International Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century 1472567978, 9781472567970

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Illustrations
Series Editor’s Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
1. Ideas of International Order, Empire, and Anticolonialism
2. The Production of International Knowledge
3. International Law
4. International Humanitarian Activism
5. International Social Movements and Nongovernmental Activism
6. Synergies: International Functional and Technical Cooperation
7. Private International Cooperation and Governance by Experts
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

International Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century

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New Approaches to International History Series Editor: Thomas Zeiler, Professor of American Diplomatic History, University of Colorado Boulder, USA Series Editorial Board: Anthony Adamthwaite, University of California at Berkeley (USA) Kathleen Burk, University College London (UK) Louis Clerc, University of Turku (Finland) Petra Goedde, Temple University (USA) Francine McKenzie, University of Western Ontario (Canada) Lien-Hang Nguyen, University of Kentucky (USA) Jason Parker, Texas A&M University (USA) Glenda Sluga, University of Sydney (Australia) New Approaches to International History covers international history during the modern period and across the globe. The series incorporates new developments in the field, such as the cultural turn and transnationalism, as well as the classical high politics of state-centric policymaking and diplomatic relations. Written with upper level undergraduate and postgraduate students in mind, texts in the series provide an accessible overview of international diplomatic and transnational issues, events and actors. Published: DECOLONIZATION AND THE COLD WAR edited by Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake COLD WAR SUMMITS by Chris Tudda THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY by Amy Sayward LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALISM by James F. Siekmeier THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES CULTURAL DIPLOMACY by Michael L. Krenn INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY by Daniel Gorman

Forthcoming: THE INTERNATIONAL LGBT RIGHTS MOVEMENT by Laura Belmonte RECONSTRUCTING THE POSTWAR WORLD by Francine McKenzie INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT by Corinna Unger WOMEN AND GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY by Karen Garner THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL HISTORY by Scott Kaufman THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD by Stephen G. Rabe THE HISTORY OF OIL DIPLOMACY by Christopher R. W. Dietrich THE NINETEENTH CENTURY WORLD by Maartje Abbenhuis GLOBAL WAR, GLOBAL CATASTROPHE by Maartje Abbenhuis and Ismee Tames

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International Cooperation in the Early Twentieth Century Daniel Gorman

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2017 Paperback edition first published 2019 © Daniel Gorman, 2017 Daniel Gorman has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. xiii constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover image © Chronicle / Alamy Stock Photo All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4725-6795-6 PB: 978-1-4725-6794-9 ePDF: 978-1-4725-6797-0 ePub: 978-1-4725-6796-3 Typeset by Newgen Knowledge Works Pvt Ltd., Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

For Sadie, Ryan, Evan, and Sam

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Contents List of Illustrations

x

Series Editor’s Preface

xi

Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction

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1

Ideas of International Order, Empire, and Anticolonialism

15

2

The Production of International Knowledge

39

3

International Law

67

4

International Humanitarian Activism

97

5

International Social Movements and Nongovernmental Activism

127

6

Synergies: International Functional and Technical Cooperation

157

7

Private International Cooperation and Governance by Experts

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Conclusion

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Notes

211

Bibliography

270

Index

319

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Illustrations 1 Portrait of Marcus Garvey, 1924 2 China: Military of the Eight-Nation Alliance during the Boxer Rebellion represented in a Japanese print, 1900 3 The First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899 4 Armenian orphans (because of the genocide) evacuating from Turkey, 1922 5 The Japanese Red Cross in northern China during the First World War, 1915 6 Festivities marking the opening of the Second Congress of the Comintern and demonstration on Uritsky (Palace) Square in Petrograd on July 19, 1920 7 Noordam delegates holding a Peace Banner, 1915 8 “Voyage around the World,” poster for the “Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,” late nineteenth century 9 Ice hockey game during the 1928 Winter Olympic Games, St. Moritz, Switzerland 10 Anti-Typhus Train to Siberia, American Red Cross, 1920

31 71 77 107 113

129 137 162 179 203

Series Editor’s Preface New Approaches to International History takes the entire world as its stage for exploring the history of diplomacy, broadly conceived theoretically and thematically, and writ large across the span of the globe, during the modern period. This series goes beyond the single goal of explaining encounters in the world. Our aspiration is that these books provide both an introduction for researchers new to a topic, and supplemental and essential reading in classrooms. Thus, New Approaches serves a dual purpose that is unique from other large-scale treatments of international history; it applies to scholarly agendas and pedagogy. In addition, it does so against the backdrop of a century of enormous change, conflict, and progress that informed global history but also continues to reflect on our own times. The series offers the old and new diplomatic history to address a range of topics that shaped the twentieth century. Engaging in international history (including but not especially focusing on global or world history), these books will appeal to a range of scholars and teachers situated in the humanities and social sciences, including those in history, international relations, cultural studies, politics, and economics. We have in mind scholars, both novice and veteran, who require an entrée into a topic, trend, or technique that can benefit their own research or education in a new field of study by crossing boundaries in a variety of ways. By its broad and inclusive coverage, New Approaches to International History is also unique because it makes accessible to students current research, methodology, and themes. Incorporating cutting-edge scholarship that reflects trends in international history, as well as addressing the classical high politics of statecentric policymaking and diplomatic relations, these books are designed to bring alive the myriad of approaches for digestion by advanced undergraduate and graduate students. In preparation for the New Approaches series, Bloomsbury surveyed courses and faculty around the world to gauge interest and reveal core themes of relevance for their classroom use. The polling yielded a host of topics, from war and peace to the environment; from empire to economic integration; and from migration to nuclear arms. The effort proved that there is a muchneeded place for studies that connect scholars and students alike to international

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Series Editor’s Preface

history, and books that are especially relevant to the teaching missions of faculty around the world. We hope readers find this series to be appealing, challenging, and thoughtprovoking. Whether the history is viewed through older or newer lenses, New Approaches to International History allows students to peer into the modern period’s complex relations among nations, people, and events to draw their own conclusions about the tumultuous, interconnected past. Thomas Zeiler University of Colorado Boulder, USA

Acknowledgments I have enjoyed writing this book, in no small part due to the help of many friends, colleagues, and students. I am thankful to Tom Zeiler for the invitation to contribute to this series, and to his support as the book came to fruition. I am very grateful to Claire Lipscomb, Emma Goode, and everyone at Bloomsbury for their help as well. Preston Arens helped with the photographs with his customary professionalism and insight. Erin Brown, Matthew Stubbings, and Jingjing Zhang provided valuable research assistance. Ruth Taylor prepared the index. Geoff Hayes and Gary Bruce listened to me talk about aspects of this book for several years. I much appreciate their feedback, forbearance, and friendship. Ryan Touhey, Ian Milligan, and John Sbardellati provide amiable camaraderie. My friend Jim Greenlee is an inspiration on the ball field and in the archives. Semper Fly! Patrick Harrigan and Heather MacDougall read sections of the manuscript and made helpful suggestions. I am indebted to too many colleagues to name for instructive discussions at conferences, workshops, and elsewhere, as well as to the hundreds of historians whose work I have read with great interest and profit for this book. I also shared arguments in the book with many students over the past few years, and have learned much from their ideas and input. Jane Forgay and the librarians at Dana Porter have been invaluable. Support for this book came from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada, the University of Waterloo, and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Most importantly, Evan, Sam, Ryan, and Sadie all helped by being themselves. Turtle Design Creator, The Book of Dark, Ocean Art Murals and Lego projects, and Art Classes all inspired me to finish my own more modest creation. Finally, and always, is Jo.

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Abbreviations ACFTU AFL AITUC AMTC ARA BIIA BIPM

All-China Federation of Trade Unions American Federation of Labor All-India Trade Union Congress Allied Maritime Transport Council American Relief Administration British Institute of International Affairs Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and Measures) BIS Bank for International Settlements CACJ Central American Court of Justice CAJ Court of Arbitral Justice CCP Chinese Communist Party CEIP Carnegie Endowment for International Peace CFR Council on Foreign Relations CGPM General Conference on Weights and Measures CRB Commission for Relief in Belgium CTC Committee on Technical Cooperation (League of Nations) CTT Commission for Communication and Transit (League of Nations) DHfP Deutsche Hochschule für Politik FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FAU Friends Ambulance Unit IACWPF Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance IAP Institut für Auswärtige Politik ICAN International Commission for Air Navigation ICAW International Congress on Accidents at Work ICHS International Committee of Historical Sciences ICI Institut Colonial International ICIC International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation ICPC International Criminal Police Commission ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions ICW International Council of Women

Abbreviations

IFLNS IFTU IHC IIA IIIC ILO IMU INGO IO IOC IPU IRC IRU ISA ISNTUC ITU IULA IWSA IWW LAI LCIWO LIHG LMU LNHO LNU LRCS LSI NER PCA PCIJ PEN PPWA PSA RIIA SCF SCI SCIU TUC

International Federation of League of Nations Societies International Federation of Trade Unions International Historical Congress International Institute of Agriculture International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation International Labour Organization International Mathematical Union International nongovernmental organization International organization International Olympic Committee Inter-Parliamentary Union International Research Council International Radiotelegraph Union International Federation of National Standards Association International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres International Telegraph Union International Union of Local Authorities International Woman Suffrage Alliance Industrial Workers of the World League against Imperialism Liaison Committee of International Women’s Organizations Ligue internationale de hockey sur glace Latin Monetary Union League of Nations Health Office League of Nations Union League of Red Cross Societies Liberal and Socialist International Near East Relief Permanent Court of Arbitration Permanent Court of International Justice (Poets, Essayists, Novelists) International Pan-Pacific Women’s Association Pacific Science Association Royal Institute of International Affairs Save the Children Fund Service Civil International Save the Children International Union Trades Union Congress

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UNIA UPU URC USDA VAD WCC WILPF WPC WSL YMCA YWCA

Abbreviations

Universal Negro Improvement Association Universal Postal Union Universal Races Congress United States Department of Agriculture Voluntary Aid Detachment World Council of Churches Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom World Power Conference Women’s Suffrage League Young Men’s Christian Association Young Women’s Christian Association

Introduction

James Joyce published his first novel, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, in 1916 during the height of the First World War. The war exemplified the twin forces that defined the international system in the early twentieth century— national identity and international interconnectivity. Joyce understood this dynamic. His protagonist, Stephen Dedalus, speaks of his desire to break free from the restrictions of collective identity: “You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets.”1 Many people in this period of cataclysmic global war shared Dedalus’s wish to transcend the boundaries of place and culture by pursuing connections beyond their state-centric identities. International cooperation in the early twentieth century entailed ongoing, organized, and collaborative interactions between groups of people in different countries, rather than merely any cross-border connections. States regularized their own interactions within the framework of diplomatic treaties, international organizations, or norms and standards of behavior. These formal instances of international cooperation provided the institutional structures within which states pursued, and sometimes impeded, greater international cooperation. International relations thus transformed from a pattern of interlocking bilateral relationships to one of organized multilateralism. This shift was accompanied, aided, and abetted by an exponential growth in the number, density, scale, and scope of international cooperative initiatives among private actors. These transnational interactions between groups of individuals with common interests, goals, aspirations, problems, friends, or enemies were often more intensive developments than the significant but tentative steps taken by states in the early twentieth century to create mechanisms of international governance. Private networks of international cooperation developed more rapidly than formal interstate cooperation because private actors faced fewer barriers, and had greater incentives, to cooperate with peers in other states. Formal international

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cooperation required states to negotiate multilateral treaties and conventions, harmonize international law, balance their national interest with real or potential collective interests, or create and maintain international institutions with few relevant antecedents. Private actors, meanwhile, could create their own rules of international engagement. They had the further advantage of being able to identify and establish relationships with like-minded individuals or organizations in other countries. As smaller and more nimble entities, private international cooperative initiatives were better placed than state governments to take advantage of the technological revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Just as the internet and social media have disrupted the conduct of international relations in the early twenty-first century, as demonstrated by the actions of Edward Snowden and Wikileaks, so did the rapid advancements in communication and transportation a century ago. The latter provided the imaginative and political space, and the material means, for private actors to mobilize across borders; compile, collate, and disseminate information; lobby subnational, national, and supranational political authorities; and shape what scholars term “international civil society.”2 In so doing, they helped create “the global” as a plane of political activity. The social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international and transnational voluntary movements, and international civil society networks whose collective international cooperation contributed to earlytwentieth-century globalization are the subjects of this book. The convergence of industrialization, state-building, and European imperial expansion in the late nineteenth century constituted what scholars have referred to as a “global transformation.”3 This transformation entailed both intensified global integration and global fragmentation. Communication, transportation, and political integration brought people around the world into ever-greater direct and indirect contact with each other, at the same time as global material inequality increased.4 While contemporaries, especially in Europe and North America, often viewed the world in hierarchical terms, these processes of globalization—of human integration across state borders, cultural divides, and linguistic boundaries, which generated a condition of globality—were equally significant.5 International cooperation developed earliest, and most intensively, in Europe and North America, but connections between Western and nonWestern societies, as well as between and within Asia, Africa, and Latin America, also grew precipitously during these decades. The old dichotomy of “the West and the Rest” does not reflect the nature of international cooperation from the late nineteenth century until the Second World War, nor is global “South-South” interaction a novel development of the early twenty-first century.6

Introduction

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Nation-states remain central to the history of the early twentieth century. They fought wars with each other; national governments created and enforced laws; and national symbols, rituals, and practices were central components of people’s lives. Yet even at the height of nationalist competition, international connections were widespread and expanding. Some of these connections entailed international cooperation between state actors, or private actors acting through national networks or associations. Internationalism was motivated by the desire for peace, ideas of world citizenship and world government, and the collective governance of shared problems. International organizations emerged in the late nineteenth century, where groups of nations recognized common interests, while international events, such as the French educator Pierre de Coubertin’s modern Olympic Games (first held in Athens in 1896), sought to encourage better worldwide relations through interpersonal interactions. Other connections were transnational, meaning interactions between individuals acting as private actors, beyond, through, or in the abeyance of the state. These interactions constituted mobile relationships, associated with the “links and flows” of people, ideas, commodities, capital, and biota across borders.7 Transnational cooperation was most prominent where actors sublimated their national identities to shared goals or pursuits. Decentering the state as the locus of historical inquiry creates not only new avenues of historical analysis, but also challenges. The first challenge is spatial. Nationalism, among other things, is a means of thinking spatially. The predominant mental map of the world in the modern era is one of nations—the archetypal map on the schoolroom wall. Yet, as Google Earth reveals, this is but one way to view the world. What are the spatial imaginaries of international, transnational, and global history? They can be geographical (natural or human). They can be cultural (language, religion). They can reflect human or environmental developments (urbanization, desertification), or flows of exchange (trade, finance, labor). As these examples suggest, one risk of writing international, transnational, or global history is that these concepts can become historical solvents, dissolving anything and everything they touch. The second challenge is representation. National history reflects the discipline’s nineteenth-century beginnings as a means of telling the “national origin stories” of European societies, and the interactions of European states.8 Global history can fall into a similar Eurocentric trap. While William McNeil’s classic The Rise of the West (1963) is a more expansive work than its title suggests, it nonetheless represents the deeply embedded binary notion of the “West and the Rest.” This theme is evident in recent studies that posit that European powers achieved global hegemony in

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the nineteenth century due to their superior ability to project military power over great distances.9 In contrast to a Eurocentric telling of the history of international cooperation, historians today have embraced the idea of global convergence. They argue that the period between the seventeenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century was characterized by a growing symbiosis between the global state system and ideas and patterns of global interaction. Historians have also studied the growing integration of the global economy. They have demonstrated that even as European economies began to outpace those of the major Asian empires by the nineteenth century, as measured by productivity and standard of living, the emergence of a truly global market connected national and imperial economies ever more tightly. While some historians posit the existence of a single world system, and others locate greater economic autonomy within regions, studies of early modern globalization place Europe’s position of global power by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as historically contingent.10 It was nonetheless in the nineteenth century when global integration deepened, providing more opportunities for international cooperation, and the possibilities for international cooperation on a much larger and wider scale than in the past. Nineteenth-century globalization was facilitated by the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of European overseas empires, and an emerging global market economy. As more people around the globe were brought into contact with each other, either directly or indirectly, ever greater possibilities of international cooperation presented themselves. Rather than a story of the imposition of Europe on the rest of the world, however, patterns of international cooperation developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through continuous cycles of negotiation by historical actors between, and within, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Just as global empires expanded and contracted in this period through patterns of mutual constitution and discourse, where power was located most in Europe but contested and reshaped by people in the colonial world, so too was international cooperation defined and determined, if unevenly, by people from around the world. The third challenge is how to compare different forms of international, transnational, and global interactions. Rather than attempt to reconstruct the Tower of Babel, or fall back on the conventional nation-state–based structure of international relations history, I  have conceptualized the international history of the early twentieth century through the lens of individuals’ interaction and cooperation. Private and nonstate transnational interactions did not always follow the tectonic shifts of the international system. While interstate war had a profound impact on millions

Introduction

5

of people in the early twentieth century, networks of interpersonal connections were not always second-order responses to these global events. While many transnational peace initiatives emerged after the First World War, they drew on a tradition of peace activism that predated the war, and continued long into the 1930s when state-centric histories of that period stressed the centrality of realist nationalist conflict. This book argues that regimes, patterns, and projects of international cooperation developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as responses to globalization. New forms of communications and transportation technology, the spread of print culture, and waves of global migration created a “multiplicity of imperial and transnational pathways.”11 Whether such pathways could be governed, and if so how and by whom, were pressing questions taken up by internationalists of many different types.

Internationalisms Many different types of internationalists were active in the early twentieth century. The historian Warren Kuehl identified cosmopolitans who advocated forms of a global community above national identities, legal or political internationalists who sought greater international cooperation between nation-states, international socialists, and peace activists (most of whom evinced a form of liberal internationalism).12 In addition to these groups, all of whom are present in the following chapters, we can identify imperial and anti-imperial internationalists. Imperial internationalists pursued transnational relationships through the interconnected networks of empires. These relationships reflected the unequal racial, economic, and cultural hierarchies at the core of imperialism. European imperialism incorporated societies in Africa, Asia, and the Americas into a global capitalist economy, and forced individuals in those societies to confront, assimilate, or contest European values. While European claims to universality predominated, there were also influential non-European imperialisms, notably those emanating from the declining Ottoman Empire and emerging Japanese imperial order in Asia. The internationalization of imperialism in the early twentieth century generated anticolonial internationalism, a loose but significant form of international cooperation that united colonial nationalists who sought liberation from colonial rule or greater autonomy within imperial societies. The most significant form of international collaboration in the early twentieth century was intergovernmental internationalism. International organizations

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were important sites of international cooperation, and attracted activists from a broad assortment of international campaigns and constituencies. The League of Nations was the most prominent example of the institutionalization of international relations in the early twentieth century, a process by which states agreed (with important limitations) to institutionalize some aspects of their international relations. The League’s centrality in many areas of international cooperation covered in subsequent chapters attests to this point. Yet international organizations such as the League were comprised of member states ultimately motivated by their national interests. States’ unwillingness to cede significant elements of their sovereignty to international organizations limited the latter’s autonomy and legitimacy, and encouraged many internationalists to pursue their interests through other means. The early twentieth century was thus distinct not only because of the emergence of international organizations, which after all were an institutionalization of formal multilateral relations, but also because of the increasingly important role of private individuals and nongovernmental campaigns and organizations as international governance actors. International cooperation among private actors was largely issue driven. This functional internationalism focused on the opportunities and challenges created by globalization, and drew a wide array of professionals, experts, activists, and others who favored international governance based on technical cooperation. The international campaigns and movements created by these private actors contributed to the rapid expansion of transnational civil society, and helped to establish informal and networked interactions as an important means of conducting international politics. Private and nongovernmental international cooperation was facilitated by the growth of a global consciousness and intercultural connections. This development can be seen in examples such as international social movements, the emergence of international humanitarianism, and religious internationalism. Religious internationalism intensified in the early twentieth century. The Islamic concept of the ummah (the global community of Muslims), the international ecumenicalism of many Protestants, the “catholicity” of Roman Catholicism, and international Judaic bonds (formalized with the creation of the World Jewish Congress in 1936) all spoke to the power of international spiritual connections in this period. Religious communities created their own forms of practical international cooperation, including the transnational activism of Christian missionaries and international ecumenical associations such as the Life and Work movement (created in 1925).

Introduction

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While international cooperation was most attractive to liberal and socialist internationalists, there were conservative and fascist variants, if of limited scope. The Italian fascist Giuseppe de Michelis envisioned an international economic governance institution that would manage the global economy on corporatist principles, subordinating national interests to collective goals of efficiency and production.13 In 1934, the Comitati d’Azione per l’Universalita di Roma convened the Fascist International Congress in Montreux, Switzerland. Its goal was to create a “fascist international.” Delegates came from thirteen European countries (though not Germany, whose diplomatic relations with Italy were strained that year due to the Nazis’ assassination of Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss), testifying to fascism’s international resonance. However, disagreements over the centrality of race, anti-Semitism, and the organization of the state illustrated how the national basis of most fascist movements mitigated against broader international cooperation.14 While notions of “illiberal” internationalism inspired thousands of Europeans to fight with Franco’s forces in the Spanish Civil War, to propose a “united fascist Europe” through the synthesis of national policies (as did British Union of Fascists leader Oswald Mosley), and ultimately to encourage collaboration with Nazi Germany during the Second World War, ideas of fascist international cooperation were thin and largely unsuccessful during the interwar years.15

International Cooperation International cooperation intensified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for four interconnected reasons. The first was the emergence of a single international system. Long-distance international relations existed before the nineteenth century, but it was only then that regional systems of interaction fused into a single planetary network. This process of convergence was fueled by European imperial expansion. The latter exported ideas of the balance of power, territorial sovereignty, and regularized diplomatic relations via multilateral conferences that underpinned the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe that followed the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Congress system was a territorial settlement, with no consideration given to questions of popular sovereignty. The balance of power system was more a philosophy of international relations than a rigid structure, and was supplemented by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s alliance system by the late nineteenth century. Yet its foundations of great power hegemony and the

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common adherence to the “rule of law” continued to dominate the conduct of international relations into the early twentieth century, conditioning the forms of international cooperation pursued by actors in this era. These principles were expanded to Asia through European imperialism and concepts of international law. Imperialism was thus a medium of internationalism. Asian empires were absorbed into the Western-shaped international order, by force or by imitation. Japan’s embrace of internationalism is evident in the Charter Oath (1868) proclaimed by the Meiji regime, which declared that “knowledge shall be sought throughout the world.”16 Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904– 5) validated this principle, and broadcast to the world Japan’s emergence as a great power. Asia’s other great power, China, was less successful in embracing internationalism. Weakened by decades of foreign interventions, and only halfheartedly willing to engage in domestic reform, the Qing Empire collapsed in 1911. While China remained divided until 1949, the various groups that contested power in China’s republican period each wished to reestablish Chinese autonomy by excising foreign oppression and joining the international system as a modern nation-state. These goals are evident in the Nationalist leader Sun Yatsen’s Three Revolutionary Principles of nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood, as well as Mao Zedong’s embrace of communism.17 Both Japan and China sought to join the international system of the early twentieth century as equals. The Western powers’ refusal to recognize these claims reveals the centrality of racial hierarchies in the period’s international relations, and also generated forms of Asian (and latterly “Third World”) anti-imperial cooperation. A geopolitical tipping point was reached by the early twentieth century, when events in one part of the world now had almost instantaneous consequences elsewhere, as revealed by the outbreak of the First World War. The war occupies a central position in the history of international cooperation. It was caused in part by prewar patterns of international integration; protagonists developed new forms of international cooperation during the war itself; the postwar peace settlement established a new international framework for formal and informal international cooperation; and a wide array of transnational movements, NGOs, and international voluntary campaigns formed or expanded after the war with the aim of fostering greater international cooperation as a means of preventing future global conflict. The global diffusion of the European nation-state model was not a onesided expression of European power, but a rapid and unsettling global process that shook the ostensible international equilibrium that the Congress system sought to maintain. Asian empires, particularly China, existed within their own

Introduction

9

international systems, and exerted influence on international relations despite their temporary comparative weakness relative to Western powers. The emergence of a single international system by the early twentieth century thus demanded more formalized patterns of multilateral interaction. This included multiple forms of private and informal international cooperation, in addition to more regularized diplomatic relations. Transnational interconnectivity diminished the “alterity” of the non-West. While early-twentieth-century internationalism was Eurocentric, transnational connections began to include greater numbers of actors, and impressed their impact on more places around the globe. The “internationalization of internationalism” can be seen, among many examples, in the discipline of geography. The fin de siècle polar expeditions of Robert Falcon Scott, Ernest Shackleton, Roald Amundsen, and Fridtjof Nansen were the final stages in a global process of exploration that united international geographic knowledge. Much as the Earthrise photograph taken by William Anders on the Apollo 8 mission in 1968 helped to frame late-twentieth-century ideas of globality, early-twentiethcentury exploration generated a broader understanding of the shared and simultaneous human experience. In place of exotic adventures set in Africa, Asia or the Pacific, early-twentiethcentury novelists looking for uncharted geographical settings had to turn to their imaginations. Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World (1912) is set in a fictional alpine valley in South America, while H. G. Wells’s The First Men in the Moon (1901) and Edgar Rice Burroughs’s John Carter of Mars (which first appeared in the pulp magazine The All-Story in 1912) took place in space. The British geographer Halford Mackinder articulated the political ramifications of “the end of exploration” in 1904 when he argued that foreign relations would now be determined by conflicts over space—geopolitics.18 Alongside this territorial view of political space, there existed diasporic perspectives of global mobility. Affinitive and identity-based bonds were as powerful for many people as were the sinews of the nation-state. These two worldviews—fixed and fluid—often dovetailed, as in the manner by which the spread of steamship technology enabled greater numbers of Asian Muslims to undertake the Hajj.19 Internationalism was both a response to and an effect of this sense of globality. The second factor that fostered increased international cooperation in the early twentieth century was the resonance of ideas of universal and international order. These too were not new. Johan Gottfried Herder and Adam Smith perceived the rising consciousness of cosmopolitan interconnectivity brought about by industrial and economic growth, while Voltaire and

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Thomas Jefferson understood the significance of impartiality in mediating the impersonal, abstract relationships that comprised international intercourse. Enlightenment ideals of universality were channeled through the parallel emergence of nationalism into the state as their vehicle for international expansion, and as markers of individuals’ identity. The nineteenth-century revolutions in transportation and communication internationalized these intellectual developments. In the French writer François-René de Chateaubriand’s oft-cited words, “it will not only be commodities which travel, but ideas which will have wings.”20 The global diffusion of ideas encouraged many actors to perceive the potential benefits of universalization and standardization. The late nineteenth century thus witnessed a global “great acceleration,” where both global uniformity and local differentiation increased rapidly.21 Chapter  1 addresses visions of international order, as well as the alternative and resistance movements they produced. Intertwined with ideas of universality were patterns of international convergence, the third factor that enabled greater international cooperation. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an age of globalization. Advances in shipping, telecommunications, and latterly automotive capabilities, to name just the most prominent advances before the First World War, provided the means by which international cooperation expanded. The technological revolution had consequences for many international activities, including the conduct of warfare. The integration of expanded railway networks and the communication possibilities of the telegraph allowed militaries to organize systemically on an unprecedented scale. Efficiency and logistics became the watchwords of generals and officers, while new weaponry, such as artillery and the machine gun, led to exponential increases in concentrated firepower.22 Technological innovation, along with mass industrialization and the reification of the nation-state as the predominant international political structure, created a “spatial convergence” that brought the lives of people around the world into closer connection. This convergence is evident in the context of colonialism. European imperialism developed slowly, and in a piecemeal fashion, from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century. This staggered imperial growth pattern accounts for the varying impact of colonialism in different parts of the world. The British established themselves in the Indian subcontinent from 1600, under the private chartered East India Company, while the Dutch secured influence in the East Indies through the Dutch East Indies Company. Western colonial powers extended their presence into the West Indies from the eighteenth century, when they established commodity colonies (primarily sugar), such

Introduction

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as French Guadeloupe, based on economies of slave labor. European colonial expansion spread throughout Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, and finally reached Africa by the 1880s and 1890s. By the fin de siècle, European maritime empires had themselves become global, and the cross-cutting spatial networks they had established provided pathways for both international and anti-imperial cooperation. Finally, common linkages, goals, and problems emerged in the decades before the First World War that encouraged the creation or intensification of international and transnational cooperation. International economic integration fostered an awareness of mutual interests, and facilitated both economic and labor cooperation. Technological innovations required common standards and technical processes, a prompt for much international cooperation regarding standardization and universalization in many technical areas. As international interconnectivity increased, many contemporaries feared a concomitant risk of international conflict given the destructive potential of modern weaponry. In response, many joined the international peace movement or advocated for international legal regulations for war. Internationalists pursued means of international cooperation that either diminished state sovereignty, or encouraged states to cooperate for their mutual benefit. This included the creation of international relations institutions, international educational initiatives, and international intellectual cooperation, the subject of Chapter 2. A prominent form of international cooperation in the early twentieth century was legal internationalism. Its touchstones were the idea of international arbitration and the Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) on international peace. It also involved the interaction between different international legal codes and practices of international relations, efforts to regulate the conduct of states through the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), international legal codification, and tentative steps in the development of international criminal law. Chapter 3 examines these issues. While international law was central to international cooperative efforts, many issues were not amenable to legal solutions. Others, such as international humanitarian crises, overwhelmed the ability of single states to provide relief. The result was the emergence of international humanitarian cooperation, including refugee aid, humanitarian relief campaigns, and mass population exchanges. These various aid efforts featured collaboration between NGOs such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, state governments, and international organizations such as the League of Nations. Other forms of international humanitarianism were more conservative, including European imperial powers’ collective

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aid and social reform programs. International humanitarian aid is addressed in Chapter 4. Closely related to international humanitarians were the progressive international social movements and NGOs that emerged in the early twentieth century. The most prominent members of this large and diverse international constituency were international socialists, women’s activists, and peace campaigners. Chapter 5 details the international cooperative work of these movements, with a focus on their shared commitment to international equality and justice. Chapter 6 shifts attention to the panoply of international functional projects in the early twentieth century. Functional cooperation dated to the nineteenth century, when the technological revolution inspired the creation of international public unions, such as the International Telegraph Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874). International transportation and communication regimes deepened in the early twentieth century, with participation by private companies and technical specialists, states, and international organizations. Innovations in international communication also fostered a broader appreciation of transnational cultural connections, as exemplified in period works such as Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days (1873). This process is evident in the emergence of an international press, and the rapid growth of international sport. A striking feature of early-twentieth-century international cooperation is the role of private governance and the rise of the expert. These themes are evident in international economic institutions such as the Bank for International Settlements (1930), international scientific cooperation, international food security and governance, and international public health. Each of these fields experienced significant growth in the early twentieth century, as illustrated in Chapter 7. *** The British writer Norman Angell’s famous contention in The Great Illusion (1910) that international economic interdependence had made war increasingly unlikely proved disastrously wrong in the short term, but it did speak more broadly to the growing international interconnectedness of the earlytwentieth-century world.23 Yet the dominant historical view of the period privileges national, military, and social divisions rather than connections. A  more fulsome analysis of the intensive non-state and private transnational networks that were created or deepened during these decades, as well as the international cooperative networks that developed between private and public actors (the “associative state”), allows us to better appreciate the role of the individual and

Introduction

13

of associational society in the history of international affairs.24 This book examines the many ways in which people in the early twentieth century joined Joyce’s fictional Dedalus in their attempts to slip the bounds of the nation. Like the mythical Daedalus who inspired Joyce, many of these early-twentieth-century internationalists were dreamers and innovators, and like the mythical Daedalus, they met with both success and failure.

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Ideas of International Order, Empire, and Anticolonialism

Concepts of “internationalism” and “international cooperation” helped provide the imaginative spaces by which people in the early twentieth century navigated their globally integrating world. Internationalism denoted a political space of organization, contestation, and discovery apart from and beyond the nationstate. This new “level of analysis,” as it would be termed subsequently in the emergent discipline of international relations, was defined in distinction to the individual and the state. The relationships between ideas and identities, and between political and social structures, conditioned what international cooperative initiatives people believed were preferable or possible. Some of these initiatives were cosmopolitan, in that they sought to transcend national differences, while most were more literally inter- or transnational, in that they aimed to unite, or facilitate interaction between, national groups. This chapter compares selected world order and international visions from different parts of the globe in the early twentieth century, reflecting on how they enabled, or sometimes impeded, projects of international cooperation.

Ideas of International Order Ideas have always been international, as has intellectual history. States may seek to control their circulation, and linguistic differences may impede their translation, but ideas are intrinsically borderless. Intellectual historians from at least the seventeenth century have considered themselves members of an international society, and by the early twentieth century it is possible to speak of the formation of a “global republic of letters.”1 The transmission of ideas still depends on social interactions, pathways of trade and intellectual exchange, the production and dissemination of texts of all types, and networks of education. Ideas are

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thus spatial. One particularly important category of spatial ideas was the mental maps, the international and global imaginaries, and the ideas of world order and international systems held by political thinkers, politicians, travelers, and others involved in thinking about the world beyond their national borders.2 These spatial concepts helped shape the forces of early-twentieth-century globalization and internationalism, and were shaped by them. Important spatial imaginaries in this era included the “Atlantic world,” the “Indian Ocean world,” the “Mediterranean world” that the Annales historian Fernand Braudel began to conceptualize in 1923, Frederick Jackson Turner’s concept of the American frontier, the “British world” of Great Britain and its white settlement colonies, migratory diasporas, various European iterations of “the Orient,” the “New World,” pan-Asianism and pan-Africanism, and ideas of Muslim world order from the ummah to pan-Islamism. These were important heuristic concepts that enabled people to make sense of an increasingly internationalized world defined by processes of territorialization.3 Many of these world order concepts emanated from Europe, and sought to maintain or expand its global influence. Others challenged the Eurocentric world order. Some of the latter emerged autonomously or reflected centuries of indigenous thought in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, while others developed in response to the rapid expansion of European empires during the “new imperialism” of the late nineteenth century and the global shock of the First World War, which undermined European claims to cultural superiority. Critical world order voices came in different registers. Some were subversive internationalists who sought changes within the existing international system, while colonial nationalists challenged the hegemony of multiethnic empires by asserting claims to autonomy. Various global pan-movements in Asia and Africa constructed global identity movements based on cultural or ethnic bonds that opposed European imperial claims to governance. Parallel traditionalist movements in the colonial world also created discursive coalitions to oppose or manipulate Western power.4 Intersecting with these world order ideas were any number of transnational communities with a spatial configuration of their own. Pacifists, faith communities, humanitarians, migrants (free and coerced), professionals, laborers, sailors, feminists, revolutionaries, criminals and many more groups traversed the globe, and in so doing created geographical and ideational linkages of their own. These transnational communities were often interlocking. Many migrants traveled, for instance, by the new steamship industry of the late nineteenth century. The development of ideas of internationalism and the technological innovations that gave these ideas material substance and allowed them to diffuse around the

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globe were thus mutually constitutive historical developments, emerging in tandem in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.5 While nationalism became the dominant international political identity by the late nineteenth century, its global diffusion was itself an international phenomenon. Its rise to global prominence allowed international activists of all types to create transnational connections with like-minded peers of different nationalities. The international peace movement was a prominent example. The same late-nineteenth-century phenomena that facilitated the reification and expansion of nationalism, such as a sense of global simultaneity that arose through vernacular print journalism and the standardization of time, also enabled the transmission of ideas of internationalism.6 If an international order idea can be identified as hegemonic during the nineteenth century, it was the idea of the balance of power. The Congress of Vienna (1815) that ended the Napoleonic Wars led Europe’s great powers to create a system of regulatory politics in which states perceived international equilibrium as preferable to war.7 The “Congress system” was an “experiment in international cooperation” through which states sought to balance their respective capabilities to make war.8 Episodic international conferences between the great powers provided a diplomatic mechanism to prevent multilateral disputes or domestic upheaval from causing a wider war.9 This form of normative international cooperation collapsed in 1914 following the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. In the resulting July crisis, Europe’s foreign ministries acted with a combination of recklessness and a lack of purpose.10 The resultant war undermined the concepts of balance of power and political equilibrium in their nineteenth-century guises, replaced by the twin ideas of revolutionary socialism and liberal national self-determination. As the chief advocates of these emergent ideas, V. I. Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, not David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, thus became the dominant political figures of the interwar period. In central and eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Habsburg, German, and Russian empires during and after the First World War threw open the question of national identity and the potential for international cooperation. The Habsburg Empire itself was a supranational entity in which at least seventeen major ethnic nationalities coexisted. While this cosmopolitan environment was dominated by Germans and Hungarians, and fostered ethnic tensions, it also encouraged intellectual and cultural elites such as the Bohemian writer Johannes Urzidil to identify as “hinternational,” a play on the German word hinter (behind) to suggest that the nation was a secondary aspect of personal identity.11 The passing of the Habsburg

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Empire’s cosmopolitan ethos was lamented by interwar thinkers who recoiled from the politics of nationalism, and inspired alternate transnational visions. The Hungarian intellectual and politician Oscar Jaszi believed ethnic nationalism was a threat to the stability of the small successor states in Eastern Europe, and advocated a Danubian confederation as a means of containing national group identities within a strong transnational political structure.12 This possibility was eclipsed by the rise of Admiral Miklós Horthy’s nationalist Hungarian government in 1920, but shows that the idea of European integration was not solely a Western European one. Other prominent proponents of central European cooperation included the Czech philosopher and politician Tomáš Masaryk.13 These ideas were counterpoised by German-dominated visions of Mitteleuropa, a concept coined by Friedrich Naumann in his Mitteleuropa (1915), and extended in racially exclusionary terms in Hitler’s concept of lebensraum.14 Intellectuals such as Hans Delbrück argued that Germany needed to adopt a global foreign policy in an age where a state’s power was seen to be commensurate with its geographical influence. The idea of Weltpolitik (world politics) had motivated Germany’s late nineteenth-century pursuit of overseas colonies. Some historians draw a connection between the racially motivated violence in the German colonial empire in the early twentieth century, particularly in southwest Africa, and later Nazi atrocities. Others argue that colonial German practices were not unique, but drew on a common Western “colonial archive” in devising discriminatory and violent policies.15 Many Anglo-American and European thinkers and politicians were inspired to devise regional and world governance proposals by a sense of increased global integration and the acute international crisis of the First World War. These proposals differed in their scale and political focus, but shared the goal of managing the tensions and optimizing the opportunities created by globalization through greater international cooperation. In Europe, the Austrian diplomat Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan Europa (1923), the French politician Edouard Herriot’s The United States of Europe (1931), and French Prime Minister Aristide Briand’s Memorandum sur l’organisation d’un régime d’union fédérale européenne (1930) made the case for greater European Union. So, too, did organizations such as the Union Douanière Européenne. While regional federalism sometimes paralleled support for other international cooperative projects, it also clashed with the views of interwar internationalists, such as the Dutch League of Nations Union, the Vereeniging voor Volkenbond en Vrede. The latter worried that regionalism would lead to bloc politics that would undermine the unity of the League.16

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19

These various federalist plans contributed to the development of the European federal union movement in the 1920s and 1930s. In tandem with the international civil service experience at the League of Nations of figures such as the French economist Jean Monnet and the Romanian historian David Mitrany (who favored functional rather than federal cooperation), interwar federalists anticipated the emergence of the European community after the Second World War.17 Ideas of imperial federation circulated in the British Empire in the late nineteenth century, but failed partly due to resistance by colonial nationalists in the settlement colonies (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa) who asserted their rights to autonomy. White supremacist world order ideas gained greater resonance in southern Africa, where many in the minority white population conflated their political and economic predominance with racial superiority. The dominant figure in this milieu was the mining magnate Cecil Rhodes (prime minister of the Cape Colony, 1890–6). He envisioned an alliance of the English-speaking peoples, an idea that found support from Americans such as Teddy Roosevelt. The Rhodes scholarships that he established in his will are testament to this historical legacy. Rhodes hoped they would create an international fraternity of leaders whose “bonds of friendship” could encourage international peace. While the scholarships have long been open to nonwhite students, their racial origins continue to draw fierce criticism.18 Early-twentieth-century southern Africa also gave rise to visions of imperial unity in the work of the Round Table. This imperial pressure group, founded in 1909, developed out of the “kindergarten” of British advisors to Lord Alfred Milner after the South African War. Its journal, The Round Table, became an influential venue for public policy debates on imperial and international issues. The Round Table’s leading figures were Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr. Its members helped frame the constitution for independent South Africa in 1910, after which they advocated for the federation of the wider British Empire.19 After the First World War, Curtis argued for world federal government in his mystical magnum opus, Civitas Dei (1938). For his part, Kerr (Lord Lothian from 1930) worked to strengthen Anglo-American relations and was an early supporter of European federalism, views he advanced in Pacifism Is Not Enough, nor Patriotism Either (1935).20 Other British writers who proffered visions of world federal governance included the novelist and socialist H. G. Wells (Open Conspiracy, 1928; The Shape of Things to Come, 1933), who envisioned an international community based on the tenets of scientific progress, and the economist Lionel Robbins (The Economic Causes of War, 1939). The idea of world government also circulated

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in other countries. In the United States, radicals (such as the feminist pacifists Rosika Schwimmer and Lola Maverick Lloyd) and moderates (such as the political scientist Quincy Wright) alike saw it as a preferable alternative to American isolationism. Other examples include the World Unity Foundation (1927– 35), led by the clergyman John Herman Randall; the Spanish internationalist Salvador de Madariaga, who created a World Foundation in 1936 to promote world unity; and the world federal government movement that emerged in the later 1930s.21 Other regional international orders included visions of transatlantic union, and historic patterns of transnational interaction throughout the Indian Ocean basin. The Atlantic world, formed through historic pathways of the slave trade and European settlement beginning in the early sixteenth century, underpinned many regional world order concepts of “the West.” Ideas of the unity of the “English-speaking peoples” were commonplace in this era, from John Robert Seeley’s The Expansion of England (1883) to Winston Churchill’s A History of the English-Speaking Peoples (which he wrote in 1938–9, but did not publish until 1956–8).22 Ideas of Atlantic union became more explicit during the international crises of the 1930s. The American journalist Clarence Streit proposed a federal union of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and Western European states in his best-selling Union Now (1939). The British political scientist George Catlin advocated an “Anglo-Saxon” union that could also include European democracies.23 These interwar transatlantic union concepts reflected the sense of shared political values that after the Second World War underpinned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Indian Ocean littoral connected Indian migrants from East Africa in the west to Fiji in the east, overseas Chinese settlers and sailors across Southeast Asia, overseas trade routes, Muslim pilgrims from as far away as the Dutch East Indies making the Hajj to Mecca, and British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonial powers expanding or consolidating their authority. Given the size and density of these oceanic connections, it is unsurprising that the Indian Ocean world was also a site of intellectual cooperation.24 Anti-imperial voice across the region challenged the universalism imposed by European imperialism by articulating diasporic nationalist and transnational networks. These Indian Ocean world intellectual currents also flowed at the global level. Many Indian revolutionaries identified with Moscow after 1917, and they constructed a wider Asian identity that incorporated the Soviet Union’s Central Asian Republics. The Asianist vision of the revolutionary activists Mohamed Barkatullah and Muhammad Shafiq combined communist and

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21

Muslim worldviews. The Indian physicist Satyendranath Bose corresponded with his German peers Albert Einstein and Walther Nernst. Indian nationalists such as V. J. Patel and Subhas Chandra Bose cultivated alliances with Irish nationalists such as Mary (Mollie) Woods and Maud Gonne MacBride through the Indian-Irish Independence League, and the interstitial Indian Marxist M. N. Roy cofounded the Mexican Communist Party and was an active Comintern member.25 These representative international “entanglements” reveal how colonial intellectuals worked to “provincialize” Europe by challenging the dominant Anglo-centric world order of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. International intellectual cooperation was not solely anti-imperial or orientalist in nature. Scholarly societies such as the Straits Philosophical Society in Singapore, the Siam Society in Bangkok, and the Burma Research Society were sites of intellectual exchange between indigenous and European intellectuals, which fostered transcultural dialogue and both contested and reified racial hierarchies.26 Visions of international order also circulated in China. In East Asia, a Chinese states-system first emerged over two millennia ago. The Chinese language and the set of rituals known as li, diplomatic practices of harmonious cooperation consistent with Chinese cosmological views of hierarchy and propriety, regulated relations between states within the Chinese world. These practices of international cooperation, in combination with Confucian ideals stressing the importance of unity, evolved into a Chinese World Order (Pax Sinica) when China became an empire. The Chinese conceived of their culture as superior, ruled by an emperor who was the bearer of the Mandate of Heaven. The emperor could ensure the loyalty of other Chinese, and demand tribute from regional non-Chinese polities such as Annam and Korea.27 The Qing Empire was weakened in the mid-nineteenth century through the Taiping Rebellion and defeats in the two Opium Wars with the British. The latter conflicts exacerbated tensions between Han Chinese and yi (non-Chinese/barbarians). The Unequal Treaties through which Britain and other Western powers secured extraterritorial rights in China upended the tributary system, blurring the spatial boundaries of Chinese sovereignty that the concept of yi helped form. Western extraterritoriality in China paralleled the concessions forced on the Ottomans, such as the establishment of foreign consulates and the imposition of the passport. Where the Qianlong emperor had demanded tribute from British Lord George Macartney when the latter visited the imperial court in 1787, by the late nineteenth century much of coastal China was incorporated into European international society. One marker of this process was the Qing creation of the

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Zongli Yamen in 1861, China’s first foreign office, an acknowledgment of the necessity of international cooperation. Waves of self-strengthening programs culminated in China’s abolition of the ancient competitive examination system for positions in the imperial bureaucracy in 1905.28 The same forces of international integration that weakened the Chinesecentered international society in the last decades of Qing rule helped create a broader, transnational “Chinese world” that united overseas Chinese, Chinese ideas of pan-Asianism, and non-Chinese minorities incorporated by China’s own imperial expansion in northern and central Asia.29 The Chinese Revolution of 1911–12 was followed by a period of civil strife where competing groups (warlords, nationalists [the Guomindang], Chinese communists) sought to seize political control of the new republic. Efforts to develop a Chinese national identity thus occurred in a “state-less” context, which allowed for the emergence of transnational ideas of “Chinese-ness.” The ethnic Chinese nationalism developed by intellectuals such as Sun Yat-sen, whose Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood) helped inspire the revolution, was a means of adopting Chinese universalism to a pluralist international system. Chinese nationalism was a component of the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth-century project of jiuguo (national salvation), a desire to reassert China’s position of international leadership. It provided a territorialized identity in an interconnected world of nation-states, combining (not without inconsistencies) ideas of social Darwinism imported from the West, a rejection of the Qing as “un-Chinese,” and a traditionalist appeal to the asserted timeless essence of Han Chinese culture.30 Chinese national identity thus both embraced and transcended the territorial nation-state. This was evident in the New Culture Movement that emerged in the 1910s. Members such as Chen Duxiu, disillusioned with what they saw as the sclerotic nature of Chinese culture, sought to supplement Chinese tradition with Western Enlightenment ideals. Members of the May Fourth Movement, begun by Chinese students disappointed with the Treaty of Versailles’ denial of China’s territorial claim to Shandong and other inequities, looked to the West for modernization models. Chinese intellectuals such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Junmai who traveled to Europe after the war, interacting with European intellectuals such as the novelist Thomas Mann and the philosopher Rudolf Eucken, advocated a more measured balancing of European and Chinese worldviews. Liang warned of the nihilism of European modernity, and believed that Chinese communalism offered a better means of managing both the opportunities and the threats of the modern world. These same international currents also led

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some Chinese nationalists to embrace Marxism-Leninism, such as the young Deng Xioping who was radicalized by his studies in France in the early 1920s.31

Counter-Hegemonic World Order Visions The Orientalist binaries of “East” and “West” used by some early-twentiethcentury Chinese intellectuals were themselves historical constructs of European imperialism.32 They reflect the power asymmetry that characterized the international system at this time, a short period in global history but one that many Western observers held to be “natural.” Yet even as global European empires reached their territorial apogee in the decades before the First World War, they rarely enjoyed anything approaching total control.33 Their power was always contingent, reliant on collaborators and the benign neglect or ignorance of many over whom they claimed to rule. When challenged, which they were regularly if not often successfully through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their rulers’ resort to violence reflected the foundational illegitimacy of their authority. It is thus unsurprising that even at the height of Western imperial power in the early twentieth century counter worldviews existed. Some of these developed to explain the rise of modernity outside the West; others emerged in opposition to Western imperialism or as autonomous indigenous worldviews without reference to the West at all. In tandem, these “non-Western” world order visions undermined Western claims to civilizational superiority, and opened up possibilities (not always realized in this period) of a more pluralist international system. The central loci of counter-hegemonic world order visions by the early twentieth century were independent states at opposite ends of Asia: Japan, the Asian state that most successfully met the challenge of Western modernity; and the Ottoman Empire, a declining world power but the host of Islam’s holy places. The pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism that emanated respectively from these sites flourished especially in the period between Japan’s seminal victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and the end of the First World War. Each evinced an emblematic world order vision that provided an alternative to Western internationalism, and that inspired other global subaltern populations. Japan was the one East Asian state that successfully resisted European subjugation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Tokugawa Japan constituted an international system in miniature. The daimyo of each regional

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han exercised regional autonomy (and in the case of southern han such as Satsuma and Choshu, even limited independent foreign and commercial relations), but united in a performative social order under the Tokugawa regime in Edo. The Tokugawa in turn regulated interactions with foreign powers under its isolationist policy of sakoku, limiting contact to the Dutch trading post of Dejima in Nagasaki Bay.34 After the Meiji Restoration (1867–8), Japan embraced selective elements of Western culture (notably through the incorporation of German military advisors) while positioning itself as the leader of a liberationist pan-Asianism. The Japanese scholar Okakura Kakuzō argued that “Asia is one,” united in its collective history of oppression at the hands of the West and its various societies’ shared appreciation of the universal. He argued in his 1904 book The Ideals of the East that love for the Ultimate and Universal . . . is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life.35

Japanese pan-Asianism assumed a more violently imperialistic tone after Japan’s war aims were stymied following the First World War. Interwar Japan’s militarist governments adopted an “Asian Monroe doctrine,” which undermined the 1926 Nagasaki pan-Asiatic conference and was justified in the writings of the pro-expansionist intellectual Ōkawa Shūmei. Japan was a beacon of modernity for other Asian peoples. The prominent pan-Islamist ulama Abdurreşid Ibrahim visited Tokyo in 1908–9, and pan-Islamists and pan-Asianists joined in forming Ajia Gi Kai (Association for the Defense of Asia) in 1909.36 Sun Yat-sen called for pan-Asian cooperation in a speech in Kobe in 1924. He spoke for many Asians in declaring that “we regarded that Russian defeat by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East.” Like Rabindranath Tagore, Sun Yat-sen argued that the fundamental characteristics of Asian civilization, which he asserted were benevolence, justice, and morality, could unite Asia in opposition to the West’s “rule of might” based on scientific materialism.37 Japan’s successful modernization inspired other Asian peoples, especially in the Ottoman Empire.38 Some late-Ottoman statesmen and political activists were attracted to pan-Islamism, which offered a counter to the history of Ottoman capitulations to Europe through the nineteenth century. These ideas culminated in Ottoman calls for global jihad in 1914, largely in an effort to mobilize the

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Ottoman Empire’s Muslim subjects, and attempts before and during the war to reinvigorate the caliphate as a substantial political institution. These panIslamist visions were opposed by the Committee of Union and Progress (the “Young Turks”), which took control of the Ottoman state before the war, and the Caliphate was abolished by Kemal Ataturk in 1924 when he proclaimed the new secular state of Turkey, but they nonetheless spoke to a strong current of moralism. Of deeper consequence were efforts by Muslim intellectuals to overturn the notion that modernity was a “Western” cultural condition by finding a modus vivendi between Western and Islamic cosmologies.39 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the father of Islamic modernism and a leading figure in the nineteenth-century Islamic renaissance, was an ardent anti-imperialist who was especially critical of what he saw as the negative materialist influence of the British on Muslim populations under their colonial rule. He believed Muslims could adopt Western scientific ideas while rejecting their ideological and moral underpinnings. He advocated a cosmopolitan pan-Islamism, in tandem with the development of Islamic nationalism, as a means of either preserving or asserting Muslim independence from imperial rule. He wrote in Arabic, helping his ideas gain a broad global resonance. al-Afghani’s search for a “middle way” between the West and Islamic orthodoxy inspired early-twentieth-century Islamic political thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah in British India, and Said Nursi and Namik Kemal in Egypt.40 World order ideas also emerged in colonial Asia. An example of these “colonial internationalisms” is found in India. Advocates of swaraj (self-rule) in India, such as Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, as well as fellow Indian nationalist leaders such as Lala Lajput Rai and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, were obviously key actors whose politics drew on, and in turn influenced, colonial nationalist movements in other parts of the world. Alongside them, however, were internationalist anti-imperial discourses that also imagined an emancipatory future, if of a different form. The Indian sociologist Benoy Kumar Sarkar anticipated the later work of Edward Said by critiquing Western Orientalism, and also rejected Tagore’s binary of a materialist West and a spiritual East. Like the Peruvian socialist activist José Carlos Mariátegui, who believed that universal history charted “its course with a common quadrant,” Sarkar argued that international anticolonial movements were “entangled” through a mutual quest for equality.41 Though not all Marxists, these internationalist anticolonial figures found the revolutionary activism of the Russian Revolution more inspiring than what they saw as patronizing Western liberal internationalism. Theirs was a global view of the international system, rather than one limited to the national, and was

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debated at the communist-organized Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku in 1920, and the Pan-Asiatic Conference in Nagasaki in 1926.

Pan-Asianism The First World War was a seminal moment for the development of ideas of pan-Asian cooperation. The global travels of soldiers, laborers, and prisoners of war created new internationalist perspectives for many Indians, Chinese, and other Asians, as well as for those Europeans with whom they came into contact. This was especially so for the approximately 1.3 million Indians who served overseas during the war.42 A representative example of their service is found in Mesopotamia, where two-thirds of the “British” soldiers besieged by the Turks at Kut for six months in 1916 were Indian sepoys.43 Indian soldiers had been brought to the Middle East to fight for the British Empire against an Ottoman enemy whose own entry into the war had broadened the conflict beyond the Christian world. By declaring jihad against the Entente powers, the Ottomans consciously framed the war in international religious terms. Britain’s main war aims in the Middle East were to protect its territorial holdings and preserve access to India. It was also concerned, however, that the Ottomans’ entry into the war might undermine Indian Muslims’ loyalty to the British Empire, given the Ottoman sultan’s role as caliph of the Islamic world. These fears were not entirely fanciful, as illustrated by the postwar Khalifat movement, led by the brothers Muhammad and Shaukat Ali, through which Indian Muslims pressed for the maintenance of the Caliph and the protection of Muslim holy sites under the new mandates system in the Middle East. Gandhi initially supported the movement, seeing in it the potential to foster cross-sectarian support for Swaraj in the aftermath of the Amritsar massacre in 1919. The latter incident, in which the British fired indiscriminately on an Indian crowd in the Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, killing 379 civilians, undermined British rule and radicalized theretofore-moderate Congress politicians. The Khalifat movement petered out by 1922, amid the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and increased Hindu-Muslim communal violence, which led Gandhi and other Congress leaders to withdraw their support. The efforts of Khalifat leaders such as Abul Kalam Azad to foster mutual aid and friendship (muwalat) with non-Muslims, such as with Gandhi’s noncooperation movement between 1919 and 1922, demonstrates how disparate religious and secular anticolonial movements pursued international cooperation after the war, while the Khalifat

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movement itself illustrates pan-Islamism’s nature as a transnational religious political movement.44 While there was no significant combat in Asia during the war, save for the Japanese-led Siege of Tsingtao in 1914, the war profoundly unsettled European rule in Asia and stimulated anticolonial sentiment. International anticolonial networks were organized around a shared opposition to imperial rule, as well as colonial nationalists’ motivation to minimize divisions within their own societies (such as religious divisions between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs in India), which could undermine the case for national autonomy. Irish and Indian nationalists fostered a mutually supportive relationship in the early twentieth century, and formed the Indian-Irish Independence League in the 1930s. Gandhi’s ideas on nonviolence were influenced in part by those of Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith. Meanwhile, Burmese and Egyptian revolutionaries (including the Wafd party leaders Saad Zaghloul and Makram Ebeid) fostered ties with Irish republicans, including in the Irish Republican Army, in the early 1920s. Irish republicans’ use of force to oppose the British during the Irish Civil War, like the Bolshevik revolution, inspired colonial nationalists internationally.45 Colonial nationalists occupied an “intermediate” position in terms of social class, operating as both elites and subalterns, and spatially, crossing the literal and cultural borders of the national.46 The latter dynamic was evident in the “affective communities” of international friendships that developed between anticolonialists within the colonized world, and with supporters in Europe (as with the personal bond between Gandhi and the British reformer C. F. Andrews).47 Colonial revolutionaries were especially mobile internationally between the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. Inspired by the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary success, these figures traveled via diasporic networks in the effort to generate international support for their respective causes. A representative example is Santokh Singh, an Indian revolutionary who grew up in the British Punjab. Singh migrated to the American west coast as a young man, where he joined the newly formed Ghadar Party of radical emigrant Indian nationalists who called for unilateral Indian independence. Singh returned to India alongside other return migrants to help lead a Ghadar rebellion, was convicted in the San Francisco Conspiracy Case that alleged a Hindu-German conspiracy to foment rebellion in India and spent three years in jail in the United States between 1916 and 1919, travelled to Moscow in 1922, was imprisoned by the Raj as a radical threat in 1925, and died in 1927 just before the Kirti Kisan Party (which he helped organize) was founded.48 State governments responded to this growing revolutionary threat by increasing their own international

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cooperation. National police and security forces shared information on suspected radicals, and international travel was circumscribed by an increasingly restrictive visa and passport regime.49 Asian empires also produced their own dissident nationalist opponents. Ho Chi Minh attempted unsuccessfully to petition the Paris peacemakers in 1919 for Vietnamese independence from French colonial rule in Indochina. The March 1 movement, launched in 1919 in part by students, called for Korean independence from Japanese colonial rule and protested Japanese aggression. Syngman Rhee, the Korean nationalist leader, made an avowedly internationalist case for his country’s independence, and explicitly associated Korean nationalism with the ideals of the American Revolution. He appealed to ideals of international law to promote Korean independence. Korean nationalists marched in Washington to protest their country’s subjugation, an example of international diasporic cooperation for colonial nationalism.50 The location was instructive. Just as London and Paris had drawn colonial and European dissidents in the nineteenth century, so Washington became a focus of the international anticolonial community in the interwar period.

Pan-Africanism and Black Internationalism The First World War had a less direct influence on international cooperation in the “Black Atlantic” in the early twentieth century. Imperial conflicts between the British Empire and German forces occurred in west Africa in the war’s opening weeks, in southwest Africa in 1915 where Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts led 40,000 loyal Afrikaners to victory over the Germans, and in east Africa from 1915 to the war’s end. The latter was the most significant African campaign, fought on both sides predominantly by African askari (soldiers) who traveled outside their home villages and interacted with other Africans as well as European officers and soldiers. The German and British forces were each supported by thousands of carriers and camp followers, whose service extended the war’s impact into African civil society. The British largely refused to use colonial troops in Europe, in the belief that this would undermine the racial hierarchies that underpinned imperial rule. The exceptions were Indian laborers who worked behind the front, as well as a small number of black African laborers. The French, by contrast, made significant use of colonial troops in combat in Europe, most notably over 130,000 tirailleurs senegalais who saw active duty against the Germans.51 The war did not fire colonial nationalism in Africa as immediately

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as it did elsewhere in the colonial world, but the experiences of Africans directly influenced by the war were disseminated widely among African communities. This was especially the case for early advocates of Negritude in the 1930s, such as the Guyanese novelist René Maran, the Senegalese writer Leopold Senghor, and the Martinique-born poet Aimé Césaire, for whom the war illustrated both the iniquities of colonialism and the necessity to cooperate in resistance. Césaire and Senghor produced the short-lived student journal L’Etudiant noir in 1935, a cooperative venture that published work from black writers from the Caribbean and Africa.52 For many early-twentieth-century Africans and African Americans, it was less colonialism itself that forged international alliances of opposition than its cognate, “race.” Racial discourse was expressed in both emancipatory and universal terms. It was often conflated with “culture,” resulting in the creation of typologies of modernization, and fixed biological terms, which led to the exclusionary and eliminationist ideologies of eugenics and racist totalitarianism.53 By the early twentieth century “race” had become a normative world order concept, one with globally destructive consequences. W. E. B. Du Bois famously declared in 1903 that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line.” The problem of race, and the potential for international cooperation to alleviate racial discrimination, was the subject of the 1911 Universal Races Congress (URC) held in London. The URC originated in the transatlantic Ethical Culture Movement, whose members approached moral questions from a secular perspective, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), whose president in 1911, Lord Weardale, served as the president of the URC. The URC’s object was to discuss, in the light of science and the modern conscience, the general relations subsisting between the peoples of the West and those of the East, between so-called white and so-called coloured peoples, with a view to encouraging between them a fuller understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a heartier co-operation. Political issues of the hour will be subordinated to this comprehensive end, in the firm belief that, when once mutual respect is established, difficulties of every type will be sympathetically approached and readily solved.

One of the largest international conferences before the First World War, it attracted over a thousand academics and activists from around the world interested in encouraging greater international racial cooperation and understanding. Delegates such as the Indian scientist Brajendra Nath Seal viewed race as a dynamic category, and believed in the promise of “racial development” and

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“universal humanity.” Despite its initial promise, a second URC in 1915 was canceled due the war, and it did not reconvene after 1918.54 The comparative optimism of the URC, while imbued with period ideas of international racial and civilizational hierarchies, contrasted with the intensified biopolitical concepts of race of the interwar period. These included the racially inflected language of climatology used by liberal internationalists involved in international social engineering projects such as the campaign against the traffic in women and children, as well as the more starkly eliminationist racial discourse used by the National Socialists in Germany and racial demagogues elsewhere, which had horrific consequences for millions of European civilians in the 1930s and 1940s.55 Racial order ideas also impacted international anti-imperial activism. The Comintern-backed League against Imperialism (LAI) was founded at the Brussels World Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in 1927. Approximately 170 delegates attended from thirty-seven countries. Based in Berlin, the LAI was led by the German communist Willy Münzenberg. Other founding members included the British socialist Fenner Brockway, British pacifist George Lansbury, J. T. Gumede of the African National Congress, American Civil Liberties Union representative Roger Baldwin, and the French pacifist Henri Barbusse. Jawaharlal Nehru was also a supporter until he was expelled in 1931 over his reluctant acceptance of the Indian National Congress’ Delhi Declaration, which called for dominion status for India within the British Empire. The LAI sought to unite anti-imperialists in China, Africa, and Latin America. It ultimately foundered due to opposition from the Socialist International, which objected to the Soviet’s role; the Guomindang’s 1927 Shanghai massacre of Chinese communists, which revealed the fissured nature of the international anti-imperial movement; and the Comintern’s waning interest in international anti-imperialism by the 1930s.56 The LAI was one component of a broader black internationalism that developed through a series of transnational movements in the early twentieth century, the most significant of which was the Jamaican activist Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Garvey was the period’s most prominent proponent of pan-Africanism, a movement that connected black internationalists in Africa, North America, and Europe. Pan-Africanists advanced different political goals, but were united in envisioning an anticolonial pan-Africanist imaginary. The UNIA inspired other organizations such as the League for Coloured Peoples in Britain and the Ligue Universelle pour la Défense de la Race Noire, founded by Maran and the Dahomey-born lawyer

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Figure 1 Portrait of Marcus Garvey, 1924 (b/w photo), American School (twentieth century)/Private Collection/Prismatic Pictures/Bridgeman Images, DGC1065636.

Kojo Tovalou Houénou in France in 1924. A small number of UNIA members broke away in the 1930s to join the controversial International Peace Mission movement of the African American preacher Father Divine. It combined religious and racial internationalism, and boasted Peace Missions in Canada, Europe, and Australia, as well as across the United States.57 Black internationalist organizations interacted with anticolonial allies in Europe, such as the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines’ Protection Society in Britain and the French Ligue des droits de l’homme [et du citoyen], as well as civil rights activists in the United States. Black internationalists such as the American academic (and future United Nations diplomat) Ralph Bunche and the Trinidadian activist George Padmore critiqued the League of Nations mandates system as a revised form of imperialism. Padmore also supported the International Union of Seamen and Harbour Workers, an international network of mariners that provided a forum for subalterns to participate in anticolonial and black

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internationalist activism.58 More radical black socialists, such as Grace Campbell, the Dutch Guianese immigrant Otto Huiswoud, and the Trinidadian immigrant Richard B. Moore formed the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB) in New York in 1919. In their work for black liberation, ABB members made connections with the international communist movement, especially African and Asian activists such as M. N. Roy. The ABB disbanded in the mid-1920s, but its advocacy of black diasporic unity and assertion of “blacks as an oppressed nation” who merited the same self-determination then being discussed in international circles for other minorities was significant.59 Its independent political line reflected the alienation many black radicals felt from white leftists, demonstrating that racial divisions in the early twentieth century transcended political ideology. In the United States, intellectuals and activists associated with the New Negro Renaissance in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the writer Langston Hughes and members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (founded by Du Bois, Moorfield Storey, and Mary White Ovington in 1909), stressed themes of cultural nationalism and pan-Africanism in their assertion of a more expressive African American identity. Under the editorship of Du Bois, one of the movement’s influential magazines, The Crisis, published articles that placed racial politics within an international context. Du Bois employed a “politics of juxtaposition,” publishing articles on Indian and Egyptian nationalist uprisings alongside pieces on violence against African Americans to establish international connections between racially oppressed peoples and to undermine paternalist colonial rhetoric.60 In emphasizing the international nature of racial oppression, du Bois and other African American activists helped generate a discourse of black internationalism that would gather strength during the civil rights and decolonization movements after the Second World War. Other black activists internationalized their politics in reaction to the increasingly bellicose nature of foreign affairs in the late 1930s. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia, seen by some black activists as an ancestral home, provoked an increase in support for pan-Africanism. The International African Friends of Ethiopia (1935–7) and the International African Service Bureau (IASB, 1937–44) were organized in response to the conflict, with the Jamaican activist Amy Ashwood a central figure in each. Another IASB cofounder, the Sierra Leonean trade unionist and activist I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson, founded the West African Youth League in 1935 to lobby for Africans rights in the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. Its progressivism was demonstrated by the central role of women in the organization’s decision-making. Japanese imperialism in Asia, meanwhile, inspired black intellectuals and opinion-makers such as the author George Samuel Schuyler and

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Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad to see Japan as an ally in the quest to attack white privilege and develop a “Black Internationale of liberation.”61 The international antiracism movement gathered momentum in the 1930s. Leaders such as Padmore drew explicit connections between their experiences of racial discrimination in Britain and international politics. Following a generation after the 1900 Pan-African Conference in London, organizations such as the West African Students Union, the League of Coloured Peoples, and the more radical IASB convened meetings and lobbied politicians to raise awareness of racism, call for colonial reform, and publicize Africans’ contributions to global society. These organizations helped organize a Conference on African Peoples, Democracy and World Peace in 1939, which connected pan-Africanism and racial awareness to liberal internationalist and pacifist politics, and brought together a multiracial community of activists such as Padmore, the Indian nationalist Krishna Menon, and Ethiopian princess Tsehai.62 This event demonstrates how international cooperation coalesced through the 1930s between anticolonial, antiracist, and liberal internationalist actors. These coalitions were an important antecedent to the development of international human rights after the Second World War.

Indigenous Peoples International cooperation was less apparent, and sometimes not yet developed at all, among those early-twentieth-century communities that were excluded by both European colonial states and colonial nationalist movements. These stateless, and often geographically disaggregated, communities were severely disadvantaged in an international system where sovereign states were the normative form of political organization. This was particularly true for indigenous peoples, who faced a double struggle in the early twentieth century. On one front, they fought to assert their autonomy relative to the colonial power under whose rule they lived. At the same time, particularly in the colonized world, they labored to assert their identity and rights as indigenous actors relative to other ethnic groups within colonial society. The Maasai, for instance, struggled as a migratory people to claim their place within east African society where the Kikuyu and other Kenyan ethnic groups competed for the mantle of Kenyan nationalism. Elsewhere, indigenous peoples were simply occluded from political view. In the Soviet Union indigenous groups were victims of Stalin’s nationalism policy and found few outlets to reach out to indigenous peoples elsewhere.63

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Despite these global limitations, many indigenous peoples nonetheless pursued transnational connections as individuals. The same conduits of early-twentieth-century internationalism that fostered international cooperation in other realms, such as labor migratory pathways, also encouraged indigenous transnationalism.64 Aboriginals, lascars, and black internationalists interacted with each other on docks around the Indian Ocean world and beyond. The Aboriginal activist Anthony Martin Fernando asserted his identity as both an Aborigine and an Australian in pressing for indigenous rights through the European press and at the League of Nations in the early 1920s. The Haudenosaunee writer and performer Pauline Johnson, herself half-white, developed a stage persona on her tours in Canada, England, and the United States, which both expressed her First Nations identity and catered to white perceptions of Native Americans.65 International cooperation was also evident in the role of nonindigenous allies, advocates, and brokers, whose support for indigenous rights helped prevent the total erasure of indigenous sovereignty. The Australian humanitarian Ann Fraser Bon worked from the 1870s to the 1930s in support of Aborigines’ land rights, though her activism reflected the contemporary settler colonial distinction between the right to use the land and property rights. The boundaries of the nation-state system, however, limited indigenous peoples’ autonomy. International nongovernmental and civil society organizations were still organized primarily along national lines, as were international cultural and sporting events. The Hopi Indian long-distance runner Louis Tewanima thus competed for the United States at the 1908 and 1912 Olympics, rather than as an indigenous person.66 Denied their land rights through the global process of settler colonialism, indigenous peoples found themselves minorities on their own land. From the British settler colonies to Latin America, Siberia to the Ainu homelands of the northwest Pacific, indigenous peoples were ascribed a shared status as “administered peoples.”67 Unlike national minorities as defined by the League of Nations minorities system, indigenous peoples had no “home” state. As a fragmented global community, they were also unable to use the new language of earlytwentieth-century internationalism to press for a homeland of their own, as did Zionists. Some indigenous actors attempted to use new international political fora to pursue their rights as sovereign minorities, but did so largely in isolation. Building on nineteenth-century traditions of petitioning that they adopted from Europe, aboriginal leaders attempted to circumvent their domestic subjugation by appealing to the international community. William Cooper, the secretary of the Australian Aboriginal League, collected close to 2,000 signatures in 1933 for

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a petition to the British Crown for the enfranchisement of Aborigines. Cooper drew explicit parallels to earlier Maori petitions to Queen Victoria, illustrating an emerging consciousness of international indigeneity. The Maori leader T.  W. Rātana and the Six Nations chief Deskaheh, meanwhile, petitioned the League of Nations in the 1920s to intervene on their behalf to overcome domestic oppression.68 These assertions of their rights as sovereign minorities were not recognized in an international system that privileged ethnic and national groups associated with an existing nation-state, as was the case with ethnic minorities in Europe, or more provisionally proto-nationalist groups that claimed the state of a nation within colonial empires. As peoples without a state, the ability of indigenous communities to assert and exercise sovereignty was severely constricted. Among the globe’s cosmopolitan populations, indigenous peoples’ earlytwentieth-century plight resembled that of groups like the Roma, who also found themselves rendered placeless by the logic of the international system. Another parallel is the Arabs, who were denied at Versailles the nation-state that they had been promised by the British during the war. Egypt attained self-rule from Britain in 1922, although only after a violent rearguard action that saw the British repress the 1919 “Arab spring” and deport its leader Saad Zaghloul and brand him a communist. Most Arabs now found themselves “administered peoples” of a different sort, living under the new League of Nations mandates.69 It was not until the 1970s that international indigenous cooperation coalesced into an institutional structure that was able to exert its presence in international politics. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples, created in 1975 with George Manuel of the Canadian National Indian Brotherhood as chairman, was inspired in part by colonized societies’ struggles of decolonization. Its members came from North and South America, as well as northern Europe, and articulated a vision of a “Fourth World” solidarity movement of indigenous societies united by a shared history of dispossession and marginalization.70

Conclusion International publics experienced a radical shift in their engagement with global connections in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a global transformation, as people around the world sought to make sense of rapid changes in the pace, spatial and temporal dynamics, and organization of their lives.71 This synchronous process meant that Europeans were as affected, if in different ways, by the technological, industrial, and imaginative shifts, as were

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those living in the colonized world. The collective international challenge of the period was how to maintain autonomy in an age of empires and of globalization. Empires regulated transnational spaces. Many other actors pursued their interests within these spaces, sometimes in parallel to or in isolation from the goals of imperial powers, sometimes in opposition to them. European metropoles were closely connected with their overseas empires, with ideas, people, trade, microbes, and much else moving between the various nodes of imperial networks. As such, empires were organic forms of international cooperation, creating the bridgeheads, “entangled histories,” and transnational spaces that connected people across borders.72 Imperial powers reacted to the forces of internationalism by attempting to decentralize their imperial administrations, and by gradually adopting the paternalist language of trusteeship and development. Colonial nationalists, meanwhile, sought to use the language of self-determination and indirect rule that emerged in European international discourse after the First World War to their own advantage. Anticipating later Cold War divisions, interwar colonial nationalists drew on Wilsonian and Leninist discourses of self-determination, and the “new diplomacy” of the “Wilsonian moment,” to articulate individual visions of independence.73 This collective ethos of anticolonialism was not merely derivative. As this chapter has illustrated, it also drew on alternate world order visions, many of which emerged from outside Europe, as well as patterns of international cooperation that predated the war and transcended imperial borders. Colonial nationalists developed intra-colonial networks through which they shared their experiences, and began to articulate an international consciousness of their shared subjugation and desire for autonomy. While the West continued to dominate the international system in the interwar years, the war had fundamentally undermined its position of hegemony. As Tagore asserted in 1921, Europe had “lost her former moral prestige in Asia. She is no longer regarded as the champion throughout the world of fair dealing and the exponent of high principle, but rather as an upholder of Western race supremacy, and the exploiter of those outside her own borders.”74 Anticolonialists such as Gandhi, meanwhile, appropriated the language of international trusteeship, stripping it of its racial implications and refashioning it as a moral argument for independence.75 By so doing, he was able to use Europeans’ justifications for continued colonial rule against them. European hegemony in the international system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was based on a proclaimed standard of civilization. The result was an international system organized around the concept of sovereignty

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and racial hierarchy. Western states, and those states that adhered to the evolving concept of civilization, were recognized as sovereign, while those outside the “civilized” circle were not. These principles in turn enabled and justified European economic exploitation of colonial and non-Western societies.76 This Western-dominated international system subsumed older regional orders, such as China’s tributary international system in Asia. Structures of international order established the security that allowed groups and individuals to advance claims to justice. In so doing, they also established the conditions for their own potential collapse or transformation. This was the case for the Europeandominated world order of the early twentieth century. European imperialism was a central factor in creating a globalized world, and in turn established the conditions within which colonial nationalism could develop. It is thus unsurprising that by the middle of the twentieth century, colonial nationalists simultaneously fought to expel colonial rulers and to create postcolonial societies organized in the very structure—the nation-state—established by those colonial powers. The foundations for these independence struggles were provided by the anticolonial international cooperative networks established in the early twentieth century.

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2

The Production of International Knowledge

A pronounced feature of early twentieth-century international relations was an increased global appetite for international knowledge. This was reflected in both the production of knowledge about other parts of the world and the creation or intensification of institutional means of producing and transmitting such knowledge. Intellectual “contact zones” emerged around the world, within which international ideas were generated and propagated.1 These “contact zones” included physical sites, such as international schools, foundations, and think tanks, as well as ideational ones, such as a discernible “internationalization” of domestic school curricula, the development of International Relations as an academic discipline, greater transnational collaboration among scholars and intellectuals, and the articulation of ideas of the international. This chapter examines how and why these various “contact zones” emerged, and assesses their contributions to the production of international knowledge.

Intellectual Cooperation An international intellectual and cultural infrastructure appeared after the First World War. The League of Nations’ International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), established in 1922, and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), opened in 1926 with the support of the French government, facilitated the transnational exchange of ideas in the interwar years. The ICIC sponsored a wide array of international cultural initiatives, such as the publication of translations of major Latin American works through its Collection ibéro-américaine.2 The ICIC’s membership included representatives from Asia, such as the Chinese intellectual Hu Shi and the Japanese religious studies scholar Masahuru Anesaki, alongside European intellectuals such as

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Albert Einstein and Marie Curie.3 Japan remained a member even after it left the League in 1933, and the United States participated in IIIC activities throughout the interwar years, demonstrating that intellectual internationalism resonated more widely than did political cooperation. Headed initially by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, the IIIC supported international collaboration between university researchers and advocated for the rights of intellectuals under threat.4 Its Civilisations series published volumes on major world civilizations with the goal of engendering greater global understanding and dialogue. The Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore was a feature contributor. The volume he cowrote with the British classicist and internationalist Gilbert Murray, East and West, epitomized the series’ aims. Tagore’s internationalism evolved from his ideas of unity and progress. He had put these into practice in India long before his 1913 Nobel Prize for Literature made him internationally famous as a symbol of East-West harmony. Tagore’s father, Debendranath Tagore, leader of the Brahmo Samaj, a monistic Hindu sect, inspired his son’s interest in holistic education. Tagore created an ashram (an experimental school of personal reflection) at Santiniketan, West Bengal, based on the imperative to seek connections between forms of indigenous knowledge and the material progress of the West. It is now a UNESCO World Heritage Site. He sought to bridge the divide between English-educated elites and poor rural Indians, and the spirit of universalism that infused Santiniketan inspired its most famous student, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Unlike Gandhi, Tagore opposed nationalism, arguing that “the minds of men are connected through some deep-lying continuous medium.” While Tagore would later criticize the materialistic West for lacking what he saw as the East’s “spirituality,” his vision of international education has had a lasting impact.5 Tagore traveled to China and Japan in 1924, where he preached the virtues of Asian spirituality and warned his audiences to avoid the pitfalls of Western material culture. In the revolutionary fervor of post-May Fourth movement China, where the Chinese revolutionary nationalist Sun Yat-sen’s Guomindang sought to create a nationalist China by, in part, borrowing from Western political practices, Tagore’s message of Asian traditional wisdom found little support. Unlike Indian radicals such as Lala Lajpat Rai, who had visited Japan during the First World War in search of lessons for building a modern nation-state, Tagore portrayed Japan’s embrace of patriotism as slavishly derivative of the West.6 While his spiritual pan-Asianism fell on dry soil in the interwar years, it demonstrates that the Western path to modernity was not the only template for international cooperation.

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The League of Nations was not the only venue for international cooperation among academics and intellectuals. International learned associations flourished from the late nineteenth century, as scholarly disciplines professionalized. These academies were catholic in their membership and focus, and organized along national lines. Prominent examples included the German Royal Society of Sciences, the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, and the British Royal Society. Inspired by cooperation between Academies of Science in Germany and Austria in the 1890s, the International Association of Academies (IAA) was formed in 1899. It was a union of national scientific and literary bodies, with the object “to initiate or promote scientific enterprises of general interest . . . and to facilitate scientific intercourse between different countries.”7 The IIA folded in 1913 due in part to lack of funds, a case of international rhetoric and spirit outpacing material support for internationalism in the prewar period. International intellectual collaboration resumed after the war. The International Research Council (IRC) united five scientific disciplinary unions.8 It became the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) in 1931. A parallel organization, the private Fédération Internationale des Unions Intellectuelles, was created in 1924 to promote international dialogue between scientists. One of the international unions incorporated into the IRC was the new International Mathematical Union (IMU), created at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Strasburg in 1920. Other international disciplinary associations and congresses had appeared amid the expansion of international unions in the late nineteenth century. The International Historical Congress (IHC) held its first preparatory conference in 1898, organized by the French historian René de Maulde-La Clavière and like-minded peers in other countries. Congress delegates sought to transcend the historical profession’s nationalistic and teleological focus by broadening historians’ ideological and methodological perspectives. The inaugural IHC followed in Paris in 1900, under the aegis of that year’s Paris World Exposition. Subsequent congresses, held at five-year intervals, drew several thousand delegates, including leading historians such as the German Karl Lamprecht and the Italian Benedetto Croce. The International Committee of Historical Sciences (ICHS) was founded in 1926 with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation as an effort to bridge the divisions within the historical discipline created by the First World War, but was soon beset by the ideological challenges of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism.9 The “international” nature of the IMU, the ICHS, and other international academic unions was partial. They were slow to admit German and Russian members (their largely western European membership was particularly exercised at

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German academics’ support for Germany’s war effort, overlooking some of their own member’s patriotic response to the war), they had relatively few Asian and Latin American members, and their proceedings were often dominated by western European and North American representatives. These facts reveal the limits placed by nationalism on international cooperation even in the ostensibly stateless world of the mind. Intellectuals and writers beyond academia also organized internationally in the early twentieth century. A notable example is PEN (Poets, Essayists, Novelists) International, founded in 1921 by the British novelist Amy Catharine Dawson Scott. One of the world’s oldest international human rights organizations, its goal, in the words of its first president, the British writer John Galsworthy, was to be a “League of Nations for Men and Women of Letters.”10 Eleven national PEN clubs attended its first international congress in London in 1923. There were branches in Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq by the late 1920s, and in India, China, and Japan by the mid-1930s. PEN was committed to international literary fellowship and the international right to freedom of expression, declaring in its charter (1927) that literature “knows no frontiers,” and that members should work “in favour of good understanding and mutual respect between nations.”11 The organization assumed a more overtly political role in the 1930s as Nazi repression threatened German writers. PEN President H. G. Wells led a protest in 1933 of the Nazis’ book-burning campaign, and the organization defended writers persecuted by their own governments and appealed for the release of writers imprisoned for their works. Its success was mixed. It failed to prevent the Spanish Falange from executing the writer Federico García Lorca in 1937, but famously helped secure the release of Arthur Koestler from a Spanish prison in 1938.12 PEN also struggled to maintain its spirit of open expression in the 1930s, particularly over the question of whether members had the right to express fervently patriotic views (such as the Italian futurist F. T. Marinetti, who embraced fascism).

Language One of the hindrances faced by advocates of international cooperation was the absence of a global lingua franca. English was not yet the most prominent global second language, while the status of French as the language of diplomacy was in decline. One proposal to bridge linguistic divisions was to create artificial universal languages. The most famous of these, Esperanto, was first advanced in 1887 by the Russian-Polish doctor and writer Ludwig Lazarus

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Zamenhof. He hoped that Esperanto could serve as an international auxiliary language that could foster international integration, and overcome international conflict by creating international amity. The First Esperanto Congress was held in 1905 in Boulogne-sur-Mer in France, and by 1908 there were almost 1,300 Esperanto groups internationally. Esperanto bore the characteristics of a secular religion, similar to the earlier artificial language Volapük and Esperanto’s off-shoot Ido, created by the German chemist Wilhelm Ostwald and the Commission for the Adoption of an International Language in 1907. Zamenhof ’s Esperanto bore a distinct Kantian ethic, a moral imperative to find common cause with one’s fellow human beings, and offered salvation to its practitioners. He hoped it could bridge the human gap between particularism and universalism, a tension of which his own Judaism made him especially perceptive. For his part, Ostwald applied his search for a unified theory of science to international language, in the belief that the latter could serve in the human pursuit of progress.13 Esperanto resonated most strongly in Europe and North America. A partial exception was East Asia, where some modernizers saw it as a tool for creating bridges between East and West. Japan had the largest number of Esperantists outside Europe, with almost 7,000 by the late 1920s.14 Esperanto appealed to moderate internationalists like Nitobe Inazô, Japan’s long-serving delegate to the League of Nations, who termed it an “engine of international democracy.”15 It was also attractive to Chinese anarchists and communists, for whom it provided a link to ideological peers in the West. After the Japanese invasion of China began in the early 1930s, some Chinese nationalists used Esperanto as a means of communicating their circumstances to the outside world. China was also a laboratory for an experiment for another international language, Basic English. Funded in part by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, the English educator I. A. Richards spent much of the 1930s in China trying to persuade instructors to adopt his simplified 850-word abridgment of the language designed to foster greater international cooperation and world peace.16 Many contemporaries viewed Esperanto and the idea of a universal language as either idealistic or delusional.17 However, these linguistic projects reflected early twentieth-century anxieties about mutual international incomprehension in a period where technological developments in communication fostered greater interdependence. While Esperanto, Ido, and Basic English failed to attain the universal usage for which their inventors hoped, they prefigured the emergence of universal languages of a different type later in the twentieth century in the development of computer code.

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The positivist and pacifist impulses that motivated artificial language supporters also inspired international cooperative efforts in information studies and bibliography. The Belgian Esperantist, Freemason, and socialist Henri La Fontaine and the Belgian lawyer Paul Otlet organized an International Institute for Bibliography in Brussels. It promoted the Universal Decimal Classification (an expansion of the Decimal Classification created by Melvil Dewey) and a Universal Bibliographical Repertory, a “world catalogue” of books (anticipating twenty-first-century projects such as Google Books and WorldCat). La Fontaine and Otlet believed international rational cooperation could overcome national divisions and create peace. The former was president of the International Peace Bureau from 1907 to 1943, and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911. He and Otlet  also organized the Union of International Associations, an umbrella organization of international civil society organizations that sought to synthesize knowledge on a global scale.18 International bibliometric cooperation was predicated on a vision of the international system that accepted, and indeed valued, the place of nation-states, and believed peace would come through their cooperative endeavor rather than their transformation or erasure. These goals were reflected in the Paris Library School, founded by the philanthropist Anne Morgan, and the American Library Association, which operated from 1924 to 1929. It exported American principles of librarianship to Europe, and became a nexus for scholarly cooperation and cultural exchange. While it closed due to budgetary pressures, its spirit of cultural internationalism led to the creation of the International Federation of Library Associations. Internationalists like La Fontaine and Otlet, the Austrian journalist Alfred Fried, the British journalist W. T. Stead, and the French physiologist Charles Richet saw world history as a project of international organization. Their liberal internationalism had its limitations, however. It was often predicated on a racial and civilizational view of world society, prioritizing Europe. These racial assumptions, in tandem with positivism, led some liberal internationalists to evince social Darwinian views, and even, in the case of Richet, to embrace eugenics.19

International Academic Cooperation The study of international relations as a distinct academic discipline emerged gradually in the decades before and after the First World War. International thought in the late nineteenth century was mainly the purview of historians and

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law scholars, particularly in the Anglo-American world. This reflected the period’s ecumenical approach to the study of politics, and focus on the emergence of nation-states and their foreign relations. The nature of empire also attracted theorists’ attention. While many representative studies explained Western imperial expansion as the outgrowth of European civilizational “superiority,” such as the environmentally determinist “frontier thesis” of Frederick Jackson Turner, others advanced early critical assessments of imperialism. The latter included the British socialist J. A. Hobson’s Imperialism: A Study (1902) and the work it later inspired, V. I. Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917). In arguing that the First World War was an imperial conflict precipitated by finance capital, and thus a symptom of late-capitalism’s imminent collapse, Lenin’s work provided Marxism with a theory of international relations that it had theretofore lacked. It also created a revolutionary catalyst for anticolonialists in Asia and Africa.20 The “territorialization” of international politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led some thinkers to analyze global politics through the prism of space and geography, and in so doing create the school of geopolitics.21 The British geographer Halford Mackinder studied the influence of space on power relationships in what he argued was now a closed world system. Mackinder believed control of land (and hence sovereignty) had eclipsed sea power as the determining factor in world affairs, and that the Eurasian heartland had become the new crux of international affairs.22 He was ahead of his time in appreciating the importance of environmental factors in world politics, and the role of geography in shaping the contours of international cooperation. A second feature of pre–First World War international thought was its focus on the anarchical nature of international relations. States were “natural” entities in systemic conflict with each other within a closed international system. The only legitimate states in this “Westphalian” international system were those that had rejected ecclesiastical political authority, and agreed to respect the internal affairs of other like-minded states in a “family of nations,” as the European powers were retrospectively believed to have done in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) that ended the Thirty Years’ War. According to this interpretation, Westphalia initiated a “Europeanized international society,” with the European nationstate model becoming the normative basis for international order in the early twentieth century. States’ territorial integrity, uti possidetis (“as you possess,” the principle by which states assert the right to keep territory taken in a conflict), and national self-determination became established norms of international relations.23

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While some historians and international relations scholars see the idea of a “Westphalian international system” as an idealized type rather than a historical description, it is clear that by the early twentieth century sovereignty had become the organizing concept of international affairs. The interconnection of sovereignty and an international process of territorialization led thinkers to apply geopolitical thought to the practice of foreign policy. International thinkers such as the German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel and the American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan believed the finite nature of international space made it imperative for states to assert and maintain their sovereignty. The latter defended the geostrategic importance of naval power in maintaining American, and by extension Western, power in a competitive international arena.24 Such ideas encouraged the view that international affairs was an arena of conflict between dynamic and fixed state polities, a condition made more acute by growing interdependence. Some observers believed interdependence lessened the risk of conflict as states’ mutual interests—for instance, in international trade—became more important than nationalist drives for honor or territory. This argument was made most prominently by the British pacifist Norman Angell in his best-selling The Great Illusion (1910). Paul Reinsch (World Politics [1900] and Public International Unions [1911]) and Leonard Woolf (International Government [1916]) also wrote influential studies of international interdependence, analyzing and itemizing the emerging infrastructure of international organization from international public unions to international arbitration.25 Others feared that interdependence implied national struggle, which would lead inevitably to war unless political machinery or mechanisms were devised to attenuate the risk. The First World War forced intellectuals and theorists to think explicitly about the nature of international relations. Debates about empire and the nature of sovereignty mobilized some prewar liberal internationalists to argue for the necessity of international organization, ideas that influenced some of the peacemakers at Versailles. Postwar international affairs thinkers were more focused on contemporary politics than their historicist prewar predecessors. These markers of social scientific professionalization aligned with international relations’ putative first “great debate,” between realists who recognized the centrality of power and utopians and idealists who placed their faith in morality and values. The simultaneous creation of international affairs institutes and, latterly, university programs, has led subsequent generations of international relations scholars to date the origins of their discipline to the interwar period. This view has been

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critiqued by scholars who see a degree of continuity across the admitted crisis years of 1914–19. They argue that interwar scholarship on international relations was characterized by deliberations about how to reconcile imperialism with the emerging dynamics and practices of international cooperation, rather than a “just-so” story to explain the post-1945 centrality of realism in international relations.26 These debates present an exaggerated dichotomy between advocates of statecraft and supporters of international cooperation. The interwar period was distinct in the history of international thought; not because of realist-idealist conflicts, but because thinkers of all persuasions were united in a desire to make sense of a new world of international interdependence. Collective security thus became a major focus of interwar international relations. Interwar liberal internationalists responded to this challenge by advancing ideas for greater international cooperation and peace. They supported the work of the League of Nations and the PCIJ, and advocated for a normative shift to peaceful change as the foundation of international affairs. The League appealed to liberals’ appetite for international intervention. International organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) could be mobilized in support of worker’s rights, while the League’s mandates system accorded with both colonialism and ideas of humanitarian interventionism whose origins lay in the nineteenth century.27 Liberal internationalism resonated most strongly in Anglo-American intellectual circles, but it also found adherents elsewhere. Théodore Ruyssen, president of the Association de la Paix par le Droit (Association for Peace through International Law), argued in 1916 that a “liberal international” based on international law was the only form of postwar international order that could restore and maintain peace. In Scandinavia, liberal internationalism began to outpace neutralism as the dominant worldview by the 1910s. Organizations such as the Central Organisation for a Durable Peace and the Nordic IPU advocated for international law and intergovernmental cooperation. Meanwhile, liberal internationalism’s message of collective security found fertile ground in central European societies who found themselves surrounded by larger powers after the First World War.28 Liberal internationalists were the League’s most vocal proponents, but it also attracted the support of some European conservatives (notably the British politician Sir Robert Cecil) who saw it as a means of ensuring stability in international affairs. Other voices, particularly in France where the human and physical impact of the First World War was felt most acutely, looked more

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circumspectly at the League and international cooperation as means of containing Germany.29 Some left liberals and socialists also supported the League, but pressed for reforms to the international system to make it more equitable. The French writer André Gide, whose African travel diaries were made into a documentary, Voyage au Congo, by his travel companion Marc Allégret, called for the reform of colonial labor practices in Africa. Many radical socialists and pacifists were guardedly drawn to the League’s potential as an agent of moral suasion in international affairs. Figures such as the British feminist Vera Brittain, the British Christian pacifist Dick Sheppard (leader of the Peace Pledge Union), and Helena Swanwick of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) came to reject its collective security potential and called for the absolute rejection of war.30 The study of international affairs also emerged outside Europe and North America. In China, the scholar Kang Youwei applied the cyclical conception of Chinese empires to the international system, while China’s defeat in the SinoJapanese War (1894–5) prompted Chinese intellectuals to devote greater attention to the history of what they saw as “successful” nation-states.31 In Japan, international affairs were studied under the aegis of international law or diplomatic history before the First World War, while political science was focused almost exclusively on domestic politics. As in Europe and North America, the academic study of international relations expanded in interwar Japan. In Japan, however, this growth was driven less by the desire to study questions of war and peace inspired by the war, and more as an expression of Japan’s increased desire to become an equal member of the international community. This imperative dated from Meiji efforts to modernize through the selective adoption of Western ideas, Japan’s entry into the First World War, and its claims to racial equality at the Versailles negotiations.32 As in the West, international relations in Japan became professionalized in the 1920s. The Imperial University of Tokyo established a chair in international politics in 1924, and international relations began to appear in the curriculum of Japanese universities. Japanese scholars also began to produce scholarship on international relations. While varied in subject matter, spanning international law, the conduct of foreign policy, and morals in international politics, this new scholarship was scientific in nature. As Jumpei Shinobu wrote in his four-volume Kokusai-Seiji Ronsō (Treatise on International Politics), international relations was “a discipline whose aim is to analyze international political phenomena collectively, to study common features to be observed therein, and thus to discover principles underlying these phenomena of international

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politics.”33 Much of Japan’s international relations scholarship in the 1920s, while not always idealist in tone, was broadly liberal internationalist in tenor. The climate changed precipitously in the 1930s. More explicitly militaristic Japanese governments suppressed works that advocated international cooperation. They instead supported justificatory studies of a New Asian Order, the “Theory of East Asian Community,” and the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” articulated by thinkers such as Hachirō Arita and pursued by imperial Japan in the Second World War.34

International Relations Institutes and Institutions Scholars, diplomats, and civil society activists began debating plans for the postwar settlement soon after the outbreak of the First World War. These debates occurred within official circles, private advisory bodies to governments such as the British pressure groups the Round Table and the Bryce group (a discussion group of British liberals led by James Bryce), American President Woodrow Wilson’s Inquiry (a collection of academic advisors), NGOs such as the American League to Enforce Peace, the Association Française pour la Société des Nations, the Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund, the Dutch Association pour la Paix durable, the British League of Nations Society (renamed Union in 1918), and peace and international women’s associations such as the Swiss World Union of Women for International Concord and the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace.35 These bodies generated international organization ideas, some of which were adopted by the negotiators at Versailles and the other postwar peace conferences, and helped constitute the international ecosystem of nongovernmental institutions focused on international affairs that developed in the 1920s and 1930s. Other representative bodies in this international network included privately funded international affairs foundations that emerged in the early twentieth century. These elite-driven institutions brought together academics, government officials, civil society activists, and philanthropists with the goal of generating increased knowledge about the nature and conduct of international relations. The leading American institutes were the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP, 1911), the Rockefeller Foundation (1913), and the Ford Foundation (1936). These foundations were established by Gilded Age and early twentiethcentury industrial capitalists (steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, and Ford Motor Company founder Henry Ford’s son Edsel Ford)

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whose fortunes had been made through large-scale vertically integrated corporate empires, and who sought to bring a similar ethos of rationalization to international relations. These foundations were transnational organizations with a broadly liberal international outlook, which led them to fund international cooperative activities. They also functioned as informal arms of the American foreign policy establishment, training and socializing foreign policy professionals and providing government with knowledge on foreign affairs. Each foundation facilitated the international circulation of ideas, money, and people, helping to create international cooperative networks (albeit geographically uneven ones, with a prominent American complexion) focused on modernization.36 A representative example of this modernization spirit and cultural exchange is the Rockefeller-supported Peking Union Medical College. Created in the 1910s to educate Chinese students in scientific medicine, it trained over three hundred doctors into the 1940s.37 Like many projects funded by American institutes, the college equated modernization with westernization, but it also inculcated a spirit of international cooperation that was important during China’s period of instability in the 1910s and 1920s. As the private foundation that mounted the era’s most extensive array of initiatives designed to foster international cooperation, the CEIP stands as the quintessential example of early twentieth-century institutional internationalism. In 1913 it sponsored a commission of inquiry into the causes of the Balkan Wars and alleged war crimes by parties on all sides. The commission spent five weeks in the Balkans conducting fieldwork. It published The Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars in the summer of 1914, just before another Balkan crisis touched off the First World War. The report focused on the impact of the war on noncombatants, such as the forced reconversion of Muslim Slavs by Bulgarian forces in the First Balkan War, and the misconduct of Bulgarian and Greek troops against each other’s civilian populations in the second conflict.38 It was one of the earliest examples of a civil society fact-finding mission that reported on the impact of war on civilian populations. The CEIP concentrated its research efforts on the causes of war and peace. Its Division of International Law helped found an Academy of International Law at The Hague in 1913, an idea first proposed at the 1907 Hague Conference by the Romanian prime minister, Demetrius Stursda. It published the influential “Classics of International Law” series, and helped fund the activities of the Institut de Droit International, as well as several European international law societies, including the Société de Législation Comparée in Paris, the

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Association Yougoslave de Droit International, and the Istituto Italiano di Diritto Internazionale. The CEIP published a monumental 152-volume series, the Economic and Social History of the World War, directed by the Canadianborn Columbia University historian James Shotwell. The series was truly transnational, examining the war’s impact on neutral countries, Japan, international trade and industrial production, and food and public health.39 Befitting its patron Andrew Carnegie’s private philanthropic interests, the CEIP also helped build (literally in some cases) an international research infrastructure on questions of international cooperation. It provided funds for the construction of the Peace Palace at The Hague (1913), and the University Library of Belgrade (1919–26), continuing the endowment’s interest in Balkan reconciliation. It also underwrote a delegation of librarians to implement a modern cataloguing system for the Vatican Library. In 1918 the CEIP began its “international mind alcove” program. The “alcoves” were stand-alone sections in libraries in the United States and abroad for which the CEIP provided materials on internationalism.40 These various documentary projects, many of which received government support or funding, reveal the interconnections between the study of international relations and states’ foreign policy. They also demonstrate the depth of interwar debates about archival openness, government transparency, and the growing importance of statistics and information as tools for foreign policy decision-making. Finally, they illustrate the emergence of philanthropic institutions, such as the CEIP, as international governance actors. These organizations developed networks with academic institutions, and themselves provided forums, which advanced the formal study of international relations. Allied to but independent from the state, international think tanks and philanthropic foundations nonetheless often shared many of the latter’s political interests and also reflected the cultural and racial preconceptions of their societies.41 They thus both advanced the scope of international cooperation and reproduced existing political and racial international hierarchies. Many other actors in the early twentieth century were involved in instructing students and educators in ideas of international cooperation, and in fostering a sense of international citizenship. They worked through a series of contact zones, including academic international relations programs, international relations institutes, international summer schools, international workshops, and instruction in higher education institutions on international affairs. In academia, Clark University in the United States launched the Journal of Race Development in 1910. It became Foreign Affairs when the Council on

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Foreign Relations (CFR) assumed its publication in 1922. Alongside the work of scholars such as Raymond Leslie Buell, author of The Native Problem in Africa (1928) and research director in the 1930s at the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), Foreign Affairs’ earlier incarnation reminds us of the centrality of race to the early evolution of the discipline of international relations. The FPA was created in 1918 to educate public opinion on foreign affairs. Its weekly National Broadcasting Company (NBC) radio broadcasts “The World Today” were the most popular of its suite of public education initiatives.42 Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service began in 1919. Like the University of Paris’ École des Hautes Études Internationales, Georgetown sought to train diplomats and state officials. The University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations, founded in 1928, was the first university graduate program devoted to international affairs and played a prominent role in the formation of the academic discipline of international relations in the United States. Among its leaders was the international law specialist Quincy Wright, an early proponent of uniting the teaching of international relations and international law. Yale University’s Institute of International Studies, a pioneer in what would become known as area studies, opened in 1935, with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. Its first director, the Dutch-American political scientist Nicholas Spykman, was an advocate of strategic studies who adapted the geopolitical ideas of Mackinder and Mahan to the more interconnected international situation of the 1930s. Princeton University’s American Committee for International Studies (funded by both Rockefeller and the CEIP) and Institute of Advanced Study (IAS) also conducted research on American international interests. The IAS provided sanctuary to the League of Nations’ Economic and Financial Section in 1940 when the latter fled Nazi-occupied Europe. The Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts, invited speakers on international affairs throughout the 1920s, including influential addresses on international federation by Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian) and Lionel Curtis. The Social Science Research Council, founded in 1923, created an international relations committee in 1926.43 Each of these institutes fostered research on international order, which helped shape deliberations on postwar planning at the end of the Second World War. In Britain, Aberstywyth University founded the Woodrow Wilson chair in 1919, the first university chair in international relations. Funded by the industrialist David Davies, the chair was designed to promote “political science in its application to international relations, with special reference to the best means of promoting peace between nations.”44 The classicist and liberal internationalist

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Alfred Zimmern was the first chair-holder. E. H. Carr assumed the Wilson chair in 1936. As chair holder, he composed his ideas on “utopians” and “realists” in international affairs that he was to publish in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (1939), a text that has retrospectively shaped many international relations scholars’ view of their disciplines’ origins. The London School of Economics followed with the Montague Burton chair of international relations in 1924, first held by the Quaker internationalist Philip Noel-Baker. The Academy of International Law opened in the Netherlands in 1923. In Austria, the post-Habsburg government ran the Consular Academy of Vienna, an international institute for the study of political economy. It was originally founded in 1754 by Maria Theresa as the Oriental Academy to train consular officers. The IIIC held a series of conferences, beginning in 1928 at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP), to encourage institutes and programs of higher education in international affairs to coordinate their programs of studies, and to facilitate the exchange of professors and students.45 As the site of the League of Nations, Geneva became an international city after 1918, and as such attracted cooperative international education initiatives. Zimmern founded the Geneva School of International Studies in 1924, on the invitation of students from the Federation Universitaire Internationale. The school drew on international affairs experts, many of whom were lured to the League of Nations in their own work, to deliver lectures. By its third session in 1926, it attracted 583 students from twenty-nine different countries, with lecturers from twenty-five nationalities. The British League of Nations Union began a summer school in Geneva that evolved into the Geneva Institute of International Relations in 1924. It attracted a largely Anglo-American audience, and aimed, in the words of the American jurist Manley O. Hudson, to produce “a common mind about international problems.” The International Federation of League of Nations Societies (IFLNS) also sponsored a Geneva summer school, with instruction in French and German, and many national pro-League societies conducted public education activities that fostered international cooperation.46 In an effort to facilitate international cooperation in the study and academic discussion of international relations, the ICIC founded the International Studies Conference (ISC) in 1928. A  forerunner of the present International Studies Association, the ISC operated from 1928 to the 1950s. It facilitated transnational scholarly cooperation in the study of international affairs, though its members were primarily European and North American. ISC conference themes in the 1930s included the teaching of international relations, collective security, and state and economic life.47 The British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA),

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known from 1926 as the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and informally as Chatham House, held its first meeting in 1920. The RIIA and its American parallel, the CFR, originated from Anglo-American collaboration at the Versailles conference in 1919. British and American advisors agreed that it would be mutually beneficial to continue the conference’s practice of expertdriven international relations policy debate in peacetime.48 The CFR quickly became the preeminent American venue for the production and dissemination of international knowledge. It was founded in 1921 by American internationalists as a nonpartisan “continuous conference on international questions.”49 It convened International Studies Conferences throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as well as study groups that brought together specialists and government officials interested in a wide array of international subjects. The activities of the council’s members helped establish a foreign policy nexus between academics, diplomats, and officials in the State Department and other branches of the American government. The council regularly hosted speakers on subjects of international cooperation, including the IPU, the internationalization of the Danube, international control of the opium trade, and the Bank for International Settlements.50 Beginning with its initial event, a roundtable on “What Americans Should Know about Germany” in January 1921,51 the council also broadened American policy makers’ understanding of foreign policy questions, and created and extended transnational networks between foreign policy intellectuals and policy makers. The RIIA and the CFR inspired the creation of similar institutes in other countries. Australian members of the BIIA began to meet independently from 1924, formally constituting the Australian Institute of International Affairs in 1933, while the Canadian Institute of International Affairs was established in 1928. Members in these countries made contributions to the study of international relations, often shaped by their national experience. Australia’s exposed position in the south Pacific helps explain the focus on international interdependence in the work of Australian scholars such as H. Duncan Hall and W. K. (Keith) Hancock on the British Empire/Commonwealth, and Fred Alexander on international organization.52 The emergence of international affairs think tanks was not limited to the Anglo-American world after the First World War. In Germany, international relations research was concentrated at the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP), founded in Hamburg in 1923 and directed by the German scholar Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and the DHfP, created in Berlin in 1920 and led by the journalist and political scientist Ernst Jäckh. Mendelssohn Bartholdy and other

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German international relations scholars interacted with their peers in Europe and the United States, such as Shotwell and Gilbert Murray, in part through funding and collaborative publishing efforts affiliated with the CEIP and the Rockefeller Foundation. These interactions speak to the widening international community of international relations scholars in the 1920s and 1930s. Scholars associated with the IAP and the DHfP argued that Germany should pursue a liberal internationalist foreign policy as a means of reintegrating itself into the international community. They also fervently opposed foreign assertions of Germany’s war guilt, and worked to rehabilitate Germany’s international standing. As such, German international relations scholars demonstrated the complementary nature of nationalism and internationalism, where the former could be marshaled as a tool of pursuing the national interest. Both institutes were nationalized by the Nazis after they came to power in 1933, compromising their transnational outreach.53 France’s most significant social sciences institute was the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques (Sciences Po), founded in 1872 by the political scientist Emile Boutmy. Emile Durkheim’s work on international society was an important prewar influence on French international thought, while the political scientist Pierre Renouvin conducted important studies in diplomatic history. There were neither separate departments of international relations in early twentieth-century France nor comparable foreign policy institutes as in the Anglo-American or German contexts. Instead, international affairs was studied across a broad spectrum of intellectual fields, including anthropology and, mediated through the focus on total history, the emerging Annales School of historical studies. By the interwar years, functional concerns with the organization of international peace and a focus on the influence of shifting international norms on colonial governance became important features of French international relations scholarship.54 A parallel intellectual movement coalesced in the Pacific Rim. The Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) was founded in 1925 as a forum for the discussion and study of relations among Pacific states and colonies, spearheaded by the American west coast Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), business, and academic figures. It held its first conference in Honolulu in 1925, and subsequent conferences took place in China, Japan, the United States, and Canada. Initial members came from the United States, China, Canada, Japan, and Britain; Korea, Hawaii, and the Philippines sent representatives by the second conference in 1927. The IPR emphasized Pacific cultural exchange, and addressed questions of migration and immigration, commercial and industrial relations, and religious and cultural interactions.55 Its journal Pacific Affairs published scholarly

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research on Asia-Pacific international relations, its Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area provided data on the region, and its Inquiry Series published books on East and South-East Asia. Japanese intellectuals such as Rōyama Masamichi participated in the IPR in the hope of getting other Pacific states to lift restrictions on Japanese immigrants, and maintain Japanese trade access to raw materials. Sino-Japanese rivalry and then war in the 1930s compromised the IPR’s cooperative efforts, though members such as William Holland continued to publish important works on international trade and commodity controls in the Pacific, and on Japanese zaibatsu (industrial conglomerates). The IPR was an early venue for what would later be termed “track-two” diplomacy, fostering an expansive international cooperative network of nongovernmental professionals from across the Pacific Rim. In contrast to the more liberal internationalist orientation of the transatlantic international affairs institutions, the IPR’s membership was diverse, including liberals and conservatives, Chinese communists, and Japanese expansionists.56 Early twentieth-century international think tanks and foundations were incubators of ideas of international cooperation, and provided experience for many individuals who would subsequently enter the newly emerging international civil service. This was especially the case in the United States, where many American internationalists moved between official and unofficial positions through the interwar years. The prominent early century lawyer and public servant Raymond D.  Fosdick, for instance, was undersecretary-general of the League of Nations from 1919 to 1920 (he resigned after the United States declined to join the League), a long-time member of the American League of Nations Association, and from 1936 president of the Rockefeller Foundation. He was also an active member of the Institute of International Research. It promoted international peace, sponsored international research activities, and helped coordinate the creation of the League of Nations Library in Geneva, funded by a Rockefeller endowment.57 Others worked in the private sector to encourage American international engagement, including bankers and business figures interested in expanding American trade interests. Willard Dickerman Straight worked for the American Foreign Service in Manchuria before 1914, where he encouraged greater American investment in China. He then worked for J. P. Morgan and the National City Bank of New York, posts from which he proselytized for more open international trade and the League of Nations.58 The American progressive movement of the early twentieth century, while focused primarily on domestic reform issues such as housing, labor rights, and temperance, was also drawn to international questions. Driven by a concern for

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social justice and focused on individuals rather than states, progressives were less tied to a national interest perspective of international affairs. They joined international movements and campaigns in the conviction that such transnational cooperative endeavors offered a means of securing change in domestic politics. A case in point was the print and radio broadcast journalist William Hard. The son of a Methodist missionary, Hard traveled the world as a child. After he graduated from Northwestern University in Chicago in 1901, he lived for a time at Jane Addams Hull House. There he imbibed the spirit of social reform that later infused his NBC radio reports on domestic issues such as industrial and child labor conditions, and his broadcasts on the 1928 Pan-American Union conference in Havana, the League of Nations Assembly in 1931, and the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932. Hard also publicized the work of prominent American internationalists who advocated American membership of the League and the World Court, including radio and print interviews with Columbia University president and CEIP president Nicholas Murray Butler, the jurist and cofounder of the American Civil Liberties Union Felix Frankfurter, and former secretary of state Elihu Root.59 Some private American internationalists saw membership in international organizations, especially the League, as a means of generating greater public support for internationalism. Others advocated international law as the best means of inculcating internationalism and fostering international peace. This spectrum between institutionalist and legalist internationalism was also present in Europe, though there the former was more prominent. What all American internationalists agreed on was the importance of international education.

International Education The classroom was perhaps the most prominent early twentieth-century international “contact zone.” International educational, bibliometric, scholarly, and outreach activities helped propagate the “idea of the international.” They encouraged people, especially youth, to conceive of their world from beyond a national perspective. International schools, such as the International School of Geneva, epitomized this spirit. It was a coeducational, bilingual (English and French) private school created in 1924 by a group led by the American journalist Arthur Sweetser, the Swiss sociologist Adolphe Ferrière, the French economist Fernand Maurette, and the Polish doctor Ludwig Rajchman. While internationalist in

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outlook, the school focused as much on cultivating social distinction as fostering internationalism, and over a third of its boarding students were American.60 International educational efforts in the early twentieth century also included student and faculty exchanges, the child advocacy work of the League’s Child Welfare Committee, and the youth outreach activities of international associations such as national branches of the IFLNS and the American Junior Red Cross.61 International themes and topics gained a foothold in school curricula in many countries in the early twentieth century. An example is New Zealand, where almost 100,000 of the country’s 1.1 million population joined the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, of which approximately one-fifth died. The appearance of international and peace subjects in interwar New Zealand primary school classrooms reflected the public’s collective attempt to come to terms with the war’s legacy.62 Japan’s leading university, Tokyo Imperial University, blended Western educational methods with a Confucian focus on elite education, and imported many foreign faculty members to instruct students. Many Japanese students studied abroad, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who later commanded Japan’s Combined Fleet in the Second World War, who studied at Harvard from 1919 to 1921. Japan’s centralized secondary and elementary schools, meanwhile, stressed subjects such as science and technology that would train Japanese youth in “progress-orientated” work. These educational developments paralleled the emergence of a cult of kyōyō (self-cultivation). Japanese youth were encouraged to broaden their knowledge of the world as a means of helping Japan become a full member of the international community.63 Japan was not unique in internationalizing its education system in the early twentieth century. The Ottomans sent educational emissaries to Europe in search of teacher training methods and pedagogical reforms, such as the Education nouvelle (the pedagogical philosophy of active learning), while South American governments also borrowed selectively from Europe to create hybrid educational practices. Youth organizations were another means by which youth expressed internationalism. Organizations such as the Hindustani Seva Dal and the Muslim National Guards (Khaksars) in India engaged, sometimes selectively, with their peers in other states or discursively with ideas of internationalism.64 Teacher exchanges were another medium of international educational cooperation, especially throughout the “British world.” The League of Empire operated an Interchange of Home and Dominion Teachers beginning in 1907. Nearly 2,000 teachers had participated in exchanges by the early 1930s.65 Most of the teachers were single women, and these transnational exchanges provided

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opportunities to travel, to visit family members and friends who had emigrated, and to compare pedagogy. Teachers’ organizations such as the English Association of Headmistresses, which dated to the 1870s, also encouraged interchanges between teachers in Britain and overseas. These exchanges also reinforced a transnational discourse of whiteness that dominated much international cooperative activity in the early century. Meanwhile, secondary school teachers (Federation Internationale des Professeurs de l’Enseignement Secondaire Officiel, 1912)  and primary school teachers (the International Federation of Teachers Associations, 1926)  both formed international organizations in the early twentieth century. While mainly European in their early membership, both bodies saw international cooperation in pursuit of world peace as a main goal.66 Students, too, were internationally mobile. Many universities conducted student exchange programs, with the highest participation rates occurring within Europe, and of American students to Europe. The Students International Union facilitated international student exchanges in Europe, as did the Academic Student Exchange Service of Berlin. In the United States, the Institute of International Education was created in 1919 by Butler and the “secular missionary” Stephen Duggan. It sought to foster international goodwill through academic exchanges, conferences on problems in international education, and the provision of international fellowships for students to study abroad. A World Youth Peace Congress took place in the Netherlands in 1928, drawing 150 delegates from thirty-two nations.67 The British literary professor Caroline Spurgeon and Virginia Gildersleeve, dean of Barnard College, created the International Federation of University Women in 1919 to support higher education for women.68 Education nonetheless remained primarily parochial in the early twentieth century, a trend that deepened in the interwar period as international politics became polarized. In response, modest transnational organizations appeared to promote a sense of public internationalism through activities such as the revision of history textbooks.69

An International Public The idea of an international public also shaped the development of foreign policy in the interwar years. Before 1914, diplomacy was the purview of diplomats and statesmen, conducted privately and without publicity. Foreign ministries were skeptical of the place of public opinion in international affairs, and often contemptuous of civil society internationalists, whom they viewed as dilettantes.

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Diplomats worried that peace activists could either encourage in the public a dangerous quiescence that would make it vulnerable to foreign aggression or stir up war hysteria over minor international incidents.70 These insular, elite views of the nature of foreign policy were rendered moot by the First World War, whose mass violence compromised diplomats’ claims to privileged expertise in international affairs. Two weeks after the Russian Revolution in 1917, the new Soviet People’s commissar for foreign affairs, Leon Trotsky, published the former Czarist government’s secret treaties with Western states. These documents revealed, among other things, French and British promises of captured territory to Italy if the latter joined their side in 1915. The Bolsheviks wished to portray the war as a bourgeois and imperialist plot, and to justify to their own population their decision to “trade land for bread” in leaving the war through the subsequent Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918.71 While Woodrow Wilson opposed the Bolsheviks’ politics, he shared their aversion to secret diplomacy. Wilson instead advocated “moral diplomacy,” and called for “open covenants openly arrived at” in his Fourteen Points speech, delivered to the American Congress in January 1918. Wilson’s commitment to democratic governance and national self-determination had not prevented him from pursuing imperialist foreign policy in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, but at the Paris Peace negotiations, he was able to impose an end to secret diplomacy on reluctant European governments.72 The decline of secret diplomacy cast light on the causes of war in 1914. Led by the German Foreign Office’s publication of a fifty-seven-volume documentary series drawing on German archival sources, Die Grosse Politik, the major European protagonist states published selective and curated compendiums of diplomatic documents, with the goal of presenting their state’s war record in the best comparative light. Austria (the nominal successor state to the defunct Habsburg Empire) published Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, France the Documents Diplomatiques Français, and Britain the British Documents on the Origins of the War. These documentary projects reflected national interests, but they unintentionally facilitated international cooperation by enabling scholars to conduct comparative studies of international relations. In so doing, they followed in the footsteps of The Foreign Relations of the United States, published by Washington in 1861 to help prevent the secessionist southern states from securing international recognition.73 Private actors, many associated with the international affairs think tanks detailed above, also produced compilations of documents and reportage on international relations. These publications were essentially expansive aggregations of

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published information, of a similar nature to work also done by government foreign ministries but on a larger comparative scale and made publically available. As such, they constituted an early form of “open-source intelligence.” State officials in turn began to use this material themselves, creating a symbiotic relationship between foreign ministry officials and international affairs think tanks. The BIIA/RIIA’s annual Survey of International Affairs, written by the historian Arnold Toynbee (with the unattributed collaboration of Veronica Boulter), provided a narrative survey of the previous year’s world events. It provided policy makers with empirical information about international affairs, and educated the broader public about world affairs. The CEIP’s annual yearbook performed a similar function. Both institutes also published their monthly proceedings, respectively, International Affairs (first published in 1922)  and International Conciliation (published by the CEIP from 1910 when it absorbed the work of the American Association for International Conciliation). These publications were distributed widely through academic and public libraries, as well as by subscription. Each became influential “contact zones” between governments, academics, and nascent civil society actors, fostering debate on questions of foreign policy and international governance.74 In addition to the Survey, Toynbee produced the first volumes of his A Study of History in the 1920s and 1930s. Inspired in part by Bergson’s concept of evolutionary idealism, a view of historical change that privileged human agency and the élan vital of individuals, Toynbee’s massive work presented international affairs as the interplay of multiple civilizations.75 He shared the declinist fears common among many postwar intellectuals, and feared a collapse of civilization lest humanity developed better means of international cooperation. Toynbee’s liberal faith in cooperation contrasted sharply with the pessimism of his rival civilizational thinker, the German historian Oswald Spengler. The latter argued in The Decline of the West (Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 1918) that the “daemonic” force of nationalism fatally compromised Europe’s balance of power system. A proponent of a cyclical understanding of history, Spengler pessimistically forecast for the West a reprise of the collapse of Graeco-Roman civilization. He had been inspired to write his book by the Agadir crisis (1911), and called for a Pax Germanica to prevent the rise of Anglo-American hegemony.76 Intellectual cooperation also occurred within the socialist world in the interwar years, although it was asymmetrical in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviet advisor Gregory Voitinsky helped found the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1920s, and institutions such as Sun Yat-sen University, a Comintern school established in Moscow in 1925 to instruct Chinese students from the

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Guomindang and CCP in Marxist theory, positioned Chinese as subservient to Soviet guidance. Moscow continued to supply the CCP with political tutelage, the psychological support of belonging to an international revolutionary movement, and military aid throughout the 1920s and 1930s.77 South American countries were divided on the dominant regional issues of the early twentieth century: pan-Americanism and the hegemonic hemispheric role of the United States. While most of Latin America opposed US imperialism (epitomized by the Spanish-American war in 1898, the American occupation of Cuba, and intervention in Mexico) and resisted Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), which justified American intervention in Latin America, the continent’s Portuguese-speaking hegemon, Brazil, identified more strongly with Europe and cultivated American cooperation. Brazil generally supported American positions at the International Conference of American States (Pan-American Conference), the first of which was held in Washington in 1889–90. The conference produced no binding resolutions, but established a pattern of regular hemispheric congresses in the International Union of American Republics, which subsequently became the Pan-American Union. The first regional international cooperative conferences of their kind, the Pan-American Conferences encouraged economic cooperation among Western Hemisphere states and promoted international arbitration as a means of solving economic disputes.78 They marked a significant development in the history of international cooperation in that states participated of their own volition in peacetime rather than at the conclusion of a crisis. Notwithstanding the limited international cooperation apparent at the PanAmerican Conferences, many Spanish American intellectuals resisted panAmericanism. The Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodō advocated Spanish American idealism over Anglo-Saxon materialism, while Argentinian politicians and writers such as Roque Sáenz Peña, Manuel Ugarte, and Gregorio Vicente Quesada advanced a vision of pan-American cooperation based on international law and resistance to American imperialism. Like Asian intellectuals such as Tagore and Sun Yat-sen, Spanish American writers sought to resist forms of international cooperation emanating from the Anglo-American world by asserting their own cultural autonomy. In so doing, they drew on the nineteenth-century intellectual legacy of Latin American thinkers such as the Venezuelan-born Chilean scholar and civil servant Andrés Bello, who rejected the concept of hierarchy in international relations in favor of the themes of regional cooperation, solidarity, and a Hispanic American “confraternity.”79 Brazilian intellectuals were more equivocal on pan-Americanism, divided

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between supporters (the abolitionist and statesman Joaquim Nabuco) and critics (the writer Eduardo Prado). Latin American countries were active participants in the League of Nations, complicating the League’s Eurocentric reputation. The Argentinian banker Carlos Tornquist was an important participant at the League of Nations International Financial Conference in Brussels in 1920, and the Chilean international jurist Alejandro Álvarez criticized European states’ attempts to impose an international right of freedom of navigation on international rivers at the League’s General Conference on Communication and Transit in Barcelona in 1921. Álvarez argued that international law must accommodate regional traditions, including the tradition of solidarity as it had emerged in Latin America. His position reflected the strong influence in Latin America of Simón Bolívar’s spirit of pan-American unity, which Latin American internationalists held to firmly even as they engaged with the new international organizations of the interwar period.80 The Brazilian government pursued an active internationalist foreign policy in the early twentieth century. From 1909 to 1919, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations supported the journal Revista Americana, with the goal of furthering international cooperation between Brazil, Spanish America, and the United States. Brazil was the only South American country to hold a non-permanent seat on the League of Nations Council. It withdrew from the League in 1928 in protest of not being granted a permanent council seat. By the interwar period, Brazil was increasingly seen by American, European, and other South American states as a member of “Latin America.” This regional geopolitical construct became common parlance in international affairs, facilitated by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbour” policy and American retrenchment from Latin American affairs as proclaimed at the Seventh Pan-American Conference (1933) and the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (1936).81 Ironically, one of the results of American retrenchment in Latin America was an increase in intraregional wars. South America experienced three intrastate wars between 1932 and 1941. Peru and Colombia fought over their border in the Leticia War (1932), the Chaco War (1932–5) between Bolivia and Paraguay resulted in over 100,000 casualties, and competing claims by Peru and Ecuador over the Zarumilla-Marañón region led to the Zarumilla War (1941). Partly in response to this regional instability, internationalism became a central component of Latin American political debate. An example was the Latin American Student Conference, held in Santiago, Chile, in 1937, which brought together Latin American youth to debate internationalism. They focused particularly

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on communist ideas of proletarian internationalism and the idea of “IndoAmericanism” propagated by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance. Like their peers in other parts of the world, Latin American youth tried to reconcile their nationalist sentiments with competing ideas of internationalism.82

Conclusion The production and dissemination of international knowledge in the early twentieth century occurred primarily through the contact zones of international relations institutes, academic networks, and schools. Their members believed collectively in the importance of educating the broader public in international affairs. Internationalists were as conscious of the heightened political significance of mass society as advocates of other political creeds. Liberal democrats, fascists, and communists all searched for ways to accommodate or mobilize what the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset termed “mass man.” Ortega believed that “mass man” appreciated technological inventiveness, but was ignorant of the values that underpinned such advances.83 Like Ortega, who argued for a European confederation, internationalists called for a wide array of transnational connections, both structural and informal. Ortega also epitomized the interwar era’s preoccupation with the role to be played by political leadership, whether the revolutionary leader of the fascist and communist imaginaries or the guided democracy of the liberal democracies, in advocating transnational integration. International institutions across the Western world were similarly shaped by this elite ethos. American private foundations operated with capital from plutocrats, the trans-Atlantic nexus of foreign policy institutes was comprised of political and policy elites, and even the new centers of international education largely drew their faculty and students from privileged backgrounds. Where they were democratic in nature, early twentieth-century “ideas of the international” were thus often more aspirational and prescriptive than substantive. This attention to public education in international affairs reflected a shift away from secret diplomacy, which many internationalists blamed as a contributing factor to the outbreak of war in 1914. The British jurist and diplomat James Bryce argued in 1921 that every civilization must “take an interest in the well-being of the others and to help them, in whatever way it finds best, to avoid or to recover from disasters.”84 The importance of public engagement with international affairs

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also became a normative component of the nascent discipline of international relations. The voices of international integration, including European unity advocates such as Ortega, supporters of the Pan-American Union, proponents of the League of Nations, champions of empire and commonwealth, and the emergent world federal movement all challenged the idea of national sovereignty as the foundation of the international system. Even the politics of national aggrandizement in the 1930s were transnational. Hitler’s policy of lebensraum, Mussolini’s grandiose vision of the Mediterranean as mare nostrum, and Japanese army ideologues’ imperial ideas of “Asia for Asians” were all dark negatives of the liberal internationalist worldviews from which they believed themselves excluded. Transnational efforts to increase public education in international relations also served states’ national interests, providing clerks and state officials with training in the craft and practise of international affairs. Internationalism and nationalism were thus sometimes complementary imperatives.85 State governments thus welcomed many of the emergent international relations institutions and education initiatives detailed in this chapter in the hope that they would provide new knowledge to help statesmen and government officials adapt to an increasingly integrated international system. Unlike the nation-state, whose legitimacy was embedded in sovereignty, internationalists could not agree on a common international structure or set of political ideas around which to justify their politics. Internationalism’s Eurocentrism and close affinity with imperialism further compromised its legitimacy. In a world where the majority of people were still subjects of colonial empires, and where the internationalist League of Nations was dominated by European states, internationalism thus remained a limited idea.

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International Law

International law represented perhaps the most expansive form of international cooperation in the early twentieth century. Defined variously as “the law of nations,” “the law of peoples,” “transnational law,” and “public international law,”1 international law is comprised of positive law and natural law. Positive laws are those laws created by human beings. They oblige signatories to adhere to certain behaviors, prohibit certain actions, and set out penalties for those who do not follow the law. Positive international law is derived from the supreme political authority in society. In the early twentieth century, in the absence of a world authority, this meant nation-states. Positive international law includes the treaties and multilateral agreements that govern interactions between states, and between states and private actors of other nationalities. Its goal is to provide determinate rules of behavior for actors in the international system.2 Natural law encompasses those customary agreements that are seen to reflect universally accepted moral principles. They are not (necessarily) consecrated in positive law, but they nonetheless guide actors by providing standards of behavior, and establish the basis for the moral sanction of transgressors. They are thus broader than positive law in their claim to provide universal standards of international interaction, narrower in their ambiguity, and weaker in their lack of formal compliance mechanisms. International relations in the early twentieth century embraced principles of both positive and natural law, within an international system whose core feature was the concept of sovereignty. States claimed the exclusive right to govern their own affairs, and state borders were inviolable. In exchange for the mutual recognition of these rights, states agreed informally to resort to war only in selfdefense, and to settle their disputes by peaceful means. Sovereignty also implied a broader moral compact that states would not intervene in, or criticize forcefully, each other’s domestic affairs. A legacy of both the Westphalian settlement

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of the Thirty Years’ Wars of Religion (1648) and the Congress of Vienna (1815), which established an informal practice of great power conferences as a means of settling disputes before they escalated into war, this compact had begun to waver in the late nineteenth century. The rise of liberal and socialist parties, interested in individual rights and justice over collective security, encouraged the critique of foreign states’ domestic affairs. The Liberal British Prime Minister William Gladstone criticized Ottoman abuses of Bulgarians in 1876, while some Europeans criticized Britain’s concentration camp system for Afrikaner women and children during the latter stages of the South African War (1899–1902). The international peace movement shied away from highlighting the plight of oppressed nationalities on the grounds that such attention could fracture international peace cooperation. Delegates at the Universal Peace Congress in 1901, however, addressed Britain’s conduct in South Africa, perhaps because British members such as W. T. Stead were willing to denounce their own country. Other domestic critics of their own state’s colonial conduct included Americans such as Mark Twain who were unsettled by the “barbarous” conduct of American troops in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, and German socialists critical of their country’s abuses in southwest Africa.3 These critical voices, however, were as yet a minority. While some European liberals and socialists critiqued European behavior in the colonial world, very few yet critiqued colonialism itself.4 The system of sovereign states was held to exist for “civilized” societies only; those societies outside the realm of “civilization” were not subject to its tenets, and were thus open to the colonial intervention of “civilized” states. This double standard, based in part on late-nineteenth-century European pseudoscientific ideas of race, explains why European international law was universal in its claims, but limited and selective in its application. States were wary of giving up aspects of their sovereignty, and thus the infrastructure of positive international law was weak. At the same time, many states pursued their international interests through appeals to natural law. European imperial interventions were a case in point. The concept of a “standard of civilization” was a deeply engrained component of international relations in the early twentieth century. Its proponents argued that civilized societies exercised restraint regarding the use of force, attained a certain degree of material development, and were possessed of standards of moral behavior. International legal discourse concerning relations between European and non-European states dates to the Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria’s natural law treatise De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones (1557). His work, and that of successors

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in succeeding centuries, incorporated both Europeans and non-Europeans into a single, shared conceptual international system, and developed lines of analysis by which different societies, and latterly states, were conceived to hold different legal status within the international system.5 Europe used international law as a tool to shape patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the international system by determining which societies could claim sovereignty over their territory, and which could not by virtue of perceived deficiencies in the capability of self-government. By the late nineteenth century, European powers employed the international legal discourse of “civilization” to justify global imperial expansion and establish “legalized hegemony” over the international system. The natural law predicates of pre-Enlightenment international law were replaced by legal positivism, which professed an objective analysis of international relations and held that sovereignty was determined by states’ adherence to the mutually agreed “rules” of international conduct.6 These included treaty-making, which resulted in the creation of a typology of sovereignty based on European perceptions of “civilization,” to account for the fact that some non-European states (notably the Ottomans and Qing China) in fact entered into treaties with other states and otherwise adhered to aspects of the European state system. Hence the application of ideas of a “standard of civilization,” by which European jurists generated a fluid typology of sovereignty, served to stratify the international system.7 In response, anticolonialists in Asia, Africa, and the Americas appealed to both positive and natural law in their efforts to resist colonial rule. They argued that European imperialism was inconsistent with the standards of civilization to which the Europeans themselves claimed to adhere, and that Europeans were hypocrites in that their own barbarous or exploitative behavior undermined their claims to be acting as the standard bearers of civilization. Such claims gained greater resonance in the aftermath of the First World War, a fratricidal European war that revealed European mendacity and barbarity for many Asians and Africans, not least those who directly experienced it in combat in Europe or Africa.8 Despite Europeans’ claim that non-European societies lacked the “competency” to participate as equals in international relations, they also paradoxically engaged in empire-building by treaty. This necessitated the de facto recognition of indigenous peoples’ sovereign rights. Indigenous leaders entered into treaties with European powers from the earliest stages of European overseas expansion.9 The Royal Proclamation of 1763 issued by Britain’s King George III, which established British governance in North America following its victory over France in

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the Seven Years’ War, also established the constitutional basis for treaty negotiations between the Crown and indigenous peoples in western North American territories not yet formally controlled by European powers.10 A similar process occurred in colonial Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite European powers’ appeal to the concept of terra nullius through the Berlin Conference (1885) to justify colonial occupation. Abyssinia entered into formal treaty relationships with European states following its defeat of an Italian army at Adowa in 1896, while the Ndebele King Lobengula sent representatives directly to London in 1889 seeking protection from the Portuguese.11 In contrast to this conventional “Westphalian” story is an analysis of international law that draws on postcolonial studies and other critical theories to problematize the history of international law.12 It seeks to account for the evolution of different, and sometimes competing, international legal traditions in other parts of the world. Some Third World Approaches to International Law scholars have suggested that international law can be a tool for emancipation, providing the means through which colonized societies could be recognized as sovereign equals. Less optimistic scholars emphasize how the unequal historical encounter between European and non-European societies has been replicated in international law itself.13 European societies discovered and defined difference. From de Vitoria’s application of jus gentium (the law of nations) to the Spanish conquest of Amerindians in the sixteenth century to the ethnographic work of anthropologists in the early twentieth century, Europeans constructed a global hierarchy of difference that they used to legitimize European legal practices and principles as superior.14

International Law and International Relations International law developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries within the broader and evolving framework of international relations. Conditioned by ideas of a balance of power, European states sought to impose order throughout the international system. This was the rationale behind European formal and informal imperialism in many parts of the globe. A representative example can be found in the international response to the nativist Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. The Boxers had risen in opposition to the presence of German missionaries in Shandong, and more generally as an expression of local autonomy in a converging world. Western powers had established spheres of interest in China, and formed an international alliance to defend their

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Figure  2 China:  Military of the Eight-Nation Alliance during the Boxer Rebellion represented in a Japanese print, 1900. Left to right:  Italy, the United States, France, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, Russia/Pictures from History/ Bridgeman Images, PFH1773749.

collective interests and nationals. An eight-nation force (including Japan) subsequently occupied northern China in 1900–1, some of whose troops symbolically crossed the Forbidden City to erase its inviolability by foreigners. The Boxer Protocols subsequently forced on the Qing included a sizable indemnity, and defined China as a pariah within the international system.15 Humanitarian motivations also contributed to Western states’ pursuit of international equilibrium. The Brussels Act (1890) was the first comprehensive international antislavery treaty. It enabled national courts to try slave traders, and was inspired in part by the moral fervor of the French Catholic abolition movement.16 The desire for international “order,” however, was most often an expression of states’ national interest. The clearest example of this was America’s fulsome assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, especially from the 1890s, whereby it laid claim to the American hemisphere as its sphere of influence.17 Lawyers such as the Argentine Carlos Calvo and the Japanese Tsurutaro Senga and Kentaro Kaneko employed legal knowledge to improve their nation’s international status. Non-Western states were disappointed to discover, however, that the power imbalances embedded within the international legal order

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limited their ability to exercise their sovereignty. This was especially the case for states such as Japan, Brazil, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire, which were outside the ambit of formal European rule but enjoyed only relative legal equality. Western jurists such as the American James Brown Scott and the Swiss Max Huber justified an international legal order based on differentiated sovereignty by invoking the language of tutelage and trusteeship. In response, some nonWestern lawyers appealed to cosmopolitan arguments that privileged local and regional realities. Others, including many Ottoman intellectuals, responded to the false promise of equality through sovereignty by embracing war as a means of securing their foreign policy goals.18 Religious law was also present in non-Western international law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The concept of dharma influenced Hindu and Buddhist states’ international relations, promoting a focus on cosmic order and the virtuous conduct of foreign relations. Siam’s rulers legitimated their authority through their sponsorship of Theravada Buddhism. Muslim international law dates from the eighth-century writings of Muhammad alShaybani on al-Siyar (the conduct of war and peace derived from the Shari’ah). It governed relations between believers in the Muslim world (Dar-al-Islam), and nonbelievers beyond its border. In the modern period, the concept of jihad (holy war) was construed as the duty to defend the unity of the Dar-al-Islam, while Muslim states like the Ottoman Empire also extended protection within their borders to other “peoples of the book,” namely, Jews and Christians, demonstrating that plural legal systems have a long history. The Ottoman sultan’s claim to the caliphate established the Ottomans’ hierarchical authority within the Muslim world.19 While these alternate religious traditions were not entirely subsumed by Western international law, Western incursions forced semicolonial and peripheral societies such as Siam and the Ottoman Empire to modernize their legal codes. The Ottomans did so themselves through the nineteenth-century tanzimat reforms, and were also forced to accede to a series of pledges or capitulations that granted extraterritorial privileges to non-Muslim foreign powers. The Siamese Kings Mongkut and Chulalongkorn effected a transition toward a secular Buddhist state by adopting treaty relations with Western powers and incorporating a standardized legal code.20 It was not until the 1920s that “semiperiphery” states began in earnest to resist extraterritoriality. Turkey’s capitulations were abolished through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), while Persia unilaterally renounced its capitulation treaties in 1927. Religious legal traditions fit uncomfortably into the sovereign state international system of the modern

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period, however, and were sidelined in the positivist-orientated international legal environment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

China and International Law International legal integration can be seen in the case of the largest non-Western polity, China. There the emperor had ruled the Celestial Empire by the Mandate of Heaven for millennia. Dynastic territories on the empire’s periphery, such as Tibet and Mongolia in the nineteenth century, existed in a vassal relationship with Beijing. Beyond the empire’s loose borders were neighboring kingdoms, such as Korea and Annam, which pledged their support to the Chinese imperial court by paying tribute, and which were to be either Sinicized or assimilated. The tribute system constituted a regional Chinese international system, a “Pax Sinica,” built on relationships rather than positive law.21 Outside the Chinese international system were societies constituted as barbarians. Some scholars have suggested that this China-centered international system constituted a “Confucian Long Peace” in the centuries before the global expansion of European imperial power.22 China’s pretensions to universalism were compromised by Western imperialism, which brought the closed and hierarchical Chinese international system into conflict with the expansive European international system based on sovereign equality. This clash was symbolized by the “unequal treaties” signed between Western states and the Qing Court after China’s defeat in the two Opium Wars. These unequal treaties established extraterritorial rights, consular privileges, and free trade in China for the Western powers. They also led China in 1860 to create an office of foreign affairs, the Zongli Yamen, an adaptation of the Grand Council that earlier Qing emperors had convened to advise on imperial security. The Zongli Yamen negotiated new forms of legal interaction with foreign states.23 China turned gradually from tributary relations to treaty relations in an attempt to deal with the imposition of European international law. This process began during the period of “self-strengthening” in the 1860s and 1870s, when the Qing attempted limited modernization after the humiliation of having to rely on Western military aid to defeat the Taiping Rebellion. The shift toward treaty relations weakened the Sinic international system. Siam and China had no formal relations for over a century after the former’s last “tributary” mission to Peking in 1854. Korea, meanwhile, continued to exist in a hierarchical relationship with China (as well as Japan once it secured colonial rule over Korea),

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while simultaneously entering into treaty relationships on Westphalian lines with Western powers.24 China’s growing integration in the European-dominated international system meant that the Chinese needed to develop greater knowledge of Western international legal practices of sovereignty and contractual relations. The tax reforms and statistical reports developed by the Imperial Maritime Customs provide a representative example.25 These changes were slow and incomplete, however, frustrated by the reactionary elements centered around Empress Dowager Cixi and the “imperial autism” of a conservative bureaucratic and literary elite that believed China’s moral power rested in a knowledge of the Chinese classics.26 China’s forced acceptance of the Western doctrine of positive law was facilitated by William Martin’s translation of Henry Wheaton’s influential Elements of International Law (first published in 1836, with seven subsequent revised editions through the nineteenth century) into Chinese as Wanguo Gongfa (Public Law of All Nations) in 1865. Martin saw commonalities in Chinese and Western legal traditions, and appealed to Neo-Confucianism in his translation of the Western conceptions of natural law and positive law. Translation is a quintessential form of international cooperation, and Martin’s was an attempt to embed both Chinese and Western international legal traditions in a common idea of the universal. The same principle of international cooperation drove late-Qing reformers such as Prince Gong, who arranged for the translation of Western source material to help train the Chinese in foreign languages and technical disciplines.27 The Qing formally negotiated their borders with neighboring states (which now included the French in Indo-China and the British in Burma), and recognized and pledged to protect overseas Chinese migration through the Treaty of Beijing (1860). These legal steps established Chinese sovereignty, and began to formalize China’s relations with other states. The Chinese had shifted from a conception of themselves atop a universal hierarchy (Yitong Chuishang) to their inclusion in a universalized international system based on sovereignty (Lieguo Bingli). This transition included an embrace of Guojifa (public international law) as a means by which China would interact with other states, a process led by officials and scholars such as Li Hongzhang and Duan Fang. An early example of China’s adaptation to international law as a component of its foreign relations was the China-Peru Convention (1874), whereby China secured better treatment for Chinese laborers in Peru as a condition of opening commercial relations between the two states.28 Although the Qing collapsed during the Chinese Revolution of 1911, republican China continued to make use of international

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law in pursuit of its national interests. It took an active role at Versailles, had its territorial integrity recognized in the Nine-Power Treaty (1922), and renegotiated the terms of the “unequal treaties” during the 1920s.29

International Legal Cooperation The integrated international system that emerged by the early twentieth century was organized around the constituent unit of the sovereign nation-state. Yet the very principle that was supposed to ensure international stability and order, nationalism, also produced international instability. National groups as diverse as the Irish, Poles, Armenians, and Serbs, to name just four, turned to political resistance and sometimes armed insurrection in pursuit of their autonomy. Multiethnic empires, such as the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian, proved especially vulnerable to the contrapuntal forces of nationalism. Their collapse in turn created new international law challenges, such as the rights of individuals (including members of national minority groups) in population transfers. The purpose of international relations for nationalist movements seeking selfdetermination was not stability and order, but justice. Their appeals to ideas of solidarity, and their justification of violence as a means of achieving autonomy, offered an alternate internationalist perspective to the pluralist world order they contested.30 Out of these competing international relations frameworks emerged an assemblage of conventions and customs that collectively constituted international law. The British utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham described international law as the set of rules that states agreed on to govern their relations; “inter-state” law, rather than the older concept of the law of nations.31 Nineteenth-century international law encompassed both Anglo-American jurisprudence, in which ideas of natural law maintained a greater influence and which bequeathed progressive or idealist conceptions of international order, and continental European international law, which embraced positivism and was more state-centric.32 These two traditions were brought into closer conversation in the early twentieth century, with implications for the use of international law as a potential cooperative tool in international relations. Global interconnectedness forced jurists and politicians to pay closer attention to the distinction between legal and political questions. This meant a focus on the role of the state, as early-twentieth-century debates on international governance had not yet compelled a “vocabulary above sovereignty.”33 Modern

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sovereignty connoted the exercise of supreme authority within defined territorial borders. Sovereignty was constrained by practices of liberal constitutionalism in many Western states by the early twentieth century, although older Hobbesian ideas of the sovereign as supreme authority persisted. Among the proponents of the latter position was the German jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt, who argued that sovereignty constituted the ability to declare a state of exception, and criticized liberal internationalism as a vehicle for liberal democracies to pursue their national interests under the guise of universalism. This tension between international cooperation and absolute state sovereignty was laid bare by the First World War, the twentieth century’s most catastrophic state of exception.34 The combination of internationalization and the advent of total war challenged established international legal practices, such as states’ ability to declare neutrality, while revealing potential new vistas for international legal cooperation, whether at the supranational level or through collaborative initiatives of legal harmonization or codification.35 International legal cooperation developed through a series of international conferences. Most nineteenth-century international conferences were limited to settling immediate disputes among states after a conflict, or were convened to establish European rules of colonial conquest to ensure that overseas colonial conflicts did not precipitate a European war. The latter was German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s motivation for convening the Berlin Conference (1884–5), at which the major European powers agreed to spheres of colonial interest in Africa, free passage on the continent’s major rivers, free trade between colonies, and a shared commitment to combat slavery. Not a single African was present as a delegate at Berlin. The Berlin Conference secured Europeans’ colonial interests, but it was a catastrophe for Africans, who lost their autonomy and much of their land, had territorial borders imposed on them that have persisted to the present day, and were subjected to varying degrees of state-organized violence. The nadir was the deaths of up to eight million Congolese as a result of forced rubber cultivation in Belgian King Leopold’s farcically named Congo Free State, and the German genocide of Herero and Nama in German southwest Africa between 1904 and 1907.36 The First Hague Conference (1899) was significant in that states met with the intent of establishing permanent, binding, and mutually-agreed-on principles of conduct. The conference was called by Russian Czar Nicholas II, and hosted by Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands. Twenty-six states sent representatives. The United States and Mexico were the only representatives from the Americas, while Korea, Japan, Siam, and China (present for the first time at an international conference) represented Asia.37 The conference’s setting was highly

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appropriate. The seventeenth-century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’s De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) was a foundation for the delegates’ work, and the Netherlands’ neutral foreign policy ensured broad state participation. The Hague was further imprinted as a center for peace by international public voices. The conference was one of the first international gatherings to attract a significant press and civil society audience. Journalists, church groups, international women’s organizations, and peace activists also sent representatives. They defined the event as a “peace conference,” a moniker the delegates adopted. Civil society actors such as the Austrian feminist and pacifist Bertha von Suttner lobbied conference delegates informally, while the British journalist W. T. Stead publicized the conference’s deliberations. Pressure from civil society bodies also led the Conference Bureau to report the proceedings more fulsomely than was then usual for multilateral meetings, an important preliminary step toward the more public diplomacy of the twentieth century.38 The first Hague Conference had two interrelated goals. The first was to find a way to mitigate the suffering caused by war, especially to soldiers, and to attenuate the accelerating arms race between European military powers. This was an acute problem given that rapid industrial development in the preceding two decades had made war an increasingly mechanized experience. The impact of technology was not purely theoretical. The American Civil War in the 1860s had

Figure  3 The First International Peace Conference, The Hague, 1899/Imperial War Museum, HU 67224.

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demonstrated the carnage of mass modern conflict, while the dozens of colonial wars in the 1880s and 1890s revealed the scale of technological destruction now possible. In Gazaland in southeast Africa in 1895, a Portuguese force of just over a thousand (half of whom were African auxiliaries) armed with modern rifles suffered only forty-five casualties while massacring thousands of Nguni troops of the Gaza empire. Three years later a young Winston Churchill reported on the British slaughter of thousands of Mahdists by machine-gun at Omdurman in the Sudan.39 The Hague Conference’s Final Act banned aerial bombardment (this meant dirigibles, but established a precedent for airplanes in later decades), poisonous gas, and the use of “dumdum bullets.” It also codified the law of war for sea and land conflicts. Not all countries ratified these declarations, and they were understood to apply only between “civilized” states and thus not to the colonial world. Nonetheless, they established important international legal norms.40 The conference’s second goal was to seek a means for states to settle their differences without resorting to war. Here the concept of arbitration loomed large. International peace activists such as Elihu Burritt, Constantin Pecquer, and Emile de Girardin had promoted arbitration as a cheap and efficient alternative to war at the International Peace Congresses of the 1840s and 1850s.41 The Institute of International Law, created in 1873, emerged as a private source of expertise on arbitration. States relied on its Project de règlement pour la procedure arbitrale internationale to frame international arbitration treaties. The United States and Britain had settled the Alabama dispute through arbitration in 1872, American Secretary of State James G. Blaine advocated arbitration in 1881 as a means of settling the “War of the Pacific” between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, and Britain agreed to American-led arbitration to settle the Venezuela border dispute in 1895–6. A treaty providing for compulsory arbitration of interstate disputes was negotiated, although not ratified, at the Washington Conference (1889), the first international conference of American states at which the PanAmerican Union was formed.42 These nineteenth-century precedents suggested to some jurists, diplomats, and activists that the principle of arbitral justice could be applied more broadly in international relations. Arbitral justice could provide standards of equity in the absence of an international government. It also constituted an extension of a state’s sovereignty in that states willingly submitted to arbitration. States were hesitant, if not openly hostile, to ceding sovereignty to an international body, but they would submit to arbitration if they were assured of fair treatment, and confident that other states would agree to binding judgments. A reciprocal system of international arbitration could thus potentially create an international order of mutual security.

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Out of these arguments at the First Hague Conference came the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Not a court per se, but rather an ad hoc framework for arbitration, the PCA established a rostrum of arbitrators on which states could draw to voluntarily settle disputes between themselves. Due to German opposition, the PCA was an optional rather than an obligatory institution, thus weakening its potential impact on international relations. It could also establish Commissions of Inquiry to investigate the facts of a dispute, a provision that could lead to a settlement being reached without resort to arbitration.43 Twentythree cases were referred to the PCA up to 1939, most notably the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case between Britain (on behalf of Canada) and the United States.44 Optional arbitration only works where trust among members is high, however, and the PCA thus fell from favor after 1914 when war created deep divisions within the international system. The Hague “system” expanded in 1902. The Latin American states present at the 1901–2 Pan-American Union Conference agreed to sign The Hague Convention, as well as a treaty to codify public and private international law and to extradite criminals between member states. These cooperative agreements built on a culture of regional cooperation dating to Simón Bolívar’s proposed League of American republics at the 1826 Congress of Panama. A further Latin American contribution to international law occurred in 1907 with the formation of the Central American Union. It was accompanied by a Central American Court of Justice (CACJ), the world’s first international court. Active from 1908 to 1918, its members included Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The CACJ pioneered the principle of adjudicating international disputes through a judicial tribunal rather than by arbitration or resort to force.45 Latin American jurists were also instrumental in articulating an American international law in juxtaposition to prevailing European ideas of international equilibrium. The Argentine lawyer Luis María Drago advanced his Drago Doctrine in 1902, which asserted the principle of nonintervention and the role of local tribunals to mediate international disputes, while the Chilean jurist Alejandro Álvarez discerned American legal traditions of noninterventionism, solidarity, and state sovereignty that he located in an anticolonial hemispheric history.46 Through their interactions with American legal figures such as Elihu Root and Leo Rowe, these Latin American jurists helped develop an anticolonial international legal infrastructure that underpinned ideas of pan-Americanism and demonstrated that international law was not shaped solely by European imperial interests. The Second Hague Conference occurred in 1907, with forty-four delegations present. It also officially recognized the Salvation Army and the International

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Council of Women, an early instance of NGO participation in multilateral international meetings.47 In the eight years since the first conference, international relations had become more bellicose. Britain had fought a major colonial war against Afrikaners in South Africa (1899–1902), while an emergent Japan defeated Russia in 1905. American President Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation of the latter conflict through the Treaty of Portsmouth provided the immediate impetus for the Second Hague Conference. The major European powers had also agreed to a series of alliances that had created two blocs, the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary) and the Triple Entente (Russia, France, and Britain). International tensions were thus more acute than they were in 1899, resulting in the second conference’s more modest achievements. Delegates agreed to provisions for the use of international commissions of inquiry, a convention requiring formal declarations of war to open hostilities, the text of a model arbitration treaty, and extended rules of maritime war. Proposals for a world court came to naught, as states disagreed on how judges for such a court would be selected.48 The idea, however, would reappear after the First World War in the form of the PCIJ. The two Hague Conventions were significant in that they established in international law that individuals had rights, even in war. States agreed to treat prisoners of war and civilians caught in a war zone with dignity. The Hague Conventions also established that some international conventions, such as the right to negotiate with another state even when it was a military enemy, were inviolable even in wartime. The Hague Conventions illustrated the promise of international law as a substantive and binding force in international affairs. These international aspirations, though, were still contained within an international system where the state remained the preeminent actor. States thus often agreed in principle to international cooperative measures, but were slow to ratify agreements, or inserted reservations that retained their autonomy to decide if and when an international agreement accorded with their national interest.

The First World War In the short term, “the Hague system” failed. Peace activists were disappointed that the Hague Conventions could not contain a series of conflicts precipitated by the decline of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, first in Libya (1911), then the Balkans (1912, 1913), and finally the July crisis (1914) that led

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to a world war.49 Nor did such legal and moral activism mitigate the horrible suffering of combatants and civilians during the First World War. Nearly nine and half million soldiers died between 1914 and 1918. The death toll increases further if one includes the civil war in Russia after the Russian Revolution in 1917, uprisings in Hungary, Poland, the Balkans, and parts of the disintegrating Ottoman Middle East, and the Greco-Turkish war (1919–22). Almost four million more individuals died in these “postwar” conflicts.50 The First World War challenged the foundations of the international system as based on the equality of (Western) states, as expressed through international conventions, treaties, and customary law. The protagonists’ respective wartime conduct also undermined international law’s legitimacy. Germany’s violation of Belgium’s neutrality in 1914, the atrocities committed by its soldiers in Belgium and France (some real, such as the destruction of Louvain’s university library, and the execution of civilians believed to be combatants or spies, such as the British nurse Edith Cavell; others mythical, like the alleged crucifixion of a Canadian soldier), and its mistreatment of civilians in occupied territories demonstrated Germany’s conviction that its national military imperatives, not international law, were the guidelines on which it acted.51 The Allies saw these acts, as well as Germany’s use of unrestricted submarine warfare and poison gas, as violations of statutory international law, and therefore illegal. Germany countered that the Allies interpreted international law as consistent with their own national interests. They also pointed to Allied offences against international law, including the British blockade of Germany that reduced the amount of imported food available to German civilians, and Allied bombing of German targets late in the war.52 The Allied-German dispute over the war’s legality weakened the legitimacy of international law as a tool of international relations. So did the peace settlement. The Allies argued at Versailles that Germany had pursued aggressive war, and had violated international treaty law and the law of war. They thus pressed for an indemnity—the famous war reparations—as well as restrictions on Germany’s military capabilities. The Germans protested that they were no more responsible for the war than other powers. This argument gained sympathizers in the United States especially, giving rise to the view that the war was caused by the system of prewar “entangling alliances,” as opposed to the deliberate actions of particular states. Revisionist arguments also appeared in Britain, notably in the economist John Maynard Keynes’s best-selling book The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919).53 The interwar debate over the causes of the war shifted attention away from its conduct, further weakening support for international law. Adherence to the

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rules of war was the lowest common denominator for membership in the international system in the early twentieth century. Germany’s argument that military necessity trumped international law shook the foundations of this system, and made it an outlier in the postwar period. Ideally, international law provides order and stability, helps spread risk and the costs of enforcement among member states, increases collective security by regulating conflict, and allows states to plan rather than merely react to short-term imperatives. To its supporters, international law emanates from the community of states, which is its collective legislator. For its critics (including defeated Germany but also aggrieved states such as Italy and Japan, as well as many realist international thinkers and politicians), the state was the only legitimate actor in the international system. These actors believed that power, not law, was the basis of international relations. Germany was a “structural violator” of international law during the war, although the Allies also ignored or contravened international conventions and customary practices. International law is founded on a common respect for the law’s authority, a collective agreement as to what legitimate sanctions exist for the enforcement of international law, the principle of reciprocity that binds signatories to each other above and beyond claims to morality, and its intention of universality.54 All four of these foundations were undermined during the First World War. Liberal internationalist jurists such as the Greek legal scholar Stelios Seferiades thus argued that international law needed to be reconstructed after the war through a “vocabulary of progress.” This reformist discourse would stress the benefits of coexistence over absolute state sovereignty, with the goal of fostering an international community of liberal democratic states. Where prewar proponents of international law argued that it provided a means of attaining peace through arbitration, postwar international law advocates argued that peace itself was the necessary goal.55 Only in a peaceful international system could justice be attained, argued interwar internationalists such as the Swedish jurist Åke Hammarskjöld and the British League of Nations champion Robert Cecil. They saw international institutions, especially the League of Nations and the PCIJ, as the best means of attaining such conditions.

The Permanent Court of International Justice While faith in international arbitration had been shaken by the war, the institutional architecture of international law nonetheless expanded in the interwar period. This architecture functioned reasonably effectively through the 1920s,

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although it was a supporting rather than primary feature of international relations. It was overwhelmed by the international crises of the 1930s, however, as states retrenched into power politics, protectionism, and ultimately war. The interwar evolution of international legal institutions was thus a limited success. The key interwar international legal institution was the PCIJ (known in the United States as “the World Court”). On June 27, 1931, a group of Norwegian fishermen raised the Norwegian flag at Mosquito Bay, on the eastern coast of Greenland. The Norwegian government subsequently proclaimed sovereignty over eastern Greenland as “Erik the Red’s Land.” This proclamation ignored Danish sovereignty over Greenland, and brought the two countries into dispute. Rather than pursuing their interests by arms, however, the two countries instead brought their dispute to the PCIJ. It ruled in favor of Denmark, still the only arctic territorial dispute to be settled by arbitration.56 The Greenland case illustrates the PCIJ’s contribution to international cooperation as an institution that adjudicated disputes by reference to clear rules of international law. As we have seen, delegates at the First Hague Conference looked favorably on the principle of international arbitration. The difficulty was that arbitration tribunal awards, being self-referential, established no legal continuity. The United States addressed this problem at the Second Hague Conference through its proposal of an international Court of Arbitral Justice (CAJ). The proposal was adopted as a recommendation (voeu), indicative of the general international support for the principle of voluntary legal arbitration. It was not implemented, however, over objections concerning the tension between the proposed CAJ’s doctrine of juridical equality and the political inequality of states in the international system. The CAJ’s suggested seventeen judicial seats were far fewer than the number of states in the international system, and smaller states feared that the judges would advance the Great Powers’ interests at the expense of their own. The larger states in turn opposed the counterproposal by Brazil for a court with as many judicial seats as there were states.57 The PCIJ was established through Article XIV of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Third Committee of the League of Nations Assembly drafted the PCIJ Statute in 1920. Unlike the prewar PCA, which was ad hoc, issue-based, and for which disputants selected their own arbiters, the PCIJ was a standing institution with permanent judges elected to nine-year terms. It became a permanent part of the international system, succeeded in 1946 by the International Court of Justice. The PCIJ addressed the perceived incompatibility of the principles of judicial and political equality by giving the League Council and Assembly

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joint authority to appoint its judges. Each of the national groups (regional sets of countries) represented in the PCA, along with national groups established for League members not represented in the PCA, could nominate up to four judges to the PCIJ. Only two of each national group’s nominees could be of its own nationality. Successful nominees had to be elected by majority in both the League Council and the Assembly, ensuring that neither large nor small states could dominate the court.58 The PCIJ was a major achievement in the history of international law, with the express goal to represent “the principal legal systems of the world.”59 During its history from 1922 to 1946, the court included judges from Europe, the United States, Latin America, China, and Japan. The PCIJ had its own permanent registry, which allowed it to keep records of its deliberations (most of which were held in public), contribute to the development of international case law, and liaise with governments. The PCIJ could adjudicate any international dispute brought to it by states or members of the League of Nations,60 as well as those classes of legal disputes that states agreed could come under the court’s jurisdiction. The latter optional clause could apply to the interpretation of a treaty, questions of international law, whether an international obligation was breached, and reparations for any breaches of international obligations. The court’s jurisdiction was thus decided by its members, and in practice most states remained reluctant to submit major issues to the court. The PCIJ could also offer advisory opinions on cases referred to it by the League Council or Assembly. Finally, with the disputants’ agreement the court could decide cases ex aequo et bono (according to the principle of equity rather than a strict interpretation of international law).61 The court was international in more than just its membership. Its justices could settle cases by reference to international conventions, international custom, the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”62 The latter clause allowed for adjudication by multiple legal traditions, although in practice Western European jurisprudence predominated. The PCIJ adjudicated twenty-five cases between 1922 and 1940, and delivered twenty-seven advisory opinions. As an international tribunal, it accepted and evaluated pleadings from parties to disputes, gathered and studied documentary evidence, and conducted public hearings. Many of its cases concerned disputes over territorial jurisdiction and the interpretation of international treaties. In the court’s first judgment, the Case of the S. S. “Wimbledon” (1923), the majority ruled against Germany for refusing passage through the Kiel Canal to the

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SS Wimbledon, which was carrying arms for Poles for their war with Russia.63 The PCIJ also adjudicated disputes concerning another interwar flashpoint, minority rights. It found in favor of Germany’s claim that Poland had violated its treaty obligations by expropriating factories and agricultural estates from German owners in Polish-administered Upper Silesia. Other case categories included transnational disputes over rail traffic and shared waterways, disputes over the payment of foreign-held loans, and the jurisdiction of international organizations.64 Some PCIJ cases had significant political consequences for the security of the postwar international order, such as the proposed German-Austrian customs union (1931), which the court advised by a narrow majority was in contravention of Protocol No. 1 (Declaration) relating to the reconstruction of Austria (1922) by compromising Austria’s territorial inviolability. Others were local disputes, such as Franco-Greek and Crete-Samos disagreements over lighthouse rights.65 While the PCIJ’s deliberations did not settle all these disputes, as illustrated by the failure of its various decisions and opinions through the 1930s concerning the Free City of Danzig to prevent the city from becoming a casus belli, the court’s work was collectively significant in demonstrating the merits of binding international justice.66 The PCIJ helped to institute customary international law, the concept that states established mutually accepted international legal obligations through their shared practices. The key judgment in this regard was The Case of the S. S. Lotus (1927), wherein the court articulated a legal conception of state sovereignty. On August 2, 1926, the French steamer Lotus collided with the Turkish steamer Boz-Kourt in the Mediterranean Sea off the Turkish coast. The Boz-Kourt sank, resulting in the death of eight Turkish nationals on board. The Lotus was taken to Turkey, where the Turkish government tried its watch officer at the time of the collision, Lieutenant Demons, as well as the Boz-Kourt’s captain, for manslaughter. France protested Demons’s sentence (eighty days’ imprisonment and a fine), claiming that Turkey violated international law by claiming jurisdiction over an alleged offence committed by another state’s national in international waters. It cited Article 1 of the Convention of Lausanne, which stipulated that questions of jurisdiction between Turkey and the other contracting powers should be decided by international law.67 The French and Turkish governments agreed to submit the dispute to the PCIJ. In its majority judgment, the PCIJ asserted its right to consider not just the arguments put forward by the parties to the dispute, but also its own research into relevant “precedents, teachings and facts” of international law.68 The PCIJ

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decided against France by arguing that states are only limited by the prohibitive regulations of international law. In all other situations, such as a dispute like the Lotus case where neither state could claim territorial sovereignty and was not bound by positive international law, it declared that “every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.” The Case of the S. S. Lotus thus established the precedent that international law permits states to act as they wish so long as they do not contravene any existing international provision or prohibition.69

The League of Nations and International Law While the PCIJ provided legal context for the nature of sovereignty in an age of international interconnectivity and instability, the Council of the League of Nations addressed the more acutely political aspects of sovereignty in the international system. The council’s collective security failures are well-known, especially its inability to contain or confront the aggressive foreign policies of Japan, Italy, and Germany in the 1930s. Yet its modest efforts to promote international cooperation should not be ignored. The council’s first notable case concerned the Åland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. Finland asserted sovereignty over the islands, but 96.4 percent of islanders expressed their wish to join Sweden in a plebiscite in 1919. The council established a Commission of Jurists in 1920 after Finland sent troops to lay its claims to the islands. The commission ruled that Finland did not have jurisdiction over the islands as it was not a “definitively constituted state” at the time the dispute had arisen, having only declared its own independence from Russia in December 1917. The commission thus favored the islanders’ case for self-determination. The legal preeminence of state sovereignty over questions of self-determination was then pursued by a League Commission of Rapporteurs, which disagreed with the jurists in concluding that Finland had established its sovereignty over the islands by its proper treatment of the islanders. The League Council ultimately sided with the Rapporteurs, recognizing Finnish sovereignty over the islands, but stressing that the minority rights of the Swedish islanders were to be protected.70 The Åland Islands case illustrates the League’s determination to balance international order (it did not wish to establish a precedent for the secession of other national minorities by overturning Finnish sovereignty) with self-determination.

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The League’s broader record in brokering international cooperation was modest, however, as demonstrated by its efforts in Latin America. The region’s states achieved a significant role in Geneva through the practice of bloc voting, and were active on the League’s various committee and commissions. Yet they were reluctant to submit their disputes to the League to settle. The League Council did criticize Peru’s aggression in the 1932 Leticia war with Colombia, and administered the disputed Amazon territory while the peace agreement was negotiated after Peruvian President Luís Sánchez Cerro was assassinated.71 However, the region’s most intense interwar conflict, the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia (1932–5), was settled by pan-American cooperation rather than by the League. When skirmishes first occurred in the Chaco region in the winter of 1928–9, the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration established a Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, composed of representatives from Latin American countries and the United States, to offer the parties arbitration. These efforts failed, and after war began in 1932 the League established a Commission of Inquiry, which recommended that Paraguay and Bolivia submit their dispute to the PCIJ to decide the case ex aequo et bono. Both sides refused arbitration, and it was only through negotiations convened by the ABCP states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru), along with the United States and Uruguay, that the war ended.72 The League was also active in other fields of international legal cooperation, including attempts to codify international law. This legalist project followed from prewar convictions, especially among American jurists, of the necessity to codify customary international law as a means of creating an international legal regime for the adjudication of functional issues. The belief was that states where international law was customary instead of based on convention would not otherwise be willing to submit their disputes to an international court.73 Attempts to codify international law through the Hague Conferences have been noted earlier. Both the Institute of International Law and the International Law Association also worked for the documentation and codification of international law. These efforts were given an international imprimatur by the creation of the League of Nations Committee for the Progressive Codification of International Law in 1925. It convened international legal experts to compile national laws and make proposals for the codification of international law across its various subfields, from nationality law to the law of the sea. The committee also canvassed states by questionnaire to identity areas of law that were amenable to international regulation. These included several issues for which international governance or standards evolved in subsequent decades, including international

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piracy, diplomatic privileges and immunity, jurisdiction over territorial waters, and procedures for the drafting of international treaties. The committee’s efforts culminated in the 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law.74 While the League’s codification efforts had little immediate impact, they established a framework for future advances in international law. Two issues central to the practice of international economic cooperation, the status of multinational entities and international trade law, provide an example. The League’s legal experts recommended regulations to clarify the nationality status of multinational corporations, suggesting that international conventions incorporate the principle that “the nationality of a commercial company shall be determined by the law of the contracting party under whose law it was formed and by the establishment of the actual seat of the company in the territory of the State in which the company was formed.”75 They also advised that states include clear terms of reciprocity regarding most-favored-nation clauses in international commercial treaties to encourage international free trade.76

The Limitations of International Law While the PCIJ’s caseload and the League’s legal codification efforts demonstrate the appeal of the idea of peaceful change in the 1920s, the politics of conflict in the 1930s revealed international law’s limitations. The postwar peace settlements embedded the principle of collective security in international law. The League’s goal was “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security.”77 The League Covenant bound members “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence” of all member states (Article 10), and to interpret threats against one member as a collective threat (Article 11). The instruments of arbitration and judicial settlement were declared the legitimate means of settling international disputes, with the PCIJ established for the latter purpose (Articles 12, 13, and 14). Where these measures failed, the League could take collective action against an aggressor state (Articles 15 and 16). The concept of aggressive war itself was the subject of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928, also known as the Pact of Paris), a multilateral treaty that declared war illegal as an instrument of state policy. While the pact did not define “aggression,” and left open the right of war in self-defense, it nonetheless helped to delegitimize war as a normative tool of foreign policy. The emerging legal norm of nonaggression was further underlined by the Stimson Doctrine (1932), whereby

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US Secretary of State Henry Stimson declared that states had the right in public international law to refuse recognition of international territorial changes brought about by force. While the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Stimson Doctrine gave states additional tools to mediate international disputes, neither was ultimately useful in preventing Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1936, Germany’s aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1939, or Russia’s occupation of Finnish Carelia after the Winter War (1939–40).78 After the Second World War, however, nonrecognition of territorial claims based on aggression has become an international norm. The occasion for Stimson’s declaration was Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and its proclamation of a new state of Manchukuo. Japan’s imperial aggression in Asia mirrored European norms and practices of international relations, and also revealed the limitations of international law as a tool for mediating international affairs. Like China, Japan was forcibly “opened” to the international community by Western pressure—in its case, during the period between US Commodore Matthew Perry’s arrival in Tokyo Bay in 1853 to the Meiji Restoration of 1867–8. Unlike the Qing, the Meiji Japan’s leaders sought to emulate the West and become an equal member of the international system. This process of modernization involved participation in Western-organized international institutions (Japan was the first non-Western member of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]) and the decision to conform to prevailing international law.79 Japan expanded its regional influence through military victories over China (1894–5) and Russia (1904–5), securing its gains through international treaties. A peripheral participant in the First World War, Japan’s emerging great power status was nonetheless recognized at Versailles where it was made a member of the League Council. The Western powers’ rejection of Japan’s proposed racial equality clause, however, illustrated that while they respected Japan’s material power, racial hierarchies in international relations persisted. Japan thereafter applied a theory of Dai-Tōa Kokusai-hō (Great East Asian International Law) as justification for its imperial expansion in Asia. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), which Japan imposed on China at the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), had established Japan’s claims on the Asian mainland and ended China’s tributary relationship with Korea. This treaty relationship was augmented after the First World War by the soft law provisions of the Open Door Policy, whereby private foreign individuals and corporations were given equal and unimpeded economic access to the China market in exchange for recognition of Chinese territorial sovereignty. The Open Door Policy was consecrated in the Nine-Power Treaty (1922), of which Japan was a signatory. Its

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occupation of Manchuria in 1931 thus contravened this normative international law, in addition to the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. Japan saw things differently, arguing that it had a legal claim to Manchuria under the bilateral terms of the Twenty-One Demands, through which it had asserted special rights in Manchuria.80 Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931 challenged both the postwar international settlement and European conceptions of international law. Both China and Japan were members of the League, whose Covenant required member states to respect each other’s sovereignty. Japan resisted international efforts to limit states’ right to conduct war, particularly in self-defense. It thus opposed efforts to reconcile the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. China, meanwhile, was leery of the possibility of “pacific” wars under the new international legal framework. While states were now technically prohibited from conducting aggressive war, there was nothing to prevent them from using state-organized violence by other means. This was the case in the Manchurian Incident in 1931, whereby Japan used a staged conflict (the “Mukden incident”) to begin the Kwantung Army’s occupation of Chinese Manchuria. Japan asserted Manchukuo’s sovereignty as an independent state. The latter’s position in the international system was highly anomalous. Japan’s decision to leave the League illustrated its leaders’ contempt for international law, and Japan itself treated the region as a colony. Yet, Japan also fervently sought diplomatic recognition for Manchukuo, illustrating its tacit acceptance of the international legal framework. In the event, only El Salvador, the Vatican, puppet-states such as Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government in Nanjing, and Japan’s European fascist allies recognized Manchukuo as a state.81 China’s faith in the League as a guarantor of international law proved empty. While Japan was criticized in the League Assembly over its occupation of Manchuria, and ultimately left the League, it did not face stronger sanctions. The League instead sent an investigative committee to Manchuria, the Lytton Commission, to ascertain the facts on the ground.82 In the 1920s, China had appealed to the legal principle of vital change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) to call for the revision of the unequal treaties, while Japan appealed to the sanctity of treaty law to defend its interests. Each reversed their positions after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, which began the Sino-Japanese War. China now called on treaty law and the international community to defend itself from Japanese aggression, while Japan now claimed a vital change of circumstances permitted it to build a new order in Asia irrespective of international treaties, including the League Covenant.83

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Commissions of inquiry had been used intermittently from the nineteenth century. They were formally incorporated into international law after the American commission of inquiry into the causes of the explosion on the USS Maine on February 15, 1898, which killed 260 men and sparked the SpanishAmerican war. Commissions of inquiry figured prominently in discussions about international arbitration at the First Hague Conference, where delegates determined that international inquiries could serve as more equitable legal instruments than the unilateral American commission of 1898. Commissions of inquiry could serve as a “safety-valve” to reduce international tensions by establishing what the Russian representative Feodor de Martens termed boundaries “to the discussions of the press, of the public and of representative bodies.”84 The 1899 Hague Convention contained provisions for the use of international commissions of inquiry to elucidate “the facts [of an international dispute] by means of impartial and conscientious investigation” in which “both sides must be heard.”85 The first prominent international inquiry occurred in 1904, when a commission helped peaceably settle the Dogger Bank dispute between Britain and Russia concerning the Russian Baltic Fleet’s sinking of British trawlers that it mistook for Japanese warships.86 Commissions of inquiry represented the intervention of the international community in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, and were thus a measured form of international cooperation. Beyond public accountability purposes, they served in encouraging states to adhere to international norms (which in the case of Japan in regard to Manchuria was negligible); however, they proved to be limited instruments of international law. So too were other “soft law” international norms that emerged in the interwar period, such as petitions, plebiscites, and mixed-claims commissions. The League of Nations made extensive use of petitions and plebiscites. Petitions were a mechanism by which disenfranchised populations, such as the populations of the new mandate territories in Africa, the Middle East, and the South Pacific, or ethnic minorities in the fourteen European states that accepted minority obligations under the League’s minorities provisions created by the postwar peace treaties, could appeal over the heads of their domestic governments to the League for redress.87 Petitions rarely led to significant action, but they expanded the scope of international politics by publicizing divisive, prejudicial, or coercive acts and policies that might otherwise have remain localized. They also established a legal precedent for colonial and Western “cause” lawyers to later press for postcolonial nations’ claims within the United Nations.88 The League used plebiscites to settle questions of territorial sovereignty left unresolved by the peace treaties, including Silesia and the Saar. The goal was to

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provide a democratically legitimate tool for populations to express their selfdetermination preferences. Plebiscites became entrapped by the very ethnic politics they were supposed to supersede, however, a dynamic that reached its nadir with the German insistence on a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor with baldly pro-German rules as one of the sixteen demands it delivered to Poland hours before it attacked the latter on September 1, 1939.89 Mixed-claims commissions were established after the First World War to settle claims by Allied nationals for property losses caused by actions of the Central powers. The most notable was the 1922 United States-Germany Mixed Claims Commission, which settled damages from the Lusitania sinking among other claims. Mexico also participated in mixed-claims commissions with the United States and several European countries concerning claims emanating from the Mexican revolution (1910–20).90

International Criminal Law One area where there was minimal international cooperation in the early twentieth century was international criminal law. Jurists argued after the First World War for what one historian has termed the “new justice.” Its prevailing trait was a desire for the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of international crimes. Its central legal components were the establishment of independent international tribunals for the prosecution of war crimes and other international offences, international cooperation regarding the extradition and prosecution of accused war criminals, and the principle that individuals who committed crimes in their capacity as state officials should not be immune from prosecution.91 The First World War had revealed the dangers of an international system that relied solely on states to police their own citizens, especially when those citizens were state officials or leaders. Rather than the established practices of prisoner exchanges and the granting of amnesties, proponents of the “new justice” believed future international security demanded punishment for those individuals who willfully violated international treaties, carried out war crimes as defined by the Geneva and Hague Conventions, or otherwise acted in a barbarous manner. The victorious Allied powers wanted to prosecute wartime leaders of the Central powers, particularly Germany, for violations of the laws of war and the dissemination of atrocity propaganda, and to reestablish the legitimacy of international law. They had some support from independent legal and humanitarian bodies. The International Law Association supported the idea of a

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war crimes tribunal, while the International Committee of the Red Cross advocated an investigation into war crimes committed during the conflict. Germany’s war leader, Kaiser Wilhelm II, fled to the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him for trial, and international support for war crimes tribunals ebbed as the 1920s wore on. Neither the League Secretariat nor the PCIJ pushed the issue, while national tribunals, such as those conducted at Leipzig by the Weimer German government, failed to produce guilty verdicts. In the absence of international tribunals, some states turned to other novel initiatives to settle questions of wartime justice. An important example was the concept of “population transfer.” While the practice of population transfer became implicated in the politics of ethnic cleansing and genocide by the 1930s and 1940s, in the 1920s it still found some support as a “positive” population policy for preventing interstate conflict.92 Greece and Bulgaria agreed to a population transfer in 1919, as did the Greek and Turkish governments in 1923. Civilians on both sides of the Greek-Turkish conflict had suffered grievously at the hands of both state governments. Each government was thus able to wash its hands of the legal consequences of its wartime conduct through their collective population transfer of more than 1.5 million people. Only in Cyprus was this policy not successfully implemented.93 The principle of prosecution and punishment was also extended to other forms of international crime.94 Early-twentieth-century international criminal law was a web of international directives that established norms and practices for the punishment of certain international transgressions. These included crimes that states collectively viewed as a threat to their respective security, such as terrorism, counterfeiting, and the traffic in women and children. International crime emerged as a global problem in the late nineteenth century, facilitated by the same forces of globalization that had produced international cooperation in many legitimate enterprises. International terrorism was a particularly problematic criminal challenge.95 A principle international legal problem was that terrorism was generally understood as a political act. Perpetrators were thus immune from extradition treaties. A series of International Conferences for the Unification of Criminal Law in the early 1930s produced model national antiterrorism legislation, but stipulated that terrorism be treated as a special offence rather than a criminal one. The assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in 1934 by Croatian separatists compelled the League of Nations to create the Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism. It produced the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937), which defined terrorism as

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“criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.” While the convention had some normative import, it was only ratified by India, and never came into force.96 Interwar support for the intensification of international criminal law drew support from liberal internationalists, as well as voices on the communist left and fascist right. Some international jurists believed that international criminal law could be used to prosecute violations of League conventions and treaties, primarily its minorities treaties. Others thought it could be used to secure international borders against revisionist threats, and protect domestic populations against peacetime violations by their own governments. While some of these goals anticipated post-1945 human rights provisions, others concerned states’ security interests rather than the rights of individuals. What united advocates of international criminal law was the belief that it could be used to protect the authority of the state and the League of Nations.97 The most visionary international criminal law idea debated in the interwar years was an independent international criminal court, which the Association International de Droit Pénal proposed in 1928.98 Supporters of an international criminal court envisioned an institution sanctioned by the League of Nations, to which states would voluntarily accede. States would collectively limit their recourse to war to solve international disputes, and grant the court limited jurisdiction over their own citizens. Proposals for an international criminal court were tied to the idea of universal jurisdiction for international crimes such as terrorism. This legal principle would allow states to prosecute nationals of other states who were accused of committing such crimes on their territory. Universal jurisdiction ultimately attracted minimal interest from states in the interwar years. States were more willing to harmonize domestic legislation concerning crimes with an international dimension, such as the traffic in narcotics and in women and children. States also intensified their collaborative policing efforts, creating Interpol as a network to share information on criminal activity.99 States were not yet willing, however, to surrender jurisdiction over their own nationals to an international body. The application of international criminal law to the political acts of state officials remained dormant until the international tribunals after the Second World War.100 Interwar proposals for an international criminal court, however, anticipated the present International Criminal Court brought into existence by the Rome Statute (1998).

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Conclusion The set of international legal norms and practices that emerged after the First World War were early steps in the erosion of state sovereignty as the hegemonic feature of international relations. They represented a growing, if still minority, conviction that states had responsibilities for their own citizens under international law. Debates about minority rights, disarmament, outlawry of war, and other forms of intervention all centered on the question of whether representatives of the international community (the League, coalitions of states, investigatory commissions) had a right or responsibility to intervene when a state mistreats its own citizens. While these norms faced stiff challenges in the early twentieth century, they established the foundation for the expanded jurisdiction of international law and ideas of international intervention in subsequent decades.

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International Humanitarian Activism

Humanitarian activism across borders, defined as helping those in need and promoting general human welfare, has a long history. A  humanitarian sensibility emerged in the late eighteenth century, inspired by the Enlightenment’s precepts of universalism, rationalism, and faith in progress and human agency. Nineteenth-century imperial humanitarianism was focused on the amelioration of slavery, and abolition became an international campaign by the century’s end. Humanitarian actors such as the Aborigines’ Protection Society advocated protectionist policies to shield indigenous peoples from settler colonial exploitation and ill-treatment in Australia, New Zealand, southern Africa, and British North America from the 1830s. Later in the nineteenth century, imperial humanitarians participated in official projects of cultural assimilation such as residential schools for indigenous children in Canada and the enforced relocation of Aboriginal children to white foster homes by Australian authorities.1 Patterns of international humanitarian cooperation fully emerged in the 1910s. Forced and compulsory labor attracted international condemnation. In the wake of the First World War, international humanitarians turned their attention to a new type of victim, the refugee or stateless person. International antislavery and refugee aid movements were joined by international social reform movements and the appearance of an international ecumenical community. These often intersecting communities of humanitarian activists came to constitute an international humanitarian regime by the interwar years. This chapter tells their story.

The Enlargement of Humanitarian Intervention The concept of humanitarian intervention emerged after the Congress of Vienna (1815). While the principle of nonintervention underpinned the

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Congress system, states’ interest in maintaining the balance of power and private actors’ moral imperatives sometimes converged. The combination of humanitarian activism, support for national self-determination, and security interests motivated European states to intervene in the Greek revolution against the Ottomans in the 1820s.2 Moral concern continued to drive transnational interventions on behalf of minorities in subsequent decades. In the Damascus Affair in 1840, a delegation of Westerners led by Sir Moses Haim Montefiore addressed Muhammad Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, to protest the prosecution of Jews accused of killing a Christian monk. Their intervention helped lead to the suppression of blood libel accusations in the Ottoman Empire, and inspired a transnational alliance of religious voluntary actors who interceded on behalf of oppressed Jews across Europe.3 In August 1860, France led an international humanitarian intervention into Ottoman Syria in response to the massacre of Maronite Christians. France was motivated by what its then foreign minister Edouard-Antoine de Thouvenel described as the demands of “humanity,” though the occupation also served its imperial designs in the region.4 Humanitarians united in international opposition to slavery after the last major European colonial outlier, the Portuguese, abolished the practice throughout their empire in 1869. Established British abolitionists were joined by civil society organizations such as the Société antiesclavagiste de Belgique, the Société antiesclavagiste de France, and White Fathers, an international missionary society formed by the French Catholic archbishop of Algiers, Charles Martial Allemande Lavigerie. Late-nineteenth-century transnational humanitarianism was emancipatory in intent and colonialist in its racial assumptions. These values were highlighted in the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference (1889–90), at which European imperial powers pledged to suppress the slave trade in East Africa and the Congo River Basin and combat the maritime slave trade. European humanitarians were slower to confront the coercive use of “free labor.” The most notorious instance was in the rubber trade in King Leopold’s Congo Free State, but the practice was also prevalent in the Portuguese cocoa plantations in São Tomé and elsewhere in colonial Africa.5 The genocidal abuses perpetrated by the Belgian Force Publique in the Congo were brought to international public attention by a privately coordinated humanitarian campaign led by the British-based Congo Reform Association. Its leaders were the shipping clerk and radical journalist E. D. Morel and the Anglo-Irish diplomat (and future Irish revolutionary) Roger Casement. News about the Congo also emerged through the reports of travelers such as the Presbyterian missionary

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William Henry Sheppard and the American explorer May French Sheldon (who defended Leopold’s colonial regime), literary sources such as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness that conveyed imperialism’s moral hollowness, photographic images of atrocities, and iconic images of symbols of abuse such as the notorious chicotte (a bull whip made from the skin of a hippopotamus). The latter represented one of the earliest political uses of photographs for the cultivation of transnational empathy.6 British parliamentarians pressed for international action against the Congo Free State, claiming that Leopold had violated foreign free trade rights and the trust of Africans as established in international law under the Berlin Act (1885). International public condemnation of Leopold’s regime forced him to cede the territory to the Belgian government in 1908, whereupon it became the Belgian Congo.7 The Congo Reform Campaign demonstrated the power private actors could exercise through transnational publicity efforts based on empirical information and moral appeals. Appeals for humanitarian aid also assumed an increasingly international character by the late nineteenth century. The famine in northern China from 1876 to 1879, which resulted in approximately ten million deaths, was internationalized by foreign missionaries who provided aid and publicized human suffering. In 1898 American President William McKinley justified war with Spain as a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the people of Cuba. Meanwhile, Clara Barton and the American Red Cross provided aid to Cuban orphans and noncombatants held in Spanish concentration camps. American humanitarian rhetoric drew charges of hypocrisy from imperial critics such as Mark Twain when atrocity stories came to light, and the United States annexed the Philippines.8 Many humanitarians acted from paternalistic motivations, reflective of contemporary worldviews that divided the world into “civilized” and “backward” regions, and also confronted questions of moral subjectivity and cultural misunderstanding or ignorance. A multilateral coalition of private humanitarian actors emerged in the early twentieth century. International humanitarian campaigns developed to combat varied issues such as chattel slavery in Ethiopia, forced labor sanctioned by colonial administrators and indigenous leaders in parts of colonial Africa and Asia, female genital mutilation in East Africa, and opium abuse in China. These campaigns constructed information sharing networks, conducted factfinding missions, publicized their activities, pressured governments to take remedial action, and fostered personal humanitarian networks. Humanitarians such as Joseph Du Teil, Travers Buxton, and Attilio Simonetti, the respective

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secretaries of the French, British, and Italian antislavery societies, developed a close correspondence.9 International humanitarian activism became institutionalized during and after the crisis of the First World War. While its impact was largely beneficial for individuals in need, international humanitarian actors still needed to justify their involvement in the affairs of other states. Their rationales were varied, and sometimes contradictory. They included arguments of expediency where domestic governments had collapsed or were unable to help their own citizens, the need to alleviate mass human suffering, the application of imperial motivations to international affairs, a moral (either religious or humanist) imperative to help fellow human beings in distress, and self-interest in seeking financial or political gain. As international humanitarian cooperation evolved in the early twentieth century, it exhibited two distinct forms. Most humanitarian actors provided emergency relief, often through crisis-specific campaigns. A  growing minority became engaged in “alchemical humanitarianism,” the goal of which was to alleviate the causes of human suffering.10 The latter necessitated a more organized and permanent international humanitarian infrastructure, and helped institutionalize humanitarianism within the firmament of international governance. Most humanitarian aid providers were private actors, either NGOs such as the Red Cross or individuals working for ad hoc or voluntary humanitarian coalitions and campaigns. The majority also came from Western countries. Their own governments generally tolerated their efforts, as humanitarians helped address international crises such as slavery and hunger that governments were unable or unwilling to manage. Humanitarians’ interests sometimes conflicted with those of their governments, as was the case with the American Red Cross’ provision of aid from 1918 to 1920 to Russian civilians during the Russian Civil War despite Washington’s nonrecognition of the Bolshevik regime.11 Many state officials, however, perceived international humanitarian action as a form of “soft power” in an age where governments increasingly appreciated the significance of public diplomacy and cultural influence. Herbert Hoover combined his Quaker convictions and engineer’s faith in technocratic solutions as director of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) and the American Relief Administration (ARA). He understood that the ARA’s multibillion-dollar postwar aid program in Europe generated political power. These efforts paralleled the public diplomacy of private American organizations such as Rotary Clubs, which exported their service ethic to Europe in the interwar years.12 For their part, recipient state governments accepted humanitarian aid when it provided

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needed material goods, but often resented the infringement on their sovereignty that aid implied. The institutionalization of international cooperation through the creation of the League of Nations after the First World War provided an organizational framework within which states and transnational civil society actors could collaborate in international human rights work. Major interwar campaigns included the work of the ILO to combat forced labor in the colonial world, and the League’s antislavery campaign. The ILO was created by the Labour Commission formed by the peacemakers in Paris in 1919, and established through the Treaty of Versailles. It was envisioned as an international social justice organization, its signatories “moved by sentiments of justice and humanity as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world.” The ILO brought together government, labor, and employer representatives with the goal of alleviating labor conditions that involved “injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people.”13 The active participation of nongovernmental voices in the ILO set it apart from other period international organizations, and enabled it to foster extensive transnational connections among both governmental and civil society actors. The ILO pursued an ambitiously activist agenda under its first director general, the French socialist Albert Thomas (1920–32), passing conventions on issues such as a minimum age for industrial workers, limitations on hours of work, and maternity rights for women workers.14 While the ILO concentrated on industrial work in the developed world, itself a transnational undertaking, it also pursued broader international cooperation in its campaign against forced labor and colonial violence. While slavery had been largely ended in colonial Africa and Southeast Asia, forced labor persisted on large-scale construction projects and plantations where local labor markets could not supply adequate manpower. Thomas was personally committed to combatting forced labor, and the ILO united missionaries, civil society activists, and sympathetic government and colonial officials in an effort to apply to the colonial world the industrial norms the ILO had advocated in the West.15 The campaign resulted in the ILO Forced Labour Convention (1930), through which ILO members pledged to “suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.” It also outlawed the use of forced labor by private actors, though military and public forced labor was exempted due to resistance from South Africa, Portugal, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.16 While the ILO’s campaign against forced labor reinforced discriminatory views about a global “civilization line,” it was a normative success in illustrating the hypocrisies of imperial trusteeship and establishing the rights

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of colonial peoples as an international issue. The ILO became a productive site of international governance in part by encouraging international cooperation between international labor activists (especially the International Federation of Trade Unions [IFTU]) and international humanitarians.17 The League’s antislavery work was less successful than the ILO’s efforts to expose and eradicate forced labor, in part because the imperial interests of some League member states were often at cross-purposes with humanitarians’ abolitionist imperative. The evangelical Christian John Harris, secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, saw the League as a means of implementing the principle of international trusteeship. Harris and his wife, Alice, had done missionary work in the Congo Free State in the 1890s and 1900s. He provided William Rappard at the League’s Permanent Mandates Commission with copious material on trusteeship and slavery in Africa, helped bring slavery in Ethiopia to the attention of the League Assembly, and supported the League’s Slavery Convention (1926) in which signatories pledged “to prevent and suppress the slave trade [and] to bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”18 The League’s antislavery activism was weakened by a number of factors. First, for all of its zeal, the Anti-Slavery Society failed to work cooperatively with other antislavery bodies such as the Pan-African Congress, which called for African representation in the antislavery movement, and the Swiss Bureau International pour la Défense des Indigènes, which favored a more multilateral approach to combatting slavery. Second, League member states prioritized their foreign policy and imperial interests over their humanitarian interests when forced to choose. This was the case with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935–6. Mussolini disingenuously justified the invasion in part as a means of combatting slavery, and League members failed to impose any serious sanctions in response.19

International Refugee Aid One of the major international humanitarian crises of the early twentieth century was the mass displacement of refugees during the “long” First World War, a period of international violence stretching from Italy’s invasion of the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (Libya) in 1911 through to the end of the Russian Civil War in 1922 and the Greek-Turkish war in 1923.20 The Balkan Wars before 1914 set thousands of Greeks, Bulgarians, and other ethnic groups on the move. Millions of men, women, and children were displaced by the First

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World War’s violence, including Serbs escaping the Austrian invasion, Belgians fleeing from the German army in 1914–15, Armenian survivors of genocide in Anatolia, and Poles, Jews, and other non-Russian minorities scattered by the invading German armies in the East or deported as loyally suspect by the Tsarist government. Millions more were displaced during the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish war, and the Greek-Turk war following the nominal end of hostilities in November 1918.21 The League established the High Commission for Refugees in 1921 to deal with these collective human catastrophes. The international refugee crisis created legal and humanitarian problems. The shifting of state borders and changes in political regimes left upwards of three million people stateless. In Hannah Arendt’s acute analysis, the great danger arising from the existence of people forced to live outside the common world is that they are thrown back, in the midst of civilization, on their natural givenness, on their mere differentiation. They lack that tremendous equalizing of differences which comes from being citizens of some commonwealth and yet, since they are no longer allowed to partake in the human artifice, they begin to belong to the human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific animal species.22

This position of international “invisibility” created legal challenges for refugees, concerning property rights, the right of return, restitution for property destroyed during the war, and family law considerations relating to marriage and child custody arrangements. One international response to this problem was the League of Nations’ creation of the “Nansen certificate” (known colloquially as the “Nansen passport”). As League high commissioner for Russian refugees, the Norwegian diplomat (and former arctic explorer) Fridtjof Nansen conceived of the idea initially to address the Russian refugee crisis. The war had created over six million displaced persons in the Russian empire by the outbreak of the Civil War in 1917. The defeat of the White Russian armies by 1921 scattered an estimated 1.5 million Russian refugees across Europe and Asia. The famine in Ukraine and the Volga valley that year only exacerbated the demographic chaos. Nansen recalled visiting Volga basin villages, which “seemed like places of the dead, with no moving thing about them, how we pushed open the doors of the houses and stepped in, and found the whole family sitting or lying down, not speaking, not moving, simply waiting for the end or some miracle of help.”23 Nansen certificates were internationally recognized identity certificates that gave travel rights to displaced Russian refugees, though they did not oblige Russia (or regional

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successor states) to grant the right of return or naturalization rights. The Nansen system was an ad hoc international cooperative innovation. It revealed the continued authority of the state as the arbiter of international identity, and refugees’ precarious legal position. Some recipients resented the position of dependence on state benefactors in which they found themselves. The novelist Vladimir Nabokov, a Russian émigré in France after the war, resented his Nansen passport as “a very inferior document of a sickly green hue. Its holder was little better than a criminal on parole and had to go through most hideous ordeals every time he wished to travel from one country to another.” The Nansen system was subsequently extended to cover displaced Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans.24 The humanitarian needs of refugees and deportees were acute, and the transnational nature of the refugee crisis necessitated an international response. Laborers and civil internees were moved across borders against their will, including approximately 100,000 French and Belgian civilians who were deported to Germany for work in labor battalions during the war. Africans were impressed or drawn into service as porters in the mobile campaigns in East and southern Africa.25 Combatants in all theaters were taken as prisoners of war. Civilians who had lost their homes or fled from violence on the western front found themselves uprooted. Refugees were created across the vast plains of Eastern Europe, along the Isonzo front where Italian and Austro-Hungarian troops clashed, south down the spine of the Balkans, and into the Middle East where over two million Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, and Persians were displaced (including an estimated 400,000 children). War refugees’ humanitarian needs included food, temporary shelter and longer-term housing, medicine and other healthcare, and resettlement. The plight of Armenians illustrates the mass suffering experience by wartime refugees, as well as some of the international cooperative responses to this crisis.

Armenian Aid In the Middle East, the most desperate refugee population was unquestionably Armenians initially displaced by the Ottoman government’s forced movement campaign of 1915. The Armenians were the largest of several minority ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire who pressed for national autonomy in the late nineteenth century. Such minority nationalism challenged both the late Ottoman government’s stability and the ethnic Turkish nationalism evinced by the Young Turks and other supporters of a more explicitly “Turkish” empire. Armenians

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were persecuted in the 1890s, including the massacre of approximately 200,000 Armenians between 1894 and 1896 as part of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s ill-fated attempt to impose Islam as imperial policy. These events were reported in the international press, and corroborated by firsthand observers such as the Swedish traveler and writer Maria Anholm, all of which heightened international pressure for intervention by foreign powers. Western indignation was fanned by the moral and religious calls for intervention by organizations such as the Eastern Question Association to protect the rights of Christian minorities.26 In the late nineteenth century European powers had claimed the right to intervene in Ottoman internal affairs to protect civilians (usually Christian) from mass atrocities, justifying their actions on the grounds that the Ottomans’ “uncivilized” status set them beyond the boundaries of international law. Such interventions were selective, however, and aligned primarily with European national interests rather than purely humanitarian goals. Thus an international military force occupied Crete from 1897 to 1899 to help the Ottomans prevent Christian-Muslim violence, and an Austro-Russian-led intervention imposed a reform package on the Ottomans with the goal of preventing Turkish massacres of Macedonians. While humanitarians such as the French journalist Gaston Routier pressed their governments to protect Macedonians on the grounds of “justice and of humanity,” the Great Powers’ primary goal was to prevent the Balkans from further destabilization. They stopped short, however, of sending troops.27 This “non-forcible intervention” was nonetheless more than European powers had done in the 1890s, where a lack of foreign strategic interests in eastern Anatolia meant that humanitarians’ moral appeals on behalf of Armenian Christians elicited no organized foreign intervention. Anti-Armenian sentiment crested again during the First World War, as the governing Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) feared that Armenians in eastern Anatolia would support the enemy Russian army. These fears of “domestic enemies” were fanned by the atmosphere of total war and the CUP’s desire to create a Turkish ethnic national space in Anatolia. The result was a statedirected policy of deportation, forced marches, and murder by commission and omission, overseen by Interior Minister Mehmet Talât Pasha, which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 600,000–800,000 Armenians. News of these deaths emerged haphazardly during the war from survivors, the Armenian diaspora, Germans such as the theologian and missionary Johannes Lepsius, and neutral country observers such as American missionaries and aid workers and the Swedish ambassador to Constantinople, Per Gustaf August Cosswa Anckarsvärd.28

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These reports generated an international aid response, a cooperative moral and practical movement led by Americans. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief was established in 1915 with support from the US State Department and the Rockefeller Foundation. It became the American Committee for Relief in the Near East in 1918, after the United States had officially entered the war, and Near East Relief (NER) after the war. It funded nurses and missionaries who provided food, shelter, and vocational training to Armenians in refugee camps in Palestine, Turkey, and Syria, and established orphanages and hospitals.29 Other secular and religious humanitarian organizations, including the Red Cross and the Jesuits, also provided funds and on-the-ground relief to refugees in camps in Ottoman territory, and aided the American Syria Relief Organization and French authorities in providing relief to the approximately 100,000 Armenians refugees in camps in Syria and Lebanon. The American relief effort, in tandem with well-organized lobbying efforts from American Armenians to apply American President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of national self-determination to their homeland, inspired calls in 1919–20 for the United States to assume a mandate over Armenia as part of a broader “AngloAmerican colonial alliance.” Wilson supported the idea of an American mandate in Armenia, but the idea fell victim to his losing battle with the American Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty.30 It was left to international aid actors to provide relief to postwar Armenians who found themselves divided between Russia, the truncated Ottoman Empire (and after 1923, Turkey), and the new Republic of Armenia (established by the Treaty of Sèvres but incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922). The League of Nations Rescue Movement provided international relief to displaced Armenians and other ethnic minorities in the Eastern Mediterranean in the 1920s. Armenian survivors were subjected to forced conversions to Islam, and some women and children were exploited sexually and as domestic labor. The League passed resolutions calling for an international inspection regime, and the reclamation and resettlement of Armenians (as well as Greek Christians) living in situations against their will. The Ottoman and then Turkish governments resisted these measures as a transgression of their sovereignty, and contested humanitarians’ universalist assumptions with claims of religious and cultural exceptionalism.31 The rescue movement exemplified the postwar shift in international humanitarian cooperation. Whereas prewar humanitarian campaigns, such as the antislavery movement, were altruistic and often religious in orientation, postwar international relief became “a permanent, transnational, institutional, and

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Figure 4 Armenian orphans (because of the genocide) evacuating from Turkey, 1922/ Photo © PVDE/Bridgeman Images, PVD1694483.

secular regime for understanding and addressing the root causes of human suffering.”32 This transition was facilitated by the imposition of the League’s mandates system in the Middle East (as well as in parts of Africa and the south Pacific), which provided an institutional and moral structure through which to extend aid. Armenians were conceptualized as a stateless nation, gaining international recognition not extended to all interwar stateless persons, but international humanitarian aid efforts were ultimately framed in universal humanist terms as Armenian nationalism fell victim to the exercise of national and colonial power in the postwar Middle East.33 Western feminists played a central role in postwar international aid campaigns in the Middle East, both under the League’s auspices and as independent actors. This was partly due to period stereotypes that categorized social concerns as “women’s issues,” but it also reflected the greater political latitude available to women in the emerging international sphere. The most prominent aid figure was Dutch relief worker Karen Jeppe. She had worked as a missionary for the German Orient Mission in the Ottoman Empire before the war, and in 1918 became head of the Aleppo Rescue House established by NER. Jeppe was subsequently a prominent member of the rescue movement, and contributed to the League’s report on Deportation of Women and Children in Turkey, Asia Minor, and the Neighbouring Territories (1921). Other dedicated women leaders of the

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international relief effort in the postwar Eastern Mediterranean included the Danish missionaries Maria Jacobsen and Karen Marie Petersen, the Norwegian missionary Bodil Biørn, and the Swedish missionary Alma Johansson, each affiliated with their respective national branch of the Female Mission Workers’ organization.34

Greek-Turk Population Exchange The postwar collapse of the Ottoman Empire precipitated a second refugee crisis, known to Greeks as “the big catastrophe.” In 1919 Greece occupied territory along the Aegean coast of Anatolia, including the city of Smyrna, which precipitated the Greek-Turk war (1919–22). The initial Greek occupation displaced 80,000 Turks who themselves had settled in territory from which Greeks had been deported by the Ottomans before the war. The Allied powers initially supported the Greek campaign, which pressed into western Anatolia, but ultimately retreated in 1922 in the face of the Turks’ successful counteroffensive, which led to an armistice. Each side carried out what would today be termed ethnic cleansing, with forced deportations, the seizure of property, and episodic violence. The war displaced roughly 1.2  million ethnic Greeks and Turks. Most of these people were classified as “emigrants,” rather than refugees, under the Treaty of Lausanne, through which the war was ended and the modern state of Turkey created. International humanitarian organizations such as the American Red Cross provided palliative relief aid.35 As ethnic minorities in Greece and the new state of Turkey, respectively, Muslim Turks and Greek Christians saw their nationality transferred as part of the mass Greek-Turkish population transfer between 1922 and 1934. The Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, negotiated in early 1923 and subsequently annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne, brokered a compulsory population transfer of extraordinary scale. Approximately 1.2  million Greek Orthodox Christians and 400,000 Muslims were forcibly moved between Turkey and Greece, respectively.36 An international “mixed commission” facilitated the transfer of displaced persons, liquidated immovable property, and oversaw other logistical aspects of the population exchange. Unlike in Europe, where the peacemakers used tools such as plebiscites to deal with national minorities in disputed territories, the Greek-Turk population exchange constituted “a process of automatic renationalization.”37 The Treaty of Lausanne itself included minority protection articles for non-Muslims in Turkey

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(the Turks refused to extend this principle to their Muslim minorities, to the disadvantage of Kurds especially) and Muslims in Greece, whose rights were to be protected by the League of Nations. This was consistent with the international legal precedent of protecting minority rights through the treaty. This principle had guided the minority protection provisions for Balkan ethnic minorities in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which ended the Russo-Turkish War.38 Yet the international community did not believe minority protection was sufficient to provide for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, hence the population transfer. Turkey’s chief negotiator, the military hero İsmet İnönü, was adamant that Turkey would neither agree to continued capitulations nor submit to a Leagueinspired minority system. The population transfer was an intrusive mechanism through which to salve Greek-Turkish tensions. Yet it reintegrated Turkey into the international community, as demonstrated by the active participation in the League of Nations of its foreign minister, Tevik Rüştü, after it gained membership in 1932.39 International cooperation for refugees diminished through the 1930s, and reached a nadir with the Évian conference in 1938. The international conference was initiated by American President Franklin Roosevelt to consider the issue of Jewish refugees, whose numbers were rising in the aftermath of the Anschluss in March 1938, through which Germany absorbed Austria, and Romanian and Hungarian anti-Semitic harassment and violence. Despite rhetorical declarations of sympathy, only the Dominican Republic agreed to take in any further Jewish refugees. In the historian Zara Steiner’s verdict, the conference “was little more than an international façade which allowed delegates to disguise the unwillingness of their so-called civilized governments to act.”40 The interwar window of international cooperation for refugees had closed, not to reopen until the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was created in 1943.

International Voluntary Aid A common theme in postwar humanitarian activism was its stress on the common and shared dignity of humanity. This was expressed in terms of Christian fellowship by many aid workers, and a parallel (and sometimes interconnected) secular focus on either individual or group rights. These twin perspectives resonated on a transnational scale during the war years, as the large-scale nature of the conflict ironically fostered closer international connections among aid and relief providers. The British-organized Voluntary Aid

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Detachment (VAD), founded by Katherine Furse, provided close to 40,000 volunteer nurses from Britain and the empire who delivered emergency field services in Europe, Britain, the Middle East, and (in smaller numbers) on the Eastern Front. Rachel Crowdy oversaw VAD operations in Western Europe during the later stages of the war, an administrative experience that subsequently led to her selection as head of the League of Nations Social Section.41 VAD nurses’ work brought them into close physical and emotional contact with Allied soldiers, enemy combatants, and civilians, experiences that often created lasting personal connections. Vera Brittain worked as a VAD nurse in Malta, where she served alongside former members of the Serbian Relief Fund, nursing sailors torpedoed in the Mediterranean, and at Étaples, France, which she described as “a Gustave Doré illustration to Dante’s Inferno” in her best-selling memoir Testament of Youth.42 Other volunteer humanitarian organizations included the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU), organized by Philip Baker (later Noel-Baker). The FAU enabled British conscientious objectors to complete their military service by providing ambulance care in France and Belgium, serving on hospital ships in the Mediterranean and English Channel, and performing civilian relief work and agricultural labor in Flanders and at home in Britain. Over 1,000 men served in the FAU during the war. The American Service Committee provided American Quakers with similar opportunities. It operated community kitchens in postwar Russia, and provided clothing to displaced persons in Europe, and food and supplies to postwar Yugoslav villagers. They worked alongside other humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the YMCA, which provided supplies and also education and leisure services to men in European internment camps.43 Members of the traditional peace churches in Canada, particularly Mennonites, Quakers, and Hutterites, also claimed exemption from military service on conscientious grounds. Many of these people had fled religious persecution in Europe in the late nineteenth century, and the Canadian government promised to respect peace church members’ religious convictions as a condition of their settlement. Freedom from military service was legislated in the Military Service Act passed by Ottawa in 1917 when it enacted conscription. A  few Canadian Quakers who wished to contribute to the war effort joined the FAU in Europe as fellow imperial subjects. The Russian government exempted some Mennonites from military service, but conscientious objection was miniscule in other protagonist states.44 Not all British and North American peace church members were conscientious objectors. Their shared international ethos of

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religious pacifism, however, transcended their national identities and provides an example of international moral cooperation. Many individuals volunteered abroad with the Red Cross. Ernest Hemingway based his novel A Farewell to Arms (1929) on his experiences as an ambulance driver for the Italian Red Cross during the war. The English painter Helena Gleichen worked in field hospitals in France and later Italy, where she operated the only portable X-ray machine on the Isonzo front. The British historian George Macauley Trevelyan ran the British Ambulance Unit in Italy, an operation of the British Red Cross and the British Committee in Aid of the Italian Wounded.45 The British nurse Florence Farmborough worked with a Russian field surgery unit on the Eastern Front from 1914 to 1916. She recalled the emotional toll of dealing with death on such a large scale: “It hurt dreadfully, especially when they [dying soldiers] looked at you and expected you to do something to help because you were there to help and you just had to make some excuse and leave them.”46 The Scottish nurse Janet Middleton worked in Serbia in 1915–16, and participated in the harrowing Allied retreat over the mountains to the Adriatic that winter. The American physician Rosalie Morton worked in a French hospital in Salonica, and served as an American Red Cross medical adviser to the Serbian army. After the war, she founded the Virginia Hospital Fund, which cooperated with the Serbian Red Cross to provide the new state of Yugoslavia with medical equipment and provided aid to Serbian youth.47 The American, Swedish, and Danish Red Cross Societies were particularly active during the war, as their “double-neutral” status enabled their workers to travel more broadly than those of protagonist nations’ Red Cross staff. Prince Charles, the president of the Swedish Red Cross, convened a meeting of Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian Red Cross and Turkish Red Crescent officials in November 1915, to discuss relief provision for prisoners of war. This resulted in the Swedish nurse and philanthropist Elsa Brändström, the “Angel of Siberia,” overseeing the Swedish Red Cross’ provision of medical aid for German and Austrian soldiers in Russian prisoner-of-war camps, many of whom were suffering from typhoid fever.48 Volunteers had different motivations for serving with aid agencies. Some did so out of religious, moral, and altruistic reasons; others held patriotic intentions of helping their fellow nationals in need. Given these disparate motivations, historians have differentiated between an emerging international sphere of humanitarian activism, represented by bodies such as the ICRC and the Vatican (which provided neutral aid at the supranational level) and nationally orientated aid initiatives driven primarily by a desire to provide aid to co-nationals. The

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latter featured national aid actors who cooperated in a transnational, rather than an international, manner, learning from each other in performing tasks such as registering prisoners of war or supplying field hospitals. This dichotomy, however, was never absolute. Even the ICRC, whose Four Principles incorporated independence and impartiality nonetheless solicited direct state partnerships for intergovernmental international relief campaigns in the 1920s. In so doing, it acknowledged states’ role in granting territorial access, providing supplies and funds, and ensuring the professional autonomy of international relief actors.49 The League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) was founded by Red Cross representatives from the five major victorious powers in 1919 (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) to expand the Red Cross’ aid activities beyond man-made catastrophes such as war. Americans played a leading organizational role, and American nationals held the presidency of the LRCS until 1944. The Japanese Red Cross Society had the largest membership of any Red Cross society during the First World War, with 1.8 million members by 1916. It was a pioneer in peacetime relief, its civilian aid campaign after the eruption of Mount Bandai in 1888 the first such Red Cross action in the world. It also sent large numbers of Japanese nurses to Russia and Europe during the First World War, partly as a diplomatic demonstration of Japan’s status as a member of international society. Yet it was a somewhat neglected partner in the LRCS, reflecting Japan’s growing estrangement from the Western great powers after the First World War. The LRCS admitted Red Cross societies from former Central power states in 1922, however, an indication of its cooperative ethos and desire to facilitate international reconciliation.50 The LRCS coordinated aid campaigns in relief of the postwar typhus epidemic in Poland and famine in Russia during the civil war. Its first natural disaster relief effort was in response to the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, which decimated Tokyo and Yokohama, killed 140,000 people, and left hundreds of thousands homeless.51 Personal transnational connections also emerged after the war between veterans, who shared a common experience of battle with which many civilians could not relate. Their numbers were immense: 750,000 in Britain and 1.5 million in Germany. Many veterans suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (then termed “shell shock”), and required emotional, physical, and financial support not always immediately forthcoming from their home governments. Consequently, national veterans associations, such as the French Union Fédérale, the British Legion, the German Reichsbund, and the Yugoslavian Union of Volunteers, lobbied their governments for veterans’ rights and compensation.52 They invoked prewar discourses of social rights and solidarisme evinced by

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Figure 5 The Japanese Red Cross in northern China during the First World War, 1915/ Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, EI-13 (420).

political thinkers such as the French socialist Léon Bourgeois and the lobbying efforts of figures such as the French war veteran and future human rights campaigner René Cassin.53 Veterans also turned to international cooperation with the view that they had a special role to play in ensuring international justice. Prominent examples included the Conférence Internationale des associations de Mutilés et Anceins Combattants (International Conference of Associations of Disabled War Veterans), first held in 1924 and one of the earliest cases of Franco-German postwar reconciliation, and the Fédération Internationale des Anciens Combattants. These organizations included veterans’ associations from both former Allied and Central powers, and their members fostered an international identity as fellow witnesses to barbarism. Veterans’ associations also lobbied the League of Nations and the ILO for support, and supported international disarmament.54 The 1920s spirit of international veterans’ cooperation diminished in the 1930s, victim of the Depression and heightened internationalist tensions. In its place emerged the disillusioned veteran, as epitomized in cultural works such as Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front (1929), whose wartime

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suffering and postwar detachment from his civilian peers often led to mental and physical hardship, economic destitution, and political radicalization.55 War veterans were the most public instance of the internationalization of war victimhood, hence their political significance. In many European countries their associations had larger memberships than trade unions, and veterans provided a base for interwar mass political movements, as in Italy where the Fasci di Combattimenti were an important component of Mussolini’s Fascist Party. There were, however, parallel cooperative efforts among national associations representing not only the less visible but also the suffering constituencies of war widows and war orphans. The war also resulted in tremendous physical damage, which required postwar reconstruction. Here, too, international cooperation emerged. At a macro level, physical reconstruction of damaged railway tracks, farms, bridges, and other property was facilitated by international financial aid. This came primarily from American banks, several of which had extended credit to the Allied powers during the war and saw the provision of further aid for reconstruction as a means of securing their liabilities. The League of Nations also coordinated the international provision of financial stability in limited instances, such as the financial stabilization program the Financial Committee of its Economic and Financial Section oversaw for the new Republic of Austria.56 A  panoply of actors literally rebuilt war-torn communities after the armistice. Most were local or state initiatives, but here, too, international cooperation flourished. An example is the international service aid movement, spearheaded by the Swiss pacifist Pierre Cérésole. He had organized volunteers in 1920 to rebuild the French village of Esnes-en-Argonne, which had been largely destroyed in the battle of Verdun. Inspired by this project (and subsequently by Gandhi’s service ethic), Cérésole founded the Service Civil International (SCI).57 It began as a private transnational effort to promote reconciliation between French and German citizens, and provided an alternate form of national service for pacifists. The SCI subsequently broadened its scope, organizing work camps across Europe, and undertaking humanitarian relief and community-building projects. Children were a particular focus of postwar international humanitarian relief campaigns. They became a symbol of martyrdom, and child welfare became a universal moral tenet for humanitarian relief activists. The ARA’s European Children’s Program distributed food and vaccines to 1.5  million Polish children, and a further 2.5 million children across Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Armenia. The Swiss politician Gustave Ador pressed the League of Nations to

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address children’s rights at its first assembly in 1920. The League’s subsequent Armenian relief campaign was the first coordinated international effort to aid denationalized children. The International Council of Women (ICW), under the stewardship of the Scottish philanthropist Lady Aberdeen, proposed a charter of children’s rights. Socialist youth associations included the Young Workers International and the International Union of Socialist Youth Organizations. French and Belgian activists founded the International Association for the Promotion of Child Welfare in 1921 as an umbrella association of private child aid associations interested in formulating international standards for child welfare. It became attached to the League in 1923.58 Most significant of all was Save the Children, an international NGO founded by the British pacifist Dorothy Buxton in 1919. Initially concerned with providing relief to European children impacted by the Allied war blockade, Save the Children Fund (SCF) quickly positioned itself as an apolitical provider of global child relief. Buxton’s sister, the reformer Eglantyne Jebb, assumed the organization’s presidency two months after its creation so that the former’s left-wing politics did not limit SCF’s support. SCF raised money to support children in crisis situations in Europe and the Near East, including child famine victims in Russia (1921–3) and the Spanish Civil War (1936–9), and evacuated Jewish children from Germany in the late 1930s. It also supported missionary efforts to aid children in Africa, and produced an International Handbook of Child Care and Protection.59 The Save the Children International Union (SCIU) was created in Geneva in 1920 to unite member organizations from forty European and British Empire states. The SCIU collaborated with the ICRC and the League of Nations’ Child Welfare Committee to establish an international child humanitarian network that embodied Buxton’s founding spirit of social justice and international solidarity. Jebb drafted the text of a World Child Welfare Charter in 1922, subsequently adopted by the League in 1924. It was an expansive document that asserted the collective role of voluntary societies, private actors, and the state in ensuring children’s rights. It declared that “the child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress,” established children as independent beings rather than the wards of adults, and pledged an international responsibility to provide children with food, health, and the “requisite means for his or her normal development, both materially and spiritually.”60 Along with the ICW’s proposed charter, which was oriented primarily toward states’ obligations to children, Jebb’s World Child Charter prefigured the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which entered into force in 1990. Jebb garnered support for international child

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rights from the pope, elites in Britain, figures in the Bolshevik government, and delegates at the League.61 While SCF’s origins were British, the most prominent providers of international humanitarian relief in the early twentieth century were American actors. This reflected American wealth, the mobilizing capacity of American funding agencies such as the Rockefeller Foundation, and the international dissemination of an ethos of progressivism. American progressives rejected social Darwinism in favor of a range of social and political reforms to address the negative socioeconomic consequences of industrialization, from anticorruption initiatives to the provision of public housing. They also undertook regular “Atlantic crossings” to interact with their European peers, exchanging information and reform tactics. Americans’ technocratic and materialist approach to international relief complemented the moral imperative of Wilsonian selfdetermination. Americans were also at the forefront of the professionalization of aid work during the war. While volunteer organizations like the Quakers remained important aid contributors, social workers, lawyers, doctors and nurses, and other experts and specialists increasingly brought their professional skills to the provision of mass aid.62 This reflected the logistical complexity and scale of war and postwar relief. It also explains why professional aid providers such as the ICRC or the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee began to overshadow smaller voluntary organizations, anticipating the later dominance of mass international aid NGOs such as CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) and OXFAM (founded as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief in 1942). The expansion of international aid in the early twentieth century also incorporated humanitarian organizations and traditions from different parts of the world. China provides a representative example. A culture of philanthropy was at the core of Confucian Chinese culture, but in the late Qing period Western missionary aid societies had become the dominant humanitarian actors in China. They actively collaborated with private Chinese philanthropists. This cooperative pattern intensified during the Republican period following the Chinese Revolution in 1911. The reformer Li Dazhou believed the Western Allies had won “the victory of humanitarianism,” and urged his country to embrace a spirit of universalism as part of the May Fourth Movement. The Chinese Red Cross was recognized by the ICRC in 1912, and it contributed to international aid efforts at home (the northern Chinese famine in 1920–1, floods in central China in 1931) and abroad. International aid efforts in China intensified with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, with organizations such as the Nanking

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International Relief Committee providing material aid to Chinese civilians and publicizing Japanese atrocities in the international press.63 While historians largely focus on international aid providers, aid recipients were not a passive aggregate. Some recipient states resisted the provision of aid as a threat to their sovereignty. The Ottoman government only grudgingly accepted limited humanitarian aid for civilians in Beirut during the First World War for fear that it would undermine its control of the city’s minority populations. Local aid recipients also helped determine which international actors provided them with aid, what type of aid was received, how it was used, and where it was distributed. This was especially true in politicized environments, such as in the aftermath of Russia’s Civil War or during the Spanish Civil War. Ideological partisans who served with either the International Brigades or in support of General Francisco Franco’s Nationalists directed their aid primarily to their respective sides in the war, and many were also recipients of medical aid themselves from Spanish doctors and nurses. The largest interwar Russian aid agency, the Zemstvo and Towns Relief Committee, Zemgor, clashed with the White Russian General Pyotr Wrangel’s military officials in providing aid to White Russian émigré soldiers in Turkey and the Balkans after 1920. It also worked intermittently with the Russian and American Red Cross and the League of Nations.64

Imperial Aid A counterintuitive location of international humanitarian cooperation was European states’ overseas colonial empires. While European empires competed for territorial influence, they also collaborated with each other. The Institut Colonial International (ICI) was formed in 1895 in Brussels, uniting private colonial associations from Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Britain. Building on earlier cooperative colonial initiatives such as the Congrès international des sciences géographiques (1875), the ICI created an international space within which private explorers, scholars, and others involved in the colonial project shared technical knowledge. The language of internationalism also provided rhetorical cover for national imperial expansion, illustrating the nationalist element embedded within internationalism.65 Transnational imperial collaboration also influenced colonial welfare policy. Before the First World War it was largely missionaries who delivered minimal welfare services to colonial subjects. After the war, colonial

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officials increasingly focused their attention on social issues such as infant mortality, which they sought to combat through the provision of maternity and child health services, the training of midwives, and public education programs. This work was encouraged by the League of Nations Health Organization. Here was a case of international policy transfer, with welfare policy prescriptions developed in Europe transplanted to the colonial world.66 Imperial warfare also fostered transnational cooperation, as illustrated during the South African War (1899–1902). The Central British Red Cross Committee provided medical aid to British soldiers in the conflict, their efforts mirrored for Afrikaner soldiers by the newly created Transvaal Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Organisation in the Orange Free State Republic. British aid efforts were composed of not only British nurses, doctors, and volunteers, but also colonial figures such as Mohandas Gandhi, who directed an Indian Ambulance corps in Natal during the war. The “boundaries of compassion” expanded beyond national borders, as German, Dutch, and American aid agencies also provided relief, while the British humanitarian and war protester Emily Hobhouse cofounded the South African Women’s and Children’s Distress Fund to provide relief to all civilians “in the name of building bonds of human friendship.”67 The British Red Cross also expanded its relief efforts in the Sudan and other parts of the empire in the early twentieth century, part of a wider feminization of international aid. Notwithstanding their cosmopolitan nature, these relief efforts still occurred within an imperial framework. So did post–First World War international relief efforts such as the Imperial War Relief Fund, whose British participants (including liberal progressive aid agencies such as Save the Children) used the rhetoric of imperial cooperation to advance their particular aid agendas. As part of its postwar relief campaign, the American CRB helped fund the Belgian École coloniale supérieure (renamed the Université coloniale in 1923), which trained Belgians for the colonial service.68 This example demonstrates that the perception of Belgium as a small, peaceful nation whose sovereignty was violated during the war overrode any opprobrium resulting from humanitarian abuses in the Congo Free State a decade previous. It also reveals the continued Western commitment to imperialism as a foundation of the international system into the interwar years, evident in the trans-imperial surveillance of the activities in Europe of colonial nationalists such as the Indian Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and M. N. Roy.69 Organized imperial humanitarianism had appeared in the late nineteenth century, inspired by sources such as the best-selling book Max Havelaar by

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Mutatuli (E. Douwes Dekker). First published in 1860 and translated into English in 1868, the book criticized the Dutch cultivation system in the East Indies.70 Mass organized imperial humanitarianism and development projects only emerged, however, after the First World War. French politicians and colonial officials advocated an imperial policy of mise en valour in the 1920s, in the hope that economic development in the colonies could contribute to the country’s postwar economic recovery. In Britain, the British Empire Exhibition (1924) at Wembley and the Colonial Development Act (1929) similarly signaled efforts to exploit the economic resources of empire.71 The donor-client nature of international humanitarian aid was inherently asymmetrical, in that aid recipients often had limited input into the form, delivery, and duration of the aid they received. Alongside the creation of the League of Nations mandates and the growth of colonial development projects, the intensification of largely Western-directed international humanitarian relief in the interwar years signified an increased presence of outside actors and influence in many parts of the Global South.

International Social Reform International social reform movements developed parallel to international humanitarian activism in the early twentieth century, fueled by a similar spirit of moral purpose and international connectedness, and driven by domestic reformers worried about the perceived social and moral threats of international issues such as prostitution and narcotics. The League of Nations provided the institutional infrastructure that facilitated international cooperation between states and private actors interested in social reform. The League’s Section for Social Affairs and Opium, headed by Rachel Crowdy, commissioned international reports on the traffic in women and children in 1927 and 1932. In so doing, the League helped establish what the historian Paul Knepper has called “an international legal regime . . . of sociological jurisprudence.”72 The League’s international study of the logistics, demographics, and social geography of international prostitution was based on thousands of personal interviews with prostitutes, criminals, and other sex trade actors. Crowdy was particularly effective in encouraging cooperation between international women’s organizations and the League, an important step in the expanding political influence of civil society actors. While the campaign against the traffic in women and children was an early experiment in evidence-based international social reform, it was also infused

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with contemporaries’ racial and social hygiene biases. It furthermore focused on women as victims or public health “threats,” rather than on the demand for prostitution. The League passed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children in 1921, which succeeded the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1904) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1910). The campaign against the traffic in women and children sought a compromise between abolition and toleration (licensed prostitution), and was typical of early century international social reform campaigns in struggling to negotiate questions of moral subjectivity, gendered identity, and personal autonomy.73 Antinarcotics reformers confronted similar issues. International cooperation to regulate drug use focused initially on the question of supply. In the nineteenth century, opium and alcohol were the psychotropic substances that attracted the greatest international attention. Opium use was most extensive in China, where the British had extended the trade through the two Opium wars (1839– 42, 1856–60). The Chinese market was dominated by opium produced from poppies in British India into the early twentieth century, after which Chinese producers predominated. Opium use was opposed by Christian missionaries, who formed the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, and Chinese reformers, who were joined by American moral reformers who opposed opium use at home and in the American-occupied Philippines. Unlike the European colonial powers in Southeast Asia, who favored the regulation of opium (in large part because opium revenues comprised between 10 and 50  percent of colonial budgets in the region), American missionaries such as Charles Henry Brent persuaded the United States to import its domestic policy of prohibition to the Pacific colonial empire it assumed following the Spanish-American War (1898). Japan also promulgated a policy of prohibition in Formosa, which it seized from China in 1895. Prohibition required the active cooperation of other states, and the American anti-opium policy thus encouraged closer international collaboration in policing the opium trade. From these origins emerged a transnational anti-opium network, highlighted by the International Opium Commission that opened in Shanghai in 1909.74 The commission’s work led to the International Opium Convention (1912), which categorized the suppression of opium (including morphine and cocaine) as a humanitarian undertaking and restricted the trade of opium to legitimate medical uses. Anxieties about the social and moral consequences of drug use widened in the 1910s and 1920s, as narcotics were increasingly perceived as an international public health challenge. At the urging of the British diplomat Lord

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Robert Cecil, Article 295 of the Versailles Treaty ratified the Hague International Opium Convention (1912) and the Protocol of the Third Opium Conference (1914). The League’s Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs produced an International Opium Convention in 1925, which placed restrictions on the production and sale of opium, morphine, cocaine, and marijuana. It also created a Permanent Central Board that monitored signatory states’ production of illicit substances, and a Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs (1931). In a reversal of nineteenth-century commodity flows, Chinese drug traffickers posed an increased international problem by the 1920s. This threat was inflated beyond its real, but limited, scale by lurid period invocations of a “yellow threat” in popular media such as Sax Rohmer’s Fu Manchu novels.75

Transnational Religious Cooperation While international social reform campaigns became increasingly secular in the early twentieth century, transnational religious cooperation remained an active and vigorous undertaking. Ideas of religious unity were discussed at the World’s Parliament of Religions held in conjunction with the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. It fostered interreligious dialogue between delegates representing Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and other Eastern religions. The parliament’s liberal Protestant organizers were keen to foster a spirit of international religious plurality, but Christian delegates’ hegemonic assumptions clashed with the pan-Asianism of leading Asian delegates such as the Sinhalese Buddhist Anagarika Dharmapala, Indian Hindu Swami Vivekananda, and Japanese Buddhist Hirai Kinzo.76 Christian missionaries often found themselves caught up in international political rivalries, but many also evinced a belief in “spiritual free trade,” arguing that their cosmopolitan message and international fellowship eclipsed their national identities. They were cultural intermediaries. By spreading the gospel, they facilitated the exchange of ideas and practices between colonial and indigenous societies through their work spreading the gospel.77 Organized international religious humanitarianism was on public display at the 1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh. It followed two smaller international ecumenical conferences, held in London in 1888 and New York in 1900. The Edinburgh Conference brought together 1,215 Protestant missionaries affiliated with 161 missions, missionary societies, church societies, and

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mission schools who were committed to mission work “amongst non-Christian peoples.” It was organized by an international committee with representatives from Britain, the United States, France, and Germany. Delegates discussed the development of Christianity and future prospects for cooperation in regard to mission work around the world, as well as the service and education of Asian religious students in the West.78 The conference was international in scope and intent, but only partially so in its composition. While technically nondenominational, it did not include Catholic or Orthodox Christian mission delegates, and thus quietly dropped the “ecumenical” designation present in its predecessor conferences’ titles. Most of the delegates at Edinburgh were European, with 509 Britons and 169 from elsewhere in Europe. A further 491 delegates came from North America, and twenty-seven from Australia and white South Africa. A  mere nineteen came from Asia. While Asian delegates were a minority at the conference, they raised significant issues that the white majority overlooked. The Japanese delegates the Reverend Dr. Harada Tasuku and Bishop Honda Yoitsu raised awareness of the expansion of Christianity in their country, and argued for greater national autonomy in the practice and direction of Christian life. The Korean political activist (and pro-Japanese) Yun Ch’iho called for domestic control over missionary funds, a provision that Western missionary organizations were unwilling to grant. The Indian Anglican missionary Vedanayagam Samuel Azariah argued that missionaries needed to confront the problem of race in relations between foreign and indigenous people.79 The Edinburgh conference highlighted many of the central tenets of earlytwentieth-century international missionary cooperation. Delegates pledged their mutual support for the free admission of missionaries in foreign countries (a religious expression of the European imperial principle of “most favoured nation status”), their “prime duty” to educate the “races of less developed civilization and lower material power,” and a desire for the regularization of relations between missions and their governments. They also debated whether to promote missionary cooperation or Christian unity as their common goal.80 Out of these deliberations emerged a more international perspective on missionary work. This internationalist spirit was frustrated during the 1910s, as patriotism reemerged within many national churches and among missionaries, but it developed anew after the war as the international ecumenical movement began to take flight. The International Missionary Conference (IMC) encouraged the application of the progressive and social democratic educational reforms prevalent in North America and Europe in the interwar period to its members’

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mission schools in Latin America and the colonial world. As colonialism came under increased international criticism, IMC conferences in Jerusalem (1928) and Tambaram, India (1938), began to identify mission education as an element of international development. The latter conference was an important moment in the history of international ecumenicalism, bringing European Protestants into contact with Asian religious teachers and leaders, encouraging discussion of Christianity’s position as a world religion, and defining social reform as a key goal of international religious cooperation.81 The IMC was one of several organizations that contributed to the growth of an international ecumenical movement. The philanthropist Andrew Carnegie founded the Church Peace Union in February 1914. It brought together leaders from twelve religious denominations to “to co-operate in abolishing savage war and establishing the reign of peace through arbitration of international disputes.”82 Later that year, Protestant internationalists from across Europe and the United States met in Konstanz, Germany, to found the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. The German Lutheran pacifist and World Alliance member Dietrich Bonhoeffer professed an ethical basis for international cooperation that encompassed the convictions of many ecumenical internationalists. For Bonhoeffer, “the Christian can only venture peace in faith, [while] access to the enemy [is only possible] via the prayer to the Lord of all peoples.”83 Only through the understanding that local churches belong to a single world church was a pax gentium possible. In 1920 the Orthodox Synod of Constantinople proposed an international federation of churches modeled on the League of Nations, and in 1925 the Swedish Lutheran pastor Nathan Söderblom convened the Stockholm Conference, which established the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work. Söderblom’s devotion to Christian unity was inspired by his early work in the international missionary movement. He became archbishop of Uppsala in 1914, a position from which he preached a message of united church work in the service of peace and justice, and undertook church relief work in Germany after the First World War. Söderblom hoped to encourage an “Evangelical Catholicity” among Protestants in parallel to Roman Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. The Life and Work movement was committed to ecumenical social gospel work, and also engaged with international politics through its opposition to war and support for the League of Nations. It worked in parallel to the Faith and Order movement, established in 1927 to encourage ecumenism in theological studies.84 The Life and Work movement eclipsed the World Alliance as the preeminent international ecumenical organization by the mid-1930s. Figures such as the

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prominent American Methodist preacher Garfield Bromley drew on Social Gospel concepts of reform to argue that human affairs were evolving in the direction of greater international cooperation, a process that must be guided by a religious unity.85 This international ecumenical spirit is Life and Work’s most significant legacy. Representatives of over one hundred churches met in 1937 at the Oxford Life and Work Conference on “Church, Community and State.” The delegates embraced a transnational Protestantism that stressed supranational and supra-racial unity, and moved away from the imperial overtones of the prewar transnational missionary movement. Their liberal internationalism was in turn challenged by other religious conceptions of international affairs, such as the realist theology of figures like the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr and the Krisis theology of the Swiss academic Karl Barth, which contested the ethical universalism advocated by many ecumenical internationalists.86 Meanwhile, the Second World Conference on Faith and Order in Edinburgh, also held in 1937, inspired the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC was formally established the following year in Utrecht, with the head of the World Student Christian Federation, the Dutch theologian Willem Adolph Visser ‘t Hooft, as general-secretary. Inactive during the Second World War, the WCC held its inaugural meeting in Amsterdam in 1948.87 The Catholic Church, which conceived of itself as inherently international, nonetheless also pursued novel universalizing initiatives in the interwar period. By the 1930s, Catholic thinkers such as the French publicist Jacques Maritain advanced a conservative defense of the rights of the individual and human dignity, which indirectly provided one vision of universal human rights.88

Conclusion International humanitarian aid blossomed in the early twentieth century. The provision of aid to casualties of war, families of soldiers, refugees and displaced persons, and civilians suffering from war, hunger, natural disaster, or pandemics were tasks that national governments and private actors could not address alone. In providing for common human needs, humanitarianism created a plane on which actors from different cultures, and even enemy states, could (sometimes only temporarily) cooperate. The First World War introduced three international crises that would come to characterize the twentieth century: mass genocide and ethnic cleansing, starvation, and the problem of refugees. The rapid expansion of international relief in the war’s immediate aftermath was both a response to the

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unprecedented scale and scope of the humanitarian crises the war had created, and the mass mobilization and organizational innovation with which states mounted their war efforts. These factors helped create a transnational relief network, drawing together state, civil society, and religious aid agencies. While these bodies sometimes clashed over funding, jurisdiction, priorities, and whether to focus on the provision of short-term aid or provide for community sustainability, the war galvanized an international sense of organized altruism that continued into the interwar years. Aid organizations founded to provide war relief, such as Save the Children, transitioned to peacetime relief after the war. An international aid nexus developed in the 1920s and 1930s, which connected donors, aid providers, government officials, and aid recipients. International humanitarian aid in the early twentieth century thus established a legacy of “transnational humanity and compassion.”89 It provides a historical example of how international cooperation worked across international, domestic, and local political spaces; united private actors, state officials, and individuals; and connected international relations, domestic politics, and individuals’ everyday lives.

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A defining feature of early twentieth-century internationalism was the growth of transnational civil society, composed primarily of international social movements and NGOs. Hundreds of these non-state actors were founded in the century’s first four decades, while others created in the late nineteenth century continued their work. Most of these movements and organizations were European or transatlantic in their membership, but some tried to incorporate non-Western (mainly Asian) members or emanated from outside Europe. This chapter examines the work of social activists and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in three areas that grew significantly in the early decades of the twentieth century: labor and socialist internationalism, the international women’s movement, and the international peace movement.

Labor and Socialist Internationalism Socialism was one of the great ideological movements of the nineteenth century, emerging as a response to the exploitative nature of international capitalism. Internationalism was thus a central component of socialism, a concept adapted from early nineteenth-century liberals to include the abolition of private property as central to workers’ independence. Socialist internationalism was predicated on the conviction that working people around the world constituted an international brotherhood. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto (1848), “the working men have no country.”1 Socialists believed that world peace could be attained when the people, rather than elites, held political power. For Marxists, this meant harnessing the common transnational interests of workers to the cause of revolution. Trade unionists pursued these goals by advocating labor rights, from better industrial working conditions

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to regulated hours and higher pay. Nationalism would wither away as workers became emancipated. These were the aims of the International Workingmen’s Association, or the First International (1864–76). Organized by European radicals including Marx and the French socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the First International advocated international cooperation between trade unions, anarchists, communists, and other socialists committed to workers’ rights. It collapsed in 1876, overcome by divisions between Marxists who preached political organization and anarchists who favored direct political action.2 These two approaches to international socialist cooperation, epitomized by the respective prescriptions of Marx and the Russian anarchist Mikael Bakunin, shaped the evolution of international socialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Socialists and parties convened the Second International in Paris in 1889. It continued the cooperative work of its predecessor, pressing for an eight-hour work day for laborers, and adopting an antimilitarist position in an age of heightened nationalist competition. From 1900, its activities were coordinated by the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) in Brussels. The ISB organized demonstrations across Europe against the First Balkan War in 1912, and convened the International Socialist Congress in Basle that autumn at which its members affirmed the moral and pacific intent of international socialist solidarity.3 Despite its international efforts, the Second International ultimately collapsed in 1916 as most members chose nationalism over international solidarity during the war. Revolutionary socialists met at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, in 1915 in an effort to maintain international socialism’s opposition to the conflict. They pledged their support for no annexations or indemnities. The question of nationalism also occupied socialist theoreticians such as the Austrian Marxist Otto Bauer and the Czech intellectual Karl Kautsky, especially concerning the multiethnic empires of Central and Eastern Europe where an industrial proletariat was still embryonic. These conditions led V. I. Lenin to conceive of national self-determination as a tool to bring about a worker’s revolution, especially where it could destabilize monarchical empires. The Bolsheviks accordingly supported ethnic nationalism in the early years of the Russian Revolution. Lenin denounced the “practicality” of the Jewish revolutionary socialist Rosa Luxemburg, his socialist intellectual rival, who criticized the Bolsheviks’ embrace of national self-determination as contrary to Marxist doctrine. Lenin claimed that Luxemburg had lost sight of the proletariat’s primary task of “day-to-day agitation and propaganda against all state and national privileges, and for the right, the equal right of all nations, to their national state.” It was imperative to “preserve the unity of the proletarian

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struggle and the proletarian organizations, amalgamating these organizations into a close-knit international association, despite bourgeois strivings for national exclusiveness.”4 Lenin’s vision of revolutionary international socialist cooperation subsequently proved attractive to many colonial nationalists. Lenin dismissed the Second International, not entirely inaccurately, as beholden to bourgeois pacifist internationalism. What emerged instead after the First World War was the Third International, also known as the Comintern, a form of proletarian internationalism led by the Soviet Union. The Comintern was conceived by international revolutionaries such as Leon Trotsky as a “Communist Party of the international proletariat.” As postwar revolts elsewhere quickly expired, such as the Spartacist uprising in Germany and the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, the major test of prospective members’ orthodoxy became their political loyalty to Moscow. Inspired by Lenin’s writings on the necessity of overthrowing the hegemonic international society of world capitalism, the Bolsheviks envisioned the Comintern as a network of international relations between socialist states and socialist parties in nonsocialist states, all working for the common goal of world revolution.5 In practice, this vision manifested itself as an asymmetrical international ideological network that took direction from Moscow. This rigidity compromised the Comintern’s ability to foment revolution in some parts of the world. In Latin America it vacillated between supporting

Figure 6 Festivities marking the opening of the Second Congress of the Comintern and demonstration on Uritsky (Palace) Square in Petrograd on July 19, 1920, 1921 (oil on canvas), Kustodiev, Boris Mihajlovic (1878–1927)/State Russian Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia/Bridgeman Images, SRM91240.

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anticolonial opposition to American influence and backing communist parties’ participation in reformist coalitions. The strongest Latin American communist parties were in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay. The Comintern perceived Latin American communists as auxiliaries of the main revolutionary action in Europe. Latin American communists themselves largely went their own way by the 1930s, resisting domestic feudal oppression rather than agitating for world revolution.6 The Soviet Young Communist League (1921–5) connected Russian youth with peers in Romania, Germany, Poland, and other European states in an effort to build future support for international communism. These efforts receded by the later 1920s, as Stalin’s seizure of power within the Communist Party brought a greater focus on building “socialism in one country.” Elsewhere, the Comintern sought to undermine European imperial rule, which Marxists saw as a symptom of the expansion of global capitalism. It supported pan-Africanism through the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, and the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau fomented antiimperial resistance in Southeast and East Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. From Singapore and Malaya to Taiwan, the Comintern supported and funded the activities of Asian communist parties. These forms of nascent international communist cooperation ironically intensified intra-colonial anticommunist collaboration, as colonial administrators cooperated to suppress an imagined global communist threat.7 International trade union cooperation was tenuous in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Trade unionism was pulled in two competing directions. On one hand, trade unionists embraced a spirit of workers internationalism, with labor gains in one country seen as a benefit to workers everywhere. This spirit led to the formation of international trade secretariats in the late nineteenth century, beginning with the International Tobacco Workers’ Federation in 1889. These secretariats were supported by the Second International.8 On the other hand, trade unions negotiated with industrial management and governments within the legal boundaries of nation-states, and furthermore, many of their members were patriots whose political views could discourage international cooperation. Franco-German trade union relations illustrate these dynamics. The French General Confederation of Labour and the German General Commission of German Trade Unions made periodic attempts to collaborate, such as through the German-organized International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres (ISNTUC). Such cooperation echoed the cautious internationalism of the French socialist Jean Jaures, who famously declared “un peu d’internationalism éloigne

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de la patrie; beaucoup d’internationalisme y ramène.” These cooperative efforts were frustrated by nationalist sentiment developed through primary schooling and compulsory military service, especially before and during the First World War when patriotic fervor was strong.9 The ISNTUC was first proposed by the Dutch trade unionist Jens Jensen, and linked trade unionists from across Europe and North America. It was dominated by German trade union leaders such as Carl Legien, and worked for the reform of labor and social conditions for workers within members’ states, as opposed to explicitly internationalist political issues. This reformist spirit was influenced by the theoretical work of the German social democrat Eduard Bernstein. He argued in publications such as “Evolutionary Socialism” that capitalism had not developed as Marx had prophesied, wherein wealth would become concentrated in a small number of hands, but had instead created a growing middle class. Gradual reform was therefore the best means of achieving workers’ rights, rather than Marx’s prescriptions for revolution.10 The views of Bernstein and the ISNTUC alienated radical Marxist trade unionists who believed that only explicitly international political action could overturn the status quo that discriminated against workers. In addition to pressuring governments and industrial employers for workers’ rights, trade unions also facilitated transnational interactions among their members. The Lucerne International, an international body of national socialist sporting organizations, encouraged exchanges and friendly competition among labor gymnastics and sports organizations. It had over 1.5 million members by 1927, two-thirds of whom were from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. It inspired the formation in Britain of the Workers’ Travel Association (1921) and the British Workers’ Sports Association (1930). These organizations promoted workers’ leisure travel, such as package holidays and cycling tours, as means of encouraging transnational connections.11 Trade unions also aided labor immigrants, such as the thousands of Italian laborers who traveled abroad to secure work. The Italian Società Umanitaria, a socialist reform organization created in 1882, gathered statistics on Italian migrant laborers and received complaints about Italian workers from other countries. Italy’s Socialist Party helped organize migrant laborers, provided Italian language information to foreign unions, and negotiated bilateral agreements to ensure Italian workers did not pay union dues in multiple countries.12 Trade unions became a force in industrial relations in Britain and the United States in the 1880s, and by the early twentieth century engaged with party politics to secure their members’ labor goals. The British Trades Union Congress (TUC, the national federation of trade unionists), along with socialists affiliated

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with the Independent Labour Party, established the Labour Representation Committee in 1900 to support members’ campaigns for parliament. It became the Labour Party in 1906, the same year the American Federation of Labor (AFL) aligned itself with the Democratic Party. These political affiliations facilitated the gradual entry of workers’ representatives into democratic politics. The TUC and the AFL both joined the IFTU, formed in 1919 in Berne as the successor to the ISNTUC, although the AFL left in 1925. The IFTU was social democratic in orientation, and thus competed with communist and nonpolitical trade unions within the international socialist world. The IFTU was linked to the reformist Liberal and Socialist International (LSI), formed in 1923 by former members of the Second International. The LSI brought mass socialist support to interwar liberal internationalist projects such as the League of Nations. The potential of the IFTU and the LSI to serve as venues for international socialist cooperation, however, was undermined by their members’ shifting interwar interests. British and American unions especially became increasingly independent, reflecting their members’ dissatisfaction with their political party allies’ pusillanimity on economic issues such as employment insurance and foreign policy responses to fascism and communism.13 A separate but related form of trade union internationalism was international guild socialism. Nineteenth-century international fraternal organizations with a social basis in labor and guild associations, such as the Freemasons and the North American-based Order of the Knights of Labor, were in decline by the early twentieth century. They bequeathed social networks and a spirit of international cooperation, however, on which twentieth-century socialists built.14 International guild socialism was advocated by varied figures such as the British Fabian economist G. D. H. Cole and the Japanese Christian pacifist and trade unionist Kagawa Toyohiko. They saw it as a means of engendering transnational connections between individuals within an international society comprising guilds, unions, and cooperative societies. Kagawa even called for a “world cooperative” in the early 1930s.15 Transnational labor solidarity developed elsewhere in Asia in the early twentieth century, a product of global labor migration. Indian laborers were particularly active, both at home and throughout the global Indian diaspora created largely by indentured labor migration.16 Chinese and Japanese laborers immigrated to Australia, Southeast Asia, and North and South America. Many white labor unionists in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada perceived Asian migrant laborers as a racial threat to their jobs, and responded by asserting their racial identity as “white” Europeans. Labor unionists were

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a significant influence on the passage of the “White Australia” policy in 1901, and labor organizations such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the transnational network of Cornish miners transmitted this racial labor ideology throughout the “British World” in the early twentieth century.17 Asian trade union cooperation was both a response to white racism and a manifestation of pan-Asianism. The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) was created in 1920 to represent Indian workers at the ILO. It soon splintered between militants who affiliated with the communist Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and reformers who favored collaboration with the ILO. The latter joined with their peers in the Japanese Trade Union Federations to form the Asiatic Labour Congress (1934–7). Despite their political differences, most Asian trade unionists saw participation in the international workers’ rights movement as a means of achieving their respective independence. India and Japan were the most prominent Asian states at the ILO, and consequently their representatives often spoke for Asians’ shared experience of colonial labor exploitation. AITUC moderates also initiated relations with the Guomindang in China, facilitated through their mutual participation in the short-lived League Against Imperialism in the late 1920s. The Guomindang were leery of trade union influence, however, having sidelined the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU; created in 1925) after their purge of the CCP in 1927. The ACFTU would not reemerge until the CCP’s 1949 victory in the Chinese Civil War.18 Revolutionary socialists such as syndicalists also pursued international cooperation in the early twentieth century. Syndicalists rejected democratic socialism in favor of overturning the global capitalist order through industrial activism and direct political action. Syndicalism was an international movement, including revolutionary syndicalists in France and Britain, anarchosyndicalists in Italy and Spain, and industrial unionists in the United States. The First International Syndicalist Congress in London, held in 1913, produced an international declaration of syndicalists’ antistatist principles. More so than other socialists, the First World War presented an acute ideological challenge for syndicalists, whose ideology of political independence and international worker solidarity predisposed them to oppose the war. This is what happened in neutral Spain, where the Confederación Nacional de Trabajo condemned the war; and in Ireland, where the industrial trade unionist James Connelly first advocated a general European strike, and then directly confronted the British government as one of the leaders of the Easter Uprising in 1916. By contrast, the French syndicalist Confédération Générale du Travail adopted a policy of “defencism” in support of its country’s war effort, as did a significant minority of

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the Unione Sindacale Italiana. The American Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) opposed the war as a “capitalist” conflict, but refused to denounce the 95  percent of its members who registered for war service after the American conscription law was passed in 1917.19 While many syndicalists initially welcomed the Russian Revolution as a step toward the international proletariat’s liberation, most syndicalist groups, especially anarcho-syndicalists, soon rejected Moscow’s guidance as inimical to their politics of direct action and a new social order organized by unions rather than political parties.20 They turned instead to their own international body, the International Workers’ Association. Both syndicalists and communists had an uneasy relationship with the international trade union movement, revealing the divisions within the international labor movement concerning the best means of international cooperation. These divisions were most pronounced for anarchists, who were ideologically opposed to any form of international cooperation based on interstate relations. Anarchists shared with other socialists a commitment to international peace and the necessity for labor solidarity in the face of global capitalism, but rejected what they saw as the statist nature of international Marxism. They were instead libertarians, committed to a politics of antiauthoritarian internationalism. These views resulted in anarchists’ expulsion from the Second International in 1896.21 Anarchism became a serious international security threat in the decades before the First World War. Epitomized by the Party of the People’s Will, the Russian anarchist group that assassinated Czar Alexander II in 1881, the politically motivated assassination of political leaders became a continent-wide concern. Anarchists believed that only direct action could bring about political change, rejecting the reformist spirit of organized socialism in favor of revolution and the “propaganda of the deed.”22 Anarchism became internationalized in part through the mass migration of European laborers, a process that also exacerbated public and government anxieties. Multiethnic labor organizations like the IWW contained anarchists in their ranks. A  series of violent anarchist incidents exacerbated these tensions. Public places were bombed in Paris, Barcelona, Frankfurt, and other major cities. Anarchists were implicated in the Haymarket riot in Chicago in 1886, where seven policemen died and many civilians were injured. The French anarchist Martial Courdin attempted to blow up the Greenwich Observatory in 1894. There were also dozens of attempted assassinations of politicians across Europe and the United States. Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, French President Marie François Sadi Carnot, and Italian King

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Humbert I were among the victims killed by anarchists in the late nineteenth century.23 This sense of public anxiety was captured in Joseph Conrad’s 1907 novel The Secret Agent. Governments perceived anarchism as a transnational security threat, and struggled to find cooperative responses. The British applied techniques derived from colonial surveillance of “secret societies” and Irish nationalism to counter perceived anarchist threats. States convened the International Conference of Rome for the Social Defense Against Anarchists in 1898. A second conference followed in St. Petersburg in 1904. Delegates defined anarchism as a criminal offence, and the St. Petersburg Protocol resulted in transnational policing cooperation and signatories’ agreement to deport foreign-born anarchists to their home countries for prosecution. Despite the assassination of American President William McKinley by an anarchist in 1901, the United States did not sign the multilateral treaties that resulted from these conferences, preferring instead to combat anarchism through restrictive immigration legislation.24 Continental European governments protested that Britain’s open asylum culture gave refuge to their domestic dissidents. Anarchism’s potential for spontaneous violence caused politicians to fear it as a possible cause of war. These fears were realized when Gavrilo Princip, a youth member of the nationalist society Young Bosnia (affiliated with the Serbian secret society the Black Hand), assassinated Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914.

The International Women’s Movement The drive for equality that motivated early twentieth-century international socialists was shared by the early twentieth-century international women’s movement. While some first-wave feminists advocated social, economic, and personal equality, their main goals were legal equality and suffrage. Feminists pressured their own governments to grant women the vote, but many also recognized that gender equality was an international issue. The International Council of Women (ICW) was formed in 1888 to discuss the international significance of injustices suffered by women. The American feminist Mary Wright Sewall was its president. Congresses of women came from around the world, many devoted to suffragism. Constituent national women’s councils were often led by bourgeois or aristocratic women who had the funds and time to participate in the movement. Figures such as the French feminist Ghénia Avril de SainteCroix, president of the Conseil National des femmes françaises, helped build

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transnational feminist networks through their organizational and leadership abilities, and their personal relationships.25 The ICW advocated an international parliament of women, and publicized issues such as equal pay for women and the citizenship implications for women marrying a foreign national. The Women’s Progressive Society and the International Women’s Union also established transnational feminist networks in the 1890s. American suffragettes convened an international conference in Washington in 1902, with delegates from eleven countries, at which the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Legal Citizenship was created. It formulated its constitution at the Berlin International Women’s Congress in 1904, and renamed itself the International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA). The feminists who gathered in Berlin concentrated on four themes that would shape the international women’s movement in future decades: social work and social institutions, women’s legal position, education, and the professions and trades available to women.26 The IWSA, which became the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship in the late 1920s, worked closely with the League of Nations. It assumed its present incarnation, the International Alliance of Women, in 1946. While the IWSA was dominated by its American members, it fostered an international alliance of women, irrespective of language and nationality, to work for liberty and equality. The Japanese Women’s Suffrage Association was founded in 1921 by Tsune Yamada Gauntlett (who attended the 1920 IWSA conference in Geneva) and Ochimi Kubushiro of the Japanese Women’s Christian Temperance Union. In 1924, it merged with other newly formed Japanese women’s organizations in the Women’s Suffrage League (WSL). The WSL enabled Japanese feminists like Fusae Ichikawa to build transnational connections with Western feminists, and to selectively incorporate ideas of gender equality into Japanese politics until this discourse was silenced by Japan’s increasingly nationalist politics after the Manchurian Incident in 1931.27 IWSA members hoped that the principle of universality could be leveraged to secure female suffrage, and demonstrated members’ conviction that political equality was central to improving women’s lives. Once women had secured the vote, other equality goals could more easily be pursued.28 The focus on political rights privileged women from industrial and democratic countries where such goals were plausible. Women’s suffrage was achieved (often with age and ethnicity limitations) in New Zealand in 1893, Australia in 1902, Canada, Great Britain, and Germany in 1918, the United States and the Netherlands in 1919, and France in 1944. The focus on women’s suffrage in Western countries

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overlooked equality issues for women in much of Asia and Africa, although the Pan-American Union and the Inter-American Commission of Women were active in promoting suffrage in Latin America in the interwar years.29 The First World War presented the international women’s movement, like its socialist peers, with an existential challenge: were its members’ loyalties primarily to their internationalist cause, or to their nation? This question was at the fore at the International Congress of Women in 1915, a meeting of 1,136 women at The Hague organized by the Dutch feminist Aletta Jacobs and the German feminists Lida Gustava Heymann and Anita Augspurg. The American social activist Jane Addams chaired the congress, which declared its collective support for female suffrage, a negotiated end to the war, international arbitration, self-determination, and open diplomacy. The congress’s resolutions on gender equality were ignored by the peacemakers at Versailles, but they helped establish women’s rights as an international political issue and testified to the transnational resonance of feminist advocacy.30 The congress also demonstrated how transnational political spaces provided feminists with a freedom to act, which was not always available in domestic politics. As private citizens, they were often precluded from active participation in national political decision-making; the barriers to entry were lower in the international arena, offering greater opportunity to shape the political discourse of social justice and women’s rights.

Figure 7 Noordam delegates holding a Peace Banner, 1915 (b/w photo)/Private collection/Prismatic Pictures/Bridgeman Images, DGC1775606.

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A Second International Women’s Congress for Peace and Freedom met at Zürich in 1919. Delegates registered their disappointment with the punitive nature of the Versailles treaty, and soon after formed the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Among the activists present at Zürich was the National Association of Coloured Women’s first president, Mary Church Terrell, who was invited by the Women’s Peace Party founders Alice Thatcher Post and Addams. An active social justice feminist, Terrell had publicized the connections between racial and gender discrimination in the lives of African American women to European audiences before the war.31 The WILPF reached a peak of 50,000 members from fifty national councils in the early 1930s. It pressed the importance of social and economic rights for women as a necessary condition for international peace, anticipating the language of positive human rights that emerged after 1945. While many of the WILPF’s mostly Western members evinced maternalist racial attitudes regarding women in colonized societies, its principle of transnational gender solidarity ensured it was broadly anti-imperial. Members passed anti-imperialist declarations at their conferences, opposed the military occupations of Egypt (by Britain in 1919), the Rhine (by French colonial troops in 1919), and Haiti (by the United States beginning in 1915), and criticized imperialism in the organization’s journal Pax International.32 Headquartered in Geneva to better lobby the League of Nations’ delegates on women’s issues, the WILPF was also a forceful advocate of pacifism. The League attracted many national and transnational women’s organizations. Several of these groups formed the Liaison Committee of International Women’s Organisations (LCIWO) in 1930–1, some of whose members had met since 1925 as the Joint Standing Committee of Women’s International Organisations. The LCIWO pressured League members to adopt an international citizenship standard for women that would curtail various national forms of legal, social, political, and economic discrimination. Such an international standard, international feminists argued, could then be used to pressure domestic governments for reform. The League took up the issue in 1937, when it commissioned a study of the international legal status of women. The international women’s movement, however, was divided as to what gender equality would look like. Non-Western feminists such as the president of the General Oriental Feminist Alliance, the Lebanese activist Nour Hamada, called attention to their underrepresentation in the international women’s movement itself. Similar calls for cultural autonomy and resistance to Western-dominated international feminism were expressed at events such as the Eastern Women’s Congresses in 1930

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and 1932, which brought together Middle Eastern feminists, and the All Asian Women’s Conference in Lahore in 1931.33 In response to lobbying from international women’s organizations, the League Council created the Women’s Consultative Committee in 1931. It convened eight international women’s organizations to advise the Council on the question of married women’s nationality. Women’s organizations debated whether to push for legal equality or lobby for incremental gains. Four Latin American states signed the Equal Rights Treaty at the Pan-American Conference in 1933, an idea first proposed by the British feminist Lady Margaret Rhondda in 1926. Other feminist groups, such as the International Co-operative Women’s Guild, argued instead for protective legislation for women as mothers and care-givers, arguing that “where there is no equality of function, legal equality cannot exist.” The League launched an international inquiry into the legal status of women in 1937, in answer to pressure from women’s activists. Its findings paved the way for the UN Status of Women Commission (1946).34 The WILPF’s feminist internationalism entailed “the right of women to participate in international affairs as equal partners, not simply to contribute to discussions about the role of women and children.”35 This was an important development in an era where women’s participation as official diplomats was limited to trailblazers such as the Russian revolutionary socialist and feminist Alexandra Kollontai and the American Ruth Bryan Owen.36 Many early twentieth-century women internationalists focused their energies on what were considered “maternalist” social welfare issues, such as poverty and infant mortality, reflecting their political beginnings in domestic reform movements. This was the case in France, where pro-natalist policies were well established, and in the United States, where activists such as Grace Abbott lobbied successfully for mothers’ pension programs.37 International cooperation provided the means to lobby for progressive change through collective action and the use of international publicity to convince or shame states to embrace change. International feminists such as the Swedish sociologist Alva Myrdal held that women’s rights were not a separate issue unto themselves, but a component of broader progressive internationalism. She argued in the 1930s that progressive social welfare policies that extended women’s individual liberty, such as child benefits and social housing provisions to support women with children, also promoted economic development and international peace.38 A  similar ethos informed the work of the Medical Women’s International Association. It was founded in 1919, inspired by the wartime relief work carried out by female physicians in Europe. The American doctor Esther Lovejoy was its first president,

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and it boasted 3,600 members by 1929. Members were particularly invested in social medicine, the study of the effects of socioeconomic conditions on public health, and they collaborated with the League, the ILO, and the ICRC on transnational health policy issues, such as birth control, working women’s health, and sex education.39 In addition to combatting gender discrimination, the international women’s movement’s advocacy work was also “decolonial” in its opposition to broader forms of oppression, notably racial, present in global empires.40 Many feminist internationalists actively opposed imperialism, perceiving parallels of oppression between their own lives and those of colonized peoples. The international women’s movement was overwhelming white, however, and international feminists’ interactions with women from other parts of the world sometimes mirrored the racial and power relationships of imperialism. The pluralist tensions of race and class within the international women’s movement widened in the interwar period, as questions of social, economic, and moral reform proved more divisive internationally than the first wave feminist goal of suffrage.41 The Young Women’s Christian Association’s (YWCA) work in China provides a representative example. Chinese YWCA branches included both foreign and Chinese members. Acting in response to the world YWCA call at its 1920 meeting at Chambéry, France, to pursue industrial issues, the Shanghai YWCA participated in a Joint Committee of Shanghai Women’s Clubs that lobbied for a child labor bylaw for Shanghai. The committee sought to improve the health and safety conditions of child laborers, and ultimately ban child labor, but the campaign foundered due to Chinese anti-imperial opposition. Similar problems befell a campaign organized by Western missionaries in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia on behalf of mui tsai, Chinese girls in domestic indentured labor.42 Racial tensions were also apparent in international moral reform crusades, where the universalizing goals of these often Western-led campaigns clashed with the different social mores of other societies. This was the case for Western women involved with the League of Nations’ campaign against the traffic in women and children in India in the 1920s and 1930s. The American missionary Mary Clement Leavitt, of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, visited an amazing forty-three countries promoting temperance and associated forms of moral abstinence in the late 1880s and 1890s, but she too met with resistance in countries such as Japan where her crusade was perceived as morally intrusive. Leavitt inspired other female missionaries to travel widely, including the American social reformer Jessie Ackermann who circumnavigated the globe

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twice in the 1890s preaching temperance.43 National temperance societies later formed the World League Against Alcoholism in 1919. These examples illustrate the racial and class divisions with which feminist internationalism was imbricated. The international women’s movement expanded tentatively beyond its transatlantic base in the interwar years. The All India Women’s Conference was founded in 1927, while regional gatherings, such as the All-Asian Women’s Conference held in Lahore in 1931, also appeared. The Egyptian activist Alexandra Avierino, who founded the journal Anis al-Jalis (the Intimate Companion) in 1898, participated in the Universal Alliance of Women for Peace.44 The WILPF and the IWSA affiliated with women’s societies in Asia, South America, southern Africa, and the Middle East. The active participation in the IWSA of figures such as Dr. Paulina Luisi from Uruguay and the Egyptian feminist Huda Shaarawi further reflected an internationalization of the previously Western-dominated women’s movement. Shaarawi’s decision to cease wearing the veil after returning to Egypt from the 1924 IWSA conference in Rome is an example of the cultural consequences that could result from international contact and collaboration. The global expansion of women’s rights sometimes created friendly competition between international women’s organizations for influence in some countries, such as Japan. Meanwhile, one of the unintended consequences of the creation of the League of Nations’ mandates system was to encourage the development of feminism in the Levant. In the 1930s, Syrian activists such as Adile Bayhum alJazairi, one of the leaders of the Syrian Women’s Union, met with French feminists at international women’s conferences in Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran.45 The Pan-Pacific Women’s Association (PPWA) was organized with funding from the Pan-Pacific Union in 1925. Jane Addams served as president of the first Pan-Pacific Women’s Conference, held in Honolulu in 1928. Subsequent interwar conferences were held in Honolulu in 1930 and in 1934, and in Vancouver in 1937. The early PPWA was led by white American and European evangelical women in Hawai’i (known to indigenous islanders as haole), who wished “to promote exchange and goodwill and to achieve mutual understanding as well as interracial and international ‘harmony’ across the Pacific.”46 Half of the delegates at early conferences were Asian and Polynesian, including representatives from the Philippines, Siam, Ceylon, Fiji, and American Samoa. Tsune Gauntlett served as president of the 1934 conference.47 The PPWA’s multiracialist spirit was mitigated, however, by the sole use of English in PPWA conferences, a reminder of the racial limitations of the age. The PPWA organized national committees and encouraged the study and reform of women’s social conditions in member

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states. This work distinguished it from more political international women’s organizations such as the IWSA, and emphasized the theme of “international friendship” prominent in many early twentieth-century INGOs. Gender equality had a different valence for international socialists, as illustrated by Kollontai’s career. She studied Marxism in Zurich and attended conferences of German Social Democratic women, through which she encountered Rosa Luxemburg. These Western European influences shaped Kollontai’s decision to organize Russian working women. This activity set her apart from the mainstream of Russian social democracy, and made her a target of the tsarist secret police. She left Russia from 1908 to 1917, during which time she worked with various European Social Democratic Parties and met Lenin. Their relations broke down during the Russian Civil War (1917–21), when Kollontai’s support of the Workers Opposition within the Bolshevik Party, which advocated collaboration with other national communist parties, clashed with Lenin’s focus on building the Bolshevik state in Russia.48 Kollontai believed that socialist revolution was essential for both women and men to achieve freedom. Women’s rights were universal in her view, an argument she made in influential publications such as the pre-revolution essays “The Social Basis of the Woman Question” (1909) and “The New Woman” (1913), and The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated Communist Woman (1926), in which she depicted feminism as the right to personal autonomy, especially in personal affairs. Kollontai opposed bourgeois Russian feminists who feared social revolution would compromise their own social positions, and tried to convince the revolutionary movement itself to take up women’s concern. This focus on individual independence reflected her prewar international experience within the European social democratic movement, and provides an example of the transnational flow of ideas that such networks facilitated.49

The International Peace Movement The international women’s movement had close ties to the international peace movement. The modern peace movement contained both absolute and moderate pacifists (a term that came into popular usage in the 1900s, replacing the appellation “friends of peace”). Absolute pacifists were a minority. They were opposed to war in any form and for any justification. Many, though not all, were Christian pacifists, including members of the historical peace churches, such as Quakers and Mennonites. They were joined after the First World War by

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increasing numbers of mainstream Protestants, as well as Jews and Catholics. The most famous international advocate of absolute pacifism in the early twentieth century was Leo Tolstoy. While his international fame was built on the success of the novels War and Peace (1869) and Anna Karenina (1877), the international diffusion of his philosophy of pacifism was remarkable. Tolstoy was influenced by his reading of the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer to renounce the material and embrace asceticism. Tolstoy became a Christian pacifist, applying his reading of Christ’s pacifism in the New Testament to international politics. He preached nonviolence in all circumstances, as opposed to a philosophy of nonresistance, and in his rejection of the state and private property he became an anarchist in all but name. Nonviolence for Tolstoy was an ethical imperative driven by his reading of Scripture. His pacifism influenced many period peace activists, including Gandhi and the Japanese Christian pacifist Uchimura Kanzō.50 While absolute pacifism attracted adherents in an age of mass international violence, most early twentieth-century peace activists were moderate pacifists. They opposed war and advocated closer international cooperation, but reserved the right to support war in limited circumstances in the greater name of peace. Thus pacifist leaders such as Ernesto Teodoro Moneta of the Unione Lombarda per la pace, Gaston Moch of the Délégation Permanent des Sociétés française de la Paix, and Ludwig Quidde of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft renounced the international peace alliance that had emerged in the 1890s and advanced just war defenses of their respective governments’ war efforts in 1914–15. They did not do so rashly. Moch had campaigned at prewar international peace congresses for resolutions permitting standing armies for self-defense. Like other pacifists, he believed war was an abomination and an anachronism, but he criticized his peers for willfully ignoring the conscripted standing army as a reality in many continental European states. Moch’s views were shared by other French pacifists such as Paul Henri Benjamin d’Estournelles de Constant, Frédéric Passy, and Théodore Eugène César Ruyssen (president of France’s largest peace organization, the Association de la paix par le droit), who attempted to combine patriotism (especially in their commitment to the return of Alsace-Lorraine) with internationalism.51 Other moderate pacifists used the outbreak of the First World War as an opportunity to lobby for progressive change at home and the constructive reform of the international system abroad. The war laid bare the international peace movement’s conflicting imperatives of peace and justice, and forced peace activists to consider whether absolute pacifism constituted a tacit acceptance of

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mass violence. Interwar pacifism increasingly became a social gospel, stressing social action on religion and ethical grounds.52 The pacifist impulse gained greater international resonance after the war, serving as a driving feature of interwar liberal internationalism and international socialism. Key pacifist initiatives included the outlawry of war movement, which inspired the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) that outlawed war as an instrument of national policy.53 The war also led to increased support for international disarmament, and peace advocates were active in supporting a series of interwar multilateral conferences at which diplomats attempted to regulate the production and use of military arms. The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments (1921–2) produced a ratio system between the great powers’ capital ships, which it hoped would prevent future arms escalation, and also produced security provisions by recognizing Chinese territorial integrity. The United States, Britain, Japan, Italy, and France agreed to maintain their strength of battleships and battle cruisers at a respective ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75. While strategic interests drove the signatory nations to reach this agreement, they were also responding to public pressure from peace organizations, including the American congregational minister Frederick J. Libby’s National Council for the Limitation of Armaments, the YMCA, Japanese and British Quakers, and the WILPF.54 American President Calvin Coolidge convened the Conference on Reduction of Naval Armament in Geneva (1927) in an attempt to widen the ratio system to included smaller vessels such as destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. These negotiations were scuppered by Anglo-American disagreements, but were ultimately secured at the London Naval Conference (1930). International disarmament efforts culminated in the Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932–4), where delegates from sixty countries met to negotiate a reduction in world armaments. Despite years of preparation and the support of many international peace advocates, the Disarmament Conference was fatally undermined by states’ unwillingness to substantially retrench their military capabilities.55 The Manchurian Crisis cast a pall over the conference before it even opened, and hopes for international cooperation on disarmament were effectively killed when Hitler withdrew Germany from its proceedings on October 23, 1933, in conjunction with Germany leaving the League of Nations. The London Naval Conference followed in 1935–6, but this too fell victim to the increasingly bellicose tenor of international relations and achieved little. Japan withdrew from the conference, and Italy, which was under League of Nations’ sanctions resulting from its invasion of Abyssinia, did not sign the Second London Treaty that delegates negotiated. The treaty, to which only France, Britain and the

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Dominions, and the United States agreed, provided only for modest size limitations to naval vessels and the caliber of their guns. It lapsed when the Second World War began in Europe in 1939.56 The international peace movement’s cooperative efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are too vast to survey concisely. They included varied undertakings such as the creation of the Universal Peace Congress and the IPU in 1889; the two Hague conferences and the international arbitration movement; the private initiatives of figures such as the French banker and internationalist visionary Albert Kuhn (who funded scholarships for French students to travel abroad, and oversaw the creation of the idiosyncratic Archives de la planète, a photographic and cinematographic portrait of global humanity); the publicity work and cultivation of international friendship pursued by international peace organizations such as the World Peace Foundation and the CEIP; and the religiously inspired peace efforts of private individuals and organized churches.57 In an effort to capture something of the nature of early twentieth-century international peace cooperation, the balance of this section presents a crosssection of international peace activists’ cooperative activities through an analysis of the individuals and organizations who were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize from its inauguration in 1901 until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. This prosopography of early twentieth-century Nobel Peace Prize winners is necessarily selective, but nonetheless demonstrates when, how, and where internationalist ideas influenced international relations. The Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel established the Nobel Peace Prize in his will, which was opened on his death in 1895. He directed that the majority of his estate be used to fund five annual prizes for recipients who in the previous year “shall have conferred the greatest benefit to mankind.” The prizes were to be awarded for contributions in physics, “chemical discovery or improvement,” physiology or medicine, literature, and finally “the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.”58 The description of the latter, the Nobel Peace Prize, reveals the turn-ofthe-century international peace movement’s focus on international cooperation and disarmament. These themes remained important for peace activists as the twentieth century unfolded, but they were joined by an increased interest in the potential of international law and multilateralism to promote and maintain peaceful change. An analysis of Nobel Peace Prize recipients between 1901 and 1939 reflects contemporaries’ views on what constituted internationalism and international

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cooperation, as well as the peace convictions of the members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee (chosen by the Storting, Norway’s Parliament). While individuals dominate the list, the prize for the Institut de droit international (Institute of International Law) in 1904 illustrates the growing importance of INGOs as a primary organ through which pacifists and peace advocates advanced their views. The Institut de droit international, the international association of lawyers founded by the Belgian lawyer Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns in 1873, was recognized for its promotion of international arbitration, and its role in organizing the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899.

Nobel Peace Prize Winners, 1901–39 Organizations 1904 Institut de droit international (Institute of International Law) 1910 Bureau international permanent de la Paix (Permanent International Peace Bureau) 1917 Comité international de la Croix Rouge (International Committee of the Red Cross) 1938 Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés (Nansen International Office for Refugees)

Humanitarians 1901 Jean Henry Dunant (cowinner) 1922 Fridtjof Nansen 1930 Nathan Söderblom

Peace Activists 1901 Frédéric Passy (cowinner) 1902 Élie Ducommun; Charles Albert Gobat (cowinners) 1903 William Randal Cremer 1905 Bertha von Suttner 1907 Ernesto Teodoro Moneta; Louis Renault (cowinners) 1908 Klas Pontus Arnoldson; Fredrik Bajer (cowinners) 1909 Auguste Marie François Beernaert (cowinner)

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1911 Tobias Michael Carel Asser; Alfred Hermann Fried (cowinners) 1913 Henri La Fontaine 1927 Ferdinand Buisson; Ludwig Quidde (cowinners) 1931 Jane Addams; Nicholas Murray Butler (cowinners) 1933 Sir Norman Angell (Ralph Lane) 1935 Carl von Ossietzky

Politicians 1906 Theodore Roosevelt 1909 Paul Henri Benjamin Balluet d’Estournelles de Constant (cowinner) 1912 Elihu Root 1919 Thomas Woodrow Wilson 1920 Léon Victor Auguste Bourgeois 1921 Karl Hjalmar Branting; Christian Lange 1925 Sir Austen Chamberlain; Charles Gates Dawes 1926 Aristide Briand; Gustav Stresemann 1929 Frank Billings Kellogg 1934 Arthur Henderson 1936 Carlos Saavedra Lamas 1937 Lord Robert Cecil No prize awarded—1915, 1916, 1918, 1923, 1924, 1928, 1932, 1939 Source: Adapted from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/

Three other institutions were awarded the prize before the Second World War. The winner in 1910 was the Bureau international permanent de la Paix (Permanent International Peace Bureau). Founded in 1891, it was the central organ of the International Union of Peace Societies. It coordinated the activities of national peace societies and promoted peaceful means of settling international disputes. It fragmented after the First World War, and international peace activism increasingly centered on the League of Nations.59 The Comité international de la Croix Rouge (ICRC), which won the prize in 1917, was the only Nobel recipient during the First World War, a conflict that directly undermined the spirit of international cooperation for which the prize had been created. The ICRC was the oldest nongovernmental international relief

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organization, dating to 1863. Its founder, the Swiss doctor Henri Dunant, was inspired to create the Red Cross by the horror of witnessing the lack of medical aid for soldiers at the 1859 Battle of Solferino. Dunant had shared the first Peace Prize in 1901 with the French politician and economist Frédéric Passy, a founder of both the Société française pour l’arbitrage entre nations and the IPU, and the then senior figure in the international peace movement. The award to Dunant was bestowed especially for his service to “fraternity between peoples,” an acknowledgment of his commitment to international cooperation.60 The ICRC worked to uphold the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906), which established international regulations for the humane treatment of civilians, prisoners, and wounded combatants. Its members also formed the Prisoners of War International Agency, a massive index card catalog of prisoner information to connect prisoners of all nationalities with their loved ones at home. With over ten million servicemen and civilians interned at some point during the war, this was a massive undertaking, and reflected the ICRC’s commitment to internationalism even during the nadir of nationalist war. Captain Charles de Gaulle was one of the millions of prisoners who connected with his family thanks to the ICRC’s labors.61 It was two decades before another organization won the Peace Prize. In 1938, the Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés (Nansen International Office for Refugees) won the honor. Like the ICRC, its founder was a previous awardee—Fridtjof Nansen, in 1922. The demographic background of the individual winners of the Nobel Prize is revealing of the gendered and Western nature of early twentieth-century internationalism. The predominance of male recipients is particularly telling. In the twenty-six years between 1901 and 1939 in which individuals won or shared the prize, only two recipients—the Austrian pacifist and author Bertha von Suttner (1904) and Jane Addams (1931)—were women. This relative absence of recognition for women was further reflected in the Nobel Committee’s Short List. Between 1901 and 1925, only 11 (4 percent) of the 240 individuals chosen for the Peace Prize’s Short List were women.62 The preponderance of male winners reflected men’s dominance of political and diplomatic leadership in all countries in these decades, as well as a collective international presumption that public activities constituted the most significant aspects of political life. This view discriminated against many women internationalists, whose work was often carried out privately and involved social reform problems that the male-dominated political establishment patronized as “women’s issues.” The lack of Nobel recognition for women peace activists is nonetheless striking given the active role women played in establishing the international peace movement. Many women

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peace activists, including those affiliated with the international women’s organizations detailed earlier, drew attention to the connections between sanctioned violence in the international system and women’s subjugation. They included figures such as the radical German pacifist Margarethe Lenore Selenka, who helped organize the international Women’s Peace Demonstration at The Hague Peace Conference in 1899, and her compatriot Helene Stöcker, who worked through the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft and the German League for Human Rights to secure Germany’s integration into the international system and advocate closer collaboration between the male-dominated international peace organizations and women pacifists in the WILPF.63 In addition to its gender dynamics, the list of early Nobel Peace prize winners contained almost entirely Europeans and Americans. The sole non-Western recipient was the Argentinian lawyer Carlos Saavedra Lamas (1937). He helped bring Argentina into the League of Nations in 1932, aided in brokering peace between Bolivia and Paraguay to end the Chaco War (1932–5), and negotiated South America’s antiwar pact (1936). A second non-Western recipient did not come until 1960, when the president of the African National Congress, Albert Lutuli, was awarded the prize. The individual winners of the Nobel Peace Prize over its first four decades can be loosely divided into three categories: humanitarians, peace activists, and politicians who supported initiatives to reduce the risk of international conflict. Despite the emerging scale of international humanitarianism in the early twentieth century, only three individuals who can be described primarily as humanitarians won the Nobel before the Second World War (Nansen; Dunant; and the Swedish pastor Nathan Söderblom, 1930). The scarcity of humanitarian awardees can be explained by the ad hoc and networked nature of many early international humanitarian ventures, which often lacked an identifiable leader or organizer. Peace leaders were, unsurprisingly, frequent honorees. Figures associated with the two major pre-1914 international peace organizations, the International Peace Bureau (IPB) and the IPU, won the prize in six separate years in this era. The IPU’s vision of international peace through legislative cooperation was honored with awards to its cofounders, Passy and William Randal Cremer (1901 and 1903) and Secretary-General Charles Albert Gobat (1902). The IPU fostered connections between parliamentarians of different nationalities committed to peace, and helped organize the two Hague Conferences. The IPU continued to grow in the interwar years, when it became an important voice in favor of international governance.64 Its members represented the gradualist wing of the international

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peace movement, advocating incremental change through national parliamentary action. They also remind us of the structural and normative power of the state in international affairs in the early twentieth century. In 1906 Gobat also became the secretary-general of the IPB. In addition to its organization prize in 1910, the IPB’s Swiss honorary secretary-general Élie Ducommun was awarded the Nobel in 1902, and its president, the Belgian socialist Henri La Fontain, in 1913. Both men were instrumental in organizing the IPB’s work as the executive bureau of the International Peace Union. Fredrik Bajer, the ex-Danish military officer who helped found the IPB in 1891, was a cowinner in 1908. He and his wife, Mathilde Bajer, also established the Danish Women’s Society, and both believed that women’s rights were a central component of international peace. National peace society leaders also feature on the list of early winners. Bertha von Suttner (1905) had influenced Alfred Nobel’s decision to create the Peace Prize. She had gained international fame after the publication of her novel Die Waffen nieder (Lay Down Your Arms!) in 1889, was an active peace leader in the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, and helped organize the first Hague Conference.65 Von Suttner’s pacifism was predicated on the idea of international cooperation. As she wrote in the circular for the creation of the Austrian peace union in 1891: “Human society—whether as individuals or as groups of individuals, called nations—has to seek the foundation of its true welfare in unity, not in separation; in mutual cooperation, not in mutual enmity.”66 The winner in 1907 was the president of the Lombard League of Peace, Ernesto Teodoro Moneta, who ironically later supported Italy’s invasion of Libya in 1911. Klas Pontus Arnoldson (1908) founded the Swedish Peace and Arbitration League, which advocated reconciliation with Norway and intra-Scandinavian cooperation. He also cooperated with peace leaders and associations abroad, including the British activists Randal Cremer and John Bright, and the Women’s Universal Alliance for Peace created by Polish Princess Gabrielle Wiszniewska in 1896. The cowinners in 1927 were Ludwig Quidde, and the founder and president of the French Ligue des droits de l’homme, Ferdinand Buisson, whose awards symbolized hopes for Franco-German rapprochement. Quidde was an active member of the German Peace Society from the mid-1890s, and served as its president from 1914 to 1929. He sought to maintain ties with French and British peace activists after the declaration of war in 1914, which brought him under surveillance by the German government.67 Buisson was one of the most fervent pacifists of his age, and a leading secularist. His career as a peace activist began at the founding congress of the International League of Peace and Freedom in 1867, chaired by the Italian revolutionary Guiseppe Garibaldi. In his Nobel

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essay, Buisson wrote of what he saw as the “moral obligation” of international peace education in an age where total war had “put itself in the position of executioner of the whole earth.”68 While institutional peace leaders were the most frequent Nobel honorees, reflective of the growing significance of organized nongovernmental activism from the late nineteenth century, other awards went to individuals who played a significant role in disseminating international norms of peace. In the 1930s, such winners included Addams and Nicholas Murray Butler (cowinners in 1931), as well as the British writer Norman Angell. Addams’s recognition reflected the international influence of her social work at Hull House, as well as her prominent leadership of the international women’s movement. Butler promoted the idea of an “international mind” from his elite position in American public affairs as president of Columbia University and a trustee of the CEIP.69 The Austrian journalist Alfred Fried won the Nobel in 1911. He established the peace periodical Die Friedenswarte, and was a close collaborator of Sumner. The leader of the German and Austrian Peace Associations, which lacked the nonconformist and labor overtones of Anglo-Saxon pacifism, Fried published the Handbuch der Deutschen Friedens-bewegung (1905).70 Journalists such as Fried and the American Devere Allen, editor of the religious international peace periodical The World Tomorrow and director of the No-Frontier News Service (which circulated peace literature in the United States and Latin America between 1933 and 1942), were instrumental in the transnational dissemination of peace information and maintaining connections between pacifists between international gatherings.71 The German journalist Carl Ossietsky was a highprofile recipient of the prize in 1935. Recognized for his disarmament advocacy, Ossietsky had been convicted of treason in 1931 for revealing German rearmament in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles. The Nazis imprisoned him in a concentration camp in 1933, where he died in 1938. His award highlighted international criticism of the Nazi regime, a sensitive point for Hitler, especially in the run-up to the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. It was also the result of a coordinated international nominating campaign that connected German supporters, including Willy Brandt and Thomas and Heinrich Mann, with allies in Western countries.72 Alongside peace society activists, the Nobel Committee recognized the importance of international law in the early twentieth-century peace movement. The French jurist Louis Renault (1907) was perhaps the most prominent fin de siècle advocate of international organization through law. Renault’s scholarship on international law was widely taught in France and abroad.73 He

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also represented France at the major peace conferences of the 1890s and 1900s, including the two Hague Conferences where he helped draft each gathering’s Final Act. He was devoted to what he termed “the juridical organization of international life.”74 August Marie François Beernaert (Belgium’s prime minister from 1884 to 1894), a Nobel cowinner in 1909, was also a proponent of international legal cooperation. Like many early Nobel winners, Beernaert was a committed inter-parliamentarian. He was also a delegate at both Hague peace conferences, where he was a vocal advocate of strengthening the laws of land warfare, a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration from 1900 until his death in 1912, and an early champion of unified international maritime law. His international career was marked by a fascinating tension. A moderate by temperament, Beernaert believed in the principle of international arbitration. Yet he had supported Leopold II’s establishment of the Congo Free State as prime minister, and while he was later critical of Leopold’s brutal forced labor regime, he was reluctant to support the expansion of arbitration (including a proposed international court of justice at the Second Hague Conference) because of the potential liability for Leopold.75 The Dutch lawyer Tobias Asser (1911) cofounded the Institute of International Law, and was an advocate of international private law. He believed states should negotiate agreements for the settlement of transnational private law disputes. Here he applied to international private law a popular principle of international cooperation—harmonization. This was a form of limited or controlled international cooperation that allowed states to maintain sovereign jurisdiction over issues in which they valued their domestic autonomy, while providing mechanisms to ease transnational interactions and prevent international disputes from escalating or contaminating other aspects of states’ multilateral relations. Asser helped organize The Hague Conference on Private International Law (1893) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and was the arbitrator in the latter’s first case, the US-Mexico Pious Fund Arbitration (1902). More broadly, he was a central figure in the institutionalization of international law before the First World War.76 Finally, numerous politicians were awarded the Nobel Prize in the early twentieth century for their support of multilateral initiatives, international law, or international institutions. These individuals, and the broader political constituencies of which they were members, held a shared commitment to peaceful change in the international system. The first politician honored with the Nobel was American President Theodore Roosevelt (1906), recognized for the multitrack diplomacy he spearheaded, which culminated in the Treaty of Portsmouth

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that ended the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5). Roosevelt was a controversial choice given his enthusiastic participation in the American imperialist war against Spain in 1898, during which he served as lieutenant colonel in the First United States Volunteer Cavalry (the “Rough Riders”) in Cuba. His Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine also asserted that the Western Hemisphere was closed to European colonization, and that the United States had a responsibility to preserve order in the region, if necessary by “the exercise of an international police power.”77 The widespread support for international legal cooperation in the early twentieth century had political supporters. The republican French senator Paul d’Estournelles de Constant (1909) favored greater international organization as the best means of ensuring international peace. He was a vocal proponent of international arbitration, founding the Committee for the Defense of National Interests and International Conciliation. He described its goal “to stimulate national prosperity among all nations by bettering international relations.”78 He was also a lifelong advocate of Franco-German rapprochement. He argued after the war in favor of European union, criticized the Treaty of Versailles as a punitive peace, and supported the League of Nations. The awardee in 1912, Elihu Root, was also a prominent supporter of international arbitration.79 The international political cause for which the most awards were given was the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson won in 1919 for his role in negotiating the League’s creation at Versailles, although his international stature was compromised by his failure to secure American ratification. Léon Bourgeois, a French member of the League Council and a leading figure in the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, won the following year. Bourgeois’s organizational genius was instrumental in building transnational support for the League, and in integrating civil society actors into its broader governance work. Swedish Prime Minister Karl Hjalmar Branting and the Norwegian secretarygeneral of the IPU, Christian Lange, were honored in 1922. Both were League and international organization supporters. Branting publically demonstrated his commitment to the League’s internationalist principles, even when it ran counter to the national interest, when he accepted the League’s award of the disputed Åland Islands to Finland. Lange championed the role of smaller states in the international system. He also drew a distinction between peace activism, which he saw as a limited moral opposition to war, and internationalism, which he defined as “a community theory of society which is founded on economic spiritual, and biological facts,” and through which the iniquities of national state behavior could be overcome.80

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The awards for 1925 (British Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain and American banker Charles Gates Dawes) and 1926 (French statesman Aristide Briand and German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann) marked the mid1920s internationalist optimism of the Locarno Pacts and the Dawes Plan. These diplomatic and financial initiatives were designed to foster Franco-German rapprochement and ensure Europe’s political and economic security. American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg was awarded the prize for 1929 for his role in negotiating the Kellogg-Briand Pact. His award may also have reflected a broader desire by internationalists to encourage greater American international cooperation, including entry into the League of Nations.81 The multilateral peace initiatives of the 1920s achieved their goals in the short term, but were made redundant in the 1930s by the twin international threats of global depression and fascist aggression. These gathering storm clouds cast deep shadows over the work of some of the 1930s’ Nobel honorees. This was the case with Angell, as well as the awards for the collective security and League activism of the British Labour politician Arthur Henderson (1934) and Lord Robert Cecil (1937). Henderson was honored for his disarmament work; he chaired the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Given the conference’s very public failure, Henderson’s award is indicative of the strain of idealism or utopianism in interwar internationalism criticized by E. H. Carr. Idealism also marked Cecil’s award in 1937. Cecil was one of the most prominent international supporters of the League’s collective security efforts. He played a central role in crafting the League at Versailles, and was a leading member of the British League of Nations Union (LNU). He was also involved with the International Peace Campaign, which emerged following the LNU’s 1936 Peace Ballot with the goal of coordinating peace associations’ activities.82 Even the 1936 award to Saavedra Lamas in part marked his work to internationalize the League in Latin America at the same time that the collapse of the Geneva conference and its failure to prevent Italian aggression had seriously compromised the League’s collective security pretentions.

Conclusion The international cooperative initiatives pursued by socialists, women, and peace activists in the early twentieth century sought to alter the international status quo. These groups were driven by a shared pursuit of international equality, and attempted to effect change by changing international norms in addition

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to lobbying governments to enact international agreements and conventions. While these three international movements pursued individual goals, and often differed in tactics and political ideology, they shared members, and their lobbying campaigns and activism intersected. A case in point is the common opposition to the First World War by international women’s rights activists (the 1915 Women’s Congress), international peace advocates, and, to a lesser extent, international socialists (for instance, those involved in the Zimmerwald Conference). All three movements worked transnationally, building networks between members in different countries. The majority of these members were private citizens. The international social movements and organizations that they created helped establish a robust international civil society, and challenged the state-based nature of international relations in the early twentieth century. This civil society was primarily transatlantic in orientation, and by no means replaced states as the prime foreign policy actors. What it did is widen the scope of issues debated in international politics, and contribute to the democratization of international affairs by stressing the importance of equality and justice, not just power.

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Synergies: International Functional and Technical Cooperation

The German director Fritz Lang’s science fiction film Metropolis (1927), one of the silent film era’s most influential pictures, presents an allegorical story of a woman and man, Maria and Freder, who attempt to bridge the class divisions of their dystopian industrial society. In its focus on industrialization, mass society, and the potential of technology as an agent of both oppression and liberation, Metropolis reflected some of the central political questions of the early twentieth century. These issues were transnational in nature, and gave rise to international efforts to govern them. While states were important regulatory actors in functional arenas, they were joined by emergent epistemic communities of experts and technocrats who created regulatory regimes, private international standards, and transnational knowledge networks. Some of these regimes were new; others evolved from nineteenth-century international public unions and networks. Technological innovation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created the need for international cooperation. States provided the funding and infrastructural support for much of this innovation activity, particularly for new technologies with military applications such as the wireless (radio) and the airplane. They were reluctant to share their technological capital, which limited the technological utopianism of many early-twentieth-century internationalists. Yet states were ultimately unable to control the international dissemination of technology. The scientific knowledge that underwrote technological innovation was itself universal, and technological transfer and cooperation were as prevalent as forms of national protectionism. Private actors such as scientists, engineers, and multinational corporations were key drivers in the development of international functional cooperation.1 They expanded their individual international

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activities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and asserted their prerogative to self-regulation and international standard setting. While national governments remained wedded to a state-centric concept of international affairs in these years, private citizens and organizations from all walks of life created a networked international society that fundamentally altered the nature and conduct of international relations. The first part of this chapter assesses the late-nineteenth-century origins of international functional cooperation, with a focus on international public unions and the principles of international standardization, and examines international cooperation during the First World War. The chapter then addresses early-twentieth-century international cooperation in the fields of communication and transportation technologies, the international press, and transnational cultural interactions as illustrated through sport.

The Nineteenth-Century Spirit of International Cooperation The idea of science as a tool of international organization resonated widely by the early twentieth century, inspired by the nineteenth-century spirit of international scientific empiricism of thinkers from Jeremy Bentham to the Comte de Saint-Simon to Auguste Comte.2 Figures such as the Fabian publicist Leonard Woolf, the British economist J.  A. Hobson, and the American political scientist Paul Reinsch argued that scientific knowledge provided systemic tools for “cooperative internationalism.”3 Reinsch believed that technical experts were best placed to take a leading role in international governance, as unlike diplomats they were not bound to national perspectives. Similarly, Woolf argued that the scientific study of international affairs would produce a shared appreciation of a collective international will, and thus identify the optimal means of international cooperation. International relations could be organized through rational study, with peace established as the normative state. This secular and empirical internationalism was most pronounced in the natural sciences, but it began to make inroads in the social sciences by the 1920s and 1930s. Public choice theory, managerial science, and organizational theory all advanced in these years. Max Weber published his seminal study of bureaucracy, Economy and Society, in 1922, while American social scientists like Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell advocated the positivist study of human beings’ social, political, and economic activities.4 German intellectuals such as

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the historians Ernst Jäckh and Hans Delbrück saw the study of international politics as essential to fostering international cooperation. The Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim believed the interwar emergence of the sociology of knowledge reflected the imperatives of international cooperation. As he wrote in the late 1920s, “in modern times much more depends on the correct thinking through of a situation than was the case in earlier societies. The significance of social knowledge grows proportionately with the increasing necessity of regulatory intervention in the social process.” Mannheim concluded that a “new type of objectivity in the social sciences” was attainable through the evaluation of the matrix of values and unconscious motivations that drove human thought, and studied the interwar growth of what he termed “the utopian mentality” in its various internationalist manifestations.5 The ethos of international empiricism was evident in the multitude of international standardization campaigns dating from the late nineteenth century. When the French anarchist Martial Bourdin attempted to bomb the Greenwich Observatory in 1894, he was targeting an emblematic international icon of the age.6 International delegates had established Greenwich Mean Time, as measured by the solar mean time at the observatory, as the prime meridian at the Washington Conference in 1884. The use of international time spread in subsequent decades, being adopted in much of Latin America and Africa by the interwar years. The international standardization of time found broad support. Scientists desired a tool of commensurability to facilitate international scholarship, employers saw it as a means of industrial management, railway administrators were eager to establish uniform timetables, and government officials used it to improve their regulatory powers (especially concerning liquor laws, reflecting a widespread international concern over alcohol consumption in these decades). Critics resisted the standardization of time on religious grounds, resentment at the perceived official intrusion into private life, out of an inability to grasp the abstract (and therefore malleable) nature of time, and due to the contrast between solar and standardized time.7 France agreed to the Anglo-American preference for Greenwich as the prime meridian in the hope that the metric system would be adopted as the international standard for weights and measures. While the British and Americans resisted this compromise, the metric system nonetheless became the most widespread international system of measurement by the early twentieth century. The metric system first emerged in 1790 as one of several radical proposals by French Republicans after the outbreak of the French Revolution. Metrication is based on a measure of one-quarter of the earth’s meridian, reflecting measurements

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completed through trigonometric surveys by 1798. Napoleon Bonaparte’s march across Europe in the following decade brought metrication in its wake, while the British, with whom he was at war, retained the Imperial system.8 The metric system’s intuitive appeal led to its wide adoption across Europe. Seventeen states signed the Convention of the Meter in Paris in 1875, which established the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM, International Bureau of Weights and Measures) and its governing board, the General Conference on Weights and Measures (CGPM). The BIPM worked to harmonize national units of measurement, a task made more pressing by the demands of international commerce, engineering and industry, and scientific observation. Industrial states established their own national laboratories to develop standards of weights and measures, beginning with the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt in Germany. The BIPM adopted the International Prototype of the Meter and the International Prototype of the Kilogram in the late 1870s, conducted research into the spectral lines of various alloys in an effort to develop more precise international standards, and studied measures of volume and density. In the 1920s it helped develop standard electrical units in response to mass electrification. Metrification made slower inroads outside Europe. Chinese authorities adopted it in a piecemeal fashion, establishing equivalencies with traditional Chinese weights and measures. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang government in the 1930s, China used metric measurements for international interactions, but maintained traditional measurements for domestic use.9 International standardization initiatives were complemented by, and often codified within, international public unions. The latter emerged organically as responses to the increased international interconnectivity and “territorialization” of politics in the late nineteenth century.10 International public unions institutionalized the conventions that states crafted at international diplomatic conferences. Common features included a multilateral agreement and a permanent bureau that administered technical and political questions pertaining to the union’s issue area. Each public international union enabled political regulation through the collection and management of information, and provided an arena within which state officials and private actors could collaborate. The host national government of each international public union (often Switzerland, as several unions congregated in Berne) supervised the latter’s activities under international law. The International Telegraph Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) were two of the first such international public unions, and by the scale and scope of their international cooperative activities the most significant.11

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European statesmen such as Napoleon III recognized in the 1860s the political wisdom of international regulation for the emerging technology of the telegraph. The result was a conference in Paris in 1865, which created the ITU. Member states’ telegraph administrations worked to standardize telegraph communication. The United States, where telegraph regulation remained in the hands of private companies, did not join until 1908. An international bureau was established in 1868, with the Swiss engineer Louis Curchod serving as its director-general until 1889. It was an independent body affiliated with the Swiss government, and established the template for international bureaus as the administrative center of international organizations.12 Traditional postage communication was also revolutionized in the late nineteenth century, especially by the evolution of faster steamship travel. The search for efficiencies in this evolving traffic inspired the American postal administrator John A. Kassen to suggest an international conference to harmonize postal communication. The Paris Postal Conference was subsequently held in 1863, where delegates opened negotiations on international postage protocols, such as synchronizing international postal transit fees with domestic postal rates. The conference led to a network of subsequent bilateral treaties that harmonized the form by which messages were sent, while states reserved the right to govern the content of messages. These technical agreements constituted an early form of functional governance, built on an asserted distinction between “apolitical” functional activities and political issues that would remain under states’ sovereign control.13 In 1874 states formed the General Postal Union (which became the UPU in 1878), which established an international flat rate for mail, and harmonized other technical elements such as postage stamp design (this is the origin of blue as the indicative color of international mail).14 International public unions sought to reduce the transaction costs, or “friction,” in conducting international trade, communication, or transportation. In some cases this meant surmounting physical and economic barriers, such as disease, the collection of tariffs, or incompatible national intellectual property legislation. The International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail (1890) created a transnational “through-consignment” system in which the free passage of freight, tariff collection reciprocity, and the provision of liability and legal rights for carriers facilitated rail traffic between contracting states. Subsequent international agreements were negotiated for carriage of goods by sea (the Hague Rules, 1924)  and by air (the Warsaw Convention, 1929). The advent of international trade exhibitions beginning with the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace in London in 1851, meanwhile, spurred calls by exporters,

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Figure  8 “Voyage around the World,” poster for the “Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,” late nineteenth century (color litho), Schindler, A./Private collection/ Archives Charmet/Bridgeman Images, CHT176007.

inventors, lawyers, and others for international intellectual property standards. The result was the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883). The United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property was formed in 1891 to administer the two conventions.15 In areas where the comparative open borders of the nineteenth century meant no political impediments existed, technical coordination was required to produce greater efficiencies. The Convention on Technical Uniformity (1886), for instance, provided a framework within which signatories addressed technical rail questions such as the coordination of gauges. International economic friction was reduced by the inclusion of the most-favored-nation clause in many commercial treaties, which lowered tariff barriers to almost nil. These dynamics of international functional cooperation carried into the twentieth century, where cooperative regimes had to adapt to an international system where the state’s administrative capacity and reach were increasing. No harmonized global law (Weltrecht) emerged, as forecast by late-nineteenth-century lawyers such as Ernst Zitelman or idealists such as the founder of the Human Freedom League,

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William Osborne McDowell, who proposed a “United Nations of the Earth” in 1907. Instead, international public unions reflected states’ desire for “normative” uniform legal instruments that could balance the private interests of business entities with those of consumers and the state.16

Technical Cooperation and the First World War The growth of international public unions slowed in the years immediately before the First World War, in part because international cooperation initiatives now existed for many of the period’s most pressing technical questions. The World Congress of International Associations (1910), the predecessor to the Union of International Associations, brought together 137 international organizations to exchange ideas on management and information services. It also attempted to curtail the duplication that the proliferation of international cooperative bodies in the nineteenth century had created. Organized international cooperation had achieved such a scale by the early twentieth century that it became a subject of study and aggregation itself. L’Institute International de la Paix published L’Annuaire de la Vie Internationale (the precursor of the present Yearbook of International Organizations) from 1905 to 1907, after which these compilations were continued by the Central Office of International Associations, created in Brussels in 1907 to coordinate the activities of international organizations. This work went dormant during the First World War, but was resumed by the League of Nations between 1921 and 1939.17 Internationalists could also be blinded by their convictions. Their idealist strains, combined with their faith in the power of rational planning, often led them to believe international cooperation had become the normative state of international affairs. War was irrational, according to conventional internationalist thought. Norman Angell’s The Great Illusion (1910) is the archetype of such political tunnel vision, but he was far from the only internationalist who failed to perceive the pregnant possibility of mass conflict in the international system.18 Increased nationalist and imperial tensions within the international system also curtailed international cooperation. Examples included the AngloGerman naval rivalry, the Agadir crisis in 1911, and the series of Mediterranean and Balkan wars in the first half of the 1910s, beginning with Italy’s invasion of Tripolitania (Libya) in 1911.19 These nationalist tensions were a central cause of war in 1914, yet the war itself counterintuitively became a spur to increased international cooperation.

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This was due to the immense technical and logistical practicalities of conducting a multinational war across multiple theaters, especially for the Triple Entente powers of Britain, France, and Russia and their allies. Wartime international cooperation was strongest in 1917–18. International logistical cooperation followed the managerial patterns and processes developed first by the various national war ministries, all of which assumed oversight of domestic war production and planning, and coordinated their economic activities with those of private businesses to ensure the necessary availability of raw materials and production of armaments and other war supplies.20 The Allied powers cooperated with each other to coordinate their respective supplies, achieve greater logistical efficiencies, and deny the Central powers material resources. On a strategic level, the Allies coordinated their war efforts through the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council. Also key was the British-led maritime blockade of continental Europe between 1914 and 1919, which depleted Germany’s supply base, damaged German civilians’ morale by restricting their food supply, and aided the Americans (and other Allied powers) by limiting Germany’s ability to continue its unrestricted submarine offensive in the Atlantic Ocean.21 The Allies benefited by their combined geographic encirclement of the Central powers, which enabled them to coordinate their international shipping and transport activities while simultaneously denying the Central powers economic contact with the broader world. Such coordination took time to develop, however, due partly to the United States’ official policy of neutrality before Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 helped draw Washington into the war. There were numerous inter-Allied cooperative initiatives on an operational level. Most were formally decommissioned after the war, but they established broader patterns of international cooperation that inspired interwar successors. The day after the war began, the French ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, proposed an Anglo-French Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement (1914). It provided a framework for the coordination of Allied purchasing, as well as for land and maritime shipping. It was followed in 1916 by the Allied Shipping Control, a British-led initiative that allocated shipping to military and import needs, and dealt with logistical problems such as port congestion. Inter-Allied shipping came under acute danger in 1917 as German submarines imperiled Atlantic Ocean convoy routes. In response, the Allies created the Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC) in December, 1917. While France, Britain, Italy, and the United States retained control of their merchant shipping, the AMTC coordinated maritime transport, and adjusted and directed tonnage

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requirements, based on shared Allied military goals.22 Unlike its ad hoc predecessors, the AMTC’s structure anticipated that of postwar international organizations. It was governed by an executive council, with a permanent international staff that provided research and recommendations. Similar inter-Allied cooperative infrastructure emerged for key domestic resources, especially food. These included the Wheat Executive, created in 1916 to coordinate Allied food supplies, the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance (IACWPF, 1917–18), directed by the American engineer Oscar Terry Crosby, and most notably the United States Food Administration directed by Herbert Hoover. Britain and France also supplied the Russian Empire with financial aid until the Bolsheviks pulled Russia out of the war in 1917. Allied cooperation dissipated after the armistice in 1918, undone by the pursuit of divergent national interests. The IACWPF was quietly disbanded soon after the war. British and French imperial interests in the Middle East led to their refusal to participate in American President Woodrow Wilson’s proposed Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, which in the event turned into the solely American KingCrane Commission.23 It is not a coincidence, however, that figures involved in national and Allied logistics during the war pursued postwar careers in international service. Examples include Albert Thomas, who coordinated munitions for the French War Ministry, and the French economist Jean Monnet, who served on the Wheat Executive and then the Allied Shipping Control. While not yet thinking in terms of supranational governance, Monnet emerged from the war convinced that international institutions dedicated to precise technical issues would allow states to “appreciate problems as a whole in the light of the general interest.”24 International cooperation between the Central powers was more limited, one of the contributing factors to their eventual defeat. Indeed, it is more accurate to speak of bilateral cooperation among the Central powers, with Germany as the hub and the Austro-Hungarians and the Ottomans as spokes. GermanAustrian cooperation was facilitated by linguistic and geographic ties, but even here Berlin and Vienna were unable to coordinate their military and economic activity as efficiently as were the Allied powers. German-Ottoman cooperation was more truly international, bridging linguistic and geographic barriers and being directed to a series of negotiated economic and military goals that predated the war. Despite its depiction in period Western stereotype as the “sick man of Europe,” the late Ottoman Empire remained a regional and economic power. Its multicultural ethos constituted a form of “internal” international cooperation that was less hierarchical than most other European empires. After unsuccessfully pursuing an alliance with the British, the Ottomans turned to

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Berlin, agreeing to a military alliance that drew the empire into a war that would ultimately cause its disintegration.25 The Berlin-Istanbul accord was a defensive measure against Russia, but also reflected patterns of prewar Ottoman-German cooperation. A syndicate of German banks was granted a concession by the Ottoman government in 1888 to extend the Oriental Railway from Istanbul into the Anatolian peninsula. The Baghdad Railway Company, also German financed, was commissioned in 1903 to extend the railway to Baghdad. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway served German imperial interests, primarily to provide Germany with an alternate transit route to the British-controlled Suez Canal, but it also represented an alternative transnational axis to those dominated by the British and the French. German technical and military advisors also played an important role in the Ottoman Empire. German military officers had trained many of the Turkish officers who supported the Committee of Union and Progress in its 1913 coup, when they occupied the Sublime Porte and deposed the grand vizier, Kâmil Pasha. The Ottoman minister of war, Enver Pasha, had served as military attaché in Berlin and was the strongest Turkish proponent of cooperation with Germany. In January 1914, Wilhelm II sent the German commander Otto Liman von Sanders to Istanbul to oversee a reform of the Ottoman army (although the Turks retained powers of command), and he played an important leadership role at Gallipoli despite personal tensions with Enver.26 Germany pursued international cooperative goals as part of its war strategy. One of its war aims was a European customs union, an extension of nineteenthcentury German ideas of a zollverein and dreams of Mitteleuropa by figures such as the the director of the Allgemeine Elektrizitätsgesellschaft, Walther Rathenau. German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg proposed a regional customs union in 1915 that would include Austria-Hungary, and could be expanded to incorporate France, Belgium, Italy, and Scandinavia depending on the war’s outcome. The Habsburg government rejected these proposals, with Hungarian Premier Stephen Tisza particularly opposed, but they reveal the integrationist element of Germany’s war aims. These nascent ideas of European Union paralleled calls by British imperialists for imperial preference (essentially a British Empire tariff zone), and by French Commerce Minister Etienne Clémentel for the continuation of inter-Allied economic cooperation after the war ended.27 In privileging national economic security over international economic connectivity, these forms of regional protectionism or economic blocs mitigated against a return to the prewar international economy’s principles of free trade, interconnected migration, and the unimpeded international flow of capital. Yet seen from another perspective, the upsurge of regional economic autarky plans

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during and after the war were measured and controlled forms of international cooperation. Politicians, bankers, businessmen, and labor unions alike collectively realized that a closed national economy was neither possible nor desirable. Rather, each wished to control their state’s economic interaction with the forces of internationalism. By fusing political and military aims with economic integration, these plans also indirectly anticipated the emergence of regional federal union plans in the interwar years. Cooperation among the Central powers was obviously severed after the war, and the defeated states were initially ostracized from postwar international organizations by the victorious nations. For their part, the Allied powers sacrificed continued inter-Allied functional cooperation after the war in favor of an international constitutional agreement in the League Covenant. This reflected their commitment to preserving the status quo ante of an international society in which nation-states were bound to each other by mutual consent. As the political theorist David Mitrany later observed, “the resulting international rules and a host of written treaties and pacts sought, like the national constitutions [of individual states], to fix the formal relationship between the sovereign individual states and their collectivity.” This relationship was “expected to be fixed and final, with international law as a gradually emerging constitution for that political cosmos.”28 Mitrany believed this had been a mistake. He thought the political and kinship bonds necessary for an international constitution to work were much weaker than the common functions and transnational connections that had developed before and during the war years. He argued that wider international functional cooperation offered a more practical means of preventing war and satisfying humanity’s “common index of need.” Humanity’s task was “to develop and coordinate the social scope of authority . . . Internationally it is no longer a question of defining relations between states but of merging them.”29 In making this argument, Mitrany identified an important disjuncture between the lived experience of transnational cooperation in many private and technical areas of life, and Allied political elites’ preoccupation with institutional structure as the key element in international affairs.

Transportation International technical cooperation continued after the war, as illustrated in reference to transportation. The League of Nations played an important, though by no means dominant, role in the interwar regulation of international transportation.

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Its first initiative was the General Conference on Communication and Transit in Barcelona in 1921. The League’s Covenant required member states to “make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League.” This reflected the peacemakers’ free trade convictions.30 The Barcelona Statute, which resulted from the 1921 conference, required signatories to ensure freedom of transit and goods by both railways and international navigable rivers and lakes. It did not include provisions for motor or air traffic. The Barcelona regulations established the framework for subsequent international transportation conventions through the interwar years, including conventions on navigable waterways and an international maritime port regime. The principle of international freedom of transit was upheld by the PCIJ, as well as through bilateral arbitration and diplomatic agreements.31 The League’s Commission for Communication and Transit (CCT) emerged from the Barcelona conference. Its members were mostly civil engineers drawn from national ministries of public works and transport, including its initial secretary, the Dutch engineer Johan Romein. It oversaw the implementation of the Barcelona Statute and other international transit governance issues, and coordinated international discussions concerning the standardization of road signs. Motor traffic grew rapidly in Europe and the Americas in the 1920s, creating a need for domestic legislation as well as international regulation. While not all motor traffic practices were universally harmonized—witness the enduring divide between countries where motorists drive on the left of the road and those where they drive on the right—the pictographic harmonization of urban road signage reflected a common international interest in road safety. The CCT began to coordinate international discussions about road signage in 1926. The European Conference on Road Traffic in 1931, of which the CCT was a major sponsor, led to a series of international road signage agreements. Triangular signs were to indicate road dangers, for instance, while prohibition signs (such as the ubiquitous and essential stop sign) were red.32 While the implementation of such provisions was not universal, they reflected a shared international desire to maintain road safety by making it easier for motorists to understand signage in foreign countries. Road traffic signage is an example of international semiotic standardization that affected the lives of regular people, as well as collaboration between international governance and local and municipal politics. The CCT also compiled national regulations on riverine trade and navigation, and its members prepared recommendations for customs administration and the free navigation of transnational rivers. These provisions reflected a long

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European tradition of transnational riparian cooperation. The Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine emerged from the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Danube River Commission was established in 1856, following the Crimean War. It provided for freedom of navigation of the lower Danube, and established a commission of riverine member states that jointly administered trade issues. Free trade and navigation on Africa’s major rivers was one of the key provisions of the European imperial powers’ General Act of the Berlin Conference (1885). Latin American states, conversely, were more skeptical of international riverine governance, citing the region’s historic conventions of state sovereignty over its waterways.33 The CCT was also active in Asia. It sent technical experts to China in 1931 to advise Chinese officials on conservation and flood control measures for the Huai River System.34 The CCT even participated in the nascent field of international environmental protection. INGOs such as the World Commission for Nature Protection and the International Council for Bird Preservation lobbied the League to pursue preservation and conservation measures. The Japanese League diplomat and agricultural economist Inazō Nitobe was an early convert. In the early 1930s, international environmental organizations and national conservation bodies such as la Ligue pour la Protection des Oiseaux in France pushed the League to take action on oil pollution caused by shipping in international waterways and oceans. The League convened an investigatory committee, though it ultimately sided with shipping industry interests over environmentalists and offered only nonbinding recommendations.35 While the League functioned as an information entrepôt regarding the governance of transnational and long-distance transportation, ad hoc and informal international cooperation was also significant. Publicists, business and financial voices, and other nongovernmental and private actors helped create an international transportation governance regime through their shared but uncoordinated efforts to create cheaper, faster, and more efficient transportation networks. States negotiated and ratified binding international treaties and conventions to regulate international transportation, but they often took their lead from private actors that supplied government officials with relevant information and statistics on the issues under discussion. Private actors were also instrumental in improving international transportation and trade networks, as demonstrated by the construction of the Panama Canal. The French-led international companies La Société internationale du Canal interocéanique (which went bankrupt in 1889) and the Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de Panama initiated the construction project that was subsequently purchased by the United States in 1904 and

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overseen by the Isthmian Canal Commission. This massive initiative brought together international investors, engineers, Panamanian and American laborers, and state governments (France, the United States, and Columbia, which granted the initial commission to the territory when Panama was still under its control).36 The advent of aviation in the early twentieth century also gave rise to pronounced calls for its international regulation. Aviation literally transcended national borders. Both technological enthusiasts and those who feared the potential military applications of airpower advocated an international body to control or administer aviation. While the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) was formed in 1903, support for the international control of aviation remained limited until fears of military airpower increased in the 1930s. This anxiety was epitomized by British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin’s declaration in the House of Commons in 1932 that “the bomber will always get through.”37 Airpower as both a threat and an economic and military opportunity exercised many politicians and intellectuals in the 1930s, as national air forces grew in size and capacity. This was especially the case in Britain. H.  G. Wells warned of its destructive potential in his 1908 novel War in the Air, in which he coined the term “airpower,” while civilians had endured aerial bombing from German zeppelins late in the First World War.38 As colonial secretary in the early 1920s, Winston Churchill authorized the use of airpower as a cheap means of suppressing an Iraqi uprising. By 1930, he had come to argue that national airpower should be placed under international control due to its destructive capacity. Concerns about airpower were also apparent in France, where the French Air Force (Armée de l’air) remained larger than the Royal Air Force into the 1930s. French Minister of War André Tardieu called for the international control of airpower at the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference, while pacifist organizations such as the British National Peace Council advocated the abolition of national military aircraft.39 These pleas for international regulation were eclipsed by national rearmament in the 1930s, with air forces growing at an alarming rate. The idea of an international air force, however, reemerged in postwar planning debates at Dumbarton Oaks. In contrast to military power, international cooperation for civilian aviation was much more extensive. Air travel brought about a significant “time-space compression,” shrinking perceptions of the globe while speeding up travel and transport times.40 Much global airspace was imperial in the interwar period. Commercial airline companies cooperated through the British state-run monopoly Imperial Airways Ltd. from 1924 to 1936, while

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the Dutch company KLM provided Amsterdam-Batavia flights and KNILM (Royal Netherlands Indies Aviation Company) provided flights from the Dutch East Indies to other south Asian destinations. International civil aeronautics developed in accord with the terms of the Convention Relating to International Air Navigation, passed by ICAN in 1919. The convention determined that a state’s sovereignty extended to its airspace, building on air traffic and navigation principles established at the prewar Paris International Air Navigation Conference (1910). The British adventurer Amy Johnston thus had to negotiate Dutch permission to fly over the East Indies on her 1930 England-Australia solo flight.41

Communication International communication also experienced revolutionary changes in the late nineteenth century, which fostered closer international cooperation. These changes were epitomized by the telegraph, which by the late 1870s encompassed the world via a network of terrestrial and submarine cables. State governments financed most terrestrial cables, while private interests did the same for underwater cables. The latter industry was dominated by the British Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies, the Danish-based Great Northern, and Western Union and the Commercial Cable Company, both based in the United States. Technical coordination was the primary early consideration, a task undertaken by the ITU. It clarified operating procedures, particularly those that caused costly delays when messages were processed at international borders. Member states also worked to harmonize tariff rates, and agreed on Morse code as the technical standard of communication. Private companies’ monopoly on international telegraph communication attracted critics such as the Australian journalist and British MP John Henniker Heaton. He argued that private ownership kept overseas telegraph tariffs artificially high, thus denying the majority of the world’s population of cheap communication. He called for a universal cable penny press.42 His campaign failed, however, as states were content to leave the technological and economic aspects of international communication to the market. The ITU also assumed responsibility for the international regulation of the age’s other two communication innovations: the telephone and the wireless. The first telephone was patented by the Scottish scientist Alexander Graham Bell in 1876, but reliable long-distance telephony took several decades of development.

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The ITU began to debate international telephone regulations in 1903, and created the International Telephone Consultative Committee in 1924, with the aim of creating international standards for long-distance telephony. Its long-serving initial secretary-general was the French engineer Georges Valensi, who also oversaw the creation of the European Basic Telephone Transmission Reference System. In the late 1930s he made breakthroughs in the transmission of color television reception.43 The ITU’s efforts to regulate international wireless communication also began in 1903, with an initial focus on the use of radio transmissions at sea. These discussions led to a Radiotelegraph Conference in Berlin in 1906, which produced the International Radiotelegraph Union (IRU). The IRU’s main governance innovation was to divide the frequency spectrum into different services; long-distance wireless transmissions, for instance, were placed below 188 kHz, while national militaries were granted use of frequencies from 188 to 500 kHz. This governance model became the template for subsequent international terrestrial radio regulation. The 1912 Radiotelegraph Conference in London fixed frequencies for maritime distress calls in the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, and required wireless manufacturers to make their receivers mutually compatible.44 The major event in the development of international radio governance was the 1927 Radiotelegraph Union conference in Washington. Delegates from eighty participating countries produced an international Table of Allocations based on the IRU’s service model, rather than a national allocation scheme as favored by some countries. The conference’s impetus was to prevent a “tragedy of the commons” scenario in which national radio competition led to mutual interference on shared wavelengths. The rise of private commercial radio in the 1920s increased this threat, as did “radio-jamming” between political rivals.45 As radio broadcasting capabilities expanded, it became evident that radio and telegraph communication might logically be regulated by the same international body. After a decade of debate, the ITU and the IRU amalgamated at the joint Telegraph and Radiotelegraph Conference in Madrid in 1932, leading ultimately to the present International Telecommunication Union. Despite international cooperation in the technical governance of radio transmission, states continued to use the radio for political aims. Germany and Italy broadcast Arabic propaganda programs in the 1930s in Iraq and Transjordan in an effort to generate Arab support. The Americans, Japanese, and Germans competed for the nascent radio market in China until the early 1930s, when the Guomindang asserted control over broadcasting as a state-building tool. While the Nanjing government was able to force some foreign broadcasters off the air

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in China, many wireless broadcasts from the foreign concessions continued to operate, and the Guomindang’s ability to regulate broadcasting was compromised by the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937.46 Radio also functioned as a tool of cultural diplomacy. Listeners in interwar Singapore found themselves at the electromagnetic crossroads of several imperial wireless powers. They could access short-wave transmissions from French Saigon, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and the BBC Empire Service, as well as intermittent stations broadcasting in local dialects.47

Press Cooperation The international communication revolution facilitated the growth of an international press by the early twentieth century, resulting in various forms of international press cooperation. News flowed across borders as easily as did commodities, migrants, and ideas. International and imperial press agencies served as agents for the creation and dissemination of international knowledge. The French Havas (1835), German Wolff ’s Telegraphisches Bureau (1849), and British Reuters (1851) news services all date from this period. These were private entities that supplied a quasi-public good,48 and through their creation of a cartel in 1865 represent a case of private actors creating a network of international cooperation. The American Associated Press joined as a partner between 1893 and 1933, establishing a transatlantic international news network. These agencies shared press copy, and collaborated in covering international events of shared domestic interest such as the Boxer Rebellion in China from 1899 to 1901. The rebellion was captured by photographers and filmmakers as well as journalists,49 and the resultant news coverage (not always accurate) was one of the first widely disseminated international events. While the press agency cartel widened the exchange of international news, journalism continued to reflect nationalist concerns and perspectives. This dynamic can be seen in the highly nationalist news coverage of the South African War (1899–1902). Unlike the occupation of northern China by the foreign expeditionary force responding to the Boxer Rebellion, the war between Britain and the Afrikaners split the international community and exacerbated nationalist tensions that were reflected in international press coverage.50 Early-twentieth-century international news coverage was conducted mainly by private newspapers, mostly based in the United States, Britain, and France. Major papers such as the New  York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the

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Daily Telegraph, the Manchester Guardian, and Paris Soir had their own foreign correspondents. A few papers outside Europe gathered their own international news, such as La Prensa in Argentina and Nichi Nichi in Japan, but smaller papers that featured world coverage drew from international press associations. The largest was the World League of Press Associations, whose thirty members (which included Germany’s Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro until 1939) exchanged news coverage. Its members included official state agencies (such as Russia’s Telegrafnoje Agentstwo Ssojusa) that presented government positions, semiofficial agencies that operated privately but largely presented pro-government coverage (such as Agence Avala in Yugoslavia or Domei Tshushin Sha in Japan), and independent agencies (including the Associated Press of India and the Canadian Press).51 Imperial press networks, meanwhile, operated within the various European empires. They constituted international news networks of a more circumscribed fashion, and lobbied for cheaper postal rates and expanded wireless infrastructure. Imperial press cooperation became international in 1932 when the British Broadcasting Company’s Empire Service began operation.52 The submarine telegraph wires by which international news was transmitted in this period were both shared and contested. The global submarine network was intrinsically transnational. By the end of the 1870s, there were 64,000 nautical miles of submarine cable; by 1923, there were 366,000. Submarine networks were developed by state actors for national and imperial interests. The British “All-Red Route,” completed in 1902 with the construction of a trans-Pacific cable, was the most expansive such “tool of empire,” but it was not unique.53 Germany built a cable network linking Berlin with German East Africa, via the Middle East, to avoid the British-controlled Suez Canal zone. Japan contracted its overseas telegraph network to Great Northern in the 1880s and 1890s, but its imperial expansion into Korea and northern China in the early twentieth century was accompanied by a cable network connecting its islands to mainland Asia.54 While states were thus key players in the expansion of international submarine cable networks, private companies built and operated underwater cables. These were multinational entities, drawing capital from international markets and carrying information from other national actors. A similar dynamic occurred in long-distance wireless broadcasting. The German government guided the formation of Telefunken, a joint subsidiary of the firms Siemens & Halske and Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft, which disseminated German news agencies’ broadcasts into Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific. Its significance grew after the First World War, when the Allies cut Germany’s submarine cables.55 By

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the interwar years, long-distance communication was dominated by an oligopoly of private companies, including the Radio Corporation of America, Western Union, the Danish Great Northern Telegraph Company, and the British-owned Imperial and International Communications, Ltd.56 The Chinese press had played a limited role in informing public opinion in the late Qing period, but began to flourish after the 1912 revolution. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean newspapers circulated in Asia, and Asian journalists participated in the American-founded Press Congress of the World. The congress, which held its inaugural session in Hawai’i in 1921, sought to establish international journalistic ethics and standards. It was committed to the ideal that the world was interconnected, and that greater communication and understanding could contribute to international peace. In the spirit of the May Fourth Movement, postwar Chinese journalists also looked to the West for guidance on best practices. The University of Missouri even ran China’s first journalism school. Yet Asian writers also criticized Western journalists for reporting misinformation on Asia, contravening the standards of professional objectivity that they preached at the Press Congress.57 While international organizations focused most of their energies on international communication among members, their directors gained a greater appreciation of the importance of international public opinion in the interwar years. The League of Nations’ Information Section publicized the League’s multitudinous activities through press releases and the publication of conference proceedings. More significant was the publicity work of INGOs, especially the various national League associations represented collectively by the International Federation of League of Nations Associations.58 The expansion of international press cooperation and the publicity efforts of international organizations reflected the international growth of information science in the early twentieth century. The new discipline of scientific management, notably American ideas of Taylorism and Fordism, constituted an important element of modernist thought. The organization and dissemination of knowledge were fundamental to the creation of a more interconnected international society, and constituted the essence of international cooperation in what the Austrian peace activist Bertha von Suttner termed the “machine age.” These ideas were manifested in the fusion of science and art, in a new focus on industrial design, and the expansion of international governance structures predicated on information and communication technology. Supporters of the League of Nations perceived it as a developing body of scientific governance, a rationalist, managerial, and planning ethos explicitly

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displayed at League functions such as the World Economic Conference in 1927.59

International Sport Functional and technical cooperation facilitated international cultural cooperation. Representative illustrations of this dynamic can be found in the realm of international sporting cooperation, including the creation of large-scale international athletic events such as the modern Olympics and the first football World Cup, the standardization of rules and equipment in many sports, and the creation of international sports federations. A mix of nationalism and the desire for international peace through sport motivated the French educator Pierre de Coubertin to organize the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1894. Central to Coubertin’s vision was the ideal of “Olympism,” which held that “a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” could be realized through the spirit of sport and what Coubertin called “moderate competition” (as opposed to the excessive competition of nationalist military rivalries).60 In 1918, Coubertin wrote that Olympism “is not a system, it is a state of mind . . . and no race or time can hold an exclusive monopoly on it.”61 The early Olympics featured cultural displays and performances alongside athletics. In 1906 Coubertin convened the Consultative Conference of Art, Letters, and Sport, where delegates developed ideas for theatrical fetes sportives, Olympic architecture competitions, and the Games’ pageantry.62 Initially a European movement, the IOC gradually internationalized. It recruited members from Japan and the Ottoman Empire before the First World War, and South America, India, and China in the 1920s and 1930s. Unlike most other international organizations in the era, the IOC was essentially a private club, rather than a federation of national associations. Members were recruited through personal connections, and in Coubertin’s founding vision they represented the IOC, not their home nations. While the IOC seized the initiative in convening the largest ongoing international sports event, it left the standardization of rules to individual sports federations.63 The IOC celebrated amateurism. This spirit was also present in other international sporting communities, including the Muscular Christianity movement in British public schools, the early-twentieth-century movement for physical education, and the prevalence of international club competitions. In Germany, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s concept of Turnen, a form of noncompetitive

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gymnastics, was intensely popular. It was directed to the health of the individual, and to the creation of a healthy national community. Turnen was exported to Germany’s colonies, where it served as a “cradle of ethnicity,” and had loosely comparative analogues in Sweden and elsewhere. These examples reveal that Anglo-American sports, while globally predominant, were not the only earlytwentieth-century international sporting traditions, and that the aesthetic and recreational elements of international sport were as important as organized international competition.64 Organized amateur sport internationalized, if slowly, in the early twentieth century. National amateur athletic associations existed in most sporting nations to coordinate team and individual athletics, and to stage athletic competitions. The Union des Sociétés françaises de sports athlétiques, for instance, was created in 1889 to govern cycling, football, rowing, tennis, and other sports, and to coordinate international competitions for French athletes and teams. These organizations selected their national Olympic teams. International sport federations also appeared. Similar to international organizations in other issue areas, these bodies formed to harmonize rules and regulations, and to provide an international forum for decision-making concerning common goals. Athletic competitions such as track and field or swimming, and team sports from football to ice hockey, require functional standardization. Some sporting standards became internationalized gradually through customary use, such as boxing’s Queensbury Rules (1867). Others were imperial standards, such as the Laws of Cricket formulated by the British Marylebone Cricket Club and implemented throughout the empire by the International Cricket Council, formed in 1909 by Britain, Australia, and South Africa.65 The many international sporting federations that formed in the decades before and after the First World War also played a central regulatory role. The earliest international federations appeared for individual pursuits, including gymnastics (1881), rowing (1892), skating (1892), cycling (1900), swimming (1908), and athletics (1912). National team sport federations were slower to federate, beginning with football (1904) and ice hockey (1908). The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) was formed by European football federations in 1904 to regulate their sport’s international matches. It governed international football according to the Laws of the Game of the Football Association Ltd., which were developed in Britain by the International Football Association Board in the late nineteenth century. Most early international sports federations, like other international organizations, were Eurocentric. FIFA began life with seven European members (Belgium,

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Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). The president of the Union Belge des Sociétés de Sports Athlétiques, Baron Edouard de Laveleye, persuaded the British Football Association to join FIFA in 1905. South Africa, Chile, and Argentina became members before the First World War, marking FIFA’s slow internationalization. Its remit was largely restricted to Europe before the 1940s, although it awarded the first World Cup to Uruguay in 1930.66 Regional federations such as the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol remained influential in the interwar years. Much of the colonial world was precluded from international sporting competitions based on the principle of national representation, although Egypt and India sent teams to the Olympics beginning in 1912 and 1920, respectively. Some indigenous and colonized athletes competed under their colonial power’s flag. International sporting competitions also emerged in Asia in the early twentieth century. The YMCA organized the first Far Eastern Championship Games in Manila in 1913, drawing competitors from China, Japan, Siam, Hong Kong, the Federated Malay States, and the Philippines.67 Transnational amateur sporting competition thrived in North America. Canadian and American amateur clubs regularly played each other in the late nineteenth century. Beginning in 1926, ice hockey teams from the Royal Military College of Canada and the United States Military Academy played an annual game. Ice hockey superseded bandy (field hockey on ice) as a winter sport in Europe by the early twentieth century, and the first European league formed in England in 1903. Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Bohemia formed the Ligue internationale de hockey sur glace (LIHG) in 1908, and Britain won the inaugural European championship in 1910. The LIHG (which assumed its present name, the International Ice Hockey Federation, in 1954)  assumed international governance over the rules of play and the size of the ice surface. Canada and the United States joined in 1920. Ice hockey spread to Sweden in 1920, and the Soviet Union in the 1930s.68 It was first played at the 1920 Summer Olympics in Antwerp, where the gold medal was won by the Winnipeg Falcons, an amateur team, reflective of the Games’ founding spirit of amateur competition. Ice hockey was then moved to the Winter Games, which were first held in Chamonix, France, in 1924. The Winter Games evolved from the Nordic Winter Games, held since 1901 and initiated in part by Viktor Gustav Balck, a Swedish IOC member and friend of Coubertin.69 While amateurism remained the key element in international sporting cooperation in the early twentieth century, the development of professional sport also featured transnational cooperation on a limited scale. Ice hockey again provides

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Figure  9 Ice hockey game during the 1928 Winter Olympic Games, St. Moritz, Switzerland/IOC Olympic Museum/Allsport.

an example. The first international professional league, the International Hockey League, operated from 1904 to 1907 with teams from Pittsburgh, Michigan, and Sault St. Marie, Ontario, Canada. The predominant professional league, the National Hockey League, formed in 1917 in Montréal. It internationalized in the 1920s when its Canadian franchises were joined by the Boston Bruins (1924), Pittsburgh Pirates and New  York Americans (1925), and New  York Rangers, Chicago Blackhawks, and Detroit Cougars (1926).70 Professional, semiprofessional, and amateur athletes in various sports also conducted international exhibitions and tours. Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru all played international exhibition matches in the United States and Europe in the 1920s and 1930s.71 In 1888–9 the Chicago baseball magnate Albert Spalding organized a world baseball tour, which brought two teams of professional American players to New Zealand, Ceylon, Egypt, and Europe to play exhibition games for foreign crowds. The tour was enabled by the same transportation technologies that had brought about internationalization in other arenas, while the racist behavior on tour of players such as Cap Anson revealed the limitations to international cooperation of the period’s “global colour line.”72 Racism was also evident in the exclusion of African American players from professional baseball. African American stars such as James “Cool Papa”

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Bell and Josh Gibson instead played in the segregated Negro Leagues, which also welcomed some Latin American players. Barnstorming (exhibition touring) sometimes brought African American players into contact with both Japanese and Cuban teams, and African Americans played in the Latin American winter leagues.73 Spalding’s tour was followed by a more extensive international exhibition tour in 1913–14 that visited Japan, China, and India in addition to Europe. It featured period stars such as Christy Mathewson, Tris Speaker, and the Native American Jim Thorpe (who had won the pentathlon and decathlon at the 1912 Stockholm Olympics). There were also exhibition tours of Japan, including a team featuring Babe Ruth in 1934. While baseball did not take root everywhere, American influences were instrumental in its establishment in Japan, and in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, which the United States captured during the Spanish-American War (1898). Cuban players, meanwhile, were instrumental in spreading baseball in Mexico, the Caribbean, Venezuela, and Colombia.74 As these examples indicate, early-twentieth-century empires provided global pathways by which sport became internationalized. British imperial sports such as cricket and polo reflected a “games ethic” of masculinity and imperial decorum. Britons exported these sports into the colonial world, where they were adopted by colonial elites, particularly in south Asia. French colonial officials included gymnastics as a component of military training for both French soldiers and indigenous recruits in French colonies from Algeria to Indochina. Meanwhile, some French colonial schools and religious groups promoted sports such as football and wrestling as a component of the mission civilisatrice.75 The international diffusion of sport was not without friction. While George Orwell’s opinion that international sport constitutes “war without the shooting” is an exaggeration, sport could create imperial and international tensions. The infamous 1930 “bodyline incident,” where the English cricket team adopted a strategy of bowling at the legs of Australian batsmen, revealed the cultural limits of British ideas of “fair play” and a conflict between ideas of sport as a gentlemanly undertaking and a masculine competition.76 French colonial officials often insisted that colonial sports be segregated, out of exaggerated fears of the potential of Muslim insurrection. Women too faced discrimination in the international sporting arena. Women were precluded from participating in many Olympic events before the Second World War on spurious “health” grounds. The 1928 Amsterdam Games, for instance, featured 2,724 male athletes from 46 countries, but only 290 women. Some international sports federations, such as the Fédération Internationale de Hockey sur Gazon (1924), prioritized men’s

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participation, leading to the separate formation of women’s federations such as the International Federation of Women’s Hockey Associations (founded in 1927 by Norah Henrietta Heron-Maxwell).77 Before 1914, international sporting connections were weak. Team sports were less significant than individual athletic pursuits and physical education, and international sporting ties were driven primarily by private actors like Coubertin and Spalding. International sport truly emerged after the First World War, the result of technological and financial internationalization, and governments’ adoption of sport for nationalist purposes. This growth can be seen in the proliferation of international sports competitions in the interwar period, and the fact that international sporting records began to be registered in the mid-1920s.78 International sporting cooperation thus assumed several different forms in the early twentieth century, knit together by the emerging set of international sports federations. Whereas competitive team sports rose to prominence in the Anglo-Saxon world, the collective individualism of gymnastics and other forms of physical education remained globally significant, and the international Olympic movement forged the ideals of international peace, nationalism, and the cult of amateurism.

Conclusion International cooperation in the early twentieth century bore a distinct theme of functional and technical standardization, largely as a transnational response to the age’s multitude of technological innovations. These innovations promised faster and more efficient international communication and transportation, but only if the many technical impediments that caused “friction” could be removed. International functional cooperation provided the answer to many of these challenges. From nineteenth-century international public unions to the rise of twentieth-century functional governance regimes, states and nongovernmental actors pursued their collective self-interest through international cooperation. This phenomenon was evident in regard to international telecommunications, postal relations, and international rail and maritime transportation. These more purely functional regimes in turn facilitated closer international cooperation in cultural realms, from the international press to international sporting events.

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Private International Cooperation and Governance by Experts

The ethos of standardization and rational planning that developed by the early twentieth century was accompanied by a growing awareness of shared international problems and challenges that transcended national borders. Issues such as the use of the world’s oceans, the flow of capital, and infectious diseases negated political borders and nationalist differences. If they were to be successfully harnessed, regulated, or combatted, these global commons issues required international cooperation. Successful international regimes emerged in the early twentieth century to deal with numerous global commons issues. These regimes were often led by private actors, rather than states, and were functional in nature. Other issues proved resistant to cooperation where political differences proved too great, or fell prey to the “tragedy of the commons,” where states and private actors found the benefits of avoiding common action more attractive than cooperation.1 This chapter investigates the private international functional regimes and cooperative initiatives that developed in the early twentieth century to address four important global commons issues: economic governance, scientific research, food security, and international public health.

International Economic Cooperation International economic cooperation flourished in the early twentieth century, the consequence of free trade, technological interconnectedness, and imperial expansion. These themes were present in the period’s many international exhibitions, and in the publicity materials of national marketing and trade boards.2 International exhibitions and World’s Fairs were international trade shows.

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Participating states and firms used them to promote their industrial and technological wares, and to generate international trade relationships. These events were also cultural exhibitions, designed both to promote international cooperation and for purposes of national prestige. As such, they were a synecdoche of broader period cultural norms and attitudes. A prime example is the colonial overtones of the era’s international exhibitions. Many period World’s Fairs included extensive ethnological exhibitions of “primitive” peoples. The 1903 Human Pavilion in Osaka, Japan, displayed an Ainu man, Fushine Kōzō, as well as subjects from Japan’s newly acquired territories of Okinawa, Taiwan, and Hokkaidō. European colonial exhibitions provided “anthropological” displays of colonized peoples, and German traveling exhibitions frequently included Völkerschauen (“shows of people”). Over a hundred colonial subjects were displayed at the 1896 Berlin commercial exhibition. The practice of using living peoples in anthropological displays continued into the interwar years, although it came under increased criticism on moral grounds. The 1924 Empire Exhibition in London included West African craftsmen on display, while the Paris Colonial Exhibition in 1931 featured a “human zoo,” which exhibited French colonial subjects from Africa and Asia.3 These examples illustrate how mass events designed to develop greater international cooperation were also sites of exclusion, reinforcing the racial and colonial norms of earlytwentieth-century metropolitan societies. Private capital flowed freely across the globe in the late nineteenth century in unprecedented volumes,4 but organized international financial cooperation was slower to develop than for international trade. This reflected the central role of monetary policy as an element of state sovereignty. Yet gradual steps were taken toward international economic integration. As world markets became more interconnected, financiers and state officials became increasingly aware of the mutual dependence of their national economies. The classical gold standard era stretched from the 1880s to 1914, during which the national currency of the system’s major states was convertible into gold at the prevailing “par exchange rate.” This system could be volatile, as demonstrated by price instability in the 1890s or the international “contagion” precipitated by a monetary shock in a participating economy, but it maintained international economic stability by limiting inflation through a managed international standard.5 In an effort to lower the transaction costs in conducting transnational trade using different currencies, France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland formed the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) in 1865. The first international monetary union in history, it subsequently attracted other European and Latin American states as either members or unaffiliated

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partners adhering to its regulations. The LMU functioned until 1927, but its utility as an international standard was undermined by the shifting value of gold and silver and by states which debased their currency.6 Coordinated international economic cooperation emerged after the First World War, which destroyed the prewar system of free trade and left many economies severely weakened (especially in the successor states created in Europe after the war). The economic consequences of the Versailles Treaty (as well as the other three peace treaties), as noted by the British economist John Maynard Keynes and latterly many others, flowed from the Allies’ punitive political motivations. Most notorious were the financial reparations imposed on Germany, which the 1921 London Schedule of Payments set at 132 billion gold marks. Yet the peacemakers also recognized that economic competition was a cause of war in 1914, and Allied financial actors sought to create international mechanisms to rebuild the international economy and prevent future destabilization. The League convened the Brussels Financial Conference in 1920 with the goal of organizing an international credit system and clearing house, as well as facilitating the exchange of financial information between states. These measures were designed to help states combat inflation and stabilize their currencies, enable countries such as Italy and Greece to confront their crippling postwar debts, and aid French and Belgian postwar reconstruction. The Brussels conference was the first step in the creation of international economic governance. It convened 150 economic experts from thirty-nine countries with the goal of creating an international framework for financial stability. It also signaled an important shift from politicians to experts as key international economic decision-makers. Unlike most other international conferences in the early 1920s, Germany and the other defeated Central powers were invited to Brussels. The only notable absences were Turkey and the Soviet Union.7 Soon thereafter, the League coordinated an international bailout of the floundering Austrian economy. International financial support was provided to Vienna to help stabilize Austria’s currency in 1922, and in return Austria was compelled to balance its budget through an austerity program. A League financial reconstruction plan to combat hyperinflation in Hungary followed in 1923–4. The League also convened the Genoa Conference (1922) that affirmed the importance of international central bank cooperation, and the World Economic Conference (1927), where delegates recommended tariff reduction and the expansion of the most-favored-nation principle as means of liberalizing world trade and promoting international economic cooperation.8

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Also present at Brussels were American representatives, despite their country’s refusal to join the League. This was an early indication of the influential role private American actors would play in interwar international governance. The League produced a model bilateral treaty on double taxation in 1928, based largely on American practices and advice, wherein the country whose resident provided infrastructure or investment was responsible for taxing business income, while passive investment income was taxed in the subject’s country of residence. This principle was adapted decades later in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s recommendations on corporate taxation.9 The signal examples of interwar American economic internationalism were the Dawes Plan (1924) and Young Plan (1929), by which American bankers advanced American proposals to allow Germany to continue paying reparations in the face of financial turmoil in the Weimar Republic. The 1923 Allied Reparation Commission under Charles Dawes reduced Germany’s yearly reparations payments and secured an international loan to stabilize its economy. The members of the Second Experts Commission under Owen Young in 1929 amortized Germany’s payments over a fifty-nine-year schedule, and tied the annuities to war debts owed to the United States. The Young Plan also sought to depoliticize the reparations question by placing it under the control of central bankers involved in the newly created Bank for International Settlements (BIS).10 The BIS was founded in 1930 as a public-private enterprise to promote international monetary cooperation. Its creators hoped that it would encourage national central banks to coordinate their respective fiscal policies. This became its primary activity after the Lausanne Agreement (1932) suspended Germany’s reparations payments. The BIS also served as a bank for international organizations (IOs), revealing the emerging interconnection between the transnational worlds of governance and money.11 The BIS drew for expertise on an international coalition of banking and financial experts. The Swedish economist Per Jacobsson wrote many of the BIS’s annual reports, and headed its Monetary and Economic Department. The British banker Charles Addis, an expert on Chinese finance, was a BIS director from 1930 to 1932, where he advocated for policies of international conciliation. The hardheaded governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Collet Norman, pressed for the importance of independent central banking and worked closely with his fellow central bankers, including the president of the Reichsbank from 1930 to 1939, Hjalmar Schacht.

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Americans were also powerful voices at the BIS, another reminder not to exaggerate interwar American isolationism. S. Parker Gilbert, who had helped convince European powers to revise the Dawes Plan, helped found the BIS and served as a liaison between American and European financial interests in the 1930s when he was a partner at J. P. Morgan. The American lawyer Leon Fraser worked with Gilbert in administering the Dawes Plan, and served on BIS councils to secure American interests in international monetary cooperation.12 The BIS provided “club standards” established through the collaboration of market and state actors, wherein the world’s major economic powers crafted rules for the international economy that would both secure financial stability and protect their respective national interests. The bank was created in a particular historical moment, one of international market instability where the threat that Germany would default on its reparations commitments was acute. It was also a product of international multilateral negotiations between state and non-state actors, as governments, private financiers, and central bankers cooperated in pursuit of their mutual interests.13 Despite the efforts of the BIS and other advocates of financial stability, international economic cooperation receded during the Depression. National planning policies, and the politics of protectionism and autarky, replaced those of international free trade.14 This shift was demonstrated symbolically by the Bank of England’s renunciation of the Gold Standard in 1931. The Gold Standard had previously collapsed during the First World War, but was resuscitated as the Gold Exchange Standard in 1925 by Winston Churchill, then chancellor of the Exchequer, on the advice of the British Treasury official Otto Niemeyer. Britain then rejected it six years later in response to the large outflow of gold and capital caused by the onset of the Depression. International free trade was also slowed by the creation of regional protectionist blocs, including the British system of imperial preference agreed to at the Ottawa Conference (1932) and France’s tight control of trade with its colonies.15 While economic autarky increased in the 1930s, the Depression also provoked transnational debates about state interventionism. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in particular both inspired and mirrored increased economic governance activities by both the state and allied private actors in other countries. These attempts to manage the tensions between society and the global market in the 1930s anticipated the infrastructure of international economic cooperation, which emerged through the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944, including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and latterly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.16

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Private International Governance Many of the individuals involved in these postwar economic reconstruction initiatives were economists and bankers, part of a broader international cohort of experts who contributed to the development of private governance and regulatory regimes in many different fields. Many of these experts were affiliated with or worked alongside the League of Nations, helping to establish Geneva as the world center of international governance.17 States used IOs such as the ILO and the International Institute of Agriculture to help regulate the global market. The experts connected to these organizations provided governments with technical expertise, and facilitated international technical cooperation through information sharing, regular conferences, and publications. IOs thus enabled the growth of many forms of private and semiprivate international governance by professional and other epistemic groups, many of whom were interested in regulating global industrial capitalization.18 Many experts provided advice to their own and other governments, as well as to IOs, and sat as representatives on international bodies. Keynes is a well-known case, but there were many others. The Russian-American economic expert Lewis L. Lorwin, who published Labor and Internationalism in 1929, provided a systemic account of the international labor movement. He also recommended international economic planning through his work at the Brookings Institute and as an ILO adviser.19 The Greek diplomat and jurist Antoine Frangulis helped found the International Diplomatic Academy in Paris in 1926, which became a center for foreign relations scholars and experts. He was an early proponent of international human rights, pressing the case for minorities in Geneva and among the growing international network of jurists.20 The Mexican academic Daniel Cosío Villegas was a delegate or technical advisor at many international conferences, including the First Conference on Economical Statistics in Geneva (1928), and sponsored fifty Spanish intellectuals as exiles from the Civil War with whom he subsequently founded the important Latin American research institute La Casa de España en Mexico.21 The British finance expert Cecil Hermann Kisch represented India at the 1933 World Economic Conference and wrote widely on the importance of central banking cooperation.22 Other experts called for a return to nineteenth-century governance principles. The French economist Jacques Léon Rueff, who worked at the League’s Economic and Financial Section in the late 1920s, opposed Keynsian prescriptions in the Depression years in favor of monetary conservatism through a return to a hard gold standard.23

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Before 1914, the global market was largely self-regulating. States played a minimal role in managing the international economy, with private investors, entrepreneurs, and other business actors exercising relative financial autonomy. These private actors created international institutions and practices in pursuit of their collective self-interests. Stock exchanges emerged or expanded in the financial capitals and major cities of industrial states in the late nineteenth century as an organized response to the growing complexity and scale of the global securities trade. They provided companies and investors with market information and a forum within which to trade. These were private institutions that set their own membership rules, and also international, with 28 percent of global assets being held by foreign interests in 1914.24 The London Stock Exchange and Paris Bourse were at the center of the global securities market before the First World War. National stock exchanges collaborated with each other to facilitate the free flow of capital, to minimize risk, and to maintain a reciprocal respect for the rights of foreign investors. Collectively they constituted a decentralized international network of individuals who determined their own operating regulations. The First World War provoked a global financial crisis, as investors sold their holdings en masse and stock exchanges quickly closed in response. The international securities market recovered after the war, but exchanges were now more closely regulated by governments. Wall Street became the international financial center. While national markets were more integrated than ever, the percentage of assets traded internationally was lower than before the war due to the prevalence of government debts in the market, Russia’s decision in 1917 to repudiate its debts, and the costs of postwar reconstruction.25 Experts also cooperated with each other in private and professional networks, establishing themselves in the process as private authorities. They created international norms and standards, coordinated the transnational provision of services, and formed cartels and business associations.26 A multinational consortium of bankers led by J. P. Morgan coordinated the issuance of loans to the new Chinese Republic for economic development projects between 1911 and the early 1920s. Many Caribbean societies, meanwhile, were tied economically to the United States through loans and financial reorganization administered by a cohort of mainly American bankers and financial advisers.27 These international networks established voluntary private sector regulatory regimes, often in highly technical fields where politicians and civil servants deferred to experts’ specialist knowledge. In the French sociologist Emile Durkheim’s terms, these international regimes constituted a form of “organic solidarity” whereby individuals performing highly specialized tasks forged connections with the broader

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(internationalist) society in which they lived. Their collective pursuit of what Durkheim described as a “shared value consensus” would, in theory, lead to international social order.28 While this vision was upended by the First World War, many of the underlying private regulatory networks that emerged in the pre-1914 era survived into the postwar world. Engineers and technical experts were at the forefront of this international regulatory movement, building on the work of nineteenth-century standardization advocates. They created international standards that shaped international communities of trade, resolved compatibility issues where national standards conflicted, and fostered an international environment amenable to technological innovation. Above all, they were focused on the process of international cooperation. The International Electrotechnical Commission was a private regulatory organization established in 1906 under the leadership of the British engineer Charles le Maistre to set standards for electric services and products. It interacted with the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures as well as scientific experts, an example of the type of international collaboration between private authorities and IOs that became more prevalent after the First World War.29 National standards associations also emerged in industrial countries by the early twentieth century. They began to cooperate formally with each other in 1926 with the creation of the International Federation of National Standards Association (ISA), the forerunner of the modern International Standards Organization (formed in 1946). The ISA concentrated on standardization in mechanical engineering, but its work also had broader social relevance in areas such as global standards for industrial processes like synching sound for motion picture films and setting standard paper sizes.30 While engineers were at the forefront of early-twentieth-century international cooperation, reflecting their centrality in an age of technological innovation, other international professional associations and private professional standards organizations were also active. Some were domestic associations that established standards that were subsequently adopted abroad, such as the International Society of Typographic Designers. Founded in Britain by the typographer Vincent Steer in 1928, it set standards for graphic design.31 Others were international associations of national bodies, the most prevalent form of IOs in this period. Examples from what was a large field include the International Actuarial Association (1895), the Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (which had lobbied for the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [1886]), and the International Publishers Association, founded in 1896 to defend publishers’ rights under the Berne Convention.32

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Multinational corporations by their very nature facilitated international cooperation. Companies such as the British soap manufacturers Lever Brothers (which became Unilever in 1930 through an amalgamation with the Dutch company Margarine Unie), the American chemical conglomerate Dupont, and the American United Fruit Company sourced raw materials internationally and established subsidiaries in many foreign countries. They also acted as informal imperialists, exercising economic and political control in places like West Africa (where Lever operated oil palm plantations) and Central America (where United Fruit plantations relied on poorly paid local and migrant labor).33 Multinationals made use of established international regulatory regimes, and created international standards of conduct through their collective operations. The Paris Convention (1883) provided the framework “to regulate and negotiate technology transfer at an international level” by establishing the national principle, through which patents filed in one signatory country were applicable in all other member states.34 This enabled multinationals such as General Electric to operate in foreign markets such as Japan without fear of their intellectual property being copied illegally. For its part, Japan ratified the Paris Convention in 1899 as a means of facilitating technology transfer; by the interwar years its domestic industries had grown to a point where it was a major applicant for international patents. The Japanese case demonstrates that when international trade returned to its prewar levels by the mid-1920s, it was more globalized; between 1913 and 1924, Asia’s share of global trade increased from 7.48 percent to 10.08 percent. Alongside Japan, China and India also experienced industrial growth that allowed them to participate more extensively in the international market, especially in textiles. Asian companies, including Japanese zaibatsu like the general trading company Mitsui & Co. and the Indian Tata Iron and Steel Company, were emerging global presences by the 1920s, and intensified intraAsian trading relationships alongside their connections to the Western market.35 International oceanic shipping, the backbone of the global market in the early twentieth century, provides an example of international corporate self-regulation. Shipping companies formed domestic and international cartels to regulate their commerce in response to rapid technological changes in the industry. In a shared effort to sustain their trade, they divided ocean routes between individual lines, established stable freight rates as a hedge against market volubility, and formed cooperative networks to jointly finance technological innovation. The International Maritime Committee (1897), meanwhile, convened lawyers, shipowners and merchants, and insurance professionals to discuss maritime law.36 In contrast, it was only in the realm of maritime safety where states took small

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steps to cooperate. The world’s maritime powers negotiated the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in 1914, prompted by the Titanic disaster two years earlier, but no IO for international shipping was created until the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (1948).37 The private international cooperative model present in international shipping paralleled the activities of international cartels in other industries. Steel companies formed the International Rail Makers Association in 1904 to collectively manage the international market in steel rails, while international oil companies created cartels to avoid mutually destructive competition. A prime example of the latter was the Asiatic Petroleum Company formed by the Royal Dutch company, Shell, and a French consortium controlled by the Rothschilds. The spirit of private international cooperation was also evident in the activities of international business associations affiliated with the International Chamber of Commerce, and consumer organizations such as the International Cooperative Alliance, founded in 1895 to provide an international forum through which consumers could act collectively.38 Substate international cooperation also developed at the level of municipal governance. European city officials and private sector municipal services experts formed the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) at the Ghent Universal Exhibition in 1913. The IULA was part of a transnational network of municipal actors whose members shared knowledge and best practices concerning urban environment and administration issues such as garbage collection, water filtration, housing, and town planning. The IULA’s president, the Amsterdam alderman Floor Wibaut, cultivated ties with the League of Nations Economic and Financial Organization, and it collaborated with other international municipal organizations such as the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences.39 The most enthusiastic early-twentieth-century advocates of municipal cooperation, such as the American Christian Socialist Charles Bouck White, looked forward to a “World League of Cities.” While this vision did not materialize, their collective efforts anticipated the emergence of cities as global governance actors in the late twentieth century. Cities already had many of the tools, including a critical mass of private experts who identified as urban cosmopolitans, to exert their autonomy.40 Private actors played an important role in international campaigns to combat some of the social and economic problems that resulted from increased financial and technological interdependence before and after the First World War. Unlike epistemic communities wherein experts worked together in the

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private sphere, experts in international campaigns collaborated closely with government officials, constituting transnational policy communities that encouraged the circulation of ideas across national borders. They built on the nineteenth-century precedents of international associations, such as the International Statistical Congress and the Association International pour le Progrès des Sciences Sociales, that promoted social change through the collection and analysis of comparative international empirical data.41 The International Congress on Accidents at Work (ICAW), for example, brought together labor activists, industrialists, civil servants, and insurance societies. It collected international statistics on industrial accidents, and hosted debates on compulsory compensation for victims. Alongside similar international bodies such as the International Association for the Legal Protection of Workers, the ICAW generated an international debate about the merits of social insurance.42 A transnational policy community emerged in the interwar years in response to international counterfeiting. While central bankers sought to coordinate their monetary policies in the 1920s, criminal counterfeiters preyed on period anxieties over inflation by forging banknotes, bonds, and securities. In 1925, Hungarian nationalist counterfeiters attempted to flood the international market with fake 1,000-franc notes. They hoped to weaken the French economy, thereby undermining French support for the Little Entente that prevented Hungarian revanchism. In response to the counterfeiting threat, Police President of Vienna Johannes Schober convened police authorities across Europe in 1923 to form the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC; renamed Interpol in 1956). The idea had been broached at the First International Congress of Judicial Police in Monaco in 1914, but was interrupted by the war.43 The ICPC was one of the earliest privately organized forms of international cooperation among former wartime belligerent states. It provided a venue for collaboration among European police officials. It also participated in League of Nations’ campaigns against opium and the traffic in women and children, and its members served as advisors at the League’s Diplomatic Conference in 1929, which produced the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency. The ICPC was Nazified in the mid-1930s. The Nazis arrested its Austrian president, Michael Skubl, days after the Anschluss in March 1938, and imprisoned him until the war’s end.44 As with the BIS, which accepted deposits of stolen gold by the Reichsbank during the Second World War, the Nazi seizure of the ICPC reveals a fascist counterpoint to liberal internationalist and socialist ideas of international cooperation.

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International Scientific Cooperation Scientific inquiry is by its very nature a universal enterprise, based on the study of the natural world where political and national divisions have no meaning. It is thus unsurprising that the rapid expansion of scientific activity in the late nineteenth century, retrospectively termed the second industrial or “chemical” revolution, encouraged international scientific collaboration. Twenty-three international scientific unions appeared between 1860 and 1899, tied together in 1899 with the founding of the International Association of Academies in Paris. Some of these bodies emerged from regional cooperative endeavors. The International Geodetic Association, established in 1886 to promote international cooperation in the study of geodesy, evolved from the Mitteleuropäische Gradmessung, through which central European scientists had worked since 1862. International geodetic cooperation was also evident at the 1884 Meridian Conference in Washington, at which states agreed to use Greenwich as zero medium for latitude. International public unions provided space for both international cooperation and the demonstration of national scientific prowess, an illustration of the complementarity of internationalism and nationalism before 1914. The latter point is further demonstrated by the growing interest before the war in the international foundations of scientific knowledge itself, as represented by the journal Isis, launched in 1912 by the Belgian historian of science George Sarton with the explicit purpose of studying science as a world activity.45 Meanwhile, the international dissemination of the German research university model led to the creation of transnational scientific networks of students and researchers. German students studied in Britain on Rhodes scholarships, for instance, while the German chemist Adolf von Baeyer, who won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1905, attracted foreign students to his laboratory at the University of Munich.46 Many liberal internationalist thinkers argued that the rapid modernization of warfare necessitated stronger international regulation.47 Scientific internationalism was one means of securing this goal. International scientific networks widened after the war. Many scientists from the defeated Central powers, however, were ostracized until their countries were gradually reincorporated into the international system by the later 1920s. International geodetic cooperation stalled with the outbreak of war, but the Reduced Geodetic Association among Neutral Nations (which included the United States until it entered the war in 1917), maintained the International Latitude Service through the war. The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics was

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formed in 1919, one of many postwar international scientific unions that emerged after the war. Many of these unions were inspired by international technocratic cooperation during the war, and by postwar relief campaigns. An example was the idea of a World Engineering Federation proposed by two Czechs, the civil engineer Stanislav Špaček and the diplomat Bedřich Štěpánek. They hoped to emulate the spirit of technocratic internationalism epitomized by Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration. Špaček and Štěpánek were also nationalists who attempted to further Tomáš Masaryk’s vision of a Czech nation-state by fostering international contacts. Their vision that technocratic expertise could fundamentally reshape international relations proved too ambitious. Engineers did create a World Power Conference (WPC) in 1924, however, an international professional network that applied principles of scientific management to engineering. In his address to the second WPC in 1930, the German engineer Oskar Oliven argued for a European electricity system. This was a technocratic parallel to contemporary visions of European federal union.48 The first pan-Pacific Science Congress, organized by the American scientists Alexander Hume Ford and Herbert E. Gregory, was held in Honolulu in 1920. The Pacific Science Association (PSA), an NGO comprised of scholars committed to studying scientific problems relevant to Pacific Rim states, was constituted at its Tokyo congress in 1926. Like the WPC, the PSA indicated the growing support among private actors for functional international cooperation. It was also one of the many interwar forums within which the “Pacific” was defined as a geopolitical region.49 Similar international scientific networks emerged in many fields, and continued even as international relations deteriorated in the 1930s. Japanese and American researchers collaborated in the establishment of high-energy acceleration laboratories in Tokyo, Osaka, and Berkeley in the mid-1930s, before the Second World War severed links. International cooperation among physicists was facilitated by the new research centers led by influential figures such as Ernest Rutherford, Max Born, and Niels Bohr, and by the the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics, founded in Brussels in 1922. These institutional connections were complemented by transnational personal networks, through which prominent physicists such as the Italians Bruno Rossi and Enrico Fermi, the German Werner Heisenberg, and the Indian Homi J. Bhabha corresponded to make advances in the study of particle physics.50 The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the umbrella organization that represented international unions from across the natural sciences, pointed to the international “brotherhood of scientists” as a model for peaceful

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international relations. While it advanced the rhetoric of scientific universalism, the ICSU also revealed the limits of international scientific cooperation. It was created as the International Research Council in 1919, and explicitly barred scientists from the defeated Central powers through the 1920s. The ICSU’s political internationalism was also strongest among its left-wing members, whose socialist politics were not representative of the organization as a whole.51 Indeed, science was not immune from national competition. States were eager to celebrate their nationals’ scientific achievements as a symbol of national culture and for their contributions to economic innovation. This was especially the case in Weimar Germany, where science was valued as a field of knowledge that could not be seized by the Allies as territory, reparations, and military capacity had been through the Versailles Treaty. Some German scientists thus turned their backs on international scientific organizations such as the Astronomical Union of the International Research Council. The unstable postwar political and cultural climate in Germany, however, did encourage some physical and mathematical scientists to reject strict scientific determinism and produce new research in fields such as quantum theory.52 The quest for national scientific prestige ironically encouraged forms of scientific internationalism. The United States imported European aviation knowledge during the First World War through the National Research Council, and after the war through the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. It also recruited German scientists such as Theodore von Karman to work in American laboratories. Germany’s aeronautical industry was grounded by the Treaty of Versailles’ prohibitions on a German air force and its scientists were otherwise largely isolated in the early postwar years.53 While nationalist in nature, these activities facilitated the international transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. Standardization efforts in international aerodynamics progressed slowly, but the privately convened International Congresses of Applied Mechanics provided a cooperative forum for mathematicians and theorists beginning in 1922. The majority of internationally minded scientists in the early twentieth century were men, but there were notable exceptions. The American mathematician Laura Puffer Morgan applied her analytical skills to the interwar campaign for international disarmament. She produced technical reports for several international conferences, including the Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932–4), and consulted for both American and international peace and women’s organizations. Morgan believed disarmament was fundamentally a technical problem, and could be solved provided that international political rivalries could be separated from questions of disarmament. She pointed to the League of Nations

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Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs as a model for achieving disarmament through “the restriction of acquisition of new armaments by either manufacture or importation.” A Permanent Disarmament Commission could be set up to administer such a system.54 Other active Americans included the anti-opium crusaders Elizabeth Washburn Wright, who promoted the production of substitute crops for poppies as a means of combatting the international narcotics trade, and Ellen Newbold La Motte, who publicized the harmful effects of the opium trade on Asian societies. As was the case for women in other political areas, international science provided women with more autonomy than was possible within gendered domestic hierarchies.55

Food Security and Agricultural Governance The examples of Wright and La Motte illustrate the increased awareness in the early twentieth century of agriculture as an international issue. States and nonstate actors alike devoted greater attention to the interconnection between agricultural, economic, health, and foreign policy interests (what today would be termed “food security”). This shift was a result of the industrialization of food production, the global expansion of commodity chains facilitated by technological advances such as long-distance refrigeration, the early stirrings of environmentalism, and states’ growing appreciation of the foreign policy implications of food supply management. Transnational networks of private international experts and institutions emerged in the early twentieth century to address international agrarian, nutritional, and related issues.56 A key development in this process was the creation in 1905 of the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA), based in Rome. The IIA was established by the American businessman David Lubin, and sponsored by the king of Italy, indicative of the important role played by state patronage in the history of international cooperation. The IIA encouraged international agricultural cooperation by providing accurate statistics on crop yields and prices, with the goal of creating a more efficient international agricultural market for both producers and consumers.57 The First World War highlighted the international significance of food production. Allied blockade policies, civilian privation, and states’ collective concern in feeding their domestic populations so as to maintain morale all revealed the political salience of international markets and food imports. The Allied Supreme War Council created an Inter-Allied Food Council

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(which convened an inter-Allied conference of food controllers in July 1918), while inter-Allied economic cooperation in regard to raw materials included the creation of a Meats and Fats Executive in 1917 and an Oil Seeds Executive in 1918.58 An international agricultural regime was clearly discernible by the late 1920s. Scientists, agronomists, horticulturalists, husbandry specialists, and other agriculture experts collaborated with state and international civil service officials to regulate agricultural practices and better manage global resources.59 The British biologist John Boyd Orr, later the first director of the IIA’s successor organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), spearheaded international nutrition studies in the 1930s. He also helped create the League of Nations Mixed Committee on Nutrition in 1935, which reported on the physiological bases of nutrition, and collected statistics on food prices, production, and consumption. This work also produced critiques of prevailing ideas of managing food production. The Australian diplomat Stanley Bruce was an early proponent of an international food production policy, arguing in the mid-1930s that the international community should focus on combatting hunger through sustained food production, rather than tying production to prevailing international market conditions.60 Alongside the IIA, the League of Nations also contributed to the interwar shift from prevailing ideas of colonialism to international development. Its Committee on Technical Cooperation (CTC) sent experts to colonies and to “underdeveloped” independent countries like China. These emergent international experts saw themselves working “for the betterment of humanity,”61 in contrast to the national or religious imperatives of colonial officials and missionaries. Anticipating post-1945 modernization and development theories, interwar experts offered forms of Western development as a universal template. The Italian agricultural expert Carlo Dragoni advocated corporatism as a governance structure that could be adapted to local conditions, while the German Max Brauer, who worked for the ILO, recommended (unsuccessfully) that the Chinese government adopt more peasant labor cooperatives. European colonial administrations expanded precipitously in the interwar period, and embraced development through new bodies such as the British Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture and Animal Health. Even the interwar exception—the Portuguese empire of António de Oliveira Salazar’s Estado Novo, which encouraged private entrepreneurs to develop Portugal’s colonies rather than provide funds from the (largely empty) public coffers—nonetheless equated the material progress of its colonial subjects with its self-proclaimed civilizing mission and

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Portugal’s own economic growth, as set out in the Colonial Act passed under the Ditadura Nacional in 1930.62 Interwar food security concerns, meanwhile, were made evident through the First World Agricultural Census. Inspired in part by Herbert Hoover’s wartime Food Administration, the census was an American-led initiative. It was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, an established proponent of both agrarian research and international standardization, in collaboration with the IIA and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Undertaken between 1925 and 1930, the census collected and collated data on global agricultural production. Some states had earlier carried out their own agricultural surveys, and a British Dominions Royal Commission reported on intra-imperial trade, resource extraction, and food supply in 1917,63 but accurate and comparable international data was absent. The American farmer and USDA statistician Leon Eastbrook directed the census, an international exercise that anticipated subsequent agrarian development work by the Rockefeller Foundation (especially in Latin America) and the FAO. While the census was a truly international effort, with data from over sixty countries, it was limited by the absence of major agricultural states such as China, the Soviet Union, and Brazil.64 Food security issues, including famines, were now seen as international crises, resulting from problems of distribution and production within an interconnected global economy, rather than as regional issues. Private organizations like the Deutsche Hungerhilfe and IOs involved in postwar food relief, such as the American Relief Administration, focused on food consumers rather than the interests of food producers. The ILO criticized state protectionism on the grounds that it was workers, including farm laborers, who ultimately suffered due to higher food prices. Its agricultural technical commission gave greater attention to agricultural laborers by the 1930s, but struggled to balance the needs of a heterogeneous international demographic that included subsistence farmers, cash-crop producers, and a myriad of other groups. It was not until 1935 that the ILO established a Permanent Agricultural Committee to promote international cooperation regarding agricultural problems. The League’s Mixed Committee on Nutrition studied dietary and nutrition conditions around the world, and concluded that hunger could be alleviated through an “economics of consumption.” These various interrelated food campaigns led to a more fully integrated and planning-orientated international food regime in the 1940s, centered on the FAO.65

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International Public Health International food security cooperation overlapped with early-twentiethcentury advances in international public health and safety, initiatives that had a tremendous impact on ordinary peoples’ lives. The sanitary movement was predominant in the nineteenth century in Europe, North America, and parts of Latin America and the colonial world. Edwin Chadwick’s The Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population (1842) brought public attention to the importance of public sanitation. The cause attracted the popular support of figures such as Charles Dickens, who publicized the poor sanitary living conditions of the working classes in novels such as Martin Chuzzlewit (1843). Driven by industrialization and urbanization, sanitary reformers successfully lobbied municipal and state actors to undertake large-scale community health initiatives such as the construction of sewer and water filtration systems.66 As germ theory replaced miasmatic theory as the prevailing scientific explanation of disease, an advance helped particularly by the work of the French chemist Louis Pasteur and the discovery of viruses in the 1890s, authorities began to appreciate the importance of personal health. Political borders are obviously inconsequential to the transmission of microbes. International health conferences were held regularly from the 1850s in response to pandemic threats, with participants from Europe, North and South America, China, and Japan. States agreed to share medical information, and to practice the prophylactic measure of quarantine. They also signed conventions for the suppression of infectious diseases, highlighted by the International Sanitary Convention (1892), which established quarantine regulations for ships traveling between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal.67 These conventions reflected a greater awareness of the migratory nature of disease, but also gave voice to periods of xenophobia, such as exaggerated European fears that pilgrims making the Hajj could transmit cholera.68 The focus on quarantinable diseases marked the transition between the collective action of the nineteenth-century sanitation movement and public health advocates’ focus on individual health in the early twentieth century. In the late 1920s, Rupert Blue, the American assistant surgeon general at large, and other figures associated with the Permanent Committee of the International Office of Public Hygiene had the vision to recommend adapting international quarantine regulations to account for the possible transmission of infectious diseases by air travel.69 Domestic public health offices were supplemented by international cooperative agreements and organizations, as public health advocates followed actors

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in other functional fields in abandoning the nineteenth-century congress system for a more institutionalized approach. The first international public health institution was the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (1902), created in reaction to mass immigration to the Americas and periodic outbreaks of yellow fever. It was followed by the International Sanitary Convention (1903) and the International Office of Public Hygiene (1907). The latter administered international public health conventions, and also served as an information clearing house for its European member states, collating statistics on disease.70 Tentative steps were also taken in the early twentieth century to combat international environmental and health threats. International health and moral regulation converged in the array of regional and bilateral treaties concerning the illicit trade in alcohol. Occupational safety and health campaigns against scourges like the industrial use of white phosphorus in match factories were organized in the pre-1914 period, and took broader shape under the postwar direction of the ILO. States also negotiated regional agreements on transnational water pollution, a concept extended to the regulation of air pollution by the late 1930s.71 These international public health initiatives reflected the growing influence of biopolitics, a concept popularized by figures such as the Swedish political scientist Johan Rudolf Kjellén.72 The First World War and the subsequent global influenza pandemic (1918– 20) underscored the imperative for international cooperation in public health. The war left millions of soldiers wounded, and caused mass sickness both during and immediately after the conflict. By some estimates, over half of all soldiers fell ill at some point during the war.73 Medical personnel thus played an essential role in all protagonist societies, and were key contributors to national war efforts. The German Vaterlandische Frauenverein boasted almost 800,000 nurses whose ministrations were essential for maintaining German war enthusiasm.74 The Allied powers also took steps to build public health infrastructure in the colonial world, such as the British-organized Africa Native Medical Corps in which 1,500 black Africans served during the war.75 While doctors and nurses largely tended to their own nationals, their ethical obligations and the international nature of the war meant they also provided aid to allies’ soldiers and civilians, and sometimes also to the enemy. Such informal transnational medical cooperation continued after the war to confront the influenza pandemic. The global influenza pandemic extended the international health crisis into the immediate postwar years, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The flu virus itself was a symptom of early-twentieth-century internationalization. It began in China as avian flu, and was transmitted globally

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by Chinese laborers who were sent by the Chinese government via North America to aid the Allies in Europe in 1917–18.76 Governments and national military authorities proved unable to deal with the flu outbreak on their own, which made them more willing to participate in international control and research efforts. This spirit of international cooperation continued into the postwar period. One of the League of Nations’ first contributions to international public health governance was its Epidemic Commission, which responded to the mass typhus epidemic in Eastern Europe immediately after the war. It sent relief workers and supplies to Poland and Russia to aid people suffering from typhus, in collaboration with the Red Cross, and advised on measures to limit the contagion. The Epidemic Commission was transformed into the League of Nations Health Office (LNHO) in 1921. It coordinated international responses to the outbreak of typhus, smallpox, and other infectious diseases, and helped establish a network of experts in Latin America, Europe, and North America that conducted research on public health issues such as infant mortality and tuberculosis. Figures such as the Polish bacteriologist Ludwik Rajchman, the LNHO’s first director and later founder of UNICEF, epitomized the interwar international focus on social medicine. Rajchman promoted research into new vaccines, supported the creation of transnational networks of public health experts, and promoted public health initiatives in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He was particularly active in encouraging public health in China, including quarantine measures for cholera after the massive 1931 flood.77 The League’s Standardization Committee also contributed to international efforts to standardize the production and use of the Bacille-Calmette-Guérin vaccine for tuberculosis.78 The 1926 International Sanitary Convention helped unite regional public health networks, which had developed in response to their own unique epidemiological conditions, into a loose international confederation that shared epidemiological intelligence. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the LNHO, and conducted extensive international public health work. By the early 1930s, Rockefeller officials such as Selskar Michael Gunn argued that public health required comprehensive social planning, and embarked on an ambitious planning project in China alongside James Yen’s Mass Education Movement.79 These planning efforts overlapped with the CTC’s development initiatives in China, illustrating the interconnected nature of many international cooperative movements by the interwar years. The Rockefeller Foundation’s ethos of international cooperation was also evident in its funding for campaigns against diseases such as hookworm and malaria, and training for experts in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the colonial world.80

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Figure  10 Anti-Typhus Train to Siberia, American Red Cross, 1920/International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Archives, V-P-HIST-01682-20.

Biomedical research institutes such as the Institut Pasteur and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research (founded by John D. Rockefeller Sr. in 1901) also appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the purpose of studying infectious diseases. While nationally based, these institutes were internationalist in orientation (the Institut Pasteur opened its first branch outside France—in Saigon—in 1891), and sponsored an international roster of scientists. The pioneering Japanese bacteriologist Hideyo Noguchi, for instance, traveled extensively in Africa and Latin America researching the causes of yellow fever.81 Other early NGOs involved in international health governance included the International Union Against Tuberculosis and the International Bureau Against Alcoholism.82 Early-twentieth-century politicians and health professionals portrayed international public health as a tool of modernization and development, but it also served the interests of colonial control. British colonial officials exported variations of the Victorian Contagious Diseases Acts to colonial jurisdictions as part of campaigns to combat the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. These provisions were predicated on gendered assumptions that women were responsible for “social hygiene.”83 Nationalist sentiment, as well as the lack of international

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professional associations in many fields, also sometimes mitigated against international health cooperation. Such was the case with neurology, where early international cooperative efforts by the Swedish neurologist Salomon Henschen and the German neuropsychiatrist Aloys Alzheimer were stymied.84 Geopolitical and eugenic concerns contributed to a spectrum of exclusionary, divisive, and sometimes even progressive forms of international public health cooperation. Neo-Malthusians such as the American biologists Raymond Pearl and Edward East attempted to convince the scientists, geographers, and social activists who attended the seventh International Neo-Malthusian Conference (1927, later renamed the World Population Conference), that the world had an optimal population density, beyond which it could not sustain itself.85 Fears of global overpopulation inspired not only international calls for economic welfare and improvements in standards of living, but also restrictive policies ranging from immigration control to the Nazis’ eliminationist measures. Other population activists, such as the American social reformer Margaret Sanger, campaigned for birth control as a means of controlling world population and internationalizing the issue of women’s health. In so doing, she called for domestic reform in the many countries where birth control was legally prohibited and morally opposed. Sanger’s work, along with that of activists involved in the World League for Sexual Reform such as the Swedish journalist and family planning advocate Elise Ottesen-Jensen (who along with Sanger and the Indian feminist Dhanvanthi Rama Rau was a cofounder of the International Planned Parenthood Federation in 1952), illustrates the connections between international feminists’ concerns for women’s reproductive rights and the biopolitics of international public health.86 Early-twentieth-century international public health efforts were shaped by ideas of social medicine, the concept that environmental and social factors influence health and disease alongside their microbiological causes. American public health officials removed standing water where mosquitoes bred as an anti-yellow fever precaution during the construction of the Panama Canal between 1904 and 1914.87 Social medicine approaches brought a clearer understanding of the full nature of international public health. They also led to its politicization. The growing role and influence of state governments and officials as public health actors, in conjunction with private medical experts and “social hygiene” reformers, meant that public health became more closely intertwined with other aspects of international relations. The medical aid provided by German and American relief workers to Ottoman subjects suffering from typhus in 1917–18 was altruistic, but it also reflected competition for postwar influence in the region. Finally,

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international public health cooperation revealed both a positive commitment to internationalism and reactionary fears of contagion. The latter, in combination with ideas of social Darwinism, racial hierarchies, and anxieties about reproductive control, led to the rise of the international eugenics movement.88 States had both a financial and an altruistic motivation to participate in international public health regimes. As such, international public health was a contested field in the early twentieth century, not only delivering great advances in collective world health, but also reflecting international racial and gendered stratifications. International biopolitical cooperation and governance was not limited to human beings in the early twentieth century. It also developed in the fields of veterinary science, animal protection, and zoology, particularly after the First World War. The Office International des Epizooties, comprised of governmentappointed experts, provided a starting point for research on animal diseases. The Bureau International Humanitaire Zoophile, founded in 1925, coordinated the activities of national animal protection societies. Conservation organizations also gathered strength, reflecting a growing international appreciation that animals were not simply resources. The Society for the Protection of the European Wisent, founded in 1922, for instance, successfully reintroduced bison into the wild. International zoological research and coordination between the directors of zoological gardens also expanded. German zoos resuscitated the journal Der Zoologische Garten in 1928, in partnership with colleagues in Austria and the Netherlands. It soon became a leading international zoological periodical. The International Union of Directors of Zoological Gardens (the predecessor of the modern International Association of Directors of Zoological Gardens) began operation in Basel in 1935, providing an international infrastructure for the organization of zoos, zoological research, and early conservation efforts.89

Conclusion The common thread connecting international cooperation in trade and finance, scientific research, agriculture and food security, and public health is that they were led by elites and experts. These various international regimes and networks reflected the professional interests of the epistemic communities that directed them. Workers, peasants, and other politically underrepresented groups were less able to express their interests. Private functional regimes were thus unrepresentative of the global community. Their memberships were overwhelmingly male and European. Nationals from other states had to learn English (or in some

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cases French or another European language) to participate, a further barrier to true international cooperation. As remains true of many global governance forums today, early-twentieth-century international functional regimes also disproportionately benefited industrial-bureaucratic states that had the requisite human, financial, and technical capital to participate as full members. Poorer states faced systemic barriers to full participation in international governance decision-making, while subjects of colonial societies, which in this era encompassed a majority of the world’s population, were largely denied the basic right of representation. The legitimacy of individual international functional regimes also varied widely. While some of the cooperative networks detailed in this chapter operated under the aegis of the League of Nations and were thus indirectly accountable to member states, the majority were directed by private individuals. The latter regimes were self-regulating, often according to the prevailing professional standards and ethics of their members, but were not accountable to broader national or international publics. These organizations and networks made decisions with wide-ranging international public consequences without significant consultation with, or contributions from, public voices. Each of these limitations remind us of the circumscribed nature of earlytwentieth-century internationalism, and reveal how much work was yet to be done in building truly international forums. That said, private experts, IOs, and states acting through multilateral conventions collectively created a dense array of international regulations, standards, transnational networks, and shared normative practices that reshaped international relations in the early twentieth century. This intensified international milieu enabled actors to share information and compile data on international issues, a cumulative activity that facilitated the crafting of new international regulations and regimes. The international standards that resulted from debates within these international fora, from international conferences and international public unions to the institutionalized correspondence of private members of a multitude of epistemic communities, did not constitute the sort of “universal law” envisioned by the most idealist internationalists of the age. They did, however, provide for greater international efficiencies and harmonization across a spectrum of economic, social, and technological issues. The functional cooperative regimes thus helped create something more lasting than a utopia: a networked international society.

Conclusion

International cooperation intensified in the early twentieth century as a collective response to globalization. Internationalists sought to manage, regulate, shape, and contest the patterns of human integration and interconnectivity that grew deeper, broader, and more comprehensive from the late nineteenth century. By many measures the world was as interconnected before the First World War, if not more so, than today. Migration and capital flowed freely around the world, while European colonial empires extended their governance across the globe, and bound together the lived experiences of millions of people. Technological changes, many emerging from the chemical and electrical revolutions of the period, connected people across vast distances. From the automobile to the airplane, the steamship to the submarine, and the telegraph to the radio, this was a period of rapid innovation. We should be careful not to overstate this case, nor to ignore the continued importance of traditional technologies, from the horse to the rickshaw.1 Nonetheless, international connections developed and deepened at an extraordinary pace in these decades. What is striking about the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is the plurality of human interactions on an international, transnational, and global scale.2 These patterns of globalization established the structural and discursive pathways that made international cooperation possible. While globalization was thus a necessary condition for the emergence of international cooperation, it was not sufficient. International cooperation in the early twentieth century also required political will and the active agency of millions of committed internationalists, each of whom made conscious choices to engage with peers in other countries in pursuit of common goals, identities, and beliefs. Internationalists’ motivations varied widely, and were often contradictory. International socialists and anarchists, for instance, differed as to how best to achieve improvements for the international proletariat, while collectively

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opposing the more conservative forms of international cooperation pursued by international financiers or statesmen who advocated multilateral diplomatic peace agreements. As international cooperative initiatives multiplied in the early twentieth century, a “thermodynamics of international cooperation” emerged within the macroscopic international system. When international cooperation developed in one arena, its dynamics were transferred to other actors both within that arena and in other areas within the international system. Peace and women’s rights activists, for example, adopted the international conference structure developed by late-nineteenth-century international public unions to regulate international technological developments. The “entropy” of internationalism thus increased, moving toward (though not reaching) a state of international equilibrium that would balance competing international political interests. This process was not irreversible, as the nationalist retrenchment of the 1930s and early 1940s illustrated, but it established a dynamism that reasserted itself after 1945. The circuits of internationalism in the early twentieth century were amplified by a series of logistical variables. English emerged as the language of internationalism in this period, reflecting the political, cultural, and economic power of the Anglo-American world. The League of Nations and the International Labour Office facilitated this process through their language, translation, and documentation policies, establishing bureaucratic processes adopted by many international organizations. International conferences and international travel created personal bonds and networks in fields as varied as scientific research, international humanitarianism, and international press cooperation. The standardization of systems of measurement and classification made international trade, industrial production, and communication and transportation more efficient. International tours and exhibitions publicized the normative appeal of international cooperation. International law provided a means of curtailing the more antagonistic tendencies of globalization. Public and personal diplomacy allowed states, voluntary organizations, and individuals to engage with peers (and sometimes opponents) in other countries. International cooperation occurred in an expanding number of contact zones, where the interests of people in different countries overlapped and intersected. This spatial configuration, conditioned by ideas and interests rather than by territory and formal diplomacy, reminds us that sovereignty was not the only relevant principle of early-twentieth-century international relations. The explosive growth of international cooperation was an important global development in the early twentieth century, but this history was neither entirely progressive

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nor preordained. International cooperation united people across borders, but it could also be exclusionary. It was often Eurocentric, gendered, and racialized in ways that restricted or precluded the participation of many people around the world. These restrictive dynamics in turn created anti-imperial international cooperative networks. Internationalism’s dual expansionary and exclusionary nature was evident in the composition of the League Secretariat’s staff. As the League’s Balfour Report (1920) declared, “members of the Secretariat once appointed are no longer the servants of the country of which they are citizens, but become for the time being the servants only of the League of Nations.”3 Beginning in 1932, League staff pledged an oath of allegiance as part of the broader principle of international impartiality.4 They were also effective in organizing international campaigns to address transnational issues and in fostering a broader sense of international community. Yet, the secretariat’s worldview and demographic composition remained Eurocentric. Western legal concepts and moral principles guided much of the League’s work, while “international” was often used in League documents to mean the world outside Europe. The League’s Committee of Thirteen made the unsurprising announcement in 1930 that colonialism remained a central component of the international system, and secretariat candidates continued to come primarily from Europe. Those recruited from elsewhere had invariably been educated in Europe or North America, could speak English or French, and had often domiciled in Europe. They were also overwhelmingly male. The League Assembly never had more than three sitting female delegates at any one time, and none before 1929. No woman was ever a delegate at the League Council. Women were more prevalent on the League’s committee’s and commissions, but were still a minority. The League’s female staff complement, with notable exceptions such as Rachel Crowdy, was restricted to secretarial roles.5 The League served an important role in facilitating international cooperation, as demonstrated in fields such as intellectual and scientific cooperation, international relief for refugees and famine victims, international campaigns against social ills such as drug trafficking, and the codification of international law. Yet in these areas, and in the many others covered in this book, the League was but one, and often not the most significant, actor. International cooperation most often developed through the collaboration of private groups and individuals who not only made use of international political spaces such as the League, but also interacted with each other directly. This international civil society developed its own political and discursive structures, making use of more accessible and efficient transportation and

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communication tools to create its own political space. While still organized primarily along international lines, with national delegations or representatives cooperating within international conferences and associations, earlytwentieth-century international cooperation nonetheless offered private actors increasing autonomy. Ideas of transnational cooperation, empire, and anti-imperialism were woven together by idealists, planners, politicians, imperialists, and cosmopolitans in the early decades of the twentieth century to create a more international and interconnected world. This world supplemented the formal international relations of the period. Foreign policy events and developments such as Japan’s emergence as a great power, European imperialism, and the two catastrophic world wars are self-evidently significant. The peace treaties signed after the First World War, furthermore, continue to influence international affairs in the twenty-first century. Yet operating alongside, and sometimes interconnected with, these events were this book’s many non-state actors (and countless others) who created, developed, debated, and contested forms of international cooperation. The cooperative activity of international organizations, social movements, private networks, and imperial and antiimperial internationalists produced a global tapestry. By integrating the history of international cooperation with the conventional diplomatic history of the period, we can better appreciate the dual dynamics of nationalism and internationalism that shaped the lives of people around the world in the early twentieth century.

Notes Introduction 1 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 [1916]), 171. 2 Alejandro Colas̀, International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). 3 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity, and the Making of Modern International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 4 Ibid., 1, 172. 5 It is impossible to do justice to the now voluminous literature on global, transnational, and international history, but representative works include David Armitage and Jo Guldi, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 14–37; Lynn Hunt, Writing History in the Global Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014), 44–77; Michael Lang, “Globalization and Its History,” Journal of Modern History 78:4 (2006), 899–931; Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Howard Leroy Malchow, History and International Relations (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” Contemporary European History 14:4 (2005), 421–39; Patrick Finney, Palgrave Advances in International History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jerry Bentley, “Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization,” Globalizations 1:1 (2004), 69–81; Adam McKeown, “ The Units of World History,” Douglas Northrup, ed., Companion to World History (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 79–93; C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); A. G. Hopkins, ed., Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006); Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing Visions of World Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); C. A. Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” American Historical Review 115:5 (2006), 1441–64; Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “World History in a Global Age,” American Historical Review 100:4 (1995), 1034–60; Emily Rosenberg, ed., A World Connecting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

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6 Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History (London: C. A. Watts, 1964); Hedley Bull, “The Revolt against the West,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 217–28; Paolo de Renzio and Jurek Seifert, “South–South Cooperation and the Future of Development Assistance: Mapping Actors and Options,” Third World Quarterly 35:10 (2014), 1860–75. 7 Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Introduction,” in Akira Iriye and PierreYves Saunier, eds., The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), xviii. 8 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); John Burrow, A History of Histories (London: Penguin, 2009), 453–66. 9 William McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1963); Philip Hoffman, Why Did Europe Conquer the World? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 10 John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Roman Studer, The Great Divergence Reconsidered: Europe, India, and the Rise to Global Economic Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Vol. 3: The Second Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1840s (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989); Andre Gunder Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 11 Stefanie Gänger and Su Lin Lewis, “Forum: A World of Ideas; New Pathways in Global Intellectual History, c. 1880–1930,” Modern Intellectual History 10:2 (2013), 347–8. 12 Warren F. Kuehl, “Concepts of Internationalism in History,” Peace and Change 11:2 (1986), 6–7. 13 Jens Steffeck, “Fascist Internationalism,” Millennium—Journal of International Studies 44:1 (2015), 13–22. 14 Stanley Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 462–70; Matteo Albanese and Pablo del Hierro, Transnational Fascism in the Twentieth Century: Spain, Italy and the Global Neo-fascist Network (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 31–5. 15 Marco Duranti, “European Integration, Human Rights, and Romantic Internationalism,” in Nicholas Doumanis, ed., The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 444–7. 16 Inazō Nitobe, “Japan’s Preparedness for International Co-operation,” Pacific Affairs 3:1 (1930), 48.

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17 Marie-Claire Bergère (trans. Janet Lloyd), Sun Yat-sen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 352–91. 18 Halford Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society 23:4 (1904), 421–37. 19 Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 193–5. 20 Chateaubriand, quoted in Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 246. 21 Christopher Bayly, cited in Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), xix. 22 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 159, 220–3. 23 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1911). 24 Ellis W. Hawley, cited in Alice O’Connor, “The Global Great Society,” Passport 44:3 (2014), 38.

1 Ideas of International Order, Empire, and Anticolonialism 1 David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 19–20; Stefanie Gänger and Su Lin Lewis, “Forum: A World of Ideas; New Pathways in Global Intellectual History, c. 1880–1930,” Modern Intellectual History 10:2 (2013), 348. 2 Duncan Bell, “Making and Taking Worlds,” in Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds., Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 257–66; Gearoid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 1996); A. K. Henrikson, “The Geographical ‘Mental Maps’ of American Foreign Policy Makers,” International Political Science Review 1:4 (1980), 495–530. 3 From an immense volume of literature, see Toyin Falola and Kevin Roberts, The Atlantic World, 1450–2000 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Edward A. Alpers, The Indian Ocean in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row, 1972 [1949]); Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt, 1920 [essay 1893]); Kent Fedorowich and Andrew Thompson, eds., Empire, Migration and Identity in the British World (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); Tracy Barrett, The Chinese Diaspora in South-East Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012); Donna Gabaccia and Dirk

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Notes Hoeder, eds., Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Adam McKeown, “Global Migration, 1846–1940,” Journal of World History 15:2 (2005), 155–89; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World Histories (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1994); Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Marshall Hodgson, Rethinking World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Introduction,” in Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing Visions of World Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11–12. Emily S. Rosenberg, “Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World,” in Emily S. Rosenberg, ed., A World Connecting: 1870–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 825–31. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition (London: Verso, 2006), 37–46; Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 69–72; Boyd Shafer, “Webs of Common Interests: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Peace,” Historian 36:3 (1974), 423–5. Bear F. Braumoeller, The Great Powers and the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 70–3. Mark Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon (London: I. B. Taurus, 2013), 205. Paul Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium,” Review of International Studies 15:2 (1989), 135–53. T. G. Otte, July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 506–10, 522–3. Urzidil, cited in Jacques Rupnik, “Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?,” Daedalus 119:1 (1990), 252. Samuel J. Wilson, “Oszkár Jászi and the Hungarian Democratic Emigration,” Hungarian Studies 7:1–2 (1991–2), 75–6; N. F. Dreisziger, “Between Nationalism and Internationalism: Oscar Jaszi’s Path to Danubian Federalism, 1905–1918,” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 19:1 (1992), 19–29. Zdenek V. David, “Tom G. Masaryk on the Unification of Europe and the World,” Kosmas: Czechoslovak & Central European Journal 25:1 (2011), 45–52. Friedrich Naumann, Mitteleuropa (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1915); Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper Collins, 2013), 150–1.

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15 Isabell Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jürgen Zimmerer, “ The Birth of the Ostland Out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination,” Patterns of Prejudice 39:2 (2005), 211–18; Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz,” Central European History 42:2 (2009), 285–9. 16 Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York: Knopf, 1926 [1923]); Wim Roobol, “Aristide Briand’s Plan: The Seed of European Unification,” in Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle, eds., Ideas of Europe since 1914 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 32–46; Anne-Isabelle Richard, “In Search of a Suitable Europe: Paneuropa in the Netherlands in the Interwar Period,” European Studies 32:1 (2014), 253–6. 17 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 21–2. 18 Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 93–108; Philip Ziegler, Legacy: Cecil Rhodes, the Rhodes Trust and Rhodes Scholarships (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 19 Alex May, “The Round Table and Imperial Federation,” The Round Table 99:410 (2010), 547–56; Jeanne Morefield, Empires without Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 103–10. 20 Andrea Bosco, “Lothian, Curtis, Kimber and the Federal Union Movement (1938– 40),” Journal of Contemporary History 23:3 (1988), 465–502; Priscilla Roberts, “Lord Lothian and the Atlantic World,” The Historian 66:1 (2004), 110, 120–1. 21 H. G. Wells, Open Conspiracy: Blueprints for a World Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1928); Salvador de Madariaga, The World’s Design (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938); Lionel Robbins, The Economic Causes of War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939); James A. Yunker, The Idea of World Government (New York: Routledge, 2011), ch. 2; Joseph Baratta, The Politics of World Federation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 49–72. 22 Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain, 8–9, 108–11, 168–7; Peter Clarke, Mr. Churchill’s Profession (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 139–43. 23 Clarence Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939); George Catlin, The AngloSaxon Tradition (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1939). 24 Kris Manjapra and Sugata Bose, eds., Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Tim Harper and Sunil Amrith, Sites of Asian Interaction: Ideas, Networks and Mobility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

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25 Carolien Stolte, “Uniting the Oppressed Peoples of the East,” in Ali Raza, Franziska Roy, and Benjamin Zachariah, eds., The Internationalist Moment: South Asia, Worlds, and World Views, 1917–39 (New Delhi: Sage, 2015), 61–3; Kris Manjapra, Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 7–12, 120–6; Kate O’Malley, Ireland, India and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919–64 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 74–8, 95–6, 105–10; Kris Manjapra, M. N. Roy: Marxism and Colonial Cosmopolitanism (New York: Routledge, 2010). 26 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Su Lin Lewis, “Between Orientalism and Nationalism: The Learned Society and the Making of ‘Southeast Asia,’” Modern Intellectual History 10:2 (2013), 360–6, 373–4. 27 Yongjin Zhang, “System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations,” Review of International Studies 27:5 (2001), 48–9, 59–61; Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society (London: Routledge, 2009), 37–43. 28 Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 31–40, 71–4; William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), 144–7; Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, 75–8. 29 Prasenjit Duara, “Transnationalism in the Era of Nation-States: China, 1900– 1945,” Development and Change 29:4 (1998), 647–70; William Kirby, “The Internationalization of China,” China Quarterly 150 (1997), 433–58. 30 Chen Zhimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 14:42 (2005), 38–40; Luke Cooper, “The International Relations of the ‘Imagined Community’: Explaining the Late Nineteenth-Century Genesis of the Chinese Nation,” Review of International Studies 41:3 (2015), 494–9. 31 Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Alternative Visions of World Order in the Aftermath of World War I: Global Perspectives on Chinese Approaches,” in Conrad and Sachsenmaier, Competing Visions of World Order, 164–9; Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4–13, 20–3. 32 The key work remains Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978). 33 Richard White makes this argument for an earlier period of European colonial in The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 34 Erik Ringmar, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order,” International Organization 66:1 (2012), 10–13, 18. 35 Okakura Kakuzō, The Ideals of the East, with Special Reference to the Art of Japan (Berkeley, CA: Stone Bridge Press, 2007 [1904]), 9.

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36 Aydin, Politics of Anti-Westernism, 83–4, 87–8, 111–14, 121; Neil Pedlar, The Imported Pioneers: Westerners Who Helped Build Japan (Folkestone: Japan Library, 1990), part III; Christopher Szpilman, “The Dream of One Asia: Okawa Shumei and Japanese Asianism,” in Harald Fuess, ed., The Japanese Empire in East Asia (München: Iudicium, 1998), 49–64; Selçuk Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900–1945,” American Historical Review 109:4 (2004), 1148–51. 37 Sun Yat Sen, China and Japan: Natural Friends, Unnatural Enemies (Shanghai: China United Press, 1941). 38 See Renée Worringer, Ottomans Imagining Japan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 39 Mustaka Aksakal, “ ‘Jihad Made in Germany?’ The Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in History 18:2 (2011), 184–99; Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 46–9, 70–3; Jacob Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 94–103. 40 Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia (Toronto: Doubleday, 2012), 94–6. 41 Manu Goswami, “Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms,” American Historical Review 117:5 (2012), 1470–5; José Carlos Mariátegui, “The Problem of the Indian,” in José Carlos Mariátegui, ed., Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972 [1928]), 29. 42 David Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); Gajendra Singh, The Testimonies of Indian Soldiers and the Two World Wars (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), esp. ch. 4; Ali Raza and Benjamin Zachariah, “To Take Arms across a Sea of Trouble: The ‘Lascar System,’ Politics and Agency in the 1920s,” Itinerario 36:3 (2012), 19–38. 43 Nikolas Gardner, The Siege of Kut-al-Amara: At War in Mesopotamia, 1915–1916 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014). 44 Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 80–93, 136–42, 179–88; SherAli Tareen, “Contesting Friendship in Colonial Muslim India,” South Asia 38:3 (2015), 421–5. 45 O’Malley, Ireland, India and Empire, 62–84; M. C. Rast, “ ‘Ireland’s Sister Nations’: Internationalism and Sectarianism in the Irish Struggle for Independence, 1916–22,” Journal of Global History 10:3 (2015), 484–7. 46 Ali Raza, Franziska Roy, and Benjamin Zachariah, “Introduction,” in Raza et al., The Internationalist Moment, xxii–xxiii, xxxi. 47 Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 14–17.

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48 Ali Raza, “Straddling the International and the Regional: The Punjabi Left in the Interwar Period,” in Raza et al., The Internationalist Moment, 92–6. 49 Radhika V. Mongria, “Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport,” Public Culture 11:3 (1999), 554. 50 Ku Daeyeol, “The March First Movement: With Special Reference to Its External Implications and Reactions of the United States,” Korea Journal 42:3 (2002), 227–30, 248–9; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 199–205. 51 Bill Nasson, “More Than Just von Lettow-Vorbeck: Sub-Saharan Africa in the First World War,” Geschichte Und Gesellschaft 40:2 (2014), 165–72; Michelle Moyd, “Centring a Sideshow: Local Experiences of the First World War in Africa,” First World War Studies 7:2 (2016), 4, 7–12. 52 Michael Adas, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology,” Journal of World History 15:1 (2004), 56–62; Raisa Rexer, “Black and White and Re(a)d All Over: L’Étudiant noir, Communism, and the Birth of Négritude,” Research in African Literatures 44:4 (2013), 6–7. 53 Christian Geulen, “The Common Grounds of Conflict: Racial Visions of World Order 1880–1940,” in Conrad and Sachsenmaier, Competing Visions of World Order, 70–1, 82–5. 54 Papers on Inter-racial Problems, Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress, Held at the University of London, July 26–29, 1911 (Boston, 1911), v; Geulen, “Common Grounds of Conflict,” 84–9; Tracie Matysik, “Internationalist Activism and Global Civil Society at the High Point of Nationalism: The Paradox of the Universal Races Congress, 1911,” in A. G. Hopkins, ed., Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 137–49. 55 Ashwini Tambe, “Climate, Race Science and the Age of Consent in the League of Nations,” Theory, Culture & Society 28:3 (2011), 112–14, 122–4; Mark Mazower, The Dark Continent (New York: Knopf, 1998), 96–103. 56 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations (New York: New Press, 2007), 19–23; Michelle Louro, “ ‘Where National Revolutionary Ends and Communist Begins’: The League against Imperialism and the Meerut Conspiracy Case,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 33:3 (2013), 331–44; Louro, “India and the League against Imperialism,” in Raza et al., The Internationalist Moment, 32, n. 20; Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 71–7. 57 Michael Onyebuchi Eze, “Pan-Africanism and the Politics of History,” History Compass 11:9 (2013), 677–80; Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Jill Marie Watts, “ ‘Shout

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2 The Production of International Knowledge 1 On the concept of contact zones, see Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992). 2 Daniel Laqua, “Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order,” Journal of Global History 6:2 (2011), 230. 3 Ibid., 228–9. 4 Annamaria Ducci, “The International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations,” in Mark Hewitson and Matthew D’Auria, eds., Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917–1957 (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 229–32. 5 Rabindranath Tagore, My Reminiscences (London: Macmillan, 1917), 162; Michael Collins, Empire, Nationalism and the Postcolonial World: Rabindranath Tagore’s

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“Unity and Divergence: Scandinavian Internationalism, 1914–1921,” Contemporary European History 17:3 (2008), 303–12. Ashworth, A History of International Thought, 145–50; Peter Jackson, Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Richard Overy, The Morbid Age (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 243–50; Marc Allégret, Carnets du Congo: Voyage avec Gide (Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1987); Ashworth, A History of International Thought, 167–70. Nicola Spakowski, “National Aspirations on a Global Stage: Concepts of World/ Global History in Contemporary China,” Journal of Global History 4:3 (2009), 478–9. Hirakawa Sukehiro (trans. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi), “Japan’s Turn to the West,” in Marius B. Jansen, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 466–77; Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race, and Equality: Racial Equality Proposal of 1919 (London: Routledge, 1998). Tadashi Kawata and Saburō Ninomiya, “The Development of the Study of International Relations in Japan,” The Developing Economies 2:2 (1964), 191. Ibid., 194; W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), 175–210. Stephen Wertheim, “The League of Nations: A Retreat from International Law?,” Journal of Global History 7:2 (2012), 210–32; League of Nations Society (Britain), “Notes on a Few of the Suggestions Already Made towards a Means of Regulating International Relations” (1915), Willoughby Dickinson Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, MS. Eng. HIST. C. 402; Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the League of Nations,” Journal of Global History 7:2 (2012), 245–7; Helen McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 2. Nicholas Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory,” in Nicholas Guilhot, ed., The Invention of International Relations Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 141; Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 3, 11–12. Mary Brown Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Frances Trix, “Peace-Mongering in 1913: The Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry and Its Report on the Balkan Wars,” First World War Studies 5:2 (2014), 151–2, 154–5. The First Balkan War (1912) was fought between the Balkan League

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46 John Eugene Harley, Agencies Educating for a New World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1931), 240, quotation at 249; Thomas R. Davies, “Internationalism in a Divided World: The Experience of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, 1919–1939,” Peace and Change 37:2 (2012), 245–6. 47 Michael Riemens, “International Academic Cooperation on International Relations in the Interwar Period: The International Studies Conference,” Review of International Studies 37:2 (2011), 911–28; David Long, “Who Killed the International Studies Conference?,” International History Review 32:4 (2006), 604– 6; Maurice Bourquin, ed., Collective Security: A Record of the Seventh and Eighth International Study Conferences, Paris 1934–London 1935 (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1936); Alfred Zimmern, ed., University Teaching of International Relations (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1939). 48 Michael Dockerill, “The Foreign Office and the Creation of Chatham House,” in Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari, eds., Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919–1945 (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1994), 73–86; Peter Grose, Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), 4–5. 49 Priscilla Roberts, “ ‘The Council Has Been Your Creation’: Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Paradigm of the American Foreign Policy Establishment?,” Journal of American Studies 35:1 (2001), 69–70; Parmar, Foundations of the American Century, 77–8. 50 Theodor Adelswaerd, “Work and Purposes of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,” September 29, 1925, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, Council on Foreign Relations Meetings Records (CFR MR) Box 435, Folder 4; Frederic A. Delano, “Control of the Opium Traffic,” March 24, 1927, CFR MR, Box 435, Folder 5; Sir Herbert Brown Ames, “The International Utilization of the River Danube,” April 24, 1928, CFR MR, Box 436, Folder 1; Jackson E. Reynolds, “The Bank for International Settlements,” February 19, 1930, CFR MR, Box 436, Folder 3. 51 Paul D. Cravath et al., “What Americans Should Know about Germany,” January 11, 1921, CFR MR, Box 435, Folder 1. 52 James Cotton, The Australian School of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 7–11; Lawrence Woods, “John Nelson and the Origins of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs,” International Journal 59:2 (2004), 387–406; Richard Devetak, “An Australian Outlook on International Affairs? The Evolution of International Relations Theory in Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 55:3 (2009), 341–4.

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53 Jan Stöckmann, “Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany 1912–1933,” International History Review 38:5 (2016), 1056–7, 1060–2, 1067–71; Katharina Rietzler, “Philanthropy, Peace Research and Revisionist Politics: Rockefeller and Carnegie Support for the Study of International Relations in Weimar Germany,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC) Supplement 5 (2008), 61–79. 54 Deniz Kuru, “Institutes, Scholars, and Transnational Dynamics: A Disciplinary History of International Relations in Germany and France,” PhD Dissertation, University of Southern California (2013), 301–5, 315–17, 347–53; Andre Burguière, The Annales School: An Intellectual History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 55 J. Merle Davis, “The Institute of Pacific Relations,” International Conciliation 218 (1926), 134–5; Akira Iriye, Global Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 27–8; Parmar, Foundations of the American Century, 87. 56 Paul F. Hooper, ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations: The Memoirs of William L. Holland (Tokyo: Ryukei Shyosha, 1995), 10–12, 136–7; Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45 (London: Routledge, 2003), 162–6. 57 Raymond Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography (New York: Harper, 1958), 188–93, 251–67. 58 Priscilla Roberts, “Willard Straight, the First World War, and ‘Internationalism of all sorts,’ ” Australian Journal of Politics & History 44:4 (1998), 493. 59 Ron Marmarelli, “William Hard as Progressive Journalist,” American Journalism 3:3 (1986), 142–53; William Hard correspondence with Nicholas Murray Butler (1927), Felix Frankfurter (1926), and Elihu Root (1925), William Hard Papers, Box 1, Folders 6, 9, 33, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 60 Leonora Dugonjić, “ ‘A Miniature League of Nations’: Inquiry into the Social Origins of the International School, 1924–1930,” Paedagogica Historica 50:1–2 (2014), 141–6; Joëlle Droux, “Children and Youth: A Central Cause in the Circulatory Mechanisms of the League of Nations (1919–1939),” Prospects 45:1 (2015), 63–76. 61 Julia Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 168–74. 62 Roger Openshaw, “New Zealand State Primary Schools and the Growth of Internationalism and Anti-war Feeling, 1929–1934,” ANZHES Journal 9:1 (1980), 1–14. 63 Jung-Sun N. Han, An Imperial Path to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), 20–2, 28–30; Hiroyuki Agawa (trans. John Bester), The Reluctant Admiral (New York: Kodansha, 1979), 73. 64 Filiz Meşeci Giorgetti, “New School of Mustafa Sati Bey in Istanbul (1915),” Paedagogica Historica 50:1–2 (2014), 44–8; Joëlle Droux and Rita Hofstetter,

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84 James Bryce, “Other Possible Methods for Averting War,” in International Relations: Eight Lectures Delivered in the United States in August, 1921 (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 258. 85 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 2–5.

3 International Law 1 Upendra Baxi, “India-Europe,” in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 744–5. 2 James Bernard Murphy, The Philosophy of Positive Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 3–4. 3 William Ewart Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London: J. Murray, 1876); Martin Kröger, “Imperial Germany and the Boer War,” in Keith Wilson, ed., International Impact of the Boer War (New York: Acumen, 2001), 30–3; “Proceedings of the Tenth Universal Peace Congress, Glasgow, Sept. 10–13, 1901,” Fourth Session, in Sandi E. Cooper, ed., Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Crisis of Ideas and Purpose (New York: Garland, 1976), 527–9. 4 Jonathan Hyslop, “The Invention of the Concentration Camp: Cuba, Southern Africa and the Philippines, 1896–1907,” South African Historical Journal 63:2 (2011), 271–3. 5 Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 113–19; Tanja E. Aalberts, “Rethinking the Principle of (Sovereign) Equality as a Standard of Civilisation,” Millennium 42:3 (2014), 770–9. 6 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 173–4; Mark Mazower, “An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century,” International Affairs 82:3 (2006), 555–9; Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 84–7; Gerrit Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54–81. 7 Richard S. Horowitz, “International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of World History 15:4 (2004), 445–86; Turan Kayaoglu, Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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8 Michael Adas, “Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology,” Journal of World History 15:1 (2004), 31–63. 9 Saliha Belmessous, “The Paradox of an Empire by Treaty,” in Saliha Belmessous, ed., Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600–1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4–15. 10 J. R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 66–73. 11 Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 319; Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation: A Study in Treaty Making (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), 108–9. 12 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 13 Arnulf Becker Lorca, “Eurocentrism in the History of International Law,” in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, 1040–2; Yasuaki Onuma, “When Was the Law of International Society Born?—An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective,” Journal of the History of International Law 2:1 (2000), 1–66. 14 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, 52–65, 310–11; Buzan and Lawson, Global Transformation, 175. 15 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (London, 2012), 127–32; Joseph Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Oakland: University of California Press, 1987); Kirk W. Larsen, “The Qing Empire (China), Imperialism, and the Modern World,” History Compass 9:60 (2011), 501–3. 16 Kevin Grant, A Civilized Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884– 1926 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 29–30. 17 John Thompson, A Sense of Power: The Roots of America’s World Role (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 48–50; Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011). 18 Arnulf Becker Lorca, “Sovereignty beyond the West: The End of Classical International Law,” Journal of the History of International Law 13:1 (2011), 58–68; Lorca, “Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation,” Harvard International Law Journal 51:2 (2010), 477, 493–503; Mustafa Aksakal, “Not ‘by Those Old Books of International Law, but Only by War’: Ottoman Intellectuals on the Eve of the Great War,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 15:3 (2004), 516–17.

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19 Fatiha Sahli and Abdelmalek el Ouazzani, “Africa North of the Sahara and Arab Countries,” in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, 393–6; Dominic Lieven, Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene, 2002), 148–51. 20 Horowitz, “International Law and State Transformation,” 461–4; Stephen Neff, Justice among Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 358–9; Case Concerning the Denunciation by China of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, between China and Belgium, 25 May, 1929, Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922–1946) [hereafter PCIJ] Series A/18, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_18/59_Denonciation_du_ traite_sino-belge_Ordonnance_19290525.pdf. 21 Shin Kawashima, “China,” in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, 453–5; Yongjin Zhang, “System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations,” Review of International Studies 27:5 (2001), 45. 22 Robert E. Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’ in Pre-Western East Asia?,” European Journal of International Relations 18:3 (2011), 407–30. 23 Yang Zewei, “Western International Law and China’s Confucianism in the 19th Century: Collision and Integration,” Journal of the History of International Law 13:2 (2011), 285–6; Jennifer Rudolph, Negotiating Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli Yamen and the Politics of Reform (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2008). 24 Seo-Hyun Park, “Small States and the Search for Sovereignty in Sinocentric Asia: Japan and Korea in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Anthony Reid and Zheng Yangwen, eds., Negotiating Asymmetry: China’s Place in Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 42; Junko Koizumi, “Between Tribute and Treaty: SinoSiamese Relations from the Late Nineteenth Century to the Early Twentieth Century,” in Reid and Yangwen, Negotiating Asymmetry, 54–65. 25 Donna Brunero, Britain’s Imperial Cornerstone in China: The Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1854–1949 (New York: Routledge, 2006). 26 Alexandre Schiele, “China’s International Attitude of Withdrawal during the 19th Century,” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 7:2 (2015), 160–2. 27 William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), 185–90, 193–200, 214–19; Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 132–6; Rune Svarverud, International Law as a World Order in Late Imperial China (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 88–91. 28 Kawashima, “China,” 470–2; Zewei, “Western International Law and China’s Confucianism,” 300; Convention and Treaty between the Republic of Peru and the Empire of China, 26 June, 1874, in William Frederick Mayers, ed., Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers (London, 1877), 189–94.

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29 Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 271–3. 30 Umut Özsu, Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 94–8; Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 127–9. 31 M. W. Janis, “Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of ‘International Law,’” American Journal of International Law 78:2 (1984), 408–10. 32 W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (trans. and rev. M. Byers) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 511–12. 33 Martti Koskenniemi, “Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law,” European Journal of International Relations 15:3 (2009), 405. 34 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005 [1922]), 5–7; Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1927]), 69–73; Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jay Winter, “Introduction,” in Jay Winter, ed., Cambridge History of the First World War, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1. 35 Quincy Wright, “Neutrality and Neutral Rights Following the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of War,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 24 (1930), 79–87; Hatsue Shinohara, “International Law and World War I,” Diplomatic History 38:4 (2014), 883–5. 36 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 316, 320–1. 37 W. T. Stead, The Parliament of Peace and Its Members (London: Review of Reviews, 1899); Scott Andrew Keefer, “Building the Palace of Peace: The Hague Conference of 1899 and Arms Control in the Progressive Era,” Journal of the History of International Law 8:1 (2006), 8–16. 38 Dorothy Jones, Toward a Just World: The Critical Years in the Search for International Justice (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 5; Daniel Hucker, “British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting the 1899 Hague Peace Conference,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 26:3 (2015), 414–16, 418–19. 39 Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 154–5; Richard Toye, Churchill’s Empire (London: Macmillan, 2010), 52–6. 40 Geoffrey Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After,” International Affairs 75:3 (1999), 625–8. 41 Vanessa Lincoln Lambert, “The Dynamics of Transnational Activism: The International Peace Congresses, 1843–1851,” International History Review 38:1 (2016), 129–33.

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42 “Alabama Claims of the United States of America against Great Britain: Award Rendered on 14 September 1872 by the Tribunal of Arbitration established by Article I of the Treaty of Washington of 8 May 1871,” http://legal.un.org/riaa/ cases/vol_XXIX/125–134.pdf; A. Curtis Wilgus, “James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 5:4 (1922), 669–72; “Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration Constituted under Article 1 of the Treaty of Arbitration Signed at Washington, between Great Britain and the United States of Venezuela, Regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, Decision of 3 October 1899,” http://legal.un.org/riaa/ cases/vol_XXVIII/331–340.pdf; Bob Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 63–4. 43 Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 1899, Articles 20–5, in James Brown Scott, ed., Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague, 1899 and 1907 (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1908), 30–3; Tjaco T. van den Hout, “Resolution of International Disputes: The Role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration— Reflections on the Centenary of the 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,” Leiden Journal of International Law 21:3 (2008), 644–6; Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War,” 630. 44 Permanent Court of Arbitration, North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Tribunal of Arbitration Constituted under a Special Agreement Signed at Washington, January 27th, 1909, between the United States of America and Great Britain (The Hague, 1910), www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=173. 45 Germán A. De la Reza, “The Formative Platform of the Congress of Panama (1810–1826): the Pan-American Conjecture Revisited,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 56:1 (2013), 9–17; Sasha Maldonado Jordison, “The Central American Court of Justice: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow?,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 25:1 (2009), 194–9. 46 Juan Pablo Scarfi, “In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898–1933,” Diplomatic History 40:2 (2016), 199–200, 206–7; Ricardo D. Salvatore, “The Making of a Hemispheric IntellectualStatesman: Leo S. Rowe in Argentina, 1906–1919,” Journal of Transnational American Studies 2:1 (2010), 1–36. 47 Steve Charnovitz, “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance,” Michigan Journal of International Law 18:183 (1996–7), 196–7. 48 Neff, Justice among Nations, 325–8; Francis Anthony Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898–1922 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 32–4. 49 Michael Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 34–9;

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Notes Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Harper Collins, 2012), 251–8, 281–92. Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz, eds., Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2013), 6–11; Branden Little, “State, Civil Society and Relief Organizations for War,” 1914–1918-Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War: http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online. net/pdf/1914-1918-Online-state_civil_society_and_relief_organizations_for_ war-2014-10-08.pdf. John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 38–42, 74–7; Katie Pickles, Transnational Outrage: The Death and Commemoration of Edith Cavell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Tim Cook, At the Sharp End, Volume One: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914 to 1916 (Toronto: Viking, 2007), 163. Isabel Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 3–4. Katarina Rietzler, “ The War as History: Writing the Economic and Social History of the First World War,” Diplomatic History 38:4 (2014), 832–3; John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1919). Hull, A Scrap of Paper, 324–6. Thomas Skouteris, “The Vocabulary of Progress in Interwar International Law: An Intellectual Portrait of Stelios Seferiades,” The European Journal of International Law 16:5 (2005), 837–42; Jones, Toward a Just World, 10. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, April 5, 1933, PCIJ A/B43, http://www.icj-cij.org/ pcij/serie_AB/AB_53/01_Groenland_Oriental_Arret.pdf. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: Stevens and Son, 1958), 5–8; James Brown Scott, “The Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice,” The American Journal of International Law 2 (1908), 800– 5; Cornelis G. Roelofsen, “International Arbitration and Courts,” in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, 165–7. Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920–1942 (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 242–5; Registry of the Permanent Court of International Justice, The Permanent Court of International Justice (The Hague, 2012 [1939]), 21–5, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_other/cpji-pcij.pdf. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920, Article 9, http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/documents/1920.12.16_statute.htm#_ Toc160729737. The League included members, such as India, which were not yet independent states.

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61 Hudson, Permanent Court of International Justice, 451–2; The Permanent Court of International Justice (The Hague, 1939 [2012]), http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_ other/cpji-pcij.pdf. 62 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 1920, Article 38. 63 Neff, Justice among Nations, 346. 64 Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, PCIJ Series A/B42, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_42/Trafic_ ferroviaire_Avis_consultatif.pdf; Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans contracted in France, 12 July 1929, PCIJ Series A/21, http://www. icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_20/64_Emprunts_Bresiliens_Arret.pdf; Competence of the ILO in regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of the Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion, 12 August 1922, PCIJ Series A/2, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_B/B_02/Competence_OIT_Agriculture_ Avis_consultatif.pdf, 24–5; Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila (1927), PCIJ Series B/14, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/ serie_B/B_14/01_Commission_europeenne_du_Danube_Avis_consultatif. pdf, 8–10. 65 Advisory Opinion, Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, 5 September 1931, PCIJ Series AB/41, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_41/01_Regime_ douanier_Avis_consultatif.pdf, 45–53; Lighthouses Case between France and Greece, 17 March 1934, PCIJ Series A/B62, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_62/ 01_Affaire_des_phares_Arret.pdf; Lighthouses in Crete and Samos, 8 October 1937, PCIJ Series AB/71, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_AB/AB_71/01_Phares_en_ Crete_Arret.pdf. 66 Anita Prażmowska, “Poland, the ‘Danzig Question’ and the Outbreak of the Second World War,” in Frank McDonough, ed., The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective (London: Continuum, 2011), 394–408. 67 The Case of the S. S. Lotus (1927), 10–12, 16, Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922–1946), Series A/10, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_A/ A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf; Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, Article 1, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne. 68 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (1927), 31. 69 Ibid., 19. 70 James Barros, The Åland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); James J. Summers, “The Right of Self-Determination and Nationalism in International Law,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 12:4 (2005), 338–48. 71 Sally Marks, “The Small States at Geneva,” World Affairs 157:4 (1995), 191, 193; Ahsan Butt, “Anarchy and Hierarchy in International Relations: Examining

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Notes South America’s War-Prone Decade, 1932–41,” International Organization 67:3 (2013), 592–4. Proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and Paraguay: March 13, 1929–September 13, 1929 (Washington, DC, 1929); Brian McCormack, “A Historical Case for the Globalisation of International Law: The Chaco War and the Principle of ex aequo et bono,” Global Society 13:3 (1999), 301– 4; Bruce Farcau, The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932–1935 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 94–5, 112–13. Boyle, Foundations of World Order, 56–9. Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Questions which Appear Ripe for International Regulation (Geneva: League of Nations, 1927), Annex III; Conference for the Codification of International Law: Final Act (Geneva: League of Nations, 1930). Nationality of Commercial Corporations and Their Diplomatic Protection (Geneva: League of Nations, 1927), 18. Most Favoured Nation Clause—Report Adopted by the Committee at its 3rd Session Held in March–April 1927 (Geneva: League of Nations, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, 1927), 13. The Covenant of the League of Nations, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ leagcov.asp. Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 448–72; David Turns, “The Stimson Doctrine of Nonrecognition: Its Historical Genesis and Influence on Contemporary International Law,” Chinese Journal of International Law 2:1 (2003), 128–9; Hatsue Shinohara, US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 103–15. Kinji Akashi, “Japan-Europe,” in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, 742. Shinohara, US International Lawyers, 100–2; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (Harlow: Longman, 1987), 2–19, 45–8. Thomas Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008), 166–70; David Tucker, “Colonial Sovereignty in Manchuria and Manchukuo,” in Douglas Howland and Luise White, eds., The State of Sovereignty (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 80–9. Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (London: Hamilton, 1972). Chi-Hua Tang, “China-Europe,” in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, 710–11; William C. Dennis, “The Doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law 26 (1932), 53–68.

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84 Feodor de Martens, “International Arbitration and the Peace Conference at The Hague,” The North American Review 169 (1899), 609. 85 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899), Article 10, Article 9, in Scott, Texts of the Peace Conferences at the Hague, 26–7. 86 “International Commission of Inquiry—Incident in the North Sea (The Dogger Bank Case), 26 Feb. 1905,” in P. Hamilton H. C. Requena, L. van Scheltinga, and B. Shifman, eds., The Permanent Court of Arbitration: International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 297–302. 87 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 78–94; Carole Fink, “The League of Nations and the Minorities Question,” World Affairs 157:4 (1995), 199–203; League of Nations, Protection of Linguistic, Racial, and Religious Minorities (Geneva, League of Nations, 1927). The fourteen states for which minority obligations applied were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Finland, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 88 Meredith Terreta, “ ‘We Had Been Fooled into Thinking That the UN Watches over the Entire World’: Human Rights, UN Trust Territories and Africa’s Decolonization,” Human Rights Quarterly 34:2 (2012), 329–60. 89 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War with a Collection of Official Documents (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933); Sydney Morning Herald, September 2, 1939, 18; Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–39 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 83–4, 1007–9. 90 “Mixed Claims Commission, United States-Germany, Constituted under the Agreement of August 10, 1922, Extended by Agreement of December 31, 1928,” 33, http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_VII/1–391.pdf; Neff, Justice among Nations, 357–8. 91 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 298. 92 Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” The American Historical Review 113:5 (2008), 1334–8. 93 Renee Hirschon, Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey (New York: Berghahn, 2008). 94 Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 2–4, 14–15. 95 Stephen Legg, “ ‘ The Life of Individuals as well as of Nations’: International Law and the League of Nations’ Anti-Trafficking Governmentalities,” Leiden Journal of International Law 25:3 (2012), 647–64; Paul Knepper, The Invention of International Crime: A Global Issue in the Making, 1881–1914 (London: Palgrave, 2009).

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96 Ben Saul, “Attempts to Define Terrorism in International Law,” Netherlands International Law Review 52:1 (2005), 63. 97 Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 122; Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878– 1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 276–82, 312–15. 98 Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 106–10. 99 Paul Knepper, International Crime in the 20th Century: The League of Nations Era, 1919–1929 (London: Palgrave, 2011), 57–64. 100 Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 291–4; Dan Plesch and Shanti Sattler, “Changing the Paradigm of International Criminal Law: Considering the Work of the United Nations War Crimes Commission of 1943–1948,” International Community Law Review 15:2 (2013), 203–23.

4 International Humanitarian Activism 1 Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 4–5, 23–4, 269–72; Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 57–75; Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, The Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Ottawa, 2009); A. Dirk Moses, ed., Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 2 John Bew, “Intervention in the Wake of the Napoleonic Wars,” in Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 119–20, 134–7. 3 Abigail Green, “Intervening in the Jewish Question, 1840–1878,” in Simms and Trim, Humanitarian Intervention, 140–5. 4 Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knopf, 2008), 169–72. 5 Daniel Laqua, “The Tensions of Internationalism: Transnational Anti-slavery in the 1880s and 1890s,” International History Review 33:4 (2011), 707–10, 719; Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, The “Civilising Mission” of Portuguese Colonialism, 1870–1930 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), ch. 2. 6 Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884– 1926 (London: Routledge, 2004), 41, 47–52; Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Boston, MA: Mariner, 1998), 115–49; Robert Burroughs, “The Travelling

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Notes Tosstorff, “Albert Thomas, the ILO and the IFTU: A Case of Mutual Benefit?,” in van Dael et al., ILO Histories, 95–105. League of Nations, Slavery Convention, Signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926, Article 2, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/SlaveryConvention. aspx; Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79. Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism, 55–9, 154–8. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, “Introduction,” in Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds., Empires at War, 1911–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4. Pierre Purseigle, “ ‘A Wave on to Our Shores’: The Exile and Resettlement of Refugees from the Western Front, 1914–1918,” Contemporary European History 16:4 (2007), 427–44; Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland, OH: First Meridian, 1958 [1951]), 302. Fridtjof Nansen, “Rescuing Millions of War Victims from Disease and Starvation,” Current History, July 1, 1929, 570. Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 168–72; Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 3–4; Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory (New York: Putnam’s, 1947), 276. Matthew Stibbe, “Civilian Internment and Civilian Internees in Europe, 1914–20,” in Matthew Stibbe, ed., Captivity, Forced Labour and Forced Migration in Europe during the First World War (London: Routledge, 2009), 61; Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5–9. Raymond Kévorkian, The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 11; Michelle Tusan, Smyrna’s Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 16–20, 30–9. Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 217–23, 234, 243–6. Kévorkian, Armenian Genocide, 243–7; Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Göran Gunner, ed., Genocide of Armenians: Through Swedish Eyes (Yerevan: Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, 2013); Wolfgang Gust, ed., The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915–1916 (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 115–25.

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29 Suzanne Moranian, “The Armenian Genocide and American Missionary Relief Efforts,” in Jay Winter, ed., America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 196–202, 207–9. 30 Charlie Laderman, “Sharing the Burden? The American Solution to the Armenian Question, 1918–1920,” Diplomatic History 40:4 (2016), 666, 677–8, 693–4. 31 Victoria Rowe, “Armenian Women Refugees at the End of Empire: Strategies of Survival,” in Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee, eds., Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century (London: Palgrave, 2011), 152–74. 32 Keith David Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920–1927,” American Historical Review 115:5 (2010), 1319. 33 Keith David Watenpaugh, “Between Communal Survival and National Aspiration: Armenian Genocide Refugees, the League of Nations, and the Practices of Interwar Humanitarianism,” Humanity 5:2 (2014), 160–2. 34 Inger Marie Okkenhaug, “Religion, Relief and Humanitarian Work among Armenian Women Refugees in Mandatory Syria, 1927–1934,” Scandinavian Journal of History 40:3 (2015), 434–6, 438–40. 35 Andrew Mango, From the Sultan to Atatürk: Turkey (London: Haus, 2009), 76, 123– 4; Davide Rodogno, “The American Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Humanitarian Politics and Policies in Asia Minor and Greece (1922–1923),” First World War Studies 5:1 (2014), 84–8. 36 Bruce Clark, Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey (London: Grant, 2006), xii, 11–12. 37 Umut Özsu, “Fabricating Fidelity: Nation-Building, International Law, and the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange,” Leiden Journal of International Law 24:4 (2011), 845. 38 Umut Özsu, The Ottoman Empire and the International Law of Minority Protection, 1815–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 24, 27, 46–9; Mango, From the Sultan to Atatürk, 101. 39 Metin Heper, İsmet İnönü, Turkish Diplomat and Statesman (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 17, 50; Bruce R. Kuniholm, “Tevik Rüştü Aras,” in Warren R. Kuehl, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1983), 23. 40 Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 977. 41 Samuel Moyn, Christian Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 17; Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 67–70. 42 Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth (New York: Penguin, 1994 [1933]), 312–13, 412.

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43 Martin Ceadel, “Pacifism,” in Jay Winter, ed., The Cambridge History of the First World War, Volume 2: The State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 592; Hertha Kraus, International Relief in Action, 1914–1945 (Scottdale, PN: Herald Press, 1944), 22, 33, 125. 44 James Urry, Mennonites, Politics, and Peoplehood: Europe–Russia–Canada; 1525– 1980 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2006), 87–100; Amy Shaw, Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada during the First World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 43–8. 45 Steven Florczyk, Hemingway, the Red Cross, and the Great War (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2014); Keith Jeffery, 1916 (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 76, 70; David Cannadine, G. M. Trevelyan: A Life in History (New York: Norton, 1993), 80. 46 Florence Farmborough, Oral History, Imperial War Museum Track 24, Description of Medical Facilities and Treatment of Wounded: 1914–1916, Adam Matthew, Marlborough, The First World War, http://www.firstworldwar.amdigital.co.uk. 47 Christine E. Hallett, Veiled Warriors: Allied Nurses of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 118–23; Rosalie Slaughter Morton, A Woman Surgeon: The Life and Work of Rosalie Slaughter Morton (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1937), 223–38, 292–4. 48 Elsa Brändström, Among Prisoners of War in Russia and Siberia (London: Hutchinson, 1929), 186; Gerald H. Davis, “National Red Cross Societies and Prisoners of War in Russia, 1914–18,” Journal of Contemporary History 28:1 (1993), 32, 37. 49 Heather Jones, “International or Transnational? Humanitarian Action during the First World War,” European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire 16:5 (2009), 698–701; Kimberly A. Lowe, “Navigating the Profits and Pitfalls of Governmental Partnerships: The ICRC and Intergovernmental Relief, 1918–23,” Disasters 39:2 (2015), 205–6. 50 Sho Konishi, “The Emergence of an International Humanitarian Organization in Japan: The Tokugawa Origins of the Japanese Red Cross,” American Historical Review 119:4 (2014), 1129–30, 1151; Yoshiya Makita, “The Alchemy of Humanitarianism: The First World War, the Japanese Red Cross and the Creation of an International Public Health Order,” First World War Studies 5:1 (2014), 122, 124–5. 51 Caroline Moorhead, Dunant’s Dream (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1999), 265–71, 276–82; J. Charles Schencking, The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Chimera of National Reconstruction in Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 2, 59. 52 Cabanes, The Great War, 25–8, 36; Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996),

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108–22; Deborah Cohen, The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 4, 89–94; John Paul Newman, “Allied Yugoslavia: Serbian War Veterans and Their International Ties,” in Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman, eds., The Great War and Veteran’s Internationalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 105–12. Jay Winter, René Cassin and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 25–46; Cabanes, The Great War, 19–20. Thomas Davies, “International Veteran’s Organizations and the Promotion of Disarmament between the Two World Wars,” in Eichenberg and Newman, The Great War and Veteran’s Internationalism, 187; Cabanes, The Great War, 65–9. Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (New York: Anchor, 1990), 281–3, 290. Adam Tooze, The Deluge: Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931 (New York: Viking, 2014), 299–304, 464–8; Robert Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 65–6, 80. Daniel Anet, Pierre Ceresole: Passionate Peacemaker (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), 65–8; Arthur Gillette, One Million Volunteers: The Story of Volunteer Youth Service (London: Penguin, 1968), 15–17, 80. Tara Zahra, The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s Families after World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 15–16; Cabanes, The Great War, 285, 290–4. Emily Baughan and Juliano Fiori, “Save the Children, the Humanitarian Project, and the Politics of Solidarity: Reviving Dorothy Buxton’s Vision,” Disasters 39:2 (2015), 131–3, 135, 141; Baughan, “ ‘Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!’ Empire, Internationalism and the Save the Children Fund in Inter-war Britain,” Historical Research 86:231 (2013), 117, 122, 133; Dominique Marshall, “Children’s Right and Imperial Political Cultures: Missionary and Humanitarian Contributions to the Conference on the African Child of 1931,” International Journal of Children’s Rights 12:3 (2004), 275–8. Dominique Marshall, “The Rise of Coordinated Action for Children in War and Peace: Experts at the League of Nations, 1924–1945,” in Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel, eds., Shaping the Transnational Sphere:Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 82–109; Clare Mulley, The Woman Who Saved the Children: A Biography of Eglantyne Jebb, Founder of Save the Children (London: Oneworld, 2010), ch. 15. Linda Mahood, Feminism and Voluntary Action: Eglantyne Jebb and Save the Children Fund, 1876–1928 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 193–7. Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2000); Jaclyn Granick, “Waging Relief: The Politics and Logistics of

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Stanford University Press, 2010), 71–94; Katarina Leppänen, “Movement of Women: Trafficking in the Interwar Era,” Women’s Studies International Forum 30:4 (2007), 523–33. Anne Foster, “Prohibition as Superiority: Policing Opium in South-East Asia, 1898–1925,” International History Review 22:2 (2000), 255–6; John Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–1945 (London: Praeger, 1997), 19–27; Daniel J. Wertz, “Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism: Opium Politics in the Colonial Philippines, 1898–1925,” Modern Asian Studies 47:2 (2013), 482, 487, 491–4. Catherine Carstairs, “The Stages of the International Drug Control System,” Drug and Alcohol Review 24:1 (2005), 57–9; Paul Knepper, International Crime in the 20th Century: The League of Nations Era, 1919–1939 (London: Palgrave, 2011), 118, 134–8; Christopher Frayling, The Yellow Peril: Dr Fu Manchu and The Rise of Chinaphobia (London: Thames & Hudson, 2014), ch. 5. John Barrows et al., The World’s Parliament of Religions (Chicago, IL: Parliament, 1893); Amy Kittelstrom, “The International Social Turn: Unity and Brotherhood at the World’s Parliament of Religions, Chicago, 1893,” Religion and American Culture 19:2 (2009), 262–4. James G. Greenlee and Charles Murray Johnston, Good Citizens: British Missionaries and Imperial States, 1870–1918 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999), 6–8; Ryan Dunch, “Beyond Cultural Imperialism: Cultural Theory, Christian Missions, and Global Modernity,” History and Theory 39:3 (2002), 301–25. Rev. George Robson, “History of the Conference,” in The World Missionary Conference, The History and Records of the Conference, Vol. 9 (Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson, & Ferrier, 1910), 8–10, 39–71; Minutes of the Conference, Business Session, June 15, in History and Records of the Conference, 78–9. Brian Stanley, The World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh 1910 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 12–13, 113–15, 118–20, 124–5. “The World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh,” Christian Observer, July 6, 1910, 2; World Missionary Conference, Report of Commission VIII: Cooperation and the Promotion of Unity (Edinburgh, 1910), 144–7. Peter Kalloway, “Education, Health and Social Welfare in the Late Colonial Context: The International Missionary Council and Educational Transition in the Interwar Years with Specific Reference to Colonial Africa,” History of Education 38:2 (2009), 234–5. Resolutions Passed by the Church Peace Union, Founded by Andrew Carnegie, at Its First Meeting, February 10, 1914, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/about/ history/church_peace_union.html/_res/id=sa_File1/CPU-Charter.pdf. Heinz Eduard Todt, Authentic Faith: Bonhoeffer’s Theological Ethics in Context (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007), 122.

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84 Jörg Mathias, “Unity in Christ or Pan-Europeanism? Nathan Söderblom and the Ecumenical Peace Movement in the Interwar Period,” Religion, State & Society 42:1 (2014), 7–12; G. K. A. Bell, The Stockholm Conference 1925: The Official Report on the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work Held in Stockholm, 19–30 August 1925 (London: Oxford University Press, 1926); Klas Hansson, “Nathan Söderblom’s Ecumenical Cope,” Studia Theologica—Nordic Journal of Theology 66:1 (2012), 63–6. 85 Garfield Bromley Oxnam, The Ethical Ideas of Jesus in a Changing World (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Cokesbury Press, 1941). 86 Michael G. Thompson, For God and Globe: Christian Internationalism in the United States between the Great War and the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 120–7. 87 Willem Adolph Visser ‘t Hooft, The Genesis and Formation of the World Council of Churches (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982), 18–24, 43–7, 63–8; Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (Toronto: Vintage, 2013), 303, 457. 88 Moyn, Christian Human Rights, 73–82. 89 Peter Gatrell and Philippe Nivet, “Refugees and Exiles,” in Jay Winter, ed., The Cambridge History of the First World War, Vol. 3: Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 215.

5 International Social Movements and Nongovernmental Activism 1 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” 1848, 25, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf. 2 Bernard Morris, “Epitaph for Socialist Internationalism,” History of European Ideas 17:1 (1993), 526–7; George C. Comninel, “Marx and the Politics of the First International,” Socialism and Democracy 28:2 (2014), 59–82. 3 Kevin J. Callahan, “The International Socialist Peace Movement on the Eve of World War I Revisited: The Campaign of ‘War against War!’ and the Basle International Socialist Congress in 1912,” Peace and Change 29:2 (2004), 156–9, 164–6. 4 V. I. Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination” (1914), Collected Works, Vol. 20: December 1913 to August 1914 (Moscow: Progress, 1964), 414, 453–4; Eric Weitz, “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right,” American Historical Review 120:2 (2015), 483–4; R. Craig Nation, War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the Origins of Communist Internationalism (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

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5 David Kirby, “Zimmerwald and the Origins of the Third International,” in Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, eds., International Communism and the Communist International, 1919–1943 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 15, 23. 6 Manuel Caballero, Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 43–9, 81–4. 7 Rick Kuhn, “Henryk Grossman on Capitalist Expansion and Imperialism,” International Socialist Review 56 (2007), http://isreview.org/issues/56/featgrossman.shtml; Hakim Adi, Pan-Africanism and Communism: The Communist International, Africa and the Diaspora, 1919–1939 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2013); Heather Streets-Salter, “The Noulens Affairs in East and Southeast Asia,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 21:4 (2014), 394–414; Anna Belogurova, “The Civic World of International Communism: Taiwanese Communists and the Comintern (1921–1931),” Modern Asian Studies 46:6 (2012), 1602–32. 8 Susan Miller, “The International Labor Movement and the Limits of Internationalism: The International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers, 1901–1913,” International Review of Social History 33:1 (1988), 5. 9 Jolyon Howorth, “French and German Workers: The Impossibility of Internationalism, 1900–1914,” European History Quarterly 15:1 (1985), 74–5, 76–83. 10 Miller, “The International Labor Movement,” 6–13. 11 Christine Collette, “ ‘Friendly Spirit, Comradeship, and Good-Natured Fun’: Adventures in Socialist Internationalism,” International Review of Social History 48:2 (2003), 225–7, 232–5. 12 Donna Gabaccia, “Worker Internationalism and Italian Labor Migration, 1870– 1914,” International Labor & Working-Class History 45 (1994), 70–73. 13 Matthew Bodah, Steve Ludlam, and David Coates, “The Development of an AngloAmerican Model of Trade Union and Political Party Relations,” Labor Studies Journal 28:2 (2003), 46–8; Geert van Goethem, The Amsterdam International: The World of the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), 1913–1945 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 24–38; Daniel Laqua, “Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism,” Contemporary European History 24:2 (2015), 176–80. 14 Steven Parfitt, “The First-and-a-Half International: The Knights of Labor and the History of International Labour Organization in the Nineteenth Century,” Labour History Review 80:2 (2015), 135–67; Jessica Harland-Jacobs, Builders of Empire: Freemasons and British Imperialism, 1717–1927 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 252–80; Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Nationalism and the Quest for Moral Universalism: German Freemasonry, 1860–1914,” in Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, eds., The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War (London: German Historical Institute, 2011), 264–79.

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15 Leonie Holthaus, “G. D. H. Cole’s International Thought: The Dilemmas of Justifying Socialism in the Twentieth Century,” The International History Review 36:5 (2014), 860–4; George B. Bikle, The New Jerusalem: Aspects of Utopianism in the Thought of Kagawa Toyohiko (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 276. 16 Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 73–7. 17 Jonathan Hyslop, “The Imperial Working Class Makes Itself ‘White’: White Labourism in Britain, Australia, and South Africa before the First World War,” Journal of Historical Sociology 12:4 (1999), 404–16. 18 Carolien Stolte, “Bringing Asia to the World: Indian Trade Unionism and the Long Road towards the Asiatic Labour Congress, 1919–37,” Journal of Global History 7:2 (2012), 258–9, 262–3, 267; Tatiana Akatova and O. Alexeyeva, “The Revolutionary Traditions of the Chinese Working-Class Movement,” Far Eastern Affairs 3 (1985), 114–24. 19 Ralph Darlington, “Re-evaluating Syndicalist Opposition to the First World War,” Labor History 53:4 (2012), 521–7, 531. 20 Wayne Thorpe, “The Workers Themselves”: Revolutionary Syndicalism and International Labour, 1913–1923 (Dordrecht: Kluwer for International Institute of Social History, 1989), 195–238. 21 Carl Levy, “Anarchism, Internationalism and Nationalism in Europe, 1860–1939,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50:3 (2004), 334–40. 22 See James Joll, The Anarchists, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1979); and Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: Fontana Press, 1993). 23 Paul Knepper, The Invention of International Crime: A Global Issue in the Making, 1881–1914 (London: Palgrave, 2010), 129–35, 140, 188–9. 24 Mary S. Barton, “The Global War on Anarchism: The United States and International Anarchist Terrorism, 1898–1904,” Diplomatic History 39:2 (2015), 304, 309–10; Richard Bach Jensen, The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch. 5. 25 Leila Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 15–24; Anne Cova, “The National Councils of Women in France, Italy and Portugal: Comparisons and Entanglements, 1888–1939,” in Oliver Janz and Daniel Schönpflug, eds., Gender History in a Transnational Perspective: Networks, Biographies, Gender Orders (New York: Berghahn, 2014), 68. 26 Karen Offen, European Feminisms, 1700–1950 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 346–55; Julie Carlier, “A Forgotten Instance of Women’s International Organising: The Transnational Feminist Networks of the Women’s Progressive Society (1890) and the International Women’s Union (1893–1898),” in Janz and

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Schönpflug, Gender History, 77–100; Dora B. Montefiore, “The Women’s Congress in Berlin,” New Age, June 9, 1904, 363. Taeko Shibahara, “Not Only for the Welfare of the Nation but for the World and Humanity: The Interwar Suffrage Movement in Japan,” Journal of Women’s History 24:2 (2012), 64–8. Mineke Bosch, “The Future of Women’s History: Internationalism and Theory in Women’s History,” Gender & History 3:2 (1991), 137–46. Carol Miller, “Geneva—the Key to Equality: Inter-war Feminists and the League of Nations,” Women’s History Review 3:2 (1994), 223–4; Ann Towns, “The InterAmerican Commission of Women and Women’s Suffrage, 1920–1945,” Journal of Latin American Studies 42:4 (2010), 779–807. Helen McCarthy, “Pacifism and Feminism in the Great War,” History Today 65:4 (2015), 4–5. Linda Schott, Reconstructing Women’s Thoughts: The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom before World War II (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 132–4; Mary Church Terrell, “The Progress of Coloured Women,” International Congress of Women, Berlin, 1904, in Kathryn Kish Sklar, Anja Schüler, and Susan Strasser, eds., Social Justice Feminists in the United States and Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 115–19. Erika Kuhlman, “The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and Reconciliation after the Great War,” in Alison Fell and Ingrid Sharp, eds., The Women’s Movement in Wartime: International Perspectives, 1914–19 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 233–6, 239–40; Marie Sandell, “ ‘A Real Meeting of the Women of the East and the West’: Women and Internationalism in the Interwar Period,” in Daniel Laqua, ed., Internationalism Transfigured (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 17. Ellen Carol DuBois and Haleh Emrani, “A Speech by Nour Hamada: Tehran, 1932,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 4:1 (2008), 109–10; Charlotte Weber, “Between Nationalism and Feminism: The Eastern Women’s Congresses of 1930 and 1932,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 4:1 (2008), 83–106. Miller, “Geneva—the Key to Equality,” 220, 230–2, 236–7. Laura Beers, “Feminism, Internationalism and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom,” History & Policy (March 30, 2015), http://www.historyandpolicy.org/dialogues/discussions/ women-peace-and-transnational-activism-a-century-on. Helen McCarthy, Women of the World (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 93–102. Miriam Cohen and Michael Hanagan, “The Politics of Gender and the Making of the Welfare State, 1900–1940: A Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Social History 24:3 (1991), 470–5. Sondra Herman, “From International Feminism to Feminist Internationalism,” Peace and Change 18:4 (1993), 325–46; Alva and Gunner Myrdal, Crisis in

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Notes the Population Question (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1934); Yvonne Hirdman, Alva Myrdal: The Passionate Mind (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 168–9, 174–8. Kimberly Jensen, Oregon’s Doctor to the World: Esther Pohl Lovejoy and a Life in Activism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010). Emma Pérez, cited in Patricia A. Schechter, “Feminist Historiography, Antiimperialism, and the Decolonial,” in Ian Tyrell and Jay Sexton, eds., Empire’s Twin: U. S. Anti-imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 156. See Christine Bolt, Sisterhood Questioned? Race, Class, and Internationalism in the American and British Women’s Movements, c. 1880s–1970s (London: Routledge, 2004). Elizabeth A. Littell-Lamb, “Engendering a Class Revolution: The Chinese YWCA Industrial Reform Work in Shanghai, 1927–1939,” Women’s History Review 21:2 (2012), 194–8; Sarah Paddle, “ ‘For the China of the Future’: Western Feminists, Colonisation and International Citizenship in China in the Inter-war Years,” Australian Feminist Studies 16:36 (2001), 331–4; Rachel Leow, “ ‘Do You Own NonChinese mui tsai?’ Re-examining Race and Female Servitude in Malaya and Hong Kong, 1919–1939,” Modern Asian Studies 46:6 (2012), 1736–63. Stephen Legg, “Governing Prostitution in Colonial Delhi: From Cantonment Regulations to International Hygiene (1864–1939),” Social History 34:4 (2009), 447–67; Ian Tyrrell, Woman’s World/Woman’s Empire: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880–1930 (Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 1991), 81–9. Aparna Basu and Bharati Ray, Women’s Struggle: A History of the All India Women’s Conference, 1927–1990 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1990), 20–6; Sandell, “A Real Meeting,” 163–5, 169, 171; Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 17–18. Sania Sharawi Lanfranchi, Casting off the Veil: The Life of Huda Shaarawi, Egypt’s First Feminist (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 196–8; Elizabeth Thompson, “Le mouvement féminin et l’essor de l’État-providence colonial en Syrie (1920–1946),” Clio: Femmes, Genre, Histoire 33:1 (2011), 116. Rumi Yasutake, “The Rise of Women’s Internationalism in the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region during the Interwar Years, from a Japanese Perspective,” Women’s History Review 20:4 (2011), 523. Fiona Paisley, Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Race Politics in the Women’s Pan-Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 64–5, 143–5. Anne Bobroff, “Alexandra Kollontai: Feminism, Workers’ Democracy, and Internationalism,” Radical America 13:6 (1979), 50–75.

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49 Alexandra Kollontai, The Autobiography of A Sexually Emancipated Communist Woman (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970); Cathy Porter, Alexandra Kollontai: A Biography (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 135–7, 142–4. 50 Martin Ceadel, Semi-detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6–8; Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God Is within You (New York: Cassell, 1894); James D. Hunt, “Gandhi, Tolstoy, and the Tolstoyans,” in Harvey L. Dyck, ed., The Pacifist in Historical Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 261–5; Peter Brock, Pacifism to 1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 456–69. 51 Sandi E. Cooper, “The Reinvention of the ‘Just War’ among European Pacifists before the First World War,” in Dyck, Pacifist in Historical Perspective, 303, 314– 15; Michael Clinton, “‘Revanche ou relèvement’: The French Peace Movement Confronts Alsace and Lorraine, 1871–1918,” Canadian Journal of History 40:3 (2005), 433–5, 444–7. 52 Brock, Pacifism to 1914, 306; Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (Toronto: Vintage, 2012), 297–9. 53 Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 259–84. 54 Neil Earle, “Public Opinion for Peace: Tactics of Peace Activists at the Washington Conference on Naval Armament (1921–1922),” Journal of Church and State 40:1 (1998), 150–55; Branden Little, “An Evolving Navy of Great Complexity, 1919– 1941,” in Kenneth J. Hagen, ed., Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 30th anniversary ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), 182–202. 55 Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–39 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 55–6; Christopher M. Bell and John H. Maurer, At the Crossroads between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). 56 Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). 57 Jay Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 15–22; Edwin Ginn, “The World Peace Foundation,” The Independent . . . Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature, and the Arts 70:3245 (1911), 295–8; George Finch, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Summary of Organization and Work, 1911–1941 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1941), v–vi. 58 “Full Text of Alfred Nobel’s Will,” Nobelprize.org, Nobel Media AB 2014, http:// www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/will/will-full.html.

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59 Ulrich Herz, The International Peace Bureau (Geneva: International Peace Bureau, 1969). 60 David Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 15–20; Irwin Abrams, “Reflections on the First Century of the Nobel Peace Prize,” Peace and Change 26:4 (2001), 526. 61 Captain Charles de Gaulle’s Cards, “Prisoners of the First World War, ICRC Historical Archives,” http://grandeguerre.icrc.org/en/File/Details/261112/6/2. 62 Øyvind Tønnesson, “Trends in Nobel Peace Prizes in the Twentieth Century,” Peace & Change 26:4 (2001), 436. 63 Ute Katzel, “A Radical Women’s Rights and Peace Activist: Margarethe Leonor Selenka, Initiator of the First Worldwide Women’s Peace Demonstration in 1899,” Journal of Women’s History 13:3 (2001), 50–4; Regina Braker, “Helene Stöcker’s Pacifism in the Weimar Republic: Between Ideal and Reality,” Journal of Women’s History 13:3 (2001), 73–7. 64 Martin Albers, “Between the Crisis of Democracy and World Parliament: The Development of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in the 1920s,” Journal of Global History 7:2 (2012), 196–202, 205–8. 65 Bertha von Suttner, Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner: The Record of an Eventful Life, Vol. 1 (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1919), 294–300, 435–48; Brigite Hamann, Bertha von Suttner—a Life for Peace (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 198–207. 66 Von Suttner, Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner, 340. 67 Alberto Castelli, “Between Patriotism and Pacifism: Ernesto Teodoro Moneta and the Italian Conquest of Libya,” History of European Ideas 36:3 (2010), 325–7; Torild Arnoldson, “The Lifework of K. P. Arnoldson, the Swedish Recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize,” The Advocate of Peace 71:3 (1909), 61; Brigitte Maria Goldstein, “Ludwig Quidde and the Struggle for Democratic Pacifism in Germany, 1914– 1930,” PhD Dissertation, New York University, 1984; Theodore Ruyssen, “The Final Efforts of the European Pacifists to Prevent the War,” The Advocate of Peace 76:10 (1914), 237; William Irvine, Between Justice and Politics: The Ligue des droits de l’homme, 1898–1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 9, 21. 68 Ferdinand Buisson, “Changes in Concepts of War and Peace,” Nobel Essay, May 31, 1928, in Frederick W. Haberman, ed., Nobel Lectures: Peace, Vol. 2, 1926–1950 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1972), 36. 69 Louis Bisceglia, “The Politics of a Peace Prize,” Journal of Contemporary History 7:3–4 (1972), 264–70; Martin Ceadel, Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 309, 316; Harriet Hyman Alonso, “Nobel Peace Laureates, Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch: Two Women of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom,” Journal of Women’s History 7:2 (1995), 7–8, 12–16.

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70 István Deák, Weimar Germany’s Left-Wing Intellectuals (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1968), 112–14. 71 Barbara E. Addison, “Pragmatic Pacifist: Devere Allen and the Interwar Peace Movement, 1918–1940,” Peace & Change 29:1 (2004), 85–7, 98–9. 72 Irwin Abrams, The Nobel Peace Prize and the Laureates (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1989), 133–4. 73 James Brown Scott, “In Memoriam Louis Renault,” American Journal of International Law 12:3 (1918), 606–10. For an example of Renault’s international scholarly influence, see the US Army course based on his lectures: Lt. Col. J. B. Porter, International Law (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Press of the Army Service Schools, 1914). 74 Louis Renault, “The Work at the Hague in 1899 and in 1907,” Nobel Lecture, May 18, 1908, in Frederick W. Haberman, ed., Nobel Lectures: Peace, Vol. 1, 1901–1925 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1972), 145. 75 Jonathan E. Helmreich, “August Marie François Beernaert,” in Warren F. Kuehl, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1983), 64–5. 76 Geert de Baere Alex Mills, “T. M. C. Asser and Public and Private International Law: The Life and Legacy of a Practical Legal Statesman,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 42 (2011), 27, 30–32. 77 Theodore Roosevelt’s Annual Message to Congress for 1904, 33, House Records HR 58A-K2, Records of the US House of Representatives, Record Group 233, National Archives, College Park, MD; John M. Thompson, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 26:4 (2015), 571–90; Irwin Abrams, “The Nobel Peace Prize: A Balance Sheet,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 21:3 (1962), 230–1. 78 Baron D’Estournelles De Constant, “International Conciliation,” The Independent . . . Devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History, Literature, and the Arts 59:2956 (1905), 206. 79 Elihu Root, “The Relations between International Tribunals of Arbitration and the Jurisdiction of National Courts,” The American Journal of International Law 3:3 (1909), 529–36. 80 Nathaniel Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 195–208; Christian Lange, “Internationalism,” Nobel Lecture, December 13, 1921, in Haberman, Nobel Lectures, Vol. 1, 345. 81 Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilization of Europe, 1919–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 419–20; Ivar Libӕk, Asle Sveen, and Øivind Stenersen, “The Nobel Peace Prize, 1901–1939: The Decision‐Making Process,” Peace and Change 26:4 (2001), 458.

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82 Lucian Ashworth, International Relations and the Labour Party (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 115–16, 118–19; Gaynor Johnson, Lord Robert Cecil: Politician and Internationalist (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 235–6, 240; E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939), 11–18, 22–36.

6 Synergies: International Functional and Technical Cooperation 1 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 114–15, 129–30; David Mitrany, “The Functional Approach to World Organization,” International Affairs 24:3 (1948), 350–63. 2 Mark Mazower, Governing the World (London: Penguin, 2012), 97–103. 3 Jan-Stefan Fritz, “Internationalism and the Promise of Science,” in David Long and Brian Schmidt, eds., Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 143, 147–8; David Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J. A. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 144–55. 4 Charles Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970 [1925]); Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Whittlesey House, 1936); Jan Stöckmann, “Studying the International, Serving the Nation: The Origins of International Relations (IR) Scholarship in Germany, 1912– 33,” The International History Review 38:5 (2016), 1058–9. 5 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949 [1936]), 1, 3, 184–90. 6 Paul Knepper, The Invention of International Crime: A Global Issue in the Making, 1881–1914 (London: Palgrave, 2009), 142–3. 7 Vanessa Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time: 1870–1950 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 35–8, 55–60, 83–7. 8 J. H. Freeman, “The Metre and the Pendulum,” Nature 348 (1990), 105–6; William Hallock, Outlines of the Evolution of Weights and Measures and the Metric System (New York: Macmillan, 1906). 9 Convention du Mètre et Règlement Annexe (1875), http://www.bipm.org/en/ worldwide-metrology/metre-convention/official-texts/; Robert Crease, World in the Balance: The Historic Quest for an Absolute System of Measurement (New York: Norton, 2011), 206, 213–15, 218, 222. 10 Charles Maier, Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2012), 79–93.

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11 Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 49–51, 56–62, 106– 17; Paul Reinsch, The Public International Unions (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1911). 12 Simone Fari, The Formative Years of the Telegraph Union (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2015), 59–73; Leonard Woolf, International Government (New York: Brentano’s, 1916), 205–11. 13 Richard R. John, “Projecting Power Overseas: U.S. Postal Policy and International Standard-Setting at the 1863 Paris Postal Conference,” Journal of Policy History 27:3 (2015), 417–19, 426–30. 14 General Postal Union, October 9, 1874, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ usmu010.asp; F. H. Williamson, “ The International Postal Service and the Universal Postal Union,” Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 9:1 (1930), 70–5. 15 Isabella Löhr, “The Propertisation and Internationalisation of Culture in the 20th Century,” Comparativ 21:2 (2011), 33–7; Daniel Gorman, “Globalization, Intellectual Property, and the Emergence of New Property Types,” in William Coleman, ed., Property, Territory, Globalization (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 128–9. 16 F. S. L. Lyons, Internationalism in Europe, 1815–1914 (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1963), 48–50; Souichirou Kozuka, “The Economic Implications of Uniformity in Law,” in Jürgen Basedow and Toshiyuki Kono, eds., An Economic Analysis of Private International Law (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 73, 76–7; William Osborne McDowell, “First Draft of a Constitution for the United Nations of the World,” Journal of American History 2:4 (1908), 537–42. 17 Elizabeth Bloodgood, “The Yearbook of International Organizations and Quantitative Non-state Actor Research,” in Bob Reinalda, ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-state Actors (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 20–1; Woolf, International Government, 158, 166–8; Michael Wallace and J. David Singer, “Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964: A Quantitative Description,” International Organization 24:2 (1970), 243–5. 18 Thomas Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 65, 75–6; J. D. B. Miller, “Norman Angell and Rationality in International Relations,” in David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 103–14. 19 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), 410–30; Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Harper Collins, 2012), 204–13, 242–71. 20 See Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

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21 “The Supreme War Council,” Current History 7:1 (1917), 434; Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 45–53, 59–64. 22 Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France during the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107–11; Arthur Salter, Allied Shipping Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921). 23 Martin Horn, Britain, France and the Financing of the First World War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 4, 177; Andrew Patrick, America’s Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 47–62; George Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of Emergencies, 1917–1918, Vol. 3 (New York, 1996). 24 Monnet, cited in François Duchêne, Jean Monnet (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 41. 25 Mustafa Aksakal, “The Ottoman Empire,” in Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds., Empires at War, 1911–1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23–5. 26 Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 13–14, 83–7; Jonathan McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 27 David Stevenson, “ The First World War and European Integration,” The International History Review 34:4 (2012), 843, 848, 852–5; William Mulligan, The Great War for Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 153–4, 156–9. 28 David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System,” A Working Peace System (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1966), 96. 29 Ibid., 98. 30 The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 23(e), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 20th_century/leagcov.asp#art23. 31 Kishor Uprety, The Transit Regime for Landlocked States: International Law and Development Perspectives (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 48–50; Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B42, http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/ serie_AB/AB_42/Trafic_ferroviaire_Avis_consultatif.pdf. 32 Frank Schipper, “Unravelling Hieroglyphs: Urban Traffic Signs and the League of Nations,” Métropoles 6 (2009), 77, 86–7. 33 Constantin Ardeleanu, “The European Commission of the Danube and the Results of Its Technical and Administrative Activity on the Safety of Navigation, 1856– 1914,” International Journal of Maritime History 23:1 (2011), 75–6; Christina Leb, Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 58–60.

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34 Walker D. Hines, League of Nations Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, Report on Rhine Navigation (Geneva, 1925); David Allen Pietz, “Engineering the State: The Huai River and Reconstruction in Nationalist China, 1927–37,” PhD Dissertation, Washington University, 1998, 118–24. 35 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 24–5; Anna-Katharina Wöbse, “Oil on Troubled Waters? Environmental Diplomacy in the League of Nations,” Diplomatic History 32:4 (2008), 522–3, 530–3. 36 Walter Lafeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 13–14, 19–24. 37 Waqar Zaidi, “ ‘Aviation Will either Destroy or Save Our Civilization’: Proposals for the International Control of Aviation, 1920–1945,” Journal of Contemporary History 46:1 (2011), 152; Hansard, HC Deb November 10, 1932, vol. 270, cc632. 38 Tony Mason, “British Air Power,” in John Andreas Olsen, ed., Global Air Power (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 7. 39 Priya Satia, “The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia,” The American Historical Review 111:1 (2006), 28–34; Zaidi, “Aviation Will either Destroy or Save Our Civilization,” 154–7; Robin Higham, Two Roads to War: The French and British Air Arms from Versailles to Dunkirk (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 58–82; Brett Hollman, The Next War in the Air: Britain’s Fear of the Bomber, 1908–1941 (London: Routledge, 2016). 40 David Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity (London: Wiley, 1992), 240–2. 41 David Mackenzie, ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 51–5; Liz Millward, Women in British Imperial Airspace, 1922–1937 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 85–6, 103, 108–9. 42 Simone M. Müller, “Beyond the Means of 99 Percent of the Population: Business Interests, State Intervention, and Submarine Telegraphy,” Journal of Policy History 27:3 (2015), 442–4, 452–7. See also Frank Schipper, “Access for All: Telegraph Reformers and Visions of Use, 1865–1914,” Comparativ: Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 21:6 (2011), 87–104. 43 Leonard Laborie, “George Valensi: Europe Calling?,” in Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, eds., Materializing Europe (London: Palgrave, 2010), 198–201. 44 Heidi Tworek, “The Saviour of the Nation? Regulating Radio in the Interwar Period,” The Journal of Policy History 27:3 (2015), 467–8. 45 Daniel Gorman, “Freedom of the Ether of the Electromagnetic Commons? Globality, the Public Interest, and Multilateral Radio Negotiations in the 1920s,” in Stephen Streeter, John Weaver, and William Coleman, eds., Empire and

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Experts, International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations (Geneva: League of Nations, 1927); Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the League of Nations,” Journal of Global History 7:2 (2012), 245–8. Michael Buckland, “On the Cultural and Intellectual Context of European Documentation in the Early Twentieth Century,” in W. Boyd Rayward, ed., European Modernism and the Information Society (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 47–9; Bertha von Suttner, Das Maschinenzeitalter [The Machine Age] (Dresden: E. Pierson, 1889); Jo-Anne Pemberton, “New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity,” Review of International Studies 28:2 (2011), 315–21. Irena Martínková, “Pierre de Coubertin’s Vision of the Role of Sport in Peaceful Internationalism,” Sport in Society 15:6 (2012), 788–91. Pierre de Coubertin, “Olympic Letter IV: Olympism as a State of Mind,” La Gazette de Lausanne, November 22, 1918 in Pierre de Coubertin, Olympism: Selected Writing (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2000), 548. Douglas A. Brown, “Pierre de Coubertin’s Olympic Exploration of Modernism, 1894–1914: Aesthetics, Ideology and the Spectacle,” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 67:2 (1996), 124–7. Barbara Keys, Globalizing Sport (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 46; Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 18–19. Nancy Fix Anderson, The Sporting Life: Victorian Sports and Games (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 67–86; Keys, Globalizing Sport, 122–4; Gertrud Pfister, “Colonialism and the Enactment of German Identity—Turnen in South West Africa,” Journal of Sport History 33:1 (2006), 77. Eugen Weber, “Gymnastics and Sport in Fin-de-Siecle France: Opium of the Classes?,” in Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin, and ‎Andrew Strenk, eds., Sport and International Relations (Champaign, IL: Stipes, 1978), 77–8; Amy Milne-Smith, “Queensberry’s Misrule: Reputation, Celebrity, and the Idea of the Victorian Gentleman,” Canadian Journal of History 48:2 (2013), 283–4. Keys, Globalizing Sport, 52–56, 61–2; Peter Beck, Scoring for Britain: International Football and International Politics, 1900–1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 56–60. Stefan Huebner, Pan-Asian Sports and the Emergence of Modern Asia, 1913–1974 (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2016), 17–54. India was represented by a single athlete, Norman Pritchard, at the 1900 Olympics, but he was of British heritage. Kenth Hansen, “The Birth of Swedish Ice Hockey—Antwerp 1920,” Citius, Altius, Fortius (renamed Journal of Olympic History in 1997) 4:2 (1996), 6–7.

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69 Åke Jönsson, “The Nordic Games: Precursor to the Olympic Winter Games,” Olympic Review 27:43 (2002), 64–5; Manitoba Free Press, April 27, 1927, 16. 70 Daniel S. Mason, “The International Hockey League and the Professionalization of Ice Hockey, 1904–1907,” Journal of Sport History 25:1 (1998), 4–7; Greg Gillespie, “Go Army! Beat RMC? The History of the United States Military Academy-Royal Military College of Canada Hockey Rivalry,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 17:1 (2000), 94; J. Andrew Ross, Joining the Clubs: The Business of the National Hockey League to 1945 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2015), chs. 3 and 4. 71 Mark Dyerson, “Imperial ‘Deep Play’: Reading Sport and Visions of the Five Empires of the ‘New World’, 1919–1941,” International Journal of the History of Sport 28:17 (2011), 2426–7. 72 Thomas W. Zeiler, Ambassadors in Pinstripes: The Spalding World Baseball Tour and the Birth of the American Empire (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 82–4, 98–105; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 73 Robert Peterson, Only the Ball Was White (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 60–2, 135–6; Rob Ruck, The Tropic of Baseball: Baseball in the Dominican Republic (Westport, CT: Meckler, 1991), 15–16. Professional American teams played exhibition series in Cuba and Mexico in the early twentieth century before the first commissioner of baseball, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, precluded World Series winners from barnstorming. See John J. Macaloon, Muscular Christianity and the Colonial and Post-colonial World (London: Routledge, 2013), 132–3, 136n. 30. 74 Zeiler, Ambassadors in Pinstripes, 188–9; James E. Elfers, The Tour to End All Tours: The Story of Major League Baseball’s 1913–1914 World Tour (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003); Ruck, Tropic of Baseball, 11–14, 18– 21; Sheldon Anderson, The Politics and Culture of Modern Sports (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 66–71. 75 J. A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986); Evelyne Combeau-Mari, “Sport in the French Colonies (1880–1962): A Case Study,” Journal of Sport History 33:1 (2006), 30–3; Bernadette Deville-Danthu, Le sport en noir et blanc, Du sport colonial au sport africain dans les anciens territoires français d’Afrique occidentale (1920–1965) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997). 76 George Orwell, “The Sporting Spirit” [1945], Essays (London: Penguin, 2000), 323; Patrick McDevitt, “Bodyline, Jardine and Masculinity,” in Anthony Bateman and Jeffrey Hill, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Cricket (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 70–84. 77 Combeau-Mari, “Sport in the French Colonies,” 36–41; Arnd Krüger, “The Unfinished Symphony: A History of the Olympic Games from Coubertin to

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Samaranch,” in Jim Riordan and Arnd Krüger, eds., The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century (London: E & FN Spon, 1999), 8; Jean Williams, A Contemporary History of Women’s Sport, Part One (London: Routledge, 2014), 156–9. 78 Pierre Arnaud, “Sport and International Relations before 1918,” in Pierre Arnaud and Jim Riordan, eds., Sport and International Relations (New York: E & FN Spon, 1998), 24–7.

7 Private International Cooperation and Governance by Experts 1 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162:3859 (1968), 1243–8. 2 Jay Winter, Dreams of Peace and Freedom: Utopian Moments in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 27–30. 3 Kirsten Ziomek, “The 1903 Human Pavilion: Colonial Realities and Subaltern Subjectivities in Twentieth-Century Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 73:2 (2014), 493–4, 498–501 (Fushine agreed to be exhibited in exchange for funding for Ainu schools); Bernhard Gissibl, “Cultures and Geographies of Imperialism in Germany,” in John MacKenzie, ed., European Empires and the People: Popular Responses to Imperialism in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Italy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 181–2; Daniel Stephen, The Empire of Progress: West Africans, Indians, and Britons at the British Empire Exhibition, 1924–25 (London: Palgrave, 2013), 98–100. 4 Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “When Did Globalisation Begin?,” European Review of Economic History 6:1 (2002), 23–50. 5 Michael D. Bordo, The Gold Standard and Related Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 171–5; Jeffry Frieden, Global Capitalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 16–21. 6 Guido Thiemeyer, “The ‘Force Profondes’ of Internationalism in the Late Nineteenth Century: Politics, Economy and Culture,” in Isabella Löhr and Roland Wenzlhuemer, eds., The Nation State and Beyond: Governing Globalization Processes in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Berlin: Springer, 2013), 32–6. 7 League of Nations, Report of the International Financial Conference (Boston, MA: League of Nations, 1920); Yann Decorzant, La Société des Nations et la naissance d’une conception de la régulation économique internationale (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2011), 21–6. 8 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 25–7, 42–5; Lucian Leuştean, “Economy and Foreign Relations in Europe in the Early Inter-war Period—the Case of Hungary’s Financial Reconstruction,”

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Notes Eastern Journal of European Studies 4:1 (2013), 48–53; Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 446–9. Robert Kudrle, “The OECD and the International Tax Regime: Persistence Pays Off,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 16:3 (2014), 202–3. Josephine and Everett Case, Owen D. Young and American Enterprise: A Biography (Boston, MA: David R. Godine, 1992), 436–8; Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931 (New York: Viking, 2014), 488–90; Frank Costigliola, “The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s,” Business History Review 50:4 (1976), 494–500. Gianni Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20–44; Madeliene Herren, “ ‘They Already Exist’: Don’t They? Conjuring Global Networks along the Flow of Money,” in Löhr and Wenzlhuemer, The Nation State and Beyond, 50–2; Kevin Ozgercin, “Seeing Like the BIS on Capital Rules,” in André Broome and Leonard Seabrooke, eds., Seeing Like an International Organisation (London: Routledge, 2014), 101–2. Charles Addis, “The Outlook for International Cooperation in Finance,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 14:2 (1931), 96–105; Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation, 56–8, 66–7, 200. Daniel Drezner, All Politics Is Global (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 138; Beth A. Simmons, “Why Innovate? Founding the Bank for International Settlements,” World Politics 45:3 (1993), 384–401. Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Mary Lambertine Fleddérus, ed., World Social Economic Planning: The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living (The Hague: International Industrial Relations Institute, 1932). P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914– 1990 (London: Longman, 1993), 73–4, 83–8; Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 104–19. Kiran Klaus Patel, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, MA: Beacon, 2001 [1944]), 148–9, 236–9, 252–6; Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Thomas Zeiler, Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). The scale of this international network can be appreciated through the database of individuals active in international governance from 1919 to 1946 found at the League of Nations Search Engine (LONSEA) (http://www.lonsea.de/pub).

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18 Craig Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 98–101. 19 Lewis L. Lorwin, Labor and Internationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1929). 20 Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 75. 21 Stanley R. Ross, “Daniel Cosío Villegas (1898–1976),” The Hispanic American Historical Review 57:1 (1977), 93–5. 22 Cecil Hermann Kisch, “Bank for International Settlements,” Spectator 146 (1931), 139–40. 23 Paul Einzig, The Destiny of Gold (London: Macmillan, 1972), 84; Christopher S. Chivvis, “Order and Freedom in the International Political Economy: The Development of the Political Economic Thought of Jacques Rueff, 1922–1972,” PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2003, 110–21. 24 Ranald C. Michie, “Reversal or Change? The Global Securities Market in the 20thCentury,” New Global Studies 2:1 (2008), 6. 25 Michie, “Reversal or Change?,” 5–10; Andrew Britton, Monetary Regimes of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 45–60; Taufiq Chaudhry, “Interdependence of Stock Markets: Evidence from Europe during the 1920s and 1930s,” Applied Financial Economics 6:3 (1996), 243–5. 26 A. Claire Cutler, “Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation,” in Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 26–31. 27 Stephen G. Rabe, “Marching Ahead (Slowly): The Historiography of InterAmerican Relations,” Diplomatic History 13:3 (1989), 311–12; Louisa Kilgroe, “The Iron Circle: J. P. Morgan and the International Banking Consortium for China, 1909–1922,” PhD Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1989. 28 Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964 [1897]), 111–29. 29 Craig Murphy, “Imperial Legacies in the UN Development Programme and the UN Development System,” in Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan, eds., Legacies of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 156. 30 Craig Murphy and JoAnne Yates, The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (New York: Routledge, 2009), 15–16; Thomas A. Loya and John Boli, “Standardization in the World Polity: Technical Rationality over Power,” in John Boli and George Thomas, eds., Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 172–3. 31 International Society of Typographic Designers, “History,” http://www.istd.org.uk/ about-istd/history.

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32 Thomas Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 52–3. 33 Brian Lewis, “So Clean”: Lord Leverhulme, Soap and Civilization (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 164–78; Jason Colby, The Business of Empire: United Fruit, Race, and U. S. Expansion in Central America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 119–38. 34 Pierre-Yves Donzé, “The International Patent System and the Global Flow of Technologies: The Case of Japan, 1880–1930,” in Christof Dejung and Niels P. Petersson, eds., The Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 201. 35 Christof Dejung and Niels P. Petersson, “Introduction,” in Dejung and Petersson, Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration, 14; Christof Dejung, “The Boundaries of Western Power,” in Dejung and Petersson, Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration, 152–3; David Lockwood, The Indian Bourgeoisie: A Political History of the Indian Capitalist Class in the Early Twentieth Century (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 44–5, 105–9. 36 Bob Reinalda, Routledge History of International Organizations (London: Routledge, 2009), 116–17; Gordon Boyce, “Network Structures, Processes and Dynamics: Inter-firm Cooperative Frameworks in the Shipping Industry,” in Lewis Fischer, ed., International Merchant Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (St. John’s, NL: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2008), 170–2. 37 Sir Colin Goad, “Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation,” November 1991, MS Eng. C. 1716, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. 38 F. S. L. Lyons, Internationalism in Europe, 1815–1914 (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1963), 115–16, 119–20; Johnston Birchall, The International Co-operative Movement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 36–45. 39 Stéphane Frioux, “Sanitizing the City: The Transnational Work and Networks of French Sanitary Engineers, 1890s–1930s,” in Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel, eds., Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s (New York: Berghahn, 2015); Stefan Couperus, “In Between ‘Vague Theory’ and ‘Sound Practical Lines,’” in Daniel Laqua, ed., Internationalism Reconfigured (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 74–5, 81–2; Couperus and Shane Ewen, “Intermunicipalism in Europe, c. 1924–1936: The Value of a Decentred, Interpretive Approach to Transnational Urban History,” in Nicholas Kenny and Rebecca Madgin, eds., Cities beyond Borders (London: Routledge, 2016), 155–9. 40 Saskia Sassen, “The Global City: Introducing a Concept,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11:2 (2005), 27–43.

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41 Davide Rodogno et al., “Introduction,” in Rodogno et al., Shaping the Transnational Sphere, 5–6; Margaret Keck and Kathyrn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 3. 42 Julia Moses, “Workplace Accidents at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” in Rodogno et al., Shaping the Transnational Sphere, 66–77. 43 David Petruccelli, “Banknotes from the Underground: Counterfeiting and the International Order in Interwar Europe,” Journal of Contemporary History 51:3 (2016), 510–13, 525–7; Paul Knepper, International Crime in the 20th Century: The League of Nations Era, 1919–1925 (London: Palgrave, 2011), 73–5. 44 Mathieu Deflem, “The Logic of Nazification: The Case of the International Criminal Police Commission (‘Interpol’),” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43:1 (2002), 21–44. 45 Geert Somsen, “A History of Universalism: Conceptions of the Internationality of Science from the Enlightenment to the Cold War,” Minerva 46:3 (2008), 365–6, 368; W. Torge, “The International Association of Geodesy 1862–1922: From a Regional Project to an International Organisation,” Journal of Geodesy 78:9 (2005), 564. 46 Heather Ellis, “National and Transnational Space: Academic Networks and Scholarly Transfer between Britain and Germany in the Nineteenth Century,” in Löhr and Wenzlhuemer, The Nation State and Beyond, 139–40. 47 Waqar Zaidi, “Liberal Internationalist Approaches to Science and Technology in Interwar Britain and the United States,” in Laqua, Internationalism Reconfigured, 22–3; Joanne Pemberton, “New Worlds for Old: the League of Nations in the Age of Electricity,” Review of International Studies 28:2 (2002), 315–16. 48 Joachim Hŏpfner, “The International Latitude Service—a Historical Review, from the Beginning to Its Foundation in 1899 and the Period until 1922,” Surveys in Geophysics 21:5 (2000), 522–3; Elisabeth van Meer, “The Transatlantic Pursuit of a World Engineering Federation,” Technology & Culture 53:1 (2012), 120–1, 124–38; Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), 82–4. 49 Roy Macleod and Philip F. Rehbock, “Developing a Sense of the Pacific: The 1923 Pan-Pacific Science Congress in Australia,” Pacific Science 54:3 (2000), 210–11, 218–19. 50 Luisa Bonolis, “International Scientific Cooperation during the 1930s: Bruno Rossi and the Development of the Status of Cosmic Rays into a Branch of Physics,” Annals of Science 71:3 (2014), 356–8; Lillian Hoddeson, “Establishing KEK in Japan and Fermilab in the US: Internationalism, Nationalism and High Energy Accelerators,” Social Studies of Science 13:1 (1983), 4–5. 51 Geert Somsen, “Universalism in Action: Ideals and Practices of International Scientific Cooperation,” European Studies 32:1 (2014), 124, 127, 132–4.

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52 Paul Forman, “Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Environment,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 3 (1971), 1–115. 53 Michael Eckert, “Strategic Internationalism and the Transfer of Technical Knowledge,” Technology & Culture 46:1 (2005), 105–6, 126. 54 Laura Puffer Morgan, A Possible Technique of Disarmament Control (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 12. 55 Warren F. Kuehl and Lynne Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 133; Ellen Newbold La Motte, The Ethics of Opium (New York: Century, 1924). 56 Cornelia Knab and Amalia Ribi Forclaz, “Transnational Co-operation in Food, Agriculture, Environment and Health in Historical Perspective: Introduction,” Contemporary European History 20:3 (2011), 251–2. 57 Amy Staples, The Birth of Development (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006), 69–70. 58 Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985); Inter-Allied Food Council: Food Controllers Conference, July 1918, The National Archives, Kew, MAF (Records created or inherited by the Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Departments, and related bodies) 60/58/b. 59 Sunil Amrith and Patricia Clavin, “Feeding the World: Connecting Europe and Asia, 1930–1945,” Past & Present Supplement 8 (2013), 29–50. 60 Nutrition—Final Report of the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations on the Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture and Economic Policy (Geneva: League of Nations, 1937), 82–96, 185–203. 61 Margherita Zanasi, “Exporting Development: The League of Nations and Republican China,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 49:1 (2007), 144. 62 Ibid., 157–60, 162–4; Joseph Hodge, “Science, Development, and Empire: The Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture and Animal Health, 1929–1943,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30:1 (2002), 1–26; Cláudia Castelo, “Developing ‘Portuguese Africa’ in Late Colonialism: Confronting Discourses,” in Joseph Hodge, Gerald Hödl, and Martina Kopf, eds., Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 65–6. 63 Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade, and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty’s Dominions, 1917, Cd. 8462. 64 Amalia Ribi Forclaz, “Agriculture, American Expertise, and the Quest for Global Data: Leon Estabrook and the First World Agricultural Census of 1930,” Journal

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of Global History 11:1 (2016), 50–1, 59–62; David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 36–9. Ruth Jachertz and Alexander Nützenadel, “Coping with Hunger? Visions of a Global Food System, 1930–1960,” Journal of Global History 6:1 (2011), 101, 103–5; Ribi Forclaz, “A New Target for International Social Reform: The International Labour Organization and Working and Living Conditions in Agriculture in the Inter-war Years,” Contemporary European History 20:3 (2011), 315–20, 325. Edwin Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965 [1842]); Socrates Litsios, “Charles Dickens and the Movement for Sanitary Reform,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46:2 (2003), 186, 190–1; E. P. Hennock, “The Urban Sanitary Movement in England and Germany, 1838–1914: A Comparison,” Continuity and Change 15:2 (2000), 269–96. Protocoles et Procès-verbaux de la Conférence sanitaire international de Venise inaugurée le 5 janvier 1892 (Rome, 1892), http://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/ drs:8135828$12i. Valeska Huber, “The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851–1894,” The Historical Journal 49:2 (2006), 473–4. “Quarantine Regulations of Airships against Yellow Fever: Report of the President of the Commission on Yellow Fever at the Meeting of the Permanent Committee of the International Office of Public Hygiene, May, 1930,” Public Health Reports 45:26 (1930), 1457–9. Anne-Emanuelle Birn, “The Stages of International (Global) Health: Histories of Success or Successes of History?,” Global Public Health 4:1 (2009), 54–5. David Fidler, “The Globalization of Public Health: The First 100 Years of International Health Diplomacy,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 79:9 (2001), 843–6. Johan Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform [The State as a Living Form] (Leipzig: University Press, 1917). Leo van Bergen, “Military Medicine,” in Jay Winter, ed., The First World War, Vol. 3: Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 301. Hew Strachan, The Outbreak of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 138. W. G. Macpherson, History of the Great War: Medical Services General History, Vol. 4 (London, 1924), 494–5. Mark Humphries, The Last Plague: Spanish Influenza and the Politics of Public Health in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 142–8;

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Notes Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122–40; Barton C. Hacker, “White Man’s War, Coloured Man’s Labour: Working for the British Army on the Western Front,” Itinerario 38:3 (2014), 29–33. Paul Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, 1890–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 139–71; M. A. Balinska, “Assistance and Not Mere Relief: The Epidemic Commission of the League of Nations, 1920–1923,” in Paul Weindling, ed., International Health Organizations and Movements, 1918–1939 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 81–108; Theodore M. Brown and Elizabeth Fee, “Ludwik Rajchman (1881–1965): World Leader in Social Medicine and Director of the League of Nations Health Organization,” American Journal of Public Health 104:9 (2014), 1638–9. Christian Bonah, “Packaging BCG: Standardizing an Anti-tuberculosis Vaccine in Interwar Europe,” Science in Context 21:2 (2008), 295–9. Socrates Litsios, “Selskar Gunn and China: The Rockefeller Foundation’s ‘Other’ Approach to Public Health,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 79:2 (2005), 296–303. Steven Palmer, Launching Global Health: The Caribbean Odyssey of the Rockefeller Foundation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010); Nancy Leys Stepan, “The National and the International in Public Health: Carlos Chagas and the Rockefeller Foundation in Brazil, 1917–1930s,” Hispanic American Historical Review 91:3 (2011), 469–502; John Farley, To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913–1951) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Christian Bréchot, “The Institut Pasteur International Network: A Century-Old Global Public Health Powerhouse,” The Lancet 387:10034 (2016), 2181; Simon Flexner, “Hideyo Noguchi,” Science 69:1800 (1929), 657–60. Anne Sealey, “Globalizing the 1926 International Sanitary Convention,” Journal of Global History 6:3 (2011), 433, 438; Paul Weindling, “The League of Nations Health Organization and the Rise of Latin American Participation, 1920–40,” História, Ciências, Saúde—Manguinhos 13:3 (2006), 2–5, 9. Stephen Legg, Prostitution and the Ends of Empire: Scale, Governmentalities, and Interwar India (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race, and Politics (London: Routledge, 2003). Bernd Holdorff, “Salomon Henschen’s Short-Lived Project of an ‘Academia Neurologica Internationalis,’ ” Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 20:2 (2011), 97–104. Alison Bashford, Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 81–97.

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86 Doris H. Lindor, Crusader for Sex Education: Elise Ottesen-Jensen (1886–1973) in Scandinavia and on the International Scene (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 79–83, 188–93; Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 51–4. 87 Alexandra Minna Stern and Howard Markel, “International Efforts to Control Infectious Diseases, 1851 to the Present,” The Journal of the American Medical Association 292:12 (2004), 1476. 88 Marius Turda, “Race, Science, and Eugenics in the Twentieth Century,” in Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 62–79. 89 Gary Bruce, “The Berlin Zoo,” Unpublished manuscript, ch. 3, 13–17; Cornelia Knab, “Infectious Rats and Dangerous Cows: Transnational Perspectives on Animal Diseases in the First Half of the Twentieth Century,” Contemporary European History 20:3 (2011), 295–8.

Conclusion 1 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 32–5, 45–6. 2 Dominic Sachsenmaier, Global Perspectives on Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 95–103. 3 “Staff of the Secretariat: Report Presented by the British Representative, Mr. A. J. Balfour,” League of Nations Official Journal 1 (1920), 137–8. 4 Frédéric Mégret, “What Is ‘International Impartiality’?,” in Vesselin Popovski, ed., International Rule of Law and Professional Ethics (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 104–6. 5 Klaas Dykmann, “How International Was the Secretariat of the League of Nations,” International History Review 37:4 (2015), 726, 728, 733–6.

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Index Abdul Hamic II, Sultan (Ottoman Empire) 105 Aberstywyth University 52–3 abolition movement 71, 97, 98, 101, 102 Abyssinia 70, 102 academic cooperation 40–2, 44–9, 194 Academy of International Law (The Hague) 50–1, 53 Ackermann, Jessie 140–1 Addams, Jane 137, 138, 141, 148, 151 Addis, Charles 186 Ador, Gustave 114–15 AFL 132 Africa. See also South African War; specific countries Berlin Conference (1884–5) 76, 99, 169 colonial wars 28, 78 First World War 28–9 imperial federation visions in 19–20 international time 159 multinational corporations 191 pan-Africanism 28–2, 130 riverine trade and navigation 169 slavery in 98, 102 treaty-making 70 African Americans 29, 32, 179–80 African Blood Brotherhood (ABB) 32 African National Congress 149 agriculture 197–9 aid. See also specific countries Armenian 104–8, 115 emergency 99, 100, 112, 116, 199 feminization of 118 imperial 97, 117–19 medical 109–10, 111–12, 118, 148–9, 204 recipients 100–1, 117 voluntary 109–17 air transportation 161, 170–1, 196, 200 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din 25 Åland Islands dispute 86, 153 alchemical humanitarianism 100 alcohol trade 201

Alexander I, King (Yugoslavia) 93 Alexander II, Czar (Russia) 134 All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 133 Allen, Devere 151 Allied Maritime Transport Council (AMTC) 164–5 Allied powers. See also Supreme War Council food production 197–8 Greek-Turk war and 108 international law 81, 92 medical corps 201 technical cooperation 164–5, 167 All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) 133 All India Women’s Conference 141 al-Shaybani, Muhammad 72 al-Siyar 72 Álvarez, Alejandro 63, 79 amateur sport 177, 181 American Association for International Conciliation 61 American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief 106 American Federation of Labor (AFL) 132 American Red Cross 99, 100, 111 American Relief Administration (ARA) 100, 114 American Service Committee 110 Amritsar massacre 26 anarchists 128, 134–5 anarcho-syndicalists 134 Anatolia 105, 108 Angell, Norman 12, 46, 151, 154, 163 animals 205 anticolonialism and anti-imperlialism. See also colonial nationalists in Indian Ocean world 20 internationalism of 5, 25–8, 29–32, 36–7, 45 international law and 69–70, 79

320

320 international networks 5, 8, 27, 30, 209 race and 30 Russian Revolution and 25–6, 27, 128 women’s movement and 138, 140 anti-imperialism. See anticolonialism and anti-imperialism Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society 102 antinarcotics reform 120–1, 193, 196–7 Arabs 35 arbitration 78–9, 145, 153 Argentina 149 Armenian aid 104–8, 115 Arnoldson, Klas Pontus 150 artificial languages 42–3 Asia. See also specific countries Comintern in 130 empires of 8–9 global trade 191 international conferences 76 international labor solidarity 132–3 international sport 178 journalism 175 spirituality 40 women’s movement 138–9, 141 Asiatic Labour Congress (1934–7) 133 assassinations 134–5 Asser, Tobias 152 Atlantic world order visions 20. See also transatlantic cooperation Australia 34–5, 54, 97, 132–3, 177 Australian Institute of International Affairs 54 Austria 53, 85, 165, 185 autarky 166–7, 187 aviation 161, 170–1, 196, 200 Avierno, Alexandra 141 Azariah, Vedanayagam Samuel 122 Bajer, Fredrik and Mathilde 150 Bakunin, Mikael 128 balance of power 7, 17, 70–1 Balck, Viktor Gustav 178 Balkan Wars 50, 51, 102, 128 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 186–7 banking 185, 186–7, 189–90, 193 Barcelona Statute 168 Barton, Clara 99 baseball 179, 180

Index Basic English 43 Beernaert, August Marie François 152 Belgium 76, 98–9, 118 Bello, Andrés 62 Bentham, Jeremy 75 Bergson, Henri 40, 61 Berlin-Baghdad Railway 166 Berlin Conference (1884–5) 76, 99, 169 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) 162, 190 Bernstein, Eduard 131 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald 166 biomedical research institutes 203 birth control 204 Bismark, Otto von 7, 76 Black internationalism 28–33 Blue, Rupert 200 bodyline incident 180 Bolívar, Simón 63, 79 Bolivia 63, 78, 87, 149 Bolsheviks 128, 129–30, 142 Bon, Ann Fraser 34 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich 123 Boulter, Veronica 61 Bourdin, Martial 159 Bourgeois, Léon 153 Boutmy, Emile 55 Boxer Rebellion 70–1, 173 Brändström, Elsa 111 Branting, Karl Hjalmar 153 Braudel, Fernand 16 Brauer, Max 198 Brazil 62–3, 83 Bretton Woods negotiations 187 Briand, Aristide 154 Britain. See also South African War airpower 170 anarchist threat and 135 colonial violence 26, 35, 77, 78 commissions of inquiry 91 and Congo Free State 98–9 economic blocs 166, 187 ethnological exhibitions 184 Gold Standard 187 imperial federation 19–20 imperial humanitarianism 118–19 imperialism 10, 21, 35, 203 international law and 78, 79, 91 international relations programs 52–3

Index international sport 177, 178, 180 labor movement 131–2, 133 metric system 159–60 opium trade 120–1 submarine cable networks 174 teacher exchanges 58–9 treaty-making 69–70 wartime cooperation 164–5 workers associations 131 British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA) 53–4, 61 British League of Nations Union (LNU) 49, 53, 154 Brittain, Vera 48, 110 Bruce, Stanley 198 Brussels Act (1890) 71 Brussels Financial Conference (1920) 185–6 Bryce, James 64 Buddhism 72, 121 Buell, Raymond Leslie 52 Buisson, Ferdinand 150–1 Bulgaria 50, 68, 93. See also Balkan Wars Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (BIPM) 159–60, 190 Bureau International Humanitaire Zoophile 205 Bureau international permanent de la Paix 147 Bureau International pour la Défense des Indigènes 102 business associations 192 Butler, Nicholas Murray 57, 59, 151 Buxton, Dorothy 115 Canada 97, 110, 178, 179 Canadian Institute of International Affairs 54 capitulation treaties 72, 109 Carnegie, Andrew 49–50, 51, 123 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) 49–51, 52, 55, 61 Carr, E. H. 53, 154 cartels 191–2 Catholic Church 124 Catlin, George 20 Cecil, Lord Robert 47, 82, 120–1, 154 Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) 79 Central American Union 79

321

central bank cooperation 185, 186–7 Central Office of International Associations 163 Central powers 112, 165–7, 185, 194, 196. See also specific countries Cérésole, Pierre 114 Césaire, Aimé 29 Chaco War (1932–5) 63, 87 Chadwick, Edwin 200 Chamberlain, Austen (British prime minister) 154 Charles, Prince (Sweden) 111 Charter Oath (1868) 8 Chatham House. See Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) child labor 140 children 114–16 China Boxer Rebellion 70–1 development projects 198 Esperanto in 43 European extraterritorial rights 21–2, 73 global trade 191 influenza pandemic (1918–20) 201–2 international affairs scholarship 48 international aid 99, 116–17, 202 internationalism 8 international law and 73–5 Japanese invasion of Manchuria 89–90 journalism 175 League of Nations and 89–90 metric system 160 modernization 22, 50, 73–4, 89 nationalism 22–3, 40, 43 Open Door Policy 89 opium trade 120 public health 202 revolutionary nationalism 40 riverine trade and navigation 169 trade unions 133 women’s movement 140 world order visions 21–3 China-Peru Convention (1874) 74 Chinese Communist Party 61–2, 133 Chinese Red Cross Society 116 Chinese Revolution 22, 74 Christianity 6, 117, 120, 121–5, 140 Churchill, Winston 78, 170 Church Peace Union 123 cities 192

32

322 “civilization,” concept of 68–9, 99, 101–2, 180 civil society 2, 127, 154, 209–10 Cixi, Empress Dowager (China) 74 class divisions 27, 129, 135, 140–1, 142 codification of international law 87–8 Colonial Development Act (1929) 119 colonialism. See also Congo Free State; South African War colonial soldiers 26, 28 “communist threat” and 130 concept of “civilization” and 68–9 cooperation 117 development projects 198 ethnological exhibitions 184 international conferences and 76 international law and 68 labor under 98–9, 101–2, 133 public health 203 colonial nationalists. See also specific individuals and countries challenges to imperialism 16, 36, 118 internationism of 5, 25, 27–8, 129 Comintern 21, 30, 129–30 commercial airlines 170–1 Commission for Communication and Transit (CCT) 168–9 Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) 100, 118 Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement (1914) 164 commissions of inquiry 50, 79, 80, 87, 91 Committee for Relief in Belgium (CRB) 118 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) 25, 104, 105, 166 Committee on Technical Cooperation (CTC) 198, 202 communication 171–3 communism 21, 23, 30, 45, 127–30, 134 Confederación Nacional de Trabajo (Spain) 133 Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration 87 Conference on African Peoples, Democracy and World Peace 33 Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments (1921–2) 144 Confucian Long Peace 73 Congo Free State 76, 98–9, 118, 152

Index Congo Reform Association 98–9 Congress system 7–8, 17, 67–8, 97–8 Connelly, James 133 Conrad, Joseph 99, 135 conscientious objectors 110 conservation 169, 205 Consular Academy of Vienna 53 consumer organizations 192 contact zones 39, 51, 61, 64, 208 Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations 108 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs (1931) 121, 196–7 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937) 93–4 Convention Relating to International Air Navigation (1919) 171 Coolidge, Calvin (US president) 144 Cooper, William 34–5 Coubertin, Pierre de 3, 176, 181 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 51–2, 54 counterfeiting 193 Courdin, Martial 134 Court of Arbitral Justice (CAJ) 83 Crete 105 cricket 177, 180 criminal law 92–4 Croatia 93 Crowdy, Rachel 110, 119, 209 Cuba 62, 68, 99, 153, 180 cultural cooperation 12, 173–81 currency regimes 184–5 Curtis, Lionel 19 customary international law 85 customs unions 166 Cyprus 93 Czech nationalism 195 Damascus affair (1840) 98 Danube River Commission 169 Darwinism, social 22, 44, 116, 205 Dawes, Charles Gates 154, 186 Dawes Plan (1924) 154, 186, 187 Democratic Party 132 Deng Xioping 22 Denmark 83, 150 Depression, the 187 Der Zoologische Garten 205

Index Deskaheh 35 d'Estournelles de Constant, Paul 153 Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft 143, 149, 150 Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) 53, 54–5 development projects 189, 198 dharma 72 Dickens, Charles 200 diplomacy 56, 59–60, 64, 77, 100 disarmament movement 144–5, 196–7 diseases 200–3 displaced people. See refugees Dogger Bank dispute 91 Dominican Republic 109 Douwes Dekker, E. (Mutatuli) 118–19 Drago, Luis María 79 Drago Doctrine 79 Dragoni, Carlo 198 drugs. See antinarcotics reform Du Bois, W. E. B. 29, 32 Ducommun, Élie 150 Dunant, Henri 148, 149 Dupont 191 Durkheim, Emile 55, 189–90 Dutch East Indies 10, 119, 171 East, Edward 204 École coloniale supérieure (Belgium) 118 economic blocs 166–7 economic cooperation 183–7 ecumenical movement 97, 122–3 education 57–9 Egypt 27, 35, 41, 98, 178 emergency relief 100, 112, 116, 199 empiricism 158–9 engineers 190, 195 English language 19, 20, 43, 141, 205–6, 208. See also language Enver Pasha 166 environmentalism 45, 169, 197, 201 Epidemic Commission 202 epistemic communities 157, 188, 192–3, 205, 206 Equal Rights Treaty (1933) 139 Esperanto 42–3 Estado Novo 198–9 Ethiopia 32, 89, 102 ethnic cleansing 93, 108, 124 ethnic nationalism 18, 75 ethnological exhibitions 184

eugenics movement 204, 205 Eurocentrism 3–4, 63, 65, 177–8, 209 European Union 18–19, 166, 195 Évian conference 109 exchange programs 58–9 exhibitions 183–4 experts 12, 185, 188, 189, 205 exploration 9 extradition treaties 93 extraterritoriality 21–2, 72, 73 Faith and Order movement 123, 124 famines 99, 103, 112 Far Eastern Bureau 130 Farmborough, Florence 111 fascism 7, 114, 193 Fascist International Congress 7 federalism, regional and world 18–20, 167, 195 Fédération Internationale Football Association (FIFA) 177–8 Female Mission Workers 107–8 feminists 107, 135–42, 148–9, 150, 204 Fernando, Anthony Martin 34 FIFA 177–8 financial cooperation 184–7 Finland 86, 153 First International (1864–76) 128 First World Agricultural Census 199 First World War casualties 81 demise of prewar empires and 17–18 food production 197–8 global financial crisis 189 humanitarian aid 124–5 impact on diplomacy 60 impact on individuals 1, 4–5, 28–9 international affairs scholarship 46 international cooperation 8, 26–7, 36, 163–71 internationalism of 1 international law and 76, 80–2 maritime blockade 164 medical services 109–10, 111, 201 Nobel Peace Prize and 147–8 pacifists 143–4, 154 reconstruction 114, 185, 188 refugees 102–3, 104 reparations 81, 185, 186, 187 socialist opposition to 128

323

324

324

Index

socialists and 133–4 soldiers and veterans 26, 28, 112–14, 201 war crimes prosecution 92–3 women’s movement and 137 flu pandemic (1918–20) 201–2 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 198, 199 food security 197–9 football 177–8 forced labor 97, 98–9, 101–2, 152 Forced Labor Convention (1930) 101 Ford Foundation 49–50 Foreign Affairs 51–2 foreign policy 50, 51, 54, 59–60, 60–1 Foreign Policy Association 52 Fosdick, Raymond D. 56 Fourth World 35 France airpower 170 economic protectionism 187 ethnological exhibitions 184 humanitarian intervention by 98 League of Nations and 47–8 “maternalist” social welfare 139 metric system 159–60 mise en valour 119 pacifists in 143 PCIJ and 85–6 study of international affairs 55 syndicalists 133–4 trade unions 130–1 wartime cooperation 164–5 Franco-German rapprochement 150, 153, 154 Frangulis, Antoine 188 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke 17, 135 Fraser, Leon 187 Free City of Danzig 85 free trade 88, 166–7, 185, 187, 207 Fried, Alfred 151 Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU) 110 functional cooperation 6, 12, 157–81, 183–206, 195 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 26, 36, 40, 118 García Lorca, Federico 42 Garvey, Marcus 30–1 Gauntlett, Tsune Yamada 137, 141 Gazaland 78

gender 120, 148, 196–7, 203, 204–5, 209. See also women; women’s movement Geneva 53, 188 Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906) 148 Geneva Disarmament Conference (1932– 4) 144, 196 Genoa Conference (1922) 185 geodetic cooperation 194–5 geopolitics 9, 45–6, 204 Georgetown University 52 German-Austrian customs union (1931) 85 German Orient Mission 107 Germany colonial empire of 18, 76 disarmament and 144 ethnological exhibitions 184 fascist internationalism and 7 international affairs institutes 54–5 international sport 176–7 liberal internationalism and 55 under maritime blockade 164 Mittleeuropa 18 Nazi regime 7, 42, 55, 151, 193, 204 PCA and 79, 84–5 reparations 81, 185, 186, 187 research universities 194 submarine cable networks 174 Telefunken 174–5 trade unions 130–1 violations of international law 81–2 war crimes 92–3 wartime cooperation 165–6 wartime medical services 201 Weimar Republic 93, 186, 196 Ghadar Party (India) 27 Gide, André 48 Gilbert, S. Parker 187 Gleichen, Helena 111 global common issues 183–206 globalization 4, 5, 6, 10, 207 global law. See international law Gobat, Charles Albert 149, 150 Gold Standard 184, 187 governance economic and financial 185, 188–90 municipal 192 private 12 regional and world 18–20, 162–3 sport 178

Index technical regimes 6, 161, 168–9, 172, 190–3 graphic design 190 Great Britain. See Britain Great Depression, the 187 Great Kanto Earthquake 112 Greece 93, 98, 108–9. See also Balkan Wars Greek-Turk population exchange 108–9 Greenland dispute 83 Greenwich 134, 159, 194 Grotius, Hugo 77 guild socialism 132 Guojifa (public international law) 74 Guomindang 40, 133, 160, 172–3 Habsburg Empire 17–18, 166 Hague Conferences 76–80, 145 commissions of inquiry 91 Hamada, Nour 138 Harada Tasuku 122 Hard, William 56–7 harmonization 152, 160, 161, 168, 171, 177 Harris, John 102 Hawai’i 141 Haymarket riot 134 health conferences 200 Heaton, John Henniker 171 Hemingway, Ernest 111 Henderson, Arthur 154 Herrero and Nama 76 High Commission for Refugees 103 historical associations 41 Hobhouse, Emily 118 Ho Chi Minh 28 hockey 178–9 Honda Yoitsu 122 Hoover, Herbert 100, 199 Horthy, Admiral Miklós 18 humanitarian activism 11–12, 71, 97–125 human rights 33, 40, 42, 94, 138, 188 human zoos 184 Hungary 18, 185, 193 ice hockey 178–9 idealism 46–7, 61, 154, 162–3 ideas, international diffusion of 9–10, 15–16 Ido 43 imperial federations 19–20 imperial humanitarianism 97, 117–19

325

imperialism. See also specific countries balance of power and 70–1 the Comintern and 130 communication networks 174 critiques of 45 development of 4, 10, 23, 73–4 internationalism and 5, 7–8, 36, 65 international law and 69 international sport and 180 multinational corporations and 191 Imperial War Relief Fund 118 India antiterrorism legislation 94 Britain in 10, 26, 120 campaign against traffic in women and children 140 colonial soldiers 26, 28 global trade 191 internationalism in 20–1, 25–7 international sport 178 labor movement 132, 133 and League against Imperialism 30 nationalist movements 21, 25, 27 women’s movement 141 youth organizations 58 Indian-Irish Independence League 21, 27 Indian Ocean world order visions 20–1 indigenous peoples 33–5, 69–70, 97, 184 individual rights 68, 80, 94 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 134 infectious diseases 200–3 influenza pandemic (1918–20) 201–2 information sharing 94, 185, 188, 201, 206 Institut Colonial International (ICI) 117 Institut de droit international 78, 87, 146 Institute of Advanced Study (IAS) 52 Institute of International Education 59 Institute of International Law 78, 87, 146 Institute of International Research 56 Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 55–6 Institute of Politics (Williamstown, MA) 52 Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) 54–5 Institut Pasteur 203 institutionalization of cooperation 6, 100–1, 160, 200–1 intellectual cooperation 21, 39–42 intellectual history 15–16 intellectual property 161–2, 191

326

326

Index

Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance (IACWPF) 165 interdependence 46–7, 54, 192 international affairs. See international relations, study of International African Friends of Ethiopia 32 International African Service Bureau (IASB) 32–3 International Association for the Promotion of Child Welfare 115 International Association of Academies 41, 194 international civil service 56, 65 International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) 170, 171 International Committee of Historical Sciences (ICHS) 41 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 89, 93, 111–12, 116, 147–8. See also Red Cross and Red Crescent societies International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) 39–40 International Conference of American States 62, 79 international conferences 76–80 International Conferences for the Unification of Criminal Law 93 International Congress of Women (1915) 137 International Congress on Accidents at Work (ICAW) 193 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1914) 192 International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) 195–6 International Council of Women (ICW) 80, 115–16, 135–6 international courts 79, 80, 94. See also Permanent Court of Arbitration; Permanent Court of International Justice International Criminal Court 94 International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) 193. See also Interpol International Electrotechnical Commission 190 International Federation of League of Nations Societies (IFLNS) 53

International Federation of National Standards Associations (ISA) 190 International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) 102, 132 International Federation of University Women 59 International Historical Congress 41 International Ice Hockey Federation 178 International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) 197–8, 199 International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) 39–40, 53 international knowledge, production of 39–65, 64 International Labour Organization (ILO) 101–2, 133, 199, 201, 208 international law 11, 57, 67–95. See also Carnegie Endowment for International Peace codification 87–8 limitations of 88–92 peace movement and 145, 146, 151–2 Third World Approaches 70 International Law Association 87, 92–3 International Maritime Committee (1897) 191–2 International Missionary Conference (IMC) 122–3 International Neo-Malthusians Conference 204 International Office of Public Hygiene (1907) 201 International Olympic Committee (IOC) 176, 178. See also Olympic Games international order visions. See world order visions International Peace Bureau (IPB) 149, 150 International Peace Congresses 78 International Peace Mission movement 31 International Planned Parenthood Foundation 204 International Radiotelegraph Union (IRU) 172 international relations, study of 44–57, 64–5, 139, 158 International Research Council 41 International Sanitary Conventions (1903, 1926) 201, 202 International School of Geneva 57–8

Index International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centres (ISNTUC) 130–1, 132 International Socialist Bureau (ISB) 128 International Society of Typographic Designers 190 International Studies Conference (ISC) 53 International Telecommunication Union 172 International Telegraph Union (ITU) 160–1, 171–2 International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers 130 International Union of Directors of Zoological Gardens 205 International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) 192 International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) 136–7, 141 International Women’s Union 136 International Workers’ Association 134 International Workingmen’s Association. See First International Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 29, 145, 149–50 Interpol 94, 193 intervention 67–8, 95, 97–102, 100, 105, 117 Ireland 21, 27, 133 Isis 194 Islam 6, 25, 72 İsmet İnönü 109 Italy 72, 114, 131, 133–4, 144 Jacobsson, Per 186 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig 176–7 Japan baseball 180 black internationalism and 32–3 disarmament and 144 Esperanto in 43 ethnological exhibitions 184 feminists 136 global trade 191 high-energy acceleration research 195 imperialism 24, 49, 89–90, 136 Institute of Pacific Relations and 56 intellectual cooperation 40 international affairs scholarship 48–9 internationalism 8, 49 internationalized education 58

327

modernization 24, 43, 48, 89 occupation of Manchuria 89–90 opium trade 120 Red Cross Society 112 submarine cable networks 174 technology transfer 191 trade unions 133 war with Russia 8, 23, 24, 80 westernization 40 world order visions 23–4 Jaszi, Oscar 18 Jebb, Eglantyne 115–16 Jensen, Jens 131 Jeppe, Karen 107 Jews 6, 98, 109 jihad 24–5, 26, 72 Johnson, Pauline 34 Johnston, Amy 171 journalism 17, 151. See also press cooperation Joyce, James 1, 13 July crisis 17 Kagawa Toyohiko 132 Kalifat movement 26–7 Kang Youwei 48 Kellogg, Frank 154 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) 88–9, 144, 154 Kenya 33 Kerr, Philip (Lord Lothian) 19, 52 Keynes, John Maynard 81, 185, 188 King Crane Commission 165 Kirti Kisan Party (India) 27 Kisch, Cecil Hermann 188 Koestler, Arthur 42 Kollontai, Alexandra 139, 142 Korea 28, 73–4, 122 Kubushiro, Ochimi 137 Kuehl, Warren 5 Kuhn, Albert 145 Kut, siege of 26 kyōyō (self-cultivation) 58 labor internationalism 127–8, 130–4, 188 labor unions 127–8, 130–2 La Fontaine, Henri 44, 150 La Motte, Ellen Newbold 197 Lang, Fritz 157 Lange, Christian 153

328

328

Index

language 42–4, 206, 208, 209. See also English language Latin America. See also specific countries communism 129–30 international sport 179, 180 international time 159 interstate wars 63, 78, 87 League of Nations and 63, 87 pan-Americanism 62–3, 79, 87 riverine trade and navigation 169 US relations with 62, 63, 71, 153, 191 women’s rights 137, 139 Latin-American Student Conference 63 Latin Monetary Union (LMU) 184–5 League against Imperialism (LAI) 30 League of Coloured Peoples 33 League of Nations antiterrorism legislation 93–4 Armenian aid 115 Brazil and 63 Brussels Financial Conference (1920) 185–6 collective security 88 colonialism and 209 communications 175 critiques of 31 development projects 198 environmental protection 169 France and 47–8 humanitarian activism and 101–4, 106– 7, 115, 119–20, 140, 193 indigenous peoples and 34–5 intellectual cooperation and 39–40 international law and 86–8 language of 208 Latin America and 63 liberal internationalists and 47 mandates system 107, 141 Mixed Committee on Nutrition 198, 199 narcotics 121, 193, 196–7 national minority groups 34, 86, 91, 98 nation-states and 167 Nobel Peace Prize and 153 political ideologies and 47–8 postwar reconstruction 114 public health 118, 202 scientific management 175–6 Secretariat staff 209 self-determination and 86

transportation regulation 167–8 Turkey and 109 women and 136, 138–9, 140, 209 League of Nations Health Office (LNHO) 118, 202 League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) 112 Leavitt, Mary Clement 140–1 legal cooperation 75–80 Lenin, V. I. 17, 36, 45, 128–9, 142 Leopold, King II (Belgium) 76, 98–9 Leopold II, King (Belgium) 152 Leticia War (1932) 63, 87 Lever 191 Liaison Committee of International Women’s Organisations (LCIWO) 138 Liang Qichao 22 Liberal and Socialist International 132 liberal internationalism ecumenical movement and 124 Germany and 55 international law and 76, 82 international organization and 46–7 Japan and 49 race and 44 regulation of war 144, 194 libraries 44, 51 Li Dazhou 116 Life and Work movement 123–4 Ligue internationale de hockey sur glace (LIHG) 178 Liman von Sanders, Otto 166 Lobengula, King 70 Locarno Pacts 154 Lombard League of Peace 143, 150 London Naval Conference (1930) 144 London School of Economics 53 Lorwin, Lewis L. 188 Lothian, Lord (Philip Kerr) 19, 52 Lotus, Case of the S. S. (1927) 85–6 Lucerne International 131 Lutuli, Albert 149 Luxemburg, Rosa 128–9 Lytton Commission 90 Maasai 33 Macedonians 105 Mackinder, Halford 9, 45 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 46 Manchukuo 89–90

Index Manchurian Incident (1931) 89–90, 136, 144 mandates system 91, 107, 141, 165 Mannheim, Karl 159 Manuel, George 35 Mao Zedong 8 Mariátegui, José Carlos 25 maritime blockade 164 maritime transportation 161, 191–2 market regulation 189 Maronite Christians, massacre of (1860) 98 Martin, William 74 Marxism 127–8, 131 Marxism-Leninism 21, 22, 45, 134 Masaryk, Tomáš 18 mathematicians 196 Max Havelaar 118–19 May Fourth Movement 22, 116, 175 McKinley, William (US president) 99, 135 medical corps 201 Medical Women’s International Association 139–40 Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Albrecht 54–5 Meridian Conference (1884) 159, 194 metric system 159–60 Metropolis (1927 film) 157 Mexico 62, 92, 152 Middle East 91, 107, 138–9, 141, 165. See also Armenian aid; Ottoman Empire; specific countries Middleton, Janet 111 migrant laborers 132, 134–5, 191 migration 16, 34, 204, 207 minority groups. See also African Blood Brotherhood; Armenian aid; indigenous peoples; refugees interventions on behalf of 117 League of Nations and 34, 86, 91, 98 Ottoman Empire 104–5 PCIJ and 85 protection 108–9 South Africa 19 missionaries 116, 117, 120, 121–4, 140. See also specific individuals and organizations Mitrany, David 167 Mitteleuropa 18, 166 mixed-claims missions 92 Mixed Committee on Nutrition 198, 199

329

Moch, Gaston 143–4 modernization. See also under China; Japan; Ottoman Empire of legal codes 72–3 private US foundations and 50 race and 29 westernization and 48, 50, 72–3, 89, 198 Moneta, Ernesto Teodoro 143, 150 monetary policy 184–5, 186–7 Monnet, Jean 165 Monroe Doctrine 62, 71, 153 Montagu Colet Norman 186 moral reform crusades 140, 201 Morgan, Anne 44 Morgan, Laura Puffer 196–7 Morton, Rosalie 111 most-favored-nation clauses 162, 185 Mount Bandai, eruption of 112 multinational corporations 88, 174, 190 municipal governance 192 Muslim international law 72 Mussolini, Benito 65, 102, 114 Mutatuli (E. Douwes Dekker) 118–19 Myrdal, Alva 139 Nabokov, Vladimir 104 Nama and Herero 76 Nansen, Fridtjof 103–4, 148 Nansen certificate 103–4 narcotics. See antinarcotics reform National Hockey League (NHL) 179 nationalism. See also colonial nationalists; specific countries among internationalist academics 41–2, 55 among scientists 194, 196 Czech 195 indigenous peoples and 33 in international affairs education 65 Islamic 25 in journalism 173 in Ottoman Empire 104–5, 107 in peace movement 143 PEN International and 42 retrenchment 208 rise to prominence 10, 17 socialist theory and 128 as source of instability and conflict 18, 75, 163

30

330 spatial thinking and 3 in sport 176, 181 in trade unions 130 nation-states cooperation and 44 diffusion of model 8–9 international relations history 3–4 League of Nations and 167 positive international law and 67 as source of instability 75 as world order concept 33, 36–7, 45–6 natural law 67, 68–9 nature conservation 169, 205 naval blockade 164 Nazi regime 7, 42, 55, 151, 193, 204 Near East Relief (NER) 106, 107 Negritude 29 Nehru, Jawaharlal 30 neo-Malthusians 204 Netherlands 10, 53, 77, 119, 170–1 neurology 204 New Culture Movement (China) 22 New Deal 187 New Zealand 58 NGOs 80, 116, 127, 146, 151, 203. See also specific organizations NHL 179 Nine-Power Treaty (1922) 75, 89 Nobel, Alfred 145 Nobel Peace Prize 145–55 Noguchi, Hideyo 203 nonaggression 88–9 nonviolence 143 North America 2, 69–70, 178. See also individual countries Norway 83, 146, 150 nursing 109–10, 111, 201 occupational safety and health 201 Office International des Epizooties 205 Office international Nansen pour les Réfugiés 148. See also Nansen certificate oil companies 192 Okakura Kakuzō 24 Ōkawa Shūmei 24 Olympic Games 3, 176, 178, 180, 181 Open Door Policy 89 opium trade 120–1, 193, 197

Index organic solidarity 189–90 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 186 Orientalism 23, 25 Oriental Railway 166 Orr, John Boyd 198 Ortega y Gasset, José 64 Orthodox Synod of Constantinople 123 Ossietsky, Carl 151 Otlet, Paul 44 Ottesen-Jensen, Elise 204 Ottoman Empire Beirut aid 117 declaration of jihad 24–5, 26 First World War and 26 forced movement of Armenians 104 Greek revolution and 98 Greek-Turk population exchange 108–9 internationalized education 58 intervention in 105 Kalifate movement 26–7 legal system 72 pan-Islamism in 22–5 typhus epidemic (1917–18) 204 wartime cooperation 165–6 outlawry of war movement 144 Pacific Rim 55–6, 195 Pacific Science Association (PSA) 195 pacifism 110–11, 128, 129, 138, 142–4. See also peace movement Pact of Paris (1928). See Kellogg-Briand Pact Padmore, George 31–2, 33 Pan-African Congress 102 pan-Africanism 28–33, 130 Panama Canal 169–70, 204 Pan-American Conference. See International Conference of American States pan-Americanism 62–3, 79, 87 Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (1902) 201 Pan-American Union. See International Conference of American States pan-Asianism 24, 26–8, 40, 121, 133 pan-Islamism 24–5, 26–7 Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat 133 Pan-Pacific Women’s Association (PPWA) 141–2

Index Paraguay 63, 87, 149 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) 162, 191 Paris Library School 44 Party of the People’s Will 134 Passy, Frédéric 148 patents 191 Pax Sinica 21–3, 73 peace churches 110–11, 142 peace movement 5, 48, 68, 123, 142–54, 148–9. See also Hague Conferences Peace of Westphalia (1648) 45, 67–8. See also Westphalian international system Pearl, Raymond 204 Peking Union Medical College 50 PEN (Poets, Essayists, Novelists) International 42 Permanent Agricultural Committee 199 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 79, 84 Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 82–6, 87, 88, 93, 168 Permanent International Peace Bureau 147 Persia 72 Peru 63, 74, 78, 87 petitions 91 Philippines 68, 99, 120, 180 physicists 195 plebiscites 91–2 Poland 83, 85, 112, 202 policing 94, 135, 193 policy communities 192–3 population transfers 93, 108–9 Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, A 1, 13 Portugal 70, 78, 98, 198–9 positive law 67, 69 Post, Alice Thatcher 138 postal communication 161 post-traumatic stress disorder 112 postwar reconstruction 114, 185, 188 Press Congress of the World 175 press cooperation 173–6 Princeton University 52 Princip, Gavrilo 135 Prisoners of War International Agency 148 private actors, role of 1–2, 157–8, 169–70, 183–206, 209–10 private foundations 49–51, 145

331

private functional cooperation 12, 183–206, 195 professionalization 46, 116 professional networks 189–90 professional sport 178–9 progressive movement 116, 139 protectionism 166–7, 187 Protestants 6, 121–4 public diplomacy 77, 100 public health and safety 200–5 public unions 160–3, 171–2, 194–6 Qing Empire 8, 21–2, 73, 74 quarantine regulations 200, 202 Quidde, Ludwig 150 race in abolition movement 98 anti-imperialism and 30 biopolitical concepts of 30 in international cooperation 209 international exhibitions and 184 League of Nations and 89 liberal internationalism and 44 opium trade and 121 public health and 205 in sport 179–80 in study of international relations 51–2 white labor unionists and 132–3 in women’s movement 138, 140–1 as world order concept 29, 36–7 Radiotelegraph Conferences 172 rail transportation 161, 162, 166 Rajchman, Ludwik 202 Rama Rau, Dhanvanthi 204 Rātana, T. W. 35 Ratzel, Friedrich 46 realism 46–7 reconstruction 114, 185, 188 Red Cross and Red Crescent societies 99, 100, 111–12, 116, 118. See also International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) refugees 97, 102–9, 115 regional and world governance 18–20, 162–3, 167, 195 regulation. See also international law agriculture 198 communications 161, 171–2

32

332

Index

private actors and 157–8, 189, 206 public health 200, 201 trade 161–2 transportation 167–71 war 11, 77–8, 148 Reinsch, Paul 46, 158 religious internationalism 6, 121–4 religious law 72–3, 105 religious persecution and violence 98, 105. See also jihad Renault, Louis 151–2 reparations, war 81, 185, 186, 187 rescue movement 106–7 revolutionary socialists 27, 62, 128–9, 133–5, 142 Rhee, Syngman 28 Rhodes, Cecil 19 Rhondda, Lady Margaret 139 Richards, I. A. 43 rights of individuals 68, 80, 94 riverine trade and navigation 168–9 road signage 168 Robbins, Lionel 19 Rockefeller Foundation 49–50 funding 43, 50, 52, 55, 56, 106, 199 public health 202–3 Rodō, José Enrique 62 Roma 35 Roman Catholic Church 6, 124 Rome Statute (1998) 94 Roosevelt, Franklin 63, 109, 187 Roosevelt, Theodore 62, 80, 152–3 Root, Elihu 153 Round Table 19 Roy, M. N. 21, 32, 118 Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) 53–4 Royal Proclamation of 1763 69–70 Rueff, Jacques Léon 188 rules of war 11, 77–8, 148 Russia aid distribution 117 anarchists 134 Civil War 100, 103–4, 112, 117, 142 commissions of inquiry 91 conscientious objectors 110 feminists in 142 humanitarian intervention by 105 Russian Revolution 25–6, 27, 128, 134

Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) 8, 23, 80 Ruyssen, Théodore 47 Saavedra Lamas, Carlos 149, 154 Salazar, António de Oliveira 198–9 Salvation Army 79–80 Sanger, Margaret 204 sanitary movement 200–5 Sarton, George 194 Save the Children 115–16 Scandinavia 47, 150. See also specific countries Schacht, Hjalmar 186 Schmitt, Carl 76 Schober, Johannes 193 Schopenhauer, Arthur 143 scientific cooperation 194–7 scientific empiricism 158–9 scientific management 175–6 Second International 128–9, 130, 134 Second International Women’s Congress for Peace and Freedom (1919) 138 secret diplomacy 59–60, 64 securities market 189 security 47, 88, 93–4, 135, 154, 193 Seferiades, Stelios 82 segregation 179–80 Selenka, Margarethe Lenore 149 self-determination in international relations 17, 45 League of Nations and 86, 91–2 nationalist movements and 32, 36, 106 V. I. Lenin on 128–9 self-regulation 157–8, 189, 206 Senghor, Leopold 29 Serbia 111. See also Balkan Wars service aid movement 114 Service Civil International (SCI) 114 sex trade 119–20 sexually transmitted diseases 203 Shaarawi, Huda 141 shell shock 112 Shinobu, Jumpei 48–9 shipping 161, 191–2 Shotwell, James 51 Siam 72, 73 Singapore 173 Singh, Santokh 27 Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) 48, 89–90

Index Skubl, Michael 193 slavery 71, 97, 98, 101, 102 Slavery Convention (1926) 102 soccer. See football social Darwinism 22, 44, 116, 205 social insurance 193 social medicine 204 social movements 12, 127–55 social reform movements 97, 119–21, 148 Social Science Research Council 52 social sciences 158–9 social welfare policies 139–40 socialist internationalism 48, 61–2, 127–32, 133–5, 196 Società Umanitaria 131 Society for the Protection of the European Wisent 205 Söderblom, Nathan 123, 149 soldiers 26, 28, 201. See also Red Cross societies; veterans South Africa 19, 118 South African War (1899–1902) 68, 80, 118, 173 South America 58, 62, 63, 149. See also Latin America sovereignty as absolute 75–6 challenges to 65 China 74 vs. cooperation 208 geopolitics and 45 humanitarian activism and 106, 117 under international law 67–9 League of Nations 6 monetary policy 184 non-Western states 71–2 as world order concept 33, 36–7 Soviet Union 33, 61–2, 129–30, 178, 185 Soviet Young Communist League (1921–5) 130 Špaček, Stanislav 195 Spain 42, 133. See also Spanish-American War; Spanish Civil War Spalding, Albert 179–80 Spanish-American War 62, 99, 120, 153, 180 Spanish Civil War 7, 117 spatial imaginaries 3, 15–16 Spengler, Oswald 61

333

spirituality 25, 40 sport 176–81 Spykman, Nicholas 52 St. Petersburg Protocol (1904) 135 Stalin, Joseph 130 standardization associations for 190 campaigns 159–60 corporate conduct 191 currency rates 184–5 intellectual property 162 medicine 202 road signage 168 in science 196 in sport 177 of time 17, 159 state cooperation 1, 5–6, 27–8, 157, 191–2 stateless peoples 33, 35, 103, 107 state news agencies 174 Štěpánek, Bedřich 195 Stimson Doctrine (1932) 88–9 Stöcker, Helene 149 stock exchanges 189 Straight, Willard Dickerman 56 Streit, Clarence 20 Stresemann, Gustav 154 student exchanges 19, 59, 145, 194 submarine cable networks 174 suffrage movement 135–7 Sun Yat-sen 8, 22, 24 Supreme War Council 164, 197–8. See also Allied powers Suttner, Bertha von 77, 148, 150, 175 swaraj (self-rule) 25, 26 Sweden 86, 153, 178 Switzerland 160–1 syndicalists 133–4 Tagore, Rabindranath 24, 25, 36, 40 Tardieu, André 170 taxation 186 teacher exchanges 58–9 technical cooperation 157–81 technological innovation engineers 190 globalization and 2, 10, 207 international cooperation 43, 157, 181 war and 77–8 world order visions and 16–17

34

334 technology transfer 191 Telefunken 174–5 telegraphy 160–1, 170–1 telephones 171–2 temperance 140–1. See also alcohol trade territorialization of international politics 16, 45–6, 160 terrorism 93–4 Tewanima, Louis 34 Thailand. See Siam Third International. See Comintern Third World Approaches to International Law 70 Thomas, Albert 101, 165 time standardization 17, 159 Titanic 172, 192 Tokugawa regime 23–4 Tokyo Imperial University 58 Tolstoy, Leo 142–3 Tornquist, Carlos 63 Toynbee, Arnold 61 trade 88, 161–2, 185, 187, 191. See also free trade trade exhibitions 162–3, 183–4 Trade Union Congress (TUC) 131–2 trade unions 127–8, 130–2 traffic in women and children 119–20, 140, 193 transatlantic cooperation 20, 29, 64, 127, 155, 173 translation 74 transportation 167–72 treaty-making 69–70, 73, 74 Treaty of Berlin (1878) 109 Treaty of Lausanne (1923) 72, 85, 108–9 Treaty of Portsmouth 80, 152 Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) 89 Treaty of Versailles China and 75 economic consequences 185 ILO 101, 102 Japan at 89 opium trade and 120–1 PCIJ 83 United States at 153 war reparations 81, 185 women’s movement and 49, 137, 138 Trevelyan, George Macauley 111 Trotsky, Leon 60

Index Turkey capitulations 72 Greek-Turk population exchange and 93, 108–9 nationalism 25, 104, 105, 166 PCIJ and 85–6 Turnen 176–7 Turner, Frederick Jackson 16, 45 Twain, Mark 99 typhus epidemics 202, 204 unequal treaties 21, 73, 75, 90 Unilever. See Lever Union of International Associations 44, 163 United Fruit Company 191 United Nations 91 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 115 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 109 United Nations Status of Women Commission (1946) 139 United States Armenian aid 106 aviation 196 baseball 179–80 BIS and 187 at Brussels Financial Conference 186 CAJ and 83 commissions of inquiry 91 high-energy acceleration research 195 humanitarian activism and 100 ice hockey 178, 179 imperialism 62, 99, 120, 153, 191 intellectual cooperation 40, 51–2, 54, 56 labor and political parties 131–2 metric system 159 New Negro Renaissance 32 opium trade 120 postwar reconstruction and 114 private actors 49–51, 186 private foundations 49–51 progressive movement 56–7, 116, 139 relations with Latin America 62, 63, 71, 153, 191 response to anarchist threat 135 syndicalists 134 telegraph regulation 161

Index Versailles negotiations and 153 wartime cooperation 164–5 World Agricultural Census 199 world governance ideas 20 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 199 United States Food Administration 165 United States-Germany Mixed Claim Commission 92 Universal Alliance of Women for Peace 141 Universal Bibliographical Repertory 44 Universal Christian Council for Life and Work 123–4 Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) 30–1 Universal Peace Congress 68, 145 Universal Postal Union (UPU) 160, 161 Universal Races Congress (URC) 29–30 Université coloniale 118 universities 48, 51–3, 59, 194. See also specific institutions University of Chicago 52 Upper Silesia 85 Urzidil, Johannes 17 USS Maine explosion 91 vaccination 114, 202 Valensi, Georges 172 Vaterlandische Frauenverein 201 Vatican 111 Versailles negotiations. See Treaty of Versailles veterans 112–14 Vietnam 28 Villegas, Daniel Cosío 188 Vitoria, Francisco de 68–9, 70 Volapük 43 voluntary aid 109–17 Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD) 109–10 Wallace-Johnson, I. T. A. 32 war. See also specific conflicts delegitimization 88–9 displacement by 104, 108 individual rights and 80 international conferences and 80 international law and 77–8 regulation of 11, 77–8, 148 war and peace, study of 50–1

335

war crimes 50, 92–3 war reparations 81, 185, 186, 187 Warsaw Convention (1929) 161 Washington Conference (1889) 78 Weardale, Lord 29 Weber, Max 158 Weimar Republic 93, 186, 196 Wells, H. G. 19, 42, 170 Weltrecht 162–3 West African Students Union 33 westernization 40, 48, 50, 72–3, 89, 198 Westphalian international system 45–6, 67–8 Wheat Executive 165 Wheaton, Henry 74 Wilhelm II, Kaiser (Germany) 93 Wilson, Woodrow 17, 36, 60, 106, 153, 165 “Wimbledon,” Case of the S. S. (1923) 84–5 women. See also women’s movement aid work 118 at League of Nations 209 Nobel Peace Prize winners 148–9, 150 scientists 196–7 “social hygiene” and 203 in sport 180–1 traffic in 119–20, 140, 193 Women’s Consultative Committee 139 women’s health 204 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) 138, 139, 141 women’s movement 107, 135–42, 138, 148– 9, 150, 204 Women’s Peace Party 138 Women’s Progressive Society 136 Women’s Suffrage League (WSL) 136 Woodrow Wilson chair (Aberstywyth University) 52–3 Woolf, Leonard 46, 158 workers’ associations 131 workers’ compensation 193 World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches 123 World Child Welfare Charter 115–16 World Congress of International Associations (1910) 163 World Council of Churches (WCC) 124 World Council of Indigenous Peoples 35

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336

Index

World Court, the. See Permanent Court of International Justice world courts 79, 80, 94. see also Permanent Court of Arbitration; Permanent Court of International Justice World Economic Conference (1927) 185 World Engineering Federation 195 World League Against Alcoholism 139–40 World League for Sexual Reform 204 World League of Press Associations 174 World Missionary Conference 121–2 world order visions 9–10, 15–35 World Population Conference 204 World Power Conference (WPC) 195 World Youth Peace Congress 59 World’s Fairs 183–4 World’s Parliament of Religions 121 Wright, Elizabeth Washburn 197 Wright, Quincy 52 xenophobia 121, 200 Yale University 52

Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku 58 yellow fever 203, 204 Yitong Chuishang (universal hierarchy) 74 Young, Owen 186 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) 55, 178 Young Plan (1929) 186 Young Turks. See Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) 140 youth 57–8, 59, 63–4, 115, 130 Yun Ch’iho 122 zaibatsu 191 Zamenhof, Ludwig Lazarus 42–3 Zarumilla War (1941) 63 Zemstvo and Towns Relief Committee, Zemgor 117 Zhang Junmai 22 Zimmern, Alfred 52–3 Zongli Yamen 21–2, 73 zoological gardens 205