there are human geographers who are speculatively and eccentrically reworking the materials provided by Euro-western traditions with the intention of reimagining the Earth in ways that may be more hospitable to other cultures and ontologies. Angela Last has been excavating cosmological undercurrents in modern European thought in order to set up “geopoetic” resonances with the decolonizing literature of the Caribbean. From another angle, Susan Ruddick has been revisiting semiotic themes in western philosophy in ways that encourage us to view terrestrial landscapes as systems of communicationdinfused with their own meaning, legibility, and responsiveness. Such research helps us to see that Anthropocene science, among other things, is disclosing an Earth that is stranger and more perplexing than western thought may have previously imagined. And in this way science itselfdeven or especially when it has the planet in its sightsdcan begin to look less hostile to other modes of thought than it once appeared. If we think of the Anthropocene as part of a more encompassing discovery of differential forces and pluralities proper to the Earth itself, it may be that choices between mono-naturalism and multinaturalism, a universe and a pluriverse, one or many worlds, are not the only options. If the incitement of planetary multiplicity is taken as seriously as it deserves to be then the issue of the multiplicity of human voices and experiences may begin to take on a very different cast. Human geography is unlikely to enjoy any great privilege in pursuing such issues, but if we rediscover the “geo” rumbling in our midst then we may yet find a distinctive voice among the many disciplines and collectivities now gathering at the thresholds of the Earth.

See Also: Chaos and Complexity; Climate Change; Decolonization; Environmental Determinism; Geohistory; Resilience.

Further Reading Castree, N., 2015. Geographers and the discourse of an earth transformed: influencing the intellectual weather or changing the intellectual climate? Geogr. Res. 53 (3), 244–254. Chakrabarty, D., 2009. The climate of history: four theses. Crit. Inq. 35 (2), 197–222. Clark, N., 2017. Politics of strata. Theory Cult. Soc. 34 (2–3), 211–231. Dalby, S., 2017. Anthropocene formations: environmental security, geopolitics and disaster. Theory Cult. Soc. 34 (2–3), 233–252. Davis, H., Todd, Z., 2017. On the importance of a date, or decolonizing the anthropocene. ACME 16 (4), 761–780. Head, L., 2016. Hope and Grief in the Anthropocene: Re-conceptualising Human–Nature Relations. Routledge, Abingdon, Oxford. Last, A., 2017. We are the world? anthropocene cultural production between geopoetics and geopolitics. Theory Cult. Soc. 34 (2–3), 147–168. Lewis, S., Maslin, M., 2015. Defining the anthropocene. Nature 519 (7542), 171–180. Lorimer, J., 2015. Wildlife in the Anthropocene: Conservation after Nature. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Lövbrand, E., Beck, S., Chilvers, J., et al., 2015. Who speaks for the future of Earth? How critical social science can extend the conversation on the anthropocene. Glob. Environ. Chang. 32, 211–218. Malm, A., Hornborg, A., 2014. The geology of mankind? A critique of the Anthropocene narrative. Anthropocene Rev. 1 (1), 62–69. Steffen, W., Leinfelder, R., Zalasiewicz, J., et al., 2016. Stratigraphic and earth system approaches to defining the anthropocene. Earth’s Future 4 (8), 324–345. Steffen, W., Rockström, J., Richardson, K., et al., 2018. Trajectories of the earth system in the anthropocene. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 115 (33), 8252–8259. Wakefield, S., 2017. Inhabiting the Anthropocene back loop. Resilience 6 (2), 77–94. Yusoff, K., 2013. Geologic life: prehistory, climate, futures in the Anthropocene. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 31, 779–795.

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Anthropogeography Julia Lossau, Institute of Geography, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Causal Explanations These are applied by researchers who assume that phenomena have causes (and can be explained by these causes). According to the rather linear logic of cause and effect, science is aimed at identifying causesdand not interpretations, purposes, or motivations. Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft One of the German organizations lobbying for colonial expansion. Formed in 1887 from a merger between Deutscher Kolonialverein and Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation. Ecumene The part of the Earth which is inhabited and cultivated on a permanent basis. Environmental Determinism It is the belief that society (i.e., human agencies, practices, and institutions) is causally shaped and constrained by the natural environment. Evolution It states the gradual transformation of patterns toward growing complexity. The term is often applied to life forms (simple organisms but also humankind). Lebensgebiet The habitat (“living space”) of a given species. In biologist approaches to human life, the term also refers to the area where a “volk” lives. Lebensraum See Lebensgebiet. Regional Geography It is the study of an area. Traditional regional geography assumed that a “natural” arena (e.g., Landschaften) was characterized by a unique and harmonious interplay between natural and cultural components. Social Darwinism It is a broad array of ideas based on predominantly Lamarckian beliefs, stating that human societies must compete with each other in close interaction with their respective natural environments in order to survive. Volk A German term that refers to a group of people who share the same culture, language, and history. While contemporary notions of state and nation assume that a given “volk” represents an imagined and socially constructed community, a “volk” was thought to be constituted by natural forces in Ratzel’s time. Wagner’s Law of Migration The naturalist, explorer, and evolutionary theorist Moritz Wagner aimed at integrating the significance of migration and geographical isolation into the concept of evolution. According to his “law of migration,” it is due to migration and isolation that biological divergence and specification is induced and preserved.

The compound “anthropogeography” is based on Greek roots and roughly translates into writing (about) the earth of humans. In the English-speaking world at least, anthropogeography is associated with the work of Friedrich Ratzel who, in turn, is widely acknowledged for his influence on early human geography. Ratzel (1844–1904), who had studied, among other subjects, zoology in Heidelberg and Jena, was a German pharmacist, zoologist, and journalist. After having traveled over much of Europe as well as of North and Central America, he became established as an academic geographer, first in Munich and then at Leipzig. Despite his education in the natural sciences, he developed a special interest into the relations between nature and humankind which led him to integrate humans firmly into his systematic pursuit of academic geography. Although he is often criticized today for his materialistic perspective, Ratzel led the way to a new form of human geography in which cultural, as well as natural, phenomena are subjected to systematicdand not only regionaldstudy. His work, however, is characterized by a paradigmatic ambivalence which, in turn, is eventually responsible for ongoing discussions about anthropogeography’s emplacement in the history of the discipline.

Locating Anthropogeography in Ratzel’s Work and Life With a record of more than 1200 papers and books, Friedrich Ratzel (Fig. 1) had been an exceptional academic and a rather abundant writer. A big part of his oeuvre dates back to his earlier years when he worked as a journalist for the Kölnische Zeitung. In order to help finance his academic education, he had begun to write popular natural scientific reports of his travels and field excursions. Since his journalistic activity proved to be successful, he soon started to work full time for the newspaper, and in 1873, he was sent for 2 years as a correspondent to North and Central America. The popularity his travelogs enjoyed by their academic and indeed nonacademic readership at least partly stemmed from a gift for prose composition. From his days as a journalist up to his death, he is said to have devoted himself to the depiction of nature and landscape, trying to reconcile scientific reasoning with aesthetic philosophy. Despite his success in writing journalistic, popular scientific texts, Ratzel resigned from the Kölnische Zeitung in 1875, taking up an academic career in the then young discipline of geography. After his return from the Americas, he was appointed at the Technical

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Friedrich Ratzel in summer 1807. From Helmolt, H. v. (ed.), 1906. Kleine Schriften, Bd. 1. Munich, Oldenbourg.

University of Munich; in 1886, he followed Ferdinand von Richthofen on the chair of geography at the University of Leipzig, where he remained professor until his death in 1904. As several commentators have noted, it had been his travels which had turned Ratzel into a geographer. Especially the 2 years that he spent in the United States, Cuba, and Mexico had a deep impact on his thinking and writings. His analyses of the rapid development of North American society indicate the shift of interest in his writings from the natural world to the human realm. This shift, which is constitutive of Ratzel’s Anthropogeographie, is embodied in three publications which are widely regarded as his core contributions to the founding of modern academic geography. The first of these publications was a two-volume regional geography of the United States, consisting of Physikalische Geographie und Naturcharakter der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika and Culturgeographie der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. While the latter, according to Wolfgang Natter, contained a somewhat totalitarian approach considering “every side of cultural life in North America,” it was not before the publication of his second major publicationdAnthropogeographiedthat Ratzel presented a more systematic, albeit rather general, statement of his ideas on the principles of human geography. The first volume of Anthropogeographie appeared under the subtitle Anthropo-Geographie oder Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte (Characteristics of Geography’s Application to History, 1882; revised 1899); the second volume, which was published in 1891, was subtitled Die Geographische Verbreitung des Menschen (The Geographical Distribution of Mankind). The new science of anthropogeography pursued three principal aims of investigation: (1) to describe the regions of the ecumene, and to research the distribution and groupings of humankind over it; (2) to research human migrations in their “dependency on the land;” and (3) to analyze the effects produced by the natural environment on individuals and societies. The determinism insinuated in the third aim is often said to surface even more explicitly in Ratzel’s third major work. In his Politische Geographie, oder die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehres und des Krieges (1897; second edition 1903), Ratzel outlined a theory of expansionism which he developed out of the central concept of Lebensraum, defining the state as an “earth-bound organism”: “The distribution of mankind . over the earth’s surface has all the distinctive characteristics of a versatile body which expands and contracts alternatively in regression and progression, building new connections and disrupting old ones, and thereby assuming shapes which, to the closest, resemble the shapes of other . versatile bodies on the earth surface” (Ratzel, 1897: 1). While the question of precisely how Ratzel’s political geography can be regarded as deterministic is dealt with in more detail later, it remains to be said here that Ratzel’s interest in questions of political theory was reflected by a thorough engagement in the political life of his time. Besides being a founding member of both the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft and its predecessor, the Deutscher Kolonialverein, he participated in the establishment of the nationalist conservative Alldeutscher Verband (Pan-German League), advocating not only the need for overseas expansion but also developing an imperative for the country to develop a competitive navy.

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It is at least partly due to such political considerations and obligations that Ratzel’s work came to lack appreciation after the end of World War II. Especially in German academic discourse, Ratzel is widely regarded as the “grandfather” of German Geopolitik which has been charged of being complicit in the development of the national socialist ideology. Another reason for why Ratzel is not commonly appreciated, at least in the English-speaking worlds, is that he is hardly translated into English. As a consequence, English-speaking scholars are dependent on the writings of one of his disciples, Ellen Churchill Semple (1863–1932), who had revised and further developed Ratzel’s anthropogeography in her own work. Otherwise famous for being the first female president of the Association of American Geographers, Semple was criticized for being a key figure in theories of environmental determinism. It is thus only recentlydand partly fueled by the centennial of his death in 1904dthat there is a renewed interest in Ratzel’s ideas and their possible impact on current geographical debates.

Geography as an Independent Discipline In order to understand the significance of Ratzel’s geography for the development of the discipline, an investigation into the broader academic context in which anthropogeography evolved is insightful. During the last third of the 19th Century, that is, by the time Ratzel was appointed as an academic geographer in Germany, geography underwent its institutionalization as an academic discipline. Although geographical subjects had been taught at universities for a long time before, the discipline had not been professionalized, that is, there were hardly any chairs or departments of geography. This situation changed after 1870 when Imperial Germany aimed at educating loyal citizens and therefore promoted school subjects with a nationalistic bias, like history, German language and literature, or geography. As a consequence of geography’s academic institutionalization, the question arose of how to delineate the new subject from already existing ones. In order to legitimize geography as a true science with a distinct object of study, many scholars, at least in Germany, focused on the surface of Earth which was supposed to be explained in causal terms and by genetic arguments. As a consequence, geomorphology became the central approach, making Ferdinand von Richthofen one of the most important scholars of this time. For von Richthofen, who had studied geology, geography represented the science of the earth’s surface and of the phenomena causally and reciprocally related to the former. Due to the scientific character of their frameworks, the time of von Richthofen and likeminded colleagues, for example, Oscar Peschel, is referred to as the “geological period” of geography as an academic discipline. It is in the context of the geological period that the significance of Ratzel’s geography becomes obvious. Ratzel, too, sought to justify the newly established discipline, reasoning about its position among other fields. In the opening pages of Anthropogeographie, he asks: “Is geography actually nothing more than a heap of twigs effectively belonging to other trees that have been thrown together for . practical reasons, and are there boundaries capable of separating geography sharply from neighboring disciplines?” (Ratzel, 1882: 16) Regarding the question of whether geography is an independent discipline, Ratzel makes it clear that, to him, geography enjoys a privileged viewpoint: “And this viewpoint is the synopsis of the earth’s surface and the life that belongs to it as whole combined by the most manifold reciprocal relations” (Ratzel 1882: 17). Compared to many of his colleagues, Ratzel paid greater attention to the “human factor,” that is, to the relations between humankind and nature or the Earth’s surface. As Wolfgang Natter puts it, Ratzel’s innovation was to develop perspective on the “reciprocal historical–geographical development of humans and their social, cultural, and political emplacements in relation to the earth’s surface” (Natter 2005: 179). By positioning humans as a factor of geographical enquiry, Ratzel challenged the discipline’s preoccupation with geology as it had been developed in the writings of Richthofen or Peschel. All of this is not to say that Ratzel’s perspective turned geography, in any way, into a social science. Although anthropogeography (re)introduced human aspects into a predominantly physical geography, it firmly rested on a framework of causal explanations, cause–effect relationships, and natural laws characteristic for the sciences of his era. As a consequence, Ratzel was criticized by his French contemporary Emile Durkheim, the founder of academic sociology. Durkheim, in his journal L’année Sociologique, reviewed both Ratzel’s Anthropogeographie and Politische Geography. On the one hand, he appreciated Ratzel’s contributions in that they had underlined the significant role that the “geographical factor” played for human life. On the other hand, Durkheim clearly disapproved of the idea that there were direct relations between the Earth and humankind. Ultimately interested in how the transformation of societydand more specifically the division of labor in industrializing societiesdshaped the conditions of human life, Durkheim aimed at explaining spatial patterns by human agency, and not vice versa. Ratzel, by contrast, kept insisting that geographical knowledge had to be derived from the Earth or the ground (Boden). In so doing, Ratzel was influenced by Darwinian concepts of evolution through natural selection and the struggle for existence. Not only had he, as a student, attended lectures of Ernst Heinrich Haeckel, whose Sozialdarwinismus encompassed a series of evolutionary theories, for instancedand very prominentdthe neo-Lamarckian principle of direct heritable adaptation. He had also incorporated ideas of the naturalist, explorer, and evolutionary theorist Moritz Wagner who aimed at integrating the significance of migration and geographical contact into the concept of evolution, thus posing a certain challenge to Darwin’s evolutionism. According to Marc Bassin, the relationship with Wagner, whom Ratzel had met in the winter of 1871–72 in Munich, represented the most significant influence on Ratzel’s intellectual development, using Wagner’s “Law of Migration” as the foundation for Ratzel’s anthropogeography. Taking up Wagner’s idea of the Lebensgebiet as the territorial base of a given species, Ratzel developed his concept of Lebensraum, or living space, which he repeatedly emphasized as being of elemental significance for his work. To Ratzel, every living organism required a specific, definite area from which to draw sustenance in order to come into existence. This, he held, was not only true for individual living organisms but also included collectives, such as herds of animals or entire

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populations. Even more importantly, and by means of a consistent biological analogism, Ratzel went on to apply his concept of Lebensraum to human society, conceptualizing the political state as the corresponding organism or “aggregate organism.” It is precisely the idea of the political state as organic or biogeographical unit depending on, and at the same time struggling for, Lebensraum that represents the source of competing geographical imaginations standing at the heart of anthropogeography.

Competing Geographical Imaginations Ratzel argued that the state as spatial organism “naturally” seeks to grow beyond a given area. Due to population growth ultimately dictated by the laws of nature, the space need of a state organism would grow. The resulting tendency of the state to requiredand acquirednew territory is a core idea in Ratzel’s anthropogeography which led him to formulate his “law of the growing areas” (Gesetz der wachsenden Räume, varied as Gesetz der Zunahme der politischen Räume, Gesetz des räumlichen Wachstums der Staaten und Völker). At the same time, however, Ratzel noted growth was confined by the limited surface of the Earth. Reflecting on the contradiction between the “law of the growing areas,” on the one hand, and the narrowness of the Earth’s territory, on the other hand, Ratzel believed in the existence of a constant “struggle for space.” Thinking of space as “the very first condition of life,” he maintained that the (Darwinian) concept of a “struggle for existence” was actually to be thought of as a problem of spatial finiteness (Ratzel, 1901). Despite his idea of a “struggle for space,” Ratzel never lost sight of a second, and rather different, geographical imagination. Both in line with and contradictory to the “law of the growing areas,” his anthropogeography entails the idea of “natural lands” (Länder) which, in turn, represents the demarcated territories of (supposedly) socially homogenous entities or nation-states. The idea of a “natural land” figures, for instance, in Ratzel’s definition of the state as an organic whole which, for him, developed out of the interaction between a specific group of people and the discrete territory the group occupiesdEin Stück Menschheit und ein Stück Boden, as he famously wrote in 1903. According to this more bounded imagination, the bonding of the group depended not so much on ethnic or racial kinship but on the shared relationship to the land. This view is further underlined in Ratzel’s definition of a Volk as a collective of individuals which are integrated first and foremost “through their common territory (Boden) (Ratzel, 1903).” In accordance with the second imagination, Ratzel disapproves of what can be called arbitrary boundaries, that is, boundaries which (supposedly) violate the laws of nature. While the passion for expansion, in Ratzel’s opinion, necessarily leads to a transgression of natural boundaries, it is nevertheless impossible to fully overrule the related natural land: The “right to particular (i.e., individual) development as it is given in the forms of the Earth’s surface” is said to counter the striving for growing areas of exchange as well as growing states (Ratzel, 1903: 207). For Ratzel, it is the multifacetedness of the Earth itself which demands multiple political entities. The Earth’s “limbs,” he goes on to explain, "continuously pertubate the very monotony which strives to blanket terrestrial polymorphism” (ibid.; see Fig. 2 for an example of a natural Land).

Anthropogeography as Imperialist Transformation of the Classical Paradigm of Geography It is against the background of the competing geographical imaginations that Hans-Dietrich Schultz (1998) sees a “cycle of growth and defeat of progress and collapse” at work in Ratzel’s writings. Given the limited surface of the Earth, the natural impulse of growth necessarily leads to a form of spatial implosion which, in turn, represents the starting point for another process of growth and, again, collapse. According to Schultz, this cycle indicates a transformation of the classic concept of geography which rested upon the idea of a close relationship between humankind, on the one hand, and nature, on the other hand. Revolving around

Figure 2 Cover illustration of Ratzel’s book on Germany. The illustration allegorically depicts the typical German landscapes of lowlands, midrange mountains, and the Alps. From Ratzel, F., 1898. Deutschland. Leipzig, Grunow.

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Figure 3 The classical paradigm of geography. The figure shows three spatial entities: state, land (natural area), and nation (Volk). According to the classical paradigm of geography, these entities, in the course of history, strive toward teleological congruency. From Schultz, H.-D., 1998. Herder und Ratzel: Zwei Extreme, ein Paradigma? Erdkunde 52, 127–143.

the concept of Ganzheit or “wholeness” as it had been developed by the philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder and reproduced, for example, by the early geographer Carl Ritter, the classical paradigm regards the region (Land or Landschaft) as individual and unique part of the Earth’s surface. As Fig. 3 shows, the rationale behind the classical paradigm assumes a harmonization between a given “natural land,” its Volk, and the related state. While this harmonization is to a certain extent reproduced in Ratzel’s work (e.g., when he writes about the Earth’s many limbs fighting uniformity), it is at the same time clearly disrupted in his “law of the growing areas.” By assuming an eternal “struggle for space,” Herder’s idea of a “fraternal community” or a “brotherhood of nations” in which all nations stick to their own limited national territory, competing peacefully in the pursuit of humanity, is dismissed. Instead, Ratzel adapts the classical paradigmdwhich had been customized to the process of nation buildingdto the political circumstances of his own era, that is, the age of imperialism. In so doing, he develops a rather bellicose concept which, to Schultz, represents nothing less than a shift from “eternal peace” to “eternal war” (see Fig. 4). It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the expansionist imagination was transformed from abstract theory into concrete politics. The applicability of Ratzel’s theoretical ideas to late 19th-Century German Tagespolitik becomes obvious, for instance, in a text written in 1898 on the naval question and Germany’s position as a world power: “There will always be ruling nations and serving nations [Völker],” Ratzel maintained, suggesting an essential choice for a Volk as being “either a hammer or an anvil.” Needless to say that Ratzel advised the German Volk to become a hammer. Germany, he wrote, “must not remain apart from the transformations and redistributions taking place in all parts of the world . if it does not want to run the risk again . of being pushed into the background for a series of generations.” (Ratzel, 1906: 377–378)

Normative Substance and Political Impact of Ratzel’s Geography Against the background of such statements, most commentators, after the end of World War II and up until today, have come to think of Ratzel’s work in rather ambivalent terms. While the central role Ratzel played for the foundation of modern geography is

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Figure 4 The imperial transformation of the classical paradigm of geography. The figure shows how the idea of teleological congruency, in Ratzel’s work, is replaced by the idea of expansion. Due to the “law of the growing areas,” the three spatial entities of the classical paradigm are characterized by incongruent movements of transgression and regression. From Schultz, H.-D., 1998. Herder und Ratzel: Zwei Extreme, ein Paradigma? Erdkunde 52, 127–143.

mostly recognized, his anthropogeography has been criticized for having suspended the will of humans in favor of eternal spatial laws governing the fate of mankind. Such judgments about the deterministic nature of Ratzel’s writings often feed in with judgments about the effects of Ratzel’s political engagement, connecting his materialistic perspective to the imperialist considerations of his time, if not to the ideological excesses of the national socialist era. More recently, however, scholars like Wolfgang Natter or, in the German-speaking context, Ulrich Eisel, have bemoaned what they regard as a certain one-sidedness in the appraisal of Ratzel’s work. Underlining Ratzel’s interest in the globalizing tendencies of the world market, they suggest that Ratzel had developed a dynamic and modern theory of space which precisely did away with the static determinism pursued by classical geography. Contemplating the merits of Ratzel’s oeuvre on North America, Natter even maintains that Ratzel identified at least part of the “dynamic of uneven development” and what David Harvey called the “spatial fix.” In addition, and with regards to the political implications of anthropogeography, Marc Bassin has detected in Ratzel’s writings a deep and genuine humanism, arguing that Ratzel’s political orientation cannot simply be read into German geopolitics after 1918, let alone into Nazi war aims. Most recently, Julia Verne has revisited Ratzel, thereby paying particular attention to his cultural geographical oeuvre. Without denying the ambivalent character of his writings, she highlights his “diffusionist ideas” which, for Verne, are derived from Ratzel’s engagement with Wagner’s theory of migration. As a consequence of the emphasis Ratzel put on mobility and diffusion, Verne considers his work “a challenging but important contribution to today’s understanding of relational spaces” (Verne, 2017: 90). In order to try to explain the differing interpretations of Ratzel’s geography, it is helpful, in a first step, to distinguish between two different forms of determinism, both relating to one of the geographical imaginations inherent in Ratzel’s work. The first one is connected to the imperialist imagination and suggests that there are immanent natural forces governing the fate and conduct of humankind (e.g., the “law of the growing areas”); the second one is more in line with the geographical imagination of the classical paradigm, drawing upon the physical environment as a causal influence on the character and development of a given Volk. For Ratzel, the fate of humans is thus determined by both the program of movement (as in the imagination of “growing areas”) and the static law of the ground (as in the imagination of “natural lands”). While this duality eventually explains the ongoing discussions about how deterministic or how modern Ratzel’s geography actually had been, it should be noted that, in both cases, “nature” is conceptualized as a determining force. In addition, “nature,” for Ratzel, had normative power in that it represented the irrevocable authority over right or wrong. As a consequence, anthropogeography could be used to provide a seemingly scientific justification for political aims, serving, for instance, as a source of inspiration for geopoliticians, such as Karl Haushofer. Although Bassin has argued that the influence of German Geopolitik on the ideology of National Socialism has been overrated since the postwar years, it is with some plausibility that Schultz suggests connectivity between Ratzel’s geography, on the one hand, and Hitler’s ideology of Lebensraum, on the other hand. According to Schultz, affinities do not so much concern the level of concrete political decision-making but rather relate to more general aspects of political reasoning which could be understood as timeless stage directions in the drama of international

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Figure 5 Two textbooks indicate the topicality of the term “anthropogeography” in German-speaking geography. The book on the left has been published in 2005. Depicting a man in a field, its cover symbolizes the very relations between man [sic] and rural environment that human geographers in Germany used to be interested in, not only in Ratzel’s time but also from the postwar era up to the 1970s. Published in 2007 in its third edition, the book on the right parallels the terms “anthropogeography” and “human geography,” thus maintaining their interchangeability (Photo: Julia Lossau).

relations. While there is no straightforward connection between Ratzel’s geography and Hitler’s war on Lebensraum, anthropogeography clearly belongs to the prehistory of the latter.

Anthropogeography Today From an English-speaking perspective, the days of anthropogeography are long over. More than 100 years after Ratzel’s death, his geography is of interest predominantly in the context of the history of geographical thought. It is interesting to note, though, that in the German-speaking context the term “anthropogeography” is in frequent use. Unlike in the English- or French-speaking worlds, the term has not been (exclusively) linked to Ratzel’s geography but is used in a wider sense to denote the whole of human geography. When Anne Buttimer wrote a paper, for instance, for the 50th anniversary of the International Social Science Council, a German version of her manuscript was published in Erdkunde, one of the leading German-speaking journals of the time. The paper’s title, “Human Geography as Social Science,” had been translated as “Anthropogeographie als Sozialwissenschaft”. While, from an outsider’s perspective, this continuity of use is disturbing given the term’s genealogy, there are research groups of Anthropogeographie (e.g., in Berlin or Leipzig), Chairs of Anthropogeographie (e.g., in Cologne or Passau), and textbooks of Anthropogeographie (see Fig. 5) in Germany up until today. The first part of the compound “anthropogeography” invokes a particular understanding of the human factor writing the earth. While “human geography” relates to humanity or, rather progressively, to (post)humanism, “anthropogeography” is more conservative in nature, emphasizing substance and physicality rather than practices of writing and interpreting the world. A prominence of substance characterizes the general orientation of German-speaking human geography which has been interested in (cultural) landscapes for much of the 20th Century. It is only following the various cultural turns of the past three decades that, in Germanspeaking geography, the term “anthropogeography” is more and more replaced by either “human geography” or “cultural and social geography.”

See Also: Colonialism; Environmental Determinism; History of Geography; Imperialistic Geographies; Political Geography; Possibilism; State.

Further Reading Bassin, M., 1987a. Friedrich Ratzel. 1844–1904. Geogr. Biobibliogr. Stud. 11, 123–132. Bassin, M., 1987b. Imperialism and the nation state in Friedrich Ratzel’s political geography. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 11, 473–495. Bassin, M., 1987c. Race contra space: the conflict between German Geopolitik and national socialism. Polit. Geogr. Q. 6, 115–134. Kost, K., 1988. Die Einflüsse der Geopolitik auf Forschung und Theorie der politischen Geographie von ihren Anfängen bis 1945. Bonn. (¼ Bonner Geographische Abhandlungen 76). Natter, W., 2005. Friedrich Ratzel’s spatial turn. Identities of disciplinary space and its borders between the anthropo- and political geography and the United States. In: Houtum, H. v., Kramsch, O., Zierhofer, W. (Eds.), B/ordering Space. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 171–186. Ratzel, F., 1882. Anthropo-geographie. In: Grundzüge der Anwendung der Erdkunde auf die Geschichte, Bd. 1. Engelborn, Stuttgart. Ratzel, F., 1897. Politische Geographie, first ed. Oldenbourg, München/Berlin.

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Ratzel, F., 1898. Deutschland. Grunow, Leipzig. Ratzel, F., 1901. Der Lebensraum. Eine biographische Studie. In: Bücher, K., et al. (Eds.), Festgaben für Albert Schäffle zur siebenzigsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages am 24 Februar 1901. Verlag der Laupp’schen Buchhandlung, Tübingen, pp. 101–189. Ratzel, F., 1903. Politische Geographie, second ed. Oldenbourg, München/Berlin. Ratzel, F., 1906. Flottenfrage und Weltlage. In: Helmolt, H. v. (Ed.), Kleine Schriften, Bd. 2. Oldenbourg, München/Berlin, pp. 375–381. Schultz, H.-D., 1998. Herder und Ratzel: Zwei Extreme, ein Paradigma? Erdkunde 52, 127–143. Schultz, H.-D., 2004. Nach 100 Jahren immer noch im Gespräch: Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904). Petermanns Geogr. Mittl. 148, 94–95. Verne, J., 2017. The neglegted “gift” of Ratzel for/from the Indian Ocean: thoughts on mobilities, materialities and relational spaces. Geogr. Helv. 72, 85–92.

Anticolonialism Neil Nunn, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Madeline Whetung, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Anticolonialism can be broadly defined as a theoretical framework, analytical tool, and grounded, place-based practice oriented toward resisting, fighting against, and dismantling the aims of colonial regimes, systems, and ideologies. Anticolonialism is closely aligned with decolonizationda practical process of revealing and dismantling colonialist power in all its formsdhowever, it differs in its primary vision of resisting and pushing back against, rather than envisioning a society free of colonial structures. While forms of anti-colonial resistance and contestation can vary widely in approach, scale, and intensity of resistance, an anti-colonial approach necessarily requires a refusal of colonial occupation and its aims, which extends beyond just reactionary approaches or self-defense. Anti-colonial thought and action emerged in resistance to European colonial expansion driven by capitalist exploitation of resources and labor in both “mother” nations and colonial posts. Colonial expansion was both enabled and justified by racist and Eurocentric ideological constructions such as the concept of terra nullius and the Doctrine of Discovery, both of which continue to underpin Western legal systems. Colonial systems are founded upon racism, and Eurowestern-derived racial categories have been used throughout colonial history to justify violent dispossession and exploitation of lands and resources. For this reason, anticolonialism cannot be understood outside broader resistances against racism, displacement and dispossession, resource extraction, and ongoing production of exclusionary hierarchies. As a broad analytical concept, anticolonialism stands in opposition to colonial regimes, both historical and contemporary, settler and extractive. Anti-colonial thought can be traced back to the work of influential scholars and activists like Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Mahatma Gandhi. These writings have typically been considered a part of the canon of both anti-colonial, decolonial, and postcolonial thinking. To make sense of the breadth of forms of resistance encompassed through an anticolonial ethic, anticolonialism has been framed as both (1) an historical event and (2) critical analytic. These interconnected approaches to fighting against colonial forces have most commonly been traced back through the 20th and 21st centuries; however, the emergence of anti-colonial actions, analyses, and strategies far precedes this period. Colonial domination has always been met with counterrevolutions, resistances, and efforts to dismantle control.

Can Geography Be Anti-colonial? Understanding Geography’s Colonial Origins If anticolonialism is about resisting and fighting against colonialism, and geography is fundamentally about engaging with and producing spatial knowledge, what does it mean to resist colonialism from within the discipline of geography? Answering this question requires examining the colonial foundation of the discipline itself. In recent decades, voices from both inside and outside the discipline of geography have begun to grapple with the implications of geography as a professional, political, and academic project that was, and still remains, fundamental to colonial projects and the perpetuation of global colonial structures. Geography’s history is entangled with the cultural supremacy of Eurowestern science, theology, philosophy, and technology, the modernist project of empire, and the exploitation and transformation of colonized territories. All of this gestures to the important but uncomfortable question: How can geography be anti-colonial? Mapping and navigation technologies that developed through modernist eras (notably Cartesian cartographical methods and the Cartesian grid) played a vital role in enabling the navigation of the world through the age of “discovery,” which facilitated colonial expansion and enaction of political authority through rationalization of space. These geopolitical techniques also worked to write over the preexisting rights and relations of indigenous people in order to dispossess them of their lands and territories. Recent discussions about the American Association of Geographers’ acquiescence, acceptance, and in some cases institutional support of military research on indigenous populations demonstrate that geography’s complicity in colonialism is not just a phenomenon of the past. Further, disciplinary support for research that helps to maintain preexisting geopolitical orders and the occupation of new territories through war and state building continues. Whether through the ongoing practices of indigenous land dispossession made possible through mapping, or the representational power of maps that naturalize Western geopolitical control, the history of Eurocentric geographic thought and practice continues to shape how settler colonial states function today. The Royal Geographical Society (RGS), for example, self-described as the UK’s learned society and professional body for geography, was historically central to colonial expansion and closely aligned with British Empirical forces through the 19th Century. Colonial practice continues within the RGS through the celebration of its history and legacy and the role it plays in perpetuating the naturalized domination of Eurowestern modes of thought. At the 2017 RGS Annual Conference, themed “Decolonising geographical knowledges,” participants at the panel “Does Geography Need Decolonising? For and Against” defended geography’s disciplinary knowledge as having objective and universal value, representing a continuation of colonial patterns and practices whereby the knowledge of the discipline is severed from the injustice it enables. The RGS remains among the largest geographical institutions in the world; it has yet, however, to fundamentally reimagine its governing organization, or the racial and power asymmetries that exist through knowledge production, or

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formally denounce its past embeddedness in violent atrocities of colonialism. Similarly, the figures celebrated and commemorated in the discipline represent continuity of the colonial past through to the present. In his educational text Man in Nature: America Before the Days of the White Man (1940), Carl Sauer expresses Eurocentric beliefs about the lack of civilization of “Indians,” myths that remain embedded in and sustain the ongoing colonial project. Critical race scholars make the important point that the celebration and commemoration of figures who engage in public expressions of racism is also a celebration of their beliefs and is indicative of powerful narratives that sanitize the past. Geographers have acknowledged that the discipline’s involvement in colonization is not solely limited to these more overt material expressions of colonial influence (geographical texts, “learned” societies, mapping) but also includes the hegemonies it produces, such as the Western ideas and categories of nature, academic practices, and naturalized beliefs of social subjects. Geographers who study colonialism are adept at identifying and describing colonial structures and practices while little thought is put into thinking around the questioning the illegitimacy of colonial nation-states, resistance to colonial projects, and reimagining societies not characterized by dispossession and supremacy. Anti-colonial thinking in the field of geography has been driven by indigenous and Black geographers outside the discipline who have offered the ideas to elucidate and critique geography’s colonial history. Though the work of anti-colonial scholars remains marginal in the discipline, geography’s historical ties to colonial projects renders their contribution even more important. Anti-colonial thought within the discipline not only allows geographers to grapple with geography’s colonial past but it also opens space to discuss how to reconcile this reality and theorize forms of resistance through a spatial lens. The growing body of anti-colonial work within geography offers new ways to conceptualize, acknowledge, and critique historical and existing structures of colonialism. Geographers have had to grapple with their historical and ongoing complicity in colonial projects and in doing so have increasingly incorporated anti-colonial and decolonial thought within the discipline. The broad temporal and geographical scope covered by anti-colonial thinking, alongside the fact that anticolonialism is continually changing and contingent upon current manifestations and interpretation of and resistance to current colonial constraint renders anti-colonial frameworks complex and necessarily reliant on revision, debate, and reconsideration.

Anticolonialism: Geography’s Response to Postcolonialism The growth of anticolonialism within human geography cannot be understood apart from critical engagements with postcolonialism. Many have identified the rise of anti-colonial thought in efforts to think critically about postcolonial challenges of race-based oppression, economic exploitation, and cultural and economic imperialism. Critics have also called into question the broadness of postcolonial cultural critique and its connotation of a time frame following colonialism. In response to this wave of dissatisfaction, proponents of postcolonialism make the convincing claim that the “post” in postcolonialism is not meant to be a temporal assertion of what follows colonialism. They instead suggest that the “post” references a colonial “transition” beyond moments of direct control by colonial regimes and often gestures to moments when archetypal imperial powers granted independence to former colonies. This line of reasoning, however, has failed to satisfy most critics. Indigenous scholars whose work is informed through lived reality within settler colonial contexts, for example, suggest that ongoing colonial occupations are not at all reflected in the prefixes “post” and “neo.” What is more, describing ongoing colonial realities in such ways disavows ongoing struggles against colonialism. Some, following the work of Patrick Wolfe, consider colonial invasion and expansion not simply an event that took place in the past but a series of practices continually reproduced through the processes, ideologies, materialities, systems, of dominant regimes. This line of thinking highlights how symbolic transfers of power have done little to change the experiences of the colonized in so-called postcolonial nations. Scholars who consider Latin American experiences of colonialism have described a more apparitional realm of cultural control whereby long-standing patterns of power produce, survive, and sustain the direct control of the colonial administration. Critics of postcolonialism from the field of human geography have specifically taken aim at the reification of a general postcolonial condition. They argue that while the broad scope and scale of many postcolonial approaches speak to a global audience and examine broad patterns of colonialism (most often from British geographical circles), they tend to obscure local specificities of colonization, resulting in a simplistic portrayals of colonial encounters. Analyses of conquest and geopolitical battles that are too broad risk separating geopolitical patterns from specific moments of violent constraint and injustice and contribute to a normalizing of history and an attendant sense of givenness, inevitability, and irreversibility of colonial occupation. Anti-colonial theorists have responded to this discomfort by highlighting the importance of place-based resistance. They suggest that locating power in a specific colonial context ensures that the particular mechanisms of colonial maintenance and production are not obscured. For Indigenous activists resisting domination in settler colonial states, this has, and continues to be achieved, by attending to a place-based reality. This grounded engagement with spaces serves as an orienting framework and ethical foundation for radical activism to emerge by offering a site to think about historical relations with people and place. This speaks to the importance of recognizing the specificity of resistance, which is held at the core of anti-colonial practice. Focusing on place-based struggles enables researchers to decentralize the monolithic epistemologies, institutions, and subjectivities that are closely aligned with ongoing systems of colonialism.

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Anticolonialism: Against Multiple Colonialisms As a broad analytical concept, anticolonialism stands in opposition to colonial regimes, both historical and contemporary, settler and extractive. Various manifestations of anti-colonial resistance predate the establishment of the concept of anticolonialism and have been retrospectively joined with anti-colonial writing, practice, and frameworks. Some notable anti-colonial movements include the Indian National Congress, the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth, the Ghanian United Gold Coast Convention, and the more recent Idle No More, Standing Rock, Unist’ot’en, and Zapatista National Liberation movements. A notable historical anti-colonial movement was the Algerian resistance that fought against the violent French occupation that began in 1830. This prolonged resistance by the Algerians was later formalized into the National Liberation Front (FLN) that took up arms in 1954 and whose actions resulted in national independence in 1962. This successful struggle led to the independence of neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. Various successful anti-colonial resistance movements have also taken place through diplomatic means. Such was the case when Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru inspired the mobilization of the Indian people in the name of self-determination against the inherent inequalities of British colonial rule. Acknowledging such historical struggles against colonialism is a powerful reminder that successful campaigns against colonialism are achievable, helping to disrupt narratives of colonized populations and cultures as anachronistic and colonial occupation as inevitable, irreversible, or divinely mandated. A key challenge of anti-colonial work is to address the way that colonial systems of control attempt to justify, legitimize, and obfuscate their very existence. As much as the colonial project has attempted to control and destroy places and bodies physically, it has also relied upon the construction of powerful narratives and mythologies, leading anti-colonial theorists to assert that it is these very processes of obfuscation, silencing, and denial that require the most critical and self-interrogative anti-colonial attention in theory and knowledge production, daily life, and practice. In the case of slavery in the United States, for example, a growing chorus argues that slavery did not end in 1865, but rather evolved into forms of terrorism, violence, lynching, and incarceration that continue to this day. The challenge of addressing the nostalgic seductions and amnesiac and revisionist histories manufactured by colonialism has been of growing interest to human geographers. Indeed, the survival of colonialism relies on a powerful normalization and romanticization of violent colonial histories and ongoing processes. Important work has sought to counteract the revisionist tendencies of colonialism by highlighting the historical continuity of ongoing occupations. Scholars such as Jodi Byrd, for instance, suggest dismantling the prevailing conditions of colonialism by acknowledging the historical continuity of the Imperial project. A similar approach can be seen through the work of Black Studies scholars (Katherine McKittrick, Sylvia Wynter, Paul Gilroy) who use the transatlantic slave trade as a reference point to argue that it is crucial to understand where the memory of slavery is made current, and how it can be used as a tool of political resistance in order to appreciate fully the weight of the colonial present.

Anticolonialism in Practice At its simplest, both within scholarship and activism, anticolonialism as a practice has increasingly been used to conceptualize opposition to all forms of domination and oppression. This all-encompassing orientation has raised some concerns about the loss of meaning for anticolonialism in specific place-based settings. As anti-colonial thought is often traced back to scholars in postcolonial or deoccupied settings, understanding anti-colonial thinking in settler colonial and neocolonial contexts is often much more difficult. Geographers have acknowledged the endurance of colonial projects and the field’s complicity and responsibility in these histories and have explored how to oppose colonialism in settler colonial countries where even the most banal aspects of daily life are structured by colonial forces. Geographers have grappled with intersectionality in anti-colonial thought and action, increasingly acknowledging that multiple modes of domination are interconnected. Misogyny, homophobia, and gender violence, for example, operate in relation to colonialism, capitalism, and other structures of domination. While there is a growing recognition that the historical origins of anti-colonial thinking also carried within it currents of misogyny and racism against other colonized groups, anti-colonial thinkers have become critical of this complex history and are striving to find ways to account for multiple systems of domination. To these ends, scholars and activists are increasingly advocating for the centering of women, queer people, people of color, youth, and elders. Many concerned with “doing” anticolonialism call for attention to the movement beyond theory and thought into active anticolonial practice, highlighting the specificity of anti-colonial thought in place and unpacking the specificity of colonial powers as they exist in specific spaces. Indeed, this is a vital element of anti-colonial practice that helps to avoid universalizing anti-colonial theories and approaches. Geographers must consider what anticolonialism means in a settler colonial state wherein settlers, arrivants, and other indigenous peoples move in different ways in, through, and against the state, as well as what anti-colonial practice means in an increasingly interconnected world where the daily actions of some have tangible impacts on others facing oppression in far-reaching parts of the world. As Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Simpson has argued, one must think internationally and interrelatedly in order to oppose dominating systems of power. Geographer Laura Pulido’s work on being a scholar-activist highlights the role that scholarship can play in supporting activist endeavors, showing how opposition to colonialism can be an individual mindset, but it must be a collective practice. A relational and inclusive ethic of fostering resistance is crucial for anticolonial practice.

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The Future of Anti-colonial Geographies Geography must confront and challenge its complicity in all colonialisms, past and present. Given this history and current reality, can geography be anti-colonial? In considering what constitutes geography now, as well as the colonial structures and systems from which it emerged, anti-colonial geographers must also be aware of who produces and engages in geographical practice. Important also is maintaining an awareness of how colonial patterns are reproduced through good intentions, and the ways in which claims to reconciliation and recognition of past injustices can be used to maintain the colonial status quo. The need to rethink what constitutes geography in the context of anticolonialism extends beyond the discipline’s complicity in the production of colonialism. Liberal individualist values and hierarchies are reproduced through various competitive aspects of the discipline, and academic theoretical work is routinely valued over the work and voices of communities and community-based activists. The power laden sociohistorical structures that currently guide the discipline of geography are being challenged by efforts to decolonizing the discipline by writing against colonialism. Human geographers have become increasingly aware of how colonial patterns are reproduced through good intentions, and the ways in which claims to reconciliation and recognition of past injustices can be used to maintain the colonial status quo by focusing on and reifying the victims and harms of colonization. Many critical race and anti-colonial scholars and activists have pointed to the futility of using colonial structures to address structures of control. In line with Audre Lorde’s famous insight that one cannot dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools, scholar-activists such as Rinaldo Walcott and Leanne Simpson provoke us to think about reconstructing something new and different in place of the traditional Eurocentric academic project, a sentiment rooted in the radical hope for a better future that is integral to anti-colonial thought and practice. For geographers aligned with anti-colonial beliefs and values, hope exists from reenvisioning what geography is and how geography is practiced, without necessarily reinventing geographical engagements anew. Cultures, cosmologies, and traditions that exist outside modernist Eurowestern onto-epistemologies show how “doing geography” need not be connected to the disciplines, histories, institutions that are deeply entangled with the colonial project. Mishuana Goeman, Katherine McKittrick, and Sarah Hunt have all written about the power of thinking about anti-colonial engagements with geography that exist well beyond the traditional confines of the discipline. Indeed geographers who raise up the knowledge of community leaders, elders, and youth or refuse to share their knowledge only through academic channels are actively working to confront and challenge disciplinary hegemonies of academic engagements with space. Anti-colonial geography is not about reformation of geographic practices, or the invitation of previously excluded voices into the discipline. Rather, practicing anti-colonial geography is about opening the possibility to think about engagements with geographies as otherwise and elsewhere.

See Also: Colonialism; Decolonization; Empire; Indigeneity; Liberalism; Modernity; Resistance.

Further Reading Coulthard, G., 2010. Place against empire: understanding indigenous anticolonialism. Aff. J. Rad. Theory Culture Action 4 (2). Daigle, M., 2016. Awawanenitakik: the spatial politics of recognition and relational geographies of Indigenous self-determination. Canadian Geogr./Le Géographe Canadien 60 (2), 259–269. Dei, G.J.S., Kempf, A., 2006. Anticolonialism and Education: The Politics of Resistance, vol. 7. Sense Publishers, Rotterdam. Hunt, S., Holmes, C., 2015. Everyday decolonization: living a decolonizing queer politics. J. Lesbian Stud. 19 (2), 154–172. Kempf, A., 2009. Breaching the Colonial Contract: Anticolonialism in the US and Canada, vol. 8. Springer Science & Business Media. Louis, R.P., 2007. Can you hear us now? Voices from the margin: using indigenous methodologies in geographic research. Geogr. Res. 45 (2), 130–139. McKittrick, K., 2006. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota. Simpson, L., 2004. Anticolonial strategies for the recovery and maintenance of Indigenous knowledge. Am. Indian Q. 28 (3), 373–384. Simpson, A., 2014. Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States. Duke University Press, Durham, NC. Simpson, L., 2017. As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical Resistance. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Antigeopolitics Ulrich Oslender, Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The term antigeopolitics emerged in the English-speaking literature in the mid-1990s. Although the term is mentioned briefly by Ó Tuathail in 1996, it was only in 1998 that it was conceptually developed in the first edition of the Geopolitics Reader, edited by Ó Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge. Subsequently, Routledge has published slightly edited versions of this first elaboration. Various authors have since made reference to the term antigeopolitics, yet mostly without engaging conceptually with it in any great detail. As its prefix anti- suggests, antigeopolitics relates critically to dominant geopolitical thinking and discourse. As such, the notion of antigeopolitics must be placed within the school of critical geopolitics that itself emerged in Anglo-American geographical writing in the 1980s. This school of thought offers a radical critique at the ways in which geographies of global politics are constructed through discourses and representational practices of statecraft intellectuals. It sees itself as a way of dealing critically with the often-silenced imperial and colonial heritage of the discipline of geography and the ways in which it has been conscripted into political service. Even though many practitioners of critical geopolitics do not employ the term antigeopolitics, it is important to understand the context and intellectual soil out of which this notion arose.

Lacoste, He´rodote, and Critical Geopolitics Geography and geographical reasoning are central to political power, military strategy, and warfare. As the French geographer Yves Lacoste memorably put it in his 1976 polemic publicationdseen by many as a revolutionary manifesto for geographydla géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre; the purpose of geography is above all warfare. What this provocative title and book intended to challenge was the commonplace assumption that academic geography was essentially about the production of objective, universal knowledge that would provide the citizenry with basic geographical facts, while the discipline’s military logic was hidden or ignored. Instead, Lacoste argued in 1985 that geography should rather be about knowing how to think about space in order to know how to organize and fight there (“savoir penser l’espace pour savoir s’y organiser, pour savoir y combattre”). Lacoste was one of many radical voices based at the experimental University of Paris VIII at Vincennes that arose as a result of the student revolts of 1968 and encouraged critical, Marxist, and anarchist thinking. In the same year, 1976, he founded the radical geographical journal Hérodote. The launch of this journal was to transform French geography away from the distinct Vidalian tradition of regional geography toward more critical perspectives on the role of geographical reasoning in policy circles and military strategy. Its first issues were thus dedicated to liberation struggles and revolutionary movements in the Third World. Although Lacoste did not use the term antigeopolitics, these are the very realms of antigeopolitical struggle, according to later enunciations by scholars from the Anglophone critical geopolitics school. There is then an important overlapping of concerns between the French radical geographical vision à la Lacoste and Hérodote on the one hand, and Anglophone critical geopolitics on the other.

Modern Geopolitical Discourse and the Cold War In the broadest sense, antigeopolitics embraces all kinds of resistances to the practices of geopolitics. As such, it does not only concern itself with the material counterhegemonic struggles of anticolonial, antiimperial, independence and liberation movements. Since geopolitics deploys representations of the world that serve the interests of the ruling political and economic elite, antigeopolitics pretends to challenge these very representations. The beginnings of modern geopolitical discourse can be traced back to encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans since the 15th Century. As Agnew and Corbridge argue, modern geopolitical discourse is characterized by its representation of others as backward and permanently disadvantaged. This discursive strategy fixes non-Europeans in a constant state of inferiority and savagery, out of which they can only emerge by changing into something they are not and adapting European traits. Such a powerful discursive separation of the world into Europeans and non-Europeans underlies much racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic thought until today. John Agnew went on to suggest that the most distinguishing feature of the modern geopolitical imagination is a global visualization without which world politics would not be possible. During the Cold War, for example, Western geopolitical discourse divided the world into three broad categories: “the East,” which stood for Communism and totalitarianism, portrayed as an essentially negative (even evil) worldview; “the West” was equated with freedom, democracy, and a positive image; and “the Third World,” which lay somewhere in between as the space where the battle between “East” and “West” was played out. Such a simplification of the spatial organization of the world constituted a powerful global visualization that oriented foreign policy and justified political, economic, and military interventions by “the West” and “the East” elsewhere. Moreover, these practices of dividing the world into a simplified pattern of easily understandable opposites were not restricted to political elites and their advisors. They

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were also reproduced in the geopolitical cultures of the everyday. A popular geopolitics emerged that reproduced such commonsense geopolitical reasoning in films, television, novels, newspapers, and journals.

The War on Terror and Moral Boundaries Antigeopolitics intends to provide an interrogation of such a global visualization and the ways in which these representational practices produce physical and moral boundaries that divide the world into “us” and “them.” Today such moral divisions can, maybe best, be seen in the discourses of the so-called “war on terror” that have revived in many ways the dichotomous discursive separation practices of the Cold War period. The US President George W. Bush’s announcement in September 2001dnine days after the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centerdthat “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” set the tone for the current geopolitical discursive practices of drawing physical and moral boundaries. Bush’s geopolitical speech act forced the audience to take sides and face the consequences of doing so. The global reach of the geopolitical terror discourse has led to significant discursive changes in the representation of political conflicts in other parts of the world, too. In South America, for example, shortly after 9/11, then Colombian President Uribe declared the country’s largest guerrilla movement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to be narcoterrorists. This categorization was subsequently used by the mainstream media to such an extent that it became a commonplace assertion to link this rebel movement with illegal drug trafficking and terrorist activities. While some of these links undoubtedly did exist, this discursive shift reduced a very complex political conflict in Colombia to one in which the State seemingly fought drug traffickers and terrorists. Gone in this geopolitical representation were the historical roots and continued relations of social injustice and exploitation at the heart of the political struggle in Colombia. An antigeopolitical perspective would challenge the ideologically motivated narcoterrorist discourse employed by the Uribe administration and expose the complexities underlying the political and social conflict in Colombia.

Antigeopolitics as (Radical) Politics The policies and strategies of empires, colonial powers, dictatorships, and states have rarely gone unchallenged by those who have been subjects to domination and exploitation. Quite on the contrary, dominating power has almost always faced resistance from various forms of counterhegemonic struggles. Proponents of antigeopolitics focus on the latter as enacting a geopolitics from below that emanates from subaltern positions within society that challenge the military, political, economic, and cultural logic of hegemonic power. Those contestations can be violent or nonviolent. They include armed struggle against oppressive outside forces or state structures, as well as peaceful mass demonstrations organized by social movements. Antigeopolitics intends to be a wide-open container in which all kinds of protests are considered that organize material and discursive challenges to dominant geopolitical power and representations. Particular attention has been paid to anticolonial and antiimperial struggles, nationalist revolutions, as well as to more recently emerging globalizing resistance movements and transnational activism networks.

Anticolonial and Antiimperial Struggles The imperial and colonial geopolitical order implied a spatialization of the world organized around the interests of Europeans. Although implicitly a violent form of domination that was established and maintained through the physical control, coercion, and cooptation of the colonial subjects, colonialism and empire building were seen by the dominating powers as a legitimate, necessary, and even beneficial enterprise for the world at large. Colonialism was not only about the appropriation of natural resources in the colonized lands, but it also saw itself as a civilizing mission on earth to rescue the native savage from ignorance, sin, and superstition. It constituted a vision for the world in which Europeans would spread civilization into the darkest corners of the planet. The brutal missionary zeal of the Spanish Empire in the Americas, for example, attests to this global visualization of the modern geopolitical imagination underlying the colonial and imperial logic.

Algeria and Frantz Fanon Anticolonial and antiimperial struggles were not only directed against the physical presence of the colonizer on colonized soil. They also challenged the geopolitical vision and the spatialization of the world that underlies colonialism. As the Martinique-born French writer, medical doctor, and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon explained in his incisive 1963 critique of colonialism, in decolonization there is the need of a complete calling into question of the colonial situation. While working as Head of the Psychiatry Department at the Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Hospital in Algeria in 1953, and confronted with the brutalities and torture of the French colonial administration in Algeria, Fanon developed his theory of the psychology of colonial domination. In 1956, he resigned his post with the French colonial authorities to work for the Algerian independence movement from Tunisia and Ghana. Fanon’s life history epitomizes the two fronts of antigeopolitical struggle: (1) the material challenge of dominant geopolitical power; and (2) contestations of geopolitical representations of the spatialized normative world order. First, he actively collaborated with the armed struggle of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN); as Ambassador to Ghana for the Provisional Algerian Government he helped to establish

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a southern arms-supply route. Second, he vociferously denounced the geopolitical vision of the French imperial project through his writings and publications. Fanon was particularly inspired by the victory of the Vietnamese Viet Minh Communist revolutionary forces against French colonial power in the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which effectively ended the First Indo-China War and ushered in French withdrawal from its Indo-Chinese colonies. Yet, Fanon would not live to see Algerian independence, as accorded between France and the FLN in March 1962. He died of leukemia in December 1961. His writings have inspired anticolonial liberation movements worldwide.

India and Mohandas Gandhi

Another influential anticolonial struggle, though of a different kind, emerged on the Indian subcontinent. Although the Indian independence movement involved a wide array of political organizations, it became mostly associated with the figure of Mohandas (or Mahatma) Gandhi. Rejecting armed struggle as an option, Gandhi advocated nonviolent mass civil disobedience against British colonial rule, a strategy of resistance that he termed Satyagraha (a Sanskrit compound meaning truth and firmness). A Britisheducated lawyer, Gandhi first gained experience in peaceful civil disobedience in South Africa during the civil rights struggles of Indian communities there. On his return to India, he helped to mobilize poor farmers and laborers against widespread discrimination and oppressive taxation. As leader of the Indian National Congress, Gandhi led nationwide campaigns for India’s independence from foreign domination, which was eventually achieved in August 1947. Gandhi remained committed to nonviolence throughout his life. The form of protest he advocated was a very embodied one, employing long fasts as a form of selfpurification and resistance. His life and teachings have been an inspiration for many civil rights leaders and social movements to come. From an antigeopolitical perspective one may argue that not only did the Indian anticolonial movement achieve independence from Britain, a significant material victory, but also that the philosophy and practice of nonviolent resistance provided a model of subaltern politics that successfully challenged military geopolitical power and the underlying dominant geopolitical vision and logic of maintaining colonial order by force. More so than the armed struggle in Algeria maybe, Satyagraha is an expression of an antigeopolitical perspective put into practice, as it challenges the very geopolitical logic of warfare and violence.

Nationalist Revolutions and Cold War Geopolitical Battles Cuba To proponents of antigeopolitics, postcolonial nationalist revolutions also provide a focus for analysis, in particular those enframed by Cold War geopolitics. The Cuban revolution of 1959 is a case in point. Led by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos, and others, a group of guerrilla fighters who had landed on the shores of Eastern Cuba in the yacht Granma in December 1956 began an armed struggle against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Helped by local peasants and with support from Batista opponents in Havana, the revolutionaries finally drove out the dictator who fled to the Dominican Republic on January 1, 1959. The initial aim of the barbudos, the bearded guerrillas, was to rid Cuba of a brutal dictatorship and affirm national, political, and economic interests against the oppressive interference of the United States. As such the revolution posed a significant material challenge to US foreign policy and the geopolitical world order in the Americas. In his amendment to the original Monroe Doctrine of 1823, US President Theodore Roosevelt had asserted in 1904 the right of the United States to intervene in the countries of the Americas in order to stabilize their economies. In reality, however, the Roosevelt Corollary was little short of being a license for the United States to practice its own form of colonialism. Subsequent interventions in the first half of the 20th Century in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti were justified by recourse to the Roosevelt Corollary. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 therefore marked a clear opposition to the US-imposed geopolitical order.

Nicaragua and El Salvador

Inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution, similar antigeopolitical challenges were raised by guerrilla movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1979. They saw themselves as concluding the unfinished business of revolutionary leader Augusto César Sandino who opposed the US occupation of Nicaragua in the early 20th Century before he was assassinated by the US-trained National Guard in 1934. In El Salvador, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was founded in 1980 as a union of various guerrilla movements with the aim of overthrowing the US-supported government. After a series of military offensives a stalemate was achieved in 1989 that forced negotiations between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government, leading eventually to Peace Accords and a ceasefire in 1992. Since then the FMLN has been a political party aiming at taking control of the country through democratic elections. Both the FSLN in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador inherited the radical tradition of the Cuban revolutionaries to challenge US geopolitical dominance in the Americas. As such, they may be seen as examples of an antigeopolitical approach to US hegemony in the region. All three revolutionary experiences were simultaneously framed by Cold War geopolitics. The US response to these challenges was to declare them a Communist threat to be opposed. In the case of Cuba, the United States imposed economic sanctions and a trade embargo on the Caribbean island in 1962, which are still in force today. This move, in turn, drove Fidel Castro’s vision of a free and independent Cuba into the geopolitical arms of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. In the case of Nicaragua, US President Ronald Reagan accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism. The United States consequently provided significant military and financial assistance to the Contras, a group opposing the FSLN, resulting in a long and bloody civil war. Reagan’s support for the Contras formed part of his wider strategy to actively support and promote movements

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that opposed Soviet-influenced governments. The nationalist struggles of Cuba and Nicaragua were thus drawn into the geopolitical battles of the Cold War period.

Social Movements and Transnational Activism Networks A further field of antigeopolitical struggle is said to exist in the myriads of social movements, human rights groups, land rights movements, environmental groups, neighborhood associations, and others that challenge the power of the state, transnational companies, and the worst excesses and effects of global neoliberalism. Different from anticolonial struggles and nationalist revolutions, these challenges are mostly located in the sphere of civil society. They do not generally aim at overthrowing governments, but are concerned with achieving significant reforms within an existing governmental system. In the social movement literature, many of these struggles have been grouped under the term “new social movements,” because they are frequently cultural struggles over the practices and meanings of everyday life.

Geopolitics From Below While most movements and groups mobilize around a specific issuedfrom housing for the poor in Douala, preservation of indigenous cultures in the Amazon, land rights for landless peasants in Brazil, protests against dam construction in India, to an immigration bill in the United Statesdmany also connect to wider issues. They recognize that their particular grievance is just one cog in the machine of a neoliberal economic globalization that favors transnational capital at the expense of workers’ rights, community values, and the environment. As these groups make these links and articulate their particular struggles against the more structural macroeconomic logic of late capitalism, it has been argued that these resistances embody a globalization from below. This entails a different vision of the world, one that challenges the geoeconomic discourse of transnational liberalism and the geopolitical representations underlying it. As such, these resistances have also been seen as a form of geopolitics from below, or antigeopolitics of protest. The World Social Forum, held annually since 2001, is maybe one of the most exciting developments in this transnationalization of protest beyond borders. The Forum effectively constitutes a convergence space for globalizing anticapitalist resistance that connects a large number of social movements, activists, NGOs, and trade unions across space and beyond state boundaries to articulate protests globally against the privatization of every aspect of life, and the transformation of every activity and value into a commodity. It draws up alternative visions to the dominant global neoliberal project and aims to show that another world is possible. The success in mobilization has been attributed to the decentralized, nonhierarchical, and weblike structure of such a movement of movements. This mobilization has been significantly facilitated by the use of the internet, which allows for local, regional, and national real-life experiences on the ground to connect and cooperate.

Antigeopolitics as Perspective Geopolitics has always been a contentious form of knowledge and practice, and there have been many critiques to dominant geopolitical reasoning. These range from the orthodox Marxism of the German communist Karl Wittfogel in the 1920s to the poststructuralist interventions of the critical geopolitics school of the 1980s. More recently, feminist geographers have called for a feminist geopolitics. They expose the historical reasoning of geopolitical thought and practice as masculinist and advocate an embodied geopolitics that rewrites the lived experiences of women and other marginal voices back into geopolitical arguments. These critiques have given rise to different ways of thinking geopolitically, or to antigeopolitical forms of knowledge. Since geopolitics is not only about politics per se but also about the representation of the world and a normative worldview, antigeopolitical discourse also intends to disrupt these representations. In other words, antigeopolitics not only sees itself as radical politics opposed to dominant geopolitical practices but also as a differential perspective undermining traditional geopolitical reasoning. Some of these perspectives are briefly reviewed here.

Dependency Theory and Development Critique Dependency theory emerged in the 1960s as an influential, complex body of theoretical concepts with structuralist and Marxist roots that explained Latin America’s underdevelopment in terms of a structural logic inherent in the development of global capitalism. It built on arguments developed in the Economic Commission for Latin America that the global system was not a uniform marketplace but divided structurally between rich and poor economiesda center of industrialized nations and a periphery of primary producersdwhich would guarantee that all of the benefits of technology and international trade accrued to the center. Dependency theorists regarded the economic development of the periphery within such an unequal world system a nearly impossible task. According to André Gunder Frank (1969), one of its principal exponents, the metropolis (or the core) creates and exploits peripheral satellites, from which it expropriates economic surplus for its own economic development. The satellites remain underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus and as a consequence of the exploitative contradictions that the metropolis introduces and maintains in the satellite’s domestic structure.

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Dependency theory has been critiqued for its overly structuralist explanatory approach to uneven development. Yet it is hard not to agree with its principal insights over the highly structured unevenness of global economic development and its underlying capitalist logic in the production of space. As a sustained theoretical critique of global capitalism, dependency theory constituted an important intellectual challenge to US hegemony and political and economic intervention in the Americas. It thus also disrupts the geopolitical and geoeconomic vision of US-sponsored global capitalism. In this sense, dependency theory can be regarded as an antigeopolitical perspective.

The Anti-geopolitical Eye One of the most prolific writers of the critical geopolitics tradition, Gearóid Ó Tuathail coined the term "anti-geopolitical eye" in 1996, referring to an alternative way of seeing and representing that disturbs the all-seeing-eye usually evident in geopolitical arguments. The anti-geopolitical eye acknowledges its view from somewhere specific. It represents a situated view of the world that rejects the detached perspectives of statesmen. Instead it travels at ground level to observe, feel, and transmit a moral proximity to those observed and described. Ó Tuathail considered the anti-geopolitical eye a provisional category, which he introduced to analyze the impassioned reports of the war in Bosnia that the British journalist Maggie O’Kane sent back to the readership in Britain from the frontlines. Her reporting was based on an eyewitness approach of multiple perspectives. The victims of the war in Bosnia were present in her visceral descriptions of the horror of war. The suffering of the victims entered graphically into her reporting, which accused, took sides with the victims, and did not try to hide behind the high-minded abstractions of traditional geopolitical discourse. The anti-geopolitical eye breaks down the distance between observer and observed. It reveals a moral proximity that accuses and asks awkward questions inquiring about ethical responsibilities that are often ignored.

Feminist Geopolitics With its emphasis on marginal voices that are usually silenced in the big geopolitical stories and its embodied vision of lived experience on the ground, the category of the anti-geopolitical eye has attracted the attention of feminist geographers. Some consider it a first step in critically addressing the marginalization of such voices and in recovering viewpoints that are otherwise hidden in geopolitical metanarratives. They see the anti-geopolitical eye as a way of embodying geopolitics and to give it that visceral feeling of life histories transmitted from close-up. It is out of this necessity that the call for a feminist geopolitics emerged at the turn of the millennium, challenging the intrinsic masculinist character of geopolitical arguments and reasoning. A feminist geopolitics perspective argues that women’s bodies are caught up in international relations, but often at the mundane level of the everyday. As a result, they have not been written into the texts of geopolitical discourse. Analytical attention grounded in the everyday would therefore recover women’s experiences and those of other marginalized people, it is argued. Specific attention in this perspective is paid to the scale of analysis. Feminists argue that geography’s understanding of space has been significantly transformed by examining the world through the scale of the body. A feminist geopolitics thus stresses the need to analyze geopolitical relationships at different scales, privileging the body as the site of performance in its own right. It therefore provides a radical departure from traditional geopolitical perspectives.

Critique of Anti-geopolitics The notion of antigeopolitics is a very recent one, barely 20 years old. Some of its associated ideas have attracted analytical attention, such as the anti-geopolitical eye in feminist geopolitics. The term antigeopolitics in itself, however, has not found widespread application to date. Its use has mainly been restricted to a handful of writers from the Anglo-American critical geopolitics perspective. It has occasionally been referenced in articles, mostly, however, without a deeper analytical engagement. In a few cases, it has also led to very disparaging and confused interpretations. This reception may partly be explained by the fact that the prefix anti- suggests a dichotomy to geopolitics that appears to be rather unhelpful. The protest movements and differential perspectives gathered under the term antigeopolitics do not oppose geopolitics per se, but rather dominant geopolitical practices, discourses, and representations. In fact, they themselves are geopolitical. Other terms that have described this oppositional attitude include counterhegemonic geopolitics, geopolitics from below, countergeopolitics, alternative geopolitics, antiimperialist geopolitics, geopolitics of and for social movements, other geopolitics, and so on. Whereas the adjectival notation of antigeopolitical can be usefuldfor example, in the notion of the anti-geopolitical eyedthe noun antigeopolitics is ambiguous and can be misleading. As a historically contingent concept of geopolitical thought and practice, it requires further critical development and elaboration.

See Also: Cold War; Colonialism; Development; Resistance; Social Movements.

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Further Reading Agnew, J., 2003. Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics, second ed. Routledge, London. Agnew, J., Corbridge, S., 1995. Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy. Routledge, London. Agnew, J., Mitchell, K., Ó Tuathail, G. (Eds.), 2003. A Companion to Political Geography. Blackwell, Oxford. Dodds, K., Atkinson, D. (Eds.), 2000. Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought. Routledge, London. Dowler, L., Sharp, J., 2001. A feminist geopolitics? Space Polity 5 (3), 165–176. Fanon, F., 1963. The Wretched of the Earth (translated by Constance Farrington). Grove Press, New York. Frank, A.G., 1969. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and Immediate Enemy. Monthly Review Press, London. Girot, P., Kofman, E. (Eds.), 1985. International Geopolitical Analysis: A Selection from Hérodote. L’Harmattan, Paris. Lacoste, Y., 1985. La géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre, third ed. Éditions La Découverte, Paris. Ó Tuathail, G., 1996. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Routledge, London. Ó Tuathail, G., 1996. An anti-geopolitical eye: Maggie O’Kane in Bosnia, 1992–93. Gend. Place Cult. 3 (2), 171–185. Ó Tuathail, G., Dalby, S., Routledge, P. (Eds.), 2006. The Geopolitics Reader, second ed. Routledge, London. Routledge, P., 2003. Anti-geopolitics. In: Agnew, J., Mitchell, K., Ó Tuathail, G. (Eds.), A Companion to Political Geography. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 236–248. Routledge, P., 2006. Anti-geopolitics: introduction to part five. In: Ó Tuathail, G., Dalby, S., Routledge, P. (Eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, second ed. Routledge, London, pp. 233–248. Wittfogel, K., 1985/1929. Geopolitics, geographical materialism, and Marxism (translated by G.L. Ulmen). Antipode Rad. J. Geogr. 17 (1), 21–72.

Relevant Websites http://www.herodote.org. Official website of Hérodote. French journal of geography and geopolitics, launched in 1976 by Yves Lacoste and named after the Greek geographer and historian Herodotus. It was pivotal in the critical regeneration of geopolitical discourse in France. Its first issues in particular were devoted to the study of post-colonial wars and revolutionary movements in the so-called Third World. http://www.antipode-online.net, Official website of Antipode. A Radical Journal of Geography. Launched in the late 1960s, Antipode is still (or once again) the flagship for radical (anti-geopolitical) thinking and debate in Anglophone geography. http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br. Official website of the World Social Forum, convergence space for globalizing anti-capitalist resistance that connects social movements, activists, NGOs and trade unions across space and beyond state boundaries to articulate protests globally. http://www.indymedia.org, Indymedia is a global, alternative, Internet-based media outlet that promotes radical political activism. Its origin lies in the temporary alternative Independent Media Center (IMC) that emerged during the mobilisation against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 to counter distortions of the demonstrations in the mainstream media. It quickly evolved into a global network of over 160 local and thematic IMCs worldwide.

Antiurbanism Philip Lawton, Geography Department, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by T. Slater, volume 1, pp 159–166, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Placemaking Placemaking or place-making is a term which has emerged in recent decades to describe the practices associated with developing what are, in official circles at least, aimed at making urban space more “liveable.” Key elements that are often associated with placemaking are a focus on pedestrian space, greening strategies, and cycle lanes. Although espousing community engagement, placemaking has, in recent years, become an increasingly popular approach among property related interests. Privatization of public space Debates over the privatization of public space can be loosely traced to the early 1990s, and through the work of authors such as Don Mitchell, Rosalyn Deutsche, and Mike Davis. Here, attention is given toward the extent to which urban public space was becoming increasingly privatized. Such privatization was seen both through the ways in which shopping centers were becoming a focal point of urban life, and, associated with this, the emergence of private forms of management in public space. Secessionism Within urban studies, secessionism is usually used to describe the withdrawal of the upper- and middle-classes from urban space to privatized spaces. While these have historically been associated with low-density suburban spaces, and particularly gated communities, it can also be directly associated with forms of “vertical secessionism” associated with upmarket high-rise buildings. Urbanism The term “urbanism” has two overlapping, yet distinct, meanings. First, for early 20th Century scholars, such as Louis Wirth, it was used as a descriptor for a way of life that was deemed wholly different to that of its rural counterpoint. With more direct relevance to recent decades, “urbanism” can also be used to describe approaches among architects, planners, and urban designers toward the transformation of urban space.

The term “antiurbanism,” has been commonly used to denote attitudes to the forms of urban life emerging from the 19th Century onwards and, in particular, the negative side of urban life, ranging from the ecological, to the social, and the moral. Popular antiurbanist attitudes thus draw largely upon mythological understandings of “the city” as a framing device for all that is negative about contemporary urbanization. Embedded within such readings, and as is detailed by Elizabeth Wilson in The Sphinx and the City in reference to the 19th Century city, is a deeply held notion that the small town equated to virtue, whereas the large city represented vice and evil, including a range of assumptions about moral virtues of women and sexual mores. Antiurbanism, in this sense, explicitly draws upon notions of “inner” and “outer” readings of urban life: the city is constantly invoked in a negative manner as against the countryside or the “rural” as a form of idyll. Similarly, the tendency toward understanding the city as set against “nature” emerges as a dominant theme within Chicago School of Urban Sociology framings of the city, who themselves built significantly upon 19th Century theorists of the city, such as Georg Simmel. For authors such as Robert Park and Louis Wirth, the city was set apart from “nature,” while at the same time described through metaphors borrowed from ecology. From this, notions of “invasion,” “succession,” as well as labeling devices of the “ghetto” or “slum” gave an impression of a certain natural order of things. While these approaches have been heavily critiqued in the ensuing literature, to a degree, such evocations continue, albeit in different guises. In the context of contemporary critical attention toward the role of, for example, economy, power, and space in shaping social relations and urban space itself, understanding the meanings of “antiurbanism” requires an approach that goes beyond binaries of “inner” and “outer” in order to unpack the complex forms of politics and social forms through which it emerges. There have been considerable shifts in urban theory over the last decade, ranging from Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid’s “planetary urbanization” to “postcolonial urbanism” as invoked by authors such as Ananya Roy. With perhaps more direct relevance for the discussion of antiurbanism, those working from a political ecology perspective advocate for a shift beyond the analysis of the “city” as set in binary opposition to its “outside.” The work of Hilary Angelo and David Wachsmuth is particularly noteworthy in this regard, with each seeking to break down the binary between “city” and “countryside” through an analysis of ideological assumptions about both categorizations. Collectively, the aforementioned approaches have provoked deep reflections on the meanings of terms such as “urbanism” and “urbanization.” Of particular note here, is the very existence of the “city” as a bounded or identifiable sociospatial entity. Thus, while Brenner is careful to outline a focus upon urbanization over “urbanism,” there are, nonetheless, significant implications for the social experience labeled as “urbanism,” and, indeed, for associated professions tasked with the physical and esthetic ordering of urban space, such as through architecture and urban design. In short, if urbanization is “planetary,” it raises significant challenges for the meanings of urbanism, both as a particular way of defining the urban experience, and as form of praxis. In their paper

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entitled, Provincializing Global Urbanism, Eric Sheppard, Helga Leitner, and Anant Maringanti illustrate the shift in the meanings of urbanism from one denoting both progress and social ills, to being understood as embodying a vast array of meanings, ranging from official ideals of global city making, to “subaltern urbanism.” A key message here is the importance of challenging inherited framings of urbanism as both a realm of theory and practice. In its contemporary form, antiurbanism must thus be understood not so much as an attitudinal category, but viewed as a contradictory impulse embedded within the processes of urbanization itself. More particularly, it must be understood in the context of the overlaps between inherited norms, political ideals, dynamics of class and ethnicity, and spatial representations that emerge through discourses of urbanism.

Shifting the Lens of Antiurbanism Unpacking the meanings of antiurbanism requires an engagement both with the more explicit ways in which it has been invoked, and with the ways in which it emerges through a variety of social, economic, and political forces in different contexts. One of the more explicit reference points in recent decades, and particularly in regard to North American framings of antiurbanism, is through the intersection between suburbanization, suburbanism as a “way of life,” and historical attitudes toward the city center as captured through the term “the inner city.” The intertwining of capitalist social formation, spatial transformations, and technology, such as the invention of the automobile, is of key importance in this regard. In as much as the invention of the automobile is so entangleddeconomically, socially, and culturallydwith the urbanization process, it can be seen as directly entwined with ways in which cities are perceived and imagined. Authors such as Jason Henderson and Don Mitchell have outlined how deeply the automobile is in embedding sociospatial divisions and producing anti-urban sentiments. The cardand particularly the SUVdhas become an “instrument of secession,” with the SUV driver having the ability to feel as though, in a figurative sense, he or she is floating above the rest of society. When viewed in spatial terms, the SUV can be seen as a key symbol of the social divisions between centers and suburbs. Yet, as is further articulated by Mitchell, the SUV can also be drawn upon in order to understand urban space in a broader sense, whereby engagement with urban life is increasingly carried out in a manner whereby individuals form a “bubble” around themselves and thus engage in a selective and predetermined manner according to their own desires. Analyzing the emergence of anti-urbanist sentiments thus requires an engagement with the overlaps between social life, urban regulation, and the emergence of different forms of urbanist practices over the last number of decades. Emerging in the 1990s, a critical body of work by authors such as Setha Low, Neil Smith, Cindy Katz, Don Mitchell, and David Harvey, began to examine the relationships between public space, citizenship, and urbanist practices. This body of work involved an analysis of the rearticulations of urban public space in central cities, including increasing privatization and terror-related securitization, as well as emerging trends in suburban space. One of the more contradictory invocations of this tendency can be viewed through the example of New Urbanism, which sought to reject the dominance of the automobile in influencing urban transformation, and to return to the more traditional ideals of village life, including the replication of historical architectural styles and layouts. Taken at face value, this approach espouses what is, in the popular imagination at least, perceived as positive attributes of urban life, such as community; however, critical scholars have advanced a highly refined and managed approach to studying New Urbanism, focused upon varying degrees of privatism, and the removal of unwanted groups and individuals. For scholars writing in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as David Harvey and Peter Marcuse, far from producing a utopian space for all, New Urbanism became a symbol of division that worked in opposition to the very essence of the city as a space of encounter. With the focus upon a particular moralizing of urban life and the invocation of small-town ideals, the ideals of New Urbanism became, for Marcuse, deeply antiurban. Antiurbanism can thus be seen to emerge through a particular approach to urban transformation and is thus bound up with power relations as they emerge in urban space. Almost two decades after the introduction of New Urbanism, different features of the “exciting” and the “unexpected” aspects of urban space are used in cities as their unique selling points, but these campaigns reflect a deeper contradiction. With particular reference to the Global North, but having an increasingly wide range of appeal, these activities bring together a dash of “new urbanism,” a dose of “creative class” economism, and ideals of “placemaking” in a neat package revolving around mixed-use and consumptionoriented streets. Indeed, such depictions of urbanism have been brought into question by authors such as Martha Rosler, who, emphasized the flawed mantra of the “creative class” and its associated claims to “diversity” as it emerged in the early 2000s. Yet, in as much as these critiques emphasized the frailties of creativity-oriented approaches, the overlaps between placemaking, real estate, and unequal power dynamics have, if anything, become more intertwined. The ideals of public space, such as “character,” image-making, walkability, density, sense of place, accessibility, and mixture of uses are all perceived as an explicit part of the profitability of place. The very features that were once an integral part of defining the urban experience, and the parts that are seen as associated with the unpredictability of urban life, are being increasingly prepackaged and denuded of their meanings. The type of world being invoked is, on the one hand, seductive, but on another, lacks the possibility of an urbanism for all. Indeed, in picking up on Donald McNeill’s analysis of Jan Gehl in Sydney, public space here becomes reduced to a form of marketable commodity. This idealization of public space, which borrows so much from ideals of engagement and everyday hustle and bustle of urban life, become striped of its meanings and reduced to a form of marketing strategy and thus regulated accordingly. As an example of this tendency, a 2017 publication, entitled Placemaking: Value and the Public Realm by CBRE and Gehl Architects, explicitly states that a key motivation of promoting placemaking, through improving the quality of the public domain associated with both spaces of work and residence, is in order to promote increased property yields.

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The continued privatization of urban space must be viewed in the context of an emerging movement toward the denouement of open and accessible public space. Within official discourses, the privatization and management of public space is presented as being in the interests of public safety. Yet for scholars such as Don Mitchell, the privatization of public space is driven by antiurbanist sentiment that excludes the very essence of urban experience. Although shifting in meanings and significance, the overlaps between contemporary management of public space, the esthetics of global urban transformation, and the constantly evolving norms of “urbanism,” can be seen as spaces in which esthetics, privatization of space, and rigid control are brought in line. Such strategies cannot be seen outside the very real imbalances of the unmaking and remaking of urban space in the interests of financialized capital. In highlighting the role of globalized real estate, in a 2015 article entitled, “Who owns our citiesdand why this urban takeover should concern us all,” in The Guardian newspaper, Saskia Sassen referred to the tendency of city developers to “deurbanise”space such that the real outcomes of such projects are not social mixing and diversity, but privatized high-rise luxury apartment buildings. There are a number of implications of this. First, in cities around the world, a form of “urbanism” is emerging that avoids the very fabric in which it is embedded. This level of exclusion is achieved through bringing together a combination of financialized capitalism, with explicitly secessionary practices, such as gating, and architectural symbolism, that ensure that such spaces are controlled for and by elite groups. Second, the attributes once associated with creating “place” have become intertwined with a set of processes that increasingly strip cities of their role as a space of human interaction, and instead created urban space that is driven predominantly by investment. Here, in the search for a utopian urbanism, a strange form of antiurbanism emerges: a city that is literally denuded of its occupants. There are other implications of the shifting realities of contemporary urbanization. The over-arching focus upon central spaces in recent decades, whether through new invocations of “urbanism,” or the more extreme tendencies toward “deurbanizing” urban space discussed by Saskia Sassen, highlights the extreme forms of unevenness in urban regional space. The labeling of central spaces as “slums” or the “inner city” has given way to seductive portrayals of central spaces as spaces of investment, lifestyle, and entertainment. This ideal is increasingly driven by class politics, and the overlaps between planning, urban design, and architecture, which seek to espouse essentialized characteristics of the “good life” as captured in depictions of “urbanism.” Furthermore, in a way that highlights the shifting dynamics of uneven urban development, various discourses and practices of antiurbanism have taken on what Alex Schafran considers a distinctly “anti-suburbanist” twist. In his work on discourses of dystopia, Alex Schafran has carefully demonstrated how the historical vilification of central urban spaces as “slums” has shifted to portraying the suburbs as places of terminal decline, via labels such as “slumburbia.” This portrayal, as mooted by Schafran, demonstrates the dominance of particular narratives, such as may emerge within media representations, in shaping negative attitudes toward places. Understanding antiurbanism, or, indeed, “anti-suburbanism” must be situated within the ever-changing dynamics of urban space.

Conclusion In understanding “antiurbanism” it becomes essential to move beyond binary notions of the “inside” and the “outside” as associated with the “city” and “countryside” respectively. The term must recognize the complex and contradictory nature of social relations as they emerge in urban space. The work of Don Mitchell and others has demonstrated how anti-urbanist attitudes can be denoted in the desire for the removal of “others” who do not fit in so as to allow the illusion of “order in urbanity.” Antiurbanism in this guise connotes removal of the very values that define what “public” means: notions of inclusion, openness, and diversity. This attitude emerges not only through the regulation of public space, but also through the avoidance of public space among the middle- and upper-classes. Antiurbanism in this regard can be seen as the demonization and banishment of street life itself. It encompasses forms of privatism, such as those associated with the “gated community,” while also denoting an attitude toward urban space as something that can be managed and controlled according to the desires of the middle- and upper-classes. It can be challenging to identify anti-urbanist sentiment as it includes the overlaps between the promotion of urbanist ideals and the role of investment strategies in shaping urban pace. Crucially, however, a reading of antiurbanism must involve an understanding of approaches, or attitudes, to urban space that result in the removal of those characteristics of urban space that are less predictable, such as associated with informal daily activities. When taken together, “antiurbanism,” in its contemporary guise, must be viewed as more than the mere desire to remove oneself physically from urban space, and instead as an attitude to urban life that is embedded within the very ideals and attributes of contemporary urbanism itself. In this regard, it can be read as a particular impulse that is identifiable through a critical reading of the contradictory relationship between urban experience, urbanist ideals, and power dynamics.

See Also: Defensible Space; Other/Otherness; Public Spaces, Urban; Public–Private Divide; Social Class; Social Geography; Urban Design; Urban Order; Urban Planning; Urban Policy.

Further Reading Angelo, H., 2017. From the city lens toward urbanisation as a way of seeing: country/city binaries on an urbanising planet. Urban Stud. 54, 158–178. Henderson, J., 2006. Secessionist automobility: racism, anti-urbanism, and the politics of automobility in Atlanta, Georgia. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 30, 293–307.

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Low, S., Smith, N., 2006. The Politics of Public Space. Routledge, New York. Mitchell, D., 2003. The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. Guilford Press, New York. Mitchell, D., 2005. The SUV model of citizenship: floating bubbles, buffer zones, and the rise of the “purely atomic” individual. Political Geogr. 24, 77–100. Rosler, M., 2010. Culture class: art, creativity, urbanism, part I: art and urbanism. e-Flux J. 21. December 2010. Available online: at: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/21/67676/ culture-class-art-creativity-urbanism-part-i/. Schafran, A., 2013. Discourse and dystopia, American style: the rise of ‘slumburbia’ in a time of crisis. City 17, 130–148. Sheppard, E., Leitner, H., Maringanti, A., 2013. Provincializing global urbanism: a manifesto. Urban Geogr. 34, 893–900. Wilson, E., 1992. The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women. University of California Press, Oakland.

Apartheid/Postapartheid Jane Battersby, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Apartheid A system of institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over another racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.

The apartheid era in South Africa existed for 46 years, between 1948 and 1994; however, its historical reach can be traced considerably further back into the country’s history and forward into present lived experiences. Apartheid (literally: “State of being apart” in Afrikaans) was perhaps most clearly defined in the 1985 United Nations’ International Convention Against Apartheid in Sport as, “a system of institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over another racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them.” Essentially, the policy sought to shape the country’s spatial, economic, and political life to enable “separate development” of the four racial groups into which each resident of the country was categorized: white, colored, Indian, and black African (labeled “Bantu,” “Native,” and “Black” during apartheid). Inherent in the system was a racial hierarchy, reinforced through all spheres of state activity and at all spatial scales. In the postapartheid era there are ongoing efforts to overcome the spatial, economic, social, and political legacy of apartheid. There are claims of other “apartheids” throughout the world (e.g., Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Brazil, the United States), drawing on similar legacies of segregation and dispossession, although without the institutional legality of South Africa’s apartheid. This article examines the origins and nature of apartheid, factors leading to the end of apartheid, transformation within the postapartheid era and provides a discussion of these other “apartheids.”

From Segregation to Apartheid Many of the building blocks of apartheid were in existence by the time the National Party was elected to power in 1948, leading some commentators to stress the continuity from preapartheid to apartheid, from de facto to de jure segregation. The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 from the British Colonies of Natal and the Cape, and the Boer Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. By the time of Union, the country had already largely been divided up along racial lines, in both rural and urban areas. The 1913 Land Act and 1936 Native Trust and Land Act apportioned 13% of the land in the Union to the black African population, who constituted around 75% of the total population. These Acts prohibited the purchase of land by black African people outside of the scheduled areas. It also made provision for the prevention of other means of independent black access to land, through squatting, leasing, share cropping, or labor tenancy. These Native Reserves and Trust Lands became the basis for the Homelands, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In urban areas, too, there was already significant racial segregation. As early as 1847 the Cape Colonial government promulgated regulations for the establishment of separate locations close to town where members of indigenous groups (including Afrikaansspeaking coloured people) were required to live, if they were not housed by their employers or were not independent property owners in their own rights. In the light of increased black African urbanization, the Native (Urban Areas) Act was passed in 1923 to establish separate locations for the black African population, and to place limitations on migration to towns. The Slums Act of 1934 was also used as a means of removing black African people from the inner urban areas. This Act also allowed for the expropriation of coloured and Indian land. These various means of racial segregation in urban areas, and racially stratified economic realities, gave rise to highly segregated cities, as Fig. 2 illustrates. In addition to spatial segregation, there were a number of other racially discriminatory laws and practices in existence before 1948. The black African population did not have voting rights, and the coloured population in the Cape had their limited franchise diluted by laws passed in the 1930s. Through Acts such as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wages Act of 1925 certain jobs were reserved for white workers. Education was also highly segregated and funded differentially along racial lines. While segregation had existed since the establishment of the Cape, there was an increase in legislation to ensure racial difference after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Many of the laws passed in the period between 1910 and 1948 were designed to guarantee the upliftment of poor whites. In the 1920s between 30% and 50% of all Afrikaners were in or close to the “poor white” category. In 1939, almost 40% of adult male Afrikaners were unskilled. It has been argued that the National Party came to power in the light of an upsurge in poor white numbers after World War II at the same time as a black urban middle class was emerging, and in the light of the development of black opposition.

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Model segregation city (Davies, 1981, 64).

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The Nature of Apartheid The degree of segregation in existence before 1948 has led some to argue that apartheid was simply a continuation of what was already in process. However, the election of the National Party brought a far more comprehensive kind of segregation to what had gone before. Between 1948 and 1951 a series of Acts were passed to lay the foundation for complete segregation on grounds of race. HF Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966, said in 1948 that the total segregation of races was the ideal situation for all races and that apartheid was the best mechanism to bring the country as close as possible to this ideal, although total segregation would not ultimately be possible. Verwoerd’s identification of the limits of total segregation derived from the dependence of the white economy on black labor, thus preventing the desired complete separation. In order to achieve its objectives, the apartheid state passed a series of laws which maintained and extended existing segregation. The core policies, which encapsulated the ideology and intent of the state, were rapidly passed into law, namely the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the Group Areas Act (1950), Population Registration Act (1950), the Immorality Act (1950), and the Bantu Authorities Act (1951). These five key policies were interlinked and created their own internal logic. The Group Areas Act provided for areas within the urban environment to be declared for the exclusive use of one particular racial group. People were only allowed to own or rent residential property or businesses in areas classified for their racial group. Unlike previous Acts, which proclaimed new areas for particular races, the Group Areas Act was also retrospective in its planning. It allowed for the rezoning of existing residential and business areas for particular race groups. It was estimated that by the end of 1976 although 32% of Chinese and Indian families had been spatially disqualified and 20% of coloured families, just 0.2% of white families had been. The high proportion of Chinese and Indian families removed under the Act is a reflection of their previous level of integration in predominantly white areas as a wealthy subsection of the black majority. It has been suggested that one of the motivations for the Act was to restrict the further rise in status of these non-white elite groups. Black African South Africans were not provided for within the Group Areas Act, as they were not recognized as legitimate urban dwellers as a result of preapartheid legislation. Black Africans were only allowed in cities as “temporary sojourners,” their “home” being in the lands demarcated under the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. The passing of the Bantu Authorities Act brought in a governmental system based on chiefs and “tribal” authorities as the only political representation for black Africans. All black Africans were therefore assigned a homeland according to their record of origin and were therefore effectively retribalized and ceased to be considered South African citizens. These two grand spatial plans (national and urban) could not be implemented effectively without a rigid racial categorization. The Population Registration Act therefore required all citizens to be identified and registered as belonging to one of four core racial groups: white, coloured, Indian, Bantu (black African). This classification influenced all spheres of life: political, economic, social, and spatial. It also facilitated other policies, e.g., the Group Areas Act, to reinforce apartheid ideology. Apartheid could not allow these racial boundaries to blur and insisted on racial purity. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts therefore banned sexual contact between people of different races in an attempt to maintain these racial boundaries. Once these core laws were in operation, the apartheid state then implemented a series of other laws reinforcing the unequal separation of people in South Africa, including the Abolition of Passes Act (1951), Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953), Bantu Education Act (1953), Natives Resettlement Act (1954), Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act (1955), Industrial Conciliation Act (1956). In its implementation, apartheid was fundamentally spatial. The power of apartheid largely derived from its control of people’s personal and community geographies at all scales of existencedfrom the national scale to the urban scale, and the microscales of entrances to buildings and bathrooms within workplaces. At the macro, national scale, South Africa was divided into black African homelands and the rest of the country. These 10 homelands were nominally sovereign nations. Black Africans were denied citizenship of South Africa, as they were considered citizens of their allocated homeland. The homelands were economically, and often agriculturally, marginal and overcrowded places. Black African South Africans remained economically dependent on white capital as laborers, yet without the rights of citizens. At the mesoscale, the Group Areas Act divided urban areas along racial grounds residentially, economically, and recreationally, refining the segregation city and reinforcing the racial hierarchy through spatial means (see Fig. 3). At the microscale, the daily lives of people in public spaces and private spaces were dictated by laws designed to reflect the apartheid ideology. Separate benches, buses, hospitals, schools, etc., were all set in place. Businesses employing people of more than one race were obligated to provide separate toilets for people of each race. Public buildings, like post offices, had separate entrances for people of different races. Within this segregation, there was a clear racial hierarchy. Within education, for example, the ratio of per capita expenditure on education in South Africa for black Africans, coloreds, Indians, and whites was 1:3.4:4.9:8.3 in 1984. This pattern of separate and unequal provisioning was reflected in all spheres of life. The interlinking of these policies at different spatial scales created a systematic web of oppression. Despite the best efforts of the state, the system was neither watertight nor internally coherent. Throughout the apartheid era cracks appeared in the system, most obviously in the form of protest, but also through periodic economic crises. The following section discusses some of the reasons for the ending of apartheid.

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Model apartheid city (Davies, 1981, 69).

Toward Ending Apartheid Although apartheid officially ended in 1994, when South Africa held its first democratic election, it had been in a period of transition for a number of years, possibly as far back as the early 1970s. Reasons for the decline of apartheid can be broadly divided into agency-based and structure-based arguments. Agency-based arguments reflect the popular narratives of internal political activism and the international anti-apartheid movement. These arguments range from those around individual agency, such as the role of key figures like Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk, to the role of wider internal and international protest. The structure-based arguments tend to focus on local and global economic crises which destabilized the system, the failure of import-substitution industrialization as a growth model, and other defects within the system. It is vital to recognize the impact of both in the nature and temporality of the end of apartheid. It can be argued that apartheid had at its core a tension or contradiction, that its downfall was therefore inevitable, but dependent on agency to reveal and exploit these structural weaknesses. The National Party came to power through playing on white fears of the emergent black middle and working classes. It was therefore in a permanent position of attempting to stem the tide of black economic and political development. The internal struggle was such that in order for South Africa to be economically viable it needed to take advantage of black labor, but needed to do this without conceding political franchise. As the South African economy developed, this contradiction became more marked. The constraints on placed upon black African access to urban areas began to impact economic efficiency. The economy was changing, requiring higher skilled workers in the manufacturing and service sectors, and yet this workforce could not feasibly emerge from the disenfranchised temporary urban sojourners educated by the Bantu Education system to be little more than manual labor. By 1977 there was a skills shortage of 99,000 in the professional, semiprofessional, and technical grades, up from 47,000 in 1969. These contradictions did not just manifest themselves in economic crises, but also by means of popular protest, both locally and internationally. In the light of these issues, the state therefore began a programme to reform apartheid through measures such as the program of black trade unions in 1979. This was in part an attempt to contain rising black labor militancy. In 1983, the government introduced the Tricameral Parliament system, which afforded a limited vote to coloured and Indians. This reform did not impact black Africans who were not recognized as citizens of South Africa, but of their allocated homelands. Under the tricameral system, parliament had three houses, one for each race. Each of the three chambers had powers of various “own affairs” issues, such as education, housing, and cultural, but “general affairs,” such as finance, defense, and foreign affairs, were beyond the control of individual houses; however, the balance of power always rested with the (white) House of Assembly, both numerically and in terms of the responsibilities of the houses. A third attempt at reform was the 1986 White Paper on Urbanization, which reduced control of access to

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urban areas for black Africans, with the objective of allowing a compliant black middle class to develop and therefore provide political and economic stability; however, through these attempts to ensure stability, greater instability was generated and protests increased. In the 1980s, as the state implemented reforms designed to make apartheid acceptable internally and internationally without disturbing the fundamentals, the perversity of the system became more apparent. Therefore, when FW de Klerk became President in 1989, the year that the Cold War ended (and therefore dissipating the fear of black-led Communism that many white South Africans held), the political and economic climate was right for moves to be made by the state to end apartheid. In 1990 the ANC (African National Congress), Pan Africanist Congress, South African Communist Party, and other liberation organizations were unbanned. In 1991, key political leaders from both sides began formal constitutional negotiations at the CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) meetings. In 1992 a referendum of white voters was held, with 68.6% voting “yes” to the continuation of the reform process. The Interim Constitution was passed in 1993, and in April 1994 the first democratic elections in South Africa were held. These changes were not a sudden transformation, but part of a long-term process of destabilizing the apartheid state through interlinked structural and agency-led processes. The nature of the postapartheid state was the result of a negotiated settlement between the apartheid state and the liberation movement. This process has largely been recognized as playing a vital role in the peaceful transition and the economic stability of the country. There are many who argue that the compromises made to ensure this stability have impacted the pace of social and economic transformation in the postapartheid era.

PostApartheid The end of apartheid as a political force heralded the start of the postapartheid era. However, postapartheid South Africa is in many ways still attempting to liberate itself from the legacy of apartheid and precursors. The challenge of this has been compounded by the significant economic debt inherited by the postapartheid government. This has led to acceptance of a number of neoliberal economic decisions. It has often been argued that the negotiated settlement at the end of apartheid was too conciliatory and delivered political freedom without economic freedom. South Africa’s postapartheid macroeconomic policy has been driven by an economic growth agenda, triggered by a need to address inherited debt. This has been characterized by market deregulation and trade liberalization. South Africa’s postapartheid macroeconomic policies have in recent years been the object of considerable political protest and one of the reasons for the emergence of new radical and populist political parties, such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). A prime example of the impact of this macroeconomic policy trend has been the consolidation and concentration of South Africa’s food system. In response to pressure from the World Trade Organization and efforts to break the restrictive power of the apartheid era marketing boards, the agricultural sector was deregulated and liberalized. This has had far-reaching consequences for the food system. Between 1996 and 2008 there was a 76% decline in the number of farmers, although the land under production was not reduced. Agriculture has become more industrialized and consolidated, so much so that one of the leading four food retailers, who control around 60% of all the country’s food sales, procure 80% of all their fresh produce from just 10 agribusinesses. This concentration is evident along the entire food value chain. For example, the country’s top 10 packaged food companies account for more than half of all packaged food sales, double the global average. The changes in the food system are indicative of the ongoing challenges of dismantling apartheid within a prevailing neoliberal economic environment. The multiscalar spatial reach of apartheid impacted upon every area of life for individuals and communities in a complex, interlinked manner. Therefore, the success of efforts to overcome the legacy of apartheid in one sector of South African life is contingent on addressing many other aspects at a range of scales. For example, equal, or even redistributive, funding of education will not result in all schools having equal economic and educational resources. Historical underfunding of education has left many coloured and black African schools with a significant proportion of underqualified teachers, particularly in rural areas. The spatial legacy of apartheid places black schools at a disadvantage in terms of access to valuable teaching resources and amenities in the city centers. The economic legacy leaves schools in poorer areas with less ability to raise school fees and additional funds to supplement state education provision. The legacy of lack of investment in black areas leaves the school community resource poor in terms of libraries and sports facilities. The educational legacy leaves schools contending with undereducated parents unable to provide the educational support for their children that children in areas of historic privilege have. In 2015, 21 years after the end of apartheid a student movement called Fees Must Fall emerged, led by the so-called “born free” generation. This movement highlighted the lack of transformation within higher education and drew attention to exclusionary fees, to a need to decolonize curricula, to the ongoing underrepresentation of black academics in senior positions, and to the unjust treatment of ancillary staff (such as cleaners, kitchen staff, and security) who had been outsourced during neoliberal restructuring of the higher education sector in the 1990s. The movement has been pivotal in highlighting the multiple ways in which the apartheid legacy and postapartheid economic policies intersect in higher education. Returning to the idea that apartheid’s power used spatial reordering at many scales to reinforce a political ideology, it is possible to observe the legacy of apartheid. At the macroscale, the state intended to redistribute 30% of South Africa’s agricultural land to black farmers by 2014. The purpose of this is to break down the historical legacy of the Homelands and Reserves policies, which forced the black African population onto just 13% of South Africa’s land, enforcing racial segregation. Land reform is critical for promoting equity, addressing past injustices and providing sustainable rural livelihoods. However, at the time of writing, just

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4% had been redistributed. This slow rate of change can attribute to the protracted negotiations that take place within the “Willing Buyer, Willing Seller” system. There have been allegations that white farmers are only offering their worst land for sale and asking way over market value. There have been counter allegations that the state is not offering reasonable payment. In 2006 the government announced the first expropriation of land as a result of the failure of negotiations between a farmer and the Department of Land Affairs. Despite this announcement in 2006, very little expropriation has actually occurred. Land reform remains a thorny political issue with conflicting data about how much land has actually been transferred to black farmers. In his maiden State of Nation Speech in 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa confirmed expropriation without compensation as ANC policy, but clarified that this should only happen if it did not threaten food security or impact on the rest of the economy. The historical legacy of the Homelands and Reserves policy is still evident in land ownership in South Africa, and land will remain a highly political issue in the coming decades. At the mesoscale, urban areas in South Africa are still largely constrained by the preexisting spatial framework. Individual movement across the Group Areas Act demarcations has been fairly limited for a number of reasons. An initial reason was the overcapitalization that had taken place in wealthier coloured and Indian areas due to a shortage in housing stock. After the Group Areas Act was repealed in 1991 the value of these properties dropped, therefore making it difficult for people who wanted to buy into historically white areas. Houses of equal quality in historically white areas are still considerably more expensive than those elsewhere, therefore the economic legacy of apartheid makes racial desegregation difficult. In addition, many people do not wish to move from areas where they have developed a sense of community, into areas where they fear hostility from the existing racial community, part of the apartheid legacy of a racialized mindset. This limited desegregation is less evident in newer areas and in Johannesburg’s wealthy Northern Suburbs, reflecting the rise of a considerable black middle class in Johannesburg. Government has attempted to encourage desegregation through means such as the land restitution program. This program allowed individuals and communities dispossessed of land after 1913 to make a claim for the land from which they were removed, alternative land, or financial compensation. This program has had little impact in urban areas as, for various reasons, most urban claims have been settled through financial compensation, rather than land. The postapartheid city has been characterized by continued peripheralization of poor households. By 2016, the Department of Human Settlements (previously the Department of Housing) had delivered 4.3 million houses and housing opportunities. At the same time the housing backlog exceeded 2.1 million. In 1994, the urban housing backlog was estimated to be 1.5 million. The increase in demand is driven by migration, natural growth, and reduced household sizes. The vast majority of the new government provided houses have been located on the periphery of urban areas, largely as a result of the high cost of urban land. It has also been asserted that urban spatial policy was less radical than had been desired due to factors such as weak local government and pressure to demonstrate urban economic stability for international investment. In 2004, the Department of Housing identified a new policy focus, Breaking New Ground, which sought to address this peripheralization; however, the majority of poor households will continue to live in peripheral areas, whether in formal or informal housing, as a result of the chronic housing shortfall and limited budgetary capacity of the state. Municipalities are coming under pressure to provide affordable housing near to city centers, with housing activists playing an increasingly active role in civil society. While there have been some cases of state-owned land being earmarked for low-cost housing development, market forces are largely prevailing. In the postapartheid era the role of the country within the Southern African region and the continent as a whole has been transformed. South Africa is now a critical political influence and economic driver within the region. At the same time as South Africa is realizing its new role in the regional and global economy, it is now also finding that its ability to overcome the apartheid legacy is profoundly influenced by the challenges of the global economy. South Africa has undergone radical transformation in many spheres since the end of apartheid, however, given the continued impacts of many aspects of the system on the experiences of citizens today, it is not yet possible to conceive of the country without reflecting on apartheid. Apartheid and postapartheid remain fundamentally linked.

Other Apartheids There have been numerous claims of other apartheids around the world, in countries as diverse as Northern Ireland, the United States, Israel/Palestine, and Brazil. If we accept the United Nations definition of apartheid used at the start of this article, it is debatable whether these can be considered apartheid equivalents. What constitutes institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination? There is indeed segregation within these nations and in some cases extreme inequality on grounds of race. In addition, the commonalities of experience can allow critical dialogue to take place between citizens of these countries. The legal framework and total ideology purposefully created under apartheid operating at all spatial scales mark South Africa’s experiences as fundamentally different.

Conclusion There are a number of countries in the world experiencing extreme segregation and inequality. In most countries this phenomenon can be traced back to common histories of European colonialism and postcolonial policies informed by colonial legal and planning processes. Apartheid diverged from this general pattern of segregation to form an almost total system of segregation of all facets of

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life at all spatial scales. This difference can be attributed in part to the nature of the South African economy and characteristics of the white settler population. Concerns about rising numbers of poor whites and a rising middle-class urban black population played a role in the victory of the historically marginal National Party, which was then able to develop the suite of policies that would become apartheid. The ultimate collapse of the apartheid state can be attributed to both agency-based and structure-based factors. While apartheid officially ended in 1994, its spatial and economic legacies are still clearly evident in the country. The past 5 years have seen the emergence of critical political movements arguing that the negotiated settlement at the end of apartheid was too conciliatory and delivered political freedom without economic freedom. The ongoing legacy of apartheid provides a useful example to examine power of spatial practices to entrench economic and political power.

See Also: Colonialism; Inequality; Segregation.

Further Reading Beall, J., Crankshaw, O., Parnell, S., 2002. Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg. Earthscan, London. Beinart, W., 2001. Twentieth Century South Africa. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford. Bond, P., 2014. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa, second ed. University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg. Christopher, A.J., 1994. The Atlas of Changing South Africa. Routledge, London. Clark, N.L., Worger, W.H., 2016. South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid. Routledge, Abingdon. Cousins, B., Walker, C. (Eds.), 2015. Land Divided, Land Restored: Land Reform for South Africa in the 21st Century. Jacana, Johannesburg. Davies, R.J., 1981. The spatial formation of the South African city. GeoJournal Suppl. Issue 2, 59–72. Lemon, A. (Ed.), 1995. The Geography of Change in South Africa. John Wiley, Chichester. Lester, A., Nel, E., Binns, T., 2000. South Africa: Past Present and Future. Prentice Hall, Harlow. Posel, D., 1991. The Making of Apartheid 1948–1961. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Saff, G.R., 1998. Changing Cape Town: Urban Dynamics, Policy and Planning during the Political Transition in South Africa. University Press of America, Lanham. Smith, D.M., 1992. The Apartheid City and beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa. Routledge, London. Terreblanche, S.J., 2002. A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652–2002. University of KwaZulu Natal Press, Durban. Western, J., 1996. Outcast Cape Town, second ed. University of California Press, Berkeley.

Relevant Websites South African History Online: http://www.sahistory.org.za. South African Cities Network, Township Timeline: http://sacitiesnetwork.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/township_transformation_timeline.pdf.

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Applied Geography Michael Pacione, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom; and Geography, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp 174–178, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd., with an updated Further Reading supplied by the Editor.

Glossary Applied Geography An approach based on the philosophy of relevance or social usefulness that focuses on the application of geographical knowledge and skills to advance the resolution of real-world social, economic, and environmental problems. Marxist Geography The study of geographical questions using the analytical insights, concepts, and theoretical frameworks of historical materialism. Postmodernism A broad-based movement in philosophy, the arts, and social science characterized by skepticism toward the “grand theory” of the modern era, stressing instead an openness to a wide range of views in social enquiry. Public Policy The actions of government and the intentions that determine these actions. Quality of Life The state of social well-being of an individual or group, either perceived or as identified by observable indicators. Social Justice A broad principle concerned with the “fairness” of the distribution of society’s benefits and burdens among individuals and groups. Social Policy The part of public policy that aims to improve human welfare and meet human needs.

The rationale underlying applied geography is based on the particular philosophy of relevance or social usefulness that focuses on the application of geographical knowledge and skills to advance the resolution of real-world social, economic, and environmental problems. Rather than being considered as a “subarea” of geography (akin to economic, social, or historical geography), applied geography refers to an “approach” that crosscuts artificial disciplinary boundaries to involve problem-oriented research in both human and physical geography. Applied geographers are active across the human–physical geography divide and in most subareas of the discipline. Applied geography is a socially relevant approach to the study of the relationship between people and their environments. The relevance and value of applied geographical research have never been more apparent, given the plethora of problem situations, which confront modern societiesdranging from extreme natural events (such as floods, droughts, and earthquakes) through environmental concerns (such as deforestation, disease, and desertification) to human issues (such as crime, poverty, and unemployment). An applied geographical approach has the potential to illuminate the nature and causes of such problems and inform the formulation of appropriate responses. The concept of useful knowledge is of central importance for applied geography but is problematic for some practicing geographers. Those who do not see themselves as applied geographers may interpret the concept as indicating a corollary in the shape of geographical research that is less useful or even useless. This would be a misinterpretation. The concept of useful knowledge should be seen as an expression of the fundamental ethos of applied geography rather than a design to alienate “nonapplied” geographers. The use of the concept of useful knowledge makes explicit the view that some kinds of research are more useful than other kinds. This is not the same as saying that some geographical research is better than other workdall knowledge is usefuldbut some kinds of research and knowledge are more useful than other kinds in terms of their ability to interpret and offer solutions to problems in contemporary physical and human environments. For “nonapplied” geographers, the idea of applied geography or useful research is a chaotic concept, which does not fit with the cultural turn in social geography or the postmodern theorizing of recent years. The philosophical disjuncture between applied geographers and other geography practitioners is illustrated most clearly by comparing the applied geographical approach with the alternative postmodern perspective. One of the major achievements of postmodern discourse has been the illumination of the importance of difference in society as part of the theoretical shift from an emphasis on economically rooted structures of dominance to cultural “otherness” focused on the social construction of group identities. However, there is a danger that the reification of difference may preclude communal efforts in pursuit of goals such as social justice. A failure to address the unavoidable real-life question of “whose is the more important difference among differences” when strategic choices have to be made represents a serious threat to constructing a “practical politics” of difference. Furthermore, if all viewpoints and expressions of identity are equally valid, how do we evaluate social policy or, for that matter, right from wrong? How do we avoid the segregation, discrimination, and marginalization, which the postmodern appeal for recognition of difference

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seeks to counteract? For some commentators the failure to address real issues would seem to suggest that the advent of postmodernism in radical scholarship has done little to advance the cause of social justice. Discussion of relevant issues is abstracted into consideration of how particular discourses of power are constructed and reproduced. Responsibility for bringing theory to bear on real-world circumstances is largely abdicated in favor of the intellectually sound, but morally myopic premise that there is no such thing as reality. Decoupling social critique from its political–economic basis is not helpful for dealing with the shifting realities of life. Some postmodern writers have acknowledged the dangers of cultural theorists retreating from the empirical world into an “in-house” dialog set within an “immaterial world” of limited relevance to “material world” events. Notwithstanding such cautionary codas, in terms of real-world problems, for many applied geographers, much postmodern thought would appear to condemn us to inaction while we reflect on the nature of the issue. As we shall see below, a similar critique may be leveled at the Marxist critique of applied geography, which was prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s. These views do not represent an attempt to be prescriptive of all geographical research but are intended to indicate clearly the principles and areas of concern for applied geography. It is a matter of individual conscience whether geographers study topics such as the iconography of landscapes or the optimum location for health centers, but the principle underlying the kind of useful geography espoused by most applied geographers is a commitment to improving existing social, economic, and environmental conditions. In this there can be no compromisedno academic fudge; some geographical research “is” more useful than other work. This is the focus of applied geography. There will continue to be divergent views on the content and value of geographical research. Such debate is healthy and raises a number of important questions for the discipline and for applied geography in particular. The concept of “useful research” poses the basic questions of useful for whom?, who decides what is useful?, and based on what criteria? The related questions of values in research and the nature of the relationship between pure and applied research are also issues of central importance for applied geography.

The Relationship Between Pure and Applied Research Applied research in any discipline is best understood in contrast with basic, or pure, research. For some commentators basic research in geography aims to develop new theory and methods that help explain the processes through which the spatial organization of physical or human environments evolves. In contrast, applied research uses existing geographic theory or techniques to understand and solve specific empirical problems. While this distinction is useful at a general level, it overplays the notion of a dichotomy between pure and applied geography, which is more correctly seen as two sides of the same coin. There is, in fact, a dialectic relationship between the two. Applied geography uses the principles and methods of pure geography but is different in that it analyzes and evaluates real-world action and planning and seeks to implement and manipulate environmental and spatial realities. In the process, it contributes to, as well as utilizes, general geography through the revelation of new relationships. The conjuncture between pure and applied research is illustrated clearly in geomorphology, where, for example, attempts to address problems of shoreline management have contributed to theories of beach transport, the difficulties of road construction in the arctic have informed theories of permafrost behavior, while problems encountered in tunneling have aided the development of subsidence theory. Applied research provides the opportunity to use theories and methods in the ultimate proving ground of the real world, as well as enabling researchers to contribute to the resolution of real-world problems. More generally, theory is essential in applied geography at two levels. First, it provides the framework for asking questions about the substantive relationships embodied in a problem (e.g., here, a model of a hydrological catchment illuminates the potential effects of a proposed flood prevention scheme). Second, social theory provides a normative standard against which current and future social conditions may be judged in terms of defined moral goals (which may address issues such as whether a minimum wage and basic standard of living should be a legal entitlement in advanced capitalist societies). There is little merit in pursuing a false dichotomy between pure and applied research. A more useful distinction is that which recognizes the different levels of involvement of researchers at each stage of the research and specifically the greater engagement of applied geographers in the “downstream” or postanalysis stages. The applied researcher has a greater interest than the pure researcher in taking the investigation beyond analysis into the realms of application of results and monitoring the effects of proposed strategies. Researcher participation in the implementation stage may range from recommendations in scholarly publications or contracted reports (a route favored by most academic applied geographers, though not exclusively) to active involvement in implementation (more usually by applied geographers employed outside academia). Between these positions lie a variety of degrees of engagement, including acting as expert witnesses at public inquiries, dissemination of research findings via the media, field involvement in, for example, landscape conservation projects, and monitoring the effects of policies and strategies enacted by governmental and private sector agencies. The balance between pure and applied research within a discipline varies over time in relation to the prevailing sociopolitical environment. When external pressures are at their greatest, disciplines will tend to emphasize their problem-solving capacity, while during periods of national economic expansion, “more academic” activity may be pursued in comfort. Some have equated these cycles with the long waves of the world economy and identified three periods in which applied geography was in the ascendancy

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Cycles of pure and applied geography.

First applied period (late 19th Century) First pure period (early 20th Century) Second applied period (interwar) Second pure period (post-1945 boom)

Third applied period (mid-1980s)

Third pure period (?)

Geography created as an applied discipline to serve the political, military, and commercial interests of the state. Based around the holistic philosophy encompassing both physical and human phenomena and focused on the core concept of the region and regional synthesis. A period of war, followed by depression, and war again demanded geography demonstrate its usefulness in fields such as land-use planning. Rejection of ideographic regionalism replaced by spatial science and the quantitative revolution; demise of holistic approach and emergency of subfields within the discipline. Extension of the concept of useful research into new areas of concern relating to social, economic, and environmental problems; applied geographers working both in academic and in public and private sectors. Applied geography as an approach rather than a subfield crosscuts the artificial boundary between physical and human geography and emphasizes the dialectic relationship between pure and applied research. Acknowledgment of the role of human agency and values in research and environmental change, and the need for a pluralist view of science. Characteristics unknown but speculativelyda return to a more holistic philosophy reflecting the growing importance of environmental issues and the combinatory perspective of applied geography.

From Pacione, M. (1999). Applied Geography: Principles and Practice. London: Routledge.

(in the late 19th Century, inter-war era, and mid-1980s), separated by two periods of pure geography (in the early 20th Century and during the post-1945 economic boom; Table 1).

The Value of Applied Geography A fundamental question for those working within the framework of applied geography concerns the value of a problem-oriented approach. We have examined this issue already in our discussions of useful knowledge and the relationship between pure and applied research, but we return to it here to address the specific critique of applied geography that has emanated from Marxist theorists. While the power of the Marxist critique has been much reduced by its own success in exposing the value bases of research, it still offers a useful perspective on the value of applied research. The essence of the Marxist critique of applied social research is that it produces ameliorative policies that merely serve to patch up the present system, aid the legitimation of the state, and bolster the forces of capitalism with their inherent tendencies to create inequality. For these radical geographers, participation in policy evaluation and formulation is ineffective since it hinders the achievement of the greater goal of revolutionary social change. In terms of praxis, the outcome of this perspective is to do nothing short of a radical reconstruction of the dominant political economy (a position which, as we have seen, may also be reached from a different direction by some postmodernist theorists). Although the analytical value of the Marxist critique of capitalism is widely acknowledged, its political agenda, and in particular, opposition to any action not directed at revolutionary social change, finds little favor among applied geographers. To ignore the opportunity to improve the quality of life of some people in the short term in the hope of achieving possibly greater benefit in the longer term is not commensurate with the ethical position implicit in the problem-oriented approach of applied geography. Neither does the argument that knowledge is power and a public commodity that can be used for good or evil undermine the strength of applied geography. Any knowledge could be employed in an oppressive and discriminating manner to accentuate inequalities of wealth and power, but this is no argument for eschewing research. On the contrary, it signals a need for greater engagement by applied geographers in the policymaking and implementation process provided, of course, that those involved are aware of and avoid the danger of co-optation by, for example, funding agencies. Furthermore, access to the expertise and knowledge produced by applied geographical research is not the sole prerogative of the advantaged in society but can be equally available to pressure groups or local communities seeking a more equitable share of society’s resources. Examples of the participatory tradition of applied research in urban geography range from the advocacy planning practiced in several US cities, whereby professional planning expertise is provided to minority groups lacking the financial ability to

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purchase such services, to nongovernmental organization–sponsored grassroots social action by marginalized communities in cities in the Third World. Applied research involves the formulation of goals and strategies and the testing of existing institutional policies within the context of ethical standards as criteria. This should not imply a simple system maintenance approach to problem solving. Indeed, it is often necessary to take an unpopular antiestablishment position, which can result in a major confrontation. For practical examples of this we may refer to the recommendations of the British community development projects of the 1970s, which advocated fundamental changes in the distribution of wealth and power and which led to conflict with both central and local government; as well as more recent policy-oriented analyses of poverty and deprivation in which the identification of sociospatial patterns is used to advance a critique of government policy.

Values in Applied Geography At each stage of the research process the applied geographer is faced with a number of methodological and ethical questions. Decisions are required on defining the nature of the problem, its magnitude, who is affected and in what ways, as well as on the best means of addressing the problem. All these require value judgments on, for example, the acceptability of existing conditions (what is an acceptable level of air pollution? or of infant malnutrition?). Values are also central to the evaluation and selection of possible remedial strategies, including comparative analysis of the benefits and disbenefits of different approaches for different people and places. In some cases, the applied geographer may seek to minimize such value judgments by enhancing the objectivity of the research methodology (e.g., by employing a classification of agricultural land capability to inform a set-aside policy). In most instances, however, it is impossible to remove the need for value judgment. The impossibility of objective value-free research is now axiomatic. One issue of particular concern refers to the values that condition the selection, conduct, and implementation of research, a dilemma highlighted by the aphorism “he who pays the piper calls the tune.” Some advocates of public policy research by applied geographers express this in terms of doubts over whether government departments will commission necessary research into the effectiveness and consequences of their own policies and a real danger that constraints will be imposed over publication, especially if this contains criticisms of the sponsors or explores politically sensitive areas. Applied geographers must beware of any restrictions imposed by research sponsors and be aware of the ways in which their research results may be used. Applied geographers must seek to ensure that their work contributes to human welfare. In practice, this goal may be approached by careful selection of clients and research projects, by ensuring freedom to disseminate results and, where possible, through engagement in the implementation and monitoring of relevant policies or strategies.

Applied Geography and Public Policy The practical value of the applied geographical approach has been demonstrated in the foregoing discussion. Applied geographers are actively engaged in investigating the causes and ameliorating the effects of “natural” phenomena, including acid precipitation, landslides, and flooding. Key issues of environmental change and management also represent a focus for applied geographical research with significant contributions being made in relation to a host of problems ranging from the quality and supply of water, deforestation, and desertification to a series of land-use issues including agricultural de-intensification, derelict and vacant land, and wetland and townscape conservation. Applied geographers with a particular interest in the built environment have, in recent decades, directed considerable research attention to the gamut of social, economic, and environmental problems, which confront the populations of urban and rural areas in both the developed and developing realms. Problems of housing, poverty, crime, transport, ill-health, sociospatial segregation, and discrimination have been the subject of intense investigation, while other topics under examination include problems ranging from boundary disputes and political representation to city marketing. The application of techniques in applied geographical analysis is of particular relevance in relation to spatial analyses where the suite of problems addressed by applied geographers ranges from computer mapping of disease incidence to simulation and modeling of the processes of change in human and physical environments. The list of research undertaken by applied geographers is impressive, but there are no grounds for complacency. While applied geographers have made a major contribution to the resolution of real-world problems, particularly in the context of the physical environment, in terms of social policy formulation in the post-war era the influence of applied geography has been mixed and arguably less than hoped for by those socially concerned geographers who engaged in the relevance debate a quarter of century ago. Several reasons may be proposed to account for this. The first refers to the eclectic and poorly focused nature of geography and the fact that “geographical” work is being undertaken by “nongeographers” in other disciplines. This undermines the identity of geography as a subject with something particular to offer in public policy debate. The very breadth of the discipline, which for many represents a pedagogic advantage, may blur its image as a point of reference for decision makers seeking an informed input. Geographers wishing to influence public policy must compete with other more clearly identified “experts” working on similar themes. A second reason for the relatively limited influence on public policy may be the apparent reluctance of (human) geographers to “get their hands dirty”dan attitude redolent of the 18th distinction between gentlemen, who derived a livelihood from the

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proceeds of landownership, and those who earned a living through trade. This applies less to research in physical geography where a basis in empirical science and positivist methodology has ensured that applied research has attracted support and acclaim more readily both from within the discipline and from external agencies. Significantly, the growth of environmentalism and accompanying convergence of the philosophy and methodology of physical and human geography has gone some way to bridge the gap between the two major subareas of the discipline and may represent a route for applied geographers to increase their policy influence. The changing content and shifting emphases of human geography during the last quarter of the 20th Century represent a third factor underlying the limited social impact of applied geography. Over the period, the replacement of the earlier land use focus in applied human geography by questions relating to the geography of poverty, crime, health care, ethnic segregation, education, and the allocation of public goods brought applied geographers into direct confrontation with those responsible for the production and reproduction of these social problems. Unsurprisingly, since policymakers are resistant to research, which might undermine the legitimacy of the dominant ideology, social policy remained largely impervious to geographical critique, particularly that which emanated from the Marxist analysis of capitalism. The failure of applied geography to exert a major influence on social policy, however, does not signal the failure of applied geography to promote any significant improvement in human well-being, which, as we have seen, may be achieved by means other than via public policy. Any assessment of the contribution of applied geography to the resolution of real-world problems must balance the limited success in the specific area of social policy against the major achievements of applied geographers in the large number of other problem areas outlined above. Rather than dwelling on the limited impact to date of applied geographical research in the field of social policy applied geographers can draw encouragement from their unwillingness to compromise a critical stance in return for public research funds or public acceptability of research findings. Furthermore, much of the applied social research undertaken achieves the goal of addressing real-world problems via its emancipatory power to expose the structural underpinnings of contemporary sociospatial problems and by encouraging exploration of alternative social arrangements.

See Also: Activism; Activist Geographies; Critical Geographies; Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies; Geography and Public Policy; Knowledge Exchange.

Further Reading Berry, B., 1972. More on relevance and policy analysis. Area 4, 77–80. Blomley, N., 1994. Activism and the academy environment and planning D. Society and Space 12, 383–385. Burawoy, M., 2004. Presidential address: for public sociology’. Am. Sociol. Rev. 70, 4–28. Bullock, A., Hughes, R., 2016. Knowledge Exchange and the Social Sciences: A Report to ESRC from the Centre for Business Research. University of Cambridge, Cambridge. Castree, N., 2000. Professionalism, activism and the university: wither critical geography? Environ. Plan. 32, 955–970. Chisholm, M., 1971. Geography and the question of relevance. Area 3, 65–68. Cooper, S., 1966. Theoretical geography, applied geography and planning. Prof. Geogr. 18, 1–2. Coppock, J.T., 1974. Geography and public policy: challenges, opportunities and implications. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 63, 1–16. Dickenson, J., Carke, C., 1972. Relevance and the newest geography. Area 4, 25–27. Folke, S., 1972. Why a radical geography must be Marxist. Antipode 4, 13–18. Frazier, J.W., 1982. Applied Geography: Selected Perspectives. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Harvey, D., 1974. What kind of geography for what kind of public policy. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 63, 18–24. Imrie, R., 2004. Urban geography, relevance, and resistance to the “policy turn". Urban Geogr. 25, 697–708. Kenzer, M.S. (Ed.), 2013. Applied Geography: Issues, Questions, and Concerns, vol. 15. Springer Science & Business Media. Lake, R.W., 2017. On poetry, pragmatism and the urban possibility of creative democracy. Urban Geogr. 38 (4), 479–494. Martin, R., 2001. Geography and public policy: the case of the missing agenda. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 25, 189–210. Massey, D., 2000. Editorial. Practicing political relevance. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 24, 131–135. Miller, H.J., Goodchild, M.F., 2015. Data-driven geography. Geojournal 80, 449–461. Murphy, A., 2006. Enhancing geography’s role in public debate. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 96 (1), 1–13. Pacione, M., 1990. What about people? A critical analysis of urban policy in the United Kingdom. Geography 75, 193–202. Pacione, M., 1999. Applied Geography: Principles and Practice. Routledge, London. Pacione, M., 2009. Urban Geography: A Global Perspective, third ed. Routledge, London. Pain, R., Kesby, M., Askins, K., 2011. Geographies of impact: power, participation and potential. Area 43, 183–188. Palm, R., Brazel, A., et al., 1992. Applications of geographic concepts and methods. In: Abler, R., Marcus, M., Olsson, J. (Eds.), Geographies Inner Worlds. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, pp. 342–362. Peet, R., 1977. Radical Geography. Methuen, London. Prince, H., 1971. Questions of social relevance. Area 3, 150–153. Sant, M., 1982. Applied Geography: Practice, Problems and Prospects. Longman, London. Slater, T., 2012. Impacted geographers: a response to pain, kesby and askins. Area 44, 117–119. Smith, D.M., 1971. Radical geography – the next revolution? Area 3, 153–157. Staeheli, L.A., Mitchell, D., 2005. The complex politics of relevance in geography. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 95, 357–372.

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Archives Matthew Kurtz, Department of Geography, Environment, and Geomatics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Archive A collection of material held in preservation to document the past; also, the site where a collection of records or objects has been deposited and preserved for later research purposes. Collective memory The shared recollections of the past that, as social activities and material artifacts, forge a sense of identity, place, and social differentiation. Materiality Bodies, objects, and things of consequence and also the concrete presences and ephemeral qualities that partake in the formation of phenomena.

The word “archive” operates in three major ways in human geography. The term can refer to (1) a collection of source documents preserved from the past; (2) a place, institution, or repository where source material from the past is preserved and ordered; or (3) an abstraction used to invoke a vast and often intangible storehouse (or source) of knowledge. In geography before the 1980s, the term was used more often in its first sensedas a source of evidence about the pastdas well as the second in reference to archival institutions where specific source material could be found. By the 21st Century, geographers were using the word more frequently in its second and third senses, although its first sense as source material remains. A topical shift has also taken place within human geography in recent decades. It is now common in the discipline to write about an archive as a place of interest in itself, worthy of study through a geographical lens, as well as a source of evidence about the past. Where earlier engagements were largely confined to historical geographers and based almost wholly on “archives-as-source,” more recent work has broadened the remit to look at “archives-as-subjects.” In that context, the archive often represents a site where tangible material about the past had been collected or, in the discipline’s more theoretical work, as an abstraction from the accumulation of human knowledge.

Archival Forms In the second sense of the termdthat is, in its “locational” or institutional registersdthere are several different forms which have been given to contemporary archives.

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Corporate archives preserve a selection of administrative and historical records of a business enterprise. Their contents can include annual reports, company histories, press releases, speeches, photographs, interviews, and marketing materials. Access is usually restricted. University archives are kept and housed by many individual colleges and universities. These collections usually preserve significant documents related to the history of the educational institution. Like corporate archives, much of the material on institutional history is likely to have been preserved for branding purposes; administrative records are less likely to include details of internal conflict. University archives can also include material on specialized subjects, or from individual faculty members, executives, alumni, or residents in the area. Material is often donated based on the long-term stability of the institution and the resources it commits to the preservation of records, which contributes to the reputation and growth of its archive. Government archives include collections curated by agencies at the national, subnational, municipal, or local level. These can include court records, departmental records, birth registries, immigration records, probate deeds, agricultural data, business registries, photographs, historic maps, and noncurrent electronic records. They can include declassified documents from military activities, foreign diplomatic engagements, and surveillance operations. Depending on the mandate of the archival institution, the collections may also include unpublished records that document many aspects of life in the jurisdiction beyond the remit of governance. Nonprofit archives collect and preserve historical material that varies substantially in nature. In some cases, the archival function is the primary mandate of the registered organization. For instance, local historical societies may be volunteer operations involving just a few individuals in a rural town or professional organizations that hold millions of unpublished records about a large jurisdiction in earlier centuries. Another example is the Internet Archive, which is a nonprofit organization that uses a random Web-crawler (called the Wayback Machine) to record and preserve dated copies of sampled Web sites. In other cases, the archival mandate is secondary to the registered nonprofit institution. Religious organizations, hospitals, labor unions, business associations, and community groups are examples. The material preserved in the archives of registered nonprofit institutions may be documents, electronic posts, maps, photographs, films, sound recordings, and/or material artifacts.

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Associative archives include the archival work of unregistered organizations, networks, or individuals. The association may take the form of a recognized network of persons, some of whom happen to preserve some records, or (in the first sense of the word “archive”) the association may be thematic links in the material preserved that invite one or more individuals to build and maintain the archive. The groups and their archives may be more or less systematic in preserving records of the past. Web pages that preserve and make available a dated record of exchanges posted to a scholarly discussion forum are one example. The personal records kept by an individual or family about their past is another. The international collection of ice-cores that climate scientists have preserved is an example of a thematic association. When the objects, stories, and traditions preserved by elders are considered to be an archive of an indigenous cultural legacy, its somewhat precarious form would be that of an associative archive.

Politics of Archives According to the philosopher Jacques Derrida, the word “archive” is derived from two Greek words: arkheion, which means house, domicile, or residence of a magistrate; and archons, referring to those in command. That was because the official documents were those that were kept at the address of the archons, in recognition of their authority but also in recognition of their access to those documents as a basis for their authority. In that context, the guardianship and localization of the archive in a particular place was essential to the authorial significance of these material collections. From these observations, Derrida made a provocative link to the contemporary political significance of archives. In an often-quoted remark from the pages of Archive Fever, Derrida (1996, 4) wrote: “There is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the participation in and access to the archive, its constitution, and its interpretation.”

Taken out of context, these comments may seem uncharacteristically foundational for Derrida. First, they imply that, due to their origin, archives are always political in nature, and then they suggest that politics (or “democratization” at least) is fundamentally concerned with the form and life of archives. Nonetheless, the growing fascination with archives as interesting subjects of inquiry (as a collection, a place, or abstraction) is tied to an assumptiondone that is increasingly frequently made in geographydthat archives are strongly or centrally linked to politics. Arguments that the uneven production, preservation, dissemination, and interpretation of knowledge are inherently political processes have given the emergent analyses of archives a critical edge. Archives are a hot topic in human geography and were it not for some recognition of this political aspect, they might have attracted considerably less attention in the discipline in recent decades. That said, archives are best understood in relation to larger regimes of research and accountability. In many cases, archives are established to preserve and make accessible some material needed for effective monitoring and audit functions, in service to accountability and regulation. Archives also stand in relation to certain configurations of research as a set of social practices. In 16th-Century Europe, for instance, the word “research” largely referred to the act of looking for a specific person or thing. By the 19th Century, research involved an inquiry whose target or “discovery” was not precisely specified beforehand, in pursuit of a more uncertain advance in knowledge. The purpose and significance of archives changed under this regime of research. Consider, for instance, some differences between modern (nonelectronic) archives, museums, and libraries. Archives and libraries both serve as storehouses of knowledge, but there are important differences involving access and singularity. The books in a library are usually published in large numbers (note that those in a historical library are often an exception) and they are frequently available for temporary removal from the institution (i.e., "borrowing a book”). In contrast, the material documents in an archive are often singular, and the documents usually cannot be taken outside a reading room. Alternatively, archives and museums both hold artifacts from the past, but museums are oriented around visual displays for a collective public. The material in a museum is often considered extraordinary (e.g., the first Mercury space capsule), whereas the material in an archive is thought to be mundanedvaluable for its abundance, detail, and relative obscurity. Individualized research and discovery are rarely key museum functions as they are for archives. The preservation and accessibility of archival material are usually oriented around the needs of researchers who, like the items preserved, are understood to be singular. Schematically, one can say that museums operate with a “one-to-many” relationship between the material items preserved and the institution’s users; that most large libraries use a “many-to-many” configuration; and that archives generally operate on a “one-to-one” relationship in the production of discoveries. There are at least three aspects in which archives are thought to be political. They are related to the decisions that the recordcreators and archivists must make with regard to the value, order, and accessibility of the material preserved. In the archival profession, these procedures are often called appraisal, classification, and access. Appraisal involves the selection of material that is to be preserved. The material in the archives represents a very fragmentary record of the past. What ends up there is almost always surprising, often the results of accidents in the messy accumulation of stuff that escaped later methodical removals. That said, the vast majority of stuff is thrown away, deemed unfit for posterity. This involves a number of different people. Those who create and save the material, and those who donate it to the archives, tend to weed it at

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various points before the records arrive at the archive: disposing of multiple drafts and irrelevant records; losing key papers; separating out documents deemed too private or invasive. But even with some boxes of material saved for an archive somewhere, not everything intended for preservation can be kept. Preservation requires storage space, staff time, and other resources. Thus, once an institution acquires the material, archivists weed through it as part of an appraisal. Two questions are often considered. First, is it better to keep as much material as possible, which limits the archivists’ ability to describe, preserve, and locate it very effectively or is it better to fully describe and preserve a smaller body of records? Second, in making a selection, what material will be of value and for whom might it be valuable? The results are political in that, among the acquisitions and within the appraisal process, the interests, values, desires, and histories of some users will be privilegeddby choice, by accident, and by structured durabilitydover those of other people. It may be hard to imagine how this could be avoided. Once appraised and preserved, some kind of classification system is required. A researcher’s ability to navigate to relevant material partly depends on it. The boxed material in archives is often ordered by source (or “provenance”), chronology, and thematic headings. For the latter, many archivists use variants of the disciplinary divisions developed in libraries in the late 19th Century, with consequent problems for classifying recent interdisciplinary endeavors. Due to the fragmentary and disordered nature of material in the archives, the thematic headings also tend to be used somewhat loosely. This sits in contrast to libraries, where the publishing industry has helped tighten the classifications. Even so, many scholars have argued that the classification systems are imbued with social and moral hierarchies. For material from the colonies housed in the Royal Empire Society library, for instance, the classification created in 1910 included a thematic category, “Rudiments of art.” This reflected an assumption that European art was more refined than that of indigenous people in Britain’s colonies. More recently, Moore reports her frustration in British local records offices after failing to find historical material about abortion, later finding relevant material under the headings “Herbalism” and “Wise-women.” She suggests that “[t]o ‘veil’ such material behind these headings may have been a conscious and shrewd decision taken by an astute archivist, well aware of the local sensitivities surrounding the topic of abortion, and fearful that such materials may be at risk of removal” (2010, 265). This choice would have been political, but for archivists to “update,” such headings involves political choices too: modification requires time, which could instead be invested in processing new boxes of material while continuing to use the older categories in the archive’s system. Along with appraisal and classification, the politics of archives are also manifest in their accessibility. Before 1990, restricted access to the archives of the secret police empowered the Stasi while making vast numbers of people in East Germany vulnerable and without recourse. In the 21st Century, private property rights are frequently used to limit access to archival material. Corporate archives are almost always restricted in terms of access and permitted use. Access to nonprofit archives often requires permission in advance, as they may need to reallocate resources to assist the researcher. Interest groups occasionally bid on an available collection in order to make its records readily accessible to their members, though a university or government archive might have made the material available to a wider public. With regard to the latter, scholars have argued that the development of public archives and “free libraries” in 19th-Century Western liberal democracies was in fact constitutive of contemporary notions of “the public”din the form of an active, self-informed citizenry and its others. Yet the spatial politics of public access remain an issue. Political decisions that placed key archival material in the care of metropolitan institutions still limit its accessibility to those in the former colonies and rural peripheries. Other forms of restricted access may revolve around age, professional credentials, or disabilities. Despite attempts to build a technological fix, these legacies of highly uneven access to archival material continue. Finally, the politics of archives work in both directions. With regard to appraisal, classification, and accessibility, the examples above illustrate how archival practices are shaped by politics, but the converse is also true. Politics are infused by different understandings of the past that are critically informed, in turn, by a society’s various archives, as one geographer, Kenneth Foote argued more than two decades ago in 1991. Accordingly, political geographers such as Karen Till have found it enriching to attend to the dynamics of archival practice and collective memory, just as archival engagements have taken a more political turn among historical geographers in recent decades.

Archival Engagements Archives take shape largely in relation to three groups: creators of the material (who may also be donors), archivists, and researchers. The latter may or may not be academics and specialists such as human geographers. For those who engage with archives, it can be helpful to consider the roles that the middle groupdarchivistsdplayed at the time the material was acquired by the institution. In highly schematic terms, the role of archivists can be said to have gone through four phases over the last two centuries. (1) In the first phase, starting in the 19th Century, archives were understood to preserve legal evidence for the needs of the state. Appraisal was undertaken by senior state officials. Archivists served as “passive curators” who ensured that the material was preserved, together with the context of its creation (e.g., the agency in which it was written). (2) By the second phase starting around World War II, the volume of records had grown considerably, and the archival profession had developed stronger ties with academic historians. In order to reduce a potentially overwhelming number of records, archivists became active appraisers, selecting material for its anticipated value for historical scholarship. (3) In the third phase, starting in the 1970s, the focus of appraisal began to shift to documenting human experience in society, not just the activities of state. The archival profession became a matter of expertise (with graduate degrees and academic journals) and archivists increasingly drew from other disciplines (not just history) in their appraisal

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of new collections and records. (4) In the emerging fourth phase in the 21st Century, archivists have begun looking toward participatory models. In this phase, many archivists are beginning to serve as mentors for communities that wish to create their own archives and as collaborators who can bring communities and established archival institutions into mutually productive dialogue. With regard to researchers in human geography, more detail is helpful in regard to the various forms of archival engagement. Broadly, the relationship between human geographers and archival material has taken at least five major shapes in recent decades. The chronology is layered and simultaneous among these research practices rather than a sequence of phases. Individual geographers often undertake more than one form of archival engagement at the same time. Thus the five shapes of archival engagement are not mutually exclusive, unlike the classification of archival forms provided above. Nonetheless, the sketches below are indicative of many of the most prominent types of archival engagement in human geography in the early 21st Century.

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Archival fieldwork refers to research about the past, which is conducted in an archival institution (i.e., inside a reading room) and which looks to the archival material as sources of information. Coined by Harris in 2001, the term “archival fieldwork” complicates simple oppositions between archival research and outdoor fieldwork, where the latter has been privileged in North America as the quintessential practice of geographers. Archival fieldwork points to a less visible tradition of geography in which, to understand changes in the landscape, many hours of archival research are involved for every hour in the field. In this case, archival research takes the shape of an extractive enterprise, mining the archival material as sources of information, for instance about the relationship between people and the environment. The methods need not be encumbered by an empiricist “datamining” endeavor, uninformed by theory. In many formulations, theory and other sources guide some initial suppositions used to draft an evolving research strategy to be carried out in the archives. Nonetheless, archival fieldwork is a long-standing tradition for the practice of archival research, one which is based solidly on an “archives-as-source” approach to learning about the geographies of the past. Reading against the grain seeks to uncover traces of voices from the margins of the historical record. As a form of analysis, it began to emerge in human geography in the 1990s. Like the archival fieldwork tradition, it treats the archival records as a source of information; however, “reading against the grain” involves an understanding of power and resistance within the context in which the archival evidence was produced, paying close attention to the way the researcher interprets select material found in archival institutions. For instance, the agency of young girls in producing the spatial configuration of playgrounds in early 20thCentury Massachusetts can be inferred from the records of the Playground Association of America. Yet, as Gagen and others have shown, the analysis requires an understanding of the then-current discourses of gender, the normative expectations of those creating the record, and a careful “reading against the grain” to identify the silent but active involvement of girls in the production of playground space. To the extent that this approach requires certain understandings of the forces involved in creating the documentary record, “reading against the grain” is built on excavations of the “archive-as-subject” in order to produce its insights from the archival material as source material. Reading along the grain explores the subtle contradictions and anxieties of those with sufficient power to create a body of records in an archive. This approach was developed by Stoler in 2009. As an interpretive exercise, it sits in contrast to the approaches above. Archival fieldwork and “reading against the grain” are both extractive endeavors. They mine the archive for evidence of ontological truths about societies of the past. In contrast, “reading along the grain” is an ethnographic endeavor. It looks for epistemological fault lines in the archive, mapping out the work that was undertaken (often under duress) in response to these worrisome uncertainties. Rather than assuming that one understands how power worked, a researcher who reads “along the grain” tries to understand the anxieties and vulnerabilities that continually unsettled those with sufficient power to create a large body of archival material. Sarah De Leeuw offers an example of this approach in geography. She looks at unsettling connections between herself and Alice Ravenhill, a progressive settler-colonial who marshaled her professional expertise in public health to the cause of indigenous people in early 20th-Century British Columbia. De Leeuw argues that a better understanding of those similarities may help contemporary settler-colonials, like herself, avoid some of the more egregious mistakes of our wellintentioned predecessors. Archival formation is a strand of research about the creation of one or more archives or the ongoing growth or reconfiguration of an existing archive. The engagement is defined by its object of inquiry rather than by its source material or interpretive strategy. The processes of construction are situated as struggles over identity and belonging in the collection of historical material. Cheryl McEwan, for instance, has sketched the creation of an archive of memory cloths in postapartheid South Africa. Amidst concern that gendered narratives were shaping the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work to the exclusion of black women, McEwan describes how a program was established to collect 1000 memory cloths for a national archive. The women were each asked to depict and narrate, in their own language, a single memory that they felt was important. The results served as testimony not only to the traumas of apartheid and violent conflict but also to men’s violence against women, the devastation of HIV-AIDS, land loss, and everyday struggles for household survival. In a context where multiple forms of oppression had silenced them, the creation of an archive of memory cloths carried stories of marginalized black women into the nation’s record. Archival intervention refers to research projects that create or add material to an archive. They can also serve to increase the accessibility of existing archival material through, for instance, digitization or better finding aids. In human geography, the purpose of archival interventions is often related to social justice or the provision of assistance to disadvantaged groups, though the politics is not always straightforward. One example studied by Ashmore, Craggs, and Neate involved the collaboration of three historical geographers in sorting and organizing the home–office archives of the elderly founder of Gemini News, a service to cover issues in the developing world. Their intervention was not simply in the tidying and restructuring of an archive, but also

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in querying what can be gained in archival research when researchers work sociably with the owner of an archive. Another potent example is Audrey Kobayashi’s 1983 doctoral dissertation, about emigration from a Japanese village in the early 20th Century, which she has discussed again in her more recent work. Kobayashi’s dissertation had made use of her unprecedented and singular access to the population registry in Japan. In 1984, she began to build a large computerized archive of records about every family who had emigrated to Canada from Japan before 1941, including their settlement in Canada and their forced resettlement after 1941. Kobayashi then used this archive in support of a movement to redress the unjust treatment of Japanese Canadians during World War II. The 1988 settlement with the Government of Canada included the creation of the Nikkei National Museum, whose purpose in part was to house a rich archive about Japanese Canadian communities. In creating a digital archive in the 1980s, Kobayashi’s role was significant both for reaching the settlement and for the creation of the museum’s archive. The contemporary strength of these five shapes of archival engagement in the 21st Century reflects a graduated move from engagements exclusively with “archives-as-source” in archival fieldwork prior to the 1980s to more engagements in the “archives-assubject” form. With human geography’s uneven turn toward social theory over the last few decades, with the attention it has given to the invention of tradition and to the role of discourse and power in conflicting understandings of the past, and with its increasing focus on everyday social practices, the discipline has found archives to be a rich subject of inquiry. They are increasingly seen as artifacts in themselves and as fascinating sites of archival practices and complex social relations. In this vein, geographers have been writing about collections of photographs, local history archives, weather records, ice cores, the archives of empire, postcolonial archives, the decaying archive of a rural homestead, and more. The rapid growth of electronic records is transforming the concerns and engagements outlined above, but it is not displacing them. Four forces are involved, along lines similar to acquisition, appraisal, classification, and accessibility. First, as increasing numbers of people use digital cameras, audio devices, Email, and other forms of text-sharing, the abundance of these devices has resulted in a population explosion in the ecology of records. This occurred inside the corporate and government spheresdlong known for keeping recordsdas well as outside such institutions. It has occurred through deliberate practices (taking a photo) and by default (swiping a credit card, texting). Second, the privatization of the historical record is building alarm in geography as new sorts of material is appraised as valuable. This occurs as social media companies hoard and sell data about their users, as older definitions of individual privacy are challenged, and as secret archives are made public to render their owners accountable. There is also strong recognition that this “technology revolution” is anything but evenly distributed around the world. This suggests that challenges will continue in recognizing and reading different forms of historical evidence in different parts of the world that could be appraised and for whom it is valuable for archival preservation. Third, the abundance of electronic data is posing challenges to structuring the archival material for later analysis. Changing software systems and hardware platforms often require that archivist keeps the technologies in which the records were produced: otherwise one may be unable to read them. These are old dilemmas for archivists: to preserve huge volumes of material that one is then unable to locate and use when needed or to preserve a much smaller slice that one can describe, identify, locate, and read in the future. There have also been disciplinary tensions between a well-established profession of archivists and those trained in the new fields of information technology and records management. Fourth, the growth of electronic records changes the spatial nature of the archive. While computer servers have to exist somewhere, other aspects and innovations tend to distribute the archive across a network. While advocates of the relevant technologies often cite their democratizing potentialdbringing distant ‘informational’ resources into the reach of a broader publicdin practice, electronic archives are often inaccessible. Many are placed behind a firewall; the archives for many scholarly journals are an example. Those around the world who have access to the Internet, and who are literate in the language of the archive, often find their archival access to be limited in the face of such privatization. Together, these concerns suggest that digital archives are no more divorced from the processes of accumulation and enclosure than their material predecessors, and that the politics of archives will remain relevant among human geographers in an increasingly electronic world.

See Also: Discourse Analysis; Governmentality; Map and Geospatial Information Libraries and Archives.

Further Reading Ashmore, P., Craggs, R., Neate, H., 2012. Working-with: talking and sorting in personal archives. J. Hist. Geogr. 38, 81–89. Cook, T., 2013. Evidence, memory, identity, community: four shifting archival paradigms. Arch. Sci. 13, 95–120. De Leeuw, S., 2012. Alice through the looking glass: emotion, personal connection, and reading colonial archives along the grain. J. Hist. Geogr. 38, 273–281. Foote, K., 1990. To remember and forget: archives, memory, and culture. Am. Archivist 53, 378–392. Gagen, E., 2001. Too good to be true: representing children’s agency in the archives of playground reform. Hist. Geogr. 29, 53–64. Gagen, E., Lorimer, H., Vasudevan, A. (Eds.), 2007. Practicing the Archive: Reflections on Method and Practice in Historical Geography. Historical Geography Research Group, London. Harris, C., 2001. Archival fieldwork. Geogr. Rev. 91 (1–2), 328–334. Hill, J. (Ed.), 2011. The Future of Archives and Recordkeeping: A Reader. Facet Publications, London. Kobayashi, A., 2017. Historical geography in the service of social justice. Hist. Geogr. 45, 2–16.

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Lorimer, H., 2010. Caught in the nick of time: archives and fieldwork. In: DeLyser, D., et al. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Geography. Sage Publications, London, pp. 248–273. McEwan, C., 2003. Building a postcolonial archive? Gender, collective memory and citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa. J. South. Afr. Stud. 23 (3), 739–757. Mills, S., 2013. Cultural-historical geographies of the archive: fragments, objects, and ghosts. Geogr. Compass 7/10, 701–713. Moore, F., 2010. Tales from the archive: methodological and ethical issues in historical geography research. Area 42 (3), 262–270. Roche, M., 2016. Historical research and archival sources. In: Hay, I. (Ed.), Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography, fourth ed. Oxford University Press, Don Mills, ON, pp. 225–245. Steedman, C., 2002. Dust: The Archive and Cultural History. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ. Stoler, A.L., 2009. Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Till, K., 2005. The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Relevant Websites https://beta.worldcat.org/archivegrid/, ArchiveGrid. As a global library cooperative, OCLC has developed a search engine to identify records in more than 1000 archives. While international in scope, a large portion of the archives in this database are located in the United States. http://archivescanada.ca/, Archives Canada. This searchable portal provides a gateway to digital material and the description of records found in over 800 repositories across Canada. https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/, Archives Hub. The Archives Hub assembles descriptions of thousands of archival collections across the United Kingdom. https://www2.archivists.org/glossary, Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology. The site provides an interactive glossary of more than 2,000 terms used in the archival profession. It is maintained by the Society of American Archivists. http://www.ica.org, International Council on Archives (ICA). The ICA promotes the preservation and use of archives around the world, and it serves as a channel of professional expertise for archivists. The link provides access to a searchable database of most of the major professional societies for archivists. https://web.archive.org/, Wayback Machine by the Internet Archive. The Internet Archive is a non-profit group that has been using a random web-crawler called the Wayback Machine since 1996, in order to record and preserve copies of websites on the Internet. The Wayback Machine is accessible to the public.

Art and Cartography Catherine D’Ignazio, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Dérive A term coined by the Situationist Internationale to denote a mode of experimental behavior or way of passing through urban spaces. In practice, dérives are often ways of walking that attempt to research, through direct observation and/or individual experience, diverse facets of the spatial environment. Détournement A term coined by the Situationist Internationale to denote a process that involved removing cultural signs and media elements (painting, literature, film, words, and gestures) from their original context and recontextualizing them in a new context, often for the purposes of social and political critique. Psychogeography Entails the study of the precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals. Independently, and slightly differently, defined by the Situationist Internationale and urbanist Kevin Lynch.

In the last century, and especially in the last 40 years, artists have made maps, subverted maps, performed itineraries, imagined territories, contested borders, charted the invisible, and hacked physical, virtual, and hybrid spaces in the name of cartography. Numerous names have been suggested for various strains of this intersection: “psychogeography,” “locative media,” “experimental geography,” “site-specific art,” and “counter cartography.” Locating the intersection of art and cartography in the last 100 years does not mean that one should ignore the achievements of artists such as Vermeer (Fig. 1) or works like the Vatican’s Galleria delle Carte Geografiche, commissioned by Pope Gregory XIII. But prior to the 20th Century, maps were in the background of paintings, and paintings were insets or illustrations on maps. Art and cartography related to each other via visual cues like insets and tiny representations that made the separation between each distinct. It is in the early 20th Century, directly after a wave of globalization (1870–1914), that artists began to engage seriously with cartography in numerous ways. Indeed, globalization plays no small part in the contemporary spatial turn of the arts, equally as cause, artistic subject matter, and the professional condition of a field characterized by rapidly proliferating international biennials,

Figure 1 The Art of Painting by Johannes Vermeer shows the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands as well as the decorative function that imperial maps served in upper-class residences in the 17th Century, 1667, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.

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conferences, and art fairs. The accelerated accumulation and circulation of capital, conflict, and people around the globe is a phenomenon that required (and is still requiring) diverse societies to develop visual and cultural mechanisms for articulating their relationships to the whole worldda world which, economically and informationally speaking, is already right in their backyard. There are three mapping impulses that, against the backdrop of the social and economic changes to everyday life wrought by war and globalization, cut across the 20th and 21st Centuries and characterize contemporary art–map practices. These are loose groupings with numerous overlaps, not rigid categories. The artists chosen to represent these impulses are several out of a field of many hundreds of practitioners across the last 125 years. The article focuses primarily on artists and artworks that engage with Western and European traditions in cartography 1. Symbol saboteurs: Artists who use the visual iconography of the map to reference personal, fictional, utopian, or metaphorical places. 2. Agents and actors: Artists who make maps or engage in situated, locational activities in order to challenge the status quo or change the world. 3. Information mappers: Artists who use cartographic metaphors to visualize informational territories such as the stock market, the Internet, or the human genome.

Symbol Saboteurs: Artists Who Use the Visual Iconography of the Map to Reference Personal, Fictional, Utopian, or Metaphorical Places As a result of advances in printing and image-reproduction technologies, by the late 19th Century, maps and globes had become affairs of everyday life in Western nations. Atlases, such as Blackie’s Imperial Atlas of Modern Geography (1860), were standard fare in children’s education in the late 19th Century. The classroom globe served to instruct pupils as to the shape of their nation and its role in an all-encompassing geopolitical space. In the first half of the 20th Century, touring maps sponsored by advertisers accompanied the rise of the automobile. Between the 1920s and 1960s, over 5 billion maps were given away at United States gas stations alone. In the early 21st Century, with the increasing availability and accuracy of civilian geographic information system (GIS) data, online services such as MapQuest, OpenStreetMap, and GoogleEarth offered free, searchable databases composed of millions of satellite map images. Denis Wood estimates that 99% of all maps have been made since 1800. The ubiquity of the map as a means of locating one’s place in relationship to the rest of the world created a unique opportunity for artists to exploit cartography’s language, symbols, and strategies. Political boundaries became iconic shapes, legible visual markers of identity and belonging that were ripe for artistic distortion, subversion, and reimagination. An early example of the symbol saboteur impulse can be seen in Mark Twain’s “Map of the Fortifications of Paris,” a map that went viral in 1870s American newspapers. In this woodcut, Twain is referencing the Prussian invasion of France, which was covered widely in United States news. Twain’s map is a crude, backwards-printed wood cut with Paris in the center surrounded by three shapes labeled “Fort” and a house icon labeled “Farm House.” The Erie Canal, Omaha, and the fictional place “Podunk” are also on the map. Here Twain is satirizing newspapers’ emerging practice of publishing attractive but uninformative maps in conjunction with military news. Just how uninformative and unattractive does a map need to be in order for the public to question its authority? Raoul Haussman’s A Bourgeois Precision Brain Incites World Movement (1920), also known as Dada triumphs!), is another early example of a symbol saboteur at work. In this piece, the artist claims the entire world as the empire of the short-lived Dada movement. The movement was informal and internationalist in organization. Its period, roughly 1916–23, coincided with World War I and rejected capitalist logic, efficiency, and esthetics in favor of celebrating chaos, destruction, and: antiart.” In Dada Triumphs!, the letters “DADA” stretch across a map of the world at the top of the photomontage. In an absurd, utopian gesture, Haussman uses the recognizable shapes of the continents and the authoritative power of naming these shapes to appropriate the entire Northern Hemisphere under the international empire of a tiny art movement. The title and territorial ambitions of the imagery suggest a call to revolution, but the revolution appears to have happened in the name of nonsense. Nevertheless, this act of imaginary conquest calls attention to the naming conventions of cartography and the way that a map makes a world. Contemporary artist Nina Katchadourian works directly with printed maps in order to subvert and distort their iconography. In her cutout map series, she removes everything except the roads from maps of Austria (1997; Fig. 2), Finland (Finland’s Longest Road, 1999), and the New York Subway system (Handheld Subway, 1996). These works leave a fragile, messy tangle of paper behind, disrupting both the legibility of the map and our tendency to conflate the map’s symbols with reality. Rather than referring naturalistically to the roads it represents, the resulting object points back to its material origins as a designed, constructed, and printed artifact, subject to transformation and dissent. Given the ubiquity of maps in educational settings, national boundaries alone provide rich iconic sources for artistic interrogation. In the case of the United States, there are numerous refigurings of the United States shape, as it is commonly understood on the geopolitical Mercator projection classroom map. For example, in 1991, Kim Dingle asked Las Vegas teenagers to draw their country, and then she painted the results (United Shapes of America, Maps Drawn by Las Vegas Teenagers; Fig. 3). Through their similar but slightly different bulges and appendages, the teenagers’ drawings indicate the ubiquity of the country’s shape in our imagination of place. At the same time, the multiplicity of suggested shapes challenges the notion of right and wrong representations of place.

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Figure 2

Austria (1997). Reproduced with permission from Nina Katchadourian.

Figure 3

United Shapes of America. Maps Drawn by Las Vegas Teenagers, by Kim Dingle, 1991.

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Likewise, in artist Minkee Bae’s participatory workshops about Uninformation Mapping, attendees collect “bad” maps of Seoul, Korea, and use GIS software to combine them and map them back to precise coordinates. The result is a geographically correct but visually insane map and video (2017; Fig. 4. There is also a rich history of artists who use the language of maps to chart emotional, interpersonal, or imaginary territories. These artists use the symbology of the road map or geopolitical map for metaphorical purposes; as methodology for locating the individual subject within vast psychological, interpersonal, territories; and/or to draw geographical parallels between the vastness of the Earth and the scope of the human psyche. As far back as 1772, there is a map of love (New Map of the Land of Matrimony, Artist Unknown; Fig. 5) that depicts the “Ocean of Love,” “Bride’s Bay,” and the “Land of Matrimony.” Contemporary works in this vein include 40 maps by Wim Delvoye, which allude to human anatomy and reference imaginary territories such as “Izuch,” “See of FioxXanilla,” “Gnody,” and “Gulf of Doj” (from Atlas I, 1992; Fig. 6). Finally, there was an explosion in the late 19th and 20th centuries of cartographies of literary landscapes, such as Tolkien’s Middle Earth and Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha County. In more recent years this has expanded to televisual landscapes, such as those found in Game of Thrones.

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Uninformation Mapping & Video by Minkee Bae and workshop participants, 2017.

Agents and Actors: Artists Who Make Maps or Engage in Situated, Locational Activities in Order to Challenge the Status Quo or Change the World In the 20th Century, particularly during the destruction, chaos, and geoscrambling of World War I, avant-garde artists began not only to take on the iconography of the map but also to envision themselves in the roles of mapmakers, which is to say, capable of leveraging the authority of the map to change the shape of the world. The Great War left millions dead, caused the disintegration of four empires, created new nations, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, granted independence to others (the Baltic states, Canada, etc.), and brought back old nations, such as Poland. During this redrawing of national borders, Tristan Tzara, a central organizer of the Dada art movement, wrote that the world had gone insane and that the artist makes fun of insanity. Dada reinforced the project of the artistic avant-garde that had begun more than 50 years earlier: to envision new futures, political utopias, and radical spiritual alternatives to the existing order. In their professed ideals, avant-garde projects valorize the new, critique-established forms (of art making, politics, governance, culture, and class), while seeking to unify or transform art and “everyday life” in varying degrees. In their numerous manifestations since Dada, avant-garde projects have consistently been absorbed by the art establishment and upheld as examples of fine art while simultaneously being critiqued as symbolic, bourgeois, homogeneous attempts at social change and revolution. The artists discussed as “agents and actors” pick up on the avant-garde project to leverage culture for social change. They use cartography from the standpoint of critical cartography, which is to say that they are aware of the power of maps and leverage that authority strategically in order to reshape the world from a social, political, or cultural standpoint. Artists using maps in their work in the first half of the 20th Century often used them to critique or comment on war, inequality, and other geopolitical realities. For example, Dada artist Hannah Hoch made use of maps in her photomontage works that combined photos, illustration, and typography from mass-media sources. Hoch’s Cut with the Kitchen Knife Dada through the Last Weimar Beer Belly Epoch of Germany (1919–20; Fig. 7) inserts a cutout mapdof European countries that planned to give women the right to votedin the lower-right-hand corner of the work among icons of industrial modernization, leaders of the Weimar

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Figure 5

New Map of the Land of Matrimony, Artist Unknown, 1772. Courtesy of Map Collection, Yale University Library.

Figure 6

Atlas I (detail). By Wim Delvoye (1992).

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Figure 7

Cut with the Kitchen Knife Dada through the Last Weimar Beer Belly Epoch of Germany by Hannah Hoch (1919–20).

Figure 8

Europe After the Rain I by Max Ernst (1933).

Republic, and images of modern women, such as poets and athletes. Max Ernst’s Europe After the Rain I (1933; Fig. 8) depicts an abstract European shape destroyed by war. Likewise, Picasso makes use of found maps and wallpaper in Women at Their Toilette (1938; Fig. 9), where a collaged woman is depicted wearing a dress made of continents. Critics have read this piece as an allegory for the world at the edge of World War II. Contemporary figures continue this tradition of geopolitical commentary, critique, and recuperation. For example, Margaret Pearce created a map called Coming Home to Indigenous Place Names in Canada (2017), a large-scale printed map that shows only place names for the landscape contributed by First Nations, Métis, and Inuit communities. Lize Mogel’s project, The Privatization of War (based on research by Dario Azzellini; Fig. 9), geographically maps relationships among more recent wars in Iraq and Colombia, the private military contractors hired to fight them, and the countries, often poor, from which these mercenaries are recruited. On this stark, black-and-white map, territory is represented by segmented cells occupied by corporations. The intent

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Figure 9

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Women at their Toilette by Pablo Picasso, 1938.

of the map is journalistic: to educate the public about the geographic flows of capital and labor involved in the United States–Iraq War (Fig. 10). In a similar vein, Joyce Kozloff, who has a distinguished career using cartographic strategies in her artwork, created the project Targets (2000; Fig. 11) that consisted of a large, walk-in globe wallpapered with detailed paintings of US military maps of numerous “enemy” countries such as Sudan, Libya, and Cambodia. Not only does this work problematize cartography as a tool of conquest and domination, but Targets (see Fig. 11) also engages critically with a history of life-size globes at international exhibitionsdfrom Wylde’s Globe at London’s Great Exhibition in 1851 to the Unisphere at the New York World’s Fair in 1964–65. Where the latter globes are meant to delight viewers with a visible world, Kozloff’s globe intimidates with its large-scale, all-encompassing threat of military violence. But activist mappers of the last 100 years also use humor, inversion, and play to denaturalize cartography and to strategically provoke their audiences. The Surrealist Map of the World (1929; Fig. 12) depicts the world with many imperial powers missing (noticeably, the United States, France, Canada, and Great Britain). Easter Island is bigger than Australia, Paris belongs to Germany, and the Middle East is entirely absent. Joaquín Torres-García’s América Invertida (1943; Fig. 13) became an icon for the School of the South. It shows the South American continent inverted, with the southern tip at the top of the map and the equator at the bottom in

Figure 10

The Privatization of War (2007). Reproduced with permission from Lize Mogel and Dario Azzellini.

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Figure 11

Targets by Joyce Kozloff, 2000. Courtesy: DC Moore Gallery, New York.

Figure 12

The Surrealist Map of the World, anonymous, 1929.

a gesture in defiance of North–South hierarchical relationships: “the North is now below,” declared Torres-García. América Invertida (see Fig. 13) set a course for numerous other artists, geographers, educators, and others to question the default orientation and projection of the world map, notably Buckminster Fuller’s Dymaxion AirOcean World Map and Jasper Johns’ 1967 painting of the same title. Fluxus maps had an additional political twist in that they called on the viewer/reader to “complete” the mapmaking actions. Yoko Ono created several versions of Map Piece that consisted of instructions such as “Draw a map to get lost” (1964) and “Draw an imaginary map of your dreams” (2001). An early version in 1962 called on readers to draw an imaginary map and use it to navigate actual streets in an actual town. Map Piece resonates with the contemporaneous practices of the Situationist Internationale (SI). Drawing on this work in You Are Not Here (2006; Fig. 14), a collaborative project created by Thomas Duc, Kati London, Dan Phiffer, Andrew Schneider, Ran Tao, and Mushon Zer-Aviv, a guide leads tourists on walking audio tours of the war-torn Baghdad through the New York City streets. Participants use maps printed with New York streets on one side and Baghdad streets on the other. In this case, the Fluxus poetry of using one place to navigate another is infused with political urgency, that is to say, the

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Figure 13

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Joaquín Torres-García’s Ame´rica Invertida, 1943.

Figure 14 You Are Not Here by Thomas Duc, Kati London, Dan Phiffer, Andrew Schneider, Ran Tao, and Mushon Zer-Aviv, 2006. Participants use the double-sided map with Baghdad tourist locations on one side and New York City streets on the opposite as they make their way by foot to the Baghdad, Firdos Square audio tour site. Reproduced with permission from the creators.

need to understand experientially the scope of human destruction for an era of drone warfare, where images of remote wars resemble video-game consoles. Even though they did not produce much in the way of maps, it was the SIda group spawned by late-Surrealism that broke away from the French Lettrist movementdthat arguably had the most significant influence on map practices to come in the next 50 years. Guy Debord, leader of the SI, coined the terms “psychogeography,” “dérive,” and “détournement” to denote critical spatial practices that could be put to use by an individual in encountering and changing the rationalized, urban environment and the “society of the spectacle.” Together with Asger Jorn, Debord created The Naked City (1957; Fig. 15), a map of Paris that envisioned its spaces in relation to psychogeographic energies, attractions, and repulsions. But the SI gave up creating art around 1962 and, thereafter, dedicated its energies to explicitly political projects, playing a key role in the French demonstrations of 1968. The key contribution from the SI, in relation to cartography, politics, and art, is that they set the stage for “mapping” as an activity that was “performed” through the individual human body in action in public spaces such as streets, parks, and plazas. Not only were artists taking on the role of mapmaker, but they were also taking on the roles of the surveyor, the photogrammetrist, and the data collectors, albeit in iconoclastic, idiosyncratic ways.

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Figure 15

The Naked City by Guy Debord and Asger Jorn, 1957.

While many of the performative, activist cartographic practices that have followed the SI have multiple influences and operated without knowledge of the movement, many of these can be conceptually linked to the original questions that the SI posed about the individual or collective body encountering social and political space. These projects range from meditative to the explicitly political and concern not only urban space, but also suburban, rural, and uninhabited landscapes. One trajectory that persists today is the impulse to map “the radically specific”dthe very small, the hyperpersonal or the overlooked facets of the environment. Richard Long’s art practice (late-1960s to present), for example, consists of solitary, multiday walks in locations around the world. He considers the walks “sculptures” and documents them via short phrases, photographs, and gallery installations using natural materials that measure the individual’s temporal presence up against a vast landscape. Likewise, in Teri Rueb’s Choreography of Everyday Movement (2001; Fig. 16), dancers carry global positioning system (GPS) receivers during the course of their everyday activities. Each person’s daily movement created a real-time drawing on the web. The artist later printed these drawings on acetate and stacked them between sheets of glass, overlaying 1 day on top of the next so viewers could see how a particular person’s daily itinerary through the city had changed. In recent years, this trajectory of the radically specific has led to year-long research projects to map a single city block in New York City (One Block Radius by Glowlab, 2004, Fig. 17), a map of pumpkins on porches in the neighborhood of Boylan Heights, NC (Boylan Heights pumpkin map by Denis Wood, 1982, Fig. 18), a map of silent places in London (Silent London, Simon Elvins, 2005, Fig. 19) and a map of swimming pools in Los Angeles (Big Atlas of LA Pools, Benedikt Groß & Joey Lee, 2013). In their own quiet way, these projects make a political case that challenges the authority, embedded value system, and perceived utility of the map by displacing our attention to things that are definitively small, everyday, and personal. A second contemporary trajectory influenced by the Situationists might be called “experimental geography,” a term coined in 2002 by Trevor Paglen, artist and geographer and the title of an exhibition curated by Nato Thompson for the Independent Curators International (2008). With an explicitly social and political orientation, these projects pick up on the Situationist’s use of performance and on Fluxus strategies of participation to map the complex territories of a globalized, informationalized world. Paglen’s own project consists of a long-term, multifaceted investigation into the Central Investigation Agency (CIA)’s “black world”: a shadowy underworld of secret prisons, illegal torture, and classified operations (Fig. 20). Exhibitions of his work display artifacts

Figure 16

Choreography of Everyday Movement (2001). Reproduced with permission from Teri Rueb.

Art and Cartography

Figure 17

One Block Radius by Glowlab (2004). Reproduced with permission from Christina Ray.

Figure 18

Boylan Heights pumpkin map (1982). Reproduced with permission from Denis Wood.

Figure 19

Silent London (2005). Reproduced with permission from Simon Elvins.

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collected on his investigative journeys around the world: signatures of people who do not exist at particular places, logos of false companies with fake addresses, and photos of planes that are not supposed to be where he finds them. Paglen’s work challenges the notion, popularized since GoogleEarth, that the whole world is now visible, mappable, and knowable. He charts precisely those geographic places that are deliberately hidden from the public eye. Other projects interrogate land use, ownership, inequality, borders, and diasporic notions of identity and belonging. In 2006, Lauren Rosenthal created a new atlas of the United States entitled Political/Hydrological: A Watershed Remapping of the Contiguous

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Figure 20

Control Tower (Area 52), Tonopah Test Range, NV (Distance
20 miles), by Trevor Paglen, 2006.

United States (see Fig. 21) that reimagines state boundaries around freshwater systems. In this ecocentric vision, watershed divides act as territorial borders, allowing citizens to locate themselves within the river networks upon which they depend. In Emily Jacir’s project Where We Come From (2001–03; Fig. 22) the Palestinian-American artist invited Palestinians living abroad, who had limited or no access to their homeland, “If I could do something for you, anywhere in Palestine, what would it be?” She then used her American passport to fulfill their requests, which ranged from playing soccer with children to placing flowers on a mother’s grave. In a similar, more technological take on uniting families across borders, artist Alvaro Morales created virtual reality postcards for immigrants who could not travel home for legal, political, or financial reasons (Family Reunions Project, 2016). Other works intervene in the physical landscape. The art collective Postcommodity spent 8 years negotiating their project Repellent Fence (2015; Fig. 23) which placed 26 giant, yellow balloons along two miles of the US–Mexico border. The balloons used indigenous medicine colors and iconography as a way of challenging binary border policy and media portrayals that erase the lived experiences of indigenous people.

Figure 21 Mississippi/Mobile-Tombigbee, Pascagoula, Pearl (a detail from “Political/Hydrological: A Watershed Remapping of the Contiguous United States”) (2006). Reproduced with permission from Lauren Rosenthal.

Art and Cartography

Figure 22

Where we come from by Emily Jacir, 2001–03.

Figure 23

Repellent Fence by Postcommodity, 2015.

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Other contemporary art projects that fall in the category of experimental geography take the form of tools. The Institute for Applied Autonomy, for example, created iSee (2001–04; Fig. 24), a web-based software application that would chart “the path of least surveillance” through New York City. Presaging the proliferation of sensors in the “smart city”, users need only plug in the beginning and end coordinates of their journey through Manhattan, and the application would spit out a printable map that takes the traveler past the fewest number of surveillance cameras. Numerous artists, community groups, and activists have created collectively authored maps with free mapping tools provided by online platforms such as Google, Flickr, and OpenStreetMap. These chart everything from Romantic places to Greenpeace expeditions to international graffiti sites. For example, An Xiao Mina and other scholars from the Civic Beat collective produced the Animal Meme Map (2016) that demonstrates how animalrelated memes circulate globally. Many action-oriented projects exist at the borders of cartography, less-directly referencing the visual language of maps but nonetheless consisting of collections of geographic places with a specific focus (a process of “mapping”). In The Pansy Project (2005– present; Fig. 25), Paul Harfleet plants pansies wherever people report being victims of homophobic verbal or physical abuse, a way of reclaiming both homophobic language (“pansy”) and the geographic site of trauma or abuse. Using his body, Alex Villar stages Temporary Occupations (2004; Fig. 26) of private spaces that border on public spaces in New York City. The video shows a series of clips of the artist gracefully jumping fences and slipping behind boundaries of private areas that are adjacent to the New York sidewalks, calling into question the purpose of these lines of demarcation. The project In Conditions of Fresh Water (2017; Fig. 27) by artist Torkwase Dyson and lawyer-geographer Danielle Purefoy was designed to interrogate environmental racism through oral histories, multimedia and visual art. The creators traveled through two counties in the Southern United States in a mobile solar-powered studio built by Dyson with recycled materials. Along the way, they collected stories of water and infrastructure, as seen through the lived experienced of black people. In many of the process-oriented mapping projects, public conversation,

Figure 24

iSee by the Institute for Applied Autonomy, 2001–04. Reproduced with permission from John Henry, Institute of Applied Autonomy.

Figure 25

The Pansy Project (2005 to present). Reproduced with permission from Paul Harfleet.

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Figure 26

Temporary Occupations (2004). Reproduced with permission from Alex Villar.

Figure 27

In Conditions of Fresh Water (2017). Reproduced with permission from Torkwase Dyson and Danielle Purefoy.

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dialog, and community building are inseparable from the art. Indeed, many of these projects use anomalous, idiosyncratic actions (planting pansies, jumping fences, hosting conversations in a homemade mobile studio, etc.) in order to provoke public engagement, raise awareness about the larger issues at stake, and, ultimately, catalyze transformative, collective action.

Information Mappers: Artists Who Use Cartographic Metaphors to Visualize Informational Territories Such as the Internet or the Human Genome The 20th Century witnessed many technological and social changes as people developed new ways of sensing the world, communicating with each other, killing each other, and moving through space. These changes helped spawn what might be called “informational territories”dvirtual, invisible, infinitely small or large, multidimensional, time-based, and even cultural and political spaces. The Internet, the stock market, the human genome, the electromagnetic spectrum, and global corporate power all serve as data landscapes that can be mined, visualized, and experienced in different ways. The 21st Century has seen a rise in data visualizationdthe graphic representation of quantitative information. While data visualization has a long history, the cartographic metaphordthe idea of data as space and creating visual relationships from nonvisual phenomena as mappingdcame later and has been accentuated and popularized in recent years. What the information mappers have in common is that they use cartographic terminology, typically reserved for discussing the surface of the Earth, and apply it metaphorically to these informational frontiers. An operative principle, descended from information theory, cybernetics, and popular computing culture, is that all the world can be treated as data, ready for selecting, categorizing, visualizing, and revisualizing in infinite ways. This principle, of course, opens into a new politics of data visualization which looks very similar to the present and past politics of the geographic map: Whose data are mapped? Whose data are left out? Who makes the map, for whom, and for what purpose? Some projects that map informational worlds overlay data on physical landscapes and are clearly linked to cartographic concerns in familiar ways. For example, Ingo Günther’s long-term project World Processor (1988–2005) is a series of over 300 globes that

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represent different views of the Earth with datasets artfully overlaid on the surface. In the case of each globe, the dataset is selected carefully to visualize the world with a different intent. For example, Landlocked Nations shows only those countries that do not border an ocean or sea, and the wall text discusses the economic and social impact of the absence of a body of water. Other datasets include life expectancy, the world according to Chinese geography, and Statistical Challenges (Fig. 28), which maps elusive, invisible qualities, such as “Happiness,” “Jokes created per year,” and “Intensity of Dreams,” onto a blank globe with no geopolitical lines. Each of these datasets has an associated globe, which is lit from within. Many projects are entirely dissociated from geographic conceptions of physical space and are preoccupied with visualizing other spaces. In Genome Valence (2000; Fig. 29), Ben Frye maps genetic data into a delicate, spherical computer graphic that one can search and zoom through. Technically, Genome Valance is a visualization of the BLAST algorithm, the most common way that scientists have of searching through genomic data to see if a particular sequence of letters is found in the genes of other organisms. Fry calls this series of work “genomic cartography.” Artists have also mapped distributed global power as its own kind of informational space. In They Rule (2001; Fig. 30), Josh On created an interactive online application that allows the user to map the interlocking relationships between individuals who sit on boards of different global corporations. Using publicly available data gathered from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Figure 28

Statistical Challenges, from the World Processor series by Ingo Günther, 1988–2005.

Figure 29

Genome Valence by Ben Fry, 2000.

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Figure 30

One of the user-created network diagrams from They Rule by Josh On, 2001.

Figure 31

1:1 Interface: Every (IP), by Lisa Jevbratt, 1999. Source: http://jevbratt.com/1 to 1.

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filings and corporate websites, the application demonstrates the unsurprising overlap among corporate boards of directors and raises questions about the ruling power of an elite class of citizens. This echoes earlier work by artist Mark Lombardi to trace global money flows and corporate malfeasance with precise network diagrams. Since the mid-1990s and the introduction of cyberspace into popular imagination, the Internet has inspired numerous artistic visualizations. Inspired by a Jorge Luis Borges quote, in 1:1 Interface: Every (1999; Fig. 31), Lisa Jevbratt visualizes the dataset of Internet protocol (IP) addresses on the Internet (everything from 000.000.000.000 to 255.255.255.255) color coded as to whether or not they are occupied by an actual website. The results of this process are output as an enormous, billboard-sized print, which is both physically beautiful and overwhelming. Fernanda Viégas and Martin Wattenberg created time-based visualizations of single entries in Wikipedia, the collective encyclopedia project, to help understand some of the dynamics of editing and vandalism (History Flow, 2003, Fig. 32). Finally, the stock market, as data source, has been an inspiration to a number of artists. Andreas Nicolas Fischer created Indizes (2008; Fig. 33) which combined and visualized three prominent stock market indices during the crash of 2008. The work is presented as a physical sculpture made from plywood and paint. Though these data-scapes of cyberspace, genes, stock market, and corporate power do not correspond to physical geography, they borrow spatial metaphors to represent multilayered informational phenomena. With the proliferation of data, it is probable that artists will continue to employ mapping metaphors to engage with complexity and power in the age of artificial intelligence.

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Figure 32

History Flow by Fernanda Viégas and Martin Wattenberg, 2003.

Figure 33

Indizes by Andreas Nicolas Fischer, 2008.

Conclusion Though art and cartography have always been in dialog, the last 125 years constitute a veritable explosion of artwork that takes on maps and mapping in order to critique, subvert, reimagine, or simply envision geographic and informational territories. There are three loose groupings of important mapping impulses that have characterized the artistic appropriation of cartographic strategies, both literally and metaphorically, from the early 20th Century to present times: symbol saboteurs, agents and actors, and information mappers. Both the Enlightenment project of cartography as a way of accessing fundamental truths about reality and the more recent critical cartographic project in which visual representations are constructed in order to transform the world remain powerful inspiration to artists. Cartographydthe idea that one can, should, or must map the world in particular waysdretains an ever-growing hold on the artistic imagination. This is especially the case in a world characterized by complexity, inequality, war, globalization, and informationalization. The idea of place is complicated and maps (critical, contestational, hacked, technological, and imaginary) are more essential than ever.

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See Also: Critical Cartography; Decolonization; Maps and the State; Psychogeography; Visuality; Walking Methodologies.

Further Reading Bender, S., 2001. The World According to the Newest and Most Exact Observations: Mapping Art þ Science. Tang Teaching Museum. Cosgrove, D.E., 2003. Apollo’s Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination. JHU Press. Harmon, K., 2004. You Are Here: Personal Geographies and Other Maps of the Imagination. Princeton Architectural Press. Harmon, K., Clemans, G., 2009. The Map as Art: Contemporary Artists Explore Cartography. Princeton Architectural Press. Kollectiv Orangotangoþ (Ed.), 2018. This Is Not an Atlas: A Global Collection of Counter-cartographies. Krygier, J., Wood, D. (Eds.), 2006. Special Issue on Art and Mapping. Cartographic Perspectives, (53). Mesquita, A.L., 2013. Mapas dissidentes: proposições sobre um mundo em crise (1960–2010) (Doctoral dissertation). Universidade de São Paulo. Mogel, L., Bhagat, A., 2008. An Atlas of Radical Cartography. Journal of Aesthetics & Protest Press, Los Angeles, CA, USA. O’Rourke, K., 2013. Walking and Mapping: Artists as Cartographers. MIT Press. Sussman, E., 1989. On the Passage of a Few People through a rather Brief Moment in Time the Situationist International, pp. 1957–1972. Thompson, N., 2008. Experimental Geography: Radical Approaches to Landscape, Cartography, and Urbanism. Melville House. Watson, R., 2009. Mapping and contemporary art. Cartogr. J. 46 (4), 293–307. Wood, D., 2010. Rethinking the Power of Maps. Guilford Press. Woodward, D., 1987. Art and Cartography: Six Historical Essays. University of Chicago Press.

Relevant Websites https://artcarto.wordpress.com/about/ An on-going project from the International Cartographic Association to bring together geographers, cartographers and artists. https://makingmaps.net/2014/05/12/map-art-exhibitions-2012-13/Cartography scholar Denis Wood has comprehensive lists of map art exhibitions from the early 2010s on his website Making Maps, co-run with John Krygier. https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/436 Web presentation of Mapping, a 1994 exhibition by Robert Storr at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. https://flowingdata.com/category/visualization/artistic-visualization/ Data art featured by the Flowing Data blog. Not all data art is related to cartography, but all of it involves some process of mapping information to materials and design decisions.

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Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems Yee Leung, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Artificial intelligence The study of how to make machines perform tasks requiring human intelligence. Deep learning Machine learning methods using multiple layers of nonlinear processing units for supervised or unsupervised classification or recognition of features and patterns as well as other decision-making tasks. Evolutionary computation Computational methods that mimic the mechanisms of biological evolutions in order to solve complex problems. Expert system Computer system that solves domain-specific problems much like human experts with high level of performance. Expert system shell General purpose tool that provides complete environments for efficient development of knowledge-based domain-specific expert systems. Fuzzy logic Nonstandard logic for approximate reasoning with imprecise premises. Knowledge acquisition The process of acquiring knowledge from domain-specific experts or by machine learning. Knowledge representation Formalisms for the representation of facts, truth, and knowledge entities in a machine understandable form. Neural network Simple brain-like computational system made up of interconnected processing elements called neurons that process information, compute, and infer by its dynamic response to system inputs. Spatial data mining Discovery of useful and nontrivial spatial structures and processes from data. Spatial decision support system Computer system that supports spatial decision-making by coupling human intelligence with the capabilities of the computer. Supervised learning A machine learning method which learns from labeled input–output training pairs/examples a function that maps an input to a designated output in such a way that it can be generalized to new situations. Unsupervised learning A learning method which acquires knowledge or unknown patterns from data without a priori knowledge about the information.

With the ability to amass information from various sources, geographers are encountering information explosion in their analyses. Facing an almost unabated growth of information, it is absolutely necessary to apply geographical knowledge and expertise to streamline, analyze, manage, digest, visualize, and integrate information in an efficient and effective manner. Without knowledge, information becomes static and perhaps useless in our analysis of human behaviors or physical processes in space and time. Geographic information system (GIS) renders an efficient way to manage our data. Geographical analysis, however, goes beyond what GIS has to offer. Geographical analysis is not just the mechanical storage, retrieval, visualization, and simple analysis of information. It often involves deep-level reasoning that integrates information and geographical knowledge to solve structured, semistructured, or unstructured problems with varying degrees of complexity. Information is the collection, representation, storage, retrieval, processing, and display of data. In general, it involves handling, processing, and organizing data suitable for calculating and measuring, as well as for reasoning with and updating knowledge. Knowledge comprises the acquisition, representation, and storage of knowledge, as well as the use of knowledge in inference and analysis. In general, knowledge deals with the handling of the body of truth and principles acquired through experience or association. It serves as a basis for inference and analysis. Furthermore, knowledge can be used to guide researchers to monitor, visualize, explore, integrate, and create information. The interplay of knowledge and information greatly expands the role of information technology in geographical analysis. Artificial intelligence, which comprises both information and knowledge in general and geographical knowledge in particular, is thus a way for achieving such goal.

Spatial Knowledge Representation and Inference Geographical knowledge may be structured or unstructured. We may organize our knowledge in a highly structured form so that problems can be solved by systematic and procedural form. Mathematical models, statistical methods, and heuristic procedures are knowledge in procedural form. This type of knowledge follows a rigid framework for the representation and analysis of structures and processes in space and time. Procedural knowledge is effective in system specification, calibration, analysis,

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scenario generation, and forecasting of well-specified and structured problems. Through research, we have accumulated, over the years, a wealth of procedural knowledge which can be effectively utilized for geographical analysis in spatial information systems. A majority of knowledge, however, is loosely structured. Subjective experience, valuation, intuition, and loosely structured expertise often cannot be appropriately captured by rigid procedures. They are declarative in nature and can only be represented by more flexible frameworks. Making inferences from such knowledge structures cannot be done procedurally. Problem-solving by if–then arguments is a typical example of using declarative knowledge for decision-making. This type of knowledge is effective in solving unstructured or semistructured problems. It is suitable for inference with concepts, ideas, and values. Similar to the use of procedural knowledge, declarative knowledge can be utilized in spatial decision-making, especially with spatial information systems. Declarative knowledge is, however, ineffective to solve highly structured problems. Consequently, procedural and declarative knowledge have to be used in synchrony throughout a decision-making process. Once a spatial structure or process is understood and can be specified in a formal and structured manner, we can always capture it by a mathematical model or procedure. The representation of loosely structured knowledge is, nevertheless, not as straightforward. Declarative knowledge representation and inference have thus become a main concern in building spatial reasoning systems with artificial intelligence. To be able to understand and to reason, an intelligent machine needs prior knowledge about the problem domain. To understand sentences used to describe geographical phenomena, for example, natural language understanding systems have to be equipped with prior knowledge about topics of those phenomena. To be able to see and interpret scenes, spatial vision systems need to have in store prior information about objects to be seen. This also applies to the deep learning paradigm intensively studied in recent years. Therefore, any intelligent system should possess a knowledge or training database containing facts and concepts related to a problem domain and their relationships. There should also be an inference mechanism which can process symbols in the knowledge base and derive implicit knowledge from explicitly expressed knowledge. Knowledge representation formalism consists of a structure to express domain knowledge, a knowledge representation language, and an inference mechanism. Conventionally, its duty is to select an appropriate symbolic structure to represent knowledge in the most explicit and formal manner, and an appropriate mechanism for reasoning. Natural language is complex. Humans can name and describe facts by natural language sentences, and are able to reason and infer with facts and beliefs. This mechanism of representing facts and inferring with knowledge may be captured by logic. Though logic is not a theory on knowledge representation, it provides formalism for reasoning about beliefs. It consists of a syntax, a semantic, and a proof theory which can be utilized for knowledge representation and inference. Propositional logic and predicate logic are typical paradigms. However, human knowledge is usually imprecise and our inferences often consist of a certain level of uncertainty. While uncertainty has various sources, the one that stems from imprecision is rampant in human systems. To represent and infer with such knowledge, we need a logical system which can handle imprecision. Among existing paradigms, fuzzy logic appears to be instrumental in processing imprecision. Fuzzy logic is a nonstandard logic for approximate reasoning. It is a formalism for drawing possibly imprecise conclusions from a set of imprecise premises. A premise is fuzzy if it has imprecise predicates. In the narrow sense, fuzzy logic is a formalism of approximate reasoning. In the broad sense, fuzzy logic is the theory of fuzzy sets. Though first-order predicate logic gives a powerful mathematical tool to represent knowledge, its theorem-proving mechanism is not efficient and flexible enough to handle spatial reasoning consisting of a large decision tree or a long chain of inference involving a large set of if–then statements. A system containing an ordered set of if–then rules is called a production system. It can be employed to perform tasks involving deep knowledge reasoning. Unlike logic and production rules which store knowledge independent of each other and with no interconnections between them, a semantic network is a highly interconnected hierarchical representation of knowledge consisting of a set of nodes connected to each other by a set of directed labeled links. Mathematically speaking, it is a labeled, directed graph. The nodes represent objects which can be facts, events, situations, actions, concepts, sets, individuals, propositions, predicates, terms, descriptions, and procedures. The links represent relationships between the objects. A semantic network provides a structure with which knowledge can be formally represented and efficiently retrieved. Retrieval and inference thus become a search for paths between nodes or a match of patterns in the network. Though semantic networks were developed for the purpose of representing the English language, it turns out to be a rather pictorial and effective tool for representing binary spatial relationships and perhaps human associative memories. Similar to semantic networks, frames are hierarchical representations of knowledge. They in a way can be interpreted as complex semantic networks with internal structures. Frames are generally used to represent prototypical knowledge or knowledge with wellknown characteristics. Differing from logic and production rules which store knowledge in small independent trunks, frames store knowledge in larger interconnected chunks (conceptual entities). A knowledge base is then a collection of frames. A weakness common to semantic networks and frames is that knowledge representation lacks a well-defined structure. Knowledge abstraction, encapsulation, and modularity which are considered as salient features of knowledge representation are not effectively realized in semantic networks and frames. These characteristics, however, can be captured by the object-oriented approach. Under the object-oriented framework, the real world is represented as a hierarchical set of objects linked by some protocols of communication among them. An object is an independent entity consisting of its own attributes (variables) and methods (operations, procedures, actions) that work on them. The attributes depict the state of an object and the methods are used for intraobject controls and interobject communications. The object-oriented approach possesses the advantages of knowledge encapsulation and inheritance. It can make spatial knowledge compact and facilitate inference.

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In addition to the major formalisms discussed above, other paradigms such as conceptual dependency, script, logical programming, case-based reasoning, and natural language processing are also potentially useful frameworks for spatial knowledge representation and inference. Though each of the formalisms has its unique structure, they are in some ways related and can be made complementary to each other. It is possible to develop hybrid knowledge representation languages which can take advantages of the salient features of individual languages.

Expert Systems for Domain-Specific Problems The major challenge in the design of intelligent spatial reasoning systems lies on our ability to build into a system mechanisms to memorize and use knowledge extracted from domain-specific experts, and to automatically acquire knowledge from voluminous but incomplete information through learning by examples. Such system can facilitate machine reasoning in a commonly encountered environment where knowledge (in terms of explicitly specified rules) and information (in the form of raw data, digitized maps, remotely sensed images, etc.) are mixed together. The situation is equivalent to human reasoning with previously taught or acquired knowledge that sits in our memories, and knowledge to be acquired by selflearning from our everyday experience. In the recognition and classification of remotely sensed images, for instance, instead of statistical methods, there may be a set of rules obtained from remote-sensing experts that can be used to accomplish the task. Thus, reasoning with a mixture of rules and data is a general phenomenon rather than an exception. The advancement of artificial intelligence attempts to design various means for the achievement of such purpose. Expert systems are perhaps a long-standing artificial intelligence product of such undertaking. Building expert systems from scratch is time-consuming. The general approach is to develop a generic expert system development tool, called a shell, with which expert systems for various problems can be effectively constructed. The shell can assist domain experts to build expert systems to solve specific spatial problems. Using a fuzzy-logic-based expert system shell (FLESS) as an example, it not only can manage rule-based inference under certainty and uncertainty, but can also utilize procedural knowledge, GIS, and remote-sensing operations in an interactive and integrative manner. Specifically, the shell facilitates the construction of rule-based spatial expert systems with intelligence and decision-making capabilities. Any mix of fuzzy and nonfuzzy terms and uncertainties in rules and facts are allowed in the system. It can employ fuzzy logic to handle approximate reasoning and fuzzy numbers to handle imprecision and certainty factors in rules. The key features of the shell are knowledge-base development, tracing, dynamic link library (DLL) technology, and operations. Knowledge-base development is the part of the shell which handles the construction of domain-specific knowledge bases necessary for securing knowledge of a specific problem. Knowledge base is built by the knowledge acquisition subsystem of the shell. It is responsible for storing knowledge entities such as objects, rules, and fuzzy terms acquired through the knowledge acquisition subsystem. Knowledge can be hard encoded from domain-specific experts. The acquired knowledge entities, representing expertise, provide knowledge for the inference engine to perform consultations. The knowledge-base development part of the tool consists of management modules for objects, fuzzy terms, rules, and inference options. Tracing is the part which provides inferential strategies and review management facilities. After defining a knowledge base, consultation can be performed. The system will trace the rule base according to the goal and the tracing method set by users. There are three basic components in the consultation driver. They are the inference engine, the linguistic approximation routine, and the review management module. The inference engine of the shell supports both forward (data-driven) and backward (goal-directed) reasoning. Linguistic approximation is a process that maps the set of fuzzy subsets onto a set of linguistic values or expressions used in decision-making. The review management module monitors and traces relevant rules and facts (objects with inferred values) at any time during consultation. It is also responsible for tracing the reasoning chain when explanations are required. The system provides two types of explanations. Users can ask why a fact is required by the system and how a fact is established. This module can also handle what-if reviews which find out what conclusions will be deduced if certain facts are changed. The feature is especially useful for decision-makers to evaluate different spatial options or scenarios. The ability to provide consultations is an important part of an intelligent system and FLESS is equipped with such capability. DLL technology is the part which manages communications with the outside environment such as external libraries and databases. In FLESS, function calls in rules are implemented by the methods of DLL, and it provides a mechanism so that data can be exchanged between an application (e.g., a GIS application involving the use of mathematical models; automatic knowledge acquisition by neural networks; or genetic algorithms) and the shell. The application can pass the data required for rule-based inference to the shell. The shell will implement the inference based on the predefined knowledge base and the given data. After making an inference, the shell will display the result or pass it back to the applications for further analysis. Operations is the part that manages systems operations and file manipulations. There is an assortment of operations in the shell. Pull-down menu and toolbox are major operations for the manipulation of knowledge bases and inference. Under pull-down menu, file operations of the knowledge base include the building of a new knowledge base, retrieving an existing knowledge base, editing a knowledge base, saving a knowledge base, and setting system preferences for external editors. Furthermore, operations for consulting a knowledge base throughout an inferential process are implemented. Help menus for objects, rules, fuzzy terms, and helps are also provided.

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Acquisition of Spatial Knowledge Symbolic approaches to spatial knowledge representation and inference are discussed and applied to construct expert systems in the previous section. Logic (standard and nonstandard), production systems, semantic networks, frames, object-oriented programming, and their hybrids all belong to symbolic systems in which knowledge is modeled by symbols. Intelligence is realized by a symbolic structure in which symbols can be manipulated and reasoning can be made. The advantages of the symbolic approaches are that they provide a structured representation of knowledge so that processing elements corresponding to meaningful concepts and inference can be traced and explained. The approach is thus a top-down approach which gives consensus knowledge to a system by instructing it what to feel and respond without having to gain knowledge through experience. It corresponds to our learning of spatial knowledge from a domain-specific expert. The symbolic approaches are, however, insufficient or inappropriate to construct intelligent spatial decision support system (SDSS) in general. Symbolic systems are usually intolerant to faults and inefficient in automatic knowledge acquisition and learning via sensation and experience. Intelligence is not attained through evolution, like human race, of these systems. Modeled after the human brain, the neural network approach, on the other hand, provides a mechanism for knowledge acquisition. A neural network is a massively parallel structure in which a large number of processing units (called neurons), each performing simple computational tasks, are connected together to represent and acquire knowledge, and to make inference. Geographical information is distributed to the neurons, and knowledge is encoded by connection strengths and acquired through a learning process. It is, more or less, a bottom-up approach and is regarded by some as an efficient model for recognition, content addressable memory, and associative reasoning. Differing from the symbolic systems, neural network models appear to have stronger learning capability and higher tolerance to faults. Their dynamic behaviors and reasoning processes are, however, difficult to explain. Attainment of intelligence generally takes a longer time and tends to fail in complex situations. This, however, is partially solved by the recent developments in deep learning, particularly in image recognition and object tracking. Convolutional neural networks and their hybrids are perhaps the most successful advance in deep learning. Parallel to neural networks, evolutionary computation which imitates biological evolution can also be used for automatic spatial knowledge acquisition through learning by examples via a parallel multipoint stochastic search mechanism involving generally the selection, crossover, and mutation operations. We can, for example, learn rules by evolutionary computational models. It can also be employed to evolve the topological structures and to optimize the parameters of deep neural networks. One may wonder why we need neural networks or evolutionary paradigms for geographical analysis. The answer to the question is mainly twofold. First, as discussed above, the neural network or evolutionary paradigm provides an alternative framework for spatial knowledge representation and inference. Problems such as spatial feature extraction and pattern recognition which cannot be appropriately modeled by the symbolic approaches may be effectively captured by these distributive models. Second, they may serve as a means to acquire spatial knowledge (which may be in symbolic form) through automatic learning. Taking information, structured and unstructured knowledge as a whole in geographical analysis, their coordination may take on the format depicted in Fig. 1. Sitting on top of the hierarchy is the deep knowledge which captures complicated spatial reasoning and relationships that are still, at the present moment, not easy to be automatically acquired through experience or learned by examples as advocated by neural networks, evolutionary computations, and other machine learning models. This is the type of domainspecific knowledge which can be effectively instilled by experts as symbolic or highly structured knowledge. With the advancement

Figure 1

Coordination of knowledge and information. GIS, geographic information system; GPS, global positioning system; RS, remote sensing.

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of deep learning in the future, there might be a chance to learn such knowledge to a certain extent. Knowledge in the second level down the hierarchy is of lower level of intelligence. It is responsible for tasks which do not require deep thinking but fast extraction or recognition of spatial features or images. It belongs to the perceptual and cognitive functions of our audio and visual faculties which efficiently detect structures and motions from data. It provides fundamental information for our in-depth thought processes. Such level of intelligence can be rather effectively imitated by neural or evolutionary computations, particularly machine learning models. The bottom-up process is similar to our unsupervised learning process which acquires knowledge or unknown patterns without a priori knowledge about the information. Cluster analysis is a typical method. The top-down process, on the other hand, is our learning process which uses accumulated and instilled knowledge to orient our faculties to look for useful things contained in information or our everyday experience so that new knowledge can be formed. To recapitulate, humans often reason with intuitions, values, experiences, and judgments. We tend to organize our knowledge with loosely defined concepts and structures. Reasoning may not require highly structured mathematical models but loosely structured commonsense that has been extensively studied in artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, we generally need both to solve complicated problems in complex geographical systems.

Intelligent Decision Support SystemdAn Integration In geographical analysis, the demand on domain-specific knowledge, technical know-hows, and accessibility to data is tremendous. It is difficult to make good decisions without powerful systems to provide, in an integrative way, supports in various phases of the decision-making process. Taking the three-phase process as an example, the system needs to support, for instance, problem diagnosis, access and scanning of databases, interpretation and monitoring of information in the intelligence phase; generation of alternatives and prediction in the design phase; and analysis of scenarios (e.g., what-ifs), explanation, and justification in the choice phase. It is almost useless if such a decision support system has no intelligence to handle information efficiently and to apply the right kind of knowledge to assist the decision-making process in a user-friendly manner. For a system to be able to support decision-making, it has to possess a certain level of intelligence. Therefore, an SDSS should be able to reason with structured and loosely structured knowledge. They should be able to manage data and user communication efficiently and effectively. Their development calls for the utilization of artificial intelligence and knowledge engineering methods to represent and infer with spatial knowledge; software engineering techniques to manage systems development, information and control flows of models and data; and spatial information system technologies to process and display data. All these have to be integrated in a seamless manner. To be generic and economical, instead of building an SDSS for a specific problem from scratch, we need to develop an SDSS development environment (shell or generator) so that experts can use it to build effectively and efficiently a variety of domainspecific SDSSs. That is, we should have a general development tool which decision-makers can use to customize, modify, adapt, and evolve SDSS for solving specific spatial problems. A general architecture of such SDSS shell is depicted in Fig. 2. The core of the system, maybe an expert system shell, directs control flows and information flows of the integrated system. It provides facilities to represent and store domain-specific knowledge

Figure 2 General architecture of an intelligent spatial decision support system. DBMS, database management system; MBMS, model base management system.

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Figure 3 System architecture of the air pollution spatial decision support system. APDSS, air pollution decision support system; DB, database; DIS, display; DM, data mining; QS, query system. Adapted from Fig. 1 of Leung et al., 2018.

acquired from experts or learning examples. It can also contain meta-knowledge for inference control, systems and user interface, and external communication. The shell has in its possession inference mechanisms for reasoning with loosely structured spatial knowledge. It is the brain of the SDSS. To utilize spatial and nonspatial data, the shell has an interface with external database management system (DBMS) such as GIS, remote sensing systems, Internet of Things (IoT), and crowdsourcing. The communication between the shell and the DBMS can be carried out by intelligent database communication methods, such as application programming interface (API). To facilitate the utilization of externally stored procedural knowledge such as deep learning algorithms, statistical procedures, and other mathematical models an interface with a model base management system (MBMS) should be incorporated into the shell. Parallel to DBMS, MBMS organizes procedural models into an easy-to-use structure. Calls to MBMS can be invoked by metaknowledge in the shell. In addition to linkages to DBMS and MBMS, user-friendly interface and knowledge acquisition modules are essential parts of the shell for human–machine interaction. Web and app interface can be provided to the users and expert to ease knowledge acquisition and decision-making. Communication between DBMS and MBMS, users and experts should also be considered. Over the years, a number of SDSSs have been developed for solving practical problems. Typical examples are fuzzy-logic-based experts systems; decision support systems for environmental management, landfill design and management, hazard monitoring; classification systems for remotely sensed images based on fuzzy logic; and systems for flood simulation and damage assessment. All of these systems are built fully or partly by the generic SDSS shell discussed above, and they all integrate spatial and nonspatial data, as well as structured and/or unstructured geographical knowledge. Though the applications are problem and site specific, the knowledge and technology are transportable and can be made useful to other places of the world. With the advancement of information and communication technologies, through the electronic super highway, information is ubiquitous and will take on a highly distributed, instantaneous, and dynamic form. Our SDSS needs to take advantage of such multitype, multisource, and multiscale information in near real time or real time. Taking air pollution monitoring and analysis as an example, a SDSS may take on the structure depicted in Fig. 3. The system integrates remote sensing, station-based air pollution and weather measurements (including land use GIS), mobile sensors (ground or aerial), IoT, air pollution simulation models, and social media to derive a complete profiling of air pollution with hard scientific data and social opinions. Such a framework should be suitable to the analysis and monitoring of other geographical structures and processes.

Conclusion In the future, geographical analysis will increasingly rely on information and communication technology. We will have to find spatial structures and processes from very large databases which are multisource, multiscale, heterogeneous, imperfect, dynamic, and ubiquitous. Creating spatial data mining and knowledge discovery capability for big and open data is thus a necessity in the development of intelligent SDSS. In addition to the conventional information, IoT, social media, and crowdsourcing will play a dominant role in decision-making in space and time. The globalization of information and decision-making is rapidly taking place. How to discover useful and nontrivial knowledge in such information environment is thus crucial in this knowledge age. Effective utilization and integration of information from various sources with geographical knowledge acquired through our

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in-depth analysis of the human and physical processes in space and time will greatly enhance our understanding of the ever changing environment and chart out courses of action for the sustainable development of human race. Artificial intelligence, in cooperation with geographical knowledge and big data, will continue to play a major role in the development of intelligent systems to support our spatial decision-making process.

See Also: Evolutionary Algorithms; Fuzzy Set and Fuzzy Logic; Geospatial Intelligence.

Further Reading Arbib, M.A. (Ed.), 1995. The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Bäck, T., Fogel, D., Michaelewicz, Z. (Eds.), 1997. Handbook of Evolutionary Computation. Oxford University Press, New York. Cortés, U., Sànchez-Marrè, M., Ceccaroni, L., R-Roda, I., Poch, M., 2000. Artificial intelligence and environmental decision support systems. Appl. Intell. 13, 77–91. Filis, I.V., Sabrakos, M., Yialouris, C.P., Sideridis, A.B., 2003. GEDAS: an integrated geographical expert database system. Expert Syst. Appl. 24, 25–34. Fischer, M.M., 1994. Expert systems and artificial neural networks for spatial analysis and modeling: essential components for knowledge-based geographical information systems. Geogr. Syst. 1, 221–235. Fukushima, K., 1980. Neocognitron: A self-organizing neural network model for a mechanism of pattern recognition unaffected by shift in position. Biol. Cybern. 36, 193–202. Goodfellow, I., Bengio, Y., Courville, A., 2016. Deep Learning. MIT Press, Cambridge. Leung, Y., 1997. Intelligent Spatial Decision Support Systems. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Leung, Y., 2010. Knowledge Discovery in Spatial Data. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Leung, Y., Leung, K.S., 1993. An intelligent expert system shell for knowledge-based geographic information systems: 1, the tools; 2, some applications. Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Syst. 7, 189–199, 201–213. Leung, Y., Leung, K.S., He, J.Z., 1999. A concept-based object oriented geographical information system. Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 13 (5), 475–498. Leung, Y., Leung, K.S., Wong, M.H., Mak, T., Cheung, K.Y., Lo, L.Y., Yi, W.Y., Dong, Y.L., 2018. An integrated web-based air pollution decision support system – a prototype. Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Syst. 32, 1787–1814. Minsky, M., 1975. A framework for representing knowledge. In: Winston, P. (Ed.), The Psychology of Computer Vision. McGraw-Hill, New York, pp. 211–277. Rich, E., Knight, K., 1991. Artificial Intelligence. McGraw-Hill, New York. Simon, H., 1977. The New Science of Management Decision. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Zadeh, L.A., 1990. The birth and evolution of fuzzy logic. Int. J. Gen. Syst. 17, 95–105.

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Arts-Based Methods Juliet Carpenter, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Embodiment The lived experience of human beings, combining mind and body. Reflexivity Being aware of one’s own position as a researcher, and acknowledging how this can impact on the research process.

Arts-based methods are an emergent methodological approach within human geography through which researchers use creative practice in any phase of their work, from initial data collection and analysis, to interpretation and representation. Arts-based methods present researchers with new pathways to create knowledge within the qualitative research paradigm, often across disciplinary boundaries. Methods grounded in the arts have the potential to disrupt traditional perspectives and ideologies. Furthermore, they differ from traditional qualitative methods in both the process of conducting research and the representation of research data. These creative practices have been criticized by those taking a positivist approach to scientific inquiry in relation to traditional conceptions of validity and reliability; nevertheless, there is increasing recognition, particularly among geohumanist scholars of the potential of creative practice to expand geographers’ capacity to explore varied understandings and experiences of place and space. There are two main routes scholars can take to harness arts-based methods. The first route is the “researcher as artist” approach, with the scholar either working solo through individual creative practice, or in collaboration with practicing artists as a collective. The second route employs participatory arts-based methods, where scholars work with research participants who themselves create artistic outputs in response to a research question. This article will address both these routes as two variations in the overall creative turn that human geography has witnessed in the last decades. Here we should qualify the use of the terms researcher and artist/creative practitioner. The increasing application of arts-based methods in geography has prompted a questioning of the binary distinction between researcher and artist in “creative geographies.” It could be argued that much scholarly research can be interpreted as a form of creativity, while at the same time, creative practice itself can be considered as a means of research. In fact, creative practice can be seen as one facet of the overlap between an artist’s and a geographer’s craft, facets that also include the skills of interview techniques, participant observation, analytic expertise, and storytelling, all of which contribute to the creative outputs of the artist-researcher. Arts-based methods in geography provide the opportunity for a new way of thinking about the artist-researcher identity and the fusion of the roles of artist and researcher. They also facilitate the raising of questions about “audiences” and their relationship with the artist-researcher. Art-based methods encourage a consideration of alternative ways of communicating and presenting geographic research. The blurring of the boundaries between art and research fits with a methodological approach that resists being categorized in traditional terms and that straddles formal disciplinary divides. Creative practice in geography can take many forms, from the written genres of poetry and creative prose, to performance-based music and drama, to dance, movement, and the visual arts. This article will outline the rationale for and benefits of applying these methods to geographical scholarship, and then consider each of the aforementioned genres alongside an examination of some of the key issues that are raised by using these novel research approaches to geography.

Rationale There is a strong rationale for the growing interest in arts-based methods in geography. Firstly, arts-based methods are a response to the evolution in recent geographical scholarship toward the affective and embodied aspects of everyday practice. This approach seeks to explore the emotional qualities of everyday life such as feelings and emotions that surface through daily-lived experience. These emotional affects lend themselves to exploration through creative practice, given the facility of arts-based approaches to give form to complex expressions. Secondly, creative-based research is more fluid, that is, it is less rigid than traditional research methods. Geographers can use such an approach to understand the messy or complex processes that are associated with embodied practice. Arts-based methods draw on the evocative power of the arts to generate new insights and enhance understanding of social phenomena. Thirdly, arts-based methods open up opportunities to engage different publics at all stages of the research, either through participatory arts-based methods that actively engage with research participants or by communicating research results through creative channels to new and diverse non-academic audiences. Arts-based methods are therefore a logical response to the changing nature of geographical scholarship and interests.

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Strengths of Arts-Based Methods Arts-based research practices offer a number of unique characteristics that allow research questions to be framed in new ways. They also offer the possibility for entirely new research questions to be posed. Fundamentally, the arts have the capacity to communicate elements of lived experience that are harder to explore using traditional geographical methods. Thus, arts-based methods can be used as a channel for promoting critical awareness and raising consciousness. This is particularly salient in research related to social justice, which aims to trouble the broader webs of privilege and power, and is thus important for geographers engaging in issues related to class, gender, race, and ethnicity. Another related area that lends itself to arts-based practice is research on issues of identity. Research through arts-based methods (e.g., theater or poetry) can build on themes of difference, diversity, and prejudice opening up possibilities to explore alternative perspectives that question “received ideas” around notions of identity, to challenge stereotypes, and to build empathy. In this way, arts-based methods have the potential to disrupt dominant narratives and to present a counter-narrative that interrupts “taken for granted” understandings. For example, feminist geographers can challenge conventional understandings of gender through artsbased methods, by addressing intersectional experiences that go beyond the binary gender divide, taking account of multiple and shifting identities. Similarly, research through creative practice can give voice to subjugated perspectives by uncovering stories that have traditionally been both neglected in academic research and marginalized in mainstream society. One of the key contributions, therefore, of arts-based practices is in facilitating dialogue and conversation, which is crucial to cultivating understanding and building connections across difference. A further strength of arts-based methods is the capacity to capture multivocal and dialogical perspectives through research. A traditional positivist perspective rejects the notion of multiple meanings; by contrast, arts-based practices actively cultivate multiple interpretations and perspectives to assist practitioners in moving toward an understanding of the complexity of the lived experiences of research participants. Thus, for example in the staging of a play that results from arts-based research practice, the theater audience is exposed to multiple viewpoints as a means of opening up dialogue and understanding through creative practice.

Genres Researchers can engage with a number of different genres as foundations for their arts-based projects; the key ones are explored below.

The Written Word: Literary Art Literary art covers a wide range of genres, from novels and short stories, to poetry and other forms of written expression. Although still based on text, that is, the traditional communication medium of qualitative research, these methods draw explicitly on the arts as a means of (re)storying a narrative, of creating resonance between the writer-researcher and the reader. The art form of poetry goes one-step further than narrative-based expression by reconfiguring words through such devices as rhyme or rhythm to uncover experiences and understanding through the combination of word, sound, and blank space. Recently, critical approaches in human geography, such as feminism and postcolonial theory, have challenged artificial binary divisions, such as the rational–emotional dichotomy, that have traditionally dominated knowledge production. Poetry offers an alternative means of responding to these theoretical developments. It draws on emotional expression as part of knowledge creation and teases out multiplicities of meaning. Employing poetry as a geographical method can open up space for interrupting traditional ways of knowing and for articulating multiple meanings, as Sarah de Leeuw and Harriet Hawkins have explored. Poetry is a novel way of compelling readers to engage critically in larger questions about the nature of social research, truth, and knowledge. Furthermore, literary art can also be integrated with other qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviewing in a mixedmethods approach, through which the researcher distills the essence of a series of interview transcripts into a literary text such as a short story or a poem. In the case of poetry, the preexisting interview text can be reframed into a “found poem,” where the words for the poem have been “found” in the initial interview text, and refashioned into poetry that distills the core of the original data in vivid and sensory detail, bringing to the fore the essential meanings of the narrative.

Music: Sound Art Music-based methods are less common than other arts-based practices described here, but they are increasingly being employed in the social sciences to help researchers access, describe, elucidate, and explain social phenomena that evade study through traditional research approaches. Studies of music and sound have a long history within geography, with recent theoretical developments mirroring the contemporary interest in both the emotional and more representational qualities of the listening and sonic experience. However, researchers in the social sciences are also increasingly using music as an arts-based method, particularly as a representational form because of its capacity to combine singing and storytelling to create narrative out of lyrical song. Music-based methods are directly linked to an increased scholarly interest in embodiment and bodily experience. Making music is inextricably linked to its articulation through performance (both in rehearsal as well as in formal performance) and is necessarily an embodied experience both for the musician-performer and the listener-audience. The musician/s can reveal emotion through the

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music, while those listening to the performance respond affectively; this music-performer-audience nexus adds to the complexity of the embodied experience, for the musician/s-researcher/s and audience. Integrating musical performance into the re/presentation of research also brings to light the resistive and transformational possibilities of music. The performative dimension of music has powerful transcendent potential in representing social justice data in sonic form, expanding listeners’ consciousness, and building understanding between communities. Music as method can also be combined with other qualitative methods (e.g., interviews) to gather data on audiences’ subjective experience of the musical performance and the emotions that it elicited. The possibilities of music-based methods in human geography are yet to be fully realized, but as with the other creative practices outlined here, music has the potential to contribute to the evolution of geographical practice. First, it facilitates the reexamination of research questions from a new perspective, such as queries about hybrid identities and how groups and individuals negotiate these identities. Second, it opens up a range of new research questionsdfor example, about embodimentdthat are increasingly relevant in geographical scholarship.

Performing Art Performance-based methods, often based on theater, can involve a variety of methodological practices. Performance is frequently thought of as a representational form, but it can serve as a means of data collection and analysis, and as a channel for re/presenting research findings. Theater practice responds closely to the recent move in human geography toward embodiment research as a way of integrating the mind and body in social inquiry. There are various ways in which scholars can capitalize on the potential of performance-based research methods. For example, using drama as a research activity, the participants or “cast” gather to examine a particular research question orally, with the textual data emerging from this improvisation stage of “collective creation.” Through participatory and performative action, the data are framed into a script through a drama-based process of analysis and subsequently performed to an audience. An alternative example is ethnotheater, which involves writing up research findings into a script for a performance based on narratives that might come from a range of sources, including interviews, participant observation notes, journal entries, or newspaper articles. This form of theater animates research participants’ experiences as well as the researcher’s interpretation of the data. These methods raise a multitude of questions about the strategies used to analyze, interpret, and transform the data into a condensed script, about the process of characterization, and about the ways in which the storyline and structure of the script convey meaning. They also raise issues about reflexivity and subjectivity, notions that are also pertinent to other arts-based methods, and the role of the researcher in constructing meaning throughout the research process. The researcher’s reflexivity and self-acknowledgment has the potential to enrich the research and uncover new layers of understanding in geographical inquiry. `What follows is an example of the application of performance-based methods in human geography. In 2010, Geraldine Pratt and Caleb Johnston explored questions of transnational migration and family separation between Canada and the Philippines through a testimonial theater project titled “Nanay.” The entire playscript was based on research transcripts from interviews with domestic workers, their families, employers, and nanny agents. The play toured worldwide and exposed different international audiences to the experiences of Filipino domestic workers who move to Canada as migrant laborers. The use of dramatic performance in this project highlights theater’s ability to challenge and disrupt conventional ways of knowing by troubling accepted notions of care and caregiving in postcolonial settings and by exploring how existing framings might be reviewed in the light of audience reactions to the play’s performance internationally. Such an example demonstrates the powerful role that performing art can have in moving beyond traditional understandings to access deeper insights into complex positions.

Dance Dance is an abstract and embodied genre that, like theater or live music, exists in the moment and draws on elements of different arts forms, in particular on components of music and performance. Recent theoretical developments in understanding embodiment and the physicality of experience have led to explorations in dance as a potential methodological tool in human geography. As an arts-based method, dance can be mobilized for data collection as well as representation of the data through choreographed movement. It can add depth and texture to research that addresses areas such as identity and difference. Dance can be used for data collection, though this component of collecting information may be alongside more traditional qualitative methods to provide dimensionality to the data. This does not mean that dance is an “add-on” in the process of data collection; rather it serves as a crucial component of an integrated approach that allows different methods to inform one another. For example, following a series of in-depth interviews, research participants might be asked to engage in creative movement, that is, to capture bodily expressions in response to the research topic. This would be followed up with a further interview to watch the videoed dance movement with the participants and to explore their reflections and reactions elicited by the movement. Informed by embodiment scholarship, research involving dance mobilizes the body as a tool through which knowledge is created and as a source of understanding and a locus of meaning. Dance can also be an alternative embodied form of representation that communicates meaning to audiences in ways that convey the accented dimensions of lived experiences. For example, artist-researchers can collaborate with a choreographer to re/present a data set of interview transcripts as a dance performance, portraying the voices in abstract ways to convey nuanced meaning. In this way, the dance adds new complexities and understandings to the data. Dance can now be found at scholarly conferences in

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geography as a performative way of presenting research findings, as it gains acceptance as an innovative approach to present research results in an academic context.

Visual Arts Visual arts offer a powerful tool for researchers as a knowledge-building practice that can challenge and dislodge traditional ways of thinking. They can provide a source of data, be an analytical tool, or be harnessed as a representational form. Visual imagery, be it drawing, painting, photography, or other visual media, can either be produced by the researcher-artist, or be subject-produced, where research participants create artistic outputs that serve as data or as catalysts for data generation within a research project. This latter casedapplying “participatory” visual methods to a research projectdis addressed in the next subsection. The researcher can employ visual imagery in particular as a means of acquiring clarity and insight into a research topic. This can be achieved through collaboration with visual artists to explore the geographical ways of knowing through arts-based methods. Harriet Hawkins, for example, worked closely with a practicing visual artist, Annie Lovejoy, who was exploring notions of community as an artist-in-residence at Roseland Peninsula in Cornwall, United Kingdom. The two artist-researchers collaborated to produce an artists’ book, “insites.” This project investigated the production of social relations and social spaces through creative cultural practice; it used photographs, drawing, maps, and reflective text to uncover meaning. The resulting book fused visual imagery with explorations of alternative “ways of knowing” place to reflect on the varieties of geographical knowledge that emerge from a creative-research partnership. There is also a growing interest in the use of multiple art forms in arts-based methods, where a variety of different arts media are combined to explore key research issues. For example, graphic novels are increasingly being used as a format for re/presenting research findings in the social sciences, combining visual images with textual narrative in order to convey meaning. Although graphic novels in geography are rather a rarity, they can be particularly useful in areas such as activist geography, where the graphic novel can be an accessible format for the dissemination of transformative research carried out in collaboration with community activists.

Participatory Visual Methods Participatory arts-based methods offer a means by which researchers can mobilize creative practices with research participants to engage more deeply with communities and uncover perspectives that cannot be accessed through more traditional qualitative methods. All arts-based methods are necessarily participatory, given their audiences are crucial to offering multiple meanings of a creative output. However, the specific field of “participatory arts-based methods” engages directly with research participants in creative practice, with the resulting artwork serving in some cases as both data and representation of the data. Participatory visual methods endeavor to confront the barriers between scholars and research subjects by disrupting hierarchical practice. They aim to empower and give voice to research subjects who may hitherto have been unseen and unheard in mainstream inquiry. Consider the method of photovoice, where photos taken by participants are subsequently used to elicit narratives and meaning through group dialogue. This practice gives the community agency to articulate their situated experiences and elaborate on their lived worlds. Photovoice often culminates in a community exhibition of photos and narratives that presents participants’ experiences and provides a forum for further discussion, between community audiences, artist-participants, and researchers. The researcher–subject asymmetry will always be present to some degree, but participatory methods go some way toward addressing this imbalance and giving voice to previously disempowered groups through an embodied and situated methodology. Another example of participatory visual methods can be found in a project led by Elena Vacchelli, who applied participatory visual methods to her work with migrant, refugee, and asylum-seeking women in London. She used the process of collage making as a strategy for drawing out women’s experiences of their migration journey and of accessing mental health services in the United Kingdom. The act of collage making, as a non-textual form of representation, elicited stories and narratives that went beyond what verbal contributions might have evoked. This may have been a particularly apt method given the sensitive nature of the topic. At the same time, the actual technique of making the collage represented an experiential activity that drew both on embodiment (the body being the spatial scale for the initiation of the collage) and reflexivity (in the re/negotiation of researcher–participant relations during the collage making and subsequent exploration of the women’s experiences). Participatory visual methods thus present a powerful means of engaging participants and multiple audiences in research conversations.

Critiques of Arts-Based Methods Some critics question the legitimacy of arts-based methods in geography, and do so from a number of perspectives. One criticism is about the validity of scholars adopting arts practices without necessarily having the appropriate skills. Although some geographers also have a background as practicing artists, the majority of geographers engaging in arts-based methods are situated at or near the “novice” end of the spectrum. This raises questions about the skills required for an artist-researcher to employ arts-based methods effectively. Such an approach requires researchers to collaborate across disciplines and to study the artistic craft that they seek to adopt in order to enhance the aesthetic qualities of the research outputs. Studying the complex traditions of an artist’s métier and learning the “rules,” as far as they exist, take time. It is only through practice that geographers can move toward an understanding of these complex processes as groundwork for their research endeavor.

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Furthermore, some critics question the validity and reliability of the analysis and interpretation of arts-based outputs. There are well-established processes for evaluating traditional academic papers through the peer review process; these relate to credibility, transferability, and confirmability. However, these traditional positivist concepts are inappropriate for evaluating creative practice in social science research, which is necessarily partial, situated, and contextual. One key component of an assessment of arts-based outputs is a consideration of aesthetics. But the use of arts-based methods in research requires a reconsideration and/or reconceptualization of what constitutes “good art” as well as “good research.” Both the process and the product are important in explorations of arts-based methods, and when considering a research-based artwork, audiences should be aware of the research context in which the artwork has been produced. A visual art output for example, requires both an analysis of the iconography embedded within the work for insights into its meaning and an analysis of the processes of both the researcher-artist’s and the audience’s embodied practices in creating and responding to the artwork. It is also important to go beyond aesthetics to consider how far the outputs evoke discussion, to examine their power to elicit responses, and to consider the extent to which they give rise to “thickened understanding” among audiences. In response to criticisms related to reliability, viewer or audience feedback can be used to appraise arts-based outputs, as a means of demonstrating their validity. For example, a post-performance dialogue with the audience of a play performed as part of a socialjustice oriented project can assess audience reactions and the extent to which the project objectives were met. This may include questions about whether the performance increased awareness of the issues covered, or about the emotions evoked through the experience. Dialogue with the audience is also important, as arts-based practices often generate multiple meanings. These audience conversations can capture the diverse interpretations and perspectives that emerge from the work. They contribute to understandings of the issue in question and also become a means of validating the output. As with all research, full methodological disclosure is important, but particularly so with arts-based methods where they are mobilized in social science research. Creative methods may involve a combination of fact and fiction, drawing on different data sources such as interview texts, researcher-artists’ reworkings of narratives into dance or drama, or musical interpretations of information into song. Methodological disclosure will contribute to an audience’s understanding of the project and its outputs, and strengthen the resulting knowledge.

Conclusions Arts-based methods present a unique way for geographers to highlight and re/construct meanings associated with their own or research participants’ experiences. They offer new ways of collecting and interpreting data, as well as of re/presenting findings, that fit with recent developments of more embodied, affective, and activity-based approaches in human geographydapproaches that give new form to encounters, feelings, and experiences. In other words, creative methods give texture to our understanding of everyday practice. This reflects the growing interdisciplinary exchanges between creative practice and human geography. Artsbased practices in research are therefore not just about applying new methods, but also about offering new ways of thinking about knowledge-buildingdways that illuminate meanings and elicit understandings that wouldn’t necessarily emerge if a researcher were to use other qualitative methods. As well as opening up a range of new research questions related to situated knowledges and embodiment, arts-based methods play an important role in expanding the diversity of audiences exposed to academic research, for example through theater performance or photovoice. However, the extent to which this is actually happening is debatable, given the enduring preeminence of scholarly publication channels as the dominant means of validating academic research, and the reluctance (and/or incompatibility) of these formal channels to embrace unconventional dissemination formats. Although arts-based methods are gaining recognition as legitimate approaches to research in human geography, they remain on the margins of methodological practice, and their potential is yet to be fully realized. In order to strengthen their position within the discipline as a viable research approach, researchers need to spend time developing new creative skills so that alternative methods can be explored and any final artifact can stand on its own, both as an accepted artwork and as a means of communicating new understandings. In doing so, geographers, as creative cultural practitioners, will build legitimacy in these methods through which their work can increase critical reflection, promote greater understanding, and provide researchers and subjects with critical agency to challenge dominant narratives.

See Also: Cultural Geography; Cultural Turn; Geohumanities; Literature; Performance, Research as; Photovoice; Situated Knowledge, Reflexivity; Subjectivity.

Further Reading Anzul, M., Downing, M., Ely, M., Vinz, R., 2003. On Writing Qualitative Research: Living by Words. Routledge, London. Bagley, C., Cancienne, M.B. (Eds.), 2002. Dancing the Data, vol. 5. Peter Lang, New York. Barone, T., Eisner, E.W., 2011. Arts Based Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.

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De Leeuw, S., Hawkins, H., 2017. Critical geographies and geography’s creative re/turn: poetics and practices for new disciplinary spaces. Gend. Place Cult. 24 (3), 303–324. Dear, M., Ketchum, J., Luria, S., Richardson, D. (Eds.), 2011. GeoHumanities: Art, History, Text at the Edge of Place. Routledge, London. Hawkins, H., 2011. Dialogues and doings: sketching the relationships between geography and art. Geography Compass 5 (7), 464–478. Hawkins, H., 2013. For Creative Geographies: Geography, Visual Arts and the Making of Worlds. Routledge, London. Johnston, C., Pratt, G., 2019. Migration in Performance: Crossing the Colonial Present. Routledge, London. Kara, H., 2015. Creative Research Methods in the Social Sciences: A Practical Guide. Policy Press, Bristol. Leavy, P., 2009. Method Meets Art: Arts-Based Research Practice. The Guilford Press, New York. Madge, C., 2014. On the creative (re) turn to geography: poetry, politics and passion. Area 46 (2), 178–185. Marston, S.A., De Leeuw, S., 2013. Creativity and geography: toward a politicized intervention. Geogr. Rev. 103 (2), iii–xxvi. Mitchell, C., De Lange, N., Moletsane, R., 2017. Participatory Visual Methodologies: Social Change, Community and Policy. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Rose, G., 2016. Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Vacchelli, E., 2017. Embodiment as qualitative research: collage making with refugee, asylum seeking and migrant women. Qual. Res. 18 (2), 171–190.

Relevant Websites cultural geographies (journal), https://journals.sagepub.com/home/cgj. Geohumanities (journal), https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgeo20. Photovoice: A Registered Charity Promoting Participatory Photography and Digital Storytelling Projects for Socially Excluded Groups, https://photovoice.org/. International Centre of Art for Social Change, based at Simon Fraser University, https://www.icasc.ca/.

Assemblage Theory Sam Page, University College London, London, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Abstract machine The guide/blueprint to how the assemblage comes together. Becoming There is always flux, always movement, nothing is static. Virtuals As opposed to the actual, the virtual is not material, but the ideal of something that affects how the something comes into being, and thus it is real.

Assemblage theory stems from a diverse body of literature that presents a topological ontology to research space, time, and structures of power, including materials and affects in its scope. In geography, it is part of a post-cartesian positioning to disabuse scholars of ideas of researcher-as-detached from their subjects of study. A loose definition of an assemblage would be the working together of components. This, however, is only a starting point as assemblage theory is flexible, debatable, and open to interpretation. Human geographers continue to interpret it in various ways, using it to explore diverse subjects. This article shall proceed as follows: first, I set out how the theory’s originators, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, sketched assemblage theory. Second, I move onto the two currently most significant interpretations by Manuel DeLanda and Ian Buchanan, discussing their definitions and differences. Third is a brief exploration of other significant theories with which the concept of assemblage overlaps, namely actor–network theory and affect. Fourth, and finally, is an overview of how various recent human geographers have utilized assemblage theory in practice.

Deleuze and Guattari’s Assemblage Both Deleuze and Guattari’s four joint (Anti-Oedipus, A Thousand Plateaus, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, and What is Philosophy?) and numerous individual texts are linked to the 20th-Century poststructuralist and post-Marxist movements. For assemblage theory, it is A Thousand Plateaus, the second volume of their Capitalism and Schizophrenia project (the first being Anti-Oedipus, published in 1972), that is crucial. It was published in French in 1980, and translated into English by philosopher Brian Massumi in 1987. Of particular influence in this work are the philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, and Henri-Louis Bergson. The keyword to emerge from this book is agencement. While the literal translation into English is “layout” or “arrangement,” in the English translation by Massumi, this word becomes assemblage (as we shall see in the next section, this is a sometimes disputed translation). In this dense and playful text, the term assemblage is frequently used to describe a coming together of diverse things, both physical and metaphysical. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari variously declare literature (as a whole), an anvil of the Dogons of West Africa, and nomadic groups to be assemblages. The book itself is pronounced as an assemblage and they insist that it can be read in any way the reader wishesdthe chapters do not need to be read in a linear fashion, and in relation with the reader, each reading of the book produces a different assemblage. We can thus interpret from this that assemblage theory is a malleable idea that can be applied to multifarious subjects. An assemblage is not an empty space to invest whatever one wishes, as it comes with some important philosophical tenets, the varying importance of each has been disputed. For instance, emphasis on the ever-changing nature of an assemblage (it is always “becoming”) means that it is never stable, but rather, always in flux. Second, the relations between the components are frequently posited as key in an assemblage. In conversation with Claire Parnet, Deleuze said that an assemblage is defined by the “cofunctioning” of its componentsdthus it is not just about the book being able to be read in any order, but also how the reader relates to that book. Third, components are not limited to people, but may also include materials (the book), bodies (including animals), and virtuals (more on this term in the next paragraph). To explore briefly how this works, another example Deleuze and Guattari give of an assemblage is a woman-bow-steppe. It is the interconnection of these three components (which are assemblages in themselves) which is the assemblage. It is not just the woman who is important as agency is distributed to the material and virtual aspects of this assemblage. The material takes the form of both the steppe and the bow. The steppe is important because it places the woman-bow on a particular terrain, and alongside the bow, may go some way in determining the kind of projectile that may be used. The body would be that of the woman, which combines the bow-steppe, producing different sorts of potentials than the bow-steppe by itself. The “virtual” has a very particular meaning in assemblage theory. The virtual is in contrast to the “actual”dboth are real: the actual is of the physical realm, while the virtual is about the affective relations between assemblages. Neither the actual nor the virtual means more than other, and both create the

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real. We might understand the virtual in the woman-bow-steppe assemblage as the intention and aim of a projectile. It is the intersection between the woman, bow, and steppe that produces the assemblage. It is the relations between the components that produce both the roles of the components in that assemblage, as well as the specific assemblage, and each component can equally be part of another assemblage. While the woman may be where the bow and steppe intersect, these two components act back upon the woman to change the potentials of the women. Deleuze and Guattari followed fellow French poststructuralist and post-Marxist scholar Michele Foucault in proposing their concepts as part of a “toolbox” rather than a singular, solid theory. As we shall see, every time a scholar assembles, or applies, assemblage theory, it can be argued that their work constitutes a unique assemblage in and of itself. Moreover, the exploration and utilization of assemblage theory has evolved not only out of the writings of Deleuze and Guattari, but also through how various others have interpreted them since the publication of A Thousand Plateaus. To reiterate, while the opening paragraph has a loose definition of an assemblage, there is no single definition, and while there is a core set of readings, this is also evolving and has led to theoretical disputes and disagreements over its potential.

Manuel DeLanda and Ian Buchanan Perhaps the most influential interpretation of assemblage theory in human geography has been by philosopher Manuel DeLanda. He has explored its potentials in three books: first, in science with Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy; second, in society through A New Philosophy of Society; and third a synthesis and further exploration in Assemblage Theory. His interpretation of assemblage theory’s potential conceivably goes even further than Deleuze and Guattari’s in that he seems to be attempting to provide a new ontological approach to the world, which is something they were not necessarily attempting. DeLanda’s theorization of what an assemblage is, is more explicit and direct than that of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly in terms of definition and how his conceptualisation can be applied to research subjects. For DeLanda, the emphasis of an assemblage is on the relationship between the components, what he calls “relations of exteriority.” While a singular component of an assemblage may have important features, it is how the components relate to one another that makes the assemblage function as it does. As he demonstrates in Intensive Science through looking at different examples taken from various fields of science such as medicine, biology, and physics, none of these components need be human to form an assemblage: the criteria that specifies what a species is are an assemblage. For human geography, while concentrating on social issues, this has wide-ranging implications related to new materialism, as it attempts to appreciate the agency of nonhuman subjects (albeit most frequently in human-centric assemblages). Through highlighting the relations of components, an important part of DeLanda’s reading is his emphasis on being antiessentialist. As an assemblage is always becoming and always defined by the relationship between components, no assemblage has an essential, defining core as components are always moving in and out of it. An assemblage is thus a multiplicity, made through its relations. According to DeLanda, this means we may categorize things differently than they have been: when a biological category is labeled, there is a search for patterns, and anything outside that pattern is left outside that category. This limits understandings, and he argues instead that a focus on process is more important. He provides an example of the recent categorization of a “tetrapod limb.” A tetrapod is any four-limbed vertebrate, revealing the relationship between a frog’s hand and a mouse’s paw. It is hard to define in terms of patterns as it includes humans, primates, reptiles, and birds within its scope. However, there is a recognized common process in the limbs that link them together, namely what DeLanda describes as the process of “asymmetrical branching and segmentation” of say, a mouse’s paw and a bird’s wing, connecting us all back to the ancient and extinct group of animals known as the Tetrapodomorpha. In A New Philosophy of Society, DeLanda adopts the language of Deleuze and Guattari in the terms “territorialization” and “coding” in order to explore social assemblages: this book is explicitly geographical. The terms offer a potential to delineate what is inside and outside an assemblage: territorialization comes first in drawing things into assemblage, and coding is a second articulation that defines the rules within an assemblage. He provides the example of a conversation to clarify the potential to understanding these terms. Territorialization involves the informal occupation of both a (material) physical and (virtual) metaphysical space: face-to-face conversations are location based, and through the relation between the conversers, spatial boundaries are specified. Importantly, as with Deleuze and Guattari’s bow-woman-steppe, components here are not just the people, but material and virtual as well. The process of coding further brings those components together, defining how they relate to one anotherdallowing a repartee with each allowing the other to speak in turn, or to recognize a chair as something to sit on (rather than talk to). The more formal these rules, the more the assemblage can be described as coded. Thus, a meeting between friends in a bar is loosely coded, while a presentation in an office may be heavily coded, with particular roles for each of the components present. To restate, DeLanda’s conception of an assemblage is one based on the relations between components that move in and out of an it and can plug into one another. This interpretation understands objects of study as multiplicities made up of components made from multiplicitous other assemblages, which together territorialize and code space. Crucially, this interpretation need not focus on humans. By contrast, the founder of the journal Deleuze Studies, Ian Buchanan, has criticized DeLanda’s interpretation, finding it little more than an overcomplicated way to describe things. Claiming DeLanda presents a heretical reading of Deleuze and Guattari, he specifies three issues: first, that the assemblage is not about “part–whole relations”; second, an assemblage is not the accumulation of individual acts; third, change in an assemblage does not happen piecemeal. He argues that tracing the individual

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components does not add much or anything to our knowledge, but instead presents a bewildering and unnecessarily complication where an assemblage has no beginning or end, components are potentially unknown, and changes are linear progression of small movements. He also takes issue with the notion that it is providing a new ontological framework, as he argues that while materials and nonhumans do have agency, they only have it in relationship to humans. DeLanda, he writes, spends too much time looking at how structures change rather than at what the structure is in the first place. It is not just DeLanda whom Buchanan finds at fault: it is also the translator of A Thousand Plateaus, Massumi. Buchanan argues that "agencement" is Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of the German word “komplex,” a term related to Freudian analysis, and a more suitable rendition would be the more literal translation of “arrangement.” He finds the implications of the word “assemblage” to be misleading, leading to interpretations of assemblages as a result of happenstance. Arrangement, by contrast, suggests a purposeful coming together of components to realize something deliberate. It is this deliberateness he finds missing from many interpreters of assemblage theory (and actor–network theory, of which he is also very critical), and a crucial factor for his definition. To Buchanan, an assemblage is not so mysteriousdits components are known and traceable, while its abstract machine is also known, and guides it’s coming together. Buchanan’s assemblage is thus not as antiessentialist as DeLanda’s as it has a key component: the abstract machine. Briefly, the abstract machine is the blueprint or plan of an assemblage. Buchanan worries that the question of power has gone missing from the interpretations of assemblage theory, and wishes to place power at the center by looking at what a structure is. Thus, a Buchananist definition of an assemblage might be expanded from our original one at the beginning of this article: the deliberate coming together of components to do something. Central to his concerns is what the structure of power is. The difference between DeLanda and Buchanan’s interpretation presents just some of the divergencies that can arise out of interpreting Deleuze and Guattari’s theory. DeLanda’s assemblage theory is an ontological lens that focuses on the relations between components (human, material, ethereal) and how they change. By contrast, Buchanan’s focus is more human-centric and looks at assemblage theory as a tool to pull apart what situations are and how power works in the attempt to achieve something.

Relations to Other Theories The ontological approach of assemblage theory has not emerged in a vacuum. Rather, there are at least two significant concurrent concepts popular in human geography, and social science more widely. First, there is a widely noted similarity between assemblage theory and actor–network theory. Both are heavily influenced by Deleuze and Guattari; however, there are scholarly disagreements of the varying differences between them. On one hand, actor–network theory is specifically societally focused, and the same cannot be (always) said for assemblage. Moreover, the ’nodes’ of actor-network theory presupposed a subject of study, whereas how those ’nodes’ are produced is a question for assemblage theory - how the subject of study becomes a subject of study is questioned. Finally, it has been claimed that the originator of the theory, Bruno Latour, is anti-Bergson (the philosopher from whom Deleuze and Guattari were influenced on the ideas of time). On the other hand, some scholars (like Buchanan) consider actor–network theory as part of the overall assemblage theory body of work. Certainly, they share some grounding in Deleuze and Guattari, and their ontological perspectives are not too far from one another. Second, Deleuze and Guattari also express a Spinozan interpretation of affect. Affect has many different interpretations and all are not linked back to assemblage theory. This point does not stop the Deleuzo-Guattarian use being important. Described by Massumi in his introduction to the book as “prepersonal intensities,” affect influences the body in an assemblage before mental cognition takes place. It is something like “a gut feeling,” for lack of a better term (there are debates about the relationship between affects, emotions, and feelings). We can understand affect as the glue of an assemblage, it is the thing that both attracts and repels different components toward or away from an assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari describe affect as a weapon, and yet it does not come from any individual but is produced through the relationship among the components of an assemblage.

Assemblage Theory and Human Geography Since the early 2000s, there has been a growing utilization of assemblage theory in human geography. Perhaps this is because it seems to speak to other currents that begun to be taken up, such as new materialism, affect, nonrepresentational theory, or emotional geography, and it also seems adept at addressing some of the complications that the Internet poses researchers. It may also be because, as we might see with Deleuze and Guattari’s example of the bow-woman-steppe, it can provide a focus where we must consider the materials and virtuals of the context, and how those components relate to each other. As such, it has the potential to help explore geography as a topological (i.e. relational), rather than a topographical, subject. Assemblage theory has also become influential for many in social science and humanities, not just geography (this article only focuses on human geography scholars). Assemblage theory was first championed by human geographers in the United Kingdom. While some scholars, such as Nigel Thrift (particularly through nonrepresentational theory) and Stephen Legg, dabbled in Deleuzian-inspired ideas before, it was work by Ben Anderson and Colin McFarlane (both situated at Durham University) that seemed to really usher into human geography its own philosophical undertaking. Introducing a special section of the journal Area in 2011, Anderson and McFarlane highlighted three ways in which assemblage theory had been interpreted in human geography thus far. First, as a way of

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describing a subject through tracing its interlinking parts. In this, the word “assemblage” was taken as quite literal, there lacks much reference to Deleuze and Guattari, and perhaps reflects the fears of Buchanan. Second, they identified the concept of assemblage in relation to other concepts; that it may cofunction with other approaches and thus produce a conceptual assemblage. Last, they found assemblage theory provides an experimental approach to the world, one that tries to appreciate the assemblages one experiences in everyday life. Included is an experimental approach to methods in research, challenging classic ideas of the role of the researcher. These different levels reveal the complexity in trying to apply assemblage theory to field work and the various potential uses scholars find in it. This very manipulability is where they locate assemblage theory’s growing popularity. That same year, McFarlane inaugurated a year-long debate in the journal City around assemblage theory and critical urbanism. Over the course of four issues, proponents and opponents debated its use and potential. For instance, in the first issue, McFarlane places assemblage theory in contrast to other theories in critical urbanism to draw out the potentials of exploring things in this way. In the very same issue, Brenner et al. replied echoing (and not referencing) Buchanan, acknowledging that an assemblage is useful as a rich descriptor, but little else. It is too vague for them. Thus, the philosophical debate about the potential of assemblage theory occurs again and again. And yet, such rebuttals have not hampered the abundant and diverse application that human geographers have since Anderson and MacFarlane’s advocacy, including, but not limited to, political, electoral, economic, health, food, economic, queer, social, cultural, digital, population, child, literary, architectural, and historical geographies. The application has thus been exhaustive, and so what follows is a cherry-picked exploration of the current crop. Frequently the first few papers in field are a “call” for others to turn their attention to assemblage theory and its potentials. These papers seldom feature much in the way of empirical exploration; rather, they display on a more theoretical basis of the potential, sometimes revealed through a case study. McFarlane’s 2011 paper “The City as Assemblage: Dwelling and Urban Space” did just that. He makes explicit that the ontology of assemblage theory reveals hitherto neglected processes of how the generation of dwellings and urban space is based on relations between components, both human and more-than-human. It brings into focus the combination of individual histories of components that relate through performance and events, and how these relations are unequally structured and contested. Also addressing concerns in the urban environments, Susan Ruddick has argued that assemblage theory may provide a new and affecting ontology in how to start thinking new cultural and environmental concerns, creating new expressions and thus potentials for social movements based around positive actions, rather than always defensive ones. Assemblage thinking has produced changes in geography that looks at the seas, as well. Philip Steinberg and Kimberley Peters argue that understanding the role of the ocean, turning to assemblage theory is necessary as previous scholars have characterized the sea as unaffective and unremarkable, a characterless space. Assemblage theory draws our attention to how this fluid space continuously is making and unmaking space in a way that is crucial to understand other geographies. Alongside this, Jonathan Pugh’s conception of assemblage bridges oceanic, ship, and island geographies through looking at particular performances of island dance as performed on a ferry. Pugh challenges these geographies to understand how an island is not isolated, but instead in the world and involved in multiple assemblages through its relationships. In the field of political geography, Jason Dittmer has shown how assemblage theory may be used to reconsider how foreign policy is made. Arguing against narratives of policy made through rational processes, he traces how the affective relationship of different components may produce foreign policy as an assemblage, with components moving in and out of it. He argues that materials are long-neglected agents in creating foreign policy and relations between actors, but all too often are crucial: for instance, he provides a novel history of UK’s Foreign Office building, arguing the 19th-Century building current housing it became a necessity as the change in communication technology meant that the endless documents coming into the previous building were shaking it to its foundations. The agency in materialsdin the building and the printerdis thus shown to be crucial in creating spaces of governance and influencing how foreign policy is made. In electoral geography, Sam Page has tried to bring new insight to a quantitative-based field by introducing it to assemblage theory. He argues for reevaluating political parties as assemblages. Questioning the accepted ideas of hierarchical structures of political parties, he has looked at how volunteers and materials created the UK Labour Party on the campaign trail, arguing that it is also the practice of the components of a party during campaigns that create it, rather than only that of the leadership. Thus, rather than understanding political parties as a top-down organisation defined by hierarchy, the agency of individual components is crucial to understanding how both the campaigns and the party, more generally, functions. In historical geography, Andrew Davies has used it to explore the Royal Navy Mutiny of 1946. This article reveals how there was not just one reason behind the mutiny, but instead the affective process of creating shared meaning between the Indian sailors bring them into a mutinous assemblage together. It was both the material component and the relationship between the Navy machinery, but also the social solidarity between other sailors as well as the Indian nationalism that construct the space of the mutiny. The concept is thus useful in reminding of how components may come into an assemblage from others, that an organization is always multiple, and how those new relations modify and are modified by those other relations. This overview only scratches the surface of how assemblage theory has been conceived and applied. The understandings and applications are evidently heterogenous, and while A Thousand Plateaus may provide a start, the development of the theory in no way stops there. Finally, while assemblage theory is still questioned for its value and its application in some quarters, it cannot be denied that others have found a use for it, embracing it and applying it with aplomb, and is increasingly influential to human geography in diverse and enlightening ways.

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See Also: Affect; Animal Geographies; Autoethnography; Becoming; Chaos and Complexity; Digital Geographies; Emotional Geographies; Ethnography; Philosophy and Human Geography; Political Geography; Post-Marxist Geographies; Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies; Psychogeography; Scale; State.

Further Reading Allen, J., Cochrane, A., 2010. Assemblages of state power: topological shifts in the organisation of government and politics. Antipode 42 (5), 1071–1089. Baker, T., McGuirk, P., 2016. Assemblage thinking as methodology: comments and practices for critical policy research. Territory Politics Govern. Buchanan, I., 2019. Assemblage theory, or, the future of an illusion. Deleuze Stud. 11 (3), 457–474. Davies, A., 2013. Identity and the assemblage of protest: the spatial politics of the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, 1946. Geoforum 48, 24–32. DeLanda, M., 2006. A New Philosophy of Society. Bloomsbury, London. Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 2013. A Thousand Plateaus. Translation by Brian Massumi (1987). Bloomsbury, London. Dittmer, J., 2017. Diplomatic Material: Affect, Assemblage, and Foreign Policy. Duke University Press, Durham. McFarlane, C., 2011. The City as assemblage: dwelling and urban space. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 29, 649–671. Pugh, J., 2016. The relational turn is island geographies: bringing together island, sea and ship relations and the case of the Landship. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 17 (8), 1040–1059. Ruddick, S., 2017. Grounding our subjectivity in the semiotic web: or, nature is a language, can’t we read? Dialog. Human Geogr. 7 (2), 161–165. Saldanha, A., 2017. Space after Deleuze. Bloomsbury, London. Steinberg, P., Peters, K., 2015. Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: giving depth to volume through oceanic thinking. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 33, 247–264.

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Atlases Julia Siemer, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by J. Siemer, H. Asche, volume 1, pp 220–224, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Atlas A collection of maps with uniform formal structure and design on a specific region or topic Atlas information system A digital collection of maps with uniform formal structure and design on a specific region or topic with interactive features Electronic atlas Digital atlas, usually available online or, previously, on electronic medium such as CD ROM or DVD National atlas Complex regional atlas referring to a national state Physical map Map depicting the physical environment of an area Regional atlas Atlas portraying a specific geographically or culturally defined area and its physical and human environment Thematic atlas Systematic collection of thematic maps depicting the spatial distribution of one or more characteristics of the physical or human environment other than topography of a specific geographically or culturally defined area Thematic map Map depicting the spatial distribution of one or more thematic characteristics of the physical or human environment other than topography

Today, every systematic application-specific collection of maps with uniform formal structure and design is referred to as an “atlas” because they are named after a book collection of world maps by the Flemish–German cartographer Gerardus Mercator more than four centuries ago. Since Mercator’s time the term atlas implies not only a specific map content and a system of map models based on a common narrative, but also the presentation medium, be it a map product in book form or paper maps assembled in a map case. The change to digital map design and production brought about increasing numbers of electronic atlases designed and developed for on-screen use. Characteristic of any electronic presentation is a screen map allowing the user to interact with the map graphic in various ways. When linked with a geographic database, electronic atlases offer extensive interaction and manipulation features of its (carto)graphic and nongraphic components. Atlases and their maps, regardless of the presentation medium, offer functions for viewing, data exploration, and knowledge acquisition of a certain geographic area or theme. As maps are a medium of communication via a specific map language, atlases can be regarded as essays in communication.

Historical Background The development of atlases can be divided into different stages. The first stage of atlas development is defined by Ptolemy’s Guide to Geography (Geographike hyphegesis), which dates back to the 2nd Century CE. In volume 8 of the guide, Ptolemy included instructions on how to show the Earth in maps and also included 26 maps. The guide was unknown until it was translated into Arabic around CE 800; however, it was not until it was translated into Latin in 1409 in Italy that it had an impact on the development of cartography and atlases in particular. By 1477, other printed versions of the Guide to Geography were available, which also included the maps. In the 16th Century, mainly in Italy, (and also later in Germany and France) more map collections were published in book form, which followed the order of maps suggested by Ptolemy. The Guide to Geography can thus be seen as an early example of an atlas. The first consistently structured atlas (Theatrum orbis terrarum) was produced by the Dutch cartographer Abraham Ortelius and published in 1570. Although its maps shared a consistent format and print technique (engraving), they lacked uniform orientation, content, and visualization. Gerardus Mercator’s Atlas sive cosmographicae meditationes de fabrica mundi et fabricati figura, posthumously published in 1595, introduced the term “atlas” for a collection of maps in book form and was also more consistent than earlier map collections. New developments in the field of atlas cartography took place during the 17th and 18th centuries in France. Advances in the quality of atlases were mainly based on higher accuracy in land surveying techniques and tools, which resulted in more accurate maps. In the 19th Century, new printing and reproduction technology facilitated the production of various types of atlases. Prominent examples are general-reference atlases such as the German Stielers Handatlas (published between 1816 and 1945) and the early British Times Atlas (first published in 1895).Current developments in computer technology and data gathering have led to new types of maps and atlases. Not only has the production of atlases changed due to new technologies, the use of maps and thus of atlases has been strongly affected as well. Digital technology applied in atlas production and use offers new ways to communicate spatial

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information. Today’s ubiquitous availability of spatial data allows for easy map, and subsequently atlas, creation by experts in their respective fields of study in cooperation with cartographers.

Types of Atlases Atlases, whether in conventional paper or electronic form, portray (a) a clearly defined geographic region or (b) a specific topic or theme.

General-Reference Atlases Atlases can depict a specific area or cover the entire Earth. The latter are often referred to as general-reference atlases and contain mainly small-scale physical maps to emphasize locations of places and their spatial relationships. General-reference atlases typically also contain additional noncartographic information such as tabular data, graphs, (air) photos, satellite images, explanatory texts, and, most importantly, indexes of place names and geographic objects linked to coordinates (e.g., latitude and longitude or an internal locational grid consisting of numbers and letters along the margins of the atlas maps). General-reference atlases, which portray a specific area rather than the entire Earth, are typically comprised of large- to medium-scale topographic maps, depending on the size of the region shown, and are often referred to as topographic atlases. Two prominent examples of current generalreference atlases are The Times Comprehensive Atlas of the World (14th ed 2014) and the Atlas of the World by Oxford University Press (25th ed 2018).Outstanding examples of printed general-reference atlases used in schools are the Dutch De Grote Bosatlas (55th ed, 2016) and the German Diercke Weltatlas (2015), both of which are complimented by online maps and additional digital content. A facsimile of the renowned German Physikalischer Atlas by Heinrich Berghaus (published by Verlag Justus Perthes between 1845 and 1848) has recently (2018) been published and evidences a resurgence of the popularity of paper atlases.

Regional and National Atlases Some atlases concentrate on a specific region, e.g., a specific country, a province or state, or any other geographically or culturally defined region and portray it in amore comprehensive manner. Atlases that portray a region, province, or state, rather than a specific country, are referred to as regional atlases. Other than general-reference atlases, regional atlases are not limited to display the physical environment and topography but document a region more comprehensively. In doing so, topics can vary and cover all subject areas of physical and human geography. A region or area can vary from a relatively small area such as a city to a group of states or even a continent. Most regional atlases are also considered to be thematic atlases as they focus on one main theme or subject area. Examples of regional atlases among many others are the Circumpolar Health Atlas (University of Toronto Press 2012) and the Atlas of Oregon (Oregon State University Press 2001). Special types of regional atlases are national atlases, which are complex regional atlases of a national state that display current thematic information on the physical and human environments, usually in a series of medium- to small-scale maps. At the same time, they depict the status of geographic visualization and geographic information technology employed in their production and can therefore be seen as a country’s official cartographic business card. Typically, government agencies or research institutions edit and publish national atlases, which are predominately geared toward research and are of a problem-oriented nature. National atlases can also be seen as comprehensive collections of current geographic knowledge of the countries they document. Depending on the design and structure, many national atlases also address the general public in order to raise awareness of a country’s specific characteristics. Additionally, national atlases play more than one role: on the one hand, they provide a comprehensive summary of a country’s physical and human geography by displaying current results of geographic and cartographic research and achievements. On the other hand, they are a symbol of a country’s unity and political independence. Hence, national atlases have played an important role in nation building (e.g., National Atlas of Finland, published in 1899 before Finland gained independence in 1917). Due to the complexity and the large number of possible themes and related workload, national atlases are often published in a number of separate volumes, each portraying one single theme (e.g., demography, physical environment, climate, etc.). Other national atlases are published as a series of single map sheets, which are successively assembled in a map case. Current digital technology allows for the development of complex electronic atlases or atlas information systems over an extended period of time with the successive publication of individual maps and cartographic visualizations. These atlases can incorporate current data sets of previously included themes or include newly emerged topics of interest to the intended audience.

Thematic Atlases In contrast to general-reference or topographic atlases, thematic atlases depict one selected geographic theme (or a small number of related topics). The number of themes is almost unlimited. Themes can range from geology, climatology, demography, land use, planning, etc. A special type of thematic atlas is a school atlas. It is based on didactics, following the principle from familiar to unknown, from near to far away, rather than the reverse, more common order of maps and topics found in general-reference atlases. Traditionally, school atlases focused on small-scale physical maps but are increasingly complemented by thematic maps on various topics. School atlases usually are published in accordance with official school curricula.

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Thematic atlases can be produced and distributed in conventional paper or electronic versions. Selected examples of thematic atlases are the Historical Atlas of Canada (three volumes published between 1987 and 1993), the German Welt-Seuchen-Atlas (World Atlas of Epidemic Diseases, 1952), the Statistical Atlas of the United States (1874), the Census Atlas of the United States (2007), the Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States (by Charles O. Paullin, 1932), the Putzger Historischer Weltatlas (104th ed, 2011), and the digital Climate Atlas of Canada (2018).

Dissemination Medium Paper Atlases Traditionally, atlases have been and are still published in book form or as single map sheets assembled in a map case. Such conventional atlases offer the user a clear structure and are therefore still used in educational settings. Although paper atlases allow for browsing through the different chapters, they also guide the user by their sequential set up. Atlas chapters and themes are arranged to facilitate the best possible way of communication of spatial information. Further advantages of paper atlases are the easy access (i.e., independence of computer technology) and the nearly unlimited atlas formats and sizes, which allow for customizing maps to a certain region or area. On the other hand, paper atlases do not support advanced geovisualizations such as animated maps and other multimedia features. Nowadays, some conventional paper atlases are complemented by a digital version that can offer those features.

Electronic Atlases More and more atlases are today produced as electronic or digital atlases. Whether an atlas is produced as a conventional paper volume or as an electronic medium is dependent on a number of limiting factors affecting its production and use. Prominent among those are accessibility of potential atlas users by the presentation and distribution medium selected, production costs, financing, and user access to computers. Nowadays, electronic atlases are predominantly offered online, whereas in the early stages of electronic mapping digital atlases were often disseminated on CD ROM or DVD. All electronic atlases, to a varying extent, allow for combination of various visualization formats such as static and animated maps, videos, photos, 3D-models, etc., and can therefore also be referred to as multimedia atlases. Electronic atlases, unlike paper atlases, are not limited to a predefined order of chapters and maps, but allow for random access of maps based on the user’s needs. They also offer a wide range of digital visualizations of spatial information for on-screen display and use. Depending on the level of interactivity, a distinction between three types of electronic atlases can be made: (1) View-only atlases are the most basic versions of digital atlases, which contain maps that can be randomly displayed but do not allow for any other interactivity than navigating through the atlas; (2) Interactive atlases allow for interactive map use by means of manipulation of the data sets contained. In an interactive atlas, the user can change colors, choose different symbols, adjust classification methods, or change the number of classes, etc. An example of an interactive atlas is the Online Atlas of Switzerland (2016); (3) Analytical atlases allow for the highest level of interactivity facilitating additional object query functions and are not limited to predefined map topics. The user can choose themes depending on individual needs, combine different themes, and conduct computations on areas and themes. Designed to its full potential, an analytical atlas offers major functionalities found in geographic information systems (GIS). Most interactive and analytical atlases offer the advantages of the following interactive features: (a) measurements of geometrical information like distances and areas; (b) changing the map extent by moving it (panning) and scaling it (zooming); (c) searching for places, objects, and locations by means of search engines or hyperlinks; (d) production of customized maps in regard to display and visualization of themes and geographic objects; (e) use of multimedia features such as photos, videos, sounds, and animations; and (f) visualization options that allow the user to aggregate thematic data to different spatial units or to change the type of data (e.g., absolute/raw and relative/standardized values), offering new views and possibly new insight into the topic under investigation. In the age of digital mass consumer information and communication, atlases are increasingly produced as electronic atlases for online use such as the recent “Atlas of Switzerland” or the Dutch “Atlas VZinfo,” which communicates geographic knowledge on the Dutch health system and health care. These atlases can easily be updated and therefore can also function as current information services or geographic data warehouses integrated in official government controlled spatial data infrastructures (SDI). Such socalled web services can facilitate easy access to official geographic data for the public.

Atlas Information Systems Atlases can be considered comprehensive spatial information systems of a particular region irrespective of their production and presentation media. They represent the complex human and physical environment in a narrative-based collection of application-specific, synoptic, and significant maps and other graphics. This may include static data presentations such as static maps, tables, text, and images as well as dynamic presentations such as animated maps, sound, video, etc. Viewed from the perspective of information and communication theories, atlases thus represent highly compressed knowledge bases of all kinds of spatial

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information. The term atlas information system (AIS) stresses the affinity of electronic or digital atlases with GIS. Like their conventional counterparts AIS offers extensive functions for viewing, exploring, and knowledge acquisition, albeit based on-screen maps. AIS combines the powerful potential of nongraphic data management and manipulation like selection, aggregation or spatial join with a flexible and user-driven presentation of spatial information. Similar to other digital atlases, AIS rely on effective design strategies of the graphic user interface (GUI) to allow for easy access and interpretation of its geographic knowledge.

Future Trends and Challenges Spatial data are increasingly available online, often through open data government initiatives or supplied by open, participatory projects such as Open Street Map (OSM), which are centered around crowd-sourced spatial data. The ubiquitous availability and the enormous amount of available spatial data in combination with the current development of the so-called democratization of cartography present new opportunities to researchers and scientists who wish to communicate their results and findings in map form. New software allows for relatively straightforward design of online atlases. Nevertheless, careful planning of the structure and content is still essential for an online atlas to be an effective tool for communication of geographic knowledge. This can usually be achieved through cooperation of experts on the topic or theme presented in the atlas with cartographers who specialize in methods and techniques of geovisualization. An example of such an atlas produced by an interdisciplinary team of researchers is the Climate Atlas of Canada (2018) in which knowledge and information on climate, climate change, and its effects on the physical and human environment in Canada are presented. Atlases, irrespective of their dissemination media, provide excellent tools to communicate geographic knowledge from multiple perspectives, bridging perceived gaps between different disciplines and their unique methods and techniques. Particularly in the field of geohumanities, at the intersection of humanities, data, and geospatial technologies, atlases can function as effective containers of spatial narratives. Digital and in particular online atlases, similar to other World Wide Web content, pose challenges for archivists: Content is constantly updated or added, the user interface is often redesigned, software is updated, etc. Not all these changes happen at the same time and make it therefore difficult to archive each updated version of the atlas. As a result, only certain stages of the atlas are typically archived. Important information on the evolution of a particular atlas project might be lost forever. Additionally, any user-driven analysis and visualization of atlas content is, based on its temporary nature, not archived unless the user has the ability to save (or download) user-generated content. Such content and its visualization as well as crowd-sourced data can also influence the cartographic quality of the atlas. Depending on the level of interactivity in the atlas, the original authors often have only limited control over user-generated visualizations, combinations of different themes, display of analysis results and their interpretation, yet these appear in the digital atlas design and layout and can therefore be mistaken as original content.

Conclusion Over time there have been enormous changes in the technology used in the art and science of cartography as well as in the compilation and production of atlases. Yet the role of atlases has remained the same. All atlases share the goal of communicating current spatial knowledge and facilitate the understanding of geographic phenomena. Depending on the medium of the atlas (paper or electronic) and its topic or regional focus, this can be achieved in different ways, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. All types of atlases utilize uniform structure and formal design to enable the user to compare two or more maps and recognize patterns, differences, or correlations between them, and thereby assist in the comprehension of geographic phenomena.

See Also: Geohumanities; Geovisualization.

Further Reading Buckley, A., 2003. Atlas mapping in the 21st century. Cartogr. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 30, 149–158. Hurni, L., Bär, H.-R., Sieber, R., 2001. The Atlas of Switzerland as an interface multimedia atlas information system. In: Cartwright, W., Peterson, M.P., Gartner, G. (Eds.), Multimedia Cartography. Springer, Heidelberg, Berlin, pp. 99–111. MacEachren, A.M., 1994. Visualization in modern cartography: setting the agenda. In: MacEachren, A.M., Taylor, D.R.F. (Eds.), Visualization in Modern Cartography. Pergamon, Oxford, New York, pp. 1–12. Ormeling, F.J., 1995. New forms, concepts, and structures for European national atlases. Cartogr. Perspect. 20, 12–20. Pucher, A., 2015. Online cartographic atlas products: learning from the past. In: InBruns, J., Vondrakova, A., Vozenilek, V. (Eds.), Modern Trends in Cartography. Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography. Springer International, Cham, pp. 57–66. Rød, J.K., Ormeling, F., van Elzakker, C., 2001. An agenda for democratising cartographic visualisation. Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - Norwegian J. Geogr. 55, 38–41. Schürer, R., Sieber, R., Çöltekin, A., 2015. The next generation of atlas user interfaces: a user study with “Digital Natives”. In: Bruns, J., Vondrakova, A., Vozenilek, V. (Eds.), Modern Trends in Cartography. Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography. Springer International, Cham, pp. 23–36.

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Sieber, R., Serebryakova, M., Schnürer, R., Hurni, L., 2016. Atlas of Switzerland goes online and 3D – concept, architecture and visualization methods. In: Gartner, G., Jobst, M., Huang, H. (Eds.), Progress in Cartography. EuroCarto2015. Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography. Springer International, Cham, pp. 171–184. Slocum, T.A., McMaster, R.B., Kessler, F.C., Howard, H.H., 2008. Thematic Cartography and Geographic Visualization, third ed. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River. Vozenilek, V., 2015. Aspects of the thematic atlas compilation. In: Bruns, J., Vondrakova, A., Vozenilek, V. (Eds.), Modern Trends in Cartography. Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography. Springer International, Cham, pp. 3–12.

Relevant Websites Commission for the Environmental Cooperation. North American Environmental Atlas. http://www.cec.org/tools-and-resources/north-american-environmental-atlas. David Rumsey Map Collection. Stieler Handatlas, Berghaus’ Physikalischer Atlas, and others. https://www.davidrumsey.com/home. Guerilla cartography. Food: an Atlas. Water: An Atlas. https://www.guerrillacartography.org/atlases/. International Cartographic Association – Commission on Atlases. https://atlas.icaci.org. Institute of Cartography and Geoinformation, ETH Zurich. Atlas of Switzerland. https://www.atlasderschweiz.ch. Library of Congress. Statistical Atlas of the United States, 1874 https://www.loc.gov/item/05019329/. Natural Resources Canada. National Atlas of Canada. http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca. Prairie Climate Centre. Climate Atlas of Canada. https://climateatlas.ca. Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu. Atlas VZinfo. https://www.volksgezondheidenzorg.info/onderwerp/atlas-vzinfo/inleiding. United Nations environmental Programme. Atlas of Our Changing Environment. https://na.unep.net/atlas/index.php. University of Richmond. Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States. http://dsl.richmond.edu/paullin.html.

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Atlases, Online Se´bastien Caquard, Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

While the term “cyber atlas” was more widely used at the turn of the 21st Century to characterize atlases available on the Internet, like its synonyms “online atlas” or “web atlas,” its popularity has faded dramatically since then (see Fig. 1). This fading is by no means a sign that atlases are no longer popular in the Web 2.0 era; rather, it is a sign that atlases have changed dramatically in the process of becoming online. Online atlases are now protean and multifunctional. They represent nodes and networks, bodies and stories, satellite and street images, authoritative and less authoritative data; they can be a series of pdf maps, GIS layers, interactive virtual globes, geoportals, and story maps; they are used not only to communicate, share, inform, educate, convince, and control, but also to collect data about their users, to sell ads and services, and to orient their users in the physical world as well as in the digital one. The boundary between maps and atlases has blurred along with the multiplication of options for producing maps via online mapping services, virtual globes, and web mapping tools. The concept of an atlas as a book of [digital] maps, with an authoritative tone, an encyclopedic ambition, a spatial and/or thematic unity, and a narrative structure has been expanded throughout the process of moving atlases to the web. These expansions are assessed and articulated in this article through a review of what can be considered four main families of online atlases: national atlases, world atlases, road atlases, and community atlases.

National Online Atlases Although it is not clear when the first map was published on the web, it is widely recognized that the first major online atlas was the National Atlas of Canada released in 1994. At the dawn of the Internet, publicly funded national atlases were leading the movement toward online atlases. This first generation of cyber atlases often took form as digital copies of their paper counterparts. The idea of a cyber atlas as a book of static, digitized maps was soon expanded with the HTML language and its capacity to improve interactivity and access to multimedia content via hyperlinks. Beyond this formal change, one of the major transformations associated with this first generation of online atlases or cyber atlases was the possibility of delivering not only maps and media, but data as well. The geospatial databases that were used to produce such maps were made available to the atlas users in the form of navigable spreadsheets. In all, cyber atlases were cheaper to produce, easier to update, and more broadly available in comparison to their material counterparts. As a consequence, many atlas projects experienced a renaissance after moving to the web and some of them even discontinued their printed editions. Such was the case for the National Atlas of Canada, whose paper version was discontinued in 1999, 5 years after releasing a web version. This seminal national online atlas could look back to a long legacy of paper atlases published since 1906, while looking forward to the new possibilities offered by the Internet: visions which are still tangible today by how this atlas maintains access to digitized versions of its original paper maps, such as topographic maps, along with access to newer, more interactive maps and geospatial data. With the turn of the 21st Century and its associated technological progress, national online atlases became even more interactive, as illustrated by the Tirol Atlas, which in 2001 was the first to use Scalable Vector Graphics technology (SVG). Atlases such as this one were not only giving access to media and data, but to services as well. For instance, the geoportal developed by the French National Geographic Institute (IGN) and released in 2006 includes a range of geospatial applications such as the application programming interface (API) Carto that enables the automatized integration of maps and geospatial data directly into administrative forms. The Ordnance Survey in the United Kingdom also offers a range of geospatial services to individuals, government agencies, and businesses such as sociodemographic analyses for businesses.

Figure 1 Interest for the terms “online atlas” (orange) and “web atlas” (blue) between 2004 and 2019 (notes: the terms “cyber atlas” and “cyberatlas” have been much less popular, but their usage follows a similar decreasing trend). Source: Google Trends Sept. 8, 2019

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Beyond these services, it is important to mention that national online atlases barely allow users to contribute data to their databases. In other words, they have not fully embraced the crowdsourcing potential offered by the Web 2.0. Instead, they perpetuate the philosophy of their paper predecessors as controlled environments that present authoritative and curated pictures of a national territory. That said, the integration of data generated by citizens through crowdsourcing mechanisms is a question being explored by certain national mapping agencies such as the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) initiative on “Mapping and the citizen sensor” (2012–16), which aimed to evaluate the potential of citizen sensors to improve national mapping projects. In brief, throughout the process of becoming online, national atlases first became interactive and multimedia before giving access to some of their data, then provided geospatial services, and have more recently explored the potential of citizen data contribution through crowdsourcing. Throughout this evolution, national atlases have kept some of their fundamental characteristics: They remain authoritative sources of geospatial data that offer an encyclopedic reference for a national territory and that promote a national, technologically savvy identity. Nevertheless, in becoming online, national atlases have lost aspects of their prestige and influential role to the benefit of new forms of cyber atlases developed by large private corporations such as Google.

Online World Atlases While artists, scientists, and politicians had envisioned for decades some interactive globes that would enable an easy access to a range of real-time information, NASA made this vision come true in 2004 with the release of World Wind. This first virtual globe was followed in 2005 by Google Earth, which popularized this type of application globally using a technology originally developed by a tech company named Keyhole. By 2008, more than 30 virtual globes were available online. Although these virtual globes are sometimes perceived as the opposite of atlases, since atlases tend to filter out as much information as possible to convey a clear message while virtual globes aim to provide a detailed, totalizing representation of the Earth, they can nevertheless be considered a completely renewed version of world atlases. Virtual globes offer a new digital perspective on presenting and accessing geospatial data at any scale and in any part of the world. They enable easy navigation between a range of map layers that can be selected and unselected, added and removed. Users can also use these globes to add and share layers as well as to customize their symbology. Being free of charge for individual users and easy to download and install, virtual globes quickly became very popular: In 2011, 6 years after its release, Google Earth had been downloaded 1 billion times. From these downloads have sprung a diversity of uses such as armchair traveling, locating events in the news, raising awareness about human crises, and developing educational and pedagogical material. For instance, the United Nations Environment Program has used Google Earth to release an early version of its Atlas of our Changing Environment in 2007 (see Fig. 2). This extensive use of virtual globes has contributed to the expansion of our understanding of the world by providing unprecedented access to satellite imagery and geospatial data while at the same time contributing to the uniformization of spatial issues. While paper versions of world atlases such as Goode’s World Atlas have been criticized for conveying an environmentally determinist message about the origins of poverty, new online world atlases, exemplified by Google Earth, have been criticized for broadcasting American technology and spatial representation worldwide, for promoting the commodification of places as well as a fantasy of global mobility. This fantasy has been accompanied by the enhancement of local mobility supported by a new generation of online road atlases.

Figure 2 Time comparison of the level of the Aral Sea in 1973 (left) and 2004 (right) as part of the UNEP Atlas of our Changing Environment originally released using Google Earth. Source: https://www.google.com/earth/outreach/success-stories/unep-atlas-of-changing-environment/ June 11, 2018.

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Online Road Atlases The paper versions of road atlases have accompanied and guided road trips throughout the 20th Century until they were replaced by GPS-enabled devices such as smartphones and online mapping services. The first generation of online mapping services appeared in 1996 with the release of MapQuest in the United States, followed by Multimap in the United Kingdom a few months later. These maps were small, slow and were not interactive, but they opened the path to a new generation of mapping services that can be considered online road atlases. One of the most emblematic examples of this new form of atlases is ViaMichelin. Released in 2001, the French tire company developed this online atlas based on its popular road atlases combined with reviews of restaurants, hotels, and tourist sites pulled from its series of famous tourist guides such as the Michelin Guide (see Fig. 3). While this type of application has the same goal as the paper version of road atlases, which is to facilitate road navigation while promoting automotive traveling and consumption, they have expanded the use of maps for navigational purposes to new horizons by combining up-to-date road networks and routing algorithms (i.e., detailed driving directions to reach a destination point from a starting point), backed by large databases of potential destinations. The driving force behind these applications is indeed the unprecedented volume of geospatial data that can be accessed and mapped. These data are organized in gazetteers, which can be described as a list of place names associated with geographic coordinates and a few attributes such as the type of place (e.g., a city, a river, a business). These gazetteers, which appeared traditionally at the end of paper atlases, were central to quickly locating a place on a map in an atlas. With online road atlases, such navigational capacity has been taken to another level. Huge online gazetteers that are now accessible include Geonames or OSM names that claim, respectively, to offer more than 10 and 21 million place names around the world along with their geographic coordinates. All these data can be easily and quickly searched to locate stores and services both in the physical and digital world as well as to identify the “best” routes to access them. This capacity makes these applications extremely attractive for both consumers and businesses; so attractive that only a couple of years after the release of Google mapping applications, John Hanke, Director of Google

Figure 3 Screenshot of the early version of the online road atlas Via Michelin released in 2001 presenting the current traffic situation and giving access to other traveling information pulled from the different guides published by Michelin. Source: https://www.michelin.com/en/newsroom/events/ michelin-at-the-paris-motor-show/ Sept. 18, 2019.

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Earth and Maps at the time, correctly envisioned “location-targeted ads as being a very, very large business opportunity.” This financial opportunity has attracted giant technology and telecommunications companies around the world that have developed their own online mapping applications or cyber road atlases: Yandex in Russia with Yandex Maps, Baidu in China with Baidu Maps, Nokia in Finland with Here WeGo Maps, and Google, Windows, and Apple in the United States with Google Maps, Bing Maps, and Apple Maps. The lucrative aspect of these applications was strengthened by the possibility offered by Web 2.0 to transform users of these data into data producers or “produsers,” whether actively or passively. While some can contribute actively, through the willingness of users to give some of their time and knowledge to modify existing data or add new data (e.g., a new road, a new business), passive contribution is the process of enabling service providers to collect geospatial data when using their applications. These data are then used by these companies to improve the quality of their maps and services provided, such as real-time traffic information, while at the same time increasing revenue generated by developing more efficient advertisement strategies. In Western countries, Waze has become the archetypical example of this new type of cyber road atlas. Waze started as a community project dedicated to create a free digital map of Israel based on crowdsourced contributions. The first version named FreeMap Israel was released in 2006. In a few years, the application became popular due to its capacity to bring together digital road maps, official traffic data, data passively transmitted by cell phones of Waze users, as well as data actively added by these users to improve the database and to share information with other travelers such accidents and police traps in real time (Fig. 4). Waze was so successful that Google bought it in 2013. Waze exemplifies the power of new forms of cyber road atlases that expand on the utility of paper road atlases by providing realtime reliable directions to get to a destination through mobile apps, not only by car, but also by different modes of transportation such as public transit in cities where these data have been made available online. These applications rely on a mix of private and public data complemented by users’ contributions to provide up-to-date information. Yet they are also characterized by their lucrative aspects, based on the collection of personal information that serve to inform more efficient ad campaign strategies in exchange for a free reliable near-real-time online road atlas. This extensive collection of geospatial information by large private corporations has raised many concerns about privacy and the monetization of personal data, contributing to growing support for open-source community atlas projects.

Online Community Atlases While community-built atlases existed prior to the Internet, they took on a new dimension with Web 2.0 and its capacity for usercontributed content. As discussed previously, this crowdsourcing capacity has been explored by national mapping agencies and mobilized to build cyber road atlases. It also frequently plays a key role in the development of online community atlases. Online community atlases vary significantly by scale. Some are organized around communities of interest at global and regional scales such as the Environment Justice Atlas, dedicated to make environmental justice issues more visible around the world based on contributions by citizens and NGOs, or the WatchTheMed project that monitors and maps the deaths and violations of migrants’ rights in the Mediterranean Sea (see Fig. 5). Others operate at more local scales such as the anti-eviction mapping project in San

Figure 4 Screen capture of directions and driving information provided by Waze based on road maps and routing services supplemented by data provided by Waze users either actively (e.g., police trap) or passively (e.g., traveling speed of their mobile phones). Source: https://www.waze.com/ livemap Sept. 19, 2019.

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Figure 5 Screen capture of the WatchTheMed project that monitors and maps migrant deaths from crossing the Mediterranean Sea toward Europe. Source: http://www.watchthemed.net/index.php/page/index/3 Sept. 19, 2019.

Francisco, which aims to document “the dispossession of San Francisco Bay Area residents upon gentrifying landscapes” through “data visualization, data analysis, and storytelling.” These atlases also vary in terms of the technology they use. While some of them have been built using open-source cartographic tools such as Nunaliit (see the following paragraphs), others rely on proprietary tools for development. For instance, such is the case of the atlas of “Indigenous Lands in Brazil” that uses Google Earth and Google Tour Builder to take the readers from one Indigenous land to another throughout the Amazon, telling the many shared stories of Indigenous land dispossession and of degradation. Beyond these differences, most of these projects share a clear political agenda: a collaborative process and the use of storytelling techniques to collect and share their content. Storytelling has always been part of atlases, but here, again, this dimension has been expanded with the Internet. Indeed, online atlases can be compared to novels that lead you through the story from beginning to end. Not only can online atlases be considered narratives as a whole, they also frequently include written and audiovisual stories associated with certain locations. In the context of community atlases, audiovisual material is used as a form of expression and testimony that enables atlas contributors to share their knowledge with their own voice. The atlas then becomes a place to aggregate these voices spatially and to make them accessible and listenable. One of the first online community atlas infrastructures openly designed to support storytelling with maps is Nunaliit, an opensource software developed at Carleton University in Canada to produce innovative forms of atlases known as “cybercartographic atlases.” Nunaliit has been used since then for producing a series of online community atlases, including several atlases designed in close collaboration with Indigenous communities (see Fig. 6). This interest that Indigenous communities have for spatial forms of expression involving storytelling is not surprising, since stories and orality are often employed to represent important aspects of their cultures. The storytelling capacity of online atlases has also stimulated interest beyond Indigenous communities and activist groups and inspired the development of a range of online mapping applications dedicated to telling stories with maps. Open-source platforms such as Neatline, Mapstory, or Nunaliit and proprietary ones such as Esri Story Maps and Google Tour Builder have emerged since the early 2010s to enable the mixing of maps with stories. These applications have been extremely popular, as illustrated by how, 6 years after its release in 2012, ESRI claims to have published more than 150,000 public story maps. Although the storytelling dimension of online atlases stands out in many community projects, it actually transcends all the categories of Internet atlases presented in this article. For instance, the next version of the national atlas of Switzerland will integrate more storytelling aspects to deliver the atlas’ content to its users, while the Climate Atlas of Canada is described as combining “climate science, mapping and storytelling to bring the global issue of climate change closer to home.” Indeed, just like their paper counterparts, online atlases are not a simple accumulation of maps: They can be characterized as a careful arrangement of maps, media, data, services, and narratives in a way that tells a story that is much more meaningful and powerful than that which any individual map could have done on its own.

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Figure 6 Screen capture of the “Gwich’in Place Name Atlas” that “features about 900 Gwich’in named places, plus their pronunciation, translation, extents (boundaries), and associated oral history. [.] It should be considered a “living atlas” as further information plus photos, videos and documents will be added when available.” Source: http://atlas.gwichin.ca/index.html Sept. 19, 2019.

Next Generation of Online Atlases Atlas production has been deeply modified by the Internet. National atlases have expanded their original philosophy of providing an authoritative perspective on national territories to the partial opening of their geospatial databases and the development of geospatial services. Large private sector companies have fully embraced the lucrative and strategic domain of virtual globes and online mapping services to produce a completely new generation of cyber world atlases and road atlases that rely on a range of public data such as sociodemographic data, data produced by private companies such as “street views” generated by Google, and data generated actively and passively by users. Although these online mapping services are often not considered as atlases per se, the metanarrative of mobility and consumption they convey through the organization of maps, services, and media make these useful to be considered as such. Finally, communities and groups of activists have both embraced and resisted these new corporate mapping applications to collaboratively design their own atlases and to instrumentalize them for pushing their political agendas. New forms of alternative cyber community atlases have emerged to give voice to marginalized and oppressed groups with the hope of amplifying these voices and making them resonate within and beyond cyberspace. It seems very likely that National Mapping Agencies will continue to develop geospatial services, probably with the growing involvement of large private sector companies which now have a unique expertise in many aspects of this domain, including a mastery in user-generated content. Virtual globes are also increasingly used on mobile devices, which are likely to become the next major platform for accessing these online world atlases. Combined with augmented reality applications, these globes will better communicate the connection between world issues and their local impacts. Online road atlases will soon be an integral part of self-driving cars and will continue to play a central role in car navigation by making driving safer and more relaxing, while at the same time encouraging the consumption of products by targeted ads based on unprecedented volumes of data collected by embedded sensors. These new forms of mobility and consumerism contrast dramatically with the highly restricted mobility of millions of people around the world who are trying to leave their homes to find a safer and better place to live. The understanding of the multiple political, environmental, social, and economic forces that generate these restricted displacements and the denunciation of their high human consequences might be supported by activist online community atlases that will likely combine factual data with narratives and stories from those impacted. Indeed, while the terms “cyber atlas,” “online atlas,” and “web atlas” are fast disappearing, it is clear that technological progress combined with political goals, business strategies, and activist movements are contributing to a continued reshaping of spatial representations whose outcomes can still be usefully defined as (online) atlases.

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See Also: Affective Mapping; Algorithmic Governance; Atlases; Cartographic Anxiety; Citizen Science; Countermapping; Critical Cartography; Cyberspace and Cyberculture; Digital Geographies; Geolocation; Geospatial Web, Participatory; Geotag; Geovisualization; Humanitarian Mapping; Indigenous Mapping; Innovative Pedagogies; Internet Geographies; Maps and Mapping, History of; Mobile Mapping; Volunteered Geographic Information.

Further Readings Allen, D.Y., 2009. A mirror of our world: Google Earth and the history of cartography. Coordinat. Ser. B. 12. Available at: http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/handle/1969.1/129202. Buckley, A., 2003. Atlas mapping in the 21st Century. Cartogr. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 30 (2), 149–158. https://doi.org/10.1559/152304003100011117. Caquard, S., Dimitrovas, S., 2017. StoryMaps & Co. The state of the art of online narrative cartography. M@ppemonde 121, 1–31. Crampton, J.W., 2009. Cartography: maps 2.0. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 33 (1), 91–100. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132508094074. da Silva Ramos, C., Cartwright, W., 2006. Atlases from paper to digital medium. In: Geographic Hypermedia. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 97–119. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-540-34238-0_6 (Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography). Haklay, M., Singleton, A., Parker, C., 2008. Web mapping 2.0: the neogeography of the geoweb. Geogr. Compass 3, 2011–2039. Kraak, M.J., Brown, A., 2001. Web Cartography: Developments and Prospects. Taylor & Francis Group. Neumann, A., 2008. Web mapping and web cartography. In: Encyclopedia of GIS. Springer, Boston, MA, pp. 1261–1269. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-35973-1_1485. Rakshit, R., Ogneva-Himmelberger, Y., 2008. Application of virtual globes in education. Geogr. Compass 2 (6), 1995–2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00165.x. Sieber, R., Serebryakova, M., Schnürer, R., Hurni, L., 2016. Atlas of Switzerland goes online and 3Ddconcept, architecture and visualization methods. In: Progress in Cartography. Springer, Cham, pp. 171–184. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19602-2_11 (Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography). Taylor, D.R.F., Pyne, S., 2010. The history and development of the theory and practice of cybercartography. Int. J. Digital Earth 3 (1), 2–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 17538940903155119. Vardhan, H., 2017. HD Maps: new age maps powering autonomous vehicles. Geospatial World. https://www.geospatialworld.net/article/hd-maps-autonomous-vehicles/. Wood, D., 1987. Pleasure in the idea/the atlas as narrative form. Cartographica 24 (1), 24–46.

Relevant websites The Atlas of Canada: https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/earth-sciences/geography/atlas-canada. British Ordnance Survey: https://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk. UNEP Atlas of our Changing Environment: https://www.google.com/earth/outreach/success-stories/unep-atlas-of-changing-environment/. French National Geographic Institute (IGN) Géoportail: https://www.geoportail.gouv.fr/. Viamichelin: https://www.viamichelin.com/. Waze: https://www.waze.com/. WatchTheMed project: http://www.watchthemed.net/index.php/page/index/3. Gwich’in Place Name Atlas: http://atlas.gwichin.ca/index.html. Environmental justice Atlas: https://ejatlas.org/. Anti-Eviction Mapping Project: https://www.antievictionmap.com/about/. Indigenous Lands in Brazil: http://tinyurl.com/y9n95fbr. Climate Atlas of Canada: https://climateatlas.ca/about-atlas. MIGREUROP “Atlas of Migration in Europe”: http://www.migreurop.org/.

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Autoethnography Kathryn Besio, Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo, Hilo, HI, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Transculturation The ways that subjugated groups may creatively adopt and transform cultural forms from dominant groups. The term is distinguishable from acculturation, deculturation, and cross-culturation.

As a form of life-writing and analytical method, autoethnography draws upon personal experience as a frame to interpret social life. Life writing takes many forms, and other examples of it include biography, autobiography, collective biography, and storytelling. Life writing disrupts the boundaries between fiction–non-fiction, researcher–researched, subject–object, home–field, and practice– text, highlighting researchers’ insistence for situated, relational analyses in representations of their own and research subjects’ lives. Autoethnography has been used in anthropology and sociology for decades, and these disciplines are most closely associated with this approach. Researchers in nursing, communication, and education have turned to autoethnography for the nuance it lends to theorizing about diverse populations and their needs, valuing the first-person voice that enlivens research emotionally. Human geographers across its subdisciplines use autoethnography, but it is used most prominently in theoretically informed postcolonial, indigenous, and feminist research. Across the social sciences, autoethnographers emphasize the method’s ability to elicit intimate, deeply felt, and personal stories that evoke places, situations, and emotions that readers may find recognizable and applicable to their own experiences, and from which they may frame recursively other people and places. It is perhaps because of autoethnography’s insistent use of personal voice that the method has come under critique. The now wider use of autoethnography has led to pluralistic applications and a range of definitions. Although a precise definition of autoethnography is lacking, there is agreement that autoethnography challenges epistemological assumptions, highlights the slipperiness of authority, and admits a wide range of voices into academic writing. This article clarifies the distinction between autoethnography and its narrative kin in order to capture the former’s potential as a method and its richness as a text, while not being overly restrictive or definitive about what is or is not autoethnography. In the spirit of autoethnography, both methodological and representational boundaries in this article are allowed and encouraged to shift.

Overview This entry focuses upon three different forms of autoethnography, noting that these are the broadest cuts to establish it as a concept and method, and additional variations may be found. The first form that I consider is a style of autobiographical writing or what I refer to as biographical autoethnography; the second is an anthropological form of autoethnography that includes autobiographical ethnography and ethnographic autobiography; and third, an autoethnographic sensibility, which draws from literary theory. The first, and most widely used, form of autoethnography is as a style of academically informed autobiographical writing that analyzes the researcher’s personal experience as an exemplar of social life, doing so in a way that is simultaneously evocative and analytical. Biographical autoethnography straddles the other forms described below, in that the autoethnographer may be studying his/her own or another culture, or the ethnographer may be an indigenous or native scholar writing about his/her own social groups. Biographical autoethnography might be thought of in John Van Maanen’s typology as a confessional tale, beginning from the life stories of researchers rather than his/her/their stories about others as a point of entry into analyzing social relations. It is oftentimes very personal, appearing more as autobiography than ethnography. For such autoethnographers, life stories are a powerful means of connecting personal experience to systemic social interactions, particularly those situated in lived, systemic oppression. This form of autoethnography has found fertile ground in the underrepresented voices of queer, postcolonial, and indigenous scholars who have brought forth stories and analyses of lives previously ignored, and whose own stories were or are suppressed. In the second use, the ethnographer/researcher writes autobiographically about her/his/their life, or uses the first-person narrative to write about an ethnographic project, where she/he/they write self-consciously about others but from a situated, reflexive authorial position. Deborah Reed-Danahay suggests that there are multiple types in this conceptualization. In this autoethnographic form, the researcher analyzes her/his/their own embedded research experience with an ethnographer’s eye, while drawing from her/his/their autobiography. This type of autoethnographic writing can have the feel of a well-written novel, sharing an interest in evocative writing with the previous form of autoethnography. In this conceptualization, autoethnography is a variant of ethnographic representation that blends autobiographical and ethnographical data, blurring the authorial distance of the ethnographer. As Ruth Behar’s work demonstrates, autobiographic ethnography can create a deeply human and particularized account of social life.

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The last conceptualization of autoethnography shares with the two previous forms the use of a first-person account, but the autoethnographer is a non-Western other who writes ethnographically about his/her/their own culture. Literary theorist, Mary Louise Pratt suggests that this form of autoethnography is produced in an idiom different from one’s own, that is, the native author uses an ethnographic rather than vernacular form in order to communicate with others. For Western-located and Western-trained ethnographers, this form of autoethnographic text is one that they want to study but not one that they would write. Nonindigenous ethnographers may engage in the autoethnographic moment by cultivating an “autoethnographic sensibility.” An autoethnographic sensibility relies upon the recognition by the ethnographer that a subject is representing her/him/themselves using the idiom of ethnography, whether textual or performative, to engage dialogically with those who would represent them. While it is helpful to consider these forms of autoethnography as discrete, they unite in their insistence upon relational ontologies and the importance of shifting perspectives in order to communicate. In the following sections, I examine these three uses of autoethnography more closely.

Biographical Autoethnography Pamela Moss’ edited volume, Autobiography and Geography, and David Butz’s article on “Autobiography” in another encyclopedia are two excellent starting points for those interested in the links between autobiography, biography, and geography. One thing is relatively clear: autobiographical writing in the social sciences is intended to disrupt authority rather than to stabilize it, and the flourishing literature in autobiography and geography encourages geographers to consider authorial positioning carefully. Geographers are taking risks that begin with personalized writing, and the recently published edited volume, Writing Intimacy into Feminist Geography, displays a range of work that is autobiographically informed and analytically robust. In their introduction to a special issue on decolonizing autoethnography, Devika Chawla and Ahmet Atay (following Archana Pathak) state that autobiographers tell their own story whereas autoethnographers tell their story’s story. This is an elegantly simple way of distinguishing between autobiography and autoethnography, suggesting that social context frames the personal story, and that the personal story frames and is framed by a particular social context. Yet the story is not just a story when it becomes a way to analyze relations of power. In a sense, the story’s purposeful explication of context differentiates autoethnography from autobiography. The “story’s story” as a defining characteristic of biographical autoethnography points to assumptions surrounding first-person narratives and their apparent factualness. David Butz states that autobiography and autoethnography privilege the first-person narrative authority, and both rely upon that authoritative framing. Who better to talk about one’s own experience than the person who was certainly there? Yet as the adage goes, autobiography and autoethnography rely upon the unreliable, the self, whose memory and perspective reflect a kaleidoscopic and shifting view on the nature of facts in social existence. Thus, although autobiography and autoethnography are told in the first person, the narrators are necessarily subjectively located. In separate articles, David Butz and Lisa Mazzei and Alecia Jackson suggest that researchers may romanticize the first-person narrative’s authenticity, ascribing to first-person narratives an epistemological certainty. There are alternative and truthful representations to these firstperson narratives. The alternative versions of social life that autoethnographers provide, and the first-person narratives by those whose facts have seldom been told, and/or purposefully suppressed, ignored, protected, or hidden, bring new voices to the foreground to reframe our understanding of contemporary life. Deborah Reed-Danahay notes that the question of who speaks for and upon whose behalf is at the heart of autoethnography. Sociologist Carolyn Ellis describes autoethnography as a reflective and multilayered first-person narrative, which connects the self and the social. The multiple layers within the narrative destabilize as much as they reveal and positions theory and method in tension, allowing autoethnographers to highlight the narrative’s instability. Carolyn Ellis, Tony Adams, and Arthur Bochner stress that autoethnographers use their stories to analyze rather than retell, and in this way differentiate autoethnography from autobiography. Ellis uses personal narratives effectively to demonstrate how to do autoethnography by drawing upon conversations and dialogue, and showing how researchers analyze the self and social through these communicative acts. Ellis’ influence on autoethnographic method and writing is far-reaching. With her coauthors, Arthur Bochner, Stacy Jones Holman, and Tony Adams, they have had significant impact on how autoethnography is used in research and writing, and readers will want to consult their many contributions to the field. Autoethnographers may draw from life experiences that were previously excluded from academic scrutiny, reflecting a more diverse range of stories than heretofore had been written about by researchers. The special issue edited by Chawla and Atay offers examples of anticolonial autoethnography, and Stacy Holman Jones and Tony Adams’ use of autoethnography as queer method focuses upon its theoretical affinity to queer theory. While an author-centric biographical autoethnography makes more transparent the researcher’s positioning, it nevertheless draws suspicion and an oft-cited criticism that this approach is too indulgently self-centered. That is, to some critics, autoethnography overstates the researcher’s positioning at the expense of illuminating broader social interactions and the flows and machinations of power. The critique of self-indulgence remains a concern for autoethnographers for a number of reasons, but two important points bear further consideration. First, work that illuminates the researcher’s position at the expense of cultural structures may falter in its attempts to foster understanding of wider cultural relations, what Ellis calls the movement in and out of the telephoto lens, between the researcher’s life as she/he/they move the analysis from self to other. Second, work that does not move beyond the

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individual researcher’s life may marginalize experimental writing strategies, leaving readers increasingly wary of reflexive research, casting autoethnographic work as yet one more way that researchers resituate the authorial gaze toward themselves. Nonetheless, the promotion of reflective and emplaced observation by indigenous and anticolonial researchers such as Margaret Kovach and Linda Tuhiwai Smith suggests that autoethnography goes far beyond mere reflection and is political praxis. In addition to a special issue in Cultural StudiesdCritical Methodologies by Chawla and Atay, publications by Maori, Hawaiian, and Native American scholars show a shared purpose as autoethnographers revisit and reanalyze histories and ethnographies. I return to the contributions of indigenous scholars later in the section on autoethnographic sensibility.

Ethnography and Autoethnography A definition closer to Ellis’ application of autoethnography comes from David Hayano in 1979, referring to “insider” anthropology, or work done by an anthropologist about her/his/their own culture. Deborah Reed-Danahay notes that anthropology’s first use of the term autoethnography was in 1975, and it was used by Karl Heider to describe his work with Dani school children’s selfrepresentations. Autobiographical anthropology are texts that written by anthropologists to examine their lives within and outside their scholarly work. Anthropologists tend to publish autobiographical anthropology separately from the ethnographic monograph, clearly demarcating the boundary between self and other. This approach differs from the ethnographic autobiography, which refers to a first-person narrative told by a non-Western other, aligning with Heider’s and Hayano’s anthropological method in eliciting autoethnographic self-representations. Reed-Danahay states that all of these approaches are considered autoethnography today. In the 1980s, anthropology led the way to reflexive and experimental writing, of which autoethnography was a part. James Clifford’s and George Marcus’ Writing Culture demonstrated that anthropological first-person narratives were at one time a radical departure from the norm. Ethnography still resides more prominently in the purview of anthropology and sociology than it does in geography, although social and cultural geographers rely upon ethnographic research much more today than they did 30 years ago. It is perhaps in anthropology that the critique of experimental personalized writing has received the most criticism. Clifford Geertz called first-person narratives victims of “the diary disease” because autoethnographers may privilege the author over the ethnographic context. Ethnography, as the hallmark method within social and cultural anthropology, occupies a central position within these subdisciplines and more attention has been paid to the “writing of culture” in these fields than geographers have done. Although geographers use autobiographical writing strategies, they do not seem to do so as extensively as anthropologists. With that said, researcher-centered writing is experiencing a resurgence in Geography, not only in response to the “cultural turn” within the social sciences that has influenced anthropological writing and authorial conventions, but also in response to feminist scholars’ insistence upon situated research, and the almost mandatory recognition of reflexive and reflective authorship. Writing about one’s positionality vis-à-vis research differs from autoethnography because autoethnography weaves the author’s context into the story more directly, using it as an analytical frame to understand another’s life world. Reflective writing shares autoethnography’s epistemological concerns that are central to an autoethnographic sensibility: How do researchers conceptualize Others’ lives, while conveying their own partial and situated understandings?

An Autoethnographic Sensibility David Butz and I have outlined what we call an “autoethnographic sensibility” in which autoethnography is something that research subjects do and which ethnographers/researchers want to understand. This use of autoethnography is more like the ethnographic autobiography. Certainly, one of the goals of ethnography is to understand the diversity and richness of life worlds, and often those dissimilar to the researchers’ own, by immersing researchers in the activities of others, and participating in and observing their lives. Oftentimes in this view of ethnography, the ethnographer is a kind of scribe who merely writes down what he or she sees. In contrast, an autoethnographic sensibility would attend to ethnographic interactions as strategic, intentional, and possibly interventionist moments, in which non-Western/ethnographic selves represent themselves as selves to their Western others. Researchers working with an autoethnographic sensibility must cultivate ways to understand when their ethnographic others engage them in producing their autoethnographic texts through the ethnographers’ text. As researchers, we attune our research to texts, performances, and moments where research subjects use the language of the researcher to make a point that is more theirs than ours. Autoethnographic texts are produced by indigenous selves in order to represent themselves to their othersdin Mary Louise Pratt’s conceptual dyad, their colonial othersdin an idiom that is not their own. Pratt’s mode of autoethnography is one that understands the “auto,” the author, in autoethnography as the colonized or formerly colonized subject, who seeks to position her/him/ their self in metropolitan-directed texts. Pratt’s conceptualization shares common ground with Hayano and Heider. The purpose of these autoethnographic representations is to intervene dialogically in representations that would otherwise write them out. Pratt suggests that historically ethnographic texts were a means by which Europeans represented themselves to their colonial subjects, and autoethnographic texts were constructed as a response and resistance to colonial subjugation. Pratt’s conceptualization of autoethnography captures something of the dialectic between accommodation and resistance: accommodation in terms of idiom or writing ethnographically, and resistance in terms of intent or writing to make one’s voice heard.

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What Pratt outlines as autoethnography does not include the work of Western-trained ethnographers who write as “autoethnographers.” The autoethnographer is an indigenous author whose ethnographic representation highlights the transcultural nature of knowledge, that is, a product of unequal cultural exchange in a contact zone. Pratt provides numerous examples in her work, listed below. One contemporary example of Pratt’s dialogic and transcultural autoethnography comes from Native Hawaiian geographer Kamanamaikalani Beamer’s research on the Hawaiian monarchy. He examines the ways that Hawaiian aliʻi (chiefs) strategically used Western notions of statehood to construct and protect Native Hawaiian political power. Although ultimately the monarchy was unsuccessful in maintaining political sovereignty, Beamer’s analysis foregrounds the agency of Native Hawaiians in their struggle for self-governance and their strategic use of European political idioms. Beamer autoethnographically critiques representations that focus upon Hawaiian abdication of power, instead focusing upon Native Hawaiian’s strategic use of a Western style monarchy to assert sovereignty. There are critiques of an autoethnographic sensibility that must be heeded. First, ethnographers can rarely represent the interests of everyone in a group or community, and their work is often a representation of key participants’ views, whose views stand in for the whole. What we take to be an autoethnographic moment must be contextualized within these wider social relations, of which researchers may have limited understanding due to proprietary knowledge. Recognizing the agency and intentionality of information “given” to the researcher as strategic has the potential to rescript researchers’ perceptions of the researcher–researched dynamic. My own work combines multiple forms of autoethnography to make more transparent complex dialogical moments that I attempt to understand. Second, given different spaces and places of research, some subjects have more representational tools at their disposal to produce textual autoethnographies. One of the problems of confining autoethnography to written texts, maps, and other forms of printed representations is the diverse range of representational tools available to those who have access to making these sorts of representations. Certainly not all autoethnographers produce texts in the strict sense; nevertheless they represent their interests in ways that engage with ethnographic representation. There is room within an autoethnographic sensibility to consider the ways that research subjects may perform their ethnographic understandings in spaces outside of texts, and that they do so in interviews, life stories, and daily life. In understanding autoethnography as performative, ethnographers with an autoethnographic sensibility might acknowledge directly those moments in which those who are usually represented assert and represent themselves as selves to the ethnographer, strategically inserting themselves into their Other’s ethnographic texts. A strategy of combining autoethnography that is committed to self-reflexivity with an autoethnographic sensibility allows for a complex representation and analysis of the research setting.

Conclusion Since its early uses in anthropology and sociology, autoethnography’s horizons have expanded, and will continue to grow as researchers look for new ways to tell the story’s story. This article focuses upon three main distinctions of autoethnography to explore its various applications and definitions. Authoethnographers focus upon the research setting as one in which knowledge is coproduced, and where there is to and fro between what constitutes the self and other. Autoethnography’s eclectic and shifting use of authorial positioning is one of its strengths, and there is a range of conceptualizations about the auto and ethnographic that comprises the term. As more researchers turn to life-writing methods such as autoethnography, creative potential abounds, but there should also be respect for whose story is being told about whom, and how researchers continue to explore notions of authenticity and authority.

See Also: Ethnography; Indigeneity; Participant Observation; Postcolonial Geographies; Situated Knowledge, Reflexivity.

Further Reading Beamer, K., 2009. Aliʻi selective appropriation of modernity: examining colonial assumptions in Hawaiʻi. Alternative 5, 138–155. Behar, R., 1996. The Vulnerable Observer. Beacon Press, MA. Besio, K., 2005. Telling stories to hear autoethnography: researching women’s lives in northern Pakistan. Gend. Place Cult. 12, 317–332. Butz, D., 2017. Autobiography. In: Richardson, M., Castree, N., Goodchild, M., Kobayashi, A., Liu, W., Marston, R. (Eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Geography. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118786352.wbieg0378. Butz, D., Besio, K., 2009. Autoethnography. Geogr. Compass 3 (5), 1660–1674. Chawla, D., Atay, A., 2018. Introduction: decolonizing autoethnography. Cult. Stud. Crit. Methodol. 18 (1), 3–8. Clifford, J., Marcus, G., 1986. Writing Culture. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Ellis, C., Adams, T., Bochner, A., 2011. Autoethnography: an overview. FQS Forum: Qualitat. Soc. Res. 12 (1). Art. 10. Holman Jones, S., Adams, T., 2016. Autoethnography as queer method. In: Browne, K., Nash, C. (Eds.), Queer Methods and Methodologies: Intersecting Queer Theories and Social Science Research. Routledge, London, pp. 195–214. Mazzei, L., Jackson, A., 2012. Complicating voice in a refusal to “let participants speak for themselves”. Qual. Inq. 18 (9), 745–751. Moss, P. (Ed.), 2001. Placing Autography in Geography. Syracuse University Press, NY.

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Moss, P. and K. Besio, 2018, Geographic Methods: Life Writing Analysis. In Oxford Bibliographies: Retrieved from: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199874002/obo-9780199874002-0180.xml. Moss, P., Donovan, C. (Eds.), 2017. Writing Intimacy into Feminist Geography. Routledge, NY. Pratt, M.L., 1992. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. Routledge, London. Reed-Danahay, D., 2017. Autoethnography. In: Oxford Bibliographies. Retrieved from: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo9780199766567-0162.xml. VanMaanen, J., 1988. Tales of the Field. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

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Automation Luis F Alvarez Leon, Department of Geography, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Algorithm A series of instructions for solving a problem through a specific calculation. These instructions can be (and increasingly are) programmed in languages that are executable by computers. Assembly Line A method of production whereby the components of a product are sequentially added, affixed, or adjusted in steps along a series of physically contiguous stations located along a causeway or moving band. Automata Plural of automaton; a device designed and/or constructed with the objective of achieving autonomous movement –often in imitation of humans or other living beings. Automation The capability of machines to carry out tasks with minimal (or even null) intervention from humans in the process. Industrialization A technological and socio-economic process, which began in Great Britain in the 18th Century and entailed the transformation of a predominantly agrarian economy and society by the transition toward increasingly automated production aided by machinery, the emergence of factories, and the acceleration of the capitalist economic system.  Robot A term related to the Slavic word meaning “serf,” and which was first used by Czcech playwright Karel Capek in his 1920 play R.U.R. Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti (Rossum’s Universal Robots) to refer to human-like artificial creatures produced specifically for manufacturing purposes. Throughout the 20th Century, the term came to be widely used in many languages to refer to (increasingly complex) machines of all kinds programmed to execute tasks automatically.

Automation is the capability of machines to conduct tasks (such as milling, cutting, transporting, assembling, navigating, or even "reasoning") unaided by human intervention. Given that current technology continues to require humans to intervene at some point(s) along the chain of designing, programming, manufacturing, or operation of said machines, total automation is still only a future (though increasingly tangible) possibility. In its many forms, however, automation has come to play a transformational role throughout history in shaping the configuration of societies and the spatial constitution of the economic landscape. The human desire to alleviate, or potentiate, work and outsource all types of tasks (from mechanical to affective) to machines is a long-standing force that has found different expressions across time and space, the most significant of which is perhaps its crucial role in the development and expansion of capitalism. For centuries, the pursuit of automation propelled scientific and technical experimentation, and influenced the collective imagination across many culturesdfrom folk characters like the Golem in Judaism and literary archetypes like Pinocchio to mechanical innovations, such as Leonardo Da Vinci’s machines. Yet it was not until the Industrial Revolution in the 18th Century that, building on the technological breakthrough of the steam engine, automation began to take a central role in human history. It is particularly due to the imperatives of production, accumulation, and expansion at the core of capitalism, that automation became paramount for the development of this economic system. Thus, capitalism can be understood dparticularly in the Westd as both the evolving product of automation, and as a driving force that continually creates conditions for further advancements in automation. Consequently, as automation and capitalism have grown apace, the former has become sine qua non of the latter. And, since innovations in automation can often be traced to specific locations, their incorporation into capitalist dynamics can serve to entrench both competition and spatial inequality by endowing some actors (firms, social groups, countries, etc.) with competitive advantages, while putting others at a disadvantage. Thus, the relationship between automation and capitalism can be understood through its geographical sources, dimensions, and impacts, all differentiated by contextual variations of concrete moments in time and locations in space. In this mutually constitutive development of automation and capitalism, social and spatial relationships are periodically reconfigured to produce new geographies. The paragraphs below outline a series of key moments in the development of automation, with an eye toward the ensuing transformations of social and spatial relations, and the resulting geographical configurations.

Ancient Automata, Medieval Robots, and the Mechanical Turk (See entry on Cyborg and Hybridity) Automatadthat is, machines made to simulate living beings dhave been intermittently present in the historical record of cultures throughout the world at least since classical antiquity. While Ancient Greece represented a zenith in the development of the mechanical knowledge about automata, evidence of their existence is limited to manuals for their construction from the Alexandrian School, mentions by the likes of Homer, and a lone surviving artifact: the Antikythera mechanism, an analog computer built in the 1st or 2nd Century BCE, probably to calculate celestial movements. Centuries later, the fall of Rome caused most of this

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knowledge to be lost in Christian Europe. Yet, during the Middle Ages, automata thrived beyond the boundaries of Europe, in centers like Constantinople, Baghdad, and Damascus. Lacking the understanding of mechanics required to produce them, European audiences were astounded by the automata that found their way to the continentdmostly through gift exchanges between courts. This surprise in turn led to the desire to investigate the ultimate causes that allowed automata to operate unaided by human action. For a long time, this was attributed to magic or some other preternatural phenomena. Eventually, toward the end of the Middle Ages, Europe began to catch up in the technology to build automata, something that was patent by the wave of mechanical clocks that swept the continent. Yet, as historian E.R. Truitt argues, knowledge of these machines did not necessarily eliminate a belief that other preternatural causes might be simultaneously at work. For centuries, automata performed the role of curiosities that exalted the imagination by combining both the technical fascination with machinery and the allure of the preternatural. Yet, from our historical vantage point, these artifacts can be seen as the harbinger of more systematic changes in the incorporation of machines in society, and their integration with human labor beyond manual tasks, especially into the realm of cognition. The legacy of automata is, then, not only the tasks that they were able to perform, but also how they paved the way, in the long horizon, for a social order characterized by increasingly symbiotic relationships between humans and increasingly human-like machines. An illuminating example of the evolving role and perception of automata is “The Turk,” also known as “The Mechanical Turk.” This invention, which consisted of a cabinet with a chessboard attached to a human-like torso of a mustachioed man in a turban (Fig. 1), fed on both the European fascination with mechanical innovations, and long-standing notions of Orientalist mysticism. Its aim was to challenge and defeat human players in the game of chess, and was unveiled to great acclaim in 1770 at Schönnbrun Palace in Vienna by its creator, Hungarian inventor Wolfgang von Kempelen. “The Turk” went on to become an international sensation, successfully touring Europe and the United States, and defeating the likes of Napoleon and Benjamin Franklin in the process. This invention captured the sense of possibility that a machine could compete, and overtake, humans at some of the most complex cognitive, tasks such as playing chess. “The Turk” was not a true automaton, however, and as such did not represent, strictly, a step forward in the technological development of automation. Rather, it was later revealed that the cabinet at the base of the contraption contained a seating area where a human chess master, posing as a machine, would be able to control the movement of the chess pieces.

Figure 1

Cut-away of The Turk from a 1798 book by Joseph Racknitz (Humboldt University Library).

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In spite of it being a hoax, or perhaps because of its success, “The Turk” performed at least two important tasks that would have longer-term impact. The first was to present a society in the midst of the turn toward rationality product of the Enlightenment, with the plausible possibility of fully artificial cognition, strategy, and action. In the centuries since, this collective suspension of disbelief has been crucial in undertaking advances in automation that build on the expectations created by “The Turk.” A direct example of this is the achievement, over a century later, of a true automatic chess player, called “El Ajedrecista,” built by Spanish engineer, Leonardo Torres y Quevedo, presented at the University of Paris in 1914dand still on museum display in Madrid. Thus, as illustrated by the link connecting the artificial automaton and the true automatic chess player, science, fiction, and imagination have combined to pave the piecemeal replication of those traits we identify as uniquely humandsuch as, most ambitiously, intelligence. While “The Turk” was famous because of what it pretended to be (a true automaton), it also left a mark in technological history because of what it actually was, that is, the synergistic integration between man and machine. Representing the complementarity of humans and machines as a legitimate means for the advancement of automation, this approach has come to influence developments we consider cutting edge in the 21st Century, such as machine learning and social computing. A salient example of the latter is a platform, released by Amazon in 2005, that tackles complex projects that computers would have difficulty solving unaided. It does so by allocating small, discrete cognitive tasks to large numbers of people distributed throughout the world and coordinating them through an online application. The name of this platform is, not coincidentally, Amazon Mechanical Turk.

From the Steam Engine to the Production Line Since the adoption of the steam engine and the power loom in British (and then European) industry over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, automation has engaged in a process of continued integration with capitalism. At every turn, this process has been characterized by shifting arrangements between the tasks performed by increasingly automated machines, and human operators, managers, supervisors, technicians, and other associated occupations. This suggests that, while the incorporation of machines in the workplace often makes some jobs obsolete, and entirely erases some occupations, it also creates a constellation of new jobs directly related to those machines. In other words, the introduction of automated technologies, from power looms to optical fruit sorting machines to office photocopiers, leads to new divisions of labor, which have ripple effects beyond the walls of the factory, and in the very social organization of places, as well as the linkages between them. In spite of the potential for automation to increase productivity (although this is not a necessary consequence), this process is generally shot through with contestation, as it can lead to increased social and spatial inequality by concentrating technology, economic gains, and political influence in the hands of industry owners, and placing workers under continued threat of obsolescence. As a result, throughout history, social movements have emerged with the explicit aim to curb the incorporation of automated technologies in various industries. Yet, while they are often portrayed as enemies of progress, these movementsdfrom the Luddites smashing textile machinery in the 19th-Century English Midlands, to Parisian cab drivers protesting the introduction of the ridehailing application, Uberdaddress the fundamental, and legitimate tensions created by the changing divisions of labor that result from the incorporation of automation across the economic landscape. As the capitalist system adopted automation at a large scale, the growth of industrial production led to significant transformations in the space-economy, particularly in Europe’s advanced countries, such as Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium. In addition to having far-flung impacts in the trade flows and production chains that spanned European colonies in the Americas, Asia, and later Africa, this gave rise to increased urban agglomeration, environmental degradation, and a remaking of society along the lines industrialization. At the same time, throughout the 19th Century, the prospects of another wave of automation loomed across the ocean, in the then-emerging economy that was the United States. During the first wave of automation, machines were not designed in a way that easily allowed their repair or upgrade, making investment in factory equipment a significant, and particularly risky, expense. To address this issue, a new system of industrial production, which came to be called the American system of manufacture, due to its association with armories in the United States, was developed throughout the 19th Century. This system involved the use of interchangeable parts and a separate assembly line. While these ideas were not new, they were implemented, routinized, and scaled by armories and factories in the United States in a way that significantly increased the gains from efficiency, allowed for recombination, and introduced unprecedented flexibility in the production process. Technological developments such as the use of interchangeable parts, new techniques for the mass-production of steel, and the advent of electrification combined in the transition from the 19th to the 20th Century to produce a qualitative change in the configuration the economic system. This change constituted, in aggregate, a Second Industrial Revolution, which would propel capitalism once again into a change of phase. Along with significant inventions in transportation, such as the railroad and telecommunications (like the telegraph and the telephone), the new forms of manufacturing bolstered capitalism through an era of intensified world trade that would only be interrupted by World War I. The outcome of this period was the emergence of the United States as an industrialized nation that would, in the span of decades, overtake the primacy of European Empires. Among the many innovations that combined to transform the American economy throughout this period, a lasting one was the assembly line. This approach, which was already in use by the Venetian Arsenal in the 12th Century, consisted on dividing the assembly process of a product into several stations, each of which was in charge of adding a specific part. While there were many iterations of this technique, the Ford Motor Company elevated it into a paradigm-shifting approach by using it to produce its Model T at a rate that allowed its massive production and eventual diffusion in the United States and throughout the world. As automation continued to progress throughout the 20th Century, the assembly line began to change

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by the increased use of industrial robots. A similar pattern was replicated across industries and areas of economic activity, where tasks had been sufficiently codified and routinized were taken over by machines able to perform them with minimal direct human intervention. A key component in this next wave of automation was the emergence and diffusion of computers, which were at the heart of the next phase of transitions that overtook the world economy and society in the second half of the 20th Century.

Computers and Geopolitics Among the most consequential developments of the past century are machines able to perform enormous volumes of calculations, at increasing speeds, and with a growing degree of autonomy. These machines, generically known as computers, have multiple historical precedents in past erasdfrom the abacus in many ancient civilizations to the Analytical Engine, envisioned by Charles Babbage in the 19th Century, and for which Ada Lovelace wrote the first programmable algorithm. Yet, it was not until World War II that computers took on a pivotal role in human affairs. In particular, it was the advances made by Alan Turing and a group of scientists working for the Allies that were able to crack the secret codes of the Enigma encryption machine, thus intercepting Nazi communications during the war. After this breakthrough, governments and corporations began to realize the enormous strategic and commercial potential for computersdalthough they did not necessarily envision the degree to which they would change society by the end of the 20th Century. During the Cold War, computers became pivotal, both as instruments for geopolitical confrontation, and as a proxies for technical (and therefore sociopolitical) superiority. These aspects cannot be discretely parsed out due to the overarching military–industrial logic that led to the tight interknitting of the state, private industry, and academia toward the development of knowledge and technology directly serving the geopolitical goals of the United States or the Soviet Union. For example, advances in microcomputers, guidance systems, and telecommunications were all essential to the development of large-scale projects with deep geopolitical underpinnings, such as the Distant Early Warning Line radar system in the Arctic, the Space Race, and ARPANET, the predecessor of the Internetdto name a few. Thus, in a very concrete way, advances in automation across various fields directly contributed to shape the spatial configuration of the world during the Cold Wardand to maintain the relative geopolitical stasis that characterized it. This geographical configuration was coordinated and maintained through the proliferation of centers of calculation specialized in producing computers (Bell Labs in New Jersey, Route 128 near Boston, and later Silicon Valley, in Northern California); housing them (a network of universities and high-performance research centers throughout the United States, the United Kingdom, and other advanced countries); or using them to coordinate large-scale technical projects, such as the Space Programs of the United States and the Soviet Union (the Manned Spacecraft Centerdlater Johnson Space Centerdnear Houston, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, Star City in the Moscow Oblast, and the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan). And not only were these geographies shaped by the logic of the Cold War and enacted with the aid of increasingly advanced computers, the entirety of life on the planet was, for decades, perched on a knife’s edge that depended on systems capable of launching nuclear war with a high degree of autonomy, themselves modeled on the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction. Toward the end of the Cold War, and coinciding with a moment of massive geopolitical rearrangement, a new technological paradigm began to upend the landscape cemented through decades of competition and détente between superpowers. The Internet was yet another defense-related development, which in its early iteration arose from the need to create a distributed communications system in case of a nuclear attack to the United States. While in the late 1970s the early iterations of this network included a handful of research universities and national labs in the United States, by 2018, the International Telecommunications Union estimated that the Internet had 3.9 billion usersdmore than half of the world’s population. The Internet has become, in the span of a few decades, a space of informational flows unprecedented in scale, speed, and complexity. The Internet can be characterized as a continuously evolving informational environment that merges the computational power of millions of ever-faster computers and devices with the capabilities of a distributed communications network that allows end-toend communication between users. As such, this network constitutes, among myriad other things, fertile ground for the spread of new forms of automation, which have leveraged the reproducibility, anonymity, and scalable potential of this digital information flows with great alacrity. In this informational context, where humans cannot possibly keep up with, or make sense of, a continuous explosion of data, algorithms have emerged as key structuring factors of the Internetdand a host of other associated technologies. Through their deep embeddedness in governance processes, financial architectures, logistical chains, transportation systems, and social networks, algorithms have become so consequential that they play a pivotal role in the fates of places, the performance of their economies, and the organization of their societies.

Algorithms in Space There is a long and variegated tradition of anthropomorphizing automation by creating machines that embody mental and/or physical traits we associate with human beings. After all, the word robot, which first appeared in the 1920 play R.U.R. by the Czech play wright Karel Capek, has cognates in various Slavic and Germanic languages, denoting the drudgery and manual labor performed by serfs. Yet, while robotics as a field of research continues to produce expanding iterations of robots, many of which are increasingly human-like (enhanced by recent advances in Artificial Intelligence), much automation is carried out by algorithms.

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In their most basic form, algorithms are series of instructions, which can be programmed with the purpose of being executed by computers. This seemingly simple procedure underpins both the development of computer science and the influence of computer systems over the configuration of contemporary societies. As Graham presciently pointed out over a decade ago in an influential article, “Software-sorted geographies,” software-sorting should be central to our conceptualization of social and geographical inequalities in the context of contemporary capitalism. This sorting is carried out on an increasingly automated basis that is enabled by the confluence of factors such as increase in computing power, networked coordination, and integration of urban, logistical, and computer systems of governance across the board. In the past few years, the influence of algorithms has expanded to take on tasks that connect, mediate, and influence the spatial arrangements structuring the foundations of contemporary society: from the control and monitoring of air traffic and international trade, to the automated collection of tolls and facial recognition via networks of CCTV systems; from the rise of highfrequency trading to the increased role of automated decision-making in life-altering contexts such as sentencing and mortgage lending. All of this amounts to the comprehensive reshaping of social and physical space in ways that make it very difficult to disentangle the algorithms written to achieve a certain function, from the spaces produced (intentionally or otherwise) by deploying them. The result of this process of algorithmic encroachment can be synthesized in what Kitchin and Dodge termed code/space, which they define as the mutual constitution of software and the spatiality of everyday life. The point here is not only the increase in the number of lines of code used for particular functions or tasks, but how the code and its functions actively perform the work that structures spaces as such. A check-in kiosk without a networked terminal becomes simply a waiting room, for example. The two developments mentioned above, the coconstitution of code and space, and the deep implication of software in social inequalities signal a fundamental transformation not only in the mechanisms of coordination and control, but in the very configuration of our world (both human and nonhuman). And, while it is beyond doubt that computers, software, and automated processes have enabled many advances in economic activity, it is now clear that it is insufficient to look for evidence of their influence only by tracking increases in “productivity statistics,” as economist Robert Solow pointed out more than three decades ago.

Automation and Geography From the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that automation, coupled with the rise of capitalism, has come to play a transformational role in the organization of the economy and the structure of societies throughout the world. Yet, as automation continues to become increasingly sophisticated, particularly with the widespread adoption of artificial intelligence applications, and the seemingly imminent diffusion of self-driving vehicles, it is worth considering what role automation plays not only in the transformation of space itself, but in our process of inquiry into such phenomena. Technological and methodological innovations are often rolled out with much hype, which can obscure their historical context, explanatory limitations, and social implications. Examples of this are the ebbs and flows in the collective fascination across academia and society with big data and artificial intelligence (see entry on artificial intelligence). As a wide-ranging field of inquiry, the discipline of Geography has a long history of not only contending with the development and effects of automation from an integrative perspective (looking at it social, political, economic, and environmental implications), but also incorporating automation as part of its methodological toolkit. An early example is the work of Waldo Tobler, who already in his 1959 article “Automation and Cartography” explored the analytical capabilities of punch-card computers for understanding and representing complex geographic phenomena. His conception of the map as a data-storage element was ahead of its time in accurately understanding the incremental development of its two discrete (but intrinsically complementary) components: the database and the graphical output. Indeed, the later developments in the field of Geographic Information Systems would continue to build ever more efficient ways of automating the cartographic process. Another GIS pioneer, Stan Openshaw, decades later (and decades ahead of its time) would explore the role of artificial intelligence in geography. In light of the enormous flood of information resulting from the digitization of records, the expansion of the Internet, and the explosion in sources of locational data, we would need tools that allow us to organize and make sense of it for the purposes of actually understanding the world. Openshaw pointed toward the expanding array of geocomputational tools and artificial intelligence applications as a way to narrow the gap between our growing ability to collect and handle data, on the one hand, and our capability to interpret it, on the other. The two examples cited above, along with many others, such as Michael Batty and other scholars’ innovative work in using and theorizing agent-based modeling for understanding the structure and function of cities are but a sample of how automation has been productively incorporated into geographical methodology. These approaches, combined with the examinations of automation “in the wild,” as it has played out across times and places, give us multidimensional insights of three types of relations in this context: (1) the social relations between humans around the sources and consequences of automation; (2) the evolving relations between humans and machines; and (3) the spatial relations that connect humans, machines, and the (physical, biological, virtual) environment. A greater understanding of these sets of relationships will continue to be crucial in light of continued technological change, as they are fundamental in shaping how automation is incorporated in the human (and nonhuman) world, and how, in turn, this world is remade in the process.

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See Also: Algorithmic Governance; High-Tech Industry; Industrial Restructuring; Industrialization; Technological Change; Technology Industries.

Further Reading Abbate, J., 1999. Cold war and white heat: the origins and meanings of packet switching. Soc. Shap. Technol. 351–371. Batty, M., 2007. Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Batty, M., 2017. The New Science of Cities. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. Reprint edition. Cockayne, D., Leszczynski, A., Zook, M., 2017. #HotForBots: sex, the non-human and digitally mediated spaces of intimate encounter. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 35 (6), 1115–1133. Del Casino, V.J., 2016. Social geographies II: robots. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 40 (6), 846–855. Graham, S., 2005. Software-sorted geographies. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 29 (5), 562–580. Kitchin, R., Dodge, M., 2011. Code/space: Software and Everyday Life. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Openshaw, S., Alvanides, S., 1999. Applying geocomputation to the analysis of spatial distributions. In: Longley, P., Goodchild, M., Maguire, D.J., Rhind, D.W. (Eds.), Geographic Information Systems: Principles and Technical Issues 1. John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, pp. 267–282. Openshaw, S., Openshaw, C., 1997. Artificial Intelligence in Geography, first edn. Wiley, Chichester ; New York. Tobler, W.R., 1959. Automation and cartography. Geogr. Rev. 49 (4), 526–534. https://doi.org/10.2307/212211. Truitt, E., 2015. Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic, Nature, and Art. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Automobilities Gregg Culver, Institute of Geography, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Automobility The system of automobile-centered mobility entailing not only cars and driving but also the interlocking aspects of production, consumption, regulation, politics, and values which produce and perpetuate automobile dominance. Hegemony A state of overwhelming social, cultural, economic, ideological, and/or political dominance by one system, institution, or social group over a given society or group. Multimodality A condition under which various forms of transportdsuch as walking, cycling, bus, rail, car, and airdare interlocked in a comprehensive manner as opposed to the dominance of one mode of mobility. New mobilities paradigm A social science paradigm emerging in and expanding since the early 2000s which highlights the importance of bodies and objects in motion for understanding social, economic, and political relationships. Politics of mobility The social struggle over how mobility and its spaces ought to be structured and who has a voice in the process. Traffic spiral Describes a process under which automobile usedby appropriating public space for roads and parking from other social uses, and thereby reducing the efficiency of other modes and the quality of life for people adjacent to these spacesdencourages even more automobile use by creating the conditions for its own expansion.

Cars, it would seem, are absolutely everywhere. As of 2009, the number of cars in use around the globe had already reached 1 billion, and as of 2018, that figure was closer to 1.4 billion. Befitting this figure, for an increasingly large part of the inhabited earth, cars dominate built environments and urban soundscapes. Commercial advertising, television, and film are saturated with images of cars; they are embedded in popular culture and daily language through idioms and metaphors and confer status and shape identities. Cars are key components of capitalist production and consumption, and function as crucial sites of state planning, regulation, and surveillance. They are one of the primary causes of accidental injury and death worldwide (with over 1 million people killed annually in automobile crashes), and their intensive natural resource demands starkly impact the planet’s climate and geopolitics. Beyond being merely a technology for facilitating the inherently geographical act of physical movement, automobility, or the car-dominated system of mobility, as a general phenomenon constitutes an already massive, yet ongoing and globally expanding social, spatial, and temporal reorganization of human life to suit the needs of cars and car driving.

Motorization: An International Overview With well over 1 billion cars in use globally, what was once exclusively a luxury item has increasingly become an object of mass consumption; however, even as automobility has become a global phenomenon, the development of motorization still varies considerably around the world. The roots of motorization are to be found in the countries in which the automobile was inventedd France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdomdand subsequently formed the basis upon which the Global North (North America, Europe, and historically Western capitalist aligned countries such as Japan and South Korea) became industrialized. Consequently, then, automobility can be most prominently observed in the countries of the industrialized Global North (see Table 1). Among these, the United States is especially notable for being tightly organized around the needs of the car and its spaces. With 821 vehicles in use per 1000 people as of 2015, the United States has the highest motorization rate of any major country (see Fig. 1). The United States in fact has more registered vehicles than licensed drivers: as of 2015, with a population of approximately 214 million licensed drivers, there were 252 million registered vehicles (not including motorcycles), or 1177 registered motor vehicles for every 1000 licensed drivers. While the United States experience bounds the outer limits of the spectrum of car dependence, the countries of the industrialized Global North are otherwise quite comparable in their degree of motorization. While exhibiting the highest motorization rates globally, the growth of the motorization rate between 2005 and 2015 (6% in North America, 7% in Japan and South Korea, and 9% in Europe) suggests a higher degree of saturation of driving in the Global North. While motorization in the European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) region grew faster than in the rest of the Global North, much of this growth occurred in the newer EU members of Eastern Europedcountries with lower motorization rates on the whole than their Western EU counterparts, but with much faster growth rates in motorization. This broad trend continues eastward into Russia, Turkey, and other non-EU Eastern European countries, where the combined motorization rate of 281 vehicles per 1000 people is still higher than the global average, yet considerably lower than in Western European countries and North America. The motorization rate also grew much more rapidly there in recent years than in the EU/EFTA, climbing 59% from 2005 to 2015.

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Motorization rate and percentage change in world regions

World region North America (NAFTA) European Union and European Free Trade Agreement members Japan and South Korea Russia, Turkey and other non-EU/EFTA Europe Global Average Central and South America Asia, Oceania, Middle East (excluding Japan and South Korea) Africa

Motorization ratedall vehicles per 1000 people, 2015

Percentage change in motorization rate from 2005 to 2005

670 581

þ6% þ9%

555 281 182 176 85

þ7% þ59% þ27% þ60% þ141%

42

þ35%

Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), 2018.

Figure 1 Global Trends in Motorization. Author calculation, based on: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA); United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2006). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision Population Database. Design: Philipp Schulz and Gregg Culver.

In contrast to the industrialized Global North, much of the rest of the globe is characterized by far greater variance in motorization rates across countries, on the one hand, but also, on the other hand, by a far more rapid growth in motorization in recent years, as Figs. 1 and 2 demonstrate. Caribbean and Latin America as a region, with 176 motor vehicles in use per 1000 people, is close to the global average, but with variations from relatively low rates in Haiti (7 motor vehicles per 1000 people), to more prevalent driving in Chile (248 per 1000) and Argentina (316 per 1000). Meanwhile, from Ethiopia (2 per 1000) to South Africa (176 per 1000), all sub-Saharan African countries have motorization rates below the global average, whereas the countries of the Middle East and North Africa range more significantly, from Yemen (23 per 1000) to Kuwait (482 per 1000). Similarly, Asia and Oceania as a region has a lower than average motorization rate. In no region has there been more explosive growth in automobility in recent years. Compared to the global average, India, for instance, has a low level of motorization at 22 vehicles per use per 1000 people in 2015, having risen from 9 per 1000 in 2005. Despite being a seemingly small increase, this growth has entailed a 179% increase in the number of motor vehicles in use. Like in much of the rapidly urbanizing developing world, this massive increase in motor vehicles has brought with it an enormous increase in fatalities and injuries, stifling traffic congestion, and, as in Delhi in recent years, dangerous levels of air pollution. China is similarly notable in this regard. Between 2005 and 2015, the number of motor vehicles in use in China mushroomed from approximately 31.6 million in 2005 to 162.8 million in 2015 (a 415% increase), which has

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Figure 2 The traffic spiral. Adapted from Kutter, E. (1975): Mobilität als Determinante städtischer Lebensqualität. In: Leutzbach, W. (ed.). Verkehr in Ballungsräumen. Schriftenreihe der DVWG. Band 24. Cologne, 65–75. Design: Gregg Culver.

increased the motorization rate from 24 to 118 vehicles in use per 1000 people. This has been accompanied and driven by a widescale road-building campaign and the rapid growth of China’s domestic car industry, which allowed China to overtake the United States in 2009 as the largest producer and consumer of cars globally. In sum, while motorization appears to have come close to a saturation point in much of the Global North, it is either rapidly expanding or just beginning to take root in much of the developing and less-developed world. Although much of the developing world still has low rates of motorization relative to the Global North, the rapid expansion of automobility has placed intense pressure in particular on densely populated cities throughout the developing world. Therefore, many of the social, spatial, economic, political, cultural, and ecological challenges and struggles of automobility previously experienced in the Global North are being increasingly felt in the developing world today.

Cars and Geography Despite the car’s more than century-long history, its fundamentally geographical nature, and wide-reaching impact and driving, automobility received little attention within human geography until recent years. Human geography historically tended to consider individual facets related to automobilitydsuch as quantitative, technical studies of accessibility; the economic geography of the automobile industry; mass suburbanization and spatial mismatch of entry-level jobs and affordable housing; oil-driven geopolitical conflict and the intensive and unsustainable exploitation of numerous natural resources (often at the cost of those living on top of them); climate change; and the pollution of the atmosphere and oceans, rivers, and lakes. However, the car system as such was largely neglected in human geography as an integral concept that systematically links such issues. Perhaps it is because cars are both so mundane and ubiquitous in the Global North, and increasingly virtually everywhere else on the globe, that has allowed automobility to be so often overlooked in much of human geography. Yet, in this aspect, human geography is not alonedfrom popular culture to the social sciences and public policy, the hegemony of the car has been mostly taken as a given throughout contemporary car-dominated societies. So, on the one hand, and more generally, lack of attention to automobility in human geography can partly be understood through one of the foundational critiques made by the new mobilities paradigm; namely, that social science as a whole was until recent years focused on fixity and stasis, territory and place. Mobilities were often treated as dead spaces or as means to an end, rather than as a core feature of social, economic, and political relationships. On the other hand and more specifically, for much of the latter half of the 20th Century, the bulk of human geography treated the study of transport as a peripheral area left over to transport geography, itself a subfield which stood in the shadows of more popular areas of human geography. While much of the rest of human geography engaged in a proliferation of epistemologies (evidenced by the growth in structuralist, phenomenological, and post-structuralist perspectives), transport geography remained largely rooted in the

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positivist spatial science framework arising out of the quantitative revolution of the 1960s, which only served to strengthen the treatment of transport as a peripheral interest relative to the rest of human geography. For much of the post–World War II decades, oil was cheap and abundant, climate change was not yet a widespread concern, and automobiles were the central object of both production and consumption of the modernist economic organization of society. The automobile and car economy was in fact so central to this modernist economic and social system characterized by mass production and mass consumption that it came to be named “Fordism” after Henry Forddthe founder of the Ford Motor Company who is credited with revolutionizing the automobile assembly line. In so far as human geography as a whole was concerned with automobility, it was predominantly in regard to automobile production, whereas the consumption side of automobility, and its growing implications for the built and social environment, was largely overlooked by much of the discipline. Meanwhile, transport geographers generally approached the motorization of society in an uncritical manner, viewing motorization as a technological necessity or the product of a natural evolution of technological improvement. Newly available and growing quantitative data sets evidenced that personal mobility was growing due to increasing car ownership, and this was broadly treated as a positive development by academia and government alike. Hence, the primary task of transport policy and research revolved around a “predict-and-provide” ideology. This predict-and-provide ideology describes the prevailing attitude that the growth of car use is both an inevitable and positive development. As such, future car use is to be predicted and accommodated, for instance, through the provision of new highways and parking structures, which ultimately leads to more driving. In this sense, predict-and-provide became a self-fulfilling prophecy in which motorizing societies steadily restructured themselves around the needs of the private car. In the later decades of the 20th Century, it became increasingly clear that predict-and-provide was destined to fail in its own termsdit proved simply impossible to engineer the problem of congestion away. Meanwhile, the economic, ecological, and socially unsustainable conditions produced by mass motorization led to an increasingly critical stance vis-à-vis automobility in human geography. Transport geography has shifted toward a focus on issues such as demand management and the encouragement of public transport, bicycling, and walking. At the same time, transport geography as a subfield has been reinvigorated with a growth of theoretical and methodological approaches, notably including an expansion of more critical perspectives and qualitative methodologies. Meanwhile, spurred on through the influence of the new mobilities paradigm, other areas of human geography have begun to take mobilities more seriously as a key concept of human geography alongside those of space, place, or scale. As a part of these shifts, since around the turn of the millennium, human geographers have been engaging in researching automobility in an increasingly sustained and consistent manner.

Defining Automobilities In its most basic sense, the term automobility is derived from a combination of autonomy and mobility. Autonomy of movement can be viewed as having two aspects: self-propulsion and a capacity for free and independent movement through space. The capacity for autonomous movement is at the heart of the term, and as such, any number of potential automobilities could be considered. Indeed, walking is perhaps the most automobile mode of transport common in the modern world today, with bicycling perhaps not far behind in this regard. In contrast, when viewed from this perspective, it is arguable whether automobile transport can be considered a form of automobility at all. On the one hand, the automobile relies on an external form of energy (petroleum, typically) for its movement that is both industrially produced and globally sourced. On the other hand, the car requires roads to run on (those uninterrupted, continually maintained, often expanding ribbons of asphalt draped across the landscape), which are generally constructed and organized by the state. Consequently, the automobile is itself hardly automobile, even if this is the utopian condition to which automobility aspires. Notwithstanding this critique, in common usage, the term automobility is virtually synonymous with the automobile-centered system of transport. As a concept, automobility is not just about cars, but refers to the larger sociotechnical assemblage of car-dominated mobilityd one which requires for its existence systems of production, regulation, and values and ideologies that sustain automobile dominance. Automobility entails the interrelation of various components, which is often broken down into six aspects. The first entails the automobile as the key manufactured product of Western industrial capitalism, so much so that the analysis of the automobile industry has come to guide the analysis of Western industrial capitalism itself, as evidenced through the concepts of Fordism and post-Fordism or Toyotaism. The second entails the automobile as one of, if not the central object of individual consumption. As personal property, the automobile plays a significant role in shaping personal identity, signaling social status, and busying the criminal justice system through new types of infractions and theft. Third, automobility is an industrial complex that links countless industries from the oil and road-building industries, to suburban development, roadside retail and leisure sites, and transportation planning. Fourth, the automobile is the predominant form of quasi-private mobility in contemporary society. It is quasi-private in that in practice it requires state intervention and thus public resources to organize, yet a private investment in an automobile in order to participate in. As a part of its normal functioning, automobility restructures daily life in such a way as to coerce car use while subordinating and marginalizing other modes. Fifth, automobility forms a cornerstone of contemporary culture, serving as a key source of what it means to live the “good life.” And sixth, automobility is one of the most profound global sources of environmental degradation, natural resource use, and threats to human (and other animal) mortality. From the automobile assembly line and oil refinery to sprawling suburban landscapes of housing and mass consumption, from the stop signs and highway patrol to the automobile insurance policy, and from the classic car chase scene to the myth of the

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adventure of the open road, automobility encapsulates and touches upon seemingly countless processes, actors, practices, and artifacts. The car itself is but one (albeit the most integral) artifact of this larger assemblage, even if in our collective imagination the car stands in for that larger assemblage.

Automobility as System and Regime In terms of conceptualizing automobility as a sociotechnical assemblage, there have been two predominant paths that approach automobility either as a system or as a regime. A system perspective views automobility as a process and product of a number of relationships and logics, which, in their combination, are unique to the car-based mobility system. Most notable of the perspective of automobility as a system is the corresponding understanding of the system as being capable of self-reproduction or “autopoiesis.” Much like the living biological cell, which, once established, produces the structures and components for its own reproduction, this view of automobility holds that once a certain critical mass of car driving is reached in a given place, disparate processes begin to take shape and link up in such a manner that automobility becomes locked in, at which point the system then creates the conditions of its own reproduction and expansion. In other words, automobility itself radically rearranges not only the built environment but also the spatial and temporal patterns of society such that the automobile becomes a necessary component for negotiating common tasks of everyday life. Motorization thereby creates a “traffic spiral” or a spiraling process toward greater automobility because mass driving creates challenges (for example, sprawling and spatially fragmented human settlements and social pressures toward greater spatiotemporal flexibility), that in turn can only be adequately solved by driving a car (see Fig. 2). The system perspective thus takes a view of automobility from a longer and broader spatiotemporal scale, which is helpful for understanding the pressures and consequences that are systematically produced by automobility. It does so by stripping away human agency, contingency, politics, and the prospects of resistance in the process. While conceptualizing automobility as a system helps to understand its fundamental trajectory, there is a risk of reifying automobility as a universal top-down and external force that subjugates and reshapes all places according to its unique logics. An alternative conception is that of automobility as a regime. A regime perspective takes into account systemic aspects of automobility while also highlighting politics and unequal power dynamics, contingency, ambivalence, and the potential for resistance and change. A regime perspective views historically and geographically contingent automobilities as the products of countless political, economic, historical, sociocultural, and geographical influences upon the motorization process. The regime perspective serves to highlight the fact that, in practice, there is no single automobility, but rather a plurality of automobilities, as systems of automobility vary considerably from place to place and time to time. The notable plurality of car-based mobility systems notwithstanding, this article refers to automobility in the singular in order to focus on automobility as an abstract, more-or-less global “system” that produces the same general types of pressures from one place to the next, even as these pressures play out differently from one context to the next.

The Spatial Impacts of Automobile Dominance As a technology, the motor vehicle has had profound spatial impacts. In this way, the automobile is fundamentally different from other widespread consumer goods, such as a vacuum cleaner or a washing machine, as the automobile makes a demand on public space and its occupants for its very function. Cars are virtually useless if they have no road space on which to operate and places to be parked when a destination is reached. Thus, producing the conditions for mass automobility requires a radical spatial reorganization of motorizing societies through the construction of an extensive and continuous network of roads and ubiquitous parkingdall of which is largely or entirely cleared of their nonmotorist users. This feat has historically been accomplished through massive, organized state interventions into the built environment, followed by continuous maintenance and ubiquitous regulation, all of which entail considerable state subsidy to fund. Cars need roads to function in a similar way that trains need continuous, unimpeded track on which to operate. In order to function efficiently, then, cars need paths that have been cleared of slower users and obstacles. This requirement has necessitated a social reconstruction of street space away from its traditional mixed use of place-making, socializing, trade, play, and transit, toward a pure transit space, or a space nearly exclusively devoted to enabling high-speed flows. Through this process, the former users of these spaces, such as merchants, pedestrians, and playing children, have been marginalized in both a social and a literal physical sense, as they have been forced to the margins of the streets to make way for automobiles. As these spaces come to be dominated by higher-speed car travel, the ability for pedestrians and cyclists to efficiently and safely make their way along public thoroughfares is frustrated, if not made completely impossible. Further, through the process, the public street spaces themselves become, to a large degree, privatized, in the sense that in order to enjoy the fullest access to public street space, one must be in a private automobile. Just as crucial as the road in facilitating not only driving, but the entire system of automobility, is the parking spaceda fact that has received especially scant attention in human geography, despite their ubiquity and stark role in shaping urban geographies in particular. For 95% of its existence, the average car is not in use, but instead is parked, and without the ability to park it upon arrival at a destination, the automobile would be of little practical use. A common estimate is that each single car requires not one but four spacesdone at home, and three at other destinationsdto accommodate its use. For automobility to function as a mode of mass transportation, then, parking spots need to be available at every destination to which people travel by car, and all of these parking

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Figure 3 Culver.

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UNESCO World Heritage Site as parking lotdThe front square of the Würzburg Residence, in central Würzburg, Germany. Photo: Gregg

spaces put immense pressure on public space, particularly in cities. For example, even in the early years of motorization in Western industrialized countries, despite the fact that per capita car use was quite low, intense demand was created for spaces to park them in dense cities built around walking and public transit use. Consequently, a range of measures have since been used in order to relieve this pressure and accommodate the needs of motorists. These vary around the globe, but have included the creation of official regulations that stipulate that new building construction provide a certain number of parking spaces, the more informal moves by property owners who buy or otherwise make use of adjoining spaces for parking (for example, by razing a neighboring building to build a parking structure), and ad hoc sacrifices of various public spaces, even those of great cultural importance, for use as a parking lot (see Fig. 3). A further solution to the parking crunch has been suburbanization of residences, leisure, and work sites to spaces where adequate parking can be provided. The steadily increasing preponderance of spaces devoted to automobility, especially in cities, has had a spatially dispersive effect on human settlements. That is, as more space is devoted to roads and parking, less space is available for other activities and uses. What were once compact cities and urban areas become increasingly fragmented and sprawling car-dominated urban regions. As cities and towns decentralize and fragment, the auto-oriented social and built environments not only privilege automobiles, but increasingly necessitate their use, as alternative modes of mobility are no longer capable of providing the individualized flexibility that the new auto-dominated geographies require. Through the traffic spiral of increasing motorization and subsequent accommodation of this increased motorization, automobility becomes increasingly locked in as daily life comes to depend more and more on access to an automobile. Moreover, through this process of usurping space toward its own needs, automobility tends toward hegemony not only as a mobility system, but as a way of life.

The Sociocultural Meanings of Automobility A core contribution of the new mobilities paradigm is the perspective that mobility is a socially produced movement, much as place is viewed in human geography as socially produced space. Mobility is therefore socially meaningful, and the meanings attributed to it can be as varied as the people who experience and/or interpret it. There is therefore tremendous difference in the meanings revolving around automobility. Nevertheless, looking across geography and history, one can see that cars and car-driving have taken on particular meanings that have shifted through the various stages of automobility’s development, which the following two brief examples highlight. First, broader, shifting, though for a time more or less stable discourses regarding automobility can be observed through time and space. For instance, at the beginning of motorization in such birthplaces of automobility as Germany and the United States, cars were luxury itemsdthe playthings of the rich. The new transportation technology was not universally welcomed with open arms by the majority of the population, but rather viewed as an unwelcome disruption by the rich toward the

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poor. For instance, during early motorization in Germany, cars, driven by the urbane, nouveau riche, were often despised by countryfolk, as they left behind dust clouds, ruined dirt roads, and caused horses drawing the farmers’ crop to shy, often causing harm to the carriages and their drivers and the loss or damage of crop. Around the same time in US cities, cars were considered by many city dwellers to at the very least be a nuisance and usurper of public space by the wealthy, and quite often as technologies of death, as the new cars left a massive number of dead (over 200,000 in the 1920s alone in the United States), most of whom were pedestrians and children. In both of these cases, societal elites pushed the motorization of society through with discourses of automobiles representing inevitable technological progress, modernity, spatial liberation, individualism, and economic development, which, ultimately, were successful for laying the broad cultural and ideological foundation of the automobile society of the past century. Second, the meanings of (auto)mobility can vary considerably between social groups and individual people. It was only as the motor car became increasingly dominant that common discourses of automobility shifted toward the notion of the car as a democratic mode of mobility. To name one example, access to and participation in automobility for African Americans in the mid-20thCentury United States promised a greater degree of self-determination, status, and spatial emancipation from racist laws and social conventions. As more African Americans entered the ranks of the wealthy, some took to the Cadillac (a luxury car that epitomized a higher social status hitherto reserved to whites), which led to a cultural struggle over the meanings of the Cadillac. While for some African Americans the use of the Cadillac signaled higher social status that challenged dominant, discriminatory societal discourses, to the white ruling class, this represented black criminality and gangsterism. These examples point to a more general aspect of the meanings of automobilitydthat as the market for mass-produced automobiles became saturated, particularly in the Global North, the era of post-Fordism increasingly produced cars for niche markets and groups. As a consequence, cars have come to shape much more than simple social status and wealth, also shaping and signaling identities more generally. At the same time that automobility remains culturally and ideologically dominant at a societal scale, for individuals and groups, cars may variously mean spatial liberation, a symbol of personal identity and group status, a rite of passage into adulthood, a necessary burden for daily life, or an unwanted and dangerous usurper of public spaces.

The Politics of Automobility A further significant insight derived from the new mobilities paradigm is that mobility is fundamentally political. Politics in this sense refers to the fact that mobility is shaped by (and also helps to shape) unequal social power relations. Whether crossing paths with other people on the sidewalk or navigating the freeways, politics are at play as people move about. Even while there may be a politics of a bike path or even standing in a queue, the politics of automobility appear especially powerful in automobile-centric societies. At whatever geographical scale that one observes the politics of daily mobility, it is apparent that alongside its domination of space, automobility tends also toward political dominance in auto-centered societies. This political hegemony is reinforced in at least three main ways. First, hegemonic automobility is reinforced through the infrastructures, engineering designs and models, and regulations that help to structure and (re)produce mobility. From traffic lights, to street design, and traffic codes, as a general rule in cardominated societies, physical infrastructure and regulations are structured so as to afford the car(driver) special rights and privileges to dominate road space. Second, car dominance is also undergirded through the physical properties of the car and driving; namely, the considerable danger produced by the velocity and mass of the motor vehicle. This real potential for physical violence gives motorists a notable power advantage over nonmotorists on the street, such as pedestrians and bicyclists, affording the car the ability to dominate the street even beyond its legally granted advantages. Third, in car-dominated societies, automobility has become largely “essentialized,” meaning that automobile hegemony is taken as a given, as the natural order of contemporary society. Automobility is thus often deeply entrenched ideologically, making it difficult to put it into question, while alternative modes are generally placed under greater scrutiny. These aspects help automobility to maintain its societal hegemony, while other modes of mobility are subordinated to this imperative. Thus, as a consequence of infrastructural, regulatory, physical, and ideological advantages, those struggling for better conditions for nonautomobile modes of transport face a difficult challenge in the politics of shaping mobility and its spaces. This strategic advantage notwithstanding, both the everyday sites of (auto)mobility and the processes of shaping these sites are often subject to contestation: car-dominance is frequently contested, both through conventional or reformist approaches, on the one hand, and more creative, direct-action, interventionist, and radical approaches, on the other hand. Regarding the former, a wide variety of groups, from grassroots collectives, to local advocacy organizations, and regional and national lobbyists engage actively with relevant state actors from the local to national and supranational scales to seek reform of existing policies and infrastructural arrangements. Bicycle advocacy organizations are perhaps the most prominent in this regard, with seemingly countless organizations working to support cyclists’ rights, from local-level grassroots bicycle advocacy groups (from Bike Pittsburgh in the United States or the Dublin Cycling Campaign in Ireland), to national cycling advocacy organizations, such as the Danish Cyclists’ Federation, to ConBici, the nationwide bicycle advocacy organization in Spain. Such groups are typically oriented toward creating more bicycle- and pedestrian-friendly policies and infrastructures both by working with local authorities toward goals they view as positive, while protesting against local authorities when the reverse is the case. In contrast to such reformist efforts, a number of direct-action, interventionist, and more radical forms of resistance toward the automobile-oriented status quo have emerged and spread internationally, which generally operate outside of existing

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institutional arrangements. One of the more famous forms of direct-action-oriented resistance is Critical Mass, the leaderless once-monthly cycling event that originated in 1992 in San Francisco under the name “Commute Clot,” and which has since spread to hundreds of cities around the world. Cyclists typically meet at a specific time and location, and ride en masse through their city, generally during the Friday evening rush hour commute. While having no official stated goals other than to serve as a bicycle celebration, Critical Mass both significantly frustrates the automobile-oriented order of the street, while opening up mobile spaces in which cyclists and observers can experience the street and city outside of the hegemony of automobility. Another international cycling-related phenomenon is the World Naked Bike Ride (WNBR), which originated as a collaboration between activists in Vancouver, Canada, and Zaragoza, Spain. While similar to Critical Mass as an en masse, celebratory bike ride, the WNBR differs from Critical Mass in that it aims to make an explicit statement using the naked or near-naked mass of cyclists to protest the exposure of cyclists and pedestrians to the dangers posed by car traffic, and the unsustainability of automobility more generally. Other forms of resistance and protest have involved more stationary forms. Park(ing) Day, another now-international urban event that originated in San Francisco, involves briefly converting street parking spaces into public park spaces as a method of sparking debate about the use of public space and temporarily reclaiming space from motor vehicles. Another form of protest of automobility that originated in St. Louis, United States, and has likewise spread internationally is the “ghost bike.” Ghost bikes are bicycles that are painted white and locked up at a location where a cyclist was killed or severely injured. These are meant to memorialize the victims of vehicular violence and to serve as a visible statement regarding cyclists’ rights to safe travel on the road.

A Look Toward the Future As much as the car has been praised for providing new means of transport for the masses, and automobility has been a core driver of economic development over the past century, automobilitydat least in its contemporary steel-and-petroleum formdis in many ways socially detrimental and ecologically unsustainable. The unsustainable ecological costs of automobility alone mean that (at least this particular form of) automobility is destined to fail. While nothing is certain about the future of automobility, a number of notable trends do suggest some shift away from steel-and-petroleum automobility. Cars are becoming increasingly electrified, “autonomous,” and shared at the same time that automobility appears to be losing ground culturally in auto-dominated societies. In urban life in the industrialized Global North in particular, the hegemony of the car is increasingly being questioned, while bicycling and walking have seen a resurgence. Meanwhile, in intercity travel, other alternative and emerging forms of mobility (such as high-speed rail, the “Hyperloop,” air taxis and drones) are being pursued or discussed. These new forms reflect both an ongoing tendency toward an ever-increasing acceleration of mobility, and that the automobile is no longer capable of reliably providing the desired speeds in the increasingly mobile, urban, and globalized world. Despite these emerging trends of stagnating automobility and some signs of shifts away from the private, petroleum-powered car in the Global North, automobility continues to expand globally both in its extensiveness and intensiveness of use. Moreover, a problematic recent trend is the rapid expansion of the especially resource-intensive and spatially domineering Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV). The United States leads in this respect, where SUVs and light trucks accounted for 49% of new automobile registrations as early as 2012. This figure was closer to 65% in 2018. Sales of SUVs have also been rapidly expanding even in Germany, a country well known for its sustainability efforts, including its relatively highly developed solar and wind energy production. From 2008 to 2015, the proportion of SUVs of the total vehicle fleet more than doubled, from 3.2% to 7.2%, raising the number of SUVs on German roads from 1.3 to 3.2 million. And, despite German government efforts to encourage electric cars, for every one new electric vehicle registration in 2014, there were 36 new SUV registrations. In China, the market for SUVs is booming as well; new SUV registrations rose to 36.4% in 2014, while the entire automobile market grew by 9.9%. Meanwhile, 8 of the 10 most sold SUVs were produced by Chinese automobile manufacturers, suggesting the SUV has become a core part of Chinese automobility as well. Whether recent developments will help to provide the basis for a shift away from automobility and toward some new system of mobility based perhaps on multimodality, is yet to be seen. Automobility remains a powerful and globally expanding force, suggesting that the system of automobility may indeed prove difficult to break from. On the one hand, the car-based system is already or is becoming socially and spatially deeply entrenched in much of the world. On the other hand, automobility continues to serve as a core of global capitalism, which provides it with considerable inertia. Despite some trends suggesting a possible stagnation and reevaluation of driving in the Global North, globally, and especially in the developing and less developed world, the general trend appears to be toward a massive expansion of driving rather than a (re)turn to multimodality and more socially equitable and ecologically sustainable forms of transport. Consequently, even as some trends suggest a shift away from contemporary forms of automobility, for much of the world, automobility is just beginning to take hold.

See Also: Fordism; Governance, Transport; Hegemony; Mobility, History of Everyday; Mobility; Suburbanization; Sustainability Transitions; Sustainability; Transport Geography; Transport and Accessibility; Transport and Globalization; Transport and Social Exclusion; Transport and Sustainability; Transportation and Land Use.

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Further Reading Böhm, S., Jones, C., Land, C., Peterson, M., 2006. Against Automobility. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Mass. Cidell, J., Prytherch, D. (Eds.), 2015. Transport, Mobility, and the Production of Urban Space. Routledge, New York and London. Conley, J., McLaren, A.T. (Eds.), 2016. Car Troubles: Critical Studies of Automobility and Auto-Mobility. Routledge, New York and London. Automobilities [special issue]. In: Featherstone, M. (Ed.), Theory Cult. Soc. 21, 1–277. Furness, Z., 2010. One Less Car: Bicycling and the Politics of Automobility. Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Henderson, J., 2013. Street Fight: The Politics of Mobility in San Francisco. University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, Mass. Knowles, R.D., Shaw, J., Docherty, I., 2008. Transport Geographies: Mobilities, Flows and Spaces. Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Mass. Merriman, P., 2009. Automobility and the geographies of the car. Geogr. Compass 3, 586–599. Norton, P.D., 2008. Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Packer, J., 2008. Mobility without Mayhem: Safety, Cars, and Citizenship. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina. Sachs, W., 1992. For Love of the Automobile: Looking Back into the History of Our Desires. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. Shaw, J., Hesse, M., 2010. Transport, geography and the ‘new’ mobilities. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 35, 305–312. Sheller, M., Urry, J., 2000. The city and the car. Int. J. Urban Region. Res. 24, 737–757. Sheller, M., Urry, J., 2006. The new mobilities paradigm. Environ. Plan. A 38, 207–226. Walks, A. (Ed.), 2015. The Urban Political Economy and Ecology of Driving: Driving Cities, Driving Inequality, Driving Politics. Routledge, New York.

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Aviation Daniel L Mabazza, Department of Geography, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by T. M. Vowles, volume 1, pp 257–264, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Aircraft Any machine supported for flight in the air by buoyancy or by the dynamic action of air on its surfaces, especially powered airplanes, gliders, and helicopters. Airlines A business that operates regular services for carrying passengers and/or goods by aircraft. Airports A complex of runways and buildings for the takeoff, landing, and maintenance of civil aircraft, with facilities for passengers. Airline alliance Is an aviation industry arrangement between two or more airlines agreeing to cooperate on a substantial level. Alliances may provide marketing branding to facilitate travelers making inter-airline codeshare connections within countries. Air freedom rights Are a set of commercial aviation rights granting a country’s airlines the privilege to enter and land in another country’s airspace. The use of the terms “freedom” and “right” confers entitlement to operate international air services only within the scope of the multilateral and bilateral treaties (air service agreements) that allow them. Deregulation Is the revision, reduction, or elimination of laws and regulations that hinder free competition in supply of goods and services, thus allowing market forces to drive the economy. Friction of distance Is the concept that the length of the journey (distance) and the difficulty of the journey (friction) affect the time needed to complete the journey (time). Globalization Is the word used to describe the growing interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and service, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information. Hub airports or airline hub Are used by one or more airlines to concentrate passenger traffic and flight operations at a given airport. They serve as transfer (or stopover) points to get passengers to their final destination. It is part of the hub-and-spoke system. Hub-and-spoke system A transport system in which passengers travel from smaller airports, stations, etc. to one large central airport, station, etc. to make longer trips. Legacy carrier Is an airline that has a long history that usually originates at some point in the first half of the 20th Century and operated over an extensive domestic and transoceanic international route structure. Liberalization Or economic liberalization is the lessening of government regulations and restriction in an economy in exchange for greater participation by private entities. In short, is “the removal of controls” in order to encourage economic development. Low-cost carrier (LCC) or low-cost airline (occasionally referred to as no-frills, budget, or discount carrier) Is an airline that is operated with an especially high emphasis on minimizing operating costs and without some of the traditional services and amenities provided in the fare, resulting in lower fares and fewer comforts. Privatization Is the process of transferring an enterprise or industry from public sector to the private sector control and/or ownership. Revenue Passenger-Kilometer (RPK) or Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) Is an airline industry metric that shows the number of revenue passengers multiplied by the total distance traveled. Since it measures the actual demand for air transport, it is often referred to as airline “traffic.” Spoke airports Are the routes that planes take out of the hub airport.

Air transport, as we know it today, has greatly enabled movement from one location to anotherdin a way that would be unthinkable to humans just more than a century ago. The development of this mode of transportation has paved way for humans to discover a lot of areas that were otherwise rather difficult, if not impossible, to reach by other modes. Most commonly, for most of their lives, people travel by land. Without question, this is the most viable way to get to relatively near locations; however, traveling by land has its threshold, mostly with respect to distance and the costs that distance incurs. This is dictated by the concept of friction of distance, which states that distance requires some effort to overcome; because of this “friction,” it is harder to achieve spatial interaction than over short distances. Therefore, with great distance, it becomes too costly or counterproductive to choose traveling by land, especially when tending to matters of urgency, such as visiting a dying relative from a faraway province or merely transporting the latest issue of a daily newspaper all over the country. When this threshold is surpassed, it is more reasonable to travel by a faster means, which is by air.

International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, 2nd edition, Volume 1

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As countries further open their borders for a freer movement of people, goods, and businesses amid a stronger push of globalization, and the continuous improvement in the standards of living even in most developed countries, the air transport industry has been one of the most important agents as it is directly involved in mobilizing such flow, thereby making it one of the most rapidly evolving industries within the transport sector in order to quickly adapt to those developments. Furthermore, besides a great deal of distance, many physical and social barriers stand to impede (or even endanger) the movement of people, goods, and services. Physical barriers may include mountains or bodies of water (as in the case of archipelagos), whereas social barriers may include wars or rebellion, territorial conflicts, or even the mere lack of suitable facilities for transportation over a certain location or to reach a faraway region. By traveling by air than by land (or by water), people are buying time, effort, and resources; this mode can even be less costly and dangerous depending on the circumstances. In the context of international travel, especially when constraints are usually more pronounced, most of these concepts particularly hold true. In air transport geography, there are three main fields of inquiry: airlines, airports, and aircrafts. Geographers are concerned with the role of these three components of air transport in shaping the evolution of movement of human activities, goods, and information across space.

The Economic Geography of Air Transport Since air transport requires a great deal of capital to start operating and high costs to sustain its services, naturally such costs are passed onto consumers through fares that are way higher than other long-distance modes, such as provincial buses or passenger ships, although this mode is preferred because it is faster and it is capable of transcending physical geographic boundaries. This follows the idea of massification of passengers and freight in transport and is efficient and cost-saving. In line with this, consumption of this mode is somewhat linked with socioeconomic status, i.e., the disposable income and purchasing power of households. Of course, people who are more affluent can afford traveling over long distances given the prices of air transport tickets. Therefore, the gradual increase in the income of households through the decades has made the mode of air transport more and more accessible to the public, although it remains as the most expensive mode of public transport. On a macroeconomic scale, economies with high gross domestic products (GDP)din other words, most developed countriesdwhere standards of living are high, there is higher government budget, and investments by the private sector and foreign businesses are thriving, this mode of transport is more widespread and accessible for consumers and is often the default, cost-saving mode in traveling long distances. On the other hand, poor countries and poor regions such as those in Africa have barely developed their aviation industries due to lack of budget, skilled labor, and necessary capital, and are often compelled to take terrestrial and water routes of transportation; however, with the change of the geopolitical landscape and through further globalization and liberalization of national economies and the increase in external loans offered by foreign creditors such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and recently, China, developing countries (mostly from Africa) have been able to construct fundamental infrastructures for air traffic in major cities, in order to accommodate some domestic and international flights and finally connect them with the air transport grid. Since external loans to construct air transport facilities are high and are difficult to pay over a short period of time, however, foreign debt servicing often leads to lower allocations in other expenditures of the country (such as social services) in the first several years after the load is made. A more commonly observed phenomenon among developed and developing countries is privatization, i.e., the entrance of private sector in airport operations, including those of foreign direct investments, which in turn play significant roles in financing and developing the whole air transport industry while allowing national governments to reduce their overall expenses and reallocate expenditures for other purposes. Most airlines, especially flag carriers such as Philippine Airlines and Japan Airlines, which were previously owned by national governments, have already been privatized in the past two to three decades. As for airports, the London Heathrow Airport, consistently the busiest airport in Europe, is currently owned and operated by the Heathrow Airport Holdings, which is under Ferrovial S.A., a Spanish multinational company involved in financing, construction, and operations of major urban transport services in Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Mactan–Cebu International Airport, which services the metropolitan area of Cebu and its surrounding provinces in the central part of the Philippines, while owned by the government of the Philippines through the Mactan–Cebu International Airport Authority, is operated by the GMR Megawide Cebu Airport Corporation, a consortium of the Philippines-based Megawide Corporation and India-based GMR Construction. Airport operators may also opt to outsource most of the work, including ground handling and personnel services, to private contractors. Such is the case of a few international airports in the Philippines utilizing Miascor Aviation Services, which used to handle towing of airplanes, maintenance, until its contract was abruptly terminated in March 2018 following a theft incident involving six of its workers. In the rapid liberalization and expansion of the global air transport industry, air transport networks reconfigure themselves into alliances, paving further the way toward the interconnection of air traffic around the world. Alliances are defined as a set of agreements between two or more carriers two jointly work on matters pertaining to their common interests and development while maintaining independent operations. Alliances provide ways for individual carriers to serve new markets which they have not previously reached and ensure two-way benefits for carriers and the individual consumers and increase the strength and width of the air transport market. They are thought to be manifestations in the increased globalization in the industry as they follow the tendency of transnational interconnection among companies. The most common benefit of alliances is what is widely known as codesharing, a business agreement in which one airline sells seats on a flight operated by another, i.e., they share the same flight to the same destination. A seat can be purchased through one airline on a flight that has a different code and is owned by another airline. Airlines enter into such agreements in order for members

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of the alliance to reach new markets which they previously have not reached. This way, not only the airlines of codeshared flights benefit from codesharing, but also the passengers and the airports by providing new markets and diversifying the possible destinations which airlines can reach. Today, there are three major alliances: Star Alliance, One World, and Sky Team.

History of Air Transport (1900–2000) In the aftermath of the World War I, which witnessed the first use of aircraft for military use, many countries raised concerns about the international use of aircrafts and their sovereignty over the airspace above them. Consequently, the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, also known as the Paris Convention of 1919, resolved that each state has absolute sovereign authority over the airspace over their territorial land and waters, and are mandated to enforce internationally accepted rules pertaining to their airspace and apply them equally between its own and foreign aircraft and their personnel. Furthermore, the same convention also mandated aircrafts to be registered in countries they belong to, and have a “nationality.” Subsequently, the relationships between the air industries of sovereign countries were codified 25 years later in the landmark Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known simply as the “Chicago Convention,” which was signed on December 7, 1994 by 52 signatory states and saw the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the promulgation of the agreements on the freedoms of aircrafts in the airspace of sovereign countries, known as the air freedom rights. The earliest developments in passenger airlines started in the 1930s, when national governments mandated the investment in the development of the earliest aircrafts as tools for trade, mail services, and even to enable visits by officials to colonies while taking less time than usually through passenger ships, which were prevalent at the time. Due to aircrafts’ potential in transporting people and goods, the development of their air transport assets were of national priority and need for most countries, which were subsequently manifested by the establishment of resultant national airlines, also known as flag carriers. While the very first advancements in the international air transport market started as early as 1960s, the world has seen a dramatic development beginning in the late 1970s, spearheaded by the United States when the US Congress passed the Air Deregulation Act of 1978, which effectively removed government control on fare and routing and introduced sweeping reforms that enabled entry of new players into the market, in the hopes of increasing competition. Through the rules of economics, the ideal situation of competition for airline service demanded that carriers increase and improve their service over time in face of a sharp rise in domestic and international demands while making air transport more accessible for public consumption. While the deregulation and liberalization initially attracted the entry of new players in the market, the airline industry turned out to follow an oligopolistic model, which meant that certain carriers, known as “incumbents” or legacy carriers, still retained dominance over parts of the market that they had been servicing, effectively continuing their control on existing fares and routes, and smaller carriers having difficulties catching up and eventually getting bankrupt and/or merged into these preexisting companies. There were also industry and nonindustry factors which affected the progress of the market since its deregulation, and eventually the failure of said competitors. Nearly a decade after, the European Union followed suit, although they took the way of introducing a rather gradual process of deregulation and liberalization of the air transport owing to the market failures seen in the United States’ model. The process was undertaken through the “Three Packages,” which spanned years from late 1980s to mid-1990s. The European Commission had a similar objective to that of the United States, although it also had an end goal to transform the European Union into a common market, which meant that individual airlines, regardless of which country they are officially registered in, gained the right to generate traffic in any other member economies of the European Union, side-by-side with the rule of openness in the national borders of the member countries. Just like the United States, the European Union retained its long-standing regulatory policies such as antitrust regulations. In 1997, when the Third Package came to a conclusion, the whole process was completed and all member countries of the Union started to share a single aviation market. Just around the same time, in the early 1990s, the Asia-Pacific region started to catch up with the growing air transport demands of the rapidly developing economies in the region, four of whichdnamely, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kongdwere branded as “tiger economies.” Due to the rising tourism industry in the region, particularly for its heritage, culture, and food, which proved to be popular for tourists mainly from Europe and the Americas, and the pivot of increasing investments of firms from the United States and Europe in countries in the West Pacific Rim, some particular hubs rose in dominance. This growth was put into a substantial slowdown, however, when the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 struck. Most airlines were compelled to downsize their operations such as laying off of hundreds of employees, reducing fleet size, among others.

Air Freedom Rights In light of the expansion of the global air transport market came the need to progressively open and link national markets, thus governments and intergovernmental bodies stepped in order to secure international general air service agreements, called the air freedom rights (also known as “freedoms of the air”). The Chicago Convention of 1994 promulgated the first two air freedom rights widely accepted today, and subsequent revisions (the last being in 2006) led to include three more. Today, 192 states are parties to the Convention (Fig. 1).

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Figure 1

The flow of flights representing the nine Air Freedoms.

The first five Freedom Rights from the Chicago Convention have the following definitions: 1. First Freedom: the right for airlines from one country to fly over the airspace of another country en route to a third, destination country; 2. Second Freedom: the right for airlines of one country on flight to another the rights to make a stop in an intermediate country for the purposes of refueling, emergency, or maintenance, although short of allowing carriers to collect or discharge passengers or cargo while making a stop; 3. Third Freedom: allow airlines of a country carry passengers and cargo from its home country to a second country; 4. Fourth Freedom: allow airlines of a country to carry passengers and cargo from a second country back to the carrier’s home country; 5. Fifth Freedom: the right to carriers to transport passengers from its home country to a second country, and then pick up passengers in that second country and proceed to a third country. At least four more freedom rights, not included in the Chicago Convention, were introduced through subsequent agreements which were negotiated between two or more governments, defined as follows: 1. Sixth Freedom: the right to transport passengers or cargo between two different foreign countries, with the carrier’s home country serving as a stop in between;

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2. Seventh Freedom: the right to transport passengers or cargo between two different foreign countries, without stopping at the carrier’s home country; 3. Eighth Freedom: the right to fly and carry passengers from their home country to a point in another country, then to another point in the same second country; also known as “cabotage”; 4. Ninth Freedom: gives carriers of one country the right to fly and carry passengers between two points within a foreign country, without the need to serve the home country as the origin or final destination; also known as “full/standalone cabotage” or “open skies.”

Geography of Airports Usually, an “airport” does not compose of a pair or runways and a terminal building alone; to accommodate in the advancements in technology and growing demand in air transport, it has to have a vast space, enough to accommodate additional structures such as hangars, cargo warehouses, airline offices, space for maintenance, parking lots, and so on. Because aircraft are getting larger and larger as the industry scrambles to transport more people using bigger or more aircraft, bigger terminals and longer runways may have to be constructed as well. But besides the specifications in the sizes and makeup of airports and how much space do they take up in a specific area, there is much more to analyze and find out. In studying air transport geography, it is crucial look into the spatial context in which air transport facilities are being erected, i.e., airport sites. Furthermore, the functions of each single airport relative to the air transport network also need to be analyzed and determined. In studying and determining the most suitable sites to erect an airport complex, for instance, physical geographic considerations play a fundamental and significant role. First, ideally, an airport has to be built over a vast tract of flat land without any topographic obstructions. It has to be placed far enough from the nearest residential areas in order to not cause pollution (such as noise) to people, therefore it needs additional space to serve as buffer zones from the general populace, but not too far to cause problems in accessibility. The climate, wind, temperature, and other climatological variables are also items for consideration, since they may pose long-term safety risks on aircrafts and passengers. Public transportation linking the airport terminals to the urban centers, with various points to collect and discharge passenger traffic, is also crucial. In increasingly expanding urban areas, the search for suitable candidates for airport space in proximity to the local urban population is becoming a more difficult struggle over the years. The selection of space is something that should not be done hastily, since an airport fixture cannot be easily modified or removed in the long run. Besides the amount of space the airport complex aims to occupy, surrounding land use types must also be taken into proper consideration. If no such land in suitable proximity with the urban areas remains, then developers may have to be located to the outskirts of the urban areas; however, this option poses a set of political, social, and environmental issues as well, as it involves massive land conversion from forest or agricultural areas and the loss of land and wildlife and the displacement of the local inhabitants, such as farmers and Indigenous people. Landowners may have to be given proper compensation in exchange for the parcels of land. Furthermore, occupation of peripheral areas raises issues of accessibility from its consumers. Therefore, additional transportation modes and infrastructures may have to be considered, such as railways, expressways, and various modes of public and freight transportation. These all cause the developers (i.e., the government) to incur additional costs and employ additional resources, more than what is originally planned. In extreme cases even, developers opt to reclaim portions of the bays and other open bodies of water to build an artificial parcel of land, as demonstrated by Osaka’s Kansai International Airport in Japan. Of course, all these decisions correspond to environmental costs of various degrees, be it to terrestrial resources (forests and farmland) or in bodies of water such as coral reefs and fishes. In Manila, Philippines, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) is placed within the city of Parañaque at the southern portion of the Manila metropolis, where there is an abundance of residential and commercial areas. Furthermore, there are no railways or regular public transportation which specifically go to the airport complex, save for a few expensive point-to-point buses and taxicabs. As a result, there is usually heavy traffic congestion along the roads leading to the airport and passengers need to adjust in their behavior, such as leaving their homes or hotels well in advance in expectation of the heavy traffic, order to not miss their flights. It gives passengers an added layer of hassle and can be discriminating against those who do not have their own private transportation or cannot afford taxicabs, ride-hailing services such as Grabs, or point-to-point buses. On the other hand, Clark International Airport, another major airport, which services the capital and its surrounding provinces and is seen as an alternative in order to decongest NAIA, is located 92 km northwest of Manila and may only be reached, if not by private vehicles, by hourly buses offered by one or two companies. This limitation raises limitations on the service capabilities of the airport, and on whether it can be a viable alternative. In an air transport network, each airport component plays an important function in making sure that passengers and cargo are transported in the most efficient way; therefore studying its function play a significant role in the geography of airports. In one network, airports may either be primary/hub airports, spoke airports, or secondary airports. Depending on the actual dimensions, layers, and interconnections of the networks, each airport may serve multiple roles at the same time. Hubs, which may loosely be defined as principal operating airports being serviced by air carriers, are more strictly defined as the integrated transport complex where a carrier concentrates its resources to generate considerably significant passenger and cargo traffic and maximize profits. A mass collection and generation of this traffic to be transported in a synchronized mode to less significant airports in the network, known as spokes, and in return, receive another wave of generated traffic. Hubs aim to collect

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Aviation Hub-and-spoke network of Philippine Airlines (PR).

Primary hubs Secondary hubs Domestic destinations (spokes) International destinations

Manila (MNL) Cebu (CEB), Davao (DVO), Clark (CRK), Kalibo (KLO) General Santos (GES), Cagayan de Oro (CGY), Puerto Princesa (PPS) Auckland (AKL), Bali-Denpasar (DPS), Bangkok (BKK), Beijing (PEK), Brisbane (BNE), Busan (PUS), Chengdu (CTU), Dammam (DMM), Doha (DOH), Dubai (DXB), Fukuoka (FUK), Guam (GUM), Guangzhou (CAN), Ho Chi Minh (SGN), Hong Kong (HKG), Honolulu (HNL), Jakarta (CGK), Jeju (CJU), Kuala Lumpur (KUL), London-Gatwick (LGW), Los Angeles (LAX), Macau (MFM), Melbourne (MEL), Nagoya (NGO), Nanning (NNG), New York City (JFK), Osaka-Kansai (KIX), Port Moresby (POM), Quanzhou (JJN), Riyadh (RUH), San Francisco (SFO), Sapporo (CTS), Seoul-Incheon (ICN), Shanghai (PVG), Singapore (SIN), Sydney (SYD), Taipei (TPE), Tokyo-Haneda (HND), Tokyo-Narita (NRT), Toronto (YYZ), Vancouver (YVR), Xiamen (XMN)

Table created from Philippine Airlines website.

passengers and cargo from the periphery areas and arrange them at the hub before flying them to their final destinations. This system theoretically increases the efficiency of the carriers that use hubs, since the movement of their aircraft and scheduled traffic are more coordinated and synchronized with each other. For instance, Philippine Airlines, Philippines’ flag carrier, has commercial passenger services currently serving 8 domestic destinations and 58 international destinations in Asia, Oceania, North America, and Europe. Currently, its main hub is the NAIA in Manila, and has secondary hubs in Mactan–Cebu, Davao, Clark, and Kalibo (see Table 1). In contrast, low-cost or budget carriers, which offer flights and services in a relatively cheaper price than legacy/traditional carriers, supplement the transportation of people to and from urban areas without having to utilize the major hub airports, which are most likely already congested and whose fees are higher, paving way to the emergence of secondary airports. Budget carriers also are capable of reaching minor airports, whose landing fees are lower than those of major international airports and are less significant for legacy carriers, and are more convenient for tourists going to countryside destinations. An example of a low-cost carrier with hubs and spokes is Cebu Pacific, another airline in the Philippines and the oldest low-cost carrier in Asia, established in 1988. It shares hubs with Philippine Airlines at Manila and few other airports such as Cebu, Kalibo, Clark, and Davao. However, it serves far more domestic destinations than Philippine Airlines, currently at 37, and an additional 27 international destinationsdmaking it the most domestic network in the Philippines. Table 2 shows the route network of Cebu Pacific. Nevertheless, airports are major drivers of economic development in a particular area. Airports promote both the connection and the competition between cities and are multidimensional spaces of high complexity. John Kasarda introduced concept of the aerotropolis (the airport-centered city). While they may require enormous capital and operating costs, airports are capable of providing returns of investment and profit to the operators, and in the long run, to the economy. Airports directly generate thousands of jobs in its need to be equipped with competent personnel. Furthermore, new urban areas, residences, commercial areas, and so on, are needed to cater to the needs to those who work for the airport and the airlines that use the airport, thereby fostering local economic growth and causing business and employment to thrive in the surrounding area. Furthermore, as there is a need to transport freight and other manufactured goods as efficiently as possible, airports also encourage the development of industrial areas and appropriate modes of transportation and infrastructures.

Table 2

Hub-and-spoke network of Cebu Pacific (5J).

Primary hubs Secondary hubs Domestic destinations (spokes)

International destinations

Table created from Cebu Pacific website.

Manila (MNL) Cebu (CEB), Davao (DVO), Clark (CRK), Kalibo (KLO), Iloilo (ILO), Cagayan de Oro (CGY) Busuanga (USU), Butuan (BXU), Calbayog (CYP), Camiguin (CGM), Caticlan (MPH), Cauayan (CYZ), Cotabato (CBO), Dipolog (DPL), Dumaguete (DGT), General Santos (GES), Legazpi (LGP), Masbate (MBT), Naga (WNP), Ormoc (OMC), Ozamiz (OZC), Pagadian (PAG), Puerto Princesa (PPS), Roxas (RXS), San Jose (SJI), Siargao (IAO), Surigao (SUG), Tablas (TBH), Tacloban (TAC), Tagbilaran (TAG), Tandag (TDG), Tawi-Tawi (TWT), Tuguegarao (TUG), Virac (VRC), Zamboanga (ZAM) Bali-Denpasar (DPS), Bandar Seri Begawan (BWN), Bangkok (BKK), Beijing (PEK), Busan (PUS), Dubai (DXB), Fukuoka (FUK), Guam (GUM), Guangzhou (CAN), Hanoi (HAN), Ho Chi Minh (SGN), Hong Kong (HKG), Jakarta (CGK), Kaohsiung (KHH), Kota Kinabalu (BKI), Kuala Lumpur (KUL), Macau (MFM), Melbourne (MEL), Nagoya (NGO), Osaka-Kansai (KIX), Phuket (HKT), SeoulIncheon (ICN), Shanghai (PVG), Siem Reap (REP), Singapore (SIN), Sydney (SYD), Taipei (TPE), Tokyo-Narita (NRT), Xiamen (XMN)

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Aircrafts The development in the technology of the aircrafts also significant contributed to the evolution in the geography of air transport networks and how we understand them today. From the first commercial flight, the St. Petersburg–Tampa Airboat Service in 1913, to the revolutionary Douglas DC-3, which carried up to 32 passengers in the 1930s and was predecessor to most passenger aircraft, today the public can enjoy transcontinental flights using aircraft of gigantic proportions and unprecedented technological advancements, most of which put emphasis on increasing the speed and capacity of aircrafts without compromising necessary safety measures. The ranges covered by today’s aircraft are classified into three realms: regional, international, and intercontinental. Indeed, in the development of more sophisticated aircraft paved the way for nonstop flights across destinations in different continents, drastically reducing travel time from several days to a few hours. The route from London to Cape Town, South Africa originally spanned 11 days with a staggering 27 stops, mainly to refuel the aircraft. On the other hand, the longest nonstop flight from Singapore to Newark, New Jersey, which came into service in October 2018, takes only 19 h covering a distance of about 15,340 km (9531 miles). This is thanks to a family of long-haul aircrafts that can withstand nonstop intercontinental services, such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, one of the most advanced aircraft to date, having a range of up to 12,000 km (7456 miles). Indeed, such technological changes in the equipment and the power of the aircrafts being developed and used have also drastically changed what we consider as short and long flights. Flight length, simply the distance covered by a single flight, is widely accepted to be classified into three: (1) short-haul flights, (2) mid-haul flights, and (3) long-haul flights. Additionally, there are also known to be “ultra-long-haul flights,” which are considered to be the longest in the world, takes more than 12 h to cover, and are also often nonstop. Short-haul flights are generally accepted to take 3 h or less, medium-haul flights 3–6 h, long-haul flights 6–12 h, and ultra-long-haul flights more than 12 h. There are varying definitions of these categories of flight distances, which differ from one airline to another, and one airport to another, in terms of time duration and/or absolute flight distance. For instance, Japan Airlines considers flights flown to Europe and North America as long-haul flights, while the rest as short-haul. On the other hand, American Airlines, the world’s largest airline by fleet size, considers short- and medium-haul flights to be those covering a distance less than 4800 km (2983 miles), and those longer to be long-haul. Furthermore, it also considers flights flown between New York and San Francisco/Los Angeles, located on the northeastern and southwestern ends of the contiguous United States, to be long-haul. Last, Eurocontrol, an organization that focuses on safety aviation in Europe, considers flights shorter than 1500 km as short-haul, those between 1500 and 4000 km (932 and 2485 miles) as medium-haul, and those longer than 4000 km (2485 miles) to be long-haul. The shortest commercial flight in the world is a flight between Westray and Papa Westray in the United Kingdom, and has an actual air time of more than just 1 min. Consequently, airlines also employ different types of aircraft, which have differing abilities to cater to flights of different lengths. Airbus and Boeing are the two largest manufacturers of aircraft around the world, and have a wide range of aircraft with different physical characteristics. Mostly, wide-bodied aircraft are used for long-haul and ultra-long-haul flights while narrow-bodied aircraft for shorter ones. There is a growing trend among airlines, especially in Asia-Pacific, to use aircraft capable of flying long-haul in rather short-haul routes. For instance, 40% of Airbus A350 flights are used for routes shorter than 3700 km (2299 miles), while flights shorter than 9300 km (5779 miles) account for 80% for Boeing 787-9’s routes. Table 3 shows the types of aircrafts produced and are currently in use and their categorization according to flight distance they are capable of covering. Note that these are the ranges of the aircraft that can theoretically, and does not necessarily, mean that they are used by airlines only for such range.

Contemporary Aviation Trends The air transport industry is one of the most rapidly changing among the transport industries in the world. Just in the past three decades, the industry has seen a continuous rise in passenger demand, due to the continuous rise in the economic status and disposable incomes of citizens, expansion of fleet size and innovations in aircraft design and construction, stricter regulations for the security and safety of air transport, and tightening competition among carriers. ICAO, on its annual report for 2016, reported that there were more than 3.8 billion passengers which were carried by scheduled aircraft services around the world, amounting to a 6.8% increase from 2015. Furthermore, scheduled services carried around Table 3

Commercial aircraft types categorized by flight distance.

Short-haul flights Medium-haul flights Long-haul flights Ultra-long-haul flights

Boeing 717, MD-88, MD-90, Boeing 737, Embraer E-190 Airbus A320, Airbus A321, Airbus A319, Airbus A318, Boeing 737-300, Boeing 737-400, Boeing 737-500, Boeing 737-600, Boeing 737-700, Boeing 737-800, Boeing 737-900, Boeing 737-900ER, Boeing 757-200, Boeing 757-300 Airbus A330, Airbus A340, Airbus A350, Airbus A380, Boeing 747, Boeing 767, Boeing 777, Boeing 787 Boeing 777-200LR, Boeing 787-9, Airbus A340-500, Airbus A350-900, Airbus A380-800

Table created from data of Flightglobal.com.

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Figure 2 Traffic by route area, percentage of international revenue passenger-kilometers, 2018. Created from World Air Transport Statistics by International Air Transport Association (IATA).

53 million tonnes of freight, a 4.0% increase. There were 35 million scheduled commercial flights flown by airlines, a 3.7% increase. Over 54,000 routes were recorded to be open from 2015’s 52,000. There were also currently more than 1400 scheduled airlines and more than 4100 airports globally. In order to measure the performance of the entirety of the aviation industries, various parameters are used, such as the number of enplanements, the overall weight of the cargo accommodated, revenues generated, among others. Currently, the majority of air traffic is concentrated within and between three world regions: Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America (Fig. 2). The air traffic in European continent is mainly concentrated in Western Europe, from London and Amsterdam, through Paris and Frankfurt, to Madrid, Barcelona, and Rome. In fact, London Heathrow, Amsterdam Schiphol, Paris Charles de Gaulle, and Frankfurt am Main constantly rank as the top four busiest airports in the whole continent, with Heathrow has consistently placed at the first rank, with more than 80 million passengers served in 2018. On the other hand, Istanbul Ataturk, which is situated in the European side of Turkey, also continues to stand at the fifth place since 2016, as it is playing a significant role as the Eastern gateway to the rest of the continent and a major airport for layovers. As for North America, a noticeable pattern of air transport geography is in the form of various hubs operated by numerous carriers offering transport across a wide variety of directions within the continent, mostly connecting passenger or freight traffic from one urban area to another, or serving as major regional collection points from peripheral areas. The flows of air traffic within the continent mostly follow a north–south route, such as along the coasts of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans serving the major coastal urban centers such as New York, Los Angeles, and Miami, as well as transcontinental traffic plying east–west routes. The Hartsfield–Jackson Airport in Atlanta, Georgia (USA), has consistently ranked as the busiest airport in the world, serving 104 million passengers in 2016 (Fig. 3). Table 4 shows the top 10 airlines in the world in terms of RPK in 2018. Airlines from North America still lead the rankings, clinching four out of the top five. Meanwhile, three of China’s airlines are also in the top 10. The Asia-Pacific market is currently the trailblazer in the whole industry. Flows of the traffic are concentrated among major hubs servicing various routes to and from the rest of Asia, Ocean, and even to and from Europe and North America. Currently, the strongest areas of traffic consist of Tokyo’s Haneda/Narita and Seoul’s Incheon to the North, China’s Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing, and to the hubs of Bangkok, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur down South. The rapid rise in the consumption of air transport as a mode of transportation is largely attributed to the fast economic development and rise in the disposable incomes of the people of China and Southeast Asian countries, in addition to already high economic development in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. This change is also attributed to the rising tourism industry in the region, which has taken pride on its numerous tourist destinations, especially for intraregional travelers and from the West. From Table 5, half (or 10) out of the top 20 busiest airports in terms of passenger traffic were from Asia and the Pacific, while North America and Europe had five each in the rankings. Furthermore, 3 out of the top 5 were from Asia. It could only be inferred as a rapid, continued development in the air transport industry of the whole continent, as well as the increasing accessibility to this mode of transportation among Asia’s population of almost 4.5 billion, which is more than half of the total world population. As seen in Table 6, airports in East Asia also continue to the top rankings of the world’s busiest airports in terms of cargo traffic, with Hong Kong topping at more than 4.5 million tonnes transported in 2016, closely followed by Shanghai and Seoul-Incheon at 3.3 and 2.6 million tonnes, respectively. The leadership of Asian airports in terms of cargo transport can be mostly attributed to the continued economic development of East Asian countries, which are heavily reliant on manufacturing industries and shipment of various specialized, high-technology goods to the rest of the world.

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Figure 3 Traffic by route area, percentage of international freight tonne-kilometers in 2018. Created from World Air Transport Statistics by International Air Transport Association (IATA).

Table 4

Top 20 airline groups in the world by revenue passenger-kilometers (RPK), 2018

Rank

Airline group name

Revenue passenger-kilometers (RPK)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

American Airlines Group (USA) Delta Air Lines Group (USA) United Continental (USA) Emirates (UAE) Lufthansa Group (Germany) International Airlines Group (UK) Air France-KLM (France) China Southern Airlines (China) Southwest Airlines (USA) Air China (China) China Eastern Airlines (China) Ryanair (Ireland) Qatar Airways (Qatar) Air Canada Group (Canada) Turkish Airlines (Turkey) Aeroflot Group (Russia) Singapore Airlines (Singapore) Cathay Pacific Group (Hong Kong) Hainan Airlines Group (China) Qantas Group (Australia)

364,191 350,299 347,963 292,221 152,214 252,819 248,476 230,697 207,802 146,961 150,916 160,000 146,023 136,985 136,947 130,222 129,798 126,663 121,223 121,178

Table created from FlightGlobal: Worldwide Airline Rankings for 2018.

In the past decades, the growing demand for air transport and the clamor for affordability gave rise to low-cost or budget carriers, such as Southwest Airlines and Ryanair, whose successful business model shifted the playing field for airlines and formidably challenged legacy/traditional carriers. Furthermore, such carriers made promising advances in the aspect of air transport, by being capable of transporting middle-class holidaymakers across various domestic and international destinations. ICAO reported in 2016 that low-cost carriers had an overall 28.8% share in scheduled passengers, amounting to 10.5% growth in 2016dtwice as much as the growth of other types of carriers. In 2018, Ireland-based Ryanair, a pioneer budget carrier established in 1984, was ranked by FlightGlobal in 2018 as the 12th largest airline in the world in terms of scheduled passengers flown and the largest in Europe. Currently, it has a fleet size of more than 400 aircraft which serve over 200 destinations in Europe, North Africa, and Middle East. Subsequently, various budget carriers have sprouted worldwide, most notably in the Asia-Pacific, in which citizens of still developing countries can buy tickets for intraregional tourism. AirAsia, a popular Southeast Asian low-cost carrier, has been rated by SkyTrax in 2018 as the “world’s best low-cost carrier” for the 10th consecutive year.

274 Table 5

Aviation Top 20 busiest airports in the world in terms of passenger traffic, 2017

Rank

Airport name

Number of passengers serviced (2017)

Number of passengers serviced (2016)

Percentage change

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Atlanta, GA, US (ATL) Beijing, CN (PEK) Dubai, AE (DXB) Tokyo, JP (HND) Los Angeles, CA, US (LAX) Chicago, IL, US (ORD) London, GB (LHR) Hong Kong, HK (HKG) Shanghai, CN (PVG) Paris, FR (CDG) Amsterdam, NL (AMS) Dallas/Forth Worth, TX, USA (DFW) Guangzhou, CN (CAN) Frankfurt, DE (FRA) Istanbul, TR (IST) New Delhi, IN (DEL) Jakarta, ID (CGK) Singapore, SG (SIN) Incheon, KR (ICN) Denver, CO, US (DEN)

103,902,992 95,786,442 88,242,099 85,408,975 84,557,968 79,828,183 78,014,598 72,664,075 70,001,237 69,471,442 68,515,425 67,092,194 65,887,473 64,500,386 64,119,374 63,451,503 63,015,620 62,220,000 62,157,834 61,379,396

104,171,935 94,393,454 83,654,250 79,699,762 80,921,527 77,960,588 75,715,474 70,305,857 66,002,414 65,933,145 63,625,534 65,670,697 59,732,147 60,786,937 60,422,847 54,504,841 58,195,484 58,698,000 57,849,814 58,266,515

-0.3 1.5 5.5 6.5 4.5 2.4 3.0 3.4 6.1 5.4 7.7 2.3 10.3 6.1 6.1 14.1 8.3 6.0 7.5 5.3

Table created from Airports Council International (ACI) data of 2018.

Table 6

Top 20 busiest airports in the world in terms of freight tonnes, 2017

Rank

Airport name

Total freight serviced in metric tonnes (2017)

Total freight serviced in metric tonnes (2016)

Percentage change

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Hong Kong (HKG) Memphis (MEM) Shanghai (PVG) Incheon (ICN) Anchorage (ANC) Dubai (DXB) Louisville (SDF) Tokyo (NRT) Taipei (TPE) Paris (CDG) Frankfurt (FRA) Singapore, SG (SIN) Los Angeles, CA, US (LAX) Miami, FL, US (MIA) Beijing, CN (PEK) Doha, QA (DOH) London, GB (LHR) Guangzhou, CN (CAN) Amsterdam, NL (AMS) Chicago, IL, US (ORD)

5,049,898 4,336,752 3,824,280 2,921,691 2,713,230 2,654,494 2,602,695 2,336,427 2,269,585 2,195,229 2,194,056 2,164,700 2,158,324 2,071,722 2,029,584 2,020,942 1,794,276 1,780,423 1,778,382 1,721,807

4,615,241 4,322,071 3,440,280 2,714,341 2,542,526 2,592,454 2,437,010 2,165,427 2,097,228 2,135,172 2,113,594 2,006,300 1,993,308 2,014,205 1,943,159 1,758,074 1,640,400 1,652,215 1,694,729 1,528,136

9.4 0.2 11.2 7.6 6.7 2.4 6.8 7.9 8.2 2.8 3.8 7.9 8.1 2.9 4.5 15.0 9.4 7.8 4.9 12.6

Airports Council International - ACI, 2018.

Conclusion In a relatively short span of over 100 years, the air transport industry, one of the newest prevailing modes of transportation, has revolutionized the way people, goods, and services are transported around the world in unprecedented proportions. Rapid technological advancement in aircraft and airports as well as progresses in the business model of airlines and the tightening competition demanding for breakthroughs in provision of services have also made air transport one of the safest and most convenient modes of

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transportation over large distances. Cities located at different sides of the world, i.e., more than 10,000 km (6210 miles) apart from each other, are now reachable through nonstop flights spanning less than a day. With the economic miracle of many countries and the improvement of the standards of living, as well as the introduction of low-cost carriers, air transport has become more accessible to wider range of people across various social stratifications. Indeed, air transport has continued to rise in use in various regions of the world: originally (and still so) robust in North America, it has also found concrete ground in Asia-Pacific and Europe, and links continue to develop across more city pairs and routes as airlines increase their fleet and countries open new airports. Annually, records in passenger and cargo traffic continue to be broken with the improvement in facilities and more efficient services. The statistics which have been created and presented have shown interesting changes in air transport trends every few years. As air transport is a rapidly evolving industry with ever-changing demands and supplies, the studies of it have to be continuously updated in accord with its growing trends. Trends observed within the past decade may not be necessarily true in the coming decade, as the industry continues to head for breakthroughs, and each individual economic, political, and social evolution of the countries change. Therefore, as an important discipline in studying air transport, the field of geography needs to be able to reinforce what it knows, and from what it knows, it may be able to predict future trends and changes in air transport.

See Also: Accessibility; Corridor and Axis Development; Diffusion; Distance; Economic Geography; Fordism; Global Commodity Chains; Governance, Transport; Hinterland Development; Transport Geography; Transport and Accessibility; Transport and Deregulation; Transport and Globalization; Transportation and Land Use.

Further Reading Graham, B., 1992. International air transport. In: Modern Transport Geography, first ed. Belhaven Press, New York, pp. 311–335. Kasarda, J.D., Lindsay, G., 2011. Aerotropolis: The Way We’ll Live Next. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Pearson, J., Oconnell, J.F., Pitfield, D., Ryley, T., 2015. The strategic capability of Asian network airlines to compete with low-cost carriers. J. Air Transp. Manag. 47, 1–10. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2015.03.006. State of Global, 2017. Air Transport and ICAO Forecasts for Effective Planning (Rep.). ICAO Air Transport Bureau. Vowles, T.M., 2009. Aviation. In: International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, first ed. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 257–264.

Relevant Websites 2016 Cargo Summary - Annual Traffic Data. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/cargo/2016-final-summary/. 2017 Cargo Summary - Annual Traffic Data. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/cargo/2017-cargo-summary-annual-traffic-data. 2016 Passenger Summary - Annual Traffic Data. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/passengers/2016-final-summary/. 2017 Passenger Summary - Annual Traffic Data. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/passengers/2017-passenger-summary-annual-traffic-data/. Allal-Cherif, O., February 22, 2019. Turbulent Ride: How the Airbus A380 Went from a High-Tech Marvel to a Commercial Flop. Retrieved from: https://scroll.in/article/913994/ turbulent-ride-how-the-airbus-a380-went-from-a-high-tech-marvel-to-a-commercial-flop. Blau, C., October 04, 2018. The 10 Busiest Airports in the World. Retrieved from: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/lists/transportation/worlds-busiest-airports-things-todo-layover/. Boeing 787 Dreamliner. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://www.boeing.com/commercial/787/. Camus, M.R., March 15, 2018. DOTr Totally Shuts Door on Miascor. Retrieved from: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/975630/dotr-totally-shuts-door-on-miascor-miascor-dotrduterte-service-provider. Cebu Pacific Air. (n.d.). Where We Fly. Retrieved from: https://www.cebupacificair.com/pages/plan-trip/our-network/where-we-fly. Douglas DC-3. (n.d.). Retrieved from: http://www.aviation-history.com/douglas/dc3.html. Featured Destinations. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://www.philippineairlines.com/en/featureddestinations#. Flight Global, 2019. World Airline Rankings 2018. Retrieved from: http://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/World-airline-rankings-2018.pdf. Flight length, May 2017. Retrieved from: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Flight_length.html. IATA World Air Transport Statistics 2018 Infographic. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://www.iata.org/docx/WATS-industry-infographic.pdf. ICAO States Today and Tomorrow. (2018). Retrieved from: https://www.icao.int/publications/journalsreports/2018/ICAO _States_Today_Document.pdf. INFOGRAPHIC, March 28, 1970. Asia-Pacific Ultra-long-range Flights. Retrieved from: https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/infographic-asia-pacific-ultra-long-range-flights447117/. List of airports in the Philippines. (n.d.). Retrieved from: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/List_of_airports_in_the_ Philippines.html. Sharp, T. (May 22, 2018). World’s First Commercial Airline. the Greatest Moments in Flight. Retrieved from: https://www.space.com/16657-worlds-first-commercial-airline-thegreatest-moments-in-flight.html.

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B Becoming Derek P McCormack, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp 277–281, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Becoming Theory of a conceptualization of the world as a dynamic and open-ended system of relational transformations. Being The existence and essence of an entity. Duration A conception of time as a lived process of intensive differentiation. More-than-human geographies Geographies that take seriously the role of nonhuman agents in shaping space and place. Ontogenetic A term derived from developmental biology but now often used to describe the kind of continuous differentiation associated with becoming. Ontology The philosophical inquiry into the nature of existence and being. Spacing Spatiality conceived as an ongoing process rather than a noun. Virtual Something which is real (insofar as it produces an effect) without being actual (insofar as it cannot be located within or defined as an object or discrete entity), for example, memory.

Becoming designates a process-based ontology of movement, in which the world is conceived of as a dynamic and open-ended set of relational transformations. Becoming is frequently distinguished from and sometimes opposed to being, with the latter suggesting essential and relatively enduring entities (real or ideal) upon which existence, thought, ethics, etc., can be grounded. For philosophies of becoming, in contrast, such categories are generally understood to be the provisional outcome “of”, rather than the precondition “for”, change. Given how becoming suggests flux, change, and continuous transformation, it might appear to be something about which human geography has always been concerned: after all, geographers have often defined their disciplinary interest in terms of a concern with how humans have transformed their natural environments. Yet while much of human geography has clearly involved inquiry into processes of spatial transformation, such inquiry has often proceeded via a belief in the necessity of establishing certain fixed ontological and epistemological reference points which themselves are unchanging. The most obvious of these ontological reference points is space, often understood as a kind of preexisting, three-dimensional container within which things and events take place. On an intuitive level, this seems relatively unproblematic. Yet it has an important limitation: space itself is not bound up in the process of changedit exists instead as a kind of fixed grid within which transformation unfolds. This ontological claim is linked with an epistemological one: namely, that knowledge is the purview of a knowing subject with the capacity to survey the world from a position of objective independence. Much geographical knowledge is premised upon such claims: insofar as this is the case, such knowledge has allied itself with philosophies of being. The primacy and legitimacy of such claims have more recently been questioned by human geographers interested in trying to understand space itself as a process: one best understood in terms of becoming rather than being. Reconceptualizing space in this way has implications for the theoretical and methodological practice of human geography. Most importantly, it has encouraged human geographers to understand the very activity of geographical thinking as the folding of theory and practice into one another as a process of ongoing differentiation.

A Brief Genealogy of Becoming The increasing visibility of ideas of becoming in human geography might easily be read as a conceptual response to the spatiotemporal disjunctions of modernity, postmodernity, or globalization. Becoming, more than being, seems to capture the dynamic logics of worlds where the coordinates of identity and place seem increasingly fluid. Yet philosophies of flux are not mere symptoms or reflections of the contemporary condition: they have a much longer genealogy. Sketching the outlines of this genealogy provides

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a useful and necessary way of contextualizing the more recent reemergence of the concept of becoming within the theoretical and empirical commitments of human geography. The respective works of the pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides provide a useful (if also thoroughly Western) point of departure for such an exercise insofar as their writings effectively exemplify the tension between being and becoming as philosophical categories. For the former, the world is best understood as flux and motion, akin to the ceaseless flow of a river into which it is never possible to step more than once. Furthermore, this flow is not uniform: it is a lively mix of often contrasting and conflicting forces. The Heraclitean view of the world as flux contrasts sharply with the ideas attributed to Parmenides for whom the claim that change is the fundamental condition of the world is based upon an illusory or false perception. The truth of the world lies instead in the apprehension of those enduring things which have always and will always exist. The difference between Heraclitus and Parmenides provides an early and oft-quoted expression of the distinction between a philosophy of being, in which everything that truly exists has a fixed, eternal essence, and a philosophy of becoming in which the universe is defined by change. Much of Western philosophy has been dominated by the former tradition, a dominance that can be traced through some of the key thinkers of this tradition. It is present, for instance, in Plato’s argument for the existence of unchanging ideal forms, an argument indebted to the writing of Parmenides. It is present in the effort by much of the Western philosophical canon to establish the existence of an enduring, transcendent God. And it is present in the effort to establish the foundations for a rational philosophy of mind. Perhaps the most important articulation of such a philosophy is contained in the work of René Descartes, who posits the mind (and/or soul) as a nonextensive center of pure understanding in the midst of a world of mobile and motile bodies, to which the mind is loosely and conveniently connected yet nevertheless fundamentally distinct. The significance of this move is that it excludes the mind from any claims about the becoming of the world. In this philosophical model, the world may change as much as it likes: the independent and indivisible substance of which the mind consists is the one thing upon which thinking can depend. Philosophies placing primacy on the establishment of categories of being (such as the subject) have achieved a degree of dominance in Western thinking: yet they have not gone unchallenged. This challenge has come from a number of “minor” strands of thinking, each of which might be said to foreground becoming rather than being. The first consists of the work of a number of “minor” philosophers whose thinking runs against the grain of the tradition outlined above by challenging the assumption that the mind is independent from and unaffected by transformations of the body. Perhaps the most important figures here are Spinoza and Nietzsche. For Spinoza, mind and body are conceived as two attributes of the same substance, and individual entities, such as persons, are understood as complex, relational orderings between bodies and environments. It makes little sense therefore to speak of the soul or mind as a kind of transcendent entity unaffected by the becoming of the world of which it is a part. Nor would such a claim make much sense to Nietzsche, according to whom the very idea of “being” represents an illusory image of the world. In this respect, Nietzsche echoes and indeed draws directly upon the ideas of Heraclitus, defining the world by the fact of its becoming, by the ongoing play of conflicting forces and energies that never crystallize into a final shape. A second important impetus to the foregrounding of becoming in Western philosophy can be found in theories of duration and process, exemplified in the respective works of Henri Bergson and Alfred Whitehead. Both thinkers grapple with some of the philosophical implications of changing conceptions of space and time emerging at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Century. The force of Bergson’s critique is directed against those theories of change which tend to “spatialize time” by subordinating it to a logic of extensiondprecisely the move made by thinkers such as Descartes. Bergson insists instead on the necessity of a conception of duration allowing for the existence of pure qualitative differentiation. If this seems to render temporality and movement abstract, it is because, to paraphrase Whitehead, the real task of philosophy is not to arrive at explanations of the concrete, but to explain abstractions. Influenced in part by Bergson, Whitehead develops a process-based ontology in which the very essence of being is the fact of its becoming. Or as he himself puts it, ‘‘the actual world is a process, and that process is the becoming of actual entities.’’ The work of Bergson and Whitehead is related to a third influence on the foregrounding of becoming as a philosophical imperative. This revolves around efforts to place primacy on the relation between thinking and the experience of pragmatic involvement in the world. Such efforts are best exemplified by two traditions, the first of which is the variety of North American pragmatism associated with William James and John Dewey. Key to the work of both thinkers is the idea that the world is not given in advance but must be made and remade through ongoing activity. A second and distinctly more European tradition can be discerned in the various strands of post-Cartesian phenomenology, most notably the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. While their respective works are very different, they both advocate a kind of philosophical inquiry into the category of being. On one level, this might place them at odds with philosophies of becoming, and in some respects, this is the case. Nevertheless, both insist on practical relational involvement in the world as the moving condition for existence. The influence of Merleau-Ponty’s work on flesh as a kind of intimate corporeally intertwining with the world has been particularly significant in this respect. A fourth set of influences moves beyond the phenomenological tradition to consider the “more-than-human” becomings from which the apparent individuality of the human subject emerges. Such postphenomenological arguments can be discerned, with different degrees of intensity, in the work of thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and more recently in the writing of Brian Massumi. These thinkers owe a debt to many of the figures whose work has already been mentioned above. For instance, drawing upon Nietzsche, Foucault develops a critique of history as the progressive and linear unfolding of time, and of the very status of the human as a subject with the capacity to survey history from without. Deleuze is similarly critical of philosophies of being in which the subject is established as a kind of a priori entity. Rather, and taking support from thinkers including Spinoza and Bergson, Deleuze argues that being is already multiple, already defined by the difference immanent to its own creative evolution. In collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze’s ideas are reworked as part of an explicitly cartographic geophilosophy emphasizing the creative and affective movement of life as a process of operating below and transversal to the scale of distinct, organized

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bodies and territories. Perhaps the most emphatic recent articulation of this line of thought is to be found in the writing of Brian Massumi, who articulates and practices a thinking space which takes seriously the moving fact of its own becoming. A fifth and final set of influences on the foregrounding of becoming in Western thought can be traced through feminist theories of embodiment and difference that challenge the primacy of sex and gender as fixed categories of identity. Here the work of thinkers such as Judith Butler, Donna Haraway, and Elizabeth Grosz is of particular significance. Clearly, individual feminist theorists differ in the extent to which they configure the relation between the sociocultural and the biological, and the degree to which the category of woman is essentialized. Yet their collective importance consists in the opening up of the spaces and politics of identity (and desire) to questions of becoming. Of course these developments do not add up to a coherent philosophical framework: they are better described as a set of conceptual tendencies with all sorts of contradictions and conflicts. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to claim that each of the thinkers above sharply juxtaposes the idea of being with that of becoming. So for Merleau-Ponty, for instance, it is possible to hold in tension “both” the idea of phenomenology as the philosophical enquiry into essences “and” the claim that this inquiry can only proceed if it acknowledges its own relational involvement in the world. And while sharply critical of elements of Merleau-Ponty’s work, Deleuze nevertheless retains the category of being in some of his own writing. However, in doing so, he seeks to complicate the apparent unity of this category. Put another way, for Deleuze it is only possible to speak of the event of being as a process of becoming that is always already differentiated.

Becomings/Geographies Although diverse, and often divergent, the philosophical tendencies outlined above have a number of important implications for the theoretical, empirical, and political commitments of human geography. First, and perhaps most obviously, they precipitate sustained reflection on the nature of space. To think of space in relation to becoming is to challenge the familiar spatial coordinates of Euclidean geometry. Space is not an unchanging, abstract container within which extensive objects are located and within which activity takes place. Nor is it prior to the positionality of an object. Rather, space, or more accurately, spacing, is better conceived in dynamic terms as a process of folding and refolding productive of what Marcus Doel (1996: 421–439) calls ‘‘scrumpled geography’’: a world of ‘‘continuous variation, becoming, and chance, rather than one of constancy, being and predictability.’’ To think of space in relation to ideas of becomingdas Doel does with particular energydis therefore to confront the fact that space is not an ideal form transcending the processual nature of involvement in the world. Space is better conceived as verb rather a noun. Second, and relatedly, to think of space through the logics of becoming is to problematize the separation of space from time. While this claim might seem obvious, it is potentially contentious in a discipline whose distinctiveness is bound up with understanding of space and spatiality. Such a claim also disturbs the argument that the social sciences need to rediscover space and spatiality, particularly in the wake of the collapse of grand historical narratives. The real question is not to rethink or reequilibrate the relation between space and time, but to think of both as part of the same material-semiotic process of becoming. This is not without difficulty. Hence our fondness, as Bergson noted, for spatializing time through certain habits of thinking that locate temporality within particular objects and entities or cut up the world into discrete quanta of representational content. There are however conceptual vehicles through which the temporal intensities of extensity can be made palpable: rhythm is one. In the work of social and spatial theorist Henri Lefebvre, rhythm is used to support a way of thinking through and apprehending the dynamic (and for him discontinuous) becoming of space–time. Third, if becoming precipitates a rethinking of space–time as a kind of rhythmic flux, it also demands a careful reassessment of the space of materiality. More specifically, notions of becoming complicate any attempt to “ground” the abstractions of theory in a relatively stable world of material entities and objects. Any spatially inflected theory of materiality, if it is not to collapse under the sheer fact of its own self-coincidence, must be able to account for the virtuality of durational differentiation outlined by thinkers such as Bergson, Deleuze, and Massumi. This is a crucial question as far as the issue of spatial transformation is concerned. If everything is actual then no possibility exists for transformationdor rather change is only possible in relation to already formed entities. Taking becoming seriously means that the material of space is not that around or through which becoming occurs. Rather, becomingdand its relative speeds and rhythmsdis part of what makes the materiality of space matter. In response to this claim, geographers are beginning, therefore, to develop ways of thinking through the transformative materiality of space and about how this transformation is facilitated by a range of technologies and technological practices. Consider, for example, software code. On one level, this might be understood as information that flows from one site to another. But the flow of code can also be understood to be part of how space becomes insofar as it provides for new ways of connecting, ordering, and inhabiting worlds. In this sense, code is not simple representational: it is also generative of new kinds of space. Such conceptual agitations of the spatiotemporal and material entanglements of geography by definition have important implications for the very “doing,” or practice, of geography. Not least of these is the fact that the conceptual element of geographical thinking is redefined as a practice caught up in the becoming of the world, and not as something surveying this flux from a position of distanced abstraction. This has important consequences for how basic geographical activities such as fieldwork are understood. Following Deleuze and Guattari, fieldwork can be rethought as a kind of “becoming minor”: a series of modest, performative interventions between the conceptual and the empirical. Such conceptions of fieldwork resonate with recent work within the discipline about how the becoming of space is entangled in questions of performance and performativity. It is also supported by the claims of nonrepresentational styles of work, particularly in the writing

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of Nigel Thrift, for whom theory is refigured as a conceptually charged set of mobile practices through which to apprehend the movement of an open-ended and ontogenetic world. Informed by such theoretical reorientations, we can trace becoming through the geographies of very ordinary practices. Consider, for instance, gardening. While such an activity might be dismissed as politically unimportant, it can also be more generously understood as practice of relational spacing that moves in the ambivalent zone between being and becoming, between the predictability of habit and the unexpectedness of potential for change, however minor. Focusing on such mundane practices also poses an important challenge to the primacy and fixity of the human as a kind of unchanging reference point for geographical thought. In this respect, theories and practices of becoming overlap with and supplement efforts to produce cartographies for a more-than-human world, involving animals, devices, and artifacts of various kinds that have always been hybrid. As Sarah Whatmore (2002) has argued, the task of such hybrid cartographies is to articulate ‘‘the fluxes of becoming that complicate the spacings–timings of social life.’’ If the idea of becoming complicates the boundaries between the human and nonhuman as distinct registers of being, it also creatively confuses the subdisciplinary boundaries that usually separate human and physical geography. Indeed, one of the key implications of taking seriously ideas of becoming is precisely such boundary confusion. Following Deleuze and Guattari, we can think of particular places as “blocks of becoming” composed of physical, social, technological, and political–economic forces. It makes little sensedconceptually and or empiricallydto try to abstract such forces from one another. In this respect, the idea of becoming provides an important element of a conceptual vocabulary that might better allow geographers to rethink complex questions that transcend the strict division between the human and physical side of the disciplinedclimate change being an obvious example. Here the task is not simply to link natural, social, and technological systems. Rather, each needs to be understood as a series of generative processes through which the very relations that constitute the environment are transformed. However, the challenge posed by philosophies of becoming is not just that they point to new ways of thinking about space. Such philosophies also demand a recasting of practices of geographical knowledge production. Put another way: to take seriously the becoming of the world is to cultivate a commitment to enactive styles of thinking and doing. This does not necessarily mean devising strange new practices or sites of eventful encounter, although it can. Rather, generating a sense of relations of becoming necessitates the cultivation of modes of address and techniques of writing that amplify the moving resonance of our ongoing involvement with the world.

Conclusion It is, of course, possible to raise various cautionary points about thinking space through ideas of becoming. Critics might very well claim that to foreground becoming is to cleave to an overly optimistic view of the potential for change. Nor are the ethicopolitical implications of such ideas always clear. Theories of becoming provoke suspicion insofar as they seem to erode the coherence and distinctness of agencies of and for change. Put another way, of what value is differentiation without agency if this differentiation cannot in some way become the focus for tactics and techniques of intervention? One might counter this critique with the observation that to foreground becoming is to extend agency across assemblages and blocks of space–time. It is also about harnessing the transformative potential immanent to open-ended spacingsdand in this sense, it is intensely political. Crucially, any spatial politics of becoming is poorly served by thinking of spaces in ontological termsdontology is insufficient to the task of thinking through geographies of becoming. What is required is an “ontogenetic” form of thinking spaceda form of thinking open to and attuned to its own capacity for variation, cultivating in the process an affective orientation not so much of optimism, but of hope.

See Also: Fluidity and Fixity; Performativity; Philosophy and Human Geography; Pragmatism.

Further Reading Anderson, B., 2006. Being and becoming hopeful: towards a theory of affect. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 24 (5), 733–752. Bergson, H., 1988. Matter and Memory. Paul, N.M., Palmer, W.S. (trans.). Zone Books, London. Bonta, M., 2005. Becoming-forest, becoming-local: transformations of a protected area in Honduras. Geoforum 36 (1), 95–112. Bonta, M., Protevi, J., 2004. Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. Crouch, D., 2003. Spacing, performing, and becoming: tangles in the mundane. Environ. Plan. 35 (11), 1945–1960. Deleuze, G., 1994. Difference and Repetition. Patton, P. (trans.). Athlone, London. Deleuze, G., Guattari, F., 1988. A Thousand Plateaus. Massumi, B. (trans.). Athlone, London. Dodge, M., Kitchin, R., 2005. Code and the transduction of space. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 95 (1), 162–180. Doel, M., 1996. A hundred thousand lines of flight: a machinic introduction to the nomad thought and scrumpled geography of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 14 (4), 421–439. Grosz, E. (Ed.), 1999. Becomings: Explorations in Time, Memory, and Futures. Cornell University Press, London. Katz, C., 1996. Toward minor theory. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 14 (4), 487–499. Lefebvre, H., 1991. The Production of Space. Nicholson-Smith, D. (trans.). Blackwell, Oxford. Lefebvre, H., 2004. Rhythmanalysis: Space Time and Everyday Life. Continuum, London.

Becoming Massey, D., 2005. For Space. Sage, London. Massumi, B., 1996. Becoming-Deleuzian. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 14 (4), 395–406. Massumi, B., 2002. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke University Press, London. May, J., Thrift, N., 2000. Time–Space: Geographies of Temporality. Routledge, London. Nietzsche, F., 1968. The Will to Power. Kaufmann, W., Hollingdale, R.J. (trans.). Vintage Books, New York. Spinoza, B., 1989. Ethics. Parkinson, G.H.R. (trans.). Everyman, London. Thrift, N., 1999. Steps to an ecology of place. In: Allen, J., Massey, D. (Eds.), Human Geography Today. Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 295–321. Thrift, N., 2004. Summoning life. In: Cloke, P., Goodwin, M., Crang, P. (Eds.), Envisioning Human Geographies. Arnold, London, pp. 81–103. Whatmore, S., 2002. Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces. Sage, London. Whitehead, A.N., 1978. Process and Reality. The Free Press, New York. Wylie, J., 2002. Becoming-icy: Scott and Amundsen’s polar voyages, 1910–1913. Cult. Geogr. 9 (3), 249–265.

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Behavioral Geography John R Gold, Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cognitive Behavioralism An approach which holds that people’s spatial behavior depends on how they understand (perceive, cognize) the world around them. Cognitive Mapping The processes by which individuals acquire, store, and recall information about the places in the environments with which they come into contact. Cognitive Science The branch of the science that studies the cognitive processes, which underpin the acquisition, storage, and use of knowledge. Ethology The comparative study of animal behavior. Gated Community A residential community protected by physical barriers or symbolic means in order to exclude intruders. Humanism A broad set of philosophies that focus on human reason, actions, and motives without reference to supernatural phenomena. Natural Hazard An extreme event in the physical environment, of geophysical or biological origin, that is injurious to human life and destructive to property. Satisficing Seeking to achieving a satisfactory outcome, rather than the optimal. Territoriality It refers to any form of behavior displayed by individuals and groups seeking to establish, maintain, or defend specific bounded portions of space.

Defining terms is an unusually important activity in the case of behavioral geography, since it has two historically contingent meanings. The first views it sensu lato as a primarily historical movement with multidisciplinary leanings that enjoyed its greatest influence between the years 1965 and 1980. Roughly coterminous with what was also known as “environmental perception,” “behavioral and perceptual geography,” “behavioral and cognitive geography,” or “image geography,” behavioral geography emphasized the role of cognitive processes in shaping decision-making and behavior, for which reason its underlying approach was known as “cognitive behavioralism.” In essence, its proponents argued that people’s spatial behavior depended on how they understood (perceived, cognized) the world around them but, like many broad-based movements, initial convergence masked underlying divergence. Researchers would soon recognize that there were considerable differences in the ways in which they conceived and tackled their subject matter. Some embraced “cognitive science,” examining regularities in human spatial cognition and behavior and using their findings as a basis from which to generate theories about how people make decisions and act in geographic space. Others looked to “humanistic” approaches. Critical of what they saw as the reductionist tendencies stemming from scientific inquiry in general and mainstream psychology in particular, they more often sought to understand human imagination and experience holistically rather than wishing to make overt connections with behavior. The second and more contemporary meaning of behavioral geography defines it sensu stricto as a subdiscipline of human geography. To some extent, this definition arose by default. Tensions between behavioral geography’s “cognitive science” and “humanistic” streams eventually led to these two schools of thought parting company by the early 1980s. Henceforth, the term “behavioral geography” described the work of those previously associated with the cognitive science wing and was largely confined to North America, where it maintained an accepted, specialized but increasingly marginal presence in geographical research and in the undergraduate teaching curriculum. At first glance, the existence of these two overlapping definitions would seem of little real consequence, but the failure to differentiate between them lies at the heart of the prevailing historiographic misrepresentations of behavioral geography. By the 1990s at least, the prevailing view was, first, that behavioral geography was primarily a limited extension of spatial science and, second, that the limitations of its underlying positivist philosophy led to it being challenged and replaced in linear sequence by alternative approaches. By failing to recognize its true scope as a broad movement that had provided a platform for nonpositivist as well as positivist approaches during the 1960s and 1970s, it became difficult to recognize behavioral geography’s contribution as a forum that once nurtured what was later termed “humanistic geography” and, indeed, indirectly helped to lay the foundations of the “new cultural geography.” This article, which is arranged chronologically, starts by looking at behavioral geography sensu lato. After examining its precursors, the initial sections analyze its underlying approaches, before dealing thematically with three significant foci for early cognitive behavioralist research in geography, namely: cognitive (mental) mapping, natural hazards, and attachment to place. The ensuing section notes the emergence of powerful bodies of criticism from radical and humanistic geographers, which effectively fractured the uneasy coexistence between positivist and nonpositivist approaches. The penultimate section of this article notes the continuing

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existence of behavioral geography sensu stricto, but points to its dual character as, on the one hand, a vibrant and specialized area of geographical research that, on the other hand, now occupies an increasingly peripheral position in the discipline as a whole. The conclusion considers future prospects, noting the continuing relevance of many of its central tenets, while accepting the unlikeliness of its regaining any degree of centrality within human geography as a shared platform for cognitive and behavioral studies.

Early Development The 1960s’ lasting reputation as a decade of fundamental and revolutionary change is mirrored in many fields of intellectual and creative endeavor, in which practitioners seized the opportunity to challenge doctrinal orthodoxy and to question established practices. Geography was no exception. Restlessness with the prevailing idea of human geography as a compendium of factual material about regions of the world combined with an intellectual curiosity that drew strength from a sudden and decisive weakening of disciplinary boundaries contributed to the advent of the theoretical–quantitative revolution and the rise of spatial analysis. These developments indelibly reshaped the discipline, influencing what geographers did and the methodologies that they adopted. Yet almost as soon as the new agenda of quantification and model building dawned, a significant groundswell gathered pace that had different preoccupations and priorities. Geographers following these new directions similarly took inspiration from multidisciplinary convergence, but while quantitative geography looked to mathematics, systems theory, and positive economics, other nascent areas of human geographical inquiry turned instead to the social sciences, the humanities, the arts, planning, architecture, and design. Behavioral geography was a case in point. Whether viewed in narrower or broader senses, it stemmed from recognizable, if isolated, antecedents from the first half of the 20th Century. Early interest focused on maps and orientation. In 1907, F. P. Gulliver read a paper to the Association of American Geographers on the way that schoolchildren perceived issues involving direction finding in their use of maps, a theme furthered by the physicist C.C. Trowbridge in 1913 in an essay on maps and imagination. They found that orientation was more often achieved by an egocentric reference system than by one based on points of the compass, with Trowbridge recognizing the significance of the home as an anchoring point in geographical space. During the interwar years, the writings of American geographer Carl Sauer and the work associated with the Geography Department at the University of California–Berkeley (which he headed) helped to counter prevailing theories of environmental determinism by stressing how human beings molded their environment through the agency of culture. His compatriot John Kirtland Wright emphasized the importance of the imagination and intellectual curiosity in structuring views of the world and recommended that geographers concern themselves with geosophydthe study of geographical knowledge from any or all points of view. In the Francophone world, Georges Hardy’s La Géographie Psychologique (published in 1939) drew attention to the significance of human psychology when considering the relationship between people and their environment. The 1950s saw further important but initially isolated initiatives that would eventually exert an influence on later research. In 1952, the British historical geographer William Kirk drew on Gestalt theory to argue that people’s behavior was rooted in a behavioral environment (the world as perceived) rather than the objective environment (the world of “facts”). In 1956, the British-born social scientist Kenneth Boulding produced a monograph entitled The Image, which suggested that human knowledge was centered around “images”dorganized impressions of the world that people develop through their experience and that act as the basis for their behavior. In itself, this work might have remained obscure had the architect Kevin Lynch not taken up its central idea in his book The Image of the City. Lynch explored the visual quality of three US cities (Los Angeles, Boston, and Jersey City) by reference to the way that the physical features of their cityscapes were perceived by their residents. Drawing on small samples of respondents in each city, he showed that people understood their surroundings in consistent ways, by forming “mental maps” that had five recurring features (paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks). The extraordinary popularity of Lynch’s book helped to establish Boulding’s concept as a key part of the frameworks employed in early behavioral geographical research, even though the concept bore little direct relationship to the notion of imagery used by psychologists. In their different ways, these works effectively foreshadowed the humanistic and cognitive science streams that fueled the growth of behavioral geography in the 1960s. The former gained impetus from David Lowenthal’s paper, “Geography, experience, and imagination,” published in 1961, which in turn drew on J. K. Wright’s agenda to recognize that people live in parochial worlds, shaped by selective perceptual filtering of environmental information, but bound into the common realm of experience through culture. In a related manner, the cultural geographer Yi-Fu Tuan moved beyond his early geomorphological interests in the landforms of New Mexico to reflect on the emotional connections between human beings and the physical environments that they encountered. These reflections appeared first in articles published in Landscape, the journal founded and edited by the writer J. B. Jackson, then in a series of monographs that explored the relationship between cosmology and feelings toward landscape, and finally in his 1974 book Topophilia. At the end of the 1960s, Anne Buttimer supplied an important introduction to nonAnglophone sources on human–environment relations through her discussion of French theories of social space and their implication for the subjective configuration of urban areas. She cautiously applied these perspectives in a subsequent study of a residential area in Glasgow (Scotland). For their part, those who founded the “cognitive science” stream were initially interested in issues concerning the knowledge held by decision makers. Herbert Simon in 1957 had challenged the use of the ideal economic person equipped with perfect knowledge as a model for behavioral decision-making with his notion of bounded rationality. Influenced by such ideas, Peter Gould employed game theory in 1963 to simulate the probable planting strategies of African farmers in the face of the uncertainties of

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their environment. In 1964, Julian Wolpert used a sample of Swedish farmers to test whether real-world decision-making accorded to satisficing (guided by the goal of seeking a sufficient output) or optimizing principles. Given that the results showed that crop yields were well below the theoretical optimumdin certain areas as low as 40% of the possible yielddWolpert concluded that the satisficing was more descriptively accurate of the behavioral pattern of the sample population. Nonetheless, there was no necessary implication of irrationality in these findings. While they might signify lack of knowledge about potential yields and the alternatives that were available, they might also reflect perception of risk, aversion to uncertainty, and culturally transmitted values that placed other benefits above profit maximization. Similarly, when analyzing industrial location decision-making, Allan Pred developed a powerful critique of normative economic models, pointing to their illogicality (e.g., it is impossible for competing decision makers to arrive at optimal locational decisions simultaneously) and the failure to consider motivation (in that decision makers might well be satisfied with a location that is satisfactory in the long run rather than optimal in the short run). As an improvement, Pred proposed a “behavioral matrix,” which included the quantity and quality of information on one axis with the ability to use that information on the other, pointing to the unlikelihood of decision makers managing to achieve the optimum on both counts. These types of studies represented a significant first step. By pointing to likely variations in behavior instead of being able to rely on assumed optimization, their authors stressed the need to include “black box” variables within the analysisdin other words, incorporate those nonobservable elements that could only be captured by surrogate means. It also heralded the future close alignment between behavioral geography and environmental psychology. In a published version of a talk given to the Michigan Interuniversity Community of Mathematical Geographers in 1965, Peter Gould pointed to the need to know about the “maps” that people have in their heads with regard to the world around them. He accepted that individual cognitions were unique, but felt that general statements might be made with a technique that could externalize personal preferences and the values that underpinned them. He illustrated this point by reference to studies of residential desirability in the United States, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, and Nigeria, whereby student respondents were asked to rank regions of their home country on the basis of lists of administrative areas (such as states or counties). By aggregating the scores for individual respondents, it was possible to map residential preferences for the national groups of students and make comparisons between students living in different nations. Other researchers looked to mainstream psychological methodology to investigate the cognitive domain. In 1966, for example, Thomas Saarinen published an account of his doctoral research on the behavior of farmers in the drought-prone Great Plains region of the United States. Using personality measures, such as the Thematic Apperception Test, as part of his methodology, their responses indicated that successes were recalled more frequently than failures. Farmers consistently underestimated the frequency of years when drought was experienced and were optimistic about the number of good years and about the size of crops in such years. Perceptions of the drought hazard were also influenced by age and previous experience, especially whether farmers remembered the drought conditions of the “dusty thirties” (the years of the formation of the Dust Bowl). Collectively, these early studies indicated that the emerging field of research served as both a corrective and a catalyst. As the former, it countered the dominant thrust of spatial analysis by embracing such considerations as learning, imperfect information, and bounded rationality in order to improve the diagnostic and predictive power of locational models. As a catalyst, behavioral geography quickly moved beyond being an adjunct to spatial scientific inquiry to become a channel for work that expanded research horizons, introduced new subjects for attention, and reconceptualized the relationships between people and their environments in quite different ways from those conventional in geographical discourse. Benefiting from the breadth of perspectives available from its two-component intellectual streams, behavioral geography became a wide-ranging field that revealed a notable flowering of creativity, with almost any scale of cognitive behavioral problem, from the interior spaces of buildings to understandings of the cosmos, becoming of interest to geographers.

Consolidation As with many embryonic fields of study, the work of the pioneers was followed by extensive efforts to consolidate knowledge. A supportive infrastructure of discussion groups and symposia developed first in North America, with the subsequent foundation of newsletters, journals, and edited collections allowing wider dissemination of materials. For example, the first symposium on “environmental perception and behavior,” held at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers (AAG) at Columbus (Ohio) in April 1965, gave rise to an influential collection of papers. Edited by David Lowenthal, it immediately symptomized the rampant plurality of the field, containing essays on attitudes toward environment, the development of psychological tests to analyze spatial symbolism, human adaptation to Arctic conditions, the study of storm hazards, and the perceptual implications of travel along major urban highways. A further volume, entitled Behavioral Problems in Geography, grew out of the 1968 Annual Meeting of the AAG in Washington, DC. Edited by Kevin Cox and Reginald Golledge, it attempted to bring some measure of overview based around an analytic approach that emphasized theory building and positivist research methodologies. Individually authored surveys of the state-of-the-art quickly followed. Thomas Saarinen’s primer Perception of the Environment, published under the imprimatur of the Association of American Geographers in 1969, offered a simple organizing framework for research findings arranged around spatial scale. His analysis began with personal spaceda bubble of space around the body defined by culturally observed rules of appropriate interpersonal distance into which intrusion by others is resented and often resisted. The survey then moved up through a spatial hierarchy that extended from the home to the neighborhood, city, region,

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and nation, culminating in worldviews. Saarinen also gave expression to the widely held conviction that cognitive behavioralist research could assist practical planning and design by offering critical insight into the relationships between people and their environment. With hindsight, this text expressed two abiding features of behavioral geography. First, it had a powerful, if seldom recognized, ideological dimension. Behavioral geographers followed spatial analysts in their practice of asserting that the new expert knowledge and associated skills were of great value to society. The basic principle was that cognitive behavioralist research could assist planning and design by offering new understandings and appropriate techniques for studying people’s relationships with their environment. In the longer term, however, it became apparent that the results of that research more often revealed evidence of the complex ways in which spaces and places were perceived rather than generating results capable of practical implementation. Second, and related, the idea of an egocentric hierarchy of bounded spaces had a compelling appeal. It seemed to offer geographers a lucid way of thinking about the world and implicitly suggested that space was an important variable in environmental cognition. The idea was avidly adopted by other researchers. For example, a 1971 monograph by Brian Goodey suggested a similar hierarchy of perceived spaces as a heuristic device. At its core were personal space and the intimately known places that arouse a sense of belonging. The hierarchy then included places visited with some regularity, places visited less frequently, and extended outwards to “far places.” There was, however, no direct relationship between distance and knowledge. “Far places” were often spatially distant but not necessarily so. Furthermore, while individuals may never have visited these places, they could still hold strong views about them on the basis of information derived from other people, from the press or broadcasting, or through the operation of cultural stereotypes. Over time other, more complex frameworks emerged. Fig. 1, for example, shows an example dating from 1977 that sought to identify the elements and relationships linking spatial cognition and behavior. Broadly speaking, it depicts two forms of “representation”dimages and spatial schematadas the basic cognitive elements that mediate behavior. Individuals are part of two worlds: the objective and behavioral environments. The “images” that they hold are the mental pictures called to mind when objects, people, places, or areas are not part of current sensory information. “Spatial schemata” are frameworks within which people organize their knowledge of the environment, containing the residue of past experience and accommodating current sensory information. Both images and spatial schemata are influenced by cognitive processes, personality, and sociocultural variables. These collectively contribute to filters that affect the flow of information and shape the decisions made. Feedback loops at all levels serve to indicate learning, assign value to experience, and to correct future behavioral strategies. At one level, this type of framework had a seductive simplicity, suggesting permissively broad lines within which to integrate research. Yet despite superficially grafting on terminology and perspectives more closely aligned to the discourse of psychology, in reality such frameworks made only passing reference to established cognitive theory or even to the particular psychological concepts that it included. In retrospect, it now appears as symptomatic of the underlying conceptual weakness that bedeviled behavioral geography, with researchers avidly pursuing innovatory theoretical directions, but seldom consolidating them into systematically organized bodies of knowledge. Moreover, this conclusion, which is true for behavioral geography in general, was also true for many of the component areas addressed by researchers in the years up to 1980das the following sections indicate.

Figure 1 A schematic framework for individual spatial cognition and behavior, c.1977. Gold, J. R., 1980. An Introduction to Behavioral Geography, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 42.

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Cognitive Maps The term “cognitive map” derives from a paper written by Edward Tolman in 1948 entitled “Cognitive maps in rats and men.” Although mainly about rats, it put forward the idea that the rodents built up so-called “cognitive maps” over time that enabled them to steer their way about their environments. Tolman compared the rat’s brain to the central office of a map-making agency, using the psychological principles of field theory to explain how the rat selectively extracted information from the environment in order to build up a field-like map of that environment. This, of course, was merely an analogy, but the idea of a “map in the mind” and the corresponding processes of “cognitive mapping”dby which individuals acquire, store, and recall information about the places and environments with which they come into contactdwere eagerly adopted by behavioral geographers. Broadly speaking, the resulting research centered on three main areas. The first comprised inquiries into the construction and organization of cognitive maps, examining the way in which maps acquire stability, and how they accommodate change through learning. An immediate and lasting focus comprised studies of the spatial knowledge of children at particular stages in their development. Inter alia, researchers examined the differences encountered when comparing children of different ages, the worldviews of schoolchildren, the effect of ethnic group and gender upon the known world, the role of socioeconomic status, the impact of the journey-to-school, preferential cognitions and perceptions of danger, and the role of fantasy and imagination. Attention was paid to the representational strategies adopted and to methods by which to externalize spatial knowledge. A broad distinction became apparent between those that considered that spatial knowledge was accumulated incrementally and those that believed that qualitatively different abilities were involved at different ages. This distinction mirrored that found in developmental psychology between incrementalists and constructivists. Influenced particularly by the ideas of Jean Piaget and Heinz Werner, the latter group believed that spatial learning was not just a question of acquiring more spatial information (as did the incrementalists), but that it also involved a sequence of stages in which the child developed progressively more sophisticated schemata through which to organize this information. The second area of research centered on cognition of the urban environment. A large corpus of research that examined perceived distance within cities, for example, generated four variables that helped to explain the discrepancies between perception and actuality, namely: direction (overestimates of distances toward the city center compared with the opposite direction); the attractiveness of the location; familiarity (especially in terms of length of residence); and the directness of the route. A substantial volume of research also focused on the character and function of the urban neighborhood. Typical topics for investigation included comparisons between perceived neighborhood and the spatially defined “neighborhood unit” then popular with planners, cognition of neighborhood quality, studies of linkages between residential satisfactions and neighborhood stability, neighborhood preferences, and intraurban migration. Studies of spatial decision-making with regard to retailing and services also showed pronounced “neighborhood effects” in choice of destination and resulting travel behavior. The most significant body of work on cognition of the urban environment, however, was stimulated by Lynch’s studies of urban legibility. The Image of the City showed how readily understood methods (sketch maps and verbal descriptions) could be used to explore urban imagery and provided the fivefold typology by which to classify elements of the perceived city. Although Lynch neglected questions of meaning, the speed with which other workers replicated his approach indicated that, in this area at least, a viable research paradigm had been created. Within 15 years, there were studies consolidating his findings in other cities of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Lebanon, and Venezuela among others. Elsewhere, Donald Appleyard applied Lynch’s ideas to the development of a new town (Ciudad Guayana, Venezuela) and gave credence to the assertion that cognitive behavioralist research might have policy relevance. In addition, Appleyard contributed to a project with John Myer and Lynch on the “view from the road.” This used a study of motorists’ journeys along freeways into four American cities (Boston, Hartford, New York, and Philadelphia) to explore road travel as a conscious esthetic experience. Understandably, this study emphasized the visual component of spatial cognition, but the same technique of using a set route as a transect was employed elsewhere to explore the sonic and haptic environments of cities. The third area of cognitive mapping research explored the wider scale of regional and world images. In their book Mental Maps, for example, Peter Gould and Rodney White used the technique of rank ordering regions from lists of national administrative units (see above) to inquire into the nature of preferential cognition. Their text contains studies of images of Britain; environmental preferences and regional images in the United States and Canada; analysis of patterns of ignorance, information, and learning; and the implications of mental maps for administration and education. Gould and White mapped preferences by means of principal components analysis and depicted the results by differential shading on a base map. Subsequent researchers used a rubber sheeting metaphor, producing a three-dimensional impression of the degree of distortion of the cognitive map compared with the cartographic map. The theme of place and regional stereotypes was further developed by researchers interested in the way that people cope with environmental complexity, noting that places and regions become classified on the basis of gross generalizations that may contain only a grain of truth. Correspondingly, those studying the images of negatively stereotyped locations also drew attention to the use of place promotiondthe conscious use of publicity and marketing to communicate selective images of specific localities or areas to a target audiencedto carry out rebranding in order to make places more attractive to potential industrial, commercial, or residential migrants.

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Natural Hazards The fact that people continue to live in places at risk from hazardous events, where “objective analysis” might be presumed to suggest safer alternative locations, provided the rationale for another strand of cognitive behavioral research by geographers. Natural hazards research combined the geographer’s interest in physical environmental processes that apparently lie outside human control with the desire to understand complex patterns of behavioral response. It focused on a range of highly infrequent, but extreme geophysical (climatological and geological), events that cause major hardship and possible loss of life for the communities affected. Natural hazards research owed its origins to Gilbert F. White, whose work on response to flooding in the United States had pointed to the complexities of individual and societal response to flooding. From initial focus on river floods, the scope of this research broadened in its coverage to include other forms of flooding (e.g., coastal floods), drought, hurricanes, tornadoes, volcanic eruption, tsunamis, snow, and avalanche. Natural hazards research also increasingly acquired a cross-national remit in the 1970s with an American-led program of studies carried out under the auspices of the International Geographical Union, which involved researchers from 15 nations examining 9 different types of hazard. The most significant results from this research emphasized a view of human beings as possessing bounded rationality. Extreme events themselves were seen as being outside the control of individuals but, since disaster occurred with relative infrequency, the threat was seen as dormant and remote rather than immediate and real. What might appear as misperception when disaster does occur normally helps to compensate for the fact that making precautionary adjustments to cope with these events would require major changes in the way of life of those under threat, which, for a variety of reasons, they are reluctant to make. However, most researchers stressed that this was not a simple case of people ignoring unequivocal evidence. In most cases, information from the hazardous environment is ambiguous and provides a paucity of reliable cues on which to base action. As a result, judgments may well err on the side of an optimistic scenario. Considered collectively, these points hint at the role of three factors that contribute to the resulting behavior. First, previous experience of the magnitude and frequency of hazards will influence how people assess the likelihood of possible recurrence, the potential impact on their lives, and the appropriate measures that they consider ought to be taken. Extreme events often act as a fixed point in experience, obliterating memories of earlier occurrences, and acting as a standard against which later ones will be compared, although the poignancy of the recollection will fade if the extreme event happens only very rarely. Second, researchers frequently argued that personality was a significant variable, with speculative hypotheses that people living in hazard-prone zones have personalities similar to gamblers, trading off the odds of losses caused by natural hazards against the prospects of profitable and untroubled living. Very little concrete evidence, however, was ever offered in support of such arguments aside from anecdote, with the suspicion that the third factordthe influence of culturedwas more important. Culture undoubtedly influences attitudes toward nature, with the responses of different societies to the same form of hazard covering the full spectrum from fatalism in the face of nature to belief in human mastery over it. Equally, response to natural hazards is mediated by culturally transmitted attachments to place. While some writers seem genuinely surprised that anyone should be foolish enough to reside in hazard-prone zones, areas such as the seashore and river basins have had records of settlement that extend unbroken back into antiquity. Symbolic and emotional attachments of these places, coupled with the economic advantages of living there, are more than sufficient to offset the risks involved.

Attachment to Place Interest in attachment to place was not confined to natural hazards research. Cognitive mapping studies had repeatedly shown the significance of attachment to place by revealing the way in which the home and the home neighborhood served as anchoring points in patterns of spatial knowledge and activity. Attention to attachment to place was also an important point of convergence for the cognitive science and humanistic streams of behavioral geography, in particular by encouraging researchers to explore the emotional content of place, including issues involving belonging, identity, security, and sense of self. This led, in turn, to several wider elements of rethinking that had profound implications not just for behavioral geography but also for human geography as a whole. First, it produced a reappraisal of “place” at a time when attention to that concept ran counter to the dominant wisdom imparted by the rise of spatial science. Second, it led to the revalorization of two concepts that had dwindled in importance in geographical research: “landscape,” an ambiguous notion originally derived from art that an earlier generation had rejected as a unit of geographical analysis in favor of “region”; and “territoriality,” a term with little currency outside political geography. Rethinking on the nature and continuing meaning of place within everyday life was epitomized by Edward Relph’s 1976 book Place and Placelessness. This examined the lived experience of place at a time where trends in urban and environmental design were fundamentally altering the everyday environment. Adopting a phenomenological viewpoint, Relph pointed to the insensitivity to the significance of place that was causing the casual eradication of distinctive places and the making of standardized landscapes. Taking examples that included the design of tourist resorts, theme parks, malls, commercial strips, new towns, and suburbia, he argued that what was occurring was not just superficial loss of physical distinctiveness but also the loss of meaning, including the replacement of the “authentic” by the “inauthentic.” The question of meaning was also central to work that saw landscapes, past and present, as media that expressed human feelings for and attachment to place. Landscape was conceived as a repository of human endeavor that comprised three elements: the tangible and physical features of an area, the record of human activities, and the meanings imposed by human consciousness

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(communicated through symbols). It was the third dimension, its symbolic meaning, which gave landscape the character of art in addition to being an artifact and hence made it amenable to the textual and iconographic analyses typical of art history and literary criticism. Essays by writers on both sides of the Atlantic interpreted American and British landscape tastes as reflections of cultural norms, with interest latterly turning to analysis of the meaning of heritage landscapes. Others studied imaginary, fictional, or utopian landscapes, which frequently contained coded longings for the return of vanishing elements of place and landscape. They examined the pleasurable feelings associated with loved places (“topophilia”) as well as its converse as expressed in “landscapes of fear.” Mindful of the debate over the role of instinct as opposed to learning in shaping human cognition, there was speculation that the experience of landscape could be rooted in atavistic traits, where the reason that people find themselves attached to some landscapes and avoid others is taken to have innate roots. The realm of atavism was even more strongly expressed in research on territoriality. The works of writers such as Edward Hall and Desmond Morris had helped to establish cross-species similarities in behavioral patterns, with the suggestion that ethological observations offered at least analogous similarities with the behavioral characteristics found in human society. The principle of territoriality, a behavioral strategy found across a wide variety of species, was seen as having particular promise in this respect. Territoriality was taken here to refer to any form of behavior displayed by individuals and groups seeking to establish, maintain, or defend specific bounded portions of space. While it immediately conjured up visions of aggressive defense, territoriality was more often a fundamental expression of social organization rather than its antithesis. Even when applied to human societies thought likely to need territories as a way of addressing primary needs (such as hunter-gatherers), the anthropological evidence showed that territorial defense was seldom required. Territories were rarely challenged once they are established. Despite often serving deep-rooted social and physical needs, human territoriality was seen more as creating a reliable background for everyday life than supplying a forum for conflict. These ideas were relevant when exploring the significance of place attachments in the lives of city residents. Work on the dwelling, for example, identified four needs thought to have a territorial dimension: as a retreat that affords security; as a controlled place in which to balance residents’ wishes for stimulation and sociability against their needs for privacy and independence; as a physical framework for the spatial and temporal organization of domestic activities; and as a microcosm that can be molded and ordered to satisfy the need for self-expression. In addition, it was suggested that the dwelling served as a territorial core that helped to bolster and reinforce identity (perhaps by being surrounded by known and familiar things, which personalize living space and convey a sense of the continuity of the present with the past). Ability to alter the exterior of the dwelling could also serve as a medium by which to communicate symbolic messages, although interpretation of those symbols depends upon the culture concerned. Another subject area for territorial perspectives on attachment to place centered on the neighborhood. Influenced by ecological and community study approaches, which saw specific groups as rooted in particular districts (“niches”) of a city, behavioral geographers explored territorial relations of groups in cities where there were intercommunal hostilities. Studies from, inter alia, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Belfast showed that residential segregation was matched by activity segregation to the extent that the main criterion in many movement decisions appeared to be the desire to avoid hostile territory. In the absence of major changes in external circumstances, such territorial hostilities were perpetuated through socialization. Children were taught to fear adjacent groups and to avoid their territory at all costs but, except in cases of extreme tension, the notion of defense was interpreted in the broadest sense. People might cluster together for security, but also did so for reasons that include preservation of culture or other shared values. Moreover, research from east coast US cities, which prefigured the modern explosive growth of “gated communities,” showed how the long-established “gilded ghettoes” of the rich were sometimes maintained counter to the general tendency for suburban and exurban flight. In doing so, it was demonstrated that territorial defense could arise as easily from restrictive covenants and symbolic displays of ownership as from walls and overt defensive actions.

Critique These brief summaries of three representative areas of research within early behavioral geography by no means exhaust the purview of a field of inquiry that addressed problems of cognition and behavior at all levels from microspace to cosmology in environments ranging from polar tundra to inner areas of metropolitan cities. Not surprisingly given this diversity and the uneasy coexistence of separate schools of thought, there was an endemic climate of critical debate even during behavioral geography’s halcyon years. Discussion about the validity of methodology, for example, was pervasive, especially with regard to cognitive mapping. For example, it was commonly assumed that “maps in the head” may be externally represented by asking people to draw cartographic maps or to rank areas from supplied lists. Yet, in reality, the abilities to draw maps, comment upon cartographic material, or to carry out ranking exercises depend heavily upon education. A respondent’s ability to complete mapping exercises may thus imperfectly represent spatial cognition. Moreover, there was no compelling evidence that the idea of a “map in the mind,” which Tolman had used as an analogy, meant that people actually have cartographic representations of the environment in their heads, regardless of the frequency with which that idea was asserted. Similarly, there was concern about the social context of cognitive behavioralist inquiry. Although, for instance, many observers applauded natural hazards research for its coherent and cross-cultural basis and for an approach that consciously built on previous work, others worried about its implicit agenda. A group of radical geographers then based at Clark University argued that it had essentially responded to parochial American interests and needed refocusing to give greater attention to Third World nations, which

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suffered disproportionately more human casualties but smaller loss of property than countries in the “developed world.” There was also fundamental objection to the use of the word “natural” in relation to hazards as if human disaster was somehow beyond human control. Rather, it was argued that in many cases, it was poverty and landowning policies that forced large concentrations of people to be living in danger in disaster-prone zones. The tenor of these arguments accorded with the root and branch criticisms of behavioral geography in general delivered by a group of radical, primarily Marxist, geographers in the 1970s. The earliest coherent critique came from Richard Rieser, then a graduate research student at the London School of Economics. Rieser, who was working on the cognitive maps held by residents of the isolated communities of London’s Isle of Dogs in the years prior to the Docklands regeneration, became progressively more disillusioned with the direction of his research. Arguing that it was conceptually and methodologically flawed, he turned his attention to the broader picture to warn that cognitive behavioralism quarried dangerous and dehumanizing theories (e.g., ideas about territoriality derived from ethology) led to psychologism (the fallacy by which social phenomena are explained purely in terms of facts and doctrines about the mental characteristics of individuals) and obscured the objective economic and social conditions that operate independently of the individual. Other radical critics, who had equally shown initial support for cognitive behavioralism, denounced its practices on similar lines. Notably, behavioral geography became branded as “bourgeois thought” that had the ideological function of supporting the status quo in that, inadvertently or otherwise, its emphasis on the individual made it unlikely that the data collected would throw light on the true nature of social relations. The directness of these comments and the standing of their authors as “insiders” in the cognitive behavioralist movement meant that the force of the criticisms struck home, even if the extremity of certain pronouncements and, more specifically, their Marxist associations meant that it was possible for their thinking to be treated as the product of political polemic and therefore dismissed. That strategy proved more viable for geographers supporting the cognitive science stream than those identified with the humanistic stream. The latter felt progressively less at home within the broader cognitive behaviouralist movement who, by the late 1970s, would promote “humanistic geography” as a new omnium gatherum that loosely embraced diverse moral and philosophical standpoints that included idealism, existentialism, and phenomenology. Humanistic geographers now attacked the materialist framework of positivism said to underpin much of behavioral geography and disputed the prevailing dichotomies between subject/ object and between fact/value. They argued that “cognitive” denoted deliberate and conscious thought processes and excluded consideration of the realm of the “precognitive.” Worse still, they argued that behavioral geography’s positivist basis depersonalized and dehumanized the people and places that were studied. Signs of a schism were readily apparent and given formal expression in 1978 by Derek Gregory’s influential book Ideology, Science and Human Geography. Gregory categorized phenomenology as a critique of positivism. Following an agenda, which emphasized the importance of structure and agency, Gregory helped to propagate a view that treated “humanistic geography” as a freestanding branch of geography, with roots deep in the heart of the discipline. In doing so, the humanistic stream’s erstwhile tactical connections with the cognitive science strand of behavioral geography were firmly severed. As this interpretation gained support, cognitive behavioralism was treated by default purely as an offshoot of spatial analysis. Revisionist historians of geographical thought reinforced this view by associating behavioral geography with the same style of scientific analysis found in mainstream experimental psychology. In particular, they repeatedly conflated “behavioralism” with “behaviorism”dthe branch of psychology that reduced behavior to stimulus–response and had associations with Skinnerian behavioral reinforcement and modification. The attribution of this dubious moral baggage also supplied grounds for identifying cognitive behavioralism with the worst aspects of scientific practicedreductionist, mechanistic, repetitious, and socially manipulative. According to this version of history, exponents of “humanistic geography” had stood out against this trend and would act as the precursors of the new cultural geography. By contrast, behavioral geography could only look back to its brief heyday when it sought to improve spatial analysis by addressing its manifest behavioral deficiencies. Although this strategy possessed elements of caricature, there was no denying that, intentionally or otherwise, the new historiography was devastatingly effective in marginalizing behavioral geography.

Continuity and Marginality Naturally, the process of marginalization was not immediate. Behavioral geography, albeit now defined sensu stricto as being the “cognitive science” strand, retained its adherents. Its future within academic geography after 1980, however, varied from country to country according to factors such as national research traditions and the extent of institutional support. In Europe, for instance, behavioral geography had only ever enjoyed patchy support outside of the British Isles, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands. In the Francophone areas, for instance, it never had a strong foothold in research or pedagogy despite an intellectual environment that included the heritage of Piaget and Merleau-Ponty and drew strength from the cognitive tradition within French psychology. At best, behavioral geography’s relatively brief period of support in the early 1980s was confined to individual researchers based at widely scattered universities, including Lausanne and Geneva in Switzerland, Liège in Belgium, and Montpellier, Rouen, Grenoble, and Strasbourg in France. In Great Britain, behavioral geography had reached its zenith by the mid-1970s. Never strongly represented outside of a handful of major university geography departments (notably University College London, Durham, and Bristol), it fared badly when researchers at these institutions either lost interest or turned to other preoccupations. Pedagogically, too, behavioral geography was ousted from the curriculum during the 1990s by the “cultural turn,” which saw the new cultural geography and reinvigorated historical geography courses covering elements of the same agenda.

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The situation in the United States was different. The larger size of the academic community and lack of competing traditionsdwith the entrenched traditional version of cultural geography providing no direct rivaldsaw behavioral geography continue to occupy a significant place in both research and the curriculum. Specialty groups and the existence of thriving associations that promulgated multidisciplinary links, such as the Environmental Design Research Association, helped to sustain a critical mass of researchers, at least in the medium term. Behavioral geography also retained its presence in geographical education. For example, a 600-page textbook by Reginald Golledge and Robert Stimson, which appeared as late as 1997, offered students a striking new synthesis of material in the mold of the cognitive science stream, with a particular focus on spatial decision-making and choice behavior. Yet imposing as the range of material cited might seem, first impressions could be deceptive. Even a cursory review of the contents made it clear that the crucial sources had appeared at least a decade, and often two decades, before that book’s publication. In reality, behavioral geography certainly maintained a niche, but the dwindling amount of new scholarship generated showed that it no longer represented the research frontier of the discipline. Looking at the content of research since 1980, it is clear that what has appeared has continued long-established trends, although with some notable innovations. The early 1980s, for example, saw two significant developments that might have improved the conceptual basis of behavioral geography. The first was an epistemological initiative that favored transactionalismdan approach to cognition which held that the values that people attach to different landscapes evolves from the interactions between people and landscape. The second was time geography. Based on ideas originally developed at the University of Lund by a group of Swedish geographers led by Torsten Hägerstrand, time geography developed the idea of a path that showed the movement of an individual over space and through time, subject to three sets of constraints: capability (including the need for food and sleep); authority (limits to the places where an individual is allowed); and coupling (places where an individual is required to be due to the requirement for interaction with others). In principle, both perspectives had much to offer. Transactionalism provided a means of drawing together disparate approaches to human–landscape relationships, but came to prominence too late to attract researchers willing to develop the basic approaches through empirical inquiry and critical reflection. Time geography, on the other hand, had considerable indirect influence on geography, especially through its impact on Anthony Giddens’ theories of structuration, with Giddens explicitly relating his analysis of the function of localities to time–space paths. By the time that Giddens’ work appeared, however, there were few remaining that would wish to develop the underlying principles under the banner of behavioral geography or even to make connection with that area of inquiry. Rather more success was experienced in specialist areas able to function with a handful of active researchers. Their defining feature was perhaps that they retained an overt cognitive and psychological rather than culturalist dimension in their attempts to explain patterns of human behavior. Cognitive behavioral studies of children’s geographies, for instance, continued to flourish, with topics developed including the child’s access to and use of the outdoor environment, attraction and avoidance behavior, the development of environmental cognition and its pedagogic implications, and policy-oriented findings on improvement of children’s play spaces. At the other end of the age spectrum, gerontological studies by geographers focused on usage of services and facilities, residential preferences, and the contracting activity space of the elderly, especially in relation to fear and perceived threat. A further cluster of research centered on issues of disability, including real and perceived barriers to access in the built environment, social inclusion, and auditory and haptic environmental interpretation for the visually handicapped. Researchers concerned with medical geography offer perspectives on environmental health, nutrition behavior, health awareness, and child abuse that offer a cognitive dimension. Some interest has been shown in geographical contexts in “nudge theory,” whereby positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions are employed as ways in which to influence individual or group behaviors. Artificial intelligence is proving a fertile area for collaboration with regard to subjects such as virtual worlds, agent-based models, human–computer interaction, and cyberphysical systems. Finally, cognitive mapping has retained its attraction, with the development of highly sophisticated quantitative methodologies and cultivation of linkages with GISdboth of which opened new avenues for multidisciplinary collaboration.

Prospect These active and state-of-the-art foci for research maintain a measure of continuity with the project that began in the 1960s as a corrective to spatial science and that became an important catalyst for new waves of research that sought to put the “human” back into “human geography.” There remains, as noted, strength in areas where the focus of attention converges with the interests of cognitive and behavioral science. The current outlook for behavioral geography sensu stricto, however, is as a specialized area of research that is undeniably marginal to the discipline of geography per se. The loss of connection with the humanistic stream, the relegation of its status through the writing of history, and the unanswered challenge posed by the “cultural turn” left behavioral geography with the reputation of being outmoded in outlook and peripheral to the mainstream of the subject. In the 1960s and 1970s, behavioral geography provided a broad platform around which research stemming from diverse agendas could converge. There is no evidence that this particular platform will again be required. Nevertheless, there remains merit in the study of many elements that were once included in the ambit of behavioral geography, regardless of whether or not it has a recognizable future as a separate subdiscipline. Despite the reappraisal of research agendas in the wake of the cultural turn, recent interest in embodiment, sensory geographies, emotional geographies, nonrepresentational theory, actor–network theory, performativity, and ethnomethodology, among others, has turned attention back, in diverse ways,

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to human behavior. Many of these developments engage with the territory of behavioral geography sensu lato, but few commentators feel any particular need to make allusion to any such provenance. In saying this, of course, there is no suggestion that the typical perspective on human behavior favored by cognitive behavioral researchersdstill heavily influenced by the intellectual climate of the 1960sddirectly accords with more recent concerns with “discourse,” “practices,” or “performance”. The shifting currents of ideas over the last half-century have done more than just change the lexicon of terms deployed when studying the material and symbolic relationships between people and their environments, since they also challenge the conceptual frameworks in which human agency is situated, question the methods by which information is gathered, and invite scrutiny of the positionality of the researcher when gathering data. Yet it is undeniable that there is a cognitive dimension present in spatially embedded everyday practices and that study of that dimension can enrich understanding of the geographical imagination. There is also a related need for forms of analysis that reintegrate consideration of the individual and the cognitive alongside forms of geographical inquiry that proceed primarily at the group level. However, contriving any approach that can bring rapprochement within human geography between cognitive behavioralism, on the one hand, and humanistic and cultural perspectives, on the other, will prove challenging. Ironically, too, it will require a great deal more attention to building conceptual foundations than behavioral geography exhibited during its heyday.

See Also: Feminism/Feminist Geography; Map Perception and Cognition; Spatial Science; Time Geography.

Further Reading Argent, N.M., Walmsley, D.J., 2009. “From the inside looking out and the outside looking in: whatever happened to “behavioural geography”?”. Geogr. Res. 47, 192–203. Burton, I., Kates, R.W., White, G.F., 1978. The Environment as Hazard. Oxford University Press, New York. Gold, J.R., 1980. An Introduction to Behavioural Geography. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Gold, J.R., 1992. Image and environment: the decline of cognitive-behaviouralism in human geography and grounds for regeneration. Geoforum 23, 239–247. Golledge, R.G., 2008. Behavioral geography and the theoretical/quantitative revolution. Geogr. Anal. 40, 239–257. Golledge, R.G., Stimpson, R.J., 1997. Spatial Behaviour: A Geographic Perspective. Guilford Press, New York. Gould, P., White, R.R., 1974. Mental Maps. Penguin, Harmondsworth. Gregory, D., 1978. Ideology, Science and Human Geography. Hutchinson, London. Lowenthal, D., 1961. Geography, experience, and imagination: towards a geographical epistemology. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 51, 241–260. Lynch, K., 1960. The Image of the City. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Montello, D.R. (Ed.), 2018. Handbook of Behavioral and Cognitive Geography. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA. Portugali, J., 2011. Complexity, Cognition and the City. Springer, Berlin. Portugali, J., 2018. History and theoretical perspectives of behavioral and cognitive geography. In: Montello, D. (Ed.), Handbook of Behavioral and Cognitive Geography. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA, pp. 16–38. Reid, L., Ellsworth-Krebs, K., 2019. Nudge(ography) and Practice Theories: Contemporary Sites of Behavioural Science and Poststructuralist Approaches in Geography?. Relph, E., 1976. Place and Placelessness. Pion, London. Torrens, P.M., 2018. Artificial intelligence and behavioral geography. In: Montello, D. (Ed.), Handbook of Behavioral and Cognitive Geography. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA, pp. 357–371. Tuan, Y.F., 1974. Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes and Values. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Relevant Websites Environmental Design Research Association, http://www.edra.org/, accessed 24 April 2019. Environmental Perception and Behavioural Geography Specialty Group, Association of American Geographers, http://community.aag.org/ environmentalperceptionbehavioralgeography/home, accessed 24 April 2019. International Association for People-Environment Studies, http://www.iaps-association.org/, accessed 24 April 2019. Landscape Research Group, http://www.landscaperesearch.org/, accessed 24 April 2019.

Belonging Sarah Wright, Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by A. Taylor, volume 1, pp 294–299, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Affect Affect refers to the energies, processes, atmospheres, senses, smells, and precognizant feelings that occur between objects or entities. Affects come before thought and cannot be readily expressed but they are felt in our bodies. They connect bodies and things together, and influence the ways we are and how we act. Affects make us and our worlds in ways that cannot be articulated. More-than-human A term that emphasizes the diverse agencies of nonhuman animals, plants, processes, and things. The term also highlights the ways that humans are not discrete containers, but come into being through entanglements with other beings, processes, and things. Multiscalar Referring to the many scales that coexist. For example, global, regional, local, and other scales are interrelated and constitute each other. Relational A term that emphasizes mutual constitution, entanglement, and relationship. People, places, beings, and things come into being together. They exist through, and are created by, their relationships.

Whether we feel we belong, who and what we belong to, and how are surely some of life’s most compeling questions. Conceptions of belonging stretch from the emotional to the physical to the political, with claims over who and what belongs potentially having, literally, life and death consequences. For refugees seeking asylum, ethnic minorities in violent conflict, and in many other contexts on different scales, the decision of whether you are one of “us” or one of “them” is all important, potentially devastating. Certain claims of belonging are predicated on the erasure of others, most notably in settler-colonial contexts where the project of nationbuilding continues to proceed, on stolen and misappropriated land. In a more-than-human world, whether a species is understood as invasive can signal its eradication. Yet diverse modes, spaces, networks, and assemblages of belonging defy and undermine exclusion in myriad ways. Belonging is felt, forged, and practiced by people and place intimately, affectively, and pluralistically as part of more-than-human constellations. The call of place and the feeling of being at home may generate belonging. Belonging could be created through the resonances of shared interest, history, culture, experiences of violence or grief, and entangled hopes. Such belongings may be in defiance of formal citizenship and state-based claims, forged through shared experiences of exclusion or resistance, or nourished on their own terms, outside, around, beneath, or beyond the state. While refugees, for example, may battle to achieve recognition and formal citizenship, they generate belonging in many different ways and at different scales. Refugees produce belonging through informal networks, through embodied practices of food sharing, speech, and care, and transnationally through shared experiences of music, storytelling, or protest. Here the richness of diverse practices, performances, and emotional connections on different scales signal belonging’s potential for openness, radical inclusivity, and possibility. Certainly, belonging is a contested and negotiated process relating to a complex set of entanglements and co-becomings. It is also both multilayered and always in progress. Amid belonging’s contested and ambiguous nature, there lies the potential for morethan-human belongings that are both open to difference and created through difference as affective encounters that coproduce alternative and nourishing lifeworlds. This is belonging-as-difference. For a long time, mainstream ideas of belonging have been human-centric, focusing on what and how humans belong to place and each other. Increasingly, however, there is a widespread understanding that ideas of belonging are more-than-human so that belonging needs to encompass an understanding of humans as living as part of more-than-human worlds. Many feminists, Indigenous theorists, and their allies point out that it is not just humans who have agency, create politics, or who have a part to play in creating more just and sustainable ways of being, becoming, and belonging. Belonging may be thus about opening up the world, being called to by the world, through the generation of affective bonds.

A Sense of Belonging Belonging is often conceptualized as a feeling or a sense (as in a “feeling of belonging” or “senses of belonging”). It is not surprising, then, that the rise of attention to, and theorization around, belonging within geography has coincided with increased attention to emotional geographies in recent years. Belonging is often understood as an emotional affiliation, an affective point of connection,

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or as described in the seminal work of Elspeth Probyn, a “longing” (as be-longing) in which belonging is a yearning for some sort of attachment. Rather than a fixed identity, belonging-as-emotion speaks to fluidity and entanglement so that individuals lean toward each other and the things with which they belong, as they long to connect and reconnect in different ways. Belonging-as-emotion points to its importance in making meaning in our lives, as it contributes to the ways life is textured and sensed. Understanding what it means to be alive, to have agency and knowledge, means attending to emotions and to belonging, to being and longing. Belonging is that which connects us and makes us feel at home, makes meaning and prompts action, and makes and remakes place. The rich emotional affiliations we may have for/with home, school, community, a collective, family, place, people, or music is what makes and defines home, school, family, place, collective, or community. These are not simple processes; neither are they uncontested nor static. Belonging is a negotiated and relational concept. Like other emotions, it does not reside inside a person but comes about through relationships and points of contact. This argument has been made by many scholars working in emotional geographies and feminist theorists. As feminist scholars like Sara Ahmed point out, belonging is generated through interactions, and works to create boundaries around what is “like” and “unlike.” Belonging comes about as it moves among people, places, collectives, and things, as it circulates, even as it helps create those things. Belonging comes about through (re)actions of towardness, as like is drawn to like, and through the generation and articulation of what does not belong, or what is “unlike.” This approach means belonging is understood as an emotional orientation of towardness, while awayness is understand as a feeling of nonalignment or non-association. Through these processes of towardness and awayness, belonging aligns one with a collective (of people, of beings, of affect, that is, a more-than-human collective) and, in so doing, helps creates that very collective. Belonging, then, produces and is produced by associations and (mis)alignments, and by actions and reactions of towardness and awayness. Speaking of belonging relationally and as an emotion might suggest that physical proximity is required to create belonging (or not-belonging), but such is not necessarily the case. Senses of belonging are, rather, multiscalar from the most intimate scales of the body and the home, to transnational relationships and everything in-between. For example, homemaking practices create belonging through sharing food, collecting and displaying objects, comfort, homely activities, and performances. These very intimate practices may also be shared through transnational networks, for example, diasporas, which create senses of connection and co-becoming. Even the most formal, legally prescribed ideas of belonging such as formal citizenship are underpinned and enabled through affective experience, while claims to citizenship by marginalized and excluded groups may be made through forging intimate memories and connections to specific local places and times. Belonging may be generated through circulated feelings of shared hate, fear, insideness, and sameness. Yet, belonging may also be generated as acceptance, negotiation, and openness to difference. In this case, belonging comes from being open to different ways of being in the world. These ways of being may be so different from our own that we do not even comprehend them, but we can still respect and gain meaning from our entanglements with others, thus opening the question as to whether belonging must really be about “like” aligning with “like,” or whether there are other openings and forms of diverse belongings to consider. Here, belonging may be created by and itself create diverse, ambiguous, and sometimes contradictory emotions. Far from taking attention away from the term’s political implications, discussing belonging as emotional and affective helps focus attention on issues of exclusion and marginalization on multiple scales. It also helps point to the ways in which multiscalar, relational, and more-than-human belongings can challenge, reframe, and reconfigure our alignments.

Politics of Belonging If belonging both divides and connects, it is little wonder that belonging and not-belonging are both heavily contested and deeply political. Forms of belonging and not-belonging create divisions and boundaries, and enable and (re)create colonial processes and racisms. Some claims to, and experiences of, belonging are buttressed by the state. Others are not. To say so may sound trivial, but the consequences of claims met or denied by the state can be profound, such as toward the Rohingya in Myanmar, who have been made stateless and subject to restriction of movement and deportation; refugees in Australia’s off-shore indefinite detention regime; LBGTI people living where their gender identities, sexual orientations, and relationships are punishable through law; women who are not allowed to own property legally or to control the terms of their relationships; and many other legally empowered forms of exclusions and violence. A life with political belonging, or belonging that is recognized by the state and/or the social order, is a life that is deemed to matter. Others are not. The potential for projects of belonging to be deeply implicated in oppressive and exclusionary agendas runs deep. Such implications are of crucial importance to recognize, particularly given a prevailing belief that belonging is, by definition, a positive thing. Looking closely at politics of belonging reveals this to be far from the case. Settler colonialism, for example, both generates and is generated by forms of belonging predicated by the dispossession of First Nations people. Belonging through land ownership of stolen land, through tropes of pioneering and battling against Indigenous people, and/or the (empty) wilderness of an “untamed land” are all belongings based on the exclusion of Indigenous identities, cultures, Laws, and prior-citizenships. Such belongings both reflect and reinforce, empower and are empowered by, colonialism as an ongoing process. Entwined with colonial logics, capitalism offers intersecting modes of belonging, as consumers, as owners of land, and so forth. Belonging might be manipulated and deferred, held out as a promise that might be attained after certain purchasesdthe right car, the right clothes, the right addressdare made, with promised belonging always beyond reach. Capitalist, colonial, and racist constructions of

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belonging may also be entwined together. Racist tropes of white supremacy, for example, are built around, and themselves empowered by, ideas of belonging that privilege white identities, white land ownership, and/or political emancipation, as precursors to belonging. Such forms of belonging, of which there are many more than those listed above, are always contested, negotiated, and refused. As such, the politics of belonging do not only reside in the ways it is enrolled to empower regressive and racist, colonial, patriarchal, or capitalist framings. Politics of belonging also work against them powerfully. For Indigenous people, for example, powerful and violent colonial expressions have been and continue to be contested, resisted, and refused through different, pluralist scales of belonging, such as First Nations citizenship, diverse architectures of gatherings, community centers, songs, dreams, culture, more-than-human co-becomings, relationships with place, and more. Some expressions of belonging can be forged in direct counterpoint to dominant structures, such as those associated with activist and independence movements that define belonging through shared experiences of exclusion, and through struggles to change the status quo. Here, exclusionary modes of belonging provide an important motivator for resistance movements worldwide, which are themselves generating and being generated by alternative and subversive modes of belonging. In addition to belongings empowered by resistance, some belongings exist on their own terms, as more-than-human attachments based on other kinds of relationality. Indigenous cosmologies, for example, often understand humans and nonhumans as kin, connected together through belonging to and with place. Rather than emerging solely from resistance, everyday expressions of Indigenous culture and sovereignty continually generate and regenerate more-than-human belongings and so strengthen and empower Indigenous cultures and self-determination on their own terms. The myriad daily practices of spirituality, language, largeand small-scale acts of dignity, and Indigenous survivance continue diversely and robustly to foster Indigenous nationhood. This point is emphasized by Indigenous scholars and their allies such as Jay Johnson and Soren Larsen, Brad Coombes, Aileen MoretonRobinson, the Bawaka Collective, and many others. For migrants who experience discrimination and exclusion by dominant cultures and/or the state, alternative belongings may be made through diverse forms of multiscalar more-than-human relationships ranging from the intimacy of family gatherings or sharing of food cultures, to the transnational networks of social media and banking, and/or attachments to places elsewhere. Diverse belongings can also be created through counterhegemonic identities and the queering of exclusionary and static belongings, for example, through humor and parody. These modes of belonging can resist, reconfigure, and refuse exclusionary belongings and create different kinds of entanglements in a much more hopeful and inclusive politics of belonging. Even while such forms of belonging are powerful, with deep transformative potential to remake the world in more inclusive ways, the fact that they exist despite, or against, discriminating and violent structures should not be ignored. Indeed, belonging is never a single or static phenomenon. There are multiple layers, senses, and politics of belonging and notbelonging.

Practices and Performances of Belonging on multiple Scales Belonging, then, is always in progress, always negotiated, always multiple, and often contradictory. For many theorists, the way to understand this contestation is through attention to the lived experiences of belonging, to practice, and to performance. Focusing on lived experience brings together the emotional aspects and the political implications of belonging discussed above. It is in practice and performance that the lived experiences of belonging can be unpacked and understood. It is through what we do, what we feel, how we create, whom we encounter, how we perform our identities, and how we simply are in life that meaning is created and experienced. Belonging comes about through diverse affective forms of being, becoming, and longing in common. Such lived experiences could be anything from common sport, hobbies, or voluntary activities, to shared pain, joy, or fear, to making music and dance, to expressions of values, to memories, and connections to place. Home, the intimate connections between body and place, is often understood as an important site or set of relationships associated with belonging, of feeling “at home.” Identities and shared experiences of gender, queerness, (dis)ability, and ethnicity are also ways that belonging is practiced, felt, and (co)created. Diverse embodied experiences, such as food and practices of food making, sharing, and eating, of styling hair, of movement, and of dance, are all potentially powerful expressions of embodied memory, home, and belonging. And through all these diverse modes and scales, belonging is not only made but is also an integral part of making places, collectives, relationships, subjectivities, and memories. These are the lived and multilayered structures of participation and membership in different more-than-human collectives and communities that orient beings to other beings, things, and places, and so create plural lived belongings. It is important to note that such intimate and affective belongings are not somehow distinct from the politics or belonging discussed above, or from more formal structures of recognized state citizenship. Rather, personal, intimate, and affective dimensions of belonging converge with, help generate, and are generated by more structured, public, and political aspects. So, for example, national political parties or nationalist movements mobilize, and are empowered by, intimate tropes of the body, home, and homemaking. White bodies orienting with other white bodies founded international white supremacist movements. Nations are made through the everyday practices of people and of objects, such as personal interactions, stamps, government documents, bodies at border crossings, germs at airports, newspaper articles, and stories of nationhood. There is no predetermined scale or site of either intimate or structural, affective or political, belonging. No one person has a fixed, unitary, or foreclosed belonging, or set of belongings. Belonging is “thick” and radically plural. These things cannot be disentangled.

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More-Than-Human Belonging A focus on practices and lived experience thus points to belonging as coming about through rich, multileveled, and more-thanhuman sets of relationships and practices. Being more-than-human means that belonging is neither felt only by humans nor created by and between humans alone. Attention to agencies beyond the human draws on Indigenous, posthumanist, and feminist ideas to understand that things, nonhuman beings, and flows help generate, and are themselves generated through connections and attachments. Here, animals, plants, rivers, weather, artifacts, things, places, networks, and processes can all be vital in generating attunements and attachments associated with belonging. A room and its furnishings, a pet, a tree that prompts memories, memories that live in the present, special food are all important active agents in creating publics, circulating emotions, and cocreating belonging. These nonhuman agents do not sit in the background and function as a stage on which humans act or experience belonging: rather, they are part of making belonging, and of forming entanglements and attachments, including with, and as place. Understanding nonhumans as an important part of creating belonging is one aspect of acknowledging more-than-human agency. There are also flows, processes, memories, and many intangible aspects of social life, some of which cannot readily be spoken of. This is part of what it means to understand belonging as both emotional and affective. Affective belongings point to the flows, rhythms, atmospheres, energies, and all that is beyond or before words and thought, that generate and transmit more-than-human beings. Affective belongings come before action; they happen before thought. They also make us who we are. As such, a body is not a container separate from its environment, but comes into being with it, through the energies and flows of affective belonging. The body and its actions are then more-than-human, more-than-cognitive, and relational. Before and beyond thought, static notions of belonging and preconceived ideas may be reconfigured. In this way, belonging becomes more than a motley collection of people and things gathered together, or things and people acting on each other. Rather, it is possible to understand belonging as relational, and as a matter of people, things, and processes coming into being together. Through the processes of belonging, and not-belonging, entities configure and reconfigure themselves. They cocreate each other. Centering co-becoming entails understanding ourselves as dynamic beings, rather than static and rigidly bounded, that do not exist separately from our more-than-human relationships and sets of belongings (and notbelongings). Such ideas of belonging have deep implications for understandings of subjectivity, of who we are and how we act, and of the diverse cosmologies that hold and make us. Deeply relational understandings of belonging draw inspiration from feminist theorists who have long pointed to the need to break down radical dualisms of us–them, animate–inanimate, men–women, public– private, human–nonhuman, etc., to see how we are all diverse, fluid, and constituted through relationships. Relational understandings of belonging also owe much to Indigenous geographies that emphasize co-becoming and radical plurality in ways that are underpinned with an acknowledgment of the active agencies of place, and the knowledges and agencies of morethan-human kin. For many First Nations people, Indigenous conceptions of co-becoming mean attending to more-than-human worlds, and the ways they guide and place us. Such co-becomings do not subsume difference but center it as part of plural and relational belongings. This approach entails acknowledging humans’ links to place, their connections with their environments, and the ways that place itself actively shapes us. Land is a teacher, a place to think with, and an agent that might guide, shape, and cocreate emergent belongings. It can teach us to be open to the world, to the many worlds that exist, to emotion and affect, to the communications of morethan-humans, and to the pluriverse. Indeed, attention to place can provide an opening to the ways that difference may emerge, and that new entanglements and alignments may be nourished. Rather than fixing place and identity as static, bounded, and exclusionary, attention to place means understanding humans’ relationships to land as reciprocal, emerging, and based in respectful co-emergence. Place holds the past, present, and future. Seeking to foreground place as active and agential means acknowledging that a human does not feel a sense of belonging to a passive place in a solely human-led endeavor; rather, place itself shapes, engenders, and relationally cocreates belonging. Within a world of many worlds, places may summon people and nurture relationships. Places guide, teach, and communicate as do the more-than-human beings, atmospheres, becomings, and relationships that make up place. While geography has increasing looked at the ways emotions are stimulated by, and even co-created with place, belonging directly links people to places, processes, and more-than-human worlds through affective relationships. Belonging, in short, (re)makes and is (re)made by social worlds, through and by relationships, including relationships with and as place.

Emerging, Pluralist, and More-Than-Human Belongings By understanding the ways that humans and more-than-humans emerge, create, and enact belonging together, emergent belongings understood as co-becoming may point to more caring and careful ways of being in/with/as the world. If we move beyond a static and discrete self, and exclusionary forms of belonging that privilege humans as the only beings able to think and act with purpose, perhaps there will be ways to transform our relationships with ourselves, with the world, and one another. An awareness of our belonging as predicated on our co-constitution with place, with each other, and with other more-than-human beings implies a responsibility and care for those with whom we co-emerge. Through our belongings we make and remake our worlds, just as, through our belongings, we are made and remade.

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Such more-than-human belongings may be based not on sameness or authenticity but through processes of diverse more-thanhuman community making, of opening up to each other, and dwelling within incommensurability in caring and careful ways that might acknowledge and work to remake power relations. This is more than belonging across difference. It is belonging-as-difference. Here, diverse belongings might work to maintain, produce, and nurture difference in ways that nourish transformation and resist the obliteration of difference. If belonging is emergent, there is always the potential for new configurations, new and open cobecomings, and new possibilities to emerge. Or taking this a step further, if belonging is always emergent as I suggest it is (even white supremacist, nominally static, nationalist belongings), then it becomes a matter of supporting processes of emergence that move toward inclusive belongings that embrace hybridity, multiple temporalities, and spatialities. For some cultural geographers and urban planners, this means supporting places of encounter on sidewalks, cafés, libraries, community gardens, street festivals, drop-in centers, and other places that facilitate interactions between unlike groups. In doing so, such geographers and urban planners are not only suggesting the need for physical proximity, for like and unlike can forge exclusionary belongings when thrown together, and belongings may be created across distance. Rather, they are calling for processes, microspaces, and sites that may nurture belonging-through-difference. This might mean undoing certain belongings, possibly unintentionally but more likely with intent, so that spaces, opportunities, and capacities to belong differently might be made. Such belongings might resist the alignment of like with like, resist fantasist tropes of static belonging, and resist the flattening of difference. This is belonging, not in consensus but with difference, through the points of rupture and surprise, that might open the possibilities for different modes of co-becoming. Indeed, it would mean shifting from modes of belonging that orient “like” with “like” to modes of being and longing that encompass and produce moments of awkward encounter, wonder, discomfort, and more. This is co-becoming through difference.

Conclusion The ways that diverse belongings link and divide people to/from other people, people to/from place, assemblages of more-thanhuman beings, and affects to/from each other signal some of the ways that belonging is deeply bound up with geography. Belonging creates and performs boundaries. It makes and is made by complex processes that signal what constellations of people, beings, things, practices, and emotions are understood as being meant to be, and not to be, in place. Belonging connects to and from place, situating all within more-than-human, affective worlds. In doing so, it also creates those very worlds. Belonging is emergent, never finished, never predetermined. It is always multiscalar, contested, and multiple, even as certain political assertions may attempt to fix it and associate it with static identities. Belonging is felt, used, and constructed in ways that build upon and are built by exclusion, racism, colonization, capitalism, and violence, but belonging cannot be finally captured or bounded. Rather, belonging comes about as diverse beings and co-becomings encounter each other, emerge together anew, and come into being together. Different modes of belonging, then, may be a point of reconfiguring, of remaking bonds between more-than-humans, and between them and their worlds, thereby creating different kinds of entanglements and co-becoming. Belonging-through-difference means generating and being generated through diverse and open, more-than-human subjectivities. Beyond encountering difference, belonging-through-difference means dwelling within moments of rupture and difference to nurture co-becoming otherwise. Colonizing processes may act to close down alternative belongings through violence and exclusion that undermine relations with more-than-human kin; yet pluralistic belongings continue to make and remake worlds. An important part of such configurations is to attend to ourselves as always more-than-human, coming into being within a more-than-human world whereby stasis and sameness is simply not an option, only co-becoming. This may be a matter of learning to belong with and as place, together.

See Also: Affect; Citizenship; Migration.

Further Reading Ahmed, S., 2004. Collective feelings: or, the impressions left by others. Theor. Cult. Soc. 21, 25–42. Antonsich, M., 2010. Searching for belonging: an analytical framework. Geogr. Compass 4, 644–659. Coombes, B., Johnson, J., Howitt, R., 2013. Indigenous geographies II: the aspirational spaces in postcolonial politics – reconciliation, belonging and social provision. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 37 (5), 691–700. Bawaka Country Including, Wright, S., Suchet-Pearson, S., Lloyd, K., Burarrwanga, L., Ganambarr, R., Ganambarr-Stubbs, M., Whitehead, B., Maymuru, D., Sweeney, J., 2016. Co-becoming Bawaka: towards an emergent understanding of place/space. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 40 (4), 455–475. Desbiens, C., Lévesque, C., 2016. From forced relocation to secure belonging: women making native space in Quebec’s urban areas. Hist. Geogr. 44, 89–101. Gibbs, L., 2013. Arts-science collaboration, embodied research methods, and the politics of belonging: “SiteWorks” and the Shoalhaven River, Australia. Cult. Geogr. 21 (2), 207–227. Gibson-Graham, J.K., 2011. A feminist project of belonging for the Anthropocene. Gend. Place Cult. 18, 1–21. Hooks, b., 2009. Belonging: A Culture of Place. Routledge, New York. Larsen, S., Johnson, J., 2018. Being Together in Place: Indigenous Coexistence in a More than Human World. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

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Mee, K., Wright, S., 2009. Geographies of belonging: why belonging? Why geography? Environ. Plan. 41, 772–779. Moreton-Robinson, A., 2003. I still call Australia home: indigenous belonging and place in a white postcolonising society. In: Ahmed, S. (Ed.), Uprootings/regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration. Berg Publishing, Oxford, pp. 23–40. Probyn, E., 1996. Outside Belongings. Routledge, London. Wright, S., 2015. More-than-human, emergent belongings: a weak theory approach. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 39 (4), 391–411. Yuval Davis, N., 2011. The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations. SAGE, London.

Berkeley School Michael Williamsy, Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp 300–304, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd., with revisions made by the Editor.

Glossary Culture The objects and ideas of humans through time. Cultural ecology Microlevel studies of human adaptation and their cultural context, informed by theory. Cultural landscape The natural landscape transformed by human activity. Determinism The philosophical idea that human actions are conditioned and governed by physical geographical conditions.

The Berkeley School is a collective term applied to the geographers and their publications that emanated from the work of Carl Sauer (quod vide) and the colleagues and postgraduate students taught by him during his long term as head of the department of geography at Berkeley from 1923 to 1955. By extension it must also include those taught by Jim Parsons, a student and colleague of Sauer’s, and subsequently head of the department from 1960 to 1966 and from 1975 to 1979. A hint of the flavor of the “School” comes from the names of some of the 27 postgraduates who completed their PhDs under Sauer. They included Homer Aschmann, Robert Bowman, Jan Broek, Henry Bruman, Andrew Clark, George Carter, Leslie Hewes, Fred Kniffen, John Leighly, Marvin Mikesell, Jim Parsons, Joseph Spencer, Fred Simoons, David Sopher, Dan Stanislawski, Philip Wagner, and Wilber Zelinsky. Of the 38 PhD recipients under Parsons, we can include William Denevan, Robin Doughty, David Harris, Paul Starrs, Thomas Veblen, Bert Wallach, and Karl Zimmerer. Kindred spirits come in the names of David Lowenthal who received his Master’s degree at Berkeley, Yi-Fu Tuan who received his PhD in geomorphology under Kesselli, and Clarence Glacken, the author of the unsurpassed and magisterial Traces on the Rhodian Shore (1967), written when a member of the department and thoroughly enmeshed in the Sauer tradition, though with the new dimension of classical scholarship. The School could be said to have ended with the death of Parsons in 1997, or perhaps sooner with his last PhD in 1994, or it may have lingered on until Barney Nietschmann’s death in 2000. Sauer had an original, independent, and wide-ranging mind, and did not adopt a doctrinal position and expect his students to tread a “narrow path.” But it was inevitable that they were influenced by his broad horizons and attitudes, especially as he encouraged them to take courses in kindred departments such as biology, plant sciences, anthropology, Latin American history, and paleography, as well as foreign languages in order to read German, French, and Spanish geographical and historical works in the original. They were made well aware of the antiquity and continuity of geography. Moreover, he was an inspiring and persuasive teacher and supervisor. Consequently, they focused on the relationship between human communities and the natural world, investigating the transformations of the natural landscape into cultural landscapes, especially in Mexico and Lower California, with indigenous cultural survivals, plant and animal domestication and diffusion. There was an emphasis on the elements of material culture that gave character to an area. None focused on Sauer’s other and later interests, for which he is probably more well-known, such as land degradation, the entry of early humans into the Americas, global plant and animal domestication, or the impoverishment of the cultural and natural environment through colonial expansion and modern imperialism. His lifelong colleague in Berkeley, John Leighly, said that he “always disclaimed any intention of founding a ‘school’ or of shaping students over a common last.” He expected the individual to find her or his own objects of interest and ways of satisfying their “curiosity.” Jim Parsons said, “There was no ‘program’, no formal requirements that graduate students were aware of.. We were on our own, an assorted group of aspiring scholars immersed in our work, seldom questioning or concerned about how geography might be defined by others.” All this was perfectly in accord with Sauer’s deeply held conviction that the individual scholar knew best what questions were worth asking. What Sauer did require, however, was that “a thesis must have a thesis”; in other words, it could not be an endless compilation of facts (an important consideration in the regionally orientated geography of the 1920s–1950s) but must formulate a problem or unanswered question, the solution to which came through thorough archival work and field work to see what the landscape and its inhabitants offered. Parsons was even more free-wheeling than Sauer (if that were possible), and equally concerned with subjects in cultural and historical geography, the human impact on the environments, biogeography, and especially Latin America, but with a far greater emphasis on the contemporary. The catholicity of the School is emphasized by the fact that it contained studies on urban geography by John Leighly and Warren Thornthwaite, and ranged in location well away from Mexico and Baja California and into, for example, New Zealand (Andrew

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Clark), Southeast Asia (David Sopher), Morocco (Marvin Mikesell), Ethiopia (Fred Simoons), and Kenya–Tanzania (Lee Talbot), together with five studies in and around the Caribbean. The commonality of these studies was characterized as much by their nontheoretical approach, intellectual initiative, direct observation, and “a good honest job of reporting” as by topic. All were major works of scholarship that synthesized impacts of humans on the environment.

Sauer’s Ideas The importance and influence of the School was out of all proportion to the work actually done. It has been suggested by Cole Harris that this was partly because Sauer and his associates were among the very few groups who cultivated “an intellectual environment that kept the past open” in American geography during its antihistorical, regional, and positivist decades. It is difficult to pigeonhole Sauer and be sure of his methodology because he seems to have darted about the geographical scene like some intellectual Voortrekker who moved on when he saw the other man’s methodological smoke. He recognized his own shifting position; “I have the idiosyncrasy that once having written something I do not refer to it again myself, except to refresh my mind as to statements of fact.I thus escape commitment to previous opinions and conclusions of mine and am therefore not obliged to defend my past self,” he told Kinvig in 1953. The “idiosyncrasy” was not difficult to understand. Like any contemplative and wide-reading scholar of worth, he clarified, extended, and redefined his ideas during the long 64 writing years of his 85 years of life. Thus his own continuing intellectual development, together with his distaste for the increasing professionalization of American academic life, and disenchantment with aspects of American society and world events, all affected his writing. The world and its many questions were simply too exciting and interesting to commit oneself to a single approach over a long period. Second, he disliked methodological writing. He told Richard Hartshorne that he was not competent in, nor did he like, logic and its application in dialectics. Any such writing he did was pragmatic; merely a “sort of habilitation,” in order to work his way through a literature and draw attention to topics that were worth looking at. Nevertheless, he wrote so authoritatively and engagingly that one of his earliest “habilitations,” “Morphology of landscape” (1925), which was basically a rebuttal of the then prevailing environmental determinism as an explanation to human action, set American human geography off on a new road of exploration. “Morphology” has been taken by some as the hallmark statement of the Berkeley School, especially its oft-quoted dictum, “the cultural landscape is fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group.” But it is doubtful if any students other than perhaps Jan Broek in his study of the Santa Clara Valley, California, ever attempted to do simply that. Sauer was far more concerned that his students engaged in voyage of discovery and exhibited curiosity, restricted only by competence, as to what a landscape offered, and employed a methodological pluralism. “Morphology” certainly emphasized the role of culture(s) in the landscape, and was probably the first introduction of the German concept of a “cultural geography” into the English-speaking world. But the most abiding characteristic of the School was its emphasis on human processes of changed“evolutionistic,” “genetic,” and “historical” were all words that he used to describe change. His “Foreword to historical geography” (1941) was another of his “successive orientations” as he pursued his wider theme of the study of humans on the earth through time. For Sauer, all geography was essentially historical, and human geography had little meaning and few valid labels unless it dealt with cultural origins, and the mechanisms of their spread, growth, and extinction. Parsons confirms that “morphology” was seldom referred to in Berkeley, least of all by Sauer, who was convinced that several Midwestern geographers must have spent more time reading it than he had in writing it. It saddened him that few seemed to have taken equal notice of his substantive historical works on Baja California and Mexico that had more thoroughly engaged him throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Indeed, it was Sauer’s discovery of the Hispanic lands to the south, and his cooperation with the anthropologists Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie, which gave his work and that of the students who accompanied him in the field such a marked Central American tinge. They included Peveril Meigs (1932), Donald Brand (1933), Henry Bruman (1940), George Carter (1942), Dan Stanislawski (1944), Robert West (1946), Philip Wagner (1954), Homer Aschmann (1954), and Brigham Arnold (1954). After 1954, Sauer tended to switch focus when he became the advisor to the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and used its funds to support postgraduate work in the Caribbean and surrounding lands, for example, Edwin Doran (1953), Burton Gordon (1954), Gordon Merrill (1957), Donald Innes (1958), and Carl Johannessen (1959).

The Parsons Era It was inevitable that every one of those students who passed out under Sauer took something of his approach and attitude with them. Some went on to found prestigious postgraduate departments of their own, for example, Fred Kniffen in Louisiana State University, and, particularly, Andrew Clark at Madison, Wisconsin, who employed a very similar attitude to Sauer on the importance of the historical approach and the need for cross-disciplinary approaches. The roll-call of his students is impressive in its own right and included Roy Merrens (1962), David Ward (1963), Cole Harris (1964), James Lemon (1964), Terry Jordan (1965), Sam Hilliard (1966), Jim Gibson (1967), Clarissa Kimber (1969), and Robert Mitchell (1969). But to include them within the definition of the Berkeley “School” would be tenuous and misleading.

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The students who emanated from the teaching of Jim Parsons are well within the definition of the Berkeley School. Parsons was a graduate student of Sauer’s, who completed his work on the colonization of western Colombia in 1948, and stayed on in Berkeley as professor and then head of department. He admired Sauer but had too independent a mind to be his intellectual clone. He certainly did work on ancient agricultural systems, origins, and dispersions, but these were not the main emphases of his work. Parsons’ studies were generally focused on the present, but with a good appreciation of what had gone before to produce that “present.” He also encouraged a more “cultural ecological” approach. Prolonged field research, far greater in breadth and depth than Sauer’s, in a variety of locations and environments was a hallmark of his work, as was also his tendency in later years to return to old field sites in order to chart changes and transformations. A good example of his innovative approach was his 1972 paper “Spread of African pasture grasses to the American Tropics.” The beginning was pure Sauer in that it traced the origins and spread of Guinea, Para, Molasses, Jaragua, Kikuyu, and Pagola grasses from Africa to Latin America from the 17th Century onwards. But the conclusion was ground-breaking as the paper was probably the first alarm call about the extent and rapidity of Central and Latin American tropical deforestation, about 20 years before the term “tropical deforestation” had even been coined and became the hot environmental topic it is today. In 1972, he remarked on the “once limitless forests of humid tropical America” were rapidly being converted to grasslands, and drawing on the changes he had seen on his many field visits in previous decades he continued to describe how great tracts of lowland forest in South and Central America had been converted to pasture lands “stretching to the horizon, interrupted only by scattered palms, remnant woodlots or rows of trees planted originally as live fences.” Outstanding geographical contributions from his students came from David Harris (1963) on plant domestication and biogeography, William Denevan (1963) on agricultural systems in the Americas, Thomas Veblen (1975) on biogeography, and Karl Zimmerer (1988) on cultural and political ecology, rural land use and development, and the Andes, and there were many more.

The Berkeley School and Cultural Geography During the 1980s, a reaction occurred in which the scholarship and striking achievements of the Berkeley School were belittled. A false and unnecessary contrast was made between Berkeley’s “traditional” cultural geography and the “new” cultural geography of the post-1970s as the new cultural geography defined itself in part by contrast with what went before. The Berkeley School was typified as empiricist, parochial, obsessed with relict artifacts, having an antiquarian “object fetishism” in landscapes, and not being concerned with the inner workings of culture. It was also represented as ossified and showing little variation over the years, with little concern for indigenous landscape interpretation and contemporary change. Only occasionally were its multiple concerns with environmental problems and human ecological processes acknowledged. Its political overtone was said to be conservative if not reactionary. The new cultural geography, on the other hand, proclaimed that it was all that the old was not, and more concerned with patterns of significance in the landscape and the reflexive role in molding social relations on the spatial patterns of race, class, and gender. In a spirited rebuttal of this “reinvention” of cultural geography, in 1993 Price and Lewis showed how the Berkeley School had been, in their words, “subjected to misrepresentation,” “selective amnesia,” and “gross generalization.” Equally, they showed that the generalizations did scant justice to the variations and innovations in the School. In particular, they demolished the charge of “object fetishism” by showing how few of Sauer’s students actually focused on artifacts. From a list of 1148 articles by Sauer’s students in 60 Years of Berkeley Geography, only 49 (or 4.3%) are concerned with artifacts in a narrow sense. If the works of Kniffen and Doran are excluded, the number drops to a mere 2.5%. Other departments in the United States, totally unconnected to Berkeley, adopted the artifactual approach, and even contemporary cultural geographers in any continent did not neglect houses, fields, barns, shopping malls, memorials, and the like. Another forgotten factor in the criticism of artifacts is that Sauer’s concept of a human artifact included plants and animals, and human modifications of landscape, and it emphasized the interrelationships between humankind and the environment. In later years, Sauer’s interests moved more from the past to the present, and even to the future, which gave him “the cold horrors.” In the concluding sentences of his Bowman lectures on Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (1952), he pointed out that humans would forever remain part of the organic world and therefore needed to develop a respect and understanding for nature: “.as we intervene more and more decisively to change the balance and nature of life, we have also more need to know, by retrospective study, the responsibilities and hazards of our present prospects as lords of creation.” Sauer’s conservatism must not be confused with simplistic political meanings of that word. He was convinced (and with good reason) that academic life was becoming over-bureaucratized, and that individual curiosity in research was being supplanted by social engineering and complex research programs dreamt up by social science theorists distant from the places and people studied. The individual was being squashed. Similarly, his distrust of Eurocentric viewpoints led to a prescient appreciation of, for example, the true magnitude and diversity of the New World population numbers. Although regarded initially with suspicion, the point about “ecological imperialism” causing massive population decline in the western hemisphere is now generally accepted. Again, his insistence on the primacy and persistence of the role of fire in altering landscapes is now firmly embedded in ecological thinking. Finally, Sauer’s rejection of modernity and capitalist development was deeply felt, and during the 1950s he went on record voicing the then wholly revolutionary idea that capacity to produce and capacity to consume were the twin spirals of the new age that had no foreseeable end. He also had a distaste for the elimination of durable native systems of living in the name of progress. These fears align him more clearly with modern-day radical environmentalists than with the conservatives.

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Since Price and Lewis’ article, the pendulum has swung again, and while the new cultural geography certainly has defined itself in part by contrasting itself with what went before, and still does so, few contemporary practitioners would now entirely disown the contributions of the Berkeley School. Parsons’ contribution and those of his students have been underestimated when analyzing the Berkeley School. Two-thirds of the 36 PhDs supervised by Parsons were based on field studies in non-Western countries, and transcended any Eurocentric perception. Some have mentioned already but many pioneered a new variation of Berkeley human–environment geography in the form of “cultural ecology.” This was a profound move, not wholly by the later Berkeley group to be sure (others were Carl Butzer and Harold Brookfield) but one which maintained the Sauerian landscape and historical interests but refocused them within a more scientific framework. This approach emphasized microlevel studies of human adaptation and their cultural contexts, but also used theory to inform problems, systematic data collection, and attempts to contribute to general concepts and explanations. Prominent among the Berkeley graduates in this innovative approach were Bill Denevan (and his student Billie Lee Turner) and Karl Zimmerer. Additionally, studies founded on political issues, which had been absent from the work of the older Sauerian students, loom large in John Wright’s and Paul Starr’s works on the political economy of the Rockies and western states.

Assessment If we accept Billiey Lee Turner’s recent conceptualization that geography’s “contested identities” have fluctuated around variants of two basic approaches that have dominated the field during the 20th Centurydthe spatial–chorological and the human–environmentdthen the Berkeley School in all its different developments and manifestation is firmly a major component and practitioner of the latter. One can certainly agree with Pierce and Lewis that Pred’s judgment that cultural geography should cast aside “the heavy ballast of Sauer-influenced landscape study” must be seen for what it is, a premature, needlessly bitter, and surprisingly naïve, view of what the individual members of the loosely defined Berkeley School were doing. A perusal of many of the theses emanating from the Berkeley department during recent years and deposited in the departmental library show that the gulf is nowhere as great as supposed. Making allowances for the changes that 75 years would make to any subject, the commonalities are closer than suspected. One most not fall into the all too common trap that anything old in geography (say before 1960) is worthless. Even if some geographers find the Berkeley ethos and emphasis does not answer their questions, we can be sure that environmental historians have grasped its themes with both hands and find it helps to explain the complexities of a modern world. Sauer’s project of elucidating the cultural landscape, suggests Livingstone, was “as much as anything else, an exercise in moral recovery. It was a double-directed visiondback to the wisdom of the past and forward to posterity.” Sauer’s plea at the end of his contribution to Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth (1956) that “what we need . is an ethic and aesthetic under which man, practicing the qualities of prudence and moderation, may indeed pass on to posterity a good earth” has (the gendered language aside) a decidedly contemporary and relevant ring to it.

See Also: Cultural Geography; Cultural Turn.

Further Reading Callahan, R. (Ed.), 1981. Selected Essays 1963–1975. Carl O. Sauer, Turtle Island Foundation, Berkeley, CA. Denevan, W., 1989. Hispanic lands and peoples: selected writings of James J. Parsons. In: Dellplain Latin American Studies, No. 23. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Harris, C., 1978. The historical mind and the practice of geography. In: Ley, D., Samuels, M.S. (Eds.), Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems. Maaroufa Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 123–137. Leighly, J. (Ed.), 1963. Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Leighly, J., 1979. Drifting into geography in the twenties. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 69, 4–9. Livingston, D.N., 1993. The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise. Blackwell, Oxford. Parsons, J.J., 1972. Spread of African grasses to the American tropics. J. Range Manag. 25, 12–17. Parsons, J.J., 1979. The later Sauer years. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 69, 9–15. Pred, A., 1991. Review of the city as text: the politics of landscape interpretation in the Kandyan kingdom. J. Hist. Geogr. 17, 115–117. Price, M., Lewis, M., 1993. The reinvention of cultural geography. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 83, 1–17. See also commentaries and replies in 83, 515–522. Sauer, C.O., 1925. The Morphology of Landscape. Publications in Geography. University of California, Berkeley, CA, pp. 271–302, 2 (9). Sauer, C.O., 1941. Foreword to historical geography. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 31, 1–24. Sauer, C.O., 1952. Agricultural origins and Dispersals. In: Bowman Memorial Lecture Series 2. American Geographical Society, New York. Sauer, C.O., 1956. The agency of man on earth. In: Thomas, W.L. (Ed.), Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 49–69. Turner II, B.L., 2002. Contested identities: human-environment geography and disciplinary implications in a restructuring academy. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 92, 52–74. Williams, M., 1983. “The apple of my eye”: Carl Sauer and historical geography. J. Hist. Geogr. 9, 1–28.

Big Data Mark Birkin, School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary API Application Programmer Interface. Computer codes and programs which can access the data of applications on devices like smart phones and tablets. Big data Extremely large datasets that are being generated in science, medicine, engineering, commerce, social media, and beyond. Crowdsourcing Creating new datasets by encouraging participation from large numbers of individuals capturing data through their own electronic devices. Dataveillance A conflation of data and surveillance. The practice of monitoring personal information or activity patterns from traces left by digital devices. IoT Internet of Things. The increase in connectivity and generation of data through devices including everyday objects such as fridges, kettles and washing machines, as well as traffic sensors, satnav, pollution monitors, and wearbles.

According to Doug Laney, writing in 2001, Big Data are characterized by one or more of the “three Vs” of volume, variety, and velocity. Scientific disciplines from astronomy and meteorology to medicine and engineering have all been impacted dramatically by the advent of Big Data. In bioinformatics, the ability to sequence individual genomes has led to an expansion of data by several orders of magnitude in less than a decade. While the first genome was not sequenced until the year 2000, both the United States and China now plan to scale this to one million individuals. Big data are providing meteorologists with the capability to produce forecasts of the weather to a high resolution in both space and time. The Square Kilometre Array telescope is expected to generate more data in 1 day than the entirety of global internet traffic in 2013. In view of these trends, it is frequently asserted that the volume of data in existence is now doubling every 2 years. On this basis, over the next 24 months as much data will be created as currently exists. Much of these data are being created in entirely novel formats, such as text and video. Streaming data are being generated in real time, and indeed entirely new businesses such as Uber have developed around the capability to translate such data into high-value services.

Big Data for Geography Administrative Data The origins of the census are as an administrative register of the population. Easily accessible granular data have been available in the United Kingdom for more than 200 years, going back to the census of 1801. Data from the census are used widely in many countries for local and central government to plan service delivery, allocate resources, and prioritized investment. They are deployed within commercial organizations to profile markets, benchmark performance, and target development of products and networks. Census data have also provided the bedrock for quantitative research in geography (as for social science in general) e.g., in studies of location and land use, deprivation, labor markets, and economic development. Modern processes of data collection for the census are somewhat expensivedfor example, collection and processing of the last UK census in 2011 is estimated to have cost in the order of £480 million. Major elements of the census include demographics (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity), housing, health, education, and migration; however, extensive coverage of these components can be found in administrative datasets without which government services are unable to function. Thus patient registration systems for general practice provide extensive coverage not only of health characteristics but also demographics and movement patterns as individuals switch from one doctor to another. Educational performance is embedded within records for schools, colleges, and universities. Extensive housing data are embedded within the council tax records which underpin local authority finances. The Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) in the United Kingdom is a good example of data collected for administrative purposes which can be used to address important geographical questions. These data are derived from the National Pupil Database (NPD) which was first established in 2002. The NPD contains demographic indicators for every pupil on the school roll in England and Wales, as well as eligibility for free school meals as a social indicator, and postcodes as a location identifier. Linkage to pupil performance tables can permit analysis of variations in attainment, effects of deprivation, and other local influences (for example by the application of geodemographic codes to pupil residences), and the attainment or value added by schools. An indicative analysis in Fig. 1A,B shows how the attractiveness of church-aided schools influences catchment size and journey patterns (anecdotally, popular aided schools have a strong influence on the demand for housing in local neighborhoods, leading to significant price distortions). Importantly, these data are updated annually and therefore longitudinally. This permits analysis of the type shown

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Figure 1 (A) Pupil commuting distances by school type and governance. (B) Migration rates by age of pupil. Source: (A) Adapted from Harland, K. and Stillwell, J. (2007) Using PLASC Data to Identify Patterns of Commuting to School, Residential Migration and Movement Between Schools in Leeds. Working Paper 07/03, School of Geography, University of Leeds. (B) Adapted from Harland, K. and Stillwell, J. (2007) Using PLASC Data to Identify Patterns of Commuting to School, Residential Migration and Movement Between Schools in Leeds. Working Paper 07/03, School of Geography, University of Leeds.

in Fig. 1A,B, where moving from primary to secondary school at age 11 can be seen to exert a powerful influence on migration patterns. Further analysis of PLASC data can potentially add significantly to our understanding of migration as both a social and spatial process. Hence it is not surprising that linking together administrative records from different providers might provide a more cost effective approach than the census when assembling a national population database. This method is under consideration as an alternative by a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, where it has now been decided to run the next census in 2021 in parallel with and a series of linked administrative records. Contingent on the success of this approach, it seems overwhelmingly likely that in future the procedure of linking administrative datasets will be adopted. An obvious advantage to linking administrative datasets is that it becomes possible to bring in much more extensive sets of characteristics (for example, across a full range of health indicators and characteristics), and by combining entirely new datasets in relation to, e.g., income (from HM Treasury or Department of Work and Pensions, DWP), social mobility (a student loan company), crime (from regional police forces), or energy (e.g., from household energy certificates). It also opens up the possibility of regular or continuous updating of the linked administrative register, in contrast to the traditional decennial census. This could be particularly significant in monitoring progression, e.g., between different levels of achievement within a school, or from one health status to another. Hence, administrative data conform to all three Vs of Big Data in offering extensive variety and much greater velocity than conventional sources, as well as having large volumes through complete coverage of the population. The Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS) runs ahead of other countries in the United Kingdom by linking data on health and education to census-based population registers. Other countries have been similarly quick to recognize the power of Big Data to complement or supersede conventional administrative sources. The Central Bureau for Statistics in the Netherlands has established a unit to exploit the power of Big Data, for example, looking at the power of social media and anonymized telephone records in tracking migration. Stats New Zealand has established an Integrated Data Infrastructure which contains

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individual level data about events in relation to crime, health, and migration, and with regard to characteristics such as income, benefits, and educational attainment.

Social Media Since the first messages were sent in 2006, the Twitter social messaging service has grown into a global phenomenon with billions of messages every day. The impact of Twitter has been transformational, as the latest fashions, cultural and sporting events, and political insights and maneuvers of many world leaders are now instantly projected through the “Twittersphere.” The medium engages users from a very wide range of social and demographic groups. In the United States alone there are more than 69 million Twitter users, with similar levels of users elsewhere in North America and Western Europe. Equivalent services are provided elsewhere by operators such as Weibo in China. Twitter has characteristics which are typical of Big Data. Content is generated in large volumes, and is currently being added at more than 20 terabytes per year, and so typically well beyond the range of desktop and laptop computing. Data are updated literally every second, minute, hour, and day. Most importantly perhaps, the content of the messages are distinct from classical censuses and surveys, representing behaviors, attitudes, lifestyles, and interests of contributors. Downloads from Twitter have been accessible for research (and commercial) purposes through the use of straightforward application scripts (APIs) targeted to specific topics or geographical areas. For example, a trawl of all Twitter messages in Leeds, UK, in 12 months to July 2012 yielded a database of more than 3 million tweets for a city of 750,000 people. The content and context of messages ranged from leisure, shopping, home, and family, to travel, education, and work (see Fig. 2). Systematic variations in content were observed through time, and enough tweets are geolocated that clear spatial patterns can also be observed. It may be somewhat predictable that contributors in the less affluent south are more likely to relate to the traditional sports (football, rugby league) than more affluent northern families who are much more likely to participate in golf, tennis, or cricket. Or that youngsters in the center of the city are more likely to be influenced by the opinions and lifestyles of TV and media celebrities. But never before has it been possible to observe and calibrate these differences, or to see them diffuse spatially and temporally. Largely due to ease of access, Twitter has proved particularly interesting and appealing to academic users. However, many other social media sources are potentially of similar or greater interest. Facebook, for example, has an even greater number of regular users, who are arranged into more well-defined networks of social interaction. Sites like Tumblr, Pinterest, WhatsApp, and Instagram are arguably all even more directly illuminating regarding lifestyles, attitudes, and behaviors. Flickr and YouTube are the most welldeveloped (but by no means only) instances of picture and video data, presenting both challenges but also opportunities for imaginative applications. Other services such as Foursquare has a specific geographical emphasis, offering the potential to link activities to spatial location in novel ways. Exploitation of social media data, specifically Twitter, has been popular as a means to understand both the spatial diffusion of geographical phenomena and the spread of information regarding events. For example, in a large body of work sponsored by The Guardian (UK) newspaper among others, large research teams used social messages from the London riots of 2012 to trace outbreaks of violence and robbery, and the reaction of the authorities to antisocial behavior. Peer-reviewed research has explored the idea that spatial patterns owe as much to the responses and behavior of the police as to the spontaneous eruption of lawlessness. Related examples using social media can be seen in the literature relating to global events as diverse as the Arab Spring and extreme weather events (such as Hurricane Sandy) or prediction of earthquake epicenters. The text element of Twitter has been especially popular as a source of content for analysis, often requiring the development or adoption of new methods in text analytics. Other social media sources have stimulated the adoption of image and video analysis, for example, in the investigation of Flickr images to trace the differential navigation patterns around a city of residents as opposed to

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visitors and tourists. In general, however, the exploitation of potential sources such as Facebook and YouTube has been more limited than Twitter for a variety of reasons, including data availability.

Volunteered Geographical information The idea of using volunteers as a means to exploit the combined resources of a vast population of citizens as sensors was noted in the geographic literature in 2007. The same year, the first iPhone was introduced, and since then powerful mobile devices have provided the means for distributed capture of information. Crowdsourcing data in this way has proved appealing to geographers, for example, to address continual small area variations in phenomena such as the weather or traffic, or to exploit the ability to create spatial intelligence at scale from a massive population of contributors. The creation of OpenStreetMap (OSM) as an easily accessible and reuseable source of geospatial data has been a spectacularly successful example of the impact of Big Data technology. Established in 2004, the model for collaboration is analogous to Wikipedia as millions of individual contributors submit data from their local environments using handheld GPS devices and other means. The OSM product is an aggregation of observationsdor volunteered geographical informationdabout locations. Rapid and continuous updates are therefore possible as these users react to changes in their everyday environments. Open sharing of the data has encouraged widespread use, while the licensing conditions for exploitation promote growth of the datasets and new tools and services. Fig. 3A,B shows examples of the OSM product at two scales for the city of Port-au-Prince in Haiti. These images resonate with one of the most well-known achievements of OpenStreetMap in facilitating emergency relief following the Haitian earthquake of 2010. Following widespread destruction of infrastructure, volunteer data providers were able to rapidly assemble an accurate picture of the situation on the ground. OSM now has a dedicated Humanitarian OpenStreetMap operation, but its unrestricted business model also encourages independent innovation. For example, in June 2019, the Missing Maps project was advertising support for urban improvement projects in Burkina Faso, mapping for disaster risk reduction in Belize, and support for the Red Cross in Myanmar, among others. While the early applications of crowdsourcing lie in handheld devices with active user input, the transformational power of this technology is now being seen within the “Internet of Things” (IoT), in which vast swathes of information are being collected by smart and autonomous devices. Traffic sensors, pollution monitors, and wearables/trackers, are all examples of IoT technology which are generating new data of direct relevance for social scientists through smart devices which are rapidly proliferating. One sense in which crowdsourced data have been regarded as potentially transformational is in the democratization of information. This can be seen clearly in the contrast between OpenStreetMap and rival commercial operations such as OS MasterMap and Google Maps, whose development can be much more rigidly protected and controlled by the product owner. This democratic spirit has spilled over into applications, as in the examples of emergency response and disaster recovery introduced above. Members of the Civic Data Design Lab at MIT have used crowdsourcing as a means to articulate informal transit systems in the Global South, creating a picture of the flow of people and vehicles which would be unknown otherwise in the absence of well-regulated bus timetables and transport services. This assembly of data provides a baseline for service development and policy intervention for social and economic progress, which in the absence of data assembly would be poorly focused and inefficient. In the future, volunteered data will become increasingly important as a source of evidence about behavior, activity, and lifestyle at city, neighborhood, and individual scales. Thus data from wearable devices can increasingly inform us about activity patterns (e.g., number of steps, speed of movement), health (heart rate, quality of sleep) and could be augmented by other forms of user-supplied content ranging from restaurant reviews to nutrition diaries in order to build a more complete picture of the social geography of cities.

Consumer Data The datasets that are generated in association with commercial transactions are a potential treasure trove for geographical research. Retail organizations are a prime example, having gathered point-of-sale data from outlets over a considerable period of time. Loyalty cards also have huge potential as a resource for geographical research. The major supermarket grocers have millions of customers, many of whom are visiting several times each month, with each visit associating to a basket of dozens of transactions. Location of the transaction and the customer residence, detailed product code, time of day, and product prices are all captured. Table 1 shows examples in which loyalty card data from one retailer has been aggregated to provide measures of market size and market share. From this, the split between electronic and physical channels has been used to indicate consumer propensities for eretail between small areas. When these data are benchmarked against readily available metrics of network configuration, urbanization, and demographics, then hypotheses about behavior and process can easily be tested. For instance, to what extent is it the case that limited access to high-quality retail networks in rural areas associates to a high propensity for electronic channels? Is this confounded by higher rates of technology adoption among the young and the affluent? The results of such studies could be valuable to policy makers (e.g., in relation to access to high-quality retail outlets (food deserts) or competition policy) and to commercial network planners, as well as to urban geographers in assessing mobility, access, consumer behavior, land use, and location performance. Alongside data from supermarkets, Big Data from restaurants, coffee shops, banks, or car dealers could all provide a broader perspective on customer spending habits; however, consumption also extends to behaviors on energy use, housing, personal

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Figure 3 (A) OpenStreetMap data layer for Haiti. (B) OpenStreetMap data layer for Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL 1.0. http://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright. Data (c) OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL 1.0. http://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright.

mobility, and leisure patterns. Data for these can be captured through utility meters, online estate agents, smart tickets and transactional records for cinemas, theaters, or home movies. Each of these datasets has one or more properties of Big Data. For example, Tesco has the highest market share of supermarkets in the United Kingdom, supported by more than 17 million users of its Clubcard loyalty scheme. Each user will make multiple trips to stores each month, with hundreds of individual purchases, which can be

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Using customer loyalty data to understand retail channel preferences.

Neighborhood

eRetail

Area type

Affluence

Lifestage

Beverley Bradford Dewsbury Grimsby Harrogate Huddersfield Hull Knaresborough Leeds Malton Otley Scarborough Wakefield Whitby York

High Low High Low Medium High Medium Medium Medium High Medium Low Medium Low Low

Rural Urban Urban Moderate Moderate Urban Urban Rural Urban Rural Moderate Rural Urban Rural Moderate

High Low Low Low High Low Moderate High Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High

Mature Young Young Young Mature Young Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature Young Mature Mature

Behavior patterns in the column labeled “eRetail” are derived from customer loyalty cards and sales data from a major retail organization. These observations can be assessed across “communities” (towns and cities) in order to substantiate the effect of location (“area type”) and demographics (“affluence” or “lifestage”) on channel preferences. Where the association matches prior expectations, the attribute is underscored e.g., we expect high use of electronic channels in urban areas. Where the association is unexpected, the attribute is struck out e.g., we don’t expect high use of electronic channels in places where affluence is low. The table indicates that the associations are less than straightforward. For example, there is no situation in which a high preference for eRetail connects to positive drivers for each factor i.e., rural with high affluence and a young population. Source: Interpretation of data presented by Kirby-Hawkins (E) (2016) Designing a location model for face-to-face and online retailing for the UK grocery market, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leeds, Chapter 6; and Kirby-Hawkins, (E), Birkin, M., and Clarke, (G) (2018) An investigation into the geography of corporate e-commerce sales in the UK grocery market, Environment and Planning B, Figure 6.

bundled across consumers, stores, product types, price bands, neighborhoods, and temporal windows. The data can be interrogated to inform tactical approaches such as special offers and promotions, or more strategic questions in relation to the acquisition of sites and configuration by location potential. Loyalty card data can underpin academic or policy studies relating to spatial and social inequalities, competition, or accessibility. Access to commercial data sources within academic research has not yet become widespread, although a number of case studies have now started to appear in the literature, usually resulting from specific data sharing agreements in which an academic group has negotiated access to the data of a consumer-facing organization. Collaborations have been promoted in the United Kingdom by intermediaries such as the Data Analysts User Group and Society for Location Analysis. Novel research with retail organizations has begun to exploit a combination of point of sale transactions, customer loyalty cards, facilities data, campaign profiles, and consumer attitudes. For example, research with commercial data has demonstrated the importance of seasonality and tourism within retail markets and touches on broader issues of second home ownership and rural displacement through the lens of Big Data. Among the many benefits of loyalty cards is the ability to connect spending patterns not just through time but to individual origin-destination pairs for retail consumption. An application to retail network planning has shown a step-change in our ability to identify and characterize time–space signatures for retail outlets, varying by micro-location, spatial context within the urban hierarchy, store attributes, and demographic profiles within the catchment. Other investigations have shed new light on channel preferences among social groups and spatial settings (including eretail), sustainable consumption and environmental attitudes, and sensitivity to price and packaging in product choice. A significant strength of big consumer data in this context is that it reveals the actual choices in buyer behavior, which do not always equate to the preferences which are stated in samples and surveys, particularly of sustainable consumption, where concern for the environment can be difficult to translate into consistent behavioral change. In recent years, research teams in the United Kingdom at the Universities of Leeds, Liverpool, Oxford, and UCL have begun to establish a supporting infrastructure for Big Data research through the Consumer Data Research Centre (CDRC). Importantly, the CDRC seeks to facilitate shared access to consumer datasets across a community of research users. In this way, the aim is to increase the impact of big consumer data by permitting reusability and sharing of research across the entire project lifecycle, and opening data access to a much wider constituency of scholars. Along with retail applications of the kind discussed above, similar cases are beginning to emerge in the study of urban mobilitydfor example, why not translate from the unit of a retail outlet to a route within a rail or bus network, using smart ticketing data, perhaps complemented by mobile telephone activity logs, or other IoT inputs from wearables, trackers, or sensors? The same arguments can be easily extended to energy consumption, housing, healthy lifestyles, and recreation, for each of which spatial analysis and network or area-driven policymaking might be crucial.

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Big Data Challenges The current range of applications which have been outlined in Section 2 above is becoming impressive. The opportunity for Big Data to have a positive impact on geographical research and scholarship will continue to escalate, as new sources continue to emerge and as the availability of data is extended. There are also substantial barriers to be overcome if the best of Big Data is to be realized. Access to administrative records is compromised by the difficulty of sharing data which are captured for one purpose, and to which the subject has either consented, or is obliged by law to provide, and then to repurpose that data within another context. As an example, consider that the Student Loans Company in the United Kingdom tracks the skills and career profiles of University graduates in the United Kingdom. Loan repayments are indicative of earnings, although the data could also be linked to income tax records (held by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)) for extra detail. These data could be crucially valuable in adding to our understanding of social mobility, labor market efficiency, economic development, and the migration of skills. However, even though local authorities and government departments, as well as researchers and commercial organizations, might all benefit from such intelligence, legal obstructions to the use of such data in this way are considerable. Most of the data held by HMRC are typically accessible only within the physical confines of government offices and even then under strict controls. Data are similarly difficult to access from many other government departments and their affiliates, such as the Department for Work and Pensions, and NHS Digital. Within commercial organizations, difficulties of access are more likely to relate to the commercial confidentiality of data. One implication of confidentiality when seeking to exploit data for research purposes is that severe restrictions may be applied on the ability to publish results, which can be a great disincentive to academic collaborations. For example, a standard condition of joint PhD research between universities and commercial partners is that the thesis must be embargoed for a fixed period after completion. In some circumstances, selected or anonymized outputs may be extracted with explicit consent of the commercial partner. Such practices are in contrast to most PhD theses, which are typically readily accessible through open online repositories. Such restrictions have prompted serious concerns about academic freedom. Commercial organizations are equally reticent about sharing sensitive data with government. In order to address this difficulty, UK government has promoted the Digital Economy Act (2017), which establishes the principle that government departments might sequester data in the public interest. An example which is cited in the legislation is if the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government might wish to access records from utility companies in order to inform policies on household energy, or perhaps winter payments for minority groups (e.g., pensioners) then the Ministry should be at liberty to enforce sharing from a commercial data provider. Similarly, the Office for National Statistics might request sales data from a retail organization in order to provide better inputs to its computation of the Retail Prices Index (or indeed, one might argue that loyalty card sales would be an invaluable backdrop to the latest Competition Commission investigation of local market monopolies from a proposed merger or acquisition). To date, however, departments have been reluctant to enforce such legal powers over data, and have preferred to proceed by negotiationdwith limited success. Public concerns about access to data and the uses to which their personal information are put have been brought into focus by recent news stories involving Cambridge Analytica and Facebook. In the case of the former, concerns have been expressed about exploitation of personal data to influence electoral voting; in the case of the latter, over the effectiveness of controls in third party access to data. There seems to be a clear breakdown here in the principle that the data are being used for purposes to which the subject has consented. This issue has also been the target of a recent governmental review in the United Kingdom, where the Social Media Select Committee concluded in 2016 that consumer organizations need to be much clearer in setting out the terms and conditions under which a consumer agrees to access a product or service. Data privacy is now becoming harmonized and more strictly enforced across Europe following the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). Social media sites, including Facebook, have also been the target for cyber-criminals seeking to “hack” personal data ranging from email addresses and financial details to patient records and vehicle license plates. Worries about data privacy and confidentiality become even more profound where linkage between two or more datasets is proposed. This problem has some intrinsic spatial manifestations, even if the underlying data are themselves anonymized. For instance, if a dataset with 50 unnamed high net worth individuals in a city is intersected with a list of 100 households within a specific neighborhood to yield a single match, then the probability that individual privacy is compromised becomes high. Where the data concerns the health, consumption patterns, social media usage, lifestyles, and behavior of individuals, then there is a clear resonance with established social concerns over malign surveillance or “dataveillance.” Data owners have established controls in response to threats. For example, if any patient data are to be linked together or to other sources, then this can only be done in the United Kingdom by a single organizationdNHS Digitaldwhich then retains control over the form in which outputs are disclosed. However, such controls may limit the research value of the data. Suppose one is interested, for entirely legitimate reasons, in exploring the relationship between red meat consumption and rare cancers, then the linkage of individual spending patterns to health records is exactly the kind of connection which one would like to facilitate. The difficulty of sharing consumer data freely among academic partners creates inequality of access at a number of levels. As noted above, it can be difficult to publish research outcomes. Even when this is possible, and within the restraints imposed by the commercial partner, it is unlikely that the data can be shared with other research users. This runs against the general trend elsewhere to share research outputs through repositories of data and code to complement literature. A potential countermeasure to promote reproducibility is the provision of high-quality infrastructure for data sharing. For example, in the United Kingdom the

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Economic and Social Research Council has invested heavily in a Big Data Network to support sharing of administrative, business, and local government datasets. Tiered service levels allow provision through open or secure channels according to the contents and ownership which are mediated via specific licenses. Nevertheless, the inevitable tendency toward concentration of expensive infrastructure may further distort the availability of Big Data to specific research groups or within restricted geographical locations. Creating sustainable business models may introduce a pecuniary component which favors certain styles of research. For example, prejudicing applied or policy-relevant work at the expense of curiosity-driven academic investigations. Another danger for the future is uneven provision across economic sectors. For example, recent experience suggests that many mobile phone operators are keen to monetize their data and less enthusiastic about sharing in a financially neutral exchange with academic users. Others, such as retailers, may be prepared to share in the interests of promoting greater understanding of customer incentives or building more profitable networks, but less enthusiastic about research which might call into question the health impacts of high sugar or excess alcohol consumption. This tends to reinforce the concerns expressed above in relation to academic freedom. Many would argue that the potential for long-term distortion through irregular data availability can already be seen in the adoption of social media, where ready access to Twitter data has led to a spike in research activity and publications which is not necessarily proportionate to the intrinsic worth of these data. Social network data from sites such as Facebook might be much more insightful in relation to the spread of information or to the formation and dissemination of opinions within social groups. In short, a fourth V of Big Datadthe Value of the assetdneeds to be considered as an important qualifier. While crowdsourced data may be widespread and easy to acquire, this is not always the case, as relevant technologies can still be expensive to deploy. This can limit acquisition and create skews which may have an explicitly geographical dimension. For example, there is much interest at the present time in the relationship between exposure to air pollution and spatial mobility. Air quality monitoring raises important questions about social equity and inequality, since the highest impacts are typically seen in innercity areas and in which the effects are felt among groups who are not typically the originators. Pollution can now be monitored continuously, but reliable reporting depends on equipment, which is costly and immobile. In Hong Kong, there are only 16 fixed air quality monitoring stations among a population of 7 million. Regardless of the quality of the analytical methods, spatial interpolation from such a sample is necessarily unreliable. Distinct social and/or spatial bias is an essential characteristic of Big Data. Among commercial organizations bias will typically manifest through the way in which specific social groups or lifestages are targeted. Thus Burberry or Prada are luxury brands with a demographic that is older and more affluent; McDonalds and KFC may be more likely to appeal to a younger and more costconscious clientele. None of the organizations might be expected to offer the balanced coverage expected in the kind of stratified random sampling that has become an established feature in social science research. For social media like Twitter, the underlying demographics are equally distorted, particularly toward younger users, although this is becoming less noticeable as the technology becomes progressively more widespread. Algorithmic transparency is also an issue here, so that the use of machines can create further bias by the way that they select particular offers for different customers. Similar concerns in a different context can be seen, for example, in the use of algorithms to screen employees for recruitment. In addition to skews and biases, the quality of Big Data is potentially limited in view of the means and purpose of their initial capture. This may impact in a variety of ways. Disentangling the semantics and meaning from short social messages is problematic, and true opinions are often masked by sarcasm or irony, with variations in use between different cultures and minority groups. Within consumer datasets the purchasing relationships between individuals may be hard to distinguish from a single weekly basket of shopping which provides for a larger household. Assembling complete expenditure profiles may be problematic when retail activity is complemented by the use of fast food outlets, independent bakers or butchers.

The Future for Big Data Geographers who seek evidence relating to processes and structure in the world around us will find it increasingly important to engage with Big Data. New forms of evidence, e.g., on consumer behavior and lifestyles, will be captured and will continue to filter into academic research. Crowd-sourcing technologies will allow social surveys to be scaled up, and present new ways to capture conventional data, such as censuses. The underlying business models and social processes that drive them will be increasingly data driven, e.g., among organizations such as Amazon and Uber; patterns of exercise and diet will not only be monitored but regulated through apps and wearable devices. These data will continue to be imperfection in their quality and coverage, but are simply too significant to ignore. New methods from artificial intelligence (AI) and data science can potentially help with the absorption of Big Data into geography (and other social sciences). However, they could also hinder. An obvious danger is that data science and AI in the hands of mathematicians and computer scientists could easily misrepresent social science. There is no need to reinvent discrete choice models, game theory or multilevel modeling, or to subvert what we know about social and human behavior within something like a black box convolutional neural network or deep learning algorithm. If nothing else, then previous experience of social physics surely teaches us this. On the other hand, approaches such as data assimilationdin which well-articulated model structures may be refined and calibrated in light of real world evidencedcould help to bring out the best of both approaches. Applied research with Big Data could bring the kind of policy focus and real world impact which is in the long-term traditions of much of the best in geography. Even more importantly, perhaps, the absorption of Big Data into the way that geographical research is undertaken could promote scholarship and education which guarantees the future importance of the subject. Producing graduates

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who understand our changing world and the way in which we are both measured and influenced by new technology devices and the associated data is surely crucial for the intellectual vibrancy, practical value, and relevance of the discipline.

See Also: Computational Human Geography; Digital Geographies; Geodemographics; Sentiment Analysis; Volunteered Geographic Information.

Further Reading Anderson, C., 2008. The end of theory: the data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete. Wired Magazine 16 (7). Bell, G., Hey, T., Szalay, A., 2009. Computer science: beyond the data deluge. Science 323, 1297–1298. Birkin, M., 2018. Spatial data analytics of mobility with consumer data. J. Transp. Geogr. 76, 245–253. Connelly, R., Playford, C., Gayle, V., Dibben, C., 2016. The role of administrative data in the big data revolution in social science research. Soc. Sci. Res. 59, 1–12. Gandomi, A., Haider, M., 2015. Beyond the hype: big data concepts, methods, and analytics. Int. J. Inf. Manag. 35 (2), 137–144. Goodchild, M., 2007. Citizens as sensors: the world of volunteered geography. Geojournal 69 (4), 211–221. Goodchild, M., 2013. The quality of big (geo) data. Dial. Human Geograp. 3, 280–284. Goss, J., 1995. We know who you are and we know where you live: the instrumental rationality of geodemographic systems. Econ. Geogr. 71, 171–198. Kitchin, R., 2013. Big data and human geography: opportunities, challenges and risks. Dial. Human Geograp. 3, 262–267. Laney, D., 2001. 3d data management: controlling data volume, velocity and variety. Meta Group Res. Note 6, 70. Longley, P., Cheshire, J., Singleton, A., 2018. Consumer Data Research. UCL Press. Lovelace, R., Birkin, M., Clarke, M., Cross, P., 2016. From big noise to big data: towards the verification of large datasets for understanding regional retail flows. Geogr. Anal. 48, 59–81. Savage, M., Burrows, R., 2007. The coming crisis of empirical sociology. Sociology 41 (5), 885–899.

Relevant Websites https://adrn.ac.uk/- the Administrative Data Research Network, a research council programme for increasing academic access to government (in the UK). https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/our-services/innovation/big-data - (description of big data acticities in the Netherlands Bureau of Statistics). https://www.cdrc.ac.uk/- the Consumer Data Research Centre, a research council programme for increasing academic access to business data (in the UK). http://www.d-u-g.co.uk/- (the Data Analysts User Group, which brings together commercial users seeking best practice in the exploitation of big data for business). https://www.missingmaps.org/- (an organization coordinating community resources to address humanitarian problems in many countries). https://www.stats.govt.nz/integrated-data/integrated-data-infrastructure/- (description of the New Zealand approach to data generation and extraction of value from microdata about people and households). https://www.ubdc.ac.uk/- Urban Big Data Centre, a research council project for increasing academic access to data generated by cities (in the UK).

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Big History John Hasse and Robert Flanagan, Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Anthropocene The concept that modern times represent a new geologic period of the Earth due to the significant environmental impacts of human activity to the Earth’s geo-biochemical systems. Big History An accounting of all known historical knowledge at the broadest scale combining cosmology, natural history, and world history into a unified narrative. Collective Learning The social accumulation of knowledge that increasingly builds from generation to generation. Origin Story The historical narrative of a culture which provides a sense of shared meaning that unifies social identity. Thresholds Transformational milestones in the evolution of the universe as relevant to humanity.

Big History is an accounting of all known historical knowledge on the broadest scale combining cosmology, natural history, and world history into a unified narrative. Big History begins with the Big Bang and proceeds through the evolution of the universe and planet Earth, the advent of life, and the emergence of humanity and its development up to the present moment, culminating with a reflection on how current trends are tracking into the future. The term “Big History” was coined by historian David Christian of Macquarie University, Australia, when it was used around the year 1989 as the title of a new course in which he attempted to narrate historical time on the largest of scales. In the decades since, a growing number of academics and authors have embraced the term and contributed to the discourse and development of Big History as a unique approach to historical knowledge. Today, Big History has emerged as a budding new discipline having launched the Journal of Big History in 2017 and the convening of the fourth International Biennial Congress of the International Big History Association which occurred in Philadelphia in July 2018. Postsecondary courses on Big History or courses that integrate Big History into existing subjects have increased over the past decade. There are also several MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) offered at the university level, and Big History is taught in thousands of high school classes. While there have been previous attempts to produce a universal historical narrative, the Big History initiative has been able to reach a new level of depth, sophistication, and accuracy through its integration of advances in scientific dating methodologies across multiple disciplines. The result has been a more precise and comprehensive treatment of universal history. Big History is distinguishing itself as a scholarly discipline through a still-developing organizational framework that uses multiple-scaled timelines to focus on patterns of increasing complexity evident in cosmic and human evolution. Other terms synonymous with Big History for describing a universal historical narrative include, among others: “universal history,” “the universe story,” “epic of the universe,” and “journey of the universe.” In Asia, the term “universal studies” is more commonly used, and it has a similar meaning.

Background to Big History While the contemporary movement of “Big History” is quite recent, there have been other attempts, some several centuries old, that compiled a more universal history than was provided by the traditional “Western Civ” approach, an approach that focused largely on European and colonial history and was almost totally dependent on written records. One of the early postscientific and revolutionary attempts was by Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), who is often considered the father of contemporary geography. Humboldt’s series Kosmos, a multivolume, multifaceted effort to gather all knowledge of nature, including the human, was not completed in his lifetime. Kosmos is often referenced as Big History’s “founding event.” There were other late 19th and early 20th Century attempts at a universal history, yet these ignored the natural world for the most part. Robert Chambers wrote Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, published in 1844, which presented a dynamic history of everything, as opposed to the much more descriptive and static content of Humboldt. In the 20th Century, H G Wells’ An Outline of History was an attempt to provide a history in the wake of the horrors of WWI that could unify the world through a global identity. Later in the 20th Century, in 1972, The Columbia History of the World was published. This was a collaborative effort by a group of Columbia University academics, and it is notable that only about 5% of its content was devoted to the history of the cosmos up to the Neolithic period or revolution. The emergence of plate tectonic theory in the 1960s stimulated Preston Cloud in 1978 to write Cosmos, Earth and Man: A Short History of the Universe. During the latter part of the 20th Century, there were some science-based popular works that foreshadowed Big History. For example, the 1980 television series presented by Carl Sagan entitled, Cosmos, Jacob Bronowski’s documentary series entitled, The Ascent of Man, and Stephen Hawking’s popular work, A Brief History of Time. One recent area of influence to Big History discourse comes from the field of religious studies. Citing the work of the paleontologist, Teilhard de Chardin, cosmologist Brian Swimme, along with Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim have developed a book and video entitled Journey of the Universe, which offers a view of cosmic history that includes the development of a religious

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sense as one of the thresholds of human history, one that impacts the way human history has been viewed. Most recently, John Haught in his The New Cosmic Story, critiques Big History for its omission of any sustained reference to the “inside” story of the universe. As already noted, David Christian began using the term Big History, in the context of his development of a course at Macquarie University in Australia. His vision of an interdisciplinary course, or series of courses, is the model often followed today at secondary and postsecondary levels. A curriculum aimed at the secondary level has been extensively developed with the support of Bill Gates. On the postsecondary level, Big History is being taught in various disciplines, many of them general education classes that follow the growing core of published texts.

Organizational Themes of Big History In its simplest description, Big History is essentially a unification of natural history and world history. As the Big History initiative has evolved over the past two decades, it has distinguished itself from conventional historical scholarship through several key tenets including viewing history through an interdisciplinary lens, encompassing much deeper time horizons, focusing on the context of how humanity fits into the universe, and in developing methods of research and teaching. There are also a number of organizational themes and conceptual frameworks developing that distinguish Big History as substantially unique from traditional historical disciplinary approaches. They include the following.

Universal Epic One of the overarching organizational themes of Big History is that it is an all-encompassing and universal epic. Events and periods are not viewed in isolation or compartmentalized but instead placed within the context of the larger historical whole, by placing human history within the larger time sequences of the natural world as revealed through the latest scientific findings using a plethora of new chronometric evidence in the fields of cosmology, physics, geology, biology, and paleontology. The events that have occurred to make our world and timelines that tie them together are becoming known in a universal empirical manner that is chronologically accurate. The history of anything belongs somewhere within the history of everything. Likewise, the history of anyone belongs to the history of everyone. As such, the sum becomes more than the parts, and all histories have their place within the universal epic of everything.

Thinking Across Scale Big History makes extensive use of timelines. What distinguishes it from the use of more traditional static timelines commonly employed by historians is that Big History employs interconnected timelines nested within the 13.8 billion year grand timeline of Big Bang cosmology (Fig. 1). Each event, epoch, or storyline of emergence is placed within the context of the larger patterns of significance and makes often unrecognized associations by connecting the dots.

Interdisciplinarity Big History is broadly interdisciplinary in its scope. It draws on a significant number of divisions in the natural and social sciences, arts, and humanities. By fostering interdisciplinary collaboration, the Big History approach attempts to integrate multiple perspectives, formulate novel questions, and develop new interdisciplinary insights.

Major Elements of Big History Complexity There is little agreement as to the definition of complexity because it means quite different things in different disciplines. Big History embraces a framework of increasing complexity, however. Christian identifies the key features of complexity in Big History: 1) More complex things consist of multiple diverse components; 2) They are arranged in a precise structure; 3) They have new or emergent properties; 4) They appear only where the conditions are just right; and 5) They are held together by flows of energy. These features help to identify the patterns of increasing complexity in the evolution of the universe. Borrowing from Eric Chaisson’s work on cosmic evolution and nonequilibrium thermodynamics, Big History identifies the key unifying patterns of change across the largest temporal and spatial scales. In an otherwise cooling universe, pockets of rising complexity, including the creation of elements and the evolution of life and intelligence itself, have emerged from chaos via energy flows in nonequilibrium thermodynamics. This framework of increasing complexity is integrated with the social sciences by big historians in order to view the increasing complexity of civilizations as well as modern industrial society. This echoes the work of Joseph Tainter on social complexity.

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Major Big History Time Lines

Figure 1 Nested major timelines of Big History demonstrate the comprehensive and interconnected nature of Big History. Adapted from The Teaching Company 2008.

Thresholds Emanating from its grounding in complexity science, Big History focuses on identifying and interpreting the most significant thresholds of increasing complexity in the Big History narrative. Threshold moments are points in time when exactly the right ingredients and conditions come together and result in new forms of complexity with emerging and essentially unpredictable properties that manifest a new mode of existence for the universe. Threshold moments can occur in an otherwise chaotic universe when the right ingredients are in the right place, within what Christian describes as Goldilocks conditions, which allow the threshold to take place naturally with resulting emergent properties. The Earth’s location in the habitable zone of the solar system (Fig. 2) is an example of a Goldilocks condition that allowed the evolution of life on the planet. The whole point of Big History is to facilitate an understanding of what it means to be human on this planet. That is also the human geographic project. Critical to any Big History is a geographic framework. And just as all geography is human geography, all

Figure 2 The emergence of life (big history threshold 7) was possible due to the Goldilocks conditions of Earth’s location within the habitable zone of the solar system. NASA.

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Big History is human Big History. David Christian has identified nine major thresholds of increasing complexity that are especially significant key milestones in the story of the universe and its relevance to humanity. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Big Bang: the creation of the universe 13.7 billion years ago Formation of stars: the first complex objects Formation of new chemical elements: dying stars and supernova build chemical elements Formation of the Earth: planets generate further complex systems Emergence of life: metabolism, reproduction, and evolution manifest a new complexity Collective learning (emergence of humanity): symbolic language and self-awareness arise Agriculture: domestication of natural systems leads to larger, more complex societies The modern revolution: vast economic, cultural, and social transformations for and by humanity The future: focus on the present trajectory toward pending threshold(s)

Collective Learning Threshold 6, Collective Learning, is the beginning of the specifically human thresholds. A central thesis of Big History is that emergence of humanity is itself a threshold of universal significance. Most significant is the ability of the human species to communicate through symbolic language with conscious self-reflection. The social accumulation of knowledge that increasingly builds from generation to generation has resulted in collective learning, which Christian views as the defining adaptation that distinguishes Homo sapiens from other species. The ability to learn collectively has allowed humanity to accumulate great quantities of information and knowledge over time and to expand its understanding of the natural world, especially as it has been socialized by human presence. This expansion of knowledge subsequently leads to the development of increasingly sophisticated technologies, which in turn allow societies to adapt culturally to new or changing environments. Collective learning throughout human history provides a framework for explaining accelerated change in communities, civilizations, and the planet as a whole.

Origin Stories According to Christian, collective learning has resulted in a scientifically based narrative of the origin of the universe. One of the concluding themes in Big History is the recognition that the universal narrative sheds light on some of the biggest questions that humanity has pondered from the earliest of times, such as where we came from, how we got here, and where we belong. Christian argues that Big History is becoming a universal modern origin story that is the “first origin story for humanity as a whole.” He bases this hypothesis on the observation that essentially all societies have origin stories, whether they are passed down orally from generation to generation, scribed in sacred scrolls, written in history books, or codified in constitutions. Origin stories reveal the psychosocial roots of those cultural narratives which explain reality and guide human behavior within a society. Christian asserts that as a universal origin story based on modern science, one that includes the common origin of all of humanity rather than more traditional national histories that begin with warring tribes, Big History is a unifying narrative with broad implications for presentday globalized society as humanity faces major planetary-scale challenges.

Synergistic Connections Between Big History and Human Geography While Big History draws on a broad array of disciplines across the academy, geography is an especially synergistic complementary discipline. Big History and geography (both physical and human) have a number of realms of intersection that include areas that overlap and complement each other. Big History brings to geography a strong thematic and temporal narrative framework that enhances geography’s traditional geospatial/societal/environmental questions (what, where, who, and why). Big History provides geography with a cogent universal narrative of how the world’s environments, planetary systems, and human societies developed, thus providing a richer, more nuanced description of geography’s theme of human–environmental interaction and its chronological and sequential links. This historical approach provides a richer context for explaining the Earth’s phenomena and how they evolved to arrive at the present, just as it provides insight into how changes may continue into the future. Big History’s attempt at a grand narrative of the Earth reflects the core of geography’s grand description of the Earth as captured in these classic definitions of geography which would be apt definitions for the Big History narrative by interchanging the terms. “The purpose of geography is to provide ’a view of the whole’ earth .” - Ptolemy, 150 CE “[Geography is a] synthesizing discipline to connect the general with the special through measurement, mapping, and a regional emphasis.” - Alexander von Humboldt, 1845 “[Geography] is concerned with the locational or spatial variation in both physical and human phenomena at the earth’s surface” - Martin Kenzer, 1989 Yi-Fu Tuan, 1991

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The alignment of geography and Big History in presenting a universal narrative is also evident in the organization of many world atlases, which commonly begin with the celestial origins of the universe and solar system followed by the formation and structures of the Earth, the emergence and evolution of life, and world history. Particularly good examples of this allusion to Big History are found in Geographica: World Atlas and Encyclopedia and the National Geographic Society Atlas of the World, 10th ed. Geography is intertwined throughout Big History in part through the spatial context necessary to understand events, what preceded them, and their consequences at any point on the historical chronology. This spatial view is often accomplished by the combination of timeline and mapping, complementary ways of viewing the process by which humanity has evolved. It is then a four-dimensional view of any particular event, both historical and geographic. Many human geographic elements that intersect with Big History include but are not limited to landscape, population movements, resources, relation of land and water, center and periphery, and changes in these elements over time. Big History also draws on many uses of cartography and geography-related infographics to communicate at both larger and smaller scales.

Geographic Works Connected With Big History While there has been a limited degree of direct reference to the term “Big History” in geography scholarship to date, there are a number of scholarly works and popular scientific literature where an intellectual nexus between geography and Big History occurs. Geographer Jared Diamond has made a career exploring connections between geography and history in his popular science books, including the Third Chimpanzee; Guns, Germs, and Steel; and Collapse. Historian Yuval Harari, who teaches World History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has innovatively woven key geographical themes into his works which focus on the evolution of Homo sapiens, presenting details that are particularly relevant to the Big History thresholds of collective learning, agriculture, and the modern revolution. Placing a major focus on the impact that post-15th-Century Western civilization has had in shaping the human geography of today’s complex modern world, Mark Boyle’s text, Human Geography: A Concise Introduction, also establishes a deeper historical and human geography connection through his framework of “watersheds in human history.” Boyle identifies four critical historical phases of human cultural development (i.e., watersheds) including: 1) “Origins of the Human Species”; 2) “Peopling of the Planet out of Africa”; 3) the “Development of Human Culture and the Invention of Settled Agriculture”; and 4) the “Rise and Fall of Civilizations.” Boyle’s use of the phrase “watersheds in human history” has a strong correlation with the Big History phrase “threshold moments in history,” and there is a close alignment with the watersheds for the four posthuman thresholds of Big History, providing a framework for further developing both the scholarly and pedagogic symbiosis of Big History and human geography. Genetic ancestry mapping (Fig. 3) provides another developing realm in which there is a cross-fertilization between geography and the Big History narrative. The sequencing of the human genome was completed in 2001, providing a map of the human genetic

Figure 3 Global mapping of human migration out of Africa is made possible by genetic comparisons of populations. Divergent mitochondrial DNA haplogroups (which indicates the matrilineage) are depicted as letters. Timescale of divergence (ka) indicated by colors.

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code of over 3 billion sequence pairs. One of the earliest applications of the data has been the tracing of paleolithic human migration and population dynamics. The Genographic Project sponsored by the National Geographic Society and IBM is one of the most extensive global collections of DNA samples to date. The project, led by geneticist Spencer Wells, has collected and analyzed samples of DNA with the dataset approaching 1 million participants from around the globe. A number of other genetic testing projects have also contributed to the mapping of early human migrations revealing an emerging narrative of the timing and route of the human diaspora out of the ancestral hearth of Africa throughout the globe.

Big History and the Anthropocene Big History embraces the Anthropocene, the concept that modern times represent a new geologically distinguishable period of Earth’s history, as a framework for contextualizing modern environmental impacts. The central tenet is that the Holocene, the current geologic epic of time describing the relatively stable climatic planetary conditions since the melting of the last glacial maximum 12,000 years ago, is effectively coming to an end due to the significant environmental impacts of human activity upon the Earth’s geo-biochemical systems. The planet is thus entering into a new geologic period that Paul Crutzen has suggested being labeled the Anthropocene. Planetary boundaries, a system of indicators for measuring planetary impacts and their connection to the Anthropocene, has been developed by Johan Rockström of the Stockholm Resilience Centre and Will Steffen of the Australian National University. They assert that once human activity has passed certain thresholds or tipping points, there is a risk of “irreversible and abrupt environmental change.” The concept of the Anthropocene is being seriously debated by the scientific community, and the term is under petition to be officially accepted by the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS). Regardless of its official IUGS standing, the Anthropocene has gained wide acceptance in human geography discourse. Big History’s concepts of thresholds of increasing complexity and associated fragility as well as its treatment of geologic time help make the concept of the Anthropocene more accessible and meaningful. The significance of the events that have occurred throughout various periods of geologic time is generally challenging concepts for the general population. As such, Big History is playing a role by innovatively communicating the numerous ebbs and flows of the Earth’s history and their relevance in shaping the world which humanity inhabits today, and the ways which humanity is transforming this same world in the Anthropocene. Geologic events and periods that have occurred over the span of the Earth’s history are made relevant and graspable in Big History, and thus the significance of planetary-scale impacts is brought to a personal-scale relevance. Big History brings the magnitude of the environmental implications of the Anthropocene into context while also providing a longer term perspective of how the Earth has emerged from each past epoch often through adaptive evolutionary radiations. Big History is poised to continue to interpret the Anthropocene over the longer arc of history as well as continue to make the Anthropocene more understandable and relevant across a larger swath of society. The historical context that Big History provides for the Anthropocene enhances the line of pedagogy and scholarship that human geography is contributing to the Anthropocene discourse by making the relevance of this new geologic era more meaningful.

Integrating Big History Into the Classroom Big History has increasingly permeated curriculum at the secondary level, particularly in the United States and Australia. Meanwhile, at the university level, Big History tropes have also started to appear in modules, but such growth has occurred at a more tepid pace. The slower infiltration into postsecondary level courses may be due to the challenge of Big History’s disciplinary breadth, making it difficult to find an academic home to champion the transdisciplinary curriculum and hesitancy of faculty to teach beyond their expertise. Rather than claim expertise across all topical areas, Christian suggests that teachers of Big History play the role of historical cartographers making what he refers to as maps of time that orient knowledge from many different disciplines in their proper temporal location while creating an appropriate scale so that the connections between the components can be made. Teachers of Big History are able to draw from many other topical experts and pedagogical resources beyond their own expertise. In response to these challenges, there are a growing number of resources produced and/or reviewed by experts that allow the material to be presented in a concise, scientifically accurate manner for instructors.

The Big History Project The Big History Project is a web-based platform geared to provide materials and media in support of teaching/learning Big History. The project is open and free, and it has the stated aim of making the teaching/learning of Big History accessible to all. The initiative was an outgrowth of collaboration between David Christian and Bill Gates, who in part funded the project. The content is cocreated by teachers, students, curriculum experts, and a team of technical developers. The fundamental goal is to provide “a world class, ready-for-the-classroom resource available to everyone, everywhere.” The materials are provided in a scalable, modular design allowing customization for usage at middle school through postsecondary educational levels. The material is developed to fulfill Common Core and key state standards. Key components of the site include free online professional development including instructional guides, lesson plans, training sessions, videos, and an active teacher community. There is also a free essay scoring service provided by a collaboration with Arizona State University available through the Big History Project web portal.

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CrashCourse Series in Big History CrashCourse is a YouTube video channel that provides educational video shorts on a wide variety of subject matter across the sciences, humanities, social sciences, and the arts. The project was initiated in 2011 by brothers Hank Green and John Green and has since expanded with additional hosts. Individual episodes focus on an educational topic, employ an upbeat and rapid delivery of information, last from 10 to 30 min, and are grouped into several dozen thematic series. CrashCourse on Big History was initially developed by the Green brothers in 2014 as a 10-episode series that outlines the history of existence, from the Big Bang forward into the evolution of life, humanity, and the future. A second season hosted by Emily Graslie debuted in 2017, adding six episodes focusing on the significance of Big History.

Big History TV Series A documentary series titled Big History: everything is connected was produced in 2013 by H2, a companion station to the History Channel, a satellite television network owned by A&E Networks. Narrated by Bryan Cranston, the series consisted of 16 halfhour episodes covering various fields of science and social science followed by a 2-h finale. The finale tied together the halfhour episodes by drawing connections between the 16 topics through the Big History conceptual framework. The series was acknowledged for its outstanding graphic design and art direction with a News and Documentary Emmy Award but has also received some critique for factual inaccuracies.

ChronoZoom ChronoZoom is a free web-based dynamic timeline that allows rapid change of scales in the graphic depiction of time, developed by Walter Alvarez and Roland Saekow at the Department of Earth and Planetary Science, University of California, Berkeley, in collaboration with Microsoft Research and Moscow State University. The project portrays a dynamic scale of time over cosmic, geologic, biological, and social periods allowing dynamic visualization of scale changes in time analogous with the manner in which global digital globes such as Google Earth allow a dynamic navigation between scales in geography.

Little Big Histories Little Big Histories offer a chance to understand the process of Big History in a smaller scale. Understanding one’s own biography as a series of thresholds requiring Goldilocks conditions and leading to increasing complexity is foundational to overcoming the immensity of cosmic Big History. In addition, Little Big Histories of places, elements, styles, and other physical and human realities can easily be done in a geographic context (indeed, must be, in order to be fully understandable). Some examples are little big histories of silver, of salt, and of domestic animals. There is a little Big History of Little Big Histories by the doyen of the field, Esther Quaedackers.

Critical Responses to Big History Critics of Big History include Stanford professor of education and history Sam Wineburg who warns against Big History becoming a substitute for actual history courses. Wineburg acknowledges the development of Big History as an intellectual movement but sees it as failing to impart a historical methodology to students by shifting from reliance on primary written sources toward a more purely scientific evolutionary narrative. Other critics, including sociologist Frank Furedi, have expressed similar concerns of Big History taking an “anti-humanist” approach, which loses the interpretation of human decisions that have changed the course of events. Another point of criticism regarding Big History is its affiliation with Bill Gates, who has championed the dissemination of Big History in secondary schools through his financial endowment of the Big History Project website. Critics have expressed concern over the influence of the billionaire on the Big History pedagogy, pointing to the Gates Foundation’s influential support for the controversial Common Core Standards that have garnered considerable pushback from some educators for the lack of inclusivity in its development. Christian responds that although Gates has underwritten the web-based technology supporting teachers, the Big History curriculum has been wholly developed by academics and educators and Gates has had no input on pedagogy or scholarship. Disciplinary identity and scholarship are another area of criticism regarding Big History. While the number of Big History courses being taught has steadily increased over the past decade, the scholarship of Big History as a uniquely independent discipline has been slower to congeal. Some question the validity of Big History as a distinct discipline in the traditional sense of the word due to its deeply interdisciplinary nature and its lack of a yet-to-be-established, uniquely defined framework of scholarship. Practitioners of Big History are typically rooted in another established disciplinary base drawn from a broad spectrum of fields across the social and natural sciences. This deep interdisciplinarity is the essence of Big History, but it has posed a challenge for curriculum and programs to be logically based in any one existing discipline, including traditional history programs, which are also usually illequipped to embrace the natural sciences. Without a recognized departmental home to champion its mission, Big History initiatives are challenged to establish new curriculum and to administer academic programs. Notwithstanding David Christian’s Big History

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Institute at Macquarie University, to date there has been little momentum for academic degree programs in Big History or the establishment of stand-alone departments of Big History.

Future of Big History and Geography In spite of the aforementioned potential synergies, there has been little scholarship to date that draws together or specifically references simultaneously both the literature of geography and Big History. Geography programs may view the emergence of Big History as both a possible opportunity but also as a potential threat. Geography as a discipline, particularly in North America, has long battled the general population’s lack of familiarity with what geographers do and has thus been vulnerable to encroachments from other disciplines which unknowingly reinvent and relabel techniques and lines of scholarship rooted in the firmly established discipline and subdisciplines of geography. Big History to date has provided limited acknowledgment of geography as a contributing discipline despite many themes that mirror geographic traditions. For example, the prominence of human–environment themes, the significance of geographic realms in shaping history, the importance of scale, the ability to combine knowledge from the social sciences, humanities, and physical science, as well as extensive use of infographics and cartographics to communicate complex data and spatial mapping are all lines of thought employed by Big History which have deep traditions in the discipline of geography. This territorial tension, while possibly portending yet another challenge to the discipline of geography, may also imply an opportunity for geography programs to strategically embrace the Big History movement and to foster a sense of cross-fertilization while offering a potential academic home for Big History. Geography departments are arguably one of the most well-equipped existing fields to house the deeply interdisciplinary intellectual content of Big History with geography’s traditions of physical and human geography bridging the natural and social science gap. Through embracing a strategy of partnership with the Big History movement, geography programs may benefit from the continued growth of the number of Big History classes within secondary education as an avenue of increased visibility and recruitment for geography. Ultimately, Big History and geography have much to offer one another, for the former offers the latter a unifying narrative that ties together many subdisciplinary themes. Conversely, geography can provide a literal grounding of Big History in the context of the Earth’s physical systems and the matrix of its human geography.

Conclusion Taking the above views into account, the authors of this article feel strongly that geography and, in particular, human geography, provides one of the best disciplines in which to explore and make use of the ideas developed in the field of Big History. Geography and human geography already provide a fruitful place for the development of scholarship and already have a strong pedagogical tradition. Human geography’s interdisciplinarity anticipates Big History. Each facet of human geography gives Big History a chance to explore the depth of time related to the subject at hand. As an example, economic geography would provide an excellent opportunity to include the Little Big History of precious metals and other items of value, giving a deeper understanding of the basis of the modern economic theory. The already expansive view of human geography would only acquire greater depth, whereas Big History would be placed at the service of the human presence on the Earth. One of the things Big History requires is a sense of connection to the realities of human existence which always takes place in a particular place and setting on the Earth. On the other hand, that place and setting have a long and deep story which deserves to be recognized. Human geographers make clear that geography plays a foundational role in all historical narrative, and so the natural history becomes a character in human history. Moreover, Big History can lose some focus on the human with its emphasis on those thresholds that happen before that advent of the human. Human geography corrects that misplaced emphasis by rooting physical development in the human context. This is a much-needed corrective to Big History. Ultimately, Big History is the story of how humans become rooted in, and have a relationship to, planet Earth. Human geography already has the structure with which to view that relationship in the present and immediate past. Big History can provide a stronger foundation to human geography and human geography can provide a richer context for Big History, all in aid of a more profound understanding of human story. The Anthropocene is where all this comes together, how planet Earth and its human inhabitants are related, both with present wealth and future threats.

See Also: Anthropocene.

Further Reading Brown, C.S., 2012. Big History: From the Big Bang to the Present, second ed. New Press, New York. Chaisson, E., 2001. Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Christian, D., 1991. The case for “big history”. J. World Hist. 2 (2), 223–238. Christian, D., 2011. Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History, second ed. University of California Press, Berkeley CA. Christian, D., 2017. What is big history? J. Big Hist. 1 (1), 4–19. Christian, D., Brown, C.S., Benjamin, C., 2014. Big History: Between Nothing and Everything. McGraw-Hill, New York. Macquarie University Big History Institute, 2016. Big History: Examines Our Past, Explains Our Present, Imagines Our Future. DK books, London.

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From big bang to galactic civilizations: a big history anthology. In: Rodrique, B., Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. (Eds.), 2017. Our Place in the Universe: An Introduction to Big History, Vol. I. Primus Books, Delhi. From big bang to galactic civilizations: a big history anthology. In: Rodrique, B., Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. (Eds.), 2017. Education and Understanding: Big History Around the World, Vol. II. Primus Books, Delhi. From big bang to galactic civilizations: a big history anthology. In: Rodrique, B., Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. (Eds.), 2017. The Ways that Big History Works: Cosmos, Life Society and Our Future, Vol. III. Primus Books, Delhi. Spier, F., 2015. Big History and the Future of Humanity, second ed. Wiley/Blackwell, Malden, MA.

Relevant Websites International Big History Association’ https://bighistory.org. ‘Big History Project’ http://bighistoryproject.com. ‘Crash Course in Big History’ https://thecrashcourse.com/courses/bighistory. ‘ChronoZoom’ http://www.chronozoom.com/.

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Biodiversity Roderick P Neumann, Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Biopiracy The unauthorized, unlicensed, and uncompensated appropriation of biological wealth from the territories of less powerful entities (e.g., states of the Global South, Indigenous minorities) by more powerful ones (e.g., corporations of the Global North). Bioprospecting The systematic collection and assessment of the genetic, chemical, and mechanical qualities of living organisms for potential biotechnological uses. Biosphere The totality of life on earth and the space in which it exists. One of the four components of the physical earth, including the lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere. Biotechnology The use of living organisms or their components (e.g., DNA) in production processes. Conservation Biology An interdisciplinary field that directs scientific analysis toward the problems of biodiversity maintenance, loss, and restoration. Genetic Engineering The process by which an organism is genetically modified by the insertion of DNA extracted from another organism in a way that cannot occur in nature. Global Commons Natural resource systems that function on a global scale and upon which all humanity depends, such as the atmosphere and oceans, but which fall outside capitalist property regimes.

Biodiversity, a contraction of biological diversity, is a relatively recent neologism whose origins are readily traceable. The invention of the term “biodiversity” coincides with the emergence, in the 1980s, of two new biology subfields, genetic engineering, and conservation biology. Technological advances in genetic engineering resulted in the commodification of genetic material as a natural resource, the raw material for a new industry. Conservation biology emerged from an effort to structure conservation practices on the scientific foundation of evolutionary biology, with its emphasis on the relationships among genetic variation, genetic exchange, species population sizes, speciation, and species extinction rates. The term biodiversity originated from within the latter field in 1986. Walter Rosen, then senior program officer for the Board of Basic Biology at the National Science Research Council, is credited with coining the term in organizing the National Forum on Biodiversity. It is an all-encompassing concept that refers to the diversity within the entirety of the world’s biosphere, as measured at various levels, including among individuals, populations, species, communities, and ecosystems. Biodiversity thus encompasses genetic, species, and habitat diversity. The invention of biodiversity was an act of political advocacy as much as one of scientific reasoning. Scientists, principally biologists and natural resource specialists, sought to rally political support for what they perceived as a general and global-scale crisis of species extinctions and habitat loss. Biodiversity thus served as a catchphrase that conservation biologists could employ to educate politicians and the general public. E. O. Wilson cemented the term in both scientific discourse and public consciousness when, in 1988, he produced the edited volume, Biodiversity, from the proceedings of the National Forum. Biodiversity has since supplanted several terms once used by biological scientists and conservationists to describe the object of their labors, including game, flora and fauna, wildlife, nature, and wilderness. Planners, scientists, policymakers, and development experts rapidly incorporated biodiversity into national development plans, research programs, global conservation agendas, and international treaties. Only a year after the publication of Wilson’s volume, the Costa Rican government established the National Biodiversity Institute to coordinate the conservation, harvesting, and marketing of biodiversity resources within its territory. In 1992, 150 countries signed the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), Article 2 of which defines biodiversity for the purposes of global governance. One of the Global Environmental Fund’s (GEF)d which the World Bank created in 1991 as a way to finance environmental initiatives in developing countriesdfirst projects was the preparation of 24 biodiversity country studies. In 1988, biodiversity was not listed as a keyword in the “biological abstracts.” Currently, there are hundreds of entries annually, while the search of a research university’s holdings yields nearly 7000 books containing biodiversity in the title. In 2011, the United Nations General Assembly designated 2011–2020 the “United Nations Decade of Biodiversity” in support of international initiatives to conserve biodiversity.

The Biodiversity Crisis Scientists, conservationists, and sport hunters have been for decades concerned about species extinction, primarily vertebrate species, at the local and regional scales. Toward the end of the 19th Century in North America and Europe, bird plumage on

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hats was a middle-class fashion statement. Exotic and colorful bird feathers were in great demand. As a consequence, many bird species were hunted to near extinction. By the turn of the century, public outrage at the scale of the slaughter prompted local and national governments to crack down on the trade and led to the passage of regulatory laws and to the formation of conservationist organizations, notably the Audubon Society. At the height of European colonialism in the early 20th Century, hunternaturalists based in Europe feared that certain game animals were being pushed to the brink of extinction in Africa and South Asia. Hunters and conservation activists pressured colonial governments to pass restrictive hunting laws and establish protected areas, such as game reserves and national parks. By the second half of the century, scientists increasingly conceptualized the problem of species extinction as a global one. This sentiment crystallized at the National Forum on Biodiversity, where extinction was framed as a global biodiversity crisis. In framing extinction as a worldwide crisis, conservation biologists constructed biodiversity as a global commons problem.

Trends in Global Biodiversity The basic unit of analysis for assessing biodiversity trends at any geographic scale is the species. Thus, the number of species measured per unit area is taken as a representative measure of biodiversity. Conversely, species extinction is taken as a representative measure of biodiversity loss. Two important sources for assessing biodiversity at the global scale are the Secretariat of the UNCBD and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN; World Conservation Union). The Secretariat, among other duties, collects and disseminates information, notably through a series of reports titled, Global Biodiversity Outlook. In publishing these reports, the Secretariat does not generate data from its own research, but rather serves as an information clearinghouse. Data come from individual scientists, governments, and major international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The IUCN, in the 1960s, began evaluating and cataloging species that have become extinct since 1500 CE or that are currently at risk of global extinction. It publicizes its findings through its trademarked Red List of Threatened Species, widely acknowledged to be the best data source on threatened species. Similar to the UNCBD Secretariat, the IUCN derives its assessments of biodiversity loss from data collected by others (including partner organizations and members of the Red List Consortium) much of which is previously published in monographs, edited volumes, and web-based databases. Based on the IUCN and the UNCBD Secretariat’s most recent published assessments and their supporting sourcesdwhich, it must be stressed, are continually reevaluated as new data are obtained – it is widely accepted that the global rate of species extinction has increased. The increase is largely due to human activities. Of the estimated total of 8.7 million species of all eukaryotic organisms on Earth, approximately 1.9 million have been described within scientific (Linnaean) taxonomies. The IUCN has assessed only 96,500 of the total number of scientifically described species, but has a near term goal of 160,000 species assessed. Based on their current assessments, 25% of mammals, 14% of birds, and 40% of amphibians are threatened with extinction. The IUCN’s data suggest that all of these rates are increasing. The Red List contains 802 documented extinctions since 1500 CE. Based on known extinctions of birds, mammals, and amphibians in the past 100 years, scientists estimate that current extinction rates are 50–500 times higher than extinction rates in the fossil record. Since it is difficult to prove that a species extinction has occurred, scientists created a category of “possibly extinct” species. If possibly extinct species are included, current extinction rates are 100–1000 times above average or “background” extinction rates. Background extinction rates are determined by tracing rates of speciation and extinction of life forms in the fossil record. The evolutionary trend has been toward higher levels of biodiversity (i.e., speciation rates higher than extinction rates), and it is estimated that current global biodiversity is near an all-time high in planetary history. The fossil record also shows, however, that global biodiversity has fluctuated greatly over time, punctuated by periods of relatively sudden (1–10 million years) mass extinctions. Scientists have identified five mass extinction events in the fossil record when a high proportion of species across a wide range of taxa disappeared, the first occurring 440 million years ago and the most recent, 65 million years ago. Conservation biologists suggest that the planet may be experiencing a human-induced sixth episode of mass extinction, representing one indicator of the onset of the Anthropocene. Other scientists, notably paleontologists, argue that the evidence for mass extinctions found in the fossil record is not analogous to the data collated and tracked by the IUCN. Specifically, the fossils of marine invertebrates are the primary evidence for identifying past mass extinctions. The (mostly) vertebrate species tracked today are not part of the fossil evidence for mass extinctions. Moreover, the magnitude of human-caused extinctions in recent centuries, somewhere between 0 and 1% of species, is not comparable to the estimated 90% of all species lost in previous mass extinctions. In sum, some paleontologists argue that while humans have greatly reduced species population numbers and caused hundreds of species to go extinct, the evidence that a sixth mass extinction is underway is not there. The unfortunate conclusion is that we probably will not know we are in a planetary mass extinction event until it is too late to alter human activities to prevent it. While many biologists are convinced that the world is facing a biodiversity crisis, there is a great deal of uncertainty involved in quantifying trends, as the numbers cited above suggest. First, there is a paucity of baseline data, beginning with the absence of a comprehensive species inventory. For example, it is estimated that fewer than 20% of all existing species have been described and cataloged in scientific taxonomies, though the actual number of existing species is unknown and estimates vary wildly from 2 million to 1 trillion species. For some taxa, the difference between what is known and what (probably) exists is even more extreme. For example, perhaps as few as 0.01% of the estimated total bacterial species have been classified. The lack of basic data means that biodiversity assessments can vary by two or three orders of magnitude between what is known and what is estimated as possible or likely. Second, the methods used for assessment can vary, so that results are not comparable or are only

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partially comparable. For example, the UNCBD Secretariat’s Global Biodiversity Outlook considers bacterial species and cultivars in its assessment, while the IUCN’s Red List does not. More troublingly, there are large epistemic differences between science-based inventories and locally based bodies of knowledge that can make them incompatible for the purpose of biodiversity assessment. Third, there is little time series data that would allow scientists to quantify trends in biodiversity over a significant geographic area. Most of the data on species have been collected on an ad hoc basis in static, one-time inventories, with a disproportionate amount of attention paid to large mammals. Finally, it is difficult to know the degree to which our assessment of biodiversity reflects actual trends in the Earth’s biosphere or is an artifact of increased monitoring.

Proximate and Ultimate Causes of Biodiversity Loss Beyond a general agreement that increased biodiversity loss is associated with human activitiesdranging from the human colonization of the Americas and Australia 15,000–50,000 years ago to the industrial revolutiondthere is a great deal of debate about causal mechanisms. A typical list of causes includes disparities in wealth and poverty, insecure property rights, overpopulation, overhunting, habitat loss, overconsumption, and, increasingly, climate change. Differences in assessing causation are driven partly by whether one is considering proximate or ultimate causes. For example, a common proximate causal explanation of the decline in global biodiversity is habitat loss driven by population pressure, especially in the Global South. An ultimate causal explanation might point to government land tenure and taxation policies that promote the concentration of land ownership and the expansion of large-scale, capital-intensive monocultures at the expense of poorer family farmers who are forced to clear new land that is agriculturally marginal, but biodiverse. Thus proximate explanations, grounded in neoMalthusian thought, often single out demographic forces, while ultimate explanations might suggest complex politicaleconomic processes through which class interests are pursued. Sometimes, the latter are referred to as root causesdprocesses that drive biodiversity loss, but which are spatially and temporally distant from where the loss occurs. An analysis that seeks to look beyond proximate causes, therefore, must examine cultural, social, and political-economic processes operating at multiple temporal and geographic scales.

The Geography of Biodiversity Geography is critical to understanding biodiversity. First, biodiversity is unevenly distributed over the surface of the Earth. In general, species diversity increases toward the equator, with the world’s most species-rich habitats occurring in the belt of tropical moist forests that falls within the tropical latitudes. Tropical moist forests are the most species-rich terrestrial habitats, covering only 7% of the Earth’s surface, but estimated to contain 50–90% of all species. Coral reefs, occurring only between 30 north and south of the equator, comprise about 0.25% of the area of the world’s marine environment, but contain 25% of its total number of species. Furthermore, the geographic distribution of many species, particularly in the tropics, is extremely limited. Such species, often referred to as endemic or restricted-range species, are found in relatively small areas and nowhere else on earth. Second, our knowledge of biodiversity is greatly influenced by its geographic distribution in the biosphere. In general, the more inhospitable and inaccessible to humans a habitat is, the less we know about its biodiversity. For example, while oceans and seas by far make up the greatest area of the Earth’s surface, they are also the least understood ecosystems and the biodiversity they contain is poorly documented. Indicative of this lack of knowledge is the fact that the most widely used maps of global biodiversity typically includes only terrestrial ecosystems. Some marine habitats, such as those surrounding the hydrothermal vents in areas of seafloor spreading, are accessible only with the most advanced technology, yet they support a diverse community of species. Unique life forms, such as bacteria that use hydrogen sulfide as an energy source, have only recently been discovered near seafloor vents. Similar problems of accessibility exist in the terrestrial portion of the biosphere. While tropical moist forests are species-rich, the most extensive are relatively inaccessible and difficult to traverse. Hence, scientists and conservation biologists have assessed only a small fraction of the tropical forests where most of the world’s biodiversity is estimated to exist. In addition, most of the world’s moist tropical forests are found in developing countries, where pervasive poverty, lack of infrastructure, and political and social instability may discourage systematic biodiversity assessments. Third, certain physical geographic features, such as islands, mountaintops, and coral reefs, play key roles in global biodiversity. Islands are important to global biodiversity because many have been genetically isolated for millions of years, allowing for speciation and genetic variation to occur separately from that on continents. Many species are thus endemic to a single island or archipelago. In addition, the genetic isolation of islands creates evolutionary dynamics that produce unusual phenomenon such as flightlessness in avian species and dwarfism. Mountaintops are similarly, though not identically, isolated geographic features. The steep terrain, altitudinal zonation, and fragmented landscapes of mountain regions create conditions for high rates of species endemism. Limestone ridges formed by living corals in shallow tropical seas create the conditions for concentrations of marine biodiversity. A wide variety of organisms, including, oysters, clams, crabs, sponges, turtles, and fish find shelter and food in the underwater architecture of the reefs. Finally, biodiversity loss is also strongly influenced by geography. For example, the three geographic features described above together account for a disproportionate amount of recent species extinctions and the world’s most threatened species. The vast majority of extinctions since 1500 CE have occurred on oceanic islands, where many species, having evolved in isolation, are relatively vulnerable to habitat disturbance and predation. However, this pattern has begun to change with the number of recent

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extinctions on continents equaling those of islands. Most of the species of birds, mammals, and amphibians currently threatened with extinction are located in the tropical latitudes. Tropical islands particularly stand out as having a disproportionate amount of the world’s threatened species. Tropical moist forests also stand out in global assessments of threatened species, because they contain high concentrations of biodiversity, but are rapidly being converted to intensive agriculture, such as land-extensive monocrop plantations. There is also a great deal of geographical variation in the extinctions and threats of extinctions among different taxonomic groups. For example, global mollusk extinctions are concentrated in North American rivers, whereas Australia has the largest concentration of mammal extinctions. Given that both the levels of biodiversity and numbers of species threatened with extinction are often geographically concentrated, some conservation biologists base protection strategies on biodiversity hotspots. Norman Myers coined the term “hotspots,” in 1988, to identify areas in the biosphere that have high levels of species diversity, endemism, and habitat loss. This exercise was driven by practical conservationist concerns, the idea being to identify areas where biodiversity protection is most urgent and where the payoff, measured as numbers of species protected, would be greatest. Since the term was introduced, conservationists have identified 36 hotspots around the world in both terrestrial and marine environments. Biodiversity hotspots have become a major focus for conservation programs and funding, with Conservation International building its program agenda around the concept and the World Bank and MacArthur Foundation providing hundreds of millions of dollars of financing; however, conservation biologists have not universally accepted the hotspot concept. Subsequent research suggests that focusing on hotspots identified under this system may not be an appropriate strategy. For example, in the case of the world’s terrestrial mammals, little geographic overlap was found between species richness on the one hand, and endemism and threats of extinction on the other. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that global climate change is causing shifts in the geographic distribution of species across many taxa, decreasing the effectiveness of the hotspots approach to biodiversity loss.

Key Issues and Critical Perspectives Biodiversity touches nearly every aspect of human affairs in the 21st Century, including environmental sustainability, poverty and social justice, medicine and healthcare, agriculture and food, and economic globalization. As a consequence, a wide range of critical assessments of the concept has emerged, ranging from questions of who should own, control, and benefit from biodiversity to questions of how to inventory and catalog the world’s life forms. Among the myriad scientific, political, economic, and social questions raised by the invention of biodiversity, three areas of concern stand out: social justice and proprietary rights; uncertainties in the study of biodiversity; and the effectiveness of biodiversity protection efforts.

Social Justice and Proprietary Rights The construction of the biodiversity crisis as a global commons problem suggests that the solution lies with restructuring property relations from the top down. There hence has been a worldwide movement toward the enclosure and commodification of biodiversity, endorsed by and enforced through such international arrangements as the UNCBD and the GEF and national governments in concert with various mainstream international conservation NGOs. Such a tragedy-of-the-commons understanding of biodiversity loss assumes that the world’s biodiversity exists “out there” in nature without proprietary claims as an uncaptured natural resource. Many social justice issues arise from such a perspective. Critics, such as Vandana Shiva, have argued that much of the world’s biodiversity and knowledge about it are, in fact, the products of the labor generations of agrarian communities. These critics argue that what passes for legitimate bioprospecting in the Global South is in reality biopiracy; that private interests (e.g., northern multinationals) take freely the biodiversity produced in the Global South and commodify it as intellectual property to be sold for a profit in the form of improved seeds, medicines, and other biotechnology products. Others point out that the local commons, which rural communities manage and depend upon for their livelihoods, are rescaled as global commons and enclosed for the benefit of an abstract “humankind.” The consequent displacements of communities in the interests of biodiversity conservation raise justice questions regarding who bears the costs of and benefits from enclosures. Such concerns over social justice and proprietary rights seem to have been shunted to the sidelines in the recent rush to place an economic valuation on biodiversity for capital investors. Discouraged by the lack of results from traditional biodiversity conservation efforts, some conservation biologists have embraced the idea of creating biodiversity commodity markets for capital investment. The IUCN’s Integrated Biodiversity Assessment Tool (IBAT) provides an illustrative case of the fundamental thinking, that biodiversity must be made profitable to be saved. Under the IBAT initiative, the IUCN created the first global policy on biodiversity offsets in an effort to advance the (so-far-unmet) goal of creating a regulatory environment for capital investment in and accumulation from biodiversity. Within the UNCBD a similar effort was made to create a globally traded asset in biodiversity. Other proposals for mitigation banking and a cap-and-trade biodiversity market are circulating in global policy circles. These and similar proposals face daunting challenges, beginning with the lack of an agreed upon unit of measurement for biodiversity and the incompatibilities between capital’s need for simplification and ecological science’s findings of complexity and interconnectivity. As it stands, these and other barriers to the dream of having the earth’s biodiversity pay for the costs of its own preservation have yet to be surmounted.

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Uncertainties in the Study of Biodiversity Practitioners have labeled conservation biology a “crisis science,” meaning that in a context of great uncertainty, as with certain branches of medicine, the risks of inaction are greater than those of action. The question, what proportion of the world’s biodiversity can be lost before the planet’s human life-support systems collapse, cannot be answered with certainty given the current state of scientific knowledge. Waiting for that question to be answered with scientific certainty is to risk, quite literally, the end of the world as we know it. Generally, it is this sort of unanswered empirical, scientific question that conservation biologists refer to when writing of uncertainty. But there are also more fundamental ontological and ideological sources of uncertainty in understanding biodiversity. These include questions regarding how species are inventoried and classified, how well scientific models reflect reality, and the anthropogenic sources of biodiversity. At the center of the scientific response to the biodiversity crisis is an effort to inventory and classify as much of the world’s biodiversity as possible and then to set priorities for its conservation. Critical observers of this strategy suggest that this is not as straightforward and empirically objective as may appear. First, there is a great deal more attention to charismatic life forms (e.g., large mammals) that appeal to scientists for subjective reasons, thus creating a biodiversity inventory skewed toward a limited number of taxa. Second, the structures of classification systems themselves are subjective constructions that vary geographically and historically. Third, as biodiversity is incorporated into human affairs in the form of commodities, scientific inventories are increasingly shaped by the demands of political economy. The prevailing model of nature in the scientific study of biodiversity is that of a steady state system of long duration, which, when disturbed, returns to stasis through an orderly set of stages (see section titled “Effectiveness of Biodiversity Protection Efforts”). Thus habitats of high biodiversity, such as moist tropical forests, are viewed as pristine remnant ecosystems threatened by anthropogenic disturbance. Increasing evidence from both the natural and social sciences suggests that many of the world’s most diverse habitats, such as the forests of the Southeast Asian archipelago, are not ancient and pristine, but relatively recent systems that have been subject to widespread and sometimes frequent cycles of disturbance, particularly from fire. Evidence for greater resiliency and less fragility in tropical ecosystems has also challenged the prevailing stasis model of nature. Moreover, presumed remnant, pristine habitats have been found to be stages in cycles of human food production systems and that disturbances produced in such systems can have the effect of increasing biodiversity. This latter finding raises questions about the role of humans in shaping the world’s biodiversity. Studies from virtually all regions of the globe suggest that humans have played an important role in shaping biodiversity at multiple levels, from habitat diversity to genetic diversity. Indeed, it is estimated that as much as 75% of the genetic diversity in agriculture has been lost since 1900. Finally, some critical analysts, building on the work of Bruno Latour, argue that the scientific project to inventory and catalog species for conservation purposes will ultimately produce the world’s future biodiversity in its own image.

Effectiveness of Biodiversity Protection Efforts In the face of evidence of increasing extinction rates, conservationists and scientists of the 1950s and 1960s laid the conceptual foundation upon which 21st Century global biodiversity protection efforts are built. Major international NGOs and global governance institutions organized to create a worldwide network of protected areas, such as national parks, that would serve as “nature islands” where wild species would be given refuge from human exploitation. As the fields of conservation biology and biotechnology emerged, protected area establishment became the centerpiece of a global scheme of in situ genetic diversity conservation. The UNCBD and GEF have adopted this framework in directing international efforts to stem biodiversity loss, focusing funding on the expansion and management of a global network of protected areas. Scientific and political interest in protected areas has risen tremendously because they are now viewed as the primary containers of the world’s extant and future biodiversity. National governments have implemented the greatest expansion of protected areas in history, creating more parks and reserves between 1970 and 1990 than in all the previous decades. Most of the increase has occurred in the Global South where poverty levels are high and the majority of the populations are rural and directly dependent on the land for their livelihoods. Critics of the nature island approach to global biodiversity conservation have questioned its effectiveness, observing that even as governments have exponentially increased the area of the Earth’s surface under formal protection, extinction rates and the number of threatened species have risen. The reasons are complex. Proponents of the approach argue that many protected areas in the Global South are not really protected, but rather exist only as “paper parks” with insufficient funds for planning and management. Thus, the solution is to funnel more funds for protected areas to poor tropical countries through such instruments as the GEF. More critical observers suggest that the problem lies in the very conceptualization of biodiversity protection in conservation biology. They note that the historical and philosophical foundations of the prevailing protected-area model equate biodiversity with wilderness and presume that the normal ecosystem dynamics tend toward steady state or stable equilibrium conditions. Equating biodiversity with wilderness discounts the positive role of human activities in biodiversity, requires the displacement of human populations from protected areas, and fails to address the fact that the vast majority of the world’s biodiversity exists outside of protected areas. The stable equilibrium concept of ecosystem dynamics has been increasingly challenged by theoretical advances and empirical findings in ecological science that suggest that instability, disequilibria, and chaotic fluctuations are far more common and perhaps “normal” conditions. The effects of climate change on the geographic distribution of species will pose perhaps the strongest test of the efficacy of protected areas. In sum, attempting to stop ecological change by bounding populations within protected areas is proving to be an inadequate response to biodiversity loss. A more comprehensive response, one that challenges the prevailing political-economic model of global capitalism, will likely be required to staunch the loss of biodiversity.

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See Also: Genetics; Nature.

Further Reading Baillie, J.E.M., Hilton-Taylor, C., Stuart, S.N. (Eds.), 2004. IUCN Red List of Threatened Species: A Global Species Assessment. The IUCN Species Programme, Gland. Castree, N., 2003. Bioprospecting: from theory to practice (and back again). Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 28 (1), 35–55. Dempsey, J., 2016. Enterprising Nature: Economics, Markets and Finance in Global Biodiversity Politics. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ. Goldman, M. (Ed.), 1998. Privatizing Nature: Political Struggles for the Global Commons. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ. IUCN Red List Committee, 2017. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species Strategic Plan 2017–2020. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland. Kolbert, E., 2014. The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History. Henry Holt and Company, New York. Larsen, B., Miller, E.C., Rhodes, M.K., Wiens, J.J., 2017. Inordinate fondness multiplied and redistributed: the number of species on earth and the new pie of life. Q. Rev. Biol. 92 (3), 229–265. Levin, S. (Ed.), 2013. Encyclopedia of Biodiversity, second ed. Academic Press, Amsterdam. Plotnick, R.E., Smith, F.A., Kathleen Lyons, S., 2016. The fossil record of the sixth extinction. Ecol. Lett. 19 (5), 546–553. Robertson, M., 2006. The nature that capital can see: science, state, and market in the commodification of ecosystem services. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 24, 367–387. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2014Secretariat. Global Biodiversity Outlook 4. Montréal. Shiva, V., 2000. Tomorrow’s Biodiversity. Thames and Hudson, New York. Wilson, E.O. (Ed.), 1988. Biodiversity. National Academy Press, Washington, DC.

Relevant Websites https://www.iucnredlist.org, IUCN’s Red List of Endangered Species. http://www.navdanya.org, Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, Navdanya. www.cbd.int/secretariat/, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. http://www.conbio.org, Society for Conservation Biology. http://www.wrm.org.uy, World Rainforest Movement. www.iucn.org/theme/business-and-biodiversity, IUCN Business and Biodiversity.

Biodiversity Mapping and Modeling James MR Brock, School of Biological Sciences, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Riki M Taylor, School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand George LW Perry, School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Humans have been recording observations on biodiversity for millennia; the oldest extant evidence (c. 28,000 years old) includes carvings and paintings of animals created by early Homo sapiens. From Neolithic petroglyphs of crocodiles in the Sahara and tigers in the Helan Mountains of China, to paintings of camelids, wallabies, and rhinoceros in South America, Australia, and India, early humans were dedicated recorders of their environment, and of the species they encountered in the landscape (Fig. 1). Early cultures and civilizations developed accurate calendars based on the lunar cycle and observed how resource abundance (animal species and fruiting times of plants) varied with season and environmental disturbance, such as the flooding of the Indus and Nile rivers . Observations on species that represented important resources (food, medicine, clothing) are recorded in artwork, in the spoken word through oral histories and proverbs, anddafter the development of the written worddin texts. Oral narratives from North America describe a detailed knowledge of species as resources and the importance of management to ensure maintenance of this resource. From the Pacific, Maori whakataukı (proverbs) describe species distributions, interactions, and identify extinctions of species in precolonial New Zealand. The earliest surviving texts that describe plant and animals vary in focus with ancient Egyptian writings, and surviving Mayan codices detailing animal species suitable for hunting, and animal domestication practices such as bee keeping. The philosopher Theophrastus (371–287 BCE) discussed the effect of soils on the distribution of plant species, as well as the various uses for plants. The use and economic value of natural resources has sometimes had a limiting effect on survival; in CE 77, Pliny the Elder described the over-use of several species to the point of local and regional extinction (e.g., Silphium) in cultures around the Mediterranean Sea. Extinction was not an inevitable endpoint of human resource consumption; globally, many cultures acknowledged the limited nature of species as a resource and attempted sustainable harvests using management regimes and the representation of resource species other than human in genealogies, mythology and as deities. Early texts of plant uses range from Mesopotamian cuneiform tablets (3000 BCE), detailing parts of species used in medicinal treatments, to the works of Hildegard von Bingen (CE 1098–1179), who considered causes and cures of disease. Use of plant materials in treatment and herbalism is represented in bas-reliefs in Indonesian temples, and orally transmitted ethnobotanical knowledge of African cultures.

Taxonomy and the Species Concept Identifying that different organisms have different traits (consumption and use), active properties (through herbalism, etc.), in conjunction with a developing understanding of reproductive systems drove an appreciation of differentiation between groups of organisms, or species. What defines a species remains debated, and has changed over time with our understanding of natural history. A standardized approach to the categorization of organisms across the natural world was published in 1758 by Carl Linnaeus. As well as formalizing a method of grouping plant species on the basis of morphology and reproductive characteristics, Linnaeus standardized the usage of binomial nomenclature in a taxonomic classification system for all species. As such, a species

Figure 1 Paintings of camels and cattle in the Manda Guéli Cave in the Ennedi Mountains, Northeastern Chad, Figure: David Stanley [CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)]. From Wikimedia Commons.

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Figure 2 The hierarchical taxonomic structure showing the classification of the extinct New Zealand ratite, the giant moa (Dinornis robustus). Moa image from Acrocynus [CC BY 3.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en]. from Wikimedia Commons.

sits within a genus, the genus within a family in a hierarchical structure. Crucially, this structure not only categorizes species but tells us about their relatedness (entities with the same genus are more closely related than those that are in the same family but different genera, etc.). The binomial species name consists of the genus and the species epithet and is either italicized (in print) or underlined (when handwritten), for example: keel-billed toucan Ramphastos sulfuratus; Lebanon cedar Cedrus libani. Formalizing a descriptive process for allocating species names provided an international standard and this revolutionized taxonomy and the ability of scientists and natural historians to discuss ideas and expound theories around natural history and biodiversity (Fig. 2). Type specimens of species are maintained in museums and herbaria around the world; researchers can confirm the identity of their study species through physical/morphological and genetic comparisons from these important reference materials. There are many different approaches to providing accessible reference resources with which to identify species: Until the 20th Century, engravings and detailed watercolor paintings were (and in the case of watercolor continue to be, despite the advent of photography) an effective way of cataloging the appearance and key diagnostic features of many species. This mode of communication was a global phenomenon: In the 17th Century, as Mughal emperors of the Indian subcontinent commissioned extensive works of art accurately depicting plants and animals, the professional illustrator Maria S. Meriman traveled from Holland to Suriname to document and paint plants, insects, and herpetofauna. Two centuries later, Beatrix Potter, before becoming known for her children’s books on British wildlife, painted a series of accurate scientific works on fungi.

Species and the Environment Alongside the developing awareness of a species concept, the links between patterns of species presence and abundance and environmental and biotic (interactions with other species) variables were becoming more apparent. After years of travel around Central and northern South America in the early 19th Century, Alexander von Humboldt published a cross sectional drawing of Chimborazo, an Andean mountain, presenting distributions of species in relation to elevation, temperature, and humidity. In particular this work highlighted how different species of the same genus can separate out along these gradients in relation to differing resources. This observation initiated discussions in the scientific community on how local environmental conditions might influence the likelihood of observing a species at a certain location (Fig. 3). Where species come from is a discussion that has been ongoing for millennia, developing from ideas around divine creation, to the 18th Century idea that variation within a species might arise after breeding that over time would degenerate into a new species. In 1809 Lamarck published the theory of transmutation that included the idea that a species might change in response to environmental pressures by the inheritance of variable traits through sexual reproduction. Yet it was not until 1859 when Charles Darwin had amassed considerable evidence and support that he proffered his works on natural selection as a key driver of evolution and speciation. Natural selection is a process that is enacted on a species by external pressures influencing mortality or fecundity

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Figure 3 A representation of species distributions in relation to environmental gradients across the Andean mountain, Chimborazo, by Alexander von Humboldt. Figure: Wikimedia Commons (public domain).

(ultimately fitness)dchanges in resources, predation, or other environmental requirements. Environmental pressures are key not only to speciation but also, as has been seen since Theophrastus, a significant determinant of whether and where a species is present in the landscape.

Species Niche Space The concept of species distribution responding to a specific set of environmental conditions led Joseph Grinnell in 1917 to first describe the niche of a species; in this case, the niches of the Californian Thrasher Toxostoma spp. His was a one-dimensional model of a niche in the sense that the sum of the physical conditions at any location that limited the presence of any one of the species of thrasher and the potential for this species to reproduce (the fundamental niche). This is a relatively simple concept to map, niches could be bounded by the extent of the limiting conditions or variables and available resources; Grinnell produced the first recognized map of niches for specific species (Fig. 4). The concept of niche as the sum of physical limitations was extended by Charles Elton in 1927 beyond immediate physical (environmental) limitations, the activity of individuals of a species can alter the conditions in and around where they live changing the availability of resources and competition dynamics (the realized niche). Essentially, the potential of physical resources in a landscape to support a reproductive population are mediated by the presence of these organisms and how they compete for these resources. G Evelyn Hutchinson in 1957 refined the niche concept further to describe an n-dimensional hypervolume, the parameters of which were defined by environmental properties, resource availability, and interactions with other species. The idea here is that there are many species interacting in the landscapedsharing the same suite of resources and each species limited by a similar range of environmental conditions: i.e., many over-lapping fundamental, and realized niches. Species that are similar and have overlapping niches might compete for resources, and each affects a given resource differently. Alternatively, species might coexist in mutualisms or parasitic relationships. The complexity of the many environmental variables, the individual species effects, and the effects of the interactions means that it is not possible to draw a conceptual diagram of this in two, or even three dimensions (hence n-dimensional), and would create an extremely complex shape driven by many variables defining resource and interaction (a hypervolume). With this appreciation of the species concept, evolutionary processes, and the complex requirements driving their distributions, scientists could now focus their attentions on the complexity and function of biological diversity, or biodiversity at and across larger spatial extents.

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Specimens examined Published records Toxostoma redivivum sonomae Toxostoma r. redivivum Toxostoma r. pasadenense

Figure 4 Californian thrasher Toxostoma spp. niches modified from Grinnell’s classic work. Toxostoma figure: Mat Tillett [CC BY 2.0 (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)]. from Wikimedia Commons.

How to Map Biodiversity? Biogeographic Realms One approach to mapping biodiversity, at a massive spatial extent compared to a single niche, are biogeographic realms. Realms represent the broadest classifications of terrestrial biodiversity, and can cover areas as large as continents. Each realm, therefore, contains a range of different ecosystem types, such as the Palearctic realm, which reaches from the Sahara through the subtropical and temperate areas of Europe and Asia to the Artic regions of northern Europe. On the other hand, biomes contain biota that exhibit vastly different traits and life histories, yet share evolutionary histories (phylogenies). Across realms, similarities between related species can be obscured through divergent evolution and speciationdadapting to different conditions and filling different niches, requiring different adaptive traits. This evolutionary process has produced the diversity of life around us and is evident throughout the kingdoms that make up life.

Biomes The concept of biomes was developed in an attempt to define community structure of biodiversity in relation to environmental variables that generally extend over a significantly smaller spatial extent than biogeographic realms. Conceptualized in the mid1900s and developed over several decades, biomes operationalize the inherent differences between ecosystems by emphasizing the similarities between commonly used ecosystem classifications, e.g., tundra, desert, grassland, and tropical forest. The major external controls on these systems were defined by Robert Whittaker (1920–1980) as precipitation and temperature (the latter essentially a proxy for incoming solar radiation), which he used to define the most enduring set of biomes. The generalizations made by Whittaker do result in some important omissions. For example, the upper limit of less than 4500 mm of rainfall per year excludes the wettest parts of the world, with some temperate and tropical rainforests, the latter incorporating some of the most biodiverse areas of the planet, receiving in excess of 10,000 mm per year (Fig. 5). The critical feature of biomes is that, despite their disjunct spatial distribution around the planet (e.g., deserts in Africa and north America), the similarities in precipitation and temperature in each biome result in similarities in ecosystem structure (e.g., desert plant community dominated by succulents) and function, as well as morphologies between unrelated species (succulent desert species of Euphorbiaceae in Africa and Cactaceae in America). As such, despite similarities in the traits of organisms and resource capture strategies, the biota of each biome lack a shared evolutionary history but are instead defined by convergent evolution,

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A Whittaker climograph of global biomes showing distribution of biomes in environmental space.

i.e., increasing similarity of traits/morphology over long periods of evolutionary time through competition for similar resources in different locations. A coarse example of convergent evolution within a biome can be seen in the forest species Dolichousnea longissimi, a lichenized fungi, and Tillandsia usneoides, a flowering plant. Both hang from branches of tall trees and have a furry appearance due to feathery leaves/leaf-like structures that absorb atmospheric water and nutrients.

Biodiversity Hotspots Some geographic regions (smaller in spatial extent than biomes or biogeographic regions) support exceptionally high levels of biodiversity (species richness and endemism) and have been identified as “biodiversity hotspots.” These areas, and their rich biodiversity, are under threat from climate change and anthropic habitat loss. Describing and mapping biodiversity of these often spatially limited areas is crucial to its preservation, and requires data across multiple spatial scales and incorporates information such as: biome-level regions, e.g., Cerrado (the tropical savannah of Brazil), to fine-scale information, e.g., location and extent of isolated patches of un-disturbed savannah vegetation in an agricultural landscape. These locations, often in highly fragmented landscapes, can represent crucial legacies of pre-human ecosystems, refugia from ongoing habitat-loss and extinction, and provide a small chance that such systems may be restored.

Anthromes Biomes use abiotic factors (notably precipitation and temperature) to categorize the structure and function of the world’s biodiversity. This abstraction fails to represent the significant effect of human activities on ecosystems across the globe over recent centuries. As such, biomes represent an ideal, a misleading view of a world with pristine ecosystems, unmodified by what can now be reasonably described as the most influential biotic component of the world: people. In recognition of this limitation, in 2008 Erle Ellis and Navin Ramankutty redefined the biome concept and added humans to the system. The result is a set of anthropogenic biomes, or “anthromes,” defined by the extent of human modification from dense urban settlements to seminatural areas; a single “wildlands” group covers all remaining areas unmodified by human actions. The development of the anthrome concept highlights the integral role of humans in the world’s ecosystems. Ellis and Ramankutty’s assessment showed that less than a quarter of the Earth’s nonfrozen surface remained as true wildlands. Their analysis revealed both the degree of change that humans have wrought upon the Earth’s surface, as well as revealing how reliant people, and many coexisting species, are on human-modified systems. Although the idea of the interconnectedness of ecosystems and humans may appear to be a modern phenomenon, many of the world’s oldest societies, particularly those of Indigenous peoples,

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have developed complex knowledge-bases relating to both their environments and their places in them. In many instances, this traditional ecological knowledge has only recently begun to be acknowledged by governments and land managers, with little official recognition in legislation and methods of best practice; however, among Indigenous groups, mapping techniques, particularly GIS, are increasingly used to consolidate and communicate this long-held knowledge. For example, the Ngai Tahu iwi (tribal group) of Te Wai Pounamu (the South Island of Aotearoa (New Zealand)) has undertaken a cultural mapping project centered on place names and associated stories that retain information on a changed environment and long-lost biodiversity.

Mapping Change in Biodiversity To understand how biodiversity might change in relation to modern climate and anthropogenic impacts we can look to recorded observations of biodiversity made by our ancestors. The representations of crocodiles in the Sahara and tigers in China highlight populations of now locally extinct species, whose ranges have shrunk in response to climate-driven habitat change and human activity. Changing representations of large mammals in ancient Egyptian artwork provides evidence of the shifting prevalence of species in the landscape, an inherited map of ancient distributions. Descriptions from ancient texts show that Barbary lions Panthera leo leo were present in the landscape of Lower Egypt recorded by Herodotus (c. 484–425 BCE), but were gone by the time of Aristotle (c. 384–322 BCE). Other examples can be found in the historic survey records by colonial settlers of the northern American continent providing data of historic distributions of tree species prior to harvesting, burning, and clearing in the New World. Witness trees, those that survived both land-clearances and war, corroborate these records and provide a historic map of a now depleted biodiversity. Shifts in distribution by species, from transcontinental changes to local extinctions, can provide data to parameterize models that will permit a forward-thinking, risk-based approach to future management of the natural world. Development of such models has been facilitated by the advent of high-resolution remote sensing, satellite, and geospatial data.

Modeling Biodiversity Maps are routinely used to represent biomes, kingdoms, individual species distributions, and protected areas; however, maps themselves are a form of model in that they are an abstraction or representation of some system in which we are interested. Maps are just one form of abstraction and many others have been used either to learn about or to predict various facets of biodiversity. In this section we will consider some of the approaches used to model biodiversity, building on the preceding discussion of biodiversity mapping.

Static Species Distribution Models (SDMs) Empirical, or data-driven, models are among the commonest form of quantitative models used by geographers. At their heart these models seek to predict a phenomenon of interest on the basis of observations of the variables that are believed to be associated with or predict it - regression approaches are an archetypal form of empirical model. Although the acausal and astructural nature of such models has been the subject of critique, they can make robust and informative predictions. Drawing on Grinnell’s view of the niche, species distribution models (SDMs) seek to predict the potential distribution of a taxa on the basis of a series of observations (presence-absence or presence-only) and associated covariates. Thus, SDMs are correlative and estimate the probability that a species occurs at some point in space as a function of that point’s environmental conditions. The advent of massive online repositories of geospatial information describing species distributions (e.g., the Global Biodiversity Information Facility [GBIF] and NatureWatch) and sophisticated machine-learning methods have made SDMs an attractive and reasonably easily implemented approach. An important application of SDMs is prediction of species potential range under environmental, especially climatic, change. The quantitative tools used in SDMs are general and have arisen from advances in machine-learning and data-driven statistical modeling; these approaches are beginning to be used in other areas in physical geography (e.g., predicting the occurrence of geomorphic events and hazards) (Fig. 6). As with any correlative model, there are concerns about the inferences that can be made using SDMs. A first issue is the extent to which the available occurrence data span the niche of the taxa of interest. Extrapolating correlative models beyond the parameter space used in their parameterization requires caution. A second concern around the use of SDMs lies with the nature of the data used in their construction. Species occurrence data are often “presence-only”; that is, they record the occurrence of a species at some timespace point, but not the absence. While informative, absence data are difficult to collect and hard to interpret (e.g., what does the absence of a highly mobile species from a site at a specific time mean?). Records of presence may not be direct sightings, but also indirect evidence such as scratch marks on trees, feces, etc., in which case the persistence of such evidence in the environment (taphonomy) must be considered. One of the most widely used methods of SDM, MAXENT, uses presence-only data, and so can draw on the data available in databases such as the GBIF, NatureWatch, digital herbaria, and museum records. When implemented carefully, species distribution models based on presence-only data are useful for prediction (where is the entity of interest?) and inference (what controls where the entity of interest is located?). Databases such as the GBIF and NatureWatch often draw on “citizen science,” which, in itself, poses challenges in understanding the biases associated with presence observations. For example,

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Figure 6 Schematic view of the typical species distribution workflow. Potential predictor variables (covariates) are identified and correlated with species presence at specific spatiotemporal locations. The “response curves” depict the relationship between a covariate and the likelihood of the species occurrence in time or space and define the taxa’s fundamental niche. Adapted from Brock, et al., 2016. Forest Ecol. Manag. and Thejoyforever [CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], from Wikimedia Commons.

in citizen science surveys participants may be more likely to record positive than negative sightings; likewise, there are socioeconomic biases associated with citizen participation, meaning that presences need to be corrected for underlying patterns that are not related to the ecology of the organism of interest. Despite such concerns, SDMs informed by traditional and citizen-acquired data have become important tools for biogeography and conservation biology, and have proven capable of making accurate forecasts of the response of taxa to environmental change, even with limited and uncertain data.

Beyond Environmental Correlations Species distribution models yield maps that show where a species’ environmental requirements are met; however, environmental conditions are not the sole control on species distributions. Two other suites of ecological processes are important if we are to predict species distributions: (i) an organism’s ability to disperse or move to suitable habitat, especially through ever more ecologically fragmented landscapes; and (ii) interspecific interactions, such as competition and facilitation.

Connectivity and Dispersal Where high-quality (or even usable) habitat is not accessible to organisms the predictions of SDMs that do not consider dispersal are likely to be over-optimistic. Early research on island biogeography and metapopulations (populations of populations) highlighted the importance of connectivity, and since then considerable effort has been made to represent connectivity in ecological models. Ultimately the questions we are interested in are: can a mobile organism move between habitat patches? and, how difficult is that movement likely to be? Models representing such connectivity fall on a continuum from those where organisms have complete awareness of the landscape they inhabit to those where they are entirely naïve. In least-cost path models, for example, different habitats are allocated different traversal costs; the route from i to j with the lowest total cost is selected, so assuming that the organism has perfect knowledge of the landscape. Approaches such as “circuitscape,” which treat organisms as particles flowing through a circuit board, assume ignorance of the cost of moving through different habitats. Parameterizing models such as least-cost-paths requires estimating the cost of traversing different habitats from the perspective of a given organism. To this end, expert opinion, biotelemetry data, mark-recapture information, and population genetics have all been used to estimate movement dynamics.

Interspecific Interactions The predictions of an SDM can be interpreted as the probability of some location being in a species fundamental niche, given the conditions there; however, ecologists have long known that there are often large differences between a species’ fundamental and

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realized niches, and that interspecific interactions such as competition, facilitation, and predation contribute to this discrepancy. While species distribution modeling tends to consider these interactions as unimportant over large spatial grains and extents, there are clear examples where species distributions are restricted by competing taxa (e.g., in New Zealand, native galaxiid fish are now largely restricted to environments where invasive salmonids are absent). Conversely, facilitation (that is, ecological interactions where both species benefit) implies that where both species are present the realized niche may expand beyond the fundamental niche! Recently, SDMs have begun to consider the effect of ecological interactions as controls on species distribution. Two methods that have received attention are the direct inclusion (as predictors) of the presence–absence of other taxa (e.g., the presence of prey species or invasive predators), and joint SDMs, where multiple taxa are considered simultaneously and their patterns of cooccurrence examined.

Dynamic Models and Agency A final critique of the correlative models described above is that they are largely static. While SDMs can function dynamically (e.g., by parameterizing them with sequences of temporal data such as climate reconstructions) doing so does not capture spatiotemporal feedbacks. Thus, ecologists and biogeographers have constructed a myriad of dynamic ecological models ranging from aggregated models operating at broad extents to highly disaggregated models considering individual-level dynamics at local extents. It is not the case, however, that SDMs are entirely divorced from more dynamic models. For example, SDMS can inform dynamic models by: (i) identifying the key environmental variables that dynamic models need to consider; and/or (ii) providing a background arena for simulation approaches (Fig. 7). Dynamic global vegetation models (DGVMs) represent vegetation dynamics and the fluxes of energy and matter (biogeochemicals and water) through the earth system over large (global) spatial extents. These models were first developed in the mid-1990s and are often used to explore how climate change, past and future, has affected the biosphere. More recently, DGVMs have included ecological disturbance processes such as wildfires and large herbivore activity. Individual-based (or agent-based) models (IBMS) lie at the other end of the aggregation spectrum from DGVMs. IBMS disaggregate ecosystems by representing their fundamental (atomistic) components (e.g., tree ferns in a forest, or gnu in a herd) and the interactions between them. In these disaggregated representations, system structures emerge from interactions between individual components. As an example, successional trajectories in a forest community emerge from competitive and facilitative interactions between individual plants from different species with different life-history traits. This individual-level view of ecology has been enabled, to some extent, by advances in computational power and by the growing availability of large and spatially resolved datasets. Nevertheless, individual-models of forest dynamics can be traced back to the early 1970s (e.g., the JABOWA model of Daniel Botkin). While the first IBMS were nonspatial, recent IBMs have emphasized the spatial arena in which individual interactions are situated. Nearly all ecological systems are influenced by human action, and ecosystem change in turn influences human activities. Models of ecosystems that represent humans and their activities as boundary conditions provide a shallow view of human–environment interactions. As an example, we could consider the effects of anthropic fire in New Zealand (NZ). Across most of the Holocene, natural fire in NZ was rare, but the arrival of Polynesians in the mid-13th Century was concurrent with greatly elevated fire activity. Likely as a result of fire-vegetation feedbacks, this increased fire activity led to widespread forest loss in the absence of evident climate change. The question here is how should we represent this human–fire–vegetation feedback? Is it adequate simply to represent human activity by increasing fire frequency coincident with human arrival? Or do we need to consider human agency directly? The answer, of course, depends on the question of interest. Efforts to represent agency directly are the aim of agent-based models (ABMs). ABMs represent disaggregate entities, as in IBMs, although these may not be “individuals” (they could be businesses, family

- Experiment - Predict - Communicate - ...

Figure 7 Simulation models have many roles to play in the scientific process, including prediction, experimentation, and communication, but ultimately they facilitate learning through surrogative reasoning. Redrawn from O’Sullivan and Perry (2013).

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units, tribes, or even web-crawlers), as goal seeking. ABMs can represent the reciprocal nature of human–environment feedbacks in a more satisfying way than representing humans as boundary conditions, and are being used more and more frequently to capture human–environment interactions.

Role of Models in Biodiversity Science: Learning and Predicting The question of how to value a model, or any intellectual construction, empirical or otherwise, is long-standing. Is a “useful” model one that has high predictive performance? Is it one that enables us to learn about the system we seek to represent? Is it one that provokes dialogue? Is it one that tells stories? Is it one that . ? The answer to this question depends on the purpose of a given modeling exercise. Validation often takes the form of a quantitative comparison of the match between a model’s predictions and some independently observed data. As has been much discussed, this approach suffers from a series of issues related to under-determination: in theory there are an infinite number of potential models that might fit a given set of data and even if most of these are implausible there will still be multiple plausible candidates. This argument does not mean that predictive performance is irrelevant; after all, we all seek accurate weather forecasts, and we do not want to walk over bridges that may collapse. Rather it means that, depending on context, other criteria may be as, or more, informative as predictive performance. Where predictive performance is not the key descriptor of success, models can be used to learn about the system of interest because it is otherwise inaccessible in space or time. If we view models as codifications of our assumptions about how some system “works” then predictive failure has heuristic value: it suggests our assumptions are ill-founded. The dichotomy, common in the literature, between learning and prediction is somewhat artificial. Clearly models that are predictively useful can help us to learn about the world and vice-versa. In the context of biodiversity models then, this reciprocality speaks to the need for improved dialogue between species distribution models and more dynamic approaches.

Further Reading Brock, J.M.R., Perry, G.L.W., Lee, W.G., Burns, B.R., 2016. Tree fern ecology in New Zealand: a model for southern temperate rainforests. Forest Ecol. Manag 375, 112–126. Franklin, J., Miller, J.A., 2009. Mapping Species Distributions: Spatial Inference and Prediction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York. Grinnell, J., 1917. The niche relationships of the California thrasher. Auk 21, 364–382. Hikuroa, D., 2017. Matauranga Maoridthe ukaipo of knowledge in New Zealand. J. R. Soc. N. Z. 47, 5–10. HilleRisLambers, J., Adler, P.B., Harpole, W.S., Levine, J.M., Mayfield, M.M., 2012. Rethinking community assembly through the lens of coexistence theory. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 43, 227–248. Hutchinson, G.E., 1961. The paradox of the plankton. Am. Nat. 95, 137–145. Kolbert, E., 2014. The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, first ed. Henry Holt and Company, New York. Myers, N., Mittermeier, R.A., Mittermeier, C.G., et al., 2000. Biodiversity hotspots for conservation priorities. Nature 403, 853–858. O’Sullivan, D., Perry, G.L.W., 2013. Spatial Simulation: Exploring Pattern and Process. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK. Quammen, D., 2004. The Song of the Dodo: Island Biogeography in an Age of Extinctions, Paperback ed. Scribner, New York. Smith, J.R., Letten, A.D., Ke, P.-J., Anderson, C.B., Hendershot, J.N., Dhami, M.K., Dlott, G.A., Grainger, T.N., Howard, M.E., Morrison, B.M.L., Routh, D., San Juan, P.A., Mooney, H.A., Mordecai, E.A., Crowther, T.W., Daily, G.C., 2018. A global test of ecoregions. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 2, 1889–1896. Soberón, J., 2007. Grinnellian and Eltonian niches and geographic distributions of species. Ecol. Lett. 10, 1115–1123. Theophrastus, 1916 (Loeb Classical Library ed.). In: Hort, A. (Ed.), Theophrastus: Enquiry into Plants. William Heinemann and G.P. Putnam’s Sons, London and New York. Wilson, E.O., 2010. The Diversity of Life. 1st Harvard University Press pbk. ed. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Will Bond Humboldt.

Relevant Websites GBIF website: https://www.gbif.org/. NatureWatch: http://naturewatch.org.nz. Ngai T.: http://www.kahurumanu.co.nz/. Biomes: https://ecoregions2017.appspot.com. Global forest change database: http://earthenginepartners.appspot.com/science-2013-global-forest. IPBES website: https://www.ipbes.net/. IUCN website: https://www.iucn.org. Convention on biodiversity: https://www.cbd.int/.

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Biopolitics Krithika Srinivasan, Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Rajesh Kasturirangan, Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, India Clemens Driessen, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The concept of “biopolitics” has come to have extensive purchase in human geography and cognate fields such as philosophy, cultural studies, political science, history, and sociology. This entry tracks the manner in which this concept has been deployed, critiqued, and developed in recent decades in order to flesh out the value of the concept and offer some thoughts on its scholarly futures. The earliest use of the term “biopolitics” can be found in the field of sociobiology; however, it is the work of the social theorist Michel Foucault that brought this concept into prominence. In the simplest sense, biopolitics refers to the ways in which life is governed, and power exercised, in the modern world. Foucault’s writings on biopower contain the first articulations of what has now become a burgeoning body of scholarship on the “power over life”. In proposing the ideas of discipline and biopower, Foucault was arguing for an elaboration of existing understandings of power, and for the need to move beyond singular conceptions of power as something that is exercised through brute force, and as exemplified by the power vested in the sovereign. In what follows, we offer an account of Foucault’s writings on biopolitics, followed by an examination of other key interventions on this theme. The final sections of the essay contain a critical overview of the manners in which this concept has been deployed in geography and the social sciences more broadly.

Foucauldian Biopolitics In theorizing changes in the character of state rule in Western Europe, Foucault draws a contrast between the exercise of power in premodern sovereign states and in newer state formations. Sovereign power relies on the threat of “destruction and death,” i.e., power exerted by removing the individual’s freedoms through punishment,rulemaking, and the law. In contrast, the modern exercise of power pays equal attention to the bodily and social flourishing of its subjects through health policies, antipoverty programs and other interventions that seek to improve and simultaneously regulate the lives of populations in line with certain truth discourses and norms. Referring to these newer forms of power as biopower, Foucault directed attention to how power circulates across society, structuring the lives of populations. To Foucault, biopolitical power consists of “generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than . impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.” Biopolitics, to Foucault, is the task of governing life. Foucault’s writings focus on the ability of power to insert itself in the functioning of life itself. In other words, he was interested in tracing the ubiquity and adaptability of power by revealing its functioning across many scales, with varied actors and their attendant rationalities, and most importantly, with concern for human flourishing being offered as a justification for techniques of control and regulation. Biopower is thus a form of power that is subtler than the crude ability of the sovereign to “take life or let live.” In Foucault’s account, the premodern sovereign was primarily concerned with securing his or her rule and levying taxes on agricultural surplus or executing those who threatened his or her power in order to ensure his or her sovereignty. In contrast, institutions of modern lifedprisons, universal education, industrial manufacturing, standing armiesdenvelop and discipline the individuals who enter them. A classic example can be found in Bentham’s model of the Panopticon for prisons. The Panopticon’s physical structure includes a vantage point from which all other parts of the prison are visible, but whether a guard is actually watching is unclear to the prison inmates. While it is impossible for a single person to watch all inmates at the same time, the sheer possibility of being seen instills self-regulation by those who are incarcerated in the prison: government is achieved without the exercise of brute force, and instead through measures that discipline subjects to guard themselves. While such disciplinary institutions and techniques shape the individual, turning him/her into a model prisoner, productive worker or an engaged citizen, government also involves the collection of data about the population of the whole, and the use of such data to regulate the functioning of the population, the collective, in line with certain norms. In both these cases, the exercise of the power of the state is no longer justified in the name of the interests of the sovereign, i.e., those in power or authority, but in the name of the interests of the state’s peoples, i.e., in the name of the very people who are being governed. Foucault theorizes this combination of individual and collective power as a combination of anatomopolitics, i.e., a politics that targets individuals and disciplines them into productive members of society and a biopolitics that targets populations and promotes the welfare of the whole. The dual focus on the individual as well as the collective is necessitated by the complexity of modern societies: small businesses, industrial manufacturing and consumer demands come together in a bewildering array of social activities that cannot be regulated in full by sovereign action. Instead, these societies need new arts of government that regulate and foster activities at many levels. In order to make this complexity manageable, the management of modern societies deploys a new organizing principle: the population. Population governance regimes are legitimized by their concern for collective welfare. That collective welfare demands forms of knowledge about the needs, traits, and capacities of populations. Biopolitical interventions thus go along with new forms of

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knowledge which besides the biophysical sciences includes a range of social sciences such as criminology, psychiatry, pedagogy, and the large-scale gathering of statistics on a variety of traits and phenomena that pertain to the regulated population. Governance in the modern era is unimaginable without these new sciences of the human that generate detailed information about populations that feed into governance regimes. In doing so, the reach of power has also greatly expanded, with technologies of power regulating human lives at increasingly microscopic scales and in seemingly neutral or beneficial ways.

Governmentality, Surveillance, and Subjectification Such modern forms of governance illustrate three key principles of Foucauldian biopolitics: governmentality, technologies of surveillance, and subjectification. Take for example, the textile manufacturing and export industry in Bangladesh in the era of neoliberalism. Textile factories need workers with a certain degree of education, a certain temperament, and the discipline to work with others while taking instruction from management. In moving from the village to work in a city-based textile factory, the worker internalizes new knowledge regimes that tacitly answer questions such as ‘what does it mean to work for the factory owner for 8 hours at a stretch?’; ‘what kind of family supports this new work culture?’ The villager turned textile worker embodies new kinds of selfhood, new family structures, and new forms of sexuality: s/he undergoes processes of subjectification by internalizing norms about what it means to lead a “good” life. This new subject is not created in isolation; arts of government manage individuals in populations and turn them into productive members of society. It is through these managerial processes, i.e., “governmentality,” that schools and universities are set up for creating disciplined and docile populations, while statistical surveys demonstrate to international funders and transnational corporations that a “manufacturing ready” population is now available for the textile export industry. Governmentality functions by the management and shaping of populations using life-processes that already exist so as to maximize their potential to meet the agendas of the nation-state. A country such as Bangladesh might work with the World Bank to recognize that it has a population that is suited to textile manufacturing for export because that population has the requisite combination of manufacturing skills, low wages, and weak labor and environmental laws. This translates into a World Bank loan to the country as a whole and that loan, in turn, enables special economic zones and industrial policies that can be exploited by industrialists to set up profit-generating textile manufacturing units. Given that governmentality is about managing existing features and processes in a population, technologies of surveillance and associated knowledge regimes are central to governmentality. The census, development indicators, and education statistics are all deployed in the creation of a productive population. Another feature of governmentality can be found in narratives of utopianism that deem that all conflicts of interest can be addressed to produce win–win outcomes. Sustainable development is one example of a contemporary utopian narrative and associated governmentalities. The discourse of sustainable development (and sustainability) emerged in responses to concerns about the ecological impacts of the pursuit of development and associated surplus production and high mass consumption. The idea of sustainable development acknowledges the biophysical limits of the planet, but holds that these limits can be overcome and managed through human ingenuity and better governance of development processes. In this view, the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts posed by an ever-expanding human economy and global development agendas within a limited biosphere can be addressed through better technology and socioeconomic policies, i.e., through further development. Such utopianism is also reflected in the responses to any failure to achieve win–win outcomesdfailure to attain the objectives of government does not lead to the disruption of the goals, mentalities and techniques of government, but instead often leads to calls to reinforce and strengthen the same governmental interventions. For example, the failure of development project in achieving universal human well-being has over the years has led to only calls for more development conceived and governed in the same way, even while the failure of the discourse of sustainability to enable planetary health leads to only calls for more programs that strive for sustainable pathways to development. The assumptions that development is the only or best means to achieve human well-being and that sustainability is the only or best means to ensure planetary health remain deeply entrenched. Biopolitics thus works through the creation of subjectivities with desired characteristics, through the operation of institutions that regulate this disciplined population for productive purposes by embedding norms about what constitutes the “good.” Through the circulation of norms, desirable traits such as literacy become universalized across the population. Further, the knowledge produced in this regime also helps determine abnormal sub-populations, i.e., those lacking the (self) discipline (for diverse psychological and biological reasons) to acquire the desirable trait. These sub-populations can be isolated and targeted by sovereign exercises of power, i.e., police action, criminalization, reformative education. Through such positive and negative actions, biopolitical power facilitates the modulation of entire populations and the “ordering” of life forces at scale. Biopolitics at its most powerful involves the production and maintenance of subjectivities that are deemed desirable to the subjects themselves, allowing them to work on themselves in becoming better subjects and realize their full potential. In this way, biopolitical strategies render ambiguous the lines between those exercising power (the authorities), and those who are the target of power. Rather, it is useful to think of subject-objects when it comes to the exercise of biopolitical power, i.e., individuals who act upon themselves in keeping with broader social norms in the service of the collective. This synchronization of authority with the individual renders the operation of biopower difficult to detect and resist, whether in the context of people who, on internalizing norms about how certain forms of dress lend a sense of confidence and stature, wear high heels despite their significant physiological impacts, or in the context of members of self-help groups, lock away their meager savings in a group bank account for development activities that they have learned to desire.

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The subtlety of biopolitical power is particularly apparent when one observes its functioning in the Anglo-American academy, an institution that has perfected governmentality, and that has proven successful in regulating otherwise independent, reflexive, and critical individuals. Discourses of excellence and self-realization, matched with a series of measurement techniques and indicators of success, enable those working in academia or aspiring to do so to feel intrinsically motivated to work hard to attain this form of success. In this model of academic excellence and success, individuals work hard not to promote a particular ideal or political cause or to deepen knowledge on a topic, but to better themselves, to get the most out of themselves by toiling away in the middle of the night at another top publication or prominent grant, driven by the narrative of zero-sum competition between academics as individuals and collectives (institutions). Individuals are made to compete against each other, and over time, internalize the norms that drive such competition. Numerical indicators such as the h-factor and grant income are internalized as measures of academic success at the level of the individual, while those such as the Research Excellence Framework in the United Kingdom measure academic success at the level of the collective, the university. Through these processes of subjectification, individual members of the academy work to meet the demands of the institution(s) that they are associated with. Whether this type of work environment is debilitating, destructive of social life and solidarity, and distracting from meaningful engagement with work, is a matter of debate. Once in motion, this type of biopolitics is hard to unravel let alone abandon. Critique of this form of management tends to be translated in a drive toward even better indicators and more elaborate modes of measuring these, to include personal well-being of workers, increasing their “mindfulness” in dealing with stress, and adding “societal impact” assessments to output measurements. Biopolitical government is relentless in its deployment of win–win and utopian narratives and practices. As discussed earlier, Foucault’s theorization of biopolitics was developed in contradistinction to sovereign power. Of course, sovereign politics and biopolitics are not mutually exclusive; as thinkers such as Agamben and Mbembe have shown, biopolitics works hand in hand with sovereignty at the margins of biopolitics, in what Agamben called the “exception” (building on controversial legal scholar, Carl Schmitt) and what Mbembe calls “Necropolitics.” The following section explores how some of these later thinkers contest, expand, and reformulate Foucault’s original insights in startling ways.

Biopolitics After Foucault While Foucault’s concept of biopower focuses primarily on discourses and practices that have the stated intention of improving the well-being of populations, all through he also theorizes the ways in which violence is embedded in biopolitical regimes. For one, there is the possibility of conflict between the needs of the population and the needs of the individual as is exemplified in population control programmes and large infrastructure projects that displace people and nature. Biopolitical regimes are focused on the well-being of the collective, and as such, often instrumentalize and sacrifice the individuals who constitute the population. Individuals become a means to the end of promoting the flourishing of the population, as is seen in rationalities of war for the sake of peace: “entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of the wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. . It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed.” In other words, individuals can be harmed in the exercise of biopower in order to foster the well-being of the collective, the population. Biopolitical regimes also engage in “dividing practices” that create hierarchies among populations. For example, racism, to Foucault, is a systemic dividing practice that is central to the biopolitical era. These ideas about the violence underlying biopolitics have been more fully explored by thinkers such as Giogio Agamben and Achille Mbembe who have written extensively about the intersections between biopolitics with sovereignty. To Agamben, the totalizing control associated with sovereignty combined with the dividing of populations in line with certain norms can throw entire populations into a state of exception. The premodern sovereign is above the law, s/he is not subject to any of the rules that bind the populace. In other words, s/he is an exception at one end of the spectrum of violability. In turn, s/he might create exceptions at the other end of the spectrum, i.e., create a category of beings who can be violated or killed without breaking the law. These abject exceptions are the shadow of the sovereign’s majesty. In the premodern past, the sovereign might have used his or her absolute powers to condemn those who challenged his/her power, but modern rulers use the very technologies of surveillance that create populations to turn entire populations into exceptions, such as in the case of Nazi concentration camps. Agamben’s work thus focuses on biopolitics that creates states of exception, which are embodied in the camp (detention camps in today’s world) as the site and geographical model for biopolitical intervention. For Agamben, the spatialized normative form of biopolitical life is the camp where the sovereign reduces political life (bios) to bare life (zoe), life that can be killed without breaking the law. It is in that condemnation of a population as a whole (or a section of a population)) that one arrives at the camp as a biopolitical space of exceptional violence. In the torture chambers of Pinochet or the KGB, the extra-judicial incarceration in Guantanamo Bay and in the gas chambers of Auschwitz, carefully delineated populations are stripped of all its humanity and stand as bare life, i.e., life that is deprived of any rights or protections. The camp is “the space opened up when the state of exception begins to become the rule.” Other thinkers point out that the camp is not the only space of biopolitical violence. Mbembe argues for the incorporation of at least two more spaces into the geography of biopolitics: the plantation and the colony. Mbembe starts by reflecting on: ‘what Michel Foucault meant by biopower: that domain of life over which power has taken control. But under what practical conditions is the right to kill, to allow to live, or to expose to death exercised? Who is the subject of this right?’

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Mbembe recognizes that the camp creates the practical conditions under which the right to kill is exercised, but he then goes on to say: “Any historical account of the rise of modern terror needs to address slavery, which could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation. In many respects, the very structure of the plantation system and its aftermath manifests the emblematic and paradoxical figure of the state of exception.” The main difference with the camp is that the slave is useful to his/ her owner while s/he is alive; his/her labor is essential to the plantation’s survival. Therefore, s/he needs to be kept alive, but not flourish so much that s/he can escape or demand freedom. If the camp illustrates the biopolitics of death, the plantation illustrates the biopolitics of injury, i.e., of keeping a population wounded but alive as long as they serve the owner. Mbembe also talks about the colony, which brings ideas of population and territory together and offers an alternative spatial model for biopolitics than the camp as a site of exception. In the colony, different populations usually have different territories: the European quarter being barred to the native, so that intermixing of populations is permitted only under strict supervision. In the colony, technologies of surveillance are mobilized and combined with racial/ethnic categorization as dividing practices. Technologies of surveillance can thus take on different functions. They can sometimes help populations flourishdJohn Snow’s famous mapping of the Broad Street pump was instrumental in stopping a cholera epidemic in Londondeven while collecting data that can be put to restrict and regulate movement, a key concern associated with the recently mandated biometric identity cards (Aadhar) in India. In the camp those technologies are used to inscribe those who are “about to die,” and in the colony these technologies are used to divide populations, to create communal divisions by reifying religious and caste differences, and in general by pitting (sub-) populations against each other. Biopolitics thus can manifest in varied forms: as the power to “foster life” as seen in Snow’s diagramming of London, as a form of “sustainable injury” in the plantation and colony and finally, as a “state of exception” in the camp where death rules over life.

The Final(?) Boundary Behind all of these biopolitical variations of life and death is the boundary between humans and other animals. The tendency in Western philosophy, from Aristotle onward, has been to view humans as the only animals who do not live permanently in the state of exception, for only the human is deemed to live a political life. In the camp, certain (human) populations are animalized and then brutalized: animalization removes the rights and protections that go along with being human, and renders the animalized human killabledlike other animals. To Agamben, these strategies of animalization are core to the history of the entire Western political tradition, of which biopolitics is an intensification rather than an exception. Within the human world, states of exception prove the rule that sovereignty, discipline, and biopolitics coexist in an uneasy equilibrium. But when it comes to the more-than-human world, the situation is far more ambiguous. For the most part, in contemporary history (and before that), nonhuman life has remained in a state of exception, and can be killed in the pursuit of human interests without sanction. When it comes to the more-than-human, the state of exception is the rule, while rituals, traditions, and laws that temper the killing of nonhuman life offer guidance on how the killing can be done, or prescribe exceptions that render some nonhuman life-forms not killable (e.g., endangered species). This points to the original position of biopolitics, which is “before the law”: “before” not in the temporal sense of preceding the rule of law, but as Cary Wolfe points out in his book of that name, violence against the nonhuman world is the condition of possibility for biopolitics in the human world. Both the plantation and the colony are evidence for the claim that the flourishing of some populations is conditioned upon violence against other populations. However, it is the factory farm where the ability “to foster life and disallow it to the point of death” reaches remarkable proportions. In the biopolitical era, humans can experience different variations of biopolitics, but livestock animals live primarily between the plantation and the camp, i.e., between a state of injury where their life is useful to the farmer while alive (like the slave) and a state of exception (like the camp) since their dead bodies continue to be useful to the agricultural industry. “Abnormal” individuals such as injured, sick, or otherwise incapacitated animals are bad for the population, and they are disallowed to the point of death before their allotted hour of slaughter. Technologies of surveillance are used to monitor the physiological conditions of individual animals and generate statistics necessary for market success, while the scientific establishment uses animal bodies to develop technologies for breeding that will further maximize the extractive potential of these bodies. The factory farm turns the logic of biopower upon itself. Foucault’s premise is that biopower leaves the logic of deduction behind and adopts a logic of production: it “exerts a positive influence on life, endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it.” All of which is true for the factory farm, except that the optimization and multiplication is entirely in the service of exploitation, which is how the factory farm differs from the camp, whose purpose is only to reduce or control individuals or groups that are considered dangerous to the collective. In contrast, the factory farm commandeers the full spectrum of biopolitical skillsdthe collection of data, veterinary and behavioral knowledge, antibiotic use, and mechanizationdto multiply life, the productive capacity of which is maximized through death. Even in the case of the dairy and poultry industries, which rely on the reproductive capacities of individual animals and their continued life, premature death through slaughter (of male calves and chicks, of spent hens and cows) are central to maximizing productivity and profits. In this, the factory farm represents a merger of sovereignty (deduction) and biopower (production). At the end of his essay on Necropolitics, Mbembe says: “I have demonstrated that the notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death.” If that’s a true demonstration of the necropolitics of the camp, the plantation, and the colony, the same argument applies with redoubled force when it comes to the factory farm,

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which arguably attains the limits of biopolitics. In fact, one might say, combining Aristotle and Foucault, that for nonhuman animals, their “absence from politics places their existence as a living being in question.”

Biopolitical Geographies Biopolitics has become a popular theoretical approach in human geography. Analysis in terms of biopolitics situates politics and power not in capital cities and occasional high profile public decisions but draws attention to seemingly inconspicuous everyday practices as the place where the political occurs. As we have seen above, the formation and maintenance of particular spatial orders are crucial in biopolitical regimes, which operate through combining specific discourses of truth with symbolic and material arrangements that foster categorization, visibility, and subjectification. This makes geographical research central in studying the workings of biopolitics, unearthing the minutiae of the ways in which these power relations are established and promoted in sites from research laboratories to medical institutions, and from offices, factories and schools to prisons, farms and even in “wild” naturedor especially so in the ever more intensive management of what is left of wildlife. Foucauldian biopolitics, representing a movement away from territory toward population, poses problems for traditional political geographers. Even though, in several places in his work, Foucault emphasized the importance of the material settings as part of biopoliticsdmost famously the Panopticon producing visibility that is internalized by the prison inmatesdin another reading of Foucault, space does not play as important a ‘role in his theory of power as abstract entities such as population. In this reading, it is the shift away from Foucault toward Agamben, Esposito, and Mbembe that has brought biopolitics closer to traditional geographical questions. In particular, Agamben’s concern with sovereignty and states of exception in the camp are eminently geographical concerns. Whether that exception happens at the border (or in administrative limbos such as Guantanamo Bay) or in special killing zones such as the death camps of the Holocaust, the capacity of biopower to produce bare life is spatial. Similarly, the plantation and the colony are both geographies of power; the plantation is a space in which a population is maintained in a permanent state of injury while the colony is marked as a zone where natural resources are produced by subject populations and exported to the city where other populations work upon them and increase their value. In this way, much recent work on biopolitics has focused on post-Foucauldian biopolitical concerns: for example, how the US invasion of Iraq was sold as a biopolitical intervention with the welfare of both Western and Iraqi populations in minddin other words, the sovereign both makes life and makes death. Geographers such as Stuart Elden have read Foucault’s later works (such as his Security, Territory, Population) as a resurgence of Foucault’s interest in spatial forms of power. Space is more than the earth’s surface, just as a population is more than the territory it occupies. Biopolitical space is produced by technologies of calculation and surveillance that “work” the surface of the earth, just as populations are produced by other technologies of surveillance and calculation. Territories are mapped, calculated, and distributed into zones that have the same biopolitical virtues as goods and services. Building on these works about political rule, the concept of biopolitics has been deployed in a variety of cases as well as to inform a range of political arguments. The banner of biopolitics allows geographers to do multiple things that may seem hard to combine, bringing together competing strands of theorizing and political positions otherwise at loggerheads with each other: where (neo-)Marxists can focus on the workings of neoliberal governmentality, those interested in identity politics or emancipatory struggles may emphasize the performativity of subject formation. Those working in the field of Science and Technology Studies now find they have a way to do politics after all, showing how in laboratories forms of knowing and optimizing life are produced. The framework of biopolitics has been found important to understand crucial historical episodes, especially Nazism and fascism to more recent trends and developments such as in urban planning and digital technologies. The imagined smart city can be seen to deliver biopolitics 2.0. Under the guise of realizing sustainable urban systems and optimizing the provision of technical services, these include the monitoring and algorithmic control of environmental behaviors. Processes of mutual reviewing on platforms of the so-called sharing economy have taught people to fold themselves into global structures for producing serviceable subjects, superhosts, and trustworthy users. In China, plans have been announced to bring the surveillance state to new levels, with a single indicator of personal trustworthiness that incorporates behaviors from traffic violations, credit scores, and social media utterances. This numerical indicator is then used to regulate an individual’s access to travel, status on dating apps, and access to housing. The biopolitical lens has been used to study the practices of corporations managing their workforces, of governments building and implementing development programs, and those of NGOs in promoting certain visions of the collective good. Scholarship in geography and beyond has found the operation of biopolitical strategies in contexts as varied as food policies, water management, the war on drugs, and health technologies. New gene editing techniques carry the promise of an ever-increased intervention in and control over life itself, increasing the potential for instrumentalizing nonhuman bodies, and optimizing human life. Social practices such as those around human reproduction are set to be transformed by these new techniques and modes of knowing, generating new biopolitical imperatives for individuals to promote certain forms of healthy life while preventing aberrations and suboptimal life-forms. At the same time, refugees and heightened border policing, or even warfare against migrants, terrorism scares and geopolitical tensions provide the conditions for more classic modes of biopolitics, materialized in barriers, checkpoints, and camps. Researchers of biopolitics do not merely seek to critique any form of its deployment. Thus, analyses can be critical but can also generate discussions on how people may actively relate to being the subject of knowledge and improvement and on what forms of biopolitical control and regulation can be considered more or less objectionable or desirable, i.e., on differences between affirmative

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and negative biopolitics. An example lies in work on contemporary genomics that asks if medical technologies, which intervene at the prediagnostic phase and which are used by individuals to act upon themselves and their health, can be considered biopolitics that is qualitatively different to the biopolitics of eugenics. Similarly, when it comes to training programs aimed at teenage mothers in Cusco, Peru, the biopolitical subjectivities produced there arguably are not merely imprints of particular neoliberal ideologies. Without getting caught up in over-simplified agency versus structure analysis, and acknowledging the ambivalences involved, this understanding of affirmative biopolitics can have an eye for the complex ways in which, in this case, teenage girls more or less consciously transform or resist the ways in which their lives are being regulated. Biopolitics can then be found to include embodied experiences of learning skills in affective environments which instill optimism about possible ways of self-development, while at the same time social, cultural and economic realities constantly reduce or negate the ambitions instilled in people. Just as academics committed to the ideal of self-realization through independent curiosity-driven research and the education of young people to become independent thinkers, find themselves confronted with very different institutional realities, “at risk” girls in Cusco find themselves trained in skills for work in the tourism industry, while the actual possibilities of meaningful and safe work in this industry are limited for people with their social and ethnic backgrounds. Nevertheless, they make do, and navigate these conditions, and their monetary and affective economies. Geographers have also looked at biopolitics beyond the human world. In tracking contemporary human relationships with the nonhuman creatures that share the planet, geographers have explored the intricate entanglement of harm and care in spaces such as wildlife conservation, animal protection, agriculture, and laboratory medicine. Biosecurity regimes that address avian flu and mad cow disease, the use of genetic technologies to improve the productivity and pliability of livestock and laboratory animals, the biopolitical character of conservation concepts and practices, and neutering programs that render street and pet dogs docile are but some examples of the biopolitical more-than-human analyses put forward in geography and elsewhere. The wide range of scholarship on biopolitics raises the question of whether there is life outside of biopolitical arrangements. If discourses and practices of biopower can be found everywhere from refugee camps and war zones to schools, medical clinics, development NGOs, and animal shelters, what does that fact entail for the analytical value of the concept, and also for understandings of contemporary society? These are issues that have been addressed in literatures that highlight those aspects of social life that cannot be easily explained with the biopolitical framework such as resistance and agency. If biopolitics works through processes of normalization and subjectification, then what, if any, are the possibilities for thinking and acting through, against, and beyond internalized norms about how to be in the world? Currently some of the blind spots and assumptions of biopolitical approaches are explored in work that combines biopolitics with other trending forms of geographical research, such as that into the agential character of what previously was the passive biophysical backdrop to human drama; ideas of how to acknowledge and represent the modes of agency and resistance by subaltern groups; and an appreciation of the role of embodied experiences and affective environments.

Thinking Forward As the above sections have shown, the concept of biopolitics has been theorized and deployed in varied manners. Usages of the term can range from very general references to any sort of politics around life to more specific articulations of particular kinds of discourses and practices of power. Debates abound around the meaning and value of the concept, on whether biopolitics is affirmative or harmful, and on whether the framework permits the theorization of resistance. In sifting through these arguments, it appears that the chief analytical value of the concept lies in its use as a framework to think through the subtle ways in which power is exercised in contemporary societies, and to theorize the relationship between the individual and society. The biopolitical lens reminds that the exercise of power is not always contingent on the deployment of violent or coercive discourses and practices by an external power/authority. Rather, power can be wielded through rationalities and interventions of care, and through the circulation of norms that create self-regulating subjects. Biopolitical power is simultaneously affirmative and harmful, and functions by blurring the boundaries between individual agency and structural conditions. It is in directing attention to the operation of nonbenign power in what seem to be spaces of care and flourishing that the biopolitical framework offers a crucial diagnostic tool for the issues that trouble today’s world. More specifically, the concept of biopolitics places an emphasis on the intricate entanglement of harm and care in many of the edifices of modern society. Whether in development governance, wildlife conservation, public health, border control, or animal welfare, programs that are aimed at protecting and promoting life often seem to entail the sacrifice of or harmful control of certain life-forms that can be a part of the population that is the subject–object of care, or reframed as external and harmful to the population. As Esposito argues, biopolitics is marked by an immunitary logic in that various practices that foster the flourishing of particular forms of life can also do harm to the same or other forms of life. The intertwining of these logics of care with practices of harm enable the smoother diffusion of power through the creation of subjectivities across the regulated population, and also make it more difficult to identify, challenge, and resist harmful power. For instance, the pursuit of development displaces people in the name of their own well-being, framing such displacement as a necessary stepping-stone to a better future. Similarly, wildlife conservation involves practices that harm the certain entities (such as invasive alien species) in the name of safeguarding biodiversity as a whole. In both these instances, the harm caused by displacement and control are justified and masked by logics of care. Such biopolitical regimes are sustained by knowledge formations that generate information that justify and render apolitical practices that are otherwise deeply politicaldconservation research produces “objective” knowledge on how to control invasive alien species even while ignoring the human-induced processes that make “native”

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wildlife vulnerable to invasive species in the first place, while development economics reframes people and nature as numbers and monetizes a range of incommensurable values in order to produce decision-making frameworks that justify displacement for development projects. It is in paying attention to the intricate interlocking of harm, care, knowledge, and norms in the exercise of power that the concept of biopolitics offers significant value for contemporary geographical theory. The concept of biopolitics may not be able to explain resistance or offer a foundation for the theorization of future worlds. It is not clear why it should: after all, none of those who have worked on the concept, whether Foucault, Agamben, or Esposito, claim to have generated a theory of everything. The task of geography and the social sciences then is not to worry about all those phenomena that cannot be explained by the concept of biopolitics, but to focus on those human and more-than-human spaces where it does have analytical value.

See Also: Citizenship and Governmentality; Governmentality.

Further Reading Agamben, G., 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. Braun, B., 2007. Biopolitics and the molecularizaton of life. Cult. Geogr. 14, 6–28. Elden, S., 2007. Governmentality. Calculation, territory. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 25 (3), 562–580. Esposito, R., 2008. Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy. University Of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Foucault, M., 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Penguin Books, London. Foucault, M, 2003. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975–1976. Picador, New York. Foucault, M, 2008. The history of sexuality. In: The Will to Knowledge, vol. 1. Penguin Books, Camberwell. Foucault, M, 2009. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–78. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. Hannah, M.G., 2011. Biopower, life and left politics. Antipode 43 (4), 1034–1055. Holloway, L., Morris, C., 2012. Contesting genetic knowledge-practices in livestock breeding: biopower, biosocial collectivities, and heterogeneous resistances. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 30 (1), 60–77. Li, T.M., 2007. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics. Duke University Press, Durham and London. Lin, C.T., Minca, C., Ormond, M., 2018. Affirmative biopolitics: social and vocational education for quechua girls in the postcolonial ‘affectsphere’ of Cusco, Peru. Environ. Plan. D: Soc. Space Online First 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775817753843. Mbembe, A., 2003. Necropolitics. Public Cult. 15 (1), 11–40. Rutherford, S., Rutherford, P., 2013. Geography and biopolitics. Geogr. Compass 7 (6), 423–434. Srinivasan, K., 2017. Conservation biopolitics and the sustainability episteme. Environ. Plan. 49 (7), 1458–1476. Twine, R., 2010. Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability and Critical Animal Studies. Earthscan, London. Wolfe, C., 2010. Before the law: animals in a biopolitical context. Law Cult. Humanit. 6 (8), 8–23.

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Black Geographies Adam Bledsoe, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, United States Willie J. Wright, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States LaToya Eaves, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Black Geographies has gained traction within the wider field of Geography since the early 2000s due to salient political issues that have drawn the attention of geographers and lay people alike. Phenomena like the racialized application of the carceral systems; police killings of Black people of all ages, genders, and class backgrounds; increasing racialized wealth disparities; pitched public battles over monuments honoring white supremacists; and the overt centering of racial antagonism in electoral campaigns and political administrations have led to myriad responses from Black populations around the world, resulting in myriad spatial contestations. Political and social movements that assert the value of Black lives, demand the renaming and reconstruction of public spaces, struggle for Black land rights, and seek to prevent the recurring displacement of Black communities from their lived spaces typify many collective Black responses to the oppressive factors mentioned above. It is upon these tensions that the Black Geographies subfield currently draws, as geographers seek to uncover how populations of African descent around the world negotiate societies informed by anti-Blackness. While current phenomena inform present-day iterations of Black Geographies literature, the subfield has its roots in the late 20th Century when geographers in North America first began to pay close attention to the lived experiences of Black communities in the US following the Civil Rights Movement. Over the past six decades, geographers have responded to the shifting political, economic, and cultural struggles of Afro-descendant populations around the world by drawing on a number of different methods and methodologies to reflect upon Black people’s experiences. In this way, Black Geographies, as a subfield, is only possible insofar as geographers pay careful attention to the spatial expressions of Afro-descendant populationsdexpressions which are tremendously diverse. The corpus of Black Geographies speaks to Blacks’ experiences around the world, discussing how Afro-descendant populations engage space and make place on virtually every continent. Such an approach recognizes the inherent plurality of the African Diaspora, pointing out the convergences and divergences of Black spatial thought and practice across the globe. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative methods, empirical and theoretical approaches, and a plethora of methodologies, Black Geographies has placed the wider discipline of Geography within a number of interdisciplinary conversations and established conceptual linkages between Diasporic populations.

Early Geographical Reflections on Blackness In the late 1960s and early 1970s, geographical scholarship in the United States began engaging with the lived experiences of African American populations in the United States. Geographic analysis of Black life in the United States occurred amidst significant shifts in the political, economic, social, and material experiences of US Blacks, as Black communities ushered in significant changes to the US political landscape. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s put African American communities and their leaders at the forefront of national and international conversations about the inequities present in the United States. For many, the 1954 Brown v. the Board of Education decision and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 represented important progress toward Black inclusion in US society. Nonetheless, the assassination of Black leaders like Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Bunchy Carter, John Huggins, and Fred Hampton, the deindustrialization of major cities with large Black populations, and the early onset of neoliberal governance in the United States belied the fact that, in many ways, structural inequality continued to play a central role in Black people’s experiences in the United States. Among Black responses to these phenomena, urban revolts and militant political organizing garnered the most public attention. Revolts in cities like Los Angeles, Detroit, Newark, New York City, and Chicago, and political organizations like the Black Panthers and Black Liberation Army demonstrated Black dissatisfaction with the continued inequality their communities faced. Because such stringent critiques of life in the United States manifested on the heels of a seemingly progressive political wave, the social sciences, broadly, took up the question of the lived realities of Black communities. A number of people and institutions sought to explain the prevailing conditions of Black communities in the United States. Analyses of Black family structures; Black access to housing, education, and social services; and capitalism’s role in marginalizing Black people typified some of the most well-known examples of work, which explored Black life in the United States. While geographers attended to a number of phenomena within Black communities, the increasing number of African Americans in US cities prompted geographical work on urban Black life. In line with the “Quantitative Revolution” of the mid-20th Century, geographers largely employed quantitative analyses and spatial modeling when attending to the urban experiences of Black communities. These quantitative approaches spoke to the prevailing political, economic, demographic, and cultural phenomena affecting Black communities. Early geographic inquiries into questions of Blackness in the United States included treatments of Black women-led households; spatial mobility and the potential for social interaction among Black populations living in the “ghetto”; patterns of urban Black mobility; the internal and external forces responsible for ghetto propagation; and the effects of judicially enforced school desegregation. Still, other geographical inquiries of the early 1970s addressed the psychological and physical backdrop to the

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widespread Black urban riots of the 1960s, the recreational behavior of small Black communities in the US South, racialized commuting trends, the historical long durée of Black habitational patterns, the effects decentralization of school administrations would have on Blacks in urban spaces, and racist policies by real estate brokers. These geographic approaches to studying the experiences of Black communities in the United States gained steam quickly, as journals like Southeastern Geographer and Economic Geography dedicated entire issues to discussing Black populations. While geographers paid attention to many aspects of life in Black communities, two phenomena came to have special significance for geographers: the formation of, and relations within, the Black “ghetto.” Quantitative studies of Black populations in the United States aptly pointed out that race appeared to be the primary conditioning factor for where people lived. As Whites in the United States increasingly moved to the suburbs, Black communities became concentrated in inner cities. Geographers argued further that these forms of segregation in urban areas resulted from a confluence of things, including White unwillingness to share lived space with Blacks and racially exclusionary zoning practices. This work showed how racist attitudes and assumptions of Black dereliction were among the main contributors to the spatial isolation Blacks experienced in the late-20th Century. Geographers thus demonstrated that where Black populations lived and their prospects for interacting with non-Black populations were factors mostly out of their control. Such geographical analysis showed how ingrained forms of societal racism and the resultant segregation Blacks faced meant a lack of Black financial capital, lack of Black-owned businesses, low-quality housing, and precarious health care. Furthermore, geographers demonstrated that it was precise because of such conditions that revolts took place in the country’s urban centers. While much of the early pioneering geographical work on Black populations examined the conditions in which African American communities lived and the factors that led to these conditions, some geographers also paid attention to the constructive ways in which Black communities responded to the innovating forms of racism they faced. In addition to quantitative analyses of how segregation persisted in the urban United States, geographers also uncovered the ways in which Black populations worked to build the future they wanted. Scholar-activist geographers imbedded themselves in Black communities in rapidly deindustrializing cities, creating grounded theories of Black struggle as they participated in local Black political movements. Such work built upon geographical interrogations of segregation to show how things like automation, blockbusting, and urban renewal kept Black communities impoverished and subsequently led to rebellious tendencies. This work did not stop at simply explaining the causes of urban revolts, however. This late-20th-Century scholar–activist tendency engaged Black communities’ aspirations for “Black Power” and probed the revolutionary potential within those same communities. Collective action like boycotts, protests, community-run education programs, and Black-run businesses punctuated the territorial practices analyzed by geographers active in Black communities. Such work was perhaps the first instance of geographers going beyond a description of the conditions in which African Americans lived and attending to the ways in which Black people became active makers of place. Attention to the aspirations and concrete spatial practices of Black communities would play a central role in the geographical scholarship that arose at the turn of the 21st evolutionary Century, as geographers began to focus intently on the spatial agency of Afro-descendant groups and individuals.

Interrogating Underlying Structures With the end of the Quantitative Revolution in Geography, a more qualitative approach came to define the discipline as a whole, and Black Geographies, specifically. Building from previous scholarship that named the inequalities Blacks experienced in the United States, scholars of Black Geographies began investigating the mechanisms by which those inequalities were perpetuated and justified. A strong tendency within Black Geographies engaged with Marxist explanations of shifting modes of production and the ways that Black communities across the United States (but particularly in the US South) were manipulated and marginalized for the perpetuation of capitalist reproduction. In addition to exploring the economic drivers of Black marginalization, the legal sphere also comprised an important unit of analysis regarding Black communities in the United States. Approaching the question of racism from a structural standpoint offered an understanding of how Blacks remained oppressed through institutional means. This approachdwhile going to lengths to understand the structural aspects of Black oppressiondnonetheless recognizes the ways in which Black populations analyze and critique these structures. Things like labor organizing, the Blues tradition, prison activism by the family of imprisoned individuals, and attempts at using legal means to secure civil rights typify this structural tendency. Black Geographies work, which takes a structural approach, emphasizes a detailed analysis of specific locationsdoften focusing on the regional scaledand uncovers how Black working-class populations fit into capitalist structures. These approaches have yielded important work on the expansion of prisons and incarceration as tools of population control and capital accumulation, the multiple iterations of plantation logics and economies in the Mississippi Delta, the effects of industrialization in the postbellum US South, and Black workers’ labor struggles in the postindustrial, neoliberal US context. This particular corpus of Black Geographies is careful to highlight the ways in which Black populations always remain affecteddand subordinateddby different moments of capitalist development. Such an approach links Black Geographies to wider conversations on racial capitalism, thereby embedding Geography, as a discipline, within conversations happening in Black studies. Another salient approach is the theoretical interrogation of the logics of anti-Blackness that informed not only the Middle Passage and chattel slave regimes of the past but continue to inform the ways in which Black peoples are viewed, treated, and placed around the world today. This approach draws correlations between what enslaved individualsdespecially enslaved womendexperienced during slavery and how we continue to see echoes of assumptions of Black inhumanity in the present day. This

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approach relies less on explorations of political economy and approaches the question of Blackness from a Humanities tradition. Importantly, this approach refuses to understand Blackness simply as a question of suffering and marginalization. Instead, it privileges the voices, actions, and expressions of Black populations. Showing how Black populations understand, critique, and offer alternatives to marginalization, the approach of acknowledging the political agency of Black people has also been taken up en masse in the subfield. Analyses of Black internationalism in Europe and South Asia, Black Power movements like the Black Panthers, the spatial thought of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Southern Black religious movements, Black LGBTQþ organizing, Black environmental justice initiatives, and Black food justice organizations have all punctuated developments in Black Geographies literature. The emphasis on political struggle and social justice highlights the multiple avenues through which Black populations attempt to address the multifaceted oppressions they face. The diversity of political approaches highlighted in the Black Geographies literature demonstrates that there is no one way of enacting or envisioning Black struggle and thus gives insight into the various ways in which Black populations understand and create place around the world.

Addressing a Variety of Experiences Although Black Geographies has emphasized the study of Blacks people’s experiences in North America, the subfield also addresses Black communities globally. Research on Black populations in South America, Central America, North America, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and North Africa typify this global approach, challenging us to think about how people of African descent make space in distinct and overlapping ways throughout the Diaspora. Such work has investigated the patterns and experiences of North African migrants throughout Europe, while also delving into the identities and of second and third generation Afro-Italians in an increasingly xenophobic Europe. The island of Lampedusa, for example, is a site of what can only be described as a modern-day Mediterranean Middle Passage, typified by the deaths of those making this maritime journey. Other scholars are studying the experiences of West African migrants as they traverse the arid and anti-Black planes of North African nations like Libya and Morocco. Further work has highlighted how nationhood in places like Brazil and Colombia is dependent on anti-Black violence and continues to be a site of various forms of anti-Blackness in urban and rural spheres. Such work has discussed various topics, including urban state violence, the role of religion in creating political subjects, and the effects of natural resource extraction on rural Afro-descendant communities. Work in this vein has paid attention to the land rights struggles of different communities. In particular, scholars have uncovered the way Afro-descendant populations confront the extractive agendas of palm oil plantations, the effects of petroleum, and the negative outcomes of environmental conservation tendencies, as they attempt to nurture their own ways of life. Further scholarship has given insight into the role that African ecological knowledge and food systems have influenced the environments and cultures of the Americas, charting the longstanding influence of African agricultural systems in North America, South America, and the Caribbean. In Central America, Black Geographies work has shown the realities of myriad forms of Black land dispossession and Black communities’ resolve to struggle against such violence. Still other research has delved into the oftenoverlooked experiences and representations of Afro-descendant populations in Victorian England and how their lives figured into 19th-Century British ideas of civilization. Thus, in form and content, Black Geographies embodies a pan-African ethic that seeks to study and intersect the experiences of an ever-expansive Black Diaspora by analyzing global (anti)Blackness, as well as the ways in which Black populations negotiate the marginalization they encounter. Black Geographies literature has made clear contributions to conversations in political economy and on the ontological question of Blackness. It has also pushed conversations on gender and sexuality, drawing inspiration from conversations on intersectionality. Recognizing that Black experiences are, in and of themselves, plural, geographers have explored topics like the corporeal violence visited upon enslaved women, pointing out that modern geographical practices hinge on ready access to, and knowledge of, Black women’s bodies. Reflecting on how anti-Black racism had numerous permutations following abolition in the United States, scholars have also pointed out that Black women were targets of discourses and practices of regional development and gendered ideas of proper housekeeping. Other work has demonstrated how Black women have renegotiated ideas of mother- and daughterhood, identified and countered entrenched forms of patriarchy, and pushed against dominant notions of race and gender as they make home in otherwise oppressive conditions across the Americas. In addressing such a wide-ranging set of topics and questions, Black Geographies literature is heavily influenced by both scholars and methodologies outside the discipline of Geography. This interdisciplinarity is due, in part, to the sub-field’s commitment to analyzing the different experiences of populations of African descent around the world. Drawing on insights and methods from economics, sociology, critical race studies, anthropology, gender studies, sexuality studies, history, and area studies, among others, helps to reflect on the diversity of Black experiences around the globe. The transdisciplinary nature of Black Geographies has thus influenced an everincreasing number of scholars and fields of study and continues to bridge conversations between Geography and other disciplines. The inclusive nature of Black Geographies is institutionally reflected. Though formally composed of geography graduate students, postdocs, and professors, the Black Geographies Specialty Group of the American Association of Geographers has a listserv that includes a swath of scholars, organizers, and concerned citizens from throughout a number of disciplines and communities throughout the world. As Black Geographies continues to be adopted and applied widely, the future of Black Geographiesdin scholarship and in the disciplinedis bound to be as expansive and varied as the production of Black Geographies throughout the world. Further work in Black Geographies is dependent upon additional research interests, methods, and field sites. Though Black Geographies enjoy a contemporary intellectual production based on qualitative and theoretical works drawn from the Americas, future

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Black geographic thought might be inspired by new methods and areas of study. The year 2019 saw the creation of The Committee on Supporting Black Physical Geographers and GIS Practitioners. This committee was created by the Black Geographies Specialty Group to devise strategies for supporting physical geographers and those who work with GIS to contribute to the field of Black Geographies. Therefore, in some way, Black Geographies may be turning back to its quantitative intellectual roots, in order to engage in critically informed quantitative studies of how global forms of marginalizations experienced by Black communities are rendered in space. Regardless of the new directions, the Black Geographies subfield takes, any innovations will continue to recognize and draw on the diversity of Black experiences and Black communities’ ways of life, as they exist across the African Diaspora. After all, Black Geographies, as a subfield, is only possible insofar as geographers pay attention to, and privilege, expressions of Black life around the world.

Further Reading Bledsoe, A., Wright, W.J., 2019. The anti-Blackness of global capital. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 37 (1), 8–26. Bressey, C., 2002. Forgotten histories: Three stories of black girls from Barnardo’s Victorian archive. Women’s Hist. Rev. 11 (3), 351–374. Bunge, W., 2011. Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution. University of Georgia Press, Athens. Darden, J., 1990. Detroit: Race and Uneven Development. Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Eaves, L.E., 2017. Black geographic possibilities: on a queer Black South. Southeast. Geogr. 57 (1), 80–95. Finney, C., 2014. Black Faces, White Spaces: Reimagining the Relationship of African Americans to the Great Outdoors. UNC Press Books, Chapel Hill. Gilmore, R.W., 2007. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California. University of California Press, Berkeley. Hawthorne, C., 2017. In search of black Italia. Transition 123, 152–174. McCutcheon, P., 2013. “Returning home to our rightful place”: the nation of Islam and Muhammad Farms. Geoforum 49, 61–70. McKittrick, K., 2006. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. McKittrick, K., Woods, C., 2007. Black Geographies and the Politics of Place. South End Press, Boston. Mollett, S., 2011. Racial narratives: Miskito and colono land struggles in the Honduran Mosquitia. Cult. Geogr. 18 (1), 43–62. Rose, H., 1971. The Black Ghetto: A Spatial Behavioral Perspective. McGraw-Hill Companies, New York. Wilson, B., 2000. America’s Johannesburg: Industrialization and Racial Transformation in Birmingham. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham. Woods, C., 1998. Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta. Verso, New York.

Blockchain Ludovico Rella, Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Bitcoin/bitcoin/BTC The capitalized version Bitcoin defines the system, software, and the cryptocurrency, while the lowercase version bitcoin indicates individual units of the cryptocurrency. The lowercase version is often used interchangeably with the pseudo-ISO 4217 code BTC. Byzantine Dilemma The Byzantine Generals Dilemma is a dilemma in Game Theory and Network Theory, whereby a decentralized network cannot reach consensus in the presence of malfunctioning or fraudulent nodes. A Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithm is one that, under given conditions, assures that all nonfraudulent nodes can achieve consensus. Cryptographic function Cryptography is the set of techniques to secure communication in presence of adversaries. The aim of cryptography is to secure that the content of a message can only be viewed by the intended parties and not by adversaries. To do that, cryptography uses mathematic formulae that are one-way and collision-free. A one-way formula is one that is easy to calculate in one direction but close to impossible to reverse: in this way, one cannot access data after they are encrypted. A collision-free formula is one that, given two different inputs, always provides two different outputs. Symmetric cryptography means that one key is used both to encrypt and decipher a message. Asymmetric cryptography, such as public key cryptography used in Bitcoin, uses a private key and derives from it a public key. When a sender A wants to send a secure message to receiver B, it uses B’s public key to encrypt the message, and B will be able to decipher it using B’s own private key. Bitcoin uses multiple cryptographic functions, such as Secure Hashing Algorithm SHA256 for mining, Cryptoasset A digital representation of value underpinned by a distributed ledger of transactions validated following cryptographic functions. While cryptocurrency represents a cryptoasset that is used as a means of payment, store of value, and unit of account, cryptoasset is more and more often used to represent Blockchain digital assets, in that many of them are not used as currencies, but rather as investments. Double spend Any digital payment system must prevent the same sum of money to be spent twice, by either duplicating files or by sending multiple payment messages and revoking them after receiving the goods. Blockchain technologies prevent double spending in the absence of centralized authorities by recording all transactions that happen in the network. Furthermore, nodes in a Blockchain network follow a set of instruction to verify that the transactions they are including in a new block do not imply double spend. Bitcoin, for instance, keeps a record called the Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) that records the sums not yet spent at any given time, and only these amounts can be used to perform a successful transaction. Fork, hard A hard fork is a change in the underlying code of a Blockchain that is not backward compatible and that is not adopted uniformly across the network. The result is that nodes running the outdated and updated code start validating different transactions, and the network splits into two, developing two ledgers, two cryptocurrencies, two histories. Famous hard forks are the split between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash in 2017, and the fork between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic after the DAO attack in 2016. Fork, soft A soft fork happens when a change in a Blockchain is so-called backward-compatible, i.e., the Blockchain’s software is updated so that only the nodes running the updated software can append new blocks to the record, but the nodes running the outdated software still recognize the new blocks as valid. Hashing Hashing is a cryptographic function that takes an alphanumeric string of arbitrary length as an input and returns a string of finite predetermined length as an output. This function is (almost) collision-free, i.e., two different inputs do not result in the same hash. Hashing is easy to calculate but hard to reverse. This means that, given an input, it is easy to calculate the hash. Conversely, the process of retrieving an input given a hash cannot be easier than hashing all possible inputs until one finds the correct value. Initial Coin Offering (ICO) An ICO, also called token sale, is a form of business finance for Cryptoasset start-ups. A firm launching an app with an associated cryptoasset, either built on an existing Blockchain or running a separate Blockchain, would sell the asset on the open market in exchange for fiat money or other cryptocurrencies, usually Bitcoin or Ether. KYC, AML, and CFT Know Your Customer (KYC) is the regulatory requirement to ascertain that all customers exist, and certify their identity, contacts, address, and history. KYC is essential in banking and finance for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Ledger A ledger is a register, a physical or digital book where the accounts, balances, identities, properties, addresses, and, sometimes, locations are stored. It records the state of an economy, and it must possess clarity and consistency in its content. Market capitalization The total value of a cryptoasset, defined as the circulating supply multiplied by its unitary price. In case a currency has only a part of its total supply in circulation (for example, because the company or foundation issuing it retains a quota), only the circulating supply counts toward the asset’s market capitalization. Node A machine running the appropriate software protocols to be visible to, and communicate with the other nodes in the network, initiate, and verify transactions. In Bitcoin, nodes can be differentiated in mining nodes or miners, full nodes, and

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lightweight nodes. Mining nodes validate transactions, add them to blocks, and add these blocks to the Blockchain. Full nodes are machines that store a full, updated version of the entire Blockchain. Lightweight nodes, or Simplified Payment Verification nodes, store a synthetic version of the Blockchain for reason connected with memory capacity and ease of calculation. Ponzi Scheme A Ponzi Scheme is a financial fraud whereby an entrepreneur asks people to invest in a business, but the returns do not come from the company’s profits, rather from quotas given by later investors. The scheme, hence, can only sustain itself if the number of investors keeps growing, and as long as all the investors do not withdraw their quotas at once. Proof-of-Stake (PoS) A family of consensus algorithms that share the principle that gives owners of a cryptocurrency the right to validate new blocks based on the stake they have, i.e., the quantity of the cryptocurrency they already own. Each node is randomly selected to validate a new block and obtain newly generated coins. The probability of a node being selected for validation might depend on the size of the stake and coin age, i.e., the period of time that the node has owned that stake. This consensus algorithm aims to incentivize honest behavior by rewarding loyalty, represented by coin age, and capital at risk, represented by the stake. PoS cryptocurrencies, hence, behave similarly to interest-bearing deposits, in that the owner is rewarded with new currency based on their existing stake, every time a new block is added to the Blockchain. Proof-of-Work (PoW) Proof-of-Work is the family of consensus algorithms that includes Bitcoin’s mining. In PoW Blockchains, nodes, often called miners, have to perform computing work in order to add blocks to the Blockchain. This is to ensure that an attacker who wants to change a block in the Blockchain cannot do so without doing the necessary calculations. Calculations for PoW algorithms are designed to be difficult to execute but easy to verify. This means that it is time- and energyconsuming for a miner to calculate a value that satisfies the requirements of the algorithm but, once a value is calculated, other nodes can easily verify that the result is legitimate. It might be the case that multiple legitimate blocks are mined simultaneously, with the possibility for the Blockchain to fork. In Bitcoin, miners automatically accept the chain containing the highest number of blocks, in that it contains the greatest PoW effort invested in it. Wallet A physical or digital way of storing the Public and Private Keys associated with a Blockchain address. A paper wallet is a paper-printed encryption of the keys, e.g., a QR code. A hardware wallet incorporates the public and private keys in an ad-hoc device, often with its own passwords for access. When a wallet is stored on a device that is connected to the Internet, and that can be accessed remotely, this is called a hot wallet, while a disconnected wallet that can only be accessed in person is called a cold wallet. White paper Originally, a technical document outlining the cryptographic features, consensus algorithms, and other details of the data structure and software architecture of a cryptocurrency. Lately, these documents tend to resemble marketing materials, and they might include the business model, profit estimates, corporate governance, prestigious endorsers, and other businessrelated information.

Blockchain technologies are a very recent, though quickly growing set of technological innovations at the intersection between cryptography, computer science, and accounting, first introduced in 2008 with Bitcoin. A Blockchain is a distributed, timestamped, append-only ledger of data connected with addresses, simultaneously kept on all the nodes within a decentralized network. Blockchains employ asymmetric, or public key cryptography to guarantee that only the owner of an account, and of the public and private cryptographic keys associated with that account, can initiate transactions. First, Blockchains are distributed in that the ledger is stored and updated simultaneously on multiple machines. Second, they are time-stamped, that is, the network agrees on a chronology of events and transactions happening in the network. The blocks of data are time-stamped and connected sequentially, forming a chain, so that the record can only be changed by appending new blocks, and no valid block can be changed without having to replace all the subsequent ones. Third, they are append-only in that a given Blockchain can only be updated by adding new blocks. Blockchain technologies are often (though not unanimously) defined as triple entry bookkeeping, as they add to the balance between assets and liabilities the layer represented by the consensus algorithm and encryption. The data stored in Blockchain technologies are almost tamper-proof, in that all computers in the network store a copy of a Blockchain and share the set of rules through which new data is added to the ledger. These transactions are then validated, packaged in blocks, and appended to the Blockchain following a predetermined set of rules, instructions, and procedures called consensus algorithm or consensus mechanism. The consensus algorithm ensures reliability, authenticity, and accuracy of the records in it. Since these technologies are very new, the terminology and definitions are still contested: while Bitcoin’s white paper used the words chain and blocks separately, the very term “Blockchain” only emerged between 2014 and 2015. Another term often used alongside Blockchain technologies is distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). Some authors tend to use DLTs and Blockchain technologies interchangeably, others tend to use DLTs as a broader term for all types of distributed databases, or to define Blockchains as those instances of DLTs that employ cryptoassets. To try to put order to this terminology, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) created in August 2017 the ISO Technical Committee 307 on Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies.

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Typology and Definitions Blockchain technologies vary depending on their openness, i.e., the freedom they afford to edit the software code, to access, read, and modify the content of the Blockchain, and to participate in the consensus process. A public, open, or permissionless Blockchain usually relies on open-source code; anyone can access the Blockchain, propose additions, and contribute to the consensus process. Permissioned Blockchains, in contrast, can be either consortium-led or private Blockchains: in consortium Blockchains, consensus takes place among a predecided set of agents. These consortia can operate on proprietary as well as open-source code. Facebook announced a consortium-led cryptocurrency, Libra, in June 2019, but it is still unclear when, and if it will be launched. Lastly, private Blockchains decentralize only the storage of the data contained in the Blockchain, while validation and addition of new content remain centralized. In February 2019, the investment bank J.P. Morgan launched a private blockchain with cryptoasset for interbank payments, called JPM Coin. In this case, the software is often proprietary and protected by patents and registered trademarks. A search on the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Website tells that in 2017 alone, there were 406 filings for Blockchain patents, and additional 602 proposed patents for cryptocurrency-related projects, showing a strong upward trend. Blockchain technologies can also vary depending on their consensus algorithms. The need for different algorithms depends on the use case, on the presence or absence of cryptoassets, and on how these cryptoassets are generated and distributed. The list of consensus algorithms is continuously growing, with new entries such as Delegated Proof-of-Work, Delegated Proof-of-Stake, Proof-of-Authority, Proof-of-Burn, Proof-of-Capacity, Proof-of-Storage, Proof-of-Cooperation, Byzantine Fault Tolerant algorithms. In open Blockchains that use Cryptoassets, the two most prominent algorithms are Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS). PoW is the consensus algorithm implemented by Bitcoin in the form of mining. Specific full nodes in Bitcoin’s network, called miners, gather transactions broadcasted through the network and keep them in a pool of transactions waiting validation. Each miner, then, proposes a candidate block and tries to include it in the Blockchain by performing the necessary computing work. A block is composed of several elements. First, each block lists the transactions that the miner proposing the block decided to include. In addition to these transactions, the miner adds the coinbase transaction, with which new bitcoins, that did not exist previously as unspent transaction outputs, are given as a reward to the address corresponding to the miner mining that block. Second, a block also includes the hash of the previous block. Third, each block contains the Unix time timestamp of that block. A block is accepted as valid only if its timestamp is greater than the median timestamp of the previous 11 blocks. Fourth, each block contains an arbitrary number, called the nonce. To be added to the Blockchain, a block must be hashed, i.e., all values contained within it must be encrypted through a SHA-256 cryptographic function. The hash of the block must fall within a specific value interval called the difficulty target, determined by the number of zeros that the hash must start with. This difficulty is dynamically adjusted depending on the computing power of the network. The target narrows when computing power increases, e.g., because more powerful machines join the system, and broadens when the computing power lowers, so that, on average, a new block is mined every 10 min. The function of the nonce is to alter the hash of the block, so that it falls within the difficulty requirements that are in force at the time when the block is mined. Since it is difficult to compute the right input given the hashed value, the only efficient way for miners to calculate a hash that meets the target is to try different nonce values until they find the right one. When a miner finds a correct result, it then broadcasts this new block to the network by the same means followed to broadcast transactions, the nodes attach this new block, and the process starts anew. The newly mined bitcoins are a reward for the effort that miners put into validating transactions. PoS, conversely, attributes the right to append new data based on the ownership of the digital asset associated with a specific Blockchain. The consensus works like a lottery: each node is extracted with a probability corresponding to the fraction of the total supply of a cryptoasset that a node holds, often weighted according to the coin age, i.e., the time that each coin has been kept. Peercoin was the first altcoin to implement a type of PoS, called minting, that combines stake, coin age, and randomization to assign the right to append new blocks and to generate new coins. This incentive structure privileges people who have a vested interest in the network’s health and well-being, and who have shown loyalty by holding coins for a long time. The benefit of PoW is its capacity to operate on extensive networks, but it is limited in the transaction speed because solving the mathematical puzzles is very timeconsuming. Furthermore, depending on the type of cryptographic puzzles that computers must solve, it can lead to concentration of computing power in few miners or validators, and in rather high levels of energy consumption. While PoS makes for a faster and less energy-consuming system, it relies heavily on large owners of a specific asset and, to some extent, it does not entirely do away with the need for trust in members of the network. The fact that Blockchain technologies found their first application in the alternative currency Bitcoin has created the misplaced impression that cryptoassets are essential components of a Blockchain technology. Blockchain technologies and cryptoassets are conceptually independent: digital assets can exist without relying on Blockchain-based storage of balances and transactions, such as DigiCash and E-Gold, Second Life’s Linden Dollar and World of Warcraft’s Gold. When these assets are not built on a Blockchain, they are customarily called virtual currencies, while they are called cryptocurrencies or, more broadly, cryptoassets when they employ Blockchain technologies. The term cryptocurrency leads to thinking that their primary or only purpose is to function as a means of payment, but that is not necessarily true. Some can represent property titles on digital or material assets, or securities and other financial products. For this reason, cryptoasset is probably a better term to define these instruments. Cryptoassets operating on an independent Blockchain are called cryptocurrencies or coins. Conversely, when a cryptoasset is used on an application developed on an existing Blockchain, it is called a token. Cryptoassets have their own monetary policy: they can start from a supply of zero, or they can be premined, and their supply can be either limited or unlimited. Bitcoin started from zero, while Ripple and Stellar, for example, instantly created all 100 billion units of their asset. Furthermore, Bitcoin will reach a total amount of 21 million

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in 2140, beyond which no new Bitcoin will ever be mined. Conversely, Ethereum has no supply cap, even if the amount of newly issued ethers will remain constant. Cryptoassets are only one of the applications on Blockchain technologies. The range of possible use cases expanded thanks to smart contracts dramatically. They were first defined by their inventor Nick Szabo as digitized, self-executable interpersonal agreements written in software code. Smart contracts would remove or reduce the risks of breach and misbehavior, and they would do away with the need for interpretation, in that they require completeness and lack of ambiguity to be machine-readable. Smart contracts are currently more broadly defined as programs that run on the Blockchain and have their correct execution enforced by the consensus protocol. The most radical application of smart contracts is decentralized autonomous organizations, i.e., organizations, firms, or institutions that can run without any human input and management.

Origins and Expansions The first Blockchain was introduced through Bitcoin by the person or collective under the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto. In an email in the Cryptography Mailing List on November 1, 2008, Nakamoto announced the publication of the Bitcoin white paper. In January 2009, Bitcoin went online with the mining of the genesis block. Bitcoin aimed to create a currency that was able to run without centralized authorities that could not be controlled or stopped by any government, whose emission and supply could not be subject to political intervention and discretionary monetary policy, and whose circulation was disintermediated rather than requiring a banking system. As repeatedly stated in the white paper, Bitcoin aims to remove either interpersonal or institutional trust in money and payments, e.g., between payer and payee, or between payers and validators. Bitcoin achieved its aims by creatively combining previous cryptographic and monetary software solutions such as David Chaum’s DigiCash, Nick Szabo’s Bit Gold, Wei Dai’s Bmoney, Adam Back’s Hashcash hashing function, and Haber and Stornetta’s Merkle Tree data structure. Bitcoin’s roots are intertwined with the growing distrust in financial institutions wrought by the financial crisis: many of the ideas that Bitcoin heralded related to Cypherpunk, cryptoanarchist and libertarian theories of free money and free banking, anonymity, anti-censorship, and self-governance. Bitcoin’s genesis block encodes the picture of January 3, 2009, where the London Times announces the possibility of a second bailout of the UK major banking institutions, both to prove the day when that block was mined and to mark Bitcoin’s distance from mainstream finance. Bitcoin started gaining attention beyond cryptographers in 2010: on May 22, the first real-world transaction took place when a pizza was purchased for 10,000 BTC, worth US$ 3.9 million as of March 2019. Also 2010 saw the emergence of cryptocurrency exchanges, with the most famous example being Mt. Gox. Also in 2010, VISA, MasterCard, and PayPal barred Wikileaks from accessing their infrastructure for receiving payments, and the website turned to Bitcoin because of its decentralization and anonymity. While this was met by the opposition of Nakamoto, Wikileaks’ official adoption of Bitcoin in June 2011 contributed to introduce this asset to the broader public. In February 2011 Silk Road was launched: it offered a variety of illegal goods and services, and it accepted Bitcoin among other means of payment to protect customers’ anonymity. Silk Road’s endorsement of Bitcoin caused regulators to pay attention to the cryptocurrency, which eventually lead to the closure of the website by the US authorities in October 2013. In parallel with Silk Road, Bitcoin became famously associated with the growth and bust of the cryptocurrency exchange Mt. Gox, which came from controlling 70% of Bitcoin’s daily transactions in 2014 to go bankrupt later that same year, after reporting the theft of more than 800,000 BTC. Ever since their emergence, cryptocurrencies have been associated with two trends: volatility in their price and growth and proliferation in their number. This proliferation of cryptoassets and exchanges, in turn, has caused Bitcoin’s dominance over the market to shrink. The opening and closing of exchanges and marketplaces, the newspaper headlines, and the regulatory interventions period contribute to great fluctuations in prices: for example, Bitcoin’s price rose from virtually zero in 2010 to more than US$ 1200 in 2013, to $ 200 in 2015, but it surpassed US$ 17,000 in 2017. Concurrently, the number of cryptocurrencies in circulation has also skyrocketed, going from only one in 2010 to more than 800 coins and 1200 tokens as of March 2019, which can be traded across more than 200 exchanges. Part of the explosive expansion of this market was associated with the birth of Ethereum in 2014. Ethereum runs a so-called Turing-complete programming language on top of a Blockchain: software can be executed by the whole network rather than by individual machines, which allowed for wholly self-executing smart contracts. Ethereum produced a shift both within and outside the Blockchain technologies space: it showed that Blockchains could be used for more than money and payments, and it triggered a change in the attitude of press, regulators, and industry incumbents. Since then, the attention shifted away from cryptoassets, and it focused on the disruptive potential of Blockchains, Distributed Ledgers, and smart contracts.

Monetary and Financial Applications: From Cryptocurrencies to Cryptoassets The earliest driver of cryptocurrencies’ expansion was to experiment and amend some features of existing Blockchains, especially Bitcoin. First, many cryptoassets emerged to modify the monetary policy of Bitcoin: in fact, Bitcoin was designed to behave like gold by being inherently scarce and difficult to mine. Bitcoin’s similarity to gold made it prone to hoarding, and it gave an unfair advantage to early adopters: hence, one of the earliest altcoins, Litecoin, changed the difficulty adjustment, average time between blocks, and the supply limit to make it less scarce. Second, Bitcoin is not anonymous but pseudonymous: while any personal

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information does not identify users, their addresses and transactions are visible. Without additional measures to mask her identity, it is possible to link an address to a specific individual. Anonymity, then, emerged as a strong use case: the most famous privacyoriented altcoins are ZCoin, ZCash, and Monero. Third, Bitcoin is not considered highly scalable in terms of speed, costs, and energy consumption. Bitcoin supports an average of 5–10 transactions per second (TPS), against the several thousand TPS supported by VISA and MasterCard. Mining Bitcoin is heavily energy-consuming, and it has been estimated that mining worldwide requires the equivalent to the energy consumption of Ireland. Besides, mining requires specialized and costly equipment called Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC). Some altcoins, then, took the payment use case as their core business and designed their Blockchain to maximize the number of TPS and minimize the energy consumption. Some cryptocurrencies have emerged out of a hard fork in an existing Cryptocurrency. The two most prominent examples of hard forks are the Ethereum-Ethereum Classic fork of 2016, and the Bitcoin-Bitcoin Cash fork of 2017. In 2016, an Ethereum smart contract called the DAO, which was a software-run Venture Capital fund, was attacked by a hacker who exploited a flaw in the smart contract’s code. The attacker managed to steal $50 million worth of Ether from investors’ accounts before it was caught. It was then proposed to edit Ethereum’s Blockchain to remove the consequences of the attack. This solution, while compensating those affected by the hack, ran against the principle of Blockchains’ immutability. This caused a split between Ethereum, which runs in the version of the Blockchain that erased the consequences of the attack, and Ethereum Classic. Later, in 2017, Bitcoin was debating whether to increase the size in bytes of blocks to increase Bitcoin’s scalability. What looks like a technical detail hides a profound political dilemma, as the size of a block has implications regarding bandwidth, storage space, and computing power required for mining, that in turn might lead to increased centralization of mining. The result was a hard fork between Bitcoin which maintained the original block size, and Bitcoin Cash, that raised this parameter. In addition to cryptocurrencies, tokens are a class of cryptoassets that are connected, through smart contracts and applications, to an existing Blockchain. Depending on their function and structure, tokens can be divided into utility and security tokens, and stablecoins. A utility token derives value from its use and utility within an associated network: it could be the currency for payments in an online marketplace, or the means for monetizing digital content on a sharing platform or social network. Utility tokens do not represent equity or bearing of debt issued by the company offering the token; hence they are an instrument for founders to raise funds without diluting control over the company. A security token, much like a traditional security, provides investors with a fungible instrument representing either equity or debt in a company or other ventures. Equity tokens are a subset of this class, and, like traditional equity, they represent ownership of quotas of the issuing company. More in general, tokenization and smart property stand for the capacity of tokens of embedding ownership rights on a real-world asset through cryptoassets and smart contracts. Most of the tokens currently in circulation comply to the ERC-20 Ethereum smart contract standard, built on the Ethereum Blockchain. Another new entry in the token landscape are stablecoins: they aim to mitigate the volatility of cryptoassets’ valuations by anchoring their value and supply to real-world assets, e.g., precious metals, oil, or existing currencies. Tokens and coins play an increasingly important part in early-stage funding for Blockchain-related start-ups through Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). An ICO is a new and still unregulated form of business finance for Cryptoasset start-ups: a new firm that wants to launch an app built on an existing Blockchain, or a wholly new Blockchain with its associated cryptoasset, would sell amounts of the asset on the open market in exchange for fiat money or other cryptocurrencies, usually Bitcoin or Ethereum. The first stage of an ICO is generally a private sale, where funds are raised informally with wealthy investors who purchase tokens at a discount, followed by a public sale. After the public sale, the token subject to ICO might be listed in cryptoasset exchanges, and investors might profit from selling the coins or tokens bought during the ICO on the exchanges at a higher price. The ICO follows typically self-imposed hard and soft caps, a hard cap being the maximum amount the ICO will raise, and a soft cap being the minimum amount to start the business. In the second half of 2017, ICOs grew to 1.25 billion US$ raised in 2017, surpassing the amount raised by angel and seed VC funding for the same year. Institutional investors started paying attention to this market when the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced Bitcoin futures contracts under the ticker XBT on December 10, 2017. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the world’s largest exchange for futures contracts, introduced its own Bitcoin futures contract, under the ticker BTC, on December 17, 2017. CBOE subsequently discontinued the issuance of new contracts in March 2019, adducing a need to review its approach to digital asset derivatives. NASDAQ is reportedly considering issuing its own futures contract in the first half of 2019. Beyond derivatives, financial institutions’ interest in Blockchain technologies has not so far usually involved cryptoassets, with some exceptions in payments, clearing, and settlement. Furthermore, state authorities are looking into the opportunity to launch Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), with prominent examples being Singapore, Canada, and Sweden. Venezuela is, to date, the first and only state that issued a cryptoasset, called Petro, backed by oil and precious metals. Estonia was also considering issuing a cryptoasset called estcoin, but it has been stopped by the European Central Bank.

Nonmonetary Uses Cryptoassets are only one possible application of Blockchain technologies, and the introduction of smart contracts has exponentially expanded the range of applications. This newly discovered versatility of Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies has led several private companies to develop their own tailored and permissioned Blockchain infrastructures, designed specifically for each use case. Over time, consensus-as-a-service started to emerge, e.g., the provision of multipurpose Blockchain infrastructures on which permissioned, modular, purpose-specific applications can be built. The two most important permissioned

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Blockchains with no native cryptoasset are Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda. Fabric, in a similar fashion as Ethereum for decentralized applications, is a deeper, infrastructural level for purpose-specific Blockchains. IBM currently uses it for managing crossborder payments and foreign exchange (FX) transactions and tracking shipping in logistics, Everledger relies on Hyperledger Fabric for tracking the origin of diamonds to make sure that they do not originate from conflict-ridden areas, and Fujitsu and the Japanese Bankers’ Association use this infrastructure for interbank communications and transactions. R3 Corda, on the other side, has a more limited scope, in that it is designed to handle financial contracts and transactions. Corda is not a Blockchain in itself, in that it does not keep a complete record of all interactions happening in the network. The parties to a transaction validate the transaction themselves, with a network of notaries. Unlike miners, notaries are appointed by the parties running a specific application on top of Corda. Both permissionless and permissioned Blockchain technologies found fertile ground in applications related to identity and personal data. Estonia, for example, partnered with Guardtime to establish a Blockchain-based record of healthcare data. More and more start-ups are leveraging Blockchain for self-sovereign identity, which stands for an identity system that guarantees access, control, persistence and portability of data to users. Self-sovereign identity is a reaction to a Big Data environment whereby individual behaviors are selectively recorded, extrapolated, aggregated, and turned into valuable and monetizable information, and used for surveillance and targeted advertising, as the Cambridge Analytica case showed. For example, Blockchain technologies can be applied to health or banking data to ostensibly render credit and health insurance scoring more transparent and fairer. Other examples of the use of Blockchain technologies relate to property and elections. Sweden, for example, has started experimenting with a Blockchain-based land registry, the Royal Mint has launched a Blockchain-powered platform for gold trading, and the Ethereum-based platform for voting e-Vox has been endorsed by high-ranking Ukrainian officials, which might hint at future developments. Other applications are explored in fair trade, development, and aid, like Disberse. Yet further applications include smart grids and energy, whereby a Blockchain keeps track of the inputs and outputs of energy in the grid to make pricing and supply more transparent. Lastly, some use cases are growing at the frontier between Blockchain technologies, the Internet of Things (IoT), machine-tomachine interaction (M2M), and artificial intelligence (AI). IoT and M2M interaction rely on the complete and tamper-proof characteristic of Blockchains to allow multiple actors to share data across a supply chain. Furthermore, smart contracts would allow to manage human–machine and machine–machine interactions: for example, only the owner could use a vehicle, or that same car could pay automatically when it accesses a highway. IOTA, for example, was the first case of a Blockchain expressively designed for the IoT use case. IBM has also deployed a permissioned Blockchain for IoT data, called IBM Watson IoT Platform Blockchain Service for IoT-enabled supply chain management. Use cases in AI, on the other side, are still few and underdeveloped in number: most of the existing examples are platforms that allow or promise the establishment of marketplaces for Big Data that can, in turn, be used to train AI and deep learning applications. DeepBrain uses Blockchain technologies to create a distributed computing environment similar to Ethereum’s virtual machine on which to run deep learning applications. Quite unsurprisingly, AI has been heavily used for cryptocurrency trading: several machine learning applications are currently devoted to adaptively devise trading strategies on cryptocurrency exchanges.

Regulation Across Jurisdictions Much like the evolution of Blockchains themselves, regulation has evolved in stages. The first such stage, connected with Silk Road and Wikileaks, was directed at anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML and CFT), law infringement, and tax and sanction avoidance. The most representative measure is the FBI arrest of Ross Ulbricht, a.k.a. Dread Pirate Robert, founder, and manager of Silk Road, in October 2013. A second stage of regulation accompanied the spread of altcoins and crypto exchanges, and the rise and fall of Mt. Gox. This phase consisted in two efforts: first, financial regulators tried to come to terms with what cryptocurrencies and Blockchain were through reports and scoping research, to assess risk for financial markets, customers, and, potentially, monetary policy. This effort translated into early regulatory decisions that, in many cases, extended to cryptocurrency operators some of the existing compliance obligations of financial institutions and payment system providers. The note 2014–21 of the Internal Revenue Service and the deliberations by the Commodities and Futures Trade Commission (CFTC) in September 2015, for example, equated cryptocurrencies to property and commodities. In 2014, the New York State Department for Financial Services passed the BitLicense Regulation on money operators handling cryptocurrencies, which barred any licensed entity from doing business with unlicensed firms. The third stage of regulation is the present one, and it is focused on tokens and ICOs. For instance, the SEC weighed in during July 2017 regarding the tokens issued by the DAO, concluding that tokens were securities if they represented money invested with a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the managerial effort of others. Aside from Blockchain-specific pieces of regulation, existing laws are impacting on this industry in different and sometimes unintended ways, e.g., the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). GDPR states that data need to be stored and process only to the extent of the specified and limited purposes for which they were gathered. Furthermore, it provides the right to rectify, amend, access, and erase data upon request, if feasible, i.e., the right to be forgotten. Blockchain technologies stand at odds with many parts of this regulation: they can record data permanently, they do not have any actor being able to enforce changes to the records, and they can work across jurisdictional boundaries. The tension between Blockchain technologies and data protection is unforeseeable at this moment.

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Blockchain regulation remains inhomogeneous geographically. Some jurisdictions and local authorities are trying to position themselves as Blockchain hubs, like Malta, Gibraltar, Zug’s Crypto Valley in Switzerland, Andhra Pradesh in India, and some US states like Delaware. Estonia is the individual country that made the most extensive use of Blockchain technologies for its activities, and its E-Residency system made it conducive to the establishment of Blockchain companies in the country. Other countries have taken a strict approach: China banned both ICOs and cryptocurrency exchanges that allowed cryptocurrencies to be traded for fiat currencies in September 2017, and other jurisdictions such as Bolivia and Indonesia banned cryptocurrencies to be used as means of payment. Moreover, regulation is uneven within each jurisdiction: each regulatory agency and standard-setting body might have a different attitude toward what to regulate, and how to do so. Indonesia’s Central Bank, for example, has categorically banned the use of anything other than the Indonesian Rupiah as means of payment and unit of account, yet the Ministry of Trade regulated in favor of Cryptoasset exchanges and their trading activities. While regulation of Blockchain technologies is developing, so are both lobbying, on one side, and self-regulation and standard setting, on the other. For example, the US Congress created a Blockchain Caucus in 2017, and Coinbase (a crypto exchange that surpassed $1 billion in revenue in 2017) has established its own Political Action Committee (PAC). Furthermore, formal and informal rules, multistakeholder governance, and standard setting seem to be emerging recently. For example, within the Bitcoin community, the New York Agreement was signed at the conference Consensus 2017 between over 50 companies (e.g., mining pools, exchanges) to implement the update SegWit2x. However, this update was later withdrawn, which was one of the reasons that led to the hard fork between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash. Some communities, such as Bitnation and Blue Frontiers, employ smart contracts, Blockchain technologies, and Cryptoassets as ways to regulate themselves both online and offline.

What Can Human Geography Contribute to the Study of Blockchain? Blockchain technologies are currently caught in a deeply polarized debate over their actual and potential impact. Enthusiasts tend to define Blockchain as 4th Industrial Revolution, the Web 3.0, and the Fifth Paradigm of computing after mainframes, PCs, Internet, and mobile devices. The expansion of the cryptoasset market is seen as part of a Cambrian Explosion of financial technologies, that in turn foresees the coming of the Internet of Money, where money flows with the same ease as information. Blockchain technologies, furthermore, enable self-enforcing smart contract, hence are defined by some as regulatory technologies, heralding the emergence of lex criptographica, a system whereby regulation becomes more and more similar in structure, style, and tools as Blockchain software code. Blockchain, hence, is seen not only as an innovation to be understood, used, and regulated, but rather the very blueprint of a new society and economy to come. Some of these claims resemble the promises and imaginaries of independence, borderlessness, and horizontality associated with the disruptive and democratizing potential ascribed to the cyberspace in the 1990s. Conversely, skeptics tend to be wary: first, Blockchain technologies open spaces for money laundering, tax evasion, smuggling, and terrorism financing. With the increased hype surrounding cryptoasset trading, volatility and risks inherent to speculative investments in this sector rise as well: a new, relatively illiquid and unregulated market can be easily manipulated, and many tokens and ICO revealed themselves being scams. Critics of this hype compare Blockchain technologies and Cryptoassets to Ponzi Schemes, the Dot Com Bubble, or the Tulip Mania in the Netherlands during the 1630s. Furthermore, many denounce the environmental costs in terms of energy consumption and carbon footprint that mining entails, together with the computing power and digital storage space being wasted for increasingly growing ledgers and increasingly harder calculations for mining. Besides, the immutability of data stored on Blockchains makes some people wary of the new forms of surveillance and control that they might afford to dominant players. Lastly, critics have pointed out to the problematic genealogy of the politic and economic ideas informing the design of Blockchain technologies that link them to neoliberal projects of a-political money and capital accumulation rather than to emancipatory projects of decentralization and self-rule. Due to the inherently political nature of their design, a rapidly growing literature in the social sciences and humanities has found in Blockchain technologies a fertile ground to explore issues of trust, power, identity, ownership, and value. Geography and its subdisciplines can contribute to this scholarship: digital geography, for example, can build on a well-established tradition of deconstructing real–virtual and material–digital divides. Economic geographers can foreground political and spatial asymmetries and the constitutive importance of regulatory geographies to the development of Blockchain and related technologies. Furthermore, distributed computation has shown to have a significant environmental and energetic footprint, which makes this topic ripe for critical scholarship in environmental geography and political ecology. The nuances that characterize geographical research can be usefully developed in relation to this deeply polarized subject. Rather than embracing the technological determinism that sees Blockchain as utterly new and unambiguously as a decentralizing and democratizing force, geographers should begin by placing and situating actually existing Blockchain technologies in their contexts. This means that geographical scholarship on Blockchain ought to foreground both Blockchain’s potentialities and its ambiguities concerning disintermediation and reintermediation, decentralization and control, coproduction and capitalization.

See Also: Digital Geographies; Digital and Platform Economies; Innovation; Internet Geographies; Technological Change; Venture Capital.

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Further Reading Antonopoulos, A.M., 2017. In: Mastering Bitcoin: Programming the Open Blockchain, second ed. O’Reilly, Beijing, Boston, Farnham, Sebastopol, Tokyo. Burniske, C., Tatar, J., 2018. Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor’s Guide to Bitcoin and beyond. McGraw-Hill, New York. Buterin, V., 2014. Ethereum Whitepaper: A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application Platform (Whitepaper). Catlow, R., Garrett, M., Jones, N., Skinner, S. (Eds.), 2017. Artists Re:thinking the Blockchain. Torque Editions , Furtherfield, England: London. De Filippi, P., Wright, A., 2018. Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Dodd, N., 2018. The social Life of bitcoin. Theory Cult. Soc. 35, 35–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276417746464. DuPont, Q., 2019. Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains, Digital Media and Society. Polity, Medford, MA. Gloerich, I., Lovink, G., van der Burgt, P. (Eds.), 2018. Moneylab Reader 2: Overcoming the Hype. INC reader. Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam. Law Library of Congress, 2018. Regulation of Cryptocurrency Around the World. Law Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Lee, D. (Ed.), 2015. Handbook of Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and Big Data. Elsevier/AP, Amsterdam. Nakamoto, S., 2008. Bitcoin: A Peer-To-Peer Electronic Cash System. Narayanan, A., 2016. Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Swan, M., 2015. In: Blockchain: Blueprint for a New Economy, first ed. O’Reilly, Beijing : Sebastopol, CA. Swan, M., de Filippi, P., 2017. Toward a philosophy of blockchain: a symposium: introduction. Metaphilosophy 48, 603–619. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12270. Tapscott, D., Tapscott, A., 2016. Blockchain Revolution: How the Technology behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business, and the World. Portfolio/Penguin, New York.

Relevant Websites Bitcointalk, the original Bitcoin Forum: https://bitcointalk.org/. CoinMarketCap: https://coinmarketcap.com. Brett Scott’s Review of Academic Research on Bitcoin updated to 2016: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1VaWhbAj7hWNdiE73P-W-wrl5a0WNgzjofmZXe0Rh5sg/ edit#gid¼0. CoinDesk: https://www.coindesk.com/. Bitcoin News: https://news.bitcoin.com/. Coin Telegraph: http://cointelegraph.com/. Coin Journal: https://coinjournal.net/. NullTX: https://nulltx.com/. Bitcoin Magazine: https://bitcoinmagazine.com/. Blockchain Initiative at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE): https://blockchain.ieee.org/. The Blockchain Research Network: http://www.blockchainresearchnetwork.org/. The Frontiers in Blockchain Peer Reviewed Journal: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/blockchain/sections/fourth-industrial-revolution. ICO Alert, one of many websites listing the new and upcoming ICOs: https://www.icoalert.com/en/. GitHub, where one can find most Blockchain projects using opensource code: http://github.com/. Reddit, online forum and social network widely used for Blockchain and cryptocurrency communities: https://www.reddit.com/. Medium, a blogging platform widely used to discuss Blockchain and Cryptoasset topics: http://medium.com/. Telegram’s messaging platform. Blockchain projects, ICOs and the like often have their Telegram channel to circulate news and discuss proposals: https://telegram.org/. Bitcoin’s Blockchain visualized as a street: http://bitcoincity.info/. Bitcoin’s network of full nodes visualized in various ways: https://bitnodes.earn.com/. Symphony of Blockchains’ audio-visual representation of Bitcoin’s Blockchain: https://iohk.io/.

Body Lynda Johnston, Geography Programme, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Corporeality A recognition of the importance of the physical body (that cannot be removed from discourse) as to understanding lived experiences. Dualisms Two factors (for example, mind/body, work/home, public/private, male/female, heterosexual/homosexual) are assumed to be distinct and mutually exclusive. Essentialism The belief that socially constructed differences (for example, gender, race, age) are determined by biology, therefore bodies are deemed to have fixed properties or essences. Identity Relates to social categories such as class and gender, but does not assume that these are fixed essences. Identities are considered to be multiple, fluid, unstable, and constituted by space/place. Social constructionism Often considered opposite to essentialism, social constructionism is an approach that examines ideas that may appear to be natural and the norm to those who accept them, but in reality is an invention of a particular culture or society. Performative Bodies and places are produced through a repetition of particular acts with a regulatory framework. Subjectivity Relates to a performative ontology of the subject with recognition of the productive aspect of language in a wider, and relational, framework. Subjectivity includes the social (ideas, ideologies, emotions) as well as the material (bodies, technologies, and things). The Other Refers to a person who is different or opposite to the Self. The Other is marginalized from the Self and/or excluded from particular places.

The body is a crucial site of sociospatial relations, representation, and identities. It is the place, location, or site of the individual. It is also a site of pain, pleasure, and other emotions around which social definitions of wellness, illness, happiness, and health are constructed. The body is the location of social identities and differences, such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, indigeneity, age, (dis) ability, size, shape, appearance, and so on. These identities or subjectivities may form the basis for oppression and exclusion, meaning that the body as a space is bound up in knowledge and power. The body is therefore a site of ongoing struggle and contestation. Where a body can go, what it can eat, what it can do, who can get access to it are regulated and controlled. The bodydmaterially, socially, psychologicallydmarks a boundary between Self and Other. There is no universal agreement about what the body is or where it begins and ends. The diversity and complexity of embodied experiences demonstrate that bodies are constructed through different social, cultural, and economic assemblages, and through different spaces and places. The sociopolitics that surround bodies and space are increasingly being critiqued and scrutinized. By examining bodies, geographers are able to understand further the ways in which places are embodied and bodies are emplaced. Sometimes referred to as the “geography closest in,” the body became the subject of social science enquiry from the late 1970s when humanistic geographers were concerned with the way bodies move through and occupy space. This early work was influenced by phenomenological approaches, and geographers explored the body as a subject that can approach and connect with its surroundings and thus bring space into being. For many the phenomenological approach was an important starting point for embodying geography. Humanistic geographers, however, were criticized for not considering the subjectivities or identities of bodies under investigation. It was not until the 1990s, and in response to criticisms of disembodied geography by feminist geographers, that the body became an explicit part of the geographical agenda. Turning to “the body” was also part of the “cultural turn” in the discipline. Over the past decade or so, the growing attention to consumption and lifestyle issues, such as food, fashion, and leisure, has meant that geographers can no longer ignore either embodied experiences or representations of bodies. It has been shown that people’s desires to be involved in particular practices or activities is intimately connected to their own body image. It has also been suggested that certain types of bodies may seek to exclude Other bodies from their environments. As such, feminist, social, and cultural geographers are critical of the mind/body dualism and are exploring notions of subjectivity, power, and embodiment.

Mind–Body Dualism The 17th-Century philosopher Rene Descartes established a dualistic concept of mind and body. Western rationalist tradition entails a radical separation of body and mind that accords primacy to the mind. Descartes argued that the mind had the conceptual power of intelligence and hence selfhood. The corporeal body was deemed to be a vehicle that could be directed by the mind. This Cartesian divisiondthe subordination of the body to the mind and the emphasis placed on dualistic thinkingdhad a profound

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impact on western thought. In particular, medical practices established the body as an object that could be measured, mapped, and experimented on. Geography, as well as other social sciences, has been built on the mind–body dualism, which posits that the mind and body are separate entities and act on each other. Not surprisingly, dualisms have shaped geographers’ understandings of place and people. Dualistic thinking in geographical research tends to create distinctions between culture–nature, production–reproduction, public space–private space, work–home, western–orient, north–south, and state–home. The mind/body dualism is gendered in that the mind is traditionally connected to positive terms such as reason, rationality, subject, culture, public, Self, and masculinity. The body, however, has been associated with negative terms such as passion, irrationality, object, nature, private, Other, and femininity. These dualisms are, however, very mobile. When the dominant subject (white, heterosexual, and masculine) is challenged, discourses shift to accommodate both sides of its constitutive oppositions. Feminist geographers have argued that rational knowledge has been defined as masculinist, which assumes a knower who believes “he” can separate himself from “his” body, values, emotions, and past experiences so that “he” is autonomous, objective, and free of context. This kind of objective rationalitydsupposedly free of bodily identity and experiencedis assumed to be universal and the only form of legitimate knowledge. Ironically, this type of rationality means that certain subjectivities become dominant and normalizeddfor example, white, bourgeois, heterosexual men become defined as the Self and all other subjectivities become “his” Other. This dualistic thinking has played a key role in the construction of geographical knowledge. There is a history of white heterosexual men excluding or marginalizing women as producers of geographical knowledge as well as what are considered “women’s topics.” Topics such as embodiment and sexuality were previously regarded as inappropriate topics to teach and to research. In some places, such is still the case, and the body remains Othered in geography. What constitute appropriate issues and legitimate topics to teach and research in geography comes to be defined in terms of reason, rationality, and abstraction as though these can be separated out from passion, irrationality, messiness, and embodied sensation. Many geographers have, however, challenged the privileging of the mind (and masculinity) over the body (and femininity) within the discipline, which has resulted in an array of new topics, such as age; animal bodies; more-than-human bodies; body shape and size; consumption; cisgender and transgender bodies; religion; race; ethnicity; (dis)abilities; health and well-being; work and employment; class and poverty; geopolitics; and visceral bodies (those topics previously considered too “dirty” or “risqué”) being put on the geographical agenda. Geographers themselves are beginning to think about ways of researching (using the body as an instrument of research), which recognize that all knowledges are embodied and situated. The body has acted as geography’s Other in different ways at different times and places. Philosophers from the periods of ancient Greeks and Romans, Judeo-Christian thought, the Renaissance, to the present day have been fascinated with the body. While there is no one consensus on what the body is, it is useful to explore what seems to be a simple question: What is the body?

What Is the Body? “The body” is often treated as a taken-for-granted entity that needs no explanation. We all have bodies; however, how and where we use our bodies varies greatly. Bodies are used to ground personal identity and to recognize other people’s identity. Bodies are used for the assignment of various roles, tasks, and strategies, for practical action, for reproduction, and for the expression of moral judgments. Bodies may also be used as artwork or as a surface upon which meaning is inscribed. With the myriad of meanings associated with the body, it becomes almost impossible to define what the body is. Some theorists who have attempted to define the body remain puzzled as to what it actually is. The body has been thought of as a corporeal place and even as terra incognita. At best the visceral matter of the body might be thought of as flesh, organs, muscles, nerves, skeletal structure, and concrete material organized and animated through social and psychical inscription. Bodies become human (as opposed to animal bodies) when a body coincides with the “appropriate” shape and space of a psyche. In psychoanalytic terms, the body may define the limits of experience and subjectivity. This “thing”dthe bodydis complicated and its meanings have changed over time and in different places. It may not be very useful, therefore, to attempt to offer an absolute or fixed definition of the body. In trying to understand what the body is, human geographers have drawn on many different approaches from a variety of disciplinary areas such as feminist and gender studies, cultural studies, sociology, philosophy, social anthropology, and geography. As noted above, geography is a discipline that has traditionally ignored the body. During geography’s engagement with positivist thought, bodies were quantified out of existence to the point that people of different shapes, colors, sizes, ages, genders, and sexualities were reduced to points, flows, and movements in space. An early exception to this type of disembodied quantitative geography was “time-geography.” Developed by Swedish geographers in the 1960s, time-geography was a contextual approach to understanding human spatial behaviors based on the idea that space and time are resources on which bodies can draw in order to participate in personal projects or activities. Based on the assumption that a body’s ability to do more than one thing at a time is limited and that people cannot be in two places at once, this approach sought to examine the interweaving of bodies and activities in logical blocks of space and time. Life paths were mapped to show a daily path was the sum of bodily movements. Cumulative maps of life paths were deemed to represent both the end result and contest of people’s actions. The exploration of time–space routines became an important concept in the development of structuration theory. Time-geography has been criticized as offering a limited understanding of humanity because

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it failed to represent a body with feelings, memories, knowledge, information, and identities. Structuralist accounts were similarly disembodied as they reduced humans to lifeless units of labor. Phenomenology was one of the first approaches to offer a more human-centered geography. Humanistic geographers in the 1970s, intent on understanding the relationship between human identity and place, considered the prediscursive lived body. One of the most useful contributions to come out of the phenomenological approach to embodiment is that subjectivity is not located in the consciousness but in the lived body. The body becomes a locus of experience that exists prior to all conscious reflection and knowledge. Bodily awareness becomes inseparable from the world of perception. This type of sensuous corporeality means that it is also the object of spatial relationsdwithout the body there would be no space. Using this approach, the body has its own intentionality and capacity to direct behaviors and function as a subject that expresses itself in a preconscious habitual and involuntarily way. A body may build up time–space routines where a series of behaviors or rituals are habitually repeated without conscious thought. Some humanistic geography scholarship rejected abstract theorization and modeling, yet other humanistic geographers developed experiential frameworks for understanding the relationships between people and place. The “triad of environmental experience” emphasized the importance of movement, rest, and encounter. Routine and repeated movements in familiar places can be thought of as choreographed. The concept of “place ballet” was used to describe the choreographed but complex movements of several bodies simultaneously. Humanistic geographies of “lifeworlds” provided an intriguing forerunner to an investigation of differently embodied subjectivities in space, yet they failed to recognize embodied differences such as gender/ sex, race/ethnicity, dis/abilities, age, class, and so on. More recently geographers with converging interests in embodiment and nonrepresentational theory have encouraged a reexploration of movement, practice, and senses. Nonrepresentation theory is concerned not so much with representations and textual discourse as the mundane and everyday practices, and senses that shape bodies and places. Sensuous geographies usually involve considering some combination of touch, taste, hearing, smell, and sight, although geographers have tended to privilege the visual over other senses. Attention to the surveillance gaze has opened up areas of research that involve understanding how and why bodies are interpreted and disciplined. Moving beyond the visual, however, has meant that geographers can understand the management of embodiment through other sensual information. Studies that focus on the social construction of disability and illness highlight embodied experiences of pain, what it means to be healthy and/or sick. Hence, attention to things that words and representations cannot express is necessary to understand the rarely spoken of but constantly performed practical experiences of ordinary people. Exploring the way people “do” subjectivities, there is now a large geographical literature on the way people dance, swim, walk, or sit their identities, as well as the way identities are performed through bodily gestures, styles of dressing, and modes of eating. Theories about the development of selfhood and identity through embodiment are combined with ideas about the way the body becomes caught up in collective experiences and power relations. There is a growing area in human geography that studies how power is articulated through geographies of exclusion. Some bodies are deemed to be “out of place” in particular spaces and the exclusion of certain people happens at a variety of scales. The effect of this exclusion is often understood as Othering. To explain further, bodies are considered as markers of difference between Self and Other in ways that maintain distinctions between valued landscapes and marginalized landscapes. Psychoanalytic theory is another important approach to understand the relationship between the Self and society, why feelings of repulsion and fascination attach to particular bodies, and how some bodies are labeled as Other. Psychoanalytic approaches tend to focus on the unconscious, rather than the conscious, enabling some geographers to try to understand the relationship between the individual and the external world. It is often argued, and hotly contested, that the unconscious is formed from individual’s sexual drives and residues of infantile experiences, and hence the experiences of early childhood are generally accepted to be critical. Children may cope with early painful and upsetting experiences by repressing them from their consciousness. It is from this repression that a split is formed between the conscious and unconscious. Theories of socialization suggest that people suffer crises of identity if they do not conform to the positions described by the “Oedipus complex.” This Greek story suggested that both male and female children regard their father as an opponent and competitor for the exclusive love of their mother. The female child supposedly experiences “lack,” which can only be resolved through the displacement of desire from mother to father. Some feminist geographers interested in the ways in which bodies become sexed/gendered have adopted this psychoanalytic work. In particular, the idea of the oedipal phase has been taken up to rethink the formation of patriarchal culture, spaces, and sexed bodies. Some psychoanalytic thought offers theories of how people’s subjectivitiesdsuch as mother, father, daughter, and sondare formed. Psychoanalytic approaches are useful to understand how certain subjectivities and identitiesdwomen, children, ethnic minorities, gay men, and lesbiansdmay be both socially and spatially marginalized. Ideas from object relations psychoanalytic theory have been used by geographers to help understand how some groups of people are feared or loathed and how this attitude to cultural difference is then played out in space, with particular attention to how groups have been subject to spatial segregation and regulation. Cultural and social values in Western societies construct particular groups as abjectd“dirty” or “polluting.” People may respond to these “abject Others” with hatred and attempt to create social and spatial boundaries to exclude or expel them. This approach is useful to understand how exclusionary landscapes are developed in different times and places. Another approach is to conceptualize the body as a site of cultural consumption and inscription upon which social meaning is inscribed. The body becomes significant mainly in terms of the social systems or discourses that construct it and make it intelligible. The philosopher Michel Foucault noted there are a myriad of techniques through which bodies are subjugated, disciplined, and populations controlled. In relation to sexuality, disciplinary techniques include laws concerning the policing of particular sexual practices so that same sex practices are repressed or censored. Ideas of morality, social laws, and values are inscribed on the surfaces

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of bodies. Bodies are “disciplined” so that certain sexual practices are deemed pleasurable (and acceptable), while others are deemed unacceptable and in need of reform. This approach shows that bodies are historical constructs that have been disciplined, regulated, and controlled. The individual body is the effect of an endless circulation of power and knowledge, and using this approach, it is possible to understand how whole populations are controlled. Many geographers have used this approach to understand bodies and spaces in, for example, the asylum, the workplace, the prison, and the state. Within this far-reaching “body as a site of cultural construction” approach, some geographers have emphasized the active and transformative role the body plays in relation to the capitalist processes that produce it. Focusing on the connections between appearance, aesthetics and capital show how the body is tied into hegemonic social identities. The body, it has been shown, can be conceptualized as an accumulation strategy, being used by people to acquire money and status. The relationship between social status and modes of dressing is complex and geographers have researched, to name just a few, merchant bankers who “power dress” in the City of London, young Muslim women who prefer to wear “Asian” clothing but conform to Western clothing in UK secondary schools, as well as body projects such as plastic surgery, body building, tattooing, and piercing. Feminist geographers taking this constructionist approach to embodiment are able to trace the history of the way genders and sexualities have been discursively produced. It is possible to identify how heterosexual relations have been produced as the norm and other forms of sexuality have been classified as Other or deviant. As such, constructionist feminists argue that bodies are produced by discourses and that essentializing discoursesdreferences to biology and physicalitydtend to naturalize that which is social difference. A constructionist approach opens up opportunities for geographers to consider how place is written on the body and vice versa. A focus on the body as discourse may ignore the materiality of embodiment and it is not necessarily useful, or indeed possible, to conceptualize constructionist and essentialist approaches as distinct and separate. These opposing positions, it has been argued, are inseparable. The physical reality of material biology (a sexed body) is often considered by constructionists as irrelevant to women and men’s gendered positions in particular places. The distinction between sex (biological differences between men and women) and gender (masculine and feminine) does not hold and is a product of historically specific Western dualistic thought which laid the foundations for the development of modern science. Philosophers have examined this dualism, plus others, such as mind–body, culture–nature, reason–passion, white–black, and positive–negative.

Fleshy Geographies The growing scholarship in fleshy or corporeal geography is evident in the vast range of studies and approaches to understanding the body. One of the most popular approaches, for geographers and other social scientists, continues to be the cultural inscription approach, which draws on poststructuralist theories to understand the body as a surface to be etched by cultural and social systems. While our bodies make a difference to the experience of places, we might also think of bodies and spaces as mutually constituted. Instead of thinking about space and place as preexisting sites in which bodily performances occur, some studies argue that bodily performances themselves constitute or reproduce space and place. Geographers have looked at the way in which bodies are gendered, sexualized, racialized, aged, and so on by, for example, work places, schools, leisure spaces, homes, suburbs, cities, and nations. Hence the mutually constitutive relationship between bodies and places can be examined at a variety of scales, from the space of the body itself, to intimate geographies such as the bathroom, bedroom, changing room, and other home spaces. Some geographers argue that bodies and spaces are performative, that is, they have no ontological status or fixed characteristics. In this way, space is not just a backdrop for bodies, rather, it plays an important role in constituting and reproducing social relations. Bodies and spaces are simultaneously material, imaginary, symbolic, and real. Understanding bodies and spaces as performative offers geographers new ways of thinking about power relations. One such way is to think in terms of space as paradoxical. Thinking of space and bodies in this way means working with the idea of simultaneously occupying center and margin (masculine and feminine, heterosexual and homosexual, young and old, and so on). Bodies cannot be understood as just man or just woman, but rather as sexed bodies that are contingent upon time and place. The commonly held belief that we all have to fit into the model of one sex or another has been contested as there are many bodies that do not fit the two sex model. For example, some bodies are born with a variety of conditions that do not fit typical definitions of “female” or “male” (and maybe known as “Intersex”). Genderqueer, gender variant, transgender, people with XXY chromosomes, and even some bodybuilders may define narrow understandings of binary gender. These corporeal geographies may queer, and make paradoxical, a variety of places from the home to the globe. Performative bodies and spaces are central to the newly emerging “emotional and affectual geographies.” Important studies in emotional geographies have argued that people and places are imaged, felt, and experienced in ways that are radically entwined with each other. Feelings of shame, pride, guilt, and pleasure that are bound up in exercise, dietary, and cosmetic regimes reveal that bodies are emotionalized sites and hence an important focus for geographers. These lived and visceral experiences are entwined in multiple power relations realized in space and place. Human geographers are increasingly interrogating bodies (their own and others) as multiple, fluid, fractured, and constituted in particular places. The research turn to fleshy bodies and places has, in a small way, created some cracks in geography’s hegemonic masculinity. Despite the turn to bodies from the mid-1990s, many power relations (cissexism, heteronormativity, patriarchal, heterosexist, transphobia, racism, ableism, neoliberalism) that structure everyday lives in homes, supermarkets, suburbs, cities, universities, and

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geography departments remain. Power, of course, circulates in and around space, place, and bodies and cannot simply be “cast off.” The process of researching and writing about bodies has produced new insights into power and place, yet it has not necessarily destabilized binary categories such as sex–gender, man–woman, mind–body, and rational–irrational. The body has been embraced unevenly in the human geography. Social, cultural, feminist, and queer geographers are leaders in this field. The fleshy body is now at the center of research based on, for example, climate change, disasters, and energy consumption. A focus on the body has provided excellent and in-depth insights into the (gendered, sexed, raced, classed, aged, etc.) lives of people in a variety of spaces, places, and times. There has been a political shift so that it is now possible, in a way that it was not two decades ago, to consider fluid subjectivities, feelings, emotion, affect, and nonrepresentational geographies. Research on embodiment has become acceptable (for some). Starting with the body in geography carries a sense of authority in many subdiscipline areas of human geography, namely social, cultural, psychoanalytic, antiracist, queer, and feminist geographies. Yet, the everydayness of advertising and popular culture, however, illustrates that language used to describe actual fleshy, material, and messy bits of bodies, especially women’s, impaired, and “old” bodies, remains unacceptable. Geographers write about and discuss emotion and affect, performativity, the unconscious, and so on, but not menstrual blood, incontinence, and other bodily fluids that are “unsexy” yet part of everyday spaces and places. In some senses then, “real” fleshy bodies still represent that which is too banal, too material, too feminized, too mysterious, too Other for geography. In summary, the body remains geography’s Other and the weighty materiality of bodiesdparticularly as conceptualized in and of biologydhas yet to be fully explored. The taken-for-granted notion that biology stands outside culture is one of the primary reasons why geographers have neglected the body as an object of study and despite this recent surge of interest in bodies, the “leaky,” “messy” zones of bodies and their resulting spatial relations remain largely unexamined in the discipline. Including the body in geography has, however, provided excellent and in-depth insights into the (gendered and queered) lives of people in a variety of spaces, places, and times and has helped shift the political ground so that it is now possible, in a way that it was not in the early 1990s, to consider fluid subjectivities, feelings, emotion, affect, and nonrepresentational geographies.

See Also: Disability; Feminism and Work; Feminism/Feminist Geography; Feminist Methodologies; Gay Geographies; Identity Politics; Intimate Geographies; Lesbian Geographies; Masculinism; Masculinities; Nature and Gender; Other/Otherness; Patriarchy; Performativity; Postmodern City; Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies; Radical Geography; Social Geography.

Further Reading Bell, D., Valentine, G., 1995. Mapping Desire: Geographies of Sexualities. Routledge, London and New York. Butler, R., Parr, H. (Eds.), 2005. Mind and Body Spaces: Geographies of Illness, Impairment and Disability. Routledge, London. Davidson, J., Bondi, L., Smith, M. (Eds.), 2005. Emotional Geographies. Ashgate, Aldershot. Grosz, E., 1992. Bodies-cities. In: Beatriz, C. (Ed.), Sexuality and Space. Princeton Architectural Press, New York, pp. 241–253. Hall, E. (Ed.), 2010. Towards Enabling Geographies: ‘disabled’ Bodies and Minds in Society and Space. Routledge, London. Johnston, L., 2019. Transforming Gender, Sex and Place: Gender Variant Geographies. Routledge, London. Johnston, L., Longhurst, R., 2010. Space, Place and Sex: Geographies of Sexualities. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland. Longhurst, R., 2001. Bodies: Exploring Fluid Boundaries. Routledge, London and New York. Longhurst, R., 2017. Skype: Bodies, Screens, Spaces. Routledge, London and New York. Longhurst, R., Johnston, L., 2014. Bodies, gender, place and culture: 21 years on. Gend. Place Cult. 21 (3), 267–278. Longhurst, R., Ho, E., Johnston, L., 2008. Using the body as an instrument of research: kimch’i and pavlova. Area 40 (2), 208–217. McDowell, L., 2009. Working Bodies: Interactive Service Employment and Workplace Identities. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester. Nast, H., Pile, S. (Eds.), 1998. Places through the Body. Routledge, London and New York. Probyn, E., 2005. Blush: Faces of Shame. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Rich, A., 1986. Blood, Bread and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979–1985. Norton and Co., London. Rose, G., 1993. Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge. Polity, Cambridge. Young, I.M., 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

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Borderland Economies Markku Tykkyla¨inen, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Brexit British exit refers to the United Kingdom’s decision according to the referendum in 2016 to leave the European Union. Counterterrorism Measures Such measures comprise actions to prevent terrorism by legislation, regulation, control and the military and intelligence services. Devolutionary Process The process whereby regions in a state gain political power and growing autonomy at the expense of the central government. Ethnonationalism A movement among an ethnic group who consider themselves a distinct nation with a right to autonomy or independence in their own territory. Gateway A borderland or set of borderlands which occupy an important position in trade and transport and the smoothing of institutional differences between larger economic areas. Institutions Formal institutions are constitutions, rules, laws, property rights, and organizations, and informal or tacit institutions are individual habits, customs, codes of conduct, group routines, and social norms, values, sanctions, taboos, and traditions. Macroregions Category 2 of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS2) constitutes the second largest areal units in the EU. Maquiladora Manufacturing industries located on the Mexican side of the US–Mexican border which utilize the low-cost labor and premises available there and export their production to US markets. R&D Inputs Research and development inputs constitute labor and funding spent by companies and the public sector on developing new products and production processes to improve the competitiveness of industry. Shatterbelt A strategically located region consisting of borderlands and states that is under the jurisdiction of a number of conflicting states and groups and is caught between the interests of powers and power coalitions. Total output It depicts the value of commodities produced in a country or region and is measured by Gross Domestic Product and Gross Regional Product.

Although borders are actually social constructs among people, social processes are reflected in the geographical space through the formation of nation-states and regions. Thus, the world is divided into the layers of regions representing different spatial levels. The geographical system of regions consists of various sociospatial constructs, such as the geographical mosaic that has resulted from administrative and economic decisions. In spite of the talk of a borderless world, various types of geographical divisions exist based on administration, institutions, ethnicity, economic performance, and welfare, and borderlands are inbetween manifestations of these divisions. Typically, borderlands are located in the fringe of nation-states and regions (Fig. 1). This is the geographical division which is represented in everything from school atlases to government policy documents. The division is far from firm and stable, however. Continuous border-forming processes produced by social processes are reshaping the regional systems, and the media suggest that areas of conflict and turmoil are liable to emerge rapidly, although many borderlands are the results of longer, historical processes based on economic performance, ethnic composition, and the evolution and decline of political, economic, and social organs. Borderlands are areas on both sides of the edges of territories created by powers, social forces, and economic activities. Traditionally, borders show the territorial dimension of state power. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is regarded as a landmark of the beginning of the existence of the modern state. Since then the principal actors in internal relations and in setting up legislation and the terms of trade have been sovereign states. The world was divided into states and power has been exercised within their borders. Only a few people would call state formation into question, because it is related to our security and patriotism, but there are some who speak of a global or cosmopolitan world, and some stress the importance of regions as the basic units of spatial organization. But, in principle, borderlands are commonly considered in a national context. When emphasizing economic and social interaction, the thesis of the end of the nation-state has hardly found widespread acceptance in the minds of citizens in this era of the information society and globalization. Although border shave become more related to access to communication systems and economic performance in the advanced parts of the world old borders and ethnocentric groupings have not vanished but grown again in the 2010s. As researchers have shown, there are inclusions and exclusions in virtual worlds which are coming more and more to determine individuals’ social status. People have uneven opportunities and resources for entering this cyber world which is not measured in geographical coordinates. Hence, theoretically and increasingly in practice,

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Social processes

Spatial manifestations of social processes and interaction with geographical attributes Regions Border formation

Nation-states Figure 1

Formation of regions and borders.

borderlands can manifest themselves on various spatial scales and in various spaces. In our vocabulary, however, the term “borderland” still usually refers to areas on the fringe of a national territory. States and federations have interests in developing and controlling borderland economies. In ancient times colonization was a common development policy in borderlands, and later many infrastructural and regional policy measures were carried out according to the interests of a state in border issues. The European Union (EU) has large programs for abolishing tension in its borderlands and creating safer borders. On the one hand, it aims to increase cooperation between the borderlands of the EU and the adjacent countries, while on the other hand, it is increasing its control over the borders to prevent illegal interaction. A great difference in wealth and opportunities between the two sides of a border can easily lead to increasing control measures, as has been happening in many places in Africa, on the US–Mexican border, and on the outer border of the EU. Frontex, the EU agency, was created to coordinate operational cooperation in the matters of border security, and another task is to follow developments in research relevant to the control and surveillance of external borders. Frontex strengthens the border control capabilities of the border guard institutions of the member states by informing them of modern technologies and products that are available. The agency also provides information on the tools needed for controlling the outer borders of the EU in an attempt to prevent illegal migration and trade and trafficking of human beings. Similar measures have been set up in the United States. The United States had instituted programs to protect borders and the focus has been especially in the US–Mexican border which is the busiest border in the world. The programs since the 1990s included high-tech detection equipment and higher and stronger fences along the border. The number of illegal border crossings has declined and the number of apprehensions in the border has declined long and significantly since the peak year of 2000. A high-security border wall along US–Mexican border has been proposed to control immigration better and prevent drug trafficking.

Hindrances and Volatility of Borderland Economies A geospatial space that is divided into states and regions is based very much on the institutional properties of each region. Borders are concrete manifestations of the division of this space into territorial entities with separate institutional settings. From the viewpoint of economic geography, there are lots of arguments which see the constitution of national borders with an import tariffs and restrictions as a hindrance to development. Economies of scale cannot materialize to the extent that they could in a borderless situation, the transactions themselves are more costly across the border, and production factors are less mobile than in a borderless situation. Protectionism due to sheltered trade causes a less efficient global production system. Growing global tension, leading to counterterrorism measures and conflicts, is also increasing the costs of economic cross-border interaction. Hence a border that is sensitive to political tensions is an economic hindrance. A border constitutes a cultural transition zone or barrier. The separating factor can be language, religion, culture, or ethnicity. Ethnonationalism combined with economic interests can be a fundamental force promoting state formation, and hence the emergence of borderlands. Discussion has evolved around the formation of the world’s regions based on cultural and economic differences and the potential clash of civilizations in the long term. The tension between the West and the Islamic world, for instance, manifests itself geographically in a division of the world into macrostructures and their substructures based on religion and ethnicity. This has been criticized as being too rough a division, however, which does not take into account the diversity of opinion and the geography of the diversity of ethnicity and religion. However, these religion-based and ethnic conflicts have been prevalent in the early 21st Century. Many borderlands are arenas for conflicts and continuous tension. Lebanon is an example of an advanced country which has suffered greatly due to its borderland status between Israel and the powerful Arab countries and groups since the 1940s. Strategic positions and natural resources in particular can make borderlands unstable, as is the casein Syria, the short-lived Islamic State, Kurd areas, Iraq, Congo, and the Cabinda exclave of Angola (Fig. 2). The roots of Cabindan separatism originate from the 19th Century when this area was known as Portuguese Congo. Cabinda is surrounded by the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo and had a semi-independent status until 1956 when it became a part of the colony of Angola. Oil production has been the

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most important resource and source of revenues for decades, but the province has remained relatively poor in spite of its oil production as tax revenues have benefitted the whole Angola. The crisis dampened during the 2010s, but hardly disappeared due to Cabinda’s oil reserves and cultural and ethnic differences from the rest of Angola. Such high-tension lands are problematic from the viewpoint of economic stability and development and their economies are encumbered with high-security costs and the threat of violence. Resources are also often used for devolutionary processes, and proximity to major conflicts outside can lead to instability and chaos. For instance, wars, crises and conflicts in the Middle East have claimed more a half million casualties in the first two decades of the 21st Century. It is obvious that there are strong national interests involved in mastering borderland economies in parallel with political interests. The border formation process reflects the reorganization of society in a concrete way, and the economy of the borderland changes along with it. The setting up of a border usually creates gradual economic decline in a region. An example of this would be Eastern Finland, which has had a stagnant economy for a century since the establishment of the state border which separated the region from the market influence of St. Petersburg in Russia (Fig. 3). The region faced economic opportunities in the 1990s when Russia liberal policy enabled cross-border trade and setting up joint ventures. This period remained short and cross-border trade suffered and roundwood trade declined in the late 2000s. Finnish forest mills forced to restructure their production due to Russian export tariffs for roundwood and Russia lost revenues from roundwood exports. Periods of growth and prosperity may alternate with periods of restructuring and decline according to a border situation. Corresponding areas affected by border can be found in many parts of the world. Post-World War II Europe was full of new borderlands, which were developing relatively slowly. One of the achievements of European integration is that it has succeeded in abolishing borders and has hence been able to create larger and more efficient markets in Europe; however, as Brexit indicates, a borderless market has perceived not only positive as larger integration has brought about side effects which have led to the resistance of economic integration and free flow of labor. Nowadays border establishment and state formation processes are taking place in the areas adjacent to Russia, leading to fragmented markets. Many countries would like to be less dependent on Russia, but this can easily lead to the cutting off of economic ties, which creates economic problems. One example of this is the energy crises that

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have emerged in the new independent states adjacent to Russia. The Ukrainian crisis since 2013 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 show how difficult it is to solve borderland issues when there are numerous conflicting economic, political, and historical interests to be solved. The borderlands of power blocks are susceptible to tension and conflicts and thus becoming a shatterbelt as has happened also in the Middle East and many areas in Central Asia and Africa. Although the border formation process brings about many regressive results when measured in economic terms, the outcome is not so straightforward. It is also dependent on the scale and viewpoint adopted. The separation of Estonia from the Soviet Union, for instance, is an example of the successful re-formation of a borderland economy. Estonia has transformed itself from a former Soviet agrarian borderland into a modern European industrial state within less than 20 years. Key factors in the transformation were the opportunities created by the division of labor with advanced economies and integration into the EU, cultural ties with market economies, and the willingness to undertake the radical transformations of the institutional settings of the economy. This reform also led to a new border formation process, however. The Estonian borderland adjacent to Russia had to cope with restructuring problems in industry and has ethnic problems related to its Russian population. The status of a borderland is very much dependent on political decisions and the development of a borderland is steered by changing institutional settings and developing economic conditions. Borderland economies are in the last resort the results of the work of social actors: people and companies.

Economic Dynamics of Borderlands The situation of a borderland is usually peripheral and marginal from the economic viewpoint, which easily brings about welfare problems. A borderland is located far away from the core of the country and its economic base may be underdeveloped and onesided whereas expanding industries grow in multifaceted and R&D intensive economic environments. Many borderland economies

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can be classified into the category of peripheral, stagnant economies. Peripherality may lead to the economic marginalization of an area, or if it has a strategic meaning, the welfare of the region will be strongly supported by the presence of state institutions. The Kola Peninsula is a good example of an area which is too important to remain an underdeveloped borderland due to its strategic location from transport and military view points. One may call such areas sheltered borderland economies, as they are subsidized by the state, which indicates their importance to the state. Fewer areas can utilize their border status to increase welfare to any substantial extent. A more positive welfare effect takes place when the borderland is adjacent to a much wealthier country and economic interaction is possible. Economic impacts are often the results of price differentials in goods and services, which attract customers, and these impacts are substantial when cross-border investments are possible. The growth of manufacturing brought about by the lower cost level of the less-developed country increases the total output of the border area. The maquiladora industry close to the US–Mexican border, for instance, has led to higher and more even incomes in the Border States than in the rest of Mexico. The Mexican maquiladora industry had its heydays in the late 2000s and since then this low-cost industry has expanded in low wage regions in Asia. Industry of this kind has also been one of the starting points for the growth of many borderlands in Asia, such as Guangdong in China and Johor bordering Singapore. Guangdong was a neglected inshore province long, but started to grow fast due to special economic zone policy since the early 1990s and is now one of the most prosperous provinces. These upwardtransitional borderland economies are merely exceptions, however, and are closely dependent on the more developed region on the other side of the border and on the level of trade regulation. Such borderland location has brought some advantages due to economic spillovers. Borderlands like Johor in Malaysia, the Riau Islands in Indonesia, and Guangdong in China are prosperous now although far away from the national centers, and they possess advanced industrial structures and higher incomes. These areas are adjacent to even more advanced areas, however, such as Johor, Singapore and Guangdong enclosing the former British colony of Hong Kong. In such cases the economy of a borderland develops so that the less-advanced border area acquires more mature economic activities such as manufacturing and assembly work from the more advanced area. Industrialization takes place when companies relocate activities to the other side of the border in order to take advantage of lower land rents and labor costs. These relocations have proven to be highly changeable, however, and as new situations develop the advantages do not always remain the same. Moreover, in more industrialized areas there is usually a certain daily crossing of labor over the border. This has been the case on the Singapore–Malaysia border and the Polish–German border, for instance. Crossing the border for trading and maintaining social relations is common under various conditions all over the world, but great adaptability is needed on the part of the local population in borderlands affected by tensions and potential conflicts, due to control and regulations. A borderland can be the area occupied by a national minority, or else there may be various ethnic and linguistic groups along the border. These ethnic issues in parallel with anterior geopolitics are often highly visible in former colonies, where borders may have been drawn for strategic reasons, dividing ethnic groups almost randomly from country to country. One example of this is Namibia. This sparsely populated country comprises 28 living languages and several ethnic groups, and includes the 450 km long Caprivi Strip that penetrates from the northeastern inland corner of the country into the middle of Southern Africa in order to guarantee connections to Southeast Africa (Fig. 4). Caprivi itself is a borderland and it creates borderlands on both sides of it. The population is a mix of tribes having relatives over the borders. Caprivi is sparsely populated, living mainly on subsistence farming and tourism and afflicted by trafficking, smuggling, and health problems related to this gateway location. Resource-based production is usually over-represented in peripheral settings, due to a legacy of concentration on the utilization of natural resources and promotion of the diffusion of settlement. In many cases the borderlands have been target areas for active colonization for strategic reasons. Siberia was colonized in order to mobilize all possible resources and to represent Russian, and later Soviet, power in the area. In the Nordic countries, Sweden colonized its vast northern and eastern borderlands, such as Eastern Finland, efficiently from the 17th Century onward to make all its corners inhabited and defendable. The same marking is taking place today. The Caprivi Strip in Namibia was efficiently linked to the main part of the country by the construction of a highway in the 1990s suitable also for an airstrip. The highway is in fact oversized relative to the traffic on it but is an excellent example of an infrastructure intended to show outsiders the readiness of the state to keep the borderland as part of its territory. The political and economic legacy of the past is still visible or even reproduced in the structure of society in many borderlands.

Impacts of protectionism and liberalization of trade As many examples show, the impacts of closing a borderlead in most circumstances to a shrinking of the geographical position. Various institutional settings, tariffs, and regulations lead to a situation in which there are less opportunities to use economies of scale and the division of labor. Thus, economies become more closed, companies are smaller, and there is less competition. The border becomes a line splitting the market area. Hence, integration has been seen in many parts of the world as a panacea for improving the competitiveness of interregional systems. The European Union is a good example of attempts to improve competitiveness by the formation of larger market areas. The aim of many trade organizations is to abolish trade barriers and protectionist economic regulation. The liberalization of trade and the movement of production factors lead to larger market areas with increasing use of economies of scale creating opportunities for industries to specialize and expand. But fierce competition leads to closures, mergers and increasing efficiency, and this may lead to a shift of industries to areas over the border, where it is possible to make use of low-cost labor and infrastructure. This means, however, that former borderlands become parts of larger economic markets, and the net effect of the opening up a border is thus positive.

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The enlargement of the European Union since 2004 brought about considerable restructuring in a large number of former EastCentral European borderlands and liberalized trade across borders. The Baltic States and the macroregions of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Croatia underwent significant structural adjustments to cope with increased competition and they succeeded in developing well. The total outputs have grown in all those countries and their macroregions more than on average in Europe in the first 15 years of the 21st Century. Some European internal borderlands have had high development potential due to their favorable locational position combined with low initial economic performance, but the spatial pattern is rather sporadic. The findings indicate that integration in Europe is still associated with significant differences between borderlands, and that intensified integration may lead to both booms and busts with respect to border economies. The serious heterogeneity in development processes is a reminder of the importance of initial conditions and geography in shaping economic outcomes, and an indication of the limited ability of both market forces and policy measures to promote spatial cohesion. The impact of integration on borderland economies is mostly dependent on the results of market dynamics areal competitiveness. The enlargement of the EU will for several decades constitute an interesting laboratory for examining the impacts of the opening up of borderland economies and creating integrated borderland economies in Europe.

Economic Projects for Boosting Borderland Economies Prosperous economic development in a borderland is very much dependent on the stability of the institutional settings and the trustworthiness of the environment. The division of the world into various types of geopolitical regions, such as shatterbelts and gateways, shows the strong dependency of borderlands on international politics and military strategies. Shatterbelts are not areas where economic growth takes place easily, in spite of international agreements, peacekeeping, and aid and support programs. In the worst cases many supranational organizations have had to help borderlands to cope with violent crises. This stabilizing task is linked to the policies and duties of the United Nations and other supranational organizations. The aid packages intended to reconstruct borderlands that have suffered due to wars are examples of the programs needed. There is often an intense military presence in borderlands, and power struggles can provoke instability in institutional development and hence lead to poorer economic development.

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Due to the devastating world wars, Europe has a long postwar legacy of cross-border cooperation to prevent tensions. In the European context, a Euroregion is a form of transnational cooperation between two or more territories located indifferent countries. The great majority of these lie within the current borders of the EU and the rest with Switzerland, Norway, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and some Balkan countries. Euroregions are limited to the competencies of the local and regional authorities which constitute them, and they are usually arranged in order to promote common interests across the border and cooperate for the common good of the border populations. There are more than 60 Euroregions in Europe, and the history of this cooperation goes back to 1958, when the first of these was set up, constituting a borderland between Germany and the Netherlands. Euroregions are independent organs related to the EU, but many projects in these regions are supported by the Union. To achieve more balanced spatial development in the EU, cohesion and convergence are required, which puts emphasis on the development of borderlands to create greater stability and integration. Various programs and funding instruments have been in effect within its inner and outer borderlands. Economic revitalization has played a central role in the measures in order to enhance economic competitiveness and sustainable development in borderlands. Europe still has much higher differences in GDP per capita by states and borderlands than the United States.

Advantages of Interaction Interaction across borders has created high expectations for the utilization of border locations, in the sense that factors such as cultural connections, labor, and social relations could be used for promoting economic activities. Economic actors become embedded in borderland in the sense that they absorb and are constrained by the economic activities, cultures, and social dynamics that are embedded in those places. But what are the advantages of borderlands in this setting? One concrete example is the way in which global and national firms may take advantage of benefits provided by a state or programs for enterprises and local actors intended to establish subcontracting, subsidiary, or R&D operations in a borderland. Moreover, the location or anchoring down of new firms in border locations may generate a new local or regional network of economic and social relations across the border, involving existing firms as well as attracting new ones. This is what happens in cases when there is a bundle of other factors which make economic activities profitable. A strong combination of competitive factors helps to consolidate the transborder embeddedness of industry, which in turn may closely be linked to interaction between particular regional cultures. The hybrid culture of a borderland can prove to be a competitive advantage fora company. Mexicali is an example of a city which has benefited from its hybrid culture. It is the capital of the state of Baja California, Mexico, and situated on the border of the US state of California (Fig. 5). 110° W

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Many residents of Mexicali come from diverse European, Asian, African, and Arab backgrounds. Chinese have moved to the city over a long period of time. The city attracts multinational companies to utilize qualified labor, infrastructure, its favorable business environment, and its location on the border. Thought maquiladora industries are prevalent, the industrial basis is modern. As one example, Mexicali is the national center for the aerospace industry in Mexico. Social interaction is diverse due to the border location and hybrid culture, and assets are often related to culture and languages, which promote business. In this age of the globalizing economy, it seems that many people would wish to do away with a less-competitive provincial cultural factor, in that companies would prefer to combine yielding cultural assets and space out production within their global networks. If institutional settings diverge greatly and cultural ties are more or less imagined, the result of this consolidation of joint ventures remains poor. Hence there are insurmountable hindrances which make the utilization of the endowment of difference in the composition and price of production factors less attractive. Adaptation to a cumbersome situation and the setting up of economic cooperation takes time and is restricted by supraregional institutional constraints such as differences in laws, rules, and economic regulation.

Different Roles of Borderlands in the Global Division of Labor Borderland economies are heterogeneous, which means that the spatial scales, institutional settings, and local conditions of production must be taken into account in assessing their development potential. Their development problems are multicausal and place-bound. Local and transborder markets are sufficient niches for production for a shopkeeper or small entrepreneur, but for companies which produce high volumes of consumer products global networking with suppliers and customers is important. Global connections are important for companies which make abundant use of R&D inputs and are innovative, but such an advanced hightech environment is missing from most borderlands. Many of the borderlands are most competitive as natural resources extracting and processing peripheries and that role in the global division of labor is by no means unimportant. Both local and translocal relations and the actors involved are crucial for the development and economic performance of borderlands. Participation in the global division of labor requires high productivity in any industry to produce wealthy borderlands. Hence, links to research and development and innovation systems created by the state and private actors are just as important for borderland economies as for any other area. Economic development in borderlands is hence a process of global-local economic network building which is comprised creating and maintaining relationships of trust on various interrelated geographical scales.

Seealso: Borderlands; Embeddedness; Export Processing Zone; Industrialization; Institutionalism/Institutional Geographies; Local Economic Development; Local Economic Development, Politics of; Networks; Region; Regional Production Networks; Resource Industries; Territory and Territoriality.

Further Reading Alder, S., Shao, L., Zilibotti, F., 2016. Economic reforms and industrial policy in a panel of Chinese cities. J. Econ. Growth (21), 305–349. Benita, F., Urzúa, C.M., 2018. Efficient creativity in Mexican metropolitan areas. Econ. Modell. 71 (1), 25–33. Chan, Y.W., Womack, B. (Eds.), 2019. Borderlands in East and Southeast Asia: Emergent Conditions, Relations and Prototypes. Routledge. Cirera, X., Lakshman, R.W.D., 2017. The impact of export processing zones on employment, wages and labour conditions in developing countries: systematic review. J. Dev. Eff. 9 (3), 344–360. Cohen, S.B., 2005. The Eurasian convergence zone: gatewayor shatterbelt? Eurasian Geogr. Econ. 46 (1), 1–22. Csernatoni, R., 2018. Constructing the EU’s high-tech borders: FRONTEX and dual-use drones for border management. Eur. Secur. 27 (2), 175–200. Gokmen, G., 2017. Clash ofcivilizations and the impact of cultural diff erences on trade. J. Dev. Econ. 127, 449–458. Harris, T., 2013. Trading places: new economic geographies across Himalayan borderlands. Political Geogr. 35, 60–68. Ho, K.C., So, A., 1997. Semi-periphery and borderlandintegration: Singapore and Hong Kong experiences. Political Geogr. 16 (3), 241–259. Jackson, S., 2006. Borderlands and the transformation of war economies: lessons from the DR congo. Conflict Secur. Dev. 6 (3), 425–447. Lee, C., 2018. Oil and terrorism: uncovering the mechanisms. J. Confl. Resolut. 62 (5), 908–928. Lv, K., Yu, A., Gong, S., Wu, M., Xu, X., 2017. Impacts of educational factors on economic growth in regions of China: a spatial econometric approach. Technol. Econ. Dev. Econ. 23 (6), 827–847. Nshimbi, C.C., Moyo, I., Oloruntoba, S.O., 2018. Borders, informal cross-border economies and regional integration in Africa-an introduction. Afr. Insight 48 (1), 3–11. Tykkyläinen, M., 1998. A multicausal theory of local economic development. In: Neil, C., Tykkyläinen, M. (Eds.), Local Economic Development. A Geographical Comparison of Rural Community Restructuring. United Nations University Press, Tokyo, pp. 347–355. Tykkyläinen, M., Lehtonen, O., 2008. Russian roundwood exports: the effects of tariffs on the Finnish border economy. Eurasian Geogr. Econ. 49 (6), 731–754. Tykkyläinen, M., Vatanen, E., Halonen, M., Kotilainen, J., 2016. Global-local links and industrial restructuring in a resource town in Finland. The case of Lieksa. In: Halseth, G. (Ed.), Transformation of Resource Town and Peripheries. Routledge, London and New York, pp. 85–111.

Relevant Websites https://frontex.europa.eu/. European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperationat the External Borders (FRONTEX). http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/. European Commission’s Regional Policy. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background. NUTS areas – Administrative divisions of the EU countries. http://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions/. OECD databases. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats. U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Borderlands Doris Wastl-Walter, Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Borderlands They are physical locations or discursive spaces along historically developed political and material borders, where differences are constructed especially between nation-states, Cross-border cooperation (CBC) Aims to develop cross-border social and economic regions through common development strategies between adjacent regions within the European Union. EU European Union European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Is a foreign relations instrument, first outlined by the European Commission in 2003, revised in 2015, to tie the Countries in the East and South of the EU closer to the EU. Frontier Is a fraction of space that refers either to the political division between two countries or to a part of a country that lies at the limit of the settled area. Interreg Is an initiative started by the European Community in 1989 that aims to stimulate interregional cooperation in the European Union. Iron Curtain Is a metaphor for the heavily fortified border between Western European states and Eastern European states during the Cold War Era. It separated not only borderlands and century-long neighboring populations but also opposing political and economic systems. NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement Permeability of borders Refers to the degree of their openness. International relations and treaties define this permeability. SAR Special Administrative Region An administrative division of the People’s Republic of China Administrative Regions. There are currently two, Hong Kong and Macao. Schengen City in Luxembourg where the much-publicized treaty abolishing systematic border controls between participating countries of the European Union was signed Territoriality Refers to the need of an individual, a social group, local economy, or state to claim authority over a segment of space. Territory Describes a socially constructed division of space that is controlled by some form of authority. A person, group, local economy, or state can occupy territories. Peace Parks Are binational or multinational Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) to re-establish, renew, and preserve large functional ecosystems, based on partnerships between governments and the private sector.

Borders exist in law as well as in the imagination. Borders are the results of agreements; they can function as barriers or bridges, and their function and meaning change over time; however, research has demonstrated that even a change in the legal definition or function of a border does not bring about an immediate change in people’s hearts and minds: In the collective memory of a population, the meanings of a border persist to such an extent that the population’s activities, especially interactions and perceptions of others, change very slowly. International relations also affect borders, whose function is both defined by international treaties and dependent on central government decisions. However, most central governments are not situated in the borderlands, which has a number of consequences. For example, most issues affecting people and their lives in borderlands such as cross-border relations, their local and regional economies, and borderland security aredeven in highly federalized statesda matter of foreign policy. Thus decisive matters are determined outside the borderland often without considering the residents’ specific situation and needs and so reducing that population’s influence. Borderland populations must adjust to (changing) geopolitics and border regimes and relations. These shifts impact inhabitants as they organize their spaces of (inter)action both on their own side of the border and across it. Most borderlands are considered peripheries within their states, characterized by geographical marginality, the limited presence of state institutions, large proportions of Indigenous populations or ethnic minorities, and a weak socioeconomic structure. Borderlands that are also economically and politically oriented toward their state centers, are referred to as having a back-to-back relation between the borderlands. In contrast, some borders that are open and easy to cross can function as bridges. Cross-border networks develop and complementarity characterize relations. In such cases, people on both sides of the border share a mutual interest in working togetherdbe it because of cultural ties or for economic reasondwhich is termed a face-to-face relation between borderlands. Worldwide, borderlands are usually symmetrical and therefore complementary. Between European Union member states the development stage of two neighboring states and borderlands is quite similar. In other cases, however, when the asymmetries of

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wealth and living standards are pronounced, the results are often tight security measures, particularly to control and regulate migration. This occurs, for example, when the North meets the South, along the US–Mexican border or around the Mediterranean, where Europe meets Africa. Nevertheless, even when borderlands differ with respect to competing economic or social standards, their standards tend to merge toward those of the more highly developed side, which means that the less developed borderland usually develops rapidly, causing an eventual increase in disparities within that nation.

The Permeability of Borders Permeability, the degree of openness of borders, is of crucial importance for people living in borderlands. The 20th Century saw each type of border regime: closed, semi-permeable, and permeable. In Europe, the Iron Curtain, which symbolized the demarcation between the West and the East during the second half of the 20th Century, was experienced as an insurmountable barrier. Inhabitants on both sides of the border lived in siloed cul-de-sacs, which meant that no contact between them was possible, and the state hindered or tightly controlled movements and crossings, which were only possible at specific border posts. This type of demarcation still exists in other parts of the world. In Korea, for example, contacts between people from North and South Korea are still nearly impossible. At the state level, tentative meetings have recently restarted to overcome these barriers. It is unlikely, however, that national citizens will experience an opening of the tight border regime in the near future. In other border contexts, although borderlands have also become economically dynamic areas, control is strict and security tight, The US–Mexican border is a case in point because goods can easily be moved back and forth between the United States and Mexico under the NAFTA treaties. The Border Industrialization Program (BIP), initialized by the Mexican government in 1965, has shaped this border landscape and its cross-border relations: Industrial plants (maquilas) built on the Mexican side of the border guaranteed both lower-cost assembly than on the US side and jobs for thousands of people living in the less developed Mexican borderland. Today the well-developed Mexican borderland attracts migrant workers from the southern part of the country and Central America; however, the border regime specifically seeks to prevent the free movement of people from the South to the North, thereby ignoring cultural ties, social links, and economic dependence between the local populations, for example, in the twin cities Ambos Nogales in Arizona, USA, and Sonora, Mexico. Within Europe, discussions on borders as obstacles to the free movement of goods has dominated national discourses for decades. Moreover, the perspective that borders are barriers to mutual understanding between nations has resulted in the joint effort of several European states to foster what has become known as “European integration”. Even when border regimes are tight, efforts are made to facilitate cooperation or at least peaceful coexistence between neighboring communities. In the 1990s, the European Union started the so-called Structural Funds Interreg Programs to overcome barriers and differences in structures, to compensate for disadvantages pertaining to location and unequal development, and to design border regions that allow local populations in the borderlands to improve economically and to interact culturally and socially. In Africa and other contexts, where borders were introduced after the age of empire without taking account of local functional and traditional relations, borderlands became sites of conflict in the 20th and 21st Centurydeither due to governmental questioning of the border or state borders not coinciding with cultural boundaries. Although asymmetry between the two sides is sometimes economically determined, it is more often determined by political circumstances that motivate people to flee one side of the border to seek a life of security and peace on the other side (Fig. 1). Finally, ecological problems, which do not stop at national borders, very often challenge tight border regimes and borderlands. Borderlands thus face a double burden: A population may face ecological problems produced across the border and then not have access to the required financial and logistical resources to handle these problems effectively. There are examples where adjacent

Figure 1 South Korean wire entanglement and luminous advertising heading to North Korea on the southern limit of the demilitarized zone between the two Korean states.

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borderlands have agreed to cooperate in the case of ecological catastrophe, where adjustments to laws have been made at the national level to equalize ecological standards, or where borderlands have been guaranteed financial support in case of ecological emergency.

The Dependency of Borderlands on Binational Relations To consider this dependency in more depth, the province Vojvodina in Serbia provides an interesting example. Vojvodina was a constituent part of the Hungarian section of the Austrian–Hungarian Empire until 1918. It became part of the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (SHS), and later Yugoslavia after the end of World War I, making the Hungarian population a minority within the newly formed state. The population has always been multiethnic; today up to 29 different ethnic groups live there. Hungarians in the Vojvodina have historically kept their close ties to Hungary and they have been guaranteed distinct rights. Even in communist times, both central governments agreed to support the Hungarian minority: Hungarians in Yugoslavia had a special passport, only valid for the border district, which allowed them to keep in contact with their families. After 1989, residents could cross the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia without a visa, making Hungary a gateway to Europe also for ethnic Serbs and others. This situation dramatically changed in 2008 when Hungary joined the Schengen group because crossing the border was then only allowed with a Schengen visa. Only Hungarians living in the Vojvodina are able to cross based on a “national visa” valid for 90 days, which has been issued by Hungary since January 2006. Hungary has traditionally been very interested in supporting Hungarians in the neighboring countries, for example, by issuing a Hungarian passport to all ethnic Hungarians who do not live within the territory of Hungary. Since 2015, when thousands of refugees came to Europe, the nationalist government in Hungary has built an impressive border fence and technical obstacles to keep refugees out of Hungary. All in all, over time the permeability of the border has changed radically and it has become very selective for whom mobility is accepted. Binational relations, and increasingly international agreements, not only affect minorities and migrants living in borderlands but also and specifically the overall economic situation. Most borderlands are marginalized within their states and thus rely on, for instance, consumers from across the border or access to work and employment on the other side. In some contexts, this interdependency guarantees a minimum income and in others, even results in economic boom. Ambos Nogales, twin cities straddling the US– Mexican border, offer one example of economic interdependency. In the past several decades, the cities experienced several moments when changes in relations between the central governments of both states affected both borderlands in dramatic ways. One such moment was when the Mexican peso was devalued. Nogales, Arizona lost shoppers from the Mexican side, who constitute the majority of its shoppers. In other borderlands, particularly in Europe, for example, between Poland and Ukraine, the Netherlands and Germany, and in the three-border area Germany–France–Switzerland (Regio Basiliensis), the population depends on its neighboring borderland(s). Residents commute back and forth, working on one side and living on the other, and borderlands like the Regio Basiliensis have a well-developed and long tradition of interaction. All these areas, however, are affected by decisions made on the national or even supranational level and how relations between the nations develop. Recently, it has been the European Union that has strongly impacted the development of cross-border relations. Taking the case of the Polish–Ukrainian borderland, it benefited from the open border for only a short period. When Poland moved politically closer to and finally joined the European Union, the border regime tightened and local cross-border interaction again became restricted. In Europe, relations between states are more or less free of friction and international treaties and binational agreements that also consider the interests of borderlands regulate binational relations. There are, however, other contexts like the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa where problems and conflictsdincluding military disputesdbetween states are specifically anchored in borderlands. The most extreme consequence is the militarization of a borderland, through which its population faces restrictions in its everyday activities and experiences the border as a clear demarcation line. Kashmir Region is a case in point. The total population of the three parts controlled by India (Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh) amounts to slightly more than nine million people. About three million people live in the Pakistani parts (Azad-Kashmir and Northern Areas); the third part is Aksai Chin, occupied by China. When British-India became independent in 1947, Jammu and Kashmir, one of the princely states of India, had the option of joining either India or Pakistan. The majority of the population was Muslim; in the Valley of Kashmir, this proportion reached more than 95%. Military disputes were followed by the UN effort to mediate a truce that finally resulted in the partition of Jammu and Kashmir. The situation has not stabilized since; two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, meet at the checkpoint, which the Indian side wants to transform into a permanent international border. Kashmiris themselves argue that Pakistan and India are interested solely in the geopolitical role of Jammu and Kashmir, not in its population and development.

Borderlands as Normative Spaces Borderlands are territories that are subordinated to a certain national regime and are therefore subject to the norms of its specific political system. Hence along a border, two extremely different political systems may meet if subjected to extremely different political norms. This is best illustrated through the example mentioned above of North and South Korea. In many borderlands, political regimes deliberately or unwittingly exercise influence on the other side of the border. Along the US–Mexican border, norms and standards in addition to cultural values are transferred across the border. Companies in the Mexican borderland frequently orient themselves toward US corporate governance principles. In other contexts, cooperation between

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organizations is possible only if one partner adapts to the norms of the other. The European Union has an explicit European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which offers financial support for development to the countries in the east and south of the EU. These examples thus demonstrate that political systems have a major influence on borderlands and their populations. Such influence is persistent in the collective memory of borderland populations and in business interactions and can, in certain cases, even manifest itself in the landscape. Finally, values and norms are represented in borderlands through practices and a range of ways in which the material world is organized. One illustration is the militarization of the border and distinctive checkpoint procedures, as along the US–Mexican border. A second is the frequent location of so called “camps” for asylum seekers in borderlands. Another is the type of special agreement that allows police to cross the border when a crime has been committed. Generally, national power and norms are manifested at the border and in the borderlands through, for instance, checkpoints, signs with warnings, and the presence of an army.

Migration and Secuturization During the last years, the role of borders for security and managing migration and refugee flows has become more and more important. While the last years of the 20th Century had been characterized by an increasing globalization and an opening of borders for goods and people, the beginning of the 21st Century has shown a very selective policy regarding security, trade, and migration. Secuturization has become a dominating discourse and practice and more rigid border regimes have influenced the daily routines of people in the borderlands. In various places in the world peopledlike the Rohinga in Bangladesh or Syrians in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordandhave had to flee because of war and persecution and they have often settled in the neighboring borderlands. Thus, they have also completely change livelihoods in those borderlands for the local people, as they need shelter, food, and infrastructure. Often they seek jobs and some have built up informal service structures like schools or markets. When they get international aid, this can provoke conflicts with the local population as they live in poverty too. Many new people come to the borderlands: migrants, refugees, NGOs, humanitarian aid, smugglers, and vendors, but also state officials like (border) police, migration officers, and militarydagencies through which care and control are enacted in the borderland. This situation can take years, and for the local populations and the governments it is quite ambiguous and causes extraordinary challenges. In cases of large distance mobility, migrants and refugees are often stopped at the border they want to cross and thus they stay in the meantime in the borderland, waiting for a possibility to move forward. There sometimes they live in formal settlements, provided for by NGOs or the UNHCR; others construct informal and precarious settlements like that in Calais, France. Since 2016, at the Hungarian–Serbian border, they have had to stay and live in the “no-mans-land” between the two state borders of Hungary and Serbia in informal camps and a very restrictive asylum policy allows only a few persons per day to ask for asylum in Hungary and enter the EU. The governmental reaction to the growing mobility of people seeking asylum or migrating for a better live raises all over the world an expanding discourse on security as well as legal and material measures to secure the national borders. Borderlands are impacted by changing national regimes of security and control. Nationalist movements and parties push the issue of secuturization of the borders even further and further, thus cutting cooperation and integration of the borderlands.

Transfrontier Conservation Areas or Peace Parks Modern US border barrier with concrete columns in the San Diego section allows small animals to pass (Fig. 2). Human borders have cut across natural environments and living areas not only for people but also for animals, who then could not access and move in their former habitats. In many borderlands efforts have been made to revitalize and preserve large functional ecosystems that transcend borders and reconnect adjacent borderlands to protect natural and cultural heritage. In Southern Africa, the Peace Parks Foundation is particularly active to support the existing or planned 18 Transfrontier Conservation Areas transcending two or more national borders in order to preserve habitats particularly for endangered species like rhinos and elephants (Fig. 3).

Borderlands as Functional Spaces Borderlands are not always marginal or peripheral areas that are poorly developed with bleak economic perspectives. They can also be places that function dynamically, with a high density of shopping centers and industrial production facilities resulting in job opportunities for locals and migrants. Further, borderlands are frequently characterized by a high degree of interdependency among regions within their own countries and even more frequently with their neighboring borderlands. In China, the Special Administrative Regions (SARs) on the internal Chinese border between Mainland China and both Hong Kong and Macau again demonstrates how state policies determine the permeability of borders and the economic dynamics. The City of Shenzhen, which has today about 12.5 million registered inhabitants, was built up as a Special Economic Zone for high-tech industries with regard to the neighboring city of Hong Kong, and is considered by the UN as the fastest growing city of the world. Along the US–Mexican border, maquilasdusually situated on the Mexican sidedattract people from peripheral areas of Mexico. Such factories take advantage of, for example, low labor costs and lower environmental standards than in the United States.

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Modern US border barrier with concrete columns in the San Diego section, allowing small animals to pass.

Figure 3 Entrance to the binational Peace Park Kgalagadi, transcending the border between South Africa and Botswana, which is also accessible from Namibia. The border formalities both for South Africa and Botswana are done in this building and game and visitors can move freely across the border within the park.

This idea of relocating the assembly process or data processing from one side of the border to another is not unique to the US– Mexican context. The area around Bratislava, Slovakia, adjacent to Austria, has become an attractive partner for selected European car manufacturers. Even when Slovakia became a member of the European Union, it maintained its booming character. The Regio Basiliensis, referred to previously, is primarily a functional space based on a common interest to support the various border-crossing activities of company owners and employees. Today, the Regio Basiliensis constitutes a highly integrated space, particularly in functional terms, with even a trinational airport. Elsewhere as well, inhabitants live on one side of the border and work on the other, commuting back and forth as part of their daily routine in the borderland. Economic activity alone does not, however, produce a functional space. An exchange of know-how between local authorities, the joint use of technical and educational infrastructure, and common environmental efforts are also required. The borderlands around Lake Constance (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland) have agreed on common ecological standards to protect the lake from pollution, thus promoting the border region as a single integrated tourist region. In Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice on the German–Polish border, the University of Viadrina on the German side and the Collegium Polonicum on the Polish side were conceptualized as an integrated center for higher education. In other contexts, agreements have been signed to allow the fire brigade to cross the border in case of emergency and to give health center access to people from both borderlands. Agreements have also been signed for the joint use of technical infrastructure such as sewage plants, highway corridors, and special facilities for trucks.

Borderlands as Everyday Spaces Above, borderlands were discussed primarily as cross-border spaces because the (inter)dependency between both sides of the border is usually very high, which is also true in everyday life. In borderlands, distinct everyday (inter)action spaces can be observed. The population copes with its given realities, which are greatly determined by a number of factors: Binational relations, national border policies, the overall economic situation, cultural conditions, and personal experience. Everyday spaces in borderlands expand to become cross-border spaces if the border regimes are sufficiently open.

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Everyday spaces may also be understood as social, overlapping political and functional spaces. These spaces are continuously produced and reproduced in single actions and networks, and in carrying out projects, thus ignoring state borders. Social spaces are relational, i.e., they are produced and exist for as long as people interact with each other. They do not constitute clear demarcations or barriers inscribed in space, although political borders may be considered clear barriers. Social spaces mirror social and cultural links as well as economic dependencies. This point has best been portrayed in Ambos Nogales on the US–Mexican border, where people on both sides of the border are socially integrated. There, people have clearly constituted social spaces and experience living across “the line.” Even after 9/11, when border enforcement tightened, their understanding of interactions and their production of (social) spaces did not change dramatically. Also, along the Finnish–Swedish border, functional and everyday spaces are to some extent highly integrated. Residents create a single integrated borderland in the course of their daily activities; they do not reflect on territorial distinctions as they go about shopping on one side and meeting friends and using entertainment facilities on the other. The two populations also interact with each other in everyday spaces. If these interactions are considered social space, then the construction of “we” and “the other” requires discussion. It is primarily the border itself that demarcates two distinct settings and populations. The populations in adjacent borderlands live in different national contexts with diverse norms, values, and standards, which may affect everyday activities and allow each population to highlight the differences between itself and the neighboring population. Furthermore, borderland populations may also distinguish themselves from those in the rest of their country. Along the US–Mexican border, for example, researchers discovered that regional identities are fluid and flexible. Such is also true for European contexts. There, however, socioeconomic and historical factors, rather than religious or ethnic ones, are of interest. In their special situation, inhabitants have developed an understanding of their area and neighbors; they assume parallels in understanding and perspective and express less interest in their respective central governments.

Borderlands and Border Identities History and the collective memory of a population are some times stronger reference points in the construction of identity than are national discourses. In numerous cases borderlands are also zones of cultural overlap where national identities become blurred in the population. This blurring of identity occurs for reasons of proximity and history: Different peoples live in each other’s vicinity and borders are highly dynamic, shifting over the course of history. On the Italian side of the Italian–Austrian border, elderly people may have lived in different states with different norms and values over the course of their lifetimes. They became used to learning and speaking different languages, holding different passports, and continuing to find themselves in different neighborhoods. These people and their descendants, like those living in the Vojvodina, may have a clear concept not of their territorial belonging and national identity, but rather of their regional belonging and their identity as border people. A similar situation prevailed in Lwiw (Lemberg; Lwow), a city in the central part of western Ukraine that was part of the Austrian– Hungarian Empire in the 19th Century. Those born there at the beginning of the 20th Century experienced various regimes. They were Austrians before World War I and became Poles afterward. The city was occupied by the Soviets in 1939, by the German army in 1941, and from 1944 until 1991, it was under Soviet control again. Since 1991, it has been the largest city in western Ukraine. Today, most inhabitants speak Ukrainian in Lwiw, while in Kiev the inhabitants speak Russian. A walk through the city provides an experience of these changing political and cultural influences, which have been codified in street names and signs and architecture as well as in less material forms such as poems and narratives. Although it was strictly forbidden in Soviet times to speak German and Polish and to refer to their eras, the language and customs from both traditions have still survived and flourish. As in Ambos Nogales, such populations develop a regional identity as Border People, which can be stronger than the changing national identities.

Current Research Issues Today, both the special restrictions and potential advantages of borderlands are being researched. A partial list of research issues includes the constant confrontation between mobility and security, between regional and national identities, and the subsequent questioning of the nation state and its norms; the level of development as a function of national law, international relations, and asymmetries. Borderlands as both lived and perceived spaces; and borderlands as socially and discursively constructed regions.

See Also: Citizenship; Cold War; Ethnic Conflict; Nation; Regionalism; State.

Further Reading: Anzaldua, G., 1987. Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. Aunt Lute, San Francisco. Bulley, D., 2017. Migration, Ethics & Power; Spaces of Hospitality in International Politics. Sage, London. Burridge, A., Gill, N., Kocher, A., Martin, l., 2017. Polymorphic borders. Territory Politics Govern. 5 (3), 239–251. Filep, B., 2016. The Politics of Good Neighbourhood. State, Civil Society and the Enhancement of Cultural Capital in East Central Europe. Routledge, London. van Houtum, H., Laine, J., Scott, J., 2016. Borderscapes, potentials and challenges of evolving border concepts. Cross Border Rev. 135–152.

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Johnson, J., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M., Rumford, C., 2011. Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geogr. 30, 61–69. Kristof, L., 1959. The nature of frontiers and boundaries. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 49, 269–282. Martinez, O.J., 1994. Border People. Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. University of Arizona Press, Tucson. Minghi, J., 1963. Boundary studies in political geography. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 53, 407–428. Moyo, I., Changwe Nshimbi, C., 2019. African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration. Routledge, London. Newman, D., Paasi, A., 1998. Fences and neighbors in the postmodern world. Boundary narratives in political geography. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 22 (29), 186–207. Paasi, A., Prokkola, E.-K., Saarinen, J., Zimmerbauer, K., 2019. Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. Routledge, London. Wastl-Walter, D. (Ed.), 2011. Research Companion to Border Studies. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot. Journals Geopolitics. Taylor & Francis Online. Journal of Borderland Studies. Taylor & Francis Online.

Relevant Websites Association of European Border Regions: www.aebr.net. Association for Borderlands Studies: www.absborderlands.org. Borders in Globalization: www.biglobalization.org. Centre for International Border Research (CIBR), Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland: http://www.qub.ac.uk/cibr. Centre for Latin American Border Studies, New Mexico State University: http://www.clabs.nmsu.edu. Center for Border Region Studies. Aabenraa, Denmark: www.sdu.dk. Center for Borders Research, University of Durham, UK: http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru. Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands: www.kun.nl/ncbr. Peace Park Foundation: www.peaceparks.org.

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Boundary Work, Art, and Place Soren C Larsen, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, United States Melanie Zurba, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Boundary objects Entities that communicate and coordinate meanings, values, and interests across the boundaries between communities of practice. Boundary work Activities that create, maintain, and break down the social, political, and epistemological boundaries that exist between communities of practice. Country/Land An Indigenous way of being/belonging that incorporates all living things and their interrelationships, including people, plants, animals, ancestors, wind, water, sun, moon, stars, seasons, and stories. Community of practice A group of people who are involved in collective learning within a shared domain, where learning is achieved primarily through collaborative practice and active participation. Research community of practice (RCoP) A community of practice engaged in the production of new knowledge.

Boundary work, art, and place is an emerging intersection of interests in human geography that uses creative activity to facilitate place-based research and governance in partnership with Indigenous and other marginalized peoples. It arose in response to limitations of participatory research and comanagement paradigms to effectively ground Indigenous self-determination, protocols, and knowledge in collaborative work. The strategy uses creative expressiondartdto create “boundary objects” or entities that communicate and coordinate meanings across epistemological barriers. It engages art in this way in order to amplify the place-based perspectives of Indigenous peoples. The process of cocreating objects such as artworks brings academic and Indigenous epistemologies into productive collaboration, nurtures and bridges Indigenous knowledge across generations, facilitates the participation of the most marginalized, and educates non-Indigenous people about the protocols of Land and Country as well as about the values and aspirations relating to Indigenous sociopolitical realities. Boundary work applies to any instance in which a social or political boundary needs to be crossed. It is especially beneficial for marginalized communities. Boundary work collaboration with academics is an intentional process of bringing direct benefits to communities through research. Although boundary work has been taken up across human geography, this article focuses on its intersection with art in the context of place-based Indigenous systems of knowledge and governance. The article begins by explaining the concepts of boundary work and boundary object; it then describes the intersection of place-based research and boundary work in human geography; and finally, it discusses the role of art as a method for place-based boundary work in partnership with Indigenous peoples.

Boundary Work Boundary work refers to activities that create, maintain, and break down the social, political, and epistemological boundaries that exist between communities of practice. It developed during the 1980s in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) as a means of understanding the interactions that arise between communities with different views of what constitutes valid and reliable knowledge. Since that time, boundary work has been taken up in a wide range of academic fields, from information science to cultural studies. In the 21st Century, it has become an important approach to place-based research collaborations between academic and Indigenous communities. Human geographers have been especially active in using boundary work to collaborate on different ways of knowingdamplifying Indigenous knowledge in particulardand to develop hybrid forms of praxis that potentially disrupt and transform existing disciplinary paradigms. Boundary work begins when communities of practice engage in a shared problem or project that requires interactions across boundaries. A “community of practice” is a group of people who are involved in collective learning within a shared domain, where learning is achieved primarily through collaborative practice and active participation; such communities range from bands of hunter-gatherers to teams of engineers at a university. Boundaries are social constructions that arise from barriers in interaction and communication between groups who are engaged in typically asymmetrical power–knowledge relations. Early scholarship on boundary work drew from actor–network theory (ANT) to conceive of boundaries as an effect of “translation” or as a process by which disparate actors forge connections that delimit their roles, and ultimately, their agencies, in terms of their relation. The delimitation of roles and agencies creates the “boundary,” which is a site of ongoing negotiation that unfolds through “boundary

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conflicts” with other communities of practice. In boundary work, conflict is seen as a productive force that translates, mediates, and entangles the interests of the communities involved. This work yields greater “coherence” and “stabilization” between communities. It is lack of interaction, not conflict per se, that leads to decoherence and reinforced barriers between communities of practice. Initially, SSK scholarship on boundary work focused on how communities of practice construct boundaries to advance their interests against the competing demands of other actors. Boundary work was originally conceived by sociologist Thomas Gieryn as a problem of demarcation for science, a “rhetorical style” that scientists use to construct an ideological boundary against “nonscience” in an effort to enlist the public (and its resources) in the interests of science. Later, as studies of boundary work expanded beyond SSK into media studies, health care, organization science, policy analysis, and sustainability science, the focus expanded to include the renegotiation and brokering of boundaries, as well as the “boundary agents” who mediate the flow of information between communities. In the first decades of the 21st Century, boundary work found new salience in the Anthropocene, an epoch when the modern boundary between nature and culture has dissolved into myriad sites of engagement at the boundaries between communities of practice. One such site of engagement is evident in the climate change debate. Boundary work entered geography during the 1990s via Science and Technology Studies (STS) as an analytic for understanding and innovating within the burgeoning field of Geographical Information Systems (GIS). The concept had diffused throughout the discipline by the turn of the 21st Century. Geographers have investigated the boundary work of care and caregiving, gender and sexuality, human–animal relations, ethnic and class identity, and environmental comanagement. Geographical scholarship has added new topics of study and established connections between boundary work and geographical theories of space and place.

Boundary Objects Boundary work often involves the production of “boundary objects.” These are entities that communicate and coordinate meanings, values, and interests across the boundaries between communities of practice. Almost anything can be a boundary object, including ideas and experiences, but it must have the capacity to coordinate representations, legitimize and transform multiple knowledges, and mobilize action among heterogeneous groups. Case study examples are characteristically diverse and include museum specimens, the state of California, a GIS data-sharing agreement, a collaboratively painted mural, and a water resource model. As this cursory list indicates, a boundary object can be concrete or abstractdand is often both simultaneously. Importantly, a boundary object does not lend itself to consensus or self-explanation, nor does it facilitate inclusion (i.e., where an object is used to include one community of practice within another) or borrowing (i.e., where the object is simply borrowed from another community). The object’s role is, instead, to translate the disparate interests of interacting communities into hybrid forms of praxis. As entities with “multiple memberships,” boundary objects inhabit several different epistemological spaces at once, satisfying the informational requirements of each while maintaining a common, but usually weakly structured, identity across sites. Although boundary objects are typically grounded within one community of practicedat least initiallydthey must create a shared dialogical space that is valued on both sides of the border in order to mediate and build coherence between “worlds.” A coauthored land management plan, for example, may be written in a way that satisfies the distinct epistemological conventions of academic collaborators. However, at the same time, the plan creates numerous problems of translation with Indigenous epistemology that demand cooperation, debate, evaluation, and review across boundaries. Such translations can support decolonizing research and may even scale up into larger “boundary infrastructures” that develop into robust new epistemological forms (for a list of examples, see the Conclusion). Generally speaking, the object’s effectiveness hinges on the degree to which it engages stakeholders in agenda setting, dialogue, debate, and review. In designing boundary objects, initial questions for participants include why the object might be created and by whom; and how the object might facilitate boundary work, both presently and in the future (i.e., after the research project is over), and the Research Community of Practice (RCoP). It is also important to identify the governance context (e.g., water management, food security, community forestry), including the relevant law(s), regulatory frameworks, policies, and protocols; assess the relevant barriers and opportunities the context provides; and design governance arrangements that make the work accountable and beneficial both within and beyond the RCoP. The governance context structures the initial possibilities for knowledge coproduction, creates the epistemological “tensions” that must be negotiated, and informs the design and development of the boundary object(s). One or more participants may take on the role of “boundary agent,” someone who makes knowledge that is coproduced within the RCoP accessible to outside decision-makers, political officials, and the public. This is an important role that is also responsible for maintaining the cultural integrity of the research process and ensuring that the voices of the most marginalized participants are heard. Disseminating the boundary object to various groups beyond the RCoP not only amplifies marginalized perspectives but also helps participants arrive at new understandings of their relationships with, and the effects of their actions on, communities of practice beyond their own.

Boundary Work in Place-Based Research One of the main ways that boundary work has been taken up in human geography is through place-based research with Indigenous communities. Boundary work offers a methodology for bringing Indigenous people, academic practitioners, and other stakeholders into a place-based learning community, also known as a Research Community of Practice (RCoP), that negotiates ongoing problems of translation through cocreated boundary objects. It responds to limitations in participatory action research (PAR),

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both the inability to support Indigenous self-determination through the collaborative process, and its Western, largely pragmatic orientation to inquiry, which may lead to failures of engagement that ultimately work in favor of marginalization. Place is important in boundary work because it provides the necessary context for a boundary object to be simultaneously understood and useful for RCoP members who come from different communities of practice. The object must have a “place” that is recognizable across boundaries in order to provide a relational space for community interaction. Key contextual information includes how, why, and where the object was created; why it is relevant; and the history of negotiations surrounding it. The place for boundary work could be an Indigenous territory, a GIS, a musical performance, a mathematical topology, or an entire cosmology. In some cases, places can themselves become boundary objects. One of the earliest academic articles on boundary work (Leigh Star and James Griesemer’s 1989 article, “Institutional ecology, ‘translations,’ and boundary objects”) provides the example of the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at the University of California, Berkeley, where the State of Californiada real and conceptual placedbecame a boundary object that translated the disparate interests of academic professionals, amateur collectors, and university administrators into the work of the museum. In Indigenous epistemologies, place is more than context; place is a fundamental way of knowing, being, and experiencing the world as the relationship of things to each other. Indigenous epistemologies are almost always place based, and place is commonly the source of Indigenous national self-determination and individual self-actualization. One of settler colonialism’s primary strategies for dispossessing Indigenous peoples of their land is to break the Indigenous connection to place. Place is therefore an important focus of research, creative activity, and celebration in Indigenous decolonization and resurgence, and consequently is essential for any effective boundary work involving academic and Indigenous communities. Place often becomes central in such collaborations, mediating and maintaining “coherence” between academic and Indigenous approaches to knowledge production. Importantly, place translates the ethical principles of PAR into the research protocols of the particular nation, iwi, tribe, band, or community. PAR principles begin with the cocreation of the research project, followed by joint negotiation of an agreement that outlines the research (e.g., questions, goals, procedures, conditions of ownership, restrictions on intellectual property, payment for participation in the research, authorship on publications), which in turn is followed by periodic consultation, feedback, and review. The ethical protocols of Indigenous peoples are concerned with similar issues, but are place based and therefore diverse; they are derived from the more-than-human, ancestral relationships of Land and Country. Indigenous ethics include not only the responsibilities each team member has to each other or the wider community but also the land itself. This assertion of place as Land or Country grounds the ethical framework of PAR within the relevant ancestral and more-than-human relationships, helping to ensure that everyone and everything is given a voice.

Art in Place-Based Boundary Work At a basic level, art involves the capacity for self-expression through new combinations of elements within a given medium (e.g., paints on canvas, words in literature, tones in music), giving rise to new representations. In place-based boundary work, the process of cocreating artwork leads to new combinations between mediums, giving rise to coproduced knowledge. The artistic process brings academic and Indigenous communities into productive collaboration by effectively positioning them as “publics” for one another within the RCoP, and as resources to draw upon for self-reflection and identification as the project proceeds. As collaborators contribute to the artwork in interaction with others, they grow accountable to the work as a whole, disparate knowledges are “translated” through the art, and “coherence” is increased within the RCoP. Importantly, “coherence” may involve the production of “inhibitory” objects that hinder communication across boundaries; they may likewise even impede boundary work within the RCoP as it pertains to culturally specific knowledge and practices. Art’s capacity for the plurality of expression makes it a favored method for negotiating these tensions. Art also offers several practical advantages for place-based boundary work, including versatility and flexibility in a given medium (e.g., painting, music, performance, material culture), mode of engagement (e.g., visual, textual, multimodal), and purpose (e.g., intent, audience, goal). Place-based RCoPs have cocreated artworks that nurture Indigenous knowledge, facilitate the participation of the most marginalized, and educate non-Indigenous people about the protocols of place. The artistic process can promote cultural safety in a research program when used as a “safe space” to facilitate reflection and self-identification, both in private (e.g., doodling, sketching, journaling) and in collaborative work. When done effectively, artwork can amplify marginalized perspectives and redistribute power and control so that Indigenous knowledges and values are prioritized over colonial discourses. To date, visual methods have been found to be especially effective in this regard. Visually oriented artwork such as paintings, murals, photographs, mixed-media, and virtual realities are malleable enough to accommodate different skills and traditions in literacy, numeracy, and preferred mode(s) of creative expression. They are also dynamic enough to respond to the different interests and agendas within the RCoP. Experimentation continues in other mediums as well, including music, dance, and material culture.

Conclusion: Boundary Work, Art, and Place Boundary work, art, and place is an innovative, place-based approach to research collaboration that puts the boundaries between academic and Indigenous communities of practice into productive collaboration. There are numerous short-term and single-project

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examples of this approach in the published literature, some of which can be found below in the Further Reading. One long-term example that has scaled up into a “boundary infrastructure” is the Bawaka Collective in Yolngu country, East Arnhem Land, Australia. Since 2007, this group of academic geographers and Yolngu women has collaborated with the place, Bawaka Country, on a number of creative projects at the Buku-Larrnggay Mulka Art Center, including work in basketry, photography, songspirals, and creative mathematics. As an RCoP, their work creates a productive tension between the “placeless” world of academia and the deeply placed world of Bawaka Country. Their work has resulted in a number of innovative translations that can be found on their website. Other examples of boundary infrastructures include the Wetlands Preservation Organization at Haskell Indian Nations University, Lawrence, Kansas, USA; the Bundanon Trust’s SiteWorks project at the Bundanon site near Shoalhaven River, southeastern Australia; and Pacific Worlds, a nonprofit Indigenous geography education project for Hawai’i-Pacific schools. More recent start-ups include the Canoe Rising student organization at the University of Minnesota, USA, and the Climate Atlas of Canada, the latter of which features documentary videos codeveloped with Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada. (URL addresses for these projects can be found in the Relevant Websites list at the end of this article.) As these examples indicate, the intersection of boundary work, art, and place in human geography represents less a formal agenda or program than an innovative, place-specific approach to research collaboration with Indigenous peoples. The integration of art and place into boundary work has taken the concept from its origins in STS and ANT and moved it toward a decolonial “border thinking” that enables RCoPs to amplify Indigenous knowledges and support Indigenous self-determination. Although work thus far has focused on collaborations with Indigenous peoples, future developments portend engagements with other place-based communities of practice, including marginalized communities situated in excluded spaces (e.g., refugee camps, ethnic enclaves) and creative place-making in urban areas undergoing gentrification. As human geographers continue to experiment with boundary work, art, and place, the disciplinary paradigm is translated through the myriad realties of place into a more pluralized geographical praxis.

Further Reading Clark, W.C., Tomich, P.T., Van Noordwijk, M., Guston, D., Catacutan, D., Dickson, N.M., McNie, E., 2016. Boundary work for sustainable development: natural resource management at the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A 113 (17), 4615–4622. Gieryn, T.F., 1983. Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. Am. Sociol. Rev. 48, 781–795. Harvey, F., Chrisman, N., 1998. Boundary objects and the social construction of GIS technology. Environ. Plan. 30, 1683–1694. Robinson, C.J., Wallington, T.J., 2012. Boundary work: engaging knowledge systems in co-management of feral animals on Indigenous lands. Ecol. Soc. 17, 387–399. Saarela, S.R., Rinne, J., 2016. Knowledge brokering and boundary work for ecosystem service indicators: an urban case study in Finland. Ecol. Indicat. 61, 49–62. Star, S.L., Griesemer, J.R., 1989. Institutional ecology, “translations” and boundary objects: amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39. Soc. Stud. Sci. 19, 387–420. Turnpenny, J., Russel, D., Rayner, T., 2013. The complexity of evidence for sustainable development policy: analysing the boundary work of the UK parliamentary environmental audit committee. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 38 (4), 586–598. Wheeler, K.G., Robinson, C.J., Bark, R.H., 2018. Modelling to bridge many boundaries: the Colorado and Murray-Darling River basins. Reg. Environ. Change 18 (6), 1607–1619. Yusoff, K., 2015. Geologic subjects: nonhuman origins, geomorphic aesthetics and the art of becoming inhuman. Cult. Geogr. 22 (3), 383–407. Zurba, M., Berkes, F., 2014. Caring for country through participatory art: creating a boundary object for communicating Indigenous knowledge and values. Local Environ. 19 (8), 821–836. Zurba, M., Maclean, K., Woodward, E., Islam, D., 2018. Amplifying Indigenous community participation in place-based research through boundary work. Prog. Hum. Geogr. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0309132518807758.

Relevant Websites Bawaka Collective (Yolgnu-academic research collective in Bawaka Country, East Arnhem Land, Australia). http://bawakacollective.com/. Canoe Rising (University of Minnesota student organization in Minneapolis, MN, USA).https://gopherlink.umn.edu/organization/canoerising. Pacific Worlds (A non-profit educational organization for Hawai’i-Pacific schools). http://www.pacificworlds.com/. Wetlands Preservation Organization (Haskell Indian Nations University student organization in Lawrence, KS, USA)., https://www.facebook.com/wetlandspreservationorganization/. Climate Atlas of Canada (A project of the Prairie Climate Center, Winnipeg, MB, Canada). https://climateatlas.ca/. SiteWorks (A project of the Bundanon Trust in Illaroo, New South Wales, Australia). https://bundanon.com.au/siteworks/.

Brain Drain H Jo¨ns and Sophie Cranston, Geography and Environment, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Brain circulation Different forms of transnational movements by skilled workers. Brain drain A net loss of skilled workers for a country or place. Diaspora Associations of diverse individuals with common identity living abroad. Emigration Spatial movement of people out of a country of residence. Expatriate A person living outside of their country of birth for work or lifestyle reasons. Immigration Spatial movement of people to a new country of residence. International migration Spatial movement of people across national borders. Migration industries Organizations that support, facilitate and control migration. Mobilities Spatial movement of diverse entities, not only people. Remittances Money sent by migrants to family and friends in a different country. Return migration Spatial movement of people back to a former country of residence. Transnationalism Migrants’ transnational lives, practices, and networks.

From Brain Drain to Brain Circulation The availability of skilled workers for regional and national economies is high on the agenda of policy makers in order to encourage socioeconomic prosperity and cultural diversity in knowledge-intensive and creative sectors that have been identified as the foundation of sustainable knowledge economies. Recruiting skilled workers is often linked to international migration because employers seek suitably qualified individuals, and skilled workers are interested in earning adequate salaries for their embodied knowledge and skills. The international movement of skilled workers may not only be driven by supply and demand of workplaces in the global economy but encouraged or forced through wars, political suppression, and environmental disasters; socioeconomic disparities and varying qualities of life; as well as cultural affinities, community requirements, and social networks within particular places and regions. Over time, economically more developed places and countries have been more successful than their economically less developed counterparts in recruiting and retaining skilled workers. This process has led to brain drain, or the depletion of human resources, in those places and countries that have been the source of international migration, and brain gain, or the accumulation of human resources, in the most popular destinations of skills migration, or the migration of skilled workers. In the second half of the 20th Century, international skilled migration has largely reinforced existing socioeconomic disparities between economically stronger countries in the Global North and less economically affluent countries in the Global South. Yet with increasing globalization based on accelerated and more affordable modes of transport, sophisticated information technologies, and instantaneous long-distance communication in the 21st Century, spatially and temporally more complex and diverse movements of skilled workers have developed. Conceptually, a long-established research focus on brain drain and brain gain has therefore been complemented by an interest in brain circulation, or a greater variety of multidirectional and often temporary rather than permanent international movements of skilled workers, as well as the related phenomena of transnationalism and mobilities. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of key concepts and empirical findings about brain drain, brain gain, and brain circulation in the context of increasingly multiscalar analyses about the motivations, experiences, and outcomes of skills migration, which have diversified their traditional focus on countries to embrace more studies on institutions, places, cities, and regions.

Terminologies Conventionally, the term “brain drain” addresses a country’s net loss of skilled workers. The term was coined in 1963 by the Evening Standard, a London-based newspaper, as part of the reactions to a report by the Royal Society about large-scale emigration of UK scientists and engineers to the United States and Canada during the 1950s and 1960s. The identification of a considerable loss of highly qualified scientists to North America prompted debates in the House of Lords and in the press. The British Minister for Science and Technology, Lord Hailsham, to whom the coinage of the term “brain drain” is often incorrectly attributed, argued at the time that the emigration of British scientists demonstrated the excellence of British science and technology and that the real problem was the inability of the United States to meet its own demand for high-level scientific and technical personnel, despite its enormous financial resources. Whereas the term “brain drain” emerged as a result of skills migration between two highly

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developed countries in the Global North, academic studies of brain drain soon turned their focus on skills migration from the Global South to the Global North and its effects for developing countries. Through this research, the term brain drain began to imply a loss of scientists and engineers that is permanent and has primarily negative effects for the home country. Due to the increasing scope and changing perspectives of brain drain studies, the terminology multiplied over the years, giving rise to notions such as brain gain in the country of destination; brain exchange between two countries; brain overflow caused by an assumed oversupply of skilled professionals; and brain waste, if skilled migrants were not able to find a job that matched their skills. Globalization processes have complicated the typical brain drain discourse further through an increased volume and flexibility of global travel facilitated by the end of the Cold War and major advances in transport and communications technologies. As an alternative term to the rather static notions of brain drain and brain gain, the concept of brain circulation was coined in a 1996 article by Xiaonan Cao, when he was a master’s student at Harvard University, to account for the observation that the immigration of students, academics, and other skilled professionals to the United States was becoming more often temporary rather than permanent. The notion of brain circulation thus acknowledges that in contemporary globalization, transnational movements of skilled workers not only assume an increasingly transient and networked nature but also link to multiplying virtual flows of knowledge and information that facilitate knowledge transfer without the physical presence of the migrant.

Global Patterns About 3.4% of the world’s population lived outside of their country of birth in 2017, and thus more than at the turn of the millennium (2000: 2.8%). The United Nations divided these migrants into four main groups: migrants within the Global South (2017: 38%); migrants from the Global South living in the Global North (35%); migrants within the Global North (22%); and migrants from the Global North living in the Global South (6%). The main countries of emigrationdin absolute numbers of migrantsdwere India, Mexico, Russia, China, and Bangladesh. The proportion of emigrants among the population of the 15 most prominent emigration countries was highest in Palestine, Syria, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Poland, and Mexico (Table 1). The main countries of immigration were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom, whereas the proportion of immigrants was highest in the rich and sparsely populated countries of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada (Table 2). Interpretations of these statistics suggest that political unrest and globally uneven labor migration from economically developing to developed countries are two main factors that cause brain drain in key emigration countries. In India and China, the motivation of migrants to acquire a university education in American and European universities and to gain subsequent work experience in these centers of the world economy is particularly high, whereas Japan is probably the most closed advanced society with both few emigrants and immigrants. The global geographies of brain drain and brain gain vary considerably by the migrants’ occupations and skill sets, which can be illustrated using the example of skills migration to the United States. In the second half of the 20th Century, the United States served as a magnet for all types of skilled workers, including students and academics, researchers and engineers, entrepreneurs and managers, key civil servants, and health and cultural workers. At the height of the American hegemonic cycle, a period that marked Table 1

Top 15 countries of origin of international migrants. Number of migrants in millions

Percentage of the home population

Country

2000

2017

2017

India Mexico Russian Federation China Bangladesh Syrian Arab Republic Pakistan Ukraine Philippines United Kingdom Afghanistan Poland Germany Kazakhstan State of Palestine

8.0 9.6 10.7 5.8 5.4 . 3.4 5.6 3.1 3.9 4.5 2.1 3.4 3.6 2.8

16.6 13.0 10.6 10.0 7.5 6.9 6.0 5.9 5.7 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.2 4.1 3.8

1.2 10.4 7.4 0.7 4.7 40.6 2.9 13.1 5.4 7.4 13.3 12.4 5.1 22.8 76.0

Source: United Nations (Ed.), International migration report 2017: Highlights, 2017, United Nations, New York, p. 13; own compilation. The World Bank (Ed.), Population, total: All countries and economies, 2017, The World Bank, New York, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL, own calculation of population percentage.

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Top 15 countries hosting the largest numbers of international migrants in 2017. Number of migrants in millions

Percentage of the host population

Country

2000

2017

2000

2017

United States of America Saudi Arabia Germany Russian Federation United Kingdom United Arab Emirates France Canada Australia Spain Italy India Ukraine Turkey South Africa

34.8 5.3 9.0 11.9 4.7 2.4 6.3 5.5 4.4 1.7 2.1 6.4 5.5 1.3 1.0

49.8 12.2 12.2 11.7 8.8 8.3 7.9 7.9 7.0 5.9 5.9 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.0

12.3 25.3 11.0 8.1 8.0 77.6 10.5 17.9 23.0 4.1 3.7 0.6 11.3 2.0 2.2

15.3 37.0 14.8 8.1 13.4 88.4 12.2 21.5 28.8 12.8 10.0 0.4 11.2 6.0 7.1

Source: United Nations (Ed.), International migration report 2017: Highlights, 2017, United Nations, New York, pp. 6, 25–31, own compilation.

the country’s purported world leadership, skilled migrants arrived in large numbers from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia because the country’s growing economy required and was able to absorb large numbers of skilled workers. According to the National Science Foundation, this process is continuing in the 21st Century because 30% of college-educated US workers employed in science and engineering professions (S&E) were foreign-born in 2015, which is twice as many than in the early 1990s. Among the more than 40% foreign-born workers with a doctoral degree (2015), the highest share could be found among computer and mathematical scientists (58%) and the lowest among social scientists (19%). Most foreign-born S&E doctorate holders came from China (22%), India (16%), and the United Kingdom (4%) and therefore from economically advanced or growing economiesdthe only exception in the Top 10 countries of origin was Iran (2%). Looking at all foreign-born doctorate holders in the United States, 21% came from India, 10% from China, 5% from the Philippines, and 4% from Mexico, which indicates the existence of brain drain at least in the latter two countries. The 10-year stay-rate of foreign-born US doctorate recipients in S&E professions from 2005 amounted to 70%, ranging from 51% in the social sciences to 76% in engineering. In 2017, the top three regional destinations of migrants were Asia, Europe, and North America, and the top regions of origin were Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa. As exemplified by economically booming places such as Singapore, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, and the previous discussion of skills migration to the United States, some places in Asia clearly benefit from brain gain, while others suffer from brain drain, thereby leading to highly polarized socioeconomic living conditions, often within one and the same country. A global economic shift toward Asia Pacific can be identified in flows of international students, many of whom will become future leaders in economy and society. According to the Institute of International Education, 4.6 million international students (2017) studied in the United States (24%), the United Kingdom (11%), China (10%), Australia, France, Canada (7% each), and Russia and Germany (6% each). International students represented the highest share of all students within Australia (24%) and the United Kingdom (21%). The most important source countries for international students in the United States were China (33%), India (18%), South Korea (5%), Saudi Arabia (4%), and Canada (2%). Research about these global patterns of international student mobility suggests that especially Chinese students are studying in the United States and the United Kingdom in order to receive the most prestigious university education with a view of emulating the success of AngloAmerican research and higher education, either at home or abroad, thereby exemplifying a shift from 20th-Century brain drain mobility to more complex and mutually beneficial brain circulation.

Motivations, Experiences, and Outcomes The motivations, experiences, and outcomes of brain drain mobility are complex and require case study specific examinations. Forced migration was the reason for the exodus of central European Jews from the German Empire and neighboring states, which occurred because of their systematic persecution through Hitler’s Nazi regime between 1933 and 1945. In the process, German universities lost a third of their often most renowned academics, mostly but not only of Jewish decent. About 90% of those academics who escaped the Holocaust through emigration, settled in the United States. In comparison, the brain drain of European

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scientists and engineers to North America during the post-WWII decades was voluntary migration in the search for better paid jobs and research environments, including the latest research infrastructure. From the 1970s to the 1990s, this brain drain mobility was converted into brain circulation because a particularly high share of US scientists and scholars with biographical connections to the German-speaking areas of central Europe spent their sabbatical leaves with support of state-funded research fellowships and awards at the recovering German universities. This circulation contributed to a cumulative process of academic mobility and collaboration that made Germany, for a short period of time at the beginning of the 21st Century, the most important source country of international coauthors for US scientists and engineers. In the long-term, significant brain drain mobility from Germany to the United States thus resulted, once the political and socioeconomic circumstances were favorable, in the rebuilding of German universities and the creation of particularly close transatlantic knowledge networks. In India, China, and Taiwan, brain drain mobility for higher education and work in the context of the booming high-tech sector of the United States during the first four post-WWII decades has been turned into brain circulation since the 1990s, through both return migration and transnational commuting. Based on improving political and economic environments in the home countries, immigrant scientists, and engineers educated in the United States made use of falling costs of transportation and communications for transferring their embodied knowledge and skills from Silicon Valley and other high-tech hubs to formerly peripheral economies in Asia. As a result of this brain drain turned brain circulation, new companies and business relationships were formed that have contributed to growth in the home economies, close professional and economic ties to the United States, and advanced high-tech hubs in Asia. Other possible benefits of skills migration for sending countries include the positive impacts of remittances on economic development in the home country and of democratic values and ideas on the home country’s civil society and politics, for example, through the creation of alternative social organizations. Yet both brain drain and brain circulation are present in the lives of immigrant scientists and engineers in the United States because skilled migrants from those countries, in which the reasons for emigration are still prevalentdincluding violence, a lack of career opportunities, deficient infrastructure, and missing state supportd have shown no inclination to return to their home countries or become involved in knowledge exchange. In recent decades, doctors, medical graduates, and nurses born and educated in the Philippines, Ghana, Nigeria, and other developing countries have flocked to the United States and the United Kingdom in large numbers, attracted by and in search of better salaries, job opportunities, and quality of life. This ongoing brain drain has posed serious challenges in the countries of origin for basic human welfare through decreasing institutional provision and service in health education and the health care sector. Such a severe depletion of skilled workers in developing countries through the demand in leading capitalist economies has been criticized because the constant loss of trained personnel in the less developed country and the reliable inflow of highly qualified workers in the more developed country could lead to a lack of investment into the education sectors of both countries. Other negative effects for the places of departure comprise of profound losses of money, skills, and opportunities, such as the investment in this person’s education; tax revenue; multiplicator, spillover, and role model effects for peers and the next generation; as well as institutional provision and service quality in the three key sectors government, education, and health. Whereas recent studies have shown that a significant reduction of brain drain mobility has very positive effects on the quality of public and private institutions in countries of origin, the possibility of negative effects of brain gain on educational provision in the destination country contributes to a situation in which the costs and benefits of brain drain for the individuals and countries involved are contested and thus require careful evaluations of specific case studies, considering the conditions in home and host countries and their relations. Brain drain studies have evolved to include studies on institutional and subnational scales and to consider the wider context and support of brain mobilities with the concept of “brain chains,” and through examinations of migration industries. Given that research suggests that US immigrant university graduates working in STEM professions create on average 2.6 jobs for US workers through their creative work in innovation, research, and development, it can be assumed that these spillover effects on job creation have a regional dimension and therefore contribute to agglomeration effects. Along these lines, research within China has found that regional emigration has a negative impact on economic growth in the source regions, whether the movement is permanent or temporary. This suggests that public policy needs to find ways of encouraging skilled workers either to stay in their home region for education and employment or to return after graduation or work experience elsewhere. In New Zealand, a small country with a relatively large international diaspora of skilled workers, strategies have been developed to enroll expatriates working in knowledge-based industries such as fashion and high tech for the benefit of the home country. Using the notion of brain chains that links mobilities, networks, infrastructures, and knowledge transfer, skilled workers’ migration journeys can be analyzed in a more holistic way, considering the complex geographies of policies and discourses, departure, transit, settlement, circulation, and perhaps return; the role of family, friends, colleagues, employers, and knowledge diasporas; private and public institutions and support services; as well as migration management, industry and infrastructure. Similar to brain circulation, the notion of brain chains suggests avoiding prior assumptions when researching skills mobilities.

Conclusions The notion of brain drain has served as an important concept for outlining global imbalances in international skills migration and the profound negative effects resulting from large-scale emigration of skilled workers for low-income developing countries. In the context of recent globalization processes, the increasingly unpredictable nature and outcomes of international migration by skilled workers has made the use of notions such as brain circulation, brain chains, transnationalism, diasporas, and mobilities more prominent than the less flexible concepts of brain drain and brain gain. The reasons for this conceptual shift of emphasis emerge

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from the twofold need to highlight the increasingly temporary and multidirectional nature of international movements by skilled workers and to acknowledge the possibility of mutual benefits for countries of origin and destination through expatriates. On the one hand, it remains important to be aware of potentially cumulative negative outcomes of brain drain mobility for the country, region, or place of origin, but on the other hand, academics and policy makers need to be aware of the wider benefits that may arise from the mobilization of elective diasporas, or those expatriates and other people living abroad who feel an emotional connection to a country or place and may choose to engage in knowledge exchange activities, for establishing economically, politically, and culturally beneficial transnational knowledge networks. In the future, studies on brain drain, brain gain, and brain circulation could usefully examine these processes with more attention to different axes of social difference (e.g., gender, age, and cultural background), and at different geographical scalesdfrom institutions and individual places to subnational regions, nation states, and supranational regions. Such studies could also provide more nuanced assessments of mobility motivations, experiences, and outcomes for those people involved and affected before, during, and after related journeys across time and space that might either remain temporary or become permanent and involve a range of other materialities, technologies, organisms, imaginations, knowledges, and ideas.

See Also: Diasporas; Education, Internationalization of; Emigration; Migration; Migration and Development; Remittances; Transnationalism.

Further Reading Balmer, B., Godwin, M., Gregory, J., 2009. The Royal Society and the ‘brain drain’: Natural scientists meet social science. Notes Rec. R. Soc. Lond. 63, 339–353. Cervantes, M., Guellec, D., 2002. The brain drain: Old myths, new realities. OECD Obs. 230, 40–42. Chand, M., 2019. Brain drain, brain circulation, and the African Diaspora in the United States. J. Afr. Bus. 20, 6–19. Cranston, S., Schapendonk, J., Spaan, E., 2018. New directions in exploring the migration industries: Introduction to special issue. J. Ethn. Migr. Stud. 44, 543–557. Crush, J., Hughes, C., 2009. Brain drain. In: Kitchin, R., Thrift, N. (Eds.), International encyclopedia of human geography. Elsevier, New York, pp. 343–347. Friesen, W., Collins, F.L., 2017. Brain chains: Managing and mediating knowledge migration. Migr. Dev. 6, 323–342. Ha, W., Yi, J., Zhang, J., 2016. Brain drain, brain gain, and economic growth in China. China Econ. Rev. 38, 322–337. Jöns, H., Mavroudi, E., Heffernan, M., 2015. Mobilising the elective diaspora: US-German academic exchanges since 1945. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 40, 113–127. Mbah, M., 2017. Formal education as a facilitator of migration and integration: A case study of Nigerian University graduates. In: Jöns, H., Meusburger, P., Heffernan, M. (Eds.), Mobilities of knowledge. Springer, Cham, pp. 247–268. Pison, G., 2019. The number and proportion of immigrants in the population: International comparisons. Popul. Soc. 563, 1–4. Salt, J., 1997. International movements of the highly skilled. OECD, Paris. Saxenian, A., 2006. The new argonauts: Regional advantage in a global economy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Schiff, M., Docquier, F., 2016. Institutional impact of brain drain, human capital, and inequality: A political economy analysis. Lat. Am. J. Econ. 53, 95–110. Skeldon, R., 2009. Of skilled migration, brain drains and policy responses. Int. Migr. 47, 3–29. Vinokur, A., 2006. Brain migration revisited. Glob. Soc. Educ. 4, 7–24. Zavodny, M., 2011. Immigration and american jobs. American Enterprise Institute and the Partnership For A New American Economy, Washington, DC.

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Buffer Zone Georges Pre´ve´lakis, University of Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Paris, France © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Chaordic An order that appears chaotic (chaosþorder) because it is not founded on hierarchical and territorial structures but functions through networks, cultural codes, and decentralized initiatives. Demilitarized Zone An area between two territories in conflict functioning as a temporary physical separation with the perspective of a permanent territorial settlement. Geopolitik School A group of geographers, mostly German, active between the two world wars under the leadership of Karl Haushofer, who challenged the Versailles territorial settlements. Iconography The set of symbols that unite a people and link it to a portion of space transforming it thus to a territory. Marches Territories organized to protect the early medieval Europe from the Moors, Celts, Scandinavians, and Slavs. Mitteleuropa The area between the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Russian parts of Europe characterized by dominant German economic and cultural presence. Reticular In geography, referring to a network of territories, contiguous or not. Shatter Belt An area where struggle between outside powers takes place openly and violently, with limited risk of generalization of conflict.

In its simplest definition, a buffer zone is an area between two or more adversarial geopolitical or military powers, which functions to separate those powers physically. A buffer zone is thus conceived as an instrument of peace and stability. The word buffer conveys the idea of absorption of tensions, of cushioning. A buffer zone can exist at various geographical scales, in accordance with the scale of the powers it is separating. If, for example, the buffer zone serves to separate two ethnic communities, it may have a breadth of a few kilometers or less; if it separates two major continental or maritime powers, it can cover many state territories. The term buffer zone was first used at the end of the 19th Century in the context of the competition between the British and the Russian Empire in the north of the Indian peninsula. During the 20th Century, this term found extensive use in human geography, especially the subdiscipline of political geography. The “Geopolitik” school included the term of Pufferzone in its vocabulary of oftenused terms. In the French literature, the equivalent zone tampon was somewhat less frequently used. The success of the term in the political geography of the first part of the 20th Century is related to the strong influence of the environmental determinism tradition. Since it was thought that physical space conditioned human affairs, the use of physical separation seemed the most appropriate means to preempt conflict situations. What this approach underestimated was the role of human action in the creation and the survival of a buffer zone. The term buffer zone has also found various uses in scientific and nonscientific literature. Buffer zones are referred to outside political geography in the fields of physical planning and environmental protection to designate any zone separating land uses that may be considered incompatible or dangerous for certain species. Buffer zones are as much the cause as the result of human affairs. The study of buffer zones thus involves the whole spectrum of spatial, political relationships. In political geography, the limits of the term buffer zone are ill-defined. It is often used instead of or in combination with other terms like frontier, march, shatter belt, demilitarized zone, glacis, or cordon sanitaire. Distinguishing these terms is complex because the realities they describe overlap considerably and it is therefore more useful to examine them together. All of these terms express geographical phenomena of spatial transition from one territory to another. At the same time, they are themselves situated in an intermediary position that relates to’ the concepts of boundary, a linear division, and that of the territory. Thus, for example, the Cyprus buffer zone becomes a boundary if examined at the scale of Greek and Turkish spaces. On the other hand, Belgium, a buffer zone between France and Germany during the 20th Century, was and is a territory by itself. Buffer zones therefore constitute a gray area of political geography. They are difficult to grasp because they are inherently unstable and changing and also because they challenge the territorial status quo. Buffer zones are at the margins of established political geography. In a renewed political geography, less centered on hierarchical center–periphery approaches and focusing more on issues of in-between, the phenomena of buffer zones encompass will in the future probably occupy a more central position.

Buffer Zones as Peripheries of Territories Ideally, buffer zones are neutral spaces between two or more territories; however, in many cases, buffer zones are organized by one power in order to cope with challenges or take advantage of opportunities coming or existing in spaces dominated by less-organized

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powers. In such situations, buffer zones are in fact peripheries of the territory of the more-structured configurations of power such as nation-states. In early human history, spatial separation between different human communities was a gift of nature. Uninhabited spaces in the form of deserts, marchlands, forests, or seas created sufficient obstruction to circulation from one territory to another to make human-made obstacles unnecessary. At the other extreme, the densely and continuously inhabited post-Renaissance Europe devised a sophisticated territorial system defining with absolute precision of the transition from one area of sovereignty to another. Between these two extremes ranges a series of separating systems that organized the transition from one field of power to another according to gradients rather than in the form of an abrupt spatial discontinuity.

Premodern Buffer Zones Premodern buffer zones resulted from asymmetrical power situations. They were organized by relatively well-structured societies facing the challenges of outside infiltration or invasion that threatened to destabilize them. The best-known examples of organized zones of transition from the “civilized” to the “barbarian” realm are the Roman “limes” and the Chinese Great Wall systems. Although both terms convey the image of a linear separation, they were in fact zones, with sufficient breadth to serve as protecting buffers. Those imperial protections were part of the imperial territory: they constituted its periphery; however, these areas also had a life of their own. Their inhabitants, in contact with the “barbarian,” were influenced by their culture and they developed their own leadership which could sometimes challenge the imperial center. Premodern buffer zones therefore had many characteristics of a territory and often evolved into states. During the Middle Ages, buffer zones between what remained of the Roman Empire and the pressure coming from outside, from the sea, or from the steppe took the form of special areas named marches in the West and “akra” (singular: “akron”) in the East (Byzantium). Many states of today carry in their names the memory of this terminology, like Denmark (the Danish march) or Ukraine (akron). Some of them continued to function as buffers in modern times, but in the form of buffer states.

Modern Forms While the stabilization of the West European political map after the Renaissance excluded the practice of peripheral buffer zones, new examples emerged in the United States. This time, buffer zones were not organized for defensive purposes, but, on the contrary, as a means of expansion into new lands. These new peripheral territories became known as the American frontier and, like the European marches/akra of the Middle Ages, they had a specific culture that differentiated their inhabitants from those of the core. The American frontier served as a buffer zone between the established and regulated American society and the lawlessness of Western lands that were being taken away from the Indigenous populations. As a buffer zone, the frontier was thus instrumental in the legitimation of colonialism. Another form of peripheral buffer zone is represented by the glacis. The term comes from the French verb glacer, which means to slip. The glacis was the outside part of medieval fortifications. A strong slope protected the fortifications from artillery and exposed the assailants to defensive fire. Following this analogy, a glacis is therefore a buffer zone surrounding a territory that it helps to defend. This metaphor was used by Joseph Stalin to legitimate the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. This East-European Soviet glacis was presented as necessary in order to protect the Soviet Union from capitalist infiltration. A parallel can be found in the US containment strategy, that is, the construction of a chain of alliances with states surrounding the Soviet Union in order to contain the expansion of communism. In the same family should be placed the French idea of cordon sanitaire: a series of anticommunist buffer states surrounding the Soviet Union to protect Europe from communist ideology after the Soviet Revolution. The Israeli Security Zone in Southern Lebanon, set up in 1982 against Palestinian infiltration and missile fire, is an example of a modern buffer zone in the form of a territorial periphery in an asymmetrical situation reminiscent of the Middle Ages.

Buffer States A buffer state is a relatively weak state lying between two or more antagonistic powers of comparable potential. There are several conditions for buffer states. Firstly, the buffer state must be geographically in contact with the territory of the other powers and must separate them; however, this separation may not be complete. Thus, for example, the fact that France and Germany had a common boundary did not cancel the role of Belgium as a buffer state before 1914 and between the World War I and II. Buffer states do not only function as a cushion between rival states. Very often their territories include essential strategic resources, especially in the form of major transport corridors and crossroads. In such a case, the demarcation of buffer states serves to neutralize their own role in a potential conflict by depriving both rival states of their military use. In such cases, a buffer zone only needs to cover the portion of the in-between territory that in which the important crossroads or axes are situated. In addition to contiguity, conditions of foreign policy orientation must be met. There are usually only two powers surrounding the buffer state. However, in rare cases, there can be more powers involved, as was the case of Poland before its partition at the end

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of the 18th Century (Austria, Prussia, Russia). In addition, surrounding states must be rivals. If antagonism ceases, the buffer state loses its raison d’etre. However, if the rivalry becomes too acute, it can also lead to the disappearance of buffer status. At the beginning of the Cold War, the tension between the US and the Soviet Union was such that many preexisting or potential buffer states were exposed to efforts for unilateral control, which often ended in solutions in the form of partition. Stalin managed to take control of all of Eastern Europe, a possible buffer zone. Korea and then Vietnam were divided and became areas of East–West confrontation; Germany, also a potential buffer state, shared the same fate. The Cold War diminished the antagonisms inside each alliance through the discipline imposed by Washington and Moscow by accentuating ideological rivalry around the international frontier dividing the two worlds. The Cold War also reduced the role of buffer states because the balance of nuclear terror made territorial arrangements more or less irrelevant. Belgium and Korea, two historical buffer states, ceased thus to function as such. Later, the Vietnam conflict led to the disappearance of two more buffer states: Laos and Cambodia. The importance of foreign policy orientation in shaping buffer states cannot be reduced to the rivalry of the surrounding states. The role of buffer states also relates to the intensity of the antagonism among geopolitical powers. The paradigmatic case of Afghanistan provides a useful illustration of this situation. In fact, it was only in 1907, when Russia and England felt that they needed to water down their rivalry in Asia in order to cope with the new geopolitical challenges arising in Central Europe that a compromise was found which consolidated the buffer state role of Afghanistan. Before that time, and in spite of the use of the term buffer state for Afghanistan already in 1883, both powers were trying to monopolize the whole area. The third condition for buffer state status relates to capability distribution. The buffer state must be considerably weaker than the surrounding states. Thus, for example, Prussia in post-Napoleonic Europe could hardly be considered as a buffer state between Russia and Austria, in spite of the fact that its location satisfied the geographical condition and that the two other powers did develop rivalries. If the buffer state must be weak, the stronger states must have a comparable potential. This relationship within the buffer system creates the possibility for buffer state neutrality through a series of strategic calculations on the part of the major actors in the system, the surrounding antagonistic powers. According to this reasoning, the power differential between each of the surrounding powers and the buffer state creates a favorable situation for the absorption of the buffer state in the zone of influence of one of the surrounding states, as a result of diplomatic pressure or military invasion. Any attempts by more powerful states to absorb the buffer state would provoke the intervention of the other strong state for which such a development would constitute a threat. The alliance of the second strong state with the smaller, buffer state would tip the balance of power again and make the operation of the takeover risky or even condemned to failure. This triangular situation puts the power challenging the buffer state at a disadvantage, which reinforces the importance of the buffer state’s independence.

The Stability of the Buffer State Buffer systems are inherently unstable, since the balance of influence between the surrounding powers can fluctuate, creating windows of opportunity for one or other power to intervene and abolish the buffer state’s sovereignty. During the late 1970s, when the US influence in Asia was at its lowest after the Vietnam War and the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet Union took the opportunity to invade Afghanistan and reconfigure it from a buffer state to a Soviet satellite. Ideally, for a buffer state, the antagonism of surrounding states would over time diminish and therefore the danger of becoming an arena of confrontation disappears. The construction of closer European relations has thus saved the West European buffer states that had suffered during previous centuries from the French–English and then the French–German rivalries. When such an optimal situation is unattainable, however, the preservation of a buffer state status is preferable to its collapse, which can lead to wars, civil wars, partition, or foreign domination. Thus, in addition to the role of surrounding states and the international environment, the capacity of the buffer state to preserve its status is also determined by its capacity to mobilize its own resources. Geographical characteristics are prominent in a buffer state’s capacity to preserve its status. Although, by definition, a buffer state cannot be as strong as the surrounding states, the more it is capable of resisting challenges to its sovereignty, the more it can contribute in stabilizing the relations between other states. Thus, when one of the surrounding states weakens, a relatively strong buffer state might be able to compensate the disequilibrium by mobilizing its own military forces. This capacity is related to the geographical conditions encountered in buffer state territories. Many buffer states developed in difficult natural environments, very often in mountainous areas. Such areas were of little interest for human establishment and therefore remained for long periods on the margins of state formation. With the gradual expansion of surrounding states, however, their peripheries met, creating buffer conditions at their intersection. Such areas are very often crossroads of important axes of circulation and, because of their intermediary geographical location, are inhabited by mixed populations whose cultural practices and identities express the transition from one geographical area to another. The geographical conditions of buffer states only sometimes support resistance to outside intervention. The mountainous character of some traditional buffer states offers a critical advantage in terms of military defense; however, the cultural mix of buffer states and their role as crossroads can make them more susceptible to external influences. For example, Lebanon’s difficulty to survive as a buffer state between Syria and Israel, largely because of the internal divisions of its population, illustrates the geographical handicap of many buffer state territories. On the other hand, in spite of cultural and geographical fragmentation, Afghans have united on several occasions against external challenges, in the process making efficient use of the defensive character of their terrain.

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Thus, geographical conditions that can be encountered in many buffer state situations do not determine in a predefined way the capacity of the population to defend the territory of the nation-state. Leadership and diplomatic experience are also important factors in shaping buffer states. The city-state of Dubrovnik/Ragusa survived the tensions between the Ottoman Empire and its Latin enemies and also founded its prosperity and its culture on its role as a hinge between the two Mediterranean realms because of the extraordinary diplomatic skills of its leaders. At certain historical moments, however, the geopolitical stresses are so intense that no diplomatic talent can avert disaster. Sihanouk, the charismatic Cambodian leader, had realized that many years before the US and the South Vietnamese troops invaded his country and put an end to a history of buffer state status going back whole centuries’. Because buffer states are spaces in between they have to cope with the instability of their geopolitical environments in order to survive as sovereign states. Sometimes their buffer state status is determined from the outside, as a result of a field of power that favors neutralization. Situations last only as long as the conditions that created them. On the other hand, there are cases where a combination of geographical conditions and human factors lead to the emergence of buffer state iconographies that can stabilize the influence of external power relations and thus extend the life span of the buffer state. The extraordinary stability of Switzerland as a European buffer state is based on a strong Swiss iconography that has enabled the country to overcome its geographical and cultural diversity and to create a determination to defend it that has gained the respect of all European powers. As situations of geographical in-between, buffer states can be the “loci” of extraordinary material and cultural wealth, but at the same time of terrible suffering and destruction. The fate of Lebanon, an Eastern Mediterranean success story that turned into a nightmare, is the perfect illustration of the contradictory nature of many buffer states.

Buffer Zones and the International Frontier Global and Large-Scale Outlooks At a high level of geopolitical generalization, buffer zones appear as separating large areas unified by religion, empire, ideology, or culture. With the rise of Islam, the Mediterranean Sea became a buffer zone between Christian Europe and Muslim North Africa. Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire, divided in three parts at Verdun in 843 CE, led to a historical buffer zone between what would become France and Germany. Many of the European buffer states between the two countries originated from Lotharingia, the Third Kingdom between the Western (future French) and the Eastern (future Germanic) Frankish realms. The Cold War separated the world on the basis of ideology, creating a complex buffer zone out of the Soviet glacis (the Eastern European buffer states), the American containment zone (in East and Southeast Asia), and the shatter belt (in the Middle East). With the end of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” hypothesis introduced a new division between large civilizational areas, separated by persistent historical frontiers, like the one between Western and Eastern Christianity (the 1054 Schism line). On such a scale, buffer zones are usually perceived in a negative light, as areas of conflict and political fragmentation, marginal in comparison to the civilization of powerful centers. This vision has been recently theorized by Violette Rey. Her concept of “inbetween” (entre-les-deux), inspired by her study of the area that Jean Gottmann named “the tidal lands of Europe” (Central Europe), describes the state of an area submitted to overwhelming, conflicting, and constantly changing outside influences. The resulting historical discontinuities constitute an obstacle to capital accumulation. A feeling of futility demoralizes elites and reinforces opportunistic attitudes; however, the argument is sometimes reversed. The 19th-Century German concept of Mitteleuropa promoted the idea of centrality of the German space, being in the middle of Europe, between East (Russia) and West (France, England). The partition of Germany after World War II transformed this potential European center into a borderline, part of the Iron Curtain separating Soviet-allied states from those in Western Europe. A parallel can be drawn with Samuel Huntington’s frontier between East and West in Europe in comparison to Dimitri Kitsikis’ “Intermediary space”. Kitsikis considers the area around the Aegean (today’s Greece and Turkey, the former core of the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires) as the center of a large historical buffer zone between the two major civilization areas of Eurasia, the West (Europe) and the East (India, China, Southeast Asia, Japan). If the linear iconography of a schism represents Huntington’s conflict hypothesis, Kitsikis’ intermediary buffer zone indicates the possibility of dialog between civilizations.

Demilitarized Zones Demilitarized zones refer to areas where military activity is forbidden or restricted, usually established by agreement or treaty between nations or military powers. In many cases of violent conflict, various forms of sanctuaries are set up in order to offer protection to noncombatants, diplomats, and hospitals. Secure zones are also organized as meeting places for negotiation or exchange of prisoners. Finally, when fighting ceases, bands of land can be neutralized from a military point of view in order to separate the populations and to avoid the spontaneous start of hostilities. During the 20th and 21st centuries, such agreements have been negotiated through the mediation of the United Nations or of diplomats of the major powers. The control of demilitarized zones often comes under the responsibility of the United Nations. Thus, since their creation, the United Nations have organized an important number of demilitarized zones, often called buffer zones. Among the most important and long-lasting are the buffer zone separating North and South Korea since 1953 and the Cypriot demilitarized zone established in 1974 between the territory under Turkish control and

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the rest of the island. Many other demilitarized zones have been set up during the various stages of the Israeli–Arab struggle, as well as in the Balkans, in Africa, and elsewhere. Such zones are part of a larger system that is termed the international frontier. This frontier is made up of a variety of international arrangements, past or present, including international protectorates, buffer states, neutralized zones, areas under international administration, international canals and waterways, international mandates, and trusteeship areas. The international frontier, managed more or less successfully by the international community, has been very active after World Wars I and II. At the peak of the Cold War, it has been superseded by the frontier dividing the two blocks. The bipolar system left few areas of the world outside either the rigid stability inside the blocks or the violent clashes in areas of confrontation, the shatter belts. The eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are among the exceptions to this double rule and this is the reason why the international community continues to be especially active in these areas.

New Issues International frontiers often carry memories of past tensions that are related to the persistence of geographical factors or to the inertia of cultural geography. With the end of the Cold War, many parts of the international frontier that had separated Eastern and Western blocs became destabilized again. The return of war to Europe has led to ethnic cleansing, diminishing again the potential of many areas to function as buffer zones between different national groups. The cases of Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo clearly indicate the trend to reinforce the separation of nationalities and to diminish the intermediary function of residual mixed communities that had somehow survived the homogenizing processes of the Cold War state formation in the Balkans. The Ukraine crisis since 2013 is also of special interest. The Ukrainian territory, part of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, became a buffer zone between Europe and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union; however, the aspiration of the part of the Ukrainian population for integration with West Europe provoked reactions from its Russian and Russophile populations, supported by Russia. The result was the secession of Crimea. The Ukraine is thus becoming a country divided between European and Russian influences rather than a buffer between these geopolitical powers. The geographical inequalities between Europe and Africa have led to the establishment of various Euro-Mediterranean projects that over recent decades have sought to manage these inequalities. These projects contribute to the formation of new buffer zone, a new European march to face the challenges of African poverty, underdevelopment, and instability, and to regulate a relationship that might become explosive. The situation became more tense during the 2010s. The flow of refugees due to violence and insecurity in Northern Africa and the Middle East added to the arrival of economic immigrants and created a feeling of demographic and identity threat in Europe. Populist and anti-European trends were reinforced in various countries, creating a real risk that the European Union would start to fracture. In order to cope with this challenge, Turkey and Greece started functioning as buffer zones that keep immigrants and refugees in their territories in exchange of European financial support. On the other hand, new forms of terrorism and warfare do not always express territorial conflicts. The Islamist challenges to American hegemony and to European security are not organized in the framework of a continuous territory with a hierarchical structure of organization behind it. Rather, they function in a chaordic way, based on reticular spaces that penetrate deeply inside the opponent’s territory. Does this shift to conflicts that make territory less relevant also neutralize the utility of buffers? Should we conclude that interest in buffer zones is or will become only historical? As it is difficult to hope that geographical inequalitiesdin the form of differences in demographic growth, development, stability, or even, in the urban sphere, of spatial segregationdwill vanish, buffer zones are likely to continue to exist, even if they have to take new forms. In our globalized world, the new reticular political geography will continue to focus on territory, but at a larger variety of scales than in the past. The focus of political geography, however, is likely to be on combinations of territories forming networks that are defined less and less by the logic of topographical distance. The cultural dimensions of political geography will become more and more important. The predominance of the territorial nation-state, both as a reality and as a geopolitical representation, will be challenged and, with it, the geopolitical forms and phenomena that have accompanied its rise. In this sense, buffer states may in fact become less relevant. Buffer zones separating the wealthy inhabitants of the Western metropolises from immigrant communities and other minorities may unfortunately emerge as new subjects of study. In cities where conflicting “civilizational” groups coexist, buffer zones may also be needed to absorb clashes. On a global scale, airports and airplanes are also turning into a reticular buffer zone. Like the maritime realm, they become spaces with their own rules that function as cushions between the societies of the developed world and the universe of legal and illegal immigration. It will be necessary for geopolitical powers to invent the reticular equivalents of the buffer zone at continental and global scales in order to respond to the buildup of tensions related to the rapid integration of the world through economic dimensions of globalization. It is essential, however, that these real or virtual buffer zones will not only have the role of partitioning new geographical spaces but also of functioning as meeting points, as crossroads of exchange and dialog. Diasporas already play such a role. Between the West and countries like China or India, they constitute in-between reticular spaces that share cultural characteristics of both worlds. Their role has been instrumental in regulating population flows, encouraging the exchange of products, capital, and innovation, and promoting dialog and understanding. Diasporas can also become unstable spaces, just as the traditional buffer zones have.

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See Also: Borderlands; Sovereignty; Territory and Territoriality.

Further Reading Amit, I., Yiftachel, O., 2016. Urban colonialism and buffer zones: gray spaces in Hebron and Nicosia. Geogr. Res. Forum 36, 144–159. Bailey, S.D., 1980. Non-military areas in UN practice. Am. J. Int. Law 74, 499–524. Bechev, D., Nicolaidis, K., 2010. Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflict and Memory in a Transnational World. Tauris Academic Studies, London. Chay, J., Ross, T.E. (Eds.), 1986. Buffer States in World Politics. Westview Press, Boulder. Del Sarto, R., 2010. Borderlands: the Middle East and north Africa as the EU’s southern buffer zone’. Mediterranean Front. Borders Conflicts Memory Transnation. World 149–167. Fazal, T.M., 2011. State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. Princeton University Press. Gottmann, J., 1980. Les frontières et les marches: cloisonnement et dynamique du monde. In: Kishimoto, H. (Ed.), Geography and its Frontiers. In Memory of Hans Boesch, Kümmerly and Frey, Bern, pp. 53–58. Hall, D.H., 1948. Zones of the international frontier. Geogr. Rev. 38, 615–625. Heffernan, M., 1998. The Meaning of Europe. Geography and Geopolitics. Arnold, London. Huntington, S.P., 1993. The clash of civilizations? Foreign Aff. 72, 22–49. Kitsikis, D., 1994. L’Empire Ottoman. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. Knippenberg, H., 2006. The political geography of religion: historical state-church relations in Europe and recent challenges. Geojournal 67 (4), 253–265. Leshem, N., Pinkerton, A., 2016. Re-inhabiting no-man’s land: genealogies, political life and critical agendas. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 41, 41–53. Maier, C.S., 2006. Among Empires. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Mitchell, D., 2005. The SUV model of citizenship: Floating bubbles, buffer zones, and the rise of the “purely atomic” individual. Polit. Geogr. 24 (1), 77–100. Partem, M.G., 1983. The buffer system in international relations. J. Confl. Resolut. 27, 3–26. Prescott, J.R.V., 2014 (Routledge Library Editions: Political Geography). Political Frontiers and Boundaries, vol. 12. Routledge. Rey, V., 1996. Europes orientales, Europe balkanique. In: Brunet, R., Rey, W. (Eds.), Géographie Universelle: Europes Orientales, Russie, Asie Centrale, vol. 1. Belin-Reclus, Paris, pp. 8–156. Romer, J.C. (Ed.), 2004. Face aux Barbares, marches et confins d’empires. Tallandier, Paris. Sinnhuber, K.A., 1954. Central Europe-Mitteleuropa-Europe centrale. An analysis of a geographical term. Trans. Pap. 20, 15–39. Taillard, C., 1989. Le Laos, Stratégies D’un Etat-Tampon. RECLUS, Montpellier. Till, K.E., Sundberg, J., Pullan, W., Psaltis, C., Makriyianni, C., Zincir Celal, R., Meltem, O.S., Dowler, L., 2013. Interventions in the political geographies of walls. Polit. Geogr. 33, 52–62.

Business Services John R Bryson and Emma C Gardner, City-Region Economic Development Institute, Department of Strategy and International Business, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by John R. Bryson, volume 1, pp 368–374, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Business services This term covers a broad spectrum of services that are predominantly traded in business-to-business transactions. Commoditization The onset of price-based competition for goods or service that occurs due to a lack of differentiable product or service attributes among market offerings. Emotional labor The process by which employers manage employees’ feelings during social interaction in the workplace. Externalization The term used to describe the process by which in-house services are transferred to external suppliers. Goods-related business services A subdivision of the category of business services that describes firms that provide inputs to clients that directly support operational activities (cleaning, catering, and facility management). Internalization The term used to describe the activities of a client who decides to replace a service obtained from an external provider with an in-house resource. Knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) A subdivision of the category business services that describes firms that provide information, expertise, and often strategic knowledge as intermediate inputs into private- and public-sector clients. Outsourcing It describes an in-house process (service or product) that has been transferred to an external supplier usually located in the same country. Second global shift It describes the development of a new international division of labor in which service activities and processes are incorporated into the international economy. The “shift” represents the transfer of service functions and employment to what may be lower-cost locations. Service offshoring/global sourcing These terms are refinements of the concept of outsourcing. They describe services that have been outsourced to suppliers located in foreign countries. The term “service offshoring” was developed in the United States and United Kingdom and is problematic as services can be “offshored” to foreign suppliers located in the same continental landmass. The alternative concept of global sourcing removes the Anglo-American bias from this terminology. SIC The Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities is a measure of economic activity constructed by the UK National Statistics agency to classify business establishments and other statistical units by the type of economic activities they are engaged in.

Developed and developing market economies have been experiencing a process of structural change over the last three decades that has involved two related alterations: first, a process of deindustrialization in which manufacturing’s share of employment has been declining; and second, compensating growth in employment and output in services and especially in business and professional services (BPSs), including digital and creative services. This shift toward competing on knowledge and expertise in client service relationships has increased the role educational systems play in supporting national competitiveness in expertise-intensive economies. Business services add value to their clients by providing operational and strategic inputs. Most business service firms are orientated toward national markets reflecting the importance of small firms in this sector. Translocal BPS firms have developed, albeit these tend to be created through linking national partnerships into an international corporate framework; many smaller firms are now able to provide services to international clients that are mediated through platforms, information and communications technology (ICT) and partnership networks with other small firms located in other countries. Business service firms play an important role in developing new process and product innovations. They develop new products (management/organizational ideas, marketing concepts, etc.) and sell them to clients, and this can have a major impact on the local and increasingly international organization of capitalist activities. It is important not to underestimate the role business service firms play in the formation of new economic geographies. Alterations in the economic system are the result of a series of unrelated and related changes made by independent private- and public-sector organizations. Central to these alterations are the activities of a group of business service professionals: management gurus and management consultants. Business services played an important role in the development of Fordism through the activities of F.W. Taylor, the American management guru and consultant, and more recently in encouraging clients to introduce e-commerce, outsourcing and offshoring, knowledge management platforms, Big Data analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI) into their business models. A key role played by business services is the transfer of

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innovation between firms and across space. They act as key intermediaries in capitalist economic systems, facilitating innovation and change, providing additional capacity and expertise to clients, and acting as intermediaries to support complex transactions including mergers and acquisitions (M&A), flotations, Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVA), company closures, cybersecurity, crisis management, and ongoing processes of financialization including the establishment of public–private partnerships and the development of new financial business models.

Defining Business Services The academic literature on business services has its foundations in a ground-breaking monograph published by Harry Greenfield in 1966. In this classic work, Greenfield argued that the consumer–producer dichotomy with respect to goods could also be applied to services. Consumer goods are produced to satisfy final demand while producer goods (machine tools, etc.) are intermediate inputs that contribute to the further production of output. He argued that a category of consumer services existed, as well as producer services with the latter providing intermediate inputs into the activities of private- and public-sector organizations. The new term “producer service” described all services that business firms, not-for-profit institutions, and governments provide and sell to producers rather than to consumers. The category of producer service includes all intermediate services ranging from finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE), business services, and professional services. Business services are a subcategory of producer services as the term excludes FIRE and consumer services that can be used for final and intermediate consumption (Fig. 1). The term business service covers a broad spectrum of services that are predominantly traded in business-to-business transactions. In practice, business services are used by both producers and consumers; for example, an accountant can complete tax forms for individuals or firms. The category of business services is further divided into two types. First, goods-related services directly support operational activities required to produce goods and services. This subcategory includes security, catering, and facility management.

Figure 1

Defining producer, business, and professional services.

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Second, knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) provide information and often strategic knowledge interventions to clients. This subcategory includes computer services, industrial design, technical services, market research, executive search, cybersecurity, data analytics (Big Data), and management consultancy. It also includes a further subcategory of “professional services” that includes legal and accountancy services. In all cases, business services are identified as activities that complement, substitute, or develop the in-house service functions of clients. Business services play a critical role in the transformation of low-value manufacturing into advanced manufacturing with a focus on the creation of high value-added goods consisting of a blend or a hybridization of service and manufacturing functions, for example, smartphones and voice-activated smart speakers with onboard digital assistants.

Measuring Business Services in National Economies The ongoing structural realignment being experienced by economies makes it impossible for governments to ensure that their national economic statistics are an adequate reflection of economic activity. This has always been the case. The UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activity (SIC) is a measure of economic activity, but essentially it is a backward-looking measure; the SIC cannot be constantly amended to take into consideration ongoing developments in the division of labor. New functions are created, and firms are established that deliver new types of products and services that do not fit with the existing SIC. It takes some time for the SIC and academics to identify new types of economic activity and to alter the existing classification system. The United Kingdom’s SIC has a long history of periodic change as it attempts to mirror the current structure of the economy; it was first introduced in 1948 and the classification was revised in 1958, 1968, 1980, 1992, 1997, and 2007. During the late 1980s it became apparent that something rather interesting was happening in developed market economies: the rapid and unexpected growth of a heterogeneous group of activities that came under the label business services. Existing criteria for measuring sectoral economic activity were less than helpful in monitoring this development, as they were designed to measure an economy centered on manufacturing rather than services. Only recently has the categorization of economic activity evolved to capture the diversity of the service activity. An indication of this problem is that initially geographers working on the growth of business services in the United Kingdom had to rely on SIC 8395 (other business services not elsewhere specified) as the primary measure for business services. The number of employees in this category doubled in only 6 years, 1981–87 (up by 160,000 workers, to 316,000 in 1987). At this time, this SIC code was problematic as it included a heterogeneous assortment of activities, including management consultants, market research and public relations consultants, document copying, duplicating and tabulating services, and other services “primarily engaged in providing services to other enterprises” such as employment agencies, security services, debt collection, press agencies, freelance journalists, translators, and typing services. The growth in the number of BPS firms was noticed by academics and policymakers and alerted them to the structural realignment that was underway in developed market economies. This is an important point in that it draws attention to emergent economic sectors. It is worth noting that between a quarter and a third of jobs, occupations, and employment activities did not exist 30 years ago. These jobs include economic activities related to the Internet, mobile computing, smartphones, health care, transport, and creative and digital services, including cybersecurity. Technological advancements continue to reconfigure the production and delivery of service activity, and therefore it is essential that economic geographers continue to monitor the appropriateness of contemporary economic classifications to ensure that new high-growth emergent activities are accurately represented.

Characteristics of Business Service Firms The growth in employment in business services was also reflected in extremely high rates of new firm formation. Business services were the main contributors of UK and US small firm service sector growth in the 1980s and 1990s and more recently in South Asia. Not only were business service growth rates generally slightly higher than those for consumer service sectors, but business services generated nearly three times as many extra businesses. Particularly outstanding was the expansion in computer service firms, but substantial growth rates were also experienced by management consultants, professional and technical services (surveyors, architects, consulting engineers, and draftsmen), market researchers, and more recently cybersecurity and digital and creative services. These growth rates are currently being experienced in some Asia-Pacific cities as emerging economies incorporate business services into their production systems. Between 1980 and 2005, for example, in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) the service sector grew from less than 40% of GDP to more than 50% by 2005. The outsourcing of business service activity from “developed” economies is fueling some of this growth, as payroll, customer support, and technical support functions are relocated to specialized providers overseas in what is termed business process outsourcing (BPO). While India is relatively dominant in this market, recent years have seen other countries, such as Kenya, develop the capabilities to drive growth in business services employment. The structural composition of all business service sectors reflects a bipolar distribution with a high number of very small firms and smaller numbers of large firms. This distribution reflects a firm formation process that has comparatively few barriers to entry. In this context, it is important to distinguish between goods-related services and KIBS. The goods-related service providers supply relatively standardized support services, often involving manual workers. They tend to have higher barriers to entry regarding capital and equipment. They also tend to be much larger companies and in many cases these markets are dominated by large transnational service suppliers. A good example is ISS (Integrated Service Solutions), a Danish provider of goods-related business services. This company

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was established in 1901 to provide security services, but has diversified into contract catering, cleaning, maintenance, facility management, and office support. ISS provides transnational corporations (TNCs) with integrated facility services across borders with a focus on creating value for clients by allowing them to focus on their core business. This firm services and maintains facilities or workplaces for clients. In 2017, 70% of this firm’s revenue came from Continental and Northern Europe and 25% from emerging markets. In 2017, ISS acquired Guckenheimer, a provider of catering services, to develop the firm’s geographical footprint in the United States. Compared to goods-related services KIBS firms have low capital and equipment barriers to entry as many of these firms sell expertise or knowledge founded upon the established reputations of individuals. The primary barrier is an expertise-based reputation for successful service delivery. Successful business service professionals create individual brands that are recognized by clients. Low barriers to entry means that from the 1980s the growth of small business service firms stands out as the single most important component of the rapid growth of small service sector business. But, this is only the case for some types of KIBS. The large accountancy firms are experiencing an ongoing process of commoditization driven by technological innovations, alterations in regulations, and client procurement. Commoditization is reducing margins and enhancing competitiveness in some service areas. There are two consequences. First, firms are focusing on higher value-added services that are more technologically orientated and this is increasing barriers to entry. Second, they are applying technology to reduce operational costs in the delivery of their most standardized services. The majority of business service activities have yet to be transformed into professional occupations. The process of professionalization represents an attempt by an industrial sector to restrict entry by establishing a system of formal examinations or an accreditation process. Professionalism represents a form of social closure that is designed to maintain the integrity of an industry’s knowledge base, ultimately limiting supply and enhancing margins. The primary business service professions are represented by lawyers and accountants, but other business services are trying to transform themselves into recognized professions. Management consultancy has tried to professionalize, but has failed due to the difficulties of identifying a single branch of knowledge that can be defined as “management consultancy.”

Explaining the Growth of Business Service Firms The tendency for firms to externalize or outsource functions and activities previously produced in-house (internalized) is one of the best-known hypotheses used to explain the rapid relative growth of business services. It has its origins in research on the importance of complementarity and economies of scale for decisions by firms about whether to externalize or internalize service functions. The problem facing all firms, irrespective of sector, concerns whether to “make” or to “buy” specified service inputs. Few firms can avoid making these decisions because the inputs provided by business services can improve organizational efficiency and add value to a good or a service at different stages in the production chain. The more advanced or complicated the production process, the more significant the decisions about business service inputs. By choosing to “buy,” usually on a contractual basis negotiated in advance, the firm is likely to be able to command the services of an expert employed by a firm specializing in a particular activity such as advertising, website construction, cybersecurity, or computer software installation and configuration for firm-specific tasks. Changing business practices and enhanced competition have been important drivers behind the growth of business services. Changing business practices as an explanation is related to the process of externalization if only because strategic downsizing and cost-cutting, especially by large client companies, meant that many firms no longer had sufficient staff to internalize business service functions. The result was the creation of large numbers of new independent business service firms. Much of the research into the drivers behind the growth of business services has revealed that cost-driven externalization based on differential transaction costs was not the major factor behind the growth of business service firms. The most important factor was demand for specialized technical expertise combined with a myriad of non-cost and cost-driven factors. Drawing upon a range of studies that have been undertaken on business services over the last 30 years it is possible to identify 10 factors that have contributed to the growth of this sector of the economy (the first 4 factors list “cost-driven considerations” and the last 6 points list “noncost considerations”): 1. Transaction costs. According to the transaction cost literature firms will turn to the marketplace for a range of services in cases where external provision is less expensive than internal provision. This explanation for employing business service firms represents a “pure” form of cost-driven externalization. The price comparison between internal and external provision of business service expertise may be based on an actual comparison of cost differentials or be a perception that external is cheaper than internal provision. 2. Flexibility. Firms employ business service firms where there is a requirement for different types and quantities of expertise, information, and knowledge. In this instance it makes comparatively limited sense for the firm to employ full-time staff, but instead to depend on external provision. 3. Risk reduction. By employing external providers of expertise clients are not exposed to the risks associated with full-time employees. Clients do not have to provide training and invest in building or maintaining in-house functions and during economic downturns clients can reduce their use of external expertise. 4. Concentration on core skills. There is the well-known debate concerning firms concentrating on what they do best rather than trying to run in-house departments designed to provide peripheral business service expertise; peripheral in this instance to the company’s core activity.

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5. Lack of expertise. A firm may not have the required expertise. In this case the firm can decide to establish an in-house department or draw upon external expertise. The difficulty and cost of establishing in-house provision may encourage companies to consider employing external experts. 6. New services. The developing market for the supply of business services produced new skills and expertise that were rapidly incorporated into client’s business requirements. Related is an increased awareness by clients of the types of expertise available. 7. Third-party expertise. In some circumstances a client will require an independent evaluation of work undertaken in-house or by another firm. This may take the form of an evaluation of a program of work or confirmation that an internal decision is correct. 8. Growing complexity of management. As business becomes increasingly competitive and global, client companies, to remain competitive, must access sophisticated design, consultancy, and marketing expertise. Enhanced global competition and growing complexity of products and services has resulted in greater demand for expertise that increasingly does not reside inside firms. 9. New technology. New technology frequently requires alterations to working practices that may be beyond the expertise and experience of a company’s employees. For example, the increasing importance of cybersecurity is driving the procurement of specialist expertise by client firms which possess or handle sensitive data. Often, in such cases, firms are faced with a “make or buy” decision, and opt to source specialist input due to the time sensitivity of such issues and to mitigate risk. 10. New regulations. New regulations (health and safety, employment, environmental) may be introduced that require expertise that is only required for a short period of time.

Business ServicesdReputations and Emotional Labor Successful business service entrepreneurs possess three important attributes: professional expertise, an existing reputation (sometimes iconic), and a network of client contacts. These essential requirements for competitive success explain the concentration of founders’ previous employment in same-sector or client firms, as these professionals acquire their reputations, expertise, and client contacts while working for either large supply or client companies. This factor partly accounts for concentrations of business service firms in major cities. Professional reputations rather than knowledge drive the formation process for business service firms because an imperfect marketplace for business service expertise exists. Part of this imperfection is the difficulties clients have in determining the quality of a supplier’s expertise. The problem is wrapped up in a productdknowledge/expertisedthat is intangible and whose quality is difficult to assess. One way of overcoming an imperfect market is to employ individuals and companies that the client already knows either directly or indirectly. Personal knowledge of individual professionals rather than of companies is thus extremely important in the client search process. The implication is that the balance of power in the labor market is held by individuals with established professional reputations and the value of this expertise is rising. This means that consultants, advertising executives, lawyers, investment bankers, and financial analysts, in effect, rent their brains, as well as reputations. The implication is that graduates, and more recently school leavers, enter large business service companies as trainees to acquire knowledge and a reputation among clients. The more recent focus on recruiting and training school leavers is a feature found in large accountancy firms that have experienced problems in recruiting graduates to service functions that have been experiencing commoditization. Once a reputation has been acquired, there is nothing to prevent a business service employee from leaving the firm, taking clients with them, and establishing their own practice. Business service activities have very low capital barriers to entry, but high human or reputational entry barriers. The importance of presentation, communication, and display in service work implies that such work cannot be conceptualized solely as an economic performance. Business service work is a “hybrid” form of work in which the economic and the cultural are blurred; this means that this form of work is a qualitatively different form of work to manufacturing employment. In effect, the provision of a business service to a client represents a dramatic act or a form of impression management. Impression management is a key feature of the work of KIBS as it is an essential part of the ways in which they present themselves and interact with clients. The accountants PwC as well as EY hire image consultants to provide seminars in personal presentation for their client-facing teams. These seminars examine ways of increasing credibility and projecting the right image when undertaking client audits and when pitching for new business. The former has also employed image consultants to instruct potential partners in dining etiquette and in the art of looking, acting, and sounding like a partner of a major global accountancy company. This implies that KIBS represent a form of “emotional labor,” a term which describes the process by which employers manage employees’ feelings during social interaction in the work process. Much of the literature on emotional labor concentrates on exploring relatively low-paid service work in which employers are actively engaged in managing the hearts and minds of their employees. In business service work, the professional institutions, the employers, and most importantly, individual professionals are implicated in emotional labor. An increasingly competitive market environment is resulting in firms trying to offer superior or highly differentiated services to clients as a key value proposition. This effort has led to intensification in the working hours of business service professionals as increasingly they are always available to clients via e-mail and smartphones. Client-facing employees are provided with smartphones and laptops to ensure continual connectivity, but by providing such resources, firms are implicitly demanding that their staff are always accessible; this demand presents implications for work–life balance leading to erosion in the boundaries between home and work. This new degree of approachability and accessibility is a mechanism to embed clients within the network of a business service firm. Strengthening relationships between clients and providers is particularly important in business relationships that

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have high levels of information asymmetry. Clients have great difficulty in determining the total value of a business service input as well as expertise-based reputations. The development of client-centered business models is one way to retain and attract clients and to avoid commoditization. Differentiation through service is an important source of value added in business service firms.

Business Service GeographiesdGlobal Cities, Service Offshoring, and the Second Global Shift Global Cities Business services have a complex geography that reflects the existence of concentrations of clients in major cities or in the global cities of London and New York. Business services have been growing rapidly not only in the major cities, but also in locations further down the urban hierarchy and even in rural locations. Conventionally, it has been assumed by economic geographers that the major cities are the locations for business service firms that provide the best expertise for client companies while firms located in other locations provide adequate expertise. This is an assumption that has yet to be tested by empirical research. Concentrations of business service firms have been used as one of the most important indicators to identify world or global cities, but this research design has not addressed differences in the quality of available expertise between firms located in major cities and those located elsewhere. The difficulty is that the global cities literature prioritizes cities in the research design while neglecting to explore the ways in which expertise is produced and delivered to their clients by business service firms. For some types of expertise, the global cities are just the access node used by clients for expertise that exists elsewhere in the urban hierarchy. The global production networks (GPN) conceptual framework has been developed to provide a theoretically informed methodological tool for exploring the globalization of production. The GPN approach focused initially on exploring governance in transnational relationships and more recently there has been an attempt to develop GPN 2.0 with a focus on dynamics. The literature on GPN has predominately focused on manufacturing. This is unfortunate given the important role business services play in facilitating internationalization; the emergence of London as an international financial center occurred to support the growth of international trade in the 19th Century. The incorporation of services into GPN has begun with a focus on financial and logistic services. Nevertheless, it is important that the ongoing development of the GPN approach engages with the well-developed geographical literature on the internationalization of BPSs.

Rural AreasdLone Eagles and High Fliers Research by economic geographers into the activities of business service firms has been dominated by studies of firms located in major cities. It is unfortunate that as a result geographers have comparatively limited understanding of the knowledge economy and the activities of KIBS in “ordinary cities” or smaller cities and market towns as well as rural areas. Research into rural-based BPSs is dominated by the American studies undertaken by William Beyers. He identified that the American Midwest has experienced significant growth rates in business service firms and importantly some of these companies are engaged in interregional and even international exports. Beyers classified exporters’ rural business service firms as “lone eagles” (one-person proprietorships) or “high fliers” (firms with more than one employee). By the very nature of the kinds of services offered by lone eagles and high fliers it is unlikely that they will be producing outputs intended primarily for consumption in local markets. There will, for example, be very limited demand for high-level management consultancy or advice on the installation and maintenance of corporate IT systems in the small and dispersed communities typical of rural areas in the United States, Canada, Australia, or Europe. Much of the output of these advanced services, and indeed those located in the much larger and longer established urban centers, are of necessity traded between localities and regions.

Service Offshoring and the Second Global Shift Business services are usually supplied and consumed locally in a process of face-to-face co-production. This relationship is based on embodied expertise centered on the ability of service providers to enter interactive relationships with clients. Heavily embodied services have conventionally been considered to have low productivity levels as it is difficult to substitute embodied expertise with machines. The relationship between embodied expertise, machines, and proximity between the supplier and consumer of a business service is being challenged with developments in AI. New technology has the potential to create entirely new services or to challenge the relationship that conventionally exists between buyers and suppliers in the co-production of a service in time and space. Initially, replacing some employees with machines increased the efficiency and profitability of service firms, but local expensive labor was still a central component of these production systems. Nevertheless, the development of new technology and associated production systems offered the possibility of relocating some service functions from high- to low-cost production locations (India, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean). Some business services are thus following manufacturing in the development of a “global shift.” The dynamics and resulting geographies of the “services shift” are so different to that of manufacturing that what occurred in the 2000s is the emergence of a “second global shift” or the development of a new international division of “service” labor (NIDSL). During the first global shift, branch plants in developing or less-developed countries were associated with the assembly of products designed by and for the developed world. During the second global shift, service functions are transferred from developed market economies to other locations. This shift could be designed to reduce costs, to provide services for a foreign market, to develop 24/7

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provision, to reduce exposure to country risk, or to access skilled labor. The geography of the second global shift is different from that of the first. It is more constrained by language, as well as cultural similarity, or the ability of foreign producers of services to relate to customers located in other countries. An additional factor influencing the location of offshore service facilities is the requirement to provide a 24-h service to customers or an extended service beyond standard working hours. The “second global shift” is a complex issue that embraces economic as well as political geography. Data processing has now become a global industry and governments are increasingly sending sensitive data to be processed abroad. The NIDSL now involves the routine processing of data in foreign countries that has the potential to expose citizens to cybersecurity threats including identity theft. Several factors lie behind the decision to send a particular service activity offshore. First, the service must be capable of some degree of standardization that does not require face-to-face interaction with clients. Second, the inputs and outputs required to deliver a service must be capable of being traded or transmitted with the assistance of ICT. Third, some service activities are not fixed in space and can be provided either as a form of foreign trade or by the temporary relocation of a service worker to a client’s premises, for example, management consultancy or various forms of auditing.

Contemporary Issues in Business Services Diversity Business services have traditionally been male-dominated worlds, where the glass ceiling hinders women from reaching the most senior positions in equal numbers compared to their male counterparts. Although many firms have launched initiatives, such as mentoring programs, to resolve this issue, gaps remain. This can be exemplified by, but is not limited to, accountancy firms, such as Grant Thornton who reported a gender pay gap of 26.6% at the end of 2017, and PwC who had a mean gender pay gap of 43.8% in 2018 following the introduction of mandatory gender pay gap reporting which came into force in the United Kingdom in 2017 for all firms with more than 250 employees. More recently there has been an increasing focus on social mobility in BPSs by researchers. The Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission have sought to understand the underrepresentation of individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in UK business services. Often, intangible factors are the cause of such exclusion; image is critical, and along with it, other proxies for professionalism such as accents and “polish” are used to select recruits who are identified as more likely to be “client friendly.” Recent years have seen firms altering recruitment practices to try to enhance social mobility, for example, by reducing academic entry requirements or offering alternative routes into the professions, such as apprenticeships. Another notable US initiative to improve diversity in the legal profession is the Mansfield Rule. Introduced in 2017, it monitors the candidates that firms consider for their open leadership and governance positions and if 30% of such applicants are minorities, firms are Mansfield Certified. Although still in its infancy, over 50 firms have signed up to the initiative, demonstrating the positive action currently being undertaken to eradicate underrepresentation within business services sectors.

Procurement Although relationships play an important role in business services, there is an increasingly pragmatic approach to the procurement of expertise by clients. This process is becoming increasingly professionalized as client firms develop dedicated procurement teams, which select service providers based on perceived quality and reputation, but also on price. The increasing professionalization of the business service procurement process is leading to increased competitive pressures in the market for business services, particularly for firms providing services to larger clients. Technological developments are also facilitating new business models in the sector. Platforms such as a “PeoplePerHour” allow microfirms and individuals to advertise their services on a freelance basis enabling clients to easily appraise market offerings and remove some of the mystique surrounding the procurement of business services allowing customers to select a provider based on price and availability. Such platforms may enhance efficiency in the shorter term, on both the part of the provider and procurer; it may also contribute to the price sensitivity of particular market segments.

Conclusion The growth in employment in business services and in the number of business service firms represents one of the most important structural realignments to be experienced by developed market economies. This growth reflects the shift toward competitiveness based upon expertise and education. Education and the effectiveness of a country’s educational system are essential for the continued development of business services, as such firms’ value propositions are based upon the possession of specialist knowledge. This interplay between business service firms and the educational system requires further research as does the application of AI to business services processes. Geographers must explore the ways in which business service professionals acquire, maintain, and develop their expertise but also the application of new technologies to the operational delivery of existing business services and the emergence of new products based on the analysis of Big Data. Research into educational systems and the activities of the professional bodies is also required, to understand the role they play in forming “educated” professionals, and on AI and the emergence of new business services processes and products. Such research would also involve identifying the “soft” personality-related skills

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that are important in the client–business service provider relationship and exploring alterations in the geographic organization of business service delivery processes. A deeper understanding of service delivery processes would also involve understanding the internationalization processes of Asia-Pacific business service firms and developments in the governance and regulation of trade in services. In addition, much of the research on business services has focused on service provision in extraordinary citiesdlarge cities and global citiesdand on cities located in the Global North. Geographers must begin to explore business services in other settings including the Global South and also in more ordinary citiesdsmaller towns and cities. It is important to remember that business service firms sell expertise, but the development of expertise involves an important transformation that requires considerable further research. Business service firms commercialize expertise by transforming it into a product that has value. The existing literature overemphasizes the quality and nature of the expertise provided by many business service firms. Comparatively few academics have explored the types of knowledge/expertise provided by business service firms to their clients. In addition, the process by which expertise is co-created with clients is altering as business service firms experience commoditization and begin to compete on price rather than on relationships and networks. Many BPS firms provide forms of recipe or standardized knowledge that is customized to meet client needs and expectations. In such cases, the expertise is readily available, but the added value is formed during a process of commercialization and customization to meet the needs of specific clients. While the knowledge or expertise may be standardized and largely generic, the creativity may be found in the process of commercialization rather than in the actual expertise. This raises important questions regarding the nature of the business service creative process. On the one hand, business service firms sell knowledge that is based on recipes that are available to all firms. On the other hand, a business service firm competes through its ability to customize recipe knowledge to meet the needs of a specific customer. Much more research is required to understand this process by which business service firms customize knowledge and also create new products and services. It is important to distinguish between the service that is provided and the processes by which business service firms deliver expertise. It is these processes that are changing as business service firms respond to commoditization and to developments in AI.

See Also: e-Business and e-Commerce; Innovation; Local Economic Development.

Further Reading Beaverstock, J.V., 2007. Transnational work: global professional labour markets in professional service accounting firms. In: Bryson, J.R., Daniels, P.W. (Eds.), The Handbook of Service Industries. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 409–432. Beyers, W.B., Lindahl, D.P., 1996. Explaining the demand for producer services. Pap. Reg. Sci. 75, 351–374. Bryson, J.R., 2007. A ‘second’ global shift: the offshoring or global sourcing of corporate services and the rise of distanciated emotional labour. Geogr. Ann. 89B (S1), 31–43. Bryson, J.R., Daniels, P.W., 2015. Handbook of Service Business: Management, Marketing, Innovation and Internationalization. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Bryson, J.R., Daniels, P.W., Warf, B., 2004. Service Worlds: People, Organizations and Technologies. Routledge, London. Cook, A.C.G., Faulconbridge, J.R., Muzio, D., 2012. London’s legal elite: recruitment through cultural capital and the reproduction of social exclusivity in City professional service fields. Environ. Plan. 44 (7), 1744–1762. Daniels, P.W., Bryson, J.R., 2002. Manufacturing services or servicing manufacturing? New forms of production in advanced capitalist economies. Urban Stud. 39, 977–991. Daniels, P.W., Ho, K.C., Hutton, T.A. (Eds.), 2012. New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From Industrial Restructuring to the Cultural Turn. Routledge, London. Djellal, F., Gallouj, F., 2008. Measuring and Improving Productivity in Services. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Empson, L., Muzio, D., Broschack, J.P., Hinings, B., 2015. The Oxford Handbook of Professional Service Firms. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Gallouj, F., Djellal, F. (Eds.), 2010. The Handbook of Innovation and Services: A Multi-Disciplinary Perspective. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. Greenfield, H.I., 1966. Manpower and the Growth and Producer Services. Columbia University Press, New York. Knight, E., Wójcik, D., 2017. Geographical linkages in the financial services industry: a dialogue with organizational studies. Reg. Stud. 51 (1), 116–127. Maglio, P.P., Kieliszewski, C.A., Spohrer, J.C. (Eds.), 2010. Handbook of Service Science. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. McDowell, L., 2015. Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography – the lives of others: body work, the production of difference, and labor geographies. Econ. Geogr. 91 (1), 1–23. Sassen, S., 2001. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Relevant Websites https://www.census.gov/services/index.html. American Government website that provides information on the U.S. service industry. https://www.ons.gov.uk/file?uri¼/methodology/classificationsandstandards/ukstandardindustrialclassificationofeconomicactivities/uksic2007/uksic2007web.pdf. British government website that provides details of the UK Standard Industrial Classification of economic activities (SIC). http://www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid¼1996,45323734&_dad¼portal&_schema¼PORTAL&screen¼welcomeref&open¼/ industry&language¼en&product¼EU_MAIN_TREE&root¼EU_MAIN_TREE&scrollto¼0. Eurostat database that provides statistical information on services across the European Union. http://www.reser.net/. The website of the European Association for Research on Services.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY SECOND EDITION

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY SECOND EDITION EDITOR IN CHIEF

Audrey Kobayashi Department of Geography Queen’s University Kingston, ON, Canada

VOLUME 2

Elsevier Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, Netherlands The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 1GB, United Kingdom 50 Hampshire Street, 5th Floor, Cambridge MA 02139, United States Copyright Ó 2020 Elsevier Ltd. unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek permission, further information about the Publisher’s permissions policies and our arrangements with organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright Licensing Agency, can be found at our website: www.elsevier.com/permissions. This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by the Publisher (other than as may be noted herein). Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers may always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-0-08-102295-5 For information on all publications visit our website at http://store.elsevier.com

Publisher: Oliver Walter Acquisition Editor: Oliver Walter, Andre Wolff Content Project Manager: Kate Miklaszewska, Natalie Bentahar, Laura Jackson Designer: Mark Rogers

EDITOR IN CHIEF Audrey Kobayashi is Professor of Geography and a Queen’s Research Chair at Queen’s University. A native of British Columbia, she completed a B.A. (1976) and M.A. (1978) at the University of British Columbia, and a PhD (1983) at UCLA. She taught in Geography and East Asian Studies at McGill University from 1983 to 1994, then moved to Queen’s, initially as Director of the Institute of Women’s Studies (1994 to 1999) and thereafter as Professor of Geography. Other positions include President of the Canadian Association of Geographers (1999-2001), and President of the Association of American Geographers (2011-2012). In 2011 she was inducted into the Royal Society of Canada, and in 2018 was appointed a Fellow of the Association of American Geographers. Her scholarship has always been strongly focused on issues of human rights. She has published widely on topics, such as anti-racism, citizenship, immigration policy, employment equity, and disability studies. Her publications are always matched, however, by participation in communities as a scholar activist. She is currently involved in several research projects that address the “Landscapes of Injustice” of the Japanese-Canadian uprooting, and the “Right to Remain” of people currently living in precarious housing in the downtown East Side of Vancouver. Her most recent project is to study the role of protest music in activism for the rights of homeless people in Dublin, Ireland and Vancouver. Major publications include Rethinking the Great White North: Race, Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada (co-edited with Andrew Baldwin and Laura Cameron, UBC Press, 2011), Immigrant Geographies of North American Cities (co-edited with Carlos Teixeira and Wei Li, Oxford University Press, 2012), and Geographies of Peace and Armed Conflict (Routledge, 2012), Racialization, Indigeneity, and Racism in Canadian Universities (UBC Press 2017), and The International Encyclopedia of Geography (editor 2017). She has received major awards from the Canadian Association of Geographers, the American Association of Geographers, the Canadian Association of University Teachers, as well as the Barnes teaching award from the Faculty of Arts and Science Undergraduate Society, and the Queen’s Award for Excellence in Graduate Teaching.

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EDITORIAL BOARD Mark Boyle Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place University of Liverpool Liverpool, United Kingdom Noel Castree Department of Geography Manchester University Manchester, United Kingdom Francis L. Collins National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis University of Waikato Hamilton, New Zealand Jeremy W. Crampton School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Newcastle University Newcastle, United Kingdom Sarah de Leeuw University of Northern British Columbia Prince George, BC, Canada Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho Department of Geography National University of Singapore Singapore Isaac Luginaah Department of Geography The University of Western Ontario London, ON, Canada Brij Maharaj Geography Discipline, School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences University of Kwazulu-Natal Durban, South Africa

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SECTION EDITORS Mark Boyle Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place University of Liverpool Liverpool, United Kingdom Mark Boyle worked from 2003 to 2007 at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow as Lecturer and then Senior Lecturer in Geography and from 2007 to December 2017 as Professor/Chair of Geography at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. From 2007 to 2012, he served as head of the Department of Geography at Maynooth and from 2013 to 2016 as Director of the Interdisciplinary National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analyses (NIRSA) at Maynooth. From January 2018 he serves as Chair or Urban Studies and Director of the Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, at the University of Liverpool, United Kingdom. He has authored two books, edited a book, edited nine special editions/sections of international peer reviewed journals and published over 90 scholarly papers and reports (including 44 in international peer reviewed journals).

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Noel Castree Department of Geography Manchester University Manchester, United Kingdom Noel Castree is a Professor of Geography at Manchester University, United Kingdom, and an Honorary Professorial Research Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia. He edits the journal Progress in Human Geography and is author of the book Making Sense of Nature (2014).

Section Editors

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Francis L. Collins National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis University of Waikato Hamilton, New Zealand Francis L. Collins is Professor of Geography and Director of the National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis at the University of Waikato. His research has explored international migration focusing on the experiences, mobility patterns and regulation of temporary migrants. Francis’ research includes work exploring: international students and urban transformation, higher education and the globalization of cities, labor migration, marginalization and exploitation, time and youth migration, and the role of aspirations and desires as driving forces for migration. Francis is the author of Global Asian City: migration, desire and the politics of encounter in 21st century Seoul (Wiley, 2018) and co-editor of Intersections of Inequality, Migration and Diversification (Palgrave, 2019), and Aspiration, Desire and the Drivers of Migration (Routledge, 2019).

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Jeremy W. Crampton School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Newcastle University Newcastle, United Kingdom Jeremy W. Crampton’s interests are in how and why geolocational technology affects urban and everyday experience and wellbeing. In particular, he studies the effects of surveillance on privacy, spatial Big Data and algorithmic decision-making. To address these questions, he analyzes how digital landscapes of algorithms and data are planned, mapped, and produced. He also has a recent interest in the geolocational implications of biometric platforms such as facial and emotional recognition technologies. Jeremy is an Editor of the journal Dialogues in Human Geography, and the author of Mapping: A Critical Introduction to Cartography and GIS (Wiley).

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Sarah de Leeuw University of Northern British Columbia Prince George, BC, Canada Sarah de Leeuw, a Professor in Canada with the University of Northern British Columbia’s Northern Medical Program, the Faculty of Medicine at the University of British Columbia, is a cultural–historical geographer and creative writer (poetry and literary non-fiction). Her research, writing, teaching, and activism focus on feminist anti-colonial social justice, especially in rural, northern, and marginalized places. She holds a Canada Research Chair in Humanities and Health Inequities and, in 2017, was inducted into the Royal Society of Canada as a member of the College of New Scholars, Artists, and Scientists.

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Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho Department of Geography National University of Singapore Singapore Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho is Associate Professor at the Department of Geography and Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore. Her research addresses how citizenship is changing as a result of multi-directional migration flows in the Asia-Pacific. She is author of Citizens in Motion: Emigration, Immigration and Re-migration Across China’s Borders (Stanford University Press), which received the American Sociological Association’s (ASA) award for “Best Book in Global and Transnational Sociology by an International Scholar” in 2019. Elaine is Editor of the journal Social and Cultural Geography, and serves on the journal editorial boards of Citizenship Studies; Emotions, Society and Space; and the Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography.

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Isaac Luginaah Department of Geography The University of Western Ontario London, ON, Canada Isaac Luginaah is a Professor and was a Canada Research Chair in Health Geography (200-2017) at the Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario, London, Canada. He is a graduate of the University of Cape Coast, Ghana (BSc. Hons), Queen’s University of Belfast, UK (MSc), York University (MES), and McMaster University (PhD), Canada. His research addresses how emerging epidemics are radically changing health landscapes in the face of increased burdens from environmental exposure in both developed and developing countries. He has led several projects on population, environment, and health. His work in Africa and North America has made strong theoretical and methodological contributions, addressing environmental hazards and deficiencies in health service provision.

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Brij Maharaj Geography Discipline, School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences University of Kwazulu-Natal Durban, South Africa

Brij Maharaj is a senior professor in geography who has received widespread recognition for his research on urban politics, segregation, displacement, local economic development, xenophobia, and human rights, migration and diasporas, religion, philanthropy, and development. He has published over 150 scholarly papers in renowned journals, such as Urban Studies, International Journal of Urban and Regional Studies, Political Geography, Urban Geography, Antipode, Polity and Space, Geoforum, Local Economy, and GeoJournal, as well as five co-edited book collections. He is co-editor of the South African Geographical Journal (Routledge), and serves on several international editorial boards. He is a B-Rated NRF researcher. He is a regular media commentator on topical issues as part of his commitment to public intellectualism.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Manuel B Aalbers KU Leuven, The University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Gunn Marit Aasvang Department of Air Pollution and Noise, Division for Infection Control and Environmental Health, Norwegian Institute of Public Health, Oslo, Norway M Abreu University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Patrick Adler School of Cities, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Adrian Guillermo Aguilar Institute of Geography, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico J Agyeman Tufts University, Medford, MA, United States Ola Ahlqvist Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States L Albrechts University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Jon Anderson School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom GJ Andrews McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Gavin J Andrews McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Roger Antabe Department of Geography, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Constantinos Antonopoulos Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Management, University of Patras, Patras, Greece Neil Argent Geography and Planning, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia Godwin Arku The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Derek H Alderman University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Knoxville, TN, United States

Frederick Ato Armah Department of Environmental Science, School of Biological Sciences, College of Agriculture and Natural Sciences, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana

Fiona Allon Department of Gender and Cultural Studies, The University of Sydney, NSW, Australia

C Arun-Pina Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Luis F Alvarez Leon Department of Geography, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States

James Ash School of Arts and Cultures, Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Claes G Alvstam School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

Sheena Asthana School of Law, Criminology and Government, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Jennifer Atchison Australian Centre for Culture, Environment, Society and Space (ACCESS), School of Geography and Sustainable Communities, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia PJ Atkins Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Rowland Atkinson Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Maoz Azaryahu University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States; and University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel Iwan J Azis Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Jen Bagelman School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United kingdom Elena Baglioni School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom AL Bain Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada W Andrew Baldwin Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Matthew D Balentine University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States Clare Bambra Institute of Health and Society, Faculty of Medical Sciences, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Brandon Barclay Derman University of Illinois Springfield, Springfield, IL, United States

Holly Barcus Department of Geography, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, United States Trevor J Barnes Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Clive Barnett University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom Jon Barnett School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia Timothy Barney Department of Rhetoric and Communication Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, United States Chris Barrett English Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States Leigh Barrick Geography Department, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Tanja Bastia Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Ranu Basu Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jane Battersby African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa Michael Batty Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London, London, United Kingdom Jamie Baxter Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Trycia Bazinet Carleton University, North Bay, ON, Canada David Bell School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Scott Bell University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada

List of Contributors

David Bennett Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Adam Bledsoe University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, United States

Aimee Benoit Department of Geography, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada

S Bodden School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Vincent Berdoulay Laboratoire Passages (UMR 5319), CNRS; and University of Pau and Pays de l’Adour, Pau, France

JS Boggs Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada

Christin Bernhold Department of Geography, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany Kathryn Besio Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Hawaiʻi at Hilo, Hilo, HI, United States Ling Bian University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Amherst, NY, United States Marcy Bidney American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, United States Roland Billen University of Liege, Liege, Belgium Mark Birkin School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Bradley Wade Bishop School of Information Sciences, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, United States Elijah Bisung School of Kinesiology and Health Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada M Jean Blair Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Ismael Blanco The Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain Sarah Blandy School of Law, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Joe Blankenship University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States

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JD Bohland Global Politics and Societies Department, Hollins University, Roanoke, VA, United States Sophie Bond School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand David Bonilla Institute of Economic Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico Marco Bontje University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Gary Bosworth School of Geography, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, United Kingdom William M Bowen Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, United States Sophie Bowlby University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom Mark Boyle Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Paul Boyle Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom Jordan P Brasher University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Knoxville, TN, United States Mark Brayshay School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom Daniel Brendle-Moczuk McPherson Library, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

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List of Contributors

S Brentjes Univeristy of Sevilla, Sevilla, Spain

RA Butlin University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Gary Bridge School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

Michael Buzzelli The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Gavin Bridge Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

Jason A Byrne Department of Geography and Spatial Sciences, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

John Briggs University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Jake Rom D Cadag University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines

James MR Brock School of Biological Sciences, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Catherine A Calder The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

Marc Brosseau Department of Geography, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada Aleid E Brouwer Faculty of Spatial Science, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands; and Academy of International Business Administration, NHL Stenden University of Applied Sciences, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands Kath Browne Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland Christopher R Bryant University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada John R Bryson City-Region Economic Development Institute, Department of Strategy and International Business, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Dirk Burghardt Institute of Cartography, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany Ryan Burns Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Richard Bustin Lancing College, Lancing, United Kingdom Colin D Butler Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia; and Flinders University, Adelaide, SA, Australia Tim Butler Department of Geography, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom

Sydney Calkin Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom; and School of Geography, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom Liam Campling School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom Sébastien Caquard Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada Jordan Carlson Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jordan T Carlson Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Pádraig Carmody Department of Geography, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland; University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa; and Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Juliet Carpenter Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom Ricardo Carreon Sosa Posgraduate School of Engineering, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico

List of Contributors

Richard Carter-White Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

James Cheshire Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Denise M Carter University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

Lynda Cheshire School of Social Science, University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia

Irene Casas School of History and Social Sciences, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, LA, United States Emilio Casetti The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Heather Castleden University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada; and Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jose Esteban Castro Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom; and National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Buenos Aires, Argentina Filippo Celata Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy Elizabeth Chacko The George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States Chad Chambers Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States GU Chaolin School of Architecture, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China Graham Chapman Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Eric Charmes RIVES, UMR CNRS EVS, ENTPE, University of Lyon, Lyon, France Sutapa Chattopadhyay Geography and Development Studies, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, NS Canada Jingfu Chen Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China Zhangliang Chen Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics and Regional Economics Applications Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States

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Simon Chilvers Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Frangton Chiyemura The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Vera Chouinard School of Geography and Earth Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Nicholas R Chrisman Bellingham, WA, United States Brett Christophers Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden Jonathan Cinnamon Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada; and Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada Gordon L Clark Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; and Department of Banking and Finance, Monash Business School, Monash University, Caulfield, VIC, Australia Nigel Clark Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom David B Clarke Department of Geography, College of Science, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom Keith C Clarke Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Nick Clarke Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom P Claval Paris-Sorbonne University, Paris, France John Clayton Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Hugh Clout University College London, London, United Kingdom

Ian Cook Department of Geography, University of Exeter, Exeter, United kingdom

Denise S Cloutier Department of Geography, and Research Affiliate Institute on Aging and Lifelong Health, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

Philip Cooke Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

Allan Cochrane Department of Geography, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Logan Cochrane Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada; and Hawassa University, Hawassa, Ethiopia Daniel Cockayne Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Thomas J Cooke Department of Geography, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States Meghan Cope Department of Geography, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, United States Jon Corbett Community, Culture and Global Studies, University of British Columbia-Okanagan, Kelowna, BC, Canada Jonathan Corcoran The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

Chris Cocklin James Cook University, Townsville, QLD, Australia

Helen Couclelis Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States

Neil M Coe Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

Rory Coulter Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Amy Cohen Department of Anthropology, Okanagan College, Kelowna, BC, Canada Peter Collier Department of Geography, University of Portsmouth, Southsea, United Kingdom; and University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom Damian Collins University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Francis L Collins National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand Michael Collyer University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Alex R Colucci Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States

Pauline R Couper Geography, School of Humanities, York St John University, York, United Kingdom Kevin R Cox Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Shaphan Cox Discipline of Geography, School of Design and Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia Sophie Cranston Geography and Environment, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom Thomas W Crawford Department of Geography, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, United States

Creighton Connolly National University of Singapore, Singapore

Noel Cressie The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

David Conradson School of Earth and Environment, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Tim Cresswell University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

List of Contributors

Verónica Crossa The College of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico David Crouch University of Derby, Epperstone, United Kingdom Graham Crow University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Gregg Culver Institute of Geography, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany Andrew Cumbers Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Nigel Curry Lincoln International Business School, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, United Kingdom Michelle Daigle University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Caoilfhionn D’Arcy Maynooth University Department of Geography, NUI Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Sandy Dall’erba Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics and Regional Economics Applications Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States Craig Dalton Hofstra University, Department of Global Studies and Geography, Hempstead, NY, United States Frances Darlington-Pollock Department of Geography and Planning, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Raju J Das York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Ebenezer Dassah United Nations University - International Institute for Global Health (UNU-IIGH), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Mark Davidson Clark University, Worcester, MA, United States Amanda Davies Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia Anna R Davies Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

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Wayne KD Davies Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Suzanne Davies Withers Department of Geography, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States Simin Davoudi Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Leith Deacon School of Environmental Design and Rural Development, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario David Delaney Amherst College, Amherst, MA, United States C Delano-Smith Institute of Historical Research, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom Vincent J Del Casino, Jr. California State University, Long Beach, Long Beach, CA, United States Carolyn NM DeLoyde Department of Geography and Planning, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada Sarah de Leeuw Institute for Critical Indigenous Studies and Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, BC, Canada; and Northern Medical Program, UNBC, Faculty of Medicine, UBC, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada Eric M Delmelle Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, and Center for Applied Geographic Information Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States Carolyn NM DeLoyde Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jessica Dempsey University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Mark Denil sui generis, Washington, DC, United States Steve DeRoy The Firelight Group, Vancouver, BC, Canada Ben Derudder Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

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List of Contributors

Menusha De Silva Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore Michael R Desjardins Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, and Center for Applied Geographic Information Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States Pauline Deutz Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom Sarah Dickin Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm, Sweden Catherine D’Ignazio Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States Martin Dijst LISER, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxemburg Mahmoudi Dillon University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, United States Alan V Di Vittorio Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, United States Deborah P Dixon School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Iain Docherty University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Klaus Dodds Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom; and University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, United States Bolesław Doma nski Jagiellonian Univeristy, Krakow, Poland Betsy Donald Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Clemens Driessen Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands Martine Drozdz Technologies, Territories and Societies Laboratory, CNRS, Paris, France Jessica Dubow University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom

Michelle Duffy School of Environmental and Life Sciences, Faculty of Science, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia Patrick J Duffy National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Rae Dufty-Jones Western Sydney University, Sydney, NSW, Australia Michael Dunford Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China; and University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Jim Dunn Department of Health, Aging and Society, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada William Durkan Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Andrew C Dwyer University of Bristol Cyber Security Group, Faculty of Engineering, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom Owen J Dwyer, III Indiana University School of Liberal Arts at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), Indianapolis, IN, United States R Earickson University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, United States LaToya Eaves Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN, United States Sally Eden University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom T Edensor Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, United Kingdom David W Edgington University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Charity Edwards Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia; and University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

List of Contributors

David C Eisenhauer Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States Stuart Elden Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom; and Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom Kajsa Ellegård Department of Thematic Studies, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden Susan J Elliott Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Sarah Elwood University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States

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David Fazzino Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, Catawissa, PA, United States Yongjiu Feng Tongji University, Shanghai, China Zhiqiang Feng Institute of Geography, School of Geosciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom David A Fennell Department of Tourism and Environment, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada Md Azmeary Ferdoush University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, HI, United States

Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro Department of Geography, State University of New York at New Paltz, New Paltz, NY, United States

Eduarda Ferreira Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, NOVA University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal

Marta Bivand Erdal Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway

Federico Ferretti School of Geography, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Christina R Ergler School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Joshua Evans University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Karen Falconer Al-Hindi University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, United States C Cindy Fan Department of Geography, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States Matthew Farish Department of Geography and Program in Planning, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada May Farrales Northern Medical Program, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada; and Environment and Community Health Observatory Network, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

Carolyn Fish Department of Geography, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, United States Robert Fish University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom Robert Flanagan Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, United States Richard Florida School of Cities, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Robin Flowerdew Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, United Kingdom Ronan Foley The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

Victoria Fast Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

Ken E Foote University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States; and University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

James R Faulconbridge Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom

Benjamin Forest McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

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List of Contributors

Peter J Forman Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom

Nick Gallent University College London, London, United Kingdom

Kelleann Foster Penn State, University Park, PA, United States

Juan Carlos García-Palomares Department of Geography, Faculty of Geography and History, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Coleen A Fox Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States Urbano Fra Paleo University of Extremadura, Caceres, Spain Derek France Department of Geography and International Development, University of Chester, Chester, United Kingdom Claire Freeman School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Cordelia Freeman School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom Christina Frendo Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Scott M Freundschuh National Science Foundation, Arlington, VA, United States

Emma C Gardner City-Region Economic Development Institute, Department of Strategy and International Business, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Gioacchino Garofoli Department of Economics, Insubria University, Varese, Italy Jay D Gatrell Office of Academic Affairs, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL, United States Franz W Gatzweiler Institute of Urban Environment, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Xiamen, China Raegan Gibbings University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Wardlow Friesen University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

David Gibbs Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

Louis Kusi Frimpong Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana

Chris Gibson School of Geography and Sustainable Communities, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

Kurt Fuellhart Geography-Earth Sciences, Shippensburg University, Shippensburg, PA, United States

Emily Gilbert Canadian Studies Program, Department of Geography and Planning, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada; and University College, Toronto, ON, Canada

Simone Fullagar Griffith University, Nathan, QLD, Australia Lisa Funnell Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom; and University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, United States

Kathryn Gillespie Seattle, WA, United States Shea Ellen Gilliam Spatial Science Institute, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States

Levi Gahman Power, Space, and Cultural Change Research Unit, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

Menelaos Gkartzios Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Carolyn Gallaher School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC, United States

Brendan Gleeson Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

List of Contributors

Charmian Goh Asia Research Institute, Singapore, Singapore John R Gold Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom Eric Goldfischer University of Minnesota, Department of Geography, Environment, and Society, Minneapolis, MN, United States Ricard Gomà The Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain Huiwen Gong Kiel University, Kiel, Germany Michael Frank Goodchild Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States D Goodman University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States MK Goodman King’s College London, London, United Kingdom Sucharita Gopal Department of Earth and Environment, Center for Remote Sensing, Boston University, Boston, MA, United States Gernot Grabher University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany Richard Grant University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, United States Dustin W Gray University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

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Martin Gren Department of Cultural Sciences/Human Geography, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Linnaeus University, Kalmar, Sweden Amy L Griffin School of Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Carl Griffin Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom Daniel A Griffith School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States; and University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States Leonard Guelke University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Javier Gutiérrez Department of Geography, Faculty of Geography and History, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain Robert N Gwynne University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Jeff Hackett The Firelight Group, Vancouver, BC, Canada RR Hagelman, III Texas State University, San Marcos, TX, United States Roy Haines-Young University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom

Neil Gray Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Jouni Häkli Space and Political Agency Research Group, Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland

Andrew Greenhalgh-Cook School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom

Michael Haldrup Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

Adaeze Greenidge University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Keith Halfacree Department of Geography, Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Edward Hall Geography, School of Social Sciences, University of Dundee, Dundee, United Kingdom

Matthew G Hatvany Department of Geography, Laval University, Québec, QC, Canada

Peter Hall University College London, London, United Kingdom

Eva Hauthal Institute of Cartography, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany

Sarah Hall School of Geography, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom Tim Hall Department of Applied Social Studies, University of Winchester, Winchester, United Kingdom Trevor Hancock School of Public Health and Social Policy, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada Carolyn Hank School of Information Sciences, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, United States Gentry Hanks Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Neil Hanlon Geography Program, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada Torfinn Harding NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway Richard Harris School of Geography and Earth Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Stephan Harrison College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Penryn, United Kingdom Johannes Hartig DIPF Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Frankfurt, Germany Rudi Hartmann Department of Geography and Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado, Denver, CO, United States Francis Harvey Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Institute for Geography, University Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany John Hasse Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ, United States Robert Hassink Kiel University, Kiel, Germany

Harriet Hawkins Department of Geography, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom Billy Tusker Haworth Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Allison Hayes-Conroy Geography and Urban Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States Jessica Hayes-Conroy Women’s Studies, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY, United States Christine Haylett The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Kingsley E Haynes George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, United States Roger Hayter Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada Stephen Healy Institute for Culture and Society, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW, Australia Liam Heaphy School of Architecture, Planning and Environmental Policy, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Katie Hemsworth Department of Geography, Nipissing University, North Bay, ON, Canada Martin Henning School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden Matthew Henry School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand Brita Hermelin Centre for Municipality Studies (CKS), Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden

List of Contributors

Andrew Herod Department of Geography, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States Rachel V Herron Department of Geography and Environment, Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada Martin Hess Department of Geography, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom John Hessler Library of Congress, Washington, DC, United States Geoffrey JD Hewings University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States Jennifer Hill Department of Geography and Environmental Management, Faculty of Environment and Technology, University of the West of England, Bristol, United Kingdom Sam Hind University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany Julian Hine University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, United Kingdom

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Rory Horner The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom; and University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa Myriam Houssay-Holzschuch Sciences Po Grenoble, Pacte, University Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Grenoble, France Donna Houston Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW, Australia Alice J Hovorka Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jeremy RL Howells University of Kent, Cantenbury, United Kingdom Richard Howitt Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia Brian J Hracs Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Phil Hubbard Leicestershire University, Leicester, United Kingdom

Elaine LE Ho Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Ray Hudson Department of Geography, University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom

Steven Hoelscher Departments of American Studies and Geography, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, United States

Rachel Hughes School of Geography, University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC, Australia

Adam Holden University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom

Sarah M Hughes Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

Peter Holland University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Louise Holt University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

David W Hugill Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

P Hopkins Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

PJ Hugill Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States

Donagh Horgan Department of Architecture, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom

RP Huizinga University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Mark W Horner Department of Geography, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States

John S Humphreys School of Rural Health, Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia

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List of Contributors

Sarah Hunt Institute for Critical Indigenous Studies and Department of Geography, University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, BC, Canada; and Northern Medical Program, UNBC, Faculty of Medicine, UBC, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada Margo Huxley Sheffield, United Kingdom Andy Inch Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Saratchandra Indrakanti Search Science, eBay Inc., San Jose, CA, United States Lisa Ingwall-King UN Environment World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, United Kingdom Carlo Inverardi-Ferri University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland Randall W Jackson West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, United States William A Jackson Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, United Kingdom Jane M Jacobs Yale-NUS College, National University Singapore, Singapore Dan Jacobson Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

William Jenkins Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Ole Jensen The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Bob Jessop Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Gunnar Thór Jóhannesson Department of Geography and Tourism, University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland Corey Johnson University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States Lynda Johnston Geography Programme, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand Melissa NP Johnson Department of English Language and Literature, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Nuala C Johnson School of Natural and Built Environment, Queen’s University, Belfast, United Kingdom Peter A Johnson University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Ron Johnston School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

Deirdre Jafferally Georgetown, Guyana

Andrew EG Jonas Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom

J Jäger University of Applied Sciences BFI Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Andrew Jones School of Arts and Social Sciences, University of London, London, United Kingdom

M Jay University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

John Paul Jones, III School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States

Mark Jayne School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom Brian Jefferson Department of Geography and Geographic Information Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States; and Department of Geography and Geographic Information Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, United States

Martin Jones Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, United Kingdom Owain Jones Bath Spa University, Bath, United Kingdom Rhys Jones Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyt, United Kingdom

List of Contributors

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Roy Jones Discipline of Geography, School of Design and Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia

Evangeline O Katigbak National Institute of Education e Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

Tod Jones Discipline of Geography, School of Design and Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, WA, Australia

Adrian Kavanagh Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

H Jöns Geography and Environment, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom David Jordhus-Lier Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway Jin-Kyu Jung University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, United States K Kafkoula Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece Roger JP Kain School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom Athanasios Kalogeresis School of Spatial Planning and Development, Faculty of Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece Md Kamruzzaman Monash Art Design & Architecture (MADA), Monash University, Caulfield East, VIC, Australia Juan Miguel Kanai Department of Geography, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Joseph Kangmennaang Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada David H Kaplan Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States Emrah Karakaya KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Stockholm, Sweden Rajesh Kasturirangan Azim Premji University, Bengaluru, India

Aoife Kavanagh The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Daithí Kearney Department of Creative Arts, Media and Music, Dundalk Institute of Technology, Dundalk, Ireland Gerry Kearns The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Gordon Kee Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China PF Kelly York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Therese Kenna Department of Geography, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Judith Kenny University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Portland, OR, United States Andrew Kent The Antipode Foundation, Cardiff, United Kingdom Sara Beth Keough Saginaw Valley State University, University Center, MI, United States Fritz Connor Kessler Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States Sun-Bae Kim Department of Geography Education, Korea National University of Education, Cheongju, South Korea

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List of Contributors

Anthony D King State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, United States mrs c kinpaisby-hill Scott Kirsch Department of Geography, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, Unites States Priya Kissoon Department of Geography, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago Rob Kitchin Department of Geography, Maynooth University Social Sciences Institute, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Jasper Knight School of Geography, Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Richard D Knowles School of Science, Engineering and Environment, University of Salford, Manchester, United Kingdom Audrey Kobayashi Department of Geography, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada BJ Köbben Department of Geoinformation Processing, Faculty of Geoinformation Science and Earth Observation, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands Natalie Koch The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States L Koefoed Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Sin Yee Koh School of Arts and Social Sciences, Monash University Malaysia, Bandar Sunway, Malaysia Tristan Kohl Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

Zoltán Kovács University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary Menno-Jan Kraak Department of Geoinformation Processing, Faculty of Geoinformation Science and Earth Observation, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands Thomas Krafft Metamedica, School for Public Health and Primary Care, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Frances Kremarik School of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom Sneha Krishnan School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom John Krygier Raleigh, NC, United States; and Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH, United States M Satish Kumar School of Natural and Built Environment, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom Matthew Kurtz Department of Geography, Environment, and Geomatics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada Vincent Kuuire Department of Geography, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada; and Social and Behavioural Health Science, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Alexey V Kuznetsov Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), Moscow, Russia Lois Labrianidis Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

Carmen Köhler DIPF Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Frankfurt, Germany

Eric W LaFary Peace Corps, Ghana

Benedikt Korf University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Suncana Laketa Institute of Geography, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland

List of Contributors

Nina SN Lam Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States Bart Lambregts Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand Wendy Larner Office of the Provost, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Soren C Larsen University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, United States Alan Latham Geography Department, University College London, London, United Kingdom Mickey Lauria Clemson University, Clemson, SC, United States Tracey P Lauriault Carleton University, Communication and Media Studies, Ottawa, ON, Canada E Laurier School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom David M Lawrence Virginia State University and Virginia Union University, Richmond, VA, United States Philip Lawton Geography Department, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland Jennifer Lea Geography, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom Philippe Le Billon Department of Geography, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Jay Lee Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States Jiyeong Lee The University of Seoul, Seoul, South Korea Sang-Il Lee Department of Geography Education, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea Richard Le Heron School of Environment, Faculty of Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

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Charlotte Lemanski University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Deborah Leslie Department of Geography, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Agnieszka Leszczynski Department of Geography, Western University, London, ON, Canada Yee Leung The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China; and The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Nathaniel M Lewis School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Nicolas Lewis School of Environment, Faculty of Science, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; and School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand R Lewis University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Sophie A Lewis Brooklyn Institute for Social Research, Philadelphia, PA, United States W Li University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States Johanna Lilius Aalto University, Helsinki, Finland Shaun Lin Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore Weiqiang Lin National University of Singapore, Singapore Peter Lindner Department of Human Geography, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany Denis Linehan University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Jo Little University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom David Littlewood Sheffield University Management School, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom

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List of Contributors

Min Liu Key Laboratory of Geographic Information Science, Ministry of Education, School of Geographic Sciences, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China; and Institute of Eco-Chongming (IEC), Shanghai, China Yan Liu The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Sally Lloyd-Evans Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom Lucia Lo Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jed Long Department of Geography, Western University, Social Science Centre, London, ON, Canada

Daniel L Mabazza Department of Geography, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines Warren E Mabee Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Alan Mace London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom Key MacFarlane History of Consciousness Department, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States William A Mackaness Institute of Geography, School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland

PA Longley Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Julie MacLeavy School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

Becky PY Loo Department of Geography, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

Gordon MacLeod University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom

Flor M López Guerrero Institute of Geography, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico Julia Lossau Institute of Geography, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany

Katherine Anne MacTavish Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, United States Avril Maddrell Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

John Lovering Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

Eric Magrane Department of Geography, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, United States

Murray Low London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom

Jacek Malczewski University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Mark Lucherini School of Geography, Geology and the Environment, Keele University, Keele, United Kingdom Timothy W Luke Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, United States

Anders Malmberg Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden V Mamadouh University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Steven M Manson University of Minnesota, South Minneapolis, MN, United States

Chris Lukinbeal School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States

Juliana Mansvelt School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

Sophia Maalsen School of Architecture, Design and Planning, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Carl Marklund Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden

List of Contributors

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Terry Marsden School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom

John H McKendrick Scottish Poverty and Inequality Research Unit, Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Alan Marshall School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Katharine McKinnon Department of Social Inquiry and La Trobe Rural Health School, La Trobe University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia

David Martin School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

Ethan McLean University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

Peter R Martin School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

Heather McLean School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Liz Mason-Deese Manassas, VA, United States

Jessica McLean Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Colin Mason Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom

Kate McLean Canterbury Christ Church University, Canterbury, United Kingdom

Elizabeth Mavroudi Geography and Environment, School of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom

Phil McManus School of Geosciences, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Eugene McCann Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

Kendra McSweeney Department of Geography, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

Andrew McCartan Maynooth University, Maynooth, Ireland

Kathleen J Mee Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia

J McCarthy Critical Geography, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom; and Bad Homburg, Germany

Tom Mels Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala University - Campus Gotland, Visby, Sweden

Andrew G McClelland Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Derek P McCormack School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom K McCracken Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia Pamela McElwee Department of Human Ecology, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ, United States Jennifer McGarrigle Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning (IGOT), University of Lisbon, Portugal

Sean Mendonca Georgetown, Guyana Jeremy Mennis Department of Geography and Urban Studies, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States Peter Merriman Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom Paula Meth Department of Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom David R Meyer Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, United States Frank Meyer Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany

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List of Contributors

William B Meyer Department of Geography, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY, United States Christiana Miewald Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada Judith Miggelbrink Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany Elisabeth Militz Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Tina Miller Kelowna, BC, Canada Bruce V Millett South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD, United States Nate Millington Department of Geography, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

BE Montz East Carolina University, Greenville, NY, United States Graham Moon School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Katie Moon School of Business, University of New South Wales, Canberra, ACT, Australia Peter Mooney Department of Computer Science, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland M Morad London South Bank University, London, United Kingdom KM Morin Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, United States Bruno Moriset University Jean Moulin, Lyon, France

Claudio Minca Department of Geography and Planning, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

Richard Morrill University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States

Jayalaxshmi Mistry Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, United Kingdom

Karyn Morrissey European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter Medical School, Exeter, United Kingdom

Clare JA Mitchell University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Lan Mu University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States

Paul Mkandawire Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Human Rights Program, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Sayani Mukhopadhyay Department of Geography, Asutosh College, Kolkata, India

Nalini Mohabir Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada Giles Mohan The Open University, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom Patricia L Mokhtarian University of California Davis, Davis, CA, United States Malene Monka Center for Dialectology, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Marius Monsrud NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway

Darla K Munroe Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Alan T Murray Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Amber Murrey Department of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom D Mustafa Critical Geography, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom; and Bad Homburg, Germany Caroline Nagel Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, United States

List of Contributors

xxxvii

Takashi Nakazawa School of Business Administration, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

Morton E O’Kelly The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States

David P Nally University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, United States

AA Naseemullah King’s College London, London, United Kingdom

John O’Loughlin Department of Geography, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, United States

Catherine J Nash Department of Geography, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada Anoop Nayak School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom S Neal University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Roderick P Neumann Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States Andrea J Nightingale University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway P Nijkamp Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Padini Nirmal Columbia University, New York, NY, United States Becki Nookemis Department of Psychology, Vancouver Island University, Nanaimo, BC, Canada Glen Norcliffe York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Patricia Noxolo School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Neil Nunn University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada Cian O’Callaghan Department of Geography, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland Kevin O’Connor Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Nathaniel O’Grady Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

Phillip O’Neill School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW, Australia David O’Sullivan Department of Geography, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States Tor H Oiamo Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jonathan Oldfield University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom Rachel Olsen The Firelight Group, Vancouver, BC, Canada Elizabeth Olson University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States Kenneth R Olwig Department of Landscape Architecture, Planning and Management, SLU-Alnarp, Alnarp, Sweden Elizabeth Opiyo Onyango Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Joseph R Oppong Department of Geography, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, United States Meghann Ormond Wageningen University and Research, Wageningen, The Netherlands Mark Ortiz University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States David T Ory Federal Transit Administration, Washington, DC, United States Evaristus Oshionebo University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

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List of Contributors

Ulrich Oslender Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies, School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University, Miami, FL, United States Samuel M Otterstrom Department of Geography, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, United States Samuel Owusu-Agyemang Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, United States Francis Owusu Department of Community and Regional Planning, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, United States George Owusu Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), Centre for Urban Management Studies (CUMS), University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana Anssi Paasi Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland LC Pace Department for the Study of Religions, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, United States Michael Pacione Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, United Kingdom; and Geography, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland Antonio Páez McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Ben Page Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom Sam Page University College London, London, United Kingdom K Parker Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps, London, United Kingdom Christof Parnreiter Department of Geography, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Marianna Pavlovskaya Department of Geography and Environmental Science, Hunter College - CUNY, Ph.D. Program in Earth and Environmental Sciences, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, United States Linda J Peake York University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jamie Pearce University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand Deborah Peel University of Dundee, Dundee, United Kingdom J Richard Peet Graduate School of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, MA, United States Tiina Peil Institute for Culture and Learning, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden Jan Penrose Institute of Geography, School of GeoSciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Chris Perkins School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom; and The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom George LW Perry School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Michael P Peterson University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, United States Aparna Phadke Department of Geography, University of Mumbai, Mumbai, India NA Phelps University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Michael Parnwell University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Catherine Phillips School of Geography, University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC, Australia

Jerry Patchell Division of Social Sciences, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China

DR Phillips Lingnan University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong

List of Contributors

Martin Phillips School of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom

Valerie Preston Department of Geography, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Graham Pickren Roosevelt University, Chicago, IL, United States

John Preston Transportation Group, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

Jan Nederveen Pieterse University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Etienne Piguet Institute of Geography, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland Andy Pike Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom Steven Pinch Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom David Pinder Department of People and Technology, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark Iva Maria Miranda Pires Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, NOVA University Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal Paul Plummer Department of Geography, The University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia Lucas Pohl Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany Jane Pollard Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Colin G Pooley Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom

Georges Prévélakis University of Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Paris, France Linda Price Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom Russell Prince Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand B Pritchard School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia Carolyn Prouse Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Samantha Punch University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom Gita Pupedis School of Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia Martin Purvis School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Junxi Qian Department of Geography, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Mike Raco Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, United Kingdom Pauliina Raento Tampere University, Tampere, Finland

Ate Poorthuis Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore

Saraswati Raju Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Clive Potter Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom

B Ramírez Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Mexico City, Mexico

Marcus Power University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom Andy C Pratt London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom

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Maano Ramutsindela Department of Environmental and Geographical Science, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

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List of Contributors

NM Rantisi Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada Samuel J Ratick Clark University, Worcester, MA, United States Laura T Raynolds Center for Fair and Alternative Trade, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, United States Jane M Read Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States Sertanya Reddy University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States Philip Rees School of Geography, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Ludovico Rella Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Johannah-Rae Reyes University of West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Andrea Rishworth Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Paul Robbins University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States Guy M Robinson Department of Geography, Environment and Population, School of Social Sciences, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia Joseph S Robinson Department of Geography, The National Univesity of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Scott Rodgers Department of Film, Media and Cultural Studies, Birkbeck, University of London, London, United Kingdom Jean-Paul Rodrigue Department of Global Studies and Geography, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, United States Dallas Rogers University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia

Mark Alan Rhodes, II Department of Social Sciences, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI, United States

Fernanda Rojas Marchini University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Gareth Rice School of Media, Culture and Society, University of West of Scotland, Blantyre, United Kingdom

Reuben Rose-Redwood Department of Geography, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

Stian Rice University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, United States

Nancy A Ross McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

Pamela Richardson-Ngwenya German Institute for Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture, (DITSL GmbH), The Faculty of Organic Agriculture, University of Kassel, Witzenhausen, Germany Lizzie Richardson Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom; and Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom Chantelle Richmond Department of Geography, Western University, London, ON, Canada Britta Ricker Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Jairus Rossi Community and Economic Development Initiative of Kentucky, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States Ugo Rossi Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning, University of Turin, Turin, Italy John Round University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Parama Roy Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India Stephen A Royle Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, United Kingdom Susan Ruddick University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

List of Contributors

Derek Ruez Space and Political Agency Research Group, Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland Gerard Rushton The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, United States Jonathan Rutherford LATTS (Laboratory Technology, Territories and Societies), Ecole des Ponts Paris Tech, Marne la Vallée, France Tod D Rutherford Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States China Sajadian CUNY Graduate Center, Department of Anthropology, New York, NY, United States

Carolin Schurr Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Nadine Schuurman Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada Guido Schwarz The National University of Colombia, Bogota, DC, Colombia Darren M Scott McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada Mark Scott University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland David Seamon Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States Anna J Secor University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, United States

Jennifer Salmond School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Gunhild Setten Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Nathan Salvidge Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom

E Shantz Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Heywood Sanders University of Texas-San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, United States Rickie Sanders Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, United States RB Sarma Cotton College, Guwahati, India VR Savage RSIS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Nathan F Sayre Department of Geography, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States Joris Schapendonk Geography, Planning and Environment, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Regina Scheyvens School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand Ted Schrecker Institute of Health and Society, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

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Elizabeth Shapiro-Garza Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States Joanne Sharp Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom Jon Shaw University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom Kate Shaw School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia Robert Shaw School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom Jianfa Shen Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China; and Research Centre for Urban and Regional Development, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

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List of Contributors

Eric Sheppard Department of Geography, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States

Mark W Skinner Trent School of the Environment, Trent University, Peterborough, ON, Canada

Mor Shilon TechniondIsrael Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

Astrid Ravn Skovse Center for Dialectology, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

HaeRan Shin Department of Geography, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea David Sibley University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Terry R Slater School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom

James D Sidaway Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Tom Slater Institute of Geography, School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Julia Siemer Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada

Vanessa Sloan Morgan University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

Dragos Simandan Department of Geography and Tourism Studies, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada; and Geography Department, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada

Adrian Smith School of Geography, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom

Neil Simcock Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, United Kingdom David Simon Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom Paul Simpson School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom Alex Singleton Geography and Planning, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Srilata Sircar King’s College London, London, United Kingdom Alistair Sisson University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia Victor FS Sit University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Ronald Skeldon University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom; and Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands Tracey Skelton Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Christopher J Smith University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY, United States JM Smith Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States Karly B Smith School of Rural Health, Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia RG Smith Swansea University, Swansea, United Kingdom Susan J Smith Girton College and Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Chris Sneddon Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, United States Edward W Soja University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States; and London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom Martin Sokol Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom Michael Sonis University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, United States; and Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

List of Contributors

Matthew Sothern School of Geography and Sustainable Development, The University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Scotland Basil Southey Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada Jacob Sowers Missouri State University, Springfield, MO, United States Hayley Sparks School of Environment, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Janet Speake Liverpool Hope University, Liverpool, United Kingdom Simon Springer Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, NSW, Australia Krithika Srinivasan Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom Pranpreya Sriwannawit Lundberg Office of the National Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation Policy Council, Bangkok, Thailand Sophie L Stadler University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada Jean-François Staszak Geography Department, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

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Fraser Sugden School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom D Sui Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States Juanita Sundberg University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Ekaterina Svetlova University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom John C Sweeney The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Erik Swyngedouw Geography/School of Environment, Education and Development, The Manchester University, Manchester, United Kingdom Ludek Sýkora Department of Social Geography and Regional Development, Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic Marc Tadaki Cawthron Institute, Nelson, New Zealand LM Takahashi University of Southern California, Sol Price School of Public Policy, Sacramento, CA, United States Minna Tanskanen University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

Philip E Steinberg Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States

T Tasan-Kok University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Rolf Sternberg Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography, University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany

Adeline Tay University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom

David Storey University of Worcester, Worcester, United Kingdom Elaine Stratford Institute for the Study of Social Change, College of Arts, Law and Education, University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

Liz Taylor University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom Riki M Taylor School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Kendra Strauss Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

Kees Terlouw Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Samuel Strong Homerton College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Jim E Thatcher Department of Urban Studies, University of Washington Tacoma, Tacoma, WA, United States

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List of Contributors

Karl-Heinz Thielmann Long-Term Investing Research, AG, Karlsruhe, Germany Deborah Thien California State University, Long Beach, CA, United States Jean-Claude Thill University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States Michael Thomas Research Department, Statistics Norway (SSB), Oslo, Norway C Thompson Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada Daniel K Thompson Anthropology and Heritage Studies, University of California Merced, Merced, CA, United States Matthew Thompson Heseltine Institute for Public Policy, Practice and Place, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Karen E Till Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland Judit Timár Center for Economic and Regional Studies, Békéscsaba, Hungary; Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary; and Hungarian Acadey of Sciences, Békéscsaba, Hungary Jacqueline Tivers Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, United Kingdom Chetan Tiwari Department of Geography and the Environment, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, United States GA Tobin University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States F Tödtling Institute for Multi-Level Governance and Development, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria John Tomaney Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Marla Torrado Department of Geography, Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States Ivan J Townshend Department of Geography, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada Charles Travis Department of History, University of Texas, Arlington, TX, United States Simone Tulumello Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal David Turnbull ACSIS, Melbourne University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia BL Turner, II School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning and School of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, United States Jennifer Turner University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom Sarah Turner Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada Markku Tykkyläinen University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland David J Unwin Birkbeck College, University College London, London, United Kingdom Tim Unwin Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom Ebru Ustundag Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada Joni T Vainikka RELATE Centre of Excellence Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland; and Department of Architecture, Design, and Media Technology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark JD van der Ploeg China Agricultural University, Beijing, China Nico Van de Weghe Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

List of Contributors

B van Hoven University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands Michiel van Meeteren Geography and Environment, School of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom Lindy Van Vliet Carleton University, North Bay, ON, Canada Eric Vaz Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON, Canada Jo Vearey African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Nagendra R Velaga Transportation Systems Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Bombay, Mumbai, India Luna Vives Department of Geography, University of Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada Louise Waite University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom G Waitt University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia Susan M Walcott Department of Geography, Environment and Sustainability, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States Gordon Walker Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Matthew Wallace Department of Sociology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden Katie Walsh Department of Geography, School of Social Sciences and Cultural Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom

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Charles Warren School of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom Stacy Warren Department of Geography and Anthropology, Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA, United States Elanor Warwick Clarion Housing Group, London, United Kingdom Doris Wastl-Walter Department of Geography, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Johanna L Waters Human Geography and Migration Studies, Department of Geography, University College London, United Kingdom Matt Watson University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Michael J Watts Department of Geography and Development Studies, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States Alex Wearing University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand Sophie Webber School of Geosciences, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia Gerald R Webster University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, United States Kellynn Wee Asia Research Institute, Singapore, Singapore Tony Weis Western University, London, ON, Canada Sarah J Whatmore School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University Centre for the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom David C Wheeler Emory University, Atlanta, GA, United States

Fahui Wang Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States

Robert K Whelan University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States

Barney Warf Department of Geography, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, United State

Madeline Whetung University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

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List of Contributors

George W White South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD, United States

Heather Winlow School of Sciences, Bath Spa University, Bath, United Kingdom

Peter White School of Architecture and Cities, University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom

Adam C Winstanley Department of Computer Science, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

M Whitehead Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom

Ben Wisner University College London, London, United kingdom

Adam Whitworth University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom Janine L Wiles Social and Community Health, School of Population Health, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Glyn Williams Urban Studies and Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom; and School of Planning and Architecture, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa Michael Williams Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom

Charles WJ Withers University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland SD Withers University of Washington, Seattle, WA, United States Dariusz Wójcik Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, United Kingdom David WS Wong Geography and Geoinformation Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, United States

Nina Williams School of Science, UNSW Canberra, ACT, Australia

Denis Wood Raleigh, NC, United States; and Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH, United States

Katie Willis Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, England, United Kingdom

Peter Wood Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Clancy Wilmott The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom Kathi Wilson Department of Geography, University of Toronto at Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada Tom Wilson Charles Darwin University, Darwin, NT, Australia Robert Wilton McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

Michael Woods Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom Orlando Woods School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore Keith Woodward Department of Geography, University of WisconsinMadison, Madison, WI, United States Rachel Woodward School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom

Thomas Wimark Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

Chih Yuan Woon Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Gordon M Winder The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Nancy Worth University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

Jamie Winders Department of Geography, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, United States

Sarah Wright Discipline of Geography and Environmental Studies, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia

List of Contributors

Willie J Wright Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States Neil Wrigley University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom

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Junjia Ye School of Social Science, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore Brenda SA Yeoh Asia Research Institute, Singapore, Singapore

Fulong Wu Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, London, United Kingdom

Godfrey Yeung Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Ryan Wyeth Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

Y-M Yeung Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Elvin K Wyly University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada Ningchuan Xiao The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, United States Ankit Kumar Yadav Transportation Systems Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Bombay, Mumbai, India Lillian Yaffe University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, United States Ikuho Yamada University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, United States Takashi Yamazaki Department of Geography, Osaka City University, Osaka, Japan Xiaobai A Yao Department of Geography, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, United States Richard Yarwood School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom

May Yuan Geospatial Information Science, The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, United States C Zhang University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, United States JJ Zhang Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore Jun Zhang University of Minnesota, Tacoma, WA, United States Yu Zhou Department of Earth Science and Geography, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY, United States Bianca Rosa Ziegler Department of Geography, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Karl S Zimmerer Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, United States Ping Zou School of Nursing, Nipissing University, Toronto, ON, Canada Melanie Zurba Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada

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HOW TO USE THE ENCYCLOPEDIA Structure of the Encyclopedia All articles in the encyclopedia are arranged alphabetically as a series of entries. There are four features to help you easily find the topic you are interested in: an alphabetical contents list, cross references, a full subject index, and contributors. 1. Alphabetical contents list: The alphabetical contents list, which appears at the front of each volume, lists the entries in the order that they appear in the encyclopedia. So that they can be easily located, entry titles generally begin with the key word or phrase indicating the topic, with any generic terms following. For example, “Small Intestine, Benign and Malignant Neoplasms of the” is the entry title rather than “Benign and Malignant Neoplasms of the Small Intestine”. 2. Cross references: Virtually all the entries in the encyclopedia have been extensively cross-referenced. The cross references which appear at the end of an entry, serve three different functions: i. To draw the reader’s attention to related material on other entries ii. To indicate material that broadens and extends the scope of the article iii. To indicate material that covers a topic in more depth

Example The following list of cross-references appears at the end of the entry “Geography and Public Policy”.

See Also: Activism; Activist Geographies; Applied Geography; Critical Geographies; Epistemology; History of Geography; Knowledge Exchange; Postpolitics and Post-Truth. 3. Index: The index appears at the end of volume 14 and includes page numbers for quick reference to the information you are looking for. The index entries differentiate between references to a whole entry, a part of an entry, and a table or figure. 4. Contributors: At the start of each volume there is a list of the authors who contributed to all volumes.

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PREFACE Ten years ago, Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift, and a team of talented editors compiled the first edition of the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. I begin by thanking them for bringing together the most comprehensive collection of key issues at the time, both for the discipline of geography and for the planet. In this second edition, we have built upon that impressive body of knowledge, asking what has changed in the past decade, and how have geographers responded? Human geography is still one of the most vibrant university disciplines in the world. Human geographers continue to challenge themselves, their students, the public, and those who hold political power. Human geographers seek to understand how humans got to the world of now and how the human species can and must address the most pressing situations of violence, oppression, refugees, poverty, and injustice. We also understand that these conditions are interrelated, as often as not as a manifestation of the long road of colonialism. Perhaps most challenging, and certainly more pressing than a decade ago, is the issue of climate change, now affecting the planet as never before. In part, because of our increasing realization of the immanent effects of climate change, geographers are more than ever concerned about the welfare of the nonhumandplants, animals, entire ecosystemsdand with our relationships with the nonhuman world. We place greater emphasis not only on practical interventions, but also on our ethical responsibilities. Geographers continue to advance understandings, both theoretical and practical, of things that inform human relationships, such as gender, race, citizenship, class, and cultural/economic/political systems. Our concern is not only with violence and despair, although we are sometimes tempted to give in when difficulties seem insurmountable, but we also attempt to find resolutions. We try to see places where “progress” means better relations between humans and their surroundings, or when exciting new developments in technology, technique, or human understanding lead to improvement of the planetary condition. Geographers as a whole tend to be cautious about what passes for progress though, including about technological developments that often have fewer benefits than threats. We are also enthusiastic about advancing knowledge in areas such as healthcare and communication. This collection covers the gamut of cautions and enthusiasms. Geographers are more than ever committed to addressing the remarkably enduring effects of colonization. Historical geographers shed light on how systems set in place centuries ago continue to structure relations across the globe, affecting citizenship, migrations, inequality, and ongoing tensions over territory and belonging. Indigenous knowledge has become an important and increasingly interconnected aspect of how we understand the world. And respect for one another, while challenged, often violently, is increasingly recognized as a necessary human goal. Many geographers have found that cultural approaches to understanding lie in art, music, poetry, and other forms of expression. While geography remains an eclectic discipline around which it is difficult to place hard boundaries, the core concepts of spatiality and place remain as strong as ever. Everything is in relationship and every relationship is a complex and ever changing network of spatiality. Spatiality is the condition of being. Place is the constellation of relationships, made significant by degrees of structure, harmony, stability, or their opposites. Geographers attempt to understand spatial relations placed and in place as the manifestation of life on earth. Everything occurs in place. If such is the first principle conveyed to students through this collection, the examples are rich, diverse, and thought provoking. The editors of the first edition offered some challenges that remain, albeit with different dimensions. The first is the obvious and inevitable arbitrariness of any collectiondeven as large and comprehensive as this onedthat attempts to capture an entire discipline. Those issues have only deepened over a decade of expanding knowledge. Many scholars have also become tired of contributing to what seems an ever lengthening list of

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Preface

geographical collections. For the second edition, we had the advantage of being able to gauge readership of the first edition as a measure of the interests of scholars and students. The editors did not make light decisions over what to include, but we recognized that some topics no longer seem relevant. Other topics have risen to the top of interests. The degree of revision for each topic depended both on recent advances in the field and on the opinions of authors and editors about what constitutes important new understanding. Some broad areas, such as indigeneity, peace studies, healthcare, and migration received major expansion. Some, such as what we thought was an arbitrary distinction between the rural and the urban, were restructured. We also commissioned a large number of new entries, especially in the connections between geography and the creative arts, in the effects and uses of recent technology, and in the changing distributions of people as a result of migration, including the rise in climate refugees. Some shifts are lamentable. We found fewer people who were willing to write about historical topics, and as a result we have reprinted more articles in historical geography than in other fields. Overall, readers may see a significant blurring of subfield distinctions, where the political, economic, social, and cultural display less clear-cut boundaries and divisions. While it may frustrate some of the more conventional notions of the discipline, that blurring is probably both a practical representation of the real world, and a theoretical advancement in understanding of how everything is interconnected. Another challenge the previous editors identified was authorial. We hope that we have gone even further in including a diversity of voices that reflect a range of perspectives and a wealth of scholarly locales. We have also attempted to recognize the degree to which authority of voice remains concentrated in the Global North/West/ developed world because of longstanding scholarly traditions, the politics of publication, and the wealth attached to universities and other knowledge producing institutions. Notwithstanding that many authors of privilege attempt to acknowledge their own positions, we have done our best to go beyond what may seem as tokenistic recognition. We fully admit that the discipline has a long way to go in that regard. One perhaps controversial decision was to remove articles about individual scholars that were published in the first edition. Recognizing the previous editors struggled to come up with a list of the “most” important and influential scholars, the selection is always arbitrary and incomplete, and re-inscribes positions of privilege. Our decision here was aided by two facts. First, with few exceptions, the biographical articles in the first edition received few downloads, either because students or their professors nowadays tend to think more of concepts than of personalities. Second, although we did not wish to consign important scholars to obscurity, we felt that their work is better understood in context. We encouraged authors to personalize the concepts they were writing about, keeping ideas and their authors relevant, and to include the work that has influenced the discipline in lists of further reading. I hope that we have succeeded. Another major difference between the first and second editions is that we abandoned the attempt to divide the publication according to subfields (e.g., political, economic, urban, rural, regional, quantitative methods, people, etc.). There were nine editors for the current edition, all of whom worked across subfields, although each had one or two major areas of expertise (e.g., health, population, culture, economics, etc.). Editors worked closely with one another to ensure all topics were adequately covered. Quite often, by working closely the editors came up with entirely new topics that push disciplinary boundaries, while realizing that some important topics needed to be combined into one article in order to provide a more comprehensive coverage. Overall, the collection represents a great deal of collaboration and generous creativity on the part of both editors and authors. This collection is vast, an artifact of ideas from and about thousands of scholars from all over the world. Their collective voices certainly cannot capture all there is to know of our discipline. Still, the entries do a pretty good job of telling the world that geographers have much to offer. Our discipline as a whole is devoted to making a better world. We are a diverse and intellectually vibrant discipline with many exciting emerging scholars. Geographers are advancing scholarship that merges new technologies and old attendance to issues of social justice, oppression, violence, environmental change, and the ways these conditions shift and seemingly intensify in the 21st Century. We can be certain the world will continue to change. If the health of geographical scholarship is anything to go by, geographers will continue to be attuned to those changes. Geography has an important place in the world. Audrey Kobayashi

CONTENTS OF ALL VOLUMES Editor in Chief

v

Editorial Board

vii

Section Editors

ix

List of Contributors

xvii

How to use the Encyclopedia

xlix

Preface

li

VOLUME 1 A Accessibility Edward Hall

1

Action Research, Participatory mrs c kinpaisby-hill

9

Activism LM Takahashi

17

Activist Geographies Levi Gahman, Johannah-Rae Reyes, Tina Miller, Raegan Gibbings, Amy Cohen, Adaeze Greenidge, and Sutapa Chattopadhyay

23

Actor–Network Theory Gunnar Thór Jóhannesson and Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt

33

Aeromobilities Weiqiang Lin and Mor Shilon

41

Affect Trycia Bazinet and Lindy Van Vliet

47

Affective Mapping Clancy Wilmott

53

Agglomeration Anders Malmberg

61

Aging and Health GJ Andrews

67

liii

liv

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Aging and Migration Amanda Davies

73

Aging in the Developing World Andrea Rishworth and Susan J Elliott

79

Agrarian Transformations Fraser Sugden

83

Agriculture, Sustainable Terry Marsden

91

Agri-Environmentalism and Rural Change Clive Potter

99

Algorithmic Governance Joe Blankenship

105

Alternative Economies Stephen Healy

111

Anarchism/Anarchist Geographies Federico Ferretti

119

Animal Geographies Alice J Hovorka

127

Animal Welfare Kathryn Gillespie

133

Anthropocene Nigel Clark

139

Anthropogeography Julia Lossau

147

Anticolonialism Neil Nunn and Madeline Whetung

155

Antigeopolitics Ulrich Oslender

159

Antiurbanism Philip Lawton

165

Apartheid/Postapartheid Jane Battersby

169

Applied Geography Michael Pacione

177

Archives Matthew Kurtz

183

Art and Cartography Catherine D’Ignazio

189

Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems Yee Leung

209

Contents of All Volumes

lv

Arts-Based Methods Juliet Carpenter

217

Assemblage Theory Sam Page

223

Atlases Julia Siemer

229

Atlases, Online Sébastien Caquard

235

Autoethnography Kathryn Besio

243

Automation Luis F Alvarez Leon

249

Automobilities Gregg Culver

255

Aviation Daniel L Mabazza

265

B Becoming Derek P McCormack

277

Behavioral Geography John R Gold

283

Belonging Sarah Wright

293

Berkeley School Michael Williams

299

Big Data Mark Birkin

303

Big History John Hasse and Robert Flanagan

313

Biodiversity Roderick P Neumann

323

Biodiversity Mapping and Modeling James MR Brock, Riki M Taylor, and George LW Perry

329

Biopolitics Krithika Srinivasan, Rajesh Kasturirangan, and Clemens Driessen

339

Black Geographies Adam Bledsoe, Willie J Wright, and LaToya Eaves

347

Blockchain Ludovico Rella

351

Body Lynda Johnston

359

lvi

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Borderland Economies Markku Tykkyläinen

365

Borderlands Doris Wastl-Walter

373

Boundary Work, Art, and Place Soren C Larsen and Melanie Zurba

381

Brain Drain H Jöns and Sophie Cranston

385

Buffer Zone Georges Prévélakis

391

Business Services John R Bryson and Emma C Gardner

397

VOLUME 2 C Capital and Space Key MacFarlane

1

Capital Punishment Alex R Colucci

9

Capitalism Eric Sheppard

15

Capitalism and the Division of Labor Mark Brayshay

23

Carceral Geography Jennifer Turner

43

Care Ethics Elizabeth Olson, Mark Ortiz, and Sertanya Reddy

49

Care, Caregiving, and Caring Mark W Skinner and Rachel V Herron

55

Cartographic Animation Michael P Peterson

61

Cartographic Anxiety Chris Barrett

65

Cartographic Symbolism and Iconography Mark Denil

69

Cartography in Islamic Societies S Brentjes

77

Cartography, Electoral William Durkan, Adrian Kavanagh, and Caoilfhionn D’Arcy

89

Case Studies Liz Taylor

95

Contents of All Volumes

lvii

Cellular Automata Yan Liu, Jonathan Corcoran, and Yongjiu Feng

101

Census Geography Wardlow Friesen

105

Census Mapping David Martin

113

Central Business District Gareth Rice

119

Central Place Theory Jacek Malczewski

127

Chaos and Complexity Graham Chapman and Michael Batty

133

Chicago School David Sibley and Audrey Kobayashi

143

Child Labor Samantha Punch

149

Children, Maps, and Mapping Christina R Ergler and Claire Freeman

155

Children/Childhood Sneha Krishnan

167

Chinese Medicine, Traditional Ping Zou

173

Choice Modeling Jean-Claude Thill

181

Chronic Disease E Shantz and Susan J Elliott

187

Circular Economy Pauline Deutz

193

Cities, Imperial Anthony D King

203

Citizen Science Victoria Fast and Billy Tusker Haworth

209

Citizenship Vera Chouinard

215

Citizenship and Governmentality Michael Woods and Lynda Cheshire

223

Citizenship Concepts Elaine LE Ho and Richard Yarwood

229

Citizenship, Extraterritorial Michael Collyer

235

City Marketing Eugene McCann

241

lviii

Contents of All Volumes

City, Modern John R Gold

247

City–Region Simin Davoudi

255

Climate Change John C Sweeney

267

Climate Change Refugees W Andrew Baldwin

275

Climate Change; Adaptation David C Eisenhauer

281

Climatology, Cultural Jennifer Salmond and Marc Tadaki

293

Coastal and Marine Management and Planning David M Lawrence

297

Code/Space James Cheshire

303

Cold War Timothy W Luke

309

Colonialism Amber Murrey

315

Colonialism, Internal Raju J Das

327

Communist and Postcommunist Geographies Judit Timár

335

Community Ivan J Townshend, Aimee Benoit, and Wayne KD Davies

343

Complementary and Alternative Medicine GJ Andrews

351

Computational Human Geography Helen Couclelis

357

Concentrated Deconcentration Bart Lambregts

365

Conservation and Ecology M Jay and M Morad

375

Consumption Deborah Leslie

383

Content Analysis Jamie Baxter

391

Core–Periphery Models B Ramírez

397

Corporate Responsibilities David Littlewood

403

Contents of All Volumes

lix

Corridor and Axis Development L Albrechts and T Tasan-Kok

411

Cosmopolitanism Barney Warf

419

Countermapping Liz Mason-Deese

423

Counterurbanization Clare JA Mitchell and Christopher R Bryant

433

VOLUME 3 Creativity Peter Lindner

1

Crime Geography George Owusu and Louis Kusi Frimpong

5

Crime Mapping Brian Jefferson

11

Critical Agrarian Studies China Sajadian

17

Critical Cartography Denis Wood, John Krygier, Jim E Thatcher, and Craig Dalton

25

Critical Geographic Information System Mahmoudi Dillon

31

Critical Geographies Federico Ferretti

37

Critical Geopolitics Joanne Sharp

45

Critical Physical Geography Marc Tadaki

51

Critical Rationalism David Bennett

55

Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies Kevin R Cox

65

Critical Theory and Human Geography Martin Phillips

69

Cross-Cultural Research Tracey Skelton

83

Cultural Capital Johanna L Waters

91

Cultural Economy Andy C Pratt

95

lx

Contents of All Volumes

Cultural Geography Chris Gibson and G Waitt

99

Cultural Politics Benedikt Korf

111

Cultural Turn Sophia Maalsen and Jessica McLean

117

Culture Kathleen J Mee

123

Cumulative Causation William A Jackson

131

Cyber Security Nathaniel O’Grady and Andrew C Dwyer

135

Cyberspace and Cyberculture Denise M Carter

143

D Darwinism and Social Darwinism Heather Winlow

149

Data Analysis, Categorical Suzanne Davies Withers

159

Deathscapes Avril Maddrell

167

Debt David Simon

173

Decolonization Sarah Hunt and Sarah de Leeuw

181

Deconstruction Clive Barnett

187

Defensible Space Elanor Warwick

195

Deforestation Warren E Mabee

203

Deindustrialization Andy Pike

213

Delocalization Athanasios Kalogeresis and Lois Labrianidis

223

Democracy Clive Barnett and Murray Low

233

Demography Philip Rees

239

Desertification Audrey Kobayashi

257

Contents of All Volumes

lxi

Development Katie Willis and M Satish Kumar

263

Development, Regional, Port–Industrial Complexes and Michael Dunford and Godfrey Yeung

271

Developmentalism Philosophy Michael J Watts

281

Dialectical Reasoning and Dialectical Materialism Erik Swyngedouw

289

Diaries, Handwritten, Online, Audio, or Video Paula Meth

295

Diasporas Elizabeth Mavroudi

301

Difference and the Politics of Difference Patricia Noxolo

307

Diffusion Emrah Karakaya and Pranpreya Sriwannawit Lundberg

311

Digital and Platform Economies Lizzie Richardson

317

Digital Curation Bradley Wade Bishop and Carolyn Hank

323

Digital Feminism Daniel Cockayne and Lizzie Richardson

329

Digital Geographies Jim E Thatcher, Ryan Burns, and Tracey P Lauriault

335

Digital Geohumanities Charles Travis

341

Digital Inequalities Tim Unwin

347

Disability Robert Wilton and Joshua Evans

357

Disasters Jake Rom D Cadag

363

Discourse Tim Cresswell

373

Discourse Analysis Melissa NP Johnson and Ethan McLean

377

Disease Diffusion and Mapping Chetan Tiwari and Saratchandra Indrakanti

385

Diseases, Emerging and Infectious Roger Antabe and Bianca Rosa Ziegler

389

lxii

Contents of All Volumes

Distance Dragos Simandan

393

Dwelling Owain Jones

399

VOLUME 4 E e-Business and e-Commerce Bruno Moriset

1

Ecological Fallacy D Sui

11

Ecology Phil McManus

15

Economic Geography Richard Florida and Patrick Adler

25

Economic Geography, Relational NM Rantisi and JS Boggs

29

Economics and Human Geography James R Faulconbridge and Sarah Hall

35

Economy, Informal Sarah Turner

41

Ecosystem Services Pamela McElwee and Elizabeth Shapiro-Garza

45

Ecotourism David A Fennell

51

Edge Cities NA Phelps

57

Edge Effects Ikuho Yamada

61

Education Nicolas Lewis

69

Education, Internationalization of Johanna L Waters

77

Embeddedness Martin Hess

85

Emigration Brenda SA Yeoh, Charmian Goh, and Kellynn Wee

91

Emotional Geographies Mark Lucherini and Gentry Hanks

97

Empire Marcus Power

105

Contents of All Volumes

lxiii

Empowerment Regina Scheyvens

115

Energy Neil Simcock

123

Enlightenment Geography Charles WJ Withers

137

Environment Sally Eden

151

Environment and Migration Etienne Piguet

163

Environment, Historical Geography of Carl Griffin

169

Environmental Determinism William B Meyer

175

Environmental Geography Karl S Zimmerer and Kendra McSweeney

183

Environmental Geopolitics Shannon O’Lear

193

Environmental Governance Carolyn NM DeLoyde and Warren E Mabee

201

Environmental Hazards RR Hagelman, III, BE Montz, and GA Tobin

207

Environmental Health Susan J Elliott and C Thompson

213

Environmental Justice Gordon Walker

221

Environmental Policy Chris Cocklin and Katie Moon

227

Environmental Racism Leith Deacon

235

Environmental Regulation Phil McManus

241

Environmental Security Jon Barnett

247

Environmental Studies and Human Geography Chris Sneddon

253

Environmentalism Anna R Davies

259

Epidemiological Transition K McCracken and DR Phillips

265

lxiv

Contents of All Volumes

Epistemology Pauline R Couper

275

Equity Janine Wiles and Audrey Kobayashi

285

Error Propagation and Modeling Sucharita Gopal

291

Ethical Issues in Research JJ Zhang

299

Ethnic Conflict Carolyn Gallaher

303

Ethnic Economy Lucia Lo

307

Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of David P Nally

315

Ethnography Aoife Kavanagh and Karen E Till

321

Ethnomethodology/Ethnomethodological Geography E Laurier and S Bodden

329

Evolutionary Algorithms Ningchuan Xiao

335

Existentialism/Existential Geography David Seamon and Jacob Sowers

341

Experimental Design Sophie Webber and Carolyn Prouse

347

Exploration Stephen A Royle

351

Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis Sandy Dall’erba and Zhangliang Chen

357

Export Processing Zones Fulong Wu

367

Extended Metropolitan Region Victor FS Sit

373

Extensive/Intensive Methods Karen Falconer Al-Hindi

381

VOLUME 5 F Factor Analysis and Principal-Components Analysis Fahui Wang

1

Fair Trade Laura T Raynolds

9

Contents of All Volumes

lxv

Famine PJ Atkins

15

Feminism and Work Jane Pollard

21

Feminism, Geographic Information System, and Mapping Marianna Pavlovskaya

29

Feminism/Feminist Geography Sydney Calkin and Cordelia Freeman

35

Feminist Economic Geography Kendra Strauss

43

Feminist Geography, Prehistory of Sophie Bowlby and Jacqueline Tivers

47

Feminist Methodologies Deborah Thien and Shea Ellen Gilliam

53

Feminist Political Economy RB Sarma

61

Fertility Katharine McKinnon

67

Festival and Spectacle Michelle Duffy

73

Feudalism and Feudal Society Simon Chilvers

83

Field Systems and Enclosure Carlo Inverardi-Ferri

91

Fieldwork Katie Hemsworth

97

Film and Cinema Chris Lukinbeal

107

Finance, Historical Geographies of Martin Purvis

113

Financial Centers, International David R Meyer

121

Financial Knowledge Gordon L Clark

131

Financial Risks and Management Ekaterina Svetlova and Karl-Heinz Thielmann

139

First World Katie Willis

147

Flâneur Alan Latham

153

Fluidity and Fixity John Paul Jones, III

159

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Focus Groups Anna J Secor

165

Food Networks Pamela Richardson-Ngwenya and Sarah J Whatmore

167

Food Networks, Alternative D Goodman and MK Goodman

175

Food Regimes B Pritchard

187

Food Security and Food Sovereignty Tony Weis

191

Foodscapes Christiana Miewald

197

Fordism Ray Hudson

203

Fordism, Postfordism, and Flexible Specialization John Lovering

209

Foreign Direct Investment Alexey V Kuznetsov

219

Fractal Analysis Nina SN Lam

229

Functionalism Jose Esteban Castro

239

Fuzzy Set and Fuzzy Logic Yee Leung

247

G Gardening and Gardens David Crouch

253

Gated Communities Rowland Atkinson and Sarah Blandy

259

Gay Geographies Nathaniel M Lewis

265

Gender and Health Janine L Wiles

269

Gender and Rurality Jo Little

275

Gender and the City Linda J Peake

281

Gender, Historical Geographies of Linda Price

293

Genealogy and Family History Samuel M Otterstrom

299

Contents of All Volumes

lxvii

Generalization William A Mackaness

305

Genetics Jairus Rossi

319

Genocide Stian Rice

327

Gentrification Dustin W Gray and Elvin K Wyly

335

VOLUME 6 Geodemographics Alex Singleton

1

Geodesign Kelleann Foster

7

Geodesy John Hessler

19

Geodesy Geographical Masking Spatial Data Infrastructure Ronan Foley

23

Geographic Information Science and Systems PA Longley and Michael Frank Goodchild

29

Geographic Information Systems and Cartography Michael Frank Goodchild

37

Geographic Information Systems, History of Nicholas R Chrisman

43

Geographic Information Systems, Overlay in Ola Ahlqvist

49

Geographic Information Systems; Ethics Jonathan Cinnamon

57

Geographic Information Systems; Public Participation Sarah Elwood

63

Geographical Masking Gerard Rushton

69

Geographically-Weighted Regression Antonio Páez and David C Wheeler

75

Geographies of the Night Robert Shaw

83

Geohistory P Claval

89

Geohumanities Harriet Hawkins

95

Geolocation Agnieszka Leszczynski

101

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Geopoetics Eric Magrane

107

Georeferencing and Geocoding Xiaobai A Yao

111

Geosimulation and Urban Modeling Michael Batty

119

Geospatial Intelligence Keith C Clarke

127

Geospatial Web, Participatory Jon Corbett and Logan Cochrane

131

Geotag Ate Poorthuis

137

Geovisualization Menno-Jan Kraak

141

Gerrymandering Richard Morrill and Gerald R Webster

153

Ghettos Tom Slater

161

Global Commodity Chains Christof Parnreiter and Christin Bernhold

169

Global Food Security David Fazzino

177

Global North/South Rory Horner and Pádraig Carmody

181

Global Positioning/GPS Jiyeong Lee

189

Global Production Networks Neil M Coe

199

Global Urbanism Sally Lloyd-Evans and Nathan Salvidge

207

Globalization and Health Ted Schrecker

217

Globalization of Communicable Diseases Joseph R Oppong

223

Governance, Corporate Dariusz Wójcik

229

Governance, Good Glyn Williams

235

Governance, Transport Iain Docherty and Jon Shaw

245

Governance, Urban Mike Raco

253

Contents of All Volumes

lxix

Governmentality Jouni Häkli and Derek Ruez

259

Green Economy David Gibbs

267

Green Revolution John Briggs

275

Growth Poles and Growth Centers Ugo Rossi

281

H Habitus Gunhild Setten

287

Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge Dan Jacobson

291

Health and Development Sheena Asthana

297

Health and Environmental Risk Jamie Baxter

303

Health and Place, Political Economy of Clare Bambra

309

Health Geography Graham Moon

315

Health in the Anthropocene: From the Global to the Local Trevor Hancock

323

Health Inequalities Nathaniel M Lewis

329

Health Services and Service Restructuring Denise S Cloutier and Daniel Brendle-Moczuk

335

Healthcare Accessibility John S Humphreys and Karly B Smith

347

Hegemony Myriam Houssay-Holzschuch

357

Heritage and Culture Roy Jones, Tod Jones, and Shaphan Cox

363

Heritage and Economy Rudi Hartmann

369

Heritage and Identity LC Pace and JD Bohland

373

Heritage Diplomacy Andrew G McClelland

381

Heteronormativity David Bell

387

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Contents of All Volumes

VOLUME 7 High-Tech Industry Yu Zhou

1

Hinterland Development Judit Timár and Zoltán Kovács

5

Historical Geography, Evolution of Peter R Martin

15

Historical Geography, Rural Patrick J Duffy

21

Historical–Geographical Materialism Scott Kirsch

31

History of Geography Michiel van Meeteren and James D Sidaway

37

HIV/AIDS in Developed Countries Matthew Sothern

45

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries Roger Antabe and Paul Mkandawire

49

Home Tiina Peil

53

Homelessness Priya Kissoon

59

Housing Alistair Sisson and Dallas Rogers

69

Housing and Health Jim Dunn

75

Housing Policy in Developing Countries Godwin Arku

79

Hub Network Location Morton E O’Kelly

83

Human Geography Chris Gibson

89

Human Trafficking Louise Waite

101

Humanism and Humanistic Geography JM Smith

109

Humanitarian Mapping Jonathan Cinnamon

121

Hybridity and the Cyborg Sophie A Lewis

129

Hypothesis Testing Roy Haines-Young and Robert Fish

137

Contents of All Volumes

lxxi

I Idealism Leonard Guelke

145

Identity Politics Audrey Kobayashi

151

Ideology Kenneth R Olwig and Tom Mels

157

Immigration Johanna L Waters

169

Imperialistic Geographies Gordon M Winder

179

Indigeneity Michelle Daigle

191

Indigenous Geographies Richard Howitt

199

Indigenous Health Chantelle Richmond and Kathi Wilson

205

Indigenous Knowledge Jayalaxshmi Mistry, Deirdre Jafferally, Lisa Ingwall-King, and Sean Mendonca

211

Indigenous Mapping Jon Corbett, Jeff Hackett, Rachel Olsen, and Steve DeRoy

217

Industrial City Richard Harris

223

Industrial Districts Filippo Celata and Ugo Rossi

231

Industrial Organization Jerry Patchell

237

Industrial Parks Susan M Walcott

243

Industrial Restructuring Ray Hudson

249

Industrialization Dragos Simandan

255

Industry, Historical Geographies of R Lewis

261

Inequality Sin Yee Koh

269

Informal Sector Adrian Guillermo Aguilar and Flor M López Guerrero

279

Informal Settlements Katie Willis

289

lxxii

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Informalization David Jordhus-Lier

297

Information Graphics Amy L Griffin

303

Informational City Jonathan Rutherford

315

Innovation Rolf Sternberg

321

Innovative Pedagogies Jennifer Hill and Derek France

331

Input–Output Analysis Geoffrey JD Hewings and Michael Sonis

341

Institutionalism/Institutional Geographies Danny Mackinnon

349

Interdisciplinarity Pauliina Raento

357

Intermediate Technology Michael Parnwell

365

International Medical Travel or Medical Tourism Meghann Ormond

373

International Organizations J Richard Peet

379

Internet Geographies Graham Pickren

389

Intersectionality Menusha De Silva

397

Interviews: In-Depth, Semistructured Leigh Barrick

403

Intimate Geographies Ebru Ustundag

409

Investment Promotion Torfinn Harding and Marius Monsrud

413

Irredentism George W White and Bruce V Millett

419

VOLUME 8 K Knowing, Emotional Jon Anderson

1

Knowledge and Education RA Butlin

7

Contents of All Volumes

lxxiii

Knowledge Communities Brian J Hracs and Steven Pinch

17

Knowledge Economy Brita Hermelin

23

Knowledge Exchange Deborah Peel

29

Knowledge Intensive Business Services Peter Wood

37

Kriging and Variogram Models Catherine A Calder and Noel Cressie

45

L Labor Control Regime Andrew EG Jonas

53

Labor Geography Tod D Rutherford

59

Labor Market Pádraig Carmody

65

Labor Unionism Andrew Herod

71

Lamarckianism Heather Winlow

77

Land Change Science/Land System Science BL Turner, II and Darla K Munroe

87

Land Rent Theory J Jäger

93

Land Rights Richard Howitt

99

Landscape Jessica Dubow

105

Landscape Iconography Steven Hoelscher

113

Landscape Perceptions KM Morin

121

Landscapes of Fear Simone Tulumello

127

Language Rhys Jones

131

Language and Research Malene Monka and Astrid Ravn Skovse

139

Legal Geographies Brandon Barclay Derman

145

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Leisure Juliana Mansvelt

151

Lesbian Geographies Kath Browne, Catherine J Nash, and Eduarda Ferreira

159

Liberalism Emily Gilbert

165

Life Course Approaches Thomas Wimark

179

Literature Marc Brosseau

185

Livelihoods Francis Owusu

193

Local Economic Development Gioacchino Garofoli

199

Local Economic Development, Politics of Kevin R Cox

207

Local–Global Michael Haldrup

213

Locality Debates Philip Cooke

223

Location Analysis Mark W Horner

229

Location Theory Alan T Murray

237

Longitudinal Methods; Cohort Analysis, Life Tables SD Withers

245

M Malls/Retail Parks Gareth Rice

253

Map Interactivity Michael P Peterson

259

Map Libraries and Archives Marcy Bidney

263

Map Perception and Cognition Scott M Freundschuh

267

Mapping, Color Amy L Griffin and Gita Pupedis

273

Mapping, Open Source Peter A Johnson

285

Mapping, Performative Chris Perkins

291

Contents of All Volumes

lxxv

Mapping, Philosophy Chris Perkins

297

Mapping, Race and Ethnicity Heather Winlow

309

Mapping, Topographic Peter Collier

323

Mapping, Web BJ Köbben and Menno-Jan Kraak

333

Maps Denis Wood and John Krygier

339

Maps and Governance Francis Harvey

347

Maps and Mapping, History of C Delano-Smith, Roger JP Kain, and K Parker

353

Maps and Protest Martine Drozdz

367

Maps and the State Matthew Farish and Timothy Barney

379

Maps, Mental Scott Bell

391

Maritime Geographies Constantinos Antonopoulos

397

Markov Chain Analysis W Li and C Zhang

407

Marxist Geography Andrew Cumbers and Neil Gray

413

Masculinism AL Bain and C Arun-Pina

425

Masculinities B van Hoven, RP Huizinga, and P Hopkins

433

Material Adeline Tay

439

Material Culture Sara Beth Keough

445

Materiality; New Materialism Peter J Forman

449

VOLUME 9 Media David B Clarke

1

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Contents of All Volumes

Medical Geography R Earickson

11

Medieval Historical Geographies Rhys Jones

23

Megacities Y-M Yeung, Jianfa Shen, and Gordon Kee

31

Memorials and Monuments Derek H Alderman, Jordan P Brasher, and Owen J Dwyer, III

39

Memory Mark Alan Rhodes, II

49

Mental Health and Geography Christopher J Smith

53

Mess May Farrales

61

Metropole d’Equilibre Hugh Clout

65

Migrant Workers C Cindy Fan

73

Migration Caroline Nagel and Paul Boyle

81

Migration and Development Ronald Skeldon and Tanja Bastia

89

Migration and Health Jo Vearey

95

Migration Industry Joris Schapendonk and Sophie Cranston

99

Migration, Forced Marta Bivand Erdal

105

Migration, Historical Geographies of William Jenkins

111

Military Geographies Rachel Woodward

119

Mixed and Multiple Methods John H McKendrick

125

Mobile Mapping Sam Hind

133

Mobility Peter Merriman

141

Mobility, History of Everyday Colin G Pooley

149

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Modernity Denis Linehan

155

Modernization Theory Robert N Gwynne

163

Modifiable Areal Unit Problem Michael Buzzelli

169

Monte Carlo Simulation Samuel J Ratick and Guido Schwarz

175

Moral Economies AA Naseemullah

187

Moral Landscapes Gunhild Setten

193

Mortality Frances Darlington-Pollock and Matthew Wallace

199

Multicultural Cities Junjia Ye

205

Multiculturalism John Clayton

211

N Nation Jan Penrose

221

National Parks Gary Bosworth and Nigel Curry

229

Nationalism David H Kaplan

239

Nationalism, Methodological Natalie Koch

245

Natural Resources Gavin Bridge and Ryan Wyeth

249

Natural Resources, Political Economy of Liam Campling and Elena Baglioni

259

Naturalistic Inquiry Dan Jacobson

267

Nature Neil Argent

273

Nature and Gender Padini Nirmal

285

Nature, Historical Geographies of Peter Holland and Alex Wearing

295

Nature, History of Minna Tanskanen

301

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Nature, Performing Simone Fullagar

305

Nature, Social Neil Argent

309

Nature–Culture Juanita Sundberg, Jessica Dempsey, and Fernanda Rojas Marchini

315

Neighborhood and Health Nancy A Ross

325

Neighborhood Change Judith Kenny and Parama Roy

329

Neighborhood Effects Sang-Il Lee

335

Neighborhoods and Community Ole Jensen

341

Neocolonialism Michael J Watts

347

Neoliberalism Julie MacLeavy

353

Neoliberalism, Urban Wendy Larner and Heather McLean

359

Neoliberalism, Urban in the Global South Verónica Crossa

365

Networks Gernot Grabher

373

Networks, Neural Irene Casas

381

Networks, Urban Nick Clarke

387

New Municipalism Ismael Blanco and Ricard Gomà

393

New Regionalism Martin Jones

399

NIMBY Phil Hubbard

403

Noise and Health Tor H Oiamo and Gunn Marit Aasvang

409

Nonlinear Dynamic Spatial Systems David O’Sullivan

415

Non-Representational Theory Nina Williams

421

Contents of All Volumes

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VOLUME 10 O Oceans Philip E Steinberg

1

Oral History Mark Boyle

7

Organizations, Nongovernmental Saraswati Raju

13

Orientalism L Koefoed and Michael Haldrup

19

Other/Otherness Jean-François Staszak

25

P Parenting, Motherhood, and Fatherhood Johanna Lilius

33

Participant Observation Katie Walsh

39

Patriarchy Catherine J Nash

43

Peasant Agriculture JD van der Ploeg

49

People’s Geography Samuel Strong

55

Performance, Research as Heather McLean

61

Performativity Suncana Laketa

65

Peri-urbanization, Global South Aparna Phadke

71

Phenomenology and Phenomenological Geography Paul Simpson and James Ash

79

Philosophy and Human Geography Stuart Elden

85

Photogrammetry and Aerial Photography Peter Collier

91

Photographs/Photography Rickie Sanders

99

Photovoice Vanessa Sloan Morgan, Becki Nookemis, and Heather Castleden

103

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Physical Geography, Human Geography, and Geographies in the Anthropocene Jasper Knight and Stephan Harrison

113

Place Tim Cresswell

117

Place and Health Vincent Kuuire and Ebenezer Dassah

125

Place Names VR Savage

129

Place, Politics of Sophie Bond

139

Placemaking Donagh Horgan

145

Planetary Health Colin D Butler

153

Planetary Urbanization Juan Miguel Kanai

159

Plant Geographies Jennifer Atchison and Catherine Phillips

163

Point Pattern Analysis Eric M Delmelle and Michael R Desjardins

171

Policing Brian Jefferson

181

Policy Mobility Russell Prince

185

Political Borders Anssi Paasi

191

Political Geography David Storey

199

Political Representation Benjamin Forest

207

Polycentricity Peter Hall

213

Polyvocality Saraswati Raju

219

Popular Culture Klaus Dodds and Lisa Funnell

223

Population and Development Marco Bontje

229

Population Geography Keith Halfacree and Holly Barcus

235

Population Growth Tom Wilson

249

Contents of All Volumes

lxxxi

Positivism/Positivist Geography David Bennett

255

Possibilism Vincent Berdoulay

271

Postcolonial Cities David W Hugill

279

Postcolonial Geographies Ranu Basu

283

Postcolonialism Luna Vives and Nalini Mohabir

289

Postdevelopment Jan Nederveen Pieterse

297

Post-Marxist Geographies Andrew Jones

303

Postmodern City Stacy Warren

315

Postmodern Turn in Geography Claudio Minca

323

Post-Phenomenology/Post-Phenomenological Geography Jennifer Lea

333

Postpolitics and Post-Truth Cian O’Callaghan

339

Postproductivist and Multifunctional Agriculture Neil Argent

347

Postsecularism Frank Meyer and Judith Miggelbrink

353

Postsocialist Cities Ludek Sýkora

357

Poststructural Political Economy Nicolas Lewis and Richard Le Heron

365

Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies Keith Woodward, Deborah P Dixon, and John Paul Jones, III

375

Post-Suburbia Eric Charmes

387

Poverty Francis L Collins

393

VOLUME 11 Pragmatism Susan J Smith

1

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Precarious Work Nancy Worth

5

Pregnancy and Childbirth Elizabeth Chacko

11

Privatization Phillip O’Neill

19

Privilege Hayley Sparks

25

Probabilism Robin Flowerdew

29

Probability Models Jed Long, Alan Marshall and Zhiqiang Feng

33

Projections Fritz Connor Kessler

41

Psychoanalysis Lucas Pohl

61

Psychogeography Denis Wood

65

Psychotherapy/Psychotherapeutic Geographies David Conradson

69

Public Geographies Betsy Donald, Christina Frendo, and Basil Southey

75

Public Geographies, Enacting Ian Cook and Jen Bagelman

79

Public Goods Kevin R Cox

87

Public Policy and Geography Mark Boyle, Tim Hall, Shaun Lin, James D Sidaway and Michiel van Meeteren

93

Public Spaces, Urban Damian Collins and Sophie L Stadler

103

Public Transport John Preston

113

Public–Private Divide Therese Kenna

121

Publishing in Geography Barney Warf

127

Q Q Method Analysis Paul Robbins

137

Qualitative Geographic Information Systems Meghan Cope and Jin-Kyu Jung

143

Contents of All Volumes

lxxxiii

Qualitative Spatial Reasoning Roland Billen and Nico Van de Weghe

149

Quantitative Economic Geography Eric Sheppard and Paul Plummer

157

Quantitative Methodologies Michael Frank Goodchild

163

Quantitative Revolution Trevor J Barnes

169

Questionnaire Survey Valerie Preston

175

R Race/Ethnicity Jamie Winders

183

Racism and Antiracism Anoop Nayak

191

Radical Geography J Richard Peet

197

Rational Choice Theory and Rational Choice Marxism Gary Bridge

207

Redlining Manuel B Aalbers

213

Refugees and Asylum Seekers Daniel K Thompson

221

Region John Tomaney

229

Regional Competition, Regional Dumping Iva Maria Miranda Pires

243

Regional Connectivity Martin Sokol

253

Regional Development and Noneconomic Factors Iwan J Azis

269

Regional Development and Technology Jeremy RL Howells

275

Regional Development Models Sayani Mukhopadhyay

281

Regional Development Theory P Nijkamp and M Abreu

297

Regional Development, Endogenous F Tödtling

303

Regional Geography Anssi Paasi

309

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Contents of All Volumes

Regional Inequalities Michael Dunford

321

Regional Planning and Development Theories Edward W Soja

331

Regional Production Networks David W Edgington

343

Regional Resilience Robert Hassink and Huiwen Gong

351

Regional Science Eric Vaz

357

Regional Uneven Development Ray Hudson

363

Regionalism John Tomaney

369

Regression: Linear and Nonlinear Jamie Pearce

373

Regulation Gordon MacLeod and Adam Holden

381

Relationality Martin Jones

387

Reliability and Validity Carmen Köhler and Johannes Hartig

393

Religion Orlando Woods

397

Remittances Ben Page

403

Remote Sensing Jane M Read, Chad Chambers, and Marla Torrado

411

Representation and Re-presentation Audrey Kobayashi

423

RepresentationdMapping Jeremy Mennis

427

Reproductive Rights Carolin Schurr and Elisabeth Militz

435

Residential Mobility Rory Coulter and Michael Thomas

443

Resilience M Jean Blair and Warren E Mabee

451

Resistance Sarah M Hughes

457

Resource and Environmental Economics Karyn Morrissey

463

Contents of All Volumes

lxxxv

Resource Industries Roger Hayter and Jerry Patchell

467

Retail Geographies Neil Wrigley

479

VOLUME 12 River Basin Development Coleen A Fox

1

Rural Communities Katherine Anne MacTavish

9

Rural Development David Storey

15

Rural Geography Michael Woods

23

Rural Housing Menelaos Gkartzios, Mark Scott, and Nick Gallent

35

Rural Identity and Otherness J Agyeman and S Neal

43

Rural Populations Keith Halfacree

49

Rural Transport Ankit Kumar Yadav and Nagendra R Velaga

59

S Sampling Lucia Lo

67

Scale Nathan F Sayre and Alan V Di Vittorio

79

Scale, Analytical Thomas W Crawford

89

Scaling, Multidimensional William M Bowen and Samuel Owusu-Agyemang

97

Science and Scientism, Cartography David Turnbull

103

Scientific Method Robin Flowerdew

109

Second World Jonathan Oldfield

113

Segregation Rowland Atkinson and Jennifer McGarrigle

119

Segregation Indices David WS Wong

125

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Selection Bias Thomas J Cooke

133

Self–Other Joni T Vainikka

137

Semiotics Ken E Foote and Maoz Azaryahu

141

Sense of Place Jingfu Chen

147

Sensory Mapping Kate McLean

153

Sentiment Analysis Eva Hauthal, Dirk Burghardt, Carolyn Fish, and Amy L Griffin

169

Services, Rural Neil Hanlon and Mark W Skinner

179

Sexuality and Queer Geographies Kath Browne and Andrew McCartan

185

Sharing Economy Anna R Davies

195

Shift–Share Analysis Randall W Jackson and Kingsley E Haynes

199

Simulation Modeling Steven M Manson

207

Situated Knowledge, Reflexivity Audrey Kobayashi

213

Situationism/Situationist City David Pinder

219

Social Capital Neil Hanlon

227

Social Class Julie MacLeavy

233

Social Economy and Social Enterprise Matthew Thompson

239

Social Geography Elaine Stratford

249

Social Movements Maano Ramutsindela

257

Social Studies of Scientific Knowledge Liam Heaphy

263

Socialism and Communism Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro

271

Society–Space Susan Ruddick

281

Contents of All Volumes

lxxxvii

Soft Power Carl Marklund

291

Soundscapes Daithí Kearney

297

Sovereignty Matthew D Balentine and Corey Johnson

305

Space Stuart Elden

315

Space and Spatiality Rob Kitchin

321

Spaces/Spatialities of Exception Richard Carter-White and Claudio Minca

329

Space–Time Jay D Gatrell and Eric W LaFary

335

Space–Time Modeling 2: Geographic Information System Science Approaches May Yuan

345

Spatial Autocorrelation Daniel A Griffith

355

Spatial Clustering, Detection and Analysis of Alan T Murray

367

Spatial Data Models Ling Bian

375

Spatial Databases Adam C Winstanley and Peter Mooney

383

Spatial Division of Labor Adrian Smith

387

Spatial Expansion Method Emilio Casetti

395

Spatial Filtering/Kernel Density Estimation Gerard Rushton and Chetan Tiwari

399

Spatial Interaction Models Morton E O’Kelly

405

Spatial Interpolation Nina SN Lam

409

Spatial Ontologies Nadine Schuurman

419

Spatial Science Ron Johnston

425

Spatially Autoregressive Models Daniel A Griffith

443

Sport Gavin J Andrews

451

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VOLUME 13 State Martin Jones

1

State Theory Bob Jessop

7

Statistics, Descriptive Jay Lee

13

Statistics, Inferential Darren M Scott

21

Statistics, Overview Guy M Robinson

29

Statistics, Spatial David J Unwin

49

Street Naming and Power Reuben Rose-Redwood and Sun-Bae Kim

55

Structural Adjustment Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura

61

Structural Equation Models Patricia L Mokhtarian and David T Ory

71

Structural Marxism Andrew Kent

79

Structuralism RG Smith

89

Structuration Theory Md Azmeary Ferdoush

97

Studentification Takashi Nakazawa

105

Subalternity Srilata Sircar

111

Subjectivity Joanne Sharp

117

Suburbanization Alan Mace

121

Super Rich Sin Yee Koh

127

Superpower Takashi Yamazaki and John O’Loughlin

133

Surrealism David Pinder

139

Surveillance Matthew Henry

147

Contents of All Volumes

lxxxix

Surveying Urbano Fra Paleo

153

Sustainability Warren E Mabee, M Jean Blair, Jordan T Carlson, and Carolyn NM DeLoyde

157

Sustainability Transitions Jordan Carlson and Warren E Mabee

165

Sustainability, Urban M Whitehead

169

Symbolic Interactionism Vincent J Del Casino, Jr. and Deborah Thien

177

Systems Thinking, Approach Frederick Ato Armah

183

T Technological Change Glen Norcliffe

187

Technology and Regional Development Jun Zhang

193

Technology Industries Martin Henning and Claes G Alvstam

199

Telecommunications Barney Warf

207

Territorial Production Complexes Bolesław Doma nski

213

Territory and Territoriality David Delaney

219

Terrorism D Mustafa and J McCarthy

233

Text and Textual Analysis Jamie Baxter

239

Therapeutic Landscapes Ronan Foley

245

Thiessen Polygon Lan Mu

251

Third Space Richard Bustin and Janet Speake

259

Time and Historical Geography Matthew Kurtz

265

Time Geographic Analysis Martin Dijst

271

Time Geography Martin Gren

283

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Contents of All Volumes

Time Series Analysis Guy M Robinson

291

Time–Space Diaries Kajsa Ellegård

301

Tourism T Edensor

313

Towns, New K Kafkoula

325

Trade Blocs Aleid E Brouwer and Tristan Kohl

335

Trade, International Richard Grant and Lillian Yaffe

341

Trade, Transport, and Communications, Historical Geographies of PJ Hugill

351

Transcribing, Coding, and Analyzing Qualitative Data Meghan Cope

357

Transitional Economies John Round

363

Transitional Justice Rachel Hughes

369

Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries Evaristus Oshionebo

375

Transnational Elites Andrew Greenhalgh-Cook

381

Transnational Ethnic Networks HaeRan Shin

389

Transnationalism Evangeline O Katigbak

395

Transnationalism and Labor Geography PF Kelly

401

Transport and Accessibility Javier Gutiérrez and Juan Carlos García-Palomares

407

Transport and Deregulation Peter White and Frances Kremarik

415

Transport and Globalization Kevin O’Connor and Kurt Fuellhart

421

Transport and Social Exclusion Julian Hine and Md Kamruzzaman

429

Transport and Sustainability David Bonilla and Ricardo Carreon Sosa

435

Transport Geography Richard D Knowles

447

Contents of All Volumes

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Transport, Urban Becky PY Loo

457

Transportation and Land Use Jean-Paul Rodrigue

463

Trend Surface Models David J Unwin

471

Triangulation Andrea J Nightingale

477

VOLUME 14 U Uncertainty Michael Frank Goodchild

1

Underclass Christine Haylett

7

Uneven Development Brett Christophers

13

Urban Age Charity Edwards and Brendan Gleeson

19

Urban Architecture Jane M Jacobs

25

Urban Citizenship Junxi Qian

33

Urban Design Creighton Connolly

39

Urban Ecology Jason A Byrne and Donna Houston

47

Urban Growth Machine Scott Rodgers

59

Urban Health and Systems Thinking Thomas Krafft and Franz W Gatzweiler

65

Urban Morphologies Terry R Slater

69

Urban Order Mark Jayne and David Bell

77

Urban Physical Geography Min Liu

83

Urban Planning Margo Huxley and Andy Inch

87

Urban Policy Allan Cochrane

93

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Urban Regeneration Kate Shaw and Tim Butler

97

Urban Regimes Mickey Lauria, Robert K Whelan, and Heywood Sanders

105

Urban Representation Nate Millington

111

Urban Village Graham Crow

119

Urbanism Gary Bridge

123

Urbanism, Comparative Charlotte Lemanski

131

Urbanism, New Eugene McCann

135

Urbanization GU Chaolin

141

V Venture Capital Colin Mason

155

Violence Simon Springer and Philippe Le Billon

161

Violence and Peace Chih Yuan Woon

167

Visceral Geography Allison Hayes-Conroy and Jessica Hayes-Conroy

171

Visuality Eric Goldfischer

175

Vital Geographies Gerry Kearns

181

Volunteered Geographic Information Britta Ricker

187

Vulnerability Ben Wisner

197

W Walking Methodologies Joseph S Robinson and Andrew G McClelland

207

War V Mamadouh

213

War, Historical Geography of Nuala C Johnson

219

Contents of All Volumes

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Waste Management Matt Watson

225

Water Resources Fiona Allon

233

Water Security Elijah Bisung and Sarah Dickin

241

Waterfront Development Mark Davidson

245

Welfare Geography Adam Whitworth

253

Welfare Reform David Conradson

259

Wellbeing in Place Elizabeth Opiyo Onyango and Joseph Kangmennaang

265

Wetlands and Reclamation Matthew G Hatvany

273

Wildness Charles Warren

281

World/Global Cities Ben Derudder

291

World-System Kees Terlouw

297

Writing Rae Dufty-Jones

309

Y Youth/Youth Cultures Louise Holt

315

Index

319

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C Capital and Space Key MacFarlane, History of Consciousness Department, University of California Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by R. J. Das, volume 1, pp 375–381, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Capital A sum of value, the goal of which is to produce more value. Class Conflict The political and economic tensions inherent within capitalist society between those who own the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and those who are forced to sell their labor (the proletariat). Commodity The cornerstone of capitalist society. A commodity is a good or service with a dual character: it serves some distinct purpose (has a use value) and can be bought and sold on the market (has an exchange value). Creative Destruction The movement that results from the simultaneous rigidity and mobility of capital: while fixed spaces must be created for capital to function, they must be destroyed at a later date to make room for new cycles of investment. The Moving Contradiction The political-economic contradiction that exists in capitalist societies, as identified by Marx, between needing to reduce labor time to a minimum and needing to maintain labor time as the grounds for value. Social Reproduction The activities and structures through which (capitalist) society is able to regenerate itself and endure from one moment to the next. Spatial Fix The idea that capitalism’s inherent crises of overaccumulation can be temporarily resolved by moving capital or labor to a different region. Surplus Labor A term Marx uses to refer to the labor performed over and above the labor necessary to produce the worker’s means of livelihood (food, clothing, etc.). In capitalist society, this excess is expropriated by the bourgeoise and forms the basis of capital accumulation. Surplus Population Bodies who have been made relatively redundant within – and thus have been cast out of – capitalist development, entering the ranks of the unemployed. Uneven Development Disparities in the levels and rates of economic growth between different spaces, times, and scales.

In certain parts of the world, you can click to order something online and have it delivered to your doorstep that same day. Amazon’s Prime Now service takes this to the extreme. Available in select urban regions within the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, and Spain, Prime Now offers 1- and 2-h delivery times. As commercial goods move faster and faster, so do data, information, and code. Satellites and underwater fiber optic cables have made communication possible over enormous distancesdand at ever-greater speeds. When iPhones connect people in California to those living in Ghana, it’s hard not to feel that the world is compressing, its spaces becoming less vast. But this is nothing new. It’s something that Karl Marx recognized over 150 years ago, at a time when railroads were drastically reshaping the global landscape of travel and trade. He famously summed this up as “the annihilation of space by time.” What he had in mind were new developments in communication and transportationdthe 19th-Century equivalents of Amazon Prime and Apple iPhonesdthat allowed commodities and markets to extend over greater distances and within smaller windows of time. These changes do not stem from some natural human drive to innovate. Over and over Marx stressed how the compression of space (and time) goes hand in hand with the movements of capital. Capital can be defined most simply as a sum of value, the goal of which is to produce more value. The latter excess is what Marxists call “surplus value.” For companies like Amazon and Apple, surplus value is realized in the form of profit, as iPhones and Prime goods are sold for more than what it cost to make them. The search for profit is sleepless and never-ending. Without the constant piling up of surplus, capitalist society could not exist. For capital must, by definition, generate more value than was present before. If it does not accumulate in this way, it would no longer be capital. There is, in other words, no such thing as a static or zero-growth capitalist economy. New markets must be found, existing ones expanded. Capital must move. But as it does, it runs into barriers in space. Labor and material goods, for instance, cannot move seamlessly or immediately from one side of the world to another. It therefore becomes necessary, especially within a globalized economy, to develop speedy systems of communication and transportation. These help to drive down the costs of

International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, 2nd edition, Volume 2

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Capital and Space

exchange and reduce turnover times, thereby maximizing profit returns and freeing up the movement of capital. Space is compressed in the processdAmazon Air’s cargo jets delivers packages overnight, over forests, over oceans. This article looks at how capital shapes space and how space shapes capital. For decades, geographers have stressed that space is not an abstract dimension or some container to be filled. (It is nothing like an Amazon shipping box.) Space is rather formed actively through social relationsdthose between people, society, and the environment. Such relations are, in turn, shaped by the spaces they produce. Capitalist society is marked by a particular kind of social relation: class conflict. Class conflict refers to the friction between workers and those who seek to exploit them in the name of capital. To understand the kinds of space this conflict requires and produces, the following section provides a very brief overview of how capital accumulates. As will become clear, capital accumulation is rooted in a moving contradiction between the need for human labor and the need to reduce the time of that labor as closely as possible to the instantaneous Now. The third section shows how this contradiction is “fixed” in and through space. From the local to the global, the movement of capital relies on patterns of uneven development, which generate violent divisions between regions and between bodies. To grasp this unevenness, and thus to grasp capital itself, it is necessary to account for more than just class conflict. Other social antagonisms, especially gender and race, have played and continue to play major roles in the formation and persistence of capital accumulation. This has consequences for the ways geographers and others think about collective struggle under capitalism. The conclusion considers how space might be made differently, so that instead of being reduced to nothing (annihilated) in the service of Apple, Amazon, and the global elite, it is pried open in the service of the oppressed.

Moving Contradiction: How Capital Accumulates Class Conflict Capital’s annihilation of space always entails the annihilation of certain bodies. In the case of Amazon, this violence is often forgotten in the lightning flashes of Prime delivery. But dig a little deeper and it’s hard to miss. The threat of annihilation is evident, for instance, in the way Amazon treats its employees. The company has been under fire for the low wages it pays warehouse employees, who work in what the company calls its “fulfillment centers.” Some “fulfillment” workers are paid so little that they have been forced to live off food stamps. While they struggle to get by, the company has prospered and continues to accumulate capital at a blistering pace. As of 2019, Amazon is valued at around $1 trillion USD, while its CEO Jeff Bezos has become the richest person alive. Amazon’s recent adoption of a $15 minimum wage alleviates some of these disparities (while conveniently skirting bad press). But this does nothing to change the fact that the company relies on low-paid workers. Instead it reinforces the very idea of a minimum wage. The division between minimum wages and exorbitant executive salaries is not some glitch in the capitalist system. As dystopian as it sounds, the gap between Bezos and his warehouse workers is built-in to the way capitalism works. Surplus value is not pulled from thin air. It requires a warehouse of workersda proletariatdto exploit. Exploitation occurs to when workers are not compensated for the full extent of their labor time. They must be paid, in theory, for what Marx calls necessary labor: the labor needed to maintain a livelihood and to be healthy enough to come in to work the next day. But any extra time spent workingdsurplus labordcan be seized by their capitalist employer, who receives it free of charge. This gratuity, literally pilfered from the bodies of the proletariat, forms the basis of how surplus value is created in production and secured in the marketplace. Surplus labor is what allows a company like Apple to infuse its products with more value than it had to pay for. This is what Marx means by the valorization of capital. Valorization is when the materials owned by the capitalist acquire greater value through inputs of unpaid labor. Electronic parts are valorized, for instance, when workers at Apple’s Foxconn factories in China assemble them into iPhones and are paid below the full value of their work. In being exploited, these workers effectively transfer onto the products of their labor (iPhones) an extra degree of value. It is in this way that factory owners increase the worth of their capital assets, by extracting a surplus off the bodies of their employees. Whatever surplus value is extracted in production is later realized in the marketplace in the form of profit, for instance, when you make a purchase at an Apple Store. Profit margins are greater the less it costs to ship these goods to retailers or consumers, which is why Amazon has an incentive to pay its warehouse workers such low wages as opposed to office workers, who are not as closely tied to logistics and delivery. As the profits pile up, labor exploitation becomes the basis of uneven development, with company executives winning out over the workers they employ. But exploitation is never guaranteed. It is always a site of intense class struggle, one that shapes the very contours of space and timedfrom the local to the globaldwith real or threatened violence. For capital accumulation to continue, capitalists must constantly find new and creative ways of exploiting workers, of extracting surplus value from their labor. This can be done by increasing the length of workday, as was done at Foxconn when high-school students worked illegal overtime hours in assembling the iPhone X. The result is the increased production of what Marx calls absolute surplus value. The other option is reducing necessary labor time, to increase the portion of work that is received as surplus. This amounts to a greater extraction of relative surplus value, which can be achieved by lowering wages or by increasing the productivity of labor, through the rationalization or automation of the labor process, to yield greater outputs per time worked. This is accomplished, for instance, by using robotic technology in Foxconn factories or by incorporating flying drones into Amazon’s delivery services. By increasing productivity these “innovations” drive down the human labor time required to assemble an iPhone or deliver a package. But the need to reduce labor time exposes a fundamental tension at the heart of capital. Capital, as Marx defines it in the Grundrisse, is a “moving contradiction” in the sense that it “presses to reduce labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor time, on the other side, as sole measure and source of wealth.” While necessary labor time is driven down in order to squeeze out more and more

Capital and Space

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surplus from workers, it remains the key ingredient within that very surplus. This contradiction arises out of class conflict. The proletariat is cast out of capitalist production at the same time that it remains absolutely necessary for it, as that which may be exploited. And so, if labor time is reduced through machines and other technological innovations, capitalists must find new and more intensive ways of exploiting the labor that is left. Therefore Amazon’s delivery drones go together with the low wages it pays its warehouse workers. For no matter how automated or “efficient” our society becomes, labor time is always required to create surplus value. It is annihilated but never eliminated.

The Space of the Commodity Capital’s moving contradiction really does move. The problem of labor time shows up again in other places beyond the factory, leading to further contradictions and carving out entire landscapes of conflict. Marx begins Capital, for instance, by considering capital’s contradiction at the level of commodities. This discussion is important, and is briefly introduced below, because it provides a roadmap for how space is produced under capitalismdhow objects are infused with labor time, stamped with value. This is, at its core, a violent process, one rooted in class conflict. Marx’s basic insight was that commodities have a dual nature. As objects, they have both a use value and exchange value. Take an iPhone. It has a use value in the sense that it is satisfies a particular purposedcalling my sister or emailing this encyclopedia’s editor. At the same time, it has an exchange value insofar as it can be bought and sold on the market. In order for this to happen, the iPhone must be measured in a way that makes it comparable with the rest of society’s commodities; it must be abstracted from its specific use. What’s created are equivalent relationships between objects in space. Marx expresses this with the simple equation, “x commodity A ¼ y commodity B.” A present-day example might look like the following: 200 Big Macs ¼ 1 iPhone Here, the iPhone becomes the means of expressing the value of McDonald’s hamburgers, serving as the latter’s equivalent. These commodities, along with all others, enter into a kind of a material community, where they interact with one another as “equals.” But what are the criteria by which this equivalence is made? For Marx the criteria are supplied by labor time, or more precisely, by “socially necessary labor time” (SNLT): the quantity it takes to produce a commodity in a given society under average conditions of labor productivity and skill. The necessary labor time for workers to reproduce their own ability to labor, as discussed above, is one instance of this in that labor power is itself bought and sold as a commodity. The basic point is that, as exchange values, commodities become magnitudes of congealed SNLT. While SNLT must be periodically reduced to extract more surplus labor, it remains the measure of value within the commodity and so cannot be eliminated altogether. In this way, market goods come to embody the moving contradiction in their value. This value is not necessarily the same as the commodity’s price, which may be calculated regardless of labor time. What’s important for the dicussion here is that the measurement of SNLT enables a certain kind of space, which is shaped more by (quantitative) equivalences between commodities than by (qualitative) social needs. In Marx’s terms, exchange takes precedence over use. In capitalist society, rather than trading Big Macs for iPhones directly, commodities are exchanged through the medium of money. Money is a special commodity in that it serves as a universal equivalent against which all other commodities can be measured. The interplay between money and commodities is a vital aspect of the overall movement of capital and its spaces of uneven development. Commodity exchange takes place not in the sphere of production but in what Marx calls the sphere of circulation. For Marx, capital accumulation relies on a specific pattern of commodity circulation. Rather than selling to buy, the hallmark of capitalism is buying to sell. Marx represents this form of circulation as M-C-M0 , which stands for the transformation of money (M) into commodities (C) that are then converted into larger piles of money (M’ or M-prime). But how can money turn into more money? Answering this requires returning to the sphere of production, to where the commodity is made in the first place. To begin the M-C-M’ cycle, capitalists use money to buy the labor, materials, and instruments needed to produce commodities. The latter become incubators of new value. For when purchased labor is exploited (compensated below its value) what it produces is infused with extra worthdit becomes valorized through surplus labor. Only once exchanged, liquidated back into money, does the commodity surrender its surplus over to the capitalist, who receives it as profit. What makes this circuit of exchange so hard to track is that it obscures its own violence. Hidden behind an almost mystical process, of turning money into more money, is the exploitation of labor. This gets buried in the noisy pursuit of M-Prime. But in the end it is labor time, not money, that is the “sole measure and source of wealth.”

Social Reproduction Many see Marx’s emphasis on labor time as evidence for what’s known as the “labor theory of value” (LTV). Proponents of LTV, including most traditional Marxists, end up adopting what Michael Heinrich calls a “substantialist” understanding of value. Under this view, value is a discrete quantity of laborda kind of propertydthat workers bestow on an individual commodity in order to transform it into an object of value. Here, labor is conceived as a natural, almost physical substance, one that might be put toward more emancipatory ends. And yet, especially when space is considered, things look very different in practice. For Marx, value was not merely a quantitative collection of abstract labor, but something determined by society as a whole. This has to do with the issue of SNLT as discussed above. If a commodity is measured by SNLT that means its value hinges on what is considered “socially

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necessary”di.e., valuabledat a given time and place. It is not just wage labor that determines this but a much larger web of social interactions. This is something that feminist geographers have stressed for decades: that it is not enough to study the sites of capitalist production. To grasp how value is formed, we must also account for what Marx called social reproduction: how capitalist society is able to regenerate itself and endure from one moment to the next. This means looking beyond the factory. Thus, while class conflict may be at the center of the moving contradiction, other uneven social structures are integral to how this contradiction actually plays out. As issues of labor time are worked out on local, national, and global levels, all of society is violently transformed, not just the relations of wage labor. This will become more apparent in the next section, which looks at the how capital overcomes its inner tensions in and through space.

Spatial Fix: How Capital Transforms Space Uneven Development Capital reshapes the world in its own image. This image, as we’ve seen, is filled with contradictions. To move beyond these, space must be molded in ways that reflect and reinforce capital accumulation, along with the social divisions that make this accumulation possible. What’s needed is a kind of spatial fix. Spatial fix is a concept David Harvey uses to describe the way capital resolves its inner tensions by expanding acrossdand reorderingdspace. The following section looks at how, in seeking a “fix” for its own contradictions, capital must build up certain spaces while destroying others. As geographers have long noted, capitalism is marked by an ongoing process of uneven development. Uneven development occurs when the enrichment of a few people and places is built on the exploitation and annihilation of others. This results not only in spatial differentials but in temporal ones as well: the development of certain bodies and regions is literally arrested, barred from the “innovations” and “progress” enjoyed by global elites. Such space-time unevenness is essential for the movement of capital. The “underdevelopment” of certain regions ensures a constant supply of cheap labor because it creates what Marx calls a relative surplus population. The latter consists of those who have been made redundant within, and thus forcefully ejected from, capitalist development. Superfluous to the economy, these bodies are essentially rendered disposable, tossed into the ranks of the unemployed, or worse. The paradox is that even though the surplus population is relatively redundant, it is nevertheless necessary in order for capital accumulation to continue. If carefully managed, it provides an exploitable “reserve army of labor” whose members can be hired at low cost. A growing surplus population also works to drive down the average cost of existing wages, as workers lose their bargaining power when others are willing to work the same job for lower compensation. To produce surplus populations, and to ensure that they remain under control (i.e., exploitable) it is imperative that certain regions be forcefully kept underdeveloped on both local and global levels. In this way, spatial division eases some the tensions resulting from class division: it generates masses of cheap workers while driving down the overall cost of labor. Uneven development, then, becomes a “fix” for capital’s moving contradiction. Apple, Inc. provides a clear example of how capital benefits from uneven development on a global level. While “designed” at the company’s headquarters in California, most of Apple’s iPhones are assembled at Foxconn factories in China, where employees have faced horrible working conditions, with grueling shifts and minimal compensation. Some have resorted to suicide. Meanwhile, the low costs of this labor enable Apple to achieve high profit margins on its products, generating massive amounts of wealth back in California. This is just one instance of what geographers call the “race to the bottom.” Within a global market, companies, regions, and states achieve a competitive advantage by loosening regulations, sacrificing worker safety, and slashing wages. Apple does so indirectly, by outsourcing its manufacturing and assembly operations to “underdeveloped” locations with laxer labor standards. While it may be able to distance itself from such abuses, a company like Apple still relies on a global patchwork of uneven development to extract surplus value and compete in the marketplace. For it, capital accumulates on the backs of those suffering elsewhere. Apple’s outsourcing is part of a much larger reorganization of production that has occurred over the past 50 years, as many manufacturing industries move from “developed” to “underdeveloped” countries. Known as the new international division of labor (NIDL) this reorganization forces us to acknowledge something that Marx recognized in his unfinished third volume of Capital. This is that capital is not monolithic. While “capital in general” can be conceived in the abstract sense (as has been done here) it is more accurate to speak, in the plural, of many capitals. This is evident in the global market, where capitals compete across geographic regions, economic sectors, and labor pools. As this competition plays out, entire landscapes are turned upside down, made uneven, marked by winners and losers.

Creative Destruction But how exactly does capital(s) reshape the world in such an uneven way? Answering this requires a closer look at the contradictions of capitalism. As geographers like Harvey point out, one of the central contradictions of capital accumulation is the tension between movement and fixity. On the one hand, as we’ve seen, capital needs to be in constant motion. It is invested again and again in the labor, materials, and instruments of production in order to make more of itself. Any excess capital generated in the process must, in turn, be used. For if capital lies idle, it cannot accumulate. The result is a seemingly endless demand for new markets, for new ways of expanding capital’s movement across space. This movement is always being sped up. In order to maintain profit margins over

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greater distances, high-speed technologies are needed to drive down the costs of transportation and communication. This is exemplified once again by Amazon’s Prime Now service. As turnover times creep closer to zero, capital flows faster and faster. But in order for it to be mobile in the first place, capital relies on fixed spaces. These include features of the built environment such as factories, stores, houses, roads, electrical grids, telephone cables, and other kinds of physical infrastructure that cannot be moved without being (partially) destroyed or devalued. Such immobile structures are necessary for the valorization of capital during production as well as the realization of capital during circulation. Apple, for instance, relies on Foxconn facilities in China to assemble its goods, along with Apple Stores and other retailers around the world to sell them. Relatively permanent roads and telecommunications networks are also needed to connect workers to the sites of production and consumers to the sites of consumption, whether in person or online. These aspects of the built environment themselves become landscapes of investment (“spatial fixes”) for excesses of capital. Examples of these include capital-intensive municipal and state development projects like the Interstate Highway System in the United States (US). The irony is that without such immovable spaces, capital would not be able to overcome the spatial barriers it encountersdwould not be able to expand into new markets or circulate at higher speeds. It in only by “fixing” space, creating solid nodes and pathways, that capital can remain mobile and accumulate. This makes for uneven landscapesdas capital tacks back and forth between zones of fixity and zones of mobility. The tension between capital’s need for mobility and its need for fixity leads to violent disruptions in space and society. Harvey describes this in terms of creative destruction, an idea he borrows from the economist Joseph Schumpeter. While fixed spaces must be built for capital to function, they must be destroyed at a later date to make room for new cycles of investment. The seesaw between creation and destruction helps relieve some of the pressures of overaccumulation. The tendency toward overaccumulation is an essential feature of capitalism as well as one of the main drivers of capitalist crisis. It occurs when surpluses of labor and capital cannot be put to “productive” use. If they lie fallow, capital accumulation will cease. To overcome this crisis, destruction (or “underdevelopment”) works to devalue capital previously invested in an area, driving down the costs of land and labor there, opening it up to new streams of outside investment. The destroyed region becomes a spatial fix: it acts as a sponge for pools of excess labor and capital, which it draws in, spurring new waves of development. Creative destruction accurately describes what has happened in many US cities over the past 50 years. In the early 1970s, the US and global economy entered a major recession. This marked the end of a massive period of growth following World War II, which had eventually culminated in a crisis of overproduction. Cities like New York were hit hard by the effects of economic stagnation. Others watched as their industrial sectors lost steam and withered. As the rate of global gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed, and profits declined, there was a dire need for new investment opportunities along with new ways of extracting surplus value from labor. Capital needed to move: this called for destruction. In the manufacturing industry, rising levels of automation allowed companies to eliminate jobs. As workers were cast out of factories, unemployment rates rose during the 1970s and early 1980s. And industrial jobs were now harder to find. This was compounded by the fact that many companies found it more profitable to “offshore” their operations to more “underdeveloped” countries like India or China, where large surplus populations kept down the costs of labor. The jobs that remained in the US were, on the whole, paid less. The very threat of offshoring worked to decimate labor unions, undermining their negotiating power and contributing to a general decline in wages across all industries (as a percentage of GDP). Especially in the Midwest and Northeast US, where the annihilation of industrial labor was felt most intensely, there was a mass exodus of capital from the city core. Stripped of value, entire landscapes were zapped of value and left to wither, from deserted industrial sites to boarded-up row homes. But destruction made space for new “creative” investments beginning in the 1970s and continuing through today. Run-down neighborhoods and derelict industrial districts have become targets for redevelopment projects, green building, and glitzy high-end apartments, attracting fresh crops of young urban professionals, foreign investors, and new forms of capital. In a city like Pittsburgh, whose revitalization is considered a “success story” by many, the destruction of the industrial sector has paved the way for new, eco-friendly urban growth. But what’s created never fully makes up for whatdand whodis destroyed. Capital’s creative destruction leads to further uneven development. This is evident, in Baltimore’s Port Covington Redevelopment project. First proposed in 2016, the project will transform an abandoned shipping and warehouse district in South Baltimore into a vibrant commercial and residential community, and home to the new global headquarters of Under Armour, Inc. While the development company, which is owned by Under Armour’s CEO Kevin Plank, says the project will create jobs and attract outside investment, local residents say it will intensify the city’s already astounding levels of income disparity. Even if the new Port Covington can entice a technology company like Amazon to build corporate offices there, as Plank and the City hope, rising real estate prices will further displace the poor. This has already happened in cities with more robust technology sectors such as Seattle and San Francisco. There, as elsewhere under capitalism, destruction leads to creation, creation leads to destruction, the cycle repeats.

Race, Gender, and Spatial Fix The example of Baltimore illustrates how the movement of capital relies on, and has destructive consequences for, areas of society beyond wage labor. Racial hierarchies are implicated as well. The city’s poor, those who stand to lose the most from the Port Covington project, are predominantly black. In Baltimore and other cities, poor blacks are confronted with extreme levels of state violence, from constant surveillance to mass incarceration to police killings. This reached a boiling point in 2015 with the police

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murder of Freddie Gray and the riots that ensued. These events, and the Black Lives Matter movements that formed around them, are deeply connected to the processes of capital accumulation. As geographers and many others have pointed out, the policing, criminalization, and coercion of racialized groups today plays an important role in the production and control of surplus populations. Such forms of oppression keep certain (non-white) bodies in positions of extreme poverty and danger, where they serve as exploitable, if not expendable, sources of cheap labor. When “dangerous” surplus populations get too large and begin to pose a threat to the social reproduction of capitalist society, they are removed from the streets through imprisonment, or else annihilated completely. These spacesdthe prison, the gravedbecome “fixes” for capital accumulation. Gender plays a major role in the movement of capital as well. As Marx argued, capitalism relies on a process of so-called primitive accumulation through which noncapitalist spaces of production are transformed to meet the ends of valorization. Marxist feminists like Silvia Federici have shown how this process involves the control of women’s bodies and the ongoing expropriation of their unwaged labor, especially the labor involved in social reproduction. One space where this occurs is the home, where women have historically taken on much larger roles, from housework to childcare. Such work plays a crucial role, alongside waged labor, in the process of valorization. For it is unpaid domestic labor that literally sustains waged labor in the first placedbirthing, feeding, and sheltering workers, allowing them to rest and survive to be exploited another day. The gendered division of space thus provides another “fix” for capital. It carves out pockets of unpaid work that, although taking place beyond capitalist production, are used to bolster the latter. Of course, gendered spaces also exist within sites of production. Geographer Melissa Wright has studied how female factory workers in northern Mexico and southern China are treated as worthless and literally disposable. Such gendered (and racialized) disposability can be found at Apple’s Foxconn factories as well, where female employees are subject to cultures of sexual harassment. The treatment of certain bodies as “waste,” whether in factories, homes, university campuses, or elsewhere, must be viewed alongside the violent movement of capital, its need to fix space for the sake of value, not of life. In a capitalist society, where economic abstraction covers up concrete social needs, life is transformed into its opposite.

Conclusion: The Emancipation of Space “Space” and “capital” are both abstract concepts. By examining them together, as this entry has done, they can be brought down to earth. Capital was originally defined here as a sum of value that seeks to produce more value. But as soon as we consider how this actually plays out in space, it becomes clear that capital is above all a social processdan inherently violent one. It is a process rooted in the antagonism between labor and the owners of capital. As workers are exploited during the production process, and paid below the full value of their labor, their employers receive a portion of their work for free. This “surplus value” becomes a seed planted within the commodities that are produced, and it is later harvested at the point of sale, when these commodities are exchanged for more money than it cost to make them. In this way capital grows, producing more of itself. The more we look at the geographies of capital, the more we see the extent to which its “growth” is actually uneven, full of knots and twists like a crooked apple tree. This unevenness stems from a deep tension at the core of capital, namely the moving contradiction between the need to reduce labor time to extract surplus value and the need to posit labor time as the very grounds on which such value can be produced and measured. As capital moves through space, its inner contradiction moves along with it. This leads to uneven development on both local and global levels, as the tension within capital is expressed and worked out in the cyclical dismantling and reorganization of landscapes. In order to overcome spatial barriersdto annihilate space with timednew structures of production and consumption must be built, from industrial plants, to strip malls, to transport and communication infrastructure. In absorbing unused labor and capital, these spatial fixes help capital defer periodic crises of overaccumulation, only to be later destroyed to make room for new spaces of investment. One of the most important things to keep in mind, and something that the study of geography helps consider, is that capital is not a homogenous entity. Today’s global economy is one in which many different capitals compete. Such competition presupposes, and works to produce, spatial and temporal patterns of uneven development. Different cities, regions, and nations move into conflict with one another, battling for the right to valorize. These fault lines occur not only along lines of class, as some traditional Marxists still maintain, but increasingly along those of gender, race, ethnicity, and other social antagonisms. If we are to bring an end to the capitalist class relation and its moving contradiction, this means bringing an end to a whole host of other relations along with it. A communism for the 21st Century, as it was for Marx in the 19th, is a “real movement which abolishes the present state of things.” This means nothing short of changing life as we know it, occupying and transforming the grounds on which that life grows. Rather than an annihilation, this is a movement to open up space, to emancipateall regions and bodies from the tyranny of capital.

See Also: Capitalism; Feminist Political Economy; Spatial Division of Labor; Uneven Development.

Further Reading De Lara, J., 2018. Inland Shift: Race, Space, and Capital in Southern California. University of California Press, Berkeley. Federici, S., 2004. Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation. Autonomedia, Brooklyn.

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Gallemore, C., Nielsen, K.R., Jespersen, K., 2019. The uneven geography of crowdfunding success: Spatial capital on Indiegogo. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 51 (6), 1389–1406. Harootunian, H., 2015. Marx after Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism. Columbia University Press, New York. Harvey, D., 2010. A Companion to Marx’s Capital. Verso, London. Harvey, D., 2018. Limits to Capital, Reprint Edition. Verso, London. Harvey, D., 2001. Globalization and the spatial fix. Geogr. Revue 2 (3), 23–31. Harvey, D., 2006. Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development. Verso, New York. Heinrich, M., 2012. An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital. Trans. A. Locascio. Monthly Review Press, New York. Marx, K., 1990. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1. Penguin, London. Marx, K., 1993. Grundrisse. Penguin, London. Massey, D., 1995. Spatial Divisions of Labor: Spatial Divisions of Labor. Macmillan, London. McIntyre, M., Nast, H., 2011. Bio(necro)polis: Marx, surplus populations, and the spatial dialectics of reproduction and “race”. Antipode 43 (5), 1465–1488. Palacios, J.M.S., 2017. The emergence of a global space for the expansion of transnational capital at the US-Mexico Border states since the 1980s and 1990s, and its links with the US military-industry complex. Regions Cohesion 7 (1), 87–121. Pickles, J., Smith, A., 2016. Articulations of Capital: Global Production Networks and Regional Transformations. John Wiley & Sons, Malden, MA. Pomeroy, C., Calzada-Diaz, A., Bielicki, D., 2019. Fund me to the moon: crowdfunding and the new space economy. Space Policy 47, 44–50. Smith, N., 2008. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, third ed. University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA. Tomba, M., 2013. Marx’s Temporalities. Brill, Leiden. Wright, M., 2006. Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism. Routledge, New York.

Relevant Websites David Harvey’s Capital Lectures, http://davidharvey.org/reading-capital/. Endnotes journal, https://endnotes.org.uk/. Marxists Internet Archives, https://www.marxists.org/.

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Capital Punishment Alex R Colucci, Kent State University, Kent, OH, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Death chamber This is a location that has come to exist with the movement of executions into prisons. Typically, a death chamber is a room specifically designed for the method of capital punishment to be used, i.e., hanging, electrocution, lethal gas, lethal injection. Death penalty A legal term which refers specifically to a punishment that results in death. When a sovereign body proclaims a sentence of death, that entity is issuing a death penalty. Death row A location in state-level prisons where inmates awaiting an execution date are incarcerated. Today, stays on death row can last many decades while the condemned inmates experience conditions of treatment and surveillance that often exceed that of the general prison population. Execution The material process of formalized killing by a sovereign entity regardless of the degree of formalized judicial proceedings.

Materially violent killing has existed since before recorded human history. Formalized killing, understood broadly as execution, dates back nearly 4000 years to early Babylonian civilizations who utilized death as a form of punishment for actions judged to be crimes. Since then, a penalty of death for any number of actions that transcend or infringe upon norms and/or laws established by sovereign populations has existed in some form at various times in every established society which has exercised some jurisdiction over a territory. This penalty of death for an infraction, carried out through a formalized execution of a person, is commonly known today as capital punishment. One of the earliest known forms of punishment that could be considered capital punishment was exclusion, where an individual’s presence in a community was forbidden. Highly favored in ancient Greece, this punitive tactic often resulted in death by depriving an individual of shelter, forcing them to provide for this needs outside of communal social interaction. Exposure to wild, nonhuman spaces, therefore, was a punishment that led to death. Since then, societies have progressively developed more direction and often more highly technological means of killing through capital punishment. It is these more modern and processional modes of capital punishmentdalong with their attendant demographic and legal appendagesdthat contemporary scholars have focused on in their study of the subject. Too often, in geographic literature as well as in other disciplines, the three terms “capital punishment,” “the death penalty,” and “execution” are used interchangeablydas if they are purely synonymsdespecially the first two terms. “Execution” refers to the physical, material actions of putting someone to death as a penalty. “The death penalty” is a legal term which refers to a punishment of death that can be handed out by a sovereign entity. “Capital punishment” is the practice of a sovereign entity materially executing a penalty of death. Throughout its existence, capital punishment’s status as an “ultimate” punishment has uncritically been assumed to be a strong force of social control, demonstrating to other would-be criminals a deterrent effect. The majority of scholarship on capital punishment done by geographers has addressed the subject in terms of its existence in the United States, with only brief mention of capital punishment internationallydmost often its existence outside the United States is invoked as a comparative device to induce reflection upon how and why the practice persists in the United States. In this way, the geographic scholarship on the subject is skewed in its distribution. In terms of a cohesive subdiscipline or approach, the subject of capital punishment remains without one; however, given its characteristics, it exists at the fringes of at least several. Specifically, these are carceral geographies, legal geographies, geographies of political-economy, critical geographies of race and racism, and postcolonial studies. Simply, capital punishment has long been a prominent aspect of the wider carceral and legal landscapes; one which has developed in line with changes in prison design and infrastructure and legal discourse and social norms. The steady mechanization of execution processes demonstrates the connection to political economies, while the use of capital punishment has often been intended as a means of social control and racist supremacy by sovereign populations. Indeed, many, often abjectly and highly visually violent, methods of capital punishment have been used in the process of colonization to assert control and influence over different territories and populations.

Geographic Distributions and Trends There are a variety of geographic trends and distributions of capital punishment that can be analyzed, generally, based on different laws and sentencing practices and different rates and locations of executions.

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International Distributions of Capital Punishment Today, of the 195 United Nations recognized countries, 56 retain capital punishment, 8 retain it only for exceptional circumstances for crimes committed during war, 28 retain it in law but have not practiced it in over 10 years and are believed to not have a policy or codified practice to carry out executions, and 106 have abolished it both in law and in practice. The vast majority of the 106 countries that have abolished capital punishment both in law and in practice for all crimes have done so in the last three decades. In 2018, the last full year since this writing, 21 countries performed state-sanctioned executions as a punishment for crime, while an undeterminable number also conduction extrajudicial executions. Those 21 countries that performed state-sanctioned executions include Afghanistan, Belarus, Botswana, China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, Vietnam, and Yemen. In 2017, 22 countries performed executions: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vietnam, and Yemen. The roughly 20 countries carrying out executions in recent years is nearly half as many as the 40 countries that carried out executions in 1997, roughly 20 years ago. The vast majority of executions in recent years, at least in countries for which there is reliable data, have taken place in China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. China annually executes thousands of individuals, though the government does not release precise figures; Iran maintains execution rates between 300 and 600 individuals annually, mostly for drug-related offenses; Saudi Arabia annually executes approximately 150 individuals, a figure that includes many foreign nationals. Figures for North Korea are impossible to verify, but it is widely assumed that they number at least in the hundreds annually. Within the last 3 years, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Vietnam stand out for their typically high annual execution totals, numbering between 35 and 125. The United States has stayed consistently between 20 and 52 individuals executed annually since 2008, while the number of individuals on death row has remained over 3000 since 1995. Regionally, the majority of countries that retain and practice capital punishment are in East, South, Southeast, and Southwest Asia, and North Africadthe prime exceptions being the United State and Belarus. Brunei, Laos, Lebanon, Maldives, Qatar, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan are the only countries in Asia that retain capital punishment in law for a wide variety of crimes but have not practiced capital punishment within the last 10 years. The majority of countries in a similar situationdwhere capital punishment exists in law but has not been practiced within ten yearsdare in east and sub-Saharan Africa. Of the countries who retain capital punishment but only in exceptional circumstances for crimes committed during way, the majoritydBrazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Perudare in South and Central America.

Distribution of Capital Punishment in the United States Capital punishment in the United States stands out compared to elsewhere in the world in a number of respects. It is often cited that the United States remains one of the last so-called industrialized countries to retain the death penalty in law and regularly carry out executions. Along with Belarus, the United States is the only country in North American or Europe to retain the practice. The United States is also one of the few countries to have successively developed and implemented alternative methods of capital punishment over time. This contrasts with many other industrialized countries which either maintained only one method of capital punishment or only changed methods once. Additionally, the United States is the only country to have different methods in use at the same time in different jurisdictions within it. At the federal level, the United States government maintains a death penalty statute, as does the United States military. At the state level 29 states, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming all maintain the legality of capital punishment. Four states, California, Colorado, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, have in place, as of this writing, a gubernatorial moratorium on capital punishment which has temporarily stopped executions. The remaining 21 states, plus the District of Columbia, have abolished the practice, with 16 doing so since 1960 and 9 of those 16 only having done so within the last two decades. New Hampshire is the most recent state to abolish capital punishment, doing so on May 30, 2019. There are several spatiotemporal trends in the practice and implementation of capital punishment in the United States. Hanging diffused colonially to the United States due to its primacy as the main method of execution in the United Kingdom. Capital punishment was prominently used throughout colonial times and for the first 100 years after independence, disproportionately against non-white populationsda practice that has persisted to the present. Only three states, Michigan (1847), Wisconsin (1853), and Maine (1887), abolished capital punishment in the 19th Century. Abolition was scare until the 1980s with just six states doing so: Minnesota (1911), Alaska and Hawai’i both as territories in 1957, Iowa and West Virginia both in 1965, and North Dakota (1973). In the 1980s, the District of Columbia abolished the practice in 1981, followed by several states in the Northeast: Rhode Island (1984), Massachusetts (1984), and Vermont (1987). It was not until 2007 that abolition continued in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and West: New York and New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland (2013), Delaware (2016), Washington (2018), and New Hampshire (2019). Execution data in the United States is considered relatively unreliable pre-1976, and so the Death Penalty Information Center maintains state execution totals for years after that date. Since then, there have been 1499 executions, and Texas has accounted for the most by a wide margin with 561. Virginia and Oklahoma are the other two states with more than 100, with 113 and 112,

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respectively. Florida (98), Missouri (88), Georgia (73), Alabama (66), Ohio (56), North Carolina (43), and South Carolina (43) all have executed over 40 individuals since 1976. As these data demonstrate, the majority of executions in recent decades have occurred in what could be termed, regionally, as the American South, with states that could be considered in the Midwest also having executed over 100 individuals. Historically, states outside the American South have also had significant execution totals. Through the 1960s, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Kansas, and California all had execution totals comparable to state throughout the South. In terms of race, since 1976 roughly 44% of the 1499 executions in the United States have been from non-white populations, despite non-white populations making up a far lower percentage of the total population in the United States. The current death row population in the United States also bears this trend out. Of the approximately 2738 individuals currently on death row, roughly 58% are characterized as African-American, Latino, or other non-white populations. Another major trend about capital punishment which can be assessed is the steady transition from public, to semiprivate, to fully private executions. Public executions, often hangings, were common throughout the United States until the 1830sdand continued in some places for another 100 yearsdwhen several factors coalesced which began their steady privatization. Evolving standards of what constituted cruel and unusual punishment, botched hangings, and unruly crowds that often numbered in the thousands, coupled with the development of state-level prisons began to cause state officials to seek a more exclusive venue for executions within prison walls. Beginning with Connecticut in 1830, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Iowa Territory, and finally Mississippi, all made execution semiprivate in the 1830s. Semiprivate executions in prisons were often still open to as many people as could fit within the prison yard, but provided state officials with a somewhat more controlled environment. States throughout the Midwest also move to semiprivate executions through the 1860s, while only Alabama and Georgia joined Mississippi in adopting the practice in the South. In 1864 and 1869, Vermont and New Hampshire, respectively, were the first two states to move to fully private executions in state-level prisons, rather than county-level prisons, where only state officials and explicitly invited guest observers were permitted to view the hanging. The move of executions to state-level prisons was also spurred along with the adoption of a new method of capital punishment: the electric chair, first designed and used in New York in 1890. States adopting this new technology, which required permanent indoor space to function, forced state officials to fully privatize executions where it was adopted due to a relative lack physical space for onlookers. By 1910, the majority of states in the Northeast and West were performing fully private executions, while in much of the Midwest and South executions remained semiprivate. Public executions remained in North Carolina until 1910, in Oklahoma until 1915, and Texas and Florida until 1924. Public hangings were reinstated in Arkansas between 1901 and 1906, but only for the crime of rapeda crime for which prosecution was almost exclusively leveled against African-Americans and often speciously. Similarly, Kentucky reintroduced public hangings for crimes of rape and attempted rapedalso almost exclusively leveled against AfricanAmericansdat the discretion of local officials in the county where the “crime” occurred in 1920. The final public execution in the United Statesdthe hanging of Rainey Betheadwas in Owensboro, Kentucky in 1936 in front of an estimated crowd of 20,000; the law allowing for public executions in Kentucky ended in 1938. Mississippi and Louisiana were the last two states to move from semiprivate executions in prison yardsdexecutions that were still open to the publicdto fully private executions in state-level prisons in 1955 and 1957, respectively, when Mississippi adopted the use of a gas chamber and Louisiana adopted the use of a stationary electric chair. Both states utilized their own mobile electric chair that was transported to county-level prison yards throughout each state for a period of time in the 1940s and early 1950s. The physical requirements of gas chambers and lethal injection executions have, in recent decades, enhanced state’s desire for complete privacy during executions. This has meant significantly decreased public access, and less public knowledge about the execution process itself. In the last several years, some states have gone as far as requiring corrections officers volunteering on execution teams to sign nondisclosure agreements about their work that allow the state to take legal action against them should they ever speak publicly about it even after they are no longer employed by the state.

Methods of Capital Punishment and Their Geographies There have been a considerable number of methods of execution used throughout human history. These methods have a wide and inconsistent range in terms of their geographic and historical distributions and their longevity or frequency of use. However, it is clear that many methods diffused spatially as a result of western colonization. The total number of methods worldwide varies depending on classification; however, aggregating from several sources, the number is approximately 35. Many of the methods have been used both in judicial executions and extrajudicial executions and continue in the present in both forms. Within recent decades, utilized methods include beheading/decapitation, crucifixion, electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, lethal injection, shooting, and stoning. Methods no longer in use in judicial executions include beating, blowing from a gun, boiling, breaking on the wheel, burning, burying alive, dichotomy, dismemberment/drawing and quartering, disembowelment, drowning, exile, exposure to animals, flaying alive, flogging, garroting, gibbeting, guillotine, impalement, keelhauling, poena cullei, poisoning, precipitation/falling, pressing/peine forte et dure, rack, running the gauntlet, stabbing, and suffocation. In 2018, beheading, electrocution, hanging, lethal injection, and shooting were all utilized. Beheading remains in use in Saudi Arabia, often in public by sword, and is the most commonly used method there. Public beheadings are also reported to have taken place in recent years in Syria, often carried out by antistate militias and members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Crucifixion has been used in recent decades in Saudi Arabia and Iran, while the practice

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is also part of the penal code as a legal punishment in Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. Electrocution has been exclusively used in the United States since 1976 when the Philippines ceased its use. Lethal gas has also been used exclusively in the United States, with the only exception being Lithuania’s use of a gas chamber from 1937 to 1940’. Hanging is the most widely used method, having been utilized in Afghanistan, Botswana, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Pakistan, Singapore, South Sudan, and Sudan in 2018. Hanging was most recently used in the United States in 1996; however, no state in the United States currently permits its use. Of countries that have recently carried out lethal injection executions, it is the sole legal method in only Thailand and Vietnam; in China and the United States, different jurisdictions maintain those options among others. Shooting is a commonly used method and has been historically anywhere where firearms are readily available; in 2018, Belarus, China, North Korea, Somalia, Taiwan, and Yemen all carried out executions by shooting. Shooting remains a possible method of execution in state of Utah in the United States. Stoning was used for a state sanctioned execution as recently as 2006 in Iran and is currently a legal punishment in Brunei, Iran, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. In terms of methods of capital punishment, the United States is unique in several regards. The United States is one of the few countries worldwide to both transition between several successive methods over time and have multiple methods in use in various jurisdictions simultaneously. First, the most commonly used methods in the United States have been, listed in order from most to least used, are hanging (9,183), electrocution (4,441), lethal injection (1,323), lethal gas (593), firing squad (130), and burning (65). Burning was used almost exclusively in colonial America, but also after independence several times as a punishment for escaped slaves. Hanging was the most common method through the early 1900s, when electrocution became the most prominent through the 1960s. This was also the same time period where lethal gas was used the most, after its first use in Nevada in 1924dthe last use of lethal gas was in Arizona in 1999, and today six states retain it as a legal alternative to lethal injection (Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wyoming). Electrocution was still used prominently through the 1990s throughout the American Southdthe last state to retain electrocution as the sole method of capital punishment was Nebraska, which moved to lethal injection in 2009. Since 2000, Alabama, Virginia, South Carolina, and Tennessee have used electrocution to execute a total of 16 individualsdthese states, in addition to Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, retain electrocution as a legal alternative to lethal injection. Tennessee is the most recent state to use the electric chair, twice in 2018. Firing squads have been used sporadically throughout the United States since independence, and earlier. Today it is listed as a legal alternative to lethal injection in Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah. In Mississippi and Oklahoma, it is listed as an option only if nitrogen hypoxia (lethal gas), lethal injection, and electrocution are held to be unconstitutional or are otherwise unavailable. In Utah, it is the only legal alternative should lethal injection drugs are unavailable or lethal injection is held unconstitutional. Since protocol for lethal injection was first developed and deemed constitutional in Oklahoma in 1977, it has spread throughout retentionist states in the ensuing decades to become the primary method of execution throughout the country. This same protocol has been revised several times to remain in line with the United States constitution, most specifically by Texas. As a result, retentionist states have adopted language from the Texas protocol when met with challenges to their own protocols. States that have changed to lethal injection since Texas did in 1982, have since adopted practices used in Texas during their own execution processes.

Past Approaches While capital punishment has been an infrequently studied subject in the discipline, the approaches taken to its study have been relatively dichotomous. Initial engagement with capital punishment was undertaken through conventional positivist epistemologies. Here, in the 1980s and 1990s, Keith Harries and occasional coauthor Derral Cheatwood, a criminologist, approach the phenomena empirically to produce maps, tables, and charts that display spatiotemporal patterns of capital punishment in the United States. These maps made visible the patterned geographies of demographic and legal/criminal variables in execution, displaying the historical regional variations between: state corrections systems, prisons, and execution; race, gender, and execution; deterrence of violent crime and execution; life-without-parole sanctions as an alternative to execution. The conclusions drawn from this research are normative and apolitical in that the data, or evidence, is left to speak for itself. Many normative studies from the disciplines of criminology and sociology proceed in a similar manner. The quantitative data used by these studies are derived from a source known as the “Espy file.” The database was started in the 1970s by amateur researcher M. Watt Espy as a dataset of all executions in the United States since the arrival of colonists in what is now the Commonwealth of Virginia. Despite its continued updating and maintenance, the database is incomplete and replete with coding errors that impact the veracity of the classification of crimes and demographic information about perpetrators. Notably, record keeping on capital punishment has never been thorough, even in recent times, and therefore the database not only is missing some notable executions, but also, it can therefore be understood that it is missing a great deal of less notable executions. This is specifically at issue in terms of the racist implementation of the practice throughout the United States, but specifically in the American Southeast and during times of the westward expansion of the United States. As a result, significant underreporting of the executions of African Americans and Indigenous populations is a persistent problem with the database. Additionally, the database lacks consistency in terms of including or excluding executions of dubious legality which often followed hastily established and blatantly unjust “people’s courts” that state governments either outright condoned or ignored and local communities considered legaldthese ad-hoc judicial proceedings disproportionately impacted non-white

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populations. Finally, perhaps this execution database’s most glaring problem is its reliance on the mere sentencing of an individual to death to be counted among the executed, rather than requiring the additional, though quite important, detail of any verification that the legal sentence ever actually carried out. Any solely quantitative study of capital punishment, including through undertaken by geographers to this point, that utilizes this database is not immune to these aforementioned issues. Any future studies that take this more normative approach would do well to nuance their use of these data through the inclusion of a discussion on these specific issues with execution data, as well as the broader strengths and limitations of quantitative data collection and measurement of human phenomena related to the abstract concept of crime. More recently in the 2010s, geographers have begun to take less normative approaches to capital punishment. In a 2015 special issue in ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, a group of geographers took a variety of approaches in explicitly assessing the uneven and unjust geographies of capital punishment in the United States. While also empirically grounded in contemporary events surrounding capital punishment, this collection of works is decidedly non-positivist in approach, offering critical assessment from wide array of epistemological vantage points. Nik Heynen offers a critique of capital punishment through an engagement with the historical–geographical legacies of white supremacism, advocating for, borrowing from W.E.B. DuBois, abolition democracy connected to the notion of a people’s geography that seeks a less violent state of human existence. Joshua Inwood and Melanie Barron use the case of Troy Davis to criticize the intertwined conditions of racism and inequality that are reinforced through the United States racial state and its justice system that privileges whiteness through law. Kobayashi focuses on anti–death penalty activism and how it connects to the uneven geographies of how capital punishment happens and to whom it happens at a variety of scales from local to international. Tyner and Colucci examine the relations between the political economy and state sovereignty over life in terms of how the ways in which capital punishment happens in the United States reflects the ways in which lives are differentially valued under capitalism. The substantive engagements from Harries and Cheatwood and the ACME special issue are certainly the most extensive and thorough seen by geographers. However, the subject is addressed briefly in two instances, once by Nick Blomley and more recently by Karen Morin. Blomley addresses capital punishment in terms of the violence of law in the expansion of private property rights and the development of the geographic grid during the westward expansion of the United States. Morin, in a larger discussion on violence in carceral spaces, discusses the violence that occurs on death row, the location where the condemned are imprisoned until execution.

Rethinking Approaches Moving forward, there is ample room to explore the geographies of capital punishment both empirically and epistemologically. First, despite what appears to be a decline both in the total number of formal, state-sanctioned executions and the places that are executing, worldwide and in the United States in recent years, the continued use or disuse of killing as a punishment is still very much in question throughout the world. This is especially prescient when considering how recent and short-lived the trend toward disuse is, which suggests that a reversal of this trend is entirely plausible. Following this, it should not be assumed that a relative decline in state-sanctioned executions means that, generally speaking, human cultural norms are permanently moving in the direction of greater tolerance and nonviolence. In terms of how geographers can think about the world and the condition of social relations within it, capital punishment reveals much about how humans interpret and act upon the actions of other humans. Given these considerations, examining capital punishment, and its continued practice, should cause academics concerned with political and cultural phenomena to question their assumptions about how people act politically, and their contextual motivations for, at times, both advocating for the use and disuse of capital punishment. More empirically, geographers in carceral and legal geographies could consider more closely matters of life and death, and practices that cause material violence. Capital punishment offers, certainly, such a subject. The dynamic variation in carceral circumstances for those on death row and judicial maneuvering required to both assert and challenge capital cases in different places, given the diverse cultural and political differences in the United States and worldwide, appear to be fruitful terrain for geographers in associated subdisciplines. Additionally, attention from geographers focused on political economy and social relations toward capital punishment have extensive potential to evaluate the material infrastructure used spatially control condemned individuals while awaiting execution, and the changing material implements used to carry out executions. Should these approaches be combined with the early foundation articulated the ACME special issue on capital punishment, then it would seem that geographers would be well positioned to speak critically on the continued practice of state sanctioned killing. Recently growth in black geographies and the use of critical race theory in the discipline also seems to be a well-positioned arena in which to consider the racial disparities in incarceration on death row and in executions. Here, scholars could additionally explore the related and not dissimilar landscape of extrajudicial executions, which, historically, have also disproportionately affected non-white populations and been a means of advancing white supremacist agendas throughout the world. Looking to both postcolonial approaches and Indigenous geographers in this regard could add greatly to critiques of contemporary states that maintain capital punishment. As geography and geographers begin, as they have in the past 20-odd years, to more thoroughly develop a voice as part of an ongoing critical dialogue about the state of the world, and the people and places in it, a focus on how and why humans kill through capital punishment provides an opportunity to demonstrate much about the condition of social relations through time.

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See Also: Carceral Geography; Legal Geographies; Violence.

Further Reading Banner, S., 2003. The Death Penalty: An American History. Harvard University Press. Blomley, N., 2003. Law, property, and the geography of violence: the Frontier, the survey, and the grid. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 93 (1), 121–141. Bohm, R.M., 2008. Karl Marx and the death penalty. Crit. Criminol. 16, 285–291. Bohm, R.M., 2011. DeathQuest: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United States, fourth ed. Routledge, Boston. Bowers, W.J., Pierce, G.L., McDevitt, J., 1984. Legal Homicide: Death as Punishment in America, 1864–1982. Northeastern University Press, Boston. Foucault, M., 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. Vintage Books, New York. Foucault, M., 2000. Power, 3 vols. In: Faubion, J.D. (Ed.), The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 3. The New Press, New York. Garland, D., 2010. Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition. Harvard University Press. Harries, K.D., Cheatwood, D., 1997. The Geography of Execution: The Capital Punishment Quagmire in America. Rowman & Littlefield. Heynen, N., 2015. If I Am Troy Davis, I failed Troy Davis: Abolishing the death penalty through an Antiracist people’s geography. ACME: Int. J. Crit. Geog. 14 (4), 1066–1082. Inwood, J.F.J., 2015. Introduction: geographies of capital punishment in the United States: the execution of Troy Davis. ACME: Int. J. Crit. Geog. 14 (4), 1058–1065. Inwood, J.F.J., Barron, M., 2015. Life and death in the racial state: collateral consequences and the execution of Troy Davis. ACME: Int. J. Crit. Geog. 14 (4), 1100–1117. Kobayashi, A., 2015. Justice versus justice: geographies of the death penalty and place-based activism in the Troy Davis case. ACME: Int. J. Crit. Geog. 14 (4), 1118–1131. Kronenwetter, M., 2001. Capital Punishment: A Reference Handbook, second ed. ABC-CLIO. Linebaugh, P., 2006. The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century, second ed. Verso. Morin, K.M., 2016a. Carceral space: prisoners and animals. Antipode 48 (5), 1317–1336. Morin, K.M., 2018. Carceral Space, Prisoners and Animals. Routledge. Sarat, A., 2002. When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition. Princeton University Press. Tyner, J.A., Colucci, A.R., 2015. Bare life, dead labor, and capital(ist) punishment. ACME: Int. J. Crit. Geog. 14 (4), 10–83, 1099. Zimring, F.E., 2003. The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment. Oxford University Press, New York.

Relevant Websites https://www.amnesty.org/en/, Amnesty International. https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/, Death Penalty Information Center. http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/index.cfm, Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide.

Capitalism Eric Sheppard, Department of Geography, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by R. Le Heron, volume 1, pp 382–389, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Capitalism is a multifaceted concept. In one respect it is an everyday term, deployed by all kinds of folks in all kinds of contexts to reference the economic system we currently find ourselves seemingly inhabiting. It is also a loaded term, lauded by conservatives and liberals who feel that this isdor can becomedthe best possible economic system, and denigrated by those who disagree. It also is an academic term, with much scholarly ink spilt on defining and analyzing capitalism, and tracing its past and future spatiotemporal trajectories. Finally, although this is less obvious, it is a geographical term. The word appeared in Europe in the 1850s, used by the French socialist Louis Blanc in 1850, with the first English usage in 1854 by William Makepeace Thackeray in his novel The Newcomes: Memoirs of a Most Respectable Family. The term “capitalist”, referring to owners of money capital, was already in use in the 1630s in the present-day Netherlands (at that time seeking to pry itself from catholic Spanish rule). Capitalism refers to a political economic system in which capitalists play a defining role. Karl Marx famously theorized capitalism, although he and Friedrich Engels preferred to call it the capitalistic system or the capitalist mode of production. We take for granted that capitalism began in Europe, invented as a way of organizing economic activities that propelled Europe’s industrial revolution and diffusing from there (in fits and starts, but by now seemingly completely) to the rest of the world. In Europe, capitalism was crafted during the philosophical era of the enlightenment: as a way of instantiating the belief that human society could be organized around secular principles instead of being ruled by sovereigns according to Christian religious dictate. Foundational principles for organizing a political economy on secular lines were the notion of individual liberty that John Locke argued was rooted in (white, male) property ownership, and Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible handdthat competitive capitalist markets transform the self-interested acts of individual producers and consumers into a socially beneficial allocation of commodities. Capitalism gained profoundly positive resonance in a 19th-Century Europe that prided itself for its emergent economic prosperity. Indeed, the invisible hand remains a key argument for capitalism’s proponentsdseen as a proof positive that capitalism, at least in principle, can bring about well-being to all, everywhere (notwithstanding Smith’s own skepticism, as a moral philosopher, about how capitalists’ self-interested motivations undermine this potential). It has also been conventional to attribute Europe’s rise to prosperity by the 19th Century to how its own characteristics enabled capitalism. The great German sociologist Max Weber argued that northwestern European Protestantism enabled “the spirit of capitalism.” Surveying eight influential accounts of Europe’s success, the geographer Jim Blaut compiles a list of such Eurocentric explanatory factors, including European culture, inventiveness, climate, topography, and political philosophy. In this (European) view, by displacing slavery, feudalism, mercantilism, and the like with capitalism, Europeans invented a political economic system that the world can only benefit from. Indeed, this self-belief drove Europeans to the view that European colonialism, by civilizing the natives, was ultimately in the interest of colonized peoples near and far (the breaking of eggs being necessary to making this omelette). Yet this geographical narrative of capitalism’s rise is profoundly misleading. First, Europeans did not invent capitalism; they appropriated capitalist practices from elsewhere through violent, racialized means. Second, capitalism (as we have come to understand it) does not pass Adam Smith’s invisible hand testdand one principal reason is its geography. Third, its seemingly hegemonic status in this era of neoliberal globalization is less than it seems; more-than-capitalist practices are commonplace, and not about to be absorbed into capitalism.

Where Was Capitalism Born? Blaut posed and answered this question in 1976, in Antipode: in Asia, Africa, and Europe. He argued that centers of capitalism were springing up across the Old World from the 12th Century, but that after 1492 European colonialism redirected this energy toward Europe. In the 40 years since he advanced this hypothesis, extensive interdisciplinary historical research has confirmed it. Scholars have documented the rich trading systems spanning the Indian Ocean prior to their disruption by the likes of Britain’s East India Trading Company, and the struggles European colonizers faced to convince Asians and Africans to purchase their wares or work for them. Britain, abetted by other European colonial powers and American free traders, worked to deindustrialize India and China, relocating industrialization to western Europe. Slavery, racism, and military power enabled Europeans to acquire gold, silver, and cheap basic commodities from their colonies, developing the factory system itself in their plantations. Indeed, the period from 1492 to the early 1800s has been termed the great divergence: Europe advanced from being somewhat backward by comparison to the Ming and incipient Mughal dynasties to become the center of capitalist global prosperity. The reasons for this geoeconomic shift of prosperity to Europe have little to do with climatic differences between East Asia and Europe, and everything to do with colonialism. Colonialism enabled the transfer of heterogeneous quasi-capitalist commodity production from localities scattered across Asia and Africa to Europe, and slavery and racism were central to this. The global deployment of colonialism and slavery, leavened by racialized European imaginaries and practices, made European capitalism possible,

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but also racial through and through. It is all but impossible to reconstruct how the capitalism that emerged in 19th-Century Europe differed from its distant forebears, but one crucial difference stands out. Formalized at the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, Europe’s nation-states accorded one another sovereign power over their own territories. As capitalism came to be accepted as the best secular approach to organizing a political economy, nation-states put laws in placedthe rule of law, as it has come to be knowndto create the political conditions of possibility for a capitalist market economy. Karl Polanyi influentially argued that capitalist markets are only sustainable if they are embedded in supportive political and cultural institutions, noting a historical “double movement” between more laissez faire and more interventionist state practices (from the more liberal long 19th Century that marked the first phase of European colonial/capitalist globalization, to the social welfare states of the mid-20th Century, to our current neoliberal era). Beyond this, organizing an entire territory in this way made it possible for capitalism to operate at a level of abstraction (the national territorial scale) enabling generalized labor values and market prices to be established for commodities. This was the geographical scalar abstraction underlying Adam Smith’s invisible hand arguments articulating the promise of capitalism, David Ricardo’s plaudit for free international trade, but also Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism. It became taken for granted that economies operated at the nation-state scale, that capitalism is European, and that this model should be replicated across Europe’s white settler colonies (and eventually beyond). In short capitalism was not European in originda transition from feudalism to capitalism beginning in Europe, and did not simply replace colonialism and slavery with something better: Racism and colonialism made Europeanstyle capitalism possible and remain embedded therein.

What Is This Capitalism, and Can It Deliver on Its Promise? Those defining and theorizing capitalism have done so by observing the version of it that took root in the 19th-Century Europe. This was the work of Scottish, English, French, German, and Austrian political economists, a white male lineage that includes Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, Bernard Mandeville, and Karl Marx (who, with Engels, undermined the Pollyannish accounts of his forebears), to be followed by figures such as Stanley Jevons, Ludwig von Mises, John Maynard Keynes, and Friedrich Hayek. Capitalism is a type of political economy (mode of production, in Marx’s terms)da particular way of transforming the more-than-human world that we reside in into economic products and distributing those among inhabitants of a society. At the center of capitalism is the production of commodities, i.e., economic goods whose production is driven by profitability considerations. Here, a commodity is not produced because society needs it, but because a profit can be made by the entrepreneur organizing its production (a motivation that is defended on the grounds that if it is profitable it must be socially usefuldthat what’s good for General Motors is good for the USA). A second key feature is free labor: the labor deployed to make this product is freely offered by workers in return for a wage, implying labor itself is allocated through a capitalist market. A third key feature is competition: Entrepreneurs compete to produce cheaper and better products in order to gain market share (and enhanced profits), driving innovation, capital accumulation, and economic growth. Economic growth is the fourth key feature: capitalism functions by reinvesting profits into producing more stuff, feeding more demand, generating more profits; Growth is capitalism’s DNA. Finally, capitalist state institutions (operating across supranational, national, and subnational scales) work to ensure the conditions of possibility for commodity production without undermining its political legitimacy or its ecological sustainability. In a nutshell, discussions of capitalism are dominated by debates about whether European-style capitalism can solve problems of sociospatial inequality, or whether it (re)produces them. Mainstream economic theory, building on the thinking of Smith et al., has devoted two centuries of effort to codifying the claim that capitalism can be socially beneficial, mobilizing ideas such as perfect competition, self-interested human nature, the invisible hand, rational choice, representative actors, and microfoundations to build a sophisticated mathematical theory of how capitalism should workdalbeit under highly abstract and artificial, spaceless assumptions. Against this, while currently marginalized as heretical relative to a powerful mainstream canon, Marxist, feminist, institutional, eco-, and other “heterodox” economic theorists, but also economic geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists, have built powerful counterarguments that demonstrate how really existing capitalism will consistently fail to deliver on its promise of well-being for all those people and places that conform to its precepts. Geographical considerations have been marginal to this debate, but when geography is taken seriously capitalism’s problems become particularly evident: Uneven geographical development is a characteristic consequence of capitalism, one that is increasingly persistent during this era of neoliberal capitalist globalization. Confining ourselves, for now, to the economics of capitalism, mainstream economists focus on exchange, not production: On capitalist markets. Their conclusions are based on imagining an equilibrium between supply and demand, in a situation where noone can take advantage of economic inequality: Market participants are price-takers not pricemakers, profits only cover marginal and fixed costs of production, and equilibrium prices seem rational. Prices reflect the marginal utility or productivity of the commodity being exchanged. Yet this is a highly idealized and simplified (not to mention ahistorical and ageographical) way of imagining capitalism that does not translate well to the real world. Capitalism is not an equilibrium moment of exchange: It is a putatively ever-expanding cycle of commodity production (Fig. 1). Let us begin with the production process through which commodities are brought to market. A capitalist advances money capital to pay for a place of production (a factory, equipped with production technologiesdmachines, computers, robots, and the likedpurchased from other capitalists), for the land on which it is built, and for the inputs needed to make the commodity (raw materials and commodities bought from other capitalists). She/he then hires labor, which typically is paid after the work has been done. All of these are purchased from those possessing them via factor markets (Fig. 1). Workers are free to sell their labor

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Figure 1

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The capitalist economic cycle. Source: Designed by author. Drawn by Matt Zebrowski, cartographer, Geography Department, UCLA.

in the market, but that freedom disappears once they enter the workplace: “[T]he money-owner now strides in front as capitalist; the possessor of labor-power follows as his laborer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect butda hiding” (Marx, 1967; Vol 1: 176). After production is complete, workers are paid and the product sent to market, in the expectation of selling it at a high enough price to recoup a competitive rate of profit over and above the costs of production. There are two kinds of market: final consumption (sales to households) and producer goods (sales to other capitalists). All these commodities, if sold, end up in the hands of the various kinds of individuals participating in the economy in quantities that reflect their desires and purchasing power: working households, capitalists, landlords, and resource owners. This cyclical flow of heterogeneous material and nonmaterial commodities (counterclockwise in Fig. 1) is enabled by flows of money in the opposite direction to pay for them (clockwise in Fig. 1). Periodically, money becomes more than a credit system to lubricate markets; when profit rates in the nonfinancial economy stagnate, money is invested in financial instruments in the expectation that more can be made here. This switching of investment capital to circulate within financial markets triggers phases of financialization; we are currently in such an era. Giovanni Arrighi has shown that financialization has historically foreshadowed wholesale geographical reconfigurations of globalizing capitalism, in the current configuration possibly the rise of China. Importantly, the commodities and money circulating through this system grow over time: this is economic growth. By the end of the year, a surplus has emerged by comparison to its beginning: a pie that is divided up among capitalists, workers, landlords, and resource owners. This surplus can be measured in physical terms (the increased physical of stuff in circulationduse value for Marx), in terms of monetary exchange value (monetary profits), or in terms of increases in the total socially necessary labor mobilized to produce the commodities (labor value). Irrespective of how we measure the surplus, dividing it up means that the interests of each of these economic classes are opposed to those of the others (with individuals possibly belonging to more than one class, such as workers who are homeowners). For example, higher profits imply lower real wagesdin purchasing power termsdand higher land or resource rents eat into profits and wages. The central relation is that between labor and capital as these are the conditions of possibility for commodity production. Here, we know that if capitalists make positive profits, then the labor embodied in (the labor directly and indirectly needed to produce) the goods that workers can consume with their wages is less than the labor they contribute to the economy. Marx called this exploitation. Conflicts of interest do not just exist between classes but also within them (e.g., among corporate oligopolies, between them and family businesses, or between unionized workforces and day laborers). All this makes capitalism characteristically unstable and subject to periodic crises; these also are baked into its DNA. Indeed, capitalism cannot stand alone as a “pure” economy. All forms of capitalism require a political system to mediate such contradictions and crises. In the case of European capitalism, the nation-state guarantees private property rights, crafts the legal system underlying the contracts and trust enabling markets to function, and functions as the political boundary object where political conflicts are negotiated (all too often ultimately in favor of the capitalists relied on to secure economic growth). The ways in which states do this (e.g., the degree to which they regulate capitalist commodity production and exchange) vary over time and space, creating a variegated landscape of national capitalisms. This is why capitalism is not an economy but a political economy. Yet capitalism also is a cultural political economy: cultural norms and

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discourses circulate that seek to normalize and secure civil society support for, or at least acquiescence to, a capitalist political economy. These discourses themselves can shift dramatically in ways that profoundly affect capitalist practices, as when the Keynesian/Fordist notion that nation-states should closely regulate the economy to save capitalism from itselfdthe state-led interpretation of capitalism that was hegemonic between the 1930s and the 1970sdwas replaced in the 1980s by the currently hegemonic neoliberal discourse that nation-states should limit their role to ensuring free markets (“good” governance) if we want capitalism to realize its promise. But what about geography? Any political economic system must be able to manage the geography of socio-ecological life, and capitalism is no exception. Thinking geographically about capitalism means, first, making sense of its spatiality. Geographical space (in its various manifestations: territory, connectivity, scale, etc.) is not simply the exogenous “out there” backdrop that shapes economic possibilities assumed by mainstream economists. Rather, it is constructed by means of societal (and biophysical) processes. But these constructed spaces also have causal effect on the trajectory of political economic processes; spatial and socio-ecological processes are dialectically interrelated. Second, geography also is not just about space: Geographers think through the lens of an “interdisciplinary discipline,” attending to how economic, political, cultural, and biophysical processes are coconstitutive of one another. For a geographer, the economy cannot be studied in isolation, nor is it plausible to claim that other processes are dominated by, or reducible to, economic processes. Consider each of these in turn. Any capitalist firm must manage the challenges of connectivity, place, and scale. For example, producing a commodity implies both purchasing at the start of a production period the inputs and labor from wherever they are available and distributing the commodity to wherever there is adequate demand for sale by the end of the production period (Fig. 2). These connectivities between places depend on accessibilitydthe time/space costs of moving commoditiesdwhich is itself a commodity produced by transportation and communications firms (underwritten by state policy and provision of public goods infrastructure). Rates of profit will depend on accessibility, which itself is unevenly distributed across space and changes over time with innovations in transportation and communications. Importantly, the complexities introduced by acknowledging the role of accessibilityda constantly shifting input to every moment of production and consumptiondreduce the likelihood that individual capitalists, workers, and consumers can realize the goals pursued by what seem at the time to be economically rational decisionsdcreating unintended consequences that undermine the rationality of production, exchange, and distribution. In recent years, critical economic geographers have begun to acknowledge how important accessibility is, empirically as well as theoretically, expanding the study of logistics and infrastructure. By the same token, the circulation of money through space and across time in order to pay for these mobile commodities is the work of spatially uneven financial markets and institutions shaping them. Firms are themselves places where commodity production must be managed. There is a politics to production in and across place, as capitalists’ desire to increase the rate of profit run up against workers’ desire for reasonable working conditions and compensation. In turn, firms are embedded in larger scale territoriesddistricts, cities, regions, and nationsdwhose nature shapes the conditions of possibility for commodity production. Michael Storper terms these relational assets, a key aspect of which is

Figure 2 The spatiotemporalities of capitalist commodity production. Source: Designed by author. Drawn by Matt Zebrowski, cartographer, Geography Department, UCLA.

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agglomeration economiesdthe ways in which agglomeration underwrites the profitability and innovativeness of commodity production. David Harvey has influentially argued that territorial states play a key role in shaping a place’s relational assets in order to attract commodity producers, noting also their instability. Assets that are highly attractive at one point in time become fixed in the landscape, and as conditions change a territory can become locked into what are no longer attractive assets, inducing firms to (threaten to) move elsewhere. These are the dynamics of uneven geographical development. We already see geographical scale at work here, but there is more to scale than this. The actions of firms and territorial states have larger-scale and smaller-scale ramifications. For example, the particular trajectories taken by globalization, importantly including global environmental change, are shaped by the localized actions of capitalists, workers, landlords, resource owners, and state institutions. In turn, those larger-scale trajectories alter the conditions of possibility for more localized actors. Consider, now, how economic and political processes are entwined with biophysical and cultural processes. Polanyi hit the nail on the head when he dubbed land and labor “fictitious commodities” because unlike “proper commodities” they are not produced for sale. If we expand his thinking from land to the more-than-human world, we know that even as capitalism works to commodify biophysical processesdin ways ranging from drilling for oil to genetic and geo-engineeringdthose processes have their own biophysical logics that exceed human attempts to enroll them into capitalism. Global climate change and mass extinctions are particularly dramatic examples of this. With respect to labor, commodified through capitalist labor markets, this is just one aspect of being human. The bulk of what being human means exceeds attempts to commodify labor, and even culture. Much of what we do in daily life, making us humans and not just laboring bodies, is at best tangential to capitalism: raising children, sexual relations, exercising, socializing, making music, art, and dance, etc. Even as many of these are commodified (hiring a nanny instead of raising kids ourselves) they are also activities central to shaping our intersectional identities that exceed commodification. Workers directly resist and contest detrimental conditions of work and social reproduction, but human contestations of capitalism also occur in many other spheres of social life. These attributes of the more-than-human world imply that capitalism and that world are dialectically interrelated; even as European-style capitalism transforms its constitutive outsides, these respond by contesting the conditions of possibility of capitalism, with outcomes uncertain. Put otherwise, the evolution of capitalism is plagued by both internal and external contradictions and crises that continually challenge its sustainabilitydcrises that undermine discursive constructions of capitalism as good, ubiquitous, and inevitable. Capitalism’s inevitability is discursively rooted in the claim that capitalism is capable, in principle, of enabling all bodies and places to prosper as long as they behave appropriately: entrepreneurially, rationally, self-interestedly, competitively, responsibly. In this view, people and places are responsible for their own success, and for failing. Yet uneven geographical development cannot be reduced to bad latitudes and bad attitudes. A systematic conclusion of economic geographers is that social and spatial economic inequalities also are shaped by how asymmetric relations between people and places empower some at the expense of others. Both individuals and places find themselves occupying distinct sociospatial positionalities, whose conditions of possibility are not only different but unequal, and are shaped through their relations with those positioned differently. Colonialism obviously operated in this way, creating conditions that positioned also newly independent nation-states in the periphery of globalizing capitalism. But the more seemingly innocent connectivities of capitalism tend to reproduce such inequalities. Unrestricted commodity trade is not a rising tide that lifts all ships, but systematically advantages places with the “right” specializations against those with the “wrong” onesdunless developmental states in the latter case intervene to force change (as in Korea, Dubai, and China). Global production networks are controlled by key firms in wealthier places, with peripheral locations enrolled through branch plants and low-wage subcontractors. Labor migrationditself a response to spatial economic inequalitydtends to relocate the most valuable residents from poorer to richer places, if the latter allow or countenance their presence; free labor migration, a key principle of capitalist economic growth, frequently runs up again racism and xenophobia in places of destination. Technological change favors wealthier places; others can take advantage of technological diffusion and catch-up, but profitable innovations cluster in places of advantage. Geopolitically, powerful nation-states, regions, and cities benefit from their role as centers of global command and control. If capitalism’s asymmetric (dis)empowering interactions tendentially favor already prosperous sociospatial positionalities to the disadvantage of others, these are far from deterministic relationships, of course. Places can climb the ladder from periphery to core (e.g., the United States in the 19th Century, the Pearl River Delta in the 21st Century), or slide down the snake from core to more peripheral status (the American Manufacturing Belt in the 1970sdeventually triggering Trumpist economic nationalism after 2016). Yet capitalist cores persistently (re)emerge, taking advantage of their asymmetric connectivities with peripheries to underwrite their prosperity. It follows from this that capitalism’s persistent failure to deliver on its promise, i.e., its tendency to reproduce sociospatial inequality, necessitates the pursuit of more-than-capitalist economic activities. If impoverished bodies and places cannot catch up with prosperous ones when abiding by capitalism’s rules of the game, then they must experiment with alternatives.

What Lies Beyond Capitalism? Since the millennium, economic geographers have come to reconsider the common viewdby proponents and opponents alikedthat capitalism has taken over the world, absorbing all other socio-ecological practices into its remit and logic via processes of commodification and accumulation by dispossession. This view is motivated by claims that capitalism is best (but see above), and/or by claims that it is hegemonic. A number of economic geographers beg to differdarguing not only

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that much lies beyond capitalism, but also that these outsides can disrupt capitalist hegemony. This reflects a longstanding interest of economic and commercial geographers, at least up to the 1950s, in how economic systems vary from place to place. J.K. Gibson-Graham (the writing collective of Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson) has been particularly influential in shaping this approach. Noting the persistence, also within the geographical core of globalizing capitalism, of daily economic practices that are not subject to the logic of commodity production, they argued that capitalism is much less hegemonic than it seems. They dubbed these activitiesdincluding housework (essential for producing a labor force), growing food at home, commoning, and barter tradednoncapitalist practices. They and others set about working with community members both to document the prevalence of these practices and also to revalue their importance and significance. This is now an active scholarly community that convenes itself under the label of diverse and community economies research, seeking also to apply this scholarship to the practical task of performing noncapitalist economic practices. Fig. 3 visualizes this approach in the form of an iceberg, whereby the capitalist political economy is the visible part of a highly diverse economy, supported and enabled by a much larger set of noncapitalist practices operating below the surface. The implication is obvious: Without noncapitalist economic activities capitalism would collapsedmuch like Polanyi’s point about capitalism’s embeddedness within the state. Such noncapitalist practices are then presented as a grassroots strategy for taking the economy back from capitalism. Some Marxist economic geographers have been highly critical of such proposals on the grounds that they divert energy from a global anti-capitalist revolution toward a seemingly futile, localized militant particularism because noncapitalist alternatives simply get absorbed into capitalism. Others disagree. Recognizing that such practices are not simply noncapitalist but morethan-capitalistddialectically shaped by but also shaping capitalismdit is not necessarily the case that the end result is capitalist

Figure 3 The community economies iceberg. Source: Image by Ken Byrne, reproduced by permission (http://www.communityeconomies.org/keyideas, accessed January 18, 2019).

Capitalism Table 1

Vectors of informality.

Production Labor Consumption Exchange Accessibility Waste

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Unregulated activities

Illegal activities

Diverse property rights

Communal activities

Household reproduction

Unregistered production Undocumented labor Black markets Informal markets Unregistered shipping, tax havens, and Bitcoin Informal waste processing

Illicit commodities Criminal activities Illegal goods Black markets Smuggling, money laundering Illicit dumping

Bootlegged goods Worker-owned production Stolen commodities Barter Stowaway goods, identity theft “Liberating,” for personal use

Non-commodities Collective labor Gleaning Sharing Bucket brigades, savings clubs Collaborative recycling

Commoning Care work Self-providing Gifting Family vehicles, lending money Handing down, re-use

Source: Sheppard, E., 2019. Globalizing Capitalism’s Raggedy Fringes: Thinking through Jakarta. Area Development and Policy, vol. 4 (1), pp. 1-27.

hegemony. Whereas Gibson-Graham demonstrate the persistence of such practices within the centers of calculation of globalizing capitalism, they are even more pervasive in its fringesdthe political economies of formerly colonized or quasi-colonized territories. Studies of capitalism in the global periphery have found postcolonial thinking helpful. On the one hand, informality is a central feature of such political economiesdpresent in the core countries but much less obvious. Table 1 sketches out vectors of informality (cf. Fig. 3), dimensioned by activities to be found in any economic system (production, work, consumption, exchange, transportation/communications, and waste) on the vertical axis, and domains of informality that exceed the European capitalist rule of law (regulatory, legal, property rights-based, communal, and familial) on the horizontal axis. This diverse set of more-than-capitalist practices not only can function as survival strategies for those marginalized and excluded from European-style capitalism, but also are a means for elites to prosecute their power beyond capitalism’s regulatory domain (helping write legislation, insider trading, tax havens, and the like). On the other hand, are national political economies (and some local political economies) where state–economy relations exceed those defined as capitalist within the European tradition of thought. The extensive literature on varieties of capitalism essentially classify almost all countries as capitalist, located on a spectrum ranging from US/UK-style “free market” capitalism to Japanese/ German-style coordinated capitalism. Yet this not only uses “northern” norms as the basis for judging all national economies, but also forecloses the possibility that all economies with functioning markets must be capitalist (after all, not all markets are capitalist; Table 1). For example, rather than conceptualizing China as European-style capitalism with Chinese characteristics, consider the proposition that China is a hybrid of state socialism and capitalism whose evolutiondnotwithstanding neoliberalizationdmay not be predestined to become a variant of capitalism.

Capitalism’s Uneven Geographies Like all seemingly abstract concepts, capitalism has its own particular geography, which must be attended to if we are to adequately understand its nature, and limits. Our very definition of capitalism references the form that a globalized set of diverse capitalist practices took once they arrived in Europe, and discourses presenting capitalism as the best possible economic system neglect the violence inflicted on other peoples and places to make this happen. This currently hegemonic model of capitalism, European style, fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate poverty in part due to the geographical challenges posed to it. The spatial extent of capitalism means that capitalist dynamics produce persistent uneven geographical developmentdenriching some at the expense of others, and necessitating experimentation with alternatives. Capitalism’s dialectical relationship with the fictitious commodities of labor and the more-than-human world can undermine its coherence from the outside. Finally, the persistence of more-than-capitalist practices in the geographical core, and particularly the geographical periphery, of globalizing capitalism is testimony to capitalism’s less than hegemonic status in practice, notwithstanding discourses by proponents and critics presenting it as currently globally hegemonic. The spatiotemporal future of capitalism remains an open questiondone whose trajectory will be shaped by its emergent geographies.

See Also: Alternative Economies; Borderland Economies; Capital and Space; Capitalism and the Division of Labor; Critical Geographies; Cultural Economy; Dialectical Reasoning and Dialectical Materialism; Economic Geography; Economy, Informal; Feminist Political Economy; Historical– Geographical Materialism; Human Geography and Economics; Imperialistic Geographies; Informal Sector; Labor Market; Labor Unionism; Marxist Geography; Neoliberalism; Orientalism; Postcolonial Geographies; Radical Geography; Regional Science; Regional Uneven Development; Sharing Economy; Society–Space; State Theory; Structural Marxism; Trade, International; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Anievas, A., Nis¸ancıoglu, K., 2018. How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism. Pluto, London.

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Arrighi, G., 2010. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times. Verso, London. Blaut, J., 1993. The Colonizer’s Model of the World. Guilford Press, New York. Blaut, J., 2000. Eight Eurocentric Historians. Guilford, New York. Cowen, D., 2014. The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Gibson-Graham, J.K., 1996. The End of Capitalism (As We Knew it). Blackwell, Oxford, UK. Gibson-Graham, J.K., et al., 2013. Take Back the Economy, Any Time, Any Place. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN. Harvey, D., 1982. The Limits to Capital. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Marx, K., 1967. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Three Volumes; Volumes 2 & 3 Prepared by Friedrich Engels). International Publishers, New York [1867–94]. Moore, J.W., 2015. Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital. Verso Books, London. Peck, J., 2010. Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Polanyi, K., 2001. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Beacon Press, Boston [1944]. Sheppard, E., 2016. Limits to Globalization: Disruptive Geographies of Capitalist Development. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Sheppard, E., 2019. Globalizing Capitalism’s Raggedy Fringes: Thinking through Jakarta. Area Development and Policy. Vol. 4 (1), 1–27. Sheppard, E., Barnes, T.J., 2015 [1990]. The Capitalist Space Economy: Geographical Analysis after Marx, Ricardo and Sraffa. Allen & Unwin, London. Storper, M., 1997. The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy. Guilford, New York. Weber, M., 1930. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Allen & Unwin, New York (translated by Talcott Parsons). [1905].

Capitalism and the Division of Labor Mark Brayshay, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Agrarian capitalism An intermediate stage of capitalism occurring in late-medieval England that laid foundations for the emergence of merchant capitalism and, later, industrial capitalism. Feudal tenancies were replaced by leases at costs that obliged peasant farmers to specialize and produce competitively for the market. Capitalism A system where goods and services are produced for profitable exchange in a free market. The means of production are privately owned, usually by independent companies operating competitively, and accumulated capital is reinvested in further production. Goods and services are produced by labor working for wages, and money is used to mediate the processes of distribution and exchange. Circulating capital Refers, for example, to raw materials or intermediate products, as one of the two types of capital among the factors of production. The other factors of production are land, labor, and entrepreneurship. (see fixed capital). Collaterateralized debt obligation (CDO) Is an asset-backed security which promises to pay investors, in a ranked sequence, or “tranches,” from the flow of cash collected from the pool of assets (e.g., mortgages or bonds) that it comprises. Commodification The process whereby every element in an economic system is assigned a price and is able to be bought and sold. Communism (see Marxism) A highly centralized political system and centrally planned command economy in which private enterprise and free trade are eliminated, and agriculture and industry are collectivized. Communist regimes have also aimed to acquire military power as a bulwark against the perceived threat of the capitalist world. Comparative advantage The theory developed to explain why it can be deemed beneficial for two countries to engage in trade even though one of the parties might be easily capable of producing all the goods involved itself. Division of Labor The functional subdivision of production processes into a series of separate operations, each carried out by workers possessing relatively few skills, whose wages cost less than those of fully skilled individuals capable of producing the entire product. It also means the geographical subdivision of production whereby the components of a particular product are made wherever efficiency and cost effectiveness can be maximized and subsequently brought together for final assembly. The geographical or spatial division of labor can also mean the geographical separation of management; research and development; and production and assembly operations that together comprise a single company. Gendered divisions of labor refer both to socially determined gender roles within societies, and the assignment of particular kinds of employment to men and women within an economy. Fascism/Nazism Right-wing authoritarian, centralist political philosophies promoting militaristic nationalism, which favor strong state economic control and regulation, and are suspicious of Western liberal capitalist democracy. Feudalism Describes a range of socio-economic systems, generally comprising intricate linkages between lords, vassals and land resources that existed in medieval Europe as well as elsewhere in the world. Fixed capital Refers, for example, to the plants or factories where goods are made, as one of the two types of capital that forms a factor of production (see circulating capital). Fordism A form of industrial capitalism (taking its name from Henry Ford’s pre-first world war Detroit motor car factory) that came to dominate Western economies, especially between 1945 and the 1970s, characterized by mass production through the assembly line, relatively high industrial wages leading to (through the virtuous circle) mass consumption. Free Market All economic decisions regarding the buying and selling of goods, services and money take place voluntarily and are free from any coercive government influence. Individuals trade, bargain, cooperate, and compete in an unfettered and decentralized manner, and the role of government is to defend market freedoms and the rights of an individual to determine the price at which he or she will sell their property. Futures trading Involves speculating on the future price of derivatives (financial instruments based on the value of shares, bonds, currency relativities, and commodities). If a trader expects a price will rise, then a fixed-term future in it will be purchased, which means that when the term expires the original agreed purchase price will fall due. Assuming prices have risen, resale at the new prevailing value will yield a profit to the trader. However, if prices fall, losses will be incurred. Options on futures are more sophisticated deals that allow traders flexibility about when to commit themselves to a futures deal. While futures can be a means of reducing uncertainty and risk, they have become a form of “casino capitalism” comprising more or less informed guesses about forthcoming movements in prices. Gentlemanly capitalism Describes the small elite group of London-based individuals who managed investment in, and the running of, Britain’s colonial economy from the late-1600s until the 1930s. The theory identifies financial capitalism as the key driver and determinant of British colonial activity and imperialism.

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Gig economy summarizes employment arrangements whereby workers have short-term contracts or offer their services on a freelance basis by performing pieces of work (each being a “gig”), for which payment is made, rather than holding a traditional waged or salaried post with an employer. Imperialism The creation, extension, or maintenance of political and/or cultural, and/or economic control of territory beyond that of the imperial power. The term has acquired a pejorative, negative meaning and it is important to note that, like colonialism, different connotations were implied by use of the term in the past. Industrial capitalism The development of the so-called factory system of production, characterized by complex and intricate divisions of labor, both within and between production processes, associated strongly with the proletarianization of the laboring classes. The industrialist takes the place of the merchant as the key player in the capitalist system. Islamic revival Complex and fundamental cultural, philosophical, political, and ethical objections to those aspects of the Western way of life that are regarded as degenerate. Includes opposition to the conspicuous consumption and profligate spending of the super-rich and the stark social inequalities that pervade some of the strongest Western democracies and offend Muslim teachings on charity and social justice. There are also Muslim ethical objections to Western bank interest charges that have led to the development of Islamic banking. Keynesian economics The ideas of the English economist, John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), that capitalism is compatible with government economic intervention regarding taxes, interest rates, market regulation, and regional policy aimed at promoting higher levels of demand, countering unemployment, and combating deflation. Laissez-faire economics Describes a system in which individuals trade, bargain, cooperate, and compete in a free and unregulated manner. Governments defend market freedoms and safeguard the rights of private property ownership. Means of Production Resources which are necessary for any form of production to occur. Usually taken to include money capital, land, raw materials, machines, labor, knowledge and information, and entrepreneurial acumen. Merchant capitalism/mercantilism A phase of capitalist evolution in which merchants engaged in a spatially expanding network of trade in staple commodities and manufactured goods (the latter still mostly produced by artisans and craftsmen). Mercantilism involved state controls, subsidies, and monopolies that regulated and protected the activities of merchant traders. Mixed economy Systems in which some of the means of production and distribution are state controlled and operated primarily as public services rather than for profit, but other parts of the economy are in private ownership and operation. Monetarism The theory developed by the US economist, Milton Friedman, that the health of the economy of a country is determined by the amount of money in circulation. Neo-Liberalism A term that refers to the reemergence, in recent decades, of support for laissez-faire economic liberalism. It is manifested in support for privatization, deregulation, and free trade; and, more recently, for austerity (associated with reductions in government spending and state indebtedness). Emphasis is placed strongly on increasing the role of the private sector in the economy and society. It represents a shift away from post-war Keynesian economics. Opportunity costs Express the costs of producing an item or a service in terms of the opportunity foregone (or the benefits lost) of not producing the next most valuable alternative. Post-Fordism The term has been used since the 1970s to describe a form of production that emphasizes flexibility, often made possible by the development of versatile, programmable machinery, capable of responding rapidly to changing consumer demand and market conditions. Proletariat Those obliged to sell their labor in return for wages in order to earn a living within a capitalist system. Proletarianization The process whereby feudal peasants became landless wage-workers within the capitalist system. Quantitative easing A means by which a central Bank, such as the US Federal Reserve Bank, increases the money supply by electronically purchasing assets, usually gilts (government bonds) or the bonds of investors including commercial banks and pension funds, in order to encourage lending to businesses and individuals, which can then stimulate a flat-lining economy. Securitized assets These are created by the packaging together of various types of contractual debt, such as residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, automobile loans or credit card debts, and selling them as cash flow products, to third-party investors. These cash flow products are variously described as securities, bonds, pass-through securities, or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Stagflation Economic conditions in which high levels of price and wage inflation coincide with abnormally low levels of economic growth, resulting in high rates of unemployment. Subprime mortgage A loan issued by a lending institution to borrowers with low credit ratings and an above average risk of defaulting on the loan. Tax haven Is a country or jurisdiction that has a low rate of taxation or does not levy a tax. In addition, a degree of secrecy is usually offered. Money held in so-called off-shore havens can be hidden in a manner that avoids taxation in the jurisdiction in which it was accumulated. Transnational corporations Very large companies that run plants and offices in several different countries and often take business decisions and make profits on a global basis. Welfare state Governments level taxes in order to raise revenues to pay for a large measure of social provision such as unemployment benefit, health care, and pensions for the elderly.

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World systems theory A dynamic structural explanation of the evolving spatial characteristics of the capitalist world economy in which a fluid mix of core, peripheral and semiperipheral territories is defined. Core regions, with higher wages, advanced technology, and diversified production, exploit both the semiperiphery and the periphery. With low wages, simpler technology, and limited production, peripheral regions are economically subordinated. Semiperipheral regions are capable of exploiting the periphery, but are themselves exploited by the core. Zero-hours contracts Are arrangements whereby employees are paid by the hour for work performed but with no minimum guaranteed hours. There may also be an absence of employee entitlements such as holidays and sickness, maternity/paternity, and redundancy benefits.

Capitalism is a socioeconomic system in which goods and services are produced for profitable exchange in a free market. The means of production are mostly in private ownership. As capital is accumulated, it is reinvested in further production. Investment decisions are usually made privately and production and distribution are mainly controlled by independent companies that operate in competition with each other. The work required to produce goods and services is supplied by a labor force working for wages and money is used to manage the distribution and exchange of goods, services, and labor. The division of labor is a term with multiple meanings according to the context and time period to which it is applied. Specialization in specific tasks by particular groups of workersdwith some work categorized and differentiated according to genderdmay be discerned in human societies since at least the beginning of settled agriculture. While a full appraisal of the changing character of household and gender-based divisions of labor is beyond the scope of this article, it is important also to acknowledge their cultural and economic importance in both precapitalist and capitalist economies. Although changes and shifts in the character and form of economic divisions of labor have occurred throughout the past, during the postmedieval era the first signs emerged of more profound reconfigurations of the phenomenon. On the one hand, well-defined geographical divisions of labor were created as distinct areas developed noticeable specializations in defined kinds of economic activity and production. On the other hand, within certain industries, a highly formalized functional subdivision of production processes into sequences of separate contributory operations began to develop. Workers possessing relatively few skills, whose wages or payment might cost considerably less than those of fully skilled individuals capable of producing the entire product, were increasingly contracted to complete each of several predetermined stages of manufacture, or to make different constituent components of an item in readiness for final assembly. Though identifiable earlier, the adoption of these kinds of division of labor became an especially prominent feature of the factories and mills of 18th-Century and 19th-Century Britain. Moreover, the same principles were ultimately adopted most fully in the Fordist assembly lines of industrial capitalism devised in Detroit before 1914, which thereafter became dominant across all Western economies, peaking in the period from the end of World War II until the 1970s. In more recent times, the term spatial division of labor has also been adopted to describe the geographical phenomenon whereby the components of a product are manufactured by plants in localities that may be astonishingly widely dispersed. Therefore, while the notion of a spatial division of labor is still used to explain the separationdwithin a small locality, or inside a single production plantdof particular activities that contribute to the making of a finished product, in many cases the geographical dispersal of contributory work may extend across an entire country, or even several countries and continents. Within a country, head-office and financial management functions are frequently located in major metropolises; research and development might be sited elsewhere, often in regions or districts where information technology and computer software skills have been amassed; and manufacturing and assembly may be sited in yet other localities where there are clusters of experienced workers, or where production costs can be minimized. Particularly since the late 1980s, it has become very common for such hierarchical functions, or “part-process” divisions of labor within a single corporate entity, to be spread around the world. Because vestiges of earlier patterns and manifestations of the division of labor tend everywhere to survive, the spatial organizationdthe geographydof modern capitalism has now become extraordinarily complex and intricate. In the process of supplying the requirements of society, capitalism still fundamentally relies on the efforts of wage-earning workers to yield profits for the owners of capital. Theoretically, the two groupsdthe capitalist entrepreneurs and the wageearning workersdare separate; in practice, however, complete disconnection is rare. The capitalist system is, nonetheless, a highly distinctive approach to the supply of society’s material needs in which the core objective is the production and self-expansion of capital; its operation has given rise to the creation of recognizable, but continually evolving, geographies of production, consumption, and exchange. Human geographers study the processes of capitalism and manifestations of the division of labor in order to understand and explain their social, economic, and political impacts and the ways in which related landscapes are created, used, and changed. While they are undeniably dominant in the world today, institutionalized capitalist economic practices are in fact a relatively recent phenomenon. Thus, although some features of the system are apparent in the ancient world, and there are still strongly

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contested academic debates about precisely when capitalism evolved, most authorities believe that it began unmistakably to emerge in the early postmedieval period as feudalism declined. Moreover, it is suggested that capitalism developed first in England; however, it soon appeared in other countries of Western Europe. Thriving merchant capitalismdfocused on investment in trade and centered on cities such as London, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Venice, and Genoaddeveloped as a major feature of the economic geography of early modern Europe. By the 18th Century, trade, colonization, and imperialism had spread this form of capitalism to the rest of the globe. Moreover, by then, industrial capitalism had developed in Europe sowing the seeds of further, far reaching global impacts. Indeed, notwithstanding some strong ideological challenges, capitalism has irrevocably changed the world and its influence is pervasive.

Theoretical and Conceptual Ideas The Human Imperative to “Truck, Barter, and Exchange” Among many writers who have offered theoretical explanations for the workings of capitalism, the first was Adam Smith, the Scotsborn philosopher and historian. Largely as a result of his 1776 book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith is regarded as the intellectual father of classical economics. He famously believed in the innate human imperative to “truck, barter, and exchange” and he developed the theory of the invisible hand of the market. Production and trade take place, argued Smith, in order to secure a profit, and surplus profits are accumulated as capital. Smith said that while people are naturally driven by a selfish desire for gain, ultimately the “good of society” is better served by the efforts of self-interested individuals than it is by altruistic collective action aimed at securing the “common good.” Best known for his 1798 Essay on the Principle of Population, the political economist Thomas Malthus broadly shared the ideas of Adam Smith. Malthus focused primarily on consumer demand in relation to the finite supply of resources and, in his 1803 Principles of Political Economy, he also argued that the adoption of capitalist approaches in agriculture provided a floor in living standards that was absent in traditional peasant farming economies. Other theorists of the late-18th and early 19th-centuries include David Ricardo, John Say, and John Stuart Mill who each published studies of the workings of capitalist economies. Ricardo’s 1817 book, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, defined fixed capital (e.g., a factory or mill where goods are made) and circulating capital (e.g., raw materials or intermediate products). Together, these types of capital represent one of the four factors of production; the others being land, labor, and entrepreneurship.

The Commercialization Model Arising from the ideas of Adam Smith and others, the orthodox explanation for the emergence of capitalismdsometimes called the commercialization modeldmaintains that rational, self-interested individuals have been engaging in trade since prehistoric times. If anything, therefore, systems such as feudalism were aberrations rather than the norm. Capitalism (re-)emerged as trade became increasingly specialized, technical advances were achieved that yielded improved productivity, and there was an evolving division of labor. Adam Smith had pointed to the commercial advantages gained as a result of the specialization and concentration of workers on well-defined single subtasks, in which they enhanced their aptitude for using appropriate equipment and thus achieved greater productivity than could be attained by each worker carrying out the entire manufacturing process. Smith drew attention to the example of (18th Century) pin makers who divided the task so that one group made the pinheads and a second group made and sharpened the shafts, each requiring the use of different tools. As another example, Smith highlighted the great range of specialist skills used in cooperation and with suitable equipment that were required to build large ocean-going ships. In his seminal 1893 work, The Division of Labor in Society, Émile Durkheim persuasively argued that the division of labor characterizes all societies (and, indeed, all species, not just human), but is positively correlated with societal advancement because it tends to increase markedly as a society progresses. Classical economic theory, therefore, sees the capitalist system as the maturing of long-embedded commercial practices and their liberation from political and cultural constraints.

Commodification, the Market, and Comparative Advantage Commodification is integral to a capitalist system. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, the historical emergence of capitalism involved the “widespread commodification of processesdnot merely exchange processes, but production processes, distribution processes, and investment processes . in the course of seeking to accumulate more and more capital, capitalists have sought to commodify more and more of these social processes in all spheres of economic life.” In short, capitalism involves the commodification of everything: all the ingredients in an economic system are capable of being assigned a price and traded. Markets have, of course, existed throughout human history. The earliest hunting and gathering societies evidently operated a bartering system; however, the introduction of money in Antiquity facilitated more sophisticated trade, which then developed its full potential across medieval Europe. Trade was highly regulated and restrictions prevented the emergence of truly free markets. A free market, in which all economic decisions regarding transfers of goods, services, and money are made voluntarily, is generally considered to be an essential feature of capitalism. Ideally, individuals trade, bargain, cooperate, and compete in an unfettered and decentralized manner, and the key role of government is not direct intervention or regulation, but simply one of defending market freedoms. Thus, in a capitalist system, the private ownership of property is both acknowledged and legally protected, as is the right of owners to sell their goods and property at a value which they determine. Such an approach is known as laissez-faire economics.

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Patterns of trade occurring in a free market can reflect recognition of comparative advantage. The theory of comparative advantage was first propounded by David Ricardo in 1817 when he demonstrated the idea by examining wine and cloth production in Portugal and England. Both commodities could be produced in Portugal more easily than in England; however, the relative cost of production of the two goods differed within each country. In England, wine production was extremely difficult, but cloth was readily manufactured. It could therefore be said that there were high opportunity costs for England to produce wine and it was better to focus on cloth making. Although in Portugal it was easy to produce both commodities, there was a comparative advantage in concentrating on the production of a surplus of wine to meet England’s demand, and trade it for English surplus cloth. Specialization enabled economies of scale to be secured and investment meant that a high quality product could be delivered. England also benefited from the arrangement because, while the cost of its cloth production remained the same, it enjoyed access to a supply of wine produced more cheaply than was possible at home. Critics point to inherent weaknesses in Ricardo’s theory such as its failure to factor in transportation costs and the implied assumption that the advantages of increased production outweigh other problems including environmental impacts and social inequalities. The theory also assumes that capital is immobile. In reality, political restrictions on the flow of capital countered the tendency of entrepreneurs to invest in neither wine nor cloth manufacture in England (where both cost more to produce) and instead to focus their attention only on Portuguese manufacturing. In the absence of such controls, and in situations where the balance of competition is perfect, it is argued that there is a tendency toward absolute advantage whereby one country, or one entity, is able to produce more efficiently than all others.

World Systems Theory Wallerstein’s world systems theory has provided a highly influential, dynamic, structural explanation of the evolving spatial characteristics of the merchant and industrial capitalist world economy. He identifies a core, a periphery, and a semiperiphery. Between the 1600s and the late 1800s, regions such as northwest Europe maintained a dominant core position, while others, such as Africa, remained in the periphery. Other regions, for example, the United States, moved from the semiperiphery into the core. In other cases, for example, among the semiautonomous Balkan states that had emerged by the 19th Century as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the move was from semiperiphery to periphery. Core regions, where wages were consistently higher, technology was more advanced and production was diversified, exploited both the semiperiphery and the periphery. In peripheral regions, wages were low, technology remained simple, and production was limited in range, often focusing on raw materials. Between the two, semiperipheral regions exhibited a mix of the characteristics of the other two regions and while capable of exploiting the periphery, they were themselves exploited by the core.

The Division of Labor: Entrepreneurs and Proletarianized Wage-Earners A feature of the demise of feudalism, especially in later medieval England, was the emergence from small-scale peasant farming economies of what some have termed an intermediate stage of agrarian capitalism. Within this stage, two groups may be identified. First, as old feudal laws and customsdunder which tenants had once held land from their lorddgradually decayed, they were replaced by economic leases that reflected market conditions. A new lease-holding or land-owning peasant farmer class was thereby established, which was obliged increasingly to respond to market imperatives, to specialize and to produce competitively. A geography dominated by the subsistence farming of peasants tied by bonds of service and obligation to the lands of their feudal lord was thus gradually refashioned and a new spatial map of production emerged. For example, often in response to physical environmental conditions, some regions began to specialize in cereal production, while others concentrated on rearing livestock. Goods were traded for profit to meet demand in the different localities. Second, as the feudal manorial system declined, those unable to lease or purchase land formed a propertyless peasantryda proletariatdthat must sell its labor in order to secure a livelihood. The labor that an individual offered became a commodity that could be precisely evaluated and built into calculations about the costs of production and the price at which goods must be sold to yield a profit. Determining price levels is central to the capitalist system. In a free market, prices depend on the supply of, and demand for, all the means of production (i.e., the resources required for any form of production). In order to maximize profits, entrepreneurial capitalists seek to minimize the costs of production and thereby outcompete other producers. Wages will therefore be subject to downward pressure. The division of labor whereby craft production processes are reduced to a series of simple repetitive operations, performed by relatively unskilled low-paid workers, offered a means within capitalist systems of lowering production costs. As feudalism was eclipsed, although a great variety of goods continued to be made in the countryside, complex integrated handicraft industries, overseen by guilds of practitioners (which controlled entry into their sector and set benchmark standards for their products), grew rapidly in workshops clustering in the towns and cities of later medieval Europe. Indeed, urban-based manufacturing dominated for several centuries thereafter. However, by the 18th Century in England and Scotland a new factory system began rapidly to develop in which some leading entrepreneurs sought to locate their premises outside the towns, where they would be beyond the regulatory restrictions of urban guilds. Such new mills and factories were peculiarly well suited to the division of their workforce whereby trained groups were assigned specific tasks in the production process. Moreover, tasks requiring the least skill, or attracting the lowest wages, were often assigned to female labor (an example of

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a gendered division of labor) or to child employees. Such an organizational approach offered a further opportunity for the owners of capital to secure an enhanced competitive edge in the market.

Marxist Ideas and Interpretations The notion of the commercialization model at the heart of classical economic theory that the capitalist drive is somehow a natural human trait, and that the emergence of capitalism as the world’s dominant socioeconomic system was inevitable, is strongly rejected by several theorists. Most prominent among these is Karl Polanyi whose challenge, articulated in his 1944 book The Great Transformation, to Adam Smith’s concept of “economic man,” and his natural tendency to trade and accumulate capital, is very well known. Today’s Marxian economists argue that the expansionary drive of capitalism was not a result of an innate human trait, but the product of its own historically specific internal laws of motion. Such critiques depend crucially on the founding body of radical doctrine, commentary, and critical analysis concerning capitalism developed by Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, which the latter articulated in Das Kapital (1867). Marx regarded capitalism as a mode of production characteristic of a historically specific phase occurring between the decline of feudalism and (what he saw as) the inevitable proletarian revolution that would usher in communism. He argued that the extraction by the bourgeois owners of capital of the surplus value of goods yielded as a result of the efforts of the labor force would ultimately trigger a power struggle in which the laboring classes were bound to prevail. The sequence that Marx predicted depended on his theory of value, which asserts that labor is the sole source of all wealth and profitdan idea which is, however, strongly contested by today’s mainstream, and even some Marxian, economists.

Gentlemanly Capitalism Interconnections between colonialism and imperialism and the development of the capitalist system have attracted considerable academic attention. London and, to a lesser extent, Paris became the preeminent centers of colonial finance, investment, and marketing. The twin iconic symbols of London’s dominance were the Royal Exchange (founded in 1565 by Sir Thomas Gresham at the junction of Cornhill and Threadneedle Street) and the Bank of England (set up by Scots-born William Paterson in 1694) (Figs. 1 and 2). European manufactured goods were traded for primary products and for the outputs of plantation agriculture such as sugar, cotton, rice, and tobacco. Plantation agriculture depended on slave labor drawn from West Africa. By 1750, as a result of the impetus of capitalism, nearly 4 million Africans had already been taken to the Americas, thereby creating both new colonial economic geographies and a permanent reconfiguration in the cultural geography of two continents. The notion of gentlemanly capitalism recognizes the pivotal role of economic drivers in European colonialism and imperialism. The term describes the small elite group of influential, London-based individuals who managed investment in, and the running of, Britain’s colonial economy from the late-17th Century until the interwar years of the 20th Century. Gentlemanly capitalists controlled the finance and services sector, which are seen as the vital focal point of British imperial power and were the crucial underpinnings that linked the United Kingdom with the rest of the globe. Comprising a blend of the old landed elite and the nouveaux riches of the City of London, cemented by marriage connections, old-school-tie links, and later by membership of the same

Figure 1 London’s first exchange was founded on the site by Sir Thomas Gresham in 1565 to serve as a center of commerce for the City. The original building was based in design on the Antwerp bourse. When officially opened by Queen Elizabeth I on 23 January 1571 it was accorded the title Royal Exchange: a name that perfectly encapsulates the mercantilist philosophy of capitalism of which England was then a major center. The Great Fire of London in 1666 destroyed the first Royal Exchange and a second was built in 1669 to the designs of Edward Jarman. This building was also destroyed by fire in 1838 and the replacement, opened by Queen Victoria in 1844, was designed by Sir William Tite. Though not used as a center of commerce since 1939, London’s Royal Exchange is nonetheless an iconic symbol of Western capitalism.

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Figure 2 The Bank of England, located in London’s Threadneedle Street (and referred to as “The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street”), is the central bank of the United Kingdom. Up to 2019, there have been 120 governors. Among the most notable was Montagu Norman whose tenure as governor (1920–44) saw the Bank’s decisive shift away from commercial banking toward a role as a nationalized central bank. Two years after Norman’s governorship, the Bank was nationalized. Founded by William Paterson in 1694, the Bank first occupied a location at Walbrook and moved to its present location only in 1734 when a new building was designed by Sir John Soane. The present early 20th-Century neo-classical building was designed by Sir Herbert Baker and its façade is one of the world’s most familiar images representing Western capitalism.

social and sporting clubs, the gentlemanly capitalists exerted immense power and influence across the rest of the world. As a radical revisionist theory of imperialism and capitalism, the thesis has proved highly controversial, but its importance lies in the emphasis it places on finance capitalism as the key motivation for, and determinant of, imperialism.

Geographies of Early Capitalism Within the context of the theoretical and conceptual ideas outlined so far, it is now appropriate to examine in more detail the historical development of the capitalist system and the division of labor in the period since the late-medieval decline of feudalism.

From Feudalism to Capitalism Although the term itself was coined only in the 17th Century, feudalism describes a range of medieval socioeconomic systems comprising intricate linkages among lords, vassals, and land resources that existed in Europe as well as in other parts of the world. Lords were nobles who held land, and vassals were granted access to portions of that land in exchange for military service and meeting other obligations. The king was the supreme lord who granted the land of his realm to the nobility in return for their fidelity, counsel and willingness to answer a royal call to arms. Feudal vassals were permitted to collect revenues generated by the land that they held. The nobility granted portions of land to lesser lords and they, in turn, gave protection to peasants who, in return for labor services and rents (usually a combination of a sum of money and agricultural produce), were allowed access to parcels of land for farming. The system of land grants in return for defined obligations was thus repeated from the apex to the base of the social hierarchy. Although by no means rigid, divisions of labor certainly existed in feudal societies, even within the most humble social strata. Prominent among the peasantry were manifestations of a gendered division of the labor required in agricultural work. Males characteristically undertook tasks such as clearing and plowing land and sowing seed. By contrast, the harvesting and processing of crops, as well as many aspects of animal husbandry, often involved a sharing of tasks among men, women, and children; but the conversion of agricultural produce into food in the barn, dairy, or domestic kitchen was mostly the preserve of females; and women also tended to dominate in the home-based production of textiles and the making of apparel. In support of the predominantly agrarian economy, there was specialization by some members of each manorial community in a range of other activities, including essential handicrafts such as those of the blacksmith and other metal workers; potters; tanners, and leatherworkers; woodsmen and carpenters; quarrymen; and masons. While the roots of the decline of European feudalism may be traced to the 1200s, as will be shown below, its demise was slow. Importantly, in England, the vacuum left by the gradual decay of feudalism was filled by nascent forms of modern capitalism. As noted already, from England capitalism spread to other parts of Western Europe and to the rest of the world; however, there is still considerable debate among scholars regarding the precise timing, the location, and the transition processes that saw its emergence. A key question is why feudalism declined at all. It began as a social contract but, over the course of time, feudal lords could no longer provide new lands to their vassals and the enforcement of their right to reassign land diminished as holdings became de facto hereditary properties. Moreover, from the 13th Century, the economies of countries in Western Europe began gradually to change

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from predominantly agrarian systems to ones that were increasingly money-based and mixed. While land remained a principal source of income, and defined an individual’s social status, even the high nobility developed a need for liquid capitaldto pay for luxury goods or to fund wars against their enemies. The process of change was boosted by the after-effects of the Black Death that devastated the population of Europe in the late-1340s and further undermined the social and cultural controls of feudalism. Indeed, for most scholars, the 14th Century marks the end of the true feudal age of dispersed lordship thus paving the way for the development in the 1500s of strong monarchies, nation states, and centralized control.

Merchant Capitalism and Colonial Expansion Although some authorities suggest that, as noted already, an intermediate “agrarian form of capitalism” emerged in England as feudalism decayed, for writers like Max Weber, Fernand Braudel, and especially Henri Pirenne, the key development in latermedieval Europe was the growth of largely self-governing cities and towns devoted to manufacture, commerce, and trade. In these towns, an increasing and autonomous bourgeoisie managed the development of merchant capitalism and this was the essential prerequisite for the rise of the modern capitalist system. Mercantilism or finance capitalism involved the investment (or “adventuring”) of capital in a spatially expanding network of trade in both staple commodities, such as timber and corn, and in an increasingly broad range of manufactured goods. The latter were still, however, mostly those made by traditional handicraft and artisan methods. Between the later-15th and the 18th centuries, the growing merchant capitalist classdat first dominated by the Portuguese (strongly backed by Venetian and Genoese investment) and the Spanishdbut soon superseded by those of England, The Netherlands, and Francedsought new markets and made geographical discoveries well beyond Europe. The colonization of the Americas and the development of colonies for the purpose of conducting trade with India, the East Indies, and the Far East were tangible geographical expressions of merchant capitalism. Many companies of investors, often obtaining royal charters that recognized their right to trade in particular regions of the world and notionally afforded the protection of the state, were formed in Europe during this period. Among the most famous are the Dutch and the English East India Companies. The latter secured its charter in December 1600 and, by the end of 1606, the company had financed two expeditions to the East Indies that returned with cargoes of pepper, nutmegs, and cloves. Although one of the company’s four ships was lost at sea as it returned from the second trip, when the spices brought back were sold, the shareholders had nonetheless secured a 95% profit on their initial investment. The basic premise of financial investment in which shareholders organized in companies (and collectively staked their money in trading enterprises in the hope and expectation of substantial profits) lay at the core merchant capitalism. Protected by state controls, subsidies, and monopolies, merchant traders were able to amass capital on a spectacular scale. Contemporary supporters of mercantilist doctrine strongly emphasized the importance of the state as both the regulator of the economy and the source of charters that accorded monopoly trading rights and offered state protection against foreign competition. Overseas conquest and the acquisition of colonies were, moreover, regarded as legitimate and indeed essential ambitions for mercantilist economies. Colonies were valuable sources of raw materials and lucrative markets for finished products. By the early 18th Century, Britain’s colonial activity was beginning to eclipse that of her rivals and London was the primate city of the world capitalist system. Although the spread of mercantilism across Western Europe is easy to understand, it has proved more of a challenge to explain why the leap to a modern industrial capitalist economy first occurred in England. The dominance of mercantilism lasted much longer in some of Europe’s less well-developed economies (e.g., Prussia, part of today’s Germany) but it was already declining in England by the mid-18th Century. Factors cited to explain England’s lead toward industrial capitalism include the centralized character and political unification achieved by the 16th Century, the Reformation, and suppression of the monasteries that saw the enormous transfer of the church’s land and political influence to secular interests, and the emergence of a new social order from the 17th-Century conflict between Crown and Parliament during the Civil War and Commonwealth, the Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution. By 1700, the capitalist bourgeois classes had triumphed and were therefore able to determine the running of England’s economy. Moreover, a further confluence of conditions allowed industrial capitalism to emerge. Most significant among the further conditions was the availability of the wealth accumulated during the merchant phase of capitalism, which could now be invested in mechanized production.

Industrial Capitalism and Its Geographies Industrial capitalism saw the rapid development of the factory system of production, characterized by much more rigid, complex, and intricate divisions of labor, both within and between production processes, to which reference has already been made. This phenomenon, which led to the proletarianization (and, he argues, exploitation) of labor, is explored in depth in E. P. Thompson’s classic study, The Making of the English Working Class. Thompson shows that, in this new turn of the economic revolution, industrialists replaced merchants as the key players in the capitalist system. Handicrafts and artisanship, the powers of the urban-based regulatory guilds, and the traditional networks of masters, apprentices, and journeymen were all eclipsed. The ethos of industrial capitalism also began to challenge mercantilist doctrines of trade barriers and protective monopolies and, by the mid-19th Century, Britain had fully embraced laissez-faire economics. A clear manifestation of this new thinking occurred in the 1840s when the duty on grain imported to Britain was abolished by the repeal of the Corn Laws. Liberalism and competition in trade, and the development of a free market economy, were now the central political and economic philosophies of the era.

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The capitalist transformation of Europe’s textile production from the 15th Century onwards has received the bulk of academic attention devoted to explanations of the emergence of industrial capitalism. Studies have focused on the increasing mechanization of the manufacturing process and its spatial concentration to enable the new technologies to be fully and efficiently harnessed. Geographers note the apparently relentless tendency toward regional specialization and concentration within the textile industries that peaked in England during the later 18th Century. In 1720s England, urban-based weavers of woolen cloth still depended on supplies of yarn produced on the spinning wheels dispersed around neighboring villages, hamlets, and farmsteads. By the late1700s, both processes were mechanized and carried out in extra-urban spinning and weaving mills predominantly located in specific geographical regions of the country. Although the manufacture of some other products remained relatively domestic in scale well into the 20th Century, others (for example, ceramics, iron and steel making, brewing, and metal goods manufacturing) were transformed in a similar way. The landscape impacts of the changes in production methods, yielded by key mechanization innovations, and in locational concentration, were profound. Steam powered technologiesdhugely enhanced by the engineering inventions of Matthew Boulton and James Watt in the early 1770sdinexorably prompted industries with high energy demands to concentrate on or near coal fields; and, in these areas, in addition to the construction of mills and factories, fledgling settlements dominated by high-density industrial housing grew rapidly and the transport infrastructure was transformed as new networks of canals and turnpike (i.e., toll) roads were built. While traditionally characterized as the specific manifestations of the industrial revolution, such geographical transformations may also be seen as the tangible, virtually indelible landscape signature of the history of the wider capitalist system both in Britain and throughout much of the world. The work required to manufacture a product within industrial capitalism was increasingly compartmentalized as a series of rigidly defined, discrete operations performed by specific groups of employees. Indeed, the highly structured division of labor, as a means of enhancing efficiency and maximizing profits, was the quintessential ingredient of the industrial capitalist economy. By the 19th Century, Britain was seen (and saw herself) as the workshop of the world, but the driving forces of industrial capitalism, comparable to those experienced in the United Kingdom, were also exerting an impact on landscapes in other parts of Europe and North America. The processes involved were complex, varied and geographically uneven and there has been much debate about the precise timing and character of the transformation in the case of particular industries and places. Parallels with the British model of change have been drawn, for example, with the development of heavy industry in Germany’s Ruhr region and in western Pennsylvania in the United States. Steam engine technology underpinned the invention in the early 19th Century of steam-powered locomotive engines and the development of railways. The impact of the introduction of rail transportation was dramatic in Europe and, arguably, even more so in North America and in imperial colonies. Railways made possible the integrationdpolitically, culturally, and economicallydof vast continental spaces. The British began to build railways in India in the 1850s. In North America, the first transcontinental railroad opened in 1869. The transport costs of raw materials and finished products were significantly reduced, new sources of supply became accessible, and new markets were opened up.

Geographies of Modern Capitalism Although progress has been neither uninterrupted nor straightforward, the period since the last quarter of the 19th Century has seen the global triumph of capitalism. Indeed, the pace of change accelerated markedly during the 20th Century: the transformation of Western economies and societies that occurred during the 1900s as a result of immense technological advances is utterly without precedent. But there have also been major setbacks and catastrophes. Although providing a short-term economic stimulus while conflict ensued, the wake of both the world wars of 1914–18 and 1939–45 saw severe disruption. Indeed, the global economic depression between 1929 and 1933 put a sharp brake on progress. Notwithstanding severe postwar dislocation, after 1945 the motor of capitalism soon burst into renewed life and growing prosperity, which lasted almost uninterrupted until the world oil crisis of 1973. A striking feature of 20th-Century capitalism has been an enormous change in the gendered division of labor. The old model, whereby femalesdonce marrieddusually ceased to participate in the paid workforce, was radically changed. In the United Kingdom, the 1901 census revealed that less than a third of women in the age group 25–54 years held paid employment. Some 80% of these were (predominantly unmarried) domestic servants and a majority of the remainder comprised working class women with low-paid jobs in textile manufacturing and primary production. A key impact of the First World War, when an acute shortage of labor occurred as a result of the enlistment of men to fight at the front, was a dramatic opening of opportunities for women to be recruited as paid employees in an unprecedentedly wide array of work. The huge loss of lives, wrought by the conflict and the influenza pandemic that followed, ensured that there was no longer term reversal in the need for women in the labor force; indeed, notwithstanding stagnation during the 1929–33 economic depression, the upward trend in female employment is notable during the entire period since 1914. By 1975, the UK employment rate of the 25–54 year-old female age group had risen to 57% and included a rapidly increasing number of married women with children. In 2017, participation reached 78% and, despite the persistence of a gender “pay gap” where female employees undertaking comparable work are rewarded less well than their male counterparts, restrictions on the kinds of jobs open to women have been almost entirely eradicated. Moreover, the British experience is a widely shared phenomenon across the Western capitalist world. In the United States, for example, approximately 75% of adult women were in paid employment in 2016, and they accounted for 57% of the country’s total labor force.

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Against the background of dramatic shifts in the gendered division of labor, and extending beyond the catastrophic impacts of war and economic slump, capitalism also faced some other mighty challenges in the 1900s: the end of empire, the rise of communism and fascism, and (more recently) the Islamic revival. It is to this more recent period in the history of capitalism, namely that between c.1875 and c.2007, that attention is now turned.

Large Corporations, Political Regulation, Fordism, Mass Production, and Economies of Scale In the last quarter of the 19th Century, the control and direction of large areas of industry came increasingly into the hands of banks and financiers. This era thus came to be dominated by finance capitalism, characterized by the growth of large corporationsdsome of them developing into mammoth industrial cartels. The development of increasingly complex systems of banking and equity markets, the corporate holdings of capital through stock ownership, and a widening separation (both cultural and spatial) between the owners of capital and the production process are further key features of this phase of capitalism. The emergence of large industrial trusts provoked legislation in the United States aimed at reducing the monopolistic tendencies then prevailing. The US federal government thus assumed a widening role in this period in the regulation of industrial standards for key industries of special public concern and in the passing of antitrust laws. Such regulation in the late 1800s and early 1900s marked a move away from laissez-faire economics. In 1913 Henry Ford famously introduced the assembly line in his automobile manufacturing plant at Dearborn, Detroit. Drawing on both the earlier experience of highly organized working methods adopted in the Chicago meat-packing industry and the time-and-motion ideas of F.W. Taylor, Ford took the concept of the division of labor to a new level whereby every manufacturing task was carefully timed and the “Model T” production process was accordingly split into a meticulously devised sequence of equal duration operationsdeach usually requiring less than a minute to perform (Fig. 3). By subdividing production in this way, Ford’s system eliminated the need for a workforce individually possessing high-level engineering skills. Moreover, by paying relatively generous wages ($5 per day), his business model envisaged the prospect that employees might afford the purchase of the automobiles ($850 each) rolling off the production line. Indeed, the delivery of high volumes of automobiles of a standardized specification in a tightly managed working environment enabled Ford both to stimulate and meet a new mass-market demand for the product. Fordist principles were soon adopted in other US manufacturing districts, in the British West Midlands, in France, and in the German Ruhr. Examples of European automobile manufacturers that adopted Fordist approaches include André Citroën, whose plant near Paris produced 100 cars per day by 1919, and the Hanover-based Opel company, which launched Germany’s first mass-production motor cars in the 1920s. However, the impetus in Germany to build a relatively inexpensive and standardized “people’s car” gathered fully only in the early 1930s. Building on the prototypes developed by the Stuttgart plant owned by Ferdinand Porsche, a new company was founded and ultimately began Ford-style mass production of the first world-famous Volkswagen automobiles. Inevitably, the term Fordism, denoting maximum efficiency, economies of scale, assembly line production, standardization, affordability, and effective marketing, was coined to encapsulate the ingredients of the approach.

Liberal Capitalism Under Pressure Economic depressions and boom-and-bust business cycles became a recurring problem in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The so-called Long Depression of the 1870s and 1880s and the Great Depression triggered by the stock market crash in

Figure 3 Fordism, as a form of industrial capitalism, manifested in the Detroit Industry Murals. The frescoes, were painted between 1932 and 1933 by the Mexican artist, Diego Rivera, in the Detroit Institute of Arts, and comprise 27 panels that depict mass production on the famous assembly lines at the Ford Motor Company (a small section of the frescoes is shown).

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1929 affected almost the entire capitalist world and prompted discussions about the long-term survival prospects of capitalism as a system. During the Great Depression, Marxists confidently forecast the complete collapse of capitalism and pointed to the ability of the Soviet communist regime (which is discussed below) to avoid the worst extremes of the global economic downturn; however, economic recovery after the Depression and World War II undermined communist predictions about capitalism’s imminent demise. Nevertheless, this era saw yet another round of state intervention as governments tried to soften the harshness of the spatial and social impacts of capitalism. Notwithstanding the importance in classical economic theory of a laissez-faire approach, it was claimed by economists such as John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) that capitalism could be made compatible with interventionist government. Against the background of the 1930s depression, Keynesian economics urged state intervention (for example, through adjustments to personal and corporate taxation levels and to interest rates) to promote investment, to stimulate higher levels of aggregate demand, to fight unemployment, and to counter deflation. Together with the inexorable rise in the ratio of government expenditure to GNP, further new terms were coined by commentators and politicians attempting to explain and to understand the workings of ever-more tightly managed forms of capitalism: these terms include mixed economy, welfare state, and state capitalism. The lengthy postwar boom came to an abrupt halt amid problems of a sudden embargo on oil supplies imposed in 1973 by the Middle East producing states, which led to a leap in crude oil prices and resulted in prolonged stagflationdan episode that reignited interest among some economic theorists in 19th-Century laissez-faire capitalism. Neoliberal policy prescriptions were urged as the best means of curing the ills of late-20th-Century capitalism. Although retaining adherents, the ideas of Keynesian economics were most decisively countered in this time of oil crises, inflation, high unemployment, and low economic growth. Theorists such as Milton Friedman (1912–2006) pointed to a contraction in the money supply (controlled by the US Federal Reserve Bank), rather than a lack of investment, as a key cause of similar conditions that had prevailed in the 1930s slump. Friedman’s monetarist ideas urged a return to the free market principles of classical economic theory as the solution to the problems current in the 1970s. Monetarismda theoretical alternative to Keynesian regulation and interventionismdemerged as a policy approach more compatible with classical liberal capitalism and it was embraced in the 1980s in some parts of the capitalist world, most notably in the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Challenge of Command Economies and Communism In the 20th Century, Marxist-style communism undoubtedly posed the most significant challenge to capitalism. Although Karl Marx predicted that communism would find support among the exploited industrial working classes of core economies such as Britain and the United States, paradoxically, the doctrine secured its first victory in 1917 in the least-industrialized of the great powers, namely Russia. The Bolsheviks who led the Russian Revolution were therefore faced with the task of introducing a Marxist socialist system not among a predominantly urbanized proletariat, but in a largely peasant rural society. In the newly created Soviet Union, a highly centralized political system was built on the ashes of the Czarist regime and, by the end of the 1920s, a centrally planned, command economy had been developed in which private enterprise and free trade were abolished and agriculture and industry were collectivized. Military power was strengthened against the perceived threat of the capitalist world. Victory in World War II (achieved at an appalling cost in loss of life), and the subsequent opportunistic territorial expansion of communism across most of eastern and central Europe, thereafter divided the world into two starkly contrasting ideological, political, and economic entitiesdcapitalist and communistdseparated by Winston Churchill’s famously evocative “iron curtain.” With both sides possessing a growing arsenal of nuclear weaponry, a confrontation arose that was characterized by an equal, mutual threat, which came to be known as the cold war. Communism spread elsewhere, perhaps most notably to China but also, for example, to parts of Southeast Asia. Attempts to impose the principle of social equality on the masses led for a period of time to the barbaric suppression of presumed privilege and elitism. Once again, these recipients did not fit Marx’s capitalist–proletarian model and the ideology therefore required adaptation according to particular circumstances. Notwithstanding the lack of Marxist purity in its application, communism was regarded as a highly dangerous challenge to both the philosophy and the practical operation of capitalism. It became clear, however, that the stifling and inflexible constraints of the command economies of Soviet Bloc countries severely encumbered their ability to compete with capitalism in terms of productivity and innovation. By the early 1980s, the communist world was in economic and political crisis. Unable to prevent the secession from communism of its client states in central and Eastern Europe, in 1991 the Soviet Union itself crumbled into fifteen separate sovereign republicsdonce more becoming open to capitalist penetration. At least for a time, the chill of the cold war began to thaw. Intriguing debates ensued on the reasons for the collapse of communism in its pioneering heartland. Some argue that Marx’s teachings are fundamentally flawed and communism was bound to fail; others blame Lenin for his inept attempt to build communism in a country that was an under-developed peasant farming society. Those who champion the notion of the irresistible forces of capitalism see communism’s demise as a victory for Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand of the market. Whatever the truth, the reintroduction of capitalism into the social and economic spaces of former communist countries has engendered a raft of severe social and economic problems, manifested most noticeably as enormous inequalities of wealth and power that remain largely unresolved. Moreover, while communist rule survives, the forces of capitalism have been unleashed in China; as a result, extraordinary, paradoxical, and startling consequences for the entire world are still in the process of unfolding.

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The Challenge of Fascism and Nazism Other potent 20th-Century challenges to capitalism include fascism and Nazism. Under Benito Mussolini, a fascist government ruled Italy from 1922, and Adolf Hitler led the Nazi (National Socialist) government in Germany from 1933. Both regimes were militarily defeated in 1945. Although the reactionary political philosophies and ideologies of fascism and Nazism extended across many spheres, one key aspect of its challenge was against the individualism, liberal commercialism, and unchecked materialism of the decadent Western capitalist democracies. While the economic principles of capitalism were not rejected by Europe’s fascist and Nazi regimes, strengthening central controls were steadily imposed. Especially in Germany, new kinds of highly regulated capitalist enterprises were therefore developed in the years preceding the outbreak of World War II.

The Challenge of the Islamic Revival/Radicalism While a full discussion, from a human geography point of view, of the Islamic revival is beyond the immediate scope of this essay, it is important to note that the powerful dislike of what is seen as the secularism, neocolonialism, and social modernization of Western-style liberal capitalism is a major feature of a movement that dates particularly from the second half of the 20th Century. Although there are immensely complicated and fundamental cultural, philosophical, moral, and political issues involved in the Islamic challenge to those aspects of the Western way of life that are regarded as degenerate, there are also some clearly identifiable, tangible objections to the tenets of capitalism. For example, the conspicuous consumption, profligate spending, and the stark social inequalities that pervade some of the strongest capitalist democracies offend Muslim teachings on charity and social justice. Authors including Muhammed Akram Khan offer insightful analyses of Islamic economics and identify the importance of ethical objections to the interest charges imposed on borrowers by the West’s capitalist banking system. Rather like the current penetration, at breakneck speed, of capitalism in communist China, the Islamic revival has occurred with remarkable rapidity and force, and represents another fast-evolving and on-going experience.

Globalization and Post-Fordism While the phenomenon arguably has much deeper chronological roots, the term globalization is commonly invoked to explain the changes that have affected the world’s economic geography in the past four or five decades. A startling revolution in all forms of communication has undeniably made the world a much more accessible place. Markets have become truly internationalized and finance moves across the world in an unfettered way. There has been a rise to prominence of transnational corporations (TNCs), which are vast conglomerates, whose immense commercial strength has severely diminished the power of individual states to regulate their own economies. With their unprecedented wealth, scale, and growing political potency, TNCsdusually headquartered in the great cities of the traditional core countriesdfreely switch their activities and investments from one country to another as economic circumstances demand. Much industrial production has been relocated to the Less-Developed World where TNCs seek the benefits of lower costs, cheap labor and fewer restrictions. The exploitation of workers in less-developed countries producing goods for TNCs in poor factory conditions for very low wages may be seen as another manifestation of the spatial division of labor. For the West, the corollary of these processes has been the painful experience of deindustrialization and a rapid shift into the services sector, the so-called sunrise industries, and an increasing shift toward financial capitalism. The consequences of these geographical shiftsddiscussed further in the next sectiondhave yet fully to emerge. The increasing power and sophistication of information and communication technologies have further aided and intensified the development of more flexible production, capable as never before of responding swiftly to changing market demands and fashions. Thus, those divisions of labor that once energized the factories and mills of the industrial revolution now occur in new forms on an international scale whereby the bespoke component elements of a product are often manufactured in plants spread across several continents. The rigid, standardized concept of manufacture where uniform products spilled with regularity in great quantity from the Fordist production lines of the past has given way to flexible, market-led approaches that, perhaps inevitably, have come to be known as post-Fordist.

The Legacies and New Complexities in the Spatial Division of Labor Although autonomous single-region firms continued to exist, by the 1990s, an accelerating decline in the old sector-based spatial division of labor had begun. Different kinds of spatial organization of enterprises had already arisen. Three arrangements were identifiable. First, some businesses were operating on the “cloning model” in which one plant took precedence as the firm’s headquarters where, in addition to production, all overall investment decisions were taken, product development occurred, and supervision and control were exercised. Branch plants, although having some degree of local management autonomy, primarily concentrated on the standardized manufacture of the product. Secondly, other businesses engaged in a “subcontracting model.” While the same kind of control would be exercised by the headquarters plant, elements of the manufacturing process tended to be subcontracted to other firms, which fed the components (which they had produced) into the manufacturing and assembly plants belonging to the core business. Thirdly, the “part-process” model had also begun to emerge. This model encompassed spatially separated management headquarters located in major metropolises; research and development teams based in a “silicon valley” or “sunbelt” district, where there

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already existed a pool of expertise in computing and information technologies; production plants that made components; and assembly plants for the final fabrication of the product in which workers, often including many female employees, were increasingly prominent but also the least well rewarded in the hierarchy. Unlike preexisting spatial divisions of labor based on industrial differentiation, which might encounter problems when a sector upon which a region or locality had depended went into decline or relocated, in these newer spatial structuresdmost particularly those firms that conformed to the “part process” modeldgeographical inequality was an inherent characteristic of the business framework itself. Paradoxically, therefore, companies that operated spatially dispersed functional hierarchies (of the kind described) both depended upon and reproduced geographical inequalities. Outwardly, a business might have been healthy and growing, but its success was predicated on operating in a geography that contained localities where actual manufacture took place, in which wages were generally relatively poor and opportunities or job prospects were limited. New processes of social dichotomization, discontentment, and disaffection affected regions that were once more mixed and relatively prosperous and the changes occurring were apparently not fully understood by the elite political classes of Western capitalist countries. They worsened as foreign-owned businesses, often headquartered in a distant country or continent, adopted the “partprocess” model of production across several states, and thereby extended some of the brutal economic impacts of new and complex divisions of labor mosaics to regions around the world. It became common for the dominant influence of the highly affluent professional and managerial groups to mask and diminish concern for the low prosperity and insecurity of manufacturing and assembly workers. Inevitably, old-fashioned state-government regional development strategies became less and less effective. Moreover, national economic policies that measured success only by increases in the absolute level of employment (often comprising work in the gig economy, the service sector, or on zero-hours contracts, as discussed below) but accorded little attention to the quality of jobs, came to symbolize the disconnect that increasingly existed between central governments and a hinterland where harsh inequality was experienced. Social and political disunity apparent in countries across the entire Western world began to be displayed. Indeed, by the second decade of the 21st Century, it was thought to have contributed to the unpredicted outcomes of elections and referenda, and a corresponding bafflement and bewilderment among the privileged and socially detached ruling establishments.

The Rise of Intensive Financial Capitalism As a form of capitalism, the pursuit of profits through the lending of money at interest has clearly existed for many centuries. As already noted, the provision of credit flourished during the era dominated by merchant capitalism. Moreover, stock market trading that gambled on future rises or falls in share prices or currencies, now commonly referred to as short selling, was pioneered in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange as early as 1609 and principally involved the speculative sale and purchase of shares in the Dutch East India Company. Such practices spread across Europe and continued when the focus of capitalism switched to businesses engaged in primary and factory production; however, modern financial capitalism, which continues to involve the traditional forms of money lending at interest, and the buying and selling of (or investment in) equities and foreign currencies, came to embrace sophisticated trade in a bewildering variety of financial products including bonds, stocks, futures, and derivatives, often structured in complex and interlocking ways. Indeed, since the late-20th Century, deindustrialization in the older Western economies of Europe and Japan, as well as in key regions of North America, has led to the increasing subordination of industrial capitalism to a new form of intensive financial capitalism.

Capitalism in the Opening Years of the 21st Century A tumultuous episode in the historical geography of capitalism began during the early years of the 21st Century and has yet to run its course. Shockwaves reverberated around the world and signs of a return to stability and calm appeared only slowly. The global financial crisis of 2007–09, which ranks as the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s, is seen as the point at which the turbulence began, but the structural and regulatory weaknesses in capitalist economics that made it possible had longer temporal roots. There can be no doubt, however, that the disaster struck with immense force in 2007 when a massive preceding expansion of subprime mortgage lending in the United States imploded and, because of the complex ways in which mortgage debts had been sold on to other lenders, an international banking emergency ensued. The collapse in September 2008 of the iconic US investment bank, Lehman Brothers, brutally exposed a hitherto hidden culture of excessive, reckless, and mostly secretive risk-taking by many financial institutions spread across the globe. Well-known banks in both the US and elsewhere were in extreme jeopardy and appeared likely to crash. Paradoxically, a meltdown in the globalized financial system was averted only when the governments of nation states bailed out imperiled banks, and subsequently imposed punitive austerity policies within their own jurisdictions as a means of stabilizing the levels of public deficit and debt which resulted. Nevertheless, efforts to avert a catastrophically deep global economic downturn proved futile. As the crisis unfolded, experts and analysts bombarded the world with an array of technical terms for financial devices, instruments, and structures that hitherto had scarcely impacted the consciousness of the ordinary population. For highly negative reasons the convoluted nomenclature of the world of finance thus entered the commonplace lexicon. The inner workings of capitalism were laid bare as never before and a crescendo of censure and criticism built up. The reputation for probity of those involved in intensive financial capitalism was trashed and replaced by an image of greed, venality, and crookedness. Bankers were seen as emblems of

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a capitalist system that was unfair, divisive, harsh, and untrustworthy. David Harvey denounced both the workings and the legitimacy of the entire capitalist system and challenged the notion of its automatic continuance. Samir Amin saw the crisis of capitalism as the turning point that could lead to its demise. Against this background, attention is now turned to key aspects of the most recent history of the system.

Subprime Mortgage Lending, Securitized Assets, and Collateralized Debt Obligations The United States subprime mortgage crisis in 2007–10 emanated from the preceding episode of rapidly rising house prices and the expansion of mortgage credit to borrowers who, owing to their below-average credit histories and inadequate down payments, would normally have been denied such loans. High-risk mortgages were offered by lenders who funded the loans by repackaging them into pools that were sold as assets to investors as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). New financial products, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), were used to apportion the risks. The less vulnerable of these securities were viewed as having “low risk” either because they were insured with new financial instruments or because they were bundled with other securities that were meant to absorb losses on the underlying mortgages. Easier access to mortgages boosted demand for homes and, in turn, further inflated house prices, especially in areas of the United States where there were shortages. At first, investors purchasing mortgage-backed securities made spectacular profits and rising US house prices shielded them from defaulting losses. Indeed, even if high-risk borrowers defaulted, they either sold their homes at a gain, and thereby paid-off their mortgages, or borrowed more against the rising real estate market. The risks and instabilities inherent in these circumstances seem to have been either very well hidden, or were poorly understood. By the beginning of 2007, house prices in the United States reached their peak and prospects for mortgage refinancing, or selling homes to realize capital to settle mortgage debt, rapidly faded. Mortgage loss rates sharply rose for both lenders and investors; and foreclosures spiraled. In April 2007, the New Century Financial Corporation, a leading US subprime mortgage lender, filed for bankruptcy. Very large numbers of MBSs were reclassified as “high risk,” more subprime lending institutions collapsed, and mortgage availability generally dried up. As a consequence the demand for housing fell dramatically precipitating a houseprice slump. Mortgagees fell into the trap of negative equity and the housing market froze. Moreover, the two governmentsponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, suffered vast losses and were taken over by the US federal government in the summer of 2008. Because MBSs, embedded within complex CDOs, had been purchased by investment banks in other countries, the US subprime mortgage crisis was a major triggering factor in the global financial crisis of 2007–09. Within the US economy it precipitated a sharp decline in construction activity, a fall in consumer wealth (curtailing domestic expenditure), and a decrease in lending by financial institutions. To revive economic activity, early in 2009 the US Federal Reserve drastically lowered the short-term interest rate and later took additional steps to reduce the longer term interest rate.

Quantitative Easing, Bank Regulation, and Government Austerity Quantitative easing (QE) is a mechanism employed by the central banks of capitalist countries when seeking to encourage investment activity and confidence in a period of severe depression. While the general concept clearly links to Friedman’s (monetarist) ideas, classical economists argue that in practice QE does not accord well with his thesis. Nevertheless, it is a way of substantially increasing the money supply. In essence, a central bank will seek to buy assets, such as gilts (i.e., government bonds), using electronically generated funds. In turn, the government will use the increased liquidity to purchase bonds from commercial banks and pension funds, and thereby in theory increase the flow of cash for more general lending in the economy. The US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and, rather later, the European Central Bank each engaged in QE. Between 2008 and 2015, the Federal Reserve purchased $3.7 trillion worth of US Treasury bonds. As a result, by 2012, the US housing market had stabilized, foreclosure rates had fallen, and home construction activity rebounded. The QE program of the Bank of England injected $550 billion into the UK economy between 2009 and 2012 and, in August 2016, the Bank’s governor announced that a further $99.6 billion worth of government and corporate bonds would be purchased amid fears of a further economic slump in the wake of the UK’s unanticipated referendum vote to leave the European Union (Brexit). QE in the Eurozone economies occurred only in 2015 when the European Central Bank pumped its first tranche of $600 billion into the faltering economies of member states. In due course, as economic circumstances pick up, central banks gradually either encash or sell previously purchased government bonds and thus steadily withdraw their QE program. In practice, the effectiveness of the 2008–15 episode of QE was hampered by compliance with tightened banking regulation, particularly with regard to the holding of capital by financial institutions across the capitalist world. Meeting in Basel, Switzerland, in 1988, the Committee on Banking Supervision devised minimum capital requirements for banks to safeguard their position in an economic downturn (Basel I). Although the model then employed to calculate the adequacy of capital holdings was considerably refined in 2004 (Basel II), and greater disclosure requirements were imposed, the absence of any specific regulation of the amount of debt that a bank could take onto its books was blamed in part for the financial crisis of 2007–09. Basel III (2010) was the committee’s response and aimed to make banks much more resilient in a downturn by addressing not only total capital holdings, but also the ratio of the bank’s total debt to the total value of its assets (leverage), and its cash holdings (liquidity). Critics, however, argued that too much time was allowed for full compliance and the regulations were still insufficiently tight (Fig. 4).

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Figure 4 A summary of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s evolving model for the tightening of bank regulation, known as Basel I, II, and III: 1988, 2004 and 2010.

Austerity economic policies constituted a seconds means by which national governments sought to cope with the financial crisis of 2007–09. Aiming to reduce government budget deficits, public spending cuts and tax increases were introduced. Austerity measures demanded of Greece from 2010 onwards offer a particularly extreme example. Faced with an unsustainable level of national debt and a gaping budget deficit, the country became dependent on loans grudgingly provided by partner states in the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In return, Greece was required to impose punitive tax hikes, deep cuts in public-sector jobs, steep reductions in government spending, lowered levels of social benefits and state pensions, and the privatization of public-owned utilities. Those speculating on Greece’s predicament began to purchase high-interest-bearing Greek government bonds in parallel with so-called credit default swaps. The latter instruments, first devised in the 1990s, required sellers to insure that buyers received the original face value of the bonds in the event of a default. It was therefore possible to gamble on earning large profits without risking the loss of the initial outlay. Inevitably, the total size of the Greek economy sharply contracted. By 2016, it had declined by almost a third. By cutting the public sector workforce, reducing salaries, pensions and social benefits, austerity had depressed spending within the economy, and recovery was made much slower and more difficult. Rescue packages devised to solve the financial crises of Portugal and the Irish Republic, although less harsh than those imposed in Greece, exposed not only the absence of any genuine capitalist fraternity within the Eurozone but also the failure of the IMF to recognize sufficiently early the scale of the difficulties faced by weaker European economies. Particularly noteworthy was that across the world’s capitalist economies the impact of austerity was generally disproportionately and unfairly felt by less well-off groups and adverse political consequences became inevitable.

Corporate Greed and Anticapitalism Protest The financial crisis of 2007–09 stimulated an intensification of the outcry against excessive boardroom pay, bonuses, and tax avoidance. As starkly widening gaps between the richer and poorer segments of the populations of capitalist countries were reported, the neoliberal model was increasingly condemned. As in the 1930s, shrill calls for trade protectionism were heard. Mass protests in the United States, United Kingdom, and other countries popularized and politicized negative sentiment toward the entire corporate class and the capitalist system. The term “fat cat” was coined to encapsulate the greed and sense of entitlement shared by high earners across the capitalist world. Economic inequalities and unfairness fed into deepening criticism of several other kinds of discrimination including the gender pay gap and the denial of equal opportunities to minority groups. Anticapitalist demonstrations grew in scale and sophistication. In 2013, while the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) largest capitalist economies met at a luxury golf resort in Northern Ireland, protestors focused on London. Calling the G8 meeting a gathering of “billionaires, dictators, and other parasites,” the organizers produced a map that plotted the locations in London of international banks, hedge funds, and other targets where people could “show their anger.” Excoriating criticism was directed toward those running large corporations who engaged in tactics that lowered their tax liabilities. Protestors argued that the failure of the wealthy to contribute their fair share toward government revenues inevitably increased the burden upon ordinary tax payers to fund vital public services. Because efforts to close tax loopholes had been signally ineffective, politicians were regarded as complicit in tax avoidance practices; but paradoxically, the acute need by deficit-encumbered governments to maximize tax revenues meant that some of the objectives of the anticapitalism protesters actually chimed closely with those of the establishment as they sought to bear down more forcefully on tax abuse.

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Tax Havens, Money Laundering, and the Panama and Paradise Papers A tax haven is a country or jurisdiction where the banking infrastructure focuses primarily on the provision of confidential (nontransparent) services to nonresident clients in a low tax or no tax environment, which enjoys very limited financial regulatory supervision. Although an investigation by the US National Bureau of Economic Research in 2007 suggested that perhaps 15% of the countries of the world were tax havens, the glare of publicity began fully to fall on them only after the onset of the global financial crisis. It became clear that around 37 geographically dispersed tax havens accounted for the overwhelming bulk of the funds deposited to avoid the payment of taxes (Fig. 5). Apart from sheltering funds as a means of legally avoiding tax, the use of offshore havens for illicit money laundering has also traditionally occurred, although the 21st Century growth in the anonymous purchase of cryptocurrencies such as “bitcoin” offered another easier means to achieve the same results. Despite attempts in tax havens to operate secretly, major leaks of information to journalists shed light on the vast scale of their business. In 2016, the so-called “Panama Papers” comprising 11.5 million leaked documents, recorded 214,488 offshore accounts. Further disclosure occurred in 2017 when similar leaks of the “Paradise Papers” revealed the identities of 120,000 individuals and companies holding funds in tax havens. Moreover, the ingenious devices employed to shield the profits of multinational companies and other investors were made public. The term “double Irish with a Dutch sandwich” was coined to describe a practice whereby a portion of a company’s profits were paid to a Republic of Ireland affiliate as royalties on patents which in that jurisdiction were taxed at a low rate. Even so, the cash involved was then further protected as the Irish affiliate company immediately routed these royalties into its own subsidiary, based in the Netherlands; and from there they were redirected to yet another Irish affiliate legally domiciled in an offshore tax haven. Against knowledge that at the same time, in Greece for example, state pensions were being cut by as much as 20%, the disconnection between the super-rich and the poor in the capitalist world grew starker and more dangerous.

Digital Platforms and the Commodification of Personal Data Digital platforms used for social media (for example, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram); for information searching (for example, Google); or for the encouragement of retail spending or customer loyalty (for example, Amazon) have ushered in a new kind of capitalism whereby the subscribers/customers have themselves been commodified. Quantities of personal data recording individual tastes, preferences and past purchasing behavior have thus become tradeable assets. In essence, the practice is simply a logical

Figure 5 The location of the 37 tax haven jurisdictions that account for the overwhelming bulk of offshore funds (based on analyses in 2007 by the United States National Bureau of Economic Research).

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extension of Wallerstein’s idea that capitalism involves the commodification of everything. However, selling private data has also been viewed as a distasteful, covert and cynical form of manipulation. Moreover, its potential for the subversive use of personal information about very large numbers of peopledfor example, to influence voting behavior in electionsdcame to be regarded as a growing danger to democracy.

The Gig Economy, Zero-Hours Employment Contracts, and Modern Slavery Changed patterns of work featured strongly in the opening years of the 21st Century. The traditional engagement of employees in both the private and public sectors of capitalist economies in well-defined jobs backed by written contracts that enshrine, for example, holiday entitlement, sickness benefits, maternity/paternity rights, employment security, and retirement/pension arrangements, certainly continued. Especially in the wake of the 2007–09 financial crisis there was growth in nontraditional forms of employment often underpinned by new business models that depended upon digital platforms. Platform-enabled, peer-to-peer businesses have been referred to collectively as the gig economy. In essence, services came to be supplied to customers by workers who often used their own equipment to meet demand when and if they wished to do so. An early example was the emergence of the ride-sharing service Uber, which was founded in California in 2009. As existing gig enterprises grew and new ones were established, their potential in future years to amount to a substantial portion of national economies was recognized. In fact by 2014, they were already estimated to comprise a $26 billion market. As employer obligations toward the gig workers were initially minimal, an increasingly significant portion of the labor force enjoyed few of the benefits and rights accorded to workers on old-style contracts. Further changes in the delivery of labor also occurred. Many traditional private and public sector employers sought to reduce expenditure on salaries and wages by engaging workers on zero-hours contracts. In these arrangements, although an employee might be entitled to some benefits and rights, hours of work were not fixed. Indeed, technically, hours were set at zero and the time worked depended on the changing requirements of an employer. Pay therefore fluctuated according to circumstances. For some, the terms and conditions of the gig and zero-hours styles of employment have been well-suited to their needs and personal lifestyles; for others, however, the precarious unpredictability of their income has constrained their creditworthiness and future prospects for career advancement. With regard to labor as an element of capitalism, the rise in the scourge of modern slavery was especially disturbing. Although, it was estimated in 2016 that globally as many as 45 million people could be regarded as slaves, the crime was well hidden and the true total of victims could not easily be calculated. In the United Kingdom, for example, it was thought that significant numbers of foreign workers engaged in the construction trade, domestic service, cosmetic services (nail bars, etc.), agricultural harvesting work, and car-wash facilities were victims of modern slavery. While very basic accommodation and sustenance was provided, the statutory minimum wage was rarely paid. Enacted in 2015 and applying only to England and Wales, the Westminster Parliament passed legislation designed to tackle modern slavery. During the following year, almost 4000 victims were reported to the police.

Global Shifts in Political and Economic Superpower Status In 2001, Jim O’Neill, then chief economist at Goldman Sachs, argued that the four BRIC countriesdBrazil, Russia, India, and Chinadshould be recognized as the new powerhouses most likely to dominate the 21st-Century globalized economy. By 2010, when South Africa was added to the list, they became the five BRICS. Together, their territories account for 40% of the world’s land and 25% of the population. While neither Russia nor China could be regarded as conventional capitalist countries and state control remained potent, both had developed hybrid market economies. O’Neill’s prediction about the rise of the BRICS at first seemed accurate, and the geographical balance of global capitalism appeared to be tilting in their direction. Between 1990 and 2014, their combined share of global GDP trebled from around 10%, to over 30%. At the time the possibility seemed real that the traditional overwhelming dominance of the economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan would be eclipsed; however, the impact of the crisis of financial capitalism severely affected the BRICS, and by the end of 2015 because its assets had fallen in value since 2010 by over 88%, Goldman Sachs closed down its BRICS investment fund. Clinging to the notion that they shared a common agenda, in September 2017 delegates from each of the BRICS countries convened in the city of Xiamen in China for what had become their annual summit. They had yet to acknowledge that the case for regarding the BRICS as a coherent group had been undermined. While China and India took advantage of globalization’s imperative to integrate into global supply chains, the approach in the other three countries was by contrast the maximization of the production and sale of their abundant natural resources. The dramatic initial fall in commodity prices in 2007–09, and erratic fluctuations thereafter, inevitably hit hardest in Brazil, South Africa, and Russia, where GDP growth rates were sharply curtailed. By contrast, India’s emphasis on services, especially in information technologies, made its economy much more resilient. The undoubted winner was China, which became the world’s second largest economy by GDP and was poised to overtake the supreme spot occupied by the United States. In 1990, China had accounted for as little as 3% of the value of the world’s manufacturing output; by 2017 its share already topped 25%.

China and the New Silk Road Over two millennia ago the Silk Road was established as a network of trade routes that linked China with central Asia and the Arab world. The name of the network referenced China’s then paramount exportdsilkdbut many other products were also carried. The

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Figure 6 Maps showing (A) China’s ancient Silk Road, c. 150 BCE–c. 1450 CE; and (B) the “New Silk Road” links, proposed in 2015, and key to its drive to spearhead a new era of globalization.

Silk Road shaped the development of the entire region for many centuries. In 2013, China’s president Xi Jinping proposed the creation of a modern equivalentda vast network of roads, railways, pipelines, and utility grids to connect China not only with central Asia, western Asia, and south Asia, but also with destinations far beyond (Fig. 6). The ambitious initiative was formalized in 2015 as a plan to invest in an infrastructure project to be known as One Belt (land routes) and One Road (maritime routes), or OBOR. Envisaging far more than physical connectivity across vast geographies, the scheme aimed to construct the world’s largest platform for trade, financial, and sociocultural cooperation in a new phase of globalization pivoted on China. Worthwhile judgments regarding the impacts on the old capitalist world of this extraordinary New Silk Road enterprise will only become possible in the years to come.

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Conclusion The historical geography of capitalism and the division of labor is a constantly evolving phenomenon. Social changes wrought by the capitalist system across the world have been seismic in their power. In the years after the World War II, Western capitalist democracies experienced an economic revival and a commercial boom; new state-sponsored welfare systems provided an unprecedented level of security; average standards of living soared to new heights. The benefits of mass production and consumerism were reflected in burgeoning car ownership, house purchase and the sprawl of suburbs, international travel, and the purchase of an endless array of consumer goods. But, in the post-Fordist era, the uncertainties caused by deindustrialization, unemployment, severe environmental damage, and social inequalities have multiplied. Impacts of reconfigured and new spatial divisions of labor have engendered geographical inequalities, where low pay and deprivation are pervasive, that are often an essential and inherent element in the business models of highly profitable companies. The clamor for protectionism has once more become strong. Indeed, some commentators, noting the growing vociferousness in the recent past of anticapitalist protesters, have coined another term that rivals post-Fordism: we are now, they argue, in an era of disorganized capitalism. While it is hard to foresee with clarity the human geographies that will emerge as a result of this phase of disorganized capitalism, we can nonetheless be certain that they will be no less fascinating than all those engendered during previous iterations of this most remarkable socioeconomic system. Since the onset of the early 21st-Century crisis of global financial capitalism, radical new critiques of the system have poured forth. Some writers now suggest that the survival of capitalism need not be regarded any more as a certainty and that a postcapitalist era should be imagined and planned. To an extent, such arguments resonate with the views of those who regard capitalism as a fundamentally rotten system in need of wholesale radical reform, but the appetite for its total demise may be less widely shared. Adam Smith believed the drive to engage in trade and exchange to be an innate human trait and, if so, it may be that despite all the vicissitudes and challenges to which capitalism has been subjected the system will in fact continue to exist.

Further Reading Amin, S., 2011. Ending the Crisis of Capitalism or Ending Capitalism. Pambazuka Press, Bangalore, India and Oxford, UK. Braudel, F., 1984. Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century V III: The Perspective of the World. English Translation. Collins-Fontana Press, London. Brenner, R., 1993. Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1150–1653. Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G., 2002. British Imperialism, 1688–2000. Longman, Harlow, UK. Harvey, D., 1990. The political-economic transformation of late-twentieth century capitalism. In: Harvey, D. (Ed.), The Condition of Postmodernity. Blackwell, Cambridge. Harvey, D., 2010. The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Harvey, D., 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. Verso, New York. Khan, M.A., 2013. What Is Wrong with Islamic Economics? Analysing the Present State and Future Agenda. Studies in Islamic Finance Accounting and Governance. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK. Mason, P., 2015. PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future. Allen Lane, London. Massey, D., 1995. Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production. MacMillan Press, London. Meiksins Wood, E., 2002. The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. Verso Editions, London. Pirenne, H., 1969. Medieval Cities: The Origins and the Revival of Trade. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Polanyi, K., 1957. The Great Transformation. Beacon Press, Boston. Sanyal, K., 2007. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality, and Postcolonial Capitalism. Routledge India, London. Scott, J., 1997. Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wall, D., 2005. Babylon and beyond: The Economics of Anti-capitalist, Anti-globalist and Radical Green Movements. Pluto Press, London. Wallerstein, I., 1976. The Modern World System, 1: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. Academic Press, London. Wallerstein, I., 1980. The Modern World System, 2: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy. Academic Press, London, pp. 1650–1750. Wallerstein, I., 1989. The Modern World System, 3: The Second Great Era of Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy. Academic Press, London, pp. 1730–1840s.

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Carceral Geography Jennifer Turner, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Abolition The action of officially ending or stopping a system, practice, or institution. In the context of carceral geography, this is associated with the prison abolition movementda loose network of activists and groups seeking to reduce or eliminate a system of punitive institutions such as prisons, immigrant detention centers, and secure juvenile facilities. Abolitionists oppose the idea that imprisoning someone is a form of justice and believe that certain groups of people are systematically targeted, such as poor people and people of color. Abolitionists outline various strategies to dismantle these institutions such as prohibiting the construction of new prisons; decriminalizing (removing laws that target, e.g., sex workers and drug users); improving health care and welfare services; community-based justice processes; and fighting against inequalities based on class, race, ability, gender, and sexuality. Crimmigration The process that results in the criminalization of immigration, which sees illegal immigrants detained in “mainstream” prisons and subjected to the same regimes as “mainstream” prisoners, regardless of whether they have committed the same kind of crimes. This is often exacerbated by processes of globalization or evoked by law-changes. Panopticon The Panopticon is a type of institutional building designed by English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th Century. The design consists of a circular structure with an “inspection house” at its center, from which the managers or staff of the institution are able to watch or observe (-opticon) all (pan-) the inmates, who are stationed around the perimeter. Prisoners would not be able to discern whether or not they were being watched and so self-regulated their behavior. Bentham proposed his plan for all types of institution, including hospitals, schools, sanatoriums, and asylums, but it is the prison that is most widely understood by the term. Although Bentham’s Panopticon was never fully realized, some of the design ideas were replicated in 19th-Century Europe and America, with particular influence upon the architecture of high security prisons, or those which we now term the “Supermax.” The Panopticon is now commonly used as a metaphor for the governance of behavior, which rationalizes the use of, e.g., Closed Circuit Television Cameras (CCTV).

In 1990 Mike Davis published his formative book, City of Quartz, where he examined the city of Los Angeles and its vast networks of surveillance and hardened policing laws. By labeling LA a “carceral city,” Davis pushed the term “carceral” away from simply the prison and into the hands of human geographers who then also turned their attention to the spatial relationships inherent in gated communities, surveillance through Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), and other banal securitization of everyday life. The term “carceral geography” was coined around the end of the first decade of the 21st Century to describe the field of geographical research that focuses upon spaces and practices of incarceration. In its early inception it was described as an extension to or substrand of geographical security studies because of the focus on spaces that securedthrough the detention or locking-up/awaydproblematic populations. Carceral geography is in close dialogue with longer-standing academic engagements with the carceral, most notably from criminology and prison sociology. More contemporary scholarship has taken a further nuanced approach to allow carceral geography to emerge as a standalone field of enquiry. Dominique Moran’s Carceral Geography: Spaces and Practices of Incarceration defined carceral geography along three lines of investigation that fold together studies of incarceration with an examination of their implicit geographies. The first characteristic of carceral geography is an enquiry into what constitutes the “nature” of a space of incarceration and the experiences that occur within it. The second focuses on spatial geographies of carceral systems (thinking particularly about the lived experiences of carceral sites, mobilities, movements within and between carceral institutions, and relationships across the carceral boundary between “inside” and “outside” of carceral space). The third aspect under scrutiny is the relationship between forms of carceral spatiality and the punitive state. This work comprises a range of methodological approaches (both quantitative and qualitative), couched very clearly within a recognition of the vulnerability of incarcerated individuals as research participants and the challenge of access to research sites (which can vary significantly according to geographical location and the stringency of gaining approval from the respective criminal justice system). Studies in this area have not only pushed geographers into new empirical territories, but have likewise stimulated innovative theoretical advances by thinking spatially, through carceral space. Together, these lines of investigation have alerted scholars within geography to the importance of carceral sites as very particular spaces for advancing geographical thinking around themes of placemaking and homemaking; emotion and space; bordering; mobility; time-space regimes; and the role of state power in defining practices of incarceration, and in the design of carceral spaces. Through such theoretical contributions, carcerality is a framework within which to interrogate a wide range of other empirical spaces.

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Characteristics, Systems, and Relationships In its traditional sense, carcerality has closely corresponded to a particular empirical focus. In its early development, carceral geographers turned their attention to spaces of captivity, holding, detention, quarantine, and imprisonment, in particular. They have investigated diverse aspects of carceral life; focusing upon change and difference for various groups of individualsdfor adults, children, young people, those convicted of crimes, migrant detainees, asylum seekers, etc.dacross space and time, and between cultures and jurisdictions. The breadth of empirical focus is large. While some scholars attend to the “mainstream” incarceration of “criminals” for custodial sentences imposed by prevailing legal systems, others are concerned with the spaces of migrant detention that confine individuals defined as irregular, such as non-status migrants awaiting decisions on admittance or removal to a particular nation-state. Studies in carceral geography have noted the variances in carceral experiences (within and) by nation-state, which is unsurprising since all countries rely on a system of imprisonment in some guise or another. There is also scholarship on the overlaps and synergies between spaces such as the interactions between prisons, migration, policing, and detention, including in the Global North and South. This work is not simply contemporary in its focus, with significant importance being placed upon historical work that tracks the development of carceral systems over time or the use/reuse of carceral sites beyond their lifespan. Other work concerning carceral spaces has taken a more cultural approach, attending to the emotional and embodied geographies of carceral life and carceral time-space and the body. Scholars have drawn upon the most dynamic and forwardthinking interventions made in other subdisciplines in human geography to assay the experience of lived experience in carceral space. For example, drawing upon concepts developed in the “new mobilities” paradigm, carceral geographers have become interested in the ways in which carceral subjectsdprisoners, detainees, refugees, for exampledmove or are forced to move. Although at first glance, the words “carceral” and “mobilities” seem to sit uneasily together, much research has challenged the assumption that carceral life is characterized by a lack of movement. Here, workdfor example, on prisoner transportation between prisons in Russia; and prison ships transporting convicts from the United Kingdom to Australiadhas used a mobilities lens to explore how movement might be disciplined, enforced, and/or coerced; or occurring on macro- and microscales. Carceral geographers have also focused upon how the design of carceral spaces affects not only those who spend time in them but can also send a message to those outside of them. A large body of literature has considered how carceral spaces come to represent society’s wider views on crime and punishment (e.g., they become a mechanism to justify criminalizing of the poor or minority groups). Examples include a prison’s influence on communities both local to and distant from it, and the impact of prison and prison privatization as part of a wider state economy. Further work in the subdiscipline has viewed spaces of incarceration as cultural landscapes, drawing on decades of work in human geography where landscapes become a way to view and/or imagine the world. In these arguments, all landscapes are representations, and carceral landscapes can be viewed in a similar way. In a world where most “law-abiding” individuals do not have first-hand experiences of carceral spaces, media representations of these spaces become important in creating impressions of such environments (see work on prison poetry and other first-hand narratives of carceral space; and on prison tourismdwhere former sites of incarceration have become sites for leisure). The carceral boundary between “inside” and “outside” and its social construction existing both within and separate from physical spaces of incarceration is a key concern. In relation to tangible and intangible things that cross the prison wall, substantial work has been undertaken regarding in-between spaces of the prison: police cells, visiting rooms, and liminal spaces of prisoner transportation such as the convict ship. Scholars have explored prisoner possessions and contraband, highlighting their significance and movement in the prison setting. More widely, this research contributes to studies of the continuity of social relations beyond the prison wall, including, for example, the significance of the prison and detention systems as central components of the economic infrastructure of society. Much work has been led by the scholarship of Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Jamie Peck that theorizes the political-economic ramifications of high levels of imprisonment in the United States. This work recognizes that the imprisonment system is critical to the successful economic functioning of certain states, such as Californiadwhere prison-building has increased in recent yearsdor to postindustrial areas, where prison siting presents an opportunity for employment and prosperity. In creating debate around an assumed binary relationship between the “inside” and “outside” of spaces of imprisonment and detention, work in carceral geography has interrogated the notion of an absolute, fixed prison boundary. One might imagine that the prison boundary exists at the outermost limit of a prison, at the juncture between controlled and securitized space and public space. The prison might be considered a closed-off world that houses a group of individuals that members of law-abiding society do not see, do not hear from, nor with whom they have cause to interact. After all, prisons are places that people are purposefully sent: convicted by the courts to serve sentences “locked away” from the rest of “law-abiding” society. Yet, many academics from a variety of different disciplines have considered that the boundary between prison and society is not a hard and fast one. Prisons have come to be seen as fulfilling a central societal function as they are linked to economies (as in the United States where jobs are created around facilities located in rural areas with little other industry) or central to the political governance of a state (by helping to maintain law and order). In addition to the economic and political facets of the prison, carceral geographers have also examined the cultural components of this boundary. As carceral geographers expand their enquiry into this area, work considers the multitude of others things that might cross the prison boundary, from contraband, visitors, and employees to other everyday items or practices such as food, clothing, news, friendships, or even allegiance to a particular football team. In this way, the prison boundary is theorized as a messy, blurry, irregular entity that is far more complex than its concrete, territorial spatialization might suggest. The simplistic dualism of an “inside” and “outside” separated by a stark line is complicated further when we consider the variety of spaces that exist inside and outside of prison which demonstrate practices that we might term “carceral”dactivities occurring in spaces of incarceration.

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Blurring the Carceral Boundary Building upon this interrogation of the complex and often blurred relationship between prison and society, work in carceral geography now makes significant headway in exploring carcerality across boundaries. This discussion has been substantially influenced by and is now difficult to separate from the influential work of Michel Foucault. In the final chapter of Discipline and Punish (1977) entitled “The carceral,” Michel Foucault describes a “carceral system” with influence far beyond the physical space of the prison. By highlighting the example of Mettray, a 19th-Century French reformatory for young boys, Foucault outlined five models of organizational control: family, army, workshop, school, and judicial system. These, he suggested, entwine with wider society and radiate out in “carceral circles” from the epicentral, most stringent of carceral spaces: the prison. Institutions he identified as being within the innermost circles included those with disciplinary ideologies such as poorhouses and institutions for abandoned children. Charities, housing associations, and societies for the moral improvement of individuals exist as more distant “ripples” where “carceral methods” that were employed to discipline focus more subtly upon surveillance of individuals. This societal spread of the carceral is termed the “carceral archipelago,” transporting the disciplinary techniques of the prison into the social body as a whole. Scholars have expanded upon this to outline “carceral circuitry” inherent in a carceral system, involving a multitude of varying institutions at different scales with different roles. Taking lead from this model, carceral geographers have increasingly described spaces beyond prisons as carceral. For example, although rates of incarceration vary globally, in the United States there has been a massive expansion of the prison system, a strategy that is being emulated by other countries with large numbers of prisoners, such as China and the United Kingdom. It is therefore natural that the prison itself is a site for significant research focus. Yet, the processes of locking people up, and the segregation that it entails, have rendered incarceration a banal practice, with features that are common to spaces outside of prison. It is small wonder that recent literature has called for a new focus upon mechanisms of socio-spatial exclusion, such as the methods used in urban spaces to channel social undesirables. These have included the fences, gates, walls, surveillance technologies, and armed security, which protect luxury areas in cities such as Sao Paulo, London, or Los Angeles. Although “banishment” is a term most commonly associated with historical mechanisms of criminal justice, such methods are being reimagined as concepts in the contemporary world; they are reemerging as hybrid tools to control populations. Seattle, for example, has witnessed the adoption of “civility codes” and “trespass admonishments” prohibiting activities such as panhandling, sitting on sidewalks, and camping, which compel certain people to remain absent from certain places for a certain period of time. Similarly, “drug-free zones” and “prostitution-free zones” imposed in Portland, Oregon, restrict individuals spatially and temporallydeffectively banishing the homeless from public spaces. In the United Kingdom, examples can also been drawn from the labeling of individuals as a threat to society, as is the case with enforcing Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) or public house banning orders upon individuals who commit certain unwanted activities. In a different register, carceral geographers have traced how the carceral apparatus has permeated into neighborhoods and communities outside of prison through exemplification of mechanisms relating to preventing juvenile delinquency, including restrictions upon access to public parks in hours after dark. Often these discussions highlight racial inequalities, such as in Loïc Wacquant’s exploration of the relationship between the ghetto and the prison, whereby racialized public culture of denigration of criminals and a criminalization of the poor allows the ghetto to be theorized as a kind of carceral space. Furthermore, ideas surrounding the wider treatment of bordersdsuch as maintaining the security of a nation’s geographical boundaries from afardlead us to question again where the prison boundary is. Alluding to a transnational and literally fluid conceptualization of carceral regimes via consideration of both onshore and offshore detention sites, carceral geographers have drawn upon the creation of “buffer zones” as an attempt to reinforce the distance between inside and outside in a world shaped by the prolific expansion of detention. An example is the practice of intercepting boats carrying migrants before they are able to arrive at the territorial border of the state. In this way, the so-called “buffer zone” places the de facto border both spatially and temporally dislocated from the territorial boundary. Strategies aimed at spatial exclusion are proliferating across contemporary societies, which extend the concept of carcerality far beyond the walls of the prison. The metaphor of the prison has been extrapolated into other spaces, particularly through the principles of the Panopticon. The Panopticon is regularly understood as the “ideal” model for a prison: circular in shape with cells arranged around a central tower, from which prisoners could at all times be observed. This notion of the threat of omnipresent surveillance shaping behaviors has seen geographic work explore parallels such as behaviors on the streets or self-regulated behaviors in other institutional settings that exhibit carceral features such as homes and schools. Research focus has also been trained upon sites beyond the traditional, landed prison regarding islands or in historical research on the convict ship. By extending carcerality far beyond the walls of the prison, carceral geographers have theorized, for example, how certain individuals in society have become criminalized, such as migrant detainees, who are often housed in former prisons or other secure spaces. This phenomenon is often labeled as “crimmigration,” or the criminalization of immigration. This sees illegal immigrants detained in “mainstream” prisons and subjected to the same “corrective” regimes as “mainstream” prisoners, regardless of whether they have committed the same kind of crimes. The events associated with the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington provide a blueprint to recent criminalization of migrants. In response to the attacks, authorities questioned around 5000 Middle Eastern men in the United States who matched the criteria of persons who might have knowledge of foreign-based terrorists according to their gender, age, and national origin. These state actions were based on stereotypes, and were called into question by civil liberties and immigrant rights groups who were concerned about racial profiling, mass detentions, and the targeting of immigrant communities in the post-9/11 security climate. In the wake of these activities, a substantial body of work within the subdiscipline

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of carceral geography has focused upon the spaces, practices, and systems of detention more widely. These include, in particular, the experiences of individuals and their families housed in facilities while awaiting immigration decisions and the geographies and (im) mobilities inherent in this experience. Such work draws upon systems of power and resistance exerted in spaces such as migrant camps and removal centers, interrogating associations with, e.g., gender; wider societal economics; constructions of citizenship and identity; precarity of life; and more besides. The carceral boundary is also complicated by the experiences of individuals who are bound up in carceral practice, although they are not themselves physically imprisoned. While incarceration represents the removal and “punishment” of an individual who has committed a crime, it also results in the stigmatization of friends and family members who are often associated with the wrong-doing of the individuals that they may visit and/or are connected to. Significant work has considered the impacts upon, for example, the children of incarcerated parents in terms of their educational attainment and likelihood of their own offending. Further work has also recognized that this stigmatization may also extend to prison staff, who are also negatively viewed in relation to societal prejudice about the nature of the work they do. Furthermore, technological innovations have drawn new attention to the blurring of the prison boundary. By way of another example, various forms of technology, including in-cell television, rudimentary computer consoles, and “tablets” with access to internal internet-style networks, have penetrated into prisons in the last decade. Subsequently, the notion that the prison wall is a hard and fast barrier to the outside world is eradicated through the transfer of media communications through that wall. Furthermore, the media are exceptional agents for challenging borders because mediated transmissions do not respect boundaries; they are fluid, and media can bring the prison into every home through its “one-to-many” form of communication. Cultural productions of prisons, such as television documentaries and drama series, are instrumental in transmitting ideas and constructions about carceral spaces to those outside of prison. As such, the prison boundary may exist at the level of every home and every individual possessing a television or mobile device with which to consume media productions.

A Question of “Carcerality” Given the complexities of the research field and the malleability of the spatial boundary that enfolds carceral space, it is understandable that those aligned with the subdiscipline have entered into significant debate about the definition of the terminology that forms such a central component of their research agenda. In its dictionary definition, carceral is “relating to, or of prison.” The etymology has been traced by Domonique Moran, Jennifer Turner, and Anna Schliehe, who have paid attention to its usage from Latin and Old Norse through its deployment by Mike Davis and Michel Foucault. Their work also explains that while spaces of imprisonment are considered to be inherently carceral, spaces beyond prisons are sometimes denoted by prefixing carceral qualifiers apparently to differentiate them from the inherent prison model, and the use of such qualifiers suggests gradations of carcerality. Graduated incarceration; hypercarceral; transcarceral; and quasicarceral are all frequently deployed in discussions relating to spaces that exhibit carceral apparatus. Such phrases imply that certain spacesdwhether the workplace of prisoners on day-release or the rooms used by family members visiting loved ones in prisondare not wholly the same as, for example, the quintessential carceral institution of the prison (either in nature, function, or experience); however, few definitive explanations of what criteria or characteristics render a space, experience, or institution inherently carceral exist. The challenge of answering questions of delineation has been introduced to every new subdiscipline in its developing stages. This challenge brings with it problematic tensions of the impact of either limiting terminology to adhere to particular spaces or practices, or diffusing it so widely that its application is moot. In an effort to theorize carcerality to a meaningful degree, Moran, Turner, and Schliehe outline three conditions that act as consideration to explore the nature or quality of carcerality (rather than stringently outline key inclusionary/exclusionary criteria). These conditions include as follows:

• • •

Detrimentda condition that evokes perceived harm to the lived experience of the individual (that is, experienced rather than intended harm) Intentionda condition that is purposefully enacted, e.g., a state purposefully operating a mechanism of disciplinary power Spatialitydthe condition through which carcerality is achieved, generally through containment or exclusion

Together, these conditions enable the achievement of carcerality. Such conditions are, as mentioned, not envisaged as qualifying criteria. It is clear that academics may engage in considerable debate about how particular contextsdwhether that of bullied schoolchildren; individuals with disabilities; or residents living in an area of poor housing qualitydmay adhere to all of these conditions; however, this is precisely the spirit in which these conditions are proffered, prompting fresh innovations within carceral geography and enabling the deployment of carcerality as a conceptual tool beyond the subdiscipline.

Conclusions: The Carceral Conundrum The complexity of the relationships that go on across, beyond, and within the carceral boundary makes it altogether extremely complicated when we think about where this boundary is located. Indeed, the notion that carcerality can also be extended to include spaces outside the traditionally conceived space of the prison where the liberty of individuals is similarly restricted, meaning that it is therefore unsurprising that the notion of the “carceral” or “carcerality” has eluded concrete conceptual definition. Beyond this,

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carceral geographers also recognize that their individual ontological and epistemological considerations of carceral space have a significant bearing upon the outputs of their research, resulting in a widely recognized carceral conundrum. Some (although by no means all) carceral geographers are driven by recognition of the significant “pains of imprisonment” and punishment that their work frequently reports, and align with an abolitionist movement seeking eradication of the prison and the systems that support it and emerge from it. In the US context, Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s Golden Gulag is concerned with the extreme growth of state prisons in California in the late 20th Century. She argues that prison building was organized by the state in crisis and was a geographical solution to systemic political economic problems. Cognizant of this use of prisons as political economic intervention, some carceral geographers are aligned to the anti-prison movement comprising a variety of grassroots organizations, lobby groups, activist collectives, prisoner associations, and student groups. Many researchers in this subdiscipline are motivated by a desire to address the significant and numerous articulated “crises” of carcerality by influencing the function of carceral institutions (such as prisons and detention centers); however, the nature and performance of this function and the role of the research exploring these dilemmas have generated significant debate. Scholars working in this area exhibit a range of opinions. On the one hand, work in carceral geography may take an explicitly abolitionist stance as noted above, where research serves the purpose of questioning the legitimacy of the carceral institution. This research often coincides with research methods that are purposefully enacted outside of institutions, such as with released prisoners or with nongovernmental organizations and lobbyist collectives. For obvious reasons, this work is commonly aligned with studies that are focused in countries with proportionally high rates of incarceration, such as the United States. Other research relies upon gaining access to carceral institutions to collect data from prisoners and/or custodial professionals. Although not exactly directly opposed to the work by abolitionist scholars, this work often involves dissemination of research findings to institutions in the hope of improving conditions within that institution. Contra to the abolitionist stance, such scholarship that strives to work against the “pains of imprisonment” serves to further legitimize the institution. It is this dilemma that is sure to be of continued conversationdboth in relation to the methodological and theoretical scope of carceral geography and its definitive terminologydas this now-firmly-established field of enquiry continues to evolve.

See Also: Activist Geographies; Borderlands; Defensible Space; Democracy; Ethical Issues in Research; Ghettos; Immigration; Inequality; Mobility; Policing; Refugees and Asylum Seekers; Social Class; Territory and Territoriality; Terrorism; Underclass.

Further Reading Davis, M., 2009. City of Quartz. Verso, London. Foucault, M., 2012. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage, London. Gill, N., Conlon, D., Moran, D., Burridge, A., 2016. Carceral circuitry: new directions in carceral geography. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 42, 183–204. Gilmore, R.W., 2007. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA. Loyd, J.M., Mitchelson, M., Burridge, A. (Eds.), 2013. Beyond Walls and Cages: Prisons, Borders, and Global Crisis. University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA. Martin, L.L., Mitchelson, M.L., 2009. Geographies of detention and imprisonment: interrogating spatial practices of confinement, discipline, law, and state power. Geogr. Compass 3, 459–477. Moran, D., 2016. Carceral Geography: Spaces and Practices of Incarceration. Routledge, Abingdon. Moran, D., Turner, J., Schliehe, A.K., 2017. Conceptualizing the carceral in carceral geography. Prog. Hum. Geogr. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132517710352. Mountz, A., Coddington, K., Catania, R.T., Loyd, J.M., 2013. Conceptualizing detention: mobility, containment, bordering, and exclusion. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 37, 522–541. Peck, J., 2003. Geography and public policy: mapping the penal state. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 27, 222–232. Turner, J., 2016. The Prison Boundary: Between Society and Carceral Space. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

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Care Ethics Elizabeth Olson, Mark Ortiz, and Sertanya Reddy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Agency The ability or capacity to exert power or to act. Corporality The state of having a body or the qualities that are attributed to having the material dimensions or experiences of a body. Interdependence When things are dependent on each other. Contrasts with dependency, which presumes an uneven relationship that is associated with the subjugation of one to another. Moral philosophy The debates within philosophy which consider ethics. More-than-human Draws attention to the human-centrism of methodologies and theories used in analysis of life and encourages approaches that decenter humans through greater attention to entanglements of humans with all other life and nonlife. Relationality The interrelated or interdependent characteristics of the world and the assumption that understanding relationships are thus important for understanding other processes, practices, systems, and structures.

In 1998, geographer David Smith asked the question, “How far should we care?” He suggested that the answer was of central philosophical importance, and one especially well suited to geographic inquiry. This article examines the theoretical interventions and empirical contributions made by geographers in the field of care. We begin by briefly situating care as a marginalized concern in the long history of Western philosophy and explain its key features as a relatively recent feminist critique of this tradition. We then propose three spatial principles that are inherent to care ethics and which make the theory particularly adaptable to moral geographies. Unlike other moral traditions, care ethics both relies on and fundamentally incorporates geographic elements such as scale, place, and distance. Geographers have advanced these engagements to illustrate the importance of care in ethical reasoning, practice, and judgment. They have also been early innovators in work on scale and care ethics, most notably in explorations of labor, neoliberalism, and the scalar processes that produce ambiguous moral landscapes in the provision and distribution of care. In the final section, we reflect on the expanding horizons of a more-than-human ethics of care.

Care in Moral Philosophy Care ethics is a field of Western moral philosophy that attends to the centrality of relationships and mutual dependency for both the formation and evaluation of ethical alternatives. Rather than framing care as a virtue or a desired outcome of moral practice, philosophers in this tradition argue that morality emerges from human dependency upon others. These relations of dependency are the foundations of moral reasoning and the spark for other ethical impulses; if we care about someone or something, we are more likely to demand justice or a preservation of rights than if we do not care. Once care expands beyond human dependency and into the mutual dependency between living and nonliving things, it draws into focus the kinds of ethical work that is done to sustain and repair our world. Care ethicists therefore argue that care encompasses a broader field of concern than enlightenment frameworks such as justice, liberty, and rights-based approaches which emphasize individuality over relationality, and autonomy over interdependency. The history of care in philosophy has changed dramatically since its marginal incorporation in the moral reasoning of liberal Western philosophical traditions to the emergence of a feminist alternative to enlightenment moral philosophy in what is now referred to as the “ethics of care.” Spanning the Romans to the Stoics, the burdens and the benefits of care and its impact upon the possibilities of living a virtuous life were acknowledged but rarely elevated to central theoretical occupation. Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger are attributed with drawing attention to the importance of care in existential and continental philosophy, respectively. Heidegger’s influence remains evident in contemporary feminist ethics of care, particularly in his acknowledgment that care and concern both obscure and reveal the meaning and nature of being in the world. By positioning care at the center of being human, and concern as the connection between self and the world, Heidegger established the individual as already constituted through sets of relations. Rather than being a virtue to be cultivated, it can be understood as simultaneously reflecting an existentialist character (care as a distraction from the anxiety of giving life meaning as we take care of the world around us) and a solicitude that both explains and produces the anxiety and love that emerges when one cares for and about another. Contemporary care ethics originated in the 1980s as feminist theorists across disciplines began to claim space within the maledominated field of moral philosophy. Earliest articulations of care ethics sought to shatter several assumptions that dominated traditional philosophical approaches and also the ways these assumptions were used to justify the functioning of contemporary states and economies. Feminist critiques of the scientific rationality of moral philosophy of the 1980s positioned caredas both

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virtue and moral sentimentdas an inferior moral concern when compared to the universal principles and the individualistic foundations of theories of justice and rights. In her 1980 article Maternal Thinking, and subsequent book of the same name, Sara Ruddick influentially argued that the care associated with practices like motherhood was deeply historical and contextual, but that this did not make it an inferior form of morality. Instead, the practices associated with caregiving require active thinking and reasoning, and this kind of rationality includes moral concern. Scholars including Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, Joan Tronto, and Eva Feder Kittay elaborated and further popularized care ethics for multidisciplinary audiences. According to Gilligan, who was working in the field of educational psychology, care ethics was a necessary corrective to the masculine approach toward moral development that favored the individualism of frameworks related to justice or rights, thus demoting women’s emphasis on relationships and care to an inferior moral position. Held similarly emphasized the gendered dimensions of morality and the female proclivity toward sustaining and nurturing life, emphasizing that feminine ethics emerged from practices of caregiving that form collections of values that point toward nonviolent morality, which prioritizes care over other valued outcomes. Subsequent theorizations have drawn care ethics away from the gendered essentialism of earlier writing, such as Tronto’s examination of the requirements for a caring democracy, and Kittay’s important engagement with Western theories of justice and their failure to adequately account for human dependency. Critiques of early care ethics range from responses that the work essentialized women as carers to observations that it failed to describe a normative theory on par with justice or rights; with its contextual insistence, care ethics refused to offer a universal theory of morality as required for claims of injustice or an embrace of individualistic rationality that underpins much of political liberalism and its related calls for responsibility. Sander-Staudt identifies five common categories of the critiques within the broad literature on care ethics: 1) the potential for care ethics to valorize care in a manner that promotes slave morality; 2) the weakness of the empirical claims of care as a gendered ethics, especially given the importance of intersectionality for explaining care dynamics; 3) theoretical weakness revealed by the reliance upon stronger ethical claims such as rights, justice, and autonomy; 4) a tendency to essentialize the relationship between gender and care, producing women as homogenized caregivers; and, 5) a focus on context and reification of proximity that trains moral attention on the scale of the home and family, while ignoring the broader moral implications of who provides care in a globalized world. That these critiques echo the broader reception of feminist continental philosophy of the 1980s and 1990s, including Luce Irigaray’s strategic essentialism, should not go without note. To discuss care as gendered sets of relations offended the sensibilities of philosophical traditions that relied upon an unchallenged claim to universalism, even as feminist, black, and postcolonial scholarship revealed the fallibility of that position. Though care was interpreted as an innate good in some early articulations of care ethics, today that normative assertion is cautionary, emphasizing the need to consider how caring relationships can also reinforce differences in power and differential outcomes in who is cared for and for what reasons. In this way, care ethics is consistent with other feminist approaches which seek to make feminized structures and practices both visible and demanding of serious empirical and theoretical engagement across disciplines. For some scholars, care is itself a thick ethical concept that functions as a virtue, sitting alongside Plato’s original virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice as skills that are necessary in order to achieve human well-being. Interpretations of care as virtuous tend to emphasize its innately positive characteristics which generate other emotions and experiences that are associated with a life worth living, such as love and trust. Care is also treated as telos, an end purpose in itself that is unique in its universality; all humans are cared for at some point in their lives, and the mutual relationships and shared dependency is thus as universal an experience as humans can have. Joan Tronto, in Caring Democracy, provides one influential categorization of care which similarly provides some definitional clarity. Elaborating on earlier work with Berenice Fisher, Tronto identifies five categories of care: caring about someone or something, assuming responsibility for its care, undertaking that care through caregiving, recognizing reciprocity and dependency of the self, and extending care to a democratic ethic of care that exceeds dyadic interpersonal dynamics. Through this “scaling up” of the moral and ethical concern of interpersonal dependency, care ethics is considered alongside metaethical questions related to the character of justice, or normative ethics evaluating right and wrong, or applied ethics that address everyday and exceptional problems that pose moral dilemmas. Within these debates, care ethics is often viewed as an alternative or corrective to masculine liberal ethics. For example, Irene Comins Mingol brings care ethics into conversation with citizenship and peace studies, Andrew Sayer draws it into moral economy, and Jean Connolly Carmalt places care into the context of international law and human rights.

Spatializing the Ethics of Care: Proximity, Scale, and Geographical Elaborations Early articulations of care ethics, such as Nel Noddings’ emphasis on face-to-face engagements, identified the intimacy of proximate relations as central to female ethical experience, and so it is perhaps expected that geographic concepts are essential to care as a moral concern. The importance of proximity to the development of sentiments, obligations, practices, and recognition of care also leads care theorists such as Stephanie Collins to emphasize context and circumstancedthe sense of morality being made in placedas a central tenet of the ethics of care. In short, the ethics of care is uniquely geographical, as place, scale, distance, and space are all inherent, rather than incidental to, the formulation of the theories themselves and to the practical application of care-based morality. Review of theories and writings about care ethics reveal three spatial principles that form the geographical underpinnings of care ethics as follows:

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1. Morality emerges from the production and maintenance of relational space. Carol Gilligan proposed that the foundations of morality must be conceived in the context of maternal relations of care, and though contemporary care feminists have moved away from this gendering of care morality, care ethics argues that morality is borne out of the experience of being in relation with someone or something. To evaluate care as a moral concern is to acknowledge the context in which moral assertions or evaluations are being proposeddin forming a relationship by caring about something, and then accepting responsibility for it and practicing care for it, a new moral space emerges. This can be material, as between an adult son and his aged parent, or virtual, as in caring for a distant other; 2. The character of relational space can expand or limit moral reasoning. Relational space is the source of moral sentiments and is therefore simultaneously productive and limiting: it is productive in the sense that relations create spaces of moral evaluation and practice, and limiting in the sense that these emerging moral spaces require recognition of responsibility (as noted earlier, they can also be bound by the rejection of the relational space existing at all). If relational space is expanded through material or virtual means, moral reasoning itself will need to adjust to this new geography of relations. A similar observation was made by David Smith in his landmark book, Moral Geographies, in which he proposed that care for the distant other is a primary concern of moral geography. Care ethics both recognizes and problematizes the role of proximity and distance, unlike other ethical frameworks claiming universally applicable principles. Because morality both rearranges and responds to space through relationships, and because relational spaces carry with them the determined priorities of care and dependency, an effective ethics must presume that reasoning is bounded by relational space. This requires attention to a third principle; 3. Ethics must attend to the constitution of the boundaries of relational space and the unevenness of concern. The relational spaces that both shape and constitute the ethics of care are not always positive and they do not always produce flourishing. They can be exclusive, as indicated by the problem of caring for the distant other. They can also be products of ignorance, limited by what individuals or societies notice, or of denial of being dependent or being responsible. Relational space can also hold together individuals with uneven power. Thus, all care ethics must be attentive to privileged irresponsibility, a phrase from Tronto which describes those who deny responsibility to care of others or themselves or who consider themselves to be autonomous and set apart from relational space. A task regularly taken on by care ethicists is revisiting the ways in which the boundaries around relations of concern are shifted and changed, such as in the conditions of contemporary global neoliberal economic policy. Geographers who work with and on the ethics of care are distinguished from nongeographic scholarship by their attentiveness to these spatial underpinnings. Whereas mainstream care ethics tends to treat space as fixed ideas of the spaces of the body or the global, geographers seek to understand how care constitutes and makes these spaces recognizable, and how space both facilitates and limits the attitudes and possibilities of care as moral praxisdas both something with respected ethical reasoning and something that is put into practice. When care ethics began to move more rigorously into geographical analysis in the 1990s, this feature became a defined characteristic of the geographical cannon as one attentive to empirical analyses of conditions and features of care, both historically and in contemporary times. In his Progress in Human Geography reports on care ethics, Jeff Popke highlights research which examines care as both a lived practice and an ethical framework. In the introduction to their special issue on care within geography, Cheryl McEwan and Michael K. Goodman suggest that, at the heart of spatial concerns surrounding care, geographers have buttressed care ethics by illustrating, through research into everyday experiences, how a sense of responsibility arises both within intimate personal relationships, as well as between and for distant others. This emphasis on undertaking intensive empirical investigation into care, and an awareness that broader philosophical approaches take an uncritical view of space, partly explains why geographers have tended to take a productively critical approach toward care ethics. Rather than presuming that care happens across inert space, geographers have been especially concerned with how practices of care configure space in a way that allows for the flourishing of some at the expense of others. Pioneers of geographic analyses of care work, such as Linda McDowell, include in-depth empirical and historical research to explain the gendering of labor and feminization of the care industry through the global movement of people and the composition of a broader moral economy of work. Other feminist geographers, including Victoria Lawson and Kim England, examine the gendered nature of care labor and emphasize how its resulting spatial arrangements in domestic and public spheres yield political and moral outcomes that can increase, rather than ameliorate, unequal access to care. Care tends to be perceived as “women’s work” relegated to the realm of the private sphere, such as the home, and caring labor is increasingly subjected to a devolution of responsibility from the state to the household, establishing women as the main providers of both privatized and family-provided care. As the conditions of how we are able to care for others change under pressures of global capitalism, so too have geographers’ analyses of the morality and ethics of care. The majority of work on care ethics in geography remains rooted in the gendering of care labor, but the application of a spatially attentive ethics of care has extended into analyses of ethical consumption, health and well-being, human rights, youth and intergenerationality, and the emerging structures of care under the auspices of neoliberalism. The places where care has been analyzed therefore reflects this diversity, as reflected in David Conradson’s observations about the settings and sites of care, or Christine Milligan’s insights into public and institutional space. Parvati Raghuram has played an important role in raising concerns about the geographical bias of care ethics itself toward Western understandings of care and encourages a postcolonial approach of “emplacing” of care in order to challenge universalist assumptions that undermine some of the intents of care ethics. This emphasis on care as contextual is perhaps the most marked feature of newer work on the ethics, as geographers seek to make sense of how care emerges in embodied, affective ways through relationships which are embedded in, and impacted by, place, space, and scale.

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These empirical and theoretical engagements with geographies of care have been particularly powerful in revealing how intimate relationships between people intersect with the governing force of contemporary capitalism. Most of these works have served as warnings about the growing crisis in the uneven distribution of power in relationships of care and dependency, whether it be in relation to an individual who has high dependency upon others for survival or a domestic worker leaving her own family to care for another family’s elderly parents. For example, transnational caregivers have drawn wide attention from geographers as women in the Global North are needed as productive labor outside of the home, and in turn are dependent upon affordable family care that is outsourced to (primarily women of color) caregivers from the Global South seeking financial stability as nannies, nurses, and cleaners. Care ethics must therefore be attentive not only to gendered relations but also to intersections with class, race, and citizenship, as privileged bodies enjoy the benefits of care while those on the margins bear the burden of providing such labor, usually accompanied by meager financial compensation and exploitative working conditions. Changing conditions of who benefits, who takes responsibility, and who is considered to be dependent versus independent in the new configuration of care has also led to calls for moral arguments that can hold together the intimate and the global. In their Editorial on care for Social and Cultural Geography, Atkinson, Lawson, and Wiles call for an appreciation of the corporality of care labor, advocating for an attentiveness to the embodied nature of providing and receiving care. This includes an emphasis on the political implications of care, particularly against the backdrop of global restructuring, in terms of how certain bodies become disproportionately and unevenly entangled in care along aged, gendered, racialized, and class-based lines. This becomes even more urgent as care is increasingly commodified and privatized. Under the watchful eye of neoliberalism, care is framed, at best, as being needed by the vulnerable and, at worst, as needed only by those too apathetic, irresponsible, or inept to be able to look after themselves. From this perspective, dependency becomes a negative moral attribute, rather than a basic condition of life. This is true not only for debates around social welfare but also into the frames of life itself, expressed through unequal access to medical provision and health-care resources in much of the world. In her Progress Reports on medical and health geographies, Hester Parr reminds us of the spatial imaginary at the heart of geographic work on care that provides insights and interruptions into the links between the body and the global, and social geographies of caring, which reflects the dramatic changes in how care is provided in the context of political, social, and economic difference. More recent work by feminist geographers has expanded the scope of who, or what, is counted among the agents of care, with a growing interest in youth geographies. Initial work on young people and care tended to focus on children and teenagers who performed the role of caregivers for ill family members. Ruth Evans, for example, examines the complexities of being a youth caregiver and the ways in which context shifts understandings and practices of responsibility. In the context of the HIV epidemic, care manifests in intergenerational relationships and care labor enacted by young people troubles traditional notions of youth transitions to adulthood, as young carers find themselves negotiating grown-up responsibilities much earlier than expected. Geographers like Ann Bartos and Elizabeth Olson have taken different circumstances of children’s care to raise questions about agency and care more broadly and to offer new insights into the political subject in a globalized world. In the broader care ethics literature, children are often presented as strictly dependent, often in spite of evidence that they, like adults, exercise caring agency. The relational space of care that emerges around children and youth can also advance harmful ethics that stabilize the images of some people as worthy of care, and others not. Attentiveness to their caring relations, connections, and interdependencies results in deeper appreciation of the political potential of young lives. In summary, geographers working in conversation with care ethics emphasize the moral complexities of care and the importance of understanding how the relational spaces produced by care can lead to poor moral reasoning when not subject to critical examinations of what is included or excluded, or the effects of presumptions of dependency and independence can moralize these spaces and allow some to exercise power over others. Milligan and Wiles write about “landscapes of care,” which they refer to as the spatial ways in which structural factors and processes become entwined with lived experiences of care. They trouble the assumption of a strict distinction between distant and proximate care, suggesting that the former can still involve emotional closeness while the latter can include manifestations of care which are abusive or lacking in compassion. In doing so, they unsettle normative spatial imaginaries of care, suggesting that the local and the global, the near and the far, are not inherent categories but instead are produced as care unfolds, and that care itself is not necessarily confined to any one particular space or place. Within this context of the emergent ethics of care, the relational spaces formed with nonhuman or the more-than-human world has become an urgent point of concern in the evaluation of suffering and flourishing, with geographers beginning to also push for understandings of agency which fundamentally disrupt nonrelational moral philosophy.

Care Ethics in More-Than-Human Worlds In the early and mid-2000s, the intensification of challenges like anthropogenic climate change and mass species extinction more clearly implicated human intervention in the destabilization of global ecologies. Nature was no longer “out there” and beyond influence, but inseparably enmeshed with human activity. This recognition, coupled with the growing urgency of worldwide environmental crises, has in recent years sparked an ecological or environmental turn across much of the humanities and social sciences. Working from a place of profound concern, scholars responding to rapid ecological change sought to offer fresh and transformative visions of human–environment relations which would better sensitize academics and the public to the enormous harm being inflicted. These efforts are evidenced by the rise of the transdisciplinary field of environmental humanities and growing public discussion of the Anthropocene.

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Geography’s turn, or rather its return as proposed by geographer Sarah Whatmore, who points to the discipline’s long-standing focus on the nature–society nexus, has been most pronounced across work in more-than-human geographies. More-than-human geographies insist that nonhumans also have agency and engage in caring and other forms of social and spatial practice which deserve attention. Key to this insistence is the acknowledgment that human sociality is never strictly human; it always takes place in relation to other entities, forces, and life-forms, from animals and parasites to technologies and air. It is the always intricate, sometimes destructive, often intimate, relations between humans and other life-forms that collectively compose the dynamic environments in which we, and numerous others, exist together and make life. As a more-than-human geographer might put it, humans cofabricate worlds with an array of others. This suggests that the caring labor of nonhumans, and the spaces that are produced through relations across human–nonhuman recognition, should be addressed in our moral reasoning about care. More-thanhuman geographies of care therefore expand anthropocentric conceptions of the social and the ethical by refocusing attention onto the material relations that cross species and other boundaries. From its inception, more-than-human geographies have developed in dialogue with foundational themes and concerns of care ethics, both implicitly and explicitly. This comes as no surprise: Joan Tronto’s earliest formulations of care were inclusive of nonhuman elements and acknowledged that concern could be directed toward and instigated by the environment, potentially anticipating contemporary moves to the more-than-human. Other philosophers have subsequently moved these feminist care ethics more substantially into the nonhuman, such as Maria Puig de la Bellacasa’s studies of how something like soil, previously disregarded within a scope of care or concern, animates new moralities. While more-than-human frameworks strain moral geographic keywords like justice and rights, both inexorably reliant upon a recognizable figure of an autonomous human, care ethics’ emphasis on relationships and acknowledgment of dependency provide unique insights for efforts to think and feel beyond the human. More-than-human reflections on care raise a fundamental question: if our relational space includes species and the lively environments we inhabit, and if we account for our dependency upon these relationships with nonhumans, then what kinds of moral responsibilities emerge? In many respects, the answer appears to be not all too different from one that might be encountered when examining caregiving for a family member; more-than-human geographies have demonstrated the importance of attentiveness to scale and how impulses to care for and about nonhumans originate in bodily (somatic) and emotional (affective) feelings produced through encounter. Scholars including Jamie Lorimer, Beth Greenhough, and Sarah Whatmore have documented how scientists and conservationists learn to be affected by other beings, developing specific bodily practices and somatic sensibilities to better attune themselves to the behaviors and ecologies of animals. These seemingly minor adjustments in practice become performances of care and “response-ability,” a phrase used to describe how those who engage with nonhuman animals day-to-day develop appreciation and concern for their social and spatial lives. Lorimer stresses how conservationists develop ethical commitments through embodied practices of care which move beyond institutional imperatives of biodiversity conservation as a neutral, objective enterprise and set of instrumental goals. Decentering language and rationality and instead locating emotions and the body as the sources of ethical motivations and encounters with other beings as the spark, these interventions offer fruitful reflections on what it may mean to cultivate caring relations with other species in everyday contexts. In the course of exploring the relations through which care originates, more-than-human approaches have also complicated the notion of intimacy in productive ways. David Smith’s provocation about the reach of care takes on new characteristics in this scholarship, for if distance once meant indifference, it is now the uncanny proximity of our dependency on nonhuman things that raises new questions about how to care when we fail to acknowledge that dependency, or perhaps struggle to understand it. Anthropogenic climate change serves as a prime example. As Amitav Ghosh suggests, we are haunted by our own small, everyday actions as the freakish extreme weather events becoming more commonplace as the world warms. Forces of planetary scale now emanate from aggregations of seemingly banal and innocuous decisions, such as turning up a thermostat. The work of moral philosopher Dale Jamieson adds a finer point to this reality, noting how under conditions of climate change the act of turning on a light could conceivably establish an ethical link between a culpable present-day New Yorker and an innocent victim faraway in both space and time. Scale is therefore critical to more-than-human care ethics, emphasizing relations with distant others through implication in planetary processes over extremes of time and space. Intimacy in more-than-human work has also come to signify what Anna Tsing points to as a common precarity shared by all living beings. Geographers and other scholars have explored these new senses of intimacy through case studies of marine plastic toxicity and irradiated insects in the aftermath of Chernobyl, asking what kinds of caring agencies or responses are awakened through a recognition of the precarious lives humans share with other species in times of environmental crisis, nuclear fallout, and toxic pollution. Engagements between care ethics and more-than-human scholarship provide new examples of the geographic underpinnings of care ethics, and in so doing, reveal the promise of drawing together the intimate vitalist philosophies of both traditions. While care ethics and more-than-human approaches may be instructive for thinking about caring relationships between humans and elephants, for example, their shared emphasis on human experience can limit the translation of their approaches to caring for something that is more difficult to experience like the global climate system. The shift in care ethics toward a critical understanding of scale suggests some promising solutions, including the possibilities of applying privileged irresponsibility to moral problems that require a different kind of relational experience than that of mother and child. Additionally, care ethics can provide greater attention to race, power, and politics, something that more-than-human geographies has been critiqued for overlooking; in its rather breathless attempts to see beyond the human estate, there is some concern that moving beyond the human has meant embracing an open-ended “affectivity” that moves attention away from vulnerable people who are still asserting their claims to humanity.

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Conclusion The geographic underpinnings of the ethics of care have made it a particularly appealing moral philosophy for geographers, who have engaged with it in critical ways to demand both stronger spatial conceptualizations within the theory and to analyze emerging spaces of moral concern that are often excluded or overlooked in other ethical engagements. Intersections between care ethics and more-than-human geographies represent perhaps the newest horizon of this work, allowing for engagements with previously underexplored aspects of care ethics, such as Tronto’s early inclusion of nonhuman factors in defining care. Changing planetary dynamics that are unique to the last decade or two are producing new visions of what care and intimacy across species and other-than-human entities might come to mean in increasingly precarious worlds. It signals not only the continued importance of recognizing how relational space is constituted and the ethics that emerge from it but also what is left out due to ignorance or a lack of humility when examining moral problems.

Further Reading Bartos, A.E., 2018. The uncomfortable politics of care and conflict: exploring nontraditional caring agencies. Geoforum 88, 66–73. Carter, J., Palmer, J., 2017. Dilemmas of transgression: ethical responses in a more-than-human world. Cult. Geogr. 24 (2), 213–229. Fisher, B., Tronto, J., 1990. Toward a feminist theory of caring. In: Abel, E., Nelson, M. (Eds.), Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women’s Lives. SUNY Press, Albany, NY, pp. 35–62. Green, M., Lawson, V., 2011. Recentering care: interrogating the commodification of care. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 12 (6), 639–654. Kittay, E.F., 2013. Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency. Routledge. Lawson, V., 2007. Geographies of care and responsibility. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 97 (1), 1–11. McEwan, C., Goodman, M.K., 2010. Place geography and the ethics of care: introductory remarks on the geographies of ethics, responsibility and care. Ethics, Place Environ. 13 (2), 103–112. Milligan, C., Wiles, J., 2010. Landscapes of care. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 34 (6), 736–754. Popke, J., 2006. Geography and ethics: everyday mediations through care and consumption. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 30 (4), 504–512. Raghuram, P., 2016. Locating care ethics beyond the global north. ACME Int. J. Crit. Geogr. 15 (3), 511–533. Reich, W.T., 1995. History of the notion of care. In: Reich, W.T. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Simon & Schuster Macmillan, New York, pp. 319–331. Smith, D.M., 1998. How far should we care? On the spatial scope of beneficence. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 22 (1), 15–38. Tronto, J.C., 1994. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. Routledge, New York. Whatmore, S., 1997. Dissecting the autonomous self: hybrid cartographies for a relational ethics. Environ. Plan. D Soc. Space 15 (1), 37–53.

Relevant Website “Care Ethics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/care-eth/.

Care, Caregiving, and Caring Mark W Skinner, Trent School of the Environment, Trent University, Peterborough, ON, Canada Rachel V Herron, Department of Geography and Environment, Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Care Care that is required due to an individual’s short- or long-term health condition and/or disability. It is an actiondcaregivingdand an emotiondcaringdthat involves diverse and complex webs of health interventions, relations, practices, and policies that occur between people in various settings. Care activities include those for both health and social care such as administering medication and looking after life-sustaining technologies, bathing, toileting, feeding, dressing, communicating, mobility, and caregiver respite. Institutional care is provided in healthcare settings that are built for the express purpose of providing healthcare (e.g., hospitals, psychiatric or mental health facilities, nursing homes, or long-term care facilities). Home and community care is provided in nontraditional healthcare settings that are not built for the sole purpose of providing healthcare (e.g., homes, schools, workplaces). Global care chains A concept used to describe the links between globalization, migration, and care, specifically the redistribution of care resources from the global South to the global North, often exacerbating vulnerability and inequality. Community voluntary organization A local, community-based organization that provides health and social care services such as meal programs, transportation, respite, and homemaking. These organizations primarily operate outside the formal healthcare system but often hold service-specific contracts with the government and feature a significant but not exclusive degree of volunteer participation. Formal/paid caregiving Care that is provided by workers who are reimbursed for their time. Healthcare restructuring An orchestrated set of policies and practices aimed at reducing the financial responsibility of the government for providing healthcare services. This frequently involves the separation of funding and delivery roles of the government, shifting the place where care is provided to nontraditional healthcare settings, closing or downsizing healthcare institutions in favor of community care (known as deinstitutionalization), and transferring responsibility for healthcare from trained healthcare professionals to individuals and their families. Informal/unpaid caregiving Care that is usually provided by close family members but can also be provided by extended family, friends, neighbors, and volunteers who do not receive financial reimbursement. Publicly funded home and community care An ensemble of services that are provided by the government (nursing, physical and occupation therapy, personal support, and home care worker) to enable an individual to live at home, often with the effect of preventing, delaying, or substituting long-term or acute-care alternatives.

Care involves a diverse and complex web of actions, relations, practices, and policies that occur between people in various traditional and nontraditional health and social care settingsdall of which are intrinsically geographical. In this article, we examine geographical contributions to understanding “care”das action (caregiving) and emotion (caring)dbeginning with a review of its roots within human/health geography with specific reference to changes in contemporary health policy, and a consideration of the reasons why this area of inquiry has grown substantially in recent decades. Next, we examine the diverse theories and concepts that inform geographical perspectives on different forms of care, which is followed by a consideration of research on the various scales, spaces, and places in which, and from which, caregiving and caring occurs. We conclude with a discussion of the limitations of current knowledge, and we call for a more inclusive and just approach to understanding care in the 21st Century.

Geographies of Care The importance of care as a field of study can be understood as part of the general shift toward greater emphasis on the social aspects of healthcare and as part of the response within the social and health sciences to broader changes in contemporary health policy and practice. Particularly in the context of countries of the Global North (the United Kingdom, Canada/the United States, Australia/New Zealand), specific concern for the geographical dimensions of care has its beginnings in research on the spaces and places of mental healthcare. Key studies in the late 1970s and 1980s critiqued the deinstitutionalization of mental health services from asylums to community-based care and the implications for individuals coping with mental illness. This initial body of work focused on the gaps between often nonexistent spaces of care in the community and the needs of people living with mental illness. Concerns were raised about how deinstitutionalization, in combination with the lack of service quality and quantity in the community, left many ex-patients poorer, homeless, drug-addicted, and even prisoners in the criminal system.

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Following early work in the mental health sector were key developments within the subdiscipline of medical/health geography that have led to the growing engagement with research questions and issues concerning care, caregiving, and caring. First, there has been a broadening of scope of inquiry from focusing solely on the biomedical as subject of care, to considering issues of health, healing, and well-being. Second, theories and concepts originating in social, cultural, and feminist geography that examined the body and affect, inclusion and exclusion, and the links between people and their economic, social, and political contexts informed and shaped the way that health and healthcare were studied. Third, the interest in developing situated and relational understandings of the complexity and dynamism surrounding healthcare provided an impetus for studying the intersection between health, place and the activities, routines, and relationships involved in care, caregiving, and caring. Finally, the use of methodologies and techniques such as feminist approaches and interview, diary, and visual methods to research the experiences and meanings of care paralleled the increased interest, use, and validation of qualitative methods in human geography. Key studies in the geography of care literature illustrate the strengths of qualitative methods for capturing the rich experiences and in-depth meanings of health and healthcare in everyday contexts. The influence of other social and health science disciplines such as nursing, health policy, gerontology, and sociology has also helped shape and direct this area of inquiry. Underlying the growing work on the geographies of care are broader concerns about changes in health policy and practice. Since the 1980s, concerns about rising fiscal deficits, an aging population, and growing healthcare costs led to a period of massive healthcare restructuring and policy change. Strategies to deal with these issues coupled with advances in medical technology, and increasing life expectancies for individuals with disabilities and chronic illnesses, have influenced where care is provided, how care is delivered, and who performs caregiving. Research on deinstitutionalization has been broadened to include acute and long-term care. For example, the lengths of hospital stays for acute care have decreased, and therefore patients are released from hospital sicker, often requiring ongoing treatment at home. Advances in healthcare technology have made it possible for many treatments and interventions that were previously administered in hospital settings by healthcare professionals to be managed in homes and communities by individuals and their families. For some people, the home has become a place where complex, sophisticated, long-term care is provided. Another cost containment strategy is the restructuring of healthcare work. This strategy involves the transferring of responsibilities and activities to workers who are not as highly skilled or paid, and in the case of informal carers or volunteers are not paid at all. For example, bathing was once the domain of nurses, but now responsibility for this activity has been transferred to nursing assistants and home care workers. In addition, restructuring of state-provided, publicly funded, home care services has resulted in stricter eligibility criteria to receive services, cut backs in the amount of hours of care, and greater restriction in the type of caregiving that workers can perform. Ultimately, these strategies have combined to change the places where care occurs, which shifts from healthcare institutions such as hospitals to homes, and the people who are responsible for caregiving as services are downloaded from trained healthcare professionals onto community volunteers, families, and individuals. Such changes have led geographers to focus on the embodiment, emotion, and relationality of care and caregiving. Care is increasingly understood as both felt in the body and connected to people and places across a range of scales. Geographers understand caring as a practice that involves feelings for others (caring about) and caregiving as an action (caring for). While many care responsibilities have shifted to the home and community, the changing geographies of families, friends, and communities (such as online social networks) means that care has become much more dispersed regionally, nationally, and transnationally. This shift makes the technologically mediated realities of caregiving and caringdfor instance, by phone, text, and Internetdof particular importance in an increasingly connected global society. These changing geographies also make conceptualizing experiences, relationships, and acts of care evermore complex.

Theorizing and Conceptualizing Care Within geography, a central concern has been to elucidate the spatial manifestations and characteristics of care in people’s everyday lives with the explicit purpose of challenging taken-for-granted assumptions within prevailing health policies and practices. There are, however, many different and often-contested ways to think about care with key contributions coming from, among others, political economy, cultural, and feminist perspectives within human/health geography.

Political/Institutional Change Against the backdrop of the widespread restructuring of health and social care services in the 1980s and 1990s, key studies have revealed that the shift in where care is provided and how care is delivered affects the experiences and meanings of home and community. Drawing on political economy, much of this work seeks to understand how institutional, political, and economic structures shape experiences and realities of receiving and providing care. These studies help to explain the unequal distribution of care resources between groups of care providers and receivers, between different regions, and between various care settings. In other words, healthcare policies affecting the provision and receipt of care are entrenched in specific political, economic, cultural, and social contexts. From this perspective, care is viewed as a political concept that involves the allocation of public resources, and issues of justice, rights, and citizenship, and researchers have used this approach to examine relations of care and practices in the home, community, and hospital. Ultimately, this work reveals the consequences that healthcare restructuring has on various groups such as care recipients, informal carers, health professionals working in the home and community, and individuals affected by the closure of their community hospital.

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Landscapes of Care The long-standing geographical concern for understanding the human experience of place has inspired work on the social and cultural dimensions of care. Of particular note is the concept of therapeutic landscape, which draws on the humanistic interest in sense of place, and the attachment and deep meaning that places hold for people. Using this concept, researchers have theorized how particular attributes of the physical and social environment, and the meanings associated with place identity can have a profound impact on health and well-being, and on care and caregiving. The concepts of landscape, including blue spaces (water), inform understanding of care providers’ and receivers’ attachment to particular locations. It is particularly useful for understanding care in the home, which is a space of care that is deeply symbolic, familiar, and where individuals may experience profound attachment and place identity.

Gender, Caregiving, and Caring Approaching care from a gendered perspective raises questions about who provides care in what settings, how such work is valued in different settings, and the gendered consequences of caring norms and caregiving policies. Feminist scholars have explored how care is naturalized as women’s work in the home and undervalued and underpaid in community settings. In general, women provide the bulk of unpaid and low-paid care work in the home and community, and the downloading of care responsibilities to the family and community has had the greatest impact on women. For example, research on gender and caregiving has examined the activity patterns of women between their home, paid work place, and caregiving location, illustrating the difficulties that women experience in balancing the competing demands and responsibilities of their households, children, elderly parents, work, and caregiving. In terms of caring, women are generally expected to do more emotion work, managing their own feelings and the feelings of others across care settings, often without recognition. Conversely, not caring is often seen as a defining characteristic of manliness with implications for how men care for themselves and engage with caregiving across space. In some places, men are now taking on greater caring and caregiving roles; however, there are fewer men in the caring professions, and they tend to provide more instrumental care in the home. Ultimately, for care policies to be inclusive and equitable, gendered differences in care, caregiving, and caring must be addressed.

Ethics of Care Underlying the diverse perspectives described above is a growing concern to develop an ethical and progressive politics of care. An ethics of care is informed by concepts of social justice, which advocate an inclusive approach in which all groups included in care are included in debates about healthcare restructuring, caregiving, and caring. Work in this area is charged with setting the agenda for how the politics of care might be played out and critiquing the assumptions and ideas that are framing the healthcare policy that impacts care experiences, access to care, and responsibilities to care. In other words, the ethics of care moves beyond analytical exercises in description. For example, recent commentaries highlight the need for a more careful consideration of the ideologically driven settings in which, and from which, care, caregiving, and caring occur. Key studies question whether “community” and “household” are appropriate resources for caregiving as opposed to institutions, the state, or the market. The changes in where care is delivered and the practice of providing care have led to a blurring of the boundaries between healthcare settings and nontraditional healthcare settings; researchers are questioning the dualism and polarity of concepts such as formal and informal care, and private and public.

Scales, Spaces, and Places of Care There is a growing body of work that explores the meanings and experiences of care in various settings. The characteristics, meanings, and experiences associated with different spaces and scales of care affect the organization and delivery of care, and the relationships, experiences, and practices involved in care. At the same time, the organization and delivery of care, and the relationships, experiences, and practices that are involved affect the social and spatial organization and characteristics of these spaces. Spaces and places of care are increasingly understood relationally, in that they are mutually constituted.

Global Care Chains Care that takes place in homes or institutions is not isolated in those spaces. The work of individuals, households, and institutions is connected by complex linkages and migratory patterns that stretch across the globe. The concept of global care chains has been used to describe the migration of women from countries of the Global South (e.g., Philippines) to the Global North (e.g., Canada) to provide caredoften as nannies of working professionals. Such migrants fill a care deficit in the destination country while often leaving a care deficit in their source country. Moreover, migration of this kind fundamentally reshapes patterns and places of care across the globe and within individual households. It redistributes caregiving resources and stretches caring across great distances. It also reinforces the perception of care work as a low skill job to be performed by others. The growth of global care chains represents a shift away from more traditional institutions of care toward less bounded free market economy of

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care. The movement of care recipients (typically from the Global North to the Global South) for medical treatment internationally, increasingly referred to as “medical tourism,” has also become a 21st-Century phenomenon that is receiving increasing interest among geographers.

The Institution Traditionally, hospitals including psychiatric facilities and long-term care facilities such as residential and nursing homes were the two main institutions for care. Research on hospitals as spaces of care has focused on the changing social, physical, and service environments associated with healthcare restructuring and the implications for patients and local communities. One aspect of this work critically examines the increasing commodification of healthcare institutions and changing financial relationships and partnerships between the government and private market interests as strategies for dealing with soaring healthcare costs in countries of the Global North. Another avenue of research centers on building understanding of the geographical variation in the availability and use of hospital services across time and space, and in relation to socioeconomic status, gender, and cultural and ethnic groups. Residential and nursing homes are spaces of care and caregiving for individuals who are not acutely ill enough to require hospital care, but are not able to manage either by themselves or with assistance in their own home. Individuals living in these settings include frail elderly people and individuals of all ages with physical, cognitive, and mental illnesses and disabilities. Key studies provide a more nuanced understanding of why long-term care residential institutions are often viewed as negative, while the home is romanticized as a positive setting in which to provide or receive care. For example, people often find familiarity and comfort in the home’s material environment such as the furniture, pictures, and the memories and stories that occurred there, and they exercise control over the schedules and activities of care at home, whereas they experience the nursing home as an unfamiliar, often sanitized, space where they need to renegotiate caring roles and relationships.

The Community Much of the care previously provided in institutions has been downloaded to the community. Care and caregiving research focuses on the intersection between care and community settings such as workplaces, schools, counseling settings, and community centers. Of particular concern are the implications of the restructuring of both acute and long-term healthcare and the withdrawal of governments from the provision of services, which are characterized by the downloading of responsibilities for providing health and social care onto community-based voluntary organizations. Numerous studies have examined the challenges facing such voluntary sector organizations as they relate to the uneven nature of restructuring, the relationships between health professionals, volunteers, and individuals who receive care. Key studies have also examined nontraditional spaces of care in the community such as day centers, drop-in centers, and soup kitchens. Research on these spaces emphasizes the importance of caregiving and caring practices that focus on bodily necessities such as food, shelter, and social relationships. Most of this research links back to the consequences of the deinstitutionalization of those with mental healthcare needs and the lack of appropriate services in the community.

The Home Studies have also examined the consequences of downloading more intensive caregiving activities to the home, as the principal setting for daily life and one of the most important zones of familiarity and meaning. Situating healthcare in peoples’ homes affects the spatial and temporal organization of the home, raises issues concerning privacy, and affects individual family members’ social networks. Some of the key issues include the immense amount of work and effort involved, the impacts on the spatial mobility and social life of the families and individuals providing and receiving care, and the potential of exacerbating caregiver burnout as well as social exclusion for carers and for people with complex chronic conditions living at home. The ability to obtain resources and supports to assist in providing and receiving care varies depending on the proximity of social supports, differences between urban and rural locations in terms of availability of public transportation and in-home care services, and varying ability to pay for required services that are not publicly funded. Research has examined how the materiality, meanings, and power dynamics of the home change when it becomes a place where care activities, schedules, relationships, and processes occur. Some of these changes include moving to a more suitable environment, structural alterations (e.g., entrance ramps, grab bars, and bath lifts), reordering domestic work including delegating tasks and pacing of the work, hiring private help, and using publicly funded home care workers. Such changes can influence individual autonomy, socioeconomic status, and family roles in profound ways. Research on the impact of the changing context of publicly funded home care on individuals and families has revealed concerns about stricter eligibility criteria, cuts in the maximum number of hours, and restrictions in the types of tasks allowed. Efforts to reduce home care budgets have led to workers being restricted to providing personal care such as baths and not other activities such as light housework, grocery shopping, or preparing meals. Service inflexibility, limited access to the type and amount of services required, and high turnover of home care staff place more pressure on informal carers to look after most care activities or to hire private care workers, further exacerbating the unevenness of quality care in the home.

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The Body Research on care and the body has focused on understanding how practices are both physically and emotionally experienced by and imposed upon the bodies of carers and people receiving care. The majority of the activities associated with care work, such as feeding, changing clothes, bathing, toileting, administering medication, and monitoring healthcare technology, are focused on the body. In essence, caregiving activities revolve around preserving, maintaining, restoring, and comforting the body. When these activities are performed by individuals themselves, they are referred to as self-care. Studies have examined the extraordinary investment of time and energy that is required in performing care work, the scheduling of care activities around fundamental bodily activities such as eating or sleeping, and the modifications that are required to the built environment as bodies grow, develop, deteriorate, and change. Bodily boundaries concerning privacy and control may have to be transgressed and renegotiated as many care activities are extremely personal and intimate. Indeed, there has also been growing recognition that violence is sometimes embedded within particular institutions and practices of care. For example, healthcare workers, report experiencing and perpetrating violence in the context of long-term care facilities because of lack of training, lack of support, and increasing workload. Part of understanding care at the level of the body is also recognizing its affects (i.e., embodied sensations) and emotional implications. For example, a focus on affect may allow scholars to understand how people react to pain or to care environments beyond what they express through language. Such explorations require the use of observation and ethnographic methods to explore care as it is happening. Studies have shown that carers and care receivers experience complex and conflicting emotions such as joy, sorrow, guilt, anger, frustration, anxiety, hopefulness, and hopelessness. A myriad of roles and relationships may be reversed, such as when an adult child provides care for the mother or father, or not expected, such as when a parent has to provide more assistance to the child with a disability even though he or she is getting older. Drawing on psychoanalytic approaches, research has focused on the emotional implications of care, and feelings of familiarity, comfort, and sense of attachment to the home and the community. The acknowledgment of the relationship among individuals’ bodies, carers’ bodies, places, and policy signals the importance of developing an ethics of care among health policy makers, researchers, and practitioners.

Toward an Inclusive and Just Geography of Care In this short article, we examined the complex interconnected geographies of care, caregiving, and caring. This field of study evolved out of the combination of subdisciplinary developments in medical/health geography and out of broader concerns for the implications of changes in healthcare policy and practices. We reviewed the diverse set of theories and concepts that inform geographical approaches to care, and we discussed the different global, institutional, community, home, and body spaces in which and from which care occurs. As with most emerging fields of study, there are gaps in existing knowledge about care, caregiving, and caring. Most research on care has focused on older people, especially women, in countries of the Global North. The experiences of children, youth and younger adults, male carers, and individuals who practice self-care are not well understood. The experiences of individuals living in low- and middle-income countries of the Global South and elsewhere, and the unique conditions and requirements of care in rural areas are also largely underrepresented in the care and caregiving literature. There is, however, ongoing interest in social justice within this field that continues to push scholars to understand the experiences of those in the Global South and rural and remote areas. Ultimately, geographers are tasked with exploring differences in care experiences and understanding the extent to which such differences are avoidable disparities that must change to create more just care and be responsive to geographical context. We have shown that changes within healthcare policies and practices affect the places and spaces of care, and people’s placespecific care experiences. Research on the geographies of care, caregiving, and caring is aimed at improving the lives of people receiving care and carers, and this focus underpins the growing commitment to developing an ethical and progressive politics of care. In this pursuit, care and caregiving researchers, making rigorous, applied contributions to healthcare policy and practice, are engaging with numerous communities of practice, especially policy decision-making structures and processes, and are informing larger debates within medical, health, and human geography.

See Also: Aging and Health; Emotional Geographies; Gender and Health; Health Geography; Therapeutic Landscapes; Welfare Reform.

Further Reading Andrews, G.J., Evans, J., 2008. Understanding the reproduction of health care: towards geographies in health care work. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 32 (6), 759–780. Cloutier, D.S., Martin-Matthews, A., Byrne, K., Wolse, F., 2015. The space between: using ‘relational ethics’ and ‘relational space’ to explore relationship building between care providers and care recipients in the home space. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 16 (7), 764–782. Herron, R.V., Skinner, M.W., 2013. The emotional overlay: negotiating aging and care in the countryside. Soc. Sci. Med. 91, 186–193. Lawson, V., 2008. Geographies of care and responsibility. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 97 (1), 1–11.

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Milligan, C., Power, A., 2009. The changing geography of care. In: Brown, T., McLafferty, S., Moon, G. (Eds.), A Companion to Health and Medical Geography. Wiley Blackwell, London, GB, pp. 567–586. Milligan, C., Wiles, J., 2010. Landscapes of care. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 34 (6), 736–754. Power, A., 2010. Landscapes of Care: Comparative Perspectives on Family Caregiving. Ashgate, Farnham, UK. Power, A., Hall, E., 2017. Placing Care in Times of Austerity. Social & Cultural Geography (online first). Rosenberg, M., 2014. Health geography I: social justice, idealist theory, health and health care. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 38 (3), 466–475.

Cartographic Animation Michael P Peterson, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by M. Harrower, volume 1, pp 408–413, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Temporal Cartographic Animation A map animation showing change over time. Interactive animation Allows the user to change or manipulate the display. Nontemporal Cartographic Animation An animation show change not related to time.

Defined as a graphic art that occurs in time, animation is dynamic visual statement that evolves through movement or change in the display. The animated map may be viewed a series of individual maps that are shown in quick succession for the purpose of depicting some type of change or trend. The most important quality of an animation is that what happens between each frame is far more important than what is depicted on each frame. All cartographic animations can be divided into two major types: (1) temporal animations that show change over time and (2) nontemporal animations that depict a change caused by a variable other than time (e.g., the deformation caused by a map projection). Cartographic animations are generally created in two different ways. In the frame-based approach, a series of individual maps are put together in a type of flip-book. Each frame contains a complete map. In the cast-based approach, a script is used to move foreground objects against a background map. The animated map can also be categorized by different levels of interaction. Animations on film or video provide the least amount of interaction. Limited interaction is possible with digital video (.avi or .mpeg) where users can interactively control the speed of playback. In interactive cartographic animation, the user directs the computer to create the individual frames and then controls their display. Few programs exist that implement this level of interaction. Cartographic animations implemented in GIS programs are often rudimentary and allow only limited interaction. The primary purpose of cartographic animation is to depict a trend or change that would not be apparent if the series of maps were viewed individually. This is best demonstrated by some 3D graphing programs that “spin” three variables in an x, y, z coordinate space. As the axis is spun, a cloud of points becomes visible. When the spinning stops, the cloud disappears. In a similar sense, a good cartographic animation creates an understanding of the data that cannot be achieved by looking at a series of individual maps. Cartographic animations should reveal patterns that would otherwise remain hidden. The “small multiples” approach is an attempt to convey similar information. Here, small versions of each map are presented adjacent to each other in a row/column format. The user is expected to view the maps quickly in a back-and-forth pattern to derive similar information to an animation. Research has shown that map readers garner more information correctly when using animated maps.

History of Animated Maps One may speculate that the very first map ever made was in some way animated. Prehistoric drawings on cave walls have survived because of the protected environment. Lost are those illustrations made on a less protected medium. Drawn with a rapidly moving stick in sand, an early cartographic animation may have depicted the movement of animals or a fast-moving river. It is only logical that early maps would have been made this way because depicting a river as an unmoving line, for example, is a much more abstract form of representation. Movement is an important part of life and would have been a critical element in early maps. The medium of maps, first stone and then paper, removed the element of movement from maps. An early animation on film was produced by Disney films in 1939. Implemented with the same cel-based technology used for cartoons, the animation depicted the invasion of Poland by Germany earlier that year. Moving arrows are seen moving toward Wausau and then surrounding and enveloping the city (see Animation 1). The animation was shown as a part of newsreels that preceded the showing of movies and was used as a form of propaganda, in this case about the menace of Nazi Germany. The advantages and feasibility of cartographic animations were described as early as 1959 by Norman Thrower, who viewed its potential from the perspective of film. The computer was soon being used to create the individual frames. Yet for a couple of decades there was little development in animation. Important exceptions include animations to show the growth of a city, traffic accidents,

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population growth in an urban region, and three-dimensional cartographic objects. Tobler’s work in 1970 on city growth is notable because not only did it present known facts but it could be used as a research tool to better understand the process of urban growth. Making these early animations on film was time-consuming. In addition, animations on film could not be easily duplicated, transported, or displayed. Contributions in the 1990s attempted to create a conceptual foundation for the use of animation in cartography. Developments included work on scripting for map series, space-time relationships, and dynamic variables. The latter included brushing, reordering, and pacing. Reordering, for example, involves presenting the frames of a temporal animation in a different order. Frames depicting earthquake activity might be reordered so that the duration of each map is proportional to the magnitude of the quake being shown. As a result, the animation is no longer temporal. While the theory of animation was explored, few cartographic tools developed to effectively automate the production of cartographic animations. A notable exception was a program written for early Apple MacintoshÔ computers called MacChoro (pronounced MacKoro). Released in 1986, the initial version of the program was the first to implement a point-and-click interface for the production of maps. Previously, mapping programs used a command-line interface (CLI) in which the user typed in a text command. MacChoro II, released in 1988, was the first program to incorporate interaction in animated mapping. This version placed a series of maps in memory that showed different data classification methods, different numbers of classes, or variables. Once defined, the series of maps could be quickly displayed at up to 60 frames per second with a dialog that controlled the speed of display and provided access to the individual maps.

Temporal Animated Maps By far the most common type of cartographic animation is the depiction of change over time. The most common example shows the movement of clouds as part of a television weather forecast. These animations are based on images from NOAA’s GOES satellite, a weather observation system. Another example might be an animation that shows the increased use of irrigation over a period of many years (see Animation 2). A variety of temporal animations have been made of air traffic, including an atlas with over 80 animations showing total air traffic, air traffic by city, flights by aircraft type, flights by region, and flights by airline (see Animation 3). All of the animations are temporal, showing flights over a 24-h period in 30 s. The compression of time is 1:2880 (1 s of the animation is 48 min– 2880 sdin real time).

Nontemporal Animated Maps While the animation of maps has been mostly associated with the representation of change over time, cartographic animations are useful for other purposes as well. Examples of nontemporal animations include depicting the deformation caused by a map projection, a three-dimensional surface, or the classification of data. Nontemporal uses of animation have evolved into a major application of the technique. A number of different types of nontemporal animations are possible with maps. Probably the most widely used is the “flythrough,” made popular by Google EarthÔ. The fly-through is constructed by combining a digital elevation model (DEM) with a satellite image. A route is then defined in x, y and z coordinates that traverses the scene. If the route is not carefully chosen, the viewer may be taken behind a hill (see Animations 4 & 5). Although a fly-through is viewed over time, what is changing in the frames is the place. It is therefore classified as a nontemporal animation. Alternative classifications of data are particularly useful to examine in animation. Classification is done to generalize data for ease of presentation. But, each classification presents a distorted view of the data. A classification animation shows alternate methods of classification (equal-interval, quantile, etc.), or different number of classes (see Animations 6–8). The purpose is to view the data in alternative ways so as not to be biased by any one depiction. Another type of nontemporal animation would be the depiction of a spatial trend. This would be evident by examining a series of related variables. For example, the percent of population in certain age groups (0–4, 5–10, 11–14, etc.) will usually show a clear regionalization with older populations closer to the center and younger people near the periphery of the city (see Animation 9). An animation of these age groups would appear to depict high values moving from the edge of the city to the center. Variable such as income and house values show similar geographic trends from the center to the edge.

Animation Display Speed The purpose of an animation determines the speed at which it should be viewed. If the maps represent a particular sequence with only slight variation between them, a viewing rate of 60 frames per second is not excessive. When viewing a set of maps with more differences, a 1 s per frame rate would be more appropriate. Users should be able to specify the display speed which is best for them. The viewing of animated maps is much different than individual maps. Although present map users are still more accustomed to single maps, future map users may not have this bias and may even expect a multiple map solution that presents alternative views of

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the data, with a method of interaction that allows for exploratory data analysis. In short, all maps will be presented as multiple displays to be viewed as quickly or slowly as the map user desires.

Interactive Cartographic Animation Most animations are frame-based and distributed in a format used for movies, like MP4. Many interactive animations were made with Adobe Flash but security concerns with the format have meant that it is not widely used anymore. The decline of this format was a major impediment to the production of interactive cartographic animations. An early example that introduced cartographic animation used frames within JavaScript, the most widely used programming language. JavaScript, embedded within HTML, was introduced in 1995 as a way to make web pages more dynamic and interactive. It implemented the ability to store frames in the computer’s memory that could then be quickly presented on the screen. A series of frames stored in memory could then be shown as an animation. The display of frames could be controlled with hotspots, predefined areas on the graphic where hovering the mouse will activate a particular action. In this case, the action is to display another frame. When the hotspots are lined-up in a particular sequence, and the mouse is rapidly moved across the hotspots, an animation results (see Animation #10). With this method, the user creates their own animation though the particular maps are preselected.

Problems With Cartographic Animation In many ways, reading a map is completely different than “reading” a cartographic animation. In map reading, especially with thematic maps, there is an all-at-once recognition of a pattern. This is the primary benefit of maps as they can convey so much information so quickly. Recognizing a pattern through an animation is not immediate because the frames need to be viewed over time. The German word ablauf (playback) exemplifies this “time” aspect of all cartographic animations. In contrast to a single map, it takes time to interpret an animation. This may be the primary reason why cartographic animations are not used more often. Most users don’t want to take the time to watch an animation. Compared to a map, recognizing a pattern through an animation takes too long for some. Working in the cognitive paradigm and concerned with information overload, psychologist Barbara Tversky and her colleagues identified four major challenges when people watch and learn from animated graphics (including maps) as compared to the static graphics of the same data: (1) Attention: In any visually rich display, readers are often unsure of where to look or what to do. The researchers suggest solutions include guided tours, short tutorials, and voice-over. (2) Disappearance: Animated displays can change quite dramatically over a short period of time. There is always the potential that the viewer will miss important information. Because of this, many basic interpretation tasks can be very difficult, such as estimating size or areas, matching colors or comparing symbols to each another, or even reading text. (3) Complexity: It is possible with computers to make a dynamic display that overwhelms our visual processing. Data generalization, a central element of cartography, may be a solution. (4) Confidence: While users often enjoy looking at animated displays, they seem less confident of the knowledge they acquire from them than from static graphics. It has been pointed out that people have far more experience using static graphics and may therefore be more trusting of the information. It could also be that animated displays are made simply because it is possible, while a static display would better convey The problem with identifying limitations of human cognition is that humans vary a great deal in their abilities, especially with greater experience. Also, motivation is difficult to incorporate in the experiments. A motivated map reader can overcome even a poor user-interface to extract often very complex information. A variety of other problems have been noted with animations. One is “change blindness,” the variety of conditions that blind us to noticing change in an animated display. Another is disorientation in fly-throughs. Animations can be reduced in complexity by classifying temporal data.

Summary The possibilities of cartographic animation seem endless. Given the number of different applications, cartographic animation may be best defined as the depiction of change through the presentation of a series of maps in quick succession. Temporal animations depict change over time like the growth of a city or the flow of the jet stream. Nontemporal animations show change that is cause by factors other than time. Cartographic animations clearly demonstrate that an individual map is only a snapshot in time. One should always ask: What was before? What is predicted to come after? What trends would be evident if the time element were viewed as an animation? Individual maps are also a snapshot in reference to related data. What nontemporal trends would be apparent if the map were viewed

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with other forms of classification or with related data variables? Finally, the individual map is a snapshot in the choice symbolization that was used to depict the data. A cartographic animation can provide a more meaningful view of spatial data through the use of different symbols or different forms of data classification. Cartography is constantly reinventing itself, and cartographic animations have stood the test of time. The method has been coopted as an example of a more advanced form of cartography by both cartographic visualization and multimedia cartography. In the end, the technique is still under-utilized and has a long way to go to overtake the dominance of the single-map solution. The era in which all maps are presented as multiples, something that could be so easily done by computer, has not yet arrived. Cartographers.

See Also: Geovisualization; Map Interactivity.

Further Reading Cartwright, W., Peterson, M., Gartner, G. (Eds.), 1999. Multimedia Cartography. Springer Verlag, Berlin. Cornwell, B., Robinson, A.H., 1966. Possibilities for computer animated film in cartography. Cartogr. J. 3 (2), 79–82. Cybulski, P., Medynska-Gulij, B., 2018. Cartographic redundancy in reducing change blindness in detecting extreme values in spatio-temporal maps. ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. 7, 8. DiBiase, D., MacEachren, A.M., Krygier, J.B., Reeves, C., 1992. Animation and the role of map design in scientific visualization. Cartogr. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 27 (4), 201–214. Dorling, D., Openshaw, S., 1992. Using computer animation to visualize space-time patterns. Environ. Plan. Plan. Des. 19, 639–650. Fish, C., Goldsberry, K.P., Battersby, S., 2011. Change blindness in animated choropleth maps: an empirical study. Cartogr. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 38 (4), 350–362. Gersmehl, P.J., 1990. Choosing tools: nine metaphors of four-dimensional cartography. Cartogr. Perspect. 5, 3–17. Griffin, A.L., MacEachren, A.M., Hardisty, F., Steiner, E., Li, B., 2006. A comparison of animated maps with static small-multiple maps for visually identifying space-time clusters. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 96 (4), 740–753. Harrower, M., 2004. A look at the history and future of animated maps. Cartographica 39 (3), 33–42. Harrower, M., 2009. Cartographic Animation. International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, first ed. Elsevier Press, Cambridge. Harrower, M., Sheesley, B., 2007. Utterly lost: methods for reducing disorientation in 3-D fly-over maps. Cartogr. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 34 (1), 17–27. Karl, D., 1992. Cartographic animation: potential and research issues. Cartogr. Perspect. 5, 3–9. Lobben, A., 2003. Classification and application of cartographic animation. Prof. Geogr. 55 (3), 318–328. Moellering, H., 1980. The real-time animation of three-dimensional maps. Am. Cartogr. 7, 67–75. Multimäki, S., Andreas, Hall, Paula, ahonen-rainio, 2015. Comparison of Temporally Classified and Unclassified Map Animations. Cartograp. Perspec. 82. Peterson, M.P., 1993. Interactive cartographic animation. Cartograp. Geograp. Inform. Sys. 1993 20 (1), 40–44. Peterson, M.P., 1994. Interactive and Animated Cartography. Prentice-Hall, Saddle Creek, NJ. Peterson, M.P., 1999. Active legends in interactive cartographic animation. Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Sci. 13 (4), 375–383. Peterson, M.P. (Ed.), 2003. Maps and the Internet. Elsevier Press, Cambridge. Peterson, M.P., 2014. Mapping in the Cloud. Guilford Press, New York, NY. Peterson, M.P., Wendel, J., 2004. North American animated flight atlas. J. Maps 2007 (1–9), 98–106. Peterson, M.P., Wendel, J., 2006. Animated Atlas of Air Traffic over North America. University of Nebraska at Omaha, Cartography and GIS Lab, DVD, p. 65. Stuckey, O., 2016. A comparison of ArcGIS and QGIS for animation. Cartogr. Perspect. 85, 23–32. Thrower, N., 1959. Animated cartography. Prof. Geogr. 11 (6), 9–12. Thrower, N., 1961. Animated cartography in the United States. Int. Yearb. Cartogr. 1, 20–29. Tobler, W.R., 1970. A computer movie simulating urban growth in the Detroit region. Econ. Geogr. 46, 234–240.

Relevant Websites Website associated with Mapping in the Cloud (2014) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/. Animated Atlas: Air Traffic over North America https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCiiJGL3AIH7CcjdlKf359yQ.

Animations Invasion of Warsaw (QuickTime 10.4 MB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-1.mov. Diffusion of Irrigation in Nebraska Diffusion of Irrigation in Nebraska (QuickTime; 240 KB) http://maps.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 213.mov. 24-hours of Commercial Flight Traffic for the Atlanta Airport (AVI 12.8 MB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-2.avi. Grand Canyon Fly-through (QuickTime; 7.9MB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-4.mov. Nebraska Fly-through (QuickTime, 2.9 MB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-5.mov. Classification Animation depicting different methods of data classification (QuickTime; 33 KB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-6.mov. Generalization animation depicting different number of classes (QuickTime; 573 KB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 216.mov. Generalization animation with sound (QuickTime; 1.5 MB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-8.mov. Spatial trend animation of age groups in Omaha, Nebraska (QuickTime; 622 MB) http://maps.dsc.unomaha.edu/cloud/PowerPoints/Chapter_21_Animations/Animation 21-9.mov.

Cartographic Anxiety Chris Barrett, English Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The history of modern cartography’s development and promulgationdfrom the 15th Century start of the Cartographic Revolution to the present 21st Century second, digital Cartographic Revolutiondhas a twin shadow history of anxiety. Throughout the last several hundred years, maps and mapping have provoked fears, concerns, wariness, even anger. These “cartographic anxieties” include a matrix of unsettledness and skepticism about the project of mapping, the representational techniques involved, and the ethical stakes of maps’ uses. If maps are taken, in J.B. Harley and David Woodward’s capacious definition, to be “graphic representations that facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes, or events in the human world,” then maps’ ability to occasion upset is not surprising: as semiotic objects and artifacts of human endeavor, maps are subject to the same biases, errors, and machinations as any other cultural text, despite cartography’s associations with the empirical. Harley famously describes the “silences” and “secrets” within a map, urgingdas others, too, have done, including participants in the GIS and Society Initiativeda kind of critical reading that implicates the map in the systems of power it helps to instantiate, and the critical history of cartographic anxiety owes much to 20th-Century critiquesdespecially feminist and social science critiquesdof cartography as a discursive practice. Derek Gregory’s 1994 introduction of the term “cartographic anxiety” to geographical literature, as part of a challenge to objectivist narratives of cartography, foregrounds the representational and the territorial as the dual arenas of unease around maps and mapping. Cartographic anxieties pertain to both the making of cartographic materials, and to the disposition and dynamics of those materials in social contexts. While the term “cartographic anxieties” may be recent in scholarly conversations, articulated concerns about maps and mapping are not new. In his dedicatory epistle to his 1589 The Principall Nauigations, Voiages, and Discoueries of the English nation, which consolidates official and eyewitness reports of British voyages to spots around the world, Richard Hakluyt describes his first encounter with a map. The Principall Nauigations is full of nearly averted or sadly unaverted disasterdperhaps unsurprisingly so, given the peril of early modern maritime traveldand that sense of danger attaches even to the origins of the work. Hakluyt’s efforts began, he explains in his epistle, as the result of a serendipitous childhood visit his cousin’s office, where he found cosmographical texts, a world map, which his cousin showed him how to read, and a Bible open to Psalm 107, which describes the fates of those who go to sea amid harrowing tempests (verses 25–30) and bodies of water that turn to desert (verses 32–35). The coincidence of the map and the Psalm cause Hakluyt to resolve to dedicate himself to assembling and developing The Principall Nauigations. The map of the world impresses Hakluyt in part because of its proximity to the lyric precarity of Psalm 107: the wonders of the world come with their dangers, and the map seems to be part of those wondrous perils. In the centuries since Hakluyt’s visit to his cousin’s office, around the high-water mark of the Cartographic Revolution in England (around CE 1400–1650), the map and work of mapping have continued to accompany a set of anxietiesdthat is, a diffuse set of negative affective responses, felt by individuals but often palpable across communities, to the concepts, ideas, practices, or instantiations of maps and mapping. The worries, concerns, and even ire stoked by cartographic projects constitute an essential thread in the history of maps and mapping, and an essential element in understanding the ways cartographic materials participate in both professional and public discourses, in this or any period. From the Cartographic Revolution in Europe onward, both those professionally engaged in cartography and adjacent fields and lay consumers of cartographic materials have expressed a range of concerns about the workings of maps and the project of mapmaking. There might be said to be three loose categories of unease: concerns about the map’s military origins and association with state-based violence; anxieties about the map’s remarkable ability to advance the strategic programs it often instantiates; and worries about the map’s essential insufficiency as a representational medium that necessarily distorts the subjects of its representational efforts.

Cartographic Anxieties 1: The Map and Violence Historians of cartography have long observed that the impetus for the Cartographic Revolution came from the need for maximally precise topographical information in the era of cannon-based siege warfare. This arms race accompanied, in the 15th and 16th centuries, developments in mathematics and technologies (in trigonometry, for example, or copperplate engraving) that produced unprecedentedly precise maps. While these maps sustained many bureaucratic uses in the administration of increasingly centralized nation-states, the strategic uses of cartographic materials predominated. For this reason, maps, charts, and plots were both highly valued and kept close by the powerful. Spain’s Philip II ensured his extensive collection of maps of Iberia was secured at all times, and Elizabeth I of England’s Privy Council clerk Robert Beale urged that a secretary who acquires maps should be sure they “be kept safelie.” In this regard, the origins of the early modern map in military exigency parallels that of the 20th- and 21st -Century digital map. Although they were not widely available until the 2000s, civilian GPS applications were made possible by the launch in the 1980s of

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the US Department of Defense’s orbiting satellites, constituting the core of the GIS grid’s infrastructure. Yet, while few smartphone users meditate daily on the military genesis of their map apps, the association with maps and state or interstate violence in the early modern period was immensely well-known and widely attested. Both popular and professional texts of the 16th and 17th centuries remark the uses of the map for intelligence, surveillance, and campaign preparation. Indeed, the strategic uses of maps dominated their invocations in imaginative literature. Maps brought on stage in Shakespeare’s playsdfor example, in King Lear or Henry IV, Part 1dsignal simultaneously their use in the disposition of nations in, or soon to be, in armed conflict; and John Milton urges in “Of Education” (1644) that students study a suggestively grouped set of disciplines: “Fortification, Architecture, Enginry [military and arms technology], or Navigation.” Even Mercator’s Atlas, in its 1635 edition, recommends that the nobility study geography via cartographic “eye-travel” in order to prepare for “fortifying the Frontiers of their owne Territories, or the directing and conducting of any warlike expedition.” When John Ogilby in his preface to his road atlas of England (1675)dthe first of its kinddtrumpeted the volume’s usefulness, it was again in the language of intra- and inter-state conflict: having maps of the roads, he wrote, would help guarantee “against [both] Civil Dissention and Forein Invasion.” As well-known as the military applications of the map were, the association of mapping with surveillance proved similarly clear to both lay and professional users of cartographic materials. In John Norden’s (1618) Surveyor’s Dialogue, the surveyor responds to the concerns of a farmer, who, as a stand-in for tenant farmers of estates, resists the estate survey. The surveyor explains that only those engaged in illicit activity should be uncomfortable with being surveilled by a mapmaker; a margin note digests his explanation simply as, “The innocent need not feare to be looked into.” The map as avatar of a watching power was matter-of-fact knowledge. While the intensity of surveillance anxiety might vary among 21st Century map users, there are moments when the surveillance potential subtending geolocational tracking nonetheless provokes acute alarm. Consider a 2009 confrontation in England that began when Google dispatched one of its fleet of Street View Cars to take 360-degree photographs of the streets of the Broughton area of Milton Keynes. These streets were only a sliver of the more than five million miles of terrain over which Google has sent its specially equipped Street View Cars, with their signature roller-ball cameras mounted atop the automobiles’ roofs. The photographs taken by the cars are supposed to allow Google users to visually examine roadways, specific locations, built and natural landmarks, cultural venues, and other sites. By embedding the photographs within the Maps platform, Google allows users of its digital cartography to toggle between an aerial (and variably abstracted) view of the area, and a ground-hugging view of place. The global reach of the Google Street View, launched in 2007, is impressive: according to Google, areas on seven continents and in more than 50 countries have been so recorded. Even so, the technology giant’s initiative has provoked some concerns about privacy, leading to both legal challenges from local and national bodies, and some policy accommodations by Google. Neither these formal challenges nor the offering of an “opt-out” policy by Google, however, assuaged the concerns of the residents of Broughton in early April 2009. When the Google Street View Car turned onto a village street, angry residents moved into the road to block and halt the car’s movement, dismayed at what they described to journalists as the “invasion of privacy” and the “tremendous liberty” Google had taken in dispatching these vehicles. What unsettled the residents was not the making of the map itself, but rather the way a cartographic endeavor intersected withthe specter of surveillance. The intersection of Google Maps with the maintenance of private spaces provoked the residents’ dismay; the idea of the map infiltrated anxieties of intrusion (especially intrusiveness in the digital era), creating a backlash organized under the sign of the map. To return to the aftermath of the Cartographic Revolution, the understanding that a map often served as a technology of surveillance and military strategy manifested in much early modern colonizing strategy, too. It was, for example, a large part of the reason why the 16th- and 17th -Century Irish, contesting and fighting English colonial rule, sought to frustrate English mapping endeavors: to prevent a map was to interrupt military and governmental control. At the same time, the English insisted on the map as a way to impose a boundedness on the Irish territory, and by using the map to reify new toponyms that estranged the Irish from their topography, the English imagined the map as a means of subduing resistance.

Cartographic Anxieties 2: The Map as Dangerously Effective The map, as refined by the exigencies of an arms race and embraced by nation-states in more or less constant international conflict, was immensely valuable for strategic and military purposes. Yet the map was also associated, from the early modern period onward, with impressive efficacy in politics, commerce, and other large-scale endeavors. Relying necessarily on strategies of representation that hierarchize its subjectsdeven if implicitly, in the logic of center and margindand require principles of selectivity and exclusion, the map’s claims to unmediated empiricism can mask its makers’ interests and motives. The aesthetic appeal and apparent authority of the map can unsettle readers, in a variety of contexts. To use another example from 17th-Century England and Ireland, the making of the estate survey frequently provoked alarm and ire from tenant farmers, who came to know that the process of remapping an estate usually concluded with an increase in rents. Unscrupulous surveyors (suggestively called by Norden and others “intelligencers”) plied their trade, developing shoddy or conveniently inaccurate maps to those willing to pay; in this atmosphere of frequent corruption, widespread suspicion attached to the making of estate surveys and plots. Even so, maps have long proven to be immensely attractive to lay readers, even those not professional steeped in the mathematics and intricacies of map-making. In the last several decades, plenty of readers of National Geographic have plastered the monthly map included in each issue on their walls, just as in 1570 John Dee remarked that “some, to beautifie their Halls, Parlers,

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Chambers, Galeries, Studies, Libraries. loveth, gatteth and useth, Mappes, Chartes, and Geographicall Globes.” Given the dangers of international travel, the Renaissance atlas became a viable alternative to the travail of wandering overseas, and cartographic materials sometimes served as replacements for the places they represented. In commercial contexts, the map faced and continues to face its own swift obsolescence in the marketplace, despite the map’s received pretense of representing a geographical truth obtaining outside time. The 16th- and 17th-Century printed maps, charts, and globes were often superceded by more precise materials, updated with the reports of ships newly returning from voyages; and the printers of cartographic materials often sent blank sheets with ships’ navigators in order to acquire the more up-to-date coastal information. In the era of Google Maps and GPS-enabled navigation devices, updates are a constant necessity, as the nuance of place and location shifts almost daily. If the use value of a useable map is related to its recentness and accuracy, then the susceptibility of the map to developing error over time is an integral part of its naturedsomething everyone knows if they have shoved a dusty globe bearing the country name “United Soviet Socialist Republic” into an attic corner. The anxiety that attaches to the map’s susceptibility to obsolescence is palpable, too, in the frustration of a smartphone user whose navigation application directs her to turn the wrong way down a newly one-way street. The artifice of a temporality that lends the map part of its authority also ensures its imminent or ultimate failure. Even maps that update in real timedopen source or other publicly available mapping platforms, for exampledstill provoke worry, trading the anxiety of obsolescence for the anxiety of more intensive surveillance. Increasingly, the era of GIS has expanded the sense of a map’s effectivenessdsometimes into legal gray areas. For example, the ability of GIS-enabled map interfaces not only to identify and represent the location of the user in the mapped area, but also to track and store those data, has occasioned profound scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court has heard multiple cases involving the status of such locational data with regard to protection from warrantless search or collection. Meanwhile, for those in geospatial information services, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (2018) poses new challenges, since compliance can involve ensuring that the collection and use of locational datadincluding that from mobile applicationsddoes not compromise the privacy of individuals. The regulations and laws (if they exist) pertaining to inhabitants’ locational data vary widely among countries, but the radical efficiency of map applications in producing maps of their users’ movements has heightened the popular sense of the map as wondrously effective, for better or for worse.

Cartographic Anxieties 3: The Map’s Enabling Distortions Though the map often evinces the appearance of immediacydso much so that a person can point to a spot on the surface of a map and declare with no explicit sense of speaking figuratively, “We are here”dit is itself a highly mediated representation, relying on any of a set of strategies of abstraction and description for accomplishing its labor. The necessity and subtlety of these strategies, which are so easily naturalized, inspire a number of cartographic anxieties: the nature of a map is, from its start, that of enabling distortion of its subject. As Umberto Eco’s famous story, “On the Impossibility of Drawing a Map of the Empire on a Scale of 1 to 1” suggests, any map relies on its ability to deform its subject in order to represent its constituent spatial relationships. The qualities of that generative deformation can provoke concern. For example, the map as refined in the Cartographic Revolution relies on a representational protocol that can be described as being either one of substitution or one of selection. As a substitutionary endeavor, the map swaps one thing for another: scale for distance, toponym for place. The act of this substitution makes the map essentially a metaphor that offers cartographic sign for signified place. This rhetorical figurative quality of the map, however, runs the risk of abstracting a place in ways that elide the lived concerns of its inhabitants. It is worth noting that few maps contain any trace of the embodied movements through their subject spaces that in fact produced the on-the-ground data needed to formulate the map itself. The map qua substitutionary representation conceptualizes its subject, draining it of its living constituents. If, on the other hand, one imagines the golden age of cartography to have produced map-making by a protocol of selection, then the map proceeds to being by including or excluding elements in order to produce a legible representation of its subject area. Miles get subtracted away until only inches remain; or mountains and trees and persons are subtracted away until only lines or blank spaces persist. This selectivity suggests the loss of content more directly than substitution, but the effects of both protocols are similar: the map becomes a symbolic expression, a discursive object subject (whether consciously or otherwise) to the biases, strategic pressures, and cultural contexts of its makers. The map, then, as discursive object, advances an unavoidably political or governmental programdif, certainly, to different degrees of emphasis and interestedness. Numerous scholars of the map have noted its plasticity as persuasive, coercive, or even propagandistic document, and over the centuries, the map has done national, territorial, and political work, among other programs it has advanced or challenged. The starkness of the map’s rhetoricity is visible, for example, in a comparison of a Mercator projection map of the world (which orients North at the top of the frame and centers Europe in the viewer’s field of vision, distorting sizes and shapes of subject landmasses, especially Greenland and Antarctica) and Buckminster Fuller’s Dymaxion map (which minimizes distortion of landmass size and shape while representing all the earth’s continents as more or less one continuous thread of land amid one encompassing ocean). These projections posit radically different views of the relative distinctiveness and isolation of the planet’s human-inhabited regions. The map’s nature as a discursive object, coupled with its tendency to conceal its strategies of artifice, make it a particularly contentious document in the context of regional, national, and international disputes over spaces. In these contextsdand especially those involving belligerence or aggression, or incursion across previously assessed bordersdthe map is often imagined as an arbiter of

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truth, even while the map’s essential nature is of embeddness in discursive practices. Because the metonymic work of the map can be immensely compelling, national leaders might articulate anxiety about a map’s changeability, by way of articulating concern about the internal or external pressures on the nation’s concept of its constituencies or geodetic shape. In that the map seeks to representdvia necessarily distorting strategies of legibilitydthe location of borders, boundaries, and limits, the parties invested in the phenomena of administration will certainly be exercised over the drawing of those maps. The process by which the borders of South Sudan were introduced to the world map offers one example of how the map is often centered in discussions of sovereignty and national boundary, but so too is the intense fight over the redistricting of United States Congressional districts. A work of sophisticated and nuanced representation, the map is often a contested text in debates about political representation itself. While (or in some cases, because) the map so often appears as an ostensible site of political representational anxiety, it also often functions as a site of generative creative endeavor seeking to exploit its vexed relationship to the experience of its subject by redefining the work of cartographic representation itself. Numerous writers, journalists, and artists have sought to explore the map’s capacity to reveal and conceal, to select and center, to exclude and marginalizedand often these innovations of map work in the aesthetic realm rely on some sense of anxiety, however productive, about the principles of making the world cartographically legible.

See Also: Critical Cartography; Digital Geohumanities; Digital Inequalities; Digital Feminism; Ethical Issues in Research; History of Geography.

Further Reading Barrett, C., 2018. Early Modern English Literature and the Poetics of Cartographic Anxiety. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Billé, F., 2016. Introduction to "cartographic anxieties.” CrossCurrents: East Asian History Culture Rev. E-J. 21. http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-21. Buisseret, D., 1992. Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Gordon, A., Klein, B. (Eds.), 2001. Literature, Mapping, and the Politics of Space in Early Modern Britain. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Gregory, D., 1994. Geographical Imaginations. Blackwell, Cambridge. Harley, J.B., 1988. Silences and secrecy: the hidden agenda of cartography in early modern Europe. Imago Mundi 40, 57–76. Harley, J.B., Woodward, D., 1987. Preface. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), The History of Cartography, vol. 1. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. xv–xxi. Harmon, K., 2009. The Map as Art: Contemporary Artists Explore Cartography. Princeton Architectural Press, New York. Helgerson, R., 1992. Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Krishna, S., 1994. Cartographic anxiety: mapping the body politic in India. Altern. Glob. Local, Polit. 19 (4), 507–521. Marchitello, H., 1994. Political maps: the production of cartography and chorography in early modern England. In: Ezell, M.J.M., O’Keeffe, K.O’Brien (Eds.), Cultural Artifacts and the Production of Meaning: The Page, the Image, and the Body. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Monmonier, M., 1991. How to Lie with Maps. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Paglen, T., 2009. Blank Spots on the Map: The Dark Geography of the Pentagon’s Secret World. Penguin, New York. Painted, J., 2008. Cartographic anxiety and the search for regionality. Environ. Plan. 40, 342–361. Rose, G., 1993. Feminism & Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Ryan, M.-L., Foote, K., Azaryahu, M., 2016. Narrating Space/Spatializing Narrative: Where Narrative Theory and Geography Meet. The Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH.

Relevant Websites “Early English Books Online” https://eebo.chadwyck.com/home. “European Union General Data Protection Regulation” https://eugdpr.org/. “Google Street View” www.google.com/streetview/.

Cartographic Symbolism and Iconography Mark Denil, sui generis, Washington, DC, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Connotation Associations evoked by a sign beyond its denotation or literal meaning. Conventional signs Something considered able to stand for something other than itself by virtue of its place in a convention of meaning. Denotation A sign’s primary meaning, independent of any associations of secondary meanings. Depiction A form of mimesis or imitation relying upon visual resemblance of some aspect of an object. Generalization A process wherein more detailed information is made understandable by elimination or modification of aspects of its representation while maintaining the aspects of its character considered significant. Gestalt psychology The study of phenomena concerning the visual field. Gestalt A conceptual resolution or intellectual organization derived from the perceived interaction of elements in a visual field. Graphic (axis) The axis of a triadic model of map symbol typology tending toward nonlinguistic abstraction in representation of the object in question. Graphic redundancy A means of ensuring that different map symbols can be received as different by variation in two or more aspects of the symbol. Iconography A set of specified or traditional symbolic forms associated with a subject or theme. Interpretant A code or convention of understanding brought to a potential sign by the reader. Interpretive community Description of a group sharing one or more conventions of understanding. Linguistic (axis) The axis of a triadic model of map symbol typology tending toward specific verbal or written names for the objects represented. Mimetic (axis) The axis of a triadic model of map symbol typology tending toward depiction of some (often visual) aspect of the object represented. Praxis Issues concerned with the practice of theory. Qualitative Differences in kind. Quantitative Differences in amount or value. Representamen The physically present trace of the sign. It represents the object through the working of the interpretant. Representation The act of standing in for something else; another object or concept. Semiology The science of the signs (Saussurean school); see Semiotics. Semiosis The process wherein a sign acquires meaning. Semiotics The science of the signs (Peircian school); see Semiology. Signified The part of the sign which is represented. Signifier The part of the sign which is present. Symbolism The use of signs to represent features on a map. Syntagm The composed statement made up of constituent signs; the map as an argument.

A map is a mediation between some situation, relationship, or condition and a user who is able to interpret that mediation. A map is a sign. It is constructed of constituent signs that are composed to persuade the map user of its capacity to represent something other than itself. As with any sign, there is nothing inherent in the map itself which holds meaning. Meaning is something that can only reside in the perceived relationship of the sign with some external concept that is accessible through a paradigm or system of understanding. These systems can be thought of as languages, as they utilize vocabularies, grammars, and canons of conventional usage. Potential users bring a system of their choice to the potential map and judge the potential map’s fitness for recognition as a map. Should it qualify, users then read meaning into it. If the users are satisfied with the validity of the reading they have made, they declare the artifact to be a good map. The map mediates between a territory, situation, relationship, or condition on the one side and a user on the other. It does so by standing in for that territory, that is, by representing it to that user in some limited way. The map is not the territory, but instead it persuasively suggests some aspect of the territory in a useful and usable manner. The map allows and facilitates a broad conceptual grasp of the territory by reducing that territory to an abstraction and presenting it as a configuration of categorized and conventionalized signs. A map is not a reconstruction of its represented territory in all specific detail. It is instead a selected, generalized, rhetorical presentation of one way of conceptualizing that territory. The map’s argument hides some specificities and submerges others in

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generalities while preserving or making explicit still others. The abstract map symbols function in much the same way that algebraic symbols abstract a mathematical equation from the specific to the general, but, obviously, not to the same extent. Our understanding of how map symbols function and acquire meaning derives from the science of signs, which is variously known as semiotics or semiology. The use of two terms for this science arises from the originally independent development of the two main schools of thought about sign function. The latter school derives from the teachings of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure while the former refers to the system developed by the American polymath, physicist, philosopher, and geodesist Charles Sanders Peirce. Each school is grounded in a different model of sign relationship, and each model is useful and informative. The Saussurean model of semiology views the sign as a two-part entity consisting of a signifier and a signified with an essentially arbitrary relationship between the parts (Fig. 1). The signifier is the part that is present: for example, the letters C, U, and P, written on a paper. The signified is the concept of cupness that groups together everything that might be thought of as having some cup-like quality. It is the structure of the language or code system that permits the linking of the two factors (the combination of letters and the concept). This sign is then available to take part in a further act of semiosis; that is to say, it can itself become the signified of a new signifier–signified pair (a new sign). The semiological model clearly displays this mechanism of progressive construction of meaning. For example, a stylized rendering on a signboard might be recognized as denoting a cup, while a sign of a cup can connote a cafe, and a cafe can connote the presence of a restroom facilitydit is likely that one is to be found nearby. Each reading builds on the previous one. Similarly, in the semiological system of typography, letterforms are a medium for signifying components of an alphabet, which in turn is used to signify written words. Writing is a language signifying elements in another language (a spoken one). Thus, semiosis occurs not only at the elemental level, but at a systemic one as well. The Peircian semiotic model is triadic. It consists of an object (the thing signified); a representamen (that which is present); and the interpretant (the code that provides the link) (Fig. 2). The utility of this model is that it allows a switching of interpretant; it shows how a sign can take on various meanings dependent upon context, expectation, and/or user experience. This is important because the interpreter (the reader, viewer, or hearer) brings the interpretant or code to the semiotic, and that interpretant or code may or may not bear any resemblance to the interpretant the author expected. Without an interpretant, the object and representamen have no relationship and the representamen would not be recognizable as a sign: It would not, in fact, be a sign. With an

Figure 1 The Saussurean model of semiology views the sign a two-part entity with an arbitrary relationship between the parts. The signifier is the part present, and this is linked to a signified object, concept, or sign. The resulting sign is then available to take part in a further act of semiosis by itself becoming the signified of a new signifier–signified pair (a new sign).

Figure 2 The triadic Peircian semiotic model consists of an object (the thing signified), a representamen (that which is present), and the interpretant (the code which provides the link). It is the interpretant that gives meaning to the representamen. It allows one to leap from the representamen to a signified object. The object (and thus the meaning of the sign) is negotiated between the representamen provided by the message composer (map maker) and the interpretant brought by the reader (map user).

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unexpected interpretant, the representamen may be taken as a sign for some quite unintended object. This model demonstrates quite clearly that the representamen (be it a text, a map symbol, or whatever) is not a self-contained repository of meaning, but rather, that meaning is negotiated each time the sign is read. Herein lies an issue at the heart of all symbolization and iconography: How can the understanding of a sign be assured, or at least anticipated? If interpretants can be chosen or switched, or if they are, in any event, brought to the sign by the interpreter, how is it that reading or interpretation is not wholly idiosyncratic and individual? It is not idiosyncratic because readers are not autonomous and unconstrained; rather, a reader is created by the interpretive community to which the reader belongs. In fact, what allows someone to exist as a reader is membership in at least one community for which a given representamen exists as a possible sign (with denotations and connotations). An analogy might be drawn to a global positioning system (GPS) receiver: The device recognizes a particular signal pattern from a satellite; it picks that signal pattern out of the background of electromagnetic noise (most of which is meaningless) because it accepts that signal pattern as a possible legitimate and meaning-bearing one. Once the pattern has been recognized by the device as being among a vocabulary of legitimate patterns, it is read as meaning, “I am this satellite.” Another satellite, perhaps one from a different system and that emitted a different pattern, would not be recognized as bearing a legitimate meaning. Conversely, the GPS would assume that a legitimate pattern received from an entirely different source would be the satellite for which it was listening. It is (for the purposes of this analogy) membership in the interpretive community of devices that can recognize the signals of legitimate GPS satellites that define the GPS receiver. A text like Joyce’s Finnegans Wake is considered difficult because it requires a reader with access to a tremendously wide and varied set of interpretants. To begin to make sense of the text, the reader must be conversant with the usages of a large number of interpretive communities. The reader must apply several interpretants and recognize interplay between the codes, as well as entertain a wider than normal range of possible interpretations. Thus it can be seen that a map, as both a sign itself and an assemblage of constituent signs, must exploit interpretant paradigms that its target interpretive communities accept as natural and legitimate or it must provide independent access to the interpretant paradigms utilized in its composition. Normally, it is through a legend, key, or list of conventional signs that a map makes explicit its symbolization scheme. Often a legend on a map will be incomplete in that it is restricted to signs that are deemed especially significant to the theme of the map, or that outline a specific hierarchy, or both. Generally speaking, the more complete a legend provided on the map itself, the less the map users or readers are required to rely upon their own expectations and assumptions. The legend, therefore, is an important feature affording access to the map. Some map user communities (by definition, a type of interpretive community) have conventionalized forms, formats, symbolization regimes, etc., that serve to both define and make usable maps for that community. Competitive orienteering maps, geological maps, and marine navigation charts are three instances of highly conventionalized maps. Often the conventions for such maps are so standardized and ubiquitous that understanding is assumed; in these cases, if a legend is published at all, it is often as a separate document altogether.

Mechanics of Symbolization As mentioned above, symbolization is one of the mechanisms of generalization, although, in effect, all generalization can also be seen as a process of symbolization. This is so because generalization is a process where one representation is made to stand in not only for the configuration of the feature but also, possibly, for another representation. It is the substitution of a sign for some aspect of a feature or of another sign. All maps require some form of generalization/symbolization; it is one of the primary means of directing and focusing attention upon aspects deemed important by the map’s rhetorical argument and of rendering transparent or invisible aspects or features deemed to be extraneous. The mechanics of perception and understanding of map symbolization may be understood by application of the tenets of Gestalt psychology, or the psychology of form. Factors such as proximity, similarity, figural stability, good continuation, closure, and others make up the Gestalt laws of organization in perceptual forms. These laws explain how individual symbols are perceived on the page and how they are perceived to interact with and among other symbols. While scientific understanding of the mechanics of perception has moved beyond the relatively basic Gestalt laws, it is still useful to conceptualize the visual field as governed by these rules. It is the gestalt of the image that, for instance, allows the individual marks that make up a dashed or dotted line to be understood as a single continuous entity. It is, as well, the gestalt that establishes the figure–ground relationship in the map image and permits multiple visual levels to develop, thus facilitating the reading of multiple intersecting configurations of symbolized features (Fig. 3). An important distinction is that between representation and depiction. Depiction is simply one dimension or possible means of representation. A photo or sketch may depict a feature more or less realistically, and the depiction can be used to represent the feature; however, the two activities are fundamentally different. A drawing depicting the Brandenburg Gate may, depending upon the context, represent an urban space, German imperialism, postwar politics, or contemporary German reunification. It might also be intended or interpreted as representing a landmark or tourist destination. In any event, while it depicts the Brandenburg Gate, context and the applied interpretant paradigm governs what it may or may not represent. It is useful to conceptualize a triadic model of symbolization. The three axes of such a model would be the mimetic, the linguistic, and the graphic. The extreme of the mimetic axis would be a realistic rendering, while at the linguistic extreme would be a name. The graphic apex would be a geometric shape, pattern, or color tone. As one moves away from the mimetic pole

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Figure 3

An illustration of some of the basic Gestalt laws.

Figure 4

An example of various possible symbols for Washington, DC plotted on a triadic symbolization model.

and toward the linguistic and/or the graphic, the symbol becomes more abstract. Away from the graphic pole, the symbol becomes more specific. The power of naming that is available at the linguistic axis facilitates context, nuance, and allusion that is not available at the other poles (Fig. 4). Taking Washington, DC as an example: The rendering of the US Capitol dome would be a mimetic symbol; the label “Washington, DC” would be a linguistic symbol; and a circled star would be a graphic symbol. A tinted area (mimicking either the political or urban area of the city) would fall somewhere between the graphic and mimetic poles, with some edging toward the linguistic. Normally, some combination of symbol type is used: a labeled dot, for instance. Such graphic redundancy multiplies the accessibility of the symbols.

Praxis of Symbolization A vocabulary of symbols and a grammar for their use help to ensure that the propositions encoded on the map through the symbolization of information are interpreted in a manner consistent with the intentions of mapmaker. A vocabulary establishes the paradigm of meaningful representamen from which to make a selection. It is, in effect, a dictionary of possible meanings. A grammar governs the acceptable proper idiomatic usage to help allow orthodox interpretation. At the most basic level, map symbols are used to represent both locatable features and their specific attributes. Representation of these features falls generally into three types: points, lines, and areas. The attributes may be qualitative or quantitative, or a combination thereof. Point features are those that are locatable on the map (at that map’s scale) as a single location, or as a constellation of individual or representative locations. A series of connected points defines a line feature. The phenomena, described by the line, are usually assumed to exist equally at all locations along the line. An area is defined by a closed line: the enclosed zone is the representation of the extent of the phenomena. Volumes can also be shown, but except in three-dimensional models, volume depiction relies on perspective and perceptual conventions, the understanding of which may or may not be problematic. The differentiable aspects of the map symbols can be categorized as symbol variables. The basic dimensions are location, size, value, texture, color (value, saturation, and hue), orientation, shape, pattern, and the tripartite element of clarity (composed of the three dimensions of crispness, resolution, and transparency). Some types of symbols are well matched to some types of data but awkward or even wholly unsuitable for others. The accompanying tables may be of assistance: Derived from MacEachren, they outline some example symbol variables and suggest a grammar of usage (Figs. 5 and 6).

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Figure 5

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A basic vocabulary of graphic symbol variables.

Many factors govern the selection of the symbol type that is most appropriate for a particular use. These include map scale, the availability of graphic variables (such as color), and the representations used for other map information. In some cases, a point symbol may be chosen to stand for an area, or an area may be defined by use of a representation of its boundary (a line feature) alone. Many times, text alone may be used to identify an area, especially if that area has no definite or uncontested boundary. An example would be a mountain range, or an archipelago, where in fact the actual edge of the area is not significant or decidable in all instances. Identification of the attribute upon which to base the representation is integral to symbol selection. As mentioned above, the attributes selected may be qualitative, quantitative, or a combination of both. Similarities between features are usually indicated by similarities in the feature symbolization, and vice versa. Qualitative differences are usually represented by qualitative differences in the symbols employed. Similarly, quantitative differences between similar features are achieved through variations in quantitative aspects of similar symbols. A symbolized road, for example, has its physical linearity represented by the employment of a line symbol; however, other qualitative attributes may be indicated by the exact specification of the line used. A particular road may be classified, for example, by surface type, traffic type, one- or two-way traffic, and access restrictions. These various classes may be symbolized using different color hues, line weights, or complexities. These qualitative differences can be incorporated into a qualitative hierarchy of road types and thus indicate information important to navigation of the road network. Roads in a network may also, or alternately, be classed by quantitative attributes, for instance, traffic capacity or demand. Quantitative differences in a line symbol may be expressed by line weight or color value, and are amenable, by their very quantitative nature, to being incorporated into hierarchies of their own. One of the most critical issues in establishing a symbol set for a particular map is that of differentiability and associativity: the ease with which differences and similarities can be seenddifferent things must look unambiguously different

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Figure 6

A basic grammar for the use of graphic symbol variables.

and related things must look clearly similar. In both cases, this is accomplished by manipulation of significant differences between symbols. Conversely, it is important to avoid gratuitous variation, that is, differences between symbols that do not carry symbolic significance but can distract from interpretation. Many factors can affect what qualifies a difference as significant or perceivable. Differences between shades of color that may seem obvious in large adjacent patches can become problematically differentiable in small patches, especially if they are widely separated on a map. The same concerns apply to small, iconic point symbols, or other types of related signs. As the symbol size decreases, and as symbols appear more widely separated on the map, more significance is required in their differences. The factor of graphic redundancy can be a key in overcoming problems of this sort. By altering two variables, the symbol is more easily seen as different and by altering only one of two symbol variables a relationship of similarity is implied. Without doubt, the most critical practical aspect of symbolization is ensuring that the code system is accessible to the map user. As has been mentioned above, it is possible for a potential user to bring almost any interpretant to the map: Without guidance, the map user’s interpretation cannot necessarily be anticipated, let alone guaranteed. Provision of a key or legend that explicates the conventional signs employed on the map is, therefore, of great importance. Whatever form the legend takes, it can only aspire to narrow the range of possible user interpretation by making explicit the forms of expression employed on the map. Legends or keys can take a variety of forms. In a list, map symbols are directly paired with definitions, and hierarchies are set out in order. A list can be quite efficient and compact, although abstraction of individual symbols from the general map context to the neutral ground of the key may interfere with identification (Fig. 7). Sometimes, this problem is addressed by the use of a so-called natural legend, or sample map: a small section of map containing examples of all the symbols used on the map, with each symbolized feature labeled. Although a small section of the actual map itself may be used for this purpose, it is relatively seldom that any conveniently sized section of the map actually contains all the required features. More often, an idealized sample is created for use as a key. It is also possible to create legends that are intermediate between the neutral list and the natural sample map. These bring a ground that mimics the map context into the list (Fig. 8). It is very desirable that all symbols appear in a legend exactly as they appear on the map, including the exact same symbol size, color, and orientation. Occasionally, production or design constraints can make this impossible, but every effort should be made to allow as little difference between the symbols as shown on the map and in the legend. Introduction of random variations into the symbol vocabulary key is counter to the rationale for the existence of the key.

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Figure 7 A list type map legend. Préfecture de Boké dans le nord-ouest de la Guinée. From Wright, H.E., McCullough, J.N., Diallo, M.S. (Eds.), 2006. A rapid biological assessment of the Boké Prefecture, Northwestern Guinea. RAP Bulletin of Biological Assessment 41. Conservation International, Washington, DC, p. 13.

Figure 8 A natural map legend. AquaRAP Caura River Watershed: State of Bolivar, Venezuela. From Chernoff, B., Machado-Allison, A., Riseng, K., Montambault, J.R. (Eds.), 2003. A Biological Assessment of the Aquatic Ecosystems of the Caura River Basin, Bolivar State, Venezuela. RAP Bulletin of Biological Assessment 28. Conservation International, Washington, DC.

Maps and Map Language Cartographic symbolism and iconography has been explained above as the application of a code system (something commonly understood as a graphic and/or verbal language) to a set of signs in order to imbue them with meaning. The language is applied by both the mapmaker in preparing the map and the map user in reading it. It is important to keep a clear conceptual distinction between the system(s) of meaning (languages) utilized or leveraged by maps and the body of works (the individual maps) that take on meaning when interpreted through one or another of these systems. This distinction has not always been well understood, and has at times contributed to debate in the cartographic literature. Since the 1970s, there has been a good deal written about “map language” or “maps as language,” with much of this discussion utilizing an essentially mechanistic flow model of communication first developed during the late 1940s. Although some authors (e.g., Tomás Kolácný) produced very complex diagrammatic elaborations on that basic theme, most working cartographers found the models to be of little utility. This is because mechanical models deal with physical aspects of mapmakingddata collection, map production, and such likedaspects not much related to the dynamics of human communication. Similarly, the occasionally recurring interest of some cartographic writers in the structure and mechanics of the eye is also of marginal utility. The eye is the tool of vision, but the eye has evolved to facilitate vision; vision did not evolve to make use of the eye. Yet other writers (e.g., J. Brian Harley) attempted to draw on research in the linguistic, semiotic, and/or psychological fields in order to account for the multifaceted nature of cartographic practice. These borrowings, however, often met with resistance. For

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example, in discussing linguistic theory as applied to cartography in 1976, Arthur Robinson and Barbara Petchenik were so distracted by superficial differences between verbal texts and graphic texts that they were unable to grasp the essential identicality of all semiotic activity. They were thus forced to reject parallels to language and, instead, to claim special powers for what they termed “mapping communication” in order to set it apart from other reading. On the other hand, in 1984, C. Grant Head usefully proposed that viewing cartography as a natural language should provide a model that could better focus attention on understanding map communication, and suggest methodologies for studying it. However, a pertinent critique of that work from a semiotic standpoint authored by Hansgeorg Schlichtmann showed that Head’s proposal did not go far enough. Certainly, the code systems leveraged by maps can be thought of as languages (because they in fact are languages, usually graphic languages), as has been mentioned above. We also know that meaning is not resident in the map; the map is made up only of signs, which must be interpreted through a language. This is because language/code systems are the only systems through which meaning is possible. A code system through which an artifact can be interpreted as a map can be termed a map language. Obviously, there can be no one “map language.” Map languages are cultural artifacts, and although various systems of understanding can inform and influence each other, it is entirely possible that a map that is recognizable through the aegis of one system may be nonsensical under another. Although a cartographer can provide a legend or key to a map (to suggest a system for reading and understanding), it is still up to the user to choose and apply a system. The artifact, composed of signs which can potentially be read and interpreted as comprising a map, is presented to a potential map user. It is up to that potential user to select and apply an interpretant (also called a code system or language) in order to generate meanings they can ascribe to the artifact: in order, that is, to make the artifact a map and make themselves map readers.

See Also: Map Interactivity; Mapping, Philosophy; Maps; Qualitative Spatial Reasoning; Symbolic Interactionism.

Further Reading Belbin, J., 1996. Gestalt theory applied to cartographic text. In: Wood, C.H., Keller, C.P. (Eds.), Cartographic Design: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives. Wiley, Chichester, pp. 253–269. Bertin, J., 1983. Semiology of Graphics. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI. Caivano, J.L., 1990. Visual texture as a semiotic system. Semiotica 80 (3/4), 239–252. Campbell, J., 1993. Map Use and Analysis, second ed. Wm. C. Brown, Dubuque, IA. Chernoff, B., Machado-Allison, A., Riseng, K., Montambault, J.R. (Eds.), 2003. A Biological Assessment of the Aquatic Ecosystems of the Caura River Basin, Bolivar State, Venezuela. RAP Bulletin of Biological Assessment 28. Conservation International, Washington, DC, p. 17. Denil, M., 2003. Cartographic design: rhetoric and persuasion. Cartogr. Perspect. 45, 8–67. Foucault, M., 1983. This Is Not a Pipe. University of California Press, Berkeley. Harley, J.B., 2001. In: Laxton, P. (Ed.), The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Head, C.G., 1984. The map as natural language: a paradigm for understanding. Cartographica 21 (1), 1–32. Monograph 31. Hoffman, D.D., 1998. Visual Intelligence: How We Create what We See. W.W. Norton, New York. Imhof, E., 1975. Positioning names on maps. Translated by G.F. McCleary Am. Cartogr. 2 (2). Jacob, C., 2006. Translated by T. Conley. In: Dahl, E. (Ed.), The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography throughout History. University of Chicago, Chicago. Kolácný, A., 1977. Cartographic information – a fundamental concept and term in modern cartography. Cartographica 14 (Suppl. 1), 39–45. Monograph 19. Lupton, E., Miller, A.J., 1996. Design Writing Research. Princetown Architectural Press, New York. MacEachren, A.M., 1995. How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design. Guilford Press, New York. McCloud, S., 1994. Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art. Harper Collins, New York. Robinson, A., Petchenik, B., 1976. The Nature of Maps: Essays toward Understanding Maps and Mapping. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Rock, I., Palmer, S., 1990. The legacy of Gestalt psychology. Sci. Am. 263 (6), 84–90. Schlicthtmann, H., 1984. Discussion of C. Grant Head ‘The map as natural language: a paradigm for understanding’. Cartographica 21 (1), 33–36. Monograph 31. Wood, D., Fels, J., 1986. Designs on signs: myth and meaning in maps. Cartographica 23 (3), 54–103. Wright, H.E., McCullough, J., Diallo, M.S., 2006. In: A rapid biological assessment of the Boké Prefecture, Northwestern Guinea. RAP Bulletin of Biological Assessment 41. Conservation International, Washington, DC, p. 13.

Cartography in Islamic Societies S Brentjes, Univeristy of Sevilla, Sevilla, Spain © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 1, pp. 414–427, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Al-Baḥr al-Muḥ
ıṭ The Encompassing Sea. Barzakh A small, narrow land barrier that separates the two main oceans of the maps, that is, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The main Quranic meaning of barzakh is, however, not geographical, but eschatological. It denotes the life of the soul after the death of the body until the Day of Judgment. D
ar al-fun
un House of the Disciplines/Sciences/Arts, new school of higher education for the Qajar army and administration, founded in 1851; taught European military methods, theories, technologies, sciences including geography and cartography, and languages. Ḥad
ıth A body of religious teachings about what the Prophet and his companions had said and done. Ḥud
ud Boundaries, the word has also other meanings such as definitions. Isolarii Books about islands, produced in Italy. Mi‘r
aj Ascent to the heavens. Mount Q
af Often drawn on world maps around the Encompassing Sea; this is derived from an interpretation of Sura 1.1 according to which God created a mountain chain at the edge of the earth out of a single green emerald. This chain is called Mṭ Q
af. Qibla Indicates direction toward Mecca, hence prayer direction, also direction regulating other social activities such as the way in which a dead body is laid to rest. S
ıl
a Island Korea. ‘Ilm al-hay’a Mathematical cosmography.

In Islamic societies, cartographic activities were part of courtly patronage and diplomatic exchange, educational literacy and scientific study, religious rituals and reminiscence, entertainment and the arts, and to some extent of war, seafaring, and administration. Many of the extant cartographic products are parts of manuscripts. Words, narratives, numbers, tables, and geometrical figures organize, structure, delineate, and interpret them. Books with maps form several topical categories as well as genres. They include cosmography, astronomy, history, and geography on the one hand and pilgrimage books, encyclopedias, dictionaries, and miscellanies on the other. The most important types of cartographic products are world maps, regional maps of the Islamic world, and maps and diagrams of the prayer directions, the Qibla. The first printed maps appeared in the early 18th Century in Istanbul, first as single-sheet maps, but quickly followed as parts of a book on the Old and the New World, that is, Ḥajj
ı Khal
ıfa’s (d. 1067 h/1657) Cih
annüm
a (version II). These printed maps adopted and adapted certain cartographic conventions, methods, and fields of interest that dominated cartography in early modern Catholic and Protestant societies in Europe. This was, however, neither the first nor the last encounter between the various cartographic traditions and practices as pursued in various societies around the Mediterranean basin. The length and depth of the history of these cross-cultural encounters render the notion of a history of cartography in welldefined geographical and cultural spaces that formed separate entities difficult to sustain. Cartographic products independent of manuscripts or printed books appeared primarily in cultural fields outside the sphere of education and knowledge production. Navigation, war, water administration, architecture, landscape design, religious ritual, and gift giving were such domains where self-contained cartographic products are known to have existed in several Islamic societies or are preserved in libraries, museums, and collections across the world. Military maps gained increasing importance during the 19th Century. In the 20th Century, private and state institutions for cartography and surveying were founded in Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries. They produced a broad variety of thematic maps, among them street maps, historical maps, meteorological maps, geological maps, and maps for tourism. These new cartographic products were supported by new methods and techniques of surveying, displaying, researching, measuring, and representing.

Cultures of Mapmaking Mapmaking in Islamic societies took its themes, methods, techniques, and formats from several societies that either existed before the emergence of Islamic societies or parallel to them. The regions where these societies flourished were Greece, Egypt, Iran, India,

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China, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and France. With the shifts and changes in Europe since the 16th Century, further European societies became relevant to cartographic activities in various Islamic societies, among them Russia, German countries, and Great Britain. The two earliest appropriations of cartographic products and practices from other cultures, which shaped mapmaking in Islamic societies for more than 500 years, occurred during the 8th and 9th centuries in Abbasid Baghdad and other regions of the empire. One of the two cross-cultural encounters is represented through the translations of Ptolemy’s Geography into Arabic during the 9th Century and their subsequent appropriation and adaptation to the interests of scholars. These translations were made in the circle of the Abbasid courtier and son of the Arab governor of Kufa, the philosopher Ab
u Y
usuf Ya‘q
ub b. Isḥ
aq al-Kind
ı (d. c. 260 h/874), and the Sabean moneylender, mathematician, astronomer, philosopher, and theologian Th
abit b. Qurra (d. 288 h/901). The other encounter had its basis in a series of maps of possibly Sasanian origin that were reproduced in Arabic, although it is unclear when this took place. These maps were adapted during the 9th and 10th centuries to the new political and religious powers and structures in Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, and Northern Africa. Step by step, the original set of maps was enriched by maps of new regions of the Islamic world and accompanied by descriptions of the mapped territories and their cultures. The two encounters led to different views on how to organize and represent the world and its parts. Maps in the tradition of Ptolemy’s Geography worked with projections, latitudes and longitudes, grids, occasionally scales, and the theory of astronomically defined climates, mostly seven in number. They often contain short references to uninhabitable parts of the earth due to excessive cold or heat derived from Aristotelian physics and meteorology. The geographical space represented in such maps was first and foremost the entire world. It was mapped as a sphere or as a semisphere. Over time, such world maps focused more and more on the Islamic world. But certain regions of the world outside of Islamic societies continued to be reported about such as China,  Sri Lanka, Byzantium, or the land of the Slaves. In addition to the world maps, maps of oceans, seas, rivers, and islands are extant from this cartographic encounter. These local maps show clear non-Ptolemaic features. They may be the result of the mapmakers’ efforts to translate textual and oral geographic information into images. The people involved in this cartographic tradition were primarily scholars of the mathematical sciences which comprised in Islamic societies in continuation of earlier Greek models number theory, geometry, theory of proportions, and astronomy. The most important representatives of this tradition in Islamic societies were the lost maps produced in the early 9th Century for the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’m
un (r. 198–218 h/813–33), the maps extant in Muḥammad b. M
us
a al-Khw
arazm
ı’s (fl. late 2nd to early 3rd Century h/late 8th to early 9th Century) Ṣ
urat al-‘arḍ (image/form of the earth), the maps extant in copies of the new Arabic translation of Ptolemy’s Geography made by Georgios Amirutzes (d. 1475) and his son for the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet Fatih (r. 849 h/1444 and 855–86 h/1451–81), and the maps found in the geographical ur
ı’s (d. 730 h/1329) Tawd
ıḥ or Sharḥalchapter of texts on ‘ilm al-hay’a (mathematical cosmography) such as Niẓ
am al-D
ın al-N
ıs
ab
Tadhkira (explanation of or commentary on the “Memoir”) (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 Ptolemy, Geographike Hyphegesis, Arabian Peninsula, Arabic translation by Georgios Amyrutzes, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aya Sofya 2610, pp 198–199. Courtesy of Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi.

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Maps derived from possible Sasanian models worked with geometrical figures such as circles, semicircles, crescents, triangles, rectangles, ovals, and straight lines to represent regional units, directions, and distances. Their focal points are the postal and pilgrimage routes within the Abbasid Empire and other Islamic states, for instance, in al-Andalus and the main parts that formed the Abbasid caliphate. The views on what these parts were and which rank each part assumed in relationship to the others depended largely on the outlook of the mapmaker and commentator subscribed toda preference for Iranian cultural values, a preference for Islamic values, or a preference for his own environment and travel experiences. The set of maps created within this tradition included as a rule a world map and in most cases 21 regional maps. Most of the world maps in the extant manuscripts show the world as a full circle; but there are also manuscripts from as early as the 10th Century and as late as probably the 17th or 18th Century that show the world as a bird. The distribution of the regions over the body of the bird varies. China or Arabia can be found as the head. India, the land of the Khazars in the Northern Caucasus Mountains, Asia, or Africa fills the wings. The tail is taken up by Northern Africa or Europe. The world maps show cosmological concepts such as al-Baḥr al-Muḥ
ıṭ (the Encompassing Sea) also known from much earlier cultures and religious concepts specific to the Qur’
an and other sources of Muslim belief such as the barzakh, a small, narrow land barrier that separates the two main oceans of the maps, that is, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. The main Quranic meaning of barzakh is, however, not geographical, but eschatological. It denotes the life of the soul after the death of the body until the Day of Judgment. The provinces and regions in these world maps are mostly registered in form of rectangular tables or stripes of boxes. They also include countries outside the Islamic world such as India or China. A few cities such as Mecca or Alexandria, rivers and occasionally their sources, islands, and tribes are also noted. The regional maps focus entirely on the Islamic world. They map Iran, Central Asia, parts of the Caucasus Mountains, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, the Fertile Crescent, Northern Africa, and three seas (the Persian Sea that is the Indian Ocean; the Mediterranean Sea; the Caspian Sea). The sequence of the mapped regions and their relative delineation differs from by naming them in the sense that most extant manuscript maps show the following order and content: Arabia; Persian Sea; al-Maghrib (Northwest Africa); Egypt; Syria; Mediterranean Sea; alJazira (Northern Iraq and Southeast Turkey); Iraq (Central and South Iraq); Khuzistan; Fars; Kirman (parts of Iran); Sind (part of Pakistan); Armenia, Arran, Azerbaijan (part of Caucasus Mountains, Azerbaijan, and Iran); Jibal; Daylam, Rayy, Tabaristan (parts of Iran), Caspian Sea; Persian Desert; Sijistan; Khurasan (parts of Iran, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan); and M
awar
a’ al-nahr (part of Uzbekistan) (Fig. 2).

Figure 2 Ṣu
rat al-Jaz
ra (Image of the land between the Tigris and the Euphrates), MS Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Ahmet III.1285, f 39a (dated 1285). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi.

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Cartography in Islamic Societies

The people creating maps and writing texts in this cartographic tradition were mostly members of the Abbasid administration for which they worked as officers of the postal routes or of the finances, philosophers, and scholars of religious disciplines, or wealthy, independent travelers and merchants. After its first famous practitioner, the geographer, mathematician, astronomer, physician, philosopher, and student of al-Kind
ı, Ab
u Zayd Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Balkh
ı (d. 322 h/934), this tradition is called the Balkh
ı school of geography. Other major representatives of this school were Ab
u Isḥ
aq Ibrah
ım b. Muḥammad al-Iṣṭakhr
ı (4th Century h/10th Century), Ab
u l-Q
asim Muḥammad b. Ḥawqal (d. c. 367 h/977), and Ab
u ‘Abdall
ah Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Muqaddas
ı (d. c. 390/1000). The earliest maps surviving from this body of works belong to a manuscript of Ibn H.awqal from 479 h/1086 extant in the Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi in Istanbul. The most pervasive feature of maps in Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish after the centuries of translation, adoption, and adaptation is, however, their combination of more than one cultural tradition of cartography. World maps attached to geographical, cosmographical, or historical texts combine between the 11th- and the 16th-Century elements of the Ptolemaic tradition with the components of the Balkh
ı school to which their makers added further elements taken from the Qur’
an and contemporary developments in politics, commerce, war, or demography. Mount Q
af, another Quranic concept, appears for instance as a mountainous ring enclosing the Encompassing Sea in maps joined to geographic manuscripts such as Ab
u ‘Abdall
ah Muḥammad b. al-Shar
ıf al-Idr
ıs
ı’s (495– c. 560 h/1100– c. 1165) Nuzhat al-musht
aq f
ı ‘khtir
aq al-
af
aq (The Pleasant Journey of Those Who Desire to Travel through Faraway Lands), to texts seen as popularizing scientific ideas such as Zakariy
a’ al-Qazw
ın
ı’s (d. 682 h/1283) Kit
ab ‘aj
a’ib al-makhl
uq
at f
ı ghar
a’ib al-mawj
ud
at (Book of Marvels of Things Created and Miraculous Aspects of Things Existing), and to texts of a more religious character such as the Khar
ıdat al-‘aj
a’ib wa-far
ıdat al-ghar
a’ib (The Unbored Pearl of Wonders and Precious Gem of Marvels) attributed to Sir
aj al-D
ın Ab
u Ḥafs. ‘Umar b. al-Ward
ı H. (d. 861 h/1457). The maps to The Book of Curiosities, a 12th-Century manuscript on astronomy, geography, commerce, and wondrous things copying a work of the 11th Century, include already the famous circular map ascribed to al-Idr
ıs
ı. It also has a rectangular world map and maps of the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, Cyprus, Sicily, maps of great rivers such as the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, maps of the former Fatimid capital al-Mahd
ıya and the Egyptian town of Tinn
ıs, and maps of lakes. The author, in all likelihood a Fatimid custom officer, combined conceptual and technical elements of the Ptolemaic tradition such as climate zones, geographical coordinates, a scale, and the configuration of the Old World with symbolic features from al-Khw
arazm
ı’s maps such as the depiction of the Mountains of the Moon as sources of the Nile and conceptual and representational elements of the Balkh
ı school such as the representation of rivers by straight lines or lakes by circles to which he added information from travelers, texts, and perhaps administrative documents. He chose some unique and not yet well-understood forms of representation for the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean (an oval) and for Cyprus (a rectangle divided into smaller units of rectangles and text) (Fig. 3). Al-Shar
ıf al-Idr
ıs
ı and his geographical and cartographic work represent another kind of cross-cultural encounter since he lived in more than one of the Mediterranean cultures. He was born in Ceuta, received his education in al-Andalus, and traveled widely in the Islamic world. Then he worked for two Norman kings, Roger II (r. 1097–1154) and William I (r. 1154–66) at their court in Palermo. At the end of his life, he returned to the Islamic world, possibly to Ceuta. Conceptually, he followed Ptolemaic cartographic theory and methods. He produced two sets of new maps. One was a circular world map engraved on a silver plate, which is lost. The other is a set of 70 regional maps drawn on paper. They are extant in various manuscripts across the world. Al-Idr
ıs
ı planned to combine them into one large rectangular map of the known world stretching from 1801 in the east in the S
ıl
a Island (Korea) to the prime meridian in the west running through the Fortunate Isles. Presenting Roger not only as a successful conqueror and master of politics, he described him as the head of the cartographic project who decided on what geographical and cartographic truth was. One

Figure 3

Book of Curiosities, Rectangular World Map, MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ar.c.90, ff 23b–24a. Courtesy of Bodleian Library.

Cartography in Islamic Societies

81

method applied for sorting out conflicting information was to trace with iron instruments on a drawing board all data on longitudes, latitudes, and distances. Al-Idr
ıs
ı wrote two, perhaps even three geographical texts; all of them lavishly illustrated with regional maps portraying the entire world in a combination of Ptolemaic concepts with ideas and symbols taken from the Balkh
ı school. He also had access to non-Arabic oral and perhaps written sources and provided fresh information about the physical and cultural geography of European lands, not available previously in Arabic. Almost all of Ottoman mapmaking is best described as a highly flexible merging of cartographic and artistic languages from all major cultural traditions the Ottoman Empire drew upon, cooperated and traded with, and fought against. While these mergers are often seen as a reflex of Ottoman cultural and scholarly inferiority, the cultural dynamics and force that brought forth such mergers cannot be overrated. If nothing else, the people involved in producing such eclectic maps were capable of reading and understanding different geographical concepts, philological descriptions, and iconographic representations. A fair amount of concrete cross-cultural work was needed in order to interpret foreign maps and make their copies and translations into Ottoman Turkish acceptable for the local consumer. As is well known and can be demonstrated for a number of the preserved Ottoman maps designed from the 16th to the 18th centuries, even the copyists participated in this process of cross-cultural adaptation. Four major cultures of mapmaking arose in the Ottoman realm. Two of these cultures, the making of portolan charts and the creation of maritime handbooks with maps of Mediterranean islands, coasts, and fortresses, were closely interconnected. They combined several previous mapmaking traditions from different Mediterranean cultures, mainly Arabic, Catalan, and Italian portolan charts, regional maps, and isolarii. They were apparently primarily designed by members of the Ottoman navy. Scribes and painters from imperial as well as commercial workshops participated in executing the fine copies. Specialized mapmaking workshops existed in the middle of the 17th Century in Istanbul. Almost all extant specimens were made for acquiring courtly patronage or to be given away as gifts. In particular, the maps illustrating the various copies of P
ır
ı Re’
ıs’ (c. 875–961 h/1470–1554) two versions of the Kit
ab-i Baḥr
ıye (Maritime Handbook) are wonderful products of art. Some of them show the inclusion of Renaissance painting techniques, while others are splendid experiments in colors and symbolic interpretations of physical objects (Fig. 4). The two other main Ottoman mapmaking cultures were situated directly in the courtly sphere. One of them consists of town views and itineraries in official histories mapping Ottoman military campaigns, adversaries, and imperial architecture. Their

Figure 4 Piri Re’is, Kit
ab-i Baḥr
ye (Maritime Handbook), The Island of Rhodes, MS Istanbul, _Istanbul Üniversitesi, T6605, f 100a. Courtesy of _Istanbul Üniversitesi.

82

Cartography in Islamic Societies

Figure 5 Szigetvár, Ahmed Feridun, Nu¨zhet Esrar el-Ahbar der Sefer-i Sigetvar (Present of the Secrets of Information on the Journey to Szigetvár), MS Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi H.1339, ff 32b–33a (copied in 1568–69). Courtesy of Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi.

execution was the task of the painters of the imperial painting workshops. As a result, many are superb exemplars of Ottoman fine arts (Fig. 5). The other mapmaking culture began to appear during the 16th Century when Arabic and Persian models of world maps became to be replaced gradually by models from Italy and then from the United Provinces, France, and German countries. Partial or full translations of books on the New World, a Latin edition of Ptolemy’s Geography, Abraham Ortelius’ Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Gerard Mercator’s and Henricus Hondius’ Atlas Minor, Willem J. and Joan Blaeu’s Atlas Maior, and other geographical and cartographic works produced in different Catholic and Protestant countries of Europe were undertaken by Ottoman scholars, often in collaboration with members of the religious minorities living in the Ottoman Empire or with converts from Catholic or Protestant Europe. The maps of these books had a profound impact on Ottoman mapmaking. The changes, however, did not constitute a unilateral Westernization to use an anachronistic term. Translators, scholars, copyists, calligraphers, painters, and trainees, and teachers of the Ottoman army transformed the translated maps in a variety of ways into maps accessible to Ottoman spectators and situated them firmly within Ottoman visual, geographic, and literary cultures (Fig. 6).

Figure 6 Willem and Joan Blaeu, Atlas Maior, Translation ascribed to Ab
u Bakr al-Dimashq
ı, Asia, MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye 2995, before f 104a. Courtesy Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi.

Cartography in Islamic Societies

83

Cartographic Genres and Practices In addition to the world and regional maps, portolan charts, and handbooks for sailing directions discussed in the previous section, a number of other cartographic formats were developed in Islamic societies. Early in the 9th Century, or perhaps even in the 8th Century, the question of how to determine from any given place the direction toward Mecca was raised. David A. King claims that there were two cartographic worlds in Islamic societies with respect to the Qibla. Mathematicians, astronomers, and mathematical geographers inhabited one of these two worlds. They developed trigonometric, projective, arithmetic, and other exact or approximate methods for solving the problem (Fig. 7). Legal scholars, students of the religious traditions, descriptive geographers, folk astronomers, and cosmographers who focused on miracles, wonders, and narrated histories populated the other. They relied on ḥad
ıth, a body of religious teachings about what the Prophet and his companions had said and done, on astronomical and meteorological alignments ascribed to the Ka‘ba since preIslamic times, and on practices of travelers. Among the various methods used for mapmaking, grids, coordinate frames, and scales played roles that are not always easily discernible. Some mapmakers applied them as mathematical tools, while others apparently saw in them primarily symbolic statements about the possibility of mapping the world mathematically. Grids were used in rectangular and circular maps. Rectangular grids were applied in world maps such as the one made for al-Ma’m
un and by Suhr
ab (fl. first-half 4th Century h/10th Century), for regional maps and world maps illustrating historical works or encyclopedias such as the Mas
alik al-abṣ
ar f
ı mam
alik al-amṣ
ar (Ways of Perception Concerning the Most Populous [Civilized] Provinces) compiled by the Mamluk judge and administrator Ibn Faḍlall
ah al‘Umar
ı (691–749 h/1301–49). Suhr
ab described his method as starting with a rectangle, followed by dividing the edges into degrees and marking the equator. Then he drew the horizontal lines that separate the climates. For positioning the localities he stretched two threads over the rectangle, one horizontally, the other vertically. Lost world maps made before 1500 may have worked with curvilinear grids as does the only extant exemplar of such a type attached to a manuscript of al-‘Umar
ı’s work. The meaning of this grid has been interpreted differently by Fuat Sezgin who believes the grid to be a stereographic projection and the map to

Figure 7

Qibla Map, MS Paris, BnF Perse 169, f 42a. Courtesy Bibliothèque nationale de France.

84

Cartography in Islamic Societies

represent the map made for al-Ma’m
un and by David A. King who points to the several errors in the grid and al-‘Umar
ı’s explanation and refers to historical evidence contradicting the identification of this map with that made for al-Ma’m
un. Coordinate frames and scales appear early on maps made in Islamic societies. Several maps, however, are inscribed merely with one set of the coordinates, mostly longitudes, and the placement of the equator on which they are noted varies. Scales too show contradictory information. Such features are often taken to illustrate a lack of mathematical knowledge on the side of the mapmakers. The quality and care invested in some specimens of this kind and the people involved in the production of the manuscripts where they are found make such a reading unlikely. An example is the world map attached to one of the anthologies produced for the Timurid prince Iskandar Sulṭ
an (r. 812–17 h/1409–14). Simple circular as well as quadratic schemes were used for organizing geographical knowledge for religious and divinatory purposes. Such diagrams could evolve into small-scale maps since they linked either the Ka’ba or major religious monuments in Mecca with the individual sectors of the circle and the regions or towns inscribed in them. They often group a multitude of localities behind one specifically chosen town whose Qibla serves as a marker or representative for all the other directions. The effect of such an arrangement was didactic and mnemonic in the same time. The earliest known scheme of this kind is found in a manuscript copy of Ibn Khurrad
adhbih’s (3rd Century h/9th Century) Kit
ab al-mas
alik wa’l-mam
alik (Book of the Routes and Provinces). It consists of four sectors of the world, each one of them being connected with a part of the Ka’badMaghrib, Egypt, Syria, al-Jaz
ıra; Iraq, Armenia, Kashmir; Manṣ
ura, Tibet, China; Yemen. Over time, the schemes became more elaborate and could comprise as many as 72 divisions. In addition to the schemes, maps and instruments for finding the Qibla were created. The most sophisticated, Mecca-centered map was engraved on three astrolabes made by Safavid instrument makers in the late 17th Century. Climatic zone charts are a further type of diagrammatic schemes that were widely used in geographical, cosmographical, astronomical, and historical treatises and dictionaries for illustrating the theoretical division of the earth as taught by natural philosophy and astronomy. Its widespread appearance across the disciplines and literary genres is but one indicator of the depth at which the intellectual outlook in Islamic societies was permeated by scientific elements of ancient Greek origin. A very simple exemplar of these kinds of diagrams is found in Sharaf al-D
ın al-Mas‘
ud
ı’s (545–after 613 h/1150–after 1216) Jah
an D
anish (Knowledge of the World), a book on astronomy, astrology, and geography written in (549 h/1154–55). Three unnamed circles enclose eight parallel, equidistant lines identified at the right as demarcating the seven climates. Geographical features such as oceans, islands, and countries are sparsely marked by words alone. Numerous Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman circular and semicircular world maps also show such a scheme of climatic zones. The division into climates became the most important format of structuring the physical world in maps as well as texts. It was applied to maps of the Ptolemaic tradition, maps working within the tradition of the Balkh
ı schools, and maps derived from early modern European maps. Examples are the semicircular world map in ‘Ayn al-Zam
an’s Ḥasan b. ‘Al
ı Qaṭṭ
an Marwaz
ı’s (465–548 h/1072–1153) Gayh
an Shen
akht (Constructing the World) and the circular maps for Iskandar Sulṭ
an, the Book of Curiosities, and Mehmet b. ‘Al
ı Sip
ah
ı-z
adeh’s (d. 997/1589) Turkish translation of his Awḍaḥ al-mas
alik f
ı ma‘rifat al-buld
an wa’lmam
alik (Explanation of the Routes about the Knowledge of Places and Provinces).

Functions and Purposes Maps, charts, plans, diagrams, and tables served a variety of functions and purposes in Islamic societies although the bulk seems to have spent their life in manuscripts, that is, in the spheres of educated readers. The earliest usage of maps seems to have happened when the armies of the newly converted Arab tribes invaded regions of Iran and Central Asia. The governor of the eastern parts of the Umayyad Empire, al-Ḥajj
aj b. Y
usuf (d. 95 h/714), is said to have ordered a map of Daylam, a mountainous region south of the Caspian Sea, before attacking it in c. 83 h/702. Five years later, when planning to lay siege at Bukhara, he ordered a plan of the city. Plans or sketches are also reported for planning in 141 h/758 the new capital Baghdad of the Abbasid caliphate and possibly for waterworks in the swamps near Basra made for the second Abbasid caliph al-Manṣ
ur (r. 136–58 h/754–75). The next time that sources report of maps, sketches, or plans for military purposes occurs in the Ottoman Empire. Laying siege to cities and fortresses such as Constantinople, Szigetv
ar, Vienna, Baghdad, or the fortresses of the Order of St. John at Rhodes and Malta included the drawing of sketches and plans, while the actual warfare made use of compasses for tunneling the walls. It is only after the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, that maps became an important tool for the Ottoman army for settling boundary disputes and negotiations over lost territories. Tax collection and market regulation, on the other hand, were subjects that apparently rarely worked with maps, and the manuals written about these themes were seldom illustrated with more than the simplest diagrams. This is, according to Ahmet T. Karamustafa, even true for the Islamic society with the broadest use for maps and the widest array of types of mapsdthe Ottoman Empire. Different bodies of the Ottoman state used maps and plans that visualized waterways and channels, architecture, and navigation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. A central function of maps in Islamic societies was to indicate religious beliefs, support the believer in carrying out her or his religious duties, and help her or him remember the visits to the Holy shrines. A further religious theme illuminated by maps relates to the Prophet’s mi’r
aj (ascent to the heavens). Maps functioned as instruments, tools, and pictorial narratives. They were turned into souvenirs and certificates (Fig. 8). Maps also served as objects of art and diplomacy. Fatimid world and regional maps were produced on costly silks embroidered with gold and colored silk threads. Consequently, they were stored with other valuables in the princely treasury rooms. The anonymous author of the Kit
ab al-Had
aya wa’l-Tuḥaf (Book of Gifts and Rarities) when describing the treasures stored by the Fatimid rulers

Cartography in Islamic Societies

85

Figure 8 View of Mecca and its pilgrimage stations, MS Jena, University Library Prov. q. 215, f 6b. Courtesy of the University Library of the University of Jena.

exclaimed that among them several hundreds, close to a thousand silk drapes were found that represented kingdoms with their kings. He marveled at the precious material used for this display of royal splendor and possession and emphasized that these drapes showed a portrait of every king, his name, the span of his reign, and an account of his life. At least four more courts are known where maps were either painted on silk or engraved on silver platesdthe court of the Khwarazmshah Sultan ‘Al
a’ al-D
ın Muḥammad (r. 596–617 h/1199–1220) in Khiva, the court of the Ilkhanid ruler Gh
az
an Maḥm
ud (r. 694–703 h/1295–1304) in Tabriz, the Norman court of Roger II (d. 1154) in Palermo, and the Ottoman court in Istanbul (857–1341 h/1453–1922). Except for Ottoman maps on silk, none of these maps are extant. In various contexts, maps were treated like miniature paintings. Outstanding examples are the world map for Iskandar Sulṭ
an mentioned above, maps in a manuscript of the Beyan-i Menazil-i Sefer-i ‘Iraḳeyn-i Sulṭ
an Süleym
an Ḫ
an (Explanation of the Stops in Sultan Süleyman Khan’s Travel to the Two Iraqs) (944 h/1537–38) by Maṭrakç
ı Naṣ
uḥ (d. 971 h/1564) commemorating Sultan Süleyman’s (r. 926–74 h/1520–66) successful military campaign of 941 h/1534–35 against his Safavid neighbor Sh
ah Ṭahm
asb (r. 930– 84 r/1524–76), and maps in 18th-Century manuscripts of Ḥajj
ı Khal
ıfa’s Cih
annüm
a (version II). A fourth function of maps was their capacity to memorize historical events and portray princely power and splendor. The most splendid examples of maps as constructs of historical memory are found in books describing and eternalizing the feats of the Ottoman sultans. Many of the views of cities and ports found in Ottoman histories since the early 16th Century celebrate either their conquest by an Ottoman sultan or an attack by a fleet in Ottoman service. According to J. M. Rogers they were also meant to visualize “the pomp and circumstance of the Ottoman court.” The composition of the views usually includes a representation of an abstract landscapedsome mountains, some flowers, some herbs, occasionally also trees and animals. This theme of the landscape, its elements, and its colors is borrowed from miniature painting. The major difference between the maps and the miniatures is the complete lack of human beings in almost all maps of this genre. A different, but equally splendid construction of imperial allegory can be found in miniatures produced for the Mughal rulers Jah
ang
ır (r. 1014–37 h/1605–1628) and Sh
ah Jah
an (r. 1037–1068 h/1628–1658). Both rulers were keen to express their imperial

86

Cartography in Islamic Societies

claims by relying symbolically on the image of a globe with or without depictions of lands and seas. A series of images painted by Muslim and Hindu court painters between 1614 and 1658 stress the legitimacy of the ruler as a dutiful son, just defender of the interests of his subjects, and pious follower of the saints. Jah
angir also used the globe for depicting his relationship to his most powerful Muslim neighbor outside of India, the Safavid Sh
ah ‘Abb
as I (r. 986–1038 h/1587–1628). The portrait, called Jah
ang
ır’s Dream, shows Jah
ang
ır as the superior and benign ruler who is connected by friendship with his smaller neighbor. Both stand on a world map that reflects knowledge of Western cartographic developments. Two animals rest at the feet of the two rulers, a lion and a lamb. The juxtaposition of lion and lamb symbolized the peaceful coexistence of natural enemies, of irreconcilable contradictions, hence the highest good a just ruler could achieve. The symbolic globe also figures in other portraits of Jah
ang
ır, which describe his successful squelching of Khurram’s rebellion, the later Sh
ah Jah
an, and his desire to destroy his political and military rival Malik ‘Ambar, minister to the rulers of Aḥmadnagar from 1596 to 1626. The minister valiantly opposed Mughal imperial ambitions in the Deccan and pursued a policy of steady recovery of territory conquered by Sh
ah Akbar late in the 16th Century. It was only ‘Ambar’s death in 1626 that opened the Deccan to Mughal invasion. The miniature of Jah
ang
ır shooting at a beheaded and speared Malik ‘Ambar while standing on a complex cosmological allegory composed of a terrestrial globe seated both on an elephant and a huge whale surrounded by a wealth of other symbolic elements expresses the magnitude of emotions roused in Jah
ang
ır by the obstacle the Deccani minister of Ethiopian origin posed to fulfilling his imperial dream. Most Islamic maps before the 18th Century ignore political space in favor of cultural space. Elements that may signal political entities such as boundaries, emblems, names of dynasties, flags, or monuments rarely occur at all on Islamic maps before 1700. Maps of the so-called Balkh
ı school indicate boundaries (ḥud
ud) explicitly, but they are not boundaries separating different states or kingdoms but boundaries dividing the Islamic world into administrative subunits. In contrast to geographical writings, which even stressed the linkage between geography and history, maps produced in Islamic societies before the 16th Century did not express this disciplinary neighborhood. A similar reluctance to deal with the political composition of the world can be seen in maps illustrating the manuscripts of Ḥajj
ı u Bakr al-Dimashq
ı (d. 1102 h/1691). In the autograph of the translation of the Atlas Minor, Ḥajj
ı Khal
ıfa and his Khal
ıfa and Ab
French partner Mehmet Ikhl
aṣ
ı followed closely the views about the political division of Europe and Asia as propagated by the Dutch cartographers Gerard Mercator and Henricus Hondius. In the autograph of Ḥajj
ı Khal
ıfa’s own geographical work for which he had engaged in the project of translation, the Cih
annüm
a (version II), the Ottoman Empire is not mapped at all and the Safavid Empire has disintegrated into a series of maps reflecting views of Iranian provinces held in pre-Safavid geographical literature. The fine copy of Ab
u Bakr al-Dimashq
ı’s translation of the Atlas Major does not contain any map of the Ottoman or the Safavid Empires. Later paraphrases of the work map the two Muslim neighbor states as found in Western atlases, that is, the Ottoman Empire is clipped to Anatolia, and the Safavid Empire has borders that fit more the situation of the early 19th than that of the late 17th or early 18th centuries when these maps were painted in Istanbul. Possibly the first Ottoman map that names Anatolia and even parts of Iran Memlekete devlet-e ‘aliye (Kingdom of the Supreme Dynasty), but continues to disregard the matter of precise boundaries of the empire in contrast to other states in Europe, is a silk map painted in Istanbul in 1182 h/1768. This map too follows without further reflection the structuring of the political space as seen in Catholic and Protestant Europe. A rupture with this disrespect for the political status and extension of the Ottoman state in Ottoman mapmaking occurred only in the 19th Century, when the modernized Ottoman army and its Western advisors took a fresh interest due to military and economic reasons in mapping the Ottoman territories. Maps of 19th-Century Qajar Iran likewise do not show any explicit interest in mapping the political space of the country. Their authors mostly focused on mapping particular provinces and their physical and cultural properties. Qajar maps show clearly that by now mapmaking in Iran followed the map culture of Europe. In the first-half of the 19th Century, British and Russian officers toured the country for mapping several of its provinces, mountains, and shores, partly on order of the Qajar court. In the second-half of the 19th Century, Iranian mapmakers who were trained in modern mathematical and cartographic methods and concepts at the D
ar alfun
un in Tehran started to work. The D
ar alfun
un was a new type of school for higher education founded in 1851 by M
ırz
a Taq
ı Kh
an Am
ır-i Niẓ
am (1186dassassinated in 1231 h sh/1807dassassinated in 1852), a diplomat and highly disputed prime minister of the Qajar ruler Naṣ
ır al-D
ın Sh
ah (r. 1227–75 h sh/1848–96). The new school was part of efforts to reform the Qajar army. European teachers taught new military methods, theories, technologies, sciences including geography and cartography, and languages. The major cartographic works undertaken by Austrian professors and Iranian students and later professors of the D
ar al fun
un were explorations, triangulations, descriptions, and drawings of boundaries between Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Northwest India (today Pakistan) and various kinds of mapping enterprises about Tehran and the settlements in its immediate environment. A number of the engineers involved in these different projects studied for some time in France or England and worked for different departments of the government and the army. In addition to mapmaking, they wrote books about geography and mathematics (Fig. 9).

Cartography and Surveying in Iran in the 20th Century In the 20th Century, cartography developed in Iran in three sectorsdprivate cartographic and surveying companies, the army, and governmental civil institutions. The first private cartographic company, Sahab Geographic & Drafting Company, was founded in 1315 h sh/1936 by ‘Abdolgh
asem Saḥ
ab (1265–1335 h sh/1886–1956) and led for most of the century by his son ‘Abb
as Saḥ
ab (1300–79 h sh/1921–2000), who was trained as an engineer. It began with publishing maps of Iranian history and physical

Cartography in Islamic Societies

87

Figure 9 Naqsh-i F
aris (Map of Persia), MS Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Staatsbibliothek, Kartensammlung D9515. Courtesy of Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Staatsbibliothek.

geography. After 1945, it also produced road maps, maps for tourism, globes, maps of Iran’s neighbors, atlases, posters, and school books. Eb
adol
ahe Bakhti
ar
ı (1306–62 h sh/1927–83), the husband of a sister of ‘Abb
as Saḥ
ab, founded in 1351 h sh/1972 the second private cartographic publishing house in Iran, Gitashenasi Geographical and Cartographic Institute. Being today the more active of the two, it has a similar range of products, including political, physical, historical, and topographical maps of Iran, its provinces and cities, road and street maps, maps for tourism and outdoor activities, maps of Asian countries, globes, books, and postcards. Since some time, the company produces its maps with computer technologies. In the field of geophysics and surveying, two men shaped the face of modern practices and products in IrandMaḥm
ud Ḥis
ab
ı (1282–71 h sh/1903–92) and Taq
ı Riy
aḥ
ı (d. after 1989). Ḥis
ab
ı, a student of Albert Einstein, was educated as a civil engineer in Beirut and Paris and did his Ph.D. in physics at the Sorbonne. Starting in 1928, he surveyed Iranian coastal roads and was a founder or cofounder of a number of institutions important for Iranian cartography, among them the country’s first weather station (1931), Tehran University (1934), the Institute of Standards of Iran (1954), and the Geophysical Institute of Tehran University (1961). Ḥis
ab
ı worked for Mossadegh’s government as the first general manager of the Iranian National Oil Company. Riy
aḥ
ı was a civil engineer who had studied at the École Polytechnique in Paris. In 1952, he became Mossadegh’s chief of staff. After the CIA coup in 1953, Riy
aḥ
ı was sentenced to 2 years of prison. In 1979, he worked for the head of the interim government after the fall of the Shah, Mahd
ı B
azarg
an (d. 1995), but left the country soon after to live until his death in France. In 1956, Riy
aḥ
ı founded with a partner the first private surveying company of Iran, Cherkate-e Nesbi Naghsheh Bardari. The company began with land surveying in the year of its foundation, but quickly expanded into other fields, among them photogrammetry (1959) and terrestrial photogrammetry. It cooperated closely with the French company La Foncière registered in the French protectorate of Morocco. About 20 French engineers and technicians came to Iran providing expertise and bringing with them needed instruments for surveying and mapmaking. The company sent c. 25 of its employees for education to France, among them Naṣr Ghaz
al
ı, today’s head of the company, who had to leave Tehran University due to political difficulties under the Shah; five or six to the Netherlands; and three to Switzerland. Renamed in 1967 as Rassad Surveying Company, it moved into hydrography, microgeodesy, orthophoto mapping, digital mapping, GIS design and implementation, tunnel drilling control, and industrial control surveying. Twice, it mapped half of Iran, the first time using photogrammetric methods, the second working with satellite material. Its main clients are oil and road companies, the municipalities of Tehran, Yazd, and Kish, and various ministries. In 1921, the army founded its first group for cartography. The first tasks the engineers of this department carried out consisted in translating, correcting, and completing Russian and English maps of Iran and adjacent countries. Fourteen years later, the first books on Iranian geography illustrated with military maps were produced for educational purposes. Subsequently, the cartographic organization of the army began creating its own military maps. As in the 19th and early 20th centuries, a major focus of military mapmaking was the exploration of the borderlands. As the National Geographic Organization, it is now the most powerful cartographic body in Iran and possesses the most advanced technology, for instance, for area photography. In 1953, Iran founded its first governmental institution for civil cartography, the National Cartographic Center (NCC). It started in 1948 as an engineering department of the Plan and Budget Organization. Working with foreign consultants and army officers, it carried out surveying work and planned the structure for the new governmental institution for mapping Iran. It focused its activities on three major domains. The first domain embraces the creation of terrestrial maps of various provinces, regions, and cities of Iran and works for producing a comprehensive map of the entire Iranian territory. NCC brought foreign engineers and technicians,

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mainly from France and the Netherlands, for surveying the country and trained students of mathematics and physics in cartographic methods and techniques. The second domain covers the charting of Iranian coastal and maritime areas, in particular in the Persian Gulf. The third major domain lies in creating the intellectual infrastructure for cartography in Iran. NCC created a research journal, organized conferences, published textbooks and the series National Atlas of Iran, and sponsored the translation of foreign publications. It has two special responsibilitiesdthe supervision of all government contracts and area photography. From 1941 onward, state bodies such as the Mining Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of the Roads ordered engineers to map the entities under their responsibility. Other governmental organizations, in particular institutes of Tehran University, the Geological Survey of Iran, and the Meteorological Survey of Iran, founded mostly in the second-half of the 20th Century, produce specialized thematic maps on geology, geomorphology, geophysics, geochemistry, meteorology, and soil or land use.

See Also: Art and Cartography; Maps and the State; Orientalism.

Further Reading Ahmad, S. M. (1992). Cartography of al-Shar
ıf al-Idr
ıs
ı. In Harley, J. B. & Woodward, D. (eds.) History of Cartography, vol. 2, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, pp 156–174. Chicago, IL: University Press of Chicago. ‘Ayn al-Zam
a n’s Ḥasan b. ‘Al
ı Qaṭṭ
an Marwaz
ı, Gayh
a n Shen
a kht. Qom: Vaḥed-e entesh
ar
at-e kit
abkh
ane-ye bozorg-e
Ayatoll
ah al-‘uẓm
a Mar‘ash
ı Najaf
ı. Brentjes, S., 2004. Mapmaking in Ottoman Istanbul between 1650 and 1750: a domain of painters, calligraphers, or cartographers?. In: Imber, C., Kiyotaki, K., Murphey, R. (Eds.), Frontiers of Ottoman Studies, vol. 2. I. B. Tauris, London, pp. 125–156. Brentjes, S. (2007).Naṣr Ghaz
al
ıl, Rassadiran, Interview, Tehran, March, 25, 2007. Edson, E., Savage-Smith, E., 2004. Medieval Views of the Cosmos: Picturing the Universe in the Christian and Islamic Middle Ages. The Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford. Ghada al-Hijjawi al-Qaddumi, 1996. Book of Gifts and Rarities.Harvard Middle Eastern Monographies XXIX. Harvard UP, Boston. Goodrich, T.D., 1990. The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Americana. Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden.  
annüm
a. Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin. Hagen, G., 2003. Ein Osmanischer Geograph bei der Arbeit. Entstehung und Gedankenwelt von K
atib Celebis Gih Karamustafa, A.T., 1992. Military, administrative, and scholarly maps and plans. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 209–227. King, D.A., 1999. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca. Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. Brill, Leiden: Köln. King, D.A., Lorch, R., 1992. Qibla charts, Qibla maps, and related instruments. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 189–205. MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Libraryu, Mihris¸ah Sultan 304. Orientalische Buchkunst in Gotha (1997). Ausstellung zum 350jährigen Jubiläum der Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha. Spiegelsaal 11. September 1997 bis 14. Dezember 1997. Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek Gotha, 1997. Rogers, J.M., 1992. Itineraries and town views in Ottoman, histories. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 228–255. Sezgin, F., 1987. Contribution of the Arabic-Islamic Geographers to the Formation of the World Map. Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main. Sharaf al-D
ın Muḥammad b. Mas‘
ud Mas‘
ud
ı., 2003. Jah
an D
anish. In: Zanj
an
ı, D.-A. (Ed.). Mir
as -e Makt
ub, Tehran. Soucek, S., 1992. Islamic charting in the mediterranean. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 265–284. The National Atlas of Iran. Maps. vol. 18, The Islamic Republic of Iran, Management and Planning Organization, National Cartographic Center, Tehran, 1371 sh. Tibbets, G.R., 1992. Later cartographic developments. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 137–155. Tibbets, G.R., 1992. The Balkh
ı school of geographers. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 108–136. Tibbets, G.R., 1992. The beginnings of a cartographic tradition. In: Harley, J.B., Woodward, D. (Eds.), History of Cartography, Bk. 1: Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies, vol. 2. University Press of Chicago, Chicago, IL, pp. 90–107.

Relevant Websites http://cosmos.bodley.ox.ac.uk Medieval Views of the Cosmos, The Book of Curiosities. http://www.ncc.org.ir National Cartographic Center.

Cartography, Electoral William Durkan, Adrian Kavanagh, and Caoilfhionn D’Arcy, Department of Geography, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by A. Kavanagh, volume 3, pp 396–398, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Cartogram A map that represents different regions not according to their land areas, but according to some other thematic mapping variable, such as population, thus distorting the shape of these regions to take account of other variables. Electoral Geography A branch of geography, within the subdiscipline of political geography, which is especially concerned with studying the geographical dimension of electoral results, as well as of how elections are organized and conducted. Gerrymandering The practice by which the shape and size of electoral boundaries is deliberately changed to benefit one political grouping (usually a governing party) at the expense of others. Geographically Weighted Regression Technique for exploratory spatial data analysis, which allows for the measurement of spatially varying relationships (thus showing how relationships between the dependent and predictor variables might vary over space). Géographie Électorale Early work in the field of electoral cartography and geography carried out in France in the early 1900s and particularly associated with French geographer, André Siegfried. Marked Register Turnout Figures Turnout figures calculated, usually for very small areas, based on the study of the marked electoral registers used in specific electoral contests, thus addressing the dearth of small-scale electoral data that emerges in places where such data are only available for (relatively large) constituency units. Such figures may be calculated to the level of the smallest areal units used for the purposes of census returns (such as electoral divisions, in the case of the Republic of Ireland). Open Source GIS Open source GIS places a focus on free and open access, modification, distribution, and active community support for the cartographic software. Packing A term used with regard to the process of altering constituency boundaries to group large numbers of supporters of a given party in an area, far beyond the required threshold for electoral success, in order to negate their influence elsewhere. Purple States A term used in the US to define key swing states in election contests. These states are often the most competitive, tending to vary in terms of party support between electoral contests, and as such, can neither be classed as a Democratic (Blue) or Republican (Red) stronghold. Redistricting Term particularly associated with American politics, mainly involving the making of changes to the boundaries of election constituencies, usually in order to take account of population change within a state as identified in the publication of census reports. In states such as the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, independent commissions take responsibility for the redrawing of election boundaries, whereas in other states, this responsibility may lie in the hands of government politicians, a factor that may give rise to the practice of gerrymandering (see earlier).

A key field within electoral geography, electoral cartography is concerned with mapping the various factors that are associated with elections, including election results (both in terms of support and representation levels), voter turnout levels, and party mobilization efforts. Studies within the areas of electoral cartography and electoral geography highlight the key role of geography in elections; stressing that voters do not express their preferences within a vacuum, and that political decision-making processes are influenced, to varying degrees by the contextsdnational, regional, and localdwith which such processes are inserted. Electoral cartography ensures that a spatial, or contextual, viewpoint remains central to studies of electoral participation, voter choice, and the operation of electoral systems, and stresses that place matters in those processes. Exploratory spatial data analysis techniques allow researchers to identify spatial patterns in different data sets and, based on these observations, to formulate hypotheses, based on the geography of the observed patterns. The exploratory nature of the practice implies that electoral cartography should be a starting point for electoral geography research, before applying other quantitative and qualitative techniques to test the emerging hypotheses with reference to various causal factors. The mapping of electoral patterns formed the key focus of the earlier work within the discipline, as most notably associated with the French regional school and the “géographie électorale” of André Siegfried in the early 1900s. Siegfried’s research, as with many other subsequent studies in electoral geography, involved a technique of map comparison, wherein the degree to which the spatial patterning of election results for different French political parties could be associated with the spatial trends associated for other, causal, factors was studied.

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Siegfried’s 1913 classic study of voting trends in the Ardéche region of France was accused of being environmentally deterministic in nature, given that he associated particular voting patterns with different physical landscapes. The linking of the physical and political environments allowed Siegfried to highlight how different landscapes helped produce different socioeconomic conditions, which in turn acted to shape the political orientation of voters within the different French regions. Little work was carried out within the field of electoral geography (and electoral cartography) outside of France until the 1960s and the emergence of geography’s quantitative revolution. Newspapers in Europe and North America (as for example The Times newspaper in 1895) from the end of the 19th Century onward started to use maps and cartograms to illustrate different aspects of electoral contests to their readers. Since then, election maps have played a significant role in media coverage of election campaign and election results, and the increasing sophistication of the techniques being used has become readily apparent across recent election contests. Media outlets favor the use of maps because their viewers/readers like maps and trust maps. As well as reflecting electoral support and voter turnout patterns in electoral contests, maps may be used in media’s election-night coverage as a means of predicting the final result nationally based on early vote returns from specific voting districts. Analysts may compare trends for the areas/constituencies returning their votes early with those of previous elections in order to tease out whether specific patterns, in terms of changing support levels, may be emerging. Election commentators can also look at past results in the areas/constituencies, which have yet to return results, as a means of predicting how the election results in those areas might pan out in the present contest and, subsequently, how the final results nationally might look. Election-night coverage for the 2016 US Presidential Election (Fig. 1), in which the use of maps and detailed analyses of voting patterns within specific areas in key swing states, or purple states, figured prominently, was a very good example of how important maps are in terms of electoral analysis. Donald Trump would himself subsequently refer back to Election Day 2016 as “the incredible night with the maps", demonstrating just how pervasive cartography is in the context of modern election coverage. The form that electoral cartography takes is often driven by its intended use. As people move away from traditional media formats as their main source of information in relation to an electoral contest, the mapping of elections also moves away from the traditional static format toward the interactive online experience. The process of interactive online mapping allows the end user to customize their own individual viewpoint as desired, in order to best explore the information of interest to them. In this sense, online interactive mapping tools offer a new cartographic experience, previously unavailable to the general public. Modern online interactive election mapping tools closely reflect the GIS (Geographical Information Systems) user interface, placing control of the commentary in the hands of the user, while still offering in-depth socioeconomic and demographic analysis where relevant. The example in Fig. 2, from a newspaper online interactive election map in 2016, allows the user to adjust the scale of analysis from the national state-wide picture to each individual county, with relevant socioeconomic and demographic statistics available at each scale. Within the academic field of electoral geography, Siegfried’s cartographic comparisons gave way to more statistically based techniques with the emergence of geography’s quantitative revolution in the second half of the 20th Century. These studies were particularly concerned with voting cartographies, electoral boundaries, and the analysis of geographical influences on voting, including work on the neighborhood and friends and neighbors effects, as rigorous statistical analyses of how space impacts on electoral behavior replaced the earlier map-comparisons approach. With other branches of political geography, such as geopolitics, in decline during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, electoral geography, with its large data bank of electoral statistics, proved to be particularly suited to the quantitative approach. Cartographical techniques still remained as a particularly powerful tool; for instance, maps of different outputs produced by the ecological models were often produced to complement the statistical analyses and to illustrate the key findings. Since then, new and highly sophisticated computer-based applications have added further dimensions to electoral cartography and to its applicability within practical politics. In recent years, a rapidly growing data deluge has provided a torrent of

Figure 1

CNN Election-night coverage for the 2016 US Presidential Election, CNN (2016).

Cartography, Electoral

Figure 2

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Interactive online map of the 2016 Presidential Election in North Carolina, US. The Guardian (2016).

geospatial data relating to many academic disciplines, and the field of electoral cartography is no different in this regard. The increasing availability of large volumes of geospatial data, combined with the latest cartographic technologies, leads to growing levels of complexity and sophistication within the mapping process. The development of geographically weighted regression techniques has added new dimensions to work within the area. The mapping of localized statistical outputs allows the reader to appreciate how relationships between various causal factors and electoral behavior may vary across space, thus illustrating how place, or local context, matters in terms of influencing how different factors relate to electoral behavior. The use of cartograms to display geographically based electoral figures has also added new dimensions to electoral cartography. The use of cartograms for the purposes of displaying US election results gives a more faithful presentation of the relative strengths of the Republican and Democratic parties. Conventional maps portray the US political space as dominated by the Republican support, due to this party’s strength in the large, but low-density, interior states. By using cartograms to display electoral support levels, however, the sizes of US states (or counties) are rescaled based on population levels, thus placing greater emphasis on highly populated states where Democratic Party support is often higher. Cartograms are also useful in the context of the United Kingdom, where the dominance of the Conservatives in low-density, rural, constituencies means that this party’s strength, especially relative to the more urban-dominated Labour Party, tends to be overestimated when conventional maps are used to display election results. Similar trends can be viewed in other states across the globe, in instances where one party is more dominant in highly populated urban areas and other parties are stronger in less densely populated rural areas; scenarios where cartograms would also prove useful in demonstrating relative levels of party strength. The use of more sophisticated mapping programs has further increased the effectiveness of partisan gerrymanders, as evidenced in the results of Congressional elections in the US in the 2000s, with such practices contributing to more general trends of congressional incumbency protection and declining electoral competitiveness. Rapidly developing GIS technologies, combined with the growing availability of socioeconomic and demographic data, have altered the cartographic process of partisan gerrymandering in the US. This technology, which allows the representation and analysis of select demographics within a given electoral area, added a new depth to the process, resulting in revisions that serve to influence and shape electoral results. The application of modern GIS technologies to the redistricting process allows the identification, and potential manipulation, of spaces of underrepresentation. With census data and GIS more accessible due to improving technology, people employed in the redistricting sector in the US during the 1990s took a new approach to how they had previously carried out their job. Recent gerrymanders have led to the establishment of “majority–minority districts”, where minority groups may have a greater opportunity to have elected representation, but the ultimate aim is to increase the number of congressional representatives won by a particular party in a given state. This process of active cartography has led to the production of some unusually shaped congressional districts, such as the widely used example of North Carolina’s 12th district, visible in Fig. 3 below showing changes between the 112nd and 113rd Congress. Boundaries were redrawn in order to group Democratic votes within safe blue districts, a process known as “packing”, and move Republican voters to neighboring districts, in order to reach a majority. It is worth noting that many of the districts with large visible changes, such as the 8th, 11th, and 13th have shifted in terms of party support from “blue” to “red,” while the most irregularly shaped districts, such as the 4th and 12th are used to group areas of strong Democratic support, demonstrating the electoral impact of the modern redistricting process.

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Figure 3

North Carolina Congressional districts in the 112nd and 113rd congress. Fan et al. (2015).

Recent research has focused on the redrawing of constituency boundaries and the electoral abuses of gerrymandering and malapportionment, while other research in this field has highlighted the impact of first past the postelectoral systems (and other electoral systems) in producing disproportional and biased electoral results. The availability of more detailed electoral data at the aggregate level has encouraged marked-register analyses-based studies of voter turnout levels (as in the Republic of Ireland). Research has also focused on the underrepresentation of “Other” groups. The process of electoral cartography has been viewed as a useful tool in identifying and addressing instances of political and electoral inequality. The cartographic process was utilized in the 2011 Northern Irish Assembly Election, the 2011 General Election in the Republic of Ireland, and the 2014 Local Election in the Republic of Ireland, to examine the impact of district magnitude on gender inequality, and proved a useful tool in realizing potential solutions. Critiques of electoral geography claim that research tends to focus on isolated studies of specific elections within specific states or regions and, hence, fails to help create a coherent body of knowledge that would add to the overall study of political geography. Other commentators view it as overtly empirical in approaches and not underpinned by well-developed theoretical frameworks, making for an atheoretical stance that leaves it at odds with general trends within contemporary human geography. Furthermore, certain aspects of the electoral process, such as voting practices by gender, are often invisible to electoral analysis. Political scientists and electoral geographers have access to polling and survey data, but cartography is limited in this sense, especially as the actual practice of voting is secret and therefore difficult to map. Feminist scholars also view GIS mapping as a “masculine” field, which does not fully benefit the methodologies of feminist geographers. Prominent academics have portrayed GIS mapping as being inherently positivist and universalizing, noting the need to expand the process beyond the quantitative in order to have a meaningful role in feminist geographies. There are a number of exciting innovations which afford opportunities to address some of these concerns. Open source GIS allows the political landscape to be aggregated into an “Open” patchwork of electoral analyses. Qualitative electoral cartography expands the field beyond its inherently quantitative roots. Open source GIS places a focus on open data, open software, open hardware, open standards, open research collaboration, open publication, open funding, and open education/learning. The “Open” nature of the technology allows for detailed temporal analysis of data at scales ranging from the global to the local, while also affording the opportunity for collaborations with associated disciplines, keeping electoral studies rooted in the larger frame of human geography, as well as the other social sciences. The application of open source GIS to the field of electoral cartography allows for global cooperation to enhance and deepen the understanding of the various social and political issues of our time, using both a social and a geographical lens. The “Open” nature of this application also allows for input from various third parties, while being simultaneously open to user review in order to improve methodology and analysis, thus retaining the benefits of peer review and replication of methods. The growing global digital network and range of devices which can support open source GIS software,

Cartography, Electoral

Figure 4

93

Map of the location quotients for post-election racist tweets. Floating Sheep (2012).

combined with the low cost for users, does not constrict the overall potential collaborator pool, thus leading to a database which is inherently accessible and open to all modes of input and review. Given the wide range of issues that can impact on an individual’s voting preference, the integration of qualitative GIS research methods has provided a new medium for electoral cartography to engage with the social and demographic causal factors, which serve to produce spatial variation. The application of qualitative mapping has been applied to examine themes such as the geolocation of tweets in the 2010 municipal elections in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, and the mapping of racist tweets during the 2008 Obama election campaign in the US, as demonstrated in Fig. 4 below. The practical framework for qualitative GIS research, utilizing open source software, allows for sources such as interviews, surveys, focus groups, document analysis, and media analysis to be drawn into electoral research design. Overall, the application of a qualitative open source GIS framework has the potential to add new layers of representation and analysis to electoral cartography, thus enriching it with a human perspective and securing it within the wider context of human geography. Another critique leveled at electoral geography relates to the manner in which geography is an epiphenomenal, or residual, factor. Efforts to promote a stronger theoretical dimension have found strong resonances with realist philosophy and structuration theory. These focus around arguments for the need to better situate electoral research within frameworks that locate this within the larger perspective of global economic transition, while also placing greater stress on the impact of the local context. This places greater emphasis on the role of geographical scale in electoral research, while also highlighting the importance of place, or the local context, in terms of electoral decision-making processes. Researchers have advocated a world-systems approach to the study of electoral geography, which would also address the discipline’s failure to study elections in the developing world. This approach would also argue for the need to understand how electoral behavior is shaped by structural constraints, thus analyzing how voters in specific places are responding to global processes. Creating electoral cartographies within such frameworks allows for placespecific electoral behavior to be studied with reference to the wider social, political, and economic contexts provided by changing global economic trends, as well as the localized institutions and cultural practices that mediate the political responses to these global processes at the local level. Basing electoral cartography on an approach to electoral geography that marries a series of different but interrelated geographical scales refocuses electoral geography as a study of how historical–geographical context impacts on political behavior. In stressing the importance of geographic scale and basing researches on a place-centered approach, while linking these to new (and ongoing) developments in geographical statistics and computer-mapping work and a greater openness to the use of qualitative techniques, a blueprint can be set for electoral cartography to prosper. In doing so, a revitalized electoral geography and electoral cartography promises to offer fresh insight not just to the subdiscipline of political geography, but also to the larger study of human geography, as well as political science and the other social sciences.

See Also: Gerrymandering; Maps; Place; Political Geography; Political Representation.

Further Reading: Agnew, J.A., 1996. Mapping politics: how context counts in electoral geography. Polit. Geogr. 15 (2), 129–146. Fan, C., Li, W., Wolf, L.J., Myint, S.W., 2015. A spatiotemporal compactness pattern analysis of congressional districts to assess partisan gerrymandering: a case study with California and North Carolina. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 105 (4), 736–753. Field, K., Dorling, D., 2016. UK election cartography. Int. J. Cartogr. 2 (2), 202–232. Flint, C., 2001. A timespace for electoral geography: economic restructuring, political agency and the rise of the Nazi party. Polit. Geogr. 20, 301–329.

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Forest, B., 2017. Electoral geography: from mapping votes to representing power. Geogr. Compass. Available at: https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.jproxy.nuim.ie/doi/abs/10.1111/ gec3.12352. Garnett, R., Kanaroglou, P., 2016. Qualitative GIS: an open framework using SpatialLite and open source GIS. Trans. GIS 20 (1), 144–159. Johnston, R.J., Pattie, C., 2006. Putting Voters in Their Place: Geography and Elections in Great Britain. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Johnston, R.J., Rossiter, D., Pattie, C., 2005. Disproportionality and bias in US presidential elections: how geography helped Bush defeat Gore but couldn’t help Kerry beat Bush. Polit. Geogr. 24 (8), 952–968. Kavanagh, A., 2015. An end to ‘Civil War’ politics? The radically reshaped political landscape of post-crash Ireland. Elect. Stud. 38, 71–81. Kavanagh, A., 2015. An evolving political landscape: political reform, boundary changes and 2014 local elections. Administration 63 (2), 59–77. Kavanagh, A., Mills, G., Sinnott, R., 2004. The geography of Irish voter turnout: a case study of the 2002 General Election. Ir. Geogr. 37 (2), 177–186. Kwan, M.P., 2002. Feminist visualisation: Re-envisioning GIS as a method in feminist geographic research. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 92 (4), 645–661. McGing, C., 2013. The single transferable vote and women’s representation in Ireland. Ir. Political Stud. 28 (3), 322–340. Raynauld, V., Greenberg, J., 2014. Tweet, click, vote: twitter and the 2010 Ottawa municipal election. J. Inf. Technol. Politics 11 (4), 412–434. Siegfried, A., 1913. Tableau politique de la France de l’Ouest sous la Troisiéme République. Armand Colin, Paris. Sui, D., 2014. Opportunities and impediments for open GIS. Trans. GIS 18 (1), 1–24.

Relevant Websites Adrian Kavanagh’s Elections website: http://www.adriankavanaghelections.org. CNN’s Election 2016 website: http://www.edition.cnn.com/election/2016. Dave Bradlee’s Redistricting website: http://gardow.com/davebradlee/redistricting/. Dorling Cartogram Application: https://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id¼b686a7679cb747e9825d1d1bb6b26046. ESRI Redistricting Application: https://www.esri.com/en-us/arcgis/products/esri-redistricting/overview. Floating Sheep geography blog:http://www.floatingsheep.org. The Guardian’s elections website: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/electionspast.

Case Studies Liz Taylor, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Bounding a case Delimiting a case and its context in time and space. Case study A type of research that focuses on the intensive analysis of a contemporary place, group, or event within its realworld context. Descriptive case study Focus on giving a detailed account of the case in its real-world context. Embedded case study A set of case studies within the main case, for example four individuals within a larger group. Evaluative case study Inquiries that focus on the “worthwhileness” of a project or event. Explanatory case study Aims to explain how or why something came to be. Exploratory case study Conducted to gather and analyze foundational data to be used for more expanded work. Fuzzy generalizations Tentative assertions from the case to a wider context. Instrumental case study A case study that is chosen to be illustrative of a wider issue or phenomenon. Intrinsic case study A case study that is chosen to be interesting in and for itself, rather than illustrative of something wider. Local knowledge case A case chosen due to the researcher’s existing familiarity with it. Logic model A conceptual scheme, often summarized as a flow diagram, representing a process or stages in an event. Mixed methods A research methodology that encompasses an overlapping suite of quantitative and qualitative research approaches to data gathering and analysis. Naturalistic generalization Links between the case study and a wider phenomenon made by the reader. Picture-drawing case study Descriptive case study that conveys the nature of a case in detail. Qualitative methods Research methods such as interviews, participant observation, and textual analysis useful in documenting and analyzing social structures or individual experiences and relationships. Quantitative methods Statistical and mathematical modeling approaches used by geographers and other scholars to analyze cultural, social, economic, and physical relationships. Story-telling case study Descriptive case study with a primarily narrative structure. Theory-seeking case study Exploratory case study with the aim of generating theoretical insights. Theory-testing case study Designed to test and refine previously produced theoretical insights. Triangulation of methods Use of data from different data collection methods to provide multiple sources of information about a case. Vignettes Stories or snapshots presented in writing to illustrate particular aspects, individuals, or events of a case study.

The case study approach involves in-depth investigation of a contemporary case within a real-life setting. The case may be a person, a group of people, an organization, an event, or a project. Sometimes multiple cases are studied. The case study approach is a useful methodology in human geography when detailed, contextualized understanding is required. It is a flexible and pragmatic approach that fits with a range of different research aims and perspectives. Case studies are widely used across the social sciences, particularly in anthropology, sociology, and education, and in the professions of law and medicine. Although case study researchers commonly use multiple qualitative data collection methods, a case study can also include quantitative data. Its focus on developing an in-depth understanding of a research topic complements projects that capture breadth such as in survey research, meaning that there is a place for case study approaches within mixed-methods research. As with all research methodologies, there are issues that case study researchers must address and communicate to ensure rigor in their work. These include choosing the case, setting its boundaries, and reflecting on generalization. Methods of data collection commonly include observation, interview, focus groups, and documentary review. Data analysis is an in-depth, iterative process, as appropriate to the format of the data, and much emphasis is given to the quality and style of the resulting case study account. Most, but not all, case study research is designed to contribute to the formulation or testing of theory. The use of case studies is also well established in geography teaching at school and university levels. Such studies vary from short summaries of empirical research or examples with an illustrative purpose to student-centered active learning strategies.

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Choosing and Bounding the Case The choice of the case will depend on the purpose of the study, as well as practical considerations such as research access. Given the considerable investment of time in undertaking the study of a case, its choice is important. Robert Yin suggests five possible rationales for choosing a case:

• • • • •

Critical in testing a well-formulated theory Extreme or unusual (for example, unusual cases in clinical psychology) Common (an everyday or commonplace situation related to the area of theoretical interest) Revelatory (significant access to a previously unstudied situation) Longitudinal (studying the case at two or more points over time to focus on change)

Sometimes the choice of a case study is primarily pragmatic, depending on research access. For example, a geography undergraduate may wish to undertake a case study of a village, exploring spatial manifestations of social groupings in a common setting. In this case the student is likely to choose a village where he or she may have some understanding of the context and access to the groupings due to family or friendship links. Gary Thomas calls this a local knowledge case. If the student was looking for an extreme or unique case, the selection process would need to be different. The case study is seen as a specific, unique system that can be bounded (delimited) over time and space (for example, the case of a management executive and his or her actions and decisions over 1 month or a conference over 1 week). It may sound easy to specify the boundaries of a case, but sometimes it is hard to know where one entity stops, especially when representations of an individual or organization on social media are considered. Abstract ideas such as “management approach” are not normally seen as cases, although we can learn about them through case studies (for example, we may learn about a particular manager’s approach to health care provision through a case study of that manager). The time frame of a case study is broadly contemporary, though documentary evidence of historical context may be collected as supporting material. Many researchers will only study one case at a time; however, a small number of individuals or organizations may be a useful base for a collective case study or a multiple case study. Choices about the number of case studies will depend on the time, resources, and personnel available for the collection and analysis of data. Sometimes there may be a focus on certain individuals within a case (for example, three managers at different levels within a company), which Robert Stake refers to as a case within a case, or what Robert Yin calls an embedded case study.

Types of Case Studies Writers have distinguished different types of case studies in case study methodology. In each of these types, single-case or multiplecase approaches may be used. Stake distinguishes between intrinsic case studies that focus on the interest presented by the particular case and instrumental case studies in which the case is illustrative of a wider issue or concern. Yin uses a slightly different taxonomy. Explanatory case studies aim to explain how or why something came to be. Descriptive case studies focus on giving a detailed account of the case in its real-world context. Finally, exploratory case studies are conducted to gather and analyze foundational data to be used for more expanded work and a set of larger questions to be pursued after the preliminary pilot data have been assessed. Michael Bassey suggests categories of theory-seeking and theory-testing case studies, in which the case is illustrative of a wider issue. Story-telling and picture-drawing case studies are analytical accounts of cases based around a narrative or a descriptive form, respectively. Finally, evaluative case studies focus on the “worthwhileness” of a program, or event, without necessarily contributing to the development of theory. These sets of taxonomies are not mutually exclusive. For example, a case study could be classified as both instrumental and theory-seeking. It is useful to think through these categories in relation to proposed research in order to refine the emphasis within the case study.

Exemplar Case Study: Researching Geography Students’ Use of GIS Grace Healy and Nicola Walshe were concerned about the reluctance among geography teachers in England to engage with Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in their classrooms. They also wished to address the limited research on students’ perspectives of GIS. They undertook a longitudinal case study to explore how a program of GIS training, integrated within a 2-year advanced level geography examination course, develops students’ perceptions of the value and nature of GIS, their subsequent engagement with it, and its impact on their geographical knowledge. Initial findings of students’ perceptions of the value and nature of GIS suggested that they do not fully grasp the significance of GIS to them, their studies, or to geography more broadly. This formed the rationale for developing a strand of the research, which explicitly examined input from industry experts to provide avenues for students to see the relevance of GIS more clearly. The research was undertaken at a comprehensive school in rural England with one class of 16- to 17-year-old geography students as the case. The case comprised not only the students but also the different aspects of their study during this period such as input from the real-world GIS experts and the GIS resources they used and created. The study was framed as a theory-seeking case study, in which a range of qualitative data collection methods congruent with a (socially) constructivist approach to research were used

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over a 7-month period. The methods included questionnaires, interviews, naturalistic observation, and in-depth analysis of students’ work.

Approaches to Generalization The case study approach can be used by researchers from a range of theoretical perspectives. Their approach to research will necessarily affect how they conceptualize generalization within their work. The writing of a case report necessitates some generalization as details are simplified and patterns elucidated, but the debated issue is the extent to which generalization beyond the case is possible and desirable. If a case is seen as interesting and valuable in its own right, generalization beyond the case may not be sought. If a case is seen as illustrative of a wider phenomenon, then the writing of the case report involves some generalization beyond the case. It may be left to the reader to make links to the wider phenomenon as they have experienced it, a process that Stake refers to as naturalistic generalization, or it may be that the case study researcher suggests tentative predictions that can be tested out in other contexts by later studies. Bassey refers to these tentative predictions as fuzzy generalizations. Sometimes case study research has been criticized for focusing too much on the particular and not enabling generalization; however, the strength of case study research is the in-depth understanding of the particular, and it never extends statistical generalization to a wider population. Other research approaches, such as survey research, are good for that. As discussed above, some case study research enables tentative generalization outside the case, but a main aim of much case study research is to contribute to theoretical understanding. So, one piece of research may propose a theoretical understanding of a phenomenon, which can then be tested out in another case study in another context, and the theory refined or redeveloped. This process assumes that a number of researchers are working within the same broad field, using and building on each other’s work through cumulation. Cumulation can enable generalization to a progressively refined theory. In some fields where there are few people working, perhaps due to a lack of resources, there can be an issue with isolated case studies being produced but not built on, meaning that overall understanding is somewhat fragmented and slow to progress.

Methods of Data Collection in Case Study Research Case study researchers characteristically use multiple methods of collecting data, in order to provide different perspectives on the case in order to build up a rich and detailed understanding. As the timescale is broadly contemporary, the researcher spends considerable time within the case study context and usually takes extensive field notes (by hand or through digital means). The research diary encompasses factual and interpretive notes, reflections, and comments and is a key working document in most case study research (Fig. 1). These methods are usually supplemented by engaging with people through semistructured interviews and gaining context through documentary analysis. In addition, the researcher may draw on questionnaires, focus groups, visual methods, analysis of statistical records, and spatial analysis, depending on their topic, approach, and research questions. For example, in a study of English young people’s developing understandings of Japan, Liz Taylor used field notes, semistructured interviews, written reflections, visual methods, audio diaries, documentary analysis, and observation with video recording. This built up an in-depth understanding of the characteristics and processes of change in the young people’s representations of a distant place over a 4-month period.

Figure 1

Example of pages from a research diary.

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As case study researchers are aiming to develop an understanding of one case in depth, using a triangulation of methods is important. More than one data collection method is used to learn about each aspect of the phenomenon being studied. Depending on the view of epistemology taken by the researcher, triangulation can be constructed as a process of moving closer to the truth about the case or as a way of providing a complementary series of insights in which any disjunction is a focus of interest, rather than a problem to be resolved. Although a case study researcher will have a plan for data collection at the start of the fieldwork period, the nature of case study research also means that additional methods may be added in, or plans changed, as the researcher gains understanding of the complexity of the case and new opportunities for learning emerge. It is important to keep coming back to the overarching aim of the research, often expressed in research questions, to avoid getting sidetracked by elements that are interesting but not central to the intended focus.

Methods of Data Analysis in Case Study Research Data analysis can be undertaken in a variety of ways, as appropriate for the forms of data produced. A careful, iterative approach moving from parts to whole and producing key insights or interpretations, which are then checked back against data, is common to case study analysis. A challenge with case study is handling the volume of data generated. Some researchers prefer to work manually; others prefer to upload transcripts and other materials to a computer-based data storage system. Whichever method is chosen, it is important to be meticulous in recording and organizing the materials produced. A qualitative analysis computer program or manual methods may then be used for linking different sources or types of data, searching for key phrases and adding notes. The holistic nature of the data is important for all researchers, but approaches differ in the degree to which they break data down into smaller elements. Some researchers prefer not to use data coding, while others will code data at quite a general level, to note themes and enable easy navigation of common elements. Another group of researchers might pursue coding to a detailed level, perhaps using content analysis approaches with some elements of their data processing. Whatever approach is chosen, it is important to pursue detailed analysis of the data, looking for patterns and exceptions, following up questions, and testing out developing generalizations. Yin suggests five analytic techniques that can be used: pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-case synthesis. The process of writing, and the reflection it generates, is a key part of the analysis stage. This will start at an early point in the project time line as notes and memos are built up, reworked, and transformed into more formal accounts later. Time is spent in careful selection of key quotations or the writing of vignettes to communicate key aspects of the case, first to the researchers themselves and then to the audience for the final case study report. It is important to test out analytical interpretations against the data, and it can also be useful to present these to a critical friend to check out the robustness of the argument being made. When writing the final case study report, the researcher needs to balance breadth and depth in the reader’s understanding of the case. It is important to give a broad feel for the context and to present sufficient data to guard against suspicion of cherry-picking to support a priori assumptions. It is also important to communicate sufficient depth in selected key elements of the case so that the reader builds up a strong imagination of the case, and so that theoretical insights are shown to be based on a firm foundation of evidence. Particular elements of the case, such as key participants or events, can be presented as vignettes, detailed word portraits that enable a “sense” of the case to be communicated. Inevitably these vignettes are heavy on their demand for word count, so such approaches have to be used selectively and strategically in a published work.

Rigor and Quality in Case Study Research Defining and ensuring quality and rigor is important in all types of research. The ways in which communities of researchers agree on these characteristics of research vary, depending on how they see knowledge as being constructed. Yin uses concepts such as validity and reliability in connection with case study research, while Bassey prefers to use Guba and Lincoln’s concept of trustworthiness. Bassey suggests eight elements that will help establish trustworthiness in case study research: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Prolonged engagement with data sources Persistent observation of emerging issues Adequate checking of raw data sources Sufficient triangulation of raw data in the construction of analytical statements Systematic testing of the analytical statements Involvement of a critical friend in testing out the statements Sufficient detail in the account to give the reader confidence in the findings An audit trail available in the case record

While a key element of case study analysis and writing is the interpretation of a complex situation, the evidence on which writers have based their interpretations should also be carefully presented so that readers can differ in their conclusions and interpretations if they so wish. The final report should then be a high-quality account which does justice to the considerable time and effort spent on collecting and analyzing data about the case.

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Yin suggests the following criteria for an exemplary case study:

• • • • •

The case must be significant (ideally both important and interesting) The case study must be “complete” (comprehensive within the case boundaries, an exhaustive effort to collect relevant data, given the time needed for full investigation) The case study must consider alternative perspectives The case study must display sufficient evidence The case study report must be composed in an engaging manner

As with all research, it is very important to follow a high standard of ethical engagement throughout. A particular issue with case study research can be whether or not to give the case its real name in the final report or publication. For extreme or unusual cases, it can be very hard to protect the identity of the case without changing key details, which may compromise the usefulness of the case report. With more common cases, obscuring the real identity is easier; however, it may be that the gatekeepers of a case would actually prefer it to be named. In this case there may still be a need to safeguard the identity of participants, particularly young people or vulnerable adults. It is important that issues of naming are considered at the start of the planning stage and included in all processes of informed consent.

Using Case Studies in Teaching There is a long tradition of using case studies in geography teaching. These case studies are usually relatively short accounts based on primary or secondary data, with an explicitly educational aim. Given the almost-infinite range and complexity of world geography, choices have to be made in lessons and curricula to balance breadth and depth. Even when geography courses aim at world coverage, some places have to be chosen for a greater focus than others. When courses are organized by theme, place-based case studies are commonly used to provide examples or illustrations of that theme. In English geography textbooks, discrete case studies of smaller-scale locations became increasingly evident from the late 1940s. Some textbooks in the 1970s were made up entirely of very detailed, local scale case studies, for example, of particular factories, farms, villages, or transport hubs. While these texts had the advantage of presenting a detailed, real-world picture of a particular place, there was a danger that the student’s geographical imagination of the world could be somewhat fragmented, and the student would lack the wider-scale understanding through which to contextualize the case studies. More recent books and syllabuses tend to blend instruction on geographical themes with locational understanding and case studies at a range of scales. At more senior levels of education, case study data can be used collaboratively with students to integrate research into classroom instruction. Hardwick describes how students can also be asked to conduct their own research projects modeled around the case study approach. In this way, an in-depth understanding of local issues can be linked to larger global challenges.

Conclusion This article has described some key aspects of case study methodology, including choice of the case, different types of case study approach, and selection of methods for data collection and analysis. It has raised some important areas of decision for the case study researcher, including the nature and extent of generalization, how to bound the case and how to ensure and to demonstrate quality and rigor. An example from geography education research was given to illustrate some of these issues, and consideration was given to use of case studies within geography education. Case study has considerable potential as a research method, both alongside large-scale quantitative studies and as an in-depth study in its own right. It is a rewarding methodology to undertake due to the depth of knowledge generated about a particular situation. This familiarity enables the researcher to develop insight and understanding, which can be distilled into theory. It is important that small-scale studies are cumulated to generate maximum understanding and to test out theories in order to advance knowledge within a field.

Further Reading Bassey, M., 1999. Case Study Research in Educational Settings. Open University Press, Buckingham, England. Flick, U., 2004. Triangulation in qualitative research. In: Flick, U., von Kardorff, E., Steinke, I. (Eds.), A Companion to Qualitative Research. Sage Publications Ltd, London, pp. 178–183. Hardwick, S., 2009. Case study approach. In: Richardson, M., Castree, N., Goodchild, M., Kobayashi, A., Liu, W., Marston, R. (Eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Geography. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Simons, H., 2009. Case Study Research in Practice. Sage Publications Ltd, London. Stake, R., 1995. The Art of Case Study Research. Sage Publications Ltd, London. Taylor, L., 2011. Investigating change in young people’s understandings of Japan: a study of learning about a distant place. Br. Educ. Res. J. 37 (6), 1033–1054. Taylor, L., 2013. Spotlight on. Case studies. Geography 98 (2), 100–104. Taylor, L., 2016. Case study methodology. In: Clifford, N., Cope, M., Gillespie, T., French, S. (Eds.), Key Methods in Geography, third ed. Sage Publications Ltd, London, pp. 581–595.

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Thomas, G., 2016. How to Do Your Case Study, second ed. Sage Publications Ltd, London. Tight, M., 2017. Understanding Case Study Research. Sage Publications Ltd, London. Walshe, N., 2017. Developing trainee teacher practice with geographical information systems (GIS). J. Geogr. High. Educ. 41 (4), 608–628. Walshe, N., Healy, G., 2017. School students’ perceptions of the value and nature of GIS: informing curriculum development and pedagogical practice. In: IGU-CGE (International Geographical Union - Commission for Geography Education), Integrating Knowledge and Understanding in Geography Education. Lisbon, Portugal, 26–28 October 2017. Yin, R., 2018. Case Study Research, sixth ed. Sage Publications Inc., Los Angeles.

Cellular Automata Yan Liu and Jonathan Corcoran, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Yongjiu Feng, Tongji University, Shanghai, China © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by P. M. Torrens, volume 2, pp 1–4, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Agent-based modeling Is computer modeling for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous agents (either individual or collective entities such as organizations or groups) with a view to assessing their effects on the system. Cellular automata Is a type of discrete model consisting of a cell-grid where each cell is in one of a number of well-defined states which evolves through discrete time steps according to rules based on the states of neighboring cells. It is studied in computer science, mathematics, physics, geography, complexity science, theoretical biology, and microstructure modeling. Model calibration Is the process of adjusting model parameters and forcing within the margins of the uncertainties to obtain a model that satisfies preagreed criteria (goodness-of-fit or cost function). Model validation Is the process of testing a simulation model with a set of sample data different from those applied to model calibration and evaluating the output with the ultimate goal of producing accurate and credible results.

The conception and implementation of cellular automata (CA) dates back to the dawn of digital computation when Alan Turing first demonstrated that computers, through their software, could embody rules that could “reproduce” themselves (Batty 1997: 267). CA were first proposed in 1943 by Stanislaw Ulam and John von Neumann, working on the Manhattan Project (Hachinski, 2001). At this time, Ulam suggested that simple CA could be found in sets of local rules that generated mathematical patterns in both two-dimensional and three-dimensional space and global order could be produced from local actions. Inspired by Ulam, von Neumann constructed a complex self-producing machine with a two-dimensional cell space, with each cell having 1 of 29 states operating within a small four-cell neighborhood consisting of the East/South/West/North adjacent cells. von Neumann proved that with his machine, mathematically any particular pattern or blueprint would make endless copies of itself within the given cellular space. von Neumann’s work set alight the field in the 1950s, initiating the scientific study of CA. However, CA did not rise to prominence until John Conway invented the board game Life in the early 1970s. Life became popular after it was presented in Martin Gardner’s “Mathematical Games” column in Scientific American, which led to a much more serious effort to apply CA to replicate real systems. Tobler (1975, 1979) pioneered this work in the geographic systems domain. Parallel developments from remote sensing (where pixel arrays are the analogue), from fractal geometries, and from raster-based geographic information systems supported the effort in applications to ecological, urban, and regional systems. These applications expanded greatly two decades later in the mid-1990s when computers had become truly graphic and studies on complexity theory, self-organization, and chaos had reached fever pitch (Batty et al., 1997).

CA Principals and Mathematical Formation CA are discrete dynamic systems in which space is tessellated into regular spatial cells and time progresses in discrete steps. Each cell in the system has one of a finite number of states. The state of each cell at a given time depends on its own state and the states of its neighbors at the previous time step through a set of locally defined transition rules. Mathematically, CA can be represented as:   t t (1) Stþ1 xij ¼ f Sxij ; SUij where Stxij and Stþ1 xij represent the state of a cell xij at a location (i, j) at time t and tþ1, respectively, both of which belong to a finite number of states of cells in the cellular space; Uij represents a set of cells in the neighborhood of cell xij; StUij represents the states of the neighboring cells at time t; f is a function representing a set of transition rules. The generic structure for CA models is typically guided by five basic principles. First, the system is defined by a set of cells that vary across different dimensions, are usually regular, and are often contiguous in that the lattice of such cells occupies the entire space. Second, each cell has a state that defines its function, and the dynamics of the system are such that the cells change state through time. Third, the state of each cell is considered with respect to its neighborhood, usually contiguous and adjacent to the cell in question. Fourth, the dynamics of the automata are such that a series of rules that apply to each cell and its neighborhood, and these determine the way in which the state of a neighborhood changes. Fifth, an all-embracing principle of uniformity and universality applies to the CA in that the operation of the rules occurs for every cell and for every discrete time period over which the

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model operates. These principles can be relaxed from their strictest form when applied to systems requiring realistic irregularities in cellular representation and much wider influences with respect to the size of the neighborhoods affecting changes in cell states. Various properties of geographic phenomena and systems may be mapped to these principles. Cells can be used to represent an almost limitless range of geographic “things”, from cars and land parcels to ecosystem ranges and microorganisms. Cells can take on any geographic form related to the spatial boundary of an entity and this might be regular (squares, hexagons, triangles) or irregular. The boundary can convey information of direct geographic significance, such as the edges of property ownership, the footprint of a vehicle, or outer walls of a microorganism. Neighborhoods are used to represent the spatial (and temporal) boundary of processes that influence those entities: It is usually based on first nearest neighbors; in more relaxed versions of these models, sometimes called cell-space models, the neighborhoods are much larger, more like fields around the cell in question. States are used to ascribe attributes to cellular entities such as a parcel’s land use, a car’s velocity, or the preferred glyconutrient for a human cell. The states can be tied directly to phenomena that act within and/or on the cell and the larger system that it exists within. The transition rules tie all of these components together; they are the glue that binds cells, states, and neighborhoods. CA, like all automata, are universal computers. Given enough time, resources, and the right rule-set, they should be capable of supporting any computable statement. CA should, in theory, be able to simulate virtually anything. This lends terrific power to the transition rules in CA modeling, where the calibration and validation of these rules become critical.

CA Modeling Assumptions and Calibration The aim of CA modeling is to capture the influence of their neighboring entities and external forces through a set of rules in order to generate meaningful patterns that represent possible paths the system being simulated can take in the future. If well designed, CA models can inform on the processes that govern the spatial evolution of geographic processes and change dynamics, and can be used to explore future outcomes through the testing of alternative scenarios. However, to be useful, the architecture and implementation of these models, along with their underpinning assumptions, must be stated in an explicit way in order to be understood and evaluated by the scientific and users’ communities. Four key assumptions in geographical CA modeling are as follows: Assumption 1: The spatial units used in CA models adequately represent the meaningful geographical entities that compose the system being simulated; Assumption 2: The neighborhood adequately corresponds to the area of influence of each spatial unit composing the system being simulated; Assumption 3: The historical dataset used for the construction of CA models is of good quality, has been acquired at the right time and at the right spatial scale for model calibration and validation; and Assumption 4: The transition rules built from historical datasets adequately capture the dynamic processing of the system being modeled and these rules remain consistent over time. Over the past four or so decades, CA modeling has advanced from the use of arbitrary, fixed cell grid representation to irregular, flexible entity-based representations, and from a rigid topologically based neighborhood definition to a flexible semantic definition adapted to each entity being represented. Research has also demonstrated that the quality of the datasets used for the CA calibration can greatly affect the simulation results. In addition, the temporal stationarity is uncommon in many geographic and land-use systems and that this may affect the performance of CA models. As such, the calibration and validation of CA modeling is critical to address each of the assumptions and involves determining the parameter values which specify the model’s rules to particular applications. Numerous calibration techniques have been applied ranging from simple statistical and probabilistic methods such as logistic regression and multivariate analysis to more sophisticated computational intelligence techniques such as artificial neural networks (ANN), genetic algorithm, machine learning, and support vector machines (SVM), to name a few. Systematic comparison of a suite of methods has been conducted. Interactive and visual methods including some based on fuzzy logic that provide geographically meaningful rules have been proposed. In addition, techniques to validate the extent of both the quantity and location of change predicted by CA models that can be trusted have also been proposed. Validation which is usually defined as ensuring that the model code is functioning correctly is becoming a more significant part of the process of model development as more CA models with different software requirements and diverse data structures emerge. In practice, model validation usually reports how well the simulated results match the actual results to provide end-users with the confidence to employ model outputs. However, many methods focus on the assessment of the end-state of simulated maps rather than the change that occurred across the simulated timeframe. In addition, metrics used to assess model performance cannot be used to mutually compare different CA models across different areas; as a result, a neutral benchmark method that contains the CA’s bottom-up mechanism is needed to evaluate how well CA models capture the dynamics in complex geographical phenomena. Meanwhile, model assessment usually relies on the spatial scale and thematic scale that are used in CA modeling, making it difficult to compare simulations across geographic and temporal scales. Focusing on change assessment, a variety of methods that are free of scaling effects are needed in order to be able to compare between different CA models as well as across different simulations and predictions.

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Applications of CA Modeling in Geographic Research CA modeling has been applied in the study of a wide range of geographic phenomena that transcend a number of disciplinary areas, including human geography, economic geography, transport geography, physical geography, landscape ecology, and the social sciences more broadly. Human and economic geography applications of CA are largely focused on urban issues that relate to urban expansion and more recently to a diverse range of urban change processes, including urban shrinkage, gentrification and densification, urban regeneration, as well as vertical urban growth. In this regard, it also involves the application of agent-based models (ABM) that employ cellular representations and complex model calibration routines. Some models developed by economists also rely heavily on CA to represent processes of urban agglomeration. In addition, CA modeling provides useful comparison of alternative scenarios of urban futures under a suite of complex conditions, aiming to support urban planning schemes and cross-cutting socioeconomic strategies. CA models have also been used to address diverse aspects of human geography including sociospatial segregation, residential mobility, and disease propagation to name only a select few. In sociospatial segregation modeling, cells are equipped with states that correspond to ethnicities, and rules based on preferences for colocation in space are used to show how small biases can quickly lead to large-scale segregation from random initial conditions. More recent models of residential mobility follow similar schemes, with rules designed to introduce more elaborate mechanisms based on spatial choice and dissonance. Individual-based models on traffic simulation largely apply agent approaches, but recent studies show that CA are powerful in simulating potential collapse of urban traffic network. Cells are used to represent vehicles and pedestrians in these instances, with movement formulated by proxy using transition rules that pass the presence of these entities as state information between cells based on heuristics designed to mimic lane-changing, collision avoidance, stopping, queuing, and junction navigation. Cellbased traffic simulations provide us with new understandings of the mechanics of traffic flow and also points toward possible solutions for emergency evacuation planning. CA models are also popular in physical geography research. CA have been applied to model forest insect infestation across different landscapes, to simulate the dispersal of airborne pollutants and the dynamic spatial structure of complex ecological systems, and to model and predict the occurrence and spread of bushfires. In climate and meteorology studies, the global climate models (GCMs) and general circulation models function as CA models at a global level. At a macrolevel, GCMs are divided into large cellular grids composed of cells of around 1 degree of latitude and longitude in size. Various models simulate the internal climatic dynamics within these cells, but the results are generally exchanged through the larger grid on simple CA schemes. CA are efficient tools for representing processes of geomorphological transport and feature as the geographic engine in models of particle movement. CA are used in a similar fashion as the mechanism of mobilization in models of wind transport for snow movement and dune formation. Transition rules are naturally accommodating of calculus-based equations in these applications. CA models that are fundamentally geographic are also widely used in landscape ecology, ecosystem security, and environmental risk studies to simulate the patterns of natural resources and ecological environments, and their possible future scenarios. CA are particularly useful in infusing geography into other disciplinary areas including ecology, biology, economics, and the social sciences, more generally. More specifically, CA embedding space–time representations have been used in anthropology to model the formation of societies and in political science and sociology to explore civil violence. As Big Data associated with the use of smart phone technologies and online communities grow, CA will no doubt continue to extend its visibility and demonstrate its value across broader swaths of the social sciences. In particular, it will highlight the ways in which we can explore and better understand the complexities of our human, economic, and environmental systems and be employed to help provide new insight and evidence to solve the “wicked” global challenges we currently face.

Future Directions in CA Modeling There exist a number of avenues that would appear fruitful for CA modeling and more specifically, for the CA modeling community to pursue. The first of these is to focus on the creation of models that are better able to capture the multidimensional processes of urban development. These processes might include [but certainly not restricted to] urban regeneration, densification and gentrification, in-fill development, along with urban shrinkage, as well as vertical urban development. A second future direction might include efforts to embed the complexities of individual human decision behavior within the CA modeling framework. A useful strategy that some scholars have begun to explore in this regard is the integration of ABM and CA, but where more research is needed. A third focus concerns the exploration and potential use of new sources of Big Data to better capture the role played by human actors in driving the spatial and temporal evolution of environmental and human systems. The final cross-cutting theme is the ongoing need to revisit and strengthen the way that theory is employed to explain the change dynamics of geographic phenomena in CA-based models.

See Also: Chaos and Complexity; Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT); Quantitative Methodologies; Simulation Modeling; Spatial Science.

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Further Reading Anderson, T., Dragicevic, S., 2018. Network-agent based model for simulating the dynamic spatial network structure of complex ecological systems. Ecol. Model. 389, 19–32. Batty, M., Couclelis, H., Eichen, M., 1997. Urban systems as cellular automata. Environ. Plan. Plan. Des. 24 (2), 159–164. Benenson, I., Torrens, P.M., 2004. Geosimulation: Automata-Based Modeling of Urban Phenomena. Wiley, London. Clarke, K.C., 2014. Cellular automata and agent-based models. In: Fischer, M.M., Nijkamp, P. (Eds.), Handbook of Regional Science. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelber, pp. 1217–1233. Couclelis, H., 1985. Cellular worlds: A frame work for modeling micro–macro dynamics. Environ. Plan.: Econ. Space 17, 585–596. Deutsch, A., Dormann, S., 2004. Cellular Automaton Modeling of Biological Pattern Formation. Birkhauser, Boston. D’Ambrosio, D., DiGregorio, S., Iovine, G., 2003. Simulating debris flows through a hexagonal cellular automata model: SCIDDICAS3-hex. Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. 3, 545–559. Feng, Y., Tong, X., 2019. A new cellular automata framework of urban growth modeling by incorporating statistical and heuristic methods. Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Sci. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13658816.2019.1648813. Guy, E., White, R., Uljee, I., Drazan, P., 1995. Using cellular automata for integrated modelling of socio-environmental systems. Environ. Monit. Assess. 30, 203–214. Heppenstall, A.J., Crooks, A.T., See, L.M., Batty, M. (Eds.), 2011. Agent-based Models of Geographical Systems. Springer Science & Business Media. Koziatek, O., Dragicevic, S., 2017. iCity 3D: a geosimualtion method and tool for three-dimensional modeling of vertical urban development. Landsc. Urban Plan. 167, 356–367. Liu, Y., 2008. Modelling Urban Development with Geographical Information Systems and Cellular Automata. CRC Press, New York. McGarigal, K., Plunkett, E.B., Willey, L.L., Compton, B.W., DeLuca, W.V., Grand, J., 2018. Modeling non-stationary urban growth: the SPRAWL model and the ecological impacts of development. Landsc. Urban Plan. 177, 178–190. Olmos, L.E., Çolak, S., Shafiei, S., Saberi, M., González, M.C., 2018. Macroscopic dynamics and the collapse of urban traffic. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 115 (50), 12654–12661. Pontius Jr., R.G., Huffaker, D., Denman, K., 2004. Useful techniques of validation for spatially explicit land-change models. Ecol. Model. 179 (4), 445–461. Stevens, D., Dragicevic, S.A., 2007. GIS-based irregular cellular automata model of land-use change. Environ. Plan. Plan. Des. 34 (4), 708–724. Tobler, W., 1970. A computer movie simulating urban growth in the Detroit region. Econ. Geogr. 46 (2), 234–240. Torrens, P.M., 2010. Geography and computational social science. Geojournal 75 (2), 133–148. Vandewalle, N., Galam, S., 1999. Ripples versus giant dunes in a saltation-avalanche model. Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 10 (6), 1071–1076. White, R., Engelen, G., Uljee, I., 2015. Modeling Cities and Regions as Complex Systems: From Theory to Planning Applications. MIT Press. Wolfram, S., 2002. A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media, Inc, Champaign, IL.

Relevant Websites A Science of Cities: http://www.complexcity.info/. Geocomputation: http://www.geocomputation.org. Geosimulation: http://www.geosimulation.org. The Bartlett Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis, University College London: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/casa/. Spatial Analysis and Modeling (SAM) Laboratory, Simon Fraser University: http://www.sfu.ca/dragicevic/. The SLEUTH model: http://ncgia.ucsb.edu/projects/metadata/standard/uses/sleuth.html. TRANSIMS: Transportation Analysis and Simulation System: https://www.osti.gov/biblio/111917-transims-transportation-analysis-simulation-system. Wolfram Research: http://www.wolfram.com. Land Change Modeller (LCM) at Clark Labs: https://clarklabs.org/terrset/land-change-modeler/. The CLUE model (CLUE, CLUE-S, Dyna-CLUE, and CLUE-Scanner): https://www.environmentalgeography.nl/site/data-models/data/clue-model/. DINAMICA EGO for environmental modelling: https://csr.ufmg.br/dinamica/. METRONAMICA: A tool to simulate and assess the integrated effects of planning measures on urban and regional development: http://metronamica.nl/. Other Free CA Modeling Software CelLab: https://www.fourmilab.ch/cellab/. Great software for cellular automata: http://xahlee.info/math_software/ca.html. CA software repository: http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/genaro/Cellular_Automata_Repository/Software.html. Urban CA: A modelling tool integrating CA, statistical and heuristic methods: https://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11335.14242. SimlandeR: A cellular automata land use model for the R software environment: https://simlander.wordpress.com/. FLUS-CA: Future land use simulation model: http://www.geosimulation.cn/FLUS.html. Predator-Prey Cellular Automaton: https://web.njit.edu/matveev/Javascript/jjj.html.

Census Geography Wardlow Friesen, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Big Data Extremely large data sets that may be analyzed by powerful computers to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human behavior and interactions. Big Data may also refer to the study and applications of these data sets. Census Error Errors which affect reliability of census data, often following predictable patterns. Census Moment The moment at which the census is said to have taken place, even though enumeration probably takes place before and after this time. De Facto Enumeration The enumeration of people according to their location at census moment. De Jure Enumeration The enumeration of people according to their usual residence. Geodemographics Analysis of demographic data using relatively small spatial units. Politics of Participation Political aspects of participating in a census, including issues of representation, identity, and confidentiality. Post-enumeration Survey Sample survey usually taken soon after a census, to estimate the degree of undercount and its characteristics. Undercount The tendency for a census to miss a proportion of the population.

Census geography involves not only the spatiality of census taking and analysis, as defined by some statistical agencies, but also takes account of the implementation and techniques used by geographers and others in census analysis as well as the applications to which census data are put. This wider definition of census geography also moves beyond the descriptive to assess some political contexts of the census process. A census is usually differentiated from a social or population survey by the fact that a census should enumerate (or attempt to enumerate) the total population of an area. Most population censuses are undertaken with a housing or household component as well. Since a census is normally taken at a single point in time, census data provide a cross-sectional view of a population, in contrast to a longitudinal approach, which collects data on individuals or households through time. There is some debate as to whether mixed forms of population registration and enumeration, which have replaced a full census in some countries, should be described as a census.

Census Implementation History of Census Taking It is not known when the first census was taken, but there is evidence of census taking nearly 6000 years ago, with occurrences recorded in Egypt, China, Babylonia, Palestine, and Rome. Early censuses were undertaken especially for the purpose of military conscription but were also used for purposes of taxation and labor requirements of the state. Thus, in most cases, enumeration only involved adult male citizens. A modern census is one that meets standards of completeness, accuracy, and simultaneity (discussed further below). Modern censuses also have broader purposes than the earlier censuses, and these include government planning for provision of services and often the determination of electoral boundaries. The first modern census is sometimes attributed to Sweden in 1749, but there were earlier censuses with modern attributes undertaken in Nouvelle-France (Quebec), Acadia (Nova Scotia), and some of the Italian principalities. In the late 18th Century and through the 19th Century, many other countries initiated full censuses: United States (1790), Spain (1798), England (1801), France (1801), Ireland (1811), Norway (1815), Australia (1828), Greece (1836), New Zealand (1851), Switzerland (1860), Italy (1861), and Canada (1871). Through the 20th Century some colonial powers initiated censuses in their territories, although in some cases full censuses were not undertaken until independence. By the end of the century, national censuses had become the norm for nation-states. In the 2010 round of census taking (2005–14), 214 nations and territories undertook at least one census, including those based on traditional full enumeration, registration/administrative data, or a combination of both. The 21 nations that did not undertake a census tended to be very small nations or those with serious political problems such as civil war. The imperative for comprehensive data in the 2020 round of censuses has been emphasized by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), since monitoring of progress for the Sustainable Development Goals implemented in 2016 requires a greater range of variables than the earlier Millennium Development Goals. A new trend in recent years should be noted. The last full enumeration census in the Netherlands was in 1971 and in Sweden in 1990, and other mainly European countries have followed suit. For example, Denmark and Finland have population registers, and

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these are combined with data from other administrative records. In 2004, France introduced a system in which data are gathered in successive annual collections rotating through municipalities every 5 years; these systems have replaced the comprehensive census. The American Community Survey (ACS) is administered annually to a sample of areas throughout the United States, with no household being sampled more than once in 5 years, and it was the justification for using only a limited number of variables in the full 2010 census. Such approaches are likely to be adopted in other countries where registration systems are comprehensive, but may not be possible in many other countries with less comprehensive systems and where certain privacy regulations are in place. These issues are further discussed below.

Objectives and Design of a Modern Census In many countries, there is legislation that regulates the implementation and analysis of the national census. A primary legislative function of many censuses is to allow equitable construction of electoral boundaries, which are often redrawn after each census. Most censuses also have objectives related to planning for the provision of services such as education and health, the development of a skilled labor force, and a range of other economic and social purposes. In order to fulfill these objectives, most modern censuses are designed to be:

• • • •

universal: the total population should be enumerated; compulsory: all residents are obliged to take part in census enumeration; comprehensive: ideally a large number of variables should be collected, although in some recent censuses only a limited number of variables are collected from the total population, and a sample of the population is enumerated more extensively (e.g., US census in 2010 obtained full enumeration for 10 basic variables, and more detailed information was collected in the rolling enumeration of the ACS); and simultaneous: the census should take place within a short period of time for the whole population to allow comparability; there is often a precise census moment (e.g., midnight on a particular date). The most notable exception to this is the census of France (see below).

The periodicity (frequency) of censuses varies considerably between countries. The five largest countries by population in the worlddChina, India, United States, Indonesia, and Brazil, undertake censuses every 10 years (India in years ending in 1; the others in years ending in 0). Before the rolling census was introduced in 2005, the French census was carried out every 6 to 9 years, sometimes, but not always, approximating the presidential electoral cycle. Although UK censuses occur every 10 years, those in many ex-British territories (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have followed a five-year cycle, although the electoral cycle in those countries is shorter than this. Political events in some countries have resulted in great variability between census years (e.g., Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sudan). The Myanmar census held in 2014 was the first for 31 years. In the attempt to achieve universal and synchronous enumeration, the timing of a census is important. It should avoid periods of extreme weather (although Finland uses New Year’s Eve), significant cultural and religious events, and periods of high levels of resident mobility. Enumeration coverage (who should be enumerated) is also an issue. A de facto enumeration (e.g., UK) records people according to the place they are at census moment, whereas a de jure enumeration (e.g., US) records the usual residence of a person. The problem with the de facto approach is that it may incorporate many people who are not usually residents (e.g., tourists) and so may be less relevant to planning and other purposes of the census. The problem with the de jure approach is that while it may reassign enumerated residents to their usual place of residence, this is not possible for usual residents who are outside of the country at the time of enumeration (unless they are intercepted at the border on their return). In some countries, both de facto and de jure data are collected and analyzed. To encourage international comparability, the United Nations has proposed a standardized range of variables that should be collected in a census, including age, sex, birthplace, citizenship, language, education, economic status, family structure, fertility, and a number of others. In practice, however, a great range of different information is collected by different countries. Although most censuses aim to be as comprehensive as possible, the number and nature of variables collected depend on financial and human resources available for enumeration and analysis, as well as political, social, and cultural considerations. Also, in countries with large sectors of the population with limited levels of education, it is necessary to create questions which are readily comprehensible to both the enumerated and enumerator. Political considerations include the desirability of convincing the population that questions are not designed to allow agencies of government to use census information for purposes of cross-checking on aspects such as income, welfare benefit payment, and military service. Social and cultural considerations include sensitivities about questions perceived as private such as questions relating to personal behavior or characteristics such as fertility, smoking, disability, or religion. In some censuses, such questions are optional.

Role of Government and Politics of Participation Even in countries that have implemented neoliberal reforms in which some functions of government have been privatized, the central statistical agencies that implement censuses have remained under government control (although often with a legislated degree of autonomy). The role of government is critical to the implementation of a compulsory census, but this role also creates problems in relation to participation.

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The politics of participation is complex, and those who object to the census may include religious groups, libertarians, and anarchists that object to being enumerated in line with their aversion to participation in most aspects of government. Moreover, as social researchers, marketers, market researchers, credit rating agencies, and spammers of all varieties have become increasingly intrusive using new online platforms, census enumeration may be classed by some along with these other intrusions. On a general level, many governments have responded to these intrusions by strengthening privacy legislation, and more specifically by increasing the provisions for confidentiality within the census collection and dissemination processes. Most recent censuses have been preceded by publicity campaigns emphasizing the public-good aspects of a census and the strict provisions for confidentiality. Nevertheless, in even the most successful of censuses there are individuals within the population who will be missed (and occasionally counted twice), and other errors related to individual and household characteristics will enter into the census process. Thus, it is necessary to consider the process of census enumeration and analysis in more detail.

Census Enumeration and Analysis Although enumeration and analysis are generally considered as separate stages of the census process, technological changes have resulted in the boundaries between these processes becoming blurred since many of the same issues are found in both. The basic units of enumeration of most population censuses are the individual and the household. These are also the most common units of census analysis, but analysis may also be undertaken by aggregation within and beyond households to use other units including family and community. In the past, spatial units of enumeration and analysis have largely been constructed to facilitate effective enumeration and to serve legislative and administrative purposes at analysis. Increasingly, with the use of geographic information systems, small spatial units are seen as building blocks to devise aggregated spatial units custom-made for almost any purpose. Other administrative and political units such as suburbs, wards, cities, districts, counties, regions, states, and provinces are still important in the process of census data analysis and dissemination.

Methods of Enumeration A great deal of effort is put into the design and testing of questionnaires before enumeration begins, and the success of census enumeration and analysis depends on the quality of questionnaire design. Well-designed census questions include those which are succinct, not open ended, and do not ask leading questions. Although census enumeration in theory takes place at a specific point in time (census moment), in reality, enumeration takes place over days or weeks in order to gather information about the particular census moment. In the 20th Century, the two most common methods of enumeration in a comprehensive census were enumerator-based distribution of questionnaires (using either direct interviewer or canvasser method, or the self-enumeration or householder method) and postal distribution of questionnaires (which inevitably involves self-enumeration but might include telephone follow-up). In the United States, distribution and collection were by post; in Spain, Italy, Australia, and New Zealand both were done by enumerators; and in Canada and the United Kingdom distribution of forms was done by an enumerator and return was by post. In many less-developed countries there is much more reliance on direct interviewer (face to face) methods such as the canvassers in India who fill out the forms themselves. An interesting combination of old and new methods was the first “digital” census in Malawi in 2018, in which 15,000 tablets were used for enumeration, and generally the digital forms were completed by the enumerators rather than the enumerated. In an attempt to make the enumeration process more cost-effective, and less demanding for most of those enumerated, some countries have implemented a long form and short form system. The United States census has used a long form and a short form since 1980, and in 2010 there was only the short form, supplemented by the rolling enumeration of the ACS. The 2000 and 2010 censuses of China also adopted the dual form system, allowing a comprehensive coverage of the population in the short form, and an increased number of variables enumerated in the long form, administered to 10% of the population. For more developed countries in the 21st Century, online enumeration (an e-census) is becoming increasingly common. Countries including Australia, Canada, Estonia, New Zealand, and Poland introduced an e-census as their primary enumeration method in recent years, but this is usually combined with paper-based enumeration. Outcomes have been variable. The interim target for Canada in 2011 was 40% online enumeration, but the outcome was 54%. In some cases, e-censuses have not gone to plan. The 2016 Australian census website was closed down on the night of the census as a result of software that was not able to defend the website against cyberattack. Nevertheless, nearly two-thirds of the population completed their census forms online and there was an overall response rate of about 95%. The 2018 New Zealand census had no similar software problems, and while 82% of people responded online, a better-than-expected response, the total response was only about 90%, representing an undercount of about twice that of previous censuses.

Population Coverage and Undercount Although the ideal of census agencies is a 100% enumeration, most censuses fall short of that figure, and the rate of response is partly dependent on whether a census is compulsory. Although participation in the census in most countries is in theory

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compulsory, in reality it is not always possible to enforce. In the United States census of 2010, which relied more on promotion than compulsion, the final response rate by mail was 74%, although enumerators were then dispatched to find households that had not replied. Even in countries where compulsory participation is more rigorously enforced, some individuals will be missed, and a few mobile individuals may be counted more than once, so that the net effect is a population undercount. A post-enumeration survey (PES) is the most common way of estimating the accuracy of census, coverage not only in terms of population undercount but also in relation to particular characteristics of the population. A PES is based on intensive sampling of particular populations and areas usually soon after the census itself to estimate the proportion of population missed by census enumeration. Target groups may include the homeless, people whose occupation or other life activity involves regular movement, and people temporarily absent from their usual residence at census moment. Target areas may include areas with relatively lower educational levels, areas with higher numbers of undocumented migrants, and remote areas. There is a significant politics surrounding population coverage and undercount. Since undercounts are more likely in areas of lower socioeconomic status, if these are not rectified by a PES or similar instrument, there may be a number of disadvantages for such areas. Since most electoral systems are based on proportional representation, such an area will be underrepresented in the political system. Further, in countries such as the United States where public funding is allocated according to population, funding for health, education, and other social purposes from federal and state sources will be reduced if the undercount is not considered.

Sources of Census Error Data errors may occur when a respondent has provided incorrect or ambiguous information or when data are being coded and entered. Respondent errors fall into several categories:

• • •

accidental inaccuracies, for example, visitors overlooked, babies forgotten, and questions misunderstood; intentional misrepresentations, for example, hiding of undocumented migrants and misreporting of income; and variables with inherent ambiguity, for example, ethnicity (see below).

Errors related to coding and entering of data may be simply technical mistakes, but they also may relate to problems with classification of particular variables, and examples discussed below include classification of households and families, and classification of ethnicity and religion.

Geographies and Politics of Households and Family Although households have served as one of the two basic units of census enumeration, they represent a complex series of debates within the social science literature. In articles published in Progress in Human Geography there has been an ongoing debate about the pivotal role of the household in shaping the geographies of gender, home, and everyday life. For example, studies of urban gentrification and its relationship to population dynamics have been enriched by the investigation of household-level change. This debate incorporates the so-called second demographic revolution which has been hypothesized around the deinstitutionalization of the nuclear (heterosexual) family, and the increasing importance of a variety of other family types. Outcomes of this demographic shift include more single-parent and one-person households, declining average household size, and a greater variety of individual and family transitions between different household structures. Thus ways in which enumeration and classification of households and families are carried out in a census influence the nature of the social research that is possible. In many censuses, a household is synonymous with a dwelling, although more than one household may exist within a single dwelling. Also significant is the fact that some households may exist between more than one dwelling, even between countries as the concept of transnational households proposes. There are even greater difficulties in attempting to capture family relationships within a census. Censuses often attempt this through identifying the relationship of each individual in a household to a primary individual. In some cases there is an identifiable “head,” in the past the male parent of a nuclear family, but with the rise of feminist perspectives and the decline in the centrality of the nuclear family, many censuses have abandoned the use of this concept for some other proxy. The US census refers to this primary individual as person 1, but this rank does not always allow the reconstruction of family types within a household, so many households are classified as being comprised of “mixed individuals” or something equivalent.

Politics of Classification: Ethnicity and Religion Two of the most contentious of census variables are race/ethnicity and religion. On one level, contention relates to the perception that these are private and sensitive issues, and many censuses present a question on religion as optional. More fundamentally, especially in the case of ethnicity, the politics of classification are significant, since “ethnicity” is a term incorporating aspects of language, heritage, birthplace, nationality, cultural ritual and symbols, and religion. The purposes of census questions on race or ethnicity are various. In colonial societies, the identification and classification of race was justified on the grounds of science, welfare assessment, service provision, and in the case of South Africa, a mechanism to administer apartheid. Many modern censuses collect data on race/ethnicity,

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usually for purposes of services and related planning, but in some cases also for broader reasons related to the rights of and resource allocations for indigenous peoples. Earlier censuses presented classifications of race in a biologically deterministic way. Questions often asked what proportion of a person’s “blood” was derived from a particular “race” with results sometimes presented in fractions. Most recent censuses have used self-declared “ethnicity,” “ethnic background,” or “ancestry.” Nevertheless, during the enumeration and analysis stages, the classification of these responses is fraught with difficulties. During enumeration, a set number of categories may be presented, purportedly representing the predominant ethnicities of a country, usually with the option to specify one or more “other” categories. Listed categories tend to be chosen over those not listed, and the self-identified “other” tends to produce some spurious responses. There are differences of opinion as to what constitutes an ethnicity. Those who analyze ethnic data maintain that Canadian or Australian are nationalities rather than ethnicities since they do not allow any differentiation between indigenous groups nor between various linguistic and cultural groups, but there are many who prefer those identities because of long-term residence in the country in question or because of the complexities of multiple ethnic origins.

Census Applications A vast range of demographic, socioeconomic, and related analyses are based on census data, and those mentioned here are only indicative. In the past, census data were accessed through published volumes, but currently digital outputs predominate, ranging from online tabulations to customized data runs and the use of data labs. Data labs allow analysis down to the level of individual records, usually involving strict conditions of confidentiality. Two examples of these are the PUMS (Public Use Microdata Samples) in the United States and the SARs (Samples of Anonymised Records) in the United Kingdom.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Analyses The mainstays of demographic analysis are fertility and mortality. In countries with birth registration systems, fertility rates are usually calculated from these data combined with census data on the cohorts of women of reproductive age. Birth registration systems usually collect a limited range of information related to the characteristics of the mother such as place of residence, age, and ethnicity, but censuses that collect fertility information such as age at first birth, ever born children, etc. allow analysis using a much greater range of variables than is possible with the birth registration data. Also, in many less-developed countries, vital registration systems are absent or unreliable, so census data are critical to the analysis of fertility. Likewise, basic rates of mortality can be derived from death registration data, but the population on which these rates are based is almost always derived from a census. Other important demographic processes and characteristics which are usually derived from census data include population size and change, population distribution and movement, ethnic composition, age–sex structure, and household and family structure. Much socioeconomic analysis is also derived from census data using variables such as income sources and levels, educational levels, occupation, industrial sector of employment, and so on. Further, multivariate indicators are constructed from these basic variables. For example, much effort has gone into the development of indicators of deprivation or well-being such as the work on social indicators by the Canadian Council on Social Development, which uses a range of census and noncensus sources.

Migration Analysis While the statistical analysis of international migration relies on some data external to the census (arrival and departure data, immigration permit data), census analysis is important in analyzing immigration outcomes. Questions on birthplace and duration of residence within a country allow the identification of the migrant population, and cross-tabulations with various social and economic variables allow an assessment of levels of migrant participation and well-being. A limitation of the census method, however, is that longitudinal analysis of individuals or families is not possible except in some cases by inference between censuses. The analysis of internal migration is highly dependent on census data in countries which do not have comprehensive systems of residence registration. A question on usual residence at a previous point in time (e.g., 1 or 5 years ago) allows the construction of matrices of movement between different areas of a country. The degree of mobility measured by this method is dependent on the spatial resolution used, with the most detailed scale (any household movement) resulting in the highest levels of measured mobility. A common use of this method is to assess economic well-being of different regions of a country in relation to population mobility, especially in relation to the educational and occupational characteristics of the migrant population. The residual method of migration analysis may be used in the absence of census data on movement into or out of an area. Age– sex characteristics of the population of an area are compared between censuses so that a survival rate is applied to age–sex cohorts between census 1 and census 2 and the difference between the hypothesized number of survivors at census 2 is compared to the actual cohort at census 2; the differences are taken to represent the net migration of each cohort between censuses.

Geodemographics Although the term “geodemographics” was first used by geographers more than a century ago to classify neighborhoods within cities, its contemporary usage can be attributed to its use within business demography to refer to the analysis of demographic

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data, usually using relatively small spatial units, for the purposes of market analysis and related purposes. The term and approach have more recently been used in other contexts, especially for social research and the provision of public services. One of the central approaches of geodemographics is the clustering of statistically similar neighborhoods or other areas. Census data are usually central to these approaches since geodemographics demands information at a detailed spatial scale and often involves a number of variables. Census data are then often supplemented by data from other sources such as market surveys, records of housing sales, electoral rolls, and so on.

Population Projections Planning at national, regional, and local levels is usually dependent on the projection of future populations. Critical to projection methodologies is robust data to construct base populations and to develop assumptions. Since undercount is likely in nearly all censuses, projection base populations are often constructed by incorporating the estimated undercounted elements of the population, so these may be seen to be better representations of the usual population of a country than the census counts themselves. Fertility assumptions are usually derived from birth registration statistics but usually use census populations as their base, and similarly life tables used in projections are derived from both death registration data and census data. International and internal migration assumptions for population projection may be the most problematic since there may be large and unexpected fluctuations in migration resulting from government immigration policy changes, economic cycles, or dramatic political or natural events. Nevertheless, census data on past migration trends may be useful in modeling possible and/or likely migration patterns over time.

Future of the Traditional Census and Big Data It has been claimed that it is the twilight of the traditional full enumeration census because of high cost, issues of privacy, declining response rates, and the development of alternative possibilities. The issue of high cost may be partially offset by the increasing use of online enumeration, although this method may not reassure those concerned with issues of privacy, considering the potential for large-scale hacking and data leakage revealed in recent years. The main alternative to the traditional full enumeration census is sometimes called a virtual census. This involves the use of data from registers, such as a movement register, and other administrative data sources. These have been utilized for several decades in some European countries, notably in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, but increasingly in other countries as well. Registrationbased censuses have been successful in those countries which already had systems of registration in place, such as those in Scandinavia, but are more problematic in countries in which the population would resist the registration of movement or the utilization of other government databases. Many countries are developing alternatives based on existing government databases, although these are often supplements to traditional census data rather than substitutes, as discussed further below. Singapore undertakes a registerbased census supplemented by a sample enumeration of about 5% of the population. This is possible because of a pre-existing household registration database which provides variables such as geographical location, age, sex, ethnicity, birthplace, and dwelling type, whereas the enumerated sample collects information on marital status, fertility, education, literacy, economic status, religion, modes of transport, and household characteristics. Another alternative to the traditional full enumeration census is a rolling census. Although the ACS is a type of rolling census, the most comprehensive adoption of this method is by France. In 2005, France substituted its traditional census with a rolling census that uses annual census surveys and rotating samples at different geographical scales, allowing annual population data estimates for the whole country. A broader threat to traditional censuses is seen by some to be Big Data, defined as extremely large data sets that can be analyzed by (high-powered) computers, usually for the purposes of revealing characteristics of (targeted?) groups, patterns of human behavior, and interactions with others and with the surrounding world. The administrative data-based alternatives to censuses, which include data from a variety of government agencies, and perhaps other sources, represent a Big Data approach, but other types have proliferated in recent years. These include the collection of data from Google search queries, Twitter tweets, Facebook entries, cell phone records, location-based tracking programs, genealogical databases, and other sources. For example, demographers have begun using aggregated Twitter tweets to extrapolate individual characteristics such as gender and age and relate this information to health attitudes and practice, family structures, and other topics. Similar projects are underway using other social media sources, although recent controversy and regulation over privacy settings on Facebook, and on the Internet more generally, may make ongoing data harvesting from these sources more difficult or even impossible in the future. An alternative interpretation of the role of Big Data is that it may reinforce the importance of census data and enhance the analyses that are possible. A distinction may be made between Big shallow Data (or exhaust data) generated as a by-product of social media data collection, and Big deep Data intentionally collected for the purposes of population-wide analysis. Starting with the US Census Bureau in the 1960s, and then adopted by a number of national statistical agencies, large census microdata sets have been made available to researchers, usually under strict privacy conditions in restricted data enclaves. These have not only allowed researchers to interrogate individual records from a census but also in some cases to link them between censuses and to other databases. Making census data even more widely available has been the development of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), which is now available for US data and also for international data. In 2018, the IPUMS International website claimed

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to have data available from 345 censuses in 89 countries covering 988 million individual records. In some cases, the availability and analysis of these databases are retrospectively enhancing the value of earlier censuses not previously available electronically, and allowing time series analysis, and in some cases, a kind of longitudinal analysis.

Conclusion The changing nature of census geography is being driven by several forces. The most obvious of these is technological change. The rapid acceleration of computer power has revolutionized all stages of the census process, ranging from enumeration to data entry to analysis to dissemination of results. Even more fundamentally, this acceleration and the development of geographic information system have altered the potential for spatial conceptualizations that were not possible earlier. Another force, partly related to technological change, is the ability of governments to gather a vast range of information on their citizens, which has reduced the need for the comprehensive census taken at a fixed point in time. Thus, some countries have abandoned the traditional census approach, and it is likely that many more will follow. Potentially at odds with this development is another significant force, namely the emergence of identity politics in many places which challenges the whole classificatory process that censuses or population registration systems represent. There are parallel concerns about the confidentiality of data collected by governments, private agencies, Internet search engines, and social media. These multiple concerns may be seen as more intrusive to personal confidentiality than the occasional traditional census ever was.

See Also: Census Mapping; Demography; Geodemographics; Population Geography.

Further Reading Bohon, S.A., 2018. Demography in the Big Data revolution: changing the culture to forge new frontiers. Popul. Res. Policy Rev. 37, 323–341. Buzar, S., Ogden, P.E., Hall, R., 2005. Households matter: the quiet demography of urban transformation. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 29, 413–436. Christopher, A.J., 2005. Race and the census in the Commonwealth. Popul. Space Place 11, 103–118. Coleman, D., 2013. The twilight of the census. Popul. Dev. Rev. 38, 334–351. Howard, D., Hopkins, P.E., 2005. Editorial: race, religion and the census. Popul. Space Place 11, 69–74. Hugo, G., 2006. Population geography. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 30, 513–523. O’Sullivan, D., 2006. Geographical information science: critical GIS. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 30, 783–791. Ruggles, S., 2014. Big microdata for population research. Demography 51, 287–297. Siegel, J.S., Swanson, D.A. (Eds.), 2004. The Methods and Materials of Demography. Elsevier Academic Press, San Diego. Subramanian, S.V., Duncan, C., Jones, K., 2001. Multilevel perspectives on modeling census data. Environ. Plan. A 33, 399–417. Wilson, T., Rees, P., 2005. Recent developments in population projection methodology: a review. Popul. Space Place 11, 337–360.

Relevant Websites Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) International. https://international.ipums.org/international/. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) USA. https://usa.ipums.org/usa/. International programs (links to multilateral population websites and national statistical agencies). https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/relatedsites.html. The Social Indicators Site of the Canadian Council on Social Development. https://www.ccsd.ca. UK census homepage. https://www.statistics.gov.uk. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). https://www.unfpa.org/. United States Census Bureau. https://www.census.gov/.

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Census Mapping David Martin, School of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Census Complete enumeration of a population for statistical purposes. Choropleth Map constructed from shaded areas in which shading represents the value of the attribute being mapped. Dasymetric Map in which underlying area data are differentially weighted across the classes of an ancillary map layer, for example reweighting census population according to one or more classes of residential land use. Ecological fallacy The fallacy of making inferences about individuals from aggregated data. Enumeration Method for collecting and recording characteristics on each member of the population, conducted by census officer called an enumerator. Geocoding Conversion of addresses, place names, or other geographic references to coordinates, such as latitude and longitude. Geodemographic classification Classification of areas based on their socioeconomic characteristics so as to place the most similar areas into the same groups. Gerrymandering Deliberate manipulation of geographical boundaries so as to maximize the electoral advantage of a particular party. Modifiable areal unit problem The dependence of analysis of aggregate data on the precise reporting zones used for aggregation.

Census mapping refers to the cartographic presentation of the results of censuses in order to reveal spatial patterns in the data. Despite difficulties in achieving complete enumeration, the high population coverage of censuses means that it is usually possible to obtain data for very small geographical areas which can form the basis for detailed maps. For most of their history, censuses have usually been administered by means of a questionnaire for each member of the population covering a range of demographic and socioeconomic topics, although a much wider range of integrated data collection methods are now being used. Postenumeration processing of census responses permits the production not only of simple counts and percentages such as numbers of households without a car or percentage persons unemployed, but also a wide range of cross-tabulations and derived indicators such as social class, geodemographic classifications, and multivariate deprivation indicators. This article considers the overall role of censuses, the uses of census mapping, and a range of census mapping techniques.

The Place of Censuses Population counts derived from censuses of population play an important part in the government of nations and a key role in understanding human–environment interactions. The earliest modern censuses, from which results have been widely published, can be dated from around the start of the 19th Century, with the first census of population in 1790 in the United States and 1801 in England and Wales. Censuses represent one of a range of methods for counting population that also includes continuous administrative and registration-based systems, particularly favored in Scandinavia, and indirect methods such as estimation from satellite remote sensing. A census is an attempt, typically decennial, to measure the location and characteristics of the entire population at a single point in time, in contrast to continuous approaches, which rely on tracking population members, usually for administrative rather than statistical purposes. These approaches all contrast with sample survey methods that do not attempt to directly record the entire population. A successful census offers the single most powerful combination of population coverage, geographical and socioeconomic detail within a single integrated dataset and can support a variety of data outputs including, for example, microdata samples and interaction data that describe migration and commuting flows. The most traditional output has been aggregate responses for geographical areas, which form the basis for most census mapping. Historically, there have been multiple motivations for conducting a census. An understanding of population resources may be required for purposes as diverse as raising an army, levying taxation, organizing political representation, planning school districts, or allocating welfare funding. The results of a census may be particularly politically sensitive when, for example, they demonstrate the relative strength of different population subgroups, such as the proportions and degree of mixing between religious or ethnic groups or the size of immigrant population groups. Where there are conflicts within a population, subgroups may actively promote or boycott census enumeration to influence policy outcomes, challenge the results of a census as not adequately representing their interests or lobby for the inclusion of specific questions or definitions. Some population subgroups, such as unregistered migrants,

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may actively seek to avoid detection by government, including a census. A longstanding criticism of censuses and their analysis is that they include only questions, which are acceptable to the prevailing government and are therefore fundamentally limited in their ability to challenge established power relations in a society. Modern censuses are generally collected under specific statistical legislation and incorporate sophisticated data protection techniques in an attempt to provide respondents with privacy assurances. These include the random swapping of individuals between areas, rounding or modification of small counts, and suppression of results for areas with small populations. The extent to which the census technical and legislative framework provides effective protection of individuals’ data, rather than simply contributing to surveillance by the state, is a strongly contested issue and varies between national contexts. Any data adjustment process will have an impact on census mapping. In general, statistical disclosure control procedures have the biggest impact on data at the neighborhood or village level, but are negligible at the scale of cities and regions. Nevertheless, since the advent of computer-based census operations, the user base for census data has increased dramatically. Computer-readable census outputs are widely used by central and local government, health care planners, academic researchers, and the commercial sector for demographic analysis and business or service planning. Census mapping, in the 1970s the preserve of university computer laboratories, can now be readily undertaken online by schoolchildren, using some of the tools described below. There is thus a strong tension between increasing the content and outputs of censuses to meet contemporary demands versus a desire to maintain comparability over time and preserve response rates. Internationally, there are major changes taking place in census enumeration methods. These include both a widespread increase in the use of Internet enumeration, involving the completion of traditional census questions online, and the integration of novel approaches using administrative, survey and big data sources. These changes are in part a response by census agencies to falling response rates due to public concerns over the privacy of personal information and increasing difficulty in accessing and delivering paper census forms to every household. Since the early 2000s, nations are adopting diverse strategies to provide the statistical information required by government. France has adopted a rolling census, aiming to cover all areas of the country during a 5-year time period, while the United States has moved to a short-form only census accompanied by a continuously administered sample survey (the American Community Survey). Countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have retained conventional census designs with a strong emphasis on online enumeration and increasing integration with administrative data sources, while others such as Austria and Switzerland have moved much further toward reliance on administrative sources to replace traditional enumeration altogether, although this is more readily achieved where some form of definitive citizen registration system is already in place. These data collection innovations have varied implications for census mapping. The potential for more frequently refreshed data and additional variables means that a wider range of maps can be created, although they are less likely to be based purely on census results, while novel combinations of data sources serve to increase the challenges of interpretation, for example, by increasing the likelihood that data may have differing levels of reliability at different mapping scales, dates, or even for different areas within the same map.

The Role of Census Mapping Geographical information systems (GIS) are routinely used to manage the logistics of census enumeration. This organizational mapping does not generally form part of published outputs but nevertheless underpins the operational success of the census. Successful geocoding of individual census returns, linking them to the appropriate areas, is essential if counts are to be correctly aggregated. The management of georeferenced address lists and geography lookup tables is a major element of census operations and unique address identifiers and locations are increasingly a key to the linkage of diverse data sources into the overall census database. Areas used for the organization of enumeration are not necessarily the same as those used for publication of results, which usually need to be meaningful in terms of administrative and electoral geographies and to support general-purpose statistical reporting. Mapping makes a unique contribution to the interpretation of census results due to the ability of the human eye to identify pattern in graphical data. Thus, complex patterns of social geography may be readily conveyed by mapped census data, which would be almost impossible to extract from tabular results alone. Ongoing fascination with these representations can be traced back to 19th Century interests in the mapping of social conditions such as Charles Booth’s poverty maps of London (1886–1903), through to the development of social area analysis and geodemographic classification whereby areas are grouped according to their characteristics defined across a large pool of census variables. The production of a final map, for example, of an area classification scheme, may be the result of extensive unseen manipulation in GIS and statistical software. The DIME (dual independent map encoding) digital data structure developed to accompany the 1970 US census was influential in the emergence of GIS standards and one of the first examples of a statistical organization digital boundary data to accompany a census. The availability of digital boundaries allows users to map and analyze census data using their own software and this provides the population base layer for many GIS applications. While geodemographic classification tends to find commercial applications, such as direct marketing or site location for retail outlets, similar approaches also serve as the starting point for area-based government policy, particularly the weighting of additional resources to neighborhoods with high levels of unemployment and multiple social deprivation. All aggregated census data are susceptible to the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). This relates to the fact that observed patterns are strongly influenced by the number and placement of area boundaries as well as the underlying population characteristics: by redesigning area boundaries it is frequently possible to change the apparent pattern in the map. Such aggregate representations are also subject to the ecological fallacy, whereby associations seen in the data at one level of aggregation will not necessarily

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be observed between individuals in the population, or at other levels of aggregation. These phenomena are particularly relevant to the use of census mapping in political districting. The general principle requires that small census areas be grouped into larger electoral districts of similar population size to achieve equality of representation, either by manual or automated means. The ability to concentrate supporters of particular parties by boundary redesign can also lead to the direct manipulation of boundaries for purposes of electoral gain, known as gerrymandering.

Techniques and Examples By far the most widely used cartographic representation of census data is the choropleth, or shaded area, map. The example provided in Fig. 1 shows the 2011 census percentage of White ethnic groups in the city of Southampton, UK. This map was created by downloading digital boundaries and a table of census statistics and integrating them using QGIS open source GIS software, giving the user complete control over the appearance of the map. Values in the map are based on the aggregation of individual census results within each output area, clearly revealing how the outer suburbs are almost entirely white, while some central areas are dominated by nonwhite ethnic groups. It is generally inappropriate to map counts in this way, as the values will often be related to the size of the area rather than prevalence in the population. A disadvantage of all choropleth mapping is that the visual dominance of an area is related to its geographical area rather than its population size. The largest areas in Fig. 1 comprise mostly docks and open water, while the most densely populated residential areas are so small as to be barely visible. While it was once necessary for users to have expertise in data manipulation and access to their own mapping software, interactive census mapping and visualization tools are increasingly available online, including on the websites of national statistical agencies, such as that illustrated in Fig. 2, from the Northern Ireland Neighborhood Information System (NINIS). This particular example illustrates several typical features of interactive census data mapping websites. The central choropleth map is fundamentally similar to that presented in Fig. 1, but here shows the percentage of people reporting their health status as “very bad” in the 2011 census for Belfast, UK. The variable to be mapped and the spatial units have been chosen from lists of available options. The central map is dynamically linked to the surrounding panels, which include an ordered histogram (bottom left) showing the statistical distribution of the mapped variable. An interactive comparison tool (bottom center) allows selection of two small areas on the map for which pie charts show the distribution of results for the census health status question in these areas. The user can alter many aspects of the map by selecting, for example, different variables, geographical units, or legend classes, but each case is limited to a set of predefined options. Similar tools can be found on the websites of many organizations including census agencies and government departments. These increasingly integrate maps of census (and noncensus) variables with associated infographics, the focus being on ease of use by the nonexpert rather than cartographic design (for example, note that Fig. 2 includes neither a north arrow nor scale bar). All census mapping is affected by general cartographic design considerations. Choices of map scale, boundary generalization, number and placement of class intervals, selection and order of colors and other layout considerations will affect how the mapreader interprets the data. A further challenge facing census users is that of comparing data from successive censuses when there

Figure 1 Choropleth map showing percentage population from white ethnic groups for 2011 census output areas in Southampton, England. Contains National Statistics and OS data © Crown copyright and database rights (2012–18) Downloaded from NOMIS https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ census/2011 and UK Data Service Census Support https://borders.ukdataservice.ac.uk/. This information is licensed under the terms of the Open Government License http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3.

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Figure 2 Northern Ireland Neighborhood Information System (NINIS) interface, http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/public/Home.aspx, showing Health and provision of unpaid care in the Belfast area. Contains NISRA and OSNI data © Crown copyright and database rights (2012–18). Mapping reproduced with permission of LPS.

have been changes in the area boundaries or in variable definitions. True comparisons can only be made between equivalent variables for areas that encompass equivalent population groups. Where boundaries have changed, it is necessary either to aggregate to the smallest possible comparable areas or to interpolate values from one time period to another. This challenge makes long-term comparison of local populations especially difficult where census outputs are tied to administrative boundaries, which themselves experience high levels of intercensal change. One approach to the representational challenges presented by the choropleth map has been the use of population cartograms, in which locational accuracy is relaxed in order that each area can be rescaled proportional to its population size. Using this approach, areas with larger populations will take up a greater proportion of the map, but with the consequence that distance and direction cannot be accurately interpreted. These maps can play an important role in allowing visual comparision between rates and proportions for areas with very different population sizes, but the distortion of geographic space can make the map difficult to interpret by the nonexpert user. With the widespread availability of high-resolution spatial data allowing demarcation of built-up areas, an attractive option is the use of dasymetric mapping, in which an additional information layer is used to restrict the shading of conventional census areas to just the residential areas, thus providing a much more accurate representation of the actual population distribution, but without distortion of geographical space. Fig. 3 provides an interesting example using a very simple mask layer over a map of a census-based geodemographic classification, produced with the CDRC Maps website. Census data for the city of Southampton have again been used, but here resulting in a very different visual representation to that shown in Fig. 1. The variable being mapped is an area classification based on the characteristics of census respondents working in each area. In this case, the data are for a set of small areas termed workplace zones. Each workplace zone has been assigned to one of 29 statistical clusters in a national classification, which distinguishes between areas dominated by different types of industry and employment. Membership of the different clusters is represented by the colors in the map. What would otherwise appear as a shaded area map has been masked using an open map layer from the national mapping agency representing built areas, so that shading only appears within the building outlines. This approach has its own challenges, as even in countries with high quality land use/land cover mapping, it may not be possible to accurately distinguish between residential and other built-up land uses at very high resolution. Another way of overcoming the interpretational challenges posed by conventional choropleth census maps is to present population values as a raster map comprising regular grid cells. Whereas, Fig. 3 is merely a presentational device in which a buildings layer has been used to mask parts of the underlying choropleth, mapping census data as a continuous layer of cell values usually involves estimation of the relevant data values for each cell, unless bottom-up aggregation from individual georeferenced census results has already been undertaken by the national statistical agency conducting the census. More often, gridded maps are constructed by top-down disaggregation of published area-based census data and a variety of approaches are in use. Dasymetric approaches have been used in combination with grid-based representations by initiatives to construct global population maps,

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Figure 3 Dasymetric mapping of 2011 Classification of Workplace Zones (England and Wales) supergroups for Southampton, England. From CDRC Maps, https://maps.cdrc.ac.uk, an output of the ESRC Consumer Data Research Center. Created by Department of Geography, UCL. Contains National Statistics and Ordnance Survey data © Crown copyright & database rights (2014–18).

such as the Gridded Population of the World and WorldPop projects. WorldPop involves combination of multiple dasymetric layers to estimate weights for each grid cell, allowing census populations of administrative regions to be disaggregated into cells according to their likelihood of containing population. Ancillary datasets include land cover, environmental variables, nighttime lights, transportation networks, urban centers, and other factors known to be strongly associated with human settlement. Fig. 4 shows the

Figure 4 Nigeria 100 m Population per pixel: 2006 census mapped using WorldPop modeling version 2c 2010 adjusted to match 2010 UN national estimates. University of Southampton. DOI: 10.5258/SOTON/WP00196 WorldPop datasets are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

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population distribution of Nigeria, using WorldPop data based on 2006 census values, rescaled to match 2010 UN population estimates. The spatial resolution of the WorldPop grid is 0.000833333 decimal degrees, approximately 100 m at the equator. Censuses continue to provide an enormously rich resource for those concerned with population and social geography. The large statistical data volumes make mapping an essential key to understanding geographical trends and processes in these data, although much spatial analysis can be performed without the production of intermediate maps. The choropleth method continues to dominate census mapping, both in the popular media and academic publications, although its representational weaknesses are well documented. A variety of alternative methods are becoming more widespread, particularly using dasymetric methods, which permit refinement of the spatial units in which population values are mapped. This theme of data combination is also increasingly evident in census data collection, with national statistical agencies adapting the design of censuses to the point where published census population estimates are becoming an integrated product of traditional and online enumeration, administrative, and surveybased data sources.

See Also: Census Geography; Geodemographics; Geovisualization; Gerrymandering.

Further Reading Baffour, B., King, T., Valente, P., 2013. The modern census: evolution, examples and evaluation. Int. Stat. Rev. 81, 407–425. Brewer, C.A., 2016. Designing Better Maps: A Guide for GIS Users, second ed. ESRI Press, Redlands, CA. Brewer, C.A., Suchan, T.A., 2001. Mapping Census 2000: The Geography of US Diversity. US Census Bureau, Washington DC. Cook, L., 2004. The quality and qualities of population statistics, and the place of the census. Area 36, 111–123. Dewdney, J.C., 1983. Censuses past and present. In: Rhind, D.W. (Ed.), A Census User’s Handbook. Methuen, London, pp. 1–16. Dorling, D., Thomas, B., 2004. People and Places: A 2001 Census Atlas of the UK. Policy Press, Bristol. Martin, D., 1996. An assessment of surface and zonal models of population. Int. J. Geogr. Inf. Syst. 10, 973–989. Mennis, J., 2003. Generating surface models of population using dasymetric mapping. Prof. Geogr. 55, 31–42. Monmonier, M., 2018. How to Lie with Maps, third ed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Stevens, F.R., Gaughan, A.E., Linard, C., Tatem, A.J., 2015. Disaggregating census data for population mapping using random forests with remotely-sensed and ancillary data. PLoS One 10, e0107042. Stillwell, J. (Ed.), 2018. The Routledge Handbook of Census Resources, Methods and Applications. Routledge, London. United Nations, 2016. Handbook on Census Management for Population and Housing Censuses. Revision 2. United Nations, New York. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/ seriesF/Series_F83Rev2en.pdf.

Relevant Websites Charles Booth’s London – historic poverty mapping hosted by the London School for Economics https://booth.lse.ac.uk/. Colorbrewer guidance on class intervals and color schemes for thematic mapping http://colorbrewer2.org/. Consumer Data Research Centre mapping interface (CDRC Maps) https://maps.cdrc.ac.uk/. Gridded Population of the World project http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v4. Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service (NINIS) http://www.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk/public/Home.aspx. UK census boundaries and data from UK Data Service https://census.ukdataservice.ac.uk/. US Census Bureau’s American Factfinder census mapping tools https://factfinder.census.gov/. US Census Bureau’s list of national programs and statistical organizations maintained by https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/relatedsites.html. WorldPop global population mapping project http://www.worldpop.org.uk/.

Central Business District Gareth Rice, School of Media, Culture and Society, University of West of Scotland, Blantyre, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Edge cities Refers to patterns of large-scale urban sprawl into the rural vastness of the United States. Edge cities are quite different from other noncentral urban developments, like British New Towns, in scale, intensity, and accessibility. Also unlike New Towns, edge cities were not specifically designed to manage the overflow of postwar baby boomers but rather they are a more explicit attempts to attract corporations and light industries through offering tax cuts and a local skilled labor force. Technopoles Very similar to European industrial districts especially those found in Northeast Central Italy. While both technopoles and industrial districts aim to nurture a specific industrial atmosphere, in the former case the emphasis is on attracting established research-based companies and innovation centers which cater to smaller high-technology companies. Technopoles tend to follow a number of stages from prototype to larger agglomeration that may eventually evolve into edge cities or large urban centers outside older established cities. Southern California is a case in point and thus is often referred to as a polycentric region. Zone of assimilation An area adjacent to the central business district (CBD) characterized by extensive redevelopment and the spread of new and typically upmarket shops and office developments (c.f., zone of discard). This type of area is the favored frontier and the physical direction that the CBD tends to extend along. As long as demand for space in the CBD continues to rise, the zone of assimilation will be constantly pushed and reshaped. Zone of discard An area at the edge of the CBD characterized by transitory business, boarded up premises, and unsuccessful commerce. The rent levels tend to be less expensive than in the main CBD which attracts smaller low-market retailers, warehouse activities, and wholesale trading premises. In many cities including Sacramento and Phoenix the zone of discard represents the old CBD that has become outstripped by newer developments and more general supply-side changes in the retail and service sectors (cf. zone of assimilation).

The term “Central Business District” (CBD) is associated with the era of the modern metropolis in which Fordism accentuated centrality, a monocentric urbanism that anchored all centrifugal and centripetal forces around a singular gravitational node. CBD was first modeled in the early 20th Century as part of the Chicago School’s famous concentric circles of urban growth. CBD is a city’s commercial heart, its center of business, and most accessible pointdinternal transportation lines converge on it. This form of development concentrates the large numbers of people, often in pedestrian friendly centers, necessary to financially support and work in the highest order services: department stores and flagship retail outlets, many of which are parts of conglomerates operating on a global scale. CBDs tend to not be located in the areal center of the city, but typically near one of its edges, as was the case in early 20th-Century Chicago, St. Louis, and Salt Lake City. Chicago’s CBD is located between Lake Michigan to the east of the Chicago River to the north and west, bordered on the south by railway yards and established industries. Skyscrapers are a CBD’s most distinctive and striking architectural features. Unlike in other areas of the city, which can include downtown, marina, red light districts, and some residential neighborhoods, the tallest buildings stand out more than a CBD’s urban realm and its open spaces. For example, the world’s first skyscraper, the Home Insurance Building, was erected in Chicago in 1885 and demolished in 1931. Chicago’s CBD continues to be defined by a number of distinctive skyscrapers ranging from the tallest being the Willis Tower (formerly known as Sears Tower) to the Franklin Center North Tower (see Fig. 1). The building of skyscrapers also marked clear boundaries between CBD and such geographic entities as downtown, light manufacturing, and wholesaling with stocks. This distinction was captured by researchers in a set of approaches to urban growth collectively known as core-frame models. These models suggest that the core of a CBD is distinct from the wider frame (or fringe) due to differences in the types and intensities of land use (Fig. 2). While more recent CBDs (see below) do not comfortability fit the core-frame spatial organization above, skyscrapers continue to mark out the distinctiveness of the CBD. Examples include One Canada Square in Canary Wharf, London; Messeturm in Frankfurt, Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw; and the Citic Tower in Beijing. In China, which has 6 of the world’s 33 megacities, CBDs are an accumulation of subdistricts rather than single sites. These have been developed under the Chinese government’s master plan to symbolize the country’s ongoing transformation from an industrial to a globally orientated service economy. The main theoretical contributions for delimiting the CBD emerged from the era of the 20th-Century modern metropolis. They employed land values and indices, namely floor space, business intensity, and valuation of properties. Initial delimitations of CBDs drew monocentric conclusions as influenced by the Chicago School. The majority of these delimitations included skyscrapers whose

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Figure 1 Skyscrapers defining Chicago’s CBD. Source: By Ali Zifan - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php? curid¼36093786.

Figure 2 Core-frame model. After Horwood, E. M. and Boyce, R. R. (1959). Studies of the Central Business District and Urban Freeway Development. Seattle: University of Washington Press, taken from Scargil, D. I. (1979). The Form of Cities, p 90. London: Bell and Hyman.

prime purpose was to earn the greatest profits for their owners. As long as tenants were able to afford the highest rates of rent for a prestige address and iconic building, CBDs were able to (a) retain their status as the most powerful and privileged center of commerce at the top of the urban hierarchy and (b) represent the culmination of local and territorial cultures from its surrounding hinterland.

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Figure 3 Idealized outline of the CBD according to Murphy and Vance (1954). Taken from Scargil, D. I. (1979). The Form of Cities, p 87. London: Bell and Hyman.

Figure 4 The Alonso Model. After Alonso, W. (1946). Location and Land Use: Toward a general theory of land rent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press taken from Johnston, R. J., Gregory, D., Pratt, G. & Watts, M. (2000) (eds.) The Dictionary of Human Geography (fourth edn.), p 21 Malden, MA: Blackwell (See also http://www.xreferplus.com/entry/733934).

The general assumption with land values and indices was that individual land uses will compete for the most desirable central location in or as near to the peak land value intersection (PLVI). The PLVI was an area in the CBD where the main roads and other transport links intersect, but the actual position of the PLVI can shift depending on the direction of CBD growth. A useful generalization based on North American cities shows how the CBD builds up around the PLVI first before extending out along the main transport corridors (see Fig. 3). Any further increases in distance away from the PLVI means a drop in land values, which in turn produces changing physical urban land use patterns (retail, office, and residential). The schematic representation in Fig. 3 is based on the land value surface that is a reflection of accessibility within the urban area. Since accessibility differs across the urban area, land use patterns are based on the ability to pay rent for the most accessible locations in the CBD. A number of similar models show that the land use most dependent upon accessibility outbids other potential users. Fig. 4 shows that retailing (usually malls, department stores, and flagship stores) is most dependent upon accessibility followed by offices and then residential land uses. The resulting type of land use pattern is also associated with steeper declines in the offer price curve for those functions (retailing) that are most dependent upon a central location.

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CBD Evolution: Overview and Empirical Referents CBD evolutiondgrowth through different stages and in different directionsdis an ongoing process and has long been an important focus of urban geographical analysis. Depending on the city and its wider spatial economy, and the role of master planning, different forces and processes have underpinned the evolution that has given shape to the form and functioning of the CBD. The spatial correlate can assume several geographic forms which range from being relatively self-contained as in New York City to constellations of business activities that extend into wider metropolitan areas as in Frankfurt and Zurich. The relationship between urban agglomeration and the metropolitan area is crucial to understanding CBD evolution. Urban agglomeration considers the extent of the contiguous urban area, or built-up area, to delineate the city’s boundaries. The metropolitan area defines its boundaries according to the degree of economic and social interconnectedness of nearby areas, identified by interlinked commerce or commuting patterns. In older industrial cities such as Boston, Cleveland, Manchester, and Magnitogorsk, CBDs have been developed and redeveloped many times, given the brutal neglect suffered by their urban infrastructure and the imposed obsolescence so characteristic of industrial decline. By contrast, and on a much bigger scale, Chinese CBDs highlight different evolutionary trajectories.

The Case of Boston Older industrial cities experienced residential relocation to the suburbs to make way for more profitable functions in the core. The evolution of Boston’s CBD from 1840 to 1920 is based around the emergence of “modern” functional areas that sprouted from three specialized nuclei (Fig. 5). In 1840 food markets, warehouse, and financial functions were largely restricted to central locations to gain access to Boston’s large European immigrant population. By 1880 Boston’s commercial activities had expanded to meet the demands of regional distribution that in turn led to the expansion of business premises. As a consequence, many central residential areas suffered the social disorganization created by the problems of eviction and residential relocation. By 1920 Boston’s CBD had split into more specialized functions than had initially spurted its growth. Finance and administration coalesced and expanded their accommodations into premium locations within the existing limits of the CBD, rather than at the expense of peripheral residential locations. By contrast, the food industry reorganized their facilities by decentralizing into adjacent residential areas based upon the differing threshold populations required to support different types of retail function because, on the supply side, different retail functions have different conditions of entry (thresholds), and thus demand minimum trade areas for their support. On the demand side, consumers spend different proportions of their income on different goods and services and purchase them with differing degrees of frequency. This pattern of CBD evolution has produced the hierarchy of retail functions found in most American and European cities.

The Evolution of the Chinese CBD In recent years, geographical research has come to focus more on Chinese urbanization. From the “dragon head” cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen to emerging first tier cities such as Tianjin, Dongguan, and Wuxi, monumental urban landscapes including eye-catching CBDs with skyscrapers, iconic architectural landmarks, and lavish government buildings have been erected to display state authority (through master planning and the use of global design expertise), corporate power, and China’s ascendance in an era of neoliberal globalization. More than 100 Chinese cities now have a population of over 1 million people, largely due to a 500

Figure 5 Evolution of Boston’s CBD, 1840–1920. From Ward, D. (1968). The emergence of central immigrant ghettoes in American cities: 1840–1920. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 58, 343–359.

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million increase in China’s urban population in the past three decades and high levels of rural-to-urban migration. With their own distinctive CBDs, Beijing and Shanghai are no longer considered to occupy such low levels in the global urban hierarchy. Traditional Chinese cites were of the compact variety, characterized by relatively high-density, mixed land use, and pedestrianoriented habitation in their CBDs. Before Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up policy in 1978, urban planning was used as a tool for carrying out planned socialist development and for translating the goal of economic planning into urban space. In general, business activity within the CBDs was sporadic, tied to opportunities that arose from land use change. After 1978, CBD evolution came to play a greater role in the modernization of China. Inner-city redevelopment, new areas of construction, high-tech parks, industrial zones, and expanded CBDs transformed the original urban spatial fabric. In contrast to their American and European cousins, the evolution of Chinese CBDs almost exclusively evolved as city government projects, financed by the city and for its own purposes. Although the role of the tertiary sector was recognized as having an impact on urban form, it was not taken seriously until 1992, when the central government proposed a strategy to facilitate its development. The first wave of CBD plans in 1992 ossified the focus on one single central place and recognized the need to diversify activities, introducing amenity spaces and making CBDs friendlier to pedestrians and cyclists. Through master planning, the Chinese Government prepared for the tertiarization of the Chinese economy by instilling pride of place in CBDs, making them the command centers of business, finance, and business services. Located within China’s megacity regions, the CBDs of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen played key roles in the transformative power of the spatial project to initially achieve regional dominance. China’s admission into the World Trade Organization in 2001 was a turning point after which CBDs evolved to include more open spaces as organizing features, iconic buildings, and sporting facilities. The Beijing master plan for the Chaoyang CBD included spatial concepts, such as representational spaces combined with urban thinking, which included the Olympic Green and the Deconstructivist designed “Bird’s Nest Stadium” built for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Chaoyang also includes a number of iconic buildings such as the CCTV building and the Jianwai SOHO towers designed by the architects Rem Koolhaas and Mikan, respectively. This enabled the Chinese Government to market the Beijing CBD through focusing on its most iconic architecture. From 2005, it had become obvious that the Chinese Government’s focus on master planning for one CBD per city left less room for second-order economic activities, including electronics development, import–export activity, and financial services. Although Chinese cities have not evolved to mirror fully blown US-style patterns of regional urbanization, local CBD hierarchies do exist. Newly planned second-order CBDs are already outpacing the development of the cities’ initial CBDs, resulting in urban patterns characterized by a number of competing CBDs. Examples include Zhongguancun and Financial Street in Beijing, Financial City in Guangzhou, and Houhai, Qianhai, and Nanshan District CBD in Shenzhen. The city of Shenzhen is of particular significance for tracing the most recent evolution of Chinese CBDs. In several decades, intensive urbanization transformed the area from a small fishing village into one of China’s most modern cities. It evolved specifically from Luohu, the initial CBD and port of entry located at the border between Mainland China and Hong Kong. In May of 1980, when Shenzhen was established as China’s first Special Economic Zone it attracted many manufacturers oriented toward the assembly of goods and export markets and also supported the concentration of commercial, financial, business, and tourist activities. In the 1990s, with the setup of Shenzhen Stock Exchange Center, Shenzhen’s financial industry began its fast-growth period with Luohu still as its initial CBD. This pattern occurred because at the time Luohu had the highest gross floor areas of commercial and business buildings (9.92% and 14.05%, respectively), which were mainly concentrated in the Caiwuwei and Guomao areas. Shenzhen’s evolution as part of the Pearl River Delta Region (PRDR) (similar regions include Jing-Jin-Ji and the Yangtze River Delta) led to different patterns of urbanization. Eventually, these patterns disadvantaged the Luohu CBD, which was not ideally located to take advantage of the spatial switching of capital along a more westerly axis: It was too far from the Guangzhou– Hong Kong economic corridor, the main direction of economic growth in the PRDR. As other government-planned CBDs evolved and prospered in Futian, Qianhai, and Houhai, Luohu became outpaced by second-order CBDs. Fig. 6 shows the location of the Houhai CBD, which was planned as Shenzhen’s second-order CBD next to the port of Hong Kong.

The CBD and the Threat of Decentralization Decentralization has complicated the relationship between CBDs and the wider spatial economy. The resulting urban patterns are characterized by the dynamics of centralization and dispersion. The literature differs on how these urban patterns should be analyzed and understood. When CBDs are planned as part of purpose-built capital cities, they tend to continue to dominate their surrounding regions despite decentralization. Examples include Washington, DC; Canberra; Ottawa; Abuja; Yamoussoukro; Naypyidaw; and Brasilia. In London, the decentralization dynamics are evident in fringe areas which are becoming more “CBD like” in terms of the activities that are emerging in certain locations. In some instances, this is a case of recolonizing areas that were previously important centers of industrial employment that had declined in importance during the 1970s and 1980s. Notable examples are Paddington, Islington and Clerkenwell, Camden, and Southwark. Depending on the data being analyzed, the presence of multiple CBDs is either thought to represent new urban structures or a continuation of older urban processes largely set in place with the emergence of the car and the dispersion of jobs, people, and capital. The literature supporting the emergence of new urban forms uses a number of defining terms to capture what is different about CBDs and their surrounding regions: exopolis, postmodern, postindustrial, post-Fordist, neoliberal, informational, flexible, global, and regional urbanization. While there is disagreement about their application, there is a general consensus that, over the

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Figure 6 The Houhai CBD in Shenzhen next to the port of Hong Kong. From Zacharias, J. and Yang, W. (2016). A Short History of the Chinese Central Business District. Planning Perspectives. 31, 611–633.

last 30 years, CBDs have found themselves functioning as part of more decentralized spatial economies: (a) Constellations of autonomous suburban municipalities grew around the city and would together, in many modern metropolises, including Toronto, contain a population greater than that of the urban core; and (b) more economic activities are located further and further away from the formerly magnetic centripetal city center. This decentralization has led to the emergence of edge cities and edgeless cities, which develop their own distinctive CBDs. Examples include Gurugram near Delhi, India; The La Lucia-Umhlanga Ridge, north of Durban, on the east coast of South Africa; and Tysons in Virginia.

The Case of UK Retailing Geographical analysis confirms that retail agglomerations in urban cores are crucial to avoiding the “hollowing out” of first-order CBDs. There is an argument that continued growth of out-of-town retail parks and regional malls in the United Kingdom and mega malls in North America poses a threat. While CBDs are expected to compete with one another on a global scale, they must first and foremost be able to survive in their own regional economies. The decentralization of retailing can become particularly problematic if the CBD is unable to fully exploit the general shift toward major space units and the demand for free adjacent car parking. In the case of the United Kingdom this trend is nothing new, as retailing has existed at non-CBD locations since before the end of the 19th Century. It was not until 1947 that the Town and Country Planning Act officially established a centralized system of planning. This meant a traditional approach to retailing as both central and local government aimed to preserve a hierarchy of shopping centers in accordance with central place theory. Consequently, proposals for peripheral sites were perceived as a threat to the established retail hierarchy and the viability of the CBD as a whole. This stands in marked contrast to the postwar situation in North America where out-of-town regional shopping centers and mega malls were commonplace. However, since the 1960s the British retail environment has altered dramatically through decentralization that reflected both morphological and organizational changes. The opening of Brent Cross in 1976 was followed by other out-of-town malls including the Metro Centre, Meadowhall, Merry Hill, Lakeside, Bluewater, and Braehead. These out-of-town sites offer good road access, large amounts of free parking, major retail chains acting as anchor tenants, and some form of nonretailing activity such as the ice rink at Braehead and the concert venue at the Trafford Centre in Manchester.

The Resilience of CBDs Decentralization has not sounded the death knell for CBDs, rather it has restructured the space in which they operate: There is more intraregional and global competition, CBDs are connected as part of a regional planning, and the building of entirely new CBDs. In response to competition between CBDs, governments have invested in their CBDs so that they continue to serve as key nodes in

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increasingly complex networks as part of the global information age. This trend is highlighted in the global cities literature which demonstrates that CBDs are the preferred locations for the worldwide networks of production, finance, trade, power, and migration which require nodal points for providing the infrastructure, information, and financial resources that keep the networks running. This trend has continued as CBD functions have expanded to absorb the scale and intensity of operations related to the hosting of top-level multinational headquarter functions and the growth of advanced corporate services. The CBD at Nariman Point in Mumbai emerged largely due to the locational preferences and functionality of domestic and foreign companies from the international financial and producer service economy. Rather than leave initial CBDs to be “hollowed out” via decentralization, some cities are being planned with connected CBDs. As evidenced by Sydney, Australia, efforts have been ongoing to reimagine the city with more than one CBD. The plan is to create a regional conurbation so that most residents can live within 30 min of their job, education, health facilities, and other services. As part of the Greater Sydney Region Plan proposed by the Greater Sydney Commission, the idea is to better connect three CBDs within the Sydney conurbation: (1) Eastern Harbour Citydbuilt around the current CBD (2) Central River Citydbuilt around a new CBD located in Greater Parramatta on the area currently known as Parramatta CBD and Westmead district (3) Western Parkland Citydbuilt around the growth expected around Western Sydney Airport, Penrith, Campbelltown, and Liverpool The plan has some way to go, but as the PRDR example above shows, if CBD location is not advantageous to the spatial switching of capital then that CBD will become less competitive. CBDs have been built as key sites within smart cities. Built on reclaimed land from the Yellow Sea, Songdo International Business District (Songdo IBD) is a new city in Incheon, South Korea. The CBD is proposed to be a sustainable, low-carbon, high-tech utopia. It was built to offer all the lifestyle of Seoul, but without the capital city’s air pollution, crowded sidewalks, and choking automotive traffic. For foreign corporations looking for access to Asian economies, the CBD is a rival to Hong Kong and Shanghai. CBDs have also been built to meet the demand for new business hubs for national and international companies. A development outside Lagos, Nigeria, is an explicit attempt to create a hypermodern and connected “World Class African Metropolis” to compete with the Asian Tiger economies and is a case in point. Eko Atlantic City is being built on land reclaimed from the Atlantic Ocean as a privately funded urban development, with the backing of the Nigerian Government. With 700,000 sq. meters of premium real estate, Eko Atlantic’s CBD aims to be the future financial capital of Africa. This development is a continuation of longer term modernizing efforts to sustain African CBDs as levers for economic growth and urban competitiveness. In Egypt, about 30 miles east of Cairo, a new capital city with its very own CBD is being built in the desert. Diverting population growth from the narrow Nile Valley to the desert has beendand continues to bedthe government’s key solution to the problems experienced in Egyptian cities and the raison d’être for “conquering” the desert through different development projects as a gateway to modernity and unprecedented economic growth. The majority stakeholder in the project is the Egyptian Army, which is also supervising the private companies doing all the construction work. Already built are the largest cathedral in the Middle East and the largest mosque in Egypt. The new capital city will have smart buildings and electronic government. The master plan shows a CBD bristling with towers, modern conference halls, an opera house, pristine eightlane boulevards, swaths of forested parkland, waterways, and various clusters with labels such as “Smart Village,” “Medical City,” and “Knowledge City.”

Conclusions Throughout much of the 20th Century, CBDs served as areas of supreme importance and all surrounding areas were sorted into ranks of decreasing eminence. Based on their ability to pay the highest rent, high-order services including retailing and clients occupying skyscrapers were located around the magnetic centripetal city center. This core-frame urban pattern was a characteristic feature of metropolitan urbanism, which dominated urban geographical analysis in the first half of the 20th Century. As urban problems developed in the postwar period, people, capital, and employment moved further away from initial CBDs creating a demand for more decentralized urban patterns. In both North America and Europe this created a more competitive space economy consummated by various non-CBD developments including shopping malls, suburbia, technopoles, and edge cities. However, since the 1980s these developments have galvanized a number of government initiatives which suggest that CBDs will remain key competitive sites in the current climate of global neoliberalism. This pattern is likely to continue in the Global South where growing numbers of the population will be concentrated in megacities.

See Also: Chicago School; Gentrification; Global Urbanism; Land Rent Theory; Malls/Retail Parks; Retail Geographies; World/Global Cities.

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Further Reading Ahlfeldt, G.M., Wendland, N., 2013. How polycentric is a monocentric city? Centers, spillovers and hysteresis. J. Econ. Geogr. 13, 53–83. Bourne, L.S. (Ed.), 1971. Internal Structure of the City: Readings on Space and Environment. Oxford University Press, New York. Dear, M.J. (Ed.), 2002. From Chicago to L.A: Making Sense of Urban Theory. Sage, California. Firley, E., Grön, K., 2013. The Urban Masterplanning Handbook. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, UK. Frieden, B.J., Saglyn, L.B., 1990. Downtown malls and the city agenda. Society 27, 42–49. Greater London Authority, 2008. London’s Central Business District: Its Global Importance. Greater London Authority, London. Hajrasouliha, A.H., Hamidi, S., 2017. The typology of the American metropolis: monocentricity, polycentricity, or generalized dispersion? Urban Geogr. 38, 420–444. Hall, T., Barrett, H. (Eds.), 2006. Urban Geography, fourth ed. Routledge, London. Lawless, P., Brown, F., 1986. Urban Growth and Change in Britain. Harper and Row, London. Mumford, L., 1986. What is a city? In: Miller, D.L. (Ed.), The Lewis Mumford Reader. Pantheon Books, New York. Park, R.E., 1997. The city: suggestions for the investigation of human behaviour. In: Gelder, K., Thornton, S. (Eds.), The Subcultures Reader. Routledge, London. Scargill, D.I., 1979. The Form of Cities. Bell and Hyman, London. Soja, E., 2012. Regional urbanization and the end of the metropolis era. In: Bridge, G., Watson, S. (Eds.), The New Blackwell Companion to the City. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., UK, pp. 679–689. Ward, D., 1968. The emergence of central immigrant ghettoes in American cities: 1840–1920. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 58, 343–359. Zacharias, J., Yang, W., 2016. A Short history of the Chinese central business district. Plan. Perspect. 31, 611–633.

Relevant Websites British Retail Consortium https://brc.org.uk/. Eko Atlantic https://www.ekoatlantic.com/. Globalization and World Cities Research Network https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/. Songdo IBD http://songdoibd.com/. The End of Central Business Districts? https://www.citylab.com/life/2015/10/the-end-of-central-business-districts/411433/.

Central Place Theory Jacek Malczewski, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 2, pp 26–30, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Central function The goods and services provided at a central place. Central place Center (e.g., urban place) for distributing goods and services to its market area. Centrality The relative importance of a central place with regard to the region surrounding it. Market area The territory surrounding a central place limited by the range of goods/services supplied. Range The maximum distance that a consumer will travel to purchase a good or service. Threshold The smallest market size for an establishment to be economically viable. Urban system A network of urban places and their hinterlands.

Central place theory is concerned with the size, number, functional characteristics, and spacing of settlements, which are nodal points for the distribution of goods and services to surrounding market areas. An interest in some aspects of the theory can be traced back to the 18th and 19th centuries, when German scholars attempted to identify the relations between settlements and their complementary regions. During the first two decades of the 20th Century, American sociologists proposed models dealing with the theoretical arrangement of central places. The first explicit statement of central place theory was made by German geographer Water Christaller and refined by German economist August Lösch. Although there are important differences between the models of Christaller and Lösch, they share a number of commonalities in terms of reasoning and underlying assumptions. They both concluded that the most efficient spatial arrangement of central places takes the form of a triangular lattice so that each central place has a hexagonal market area. In the post–World War II period, the classical models have been modified, extended, and tested empirically by researchers from various disciplines, including geography, economics, regional sciences, and urban/regional planning. Together, the models of Christaller and Lösch, as well as later modifications and extensions of those models, form a subdivision of location theory that is called central place theory.

Classical Central Place Theory A Single-Function Central Place System The central place model is based on a series of simplifying assumptions. It assumes that economic activities are taking place on an isotropic surfacedan idealized region which is completely flat and homogeneous in every respect. This implies that there are no barriers to movement and the transportation cost per unit of distance is the same in all directions. The theory also presupposes that population and income are evenly distributed over the region. Finally, it is assumed that both consumers and producers have perfect knowledge and act entirely rationally with respect to this knowledge. Given these simplifying assumptions, central place theory introduces two economic parameters which control the potential locations of individual central places: the threshold (the minimum level of demand necessary to support business activity) and the range of a good (the maximum distance a consumer is willing to travel to purchase a good or service). The theory addresses the spatial interplay between the threshold and range. Using these two parameters the central place model demonstrates how an economic landscape evolves toward a spatial equilibrium in which a single-function central place system consists of equal, regular hexagonal market areas, just large enough to contain the threshold demand, served by central places located at equal distance from each other.

Multiple-Function Hierarchical Systems The hexagonal pattern of market areas generated by the single-function model provides a starting point for a more complex multiple-function hierarchical system of central places. A key concept underlying the multiple-function framework is that of the order of a place which is derived from the orders of goods (and services) that are available in it. Some goods have a low threshold and a correspondingly low range (low-order goods), whereas others need a much higher level of demand for their existence and are characterized by a more extensive range (high-order goods). Since threshold demand and market range vary enormously for

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different goods and services, it is impossible for all the central place functions to be carried on in all central places. Lowest-order goods and services are available at a large number of locations, while highest-order goods are available at only a small number of locations. Accordingly, Christaller’s urban system is arranged in a nested hierarchy of central places and market areas with lower-order market areas completely contained within higher-order areas (Fig. 1). Central places on each level of the hierarchy are characterized by a specific mixture of functions in accordance with their threshold and range values. At the top of the hierarchy is the highest-order center with many specialized functions (including other functions as well); at the bottom of the hierarchy there are a great many small central places with a few lower-order functions serving small market areas. Each level supplies all the goods and services that the centers below it will provide plus some additional ones. This implies interdependency between levels of the hierarchy in that all centers except the smallest have other centers dependent on them for supply of certain goods and services. Christaller suggested that the relationships between subsequent levels in the central place hierarchy are fixed and defined by a k-value, which indicates the number of lower-order centers (hexagonal market areas) served by a central place at the next highest order in the system. Using the k-value, Christaller proposed three types of systems based on the marketing, transportation, and administrative principles (see Table 1). According to the marketing principle (or the k ¼ 3 network) the hierarchy and nesting pattern results in a system that serves a maximum number of evenly distributed consumers from a minimum number of central places. However, a transportation system to serve such an arrangement is not efficient because the important links between larger central places do not pass through intermediate ones. Consequently, a k-4 network organized according to the traffic principle was proposed to account for situations in which the costs of transportation were significant. The transportation principle results in an arrangement that maximizes the number of central places located on the main transport routes. In the hierarchical arrangement according to the marketing and transportation principles, lower-order places (or market areas) located between higher-order centers are divided equally among three centers in the case of the marketing principle, and between two centers in the case of transportation principle. Such a division of smaller areas and larger ones is inefficient from the perspective of spatial arrangement for purposes of administration. Consequently, Christaller suggested that in regions with a highly developed system of central administration a k ¼ 7 hierarchy would tend to develop. In this arrangement, the hexagonal market areas of the smaller settlements are completely enclosed within the market area of the larger settlement. Efficient administration is the control principle in this hierarchy.

Lo¨sch’s Variable k Hierarchies Christaller’s models are based on the assumption that the k-values, once adopted, would be fixed; that is, they applied equally to the relationships between villages and towns, towns and cities, cities and metropolitan places, and so on, through all the tiers of the central place hierarchy. Lösch used a similar hexagonal unit for his central place model but he improved and extended Christaller’s

Central place

Market area boundary Fourth order Third order Second order First order

Figure 1

A hierarchical spatial agreement of central places.

Central Place Theory Table 1

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Christaller’s systems of central places

Principle

k-Value

The goals of the system

Marketing

k¼3

To serve a maximum number of consumers from a minimum number of central places.

Transportation

k¼4

To locate as many central places as possible along the main transport routes connecting the higher-order centers.

Administrative

k¼7

To provide administrative control: lower-level administrative units are completely controlled by higher-level centers.

Arrangement of central places

form. The major difference between the two approaches was that Lösch regarded the fixed k assumption as a special limiting case. Lösch developed variable k hierarchies by allowing various hexagonal systems to coexist. This was achieved by superimposing the hexagonal network for one level of central places upon the network for another and then rotating the networks until the maximum degree of spatial association of central places was obtained. The reason for doing this was to minimize the route-distances necessary to link the settlement pattern; as a result, it increased the efficiency of the spatial organization. In this manner, Lösch generated a pattern of sectors radiating from the largest urban center (the highest-order central place) in a given region. The Löschian landscape is composed of city-rich sectors alternating with sectors containing few urban places. This tendency of the urban system to form a sort of radial banding around the highest-order central place is in reality reinforced by transportation patterns. While in Christaller’s model hexagonal market areas are arranged in a nested pattern with the market areas of lower-order goods packed within those of higher-order goods, in Lösch’s model there is a much more complex web of interconnected market areas. Specifically, the Löschian spatial organization is characterized by a less distinct hierarchical structure than that proposed by Christaller because (1) central places of the same size do not necessarily perform the same range of functions, (2) higher-order central places need not have all of the functions of lower-order centers, and (3) the city-size distribution is more likely to follow the rank–size rule.

Impacts on Urban Geography There has been considerable support both for and against the overall effectiveness of central place theory in describing and explaining the locational relationships of central places and their market areas. On the one hand, the theory has been criticized for its emphasis on description rather than explanation. The classical models are extremely rigid and deterministic. They predict a partial equilibrium under a constant set of conditions. The models describe an essentially static set of locational relationships with no reference to how the spatial pattern might change over time. The social and cultural environment of the relationships is taken for granted making them independent of the political and social forces operating at various spatial scales. In contrast to these limitations, central place theory has stimulated research in urban geography and related disciplines such as retailing/marketing geography by providing a framework for empirical and applied studies. The broader notions of the theory, particularly the hierarchy of functions and centers, the interdependence of settlements and market areas, threshold population, and spatial competition, have given extremely useful terms of reference and organizational concepts within which to examine systematic regularities in the size, number, and spacing of settlements, retailing centers, and public service facilities. A great deal of research has been built on these core ideas. The vast literature which has grown up around the classical central place theory may be broadly classified into two categories: (1) theoretical studies concerned primarily with evaluating and modifying the various postulates of the theory and (2) empirical and applied studies which have been more concerned with utilizing elements of the theory for descriptive and planning purposes.

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Modifications of the Classical Models There is a considerable amount of research on theoretical refinements of the classical central place models. According to Berry et al., this research can be subdivided into two groups of approaches aiming at (1) extensions of the classical models and (2) development of alternative approaches. The former studies attempt to modify the traditional models without changing their underlying assumptions, while the latter intend to make the classical models more realistic and to increase their theoretical generality. Subsequent to Christaller and Lösch, considerable efforts have been made to modify and extend the classical central place models, particularly with regard to their nature and properties. These efforts have been directed toward developing more general hierarchical models, refining the spatial equilibrium (market-area structures), and examining the size and configuration of centers in a central place system. In addition, some attempts have been made to integrate the central place theory with fundamental concepts of urban geography such as the rank–size rule. The rank–size rule indicates that central places, at least in their population sizes, follow a kind of gradient rather than being arranged into a hierarchy. Beckmann resolved this inconsistency by suggesting that each level of the urban place hierarchy might be subject to random influences. If this provision for population variation is added to central place theory then the patterns of center sizes would approximate the rank–size distribution. To make the classical models more realistic a number of attempts have been undertaken to scrutinize the central place system under various conditions, including a nonuniform population (or demand) density, spatial variation in the incomes of consumers, interdependencies between levels of urban hierarchy, price and transportation cost differentials, and variations in consumer behaviors. The alternative approaches to the classic central place models are mostly of a partial equilibrium nature, attempting to describe and explain some aspects of the central place system while disregarding others. One of the main problems with these approaches is that the economic rationality behind actions of individual consumers and firms remains blurred. Researchers engaged in developing so-called new economic geography have addressed this problem. These “new” approaches propose a framework that adds dynamic factors to the classical models and incorporates the behaviors of individual consumers and firms into the central place framework. Krugman demonstrated that with some adjustments, the static central place models could be made sufficiently dynamic to explain the development of a hierarchical urban system. Fujita and his colleagues provided further insight into the nature of urban systems. They suggested that in a region with multiple industries that differ in terms of scale economies and/or transport costs, the urban system self-organizes into a highly regular hierarchical system along with a gradually increasing population size of the region. This finding supports Christaller’s central place hierarchy.

Empirical and Applied Studies The theories outlined in the works of Christaller and Lösch have generated a large volume of literature reporting on empirical research into the spatial regularities suggested by the central place models. These empirical studies, however, have only partially been successful in demonstrating the existence of urban hierarchy. Although the theory has been verified by empirical evidence derived from many regions of the world, the empirical studies have tended to focus on regions with specific characteristics. They have concentrated on rural regions with relatively homogeneous natural and cultural environments (such as Midwest United States, the flat Gangetic Plain of India, Szechwan in China, and Saskatchewan in Canada) and therefore have failed to distinguish a complete range of upper-order settlements such as national metropolitan centers and global-level cities. Christaller’s original hierarchy as established in southern Germany included seven orders of central places. There is some evidence to show that Christaller’s hierarchy of urban places has changed in response to the process of globalization and development of telecommunication technologies. Hall suggests that the two bottom levels of Christaller’s hierarchy (i.e., market hamlets and township centers) have gradually disappeared from the hierarchy. At the same time, a global and a subglobal level have been added at the top of the hierarchy of urban places. Interestingly, most empirical studies have been concerned with the distribution of consumer services and there has been little or no reference to the information-dependent producer services. The economic landscape as prescribed by the central place models has changed due to the development of transport and telecommunication technologies. The technological advances have eroded the frictional effect of distance on consumer behavior, and consequently there has been a major shift in the organization of urban systems from spatial structures in which central places are graded with multilevel hierarchy (according to the models of Christaller and Lösch) toward systems shaped by the exchange of specialized information. Graham and Marvin suggest that a “hub and spoke” urban network interconnected by fast transport infrastructures and telecommunication systems has gradually replaced the multilevel functional hierarchy of central places. This claim echoes Pred’s work, who argues that along with the structural changes of advanced economies the urban–hinterland relationships have become more horizontal in terms of the hierarchy of central places, and they have become global in scale. The classical central place models have had an important impact on spatial diffusion research. There have been a number of theoretical and empirical studies attempting to link spatial diffusion and central place theory. The results of these empirical studies suggest that the relations between central place hierarchy and spatial diffusions follow a two stage process: (1) a “filtering down” of innovations through the urban hierarchy and (2) a contagious “spreading out” from urban centers to other locations in their hinterland. Thus, the innovation potential of a central place is related to its position in the urban hierarchy and the amount of interaction it has with centers that have already adopted the innovation.

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The usefulness of central place models is supported by the successful applications of central place approaches for analyzing the locational patterns of the private and public sector services within urban areas. The most common and perhaps the most successful applications have been studies of the spatial patterns of retail activities. The classical studies are those by Berry and his colleagues. These studies confirm the applicability of the central place concept for analyzing the intraurban patterns of business centers. For example, the principles of central place theory have been applied to Chicago and its suburbs, where a systematic hierarchy of centers and subcenters (albeit strongly influenced by the existence of major radial transportation lines) was identified. More recently, central place models have provided a foundation for a geographic information system (GIS)-based analysis of the spatial patterns of marketing and retailing and for an empirical testing of the hierarchy of central places. Central place models are considered to be useful descriptive tools, with some prescriptive value for regional/urban planning schemes. The main stimulus for using central place theory in developing regional plans has been related to the efficiency of central place arrangements that may have a positive effect upon the economic development of a given region. Central place theory has been successfully applied to regional plans in various regions and countries (e.g., USA, Canada, Europe, India, and Middle East). For example, the spatial pattern of new settlements on the drained polders of Holland was planned around the postulates of central place theory. Similarly, Israeli settlements on the Lakhish plains were developed according to a threelevel hierarchy.

See Also: Diffusion; Hub Network Location; Location Theory; Networks, Urban; Retail Geographies.

Further Reading Beaumont, J.R., 1987. Location–allocation models and central place theory. In: Ghosh, A., Rushton, G. (Eds.), Spatial Analysis and Location–Allocation Models. Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, pp. 21–54. Beavon, K.S.O., 1977. Central Place Theory: A Reinterpretation. Longman, London. Beckmann, M.J., 1968. Location Theory. Random House, New York. Berry, B.J.L., 1967. Geography of Marketing Centers and Retail Distribution. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Berry, B.J.L., 1971. Hierarchical diffusion: the basis of developmental filtering and spread in a system of growth centers. In: Hansen, N.M. (Ed.), Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development. The Free Press, New York, pp. 108–138. Berry, B.J.L., Parr, J.B., Epstein, B.J., Ghosh, A., Smith, R.H.T., 1988. Market Centers and Retail Location: Theory and Applications. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Christaller, W., 1933 (trans. 1966). In: Baskin, C. (Ed.), Central Places in Southern Germany. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Davies, W.K.D., 1967. Centrality and the central place hierarchy. Urban Stud. 4, 61–79. Fujita, F., Krugman, P., Mori, T., 1999. On the evolution of hierarchical urban systems. Eur. Econ. Rev. 43, 209–251. Graham, S., Marvin, S., 1996. Telecommunications and the City: Electronic Spaces, Urban Places. Routledge, London. Greene, R.P., Pick, J.B., 2006. Exploring the Urban Community: A GIS Approach. Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Hall, P., 1998. Cities in Civilization: Culture, Technology and Urban Order. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. Hundson, J.C., 1969. Diffusion in a central place system. Geogr. Anal. 1, 45–58. King, L.J., 1984. Central Place Theory. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA. Krugman, P.R., 1995. Development, Geography, and Economic Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Lösch, A., 1940 (trans. 1954). In: Woglom, W.H., Stolper, W.F. (Eds.), The Economics of Location. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Pred, A.R., 1977. City-system in Advanced Economies: Past Growth, Present Processes and Future Development Options. Hutchinson, London. Ullman, E., 1941. A theory of location for cities. Am. J. Sociol. 46, 835–864.

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Chaos and Complexityq Graham Chapmany, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom Michael Batty, Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London, London, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by G. Chapman, volume 2, pp 31–39, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Chaos The deterministic behavior of a dynamic system in which no system state is ever repeated. In terms of the phase space, this means that no point is ever revisited. Complexity There is no agreed definition of complexity. Most definitions start with a minimum requirement that many parts are involved in nonlinear interactions, which create a whole with emergent properties. Other authors insist that the parts have a cognitive model of their role and position in the system but since these cognitive models cannot claim to complete knowledge either of themselves or of the system, the partiality of knowledge is the reason that the characteristic behavior of the whole is seen to be emergent. For this reason, some authors insist that complexity is a property of biological and social systems rather than of physical or chemical systems. Nonlinearity This occurs if change in one variable does not cause a proportionate constant change in a dependent variable. Strange attractor A region of phase space, described by a fractal; containing the path of a chaotic system.

Chaos to Complexity There is a reasonable consensus on what the study of chaotic systems means, at least in formal terms, but there is very little consensus on what the study of complexity entails. This is a generic field, almost a point of view or perspective, a paradigm which conceives of such ordered systems as evolving from the bottom-up. Complex systems consist of very large numbers of elemental units that act almost independently but when examined in their aggregate, display patterns that are highly ordered. In complex systems, order emerges spontaneously from which a hierarchy of functions appears but where such structures are not governed or manufactured from the top-down. Most definitions start with a system composed of many parts which involve nonlinear interactions which create aggregations or “wholes” with emergent properties. These properties are “emergent” because they cannot be predicted from what is known about the parts and their interactions. Sometimes the mantra of the Gestalt movement in psychology is invoked for such complex systems where it said that “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.” Complexity embraces the dynamics of a system in that its trajectory or path through space and time is defined in such a way that unusual or unexpected transitions can be identified. Complex systems models embrace a range of behaviors from all kinds of chaos or catastrophe to complex equilibria that manifest regular oscillations or cycles. Models of such complex systems can be set up computationally so that we can find out what actually emerges from a known set of interactions, even if we cannot predict the consequences of such complexity in formal terms. Without computers, systems theorists were only able to make small advances in understanding the dynamics and fluctuations of such system behavior. Back in the 1920s, Volterra following Lotka derived equations for the interaction of two species in an ecosystem, using nonlinear functions. The classic example is the relationship between basking sharks as predators and shrimps as prey. If the abundance of shrimps is low, the sharks starve, and there is a population crash. The shrimps can undergo a population explosion, since sharks reproduce slowly. But when the sharks do increase, shrimps decrease at an accelerating rate. The relationships are nonlinear, that is, the rate of change of one variable with respect to the other is not constant. The system results in “repeated” fluctuations in the two species in time (as we illustrate in Fig. 1), which is indicated by the closed loops for different rates of change which show the system in its phase space (see Fig. 2). This behavior is often called a dynamic equilibrium although complex systems models often simulate situations which are far-from-equilibrium in that their behavior never settles down, implying a permanent state of disequilibria. Although there had been mathematical intimations of this variety of dynamics more than a century ago, it was not until computer simulations began that theorists finally understood there were classes of systems that never went to equilibrium, and never repeated a previous state. One of the first which became a classic example was by the meteorologist Edward Lorenz, who modeled the Earth’s climate using three variables linked to each other by nonlinear functions. Fig. 3 shows how these three variables might change through time and this looks somewhat random, but Fig. 4 shows how regular its behavior is when visualized within its phase space. Since the system revisits the same neighborhoods in this space, we can say the path of the system has a kind of shapedhere a shape with two lobes like a butterfly. This shape is known as a strange attractor. In this case, the system stays in one neighborhood for a while, then flips to the other neighborhood. The strange attractor actually exists in three dimensions: q

Professor Graham Chapman passed away on August 31, 2014. Professor Michael Batty edited and added to Chapman’s article on Chaos and Complexity for the second edition of the Encyclopedia. y Deceased.

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Figure 1

Lagged fluctuations in the populations of shrimps and sharks from the Lotka–Volterra equations.

Figure 2

The cycles of shrimp and shark populations from Fig. 1 represented in a phase space.

Figure 3

The behavior of a typical chaotic variable in time.

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Figure 4

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The Lorenz attractor.

one for each of the three variables which are the rate of convection, horizontal temperature variation, and vertical temperature variation. The attractor is shown in Fig. 4 as a three-dimensional trajectory where every positioning of this line defining the trajectory is in a different position in the phase space. These systems are deterministic in that they have no random component. For any given current state, there is one and only one next state. This means that from any point in the phase space, there can be one and only one line segment going to the next point. Hence, wherever in Fig. 4 it appears that the lines touch and cross each other, they do not. They are separated in the third dimension, and pass either behind or in front of each other. In this sense, although this attractor appears to be a continuous surface, it is in fact a single line. We can think of the trajectory of some systems as being modeled as a number, where each digit follows deterministically from the digit before. A system that goes to a stable end state might be like 1974653843432222222222222. A system that reaches a dynamic equilibrium may be something like 5913746525341414141414141. With chaotic behavior, the number is essentially random, in that there is no detectable pattern in it, and it never goes to a terminal state. This understanding leads us to the apparently paradoxical termddeterministic randomness. It highlights the fact that systems can be deterministic, but there is no way we can predict the value of the n-th digit, without calculating all preceding n  1 steps. This lack of predictability is a feature of randomness, but not the kind of randomness which originates from flipping a coin. We will return to this feature in a discussion of measures of complexity, below. So, let us summarize the main characteristics of chaotic behavior we have identified so far: such systems are deterministic, they never repeat themselves, and they manifest strange attractors. Now, consider the two lobes of Fig. 4. Suppose one lobe represents ice age Earth, and the other, thermal period Earth. At some stage in the future, which state will the Earth be in? If the future we are thinking about is tomorrow (one iteration), then there is not much difficulty in saying tomorrow will be much like today. The only way we can find out what it will be like in 300 iterations is to calculate all 300 steps. The future of the system is computationally irreducible. It is not that the system exhibits “counterintuitive behavior”; the behavior has no intuitive characteristics. Further, if we change any of the initial conditions by even the smallest amount, our prediction of tomorrow will change by an almost equally small amount, but the system in 300 iterations may be in a completely different state from the one calculated initially. These systems are infinitely sensitive to initial conditions. This has been paraphrased as the “butterfly effect”: that a butterfly flapping its wings in West Texas may or may not set off dynamics that culminate in a hurricane in the Caribbean a month later (notwithstanding the fact that the attractor also looks a little like a butterfly!). In history, the effect has been mythologized as: “for want of a nail, a shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, a horse was lost; for want of a horse, a king was lost, and the kingdom too.” Chaos theory, in fact, is poorly named. It is not at all about what we colloquially call chaos or even about randomness; it is about deterministic systems that are computationally irreducible. Further, it is about the impossibility of ever accurately mapping the real world onto such a system model due to the indeterminacy of the level of resolution. To do so, we would have to have infinitely finegrained observations of the real world, and an infinitely large model, both of which are impossible. Our increasing theoretical understanding of this problem has made us realize that we will never be able to predict the weather of northern temperate areas for more than a week or two by calculating forward from current system states. The present limitation of most weather forecasts to 5 days is because we are already nearing that limit. This limitation does not preclude some seasonal forecasting based on the historical understanding of repetitive behaviordas with El Nino or the North Atlantic Oscillationdbut it does limit predictions that are made for longer than about a week.

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Although at first glance it might seem that we now “know we cannot predict” the future, systems theorists have studied many different kinds of attractors, and to some extent can narrow down the range of possible futures. What chaos theory does is enable us to develop an appropriate perspective on prediction rather than providing us with tools that enable it, and in this sense, it is relevant to both human and physical systems which embrace the range of sciences from the social to the natural and from the artificial to the physical. Chaos thus has wide applicability to a variety of space-time systems of which geographical systems are examples par excellence.

Defining Complexity There may be a degree of agreement on the starting points for the study of complexity but from that point on, complexity becomes a circus big-top for any number of performing intellectual acrobats in an increasing number of circus rings. The behavior of chaotic systems is a-intuitive, not even counter intuitivedthat is, we cannot guess what such a system will do, we have to wait and see what such systems do. Complexity is one useful step beyond such an intuitive behavior where the dynamics of the system may well evoke in us some intuitive recognition of holistic behavior. Good examples are when a shoal of fish maintains a coherent pattern, but changes direction to avoid a predator, or when a flock of birds seem to behave as a collective, forming and re-forming a collective V-shape as they fly along their migration routes. In these circumstances, we cannot predict exactly how the shoal or the flock will behave, but if we observe the same species, we begin to see the kinds of behavior that might occur. The same may be said of our understanding of riots at a football grounddwe may know more about the pre-conditions that might provoke or prevent a riot, but we are not be able to predict exactly when and in which part of the crowd the riot will start. Increasing attention is now being paid to networks and emergent behavior. In fact, network science has to some extent become the cornerstone of complexity science. Networks may be richly connected, thinly connected, hierarchically connected, or in any combination thereof. Increasingly we realize that the patterns of connectivity can have significant effects on whether disruptions to the flows on the network links dissipate or propagate. The classic example involves different configurations of road structures and the way their connectivities affect the manner in which jams develop and propagate, as any driver on a high-speed motorway network will realize as congestion builds to thresholds that reflect stops and starts in conditions of saturated flow. Another example is a power grid in a large city which can collapse unpredictably when a minor fault trips a sequence of more significant faults. Put simply, we are only just beginning to develop the tools to understand how complex dynamics develop on different network structures. The examples of fishes, birds, and humans are intrinsically biological (in that nervous systems are involved) but the example of the power system is physical. Some complexity theorists would claim that these two kinds of cases have the same basis, and that the distinction between biological and physical is an “obsolete disciplinarity” compared to the development of new interdisciplinary ways of thinking that characterize complexity theory. Others would claim that they are radically different and cannot be fused. This dispute lies at the heart of our understanding of what is meant by “science,” and what is meant by “being human.” In classical science, the future is only an outcome of the present: the only questions that can be asked are “how” questions, not “why” questions. On the other hand, human beings believe they have agency, and can choose a future. Both camps in complexity theory toy with the idea of “emergence,” which implies that when some components are combined, there are properties of the whole that are not properties of the parts, hence the reference back to the Gestalt that we noted in our introduction. At one level, this is trivially true although still mysterious. Two gases, oxygen and hydrogen, combine together to make a compound, water, which has unique properties unlike those of either parent: its solid phase (ice) is less dense than its liquid phase, and hence ice floats. At other levels, it is nontrivially true. Time and again one can read that the most complex entity in the known universe is the human brain, and human beings have self-consciousness. Where does this self-consciousness come from? The only answer so far (if one accepts the question as being meaningful) is that when a sufficient number of neurons are connected together (and it is a number in the billions) consciousness “emerges” as an effect that is not attributable to the properties of the neurons and synapses of the brain. That is to say, given enough quantity, qualitative changes occur. Those who claim that the shoal of fish and the power system can belong to the same class of complexity are basing their claim on this idea that complexity emerges as a result of quantitiesdof elements and of connections between elements. The problem is that with consciousness comes agency. For “humanists,” choosing a future implies that humans can imagine a model of a future, and that the choices are purposive and nonrandom. The question that we cannot answer is: “How do you explain behavior simultaneously as an ‘outcome’ and as an ‘intention’?”

Modeling Complexity: Cellular Automata The most generic model of complexity which encapsulates emergence in space and time is called a cellular automaton (CA). These models were first proposed during the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos during World War II by Stanislaw Ulam and they were then picked up by John von Neumann, who argued that they represented a simple analogue for how growth processes could be modeled on the newly invented digital computer. They were first articulated as temporal processes on a two-dimensional lattice, which enabled changes in the state of the cells defined by the lattice to be made through concentration, diffusion, transitions of various sorts, and local action at a distance, all relating to the cell in question and its neighbors. CAs have thus become ubiquitous in

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exploring many aspects of what is claimed to be emergent behavior. In their simplest form, they are large, two-dimensional “boards” of many squares arranged in a rectangular grid. The cells can take on as many states as relevant to the problem but in their simplest form the states are developed or not developeddbeing colored, say, black or white. Any set of initial conditions of black and white may be used and, in any given simulation run, a set of transition rules is used to determine how a square may or may not change from black to white, or vice versa, in any one iteration. If the corner (diagonal) neighboring squares are counted, any square can have eight neighbors. For all unique combinations of black/white states for these nine cells, a transition rule specifies what the state of the central cell will be after the current iteration. There are therefore 29 ¼ 512 black and white combinations of the nine squares overall that will give an output state of either black or whiteddeveloped or not developeddfor the target square. For many starting states and for many transition rules, patterns simply go to some stable and possibly monotone state; however, there are examples where dynamic patterns emerge which seem to behave “organically.” One of the best exemplars is John Conway’s famous “Game of Life,” invented in 1970 as a board game in which a change in the state of any cell can reflect a birth, a death, or no change, the cell changing to black, white, or remaining the same color (see Fig. 5). The reader is urged to visit the website at the end of this article to explore this game from which they can experiment to generate many of the “life forms” which emerge from the interactions of neighbors on the grid. The neurophilosopher Daniel Dennett used this game as a starting point for his attempt to show that there could be a solution to the “outcome/intention” paradox in a book which has a similarly contradictory title: Freedom Evolves. Just as systems that go to equilibrium or dynamic equilibrium are of little interest to the chaos theorist, so also the complexity theorist is not interested in those simulations which reach a static terminal state. By contrast, other CAs have many significant and interesting properties. They are computationally irreducibledonly by running the CA 1000 iterations can you know what state it will be in after 1000 iterations. Each cell is a “self” with a boundary, and it has “knowledge” of its own state and that of its immediate neighborsdso it is in an environment with limited spatial knowledge that is not total knowledge. Its future states depend on how it reacts to this knowledge. Dynamic patterns self-organize and higher scale (multicell) entities emerge, which have characteristic behavioral patterns. Indeed this allure is so strong that there is an international “Game of Life” club with its own vocabulary describing changes in state using the terminology of “guns,” “breeders,” and “gliders”

Figure 5

Breeders, guns, and gliders in Conway’s Game of Life.

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that they have coined for different sets of transition rules. “Guns” are static shapes that fire “projectiles” at regular intervals in straight directions; “breeders” are shapes that produce new versions of themselves; “gliders” are shapes that maintain their shape as they drift across the board. It is the iteration of these rules that generates the patterns, examples of which we show in Fig. 5. This seems like a perfect metaphor for emergence, but actually it is not. The behavior of the whole is explicable by the behavior of the parts. Although it may appear that a “breeder” is an organic whole, it has no self, no boundary to self, and no central knowledge processing. All of that still occurs at the level of the individual cells. The “organisms” do not evolvedthey might get eaten up or disintegrate, but the stable shapes that wander round the board do not randomly mutate and form new species. The simulations might, however, be good metaphors for the shoals of fishdthere is no central processing there either, although an onlooker can sometimes get the sense that there could be. The behavior of the whole shoal may affect the survival of the species of fish, but this is an outcome, not an intention. It is the human observer who imbues the fascinating patterns of Conway’s “game” with the dignity of “life.” These “creatures” lead frictionless lives in which they consume no negentropy, nor do they produce entropy. Notwithstanding this criticism, enthusiasts ardently pursue the field of artificial life of which this simulation is a founding cornerstone. There is no doubt considerable value in using these models to throw light on some kinds of complex dynamics. A favorite example is modeling traffic flows on motorways, where traffic can accelerate, then decelerate, and bunch up, often forming standing waves at points where there may have been an incident hours earlier. Running a model in which simple rules relate to how cars adjust to each other in terms of spacing and speed can mimic these effects. In fact it is the randomness of how drivers react and speed up that often causes the waves without any particular incident as such.

The Big-Top of Complexity Many of the topics that now vie for attention within the complexity circus had their origin somewhat outside this new field, or even before the new tent was erected. Examples include artificial intelligence (AI) which itself comes in a variety of incommensurate forms. These include expert systems, which quarry human experts such as doctors diagnosing a patient, to elicit the rules underlying their decision-making. Others may depend on artificial neural nets (ANNs) which enable patterns to be discovered in big data explicitly using a model of data processing in analogy to the way neurons are related in the brain. Neurons are connected in nets, and “fire” each other off, or not, according to specified thresholds. They “learn” to replicate the same relationships between their input data and outcomes they are designed to reproduce. The problem with the latter is that the relationships that link data with output cannot be isolated from the network: they are “black boxes,” and in this sense, the patterns that are generated are truly emergent but often not explicable. It is then difficult to build confidence that the network will correctly identify novel cases. An apocryphal anecdote relates that the US Army trained a neural net to distinguish between Soviet and US tanks by inputting thousands of photographs of each to the net. When it came to using the net in the field to distinguish at high-speed between friendly and enemy tanks, all the tanks were found to be friendly. It turned out that the net had originally distinguished the two types of tanks in terms of whether the photography was clear (a US tank) or grainy (a surreptitious distant shot smuggled out of the Eastern Bloc). All real-time images were clear; therefore all tanks were friendly. Notwithstanding these limitations, ANNs can still be useful and are now the basis of machine learning and deep mining. They have been quite widely used in spatial analysis in a variety of ways, to examine patterns in spatial interaction through to classifying ecosystems from remotely sensed satellite imagery but the verdict is still out on how good such methods will be at dealing with complex systems in the long term. A similar “blind” and “self-organizing” tool is genetic programming, where thousands of arbitrary rules are assigned to solve a task, and those that are most successful in any generation are selected for the next iteration. The programs often involve random mating (swapping elements of code) so that the fitness of the genes can be established and an optimum configuration of the problem in hand be generated. Another popular development within the big-top is the use of agent-based models (ABMs). These are in principle rather more sophisticated versions of CAs, cells on which agents or objects can move. An application within geography is to the modeling of cities, seeing how social segregation, or suburban sprawl, may result from interacting agents with differing behavioral rules. Studying the behavior that emerges, and testing new hypotheses and new rules, can help understand urban processes in a way which is radically different from old-style classical spatial economics. These models can also be operationalized by linking them to GIS systems so that the “board” becomes the “real” city. Developments in robotics may also come within the circus tent, not so much for applications within industry, but for a better understanding of biomechanical principles. The construction of a mechanical dog that can run with the same gait as a real dog reveals that only some of the simulation needs to be in information processing. Much of the performance of the robot is better built into its own mechanical structures and material balances and tensions, so that the control is stimulating “inherent response” harmonics of bouncing and stretching. Perhaps the most far-reaching of complexity’s current buzz-words is the idea of the “tipping point.” The implication that there are thresholds beyond which stability becomes instability, or leads to an irreversible, alternative, and undesirable state, has been given political legs, and is used almost regardless of whether there is a well-founded model behind the tipping point or not. So in that sense, complexity has entered our imagination as a somewhat frightening, certainly mysterious metaphor in terms of the following typical clichés: the climate will soon pass a tipping point, immigration will soon pass a tipping point, and the educational system will soon pass a tipping point. We need to be careful about our use of this new science in the popular imagination.

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Measuring Complexity There is little doubt that many of the systems that we as geographers are concerned with from both the human and physical perspectives are getting more complex as they evolve. Life itself is the obvious manifestation of this increasing complexity and, by this account, it ought to be possible to provide a quantitative measure of complexity, so that the extent to which “this system” is more complex than “that” can be expressed quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Many authors believe that no measure of complexity has yet been discovered that has any useful meaning. However, there are some measures which attract intellectual curiosity, and perhaps in the future some significance will be derived from them. The most cited is the Solomonoff–Chaitin measure of algorithmic complexity, which says that the degree of complexity is defined by the shortest possible algorithm that can express the observed behavior. Formally this is defined in terms of the length of a program in a universal Turing machine (the most basic theoretical computer) required to generate or print any given output. To return to our numerical examples, a single decimal digit like 4 or 6 requires 3.322 bits of information for it to be measurable. Suppose the behavior of some system is represented by the string 0.333333333333333333333. which is 100 decimal numbers long. To express 100 such numbers requires 332.2 bits. But we can also express the number as n ¼ 1/3. This expression requires only 2  3.332 bits, plus a small length of program for calculating the division. The number is clearly much less complex. By contrast, a string of 100 numbers from a chaotic system cannot be summarized by an algorithm that is shorter than the 100 numbers, and it has therefore “complete” complexity. Some fairly simple reasoning leads to the conclusion that the proportion of numbers that are not complex becomes vanishingly small, implying that stable solutions are extremely rare. In statistical terms, if some sample of numbers are randomly drawn from a normally distributed population, again we need not know all the numbers; we can use an algorithm to specify the distribution in terms of a few parameters such as the mean and standard deviation. We need not know all the details of each number. Apparently complexity has been reduced. The use of statistical analysis in social science has thus been based on the idea that it is the aggregates, not the individuals, which matter. However, no two nontrivially sized samples will contain the same numbers (hence the idea of the standard error of the sample mean). Now, suppose the behavior of the whole is not an aggregate, but the emergent effect of individuals interacting with each other. Then, clearly, the initial conditions in the two cases are different, even if the sample characteristics are the same. So if we are interested in emergent dynamics, the statistical approach will not work. As an example, suppose people have an individual and static propensity to riot. Then a statistical analysis of a sample of football fans will work out quite easily the likelihood of a riot of intensity x; however, if the propensity of each individual to riot is changed by the behavior of a neighbor (and worst of all it is a positive feedback loop), then what matters most is being able to predict a single trigger point somewhere. Such a trigger point may be the simple adjacency of two people who have poor self-control and competing loyalties. Then there are further adjacencies to considerdwhether those surrounding the flash-point pair are likely to suppress or aggravate the situation. Even the same crowd of people may yield completely different behaviors depending on who is adjacent, or who is connected to whom. There is really only one possible conclusion about the state of our knowledge of our own societies. They are intrinsically complex, and all models of them introduce simplifications that render model predictions unreliable. This is one of the pessimistic conclusions that complexity brings to the party, that the world is unpredictable, and that no model can ever reproduce reality in a way that captures the essence of any complex system. In fact, in geographical systems, particularly those dealing with human systems, complexity is always increasing while entropy is always decreasing and this poses limits on our understanding that in turn limits our powers of explanation, and of course prediction.

Properties of Complex Systems: Scaling and Fractals Although our focus on chaos and complexity here has been dominated by limits on what we can explain, model, and predict, there are properties of complex systems that are generic, perhaps even universal, that enable us to make comparisons between different applications. We have not said very much about the size of such systems, although we have implied that complexity does not relate to size per se but to more qualitative features such as the processes of evolution that give rise to emergence. Complex systems, however, do manifest regularities with respect to their size and the distribution of their elements. Many such systems are built around the idea of their elements competing with one another for limited resources. Take cities, for example. Cities grow up where people come together to pool their resources which is the economic imperative based on increasing prosperity and opportunity. In this sense, there are many cities as most of us cannot live and work and exchange our resources in the same place and in any case, physical resources that are required are not evenly distributed. Cities thus compete with each other and over time, all of them cannot grow to the same size. It is obvious that there will be a much smaller number of large cities than small cities. So as an exemplar, the system of cities represents a generic class of objects or elementsdindividual citiesdthat become ordered in some way as they evolve. The distribution of such elements is extremely well defined and follows what are called power laws. In other words, when we look at the size of cities by their rank-order, we find that their sizes fall off as a nonlinear relation that follows an inverse power law, which in its purest form suggests that the size of any city at any rank in the set is the size of the largest city in the set divided by its rank. There are other ways of saying the same but, in essence, many complex systems show a distribution of their elements that

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follows this rank-size rule. In the social sciences, the distribution of incomes, the distribution of talents of many kinds, the distribution of words in a novel, and so on all follow the same kinds of power law. In the physical world too, the distribution of many geomorphological objects follow the same laws: the distribution of any phenomenon that involves energy discharge such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, moon craters, river flows, and so on. This observation in and of itself is not particularly insightful for it has been known for many years; but it is what it implies that is important. It is an example of fractality in that when we examine a power law, it is clear that the relationship between, let us say, size and rank is scaling in that when we take a piece of the distribution and scale it up or down, we find the same distribution. This is the property of self-similarity. It means that wherever we are on the distribution, whichever way we look, up or down, we see the same function. In short, if we did not know what city size we were looking at, just having acknowledge of the relationship would not tell us which city because at that point in the distribution, size is not relevant; it is the relative distribution that is. For example, if our city size could be predicted from the rank-size power law as P(r) ¼ Kr1 where P(r) is the population P of the city at rank r and K is a constant of proportionality, if we were to scale the rank by s as sr, the new population would be P(sr) ¼ K(sr)1 ¼ s1Kr1 ¼ s1P(r); this is a simple scaling which implies the fact that the distribution of city sizes is self-similar. We do not have time to explore this here but we can generalize these kinds of relationships to space and time in that we can demonstrate that the way cities, rivers, craters, and so on are distributed are fractal-like in space and time, in terms of their configuration and packing in Euclidean space and their clustering in time. In terms of complexity theory, however, we are but at the beginning in terms of mapping out a new paradigm which will provide us with a template for dealing with complex systems in future research. These are brave words indeed for they imply very different ways in which we need to think about human, natural, and physical systems but remember that it was Stephen Hawking who in speculating on the most important advances in future science in the year 2000 said that: “I think the next century will be the century of complexity.”

Conclusion Systems that are perfectly organized (ordered) do not evolve unless by outside intervention. Systems composed of individuals which exhibit purely random behavior, like molecules of gas in a cylinder, do not evolve, and are best described in terms of their aggregate properties. Poised between randomness and order are other systems. Of those that are biological, we can state that we, the observers, think they have the following properties. They have a large number of elements because when the number of elements increases, formal description of the relations between elements ceases to give an understanding of the whole. There are dynamic interactions among this large number of elements, and many of these interactions are nonlinear. There is feedback within the system. They have a history and every element of the system is ignorant of the behavior of the whole. With regard to complex reflexive social systems, none of the mappings between these conditions and the “real world” is unambiguous. In short, the systems that are candidates for complexity evolve and are intrinsically unpredictable: cities, the atmosphere, rivers, economies, the list of systems with which we deal as geographers is endless, and slowly but surely being informed by the science of complexity. With reference to human geography, complexity has made an impact as a metaphor, the value of which Thrift (1999) has compared with actor–network theorydwhere again there are many parts not fully aware of the way their behavior is mediated by the network. Harris (2007) has used insights drawn from complexity theory to grapple with the interface between society and planet in the quest for sustainable development. In more applied terms, ABMs are used to study system evolution, for example, with regard to cities by Allen (1997) and Batty (2007), and these relate strongly to the dynamics of their networks. These models may provide us with many insights into how systems can behave, and how they might behave, but very little by way of predicting their exact behavior. The most certain prediction is that they will be unpredictable because of sensitivity to initial conditions and bifurcation points.

See Also: Cellular Automata; Fractal Analysis; Neural Networks.

Further Reading Allen, P.M., 1997. Cities and Regions as Self-Organizing Systems: Models of Complexity. Gordon and Breach, Amsterdam. Allen, P. M., Torrens, P. M. (Eds.), 2005. Special edition on complexity. Futures 37. Batty, M., 2007. Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Casti, J.L., 1993. Searching for Certainty: What Science Can Know about the Future. Abacus, London. Chapman, G.P., 2007. Evolutionary psychology, complexity theory and quantitative social epistemology. Futures 39, 1067–1083. Chesters, G., Welsh, I., 2006. Complexity and Social Movements: Multitude at the Edge of Chaos. Routledge, London. Gardner, M., 1970. Mathematical games – the fantastic combinations of John Conway’s new solitaire game “life”. Sci. Am. 223 (4), 120–123. Harris, G., 2007. Seeking Sustainability in an Age of Complexity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Johnson, J., Nowak, A., Ormerod, P., Rosewell, B., Zhang, Y.-C. (Eds.), 2017. Non-Equilibrium Social Science and Policy: Introduction and Essays on New and Changing Paradigms in Socio-Economic Thinking. Springer, New York. Manson, S.M., 2001. Simplifying complexity: a review of complexity theory. Geoforum 32, 405–414. Thrift, N., 1999. The place of complexity. Theory Cult. Soc. 16 (3), 31–69.

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Relevant Websites By far the most relevant web site is that developed by the Santa Fe Institute as The Complexity Explorer: see https://www.complexityexplorer.org. The Complexity Explorer provides online courses and educational materials about complex systems. Complexity Explorer is an education project of the Santa Fe Institute - the world headquarters for the study of complex systems. The Lorenz equations are at https://www.complexityexplorer.org/courses/94-nonlinear-dynamics-mathematical-and-computational-approaches/segments/7975. And the Game of Life is at www.complexityexplorer.org/explore/glossary/258-game-of-life https://www.complexityexplorer.org/explore/virtual-laboratory/126-conway-s-gameof-life.

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Chicago School David Sibley, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom Audrey Kobayashi, Department of Geography and Planning, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by D. Sibley, volume 2, pp 40–44, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Concentric Zones A theory of the spatial structure of the city based originally on the work of E. Burgess of the Chicago School of Sociology, which posits that the city is organized in concentric zones according to land use. Burgess and Robert Park later developed a theory of social mobility by which immigrants move from the working-class areas at the center of the city to the more affluent suburbs. Pragmatism A philosophical approach that holds that the value of a theory is based on its usefulness in understanding actual human life. The idea is largely credited to the American philosopher John Dewey. Symbolic interactionism Although there are many variants, symbolic interaction generally refers to theories based on the social consequences patterns of interaction among human through words and other forms of communication. It focuses on the meanings that emerge in particular social contexts and is therefore often associated with pragmatism. Urban Ecology A method of understanding the spatial differentiation of populations in the modern city based on mapping population characteristics. Urban ecologists attempt to understand how an urban population organizes itself within particular environments.

The Chicago School refers to the Department of Sociology, at the University of Chicago, which came to major prominence during the first part of the 20th Century. Although the University of Chicago has, or had, other celebrated schools, such as The School of Economics and The School of Pragmatism, the term Chicago “School” in sociology suggests rather a group of scholars working closely together and sharing philosophies and methods, as in Plato’s academy. It may also suggest something rather specialda constellation of academics that is leading the way in an academic field, a group whose work inspires others in the discipline and shapes a paradigm for research. Generally, it could be suggested that we need to be skeptical about this Platonic and placespecific vision of a school. Certainly, in the case of the Chicago School of Sociology, it would be necessary to talk about mythologies, fictions that reflect an external perception of the sociology department, and have contributed to an uncritical view of the institution’s contribution to knowledge. Any detailed examination of the work done in the department, particularly during the first 50 years of its existence, demonstrates that it has accommodated radically different approaches to social research, often at the same time, and that the sociologists have had an uneasy relationship with academics in cognate fields, particularly academics elsewhere in the University of Chicago, including in geography. The Chicago School began as a graduate department of sociology in 1892, in a period when the city was growing very rapidly. The department’s first chair, Albion Small, had studied both in Germany and in the United States. At Chicago, he was concerned to promote a systematic, scientific sociology. He was a key figure in establishing sociology as an academic discipline in the United States as first editor of the American Journal of Sociology. Small appointed William Thomas, who had also studied philosophy and sociology in Germany and who, with Znaniecki, produced a major study of Polish peasants in Europe and America between 1918 and 1920. Robert Park accepted an invitation from Thomas to fill a teaching part-time teaching position, and after six years, he became a professor in 1914. Park’s previous experience was diverse. His undergraduate degree at the University of Michigan was in philosophy. He worked as a journalist in New York City, did a master’s degree in psychology and philosophy at Harvard, studied philosophy in Berlin under Simmel and in Strassburg under Windelband, and completed a PhD in philosophy at Heidelberg. He then lectured at Harvard, worked as a press agent for the Congo Reform Society, and was personal assistant to Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee College, Alabama, until he moved to Chicago. These three scholarsdSmall, Thomas, and Parkdhad some common ground, particularly their familiarity with Simmel’s philosophy gained during their studies in Germany. Ellsworth Faris, appointed in 1919, had a doctorate in psychology and had worked as a missionary in Africa. Ernest Burgess, appointed in the same year as Faris, was the only member of the department in the early period who was trained as a sociologist. Disciplinary boundaries in the humanities and social sciences in the early 20th Century were more fluid than later in the century but philosophical and methodological diversity was a continuing theme of Chicago sociology. There were two other key figures in the early development of Chicago sociology: Louis Wirth, who became a professor in 1926 and was a major contributor to early studies of urban ethnicity, and Herbert Blumer, a professor from 1931, who was concerned with relationships between urban ecology and social psychology. All had a profound effect on urban and social geographers in the post–World War II period. A strong interest in philosophy and a concern with universal theory were fundamental to the development of scientific sociology at Chicago. The department is probably best known for its promotion of urban ecology. Park and Wirth, for example, saw the

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communities juxtaposed in the industrial city as an expression of an ecological order, a system of competition and temporary equilibrium based on spatial interdependencies. This competitive system, however, develops into a cultural order, whereby mutual understandings emerge from increased interaction among members of different groups, and then a moral and political order, in which societal norms and goals are articulated, is realized. It is easy to see how this evolutionary system fitted American beliefs in assimilation and the adoption of “American values,” and how it fails to explain conflict, exploitation, and the persistence of groups who do not subscribe to mainstream values. Robert Park’s introductory essay in The City, published in 1925, demonstrates that he was well aware that sociospatial relations were more complex than this model of urban ecology suggests. In a long list of problems that he would include in an urban research agenda, Park identified social unrest, strikes, and violence, for example, but he did not provide any clues about how he would deal with them theoretically. Although there were some differences in the theoretical approaches of members of the facultydbetween Park and Burgess, for exampledit has been suggested that there was a common philosophical underpinning to research in the School. This was pragmatism, a form of empiricism in which a fundamental proposition is that knowledge acquires meaning and validity on the basis of its usefulness. Theory, then, is inseparable from practice. Of the key figures in the pragmatist group in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead were members of the University of Chicago and a third, William James, had taught Robert Park when he was an undergraduate at the University of Michigan. Mead was a social psychologist and professor in the sociology department from 1894 to 1931. Pragmatism provided the philosophical basis for symbolic interactionism, a term coined by Herbert Blumer, who had been a student of Mead. We could think of it as an approach to understanding that involves engagement with others, accepting the pragmatist premise that the acquisition of knowledge requires involvement in the world and the observer’s involvement affects outcomes and, therefore, what is known. Peter Jackson and Susan Smith argued that symbolic interactionism chimed with Chicago sociologists’ strong interest in social reform but there are other views on their social commitment and involvement that will be turned to later. The particular urban projects undertaken by the Chicago School during this period have been referred to as urban ethnographies, although the level of involvement that is required in modern anthropological research was not evident in most of these studies, and there was a common tendency to observe other cultures through an assimilationist lens. Projects included studies of vice (Reckless), the ghetto (Wirth), black families (Frazier), and mental illness (Faris). These were all focused on the city, but one of the most innovative and outstanding studies was Thomas and Znaniecki’s five-volume The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, tracing the migration of Polish peasants from the villages of Poland to Chicago parishes, using a range of methods and materials, including oral histories, letters, and newspaper reports. A fundamental weakness of the urban community studies is demonstrated in Zorbaugh’s writing on wealth and povertydThe Gold Coast and the Slum. Zorbaugh provided a detailed description of life in a relatively poor Persian district close to the affluent Gold Coast, but interpreted institutions of everyday life, such as coffee shops, as evidence of “social disorganization.” Cultural difference was seen as a failure to adapt to progressive, modern American values. Despite such ethnocentricity, we could argue that Chicago sociologists in the early period laid the foundations for modern urban social geography, as well as for ethnographic approaches, especially in anthropology. The way in which the work of the Chicago School entered geographical consciousness, however, was curious.

Human Geography and the Chicago School The first commentaries on Chicago sociology in geography are found in spatial science texts in the 1960s, with reference only to Burgess. Urban geographers at the time were concerned with the internal structure of the city. Barry Garner, writing in 1967, referred to the “classic” concentric zone model of Burgess that described the typical succession of land uses with distance from the city center. Walter Isard, in 1956, and Brian Berry, in 1959, had “explained” this sequence in terms of the substitution of rents for transport costs. Spatial science in this period was primarily concerned with geometry, although neoclassical economic theory was often harnessed to provide explanations for spatial patterns. David Harvey, writing in 1969, only objected that Chicago was a sample of one, so the land-use succession described by Burgess could not stand as a generalization about urban spatial structure. Burgess did have a greater interest in cartography and demography than did other Chicago sociologists, so the connections between his writing and the interests of spatial scientists were closer than with other writers in the Chicago School, but it is notable that the principal concerns of the sociologists, in the dynamics of social areas and the relationship between the social and the spatial, were totally ignored by geographers at this time. It could be that the iconic concentric rings of Burgess’s land-use model, which became a standard feature of urban geography texts and university and high-school curricula, hampered critical thinking about the capitalist city. To understand Park’s profound influence on post–World War II geography, during a period known as the “Quantitative Revolution,” requires that we take quite literally Park’s distinction between the biotic and the cultural, a point made by Berry and Kasarda in hugely influential work Contemporary urban ecology (1977). In actuality, Park considered them to be interactive, but both the moral economy (which was a term he adopted from August Compte) and the internal structure of the citydwhich became the single most important concept in urban geography by the 1960sddraw only from the biotic notion of invasion and succession to describe the dynamic structure of the city and the location of its residents. Nicholas Entrikin points to the “double irony” that as Park’s notion of human ecology and urban geography converged from the 1950s to the 1970s, redefining ecology in positivist terms, they disregarded Park’s neo-Kantian epistemology, in which he went to great pains to distinguish the ideographic definition of the discipline of geography from the nomothetic definition of the discipline of ecology. Park’s social ideas actually had more in common with

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geographers such as Vidal, Hettner, and Hartshorne, who adopted an ideographic perspective on human beings and nature, than with those geographers for whom urban ecology became the most important theme of their subdiscipline. Entrikin undertook in 1980 a comprehensive review of cross-references between the two “Chicago Schools” of geography and sociology. Although Barrows does not seem to have cited Park, Park cited Barrows in his 1936 essay on “human ecology,” and Entrikin argues that human geographers had an important influence on Park’s original ideas of urban ecology and that Park agreed with Barrows’ understanding of the difference between the two disciplines being that geographers were concerned to study the relationship between humans and the physical environment, while sociologists emphasized the relationship of humans to the social environment. One of the most important examples of the extremely productive field of urban geography at that time. Berry and Kasarda’s Contemporary Urban Ecology was the most comprehensive and the most influential discussion of Park’s human ecology by the 1970s. Based in the Department of Geography at Chicago, they admonished the discipline to update itself by developing the quantitative methods that would support Park’s ideas about the internal structure of the city. Supporting Park’s scientific empiricism, they conducted surveys, mapped residential locations, and developed new methods such as factorial ecology to explain who lived where. Many of their studies were located in Chicago, in particular a large-scale survey of white households, which they showed moved away from black households with increasing frequency as the “penetration” of black households into white areas advanced. Park had also often used the metaphor of penetration to discuss what he called “invasion” in the race relations cycle, and he depicted modern migration as a form of “peaceful penetration.” But we should note carefully that in the shift that occurred subsequently from human ecology to factorial ecology, while the urban models became increasingly complex, the explanation of human relations became increasingly simplifieddin a sense fulfilling Park’s prophesy concerning the reduction of all relations to spatial relations. Given their spatialist predilection, then, geographers of the quantitative revolution read Park in very limited and selective ways. One important way was in the dogged production of urban maps. Maps were viewed as lending power to truth, evidence of the strength of spatial pattern, as well as important results of the ongoing demand that geographers work best from empirical fieldwork. Indeed, Berry and Kasarda, like many others, refer to the “street cred” that Robert Park achieved by having been a reporter for some years before he left to complete his PhD and by having witnessed in person the conditions in which people lived. Bearing witness with the confidence of neutrality is a hallmark of the ethnographic method, but when the evidence thereby gained is limited to that which exposes spatial patterns, it becomes easier and easierdas technology and mathematical models developdto establish greater and greater distance between observer and observed. The crux of the matter here, of course, is precisely the relationship between the observer and the observed. Berry and Kasarda end their book with a caution that geographers and planners need to avoid becoming too instrumental in the course of social change, lest they unduly influence the outcomes, or limit future possibilities on the basis of past knowledge. This work is part of what Vernon Williams has called the “assimilationist onslaught” that captured urban geographers and urban sociologists alike. In sociology, the onslaught is part of what led some sociologists at the time to declare symbolic interactionism dead, in part becausedamong many other reasonsdit was not seen to deal with structural processes such as segregation. It was also viewed as heavily reliant upon a dominant white perspective on what the ideal city should look like and how it should be arranged. But one would search the geographical literature at the time in vain for anything not written from a normataive assimilationist perspective. From a very different perspective, reworking of the social aspects of urban research probably started in the 1970s with Ceri Peach in British geography. Peach was very enthusiastic about the Chicago School, describing it as “the fountainhead from which all else flows.” He saw the basic propositions about social and spatial distance as key to an understanding of urban social and spatial segregation; however, there were some more critical reflections on Chicago sociology coming out of the urban ethnographies of Peter Jackson and others in the 1980s, including Jackson and Smith’s text, Exploring Social Geography. Certainly, acknowledging the research of the early Chicago sociologists contributed to a change in emphasis in urban geography and helped to weaken boundaries between urban geography and similar work being done in sociology and anthropology but there are still questions about the centrality of the Chicago School in urban studies. In any case, Smith and Jackson showed that there was more than one way to read the Chicago School and its influence.

Other Chicago’s In the process of locating knowledge, in a particular discipline and a particular place, exclusions occur. This may not be a serious problem if histories and geographies of ideas identify only loosely bound places that are argued to be key nodes in the production of knowledge. In the case of the Chicago School, narratives that claim so much for the academics in the sociology department are largely silent about important urban research done elsewhere in the same university and the city. In 1936, the University of Chicago Press published The Tenements of Chicago, 1908–35, edited by Edith Abbott. This collection of essays on housing questions had been preceded by papers on housing questions by Abbott and Sophonisba Breckinridge that appeared in the American Journal of Sociology in 1910 and 1911 and these two produced a book on housing problems in the city in 1912. The later work presents a strong contrast to the sociologists’ monographs, with their emphasis on social disorganization and assimilation. In a chapter on landlordism, for example, Edith Abbott and Helen Rankin Jeter used Marxist concepts of use and exchange value (without referencing Marx) to explain how landlords contributed to inequalities in the housing market. Similarly, in a chapter on rents, Jeter noted how anticipated land value, taxation, and income from the site pushed up subsequent valuations without

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regard for the needs of tenants or their ability to pay, or for the continuing decay of the building. This argument was well supported with evidence from Olcott’s Land Values Blue Book of Chicago, which charted annual changes in the geography of land values in the city. The women’s view of race and housing was also significantly different from that of the men in the sociology department. Following a paper by Breckinridge in 1913 and earlier research on race by W.E.B. Du Bois in 1899, Edith Abbott and Mary Zahrobsky noted how housing submarkets were created by discriminatory practices. In particular, they argued that black families were paying significantly higher rents than white immigrants for comparable accommodation because discrimination against black people limited the supply of housing available to them. Scarcity meant that landlords could postpone repairs and raise rents knowing that an apartment could be let at any time. Another study by a woman, Mary Faith Adams, noted how Mexicans were similarly affected by racism in the housing market. In addition to what would now be considered incisive analyses of housing problems in Chicago, some of the women also made perceptive observations on the lives of recently arrived immigrants. These included an account of evictions of Italian families by a railroad company, noting the pain of separation from the rest of the community, and the adjustment problems of Croatians who still felt a strong attachment to their rural homeland. There is an awareness of injustice and exploitation that is missing from the urban ethnographies of the sociologists and that certainly was never passed on to urban geographers who became enthralled by the Chicago School of Sociology after World War II. The political implications of their research are spelled out in one of Edith Abbott’s contributions to the book. Noting the problem of low pay and the lack of affordable housing provided by the private market, she makes a case for large-scale public housing. It is clear from the essays in The Tenements of Chicago that this group of women were somewhere to the left of Robert Park. Edith Abbott and Sophonisba Breckinridge were both on the faculty of the University of Chicago where Abbott was dean in the School of Social Service Administration, so it is not as if the women’s research was hidden from the sociologists. In fact, Burgess acknowledged Breckinridge’s outstanding contribution to social work, while maintaining a distinction between “scientific” sociology and “practical” social work. The failure of the sociologists and Park in particular, to recognize their contribution to urban theory, appears to be a consequence of sexist attitudes and a distaste for the women’s politics. One sociology student recalls being immersed in sociology as a science and hearing only occasional rumblings about the “old maids” downtown who were wet-nursing social reformers. The gendering of academic knowledge was exacerbated by the editorial policies of the American Journal of Sociology. While Albion Small was editor, the proportion of papers by women fell from 15% to 5%, suggesting that American sociology became a more masculine enterprise as the subject established a place in the academy. We could compare these analyses of housing submarkets with Park’s facile observation (in 1935) that because of the abandonment of middle-class housing near the city center as a result of “white flight”: African Americans found themselves living in the center of the city, making no reference to the subdivision of properties by landlords or their failure to invest. And Park believed that whereas European immigrants were able to work themselves out of the poverty of the inner city toward middle-class lives in the suburbs, African Americans were not. Park not only disparaged race, but he conflated gender and politics, once remarking that the Chicago women were more dangerous than the city’s corrupt politicians or gangsters. This observation reflected conservative male anxieties about progressive movement, especially Hull House settlement and its most prominent member, Jane Addams. This movement was inspired by the efforts of Charles Booth, Beatrice Potter Webb, and other members of the Bloomsbury Circle, to alleviate slum conditions in East London. Jane Addams, after a visit to London during which she witnessed the work being done there, returned to the United States and in 1889 established Hull House in the Chicago slums. Hull House was one of a number of settlements established in large American cities (and in London, Manchester, and Liverpool) in the late 19th Century to provide support for newly arrived immigrants and the poor, more generally. Members of Hull House provided literacy classes and a crèche for working women, as well as undertaking research on housing conditions. Apart from her work in the settlement and elsewhere in the city, Addams was an important figure in the peace movement during World War I, and she was prominent in the international women’s movement. Edith Abbott and other contributors to The Tenements of Chicago had also been involved in Hull House, and Abbott acknowledged the help of Addams’ cofounder, Julia Lathrop, in the preface. The radical background of Abbott and other members of the Social Service Administration faculty is clearly something that Robert Park found troubling. Until Martin Bulmer’s 1984 history of The Chicago School of Sociology, there was neither acknowledgment of the academic contribution of the women nor any sustained critical commentary on Park and his colleagues. Earlier accounts by geographers, including Peach, Jackson and Smith, and Cater and Jones, all neglected to specify or mention the work of the School of Social Service Administration and its contribution to urban theory.

Park, Science, and Race Most accounts of the Chicago School understandably present Robert Park as the central figure because he set research agendas and promoted urban ethnography. Although others did most of the urban research, Park is associated with innovative methodologies and the identification of significant topics for research. There is a common assumption that the approach to research promoted by Park involved “getting your hands dirty” but there is evidence that Park himself insisted on keeping a distance from the research subject. This practice comes from his view of science. Showing the influence of Windelband’s scientific philosophy during his education in Germany and Auguste Comte, who distinguished between abstract and concrete science, Park maintained that sociology, including human ecology, was an abstract science, whereas geography and social work were concrete sciences that provided the facts

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that sociologists used in their theorizations. According to his notional hierarchy of knowledge, abstract and theoretical sociology was “higher” than concrete, fact-gathering activities, like social work research. This hierarchy had two implications. First, it allowed Park to devalue social work research and, second, it made it possible for him to argue that the sociologist should try to maintain objectivity by not getting involved with the subject. Interestingly, Burgess did not share this view and he called for the integration of social work and social theory. Park’s position on the theoretical status of sociology was crucial in relation to work on race. In 1919, there was a “race riot” in Chicago (there were similar but not so serious conflicts in Liverpool and Cardiff in the same year) and Park was appointed to the Chicago Commission on Race Relations to investigate the riot. A report on the riot was actually produced by the black sociologist, Charles Johnson, with some help and guidance from Park. Martin Bulmer noted that it showed a high degree of scientific detachment from what he (Bulmer) called the “emotional” subject matter. The poor state of race relations at this time encouraged sociology students to get involved but Park advised them that they should approach the problem with detachment, “like a scientist dissecting a potato bug.” This comment clearly contradicts the view that Chicago sociologists promoted hands-on research. Maybe they did, but apparently not on questions that were politically charged. A survey of sociologists connected with Park at this time concluded that there was an overriding concern to distinguish sociology from socialism. The assumption that the Chicago School in the early 20th Century initiated research on urban ethnicity and sociospatial relations has probably contributed to the neglect of earlier work on the spatial aspects of race by W.E.B. Du Bois. The poverty maps that were developed at Hull House in Chicago became the exemplar for other mapping expeditions along the Eastern seaboard, including Philadelphia, where W.E.B. Du Bois arrived in 1896 at the behest of Pennsylvania State University. In his research on the black population of Philadelphia at the end of the 19th Century, Du Bois produced extensive maps of the Seventh Ward, and his maps continue in use today. Du Bois especially addressed the question of the geographical distribution of African Americans, and their “occupations and daily life, their homes, their organizations, and, above all, their relation to their million white fellow citizens.” Du Bois, as a black (albeit middle class) academic, recognized not only the significance of racism in relation to employment and housing but also the collective strength black migrants gained through affiliation to black churches and (enforced) residential clustering. He also put the black experience into a comparative framework by looking briefly at the migration streams of Italian, Jewish, and Irish minorities. This was a landmark work; however, while Park acknowledged Du Bois’ contribution to an understanding of race in America in a general way, he took nothing in terms of theoretical insights from The Philadelphia Negro, published in 1899. Similarly, histories of urban social geography have neglected Du Bois’ contribution. Thus, we could conclude that “the Chicago School,” as a collective endeavor in the production of knowledge, has, in part, been defined by omissions. The omission of an understanding of racialization is partly illuminated by a glimpse at the relationship between Du Bois and Park, respectively, and another major scholar of the early 20th Century, Booker T. Washington. The conflicts between Du Bois and Washington, the two major African American social scholars of their time, are well known and researched. Du Bois is seen as a radical and an activist and Washington as the opposite. Du Bois became involved in the internationalist pan-African movement; he was one of the founders of the NAACP; and he wrote extensively on the problems of racism; his work inspired the likes of next generation antiracists such as Frantz Fanon, and later still, Gordon, Gates, and Gilroy. His famous statement that “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line” (from Souls of Black Folk) has become a rallying cry for the late 20th and early 21st Century antiracism movements and critical race scholarship. Du Bois’ description of race as a concept with far-flung and devastating consequences for racialized peoples was decades ahead of the uptake of social construction theories in mainstream scholarship. Washington, on the other hand, is known for his conciliatory approach, cautioning African Americans to be patient and to work their way toward the middle class, and for his influential role in the adoption of “separate but equal” laws through his infamous “Atlanta Compromise,” to which Du Bois devotes a full chapter in Souls of Black Folk. The connections among Du Bois, Washington, and Park, both personal and intellectual, are important for a number of reasons, but they are also fundamentally part of the disciplinary history of urban geography, which usually begins with an acknowledgment of Park, but whose roots are much deeper. After Du Bois and Park received their PhDs in the 1890s, Du Bois was offered a position as assistant to Washington. He refused based on their irreconcilable differences. The position subsequently was offered to Park, who traveled with Washington to Europe, where Washington hoped to show that among the European peasantry, he would find the “man farthest down,” whose life was significantly more difficult than that of African Americans. Many scholars have noted the extent to which Washington’s way of thinking was reflected in Park’s later work on the race relations cycle, and his almost complete disregard for racism as a process of social differentiation.

Conclusion This article has focused on the early 20th Century because it was the academics in the Department of Sociology during this period that have had most influence on human geography, initially in the realm of spatial science and later in broader urban social geography. Howard Becker, a member of the “second Chicago School,” has argued that the department was never a “school” because there was no unifying theoretical or methodological perspective. Although most histories emphasize ethnography, there was also an early quantitative tradition established by William Ogburn in the 1920s and followed by Hauser, Stouffer, and Duncan. Similarly, Burgess favored questionnaire surveys and quantitative techniques rather than ethnography. Social geography’s Chicago School has been built around Robert Park, who was a complex character. His positive role in developing urban ethnography must be acknowledged but his resistance to ideas coming from elsewhere, notably from the Chicago School of Social Service Administration,

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has contributed to partial and distorted histories of urban research in the early 20th-Century city. Had Park not discounted the voices of women scholars and scholars of color, the Chicago School may have had a very different legacy. If the study of “schools” has value, it is in part because of our recognition of the iconoclastic influence and power of both the ideas and the political influence of intellectual leaders. Surely, no figure has had a stronger influence on the discipline of human geography than has Robert Park, and others of the Chicago School who influenced the post–World War II quest to understand the internal structure of the city. Yet, ironically, as urban geographers today seek to transcend remnants of spatialist thinking and turn their attention to questions of race, social injustice, and equity of access to housing, civic participation, and other benefits of urban life, they now turn to Du Bois and to the influence upon his work of the maps of Jane Addams and Hull Housedboth of whom can be viewed as Park’s nemeses. The complex and conflicting relationship between the Chicago School of Sociology and the discipline of human geography therefore represents a particularly telling example of the need to understand that scholarship is much more than simple ideas.

See Also: Berkeley School; Social Geography.

Further Reading Abbott, A., 1999. Department and Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Barrows, H., 1923. Geography as human ecology. Ann. AAG 13, 1–14. Becker, H., 1999. The Chicago school, so-called. Qual. Sociol. 22 (1), 3–12. Berry, B.J.L., Kasarda, J.D., 1977. Contemporary Urban Ecology. MacMillan, New York. Burgess, E.W., 1929. Urban areas. In: Smith, T.V., White, I.D. (Eds.), Chicago: An Experiment in Social Science Research. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 114–123. Deegan, M., 1981. Early women sociologists and the American Sociological Society: the patterns of exclusion and participation. Am. Sociol. 16, 14–24. Du Bois, W.E.B., 2008 [1903]DuBois. The Souls of Black Folk. Project Gutenberg EBook. Entrikin, J.N., 1980. Robert Park’s human ecology and human geography. Ann. AAG 70 (1), 43–58. Jackson, P., Smith, S., 1984. Exploring Social Geography. George Allen and Unwin, London. Mayer, H.M., 1979. Urban geography and Chicago in retrospect. Ann. AAG 69 (1), 114–118. Park, R.E., Burgess, E.W., 1925. The City. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Plummer, K., 1991. Symbolic Interactionism, vols. I & II. Edward Elgar, Aldershot. Sibley, D., 1995. Geographies of Exclusion. Routledge, London.

Relevant Website http://userpages.umbc.edu/lutters/1996_SWLNote96-1_Lutters,Ackerman.pdf - This is an introduction to the Chicago School of Sociology by Wayne Lutters and Mark Ackerman.

Child Labor Samantha Punch, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 2, pp 45–49, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Division of labor The widespread specialization of tasks and occupations within a society. Majority world It refers to the developing world, which includes Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. The term “Majority world” reflects that the “majority” of population, poverty, landmass, and lifestyles exist in the three economically poorest continents of the world. Minority world It refers to the developed world, which includes the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia Socialization The process whereby individuals come to learn the beliefs and behavior that are seen to be appropriate for a particular society. Values Central ideals and beliefs that inform people’s actions and can be common throughout a society, for example, the values of “family life.”

Throughout the world, many children play a key role in both productive and reproductive household labor, and may contribute to their household maintenance in both paid and unpaid ways. However, many children’s tasks are not recognized as work and can be underestimated or undervalued. For example, domestic labor is considered something that children should automatically carry out without pay. In this sense, child labor can be compared to the invisibility and undervaluation of women’s work. It can also be invisible since children’s work is often masked as “training” or “helping.” Partly, this may be because children’s labor is often controlled by women and is intended to help women with their reproductive tasks or to replace women releasing them for more productive labor. However, care must be taken not to assume that all children’s work is within the stereotypical female sphere of domestic work and childcare. Children carry out a wide range of unpaid and paid work in diverse contexts, such as at home, on farms, in shops, restaurants, factories, and in a variety of jobs in the tourist industry. Sometimes the work they do is similar to that of adults, and at other times it is adapted to their age and particular competencies. For example, children’s division of labor within households may be divided according to their gender, age, birth order, and sibling composition. Since the 1990s, an increasing number of studies have examined the nature of child labor from children’s own perspectives. This is partly because of the growth of the new social studies of childhood which views children as social actors whose own perspectives should be sought when constructing knowledge about their daily lives. In relation to child labor, this has also led to a recognition of the importance of children’s work during their childhoods in the present rather than only as having socialization value for their future lives as adults. Most of the literature on children and work can be placed within three broad categories: definitions of child work/labor; policy and legislative debates of protection versus abolition; and the reasons why children work, which include debates on the economic utility of children. Each of these will now be considered.

Definitions: Child Work Versus Labor There has been an ongoing debate about how children’s labor is conceptualized: whether it is positive and a form of socialization, or negative and a form of exploitation. This led to a distinction between the definitions used to describe children’s activities. “Child work” was considered to be acceptable, a social good, and a form of socialization useful for children’s future lives as adults. Whereas “child labor” was perceived as unacceptable, a social evil, and a form of exploitation which could be detrimental for children’s futures. A distinction was made between two categories of child work: unpaid family work and paid work outside the family circle. Recent thinking on child work abandons the work/labor dichotomy and recognizes the complexity of the nature of children’s work. Certain activities are considered more appropriate, less harmful, and even beneficial for child workers. Children working in family enterprises or with close kin, especially in rural areas, tend not to be subject to the same risk of exploitation as those working

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in labor-intensive industries or in an urban environment. For example, Boyden stated that in Peru, domestic service and agriculture are legally considered more appropriate for children because: ... they involve non-market relations of production and are both traditional and fundamental to Peruvian society. ... The assumption is that young people involved in non-waged activities, recruited into the labour market through kinship networks, or working in family enterprises, are in some way guaranteed protection. Exploitation is seen solely as a function of waged employment in large impersonal concerns. Boyden, 1988: 199

However, it is wrong to assume that child work is protected when it occurs within kinship relations. Exploitation may be more concealed and difficult to accept in family enterprises but that does not render it nonexistent. It is often harder to intervene in cases of child exploitation when the child is dependent physically and emotionally on the exploiter. In Latin America, where fictive kinship relations exist, it can be common for rural children to work for their godparents as domestic servants in return for their upkeep or continuing their schooling. Domestic service is not only one of the main forms of child work but is also highly exploitative, as the child can be vulnerable to psychological, physical, verbal, and sexual abuse. Paradoxically, it is one of the activities considered most appropriate and least harmful for children, often not included in legislation or most lenient on the entry age of the child. Thus, exploitation can be concealed by ideas about reciprocity within kinship relations, which can facilitate a source of cheap labor for the wealthier of the fictive kin. It is important not to assume that kin relations are always based only on reciprocity and mutual support rather than exploitation and oppression. Similarly, it should not be assumed that wage employment for children is necessarily exploitative. It can have positive benefits as it enables children to earn an income, however small, which can help to support themselves and/or their families. Paid work can stimulate children’s personal growth, self-esteem, and development, as well as encouraging a sense of family responsibility. By earning their own money, children have access to greater decision-making power and autonomy. In contrast, unpaid family work can reinforce children’s economic dependence on their parents. Some children prefer paid employment outside the home environment rather than engaging in unpaid family work. For example, children in Indonesia said they preferred to work for low wages in factories rather than for no wages for the family. Some children say they prefer paid work because it is less exploitative and has more future prospects. Therefore, it is too simplistic to assume that child work in the urban world of commerce and industry is automatically exploitative, whereas child work in traditional occupations of farming and domestic service is a beneficial and essential form of socialization. Such a division became more accepted and accentuated because of the formation of child labor legislation. On the one hand, it tended to refer to the potential negative consequences and effects of child waged employment with nonkin. On the other hand, it neglected, ignored, romanticized, or even encouraged nonremunerated work of children carried out within familial contexts. Such a simplistic division of children’s work obscured the complexities involved. It is difficult, therefore, to classify which types of child work are “exploitative” child labor and which have positive benefits. White suggested that children’s work should be viewed as on a continuum, rather than trying to categorize it as one of two extremes. It is argued that work is not just good or bad for children but on a continuum from best to worst, where at one end the experience of work is positive and beneficial, and at the other end, it is negative and destructive. Most child labor falls somewhere in between the two extremes. However, it can be difficult to decide where particular employment should be placed along the continuum, since the majority of work has both positive and negative effects simultaneously, both in the present and for children’s futures. Work for children can be seen either positively or negatively: For large numbers of children work is an ordeal, a source of suffering and exploitation, and a fundamental abuse of human rights. Often, child labour results in educational deprivation, social disadvantage and poor health and physical development. Yet child work can be an important element in maturation, securing the transition from childhood to adulthood. It can also be essential for family survival. Bequele and Boyden, 1988: v

Ways in which children are considered to be “exploited” vary and depend on one’s definition of “exploitation.” It can be seen in terms of present suffering or as having long-term detrimental consequences. It is recognized that children can face many dangers at work, both physical and psychosocial. The physical hazards include the health and safety risks of dangerous working environments and the use of unsafe tools and equipment. The social dangers occur more frequently and include low pay; long hours; lack of legal protection; sexual, physical, or emotional abuse; slave-like or socially isolating conditions, and work that is mundane and repetitive. Boyden et al. noted that there are major physiological, psychological, and social differences between children and adults which can increase children’s susceptibility to such hazards. However, they discussed the difficulty of measuring the actual impact of work on children. This is because of the “invisibility” or subtlety of some of the effects; differing cultural views of risk and benefit; difficulty of isolating work impact from other causes (such as poverty); and the difficulty of gaining an accurate diagnosis of children’s health conditions. Consequently, they argued that:

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... issues and on the adverse effects on schooling, while psychosocial effects have been largely ignored. The overall picture that has emerged suggests that in various ways – and especially physically – children probably are more susceptible to adversity than are adults, although conclusive evidence has yet to be provided. Boyden et al., 1998: 110

Child work can also be beneficial both in the present and for the future. In the present, the child’s contribution to the survival of the household is important in much of the Majority world where children are encouraged to contribute to household income and not be a financial burden. Work is also important for the children themselves as a source of pride, satisfaction, and self-esteem. Work can have a moral value, giving children a sense of efficacy and responsibility. Many children like to feel that they are making useful contributions to their families as it can increase their status as family members, as well as building their confidence. Children’s work can also give them access to a wider social network and to consumer goods. It can enhance their personal autonomy and give them a sense of independence and self-reliance. In addition, children develop useful skills which they will need for their future, and sometimes it may be crucial for them to build up their competencies with particular ways of working, such as learning to plow fields correctly. In family enterprises, the place of residence is also the place of work where children are prepared for future economic responsibilities and acquire initial skills. The household and the family can play an important role in preparing children for their future by helping them acquire the necessary skills. Therefore, children’s work can have many benefits for children themselves and their families. These benefits and the subjective value given to work by children, their families, and communities mediate children’s vulnerability and enable them to be more resilient. The advantages and disadvantages of children’s work need to be weighed against each other, while also focusing on the perspectives of children and their family, taking into account their wishes and needs. For example, Woodhead showed that children in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, The Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua demonstrated an ability to reason about which work was best for them. They considered a range of costs and benefits, including relative income, security, safety, hazard, exploitation, independence, and autonomy. His study also showed that children’s perceptions of the benefits of their work, such as enhanced self-esteem and sense of responsibility, often outweighed the drawbacks, such as poor working conditions. Therefore, in order to reach an adequate understanding of the nature of children’s work, one must take into account the long-term and short-term outcomes, the specific social and cultural environment, the historical and economic context, as well as both adults’ and children’s perceptions of their own situation.

Legislation: Protection or Abolition? The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that exploitative child labor should be eliminated, but the Convention’s recommendations ‘‘may not be realistic for all countries, especially those whose economies and educational facilities are insufficiently developed’’ (Bequele and Myers, 1995: 93). The International Labour Organization (ILO) has been striving to ban child labor since 1919, and the ILO’s Minimum Age Convention of 1973 (No. 138) sets out the current principles guiding international child labor. However, recent discussions of policymaking and legislation have shifted from a desire to ban all child labor to providing legislation to protect children from overexploitation. The illegal status of children’s work forces it underground, to be denied by governments, employers, parents, and the children themselves, and where it is hidden it is not included in protective legislation. Otherwise, it may be disguised as an “apprenticeship” or “training,” when in reality such a label is a convenient excuse to pay even lower wages. However, illegal child labor tends to be confined to industrial or commercial jobs, especially factories, mines, and other hazardous employment. Labor legislation prohibits children under a certain age, usually 12–14 years old, from doing certain jobs which tend to exclude the agricultural and domestic sectors. Even where comprehensive legislation exists, it is rarely enforced in the Majority world. This is because there is a shortage of inspectors, who are badly paid and are often easily bribed. Bequele and Myers outlined the preventative approaches which aim to tackle the underlying social and economic conditions, and rehabilitative approaches which deal with the symptoms of child labor. They highlighted the need to target the most at-risk groups which include those working in hazardous situations and very young children. However, they also recognized that ‘‘protecting children against a particular hazard, and making their work more tolerable, may encourage them to stay in it.’’ (Bequele and Myers, 1995:156.) There is no disputing that exploitative child labor conditions should be regulated, but the child’s view, the context, and the consequences should also be taken into account.

Causes: Why Do Children Work? Whether children work is not a question of choice for many children or their families. The causes of child labor usually stem from poverty and underdevelopment, but this is not the only reason why children work. They also work as a result of other structural constraints, including the failure of the education system, unemployment and underemployment, vested interests of employers,

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and rapid rural–urban migration. In addition, children may work because of a lack of parental awareness of the implications for children’s health and development, social and cultural attitudes, and lack of political will for effective action. Also, children may choose to work to help their families, to enhance their independence and competencies, to gain access to consumer luxuries, to gain useful skills, and as a means of self-actualization. On the demand side, employers prefer to employ children as they can do labor-intensive tasks for lower wages than adults, they are a good source of casual labor, and tend to be a docile labor force as they are unprotected by legislation and workers’ rights. On the supply side, whether children work or not tends to depend on the wealth of the household, the employment status and wage rates of employable adults within the household, the availability and cost of schooling, and the social and cultural environment. Family dynamics and household composition are also cited as influencing whether children work. For example, Boyden et al. noted that ‘‘in many places, a disproportionate number of working children appear to be from homes headed by a single woman’’ (1998:138). They observed that family emergencies, such as death or incapacitation of an adult earner, loss of a job, harvest failures, and severe weather may also increase the likelihood of children starting work. The way in which society views childhood across time and space influences the nature of child work. Cultural expectations not only shape the types of work which children do but also impact upon the meaning and value of their work. Cunningham noted that changing concepts of childhood over time affect the growth and decline of child work. He observed that once childhood in the United Kingdom became viewed romantically as a special time of life to be protected, this helped to encourage the separation of children from the adult world of work. In the Majority world, children are considered as economically valuable to their parents for two main reasons: In the short term because they contribute to the household with either unpaid work or financial contributions from paid work. In the longer term because children are a source of financial security in old age. The debate on the economic utility of children considers to what extent the economic benefits of having children outweigh their economic rearing costs. Studies exploring the economic contribution of children to peasant households provide contradictory results. For example, on the one hand, some have concluded that children’s economic costs outweigh their benefits as they consume more than they produce up until the age of 16. On the other hand, others have suggested that children make a significant economic contribution, and that boys in particular have produced more than they have consumed by the time they reach 16 years of age. It has also been argued that children are neither a net asset nor an economic liability to the peasant household: their work makes some contribution to the agricultural household but each child is also an additional mouth to feed. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the negative effect of nonproducing young children is compensated by the positive effect of the productivity of children when they are older. Despite contradictory evidence regarding the economic utility of children, it is widely recognized that children are valuable to their parents particularly in rural areas for their work on peasant farms. Although the children’s contribution is considered important for family well-being in poor households, it is debatable whether it is indispensable. The significance of the economic utility of rural children is that, to a certain extent, parents are dependent on their children both for their unpaid work and for security in old age, thereby reinforcing interdependent household relations. It is widely acknowledged that many children in the Majority world are expected to undertake unpaid household labor on a routine basis and may contribute to the survival of the household with paid work. However, it is worth bearing in mind that many children in the Minority world may also work, although some argue that their participation in work tends to be more symbolic: for socialization purposes rather than because of economic need. Recent research has shown that children in the Minority world work for a variety of reasons which can be related to opportunities and constraints. For some children, work provides opportunities for increasing financial and social autonomy, developing new social networks, and accessing consumer and leisure cultures. For other children in the Minority world, poverty is the key reason why they work, and their work experiences can be negative. They may begin work later than their peers in the Majority world, and they may work shorter hours, but children in the Minority world can also suffer from poor working conditions, such as unsociable hours and poor pay. Employment for children in the Minority world is part-time rather than full-time but, like children in the Majority world, their experiences of work are extremely diverse, encompassing both positive and negative features and consequences, and is often combined with school. Despite the complexity and variety of the nature and causes of work for children, one thing is certain: work is a common part of many rural and urban childhoods throughout the world.

See Also: Children/Childhood; Livelihoods; Vulnerability.

Further Reading Ansell, N., 2005. Work: exploiting children, empowering youth? In: Ansell, N. (Ed.), Children, Youth and Development. Routledge, London, pp. 158–191. Bequele, A., Boyden, J. (Eds.), 1988. Combating Child Labour. International Labour Office, Geneva. Bequele, A., Myers, W.E., 1995. First Things First in Child Labour: Eliminating Work Detrimental to Children. International Labour Office, Geneva. Boyden, J., 1988. National policies and programmes for child workers: Peru. In: Bequele, A., Boyden, J. (Eds.), Combating Child Labour. International Labour Organisation, Geneva, pp. 195–216. Boyden, J., Ling, B., Myers, W., 1998. What Works for Working Children. Rädda Barnen and UNICEF, Stockholm.

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Cunningham, H., 1995. Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500. Longman, London. Fyfe, A., 1993. Child Labour: A Guide to Project Design. International Labour Office, Geneva. Hobbs, S., McKechnie, J., 1997. Child Employment in Britain. Stationary Office, London. Miljeteig, P., 1999. Special issue on child labour introduction: understanding child labour. Childhood 6 (1). Mizen, P., Pole, C., Bolton, A. (Eds.), 2001. Hidden Hands: International Perspectives on Children’s Work and Labour. RoutledgeFalmer, London. White, B., 1994. Children, work and ‘child labour’: changing responses to the employment of children. Dev. Change 25, 849–878. White, B., 1996. Globalization and the child labour problem. J. Int. Dev. 8 (6), 829–839. Woodhead, M., 1998. Children’s Perspectives on Their Working Lives: A Participatory Study in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, The Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Rädda Barnen, Sweden. Woodhead, M., 1999. Combating child labour: listen to what the children say. Childhood 6 (1), 27–49.

Relevant Websites http://www.antislavery.org, Anti-slavery International: Child Labour Programme. http://www.globalmarch.org, Global March against Child Labour. http://www.hrw.org, Human Rights Watch: Child Labor. http://www.ilo.org, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). http://www.unicef.org, The 1997 Report of The State of the World’s Children Focuses on Child Labour and can be Downloaded from the UNICEF Website. http://www.worldbank.org, Working Paper from the World Bank’s Human Capital Development and Operations, World Bank.

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Children, Maps, and Mapping Christina R Ergler and Claire Freeman, School of Geography, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by V. Filippakopoulou, B. Nakos, volume 2, pp 50–57, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Children/Young people The United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) defines children as below the age of 18. Participation Participation encompasses formal (e.g., political forums) and informal arenas of participation (e.g., family discussions about what to have for dinner). Participation often carries the connation of rights, empowerment, and justice and describes various forms of social engagement. Participation in this article encompasses mainly two meanings. Using maps as an example, first, participation refers to taking part in the map-creating process itself. Second, participation has a broader connotation of children’s rights of taking part in informing decision-making processes through the maps the children created or providing information that the adults then use to create maps. Spatial Cognition Spatial cognition or environmental cognition refers to children’s ability to provide an “accurate” representation of their spatial surroundings. The focus lies in the replication of the reality of the physical and social environment, and children are assessed and evaluated on their abilities to recreate this reality in maps, which can be paper, aerial, GIS, or other map formats. Spatial Literacy Spatial literacy refers to children’s knowledge of their environment and the meanings they attach to places. Their spatial literacy is based on experiencing and feeling their social, cultural, and physical environment. Children’s spatial literacy is relationally constituted through interactions with others (parents, friends, strangers, officials), as well as with the natural and built environment. The focus of spatial literacy is children’s place-based experiences. Voice Children’s voice refers to valuing and taking into account children’s own views, experiences, perceptions, and perspectives rather than asking their parents or other people who work closely with children to gain insights what children think.

Maps are a central component of children’s lives, but maps and mapping with children have changed over time as has the use of mapping for and by children, professionals, and researchers. Children’s relationship to spatial data is a dynamic process changing as they develop and as their environment changes. Mapmaking in its various forms is one way of depicting and creating knowledge, often developed with the aim of informing, navigating, labeling, and describing places as well as analyzing and revealing spatial relationships and sociospatial processes. In other words, maps provide children with insight into the spatial worlds in which they live, but also allow entry into children’s own understandings and representations of their spatial worlds. Maps are a tool that gives voice to their needs and experiences. Maps have, therefore, the potential to be used to support children’s rights and to enable children’s needs and views to be better represented in the planning and development of children’s lived environments. Maps simplify, showcase, and often provide access to a much greater complexity than they initially appear to represent; however, their use and the formats they take are changing. Perhaps the biggest change is in the accessibility of maps through technological devices. Maps are immediate, portable, and there is the potential to have live updating of spatial references. Thus, new technologies have created a whole new realm of access to maps, spatial representation, and how maps are used by and with children to gain insight into their views on their communities and the places they frequent their lifeworlds. New technologies provide access to children’s “spatial literacy” beyond simply measuring how well they can replicate and represent their immediate surroundings through what is often referred to as “spatial accuracy” or “spatial cognition.” In contrast, “spatial literacy” references children’s place-based experiences as relationally constituted through routines, emotions, interactions with others (parents, friends, strangers, officials), as well as with the natural and built environment. Nonetheless, there are also some downsides to these new developments. These include both the potential and risks associated with advances in spatial technology for children’s well-being, but the starting point is that maps matter and are powerful. Maps are tools for moving around and understanding the immediate environment and the wider world. Maps are important for children and young people’s current and future citizenry as they develop and build confidence in their cognitive resources so they are able to deal with immediate issues such as wayfinding. Additionally, they are necessary for developing understanding of longer term issues such as global migration and climate change, matters that will affect humankind for centuries to come.

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Not All Maps Are on Paper: A Brief Overview on Map Developments and Their Purpose Maps have a long history of use and representation; in fact, some of the earliest maps dated to 3500 BCE use techniques not dissimilar to those frequently used by children, although this view has been critiqued by some researchers. There is an overall general spatial layout populated by buildings and features such as people, rivers, and mountains in a stylized pictorial form viewed side on from a position on the ground or slightly elevated. Just as over time, the standard perspective for maps has become an aerial bird’s-eye view so too as children they themselves develop their maps to become more aerial in orientation using standardized representational plan-view features, spatially more accurate but arguably less interesting and personal (see Fig. 1). Maps also vary in scale ranging from the micro to the macro or local to the global; however, the scale regulates the detail shown in the map with larger scale maps being able to show more detail information with greater accuracy. In some cultures, maps took on different representational forms. Indigenous Australians navigated over huge distances with the aid of star “maps” and song lines. Pacific peoples navigated across the vast Pacific Oceans using charts made from sticks and shells that were remarkably accurate. Different ways of viewing, perceiving, and representing the world persist, especially among Indigenous peoples, and are important when considering maps as tools for use with children. For example, Maori in New Zealand see some knowledge, especially place-based knowledge of significant sites, as inappropriate for representation on publicly available maps. Some place knowledge is known but sacred, and when passed on to children it is done orally, not through Western-style maps. Maps in their varied forms, therefore, act as repositories of cultural as well as spatial knowledge. Despite the diverse forms maps can take, their development and use reflect broader societal, cultural, political, and economic changes. Therefore, the idea that the production of an abstract symbolic plan view is the ultimate objective of all mapmakers can be questioned. The form a map takes depends primarily upon its purpose, to which we will turn in more detail later. We first discuss the shift from spatial cognition to spatial literacy in mapping with children, as this shift alters the purpose of maps and how maps are used with children presently.

Mapping and Children: From Spatial Cognition to Spatial Literacy Drawing maps has been a long and entrenched part of educational curricula. Mostly, maps and mapping have been used as a way of testing children’s knowledge of the world and especially testing their spatial cognition and their ability to provide an “accurate” representation of their knowledge and understanding of space and place. One of the best-known approaches in this respect was Piaget’s theory on child development and intelligence. Piaget postulated that children’s development goes in stages and before age 7, children cannot perceive others’ perspectives. Consequently, they can only see space from their own egotistical perspective. Only much later therefore can they show effective, complex, multidimensional spatial understanding (see Fig. 2). Piaget’s theories have been important determinants of approaches taken by those interested in child development and indeed children’s geographies. Piaget’s work has unfortunately for a long time led to young children’s exclusion from contributing to planning and development based on his induced belief that children lack the understanding necessary to provide useful spatially accurate contributions. The underestimating of children’s spatial abilities has been used to justify children’s exclusion from decision-making processes and, in particular, planning processes; however, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) states in Article 12, all children have a right to be informed about and have their views recognized in decisions that affect them. This would mean that, according to UNCRC, they also have the right to voice their opinions on the cities in which they live; however, often children, and especially young ones, are denied this right due to the widely distributed perception that they lack adequate understanding of large-scale environments. Recently, researchers began to work with one overlooked group (preschoolers) showcasing that even young children do in fact have a concept of the city at the city scale and can cogently demonstrate this understanding (see Fig. 3). Preschoolers should, therefore, also have their needs considered in city planning and development. Children of any

Figure 1

Examples of children’s handdrawn maps using pictorial (A) and the more standardized aerial (B) perspective of traditional maps.

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Figure 2 A visualization of Piaget’s development stages and children’s mapping abilities showcasing the supposedly greater and more accurate detail children provide with an older age exemplified by children’s understanding of vertical and horizontal axes. Piaget and Inhelder (1956, p. 383).

Figure 3

Preschool child’s city map showing a range of housing, vehicles, services, green spaces, and people.

age should not be excluded from decision-making and development processes on the basis of their spatial abilities. Rather the approaches used to reveal their opinions and views should be adjusted to suit their interests and abilities (for more detail, see section on mapping approaches and techniques). Cognitive mapping where maps are used both to test children’s existing knowledge and their ability to portray that knowledge in spatially accurate representations has been of considerable interest to geographers among others, with a number of early studies emanating from the 1980s. Some early studies showed that children’s maps improved if they lived in the space and walked around it, confirming links between active experience and representational ability. For example, unsurprisingly, it has been found that children at the age of 10 who have had more exposure to maps, and children who have had more direct travel experiences, have greater ability to draw spatial cognitive maps. Other researchers showed that while exposure and experience increased the “content” on children’s maps, it had no impact on their mapping skills unless accompanied by teaching them mapping skills. These findings suggest that experience on its own does not always lead to the ability to produce a more spatially correct map. In other words, spatially accurate maps can be more an indication of map-drawing skill than of spatial knowledge. Nonetheless, mapping skills

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development is important in developing spatial literacy. Spatial ability has been correlated with later performance on mathematical tasks and is often seen as important for everyday life. Understanding spatial and multidimensional data provided by means of illustrations is helpful if not critical for everyday tasks such as assembling furniture based on instruction diagrams, interpreting graphs in analog and online media, or simply using a map to locate a place or one’s location. Visual representations can help students in science- and technology-oriented disciplines to understand concepts and systems across multiple orders of magnitude that are otherwise difficult to describe just with words, from an atom, an organ, or species’ life cycle to large systems such as the solar system. In other words, context matters in terms of children’s mapping abilities, and this may have been an issue with Piaget’s work where the context was theoretical rather than “real.” When experiments are made more real, as in the “hiding from the policemen” test, children show higher spatial abilities and enhanced ability to perceive alternative viewpoints. In contrast to Piaget, the Russian Psychologist Vygotsky took a sociocultural approach toward children’s development and to their spatial understanding and mapping abilities. His views afford a dynamic, socially, historically, and culturally grounded view on children’s development where children gradually come to know and understand the world around them through their engagement with their physical surroundings and social interactions. Knowledge and understanding of the world is coconstructed with peers, older children, and adults, as well as the sociospatial setting in which it occurs. He argues that the richer the children’s activities and their interactions are, the greater the children’s understanding and knowledge becomes; however, he also believes that children grow into the intellectual life of those around them, leading to the need to stimulate children’s competence with the help of others. Children move to higher stages of development under adult guidance or in collaboration with more skilled peers. In other words, children’s development progresses when their knowledge and competence are challenged and broadened by peers and by adults such as parents or educators. Vygotsky showed that children could perform given tasks more skillfully with others than simply on their own, which he conceptualized as a fundamental aspect of his theory of the zone of proximal development. By way of example, researchers have shown how collaborations between adult researchers and primary school-age children can lead to richer and more detailed mental maps. Often children are very reluctant to participate in a mapping activity when they lack the confidence to engage with the task; however, their knowledge surfaces through one-on-one conversations, which support gaining confidence to represent their knowledge, and in doing so produce very detailed socio-spatiograms of their environment, as shown in Fig. 4. Without these child–adult collaborations, their views and experiences and as such their voices would not be developed, which we will discuss in more detail later. This point does not imply that children can only provide detailed accounts of their lifeworlds in maps with the help of adults. Rather, these collaborations showcase the mutual learning process between children and adults, be it through collaborating on the mapmaking or talking about the self-drawn map. Their spatial literacy matters more than spatial accuracy. Within the subdiscipline of children’s geographies, a leading exponent of the use of mapping techniques with children was Hugh Matthews whose interest began in the 1980s with analyzing children’s cognitive mapping abilities. He was also concerned about children and young people’s place-based experiences and their emotions, and thus he is seen as a founding father of children’s geographers’ current engagement with spatial literacy. Matthews’ pioneering work in children’s geographies included preliterate children’s perceptions and understandings of large-scale urban environments, an understanding that they should lack according to Piaget’s conceptualizations. His work led to a more critical engagement with Piaget’s work. Moreover, Matthews’ interests did not stop at finding out about children’s cognitive understanding of their environment at different ages. He was also interested in their spatial literacy, their experiences, fears, and knowledge of their local or other areas through which they traverse. While his initial work combined approaches that included analysis of children’s environmental cognition, inspired by psychological approaches, he later included a plea to researchers working under the umbrella of children’s geographies to empower children and see them as experts of their lifeworlds. Matthew’s work acted as a catalyst for ongoing discussions on how children can best “voice” their experiences. Interest in children’s spatial literacy bringing together children’s environmental cognition and “voice” has grown markedly in recent years and, especially, with the advent of portable technology where the different functions of mapping can be more widely represented.

Figure 4 A neighborhood map in process that only surfaced due to an adult–child collaboration; on her own, the child lacked confidence to show the very detailed neighborhood knowledge she possessed.

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Maps and Map Creations Can Have Different Purposes The development of a now much wider range of mapping formats and tools presents ever-increasing opportunities for children both to demonstrate and to produce knowledge. Such new opportunities move beyond traditional knowledge in the form of producing spatially accurate maps that can be tested against predetermined criteria. They enable children to create maps that can be used to understand children’s worlds. These maps can in turn be used to inform better practice and thus assist practitioners in building healthier and more sustainable environments. As such, maps are the product that transfers or showcases information, a tool through which children engage in the knowledge creation process and a means for adults and professionals to engage with children. Therefore, maps are widely seen as an important tool for empowering children, enhancing their participation, as well as constituting an enjoyable social process. Empowering children’s voice: Maps enable children to show their spatial literacy and the meanings they attach to places. Maps present children with an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge and experiences directly rather than through an adult intermediary, as is the case with an interview or other interpreted media. Through maps, children’s “voices” can be heard and visualized, as maps can be used by children to convey their own views, understanding, and perspectives. Researchers employing mapping techniques have consistently emphasized that children have the right for their views to be recognized and listened to. Maps can be part of a process to recognize children’s rights in that they give voice to the child as required by the UNCRC (especially Article 12 & 13). The Convention proposes and legally defines children’s right to participate in social and political matters that affect them. As a consequence, the research in sociocultural and political arenas has changed, and at least on paper, children’s participatory rights have increased since the ratification of the Convention by the majority of countries world wide. Participation: Maps are increasingly used in participative processes, especially in the field of urban development, planning, and design. Maps assist planners and others to understand and/or identify, for example, children’s travel routes, favorite places, places they avoid, meeting places, play places, and good design generally. Any participative exercise where children are included has to respect their rights and be meaningful. In some circumstances, children have been asked to draw neighborhood maps but are given no opportunity to explain what their maps represent and do not understand why they are being asked to draw the map or for what purpose the map will be used. There is a general consensus among researchers using mapping techniques for the need to commit to using the map appropriately and with intent. Drawing a map in itself and only drawing a map can be merely an exercise in tokenism. Such tokenism has been seen where maps are used just as embellishments and aesthetic additions to a plan rather than as data that are taken into account in shaping the development. Maps as a social process: Creating maps individually and the process of collaboratively creating maps can also be a driver to create and use maps. Creating maps is fun and often involves big smiles, giggling, and laughter. Different methods can be used to create maps. The tile method, for example, used with preschoolers, provides opportunities for communal city mapmaking based on negotiation between child participants (see Fig. 3). Computerized mapping techniques and applications frequently involve children working together as in friend groups playing Pokémon Go, in which virtual creatures, Pokémon, appear as if they are in the player’s real-world location. For professionals such as planners, maps enable children to give insights into their social worlds and communities, and opportunities for children and professionals to understand each other’s spatial perspectives and the development context better. One important product from this process, and often an underlying driver for engaging children in mapping activities, is the use of maps to help create healthier and more livable spaces for all ages. Thus, two elements of the mapping process are important; the mapping process itself, as this can be a process where important information is discussed and explored, and second, the mapping outcome. The outcome will be determined by its purpose; a map designed to test spatial accuracy will be very different from one that will be used in a city plan to highlight pedestrian-friendly neighborhood travel routes from the perspective of children.

Mapping Approaches and Techniques Maps are highly variable. There are thematic maps that show just one kind of information, such as children’s friendship networks, their dominant routes to school, or their perceived (un)safe locations on their route, whereas general purpose maps include a range of information such as children’s favorite and least favorite places alongside the deprivation levels present in local areas, and so on (see Figs. 5 and 6). Mapping techniques with or for children are diverse and vary depending on the purpose and access to technologies. Mapping can be an individual or a social process; it can use simple techniques such as pencil and paper, or more elaborate ones that involve GPS, or mobile mapping apps available on smart phones. Different types of approaches to mapping can have different outcomes, as we shall show in this section. Sketch maps/Mental maps/Cognitive maps/Aerial maps: These types of maps are very popular with children and already occur in William Bunge’s geographical expeditions (see Fig. 6) and Kevin Lynch’s work “Growing up in cities” in the 1970s. In both examples, children were asked to draw their perception of the local environment or in Roger Hart’s and Robin Moore’s case, their favorite neighborhood places. Children’s maps vary in detail and form ranging from simple pictures to detailed individual or collaborative depictions of children and young people’s use, experiences in, and perception of their environment (see Figs. 1 and 6). When employing this method, the adults typically want to find out about places children and young people like and dislike, favorite and scary/dangerous places, children’s special places, as well as places and activities in which they frequently engage, their social connections in places, and what they think about all the places they drew. They also seek to understand how children relate to these

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Figure 5

Children’s friendship networks in a Toronto suburb in the 1970s (Bunge and Bordessa, 1975, p. 69).

Figure 6

Mental map of a 9-year-old girl growing up in a low-rise environment (Bunge and Bordessa, 1975:81).

placesdtheir place attachment or how these places can be improved (see Figs. 1 and 6). Nonetheless, even in these early works, the limitations of this approach were observed. For example, children often draw stereotypical images of places influenced by the dominant societal image of children and childhood. Playgrounds remain a dominant feature in children’s drawings, although they engage in many other play activities in or outside their neighborhoods. In planning for children, play areas are often prioritized above the other spaces they use, such as streets, parks, and sports fields. Handdrawn maps are further often criticized for only being able to provide detailed insights into one particular area rather than being illustrative of larger and more complex environments. Asking children to map also runs the risk of excluding less able children and children who are self-conscious about their drawing skills, as well as older children and young people who may find the activity “childish” and “boring” and instead prefer more challenging and appropriate methods for their interests and skills. Route maps: Two major forms of route maps dominate this mapping technique. The first is where children draw by hand or annotate their routes on a map (aerial, GIS, paper). The second is where an adult uses information provided by the children to display and analyze actual mobility patterns. When asking children to draw their route from home to school (and back), for example, researchers and planners are primarily interested in the quality of the features children encounter along their route whether traveling by themselves, with peers, or with adults. Children are often asked to annotate their routes, indicating dangerous or safe parts of the route (including but not limited to traffic lights, crossings, traffic signs, scary and fun places), their favorite and least favorite parts of the route, and what makes the route appealing or not, as well as their suggestions for improvements to the route (see Figs. 7 and 8). Drawing route maps is not limited to the class room and can include outdoor activities, for example, a take-home activity. Children then capture their experiences and important dangerous and safe aspects of their route with photos, which they then can add to their mapped route at a later stage. A second popular route mapping approach captures children’s mobility patterns with a Global

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Figure 7

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A route map drawn by an intermediate school student indicating safe and dangerous infrastructure features cycling to school.

Figure 8 A high school student annotated an aerial map indicating safe/fun (green and zeros) and dangerous/boring (red and x) on their way to/ from school.

Positioning System (GPS). Children are asked to wear a GPS device for several days to gain insights into their roaming patterns. They also often fill in a travel diary. The maps created from these sources can display the routes children take over a predetermined time period or across different seasons (see Fig. 9). They can show just the routes from home to school and back or be used to analyze data, as in assessing the comparative mobility of children from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Using GPS technology with children necessitates that researchers not just download the data, however, but also collaborate with children to discuss, confirm, and contest their routes in order to be able to gain effective insights into the children’s lived experiences (see Figs. 7, 8, and 11). Sensory maps: These maps showcase how children experience and describe their surroundings with all their senses. In sensory mapping, children capture the sounds, smells, and the visual appearance of the area as well as their feelings in different parts of the environment (e.g., stressful, soothing). The map can be created in situ or they can experience the environment and then recall and note down their experiences later in, for example, a classroom setting or at home. Sometimes children are asked to close their eyes to remove any visual distraction, allowing them to focus on other senses and then to note down or recall later, for example, the sounds they hear (e.g., a bird chirping, whoosh of a car passing). Sensory maps can be created individually or in groups, but the collation of these sensory experiences allows others (e.g., adults, peers) to reexperience the route or area in their imagination. Models: Models are three-dimensional representations of space and work particularly well with younger children. Model making allows children to see the real world in miniature form. Traditionally models are used to explore and represent the benefits and constraints of children’s current local environment and their vision for its future development. The knowledge of enabling and

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Figure 9 Snapshot of 11 primary school children’s roaming in their neighborhood in winter (blue) and summer (orange) captured with a Global Positioning System.

constraining environments and children’s suggestions are particularly useful for planners and architects. The model building allows children to show significant areas, buildings, parks, or even trees that are salient and significant for them. Often models are used as prompts for further discussions (see Fig. 10). Examples include box city models, where children create representations of a place. Models are also valuable in that they enhance children’s ability to understand space and proposed changes or developments. Models vary in their materials and include objects found in nature, bought crafting materials (e.g., felt), or objects specifically made for the model-making activity (e.g., wooden houses). The base of the model can be a simple cardboard or a map base, possibly glued to a sturdy board. Fig. 3 shows carpet tiles used as a base. Computer games and apps provide opportunities to create interactive models that can change as scenarios change and as opportunities become available. Models require more resources and time for the creation process, however, and as for all mapping methods, have their limitations. Geographic information systems (GIS) and Qualitative GIS: Computer maps through GIS perform two main functions. They enable children to demonstrate their own spatial knowledge in ways that are accessible and fun, and they allow researchers to apply sophisticated techniques to the analysis of children’s spatial knowledge and use. These two functions combined provide a very powerful geographic tool for children’s geographers and the development professions. The rapid growth in GIS-based technologies, their accessibility, and increasing affordability mean children are becoming very familiar with and often highly skilled exponents of

Figure 10 Example of an intermediate school pupil’s vision for a cycle pathway which led to discussions about how a cycle skills training program can speak better to young people’s needs and expectations.

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computerized mapping. Given the wide availability of Google maps and computer games, children now generally find aerial photos easy to interpret and manipulate and can relatively easily move between plan and side-on (pictorial) views. UNICEF’s “Map your world,” for example, uses a social mapping model that encourages children to act as agents of change. Children in Kolkata have used mobile phone apps to track drinkable water taps. GIS can bring together different types of data and different datasets. Children’s data can be overlaid onto existing GPS-referenced datasets such as land use data, city plan data, transport flow data, and housing and service facility data, in ways that allow far more complex and nuanced insights into children’s environments. Researchers, for example, overlaid children’s home ranges onto city habitat maps, allowing researchers to assess accurately the type of habitats children favored as play areas; thus sports fields and streets were identified as key spaces, with limited use made of woodland habitats. GIS allows researchers and built environment and planning-related professionals to include massive datasets in ways hitherto impossible to deal with due to the high-processing requirements. Though GIS focuses on precise spatial positioning and generally produces quantitative data requiring highly specified skills for conducting complex and meaningful analysis, it can be very effectively used in conjunction with qualitative data. The “qualitative,” “qualified GIS,” or “SoftGIS” approach combines and integrates qualitative research and data with GIS. Nonetheless, approaches are quite diverse and vary. Often they link stories about places to a physical location on a map at a particular time or across time, which in turn then can be linked to interviews, walks, sketch maps, photo–voice activities, and so on. Data such as photographs, notes, and commentaries, audio and video recordings, drawings, GPS locations, and other data can be added to a generic map layer (see Fig. 11) both by researchers or in light of a citizen science project, expanding the source of input and the reach of maps. Some studies use a qualitative GIS approach to analyze qualitative data such as children’s perceptions of their environment, which can then be linked to data on deprivation levels or barriers and enablers on routes to school in light of traffic and accident data. This GIS-based triangulation of subjective and objective perceptions provides more nuanced understandings and helps refine questions needing consideration, such as commuting patterns or neighborhood qualities. Other approaches are participatory and often web-based (also known as public participation GIS or PPGIS). These can be used to inform authorities about possible planning and strategic processes having the potential to improve people’s well-being informed by their local knowledge, when integrated to improve community-level health and planning interventions. Such examples are still rare and there is the risk that children’s voices may be silenced and buried in large numerical and spatial datasets when emphasis in using the GIS approaches is put on spatial accuracy rather than on spatial literacy.

Figure 11 The Figure shows a neighborhood walk of two girls who took photos of meaningful play activities and places in their neighborhood. The walk was captured by a GPS device and geolocated photos. The GPS route and photos were collated and then enriched by comments captured with a recorder during the walk.

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Debates, Strength, Limitations, and Future Directions Areas where maps have been widely used include traditional engagement with maps where map drawing is used to assess spatial skills and to convey knowledge and understanding from the child or to the child. Increasingly, maps build in a participative process where maps are employed to reveal and directly tap into children’s knowledges and understandings, overcoming the necessity to exchange knowledge through an “adult mediator.” These maps can then be mobilized to create more child-oriented developments and environments; however, to make full use of the power of maps, it is important that the end product, the map, and the mapping process are relevant and meaningful for all involved parties. The chosen approach needs to speak to children and young people’s interests and abilities, and to be entered into willingly. Researchers, planners, and decision makers also need to be transparent about the analysis and what will happen to the mapsdhow they will be useddas well as the expected time frame for implementing any suggested improvements as involved parties expectations often differ. Ideally, the process is enjoyable and involves mutual learning in which adults can gain insights into children and young people’s lifeworlds and children and young people get a new and different perspective on their environment. This process in turn can lead to healthier and more sustainable environments and more long-term attention being paid to children and young people’s voices when planners, policymakers, and decision makers integrate children’s concerns and suggestions in their decisions. To ensure a range of voices is heard and incorporated in any decision-making process, a diverse body of children and young peopledvarying in gender, culture, age, abilities, ethnicity, class, and places they grow updshould be invited to participate in the mapping process. In this way, the previous silencing of children and young people can to some extent be avoided and the privileging of certain groups within places or societies be kept to a minimum. Therefore, researchers, planners, and decision makers should be reflective in all steps of the mapping process, from the creation of the project, to the decision about who is invited to participate, to the creation of the final map. Maps are powerful and can easily be manipulated to convey a desired political message and they can be easily misinterpreted. Reflexivity is imperative to ensure that no one is silenced or misrepresented, or that their needs and visions are recognized and not oversimplified. Although the growth in mapping and access to spatial data is a huge step forward, there are also practical and ethical factors to be considered when engaging with children and young people and the new potentialities offered by the mushrooming availability of digital spatial data. Because children’s locations can be accurately pinpointed, especially if the data become available beyond the research team, information about children and young people’s homes, places they play in groups or alone, and other places where they gather may become widely known. Their anonymity must be appropriately protected. In recent years, researchers have increasingly highlighted the need to ensure that the data that children and young people provide in maps must be treated respectfully and in appropriate ways. As this encyclopedia article has shown, there has been a history of seeing especially children’s maps as underdeveloped and indicative of a lack of knowledge. Such assumptions have translated into a rationale for children’s exclusion from participative processes such as city development plans; fortunately such misplaced assumptions are being progressively more challenged. Maps are one way children use to represent their world. Effective understanding requires the use of a multiplicity of methods. The skill for the researcher lies in finding the best mix of methods that suit the task in hand and the cohort of children and young people involved.

See Also: Affective Mapping; Arts-Based Methods; Children/Childhood; Indigenous Mapping; Map Interactivity; Map Perception and Cognition; Mixed and Multiple Methods; Mobile Mapping; Neighborhoods and Community; Photovoice; Sensory Mapping; Spatial Ontologies; Youth/Youth Cultures.

Further Reading Blades, M., Blaut, J.M., Darvizeh, Z., Elguea, S., Sowden, S., Soni, D., Spencer, C., Stea, D., Surajpaul, R., Uttal, D., 1998. A cross-cultural study of young children’s mapping abilities. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 23, 269–277. Cope, M., Elwood, S., 2009. Qualitative GIS: A Mixed Methods Approach. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Danby, S., Davidson, C., Ekberg, S., Breathnach, H., Thorpe, K., 2016. ‘Let’s see if you can see me’: making connections with Google Earth™ in a preschool classroom. Child Geogr. 14, 141–157. Derr, V., Chawla, L., Mintzer, M., 2018. Placemaking with Children and Youth: Participatory Practices for Planning Sustainable Cities. New Village Press, New York. Donaldson, Hughes, 1978. In: The Open University 2006 Media Kit, ED209: Child Development DVD-ROM (Media Kit Part 1, Video Band 1). The Open University, Milton Keynes. Ergler, C., 2019. The Power of Place in Play: A Bourdieusian Analysis of Auckland Children’s Seasonal Play Practices, Bielefeld, Transcript (in press). Freeman, C., Vass, E., 2010. Planning, maps, and children’s lives: a cautionary tale. Plann. Theor. Pract. 11, 65–88. Freeman, C., van Heezik, Y., Stein, A., Hand, K., 2016. Technological inroads into understanding city children’s natural life-worlds. Child Geogr. 14 (2), 158–174. Freeman, C., Ergler, C., Guiney, T., 2017. Planning with preschoolers: city mapping as a planning tool. Plann. Pract. Res. 32, 297–318. Harwood, D., Usher, M., 1999. Assessing progression in primary children’s map drawing skills. Int. Res. Geogr. Environ. Educ. 8 (3), 222–238. Jarvis, C.H., Kraftl, P., Dickie, J., 2017. (Re)Connecting spatial literacy with children’s geographies: GPS, Google Earth and children’s everyday lives. Geoforum 81, 22–31. Jirout, J.J., Newcombe, N.S., 2014. Mazes and maps: can young children find their way? Mind, Brain, and Education 8 (2), 89–96. Liben, L.S., Myers, L.J., Christensen, A.E., Bower, C.A., 2013. Environmental-Scale map use in middle childhood: links to spatial skills, strategies, and gender. Child Dev. 84 (6), 2047–2063. Loebach, J.E., Gilliland, J.A., 2016. Free range kids? Using GPS-derived activity spaces to examine children’s neighborhood activity and mobility. Environ. Behav. 48, 421–453. Matthews, M.H., 1985. Young children’s representations of the environment: a comparison of techniques. J. Environ. Psychol. 5, 261–278. Schmeinck, D., Thurston, A., 2007. The influence of travel experiences and exposure to cartographic media on the ability of ten-year-old children to draw cognitive maps of the world. Scot. Geogr. J. 123 (1), 1–15.

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Wilson, K., Coen, S.E., Piaskoski, A., Gilliland, J.A., 2018. Children’s perspectives on neighbourhood barriers and enablers to active school travel: a participatory mapping study. Can. Geogr. 63 (1). Wridt, P., 2010. A qualitative GIS approach to mapping urban neighborhoods with children to promote physical activity and child-friendly community planning. Environ. Plan. Plan. Des. 37, 129–147.

Relevant Websites Action for Children’s Environments. Promoting safe communities: Improving child protection in slums through a convergent approach in Mumbai and Bhopal. http://acetrust.net/ project/promoting-safe-communities/. Growing Up Boulder - http://www.growingupboulder.org/. University of Otago. Yes we can! Pre-schoolers as competent evaluators of their city. https://www.otago.ac.nz/geography/staff/academic/otago688365.html. Taller Creando Sin Encargos. https://tallercreandosinencargos.tumblr.com/.

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Children/Childhood Sneha Krishnan, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by F. Smith, N. Ansell, volume 2, pp 58–64, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Cyberspace The abstract or virtual space created among computers and other technologies of digital communication. Identity Refers to our ways of understanding ourselves, others, and the spaces we inhabit. Identity is closely related to the concept of “subjectivity,” which suggests that our sense of ourselves draws on historical and cultural discourses that determine the ways in which we inhabit our everyday worlds. Imperialism Refers not only to administrative regimes of colonial rule but also to logics of power that articulate imaginative geographies in which the “East”/“Orient” is set up as a backward space lacking in development. Decolonial theory addresses imperialism as ongoing in everyday experiences of race and gender. More-than-human Refers to the agencies of nonhuman matter in shaping the experience of human life, including political ecology frameworks addressing the role of the environment, as well as to materialist frameworks that seek to make sense of nonorganic matter as embroiled in human life. Queer theory Refers to theoretical frameworks that seek to unsettle assumptions of heteronormativity and life cycle that underlie social and political thinking. Life-course Refers to the framing of childhood and youth as stages in a linear and normative progression toward adulthood. Carcerality Refers to discourses and practices that circumscribe the mobility of particular social groups as a mode of discipline. Prisons are the paradigmatic example of carceral institutions; however, the word has also been used in the study of remand homes and juvenile detention centers, of immigration-related detainment, and also to educational confinement in residential schools.

Studies in human geography increasingly take seriously not only children as subjects of study but also the category of “childhood” as historically and culturally determined. This scholarship has shown that childhood and its cultural meanings are embroiled in the politics of race and imperialism, as well as in geopolitical questions about empires and nation-states, marking a departure from the tendency to take for granted childhood as an empirical category, including those under 18 years of age, as according to the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also takes seriously critiques advanced within the study of colonial and postcolonial worlds of “childhood” as a category that engages debates simultaneously about age, agency, development, and civilization. Further, focusing on the details of children’s lives in different geographical and historical contexts, scholars have demonstrated variations of gender, class, ethnicity, and (dis)ability that are shaped by where children are able to go to school, play, work, and live. Additionally, scholarship on childhood has also shifted from a focus on the child as a subject of transition, i.e., as an immature subject on the way to becoming a fully political and social being, to an emphasis on children’s agency and capacity to shape their own lifeworlds. Scholarship also emphasizes childhood as central to debates in policy and public discoursedas integral to shaping understandings of globalization, geopolitics, and socioeconomic as well as ecological change.

Children/Childhood and Human Geography Geographical scholarship on children and childhood has made key contributions to understanding children as subjects capable of exercising complex forms of agency. In this, geographers drew on an interdisciplinary trend in the social sciences from the mid-20th Century onward toward the study of children and childhood. This area of research is characterized as the New Social Studies of Childhood. The shift in focus emerged during the 1970s from an interest in representation and power; some of the related publications focused on the absence of children in the study of social life across disciplines. Early geographical studies by William Bunge and James Blaut took an approach drawn from developmental psychology, focusing on the capacities of children in different socioeconomic circumstances. Studies that built on these works developed two key trends in geographical research on childhood: a focus on transitions out of childhood that saw the child as a subject in the process of change, and an emphasis on the natural environment and its impact on children’s development. Scholars such as Cindi Katz, whose landmark work in New York and Sudan remains influential to the study of childhood, developed from this to focus on the influence of global sociopolitical forces on children’s lives. Other key scholars writing during the 1990s and early 2000s such as Gill Valentine, Tracey Skelton, and Stuart Aitken further developed the study of childhood, influencing debates on children’s experience of public and private spaces, the agency of children and young people, and global childhoods. Historical perspectives on childhood and children’s experience have also found their place in

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geographical scholarship, particularly work focused on scouting and guiding movements, as well as on imperial childhoods. Arguably the most significant contribution geographers have made to the field is in their focus on the embodied and material experience of childhood. In this, they have drawn out the ways in which children and young peopledboth in everyday life and in discourses about childhood and youthdhave been implicated in the spatial politics of race, class, and gender, as well as in discourses about territory, environments, and labor.

Theoretical Frames “Childhood” as Political Children and childhood were studied through much of the early and mid-20th Century as naturalized categories. Social constructivist approaches unsettled this categorization, suggesting instead that the notion of childhood was historically and culturally articulated. Geographers have intervened to establish the spatial and geopolitical constructedness of childhood. Scholars both within and beyond geography increasingly argue for approaches that unsettle colonial modes of categorization through methods that seek to decolonize practices of knowledge. The study of childhood and children has been central to some of this scholarship, albeit largely outside the discipline of geography. Postcolonial scholars have examined the attribution of “childhood”da state lacking in developmentdto non-white races and civilizations in imperial discourses. This metaphorical discourse of “childhood” often served to justify practices of imperial rule as the stewardship of regions and people determined to be too undeveloped to govern themselves. On the other hand, actual children were often at the heart of liberal imperialist discourse that sought to justify colonial rule as a civilizing force. Scholars have shown, for instance, that removing children to boarding houses was widely heralded as a means to separate them from undesirable influences at home and educate them within an imperial paradigm. Others focusing on juvenile justice systems have shown that elaborate discourses about race and the capacity for reform informed the ways in which children were punished and rehabilitated. An emergent scholarship links these historical practices with ongoing questions of children’s implication within imperial systems: for instance, as prisoners, as subjects of police violence, and as racialized figures of reform and uplift. Queer theorists have further deployed the category of “childhood” to examine critically the normative disciplining both of life cycle time and temporal imaginaries of development. Jack Halberstam, for instance, has shown that radical queer subcultures embrace a refusal to “grow up”di.e., to adopt markers of middle-class adulthood such as marriage and biological reproductiondand in doing so resist the compulsion to reproduce heterosexual norms. At the same time, scholars such as Lee Edelman have shown that the figure of the child as a site of biopolitical futurity is often central to disciplinary regimes that stigmatize radical cultural movements as being threatening to an imaginary of the ordinary middle-class life. For instance, Edelman argues that the figure of the child as simultaneously innocent and impressionable and also easily corruptible is at the heart of calls for heightened policing and surveillance of public places.

Children’s Agency Children’s agency is increasingly extensively theorized both within and beyond geography as scholars show that young people are rarely passive objects of adult machinations, but subjects with the capacity to impact and shape their own lives. Research during the 1980s and early 1990s largely studied childhood through adult proxies; contemporary research methodologies seek to highlight children’s and young people’s own agency as competent social actors. Ethnographic and other qualitative methods increasingly directly engage children as their subjects. This scholarship has been driven by an emphasis on the ethnographic portrait as a mode through which to unpack the individual and singular experiences of children within the wider contexts of social change that they inhabit. While scholars who use the portrait method acknowledge its limitation in privileging individual experience, it does not undermine the social construction of “childhood” as a shared category of experience. While historical research on childhood and children remains burdened by adult representations, a growing critical focus on the material life of childhood (e.g., children’s use of dolls and toys) allows for perspectives that focus on children’s agency. This scholarship has simultaneously unsettled liberal and sovereign understandings of “agency,” emphasizing affective and embodied practices through which subjects inhabit their contexts in agential ways. Scholars have built on a feminist critique that seeks to move away from agency as being straightforwardly synonymous with “resistance” to show that children exercise discretion in making sense of their social worlds, and in generating discourse about their work, their own bodies, and the geopolitical contexts in which they live. For instance, scholarship on childhood and leaf collection in the Himalayas has shown that children’s social interactions with each other in the course of their work generate discourse about gender. Children’s work as coal miners in Central Asia allows them to locate themselves within a post-Soviet geopolitical context that necessitates their work. Further, scholars have emphasized imaginative exercises and children’s play, as well as young people’s everyday engagements with discourses of class and race, as important sites where they exercise agency in building lifeworlds.

Children’s Spaces A key contribution that geographers have made to the study of childhood is in emphasizing place and space not only as an empty site on which children’s lives are enacted but also as key to the construction of childhood itself. For instance, the lens of scale has

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allowed geographers to unpack the ways in which childhood is embroiled in multiscalar engagements that link “local” spaces such as playgrounds, schools, and neighborhoods to national and global socioeconomic processes. This section elaborates on some key spaces in the study of childhood.

Home Feminist scholarshipdin geography and other disciplinesdhas extensively explored “home” as a troubled site of belonging and discipline and located it at the heart of (rather than as a haven from) political and cultural currents. This work establishes that the fantasy of the home as a refuge of individual freedom and comfort is suffused with violent histories, racialized and casteinflected practices of exclusion, as well as geopolitical conflict. Especially in colonial contexts, this scholarship has shown that “home” served as a site in which relations of race and gender were enacted in, for instance, the experience of mixed-race marriage and that of domestic servants resident in but excluded from the privileges of the home. “Home” has been examined in geographical studies of childhood not only as a refuge for children but also as a site of discipline and abuse. Home is also a place where children are cared for, as well as a place in which children may play caring roles. Scholarship focused in particular on epidemics and contexts of conflict in the Global South, as well as work on children’s economic labor, has shown that children often play important roles in shaping the everyday life of the home. Scholars of childhood have further highlighted the importance of intergenerationality in shaping children’s experience of the home: Critiquing the tendency to study the young and the old as insular categories, this scholarship shows that the experience of childhood is relational and shaped by those of other ages in the proximity of the child. Further, work on parenting has taken a scalar approach to unpacking the ways in which parenting roles might be shaped by wider sociopolitical conditions and in turn undergird the experience of childhood. Within feminist geography, this has further been nuanced by the lens of intersectionality, which highlights particular racialized and classed experiences of “home” as a site of contestation. For instance, scholars have shown that young Muslim women in the West often experience tensions between filial demands in the home that place emphasis on family and honor, and the ethnicization in wider British society that pushes them to assume less culturally marked subjectivities.

School and Childcare Going to school is a key theme in geographies of childhood. Schooling and childcare have gained normative status as central aspects of children’s lives since the early 20th Century. Indeed, children spend most of their lives in such institutions and away from their parents. Historical scholarship has shown that schools played central roles in reproducing appropriate citizenship and in creating workers for a modern and capitalist economy. Critical scholarship on the Global South has also shown that schools were central to the building of consent for imperial projects of civilization, as well as for postcolonial development projects. Focusing particularly on schools for First Nations children in Canada, scholars have shown that schooling in imperial contexts was closely intertwined with geographies of carcerality. Young people were taken from their homes to residential schools as a means of “modernizing” them away from the influence of their families. Schools in these contexts reinforced colonial hierarchies. Much like home, school has been shown to be a complex site of both care and development, as well as of discipline and even violence. Schooling has been of particular interest to geographers interested in the life-course. Schooling is a site where adult–child boundaries are articulated and reinforced. In the context of schooling, children are “put in place” by adults; at the same time, the process of schooling attempts to facilitate transitions to adulthood. Transitioning from school to work often marks entry to adulthood, and the inability to make this transition has been widely studied as a site of tension in the lives of young people. School has also been shown to be a site that ambiguously offers opportunities for social mobility while at the same time reinforcing social inequalities in many contexts. Geographers have shown, for instance, that the location of schools and the time it takes pupils to travel to them matter significantly in shaping the schools’ capacity to address inequality. Indeed a substantial scholarship questions the utility of schooling as a tool for development.

Public Space Children’s presence in the public spaces of streets and parks has long been a site of anxiety. While on the one hand, the street and the “stranger dangers” that might lurk in it are a subject of study as sites of danger to children, so also are “delinquent” children as dangerous or deviant subjects. Geographers have shown that a social assumption that underlies the presupposition that children out on the streets can be “dangerous” is the idea that such public spaces are adult spacesddevoid of the innocence and protection associated with childhooddthus marking children who inhabit them as being less childlike. Indeed, this contestation over public space is suggestive of the ways in which spatial regimes shape definitions of “childhood.” Accordingly, public institutions often treat children living on the streets as having adult capabilities, and as potential criminals. At the same time, in the discourse that addresses the presence of children and young people in public spaces “childhood” is often attributed even to young adult women who are seen as victims rather than agent subjects. Scholars focused on the Global South have simultaneously shown that in many parts of the non-West children are not necessarily seen as “out-of-place” in public places. Intersecting with the scholarship on children’s work, this scholarship asserts the cultural and historical specificity of the idea that home and school are the appropriate places for children. At the same time, studies focused on “street children” (i.e., children who dwell on the street, and often away from their families) have demonstrated that

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children show resourcefulness in making claims to public spaces where they may be marginalized. Scholars working with children in these contexts have also successfully adapted visual methods: for instance, mental mapping, as a tool through which to make sense of how children see and represent public space.

Cyberspace Much like the street, cyberspace is a site of anxiety about children and childhoods. Scholars writing about young people’s use of the Internet during the 1990s highlight anxieties about the unknown character of the Internet as well as an emergent “digital generation”: youth with more conversance of new technologies than their parents. They also focus on new legislation passed in that period to protect children in their use of the Internet: Much like public spaces, the Internet was a site of “stranger danger,” where predatory adults might draw innocent young people into illicit activity. This scholarship argues, in doing so, that surveillance of children’s Internet use came to be seen as a central parental duty during the 1990s. At the same time, digital technologies and the Internet also function as modes through which surveillance is enacted on children. Scholars have written about the use of cameras to broadcast images of children in nursery and primary schools to their parents via the Internet. Similarly, educational institutions might use “smart cards” to keep track of children’s mobility within the school. This is becoming especially the case as schools implement zero-tolerance policies on children’s misbehavior, necessitating perpetual surveillance as a mode of discipline. Further, gaming and social networking websitesdmany of which permit the registration of teenagersdalso collect information about their users, opening up a site of corporate surveillance of children’s play. More recent scholarship focuses on children and young people’s inhabitation of digital subjectivities. As digital technologies become more pervasive in everyday life, geographers have shown that young people articulate forms of sociality that are distinctly digital: for instance, in text-messaging cultures that engage the use of apps and memes. Young people also use social networking platforms and digital apps to build and sustain networks of friends, as well as to engage in political and entrepreneurial activity. Scholarship focused in particular on the Global South indicates that young people’s participation in digital cultures allows them to access cultural discourses that might otherwise be unavailable to them, and to appropriate and reinvent them. This scholarship also shows that while new media and digital technologies might engage youth in a scalar politics that allows them to access “global” cultural markers, children and young people remain rooted in many ways in networks of geographic proximity. The Internet thus does not supplant the neighborhood or the school as the site of children’s social networks.

Children and Socioeconomic Change Scholarship on children and childhood has been driven by young people’s increasing visibility within topical political debates about development and ongoing socioeconomic changes. The discourse and practice of development geographically places children as objects of particular kinds of intervention, shaped by global capital flows. The movement for Child Rights, for instance, which began in 1919 in the wake of the First World War, was characterized by the work of organizations such as “Save the Children” (that also participated in drafting the Declaration of the Rights of the Child that the League of Nations adopted in 1924). This discourse normalized as a matter of policy of Western and middle-class expectations of childhood. It advocated, for instance, for the abolition of child labor, which many scholars have shown does not consider the socially and economically productive roles children have traditionally played in many societies. This period also saw a substantial growth in the movement of children across national borders as adoptees, and as subjects of government programs that sought, through social welfare measures, to rehabilitate children thought to be living less than salubrious lives. Post-1945 development regimes have similarly intervened in the lives of children. They are characterized by the work of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the enforcement of international standards of protection for children. In this section, I examine how geographers have examined childhood in the context of three main topics of study to do with socioeconomic change: globalization, geopolitics, and ecological change.

Globalization By “globalization” I refer to the range of social, cultural, and economic processes that are linked to the global flow of capital from the 1990s forward. Globalization has also been associated with the rise of neoliberalism as a set of ideologies founded on the privatization of economic, social, and cultural resources. Scholars across disciplines argue that the processes of globalization have radically transformed the experience of childhood. They have reshaped the ways in which children experience education and transformed the ways in which young people enter the workforce. At the same time, popular media and scholars alike have asked if childhood has been homogenized as more young people have access to the same media, food, clothing, and cultural discourses about practices such as romance and dating (on the one hand) and labor and play (on the other). Research has shown, however, that rather than homogenization, this context reveals the complexity of scalar relations in the lives of the young. For instance, several ethnographic studies have shown that young people in the Global South wear and display fake versions of well-known global brands as a mark of status. In “faking,” this scholarship shows young people locate themselves within global circuits of capital and meaning, while simultaneously subverting them. Younger children might have less independent access to such practices of consumption; nevertheless, scholars have

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shown that children become producers of social and cultural capital for families through the sartorial and consumption choices that parents make for them. Another major focus of this scholarship has been the question of transitioning out of childhood: A process that scholars have argued is complicated by structural transformations that make it hard for young people to achieve markers of adulthood such as the capacity to earn adequately to support a family. “Waiting” further becomes a condition of everyday life: Schools, families, and medical establishments have all increasingly come to value children’s capacity to wait for better things as a sign of their maturity and ethical capacity. In this context, scholarship focused on the Global South has shown that children engage in creative practices and everyday subversions that allow them to inhabit their contexts as agent subjects.

Geopolitics Ongoing debate on migration in the context of a global “refugee crisis” as well as sweeping anti-migrant legislation in North America and Europe has precipitated intense debate about children’s mobility across borders. A growing number of children either migrate unaccompanied across national borders or are separated from their families en route. Others find their status as “children” and the protections this affords them under international agreements in question at borders. In this context, an emergent literature asks how geopolitical processes shape experiences of childhood. This work is mainly driven by a scholarship in feminist geopolitics, and asks how racialized contexts of conflict and national boundaries unsettle and reconstitute the boundaries of childhood and adulthood. Historical geographers interested in these themes have shown that the gendering and racialization of childhood was integral to 19th- and 20th-Century imperial cultures. Undergirded by organizations such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, these processes shaped practices of play and exploration. Others writing in historical contexts have emphasized the role of children’s relocation, through welfare programs and as adoptees, as central to their implication within imperial geographies. Scholars who are focused on more contemporary contexts have traced the endurance of such logics in the articulation of the child in the Global South as a subject of philanthropy and development. Feminist geographers have unpacked the intersection of bio- and geopolitics to ask how geopolitical concerns about borders and demography shape decisions about reproduction. For instance, in some contexts, it has been shown that racialized anxieties about dwindling populations prevent women from accessing contraceptive technologies. Work on this subject has drawn on conceptualizations of childhood in queer theory to show that the figure of the child plays a central role in territorial fantasies of futurity. This further shows that “childhood” itself is co-constituted with geopolitical discourses. Additionally, scholarship on popular geopolitics has shown that media texts intended for children (e.g., cartoons and video games) center childhood in affective engagements with geopolitics, and simulate situations that implicate children’s bodies in processes of territorial articulation and contestation.

Ecological Change As environmental damage and the lasting changes that this has wrought become increasingly important to geographical scholarship, scholars have also asked how children and their lives engage these transformations. Rural landscapes in the West have long been idealized as idyllic locations for childhood. The countryside in Britain, for instance, features in literary and sociological narrative in the early 20th Century as a site of peace and innocence. At the same time, geographers have shown that engagements with this landscape in experience are more complicated, marking geographies of fear, poverty, and work in the lives of children who live in close connection with natural worlds. Using a more-than-human geographical approach that draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “assemblage,” scholars have also shown that ideas about agency and capacity in childhood are articulated in natural ecologies that include both human actors and environmental agents. Playdwith sticks and stones, wooden objects, and toys, as well as in imaginative landscapesdhas been highlighted in particular as a site where matter is made “vibrant,” to borrow from the theorist Jane Bennett, and where material ecologies of childhood are constituted. Beyond European and North American contexts, scholars working with a political ecology framework have shown that environmental changes are integral to the ways in which children’s work and play have been transformed. One approach looks at geographies of food poverty and children’s access to nutrition as driven by considerations of political ecology. This approach also includes studies of obesitydfor instance, in studies that focus in particular on the urban form and the political economy of food (especially the phenomenon of “food deserts”) in conjunction with debates about fat and its circulation within biomedical discourses. Other approaches have focused on how the types of labor marked as appropriate for children is shaped by changing ecological landscapes. For instance, scholars have shown that devegetation and the loss of lands in certain contexts place burdens on children to travel further to find grazing or cultivable land.

Conclusion This article has attempted to draw attention to the ways in which children and childhood constitute subjects of academic study and of epistemic and territorial contestation. Geography has contributed significantly to this scholarship, particularly in how it has drawn attention to the ways in which children’s bodies are implicated in the organization of everyday social and cultural space, as well as in its articulation of larger scale geopolitical boundaries. The child as a cultural figure is central as much to the articulation of the boundaries of home, and to the organization of everyday social space, as to the drawing of geopolitical boundaries and

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contestations over territory. Indeed, feminist geopolitics does the work precisely of unpacking the ways in which geopolitics is brought homedmade domestic and intimatedin discourses about children and childhood. Political and cultural geographies of childhood and children unpack the role of space in determining the racialized and gendered terms of who counts as a child, and what childhood entails as a socially constructed experience. Beyond academia, these geopolitics and geographies have shaped understandings of children’s lives beyond a liberal discourse of child rights, toward a more nuanced understanding of the circumstances under which children labor, play, and engage sociopolitical structures. Key conceptual directions in which the study of childhood has developed in recent years have been in the use of queer and decolonial theory. These conceptual framings highlight shifts not only toward more situated and nuanced readings of childhood but also toward methodological interventions that ask how “childhood” both as a conceptual category and a site of experience is located within normative renderings of life cycle and civilizational time.

See Also: Colonialism; Home; Radical Geography.

Further Reading Aitken, S., 2001. Geographies of Young People: The Morally Contested Spaces of Identity. Routledge, London. Blaut, J., Stea, D., 1974. Mapping at the age of three. J. Geogr. 73, 5–9. Bunge, W., 1977. The point of reproduction: a second front. Antipode 9, 60–76. Dyson, J., 2014. Working Childhoods: Youth, Agency and the Environment in India. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Halberstam, J., 2011. The Queer Art of Failure. Duke University Press, Durham. Hart, R., 1979. Children’s Experience of Place. Irvington, New York. Holloway, S., Valentine, G. (Eds.), 2000. Children’s Geographies: Playing, Living, Learning. Routledge, London. Honwana, A., De Boeck, F. (Eds.), 2005. Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa. James Currey, Oxford. Katz, C., 1991. Sow what you know: the struggle for social reproduction in rural Sudan. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 81 (3), 488–514. Kraftl, P., Horton, J., Tucker, F. (Eds.), 2012. Critical Geographies of Childhood and Youth: Contemporary Policy and Practice. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Matthews, H., 1984. Environmental cognition of young children: images of school and home area. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 9 (1), 89–105. McKittrick, K., 2007. Freedom is a secret: the future usability of the underground. In: McKittrick, K., Woods, C. (Eds.), Black Geographies and the Politics of Place. Between the Lines Press, Toronto, pp. 97–111. Robson, E., 2004. Children at work in rural northern Nigeria: patterns of age, space and gender. J. Rural Stud. 20 (2), 193–210. Smith, F., Barker, J., 2000. Contested spaces: children’s experiences of out of school care in England and Wales. Childhood 7 (3), 315–333. Young, L., 2004. The “place” of street children in Kampala, Uganda: marginalisation, resistance and acceptance in the urban environment. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 21, 607–627.

Relevant Website http://www.gcyf.org.uk. Geographies of Children, Youth and Families Working Group, RGSIBG.

Chinese Medicine, Traditional Ping Zou, School of Nursing, Nipissing University, Toronto, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Eight principles of diagnosis A method of diagnosing diseases based on the patient’s presentation of (1) yin/yang (2) exterior/ interior (3) cold/hot, and (4) deficiency/excess of qi. Five agents A Traditional Chinese Medicine theory that states that all matter can be described by wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. Kampo A Japanese–Chinese medical system that originated from Traditional Chinese Medicine. Meridians Vessels in the body that transport qi and xue. Moxibustion A Traditional Chinese Medicine therapy that involves burning mugwort on the body. Qigong A Chinese physical exercise that promotes wellness and relaxation through meditation, breathing, and posture. Qi The body’s heat energy, which is associated with yang. Tai chi An ancient Chinese martial art and physical exercise that is characterized by deliberately slow, continuous, circular, well-balanced, and rhythmic movements. Xue The body’s fluid energy, which is associated with yin. Yin yang Two general terms that describe two opposite aspects of things or phenomena in nature that are opposite but interrelated to one another. Zang fu A term used to describe two sets of organs commonly implicated in Traditional Chinese Medicine diseases.

History With a history of more than 3000 years, Traditional Chinese Medicine is a well-established medical system that provides a unique theoretical and practical approach to the treatment and prevention of diseases. Due to China’s vast geographical area and large number of different ethnic groups, a number of different Traditional Chinese Medicine schools of thought arose throughout history. In addition, China was comprised of a number of warring states ruled by numerous vassals for many dynasties, so the consolidation of Traditional Chinese Medicine occurred gradually. Guided by general Chinese philosophical theories, Traditional Chinese Medicine includes a wider range of practices compared to Western medicine. Traditional Chinese Medicine not only cures and prevents existing diseases, but it also engages a range of physical practices such as tai chi to maintain health and thus coincidentally prevent disease. The importance of Traditional Chinese Medicine and its development are recognized and supported by the Chinese government. In China, Traditional Chinese Medicine is currently included within the health-care system and accessible to the entire population in hospitals and communities. More than 90% of the urban and rural Chinese population has sought Traditional Chinese Medicine in their lifetimes. Even after the introduction of Western medicine, China has kept its practice of Traditional Chinese Medicine by integrating it with Western medicine. Western medicine was introduced to China between the mid-17th Century and 19th Century by Christian missionaries. After the Opium War of 1840, Western medicine started gaining influence due to the large-scale integration with China. As a result of Western medicine’s gain of popularity, debates raised on the topic of the relationship and difference between Western medicine and Traditional Chinese Medicine. The idea of integrating both practices was born from these debates. Chinese Traditional Medicine was furthered by Chairman Mao after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. He encouraged physicians to learn Traditional Chinese Medicine and further develop it by integrating Western medicine and modern scientific methods. With governmental policy support, integrated medicine (中西医结合) became the cornerstone of the national health policy in China.

Geographical Spread of Traditional Chinese Medicine Throughout Asia Traditional Korean Medicine and Kampo (Japanese–Chinese medicine) both originated from Traditional Chinese Medicine principles. Traditional medicine in three countries, China, Korea, and Japan, has the same origin, but differ in method of diagnosis, treatment, and herbal medication. Different regions had their own epidemics and unique climates influencing the available ecology, so Traditional Korean Medicine and Kampo in Japan altered Traditional Chinese Medicine to match their environments accordingly. Traditional Chinese Medicine was introduced to Japan during the 6th Century due to influences from the Jin and Yuan

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dynasties in China. During the 10th Century, Traditional Chinese Medicine spread alongside Buddhism to Korea. In addition, the printing process was improved during the 10th Century, thereby facilitating the transmission of manuscripts from China to Korea. Korean practitioners eventually published a number of Korean medical manuscripts that adjusted Traditional Chinese Medicine principles to match local plants and herbs. By the 20th Century, Traditional Korean Medicine was significantly distinct from Traditional Chinese Medicine. As a result of historical spread of Traditional Chinese Medicine to different regions, traditional medicine remains in high demand to this date in Asia. Traditional medicine is officially recognized in the national health-care systems of all three countries, in contrast to Western nations, where Traditional Chinese Medicine is labeled as alternative medicine. In addition, traditional medicine is officially taught in a number of medical schools in Asia.

Geographical Spread of Traditional Chinese Medicine to the Western World Cultural and economic factors in health and medical geography can explain the popularity of Traditional Chinese Medicine usage in North America. In North America, Traditional Chinese Medicine is considered as an alternative and complementary medicine. The United States is the world’s biggest importer of Traditional Chinese Medicine products, and lifetime consumption of Traditional Chinese Medicine in North America is similar to the usage rate of mainland Chinese. The enduring popularity of Traditional Chinese Medicine among Chinese immigrant populations may be due to a number of factors, including age, language barriers, geographic regions, and traditional beliefs. Many aged Chinese immigrants may experience language barriers with English, which can result in these individuals forming close bonds with other Chinese in their local community (e.g., the historical formation of Chinatowns throughout North America). These individuals may resist assimilation and thus mistrust Western medicine. For example, a common belief in the Chinese community is that Traditional Chinese Medicine treats the root cause of the problem and has fewer side effects than Western medicine, which only alleviates the superficial symptoms. In addition, many Chinese immigrants who utilize Western medicine frequently use Traditional Chinese Medicine. These individuals utilize Traditional Chinese Medicine herbal medicines on top of their treatments prescribed by Western doctors. Acculturation is a factor which influences Chinese; North Americans use Traditional Chinese Medicine and Western medicine. A number of studies have shown that as Chinese immigrants stay longer in North America, they tend to consume more Western medical services and use less Traditional Chinese Medicine. Adding on to the concept of acculturation, an immigrant’s country of origin also affects their usage of Traditional Chinese Medicine in their new nation. Immigrants from Hong Kong are, for example, less likely to use Traditional Chinese Medicine than immigrants from mainland China, possibly due to Hong Kong’s colonial history and Westernization. Last, the city where immigrants reside can also affect the frequency of Traditional Chinese Medicine usage. Smaller cities result in the formation of smaller Chinese communities, and thus, individuals will become more acculturated.

Historical Practitioners and the Classics Bian Que. The first recorded physician who established Chinese medicine diagnostic procedures. One of the highest compliments a Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioner could win is to be called a “living Bian Que.” Huangdi Neijing (The Yellow Emperor’s Internal Classic, time unknown, author unknown). This book is comprised of two parts: the Suwen (The Book of Plain Questions) and the Lingshu (The Spiritual Pivot). The book summarizes previous medical experiences and deals with the anatomy and physiology of the human body. This is the earliest classic of Traditional Chinese Medicine passed on to the present, and it lays the foundation for Traditional Chinese Medicine. Zhang Zhongjing. The author of Shanghan Zabing Lun (Treatise on Cold-induced and Miscellaneous Diseases). This book establishes diagnosis based on overall analysis of signs and symptoms. Its 269 prescriptions make up the basis for modern clinical practice. It was rewritten and divided into two parts called Shanghan Lun (Treatise on Cold-induced Diseases) and Jin Gui Yao Lue (Synopsis of the Golden Chamber). Hua Tuo. He pioneered the use of an anesthetic drug and was the greatest surgeon in Chinese history. He also devised gymnastic exercises known as Wu Qin Xi (the game of the five animals) to help people keep fit and healthy. Another highest compliment a Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioner could win is to call him an “alive Hua Tuo.” Huangfu Mi. The author of the Zhenjiu Jiayijing (Systemic Classic of Acupuncture and Moxibustion). This text is considered to be the earliest complete reference guide to acupuncture and moxibustion. It summarizes information on the meridians, acupuncture points, needle manipulation, and their contraindications. It lists a total number of 349 acupoints and discusses the therapeutic properties of each point. Sun Simiao. The author of Qianjin Yaofang (Prescriptions Worth a Thousand Gold for Emergencies) and Qianjin Yifang (Supplement to the Precious Prescriptions). This is the first medical encyclopedia in China and was comprised of 30 volumes and 5300 prescriptions. These books deal with acupuncture, moxibustion, dietary therapy, as well as disease prevention and health preservation. It was an outstanding reference for treatment of deficiency diseases. Li Shizhen. The author of the Bencao Gangmu (Compendium of Materia Medica). This book summarizes most of the herbal information available in the 16th Century.

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Philosophical Theories Within the Chinese historical contexts, Traditional Chinese Medicine is one of the qualitative sciences based on general philosophical theories, including yin yang, and five agents.

Yin Yang The yin yang theory is an ancient Chinese philosophy that exists as a perspective and methodology to explain the origins and variations of the universe. It is the philosophical support to Traditional Chinese Medicine. Ying yang are two general terms that describes two opposite aspects of things or phenomena in nature that are opposite but interrelated to one another. In general, anything that is moving, ascending, bright, progressing, and hyperactive pertains to yang. The characteristics of stillness, descending, darkness, degeneration, and hypoactivity pertains to yin. Yin and yang can interact and combine with each other in the process of movement. Either yin or yang contains its opposite aspect. Yin and yang tends to automatically maintain and reestablish the state of harmony and equilibrium. In Traditional Chinese Medicine, the yin yang theory is used to explore relationships of opposition and restriction, as well as the coordination and unity existing in tissues, structure, physiological functions, and pathological changes of the human body.

Five Agents Five agents (五行) theory explains that all phenomena of the universe and nature can be broken down into five elemental qualities, which can be represented by wood (木), fire (火), earth (土), metal (金), and water (水). These five agents are interconnected and act and counteract each other. This relational theory constitutes the basis of how Traditional Chinese Medicine understands the human body. The five agents theory is also applied in diagnosis and therapy.

Major Concepts Different from Western medicine, which emphasizes scientific evidence, Traditional Chinese Medicine applies broad philosophical theories and laws of nature to the study of the physiological activities and pathological changes of the human body. Traditional Chinese Medicine understands the human body based on a holistic understanding of the universe. Furthermore, treatment of illnesses is based on syndrome differentiation guided by the yin yang theory. Basic concepts of Traditional Chinese Medicine include zang fu (脏腑) organs, essence (精), qi (气), xue (血), body fluids (津液), and meridians (经络). Traditional Chinese Medicine considers zang fu organs as the core of human body. Through long-term observation of the physiological and pathological changes of the human body, Traditional Chinese Medicine established the zang fu theory, which explains the location, physiological functions, and pathological changes of human body’s organs, as well as the relationships among and between organs and external environments. Zang fu is a combined term that describes two unique types of organs. According to Traditional Chinese Medicine, there are five zang organs (heart, liver, spleen, lung, and kidneys) and six fu organs (gallbladder, stomach, small intestine, large intestine, bladder, and triple energizer). The zang organs can generate and store essence and serve as the center of human life activities. The fu organs function by receiving, transporting, and transforming food and water. Traditional Chinese Medicine treatment starts with a holistic analysis of a body system and then focuses on the correction of pathological changes through readjusting the functions of zang fu organs. Essence (精), qi (气), xue (血), and body fluids (津液) are the basic material to form and sustain the life activities of the human body. The generation, distribution, and discharge of essence, qi, xue, and body fluids depend on the zang fu organs. Qi has the function of promotion and warming, while essence, xue, and body fluids all have the function of nourishing and moistening. Therefore, qi pertains to yang and essence, xue and body fluids pertain to yin according to the yin yang theory. The meridians (经络) are channels running from the zang fu in the interior of the body to the limbs and joints, transporting qi and xue. Traditional Chinese Medicine identifies 12 regular (十二经 脉) and eight extraordinary meridians (奇经八脉).

Diagnostics Four Diagnostic Methods In Traditional Chinese Medicine, there are four diagnostic methods (四诊): inspection (望), listening and olfaction (闻), inquiry (问), and palpation (切). Inspection focuses on the face and particularly on the tongue, including analysis of the tongue size, shape, tension, color and coating, and the absence or presence of teeth marks around the edge. Listening refers to listening for particular sounds, such as wheezing, coughing, and speaking. Olfaction refers to attending to body odor. Inquiry focuses on the “seven inquiries,” which involve asking the person about the regularity, severity, or other characteristics of chills, fever, perspiration, appetite, thirst, taste, defecation, urination, pain, sleep, menses, and leukorrhea. Palpation which includes feeling the body for tenderness and the palpation of the wrist pulses as well as various other pulses, and palpation of the abdomen.

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Tongue and Pulse Diagnostics Examination of the tongue (舌) and the pulse (脉) is among the principal diagnostic methods in Traditional Chinese Medicine. Teeth marks on certain sections of the tongue’s surface are believed to correspond to the certain zang fu organs. For example, teeth marks on one part of the tongue might indicate a problem with the heart, while teeth marks on another part of the tongue might indicate a problem with the liver. Pulse palpation involves measuring the pulse at three different locations on the radial artery, which are Cun (寸), Guan (关), Chi (尺) located two finger-width from the wrist crease, one fingerbreadth from the wrist crease, and right at the wrist crease, respectively. Using the index, middle, and ring fingers, a Traditional Chinese Medicine practitioner usually palpates a patient’s pulse on both arms, for a total of 12 pulses, all of which are thought to correspond with certain zang fu organ. The pulse is examined for several characteristics including rhythm, strength, and volume and described with qualities like “floating,” “slippery,” “bolstering-like,” “feeble,” “thread,” and “fast”; each of these qualities indicate certain disease patterns. It could take several years to learn pulse diagnostics.

Eight Principles of Diagnosis The process of diagnosing a disease by finding a pattern is called 辩证, usually translated as “pattern diagnosis,” “pattern identification,” or “pattern discrimination.” The first step is the evaluation of the present signs and symptoms on the basis of the “Eight Principles” (八纲). These Eight Principles are organized into four pairs that describe the fundamental qualities of a disease: exterior/interior, heat/cold, deficiency/excess, and yin/yang. Out of these, heat/cold and deficiency/excess have the biggest clinical importance. The yin/yang quality, on the other side, has the smallest importance and is somewhat seen aside from the other three pairs since it merely presents a general and vague conclusion regarding what other qualities are found. In detail, the Eight Principles refer to the following: Yin and yang. Yin and yang are universal aspects which all things can be classified under including the Eight Principles’ other three couples and disease in general. For example, cold is identified to be a yin aspect, while heat is attributed to yang. In addition, deficiency-cold and excess-heat patterns are sometimes referred to as “yin patterns” and “yang patterns,” respectively. Exterior (表) and interior (里). Exterior refers to a disease manifesting in the superficial layers of the body, such as skin, hair, flesh, and meridians. It is characterized by aversion to cold and/or wind, headache, muscle ache, mild fever, a “floating” pulse, and a normal tongue appearance. Interior refers to disease manifestation in the zang fu, or in a wider sense to any disease that cannot be counted as exterior. Cold (寒) and heat (热). Cold is generally characterized by aversion to cold, absence of thirst, and white tongue fur. A more specific diagnosis depends on whether cold is coupled with vacuity or repletion. Heat is characterized by absence of aversion to cold, a red and painful throat, dry tongue fur, and a rapid and floating pulse, if it accompanies an exterior pattern. In all other cases, symptoms depend on whether heat is coupled with vacuity or repletion. Deficiency (虚) and excess (实). Deficiency can be further differentiated into deficiency of qi, xue, yin, and yang, with all their respective characteristic symptoms. Yin deficiency can also cause “empty heat.” Excess generally refers to any disease that can not be identified as a deficient pattern and usually indicates the presence of one of the Six Excesses, or a pattern of stagnation of qi or xue. In a concurrent exterior pattern, excess is characterized by the absence of sweating.

Six Excesses The Six Excesses (六淫, 六邪) are allegorical terms used to describe disharmonious patterns with typical symptoms, which resemble the effects of six climatic factors (六气). These symptoms can occur because one or more of those climatic factors were able to invade the body surface and proceed to the interior. In addition, the Six Excesses can manifest inside the body without an external cause. In this case, they might be denoted “internal,” e.g., “internal wind” or “internal fire (or heat).” The Six Excesses and their characteristic clinical signs are (1) wind (风), rapid onset and changing location of symptoms, itching, nasal congestion, “floating” pulse, tremor, paralysis, or convulsion; (2) cold (寒), cold sensations, aversion to cold, relief of symptoms by warmth, watery excreta, severe pain, abdominal pain, contracture/hypertonicity of muscles, white tongue fur, “deep,” “hidden,” or “string-like” pulse, or slow pulse; (3) fire/heat (火), aversion to heat, high fever, thirst, concentrated urine, red face, red tongue, yellow tongue fur, or rapid pulse; (4) dampness (湿), sensation of heaviness, sensation of fullness, indigestion, greasy tongue fur, “slippery” pulse; (5) dryness (燥), dry cough, dry mouth, dry throat, dry lips, nose bleeding, dry skin, or dry stools; (6) summer heat (暑), either heat or mixed damp-heat symptoms. Six Excesses patterns can consist of only one or a combination of Excesses (e.g., wind–cold, wind–damp–heat). In addition, they can also transform from one into another.

Disease Category and Pattern In Traditional Chinese Medicine, a disease has two aspects: disease category (病) and pattern (证). The former is the diagnosis and the latter, and more important one, is the syndrome. Most of the disease categories (病) listed by Traditional Chinese Medicine constitute mere symptoms, such as headache, cough, abdominal pain, and constipation. The pattern refers to a pattern of disharmony or functional disturbance according to yin yang and other theories of the Traditional Chinese Medicine. There are disharmony

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patterns of qi, xue, the body fluids, the zang fu, and the meridians. The treatment will be chosen according to the pattern rather than the disease category. Thus, two people with the same disease category but different patterns will receive different therapy (同病异 治). Vice versa, people with similar patterns might receive similar therapy even if their disease categories are different (异病同治).

Treatments Medicinal Substances and Pharmacology Traditional Chinese Medicine is usually regarded as herbal medicine because plant elements are the most commonly used substances in the treatment; however, nonbotanic substances including animal, human, and mineral products are also utilized. Typically, one batch of medicine is prepared as a decoction of about 9–18 substances. Some of them are considered as main herbs and some as ancillary herbs. Different ratios of ingredients in a prescription and different dosages yield different effects. According to the theory of pharmacology in Traditional Chinese Medicine, medicinal substances are classified according to their natures, tastes, and functions. First, Four Natures (四气), including hot, warm, cool, or cold, are used to classify medicines’ nature. Hot and warm herbs are used to treat cold diseases, while cool and cold herbs are used to treat heat diseases. Second, according to the five flavors (五味), medicinal substances can be classified as acrid, sweet, bitter, sour, and salty. A substance may also have more than one flavor. Each of the five flavors corresponds to one of the zang fu organs, which in turn corresponds to one of the five phases. A flavor implies certain properties and therapeutic actions of a substance. For example, saltiness drains downward and softens hard masses, while sweetness is supplementing, harmonizing, and moistening. Third, according to specific functions, medicinal substances can be classified in various categories, such as exterior-releasing, heat-clearing, downward-draining, dampnesstransforming, interior-warming, qi-regulating, food-dispersing, worm-expelling, stopping bleeding, phlegm-transforming, coughsuppressing, spirit-quieting, liver-calming, blood-nourishing, yin-enriching, yang-fortifying, vomiting-inducing, and substances for external application.

Acupuncture and Moxibustion In Chinese, characters for acupuncture (针灸) literally mean “acupuncture–moxibustion.” Historically, acupuncture is often accompanied by moxibustion, which involves burning mugwort on or near the skin at an acupuncture point. Acupuncture is the insertion of needles into superficial structures of the body (skin, subcutaneous tissue, or even muscles) at acupuncture points (acupoints) with their subsequent manipulation, aiming at influencing the flow of qi. According to Traditional Chinese Medicine, acupuncture relieves pain and treats various diseases. In electroacupuncture, an electric current is applied to the needles once they are inserted, in order to further stimulate the respective acupuncture points. Moxibustion is a Traditional Chinese Medicine therapy which consists of burning dried mugwort on particular points on the body. Suppliers usually age the mugwort and grind it up to a fluff; practitioners burn the fluff or process it further into a cigar-shaped stick. They can use it indirectly, with acupuncture needles, or burn it on or near the patient’s skin.

Food Therapy In Chinese culture, it is believed that food is the first necessity to human life (民以食为天). Food therapy is a method of adjusting diet according to Traditional Chinese Medicine theories. The food therapy suggests that different foods have different effects on zang fu organs, qi, and xue. A proper diet can nourish zang fu organs, while an improper diet leads to yin yang imbalance and the unhealthy condition of zang fu organs. The purpose of the food therapy is to supply proper nutrition, replenish essential qi, and correct deviations of zang fu organs and yin yang balance, thus promoting health and postponing aging. In Traditional Chinese Medicine, food is conceptualized according to both nutritional and functional aspects. First, food is considered as diet because it provides the necessary substances for life and health. Second, food is also considered as a medication. Since food is considered a form of medication, Traditional Chinese Medicine considers a proper diet to be just as important as medicine. Third, food is considered as tonic. It is believed that food can help individuals smooth body mechanisms, build up resistance against disease, and slow down the aging process. Lastly, some foods are considered harmful to patients of certain conditions. Thus, food abstention, the practice of avoiding certain foods during illness, is recommended by Traditional Chinese Medicine. There are four major principles of food therapy in Traditional Chinese Medicine. The first principle is light eating (食宜清淡) a diet composed of mostly grains supplemented with vegetables and fruits and discourages excess intake of alcohol, meat, and other fatty and sweet foods. Traditional Chinese Medicine affirms the benefits of vegetarian food and balanced intake. Excess intake of meat could produce excess heat in the body and stagnation of body fluids, resulting in yin and yang imbalance and impairment of qi movement. The second principle of food therapy focuses on balancing the hot and cold nature of food (寒温中适). Consistent with the yin yang theory, Traditional Chinese Medicine suggests that foods have three different natures (hot, neutral, and cold). In Traditional Chinese Medicine, “hot” and “cold” refers to the yin and yang nature of the food, which does not directly correlate to the physical temperature of the food. Foods of different natures have different functions. Foods with different natures should be coordinated with each other to promote health and treat disease. The third principle focuses on the harmony of the five flavors of food (谨和五味). Traditional Chinese Medicine classifies the tastes of food as five flavors: sour, sweet, bitter, spicy, and salty. Different flavors have different effects on the human body and pertain to different zang fu organs. With a dispersion effect, spiciness relates

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to the lung and large intestine. Saltiness relates to the liver and gallbladder with constricting and emollient effects. Sourness can emolliate the liver and control diarrhea and perspiration. Bitterness relates to the heart and small intestines and can have discharging, drying, and strengthening effects. Sweetness relates to the stomach and spleen. It can help digestion, neutralize the toxic effect of other foods, and replenish qi. The proper combination of food with different flavors is very beneficial for one’s general health and xue. Excess intake of any single flavor can lead to an imbalance which can cause harm. The fourth principle of food therapy is that diet should be consistent with different health conditions (辨证施膳). For example, foods of a cold nature may be used to treat cases of hot conditions. To treat yin deficiency, cold and neutral food, such as pork, yolk, sang shen (fruit of mulberry), and turtle, can be used to replenish qi and xue. To treat yang deficiency, sweet and warm food, such as round-grained nonglutinous rice, millet, Chinese yam, soybean, and big dates, can be used to nourish yang.

Exercise Therapies: Tai Chi and Qigong The meditation exercises tai chi (太极拳) and qigong (气功) are examples of other integral features of traditional Chinese healing that have been incorporated into health and fitness programs to complement modern medicine. Tai chi is characterized by deliberately slow, continuous, circular, well-balanced, and rhythmic movements that were originally practiced as a martial art. Qigong is another characteristic exercise based on Traditional Chinese Medicine. Qigong contains elements of meditation, relaxation training, martial arts techniques, and breathing exercises that are intended to cultivate qi and transmit it to all the bodily organs. One branch of qigong is qigong massage, in which the practitioner combines massage techniques with awareness of the acupuncture channels and points. Today, many people worldwide regularly perform these exercises to promote health.

Modern Development and Scientific Research Drug Research Nearly 200 modern medicines have been developed either directly or indirectly from the 7300 species of plants used as medicines in China. For example, ephedrine, an alkaloid used in treating asthma, was first isolated from the Chinese herb ma huang. Today, scientists continue to identify compounds in Chinese herbal remedies that may be useful in the development of new therapeutic agents applicable in Western medicine. For example, an alkaloid called huperzine A was isolated from the moss Huperzia serrata, which is widely used in China to make the herbal medicine qian ceng ta. Studies suggest that this agent may compare favorably with manufactured anticholinesterase drugs such as donepezil, which are used to treat Alzheimer disease.

Genetics Research The yin yang principle can be applied to genetically linked diseases such as inherited breast cancer and its associated genes BRCA1 and BRCA2. According to the principle of natural law, there is an opposite energy to the genes that produce the disease. For example, if either of these genes is activated, somewhere in another part of the genetic code, there also exists a gene to suppress the action of the cancer gene. In the human body, there must be complementary programs running, one for developing the disease and one for healing it. Balancing these two programs, we might be able to control illness.

Safety Certain Chinese herbal medicines involve a risk of allergic reaction and in rare cases involve a risk of poisoning. Cases of acute and chronic poisoning due to treatment through ingested Chinese medicines have been reported in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, with a few deaths occurring each year. However, many adverse reactions are due to misuse or abuse of Chinese medicine. For example, the misuse of the dietary supplement ma huang (麻黄), known commonly in the West by its Latin name Ephedra, can lead to adverse events including gastrointestinal problems as well as sudden death from cardiomyopathy. Products adulterated with pharmaceuticals for weight loss or erectile dysfunction are one of the main concerns. This naming system sometimes can also cause safety issues. Many Chinese herbs have different names depending on location and time of production; in addition, herbs with vastly different medical properties have shared similar or even same names. For example, there was a report that mirabilite/ sodium sulfate decahydrate (芒硝) was misrecognized as sodium nitrite (牙硝), resulting in a poisoned victim. A concern is also contaminated herbal medicines with microorganisms and fungal toxins, including aflatoxin. Traditional herbal medicines are sometimes contaminated with toxic heavy metals, including lead, arsenic, mercury, and cadmium, which inflict serious health risks to consumers. The World Health Organization, the National Institutes of Health, and the American Medical Association have released statements on acupuncture, and these groups generally agree that acupuncture is relatively safe and further investigation is warranted. Several cases of pneumothorax, nerve damage, and infection have been reported as resulting from acupuncture treatments. These adverse events are extremely rare especially when compared to other medical interventions and were usually found to be due to practitioner negligence. Dizziness and bruising will sometimes result from acupuncture treatment. Some governments have decided that Chinese acupuncture and herbal treatments should only be administered by persons who have been educated to apply them safely.

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Mechanism of Action Historically, Traditional Chinese Medicine is a qualitative science which tends to explain health phenomenon based on traditional philosophy. Traditional Chinese Medicine concepts, such as qi and yin yang, are used to describe specific biological processes but are difficult to translate into modern scientific terms. Most doctors of Western medicine would understand that qigong preserves health by encouraging relaxation and movement, that acupuncture relieves pain by stimulating the production of neurotransmitters, or that Chinese herbal medicines may contain powerful biochemical agents; however, qi or yin yang might be difficult for doctors to understand. Thus, the largest barriers to describing the mechanisms of Traditional Chinese Medicine in scientific terms are the differences of language and lack of research. Future research should aim at explaining possible scientific mechanisms behind these Traditional Chinese Medicine concepts.

Further Reading Duan, Y., 2001. Yi Guwen 医古文 (Medical Classical Chinese). B: Renmin Weisheng Chubanshe. Revised and Expanded Version of a Classic Textbook. Guo, A., 1981. Huangdi Neijing Su Wen Jiaozhu Yuyi 黄帝内经素问校注语译 (Critical Edition of the Inner Canon of the Yellow Emperor, Basic Questions, with Vernacular Translation). Tianjin Kexue Jishu Chubanshe. Li, L., Guo, H., 1990. Zhongguo Chuantong Wenhua Yu Yixue 中国传统文 化与医学 (Chinese Traditional Culture and Medicine). Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe. Liu, Z.C., 2007. Basic Theories of Traditional Chinese Medicine. Higher Education Press. Ma, B., 1994. Zhongguo Yixue Wenhua Shi 中国医学文化史 (A History of Medicine in Chinese Culture). Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe. Qiu, P., 2002. Zhongguo Yiji Dacidian 中国医籍大辞典 (Unabridged Dictionary of Chinese Medical Books). Shanghai Kexue Jishu Chubanshe. Shi, X., 1998. Han Ying Shuang Jie Zhenjiu Dacidian 汉英双解针 灸大辞典 ("A Chinese-English Dictionary of Acupuncture and Moxibustion"). Huaxia Chubanshe. Sun, J., 1984-88-. Zhongguo Yi Ji Ti Yao 中国医籍提要 (Abstracts of Chinese Medical Books). Jilin Renmin Chubanshe, Changchun. Wang, B., 1997. The Yellow Emperor’s Cannon Internal Medicine. Chinese Press of Science and Technology. Xu, H., Chen, K., 2008. Integrative medicine: the experience from China. J. Altern. Complement. Med. 14 (1), 3–7. Zhang, F., 2012. Integrative medicine: the experience from China. Evaluation of impact on health-related quality of life and cost effectiveness of Traditional Chinese Medicine: a systematic review of randomized clinical trials. J. Altern. Complementary Med. 1108–1120. Zhang, X.L., Wu, F., 2005. Regimen in traditional Chinese medicine. J. Altern. Complement. Med. 14 (1), 3–7 (China Press of Traditional Chinese Medicine). Zhou, J., Xie, G., Yan, X., 2001. Encyclopedia of Traditional Chinese Medicines: Molecular Structures, Pharmacological Activities, Natural Sources and Applications, 6 volumes. Verlag Berlin Heidelberg: Springer. Zou, P., 2016. Traditional Chinese medicine, food therapy, and hypertension control: a narrative review of Chinese literature. Am. J. Chin. Med. 44 (8), 1579–1594.

Relevant Websites Chinese Medicine Chronology http://www.shen-nong.com/eng/history/chronology.html. Shijia (中医世家) http://www.zysj.com.cn/index.html. China Association of Chinese Medicine (中华中医学会). China Association of Chinese Medicine (中华中医学会) http://www.cacm.org.cn/zhzyyxh/index.shtml. American Association of Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine http://www.aaaomonline.org. Chinese Medical Institute and Register http://www.cmir.org.uk. National Certification Commission for Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine http://www.nccaom.org. The Journal of Chinese Medicine http://www.jcm.co.uk. The American Journal of Chinese Medicine https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/ajcm. Traditional Chinese Medicine news, information, education, research and discussion http://www.acupuncture.com.au.

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Choice Modeling Jean-Claude Thill, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, United States © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 2, pp 78–83, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd., with revisions made by the Editor.

Glossary Choice set A set of discrete choice alternatives available to an individual. Markov process A mathematical framework of discrete time stochastic process characterized by a set of states. Maximum likelihood A statistical method to make inferences about utility parameters from a dataset. Random utility Utility or satisfaction of a choice alternative, comprising a deterministic component (systematic utility) and a random term. Rational behavior A consistent and deliberate decision process driven by the maximization of an individual’s utility. Systematic utility The deterministic portion of the utility of an alternative.

A conventional premise of microeconomic theory is that demand and supply are traded off through continuous adjustments in quantities. Individual demand is determined by calculus methods that maximize consumer utility (i.e., satisfaction), subject to constraints. By the 1970s, it had become clear from the pioneering work undertaken in transportation, marketing, and economics that many consumer decisions do not conform to this postulate of marginalist consumer theory. Individual decisions actually often involve a finite number of options that are indivisible, mutually exclusive, and collectively exhaustive. The determination of a 4-year college one is to attend upon high school graduation; the car make to buy; whether to buy a car, lease it, or neither; the commitment to marry; and the choice of a travel mode for one’s daily commute are all examples of discrete choices that cannot be comprehended through the lens of conventional decision theory. Choice modeling is the theory of individual decisions among discrete alternatives and its empirical derivatives in the form of measurement procedures and estimation methods. Although choice models are commonly based on the postulate of rational behavior (a normative stance), they purport to be a faithful description of the expected behavior of individuals. From rather narrow beginnings rooted in the econometrics of qualitative response variables and in the mathematical psychology of rational behaviors, choice modeling first addressed simple choice situations (for instance, “where shall I do my grocery shopping this week?”), but quickly gained in robustness to cope with complex, multilevel systems of intertwined and constrained decisions. Choice models continue to contribute to the social science understanding of how human and social systems take shape from the coalescence of decisions of multiple actors (consumers and producers) based on utilitarian principles. They are also valued as operational models in various areas of applied spatial sciences, such as retail analysis, transportation, business-site selection, housing, and real estate. Human geographers mistakenly refer to spatial interaction models as choice models on occasions. If indeed equivalence has been established between certain forms of choice models, such as the multinomial logit model (MNL) presented hereunder, and entropy-maximizing models of spatial interaction, the analogy is nevertheless in the algebraic form of the two models and not in the implied behaviors. Spatial interaction modeling is the subject of another article.

Theoretical Foundations A simple choice problem can be conceptualized as the selection of one alternative from a predefined set of available discrete choice alternatives that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, which is also known as the choice set. In keeping with the view on consumer economics that utility cannot be derived from commodities per se, but from their objectively measurable characteristics, the utility of each alternative is evaluated on the basis of their intrinsic attributes as well as on the personal characteristics of the decision maker. The latter dependency accounts for interpersonal differences in the subjective perception and evaluation of alternative attributes. Following Thurstone’s random utility theory, it is typically posited that, while individuals deterministically choose the alternative with the greatest utility, the utility of an alternative cannot possibly be known with full certainty. Unobserved preference factors and measurement errors and approximations account for the random component of utility. Hence, the model cannot forecast what choice is made, but it can estimate the likelihood that a given option in the choice set be selected. The actual calculation of choice probabilities is contingent upon the specification of the error term (random utility) of the model. In early studies on discrete choice modeling, it was assumed for convenience sake that errors are independently and

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identically distributed as a double-exponential function. Choice probabilities then take an elegant closed form known as the MNL. More formally, if n denotes an individual and i is an alternative, the probability that individual n chooses i has the form: eb0 Xin Pn ðiÞ ¼ P i b0 X j jn je

(1)

where b is a vector of parameters to estimate empirically and X is the vector of measurable characteristics of the alternatives that are variables in the systematic utility. For empirical reasons, the MNL is attractive and has become the workhorse of choice modeling due to its tractability and the relative ease with which its parameters can be estimated. Models based on other distributional assumptions of errors remain, to this day, less tractable. Assuming that errors are normally distributed, the so-called probit model has grown quite in popularity in recent years. One of the noteworthy properties of the MNL that stems from the assumed distribution of errors is that it satisfies Luce’s choice axiom and, therefore, exhibits independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This entails that the ratio of choice probabilities of any two alternatives depends only on their systematic utility components and is totally unaffected by other alternatives that may be available to the decision maker. According to the choice axiom, no allowance whatsoever is made for different degrees of substitution or complementarity among choice alternatives. Consequently, any new alternative entering the choice set draws market share equally from each alternative already in the choice set. Whether the IIA property holds in the practice of specific decision situations has been the subject of considerable debate. If it does not hold, MNL predictions are biased and can be behaviorally counterintuitive. A famous illustration of this is Debreu’s red bus/blue bus paradox whereby the introduction of a new bus service (red bus) competing against an existing bus service and private automobile would be forecasted by an MNL model to grant one-third market share to each transport alternative, while intuition dictates that car would maintain a 50% market share and the balance would be split equally between the two bus services. This discovery has led to alternative approaches to modeling discrete choices that impose less restriction on structures of substitution between alternatives.

Empirical Validation and Statistical Estimation The implementation of discrete choice theory to real-world decision situations involves significant measurement and statistical estimation issues. From the onset, two broad approaches have prevailed. In discrete choice models sensu stricto, actual choices observed by survey and independent variables entering the utility function are either objective measures or subjective evaluations of the various choice alternatives of a prespecified choice set. The parameters of the utility function and the choice probabilities are estimated through data-fitting procedures, usually a maximum likelihood method, so as to reveal preferences through calibration on overt behavior. This perspective has been very popular in transportation, housing, shopping, and other locational studies. Alternatively, decompositional multiattribute preference models are estimated on the basis of an individual’s stated preference ordering for a set of hypothetical choice alternatives. Choice set alternatives are composed according to principles of experimental design so as to insure statistical representativeness. Decompositional preference models first estimate the utility function of each individual on the separate contributions of each attribute level (using least-squares regression analysis, analysis of variance, or linear programming), and apply a choice model to the resulting preference structure to simulate a choice outcome. Each of the two approaches has different advantages and disadvantages. Because decompositional preference models are based on principles of experimental design, it is recognized that they can better account for the interpersonal heterogeneity in preferences. They can also handle choice alternatives that are beyond the realm of observation because they do not currently exist. Therefore they are in a unique position to predict the success of new choice options, such as new forms of public transportation services, new electric automobile technologies, new supermarket concepts, or new concepts of housing developments, such as transit-oriented developments and mixed-use complexes as responses to the challenges of greater urban sustainability. It is undeniable, however, that the experimental nature of data collection in decompositional models renders them more complex, while the validity of their prediction of actual choices may be inferior to that of discrete choice models sensu stricto. Estimation procedures for combining revealed and stated preference data, along with psychometric data (i.e., attitudes and perceptions), have been available since the early 1990s and have been instrumental in enhancing the behavioral representation of the choice process.

Modeling Complex Choices Admittedly, the choice model embodied by Eq. (1) raises a number of issues regarding its behavioral underpinnings and its ability to capture more than just the simplest choice decisions made by human beings. These issues have driven the agenda of research on choice modeling for the past three decades.

Choice Set Formation and the Decision Process The model of Eq. (1) suggests that the choice set is known beforehand and independently of the choice process. In fact, the choice set of any single decision maker is a subset of the universe of all alternatives that are both feasible to the decision maker (living in the White House belongs to the realm of fiction for all practical purposes) and known at the time a decision is made (hence the power of

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advertising to raise people’s awareness). Accordingly, individual behavior can be framed as a two-step process wherein a choice set is specified first, and a selection among available alternatives is then made. Using the universal choice set may be a poor surrogate for the decision maker’s choice set because it fails to account for constraints precluding certain alternatives, such as their physical availability (e.g., absence of passenger train service between many US cities), time availability (e.g., a grocery store that is too remote for biweekly food purchases), affordability, and others. When a decision maker has no or limited knowledge of some perfectly feasible alternatives, these alternatives are in effect removed from one’s choice set. Hence, proceeding with a model based on the universal choice set is bound to bias estimation results (a nonzero probability is falsely assigned to alternatives outside the choice set) and to impute to the nonselection of this alternative to individual preferences and free will instead of unawareness and infeasibility. Given these considerations and for pragmatic reasons of data availability and computational power, reduced choice sets are employed instead of universal choice sets in many decision situations of relevance to human geography. Ad hoc narrowing, sampling, and aggregation strategies are routinely implemented with reasonable success as far as the selection among geographically defined alternatives is concerned. Ad hoc narrowing of the choice set may be based on some distance cutoff or some other independent and well-informed knowledge of behavioral decisions. By reducing the choice set to a manageable number of alternatives, these strategies are also instrumental in enabling the modeling of spatial choices, which routinely involve a very large number of possible alternatives (hundreds of restaurants in a midto large-size metropolitan area, tens of thousands of housing units for lease or for sale, etc.). Having decision makers specify their own choice sets is a very controversial matter due to the inaccuracy of the information in the light of the fact that the choice set is not explicitly kept in memory by the decision maker. A somewhat less arbitrary and more systematic approach to the two-stage choice-problem process consists in the implicit approximation of the decision maker’s choice set. This approximation proceeds by assigning a weight to each alternative to reflect its degree or likelihood of membership to the decision maker’s choice set according to some preset rules such as geographic proximity or accessibility. Finally, the choice set can be explicitly determined, in which case the choice process represented by Eq. (1) is replaced by Pn ðiÞ ¼

M X

Pn ðijCÞPn ðCÞ; cC

where i ˛ C

(2)

C¼1

Here, the second term models a given choice set C from the universal choice set M as a function of personal and household characteristics of the decision maker (including one’s locational profile) and of characteristics of the alternatives in choice set C; the first term involves the evaluation of alternative i conditional on choice set C. This framework has been successfully implemented in various spatial-choice contexts, including the choice of shopping destinations.

Substitution Among Alternatives Because of its property of independence of IIAs, the MNL (Eq. 1) imposes that all alternatives be uniformly substitutable (equal cross-elasticities). The red bus/blue bus paradox illustrates the senselessness of this assumption in many decision situations. This is proven to be particularly the case with spatial decision-making because choice alternatives exhibit well-defined spatial structures resulting from adjustments to the preference of decision makers for minimizing effort in travel and search activities and from adjustments to the decision maker’s processing of information on spatial alternatives into clusters based on geography. In other words, choice alternatives that are located nearby are closer substitutes than distant alternatives. A variety of choice modeling approaches exists that afford a richer pattern of substitution among alternatives. First, the handful of choice models mentioned in the previous section that implicitly or explicitly capture the extent of the decision maker’s choice set are not affected by the IIA property. The same can be said of the multinomial probit model; this model encapsulates the degree of substitution between pairs of alternatives through a variance–covariance matrix estimated on empirical choice data. In certain choice situations, patterns of substitution among alternatives can be figured out without great difficulty on the basis of existing cognitive and behavioral theories and built into the choice model. The nested multinomial logit model (NMNL) assumes that alternatives can be sorted hierarchically according to their degree of substitutability. A classical case is that of the housing choice problem. Fig. 1 illustrates such a problem, where housing units are clumped into types (single family vs. apartments) in first instance because of the low level of substitutability between housing types. Then, within each type, differentiation based on the neighborhood emerges (N1 through N3), and finally each unit of each type in each neighborhood is evaluated on its own merit (U1 and so on). The NMNL exhibits the IIA property for choice alternatives belonging to the same cluster (or nest). This model is a member of a broader class of choice models that also allow for cross-elasticities between alternatives. The primary drawback of the NMNL is that the particular structure of substitutability among alternatives must be defined by the analyst beforehand, while the hierarchical order is sometimes unclear or arbitrary. It should be noted that the hierarchical structure that underpins the NMNL creates a form of conditionality of choice subsets and by the same token solves the problem of the choice set definition.

Relationships Among Choices It is not unusual at all for decisions to be interrelated. An individual’s choice of housing location is intertwined with the location of the place of work. These choices in turn are influenced by a number of the individual’s nonspatial decisions, such as the decision

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Single family house

N1

N2

Apartment/ condominium

N3

N1

N2

N3

U1 U2 U3 U4 U1 U2 U3 U4 U1 U2 U3 U4 U1 U2 U3 U4 U1 U2 U3 U4 U1 U2 U3 U4

Figure 1

Nested structure of housing choice alternatives.

to marry, raise a family, and adopt a certain lifestyle. Individual decisions may also need to be coordinated within the framework of a household. Finally, other decisions of more limited scope may be affected: decision to buy a car or not, choice of the commute travel mode, choice of a commuting route, etc. The multiple facets of travel decisions have also been recognized as an area where an integrated modeling approach is beneficial. Simple origin–destination trips are subsumed by trip chaining and household daily activity patterns, where activity scheduling, stop frequency, timing and location, routing, and modal choices come together. Similarly, choices made by private business or government entities are seldom the results of isolated decisions. The integration of complex sets of decisions within the framework of random utility theory has followed three main lines of research. In the first and simplest, complex decisions are modeled jointly, in a single step. The decision maker is seen as selecting from a super choice set formed of the Cartesian product of choice sets defined on each elemental choice dimension. For instance, the integration of residential location choice (three neighborhoods from which to choose) and of the choice of a commute travel mode (three modes available) creates a choice set made of nine composite housing location/travel mode options. As a variant of this approach, trip-chaining behavior can be modeled as a Markov process, with probabilities of transition between states rendered by a joint choice model. Evidently, the joint modeling approach may not be well suited to the complexity of the multidimensional decisions due to the IIA property. With a decomposition of the choice set into hierarchical groups, a nested choice model captures the complexity through a series of simple choice models conditioning decisions along dimension to choices modeled at earlier stages. Finally, for decision situations where some choices are on a continuous scale (e.g., weekly commute time), mixed continuous/discrete choice models can be estimated.

Other Decision Rules Random utility choice models make specific assumptions on the internal mechanisms used by decision makers to process information and derive a choice. The customary linear utility function supposes trade-offs (or compensatory offsets) among attributes of choice alternatives, on the basis of which a deterministic decision is made that maximizes utility. In this view, poor performance of an alternative on one choice criterion can be compensated by a good performance on one or more other criteria. Various decision rules that do not espouse the principle of full compensation between attributes have been suggested. Some rules may require that an alternative must exceed specific values of each attribute to be chosen (e.g., a house should have a sale price under $300,000 and be no more than one mile away from work). Alternatives that fail to reach a certain attribute level are rejected as unacceptable, even if they outperform other alternatives on some other attribute. Some other rule systems are less stringent and consider an alternative as worthwhile if it meets a preset threshold on one attribute only, regardless of its performance on others (a house should have a sale price under $300,000 or be less than one mile away from work). Another popular rule system is the elimination by aspect. This rule proceeds in a stepwise fashion, considering each attribute in turn from the attribute deemed the most important to the least important. The selection process eliminates all alternatives that do not satisfy a threshold defined on the selected attribute and continues until a single alternative remains. Interestingly, these alternative decision rules can also serve as methods for defining choice sets. Attribute trade-offs are not the only property that sets apart rule-based and random utility models. While the latter are parametric models of choice behavior, the former emphasize the algorithmic methods of information retrieval, representation, processing, and fusion that lead to a unique choice decision. Not surprisingly, diverse constructs of data mining and knowledge discovery have

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Motivations Goals Perceptions Attitudes

Context: personal, social, cultural, and spatial constraints and norms

Experiences and existing knowledge

Preferences

Evaluation of alternatives and choice

Figure 2

Conceptual framework of decision-making process.

become prominent in implementing noncompensatory choice models, such as decision trees and related methodologies. With decision trees, sequential sets of conditions on attributes are applied so as to identify the choice strategies that lead to alternatives being selected. Complex learning algorithms of rule induction developed in artificial intelligence have dramatically expanded the horizon of possibilities in modeling choices from a process-oriented perspective. Some hybrid semicompensatory rule-based systems even have the flexibility of blending random utility maximization with decision thresholds. Once calibrated on empirical choice data, rule-based systems can be built into computational process models that simulate real-world choice behavior over the full range of spatiotemporal scales.

Decision-Making and Modeling Choices While this may not patently transpire from the discussion held thus far in this article, choices are the results of a decision-making process involving multiple sets of considerations. Behavioral geographers and environmental psychologists have worked at crafting the conceptual framework that integrates the actual act of selecting an alternative with the mental and cognitive processes that operate under the influence and constraint of the ambient social and physical environment of the decision maker. Fig. 2 schematically represents such structure. Choice models have traditionally addressed the relationship between individual preferences on the one hand, and the evaluation of alternatives and the resulting choice of an alternative on the other, at the exclusion of all other considerations reported in the schematic framework. To this day, the theory of choice modeling still has a limited ability to incorporate these other considerations and, when it does, it is in a rather piecemeal fashion. The state-of-the-art in choice modeling can positively be linked to the so-called hybrid choice models that integrate multiple models of choice under constraints and models of cognitive and psychological factors in a recursive structure. Owing to their flexibility and structural similarities to the framework depicted in Fig. 2, simulators and computationally intensive numerical procedures (e.g., artificial neural networks) can be expected to play a significant role in tomorrow’s choice modeling.

See Also: Behavioral Geography; Spatial Interaction Models; Time Geographic Analysis.

Further Reading Ben-Akiva, M.E., Lerman, S.R., Lerman, S.R., 1985. Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application to Travel Demand, vol. 9. MIT press. Ben-Akiva, M., Bradley, M., Morikawa, T., Benjamin, J., Novak, T., Oppewal, H., Rao, V., 1994. Combining revealed and stated preferences data. Mark. Lett. 5 (4), 335–349. Bhat, C.R., 2000. Flexible model structures for discrete choice analysis. In: Hensher, D.A., Button, K.J. (Eds.), Handbook of Transport Modelling. Pergamon Press, Oxford. Domencich, T.A., McFadden, D., 1975. Urban Travel Demand-a Behavioral Analysis. North-Holland Publishing Co. Golledge, R.G., 1997. Spatial Behavior: A Geographic Perspective. Guilford Press, New York. Hensher, D.A., Johnson, L.W., 2018. Applied Discrete-choice Modelling. Routledge. Louviere, J.J., Hensher, D.A., Swait, J.D., 2000. Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and Applications. Cambridge university press. Luce, R.D., 1977. The choice axiom after twenty years. J. Math. Psychol. 15 (3), 215–233. Manski, C.F., 1977. The structure of random utility models. Theory Decis. 8 (3), 229–254. McFadden, D., 1973. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In: Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. Academic Press, New York, pp. 105–142.

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McFadden, D., 1978. Modeling the choice of residential location. Transp. Res. Rec. 673, 72–77. Pitfield, D.E., 1984. Discrete Choice Models in Regional Science. Pion, London. Recker, W.W., Kostyniuk, L.P., 1978. Factors influencing destination choice for the urban grocery shopping trip. Transportation 7 (1), 19–33. Timmermans, H., Golledge, R.G., 1990. Applications of behavioural research on spatial problems II: preference and choice. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 14 (3), 311–354.

Relevant Website http://www.jocm.org.uk. Journal of Choice Modelling (a new open-access journal covering theory and practice in the field of choice modelling).

Chronic Disease E Shantz and Susan J Elliott, Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by K. Robinson, S. J. Elliott, volume 2, pp 92–96, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Comprehensive intervention It focuses on multiple risk factors and approaches, addressing multiple segments of society, implemented in multiple settings/environments. Determinants of health The range of personal, social, economic, and environmental factors that determine the health status of individuals or populations. Epidemiology The study of the health of populations. Health promotion The process of enabling individuals and communities to increase control over the determinants of health and hence improve health status. Morbidity Illness. Mortality Death. Population health approach This approach, through a focus on the broad range of health determinants, aims to improve the health of entire population (as opposed to individuals) and to reduce health inequities among population groups. Prevention It includes measures to prevent the occurrence of disease (primary prevention), as well as arrest its progress (secondary prevention) and reduce its consequences (tertiary prevention).

Chronic diseases are ongoing/recurring, not caused by infection, or passed on by contact. They generally cannot be prevented by vaccines, do not resolve spontaneously, and although they can be treated, are rarely cured by medication or other medical procedures. Chronic diseases are often caused by a combination of health-damaging behaviors (smoking, drinking, poor nutrition, and physical inactivity) and exposure to socioenvironmental conditions (stressful living circumstances, poverty, and automobilefocused urban centers) over time. The World Health Organization (WHO) identifies four main types of chronic diseasesdcardiovascular disease (CVD; primarily heart disease and stroke), cancer, chronic respiratory diseases, and diabetesdresponsible for the majority of related deaths; however, mental disorders, vision and hearing impairment, oral diseases, bone and joint disorders, and genetic disorders are also noted as chronic diseases that account for a substantial portion of the global burden of disease. Inflammatory disorders such as allergic and autoimmune diseases can also be considered chronic diseases and appear to be a growing contributor to this burden.

The Global Burden Chronic diseases are the largest cause of mortality in the world, accounting for more than 70% of the world’s deaths. The greatest contributor to this burden of illness is CVD, followed by cancer, chronic lung diseases, dementia, and diabetes. The picture of health has not always been this way. Many countries in the developed world have “achieved” what is known as “the epidemiologic transition.” That is, the health status and disease profile of human societies have historically been inextricably linked to their level of economic development and social organization; when we lived as hunter gatherers, we had very high birth rates as well as high death rates. Major causes of death were starvation, warfare, interactions with fierce animals, high rates of maternal and child mortality, as well as frequent epidemics of infectious diseases and famines. Healthcare systems at this time represented indigenous systems, traditional healers, and herbal medicines. As we organized ourselves into agrarian societies, we had better access to food and therefore birth and death rates began to fall near the end of this period. High rates of fertility continued given persistent high rates of infant mortality and the need for farm labor, but both of these, as we saw, fell tremendously during the Industrial Revolution. Deaths from infectious diseases decreased dramatically, standards of living increased accordingly, and families therefore gave birth to fewer children. Farming practices became mechanized, more food was being produced for fewer people, and all in all people lived longer and healthier lives. While there is some suspicion that the primary reason for this shift was the development of, and increased access to, a modernizing healthcare system, others disagree. A historical epidemiologist named Thomas McKeown explored over 300 years of data and concluded that in fact, the primary contributors to enhanced health status were sanitation, improved nutrition, and family planning. Stage 4 in the epidemiologic transition represents our current state, where chronic diseases take the lead with respect to mortality and morbidity. The literature often refers to these as “diseases of affluence” given that as a human society, the higher our standard of living and the more progressive our economic development, the more likely

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we are to die of a chronic (as opposed to infectious) disease. Now, we see deaths overtaking births in many parts of the world. The explanation for this is that women are more educated, take a full role in the workforce, and are choosing to have fewer children. Fertility is, therefore, at below replacement levels (e.g., see the population trends in Japan, Greece, and Germany). As a result, some countries have to rely heavily on immigration to fuel their economies. As we live longer, and make more money, rates of chronic diseases increase, due to the role of lifestyle (smoking, drinking, diet, and lack of physical activity) and environmental (exposure to air pollution, toxic chemicals, stress) factors. The final stage of the epidemiologic transition predicts effective chronic disease management that would see a substantial reduction in mortality from chronic disease, but the true pattern of stage 5 is yet to be determined. Regardless, the global prevalence of chronic diseases continues to increase, with the majority occurring in lower income countries. Chronic diseases have not simply displaced acute infectious diseases as the major cause of death in these countries, but joined them. As a result, such countries now experience a double burden of disease; a polarized distribution of ill health, if you will, that puts a tremendous strain on healthcare systems and complicates any policy response. For example, as the prevalence of chronic diseases such as diabetes have risen significantly in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in recent decades, rates of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis (Tb) have remained high. Furthermore, evidence suggests a synergistic relationship between the two, where chronic diseases increase morbidity and mortality from Tb and vice versa. In other regions of the Global South, such as subSaharan Africa, allergic diseases are now emerging as a public health risk. Despite this increasing burden of disease, global spending per death per person for communicable diseases still far outweighs that for noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), underscoring the need for an integrated approach to prevention.

Determinants of Chronic Disease Although chronic diseases are among the most common and costly health problems in the world, they are also among the most preventable. A small set of risk factors explains the majority of chronic disease occurrence at all ages and for both sexes. Four of the most prominent chronic diseasesdCVDs, cancer, chronic lung disease, and diabetesdshare common and preventable biological risk factors, specifically high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, and obesity/overweight (Fig. 1). These intermediate, clinical risk factors are related to three modifiable behavioral risk factorsdunhealthy diet, physical inactivity, and tobacco usedas well Main chronic diseases Cardiovascular disease Cancer Chronic respiratory disease Diabetes

Intermediate clinical risk factors Raised blood pressure Raised blood glucose Abnormal blood lipids Overweight/obesity

Modifiable risk factors Unhealthy diet Physical inactivity Tobacco use Nonmodifiable factors Age Heredity

Underlying conditions Socioeconomic Cultural Political Environmental Figure 1

The determinants of chronic disease.

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as nonmodifiable risk factors (age and heredity). Modifiable risks are not solely determined by individual lifestyle choices, but are rather shaped by underlying socioeconomic and environmental conditions. The underlying determinants of chronic diseases reflect larger societal and institutional forces driving social, economic, and cultural change such as globalization, urbanization, population aging, and policy structures. A range of other factors contributes to a much smaller proportion of chronic disease, such as excessive alcohol use and infectious agents (related to cervical and liver cancers). Physical environmental factors (such as air pollution) can cause chronic respiratory diseases. Finally, genetics and psychosocial factors (such as stress) also play a role, although their interaction with other determinants is more complex. Greater exposure to physical risks, higher levels of psychosocial stress, and lack of access to healthcare make those living in poverty even more vulnerable to chronic disease; further, the experience of chronic illness can also push families into poverty. Investigation of chronic disease epidemiology from a life course perspective has demonstrated the critical role of conditions in particular life stages in determining chronic disease. In particular, prenatal (maternal health, nutrient intake, and exposure to harm) and early childhood conditions (diet and socioeconomic conditions) are associated with rates of chronic disease in adulthood. An emerging area of research investigating the link between socioenvironmental factors and health is epigenetics. Through epigenetic mechanisms, our genes respond directly to our environments by changing their expression. Through altering subsequent biological processes, it is thought that epigenetic changes can impact health and may play a role in the development of chronic diseases over time and across generations.

Geographies of Chronic Disease Geographers have contributed to our understanding of chronic disease in a number of ways: distribution and diffusion through disease ecology approaches, the use of geographic information systems (GISs) and spatial analysis, contributing to our understanding of determinants, highlighting the inequalities in mortality and morbidity, contributing to our understanding of the impacts of chronic disease on individuals, as well as more recently contributing to our understanding of prevention. Disease ecology is a long-standing branch of medical geography that focuses on the distribution and diffusion of disease. Simply mapping the incidence of mortality and morbidity from chronic diseasedat various spatial scales (local, regional, national, and international)dcan provide clues as to its etiology and treatment. In a sense, therefore, these types of investigations are primarily hypothesis generating. When we pair incidence data with potential determinants, we can start to test whether or not hypotheses have some credibility. For example, we can map data on the hardness of water along with incidence of mortality and morbidity from CVD to assess whether or not these two things are associated in space. Or, we can map air pollution data along with CVD data to assess the same (potential) association. The introduction of sophisticated GISs and spatial analytic techniques allows us to explore these relationships even further. Take, for example, the simple mapping of CVD incidence data. We can map rates for, say, Canada and the United States. From such maps we can develop a powerful visual display of where rates are high and where they are low. While interesting enough, the application of spatial analytic techniques such as local indicators of spatial analysis (LISA) allows us to create a simple coefficient that tells us whether or not the patterns we see in the map are occurring due to some systematic distribution or simply because of chance. This process of identifying “hot spots” of disease then focuses researchers and policymakers on areas deserving of greater attention. Geographers have also contributed substantially to our understanding of the determinants of chronic diseases and their associated risk factors. The importance of space and place underlies much of this work. For example, geographers have contributed to our understanding of the different pattern and intensity of risk factors in remote northern communities in Canada. Geographers have also undertaken substantial research on the role of the built environment as a determinant of chronic diseases and their related risk factors. Using GIS to objectively measure features of the built environment, for example, we can see the relationship between the built environment and physical activity, a major risk factor for overweight and obesity, CVD, diabetes, and some cancers. Some geographers have explored the assessment of a “walkability” index using GIS in residential neighborhoods, where “walkability” can be defined as the extent to which characteristics of the built environment and land use may or may not be conducive to residents in the area who walk for exercise, recreation, or leisure in order to access amenities or travel to work. Multilevel models have increased the capacity of geographers to explore not only the spatial distributions of (chronic) disease, but also their determinants at the individual and ecological levels. For example, health geographers have always been curiousdin terms of the determinants of disease more generallydabout the relative contributions of the characteristics of the individual (e.g., sex, age, and income) versus the characteristics of the neighborhood in which the individual lives (e.g., average income, average education, and average dwelling value). With respect to inequalities in the burden of chronic disease, geographers have focused on a range of characteristics: socioeconomic status in general (income, in particular), race, ethnicity, education, and geographic location. For example, researchers have found a distinct social gradient in the incidence of chronic disease by socioeconomic status, indicating a stepped gradient in incidence with decreasing status. Geographers have also deconstructed this further to indicate that while income is a major determinant of chronic disease inequality in the United States, education plays a greater role in the Canadian context. This may be due to the lack of universal health insurance in the United States. Rates of chronic disease, and their associated risk factors, are also higher among certain racial and ethnic groups. For example, many African Americans suffer disproportionately from hypertension, diabetes, and dyslipidemia (i.e., an abnormality related to fats or lipids in the blood), all of which are significant risk factors for CVD and some

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cancers. The primary factors contributing to this pattern could include chronic overweight and obesity, high salt intake, lack of adequate follow-up, inadequate access to healthcare services, cost of treatment, etc. Further, geographic variation in mortality from chronic disease in African Americans has been the focus of several research studies, and substantial variation has been found. Similar results stem from studies of geographic variations in chronic disease rates among women, and particularly minority (i.e., African American and Hispanic) women. While much of the above research has employed quantitative methodologies, the use of alternative epistemologies by human geographers to explore the experiences of individuals diagnosed with a chronic disease has also contributed substantially to our understanding. These researchers focus on the meaning of chronic illness and the disruptions to life because of its onset. Major findings indicate a shrinking of geographical worlds as chronic illnesses progress and individuals find that the social and economic roles that they play(ed) as well as the spaces they inhabit(ed) begin to erode as working life and many aspects of social lives come slowly to an end as the chronic disease progresses. Geographers have recently been embracing inter-, multi-, or transdisciplinary approaches to understanding the complex causality of chronic diseases. A body of research has emerged that investigates how environmental exposures over time (termed the “exposome”) interface with biological pathways that cause disease. A specific role for geographers in this area of study is to understand how these concepts relate to space and place as well as broader systems of health inequities. Finally, health geographers have moved into the area of chronic disease prevention and health promotion. Much of this work has focused on the capacity-building efforts of both communities and public health systems in the context of chronic disease prevention. Health promotion specialists are realizing the importance of the environment (social, physical, and cultural) in the prevention of chronic disease and have begun to shift the emphasis from individual lifestyle-type promotion activities (e.g., encouraging individuals to quit smoking) to community-based interventions and policies (e.g., bylaws around the use of and advertising for tobacco).

Response to the Burden Although historically neglected in international health and development work, there have been increasing calls to action concerning the global burden of chronic diseases. Although it was a commonly held notion that chronic diseases mainly affect high-income countries, the majority of global deaths due to chronic disease over the past decade have taken place in LMICs. Chronic diseases hinder economic growth in all counties, but prevention efforts are projected to be especially important in emerging-economic countries experiencing rapid economic growth (e.g., China and India) as well as the lowest-income countries. In 2013, the WHO released a Global Action Plan for the prevention and control of NCDs, which outlines a coordinated policy plan to reduce premature mortality from chronic diseases by 25% before 2020.

Integrated Approach to Chronic Disease Prevention A significant percentage of deaths from cancer, heart disease, and diabetes could be reduced or delayed through primary prevention. Based on the commonality of risk factors and approaches across many chronic diseases, there is a growing recognition of the strong rationale for pursuing an integrated approach to prevention efforts. Although an elevation of a single risk factor significantly predicts individual’s ill health, the societal burden from NCD results from the high prevalence of multiple risk factors related to general lifestyles. Community-based activities are required with an “integrated” public health approach targeted to the population, in addition to those at high risk by linking prevention actions of various components of the health system, including health promotion, public health services, primary care, and hospital care. Integrated chronic disease prevention aims at intervention that addresses the common risk factors by the health system and other existing community structures, rather than an outside prevention program. It denotes a comprehensive approach, which combines varying strategies for implementation. These include policy development, capacity building, partnerships, and informational support at all levels. Integration also calls for intersectoral action to implement health policies. Finally, an integrated approach centers on strategic consensus building among different stakeholders, such as governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector organizations, in an effort to increase cooperation and responsiveness to population needs.

Promotion of Health Equity Traditionally, chronic diseases were considered diseases of affluence. In recent decades, evidence indicates that this relation has been inverted, as the risk of developing NCDs has become higher at lower socioeconomic levels. Furthermore, in many cases, low socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with poorer disease outcomes. For example, in the chronic autoimmune disease systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), poor SES is correlated with higher disease activity and increased mortality. SLE also illustrates broader health disparities, as it disproportionately affects women, particularly women of color, who also experience significantly poorer health outcomes.

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Prevention strategies should consider underlying influences on health inequalities such as education, income distribution, public safety, housing, work environment, employment, social networks, and healthcare access, among others. It is important that strategies are aimed at reducing overall population risk while simultaneously reducing the gap among different population groups. In many instances, this requires a redesign and an evaluation of interventions of well-documented efficacy. It also entails the identification and special attention to key population groups, such as indigenous people, new urban migrants, and women.

Community-Based Interventions Community interventions are effective for NCD prevention, since the interventions intend to act not only on the individual and its nearby social nucleus, but additionally on the social environment that determines behaviors. These interventions imply the active participation of families and communities, pooling and sharing resources to ensure integrated preventions, the identification of leaders, organized groups and institutions, and the development of strategic coalitions and alliances.

Looking Forward In recent decades, scholars have questioned whether the world is close to achieving its demographic transition. Will infectious diseases be a thing of the past, with chronic diseases putting an increasing strain on the world’s economies and healthcare systems? Will the stage of effective chronic diseases management take root and bear fruit, altering the curve seen in the final stage of the epidemiologic transition? As the prevalence of chronic diseases continues to rise, particularly in LMICs battling a double burden of disease, managing the global burden of disease has proven to be a complex undertaking. Despite, or perhaps as a result of, effective prevention and control responses, allergic diseases are now emerging in the Global South while infectious diseases are reappearing in Western countries as vaccination rates falter. Evidence suggests that many countries are in different stages of epidemiologic transition. As we look forward, it remains clear that an integrated approach to management with a focus on promoting health equity is needed to address this global health challenge.

See Also: Epidemiological Transition; Health Geography; Health Inequalities; Medical Geography.

Further Reading Atiim, G., Elliott, S., Clarke, A.E., 2017. “If we are waiting for the numbers alone we will miss the point”: a qualitative study of the perceived rise of food allergy and associated risk factors in the Greater Accra Region, Ghana. Global Health Res. Policy 2, 20. Dyck, I., O’Brien, P., 2003. Thinking about environment: incorporating geographies of disability into rehabilitation science. Can. Geogr. 47 (4), 400–413. Kuh, D., Ben-Shlomo, Y., 2004. A Life Course Approach to Chronic Disease Epidemiology. Oxford University Press, London. Leslie, E., Coffee, N., Frank, L., Owen, N., Bauman, A., Hugo, G., 2007. Using geographic information systems to objectively assess relevant environmental attributes. Health Place 13, 111–122. McKeown, T., 1988. The Origins of Human Disease. Oxford University Press, London. Niessen, L.W., Mohan, D., Akuoku, J.K., Mirelman, A.J., Ahmed, S., Koehlmoos, T.P., Trujillo, A., Khan, J., Peters, D.H., 2018. Tackling socioeconomic inequalities and noncommunicable diseases in low-income and middle-income countries under the Sustainable Development agenda. Lancet 391 (10134), 19–25. Prior, L., Manley, D., Sabel, C.E., 2018. Biosocial health geography: new ‘exposomic’ geographies of health and place. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 1–22. World Health Organization, 2005. Preventing Chronic Diseases – a Vital Investment. WHO Global Report. WHO, Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_ report/en. World Health Organization, 2013. Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases 2013–2020. WHO, Geneva, Switzerland. https://www.who.int/ nmh/publications/ncd-action-plan/.

Relevant Websites http://cbpp-pcpe.phac-aspc.gc.ca. Canadian Best Practices Portal for Health Promotion and Chronic Disease Prevention is designed to develop and disseminate best practices information for chronic disease prevention and control interventions. http://www.cdc.gov. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (US), National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP). http://www.cdpac.ca. Chronic Disease Prevention Alliance of Canada (CDPAC) – a networked community of organizations and individuals who share a common vision for an integrated system of chronic disease prevention in Canada. http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca. Public Health Agency of Canada, Centre for Chronic Disease Prevention and Control. http://www.euro.who.int. World Health Organization-Countrywide Integrated Non-Communicable Disease Intervention (CINDI). http://www.who.int. World Health Organization, Department of Chronic Diseases and Health Promotion (CHP). https://www.knowledge-action-portal.com/. World Health Organization, Knowledge Action Portal – a community-driven platform to engage, inform, and connect a range of stakeholders in NCD prevention and control.

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Circular Economy Pauline Deutz, Department of Geography, Geology and Environment, University of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cradle-to-Cradle Related to industrial symbiosis, products are designed so that residues can serve as inputs to other product. The differentiation of technical and biological cycles originates in this concept. Degrowth Idea that sustainability can only be achieved by reducing levels of production and consumption from current levels in developed countries. This is to be achieved by promoting the sharing of goods, increasing product longevity, dematerialization, etc. that are also part of a circular economy. Ecological Modernization A progrowth approach to sustainability, which holds that with regulatory safeguards economic development and environmental protection are mutually supportive: technological innovations can produce environmental benefits; environmental regulations create economic opportunities. Material Flow Analysis Approach for measuring the amounts of different materials moving through and/or stored in a given system. Latter could be defined at a range of scales, e.g., local to global. The focus can be on individual materials, or requirements for particular product(s), or flows through particular places (e.g., urban scale). Sustainable Development Idea that economic development should also balance environmental and social priorities. The most common definition is: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising with the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Report from the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our common future (1987).

A circular economy is an economic system within which the maximum use is extracted from resources and minimum waste is generated for disposal. The term has taken off dramatically in recent years in the academic literature following the discussion and 2015 adoption of the circular economy policy in the European Union (EU). A similar effect occurred in China related to the Circular Economy Promotion Law, which came into effect there in 2009. At the global scale, circular economy approaches are argued (by the United Nations among others) to have the potential to contribute significantly to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Much research interest in the circular economy comes from business and systems engineering perspectives taking a normative approach. There is, however, a relatively small but significant thread of circular economy research from geographers and other social scientists. This work, which is notable for its more critical stance, is drawn on in the following discussion. The following sections examine the meaning of circular economy, some key concepts on which it draws, options for implementing the circular economy, policy approaches, and the potential for the circular economy to contribute to sustainable development.

Defining the Circular Economy At its core, the circular economy is about reforming the present predominantly linear economic model of the production and distribution of goods (which has become known as “take, make, and dispose”) into a system where disposal is minimized. In the linear economy, raw materials are extracted (or grown), processed, combined, sold, distributed, sold again, used, and finally disposed of. In addition to the disposal of products after use, there are many steps along the way at which resources are lost from the economy (e.g., residues from the extraction industry, industrial residues, packaging used at all stages). A circular economy needs to avoid all these potential losses of material, with embodied energy and labor, by finding alternative uses. This seemingly ambitious approach can be seen as an attempt to restore pre-, or early-, industrial, practices. That is, practices of recovery that were more common before mass production, the rise of consumerism, and widespread use of economical but hard to recover materials (such as plastics). These largely 20th Century developments in production and consumption brought about what has been called the throwaway society. Present enthusiasm for the circular economy is a reaction to the latter, firmly rooted within concerns for climate change and the excess carbon emissions generated by what may be considered excessive consumption alongside poor disposal practices. One of if not the most widely quoted definition of the circular economy comes from the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF): a circular economy would “redefine growth, focusing on positive societywide benefits. It entails gradually decoupling economic activity from the consumption of finite resources and designing waste out of the system. Underpinned by a transition to renewable energy sources, the circular model builds economic, natural, and social capital” and is “restorative and regenerative by design” (EMF, 2017). The EMF has played a major role in the present popularity and policy adoption of the circular economy concept, achieving a significant level of support from industry and recognition from nation and international bodies including the United Nations. Its definition of circular economy is an ambitious, aspirational one that includes an assumption of success in terms of both environmental and social benefits. The EMF definition broadens resource efficiency debates by building in utilization of renewable energy, typically a distinct area of activity, research, and policy. Thus, under a circular economy, a society would live within the

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means of its energy and material resources. Nonetheless, this is a progrowth formulation, but one that defines a circular economy as providing growth that brings benefits for everyone. While acknowledging the highly significant role of the EMF in helping the term circular economy gain a traction with industry and policymakers that earlier related concepts have not achieved, its definition is nonetheless just one view. It has its origins in a certain set of circumstances and is as open to critique as any. Indeed, although the fundamental idea of the circular economy as an approach to resource efficiency is undisputed, little else about it is. Multiple definitions have been proposed and discussed. Some of these stay very close to the resource efficiency aspects; others go further and claim that a circular economy has much broader implications for social change. As will be discussed later, some activities associated with a circular economy (such as recycling of postconsumer waste) are well entrenched in at least some places; however, typically definitions of the circular economy reflect the authors’ idea of what society should aspire to, or a means to achieve a more sustainable society, rather than something that already exists. Some authors refer to “the circular economy,” others to “a circular economy.” In the English language, this distinction is significant as implying, respectively, that there is one vision or practice of a circular economy, or potentially many alongside each other. The term has been seen as an expression covering many different activities and aspirations and certainly draws on many preexisting concepts and practices.

Concepts Contributing to the Circular Economy The term circular economy has been around since at least the 1980s, and its recent popularity is predated by most if not all of the concepts and practices implied by the expression. Those earlier ideas and practices are themselves interrelated and are to some extent simply reexpressing each other in different terminology. Several key terms are discussed to illustrate the range, some of which are already very well established areas of research and/or policy and/or practice.

Learning From Nature A common assumption behind the ideas on which circular economy draws is that human activity would be more protective of the environment if it were organized on principles drawn from nature. These approaches include systems analysis, industrial ecology, industrial symbiosis, industrial metabolism, and cradle-to-cradle. While both the biological accuracy of some of underlying ideas and their applicability to human systems have been debated, it is undeniable that certain key ideas for potential environmental benefits have been influential in both research and practice.

Circles and Loops

The “circular” part of the circular economy refers to the movement, or “cycling” of nutrients, or energy between different elements of an ecosystem in nature. Thereby the form and use of substances change as they pass between different elements of an ecosystem (e.g., from a dead, organism to the soil, or from the soil to a plant, from a plant to another living organism, etc.) but are not left to waste. “Closing the loop” and related expressions have been widely used to convey the idea of recovering material at risk of being lost to the economy (e.g., residues from industrial production) and instead making it part of a metaphorical cycle, whereby the material passes to another productive use. The idea of potentially recoverable material being lost in this way also gives rise to references to leaks. Thus, loop closing refers to keeping material in economic circulation, (i.e., within a cycle), rather than leaking as waste for disposal, or potentially contributing to pollution (if not handled or disposed of safely). One of the most recognizable graphical depictions of the circular economy is the EMF circular economy diagram (Fig. 1). Illustrating a number, though not all, of the loop closing possibilities (see “closing loops in a circular economy” later), the diagram follows the cradle-to-cradle practice of distinguishing between the bio- and technical cycles. Biobased products have in common certain recovery loops that utilize their propensity to decompose. The technical materials should be capable of being reused or recycled without a degeneration in quality. Treating these cycles as separate may be seen as purely illustrative or possibly aspirational. Composite materials, widely used in packaging, for example, can be very difficult to separate for recovery.

Closing Production Loops: Industrial Ecology and Industrial Symbiosis

Industrial ecology is a field of research and practice aiming at the greening of industrial society by taking lessons from ecosystems in nature. With origins including the seminal 1989 work of Frosch and Gallopoulos, industrial ecology draws on a number of biological concepts. It asserts that system-scale resource optimization (whether based on a location, or a product) is environmentally and economically beneficial compared to individual companies optimizing their performance. The focus is on production rather than consumption-related issues; it comprises a greening of industry strategy. Tools such as material flow analysis and life cycle analysis (see also later) are widely studied and employed by industrial ecology scholars in order to identify potential system-scale developments and to assess their environmental impacts (compared to either current activity, or alternative system changes). These considerations are equally applicable to circular economy as to industrial ecology, though more scenarios become relevant for modeling when the system of interest is defined to include consumers. A subfield of industrial ecology, industrial symbiosis, revolves around the idea that the residues of one firm can become the inputs for another. This is a particular form of loop closing, which focuses on industrial, or preconsumer, residues and seeks a recovery option with another industrial, or commercial, entity. Different approaches to this have been attempted, e.g., with firms

Circular Economy

Figure 1

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The Ellen MacArthur Foundation circular economy diagram.

colocated or facilitating links between firms on a regional to national scale. Industrial symbiosis research spans the globe in terms of both researchers and case studies and indicates that the outcome depends significantly on the regulatory, cultural, and economic context. Research has questioned the assumption of the industrial symbiosis literature that loop closing should be at the local scale or that local economic benefit can be derived from industrial symbiosis strategies. National scale regulations (or supranational in the case of the EU) may provide a conducive framework for industrial symbiosis, but many companies are operating across national boundaries. One consequence of environmental management at system rather than company level is the need for collaboration between companies and other separate organizations. Collaboration might be an exchange of information (e.g., between producers, users, and recovery bodies) or can involve an economic transaction. The collaborative elements of industrial ecology both open possibilities for resource efficiencies and create challenges of implementation. The economic benefits of system-scale ecoefficiencies may not be shared in a fashion to the satisfaction of all parties. Leaving aside the subjectivity of identifying the appropriate system scale and boundaries, there is seldom a relevant system-scale body with decision-making and implementing authority.

Decoupling of Economic Growth From Environmental Impact The aim that economic growth might continue without environmental impacts (resource, energy use or waste, pollution production) growing at the same rate is known as decoupling. This aim is critical to all approaches to sustainability that avoid a low, no, or degrowth approach.

Dematerialization and Servitization

Dematerialization and servitization are both approaches to enabling economic growth to continue while preventing reducing resource use from expanding at an equivalent rate. The former includes a wide range of both technical and organizational solutions for reducing the amount of resources needed for a given purpose. Technical solutions for dematerialization could include selection of lighter weight but stronger metals, or making of small products. In these cases, the experience and practice of using the final product may be little changed. However, the social–economic approaches to dematerialization may imply very different experiences and practices around existing products. Servitization is an example of a social–economic approach to dematerialization. It emphasizes changes in business models, whereby companies sell a service rather than a product. Some of these ideas are becoming more common, with increasing demand for such an approach adding to the now well-established practices of some companies (famously including Xerox who switched to selling copies rather than copiers some decades ago).

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Performance Economy

Another foundational idea behind the circular economy is Walter Stahel’s concept of a performance economy. The idea, which appeared by name in 2005, draws on ideas published first in the 1970s, and concerns reducing resource dependence while protecting employment opportunities. An example of an approach to decoupling resource use (and other measures of environmental impact) from economic growth, the performance economy draws on practices such as dematerialization and servitization. An explicit aim of the performance economy is to protect well-being while conserving resources. Thus, the proposal is to shift from reliance on energy and technology to human labor to perform tasks. This is attempting to reverse the underlying economic logic of industrialization and mass production, which has sought to increase productivity (and decrease costs) by the replacement of labor by machinery (with by implication a need for nonhuman energy). Such a transition is unlikely to happen without policy intervention. It is to be doubted whether political support for environmental causes has quite reached a point where it is ready to confront the interests of business.

Regenerative Development This term, used by the EMF and others, refers to the ideas of John Tillman Lyle (1994: 10) who wrote “A regenerative system provides for continuous replacement, through its own functional processes of the energy and materials used in its operation.” This implies working in tune with the landscape to produce development that enhances the potential, e.g., sensitive use of available resources, enhancing positive features. This goes beyond merely not harming the environment to being designed to restore (the term “restorative” is also used), that is, a system that is environmentally self-sustaining. Lyle’s idea, itself an extension of the idea of regenerative agriculture (e.g., ensuring replenishment of nutrients removed from the soil by the harvesting of crops), has been extended to urban planning and landscape design. The emphasis on renewable energy within at least some definitions of the circular economy is part of this wider ambition to live within planetary means.

Reforming the Economy: Putting a Circular Economy Into Practice This section examines key ideas relating to the implementation of circular economy practices. These ideas could mostly have also appeared in the previous section, as they are also typically not new.

Circular Design An awareness of potential impacts of resource management choices and selecting options that minimize them are important elements of the circular economy. The latter should not be concerned with simply tidying up after consumption, but rather involves organizing to be intentionally more efficient. Ecodesign, or design for the environment, is the practice of taking environmental impact into consideration at the time of product design. Cradle-to-cradle is a form of ecodesign emphasizing potential to use residues in another product. The recovery and disposal options for a product and its potential to cause pollution in the environment are largely determined at the point of design (e.g., by the choice of material and selection of fixtures that will help to determine durability). Although ecodesign is far from a new idea, there is a new receptiveness to the concept among policymakers and recognition among industry that might serve to take implementation of ecodesign to a far greater level than has so far been achieved. There are, however, decisions to be made that may be imponderable at point of design. How can the design be optimized for recovery, for example, when a product is being sold across the globe, and available recovery options at the time and place they are needed cannot be known? As the following section illustrates, there are many recovery options from which to choose.

Closing Loops in a Circular Economy Whether the circular economy is seen as a fundamental restructuring of the economy or an improvement to current practice, there are a number of material recovery practices that are variously well established in different places and will continue to be important. Although the idea of the waste hierarchy (originating in the 1975 Waste Framework Directive and posing the order of preference: reduce, reuse, recycle, and recovery of materials; energy recovery) seems outdated compared to the more holistic concept of the circular economy, circular economy strategies are essentially designed to drive practices toward activities toward the top of the hierarchy. Inspired by earlier calls for the three R’s (reduce, reuse, and recycle), no fewer than 10 R’s have been identified (Table 1). These are classified according to the scale of loop closing. They are all open to different interpretations, e.g., more closely tied to consumers or producers. Some of these activities are widely promoted by policies and successfully implemented in some areas.

Value Generation Models Although some of the routes to loop closing identified in Table 1 are options for individuals to consider, many of them offer potential means for the commercialization of the circular economy. Thus, the circular economy is a green economy or ecological modernization strategy. That is, innovations to support environmental ends can simultaneously be economically viable. Further, it is argued that the processes underlying innovation in a capitalist economy may be needed to achieve the technological/organizational

Circular Economy Table 1

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Ten practices for loop closing within a circular economy. Practice

“Short” loops R0

Refuse*

R1

Reduce

R2

Resell/reuse

R3

Repair

“Medium” loops R4

Refurbish

R5

Remanufacture

R6

Repurpose

“Long” loops R7

Recycle

R8

Recover (energy)

Definition

Example

Can be seen as consumer activities, though all could also be applied to producers or others in the supply chain Consumption is avoideddeither altogether or a lowmaterial form selected (e.g., avoided packaging) Avoiding the generation of wastedapplies more to producers, for consumers may imply application of one of the other practices Extending product life by the original or another own using it for the original purpose with little or no intermediary activity (which would imply one of the activities later); might or might not involve a monetary transaction between previous and subsequent users Extending product life by fixing a product to restore previous function or appearance; product may or may not remain with the original owner Business-led activities, though possibly aimed at consumers Similar to repair but refers to larger or more complex products, such as buildings or vehicles; may involve a product “upgrade”; less likely to be undertaken by an individual Recovery of product/components (with cleaning, repair as required) retaining original purpose; may be sold directly to consumer or installed as component of larger product before sale Conversion of a product or component to enable a different use; this could be at a “craft” scale, or a commercial operation Focus of formal waste management activities, likely to remain significant options Recovery and reprocessing of materials to be used in the manufacture of a new productdincludes, but not limited to, municipal collection of postconsumer residues While “recovery” is a general term covering R2–R9, here it refers to processes such as incineration from which energy generation is the primary output (materials such as ash may also be produced)

Keeping a mobile phone beyond the end of initial contract More material-efficient design of product Using someone else’s out of contract phone

Having a new screen fitted on a mobile phone

Buildings being restored with improvements to insulation/ plumbing Car engines/tyres recovered from otherwise end of life vehicles Apartments made from disused warehouses

Municipal collection of paper Energy from waste plant

Based on definitions in Reike, D., Vermeulen, W.J.V., Witjes, S., 2018. The circular economy: new or refurbished as CE 3.0? d Exploring controversies in the conceptualization of the circular economy through a focus on history and resource value retention options. Resources Conserv. Recycl. 135, 246–264.

changes required to build a circular economy. The extent to which green economy aspirations for social benefits can also be met via circular economy activity is considered below under sustainable development. A significant proportion of circular economy–related research concerns the development of business models, i.e., economically viable approaches to circular economy activity, i.e., circular economy. Notably, most activities in Table 1 already exist as commercial operations with respect to certain types of products. Some examples are offered in the following subsections.

Short Loop Strategies: Reuse and Sharing

This category includes a range of practices such as finding new uses for old items, sharing or passing on objects (e.g., outgrown baby clothes) among family members that are the antithesis of a throwaway society. This type of practice might be seen as a common-sense approach or an economic necessity depending on one’s circumstances. There has long been an informal approach to commercializing these practices (e.g., garage sales in the United States, car boot or jumble sales in the United Kingdom), whereby no-longer-wanted (or just unwanted) goods can be sold on to people outside of the personal network of the seller. Internet technology has supported approaches that have appeared for finding sources/outlets beyond one’s personal network and neighborhood. Charity shops, or thrift stores, provide an outlet for goods without individuals having to find a buyer themselves. Likewise buyers can find preused items without having to know the seller. Sellers, buyers, and the organizations in between can all feel that they are serving a good cause. Over the last two decades, however, highly commercialized approaches have appeared to facilitating exchange and sharing far beyond personal networks and neighborhoods. Companies such as Ebay, Uber, and Airbnb have been hugely successful

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commercially by providing Internet platforms through which others can sell on unwanted goods or provide temporary access to a good (whether a car with driver or accommodation), i.e., “sharing.” The so-called sharing economy has been researched as an element of the circular economy, representing a form of dematerialization. However, the social and environmental consequences are very much subject to ongoing debate, especially as regards the impact on the businesses traditionally fulfilling these roles (such as taxi companies in the case of Ebay) and are very much successful business models for the people owning the companies with the technology. While may be benefits from more intensive use of resources (especially expensive, energy- and material-intensive resources such as houses and cars), the business models are not designed with material efficiencies in mind or have become quickly exploited to different ends.

Medium Loop Strategies: Remanufacturing and Repair

Manufacturing companies have expanded their business models to incorporate recovery activity. This is particularly true in industries where products (such as cars or capital goods) are designed to last for an extended period. These activities might include offering repair services; marketing of components as spare parts of industrial/consumer products; offering service contracts; or remanufacturing. Some companies specialize in this type of activity, e.g., manufacturing spare parts for other companies’ products or exist to service products that they have had to part on manufacturing. The expansion of the circular economy will require the creation of markets for this type of activity for more products, alongside promotion of modular designs so that more products are made with repair/upgrade as mainstream options.

Longer Loops: Recycling

Although in many countries, managing domestic waste is a statutory responsibility for local authorities, it has become a privatesector activity through the appearance of recycling and reprocessing companies. Policy emphasis has been placed on recycling, with the primary intention of diverting waste from landfill, rather than more radical initiatives to reduce consumption. Recycling offers a panacea for the throwaway society, whereby consumption can continue unabated, but with the more conspicuous environmental side effects ameliorated. With increasing emphasis on recycling and recovery, waste management companies in more developed countries (MDCs) have broadened their scope from managing disposal to finding markets for goods. However, there are substantial variations geographically in the quality of waste service provision. In many less-developed countries (LDC), an efficient collection and disposal system would comprise a significant step forward in terms of public health and environmental protection. Recycling in these countries is part of the informal economy, with individuals earning some form of livelihood by scavenging from waste dumps. This disparity in regulatory enforcement, and therefore compliance costs, contributes to the leak of used materials from more to less developed countries where they contribute to the waste-related social and environmental problems.

Choosing Recovery Options and Modeling Their Impact Although not all the wide range of loop closing activities are likely to apply in a given situation, there are nonetheless potentially a range of options from which to choose when designing a product or disposing of an item. These two activities, design and disposal, though traditionally carried out in isolation from each other, are connected through the biological metaphor of a product life cycle. The metaphor can refer to individual items, which require some form of recovery or disposal when no longer useful (i.e., at “end of life”), or of products which undergo a life cycle from initial design to the ceasing of production and eventual disappearance from use. An important extension of understanding the various stages a product undergoes is to seek to measure the environmental, economic (and increasingly social) impact of the product across all of those stages (i.e., life cycle analysis), e.g., judging the environmental impact a product based on energy and resources consumed in production, use and disposal. Given the global distribution of products, however, it is unlikely that a designer would have an adequate level of knowledge of the disposal options available for any given item to be able to optimize design environmentally. Thus, at the end of life (or a given phases of life) for a product, the choice of most environmentally sound option for loop closing will need further consideration. A form of life cycle assessment, or environmental impact analysis, could also be employed in this case. A further potential application of life cycle analysis is in the design of local authority waste services. There is the potential for conflicting assumptions, approaches, and priorities, however, between product designers, waste service providers, and individual holders of unwanted items.

Policies for the Circular Economy Notwithstanding the potential commercialization of the circular economy strategies, the research into environmental policy implementation strongly implies that regulatory drive will be important for widespread implementation. Many countries or supranational bodies have implemented policies that are relevant to the circular economy, primarily focusing on the environmental/ economic elements. China and the EU are prominent examples.

Circular Economy in China China’s Circular Economy Promotion Law was response to what were becoming all too obviously unsustainable levels of resource consumption and waste and pollution generation; the Law was a strategic attempt to decouple China’s phenomenal rates of

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economic growth from its environmental consequences. Plans to promote reuse, recycling, and recovery of wastes were seen as contributing to energy use and carbon emissions reductions as well as resource efficiencies. Industrial symbiosis is a key element to the implementation of the circular economy in China. A series of industrial parks were designated as demonstration projects for cooperating colocated companies (eco-industrial parks), with an encouragement for governmental organizations to provide support. Establishment of and improvements to services for collection and recycling of domestic waste were also included. The Law refers to social as well as economic and environmental aims, but without explanation. As with other countries, while the literature points to success stories for companies, materials, or places, the overall impact of the Law is hard to assess.

Circular Economy in the European Union Along with other areas of environmental policy in the EU, the circular economy strategy has a strong economic imperative (e.g., the expectation of creating jobs or resource security) and can be seen as part of its ecological modernization approach. Although the strategy is fast-evolving, in the EU, the policies implementing circular economy priorities have been evolving since the 1970s (Table 2). These have been aimed at improving the environmental standards and safety of disposal techniques (such as landfill and incineration), driving waste management options up the waste hierarchy, and contribute to the EU’s carbon emissions reduction strategy. Recent reforms have attempted to address barriers to loop closing represented by the legal definition of waste. The latter, designed as an environmental protection measure, brings requirements for how and by whom a material can be handled. These bestow a handling cost on materials, even if they closely resemble nonwaste alternatives. The designation of “residue” as a common term for wastes (substance to be disposed of) or by-products (substance with a specific avenue for recovery) and the establishment of rules governing the definitions of waste, by-products, and “end of waste” (waste that has been processed to point where it does not need to come under waste regulations). The designation of by-product and end-of-waste status are contested, and even once agreed in principle, are contingent on circumstances (an actual market is needed, not just a technical possibility). These complexities indicate that the expected benefits intended from the circular economy (such as resource security) may be more elusive than expected. Furthermore, the combined effects of cumulative regulations must be carefully considered. Environmental protection regulations backed up by penalties for noncompliance send a much stronger signal to companies than encouragement to consider resource recovery. Notably, EU-scale policies are designed to allow national variation in implementation to fit the particular context and political preferences. Consequently, there has been considerable variation in the approach to resource efficiency (Table 3). Some countries are focused on reducing waste to landfill, and industrial symbiosis is just one of many approaches to that, rather than an objective for its own sake. Others are explicitly trying to develop industrial symbiosis networks as part as either wider business sustainability strategies or regional development strategies.

Table 2

EU policies relating to the Circular Economy.

Relationship to circular economy

Policy

Relevant provisions

Encourage design for circularity

Ecodesign Directive 2009 Producer Responsibility Directives (various since 1994)

Reduce waste and create supply of residue for other uses

Landfill Directive 1999 Tax on landfill introduced by various EU countries

Increase use of renewables

Renewable Energy Directive 2009; EU Emissions Trading Scheme 2005

Encourage and facilitate resource recovery

Waste Framework Directive 2008

Prevent ongoing harm, remediate and restore previous damage

IPPC Directive, 1996, 2008; Industrial Emissions Directive 2010; Environmental Liability Directive 2004

Requires energy efficiency in energy-using products (scope to be expanded to include materials-related elements) Encourage design for end of life criteria for specific products by imposing some liability for end of life disposal costs on producers Requires practices including monitoring emissions; targets to keep biodegradable waste from landfill Financial incentive to companies/local authorities to seek routes to recovery Financial incentives to reduce carbon emissions for energy-intensive industries and requirements to source energy from renewables Procedures to determine end of waste and clarify definitions of by-products Sets emissions limits, establish and require Best Available Techniques; establish licensing requirements relating to waste and liability beyond ownership

Deutz, P., Baxter, H., Gibbs, D. (forthcoming). Governing resource flows in a circular economy: rerouting materials in an established policy landscape. In: Macaskie, L. E., Sapsford, F. J., Mayes, W. M. (Eds.), Resource Recovery from Wastes. Cambridge: Royal Society of Chemistry.

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Circular Economy Table 3

Variations in policy approach to industrial symbiosis as a means to closing preconsumer loops within the European countries listed.

Approach to industrial symbiosis

Country

Element in strategy to divert waste from landfill Part of a sustainable business strategy Component of regional development initiatives Focus on place-based initiatives Is promoted outside of place-based initiatives Multiple partners, including public and private sector

Belgium, Portugal, Spain, UK, Germany, Netherlands France, Switzerland France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK All, though increasing reliance on private sector in the United Kingdom

Derived from Boons, F., Spekkink, W., Isenmann, R., Baas, L., Eklund, M., Brullot, S., Deutz, P., Gibbs, D., Massard, G., Romero, E., Ruiz, M.C., Verguts, V., Davis, C., Korevaar, G., Costa, I., Baumann, H., 2015, Comparing industrial symbiosis in Europe: toward a conceptual framework and research methodology. In: Deutz, P., Lyons D. I., Bi, J. (Eds.), International Perspectives on Industrial Ecology, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 69–88.

Circular Economy and Sustainable Development The circular economy is seen as an approach to implementing sustainable development. The potential for the circular economy in this regard is clear to see, as it should conserve resources for the future and reduce (eventually eliminate) waste and related pollution as burdens for the present and future generations. However, consideration of the circular economy as a route to sustainability introduces expectations of social benefits and equity that are not inherent in resource efficiency strategies. Some of the challenges around that can be illustrated with reference to the SDGs. At present, global notions of sustainability are closely tied to the SDGs. Of the 17 SDGs, circular economy practices are most directly relevant to Responsible Production and Consumption (number 12) and Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure (number 9). Increasing resource efficiencies would make production and consumption more sustainable and would be associated with enabling infrastructure (e.g., for recovery and reprocessing of used materials). Effective implementation of loop closing strategies (especially in the context of less-developed countries) would be beneficial for Life on Land (15) and Life Below Water (14) (e.g., helping to reduce current extraordinary levels of plastics in the oceans). If direct and indirect effects of circular economy strategies on carbon emissions are considered in selecting recovery options, then Climate Action (13) is also supported. Potentially, other goals could also be furthered by successful implementation of the CE, such as Decent Work and Economic Growth (8), Sustainable Cities and Communities (11), and even No Poverty (1) and Ending Hunger (2). But, these social benefits imply not just that CE-related innovation occurs, and that jobs are created, but that they are “decent” jobs, that those jobs are available and desirable to those currently experiencing poverty and malnourishment. There is no evidence by which to judge the likelihood of this, especially not relating to specific locations. Academic and policy predictions of overall numbers and types of jobs created, for example, vary widely, and the impact at specific locations is even more uncertain. The capturing of social benefits would require supportive policy attention to the style of circular economy implementation and to matters of wealth distribution. Notably, the SDGs themselves are essentially voluntary policies for national-scale implementation. Furthermore, outcomes in different countries are not independent of each other. The EU and China are both trying to promote circular economy practices to promote their own resource security and economic benefit. China (and other countries’) recent steps to ban the importing of waste plastics is having a major effect on how those materials are dealt with in the European countries. Likewise if the EU used circular economy strategies to achieve self-sufficiency metals currently imported from China that would impact on the Chinese economy.

Conclusions There is much room for debate around both what a circular economy might comprise and how it might be achieved, with both the end objective and means to achieve the end currently, and for the foreseeable future, likely to vary substantially geographically. At present, there are multiple elements of circular economy practice operating on different scales and including different materials/ practices variously in different places. Each element could be referred to as “a circular economy.” Presently, and perhaps healthily, there are competing images of what authors envisage as “the circular economy.” Likely, the various circular economies will coalesce as subsystems within whatever may emerge as the global circular economy. Analogously, and relatedly, there is only one global capitalist economy, however variable the constituent processes and their effects at different places. Further research will help to identify the likely directions of circular economy development and their implications.

See Also: Sharing Economy.

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Further Reading Allenby, B., Richards, D. (Eds.), 1994. The Greening of Industrial Ecosystems. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, USA. Chertow, M.R., 2000. Industrial symbiosis: literature and taxonomy. Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 25, 313–337. Frosch, R.A., Gallopoulos, N.E., 1989. Strategies for manufacturing. Sci. Am. 261, 94–102. Gibbs, D.C., Deutz, P., 2007. Reflections on implementing industrial ecology through eco-industrial park development. J. Clean. Prod. 15 (17), 1683–1695. Gibbs wrote this, based on data largely collected by me. Gold, L., 2004. The Sharing Economy: Solidarity Networks Transforming Globalisation. Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants. Gregson, N., Crang, M., Fuller, S., Holmes, H., 2015. Interrogating the circular economy: the moral economy of resource recovery in the EU. Econ. Soc. 44, 218–243. Hobson, K., 2016. Closing the loop or squaring the circle? Locating generative spaces for the circular economy. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 40, 88–104. Kirchherr, J., Reike, D., Hekkert, M., 2017. Conceptualizing the circular economy: an analysis of 114 definitions. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 127, 221–232. Lazarvic, D., Valve, H., 2017. Narrating expectations for the circular economy: towards a common and contested European transition. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 31, 60–69. Lieder, M., Rashid, A., 2016. Towards circular economy implementation: a comprehensive review in context of manufacturing industry. J. Clean. Prod. 115, 36–51. Lyle, J.T., 1994. Regenerative Design for Sustainable Development. Wiley, New York, USA. Mathews, J.A., Tan, H., 2011. Progress toward a circular economy in China. J. Ind. Ecol. 15, 435–457. Millar, N., McLaughlin, E., Börger, T., 2019. The circular economy: swings and roundabouts? Ecol. Econ. 158, 11–19. Stahel, W.R., 2010. Performance Economy, second ed. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK. Tukker, A., 2015. Product services for a resource-efficient and circular economy: a review. J. Clean. Prod. 97, 76–91.

Relevant Websites Dutch government website outlining their circular economy strategy https://www.government.nl/topics/circular-economy. Ellen MacArthur Foundation https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/. uropean Union http://ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/index_en.htm. United Nations Sustainable Development https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/. WRAP: UK government-supported organisation promoting circular economy activities http://www.wrap.org.uk/.

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Cities, Imperial Anthony D King, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, United States © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 5, pp 317–321, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

An empire is a form of polity where one state extends its dominion, usually by military power, over the territories and populations of others, generally ethnically and culturally different. In this context, imperial city can refer to both the capital and seat of the emperor and also to other major cities in the empire. Interest in imperial cities (more of a historical than contemporary phenomenon) is likely to have been generated in recent years following the emergence in urban studies of the category of the world or global city and, in cases, of the historical origins of that status in an earlier role as imperial city. An additional explanation may be the formal demise of European colonial empires in the mid-20th Century and the subsequent appearance of postimperial economic, cultural, and especially demographic features in what were previously Europe’s imperial cities such as Paris, London, or Lisbon.

Empires, Nations, and Cities From a long-term historical perspective, the dominance of the nation-state as a form of polity is relatively recent. Currently, the United Nations Organization recognizes almost 200 independent states, each with its own national capital city. Yet at the end of the 18th Century, there were only some 20 of what today would be accepted as nation-states. The increase has occurred mainly in the 19th and especially the 20th Century. Between 1945 and 1990, for example, the number of independent states tripled, from 67 to 186, following the collapse of European imperial regimes, especially in Asia and Africa. As recently as the late 19th Century, the world had been dominated by some 16 empires, each with their imperial capitals and other important imperial cities. That the six official languages of the United Nations Organization are the languages of what were historically once the world’s largest empires (British, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Qing Chinese, and French) is sufficient comment on the past and continuing importance of previous empires and their principal cities in disseminating their languages, forms of law and governance, and religions and cultures. From the most ancient to the most modern, over 80 different empires have been recognized over the last 2 millennia, their realms, regimes, and ideologies physically demarcated in both space and stone. For example, in the 2nd Century BC, Qin Shi Huang, first Chinese Emperor and founder of the Qing dynasty, united the majority of the Han Chinese under a government based in what is now the modern city of Xi’an, from here introducing a unified legal code, a common currency, and a written language. From this central imperial capital, the spatial extent of the Emperor’s rule was marked by the first stages of China’s Great Wall, a massive defensive and symbolic edifice, later to be extended under the Ming and other dynasties. Subsequently, in the 10th Century, China’s imperial capital was moved to Peking (modern Beijing), where the Imperial Palace was situated at the heart of multiple layers of walls and gates, enclosing the Forbidden City, an ingenious spatial mechanism simultaneously projecting and also concealing imperial power. Simply expressed, towns and cities were historically first created by the dominance of some social groups over others and by their ability to appropriate from the less powerful an agricultural surplus; in return the more powerful urban faction might provide different services for the rural populace. If, by the same logic, national capital cities exist by commanding a surplus from the resources and territory of the nation-state and providing services in return, imperial capitals grow even larger, richer, and stronger by appropriating the resources and territories of an expanding empire. For these reasons, imperial cities have, at various periods throughout history, and especially in the 19th Century, frequently become the largest, in terms of population and often the richest, as centers of consumption, of all cities in the world. Moreover, long after the empire itself has disappeared, in some if not every case, the accumulated resources, institutions, infrastructure, transportation networks, as well as cultural attributes of the earlier imperial regime have continued to exist in the one-time imperial city. These may include banks, institutions of government and law, universities, museums, libraries, military installations, docks, shipping, road, and in the modern era, rail and airline transport routes, as well as the offices, symbols and practices of empire, including languages, attitudes, and beliefs. To different degrees, therefore, such continuity might be true of the imperial regimes and cities of Rome, Istanbul, Peking, Cairo, Venice, London, Madrid, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Moscow, Vienna, among others. In this way, many one-time, imperial cities of the late 19th Century have, at the close of the 20th, mutated into what urbanists have, since the 1990s, increasingly called world or global cities. Economically, imperial cities have been able to appropriate and assemble resources, whether grain, precious metals, fuel, labor, building materials, food, looted treasures, and science and knowledge from the far corners of the empire. Ancient empires have assembled slave labor to build massive pyramids, such as those at Luxor (Egypt) or Teotihuacan (Mexico); in modern ones, such as that of Britain, slavery was used to build up vast plantation economies in the Caribbean, generating capital for industrialization and urban development in the metropole. In imperial cities such as Delhi and Agra in the Moghul Empire (1526–1857) or Madrid and Seville in the empire of Spain (1492–1975), spectacular palaces, public works, and exotic gardens have been funded from the proceeds of imperial conquest. In the modern era, in the brief but singularly violent history of the Belgian Empire (1901–62), profits from rubber extraction in the Congo Free State under the rule of

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Leopold II, gross exploitation, and murderous atrocities were used to build and equip the spectacular Musée du Congo in imperial Brussels (later, the Royal Museum for Central Africa) as well as other monuments. Under the Second French Colonial Empire (1830–1960), territorially the largest after the British Empire, and extending into north and west Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Océana, Paris added to its existing imperial features, including Napoleon’s tomb in the Invalides and the spectacular Arc de Triomphe celebrating his many campaigns. In the 20th Century, the resplendent tomb of colonial general, Herbert Lyautey, was located close to that of Napoleon. Not far away, an imposing bust of his army colleague, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, rests on the shoulders of four Asian and African women, natives of the various countries where he had served. Following postwar decolonization, the museum established for the 1931 international colonial exhibition in Paris was transformed into the Musée National des Arts d’Afrique et d’Océanie. Both historically and in the contemporary world, ethnically and culturally different peoples have brought, or have traveled, to what are inherently multicultural cities. Whether defined by the cultural diversity of its peoples or the extent of its trade, the imperial city is, by default, the forerunner of the international city. Imperial trade, imperial wars, and the exploits of imperial armies not only add wealth, knowledge, and economic and political power to the city but generate much of its symbolic capital, the monumental arches, ceremonial ways, obelisks, commemorative parks, equestrian statues, gardens and vistas, war memorials, busts of imperial warriors, and thoroughfares named for faraway places. The imperial city is a site for impressive monuments, arenas, and stadiums to mount spectacular displays, whether exhibitions, sporting contests, or demonstrations of political power. Imperial cities can be divided into two classes: those designed from scratch and purposely built to function as an imperial capital and others, usually national capitals, which have grown on the basis of centralized regal power and then acquire imperial features as the empire expands over time. Most of the large European capitals fit into the second type. India, while providing historical examples of both, also offers, in the case of New Delhi, a uniquely modern version of the first type. In the early 20th Century, the imperial government, anxious to escape the growing nationalist movement in Calcutta, moved the capital of the British Raj to a less volatile, more geographically central location. The relocated capital was planned on spectacular beaux-arts principles: vast processional thoroughfares, endless vistas, the viceroy’s monumental house of gigantic proportions, the vast iconic statue of the King-Emperor sheltered by a soaring canopy, and the residential areas for the imperial bureaucracy laid out according to a rigid social and spatial hierarchy. Of all ancient imperial cities, however, it is Rome and the cities founded by the Roman Empire that best illustrate the structural characteristics and political processes which distinguish imperial from other types of cities.

Imperial Rome and Imperial Cities As an imperial city and the center of a vast multiethnic, multicultural empire spreading out from the Mediterranean shores into Northern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, Rome and the Roman Empire provide an example of the centrifugal and centripetal movements that influence imperial capitals and the principal cities in its colonies (or provinces). As the empire expanded between 27 BCE and CE 330, new cities were founded from which the new provinces were governed and administered. Though influenced by local geographical and cultural conditions, the cities of the empire, by their location on land and seaborne trading routes, were to become part of a new urban network. They carried the Latin language and culture of the metropole to the colony, but also brought back local knowledge and culture from the periphery to the metropolitan core. Carefully planned, Roman Empire cities were generally walled, for both defense and administrative purposes, and in most cases laid out on a grid, a spatial device for colonizing new lands and peoples that was to have immense significance, not only for the Romans but also for later empires, such as that of the Spanish in South and Central America. As Roman rule expanded through Italy, the Eastern Mediterranean, and into Gaul and Spain, cities were established in which the conquering armies were garrisoned and from which Roman rule was extended over the surrounding province. Similar institutions meant that similar spaces and built forms were found in different Roman cities. In Pompei or Trier, where the grid plan dates from the 1st Century, the forum or market place was the center of public activity. Other public buildings included baths, a gymnasium, temples dedicated to different deities, occasionally a circus or race track, and a basilica or audience hall. An amphitheater provided the setting for gladiatorial displays. As with the massive Porta Nigra in Trier, imposing gateways often marked the entrance. Founded after the invasion of Britain in CE 43, London was located at an important river crossing. In addition to a forum, basilica, and temples, London, as the capital of a new province, was also the site of a governor’s palace. Ephesus, in what is now the southeast corner of Turkey, was the main city of the eastern Aegean and capital of the province of Asia. A busy port, exporting goods back to the imperial capital, in the 2nd Century CE it had extensive cultural facilities, including a magnificent library, built to commemorate an earlier governor of the province, Tiberius Julius Celsus. Fronted with huge marble columns and statues dedicated to wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue, the library had facilities to store up to 12 000 scrolls. In addition, there were girls’ gymnasium, theater, baths, stadium, and temples to the Goddess Artemis, a destination point for pilgrims. Rome itself was built up especially in the first two centuries CE. At the end of the first, it had a population of some 1 million people, and under Augustus, emperor for 40 years (27 BCE–CE 14), it became the greatest city in the Western world. Augustus drew on the extensive new wealth coming into Italy from the colonies and spent immense sums on the city. Grain was shipped to Rome from its province of Egypt; olive oil for lamps, cooking, and food came from the Roman settlement in Carthage, North Africa. With his friends and lieutenants, Augustus added some of the city’s most spectacular buildings, such as the original

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Pantheon, the Baths of Agrippa, and the Horologium, an enormous sundial, with an obelisk, imported from Egypt, used as a pointer. The Rome of Augustus was a Golden Age for Latin and the legacy was measured not only in buildings but also in literature and architectural treatises including, during the 1st Century, the Ten Books on Architecture by Vitruvius, to become of immense significance for architects in the European Renaissance. The Colosseum, the largest amphitheater in the Roman world, was dedicated in CE 80. Emperor Trajan (98–117), extending the empire’s boundaries with his victories in Dacia (present-day Romania) and later conquests in Mesopotamia, returned to Rome with cohorts of slaves and huge spoils of war. His deeds were commemorated in the huge column named after him, erected in a prominent place in the Roman Forum. On this, an intricately sculpted frieze provides a narrative account of his exploits. Along with the grid plan, the Romans brought peace, trade and governance, street layouts, classical temples, municipal baths, and huge aqueducts that brought water into cities, as at Nimes in France and Segovia in Spain. The artificial harbor at Ostia, the port of Rome, was critical in extending trade and shipping facilities. In all the provinces, newly built roads helped to link the provinces together. In CE 122, Emperor Hadrian (117–38) marked the northern limits of the empire in England with the wall named after him. Everywhere, victories abroad were signified by triumphal arches or commemorative columns. The significance of the Roman Empire for the development of imperial cities is not limited to the founding of many cities, nor to the archaeological ruins which its decline left behind. With interest in the architecture of the ancient world revived by the Renaissance, the Roman Empire was to bequeath to modern Europe and its colonies, including North America, innumerable models of architecture and urban design. In terms of building typologies, architectural styles, or spatial forms, Roman models (incorporating the Greek) were to be spread by European colonialism all over the world.

Imperial London, Empire Cities In the modern era, the reciprocal nature of the growth of the imperial city and its overseas empire is well illustrated by the symbiotic development of London and the colonial port cities of the British Empire. Beginning with the conquest of Ireland and the earliest settlements in North America in the late 16th Century, the subsequent expansion of British military, naval, and trading power in the Caribbean, North America, South Asia, Australasia, and Africa was to have a major impact on the physical growth and economic prosperity of London. As well as the violence, profits from the trade in slavery, and the plantation economies of sugar, tobacco, and indigo in the Caribbean and the American South were behind the setting up of the infrastructure for an overseas trading economy in the late 17th Century. Merchants in this overseas trade helped in the founding of Lloyd’s insurance (1687–88), a stock exchange of sorts (1670s), and the Bank of England (1691), boosting an already thriving European economy. Trade with the East was stimulated by the East India Company (founded in 1600), whose impressive new headquarters were opened near the Bank of England two centuries later. By the mid-18th Century, colonial conquests in India, North America, and the Caribbean and a boom in the Atlantic economy had made London the largest center of international trade and its merchants the most prosperous in Europe. In terms of population, for over a century and a half, between 1750 and the height of British imperial power in 1910, London remained by far the largest city in the world, the population having grown from almost 1 million to 7 million during the 19th Century. Reflecting the territorial expansion of this seaborne empire was a completely new system of docks constructed between 1799 and 1828, and their names (West India, East India, and London) linking their distant and local destinations. Collectively, they could hold over 1400 merchant vessels. As the trading infrastructure grew, it greatly increased the importance of the city economy so that, by 1815, London was already a world financial center. During the 19th Century, the City of London, boosted by Britain’s lead in the Industrial Revolution, further enhanced its commercial and financial resources and moved increasingly into overseas investment, in both the British colonial empire and the informal colonies of Latin America. The centrifugal flow of capital was accompanied by the centrifugal flow of people. From 1815 to 1925, over 25 million emigrated from the British Isles, 10 million to British possessions round the world, especially Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, taking institutions and cultural attributes with them, and also retaining economic and social links with people at home. Back in the imperial city, their places in the labor market were, in some cases, filled by the inflow of labor from the oldest colony, Ireland. Even in the early years of the 20th Century, there was a small cosmopolitan population in London, not only from Europe but also from the Middle East, India, China, and Africa. London, along with other major ports in Britain (Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol), was part of a much larger imperial trading system that linked all the major port cities of the empire together. While some of these had developed from Indigenous settlements existing prior to colonial contact, many developed especially in the 19th and 20th centuries to become the major cities of the empire. In India, Calcutta was long known as the “second city of the empire.” With Bombay and Madras, it had been built up and developed from the 17th Century. Elsewhere, other cities were part of the networkdin Southeast Asia, Singapore and Hong Kong; in South Africa, Cape Town, Durban, and East London; in Jamaica, Kingston; in Australia, Sydney, Melbourne, and Perth; and in Canada, Montreal and Halifax. These cities were not only the sites of trade which, in the 19th Century, in most cases consisted in raw materials shipped to the metropole for processing, in return for industrial products sent back to the colony, but also, as in the Roman Empire, they were the places where new hybrid cultures developed, and as new industrially made products were introduced by the imperial power, Indigenous craft production was forced into decline. Colonial port cities, as well as other inlands, also hosted the institutions and buildings of government, administration, education, technology, and the imperial architecture in which they were built. From the mid-19th Century in India, much of

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the colonial administration and engineering works were housed by the public works department (PWD), a vast administrative and technical bureaucracy, functioning under the supervision of British imperial engineers. PWD personnel established a network of civil and military stations all over the country, along with barracks, institutional buildings, offices, canals, roads, and railways, linked to the major cities, and enabling the imperial government to maintain control over the country. During the frequent famines in India, brought on by climate failure and the government’s policy of replacing subsistence farming by cash crops, such public works were used to help alleviate poverty, but they were never enough to prevent millions of deaths from famine. As with the Roman Empire centuries before, new ideas about town and city planning, developed in the metropole in response to the urban chaos of industrialization, were exported to the empire’s rapidly growing cities in the early 20th Century. In many European colonial cities in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, ideologies about health, race, and culture had resulted in the founding of “dual cities,” the native town and the European settlement. The new “science” of town planning was applied principally to the latter. Noting the rapidly growing cities and consumer markets, metropolitan corporate as well as Indigenous interests were quick to establish shops, businesses, and factories. Along with the capital and businesses went the urban typologies of the metropole, often drawing for their architecture on Roman models, and also generating hybrid forms. By the 20th Century, the built and spatial environments of these empire cities often had more in common with each other than each had with the culturally and economically different vernacular environments where they existed. Imperial expansion outside the metropolitan center generated spatial expansion inside it. In the later years of the 19th Century, Britain extended its empire by a third, with new colonies in Southeast Asia; Southern, Central, and Western Africa; South America; and South Asia and Hong Kong. In London, new buildings for the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and India Office were established in Whitehall. The Imperial Institute of the United Kingdom, the Colonies, and India was set up in Kensington in the 1880s in order to exhibit the Empire’s products and raw materials, to disseminate information on emigration, industries, and trades, and to promote further colonization and commercial and technical education in the interests of the Empire. The Imperial College of Science and Technology was established in the early years of the 20th Century. In other parts of the imperial city, colonial agencies provided information to the 8.5 million British people who migrated to British imperial territories in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Americas between 1881 and 1910. The growing consciousness of empire in London at this time combined with an increasingly competitive awareness of the new urban improvements being constructed in other European imperial cities such as Paris, Vienna, Seville, and Rome. It became apparent that London lacked a specifically imperial space, providing an imposing vista and site for celebration. Following the death of the Queen-Empress Victoria in 1901, a plan for Imperial London was proposed, leading to the building of the Victoria Memorial, fronting Buckingham Palace, “a great imperial and national ideal wrought in marble,” according to The Illustrated London News. The mall was remodeled as a processional way with a wide vista focused on the new Admiralty Arch in Whitehall. The expansion of empire involved new peoples, territories, languages, and cultures as well as health hazards, presenting challenges to existing states of knowledge. To meet these challenges, innovative schools and institutions were established at the University of London. Scientific and medical needs were accommodated in the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, set up in 1899. The School of Oriental Studies, established in 1916, trained British administrators across the empire, offering language instruction and cultural knowledge of older and newer colonies; the School’s motto, “Knowledge is power.” Africa was later added to its remit. After 1918, the economic significance of the empire increased. In the nationally symbolic space of Trafalgar Square and the adjoining Strand, the most significant imperial territories were soon to be represented by imposing administrative and diplomatic premises: after Australia House (1914), came India House (1924), Canada House (1925), Africa House (1928), and South Africa House (1933). With the British Empire Exhibition taking place at Wembley in 1924, London was provided with its first major national sports stadium. The event also extended imperial toponymy to some of West London’s prominent thoroughfares. These visible signs of empire did not of course stand alone, but became part of a larger cosmopolitan totality.

Postimperial City In the 21st Century, postimperial London is as present as was once the Imperial City. Over half a century after the demise of empire, citizens originating in the one-time colonies and their descendants have transformed the ethnic composition of the city. Almost half of the country’s ethnic minority population lives in London where it forms a substantial fifth of the city’s population. While London’s cosmopolitan and multicultural society consists of citizens originating from all over the world, speaking over 300 languages, the roots of most of them can be described, according to different perspectives, as either postcolonial or postimperial. What was once the infrastructure for maintaining an empire has become an infrastructure for maintaining, at least in part, a world economy of capitalism: the financial services industry, including banking, insurance, law, and real estate; international institutions and multinational corporate headquarters; cosmopolitan educational and cultural sectors: museums, universities, libraries, theaters, and research institutes. Like others of its kind, this is a postimperial global city.

See Also: Urban Architecture; Urban Design; World/Global Cities.

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Further Reading Atkinson, D., Cosgrove, D., Notaro, A., 1999. Empire in modern Rome: shaping and remembering an imperial city, 1870–1911. In: Driver, F., Gilbert, D. (Eds.), Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 40–63. Chase-Dunn, C.K., 1985. The system of world cities, AD 800–1975. In: Timberlake, M. (Ed.), Urbanization in the World-Economy. Academic Press, New York, pp. 269–292. Darwin, J., 2007. After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires. Allen Lane, London. Imperial cities: overlapping territories, intertwined histories. In: Driver, F., Gilbert, D. (Eds.), 1999. Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 1–20. Fuller, M., 2006. Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian Imperialism. Routledge, London. Gillem, M.L., 2007. America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London. Hall, P., 1993. The changing role of capital cities: six types of capital city. In: Taylor, P., Lengelle, J.G., Andrew, C. (Eds.), Capital Cities: International Perspectives. Carleton University Press, Ottawa, ON, pp. 69–84. Hochschild, A., 1998. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Central Africa. Houghton Mifflin, New York. Hopkins, K. (Ed.), 2001. Globalization in World History. Pimlico, London. King, A.D., 1990. Global Cities: Postimperialism and the Internationalization of London. Routledge, London. King, A.D., 2016. Writing the Global City: Globalisation, Postcolonialism and the Urban (Architext). Routledge, London. Metcalf, T., 1989. An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain’s Raj. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Said, E., 1993. Culture and Imperialism. Vintage, London. Scarr, C., 1995. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Rome. Penguin Books, London. Scriver, P., 2007. Empire-building and thinking in the public works department of British India. In: Scriver, P., Prakash, V. (Eds.), Colonial Modernities: Building, Dwelling and Architecture in British India and Ceylon. Routledge, London. Skinner, G.W., 1977. The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. Smith, T., 1999. A grand work of noble conception’: the Victoria Memorial and imperial London. In: Driver, F., Gilbert, D. (Eds.), Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity. Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 21–39. Steinhardt, N.R.S., 1999. Chinese Imperial City Planning. University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu. Wright, G., 1991. The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

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Citizen Science Victoria Fast, Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada Billy Tusker Haworth, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Crowdsourcing Contributions (obtaining content or completing tasks) from the public, typically through the Internet Citizen data collection Volunteers record observations and collect data on phenomena in the physical world, contributing to crowdsourced datasets Citizen data interpretation Volunteers perform simple, largely online-based data analysis tasks through activities such as image interpretation or game playing Distributed computing Volunteers donate their idle computing power (including devices such as smartphones) for processing of large or complex scientific datasets Geographical citizen science Citizen science efforts that contain explicit (and sometimes implicit) geographic information Participatory and/or collaborative science Volunteers are involved in data collection and/or analysis but also problem definition and project design Volunteered geographic information The widespread voluntary engagement of private, nonprofessional citizens in the creation and dissemination of geographic data, in a wide variety of forms through a wide variety of practices

Citizen science denotes the participation of nonprofessional volunteers in scientific practices. This involves a wide variety of activities, largely falling into two categories: citizens collecting data or citizens analyzing data. Citizens partaking in scientific studies as subjects (e.g., survey respondents and participation in medical trials) is not considered citizen science. In citizen science, volunteers around the world record observations and submit the data to scientists for analysis and use in their projects. The collaborative effort of citizens volunteering and collecting data often results in accumulation of rich and diverse datasets for scientific inquiry that would otherwise be unobtainable, with the strength of citizen data collection being both in the number of data recorders and observations and in the capture of unique local, contextual, and/or informal knowledge. The involvement of citizens in data analysis, whereby volunteers systematically examine scientific data such as digital photographs, play computer games, or donate their idle computing power, as examples, aids scientific discovery by facilitating data classification and detection of patterns and trends in large datasets that researchers and computers would not otherwise have the ability to perform. Thus, citizen science can save time and resources. Citizen science challenges the assumptions of scientific inquiry that only dedicated professionals produce knowledge, and that the nonprofessional public are passive recipients in a unidirectional system of knowledge transfer. There are numerous benefits to citizens, including increased public knowledge and interest in science, feelings of self-worth in contributing to important scientific research, and increased public access to spatial knowledge production. Alongside opportunities for science and citizens, there are challenges and unanswered questions: who is contributing (or more aptly, who’s not contributing), how good is the data, when is a citizen science approach suitable/ideal, where is it being done, and how is this impacting traditional science? And perhaps most urgently, what is the connection to (human) geography? Geography is pertinent to citizen science. The spatial nature of projects, citizen observations, and the people involved shape the global coverage, levels of participation, data characteristics, and successes and limitations of citizen science efforts. Citizen science projects operate from local and regional to national and global spatial scales. Volunteers may be monitoring unique animal species in their local region, such as the recording of humpback whale sightings in bays on the east coast of Australia through a project called Marine Mammal Watch, or contributing to global datasets with millions of observations, such as eBird, which harnesses the collective power of birder observations volunteered from around the world. The geographic scale of a citizen science project is related to project objectives and the spatial distribution of the phenomena being studied. Scale influences both the data collected, including how it can be used, and who participates in the project. There are geographies associated with citizen scientists beyond the locations of projects. Demographics play a role in dictating who contributes to citizen science. Some projects require subject knowledge or particular skills, such as computer literacy, which may exclude parts of the population from participating. Furthermore, many projects are Web based (e.g., projects on the Zooniversedan online portal of citizen science projects) and therefore require technology access and literacy, which is further dependent on income and education. On local and global scales there are vast portions of populations who do not have access to digital and Internet technologies and thus the notion of the digital divide impacts geographies of citizen science participation. There are further biases related to uneven benefits gained from volunteering, with those in societies unable to participate in citizen science due to elements of the digital divide becoming further marginalized through their disproportionate access to the knowledge system.

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The impact of who participates, and more aptly who does not participate, is further explored in the “Who are citizen scientists” section. The most explicit geographic component of citizen science project is the geographic data that captures the spatial distributions of phenomena being observed. For some citizen science projects, there is not necessarily a geolocational component to the data (e.g., amateur astronomy observations or participation in online games like Foldit, where citizen scientists solve puzzles that aid protein science), but for many there is. These include, among others, citizens recording species observations, locations of litter, or analyzing natural disaster damage from aerial photographs. The explicit spatial data exist as geographic coordinates (e.g., the coordinates of a raspberry bush reported on Falling Fruit), addresses (e.g., the address of a backyard ice rink reported via RinkWatch), features (e.g., rare plant species in Nosehill Park reported in PlantWatch), and geographical boundaries (e.g., Snowy Owl spotting by city on eBird). There is also implicit spatial data, typically nonnumeric indications of location, such as “over there.” Increasingly, machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence are learning how to understand/use implicit spatial data. For example, computers are becoming infinitely more sophisticated at identifying the location of photos based on local landmarks, points of interest, or landscape characteristics (e.g., from the shoreline or cliff outline). Where citizen science efforts contain explicit (and sometimes implicit) geographic information, the term geographical citizen science can be used. Geographical citizen science refers to a subset of citizen science in which the collection of locational information is integral to the scientific study. Here we see links to volunteered geographic information (VGI). VGI involves the widespread voluntary engagement of private, nonprofessional citizens in the creation and dissemination of geographic data, in a wide variety of forms through a wide variety of practices. While geographical citizen science can be considered to fall under the definition of VGI, citizen science and VGI remain separate concepts. Citizen science focuses on the public’s contribution to more traditional notions of science, and these contributions do not necessarily include a geographic component. Contrastingly, VGI focuses on volunteers’ contributions of geographic data, which may or may not have a scientific goal. To summarize, citizen science is scientific, and VGI is spatial, though many of the key topics within each phenomenon overlap: protocols related to the project design, participant contribution, and technical and data collection infrastructure, as examples.

History and Trends Citizen science is not new. Citizens were integral to early science (before 1800s), where there were few formal qualifications and simplistic equipment to support scientific exploration and discovery. Scientists (including geographers) have relied on volunteers for data collection when a research team was not feasible/possible. A notable geographic example is Dudley Stamp’s 1960s land use survey of Britain, engaging thousands of volunteers to complete much of the fieldwork. Citizen science occurred less during the period of big science, where controlled experiments, specialized tools, and formalized qualifications required to do science excluded ordinary people. The resurgence of citizen science in the last two decades can be attributed to technological developments and societal shifts. Advancements in networked technologies, including the simultaneous advancement in the World Wide Web (the Web) and the miniaturization of scientific instruments, have enabled the proliferation of and broader participation in citizen science projects. In what began as a distributed read-only platform (Web 1.0), the Web has evolved to be a powerful communication (Web 2.0) and collaboration (Web 3.0) tool. In its first iteration, the Web was an open-source information space where pages and documents are identified and interlinked by uniform resource locators, more commonly known as URLs or Web addresses. As a read-only platform, it is used to distribute a one-way flow of information. Web 2.0, defined as an interactive read and write Web, supported a two-way flow of information and facilitated greater communication. It led to the growth of user-generated content (UGC) and the locationrelevant cousin, user-generated geographic content or VGI. Web 2.0 developments provided a medium for human communication, enabling citizen science projects to achieve a critical mass of participation not previously possible. Supported by the Web, citizen science now involves millions of citizens and billions of data points. The capacity to do citizen science was further advanced by networked digital technology, including the miniaturization of scientific instruments (Internet of Things and sensor web) and ubiquity of personal devices (e.g., Global Positioning System, smartphones, and cameras). Here, these Web 3.0 developments support connectivity and the integration of people and technology. Participation in citizen science projects can be as easy as snapping a photo on your smartphone and uploading it via an app. Pair this ease of contribution with normative secondary and postsecondary education and broader societal shifts toward greater citizen participation in government and other professional activities (e.g., participatory budgeting), and we see more citizens involved in citizen science projects.

Who Are Citizen Scientists? Citizen science contributors often actively share their unique local, contextual, informal, and/or formal knowledge. Pertinent questions relate to who contributes, what motivates citizens to participate, what are the learning outcomes for both citizens and science, and who runs this science? Who contributes to citizen science? The short answer: everyone and anyone. The reality: demographics and geographies of inequality and exclusion play a role in defining who contributes to citizen science. Various levels of expertise, skills, and/or capital

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are required to become a citizen scientist. Projects require a range of topical knowledge (e.g., species of animal), particular skills (e.g., computer literacy), or equipment (e.g., a weather station). A degree of time commitment is often an essential element of citizen science (but not always, see the next section on citizen science activities), which favors those with generally more time available, such as the retired or youth. These factors, among other issues, limit certain parts of the population from equitably participating. Research has shown that citizen scientists are predominantly male, well-educated, and from higher income brackets, affording them both time and financial resources. This trend is slowly changing, as a greater number of citizen science projects are tackling a wider range of topics; actively targeting diverse participants, developing broader engagement strategies, and reducing barriers to participation. Motivation to participate ranges from explicit acknowledgment of volunteers’ contributions to intrinsic value derived from participating. On the one side, participants are enticed by the gamification component (the Pokémon Go effect) and rewarded through tokens, points, leveling up, certificates, and sometimes the addition of friendly competition. The rewards rarely have any monetary value but satisfy urges to explore and collect (an added bonus: collecting digital tokens seems to have less of an environmental impact than collecting valuable “collectors” trinkets of yesteryear that now are in abundance in pawn shops). Beyond, or in addition to, rewards, citizen scientists can be motivated by intrinsic or altruistic valuesdthe desire to help. Wanting to contribute to the production of knowledge that can influence genuine scientific outcomes, potentially transforming public and institutional behavior can be a significant motivator. The learning outcomes for participating citizens range from personal development, knowledge acquisition, and project-specific skills. Individually, citizen scientists are encouraged to learn, participate, and contribute to science, which inspires a better understanding and appreciation of science and the world around us. Contributors who are engaged in the topic of interest (e.g., litter mapping) are often more inclined to be advocates for that topic (e.g., hosting a community cleanup day). They, in turn, inspire others. Contributors also develop generic knowledge on that topic. For instance, to keep with the litter example, contributors educate themselves on the “going zero” waste movement and reduce their plastic use. Motivations can also be temporal, with weekends, warmer months, and daytime proving more popular for volunteers to do field collection activities. The leaders of citizen science projects are responsible for sound research design, establishing research objectives, developing a methodology, controlling for biases, addressing limitations, and managing legal and ethical issues. These people are often, but not exclusively, scientists because of the significant expensesdboth labor and capitaldof managing a project. It is common to think that citizen science projects are free because they are sustained by volunteersdfree data creation, sometimes free analysis and project scoping. But there is a significant amount of work required in developing a project, often needing a team of scientists or leaders to ensure sound project design, develop supporting technologies and methods, recruit and train participants, manage and organize data, analyze and present data, and share the results. Academic and research-based investigators are often awarded a grant or receive donations to do this type of research. While many projects are still headed by a traditional science leadership team, the provision of open and free tools to collect data has led to a growing number of bottom-up projects that are initiated and led by motivated individuals or community groups. Organizations and initiatives are beginning to emerge, such as SciStarter.com, that provide a support network for citizen scientists and scientists doing citizen science by sharing best practices, promoting projects, and providing tools to develop and support project management.

Overview of Citizen Science Activities Citizen science encompasses a diverse and expanding variety of activities and projects, facilitating public involvement in science in different ways with varying outcomes for citizens and for science. Activities range from those demanding minimal effort by volunteers to those with much greater time, knowledge, or attention requirements of volunteers, and from those where the volunteer performs tasks for science to those where the citizen aids in designing and defining the scientific project. Table 1 presents an overview of the types of activities performed by citizen scientists, summarized into four broad categories.

Distributed Computing In distributed computing, citizens download software to their personal computers or other devices, such as tablets or smartphones, to facilitate the processing of data. Data analysis takes place as part of the computer’s background processing or when the device is idle (much like the running of a screen saver), and processed results are automatically sent back to the project when tasks are complete (this can occur when the device is connected to Wi-Fi to minimize data charges to the volunteer). In this way, the activity requires very little effort, skills, resources, or time commitment from the volunteer, with the only notable cost being minimal power consumption for the device(s) in use. Volunteers do need access to necessary technological devices, however. Examples of distributed computing include World Community Grid and SETI@home. World Community Grid utilizes donated computing power to assist with scientific problems related to health and sustainability, such as the search for drugs to combat the Zika virus or to prevent the onset of AIDS. Volunteers choose a research area that interests them, and their computer performs calculations when it is idle to help scientists identify potential areas for further lab research. Similarly, SETI@home sees volunteers download free software that analyses data during idle computing time, but in this case, using radio telescope data to aid the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence.

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Citizen Science Types of citizen science activities.

Citizen science activity

Brief description

Distributed computing

Volunteers donate their idle computing power (including devices such as smartphones) for processing of large or complex scientific datasets Data interpretation/volunteered thinking Volunteers perform simple, largely online-based data analysis tasks through activities such as image interpretation or game playing Data collection/crowdsourcing Volunteers record observations and collect data on phenomena in the physical world, contributing to crowdsourced datasets Participatory and/or collaborative science Volunteers are involved in data collection and/or analysis but also problem definition and project design

Example projects World Community Grid SETI@home USGS iCoast Invader ID Foldit eBird iNaturalist OpenLitterMap Extreme Citizen Science: Analysis and Visualization

Distributed computing provides numerous opportunities, despite the low-level participation requirements. It reduces time, financial, and human and computing resource limitations in the analysis of large datasets, allowing more to be done more efficiently. Volunteers acquire positive outcomes associated with the knowledge that they are contributing to something important, with projects often reporting back to volunteers how much they have contributed and how their contributions have been of assistance.

Data Interpretation/Volunteered Thinking Data interpretation and volunteered thinking activities require volunteers to perform basic data analysis tasks, usually on their personal computers or other devices. Such projects harness the ability of the human brain’s cognitive abilities to identify patterns that computers cannot. Many scientific endeavors use imagery as data, and volunteers can help classify and interpret such data, for instance. This is the case with USGS: iCoast, which has volunteers visually compare aerial photographs of locations before and after major US storms to assist in completing coastal damage assessments, and Invader ID, a project on the Zooniverse platform that asks volunteers to identify marine invertebrates in photographs taken from sample locations at various locations and times to enhance understandings of human impacts on marine communities. The same images are presented to multiple volunteers on multiple occasions so that any individual misidentifications or mistakes can be corrected by the collective wisdom of the crowd. Citizen science also occurs through gamification of projects, whereby participants volunteer their thinking through the playing of online games. Elements such as multiplayer competition and participants’ rankings or rewards serve as additional motivations for volunteers. Players of Foldit, for example, apply problem-solving skills to manipulate data related to three-dimensional protein structures, which can aid biology in finding cures for various diseases. The diversity demonstrated in playing styles and approaches and the absence of biases associated with content knowledge exhibited by nonexpert volunteers are strengths of this project. This form of citizen science requires greater volunteer time and effort commitment than distributed computing but arguably provides increased benefits for the volunteer, including the enjoyment of game play.

Data Collection/Crowdsourcing Data collection by volunteers is premised on the notion that professional scientists cannot be everywhere at all times to observe geographically diverse phenomena, such as species observations, and citizens represent a global network of potential data collectors. Nonprofessionals voluntarily collecting observations in the field or monitoring real-world phenomena for science represents a mode of citizen science that predates the Internet (e.g., the annual Audubon Christmas bird count has been running since 1900). Yet, the Internet has increased the scope of projects and the scales of volunteering, enabling increasingly large and detailed crowdsourced datasets to be procured for science. eBird, the world’s largest biodiversity-related citizen science project, draws on the enthusiasm and meticulous data recording habits of birders around the world and reports more than 100 million bird sightings are contributed each year, forming an open online dataset with countless potential uses for ornithological science and related fields. Over 200 scientific articles have been published utilizing eBird data to date. Of course, it is not just avian species that are observed by citizen scientists. iNaturalist, for instance, allows volunteers to collect and transmit observations of any organisms they encounter via a smartphone application. The data are then included in various global scientific data repositories. And nonanimal phenomena can be observed too. Open Litter Map, an environmental activism initiative, calls on volunteers to monitor the presence of plastic and other litter to build a crowdsourced dataset to inform environmental science, public behaviors, and policies in reducing global pollution. To participate in data collection, some knowledge of the phenomena being observed is usually required, though any specific knowledge or skills required is usually provided through basic training or instructions to the volunteer. Some forms of data

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collection are more passive and do not require any knowledge or skills, however, such as those that exploit the built-in sensors of smartphones to automatically detect and record phenomena such as noise, light, or location. Data collection also requires varying degrees of time commitment for volunteers, and sometimes basic equipment or materials too, not to mention Internet/technology access for data submission. But in addition to the advantages of distributed computing and data interpretation, data collection often affords the volunteer other benefits, such as the opportunity to spend time outside, to engage with nature or to socialize with other volunteers.

Participatory and/or Collaborative Science In the majority of citizen science activities, the project goals and design remain formulated and managed by professional scientists, with volunteers performing one or more of the tasks described above. Increasingly, projects are emerging that provide the citizen even greater input. In what has been termed “community science” or “participatory science,” volunteers are also involved in problem definition and designing approaches and suitable methods for data collection, as well as collecting data. Data analysis and publication of results are usually still reserved for professional scientists, as often citizens lack this specific expertise. Collaborative science or “extreme citizen science” is a further step toward equal access to scientific knowledge production and sees participants potentially integrated into all parts of a project. Citizen science at this level presents the opportunity for science to be undertaken completely by nonprofessional volunteers to achieve their own specific goals.

Adding Citizens to the Scientific Method Citizen science, like any scientific endeavor, requires a sound research methodology and data management techniques to optimize scientific outcomes. The techniques of traditional scientific data management apply to citizen science, but arguably, citizen science can be more complex because of the addition of volunteers. An important consequence of who can and does lead and/or participate in citizen science is the potential introduction of sampling biases in citizen science data, including geographic biases relating to where volunteers are, and content biases associated with the societal, ideological, and political positions of participants. For example, when a bird dataset is gathered using citizen science, does it accurately reflect the distribution of birds or merely the locations of the citizen scientists? Thus, citizen science tends to be better suited to where there are more people or an engaged community (e.g., birders). Citizen science projects cannot often obtain, or adhere to, accepted scientific standards (e.g., random sampling), but a robust project design and subsequently scientific method have a significant impact on the quality and uncertainty of data created. Data quality has been a hot topic in citizen science (and VGI, too). Similar to expert-collected data, there are differences between the quality of observations from different volunteers. Data collection standardization is important for subsequent data quality. Furthermore, volunteers who gain training from experienced observers often return results with reduced errors and increased data quality. Once the data are collected, data validity evaluation methods can help scientists ensure their data are of good quality. Other potential sources of data uncertainty include positional inaccuracies of observations, misidentifications/misinterpretations (e.g., of species), unknown reliability (in timing, regularity, or volume) of contributions, and volunteer dropout. Lastly, project design needs to consider balancing openness, where data collected by a network of citizens should be subsequently available to that network of citizens, with (geo)privacy, where project leads ensure the ethical and confidential treatment of personal information. Overall, citizen science engages the public in traditional scientific endeavors and can make a meaningful contribution to scientific inquiry. Citizen science is geographically relevant through scale, demographics, and explicit/implicit locational data. Citizen science has a long history but is more relevant than ever resulting from technological and societal advancements. Citizen scientists can be anyone, but in reality, participation inequality is observed, and volunteers are often limited to those with generic knowledge, specific skills, equipment and technology access, time to share, and motivation to participate. The participation of citizen scientists ranges from passive to active contributors; as simple as turning on a “monitor now” function on a smartphone to driving the project scope and research question. Citizen science requires sound methodologies and data management techniques, similar to traditional science, to have the greatest impact while managing and reducing limitations such as inherent biases. Citizen science, and in particular geographical citizen science, is as, if not more, important in the 21st Century as it ever has been. In a climate of rapid societal and environmental change, “fake news,” and increased public involvement in a wide range of traditionally “expert” arenas (e.g., citizen journalism), the opportunities presented by citizen science for conducting robust scientific research with the meaningful involvement of citizens are invaluable to both modern science and citizens, both of which have increasing demands, but also converging aspirations to positively impact the world.

See Also: Volunteered Geographic Information.

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Further Reading Bhattacharjee, Y., 2005. Citizen scientists supplement work of Cornell Researchers. Science 308 (5727), 1402–1403. Bonney, R., Cooper, C.B., Dickinson, J., Kelling, S., Phillips, T., Rosenberg, K.V., Shirk, J., 2009. Citizen science: a developing tool for expanding science knowledge and scientific literacy. Bioscience 59 (11), 977–984. Bruce, E., Albright, L., Sheehan, S., Blewitt, M., 2014. Distribution patterns of migrating humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) in Jervis Bay, Australia: a spatial analysis using geographical citizen science data. Appl. Geogr. 54, 83–95. Connors, J.P., Lei, S., Kelly, M., 2012. Citizen science in the age of neogeography: utilizing volunteered geographic information for environmental monitoring. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 102 (6), 1267–1289. Cooper, C., 2016. Citizen Science: How Ordinary People Are Changing the Face of Discovery. Overlook Press, New York. Elwood, S., Goodchild, M.F., Sui, D., 2012. Researching volunteered geographic Information: spatial data, geographic research, and new social practice. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 102 (3), 571–590. Haklay, M., 2013. Citizen science and volunteered geographic information – overview and typology of participation. In: Sui, D.Z., Elwood, S., Goodchild, M.F. (Eds.), Crowdsourcing Geographic Knowledge: Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI) in Theory and Practice. Springer, Berlin, pp. 105–122. Silvertown, J., 2009. A new dawn for citizen science. Trends Ecol. Evol. 24, 467–471. Sui, D.Z., Elwood, S., Goodchild, M.F., 2013. Crowdsourcing Geographic Knowledge: Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI) in Theory and Practice. Springer, Berlin. Wiggins, A., Bonney, R., Graham, E., Henderson, S., Kelling, S., Littauer, R., LeBuhn, G., Lotts, K., Michener, W., Newman, G., Russell, E., Stevenson, R., Weltzin, J., 2013. Data Management Guide for Public Participation in Scientific Research. DataONE, Albuquerque, NM.

Relevant Websites CitizenScience.org http://citizenscience.org/. SciStarter https://scistarter.com/. Zooniverse https://www.zooniverse.org/.

Citizenship Vera Chouinard, School of Geography and Earth Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Citizenship How we are situated within relations, practices, and discourses of power through which our communities, nations, and the world are governed. Civil society The World Health Organization (2019) defines civil society in the following way: “Civil society refers to the space for collective action around shared interests, purposes and values, generally distinct from government and commercial forprofit actors. Civil society includes charities, development NGOs, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, social movements, coalitions and advocacy groups. However civil society is not homogeneous and the boundaries between civil society and government or civil society and commercial actors can be blurred.” Critical social geography An umbrella term used to identify research that uses critical social theory and considers progressive ways to improve people’s lives. Differencing The processes through which embodied differences, such as gender, disability, and race, become bases of discrimination and of constructing citizens as negatively different or “other.” Feminist geography A subfield that became increasingly influential particularly from the 1980s onward and focused on how gender and intersecting differences such as race empower and disempower people. Radical geography A subfield that emerged in the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It developed a strong Marxist orientation and emphasis on class differences although there was also work by socialist feminists. Sexual citizenship The performance of particular sexual identities as citizens. Shadow citizens Citizens who enjoy rights in principle but not in practice. Social model of disability Challenges medical models of disability by emphasizing that people are disabled by physical and social barriers in their environments rather than treating disability as an individual medical condition that requires medical intervention. Socialist-feminist A branch of feminist geography and feminist studies concerned with how gender and class intersect and help shape people’s lives and environments. Transnational Processes that unfold across national boundaries. Utility-maximizing economic man A concept that assumed that men’s utility maximizing behaviors (e.g., with respect to short commutes) were universal. Whiteness An attribute of some places, a position of structural advantage, and a racialized regime of power and oppression and discursive practices.

Citizenship refers to how we are, diversely, situated within and engaged with relations, practices, and discourses of power through which our communities, nations, world, and our lives are governed. It involves claiming, exercising, and contesting rights, entitlements, and obligations (e.g., rights to vote, to strike, and the obligation to pay taxes). It also involves processes of inclusion and exclusion: such as who is and who is not granted the status of citizen and legal immigrant, and which groups face particularly severe barriers to exercising citizenship in practicedfor instance, groups such as homeless and disabled people. Citizenship is also geographically uneven across the globe with less affluent countries in particular less able to ensure that rights to conditions of life that promote well-being, such as access to timely and effective health care, freedom from poverty, and access to services such as clean water and affordable transit, are realized in practice. In what follows I consider how geographic studies of citizenship have evolved (based on the literature in English). I begin with an overview of the origins of critical geographic thinking about citizenship in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s focusing, in particular, on developments in radical, feminist, and critical social geography. This overview is followed by a discussion of how geographers are addressing matters of citizenship in the 21st Century. In the conclusion, I consider some of the ways that geographers might take this work forward and also help to ensure that experiences of citizenship (as well as non-citizenship status) are more empowering and inclusive of diversity than they are today.

Origins of Thinking Critically About Citizenship in Geography (1970s–1990s) Geographers’ interests in citizenship date back to the classical writings of thinkers such as Strabo and Ptolemy; however, it has only been since the 1970s, with the rise of radical, feminist, and critical social geography, that geographers have delved more deeply into the formation and contestation of citizenship. The radical geographers of the 1970s and 1980s played a pioneering role in terms of

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putting issues of social injustice, in particular in terms of class location and the exploitation of workers in capitalist society and space, on the research agenda. Although not necessarily framed as matters of citizenship this scholarship nonetheless highlighted inequalities among citizens and also advanced the notion that the point of geographic knowledge about such inequalities was to change society for the better. It was during the 1970s that the first body of literature concerned with women’s lives, struggles, and oppression in society and space emerged. But it was from the 1980s onwards that feminist geographers seemed to “hit their stride” (in terms of confidence, knowledge, and determination) sufficiently to be able to openly critique scholarly practices that continued to render women’s lives far less visible than those of their male counterparts. Janice Monk and Susan Hanson, in a 1982 article aptly entitled “On Not Excluding Half the Human in Human Geography,” argued that geographic research was not only flawed empirically in failing to consider women’s lives it was also theoretically and methodologically flawed (for instance, in using concepts such as “utility maximizing economic man” to understand intraurban migration or housing patterns and failing to address gender differences with respect to phenomenon such as commuting). They also rightly went a step further to challenge women’s exclusion from and marginalization within geography as a disciplinedsomething that remains a problem to this day. Again, although not necessarily framed in terms of citizenship, work such as this helped to highlight the pervasive sexism in the academy, how this was contributing to an extremely impoverished understanding of women’s lives, rights, and issues as well as denying them rights to inclusion and advancement in academic workplaces. Linda McDowell’s work on the gendered nature of the labor force and on gendered expectations of how work would be performed in sectors such as merchant banking in the United Kingdom helped to shed further light on gendered working identities and on why women are so often disadvantaged in the workplace in terms of recognition, respect, and advancement (not to mention pay). Another important contribution to feminist geographic thinking about citizenship during the 1980s is studies focusing on the role of the state and planning processes in reproducing gender relations and sociospatial divisions of labor oppressive to women. Sophie Bowlby, for example, examined how postwar planning practices in Britain gave rise to suburban environments designed to reproduce women’s domestic roles in the home. As in the wider feminist literature, the state was recognized as a critical site of struggle over policies and practices shaping women’s lives in areas such as employment equity, access to services such as daycare and public transit, the availability of welfare supports and planning the environments that women would live in. Much of this work was socialist–feminist in orientation, treating gender and class relations as pivotal, intertwined relations of power that reproduced capitalist societies, and ways and places of life. If the 1980s saw feminist geographers further develop their critique of male-stream human geography and in the process begin to show why women’s experiences of being a citizen were often less empowering than those of men, the 1990s was a period of soulsearching among feminist and to a lesser extent among radical geographers about who was and who was not being considered as part of the project of creating a more critical, inclusive, and progressive human geography. Gill Valentine, for example, drew attention to how lesbian women’s experiences of urban space were often overlookeddneglecting to consider how, for instance, streets were coded as “for” heterosexual people and how those navigating such spaces as “sexual dissidents” had to struggle to move through those spaces on their own terms (e.g., by listening to culturally appropriate alternative music). Chouinard and Grant, in a 1995 article in the journal Antipode, also addressed this topic but, in addition, critiqued geographers’ failure to include disabled women as worthy subjects of research or to delve into ways in which they are oppressed in spaces of everyday life (for example, when subjected to invasive questioning by able-bodied people about “what is wrong” with their bodies or minds in public spaces of life). Feminist geographers during the 1990s also engaged in more explicit ways with questions about the relations and practices of citizenship in which women (and men) were engaged and the socially and spatially complex ways that struggles over rights unfold in late capitalist society. A very important contribution to rethinking citizenship as a gendered set of relations and practices was challenging traditional conceptions of political acts as occurring exclusively in formal political spaces (e.g., state legislatures) pointing out not only that private spaces such as the home may serve as important spaces of organizing for women, but also that women’s political acts often blur the boundaries between the private and public and challenge assumptions about formal and informal politics. Feminist geographers helped to demonstrate that many women, denied full access to formal political spaces of life, have to be creative in making spaces for political action by, for example, making public what is usually privatedthrough collective displays of individual grief at the disappearance and death of their children at the hands of an oppressive political regime in the case of the Madras (Mothers) of La Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, for instance. Political actions may cross private and public boundaries, do not always involve direct engagement with the state and may have effects that are private, public, or both. We need, therefore, to be as concerned with how citizenship unfolds in civil society and not simply through direct engagement with state institutions, officials, and staff. By thinking about gendered political acts in this broader, more spatially fluid way we can also appreciate that citizenship encompasses more than formal political activities such as voting. There were two other notable developments in feminist geographies of citizenship during the 1990s. One was, as the years went by, growing interest in what Kobayashi termed processes of differencing in society and spacedwhich enabled and empowered some citizens and disempowered citizen and noncitizen “others.” Feminist geographers explored how multiple embodied differences, in addition to gender and class, marginalized some people in terms of exercising rights of citizenship or gaining those rights while privileging others. Sexual citizenship was an important area of inquiry in this regard. Brown, building on work by feminist geographers such as Valentine as well as queer studies, for example, examined how AIDS activists in Vancouver were challenging representations of the illness as an individual medical problem and the related erasure of gay men’s lived experiences of marginalized citizenship and associated issues such as insufficient access to culturally appropriate health care. A more radical democratic

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citizenship was needed that would help to ensure that their stories of living with AIDS were heard and that they had opportunities to shape the policies, services, and practices affecting their lives. The other notable development in feminist geographies of citizenship in the 1990s was rethinking relations, practices, and discourses of citizenship in more transnational ways. Kofman has examined the impacts of a multiplicity of jurisdictions in the European Union on the status of groups such as migrant laborers, women immigrants, and refugeesdshowing how groups often constructed as “outsiders” within civil society are marginalized in terms of abilities to claim full rights and entitlements of citizenship. Such work by feminist geographers is helping to show that understanding how diverse people are situated in relation to rights, practices, discourses, and spaces of citizenship requires close attention to processes of inclusion and exclusion, differencing and oppression which cross-cut transnational, national, local, and personal scales. Pratt, for example, showed how the temporary worker status granted to migrant female Filipino domestic workers under the Canadian live-in care-giver program helped to lock them into working for particular employers in their homes in Vancouver and also made them vulnerable to the denial of fundamental human rights such as the right to privacy in their employers’ homes. The 1990s were also years during which a small body of critical geographic research concerned with disabled people’s lives emerged. Some of this work advocated for a social model of disability (in which it is social barriers to inclusion rather than the physically impaired person which is the problem as in the medical models of disability that had prevailed to date). Some of this debate was captured in the journal Transactions of the British Institute of Geographers in an exchange between Gleeson, Butler, Imrie, and Golledge about why, in the first three geographers’ views, Golledge’s behavioral work on the visually impaired and wayfinding veered too close to medical models of disability. Among the examples of this that they gave was that by using concepts and terms such as “distorted spaces” to understand how visually impaired people experienced their environments, Golledge was, at least inadvertently, constructing these people as “less able” than their sighted counterparts (i.e., as opposed to being differently able). These and other debates contributed to the emergence of a small body of work concerned with geographies of disability some of which had direct and indirect implications for understanding disabled persons’ experiences of citizenship. In the first edited collection on geographies of illness, impairment, and disability (Mind and Body Spaces edited by Ruth Butler and Hester Parr), Butler wrote an account of how experiences of marginalization within and exclusion from the LGBTQ community were accentuated when one was also visually impaired (e.g., being unable to rely on visual cues to judge if someone was attracted to you in settings such as a gay bar or party). In an analysis that arguably foreshadowed much more recent calls to understand citizenship as embedded in the everyday and mundane acts (more on this in the next section on Geographies of Citizenship in the 21st Century), Butler’s work helped to complicate our understanding of experiences of belonging as a sexually dissident citizen. In the same volume, Chouinard considered disabled women’s activism in Canada and beyond arguing that these activists were marginalized in the disability movement on the basis of gender and in the women’s movement on the bases of disability and other differences such as being sexually dissident. Gleeson’s (1999) historical materialist account of disability and the geographies of disabled people’s lives also at least indirectly touches on matters of citizenship. He shows, for example, how the industrial revolution and the rise of the factory system of production contributed to the construction of disabled workers/citizens as insufficiently productive and how exclusion from work and sometimes even from their own homes and families forced them to struggle to survive on the Victorian streets of Melbourne or in large-scale asylums for the “insane.” These were not the “shadow citizens” sometimes referred to today (who have rights in principle but often not in practice) but “rejected citizens.”

Geographies of Citizenship in the 21st Century: Whiteness, Disability, Transnational and Postcolonial Perspectives, Resistance, and the Everyday This section provides an overview of some key trajectories of change in contemporary geographic research concerned with citizenship. One such trajectory is growing concern with the sociospatial construction of “whiteness”dunderstood simultaneously as an attribute of some places, a position of structural advantage, a racialized regime of power and oppression, and discursive practices. Despite interest in issues of racism among early radical geographers such as Bunge (who famously led geographic expeditions in cities such as Detroit designed to impart the knowledge and tools to enable members of black communities to contest issues such as poverty and displacement), it has only been in this century that geographers, inspired by critical race theory, have begun to place more emphasis on how “whiteness” works as a sociospatial regime of power and privilege. Exceptions to this in the 1990s included articles by Frankenburg and by Bonnett. What this more recent wave of geographical research does is draw attention to how whiteness undergirds and reinforces racist practices that privilege white citizens over those of color. It also reminds us of how we often remain oblivious to how these regimes of privilege and oppression are at work in our daily lives and influence the extent to which we can exercise rights of citizenship in practice. In their 2000 article in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers entitled “Racism Out of Place,” Kobayashi and Peake called for an antiracist geography for the new millennium that would interrogate the social and spatial dynamics of whiteness. Using a case study of the school shootings in Littleton, Colorado, they demonstrated how the whiteness of the community (there was only one African-American family in it) was associated with representations of Littleton as a “normal” American community where such acts of violence were an aberration. This was despite the facts that the son in the African-American family was one of the victims of the shootings and that the white young male perpetrators gravitated to racist content on neo-Nazi Internet sites. The authors point out that had a similar event occurred in a different place, such as an inner-city neighborhood with predominantly people of color, it

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would have been scripted quite differently in media and popular discourse. There would likely, for instance, have been talk of dysfunctional families and disaffected youthdin other words, representations of the community as fundamentally “abnormal” and flawed. Peake and Ray, in their 2001 article on racializing the Canadian landscape, raise similar concerns showing, for example, how whiteness is intrinsic to our understanding of the nation (e.g., images of the Great White North that help to erase the presence, history and lives of Indigeneous citizens) and construct the desirable/normal citizen as white. In 2006, Shaw noted that, despite such calls, geographers had been slow to engage with studies of whiteness. She used examples from an Indigeneous inner-city neighborhood in Sydney, Australia, known as “The Block” to illustrate some of the fluid ways in which whiteness is performed and made a basis for specific citizenship claims in place. She notes, for instance, how non-Indigeneous residents or visitors contested being made to feel fearful in the streets of this neighborhood and used tactics such as getting heritage designation for buildings to support gentrification and a whitening of the community. More recently, in 2009, Housel examines the micropractices through which elderly white women try to reassert white privilege in a declining neighborhood in Buffalo where they are frequently targets of crime and where the police presence has diminished. Often unable to afford to move, as suggested to them by police, some of the women use practices, such as no longer carrying a purse, to help regain a sense of being safe from attack. Such practices, she argues, can be read as an attempt to reassert an aspect of the white privilege they enjoyed in the past. Pointing out that geographers have shown growing interest in childhood and whiteness but the two are seldom considered together, in a 2008 article, Vanderbeck examines New York city’s Fresh Air Fund program in place since the 19th Century. He shows how, under this program, inner-city children (mostly black or Latino) were constructed as needing to escape their neighborhoods in the summer to stay with overwhelmingly white families in the suburbs and rural areas. Also examining journalistic accounts of the important destination of the state of Vermont, he argues that these accounts rescripted whiteness as a solution to inequality rather than a problem. Whiteness has also been understood as having a “visceral” geography through which black and brown embodied subjects feel the physical, psychological, and emotional impacts of invisible racialized practices of micro-aggression in academic geography departments. These impacts include the trauma and stress associated with being constructed as less competent or knowledgeable than their white colleagues or fellow graduate students. Geographies of whiteness thus help to enrich our understanding of who counts more or less as citizens and who enjoys rights, such as freedom from discrimination, and who does not and why. They draw attention to how places, for instance, in Canada and the United States, are assigned racialized meanings that associate whiteness with being “normal”/desirable citizens and communities as well as constructing places, homes, and communities where the majority are brown or black (e.g., some inner-city neighborhoods) as abnormal and dysfunctional. Perhaps most importantly, these studies force us to make visible the mundane and taken-for-granted everyday practices that sustain whiteness as a regime of power and oppression and in doing so make some citizens far less equal than others. Although this literature is still not sufficiently engaged with by the majority of human geographers, geographies of disability are also adding to our understanding of differential access to citizenship in society and space. One example is Chouinard’s recent work on how countries of the Global South are located at the extreme global peripheries of law, where disability human rights recognized in principle under international law are very difficult or impossible to realize/exercise in practice. She also calls for greater attention to the geographically uneven production of impairment as well as disabling conditions of life through, for example, the exploitation of cheap labor in unsafe working conditions (e.g., the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh). As in disability studies more generally, Hall and Wilton have called for more relational conceptions of disability in society and space. Among the possible advantages of these would be enabling geographers to further tease out how ableness operates and is reproduced by everyday encounters and practices that value able bodies and minds over others. This in turn would help to make more visible the often taken-for-granted ways in which full citizenship is denied to vulnerable groups such as disabled women and men. Max Counter, in a 2017 article published in the journal Social and Cultural Geography, explores the linkages between becoming (and fearing to become) landmine victims, being displaced from agricultural lands, and experiencing disabling conditions of life in Colombia. He argues that, despite government reassurances that landmine victims will receive reparations, the process of obtaining these is protracted, frustrating, and does not always result in full compensation for citizens who have become landmine victims. He notes as well that the extensive planting of mines during protracted conflict between guerilla factions and government forces, as well as a lack of information about where the mines are located, have created a pervasive geography of fear and that that fear alone is often enough to displace people from farming activities and rural places. Displacement from farming livelihoods is traumatic, and alternative employment and income is difficult to find (although there have been some limited efforts to reemploy landmine victims through activities such as street vending but these jobs do not pay well). So, in addition to physical and psychological impairment, the former worsened through problems with badly fitted prostheses, landmine victims are further traumatized and disabled due to financial insecurity. In a 2017 article in the Canadian Geographer, Wilton et al. explore how disabled immigrants are denied access to citizenship in Canada on the grounds of medical inadmissibility. They note how applicants are constructed as placing an undue burden on health and social services and how these provisions fail to recognize the positive contributions disabled people might make as citizens. Such work in geographies of disability is shedding light on how disabled people are constructed as “shadow citizens” who enjoy rights in principle but not in practice. But we also need to turn a critical eye toward who belongs and who does not in the academic discipline of geography itself. This is arguably a matter of citizenship in the context of the production of knowledge. While there is a growing literature on the ableist academy in disability studies, there are very few autoethnographic accounts of being disabled in geography. This is presumably because we are still not very good at recruiting disabled faculty and students into our discipline.

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Indeed prevailing norms of academic success that emphasize quantity over quality and sameness (ability) over diversity are powerful barriers to remedying this lack. As geographers we all need to take responsibility for changing this climate of exclusion and silencing. Feminist geographers’ efforts to advance our understanding of differential access to citizenship as the outcome of transnational processes such as managing migration have been complemented by research which draws on postcolonial theory. McEwan’s work on gendered forms of citizenship and democratization in postapartheid South Africa stresses the importance of developing nonWesternized conceptions of diverse women’s citizenship. She discusses how black women in customary marriages are denied fundamental rights of citizenship to an extent not found in Western nationsdrights to inherit property or to engage in any political action in spaces of public life for instancedas a result of deeply entrenched, traditional structures of patriarchal forms of authority. She calls for greater attention to how such women develop alternative forms and spaces of citizenship, such as developing self-help groups in the private sphere of the home in their struggles against domestic violence. Feminist geographers with interests in queer theory and studies have continued to explore how sexual citizenship and queer identities are constructed in place. Bain and Nash, for example, consider a women’s bathhouse police raid in Toronto that led to court proceedings and media reports that tended to recognize only heterosexuality and homosexuality as legitimate sexual identities and, in doing so, erased the more experimental and dissident female sexual identities and practices of citizenship that event organizers hoped to promote. As interdisciplinary interest in citizenship grows, and as our world becomes more mobile and interconnected, critical social geographers are making important contributions to understanding transnational, postcolonial, and globalized practices of citizenship. In a 2010 article, for instance, Lorimer examines international conservation “volunteering” as an emerging way of trying to express citizenship at the global scale. He focuses on nonprofit and commercial organizations in the United Kingdom that “place” volunteers in destinations where they can “make a difference” by contributing to conservation (e.g., working to protect animals such as lions). He suggests that this growing phenomenon can be viewed in a number of ways. One is that it is a form of global citizenship informed by universal science. Another is that such volunteering is a response to neoliberal government austerity and cuts in spending and the related notion that “active citizenship” through volunteering is encouraged. Another is to view international conservation volunteering as an assemblage of human and nonhuman beings, objects, emotions, and places. He notes, for example, how volunteers are emotionally drawn to “charismatic” animals such as lions and elephants when deciding on a conservation project and how places must be seen to be “safe” for volunteers. He concludes that these citizenship practices are not global, not particularly effective in terms of conservation (expending carbon from burning airplane fuel, for instance) and involve, in a postcolonial way, asymmetrical relations or power imbalances between wealthier nations or regions that send volunteers and the middle-income nations or regions that receive them. Critical social geographers are also calling for geographies of citizenship to be more closely grounded in understanding the ordinary, everyday acts through which it finds expression. In a 2012 article, for example, Staehli et al. point out that there is a complexity to citizenship as it is expressed/performed in ordinary spaces of everyday lifedsometimes reinforcing but at other times contradicting legal ideals and norms. They argue, further, that there is also a need to recognize the complex spatiality of lived citizenship occurring as it does in multiple sites including those with symbolic and/or institutional meanings. In their view, thinking about citizenship as acts that accumulate through everyday life also makes it easier to see possibilities for more transformative, less oppressive modalities of citizenship. Geographies of citizenship thus have important contributions to make to our understanding of resistance by citizens as well as noncitizen subjects. In 2008, Dickinson et al. also advocated that geographers pay greater attention to citizenship as acts that unfold in everyday spaces of life. They argued that if citizenship is seen as an ongoing process of contestation this would help to reveal its transformative potential. This is arguably a little too simplistic as everyday of acts of citizenship also sometimes involve acquiescing to prevailing expectations of what citizens should and should not do (e.g., avoiding speeding in one’s car and committing murder, respectively). They can also involve acts that affirm, in a more positive and even celebratory way, some aspects of citizenship (such as welcoming ceremonies for new citizens in Canada that help to instill a sense of loyalty). And yet some other acts of citizenship can be contradictory in form and outcome. As a disabled female professor, for example, I can try to claim human rights to freedom from discrimination in an academic workplace on a prohibited ground such as disability under Canadian Human Rights Lawdan act of citizenship that can feel empowering but also oppressive, traumatic, and stressful especially when reasonable accommodations are not realized or maintained in practice. As geographers, we need to keep such complexities firmly in mind when developing geographies of everyday citizenship. This also indicates the importance of attending to the emotions involved in everyday acts of citizenship. Feminist geographers have had an interest in mobility and citizenship and other statuses for some time. For example, in Kofman’s work on the regulation of migrants in the European Union and in Hyndman’s work probing human rights in refugee contexts. Critical social geographers are also addressing connections between mobility and citizenship as in the work mentioned above on how disabled migrants are often denied permission to enter and apply for citizenship in Canada. Cresswell also tackles mobility and citizenship, in a different way, in a 2013 book chapter. He argues that the citizen is a legal, cultural, and social figure who stands at the crossroads of the following geographical imaginations: (1) the imaginary of a rooted and sedentary nation with clear boundaries, (2) the imaginary of a dense, heterogeneous city, and (3) the imaginary of free mobility in a world that is increasingly interconnected. Looking at citizenship historically, he points out that in the ancient polis a citizen was a citizen by birth (women, children, and slaves could not be citizens). In the medieval city, however, it became possible to move to the city, acquire property, and become a citizen. By the end of the 19th Century, citizenship was mostly associated with the nation-state. He argues that, however, toward the end of the 20th Century the declining importance of the nation-state has made the city once again more

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important as a site of citizenship. In our globalized world, mobility is also an important aspect of our citizenship practices. When we travel, we bring documents such as passports to gain entry to countries. As Cresswell points out there is also the notion that citizens have to be protected from others who move differently. Examples of these include illegal immigrants and suspected terrorists. These are examples of unwanted citizens. Cresswell suggests that the terms “shadow citizens,” “barely citizens,” and “insurgent citizens” are useful in capturing the experiences of those citizens who although they are legally citizens are not treated as suchdthis would include groups such as homeless people, disabled people, some elderly people, and many others.

Geographies of Citizenship: Where Do We Go from Here? Geographers continue to make important contributions to our understanding of citizenship in society and space. But how should we be taking research and action on this topic forward in the future? One useful starting point is to delve further into citizenship in our own backyardsdnamely the discipline of geography and spaces of academic life more generally. With respect to the former, and thinking about citizenship broadly as being about who is included and who is not and who is empowered and who is not, we need to delve more deeply into why diverse groups including women, people of color, and disabled people remain under-represented among faculty in geography. Where faculty members from such groups are represented we need to learn more from them about what it is like to be a marginalized member of the academy and what they think needs to change so that they are enabled to do, rather than prevented from doing, the best job they can. We also need to revisit and challenge what is regarded as being a “successful” academic. As some feminist geographers have argued recently, the neoliberal academy with its hyperemphasis on speedy scholarship and productivity measured in quantitative terms and with growth in precarious, contractual teaching jobs, is creating a climate in which mental health challenges are increasing among faculty as well as students. This is a climate in which having an able body and mind confers distinct advantages on those fortunate enough to have them as it does on those who are white and male. Another timely and important avenues for future critical geographies of citizenship are generational differences in how citizenship is understood and performed in places of everyday life. How, for example, do millennials understand and practice citizenship and how does this compare to older citizens in countries such as Canada? How do other aspects of differences among citizens, such as in gender, ability, race and sexuality, or immigration status also help to shape intergenerational citizenship practices? In a more practical/policy sense how can we move toward creating everyday spaces of citizenship that are more inclusive, respectful, and empowering to citizen and noncitizen subjects who are too often left on the “outside looking in” when it comes to being able to claim, enact, and contest the rights and obligations of citizens? There is also a need to bring research into geographies of childhood, whiteness, and citizenship into greater dialogue. This might include studies of how diverse children are being prepared to be “normal,” “good,” “productive,” “compassionate,” “inclusive,” or “tolerant’ and “neoliberal” or other sorts of citizens in spaces of everyday life such as the school classroom, volunteer and leisure activities, and the home. In doing so, it is important to ask about the extent to which to which, in the course of learning about/ preparing to be young citizens, they are challenging prevailing norms and practices of citizenship and the implications of doing so for progressive change. Geographers could build, for example, on Holt’s work on children with socio-emotional/behavioral differences to explore how citizenship is being taught and learned in spatial settings such as the classroom. There are many other exciting avenues for critical social geographic research concerned with citizenship and its performance in place. But whatever specific topics we choose to focus on, it is of the utmost urgency that we understand these in the context of a world that is becoming increasingly unequal in terms of the concentration of extreme wealth among an elite few and the grinding poverty in which so many of the world’s people struggle to survive. Even in wealthier countries such as the United States people are losing their lives to poverty and indifferencedfor example, elderly people who die of hypothermia in apartments that are no longer heated because they cannot pay. For groups such as these and others such as disabled people, particularly in poorer nations of the world, citizenship is largely illusory. These are among our most “disposable” and “rejected” citizens. If we fail to challenge the greed and insatiable quest for wealth that drives our current neoliberal capitalist order and do not promote more sustainable, compassionate, innovative, and inclusive forms of citizenship in place, then we will have failed the many vulnerable citizens and noncitizens in our world as well as future generations of citizen subjects. We have also come perilously close to making the planet we share a much more inhospitable and dangerous place for the vast majority of citizens. I hope that, as geographers, we can help to make the world a healthier, more empowering, and enabling place to live out our lives as diverse citizen subjects.

See Also: Capitalism; Citizenship and Governmentality; Critical Geopolitics; Critical Theory and Human Geography; Democracy; Disability; Environmental Governance; Ethnic Conflict; Gerrymandering; Identity Politics; International Organizations; Intersectionality; Knowledge Communities; Liberalism; Marxist Geography; Nation; Neoliberalism; New Municipalism; Other/Otherness; Patriarchy; Place, Politics of; Political Representation; Post-Marxist Geographies; Poverty; Precarious Work; Privilege; Public Geographies; Radical Geography; Resistance; State; Transnationalism; Urban Citizenship.

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Further Reading Bain, A.L., Nash, C.J., 2007. The Toronto women’s bathhouse raid: querying queer identities in the courtroom. Antipode 39 (1), 17–34. Bonnet, A., 1997. Geography, ‘race’ and whiteness: invisible traditions and current challenges. Area 29 (3), 193–199. Bouvard, M., 2002. Revolutionizing Motherhood: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 1–278. Bowlby, S., 1984. Planning for women to shop in postwar Britain. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 2 (2), 179–199. Brown, M.P., 1997. Replacing Citizenship: Aids Activism and Radical Democracy. Guilford Press. Butler, R.E., 1994. Geography and visually impaired and blind populations. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 19 (3), 336–368. Butler, R.E., 1999. Double the trouble or twice the fun? Disabled bodies in the gay community. In: Butler, R.E., Parr, H. (Eds.), Mind and Body Spaces: Geographies of Illness, Impairment and Disability. Routledge, pp. 203–220. Chouinard, V., 1999. Body politics: disabled women’s activism in Canada and beyond. In: Butler, R.E., Parr, H. (Eds.), Mind and Body Spaces: Geographies of Illness, Impairment and Disability. Routledge, pp. 279–304. Chouinard, V., 2018. On the global peripheries of law: disability and human rights in the global south. Laws 7 (1), 8þ. Chouinard, V., Grant, A., 1995. On being not even anywhere near ‘the project’: ways of putting ourselves in the picture. Antipode 27 (2), 137–166. Counter, M., 2018. Producing victimhood: landmines, reparations, and law in Colombia. Antipode 50 (1), 122–141. Cresswell, T., 2013. Citizenship in worlds of mobility. Crit. Mobil. 105–124. Dickinson, J., Andrucki, M.J., Rawlins, E., Hale, D., Cook, V., 2008. Introduction: geographies of everyday citizenship. ACME 7 (2), 100–112. Frankenburg, R., 1997. Introduction: local whitenesses, localizing whiteness. Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism. Duke University Press. Gleeson, B.J., 1996. A geography for disabled people? Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 21 (2), 387–396. Gleeson, B., 1999. Geographies of Disability. Routledge. Golledge, R., 1996. A response to Gleeson and Imrie. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 21 (2), 404–411. Hall, E., Wilton, R., 2016. Towards a relational geography of disability. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 41 (6), 724–744. Holt, L., 2010. Young people with socio-emotional differences: theorizing disability and destabilising socio-emotional norms. In: Chouinard, V., Hall, E., Wilton, R. (Eds.), Towards Enabling Geographies: ‘Disabled’ Bodies and Minds in Society and Space. Ashgate, pp. 145–164. Housal, J.A., 2009. Geographies of whiteness: the active construction of racialized privilege in buffalo, New York. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 10 (2), 131–151. Hyndman, J., 2013. A refugee camp conundrum: geopolitics, liberal democracy and protracted refugee situations. Refuge 28 (2), 7–15. Imrie, R., 1996. Ableist geographies, disablist spaces: towards a reconstruction of Golledge’s ‘geography and the disabled’. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 397–403. Kobayashi, A., 1997. The paradox of difference and diversity (or why the threshold keeps moving). In: Jones III, J.P., Nast, H.J., Roberts, S.M. (Eds.), Thresholds in Feminist Geography: Difference, Methodology and Representation. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers. Kobayashi, A., Peake, L., 2000. Racism out of place: thoughts on whiteness and an anti-racist geography in the new millennium. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 392–403. Kofman, E., 1999. Female ‘birds of passage’ a decade later: gender and immigration in the European Union. Int. Migr. Rev. 33 (2), 269þ. Kofman, E., Sales, R., 1998. Migrant women and exclusion in Europe. Eur. J. Wom. Stud. 5 (3–4), 381–398. Lorimer, J., 2010. International conservation ‘volunteering’ and the geographies of global environmental citizenship. Political Geogr. 29 (6), 311–322. Mahanti, M., 2004. Mapping race and gender in the academy: the experiences of women of colour faculty and students in Britain, the U.S. and Canada. J. Geogr. High. Educ. 20 (8), 91–99. McDowell, L., Court, G., 1994. Missing subjects: gender, power and sexuality in merchant banks. Econ. Geogr. 70 (3), 229–251. McEwan, C., 2005. New spaces of citizenship? Re-thinking gender participation and empowerment in South Africa. Political Geogr. 24 (8), 969–991. Monk, J., Hanson, S., 1982. On not excluding half the human in human geography. Prof. Geogr. 34 (1), 11–22. Peake, L., Ray, B., 2001. Racializing the Canadian landscape: whiteness, uneven geographies and social justice. Can. Geogr. 45 (1), 180–186. Pratt, G., 1998. Inscribing domestic work on Filipina bodies. In: Nast, H.J., Pile, S. (Eds.), Places Through the Body. Routledge, pp. 283–384. Shaw, W.L., 2006. Decolonizing geographies of whiteness. Antipode 38 (4), 851–869. Staehli, L.A., Ehrkemp, P., Leitner, H., Nagel, C.R., 2012. Dreaming the ordinary: daily life and the complex geographies of citizenship. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 36 (5), 628–644. Valentine, G., 1993. (Hetero)Sexing space: lesbian women’s perceptions and experiences of everyday spaces. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 11 (4), 395–413. Vanderbeck, R.M., 2008. Inner city children, country summers: narrating American childhood and geographies of whiteness. Environ. Plan. 40 (5), 1132–1150. Wilton, R., Hansen, S., Hall, E., 2017. Disabled people, medical inadmissability and the differential politics of immigration. Can. Geogr. 61 (3), 389–400. World Health Organization, 2019. Civil Society. Available from: www.who.org.

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Citizenship and Governmentality Michael Woods, Department of Geography and Earth Sciences, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom Lynda Cheshire, School of Social Science, University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Active citizens Individuals capable of regulating their own behavior according to prevailing standards of conduct. Advanced liberalism A political rationality that governs “free” citizens through appeals to obligations to one’s community. Analytics of government A study of government that shows how categories of state and society are brought into being through changing practices of rule. Citizenship Commonly denotes membership to a national polity to which certain rights and responsibilities are attached. Governmentality In a broad sense refers to the conduct of conduct. Applied more specifically to the governing activities of the state. Rural governance The study of the changing modes of governing in rural societies (usually in terms of the increased inclusion of rural citizens in the exercise of rule).

In its most straightforward sense, citizenship is understood as bestowing upon individuals a legal status as members of a national polity, enacted by state apparatus and defended by legal and administrative rules and regulations. As members of that polity, individuals are entitled to certain political, civic, economic, and social rights, including individual freedom of speech, rights to property, the right to vote, and the right to live according to the prevailing standards of societydregardless of race, sex, or social class. At the same time, these rights are accompanied by a reciprocal set of obligations to the collectivity so that the rights of others can be secured. It is more constructive, though, to consider citizenship not only in terms of legal status, but also as a device for understanding the relationship between the individual and the state in how society is governed. This relationship is not fixed and universal, but subject to change and contestation as particular definitions are enforced downward by the state, and upward by individuals and communities demanding an extension of their rights. Moreover, while in legal terms, citizenship is considered a universal entitlement for members of a nationality, experience shows us that citizenship rights have not been extended to all members of a society even when they hold formal citizenship status. For some social groupsdwomen, Indigenous people, immigrants, and lesbian and gay communities, among othersdthe granting of citizenship rights has not occurred without significant struggle, but there are others too for whom the ability to participate as active and autonomous members of society is circumscribed by conditions of unemployment, poverty, and general social exclusion. Thus, we should see citizenship not as an automatic entitlement for all those bestowed with the legal status of belonging to a nation, but as something enacted, performed, and, increasingly, conditional upon the ability of individuals to conduct themselves in a way that is deemed morally and ethically responsible. As a concept, therefore, citizenship refers to a suite of rights and responsibilities that are negotiated between the state and the individual, but it is also a set of practices that constitute subject identities through material and institutional arrangements. Such thinking is influenced by the governmentality writings of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, and his “analytics of government.” From this perspective, entities such as state, society, and citizen are social constructs developed under certain regimes of government that are historically specific. An analytics of government examines how these different regimes come into being, and the various govern-mentalities that arise as those responsible for exercising rule pose questions about the appropriate domains of government (citizen, market, population, and community) and the means through which they might best be governed. What makes an analytics of government distinct from other approaches to the history of ideas, however, is that it moves beyond an examination of abstract political ideologies to examine the ways that certain categories of subject are constituted through the application of various techniques, instruments, and institutions of material intervention. Since the mid-1990s, there has been considerable growth in the adoption of a governmentality perspective for exploring the changing form and function of the modern state and, by extension, the modern citizen. While there is nothing uniquely rural in these processes, there is a burgeoning body of literature on “rural governance” that examines these changes in the context of rural societies of the advanced Western world. What follows is an overview of the construction of rural citizenship as an object of concern for political authorities, a brief outline of the key concepts and ideas that are common to governmentality analyses, and a discussion of the way this work has been applied to the field of rural studies.

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Understanding Rural Citizenship The concept of citizenship is not necessarily readily associated with rural societies. The term “citizen” shares an etymological route with “city” in the Latin word “civitas” and, throughout history, citizenship has been primarily associated with urban societies, such as Greek and Roman city-states and medieval boroughs. The countryside, in contrast, was associated with rigid social hierarchies supported by institutions such as the church and landed estates, and underpinned by particularistic relations between tenants and landowners. The application of ideas of citizenship in the countryside can therefore arguably be considered as part of the urbanization of rural society. The remaking of rural people as “citizens” began with the rise of modern nation-states from the late 18th Century, and the promotion of ideas of national citizenship. However, the rights and responsibilities of national citizens are not set, but open to political contestation and negotiation. In particular, the British sociologist T. H. Marshall suggested that states balance the rights of citizens in varying degrees according to ideology and stage of historical development. Thus, in the 20th Century, broadly social-democratic states in Europe, including Britain, emphasized social rights through the creation of welfare states. In a rural context, this meant that rural residents gained the same rights of access to public services such as health and education as urban residents, despite the often higher costs of delivery; and the state took an interest in protecting farm populations from fluctuations in the agricultural economy through various price support schemes. Claims to similar social rights can be seen in rural politics and policies in North America and Australia, notably in campaigns for electrification and other infrastructure provision, and in some elements of agricultural support. More recently, the ideological drive of state restructuring and the consequences of social and economic restructuring in rural areas have combined to reconfigure citizenship in rural society in a number of ways. First, as neoliberal states have retreated from their commitment to social rights, rural activists have mobilized to assert their “right” to public services threatened by rationalization, or to demand state intervention to protect farms and rural communities from adverse economic pressures. At the same time, the inequalities of public service provision have been highlighted by in-migrants who demand the same level of service provision in their new rural communities as previously experienced in towns and cities. Second, claims to citizens’ rights have been used by external pressure groups to challenge some established features of rural societies. These include the promotion of a right of public access to open countryside in Britain, which has challenged the historic privileges of landowners. Third, some governments have sought to redefine the rights of citizens as akin to the rights of consumers, notably by introducing the right to choose into public service provision. Economies of scale have meant that this has been less successfully achieved in rural areas than in urban areas, creating a geographical disparity. The blurring of citizens’ rights and consumers’ rights has also been reflected in the assertion of consumer interests in food, agricultural, and environmental policy networks. Finally, the neoliberal state has also reimagined the balance between citizen rights and citizen responsibilities. While the focus of citizenship has traditionally been on the rights it embodies, recent decades have seen a renewed emphasis on the responsibilities that citizenship also implies. The concept of active citizenship has become engrained in rural policy across a range of domains, including rural development, conservation, resource management, public service provision, and housing, and can be positioned as part of shift in the mode of governmentality, as discussed further in the remainder of this article.

Governmentality Throughout the course of his work, Foucault came to use the term government in various ways. In his earlier writings, he defined it in broad terms as the “conduct of conduct”: a set of actions upon actions to shape, guide, or change the course of behavior. In later work, however, government came to refer more specifically to the exercise of political power by the modern state, as outlined in his famous essay on “governmentality.” In this and subsequent accounts of his work, two key themes on governmentality can be discerned. The first relates to what he called a “problematics of government” whereby those seeking to govern pose questions about how this might best be achieveddwho should be governed, by whom, to what ends, and by what means? Consistent with Foucault’s interest in government as practical activity, these questions were both discursive and technical in that they constituted reality in particular ways that made it amenable to intervention via the application of a broad range of practical techniques and procedures. The second area of interest in the governmentality literature refers to the emergence, from the 17th Century onward, of a novel form of political power known as biopower. Biopower was distinct from sovereign forms of power in that it demarcated a new sphere of interest for political authoritiesdknown as the populationdand a new area of concern regarding the health and welfare of that population. This evolved in two basic forms. First, a disciplinary power, which targets itself at specific individuals, seeking to create mute and docile bodies through the application of certain disciplinary techniques of training and surveillance. The second, a biopolitics of the population, seeks to manage the population as a whole through techniques of normalization. In order for these new forms of governing to take place, the life of this population had to be made “knowable” and measureable. Thus, an explosion of discourses about the problems of public health, housing, sexual activity, and so forth occurred, accompanied by new techniques of calculation, audit, and inscription that brought the formerly hidden life of the population into the domain of state activity.

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Liberalism Contemporary governmentality theorists such as Nikolas Rose have extended Foucault’s ideas on biopower to link its emergence with the rise of a new liberal regime of government, which sets limits on the extent to which the state can intervene in the workings of the market and civil society. As a practice of government, liberalism involves the development of new techniques for governing which enable political authorities to govern people, events, and places without destroying their freedom. It seeks to achieve this goal by modeling its own techniques of governing upon the self-regulating mechanisms that occur naturally within civil society. These techniques, which are readily apparent today, include exposing state administration and private individuals to the self-regulating principles of market competition; nurturing the norms and values that are believed to exist naturally in the sphere of civil society; and implicating private actors and nongovernmental agencies in the activity of governing. Central to all these techniques are practices of self-government, with liberal forms of rule relying upon the construction of a new kind of active citizen who is imbued with the skills and sensibilities of rational self-government, thereby rendering the direct imposition of state will unnecessary.

Governing Through the Social During the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, governments of advanced Western societies have experimented with various forms of liberalism in pursuing more effective means to achieve their ambitions for a well-ordered society. Two such models have been discerned over the last century, each conceiving the various domains of governmental concern in quite different terms, and each embodying a changed relationship and corresponding demarcation of responsibilities, between the state and citizen. The first is a “managed liberalism,” which manifested itself most clearly in the Keynesian welfare state of the mid-20th Century. Where classic liberalism governed through the rational choices of autonomous individuals, welfarism demarcated a new object of government interestdknown as the “social”dwhich acted upon the well-being of individuals in the name of society. For social forms of government to work, it was necessary to nurture the collective ties of solidarity that linked individuals to wider society and to infuse those individuals with the norms of social obligation. In return, they were accorded equal rights to political representation and economic and social security via a national welfare state.

Advanced Liberalism Empirical observation shows us that this form of government is no longer dominant. In its place is what has been referred to as an “advanced liberal” rationality of rule, or a post-welfarist regime of the social, which contains elements of both classic liberal and social governmentalities. As with its earlier manifestation, advanced liberalism reconfigures the subjects of rule as autonomous and free actors, responsible for guiding their own conduct, but also as members of subnational communities and networks rather than as members of society as a whole. This suggests there has been a rescaling of citizenship, with allegiance to others enacted in the context of localized family and community obligations. Additionally, however, there is an increased emphasis on the performative aspect of citizenship, with rights increasingly contingent upon individuals demonstrating a willingness to accept personal responsibility for their own future. Here, it is possible to see a melding of the two poles of liberal and social citizenship. The first poledwhat may be termed economic citizenshipdrelates to the required conduct of citizens in the sphere of the market as responsible and informed consumers, capable of managing their lives in an entrepreneurial and prudential manner. The second pole revolves around an ethic of citizenship that is more community-based and invokes ties of obligations to others.

Governing Rural Citizens The adoption of a governmentality perspective has done much to shed light on the changing practices of rural citizenship, albeit under the much broader heading of rural governance. Since the mid-1990s, governmentality analyses have become increasingly popular in rural studies as researchers have sought to understand the changing relationships between rural areas and the state, and the discursive practices through which the various domains of farmer, rural citizen, and community are demarcated as objects of government concern. In many parts of the advanced Western world, significant changes have occurred in the way rural areas are governed, underpinned by a broader shift from a welfarist to an advanced liberal rationality of rule. As evidence of this trend, researchers point to the dismantling of many of the social and economic forms of protection that were traditionally afforded to rural areas, and their replacement with new policy discourses centered around the promotion of self-help and self-reliance in farm and natural resource conservation and management, rural service provision, and community renewal. For many observers, such moves are symptomatic of attempts by governments to divest themselves of their responsibility to rural areas, particularly at a time when so many are experiencing economic and social decline. Yet, we are reminded that advanced liberalism constitutes a new mode of rule, as opposed to an absence of rule, and that the enrollment of rural actors into the domain of governing has been accompanied by new governmental technologies that reconfigure rural citizenship into something that is active. This has also entailed the formation of a new category of citizen whose conduct does not accord neatly with prevailing standards of responsible conduct. In one of the earliest papers to examine state intervention in rural matters using a governmentality perspective, Murdoch and Ward present an historical analysis of the practices through which British agriculture came to be established as a sector of interest

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to the state. Through much of the 19th and 20th centuries, this interest in farm matters was enacted through the lens of a national rural policy framework organized around the domestic production of food and/or minerals, or in the case of the Antipodes, for export back to the home country. The prevailing rationality of this social form of government was the importance of farming to the national economy, and a commitment by the state to ensure its prosperity was assured. In accordance with these goals, a whole regime of material and institutional farm support structures was established, which collectivized farm risk in the name of the social. This protectionist agenda also extended to rural areas more broadly, with rural citizens conceived as having equal rights to the same level of services and infrastructure as their urban counterparts, which the state was prepared to meet. In the settler colonial nations of Australia, the United States, and Canada, governments were even more ambitious in their interventionist strategies as attested by the establishment of closer settlement and other regional development programs, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States, and the new inland towns of Albury-Wodonga in Australia. In line with recent moves toward advanced liberalism, governments across the Western world have begun dismantling the protectionist regimes of the last century amid criticisms that they have fostered a handout mentality in rural communities and perpetuated inefficiencies in agriculture. Compounded by economic rationalist arguments that subsidized rural service provision is no longer cost-effective, the result has been a withdrawal of state support in rural areas as rural people are encouraged to play a more active role in providing those services for themselves. To a large extent, this new agenda of rural active citizenship has been driven by political authorities and embodied in a range of new institutional and funding arrangements that reconstruct rural people as partners of the state rather than as passive recipients of welfare. Yet, at another level it has also been embraced by rural people who have responded to reduced state support by mobilizing into local action groups and formulating their own, sometimes novel, solutions to the problems they face. The reconstruction of citizen identity around the two poles of market and community is discernible within the rural sphere. Market-based identities are most apparent in the realm of farming where collective problems for the state have been reconstituted as problems for individual farmers. Rather than directly regulating agriculture through production and price controls, states now seek to shape farmer behavior through conditional funding and market-based instruments. Public goods from agriculture, for example, are supported through payments for environmental services (or ecosystem services) (PES), which can include tradable credits or payments made by private sector corporations. Individual farmers are responsible for opting into PES schemes or choosing to operate on a purely market-led business basis; however, PES initiatives can also encourage greater cooperation between farmers, creating a community through which rural and environmental governance goals can be delivered, as Wynne-Jones has observed for agri-environmental projects in Wales. Attempts to harness the self-governing properties of individuals to economic imperatives can also be observed in governmental approaches to rural and regional development, which are imbued with a similar discourse of increased self-reliance and personal responsibility. For agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the problems facing declining rural areas arise from their lack of integration into the global economy and are rooted in the supposed deficiencies of rural people themselves: they are unskilled or have the wrong skills, they lack a self-reliant mindset, and, perhaps understandably, they have been rendered powerless and demoralized by their experiences of rural industry and community decline. With the causes of rural decline constructed in this way, the solution is seen to lie in the provision of “capacity building” that directly works on the attitudes and values of rural people to build their self-esteem, imbue them with a spirit of entrepreneurship, and reconstitute them as self-responsible and active citizens. While capacity building has been touted as a source of empowerment for rural people by providing them with the skills to articulate their own needs, it has also been seen to operate as a vehicle through which rural development initiatives can be governed according to state ambitions for a globally competitive rural economy. This is exemplified by Cheshire’s study of the Building Rural Leaders Program: a training course in Australia designed to assist rural people in building their leadership and rural development skills. Drawing on Foucault’s writings on disciplinary power, she suggests that Building Rural Leaders seeks to create economically productive but politically “docile” rural leaders through its efforts to enhance their entrepreneurial disposition while simultaneously directing those efforts toward embracing, rather than resisting, the changes they face. While market rationalities are often viewed as contradictory to the sentiments of community, the latter remains a central pole of action within advanced liberalism and often complements economic discourses of citizenship in unexpected ways. There is often a focus on “governing through community,” which plays out in rural areas in a number of ways: first, in the way community is deployed as a means of imbuing individuals with a collective, rather than an individualized conscience, thereby encouraging enterprising citizens to engage in rural development or natural resource management activities that benefit the rural community as a whole. Often referred to as “social” or “community” entrepreneurs, these individuals are viewed as the consummate active citizen: imbued with all the enterprising qualities of rational self-management but community minded enough that they voluntarily elect to channel their skills into community, rather than individualistic, endeavors. Social enterprises, in particular, have plugged gaps in public service provision in rural communities arising from government austerity policies, including the management of libraries or leisure facilities, as well as more commercial services that are not viable as for-profit businesses, including community-owned shops, petrol stations, and public houses. More broadly, formal and informal volunteering is oriented toward community selfhelp, including support for schools, volunteer driver schemes replacing or substituting public transport, and care for elderly neighbors, with retired residentsdincluding in-migrantsdoften playing a major role in organizing and providing volunteer labor. A second way is governing through community which discursively reconstructs rural issues as local community, rather than state concerns. Community-based organizations (CBOs) have increasingly become involved in natural resource management, supplanting state agencies, but as Molden and colleagues note, the capacity of CBOs to take on these responsibilities is effectively dependent on establishing local legitimacy. In Molden’s case study in Washington state, USA, the management of an area of largely state-owned

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industrial forest had been assumed by a CBO that sought to establish community forestry with ecological and social development goals. In order to achieve these goals, the CBO needed to enroll the local community, gain support from key actors but also articulate a discourse that presented the forest as the community’s concern and envisioned beneficial outcomes. Third, in policy discourses, the economic and social well-being of rural areas is frequently understood in terms of the presence or absence of a community culture. So-called “can-do communities,” which take active responsibility for their own well-being, are commonly viewed as possessing a positive outlook in life and a consensual approach to solving problems. Conversely, struggling communities are viewed as an aberration to this and require the application of remedial or expert intervention to reestablish the community culture that has been lost. In practice, this deployment of community frequently begins with the administration of a community audit or skills workshop in which local residents are encouraged to identify their own problems and collectively develop appropriate solutions using local skills and resources. While practices of community development and community capacity building are not unique to rural areas, the strong historical association between rurality and community serves to bolster the claim, not only that rural people should be expected to help themselves, but also that it is part of their culture to do so, and their right to expect this. Finally, it is argued that such discourses work to normalize particular ways for rural communities to think and behave, thereby creating a distinction between the civilized members of society who understand their obligations to self and others, and those who have failed to exercise their citizenship in a responsible manner. Those seen to lie beyond this normative framework are often considered beyond help anddin a policy climate of “picking winners” for marketable rural development opportunitiesdgovernment assistance often passes them by. Fourth, it is important to note that the reordering of rural citizenship has not been restricted solely to those who live in rural areas, but equally to the conduct of all citizens in how they relate to the countryside. Formal codes of conduct established specifically for nonrural dwellers visiting rural regions exhort a similar ethos of good (countryside) citizenship based on commonsense notions of responsible behavior and respect for other users, such as the Countryside Code in England; however, as Flemsæter and colleagues examine for outdoor recreation in Norway, the enforcement of such codes and other more subtle forms of disciplining the use of rural space can produce an uneven moral geography in which some activities and behaviors are encouraged (such as walking) and others are discouraged or spatially restricted (such as using bikes or snowmobiles). As they observe, this produces a differentiated “outdoor citizenship” where citizen rights to the country are moderated according to the perceived impacts of recreational activities on other users of the countryside. Finally, the limits of the advanced liberal mode of governmentality and practices of active citizenship and community self-help have been tested by new political movements that have questioned the equity of government policies across urban and rural areas. Populist parties and candidates in Europe, Australia, and the United States, the campaign for Britain to leave the European Union, and protests such as the gilets jaune in France have all disproportionately drawn support from rural areas and employed a rhetoric of the neglect of rural interests by metropolitan elites. As ethnographic studies by Loka Ashwood, Kathryn Cramer, and Arlie Russell Horschild in the United States, as well as research on rural protests in Britain by Woods and colleagues, have shown this discourse resonates with rural residents who have experienced decreasing government support for agriculture, infrastructure, and public services, but increased regulation of aspects of rural culture, such as hunting and some elements of land use. Yet, the demands of the movements are ambiguousdin some cases calling for economic protectionism and increased government spending in rural areas, but in other cases articulating a distrust of government and supporting neoliberal “small government” policies that are consistent with the advanced liberal mode of governmentality.

Summary Studies of contemporary citizenship have advanced significantly in recent years as a result of the adoption of a governmentality lens through which the fundamental categories of state, citizen, and society, and the relationship between them, can be problematized. In the field of rural research, this approach has been adopted predominantly in the context of the changing governmentalities of the state and the emergence of an advanced liberal mode of rule which seeks to govern through the rational market-orientated conduct of the enterprising farmer and/or the redefinition of rural dwellers as ethically informed community members. Empirically, this has led to a proliferation of studies examining the mentalities of rule as articulated in rural policy documents anddin fewer casesdexploring how they become embodied in material interventions such as rural leadership, community capacity building, and farm financial counseling programs. What has been missing, until recently, is a greater consideration of the way that rural people engage with these discourses of active citizenshipdnot merely as objects of political power, but as potential sources of resistance or contestation through which challenges to the new policy frameworks might occur. If the inclusion of rural people into the networks of the state has enabled political authorities to govern their conduct more directly, then it has also created a space for a much closer engagement of rural people with government policy. Indeed, more recent research has also suggested that the mobilization of rural people around protest activities can also be perceived through the lens of citizenship and understood as attempts by rural people to reassert themselvesdas citizensdin response to the perceived erosion of their rights. What this new research reminds us is that citizenship remains a contested fielddone that required a more detailed and ongoing analysis.

See Also: Citizenship; Governmentality; Liberalism; State; Urban Governance.

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Further Reading Argent, N., 2018. Rural geography III: Marketing, mobilities, measurement and metanarratives. Progress in Human Geography, 0309132518778220. Ashwood, L., 2018. For-Profit Democracy: Why the Government Is Losing the Trust of Rural America. Yale University Press, New Haven. Cheshire, L., 2006. Governing Rural Development: Discourses and Practices of Self-Help in Australian Rural Policy. Ashgate, Aldershot. Cramer, K.J., 2016. The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Dean, M., 1999. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. Sage, London. Dufty-Jones, R., 2015. Governmentalities of mobility: The role of housing in the governance of Australian rural mobilities. Journal of Rural Studies 42, 63–78. Flemsæter, F., Setten, G., Brown, K.M., 2015. Morality, mobility and citizenship: legitimising mobile subjectivities in a contested outdoors. Geoforum 64, 342–350. Foucault, M., 1991. Governmentality. In: Burchell, G., Gordon, C., Miller, P. (Eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, pp. 87–104. Higgins, V., 2002. Self-reliant citizens and targeted populations: the case of Australian agriculture in the 1990s. Arena 19, 161–177. Horschild, A.R., 2016. Strangers in Their Own Land. The New Press, New York. Kelly, C., Yarwood, R., 2018. From rural citizenship to the rural citizen: farming, dementia and networks of care. J. Rural Stud. 63, 96–104. Molden, O., Abrams, J., Davis, E.J., Moseley, C., 2017. Beyond localism: the micropolitics of local legitimacy in a community-based organization. J. Rural Stud. 50, 60–69. Monnat, S.M., Brown, D.L., 2017. More than a rural revolt: landscapes of despair and the 2016 Presidential election. J. Rural Stud. 55, 227–236. Murdoch, J., Ward, N., 1997. Governmentality and territoriality: the statistical manufacture of Britain’s ‘national farm’. Polit. Geogr. 16, 307–324. Rose, N., 2000. Community, citizenship and the third way. Am. Behav. Sci. 43, 1395–1411. Thomas, A.C., 2017. Everyday experiences of post-politicising processes in rural freshwater management. Environment and Planning A 49 (6), 1413–1431. Woods, M., Anderson, J., Guilbert, S., Watkin, S., 2012. ‘The country(side) is angry’: emotion and explanation in protest mobilization. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 13, 567–585. Woods, M., 2006. Political articulation: the modalities of new critical politics of rural citizenship. In: Cloke, P., Marsden, T., Mooney, P.H. (Eds.), Handbook of Rural Studies. Sage, London, pp. 457–471. Wynne-Jones, S., 2017. Understanding farmer co-operation: exploring practices of social relatedness and emergent affects. J. Rural Stud. 53, 259–268.

Relevant Website The UK Countryside Code:https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-countryside-code.

Citizenship Concepts Elaine LE Ho, Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, Singapore Richard Yarwood, School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Big Government A term used derogatively by some commentators to criticize intrusive, overregulatory governments. In the United Kingdom, the former Prime Minister David Cameron used its antithesis, “big society,” to describe policies that aimed to empower local communities and rollback the state. Liberal citizenship A form of citizenship that stresses individual liberty. Emphasis is placed on the legality and equality of citizen rights, and the ways that these are achieved and maintained through the social-judicial systems of the state. Orientalism A discourse that depicts the image of the Orient (e.g., in Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia) as threatening, inferior, and underdeveloped as compared to Western knowledge or power. Tianxia An ancient Chinese philosophy which roughly translates as “all-under-heaven,” depicting a world order that transforms social difference into harmonious relations, but which has been criticized for its universalizing intentions. Zomia Refers to a geographical mass of highland Southeast Asia which extends across national borders, and is inhabited by populations said to have resisted the rule of monarchs, colonizers, and modern nation-states.

Citizenship is an important idea in geography. Broadly speaking, citizenship refers to a person’s relationship with a political unit, but the precise ways in which it has been thought of and practiced by geographers reflect different historical, philosophical, political, and cultural traditions. Some scholars analyze citizenship normatively as a political philosophy or legal status. Others draw attention to the practices of citizenship, such as how citizens accept and perform communal duties, but also present the potential for contesting citizenship. Geographers have contrasted state-sanctioned forms of active, communal citizenship with activist forms of citizenship that use spaces as sites of protest. Others have argued that greater attention should be given to everyday forms of citizenship and what this tells us about de facto and de jure exclusion and inclusion in spaces below the level of nation-state. Geographers have thus engaged with different ideas about citizenship to explain how social, cultural, and political processes combine to shape particular places. Yet debate remains about how concepts of citizenship should be used in geography. Citizenship has widely been used in the West to describe a person’s relationship with a nation-state and, in particular, the rights and duties that are associated with it. It also defines and confers legal status on the membership of the nation-state and, with it, forms of political and social inclusion. Citizenship further functions as a political agreement between citizens and the state, such that citizens assign to the state the authority to govern and, in turn, obey the rules set out by the state. In this compact, citizens are also entitled to a legally defined set of rights. Consequently, considerable attention has been given to the importance of individual liberty, privacy, and “the right to rights” within national frameworks of citizenship. Increasingly, these concepts of citizenship are being challenged by some geographers as new forms and iterations of citizenship are recognized in spaces above, below, and beyond the nation-state. Within citizenship studies, a turn toward “citizenship after orientalism” has also given greater attention to the genealogies and practices of citizenship in non-Western societies, thus challenging and reconceptualizing Western interpretations of citizenship. Yet, far from weakening the concept of citizenship, these debates are leading to new, spatially attuned concepts of citizenship that recognize the significance of geography to citizenship and vice versa.

Expressions of Citizenship in Western Societies The Western contractual model of citizenship takes as its premise that citizens are rights-bearing and rights-claiming individuals. The Ancient Greek polis, in which citizens exercised their claims to rights in the agora (public square), is seen as the classical model through which modern citizenship evolved. In the 4th-Century BCE, Aristotle’s The Politics argued that people were political beings whose potential could only be recognized by participating in a polis, or city-state. These ideas established some of the broader principles that have influenced some Western ideals of citizenship. Three aspects are particularly important. First, citizenship stressed the ideals of service and privileges: citizens had not only rights but also duties to participate in public, political, and judicial processes. Second, citizenship was inclusionary and, by definition, exclusionary as well. Citizenship was only available to men above 20 years old who were heads of their households, slave owners, warriors, and of a recognized genealogy. Citizenship was elitist; very few enjoyed its benefits. Finally, citizenship was also bound to a particular territory, in this case the city-state. Thus, a citizen of Athens was only a citizen of Athens and this status did not extend to other city-states. A city’s territorial limits defined the physical extent of citizenship but, at the same time, wove citizens into its social, political, and economic fabric. Many of these practices were lost in the West with the rise of feudalism in Medieval Europe, though, of course, other versions of citizenship existed in other, non-Western places. Citizenship reemerged in the West during the 18th Century to bolster the growth of

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the nation-state. Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s (1950 [1992]) seminal essay on “Citizenship and Social Class” traced the development of civic, political, and social rights in England. Significantly, his work observed a shift away from forms of justice and welfare that were locally administered to local people, and toward the development of socio-judicial networks that aimed to deliver universal rights at a national level. In part, this was in response to migrations that took citizens from their place of birth to cities or other places of work. Citizenship provided identity, a degree of social control, and, significantly, uniform rights at a national level. Marshall’s essay celebrates a liberal model of citizenship that has been important in many Western countries, especially the United Kingdom. In part, it reflects the hopes inspired by the postwar formation of the welfare state and the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) as a means of delivering social rights to all. In contrast to the Greek model, citizenship and the rights associated with it were regarded as universal. The extent to which this is the case has been a cause for concern among geographers, many of whom have examined the difference between de jure (legal) and de facto (the reality) rights of citizens within and between different states, prompting speculation that many are still excluded from full citizenship on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, or disability. Marshall’s work remains significant, but later commentators criticized it for its narrow focus on England, gender blindness, and an apparent historical predetermination that glosses over many of the struggles associated with gaining, claiming, and maintaining rights. Different models of citizenship have developed based on the distinct historical and political circumstances of particular nation-states. These distinguish between the extent, type, and performance of rights, as well as the significance placed on public space. A key distinction, for example, has been between liberal models of citizenship that emphasize rights, public space, and the significance of government in delivering these, and Republican models that place more emphasis on duty, community, and locality. The latter is influential in the United States, reflecting a historic mistrust of “big government” and a championing of the individual and local community over that of the state. Emphasis is placed on active political and social participation at the local level through, for example, town hall meetings, religious congregations, and voluntary and civic groups. Often these ideals are supported by public acts, such as swearing allegiance to a flag, to remind people that their status as citizens was achieved through struggle and that they have a duty to the state. The balance between rights and duties constitutes a shifting and contested political terrain. Many neoliberal Western governments have retreated from the state’s responsibility to provide social and welfare rights over recent years, instead placing greater obligations on the private and voluntary sector. This approach has required individuals and communities to live as active rather than passive citizens by participating in and supporting voluntary, communitybased forms of action. Different forms of citizenship have different spatial manifestations. Thus, states that prioritize active models of citizenship value local meeting places or voluntary organizations. By contrast, government offices and public services reflect the values of liberal citizenship. Nevertheless, all of these forms of citizenship are bound by and into the territory of the state. Thus, rights and duties bind citizens into the political–judicial–social networks of a nation-state to such an extent that they are usually lost when sovereign borders are crossed (British citizens, for example, do not have rights to free health care at the point of delivery in the United States as they would in the United Kingdom). Formally and legally, Western models of citizenship, however diverse, remain wedded to the nation-state. In contrast, non-Western thinking has challenged the idea that citizenship should be bound to the nation-state, as the following section examines.

Expressions of Citizenship in Non-Western Societies Outside of Europe, citizenship was introduced through the extension of a Westphalian system of sovereignty and territoriality to other parts of the world. Citizenship, as a means of organizing national membership, became extended to other political units desiring to be part of an international community of nation-states. For countries that underwent colonization and decolonization, modern citizenship was often introduced in unsolicited, violent, and contradictory ways. Postcolonial scholars and intellectuals argue against the imposition of Western citizenship values in non-Western contexts. They note that citizenship rights need to be understood relationally and grounded in specific histories of different regions, rather than through ideological or discursive lenses. How political subjectivities are recognized, interpreted, and organized hierarchically is deeply entwined with the ways in which forms of knowledge about colonialism and colonial subjects were represented by both the colonizers and colonized themselves. Studying political subjectivity through Western-centric approaches to citizenship means researchers may miss other types of political subjectivities. Citizenship theorist Engin Isin thus called for studies of “citizenship after orientalism” that would uncover the ways in which colonial discourses and practices instituted certain “norms” of citizenship or disqualified other forms of indigenous political subjectivity. This approach would allow for recovering previously concealed political knowledge and practices that can forge new conceptualizations of the political subject. Investigating how people outside of Western polities thought about and developed practices of self-rule, rights, and contestation elicits approaches that can decenter hegemonic Western conceptions of citizenship that were transplanted to those polities through colonialism and modernization. Colonial powers encouraged colonized societies to maintain their cultural identities and manage their communities separately from the public sphere (e.g., using customary laws). Such communities were thus regarded as cultural communities rather than political communities. In investigating the religious institutions known as mathas in India, anthropologist Aye Ikegame argues that the withdrawal of the religious into the private sphere in Western political thought meant that colonialist and orientalist thinking presumed that civil society did not exist in non-Western societies. Yet the mathas and the gurus who functioned as religious

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leaders provided social welfare to the communities they served and exercised authority over certain matters. Moreover, conflict over royal honors between competing mathas resembled what is recognized popularly today as protests and demonstrations. The social and political roles of the mathas cannot be grasped, however, if we remain bound to a lens that ignores the political cultures of other regions that do not fit within the state–civil society binary more common in Western analyses of citizenship. In fact, expressions of citizenship existed in non-Western societies even prior to colonialism. Sociologist Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere as an epochal space of public discussions over government policy provided an account of how citizenship subjectivities emerged. This depiction of citizenship has been critiqued for privileging the male bourgeois subject. However, alternative accounts, such as those by Nancy Fraser or Hannah Arendt that are premised on feminist critiques or rights-based arguments, respectively, in turn privilege a particular representation of citizenship subjectivity that makes a claim todand exercisesdrights (contesting an identifiable authority with the intention of revision). This approach reduces political action to assertion despite the existence of other forms of political subjectivity that could struggle against oppression in diffused or arbitrary ways. Moreover, the precolonial imaginary of the state in non-Western societies may have a different spatial organization from the Westphalian model, with the former reflecting the diffusion of power from the center to the peripheries, and where peripheral segments exhibit the freedom to switch their allegiances contingently. With the construction of the modern-state, remnants of this spatial organization remain. For example, in Thailand, the Tai Kingdoms that predate modern Thailand conceptualized difference in a spatial rather than ethnic way: Those who dwelled further away (space of wildness) from the center of power (space of civility) could gain greater status over time as long as they moved closer to the center. The concept of zomia provides further insights into how hill tribes (also known as highlanders) in mainland Southeast Asia continue to retain a separate identity from the modern nation-state. Nonetheless, within the institution of the nation-state, some hill tribes have partnered with local and international nongovernmental organizations, invoking international conventions such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) to demand from their respective government’s citizenship documents that confer legal status and recognition on their communities. Citizenship in different parts of the world also evolved incrementally through an amalgamation of citizenship traditions and practices from other places. Contemporary Chinese citizenship, for example, draws on a variety of political influences ranging from the late Qing and early Republican periods to those from Europe and Japan. The Chinese political philosophy of tianxia (all-under-heaven) seeks to forge a sense of nationhood that is shared by the different ethnic groups represented in China; however, this approach privileges Han Chinese identity and connotes a distinctive geographical worldview of how international relations between political units should be organized, with China at the center of the world. The relationship between the state and people is captured in a variety of Chinese language terms that elide direct translation to English and reflects the multiple ways in which citizenship has evolved in China through changes in the political system, the juridical and administrative framework, and the economy. In other words, citizenship outside of Western societies may adopt a hybridized model that resembles recognizable features of Western forms of citizenship in part, but also deserves recognition as practices that legitimately depart from expectations of how citizenship should be practiced in accordance with Western liberal traditions and the nation-state model.

New Geographies of Citizenship? Our accounts of the similarities and differences in how citizenship has evolved in Western and non-Western societies signal that it is inadequate to approach citizenship as a normative or prescriptive model of how societies should be socially ordered. Geographers have explored the different spaces in which citizenship is played out. Attentiveness to the different local contexts in which citizenship developed positions geographers to contribute new perspectives that decenter the hegemony of Western interpretations of citizenship. Moreover, geographical perspectives offer insights ranging from the significance of spaces above and below the state, to the formation, identity, and performance of heterogeneous forms of citizenship. Four key directions can be identified. First, postmodern views of citizenship recognize diversity and difference, emphasizing cultural and social rather than national identities. The scope of work in this area is diverse and includes studies of Aboriginal people, gender, sexual citizenship, religion, age, and disability. Here, geographers are starting to recognize the significance of different spaces to the formation of citizenship. Feminist geographers, for example, have argued that too much emphasis has hitherto been placed on public space, which is often dominated by men. Their work has refocused attention on private spaces of citizenship and the significance of the home, as well as ways in which women have forged new, public spaces of citizenship to empower women and other marginalized groups. For example, the spaces of schools, shops, nurseries, and community groups have been used to improve the visibility and voice of women and, in turn, have provided platforms to campaign for better rights for women. Likewise, religious spaces serve as important crucibles where political subjectivity can be manifested in societies in which the demarcation between secular and religious social worlds are fluid and dynamic. Another example pertains to the significance of highland and lowland spatial distinctions in non-Western societies that separate hill tribes culturally from the populations that lie closer to the center of power, which is associated with the modern nation-state. Just as with the movements by Aboriginal people in Western societies seeking to claim their indigenous rights and land reserves, the mobilization of hill tribes in non-Western parts of the world challenges prevailing models of citizenship and assimilationist policies instituted by the nation-state.

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Second, an important body of work has sought to reconceptualize citizenship as global rather than national. In part, this has been driven by the “mobilities turn” in geography, which has emphasized the movement of people, material objects, and ideas between national boundaries and other spaces. As some groups of people travel, work, live, and communicate across borders, concepts of transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship are challenging models of citizenship that are based on the nation-state. Thus, some work has focused on the ways that flows of ideas, information, and people between spaces can shape cultural citizenship and loosen moorings to the state. Religious beliefs or ethnic traditions may, for example, transcend boundaries and connect citizens to wider networks of practitioners. The Falungong movement, for example, leverages upon both practitioners within the Chinese diaspora and those who are non-Chinese but adhere to the group’s religious and political beliefs to lobby international state and nonstate actors in protesting the suppression of the group’s activities in China, allowing alternative expressions of political subjectivity within the nation and beyond. Citizenship might therefore be conceived as relational rather than absolute, something that is constituted by its connections with different people and places, and not by the borders of the nation-state. Citizenship remains inherently geographical, but, rather than being entirely defined by fixed boundaries, it is also fluid, mobile, and multidimensional in nature. Third, and related, citizens from different places can also be enrolled in networks that transcend national boundaries to strive for political and social change at a global level. Examples include transnational coalitions such as the Fairtrade or the Occupy movement. These forms of citizenship gain strength through linkages above the state to similar sites with similar aims in different places, cutting across borders. Thus, a Fairtrade shop becomes a place where consumptive practices can link, speak, and care for “distant others” and, in doing so, lobby for change. Similarly, new social networks crystallize in symbolic places of protest to not only challenge a global political order but also point toward new forms of global citizenry that is global rather than national in outlook. The Occupy movement, for example, started in 2011 in Zuccotti Park, New York, before spreading to more than 900 cities in 82 countries via activist networks. A series of protests occurred at symbolic urban sites across the worlddsuch as Puerta del Sol square in Madrid, Yeouido in Seoul, and the National Congress of Brazil in Brasíliadto demand wealth redistribution, an end to austerity measures, job creation, and democratic reform. While locally based and supported by a wide range of apparently disparate groups, the Occupy movement reflected a wave of global demands for redressing political, social, and economic injustices. While the sites themselves were temporary, their transnational nature meant that these sites of citizenship “jumped scales” and made efforts to secure rights at a national or global scale. Fourth, poststructuralist citizenship scholars approach citizenship as modes of political being that are enacted through encounters rather than in terms of membership to a nation-state or any notion of community that assumes the subjects of political life can be determined in advance and brought together in a political unit that assumes boundaries and unity within. Rather, the relational focus in such renderings of citizenship means that citizens are brought together through both who we engage with and how we engage with one another, locally and extralocally. A range of connections are possible, such as by inhabiting proximate spaces, travel to distant places, Internet technology, and other forms of shared agendas and solidarity. Such connections are contingent and constantly changing, depending on life circumstances and the possibilities for engagement across spaces and scales. This view of citizenship also entails shifting focus from a central authority figure, normally considered the government of a nation-state, to the formation of those connections and how the power relations ensuing become constituted. Such an approach allows citizenship analyses to capture not only those who are present as citizens of a nation-state but also those persons rendered absent or considered irregular in normalized accounts of citizenship and membership both within and beyond the nation-state (i.e., hill tribes, emigrants, or irregular migrants). The manifold ways in which the concept of citizenship manifests in Western and non-Western contexts underline the specific spatial and cultural contexts in which expressions and practices of citizenship develop. Geographers can contribute to analyses of citizenship not only by being spatially attuned to local histories and mores but also by engaging in scalar analyses of how political subjectivities are manifested at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels.

See Also: Activism; Citizenship; Colonialism; Decolonization; Governmentality; Indigeneity; Orientalism; Religion; Scale; Subjectivity; Transnationalism; Urban Citizenship.

Further Reading Arendt, H., 2007. The Promise of Politics. Schocken Books, New York. Bauböck, R., 2003. Towards a political theory of migrant transnationalism. Int. Migr. Rev. 37, 700–723. Bellamy, R., 2008. Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Closs Stephens, A., Squire, V., 2012. Politics through a web: citizenship and community unbound. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 30, 551–567. Desforges, L., Jones, R., Woods, M., 2005. New geographies of citizenship. Citizsh. Stud. 9, 439–451. Fraser, N., 1990. Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. Soc. Text 25/26, 56–80. Habermas, J., 1999. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harris, P., 2002. The origins of modern citizenship in China. Asia Pac. Viewp. 43, 181–203. Ikegame, A., 2012. Mathas, gurus and citizenship: the state and communities in colonial India. Citizsh. Stud. 16, 689–703. Isin, E.F. (Ed.), 2015. Citizenship after Orientalism: Transforming Political Theory. Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke.

Citizenship Concepts Isin, E.F., Turner, B.S. (Eds.), 2002. The Handbook of Citizenship Studies. Sage, London. Marshall, T.H., 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. Pluto Press, London. McKinnon, K., 2005. (Im)mobilization and hegemony: “hill tribe” subjects and the “Thai” state. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 6, 31–46. Painter, J., Philo, C., 1995. Spaces of citizenship: an introduction. Polit. Geogr. 14, 107–120. Yarwood, R., 2014. Citizenship. Routledge, London.

Relevant Website Open Democracy https://www.opendemocracy.net/engin-isin/citizenship-after-orientalism-introduction.

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Citizenship, Extraterritorial Michael Collyer, University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Diaspora A group of people associated with a particular place who are dispersed across a range of other locations. The diaspora involves people born in the original place and their descendants, particularly when they express a feeling of common belonging. Diaspora is widely used to refer to the global dispersal of a group of emigrants from a particular country, but it can refer to any dispersed group of people with a commonsense of belonging. Emigration Movement of people, particularly citizens, away from the territory of a nation-state. Immigration Movement of people, particularly noncitizens, onto the territory of a nation-state. Spatiality The spatial arrangement of a process or group of objects. Territory Space over which sole rights of ownership or use is claimed.

The invigorated interest in citizenship in geography is often dated to the publication of Painter and Philo’s journal special issue on “Spaces of Citizenship” in Political Geography in 1995. Until then, geographical work on citizenship had been relatively sporadic. This seminal collection provided a strong base from which geographical analysis of citizenship has flourished. In Painter and Philo’s introduction they identify two spatially defined groups “us,” “here” and “them,” “there.” This framing clearly articulates the exclusionary basis for citizenship and introduces the central elements of belonging (“us/them”) and territorial presence (“here/there”). This frame of analysis is brilliant in its simplicity. It demonstrates how the initial binary exclusions combine to produce the categories on which modern understandings of citizenship are founded. This simple distinction is inevitably complicated by international migration. International migrants lead to a third category “them, here” those people who are present on state territory but are excluded from citizenship. This simplified system of analysis can be expressed in a straightforward table (Fig. 1), although Painter and Philo do not express it in this way but rather move quickly on. Yet it is worth reflecting on these categories. Immigration complicates the initial citizenship binary to create the contentious “them, here” category which frames a vast literature around migration and citizenship. Expressing these categories in the form of a table highlights the obvious gap in this account, which is not mentioned by Painter and Philo’s collection and indeed is one of the great absences from most analysis of citizenship: emigration. The population produced by emigration is the fourth box of this heuristic presentation, “us, there.” Overlooking emigration is initially surprising since every immigrant is always initially an emigrant. Yet emigrants may quickly lose any recognition from their home government that they belong and they are not automatically considered as “us, there.” Historically, when emigrants left as armies, conquering territory and furthering imperial ambitions, or as traders, they were memorialized and mythologized. They were cherished as valuable members of the nation and welcomed back with open arms. But when marginalized populations left to work in other countries, they were widely considered with shame and almost universally overlooked by governments. This situation may be because their departure highlighted the problems of their home countries, which could not provide a decent living for everyone there. Alternatively, the realization that “us, there” had much in common with “them, here” against whom “us, here” consciously defined themselves must also have had a part to play. Whatever the case, for generations, poorer emigrants slipped out of the country silently, like the Kabyle laborer that Abdelmalek Sayad interviewed in France in the early 1970s, who left at night and did not even tell his family that he was leaving. This situation has begun to change very recently. Governments of countries as different as Scotland and Sri Lanka have begun to recognize and celebrate emigrants of all backgrounds. As histories of poor, disenfranchised labor migrants, which in some cases date back centuries, are retold, there is evidence of a wider trend. The privileging of military and commercial exploits continues, but these retellings have begun to recognize the tremendous contribution that poorer emigrants have made, and in many cases, continue to make, as well as the sacrifices that they have made. A more universalist language of citizenship has become more common to describe and analyze the relations that governments maintain with emigrants. It is now widely recognized that leaving your country of citizenship does not result in the disappearance of the rights (and in some cases the obligations) associated with citizenship. Indeed, there is now a recognized status of extraterritorial citizenship that is widespread and increasingly associated with particular

Us Them Figure 1

Here Us, here Them, here

There Them, there

The categories created by the intersection of space and belonging.

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bundles of rights, such as voting. Through extraterritorial citizenship, belonging is respatialized to encompass entire populations living beyond national territory, not just select groups. This phenomenon is occurring in very different countries around the world, at a very similar moment in time. It may not last long for many, but the growing recognition of “us, there” is a significant moment in the evolution of citizenship.

Defining the Extraterritorial Citizen The main difficulty of tracing this evolution is that what is now widely called extraterritorial citizenship has been analyzed and implemented under very different names, even in the very recent past. Citizenship has become a common term, but it is qualified by a wide range of closely related adjectives. There are significant bodies of work on transnational citizenship, diaspora citizenship, postterritorial citizenship, diasporic citizenship, external citizenship, and emigrant citizenship, all of which have at least some overlap. Similar approaches are referred to without reference to citizenship as “diaspora strategies,” “diaspora governance,” or “diaspora engagement.” Analysis of these processes in terms of citizenship has largely been initiated by nongeographers, although there have been regular calls for greater application of citizenship within geography. A language of citizenship, rather than alternative formulations, is useful for four reasons. First, it describes a relationship with state institutions on an individual basis. Second, citizenship confers identifiable and advantageous rights to that individual, not simply obligations or expectations, such as financial transfers as the diaspora engagement approach implies. Third, although the relationship is an individual one, it applies universally across a group of people who share similar characteristics without further distinction, at least in theory. Finally, the language of citizenship is definite, the boundaries are clear, individuals are either included or excluded, and there is no blurring of membership. This approach means that it is at least theoretically possible to identify everyone to whom the status of citizen applies, or even could apply in the future. All four of these advantages differentiate citizenship from related notions of diaspora, where criteria for membership are far from clear, and there is tremendous uncertainty about to whom they apply and therefore to potential sizes of diaspora groups. The term “extraterritorial citizenship” has been in use for about 20 years. It originally had a lot in common with diaspora and so did not make the most of these four advantages. It often avoided the legal distinction of citizenship in favor of more fluid ideas of belonging to some kind of imagined community. Over the last 20 years, notions of diaspora have proliferated, very much along these lines. The attraction of citizenship is that it ascribes a more precise relationship delimited by the legal definition. A more restrictive interpretation is to consider extraterritorial citizenship as simply the citizenship of emigrants. In practice, most countries allow this group to retain their citizenship for the rest of their lives, though in some countries, such as China, they must give up their citizenship if they acquire another. The experience of being outside the territory of citizenship applies both to citizens who leave the territory of citizenship briefly (for purposes of tourism, e.g.) and to those who are permanently resident abroad. Thus it is only really the latter group for whom extraterritorial citizenship is relevant if the status can be passed on to children born abroad. Even where citizenship can be passed on generationally, it is widely argued that such an approach should not extend beyond the second generation. The majority of countries where citizenship can be inherited by children not born on the territory of the state granting citizenship follow this limitation on the passing of citizenship. Other terms have been used to make explicit the connection between the new transnational approach and the more formal analysis of citizenship. The idea of “transnational citizenship,” like the closely connected “diasporic citizenship,” has become widely used to analyze forms of nonstate membership that result from migration. This approach includes postcolonial analysis of local forms of city-level memberships or more cosmopolitan forms of connection and belonging that do not include state institutions. Although these are important areas of discussion around citizenship, and the scale of belonging is not necessarily at the state level, most discussion of extraterritorial citizenship focuses on the scale of the nation-state and state territory. The territorial focus of extraterritorial citizenship is important, since it highlights the shifting spatialization of state power beyond state territory. I therefore prefer to maintain the emphasis on “extraterritorial citizenship” defined fairly rigidly. This article maintains two key criteria in considering extraterritorial citizenship: citizenship is a formally recognized, legal status; and the individual citizen is outside the territory of the state of which he/she is a citizen. These relatively narrowly defined terms have clear analytical advantages. Although this status has become much more widely discussed in both academic and policy contexts over the last 20 years, the practice may be traced back much further.

The Historical Development of Extraterritorial Citizenship The relationship between collective political institutions and individuals associated with those institutions living some distance away has antecedents that predate the territorial state. Although the diaspora is not necessarily territorialized, connections that persist despite distance and dispersal are essential to the idea of diaspora. Contemporary interest in diaspora can at least partly be explained by the attractions of a concept of political organization that predates state institutions. For much of its history, the term “Diaspora” (usually capitalized) has referred to the Babylonian exile of the Jews from the 6th Century BCE and their subsequent dispersal from Palestine. This understanding of diaspora is roughly contemporaneous with the origins of links between territorialized institutions and individuals beyond those territories. Engaging with the diaspora is the function of the modern consulate

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but this may be traced to the institution of proxeny between Greek city-states in the 5th Century BCE, which some have argued also extended to Egypt. Institutionalized relationships between territorialized institutions and individuals living beyond the territory in question evolved in a fairly haphazard manner, through Imperial protection offered to pilgrims on the Hajj from CE 8th Century onward to the Capitulations imposed by European powers on the Ottoman empire in the 19th Century. These relationships were not codified into the modern consular system until the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Although the 1963 convention formalized existing practice, it was signed at a time when emigration was still largely overlooked beyond the concerns of the wealthier states for their wealthiest “expatriates” and business travelers. The convention specifies the activities of the consulate including “protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law” (Art. 5a). Article 5, covering consular functions, is the longest article of the convention, running to 13 subclauses. All these functions are associated with internal sovereignty but are carried out extraterritorially. The consulate contrasts with the embassy which is the focus of state-to-state relations associated with external sovereignty. There is still a clear hierarchical distinction between the two, with embassies associated with the high politics of official diplomatic relations, and consulates involved with the low politics of population management and mundane administration, yet this is the key to emigration. From as early as the 1970s, Abdelmalek Sayad was unusual in his focus on emigration, and his insistence on the enduring connection between immigration and emigration, exemplified by his continued use of the label émigré-immigré. His scholarship marks one of the first detailed examinations of the distinct context of emigration. It also precedes the important developments around the broadening of analysis of diaspora. This theme also characterizes the cultural studies approach to diasporas in which diaspora retains a distinct theoretical focus from states. In the three decades since then the term diaspora has been widely popularized and taken up in specific policy contexts. At least 113 countries now have diaspora institutions of one form or another. This trend marks a significant shift from the theoretical sense of diaspora as a cultural, primarily nonstate organization to a much broader, more popular understanding of diaspora as a group of individuals associated with a particular state who are outside the territory of that state. The renewed interest in diaspora coincided with and has significantly overlapped the transnational turn in the social sciences in the early 1990s. Until then, there was no analytical framework that drew attention to distant connections, although it is clear that such connections had always existed. Immigration had been prioritized in empirical studies and emigration overlooked; transnationalism provided a way to unite the two, as Sayad had long argued for. The relationship between diaspora and territory was initially uncertain and, particularly in the early cultural studies work, territory was of very little relevance. Transnationalism was imagined in territorial terms from the outset. The mix of the territorial and the extraterritorial has always been a significant strand of analysis in transnationalism. The language of citizenship reinforces the connection with a territorialized space. Citizenship is membership of a political community and in almost all contexts that political community is a territorial one. The formalized relationship of citizenship arrived fairly late, given the long history of distant affiliation to political institutions considered above. For most of the two centuries or so that the term citizenship has been widely used it has meant a territorial relationship. Citizens who leave that territory have always retained some rights, at a minimum these have involved the right to return to the territory unchallenged, although often not much more. Unlike more fluid notions of diaspora, where specifics of who belongs and how many there are always a challenge, citizenship offers a more precise status and more obviously delimited group of people, even if in practice estimates still vary widely. From the 1980s onward, the growing awareness of connections across international borders drew attention to the formal connections of citizenship that continue from beyond the territory. Such connections may be imagined as a “deterritorialization” of the state in question, but the last few decades have shown that deterritorialization has not resulted in a gradual decline in the significance of territory; if anything the opposite has happened. Relationships between state and diaspora are often described metaphorically in terms of ongoing territorialization: diasporas have been labeled as Haiti’s 10th department, Ecuador’s “fifth region,” and Africa’s “sixth zone,” among others. The territorial imaginary is used to emphasize continual presence. The maintenance of relations across international borders has therefore come to be seen as extraterritorial, not necessarily undermining territorial practices but going beyond them. A growing array of rights associated with territorially based citizenship has been extended to members of the political community who are resident elsewhere. This practice varies from practical support through the consulate, which applies to even those individuals who are temporarily out of the country, to the institutionalization of the extraterritorial practice of key aspects of citizenship, most obviously voting. The recognition of rights of citizens and in many cases their descendants beyond state territory has expanded rapidly over the last few decades. In some cases these rights are restricted to those with citizenship and in other cases they involve people beyond this limited group. The developments above have been widely celebrated, and not without reason. The significance of relations across borders suggests a growing cosmopolitanism and in practical terms the vast financial and nonfinancial contributions made by emigrants, and even their descendants are now very widely appreciated. For some, this growing appreciation is the explanation for the gradual extension of rights to emigrant citizens, although it has also been criticized as citizenship for sale. In other cases, the extension of extraterritorial rights is viewed as more problematic. Such concerns focus particularly on the recognition of extraterritorial citizenship for individuals in neighboring states who have not themselves moved, but have been isolated from the state by historical border changes. In these very particular cases extraterritorial citizenship is not welcomed as a sign of contemporary hybridity, but critiqued as a very modern and sometimes explicitly confrontational form of state-building. The impact of citizenship, on individuals and on wider political communities, depends significantly on the nature of the rights that are attached to it.

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Rights and Obligations of Extraterritorial Citizenship Over the last few decades a distinct status of extraterritorial citizenship has begun to emerge, though the terminology and the formalization of the rights associated with it vary. In some cases this is referred to as diaspora engagement and there is indeed a range of activities that cover a broad and relatively undifferentiated group of people that certainly goes beyond citizens. Some countries have a quasi or partial citizenship status that is still restrictive, but not as restrictive as citizenship, in order to cover some of these benefits. In other cases the focus is much more narrow. Benefits such as investment advantages or voting require individual registration and are typically open only to those who hold citizenship. The term “extraterritorial citizenship” should refer to something as close to full citizenship rights as possible. Where a lesser package or rights is offered another term is perhaps more appropriate, such as “diaspora citizenship.” Models of diaspora citizenship do not require formal membership. Diaspora is often the terminology favored by states when they attempt to reach out to emigrants and their descendants. This approach reflects the self-identification of many emigrants themselves. It may involve a purely cultural link, celebrations of particular festivals, or particular forms of tourism. These activities encourage a pride in an ancestral homeland, and may be directly financially beneficial or contribute to raising awareness in positive ways. The global festivities around St. Patrick’s Day are a good example, encouraging links with Ireland far beyond Irish expatriates and doing major Irish brands no harm in the process. In a more formal sense, partial citizenship represents a particular extraterritorial status. Such situations often arise where states prohibit dual citizenship. The most obvious example is the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) status. An OCI card is granted on an individual basis and confers significant rights, such as visa-free travel to India, although it falls a long way short of the rights associated with full citizenship. In contrast to these partial measures, extraterritorial citizenship rights, such as voting, are widely justified on the basis of full equality between citizens in the country and citizens outside the country. Even though such equality is unlikely, as a hypothetical goal it distinguishes extraterritorial citizenship from other forms of broader diaspora engagement. Extraterritorial citizenship allows individuals to return to the territory of their citizenship and to continue to enjoy equality of rights with other citizens. More importantly, it involves the introduction of systems to allow citizens to experience a growing number of such rights without returning home. The expansion of voting has been most widely studied. It is now the case that the large majority of countries have systems in place to allow their citizens to participate in national elections. Other rights that may be exercised from overseas include social protection, such as the receipt of pensions or welfare benefits outside the country. Particular investment opportunities, certain occupations, or rights to own property are frequently restricted to citizens yet can be extended to operate externally as well. Clear obligations that may be imposed extraterritorially are much rarer. The US approach to tax returns and ultimately collection is the only universally imposed obligation and this is only possible given the sway held by the United States on the entire global financial system. There is no other country that could realistically impose the sanctions necessary to enforce such measures. The more recent trend to strip citizenship from individuals suspected of engagement in terrorist activities while outside their country of citizenship, rather than to prosecute them on return, is a particularly concerning development that appears to relate to the power of the state beyond its territory. There is an implied obligation here that citizens should avoid behavior judged to be against the interests of their state of citizenship if they wish to retain that citizenship. Still legal challenges are underway, and such extraterritorial obligations are not yet sufficiently established or systematic to be referred to as a clear policy. In many situations these obligations are only applied to dual nationals, although not always, so it is far from a universal characteristic of extraterritorial citizenship. In general, extraterritorial citizenship is much more about rights than about obligations, which provokes the question: why would states want to agree to it?

State Sovereignty and the Future of Extraterritorial Citizenship The approach of extraterritorial citizenship deliberately applies the analysis of citizenship to the distant relations maintained between state institutions and individual with a claim to belong to that state. In contrast to widespread alternatives, such as diaspora, the language of citizenship has a number of advantages, particularly the claim to a universal experience and a goal of equality, in terms of rights. It is this argument of fully or equal citizenship that is often used by emigrants’ organizations in campaigning for these rights and in justifications of state institutions when they are accorded. Even if absolute equality is more difficult to achieve in an extraterritorial context than territorially it remains an important principle. For this reason, extraterritorial citizenship refers to a status that is distinct from broader diaspora belonging. Extraterritorial citizenship is definite and relies on an individual membership, typically one that must be registered and certainly one that is clearly delineated; just like other forms of citizenship individuals are either included or excluded. These relationships have a long history, although it is only really in the last decade that their institutionalization has taken off. Key rights, such as voting from abroad, are now accorded by the large majority of states in the world. There are two broad explanations for why states would accord such rights: interests and norms. The first uses the rise in financial remittances as an explanation for the reciprocal granting of rights to individuals to both recognize the sacrifices they have made and to encourage them to make more. The argument is that states grant rights to emigrants because they have an interest in doing so; they have something obvious to gain. The second explanation does not totally deny the first, but it suggests that this development is more normative. States have begun to treat emigrants well not because they want something from emigrants, but because it is the right thing to do. These explanations reflect the classic distinction between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness, which are always difficult

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to separate. In this case, however, if states were motivated most significantly by interest, it would be states that depended most on emigrants’ financial contributions. There is no clear pattern to suggest that this is the case. The difference between these two explanations is significant since they have different implications for the future of extraterritorial citizenship, and more broadly for our understandings of state sovereignty. Neither interests nor norms last forever, but interests shift more rapidly than do norms. If the explanation was based on interest, support for extraterritorial citizenship policies would fall as soon as remittances declined. Extraterritorial citizenship would be a short-term change for a particular group of states. Yet that is not how extraterritorial citizenship appears to be evolving. From the account presented in this entry, the rise of extraterritorial citizenship is clearly a normative change. Normative changes are likely to last a generation or more. They are also likely gradually to have an impact on all states, regardless of their financial dependence on remittances. State institutions across the world are substantially expanding the remit for what they are doing, engaging with citizens regardless of where they are. The key change of extraterritorial citizenship implies a shift in state sovereignty focused on state territory to a broadly nonterritorial practice of sovereignty.

See Also: Citizenship and Governmentality; Citizenship; Emigration; Immigration; Migration and Development; Migration; Sovereignty; State Theory; State; Territory and Territoriality; Urban Citizenship.

Further Reading Balibar, E., 1988. Propositions on citizenship. Ethics 98 (4), 723–730. Basch, L., Schiller, N.G., Blanc, C.S., 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. Routledge, London. Bauböck, R., 1994. Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration. Bauböck, R., 2009. The rights and duties of external citizenship. Citizsh. Stud. 13 (5), 475–499. Collyer, M., 2014. A geography of extra-territorial citizenship: explanations of external voting. Migr. Stud. 2 (1), 55–72. Collyer, M., 2017. Diasporas and transnational citizenship. In: Shachar, A., Bauböck, R., Bloemraad, I., Vink, M. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 576–598. Collyer, M., King, R., 2015. Producing transnational space: international migration and the extra-territorial reach of state power. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 39 (2), 185–204. Fitzgerald, D., 2000. Negotiating Extra-territorial Citizenship: Mexican Migration and the Transnational Politics of Community. University of California Press, San Diego. Gamlen, A., Cummings, M.E., Vaaler, P.M., 2019. Explaining the rise of diaspora institutions. J. Ethn. Migr. Stud. 45 (4), 492–516. Hall, S., 1990. Cultural identity and diaspora. In: Rutherford, J. (Ed.), Identity: Community, Culture,difference. Lawrence & Wishart, London, pp. 222–236. Ho, E.L.E., 2011. “Claiming” the diaspora: Elite mobility, sending state strategies and the spatialities of citizenship. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 35 (6), 757–772. Painter, J., Philo, C., 1995. Spaces of citizenship: an introduction. Political Geogr. 2 (14), 107–120. Sayad, A., 2018. The Suffering of the Immigrant. John Wiley & Sons, London. Sheffer, G. (Ed.), 1986. Modern Diasporas in International Politics. Taylor & Francis, London. Tan, Y., Liu, X., Rosser, A., Yeoh, B., Guo, F., 2018. Transnationalism, diaspora, and development: a purposive review of the literature. Geogr. Compass 12 (12), e12413.

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City Marketing Eugene McCann, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Myths Narratives about the world that are not necessarily untrue. More importantly, they resonate with their audience and provide an agenda and legitimacy for action. Revanchism A term generally referring to vengeful policies and used in the contemporary urban context to highlight the negative effects of zero-tolerance policing and related policies on the poor.

Classic city slogans like “I & New York” and “Glasgow’s Miles Better” are so embedded in the popular consciousness as to have long outlasted their official use by their respective municipalities, Chambers of Commerce, and Convention and Visitors Bureaus. Cities and towns are increasingly associated with symbols, slogans, or taglines. These slogans are the most widely recognizable elements of an interconnected group of contemporary strategies known by a number of names including urban entrepreneurialism, city branding, and city marketing. They are intended to enhance a city’s competitive advantage over others in the context of zero-sum competition for resources, investment, jobs, and tourist revenue. While the ubiquity and persuasiveness of city marketing strategies often makes them appear to be natural and normal activities of city governments and business organizations, geographers and others have shown that city marketing is a social process with a history, a geography, and a political economy. Thus, through the empirical study of city marketing and through efforts to conceptualize the process in terms of its political, economic, and social contexts, geographers and others have identified how the character of city marketing has changed through time, how it refers to and reshapes certain aspects of urban society and urban built environments, and in whose interests it operates. These themes highlight a number of myths, tactics, and intended audiences that characterize most city marketing strategies. Key myths that permeate city marketing schemes include: the city as welcoming and safe, vibrant and fun; tolerant and accepting of social and cultural difference; environmentally friendly, culturally rich, and/or business friendly; and strategically and conveniently located. Favorite tactics of city marketers, beyond sloganeering, include: the provision of packages of business incentives; (re) building, policing, and cleaning the urban built environment to keep its appearance in line with the city’s marketing image; and continual efforts to maintain coherence in the city’s marketing message by keeping disparate interest groups (often referred to as “stakeholders”) on the same page, “on message,” or, in some cases, out of the spotlight. Finally, many city marketing strategies are characterized by their attention to a range of audiences or niche markets: potential business investors; potential residents and workers; tourists and conventioneers; the promoters of mega-events like the Olympics; grant-giving agencies; and local residents. In this regard, city marketing is not only strategic; it is also powerful and political. It involves struggles by different groups seeking to shape cities in ways that satisfy their interests.

City Marketing in Historical-Geographical Context City marketing did not emerge fully formed from the heart of the Big Apple, nor was it a child of Mr. Happy, Glasgow’s cartoon symbol. Rather, the legendary New York and Glasgow campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s marked only the beginning of the contemporary phase of city marketing. While contemporary city marketing has important distinguishing contexts, features, and impacts, it is worth pointing briefly to earlier examples of the phenomenon. Place marketing has occurred in various forms since at least the middle of the 19th Century. In the United States at that time, the development and sale of railroad towns on the Anglo frontier was facilitated by advertising in the East and elsewhere. In the first half of the 20th Century, resorts and newly built suburbs became major foci of place marketing efforts in Britain and the US as mass tourism burgeoned. In these and other contexts marketing was driven largely by private actors. By the last third of the 20th Century, a series of political-economic restructurings set the context for the contemporary era of city marketing. Geographers generally regard the economic crises of the early 1970s as marking a series of political and economic shifts that fundamentally changed the character of cities and urban governance. This was a time, in the western world, of deindustrialization, high rates of unemployment, and a growing turn to fiscal austerity at all levels of the state. These conditions paralleled and precipitated the growing popularity of a neoliberal ideology that advocated for the benefits of a market logic and for the “roll back” of the state through, for example, the privatization of nationalized industries. In the many industrialized cities that had enjoyed economic prosperity in the postwar period, local governments and Chambers of Commerce had largely managed the economy and social reproduction but had not engaged in the sort of boosterism characteristic of private actors in earlier years.

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With the drying up of tax revenues and flows of funding from other levels of government, these actors found themselves compelled to act entrepreneurially in order to gain a competitive advantage as they sought to fix flows of resources, jobs, and capital in their city rather than see them stream into another.

Placing City Marketing: Geographical Approaches Neoliberal urbanism, including the activities of coalitions of political and economic elites, sets a context for understanding contemporary city marketing. Indeed, this set of hegemonic power relations is the context even for efforts to brand cities in apparently more progressive or participatory ways.

Urban Entrepreneurialism, City Marketing, Growth Coalitions, and Other “Stakeholders” Urban geographers’ conceptualization of contemporary city marketing is heavily influenced by David Harvey’s classic article, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism.” Harvey makes three related claims: first, that since the early 1970s, city governments had to take an entrepreneurial stance in relation to capital as a result of the changes described above. Second, this shift has entailed a relocation of control over, and risks emanating from urban economic development. Control of local governance is increasingly vested in private and unelected institutions. Local state agencies are thus left playing a facilitative role in urban policymaking while assuming more of the risks of development. It is the relocation of risk that Harvey sees as distinguishing contemporary entrepreneurial city marketing from earlier forms of civic boosterism. His third argument is that the entrepreneurial impulse has encouraged an initiatory or speculative ethos in entrepreneurial cities that led coalitions of private and public actors to focus more resources and attention on the construction of spectacular sites or built environments that will, it is hoped, prime the pump for further private investment. In this case, the geographical lens at work is one that focuses on specific scales of action (such as the global, national, and local), and on the ways in which processes generally seen to be operating at one scale are, in fact, thoroughly imbricated with the others. This perspective provides a great deal of insight into the structural conditions for and practices that constitute city marketing. Who are the actors involved in contemporary city marketing and what are their key interests? Neoliberal entrepreneurial urbanism has not sidelined the types of business interests involved in 19th-Century marketing. In fact, these locally dependent place entrepreneurs, or rentiers, are crucial to the process because their economic interests are based in drawing rent from land and buildings in a specific city. Therefore, it is generally in their interests to advocate for policies that will increase land values and intensify land uses in their locality. In order to achieve this goal, rentiers (i.e., developers, construction companies, property financiers, the real estate industry, etc.) must bring local politiciansda group that is as much, or more, locally dependent than they aredinto a growth-oriented coalition. The large-scale political-economic conditions that Harvey identifies in the post-1970 period make local policymakers increasingly likely to engage wholeheartedly in such a coalition, offering as it does an opportunity to increase tax revenues. The geographical literature shows how these actors join with other institutions and groups who view their interestsdeconomic or otherwisedas aligned with local economic growth. The other institutions include local media, utilities, local arts and entertainment organizations, and universities. As members of a private–public growth coalition, locally dependent actors propagate the myths and engage in the tactics of city marketing in order to attract and fix mobile capital and related resources in their place. A burgeoning literature on participatory city branding seeks to broaden the terms and possibilities of branding, however. This literature draws on and engages with the work of geographers, but stems from marketing and management disciplines. On an analytical level, this literature seeks to better understand how people associate with or “buy into” and therefore support particular representation of a place (i.e., a place brand). The literature provides examples of, and proposes models for, the co-creation of city brands by the “usual suspects” of city marketing (political and business elites) in conversation with a wider range of community stakeholders. Yet, how these approaches account for the entrenched power imbalances that channel and constrain access to decision-making arenas remains to be seen.

The Role of the Urban Built Environment in City Marketing Geographers have also employed a second, not unrelated lens to the study of city marketing. It involves a concern with the mutually constitutive relationship between the built environment and social action. This approach seeks to understand the “rewriting” of the city through marketing strategies in (1) textual and representational terms, and (2) a physical sense. City marketing frequently entails the writing and rewriting of a particular “script” or story about a city, particularly but not only for cities that are attempting to rebound from economic crisis and decline. The actors described above present what they see as the most attractive essence of their city to the world via an assemblage of tangible and intangible elements of its landscape, economy, society, and culture. This brand is not only captured in a slogan and a logo, but also involves the careful managing and presentation of specific images of the city through city web sites, marketing brochures, and, where possible, via stage-managed media events. Cities like Sydney, who have successfully competed for mega-events like the Olympics in the past, offer their iconic landscapes as stage sets for global media consumption during those events. More prosaic still, cities such as Barcelona use elements of their built environments, like unique styles of architecture, to convey specific meanings to particular audiences.

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While the urban built environment can be used as part of a carefully constructed writing and rewriting of a city, geographers also note the ways in which the branding of cities can provoke the reshaping, policing, and managing of its physical spaces. This form of physical reworking involves: (1) the building or renovation of elements of the built environment to enhance or correspond to a marketing goal, such as the use of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao to represent and facilitate the city’s postindustrial tourist economy, and (2) the policing, cleaning, and managing of urban public spaces with the express intention of making them correspond to a carefully constructed brand and, thus, to make them feel safe and welcoming for those who the growth coalition sees as its most valuable clients. The way that urban growth coalitions learn from and, to some extent, replicate successful marketing models from elsewhere led Harvey, in his classic article, to identify a problematic “serial reproduction” of sameness across urban landscapes which, by definition, crowds the marketplace and dilutes the competitive advantage that certain types of branding provide to the city. Every branddits slogan, its logo, its iconic landscape elementsdhas a shelf life and the expiration dates seem to arrive all the more quickly when marketplace crowding compels growth coalitions to innovate and find new marketing styles and strategies to distinguish their city from others. The production of an urban brand is, then, an ongoing process, not a one-off event; not only does it entail carefully monitoring the representational strategy (including which elements of the built environment to foreground), but it also involves constantly policing and managing the city itself, so that its public spaces and even its peopledor at least those who are on public view in spaces likely to be traversed by tourists or business peopledcorrespond to and enhance the city’s brand. A number of related tactics are involved in this element of a branding strategy. At a general level, the city is frequently divided into “frontstage” and “backstage” areas. The former are tourist and/or business and shopping zones. The latter are areas seen as dangerous, unpalatable, or of little interest to highly valued visitors and residents. More or less subtle representational strategies can be used to channel valued populations in certain directions including, for example, the careful construction of tourist maps to focus the tourist gaze on specific sites/sights. This channeling of people through the urban built environment is now frequently the purview of employees of Business Improvement Associations (BIAs), Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), or their equivalents. These are private organizations, funded by special localized levies and taxes, which have, under conditions of neoliberal entrepreneurialism, assumed the formerly public functions of managing clearly delimited areas of the city (frequently the downtown). These private governance agencies not only offer tourists advice, but also frequently provide street-sweeping services in their area and contract with private security firms to enforce bylaws and guard against so-called “quality of life” crimes (e.g., panhandling, public intoxication, graffiti tagging, and sex work), which tend to have profound negative effects on low-income, marginally housed, racialized, and otherwise stigmatized and marginalized urban populations. BIDs, then, are inspired by and seek to reinforce some of the central myths of city marketingdthe city as safe and friendly, fun, and without obstacles to commercedby directly addressing the conditions of urban life that explicitly question the veracity of those myths.

The Sharp Edge of the Hard Sell: Managing and Policing the Branded City Many have noted that the attempts by tourist agencies, Chambers of Commerce, and BIDs to manage the urban environment in correspondence with a particular marketing strategy are often armored with a hard edge of “zero-tolerance” policing, high-tech surveillance, and “defensive architecture” and strategies. These strategies involve the strict enforcement of laws for even the most minor infractions, the blanketing of city neighborhoods with closed-circuit television (CCTV), and, with the rise of so-called smart cities, various other sorts of sensors, and architectural features such as spikes embedded in alcoves and other places where people might sit or lie down. While many applaud the “cleaning up” of cities where these tactics are deployed, others argue that this sharp edge of image-conscious urban governance marks a new high (or low) point in a mean-spirited, “revanchist” (vengeful) war against the poor in contemporary cities. Many of these strategies and the politics around them are epitomized by Times Square in New York. In the 1990s, under the guidance of Mayor Giuliani and a private–public development partnership, this neighborhood which was renowned as a “redlight” district but was also regarded by many as the vibrant heart of the city was transformed into what proponents see as the welcoming face of the new tourist- and business-friendly Manhattan and skeptics regard as a bland, and literally “Disneyfied” space of consumption (featuring a Disney store, Disney theatrical productions, and a studio of Disney-owned ABC Television). The Square has its own BID, whose street cleaners patrol constantly, a police substation, and is in Midtown Manhattan, a neighborhood where almost every square foot of public space is covered by at least one CCTV camera. Of course, the rewritten square is also the site of the annual, internationally televized street party to welcome the New Yeardan event staged to convey the city’s image as a friendly, safe, vibrant, and fun, if sometimes chilly, place.

Know Your Audience: Targets of and Participants in City Marketing and Branding It is already evident from the discussion above that city marketers tend to have more than one audience in mind when they create a brand. Clearly tourists, potential residents, and business investors are in the sights of most urban growth coalitions when they charge marketing consultants with enhancing their city’s image. Moreover, the recent urban branding literature suggests that a wider range of “stakeholders” can and should be involved. It is worth elaborating on the range of audiences and participantsdand the audience-specific tacticsdthat has been identified in studies of city marketing.

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Potential business investors are enticed with talk of a generally “business-friendly” environment, tax incentives, a willing and well-trained workforce, ongoing economic growth, an already existing cluster of similar businesses and suppliers, help with customized facilities, proximity or easy transportation to markets, and high quality of life for CEOs and valued workers. These themes were evident in the recent competitive frenzy among North American municipalities and regions to attract Amazon’s second headquarters (HQ2). Potential residents, who in many but not all cases would be workers in the city, are enticed with the promise of jobs and abundant career opportunities, a low cost of living, and high quality of life. The attractive features advertised to residents encompassed everything from proximity to attractive natural environments and recreational opportunities adjacent to the city, to bike paths, high-quality recreational facilities and spectator sports, good schools and colleges, abundant cultural activities, and so on. The combination of economic development and quality of life discourses has certainly been at the heart of many city marketing campaigns. Marketers seek to present their city as an economic boomtown and, simultaneously, an ideal hometown. Among potential residents and workers who have become particularly coveted since the turn of the millennium in North America has been the socalled creative class of young workers employed in the technology and design industries. Cities pursuing this market niche have sought to highlight their vibrant neighborhoods, coffee shops, active (rather than spectator) recreational opportunities, diversity, cosmopolitanism, and “cool.” Urban elites who market to tourists and conventioneers are, for their part, likely to touch on some of the same quality of life and “quality of place” images outlined above, but are more likely to foreground the more immediate, visceral, and ephemeral experiences available in the citydfrom art galleries to night life. Yet, the tourist market is highly segmented and city marketers are careful to tend to a variety of niches within it. Other important audiences require their own specific combinations of marketing tactics. Certain cities spend a great deal of resources on marketing themselves to the organizers of spectacular mega-events, such as the Olympic Games, the soccer World Cup, or to those, like the officials of the European Commission, who can bestow titles like “Capital of Culture.” These bids take a great deal of effort from a range of institutions and volunteers, and involve often quite detailed marketing strategies. The time, care, and money put into these bids indicate the substantial nature of expected returns and legacies from events like the Olympics, particularly as a result of the expected global media coverage. Clearly, city marketers use various print and electronic media, yet the marketers do not necessarily always control the ways their city will be portrayed. Thus, the media become not only agents of city marketing, but also a target audience as city marketers seek to persuade them to present their city favorably in feature stories, travel articles, and the increasingly ubiquitous rankings of the best cites for business, quality of life, young people, etc. While cities’ relationships with funding streams from other levels of government have changed since the 1970s, this is not to say that central government, for example, is no longer important as a source of revenues and as a target for a certain type of city marketing. There is evidence of a focus by local elites on competitive bidding for grants from central government. Therefore, urban governments, private–public partnerships, etc. must present themselves in a particular way through the grant proposal process. The practice of what might be called “policy boosterism” is another example of the marketing relationship between political, bureaucratic, and business elites in one city and their peers elsewhere. It involves the promotion of locally developed policies, programs, or practices to broader communities of interested peers. Planners will “talk up” and share their zoning innovations with other planners elsewhere, for example. It is worth noting that city marketing is not always externally focused. Marketing often targets the population of the city itself. Critical urban geographers have tended to see this internally oriented marketing as part of an effort to legitimize the policies and objectives of governing elites, to convince citizens that neoliberal growth strategies benefit everyone in the city equally. On the other hand, the burgeoning literature from marketing and management suggests that there may be progressive potential, beyond the narrow neoliberal frame, in participatory forms of city branding. They argue that it may be possible to utilize these methods of city brand development (involving consultants in designing city-wide focus groups and brand-visioning processes, for example) to identify common understandings and goals across the population, and therefore use the branding process to develop new policies and nurture “buy-in” to those policies in order to change the character of the city for the better. This is not a straightforward process, of course. Yet, proponents of “bottom up” or participatory branding argue that it can transform policy in ways that extend beyond a neoliberal frame. On the other hand, important concerns remain about the ability of ordinary citizens to be considered “stakeholders” in participatory branding processes. As Kavaratzis and Kalandides (2015, 1378–79) note in the case of Bogotá, “participation in the thematic focus groups was achieved only for the educated middle class, thus neglecting a large section of the city’s residents,” and since these exclusions are common elsewhere too, there is a concern that city branding will largely remain a top-down, instrumental, exclusionary, and neoliberal practice, despite the efforts of a few consultants to do things differently.

Staying on Message: The Politics of City Marketing As the above examples indicate, city marketing has a number of political motivations and implications. The importance that marketers place on creating and managing a coherent, singular brand for a city necessitates political activity intended to persuade or enroll a wide variety of interests in a broad growth coalition and efforts to stay “on message.” Growth coalitions comprise interests from a range of economic sectors as well as state actors, and representatives of other institutions and interests. Therefore, there can be different foci within a coalition. This “silo” effect can be exacerbated in larger citiesdor in urban regions where numerous cities have combined their resources to construct a single marketing strategydsince even interests from the same sector might find themselves at odds over development strategy due to their embeddedness in different neighborhoods or municipalities. Thus, a continual politics of consensus building and persuasion within the coalition is necessary if a single brand is to be articulated

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and maintained. While this pluralistic political context can produce successful long-term agreements on coherent marketing strategies, it can also produce difficulties in maintaining coherence under a single marketing banner. The politics of persuasion and consensus building operates not only within growth coalitions, but also between the coalition and the larger population of a city. In order to present a unified and welcoming marketing image, marketers must find ways to dampen opposition to their particular branding and development vision. Thus, it is necessary to build what Cox and Mair call a “localist ideology” where most residents of a city are persuaded that they are worthy, deserving, and unified in relationship to the “outside world.” Not surprisingly this sort of hegemonic discourse is never complete or entirely convincing. Not all residents will be persuaded by a marketing strategy or a particular development agenda. The limits of top-down branding has been evident in the various recent refusals of local populations to accept the costs of Olympic games, including those in Calgary, Boston, and Hamburg, for example. Opposition to this sort of city marketing and its relationship to the demands of major corporations has also been clear in the case of Amazon’s search for its HQ2 site. Indeed, not only did cities short-listed by Amazon see opposition groups spring up to question the massive financial and other concessions that city governments were offering the company, but opposition has continued after Long Island City, New York, and the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC, were chosen as joint winners of the competition.

Future Directions The study of city marketing has been a vibrant element of urban geographical scholarship since the beginning of the 1990s. Yet, there are aspects of the phenomenon that have been less studied than others. Furthermore, there is a danger of the literature becoming rather uninspiring, with new studies, ironically, engaging in a “serial reproduction” of their own by producing new case studies of city marketing without furthering conceptual understandings. On the other hand, worthwhile work is being done in the following areas and more of it is necessary. First, Lucarelli’s (2018) argument for a deeper conceptualization of the political in the politics of city branding as a regime of knowledge production, and Vanolo’s (2018) response point the way toward new avenues for critical investigation in the future. Second, research on affect in critical human geography might lead to new insights into the ways in which brands, symbols, and slogans move their audiences on a variety of levels, including the way in which images and visualizations are used in city branding, and how they mediate how people see and feel attached to places. Third, the ways in which urban policy professionals, such as city planners, engage in policy boosterism and how this practice shapes cities and the interurban networks in which they exist can both inform and be informed by the literature on policy mobilities. Fourth, more detailed analyses and evaluations of the effects of marketing strategies are necessary. Can campaigns intended to attract new workers or investment be measured in order to evaluate their direct and indirect consequences? Fifth, as city marketing becomes more common beyond the Western industrialized world, it seems reasonable to assume that analyses conducted in a variety of different historical, cultural, and political-economic contexts would benefit from and lead to further theorizations of postcoloniality and international development. Are standard theoretical perspectives tenable, for instance, if they are employed to study city marketing in Global South or settler colonial cities? These are open and interesting questions.

See Also: Urban Geography; Waterfront Development; Urban Growth Machine; Urban Policy.

Further Reading Colomb, C., 2012. Pushing the urban frontier: temporary uses of space, city marketing, and the creative city discourse in 2000s Berlin. J. Urban Aff. 34 (2), 131–152. Cox, K.R., Mair, A., 1988. Locality and community in the politics of local economic development. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 78, 307–325. Evans, G., 2003. Hard-branding the cultural city–from Prado to Prada. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 27 (2), 417–440. Green, A., Grace, D., Perkins, H., 2016. City branding research and practice: an integrative review. J. Brand Manag. 23 (3), 252–272. Hae, L., 2018. Traveling policy: place marketing and the neoliberal turn of urban studies in South Korea. Crit. Sociol. 44 (3), 533–546. Hall, T., Hubbard, P. (Eds.), 1998. The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime, and Representation. Wiley, New York. Harvey, D., 1989. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation of urban governance in late capitalism. Geogr. Ann. 71 B, 3–17. Joo, Y.M., Seo, B., 2018. Transformative city branding for policy change: the case of Seoul’s participatory branding. Environ. Plan. C Politics Space 36 (2), 239–257. Kavaratzis, M., Kalandides, A., 2015. Rethinking the place brand: the interactive formation of place brands and the role of participatory place branding. Environ. Plan. 47 (6), 1368–1382. Lauermann, J., Vogelpohl, A., 2017. Fragile growth coalitions or powerful contestations? Cancelled Olympic bids in Boston and Hamburg. Environ. Plan. 49 (8), 1887–1904. Lucarelli, A., 2018. Place branding as urban policy: the (im)political place branding. Cities 80, 12–21. Lucarelli, A., Olof Berg, P., 2011. City branding: a state-of-the-art review of the research domain. J. Place Manag. Dev. 4 (1), 9–27. MacLeod, G., 2002. From urban entrepreneurialism to a revanchist city? On the spatial injustices of Glasgow’s renaissance. Antipode 34 (3), 602–624. McCann, E., 2004. ‘Best places’: inter-urban competition, quality of life, and popular media discourse. Urban Stud. 41 (10), 1909–1929. McCann, E., 2013. Policy boosterism, policy mobilities, and the extrospective city. Urban Geogr. 34 (1), 5–29. Rose, G., Degen, M., Melhuish, C., 2016. Looking at digital visualizations of urban redevelopment projects: dimming the scintillating glow of unwork. In: Jordan, S., Lindner, C. (Eds.), Cities Interrupted: Visual Culture and Urban Space. Bloomsbury, London, pp. 105–120. Vanolo, A., 2008. The image of the creative city: some reflections on urban branding in Turin. Cities 25 (6), 370–382.

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Vanolo, A., 2017. City Branding: The Ghostly Politics of Representation in Globalising Cities. Routledge, London. Vanolo, A., 2018. Politicising city branding: some comments on Andrea Lucarelli’s ‘Place branding as urban policy’. Cities 80, 67–69. Ward, S., 1998. Selling Places: The Marketing and Promotion of Towns and Cities, 1850–2000. E & FN Spon, London. Ward, K.G., 2000. From rentiers to rantiers: ‘Active entrepreneurs,’ structural speculators,’ and the ‘politics’ of marketing the city. Urban Stud. 37, 1093–1107. Ward, K., 2007. Business improvement districts: policy origins, mobile policies and urban liveability. Geogr. Compass 1 (3), 657–672.

City, Modern John R Gold, Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 7, pp 150–156, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Human Ecology The area of ecological inquiry that deals with the interactions between human beings and their environments. Modernism A shared international tendency within the arts that emerged in the last decade of the 19th Century and the first three decades of the 20th Century, which sought to express the spirit of modernity through radically different forms of representation that often challenged established practices. Modernity Quality or condition of being modern, the sense of living in modern times. Modernization The process of social transformation induced by the switch from agrarian to industrial modes of production. Urbanization The relative growth of the population living in towns as opposed to rural areas.

Any use of the term “modern city” needs careful definition. In one sense, it need not imply anything more than that which is current but the term often gains added potency from the epithet “modern” signifying a sense of opposition. The modern city is not just that which is here and now but also something that provides a sharp contrast with what has gone before. In this sense, labeling a city as “modern” reflects the fact that cities are normally the places where economic, social, and cultural innovations first appear. Most of these innovations are passing fashions that quickly fade, but others can constitute pervasive new trends that bring far-reaching changes to both the city and the wider society. Judgments about the nature and consequences of these changes reflect the attitudes that observers adopt toward “modernity”dthe sense of living in modern times. Some have viewed modernity in a positive light, stressing the benefits of abandoning the constraints of the past, liberating progressive thought, and fostering creativity. Others interpret modernity pessimistically, identifying emerging trends as likely to alienate the city’s residents and undermine the quality of life. Judgments about modernity, of course, can vary over time. The typical changes brought by city-center reconstruction in the 1960s, for example, were overwhelmingly identified at the time as the march of progress and as bringing much-needed order to urban chaos. Two decades later, the same developments were roundly condemned for misunderstanding how cities function, as abandoning fundamental values, and as being motivated by commercial greed and bureaucratic arrogance. This sense of ambiguity underpins both principal uses of the term modern city as it is employed here. The first sees the modern city as synonymous with the “industrial city,” relating the term to a period lasting from roughly the 1820s to the 1970s, in which the city was reshaped by the modernizing influences that occurred in the wake of demographic and technological change. The second sees the modern city as a late stage in the development of the industrial city, coterminous with the rise of modernism in architecture and planning and, therefore, restricted to the three decades after World War II.

The Industrial City Formulating an understanding of the industrial city necessarily invites comparison with its preindustrial counterpart. The latter was an outpost in a sea of rurality. Typically walled, with narrow streets and tightly packed buildings, it maintained close links with the countryside, notably through ties of landownership and by serving as a marketplace. The preindustrial city was socially stratified, with power concentrated in the hands of ruling families or occupational groups (especially guilds), who were themselves associated with long-established areas (“quarters”) of the city. Its craft economy saw trades clustered in specific quarters but there was no functional differentiation in land use, with an intermingling of houses, shops, workshops, and markets. The advent of industrialization, rapid demographic increase, and urbanization (the relative growth of the population living in towns as opposed to rural areas) brought irrevocable change. The city became the prime forum for modernizationdthe process of social transformation induced by the switch from agrarian to industrial, especially mechanized, modes of production. The loosening of the class boundaries that typified the preindustrial city allowed new networks of social relationships, derived from occupational specialization of labor, to flourish. In these circumstances, the way of life for the working classes became dictated by the factory clock, with people taking their identity from their place in the workforce. The interplay between quantitative and qualitative aspects of modern urban life fascinated social theorists.

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City dwellers would be in contact, directly and indirectly, with thousands of other people, rather than just a few hundred as in rural society. It was believed that such increases in the scale of urban life had a profound, albeit mostly deleterious, impact on the way that people lived. The German social theorist Fernand Tönnies, for example, contrasted rural and urban lifestyles, arguing that the former was characterized by the warm primary social relationships of community (Gemeinschaft) and the latter by the cold, impersonal, and contractual relationships of society (Gesellschaft). His compatriot Georg Simmel accepted that there were positive elements to city life, particularly through removing the constraints of small-town life and allowing individuals to assert their uniqueness, but expressed concern about the price of adjusting to the new environment. He argued that the slower tempo of rural society permitted unconscious and habitual behavior patterns, whereas the modern city forced people to devise conscious strategies if they were to cope with the sensory overload that resulted from the quickened pace of life. Simmel argued that this condition caused a distinct “metropolitan personality”, manifested in the detached and blasé approach that people adopted when dealing with their fellow citizens. His ideas, in turn, influenced American social theorists, particularly Robert Park who had attended lectures that Simmel gave in Berlin in 1899. Park took the idea that individuals and groups had to adjust to come to terms with modernity although, unlike Simmel, believed that the city was also a product of nature, especially human nature. From that standpoint, Park proposed that human society might be studied using concepts analogous to those employed by ecologists when studying plant communities. Park moved to the University of Chicago in 1914, where his proposal for the study of “human ecology” strongly influenced the approach to sociological inquiry adopted by the University of Chicago’s Department of Sociology and Anthropology. The socalled Chicago School of social researchers used their home city as a laboratory, applying ecological concepts to fieldwork-based studies of, inter alia, community formation, gangs, hoboes, social movements, and race relations. They recognized that distinct communities, identified by their shared social characteristics, were clustered in geographically delimited portions of the city. Following ecological theory, these were termed “natural areas” and constituted the “niches” which different communities occupied within the city. The idea of natural areas served as the cornerstone for generalizations about the spatial organization that lay beneath the superficially chaotic appearance of the modern city. The most famous exposition of these principles was the concentric zone theory, developed by Edward Burgess in 1924 (Fig. 1). Chicago, located on the shoreline of Lake Michigan, had steadily expanded outward for over a century. Burgess interpreted that experience to propose a model of five ever-expanding concentric rings. At its heart was the central business district (CBD) known in Chicago as “the Loop”, although the model was generalized to address the tendencies of any town or city to expand radially from its center. Burgess noted that Chicago’s growth was fueled by the arrival of poor immigrants, who had little option but to accept cheaper housing in the run-down districts close to the urban core. This area, known as the “zone in transition”, not only housed the city’s transient elements and underclass, but also saw the greatest competition for land and resources due to the pressure on land caused by the growth of business and light manufacturing. As time went by, the poor could take advantage of their rising standards of living to move out to locations where housing was better and crimeless, with their place taken by newer immigrants who, like their predecessors, had to take what was on offer. Poorer areas, therefore, were located near the center and more prosperous districts near the city’s periphery. Processes of change occurred through sequences of

TORY ZONE AC F I

LOOP II ZONE IN TRANSITION III ZONE OF WORKINGMEN’S HOMES

IV RESIDENTIAL ZONE V COMMUTERS ZONE

Figure 1

The growth of the city. Source: Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W. and McKenzie, R. D. (1925). The City. 51p. Chicago: University of Chicago.

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“invasion” (the spread of a community into an area previously occupied by another) and “succession” (the resulting changes in the composition or structure of an ecological community). The concentric zone model showed that the modern city had an underlying sociospatial structure vital to its functioning rather than being an inchoate mass of loosely related parts. Later theorists attempted to revise and extend Burgess’ formulation. In 1939, Homer Hoyt added sectoral principles (development in wedges out from the city center), although he was more interested in the location of higher-priced housing than developing general models. In 1945, Chauncy Harris and Edward Ullman suggested that cities might have multiple nuclei rather than a single center. Collectively, their ideas influenced thinking about the structure of the modern city and, indeed, excited another generation of urban theorists in the 1960s and 1970s with the rise of spatial analysis. Nevertheless, the models had long-drawn adverse comment for their Darwinistic and ecological basis, with critics arguing that they oversimplified urban land-use patterns and failed to explain how natural areas formed in the first place. In addition, although belatedly realized, ecological models effectively described the past. For most US cities, the CBD had reached its peak by the late 1920s and no longer supplied the engine by which the dynamics of the commercial economy generated waves of invasion and succession. Later, the onset of deindustrialization further eroded the value of ecological models by removing other key dynamics of growth. Yet long before that time, new developments in planning and architectural practices, themselves rooted in the logic of industrialism, had arisen that appropriated the term modern city for the period of postwar development characterized by radical urban reconstruction. Those practices were rooted in the rise of modernism.

Modernism While there is no single consensual definition for “modernism”, it was essentially a shared international tendency that emerged within the arts in the last decade of the 19th Century and the first three decades of the 20th Century. Manifested in the work of disparate and largely independent movements that challenged the established order, modernists sought to express the spirit of modernity, in both its optimistic and despairing modes. In terms of representation, modernism prompted a search for forms that expressed the needs and challenges of modern times against those of the past. Seen in this way, modernism was defined primarily by forms and esthetics. These included atonality in music, abstraction in art, free verse in poetry, streams of consciousness in novels, and geometric and unadorned shapes in architecture. At another level, modernism was identifiable by the attitudes that underpinned the new representations, which included attitudes toward the past, the arts, and their relationship with industry, and the conduct of everyday life. Modernism, thus, was not just a matter of painting, sculpting, or designing buildings in radical ways; it also signified that the individual artist or designer had adopted moral positions guided by the “right spirit”. At the outset, then, the development of modernism in general and architectural modernism in particular was founded in critique. Modern architects rejected the conventional role of the architect as restricted to being the designer of special buildings. Rather they believed that for architecture to work, it was necessary to take a holistic view and become involved in the design of the everyday environment at all scales from interior design to the city and beyond. Modernists castigated traditional building practices for placing pursuit of style over function and for failing to take advantage of the potential of new constructional materials, such as steel, glass, and concrete. Above all, they criticized what they saw as the muddle and confusion of the industrial city, which had grown without formal plan and with minimal concern for the welfare of the working population. Instead, architectural modernism embraced rationalist approaches toward the ordering of urban space, with development guided by comprehensive (“master”) planning. Modernists celebrated the potential of industrialized building methods as offering the opportunity to remake the modern city and offer better conditions for its inhabitants. The dwelling, from this point of view, could be as precisely, quickly, and efficiently made as any manufactured product. The “modern movement” saw architecture as responding primarily to what the building was supposed to do. In emphasizing function rather than being deflected by considerations of culture or style, modernism therefore claimed to offer principles suitable for universal application. These principles in due course would lead to visions of the modern city that combined buildings, traffic movement systems, and land use in ways quite different from anything previously attempted (Fig. 2).

The Making of the Modern There were many hearths of modernism. North American cities, particularly the late 19th-Century Chicago, made their contribution. In 1885, for instance, the “Loop” gained the first recognizable skyscraper with the completion of the ten-story “Home Insurance Building”. Designed by a local architect William LeBaron Jenney, it showed the development potential of “iron and steel” framed structures that freed buildings from the height restrictions imposed by the load-bearing strengths of conventional materials. Chicago’s CBD quickly took on a pronounced vertical dimension (Fig. 3), with the city acting as the proving ground for building forms that would later change the appearance of the downtowns of large cities throughout the world. Another important source of influence came from the public housing estates of West European cities, particularly Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the Netherlands and Munich, Hanover, and Frankfurt in Germany. Housing was always of particular concern for modernists, with social housing programs offering the opportunity to raise the living standards of the working classes. The city of Frankfurt, for instance, created eight major housing developments between 1925 and 1929, providing 15 174 living unitsdroughly 11% of Frankfurt’s total housing stockdprimarily in peripheral estates of row housing. Designed by the Architect’s

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Figure 2 Scheme for the regeneration of Boston Manor (1958). General view from the southeast. Source: Architecture and Building, 1958, vol. 33, p 337 (journal ceased publication in 1960, authors deceased, copyright untraceable).

Department under Ernst May, the estates were notable both for innovations in prefabricated concrete slab construction and for use of “minimum habitation” (Existenzminimum) space standards to maximize the number of dwelling units created. Achieving these standards was dependent on extensive use of ingenious built-in storage, foldaway beds, and kitchen design. Around 10 000 of the dwellings, for instance, were equipped with the industrialized and ergonomic “Frankfurt kitchen” which was intended to modernize and simplify household chores. These and similar developments provided ingredients for the visionary city schemes produced by European modernists immediately before and after World War I. The German architects Bruno Taut (1880–1938) and Ludwig Hilberseimer (1885–1967), the Swiss architect Le Corbusier (1887–1965), Russian urban decentralists such as Nikolai A. Miliutin (1889–1942) and Mikhail Okhitovitch (1886–1937), and the Italian Futurists Antonio Sant’Elia (1888–1916) and Mario Chiattone (1891–1957) all contributed images of urban futures that responded to the opportunities made available by science and advanced technology. Their chosen

Figure 3

Steel-framed buildings in “the Loop”, Chicago.

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designs varied profoundly in spatial organization and esthetics, but broadly contributed two prototypic visions of what the future city might look like. One type exploited the potential of mass transportation, with the components of the city arranged into corridors along high-speed transport lines, simultaneously offering enhanced mobility while retaining proximity to open countryside (due to the narrowness of the strips of development). The other type comprised the “city of towers”, in which the modern city appeared as a geometrically arranged and high-density agglomeration with a pronounced vertical dimension. Further development of these ideas came from the activities of the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM). Founded in 1928 as an international body for promoting and disseminating modern architecture, CIAM was the most important forum for discussion of ideas about modern-city design in the interwar period. Its meetings and manifestoes consistently asserted the architects’ right to be involved in city planning. Although far from being harmonious or single-minded, the organization promoted an analysis that saw architecture as appropriate if fit for purpose. CIAM’s approach took four elementsdwork, housing, transportation, and recreationdas the key functions of the city and held that the city worked best if these were allocated to separate land-use zones or channels. Although this left aside the difficult question of how to deal with town centers, CIAM’s functionalist recipe appealed as a way to end the conflicts produced by mixed land use and looked to segregation of pedestrians and vehicles as a rational way to design cities for the motor age.

Making the Modern City Economic and social conditions after the war were not immediately favorable to the rapid reconstruction of the modern city. Nations that had experienced wartime destruction and the upheavals caused by mass flows of migrants necessarily prioritized resources for urgent action to renovate the urban fabric, deal with housing shortages, and repair infrastructure. In most cases it took until the late 1950s, when the immediate problems of economic austerity had receded, for policy-makers to tackle the larger question of pervasive urban problems. When doing so, they could take advantage of a social consensus that favored planned and comprehensive approaches rather than piecemeal action and which saw the industrial city, once the symbol of modernity, as now associated with the failure of the old order. The ethos of the times, combined with rising standards of living and growing awareness of the challenge posed by rapidly increasing car ownership, favored urban reconstruction and modernization. The moment was therefore propitious for the spread of modernist thinking about the broad framework of the city and its various componentsdworkplaces, leisure facilities, city centers, hospitals and health centers, schools, universities, housing, and roads. The first step in comprehensive redevelopment was wholesale clearance of dilapidated districts, although official definitions of “dilapidation” frequently bore the hallmarks of convenience if an area of existing development stood in the way of rebuilding a town center or constructing new housing estates. Planners routinely sought to recreate urban structure by adopting principles of single land-use zoning. Housing areas were conceived as “neighborhoods” in which good design supposedly led to the flourishing of communal life and, particularly when dealing with social housing, gave previously deprived tenants an opportunity to experience a markedly improved standard of life. New housing estates were emblematic of the modern city, at their best providing an exciting imagery of tall buildings set in green open spacedthe embodiment of a “city in a park” (Fig. 4). Shortage of resources, however, frequently led to approaches that neglected the necessary provision of social and communal facilities and concentrated on producing the maximum number of dwellings at lowest cost. This was particularly the case in cities that experienced shortage of suitable land for building. Traffic arrangements saw the introduction of traffic-free precincts in association with high-capacity roadways and multistory car parks. There was extensive use of vertical segregation of pedestrians and vehicles by means of flyovers, underpasses, and subways. Sensitivity to the subtleties of place was secondary to the pursuit of spatial order, often leaving major historic landmarks and buildings as isolated and forlorn islands in a sea of change. Important changes also occurred in the appearance of the built environment. Skylines became punctuated by tall buildings, with the use of modern materials and the adoption of novel building technologies

Figure 4

Flats at Alton West, Roehampton, London (LCC Architects Department, 1954–1958).

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contributing to a new visual vocabulary of nontraditional built forms. This affected the construction and appearance of houses, offices, factories, transport facilities, bridges, and street furniture. Concrete became a favored building material. Official handbooks provided guidelines for landscaping, signage, and even ways of trimming trees fringing the highways. Architects and planners, of course, rarely had a free hand to impose blueprints derived from visionary principles. In Britain, for example, town-center renewal scarcely occurred before the 1960s, with the passage of time since the end of the war serving to foreclose options. To elaborate, the property boom had seen piecemeal accumulation of office blocks and partial redevelopment of high streets of many towns and cities in a manner that paid little attention to the wider needs of the town. Highway authorities, for their part, had also created roads without close coordination with plans for the built environment. In Birmingham, for instance, the city’s engineers pushed forward the long-awaited “inner ring road” in 1956–57, deliberately choosing not to adopt a plan for the central areas in case its stipulations deterred investment by the commercial sector. Instead, they sought to capitalize by offering potential developers sites along the line of the “ring road.” This led, for example, to the Smallbrook Ringway, one of Britain’s first urban motorways, becoming lined with continuous ribbons of offices and shopsdan extraordinary negation of the principles of pedestrian–vehicle segregation so cherished within modernist circles. This saga of insensitive road planning was not atypical, either in Britain or elsewhere. The private car was then closely associated with personal mobility and freedom of choice. A powerful coalition of politicians, planning and design professionals, and commercial interests connected with the road industry shared an ideological commitment to supply-led solutions for road problems. Few challenged the prevailing view which held that, with suitable surgery, the older urban cores could accommodate modern traffic and communications flows on an indefinite basis. After all, city planners and local politicians associated such surgery with the pursuit of progress, with cities needing to change to meet the demands of the internal combustion engine. Carving urban motorways through the knotted entrails of the inner city and building high-capacity ring roads ranked along with remodeling city centers and employing high-rise flats as precisely the actions expected of progressive municipalities.

The Demise of the Modern City The confidence with which these goals were pursued would soon be severely dented by wholesale criticism. To some extent, the critique had already emerged before the main phase of reconstruction occurred. In the late 1950s, Jane Jacobs, an associate editor of the Architectural Record, took issue with prevailing approaches to urban renewal. As outlined in her 1961 book The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jacobs saw the city’s vitality threatened by a utopian and predominantly visual-artistic approach to redevelopment that failed to take account of urban complexity and intensity. During the early 1960s, studies on both sides of the Atlantic made it clear that comprehensive redevelopment policies failed to take social factors into account that, in some instances, compensated for the physically blighted nature of areas earmarked for clearance. These studies made little impact at the time, but their importance was reassessed, when a raft of other problems became manifest in the late 1960s and early 1970s. City-center redevelopment schemes repeatedly failed to resolve how to devise attractive town centers that gave expression to civic identity and placed narrowly defined functionality before liveability. Road developments, especially urban motorways, added to urban pollution and created impenetrable barriers within the districts they bisected. Pedestrianized precincts suffered from visual sterility and placelessness. The reputation of social housing, especially estates of tall blocks, collapsed in the face of high-profile reportage of constructional, social, financial, and management problems. Taken together, these criticisms led to the paradox of the modern city becoming a historic term. Just as the modern city sensu lato became superseded when processes of deindustrialization finally removed the intimate relationship between modernity and industrialism, so too did the strength of criticism directed toward modernist intervention render the modern city sensu stricto a thing of the past. Henceforth, commentators would have to resort to the prefix “post”dpostmodern and postindustrialdto meet the linguistic problem of how to describe what came after the modern city.

See Also: Urban Architecture; Urbanization.

Further Reading Brown, N., 2001. Robert Park and Ernest Burgess: Urban Ecology Studies, 1925. http://www.csiss.org/classics/content. Cherry, G.E., 1988. Cities and Plans: The Shaping of Urban Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Edward Arnold, London. Deckker, T. (Ed.), 2000. The Modern City Revisited. Routledge, London. Donald, J., 1999. Imagining the Modern City. Athlone Press, London. Gold, J.R., 2007. The Practice of Modernism: Modern Architects and Urban Transformation, 1954–1972. Routledge, London. Gold, J.R., 1997. The Experience of Modernism: Modern Architects and the Future City, 1928–1953. E. and F.N. Spon, London. Hall, P., 2002. Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century, third ed. Blackwell, Oxford. Hvattum, M., Hermansen, C. (Eds.), 2004. Tracing Modernity: Manifestations of the Modern in Architecture and the City. Routledge, London. Jacobs, J., 1961. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Random House, New York. Le Corbusier, 1967. The Radiant City. Faber and Faber, London. Lindner, R., 1990. The Reportage of Urban Culture: Robert Park and the Chicago School. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

City, Modern Mumford, E., 2000. The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928–1960. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Punter, J., Carmona, M., 1997. The Design Dimension of Planning: Theory, Content and Best Practice for Design Policies. E. and F.N. Spon, London. Ravetz, A., 1980. Remaking Cities: Contradictions of the Recent Urban Environment. Croom Helm, London. Robson, B.T., 1969. Urban Analysis: A Study of City Structure with Special Reference to Sunderland. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ward, S.V., 2004. Planning and Urban Change, second ed. Sage, London.

Relevant Websites http://www.open2.net From Here to Modernity, BBC/OU Open2.net. http://www.lib.uchicago.edu R Park: Sociology, University of Chicago Centennial Catalogues.

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City–Region Simin Davoudi, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary City-region City and its environs. Inner core area Core, center, node, city, urban tract, the C zone. Outer surrounding area Hinterland, umland, metropolitan community, region, field of association, catchment area, the S zone. Functional urban region A geographical area delineated by either the analysis of commuting data or the approximation of time–distance from the core. Conurbation A geographical area consisting of a number of neighboring municipalities.

Origin of the City-Region Since the 1990s, there has been a remarkable resurgence of the concept of the city-region in both academic and policy communities. In broad terms, the concept articulates the relationships between the city and its environs. For almost 30 years the focus on the city-region had been overshadowed by a shift of emphasis toward urban and particularly inner urban issues. Its revival is not only a reincarnation of an existing analytical construct to understand complex spatial relations but also a manifestation of a political move toward new regionalism. This has been coupled with the struggle over the rescaling of state intervention to intermediate levels such as the city-region. While the city-region’s rising popularity is recent, its origin is not. The idea that the city cannot be understood fully by reference only to its administrative boundaries has a long history. While the term itself is thought to have been coined by Robert Dickinson in 1947, the concept can be traced back to an even earlier time in both theoretical and applied studies as well as planning practices. An example of the latter is the 1909 Plan of Chicago which promoted a regional vision of the city which extended well beyond its administrative boundaries. Similarly, in 1915, Patrick Geddes, the Scottish planner, used the notion of conurbation to advocate the need for planning to take into account the resources of the region in which the historic but rapidly spreading cities are situated. In 1933, R. D. McKenzie, an American sociologist, pointed out that the metropolitan region was primarily a functional entity. Despite its long history the concept of the city-region does not enjoy a common definition, either in its use as an analytical term or in its upsurge as a political one. Analytically, it represents different spatial entities depending on how it has been arrived at methodologically. Politically, it means different things depending on the type of policy agenda it serves. In practice, the concept is frequently used simply to refer to the areal extent of a metropolitan area. While there are clear linkages between the analytical and political usages of the concept, the main focus of this article is on the city-region as an analytical construct. As such, a key contribution of the concept to spatial thinking is its departure from a preoccupation with the physical structure of the city and the urban form per se toward a focus on the relational dynamics of the social networks and urban functions that often transcend bounded perceptions of space. The contemporary relevance and significance of the city-region concept lie therefore in its potential: first, to evoke a relational understanding of space and place in policy and practice; second, to encourage researchers to seek new methodologies for mapping the less-tangible interconnections which define the virtual contours of what Manuel Castells calls the space of flows; and third, to contribute to the debate about metropolitan governance.

Definitions of the City-Region Since the 1950s, there has been a myriad of studies attempting to define the components of the city-region; to identify, measure, and map its boundaries; and to understand the interactions between its constituent parts. Despite their variations, they share two common features: first, they portray an urban-centric conception of the city-region which puts the emphasis on the city, sometimes at the expense of neglecting the region. Second, they represent an economically driven approach to the city-region definition in which the dominant economic flows determine the extent of the city-region. Exceptions to these approaches do exist but are rare and more recent. The supremacy of the urban-centric framing lies partly in the historical evolution of the spatial structure of the city-region. Until the mid-20th Century the city-region’s spatial structure was largely influenced by a continuing concentration of population and economic activities in the core city in most of the developed world. Although this trend began to reverse in the latter part of the 20th Centurydwhen, mainly in the West, population and employment began to decentralizedit did not substantially change

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the urban-centric perspective. Indeed, such a framing has been further boosted by the rapid growth of mega city-regions in the developing world. City-regions such as Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Lagos, Tehran, and Shanghai are seen as magnets for attracting population and economic activities. It is argued that regions with successful core cities at their heart can develop a vibrant and continually evolving hierarchy of settlements of different sizes that carry out a wide range of functions. Embedded within this view of the city-region is an implicit recourse to Christaller’s “central place” theory. That theory implies a nested hierarchy of cities which serves populations drawn from within regular hexagonal catchment zones at successively larger scales. The continuing dominance of the economically driven approach may be explained by the prevailing policy frameworks based on competitive city-regionalism. Indeed, what underpins the reemergence of the city-region since the late 1990s is a growing conviction that participation in the service-intensive global economy has led to greater spatial concentration of activities. It is argued that cities are reemerging as production sites and as the powerhouses of modern, advanced economies, where the creation of unique knowledge is of greater significance than exploitation of natural resources or mass production. It is argued that city location is as important for this new knowledge-based economy as factory floor space was for the industrial economy. City-regions have thus become an insistent element of the geographic landscape. Will Hutton has called these postindustrial cities the “ideopolis,” arguing that they represent a 21st-Century metropolitan version of what we first saw in Italian Renaissance city-states. Their buoyant demand, intellectual capital, and business self-confidence help to create and sustain new ideas. Among the common features underpinning the successful performance of postindustrial cities are a diverse economic base, internal and external connectivity, quality of life, skills and human capital, innovation in firms and institutions, leadership, and strategic decision-making capacity. Built on these arguments, it is concluded that the competitiveness of major cities is the key determinant of regional performance in advanced knowledge-based economies.

The City-Region Interactions The economic approach to city-region is a limited one because it fails to recognize a full spectrum of city-regional relationships, which constitute a complex web of visible and invisible multidirectional flows of not only economic but also social, cultural, and environmental activities (see Box 1).

Box 1

• • • • • • • •

Potential flows in the city-region People (daily commuting to work, shopping, leisure; nondaily commuting for cultural, entertainment, and recreational activities; and migration) Goods (manufacturing and semi-processed materials between firms) Services (banking, educational, health, and business) Capital and assets (investment, taxes, land ownership, and property rights) Waste and pollution (solid waste, emission, and water pollution) Environmental resources (water and minerals) Knowledge (technical information, social ideas, and experiences) Social norms, values, lifestyles, and identities

Through these interactions, cities and regions may share a mutually reinforcing relationship. Furthermore, each of these interactions creates its own spatial imaginaries and functional boundaries which do not always overlap. The outcome is a complex web of interactions and a multiplicity of boundaries. Hence, city-region boundaries do not constitute precise lines; instead they are blurred, if not indeterminate. Despite a long-standing recognition of the complexity and emergence of the city-region spatial structures, however, attempts to define the city-region have remained entirely focused on its economic functions. It remains the case that the most widely recognized and deeply embedded interpretation of the city-region is its conceptualization as a functional economic space.

City-Region as a Functional Economic Space Conceptualizing the city-region as a functional economic spacedpioneered by Brian Berry in 1968dhas remained an enduring and powerful spatial imagination. Within this perspective, the city-region is depicted as a largely self-contained and integrated economic entity, commonly known as the functional urban region (FUR). The concept of FUR was first developed in the United States as a way of moving away from an earlier population-based concept of metropolitan district, which referred to urban agglomerations with more than 200,000 populations. The shift took place when Gras used economic rather than spatial criteria to identify 14 metropolitan areas in North America. Later, the notion of metropolitan area was formally adopted by the United States Bureau of the Census in 1950. These were called the standard metropolitan statistical srea (SMSA) and referred to areal unit of more than 50,000 population. The defining characteristic of the metropolis was considered to be the commuting pattern of the workforce which

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was assumed to be radial from the periphery to the center(s) where the jobs were located. In Britain, the notion of “conurbation,” which was coined by Patrick Geddes in 1915 and further developed by Fawcett in 1932, was spatially, rather than functionally, defined. Fawcett defined seven conurbations in Britain, which more or less corresponded to those that were later delineated by the statisticians in the General Register Office (GRO) using the 1951 census. So, at the time when the British statistical authorities were using the concept of conurbation defined largely on the basis of physical extent of the city, on the other side of Atlantic, SMSA put functional integration at the center of the definition of metropolitan areas. Meanwhile, in other parts of Europe, researchers were drawing on criteria similar to the ones used to define SMSA in order to delineate city-regions. A notable example is Hans Carol’s definition of Zurich city-region in 1956. Given Christaller’s strong influence in the continent, Carol combined the two approaches (one based on commuting data to define the city-region and the other based on the range of services to define the hierarchy of service centers) to map the arrangement of central places in the city-region of Zurich. He then argued that a planned decentralization of activities should be guided by this framework. By the 1970s, these were also introduced in the United Kingdom by Peter Hall and his study of standard metropolitan labor areas (SMLAs) for England and Wales. Both SMSA and SMLA consist of the historic city and its commuting hinterland instead of being limited to the continuously built-up area centered upon a particular city. The functional approach to city-region definition has been further advanced by studies such as those undertaken by Mike Coombes and Paul Cheshire in Britain as well as through pan-European research programs such as the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON). Regarding its utility, the FUR is often seen as an organizing mechanism in national space economies; however, evidence from a survey conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2002 of its members has revealed that this is not the case in countries such as Japan, Mexico, Korea, Spain, and Turkey. Furthermore, the official recognition of the FUR as a framework for policy implementation varies considerably from one country to another. In some countries, such as Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland, FURs are used as a framework for the implementation of policies relating mainly to labor market and transport. In other countries such as Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, FURs serve as a basis for identifying areas which qualify for national or European aid. In Norway, the concept of FUR has played a significant role in the discussions about regionalism and new regional policy. In a fourth category, countries such as Portugal, Sweden, Czech Republic, and the United States do not use FURs as their official units for policy implementation. Nevertheless, adopting a FUR approach (as a proxy for the city-region) to policymaking has remained an attractive proposition particularly in the area of strategic planning where the need for coordination and integration of investments, policies, and programs is considered to be critical. Indeed, such arguments have been used to justify the ongoing call for the alignment of local government’s institutional boundaries with those of the city-regions.

Mapping the City-Region While there have been numerous attempts to define the city-regiondas an FURdthe emphasis has remained on the city as the node of interactions, and on the economy (or indeed on work-related commuting) as the determining function. This has largely shaped (and been shaped by) the methodologies that have been used to map the FURs. Despite their differences, such methodologies fall into one of two broad categories: one is the top-down and deductive approach and the other is the bottom-up and inductive approach.

The Top-Down Approach In the top-down, deductive approach, analyses start from a predetermined set of cities as nodes or destinations for the economic flows and then move out to assign other areas to them. These cities (nodes) are selected on the basis of a specified set of functions, population size, economic performance (often measured by the gross domestic product), accessibility and connectivity, intensity of financial and business services, and so on. Depending on the weight given to the criteria for the selection of nodes, the number of cities and hence the frequencies of the city-regions reduce or increase. While a classic example of the top-down definition is the official definition of Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States, the approach has also been used in countries such as Canada, France (urban areas), Germany, and Portugal, as well as in pan-European studies such as ESPON. One key criticism of the top-down approach is its disregard for in-between places; those shaded white in Fig. 1.

The Bottom-Up Approach In the bottom-up, inductive approach, the city-regions emerge from the full set of commuting data through an algorithm that simultaneously optimizes the boundaries on the basis of a size of employment criterion and a minimum threshold of self-containment of flows to workplaces. This approach has become feasible only recently as a result of advances in data manipulation and computation. It still remains an exceptional feature of a landscape dominated by the traditional top-down definition of the FUR. The most notable attempt to adopt the bottom-up approach is the work undertaken by Coombes et al. in 1986. Different variations of this approach are also used in countries such as Finland, France (for defining employment areas), and Italy. In technical terms, the first approach is nodal and nonexhaustive (not covering the whole of the national territory) as illustrated in Fig. 1, while the second one is nonnodal (or multinodal) and exhaustive, as shown in Fig. 2. The first one is underpinned by an

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Figure 1 Example of a top-down approach to city-region definition in England, 2001. Source: Robson, B., Barr, R., Lymperopoulou, K, Rees, J., and Coombes, M. (2006). A Framework for City-Regions. Working Paper 1: Mapping City Region. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, p 22, Figure 2.8: city–region boundaries with a 25% cutoff.

urban-centric conception of the city-region, while the second one marks a departure from it, shifting the emphasis from the city to the region. While the bottom-up approach provides a more inclusive way of understanding the complex flows of commuting across a wider territory, it remains an economically driven approach and largely reliant on travel-to-work analyses. One advantage of the nonnodal approach is that it can reveal potential polycentric patterns in the wider region. As Davoudi’s work on polycentricy has shown, promoting the development of such polycentric urban regionsdwhere a number of neighboring and nonhierarchical cities interact with each other economically and complement each other in service provisiondhas become a central objective of the European spatial policy. Given the dominance of the top-down approach and its upsurge in policy domain, the remaining sections of this article focus on providing an outline of its evolution and key features.

The Structure of the City-Region The top-down approach attributes two distinct but interrelated components to the city-region: the inner core area (central urban tract) and the outer surrounding area, which is associated with and sometimes dominated by the core. The two entities have been given various terminologies. The inner area has been called the core, the center, the node, the city, and the urban tract. The outer area has attracted terms such as the “hinterland” by Gras in 1922, umland (the land around) by the German scholar Schöller in 1957, “metropolitan community” by Bogue in 1949, and the “region” by McKenzie in 1933 and Dickinson in 1947. For Mumford, the city’s region is its field of association or catchment area. In 2005, Parr codified these two entities by calling them the “C

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Figure 2 Example of a bottom-up approach to city-region definition in England and Wales, 2001. Source: Robson, B., Barr, R., Lymperopoulou, K, Rees, J. and Coombes, M. (2006). A Framework for City-Regions. Working Paper 1: Mapping City Region. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, p 11, Figure 2.1: Bottom-up city–regions: all workforce, self containment 70%.

zone” and the “S zone” to disassociate them from their historical baggage and to use categories that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. For Dickinson, the outer area can be further divided into two categories: the city settlement area or the daily commuting area, and the city trade area or the catchment area for central services. An early and striking example of a top-down, urban-centric framing of the city-region is the one portrayed in 1949 by Donald Bogue, who, drawing on biological analogies, delineated 67 metropolitan regions in America based on an arbitrary system of decreasing values, beginning with the metropolitan center as the dominant and followed by the hinterland city as subdominant, the rural nonfarm as influent, and the rural farm as subinfluent. Another example of identifying associational zones is the work undertaken by Boustedt in 1953. He defined the city-regions (stadtregion) of Germany as consisting of a core (one or more contiguous administrative units and associated gemeinden), an urbanized zone (verstädterte zone), the fringe zone, and the wider area of umland within which the influence of the city predominates. Mapping the city-region (or more precisely the FUR) has invariably involved identifying such zonal arrangements. In the top-down approach, this involves first, defining the core and second, identifying the extent of its influence by measuring the economic flows to and from the core. These are elaborated in turn.

Defining the City in the City-Region A top-down approach to mapping the city-region starts with defining the core city (or urban tract). Traditionally, this has referred to the compact and fairly continuous built-up area. Such an area has also been a defining feature of conurbation as used by Fawcett in

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1932. For him, a conurbation was an area occupied by a continuous series of dwellings which were not separated from each other by rural land. This approach and its follow-up by British (GRO) and American statisticians (SMSA) were designed partly to distinguish the predominantly urban areas from the predominantly rural ones. In that sense, their understanding of conurbation was not the same as the one used by Patrick Geddes. His was more consistent with the wider concept of the city-region as a functional space and came closer to what Friedmann and Miller called the urban field. Meanwhile, in France the notion of urban aggregates was defineddfor the 1954 censusdas those contiguous communes that were linked together primarily in terms of family associations (cadre de l’ existence familiale). This linkage included the geographic framework in which, for example, schools and shops were located but excluded the workplaces. In Germany, while there were no official definitions of urban areas by census authorities at that time, several studies attempted to define the city-region. A notable example is Hesse’s work on typologies of gemeinden in southwest Germany in the 1940s. Using the compactness of the urban land usage as a criterion remains at the center of the statistical definition of the core city as well as the distinction between what is urban and what is rural. For example, in Finland (in common with other Nordic countries) a built-up area, taajama, refers to a cluster of buildings containing at least 200 residents in which the distance between buildings does not exceed 200 m; however, given the diffusion of the urban–rural fringe, the definition of an urbanized core in terms of continuous urban land uses has become increasingly elusive and in many cases irrelevant. Definitions of the urban based on economic function have grown apart from definitions based upon physical development. For example, using the terms loosely, England is in physical terms predominantly rural but in socioeconomic terms overwhelmingly urban. Indeed, an important feature of the city-region, particularly when it is based on the bottom-up approach, is its potential to reveal the multifaceted interrelationships between urban and rural areas within a particular spatial context.

Delineating the Extent of the City-Region There are two ways of defining the city-region (or FUR) as a geographical entity: one is through statistical analysis of actual flows, and the other is by an approximation of time–distance from the core. Both are briefly outlined in the following sections.

Measuring the Flows The focus of the statistically defined city-region is on measuring the precise areal extent of the city’s associations. While such associations are dynamic and include a wide range of economic, social, and environmental links, the hegemony of economic discourse and economic data has meant that the only city-region interaction which has proved amenable to measurement and mapping is the flows of people or more precisely the flows of daily commuters to work. This interaction is evident by the OECD’s survey of its members, which concludes that the most typical concept used in defining a functional region is that of labor markets. Within this perspective, after the delineation of the core city, the extent of the FUR is determined by including each locality that has more than a given proportion of its active labor force working in the core city and hence commuting from such localities to the core on a daily basis. Clearly, the lower the proportion the larger will be the extent of the FUR and vice versa. In technical terms, a low percentage point will cause overbounding, while a high threshold will lead to underbounding. In the case of the former, areas whose labor market linkages with the core are not above a certain threshold will be excluded from the resulting city-region, even if they may be tightly connected to it through, for example, environmental, cultural, or administrative ties. Conversely, when the threshold is low, the resulting FUR will engulf those cities and towns that fall within that threshold even if they assume historical and political independence. The issue is not a mere technical one, and can have far-reaching implications for spatial planning, investment programs, and sense of place and identity. A major criticism of conceptualizing the city-region as a FUR is its heavy reliance on not only one type of interaction (e.g., economic) but also on one economic criterion (e.g., travel-to-work) for measuring that interaction. Such reductionism has been compounded by a lack of attention to the differences between labor market areas. Often, the average commuting distance of the higher-order occupational groups (such as professional and managerial) is much longer than the lower ones (such as unskilled manual), leading to more than one city-region boundary for one type of commuting, as shown in Figs. 3 and 4. Furthermore, labor market analyses have a limited utility in capturing the economic relationships of the FUR. For a more sophisticated approach, other nonwork trip-gneration activities, such as journey to shops, services, and leisure facilities, need to be taken into account, despite the difficulties of measuring them. If a more sophisticated approach becomes feasible, the city-region boundaries will further diverge. Yet another complexity arises when the housing market areas are taken into account. It appears that for members of households making residential location decisions, the city-region boundary is defined by their mental maps of areas with which they are familiar. Such areas do not necessarily match that of the labor market area, hence creating yet another boundary for the city-region. In an ambitious attempt to move beyond the labor market areas and capture the economic relationships of the mega city-regions, a European project called Polynet has attempted to measure the interactions between the firms and particularly those which are key intermediaries in the knowledge economy, such as advanced business services, financial institutions, law, accountancy, and management consultancies. Given that much of such interaction takes place in the cyberspace and via the Internet, measuring them has proved notoriously difficult. What is certain is that these interactions take place within a city-regional boundary which is likely to be different from those mentioned above. The key message is that such complexities confirm the view that the city-region geometry is best characterized by multiplicity, fuzziness, and overlaps, manifesting only an approximation of selfcontainment which is likely to vary for different kinds of activities, flows, and functions. It is important to note that concepts

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Figure 3 Example of city-region definition based on professional and managerial labor market area in England. Source: Robson, B., Barr, R., Lymperopoulou, K, Rees, J. and Coombes, M. (2006). A Framework for City-Regions. Working Paper 1: Mapping City Region. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, p 25, Figure 2.10: Catchment for professional and managerial workers.

such as polycentric regions or mega city-regions which are increasingly appearing in academic and policy discourse are fundamentally different from the common definitions of the city-region because they consist of multiple city-regions. The well-known examples include clusters of city-regions in Pearl River Delta (southern China), Yangtze River Delta (eastern coast of China), the Randstad (western Netherlands), Rhine-Ruhr (Germany), Kanasai (Japan), Beijing–Seoul–Tokyo urban corridor (transcending national boundaries), and Greater Golden Horseshoe (Ontario, Canada).

Approximating the Time–Distance In addition to the use of statistical analyses of the actual commuting flows, there have been other attempts to map the city-region using an approximated time–distance considered to be reasonable or convenient for daily commuting. Before the introduction of public transport in the late 19th Century, the 3-mile radius was considered as the limit of travel by foot and hoof. In the modern metropolis, Blumenfeld argued that the reasonable traveling time from the outskirts to the center had to be no more than 40 min. For Geddes, the general rule for convenient commuting distance was an hour. While most commentators have used the latter as the maximum commuting distance, in 1995 Batten has argued for the lower limit of half an hour. More recently, ESPON research used a measure of 45-min driving time as a proxy for identifying functional urban areas across Europe. In all these, lines of equal time– distance to and from the city (isochrones) are used to define the extent of the city-region.

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Figure 4 Example of city-region definition based on unskilled and routine labor market area in England. Source: Robson, B., Barr, R., Lymperopoulou, K, Rees, J. and Coombes, M. (2006). A Framework for City-Regions. Working Paper 1: Mapping City Region. London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, p 26, Figure 2.11: Catchment for semiskilled and routine workers.

Whatever is considered as a comfortable commuting time, this methodology remains arbitrary and suffers from the same flawed assumption which was made by Bogue in 1949 when he mapped metropolitan regions in America. He assumed that accessibility between one center and another was a basic determinant of city-regional relations. The assumption was that a metropolis can dominate all of the area which lies closer to it than to any other similar city, even if the other metropolis is larger. While proximity may be necessary for the creation of a functional economic space, it is certainly not sufficient. Having said that, it is true that as speed and convenience of travel increase, so will the isochrone and hence the extent of FUR, because people can, if other conditions are right, commute farther distances within the same time span. A notable example of the role of infrastructure in expanding the FUR is the development of Oresund Bridge between Copenhagen and Malmo, which has led to the creation of a transnational city-region.

City-Region as a Political-Administrative Space Conceptualizing the city-region as a political-administrative space has been at the heart of debate about appropriate spatial scale for strategic decision-making and for coordination of public investments, policies, and programs. It is argued that the local government structure should be coaligned with that of the functional economic space. This argument has been strongly pursued within the spatial planning communities. As early as 1915, Geddes was advocating that for sensible planning conurbation is the most appropriate spatial scale. Across the Atlantic, the 1909 Plan of Chicago provided one of the first comprehensive plans for a city-region.

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This is the economic city-region, based on the travel-to-work area This is the municipal city boundary, an administrative and political definition

This is the metropolitan city, a physical definition based on the contiguous built-up area

Figure 5 Examples of administrative overbound and underbound (Leeds and Birmingham in England). Source: HMSO (2006). Devolving Decision Making: 3 - Meeting the Regional Economic Challenge: The Importance of Cities to Regional Growth, London: HMSO, p 12, Figure 2.1: The coincidence between administrative cities and city-regions varies.

However, by the end of World War II there were still only about 10 city-regional governments in place in the developed world, most of which were dependent on central governments. In England in the 1960s, a major attempt to coalign the administrative boundaries with those of the functional urban regions was made by Derek Senior, a member of the Royal Commission on Local Government. His Minority Report advocated the establishment of 35 city-regions for England to form the upper tier, of a two-tier structure, of local government with responsibility for strategic planning; however, the subsequent legislation for reform failed to implement these aspirations. Hence, there remains in Britaindas in many other developed countriesdthe problem of overbounding when the municipal boundary covers large tracts of rural land (see Leeds in Fig. 5) and underbounding when the municipal boundary does not cover even the whole of their built-up area (see Birmingham in Fig. 5) let alone their functional hinterland.

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None of these technical nuances has stopped large cities’ annexation of the surrounding areas and calling for increased cityregional authorities. Some have drawn on the intellectual support of influential figures such as Jane Jacobs. In her book, Cities and the Wealth of Nations, she considered nation states as artificial statistical constructs and argued in favor of city-region states, claiming that city-regions are more “natural” spatial units. In regard to the governance of city-region scale, the OECD survey (mentioned above) highlighted that in most of its member states there is no formal structure of governance operating at the level of functional urban regions, although there has been a proliferation of voluntary intermunicipal cooperations at, loosely defined, city-regional level. Given the variable geometry of the cityregions, such voluntary collaborations provide a more flexible governance framework, capable of adapting to the rapidly changing dynamics of the city-region configurations. While such cooperative arrangements are motivated predominantly by the economic competitiveness agenda, they are also increasingly justified by the sustainable development agenda and, in particular, the need for managing the environmental footprints of the cities over their hinterlands. More importantly, the environmental concerns as well as the recognition of the role of culture and identity are increasingly challenging the narrow, urban-centric, and economically driven definitions of the city-region. They are calling for a focus on the emerging relational dynamics of the city-region space.

Conclusion The city-region has enjoyed a widespread resurgence in recent years as both an analytical and a political concept. While in the last 60 years or so, many approaches have been adopted to define the city-region and map its boundaries, with a few exceptions, the dominant conception of the city-region has been urban-centric and economically driven. While the dominance of this econo-urban perspective has historical roots, it has been further boosted by the apparent reemergence of cities as magnets for attracting population and economic activities and a prevailing policy framework based on competitive city-regionalism. It is argued that competitive cities create prosperous regions through a potential chain reaction, which can follow from a high-level commitment to strengthen a city’s knowledge base as a launch pad for stronger economic performance and a distinctive external profile. While the evidence for such trickle-down or ripple-out effects is yet to be documented, this argument continues to frame the debate about the city-region in both analytical and political terms. Analytically, the trickle-down discourse has fueled the dominance of the urban-centric and economically defined conception of the city-region, as clearly reflected in the interpretation of the city-region as a FUR and the top-down approach to define its boundaries. Politically, the trickle-down discourse has become the key justification for channeling policy attention, investments, and political powers toward the economic growth in major cities often at the expense of those parts of the regions which fall outside the cities’ hinterlands. Both the urban-centric and the economically driven framing of the city-region have been challenged. The former is under increasing strain by the changing patterns of work, mobility, and lifestyle in rural areas, while the latter is questioned by a rising concern over the environmental footprint of the cities which affect their hinterlands and beyond. Nonetheless, there remains a key shortcoming in the current city-region agenda, that is, the disconnection between the conceptions of the city-region as an economic space from its conceptualization as an ecological space. Contemporary city-regions are key sites of consumption of environmental resources and production of waste. As such, they are engaged in not only economic exchanges and distributions of benefits but also ecological exchanges and distribution of risks and disbenefits. An illustrative example of this issue is the city-regional relationship based on the management of municipal waste, which is based largely on generation of waste in the city and its disposal in its hinterland and beyond. Critical examination of how these changing ecological relationships may reshape our conceptions of the city-region and deepen our understanding of the emerging relational dynamics of the city-regional space will therefore make a valuable contribution to push the debate forward. The contemporary drive for rescaling of governance to city-regional level is premised primarily on corporate interests in economic competitiveness and as such will continue to be contested by spatial egalitarianism and environmental consciousness.

See Also: Central Place Theory; New Regionalism; Regionalism.

Further Reading Coombes, M., Wymer, C., 2001. A new approach to identifying localities: representing ‘places’ in Britain. In: Madanipour, A., Hull, A., Healey, P. (Eds.), The Governance of Place: Space and Planning Processes. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 51–69. Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan areas: new approaches to geographical definition. In: Dahmann, D.C., Fitzsimmons, J.D. (Eds.), 1995. Population Division Working Paper 12, US Bureau of the Census, Washington DC. Davoudi, S., 2003. Polycentricity in European spatial planning: from an analytical tool to a normative agenda. Eur. Plan. Stud. 11, 979–999. Davoudi, S., 2018. Imagination and Spatial imaginaries: a conceptual framework. Town Plan. Rev. 89, 97–107. Dickinson, R., 1964. City and Region. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London. Eurostat, 1992. Study on Employment Zones. Luxembourge: Eurostat Report E/LOC/20. Hall, P., Pain, K., 2006. The Polycentric Metropolis: Learning from Mega City Regions in Europe. Earthscan, London. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002. Redefining Territories, the Functional Urban Regions. OECD, Paris.

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Parr, J., 2005. Perspectives on the city-region. Reg. Stud. 39, 555–566. Ravetz, J., 2000. City-region 2020: Integrated Planning for a Sustainable Environment. Earthscan, London. Robson, B., Barr, R., Lymperopoulou, K., Rees, J., Coombes, M., 2006. A Framework for City-regions. Working Paper 1: Mapping City Region. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London. Scott, A., 2001. Globalization and the rise of city-regions. Eur. Plan. Stud. 9, 813–826. Vogel, R.K., Savitch, H.V., Jiang, X., Yeh, A.G.O., WU, W., Sancton, A., Kantor, P., Newman, P., Tsukamato, T., Cheung, P.T.Y., Shen, J., Wu, F., Zhang, F., 2010. Governing global city regions in China and the West. Prog. Plan. 73, 1–75. Zacharias, J., Yuanzhou, T., 2010. Restructuring and repositioning Shenzhen, Chinas new mega city. Prog. Plan. 73, 209–249.

Relevant Websites ESPON Research Programme website, http://www.espon.eu. UK Office of National Statistics website, https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/articles/cityregionsarticle/2015-07-24.

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Climate Change John C Sweeney, The National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 2, pp. 147–155, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Anerobic Not in contact with the atmosphere, typically “oxygen-free” conditions. Axial tilt A cyclical change in the tilt of the Earth’s axis. This ranges from 22 to 25 degrees over a period of about 41 000 years and increases or decreases seasonal differences, especially at higher latitudes.: A radiometric dating method based on the decay of the naturally occurring isotope carbon-14 to determine the age of carbonaceous materials. Cross dating A technique used to match ring-width variations in a tree-ring record with corresponding ring patterns in another. Overlaps allow extension of record into the past. Eccentricity A cyclical change in the Earth’s orbit around the Sun whereby a more elliptical orbit gives way to a more circular orbit, meaning seasonal changes in radiation amounts received at particular latitudes occur. Global Climate Models (GCMs) Three-dimensional mathematical simulations of the processes that regulate the global climate system. GCMs are used to provide future climate scenarios and to inform policy. A disadvantage is their inability to resolve small-scale processes and the coarse grid which they must use due to intensive computing requirements. Precession of the equinoxes A slow gyration of the Earth’s axis occurs due to the pull of gravity from the sun, moon, and other planets. This produces changes in the date of closest (perihelion) and most distant (aphelion) approaches to the sun, resulting in seasonal radiation receipt changes at particular latitudes. Regional climate models (RCMs) To overcome the difficulties posed by coarse grid GCMs, RCMs with a higher resolution are constructed for smaller areas. These are driven at their boundaries by a parent GCM. Younger Dryas A cold period, most pronounced in the North Atlantic, lasting from approximately 12 700 to 11 500 BP. Named after an alpine/tundra flower, this abrupt climate change is believed to have been caused by a shutdown of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation.

Communities which cope with climatic hazards by implicitly assuming a continuance of the status quo learn harsh lessons. Despite this, quite limited adaptation to known risks is often apparent in contemporary society. In the past, the catastrophe of harvest failure led to sometimes quite sophisticated coping responses and the shunning of areas of known high risk based on the collective folk memory of the communities concerned. In the present, however, the most typical response has been to develop a climatic fingerprint, usually of three decades or so of climate observations, as the basis for forward planning. Engineers, farmers, and planners extrapolate from this for guidance on the probable range of extreme events which will be experienced during the lifetime of a structure, or over a range of harvests. These are now demonstrably flawed approaches as the nonstationarity of climate time series has become apparent. An inherent characteristic of climate is change, and a period of rapid change is now underway which has the potential to threaten the fabric of society in many parts of the world during the present century. Indeed, there are major initiatives emerging at both the highest political levels, as evidenced by international treaties such as Kyoto, as well as bottom-up initiatives such as the “transition towns” which are indicative of growing public sensitivity to the magnitude of the problem faced. A fundamental reassessment of human–environment relations is an integral part of coping with what is viewed as the most severe problem facing the world in the present century.

Evidence From the Past Instrumental observations provide the optimum means of comparing past and present climates. Invention of key instruments, such as the thermometer (Galileo) and barometer (Torricelli) generally occurred in Renaissance Italy in the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, though records from these times cannot be safely relied upon. The quality of the instruments, especially the glass used, varied widely and the multiplicity of scales and exposures posed additional problems of comparability from place to place and over time. It was the Industrial Revolution, with the need to construct public water schemes to alleviate the unhygienic conditions of the coalfield cities of Western Europe, which provided the main impetus for the development of a more elaborate meteorological network. The demands of the railways for a standard time system in the early years of the 19th Century also required a more rigorous temporal regime within which comparable observations could be made. Gradually, the observational network

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was extended overseas by the European maritime colonial powers, albeit with a coastal bias which limited understanding of tropical climates for many decades. Outside of Europe and parts of North America, the length of the observational record is frequently quite short and provides only a limited insight into the climatic conditions before the middle of the 20th Century. Alternative ways of deducing past conditions have therefore been developed.

Documentary Sources A long tradition of documenting climate extremes exists in some countries such as Iceland, China, and Ireland (Fig. 1). Similarly, dates on which harvests occurred, or on which flowering of particular plants took place, or when other natural events such as bird migration occurred were often meticulously documented. Collective decisions about when in autumn to pick the grapes for winemaking in some of the villages in northern France are recorded back to the 14th Century, while in Japan the date in spring when the Emperor traveled to Kyoto to view the newly flowered cherry blossoms was similarly recorded. Comparison of when such events take place today with local instrumental observations enables calibration of such documentary sources to be achieved, providing rudimentary reconstruction of growing conditions for much of the past millennium for individual locations. Early newspapers, estate records, and ships’ logs during the era of sail also provide useful documentary sources. For example, on ships of the British Navy the log was also maintained three times daily while in port, usually by the Master who, unlike the Captain, often stayed with the same ship for the duration of his career. Compilation of such records enables rudimentary weather charts to be constructed and aspects such as storm frequency to be compared with the present day.

Proxy Sources An indirect deduction of past conditions can be derived by examining relict phenomena sensitive to the climatic conditions which prevailed at the time they were laid down. Some tree species growing in climatically stressed environments produce annual growth rings symptomatic of the conditions prevailing during the season concerned. Calibration of the ring width or the cell density with proximal instrumental measurements of climate for the same period enables a transfer function to be established which can be applied to the rings formed before the observations were available. Moreover, by overlapping ring records from the present with

Figure 1 In this old Irish manuscript, reference is made to a storm on Lough Conn in Co. Mayo allegedly in 2668 BCE. While the veracity of such documentary sources is questionable, they can provide glimpses of past climatic conditions. Source: Royal Irish Academy.

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 T Range +

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 T Max + Species 1

Species 2

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Figure 2

Reconstruction techniques based on known tolerance-of-climate characteristics of beetles.

older wood, a technique known as cross dating, the record can be pushed back several thousand years. In some cases, individual high-magnitude, low-frequency events, such as volcanic eruptions, can be detected. Pollen grains provide a lower resolution record than tree rings, though they enable a better picture of overall environmental changes to be discerned. Pollen production is prolific for some plants, and pollen grains resist decomposition very effectively if deposited in anerobic conditions, such as in a lake bed or peat bog. Since species tend to produce distinctively different pollen types, analysis of a particular layer enables the deduction of the compositional vegetation characteristics at the time the layer was deposited. From the vegetation assemblage, the prevailing climate may be deduced and its fluctuations charted over time by examining sequential layers of pollen. Although this generally only results in relative dating of events, a time calibration is often possible using carbon isotope dating of organic deposits such as bones, antlers, etc. also deposited in a particular layer. Closely related to the palynology methodology is climatic reconstruction based on beetle remains. Again, the tolerance of the species to present-day climate is used to infer paleoclimatic conditions (Fig. 2). Deep cores have now been drilled into the icecaps on Greenland and Antarctica. The annual layers of ice here are delimited by slight melting during the short summer periods. While air bubbles trapped in the ice enable the composition of the atmosphere during past periods to be inferred, it is the isotopic composition of the oxygen making up the ice itself which provides the paleoclimatic information. Isotopes of an element occur because of an additional neutron or two in the atomic nucleus, rendering the nucleus slightly heavier than the normally occurring form of the element. In the case of oxygen, about 0.2039% of a typical sample will consist of 18O atoms as opposed to the normal 16O atoms which account for almost all of the remainder of the sample. During evaporation, ocean water made up of the lighter 16O atoms enter the vapor phase more readily than their heavier counterparts. If this water vapor then condenses and falls as snow during cold periods it may not recycle back to the oceans for extended time periods resulting in the ocean waters becoming selectively impoverished in 16O and enriched in 18O. Measuring the ratio between these two isotopes in layers of glacial ice thus provides a geological thermometer enabling a snapshot of global temperature conditions at the time the snow was obtained. Similar methodology can be used in analyzing the microscopic shells found by drilling into undisturbed layers of sediment on the ocean floor. These were built by creatures using the oxygen in the seawater in which they lived. This can yield data on the temperature of the ocean in which they swam as far back as 2 million years ago.

The Record of Climate Change Climate Change in Prehistory Reconstruction of climate over the past 2 million years confirms that the Earth then was a glacial planet. For much of that interval, a bimodal climate type prevailed with cold glacial periods lasting 90–100 000 years punctuated by shorter, warmer interglacials of about 10 000 years. The peak of the last glacial extended from 25 to 18 000 BP and by 14 500 BP rapid warming was underway in the North Atlantic region. Abrupt termination of glacial events occurred with temperature rises of up to 2  C per decade over large

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areas. As the Laurentide ice-sheet melted, however, iceberg armadas released cold, low salinity and therefore relatively low-density water into the Atlantic Ocean, diminishing the vigor of the North Atlantic Drift and triggering a dramatic return to cold conditions for much of Europe. This lasted from 12 700 BP to 11 500 BP, a period known as the Younger Dryas event. After this, abrupt warming resumed and the warmest times of the present interglacial (1–2  C above mid-20th-Century levels) were experienced around 6000 BP, though the timing of this mid-Holocene maximum varies by several millennia for different regions. Generally though, the warmth of the mid-Holocene was associated with plant, animal, and human migration poleward. Agriculture became established in Europe and China and cave paintings from the Sahara show hippopotami hunts and cattle herding in areas that today would be considered hyperarid. After the peak of the mid-Holocene warmth, drying introduced climatic stresses to many of these places and concentration around reliable water sources such as oases and river valleys seems to have occurred. A strong correlation between CO2 concentrations as deduced from analysis of air trapped in the ice layers and temperature as inferred from the isotope analysis is evident, implicating this greenhouse gas as a historic regulator of global temperature. However it is important to emphasize that it is not CO2 which initiates the temperature rise at the end of a glaciation, and in fact a rise in CO2 tends to lag several centuries behind the rise in temperature during this event. This is related to a delayed response from the oceanic CO2 reservoir and, once this occurs, amplification of temperature rises takes place as a result of normal greenhouse gas processes.

Historical Climate Change Cooler and moister conditions prevailed over much of the eastern Mediterranean in the centuries during which imperial Rome spread its influence across Europe. Gradually, increased frequency of drought conditions further east in Asia spread westward, bringing plagues and mass movements of population in its wake, ultimately to undermine Rome itself. Cooler, stormy conditions set in over much of Europe after AD 400. Toward the end of the first millennium AD, temperatures in Northern Europe appear to have been about 1  C warmer than the mid-20th Century. This Medieval Warm Period lasted for about three centuries, but was not a global warming event. Harvests were easier, especially in the northern lands where wheat could be grown in northern Norway, oats in Iceland, and barley and rye in Greenland. Viking voyages into the Mediterranean, up the rivers of northern Russia, to the edge of the polar ice, and into the western ocean as far as Greenland and Canada were facilitated by benign climatic conditions. However, by AD 1200 a downturn was beginning. The ice was returning to the seas around the colonies in Iceland and Greenland and supply routes were becoming increasingly difficult. The Danish parliament debated whether Iceland should be evacuated after a major volcanic eruption in 1783–84 which caused further hardship. By 1540, the last inhabitants of the Greenland colony had died; their demise inevitable as a result of their failure to adapt to the changed climatic conditions as the Inuit had so successfully done. The Little Ice Age (1450–1850) was also considered previously to have been a period of global cooling, though current views tend to suggest cooling varied greatly over time and space. However, for the Northern Hemisphere as a whole, the Little Ice Age most likely contained the coldest three-century period of the entire postglacial record. The Mediterranean froze twice around Marseilles. The Thames froze on at least 20 occasions and slabs of sea ice 5 km in extent appeared in the English Channel. An Eskimo was observed paddling his kayak in the mouth of the River Don near Aberdeen in the early 1700s. Harvests failed and famines occurred in many parts of Europe. In North America, glaciers doubled in extent in the Rockies and moved downslope by 400 m. Recovery from the Little Ice Age has now taken place with a vengeance and furthermore, in contrast to the changes of the last two millennia, the changes of the 20th Century have an undisputed global warming signature.

Natural Causes of Climate Change External Causes The Sun delivers 1370 W m 2 on a level horizontal surface at the top of the atmosphere. Any variability in this could be expected to cause climate change and it seems probable that on geological timescales, this has been the case. On shorter timescales, small changes in solar irradiance have been detected by satellites over the past three decades. These, however, are too small to explain the temperature variations which have occurred over the same period. The best-known causes of solar output changes are caused by disturbances on the surface of the Sun which manifest themselves as sunspots. These exhibit a cyclical behavior, typically of 11 years but embedded in longer cycles of 22, 80–90, and around 180 years. Attempts to link sunspots to climate trends have proven inconclusive, though the coldest decades of the Little Ice Age corresponded to a period when sunspot activity declined to almost zero. Fluctuations in the receipt of solar energy also happen due to three cyclic variations in the Earth’s orbit around the Sun. Eccentricity changes occur over a period of 96 000 years whereby the orbit changes from its most elliptical to a near circular mode. This results in up to 25% more radiation arriving at the Earth as a whole when it is at its point of closest approach to the Sun as opposed to 6 months later when it is most distant. The tilt of the Earth’s axis also changes over a period of 41 000 years from a minimum of 21.8 –24.4 and back. Seasonal climate contrasts are sharpened by a greater tilt. Finally, the elliptical orbit itself slowly rotates changing the time of year when closest or furthest approach to the sun occurs. This is known as the “precession of the equinoxes” and occurs on a 22–23 000-year cycle. None of these changes affect the annual total of radiation receipt, though when combined

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they appear to have the potential to reduce seasonal receipt at high latitudes and have been implicated in causing the glacial/interglacial oscillations of the past 2 million years.

Internal Causes Volcanic eruptions can eject both particulate matter and gases high into the atmosphere. Where aerosol particles, usually sulfates, get into the stratosphere they may linger in suspension for several years, gradually spreading out and forming a dust veil which has the effect of scattering solar energy and inducing cooling at the surface. Typically, this cooling is of the order of 0.2–0.5  C for a year or two after a major event. For maximum global climate impact, a number of factors are required:

• • • •

A low latitude location to enable global spread of dust veil Explosive power to inject material into the stratosphere High sulfur content to generate maximum aerosol sulfate load Clustering of major events

Human Causes of Climate Change: Global Warming A Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, suggested in 1896 that if atmospheric concentrations of the trace gas CO2 were to double, global temperatures could increase by about 5  C. Though at that time thought of as a somewhat hypothetical possibility, the contention is proving increasingly prescient. Preindustrial concentrations of about 280 ppm have now risen close to 380 ppm principally as a result of anthropogenic emissions. Annual fossil fuel-related emissions are currently of the order of 7.2 Gt carbon with a further annual contribution from land-use changes such as deforestation of 0.5–2.7 Gt carbon. Increases in other greenhouse gases are also occurring. Methane has already doubled from its preindustrial concentration. About 60% of emissions are related to anthropogenic activities. Nitrous oxide has increased by 13%, most likely related to increased fertilizer use in intensive agriculture. An important consideration for control policies is the residence time of greenhouse gases. While for some, such as CO2, this is very dependent on which stores atmospheric carbon eventually ends up in, other greenhouse gases such as methane have relatively short residence times. Accordingly, targeting policies on such gases offers better short-term reductions in overall greenhouse gas loadings. Unequivocal evidence from a variety of sources confirms that a major global warming event is underway. Over the last 100 years, global average temperature has increased by 0.74  C with an acceleration in warming evident over recent decades. The 11 warmest years in the instrumental record have occurred since 1995 (Fig. 3). Associated with this warming have been changes in other parameters such as ocean temperatures and precipitation. Increases in precipitation have tended to be most pronounced in the midlatitudes, with decreases more common in parts of the tropics where more intense and longer droughts have also been observed. Many extremes consistent with a warming trend are increasing, such as heat-wave frequency, heavy rainfall events, and the intensity (though not frequency) of tropical cyclones. The recently published Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), reflecting a consensus of 2500 climate scientists and endorsed by 130 governments, was the latest in a series of highly influential statements which reflects growing confidence that people are playing an increasingly dominant role in changing global climate. The First Assessment Report (1990) was tentative: “. the observed increase could be largely due to this natural variability; alternatively this variability and other factors could have offset a still larger human-induced greenhouse warming.” The Second Assessment Report (1995) was less cautious: “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human impact on global climate.” The Third Assessment

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Figure 3 Global temperature trend. From Climatic Research Unit, University of Norwich. Brohan, P., Kennedy, J., Harris, I., Tett, S. F. B. and Jones, P. D. (2006). Uncertainty estimates in regional and global observed temperature changes: A new dataset from 1850. Journal of Geophysical Research 111, D12106, https://doi.org/10.1029/2005JD006548.

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Report (2001) boldly stated that: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.” This conclusion is now strongly reinforced in the Fourth Assessment Report (2007): “It is very likely that anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases caused most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th Century.” In the carefully crafted language of the IPCC, “very likely” equates to “90% sure.”

Modeling and Future Projections Global Climate Models Global climate models (GCMs) have developed rapidly over recent decades in response to major advances in computing power and better understanding of how the climate system works. GCMs work by solving primary equations describing energy, momentum, mass, and water vapor at thousands of grid points on, below, and above the surface. Each equation is solved at a fixed time interval (10–30 min) enabling a progression into the future to be derived from an initial starting set of conditions. Such is the enormous computational resources required that GCMs are only maintained at a small number of facilities around the world. Early generations also simplified many of the inputs. Coupling ocean and atmosphere models was a particularly difficult task because of the latter’s much longer response time. Sulfate and nonsulfate aerosols, vegetation and atmospheric chemistry, and better representation of the carbon cycle have all recently been incorporated in most models and a range of input emission scenarios is now employed based on assumptions concerning the socioeconomic evolution of the global community over the next century. Nevertheless, GCMs have not completely overcome the difficulties associated with processes that occur on scales finer than their grid resolution, such as cloud processes. They also exhibit continuing difficulties in handling feedback processes, such as ice-albedo, cloud, and water vapor feedbacks. Notwithstanding these difficulties, best estimates for global temperature increases for the end of the present century relative to the end of the last, range from 1.8 to 4.0  C, depending on the emission scenarios used.

Downscaling The limitations imposed by computer processing capacity means that GCM grid sizes of the order of 300 km are inappropriate for environmental managers and policymakers. Downscaling of GCM output to a finer mesh resolution has thus become a major research objective, and achievement, of climate scientists over the past decade. Regional climate models (RCMs) are produced by nesting a secondary model within one or more of the grid spaces of the GCM. Outputs from the parent GCM, such as pressure, wind, temperature, and water vapor, at various altitudes for the area bounding a specified domain of interest, are used to drive the RCM. Within this domain, more spatially detailed output may be produced. Typically RCMs offer resolution of approximately 20–50 km, though even this may be too coarse for many users. In addition, the RCM suffers from any inherent deficiencies in the parent GCM since only a one-way influence (GCM/RCM) is allowed. Multiple GCMs and ensemble-based approaches are often used to address such uncertainties. An alternative to regional climate modeling involves a range of statistical techniques designed to downscale from coarse GCM scales. Among these are regression-based techniques, various scaling methods and the use of statistical weather generators. The most widespread is statistical downscaling (SD) which depends on strongly linking both the surface variables of interest and GCM output to a large scale atmospheric dataset from which transfer functions may be derived. Usually, upper air data is used to provide this link. Such a technique can provide downscaled output from multiple combinations of GCMs at a spatial resolution useful for guiding decisions which may be affected by future climate change. SD may require large amounts of good quality data for calibration and its effectiveness is ultimately dependent on the reliability of the parent GCMs employed.

Impacts The impacts of climate change will depend not only on the magnitude of change experienced (Fig. 4) but also on the socioeconomic development trajectories which the world may take over the coming decades. Adaptation measures which might mitigate impacts to some degree also require consideration. A cascade of uncertainty commencing with the socioeconomic assumptions and ending with impact assessment is evident (Fig. 5). However, some confident projections are now emerging. Higher temperatures and reduced rainfall are likely to result in an increase in the extent of water-stressed regions in the years ahead. Mid-latitude areas such as the Mediterranean and dry tropical regions such as the Sahel are particularly vulnerable. Notwithstanding this, the incidence of heavy precipitation events is likely to increase significantly, altering flood frequency and severity in almost all parts of the world. The reductions in glacier-fed river flows in the summer melting season are also likely to result in major reductions in water availability in parts of the world highly dependent on such resources. Impacts on biodiversity are expected to be considerable with 20–30% of species facing extinction if temperature rises exceed about 2  C. Additional indirect stresses from fire, pests, and diseases are also likely to be experienced. Food potential may increase for a time at higher latitudes as additional CO2 concentrations stimulate higher yields. In northern Europe, for example, reduced winter cold is likely to assist agriculture and hydroelectric power production. But for any increase above about 1–3  C, and indeed

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Figure 4 Global mean annual temperature change relative to 1980–99 C. Significant extinctions around the globe is defined here as more than 40%. About 30% of global, coastal wetlands lost is based on average rate of sea level rise of 4.2 mm yr 1 from 2000 to 2080. Source: IPCC, 2007.

Socio economic assumptions

Emissions scenarios

Concentration projections

Radiative forcing projections

Climate scenarios

Climate change impacts

Increasing uncertainty

Figure 5

The uncertainty cascade in assessing climate impact.

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for any increase at all on present levels for low latitudes, crop-yield potential is likely to fall. Parts of Africa are particularly vulnerable to reductions in the area of land suitable for agriculture as well as reductions in the growing season. Sea level rise estimates range from 18 to 38 cm for low emission scenarios to 26–59 cm for high scenarios. For densely populated deltas, particularly in Asia, and low-lying islands this poses a major threat and hundreds of millions of people will become vulnerable to flooding, a situation exacerbated where risks are enhanced by tropical storms or coastal subsidence. Some small islands will find their water resources and tourism compromised, for example, by erosion of beaches and coral bleaching. As with all climate hazards, poor communities will bear the brunt of these impacts. While in some high-middle and high-latitude locations, warmer winters will reduce annual heat-related mortality considerably, increased incidence of heat waves, such as occurred in Europe in 2003, will be associated with increased mortality overall, and especially for the elderly. Changes in disease incidence, such as malaria and water-related diseases, can also be expected.

Policy Responses and Adaptation Vulnerability to climate change is greatest in developing countries with weaker economies and social institutions. People already living on the margins lack the resources necessary to cope adequately with the stresses of climate change. For some, such as the mega deltas of Asia or the low-lying islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the effects will be considerable; and yet the problem is not essentially of their making. This mismatch between the primary culprits and the primary victims has bedeviled international attempts to address the problem. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was agreed upon at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This had as its ultimate objective, the stabilization of greenhouse gases at a level which would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system. The convention recognized the difficulties faced by the developing countries and assigned the lead in combating climate change to the developed countries. More detailed legally binding commitments for industrialized countries emerged in new proposals in Kyoto, Japan in 1997. Under these proposals, the developed countries were required to provide financial resources to the developing countries and to facilitate the transfer of cleaner, less-polluting technologies to them. Innovative flexible mechanisms, including trading of CO2 emission rights, would be employed by the developed countries to reduce their overall greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% by the period 2008–12 as compared with 1990. Individual targets for each country were set to take account of their particular circumstances. However, despite the Kyoto Protocol coming finally into force in 2005, progress has been slow. The United States withdrew its commitment to ratify the protocol in March 1991 and other nations such as Australia have also since refused to ratify. This, together with the fact that major developing countries such as China and India remain immune from any emission-reduction requirements has limited the likely effectiveness of a treaty which was always going to be a small first step in tackling the problem. The 27 countries of the European Union (EU) have always been the main champions of emission-reduction targets and have interpreted the “dangerous climate change” clause of the UNFCCC to mean a global temperature increase of 2  C. In 2007, the EU agreed a further unilateral set of cuts in their own emissions. These amount to 20% reductions on the 1990 levels by 2020. Thirty percent is on offer if the other developed countries currently not participating in the Kyoto Treaty commit to specific emission reductions as part of a new post-Kyoto arrangement. However the effectiveness of any international agreement which does not involve some reductions from the most rapidly growing developing world economies is questionable. China, for example, is expected to surpass the United States as the highest emitter of greenhouse gases by as early as 2009.

See Also: Environment; Environmental Policy; Environmental Regulation; Human Geography and Environmental Studies.

Further Reading Brohan, P., Kennedy, J., Harris, I., Tett, S.F.B., Jones, P.D., 2006. Uncertainty estimates in regional and global observed temperature changes: a new dataset from 1850. J. Geophys. Res. 111, D12106. https://doi.org/10.1029/2005JD006548. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Report of Working Group II of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Climate change 2007: mitigation of climate change. In: Report of Working Group III of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. Climate change 2007: the physical science basis. In: Report of Working Group 1 of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Relevant Websites http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/eccp.htm - European Climate Change Programme. http://www.ipcc.ch/index.htm - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/2860.php - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Climate Change Refugees W Andrew Baldwin, Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Climate refugee A category that describes forms of forced displacement that are said to result from climate change. Epistemology A branch of philosophy concerned with understanding the preconditions, formation, ethics, and politics of knowledge. Environmental determinism A discredited approach to human–nonhuman relations that gives primacy to the environment when explaining social, political, and cultural life. Neo-environmental determinism An approach to human–nonhuman relations which denounces determinism even while embracing some of its core assumptions. Performativity Originally a concept from gender theory, performativity is a word used to describe how concepts are not pregiven but come into being through the knowledges that describe them.

On first glance, “climate change refugee” appears to be one of the more intuitive categories in the climate change lexicon. One can easily imagine, for example, that as sea levels rise or as sea ice melts vast numbers of people around the world, often some of the poorest and most vulnerable, will be made homeless and forced to find refuge somewhere other than their place of residence. This image of “climate refugees” or “climate change–induced migration” appears routinely in news media and in various forms of political rhetoric. But, as the old saying goes, appearances can be deceiving. Over the last decade the category “climate refugee” has become the subject of burgeoning scrutiny, contestation, and debate not only among geographers but across the humanities and the social and environmental sciences. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change even described the “climate refugee” concept as scientifically and legally problematic. What therefore appears at first to be a neutral empirical category is, on closer inspection, in fact, quite controversial, which, in turn, raises fundamental questions not only about the political status of this vexing concept, but also about the politics of climate change more generally. For some, the “climate refugee” category is a useful rhetorical device because it puts a human face on the otherwise abstract climate crisis. The assumption here is that citizens are more likely to demand that states and markets transition to alternative forms energy use in the knowledge that climate change stands to severely disrupt the lives of actual people. For others, however, the category is profoundly problematic because it organizes the climate change imaginary in ways that reinforce existing relations of power and inequality while diverting political attention from structural explanations of climate change, such as capitalism and the legacies of European imperialism and colonialism. This short entry outlines some of the methodological and theoretical controversies at stake in the category “climate refugee” as well as in the wider discourse on environmental change and human relocation. It draws primarily from geography and from related fields, such as international relations, anthropology, and migration studies, given the interdisciplinary nature of the debate. In one sense, at the core of the controversy lies the relationship between climate change and three main forms of human mobility: migration, displacement, and resettlement. Here, the primary issue is the extent to which climate change can be said to be the final cause or driver of these forms of mobility. It is often assumed in poplar climate change discourse that migration will be among the most detrimental societal impacts of climate change. According to this reasoning, if climate change gets out of hand, migrants will begin circulating around the world in ever-increasing numbers, which will result in the proliferation of either humanitarian crises or political violence, such as low-level conflict or even full-blown war. On this last point, for example, there is no shortage of commentators who argue that the Syrian civil war was the result of mass rural-to-urban migration as farmers were pushed off their land owing to a drought that engulfed the Fertile Crescent in the mid-2000s. Some have suggested that these farmers are among the world’s first “climate refugees.” It has even been claimed that those fleeing the Syrian civil should be considered “climate refugees.” These are dubious claims, however. While no one would ever dispute that the drought occurred, the fundamental problem with environmental explanations of the war is that they vastly oversimplify its intricate sociopolitical conditions. Such explanations overlook, for example, the important role that Syria’s political economy played in shaping the conditions that led to large-scale rural-to-urban migration. At the core of the “climate refugee” controversy is therefore a problem of explanation. Echoing the Marxist critique of Malthusianism and environmental determinism that gained prominence in human geography in the 1970s and 1980s, some now refer to the climatic explanation of mass migration, i.e., “climate refugees,” and warfare as climate reductionism or neo-environmental determinism. Environmental determinism was a popular methodology in academic geography in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It broadly sought to explain social, cultural, and political life as a function of the environment. Moreover, many of the key texts associated with this now-discredited field were also centrally concerned with the relationship between migration and the environment. At the crux of the contemporary critique of climate reductionism is the notion that social relations, such as climate refugees or climate-induced war, misrepresent the phenomena they seek to describe on account of the way

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they privilege simplistic, naturalistic explanations of complex social phenomena over and above historical explanation. As a result, geographers and other researchers are nowadays far more likely to repudiate deterministic reasoning in favor of explanations that foreground the complex interactions between environmental factors, such as the impacts of climate change, and the social relations within which migration, displacement, and resettlement are irretrievably embedded. The core principle informing this methodological approach is the multicausality of migration: migration never results from any one factor but is the culmination of a range of relations, such as property rights, land tenure, social exclusion, and labor markets. But even while this approach may provide what appears to be a progressive alternative explanation to determinism, it nevertheless retains some of its determinist assumptions. This is why neo-environmental determinism has been used to characterize this approach. Discussions about “climate migration” or “climate refugees” are often accompanied by declarative statements which acknowledge the multicausality of migration or displacement yet which also elevate climate change as the “trigger” or final cause amid all the other variables that explain migration. In statements like this climate change is held as the “first among equal” explanatory factors. A good example of this is found in the well-cited scientific assessment undertaken by the UK government in 2011, Migration and Global Environmental Change, which argues that climate change is not a direct cause of migration but that climate change will affect weather patterns which will in turn affect livelihoods and thus migration. In this explanation climate change is said to be an indirect trigger of migration, albeit one inflected by in situ social relations. Such appeals to complexity also disavow questions of power. As with first-generation environmental determinism, the recent push to explain migration, displacement, and resettlement as a function of climate change largely ignores the way it upholds existing relations of power. All of this raises serious questions about whether something called “climate change displacement” or “climate migration” or “climate refugees” can even be said to exist at all. Such categories may feel intuitive. But is climate change ever the actual trigger of migration or displacement? If migration and displacement are multicausal social relations, then how are researchers meant to account empirically for the simultaneously historical and environmental dimensions of migration and displacement? What degree of emphasis should be placed on historical explanation? What emphasis should be placed on environmental explanation? What happens when we acknowledge that something called “the environment” or “climate” is an artifact of power? As it stands, these remain unresolved analytical problems in relation to the question of climate change and migration. But importantly they also echo one of the more long-standing philosophical problems running throughout contemporary human geography, namely the constructed binary between Nature and Society, or Nature and Culture. The “climate refugee” is after all a category which enables those who use it to differentiate groups of people on the basis of nature. Insofar as it explains the social life of migration as a function of nature, environment, or climate, it dissimulates the historical conditions of migration. One way researchers have found to circumvent this analytical conundrum about causation has been to say that whatever the causes of migration, human societies have always relied on migration as a reasonable adaptive response to environmental changes. This normative principle is now at the forefront of the institutional debate about “climate change refugees” and “climate migration.” On the one hand, there are those seeking to find ways of operationalizing this principle into climate change policy, while others insist on the need to defend the right to migrate in advance of climate change. Some have also suggested that while adaptive migration sounds reasonable in principle, we should remain mindful that adaptive migration can be easily accommodated into existing labor migration regimes which are oftentimes exploitative and which serve to maintain capitalist social relations as opposed to meeting the real material needs of subaltern groups that rely on migration as either a primary or supplemental source of income. Running throughout the entire discussion of “climate refugees” concerns the issue of human rights. The category carries the connotation of being a rights-bearing category and certainly many have sought to ensure that the rights of those forced to relocate due to climate change are legally recognized in international law. It is important to acknowledge, however, that the Geneva Convention, which defines the category “refugee” as a person subject to persecution, makes no provision for climate or the environment. This interpretation of the Geneva Convention was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 2015 when it refused an asylum application from a Kiribati citizen who sought refugee status on the grounds that climate change was rendering the Pacific island uninhabitable.

Knowledge and Power If the controversy surrounding the category “climate change refugee” is marked by a crisis of explanation, then by definition this crisis has implications for knowledge and knowledge formation. Here the main issue is that the “climate refugee” can never actually be known as such; the principle of multicausality prohibits it. Nor can one ever know the phenomenon “climate change migration” in any direct sense. The very moment one attempts to explain migration or displacement as a function of climate or the environment one immediately encounters the impossibility of such explanation, since migration is only ever multicausal. By this reasoning, no one can ever be said to be a “climate refugee” at least not in the present. Instead, and this takes us to the crux of the epistemological problem, the entire discourse on climate change and migration is scripted in the grammar of the future-conditional. “Climate refugees” may not be said to occur in the present. But this has not prevented the figure of the climate refugee from being constructed as a distinctive future possibility. In fact, one of the primary ways the relationship between climate change displacement can be known is through speculative, quantitative methods. Such methods are aimed at anticipating the scope of “climate migration” or “climate refugees” in the future. One common feature of this speculative genre is to quantify the number of people who will be displaced by climate change by a certain date in the future. The World Bank, for example, estimates claims that 143 million people may be internally displaced

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because of climate change in Latin America, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa by 2050. It reaches this conclusion by modeling various future scenarios of slow-onset climate change in conjunction with socioeconomic data and then aggregates this modeling at the regional scale. The UK government report noted earlier also makes use of scenarios. A range of other modeling techniques are also gaining purchase in geography and in other disciplines to make empirical sense of the relation between climate change and migration and displacement. Underpinning the need to quantify this relation are wider concerns about governing climate change in general and governing “climate refugees” in particular. This is a model of knowledge formation which presupposes its object of analysis and then retrospectively seeks to devise an empirical method to give it numeric specificity. But as we have already seen, the object of analysisdthe figure of the “climate refugee” or “climate migrant”dis not a settled category, does not succumb to easy definition, and evades objective measure. Epistemological critiques of “climate refugees” and “climate migration” have seized on this basic contradiction in order to pose a set of questions about the politics of the “climate refugee.” The essence of these critiques boils down to the indeterminate quality of the object “climate refugee” or “climate migrant.” If there is no such thing as a climate refugee, or if the object defies coherent conceptualization, then how is it possible for it to be enumerated either scientifically or legally? What is at stake when states and institutions undertake to govern a phenomenon which does not correspond to a concrete empirical reality? If one is purportedly governing a “climate refugee” or “climate migrant, how can one be so sure? What mechanisms of accountability exist to ensure that attempts to govern so-called “climate refugees” are not arbitrary? And, ultimately, for whom is the “climate change refugee” or “climate migrant”? One way of responding to these questions has been to suggest that the figure of the “climate refugee” is actually a performative category. Not unlike gender or race, the object itself has no essence and yet the discourse on climate refugees or climate migrants is enacted, or performed, as though it did. What performativity means is that the figure of the “climate refugee” does not preexist its construction but comes into being through the very process of its construction. Knowledge of the “climate refugee” is not read directly off the figure. Rather it is precisely through the act of knowing the figure that the figure itself comes into being as an object of knowledge. In this sense, it is proper to say that not only is the figure of the “climate refugee” socially constructed but so also that knowledge about the figure is socially constructed. Attempts to understand the implications of this insight take numerous forms, although in the main researchers have sought to explain why the figure of the “climate refugee” enjoys the status it does. This places emphasis on a form of explanation markedly different from empiricism. Whereas empiricists seek to understand how climate change affects migration, constructivists are more interested in explaining the popularity of the concept, how it is sustained in the public imaginary, how it is represented, what it means, and what the all-encompassing discourse on “climate change refugees” reveals about the politics of security, humanitarianism, adaptation, or resilience. One useful starting point for thinking the constructivist dimensions of “climate change refugees” has been to show how the figure of the “climate change refugee” is sustained by a unique epistemic community. Such a community is one in which research institutions, research councils, philanthropic organizations, international agencies, governments, and nongovernmental organizations come together to define the parameters of the discourse. These parameters are not defined in secret nor as some kind of clandestine conspiracy but arise instead through a shared set of assumptions, beliefs, and values as well as to a commitment to certain kinds of questions and methods. In the case of “climate change and migration,” for example, the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility functions as a kind of epistemic community. Comprised of the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Refugees International, the University of Liege, and the Arab Network for Environment and Development, the group supports the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change through the provision of technical knowledge. It is beyond the scope of this short entry to account in full for the way this group operates as an epistemic community. Broadly, however, it is concerned with conceptualizing the relation between climate change and migration as a scientific and legal problem that warrants technical and managerial solutions. It constructs this relation as distinctively “international” and thus a problem of collective action. And it is generally unconcerned with questions of capitalism and power. In contrast, several geographers have approached the “climate refugee” category as one infused by relations of power, posing the question: for whom is “climate migration” or “climate refugees” a problem? Research in the Maldives, a low-lying archipelago in the Indian Ocean, revealed, for example, that while low-lying islands are commonly perceived to be at risk of climate change, most Maldivians place very little weight on climate change as a reason they might migrate. Instead they cite economy and family relations as the main reasons they might consider migrating. A similar problem arises in cases where groups actively refuse the label “climate refugee” on the grounds that it undermines their political agency by constructing them in the language of victimhood. Such is the case in Kiribati, for instance. One study showed, for example, how even the Pacific island ambassadors to the United Nations were in agreement that the category of “climate refugee” is a poor descriptor for those living in low-lying Pacific islands. These cases raise an important question about who the category “climate refugee” is for, if those it is intended to describe feel that it misrepresents them. Numerous studies have emerged in recent years which demonstrate that the figure of the climate refugee is constructed primarily for the benefit of European and Western audiences. Such analyses often show how the “climate refugee” is constructed through a postcolonial framework in which colonial relations of power continue to operate in places that were formal colonies of European nation-states. Here, the figure of the climate refugee and climate migrant is said to conform to a model of “otherness” whereby it occupies a diminished or subordinate position in relation to Euro-Western subjectivity. Postcolonial analyses such as this call attention to the way that European forms of knowledge and authority are central to the performativity of “climate refugee” and “climate migration” discourse.

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Other similar forms of analysis argue that the discourse of climate migration acquires its popularity at precisely the moment in which climate change presents itself as a fundamental challenge to European humanism. Climate change, paradoxically, stands to undermine all the achievements of modern humanism. If industrialization, globalization, the spread of institutions, and technological advancements have all been achieved at the expense of the global climate, then partly at stake in climate change is a fundamental reconsideration of what it means to be human. For many this is a daunting, even debilitating prospect, so accustomed we have become to the artifice of modern life. Enter the figure of the “climate refugee” or “climate migrant.” At precisely the moment in which humans are being forced to reconsider their place in the Earth system, the wider discourse on climate change and migration offers some respite. Rather than having fundamentally to alter existing structures and relations of power in light of the climate change crisis, European humanism instead seeks to adapt to climate change by governing the very other of climate change: the climate refugee or climate migrant. According to this argument, it is precisely through the figure of the climate change refugee that European humanism seeks to reproduce its power and authority at the very conjuncture in which its power is being radically undermined by the very modernism that sustains it. Psychoanalytic variations on this same argument make the point that the “climate refugee” is merely symptomatic of a wider humanist malaise. This brings us squarely into dialogue with the deep and, what is for many, the unsettling terrain of race and racism. For at the center of European humanism are abiding questions about race and whiteness. Although race is often narrowly reduced to questions about skin or phenotype, a more productive way of thinking about race bequeathed to us by the Martinican writer Frantz Fanon is to say that race is imagined in relation to the human such that the racialized are understood as constructed outside the category of the human. This insight is central to the notion that the category of the climate refugee is a racial category. We know, for example, that, like race, it is an invented category. And like the category race it is also one that has been shown to be naturalized, ambiguous, anachronistic, ahistorical, and apolitical, all of which are common racial tropes. This insight is very powerful because it suggests that the discourse on climate change and migration is sustained not simply by and through the crisis of European humanism. It also suggests that it is sustained by specific configurations of whiteness. This has led some to interpret the discourse on climate change and migration as a form of post-racial expression, a paradoxical form of racist expression which is sustained without any immediate or direct reference to race.

The Mobilities Paradigm To date, the category of climate refugees has been taken up only sparingly within the field of mobility studies or what is sometimes called the mobilities paradigm. This is beginning to change, however, as scholars look for ways of reconceptualizing the relationship between climate change and human migration that do not reinforce the forms of power noted above. The related concepts of mobility justice and kinopolitics offer productive avenues for rethinking human mobility in the context of climate change and Anthropocene. Mobility justice positions human mobility within wider considerations of uneven development and structural inequality in order to show that patterns of human mobility are never politically neutral but always bound up with prior histories of exclusion and violence. Central to mobility justice is the idea that the ethics and politics of economic and social justice are limited if they neglect to account for the historical production of unequal relations of mobility. In much the same way, kinopolitics captures the way in which modern capitalist forms of power are bound up with technologies of migration control that approach migration and mobility as exceptional as opposed to foundational moments in human experience.

See Also: Epistemology; Migration; Mobility; Nature; Performativity; Postcolonialism.

Further Reading Baldwin, A., 2012. Orientalising environmental citizenship: climate change, migration and the potentiality of race. Citizsh. Stud. 16. Baldwin, A., 2013. Racialisation and the figure of the climate change migrant. Environ. Plan. 45, 1474–1490. Baldwin, A., 2014. Pluralising Climate Change and Migration: An Argument in Favour of Open Futures. Geography Compass forthcoming. Baldwin, A., 2016. Premediation and white affect: climate change and migration in critical perspective. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 41, 78–90. Baldwin, A., 2017. Climate change, migration, and the crisis of humanism. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Change 8, 1–7. Baldwin, A., Bettini, G., 2017. Life Adrift: Climate Change, Migration, Critique. Rowman and Littlefield, London. Bettini, G., 2013. Climate barbarians at the gate? A critique of apocalyptic narratives on ’climate refugees’. Geoforum 45, 63–72. Bettini, G., 2014. Climate migration as an adaption strategy: de-securitizing climateinduced migration or making the unruly governable? Crit. Stud. Secur. 2. Bettini, G., Nash, S., Gioli, G., 2017. One step forward, two steps back? The fading contours of (in)justice in competing discourses on climate migration. Geogr. J. 183, 348–358. Farbotko, C., 2010. Wishful sinking: disappearing islands, climate refugees and cosmopolitan experimentation. Asia Pac. Viewp. 51, 47–60. Farbotko, C., Lazrus, H., 2012. The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu. Glob. Environ. Chang. 22, 382–390. Hulme, M., 2011. Reducing the future to climate: a story of climate determinism and reductionism. Osiris 26, 245–266. McLeman, R., 2013. Developments in modelling climate change-related migration. Clim. Change 117, 599–611. McLeman, R., 2014. Climate and Human Migration: Past Experiences, Future Challenges. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. McLeman, R., Gemenne, F., 2018. Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration. Routledge, Abingdon. McNamara, K.E., Gibson, C., 2009. ’We do not want to leave our land’: Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of ’climate refugees. Geoforum 40, 475–483. Nash, S., 2019. International Policy and Discourse. Bristol University Press: Bristol. Nicholson, C., 2014. Climate change and politics of causal reasoning: the case of the climate change and migration. Geogr. J. 180, 151–160.

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Piguet, E., 2014. From “primitive migration” to “climate refugees”: the curious fate of the natural environment in migration studies. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 103, 148–162. Selby, J., Dahi, O., Fröhlich, C., HUlme, M., 2017. Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited. Political Geogr. 60, 232–244. Stojanov, R., Duzí, B., Kelman, I., Nemec, D., Prochazka, D., 2017. Local perceptions of climate change impacts and migration patterns in Malé, Maldives. Geogr. J. 183, 370–385.

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Climate Change; Adaptation David C Eisenhauer, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Adaptation to climate change is the process of adjusting to the negative effects of climate change while taking advantage of opportunities to better cope with changing conditions, risks, and hazards. Vulnerability to climate change is the outcome of a system’s exposure to climate perturbations, sensitivity to impacts, and adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity is the latent ability of a system to effectively respond and adjust to climatic change. Limits to adaptation are the factors that prevent adaptation from succeeding and, once encountered, entail dangerous climate impacts being experienced. Maladaptations are actions that were taken to address climate vulnerability that have the unintended consequence of increasing vulnerability.

Adaptation to climate change is the process of adjusting to the negative effects of climate change while taking advantage of opportunities to better cope with changing conditions, risks, and hazards. Climate change adaptation seeks to reduce vulnerability to climate change risks, perturbations, and stressors while increasing the capacity to respond to unavoidable impacts. Adaptation actions can range from incremental adjustments directed at maintaining current conditions to transformative changes aimed at fundamentally altering existing social, political, economic, and/or material arrangements. While all regions of the world will be affected by climate change and, thus, need to adapt, the groups already most exposed to existing social and ecological hazards tend to also be the most vulnerable to climate change and most in need of adaptation. Scholarship in the field of climate change adaptation includes efforts to identify the regions, sectors, and populations most vulnerable to climate change; elucidate the mechanisms through which successful adaptation could be achieved; and support the implementation of actual adaptation actions and programs. Adaptation research is both descriptive and normativedit seeks to describe the dynamics of adaptation as well as to inform, support, and direct society toward desired adaptive outcomes. As a transdisciplinary field, research on adaptation draws upon a wide range of methods from a variety of social disciplines, including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. The diversity of approaches within adaptation scholarship has contributed to a rich array of theorizations and empirical studies on adaptation as well as significantdand sometimes contentiousddebates as to the purpose, goals, and means of adaptation practice and research. Nonetheless, widespread agreement does exist that significant levels of adaptation are needed as the projections for climate change impacts in the 21st Century continue to become more severe. Thus, increasingly, adaptation scholarship is marked by a growing sense of urgency within efforts to identify mechanisms for spurring, implementing, and supporting effective on-the-ground adaptation action. As both research and practice have found, the creation of effective and equitable adaptation actions and policies is challenged by a number of factors, including uncertainty regarding future levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and the sensitivity of the climate system to those increased levels as well as social, technical, and political barriers. Indeed, a fundamental finding of adaptation to climate change research is that the process of adaptation is complex, challenging, contentious, and continuous. During the past decade, researchers and practitioners have worked to pioneer strategies to overcome constraints, navigate complexities, and to support actual adaptation actions. This includes efforts to outline general attributes and resources that help individuals and groups to adapt, create planning and policy-making heuristics and frameworks to guide decision-making, and to generate climate information and resources that are useful and useable to decision-makers and stakeholders. Furthermore, empirical research has demonstrated that successfully adapting to climate change often requires addressing the deeply entrenched structural causes of vulnerability.

Origins of Adaptation Research: Impact, Vulnerability, and Policy Assessments Concern with adaptation to climate change coalesced alongside the emergence of the international commitments laid out during the early 1990s within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to prevent dangerous levels of human interference within the climate system and for the most developed countries to provide funding and technical support to developing countries to reduce vulnerability to climate change. The field of adaptation to climate change research formed around three related research areas that sought to inform and support these commitments. First, in order to identify what constitutes dangerous interference in the climate system, adaptation researchers sought to estimate the extent to which social and ecological

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282 Table 1

Climate Change; Adaptation Early adaptation research.

Climate impact assessments focused on estimating the net impact climate change would have on regions, people, or sectors after potential adaptations occurred. By doing so, researchers sought to identify the point at which climate change impacts would exceed society’s capacity to respond and become dangerous. Climate vulnerability assessments aimed to identify the regions, populations, and sectors most at risk due to climate change. This research recognized that vulnerability to climate change was unevenly distributed. Vulnerability assessments were used to guide policy and financial support from the wealthiest nations to the locations and populations most vulnerable to climate change. Adaptation policy assessments sought to elucidate the most effective adaptation options for decision-makers to pursue. Researchers distinguished between “facilitation” and “implementation” actions. Facilitation actions aimed to increase the capacity to create adaptation plans. Implementation actions aided in the actual enactment of adaptation policies and plans.

systems were capable of successfully adapting to different levels of climate change. Thus, much early adaptation research took the form of “climate impact assessments” in which the primary goal was to identify what adaptation were likely to occur in response to different climatic impacts and project what “residual impacts” would remain after adaptation occurred. Within this research, it was assumed that any climate change stressor or impact would have some “initial impact” to which a system would attempt to adapt. If the system fully adapted to the climate change impact, then there would be no residual impacts. Once climate change impacts began to exceed the capacity of the system to fully adapt, some level of residual impacts would be experienced. Therefore, the point in which residual impacts begin to become a threat to the well-being of people is the threshold of dangerous interference with the climate system. Consequently, impact assessments were a crucial tool in estimating the amount of mitigation necessary to meet the UNFCCC commitment to prevent dangerous human interference in the climate system (Table 1). Second, adaptation research sought to identify the populations, regions, and sectors of the world most vulnerable to climatic impacts. This research sought to inform international investment and technical guidance for adaptation in less developed countries by locating the regions of the world most in need of assistance. To accomplish this goal, researchers conducted “vulnerability assessments” that sought to measure the vulnerability of people, sectors, and/or regions by quantifying exposure and sensitivity to climate change impacts as well as the capacity of the examined system to adapt. These dimensions of vulnerability will be detailed in more depth later in the entry. What is important to recognize at this point is that the aim of early vulnerability assessments was to identify particularly vulnerable people, regions, and/or sectors in order to direct international and national resource allocation and technical support. The need to locate particularly vulnerable targets for investment and support required the creation of metrics and indices that allowed for comparisons between and rankings of populations, regions, and sectors. Consequently, initial work in this realm sought to specify indicators or determinants of vulnerability that would allow for comparative analysis between disparate vulnerable regions in order to guide funding and support to the world’s most vulnerable nations (Table 2). Finally, a third early strand of adaptation research was to provide recommendations of actual adaptation measures. Both impact and vulnerability assessments assumed that some amount of adaptation would occur in response to experienced and projected climate change, yet rarely specified what specific adaptation actions were most likely to succeed in effectively and efficiently reducing climate impacts. Thus, “adaptation policy assessments” sought to directly inform and support the practical implementation of adaptation by contributing to policy-making at the international, national, and local levels. To accomplish this, adaptation scholars needed to consider the contextual needs, opportunities, and objectives of the system of interest. Thus, adaptation policy assessments relied on dialogue between researchers and stakeholders. Early work within adaptation policy assessments distinguished between facilitation and implementation actions. Facilitation actions related to increasing the necessary preconditions for successful adaptation such as improving decision-makers’ understanding of climate change threats, providing financial resources, and supporting the creation of well-run governance institutions. Implementation actions entailed activities that directly reduced exposure and/or sensitivity to climate change impacts. Adaptation policy assessments were, therefore, a complement to vulnerability assessments in pursuing the commitment to reduce climate vulnerability in the developing world. Vulnerability assessments sought to identify the locations most in need of assistance; adaptation policy assessments worked to catalyze and guide the practical implementation of actual adaptation actions. Together, impact, vulnerability, and adaptation policy assessments provided the groundwork for much of contemporary adaptation research. In particular, the focus on supporting and informing international efforts connected to the UNFCCC has continued to be a major factor in adaptation scholarship. This has both contributed to research on adaptation having relevancy to and influence in high-level policy debates as well as to criticism of the field as avoiding addressing the power asymmetries embedded in

Table 2

Vulnerability to climate change.

Vulnerability to climate change is the outcome of a system’s exposure to climate perturbations, sensitivity to impacts, and adaptive capacity. Endpoint approaches focus on the vulnerability remaining after adaptation actions are implemented. Starting point approaches prioritize the contextual factors that contribute to some regions, people, and sectors being more vulnerable than others. Proximate causes of vulnerability are the direct factors that contribute to people being at risk, such as exposure to hazards. Root causes of vulnerability are the structural factors that lead to uneven distributions of risk, such as discrimination and exploitation.

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international development and policy endeavors. Nonetheless, while the influence of early research on adaptation continues to be felt in the field, scholarship on the topic has also diversified and expanded greatly during the past two decades. The following section documents how understandings and concerns regarding adaptation have developed into a complex and, often, contentious field of study and practice.

Prominent Adaptation to Climate Change Research Areas During the past three decades, adaptation scholars have generated a wealth of empirical examinations of efforts to design and implement adaptation in a wide range of social, political, and economic contexts. Such research has built and expanded upon the field’s initial focus on impacts, vulnerability, and policy options to incorporate concerns regarding development, justice, politics, and sustainability. This has contributed to adaptation becoming a varied field of scholarship with a range of differing approaches. Moreover, critiques of adaptation research from outside the field have been frequent and, often, trenchant. In particular, scholars from the fields of political ecology, postcolonial studies, feminist studies, and the political theory have generated incisive critiques of the all too frequent technocratic and apolitical framing of climate change adaptation. Contemporary adaptation scholarship has engaged with such critical scholarship and worked to include political dynamics within analysis as well as develop methods to address the structural root causes of vulnerability, such as poverty, marginalization, and corruption. Indeed, as will be documented throughout the rest of the entry, there is growing awareness within the field that adaptation must proceed at two levels: incremental shifts and transformational change. While the current state of the adaptation to climate change literature is diverse, a few prominent areas of research have coalesced and bridged much of the field. In particular, the concepts of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, limits, barriers, politics, and success conditions have become rich areas for exploration. Each of these topics has produced a wealth of knowledge. Indeed, ongoing scholarly debates exist within each area regarding how to best approach, examine, and frame adaptation as well as the basic principles and objectives of adaptation research. The remainder of this section highlights some of the key attributes and findings of adaptation scholarship on each of the aforementioned areas of research.

Vulnerability Adaptation to climate change research is fundamentally concerned with questions of vulnerability. Within adaptation research, vulnerability is most commonly defined as (1) a system’s exposure to climate perturbations and stresses, (2) sensitivity to climate impacts, and (3) adaptive capacity to respond to climate change. Exposure to climate change is the extent to which a social or ecological system is subject to a climatic perturbation or stress, such as sea level rise, more frequent heat events, or changes in precipitation. Sensitivity refers to the degree to which a social or natural system can absorb climatic impacts and stresses without suffering long-term negative consequences. Adaptive capacity, which is explored in more depth below, is defined as a vector of resources that can be mobilized in advance of or in response to climate change risks. Adaptation actions can address any of these components of vulnerability individually or in some combination. Within adaptation research, vulnerability is frequently contrasted to the concept of resiliency, which refers both to the capacity to absorb impacts as well as to self-organize and transition to a new state if climatic conditions render an existing system untenable. Thus, a resilient system is not necessarily one that simply has the capacity to “bounce back” from climate impacts, but also one that can adapt and shift to new and desirable states. In contrast, a vulnerable system lacks the capacity to absorb impacts or transition to a positive state. As described earlier, assessing vulnerability was a central aspect of early adaptation to climate change research. Initial vulnerability assessments typically employed an “endpoint” or “outcome” approach to characterizing vulnerability. This research sought to identify the “residual impacts” that remain after some level of potential adaptation actions are taken. That is, vulnerability was a product of the inability to adapt to climate impacts. Thus, this research aimed to summarize the net impacts of climate change and identify the places, people, and sectors most vulnerable. As an alternative to the outcome approach, adaptation scholars developed what is known as the “contextual” or “starting point” vulnerability approach, which considers vulnerability to be a characteristic of social, natural, and physical systems. Research within this approach highlights that climate change unfolds through existing vulnerabilities caused by inequalities and uneven development. Thus, climate change interacts with and frequently amplifies existing social, environmental, and political vulnerabilities, such as extreme poverty, scarcity of livelihood opportunities, systemic discrimination, violence, lack of political representation, and poor health conditions. Contemporary research on climate vulnerability emphasizes the existence of multiple stressors and vectors of vulnerability beyond climate change alone. In light of this, adaptation scholars frequently make the case that responses to climate change ought to also address the underlying social, political, and economic causes of vulnerability. In this regard, climate vulnerability research now distinguishes between proximate causes and root causes of vulnerability. The proximate causes of climate vulnerability are the direct, everyday factors that contribute to people experiencing risks and hazards. This includes poor living conditions located in hazardous areas, lack of livelihood options, a scarcity of resources, and an inability to access capital and credit. The root causes of vulnerability are the structural forces and processes that contribute to people living in poverty, residing in hazard prone regions, and lacking secure livelihoods. That is, root causes include the social, political, and economic structures that shape and condition collective life in uneven and inequitable ways; while the proximate causes are the material and social manifestations of such forces and processes. Compared to root causes, proximate causes are often easier to

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identify and are more tractable. Identifying and addressing the root causes of vulnerability remains a significant challenge. Indeed, reviews of the literature on climate change adaptation demonstrates that the vast majority of adaptation efforts have focused on addressing the proximate causes of vulnerability and that the root causes have often been overlooked or ignored. However, recent scholarship has argued forcefully that the root causes of vulnerability must be addressed if adaptation to climate change is to be just and sustainable.

Adaptive Capacity Adaptive capacity is the latent ability of a system to prepare for climate change and/or respond and adjust to the effects of climate change. Adaptive capacity presents a picture of the adaptive space of a system and the range of possible adaptive actions available to actors. Adaptive capacity facilitates adaptive outcomes in two ways. First, adaptive capacity modifies exposure to climate change risks and reduces sensitivity to climate impacts by increasing the ability to absorb and recover from losesdthereby decreasing vulnerability. Second, adaptive capacity facilitates transitions and transformations toward a more desirable state when current conditions are no longer tenable. By both decreasing vulnerability and increasing the ability to successfully respond to impacts, investing in building adaptive capacity is widely seen as a positive goaldespecially within situations where potential climate impacts are difficult to predict and, therefore, hard to plan adaptation actions for. However, a number of uncertainties regarding adaptive capacity exist. First, because adaptive capacity is a latent quality, it is difficult to measure directly. Indeed, it is not until adaptive capacity is mobilized that it becomes visible. Rather than directly quantifying adaptive capacity, adaptation researchers have theorized a number of factors as being proxies of adaptive capacity. These are referred to as “determinants of adaptive capacity.” The determinants of adaptive capacity include factors such as economic resources, education, access to technology, infrastructure, institutions, and social equity. Because the determinants of adaptive capacity act as proxies for assessing adaptive capacity, there exists uncertainty regarding exactly how well such determinants mirror the actual capacities and capabilities needed to adapt to specific impacts and stresses associated with climate change. The determinants of adaptive capacity have been found to be useful in responding to historical climate and weather events, but climate change will contribute to unprecedented conditions. Furthermore, there are uncertainties regarding projecting the state of these determinants in the future, when climate impacts will be felt. More recently, adaptive capacity has been described as having two dimensions. First, there are generic capacities that address basic human well-being and security, such as health, education, livelihood opportunity and security, and political rights. Second, there are specific capacities that foster the tools and skills required to plan for and respond to climate change explicitly. By distinguishing between generic and specific adaptive capacities, it is possible for researchers to better assess the strengths and vulnerabilities of regions, populations, and socio-ecological systems. For instance, if a population is found to have high levels of specific adaptive capacity and low levels of generic adaptive capacity, then they can be understood that have strong existing strategies for coping with climate variability but lack the general assets, such as financial resources or political rights, needed to flourish in response to climate change. Thus, rather than designing programs to build adaptive capacity broadly, tailored efforts to increase specific adaptive capacity can be created. The objective of policy, therefore, is to reach a space in which a balance of generic and specific adaptive capacity exists (Table 3). Research on how adaptive capacity becomes translated into actual adaptation actions has demonstrated the importance of the capacity of nation states and governments to design, implement, and sustain policies that reduce vulnerability and increase citizens’ ability to flourish in the face of climate change. However, some scholars contend that the very policies seeking to increase adaptive capacity within international development projects have had the unintended consequence of reducing the capacity of governments to address crucial issues of social and political inequality. This is because programs to increase adaptive capacity are often connected to development initiatives that seek to reduce the role of central governments and deregulate markets. Further, scholars have observed that many of the theorized determinants of adaptive capacity implicitly assume that economic growth, technological development, and participatory governance at the local level automatically contribute to lessening the exposure and sensitivity of vulnerable populations. However, decades of experience with international development projects demonstrates this is rarely the case. Indeed, research on adaptive capacity within the developing world suggests that there exists a need to connect the cultivation of adaptive capacity with policies that directly tackle the root causes of vulnerability. Such a two-tiered approach is further explored later within the “Linking Adaptation to Development” section.

Table 3

Adaptive capacity.

Adaptive capacity is the latent ability of a system to effectively respond and adjust to climatic change. Determinants of adaptive capacity are measurable proxies presumed to reflect ability to adapt to climate change. Generic adaptive capacity encompasses the factors such as education, wealth, and political rights that are presumed to be increase the capability to adapt in response to a wide range of climate impacts. Specific adaptive capacity refers to the resources presumed to be beneficial in responding to specific climate impacts.

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Limits and Barriers to Adaptation to Climate Change The continued growth in global greenhouse gas emissions has not only made the need for adaptive actions increasingly urgent, it has also made clear that there are limits to what adaptation can accomplish. Indeed, the concept of dangerous climate change is premised upon the notion that, at some level of climate change, adaptation is no longer tenable. Limits to adaptation can be due to physical, economic, technological, and/or cultural factors. For instance, rapid and significant levels of sea level rise could place limits on the implementation of adaptive actions to prevent flooding and storm damage in low-lying coastal areas and for small island nations. Identifying potential limits to adaptation and projecting when and where they might occur is crucial to developing medium- and long-term adaptation policy for a number of reasons. First, limits highlight dangerous scenarios to be avoided through mitigation policy. Second, if encountering a limit becomes unavoidable, then transformative actions that profoundly change the patterns, distributions, and processes of social and economic life are likely to be needed. Thus, research has sought to explicate the physical and social limits of adaptation as well as to predict where breaching these limits is likely to occur. One way this research has played out is the search for objective and absolute limits to adaptation. The existence of thresholds in ecological and physical systems that, once crossed, entail irreversible and profound change are widely seen as presenting objective and absolute limits to adaptation. An example of this would be rapid coral reef die-off once a certain level of ocean acidification is reached due to carbon emissions being absorbed into the world’s oceans. In the event that such a threshold is crossed, societies dependent upon coral reef ecosystems would encounter significant limits to the ability to adapt their cultural and economic practices, which could result in them failing to cope with climate change or cause them to dramatically alter their way of life. Other objective limits to adaptation include situations in which the economic costs of adaptation are no longer feasible or when technological innovation is unable to successfully deal with climate impacts. An alternative, constructivist approach to identifying limits to adaptation argues that any limit is the result of the values, institutions, and practices of societies. Thus, what counts as a limit to adaptation is not objective or immutable, but the outcome of dynamic, contingent social processes. Within this approach, limits are endogenousdthey emerge from the goals, values, risk perceptions, and social choices that exist within a population. For instance, in the case of societies with economies dependent upon coral reefs, the potential for rapid die-offs is only a limit to the extent that a society has the goal maintaining an economy centered around reef ecosystems, values social practices connected to reefs, and/or has choices available to pursue other feasible economic and social practices. Furthermore, if the goals, values, and social choices of such a society do act as limits to adaptation, they should not be viewed as immutable. Instead, social and political change can make adaptation actions feasible that were once considered off-limits. Limits are often compared and contrasted to barriers to adaptation, which are factors that constrain the implementation of and/ or reduce the options available for adaptation, but, unlike a limit, can be overcome through individual and/or collective action. Adaptation research has identified a range of common barriers, including the scarcity of financial resources, complexity of climate information, lack of political will, public skepticism, fragmentation of governance and institutions, and economic conflicts. Barriers to adaptation can be connected to the concept of adaptive capacity, as a barrier could be a reason for latent adaptive capacity failing to be translated into actual adaptive actions. That is to say, if a local government has relatively high levels of adaptive capacity but is failing to implement adaptive policies, it might be that a federal regulation or a lack of political will from local elected officials is acting as a barrier to adaptation. Consequently, research that empirically identifies barriers to adaptation can help with the design of targeted initiatives to address factors limiting and constraining adaptive actions. Together, research on the limits and barriers to adaptation can help elucidate the upper boundaries of adaptation as well as the factors that hinder adaptive actions. However, distinguishing between a limit and barrier is sometimes difficultdespecially when limits are considered to be socially constructed. As a general rule, though, a barrier can be overcome within existing institutions and prevailing frameworks, while encountering a limit requires a change in the institutions and frameworks that structure action (Table 4).

The Politics of Adaptation An emerging and rapidly growing adaptation to climate change research agenda is coalescing around the politics of adaptation. While the political dimensions of adaptation have been long acknowledged, adaptation research has often only superficially examined political dynamics. This has contributed to a common critique that adaptation research treats the process of adaptation as largely a technical problem to be solved through better governance institutions and more effective technology. Within such a technocratic framing, politics frequently has been identified as a barrier to adaptationdsomething that impedes rational actions.

Table 4

Limits and barriers to adaptation.

Limits to adaptation are the factors that prevent adaptation from succeeding and, once encountered, entail dangerous climate impacts being experienced. Absolute limits are thresholds that once crossed entail irreversible change that are impossible to adjust in response to, such as sea level rise that overwhelms defensive measures. Social limits are the result of the values, institutions, and practices of society that severely constrain adaptation. Such limits are deeply entrenched in society, but malleable to change. Barriers to adaptation constrain the effectiveness of adaptation, but can be overcome through individual or collective action.

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However, more recent scholarship has called for critically examining the ways in which politics not only closes down the potential for adaptation but can also open up possibilities for positive change and potentially even radical, transformative change. Politics within this research includes both formal institutions, such as voting and governmental actions, as well as informal practices of resisting and mobilizing power. While research on the politics of adaptation is diverse and multifaceted, a few principles tend to guide scholarship. First, all adaptation is embedded within differentiated and uneven arrangements of power, decision-making, and precarity. Any adaptation effort unfolds within already ongoing struggles and conflicts regarding access to resources, security, and representation. The intensity of such disputes may vary from one context to another, but some level of disagreement and conflict is almost certain to exist. Second, contestations around adaptation frequently involve debates regarding authority and what counts as legitimate and valid knowledge. Researchers seek to untangle how some actors become seen as experts possessing valid and important knowledge, while other actors are excluded from the category of expert for not possessing credible information. Third, climate change and responses to it generate new subjectivities, which, in turn, have complex impacts on power and vulnerability. One way this plays out is that populations across the globe are being labeled as “resilient,” “vulnerable,” “at risk,” “climate refugees,” and so forth in relation to emerging climate threats and opportunities. Such categories have material and cultural effects as they intersect and interact with existing subjectivities, such as race, class, gender, and livelihood. A prominent example of such emerging subjectivities is the growing solidarity of those residing on small island nations. Such populations have formed a new global community in part due to their shared vulnerability to global sea level rise and have worked collectively to push for dramatic cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, vulnerability to climate change is a manifestation of structural and deep-rooted inequalities and uneven economic and political processes. Thus, research on the politics of adaptation focuses on elucidating the “root causes” of vulnerability and highlights the complex webs of relations that lead to some groups and locations being vulnerable and other groups being well-off and secure. Such a relational approach seeks to demonstrate that the relative vulnerability of some is directly linked to the security of others. Moreover, these relationships interact with other processes unfolding at various scales, such as economic globalization, national and international policies, and environmental change. Consequently, research on the politics of adaptation stresses that any adaptation policy will have reverberating effects at various scales (Table 5). Research on the politics of adaptation often seeks to not only understand the political dynamics of adaptation but also to influence and inform political action. In other words, researchers take a normative stance as to what a desirable political process would entail. In such cases, adaptation researchers tend to advocate for greater input, autonomy, and justice for marginalized and vulnerable populations. Moreover, research has demonstrated that vulnerable groups are not passive victims of climate change; instead, they are active agents strugglingdsometimes successfully and other times notdto cope with climate variability and improve their situation. By documenting the capacity of otherwise marginalized groups to cope and adapt to climate change, research on the politics of adaptation makes a case for empowering vulnerable populations in ways that acknowledge their agency and build off existing practices, values, and visions. Empirical research exploring the politics of adaptation has largely, though not exclusively, occurred within the Global Southdwith a great deal of focus on international efforts to structure, finance, and implement adaptation programs. For instance, research in Nepal had documented how the dominant focus of international agencies and donors is to “get the institutions right” in order to support locally driven adaptation projects. Adaptation programs in Nepal have received significant international funding through UNFCCC supported programs. Adaptation planning has unfolded at the national, local, and community levels with design principles that bridge these levels. Such internationally funded efforts have succeeded in creating good institutional structures that include bottom-up information practices and participatory methods for mapping vulnerability. For instance, community-level “usergroups” with a minimum of 30% women and ethnic and caste minorities were created as a mechanism to ensure vulnerable populations had a voice in decision-making within adaptation programs. However, researchers focusing on the politics of climate change adaptation in Nepal have found that these initiatives have avoided directly addressing political change and, therefore, failed to include crucial concerns that exist about changing livelihoods, identity politics, and government structures. Indeed, ethnographic research in rural Nepal on the design of adaptation policy, implementation strategies, and actual adaptation actions has demonstrated that while the most marginalized and vulnerable populations are formally included through user groups and other participatory methods, such groups have negligible influence on actual decision-making. Rather, the wealthiest and politically connected still control how adaptation programs unfold. Consequently, the internationally supported and funded participatory climate change adaptation program had the unintended effect of entrenching and, even, deepening existing vulnerabilities and the social, political, and economic dynamics contributing to the precarity of marginalized populations. An important takeaway from this and other research on the politics of adaptation is that seeking to de-politicize climate change adaptation projects at the international and national levels contributes directly to intensifying political struggles and dynamics at local levelsdwhere marginalized populations often are unable to meaningfully influence decision-making even when institutional design appears to meet success criteria. While the specific ways in which such dynamics play out is extremely context dependent, research on the politics of climate change adaptation has uncovered similar outcomes in places as diverse as the dry rangelands of Kenya, coastal Bangladesh, and Kingston, Jamaica. Table 5

Politics of adaptation.

Politics of adaptation research recognizes that adaptation is inherently a political process and explores the role of power, recognition, and authority within responses to climate change.

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Defining Successful Adaptation and Avoiding Maladaptation After decades of adaptation research, significant debate persists as to what constitutes successful adaptation and how to best assess success. Broadly, a successful adaptation action ought to decrease vulnerability without negatively impacting the sensitivity, exposure, and adaptive capacity of populations located elsewhere or in the future. Additionally, a successful adaptation should not negatively impact overall economic, environmental, and social sustainability. Research suggests that success can be assessed based upon general principles of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy. Effectiveness is a measure of an adaptation’s actual impact on decreasing vulnerability to climate change. Evaluating the efficiency of an adaptation action entails assessing its overall costs and benefits as well as the distribution of those costs and benefits. Adaptation scholars frequently argue that costs and benefits should not be reduced to monetary and market values, but also include social, cultural, and ecological benefits and costs that might prove difficult to quantify. Thus, a successful adaptation should not only reduce vulnerability but should do so in an efficient manner and not deplete the resources and conditions that make further adaptation possible. Finally, for an adaptation action to be successful, it must meet broad perceptions of equity and legitimacy. That is to say, adaptation actions must be seen by affected populations as fair, desirable, and legally and socially valid. Equity includes considerations of the spatial and social distribution of the consequences of an adaptation actiondin other words, the winners and losers. Outcomes of adaptation can be assessed based upon a variety of principles, such as just desert, equality, and need. The legitimacy of an adaptation action relates to the degree that those impacted by adaptation actions believe decisions are acceptable and the process of designing and implementing them to be valid. Transparent, open processes are more likely to be perceived as acceptable than the ones that are conducted with little to no input from impacted parties. Assessing and measuring equity and legitimacy requires appreciating social and political contexts in which adaptation actions are taking place. What counts as fair and valid will vary from one context to another. Further, the temporal aspects of adaptation and climate change also complicate determining the equity and legitimacy of adaption as many choices will have long-lasting, intergenerational consequences. Thus, the long-term success of an adaptation action will likely depend in part on future generations perceiving actions taken now or in the near future to be equitable and legitimate. For instance, relocating poor and vulnerable communities out of flood zones might be the most effective and efficient adaptation strategy in response to projected sea level rise and the potential for increased coastal storm frequency and intensity. However, if this process is not transparently conducted with careful consultation and meaningful input from the targeted population, there is a significant risk that the adaptation effort will not be perceived as equitable and legitimate. In such a situation, the precarity and marginality of the vulnerable group could be reinforced and, potentially, deepeneddeven if they are relocated to a location less exposed and sensitive to climate impacts. As general principles, effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and legitimacy provide a strong starting point for evaluating the success of adaptation. However, narrowing down on precisely what success entails and how to measure success has proven to be a continued problem. A substantial component of the challenge of defining and measuring success is that, ultimately, whether an adaptation action contributes to desirable effects comes down to normative and contextual dimensions. The values, goals, and worldviews that structure and orient collective action are heterogenous and mutable, which makes explicating universal and clear principles for success impossible. This is especially the case for principles such as equity and legitimacy or in evaluating distributional outcomes. Due to these complications, adaptation research has sought to elucidate general principles within the design and implement of adaptation processes that increase the likelihood of success. Many of the principles reflect a commitment toward good governance, democratic principles, and adaptive, flexible management strategies. For instance, adaptation researchers have suggested that the following principles are likely to increase the success of adaptation: communication and public engagement; deliberate planning and decision-making; developing synergies between adaptation action and other policy goals; fostering public accountability; cultivating space for social learning and reflexivity; and demonstrating the social and economic value of adaptation plans and policies. Beyond the difficulties presented by differences in values, goals, and worldviews, there is the potential for adaptation actions to have negative, unintended consequences for both the targeted and external actors in the present or future. The term “maladaptation” describes an adaptation action that has the effect of directly increasing vulnerability to climate change and/or decreasing overall capacity to implement sustainable adaptations in the future. Adaptation research has identified three broad types of maladaptation. First, maladaptation can occur when actions taken to address climate risks and stresses actually increase the exposure and sensitivity and decrease the adaptive capacity of the target of the action in the present or future. For example, the building of a sea wall might decrease vulnerability in the short term; yet, this could lead to more people moving to the low-lying coastal area being protected. If future sea level rise combined with more prevalent and/or powerful coastal storms overwhelm the coastal protections, then vulnerability in the future will be increased as more people and infrastructure are exposed to potential impacts. Second, maladaptation can emerge when adaptation actions have the unintended consequence of actually increasing present or future vulnerability and/or decreasing the adaptive capacity of external actors. For instance, the implementation of “hard” coastal protections such as groins and sea walls that aim to reduce coastal erosion and flood damage are likely to have negative consequences for neighboring coastal areas due to the disruption of sediment transport and energy dissipation. Third, maladaptation can undermine the conditions for sustainable development. That is, even if an adaptation action succeeds in reducing vulnerability, it could still negatively impact people’s long-term capability to provide for themselves and their families and communities in ways that are socially and environmentally sustainable. Examples of such maladaptations include actions that lock-in fossil fuel–dependent development trajectories and ones that push communities into low-profit livelihoods with little potential for economic growth.

288 Table 6

Climate Change; Adaptation Defining success and avoiding maladaptation.

Successful adaptation decreases vulnerability without adversely impacting people living elsewhere or in the future. Effectiveness entails actually reducing vulnerability Efficiency refers to reducing vulnerability without depleting the resources necessary to meet other social goals. Equity means that adaptation actions treat people fairly and do not contribute to social problems, such as inequality. Legitimacy requires that adaptation actions are created and implemented through processes that are seen by effected parties as credible and valid. Maladaptations are actions that were taken to address climate vulnerability that have the unintended consequence of increasing vulnerability.

Thus, research has explored both what success and failure of adaptation entails. By doing so, adaptation scholarship can inform the design and implementation of adaptation policies by outlining what works and does not work. It is important to recognize that a key finding of research on adaptation success is that much of what determines the effectiveness of actions taken to reduce climate vulnerability depends upon the cultural and political context. Thus, normative and qualitative concerns about values and goals are at the heart of success. Quantitative tools, such as cost–benefit analysis and multicriteria analysis, can help achieve success, but without continually engaging with the social context of vulnerability and resilience, it is difficult to successfully respond to climate change risks and stressors (Table 6).

Informing and Supporting the Implementation of Adaptation Actions While scholarship on adaptation to climate change has produced an immense and diverse array of knowledge about the drivers of climate change vulnerability as well as strategies for implementing policies and plans that reduce sensitivity and exposure while increasing adaptive capacity, this knowledge has not contributed to the adaptive actions deemed necessary to prevent dangerous climate impacts. Indeed, a number of empirical studies have documented a persistent and durable gap between the information available to inform decision-makers and lack of meaningful action taken to address climate change vulnerability. This challenge of translating scientific information about climate change vulnerability into concrete actions has been referred to as the “knowledge-action gap.” A substantial effort has been made to narrow or close this gap through a range of strategies to facilitate the use of climate knowledge in decision-making. Two prominent tactics for informing and supporting actual adaptation actions are the “mainstreaming” of adaptation into development and the production and dissemination of “decision-support” through the creation of “useable climate information” and “climate services.” Efforts to mainstream adaptation into development seeks to explicitly include concerns regarding short-, medium-, and long-term climate change into international and national decisionmaking and planning around investments in infrastructure, institutions, and livelihoods. Programs to provide decision-support generally unfolds through iterative, long-term interactions with on-the-ground decision-makers and managersdfrequently at the local level. Theorization on both mainstreaming adaptation and decision-support draw upon the insights gained through previous research on climate vulnerability, adaptive capacity, barriers, limits, determinants of success, and the politics of adaptation. Another recent promising, though incipient, approach to further closing the gap between knowledge and action is the creation of “pathways of adaptation” that seek to outline multiple potential development and policy trajectories toward a desirable, sustainable future (Table 7).

Linking Development and Adaptation The importance and value of linking adaptation to development was recognized early within international efforts to reduce climate vulnerability. Linking adaptation to climate change with development recognizes that the poorest people are most at risk from Table 7

The implementation of adaptation actions.

Mainstreaming adaptation into development seeks to include concerns about climate change vulnerability a central part of decision-making in the design and implementation of development projects. Sustainable adaptation recognizes that current development paradigms are ill-suited to addressing climate vulnerability and, in some cases, might worsen the problem. Therefore, development must be adapted to climate change and incorporate insights on the root causes of vulnerability in order to achieve social justice and ecological integrity. Decision-support refers to a wide range of strategies to facilitate the actual creation and implementation of adaptation policies. Climate services are tools and resources that climate scientists tailor to the information and work requirements of decision-makers. Useable climate information is information that is collaboratively produced to fit decision-contexts, interplay with knowledge systems used in decisionmaking, and addresses concrete, tractable problems. Pathways approaches conceptualize adaptation as a continuous, iterative process that unfolds in light of deep uncertainty regarding the future state of the climatic and social conditions. Transformative adaptation entails profound and extensive shifts in social, ecological, and/or infrastructural conditions in order to avoid maladaptive outcomes.

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climate impacts and, therefore, synergies exist between poverty reduction and climate adaptation. Furthermore, an analysis by the World Bank in 2006 estimated that climate change could negatively impact up to 40% of all development financed by international assistance and concessional loans. Thus, climate change was seen as both a problem to be addressed through development as well as a challenge with the potential to undermine development if not properly accounted for. In response to this recognition, scholarship of adaptation in the mid-2000s called for “mainstreaming” adaptation into development projects. Mainstreaming entails explicitly integrating climate change information, policies, and actions into development planning and implementation. Early on, climate change scholars highlighted the potential synergies between improving adaptive capacity and traditional development projects. Thus, improving governance, making institutions more accountable and transparent, supporting sustainable livelihoods, and increasing education was seen as a win–win for reducing vulnerability and achieving development targets. Additionally, efforts were made to “climate-proof” development by ensuring that climate change projections were included into decision-making regarding investments in infrastructure and technologies were robust against a range of potential climate impacts and conditions. Moreover, by including climate projections, development projects could be designed to address possible future climate hazards, such as sea level rise or heat events. However, many scholars of adaptation to climate change argued that mainstreaming adaptation into development required also adapting development to climate change. That is to say, climate change vulnerability is not just a problem for development to solve; rather, it is also a problem caused, in part, due to dominant forms of development pursued at the international level. Research within the “double exposure” framework documents how climate vulnerability becomes intertwined within vulnerabilities associated with economic globalization in countries such as India. Moreover, scholarship examining how adaptive capacity is mobilized into adaptive actions found that many aspects of neoliberal restructuring connected to development projects had the effect of decreasing the capacity of governments to create, coordinate, and implement adaptation actions. These concerns have been supported by a range of ethnographic studies of efforts to incorporate adaptation into development projects that uncovered that many policies pursued to lessen climate vulnerability had the unintended consequence of deepening and entrenching precarity and marginality. Consequently, adaptation to climate change scholarship has argued for new forms of development that both address the emerging vulnerabilities brought about by climate change and the root causes of vulnerabilitydsome of which are tied to development itself. Thus, there is the need for a two-tiered approach to development that, at one level, seeks to ameliorate the impacts of climate change through effective disaster management and investing in incremental adjustments while, at another level, addresses the systemic, structural roots of inequality, vulnerability, and marginality. A prominent framework for accomplishing this is the “sustainable adaptation” approach, which is based upon principles of social justice and environmental integrity. Sustainable adaptation incorporates lessons from research on the root causes of vulnerability, the politics of climate change adaptation, and the limits and barriers to adaptation in order to present a framework for designing development projects that recognize the context of climate vulnerability, incorporate different views and values, and integrate local knowledge with other sources of knowledge about climate change.

Decision-Support and Useable Information Policy-makers, managers, and practitioners have rarely seen knowledge about climate change as relevant to their needs. Even in situations where decision-makers consider climate change vulnerability to be an important problem to be addressed, they frequently struggled to access, integrate, and deploy information about climate change. In part, the ways in which climate science is produced and disseminated creates barriers to the uptake and use of such information. Therefore, adaptation scholars have pioneered new, innovative ways of linking and reconciling the production of and demand for climate information. Whereas early “adaptation policy assessments” sought to document the range of potential adaptation actions available to decision-makers, current adaptation policy research seeks to iteratively work with users to tailor and contextualize climate information to support the specific needs of targeted groups. Crucially, this scholarship argues that the factors contributing to the failure of climate science to lead to adaptation actions originate from both sides of science–policy interface. Consequently, endeavors to make climate science more useable and useful entail reconfiguring and blurring the boundaries between science, policy, and politics. This includes projects to produce “useable” climate information that fits existing decision-making contexts and interplays with the knowledge systems currently used by decision-makers as well as efforts to generate “climate services” and “decision-support tools” that are useful to decision-makers. The creation of useable information requires long-term, iterative collaboration between users and producers of climate informationda process often referred to as “the co-production of climate knowledge.” Ideally, potential users would be included throughout the knowledge production processdfrom the setting out of objectives to the finalization of reports. Through such a collaborative process, adaptation scholars aim to generate climate information that is tailored to the practical needs of users. At a more broader level, climate services are forms of climate information and knowledge that have been tailored to be useful in decision-making aimed at reducing climate vulnerability and enhancing the well-being of people. Climate services providers are organizations that can operate at the local, regional, national, and international level to generate, provide, and contextualize climate information for decision-makers. Examples of climate services include seasonal forecasts, projections of medium- and long-term weather and temperature trends, and predictions and monitoring of climate hazards and risks. Such services are often “coproduced” through collaborative processes that bring together climate scientists, service providers, practitioners, policy-makers,

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and other experts. Thus, similar to the creation of useable climate information, climate services involve new, inclusive forms of knowledge production. A significant limitation to both useable climate information and climate services is that they tend to be only as effective as existing decision-making contexts allow them to be. That is, because they aim to fit existing decision-making contexts, interplay with current knowledge systems, and support solving problems within those contexts, both useable information and climate services struggle to address urgent problems that existing modes of decision-making are ill-suited to identify, address, and/or solve. Consequently, there is a risk that maladaptive structures could be reinforced. In light of this, a growing call to integrate processes of transformative change into decision-support efforts. As the next and final section details, pathways approaches are emerging as a prominent tactic for simultaneously informing and creating efforts to address the need for incremental adaptation and transformative change.

Pathways Approaches and Transformative Change In recent years, the growing recognition that climate change will continue to impact society for centuries and, therefore, adaptation will be a continuous, iterative process has given rise to “pathways approaches” to adaptation. That is, adaptation can no longer be thought as targeting just discrete climate change risks and hazards; rather, it must be conceptualized as an open-ended effort to respond and anticipate to a dynamic and increasingly unpredictable climate system. This is in large part due to the fact that current greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere have committed the planet to significant future warming and that the window for preventing dangerous levels of human interference in the climate system is rapidly closing. For instance, regardless of future mitigation policies, sea level rise will continue to unfold for centuries, if not longer, at a rate that remains uncertain. Thus, decisionmakers and stakeholders need to accommodate for a range of possible futures as well as expect surprises by creating alternative sequences of plans that flexibly allow for new trajectories as monitoring reveals changes in climatic, ecological, social, and physical conditions. While multiple pathways approaches exist, they share a few common features. First, by drawing upon core themes of vulnerability, barriers, politics, and success conditions as well as lessons from efforts to tailor and translate climate information for practical use, pathways approaches seek to highlight alternative trajectories, or “paths,” that achieve desired social and ecological outcomes. In creating an array of possible pathways, scientists, decision-makers, and stakeholders ideally consider the widest range of plausible futures and generate policy and development paths robust in multiple potential conditions. Second, pathways approaches highlight how short-term decisions can either broaden or narrow future options. Thus, flexibility tends to be valued within the creation of pathways so that adaptation actions do not foreclose future options or make it difficult to switch to new paths if conditions change. Third, the incorporation of monitoring and learning is crucial to the success of pathways approaches. In particular, pathways approaches tend to identify critical thresholds or tipping points in social, ecological, and climatic conditions that warrant a change in policy and development direction. That is as climate change unfolds, some trajectories become untenable while the viability of other paths increases. Thus, monitoring for important signs of changedcombined with flexibilitydallows for switching to new, more robust pathways. Moreover, social learning enables stakeholders and decision-makers to reassess plans in light of new and better understandings of the challenges climate change poses. In anticipating and responding to potential climate impacts, pathways approaches forefront the need for both incremental adaptations aimed at the proximate causes of vulnerability as well as transformative change that targets root causes. To integrate incremental and transformative change, pathways approaches utilize the concepts of “adaptive space” and “maladaptive space.” When the system being analyzed is considered to be operating within conditions that broadly are conducive to meeting social and ecological goalsdi.e., adaptive spacedthen incremental adaptations will generally be sufficient to achieving desirable outcomes; however, if a system begins to experience social, climatic, ecological, or physical shifts that erode its capacity to attain positive outcomes, then it is beginning to enter maladaptive space and transformative adaptation is necessary. Transformation in the context of climate change adaptation remains a contested term, but it can be thought about as an adaptation that results in something fundamentally different than previously existed. Thus, by pursuing both incremental and transformative adaptation, pathways approaches need to simultaneously work within and dramatically change existing decision-making contexts. Accomplishing this requires a diverse array of climate information and services. The types of useable climate information described earlier are adept at supporting incremental adaptations that work within current decision-making arrangements, but they are unlikely to support transformative change. Consequently, recent research has begun to examine the forms of climate information that can play a role in the pursuit of fundamental change. Such research remains promising, yet inchoate. For instance, adaptation scholars have begun applying participatory research methods that aim to elevate public concern in order to advance fundamental changes in social, political, and economic conditions in places such as the arid drylands of Kenya, urban coasts of Bangladesh, rural communities of Nepal, and remote indigenous communities of the Arctic. By opening up knowledge production and policy creation process, such research seeks to inform pathways approaches so as to make possible adaptation pathways commensurate with the scale of projected climate impacts. Consequently, scholarship on pathways increasingly forefronts the crucial and unavoidable political nature of adaptation to climate change. Such work crystallizes more than two decades of research that has documented the need to directly address the root causes of vulnerability through structural reforms aimed at alleviating poverty, empowering the marginalized, and redistributing resources in an equitable manner. With the increasing urgency associated with projected climate change impacts in the coming decades, the need for continuous creative, effective, and widespread adaptation is becoming clear. Thus, pathways approaches

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present a powerful framework that synthesizes the valuable insights gained through adaptation scholarship in order to support the implementation of effective, sustainable, and just planning and development trajectories. Crucial and significant questions regarding how pathways approaches can successfully create a sustainable and just future remain. Indeed, for both adaptation scholars and practitioners, translating the promise of pathways into concrete, meaningful action will continue to an important task for the foreseeable future.

See Also: Anthropocene; Climate Change; Environmental Hazards; Environmental Policy.

Further Reading Adger, W., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., 2009. Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Clim. Change 93, 335–354. Bassett, T.J., Fogelman, C., 2013. Déjà vu or something new? The adaptation concept in the climate change literature. Geoforum 48, 42–53. Eakin, H., Luers, A.L., 2006. Assessing the vulnerability of social-environmental systems. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 31 (1), 365–394. Eakin, H., Lemos, M., Nelson, D., 2014. Differentiating capacities as a means to sustainable climate change adaptation. Glob. Environ. Chang. 27, 1–8. Eriksen, S.H., Nightingale, A.J., Eakin, H., 2015. Reframing adaptation: the political nature of climate change adaptation. Glob. Environ. Chang. 35, 523–533. Haasnoot, M., Kwakkel, J.H., Walker, W.E., ter Maat, J., 2013. Dynamic adaptive policy pathways: a method for crafting robust decisions for a deeply uncertain world. Glob. Environ. Chang. 23 (2), 485–498. Inderberg, T.H., Eriksen, S., O’Brien, K., Sygna, L. (Eds.), 2015. Climate Change Adaptation and Development. Routledge, New York. Kirchhoff, C., Lemos, M.C., Dessai, S., 2013. Actionable knowledge for environmental decision making: broadening the usability of climate science. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 38 (1), 393–414. Leichenko, R., O’Brien, K., 2008. Environmental Change and Globalization: Double Exposures. Oxford University Press. Lemos, M.C., Boyd, E., Tompkins, E., Osbahr, H., Liverman, D., 2007. Developing adaptation and adapting development. Ecol. Soc. 12 (2). Moser, S., Pelling, M., 2013. Successful Adaptation to Climate Change: Linking Science and Policy in a Rapidly Changing World. Routledge, New York. O’Brien, K., 2012. Global Environmental Change II: from adaptation to deliberate transformation. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 36 (5), 667–676. O’Brien, K., Eriksen, S., Nygaard, L., Schjolden, A., 2007. Why different interpretations of vulnerability matter in climate change discourses. Clim. Policy 7 (1), 73–88. Pelling, M., 2010. Adaptation to Climate Change: From Resilience to Transformation. Routledge, New York. Wise, R.M., Fazey, I., Stafford Smith, M., Park, S.E., Eakin, H.C., Archer Van Garderen, E.R.M., Campbell, B., 2014. Reconceptualising adaptation to climate change as part of pathways of change and response. Glob. Environ. Chang. 28, 325–336.

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Climatology, Cultural Jennifer Salmond, School of Environment, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand Marc Tadaki, Cawthron Institute, Nelson, New Zealand © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The relationships between people and their atmospheric environment have been studied from many different perspectives. Social scientists such as anthropologists and human geographers have looked at patterns of human settlement, decision-making, and ritual and asked how these are shaped by and in turn shape the atmosphere. Natural scientists such as climatologists and applied meteorologists focus their efforts on quantifying the structures and processes of the atmosphere and identifying how these affectdor might effectdhuman interests. Recent proposals for the integrated study of climate and society need to be understood in relation to which traditions of scholarship they emerge from and how these traditions shape what is prioritized and excluded from climate– society research. Here, the history, context, and possible futures of “cultural climatology” are examined for their utility as a way of conceptualizing human–climate relationships.

Climate and Climatology Climate is the term we use to describe our general experience of weather. Most commonly, when we describe the climates of a region, we draw on a scientific description of the average state of the atmosphere. We “know” the climate of a region based on average statistics (usually 30 year mean values) of temperature and precipitation (and sometimes humidity or pressure) recorded under standard (or agreed) conditions at one or more sites considered representative of the region. We can also describe the general conditions of the weather processes that drive the average climates we experience, based on generalized representations of our understanding of the typical form of weather events. Climate can thus be understood as (1) a descriptor of atmospheric conditions in a place and (2) a set of simplified representations of atmospheric processes (ranging in scales from micro to global) that can impact on life, infrastructure, and landscapes. Climatologists apply the scientific method to the description, analysis, and prediction of atmospheric conditions and dynamics. The science of climatology treats the atmosphere as an object which can be reduced to a set of measurements, and classifies and orders atmospheric processes according to agreed criteria. Underpinning this scientific method is the assumption that the state of the atmosphere at any given point in time and space is governed by a knowable set of processes. There is an expectation that while the climate of a region can never be directly experienced or measured at any given single point in time and space; the weather that is observed will be bounded by, and oscillate around, the normal or average or expected condition of the atmosphere, vis a vis climate. Based on these foundational assumptions, the unpredictable, apparently chaotic characteristics of the atmosphere can be reduced to something that is more predictable, explainable and hopefully manageable than “weather,” which is how the atmosphere is directly experienced.

Climate and Experience However, to most people, climate is experienced as much more than statistics. Humanity cannot exist without an atmosphere, and the condition and patterns of atmospheric behavior provided the material context within which human life began and formed societies. Our abilities to live within, benefit from, and ascribe meaning to the atmosphere have formed a fundamental part of our existence throughout human history. Indeed, many ancient and traditional societies have origin stories and myths that describe atmospheric conditions and phenomena, even personalizing these in the form of deities and explaining phenomena as related to human actions. Depending on the nature of the weather experienced in a region (and human capacities to adapt to it), human activities and settlements have been, and are, affected by the condition of the atmosphere. At the same time, human activities have different capacities to modify atmospheric conditions and processes at distinct temporal and spatial scales. These relationships between climate and society are dynamic, changing across time and space, and governed by both human relationships and atmospheric processes. Humans have an inherent sense of climate based on experience, which goes beyond our scientific ability to interpret mean temperatures or precipitation. This understanding of climate continues to be reflected in the clothes we wear, the food we grow, our jobs, sports and hobbies, the types of houses and urban infrastructure we chose to support our lifestyles, the holidays we choose, and even our individual and collective health and emotional well-being. We share our experience of the atmosphere through stories, myths, images, and music; these cultural representations of the atmosphere both record and embed human meanings. While the availability of contemporary statistics and measurements make it easy to objectively describe climates, such measures do not convey the importance of the atmosphere to everyday life in the past, present, or the future. In its broadest sense, cultural climatology aims to bridge this gap between our scientific description and understanding of processes operating in the atmosphere and less easily quantified social and cultural meanings which we apply to it.

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History of Cultural Climatology In geography, the relationships between climate and human activities have historically been studied by applied climatologists. Through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, applied climatologists examined the relationships between climate and human enterprises such as industry, agriculture, and tourism. It was perceived as a way of linking climate and social variables for the benefit of society, with a focus on prediction, maximizing profits, technological development, and mitigation of climate-related risk and limitations. This led to formalizing the distinction between the two approaches of meteorological climatology and geographical climatology in the late 1990s. Cultural climatology could be interpreted as a proposal for the rebranding and refocussing of applied climatology that took place in the early 2000s. The term was first coined by geographical climatologists Thornes and McGregor in a chapter in the 2003 book Contemporary Meanings of Physical Geography edited by Trudgill and Roy (see further reading). They envisaged cultural climatology as the study of the processes of, and the interactions and feedbacks between, the physical and human components of the climate system at a variety of temporal and spatial scales relevant to human activities. This broad scope included the traditional focus on physical processes but would also explicitly include the study of societal responses to climate and climate information; however, unlike applied climatology, culture and climate were to be seen as intertwined and impossible to study without the context of the other. This duality between culture and climate appears driven at least in part by the rise in public concern and government investment in climate change. They observed that because future climates are unknown because of human intervention, and because any attempt or slow or mitigate change has societal implications, the conventional scientific description of current climates and climate processes as a collection of independent physical processes (with their roots in western notions of science) may not be effective in managing and mitigating climate change. Rather, it was hoped was that by integrating social dimensions in new ways would provide a new dialogue for mediating climate change and enable applied climatologists to move beyond the assumption that climate determined the social and economic capacities of humans and their societies. Thornes and McGregor went on to argue that if the science of climate change was to become institutionalized into policy then climatologists must embrace the social dimension of their work by becoming cultural climatologists and avoid leaving decisionmaking (specifically around management of climate change) to those with little or no understanding of atmospheric processes. It was hoped that cultural climatology would provide a distinctive intellectual place for geographer–climatologists within an increasingly competitive field of environmental and climate change scholarship.

Where Did Cultural Climatology Go? The term cultural climatology has since only appeared explicitly in a handful of peer-reviewed journal articles, and these were mainly from Thornes, his students, and colleagues. The term did not gain much traction in the literature or as a discrete subdiscipline within climatology. Perhaps this was in part because most examples of cultural climatological research in the literature offer a “museum view” of culture–weather relationships, in which cultural climatology is reduced to the study of cultural artifacts that depict weather. Such studies treated culture as something different to science, rather than something that enriched science. Although not explicitly related to the term, the ideas behind cultural climatology continued to evolve and develop independently within the geography–climatology–based literature. For example, Hulme, while not explicitly relating his work to cultural climatology, makes an effective contribution in this space. His work examines how managing and adapting to climate change really challenges the idea of treating nature (the atmosphere) as a separate entity to culture. Hulme examines how notions of a “global” climate are detached from human experience and intended to cleanse debate of human “values” by presenting a single and authoritative scientific account of climate change affect the ways in which we approach mitigation and adaption. Other scholarship (by nonclimate scientists) also effectively reworks traditional climate–society knowledge using more integrated approaches. This can be found more widely in human geography, sociology, anthropology, cultural and media studies, global environmental change, and adaption sciences. Such research shows the importance of both direct and indirect individual and collective experience of the atmosphere when constructing notions of climate and climate change. It also emphasizes the importance of understanding how societies construct their notions of climate based on the nature of the local weather patterns and the respective technological values and capacities that shape the communities’ responses to conditions. Societal responses to climate may have little to do with scientific education and more to do with societal experience and framing it can be very difficult to reach agreement on how to use the atmosphere as a resource, and protect it from unintended consequences of global development without understanding climate–society relationships from this perspective. Although such work falls within the broad definition of cultural climatology, potentially legitimizing the inclusion of this work here, it has not aligned with the subject explicitly perhaps because the authors were not aware of the idea. Thus, although Hulme and other scholars arguably enact the spirit of cultural climatology, the potential for cultural climatology specifically to inspire a different kind of biophysical climatology remains largely unrealized.

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Future Directions for Cultural Climatology? The idea of a cultural climatology provokes climatologists to think a bit harder about the importance of science’s social relations in their work. But to date, cultural climatology as expressed within the narrow confines of early definitions has had a limited impact on our understanding or ability to action our knowledge of climate–society relations. Geographers who are well placed to do this work based on long history of working at the interface of nature–culture divide have yet to exploit this ground fully, and few climatologists would claim to recognize themselves or their work as that of cultural climatologists. Critical physical geography approaches focussed on unpacking the social dimensions of biophysical science may present opportunities to further explore this area in the future. Arguably, there has have never been such a pressing need to reimagine the relationships between science and society. Society both responds to and influences the atmosphere. The extent to which human activity can and has changed the characteristics and behavior of the atmosphere has never been seen before and has the potential to magnify the limitations associated with old ways of organizing and dividing knowledge into nature and culture categories. Climate information is processed based on cultural agreement on scientific method and then interpreted and acted upon based on individual and collective circumstance, experience, and narratives. Progress in illuminating this process and explicitly acknowledging the power and influence of social dimensions is currently hindered by the difficulties of narrowing both climate and culture as concepts down to a few words on a page. Perhaps new pathways for cultural climatology include neither expecting climatologists to learn about culture nor policy and decision makers or social scientists to learn about the atmosphere. Rather the two communities need to embrace each other with new forms of communication and understanding which span the nature–culture divide. Climate as an object could be replaced by definitions of climate as a way of understanding human relations with the atmosphere. Physical dimensions of the atmosphere can also be interpreted by cultural meanings, and this process of interpretation could feature centrally within a revitalized cultural climatology agenda. Making visible the invisible processes of description, categorization and adding value could be an important part of this vision. The time where value lay in being able to describe climates for agricultural or development or tourism purposes has passed; a richer conception of society and the public interest is needed if climatology is to reducedrather than exacerbatedeconomic and environmental injustice. There is an urgent and continuing need to study the past, present, and future impact of both the atmosphere on human life and human activities on the atmosphere. Within this endeavor, there is a need for a form of cultural climatology which moves away from single universal global way of viewing climate and allows for and legitimizes the nuances of climates as understood in the context of people, place, and history. This will challenge the notion of ideal state as single stabilized globalized atmosphere and require a radical rethinking of the ways in which we define, understand, and imagine our relationships with the average condition of the atmosphere. If we take a view moving forward that cultural climatology acknowledges that climate has both cultural and physical components, but that neither can be understood without the context of the other, what new possibilities open up for managing the atmosphere as a resource and mitigating our impact on it?

See Also: Critical Physical Geography; Nature–Culture; Physical Geography, Human Geography, and Geographies in the Anthropocene.

Further Reading Castree, N., 2015. Geography and global change science: relationships necessary, absent and possible. Geogr. Res. 53 (1), 1–15. Hulme, M., 2008. Geographical work at the boundaries of climate change. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 33, 5–11. Randalls, S., 2017. Contributions and perspectives from geography to the study of climate. WIREs Climate Change 8, 466. Tadaki, M., Salmond, J., Le Heron, R., 2014. Applied climatology: doing the relational work of climate. Prog. Phys. Geogr. 38, 392–413. Thornes, J., 2008. Cultural climatology and the representation of sky, atmosphere, weather and climate in the selected art works of Constable, Monet and Eliasson. Geoforum 39, 570–580. Thornes, J., McGregor, G., 2003. Cultural climatology. In: Trudgill, S., Roy, A. (Eds.), Contemporary Meanings in Physical Geography: From what to Why? Arnold, London, pp. 173–197.

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Coastal and Marine Management and Planning David M Lawrence, Virginia State University and Virginia Union University, Richmond, VA, United States © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 8, pp. 12–20, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Bathymetry The measurement of water depths and analysis of the undersea features those data reveal. Contour Map A map that illustrates topography (or bathymetry) with the aid of lines that connect points of equal elevation (or depth). Fathom A measure of the depth of water equivalent to 6 feet. Fathometer An instrument that measures the depth of water by sound. Panoramic Map A map that illustrates topography as viewed from above. Physiography The study of the structure of the Earth’s surface. Sonar A technology used to detect ships or underwater obstacles through the use of sound waves that echo off the target. Sounding Measurement of the depth of a body of water.

The oceans are arguably the most challenging mapping environment on Earth, maybe even the Solar System. The land can be surveyed by teams on the surface, or mapped using imagery obtained from higher elevations, or via aerial- or satellite-based platforms. The surface of many planets, planetoids, and moons can be observed via Earth-based telescopes, spacecraft, or satellites. The oceans, until recently, were quite another matter. The first challenge to mapping the oceans is their size. Seventy percent of the Earth’s surface is covered by the oceans. The second is the depth. The average depth of the oceans is 3.8 kmdthe maximum depth is more than 10.9 km. Except in the shallowest areas, the bottoms of the oceans are impossible to observe directly without specialized equipment. Humans cannot breathe underwater, and must either transport the oxygen they need for survival in self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA), or else bring a breathable atmosphere with them in underwater vehicles such as submarines or submersibles. Shallow areas of the oceans can be mapped with scuba divers using more-or-less traditional surveying techniques, albeit with equipment capable of surviving the harsh marine environment. Marine archaeologists do this fairly routinely when mapping shallow-water wrecks. But over most of the oceans, anyone attempting to map the depths using scuba gear runs into another significant problemdpressure. Water, unlike air, is not a compressible fluid; thus, pressure changes rapidly with depthdabout 1 atm for every 10 m of depth. Thus, the pressure of the deepest areas of the oceans adds up to more than 1000 atm. Aside from wreaking havoc on human physiology, water pressure can be devastating to surveying and sampling equipment. In traditional mapping, humans survey what they can seedthis is impossible in most of the ocean basins, as sunlight penetrates only 100 or 200 m beneath the surface (sometimes less, depending on the clarity of the water). Some wavelengths, such as reds and yellows, are absorbed quickly, affecting the visible colors within the photic (sunlit) zone. Even when artificial illumination is available, only a limited area is visible.

Obtaining Data Despite all the challenges, the oceans needed to be mapped. As maritime commerce developed in ancient times, mariners quickly found the need to record the locations of reefs, sandbars, currents, and other navigational hazards. Mariners needed to ensure that the water was deeper than the draft of their ships. They needed to know the characteristics of the bottom, such as whether it was muddy, sandy, or rocky. So how were the early maps of the ocean made? By feel. Early soundings were obtained using poles or weights suspended from a rope. Stick the pole in the water, drop the weighted line; when the bottom is felt, or when the line halts its descent, measure the length of the pole or rope pulled outdthat is the depth. This technology was not improved upon for thousands of years, and may still be in use today. The first evidence of such methods dates to about 3500 years ago to Egyptian bas-reliefs and paintings depicting the use of both sounding poles and weighted lines.

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The first written account of using a weighted line to determine water depth dates to about 2500 years ago to a description of sounding the Mediterranean near the mouth of the Nile by the Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus noted that the bottom consisted of a yellowish mud similar to that deposited by the Nile along its banks. One of the deepest soundings obtained from the Mediterranean during that time period was described by the Greek geographer Strabod1000 fathoms in the vicinity of Sardinia. That record sounding, obtained by Posidonius about 100 BCE, was not equaled for nearly 2000 years. Sounding is referred to at some length in the New Testament book Acts of the Apostlesdin the passage that describes the shipwreck of St. Paul on the island of Malta. The ship was caught in a storm, and one night, as the sailors suspected the ship was near land, took soundings that confirmed the approaching shore. They anchored in 15 fathoms of water and survived the night, but grounded the ship on a shoal the next day. As can be imagined, the depths that could be measured with a sounding pole were quite limited. Ideally, such poles should not be any longer than the hull itself. They should not be heavier that what could be readily handled at sea by a man. Weighted ropes could be used to measure much greater depths, but they were not without challenges of their own. For one, it could be difficult to know whether or not the bottom was reached. Usually, mariners relied on some indication that the line has stopped or slowed its descent. The downward momentum created by the weight of the deployed line itself could pull more line overboard with little noticeable decrease in velocity. To prove that the bottom had been reached, John Mercer Brooke, a midshipman working for Commander Matthew Fontaine Maury at the US Navy’s Depot of Charts and Instruments, devised a system consisting of a sampling tube that passed through the center of a weightdusually a cannonball with a hole drilled through it. Upon contact with the bottom, a mechanism would release the weight; meanwhile, the sampling tube would be driven into the sediment. Thus, as the sounding line was retrieved, some of the benthic material could be brought up for examination. Brooke’s device was first tested on 7 July 1853, on a cruise of the USS Dolphin, commanded by Lieutenant Otway H. Berryman, in the North Atlantic. A midshipman, J.G. Mitchell, deployed the device from a small boat at 1:20 p.m. It took him 6 h to retrieve the devicedfrom 2000 fathoms of water. The bottom had clearly been reached, the sampling tube containing sediments full of diatoms and foraminifera. Sometimes the bottom was never reached. This could happen for a variety of reasons: maybe the weight attached to the line was insufficient to pull it to the bottom; maybe it was too much, causing the line to snap. On other occasions, the weight of the line alone proved too much, resulting in a break. Regardless of the problem, the line would pay outddrifting with subsurface currentsdgiving the impression of a bottomless abyss. Even if a sounding effort went as planned, the ropes typically absorbed water, thus gaining more weight. This phenomenon, in the days before a steam winch was developed, meant more backbreaking work for the sailors cranking whatever device was being used to retrieve the line. Even after steam-driven winches were developed, the weight of sounding lines posed a problem. A logical next step was to use lines made of material that would not absorb waterdnamely lines or cables made of metal. The first recorded attempts to use wire for sounding the sea was on the United States Exploring Expedition (1838–42) led by Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. He chose copper wire, which did not work too well, and he reverted to using rope. The US Navy, under the direction of Maury, experimented with piano wire on the USS Taney expedition, commanded by Lieutenant Joseph C. Walsh, to the North Atlantic in 1849–50. In order to get sufficient length, segments of wire were spliced together. The sounding wires repeatedly parted at the junctions. The use of wire or cable was eventually perfecteddseveral decades later. Soundings in the deep sea took a long time when muscle power was required to raise the sounding lines. Nevertheless, even with steam- or diesel-powered winches available, raising the sounding lines took a long time. For example, HMS Challenger was equipped with a steam-powered winch on its famous voyage circumnavigating the world, but sounding and other deepwater sampling took hours. From December 1872 through May 1876, the Challenger took little more than 350 soundings. A more rapid way of obtaining depth data was needed. The answer was something known of at least as far back as Aristotle: sound. (Actually, humans have probably known that sound could be heard in water since the time they have been swimming, but Aristotle is the first to record that fact.) In more modern times, Leonardo da Vinci wrote of his successful attempts to listen to distant ships via a tube immersed in water. The use of sound waves in water to determine distance and depth was proposed in 1807 by Dominique François Jean Arago, a physicist and future prime minister of France. Arago, a polymath, had many other interestsdsuch as helping to develop the wave theory of lightdand thus failed to follow up on his proposal. A number of researchers determined the speed of sound in various aquatic settings; others, such as Maury, proposed specific techniques to measure depth of water using sound, but inadequate listening devices rendered the proposals fruitless. A number of inventors began working on electronic devices that measured depth of or distance in water by sending and receiving echoes at the beginning of the 20th Century. The effort was given even greater impetus after the sinking of the “unsinkable” RMS Titanic following its collision with an iceberg on the night of April 14 and 15, 1912. Reginald Fessenden, a Canadian inventor working for Submarine Signal Company, had been developing an oscillator that sent a clear, penetrating sound through water for the company, which had been seeking an underwater warning system to help ships avoid collisions or running aground. They implemented an effective belltype device on board a number of lightships, but eventually they wanted something with greater capacity to send and receive messages underwater. The bells were less than ideal. Fessenden’s oscillator, however, was promising. Fessenden and Submarine Signaldmotivated by the Titanic disaster as well as a collision of the liners Republic and Florida off Nantucket in 1909drefocused their efforts, seeking a way to detect obstacles, such as icebergs, as well as measure the depth of the bottom. Fessenden further improved his oscillator that sent out a clear “ping” sound as well as a receiver that could detect the echo of the sound as it bounced off another object.

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On 27 April 1914, a seasick Fessenden and a seasick crew on board the US Coast Guard cutter Miami finally caught enough of a break in the dreary, unsettled North Atlantic weather to test the efficacy of the device in detecting icebergs. A terse telegram sent to Boston announced the results: “Bottom one mile. Berg two miles.” Submarine Signal focused on marketing Fessenden’s device as a means of underwater communications. Little thought of using it to measure depth on a routine basis occurred until 1922, when Submarine Signal asked engineers R.L. Williams and Herbert Grove Dorsey to work on improving it for depth measurement. Fessenden’s oscillator required an operator to listen for echoes using headphones. Their contribution was in developing an apparatus that could detect echoes automatically. All the operator had to do was to read the depth on a lighted scale. Dorsey named the instrument the fathometer. Similar devices were called echo sounders. Early versions of the fathometer were not capable of accurate depth measurement in very shallow waters, or while a ship was underway. While Williams and Dorsey continued Fessenden’s efforts to improve the Submarine Signal device, others worked to develop similar instruments. Paul Langevin, a French physicist, and Constantin Chilowski, an expatriate Russian electrical engineer living in Switzerland, collaborated on an instrument that used supersonic frequencies. Their echo sounder was the first to be used in a practical applicationda survey of a route for an undersea cable crossing the Mediterranean from Marseilles to Philippeville, Algeria, in 1922. The British, under Robert Boyle, developed their own systemdprimarily for use in antisubmarine warfare. Back in the United States, Harvey C. Hayes of the Naval Research Laboratory developed what he called a “sonic depth finder” that could rapidly and accurately measure depth, even while a ship was steaming rapidly across the open ocean. Hayes tested his device, first on the battleship USS Ohio on a short run between Annapolis, Maryland, and New York City in February 1922. Hayes’ sonic depth finder was then transferred to the destroyer USS Stewart prior to its departure to the Philippines via Gibraltar and the Suez Canal the following June. The Stewart, departing from Providence, Rhode Island, acquired more than 900 soundings in the 9 days it took to reach Gibraltar. The achievement, in comparison with the 350 soundings made by the HMS Challenger in the 3 years it took to circumnavigate the world, was set to revolutionize oceanographic mapping. By 1924, it was already revealing errors in depth measurements made by traditional weighted-line methods. Despite the profusion of work in echo sounding the depths in the years after 1914, Fessenden was not forgotten. He was awarded the Scientific American’s Gold Medal in 1929 for his invention of the fathometer. Fathometers were limited to measuring the depth of the ocean at a single point at a given time; thus, a ship could only record a single line of data as it traversed the oceans. An ideal next step would be to record data from several linesdbeamsdat once. Developments along those lines began with a failed attempt by General Instrument Corporation to develop an instrument for radar-based mapping using the Mills Cross technique. Named for a radio telescope in New South Wales, Australia, the Mills Cross technique uses a perpendicular array of instruments to collect data from a wide swath of spacedin both the astronomical and geographical senses. For a radio telescope, the perpendicular arrangement of sensors allows precise determination of the location of a radio source. The General Instrument engineers hoped to adapt the technique to radar-based mapping, by designing a system where an array of radar emitters was perpendicular to an array of radar receivers, allowing for multiple-steered beams that could precisely determine distances to multiple points simultaneously with each ping. While the effort to obtain the radar-mapping contract failed, they contacted three engineers, Harold Farr, Paul Frelich, and Richard Curtis, in a sister division–the Harris Anti-Submarine Warfare Divisiondto see if the sonar group could benefit from the idea. If it worked, it would allow high-resolution images, analogous to contour maps, of the ocean floor. The idea worked. By 1963, the three had developed and installed a multibeam sonar system on the USNS Compass Island. By 1968, they had begun development of a commercial system called Sea Beam. The first operational Sea Beam system was installed on the French research vessel Jean Charcot and used on the Vema II cruise in 1977. Instead of just a single line, ships equipped with multibeam sonar can map thousands of square kilometers of ocean floor in a single cruise. Even with multibeam sonar systems, the extent of the ocean floor mapped was limited to regions traversed by survey vessels. Another method was needed to map areas that had not been visited by ships. Just such a method arose from the study of the topography of the ocean surface. Sea level is not leveldeven when the effects of wind and waves are taken into account. The sea surface is analogous to a rolling landscape consisting of hills and valleys deviating as much as 100 m from average sea level. The height anomalies are caused by the gravitational effects of the features of the ocean bottom. Geophysicists had long recognized this, and beginning in the 19th Century had sought ways to measure the strength of the force of gravity at the ocean surface. At the time, gravity was measured with a variety of devices, such as a type of gravity barometer, but most methods were not of sufficient precision to use in geophysical research. Pendulum devices were best for measuring gravity, but ship motions on the surface rendered most such devices useless at sea. Felix Andries Vening Meinesz devised a multiple pendulum device effective in measuring gravity in the soft, shifting soils of his native Netherlands, and adapted it for use at sea in the 1920s. He still needed a stable platform for taking the measurements at sea, and found what he needed in submarines. Vening Meinesz, a big man, squeezed himself into the small submarines of his day and, over a span of 15 years, from 1924 to 1939, traveled more than 125 000 miles and took more than 800 gravity observations at seadnearly doubling the total at the time. After World War II, several thousand more gravity observations were made on submarine cruises until the mid-1950s when Anton Graf and Lucien LaCoste independently developed spring gravimeters accurate and stable enough to be used on surface ships. The relationship between gravity and sea-surface height is not what it may seem at first glance. Gravity is an attractive force which, according to Isaac Newton, is largely a function of the masses of the objects involved and the distance between them.

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(Gravity is better explained by the general theory of relativity than by Newton’s “laws” of gravity, but the “laws” are still useful approximations in most cases.) Thus, it would seem that a massive object that rises from the ocean bottom to near the surface would create a depression in the ocean surface; conversely, a depression in the ocean bottom, such as a deep-sea trench, would create a rise in the ocean surface. A seamount does pull water toward its slopes, but because the force of gravity acts perpendicular to the surfaces involved, the overall effect is to squeeze water toward the surface above the summit, creating a bulge instead of a dip. Conversely, the gravitational attraction along the walls of a depression in the sea floor pulls water away from the surface, creating a depression on the surface. The work of Vening Meinesz and others established the relationship between gravity anomalies and irregularities in the elevation of sea level. Surface-based measurements, however, were limited in their coverage of the world’s oceans. What was needed was a method of measuring gravity anomalies on a global scale. The space race between the United States and the Soviet Union triggered the development of just such a method. The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration began developing a series of Earth-observing satellites in the 1960s and 1970s. Skylab, launched in 1972, was fitted with an early radar altimeter to measure the height of the ocean surface. A satellite, Geodetic and Earth Observing Satellite 3 (GEOS-3; 1975–78), was equipped with a better altimeter. SEASAT (1978) was specifically designed for observing the Earth’s oceans. Fitted with a radar altimeter that could measure the height of the ocean to within five centimeters, SEASAT held great promise, but its batteries failed within 3 months. Still, it logged more than 100 million km of tracks across the Earth’s surface, far more than most ships could cover in a century. Newer satellites have since been launched to continue the work of GEOS-3 and SEASAT. William Maurice Ewing, a young geophysics professor at Lehigh University (and future founder of Lamont Geological Observatory, now Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory), further revolutionized oceanographic mapping by applying seismic techniques that he had learned in the oilfields of Texas to studies of the geology of the ocean floor.

Making Maps Because of the dearth of depth measurements, much less accurate depth measurements, the first attempts to map ocean basins were doomed to be suspect. Matthew Fontaine Maury made the first serious attempt to map an ocean basin in 1854, producing the Bathymetrical Map of the North Atlantic Basin with Contour Lines Drawn in at 1000, 2000, and 4000 Fathoms. The map, made with only about 200 soundings, proved that the ocean floor was far from a flat, featureless plain it was once thought to be, but it could not reveal the features that were there in much detail. The most prominent feature he called the Dolphin Risedan apparently broad plateau in the middle of the North Atlantic. The plateau is actually not so broad. It is a relatively narrow, often rugged mountain range now known as the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. The Challenger expedition generated so much data that original reports based on its results were published for decades after the ship returned to England in 1876. Sir John Murray, who began as a young naturalist on the expedition and who took over as editor of the expedition’s reports following the death of chief scientist Charles Wyville Thomson in 1882, made a fortune from mining phosphate-rich guano deposits he discovered afterward on Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean. Much of the money he spent on scientific researchdsuch as underwriting the publication of later volumes of the Challenger report, but some of it was spent on other endeavors, such as mapping the ocean basins using new data coming in every year. His maps show a progressive improvement in resolution, such that the Mid-Atlantic Ridge looks like a ridge in his North Atlantic map of 1911. Some of the best early maps of individual basins were prepared by Alexander Agassiz, son of naturalist Louis Agassiz, from data collected on three cruises of the US Coast and Geodetic Survey steamer Blake in the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and the Western Atlantic between 1877 and 1880. Agassiz’s maps, each based on hundreds of soundings, stand up fairly well today, even though they were published in 1888. The next great advance in oceanographic mapping came with the advent of echo sounders. One of the premier expeditions in the early part of the 20th Century was that of the German research vessel Meteor from 1925 to 1927. The Meteor zigzagged across the Atlanticdprimarily the South Atlanticdtaking paired echo soundings at about 30,000 stations and following up with several hundred wire soundings for further verification. Scientists on board Meteor also measured physical characteristics of the water such as temperature at depth. The ocean basin maps based on that data were a vast improvement over earlier work, including Murray’s, in the Atlantic. For example, both sounding and temperature at depth data were used to prepare one map of the Atlantic Basin showing the Mid-Atlantic Ridge snaking through the oceans roughly mid-way between North America, Europe, and Africa. There is a hint of an extension into the Indian Ocean. From Maury through the Meteor, maps of ocean basins had typically been drafted as contour maps. The vast amounts of data available made much better maps possible. But when oceanographer Bruce Charles Heezen and his geologist/cartographer partner Marie Tharp of what is now Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory embarked upon an effort to map the world’s ocean floors in 1952, however, they faced a major problem. The US Navy, because of Cold War security concerns, forbade the use of their data in the preparation of a detailed bathymetric contour map. Heezen and Tharp were only briefly stumped. Rather than quit, they decided to see if they could get away with making physiographic mapsdillustrating what the ocean basins would look like if all the water had been draineddin the style of cartographer Armin Karl Lobek. While making transatlantic profiles working with the Stewart’s soundings, Tharp discovered a notch in the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, a rift valley, which meant the Earth’s crust was splitting along those cracks. The discovery, along with ensuing

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research tracing the location of the rift with a combined use of sounding data and earthquake epicenter locations, showed the midocean ridge systems extended for tens of thousands of kilometers around the surface of the Earth. Heezen and Tharp began working on a series of ocean basin maps, beginning with that of the North Atlantic in 1957. They completed work on the South Atlantic in 1961. The pair originally planned to map the Mediterranean next, but the oncoming International Indian Ocean Expedition prompted them to map that basin next. All this time, Tharp, who plotted thousands and thousands of measurements by hand, and Heezen, filled in areas in between sounding tracks by educated surmises as to what lay between. This methoddthe best anyone could do with the limited data of the timedcaused problems in the Indian Ocean, however. No one had yet envisioned triple junctionsdwhere three tectonic plates come togetherdso their map omits the triple junction now known to be there. The Indian Ocean map did get the attention of the editors of National Geographic Magazine, however. Those editors teamed Heezen and Tharp with Heinrich Caesar Berann, an Austrian artist who pioneered the modern panoramic map, for a series of full-color maps of the ocean basins. The team worked well together. After completing the series for National Geographic, they began preparing a world ocean floor map. That work, underwritten by the Office of Naval Research, was published in 1977. Both a map and a work of art, it remains an iconic presence in earth science departments three decades later (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 World Ocean Floor Panorama, Bruce C. Heezen and Marie Tharp, 1977. Reproduced by permission of Marie Tharp Maps, L Street, Sparkill, New York 10976. Copyright by Marie Tharp 1977/2003.

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Heezen, unfortunately, never saw the finished project. Shortly after approving the proofs and sending the map to the printer, he died of a heart attack while preparing for a dive on the Reykjanes Ridge aboard the US Navy’s research submarine NR-1 on 21 June 1977. A problem that plagued Heezen, Tharp, and other mappers of the ocean floor, was the uneven availability of sounding data. The Space Age, however, offered a solution in the form of eyes in the sky. William F. Haxby, a graduate student at Cornell University, was asked by his advisor, Donald L. Turcotte, to take a look at some GEOS-3 radar altimetry data that Turcotte was given while attending a NASA meeting in 1976. Haxby could do little with that, but the 3 months of SEASAT data was another matter. Haxby, intending to produce a map of gravitational anomalies, realized, as Felix Andries Vening Meinesz had, that the anomalies also revealed ocean-floor topography. By 1982, he had produced a map of the world’s ocean floor using satellite data alone. The map, “Gravity Field of World’s Ocean (Color Map)” was published by the US National Geophysical Data Center in 1985. Even with the global reach of satellites, techniques such as Haxby’s suffered from errors as well as insufficient resolution when applied to smaller areas or in areas of complex terrain. Walter H.F. Smith of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and David T. Sandwell of Scripps Institution of Oceanography combined radar altimetry data with traditional sounding data where available. The result was a higher resolution, more accurate map of the world’s ocean basins, published in 1997.

Accomplishments and Future Prospects The efforts to map the world’s ocean floors have revealed many secrets of the deep. Among the most important discoveries was the finding that the ocean floors were as topographically complex as any landscape above the ocean surface. The mapping effort revealed the composition and structure of tectonic plates as well as evidence for many of the processes involved in tectonic activity. The work has revealed many secrets of the Earth’s past, and has led to the opening of vast areas of the Earth’s surface to mineral exploitation. As with all things, no single oceanographic mapping technique is adequate in all occasions. Modern hydrographers use every method at their disposal to get the quality data they need for their research. The focus is on mapping individual ocean basin and smaller regions in greater detail, although world ocean floor maps will continue to be improved as more data come in.

See Also: Art and Cartography; Cold War; Exploration; Geodesy; Mapping, Topographic; Maps; Natural Resources; Oceans; Surveying.

Further Reading Adams, K.T., 1942. Hydrographic Manual. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Agassiz, A., 1888. Three Cruises of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Steamer ‘‘Blake’’ in the Gulf of Mexico, in the Caribbean Sea, and along the Atlantic Coast of the United States, from 1877 to 1880, vol. 1. Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston, MA. Amato, I., 1998. Pushing the Horizon: Seventy-Five Years of High Stakes Science and Technology at the Naval Research Laboratory. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC. Blake, R.F., 1914. Submarine signaling: the protection of shipping by a wall of sound and other uses of the submarine telegraph oscillator. Trans. Am. Inst. Electr. Eng. 33 (2), 1549–1561. Bruins, G.J., Scholte, J.G.J., 1967. Felix Andries Vening Meinesz. 1887–1966. Biogr. Mem. Fellows R. Soc. 13, 294–308. L-3 Communications SeaBeam Instruments, 2000. Multibeam Sonar: Theory of Operation. L-3 Communications SeaBeam Instruments, Washington, DC. Dall, W.H., 1883. First use of wire in deep-sea sounding. Science 1, 65. Dorsey, H.G., 1933. Echoes give ocean depths. Sci. Mon. 36, 65–68. Hall, S.S., 1992. Mapping the Next Millennium: How Computer-Driven Cartography Is Revolutionizing the Face of Science. Vintage, New York. Hall, S.S., 2006. The Contrary Map Maker: Marie Tharp b. 1920. N. Y. Times Mag. (December 31), 45. Hayes, H.C., 1924. The sonic depth finder. Proc. Am. Philos. Soc. 63, 134–151. Lawrence, D.M., 1999. Mountains under the sea: Marie Tharp’s maps of the ocean floor shed light on the theory of continental drift. Mercator’s World 4 (6), 36–43. Lawrence, D.M., 2002. Upheaval from the Abyss. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ. Nelson, V.J., 2006. Marie Tharp, 86: Pioneering maps altered views on seafloor geology. Los Angel. Times (September 4), B-15. Raisz, E., 1931. The physiographic method of representing scenery on maps. Geogr. Rev. 21, 297–304. Smith, W.H.F., Sandwell, D.T., 1997. Global sea floor topography from satellite altimetry and ship depth soundings. Science 277, 1956–1962. Spiess, F., 1985. In: Emery, W.J. (Ed.), The Meteor Expedition: Scientific Results of the German Atlantic Expedition, 1925–1927. Amerind Publishing Company, New Delhi. The New York Times, April 16, 1912. Many Great Liners Paid Toll of the Sea. The New York Times. Theberge, A.E., 1999. Sounding pole to sea beam. Surveying and Cartography 5, 334–346. Wilford, J.N., 2000. The Mapmakers, second ed. Alfred A Knopf, New York.

Code/Space James Cheshire, Department of Geography, University College London, London, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Capta: Units that have been selected and harvested from the sum of all potential data. Data is everything that it is possible to know about that person, whereas capta is what is selectively captured through measurement. Captabases store a collection of capta, typically as tables, to be queried (in the same way as databases). A capta shadow is the assemblage of all capta held across various captabases that refers to a specific person or object. Codejet: Material objects dependent upon software to function as required. Code space A space that is dependent on software to be transduced as intended. In such spaces code and space are produced through one another. Pervasive computing A mode of computation that consists of the wholesale embedding of software into everyday objects and infrastructures rendering them interactive and smart to varying degrees. Sousveillance The self-monitoring of one’s personal life through surveillance technologies. Wearable computing Accessories we wear, such as watches, that can perform computational functions and collect data about ourselves.

Code space is a term coined in the early 2000s by Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin through a series of papers that include “Code, Space and Everyday Life,” “Flying through Code/Space: The Real Virtuality of Air Travel,” and “Code and the Transduction of Space.” These papers culminated in the publication of the Code/Space book in 2011 (with the paperback edition published in 2014). Central to these works is the idea that: coded spaces occur when software (code) and the spatiality of everyday life are produced through one another. Spatiality is the product of code and the code exists primarily to produce a particular spatiality. For example, if the payment systems in supermarkets stop working, then the store no longer functions and customers abandon their shopping. What is more, a failure of a major credit or debit card provider’s systems will render all transactional spaces useless unless customers have sufficient cash for payment, thus highlighting another key element of code spaces, which is that can and does occur in a distributed way across a range of architectures. For this reason, they can be grounded in one location but accessible from anywhere across the network and linked together in turn to form complex webs of interactions and transactions. This attachment to one spatiality alongside distributed access causes coded spaces to be simultaneously local and global in nature. Code/space is thus territorialized (as in the case of the supermarket) and deterritorialized (as in the case of the global payment systems). This territorialization can lead to a complexity much greater than the sum of its parts. How code/space emerges is therefore neither deterministic nor universal, but contingent, relational and dependent on context. The result is that coded spaces are never manufactured and experienced in the same way. That said, they also do not arise from nowheredthe code is the product of the conventions, standards, and representations that reflect historical circumstances such as the economic and social climate at the time. What’s more, not all interactions with software transduce code spaces. The presence of software can facilitate the transduction of spatiality, but it is not essential: the relationship between code and space are not equal. Such examples are referred to as coded spaces. For example, failure of a lecturer’s laptop may prevent them from projecting their slides, but they can continue their lecture and might even be more effective as a result! Put simply, code space is dependent on the interaction between code and space, whereas coded spaces are less mutually dependent. The former merely augments the latter. Cities have become the cradle of code(d) spaces. Smart Cities are built on code, which companies such as IBM seek to deploy to optimize the use of the interconnected information generated through urban technologies in order to make the most of limited resources. Authorities have embraced this technology while also needing to manage unintended impacts from the likes of appbased taxi and delivery services such as Uber and Lyft filling roads with their cars, vans, and (motor)cycles. The drivers employed by these apps are dependent on code for identifying and collecting clients, navigating them to their destinations, calculating the fare, and processing payment. They could perform some of these functions if the app were to fail temporarily, but would be significantly affected if there were a prolonged failure. Their vehicles have become codejetsdobjects dependent on code. These technologies are particularly disruptive in cities with established, formalized, methods of transport. For example, drivers of London’s famous Black Cabs are required to pass “The Knowledge”: a complex test to demonstrate intricate knowledge of the city streets. The Knowledge has become largely redundant in an era of sophisticated satellite navigation systems capable of receiving live traffic updates. London’s black cab drivers resisted technology for many years, extolling the value of a tacit knowledge of the city accumulated through experience over far less qualified competitors who will be lost if their app fails. Their resistance has had

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limited success since in 2017 Uber said they had 40,000 drivers in London, which if true is more than enough to fundamentally change congestion patterns and driving behaviors in the city. This is a change driven by code. Travelers are increasingly dependent on transport planning apps such as Citymapper and Google Maps. People’s choice of routedparticularly during times of service disruptiondis informed by such technology. In some cases it can be used to mediate impacts by spreading travelers more evenly across the transportation network through offering a range of alternative routes if, for example, a key line in a metro system is out of action. But in others they can cause new bottlenecks elsewhere in the network if the same routing advice is given to all. This dependence on code is without even considering the need for it to run synchronized traffic signals, drive trains, and monitor buses. Such functions are now managed by “urban operating systems” that can dictate how space is used and transduced. For example, it will be possible (if it isn’t already) to monitor and manipulate not only large-scale events like traffic flows and parking availability in many cities but also the lighting of individual rooms to manage energy consumption. These operations are essential if growing cities are to thrive, since it is much easier (and cheaper) to use code to use existing physical infrastructures more effectively than bore the new tunnels and lay the new tracks required to create more capacity. There are also many other positive arguments for smart citiesdand more intensive use of the data they generatedbut they require a new form of planning that sees data privacy in equal terms to the rest of the process. This process has been played out in Toronto where data privacy has become the biggest challenge Google Sidewalk Labs’ plans for a smart city development. The project offers real innovations in design and environmental impact but has seen resignations from senior advisors over concerns for the privacy of inhabitants as their offline and online worlds could be connected and analyzed. In 2019 these issues became almost farcical for the company when Apple erected a large advertisement above the Sidewalk Labs office with the slogan “We’re in the business of staying out of yours. Privacy. That’s iPhone”. Core to this issue is the extent to which captadthe samples of data collected about our livesdbecome concentrated in particular organizations and then used to create profitable products or alter behaviors without clear lines of consent.

Code Spaces Dodge and Kitchin’s publications on code space utilize vignettes to illustrate the pervasiveness of code in their commutes, at work and at home. Since their publication, mobile phones in particular have created workdand learningdspaces everywhere. Late night or early morning emails tagged with “Sent from an [insert phone here]” are probably written from the sender’s bed or at the dinner/ breakfast table. Such behaviors are actively encouraged by software companies eager to sell their flexible working products. For example, in 2013 Microsoft faced backlash after it ran a marketing campaign promoting their ability to keep workers connected to the office wherever they are, with phrases such as “Whether in an office park or a National Park, you can still participate in meetings.” A phone or tablet with an Internet connection is therefore all it takes to create a sophisticated code(d) space. It is also clear that for almost everyone in the Global North, and increasingly those in the Global South, there is no choice but to engage with code(d) spaces and be the subjects of surveillance as a result. Many cities now operate cashless transport systems, for example, so travelers are required to share their credit/debit card information in order to make payment. If card systems fail there are no alternative forms of payment. Those who try not to engage are viewed with suspicion or are considered old fashioned and often they pay a price: on the London transport system purchasing a paper ticket (that cannot be traced to an individual) costs more than doing the same journey paid on contactless payment card. Aside from the imposition of code spaces from government and corporations, there are also ample opportunities to accelerate this process from the ground up as individuals purchase gadgetry for a smart home. Those who have pioneered such devices may have compromised elements of their privacy that outweigh the benefits the technology claims to offer. This balance is at the frontier of code spacedis it acceptable to slow progress to ensure user privacy is handled correctly or is it better to pioneer the technology and deal with the consequences later?

Air Travel Air travel provides a series of code(d) spaces that the traveler must occupy in order to complete a journey and was the example first highlighted by Dodge and Kitchin. The check-in area of an airport is rendered useless without the code to run the systems required to log passenger details and route their luggage. Online check in enables those traveling light to proceed through this space and straight to departures, a process contingent on the code to check boarding passes and perform hand baggage and body scans to identify high risk passengers. As Mark Graham and colleagues observed in 2013 it is in these contexts that code delimits behavior since it requires people to follow accepted procedures and behave in ways that are sufficiently mundane that they the can be captured by the code. They argue that in these spaces code is not acting deterministically to produce space, instead it is working through broader “technologies of power” deployed in the management of bodies and populations. For example, in early 2019 Chinese airports made headlines after installing facial recognition kiosks that displayed tailored flight information to passengers as they passed by. In this case it surfaced code that is unnoticed and unquestioned by the majority of passengers, but it is exerting significant power over the spaces it acts upon as passengers get tracked through the airport. Once through the airport and onto a flight, the planes themselves are clearly software-dependent, but recent models use code to adjust cabin conditions to alter circadian rhythms and have sophisticated at seat entertainment systems that both impact on the immediate surroundings of the passenger. Surroundings that are also dictated by the cost of ticketdwith ever decreasing space

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available in economy class and more luxurious possibilities in first and business. But it is possible to “hack” the code spaces associated with air travel through gaming frequent flyer programs through the strategic purchasing of items or opportunistically exploiting loopholes in their algorithms to gain access to spacesdsuch as airport loungesdoff limits to the majority of passengers.

Home It is in the home that code(d) spaces can be at their most pervasive and intrusive. Many early examples of coded spaces were drawn from TVs, personal computers, robotic vacuum cleaners, and posited triggered concerns about surveillance and privacy. Such concerns have been dramatically amplified in recent years as the extent to which such surveillance practices are now possible has been realized. For example, “home assistants” such as the Amazon Echo and Google Home are being installed in one or more rooms in people’s homes. Such devices listen out for their trigger word, the name “Alexa” is the default for Amazon Echo, once it has been uttered the device will record the command that follows, send the recording to a server where it is converted from human speech to code that enacts a command. This is a computationally intensive process and therefore it is no surprise that the pioneers of such devices have large computing infrastructures at their disposal. The commands can control the temperature of the room, adjust lighting, play music, and make orders. They are getting more sophisticated and have even begun to behave in unexpected ways, for example, listening/recording when they shouldn’t be. What’s more they are opening new frontiers in surveillance and privacy with the likes of video enabled doorbells allowing neighbors to share images of suspicious individuals and in the case of Amazon’s Ring doorbell using video content in advertising to publicly identify “suspects” who have not been convicted of any crime. Through these devices and other “smart home” technologies controlling the space within one’s home is no longer done entirely within the homedthe act of turning on a light is no longer a closed circuit between the switch and its bulbdthe command may require interaction with an energy intensive global computing infrastructure and the use of proprietary software. The implications for this are still being worked through. For example, smart home devices have notoriously poor security protocols in place and everything from Internet enabled baby monitors to light bulbs and plugs have been hacked. And even within the home a worrying development is the use of such devices by domestic abusers who use them to exert even more control. There are now a number of projects such as Tech vs Abuse that seek to understand the risks and opportunities that such new forms of technology now represent.

Consumption The naturedor at least the premisedof consumption practices in physical retail spaces has changed relatively little over time. In major retailers, particularly supermarkets, the use of code dictates the physical layout of the storedor the products stocked there. They operate a modular system where the products that furnish blocks of shelving are allocated according to the machine learning algorithms that profile customer-buying preferences. This has a major impact on the store with aisles stocked with a geographically diverse range of products to supply the communities that shop there. The use of loyalty cards also allows retailers to establish the catchment of their stores (see Fig. 1) and append further demographic characteristics to their customer databases. The challenge with such approaches is that the code is notoriously bad at anticipating future consumer needsdinstead it can reinforce past behaviors. If a particular product category becomes popular then it will be stocked at the expense of others reducing the choice available. What’s more, code has the potential to be used in a discriminatory way as dynamic pricing can be applied to charge customers different amounts for the same product; it’s even technically possible to adjust pricing and offers to a consumer as they walk through the store. This approach to pricing is unlikely to be implemented, but it is only one step beyond some of the instore surveillance techniques routinely deployed to track consumers as they fill their baskets. Of course, consumer tracking is much easier and more routine online and there is a constant drive to create a seamless flow of consumer data from virtual into physical stores. Increasingly physical stores are seen as exhibition spacesdthe bulk of transactions do not take pack in store, consumers see what they like and then go online to make a purchase. Less technologically resilient stores are going out of business as they cannot compete, transforming town centers, and thus creating code spaces that are not the direct product of code, but an indirect one. The character of town centers is changing as a result of code running elsewhere. Small stores are no longer competing among themselves, they are competing with code that could have been written on another continent issuing commands to an automated fulfillment center hundreds of miles away, tasking a delivery driver to deliver to an address only a block away.

Self-tracking Technology is also creating new code(d) spaces all the time. Self-tracking tools are emerging at the intersections between health and wellness, work and life and accessibility and luxury. One example of sousveillance (the self-monitoring of one’s personal life through surveillance technologies) takes the form of fitness apps. When installed on mobile phonesdand in some cases paired with wearable computing such as a smart watchdthey create coded spaces. Fitness apps provide performance datadspeed, heart rate, cadence, and so ondbut they also offer the opportunity to compare performance against people have exercised in that location previously to the extent that it’s possible to race against others across different segments. A solo jog in the park becomes a more social experience, with performance benchmarks to aspire to. The park therefore begins to share many of the characteristics of the gym. The great outdoors become networked through the quantified self. As with all code(d) spaces this development has had, perhaps unintended in some cases, consequences in relation to the privacy of their users. One of the most well-known of these

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Figure 1 Lines from customer home areas to the store they have purchased items in based on data from a UK high street retailer. Left hand map shows raw data, right hand map shows lines after address cleaning algorithm applied to remove customers who have moved house without updating their record with the retailer.

was the revelation that the traces of those using one particular appdStravadwere aggregated and mapped to show users around the world. In cities users maintained anonymity in the crowd, but elsewhere the tracks stood out to reveal “secret” military bases in parts of the Middle East and Africa as soldiers connect their army-issued devices to the app. The app depends on public disclosure of routes in order to provide the competition users enjoy but more can always be done to educate about the implications of this. Those who work in sensitive roles can easily justify their need for privacy but many others are under increasing pressure to share more data with the likes of employers and insurance companies in return for workplace incentives or lower premiums. As Fig. 2 also shows, usage of such technology within a country remains heavily influenced by government policy and the broader socioeconomic characteristics of a population, but is becoming more pervasive.

Code Space Research It is worth discussing the use of datasets collected by code(d) spaces in geographical research as more and more studies utilize them. The data collected by code(d) spaces is subject to a lot of hype but is far from perfect. It presents a set of challenges that are technical, ethical, and epistemological. At the very least it needs to create new knowledge. Many of the new forms of data offered by code(d) spaces simply track what is already known. For example, aggregate data from smart transport systems will reveal a morning and evening peak in demand that corresponds to well-known rush hours aligned with dominant work patterns. Large-scale data infrastructuresdand surveillanceddo not justify such a finding. Instead, the potential of such data exists in the potential to inform behaviors at the individual level to improve the network, particularly during times of stress. Such a shift in the volume of data available, particularly at the individual level, means that researchers have changed how sampling is practiced in geography and the social sciences more broadly. There are moves toward utilizing top-down approachesdwhere data are assembled based on constructed sampling framesdto bottom-up approachesdwhereby researchers are presented with a population from which to attempt to sieve samples. This process, however, needs to be tempered by an appreciation of how the data are collected: they are by-products of other activities that can lead to significant biases. Just because a dataset reveals

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Figure 2 An extract from the Strava Heatmap (see strava.com/heatmap). Brighter lines denote more users of the app. It is clear there is no access to the map in North Korea, in contrast to high usage among South Koreans.

more information than perhaps was originally intended, it does not mean that it becomes useful in any analytical sense. For example, home electricity monitors can provide a strong indication that a person is at home but does not offer enough to say if they are efficient users of electricity (see Fig. 3). In the United Kingdom, where smart meters have received significant subsidy to be installed in households, a key incentive was to provide the data required to help cut energy bills, this seems to have failed with estimates that savings would average just £11 per year (BBC News 2018). Smart home technology needs code to inform behavior change and this needs to be supported by research. Geographers are well placed to work with data streams from code(d) spaces since they can place such data in their spatial, but more importantly, societal context. They do however need to acquire the technical skills to work confidently with large datasets, such skills, and the training required to acquire them, have been cautioned against by some within the field. For example, some argue that geographers are at risk of inhabiting some of the same ground that big data for the production of profit or the manipulation of populations does. This may be so, but many share a desire to see the use of big data in such a way that it will change perceptions, opinions and offer genuinely new insights. There is, of course, also tremendous potential for the data gathering abilities of contemporary code spaces to deliver public good. The data they generate are both extensive and have the potential to generate a deeper understanding about our society. This extends their importance far beyond the realm of identifying customer tastes and preferences and through the lens of code space into substantive contributions to the social sciences in particular. For example, they can help to provide insight to issues as diverse as urban vitality, community carbon footprints, or the collective consumption of public transport services; however, for their potential to be fully realized in tackling issues of broader societal concern, the quality and provenance of consumer datasets needs to be fully understood, as does the true extent of their possible applications.

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Figure 3 Four graphs each showing the dominant temporal patterns of electricity usage as recorded by smarter meters in the United Kingdom. Each show morning and evening peak usage to varying degrees, but little is revealed about home energy efficiency, for example.

Further Reading Dodge, M., Kitchin, R., 2004a. Code, Space and Everyday Life. CASA Working Paper 81. Dodge, M., Kitchin, R., 2004b. Flying through code/space: the real virtuality of air travel. Environ. Plan. 36, 195–211. Dodge, M., Kitchin, R., 2005. Code and the transduction of space. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 95 (1), 162–180. Dodge, M., Kitchin, R., 2009. Software, objects, and home space. Environ. Plan. 41, 1344–1365. Graham, M., Zook, M., Boulton, A., 2013. Augmented reality in urban places: contested content and the duplicity of code. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 38, 464–479. Kitchin, R., Dodge, M., 2014. Code/Space. MIT Press, Cambridge. Lansley, G., Cheshire, J., 2018. Challenges to representing the population from new forms of consumer data. Geogr. Compass 12, 7. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12374. Longley, P., Cheshire, J., Singleton, A. (Eds.), 2018. Consumer Data Research. UCL Press, London. Neff, G., Nafus, D., 2016. Self-Tracking. MIT Press, Cambridge. Thrift, N., 2014. The ’sentient’ city and what it may portend. Big Data Soc. April–June 2014, 1–21. Thrift, N., 2014. The promise of urban informatics: some speculations. Environ. Plan. 46, 1263–1266. Zook, M., Graham, M., 2018. Hacking code/space: confounding the code of global capitalism. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 2018, 1–15.

Relevant Websites Quantified Self Project: https://quantifiedself.com/. Sidewalk Toronto: https://www.sidewalktoronto.ca/. Tech vs Abuse Project: www.techvsabuse.info.

Cold War Timothy W Luke, Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

In his close advisory roles to President Harry Truman, Bernard Baruch first named the tangle of mutually aggressive maneuvers in Europe and East Asia between the Soviet Union and the Western Allied Powers of the United States, Great Britain, and France a “cold war” during 1947. This label soon was publicized broadly by Walter Lippmann in his 1947 book with same name, and the Cold War concept came to categorize much of the world’s 20th Century history. It was, however, a complex multidimensional struggle, ranging across stark differences in ideology, economics, and culture as well as geopolitics, diplomacy, and technology. These conflicts arguably began with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, but those tensions were more diffuse as liberal capitalist and illiberal fascist regimes both courted Soviet diplomats and the Communist Party leadership in Moscow for access to the USSR’s markets and resources. After years of intense competition, the abruptly signed Molotov Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 unified them in a synchronized joint invasion of Poland. Less than 2 years later, Berlin turned eastward in Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, and Moscow quickly allied itself with the capitalist West to defeat the Axis powers. The deeper existential differences behind the Cold War resurfaced as World War II drew to a close when the so-called “Big Five” Allied powers seriously disagreed over how to organize the post-1945 world order, following the defeat of the three major Axis powersdFascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan.

European Start of the Cold War The Cold War’s immediate origins lie in 1944–1946, but the conflict crystallized in 1947 as the United States and the Soviet Union began a very direct on-going cultural, social, technological competition as well as many more indirect and intermittent military confrontations. To conduct this new kind of war, major strategic changes were made by Washington. In July 1947, only 2 years after President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met at the Potsdam Conference hoping to agree on a new global agenda for Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union to create a more peaceful postwar world, President Truman rapidly reorganized the American military under a single new executive Department of Defense, formed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and created the National Security Council to manage the Cold War and prepare for a new major East-West military conflict. During World War II, the divergent visions held by the different Western Allies and the USSR for new postfascist governments in Europe were quite evident; but, they were essentially moot as long as Nazi occupying forces were in place. By 1944, however, the conflicts intensified as Free French forces reestablished control in Paris, the German occupation of Italy ended south of the Piedmont, and the Soviet liberation of Poland brought Red Army units into Germany itself. Large numbers of Communists fought against Hitler’s forces in France and Italy, while a free Polish regime hoped to return to Warsaw from its exile in London. However, the USSR set up a pro-Moscow provisional government in Poland, and the Allies worked hard to keep Communists from controlling both France’s and Italy’s postoccupation governments. As Hitler’s regime collapsed in May 1945, independent communist governments came to power on their own in Albania and Yugoslavia, while the USSR engineered the installation of communist regimes in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Consequently, in an attempt to halt the further spread of Communism, President Truman promulgated the Truman Doctrine to aid anti-Communist forces fighting in Greece and Turkey in March 1947. This move launched the official policy of “containment,” and it also brought the Marshall Plan to fund Europe’s industrial reconstruction. Greece might have gone the way of Yugoslavia, but British, and then American, assistance help crush the Communist insurgency there during the Greek Civil War. Even though Czechoslovakia initially installed an independent multiparty parliamentary government after the war, Communist activists sparked a crisis in February 1948 that prompted Prague to ally itself with Moscow as well. Britain, France, and the United States during 1947 and 1948 increasingly consolidated their respective zones of occupation in formerly Nazi Germany into a single administrative unit. In response, the USSR imposed a land blockade in the summer of 1948 against the three Western powers’ zones of occupation in Berlin. For 11 months, Berlin was sustained materially by a costly airlift, but this lifeline maintained Western control in the American, British, and French zones in the city. However, deeper frictions sparked during these developments led first to the creation of West Germany during May 1949 and then East Germany in October 1949 as two separate states dependent on either the Western powers or the Soviet Union. The iconic center of the Cold War then emerged from a divided Berlin, a divided Germany, and a divided Europe. Similarly, the cooperative spirit of the Allied response during the Berlin Airlift led to the creation of a formal military alliance between the Western Powers around the North Atlantic Basin, or NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Even though minor progress was made after Stalin’s death in 1953 with the State Treaty between Austria and the four war-time allies, ending its German-style four power occupation and giving it independence in a formal state of neutrality during 1955, Europe remained very divided. And it stayed near the edge of war for the next 40 years after the creation of the two German republics. As West Germany in 1955 also attained full sovereignty, it was allowed to rearm itself, and then join NATO. East Germany also began rearming in 1956, and then joined the Warsaw Pact, which was the East Bloc’s military alliance against a rearmed independent Germany and NATO.

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Cold War Outside of Europe Outside of Europe, the Cold War was a misnomer from the beginning as open military conflicts raged for decades. In China, the last revolutionary civil war between the Nationalist, or Kuomintang, Party, and Communist Party led to the defeat of the Nationalists and their forced retreat to Taiwan by 1949, allowing the People’s Republic of China to be declared in Beijing on October 1, 1949. The United States did not intervene decisively to assist the Kuomintang, but it guaranteed the Nationalist regime’s security after its anticommunist forces fled to Taiwan. In less than a year, the partitioned Korean peninsula, which Japan had annexed by 1910, saw the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Kim II Sung invade its southern neighbor, the American-backed Republic of South Korea, which was created in August 1948 with UN support. The Korean War ensued from June 1950 through June 1953 as both Moscow and Beijing backed Kim’s attempts to militarily unify the Korea’s territories. An armistice was accepted after 3 years of war between a United Nations coalition under American leadership with North Korea and its Chinese Communist and Russian backers. As the first of many full-blown “proxy wars” between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Korean War still has not ended in a formal peace treaty after nearly seven decades. At the same time, French efforts to reestablish control over Indochina, after local communist and nationalist rebels with hopes for postwar independence there fought with the Allies to defeat the Japanese, led to the First Indochinese war from 1948 to 1954. The nationalist and communist Viet Minh forces under Ho Chi Minh decisively defeated the French in 1954, and the region was more formally partitioned. Cambodia and Laos, which remained under their traditional royal rule with nominal independence, and the former French colonies of Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin were divided into a separate South and North Vietnam. The Geneva Accords of 1954 promised national elections in 1956 to unify the nation, but the Southern regime in Saigon repudiated that provision, fearing a communist electoral victory. The Second Indochinese War began in 1959, and it lasted until 1975. The Hanoi regime received arms and assistance from the Communist bloc, and the United States continued its support to antiCommunist Saigon as it had done since 1946. In 1965, however, the United States sent large contingents of its own troops into Viet Nam along with support from Australia, Thailand, Philippines, and South Korea, but then withdrew in 1973 after 8 years of tactically successful but strategically indecisive battles. The conflict had been taken into Laos and Cambodia by both sides since the early 1960s. After the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, the communist Khmer Rouge fought against American forces and the pro-American traditional regime until they also came to power in 1975 when the Communist forces of North Vietnam and southern Viet Cong partisans finally defeated the American-backed South Vietnamese regime. The “hot war” quality of Cold War conflict outside of Europe was fueled by local nationalist struggles against weakened or collapsed old European empires. Some of these nationalist struggles began or grew, during World War II as anti-Japanese, antiGerman or anti-Italian wars with Western backing, but Communist parties played a major role in many of anti-Fascist struggles. Others were more local conflicts, but they became sites of struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union because of the Communist parties. The collapse of the Batista government in Cuba, and the coming to power of Fidel Castro in 1959 as well as the support given to radical nationalist Arab powers after the emergence of Israel in 1947 in many subsequent conflicts are good cases in point. While more indirectly ideological in nature, these two sites were among the most volatile flashpoints of the Cold War era. The Kennedy Administration’s backing of the failed Bay of Pigs counterrevolutionary invasion of Cuba moved the Castro government closer to Moscow for military and economic support after 1961. By mid-year in 1962, it was becoming apparent that the USSR was preparing to place a small number of intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. This deployment mirrored earlier American basing of comparable missiles in Western Europe and Turkey, but the United States challenged Moscow in October 1962 with an “embargo” of sea-borne shipping into Cuba to prevent the completion of these Soviet missile sites and force their dismantlement. For nearly a week, the world teetered on a knife-edge between shaky Cold War peace and all-out nuclear war until Khrushchev backed away from confrontation. Such brinksmanship during the Khrushchev years, which had reached nearly the same levels of nuclear confrontation over squabbles in Berlin and Taiwan, taught both sides to cooperate with each other in the Cold War’s conflicts in the coming years. This somewhat cooperative spirit was reflected in more subtle support the Soviet Union provided to the front-line Arab states against Israel, which had strong American backing, in its 1970, 1980, and 1981 conflicts with its neighbors. Although Soviet aid backing for Egypt and Syria led to an American global nuclear alert in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, Moscow tend to tread gingerly around the explosive Arab-Israeli conflicts even when Israel openly invaded Lebanon, fought air battles with Syria or destroyed Iraq’s developing nuclear weapons program by bombing the Osirak reactor complex. Moscow backed the Palestinian Liberation Organization and radical regimes in Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Somalia, but it avoided a more direct face-off with the United States in the region even when it became apparent that Washington actively supported the Islamic mujahiddin counterrevolutionaries in communist-led Afghanistan against the Soviet invaders there.

Waning Ideological Competition Most of the ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union eroded as a battle of ideas in 1960s and 1970s. Khrushchev’s limited efforts to reimagine communism after Stalin’s death in March 1953 in more flexible consumer-oriented terms ended with his ouster in October 1964, leaving the Brezhnev and Kosygin traditional party line to consolidate an “obsolete communism,” which began unraveling during the 1970s from within. The Warsaw Treaty Organization forcibly intervened in

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Czechoslovakia in 1968 to maintain Soviet-style rule over and against more independent and innovative Czech ideological reforms, and a New Left all around the world repudiated it. Likewise, Washington became bogged down in the quagmires of Southeast Asia fighting the communist-led wars of national liberation in Cambodia and South Vietnam by backing corrupt military dictatorships, even as it accepted new trade ties and strategic parity with the USSR with regard to their nuclear strike forces. The People’s Republic of China erupted in a countrywide ideological civil war between radical Maoist “red” activists and more technocratic “capitalist road” economic reformers, which ended only after Mao’s death in 1976 and then Deng Xiao Ping’s consolidation of power in 1978. With these upheavals, Beijing slowly turned more toward the West. And, a strange new era of détente unfolded between Washington and Moscow after West Germany made moves toward an Ostpolitik, or “Eastern Politics,” focused on building new cultural, economic and technical exchanges with the East Bloc. These geopolitical maneuvers and internal battles left Moscow’s pretense of remaining the world’s leading revolutionary center almost a complete mockery, particularly in years between August 1968 after it invaded Czechoslovakia to impose a Moscow-friendly Communist regime after ousting a more maverick nationalist but still communist government, and December 1979 when it charged into Afghanistan to prop up the putative Marxist-Leninist regime in Kabul. Rather than leading a global ideological movement, as it successfully did during the 1920s and 1930s, to convince workers of the world to embrace communism willingly, Moscow was left by the early 1980s embroiled in numerous interventions in Latin America, Africa, the Mideast, and Asia. In each one, it sought to impose or maintain its model of “actually existing socialism,” which even fewer Soviet citizens wanted anymore at home, with military assistance, economic subsidies or actually armed intervention. The neoliberal turn in Great Britain and the United States in 1979 and 1980 brought to power Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Their revitalized faith in capitalist free enterprise and militant anticommunism sparked fresh tensions between the East and the West in the early 1980s as the Communist Party and Soviet Union saw four general secretaries and presidents come and go within 3 years. Not recognizing how Leonid Brezhnev’s “actually existing socialism” only masked the institutional failings of its neo-Stalinist socialist order, Moscow stumbled into more unsustainable international entanglements. Hence, when Mikhail Gorbachev became President of the Soviet Union and General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, he tried returning to Khrushchev’s reformist tendencies with his own three-pronged program of greater perestroika (restructuring), democratikizatsiya (democratization), and glasnost (openness) in the USSR. These efforts were matched with new strategic arms accords with the West, a pull-out from Afghanistan, and reductions in its military forces in Eastern Europe. By 1989, such rapid liberalization efforts pulled apart neo-Stalinist order of the Soviet Union as well as its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe from within. Nationalist and worker revolts in Poland in 1980 also triggered a real change across the region. And, 1989 and 1990 brought a wave of peaceful popular uprisings to replace the Marxist-Leninist regimes of Eastern Europe. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall was breached, Germany reunited in 1990, and the Russian Republic essentially started refusing to collaborate in the Soviet Federation with the larger Soviet Union. By December 1991, the USSR itself dissolved, and the major republics within the Union became sovereign independent states under the rule of former communists who individually repudiated their Communist Party memberships but not their authoritarian party leadership styles as many retained power as oligarchs in new postcommunist regimes.

Legacy of the Cold War The Cold War expressed at least two very different approaches to organizing and then living modern urban industrial lifedone supposedly capitalist and one allegedly socialist. Despite each side’s pretense of ideological faithfulness, neither liberal democratic capitalism nor totalitarian state socialism was true to either their original designs or their ordinary expectations. The free market aspirations of 19th Century liberalism in the West were constrained by state involvement, cultural inertia, or religious conviction just as the full communist utopia of 19th Century socialism soon failed amid conditions of economic underdevelopment, feudal governance, or permanent militarization. Liberal democratic capitalismdeven in the 1920s, 1960s or 1980sdnever proved to be entirely liberal, fully democratic or truly capitalist, since bureaucratic paternalism, constitutional limitations, and national protectionism frequently hobbled personal rights and social progress. Likewise, totalitarian state socialismdeven in the 1930s, 1950s or 1970sdalways lacked total social control, rational state authority, convincing socialized community that undercut the foundational ideas of collective economic, cultural, social, and individual freedom. Racism, nationalism, elitism, and militarism, which plagued in both blocs prior to 1914, and then worsened into the 1940s, clearly deformed both the capitalist West and the communist East in ways that predated from each bloc’s peculiar beginnings. Yet, their life-or-death struggle with fascism from the early 1930s to 1945 also created a system of permanent war that neither Washington nor Moscow, London or Beijing, Paris or Belgrade found easy to repudiate. What weak ideology could not sustain, strong geopolitics maintained for nearly 50 years. In a truly Orwellian fashion, the peace that dawned in 1945 actually led to an era of continuous war; and, the victories and defeats incurred by both sides in supposedly “low-intensity” conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America soon sparked new “high-intensity” confrontations between Cold War client states, parties and movements and their former sponsors in Washington and Moscow. The spillover from this violence has marred the daily lives of millions since the Cold War purportedly ended in 1991. Indeed, many of the seeds of today’s post-Cold War conflicts were sown from the 1970s to the 1990s as narcocapitalism developed out of socialist national liberation movements. Radical jihadism gain momentum by fighting for Washington against Moscow’s Middle East client states. Meanwhile, maverick capitalist and socialist countries went off on their own irrational nationalist misadventures in Santiago, Buenos Aires, Pretoria, Taipei, Tel Aviv, Tehran or Havana, Pyongyang, Mogadishu, Baghdad, Hanoi, Belgrade,

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and Damascus. Anarchy in Africa, poverty in Latin America, jihadism in the Mideast, and genocidal nationalism everywhere all were triggered, in part, by the superpowers’ competition during the Cold War. In many respects, the Cold War has not truly ended. It has simply abated somewhat in its intensity or morphed significantly in its form. Almost three decades after Ronald Regan called for Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall and fully engage all nations in the Communist bloc with global society, which both occurred, the United States and Russia continue to maintain large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. Thousands still are deployed with long-range strategic strike forces whose most probable use would be against each otherdthe two former Cold War rivals. Moscow continues to resist Western inroads into its former spheres of influence all across Central and Eastern Europe to the point of invading Georgia and Ukraine to gain leverage, while Washington still frets over the popularity of the post-Castro regime in Cuba and Havana’s close ties to populist anti-American regimes at various in times Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina. Meanwhile the survival of ruling Communist cliques in socialist or nationalist parties, and the rise of new authoritarian regimes with anti-Western leanings, ranging from Cuba and North Korea to Belarus and Serbia, is persistent factors that keep Cold War styles of diplomacy alive and well in some corners of the world. Even though the smaller states no longer always have the backing of powerful ideologically sympathetic antagonistic patrons in Moscow or Beijing, these countries frequently maintain repressive, and sometimes militant, governments that are anti-Western, anticapitalist, and anti-American in tone, which Russia and China occasionally have found useful to support to oppose the United States. Washington, in turn, continues its policies of armed containment, economic sanctions, and ideological condemnation selectively in many of its relations with these governments long after the demise of the Soviet Union, which shifted older Cold War competition toward traditional great power rivalry. It also expects its allies to follow this lead in their respective regional ties, but this pattern varies. Some US allies, for example, maintain a Cold War stance vis-à-vis North Korea, but most others have developed cordial relations with Cuba. Likewise, Moscow is threatened by Germany’s, France’s and the United States’ advances into central and Eastern Europe with the enlargement of the European Union and NATO, while Moscow has pushed for greater advantage in Syria, Iran, and Ukraine after 2000. The domestic effects of the Cold War in the United States and the Soviet Union have been fundamental and long lasting. Whatever hope remained for those seeking to build a truly alternative modernity grounded in a revolutionized socialist society was lost in the permanent mobilization of a red garrison state either during the Russian Civil War and collapse of Maoism. After the June 17, 1953 uprising in East Germany, Moscow has had to forcibly impose, and then maintain, its socialist designs through military coercion for nearly four decades. Ultimately, the cultural, economic, political, and social costs of actually existing socialism during the Cold War led to the union’s fragmentation, socialism’s bankruptcy, the republics’ secession, and the soviets’ degradation. In December 1991, the USSR ended without a bang and with few whimpers. The young nation in the New World instructed by its first president to avoid entangling foreign alliances and has not stayed true to its original revolutionary ideals. Instead it created a vast network of treaties, an empire of bases, and an institutionalized military-industrial apparatus that has borrowed trillions, misspent billions, and disserved millions to attain its limited Cold War victories. In the meantime, blowback from its decades of proxy wars, engineered coups, military interventions, and diplomatic misadventures set the stage for much of the 21st Century’s post-Cold War global factions as a resurgent Russian government and more assertive Chinese state have openly challenged Washington since its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Just as there has not been an “end to history,” there is not yet truly an end to all Cold War rivalries. The ideological motivations have been replaced by nationalistic pressures, geopolitical ambitions, and economic imperatives. Some see Cold War-style intrigues in Russian election meddling across the West, Moscow’s interventions in Georgia, the Crimea, and Ukraine, but there are no longer absolute ideological values at stake in these conflicts over political primacy in Russia’s “near abroad.” Likewise, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, across the Global South, and with its new Silk Road initiatives in Eurasia are rooted in its revitalized national pride and economic clout rather than communist zeal.

See Also: Capitalism.

Further Reading Booth, B., 1998. Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Burke, K., 2018. Revolutionaries for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War (The New Cold War History). University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. Carter, D., Clifton, R., 2002. War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy. Palgrave, London, pp. 1942–1962. Cohen, S.F., 2009. Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War. Columbia University Press, New York. Cohen, S.F., 2018. War with Russia: From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate. Hot Books, New York. Delpech, T., 2012. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica. Fischer, B.A., 2000. The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. University of Missouri Press, Columbia. Gaddis, J.L., 2005. The Cold War: A New History. Penguin Press, New York. Garthoff, R.L., 1994. The Great Transition: American-soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC. Hanhimaki, J.M., Westad, O.A., 2004. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. Oxford University Press, New York. Hiro, D., 2019. Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy. Oxford University Press, New York. Lebow, R.N., Stein, J.G., 1995. We All Lost the Cold War. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

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Leffler, M.P., 1994. The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953. Hill and Wang, New York. Loth, W., 2002. Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950-1991. Palgrave, London. Lucas, E., 2014. The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West, Revised Edition. St. Martin’s Griffin, New York. Mastny, V., 1998. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. Oxford University Press, New York. McFaul, M., 2018. From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia. Houghton Mifflin, New York. Miller, C., 2016. The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (The New Cold War History). University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill. Sayigh, Y., Shlaim, A., 1997. The Cold War and the Middle East. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Taylor, P.J., 1990. Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical Transition. Guilford, New York. Westad, O.A., 2007. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

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Colonialism Amber Murrey, Department of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Appropriation Within the context of colonial logics, refers to forms of large-scale taking possession of the material or cultural resources of colonized people by colonial subjects with little or no compensation. Colonial appropriations are frequently ideologically masked, socially normalized, legally condoned, and/or historically erased by the colonizers. Colonialism Writ large refers to some combination of territorial, juridical, cultural, linguistic, political, mental/epistemic, and/ or economic invasion and subsequent domination of a group of people or groups of people by another group of people. Decolonization Defies simple explanation within colonial, anti-colonial, and neocolonial contexts and geographies. Broadly, decolonization signifies the ceaselessdeveryday, systematized, and “disordered”dstruggle to overcome the facets, structures, infrastructures, and traces of colonization. According to Frantz Fanon, decolonization is thus a complex but “permanent motivation” felt by all those subjected to colonial logics. Within the mainstream, decolonization refers to the historical moment and processes of independence in a formerly colonized country. Dispossession A central feature of European colonialism, denotes the stripping of a group of people or a person of their lands, territories, or other possessions, often by force. Eurocentrism A term coined by the Pan-African Egyptian political economist Samir Amin, refers to the cultivation of a worldview centered upon European (or Western) norms and ideas. Eurocentric ideas, which are otherwise regional and particular to Europe, are imposed upon the rest of the world under the guise of “universality.” This habit of equating “the universal” with Euro-American thought is intellectually tenable because it occurs within a wider global political and knowledge economy dominated by Euro-America. European colonialism (circa late 1400) Are particularized and changing political-economic-social-religious systems of European political, economic, social, and educational domination that generated and benefited from Eurocentric racialized and racist logics. European colonialisms are distinct from other colonialisms because of their immense geographical range, Eurocentric logics, ideologies and observances of racial hierarchies and segregation, centering of appropriation by dispossession, and structural and cultural persistency within post-colonial epochs. Imagined geographies A term coined by the Palestinian literary scholar Edward Said in Orientalism, is a concept central to postcolonial thought, including postcolonial geographies. Said interrogated the ways in which “orientalism,” or the study of what European scholars called the “Orient,” were constructs of the European imaginary. Imagined geographies then refers to the ways in which knowledges of local, regional, and/or national geographies (the people, place, and landscapes within them) are invented through discursive practices and largely accepted as accurate within Eurocentric knowledge hierarchies. Taken as accurate, they inform social thought, actions, and behaviorsdthus becoming real. Othering Is an active rhetorical practice in which dominant people (i.e., the “Self”) malign, demonize, and stigmatize communities of people as “Others” through cultural productions (language, media, publications, popular culture); political discourse and action; and the management and containment of knowledge (including the policing of expertise and regulation of education). Othering is a form of dehumanization, against which the Self arises as most wholly human, noble, and valued. Post-colonial Refers to the epoch following political, juridical, or direct independence of a formerly colonized country. The term signals that a country has observed decolonization and independence, although its usage does not presume that decolonization or independence affected a total break with all structural, economic, political, social, or cultural aspects of colonization. Postcolonialism or postcolonial studies Is a body of thought that critically evaluates colonialism, colonial legacies, and imperialism, frequently with a focus on representations and discourses. Settler colonialism Is a protracted form of direct colonization, often European colonialism, that is territorially, geographically, and temporally continuous. Like other European colonialisms, settler colonialism is deeply racialized and racist. Settler colonialism, according to the Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolf and other scholars, is understood as a “failed invasion,” i.e., a lasting failure of the colonial desire to eliminate native people.

European Colonialism(s) Colonialism refers to the combination of territorial, juridical, cultural, linguistic, political, mental/epistemic, and/or economic domination of one group of people or groups of people by another (external) group of people. European colonialism refers to the various formulas of territorial domination effected by European powers upon non-European people (indeed, upon much of the world), from the late 1400s to the mid- to late 1900s. These European countries included Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France,

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Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. At various points in modern history, European powers colonized, in some form, most of Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, Oceania, the Middle East and the Arctic (excluding Antarctica). As with any large-scale, multidimensional, and socially holistic phenomenon, there is incomplete transferability of the characteristics of one form of European colonialism upon another. Heterogeneous material practices and imaginaries emerge(d) from and within European colonial systems. These colonialisms are extensive, porous, and dissimilar imagined and material (re)orderings of the world. Frictions and power struggles between European powers as well as colonial subjects for the control over territory, markets, labor, and ideology shaped the patterns of European colonialism. Interdisciplinary scholars working within colonial studies demonstrate the disunities, ambiguities, and incoherence of European colonialisms, including how they were practiced and experienced distinctly according to historical context, local geographies, colonial policy, precolonial sociopolitics, and more. As such, these epochal terms are problematic. The “precolonial,” for example, was never absolute nor static and some scholars have argued these are inappropriate frames for understanding the rich range of human history. The Nigerian political philosopher Olufémi Táíwò writes of the limitations of the dominant historical imposition of precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial upon African societies as explanatory categories. He argues that the preeminence given to these epochal structures works to essentialize African societies, reduce appreciation for people’s agency, and misrepresent the dynamism of culture. Colonial domination, law, appropriation, and containment were distinct and dynamic over time in each respective colonial territory, but European colonialisms shared various broad tendencies. Chief among them were (a) the initial penetration and restructuring of colonial markets, territories, and cultures by concessionary companies and Christian missionary work; (b) “accumulation by dispossession,” or colonial enrichment through legalized territorial domination, natural resource extraction, forced labor, and tax administration (later to be replaced by colonial debt burdens and subsequent economic restructuring); and (c) racialized, patriarchal, and heteronormative logics and shared white supremacy that afforded ideological foundations for European colonialism.

The Colonial Encounter The labor of early colonial projects was outsourced to European missionaries, explorers, and corporate entities. Their publications and rhetoric communicated initial exaggerations, misrepresentations, misunderstandings, and/or apprehensions about Indigenous non-European people. Concessionary companies preluded formalized colonial domination in Africa, the Americas, and Asia by conducting the geographical explorations, trade arrangements, and enslavements that created the basis for economies of extractivism. British, Belgian, French, Dutch, Danish, German, Portuguese, and Scottish private concessionary companies implemented systems of forced labor and “trade by force” via the widespread appropriation of land and resources. This establishment of “extractive states” predated formal colonial projects (circa 1400–1800) across the African continent, often within monopolistic frameworks that outlawed foreign investment through strict regulations from the various monarchies and colonial heartlands. European concessionary companies strategically established the tenor for the cultures, power, territories, and oppressions of state-led colonialism. This included the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish establishment of hundreds of European ́ slave forts and slaving routes across Africa’s Atlantic coast. Before his assassination in June 1980, the Guyanese historian Walter Rodney documented the disruption and replacement of precolonial trade networks in his seminal work, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. This text provides one of the most comprehensive rebuttals of the opinion that colonial rule “modernized” or “improved infrastructure” in the colonies. Rodney documents the organic social and economic progress made within Africa up to the 15th Century, which ceased and stagnated precisely because of European slavery of much of West and Central Africa alongside the destabilization of preexisting intra-African trade networks by European explorers. The active halting of progress within Africa simultaneously contributed to European capitalist development. This is a process recognized in political economy as “uneven geographical development.” Alongside the often-bellicose forms of extraction and force carried out by private companies, European Christian missionary activities and energies were directed at the “civilizing mission” through the spiritual conversion of Indigenous people. These “civilizing” activities were central to European avowals to benevolent colonialism, or the arguments that colonialism was pursued to the mutual interest and benefit of colonizers and colonial subjects. Euro-American Christian missionaries were involved in the everyday activities of working at health clinics. Beyond preaching the gospel, they also opened and then directed formal primary schools that compelled colonial cultural norms in the name of religious salvation and intellectual development. While missionary activities varied greatly and are far more manifold than can be outlined here, they often had a deleterious impact on Indigenous knowledge systems through the marginalization, dismissal, destruction, or criminalization of non-Western belief systems, educational systems, and ontologies. Colonized people had diverse modes of adaptation, acquiescence, reinterpretation, and refusal of colonial epistemes and structures. The South African anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff, British anthropologist J. D. Y. Peel, Nigerian historians Toyin Falola and Waibinte E. Wariboko, and other scholars working within missionary and colonial studies document the modifications and ambiguities of Christian and evangelical epistemes through these colonial encounters. In their 1997 book, Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier, the Comaroffs trace the dialectical facets of exchanges between British evangelists and Southern Tswana, arguing that the “collision” of these two groups resulted in the emergence of hybrid practices and identities for both. Focusing on everyday encounters and practices allowed for a nuanced view of colonialism, not as

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a simple or one-sided venture of domination but as a dialectical encounter that changed everyone involved. Elaborating the agencies within everyday colonial encounters is important in revealing the complexities and ambiguities of domination. Many critical thinkers argue that it is precisely in the everyday that the strategic banality of colonial violence is revealed. The Martinican anti-colonial psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon too examined some of the ways in which the colonizer was transformed by the colonial encounter. For Fanon, the colonist was socially distorted and pathologically sickened. In his 1952 work, Black Skin, White Masks, and again in his 1961 book, The Wretched of the Earth, he exposes of the psychiatric “decay” of French colonists in Algeria. In one study, the normalization of torture impels a colonial police officer to abuse and torture his own wife and children. Among the colonized, Fanon notes depression, suicide, self-harm, anxiety, insomnia, blurred sensory perception, ulcers, amenorrhea, premature graying of the hair and other psychophysical and embodied conditions that result from the normalization of violence in colonial Algeria. Within this critical analysis, epistemic (or knowledge) disappearings are forms of violence.

Control Over Land, Labor, and Imagined Geographies European colonialisms were complex and varied economic, political, and sociocultural structures and projects of and for European enrichment. Mosotho feminist political theorist Patricia McFadden traces postcolonial statecraft as plunder to earlier colonial structures crafted to permit the plundering of land, labors, and bodies. Urban geographer Nasser Abourahme argues that colonial dispossession was a legalized robbery or even lawmaking robbery. The British geographer David Harvey draws upon Karl Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation, by which we mean the “original” extraction of value from social-biological life, to argue that forms of crude appropriation (simply, theft or taking) endure in the form of accumulation as dispossession. In European colonialism, capital was accumulated by the colonialist and colonized minority through the dispossession of the colonized majority. Dispossession took the forms of territorial domination, natural resource extraction, and forced labor.

Territorial Domination and Land Dispossession Social scientists and historians of colonial studies emphasize the centrality of European appropriations of land and analyze the particular discursive-material projects of territory-making effected by European colonial administrators. Many African societies experienced an intensification of European territorial domination and exploitation following the European “Scramble for Africa” and the Berlin Conference in 1884, in which Western European powers met to arrange the territorial domination of the African continent in a manner cordial for Europeans. This amounted to the forced and arbitrary amalgamation of previously distinct boundaries of African regions; the boundaries drawn by colonial authorities were indiscriminate and brought together diverse societies within the authority of a united colonial nation-state. This exercise in forced cartography initiated the formal period of modern European colonization. Sometimes called the high imperial period, this period lasted from 1884 to approximately 1990. South Africa is one of a number of exceptions to this timeline, where firm and violent racial segregation persisted in legal form until the abolition of apartheid in 1994. The Western Sahara, which remains colonized by Morocco, is another exception. European colonizers, who deemed forms of plunder and dispossession legal, enforced their colonial operations through the imposition of juridical structures. The Ugandan political scientist and anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani, in his 1996 work Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, argues that the European mission in Africa was united by two adjacent dominations: the rule of value (i.e., the market) and the rule of law (i.e., the civil society), and that both of these endeavors were “incomplete” at the moment of decolonization. Mamdani’s work further explains the ways in which European colonizers “marshaled” Indigenous culture through the promotion and demotion of certain “customary” practices. Of particular significance was the British recognition of the importance of the subcontracting of colonial violence to Native Authorities in the name of customary culture. Such tactics by colonizers are grouped under a set of practices called “divide and rule,” or the instrumentalization, exacerbation, or invention of internal tensions and conflict between colonized subjects and people for the purposes of their supraexploitation by the colonizers. Native landlords or Indigenous chiefs from India to Kenya were frequently hand-selected to oversee cultivation and land usage at the community level. Ghanaian feminist and agrarian scholar Dzodzi Tsikata and researcher and former Program Officer with Women’s Rights and Citizenship Program in Canada Pamela Golah trace the ways in which colonial land tenure systems continue to enable dispossession, particularly for women in postcolonial societies. On the issue of colonial land appropriation, Fanon asserts that the most essential value for a colonized people is land. Control of land was crucial to European colonial projects. The French colonies, for example, were commonly referred to as the pré carré (backyard) and the chasse gardée (private hunting preserve) of the French state and their affiliating corporations. Land inhabited by Aboriginal people in colonial Australia was deemed terra nullius or empty land. Contradictory imaginaries emerged to rationalize the absentpresence of native people. Under European colonial administrative control, land tenure systems were reorganized so that all land was deemed colonial land on which colonial subjects were mere occupants. They could be, and frequently were, dispossessed of land in the name of capitalist development and state progress. In settler colonialism, the colonizers appropriate land for the purposes of occupation as well as, like in other European colonial forms, for the purposes of capital accumulation. Colonial settlements are imposed through racialized rhetoric of permanence that demand large-scale displacements and resettlements of Indigenous people. The Canadian historian Allan Greer and others describe the ways in which colonialism transformed entire geographies, not just through the construction of fences, the clearing of forests, the maintenance of survey lines that demarcated private property, but also through new forms of and enclosure in the Americas (the

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so-called “New World”). By declaring mountain and forest areas to be part of a commons (to be shared by all inhabitants), European colonialists were laying claim to the collective resources (fish, game, timber, and wild flora) found in those areas. At the same time, European colonialists used these “commons” for the grazing (frequently overgrazing) of privately owned cattle and livestock, practices which contributed to the degradation of the natural environment. Greer argues that the imposition of this European “commons” in the settler colony was a central feature of colonial dispossession, one which often preceded formal settlement. In the article, “Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America,” Greer characterizes the great “enclosure movement” as a “multi-species assault on the native commons” as European colonialism was advanced first by European-owned livestock grazing across the continent, “bringing in its wake a colonial enclosure movement that left virtually no room for Indian people.” The varied and rapid shifts in land use under European colonialism had environmental consequences, including biodiversity loss, deforestation, and sometimes climate change. There was a marked cooling (0.15
C) of the earth’s temperature due to the steep decline in population during the Spanish and Portuguese colonization of the Americas in the 15th Century. Alexander Koch, Chris Brierley, Mark M. Maslin, and Simon L. Lewis document the climactic shifts that resulted from the “Great Dying.” Ninety percent of the Indigenous population, or 56 million people, died between 1492 and 1600 as a result of disease, land loss, malnutrition, and more. This massive loss of human life triggered a reduction in land use and subsequent reforestation of 55.8 mega hectares, prompting a marked carbon dioxide uptake. Across Oceania, Asia, and Africa, the imposition of monocropping and plantation farming by European colonizers resulted in considerable biodiversity loss and new land use tensions, as communities were forced from land for colonial projects. Colonial administrators frequently engaged in the targeted destruction of native agriculture and water sources to quell anti-colonial resistance. French and Spanish colonialists poisoned wells, killed livestock, and destroyed gueltas (or drainage canals) in their efforts to suppress Sahrawian resistance, under the leadership of Cheikh Ainin, in the Sahara. Colonial trophy hunting threatened, and sometimes caused the extinction of, large fauna.

Extraction and Forced Labor From the early 1500s, enslaved people were forcibly transported to the Americas and the Caribbean (the so-called “New World”) via the Middle Passage, an often-lethal voyage in the hulls of ships with little food and water and no sanitation. Approximately 12.5 million Africans were taken captive and enslaved between 1444 and 1867. An estimated 40% of enslaved Africans were forced to labor on Brazilian sugarcane plantations. Transatlantic slavery arose as a racist colonial practice in response to the killing, deaths, and genocides of Indigenous people of the Americas and Caribbean, who could no longer labor or be forced to labor for European companies. Black feminist theorist and cultural geographer Katherine McKittrick works within the domains of black geographies and plantation geographies to articulate the importance of a “black sense of place” that recognizes the violent conditions of bondage but focuses on the black creativities and cartographies that emerge in place. Following the abolition of slavery in the Caribbean and Americas, forced labor, in various forms, remained at the foundation of European colonial domination and exploitation. Unpaid and unfree colonial labor was differently regulated. Sometimes each ablebodied subject was coerced to deliver a quota of goods biweekly under guarded surveillance and threat of violence. This was so with the forced rubber tapping and ivory extraction in Belgian colonialism in the Congo Free State (present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or Congo-Kinshasa) between 1895 and 1908. This is a period in which the American historian Adam Hochschild, in King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa, estimates that 10 million peopledhalf of the population of the DRCddied as a result of direct and auxiliary conditions of forced labor. Failure to deliver the biweekly quota of rubber resulted in ones imprisonment or the imprisonment of family members. Beyond imprisonment, workers were subject to considerable forms of physical violence for the delivery of inadequate kilos of rubber, including beating, lashing with la chicotte (a heavy leather whip), burning to death, and dismemberment, particularly the cutting off of hands. In other European colonial systems, subjects were forced to work a certain number of days per year or per agricultural season. This was the case with the corvée, or unpaid labor, in lieu of taxes in the French-colonized regions of Central and West Africa. The French colonial prestations en travail, or obliged labor, in the Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) meant subjects were forced to work in cotton plantations a certain number of days per week. In other European colonial regimes, people were made to devote the crops from a certain proportion of their tilled land, as was the case in Dutch colonialism in Java. Colonizers often contrived extensive systems of forced, often migrant, labor when they undertook large infrastructural projects, including the clearing of forests or the construction of dams and railroads. In Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese operated a system known as chibalo, or forced migrant labor. Such was also the case of the French colonial Congo-Ocean Railway, a 512-km (318-mile) railroad connecting Brazzaville with Pointe-Noire in the French colony of Equatorial Africa (what is now the Republic of the Congo, known also as Congo-Brazzaville or the Congo). The British explorer and geographer, Henry Morton Stanley (1841– 1904), whom the King of Belgium employed to chart the territory of the Congo, had urged the British and later the French to build a grand central African railway in 1882 as the foundation for a “preeminent” colonial administrative system. The French embarked on the project years later. During the 12-year construction period, an estimated 20,000 unfree workers, most of them forced from nearby French colonies (including Chad and the Central African Republic), died. The causes of death varied from industrial accidents to what epidemiologists now refer to as “extreme wasting,” or severe weight loss, muscle wastage, and deterioration of the brain. Terre d’Ébène, written in 1929 by the French journalist Albert Londres, provides a scathing critique of the project. In it, he writes that the Congo-Ocean Railwaydwhich had been touted by colonialists as an “altruistic” and “civilizing” projectdhad “as many deaths as railroad ties.”

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Coercive labor systems enriched colonialists and private concessionary companies while contributing to the decline in the wellbeing of colonial subjects in immeasurable ways. Forced labor monopolized time and energy away from the cultivation of food and, hence, intensified the rate at which other labor needed to be conducted. When people were unable to farm, shepherd, fish, hunt, or gather because they were occupied with unpaid labor, food yields were reduced. This in turn increased the likelihood of famine and malnutrition.

Colonial Imaginaries: Racist, Patriarchal, and Heteronormative In the face of the reworking of ecological relations in colonial societies as well as anti-colonial resistance and critique, European imagined geographies held that colonization was or could be advantageous for colonized people and places. These racist and racializing imagined geographies were central to the rationalization of colonial exploitation. Imagined geographies, a term coined by the Palestinian philosopher Edward Said in Orientalism, is a central concept within postcolonial thought, including postcolonial geographies. Imagined geographies refers to the ways in which knowledges of local, regional, and/or national geographies (the people, place, and landscapes within them) are invented through a set of discursive practices and taken as accurate within a Eurocentric knowledge hierarchy. Taken as accurate, they inform social thought, actions, and behaviorsdthus becoming real. European expansion in the High Middle Agesdfrom the colonization of Ireland, to the Crusades, to the Norman expeditionsdhad cultivated what British historian Robert Bartlett terms a mentality of conquest. In this mentality of conquest, the use of force and might were accompanied by a rhetoric of conquered populations as barbaric, backward, and culturally subordinate. For example, in IrelanddBritain’s first colony in the 1500sdIrish-Gaelic people were Othered through an imagined geography of barbarism, backwardness, and incivility. Othering is an active rhetorical practice in which dominant people in power malign, demonize, and stigmatize communities of people through: cultural productions (language, media, publications, popular culture); political discourse and action; and the management and containment of knowledge (including the policing of expertise and regulation of education). The simultaneous fears and anxieties of rebellion, alongside the mentality of conquest, manifested as animosity for internal minorities within Europe, among them nonbelievers, pagans, wanderers, and the underclass. This mentality of conquest set the tone for the series of European geographical “discoveries” of the mid-1400s and 1500s. Decolonial scholars appraise the mentality of conquest. The Puerto Rican decolonial sociologist and political economist Ramón Grosfoguel argues that there is an essential link between the European Enlightenment tradition of philosophical reasoning as “I think, therefore I am” and “I conquer, therefore I am.” This link, he argues, is the common logic of elimination: the elimination of people (genocide) and the elimination of knowledge (epistemicide). This order of power and knowledge was the foundation for the modern/colonial world. Certain modes of knowledge and ways of knowing enable certain modes of rule and power. Chicana cultural feminist and queer theorist, Gloria Anzaldúa maintains that the colonial objectification and thingification (following Césaire) of people is the “root of all violence.” Othering and objectification, she argues, rhetorically disguises the systematic violent results of colonial actions as merely inadvertent or accidental. For Martinican poet and anti-colonial philosopher Aimé Césaire, the colonizer was compelled to create false narratives and self-deceit to justify active colonization. In Discours sur le Colonialism (published in 1950), Césaire calls this the colonial “collective hypocrisy that cleverly misrepresents [the native’s] problems . to better legitimize the hateful solutions provided for them.” The “reinvention” of the identity of the colonized, effected through the destruction of history and rereading of colonial social worlds, rendered colonial subjects into objects of reference for the colonizers: commodities to be exploited, for Césaire, mere “things.” The thingification of colonial subjects occurred alongside the valorization of the colonial mission, as part of what the French termed la mission civilisatrice. Following Nigerian historian E. A. Ayandele, white supremacy was constitutive of colonial epistemic logic, rather than being additive to it. In Race and the Colonizing Mission: Their Implications for the Framing of Blackness and African Personhood 1800–1960, Waibinte E. Wariboko outlines the ways in which white supremacy, anti-blackness, and anti-Indigenous racisms were integral to the European “civilizing mission.” Racialized Othering and imagined geographies long predated the term race, which emerged in the 1800s as a means of classifying the natural world. By the late 1800s, racial hierarchies had become pseudoscientifically viable and politically powerful. This occurred at the same time as European imperialists intensified their colonization of the African continent. The emergence of racial hierarchies and racism alongside colonial expansion were fundamental features of European modernity and capitalism. European colonialism permeated and shifted non-Western and Indigenous social relations by altering communal relations, including gender identities. The Nigerian sociologist Oyèrónke Oyewùmí illustrates that for the Yorùbás of present-day Benin, Nigeria, and Togo, gender was not a structuring principle of precolonial society, rather it became one after the imposition of patriarchal coloniality. The Nigerian poet and anthropologist Ife Amadiume similarly charts the supple gendered identities of precolonial West Africa in her 1987 text, Male Daughters and Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African society. The Argentinian decolonial feminist philosopher María Lugones refers to the constitutive relations between patriarchy and European colonialism as the “coloniality of gender.” The colonial imposition of binary and patriarchal man–woman categorizations resulted in institutional, legal, political, and economic subordinations of women that often did not correspond to preexisting relations.

Anti-Colonial Resistance The colonial project was not impermeable, and colonial power was not complete. Nigerian historians Toyin Falola and Waibinte E. Wariboko document the wide range of first or opening “encounters” between African people and European explorers and invaders,

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which ranged from hesitation to hostility. Wariboko’s historiography of the Eastern Niger Delta in the late 19th Century highlights the multiple motivations and preexisting social institutions that prompted the Elem Kalabari people to “collaborate” with British corporate and colonial agents at precisely the same time their neighbors, the Bonny, Opobo, and Nembe-Brass, resisted and opposed them. In Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria, Falola examines the ways in which violence, in its varied forms (damage, control, and humiliation are the basic elements of violence identified by Falola), mediated colonial encounters and sustained colonial rule. At the same time, Falola contends that colonial administrators acknowledged the limitations of total force as a means of social control, not as “an act of magnanimity but [as] a basic exercise of common sense.” Drawing on the work of Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre, Falola recognizes a seeming paradox in colonial domination through violence: the economic incentive to avoid totalizing violence (and thereby ensure sufficient volumes of labor) alongside the sociopolitical drive to control and suppress Indigenous freedoms, rights, epistemes, and spiritualities. For Fanon, the logics of colonial domination and violence, alongside the capitalist incentive to foster consumers in the colonies and the post-WWII devastation of Western Europe, set the path for inevitable decolonization. Anti-colonial movements and the reactionary colonial violence and repression they triggered have often been erased, dismissed, or misremembered by what Fanon calls colonialism’s bewilderers. Nonetheless, resistance was pervasive. Anti-colonial resistance emerged alongside exploration and conquest, and it continued throughout the European high imperial period. Just as colonial power was not monolithic, resistance to colonialism took many forms. Everyday resistances included sabotage, theft, withdrawal or marooning, and minor refusals to cooperate. Colonialists frequently responded to nonviolent resistance with violence, triggering and impelling anti-colonial wars, such as those fought by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), also known as the Maquis of Cameroon and the Mau Mau in Kenya. In Cameroon, periodic and near-constant resistance to French colonialists escalated to guerrilla warfare in the late 1940s. Members of a nonviolent, anti-colonial movement led by a party of mostly school teachers and trade unionists, the UPC, asserted their desire for full independence from France. French colonizers responded with bloody repression. During what is referred to as la periode du trouble (period of trouble) from 1948 to 1961, French troops and their auxiliary soldiers from neighboring countries occupied, razed, and raided the Western (dominantly Bamiléké) regions of Cameroon. What followed was a guerrilla war and the massacre of thousands and possibly hundreds of thousands of people. The French and their proxy army hunted, tortured, and killed presumed anti-colonial Maquisards and their sympathizers. Among those assassinated was the UPC General Secretary Ruben Um Nyobè, who was the first African leader to appeal for independence at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City in 1952. Cameroonian historian Walter Gam Nkwi traces Um Nyobè’s assassination along with his mother-in-law on September 13, 1958, by the French colonial Army. After his death, his body was dragged through the streets of Boumnyebel and displayed publicly, as was the style of French colonialists to display the bodies of their victims. Felix Moumie, Um Nyobè’s second-in-command, was poisoned in Geneva on November 3, 1960, allegedly by an agent of the French secret service (the SDECE). Finally, Ernest Ouandie was publicly executed by firing squad in Bafoussam by French-backed postcolonial forces on January 15, 1971. The colonial and postcolonial suppression of the UPC is cataloged by Cameroonian historian Mongo Beti in Main Basse sur le Cameroun: Autopsie d’une Décolonisation as well as by Cameroonian journalists and scholars Thomas Deltombe, Manuel Domergue, and Jacob Tatsitsa in La Guerre du Cameroun: L’Invention de la Françafrique. In Kenya, the Mau Mau embarked upon what was the most prolonged uprising in British colonial Africa. In response to a number of social and ecological pressures in the 1940s and 1950s, including colonial confiscations of land and restrictive policies implemented to force Kenyans into wage labor, people collectivized under the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA, also known as the Mau Mau) to express their grievances. Colonial land and labor policies created an underclass of squatters, numbered at 100,000 by the early 1920s. Like in Cameroon, the Mau Mau struggle built upon and followed previous movements against British occupation and rule. The British colonists interpreted Kenyan anti-colonial violence as a form of mental and social illness and responded with force. Colonialists underwent a system of mass detentions, holding thousands of Kenyans in concentration and work camps. Like in Cameroon, death tolls were not taken by colonial administrators, and the figures, especially of citizen killings, remain disputed. In Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire, British historian David Anderson estimates that more than 20,000 Mau Mau militants were killed by the British colonizers. Anti-colonial struggle and conflict like that in Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Viet Nam, and elsewhere threatened the stability of Western European colonialism in the post-WWII and early Cold War period. In this geopolitical context, colonialists recognized their interests in pursuing what Fanon describes as decolonizing in a “friendly fashion.” By which he meant, granting independence to many of the colonies while working to hand-select leaders who might have more sympathy for departing colonizers. By channeling independence and anti-colonial movements in receptive and pro-colonialist directions, colonialists were able to maintain profitable relations, economic concessions, and political influence in their postcolonies.

Postcolonial and Marxist Analyses of European Colonialisms The double and simultaneous features of European colonialismdas simultaneously imaginary/discursive and material projectsdfostered rich debates within the interdisciplinary domains of colonial studies. Broadly, these perspectives have centered on the tensions between postcolonial thinkers, drawing upon the traditions of deconstruction and postmodernism, and political economists and others influenced by Marxist thought.

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Postcolonial studies emerged within anti-colonial thought alongside decolonization from the 1950s in response to Eurocentric interpretations of colonialism and imperialism. For postcolonial thinkers, the emphasis has been on critiquing the discursive cultures of colonialism and recovering particular, contextualized subaltern or colonized perspectives, voices, and epistemes. Postcolonial work has importantly demonstrated the distinctions between colonial experiences by race, gender, class, sexuality, and more. Postcolonial scholars, inspired by Edward Said, the French social theorist Michel Foucault, and others, understand power and power relations as perpetually negotiated through and in the discursive practices of knowledge making. This includes how people are classified, categorized, and disciplined. Postcolonial thinkers have critiqued Marxist scholars for the comparative lack of attention to race, racism, and the role of slavery and colonization in the very emergence of capitalism. Lebanese-Australian anthropologist Ghassan Hage, for example, argues that the role and function of European colonialism within capitalism has been underspecified by Marxist scholarship. Stagist Marxist scholarship, such as that of Hobson and Lenin, has been critiqued by postcolonial scholars as persistently Eurocentric in the understanding of causality and change, although Marxism has a long and rich tradition of internal dispute regarding stagism. Of central importance for Marxist scholars are the processes and functions of class formation at the global scale for understanding the material expansion of capitalism and its varied and uneven manifestations over time, space, and scale. Power relations are established through the control of private property and the transformation of humans into exploitable beings via labor-power. Postcolonial theory is critiqued by some Marxists for the relative lack of attention to material violence, historical patterns, and avoidance of the political issues of causality and global capitalism. In Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital, Indian sociologist Vivek Chibber argues that postcolonial theory inadvertently reestablishes East–West and North–South divides by offering a vision of the world in which each is so dissimilar as to be incompatible for projects of collaboration or mutual comprehension. Critical scholarship in the 1990s pushed such conversations in new directions, bridging understandings and emphasizing the simultaneity of ideological and material exploitation, including within cultural materialism. South African sociologist Zine Magubane’s 2004 work, Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa, echoing work of Cornel West draws from Marxist studies and postcolonial studies to offer productive insights of colonialism as base-superstructure and ideological oppression. Feminist political ecologies of colonial relations similarly attend to patterns of material exploitation alongside critical interrogations of rhetoric and discourse in power struggles and domination.

Colonialism in the Present Social scientists, including human geographers, have attended to the nuances of “colonial durability” and coloniality in the present. That is to say, the ways in which, following postcolonial thinkers, colonialism did not “end” with decolonization in the 1940s, 1960s, or thereafter, but has persisted in amended form. There is substantial consensus in the critical humanities and social sciences that colonialism, in some form(s), endures and that the influences of colonialism continue to structure and inform culture, relations, territoriality, geography, politics, and economics. Colonialism in the present signals the 61 countries in the world that are recognized by the United Nations as colonies or territories. Aruba, Cayman Islands, Guam, Guadeloupe, New Caledonia, St. Helena, and more are either non-fully-self-governing states, self-governing dependencies, or remain governed by colonial powers. In an international nation-state system directed by the interests of hegemonic states, postcolonial territories (particularly archipelagos and small island states) sometimes negotiate partial sovereignty as a means to seek economic redress or support, rather than full political independence from their former colonizers. Colonialism in the present can also refer to the formal occupation of one country by another. As geographer Derek Gregory argues in The Colonial Present, modern colonialism abounds in the United States’ and Britain’s present imperial strategies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Colonialism in the present also refers to those less immediately visible residues, practices, logics, and arrangements of colonialism. To these ends, colonialism remains a term useful for understanding the maintenance of racial hierarchies, masculinist and patriarchal relations, geographical divisions, and economic inequalities. As such, colonialism is not a historical artifact but a persistent force in the contemporary world. Critical social theorists Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein argue that settler colonialism in particular might be better understood as a continuous process of dispossession rather than as an episode or historical epoch. In this, they draw inspiration from the Australian anthropologist Patrick Wolf’s arguments about settler colonialism as a protracted structure of failed invasion. In such a framing, settler colonialism is an ongoing elaboration of racialized elimination that is not yet concluded. This argument is significant because it reframes internal debates and frictions between scholars of critical colonial studies who have sometimes been concerned with the examination of typologies of colonialism in isolation from other forms.

Neocolonialism The economic and political consistencies between the colonial and postcolonial periods have been highlighted in the form of the state and the organization of state power. The “miscarriages” of decolonization to deliver transformed economic relations, political sovereignty, and social well-being were recognized by many critical scholars and politicians immediately following formal decolonization. Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, published Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism in 1965, just 8 years after Ghana became an independent country in 1957. In it, he coined the term “neocolonialism.” For Nkrumah and other postcolonial

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African presidents (including DRC’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and Gabon’s first president, Léon M’ba), neocolonialism signals the continued domination of African societies by European finance, multinational corporations, extractive interests, and legal systems. Nkrumah’s critique focused on the lack of political independence and sovereignty for postcolonial nation-states. Nigerian political economist Claude Ake explains that African postcolonies maintained forms of colonial governance that were largely capricious, habitually violent, and permanently hostile. In most postcolonial societies, the former colonizers maintained some level of market preference, political influence, military presence, and/or cultural and educational hegemony. People and politicians who refused neocolonial political structures and economic relations with Europe were isolated, threatened, ideologically sabotaged, or assassinated during the postcolonial and Cold War period. Decolonization, then, was often (but not always) critiqued as a superficial transfer of power that fostered internal colonialism while the racialized global economy remained largely unchanged. Among those unchanged features, as Mamdani and others have argued, were the propensity to preserve the sovereignty of (colonial) law rather than the sovereignty of people and the maintenance of political impunity. Formal decolonization rehabilitated the outward form of dispossession and exploitation while many of its core dimensions endured. In particular, the political economy of extraction remained a primary logic of accumulation in the postcolony. Some have argued that the scale and ecological destructions of extraction or “neoextraction” have intensified in the postcolonial and neoliberal period. Amplifications of dispossession and extraction occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War, a time of considerable decline of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberal designs. For the postcolonies, the implementation of neoliberal policies such as the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s triggered new forms of poverty, declines in real wages, and intensified competition for land.

“Colonial Duress,” Recursions, and Boomerangs Alongside critiques of the superficiality of decolonization by those working within traditions of political economy, postcolonial scholars carried out direct critiques and deconstructions of persistent colonial power. Albert Memmi, in Decolonization and the Decolonized, writes of the protraction of oppression at a social and individual level. Working in the domains of postcolonial anthropology, Laura Ann Stoler describes “colonial duress” as the recursive inequities and arrangements of colonial logics, which reemerge in reworked form. Among these looping or circular colonial recursions are sets of colonial apprehensions about the Other, such as immigration and the fear of a declining white populace. Repetitions of technologies such as walling, policing, bordering, and the camp are symptoms of “colonial duress.” Colonial ideological recursions include white nationalism and secularism. For Stoler, the cyclical and iterative materialization of these apprehensions, technologies, and ideologies reveal an ongoing colonial presence rather than mere legacy (or holdover). Cameroonian critical theorist Achille Mbembe coined the term “necropolitics” to describe the particular form of postcolonial governance that can be traced to colonial logics. This is a governance that dominates and controls through the provision of death and death-making, as opposed to Foucault’s biopolitics, in which governance is practiced through the discursive, calculative, and administrative aspects of the domains over life. For Mbembe and others, the postcolony continues to be a place of corporate capture, predation, and extraction. Postcolonial geographers have also looked at the so-called “boomerang” (or ricochet) effects of colonial practices, particularly violence, across space and time. Césaire traces the choc en retour or boomerang (i.e., the reverse shock) of European colonialism. The violent technologies of surveillance, territorial control, and sociocultural domination, he argues, are first tested and refined in the colonies before “returning home” to the metropole of the empire (this argument is rearticulated by Abourahme). The JamaicanBritish cultural materialist Stuart Hall, similarly, argues that the perception that colonialism and empire happened “over there” (or that it is spatially separate from the core or Western European mainland) is incorrect. Rather, the postcolonial method requires a flexible but precise examination of the cultural translations or transculturations of colonialism across and between the colony and the metropole. Intellectual projects, such as the work of Indian postcolonial historian Dipesh Chakrabarty, to “provincialize” Europe discredit illusions that Euro-American “modernity” was organic, singular, or universal. Rather, European modernity and transitions to capitalism are particularized histories bounded by place and time.

The Colonial Matrix of Power During the 1990s, Latin American scholars cultivated another way of understanding and challenging the phenomenon of colonialism in the post-colonial moment. This new paradigm of critical thought was the decolonial turn. For decolonial thinkers such as Aníbal Quijano, Catherine Walsh, and Walter Mignolo, coloniality is understood as the “other side” of modernity, or its constitutive formula. Coloniality marks the combined social, political, economic, epistemic, and territorial dominations of Western Europe since the so-called colonial encounter, or the initial moments of contact between European explorers and conquerors and the Indigenous people of the world. For decolonial scholars working within Latin American history, this definitive moment was 1492, when Christopher Columbus landed on the island of what is now Barbados. This landing ushered the establishment of a global “colonial matrix of power” in which the modern world is the colonial world. For decolonial scholars, there is no “modernity”dno technological advancements, no industrial capitalism, no conspicuous consumptiondwithout coloniality.

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For the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano, the “coloniality of power” refers to the intersection of varying forms of colonial hegemonydthe production of knowledge, economic inequality, gender relations, racializationsdas coproducers of a matrix of colonial power, or coloniality. In this, Euro-America has been the geostrategic, epistemic, and sociopolitical base of colonial capitalism for 550 years. Argentine theorist Walter Mignolo expresses this relationship as a compound expression: modernity/coloniality. Coloniality and modernity are constitutive of one another. “Modern” Euro-Americadthe wealth, material artifacts, consumptive habits, biosocial appetites, imagined geographies, racial anxieties, techniques of control, and moredexists because the colony existed, the modern postcolony exists, and a colonial matrix of power persists. This world ordering is referred to as “global coloniality” or the “colonial matrix of power.” This is what the argentine and Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel calls the capitalist/patriarchal Western-centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world-system. The colonial matrix of power operates as a hegemonic ordering logic that configures economies, relations, and epistemes but in ways that often go unsaid, unacknowledged, and unrecognized. For this reason, decolonial scholars have been interested in understanding the epistemological functions of global coloniality, as it is through the structuring of epistemes and the declaration of modernity-as-universally-valid that coloniality is concealed. The Mexican sociologist Rolando Vázquez calls this effacement of coloniality by modernity “the denial of the denial.” Coloniality operates rhetorically through a double negative that dispossesses and excludes the “Other” and then invalidates, negates, and disavows that very dispossession and exclusion.

Decolonization in the Present Struggles against persistent forms of colonization, neocolonization, imperialism, and coloniality have continued and fluctuated in recent years. A variety of arrayed and interconnected movements to decolonize coloniality/modernity and settler colonialism have gained strength against cognitive and epistemic colonization. Among these movements is the movement to “decolonize the university.” Scholars and academics build from a critical toolkit of decolonization to unsettle the ongoing material-and-epistemic work of coloniality of being.

Decolonizing the University Collective and individual projects aimed at challenging the epistemic authority and privilege of Euro-normative frames and “mastery” within the university have reemerged with gusto at the turn of the 21st Century. These reinvigorations have been prompted, in part, by the international visibility of anti-racist movements. Among them are #BlackLivesMatterda movement that is itself a reflection of critical anti-racist scholarship on the production of bodies and communities as “disposable”dand transnational and national anti-colonial and anti-racist student movements. For example, the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall movements were similarly connected to, and predated by, intellectual work on the university as: colonial instrument; technique of racialized domination; and exclusionary space for the production of the “expert” knowledge. Mbembe calls this moment of epistemic decolonization the end of the age of innocence. Such a context is critical for understanding the present state of decolonial work in human geography and, by extension, conversations on coloniality and the colonial present. A cornerstone of this epistemic orientation is the recognition that knowledge is not innocent. Knowledge is political. There is no unproblematic or natural or inherent scholarship. Entries in encyclopedias, for example, are generated somewhere, by some body. Struggles pushed forward by Indigenous people, anti-racist activists, and decolonial theorists have combined to assert a pressure to decolonize knowledge, pedagogy, and educational institutions. A significant imperative of late 20th- and early 21st-Century decolonization was the struggle against what Kenyan scholar and author Ngugi wa Thiong’o calls “colonization of the mind” or mental colonization. In Decolonising the Mind, wa Thiong’o is particularly critical of the ongoing dominance of colonial languages in postcolonial societies and their role in influencing thought, community relations, and perceptions of self. Colonial cultural dominance affects a physical as well as epistemic trauma. It is what he calls an “open wound.” This is partially because colonial imagined geographies become real in the social world, including through the epistemic framing and informing of action. Othering has deleterious psychological impacts on the people. Before being beaten to death by apartheid police in September 1977, South African intellectual and activist, Steve Biko, similarly asserted that “The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.” Geographers critique the discipline’s history of complicity within colonial projects, including how early geographers worked in the service of colonial agendas as well as how geography continues to be imprecated within colonial projects. The Eurocentric lenses of the discipline reinforced binary schisms. These binary opposites defined the relationships between the so-called natural and social worlds. British-Jamaican political geographer Patricia O. Daley examines the necessity of actively critiquing and challenging the ways in which the discipline is oriented toward pursuits of “discovery” in the Global South that reproduce colonial inequalities. Calls to recognize coloniality within the university and work toward its decolonization have given rise to critiques and changes within epistemologies, conferencing, disciplinarity, curriculum, expression, iconography/campus landscapes, institutional culture, methodology, pedagogy, publications, praxis, research, and more. For Grosfoguel, the future of the uni-versitydthat is, the 18thCentury university modeled on Euro-American racist/sexist epistemes, which are deemed universal and hegemonicdis as a pluriversity. In a pluri-versity, knowledge creation serves the needs of holistic well-being beyond coloniality. The priorities for knowledge creation, as outlined by Linda Tuhiwai Smith in Decolonizing Methodologies, include self-determination, healing, decolonization, transformation, and mobilization. Working within the current uni-versity, scholar–decolonizers engage in “epistemic disobedience”

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to challenge, eradicate, and move beyond colonial hierarchies and epistemes. Mignolo explains that epistemic disobedience are those manners and practices of thinking/knowing that are not contained within, informed by, or amenable to modernity/coloniality. Decolonization remains a useful tool for action and critique. Yet, it is not a project without critique, including external dismissals and more generative internal criticism.

Critiques and Co-optation(s) Decolonization, Fanon writes, is a project of chaos. Internally, the logistical and empirical practices and articulations of decolonization remain contested and uncertain within the social sciences, including within geography. Scholars have been open and adamant about the potential impasses of decolonization. These logistical, disciplinary, and cultural ambiguities present challenges to the transformation of scholarly canons, the realization of substantive and structural decolonization within the university as opposed to mere shifts in content, as well as the opening up of pluriversals to wider audiences. While there are important and nuanced scholarships that critique various expressions of colonialitydincluding internal critique of the colonial roots of geography, the relations between geography and militarism, and the reproduction of heteronormative, racialized, and patriarchal norms within certain geographic scholarshipddecolonization remains unfinished. Tensions emerge within unfinished projects. Such tensions have led some scholars to a dismissal of moves to decolonize the university as superficial or fashionable. The latter sees decolonization of the mind as little more than the newest form of academic self-promotion. This includes the possible instrumentalization of anti-racist and anti-colonial knowledge projects by hegemonic actors as well as the limitations of framing our project as a “decolonizing” one, rather than, for example, as projects to Indigenize, feminize, or queer the university. Hegemonic academic actors have sometimes, as with earlier decolonizing and emancipatory struggles, co-opted the call to “decolonize the university.” On the heels of large and often corporate academic associations convening conferences under the auspices of “decolonizing” and strident critique of such projects (such as James Esson, Patricia Noxolo, Richard Baxter, Patricia Daley, and Margaret Byron’s interrogation of the 2017 RGS-IBG chair’s theme of “decolonizing knowledges”), appropriations have been laid out through normative and established hierarchies. Such projects frequently fail challenge deeper inequalities in the arrangements of power and privilege sustained through the uneven organization of “academic knowledge” globally. Considerable critique has emerged in recent years against efforts to mainstream decolonization, including the ways in which mainstreaming risks overwhelming or subverting calls for reparations and racial justice. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang argue against the deployment of decolonizing rhetoric in recent years in their seminal article “Decolonization is not a Metaphor.” While many “decolonizing” projects are important within broader conceptions of social justice, they may forestall conversations about land repatriation within settler colonialism society. Calls to “decolonize” various aspects of life might better resemble what Tuck and Yang call “settler moves to innocence,” by which they mean the colonial tendency to appropriate the language and efforts of “decolonizing” in selfcelebratory manners that whitewash and efface settler colonialism in the present. A more radical decolonizing politics center material life and colonial extractions, including the appropriations of land and destructions of environments and livelihoods. Decolonizing projects come under external backlash and dismissal, as well. Recent public dismissals of Indigenous scholarship as unscientific or untrue have coincided with the “prank” publishing of “feminist” and “queer” articles that would demean entire schools of critical thought under the auspices of “academic grievance studies” or PC-culture. The calls for objectivity, balance, or equality for “all views” can be mechanisms for dismissing the perspectives of marginalized and racialized people in the reactionary and declarative scholarship of empire.

Colonial Apologists and Defenders in the Present A small number of scholars argue some combination of the following: (a) colonialism improved the infrastructure, economic, legal and/or political systems in colonized societies and that, therefore, the benefits of colonialism outweighed the negative consequences; (b) the violence of colonialism is “overstated” in colonial studies or that colonial violence is somehow defensible because of precolonial Indigenous violence; and (c) some postcolonial societies would or should welcome recolonization today. Scholars who maintain one or more of these perspectives are known as “colonial apologists.” Although relatively small in number, colonial apologists frequently hold positions of privilege and power in the world’s leading institutions. The varied ideas propagated by colonial apologists are grounded in speculative forms of blindness that themselves emerge from the imagined geographies of colonial racisms and the coloniality of being. It is for this reason that Vázquez refers to the dismissals of coloniality, or racist-colonial capitalism, as the denial of the denial. The incapability to perceive or acknowledge structures of racism and violence is sometimes analyzed as a form of agnotology, or an active production of ignorance. The British urban geographer Tom Slater underscores the significance of agnotology as a conceptual tool that allows political geographers to discern the strategic fostering of ignorance through misinformation. Overstating the quantity or strength of colonial apologist arguments, in the guise of allowing all perspectives to be heard, can risk “bewildering” (as Fanon writes) the some 80 years of critical scholarship that documents the varied traumas, destructions, and violence of European colonialism. At the center of colonial apology are contestations of the relationship between colonialism and violence. Colonial apologists sometimes point to the financial investments in imperial defense and colonial armies as an indicator that colonialism was “subsidized” by taxpayers in the homeland. In such a view, colonialism was a benevolent project of modernization. Rudyard Kipling’s

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1899 poem, The White Man’s Burden, is an example of such a perspective. Kipling laments the “burdens” of empire-making, such as the dreariness of extensive travel and colonial occupation without praise from the colonized. Some colonial defenders argue that colonized societies were “poor before colonialism.” In the context of critiquing anti-colonial, postcolonial, and decolonial scholarships, colonial apologists stress the inability to statistically determine poverty prior to colonial domination and therefore an incapacity to establish a baseline against which to evaluate the total impacts of European colonialism. Some reject the theory of uneven geographical development, which emphasizes that inequalities in capitalist growth were built into colonial exchange and that these inequalities remain historically and materially embedded in the world economy. Other scholars stress that colonialism was not purely or merely a European project but has occurred in other parts of the world throughout history. Some purport that the legacies of European colonialism are “mixtures of good and bad.” Beyond dismissing the negative impacts of European colonialisms in the past, colonial apologists sometimes write articles asserting the political and economical possibilities of implementing new forms of colonization. Such authors frequently cite one or two native or Indigenous people who are said to hold the opinion that “things were better in colonialism.” Such statements are taken a true by colonial apologists, who tend to avoid historical contextualization that might more accurately reveal these statements as critiques of the exacerbation of economic and social inequalities of contemporary capitalism in the (neo-colonial) post-colony. As colonial apologists define colonialism as a historical epoch that concluded with nominal political decolonization, they are ontologically blind to the ways in which European colonialisms continue through neocolonialism, colonial duress, and/or the coloniality of being.

Transcending Coloniality and Epistemic Justice Scholars pursue creative and novel ways to challenge, resist, or blend epistemes in the long struggle to decolonize. Motivated to push the conversation beyond critique, scholars like the Zimbabwean decolonial philosopher Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni argue that decolonial options offer pluriversal and alternative epistemes for understanding and thinking about our social and natural worlds. Scholars reconsider and reassert the importance of recognizing and/or recovering ways of knowing the world that have escaped, endured, and/or resisted colonization by Eurocentric ontologies and epistemes. Present-day decolonial studies seek to move beyond critique to the conduct of active, politically, and ethically oriented scholarship. Decoloniality is a praxis that encourages an acknowledgment of identity as a mode of identities-in-politics, not identity-politics, and as a way to avoid oversimplification or nostalgia. Indigenous approaches emphasize an ability to work collectively without claims to expertise or mastery. Decolonial notions of the pluriverse posit possibilities of coexistence and coentanglement of multiple worlds and ways of being in the world. Calls for convivial and decolonial knowledge otherwise demand that intellectuals, and people more broadly, move away from binary imaginaries. These efforts seek to imagine “other ways” of expression, knowledge, shared and collective thinking, and creative processes. Beginning from the perspective of decolonial options means that those taken-for-granted scholarly lexicons in the social sciencesdgender, nation-state, territory, landscape, the normative individual, culture, and moredare unsettled as analytical frames. Decolonial options are more than supplementary components to be merely added upon preexisting terms and frames: To take this project seriously, a new vocabulary, a decolonial language, will be indispensable.

See Also: Black Geographies; Borderlands; Brain Drain; Capital & Space; Carceral Geography; Core–Periphery Models; Development; Economic Geography; Empire; Encyclopedia of Human Geography; Epistemology; Exploration; External Debt; Feminist Economic Geography; First World; Genocide; Ghettos; Global North/South; History of Geography; Ideology; Imperialistic Geographies; Land Rights; Marxist Geography; Masculinism; Migration, Forced; Modernization Theory; Natural Resources; Neoliberalism; Philosophy: Developmentalism; Post Development; Poverty; Privilege; Segregation; Self–Other; Soft Power; Structural Adjustment; Superpower; Uneven Development; Violence and Peace; Violence.

Further Reading Abourahme, N., 2018. Of monsters and boomerangs: colonial returns in the late liberal city. City Anal. Urban Trends Cult. Theory Policy Action 22 (1), 106–115. Amadiume, I., 1987. Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. Zed Books, London. Amin, S., 2004. The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World. Monthly Review Press, New York. Anderson, D., 2005. Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. Anievas, A., Nis¸ancıoglu, K., 2015. How the West Came to Rule. Pluto Press, London. Anzaldzua, G., 1999. Borderlands/la frontera: The new mestiza. Aunt Lute Books, San Francisco. Bartlett, R., 1993. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Bhambra, G.K., Gebrial, D., Nis¸ancıoglu, K. (Eds.), 2018. Decolonising the University. Pluto Press, London. Biko, S., 1978. I Write what I like: Selected Writings. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Byrd, J., 2011. The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Césaire, A., 1955, reprinted 2000. Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Pinkham, J. with a New Introduction by R.D.G. Kelly. New York: Monthly Review Press. Chibber, V., 2013. Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital. Verso, London. Comaroff, J., Comaroff, J., 1997. Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Daley, P., 2018. Reparations in the space of the university in the wake of rhodes must fall. In: Kwoba, B., Nylander, O., Chantiluke, R., Nkopo, A. (Eds.), Rhodes Must Fall: The Struggle to Decolonise the Racist Heart of Empire. Zed Books, London.

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De Sousa Santos, B., 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO. Du Bois, W.E.B., 1903. The Souls of Black Folk. A.C. McClurg & Co, Chicago. Dussel, E., 1994. El encubrimiento del Otro: Hacia el origen del “mito de la modernidad”. Plural Editores, La Paz, Bolivia, p. 1492. Falola, T., 2009. Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis. Fanon, F., 1961, reprinted 2001. The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin, New York. Greer, A., 2012. Commons and enclosure in the colonization of North America. Am. Hist. Rev. 117 (2), 365–386. Gregory, D., 2004. The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. Wiley-Blackwell, London. Grosfoguel, R., 2008. Transmodernity, Border Thinking, and Global Coloniality: Decolonizing Political Economy and Postcolonial Studies. Eurozine, pp. 1–24. Hage, G., 2016. E´tat de siege: a dying domesticating colonialism? Am. Ethnol. 43 (1), 38–49. Harvey, D., 2006. Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development. Verso Books, London. Hochschild, A., 1998. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa. Houghton Mifflin. Hooks, b., 1992. Black Looks: Race and Representation. South End Press, Boston. Koch, A., Brierley, C., Maslin, M.M., Lewis, S.L., 2019. Earth systems impacts of the European arrival and great dying in the Americas after 1492. Quat. Sci. Rev. 207, 13–36. Londre, Al, 1929. Terre D’Ébène. Motifs, Paris. Lugones, M., 2007. Heterosexualism and the colonial/modern gender system. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 22 (1), 186–219. Magubane, Z., 2004. Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Mamdani, M., 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton University, Princeton. Mbembe, A., 2015. Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive. Unpublished manuscript. https://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20-% 20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf. McKittrick, K., 2011. On plantations, prisons, and a black sense of place. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 12 (8), 947–963. Memmi, A., 2006. Decolonization and the Decolonized. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Mignolo, W., 2000. Local Histories/global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Mignolo, W.D., 2002. The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. S. Atl. Q. 101 (1), 57–96. Mignolo, W.D., Walsh, C., 2018. On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis. Duke University Press, Durham. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 2013. Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 2018. Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. Routledge, London. Nkrumah, K., 1965. Neo-colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism. Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd, London. Nkwi, W.G., 2018. Ruben Um Nyobe: maquisard Camerounais, radical et liberateur, c. 1948-1958. In: de Bruijn, M. (Ed.), Biographies de la Radicalisation Des Messages caches du Changement social. Langaa RPCIG, Mankon, Bamenda, Cameroon. Oyewùmí, O., 1997. The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses. The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Peel, J.D.Y., 2003. Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Quijano, A., 2000. Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America. Nepantla Views South 1 (3), 533–580. Quijano, A., 2007. Coloniality and modernity/rationality. Cult. Stud. 21 (2), 168–178. Rodney, W., 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Black Classic Press. Slater, T., 2019. “Agnotology” in Antipode Editorial collective. In: Keywords in Radical Geography: Antipode at 50. Wiley Blackwell, London. Stoler, A.L., 2016. Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times. Duke University Press, Durham. Tsikata, D., Golah, P., 2010. Land Tenure, Gender and Globalization: Research and Analysis from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Kali for Women, New Delhi. Tuck, E., Yang, W.K., 2012. Decolonization is not a metaphor. Decoloniz. Indigeneity Educ. Soc. 1 (1), 1–40. Vázquez, R., 2012. Towards a decolonial critique of modernity: buen vivir, relationality and the task of listening. Capital, poverty, development. Denktraditionen im Dialog:Studien zur Befreiung und interkulturalität 33, 241–252. Vimalassery, M., Hu Pegues, J., Goldstein, A., 2016. On colonial unknowing. Theor. Event 19 (4), 1–13. Wariboko, W.E., 2011. “Race” and the “Civilizing Mission”: Their Implications for the Framing of Blackness and African Personhood, 1800–1960. Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ. Wariboko, W.E., 2014. Elem Kalabari of the Niger Delta: The Transition from Slave to Produce Trading under British Imperialism. Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ. Wolfe, P., 2006. Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. J. Genocide Res. 8 (4), 387–409.

Relevant Websites ALICE: http://alice.ces.uc.pt./en/?lang¼en. Citing Africa: http://www.lse.ac.uk/africa/citing-africa/citing-Africa. Critical Social Theory: https://globalsocialtheory.org. Convivial thinking: https://www.convivialthinking.org. Decolonialidad Europa’s Charter of Decolonial Research Ethics: https://decolonialityeurope.wixsite.com/decoloniality/charter-of-decolonial-research-ethics. Feral Visions, A Decolonial Feminist Radio Hour: https://player.fm/series/feral-visions. Vitamin D: Decolonial Vitamins Against the Colonial Matrix: https://vitamindecolonial.wordpress.com. Towards Decolonial Futures: http://blogs.ubc.ca/towardsdecolonialfutures/.

Colonialism, Internal Raju J Das, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by R. J. Das, S. Chilvers, volume 2, pp 189–194, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Blacks A group of people whose skin color is (perceived to be) darker than other groups’. Being Black men or Black women has often become a cause of them being oppressed by White people. Yet, there is no scientific basis for classifying people into Blacks and non-Blacks. Most Blacks (men or women), like most Whites (men or women), have to work for a wage/salary for capitalists under their control, and are subjected to class-exploitation. As a racialized group, Blacks are subjected to superexploitation, even if a small Black propertied-class has emerged. Capitalism A form of class-society where means of production are controlled by the capitalist class to produce commodities for private profit and where the majority (workers), lacking access to private property, work for a wage/salary for, and under the control of, the capitalists, who appropriate a large proportion of the fruit of the labor of the majority. Class A form of society where one small group of people with its effective control over the means of production, appropriates surplus labor/product from another group which performs most of the productive work. Colonialism/Coloniality The relation of political-cultural domination between two countries that enables one country to exploit another. Generally, European countries and Japan have been colonizing countries. Colonialism can continue in the form of internal colonialism, some argue. Domination A relation/process in which one group, in its own economic-political interest, exercises power relation over another group. Economic Development Indicated by the rise in productivity of labor and per capita income, this refers to the development of productive forces (laborers’ skills, and means of production, including technologies, and social and physical infrastructures, or the built environment). Ethnicity A process in which a group of people identify with one another on the basis of some real and/or perceived common history or on the basis of common language, culture, location, religion, etc. Exploitation A process in which surplus labor (i.e., the amount of labor a group of people has to perform beyond what is necessary for its own reproduction), or the product of surplus labor, is appropriated from one class by another class. Imperialism It is capitalist exploitation and competition at the global scale. It is a process where monopolies (e.g., MNCs) of advanced countries supported by their militarily powerful states and by international organizations (e.g., World Bank), exploit the workers and small-scale producers of less developed countries with militarily weak states; imperialism also involves the big business of advanced countries using politically enabled access to markets, labor and resources of less developed countries as a means of staying competitive internationally. Indigenous peoples They are the original inhabitants of a country, relative to all the ethnic groups who have settled in that country. The indigenous peoples have been coercively dispossessed of their land/resources by the settlers. They have thus experienced a severe erosion of their political sovereignty and of their cultures, which often have an element of collectivism and which are respectful of nature. Many indigenous peoples experience what is called internal colonialism, or elements of a colonial relationship. Oppression A relation/process in which one group excludes another group from access to what is considered conductive to a good standard of living. Signifying an attack on democratic rights of people, oppression can exist on the basis of such relations as race, gender, religion, ability, sexuality, language, location, and nationality. Power Extra-economic processes in which one person and a group of people (e.g., a class) makes another person or another group of people (or a class) do things that are against the latter’s interest and that they would not freely do. Race It is a set of relations rooted in perceptions of differences in skin color, whereby one race is discriminated against by another race, overtly or covertly. Racism is a set of ideas and practices that is informed by perceived racial differences, and that reflects racial inequality. Racism has informed colonialism and slavery, and typically enabled the super-exploitation (i.e., above-average exploitation) of racialized men and women in the hands of enterprise-owners. Race/racism hurts the racialized doubly: racial oppression and above-average class-exploitation. State A set of institutions which maintain order in a society. Developed historically with the emergence of class relations, the most fundamental role of the state in capitalist society is to maintain private property relations and general conditions for profit-making and to keep the exploited classes in place. Uneven Development (regional disparity) This refers to the fact that one region/country experiences a higher level of the development of productive forces than another region/country.

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Whites Sometimes synonymously used with Caucasian, this refers to a group of people with light skin color of more or less European descent. There is no scientific basis for dividing the world population into Whites and non-Whites, yet being White men or White women often become a source of certain privileges for them in relation to non-White men and women. This does not mean that every single White is an oppressor of non-Whites. White and Black men and women have a common interest in fighting together against racial (and gender) oppression and class-exploitation.

Internal colonialism refers to the relations of exploitation and domination between ethnically/culturally heterogeneous groups, within a sovereign territory. Or, as Chavez has put it: The internal colonialism theory (henceforward, the ICT) seeks to explain the subordinate status of a racial or ethnic group in its own land within a larger state that is dominated by different people. The ICT, according to Chavez, is the domestic version of the colonial (imperial) paradigm which includes formal colonialism, neocolonialism, postcolonialism, and borderlands theory, a paradigm that explains ethnic/ racial inequality across time and space, and suggests more appropriate solutions to that inequality than other theories. The theory was pioneered in the advanced country context (the United States) and in the global periphery (South America). After the formal end of colonialism by the 1940s–1960s in most parts of the world (note South America achieved formal decolonization much earlier), persistent poverty in the global periphery (i.e., the ex-colonies) remained, which could not be blamed (entirely) on colonialism. It was also increasingly clear that within the advanced world there were social groups (e.g., aboriginal peoples) who experienced material deprivation like most people in the ex-colonies did. Existing concepts such as dualistic economy (separate existence of traditional and modern sectors), rural–urban inequality, modernization, culture of poverty (blame-the-victim approach), and racial assimilation, were judged by progressive scholars (e.g., Gundre Frank) inadequate to explain these phenomena. What came to be known as the ICT was devised by scholars from multiple disciplines such as Sociology and Latino or Ethnic Studies, partly because of this inadequacy.

History of the Concept of Internal Colonialism The concept of internal colonialism has a long and multinational history. As early as 1944, William Du Bois, speaking in Haiti, asserted that African Americans were in a semicolonial status in the United States He prompted attempts by Black intellectuals to formally designate African Americans as a colonized people. Between 1960 and 1966, a new cohort of Black analysts and activists was inspired by writers, such as Fanon, by new postcolonial African leaders, including Nasser (Egypt) and Nyerere (Tanzania), and by other anticolonial activist writers, including Fidel Castro and Mao Zedong. Perhaps the best-known use of the concept of internal colonialism by political actors comes from the civil rights struggles in the United States. Malcolm X argued in a speech entitled “The Black Revolution” (1964) that America, as a colonial power, had colonized millions of Afro-Americans by depriving them of first-class citizenship and of civil and human rights. During the riots of 1967 in the United States, Martin Luther King characterized America’s Black ghettos as internal colonies. King observed that the slum was little more than a domestic colony which left its inhabitants dominated politically, exploited economically, segregated and humiliated in every possible manner. King’s and Malcolm X’s vocabulary would soon also be taken up by the Black Panthers who proclaimed in their 10-Point Platform and Program that they wanted land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, and peace. They also demanded a United Nations-supervised plebiscite in the black colony in which only black colonial subjects would be allowed to participate. What is known as the classical academic theory of internal colonialism as it applied to the United States is represented by the work of Blauner, Allen, and Barrera, among others. Like the views of political activists, academic ideas about internal colonialism were also developed during the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States. Robert Blauner has compared the Black people of the United States to the exploited masses of the Third World. He has asserted that African Americans constituted an internal colony within the United States and that they require political and economic independence from the dominance of the ruling Whites. According to Blauner, Blacks are a minority of a different kind: a permanent minority, an oppressed people, a colonized group. Blauner viewed the Black ghetto as a major device of Black colonization and the geographical locus of the colony. The White dominance was established by force to secure the labor of colonized people for the least desirable jobsdones that White people would not accept. Blauner extended the ICT beyond African Americans to encompass Mexican Americans and Indigenous peoples. He focused on the features common to both external colonialism and internal colonialism: compulsory entry of the colonized into a dominant civilization; transformation/destruction of Indigenous culture by the colonizing power; management and manipulation of the colonized by dominant power representatives; racism, whereby a population seen as biologically inferior by a more powerful population group is dominated, abused, and subjugated socially and psychologically by the more powerful group; and division of occupations between the dominant and subordinate populations. Robert Allen has presented a colonized people’s academic perspective on internal colonialism, pointing to how Black America was being transformed (at the time of his writing) from a colonial nation into a neocolonial nation, the latter subjected to the will

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and domination of White America. In other words, Black America was undergoing a process similar to that experienced by many colonial countries. Allen has noted that the colonized Blacks, like people in colonized countries, were prevented from developing a strong bourgeois middle class engaged in widespread economic activity and competing with the White masters. Allen said that the Blacks were restricted to performing unskilled labor in the production of raw materials (e.g., cotton) for sale in northern mills and foreign countries. According to Allen, since the American Civil War (1861–65), the Black community has been primarily working class, along with a very weak Black bourgeoisie, which included both petty bourgeois and capitalist elements. With the 1960s Black rebellions, there arose a need to coopt the Black Power Movement on the basis of an alliance between the White corporate sector and Black capitalists. An expanded “new” Black bourgeoisie was needed to manage the internal colony and supervise the institutions of governmentdincluding welfare, education, and public safety (police, courts, and prisons)dwhere mostly White functionaries had previously operated. For many decades, this arrangement reduced White America’s reliance on physical force to maintain its domination. As Allen has explained in a recent article, beginning in the late 1960s in the United States, a neocolonial situation was developing in the relationship between Whites and Blacks, motivated by the fact that, with the rise of Black Power militancy and the urban rebellions, the White power structure, locally and nationally, experienced a political crisis. As a result, the Whites sought to maintain their hegemony by replacing direct White control of the internal Black colony with indirect neocolonial control. This neocolonial control occurred through black intermediary groups, much as in the era of national independence struggles classic colonialism gave way to neocolonialism in the Third World. Direct White control was the policy of the conservative, segregationist, Southern ruling class; by contrast, indirect neocolonial control was the policy of the liberal White power structure of the North. By developing a class of Black professionals, politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople, an intermediary class was developed as a buffer to be coopted by the Whites to act on their behalf in controlling African-American communities. Another aspect of this neocolonial strategy, Allen noted, was a systematic plan for police repression and state violence directed against revolutionary nationalists and Black radical groups such as SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] and the Black Panthers. The neocolonial model suggested that only members of the Black middle class would have the possibility of (partial) assimilation, and that racial (and class) conflict would continue despite gains for some sectors of the Black middle class. William Tabb also saw the relation between the Black ghetto, as an internal colony, and the White society in terms of economic control and exploitation and political dependence and subjugation. (He did, however, acknowledge that this approach was not entirely adequate because exploitation and subjugation were not unique to internal colonialism.) Mario Barrera has applied the ICT to Chicanxs in the United States, considering how colonialism and racism derived from the material interests of elite Anglos: Internal colonialism served the interests of the dominant class among the noncolonized population. Barrera said that colonial oppression of Chicanxs did not benefit the White workers, while it meant that Chicanxs formed subordinate sections of each class (workers and the dominant class). Outside of the United States, Casanova, Stavenhagen, and others began the discussion on the internal colony as a part of a renewal of Marxism in Latin America during the 1960s to explain social problems of postcolonial societies in terms of, at least in part, the colonial heritage of these societies. Casanova was a Marxist who took nonclass social relations seriously. Pablo González Casanova became the first scholar to describe internal colonialism inside countries of the global periphery. Casanova focused on the abuses that Indigenous peoples suffered at the hands of Spaniards and criollos inside Mexico. Critical of modernization and dependency, Casanova said that internal colonialism corresponded to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous groups. He added that the colonial structure and internal colonialism are distinguished from the class structure since colonialism (and by implication, internal colonialism) is not only a relation of exploitation of the workers by the capitalists and their collaborators, but also a relation of domination and exploitation of a total population, i.e., the colonized, with its distinct classes, proprietors, workers, by another population with its own distinct class structure. Like Casanova, Rudolfo Stavenhagen, who considered the former as his teacher, employed the concept of internal colonialism to gain insight into the sociocultural and political/economic dynamics of less developed countries. Stavenhagen has argued that the pattern of capitalist domination–subordination generally involves not only economic classes and geographic regions but also ethnic groups. He has maintained that this was particularly the case when, in the postcolonial ethnocratic state, social class divisions happen to coincide or overlap with ethnic (linguistic, cultural, religious, racial) distinctions because of a particular colonial and postcolonial history. Thus, the pattern of ethnic stratification that we encounter in so many countries today is the expression of a deeper structural relationship that we may call internal colonialism. The internal colonialism theory traveled to Europe from the Americas, when a North American scholar, Michael Hechter, applied it to the “Celtic fringe” (Ireland, Scotland, and Wales) of the United Kingdom and thus, by extension, to other long-established European states. Hechter argued that Britain’s Celtic fringe had been denied full industrial development as a result of a “cultural division of labor” (CDL), which is a system where cultural distinctions are superimposed on class divisions (one ethnic group is the capitalist class while another such group is the working class). Hechter countered the diffusionist model, in which development spread from core to peripheral areas. He suggested instead that the channeling of certain peoples into the hierarchical CDL under colonial administrations led to the development of ethnic identities that superseded class, as life chances increasingly depended on ethnic membership. This “internal colonialism” is predicated upon the unequal rates of exchange between the urban power-centers and the peripheral, often ethnic, hinterlands.

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The theory also traveled “Down Under,” when in 1978 Mervyn Hartwig applied it to Aboriginal peoples in Australia. Hartwig said that ideological and political domination over Aborigines relates to the specific modes of exploitation of Aboriginal societies, suggesting that there is an intersection of relations of class with those of race/ethnicity.

Recent Conceptual and Empirical Developments Some recent attempts at revisiting the ICT and applying it to new contexts are mentioned in what follows. In 2005, Allen reapprised his 1960s contribution. In his reappraisal, he explored how his neocolonial model evolved within African America. He noted two distinct post-1960s economic trends. On the one hand, the Black bourgeoisie has become increasingly integrated into corporate America even as the underclass faces a postindustrial social wasteland of joblessness and increasing hardships; on the other, independent Black capitalists have become increasingly marginalized, as many White corporations have begun assertively courting the Black community as a market. There has been an explosion of the Black managerial sectordthat is, of Black people with MBAs who have been highly trained in corporate administration and business skills. Of course, this training is also quite useful for the administration of the internally colonized. Furthermore, the 30 years of advances in electoral politicsdfrom a few hundred elected officials to over 9000 by the 1990sdhave been overshadowed by the ability of the corporatists to keep Black political aspirations expressed primarily within the Democratic Party rather than responsive to colonized Black communities. Building on a survey of internal colonialism, Pinderhughes (2011) has offered what he called a new geofocused ICT. This theory entails: (1) defining colonialism as a geographically based pattern of subordination of a differentiated population with each geographically separate territory as a distinct colony; (2) applying a class analysis for sociologically diagramming class interests and dynamics; (3) describing a colonized people’s continuous development from the start of their subjection to the present; (4) including gender, sexual orientation, and other dimensions of social oppression; (5) outlining the colony’s division of labor as it relates to the dominant country’s economy; (6) identifying three major ways to abolish a colony: collective assimilation, ethnic cleansing, and positive abolition; (7) seeking commonality with other theories of oppression; and (8) elaborating a framework that presses for maintaining historical and political context in the critical discussions on internal colonialism. There have also been several attempts to apply the theory to many other societies beyond the original contexts in which the theory was developed as well as to apply the theory to its old contexts in ways that consider more recent empirical developments. There is space here for citing three examples from India, China, and the federal trust lands in the United States, respectively. According to Walker (2008, 558–59), contemporary India is characterized by an internal colonization of the poor through which the Indian state has expropriated the land and resources of rural dwellers and transferred them to both domestic and international capital. The state and by private landholders’ use of officially sanctioned criminal violence against the rural poor, in the neoliberal context, forms the political and social corollary to the economic internal colonization of the poor. Sinha has explained underdevelopment of an Indian state (i.e., Bihar, in Eastern India) in terms of internal colonialism expressed as the concentration of economic and political power at the Center (see Corbridge (1987) for a critique of the application of internal colonialism model to regions such as Jharkhand, India). In China, according to Gladney (1998), the expropriation of Xinjiang’s vast mineral and petrochemical resources and its sale on the international market appear to fit the internal colonialism model. The Uyghur in Xinjiang, in addition to other Indigenous peoples such as Tibetans, now labeled as minority nationalities, have been turned into internal colonial subjects. Palmer and Rundstrom have argued that “Indian Country” in the United States has long been riven with the governmental and corporate institutions of a settler society pursuing a policy of internal colonization administered by the BIA (US Bureau of Indian Affairs). The US government’s publicly declared “goal of using GIS to improve the resource management” was secondary to the mission of perpetuating the agency and the colonial agenda it is assigned within the US government. GIS deployment in “Indian Country” proceeded by following an internal colonial model featuring misuse of funds, top-down policy impositions without consultation, and the maintenance of Indigenous peoples’ dependency by repeated efforts to sustain the BIA’s position as an obligatory point of control.

Claims About the Mechanisms (Dynamics) of Internal Colonialism: A Synthesis It is now possible to synthesize ideas concerning internal colonialism’s mechanisms as represented in the literature. Economically, internal colonies include those populations who produce primary goods for urban markets and/or who constitute a source of cheap labor for enterprises controlled from the cities and/or who constitute a market for the products and services of urban centers. The internally colonized are excluded from participation, or suffer discriminatory participation, in the political, cultural, and other institutions of the dominant society. Internal colonial relations involve both class and nonclass relations of inequality (in their spatial

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form). And because of these, the internally colonized, in the Global South, experience subsistence economy, technological backwardness, lack of essential services, and lower quality of life. For some scholars, the relationship of internal colonialism is dominantly class-based. The internally colonized are exploited through pre-/noncapitalist relations (feudalism, slavery, forced and salaried work, peonage) and through various forms of primitive accumulation. They are also exploited through capitalist relations. The ethnically dominant groups, such as mestizos in Latin America, extract surplus from the region’s Indigenous inhabitants by buying cheap and selling dear (thereby ensuring the prevalence of unequal exchange) and by charging extremely high interest rates on loans. Where wage relations exist, many in the internal colony are forced to sell their labor power to the ethnically dominant employers for a wage that fails to cover subsistence costs. Thus, the internally colonized Indigenous communities sell commodities, including labor power, below value to others. Stavenhagen has explained that the extraction of surplus from Indigenous inhabitants furthers accumulation. Internal colonialism in many parts of the Global South represents the processes in which the hegemonic mode of production, that is, dependent capitalism, subordinates precapitalist modes of production in rural areas, and thus the Indigenous inhabitants (as workers and as petty producers) involved in these modes of production. The relations of exploitation can take geographical forms. Internal colonialism (in South America) refers to a geographical relationship between a few poles of growth and the rest of the country. This is a relationship that was established during the region’s colonial period. Internal colonial relationship both leads to and reflects a process of economic and social polarization between different geographical areas within a country. The development of the growth poles (developed urban regions; productive agricultural areas) leads to underdevelopment of poor regions. Big cities (which are also seats of administration) control credit and commerce and exploit South America’s Indian communities through unequal exchange and usurious interest rates, thus furthering decapitalization of rural areas. The economy dominated by ethnically dominant is capitalistic and dynamic. The economy of the internal colony is stagnant and is embedded in precapitalist, capitalist and noncapitalist relations. The dynamism of the former, according to the ICT, is made possible by exploitation of the latter. Internal colonialism is not just about “economic” exploitation, however. It is also about a relation of oppression (or exclusion). The internally colonized are culturally oppressed though stereotypes held by dominant sections and are subjected to discrimination and violence.

Critical Assessment The number of published works employing the term internal colonialism has relatively declined (with the exception of its application to Indigenous peoples) since the 1980s; however, the concept is still extensively used as a theoretical tool in the academic literature. The ICT challenges the dualistic ideas of modernization theory (which includes the idea that the traditional sector will become modern over time). It usefully explores the link between class and nonclass relations such as ethnicity/race. It is said to challenge “orthodox” Marxism for its (apparently) exclusive focus on class. Chavez has said that as compared to other theories, the ICT explains better colonialism within national borders. Chavez adds that the ICT explains more clearly the unequal relations between ethnic groups, so it deserves further application by scholars. Allen, a pioneer of the ICT, has said that criticisms of the ICT do not negate its usefulness, particularly in its neocolonial formulation. He says that the theory’s applicability has grown more evident, as it has enormous implications for analyzing the present situations of Native Americans, Latinos, Chicanxs, Asian-Americans, and other colonized/racialized communities. Allen also says that the articulation of the concept of coloniality of power within the ICT can contribute toward the development of a global paradigm of the colonial relationship and thus provide a deeper theoretical understanding of the powerful resistance on the part of the world’s subaltern communities and nations. No theory is above criticism. The ICT is not an exception. Hind has concluded that the ICT offers far too many explanations and makes too many deductions in an ad hoc or an ex post facto manner. Furthermore, Hind has argued that the ICT mistakenly implies an improbable degree of cohesion and identity among specific social groups, oversimplifying complex social structures and relationships. Blauner was also disturbed by the faddiness in the literature and by the fact that many social scientists applied the idea in a mechanical manner. Harold Wolpe has said that the ICT tends to treat ethnic relations as autonomous of class relations. One entire population is said to subjugate another. Therefore, class distinctions are ignored within each of the populations, within the ICT. The major division in society is not social-political division between Indians and non-Indians within South America (or more generally, between the internal-colonizer and the internally colonized), but the class division between owners and nonowners of means of production. Some workers belonging to the ethnically dominant group may benefit from the surplus appropriated from Indigenous inhabitants, but the workers do not own means of production and possess extra-economic power to exploit and subjugate the internally colonized. There are also cultural differences within the Indigenous community so they are not culturally homogenous vis-à-vis the ethnically dominant group. Kay has said, the key to the concept is the relation of domination and exploitation between two ethnic groups. The actual ethnic, social, cultural, and even geographical elements are not central to the mechanisms of internal colonialism but facilitate (pre-/noncapitalist) exploitation and political and cultural domination.

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To the extent that internal colonial relation is an aspect of class relations, how do we distinguish between the two? It is more appropriate to talk about class relations than colonial relations insofar as capitalism is the dominant mode of production in the country, and insofar as the forms of exploitation that are said to persist within internal colonies are common and apply to nonIndigenous groups as well. It is valid to talk about colonial relations when extra-economic coercion accompanies these forms of exploitation and would not otherwise exist. The under-stressed political dimension of extra economic coercion is a key element in defining internal colonialism. Wolpe has said that in certain circumstances, within the boundaries of a given state, capitalism may develop predominantly by means of its relationship to noncapitalist modes of production. When this occurs, the mode of political domination and the content of legitimizing ideologies assume racial, ethnic, and cultural forms, and for the same reasons as in the case of external colonialism or imperialism. In cases such as Wolpe is describing above, the political domination assumes a colonial form, the precise nature of which depends on the specific mode of exploitation of the noncapitalist society. Reflecting on the Canadian situation, Hicks echoed Wolpe’s complaint that simply invoking the concept of internal colonialism is no substitute for a careful analysis of the specific modes of exploitation occurring at any given time and place, and for a careful theorization of the intersections of class with ethnicity which occur as a result of the combined and uneven development of capitalism. The ICT has been applied to Aboriginal peoples in Canada. But these scholars assume that Aboriginal and White populations are homogeneous groups, and thus this assumption reifies the two categories and ignores class interests. In other words, the ICT assumes that all Whites have an interest in maintaining an internal colonial relationship with Aboriginal peoples, and that all Aboriginal peoples have the same economic, social and political interests that revolve around resistance to internal colonialism. An underlying assumption of the ICT is that peripheral regions, which tend to coincide with the areas where ethnically subordinated peoples live and work, in a country will always be necessary to fuel the capitalist system. What the ICT disregards is the possibility of the important role played by technological change, at least in the advanced capitalist center of the economy; that is, it disregards the possibility that workers can produce more surplus value in its relative form (when they produce more every hour relative to their wages). Indeed, many scholars who advocate the ICT fail to consider the possibility of the demisedor a serious weakening ofdinternal colonialism, with the further development of capitalist relations. The process of weakening of internal colonialism is subject to contradictory forces, and how these forces play out is a historical–geographical question. The ICT is based on the idea that the dominant ethnic group has a vested interest in maintaining internal colonialism. However, this belief is mistaken: as capitalist relations developed and penetrated into remoter regions (e.g., in Mexico from the 1850s onwards), class relations based on capitalism entered into conflicts with colonial relations based on either mercantile relations or exploitation through extra-economic means. To the extent that internal colonialism is based on the appropriation of unfree labor of Indigenous inhabitants, and to the extent that nominally free wage labor may be more appropriate (that is, more profitable) than unfree labor, internal colonialism may weaken. It is mainly those enterprises of the ethnically dominant groups whose technology has lagged behind and who use cheap forced labor, who may be interested in internal colonial relations. Further, the weakening of internal colonialism may happen through class differentiation within the internally colonized community, beginning with the development of petty commodity production in rural areas. Political struggles for land, better working conditions, and full political participation also can contribute to the demise of internal colonialism. The internally colonized may adopt cultural lifestyles of the ethnically dominant as a means of breaking out from the Indian communities of South America in search for jobs in cities and can thus contribute to the breakdown of internal colonialism. State-led agrarian reforms, including state investment in internal colonies (presumably under political pressure from the rural population including the Indigenous inhabitants), can lead to the closure of the gap between them and the rest of the society. Kay has said that applying internal colonialism to analyze regional disparities in the developed world is problematic because the precapitalist social relations of production and exploitation no longer exist in any meaningful sense there and because most have never been colonies of an imperialist country in modern history. Analogies are valuable in social analysis insofar as they summarize and illuminate certain features of the subject under investigation. One such analogy is Tabb’s “colonial analogy”between the situation of purported internal colonies, such as Central Appalachia, and that of colonized countries, which has been stimulating and fruitful for scholars who seek to understand the problems of the ethnically subordinated groups in various countries of the postcolonial world. But analogies, while providing insights into some aspects of reality, can obscure or distort others. A loose analogy is no substitute, in the long run, for a precise theory that can lead to more detailed investigations. In fact, as Wald says, there was never any agreement as to whether “internal colonialism” was primarily a metaphor or a description of objectively existing economic relations. Walls has argued that the ICT as applied to places such as Central Appalachia needs to be superseded by a model of peripheral regions within an advanced capitalist society. Theory is expected to be a guide to action. The ICT has been found deficient on this ground. According to Kay, a central weakness of the theory is that it contains a hope for liberation from oppression and exploitation through ethnic, cultural, and national autonomy (also see Tabb, 1974). It can be used to raise political consciousness, but it cannot fulfill that goal. Structural conditions for establishing a separate state do not exist in most situations, as most internal colonies are heavily dependent on the national capitalist system. Interestingly, Blauner, one of the originators of the theory, has given up on using the ICT in his more recent writings and the reason for this is political. Blauner says that in the mid-1970s he stopped using the colonial analogy. The theory of overseas colonialism pointed to a practical solution: the colonizers could be sent

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back to Europe, and for the most part they were. But Blauner acknowledged that he could find no parallel solution for America’s domestic colonialism. Such disconnect between theory and practice suggested to him an inherent flaw in the ICT itself. Similarly, Walls has said that taking the term “colony” in its strongest sensedthat is, as a suppressed nationdwould imply that the Appalachian region should either be an independent nation-state or should become a new state inside the United States. Another implication of the ICT is that locals should own coal companies, but this raises the question: Would the region really be better off if all these companies were owned by the local millionairesda sort of bourgeois decolonizationdinstead of the national and international energy corporations? If the main reason for Appalachia’s economic backwardness is the private ownership of the coal industry, then this suggests the possibility of public ownership, perhaps even limited to a regional basis. If the problem is defined as capitalism more generally, then the alternative would be some form of socialism that would go far beyond the nationalization or Appalachianization of the coal industry. And this is suggested by an alternative theory to the ICT that sees the region as a peripheral region within an unevenly developing advanced capitalist society. This critical stance toward the ICT was suggested by Gonzalez decades ago: the ICT lumps all strata of White society, uncritically, into one incoherent mass and treats class struggle as secondary to national liberation of ethnically/racially oppressed groups, where oppression was thought to be based on racist attitude rather than on material interests. Commenting on the situation in South Africa, Alex Callinicos has raised a similar concern. According to him, the ICT suggests that since Black South Africa is a nation colonized by the Whites, then all its classes should unite to win their political independence. According to him, the ICT is a piece of bizarre fantasy. South Africa is the most highly industrialized country in Africa, whose population, Blacks and Whites, has been increasingly proletarianized over the past century. The South African Communist Party is mistaken to think that this capitalist social formation is in fact two societies, one White, the other Black, each with its own distinct class structure, related primarily through Whites’ colonial domination of Blacks. Callinicos says that this suggestion is preposterous and flies in the face of the research by South African Marxists, which has showed how the institutions of racial domination were first created and have since been reshaped over the years in order to meet the needs of the different fractions of South African capital. In conclusion: Like many theories that highlight nonclass relations of oppression, the ICT successfully draws attention to one of these: colonial relations inside a sovereign nation/territory. And unlike many other theories of nonclass relations, the ICT highlights the geographically uneven aspects of society. But drawing attention to a problem is one thing; adequately explaining its origin and dynamics, and saying what is to be done about it, is another.

See Also: Capital and Space; Capitalism; Colonialism; Development; Modernization Theory; Neocolonialism; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Allen, R., 2005. Reassessing the internal (NEO) colonialism theory. Black Sch. 35 (1), 2–11. Blauner, R., 1969. Internal colonialism and ghetto revolt. Soc. Probl. 16 (4), 393–408. Blauner, B., 2001. Still the Big News: Racial Oppression in America. Temple University Press, Philadelphia. Casanova, P., 1965. Internal colonialism and national development. Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 1, 27–37. Chavez, J., 2011. Aliens in their native lands: the persistence of internal colonial theory. J. World Hist. 22 (4), 785–809. Corbridge, S., 1987. Industrialization, internal colonialism and ethnoregionalism: the Jharkhand, India, 1880–1980. J. Hist. Geogr. 13 (3), 249–266. Das, R., 2018. Marxist Class Theory for a Skeptical World. Haymarket, Chicago. Gladney, D., 1998. Internal colonialism and China’s Uyghur Muslim Minority. ISIM Newsl. Retrieved from: https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/16734/ISIM_1_ Internal_Colonialism_and_China-s_Uyghur_Muslim_Minority.pdf?sequence¼1. Hartwig, M., 1978. Capitalism and aborigines: the theory of internal colonialism and its rivals. In: Wheelwright, E.L., Buckley, K. (Eds.), Essays in the Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, vol. 3. Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Brookvale, pp. 119–141. Hechter, M., 1975. Internal Colonialism the Celtic Fringe in British National Development. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Hicks, J., 2004. On the application of theories of internal colonialism to Inuit societies. In: Presentation for the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg. Retrieved from: http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Hicks.pdf. Hind, R., 1984. The internal colonial concept, comparative studies. Soc. Hist. 26 (3), 543–568. Kay, C., 1989. Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. Routledge, New York. McRoberts, K., 1979. Internal colonialism: the case of Québec. Ethn. Racial Stud. 2, 293–318. Palmer, M., Rundstrom, R., 2013. GIS, internal colonialism, and the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 103 (5), 1142–1159. Peckham, R., 2004. Internal colonialism: nation and region in nineteenth-century Greece. In: Todorova, M. (Ed.), Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory. New York University Press, New York, pp. 41–59. Pinderhughes, C., 2011. Toward a new theory of internal colonialism. Social. Democr. 25, 235–256. Qayum, S., 2002. Nationalism, internal colonialism, and the spatial imagination: the geographic society of La Paz in turn-of-the-century Bolivia. In: Dunkerley, J. (Ed.), Studies in the Formation of the Nation State in Latin America. University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, London, pp. 275–298. Sinha, S., 1973. The Internal Colony: A Study in Regional Exploitation. Sindhu Publications, New Delhi. Stavenhagen, R., 1965. Classes, colonialism, and acculturation. Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 6 (1), 53–77. Tabb, W.K., 1974. Marxian Exploitation and Domestic Colonialism: A Reply to Donald J. Harris. Retrieved from: http://inctpped.ie.ufrj.br/spiderweb/dymsk_5/5.2-2%20Tabb.pdf. Wald, A., 1981. The culture of internal colonialism: a Marxist perspective. Melus 8 (3), 18–27. Walker, K., 2008. Neoliberalism on the ground in rural India: predatory growth, agrarian crisis, internal colonialism and the intensification of class struggle. J. Peasant Stud. 35 (4), 557–620.

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Walls, D.S., 2014. Internal Colony or Internal Periphery? A Critique of Current Models and an Alternative Formulation. Retrieved from: http://web.sonoma.edu/users/w/wallsd/pdf/ Internal-Colony.pdf. Wolpe, H., 1975. The theory of internal colonialism: the South African case. In: Oxaal, I., Barnett, T., Booth, D. (Eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, pp. 229–252.

Relevant Websites Pambazuka News. The question of ‘internal colonialism’ https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/question-%E2%80%98internal-colonialism%E2%80%99. Black Agenda Report. Black History Month and The Unspoken Nature of Internal Colonialism. A Black Agenda Radio commentary by editor and columnist Jared A. Ball https:// blackagendareport.com/content/black-history-month-and-unspoken-nature-internal-colonialism. Global Research. America's Internal Colonialism https://www.globalresearch.ca/america-s-internal-colonialism/32074.

Communist and Postcommunist Geographies Judit Tima´r, Center for Economic and Regional Studies, Békéscsaba, Hungary; and Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Forces of Production/Productive Forces The forces of production are the forms in which nature and raw materials are appropriated and used in the labor process. The productive forces are the unity of means of production and labor (with the mental and physical capabilities and experiences of human being exercised in labor process). Means of Production The unity of the instruments and the subject of labor. Mode of Production The method of producing the necessities of life. It is the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production. At a certain stage of their development, the productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production. This conflict is the economic basis of social revolution and leads to change in the entire society. Classic Marxist texts describe the historical sequence of modes of production such as capitalism which gives way to socialism. Relations of Production The objective material relations formed between all people in the process of social production, exchange, and distribution of material wealth. The basis of these relations is ownership of the means of production. While capitalist property is a form of private property, social property appears in the form of public or state property in socialism and cooperative and community property in communism.

“Scientific communism”, which isdin addition to dialectical, historical materialism, and political economydan important part of Marxism and Leninism, posits that it is inevitable that communism should replace capitalism and explores the possible forms a socialist–communist society might assume. Notwithstanding the various meanings which attend to the idea of communism and the various strands and strains of scientific communism which exist, geographies which: (1) use the theoretical framework and concepts of scientific communism (socialism) to study geographic issues; (2) provide support for a communist social and economic formation (mode of production) and for social and political movements fighting for such a society and/or; (3) are institutionalized geographies cultivated in countries building state socialism (communism), can be regarded as “communist geographies”. Considering the fact that the characteristics of communist geography, which later evolved into postcommunist (postsocialist) geography, can best be studied in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern European countries, which turned Marxism into a state ideology and which were later characterized by a postsocialist (postcommunist) social order, this article documents communist and postcommunist geographies in this region.

Scientific Communism and Communist Geography We can hardly speak of communist geography as an approach that is linked to Marx’s theory of scientific communismdeither in the “Eastern” or in the “Western” geographies with different interpretations of Marxism, bearing varying relations to Marx’s ideas themselves. Geographers for example have long advocated for forms of “anarchist communism”. The most powerful advocate of anarchist communism was Russian theoretician and geographer Peter Kropotkin. Published at the turn of the 20th Century, his works argued against both political and economic centralization. They cherished the idea of communities operating on the principle of cooperation and mutual support, where the “mess” of the people will organize itself by itself. But anarchist communism is diametrically opposed to the Marxist Leninist interpretation of state-level “authoritarian communism”. More recently, from the 1970s there has arisen a tradition of Marxist Geography which not only has brought Marxism into geography, but which has also put geographical perspectives into Marxism. However, not even this school is labeled as communist; rather, it is referred to as Marxist geography, with the adjective “Western” used for the sake of clarity and in order to set it apart from the geography cultivated in state socialist countries in the East. Followers of Marxist geography primarily use political economy and dialectical and historical materialism proposed by Marxismdfor example, David Harvey has almost single handedly created a completely new “historical geographical materialism”. But this tradition has not dug deeply enough into the theory of scientific communism or the workings of state socialist regimes, toward which they adopted a critical attitude. In fact geography in state socialist countries was more technocratic rather than radical. It failed to lead to any powerful theory that could have resulted from bringing scientific communism into geography. Paradoxically, the writing of radical theories was foiled mainly by the very totalitarian systems that were built upon purportedly radical principles. The ruling communist party, reiterating the need to build socialism (communism), turned to the theory of scientific communism and Marxism Leninism as a whole in order to justify its own existence. Justification, however, came at the price of distorting Marx’s original theory. In general, the end

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of Stalinism also marked the end of an era when social sciences had to meet strict criteria and were under close scrutiny. However, the picture was far more subtle. Brought about by the popular movements/revolutions of the mid-1950s in GDR, Poland and Hungary, the Prague uprising in 1968 and the cultural revolution in China, changes, which differed from one country to the next also affected geography and geographical practices. Especially in the Stalinist era, but several decades later as well, as attested to by the works of significant researchers, geography contributed to a state-level corruption of Marxism and Leninism. One of the most frequent manifestations of such corruption was the permanent use of the terminology of scientific communism and, in a broader sense, that of Marxism and Leninism. Thus, for instance, the word “population” in a demographic analysis was only too readily replaced with “the forces of production”. Likewise, terms such as “mode of production”, “relations of production,”, or “territorial division of labor” were used ubiquitously in literature. Sentence starters like “In compliance with the requirements of our socialist society .." were often prescribed by the Communist Party or used simply as propaganda sound bites or as declarations of a sense of belonging (the use of the various forms of the first person plural was common) and personal commitment. It was perhaps the political economic approach of Marxism that impacted the geographies written in state socialist countries the most. Human geography was replaced with economic geography from the outset. Industrial, agrarian, settlement and population geographies were, as a rule, regarded as subdisciplines of economic geography. Attention was focused if at alldin some countries social and cultural geographies were simply nonexistent on production, in connection with a materialist weltanschauung and the political practice of forced industrialization. It was a common “belief” that the development of the productive sectors would automatically lead to the development of the nonproductive ones, improve living conditions, and resolve the problem of social reproduction. Research focused on structures, especially on the macroscale. Locational analyses and quantitative modeling of the optimal regional allocation of production with a command economy perspective put had the most far-reaching influence in socialist countries. Theories of the “territorial productive complex” (TPC) and economic regions (rayons), worked out in the Soviet Union, also “reached” other countries, though their feasibility was the subject of heated debates. In contrast to Marxist geography in Western countries, geography in state socialist countries did not participate in the conceptualization of the issues of class relations. Although descriptions of social structures were “sneaked into” demographic analyses, changes in the ratio of the working classes to peasantry in agricultural co-operatives (and those in their living standards) were presented in academic literature from the 1970s and the 1980s alongside how these changes were interconnected with industrialization and urbanization these were the “hottest” topics of the era. At best, geography refrained from going into detail regarding the “individualism of the peasantry” or the “unprogressiveness of villages.” Marx did not “promise” an equal standard of living for the socialist stage, since it was division according to the principle of labor rather than that of needs that prevailed. Nevertheless, official party ideology made egalitarianism into one of its high-sounding slogans. This is very likely to be one of the reasons why the Marxist theory of uneven development was not further elaborated during state socialism. Whenever regional backwardness was identified, it was not its underlying drivers that were to the fore. The fact that certain elements of the capitalist mode of production prevailed for a while was considered to be a natural outcome of the laws of dialectics. Therefore, whenever backward regions/ settlements were studied, it was development opportunities rather than the causes of backwardness on which attention was focused, thereby offering opportunities for the state and for central planning. There were countries where debates pointing out the negative role of the state were conducted, as was the case in Hungary in the 1980s in the case of sociologists Szelényi, Manchin and Ferge. However, geographical experiences did not feature in such debates. The above debates focused on whether market mechanisms offset inequalities generated by the state in the socialist era, or whether they added their own inequalities. To give Marxist theoreticians their due, it should be noted that those (e.g., Lukács, Bloch, Kołakowski, Ðilas) whose oeuvres proved to be influential, found themselves in confrontation with the ruling orthodoxy: they were deported, imprisoned, or forced to emigrate from their home countries.

Communist (Socialist) Geography Supporting the Building of State Socialism Marxism strives to both understand and change the surrounding world. Since the overthrow of capitalism was no longer a topical issue in state socialism, during the Stalin era and the Cold War, struggle against “bourgeois pseudosciences” and the building of a socialist society were assigned as tasks to sciences. The latter task (i.e., the building of a socialist society) was in conformity with the tenet according to which Marxist Leninist epistemology was based in practice. Geography, too, would openly identify the satisfaction of the needs of society with the objective of “serving working people”. However, apart from activities aimed at popularizing sciences among workers, such services were a far cry from today’s people’s geography project initiated by Western Marxist and critical geographies. In fact, they mostly meant applied research for and in support of the state. From then on, only within the boundaries of the prevailing status quo was it possible to make any change. If there is a communist (socialist) geography, direct or indirect assistance with central planning is very likely to be its universal characteristic. Economic (human) geography was closely related to economic, regional and settlement network development and planning in several different ways. Atlases popularizing the 5-year plans of the “people’s economy”, empirical studies “laying down the geographical foundations of economic development” and theories and models that made the delimitation of economic regions possible were the chief “products” of the era. Staff at research institutions had to contribute to planning at various scales and some researchers were retained as experts. As tight political control

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was easing so some criticism was also voiced. Several countries adopted the Soviet experience in the participation of geography in the gigantic “transformation of nature” or at least references were made to such utilization of research. It was sometimes the case that geographers, not always making it a point of honor to refer to their sources, imported Western theories such as Christaller’s theory on the central place. In the 1970s and 1980s numerous studies (e.g., rural research and in Poland and Hungary and social geographic research of German and British origin with an eye on practical application) were carried out in Central and Eastern Europe, which did put forward proposals for improving the living conditions of those in need. No comprehensive evaluation of such studies or applied geographic studies is available as yet. But some of the retrospective theoretical studies in the postsocialist era assert that not only geographical expertise, but also expertise in social sciences in general was used as a tool for the legitimation of political power.

Geography in State Socialist Countries The term “communist” geography used as a synonym for “socialist” geography was the original “official” term used to set institutionalized geography in state socialist countries apart from other geographies. In this sense, all kinds of geography cultivated in those countries were socialist (communist). The authoritarian regimes “saw to it” that geography, and any discipline for that matter, was or at least looked ideologically consistent. The most universal characteristic of geographical knowledge produced in such a social environment was, therefore, its attitude toward the ruling powers, which profoundly affected the missions of geographical institutions. This institutional system was controlled and, hence, centralized by the state (the communist party). Institutes of geographic research which were spun off from universities and which were parts of the national academies of sciences were established. These institutes, oriented toward central planning for a people’s economy, worked according to national research plans. Academies were responsible for using a Soviet-type scientific rating system, which proved to be an efficient tool for state-controlled cultural policy to establish a cadre system in the profession as a whole. During the Stalinist era, geographers in several countries were severely criticized, stripped of their academic degrees, dismissed from work or arrested. As actual cases attest to it, reasons included a World War II role, religious affiliation, a statement negating socialist development (e.g., that a given country is an agrarian rather than an industrial-agrarian country), the use of a “bourgeois” approach (e.g., a morphologic rather than functional approach adopted in urban study), or incorporating locational theory from Western geographies. The scale of such “cleansing” was completely different in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary (in the latter country even the Geographic Society, operational since 1875, was banned), due to their roles in the war, from that in Poland, where access to Western literature was easier and which had a wider network of international relations. Soviet hegemony was felt nearly everywhere; for example, guest tutors and researchers contributed to the teaching and the research carried out by their hosts and published in their journals; studies published in the Soviet Union were translated and widely disseminated etc. Generally, the grip of this hegemony only slowly eased, except in China, which broke away from the Soviet Union completely, Yugoslavia, which also kept its distance, and later in Romania and Albania. With dictatorship becoming softer, the number of bilateral Western relations grew and, in addition to COMECON research, wider institutionalized co-operation in the International Geographic Union also played an important role. The separation of physical geography from economic (human) geography was also reflected in institutional fragmentation. The story of such “legal separation” and later their unification, requires political more than philosophical understanding. Since the spread of the dualist approach led to a breaking away from the presocialist tradition of unified geography in most countries, geographers turned from society–nature relations to Marxism for explanation. Explanation was provided by the fundamentally different laws that underlay the development of the phenomena in the ʻtwo geographies’ and the suspected dangers posed by environmental determinism in particular was branded as “bourgeois”. In the Khrushchev era, prompted by Anuchin, a major debate was sparked between “monists” and “dualists” in the Soviet Union. Finally, the party joined in the debate and declared that the rigid separation of nature from society was erroneous and of a “Stalinist nature”, expressing that such separation ran counter to (economic) planning interests. “Theoretical debates” had nearly nothing to do with philosophy proper. Rather, such debates were a reflection of a political power struggle. Both parties sought justification in the tenets of Marxism Leninism, the practical need for planning and the national geographies of the pre-Stalinist era. But they were led to different conclusions. At the time of a similar change in paradigms Romania rediscovered its national roots, and Mihailescu’s 1936 university textbook advocating the unified approach was reissued in 1969. For such, a change in orientation in the Soviet Union was necessary. Nevertheless, the explanation provided for a more recent reissuance of the book was also in line with Romania’s current regime’s concern with nationalism. The fact that, for instance, in China the balance between physical and human (economic) geography could not be restored can be ascribed to its complete confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is another indication that the dominance of physical geography being politically less risky prevailed in most state socialist countries even in the era of an integrative “constructive geography” and despite the spread of the anthropocentric approach of landscape and environmental research. It is hardly a coincidence that integrated landscape geographic research adopting a new system approach became one of the areas that challenged a descriptive static view. This, however, left the empirical or positivist nature of most human geographic research unaffected. The revamping and spread of quantitative methods also occurred in state socialist countries

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mainly in the 1960s and 1970s and due particularly to the weight of applied geography to which regional science quickly found its way. However, revamping failed to materialize in qualitative methods and social theories, except those of a Marxists Leninist hue.

Characteristics of the Postcommunist/postsocialist Geographies Unlike the term “communist geography”, “postcommunist/postsocialist geography” had a more unambiguous and more uniform meaning and gained more currency: it is used to refer to studies focusing on the geography of the new social order in ex-socialist countries. Considering the fact that 1989–1991 political changes in Central and Eastern Europe (CCE) and the Soviet Union occurred before communism had been reached (only the Soviet Union declared officially the reaching of the stage of full communism), it stands to reason that the adjective “postsocialist” was more frequently used than “postcommunist”.

The First Two Decades of Postsocialist Geographies in Postsocialist Countries Privatization, and the introduction of a market economy and multi-party democracy has changed the relationship of geographical knowledge production with political power in CEE countries. The length of time for political, economic and social transition to occur varied from one country to the next, which further differentiates emerging national human geographies of the former Soviet bloc. These geographies are in the state of transition themselves: trends after the political regime change were, in several countries, the organic continuation of the processes that started in the 1980s (or even earlier). In the early 1980s Kuklinski deemed developments in Polish geography to constitute a change in paradigm in which the issues/problems of economic, social and ecological crisis, spatial differentiation, new local and regional communities, the changing system of values, were now to be addressed/resolved with new methods and by using interdisciplinary relations. At an international meeting of the directors of academy-run geographic research institutions in September 1989, the representatives of several countries already put the tasks and situation of geography in the context of a “political and economic crisis”, “social movements”, and “perestroika”. By contrast, at the same meeting, a participant from Cuba emphasized the importance of the second edition of a national atlas and a Mongolian attendee pointed out, among other things, the weaknesses of the supply of cadres. In the countries of postsocialist transition, despite their differences, the first two decades of the transformation of human geography shared a few universal characteristics: (i) The relationship between economic and human geography became what it used to be: in effect they “reversed places” in terms of their weight, hierarchical relationship, and institutional background. Research institutes, no longer controlled by party politics, found themselves to be subject to market conditions. University faculties were reorganized in general, there was a marked change in direction, with everyone looking to the “West”. (ii) Human geography became more diverse and further specialized. There was also a renaissance of political geography, boosted by increasingly strong nationalism and as a revival of the traditions of “bourgeois geography”. Numerous geographers were rehabilitated and several areas of research that used to be off-limits (e.g., geography of religions) became again accepted. Charged with new political content, ethnic geography achieved high visibility. New subdisciplines emerged including, for example, tourism geography or election geography, which was inconceivable in the era of state socialism owing to the lack of free general elections. (iii) Democratization also paved the way for pluralism in philosophy and social theories. After the political regime change, challenging Marxism and Leninism rather than the emergence of unmistakably new trends was more common. Experience gained in the totalitarian regimes seemed to be supporting “value-neutral sciences”. “Situated” or “nonneutral” knowledge was not even raised as an issue to be debated. Social and cultural theories as fomenters were hardly able to penetrate into established geography. Critical geography was also hardly able to gain in popularity in part for the above reasons and in part because of the negative connotation associated with left-wing thinking in postsocialist countries. Some claim that characteristically postsocialist directions of development underlie shifts in views that are relatively comprehensive and in keeping with Western trends. One example that supports this claim is a shift from the earlier dominance of structuralism toward human agents, individuals, their spatial behavior as well as the cognitive and decision-making factors involved in such behavior. Underlying this trend is vigorous liberalism and a commitment to individualism. The latter was inspired under the new political circumstances by the need to “liberate” the individual oppressed by the socialist state. There was also a shift in the political economic focus in several countries. The simultaneous emergence/strengthening of cultural geography, however, was not a response to an increasingly self-conscious cultural policy. Nor was it inspired by identity-based postcolonial or environmental social movements, since such movements were rather weak. This is, in part, the reason why “new cultural geographies” in postsocialist countries were not linked to, for example, the homeless, the disabled or homosexuals whose spatiality was perceived to be rather narrow relative to dominant cultural realms. It focused on (mainly ethnic) groups that were “off-limits” in the socialist era.

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Relations of Postsocialist Geographies in the “East” and in the “West” in the First Two Decades There have always been researchers in the West who have taken an interest in studying state socialist countries. During the first decade of postsocialist transition, the Western versions of postsocialist geographies became institutionalized: in addition to a number of interdisciplinary institutes operational in several parts of the world, there was a Russian, Central Eurasian and East European Speciality Group in the Association of American Geographers and a Post-Socialist Geographies Research Group in the Royal Geographical Society and the Institute of British Geographers. These organizations helped to bring together scholars with an interest in post-socialist issues and organized East West workshops. Similar to their Eastern counterparts, members of these organizations also contributed to revealing the national and local characteristics of key social, political, and economic trends in postcommunist transition. However, while researchers in the West focused on for instance governance, power structure; socioeconomic and gender inequalities, social and cultural identities and marginalization, those in the East adopted a different approach to such issues, focusing mainly on regionalization, decentralization; regional, settlement inequalities; territorial identities, and; underdeveloped areas. Overall, though both “parties” adopted a wide variety of approaches to research on postsocialism, it seems that in postsocialist countries, at least in the first decades, few regarded geographical relations to be the outcome of social processes (and when they did, it was to a much lesser extent). Rather, they treated such relations as spatial patterns. One reason was the dominance of the concept of absolute space space as a container, space as separated from concrete social processes. Furthermore, the mapping of spatial patterns was of a quantitative nature. The fact that the development of qualitative methods was put on the back burner did not help strengthen the ʻsocialʼ in social geography. Attention was paid to the real material world rather than to symbolic space. There was also a strong social demand for sticking to reality and empiricism, the challenge being the understanding of a new era where the importance of mapping and documenting was higher priority than might be expected. The significance of applied geography not only remained, but in CCE it was also further strengthened because of regional European Union (EU) planning and because it was a source of income for many institutes. Applied geography, however, continued to be used in studies ordered mainly by the state. No studies were carried out in furtherance of social movements and in order to examine spaces of resistance. One of the benefits of shared interest in postsocialism and of joint East West projects is, among other things, that scholars now do examine such subject matters. Nevertheless, with Sovietization now of little relevance, criticism has been voiced concerning the dangers of a new colonializing of geographical knowledge from the West and a Western (and, within that, British and American) hegemony. The key starting point of research adopting such an approach is that postsocialist transition reshapes East and West alike and postsocialism is both an Eastern and Western phenomenon.

New Trends in Postsocialist Geography Combined with generational change and the rise of a new collection of geographers, new trends have evolved in geography in CCE and the former Soviet Union in the 2010s. The spread of left-wing and critical geography in the region was encouraged by the free movement of researchers and a free exchange of knowledge, international (mainly EU) projects and networking, and was further boosted by a shift toward the political right-wing by its having triggered a backlash. One manifestation of the spread of critical geography is the application of critical (and within that mainly neo-Marxist) social theories. This is reflected in, for instance, the spread of Lefebvre’s concept of space, the application of the theory of uneven spatial development, class-based studies and the usage of postcolonialist, poststructuralist, feminist, social, and environmental justice concepts. But pioneers have been required. It is no rare occurrence that the importer of a social theory-based approach is the only representative (intermediary) of that theory in geography in a given country, which makes the fight for the acceptance of that approach difficult (see, for instance, queer geography represented by Pito nák in the Czech Republic or critical disability geography represented by Fabula in Hungary). It is urban studies that seem to have embraced social theories the fastest and on the broadest basis. As researchers strove to understand the belated but spectacular spread of suburbanization and gentrification driven by the evolvement of market conditions, democratization and neoliberalization, a comparison of these spatial processes with their counterparts in the West and studies on the importability of the Western urban theories went without question. The topic of the debate is no longer the comparison of the ʻEastʼ and the “West”. For instance, the Eurasian Geography and Economics devoted a thematic issue to “postsocialist cities and urban theory”, a topic raising much more general conceptual questions. In this thematic issue, Ferencuhová and Gentile (2016) also voicing the opinions of many of their fellow researchers were critical of the still poor visibility of research on ʻpost-socialistʼ cities and of the lack of the impact of such research on international discourses. Nevertheless, this thematic issue also suggests that the debates of the past decades have encouraged some to raise issues that go beyond the pursuit of the nature of postsocialist cities. Today, some ask “What is the general relevance of the concept of post-socialism in social sciences?”. Accompanying the above changes, the occurrence of a social turn is unmistakable in the 2010s. Increasingly vocal criticism of the concept of absolute space has been a major contributor to such a turn. In line with a relational approach to conceiving of space (a much wider development in Geography), focus has been shifted onto how space is produced through social relations and practices; furthermore, research into symbolic space and spatial representation also became more frequent. Examples of the changes linked by changes in approaches include research on peripheralization replacing research on the dichotomy of center and periphery, and the disappearance of limiting the meaning of “border” to a physical border in border studies after the political regime change. In studies of everyday life, the household scale and the identification of the difficulties facing social groups exposed to social and spatial marginalization and peripheralization is receiving an increasingly strong focus in research, so the application of qualitative methods

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(for the time being, mainly various types of interviews and discourse analyses rather than participatory observation, or action research) has also started to gain ground. Due to the very novelty of these topics, approaches and methods, and given the lack of their application in some countries, studies presenting Western examples and their well-thought-out national adoption are published in order to encourage a change in approach. (See, e.g., a book on qualitative methods by Rochovska et al. (2007) and one on spatial theories edited by Faragó (2018) published in the language of the country of publication.) A new trend linked to the emergence of the various types of critical geography and reflecting a generational change in the geographical scholarly community is research supporting civil society and subordinated social groups as an alternative to technocratic applied geography reinforcing the current status quo and delivering state orders. Such research is often accompanied by political activism outside the academia. It aims at supporting movements (e.g., Right to the City) striving to protect the homeless against, for instance, neoliberal urban policies and evictions and those living in deep poverty in rural/urban areas undergoing ghettoization at a number of locations. Relationships between researchers of postsocialist geography in the East and those in the West have become so close since the 2010s that their results often cannot be separated or analyzed separately. One of the causes of such closeness is that, within the institutional network of the academia, under the pretext of the standardization of the qualifications of researchers, studies are now published in English even in long established national geographical journals. Another is that research networks linked to or organized outside international projects are undergoing professionalization. As a result, the number of joint publications has been on the increase, and as young researchers of post-communist geography now enjoy the freedom of movement between various research institutions, universities and even disciplines it is often difficult to identify who conducts postsocialist geographic studies and where. However, as long as the uneven power relations of geographical knowledge production and the uneven spatial development underlying them survive, emphasis on the uniqueness of geography as cultivated in former socialist countries continues to bear relevance even if it is not labeled as postcommunist or postsocialist. In addition to the economic disadvantages faced by academic institutions, increasingly strong political control over research funding endangering academic autonomy has become manifest in some countries in this decade. For instance, in Hungary the government’s ban on the pursuit of gender (and Marxist) studies is deflecting social geography from international trends yet again. Currently, the depth of the self-assessment indispensable for resistance that geographers living in former socialist countries can or willing to reach is a great challenge. Theoretical approaches like the decolonial option worked out in a non-Western context, then further elaborated by Tlostanova applying it to post-soviet circumstances, and also adopted by social geographic studies may serve as a tool and benchmark for such self-assessment. This approach enables “true intersectionality” between the “postcolonial” and the “postsocialist”, and discussions shaped jointly by equal parties to replace ready-made discourses based on Western ideas. Furthermore, it facilitates the stopping of the practice of self-colonization in geographical knowledge production.

See Also: Applied Geography; Capitalism and the Division of Labor; Capitalism; Cold War; Critical Geographies; Cultural Geography; Economic Geography; Ideology; Neoliberalism; Political Geography; Population Geography; Positivism/Positivist Geography; Post-Socialist Cities; Regional Science; Resistance; Second World; Situated Knowledge, Reflexivity; Social Class; Social Geography; Space; State; Structuralism/Structuralist Geography; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Demek, J., 1980. The geographical prognosis in present-day Czech geography. Sb. Ceskoslovenske Geogr. Spolecnosti 85 (1), 3–8. Domanski, B., 2004. West and East in ‘New Europe’: the pitfalls of paternalism and a claimant attitude. Eur. Urban Reg. Stud. 11 (4), 377–381. Fabula, Sz., 2013. Body politics and urban spaces: disabled people’s encounter with and resistance to disabling urban environments in Hungary. In: Cretu, C., Fabula, S., Kurucz, L., Lados, G., Lenkey, M., Marincsák, Z., Martyin, Á., Pálóczi, I.Z., Pásztor, K., Tóth, C. (Eds.), Regional Development and Cross Border Cooperation. Editura Universitatii din Oradea, Oradea, pp. 10–20. Faragó, L. (Ed.), 2018. Kortárs térelméletek kelet-közép-európai kontextusban. Dialóg Campus, Budapest [Contemporary theories of space in a East-Central European context]. Ferencuhová, S., Gentile, M., 2016. Introduction: post-socialist cities and urban theory. Eurasian Geogr. Econ. 57 (4–5), 483–496. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 15387216.2016.1270615. Jalowiecki, B., 1986. Social geography in Poland. In: Eyles, J. (Ed.), Social Geography in International Perspective. Croom Helm, London & Sydney, pp. 172–184. Johnston, R. J. and Claval, P. (Eds.) Geography since the Second World War. Sydney: Croom Helm. Marx, K., 1970. Critique of the Gotha Programme. In: Marx/Engels Selected Works, vol. 3. Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp. 13–30. Online Version: http://www.marxists.org/ archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Critque_of_the_Gotha_Programme.pdf. Marx, K., Engels, 1969. Manifesto of the communist party. In: Marx/Engels Selected Works, vol. 1. Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp. 98–137. Online Version: http://www.marxists. org/archive/marx/works/download/manifest.pdf. Peil, T., 2006. Emerging, submerging and persisting ideas: is there social and cultural geography in Estonia? Soc. Cult. Geogr. 7 (3), 463–492. Pitonák, M., Klingorová, K., 2019. Development of Czech feminist and queer geographies: identifying barriers, seeking progress. Gend. Place Cult. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 0966369X.2018.1563528. Rochovská, A., Blazek, M., Sokol, M., 2007. Ako zlepsit kvalitu geografie: O dôlezitosti kvalitatívneho výskumu v humánnej geografii. Geografický  Casopis. 59 (4), 323–358 [Adding quality to geography: on the importance of qualitative research in human geography]. Stenning, A., 2005. Out there and in here: studying ‘Eastern’ Europe in the West. Area 37 (4), 378–383. Timár, J., 2006. The transformation of social and cultural geography during the transition period (1989 to present time) in Hungary. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 7 (4), 649–667. Tlostanova, M., 2012. Postsocialist s postcolonial? On post-Soviet imaginary and global coloniality. J. Postcolonial Writ. 48 (2), 130–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 17449855.2012.658244. Turnock, D., 1982. Romanian geography reunited – the integrative approach demonstrated by the conservation movement. Geojournal 6 (5), 419–431.

Communist and Postcommunist Geographies

Relevant Websites www.cvmr.cz, Centrum pro ývzkum mest a regionŮ (CVMR). http://www.marxists.org, Marxists Internet Archive. https://www.periferiacenter.com, Periféria Policy and Research Center. http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/CITIESAFTERTRANSITION.html, The ‘Cities after Transition’ CAT List.

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Community Ivan J Townshend and Aimee Benoit, Department of Geography, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada Wayne KD Davies, Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by S. C. Aitken, volume 2, pp 221–225, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Alterity A term associated with postmodern sociological ideas concerning the Self and the Other. It refers to how the self is given meaning in terms of an “Other,” but is also used to refer to a sense of Other-directness. Alterity stands in contrast to Ipseity, or Self-directness. Common Interest Development A form of neighborhood or residential development that requires mandatory membership and payment of annual dues, such as through a governing homeowner association, strata board, or similar body for the private governance of the area or development. These can range from simple condominium developments to large private neighborhoods and gated communities. Restrictive covenants on property titles are typically used to control architectural characteristics, appearance, age requirements, or activities. Community Association (Neighborhood Association) An organization, typically not-for-profit, established by residents to provide for the social and recreational needs, political voice, and activities of local residents in a territorially defined neighborhood area. The community association movement in England after World War II was influential in developing and promoting community association principles, and in promoting the development of local community center facilities (community hall) in each area. In the UK and Canada these organizations are routinely consulted on municipal planning issues that affect the area. New variants of this idea are becoming more common in the form of Homeowner Associations (HOAs) that are the governing body of Common Interest Developments, such as gated communities. Factorial Ecology A multivariate approach to the study of urban social structures and neighborhood differentiation. It typically employs Factor Analysis or Principal Component Analysis of census-based social indicators at census tract scale to identify separate urban social dimensions, and then maps the factor scores or component scores to examine the spatial patterns of these urban social dimensions. Neighborhoods may also be grouped into homogeneous groups (typologies) based on a cluster analysis of the factor or component scores. Gemeinschaft A German word, translated into English as “community.” Sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies developed the conceptual dichotomy of Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft to denote very different types of social interaction. Gemeinschaft describes social ties that are based not on self-interest but on the benefit of the group. The term refers to social life associated with personal interactions, family, tradition, and the roles, values, and beliefs based on such interactions. These simple forms of social structure are generally used to connote traditional rural life. Gessellschaft A German word translated into English as “society.” Sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies developed the conceptual dichotomy of Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft to denote very different types of social interaction. Gessellschaft describes social ties based more on self-interest and less on the benefit of the group. The term refers to social life associated with indirect interactions, impersonal roles, contractual exchange, formal values, and beliefs based on such interactions. These more complex forms of social structure are generally used to connote industrial and postindustrial urban life. NIMBY An acronym for “Not In My Back Yard” that generally refers to the attitudes of local area residents to unwanted land use changes, or types of development proposed in their neighborhood. Social Inclusion Social inclusion is a somewhat contested term that refers to the degree to which individuals and groups are able to participate in mainstream society. As a dynamic process, social inclusion involves a range of economic, social, and institutional dimensions. It can incorporate and be measured through factors such as access to the labor market, education, and community-based resources; one’s social and spatial rights; one’s relationships and social network; and one’s sense of belonging to a group. Smart Growth An approach to urban planning and development that centers around 10 principles: mixed land uses; compact design; creation of a range of housing opportunities and choices; creation of walkable neighborhoods; fostering distinctive and attractive communities with a strong sense of place; preservation of open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas; targeted development toward existing communities; provision of a variety of transportation choices; development decisions that are predictable, fair, and cost effective; and the encouragement of community and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions. Topophilia A term loosely meaning “love of place.” From a humanistic geography stance, geographer Yi-Fu Tuan elaborated on this concept as the emotive, intimate, and affective bond between people and place, and how environmental perceptions and values at different levels intersect for the species, the group, and the individual.

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Transit Oriented Development An urban and regional planning approach that aims to create vibrant, livable, sustainable communities that are compact, pedestrian-oriented, and that are based on mixed-use communities centered on train systems, including light rail transit. The approach attempts to reduce reliance on the automobile and to integrate transportation systems across separate municipalities for a more balanced regional system, and to promote both city revitalization as well as suburban renewal.

Community is an ambiguous, complex, and rather fluid concept that has been the subject of thousands of publications. Although often used casually as a synonym for a town or settlement, it is more precisely employed as a collective noun that describes a group of people that have something in common among them. The search for similarity among people is a primary force in defining interpersonal relationships. It is through such similarities or commonalities that people create personal relationships and associations which may create a sense of belonging or even mutual aid that binds them together. The common features that define the community may come from a similar ethnicity, religion, kinship, shared interests, or location. Community can be viewed aspatially (nonterritorial), or spatially (territorial) if the relationships derive from people living in some common area, which provides association through shared participation in local activities, or even a combination of the two. The term neighborhood is sometimes used as an alternative word for community, but it usually describes smaller residential areas that are important sites of local identities, social networks, and everyday routines. Community is rarely viewed negatively. It is usually seen in a positive sense, since it is assumed to create empathy, enhance personal and social well-being, and provide the capacity for sharingdfeatures that combat the isolation or self-absorption of individuals. Moreover, the term community has been used as an aspiration, to create communities that fulfil some desired and more perfect life. Examples can be seen in many utopian writings throughout history, from Plato’s Republic onwards, to the many practical attempts to establish such living spaces such as in England from the 16th Century, to Israel’s kibbutz movement in the last century, or in various modern religious cults. Yet one must be careful not to exaggerate the positive roles of communities. Some communities can be coercive, because they impose group or state norms upon its members, which allow little self-expression or freedom to leave. For this reason, some scholars highlight the need to view communities and social cohesion not as homogeneous units, but as inherently pluralistic, conflictive, and inclusive of diverse value systems, interests, and behaviors.

Modernization and Community It is often assumed that historic societies, also described as traditional or “folk communities,” were composed of locally based groups bound together with horizontal familial, social, and work ties dominated by face-to-face relations based on place of residence. In contrast, modernity, and especially industrialization, created societies that were much more complex in having both horizontal links and more vertical linkages, or associations between people beyond the place of residence. Tönnies described this distinction as the difference between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, in his study of the emergence of modern social life. But it is incorrect to view these as alternatives. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft should be regarded as end members of a continuum in which most societies have elements of both, although with different degrees of emphasis, for even local folk societies have some vertical linkages through trade links or through external political control. Yet there is no doubt that modernization in most parts of the world, in the last three centuries in particular, has ensured that community has become more complex. Davies and Herbert have argued that modern communities are also more socially fragmented due to six major trends, which have changed the nature of participation in communities. One comes from greater specializations in society as modernism has progressed, creating increasing divisions, such as from the presence of more varied workplaces, interests, and lifestyles. Another comes from an increasing secularization, particularly in the western world. Religious organizations have traditionally created communities from their adherence to particular shared beliefs. Although shared religious beliefs still exist in western societies, the increasing number of splits within Christianity means the loss of a former solidarity based on adherence to one religious organization with its local churches. So religious differences have reduced local cohesion in parts of the western world, as has the decline in religious observance. A third element that has fragmented community comes from our greater subordination to others, due to higher levels of dependency in our more complex society, such as wage earners to managers and corporate owners. A fourth force comes from our greater spatial-temporal flexibility due to more rapid and varied transportation and communication devices, from railways to buses, cars, airplanes, and contacts by computers and mobile phones. All of these factors have produced a series of global networks and flows, which the growing “mobilities” literature suggests is transforming the very nature of communities. The emergence of greater spatial-temporal flexibility in the mid-20th Century led to the concept of the nonplace urban realm, the idea that automobile culture linked people in very different spaces from where they lived and allowed them to maintain close and almost instant contact. This phenomenon of increasing spatial-temporal flexibility has become even more pronounced with computers, mobile phones, and globalization, and has produced a rise in the prevalence of aspatial network communities. The fifth process that has created change in community participation comes from the increasing settlement size, density, and heterogenity, which led Wirth to argue that cities provided the opportunity for individuals to have greater degrees of contact with others and with many more organizations, given the variety of workplace, commercial, entertainment, and leisure activities. The prevalence

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of low-density suburban residential areas has been a force for reducing contacts between people in these different areasdas has been shown in literature on place privatization. But whether people are able to take advantage of all these opportunities is also a function of a sixth factor, namely, the ability to select or to choose to participate in various associations, whether spatial or aspatial. Throughout history, and even in totalitarian societies today, people’s choices were limited since they were bound in collective ties and subordinate roles, as was the case in highly ordered feudal societies. It took the Enlightenment to proclaim the rights of humans to selfexpression and political participation, rights that were subsequently enshrined in law, at least in democratic societies, which allowed greater freedoms and rights to choose for all adults. But the emergence of individual rights took time, and there are still many constraints. For example, only in the last century have women’s rights become equal to men’s, in law, if not always in practice, and they are still limited in many countries because of patriarchal social mores. Individuals vary in their degree of participation in groups and most, except those in communes, only participate in associations to a limited extent. This uneven participation has led to the idea of limited liability communities, which means most only have partial participation in communities, either because of their other linkages or obligations, or structural barriers that prevent their full participation. Some individuals have few or no associations, which Durkheim saw as a new, worrying, and growing condition of 19th-Century modernizing societies, one which he described as anomie, essentially a condition of social isolation. Many contemporary theorists have also focused on the problematic character of individuality and lack of community in postmodern societies, although some are optimistic that community can be reinvigorated. In Bowling Alone, Putnam argued that participation in voluntary associations in the US decreased markedly in the later 20th Century, reflecting a broad decline in civil society and social connectedness. Yet sometimes social isolation is a choice, as exemplified by hermits throughout history. The problem occurs when social disconnectedness and isolation characterizes individuals who cannot forge relationships, as frequently seen among the indigent, and those too infirm or old to associate with others. Indeed, one of the great problems of our age is loneliness. The trends that have created societal fragmentation have been linked to increases in individualism, and the reduction, and often discrediting, of the older forms of cohesion within groups that created communities. But social fragmentation and decreased social bonds have also been the topic of a series of critical books on what was seen as moral permissiveness, selfishness, a culture of narcissism, and even the decline of civilization. Nevertheless, the loss of shared identity associated with increased mobility led one philosopher to believe that it explains what lies behind the new populist political reaction against elites. Such grand generalizations may be misleading. But individualism has helped reduce local participation and in its extreme form produces selfishness and selfabsorption. Extreme individualism has been condemned for centuries, as seen in the classical Greek tale of Narcissus. But Charles Taylor, in The Malaise of Modernity, has taken a more positive view, seeing individualism as an opportunity for each human to develop to their fullest extent and to self-actualize, rather than being constrained by society, providing a moral opportunity for individuals to use their skills to benefit others, creating a better, authentic society.

Physical Design and Communities Community subsumes people, place, and organizations, as well as the forces that affect them all. It has been argued that a shared ecology is one of the key dimensions of community, and within this context, factors such as space, location, delineation, and bounding are important. People can forge identities at a variety of different spatial scales, but it is difficult to find the optimal scale for maximizing community. Such scales may vary throughout the life course, the daily time-space paths of individuals, or other environmental traits. Psychologists have noted that the psychology of the individual is situated within, and interacts with, sets of person–environment settings, and will vary depending on the extent to which an individual can achieve person–environment congruence. Similarly, the question of how to increase social participation and solidarity at a local level is not new. Throughout history many attempts have been made to use the physical design of areas to try to produce greater local cohesion. A frequent approach has been the addition of large open areas in front of major church buildings, palaces, and later city halls, to act as gathering spaces for celebrations, and which have the effect of increasing local solidarity. From the Industrial Revolution onwards urban visionaries and compassionate industrialists have conceived or even built new settlements with particular designs aimed at solving the perceived urban social ills of their day, so their inhabitants would be shaped or improved by the new community designs. Examples include Robert Owen’s New Lanark settlement, Saltaire near Bradford, Pullman in Illinois, and later the Bournville settlement built by the Cadbury family. But it was the ideas of Ebenezer Howard in Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Reform (reissued under the title Garden Cities) that created a radical new urban concept, one designed to combine the best of town and country and based on strong community links. The concept used better and varied types of housing, green spaces with lots of trees, and curvilinear roads to mimic nature. It also stressed the need for settlements to be complete towns of around 30,000 people, with a surrounding Green Belt for agricultural and recreational use, and with enough local commercial facilities and employment in separate industrial areas to create self-sufficient settlements linked by rapid transit to large cities. The incorporation of large amounts of green space and trees in residential areas, linked to the Romantic period ideas of nature, had previously been pioneered in the low-density mid-19thCentury American upper income areas. But Howard’s vision was not one only of physical designs. He envisaged that Garden Cities would be based on a new cooperative order with a socially mixed population. This new order would be initiated by a group of people who would borrow money to buy cheap rural land and use the profit from its conversion to urban uses to finance the new facilities. The first Garden City of Letchworth, 30 miles from London, was started in 1903. It largely corresponded to this ideal, with a socially mixed population and with distinct neighborhood areas, although the architects replaced Howard’s plan for a commercial avenue with a business center near the main rail station. Certainly its initial growth was halting, but together with Howard’s writings the first Garden City became the inspiration for similar settlements and societies throughout the world. However,

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most so-called Garden Cities did not replicate the cooperative community order or economic self-sufficiency; they became primarily green residential satellites. In the 1920s, Le Corbusier proposed a different urban solution based on modernist high-density 60-story tower blocks, containing a whole range of community facilities such as shops and even schools, surrounded by green spaces and oriented to maximize sunlight. Adopted with alacrity by post-World War II governments to solve the housing crises, the community and ecological ideals were almost never incorporated. The result was often poorly constructed high-rise units, without adequate security, with surroundings that soon became derelict, and located far from previous family links or employment, or even adequate local services. Within a decade or two most had severely deteriorated, and had become poverty sinks, so many were demolished. More positive results for a better community life came from the Neighborhood Unit plans of Perry. In many ways these planned communities were based on Garden City ideals of low density, green areas, with a central core of community facilities and schools, with main roads to the edges, and later with cul de sacs, and walkways to schools and local shops. They became the basis of the explosion of planned suburban areas in western cities from the 1950s, but created low-density sprawl and greater traffic problems. However, since they were usually aimed at specific income groups they reduced social mixing. Few had enough stores to satisfy local needs or enough employment areas, so were far from Howard’s self-sufficient towns based on cooperative principles. By the late 1960s the more affluent areas had large recreational facilities, such as lakes or golf courses. Although attractive, many were open only to local residents, or those able to pay high membership fees, again reducing social interaction between people of different income levels. The period also saw the advent of common interest developments such as gated communities with security guards on gated entry points, and often with earthen mounds or walls around them, which restricted access to residents, friends, and delivery services. Promoted as ideal communities and safe places free from the increasing crime in cities, they were also socially homogeneous. In this sense, they were even more socially regressive in the context of cities as a whole. In the 1990s, yet another new design approach called New Urbanism emerged to solve the problems of suburbia, by enhancing local community interaction. Its key ideas were enshrined in a charter of 27 principles. In general, the approach aimed to: increase compactness and mixed uses; include a range of housing types and prices in a green environment; develop pedestrian friendly and distinctive designs that create particular senses of place for the area as a whole, as well as smaller so-called “villages” within them with unique design features to create a sense of place; and include a compact center with a range of civic and commercial activities to act as gathering places. Designs such as Seaside in Florida or Kentlands in Gaithersburg, Maryland were early exemplars of the approach, but the ideas are usually applied to areas within cities. These represent improvements over older suburban designs, providing more attractive environments, a greater sense of place, and some degree of mixing, and attempted to provide for community spaces, public art, and more greens space. But they typically have insufficient employment or retail establishments to reduce the degree of commuting or shopping outside the area. Also, few of the early examples had the range of housing needed for different generations, although many scholars question whether diversifying the housing options within neighborhoods actually achieves the intended outcome of increased social mixing or community involvement. Even fewer have been concerned with the increasingly recognized problem of climate change and the need for lower resource use to alleviate the problem. Planners have therefore turned also to community designs focused on principles of transit-oriented development and to smart growth principles of urban villages, but few seem to enhance community interaction.

Survival and Revival of Local Communities Most new physical designs for settlements that were meant to improve community cohesion have not succeeded. Yet it is important not to exaggerate the trend of what has been called the “emptying out” of place-based communities, as three examples will show. First, tight place-based local networks survive, as Gans showed in what he called urban villages in poorer parts of Bostondplaces based on kinship, ethnic, intergenerational ties, and often local work relationships. Linked to these ideas were the critics of the planning trends of the 1960s, such as Jane Jacobs, who not only identified strong social ties and connections within inner city neighborhoods, but who also stressed the need to resist modernizing trends and the destruction of old place-based communities to accommodate new transport or public housing projects. Second, many services provided by government, such as local schools, libraries, and leisure facilities, still survive in local areas, and these often lead to greater local interactions among neighborhood residents. In addition, police authorities around the world have placed a greater emphasis upon community policing since the 1980s, so that residents are more likely to cooperate in crime reduction policies; however, austerity programs in the past decade have often meant local services have been cut, or have been privatized. Also, the older pattern of many local stores has decayed, except in gentrifying neighborhoods, because low-density suburban areas do not have the customer basis for stores to compete with the big new commercial areas. Moreover, despite an increase in secularism, some local religious groups are still active, many of which organize their activities in local areas called parishes centered by a church, helping to ensure that local community survives. Indeed, studies of immigrants in Canada have revealed that they derive most of their social and support linkages through their ethnic and religious societies, although these are substantially reduced by the third generation as they participate more in the wider society. Yet older faith-based communities such as Orthodox Jews are still intimately linked to their local areas, because of the need to regularly patronize the local synagogue, and to avoid travel on the Sabbath. A third trend that increases local community cooperation comes from grassroots groups that have created recreational and social activities that were not provided by private organizations, local governments, or churches. Neighborhood or community

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associations in particular have been recognized as an important mechanism through which residents protect their local territories and advocate for positive change, in addition to establishing locality-based social and recreational activities. The period following World War II was important in establishing a neighborhood or territorially based community association movement in Britain and elsewhere. But they vary drastically in their effectiveness and in the social and recreational functions they carry out. In some cities, such as Calgary and Edmonton in Canada, the associations are recognized by the city and planning has long been based on the delineation of these community areas. Members of these organizations are routinely consulted when development changes are proposed, although the consultation over major projects is more about explaining what is happening, rather than true citizen participation in decision-making. Less formal are the block watch systems where local community monitors enhance cooperation by alerting neighbors and police of crime and suspicious activities in their block. In poorer city areas another boost to community interaction has come from organizers such as Alinsky who created community action groups to fight against problems that reduced the livability of their areasdfeatures such as noxious fumes from local industriesdand provided guidelines about how to engage in such activities and to create greater degrees of local cohesion. His approach was very much bound to the idea of neighborhood or community as a territorial unit, although some of the ideas subsequently became implemented as institution-based community organizing. Similar groups have emerged to fight what locals believe are unwanted developments in their areas, creating a form of community-based NIMBYism. Although they have a very mixed pattern of success or collective efficacy, the process itself does create greater linkages between the residents, and can lead to greater personal and collective efficacy. Local associations are not necessarily always positive. Those attempting to reduce crime have often turned into vigilante groups, imposing their own ideas on others, while there are many examples of states using local groups to quash dissent. An extreme form was created through the Block Warden system in Nazi Germany, where the local area managers reported people with dissident antistate views to the Gestapo. In China, dynasties from the 10th-Century Song regime onwards used groupings of a small number of households, called bao, to provide services to overlords. But they were also used to maintain local order, and under later dynasties were used for surveillance to root out subversion. Today, a system of local neighborhood grids in Chinese cities has paid local managers to resolve local disputes, help the sick, and carry out anticrime patrols, as well as reporting bigger problems to the municipal authorities. Such benign functions seem laudable. But many believe the current Chinese communist regime is increasingly using these neighborhood grids to identify and control dissidents, while the use of facial recognition surveillance in some areas increases control.

Measuring Community Differences Trying to operationalize and measure concepts such as community, or how one community differs from another, is a problematic area of inquiry. Indeed Hillery’s famous study identified 94 different conceptions of community, which could be distilled to three themes of social interaction, common ties, and area. However, there have been limited efforts to study all of these features of community at the same time. Yet it must be remembered that some of the earliest studies of the character of communities and cities have been the vivid literary descriptions by novelists and travel writers, as seen from Boccaccio’s 14th-Century accounts of Florence in the Decameron, to contemporary works such as Jan Morris’s portraits of Venice and other cities. In addition, there have been many attempts to measure and map the variations in community character to provide more precise and verifiable descriptions of these areas, but most have focused on individual variables. There has been an attempt in Davies and Herbert’s Communities within Cities to synthesize the ideas, and to delineate a more comprehensive geographic rubric for understanding or measuring differences in community, particularly among place-based communities or neighborhoods. They identified three different domains of interest called, Areal Content, Behavioral, and Conceptual Identity. The Areal Content domain deals with natural environmental, as well as urban morphology or design features, such as variations in neighborhood plans or designs. The Chicago Human Ecologists are often credited for being the first to effectively describe the different types of so-called “natural areas” or communities in cities, which Burgess generalized as a series of concentric zones of different uses around the central business district. Subsequently, Hoyt argued that sectoral patterns were a more general representation of the areal differences within cities, while Harris and Ullman proposed a less regular patterning, based on a series of separate areas developed from multiple nuclei. Apart from Hoyt’s work, these studies were not always based on effective measurements. Despite these American examples the origin of precise measurements of the social differences between areas must be attributed to Charles Booth in his 17 volumes on the character of London’s areas, workplaces, and social conditions. A key part of his work was the street-by-street maps of degrees of poverty or prosperity, initially from survey observations, then later by using census variables to construct a seven-point scale of the differences in “social condition.” But it was not until the 1950s that Shevky and Bell provided a more general description of the differential character of areas within cities through their Social Area Analysis. They identified three axes or constructs of differentiation, called social rank, urbanization, and segregation, now more usually generalized as socioeconomic differentiation, family status, and ethnicity. Each of these axes was measured by a summary of three variables from the census, enabling a classification and mapping of the social variation of the spatial units in the city, namely census tracts. From the 1960s the use of more census-derived variables combined with the more widespread use of multivariate methods led to many precise studies, called factorial ecology, identifying axes of social differentiation and mapping their variations through factor scores. An early study using this technique in Toronto showed that the three Social Area axes of family status, economic, and ethnic status had concentric, sectoral, and clustered patterns respectively, meaning the older ecological ideas were complementary, not competitive patterns. Subsequent factorial studies using increasingly sophisticated techniques extended the number of axes of

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differentiation identifying several separate axes within the three major dimensions, while the factor scores have often been used to classify areas into community typologies. Similar attempts to classify neighborhoods based on multiple attributes can be seen in the cluster analysis of American communities, identifying types, among others, such as “blue-blood estates,” “grey power,” “rank and file,” or “new melting pot” communities. These kinds of community differentiation approaches are routinely used in geodemographic market segmentation studies. A second domain is identified as the Behavioral source of variations. It deals with social networks, social processes of community life, formal and informal groups, and social capital, as well as local facility use, shopping behaviors, the interactions and political participations that people have within or outside their local areas. Many studies show that indeed the community is not lost in a gessellschaft-like urban context, while community without propinquity, or network-based aspatial communities, are also found, so that in some situations, community is liberated from spatial association. Also, studies of community differences in cities have shown that numerous empirically distinctive dimensions of variation of what sociologist Albert Hunter called “communityness” can be recognized and measured in the Behavioral domain. The Conceptual domain deals with cognitive and affective characteristics. The former concerns peoples understanding of place, and mental concepts of community and community boundaries. Pioneering work on cognitive mapping showed that people’s mental maps reveal how areas within cities have strong or weak identities. Also there are often different people identities, as well as place identities because of the perceived character of the local residents and the area, whether based on age, dress codes, ethnic characteristics, and so on. In addition, various territorial or boundary markingsdeither deliberately introduced as architectural features or styles, such as gates, walled communities or symbolic entries, or from local informal territorial markers such as graffitidshow how symbolic communication is also an important cognitive dimension in place differentiation. Clearly these four kinds of characteristics show the domain is more complex than a single cognitive scale of community, and multiple dimensions of cognition can be identified as creating differentiation among communities and neighborhoods in cities. The Affective Domain concerns community features associated with feelings and emotions. Again most early studies deal with individual sources of variation, such as the topophilia concepts of Tuan, or degree of cohesion, belonging, or psychological sense of community of residents; however, the idea of a single scale of the communityness in this domain is an oversimplification. Davies and Herbert showed that at least eleven different dimensions can be recognized. These include subscales or separate dimensions such as symbolism of place, sentiment and attachment, evaluation of area, nuisances–annoyances (negative externalities), security and safety, empowerment, place appearance, latent participation, aesthetics, common values, and empathy or belonging. All of these were measured in a study of community differentiation and shown to be separate features.

Does Community Still Matter? The extensive literature on community has shown that it is a multidimensional concept and that its study has changed from the single dimension approach of early years to the extensive exploration of its many domains, both conceptually and in terms of measurement. The search for community may be a fundamental human trait, in which the longing for community expresses the essence of humanity. Attempts to create community through new designs and urban places have had very limited success, reminding us that community is socially constructed. Yet, territorial or place-based communities, the sites of the shared ecological integration of communities, are still important for many. But their importance may be episodic in nature or differ by age, gender, life course stage, as well as different degrees to which individuals can attain person–environment congruence. It is now recognized that an increased sense of community is associated, in urban and rural areas, with higher levels of well-being and lower rates of mental, social, and health disorders. The need to construct community and to overcome the individuality versus community dichotomy and fragmentation of the postmodern world may be more important than ever. Social theorists point to the potential for such through increased attention to alterity, the unconditional liking of others, and the development of a new morality and ethics of the “Other.” The importance of community is not simply a philosophical debate. A substantial share of the geography or ecology of wellbeing seems to be explained or accounted for by spatial variations in the intensities of selected dimensions of community, especially the affective traits of community. Community, and neighborhood, continues to have psychosocial significance in people’s lives, is a force for social inclusion, and is an indispensable third pillar of a healthy society. Despite all the angst about a loss of community, most agree that it still does matterdfor the self, for society, and for the spatial unfolding of well-being in our societies.

See Also: Affect; Affective Mapping; Becoming; Behavioral Geography; Belonging; Census Geography; Census Mapping; Community; Defensible Space; Emotional Geographies; Gated Communities; Gentrification; Geodemographics; Habitus; Map Perception and Cognition; Neighborhood Change; Neighborhood Effects; Neighborhoods and Community; Neoliberalism; Other/Otherness; Privatization; Psychogeography; Segregation; Sense of Place; Social Capital; Structuration Theory; Transportation and Land Use; Urban Age; Urban Citizenship; Urban Planning; Urban Village; Urbanism.

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Further Reading Bauman, Z., 2001. Community: Seeking Safety in and Insecure World. Blackwell Publishing, Malden. Cnaan, R., Milofsky, C. (Eds.), 2007. Handbbook of Community Movements and Local Organizations. Springer, New York. Davies, W.K.D., 1984. Factorial Ecology. Gower, Aldershot. Davies, W.K.D. (Ed.), 2015. Theme Cities: Solutions for Urban Problems. Springer. Davies, W.K.D., Herbert, D.T., 1993. Communities within Cities: An Urban Social Geography. London Belhaven Press. Grant, J., 2006. Planning the Good Community: New Urbanism in Theory and Practice. Routledge, London. Jacobs, J., 1961. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Random House, New York. Keller, S., 2005. Community: Pursuing the Dream, Living the Reality. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Lasch, C., 1979. The Culture of Narcissism. Norton, New York. Levinas, E., 1991. Entre-Nous (On Thinking-Of-The-Other). Columbia University Press, New York. Lyon, L., Driskell, R., 2012. The Community in Urban Society, second ed. Waveland Press, Long Grove, Illinois. McKenzie, E., 1994. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government. Yale University Press, New Haven. Putnam, R.D., 2000. Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Touchstone, New York. Rajan, R., 2019. The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the Community behind. Penguin Random House Canada, Toronto. Reps, J., 1965. The Making of Urban America: A History of City Planning in the United States. Princeton University Press. Stokols, D., Altman, I., 1987. Handbook of Environmental Psychology, vol. 1. John Wiley and Sons, New York. Taket, A., Crisp, B., Graham, M., Hanna, L., Goldingay, S., Wilson, L. (Eds.), 2014. Practising Social Inclusion. Routledge, New York. Taylor, C., 1991. The Malaise of Modernity. House of Anansi Press, Concord, Ontario (CBC Massey Lecture Series). Townshend, I., 2001. The contribution of social and experiential community structures to the intra-urban ecology of well-being. Can. J. Urban Res. 10 (2), 175–215. Townshend, I.J., 2002. Monitoring community dimensions: city-wide characteristics and differentiation by social region. In: Davies, W.K.D., Townshend, I.J. (Eds.), Monitoring Cities: International Perspectives. International Geographical Union and Urban Commission, Calgary and Berlin, pp. 435–459. Urry, J., 1999. Sociology beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century. Routledge, London. Walls, D., 2015. Community Organizing. Polity Press, Malden, MA. Weiss, M.J., 1988. The Clustering of America. Harper & Row, New York. Winlow, S., Hall, S., 2013. Rethinking Social Exclusion. The End of the Social? Sage, Los Angeles.

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Complementary and Alternative Medicine GJ Andrews, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Alternative medicine Forms of medicine often used instead of conventional medicine. Complementary medicine Forms of medicine that exist, and are used, alongside conventional medicine. Conventional medicine Orthodox biomedicine, ranging from its scientific assumptions and approach to the character of its remedies and services. Holistic medicine Forms of medicine that deal with the person’s mind and body and seek to investigate and address the wider causes and consequences of diseases as they occur throughout people’s daily lives. Therapist Public or private sector practitioners of complementary and alternative medicine. Traditional medicine Forms of medicine that originate in traditional societies and cultures, passed down orally through generations. They are often more commonly found in developing world countries and the Asia-Pacific region.

The terms “alternative medicine” and “complementary medicine” refer to all therapies and treatments which are not currently part of mainstream conventional medicine. During the 1970s and 1980s, the term “alternative medicine” was the first universally accepted title. By the 1990s, however, the term complementary medicine had gradually become more popular, primarily because it denotes working alongside conventional medicine rather than in opposition to it. This distinction is particularly important for both people who work in the sector and researchers, many of whom do not wish to be thought of as involved in a marginal or hostile field. Because the title alternative medicine has remained the most popular in North America, in order to avoid further confusion and unnecessary debate, the all-inclusive term “complementary and alternative medicine” (often abbreviated to and pronounced CAM) has become preferred in the international literature. Occasionally, the terms “holistic medicine,” “integrative medicine,” and “nonconventional medicine” are also used as universal titles. One could argue that researchers should select from these different titles to describe subtly different engagements between conventional and other medicines; however, although selection is sometimes done, it is the search for an acceptable inclusive term for the entire sector that has occupied scholars. CAM refers to an extremely diverse set of practices, grouped together as much because of their shared distinction from conventional medicine as because of their commonalities. Indeed, CAM is not a unified field, but constitutes a wide range of materials and practices. Twelve core practice modalities of CAM exist: acupuncture, chiropractic, creative and sensory therapies, healing, herbalism, homeopathy, hypnotherapy, massage, reflexology, naturopathy, and osteopathy. When taking into account various subvarieties of these modalities, together with many other less-known varieties, it is possible to list many hundreds of distinct forms of CAM. Moreover, the borders of CAM become blurred and its forms much more numerous, as it becomes incorporated into many materials and practices of everyday life. In this respect CAM increasingly permeates the daily lives of people, ranging from aromatherapy shampoos to yoga workouts at workplace stations. There are a number of ways of classifying and grouping different CAM modalities. A typical scenario is under four broad categories: “mind–body therapies,” “biological therapies,” “energy therapies,” and “physical therapies.” Such a classification serves the purposes of research where it is necessary to talk collectively yet provide some distinctions (e.g., with regard to education, policy, and regulation). In terms of regulation, certain CAM modalities are fully regulated often by national-scale representative organizations. Other modalities are partially regulated and some continue largely unregulated. Much, however, depends on the particular modality and the geographical context. Other important differences between particular modalities of CAM relate to their relationships with conventional medicine. Some modalities are far more integrated with conventional medicine than others. Indeed, those that draw closest to the medical model, in terms of their theoretical basis and ability to provide an acceptable evidence-base, typically have strongest relationships and often share spaces for practice (such as osteopathy and chiropractic), although some researchers argue that debates about “letting CAM into” conventional medicine and the categorization of CAM in terms of its difference and distance from conventional medicinedoften for stated purposes of safety and regulationdserve as an orthodox medical control over CAM. Research has shown that CAM has grown very rapidly during the last 30 years; some commentators have called it the most significant health-related consumer trend of the 20th Century. Studies frequently identify that over a quarter of the general populations of developed world countries use CAM regularly for a variety of conditionsdchronic, long term, musculoskeletal, and psychological being the most common categories. A great deal of provision is by the small business private sector, the hundreds of thousands of private therapists worldwidedeither working alone or in small group practicesdconstituting an extensive global but cottage industry. Increasingly, however, as noted above, CAM is available in conventional healthcare settings, the most common scenario being its provision alongside general/family practice. Some orthodox health professionals (such as nurses) with interests and

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expertise in CAM have developed therapies as part of their everyday work routines, albeit often in an unofficial capacity, and therefore, on a service level, they can be inconsistent. Less typical, yet becoming more common, is for CAM to be provided in hospitals and community settings through dedicated service initiatives. Meanwhile, a number of large companies selling herbal supplements, or with chains of outlets, represent the involvement of much bigger business in CAM. Nevertheless, much depends on the particular national context. North America, for example, is home to much larger CAM businesses than is Europe.

The Organization of CAM Research CAM research has developed into a discipline in its own right. Indeed, reflecting this are a number of dedicated academic journals and regular international conferences (see, e.g., the journals Complementary Therapies in Clinical Practice and Complementary and Alternative Medicine). Moreover, many scholars now research and teach CAM exclusively and regard themselves primarily as CAM researchers. It is a discipline constituted of many different perspectives, including biomedical, economic, sociological, psychological, policy, anthropological, and geographical; however, this diversity also reflects its disparate institutional character. There are very few dedicated university departments of CAM and consequently the majority of researchers are located in departments that reflect their “parent” disciplines. A number of CAM research institutes, and also places that disseminate research findings to the practice community, exist worldwide.

Social Scientific Fact Finding Initial social science research on CAM during the 1980s, and throughout the 1990s, was also engaged in some basic “fact finding” about the social nature of production and consumption. For example, rates of use were investigated for both CAM as a whole and between therapies, studies finding various manual therapies (such as massage and reflexology) to the most frequently provided and used. With regard to who uses CAM, studies have found females, younger adults, and the more affluent to be the largest groups of users, particularly due to the need to find out-of-pocket payments for many treatments. Contrary to popular opinion, studies have also found that, with the exception of children, many sections of society, and all age groups, use CAM regularly. With regard to some trends in use, studies have found users to actively mix and match conventional medicine and CAM and feel empowered in creating their own treatment profiles. They have found people to be frequent users (typically once a week or every 2 weeks), and that they use CAM over long time periods, often for their general health maintenance. It is also recognized that broader social trends and transitions have underpinned the CAM phenomenon. Commentators have found CAM use to be associated with an emerging health consumer culture, and a greater number of peopledoften referred to as “smart consumers”dwho inform themselves about health and illness and use this knowledge when selecting from the treatment options available to them, or otherwise seek alternatives. Some commentators have linked CAM to spiritual cultures that have developed alternative philosophical visions toward health. In response, others have been quick to stress that, CAM is mainstream and most users believe in biomedicine. More practically, regarding the immediate reasons for using CAM, researchers have identified push factors from conventional medicine, including perceptions of its impersonal nature, a lack of caring, long waiting lists, and its inability to cure long-term chronic conditions. Meanwhile, identified pull factors of CAM include the longer time and dedicated attention that therapists are able to give to clients, and the individualized nature of their care. Of research focused squarely on CAM provision, a great deal discusses technical issues relating to practice development. Recent work, however, is focused much more broadly on features and contexts of production. For example, the career pathways of therapists have been investigateddstudies finding therapists to have entered the CAM sector from other caring professions (e.g., nursing, social work, and teaching). A range of ethical and moral issues in practice have also been discussed. These have included when and whether therapists refer clients to conventional practitioners, when and whether they discontinue treatments, and what they do if a client can no longer afford to pay for their services. Businesses, business planning, and career aspirations have been investigateddstudies finding these to be typically short term, low level, and “realistic.” Other research has considered regulation and professionalization, particularly in the context of current policy debates on how CAM should be provided in and integrated with conventional medicine. One of the main debates here has been agreeing on acceptable methods to collect evidence for practice. Some therapists claim that because their therapies do not work on scientific principles, they should not be subjected to clinical trials. Meanwhile others argue that the often subtle health gains obtained through using CAM are not adequately captured by clinical trials; however, most doctors, policymakers, and researchers strongly disagree and suggest that clinical trials are both appropriate and necessary in order for conventional healthcare systems to fund CAM, and for their clinicians to take CAM seriously.

The Origins of a Geographical Perspective Mirroring the growing popularity of CAM during the past 30 years, and its connections to many aspects of social and cultural life, like other social scientists, human geographers are becoming increasingly interested in it as a subject of study. Just as the roots of many forms of CAM are located in traditional medicinedoften from the developing world and East Asiadso are the roots of geographical research on CAM. Traditional medicine typically refers to treatments associated with ancient societies, passed down

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through their generations, often in the form of oral knowledge. It is the methods, beliefs, and approaches that people employed to restore health before the arrival of conventional biomedicine. Examples include Pinyin (China), bone setters (worldwide), ayurvedic medicine (India), and Kampo medicinal preparation (China). The study of traditional medicine was an important interest of early medical geography. Charles Good’s 1977 paper outlined an agenda that heavily influenced and directed research. Good pointed out the substantial health problems facing Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the lack of conventional services in many areas but, at the same time, the widespread availability and use of traditional medicine. He noted the vast labor power, resources, and access to local populations available to conventional medicine through integration or collaboration with traditional medicine. Although Good clearly assumed the superiority of conventional medicine, he did indicate the potential for collaboration from the national scale to the scale of individual facilities, and the need to investigate how integration relates to wider national and regional health goals and health planning. Mirroring the perspectives and concerns of the medical geography in the 1970s, the research agenda Good posed was focused on the accessibility and utilization of services, including investigating spatial arrangements of traditional medicine in urban and rural areas, factors in seeking traditional medicine, and various obstacles related to distance. Although these issues are still investigated to the present day by geographers, many now look for a deeper and often qualitative understanding of the cultures, values, and belief systems that relate to traditional medicine in particular places of the developing world. Meanwhile, other scholars have started to investigate the roles of traditional medicines used by indigenous people located in developed world countries (such as First Nation communities in Australia and Canada). Research here suggests that ideas about medicine and healing are often part of a broader cultural association with place and landscape. These can often conflict with dominant Western ideas. In contrast to these tensions, Maori notions of health and landscape have actively informed health policy in New Zealand.

Geographies of Production and Consumption Not all research on CAM that has a geographical orientation has been conducted by geographers or is labeled as geography. For example, numerous studies by CAM researchers have considered regulatory issues within well-defined areas of political jurisdiction, and profiles of CAM provision and use within and between places ranging in scale from countries to individual institutions. Beyond sampling frames, in these studies, spatial issues are not often prioritized and given a central place in research questions and analysis. The need for explicit geographical research on CAM was first highlighted by Anyinam in 1990. His argument was for wideranging quantitative inquiry, including attention to local, regional, and national distributions of therapists, their relationships to biomedical services, their referral networks, and practice catchment areas. Only a modest number of studies answered this call and the ones that did mainly considered spatial trends in CAM provision at the regional level. In retrospect, given the vast range of CAM provided in so many places, responding effectively in this way was always going to be a very tall order. Moreover, another important disciplinary context was that very shortly after Anyinam’s paper, medical geography was to undergo a significant reform that would witness the emergence of a qualitative “postmedical” geography of health, focused far more on experiences of health and disease, than on distributive features of service provision as emphasized by Anyinam. Since the turn of the century, qualitative research on CAM has adopted humanistic and social constructionist theoretical positions and has had very different priorities. A consistent theme has been cultural and consumer geographies of CAM. Studies are attempting to understand who uses CAM and why, how usage differs between and across places, and how place itself shapes and is shaped by CAM. A variety of cultures are explored and articulated in research ranging from local spiritual and “alternative” cultures in CAM, to “high” consumer CAM cultures as progressed, for example, through lifestyle magazines. Research has also begun to consider how different cultures of CAM may be associated with versions of urbanicity and rurality. For example, a study in Devon, UK, articulated how certain forms of CAM are associated with spiritual ancient landscapes, idyllic landscapes, and certain rural cultures. Meanwhile other studies articulate how CAM is associated with urban living and city quarters. Studies have also considered design features of CAM settings and how they play an important part in the overall CAM consumer experience. For example, research has observed that some therapists’ clinics are clearly decorated by them to resemble conventional medical places, though the majority of CAM clinics are purposefully designed and decorated to exert a subtle calming effect, and to provide a spiritual experience. Other research has focused on professional spaces where orthodox medicine and CAM are increasingly combined (such as GP surgeries). An emerging field of critical research considers the many versions and subversions of place and presence in CAM, hence questions any sense that a mind–body dualism might be operating in therapeutic encounters. Many years ago Williams presented the idea of “landscapes of the mind” in her discussion of imagery and visualization of place in psychotherapeutic practices, autogenic training, relaxation techniques, and meditation. Years later Andrews and Shaw followed up studying imagery and place as a practice in CAM. Here imagined therapeutic places were found to be constructed and manipulated by therapists and their clients. In some cases, mental imagery was subtle and supportive to other therapeutic techniques. In other instances, it was found to be a central feature of therapies and used more directly, particularly to construct mind-bridges with past life events. Most recently Lea et al. have shown how mindfulness and meditation can be inserted by users into everyday life at opportune momentsdthis agency often not being fixed in time and space and distributed across mind, body, and context. More generally, latest inquiries in geographical CAM research have moved beyond the humanism and social constructionism of what CAM means to people and places (or vice versa), to employ a distinctly “posthumanist” perspective (see studies by Doel, Segrott, Lea, Philo, Andrews, McCormack, Boyd). This scholarshipdincluding insights from new materialisms, actor–network theory, affect theory, and nonrepresentational

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theoryddecenters “the human” in CAM, looking also to its nonhuman and more-than-human aspects. Some common understandings include as follows: (1) CAM emerges through relational material assemblages of human and nonhuman entities working on the same ontological level of existence, the outcomes of assemblages being more than the sum of their parts; (2) CAM is enacted by the practices and performances that vital human and nonhuman biological bodies undergo with vibrant nonhuman/material objects, the efforts they exert and the energies they create together; (3) CAM occurs in immediate, prepersonal, moving space-times. The ways human and nonhuman agents create distinct “pockets” of space-time is important: their speeds, rhythms, momentums, encounters, and changes of direction. Interestingly, there seems to be a natural alignment between these new posthumanist interests and understandings, and the fundamental nature of CAM itself (which there does not necessarily have to be given that one might take a posthumanist research position on any empirical reality). This alignment includes a shared: emphasis on vitality and biology/ nature beyond the human; holistic view of the body and mind; careful critique of technology; willingness to accept excessive dimensions of the world not objectively measurable in a scientific sense; emphasis on senses and sensations in life; mindful “wonderment” about the immediate unfolding of the physical world around us and our part in it.

Calls for Future Inquiry Because CAM is a relatively new field of inquiry for geographers, naturally there are many opinions as to what future research should focus on and the perspectives it should take. CAM deconstructs traditional understandings of health and illness, and fuses a vast array of materials and practices. It therefore poses a serious challenge to human geography in terms of how to approach it. With its traditional concerns for services and health experiences, health geography alone might not be able to cover all the necessary ground. Indeed, as Doel and Segrott have noted, for health geographers terms like health, disease, illness medicine, and place need and use are constant points of reference; however, as they also suggest, in CAM these are precisely the kinds of things that are subverted and redefined. Consequently, future geographical study on CAM will have to be able to deal with CAM much more broadly as a wide-ranging consumer phenomenon. This coverage, as Doel and Segrott mention, should not be an overly difficult task as CAM is consistent with human geography’s current engagements with aspects of everyday life, human practices, and performativity. Others have argued that future research is needed to explore a greater variety of CAM places and practices. With regard to places, imagined places in practices (as outlined above) certainly provide an avenue for future inquiry. Another important issue is the transportation of traditional medicine from the places of their origin to the West. In this respect, postcolonial theory needs to be brought to bear in understanding of how traditional medicines might be morphed into CAM in new Western social and cultural contexts. With regard to perspectives, research on the political and economic geographies of CAM would certainly be welcomed. On the microscale, this research could involve, for example, aspects of integration with conventional medicine in shared places, and how different modalities of CAM may be integrated differently within different conventional places for healthcare. Also in terms of perspectives, there certainly needs to be a more thorough examination of gendered characteristics of CAM through a feminist lens, and commentators need to understand the ways in which gender may play out in various places for CAM. Also required is attention to how CAM is important to histories of places, the historical identity of places, and how it might be associated with heritage sites and industries. There are certainly many other places and perspectives to be followed. The key message is that because CAM spans so many materials and practices of everyday social, cultural, and economic life, researching it must inevitably embrace multiple perspectives.

See Also: Chronic Disease; Health Geography; Medical Geography; Psychotherapy/Psychotherapeutic Geographies.

Further Reading Adams, J., 2004. Exploring the interface between complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) and rural general practice: a call for research. Health Place 10 (3), 285. Andrews, G.J., 2003. Placing the consumption of private complementary medicine: everyday geographies of older peoples’ use. Health Place 9 (4), 337–349. Andrews, G.J., 2004. (Re) thinking the dynamics between healthcare and place: therapeutic geographies in treatment and care practices. Area 36 (3), 307–318. Andrews, G.J., Shaw, D., 2010. “So we started talking about a beach in Barbados”: visualization practices and needle phobia. Soc. Sci. Med. 71 (10), 1804–1810. Andrews, G.J., Evans, J., McAlister, S., 2013. ‘Creating the right therapy vibe’: relational performances in holistic medicine. Soc. Sci. Med. 83, 99–109. Anyinam, C., 1990. Alternative medicine in western industrialized countries: an agenda for medical geography. Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien 34 (1), 69–76. Boyd, C.P., 2017. Non-representational Geographies of Therapeutic Art Making: Thinking through Practice. Springer. Clarke, D.B., Doel, M.A., Segrott, J., 2004. No alternative? The regulation and professionalization of complementary and alternative medicine in the United Kingdom. Health Place 10 (4), 329–338. Del Casino Jr., V.J., 2004. (Re) placing health and health care: mapping the competing discourses and practices of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ Thai medicine. Health Place 10 (1), 59–73. Doel, M.A., Segrott, J., 2003. Self, health, and gender: complementary and alternative medicine in the British mass media. Gend. Place Cult. 10 (2), 131–144. Doel, M., Segrott, J., 2003. Beyond belief: complementary medicine, lifestyle magazines and the dis-ease of everyday life. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 21 (6), 739–759. Doel, M.A., Segrott, J., 2004. Materializing complementary and alternative medicine: aromatherapy, chiropractic, and Chinese herbal medicine in the UK. Geoforum 35 (6), 727–738. Good, C.M., 1977. Traditional medicine: an agenda for medical geography. Soc. Sci. Med. (1967) 11 (14–16), 705–713. Lea, J., Cadman, L., Philo, C., 2015. Changing the habits of a lifetime? Mindfulness meditation and habitual geographies. Cult. Geogr. 22 (1), 49–65.

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Lea, J., Philo, C., Cadman, L., 2016. ‘It’sa fine line between. self discipline, devotion and dedication’: negotiating authority in the teaching and learning of Ashtanga yoga. Cult. Geogr. 23 (1), 69–85. McCormack, D.P., 2003. An event of geographical ethics in spaces of affect. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 28 (4), 488–507. McCormack, D.P., 2013. Refrains for Moving Bodies: Experience and Experiment in Affective Spaces. Duke University Press. Philo, C., Cadman, L., Lea, J., 2015. New energy geographies: a case study of yoga, meditation and healthfulness. J. Med. Humanit. 36 (1), 35–46. Stock, R., 1981. Traditional healers in rural Hausaland. Geojournal 5 (4), 363–368. Verheij, R.A., de Bakker, D.H., Groenewegen, P.P., 1999. Is there a geography of alternative medical treatment in The Netherlands? Health Place 5 (1), 83–97. Wiles, J., Rosenberg, M.W., 2001. ‘Gentle caring experience’: seeking alternative health care in Canada. Health Place 7 (3), 209–224. Williams, A., 1998. Therapeutic landscapes in holistic medicine. Soc. Sci. Med. 46 (9), 1193–1203. Williams, A.M., 2000. The diffusion of alternative health care: a Canadian case study of chiropractic and naturopathic practices. Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien 44 (2), 152–166. Wilson, K., 2003. Therapeutic landscapes and First Nations peoples: an exploration of culture, health and place. Health Place 9 (2), 83–93. Wilson, K., Rosenberg, M.W., 2002. Exploring the determinants of health for First Nations peoples in Canada: can existing frameworks accommodate traditional activities? Soc. Sci. Med. 55 (11), 2017–2031.

Relevant Website Canadian Interdisciplinary Network for CAM Research (IN-CAM). https://www.iscmr.org/content/incam/about-incam.

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Computational Human Geography Helen Couclelis, Department of Geography, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, United States © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Algorithm A set of precise step-by-step instructions to be followed by a computer in solving a problem or simulating a process. Ambient Computing Computing by devices distributed in the environment, such as sensors, operating individually or in concert with other devices. See “Augmented Environment.” Artificial Intelligence (AI) A computer science field aiming at the development of programs or devices exhibiting behavior that may be characterized as intelligent. Hard AI purports to replicate processes of human intelligence, whereas soft AI is only concerned with the outcomes of the behavior. Artificial Neural Network (ANN) The most popular machine learning technique in computational human geography. The simplest (“supervised”) ANNs can “learn” to distinguish objects from a very large number of examples presented to them and are then able to inductively identify instances of known kinds of objects that they had not yet encountered. This capability of ANN is widely used for pattern recognition and classification. Augmented Environment A space equipped with sensors, transmitters, and receivers that allow suitably equipped users to obtain and/or post information about that space that would not normally be directly available to the unaided senses. Complex System A system of many interacting components that is open to exchanges of energy, matter, or information with its environment. Complex systems have characteristic properties and behaviors (nonlinearities, unpredictability, selforganization, chaos, emergence, etc.) that differentiate them sharply from the simple, closed systems of classical science. Deep Uncertainty Uncertainty about future states of the world and/or the outcomes of actions that is qualitative in nature, that is, cannot be expressed in probability terms. Four-Color Theorem (Conjecture) The first major mathematical theorem to be proved with the help of a computer. The proof confirmed that four different colors are necessary and sufficient to color any arbitrarily complex map so that no two adjacent areas have the same color. This landmark proof has special significance for computational geography because the problem is explicitly spatial. Heuristic A computational shortcut for obtaining approximate solutions to problems for which analytical solutions either do not exist or could not be derived within a reasonable amount of time. Monte Carlo Techniques Computational procedures that use random sampling algorithms to derive the statistical properties of classes of patterns. Numerical Solution A solution derived through a digital approximation method, as opposed to an exact analytic solution. Optimization A class of techniques for finding minimum or maximum values of functions subject to a number of constraints. Simulation Model A computational model that mimics the behavior of some dynamic empirical process of interest.

Computational human geography is part of a broad spectrum of fields in both the natural and the social sciences that have adopted the qualifier “computational” to describe their methodological and epistemological approach to their subject matter. We thus have, on the natural science side, computational physics, chemistry, biology, and so on, and even computational mathematics. Similarly, in the social sciences, the terms computational economics, political science, anthropology, linguistics, etc., have appeared in the literature in recent decades, sometimes also as titles of professional journals (e.g., Computational Economics 1988–, Computational Linguistics 1974–). All these relatively new fields are part of computational natural or social science, or computational science more generally. The term computational science is sometimes used interchangeably with scientific computing, though the latter may have a narrower, more applied meaning. The rapidly increasing number of journals with related titles (e.g., Scientific Computing World 1994–, SIAM Journal on Scientific Computing 1980–) and of computational science degree programs at major universities worldwide attest to the growing interest in computational approaches across the sciences. In geography, the terms Geocomputation (also the title of a successful international conference series), geoinformatics, or geomatics (the names of several engineering departments specializing in geospatial computing), Computational Geography (the name of a research center at the University of Leeds), and Computational Spatial Science (a research focus at Arizona State University), all include computational human geography, though they are not restricted to the social science side of the discipline.

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Computational Science and the Theory of Computation Computational science has its origins in the first digital computers that became available for use by scientists in the mid-to-late 1940s. Even in their early, primitive incarnations, these machines could tackle the massive calculations needed to solve complicated problems much more efficiently than professional humans. But scientific computation proper began when the use of computers moved beyond mere number crunching to helping derive approximate numerical solutions to problems that were too large or difficult to solve analytically. Since that time, the extraordinary expansion of computing technology has continued unabated, affecting every aspect of the domain: hardware, software, data, infrastructure, and computational techniques, enabling an ever-growing range of applications, many of them now part of everyday life, and leading to a new public appreciation of what computers can do. In academia, computational approaches to problem-solving were at first considered very much second best to traditional methods, especially in the formal sciences such as mathematics, theoretical physics, and economics. A turning point in the status of computation as a legitimate scientific approach was reached in the 1970s, when the four-color conjecture, one of the famous (and very geographical) unsolved problems in mathematics, was proved; or rather, it was demonstrated to be true by using a computer to perform an exhaustive search through some 1500 configurations representing all possible classes of four-color maps. This caused quite a stir in the discipline. At first, many mathematicians refused to accept the computer-aided solution as a valid proof, but eventually the work was verified independently, while other similarly derived proofs started appearing in prestigious mathematical journals. On the theoretical side, the rise of the complex systems paradigm in the natural and social sciences, which occurred around the same time, allowed research issues to be framed as complex systems problems. These are almost by definition not analytically tractable and require computers for their solution. More importantly, complex systems are typically dynamic systems undergoing some process, and computer algorithms themselves describe a complex process. Thus, algorithms can be used not only to solve problems for which mathematical solutions may or may not exist, but also to formulate complex system problems from scratch as complex processes. In computational human geography, typical exponents of the aforementioned classes of complex system applications are cellular automata models (CA), and agent-based models or systems (ABM or ABS) (see next section). Both CA and ABM/ABS are based on automata theory, one of three branches of the theory of computation. Automata are time-dependent formal structures evolving under sets of “if–then” rules that operate on each automaton’s current and possible future states. Both these very important classes of applications involve the development of simulation models, that is, algorithms embodying specific computational processes that are assumed to mimic the empirical processes of interest. Beyond these process-oriented applications, a wide array of other methods and techniques from scientific computing are also used in human geography to generate problem-solving procedures for statistical, graphical, and other forms of data processing. Methods for searching large solution spaces, for model calibration, for function optimization, for spatial cluster detection, for dealing with data uncertainty, and many others were routinely used by quantitative geographers already in the 1970s. These methods represent the more standard use of the computer as a data-handling and numerical problem-solving device, providing solutions to mathematical and statistical problems such as those found in spatial analysis and spatial optimization. Such problems can often be solved only approximately in practice because an exact solution would take far too long to calculate, even on the fastest computers. In this case, heuristics are used, that is, computational shortcuts that can produce good enough solutions. Heuristics are also used by default in the numerous instances of problems in human geography that have no formal expression, but are directly translated from the conceptual to the computational stage. These forms of computing as numerical problem-solving also have a long and distinguished history in the field. In more recent years additional, increasingly sophisticated computational techniques were introduced to geography for handling tasks such as pattern recognition, classification, advanced visualization, or very large optimization problems. Many of these techniques, including genetic algorithms, simulated annealing, self-organizing maps, and most importantly, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), were derived from Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is expected to play a growing role in science and technology and in everyday life. The next two subsections discuss some of the very diverse uses of computation in human geography, from the early days of the approach, to the present, and to the emerging future.

Computation in Human Geography Historical Overview Sometimes, computation in (human) geography is thought to be practically synonymous with the use of geographic information systems (GIS), but in actual fact, the history of the field’s involvement with computation is both much longer and broader than its association with GIS. From the 1950s on, the rise of the quantitative revolution offered fertile ground for experimentation with computational techniques in the context of spatial analysis, optimization problems, and early models of spatial decision and behavior. Hägerstrand’s pioneering work in spatial diffusion demonstrated two major notions related to computation: (1) the idea that spatial diffusion is a spatial process that may be seen as an algorithmic process and (2) the utility of a computational stochastic sampling technique from the class known as Monte Carlo simulations. Hägerstrand’s work thus touched on the traditional two major aspects of scientific computation: as direct process representation and as datahandling methodology.

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The First Steps

Human geography had another significant early encounter with computation in the form of the first generation of urban models that appeared in the 1960s. In practical terms, these models turned out to be overambitious, expensive, heavily criticized, and ridiculed failures, especially in the United States, but the seeds for the computational solution of large empirical problems were planted in the discipline at that time. These early computer models consisted of very large systems of simultaneous equations that would have been extremely difficult to solve manually. Approximate solutions were generated by iterative algorithms that assigned values to the different model parameters until an acceptable point of convergence toward equilibrium was reached. The failure of these models had less to do with computation per se as with certain immature conceptualizations of cities as static equilibrium systems. Around that time, another computational approach to human geography emerged out of operations research (OR), a new discipline that contributed the notion of decision optimization and led to formal decision studies. Spatial extensions of OR, as in location modeling, spatial optimization, and spatial decision-making and planning, continue to generate useful and well-regarded theoretical and applied research to this day. Application areas benefiting from an optimization perspective include marketing and store location, school and hospital location, the location of cell phone towers, truck routing, the dynamical deployment of emergency vehicles, and others. Partly in reaction to mechanistic representations of human phenomena as aggregate systems of statistical regularities, behavioral and cognitive geography emerged as a movement emphasizing the perceiving, thinking individual who makes and carries out decisions in geographic space. Much of behavioral geography has used computational techniques quite extensively. Work in that area has been quite diverse, ranging from humanistic perspectives on values, attachments, and emotions relating to place, to theoretical models of spatial decision inspired from microeconomics, Game Theory, or Operations Research, to empirical studies of individuals or groups making housing, transportation, shopping, land-use, and other choices in urban or rural environments. In addition to introducing human geography to experimental psychology and cognitive science, this latter thrust in behavioral geography was particularly amenable to approaches from another major development to come out of Turing’s theory of computation: Artificial Intelligence (AI). Computational models of housing search, of orientation and route finding, of directional biases in spatial behavior, and so on, began appearing in the literature by the late 1970s. These AI-inspired models emphasized the unobservable cognitive processes thought to underlie spatial decision and behavior, including the generation of cognitive maps.

Cellular Automata and Agent-Based Models

Also around the late 1970s, the first publications on Cellular Automata (CA) started appearing in human geography. Of the complex systems models available in the physicomathematical and computational literature, CA stood out as being directly applicable to geographical problems. Cellular Automata consist of one-, two-, or higher-dimensional arrays of automata, which in geography are typically thought of as spatial cells. Each cell updates its current state by computing the next state as a function of the current state and those of specified neighboring cells in the array, based on predetermined updating rules and the specification of a neighborhood. The dynamic behavior of the array as a whole thus defines a “macrolevel” that is the collective outcome of the “microlevel” behavior of the individual, locally interacting cells. Because of the fundamental role that the notion of neighborhood plays in CA dynamics, these models are inherently spatial, and the underlying algorithm generates a spatial process analog. Beyond their inherent spatiality, CA have several additional desirable properties for human geography and beyond. Because they generate complex macroscale patterns as the result of microscale interactions, they may be seen as metaphors for urban and regional organization resulting from a myriad of interdependent decisions by individual actors; they occasionally produce surprising outcomes that stimulate new thinking about the real systems modeled; they are relatively easy to program and implement; and they produce striking dynamic visualizations. CA-based models are used in human geography in two different ways. Originally, they were seen primarily as instructive, intuition-sharpening metaphors, focused on isolating and exploring properties of interest of complex spatial systems and providing opportunities for novel thought experiments. One of the earliest and best-known examples of this first kind of CA was developed not by a human geographer but by a Nobel laureate economist. Schelling’s model of spatial segregation is famous for demonstrating that even mild individual preferences for being close to one’s “kind” may eventually lead to starkly segregated spatial patterns. The second and more widespread use of CA is as simulations of actual spatial processes, such as those of regional and other land-use change. For example, cells, which constitute the microlevel, may represent plots of land belonging to individual farmers, each of whom decides on next year’s cultivation as a function of the decisions of surrounding farmers. In that case, the resulting macrolevel is the land-use pattern of the agricultural region, as it evolves over time. By the early 1990s, as CA models were beginning to become popular in human geography, ABM/ABS were being adopted in many areas of social science. These soon found their way into human geography, often in conjunction with CA. ABM are part of the same broader computational family as that of CA. “Agents” are classes of automata that seek specific goals based on sets of constraints and behavior rules, simulating decision-making entities that can sense conditions in their environment, interact with it and with other agents, and follow rules. Agents may be simple or highly complex, they may be spatially mobile or not, and they may represent individuals, groups, institutional decision makersdgenerally, any decision-making entity, human, animal, or even inanimate (e.g., an electronic device). Interest in ABM/ABS has grown rapidly in human geography, rejoining the earlier efforts in parts of behavioral and cognitive geography to study and represent computationally the processes of spatial decision and behavior. Nowadays, the simple AIinspired, custom-built models of the 1980s have been largely superseded by sophisticated versions of ABM/ABS that can represent decision and behavior with considerable realism, often based on easily available off-the-shelf software. Also, increasingly, ABM/ABS are being integrated with CA into more complex structures, with the latter representing processes in the spatial environment and the

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former the decision-making entities affecting and being affected by these processes. The advantage of this mixed approach is that it is easier to assign complex behavior to agents within an ABM/ABS framework than to express it in the form of updating rules for a CA cell. Together or separately, both these types of automata-based models have been an integral part of computational human geography for quite some time now, having become more sophisticated and empirically relevant in the process. While not directly part of computational human geography, computer cartography and GIS have affected the field profoundly. Computer-aided cartography appeared as soon as computers were able to produce some primitive graphics, and around the same time, the ancestor of GIS took shape in the guise of the computer-aided cadaster for Canada. Both fields quickly transcended their origins as the computerized versions of traditional ways of doing things, to move in unanticipated, vibrant new directions. Computer cartography soon extended into animated cartography, digital terrain modeling, and three-dimensional (3D) visualization, the dynamic mapping of abstract flows (e.g., of migration or money flows), the integration of field and remotely sensed data (also from urban areas), and so on, and even took care of stylistic problems such as of the correct placement of lettering on maps. As for GIS, its explosive growth into a technology affecting a host of domains well beyond geographydhuman or otherdhas been amply documented. While being the most prominent piece of the computational revolution in (human) geography, GIS is clearly not the only one.

The Presentdand Beyond There are by now few areas of human geography that have not been touched by some development or other coming out of the computational turn in the disciplinedbe it a computer-generated map, the visualization of an environment, a simple GIS analysis, or a tool for spatial data exploration. Most of the earlier encounters of human geography with computation continue to flourish today. They are supported by increasingly powerful and easy-to-use software packages as well as good and plentiful data, both of which are now often available free over the web. At the same time, novel technologies and sources of data, and expanded notions of computation, such as mobile and pervasive computation, have been added to the repertoire of human geography. Developments in these new areas may be discussed under three headings: The Data Revolution; Spatial (especially Urban) Informatics; and Ambient Computing.

The Data Revolution The term “big data” is now part of everyday discourse, and those with some background in related areas know about the five V’s of big data: volume, velocity, variety, veracity, and value. Big data have definitely already impacted computational human geography, with some of the V’s being represented in current work more prominently than others. Some argue that next to the “big” data, there is also “new” data, although this may actually be part of the “variety” characteristic. Either way, “new” data may be the more relevant kind for human geographers, considering the extraordinary diversity of data sources newly available to researchers. Thus, next to the traditional topographic, satellite, census, and survey data, researchers can now have access to a wealth of crowd-sourced data (usergenerated content, volunteered geographic informationdVGI). Some examples: data from social media applications, such as Foursquare, Instagram, Twitter, Flickr, and dozens of others; spatial tracking data generated by automobiles, bicycles, or pedestrians; counts of travelers entering and exiting metro stations, or buses; and so on. Most of the latter, automatically captured data, and data from sensors more generally, are available time-stamped and with location information accurate enough for research and for some management purposes. A tribute to the Big Data age, the phrase “evidence-based” (essentially meaning data-based) has been adopted by managers, politicians, and professionals in several disciplines to describe the perceived quality of their decisions and actions. Despite the proliferation of data sources, for sheer volume, none can yet match the Internet, which is both a repository of data of any sort and provenance, and a primary source of data itself. This latter aspect is less developed but is exemplified by the well-known 2006 case, whereby a growing number of Google searches for “flu” or “flu symptoms” helped provide an early warning to authorities about the spread of the disease. This particular success could not be replicated, and Google scrapped its “Flu Trends” program in 2014. Still, the billions of daily users of the web worldwide constitute an extraordinary source of potential data still to be tapped by researchers. One major way to access that enormous store of mostly unconventional data is already being exploited by human geographers: this is the extraction of data from text (“unstructured data”), e.g., from Wikipedia or from any other written document posted online. Data Mining, the general term for this approach, is briefly discussed later.

Spatial Informatics Simply defined, Informatics is a recently defined computational field whose objective is to facilitate the conversion of data into information and usable knowledge. Cartography has been geography’s oldest and still among the most important ways of visually conveying knowledge about the world and has tracked the computational turn of the discipline. In more recent times, cartography has been joined by additional, increasingly sophisticated computational visualization possibilities. It is now standard for software used by human geographers (and beyond) to include interactive graphic interfaces that blur the distinction between confirmatory and exploratory analysis. This fusion of advanced computational data-handling, visualization, and analysis is a very powerful development because it capitalizes on both the deliberative and the intuitive capacities of the human mind, creating fruitful right

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brain–left brain synergies. Visualization is also used extensively to communicate ideas among researchers, and especially among researchers and the public, where the proverbial picture that is worth a thousand words can help break down the barriers separating experts and nonexperts. Interest is also growing exponentially in exploratory spatial data analysis and data mining, both of which involve classes of techniques that facilitate the discovery of interesting patterns in large databases. Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) is a distinct data analysis approach that makes intensive use of visualization. EDA relies on several different techniques, but its objective is to help explore rather than describe a database: to allow users to get a feel for the underlying structure of the data, to find patterns, to identify interesting outliers and anomalies, to probe assumptions, and generally, to allow users to “understand” a database as much as possible. There is considerable similarity in overall goals between EDA and Data Mining, the latter being more recent and much more heavily invested in advanced computational approaches, such as Machine Learning. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), thus named because of their beginnings in the 1940s as models of the brain, are still the most popular machine learning technique in computational human geography. The simplest (“supervised”) ANN can “learn” to distinguish objects from a very large number of examples presented to them and are then able to inductively identify instances of known kinds of objects that they had not yet encountered. This capability of ANN is widely used for pattern recognition and classification (e.g., of land uses or urban features), and occasionally for prediction. Human geographers have also used ANN to identify and classify crowd-sourced photographs of places, and for text mining (or “text analytics”) of documents on the web, though more traditional statistical and linguistic approaches are still useful for extracting relevant information from text. More advanced forms of machine learning (unsupervised ANN, deep learning) are beginning to be tackled by human geographers with appropriate levels of computational expertize and may become available before too long to a broader range of researchers.

Ambient Computing Next to the evolutionary computational developments aforementioned, there are also some quite revolutionary ones that are already affecting parts of human geography. Until recently, computation was done on computers or on their portable offspring, the laptop and the tablet. Today there is a plethora of new digital technologies that support distributed, wearable, and mobile computing, the latter being led by the introduction of the smartphone in 2007, followed by smart watches and smart clothing. These technologies are increasingly supported by sensors distributed in the environment that can provide real-time information on any number of variables of interest to human geographers as well as the public (e.g., on street noise, crowd sizes, or traffic speeds). Sensors may also be airborne, on drones, themselves a relatively new technology. Much of this broader trend toward pervasive computing involves the convergence of technologies that have been around for a while, such as wireless Internet, sensors, and Global Positioning Systems (GPS). Other emerging technologies, such as Virtual Reality (VR) devices also depend on the aforementioned but are for the most part early applications of genuinely novel technologies. Examples of new research areas in human geography that are already capitalizing on these developments are Location-Based Services (LBS), and augmented environments, while the advent of autonomous vehicles raises new dilemmas for urban and transportation geographers and for planners. LBS allow smartphone users on the move to receive GIS-generated maps that display the location of nearby points of interest (commercial or other), that show good routes from the subject’s current position to a destination, or that alert users to the presence of friends at nearby locations. Augmented environments are urban (usually) environments outfitted with distributed sensors. These are wireless transmitters and receivers that can provide to suitably equipped users local realtime information that would normally not be directly accessible to them. Virtual Reality (VR) largely depends on ambient sensors, and the sonic, visual, textual, and other information these provide. Applications can range from accessing narratives describing historical buildings or districts in a subject’s immediate environment, to receiving and sharing spontaneous commentaries by visitors in public places that subsequent visitors can access, to auditory signals allowing blind subjects to construct effective mental maps of their surroundings. Another novelty of the age is the “Internet of things” (IoT), whereby invisible networks of wirelessly connected electronic devices (often domestic ones, such as doorbells or refrigerators) communicate with one another across urban space. These latter research areas are at the frontier of computational human geography, eventually requiring a radical rethinking of traditional notions of space and place, and of the relationship among humans, their technology, and their environment.

Issues and Critiques Over the years, computational human geography has had its strongly committed, sometimes strident champions as well as its skeptical, often dismissive critics. Critiques of computational human geography originate from both within the postpositivist perspective of geography as spatial science, as well as from the humanistic and social theory perspectives. The internal critiques parallel those of all computational (social) science and tend to center around epistemological and methodological issues, whereas the external critiques are more likely to contest the ontological assumptions underlying many uses of computation in human geography. Critiques of computational approaches in human geography should be distinguished from those, also found in the geographical literature, that examine the role of computers in society more generally. Concerns tend to focus on issues of empowerment, access, privacy, surveillance, digital divides, inequality, and other societal dilemmas, often in the context of discussions of GIS and its potential uses and misuses. These discussions continue today, with added emphasis on the very real risk of AI causing massive job losses and other undesirable effects in practically every sector of the economy and society.

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Internal Critiques The most widely accepted definition of computational science as the use of computer-based methods and techniques to solve scientific problems does not do justice to the extremely significant role of computation in not just solving but also in representing problems. This is an important distinction because there is little controversy surrounding the problem-solving, numerical computing aspect of computational human geography. On occasion, techniques might be used incorrectly or inappropriately, but beyond that, no one misses the days of the slide rule. The representational aspect of computation, on the other hand, raises a number of important issues that have yet to be properly addressed, let alone resolved. Computation has often been discussed as the third way of doing science, lying somewhere between theory development and experimentation. This implies a new approach to knowledge production and the need for a new kind of research methodology different from either the mostly deductive mode of theoretical work or the mostly inductive mode of experimental science. That third way centers on the construction of complex simulated worlds, within which experiments may be run that would have been difficult or impossible to conduct in the real world. Examples from computational human geography would be processoriented models of people interacting with their environment, often expressed as coupled agent-based and CA models. These may simulate farmer communities dynamically affecting land cover through adaptive land-use decisions, households seeking suitable housing in changing urban neighborhoods, or trip makers responding to various congestion pricing schemes on transportation networks. Such models are built to incorporate considerable empirical and intuitive understanding of the complex processes of interest, and when calibrated to actual data, they are often presented as suitable for policy analysis. The epistemological problem is that models of complex open systems with deep uncertainties, as social systems nearly always are, cannot in principle be used for prediction. Predictive models belong in the traditional scientific paradigm of theoretical closed system descriptions supported by experimental evidence or at least of well-established empirical generalizations such as human geography’s spatial interaction models. Because this fact is not always appreciated, many computational modelers understand progress in the field to mean building simulations that are increasingly more detailed and realistic, though increased detail can actually decrease any predictive value, such models may have by introducing additional “noise.” The meaning of model validation in this new world of computational process models thus remains open, and so does the question of how to derive valid insights that may be useful for both theory development and for policy guidance. Technically, there are two main reasons why models of complex open systems cannot yield reliable predictions: because they are very sensitive to data quality, and because many different models can provide acceptable fits to the data. In other words, any particular model is but one realization out of a large space of potential models, few or none of which may be correct by whatever definition of the term. This issue is sometimes addressed with Monte Carlo simulations that generate many versions of a particular model by systematically varying the parameters; model outcomes are then considered reliable to the extent that they are reproduced by large numbers of different parameter sets. This methodology may take care of parametric uncertainty but cannot address structural uncertainty, that is, the degree of confidence one may have in the structure of the model. Researchers in both the social and the natural sciences have suggested methods for generating large numbers of different model structures in a manner analogous to generating versions of the same model through Monte Carlo simulations. The idea is that exploring the properties of entire classes (ensembles) of models, even relatively simple ones, may yield more robust insights into complex processes than the study of even the more realistic-looking individual models. There is fertile ground here for the more theoretically inclined computational human geographers to make contributions that will also benefit researchers in many other fields.

External Critiques Computational human geography has evolved out of the discipline’s quantitative revolution, and the external critique has mirrored that development. Beyond the evident, inadequacy of computational models as representations of individual human consciousness is their apparent total inability to represent central social theory constructs such as gender, race, class, and society or more elaborate notions such as the social construction of space or social/spatial justice. There seems to be no language that can effectively translate between these two domains of human geography, the computational and that of social theory. Cross-fence critiques have substantially waned by the early 2000s, the two sides appearing to have resigned themselves to coexist in mutual disregard. Glimmers of a rapprochement are evident however in parts of the field under the banner of mixed research methods (quantitative/computational and qualitative). A particularly noteworthy development is the adaptation of GIS tools to socially engaged applications, as spearheaded, for example, by the public participation GIS (PPGIS) agenda. Of course, in their daily lives, nonquantitative geographers partake in the conveniences and products of the information age as much as anyone else. Yet persistent major differences in philosophy make it unlikely that computational human geography will be accepted by more than a fraction of the discipline, at least in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, increasing numbers of scholars from other social sciences are already adopting approaches and methods from computational human geography in their own work. To close, the basic ontological objections to representing the human world in terms of (x, y, t) coordinates and measurable attributes have had little reason to change since the 1960s. For much of social science, human and social phenomena are fundamentally irreducible; quantitative methods can only scratch the surface of what really matters. Thus, for many human geographers, computational human geography is social physics that has evolved from the age of celestial mechanics to that of collapsing sand piles (an oft-cited example of complex system behavior in physics). If anything, the picture has only gotten worse, considering that the theory of computation is also known as the theory of abstract machines. It is understandable that those who have objections of principle to

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the use of physicalist and mechanistic representations of human beings may feel even more threatened by today’s clever and capable computational agents and robots, than by the point particles of the quantitative revolution. Indeed, in our technology-obsessed age, computation as form of power and as alluring rhetoric may present new and troubling societal risks. That fear culminates today in the existential risk of intelligent machines subjugating humans, or, at the limit, annihilating the human race. An interesting aspect of this unprecedented concern is that it is expressed by certain giants of science and information technology, as well as by sciencefiction writers and technophobes. It is too early to tell whether computational human geographers might pick up that theme at some point in the future.

See Also: Cellular Automata; Choice Modeling; Evolutionary Algorithms; Quantitative Revolution; Simulation Modeling; Spatial Data Models; Spatial Databases.

Further Reading Ash, J., Kitchin, R., Leszczynski, A., 2018. Digital Geographies. SAGE Publications, London. Bankes, S., Lempert, R., Popper, S., 2002. Making computational social science effective: epistemology, methodology, and technology. Soc. Sci. Comput. Rev. 20, 377–388. Batty, M., 2005. Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-Based Models, and Fractals. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Batty, M., 2013. The New Science of Cities. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Benenson, I., Torrens, P.M., 2004. Geosimulation: Automata-Based Modeling of Urban Phenomena. Wiley, Chichester. Brundson, C., Singleton, S., 2015. Geocomputation: A Practical Primer. SAGE Publications, London. Couclelis, H., 1998. Geocomputation in context. In: Longley, P.A., Brooks, S.M., McDonnell, R., Macmillan, B. (Eds.), GeoComputation: A Primer. Wiley, Chichester, pp. 17–29. Geertman, S., Reinhardt, W., Toppen, F. (Eds.), 2011. Advancing Geoinformation Science for a Changing World. Springer, Heidelberg. Gilbert, N., Troitzsch, K.G., 1999. Simulation for the Social Scientist. Open University Press, Buckingham. Gimblett, R.H. (Ed.), 2002. Integrating Geographic Information Systems and Agent-Based Modeling Techniques. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Longley, P.A., Brooks, S.M., McDonnell, R., Macmillan, B. (Eds.), 1998. GeoComputation: A Primer. Wiley, Chichester, pp. 17–29. Openshaw, S., 1998. Towards a more computationally minded scientific geography. Environ. Plan. 30, 317–332. Portugali, J. (Ed.), 2006. Complex Artificial Environments: Simulation, Cognition and VR in the Study and Planning of Cities. Springer, Berlin. Wolfram, S., 2002. A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media, Champaign, IL.

Relevant Websites https://journals.sagepub.com/home/epb The journal Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science (Formerly Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design). “.the leading journal for the publication of high-quality articles that present cutting-edge research in analytical methods for urban planning and design. The journal focuses on smart cities, urban analytics, GIS, and urban simulation models.” (From the journal’s website). http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk CASA: the UCL Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis. CASA is an initiative within University College London to develop emerging computer technologies in several disciplines which deal with geography, space, location, and the built environment. A majority of CASA’s publications and research projects would qualify as “computational human geography’. http://ccl.northwestern.edu Northwestern University’s NetLogo Models Library: this is a rich, continuously growing collection of simple computational models, many of which represent familiar geographical processes. It includes a version of the well-known Schelling model of spatial segregation. http://www.geocomputation.org Initiated in 1996. This site maintains papers and other information from previous conferences and links to upcoming conferences.

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Concentrated Deconcentration Bart Lambregts, Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Backwash or polarization effects The movement of economic resources from less developed to developed areas, resulting in the strengthening of the dependency relationship between them. Endogenous development A predominantly bottom-up development process, initiated and carried out by local and regional actors, and influenced and shaped by regional institutions and policy. Exogenous development A predominantly top-down development approach, implemented by the central government or external agencies and strongly based on factors such as external demand, the attraction of international firms and technology, and the mobility of capital and labor between economically strong and weak regions. Growth center A spatialized interpretation of the growth pole in which the latter’s growth-inducing capacities are attributed to cities of at least a certain size and with an advanced economic structure. Growth pole A complex of functionally linked industries dominated by a propulsive industry, the latter being the engine of the development dynamic, thanks to its intrinsic capacity to innovate and stimulate economic growth, and to nurture the formation of other economic activities and industries. New town A new settlement created not far from an existing urban center. A new town differs from a dormitory suburb by that it also provides jobs, retail functions, schools, and other public services to its residents. Polycentric urban development Emergence of an urban system consisting of more than one urban place. Urban sprawl Spread of low-density urban developments to nearby undeveloped land around a city.

Concentrated deconcentration refers to the geographical redistribution of mobile resources, such as people, jobs, and services, away from a territory’s urban core and toward what are usually smaller centers either nearby or further away. It gives rise to settlement patterns that are best conceived as polycentric and, at the metropolitan scale, offers an alternative to urban sprawl. The concept is essentially bi-scalar. It always involves deconcentration at one particular level and concentration at another, inevitably lower level. The process may occur spontaneously, driven by market forces, or be pursued through spatial and/or economic planning strategies. The latter are deliberate attempts by policymakers to direct urban and/or economic development away from primary and toward smaller and more peripheral centers, usually with the purpose of easing pressure on the primary center and/or achieving a territorially more balanced development. Concentrated deconcentration can be observed and/or pursued at various spatial scales ranging from the local to the national and, in exceptional cases, the supranational. In geographical literature, concentrated deconcentration is sometimes also referred to as “decentralized concentration” or “concentrated decentralization.”

Conceptual Origins Organic and, geography permitting, concentric expansion was the dominant way for cities to grow until, toward the end of the 19th Century, the arrival of motorized transport modes enabled town planners (then still a rare species) to consider alternative models for the management of urban growth. Seeking to address the dismal living conditions prevailing in many British cities at the time, Ebenezer Howard was one of the first to look for what was in essence a regional solution to urban problems. In his pioneering book Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform (1898; in 1902 republished as Garden Cities of Tomorrow), Howard proposed how city dwellers, notably the urban working class trapped in substandard housing, could be offered better living conditions by moving them in a planned and organized fashion, to compact but, compared to the existing cities, pleasantly spacious new settlements at some distance from existing urban cores. His garden cities were not to be dormitory suburbs of which the residents depended for jobs on the nearby central city, but self-supporting, economically viable communities that combined the key advantages of both “the town” (i.e., access to jobs and services) and “the country” (i.e., healthy environments and space). Howard, moreover, did not picture his garden cities as disconnected islands in an otherwise empty world butdperceptively for the timedthought of them as constituents of larger (i.e., regional), multicentered systems of closely interconnected towns and villages. His ideas were received with enthusiasm, notably in progressive circles, and, at an experimental scale, put into practice through the inception of Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn Garden City (1920), both near London. Howard’s innovative approach to addressing urban congestion can be viewed as a very early attempt at concentrated deconcentration in an urban management context. While limited in its immediate material urban impacts, it helped to pave the way for the introduction in 1946 of the eventually much more consequential British New Towns Act. This act would guide the UK’s attempts at

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addressing urban congestion and managing overspill for decades to come and inspire planners around the world to explore similar pathways. Early followers included the Netherlands, France, Japan, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, the Soviet Union, and various East European states, with especially the latter initiating the development of dozens of new towns, often in peripheral areas perceived in need of development. When in the 1960s and 1970s influential advisory bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations also started to promote concentrated deconcentration as a regional development strategy, a variety of African, Middle Eastern, and (South) East Asian countries jumped on the bandwagon as well. Some 70 years after the publication of Garden Cities of Tomorrow, the idea of steering growth away from primary centers and toward smaller and more peripheral places had become viewed by many a policymaker as an effective answer to a variety of both urban management and regional development problems, and put into practice in countries around the globe.

A Multipurpose Strategy Howard’s garden cities were essentially a response to the poor living conditions in congested urban cores and meant to create better living conditions for the urban working class. In the course of time, concentrated deconcentration strategies would come to serve other objectives as well. These can broadly be split between those related to the management of urban growth (akin to Howard’s focus), and those geared to the promotion of regional development. While these categories are not mutually exclusive (concentrated deconcentration can be employed to serve both at once), the distinctive features merit separate treatment.

Concentrated Deconcentration as a Growth Management Strategy Prior to World War II, the toolboxes of urban planners were mainly filled with concentric growth models and some variations on the theme. Over time, however, the needs and desires of the (aspirant) urban population further diversified and (individual) motorized mobility became an increasingly common feature of urban life. Managing urban growth, in consequence, became a more complex task. During the first postwar years, the regular engines of urban population growth (i.e., births and immigration) in many parts of the world ran at full speed and produced a strong demand for housing and related services. Demand for housing was further enhanced by the urban renewal programs that aimed to rehabilitate war-damaged neighborhoods and to address persistent inner-city problems (e.g., high densities, poor services, and (consequent) substandard living conditions). These programs often involved the temporal and/or permanent displacement of inner-city dwellers, who needed substitute housing as a consequence. Simultaneously, improved transport and changing location preferences among the more well-to-do citizenry reinforced the emergent but yet mostly unguided suburbanization process. Against this background, London was one of the first cities to become the subject of a comprehensive concentrated deconcentration policy used for growth management objectives. The Abercrombie Plan for Greater London of 1944, borrowing heavily from Howard’s garden cities vision, aimed simultaneously to reduce inner-city densities, curtail metropolitan growth, preserve green space, and impose order to the market-driven, sprawling deconcentration process that was already underway. The plan advanced the idea to develop, in a ring at some 50 km from London and beyond a green belt, eight so-called new towns. Each of these was to accommodate (initially) some 50,000 “rehoused” Londoners, with another 600,000 to be relocated to a range of existing small but to be expanded country towns a bit further away. The new towns were to be developed from scratch in different places up to 50 km from the city’s core (Fig. 1). They would eventually be realized under the 1946 New Towns Act. This act established the concentrated deconcentration of urban dwellers as a state policy and paved the way for the developmentdin three wavesdof close to 30 new towns around major cities in the United Kingdom in the decades following. Other countries were quick to follow the example set by London and the United Kingdom. The villes nouvelles developed around Paris in the 1960s and onward served largely similar goals and so did the satellite towns of, among others, Stockholm (labeled ABC cities), Moscow, Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, and Osaka. The concentrated deconcentration policies employed in these and other cases typically were fine-tuned in accordance with local conditions and needs, and the range of objectives served gradually broadened in result. Planners in the Netherlands, for example, used their combined concentrated deconcentration and growth-center strategy not only to keep the country’s largest cities from growing larger, but also to realize national (social) housing targets, maintain a sharp distinction between urban and rural realms, and create favorable conditions for public transport (so as to reduce car dependency and foster returns on public investments in public transport infrastructure). It was the time when spatial planning matured as a policy discipline and optimism about the manageability of society ran high. In recent years, the center of gravity for new town development has shifted to the Global South, in particular to Asia, the Middle East, and more recently Africa. While in many advanced economies changing conditions forced policymakers to redirect their attention toward the revitalization of existing cities (see below), in parts of the Global South a potent combination of rapid economic development, ongoing rural to urban migration, urban boosterism, and global capital seeking investment opportunities has fueled (and still fuels) a massive construction boom. Over the past 20 years or so, this boom has not only radically transformed the skylines of many existing cities but also led to the planning and (initial) development of hundreds of new towns, the bulk of them in China. Like their 20th-Century (European) counterparts, they can be seen as manifestations of concentrated deconcentration in that they serve, at least in part, to mitigate pressure on existing, often severely congested (mega)cities, and represent attempts to create (at least some) urban density to counterbalance low-density urban sprawl. In several other respects, however, new towns in the Global South also differ quite substantially from European examples. For one thing, many of these contemporary new towns are

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private sector rather than state-led developments, and cater to middle and upper class rather than to working-class members of society. As a result, they usually take the shape of exclusive, enclave-like, and privately managed ensembles dominated by (upmarket) residential and leisure functions. Examples include Bumi Serpong Damai (or BSD City) in Indonesia and Appolonia City in Ghana, which offer the well-to-do a secluded escape from the hustle and bustle of Jakarta and Accra, respectively. Another difference relates to the supply-driven nature of many of these new developments. Where most 20th-Century new towns answered

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to a demand (or a housing shortage) created by policies aimed at decongesting existing urban cores, contemporary new towns are often built with the explicit intent to attract capital across national borders (e.g., Forest City in Malaysia, which was originally destined, in particular, for home buyers from China), and/or to simply generate economic output and unlock the value of local land banks (sentiments linked to the development of many recent new towns in China, for instance). Another novel feature is the (related) phenomenon of new towns being developed with the help of foreign capital and by foreign developers. Chinese developers, for instance, play an important role in the building of new towns in Angola (among other countries), and CamKo City in Cambodia is built by South Korean investors and construction companies. Overall, compared to their 20th-Century forerunners, many of the new towns currently appearing across the Global South are born from different ambitions, target different segments of society, are pushed and produced by different sets of actors, and subject to different funding and management models. As such, they offer an almost incomparable experience.

Concentrated Deconcentration in Regional Development Strategies In the same early postwar years that urban planners embraced concentrated deconcentration as an urban growth management tool, economists and economic geographers pondered how capital’s ability to move could be put to use for regional development purposes. The promotion of economic growth in regions that were perceived to lag behind ranked high on many a government’s agendadbe it as part of (postcolonial) nation-building projects, informed by concerns over unbalanced interregional migration flows, or spurred by the desire to better utilize a country’s (natural) resources. This interest strengthened further in the 1970s and 1980s, when automation and the globalization of manufacturing production altereddinitially often for the worsedthe faith of many an already industrialized region, urging the governments of advanced economies, in particular, to widen the scope of their regional development efforts. With endogenous development strategies yet to come to prominence, the main idea entertained was to make use of the mobility of capital and trigger regional development exogenously, among others, by guiding resources away from primary centers and toward regions perceived in need of development. Inspiration here was not taken from Howard and the new town advocates, but from the work by, first, the French economist François Perroux, who described in his growth pole theory how concentrations of so-called propulsive industries (i.e., industries with high growth potential, innovative capacity, and extensive input–output relations) by stimulating the development of related industries can act as engines of growth, and second, economic geographers such as Jacques Boudeville, who spatialized Perroux’s theory and proposed that a growth pole’s stimulating effects should be strongest in its direct geographic surroundings, and that therefore the creation of growth poles in lagging regions should make for effective regional development policy. Urban geographers and city planners took these ideas yet further and argued that cities too could act as engines of (regional) growth, especially when they had a reasonable size (e.g., more than 250,000 inhabitants) and were home to propulsive economic activities (certain types of services included). Fueled by the synergetic effects between urbanization and industrialization, such cities, labeled growth centers, were considered capable of delivering sustained growth that should be felt throughout the wider region they were (made) part of. While the nomenclature and the aims differed from those employed in the domain of urban growth management, the key modus operandi, i.e., the guiding away of resources from primary centers to (re) concentrate them in peripheral centers elsewhere, did not. In Western Europe, the French were particularly concerned about the lack of interregional balance in their territoire. The 1947 report Paris et le désert français [Paris and the French desert] called attention to the country’s asymmetrical spatial distribution of resources, with Paris dominating the country in virtually all respects. A more balanced development was advocated and throughout the 1960s and 1970s pursued through a policy which promoted the development of eight so-called métropoles d’équilibre or “counterweight cities” (Fig. 2). These existing cities, located all over the country, were selected for their development potential and received a comprehensive package of stimuli which included investments in infrastructure, the upgrading of public services, and the rolling out of urban expansion and redevelopment schemes. A close contemporary counterpart of this early balancing strategy is found in China’s attempts at reducing the development gap that separates the country’s eastern regions (spearheaded by the Yangtze River and Pearl River Deltas and the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region) from much of its interior. Following more generic, infrastructure-oriented schemes targeting western and central China, development efforts are now (i.e., under the country’s 13th 5-year plan for economic and social development) channeled toward a dozen city clusters situated along a series of so-called “urbanization axes”. These city clusters are seen as “growth poles” responsible for supporting regional development and comprise an important pillar of the country’s New Urbanization strategy, which, among other things, is supposed to fuel domestic demand and reduce the economy’s dependence on exports. As a clear sign of the times, the promotion of these inland city clusters is not supposed to happen at the expense of the coastal powerhouses of the east. The latter, rather than being disburdened, are meant to grow further still and more firmly establish themselves as China’s urban torchbearers on the world stage. The arguably more daring option available to planners was to initiate in lagging regions the development of largely or entirely new growth centers: the cities of considerable size built around one or more propulsive industries referred to above. In the early stages, faith was typically put in the growth-inducing capacity of basic, heavy industries. A fine example comes from Latin America, where governments throughout the 1960s and 1970s were particularly keen on developing growth poles and centers. Founded in 1961 and envisioned to become the “Pittsburgh of the tropics,” Ciudad Guayana was meant to open up a frontier region in eastern Venezuela and help reduce the country’s dependence on crude oil exports. The city was built around an extensive, export-oriented metal works complex that benefitted from the region’s iron ore and bauxite reserves, and the hydropower and ocean access provided by the Caroni and Orinoco rivers. Initially it grew quickly and appeared well on course to becoming a success story; however, from the 1980s on, failure to upgrade the industry, frequent conflicts between workers and management, questionable state

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interventions, and insufficient diversification into other, more contemporary growth sectors, among other factors, have harmed the city’s economy and dimmed its outlook. Sometimes, hope was not pinned on heavy industries but on the growth-inducing capacities of specific tertiary sector activities. A case in point is Akademgorodok (Academy Town), an educational and scientific center established in the 1950s to boost the development of “Empty Quarter” Siberia. It involved the transfer of substantial scientific communities from Moscow and Saint Petersburg (then still Leningrad) and the construction of a town for 50,000 people. After having experienced years of fortune and, around the collapse of the Soviet Union, decline, the town currently appears to thrive, being home to around 100,000 people and several hundreds of public and private knowledge-intensive institutions and (international) companies. Today, around the world plans for new growth centers are still being developed. They differ from many of their forerunners in that they tend to revolve around high-tech rather than heavy industries, rely less on the straightforward relocation of resources from primary centers (in line with the shift in regional development thinking toward endogenous modes of development), and often are located not too far from existing urban centers (so as to be able to tap into the skilled human resources and other economies provided by major cities). Cyberjaya, a new, IT-themed town developed from the late 1990s south of Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, is a good example and in 2017 reportedly was home to more than 800 companies and a (daytime) population of around 100,000. Similar plans can be found on many a drawing table or under construction elsewhere in South and East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, where authorities feel an urgent need to diversify and upgrade economies, and the belief in top-down approaches to regional development is still strong. Examples include Songdo International Business District in South Korea (a high-tech, smart city near Seoul), Xiong’an New Area in China (a massive, state-led new development near Beijing that is to become a key center of innovation), Binh Duong New City in Vietnam (a mixed, innovation and technology focused development near Ho Chi Minh City), King Abdullah Economic City in Saudi Arabia (one of six new cities being planned/developed in the kingdom and part of a move to diversify the economy away from oil), Kigali Innovation City in Rwanda (a major education and (bio)tech focused development project that is supposed to help Rwanda become a knowledge-based economy), and Konza Technopolis in Kenya (an effort to develop a business process outsourcing hub near Nairobi). Yet another option available to states is to try spur regional development by moving government agencies or state-owned enterprises from a country’s administrative and/or economic center(s) to depressed regions. The jobs, purchasing power, and technology so imported to a region are expected to stimulate other sectors of the local economy and trigger adhopefullydlasting process of economic expansion. For instance, in the Netherlands in the 1970s, the provinces of South Limburg, suffering from the demise of its mining industry, and Groningen, a persistently lagging region in the far northeast, received various national government agencies (moved there from the country’s administrative center, The Hague) and a university each to create jobs, increase local spending, and better equip them for a more knowledge-intensive economic future. The practice lives on today, for example, in Mexico, where in July 2018 the newly installed government announced ambitious plans to relocate dozens of the state’s departments and agencies

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from Mexico City to a great variety of secondary cities all around the country. The move, which is reported to potentially involve as many as 2.7 million people (government workers and their families), is supposed to help decongest Mexico City and stimulate local economies in the country’s periphery. Similarly, yet more modestly, a 2018 parliamentary enquiry into regional development and decentralization called for Australian federal government agencies to more seriously consider the sensibility and feasibility of moving functions to the regions and away from the country’s administrative centers, again with an eye to foster regional economies and decongest the country’s major urban centers. Ambitions and the choice of strategies applied to achieve deconcentration depend on how states approach manipulating market dynamics, and, in close relation, on a state’s capacity to direct the movement of resources effectively. Interventionist states would typically maintain high ambitions and not shy away from large-scale, state-led development programs, while those who put more trust in the market and/or lack the capacity to effectively intervene are more likely to limit themselves to implementing strategies aimed at influencing the direction of private sector investment flows, for instance, by granting financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks), and/or offering regulatory dispensations (e.g., in the realms of labor and/or the environment).

Achievements and Flaws Did the use of concentrated deconcentration as a growth management tool relieve pressure on core cities, provide livable spaces for former and would-be urban dwellers, and help to counteract uncontrolled suburban sprawl? And did the application of concentrated deconcentration in regional development strategies deliver growth and reduce imbalances as expected? Unequivocal answers to these questions are hard to give, but some general comments can be made.

Concentrated Deconcentration as a Growth Management Strategy By design, concentrated deconcentration policies were supposed to pave the way for their own retirement: the need for such policies was to diminish as they successfully reduced urban congestion in core cities. From the late 1970s onward, and especially in western economies, it started to become evident that deliberate concentrated deconcentration policies in combination with market-driven suburbanization were causing population growth in many western cities not only to diminish, but sometimes even to turn negative, and at times substantially so. For instance, in the Netherlands, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the country’s largest cities and both the subject of concentrated deconcentration policies, lost almost 25% of their inhabitants between 1965 and 1985. Aggravating the problem was that middle-income households, in particular, took the opportunity to swap their cramped city flats for the more spacious and comfortable terraced or detached houses built in the new centers developed at commuting distances. Low-income and otherwise vulnerable groups stayed behind, undermining cities’ capacity as concentrations of purchasing power. When the general economic climate into the 1980s and early 1990s remained bleak, urban unemployment rates increased markedly (with rates between 10% and 20% not unheard of) and social deprivation in many cities reached problematic proportions. Policymakers responded by shifting their attention toward large-scale urban revitalization projects and the avoidance of further capital flight. Especially in much of Europe, policies actively encouraging urban dwellers to leave town rapidly lost their appeal. Concentrated deconcentration, in combination with regular suburbanization and economic stagnation, thus turned into a threat to the vitality of many donor cities, but did it produce livable spaces for those who actually moved out? The answer to this question differs from case to case. For most of the newly planned centers, ambitions ran high: they were envisioned to offer attractive housing, good quality services, and job opportunities for their inhabitants. In practice, however, many new centers started as bedroom towns deprived of jobs, with most dwellers commuting to their previous places of residence for work. Creating homes, especially when it concerned state-managed social housing, appeared to be much easier than convincing the private sector to create jobs in such places. Yet, over time, some of these bedroom towns evolved into lively, versatile centers indeed, offering the promised mix of attractive housing, job opportunities, and common goods. Examples include Milton Keynes, in between London and Birmingham, and Reston, near Washington DC. Others, however, largely failed to diversify or took a longer time and are currently still in the process of doing so. The housing mix mattered a lot for the purchasing power and the human resource mix it attracted, with a healthy combination of owner-occupied and rental housing in different price categories offering the most fertile soil for economic life to grow on. Many of the new centers that failed to develop into versatile, opportunity-rich communities have a housing stock dominated by low-cost social housing, usually of the rental type. Over time, these places tended to fill up with low-income families, frequently with a migration background. Deprived of purchasing power and lacking in the labor skills demanded by the emerging postindustrial, increasingly knowledge-intensive economy, such centers offered little to attract private investors, meaning they remained heavily dependent on public investments. With government budgets under pressure from economic stagnation and the neoliberal turn of the 1980s/1990s, and with most of the “donor cities” themselves urgently requiring support as well, many of these vulnerable new towns became underfunded, allowing, in particular cases, vulnerability to transgress into trouble. In the United Kingdom, a 2002 government report called attention to the “major” problems several of the English new towns were experiencing. It referred to high crime and unemployment levels, the existence of pockets of severe deprivation, and much of the housing and infrastructure needing a thorough overhaul. The autumn 2005 riots affecting Marne-la-Vallée and Villeneuve d’Ascq (among many other places) signaled that not all was rosy in each of France’s villes nouvelles either, and the same can be said of ABC cities Vällingby and Farsta near Stockholm, which did not escape the social unrest troubling Sweden in May 2013. A response currently tried in various places involves the large-scale redevelopment of these

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monotonous districts or towns, with efforts generally aimed at diversifying the housing stock and the socioeconomic makeup of their inhabitants. Early results, as on display in the Bijlmermeer near Amsterdam, are promising, but more time will have to pass to see how sustainable they are. A similarly mixed answer applies to the question concerning to what extent concentrated deconcentration has helped to counteract uncontrolled suburban sprawl. Where implemented, particularly where new towns and overspill centers also provided middle- and higher-income housing, concentrated deconcentration strategies have without doubt helped to mitigate sprawl and its effects. Yet, the impacts should probably not be overestimated. In many countries, despite concentrated deconcentration policies being in place, sprawl has proven to be hard to contain, not least because there are too many rewards for those directly involved in its production and consumption. The effectiveness of a country’s planning system matters immensely for these outcomes. Whereas, for example, in the Netherlands most people eventually moved to where the government said they should, the proportion of planned overspill from London accommodated by the city’s new towns has been reported to be substantially less than anticipated. It is still too early to pass judgment on the youngest generation of new towns emerging in the Global South. While acknowledging thatdcompared to their forerunnersddifferent measures of failure and success will guide the way they will be locally evaluated, some preliminary critical remarks can be made. First of all, doubts can be raised about the degree to which many of these new towns, in particular the more exclusive and commercially driven ones, will contribute to mitigating the myriad problems cities in the Global South face. By merely offering the well-heeled a way out from the city, such new towns reinforce sociospatial segregation and erode the tax base of what are often already underfunded and underserviced citiesda dynamic that we have seen causing problems to cities before. The focus on residential and leisure functions in such new towns, moreover, is likely to generate substantial new commuter flows, which in the absence of proper public transport services will be mainly car based. Second, opportunistic, supply-driven developments resulting in large volumes of unoccupied real estate (as in the case of China’s “ghost towns”) score poorly from a sustainable resource management perspective, with land and other resources being consumed not to house people but merely for speculative purposes. Yet other concerns can be expressed about due process, in particular regarding the displacement and compensation of the original inhabitants of the areas destined for new town development. Examples abound of new town creation going hand in glove with land grabs and undercompensation of the original inhabitants. Finally, while it is well possible that the more upmarket new towns will offer living conditions that satisfy the tastes of their occupants, the (relatively few) new towns that are designed to accommodate lower-income city dwellers often share the same characteristics as the less successful ones built in the West half a century ago. These cities tend to be highly monotonous in terms of architecture, vulnerable in terms of population structure, and, in addition to that, often located uncomfortably and uneconomically far away from places of work. On a more positive note, urban dynamism in the Global South is often very high. Lax enforcement of rules governing the use of space and high levels of informality and entrepreneurship mean that generally few things stay the same for long. What now may be considered misguided strategies or missed opportunities in design, may well soon be “fixed” by grassroots entrepreneurship and/or the next hype chased by the real estate development community.

Concentrated Deconcentration in Regional Development Strategies Doubts about the efficacy of the application of concentrated deconcentration principles for regional development purposes emerged relatively quickly. Policymakers and planners had anticipated that by guiding mobile resources toward lagging regions such regions could be put on a trajectory toward sustained economic growth. From the early 1970s on it became clear that in many cases the actual results fell short. In the years following, many such strategies were abandoned prematurely and by the early 1990s new regional development paradigms focusing on the engagement of local resources and capacities were more likely to be preferred. In many cases, policymakers turned to growth-pole and growth-center policies without properly analyzing the factors that had frustrated regional development so far. In other cases, policymakers underestimated the complexities involved in creating growth poles or centers and failed to pay attention to critical enabling factors such as the provision of adequate financing and the installation of effective planning powers, or they were not willing or able to make the long-term investment needed. In still other cases, strategies were compromised and rendered ineffective by the inclusion of too many, often conflicting secondary aims. Most disappointing, however, was the fact that the anticipated positive external effects of new economic growth centers in many cases failed to materialize or, even worse, were overshadowed by unforeseen detrimental side effects. The support for and the development of (new) centers of economic activity in peripheral and/or deprived regions was assumeddthrough spread and trickledown effectsdto favor the entire region or at least large parts thereof. The new industries were supposed to establish linkages with existing business in the region or pave the way for the establishment of such business, and the income generated by the new industries and their employees would also flow directly into the local economy. But in practice these anticipated benefits, if they occurred at all, were frequently neutralized or even outdone by so-called backwash or polarization effects. The new, often heavily subsidized industries could easily become responsible for putting out of business the firms in the growth pole’s hinterland that had previously provided similar products or services to the regional market. If the development of the growth poles went together with the construction of new extra-regional transport connections (which was often the case), cheaply imported producer and consumer goods could do a lot of damage to the traditional local/regional production structure as well. Finally, if the new center(s) indeed proved successful and created abundant job opportunities, they could induce substantive labor migration from the hinterland and/ or beyond to the new center. Such flows usually consisted of a region’s most enterprising and prolific people, and their leaving often

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meant a great drain on the hinterland’s human capital resources. In the worst of cases, these detrimental effects could lead to strong polarization at the regional level (i.e., great disparities between the planned growth center and its hinterland). To what degree the newer generation of hi-tech and IT-themed growth centers will be able to circumvent the pitfalls discussed above remains to be seen. One positive feature is that the activities accommodated by such centers are more likely to be “new” to their direct environment and thus less likely to directly compete with existing local economic activities, at least not in terms of goods and services produced. An important vulnerability, however, concerns their dependence on highly skilled labor. Highly skilled labor must either be locally/regionally available or be attracted from further away (potentially from abroad even). The former option is not always available (and if it is, intensifies local competition for highly skilled labor), and the latter sets high standards for such factors as quality of life and (international) connectivity. When sufficiently qualified labor is not available and cannot be attracted, the activities that do emerge are often less “high-tech” or less well placed in global value chains than anticipated. Finally, despite its less than successful track record, the application of concentrated deconcentration in regional development policies should not be seen as totally in vain. At the very least, the experience has helped geographers and other researchers to understand regional development’s intricacies and to look more pointedly for better ways forward.

Concentrated Deconcentration Into the Future Today, belief in the capacity of government policies to effect social change is arguably less robust than during the first post–World War II decades, when concentrated deconcentration as a spatial strategy was introduced to urban growth management and regional development practices. Yet, concentrated deconcentration has not disappeared altogether. Over the past few decades, even in a context of neoliberal policy dominance, planners still seek to influence where investors invest, where people live and play, and how they move around. Good reasons for the pursuit of concentrated deconcentration and balanced regional development remain. The Global South, in particular, is still home to many heavily congested, poorly serviced, and sprawling cities that could well benefit from well-considered, inclusive growth management strategies informed by concentrated deconcentration principles. More universally, the need to provide viable alternatives to resource-hungry (sub)urban sprawl and to create living conditions favorable to nonmotorized and public transportation is more urgent than ever, given that it will be hard, if not impossible, to mitigate global warming, air pollution, and other environmental threats without reducing traffic emissions and achieving more efficient urban land use. Uneven development too is as serious a policy concern today as it was during much of the previous century. Over the past two decades, cities, and notably those well plugged into either advanced industrial or postindustrial segments of the global economy, have fared relatively well, benefitting first from a period of intense global economic integration prior to the global financial crisis, and second, after said crisis, from a surplus of idle capital looking for a place to land and generate returns. In many countries, the resulting sharpened urban–rural divide in combination with a widening gap between poor and rich, in general, fuels a growing sense of unease and prompts governments to act including through reinvigorated, place-sensitive regional development strategies. Market dynamics too are providing new centrifugal and centripetal tailwinds for concentrated deconcentration at the urban and regional scale. In places, increasingly unaffordable city centers force out people, less moneyed businesses, and even public services toward more affordable, peripheral locations. Where car use comes at a high price (monetary or measured in travel time) and city– regional mass transit systems are in place, station areas increasingly emerge as magnets for development, valued by housing consumers, businesses, and developers alike. The Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) revolution has somewhat mitigated the tyranny of distance, but agglomeration economies remain important stimuli for people and businesses to colocate in space. There will therefore remain merit in as well as potential for encouraging mobile resources to concentrate in smaller centers across space, at least from an urban growth management perspective, although it is unlikely to happen under the banner of “concentrated deconcentration.” Newer concepts such as polycentric (urban) development, transit-oriented development, and smart growth in effect have already taken its place. In combination, and having learned from mistakes made in the planning and design of earlier generations of new towns, they offer a timelier and more comprehensive manual for the management of urban growth, in general, and the development of compact, high-density, and multifaceted communities, in particular. Their underlying rationale, however, is very much the same: the more sustainable way forward is by encouraging people, jobs, and services to concentrate in space rather than by allowing them to sprawl at will.

See Also: Polycentricity.

Further Reading Alonso, W., 1968. Urban and regional imbalances in economic development. Econ. Dev. Cult. Change 17, 1–14. Barca, F., McCann, P., Rodríguez Pose, A., 2013. The case for regional development intervention: place-based versus place-neutral approaches. J. Reg. Sci. 52, 134–152. Bontje, M., 2001. Dealing with deconcentration: population deconcentration and planning response in polynucleated urban regions in North-west Europe. Urban Stud. 38, 769–785. Clapson, M., 2017. The English new towns since 1946: what are the lessons of their history for their future? Histoire Urbaine 50, 87–105.

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Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006. Transferable Lessons from the New Towns. DCLG Publications, London. Desponds, D., Auclair, E., 2017. The new towns around Paris 40 years later: new dynamic centralities or suburbs facing risk of marginalisation? Urban Stud. 54, 862–877. Faludi, A., van der Valk, A., 1990. Rule and Order: Dutch Planning Doctrine in the Twentieth Century. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht [etc.]. Garretsen, H., McCann, P., Martin, R., Tyler, P., 2013. The future of regional policy. Camb. J. Reg. Econ. Soc. 6, 179–186. Gipouloux, F. (Ed.), 2015. China’s Urban Century: Governance, Environment and Socio-Economic Imperatives. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA. Hall, P., 2002. Urban and Regional Planning, fourth ed. Routledge, London [etc.]. Hall, P., 2009. Looking backward, looking forward: the city region of the mid-21st century. Reg. Stud. 43, 803–817. Hansen, N.M. (Ed.), 1972. Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development. The Free Press, New York. Higgins, B., Savoie, D. (Eds.), 1988. Regional Economic Development: Essays in Honour of François Perroux. Unwin Hyman, Boston. Iammarino, S., Rodríguez-Pose, A., Storper, M., 2018. Regional inequality in Europe: evidence, theory, and policy implications. J. Econ. Geogr. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lby021. Keeton, R., 2011. Rising in the East. Contemporary New Towns in Asia. SUN Architecture, Amsterdam. Moseley, M.J., 1974. Growth Centres in Spatial Planning. Pergamon Press, Oxford. Moser, S., Swain, M., Alkhabbaz, M.H., 2015. King Abdullah economic city: engineering Saudi Arabia’s post-oil future. Cities 45, 71–80. van Noorloos, F., Kloosterboer, M., 2018. Africa’s new cities: the contested future of urbanisation. Urban Stud. 55, 1223–1241. Parr, J.B., 1999a. Growth-pole strategies in regional economic planning: a retrospective view. Part 1. Origins and advocacy. Urban Stud. 36, 1195–1215. Parr, J.B., 1999b. Growth-pole strategies in regional economic planning: a retrospective view. Part 2. Implementation and outcome. Urban Stud. 36, 1247–1268. Richardson, H.W., 1976. Growth pole spillovers: the dynamics of backwash and spread. Reg. Stud. 10, 1–9. Storper, M., 2018. Separate Worlds? Explaining the current wave of regional economic polarization. J. Econ. Geogr. 18, 247–270. Wang, L., Kundu, R., Chen, X., 2010. Building for what and whom? New town development as planned suburbanization in China and India. In: Clapson, M., Hutchison, R. (Eds.), Suburbanisation in Global Society. Emerald, Bingley, pp. 319–345.

Relevant Website On new towns around the world: http://www.newtowninstitute.org/.

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Conservation and Ecology M Jay, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand M Morad, London South Bank University, London, United Kingdom © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is reproduced from the previous edition, volume 2, pp 259–267, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Biological Diversity or Biodiversity The diversity and variability of life at all levels from genes to populations, ecosystems, and landscapes. Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD) An international agreement that came into force in 1993 following the UN conference on environment and development (the Earth Summit) in 1992. Conservation Movement With respect to nature, a conservation movement is a social movement concerned with the protection or conservation of elements of the living environment through social or political change. Ecology The discipline involving scientific study of the interactions of living organisms and their nonliving environment. Ecosystem Means a system of living organisms and their nonliving environment. Endemic As defined by ecologists and zoologists, means the situation in which a species or other taxonomic group is restricted to a particular geographic region. Such a taxon is said to be endemic to that region. Environmental Movement A social movement concerned with the protection or restoration of elements of the living and/or nonliving environment through social or political change. Environmental movements are frequently broader than conservation movements but may include nature conservation as one concern. EU European Union. IUCN World Conservation Union, formerly the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, an international organization combining government and nongovernment members, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. NGO Nongovernmental organization. Examples include Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Conservation International, and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). UNEP United Nations Environment Programme. The aims of the organization are “To provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations.” UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization. The aims of the organization are to promote international cooperation among its members in the fields of education, science, culture, and communication. WWF An international nongovernmental organization with branches throughout the world.

“Conservation” is a term that has been applied to multiple phenomena: conservation of nature, of matter, of energy, of art, and of buildings, heritage sites, and places. Conservation of nature refers to norms, values, institutions, and social movements concerned with the protection or wise use of natural areas and living resources; and the term is largely a Western concept that has been associated with the creation and management of “protected natural areas,” including parks, game reserves, and wildlife sanctuaries. More recently, conservation has been applied to the notion of “biological diversity” or “biodiversity,” a term referring to the variety of life in all forms and at all levels of organization. Conservation may, but need not, involve preservation. Preservation involves maintaining an object or feature in a fixed state in perpetuity. Since most features of nature fluctuate and change, preservation is seldom an aim; rather, the aim is usually to ensure their continued existence at a socially determined level. Conservation of species for the purpose of fishing or hunting, for example, may involve the management of a target population such as grouse, trout, salmon, deer, etc. at a level where they are plentiful for hunters. Conservation of a landscape often means maintaining a particular relationship with land, for example, a relationship that preserves symbolic or iconic features in an otherwise changing landscape. Conservation may involve structured social organizations such as government departments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or spatially discrete communities such as a village, as well as loosely structured, social movements or networks.

Ecology The term ecology, coined in 1866 by the German biologist Ernst Haeckel, is derived from the Greek word oikos, denoting home or habitat. Traditionally, ecology has often been considered a branch of biology, and historians have often argued that ecology was inspired by Darwin’s theory of evolution. Life forms have been examined by biologists at various levels, from proteins and nucleic

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acids to cells and individual organisms. Ecologists generally engage in this type of study at the level of populations, communities, and ecosystems, or even the biosphere as a whole. Ecology’s central building blocks, ecosystems, are treated as integrated, complex units consisting of the living organisms as well as nonliving (physical forms such as energy and nutrients) objects in a given habitat. In turn, the complex relationships between ecosystems have led to the concept of the biome, denoting assemblages of interrelated ecosystems, such as desert biomes. The biosphere comprises all of the Earth’s biomes where life forms can exist. The field of ecology may also be subdivided into the study of ecozones, which are generally demarcated by continental borders, and each ecozone can be further subdivided into ecoregions. Ecological questions and scholarship have generated interest well beyond the life sciences, in fields such as epidemiology, urban planning, and human geography. Also, rising concerns for the future of the planet and natural habitats have (more recently) seen green issues at the center of wider social, economic, and political debates. In particular, the prospect of increased global warming has bestowed on these debates an unprecedented sense of urgency and mounting significance. It is widely accepted that the birth of urban ecology in the 1920 (attributed to the “Chicago School”) has been responsible for the proliferation of human and social ecology into other disciplines, such as human geography; however, some geographers date back human geography’s involvement with ecological questions to the beginning of the 20th Century and more specifically to the publication in 1911 of The Influences of Geographic Environment, by Ellen Semple. The author famously claimed in her book, “Man is a product of the earth’s surface.” The work of human geographers echoes and substantively overlaps with that of political ecologists, as both groups endeavor to bring together formerly unrelated areas of investigation. The catalyst to this growing body of scholarship may have been the field of cultural ecology, which examined how human cultures demonstrated high levels of adjustment as survival strategies toward their surrounding natural habitats. Ecology and conservation have become linked in the area of biodiversity conservation and the management of valued landscapes and ecosystems.

Conservation: A Very Brief Overview Although nature conservation has become a global phenomenon, the concept and practices are the cultural products of Western society in the late 19th and 20th centuries. The institutions, values, and practices associated with nature conservation are almost universally influenced by a Western paradigm of scientific and rational management of dedicated spaces and political economies of power. The paradigm is one which perceives a clear distinction between the worlds of nature and humans and which tends to value science and rationality as means of problem-solving. The political economy of past and present colonial and neocolonial relations between Western countries and countries of the Third World means that contemporary conservation organizations and programs have been heavily influenced by Western assumptions and values. This trend has been perpetuated through international organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Conservation Union (IUCN), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Conservation in the contemporary Western world has evolved from two main roots, an elitist tradition, originating mostly in Britain, and a populist tradition, originating mostly in North America and Australasia. The elitist tradition stemmed from the English association of aristocracy with hunting and game management, influenced by “enlightenment” respect for scientific approaches to knowledge and resource management. The populist tradition evolved from early romantic trends in American society, which linked wilderness to moral virtue and national identity. In addition to the elitist and populist traditions, a distinction can be drawn between Old World and New World conservation. The colonists of North America, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa perceived the land as largely empty. They set aside areas protected from human encroachment and thereby created landscapes that tended to be sharply divided between intensive human habitation and so-called wilderness. Old World countries in contrast have been more concerned with conserving traditional landscapes against the encroachments of modern forms of development. Thus, the practices of conservation in Europe contrast significantly with those in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Conservation in Old World countries was more gradual and mixed in terms of aims and processes, incorporating concerns for cultural as well as natural heritage. In the New World, conservation was more directly focused on the protection of native fauna and flora with little or no regard for the cultural heritage or possible rights of native people. The creation of parks and reserves was largely a matter for negotiation between different settler-interest groups in the face of rapid environmental change and destruction of native ecosystems and species.

Conservation in the United States Concern with the conservation of nature and wild areas began in the United States during the 19th Century. In 1836, Ralph Waldo Emerson published Nature, in which he articulated the importance of wilderness as a source of moral and spiritual uplift. His ideas influenced Henry David Thoreau (1817–62), an eloquent and passionate advocate for nature and a key inspirational source of American environmentalism. The 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s, following the exploration and opening up of land West of the Mississippi River, brought a surge in the number of travel books and romantic literature by adventurers, explorers, and artists. They conveyed notions of romantic beauty and heroic grandeur linked to wild and empty spaces. A series of government-sponsored survey reports of the West were published, and included artistic illustrations, bringing the scenic and natural wonders to the attention of eastern Americans.

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In 1864, George Perkins Marsh published Man and Nature: Or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action, a work which strongly influenced intellectuals and policy makers of the day. Having traveled widely and noted the widespread ecological damage suffered in the Mediterranean, Marsh highlighted the ravages wrought on the natural world by development and warned of the need to protect natural resources. By the 1870s, public support for preserving areas of wilderness was firmly in place. Yellowstone National Park, the world’s first, was created in 1872, and by 1892, John Muir had founded the Sierra Club, one of the oldest conservation organizations in the world. In 1897, the New York–based Wildlife Conservation Society founded the New York Bronx Zoo. American conservation was given a boost in 1901 when Theodore Roosevelt became President. Roosevelt believed strongly in the moral benefits of wilderness contact and recreation. He considered that it encouraged such manly qualities as courage, endurance, and self-reliance. Furthermore, he believed that the land itself embodied the ideals of American independence, resourcefulness, and democratic freedom. Contemporary responsibility for conservation in the United States is distributed between numerous federal and state agencies. The Fish and Wildlife Service, as part of the Federal Department of the Interior, is responsible for federal wildlife laws, endangered species, migratory birds, nationally significant fisheries, and the management of national wildlife refuges. The Parks Service, a separate department within the Department of the Interior, administers national parks, historic sites, recreation areas, and scenic rivers. States have their own departments and programs. For example, the State of New York has a Department of Environmental Conservation with a broad environmental mandate that includes conservation of open space and the creation of an open space network. The State of Washington, on the other hand, has a Conservation Commission with no operational responsibilities for public land but with a mandate to provide leadership and advice. NGOs within the United States include agencies that are both large in terms of their American membership and massive on a world scale. American conservation/environmental organizations have had a major influence on conservation elsewhere in the world both as direct contributors to conservation programs and in shaping policies on conservation by international organizations such as the IUCN and the World Bank.

Conservation in the United Kingdom Early conservation practices in Britain were largely related to the protection of habitat for game birds, deer, trout, and other species for hunting by the aristocracy. Populist concern for conservation began toward the close of the 19th Century when groups such as the Commons Preservation Society, founded in 1865, were formed to preserve commons and countryside access for the public. In 1895 in the United Kingdom, the National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty (“The National Trust”) was formed to promote the preservation ofdand public access todbuildings of historic or architectural interest and land of natural beauty. An NGO dependent on membership subscriptions and donations, it has grown to become one of the largest conservation organizations in Britain. While populist concern for conservation was widespread at the beginning of the 19th Century, the effort and concerns of voluntary organizations were resisted by entrenched interests such as the owners of large estates, competing government departments, and local county councils. Only in 1949 was a National Parks Commission formed, and even then, the powers of the commission were feeble; they could designate national parks and provide advice, but administration was under the jurisdiction of county councils. Nevertheless, over the following decades, the commission made a significant contribution to the development of protected areas in England and Wales. In addition to the commission, a nature conservancy was established with a mandate (and the funding) to identify and administer land as “national nature reserves” or sites of special scientific interest (SSSIs) for protection of wildlife. Despite these measures, wildlife continued its steady decline. Agricultural intensification during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s brought the destruction of many treasured elements of countryside landscape. The realization grew that it was not sufficient to preserve islands of habitat surrounded by ecological deserts of farmland; in order to protect species and biological diversity, it was necessary to preserve or restore ecological processes across whole landscapes. In 1968, the mandate of the National Parks Commission was broadened to advocate for conservation throughout the countryside (not just in national parks), and it became the Countryside Commission (and, after successive restructurings, Natural England under the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). The Countryside Commission introduced the concept of Environmentally Sensitive Areas and the Countryside Stewardship Scheme (later the Environmental Stewardship scheme) to encourage farmers to conserve valued elements of the landscape and compensate them for loss of production. Voluntary organizations have had major influence in terms of general public opinion and political pressure on local and central government officials. Such organizations include the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the Royal Society for Nature Conservation (formerly the Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves), the National Trust, Fauna and Flora International, and national branches of Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the WWF. Like the American organizations, they have had major influence on conservation in other parts of the world.

Conservation in Australasia The first European settlers of Australia encountered an ecology that was entirely different from anything they had experienced before: a land of thin soils, drought, erratic rainfall, strange plants, and radically different fauna (e.g., marsupials and the strange duck-billed platypus and spiny echidna). Royal societies and natural history societies sprang up almost in tandem with settlement. By the 1890s, every Australian colony supported a natural history society, royal society, or both.

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Concerns for conservation began soon after settlement in response to mass slaughter of native mammals by commercial hunters and trappers and to the damaging impacts of European-style development on native fauna and flora. In 1881, the New South Wales Zoological Society persuaded the state government to pass the Bird Protection Act, and in 1883, the Queensland Royal Society campaigned for the creation of national parks. The Royal Society of South Australia lobbied for the creation of national parks in the late 1880s, and in Western Australia, the Natural History Society successfully campaigned for fauna and flora reserves. From the 1920s to the 1950s, conservation in Australia was overshadowed by events such as the Great Depression, the two World Wars, the Korean War, and a prevailing development focus. By the beginning of the 1960s, there was growing concern at the loss of native species, coupled with a greater appreciation of native fauna and flora as symbols of Australian identity. The Australian Conservation Foundation, as one of Australia’s largest voluntary organizations, was founded in 1964 with the aim of protecting Australian rainforests, interior drylands, and the Great Barrier Reef. During the 1970s, conservation groups sprang up in opposition to logging of state forest, coastal sand mining in Queensland, uranium mining in northern Australia, and hydro development in Tasmania. As well as the activism of populist conservation groups, conservation by Australian government agencies also increased from the 1970s onward. A significant Australian initiative in the final decades of the 20th Century was the landcare movement. While the primary aims of landcare groups are land health and sustainability, many have discovered that long-term sustainability under Australian conditions may require a return to native trees and deep-rooted native grasses as an alternative to more productive but less ecologically resilient introduced pasture grasses. More recent official conservation concern, at both federal and state levels, has focused on implementation of a national biodiversity strategy. Published in 1996, the strategy has prompted numerous action plans and reports, but evidence of effective change on the ground is still to come.

Conservation Under the European Union Conservation of nature in the European Union has developed from early efforts to limit transborder environmental impacts, to a region-wide concern with the protection of valued fauna, flora, and traditional rural landscapes. The 1972 Helsinki Convention on the Baltic Sea and 1976 Barcelona Convention on the Mediterranean Sea, for example, were efforts to reduce the cross-boundary effects of agricultural and industrial pollution by countries surrounding these water bodies. A Europe-wide perspective became more evident with the 1979 Bird Directive, which aimed at long-term preservation of all bird species in the European Union. The directive identified endangered bird species and made member states responsible for designating special protected areas. Similarly, recognition of the importance of habitat for species conservation became evident with the 1992 Habitats Directive, which aims to protect wildlife species and their habitat. Member states were required to identify areas of special conservation interest and draw up management plans for their protection. Over the 1990s, European agricultural policies began to address the damaging effects of agriculture on native wildlife and traditional agricultural practices. Changes were introduced to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to enable member states to administer agri-environmental policies that would encourage farmers to protect wildlife habitat and landscapes or features of natural or cultural value. In 2000 the program, Natura, was introduced as the focus of a common European conservation policy. Natura 2000 aims to create a network of protected areas to conserve vulnerable species and habitats across their natural range irrespective of national or political boundaries. It links to other policy instruments, most particularly financial support through the EU Rural Development Regulation. Unlike the North American commitments to “wilderness” conservation, European approaches are concerned with conserving a heritage of species and landscapes which has been constructed and managed over generations; the landscape is thus a manifestation of human history in a way that North American, Australian, or New Zealand wilderness is not. In these latter examples, parks and reserves are the creation of the colonial immigrants, not the indigenous people, and do not generally reflect the histories of the settler society.

Conservation in Non-Western Countries Moving to countries formerly under British colonial rule in Africa, East, Central, and Southern Africa, conservation was strongly influenced by the British tradition of game protection for the elite, in this case, officers of the British civil service and their visitors and families. It focused on the protection of game animals and their habitat and was largely a response to uncontrolled slaughter by early explorers, traders, and settlers. By the beginning of the 20th Century, game reserves had been established in Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and the British colonies of central Africa. The reserves were subject to strict regulations about hunting and in many cases indigenous people and their animals were barred from entering. With the transfer of government away from Britain as countries became independent, conservation priorities changed and in many cases, reserves became protected areas in name only. The fate of many of the reserves created during the British colonial era continues to be uncertain, particularly given the population pressures that many of the former colonies face. Many of the reserves are subject to uncontrolled poaching or agricultural encroachment. Game tourism has become an important source of foreign exchange for some countries, however. Countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have significant tourism industries that depend in substantial part on the wildlife present in public and private game reserves.

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India, as another country that experienced British colonial rule, was also influenced by British ideas and policy. At the beginning of independent rule in 1947, India inherited Corbett National Park, a popular preindependence hunting spot for the British (named after Jim Corbett, a tiger hunter turned conservationist). In addition, there were areas such as Keoladeo National Park, a wetland sanctuary for birds created by the Maharaja of Bharatpur, Bandhavgarh, hunting grounds of the Maharaja of Rewa, and Bandipur, hunting grounds of the Maharaja of Mysore. Since Indian independence, many of the former hunting areas have been turned into national parks or wildlife sanctuaries, and new areas have been established. Problems with funding, population growth, conflict between people and wild animals, and development of land and water resources for agriculture have meant that many of India’s parks and wildlife sanctuaries are under pressure. Pressures include poaching, removal of trees for firewood, and lowering of water tables through irrigation of adjacent lands, primarily for agriculture. New conservation partnerships are developing throughout the Third World, however, between Western-based and international organizations and host countries. WWF, for example, runs a tiger conservation program that has involved partnership with governments and local organizations in India, China, Bhutan, and Southeast Asia. Conservation International, in collaboration with government and local farmers in Ghana, has encouraged farmers around Kakum National Park to grow cocoa without cutting down forest canopy. The UNEP through its World Conservation Monitoring Centre together with the IUCN and the World Commission on Protected Areas has developed an important coordinating role for identifying protected areas and providing information that can assist with their management.

The Rise of Global Conservation Institutions The rise of global conservation is largely a post–World War II phenomenon, and it is possible to discern two main stages in its philosophy and development. The first stage, from the early and mid-1960s to the early and mid-1980s, could be characterized as an age of dawning realization of the global scale of environmental problems and the global interconnectedness of problems. The second stage, from the early and mid-1980s to the present, has been gradual acceptance that conservation of nature cannot be separated from other aspects of human ecology; it is inextricably linked to socially equitable sustainable development.

Global Conservation Stage 1: A Growing Awareness of Interdependence The first truly international organization for conservation of nature was the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, now known as the IUCN. It was formed in 1948 with support from UNESCO. Intended as a clearinghouse for government agencies and private national and international organizations, it was a blend of government and nongovernment organizations that became headquartered in Gland, Switzerland. It was not until the 1960s, however, that widespread awareness of the global scale and interconnectedness of conservation and environmental issues began to be appreciated. By 1960, certain types of habitat had already experienced worldwide depletiondfor example wetlandsdor damage as a consequence of industrial developmentdfor example, the forests of Scandinavia and eastern Canada damaged by acid rain caused by industrial emissions from countries to the south. A key event included the 1962 publication of the book Silent Spring, by Rachel Carson, which clearly identified links between the decline of bird populations and application of pesticides. This insight brought home to many, an awareness that the chain of life is interconnected. Following growing environmental awareness in the 1960s, the 1970s experienced a number of important events, as indicated in Table 1.

Global Conservation Stage 2: Paradigm Change: Conservation Depends on Social Justice and “Sustainable” Development Through the 1990s and the new millennium, conservation organizations have increasingly come to accept that conservation of nature/biodiversity depends on the maintenance of ecosystem processes and critical interdependencies between plants, animals, and humans. In addition, they have come to realize that successful conservation requires community acceptance and involvement at local levels. If local people do not or cannot provide the conditions for other species to survive, national and international policies ring hollow. More and more, organizations such as Fauna and Flora International, WWF, and the Wildlife Conservation Society operate in association with national and local groups. There has been a paradigm shift, from a narrow focus on species (tiger, big game) “by government decree,” to programs that involve local communities in ways that will assist community members to sustain a livelihood.

The Contribution of Human Geography Writings on conservation of nature/biodiversity by human geographers have been rich and various. Many have been flavored by an underlying normative concern for protection of nature or, conversely, for social justice in the face of Western-style conservation solutions to non-Western countries and cultures. Attempting to summarize the diversity of scholarly writing on issues of nature conservation and biodiversity is difficult, but a number of themes can be identified. They include empirical studies, critiques of conservation, examination of the epistemologies of conservation, the social construction of conservation places, the political ecologies of conservation, and the complexities of integrating conservation with social and cultural sustainabilities at local level.

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Conservation and Ecology Important events: stage 1, 1970s and stage 2, 1980s and 1990s.

Event Stage 1 1971 Ramsar Convention 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm

1972 Paris Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (under the auspices of UNESCO) 1972 publication of the Club of Rome report, The Limits to Growth by D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W.W. Behrens 1973 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1979 Formation of Greenpeace International 1980 Publication of the World Conservation Strategy by the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and UNEP

Stage 2 1987 Publication of Our Common Future

1991 Global Environment Facility (GEF)

1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), Rio de Janeiro

1993 the Biodiversity Convention came into force

1993 creation of the World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) by UNEP 2005 The United Nation releases the report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

Comment An international agreement, which provides the framework for conservation and wise use of wetlands. The first international conference on environmental issues, organized by the UN Economic and Social Council. Representatives attended from 113 countries and 400 intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Preparatory meetings before the conference identified environmental issues more clearly, including the differences between countries, and the overriding importance of development for poor countries. A convention that established the system of world heritage sites as cultural or natural features of outstanding universal value. The book highlighted the implications of uncontrolled growth on renewable and nonrenewable resources, and the finite capacity of the earth to absorb wastes. Founded as an outcome of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The mandate of UNEP was to coordinate the development of environmental policy by keeping on monitoring the global environment and bringing emerging issues to the attention of governments and the international community. Intergovernmental agreement to ensure that international trade in wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival. A voluntary environmental organization that was particularly effective in drawing media attention to the slaughter of whales. One of the first publications by conservationists to recognize that conservation of nature is inseparable from social and economic sustainability and cannot be achieved without development to alleviate the poverty and misery of millions of people. It was the first major public document to introduce the term “sustainable development.” Report of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, otherwise known as the Brundtland report. The report was highly influential in its articulation that development should be “sustainable” and that sustainability involves both intra- and intergenerational equity. With its unapologetic insistence on sustainability, no matter how vaguely defined, the report provided the basis for a changing world paradigm for conservation and environment and development. A fund established which helps developing countries to fund projects and programs that protect the global environment. In 2002, projects funded by the facility included biodiversity, climate change, land degradation, and the effects of pesticides. The Earth Summit was the largest gathering of heads of state, government officials, international organizations, and nongovernment organizations held to that date. It provided the impetus for the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and Agenda 21, a statement of an international program of action for the 21st Century. The convention aimed to ensure conservation of biological diversity by member states, sustainable use of biological resources, and equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resources. As a consequence, a large number of countries have since produced strategies for conservation of their biological diversity and the term “biodiversity” has become widely used. An important facility for assessing the progress or otherwise of conservation efforts. The report by 1300 experts from 95 countries concluded that approximately 60% of the earth’s ecosystems were being degraded or used unsustainably.

Empirical and comparative studies of conservation organizations, policies, and programs have provided comparisons of conservation programs in different countries and the manner in which conservation policies and programs “mesh” with other socioeconomic and political arrangements, including the values, concerns, and circumstances of local communities. They include analyses of the relationships of groups involved in conservation at local, national, and international levels and the role of international organizations and NGOs.

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Critiques of conservation have attempted to address the questions: Who gains and who loses from conservation programs? How are the losers from conservation affected and how do they respond? How are national or international elites implicated in the creation of protected areas? Are the advantages of conservation equally shared? The studies have particularly focused on political ecologies of neocolonialism and globalization, which involve the imposition of conservation constraints on local communities by national or international elites. Such analyses have revealed the often unequal spread of costs and benefits from conservation. Epistemologies and discourses of conservation have examined the ideas, assumptions, and knowledge of actors involved in conservation, including scientists, national policy makers, national and international conservationist organizations, and local communities. While many conservation organizations are prepared to acknowledge the value of local ecological knowledge, criteria for international funding frequently depend on scientific assessments of ecological value. Conservation management policies may depend on scientifically based proposals, which are problematic or inappropriate for local circumstances. Resistance to Western scientific views of conservation may come from groups who perceive nature and their relationships to nature in ways that are at odds with those of the Western scientific community. For example, while an organization such as the European Union with its Natura 2000 program is clearly focused on creating a network of key sites for “biodiversity” as identified by scientists, local communities may view the same landscapes as icons of national identity, as heritage, or as backward areas that need to be developed. Social and cultural geographers have focused their attention on the social construction of conservation/biodiversity/protected areas; and these studies examine the ways in which conservation and/or biodiversity come to be construed by different groups and how protected areas are constructed from the collection of different (often divergent) interest groups involved. For example, in relation to biodiversity, groups vary on what they consider relevant elements of biodiversity (do worms, fungi, or bacteria count?). In addition, there is no consensus on the importance of different types of biodiversity (are key species such as tigers more important than ecosystems such as wetlands?), the kinds of places that deserve protection (should protected areas include privately owned land, or only public land?), and forms of management (how much should harvesting be allowed? Should human habitation and production be included?). One significant recent development prompted largely by the contributions of human geographers has related to the changing paradigms and a conservation of hope. These writings have noted the changing influence of concepts such as “sustainability” on conservation objectives, and the ways in which the paradigms of Western-based conservation have been changing in response to global concerns such as the United Nations Millennium Development Project and its call to reduce absolute poverty and ensure environmental sustainability. The literature includes a normative concern to “decolonize” conservation and to reduce the opposition between protected nature and spaces of human habitation that has frequently infused the language of both conservationists and scholars. Some analysts have noted that protected areas do not always involve displacement or loss for local people; in some cases, wilderness can provide habitat both for Indigenous people and for wild nature. A trend of the past 2 decades has been the intermixing of habitat protection with other forms of land use to create “multifunctional” rural landscapes. This is certainly clear in the European Union, where agri-environmental programs allow farmers to be compensated for costs involved in conservation of wildlife habitat or landscapes of cultural value. Concepts of “ecological corridor” and habitat “stepping stones,” introduced from conservation biology and landscape ecology, have encouraged visions of landscapes which allow human and nonhuman species to coexist in shared space. The paradigm is of humans-in-nature, rather than humans at war with nature, or humans rescuing nature, or humans exploiting nature. A problem for geographers interested in nature conservation is that the term “nature” has been eclipsed or conflated with “environment,” and “environment” has been appropriated by the hegemonic discourses of environmental management and environmental science. Critical or reflective geographers concerned about conservation of nature or biodiversity are almost immediately trapped by the close historical association between protection of wildlife and habitat by elite groups and the dispossession of the poor, the indigenous, or the minority from traditional relations with their natural environment. Geographers thus have no vocabulary to describe or explain their interest without inviting the accusation that by doing so, they uphold colonial, neocolonial, or capitalist systems of oppression. This tension is unfortunate because in the discourses about conservation of nature and biodiversity, human geographers have special insights to offer. Theirs is an awareness of whole system interactions; of the intimate cocreation of landscapes by humans and nonhumans; of the importance of human subjectivities, and an understanding of the ways that power relations structure spatial organization and the allocation of resources. In Spaces of Hope (2000), David Harvey explains that in our contemporary world, the rich are becoming more affluent and multinational corporations are gaining increasingly greater powers; but much of the world’s natural resources and landscapes are being damaged and depleted. Harvey argues that there is nothing particularly new about this, but the absence of political will to do something about this constitutes the greater threat. In order to make unavoidable changes to redress the catastrophes we face, Harvey contends that humanity needs to become the “architects” of a different environment, spanning the meeting points between the personal and immediate scales (of the “body”) and the global political economy. This and other similar inputs from human geographers provide a compelling argument that humanity can draw inspiration and insight from utopian visions. If any vision of the environment (as “spaces of hope”) is to work, the argument goes, it must take account of our human qualities. Harvey’s point is that human geographers should not shrink from the messy business of engaging with such major contemporary issues as environmental damage and biodiversity loss. “Spaces of hope” require such engagement. Examining the geographical literature of the past 2 decades on conservation, it is clear to see a rising interest in the political, social, and environmental implications of nature conservationdfrequently one and the same as biodiversity conservationdand

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a rising effort to identify pathways of hope. Such pathways are offered as an alternative to the bitter pessimism of environmental destruction that has characterized conservation thinking for so long. Much of the pessimism remainsdthe powerful social forces of environmental destruction continue apace; however, as the dynamic of environmental destruction gains wider recognition, there is also the realization that humans are unavoidably in and of nature and must find ways to reconcile human aspirations with ecosystem limits. This realization is a source of hope.

See Also: Biodiversity; Biopolitics; Deforestation; Empire; Environmental Justice; Environmentalism; Heritage and Culture; Heritage and Identity; Human Geography and Environmental Studies; Internal Colonialism; Nature, Historical Geographies of; Nature, Social.

Further Reading Adams, W.M., 2003. Against Extinction, the Story of Conservation. Earthscan, London. Adams, W.M., Mulligan, M. (Eds.), 2003. Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era. Earthscan, London. Brechin, S.R., Wilshusen, P.R., Fortwangler, C.L., West, P.C., 2003. Contested Nature: Promoting International Biodiversity Conservation with Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century. State University of New York Press, New York. Harvey, D., 2000. California Studies in Critical Human Geography, 7: Spaces of Hope. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Hutton, D., Connors, L., 1999. A History of the Australian Environment Movement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. IUCN, WCMC, 1998. 1997 United Nations List of National Parks and Protected Areas. IUCN Publications, Gland. IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991. Caring for the Earth, a Strategy for Sustainable Living. The World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme, and World Wide Fund for Nature, Gland. Library of Congress, 1850–1920. The Evolution of the Conservation Movement. http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amrvhtml/conshome.html. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Biodiversity Synthesis. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Living Beyond Our Means, Natural Assets and Human Well-Being. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. Southworth, J., Nagendra, H., Munroe, D.K., 2006. Editorial, introduction to the special issue: are parks working? Exploring human–environment tradeoffs in protected area conservation. Appl. Geogr. 26, 87–95. Zimmerer, K.S., 2006. Cultural ecology: at the interface with political ecology – the new geographies of environmental conservation and globalization. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 30 (1), 63078.

Relevant Websites http://www.conservation.org. Conservation International. http://www.foei.org. Friends of the Earth International. http://www.greenpeace.org. Greenpeace International. http://www.iucn.org. International Union for the Conservation of Nature. http://www.nationaltrust.org.uk. The National Trust. http://www.nature.org. The Nature Conservancy. http://www.unep.org. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). http://www.wcs.org. Wildlife Conservation Society. http://www.iucn.org. World Commission on Protected Areas. http://www.unep-wcmc.org. World Conservation Monitoring Centre. http://www.iucn.org. World Conservation Union. http://www.wwf.org. World Wide Fund for Nature.

Consumption Deborah Leslie, Department of Geography, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Actor–network theory (ANT) A body of theory associated with science studies and, in particular, the work of Bruno Latour, John Law, and Michel Callon. ANT involves a material-semiotic method. The aim is to understand how people, ideas, technologies, and nature form networks. Relations within the network are not conceptualized as preexisting, but rather are precarious, emerging within the course of network interactions and requiring constant repetition. Commodity There are a variety of uses of the term commodity, including objects of value, things that are produced for the purpose of being exchanged, and objects that are exchanged for money. In a society driven by the production of commodities, an entrepreneur chooses both the commodity to be produced, and also the method by which it will be manufactured, according to expectations about its salability on the market and ability to generate profits. Commodity chain A set of interrelated activities (such as production, consumption, design, marketing, and retailing) necessary for the production of a particular good or service. The concept is often associated with the global commodity chain (GCC) and global value chain (GVC) literatures, and in particular the work of Gary Gereffi. In this conceptualization, the economy is understood as an assemblage of individual commodity chains. The idea is that each commodity chain has a different form of organization, as well as different forms of governance, geographies, and power relations. Commodity culture and knowledge An approach to understanding the ties between production, consumption, and distribution that emphasizes a nonlinear circuit, rather than a chain. This literature is associated with the work of Cook and Crang, as well as Jackson, and is influenced by work on material culture (see below). Commodification The extension of the commodity form to goods and services which previously were not commodities as previously defined. There are different meanings of commodification, depending on how a commodity is defined. Commodity fetishism The notion of commodity fetishism emerges in the writing of Marx in Capital Volume I and refers to the process whereby in the marketplace, commodities appear to have value in relation to each other (or in relation to money). The true source of their valuedhuman labordis not visible. Consumers perceive commodities as natural, as having a life of their own, rather than as socially produced. Flexible accumulation A term stemming from French Regulation Theory (associated with the work of Aglietta and Lipietz, among others) which refers to the relationship between production and consumption which began to take shape after the early 1970s. Flexible accumulation is associated with flexible or just-in-time production systems, flexible labor markets, and more segmented consumption patterns. It is also referred to as “post-Fordism” or “reflexive accumulation.” Global production networks (GPNs) Globally organized networks of connected firms, as well as nonfirm institutions, through which goods and services are produced and distributed. The GPN literature traces multiple forms of embeddedness of firms. Governmentality The literature on governmentality stems from the work of Michel Foucault and is concerned with how government seeks to cultivate certain forms of behavior among individuals, populations, firms, and economies. Governmentality emphasizes the types of governing authority; the forms of knowledge, techniques, and the entity to be governed, as well as how it is conceived; and the consequences of governance. Power is not determined a priori but is rather the result of a constantly changing assemblage of techniques, practices, and rationalities. Material culture A body of work which explores the relationship between physical objects and social relations. It draws upon a range of disciplines, including anthropology, archaeology, design studies, history, and geography. A key theme in the literature is that material objects are shaped by human actions, but individuals gain habits, ethics, and values through their interactions with material environments and objects. Postmodern There are two main uses of the term postmodern. First, the concept refers to a “postmodern” era characterized by the dominance of signs and symbols over use values. Some commentators read postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism or flexible accumulation. A second use of the term is implied by the concept of postmodernism as an artistic or theoretical shift. Here, postmodernism refers to a set of aesthetic practices associated with irony, pastiche, and eclecticism and a blurring of the divide between high art and popular culture. Postmodernism also denotes a set of theoretical ideas demonstrating skepticism toward modernist universalisms, metanarratives, and grand theory.

In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in the dynamics of consumption in contemporary capitalism. This interest is reflected in a wide array of popular films and books expressing concerns about the political and environmental consequences of our consumer society, as well as an explosion of academic work on the topic. Geographers have turned their attention to new spaces

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and scales of consumption, as well as issues of identity and ethics in consumption. Analyses have focused on a range of commodities, including food, clothing, furniture, and flowers. Why this interest in consumption? In part, the attention to shopping is related to the broader “cultural turn” in economic geography over recent decades, which aims to bring together economy and culture, production and consumption, and the material and the symbolic. This focus is also tied to the shift toward a more flexible regime of accumulation, according to greater attention to the role of demand in innovation. An emphasis on consumption is a manifestation of growing concerns related to the safety, security, and sustainability of food and other commodities, as well as a generalized disillusionment with the growing expanse of consumer culture, including the diffusion of consumer subjectivities into political practice, education, the academy, and healthcare.

Defining Consumption Consumption typically refers to the selection, purchase, use, maintenance, repair, and disposal of goods and services. Under capitalism, consumption is primarily oriented around the consumption of commodities. Commodities are objects or services which have a use value (or function) and an exchange value (in that they are exchangeable for money or for other goods through barter). Capitalism is associated with the commodification of more and more aspects of social life. Virtually every human activity in Western and non-Western societies relies on, or has commodities associated with it, including marriage, birth, death, and war. Genes, embryos, and knowledge have all gained status as commodities. Yet, despite the growing trend toward commodification, consumption is not entirely constituted by capitalist relations. It takes place at a different time and place from commodity production, and it offers ways of decommodifying objects produced and exchanged as commodities in other sites. As Andrew Sayer puts it, objects which begin their life as commodities do not necessary remain commodities at all moments in their existence. Consumption overlaps and is connected to other spheres of economic activity. Marx, for example, illustrates that the moment of production is simultaneously an act of consumption in that it involves the consumption of labor power and other commodity inputs. Similarly, the production of labor power entails the consumption of food and other commodities, and is therefore also an act of consumption. At the same time, the work of consumption is an act of production. In consuming food, for example, the human being actively produces the physical body. Commodities not only perform a useful function in the reproduction of the human being, but they also hold particular associations or meanings for users. As such, commodities convey value within a system of other objects, and have a sign value. Important early discussions of consumption, such as those of Jean Baudrillard, stress the disconnection between the use values and sign values in the contemporary or postmodern era, and the growing importance of sign values relative to use values. For Baudrillard, the surface of the commodity has become detached from the commodity; this simulation of commodities has become its own reality or hyperreality. For Baudrillard, the consumption of signs of commodities has become more important than the consumption of commodities themselves; however, the primacy of sign values is widely contested in the literature on consumption, with many theorists maintaining that use values remain pivotally important in practices of consumption. The consumption of goods and services is bound up in rituals and social relationships, including relations of inclusion and exclusion. Material goods are not only things, but rather they convey meanings related to class, gender, sexuality, race, and style. Consumption plays a role in the production of identities, and in the maintenance of individual narratives of the self. Most significant in this regard is the work of Pierre Bourdieu. In his book, Distinction, Bourdieu illustrates how consumption choices are tied to status rivalry and class, and signify position in a social field. Consumption is not a wholly individualistic and self-indulgent act. There is a variety of motives for consumption, ranging from selfish, egoistic ones to benevolent and altruistic aims. Consumption can be tied to external imperatives, such as the pursuit of status, but it is also practiced for its own sake and in light of internal motivations. Much research illustrates that consumption is often pursued with the interests, needs, and advice of others in mind, and in the context of relationships of caring and love. Anthropologist Daniel Miller has made a particularly important contribution to the field of consumption studies by highlighting the social and moral dimensions of shopping, much of which is directed toward family members and friends. Thus, rather than being an individual and momentary act of purchase, consumption is a social process, whereby people relate to other beings and artifacts in complex ways, transforming the meanings of commodities dramatically as they incorporate them into their lives.

Theorizing Consumption Given its significance in everyday life, it is perhaps surprising that until the last several decades, geographers and other social theorists have tended to ignore consumption, focusing instead on the realm of production. When consumption did enter the equation, as in the Frankfurt School, it was generally condemned as a realm of uniformity, falsity, and meaninglessness. Writing in the 1940s, authors such as Adorno and Horkheimer described how consumption practices were increasingly dictated through the machinery of capitalist cultural industries, promoting a homogenized and materialistic American culture. For the most part, consumers were conceptualized as passive dupes, seduced by the schemes of retailers, marketers, and advertisers, and politically pacified through the consumption of useless objects and mass entertainment. For these thinkers, the dominance of consumption diminished the possibility for freedom and individuality. The meanings and pleasures of consumption, and the subjectivities they mobilized, were seen as inauthentic and compromised. These early discussions of consumption focused overwhelmingly on the negative

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dimensions of consumption and were underpinned by an entrenched belief in the monolithic and determining nature of capitalist transformation. Ironically, thinkers on the right (such as F. R. Leavis) have been prone to a similar tone when writing of mass consumption. Concern was expressed, for example, regarding the loss of community and tradition, and the rise of hedonism related to consumption. Partly as a reaction to this portrait, a new literature emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, which was more optimistic in its outlook. This literature grew out of the work of a number of theorists such as Stuart Hall based at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. For these authors, moralistic pronouncements, such as those of the Frankfurt School, were based on elitist prejudices. Geographer Peter Jackson was also quick to suggest that many critiques of consumption privilege academic knowledge over popular wisdom, showing little respect for the political judgment or moral integrity of ordinary consumers. Jackson claimed that dominant accounts often displayed a distaste for low (and female) culture and were blind to the multiple and complex meanings that shopping, commodities, and popular culture offered to individuals. In contrast to the conception of “consumer as dupe,” this new literature highlighted the increasingly knowledgeable ways that buyers engaged with consumer culture. Influenced by this broader shift, geographers began to produce a lively literature foregrounding the capacity of consumers to appropriate the retailer and advertising schemes to their own advantage, and their ability to forge diverse subjectivities. The emphasis was on the critical capacities of consumers, the practices through which commodities were endowed with oppositional meanings, and on the ways in which consumption was a realm of creativity and resistance. Such interventions were not immune to criticism, however; for many social scientists, the pendulum had swung too far in the opposite direction, with a tendency to over-celebrate consumer agency and to ignore the control of producers. Still others argued that the celebration of everyday acts of subversion was obscuring the more genuinely radical potential of consumption to challenge power relations in supply chains. In response to these debates, a more nuanced perspective emerged in geography in the 1990s. Influenced by Michel Foucault’s theories of governmentality, this literature foregrounded how consumer conduct is mobilized, motivated, and distributed, and how consumer freedom and choice itself can serve as an effective form of power and governance. Modes of governance work through the capacities and freedoms of the governed in order to secure the ends of government. Foucault’s work foregrounded the way power enables as much as it constrains. Emphasis was placed on the way in which commercial institutions frame the subject of consumption, on how technologies of consumption mobilize consumer conduct by forging links between human motivations and the specific features of commodities. Paul duGay, for example, suggested that the focus should not be on producers or consumers, but on the relation between the two, and on the devices used to promote consumption. Consumers do not exist prior to descriptions of them but are rather enacted and performed through consumer discourses. In this way, regimes of governance do not determine forms of subjectivity and citizenship; rather they elicit, promote, and facilitate particular qualities in agents. These regimes are successful to the extent that agents come to experience themselves through consumption practices. The aim of such research is not to establish a single theory of consumption, but to trace the ways in which geographically and temporally specific modes of consumer conduct are mobilized. While consumers are governed, there can be moments of problematization where the techniques, knowledges, languages, and practices of governance are called into question by authorities (such as corporations) and the governed (in this case consumers).

Spatializing Consumption Drawing on these theoretical insights, geographers have added a distinctly spatial dimension to the study of consumption. They have explored different scales of consumption that range from the global to the local. Operating at the global scale, much work has been devoted toward an understanding of the globalization of commodity culture. Here, there has been an attempt to understand global flows of commodities (such as McDonald’s hamburgers, Coca Cola beverages, and GAP clothing). For many commentators, the diffusion of these global brands is leading to a process of cultural and economic homogenization, often referred to as a “McDonaldization” of culture; however, geographers have been much more cautious and critical of such overarching claims. Dispelling many of the myths of globalization, they have been quick to cite the resilience of local cultures in a transnationalizing world, foregrounding the production of new forms of local culture and new meanings of the “local.” Research has illustrated how goods assume different meanings in different places and has illuminated the difficulties of forging global markets. Landscapes of consumption, and the power relations that characterize them, have also been an important focus of attention. This work has become all the more critical, as landscapes of consumption have become more ubiquitous and cities have come to resemble theme parks and shopping malls, with their carefully designed streetscapes and privately maintained security forces. More and more, urban-economic development agendas focus on marketing the city as a site of creativity and entertainment, as well as consumption and culture, in order to attract tourists, investment, and talent. Geographical work traces the control exercised in the layout and design of shopping malls, department stores, high streets, luxury fashion boutiques, and festival marketplaces, and the gendered, racialized, class-based, and hetero- and homonormative identities associated with such spaces. Much of this literature has explored the experience of these spaces for residents, acknowledging that despite surveillance and control, consumersdincluding women, youths, and seniorsdoften derive pleasure in these quasi-public spaces. There has also been work on more mundane spaces of consumption, such as second-hand stores or car boot sales. Geographers such as Gregson and Crewe draw attention to the need for ethnographic research on cultures of thrift and scavenging. They call for research on what people do with their purchases, how they transform commodities (through repair, recycling, restoration, and

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alteration), and on the ways in which they use, reuse, and dispose of goods. In this vein, a large literature has emerged on how things come to be considered “waste,” losing their status as fetish. Work has also been done on the geographies of global resource recovery. Goods declared as waste in one part of the world (often the Global North) are shipped to other regions in the world to be reconditioned, recovered as cheap materials, or sold as second-hand goods. These geographies of resource recovery are constantly shifting. The home has also assumed greater importance as a site of consumption, due in part to the expansion of e-commerce. While geographers have long been interested in the consumption of housing itself as a positional good, they are beginning to explore the dynamics of consumption within the space of the home. The home affords an interesting opportunity to examine the relationship between people and goods because it is a space of both individual and collective consumption, where the goods purchased and the meanings assigned to them are negotiated between household members. Digital consumption has become a key area of research interest. Online shopping has changed the consumption landscape in recent decades, leading to further globalization, and accounting for an ever-growing percentage of all purchases, particularly the case in the Global North, but also in countries in the Global South, such as China. Digital consumption is having a major impact on bricks and mortar retailers. Commercial businesses increasingly need an online presence in order to compete and to generate customers willing to visit their physical stores. People also interact with physical consumption spaces through the filter of digital media. A lot of purchasing decisions are made with the assistance of apps and social media. Geographers have examined how virtual and material worlds intersect, and how digital technologies are transforming consumer worlds. One key finding is that consumption spaces are increasingly portable, following us everywhere, and creating a situation where we are always connected to consuming communities. There is also greater interest in how the platform economy is transforming consumption practices, particularly in realms such as automobile and clothing consumption, where there is an increase in renting rather than owning goods (evident in the expansion of platforms such as Zipcar and Rent the Runway). Research also traces how e-commerce is providing new opportunities in the realms of logistics, warehousing, and big data. This literature explores how consumers are increasingly tracked, their consumer purchases becoming data which is stored in electronic databases that are subject to algorithms. These algorithms are then used to further direct and control consumption. In addition to the rise of digital spaces of consumption, there has been an expansion in “pop-up” shops. The origins of this form of retailing date back centuries to traveling merchants and hawkers, selling wares from a cart, or to the periodic markets that have long flourished around the world, especially in the Global South. Since the early 2000s, pop-up shops have proliferated in the margins of the city, occupying unused stores or shipping containers, particularly in the Global North. These temporary spaces often serve as temporary, inexpensive, and flexible sites for selling a range of innovative products, including craft and artisanal goods. In some cases, they are started by individual entrepreneurs selling unique new products, while in other cases, the format has been appropriated by large corporations such as Google, Amazon, or Bulgari, who want to sell off merchandise, collect data on consumers, or simply promote their brand. The pop-up format imparts the impression that the consumer is getting a unique retail experience, something that is temporary and cannot be replicated. While often positioned as offering an alternative/creative/DIY retail environment that interrupts the homogeneity and sameness of the urban landscape, often they are complicit with gentrification and culture-led urban regeneration, illustrating the contradictions embedded in this form of consumption. Geographers have also explored how consumption discourses map the body, including its size, shape, health, and sexual attractiveness. Drawing on literatures on affect, emotion, and embodiment, there are discussions of the ways in which consumers think and act through the body. This work analyzes how discourses shape the body’s spatiality, comportment, and motility, defining its possibilities and limitations. Research highlights how spacesdsuch as the shop floor or changing roomdare spaces where emotions are produced through corporeal practices related to gazing at, touching, and trying on products (such as clothing). Practices of discipline, surveillance, and self-restraint form an important part of everyday life. Food consumption in particular illustrates the intimate connection between consumption and the body. In the case of food, the commodity is ingested and quite literally becomes part of the body. The corporeal nature of food consumption is illustrated in the growing concern over food safety and quality, and the heightened sense of public mistrust of scientific and government knowledges and regulations governing food. Food consumption patterns have long-term consequences for health and mortality. Inequalities in access to food based on class, race, and geography have become an urgent concern for researchers. One avenue of research which demands further attention is on the links between race/ethnicity and consumption. There have been a few studies focusing on Asian fashion in the United Kingdom, as well as ethnic purchasing patterns. One interesting study is Slocum’s analysis of the ethnic and racial characteristics of consumers participating in local farmers’ markets in Minneapolis. She concludes that customers are largely white, and that African-Americans, in particular, are less likely to engage in shopping at local farmers’ markets. Similar conclusions have been drawn in relation to craft markets, which are also dominated by white, middle-class women, both online (in digital spaces such as Etsy) and in outdoor markets. More research is needed on consumption and race. Consumption incorporates a series of practices located in particular places but it also serves to connect consumers with actors in other sites and locales. Consumer choices are mediated by advertisers, retailers, trading organizations, and education campaigns, illustrating the way that consumption is constituted through social relations at a variety of scales. As Andrew Sayer notes, consumption encompasses a range of social and material relationships between the producer and consumer, between the purchaser and consumer, between a consumer and other consumers (joint consumers or third parties), and between consumers and other individuals who may have claims to the same resources. Consumption also entails a relationship between the consumer and the natural environment. A single act of purchase may have different impacts in terms of these various relationships and sites. Geographers have been at the forefront of a body of scholarship calling for work that traces the entire trajectory of a product from its conception and design, through its production, retailing, and final consumption. This is a vertical approach to consumption

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because it highlights the uniqueness of individual commodities which are characterized by a distinct temporality and spatiality. The specificity revealed within vertical approaches has implications for chain dynamics and power relations, as well as consumption practices, ethics, and politics. Such an approach differs from a horizontal analysis of consumption emphasizing the broader characteristics of consumption in a particular place or gendered and ethnic dimensions of consumption. The introduction of a vertical heuristic underscores the need for multiple approaches to consumption, exploring the specificity of individual commodities, but also the overlap between commodities and commodity chains. One useful contribution to the vertical approach has been to highlight the way individual commodity chains are organized and governed, a key theme in the work of Gary Gereffi. These discussions have advanced our understanding of the influence and control exercised by a range of intermediaries along a chain. There are a number of different approaches to commodity chains, and it is not my aim to review them here. One important point, however, concerns the political value of tracing these connections. Much of the global commodity chain (GCC) and global value chain (GVC) literatures are underpinned by a political economy perspective, emphasizing systematic inequalities between core and periphery in global commodity systems, and the flow of economic surplus across space. Often, the aim is to penetrate the fetishism of a particular commodity, to delve below the fantastic images associated with the product in the realms of advertising and retailing, and to trace the value of a commodity back to the hidden abode of production. For many analysts, commodity chain analysis offers the possibility of defetishising commodities. This approach involves looking beyond the exchange of commodities, to the value created in producing the commodity, in order to fully understand and appreciate what a commodity is. Taking this approach allows one to view commodities as thoroughly embedded in social and geographical processes, the idea being that increased education may lead consumers to question their role in perpetuating landscapes of exploitation. Other analysts remain skeptical of the linear nature of such explanatory sequences, preferring a network metaphor which captures multistranded relationships between producers, retailers, consumers, and other actors. This work sees chains as having no beginning or end. Inspired by a number of approaches, including work on commodity cultures and knowledges (associated with Cook, Crang, and Thorpe), global production networks (GPNs), and actor–network theory (ANT), this literature explores the interdependence between people, firms, states, and organizations in commodity networks and the flow and translation of knowledge. Agency is viewed as relational; nodes do not exist as concrete objects, but rather are constituted within the networks they are part of. In this way, consumers are not discrete beings, but are relational and embodied subjects interacting with material and immaterial things, organizations, and states in consumption practices. Seen from this vantage point, commodity fetishes are not veils, masking the origins of consumer goods. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that simply providing additional knowledges to consumers about the production of goods will automatically lead to changes in consumer behavior. Relations between actors are prone to rupture and recombine in everyday consumption. The goal then is not to thicken surfaces, but to think constructively about how surfaces are productive of particular identities and relations. A final point relates to the role of the commodity itself in these networks. Inspired by both ANT and work in anthropology on material culture, there is a growing interest in how the commodity itself is an important actor in commodity networks, along with other nonhuman actors, such as technologies and nature. There has been increased attention to the role of objects and the ways in which they allow humans to order society in more durable and mobile ways. Material goods, buildings, and machines are not mere outcomes of human action; they actively participate in processes of interaction. In this vein, material objects and commodities can be considered as actors within commodity networks.

Politicizing Consumption For Noel Castree, recent work on the geography of consumption displays a tendency to avoid normative judgment. Castree argues that there is a need for a more systematic consideration of how to weigh the goods and bads of consumption, along with a way of evaluating the values, practices, and impacts of consumption upon people within and between locales. He suggests that consumption researchers frequently adopt a situated and reflexive voice in order to challenge authoritarian standpoints such as those of the Frankfurt School; however, Castree worries that this “modest” voice obscures the need for academics to take a stand, to offer principled arguments and suggestions in particular circumstances. While acknowledging the problematic nature of imposing normative standpoints a priori and the complexity of normative thinking, it is crucial to offer criticisms of consumption (and commodification) based on case-specific arguments. Castree raises issues surrounding the audience of consumption studies, suggesting that consumption researchers in geography need to be more explicit about whom they are addressing in their work, in order to reflect more explicitly on the political implications. This discussion foregrounds the politics of consumption. In an influential historical polemic published in 1995, Daniel Miller suggested that consumption was at the vanguard of history and the fulcrum of dialectical contradiction. He argued that on the one hand, it appears as one of the key social issues of our time, responsible for massive suffering and inequality. On the other hand, consumption is also at the heart of potential political movements. While not entirely optimistic that consumer power will be realized, Miller argues that if consumers could mobilize and channel their power, they could mount an effective challenge to the amorality of the market. While geographers have typically not viewed consumption as a potential site of struggle, they are beginning to explore the political possibilities of this space. There has been heightened attention to a range of social justice movements, such as producer and consumer cooperatives, consumer boycotts, green and sustainable consumption, craft and artisanal consumption, the slow food

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movement, and organic and fair-trade consumption. These forms of activism cannot simply be dismissed as liberal or individualistic. Many encompass radical and collectivist forms of struggle. Furthermore, these movements appeal to groups historically marginalized in production-based struggles (such as women and youth). Gender bias and a moral distaste for shopping have obscured their potential. The global mobility of capital makes struggles at the point of production increasingly difficult to wage. There is therefore a need to consider new sites of organizing outside the workplace and production. There are of course many limitations associated with consumer-based movements and few represent a genuine resistance to capitalism. While there have been selective improvements in working conditions in certain industries, ultimately systematic inequalities are not addressed in many ethical consumption initiatives. In the case of organic food consumption, the impact on the environment may be positive, but geographers have shown that working conditions can be just as exploitative in organic agriculture as in the mainstream food economy. Others have suggested that many campaigns are merely marketing initiatives designed to reassure consumers. These limitations, however, should not blind us to the potential of these movements, and to the need to establish a politics that can challenge global capitalism from a variety of vantage points and spaces, including consumption. Ethical and sustainable consumption has become a large topic of debate in recent decades. This literature draws attention to the way ethical consumption is reworking commodity chains and highlights the networks of different agents that shape ethical consumption, including charities and other nonprofit organizations, certification bodies, marketers, and retail corporations. While much of the literature focuses on socially and environmentally oriented consumption decisions, a growing literature has emerged on “ordinary ethics,” less concerned with “ethical consumption” and more oriented toward the way ethics are embedded in everyday consumer decision-making processes, which encompasses care for the self and others. Until recently, most of the literature on ethical consumption focused on consumers in the Global North. This Northern-centric bias has been challenged in recent years. Recent work foregrounds ethical consumption practices in the Global South, including the mainstreaming of a politics of consumer responsibility among middle-class consumers. The ordinary ethics present in all consumption in the South has also been a topic of concern. This work foregrounds a range of spaces not often associated with “ethical consumption,” such as informal and market spaces.

Conclusion From a marginalized field of study, consumption has emerged as an important terrain of enquiry and political practice; however, consumption still needs to be taken seriously in many branches of the discipline, particularly in economic geography where there is a tendency to prioritize production. It is really only in the last few decades that economic geographers have begun to emphasize the role of demand in innovation systems, which are particularly important since a growing proportion of profits are derived from the stages nearest to the customer, and innovation in customer service is now critical to firm success. The customer is increasingly the focus of innovative and entrepreneurial activity. Sophisticated users are increasingly viewed as being actively involved in evaluating, conceiving, and modifying products, particularly in specialized product categories such as sporting goods and computer games. The focus on the customer shifts the emphasis beyond the region or industrial cluster in the attempt to understand innovation systems, since customer relationships often occur at a distance. The increased focus on users is a necessary corrective to the earlier tendency to ignore the role of consumption in innovation. In sum, consumption studies are coming of age, leaving behind earlier simplifications regarding agency and determination, and examining the geographical complexities in the way consuming subjects are constructed and governed. Geographers have drawn attention to the diverse motivations that underpin consumption and the multiple linkages that exist between consumption and other economic spheres, as well as between consumers and other actors, objects, and nature. While processes of commodification have become increasing prevalent and insidious, geographers have come to recognize the political possibilities of mobilizing at the site of consumption.

See Also: Corporate Responsibilities; Food Networks; Global Commodity Chains; Material Culture.

Further Reading Adorno, T., Horkheimer, M., 2002. The culture industry: enlightenment as mass deception. In: Noerr, G.S. (Ed.), Cumming, J. (Trans.). Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Stanford University Press, New York, pp. 94–136. Baudrillard, J., 1998. The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures. Sage, London. Bourdieu, P., 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Routledge, London. Castree, N., 2004. The geographical lives of commodities: problems of analysis and critique. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 5, 21–35. Cook, I., Crang, P., Thorpe, M., 2004. Tropics of consumption: ‘Getting with the fetish’ of ‘exotic’ fruit? In: Hughes, A., Reimer, S. (Eds.), Geographies of Commodity Chains. Routledge, London, pp. 171–192. Crewe, L., 2013. When virtual and material worlds collide: democratic fashion in the digital age. Environ. Plan. 45, 760–780. Daya, S., 2016. Ordinary ethics and craft consumption: a Southern perspective. Geoforum 74, 128–135. duGay, P., 2004. Devices and dispositions: promoting consumption. Consum. Mark. Cult. 7, 99–105. Fine, B., Leopold, E., 1993. The World of Consumption. Routledge, London.

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Gereffi, G., Korzeniewicz, M., Korzeniewicz, R. (Eds.), 1994. Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. Greenwood Press, Westport, CN. Grabher, G., Ibert, O., Flohr, S., 2009. The neglected king: the customer in the new knowledge ecology of innovation. Econ. Geogr. 84, 253–280. Gregson, N., Ferdous, R., 2015. Making space for ethical consumption in the South. Geoforum 67, 244–255. Gregson, N., Metcalfe, A., Crewe, L., 2007. Identity, mobility and the throwaway society. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 25, 682–700. Hall, S.M., 2011. Exploring the ‘ethical everyday’: an ethnography of the ethics of family consumption. Geoforum 42, 627–637. Hawkins, R., 2015. Shifting conceptualizations of ethical consumption: cause-related marketing in India and the USA. Geoforum 67, 172–182. Jackson, P., 1999. Commodity cultures: the traffic in things. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 24, 95–108. Mansvelt, J., 2008. Geographies of consumption: citizenship, space and practice. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 32, 105–117. Maskell, A., Power, D., 2005. On the role of global demand in local innovation processes. In: Fuchs, G., Shapira, P. (Eds.), Rethinking Regional Innovation and Change. Springer, New York, pp. 273–290. Miller, D. (Ed.), 1995. Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies. Routledge, London. Sayer, A., 2003. De)commodification, consumer culture, and moral economy. Environ. Plan. Soc. Space 21, 341–357. Slocum, R., 2008. Thinking race through corporeal feminist theory: divisions and intimacies at the minneapolis farmers’ market. Soc. Cult. Geogr. 9, 849–869. Wrigley, N., Lowe, M. (Eds.), 1996. Retailing, Consumption and Capital: Towards the New Retail Geography. Longmans, Harlow, pp. 48–67.

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Content Analysis Jamie Baxter, Department of Geography, Western University, London, ON, Canada © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Code (noun) A theme or category used to group text units by similar meaning; (verb) the process of ascribing themes or categories to text units. Codebook A list of codes and their definitions for categorizing communication messages. Interrater/intercoder reliability A measure of the degree to which different coders apply codes in the same way to a range of text units. Typically, a correlation coefficient above 0.8 is considered “good.” Message Any communication between humansdfor example, a newspaper article, interview, or speech. Text unit A subunit of a larger textdfor example, paragraphs, lines, words. Unit of analysis The unit actually measured, typically the text unit. Unit of observation The unit about which study conclusions are drawndtypically, it is the same as the unit of analysis, but sometimes it is something the unit of analysis representsdfor example, newspapers, political parties.

Content analysis is a social scientific methodology for making sense of recorded human communication, including news media, policy documents, letters, and even video or novelsdparticularly, written texts. In practice, content analysis involves breaking down texts into smaller units: paragraphs, sentences, phrases, or single words. These units are then grouped according to common meaningdcodes. This methodology is typically used to make at least three types of inferences, including those about the producers of the texts, the messages in the texts themselves, and the audience for those texts. While content analysis has evolved it has inspired other forms of textual analysis that are much more conscious of the politics of representation whereby analysis of text is embedded in flows of knowledge, power, and social class (see Text, Textual Analysis, entry in this volume). Although content analysis was formalized around the 1920s, it grew rapidly during World War II in communications research to study propaganda in the media. This era of popularity continued through the following decades as the quantitative revolution took hold across the social sciences. Although the methodology was heavily developed as a quantitative method during that era, in the decades since the quantitative revolution the term “content analysis,” like “textual analysis,” has been used in much broader ways. While the terms overlap to some degree, content analysis is much more firmly rooted in positivism, while textual analysis aligns more closely with approaches like critical theory, feminism, political economy, and political ecology. When the term content analysis is used, a key distinction is between primarily quantitative and qualitative versions; the latter often referring to “methodology”dwith version-specific ontological and epistemological underpinningsdwhile quantitative content analysis is often simply referred to as a “technique” or a “method.” Qualitative content analysis more closely aligns with textual analysis, but that too depends on the ontological and epistemological bases of the work. For example, some social constructionists may approach qualitative content analysis far less critically than their feminist and political ecology counterparts. This bifurcation of content analysis is somewhat unique, so it is paramount to understand how the term is being used in practice/context. Early definitions of content analysis are still heavily cited in the social sciences, and these emphasize positivistic underpinnings particularly a focus on what is observable and tacitly undisputed in texts. That is, only the surface meaning of texts is to be analyzed as they are ostensibly unchanging. Such a basis led to focusing on such practices as quantification, replication, and an emphasis on objectivity. Some of the more recent definitions acknowledge the inherent ambiguity of objectivity, in particular that objectivity implies essentialist notions of meaning in textdthat meanings are singular and fixed over time and spacedsomething most geographers likewise no longer accept. Thus, these more modern definitions emphasize the “validity” (credibility) of inference rather than the repeatability of inference. Despite such advances, most books on content analysis almost exclusively discuss content analysis as a positivistic, quantitative endeavor that involves counting the occurrences of predefined, though admittedly, theoretically informed codes. Though some of the most cited authors acknowledge the notion that content analysis can also be qualitative, those books still mainly concern quantitative implementations of content analysis. For the qualitative content analyst, a key issue is not the presence or absence of a phenomenon or the number of times it occurs in a text or group of texts; it is the meanings within the texts, their context, and how they are derived from text that matters most. What follows is a more detailed discussion of these two very different forms of content analysis.

Quantitative Content Analysis Many maintain that, in the strictest sense of the term, and to avoid ambiguity in relation to critically and qualitatively oriented textual analysis, “content analysis” refers to its quantitative form. Some key characteristics that comprise this quantitative form include adherence to the scientific method, the message (not its producer) as the unit of analysis and/or observation; phenomena

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must be counted; and explanations are nomothetic. Among the characteristics of the scientific method that many content analyses sourcebooks cite are that a study must be objective, based on an a priori research design, reliable, replicable, valid, generalizable, and deductive. For the quantitative content analyst, the messagesdnot the audiences for or producers of those messagesdare supposed to be the unit of analysis and/or observation. That is, there must be some “communication” between individuals or groups in a content analysis study, even if the conclusions concern people/groups. Thus, not only texts are open to study by the content analyst, any form of communication is available for study. While the requirement that the phenomena must be counted is rather straightforward, the nomothetic mode of enquiry is not. Nomothetic refers to research that seeks out broad, generalizable, yet parsimonious, explanations of a wide array of cases, not just a specific case or a few cases. The typical process for conducting a quantitative content analysis should be familiar to any social scientist who understands the hypothetico-deductive process, including the following ordered steps: theoretical rationale, conceptualization, operationalization, a priori development of code definitions, sampling, application of code definitions to communication messages, tabulation and statistics, reporting, and conclusions. An example from geography concerning the relationship between distance and bias in newspaper reporting on spotted owl habitat protection will be used to demonstrate each step.

Theoretical Rationale As with all deductive research, the process starts with a theoretical rationale, specifically a relationship between concepts that is to be tested empirically. In the case study, one general class of relationships tested is the variation over space in the coverage of an environmental issue. Specifically, two hypotheses (among others) are tested: (1) newspaper coverage concerning logging and the protection of spotted owl habitat decreases with physical distance from the habitat forests in questionda distance decay effect of “newsworthiness”; and (2) reporting bias likewise varies systematically with physical distance.

Conceptualization and Operationalization The conceptualization and operationalization process helps link theory with the available data. In our example study, “physical distance” is measured as the number of kilometers between the city in which a news item on spotted owls is published and the nearest city contained within the owl’s US habitat range (i.e., the northwest). The “amount of newspaper coverage” is measured in two ways: the “number of stories” and the “average story length in words,” whereas the “bias in coverage” concept (i.e., toward logging forests within the range of the spotted owl habitat) is measured in two ways: as pro-cut and pro-save sources, and pro-cut and pro-save themes. Thus, the study tests whether the independent variable “physical distance” predicts each of these four dependent variables.

A Priori Development of Code Definitions This stage requires that a list of code definitionsda codebook or dictionarydis developed prior to coding. That is, the strictest practitioners will not read their data prior to creating their codebook; rather, such researchers will refer primarily to existing theory. There are preexisting dictionaries, such as the Harvard and Lasswell general-purpose dictionaries, which, because they are standardized, facilitate cross-study comparisons. Two key aspects of quantitative coding are that there can only be one code per text unit and that each code must be unique from all other codesdmutual exclusivity. This seems a rather strict requirement and would frustrate most qualitative analysts, but it is considered necessary by purists in order to meet the basic assumptions for statistical analysis. In our example, if a passage (message text unit) concerns mainly a “source,” it may only be coded as a pro-cut source; a pro-save source; or a neutral/unknown source, and nothing else. Thus, very strict decision rules must be put into place ahead of time. At this stage initial tests of interrater or intercoder reliability of human coding may be calculated to ensure that definitions can be consistently applied by different people. This is essentially the correlation across each of the test coders’ applications of the codebook to the same data. Most authors agree that a correlation coefficient of 0.80 or higher is indicative of a reliable quantitatively oriented coding scheme.

Application of Code Definitions to Communication Messages There are two ways to apply codesdusing humans or using a computer. A potential source of confusion is that both may actually be facilitated by computer. Typically, codebooks are used by humans, whereas dictionaries are used by computer programs, and both have the goal of ensuring consistent application of the codes. Though this seems like a purely mechanical process, there is frequently some code refinement during this phase whereby preliminary reliability checks are made and the coding scheme refined. Unlike hermeneutic qualitative content analysis, which may require special knowledge of social theory in the area being studied, quantitative content analysts advocate that ideally, once the definitions are established, human coding requires no special training as a social scientist, merely training about the specific codebook. There are numerous software packages that facilitate computerdictionary-based coding (e.g., Verbatim Blaster) as well as human coding (e.g., NVivo). While it is typically beyond the scope of most empirical publications to include the codebook or dictionary, even as an appendix, a good research paper will provide at least one example of how a key coding choice was made.

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Sampling Since a census of all communication messages is often impractical (e.g., all newspaper articles on spotted owls), typically a theoretically relevant sample of messages is selected. The sample may be narrowed through random selection of elements on such dimensions as time period, place, and source. The example study is narrowed to 10 daily newspapers from the United States during a 5-year period from 1990 to 1994. The rationale is that the issue peaked in this period and the daily papers they picked had circulations that were between 300,000 and 600,000 to control for known bias effects from very large circulation newspapers.

Tabulation and Reporting Texts concerning content analysis tend to involve detailed discussion of the various ways the data may be presented quantitatively, and these mirror procedures for secondary data analysis in general methods texts. Data may be presented simply as frequencies, or in more sophisticated terms as relationships between variables in bivariate tests and multivariate models. In the case example, histograms show frequencies of stories, average words per story, and bias (“themebalance” and “sourcebalance”) with the category axis representing the newspapers ordered by distance from the spotted owl habitat (Fig. 1). Although the predicted distance decay pattern does appear for the “number of stories” and somewhat for “average length of stories,” no support is found for a spatial dimension to “source” or “theme bias.” This conclusion is reinforced with a multivariate regression analysis (not included here) showing that physical distance is a statistically significant predictor of “story frequency” and “average story length,” but not of “source” or “theme bias.” Thus, the conclusion is that distance does not predict reporting bias, but it does predict the amount of newspaper coverage.

Qualitative (Hermeneutic) Content Analysis Though there are plenty of standardized procedures for quantitative content analysis formalized in several textbooks outside of geography, far less is written about qualitative content analysisdanywhere. That said, there is much written about the broad category of textual analysis. There are questions about the appropriateness of using the term “content analysis” in reference to

Figure 1 Example summary data from a quantitative content analysis study. Reproduced from Bendix, J., Leiebler, C., 1999. Place, distance, and environmental news: Geographic variation in newspaper coverage of the spotted owl conflict. Annal. Associat. Am. Geogr. 89 (4), 658–676 – Fig. 3, with permission from Blackwell.

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qualitative research, suggesting that perhaps textual analysis or a related term should be used instead. Several researchers claiming to conduct content analysis might instead use terms such as interpretive analysis, hermeneutic analysis, ethnographic analysis, discourse analysis, grounded theory, critical analysis, or semiotic analysisdmany of these overlapping with, or more commonly known among their practitioners as, “textual analysis.” Part of the problem may stem from a simple misunderstanding of terminology, but another possibility is that qualitative content analysis is a legitimately unique methodology that simply shares epistemological and ontological elements of its qualitative cousins just listed. It is difficult to tell which is the case, however, since journal articles rarely allow for an adequate elaboration of methodology. Many of the books on (quantitative) content analysis discuss qualitative content analysis in rather pejorative terms. One of their critiques against qualitative message analysts is that the latter tend to overemphasize the creators and audiences of messages (texts) rather than the messages themselves. Indeed, emphasizing creators and audiences is viewed by the qualitative practitioners to be one of the major strengths of their approachdspecifically, that the research lens is appropriately focused on the people involved in message creation and consumption since these involve power relations (Table 1). Some argue that the differences between quantitative and qualitative content analysis are at least partially a matter of degreedfor example, that qualitative content analysts focus on deep (latent) meaning, whereas quantitative analysts focus more on surface (manifest) meaning. It is more often the case, though, that these practitioners advocate fundamentally different approaches to social science. The following is a list of characteristics that, though they may be present in quantitative content analysis, they are nevertheless most commonly found in qualitatively oriented content analysis:

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

focus on theory development (induction) not just theory testing (deduction); researcher is the instrument, not the codebook; skilled social scientists are required to do the work; latent content (between the lines; “hidden” meaning) is more important than manifest content; more flexible coding rules (e.g., multiple codes per unit of text); attention is paid to how a message is produced in the first place (e.g., interviews); researcher is often a cocreator of the messages (e.g., interviews); inferences often concern producers of messages and/or the intended audiences; inductive development of concepts (codes); identification of the presence/absence of a concept rather than precise frequencies; multiple content types (e.g., newspapers, policy documents, archival material) considered simultaneously; each source may have potentially different text unit sizes; heavy use of example quotations from the data; and attention to valid inference at the expense of large sample size and strict a priori coding rules.

By way of summary, Table 1 highlights some of the strengths and limitations of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Many researchers today now advocate for the combination of methods where appropriate, and increasingly we see content analysis studies that use both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in the same study.

Content Analysis in Human Geography Likewise human geographers use the term “content analysis” in various and sometimes ambiguous ways. A survey of geographic literature on the topic leaves the distinct impression that content analysis has fallen between the cracks of Table 1

Relative strengths of quantitative and qualitative content analysis.

Strengths

Quantitative

Qualitative

Reliable Transparent Generalizable Nonreactive/unobtrusive Inexpensive Wide spatial and temporal coverage Valid Methodologically flexible/adaptable to research situation Findings relevant to resolving a specific problem Connection to/engagement with those studied Conditions of document creation are clarified Useful for answering “why” questions Takes advantage of researcher-as-instrument

Morea More More More More More Less Less Less Less Less Less Less

Less Less Less Less Less Less More More More More More More More

Each strength is considered to be a continuum whereby “more” and “less” concern the characteristics of each content analysis methodology in relation to the other. a

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quantitative and qualitative geographic research. Current texts on geography methods and some dictionaries of geography have either no entry whatsoever concerning content analysis or only brief mention. In addition, entries for the term “text” and “textual analysis” likewise make no/scant mention of content analysis. Instead, entries for “text” are more likely to mention, and discuss at length other, explicitly qualitative, interpretive analytical techniques such as semiotic analysis, discourse analysis, landscape analysis, or cultural analysis. This may signal at least two possibilities. One is that geographers eschew content analysis as a worthwhile form of human/social research. Another possibility is that nobody is really sure what it is that content analysis is meant to do for geographers. The answer seems to fall somewhere between these two explanations. For example, as further indication that this methodology is marginalized in geography, when the term “content analysis” does appear in geography methods texts, less than a page and little elaboration are typically provided. Further, the passages in those texts tightly align with the notion, and somewhat pejoratively so, that content analysis is solely a quantitative endeavor. To add further to the confusion, content analysis is typically discussed in the qualitative section of geography methods texts rather than in the quantitative section. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that this methodology receives such short shrift. This situation underscores the unique position of this methodology as one that can be implemented quantitatively or qualitatively, which may also be one of its primary weaknessesdi.e., terminology. Despite the dearth of material in geography methods texts, geographers do actually use the term “content analysis” frequently in their research and writing. For example, a search of the Geobase geography journal database in the 18 years between 1982 and 1999 for “content analysis” anywhere in the title or abstract produces more than 219 articles, while that figure jumps dramatically in the 18-year time span 2000 to 2018 to 2676 articles. Once references from physical science/physical geography journals are eliminated, slightly more than half of those references relate to what is discussed here and the majority of those are empirical studies. Further, the same search in the title and abstract of four influential geography journals (Annals of the Association of American Geographers, The Professional Geographer (PG), Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (TIBG), and Area) over the shorter 10-year period from 2008 to June 2018 produces 14 empirical articlesd5, 3, 1, and 5, respectively. It seems that content analysis is alive and well in geography. What seems to separate geographers from the early history of content analysis in the social sciences is that the communications being analyzed are often “created” by the research process itself. That is, the “texts” in much of the empirical work by human geographers come from interviews and focus groups that were led by the researchers themselves. Thus, the researchers are participants in the data creation. While this would certainly offend the purist quantitative content analyst on the grounds that it violates objectivity, such an approach to data “creation” receives ample epistemological and ontological support from qualitative researchers across the discipline.

Debates There are at least four important debates concerning content analysis that are worth highlighting. These reflect general methodological debate in social science and human geography.

What Constitutes Objectivity? At least two related issues are worth considering. First, while some quantitative content analysts endorse that a hallmark of objectivity is defining codes prior to even looking at the message data, other quantitative content analysts advocate that it is entirely acceptable to conduct an inductive reading of the messages to develop codes. The qualitative content analyst typically prefers the latter approach since theoretical development is often their goal anyway. Second, most current discussions of objectivity center on the notion of intersubjective interpretations that can be agreed upon by a wider group, which is why there is heavy reliance on interrater reliability in content analysis. Yet, in practice, the “raters” are often supervisors and their students or otherwise likeminded individuals. So we must be cautious about considering that such results represent “reality,” and think critically about how intersubjectively narrow the interpreted reality might be.

What Is the Relative Importance of Manifest Content as Opposed to Latent Content? In theory, manifest content concerns the most “commonly” understood intersubjective interpretation of a message, while latent content concerns more holistic and/or deeper meanings and even the relationships between messages, which are also intersubjective. Some consider this difference equivalent to the difference between “surface” and “deep” meaning, and many equate manifest content with quantitative content analysis and latent content with qualitative content analysis. Such dichotomies are in practice false, because, for example, the content sought, whatever it may be, is a selective process. Ultimately, all content will fall somewhere along what may be considered a continuum from manifest to latent meaning. Equally important is that wherever the researcher looks for meaning, whether deeply or not, that meaning is often determined by their own preexisting methodological and theoretical preferences. This reflects ongoing debates concerning the crisis of representation marked by the cultural and representational turns in geography and the social sciences generally.

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Is Frequency Related to Importance? Some assume that knowing the precise frequency of some phenomenon is more important than simply knowing whether it exists in a text. In the example above it may be important in some instances to know how many different newspapers are biased one way or the other, while in others it may be enough to know that the Houston Chronicle is heavily biased toward the “pro-cut” frame. The simple presence or absence of a phenomenon may be enough to address the problem at hand.

Do Computers Make It Too Easy to Produce Irrelevant Results Rapidly? A common criticism against computerized content analysis software (CCAS), and even computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) generally, is that computers make it too easy to produce results rapidly. This goes hand-in-hand with concerns about an overemphasis on manifest contentda reason many qualitatively oriented geographers dismiss content analysis. There are more than 30 CCAS packages excluding all-purpose CAQDAS packages like NVivo or Atlas.ti. Indeed, programs like General Inquirer can, in seconds, produce output using preloaded dictionaries. There are at least three sources of concern. First, such programs are accused of being little more than keyword countersdconsistency at the expense of relevance. Second, is the concern that computers are a poor replacement for humans as creative, adaptive, interpretive thinkersdmanifest content of the worst kind. Though computers may consistently apply rules, they may not always accurately identify the appropriate, contextualized use of a message. This inaccuracy increases with the size of the text unit. Third, many lament the potential loss of meaning from simply applying preexisting dictionaries or coding schemesdcomparison at the expense of new understanding. The best use of CCAS and CAQDAS is to help facilitate the task of interpretation; the worst use is to simply allow them to produce frequencies without any theoretically informed reflection on the how those frequencies came to be.

Conclusion When used appropriately, content analysis can provide extremely useful insights about “texts”; however, since the term “content analysis” can be used in a variety of contexts, it is important to understand how the term is being used in each specific case. Foremost, consumers of empirical research must understand whether it refers to quantitative or qualitative content analysis since each has very different epistemological and ontological foundations and standards for rigor. Likewise, practitioners should be careful to define the precise way they are using the term. Since the roots of content analysis are decidedly quantitative, those adopting a qualitative approach may opt for a less ambiguous label like interpretive analysis, hermeneutic analysis, ethnographic analysis, or discourse analysisdall of which may be subsumed under the broader term “textual analysis.”

See Also: Positivism/Positivist Geography; Quantitative Methodologies; Semiotics.

Further Reading Babbie, E., 2003. The Practice of Social Research, tenth ed. Wadsworth/Thompson, Belmont, CA. Bendix, J., Leiebler, C., 1999. Place, distance, and environmental news: geographic variation in newspaper coverage of the spotted owl conflict. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 89 (4), 658–676. Berelson, B., 1952. Content Analysis in Communication Research. Hafner, New York. Crang, M., 2005. Qualitative methods: there is nothing outside the text? Prog. Hum. Geogr. 29 (2), 225–233. Holsti, O., 1969. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Addison-Wesley, Don Mills, ON. Krippendorff, K., 2003. Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Larsen, S., 2004. Place identity in a resource-dependent area of northern British Columbia. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 94 (4), 944–960. Lowe, N., 2002. Software for Content Analysis: A Review. Report for the Identity Project. http://people.iq.harvard.edu/Bwlowe/Publications/rev.pdf. Neuendorf, K., 2002. The Content Analysis Guidebook. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Weber, R.P., 1990. Basic Content Analysis. Sage, Newbury Park, CA. Wilson, D. (year), Text, Textual Analysis, (this volume).

Relevant Websites http://academic.csuohio.edu. Companion to Neuendorf’s book, The Content Analysis Guidebook Online, The Academic Server. http://www.courses.washington.edu/socw580/contentsoftware.shtml. General content analysis, (links to software). http://www.content-analysis.de, (German language version of site). http://www.webuse.umd.edu:9090. Online version of General Inquirer software, Scientific Research on the Internet, University of Maryland.

Core–Periphery Models B Ramı´rez, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Mexico City, Mexico © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The core–periphery categories have explained the relation between regions that have experienced capitalist development and concentration, and the ones set apart. These terms have been used by different theoretic currents and in different ways since the end of the 19th Century. They have two different aims, depending on the model: to analyze change and transformation of different societies or modes of production, and to propose different ways in which change and transformation could affect countries, regions, or cities. These models have been developed by different areas of knowledge in an attempt to generate links and connections within them. Urban or economic geographies have been crossed by economic, political, sociological, or planning perspectives generating different ways to go beyond the economic or the geographical view. Not in all discourses are the above categories used as part of the construction of the model. Nevertheless, others such as developed–underdeveloped, metropolis–satellite, modern–traditional, and North–South, implicitly refer to the relation between one central zone and another that surrounds it in the so-called periphery. The main perspective in this discussion assumes a change of societies and territories as the central approach. One can recognize three different perspectives of change: transition, organization, or integration. In the first, transition adopts a macro-scale dimension. At the end of the 19th Century, this discussion was led by Marx, Durhein, and Weber, among others, and related to the modern aspects of capitalism but, specifically, to an attempt to understand the nature of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This comprehension was different for each of the authors and their positions were sometimes even opposed. On another scale, the second processes are related to the urban–rural scenario, which means they emphasize the regional perspective of the geographical situation of space. Part of this view consists of the ways in which cities reorganize the surrounding countryside, integrate production to the requirements of urban industry, concentrate services, and organize central places. Three aspects are discussed here: that of integration of rural to urban resulting in regions, organization of the surrounding centers, and transitions from rural to urban. Lastly, integration of developed and underdeveloped countries and the way in which links and relations are generated in the world market, or at the regional scale as well, are part of these arguments. It is important to mention that the adopted frameworks are also a part, sometimes explicitly but others implicitly, of the explanations given to understand intranational processes between different regions. One of the main characteristics of the discussion is that the leading vision of the problem always juxtaposed two different geographical territories in a confrontation of hierarchical spaces: the center and the periphery. This juxtaposition assumes not only the possibility, but also the necessity to generate change in the periphery in order to achieve goals and richness in the center. But at the same time, it assumes either the possibility that all spaces in some sense need to be like the center, or within an historical interpretation, that all non-European spaces are underdeveloped. In that sense, some authors have characterized the discussion as Eurocentric. The search for equilibrium between spaces is at the core of the discussion. In general terms, we can recognize two types of models: those emphasizing the national approach, where the assumption is that the process of social and territorial change is essentially internal to nation-states; emphasis is placed on the intranational situation in order to solve regional differences. On the other hand, the international models, with an economic emphasis, assume that the world markets and trade are the main aspects producing change and evolution in countries and regions. In both cases, arguments regarding the causes of development and underdevelopment generate different theories on the subject.

Intranational Models Within the national perspective, we can recognize three different positions. First, that of economic geography at the end of the 19th Century, developed by Vön Thünen; later, between World Wars I and II, we have the central place theory developed by Lösch and Christaller. Both focused their interest in studying centrality as a way of organizing a city and its surrounding rural areas. The former, in a circular way, organizes agriculture, cattle production, etc., in the periphery, leaving the urban center as the main point to be developed according to urban-industrial necessities. The latter is a geometric and hexagonal model, first organizing the main center and its hinterland, depending on the services provided and the cost of transportation defining the limits. But at the same time, different and less-important centers are organized in a hierarchical structure of less-important units around the main urban central place. Since these models have been widespread among geographers and economists, they are still important today. We will return to this perspective when we explain Krugman’s contemporary proposal. Within this perspective, linking the economy with geography we can include Perroux and Boudeville’s proposal, known as “poles of development” or “growth poles.” It came out in France after World War II and assumes that growth and development do not exist in all regions at the intranational scale, leading to the recognition of two different types of regions: the homogeneous and the polarized, which could introduce change through planned activities. The former are those where continuity and

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concentration are the main features making the region coherent and interdependent; the polarized regions are backward but have possibilities for industrialization, allowing for transformations in production and services. Lastly, regional plans are those spaces where investment could generate the established economic goal of change and growth. Even if this proposal does not assume the center–periphery discourse, the main features of the model are within this perspective: the objective is to transform the polarized regions into developed ones by planning activity imposed at the regional level as well. As a second perspective, we include Rostow’s transition modeldan important position in the 1960s. He does not concentrate on the dichotomy between central and peripheral countries, but points out the possibility that those who are backward can achieve development through the application of the industrial modernization of the West, focusing on the ability of the entrepreneurial elite to stimulate growth and change. The model assumes a linear view of growth and not the polarization perspective, as his implementation has to be done in five stages, each of them representing a transition from the traditional to the modern society. We could argue that different stages of backwardness might achieve the growth of the center if they follow the path of development and change defined by the model. It has a double target: on the one hand, it allows for evolution and change, but on the other, it assumes an integrative possibility for the less-modern or even backward countries, at any stage of their transition, to achieve the goals and principles of the developed ones located at the center of the process. In that sense, we can affirm that it is a model that tries to find equilibrium and homogeneity within economies and territories, with a strong influence in models like Friedmann’s, as will be developed later. The third national perspectives, mainly economic, which are widely known among geographers, include those of Myrdal, Hirschman, and Friedmann. Developed in different contexts and even times, they have been very widespread among academics and politicians in order to promote change and development. The Swedish politician and economist, Gunnar Myrdal, pushed forward his vision at the end of the 1950s in an attempt to generate a world antipoverty program. His proposal, called the Circular and Accumulative Causation Model, emphasized the vicious and circular cause of poverty. Change, he assumed, could be not only economic but of any kind, since all movements could generate others in an interwoven and circular manner. In that sense, his arguments support a strong interdependence between economic and political phenomena and between the institutions supporting these processes. Thus, state intervention is important in the economic and political life of any country. Changes in the economic and social system do not generate the compensations required for equilibrium. On the contrary, there are other processes moving the system in the same direction as the original change. As a result, there is an increase in movement, giving an impulse to the accumulative transformation of social processes, resulting in a disequilibrium and sometimes accelerating rhythm and evolution. Causes for change are cumulative in a circular system and they could generate an ascendant movement. The more we know about the different factors and the way in which they interrelate, the more one can cause a maximum increase in policy efforts, changing the social system. Industry is considered to be the main agent of change, producing, in a centrifugal manner, new impulses to other localities. Inequalities are seen only as a problem of the rhythm of progress between regions within a country. In that sense, there is a need to generate compensatory changes in external diseconomies in order to compensate impulses that evade changes. The role of public intervention is important in order to generate movement and to provide harmony for social change; to prevent poverty and inequalities between regions, industries, or social groups. During the 1960s, when the welfare state was still one of the main agents supporting development, Albert Hirschman, a German economist who lived in the United States for many years, generated a possibilistic escape route from narrow economic structures. His main interest was how to make a bridge between politics and economy, endogenous and exogenous factors for development. In this case, his model is a conjunction of political and economic forces, organizing, in an appropriate place, the political dimensions of economic phenomena, with both forces treated as endogenous variables. The model assumes that economic growth will reduce political tensions and can produce more cohesion within economic and political agents. In this view, the market is the only possibility to create changes through growth and industrialization. The role of the State in development via the model of import substitution is important. Maturity of a country is achieved when it is industrialized; the infrastructure required is provided by the State as well as subsidies for new industry. In that sense, hidden resources have to be distributed through State intervention. Lastly, with strong influence from Myrdal, Hirschmann, and Rostow, and other positions like those of Prebisch and Isard, in the late 1960s John Friedmann developed a simple and normative model of spatial development in backward countries. Despite the fact that he later moved his view to other assumptions, it is an important model to analyze as it incorporates many of the dominant ideas of the moment. The model assumes, in a linear perspective, the evolution of a spatial system in four stages, which traces the transformation from an underdeveloped to a developed situation in a national or regional context. The first stage assumes the existence of independent local centers with scarce population, mainly rural or devoted to the primary sector, without any exploitation or hierarchy among them. In the second stage, industrialization marks the beginning of the transformation, assuming the concentration of investment in one or two cities, creating the emergence of a dualistic spatial structure due to flows and exchanges, with a center that is experiencing rapid and intensive development, and a periphery whose economy imperfectly relates to this center and is either stagnant or declining. Maturity in industry and concentration of wealth in the center bring opposition to political consciousness in the periphery. These are some of the main features of the third stage. The dynamic of regional differentiation is observed as national governmental actions and the growing market brings about more regional disparities. Poverty is confined to limited areas of the periphery, with strong possibilities of being eradicated through state interventions.

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The final stage creates a functional, independent system of cities at the national level with a balanced, urban-sized distribution emerging with regional centers competing effectively for resources using national capital. The assumption of national integration, efficiency in the location of firms, and growth at maximum and minimum interregional imbalances are part of the main features generating the model. Apart from the author’s movement from these ideas to others in subsequent works, it was considered weak in two senses: as a descriptive view of the process and as a guide for public intervention. More arguments against this view are that it did not take into account differences in colonization within different Third World countries, natural resources, and economic activities resulting in the “new activities” of the colonies. He undermined the role of foreign influence and emphasized the possibility of internal development without external forces constraining or controlling changes. In other perspectives, the model could be characterized as apolitical, considering that regional policy is a natural interest of governments simply due to public interest, and that poverty is treated as a regional and not a social problem, assuming that it could be easy to solve by following a spatial model.

International Models These visions support trade and international relations as the main origin of core and periphery relations. Three groups of positions can be found in: the neoclassical model of Ricardo and Samuelson, the Marxist tendency, wherein we include the “imperialist position” developed by Lenin, the “world system” of Wallerstein, “unequal exchange” introduced by Arghiri Emmanuel and adapted by Samir Amin and others, and lastly, the “dependency theories” in Latin America. International models are recognized by some authors as exogenous and always connect one space with another, mainly through trade and the world market. Ricardo developed the “law of comparative advantages,” in which international exchange will lead countries to production specialization according to the relatively lower prices of the labor force, producing revenues for all countries. Neoclassical economies added to Ricardo’s proposal that natural resources and capital were important elements in order to define the comparative advantages among different countries. On the other hand, Samuelson admits that international exchange solves economic inequalities among nations; therefore, underdevelopment could be reduced through world specialization of production. The above arguments are supported by authors who argue for the comparative advantages between countries and free exchange as a means to correct inequalities between production factors and the distribution of resources among countries. Those positions are a pure and free defense of international exchange, as well as an assumption of homogeneity in production factors, level of knowledge and technology, and the natural and social conditions existing in the countries. Contrary to the above concepts, Marxist theory created an important framework to understand capitalist relations at the international scale. In the first place, theories of imperialism seek to explain the continued growth of capitalism by focusing on the way in which the European expansion and the acquisition of colonies allowed for the exportation of capital, thus avoiding crizes in the centers. There are two main positions sustaining imperialism. First, that of Hobson, who argued that in the absence of effective demand in the metropolis, the need arises to find new markets for commodities overseas. On the contrary, Lenin’s argument sustained that to eliminate the declining rate of profit in the core; the opening of the colonies was an opportunity to find more profitable investment opportunities abroad, mainly through the flow of investment to the periphery. Lenin conceived imperialism as a developed stage of capitalism and not as the relation between two territories and economies. This stage was characterized by four features: dominance of monopolies and financial capital; export of capital more than commodities; creation of world monopolies; and partition of the world between various imperialist powers. Years later, the “world system” model generated an advanced discussion of Lenin’s imperialist perspective. Wallerstein, his main supporter, argued for the necessity to understand world history within the context of the capital accumulation process on the world scale, implying a draining of capital from the periphery to the center of the world economy. This position, shared with Emmanuel, Gunder Frank, Cox, and Samir Amin, accepts that theory and history are not only related but are the same: theory is history. The model has two main characteristics: on the one hand, it sees class as a group in the world economy, and on the other, it does not analyze class exploitation but efficiency along the various scales of the world system. The name of the world system is capitalism, and more precisely, the capitalist world economy in process with a core and a periphery formed since the beginning. The core produces high-valued goods and products, the periphery those of low value. There could be an external arena waiting to be incorporated into the periphery (empires or countries without the capitalist mode of production) that are sending products to the center as well. The contradictions of the system will allow us to understand its nature, characteristic structures and process, as well as to mark tendencies, contradictions, antinomies, and paradoxes. It will not last forever, since it cannot be programmed to do so. Within this framework and with a strong criticism of the ordinary theory of underdevelopment, the unequal exchange theory of Samir Amin analyzes relations of accumulation at the world scale as well, with an emphasis on the flows and transfers of value generated by the relations between the developed center and those of the underdeveloped periphery. When precapitalist countries interact, they relate with the center through open or hidden transfers of value from the latter to the periphery. Some critics of the unequal exchange theory have argued that Marxist theory is mistaken in that exploitation takes place in the sphere of circulation and not in that of production. This criticism is shared with that of the dependency school as well. During the 1950s, strongly focused on Latin America and undoubtedly influenced by the discussions going on at that time, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) model was of great importance for the continent because it supported the welfare state, generating industrialization via the substitution of imports. This had an impact on the

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transformation of the continent during the second half of the 20th Century, going thereafter into positions that created the Latin American dependence model. According to authors such as Prebisch, Cardoso, and Falleto, dependency refers directly to those conditions of existence and functioning of economic and political systems, and to the internal and external foundations within Latin American countries. It is a model of relations sharing both national and international characteristics generating development. They argue that conditions of underdevelopment are the result of the relation between central and periphery societies. Through a transfer of resources from the latter to the center, it generates distortions in the economies of the periphery and limits the allocation of resources which create economic growth. This transfer adopts many faces and forms. The underdeveloped situation is historically defined; therefore it is not a model of organization of economic data, where it is important to differentiate processes of relations between the colonial or national peripheral situation. It was generated with commercial and industrial capitalist expansion when, despite different degrees of productivity, each country adopted diverse positions in the global capitalist system. Countries then have different positions within an international economic structure, as well as different positions of domination. Dependency theory argues against the possibility of autonomous national development of Latin American economies and had a strong influence, managing to characterize processes during the 1960s and 1970s in the continent. Despite all the critics this model had, authors such as Gunder Frank and Castells used this framework to explain underdevelopment in the first place or, second, to characterize the urbanization of Latin America as dependent. What are the links between the three forms of Marxist exogenous models? In Roxborough’s opinion, if imperialism focuses on the gains of the center, dependency focuses on the disadvantages of the periphery and unequal exchange in the forms and conditions of the movement of commodities and value. Despite the importance the above theories had in explaining differences at a world scale, arguments directed at analyzing regional unequal development at the national level were used in order to define transfers of value between developed and underdeveloped regions within nations. They were part of the geographical discussions regarding regional transformations or relations among countries as well.

Contemporary Discussions The discussion on core–periphery models converges today on five visions, with different positions. The first includes some authors assuming that, due to the centrality and concentration character of models like those of urban economics and industrial location, these become important in order to understand “the new economic geography.” Krugman explores the possibility of generating two different kinds of core–periphery disequilibrium models: those related to the endogenous situation of the national scale and those of the international scale within the neoclassical economic perspective. Concentration is at the core of Krugman’s arguments, as well as the creation of centers of population and industry. He debates on the possibility of having a center–periphery model that depends negatively on the costs of transportation, and positively on demand and scale economy. The above elements are part of an accumulative process that generates and increases regional differences. The same perspective could be used to understand the organization of metropolitan areas, as well as interactions between countries at an international scale, and between regions in an intranational manner. The way in which those factors interact as part of a system generates the core–periphery model; however, the impossibility of finding equilibrium is part of Krugman’s arguments. The second position is mainly political and relates to the way in which the world perceives integration and reorganizations under the present economic and political conditions, which are moving toward globalization. Integration has three visionsdthe European, where the search for autonomy from Washington has generated new centers in Berlin and Paris which, without any doubt, reorganize the European periphery according to the relations of each area with the United States. The way in which the European community has been gaining strength in the last few years offers arguments that fortify this view of the world situation. On the other hand and within Latin America, the same globalized context allows us to conceive of the integration of the continent’s regional development through the generation of blocs and alternative postures along with the ones from Washington, or through intranational concepts, wherein the Economic Commission for Latin America, in its modified form, is still important today. The United States’ perspective included a free market with Mexico and Canada through North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), despite the fact that mobility and free circulation of the labor force is not a part of this proposal. The center, of course, is the United States, and the other allied countries are the periphery. The reorganization of agreements among countries of the world and, specifically, those of Latin America, has generated changes in the way in which the organization of commerce and trade is taking place in the world market. These visions change the concept of only one center and many peripheries to that of multiple centers, possibly hierarchized. This is part of the contemporary view and, of course, could be applied as well to other regions, such as the Asian part of the globalized triad of the world. Third, at the intranational scale, this view of multiple centers with corresponding peripheries is important in order to understand regional imbalances and differences as well. From only one center and one periphery, competition for primacy among regions and cities is part of the contemporary tendencies in countries’ reorganization. At the same time, sustainable development requires the development of urban areas, specifically metropolitan cities, needed to open the perspective of the urban periphery for the

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conservation and preservation of the natural environment, more than development or urban growth. Another position within this scale is the perspective of the global cities, implying a concept of center developed through the concentration of services more than production. The tertiary sector is now more important than ever, especially that which is related to the financial and information sectors as activities generating concentration more than industry. Peripheries are the areas where those activities do not exist, as nowadays these areas are more spread out than usual. Fourth, there are some views which do not integrate space through center and periphery but use flows to generate relations and links in a space of discontinuity more than a homogenized territory. Fragmentation is an important part of this concept, wherein some views of the regulationist theory are important, with authors such as Vetz leading this proposal. The possibility of explaining processes at both scalesdthe international or intranationaldare included in this position, wherein centers are elements for the concentration of different kinds of flows within the national or international arena. Finally, the critic’s vision of the dualistic concept of the core–periphery vision has two aspects: one developed within the Marxist perspective against the concept of the ECLA in 1960, and the contemporary vision that came out with the discussion regarding space. The former has been made within the Brazilian context by Francisco de Oliveira; he comments that the dualist model of the ECLA in the first instance, and the dependency theory that followed, were not correct. He argues that rent concentration and accumulation in the periphery are part of the reproduction of history and capital, and therefore also reproduce the history and construction of capitalism in the central countries. Both histories are then interrelated in the production of wealth, in rent extraction, and in the differential impact of trade. In a sense, its conjunction is part of the assumptions adopted by the world system and by the unequal development perspective as well. In a different manner and with arguments influenced indirectly by Marxist theories, but including the critics of modernization, Eurocentrism, and others, nowadays Doreen Massey has set forth another opinion on the dualistic concepts of world development and transformation. Given the general reflection on the concept of space and the way in which it relates to time in a rhythmical and joint movement, changes and relations among countries, cities, and regions could be understood in a different manner. Encounters of different societies with particular stages of development and diverse histories could cause multiple and heterogeneous trajectories, directions, and velocities of change and movements. The story of the West, its modernism and capitalism, is not the only possible history for the future. Each space, in any scale it might be considered, could contend with particular space–time movements, together with different trajectories and directions, in a situation in which encounters between different stages of development could generate new possibilities of change and relations. Coexistence and multiplicity in networks of trajectories and relations are the results of different relations not working as opposites but just as different parts and stages of the same process. In this perspective, “backwardness” is not such, but is only one form of transformation with a direction and movement that is different from the “established” history. For this perspective, there is not only one center but multiple centers, as well as different and also multiple peripheries moving in coexistence as the result of a coherent and multiple movement of places within particular space–times. This perspective is dramatically changing the way in which spaces are considered. Homogeneity and equilibrium are not the images we need to achieve, as it was in the previous vision of modernism. On the contrary, simultaneous heterogeneity of different images of space–times in coexistence could achieve more democratic and politically active places where the images of people working for their own transformation could take place in simultaneous times. This is indeed a new and different way to analyze space. The dualistic perspective is nowadays, in turn, hoping to find more open and democratic ways of visualizing transformation and change for the future.

See Also: Cumulative Causation; Industrialization; Modernization Theory; Regional Inequalities; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Akhter, M., 2019. The proliferation of peripheries: militarized drones and the reconfiguration of global space. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 43 (1), 64–80. Amin, S., 1973. Le Development Inegal. Minuit, Paris. Amin, S., 1974. Accumulation on the World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. Monthly Review Press, New York. Barbero, J., Zofío, J.L., 2016. The multiregional core-periphery model: the role of the spatial topology. Netw. Spat. Econ. 16 (2), 469–496. Cardoso, F., Faletto, E., 1969. Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina, first ed. Siglo XXI, México. Freedman, M., 1980. Free to Choose. Towards a New Economic Liberalism. Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc, New York. Hirschman, A., 1971. A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin American. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Jia, J., Benson, A.R., 2019. January. Random spatial network models for core-periphery structure. In: Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining. ACM, pp. 366–374. Krugman, P., 1995. Development, Geography and Economic Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Lenin, V.I., 1969. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. International Publishers, London. Martínez-García, M.P., Morales, J.R., 2019. Resource effect in the core–periphery model. Spatial Econ. Anal. 1–22. Massey, D., 2005. For Space. Sage, London. Myrdal, G., 1957. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped. Regions Gerald DucKworth, London. Rostow, W.W., 1960. Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifes to Cambridge. University Press, Cambridge. Roxborough, I., 1979. Theories of Underdevelopment. MacMillan, London. Shannon, T.R., 2018. An Introduction to the World-System Perspective. Routledge. Wallerstein, I., 1976. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of European World Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

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Relevant websites www.cepal.org. - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-global-history/article/prebisch-and-myrdal-development-economics-in-the-core-and-on-the-periphery/D4F6ED306262962883 41922A7AC4F593 - Cambridge Core. Journal of Global History. Prebisch and Myrdal: development economics in the core and on the periphery. http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script¼sci_arttext&pid¼S0101-31572017000100065 - Scientific Electronic Library Online. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy. Raúl Prebisch and the conception and evolution of the core-periphery system. Red Del Tercer Mundo: Third World Network, www.redtercermundo.org.uy. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, www.eclac.org.

Corporate Responsibilities David Littlewood, Sheffield University Management School, The University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by A.Hughes, F.Wray, volume 2, pp 292–297, © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

Glossary Corporate Responsibilities Chapter B-Corporation businesses certified to meet high standards of social and environmental performance, public transparency, and legal accountability, balancing profits and purpose. Base of the Pyramid (BoP) The estimated 4.5 billion people globally living on less than US $8 per day. Suggested to represent a significant opportunity for business that can provide the BoP with needed goods and services. Business case instrumental rationale for corporate social responsibility. Argues that being socially responsible can be good for society and the environment, but also good for business and the financial bottom line. Business ethics the study of moral and ethical issues arising in the global business environment, and the application of ethical principles in business. Corporate citizenship notion that corporations are members of society akin to individual citizens, corporations can also play a role in administering citizenship rights for individuals Corporate irresponsibility corporate actions that violate norms and perceived standards of social responsibility, as assessed by key stakeholders, and which have negative impacts on society, the environment and/or corporations themselves. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) umbrella term for various theories, writings and practices relating to the role, responsibilities and impacts of corporations on society and the environment. Used somewhat interchangeably with corporate responsibility and corporate responsibilities, although some authors suggest CSR has a more explicit social focus. Creating shared value business strategy where policies and operating practices are adopted which simultaneously enhance the competitiveness of a company whilst also advancing social and economic conditions in the communities in which it operates. Global Compact United Nations initiative whereby companies sign up and agree to respect ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. Greenwash corporations misrepresenting their environmental and/or social credentials, and the depth of their engagement with sustainability concerns. Philanthropy charitable donations by individuals and organisations which often aim to promote societal wellbeing. Social contract notion that corporations only exist through the cooperation and consent of society. Commitment to the social contract creates moral obligations for corporations to society. Social innovation process of developing and deploying effective solutions to social and environmental challenges in support of social progress. Stakeholders individuals, groups and organisations who can affect or are affected by an organisation’s activities Sustainability corporations operating in ways that address the needs of today’s society without compromising the ecological, social, and economic survival of future generations

In November 2017 details from the so-called “Paradise Papers” began to be made public. The release by journalists of these confidential electronic documents provided a window into the tax affairs and tax avoidance practices of some of the world’s most powerful people and corporations. Just 6 months later in April 2018, Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg found himself before the US Congress being questioned in relation to the Cambridge Analytica data sharing scandal. Facebook and wider social media companies continue to face serious scrutiny for their role in influencing and potentially undermining political processes globally, as well as in the dissemination of inappropriate content online. Finally, and most recently, in April 2019, the former chief executive of the Volkswagen group (VW) was charged with fraud in Germany relating to the so-called “Dieselgate” emissions scandal. He joined several other former VW executives already charged, and has similarly been indicted by the US Department of Justice. In the wake of these and other recent corporate scandals, corporate responsibilities and the wider role of business in society is high on political and societal agendas. Despite this significance, however, agreement on the meaning of corporate responsibilities and particularly around what responsibilities corporations and wider businesses have in society remains elusive. Practices of corporate responsibility also vary significantly between firms, industries, and geographically, and are still evolving. This article aims to provide insight on the current state of knowledge about this important, topical, and complex subject. The article is structured as follows. Corporate responsibilities are first defined, with related notions of corporate responsibility, corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate citizenship, corporate sustainability, etc., also introduced. An overview of debates and theories regarding the responsibilities of corporations in society is then provided. Practices of corporate responsibility and

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corporate irresponsibility are then considered across multiple domains, including in community development, in employment, and for the environment. The geographies of corporate responsibility are then discussed, including how practices and meanings vary across space. Finally, the future of research and practice in the field of corporate responsibilities is explored.

Defining Corporate Responsibilities Defining corporate responsibilities is not straightforward. In part because there remains little agreement on what responsibilities corporations have in society and for the natural environmentdsee later discussions. But also because of the variety of related and even overlapping terms and ideas deployed in debates and extant literature, for instance, corporate responsibility, corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, philanthropy, corporate sustainability, etc. A plethora of definitions of corporate responsivities also exist in academia, policy, and practice. These provide inspiration for its definition in this article, but also bring additional complexity. Corporate responsibilities is therefore defined quite broadly in this article as an umbrella concept for various theories, practices, and writings concerned with the role, responsibilities, and impacts of corporations on society and the natural world. The concept of corporate responsibilities overlaps significantly with that of corporate responsibility. Corporate responsibility is widely discussed in business and management scholarship, and is similarly concerned with a questioning of the role and responsibilities of business, and especially corporations, in society. However, the term corporate responsibility can also be deployed in a more practical sense to describe actions taken by business, including but in particular going beyond legal compliance, that reflect business responsibility for some wider societal good. This practice of corporate responsibility is thus something that is largely voluntary, with its precise direction and form at the discretion of business. Corporate responsibility is distinct, at least in the view of some scholars and practitioners, from the related notion of CSR. Corporate responsibility is suggested to have a broader scope than CSR and to encompass day-to-day operating practices, strategies, and all decision-making by businesses. In such conceptualizations CSR is particularly associated with philanthropy and charitable giving, and is a “bolt-on” for business, whereas corporate responsibility is something more strategic and “built-in.” It should be emphasized that not all scholars identify the distinction in this way, indeed corporate responsibility and CSR are sometimes viewed synonymously, and with their respective deployment a question of personal preference. They may even be used simultaneously in the same work. Related terms like corporate citizenship, corporate sustainability, community investment, among others, may also be encountered in work in this area. It has been suggested that notions of corporate citizenship imbue corporations with a role in administering citizenship rights for individuals, particularly in contexts of state retreat or failure, and advancing neoliberal globalization. Other times, however, corporate citizenship is largely used in a way roughly equivalent to corporate responsibility or CSR. Corporate sustainability or just “sustainability” is increasingly being used in place of corporate responsibility. This may reflect its clearer link to environmental concerns, its more positive and less confrontational connotations, and/or its popularity among policymakers (e.g., the Sustainable Development Goals), companies (e.g., the World Business Council for Sustainable Development), and consumers (notions of sustainable consumption). Finally, community investment is particularly associated with philanthropy and charitable giving but may even include business infrastructure investments that can also benefit communities. In certain country contexts, and among particular industries, it is the term of preference as it makes no allusion to any potential moral or ethical responsibilities. Having now defined corporate responsibilities, and explored its relationships with related concepts and terms, we turn next to debate regarding the responsibilities of corporations in society.

What Are the Responsibilities of Corporations in Society? Writing in the 1960s, the economist Milton Friedman famously argued that “the only social responsibility a law-abiding business has is to maximise its profits for its shareholders.” He suggested that the role of corporate officials is to make as much money as possible for their shareholders, and that any notion of corporations having wider societal responsibilities was a “fundamentally subversive doctrine.” Key arguments advanced by Friedman, and other critics of corporate responsibility, include first, that corporate responsibility involves spending someone else’s money. It is suggested that such actions are a tax on shareholders and customers, and may limit the ability of the former to use profits to achieve their own philanthropic objectives. Second, the dangers of “do-gooder” executives are highlighted, who it is argued may take their eye off the goal of profit-making and the achievement of competitive advantage and prioritize their own personal reputations and legacy instead, to the detriment of the company and its shareholders. A third key strand of criticism relates to a suggested lack of managerial competency in social arenas. Indeed, substantial work now exists highlighting dysfunctional engagements in the social arena by businesses. Fourth, it is suggested that firms engaging in social responsibility practices, acting as “corporate citizens,” are usurping the role of the state without the requisite accountability to citizens. Final avenues of critique include that where corporations do engage in social responsibility activity it often amounts to little more than “greenwash” (where companies misrepresent their environmental and social credentials). Meanwhile, the negative repercussions for reputation and relationships of botched social activities, or corporations being found hypocritical in the social arena, can also be severe. In counterpoint to the above critical perspectives, the modern movement for corporate responsibility emerged in the 1950s, with the publishing of Howard Browen’s book Social Responsibilities of the Businessman a notable highlight. However, concern with the role

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of business in society can be seen much further back, including Cicero’s arguments on “controlled greed” in the 1st Century BCE, as well writing by non-Western counterparts like India’s Kautilya in CE 4th Century. Medieval Christianity and Islam also publicly condemned certain business practices, e.g., usury, while in his 18th-Century work The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identified the need for participants in the marketplace to act “honestly” and “justly.” Precursors of the modern social responsibility movement can also be seen in 19th-Century boycotts of foodstuffs produced with slave labor, as well as the philanthropy of entrepreneurs like Cadbury (Bournville) and Rowntree (Rowntree Foundation) in the United Kingdom, and Carnegie (Carnegie Trust) and Rockefeller (Rockefeller Foundation) in the United States. The case for corporate responsibilities, and that business should be mindful of its role and impacts on society and the natural environment, has been made by many scholars, across multiple disciplines, drawing upon diverse theories and philosophies. For example, it has been widely argued that an implicit “social contract” exists between business and society, and that corporations are allowed to exist only through society’s consent and cooperation. The existence of such a social contract is suggested to create moral obligations for business, albeit the precise terms of any such social contract remains debated. In another example, the primacy Milton Friedman gives to shareholder interests is often contrasted with relational, so-called stakeholder approaches to capitalism. The term stakeholder, and wider stakeholder theory, was popularized by Edward Freeman in the 1980s, who defined a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objective.” Shareholders are an important stakeholder group for business, but so are employees, customers, communities, suppliers, government, and even the environment. An organization’s stakeholders vary depending on its mission and activities. In normative stakeholder theory it is argued that managers have a fiduciary relationship with the corporation’s wider stakeholders, not just its shareholders. It is suggested that stakeholder groups other than shareholders may have a legitimate interest in the corporation, and that the interests of all stakeholders are of intrinsic value and need to be taken into consideration in business decisionmaking. Supporters of normative stakeholder theory have built arguments to justify this position drawing upon diverse perspectives including Kantian capitalism, theories of property and distributive justice, feminist ethics, fairness principles, Aristotelian approa