Intercultural Dialogue : In Search of Harmony in Diversity [1 ed.] 9781443873512, 9781443863629

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CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Edward Demenchonok Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Striving for Dialogue and Harmony in a Conflicted World Edward Demenchonok and Keping Wang Part I. Cultural Identity and Intercultural Dialogue as an Alternative to Homogenizing Globalization Chapter One............................................................................................... 21 Bridging the Gaps: The Voices of Non-Western Philosophies in Global Polylogue Enrique Dussel Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 43 Toward a Philosophy of Intercultural Dialogue in a Conflicted World Raúl Fornet-Betancourt Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 57 Social Identities: Conflict and Resolution Jorge J. E. Gracia Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 81 Bakhtin’s Dialogism and Current Discussions on the Double-Voiced Word and Transculture Edward Demenchonok Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 139 Toward a Phenomenology of Intercultural Dialogue Marc Lucht Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 159 Eurocentrism, Hospitality, and the Long Dialogue with China Andrew Fiala

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Contents

Part II. In Search of Harmony in Diversity Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 181 “Harmony in Diversity” and Dialogue among Cultures Xin Ru Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 191 A Harmonious Society in a Harmony-Conscious Culture Keping Wang Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 207 Four Aspects of Hé (Harmony ࿴) in Daoism Xia Chen and Yan Liu Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 221 Whitehead’s Concepts of Number and Harmony: Their Background, Transformation, and Use Leonidas Bargeliotes Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 239 Contemporary Chinese Culture in a Diverse World Xiujuan Chen Part III. Intercultural Philosophical Dialogue Facing World Problems Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 255 The Philosophical Quest for Perfect Justice William L. McBride Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 271 No Democracy without Both Representation and Participation Enrique Dussel Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 291 Universal Human Rights in a Culturally Diverse World Edward Demenchonok Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 347 Gandhi’s Contribution to Non-Violence and Global Peace Y. V. Satyanarayana

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Chapter Sixteen ....................................................................................... 365 After Babel: Journeying toward Cosmopolis Fred Dallmayr Contributors ............................................................................................. 379 Name Index ............................................................................................. 385 Subject Index ........................................................................................... 389

FOREWORD EDWARD DEMENCHONOK

The theme of this volume is promoting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue as the way toward a more peaceful, just, and harmonious world.1 Readers may hear the words “in search of harmony” in the title as a bit too idealistic. Invoking such powerful notions generally runs the risk of meeting suspicion and misinterpretation. In today’s polarized and conflicted world, permeated with escalating violence, massive injustice, gross material disparities, and ecological crisis, they may ask: What “harmony” are you talking about? Why even mention this term “harmony,” which, like other humane and nice-sounding notions such as “peace,” “justice,” “human rights,” and “democracy” has been compromised by ideological abuse in hypocritical political language and reduced to a euphemism for manipulative purposes, becoming nothing more than Orwellian “doublespeak”? Should we abstain from using these notions because they have been heavily abused by politicians and loaded with connotations associated with dominant ideologies? Or should philosophy assume a critical role in clarifying these notions, unpacking their distortions, restoring their genuine meaning, and regaining their role in the ongoing struggle of people for a better life, for peace, human rights, and more harmonious relations within society, within their inner selves, and with nature? Critical social inquiry should distinguish the genuine meanings of social ideals and conceptions from their ideological distortions. Social ideals must not be trivialized or inflated by their casual use in political discourse or identified with any claims that their fulfillment is “just around the corner.” We need to keep ideals in mind, but hold them accountable to actual circumstances. We also need be wary of political campaigns using mass media sound bites and calculated gestures of propagandists and pundits in the service of governments and economic elites that suggest we are already living in a near-just or almost-harmonious world. These imply that the full realization of the declared goals and ideals requires only blind, unconditional trust, conformity, and loyal subjection to the government.

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Perhaps one of the more pernicious forms of ideology of the status quo is the claim that there are no alternatives to present institutions. Ideals of a free, just, peaceful, and harmonious society guide philosophers in critically analyzing and evaluating existing societies and their problems. Humanistic thinkers approach social and world problems from the perspective of their concern about the plight of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity, indicating possible solutions through non-violent means. In rethinking significant past intellectual achievements, we can rediscover their rich heuristic and philosophical potential and creatively apply them to contemporary experiences. One classic, yet still relevant, source of guiding light for thinking through these problems is found in the philosophical legacy of Immanuel Kant. He said that the greatest evils are the results of war. He provided a philosophical grounding for the ideal of lasting peace and offered a project to achieve its practical realization through a solution to social and international antagonisms that would lead toward planetary harmony. Kant accurately diagnosed the dangerous tendencies of modern civilization that remain with us today: authoritarian and paternalistic power structures in society, wars among nations, and the imperial ambitions of powerful states. He warned against a “world republic” for fear that the hegemony of a powerful state would be like a despotic “universal monarchy.” He rightly considered all of these to be threats to freedom as such, and he warned that they might someday imperil the future of the human race unless they are properly confronted and dispatched. His solution was to relate the prospect of lasting peace to the advancement of a lawful society of free, morally conscious, and enlightened citizens. He believed that within a political community organized around a republican constitution, citizens can deliberate and decide on major political decisions, including those of war and peace. He also believed that most people would prefer to avoid suffering the calamities of war, so that they can be united with other peoples within a peaceful federation of free states. An international system would eventually evolve toward a cosmopolitan order of law and peace. Kant envisioned a dilemma for humanity. On one side is the continuation of politically organized violence, leading to collective suicide: “destroy one another, and thus find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence along with their authors” (1996, 328). On the other side, the only rational way to avoid such destruction is through a peaceful alternative, to aim for lasting peace through a lawful international order and federation of nations, and a realization of the ideal of a cosmopolitan order. This dilemma is even

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more relevant in the Nuclear Age, when perpetual war threatens to turn our entire planet into a graveyard. Kant’s proposed solutions remain as apt and urgent today as they were in his time. His project, however, remains largely an unfinished agenda. So far, humanity has paid a heavy price for the delays and inconsistencies in its implementation, which fail to constrain the escalating violence. After the end of the Cold War, many hoped that humanity would at last come to its senses and embrace new opportunities for peaceful and collaborative relations among the nations as equals, for the solution of social and global problems. These escalating problems, such as gross material disparities, third-world underdevelopment, stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons, and the ecological crisis, threaten the future of humanity. However, these hopes were soon dashed. Instead of a world order grounded in the rule of law and comity among nations, the world—even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001—confronted the spectacle of a heavily militarized superpower that espouses a strategy of global hegemony. This shift in world politics was a result of the neoconservative “revolution,” of the Bush Doctrine and its implementation in a boundless “global war on terror,” the invasion in Iraq, and so on. The hegemonic project is pursued as alternative to international law and institutions, opposing to them “moralization” of international politics based on the ethos of a superpower. Many theorists are concerned about the emerging “hegemonic international law” and the possibility of hegemonic capture of humanitarian and universalizing concepts and their distortion into “humanitarian imperialism” or “imperial cosmopolitanism.” In the words of Jürgen Habermas, “The Bush administration has laid the 220-year-old Kantian project of juridifying international relations ad acta with empty moralistic phrases,” and the neoconservatives impose “the vision of an American global political order that has definitively broken with the reformist program of UN human rights policy” (2006, 103, 28). Currently, the military preponderance and hegemonic policy of the world’s sole remaining military superpower is perceived as a threat by nations that do not want to be dominated; this provokes their defensive reaction. Facing a threat to their security, they try to counter the policy. It triggers counter-alliances, a geopolitical competition, and the arms race, increasing the risk of war. But the real alternative will be not for the dominating power to change hands, but for a world free from any hegemonic domination. The problem of war continues to lie at the heart of many other contemporary problems. This creates a vicious circle of violence against human beings and nature, with little room for positive programs of social

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and cultural development, disarmament, and preservation of the environment. In this atmosphere of disenchantment, the themes of peace, justice, and preservation of unique cultures have almost disappeared from public discourse. The twenty-first century seems to be repeating the violent pattern of the past century. But now things are different. These developments are not limited to a sole country. They are on a global scale, threatening the future of the human race. We can no longer deny the obvious, which is that humanity finds itself today on a planet with a rapidly deteriorating ecology and the potential risk of nuclear Holocaust. There exists not only the immediate threat of living on the “powder keg” of the stocks of weapons of mass destruction, which can be detonated by regional wars and explode at any time, but also the “time bombs” of the escalating ecological crisis and of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the underdeveloped countries. The “end of history” of humanity can come “not as a bang but as a whimper”: an entropy-like, agonizing process of degradation. The complexity of world problems poses challenges to philosophy and calls for its transformation. Philosophy can critically examine the nature of these problems, their current effects and future consequences, awaken the global consciousness, and assist in understanding the urgent need for joint efforts by nations in finding possible solutions. Philosophy can also contribute to social transformation through envisioning alternative futures. Philosophy is characterized by openness to all questions and all possibilities, taking nothing for granted. It can fulfill its task only if it approaches the social ideals in relation to reality and uses them as criteria for the evaluation of current social and cultural processes. This means we must compare ideals to empirical reality and reveal their opposites— violence, injustice, deprivation of rights, undemocratic power, or disharmony—to observe how close our reality is to the ideals or to some political program that appeals to ideals, and which claims to be a road-map toward their realization. Such critical assessment will help us see obstacles and problems on the way toward achieving these goals and help determine which issues need to be solved to facilitate progress toward, if not an “ideal,” then at least a realistically better, more peaceful and just world. Such a normative critique shows a glaring discrepancy between declared ends and the means: world stability through power politics and the hegemony of a global empire; security through militarization and global electronic mass surveillance; prosperity of the few at the expense of the many; economic growth at the cost of destroying the environment; and forcible “spread of democracy” in violation of international law. The imposition of democracy and human rights by military force or by the

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unilateral actions of either one nation or a group of nations (condominium), within the framework of power politics, cannot succeed in the long term. Traditional policies have failed to solve the real problems. They have not removed the root causes of the problems, but have made them even worse while also generating new problems. Thus, new approaches and policies are needed. In contrast, a call for genuine harmony invokes a different philosophy, at the center of which is human freedom and the vital interests of humanity. It promotes an ethics of nonviolence and planetary coresponsibility. It attempts to bridge the ideal and the real world, aiming for a more harmonious world—including peace and cooperation among the nations, freedom, justice, democratic equality, realization of human rights, dialogical relationships, conditions for harmonious development of individuals, flourishing of diverse cultures, and preservation of the natural environment. This critical view of harmony needs not deny differences and conflicts of interests, but it approaches them in a balanced, egalitarian, and dialogical manner. It considers the legitimate interests of all and their rights of participation in the decision-making process regarding the issues that affect them. It asserts that morally good ends can be achieved only through morally good means. Intercultural dialogue is a condition and an indispensable means for progression toward a more peaceful and harmonious world. In its normative role, dialogism can serve as the standard for evaluation and critique of the existing relationships within a socially-culturally diverse world. It can also serve as a regulative principle in the ennoblement of human relationships. Dialogism should become the norm broadly recognized by both the scholarly community and the “reasoning public” for ways of thinking and in relationships on all levels—intersubjective, social, cultural, and international. Philosophy can contribute to the further grounding and assertion of the normative status of dialogism. However, on the one hand, dialogue—as the way toward removing divisive prejudices, justly resolving conflicts of interests, and collaborating on solutions to problems—has never been so urgent as now, in a world facing problems that threaten the future of humanity. On the other hand, the task of implementing dialogical relationships has never seemed as difficult as it is in today’s politically and economically polarized world. While diverse cultures and culturally embedded philosophical traditions tend toward a dialogical interaction, the political abuse of cultural differences continues to result in “culture wars” and violent “clashes.” Asymmetry of political-economic power, domination, and a homogenizing effect of globalization in its hegemonic version create conditions

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conducive neither to the preservation of unique cultures of nations and minority groups nor to the dialogue of cultures as equals. Thus, today we see only embryonic rather than full-fledged manifestations of intercultural dialogue. The full realization of its potentials is still to come. Philosophy is committed to a priori respect for all human beings as potential participants in intersubjective and intercultural dialogue. Intercultural dialogue should have inter-philosophical global dialogue as its epistemological and ontological foundation. Philosophers are facing a twofold task: to examine the conditions for intercultural dialogue, while at the same time striving for a better understanding of the existing problems which hinder dialogue, and to seek possible solutions. A dialogue that is beginning to take place among the various world philosophies contributes theoretically and practically to fostering intercultural dialogue, which, in turn, may serve as a model for constructive political interactions, thus promoting a more peaceful, just, collaborative, and harmonious world. The realization of human dialogic potential ultimately depends on us. Possible solutions to—or at least mitigation of—the world problems that concern all human beings are related to alternative, dialogically oriented, and more humane models of society. It is necessary to go beyond instrumental rationality and to be open to cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue, humanizing education, and the ethics of co-responsibility. The solution to these problems can be achieved only by peaceful means, based on strengthening international law and institutions, increasing global consciousness and progressive movements, and aiming for a gradual realization of the ideal of a cosmopolitan order of law and peace. It is our hope that this volume will help readers to see that meaningful choices remain, for all of us, as peoples, nations, and individuals.

Note 1.

Essays in this volume are based mainly on the keynote addresses and other papers presented at the conference of the International Society for Universal Dialogue, summer 2010, Beijing, China. The general theme of the conference was “Dialogue among Cultures: Peace, Justice, and Harmony.” I would like to begin by thanking the Beijing International Studies University for hosting the conference. Further gratitude is expressed to the estate of the late Jens A. B. Jacobsen for its generous financial support. I am also grateful to Keping Wang for his assistance, particularly in proofreading the chapters of this volume on Chinese philosophy and culture. Thanks also to Elizabeth D. Boepple for her help in editing the volume.

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References Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. The Divided West. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1996. “Toward Perpetual Peace.” In Practical Philosophy, translated by Mary J. Gregor, 311–352. New York: Cambridge University Press.

INTRODUCTION STRIVING FOR DIALOGUE AND HARMONY IN A CONFLICTED WORLD EDWARD DEMENCHONOK AND KEPING WANG

Intercultural dialogue is underpinned largely by the social, cultural, and world problems that concern all human beings. These problems are the subject of dialogue among philosophers at conferences and through publications. This volume contributes to the ongoing debates in philosophy and cultural studies regarding the problems of cultural identity and relations among different cultures, as well as the role of intercultural dialogue in striving for a more peaceful, just, and harmonious world. It responds to the need to find alternatives to deal with a twofold problem: the homogenizing consequences of the current globalization in its hegemonic version on the one hand, and ethnocentric fragmentation and religious/ideological fundamentalism on the other. The contributors, from different countries, seek a common ground in promoting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. In approaching these issues dialectically, they argue for the preservation of uniquely diverse cultures and for dialogic (respectful and mutually complementing) relations among them based on universal human values. They are therefore preoccupied with the consideration of cultural diversity and universality. The contributors approach these problems philosophically and from a broad historical perspective. The chapters of the volume reconstruct the ideas of dialogue and harmony as expressed in different cultural traditions, including Daoism, Confucianism, Ancient Greek, and Indian philosophy, as well as contemporary Latin-American, Russian, and other philosophies. At the same time, the contributors view the ideas of dialogue and harmony in the current setting and their normative role in the analysis of the complex and conflicting socio-cultural tendencies in their own countries and the world over. In contrast to the concepts of “culture wars” and “clash of civilizations,” this volume articulates the ideas of intercultural dialogue as mutually beneficial for each culture and as a condition for their flourish-

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Introduction

ing. The volume connects the ideas of dialogue and harmony to the philosophy of nonviolence and the planetary ethics of co-responsibility. The volume approaches the theme of harmony and other concepts from the perspective of the cultural diversity of our world and interrelations of the cultures, arguing for the necessity and significance of intercultural dialogue. The contributors do not pretend to provide any final “answers” or ready “solutions,” but rather view their modest goal as participating in the ongoing discussions about these problems and to invite the readers to join them in critical reflections and constructive conversations. This introduction will start with a brief review of some main themes elaborated in the chapters of the volume, and then the second part will introduce the topic of harmony.

The Harmonizing Potential of Intercultural Dialogue The chapters of the volume are organized in three thematic parts. The first, “Cultural Identity and Intercultural Dialogue as an Alternative to Homogenizing Globalization” addresses the importance of a quest for intercultural dialogue and the conditions for its realization, as well as the problems that need to be solved for a dialogue of equals to prevail over the monologic dicta of the powerful. Then the question is: A broad crosscultural philosophical dialogue about what? Hence, the volume proceeds toward the content of an intercultural philosophical dialogue addressing some of its major themes. Intercultural philosophy not only affirms the principles of intercultural dialogue and the conditions for its realization, but helps to clarify issues pertaining to the thematic content of such a dialogue regarding universally valid themes in the culturally diverse world. One of these themes focuses on harmony in cultural diversity, which is explored in the essays of the second part, “In Search of Harmony in Diversity.” Some other themes for the dialogue, such as justice, human rights, democracy, non-violence, and cosmopolitan order are discussed in the third part, “Intercultural Philosophical Dialogue Facing World Problems.” Diverse cultures all express, in one way or another, the ideas of dialogue and harmony. At the same time, cultures themselves are complex and far from being harmonious either internally or in their external interrelationships. Cultural diversity contains a rich potential and opens new opportunities for the creative self-expression of individuals and for an interactive development of cultures and human liberation. But cultural identity is also used as an ideological weapon in political power-games under the banners of nationalism, racism, and religious fundamentalism. Freedom of cultural self-identification presupposes a responsibility for respecting the

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same freedom for others, thus promoting mutually beneficial intercultural relations through dialogue. Dialogic relationships are an indispensable means for progression toward a more harmonious world. Unless mutually respectful dialogic interrelations among culturally diverse people prevail, the continuation of historical patterns of culture wars and ,clashes of civilizations will be even more devastating in the globalized world.

Striving for Cultural Identity and Intercultural Dialogue The issues of cultural identity, diversity, and the relationship among different cultures came to the forefront of social consciousness during the second half of the twentieth century. After World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, the process of decolonization and movements for national liberation and cultural identity stimulated the emergence of Latin American, African, and other “Third World philosophies.” These emerged in the form of the philosophical self-consciousness of ex-colonial nations, challenging Eurocentrism and striving for the creation of their own thought in order to help their quest for cultural identity and independent socio-cultural development. In the search for their originality, or “authenticity,” they turned focus to their own cultural traditions. However, their further development requires them to interrelate with other philosophical traditions and to elaborate their intercultural dimensions (Demenchonok 2010, 448). In the historical development of these philosophies, they show a tendency to evolve from initial ethnocentrism to more critical self-reflection and openness to intercultural dialogue. A dialogue among the various world philosophies suggests a broad conception of philosophy’s mission and place in the world, which William L. McBride calls “the globalization of philosophy” (2010, 428). Philosophers from various countries have made distinctive contributions to the dynamics of inter-philosophical and intercultural dialogue. Their ponderings represent various perspectives and theories, in many respects overlapping or complementing each other, and forming a polyphonic interaction of creativity. In this polyphony, the voice of Latin American philosophers stands out. Long ago, they had addressed relevant issues related to interculturality, and they created in practice a new, original type of culturally embedded thought—Latin American Philosophy. They helped advance and develop the ideas of intercultural philosophy from the viewpoint of Latin America and other developing regions, applying them to the philosophical North-South dialogue in the search for a solution to social and global problems.

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Introduction

Since the late 1980s, Latin American and German philosophers have initiated a series of seminars in response to the need for an intercultural dialogue in philosophy, which would help to overcome the traditional dominance of Eurocentric discourse. The project was coordinated by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, a Cuban philosopher residing in Germany. Two main philosophical currents came to the forefront of the dialogue: discourse ethics and the liberation philosophy, represented respectively by Karl-Otto Apel and Enrique Dussel. The first seminar of this dialogue took place in 1989, in Freiburg, and the second in Mexico City, in 1991. These were followed by seminars on a regular basis on both continents, in which intellectuals from other regions of the world also participated. In this volume, the Latin American philosophical thought regarding intercultural dialogue is represented by Enrique Dussel, Raúl FornetBetancourt, and Jorge Gracia. Dussel’s chapter “Bridging the Gaps: The Voices of Non-Western Philosophies in Global Polylogue” addresses the problem of dialogue among cultures and among culturally embedded philosophies within a broad historical and global perspective. It points out the historically inherited and recent obstacles, such as the asymmetrical situation of its participants, which are obstructing equality in dialogue. Dussel asserts that intercultural dialogue should have an inter-philosophical global dialogue as its epistemological and ontological foundation. This crosscultural philosophical dialogue, or polylogue, should include the philosophers and philosophies of both Western (the industrialized global North) and non-Western (the developing global South) regions. He addresses the problem of what he calls “philosophical coloniality” and the necessity of fostering a dialogue among philosophers of the countries of the global South. As an alternative to the hegemonic “univocal universality,” he envisions an emerging new world, which will be an analogical pluriverse of different cultures engaged in dialogue “in a permanent process of creative cross-fertilization.” The theoretical foundation of philosophy’s contribution to intercultural dialogue is analyzed by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt in his chapter “Toward a Philosophy of Intercultural Dialogue in a Conflicted World.” He points to the ambivalence of human dialogicality, stemming from the existential contradictions of the human condition in each person as well as a structural contradiction in history. The existing asymmetries of power and marginalization of traditional cultures need to be changed in order to provide favorable conditions for dialogue. Philosophy’s contribution to intercultural dialogue in a conflicted world consists of defending the culture of reason in response to irrationality and the “aphasia” that condemns humanity to conflict. Philosophy should show the path of dialogue as the only alterna-

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tive for the humanization of our world. Fornet-Betancourt views philosophy as culturally embedded and elaborates a project of “the intercultural transformation of philosophy.” The emerging intercultural philosophy introduces a new perspective in our understanding of what philosophy is, of its history, its methods, and forms of articulation. Much of the conflict that permeates the world today is the result of clashes between cultures, religions, races, nations, and ethnic groups. Is there a way to establish dialogue and resolve these conflicts? Jorge Gracia provides an answer to this question in his chapter “Social Identities: Conflict and Resolution.” He highlights the obstacles to the proper understanding of social identities which are characterized by two major dilemmas: “essentialism” versus “eliminativism,” and “generalism” versus “particularism.” Instead, he proposes a third approach, which he calls the “familial-historical view of social identities,” which opens the doors to dialogue and understanding, diminishing the possibility of conflict among peoples from different cultures. The contribution of Russian philosophy to intercultural dialogue is reviewed in the chapter “Bakhtin’s Dialogism and Current Discussions on the Double-Voiced Word and Transculture” by Edward Demenchonok. It is focused on Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy, highlighting its idea of the universal character of dialogic relationships, which form the very foundation of all human activities—self-consciousness, intersubjective relationships, cognition, and cultural creativity—from the personal level to the most general level of dialogue among cultures. The chapter examines dialogism in Bakhtin’s philosophy of language, especially in the theory of the double-voiced word, as well as its influence on contemporary studies of the phenomenology of indirect speech. Dialogism, and all linguistic phenomena related to it, is a constitutive characteristic of language. Thus the various forms of dialogue related to language (including a dialogue of cultures) bear this inherent dialogic property immanent in language. Attention is paid to spiritual practice and the dialogue of spiritual traditions, as interpreted in the theory of “synergic anthropology.” Bakhtin’s ideas of outsideness, freedom, and creativity found their contemporary elaboration in the theory of transculture. The principles of dialogic philosophy can serve as a theoretical basis of a new, dialogical civilization. In his “Toward a Phenomenology of Intercultural Dialogue,” Marc Lucht examines the manner in which phenomenology can offer an alternative to a nihilistic vision of life. He enumerates the resources that phenomenology can offer for reflection on intercultural dialogue. Phenomenology’s pointing to the possibility of non-relative norms can orient our attempts to search for common ground with interlocutors from alien cultures

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Introduction

and resolve disagreements peacefully. Phenomenology can give us hope that dialogue is not merely manipulative, and that through dialogue and mutual criticism, we can find jointly recognized measures, enabling us to correct and improve our moral commitments and facilitate consensus. The complexity of the dialogic relationship between different cultures is analyzed in Andrew Fiala’s chapter “Eurocentrism, Hospitality, and the Long Dialogue with China.” Genuine dialogue between cultures is enriching, but the potential can be undermined by tendencies toward ethnocentrism, fundamentalism, and domination. Modern European Christian culture must not practice hegemony. Breaking such hegemony— “decentering,” to use Habermas’s term—is a condition for genuine dialogue across cultures. According to Fiala, the long centuries of interaction between Europe and China confirm the decentering of European Christianity. There is no “center”; rather, there are cultural spheres that overlap and develop against and with one another. In such a decentered world, we are each simultaneously both guests and hosts, engaged in a dialogue that has been going on for centuries.

The Concept of Harmony in Philosophical Traditions and Its Relevance How to conduct a fruitful dialogue among cultures? Xin Ru holds that the idea of harmony in diversity advocated by Chinese traditional philosophy may serve as a basis for conducting such a dialogue in its modern setting. In his chapter, “‘Harmony in Diversity’ and Dialogue among Cultures,” he analyzes the concept of harmony in Chinese philosophy and its relevance in the global context of today’s world. As a philosophical concept, harmony’s primary premise is the existence of different things in the world, and then it aims to take them as an integral whole and lead them to harmonious development and concord. The true meaning of harmony is not to agree passively with the maintenance of the status quo, but actively to advocate taking the initiative to conduct dialogue and exchange among different cultures. Ru formulates some basic principles that need to be accepted in order to carry on dialogue among cultures. First, all the parties to the dialogue should acquire awareness of globalization and have a common goal. Second, the dialogue should be conducted on the basis of full equality. Third, the dialogue needs a friendly atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect. Fourth, all the parties to the dialogue should have the spirit of tolerance regarding the differences among cultures. The implementation of these principles will benefit the maintaining of world peace and stability, and the flourishing of world cultures.

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In his chapter “A Harmonious Society in a Harmony-Conscious Culture,” Keping Wang examines the concept of harmony in Chinese philosophy and studies its relevance. He analyzes the project of constructing “a harmonious society” (héxié shehui) in contemporary China. Some teleological aspects of the project are viewed from the perspective of Confucianism as a harmony-conscious cultural heritage. Wang focuses on issues such as the orientation of the harmonious society, the importance and measurement of harmony, the distinction between harmony and uniformity, the dialectic mode of harmony versus conflict, and the building process of the harmonious society as such. The harmonious society is advocated as part of the Confucian heritage, in which harmony is always emphasized as a solution to social strife or conflict, and as an ideal of good governance. This concept acknowledges the existence of opposition and conflict within things and among persons, but claims that the final solution to conflict is hidden in the power of harmony. In the political culture, the principle of harmonization without being patterned or standardized tends to encourage an organic synthesis between the rule of law and the rule by virtue, according to the cultural legacy in China. It preserves the differences but seeks a common ground among them, aiming at peace and justice. Cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. This idea is elaborated in the chapter “Four Aspects of Hé (Harmony ૂ) in Daoism,” by Xia Chen and Yan Liu. Two schools of thought, Confucianism and Daoism, assert the oneness of heaven and humanity. Nevertheless, they differ in their emphasis on different aspects of hé. Confucianism stresses the importance of the moral properties of heaven and adapts them to person-to-person relationships. Daoism advances the theory of mutual correspondence between heaven and humanity. The goal of Daoist practice is the establishment of harmony on different levels: between the body and mind of the individual, between the individual and its surroundings, and between the individual and the cosmos. The ultimate, ideal level of attainment is of oneness, of merging oneself with the environment in a sense of cosmic union that alone can lead to complete fulfillment, and further, the transcending of the self. The Pythagorean concepts of number and harmony have been expressed mainly by Plato’s dialectic of opposites and by the musical scale and harmony, which indicate the applicability of mathematics to physical phenomena and, in human experience, to the dialogue of cultures and mutual understanding. This is examined in Leonidas Bargeliotes’s chapter, “Whitehead’s Concepts of Number and Harmony: Their Background, Transformation, and Use.” His analysis of Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of number and harmony points to Pythagoras, who saw the cos-

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Introduction

mos in terms of number and mathematical ratios or harmonies. In the system of organic philosophy, the ladder of ascent is similar to that of Pythagorean Plato. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism culminates in the notion of peace or harmony of harmonies, which completes the panorama of a civilized life, the perfect attainment of coexistence and of a peaceful way of life. Xiujuan Chen’s chapter “Contemporary Chinese Culture in a Diverse World” analyzes the development of Chinese culture under the impact of modernization and globalization. Chen emphasizes the importance of “cultural self-consciousness” and of seeking common ground while preserving differences. Given the process of cultural globalization and the trend toward cultural diversity, there is a need for a better understanding of the development of traditional Chinese culture. The inner core of Chinese culture is the concept of harmony between human beings and nature, an ecological view that emphasizes harmony, co-existence, and co-prosperity between humanity and nature. Chen argues that there is a need to deepen intercultural dialogue, communication, and integration between one nation’s own culture and other nations’ cultures to gradually incorporate the particularity of national culture into the universality of human culture.

The Critical Role of Intercultural Philosophy in Addressing the World Problems One role philosophy fulfills is to perform a critical analysis of social and global problems—such as wars, poverty, massive injustice, human rights violations, and the ecological crisis—, seeking root causes and suggesting possible solutions, which would lead toward a less conflicted and more harmonious and humane world. Intercultural philosophy is important in this respect, for it challenges Eurocentric patterns, idealized concepts of Western society, and a hegemon-centered world. Philosophers from diverse cultures and perspectives thereby address the problems of their own countries or groups, acquiring a more critical view of the world and engendering a reassessment of existing theories. From the perspective of intercultural dialogue, William McBride, in his chapter “The Philosophical Quest for Perfect Justice,” examines some of the concepts of political philosophy such as justice, peace, and harmony, in comparison to the realities of our world. Philosophy is viewed not as confined to abstract, universal principles detached from empirical realities, but rather as bridging both. It is by alternating between empirical realities and the world of principles, and by using realities to rethink the principles in a critical light, that philosophy best carries out its unique task. With this

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approach, McBride critically analyzes John Rawls’s theory of justice and the so-called original position. He points out that the philosophical quest for perfect justice, as exemplified in the writings of Rawls and his followers, stands in striking contrast to the massive injustices rooted in dominance that pervade the real world. The whole pretense that we can describe the nature of the perfectly just society and then consider the society in which we live as a “nearly just” one is ultimately an illusion. The era of the ideal, self-congratulatory theory, presenting the West as comprising “nearly just societies,” has come to an end and needs to be critically revised. The term “justice” should not be reduced to particular legal systems and the prejudices of those who control them. A struggle against injustices needs a reorientation toward theories of injustices. This is important for a broader theory of society. The philosophers’ task is to pursue a critical analysis of the social system. McBride suggests that wisdom from other cultures and philosophical traditions can be helpful for this task. Intercultural philosophical dialogue is facilitating this. The necessity of a reorientation toward a broader theory of society is also addressed by Enrique Dussel in his chapter, “No Democracy without Both Representation and Participation.” Dussel examines some of the themes currently being debated in social and political philosophy, such as representative and participatory forms of democracy. He points out two problems: First, some liberal forms of representative democracy are frequently mistakenly equated with the definition of pure democracy. Second, there is a tendency to frame the issues involved in the debates in terms of antagonistic extremes such as participative democracy versus representative democracy. Instead, Dussel argues that these terms must be approached dialectically to consider both participative and representative democracy, to strengthen the state from the horizon of the dissolution of the state, and to exercise participative democracy with political leadership. According to him, the most far-reaching revolution of the twenty-first century will be the liberation of political communities in representative democratic states, which will institutionalize a participatory democracy of the impoverished majority of civil society (from community assemblies at the neighborhood or village level to different kinds of social movements). Democratizing the electronic means and networks of communication and putting them in the hands of the citizens is an essential prerequisite for real democracy. This presupposes a significant growth in people’s consciousness regarding political problems, and in defense of their rights.

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Introduction

Regaining the Ideals of Human Rights, Peace, and Cosmopolitan Order The current discussions on the justification of the idea of human rights are reviewed in Edward Demenchonok’s chapter, “Universal Human Rights in a Culturally Diverse World.” This examines Immanuel Kant’s concept of human rights as freedom and his ideal of cosmopolitan order, arguing for their relevance. Analysis of the recent attempts by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Michael Perry to ground the concept of human rights on religion shows that their claim that religious worldviews provide the only intelligible foundation faces serious challenges in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. With Immanuel Kant in the background, the chapter is focused on the theories that seek to develop an account of human rights that does not depend upon controversial metaphysical or religious doctrines. It examines an approach to grounding human rights from the perspective of discourse ethics, as developed by Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Rainer Forst, and Seyla Benhabib. It argues for a universal concept of human rights as a regulative principle or normative yardstick for the evaluation and the possible critique of all states, including democratic ones. To the “imperial” version of cosmopolitanism is opposed critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism. The analysis concludes that the true solution to the problem of protecting human rights can be achieved only by peaceful means, based on strengthening international law and institutions and aiming to a gradual realization of the ideal of a cosmopolitan order of law and peace. How to practice the principles of non-violence and achieve peace in a world permeated by violence? This was a question to which Mohandas Gandhi tried to find an answer. It is analyzed in Y. V. Satyanarayana’s chapter, “Gandhi’s Contribution to Non-Violence and Global Peace,” which analyzes the distinctive features of Gandhi’s views of non-violence, focusing on the concept of satyagraha, non-violent direct action, as a technique to resolve social conflict in a non-violent way. The fundamental principles connected with satyagraha include truth, non-violence, and selfsuffering. Gandhi advocated the need for morally acceptable means for attaining morally justified ends. Satyagraha was a method that can conquer evil by good, untruth by truth, egoism by altruism, enmity by friendliness, and brutality by gentleness. Its followers employ strategies such as noncooperation, civil disobedience, and fasting. Its most important goal is to bring a change in the hearts and minds of people. An enduring peace can only be ensured by non-violent means. Globalization, intercultural coexistence, human rights protection, and our co-responsibility to preserve peace, the environment, and sustainable

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world resources are unprecedented challenges that call for a cosmopolitan perspective. Contemporary cosmopolitanism tends to be responsive to cultural diversity and power relations in today’s global conditions. In “After Babel: Journeying Toward Cosmopolis,” Fred Dallmayr examines the conditions for progression in the direction of cosmopolitan order. He points to gross material disparities, global warming, and hegemonic tendencies toward a global “central command structure” as problems to be solved on the way to this goal. Equally important is to regain social ethics and to cultivate co-responsibility and shared well-being. To homogenizing globalization Dallmayr opposes the importance of the diversity of languages, customs, and cultural traditions. It is necessary to go beyond instrumental rationality and be open to dialogue and listening, cross-cultural and inter-religious interaction, ethics, and spiritual insight. In contrast to the idea of a uniform global super-state hegemonically controlling the world, “cosmopolis” means a shared aspiration negotiated among local or national differences. The contemporary period is viewed as part of a transitional phase from an international to a cosmopolitan order. It is a hope predicated on the progressive maturation and transformation of humanity.

Intermezzo: On the Modes of Harmony The ideals of harmony have been expressed, in various ways, in cultural heritages across the world since ancient times. Their commonality and relevance are remarkable in our culturally diverse, conflicted, and globally interrelated world. Harmony is a general notion; its semantics include meanings related to music, arts, social relationships, and the inner world of human beings. The term “harmony” derives from the Greek ܼȡȝȠȞȓĮ (harmonia) meaning joint, agreement, concord (from the verb ܼȡȝȩȗȦ, harmozǀ, to fit together, to join). In Greek mythology, Harmonia (ÁȡȝȠȞȓĮ) was the goddess of harmony and concord. Her Roman equivalent was Concordia, the goddess of agreement, understanding, and marital harmony. Their opposites are Eris and Discordia. Webster’s dictionary defines “harmony” as “accord in facts, views, or acts; sympathetic relationship; friendship; inner calm; a pleasing integration of components. Music: the science of cords; coincident combination of musical tones.” It lists the synonym as “agreement,” which in turn has its synonyms: accordance, concordance, concord, concurrence, harmony, understanding, unison, bargain, compact, contract, covenant, pact, stipulation. European languages have equivalent terms for harmony with similar meanings, and the Chinese dictionary offers synonymous counterparts such as “hé” (harmony or peace), “héxié” (harmony or

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Introduction

concordance), “hémù” (peaceful co-existence or on good terms), and “héshƝng” (consonance in sounds).1 In what follows, we will take a closer look at the concept of harmony in Chinese philosophy: the principle of hé (harmony) remains paramount to all Chinese cultural ideals. The term is ubiquitous in music and the fine arts in general, and defined in terms of how contrasting elements, such as a higher and lower tone, combine to make a pleasant whole. Confucianism played an important role in the formulation of early Chinese music. It asserts that musical harmony helps people to become more civilized and creates balance within individuals, nature, and society. Daoism views harmony as the balance of yin and yang, which describes how seemingly opposite or contrary forces are interconnected and interdependent in the natural world. Analogously, we seek social harmony, a balance between the interests of individuals and those of society. Harmony was prized for its ability to assuage conflicts that had long haunted the ancient Chinese, especially during the Warring States Period (475–221 BCE). However, the practical relevance and worth of harmony can be better appreciated by elucidating its three modes, namely, the “dialectic,” the “synthetic,” and the “receptive.” The dialectic mode calls for wise treatment of the interactive connection between the opposites (dui) within forms of things (xiang) in the light of the principle of harmonizing or conciliating (hé), the conflict (chou) caused by the opposition (făn) as proposed by Zhang Zai, a later Confucian thinker in the Song Dynasty: As there are forms or aspects of things, there are their opposites within (y΅u xiang si y΅u dui). These opposites will likely stand in opposition to what they do (dui bi făn qi wei). Opposition leads to conflict (y΅u fan si y΅u chou). Conflict is then to be harmonized and resolved (chou bi hé er jie). (1975, 25; cf. Wing-tsit Chan 1973, 506)

These opposites are not merely interdependent, but also interactive in their respective functions. Consequently, they will lead to their co-existence in an ontological sense, and to their opposition (făn) in a kinetic sense. As the power of their opposition grows, it gives rise to the tension of conflict (chou). According to Zhang Zai, chou will be removed or reduced as the opposites are brought into unity or concord by virtue of harmonization or reconciliation (hé). This emphasis corresponds to the conventional focus on the value of union or convergence among the opposites or differences in the Chinese way of thinking, and thus claims that the appropriate solu-

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tion to interpersonal conflict rests on the power of harmony, which emphasizes a “win-win” approach. This argument echoes Heraclitus’ proposal on the harmony of opposites. According to him, “what is opposite agrees, and from differing things comes the fairest harmony, and all things happen according to strife” (2010, pt. 1, text 71, 161). In other words, without opposition, there is no agreement. Heraclitus was also aware of the animate features of strife, stressing it as characteristic of eternal flux that, in its violent form, should be eliminated: “Violence has more need to be extinguished than a conflagration” (ibid., text 132, F87, 171). The synthetic mode of harmony connotes a dynamic process of creative transformation, during which all elements collaborate while maintaining their individual identities, just as when spices are dissolved, they become inextricable parts of the soup but retain their unique flavor. This is a creative process. It should draw on diversity in a harmonized form rather than imposing a rigid pattern of conformity. It emphasizes compatibility among elements whose differences are treated as indispensable. The result is a vital new organic whole in a reconstructive and recurring system. Conversely, imposing a pattern of conformity rejects unique features of diversity. Hence, it is characterized as a mechanical multiplication of the same identity. Just as the soup analogy shows, such sameness has no unique ingredients to make the whole rich and appealing. Such being the case, imposing patterns is assumed to be static and short-lived, whereas diversity in a harmonized form is thought to be dynamic and long-lived (hé neng sheng wu, tong ze bu ji). The receptive mode contains a moral message about empathetic sensitivity to others. Confucius asserts: The gentleman (junzi) harmonizes his relationship with others but never follow them blindly (hé er bu tóng). The petty man (xiaoren) just follows others blindly disregarding any principle of harmony (tóng er bu hé). (13:23)2

Here the gentleman acts upon the principle of harmonization without imposing a pattern, while the petty man imposes conformity without harmony. Harmonization without imposed conformity is by nature inclusive and tolerant. It is receptive to different but constructive components. It hankers after unity in diversity while revolting against any hegemonic dominance of the one over the many. Harmonization advocates see the world from the viewpoint of others in search of the common good instead of forming a rigid group that places personal interests ahead of the welfare of all. Conversely, conformity without harmonized diversity is exclusive and intoler-

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Introduction

ant, rejecting any factors except the absolutely similar ones. Thus, it disregards the nature of harmonization and the virtue of justice altogether. Such imposition ignores public ethics in its pursuit of conformity and groupism of an exclusive kind without thinking of doing justice to others and society as a whole. The categories of harmony (hé) and uniformity (tóng) indicate two different moral codes. The former is oriented towards the common good and is grounded in the virtues of rén (reciprocal benevolence, humanheartedness, kindness, and love) and yì (righteousness or justice). It is possible only when personal cultivation develops into the high state of gentlemanliness that enables one to go beyond pursuing one’s own interests. The latter is directed toward the individual good and is determined by one’s own desires (yù) and profits (lì). It is confined to selfishness and working at the cost of others’ welfare. It is by nature “a thief of morality” (de zhi zei ye) who will ruin all the virtues.3 These three modes of harmony make up the main part of the harmoniousness. In summary, the dialectic mode is socio-politically teleological as it is principally intended to approach the ultimate goal of harmonized human relations and social order by means of state administration. The synthetic and receptive modes are methodological, referring to ways to synthesize different components to foster a unity in diversity while avoiding arbitrary imposition of conformity over the symphonic many. It is based on the conviction that the harmonization of human relations is feasible providing individual passions and desires are in harmony with the best interests of all. Thus harmony can be seen in the morally virtuous social order in the same way as we experience it in music or art, with the ultimate goal being universal order and beauty. As it is written in the Analects (Lun yu): In the process of conducting the rites, seeking harmony is the most valuable principle (lƱ zhƯ yòng, hé wéi guì). Of the ways prescribed and cherished by the ancient sage-rulers, this is the most beautiful and therefore followed alike in dealing with matters great and small. Yet, if harmony is sought merely for its own sake without having it regulated by the rites, the principle will not work in fact. (Confucius 1995, 1:12, 69)4

Why is harmony so important? As is recorded in historical documents, the rites in ancient China were employed comprehensively as a kind of performing art on certain occasions of social interaction such as ancestral sacrifice and divinity worship. The performance would involve not only rules of proprieties or rituals, but also music and dance combined. In its actual performance as a process of organic cooperation and integration,

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harmony is the ultimate aim in view of unity in variety. The artistic effect of harmony in this case goes beyond aesthetic appreciation, and extends symbolically into the social utility of harmony related to human relations and efficient teamwork, so long as the principle of harmony is properly applied to “dealing with matters great and small” in socio-political praxis. The performers and spectators alike comprise at least four kinds of expectation, namely, technical, aesthetic, moral, and socio-political. The mode and effect of such conduct create an ambiance spreading to the society and the government as well. This is the chief reason why the ancient sagerulers prescribed and cherished the principle of harmony itself. In order to maintain its function, they would also regulate it by means of rites in accord with specific situations. All this suggests that a more rational and appropriate measurement of harmony lies not merely in the rites as institutional regulations and codes of conduct, but in the principle of correctness that works according to specific situations. Otherwise, it would be in vain if harmony is attained for harmony’s sake by imposing conformity over all the dynamic differences encountered. Incidentally, as mentioned elsewhere in the Musical Records (Yue ji) (one of the Confucian classics), musical harmony is alleged to be an echo of or identified with the harmonia of heaven and the earth. This twofold harmonia is supposed to work deeply into the human soul and cultivate the human character, thus making the individual become harmoniously integrated not merely with the music proper, but with heaven and the earth. All this is perceived as a manifestation of the oneness between heaven and human (Wang 2007). Some interesting insights into the concept of harmony can be found in, for example, the works of Francis Macdonald Cornford, an English classical scholar and poet, who was particularly interested in the pre-Socratic philosophers and Plato, in his essay entitled “The Harmony of the Spheres.” Being a celebrated classicist, Cornford surely knows inside-out the subtle discrepancy between the implications of harmony in English and those of harmonia and symphǀnia in Greek. Notwithstanding the clear distinction which he clarifies in the argument, he enriches the multifold significance of the Greek term harmonia by blending the harmony of music not only with the harmony of the cosmos, but also with the harmony of the soul and the harmony of the society. Cornford discusses various themes related to the harmony of the spheres. Particularly thought-provoking are his explications of the macrocosm of the cosmos or universe and the microcosm of the individual from the Pythagorean perspective. According to him, the cosmos originally signified order and beauty. The very essence of order is a measure or limit

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Introduction

imposed upon the infinite. The very feature of beauty that lies in the celestial harmonia consisted in the intervals of a musical scale that is supposed to be always present, but inaudible to the human ears. Modeled upon the macrocosm of the cosmos, the microcosm of the individual is a mimesis or reproduction. More specifically, this microcosm of the individual stands for the soul, in which its health and beauty are dependent on the proportions, rhythms, or equipoise of contending elements. All this is determined by the golden mean or the virtue of temperance that excludes both excess and deficiency in respect to the turbulence of passions and desires. Thus in virtue the soul achieves moral order and beauty.5 Allegorically, the fourfold sensibility mentioned by Cornford appears to be hierarchical. It starts from the aesthetic sensibility for musical order and beauty, goes up to the moral sensibility for virtuous order and beauty, continues up to the social sensibility for social order and beauty, and eventually climbs to the top to the universal sensibility for universal order and beauty. Coincidently, this progression corresponds somewhat to the Confucian notion of hé qua musical harmonia and social harmony in certain spheres. That means to upgrade one’s state of being and develop a kind of celestial sensibility for the celestial harmonia, or the universal sensibility for the universal order and beauty. This could be understood in light of both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. This would lead us to assume that if each of us tries to seek this goal for the sake of humankind in its entirety, the world would be a better, more harmonious place in which to live.

Notes 1. The Chinese notion of harmony (hé) runs through the thoughts of Confucianism and Daoism, as is discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine of this volume. Hé is the Latinized transliteration (pinyin) of the Chinese character ઼. The Chinese language is tonal by nature, featuring four distinct tones. Hé is marked with the third tone and is distinguished from the first, second, and fourth tones as regards spelling, pronunciation, and meaning. This is similar in some ways to ancient Greek. Many Chinese notions find no equivalents in modern Western languages. This being the case, the notion of hé is, like many others, rendered according to the specific context in which it is being discussed. Nevertheless, its essential meaning bears the basic sense of harmony, peace, concord, reconciliation, and harmonization. In addition, hé is so spelled in the tonal form as to avoid confusion with the English third-person pronoun, “he.” 2. The translation is by Keping Wang. The original Chinese version follows: “jun zi hé er bu tong, xiao ren tong er bu hé.” Its English rendering is rephrased with reference to the above two versions apart from a bilingual one by Cai Xiqin and Lai Bo. Cf. Confucius 1994, 244; 1995, 185.

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3.

The original Chinese version follows: “xiang yuan, de zhi zei ye” (cf. Confucius 1995, 17:13, 231). 4. The Chinese original transliterated in its Latinized pinyin system goes as follows: “li zhi yong, hé wei gui. Xian wang zhi dao, si wei mei; da xiao you zhi. You suo bu xing, zhi hé er hé, bu yi li jie zhi, yi bu ke xing ye.” The English translation here is modified with a particular reference to that of the same passage in these two versions as follows: (1) “Of the things brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable. Of the ways of the Former Kings, this is the most beautiful, and is followed alike in matters great and small, yet this will not always work: to aim always at harmony without regulating it by the rites simply because one knows only about harmony will not, in fact, work” (Confucius 1979, 1:12, 61). (2) “In practicing the rules of propriety, appropriateness is to be prized. In the ways prescribed by the ancient kings, this is the excellent quality, and in things small and great we follow them. Yet it is not to be observed in all cases. If one, knowing how such appropriateness should be prized, manifests it, without regulating it by the rules of propriety, this likewise is not to be done.” (69). 5. To justify this point, Cornford uses poetry: The man that hath no music in himself, Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils; The motions of his spirit are dull as night, And his affections dark as Erebus: Let no such man be trusted. Dust as we are, the immortal spirit grows Like harmony in music, there is a dark Inscrutable workmanship that reconciles Discordant elements, makes them cling together In one society. (1950, 14–15, 20)

References Chan, Wing-tsit. 1973. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Confucius. 1979. The Analects. Translated by D. C. Lau. London: Penguin. —. 1994. Analects of Confucius. Translated by Cai Xiqin and Lai Bo. Beijing: Sinolingua. —. 1995. The Confucian Analects in the Four Books. Translated by James Legge. Changsha: Hunan Chubanshe. Cornford, F. M. 1950. “The Harmony of the Spheres.” In The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays, edited by W. K. C. Guthrie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Demenchonok, Edward, ed. 2010. “Rethinking Cultural Diversity: Intercultural Discourse and Transculture.” In Philosophy after Hiroshima, edited by Edward Demenchonok, 447–476. Newcastle upon Tyne:

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Introduction

Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Heraclitus. 2010. “Text 7” and “Text 132.” In The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy, translated and edited by Daniel W. Graham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McBride, William L. 2010. “Philosophy as Global Dialogue and the Rejection of Gratuitous Military Violence.” In Philosophy after Hiroshima, edited by Edward Demenchonok, 419–430. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Wang, Keping. 2007. “A Rediscovery of Heaven-and-Human Oneness.” Journal of American Economics and Sociology 66 (1): 237–259. Zhang Zai 1975. “Taihe pian” [On great harmony]. In Zhangzi zhengmeng zhu [Commentary on Zhang Zi’s works], edited by Wang Fuzhi. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju. (The English rendering is slightly modified with particular reference to Wing-tsit Chan’s translation.)

PART I CULTURAL IDENTITY AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO HOMOGENIZING GLOBALIZATION

CHAPTER ONE BRIDGING THE GAPS: THE VOICES OF NON-WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES IN GLOBAL POLYLOGUE ENRIQUE DUSSEL

Intercultural dialogue, which has been ongoing since the beginning of the twenty-first century as a cultural and political priority, should have inter-philosophical global dialogue as its epistemological and ontological foundation. To be truly global, this dialogue should not be limited by the philosophers and philosophies of Western countries (industrialized global North), but should also include the philosophers and the philosophical thought of non-Western regions (developing global South). This crosscultural philosophical dialogue, or polylogue, should aim not only at a better mutual understanding and collaboration among the philosophers of the North and of the South, but also at a closer communication and collaboration among philosophers of the different countries of the global South. A dialogue between the philosophy of the North and that of the South is necessary, but still does not exist in a true sense. One cause is their asymmetrical relationships. The Eurocentric or Western-centric views are still predominant in contemporary philosophy. For many Western philosophers, Eurocentrism (sometimes inadvertent) underpins their belief in the universality of their philosophical views, causing them to underestimate or ignore other philosophical traditions. On the other hand, philosophers from non-Western regions frequently fall into the trap of a Eurocentric prejudice if they don’t know the history of philosophy in their own countries, and instead limit themselves merely to commenting on and interpreting the works of European philosophers. Some of them may fall into the opposite trap of ethnocentric fundamentalism. Therefore, all of them need to engage in critical self-reflection to overcome Eurocentric or other ethnocentric limitations of their views, to be open-minded regarding cultural diversity of today’s world, and to be open toward dialogue with the other as equals. Only under these conditions—within an ethical framework of the relationships of

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symmetry, respect, and openness to truth—can a dialogue between the philosophy of the North and that of the South truly begin. One of the manifestations of this cross-cultural dialogue was the North-South philosophical dialogue started in the late 1980s between European and Latin American philosophers (due to Karl-Otto Apel’s and my initiatives), in which intellectuals from other regions of the world have also been participating. The first seminar of this dialogue on the theme “Philosophy of Liberation: Foundations of Ethics in Germany and Latin America” took place in November 1989 in Freiburg. It was followed by seminars on a regular basis on both continents, resulting in a series of publications (see Apel, Dussel, and Fornet-Betancourt 1992; Dussel 1994, 1996; Fornet-Betancourt 1992; Sidekum 1994; Fornet-Betancourt 1996, 1998, 1999, 2003). At the same time, special attention needs to be paid to fostering dialogue among philosophers of the countries of the global South. Historically, there has been a disproportionate concentration in the global North of the exercise of cultural, political, economic, and military power (including of power characterized by inequalities of race and gender, among other factors) against the global South of the former colonial world, which as we have seen began to be configured in the sixteenth century. This asymmetry has been intensified since the Industrial Revolution in Latin America, Bantu Africa, the Arab and Islamic world, and Southeast Asia and India, including China (although it was not directly colonized, but was affected by Western power from the nineteenth century onward). Thus, it is necessary to begin an inter-philosophical dialogue between the world’s post-colonial communities; that is, a South-South philosophical dialogue. Such dialogue is necessary for further development of the philosophies rooted in diverse cultural traditions. It is also necessary for those philosophies that are striving for recognition. For more than three decades, modern Western philosophy decreed the inexistence as philosophy, strictly speaking, of all of the philosophical exercises undertaken in those countries that have suffered the effects of the colonialism imposed by the European metropolitan powers. It is thus imperative that the philosophers of the South meet in recognition of their existence as such, grounded in the traditions that they have cultivated in the regional philosophies from which they have emerged. These philosophers need to clarify their positions, develop working hypotheses, and then, upon this basis, initiate a fertile NorthSouth inter-philosophical dialogue, with a well-defined agenda previously elaborated by the philosophies based in the cultures of the so-called underdeveloped countries of the global periphery (which has been exploited by colonialist capitalism that has become globalized and is today in crisis).

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This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I will analyze the factors that impeded the development of the regional philosophies in the South. I will focus on philosophical coloniality and its various aspects. In the second part, I will address the problems of economic, political, and cultural liberation of the South. Within this context, I will outline some of the themes for an agenda for a South-South philosophical dialogue. My approach to these issues is set forth in the form of simple theses that might contribute to this dialogue, with the intention that they be tested in the forthcoming debates as bases for possible consensus regarding central themes. These themes must be prioritized and ranked in their order of importance with a view toward more focused, specific dialogues at later stages of this process. There, they can be explored in greater detail as part of agreed upon frameworks that could be taught at the secondary level, high schools, universities, and other institutes of learning, where they can help spark new working hypotheses and innovative research projects derived from the new philosophical paradigm presented here.

Postcolonial Philosophies in Search of Their Identities and Recognition Metropolitan Modernity and the Colonial Worlds As a starting point for this dialogue, I suggest reflecting on the significance and implications of the current situation of contemporary postcolonial philosophy, the causes of its prostration, as well as of its supposed lack of fertility, invisibility, and non-existence in the eyes of our fellow philosophers in the so-called periphery. How did this situation come about? How can this alleged non-existence of the regional philosophies be overcome? Which are the themes that should be explored, and in what order? This is also reflected in the existing system of education. In some regions of the South or postcolonial world, the histories of our regional philosophies, some of which have ancient roots dating back centuries and even thousands of years, have begun to be written for the first time and to be renovated with new criteria. It has been a long time since the history of our philosophies ceased to be a central aspect of the formation of our university students of philosophy. The long prevailing tendency has been to simply transplant the curriculums developed in European or United States’ universities (the latter particularly since the end of World War II). All of this reflects a dismal state of affairs that, as one of the manifest fruits of a cultural colonialism, must be confronted.

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Chapter One

The discussion regarding which have been the factors that impeded the development of our regional philosophies in the South, and the order in which they arose, ought to be the first item on the agenda. This must be explored upon the basis of a full awareness of its importance. My point of departure is that all philosophies (Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Amerindian) have inevitably been ethnocentric in character, since their origin lies in a certain ontological naïveté that considers each world (each cultural totality assumed as a complete grasp of the meaning of human existence), and as the center around which the rest of the world rotates. This ethnocentrism, however, was empirically local and regional in character. Even the immense Chinese empire, which always assumed itself to be the center of the universe, was always centered on its particularity, with only the most incipient consciousness of its near and distant surroundings. But it was only in the European context, beginning during the fifteenth century of the Common Era, that such traditional expressions of ethnocentrism, for the first time in the history of humanity, reached the most distant confines of the planet itself. It was then that Chinese, Portuguese, and Spanish navigators, for the first time, achieved the circumnavigation of the globe, which made possible the expansion of the European version of what was merely another particularistic, localized ethnocentrism into an ethnocentrism on a global scale. This included first the modern expansion of Mediterranean Europe, and later that of Northern Europe, which together marked the inception of what we describe today as globalization. European modernity emerged simultaneously with this process of globalization thanks to the mercantile centrality of the North Atlantic (which displaced that of the Mediterranean), the emergence of capitalism as a historical phenomenon, Eurocentrism, and the scientific and technological revolution that resulted from the combination of all of these factors. All of this was also the origin of a modern philosophy that laid claim to the privilege of being the sole vehicle for the deployment of human reason, one capable of transcending the narratives of mythology. This philosophy has not only the pretension of being universal, planetary, and the expression of human reason as such, but also categorizes all of the other regional philosophies of the South as “backward,” naïve, and particular. The argumentation of this philosophy was focused on the demonstration of the superiority of European civilization, and thus gradually that of its philosophical thought—once the process of the Spanish conquest of the Americas began at the end of the fifteenth century in the Caribbean (with all of the cultural conflicts that were inherent in this process). The European military conquests and the destruction of pre-existent commercial

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routes helped impede other cultures, subsequently matching European levels of development. It sought to prevent them from progressing on the basis of a new perspective of world history distinct from that inaugurated by the original world-system emerging with the so-called discovery of the New World. Cultures that were colonized sought to defend themselves by reiterating the value of their past glories, but this was not a sufficient basis for them to resist the new developments that ensued or to formulate arguments that were effective against the superiority assumed by their European adversaries. In the end, they were largely swept away by events. For centuries, they were not able to confront the new European philosophy. This overall landscape should not be exaggerated, however, because in reality, significant moments of specific creativity were found in all regions of the South. But these were soon diminished in significance from the regional histories of these philosophies by comparison with the prevalence of the advances achieved by modern European philosophy beginning with Descartes, which attained a hegemony that is still unsurpassed among the colonial élites. A specific kind of historical judgment soon became diffused throughout the periphery. True, a certain kind of philosophical discourse was conducted with locally important figures. But how could this be compared with the thought of Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, or Rudolf Carnap? But this question, namely, how to compare the thought of the great European philosophers read everywhere and by everyone to that of local philosophers who lacked global recognition and were never canonized, was poorly formulated. As a result, the responses it inspired were incomplete and complicit, serving only to blur and bury the historical truths at issue. Until recently, in Latin America it was said, “there is no Latin American philosophy!” This would be true if, by philosophy, one understands the practice of the kind of theoretical discourse that had been developed in the context of modern European philosophy. But certainly in the Latin American context there have been numerous philosophers and philosophical currents that have helped lay the basis for cultural, political, economic, or technological processes, and that have interpreted the meaning of life within the cultural contexts of our region. But these efforts obtained regional, not global, recognition, as might be expected within the framework of a peripheral culture. The fact is that European colonial domination was not only military, economic, and political, but was also ideological, cultural, and at root philosophical. We must, therefore, give serious thought to the causes that produced the eclipse of the philosophies of the South, so that we can clearly comprehend the negative factors that must be overcome before we can

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undertake the process of developing the philosophies of the post-colonial, peripheral, or dominated regions of the world.

The Colonial Dimensions of Economic, Technological, and Military Expansion At the end of the fifteenth century, Europe was completely delimited and surrounded by the Ottoman Empire. The Muslims laid siege to Vienna until well into the seventeenth century, and did not cease to occupy Granada (the last region representative of the splendor of the ancient Caliphate of Cordoba) until January 1492. The Latino-Germanic region of Europe (not that of the Byzantine or oriental Empire) was peripheral, underdeveloped, and cornered by the Islamic world. Thus, Europe was unable to connect itself with the “Old World” envisioned by Adam Smith. Its only path in that direction lay through the ports of the Italian cities that dominated the traffic of the Eastern Mediterranean and, from there, to Fatimid Egypt or Syrian Antioch. Eventually, that route led to Baghdad or to the caravans, which reached China through the deserts of the north, or India via Kabul, and north of the Black Sea all the way to Constantinople, or across the Red Sea or Persian Gulf toward Hindustan and the China Sea. This Europe, during the so-called Middle Ages,1 could only break through its isolation from the North-East (through the principality of Moscow, which reached into Siberia and arrived at the Pacific at the beginning of the seventeenth century), or via the west through Portugal and Spain. Then, the Portuguese shipbuilders’ introduction of the caravel in 1441, along with the slow dominion of the Oceans—thanks to Chinese maps of the Atlantic and Pacific, and other Chinese navigational technology such as the compass2—enabled Europe to discover and manage the Atlantic Ocean. It became then the geopolitical center of European modernity. The development of naval and military technology enabled Portugal to take control of the maritime commercial routes of Africa, the Indian Ocean, India, the Moluccas, and the coasts of China and Japan. Spain established the first European continental colonialism in Latin America and imposed it upon the continent’s original inhabitants (Mesoamericans, Incas, Tupi-Guaraní) for three hundred years (from the end of the fifteenth century until the beginning of the nineteenth century, approximately). Upon the emergence of the first phase of Early Modernity,3 this expansion, due to greater levels of development of military strategy and technology by comparison with the cultures of native Latin America, established an economic system of mercantile and monetary capitalism. Capitalizing on the extraction of silver, gold, and colonial goods, this system was

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founded upon inhumane domination of the continent’s indigenous peoples and the Atlantic slave trade, which incorporated western Africa into a triangle of death structured around the relationship between Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Europe transported arms to Africa, and from there, slaves were transported to the Americas (and later to the English colonies in North America). Slavery enabled the growth of the market in silver, gold (money), and tropical products (sugar, cacao, tobacco, etc.), transactions that took place in and through Europe, allowing profits to be accumulated in its banks. This was the period of capitalist “primitive accumulation.” Later it would be the Dutch, English, French, and Danes who landed in India and the rest of Asia, after which European capitalist commerce, with its center in Europe, achieved global dimensions. The tragic component inherent in the process that produced the capitalist economic world-system is that the colonial world was interpreted as one inhabited by beings whose humanity was disputed and who were exploitable. They were treated as if they belonged to a secondary class of human beings in anthropological, ontological, and ethical-political terms, as we shall see. The original inhabitants of the colonized regions of the global South were thus assumed to be sub-humans, whose domination by Europeans supposedly endowed them at the same time with a limited degree of enhanced humanity. From the European perspective, coloniality was interpreted as a kind of gift: the endowment of humanity. This ideological core, which underlies all the other modern ideologies, has prevailed until the present. From their origins, the emerging modern states (Spain, Portugal, the United Provinces of Holland, England, France, and Denmark) combined the following interrelated characteristics: (1) royal domination of state churches (Christendom or Christlichkeit in German, which is not the same as Christianity) (Loewith 1964, pt. 2, chap. 5; Dussel 2011, chap. 4); (2) coloniality; (3) mercantilist versions of capitalism, and (4) Eurocentrism. The coloniality of power (a concept clarified by the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano) of the European colonial metropolises was expressed in diverse forms of domination imposed upon their dependent colonies. The coloniality of the members of the colonial communities impeded participation of the colonized peoples as proper citizens; they enjoyed neither political nor human rights equivalent to those of the European metropolitan subjects. This explains how it was possible, within this context, for the French Revolution to issue the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens in August 1789 (the first list of its kind of ostensibly universal human rights),4 while at the same time applying its Code noir (Black code), which defined duties and restricted the rights of Caribbean slaves. Code noir was

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the governing law in the French colony of Haiti (whose slave rebellion in 1791 finally led to independence in 1804). These slaves evidently were considered neither human nor the subject of the new universal human rights proclaimed by a bourgeois, colonialist revolution in metropolitan France. In short, it considered the citizens of the metropolis to be equal, fraternal, and free, but considered the slaves of the South to be nonhumans who were inherently unequal and thus the legitimate objects of domination.5 Violent military coercion guaranteed economic theft, which was not considered to obligate the metropolitan center in terms of a debt owed to the colonies (and which would involve a just payment of interest). What was at issue was the direct appropriation of goods belonging to someone else pursuant to a purported right of conquest, which always in fact implied an imposition grounded on superior military force. Jürgen Habermas has correctly emphasized that any consensus must be achieved as the result of the symmetrical, rational participation of all those affected. But the political dimension of colonialism implied instead the asymmetrical imposition, by force, not of a rational consensus, but of an irrational will to power exercised by the center against the periphery. Nonetheless, the philosophers of the center speak today of rights, symmetry, and democracy (without criticizing wars conducted today to “establish democracy” in the “backward” countries of the South), without ever acknowledging the last 500 years of irrational, colonialist, and antidemocratic political and military violence and its negative effects, in which they are implicated. The political philosophy of the South today must rethink all philosophical tradition from Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill through the Frankfurt School, Carl Schmitt, Alain Badiou, or Giorgio Agamben, to name just a few, who have not yet succeeded in overcoming the Eurocentrism that has always accompanied the political expansion of Europe, and now that of the United States.

Colonialism and the Search for its Ontological-Philosophical Justification From the beginning, colonial praxis has relied upon a philosophical justification as its foundation. This is the point of departure for modern European philosophy with its universality claim, which unfortunately is accepted by most of the members of the philosophical academies of the South. This justification also had an anthropological character, which implied the assumption of the superiority of European human beings over

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those of the South,6 as well as historical underpinnings,7 and ethical aspects8 that served to justify colonialism. But the ultimate foundation was ontological in character. The European “I,” pronounced over the South for over a century and a half, began in 1492, with the factual formulation “I conquer the New World” projecting itself as a universal ontological foundation for the “I” as such. This status as a central Ego (Ichheit) around which everything revolved was inadvertently European: a European “I” with the pretension of discovering itself to be universal and ultimate, which knows itself, and which can reconstruct all of the world (including all of the worlds contained within the South). It is within this context that René Descartes, during the second phase of Early Modernity, enunciated his Ego cogito. This Ego, this metropolitan European “I”—I repeat: inadvertently “European,” and male, white, adult, metropolitan—is the ontological-philosophical foundation of what Martin Heidegger will denominate as the “world” (Welt) in Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) (1927). Of course, Heidegger sought to demonstrate that this “I” is founded upon a “Being-in-theWorld” that is always presupposed (see Dussel 2008). In 1637, Descartes’ Discourse on Method served as the manifesto of modern European philosophy, and it has maintained its role as the supposed universal philosophy throughout the last 400 years (ibid.). The need to overcome this Eurocentric vision must be the primary objective of a dialogue among philosophers from the post-colonial regions, who continue to be treated as if we were still colonial subjects in epistemological and philosophical terms in the vast majority of our spaces for philosophical and academic reflection within the universities of the South. In large part, philosophers on the periphery have been relegated to being mere commentators on modern European philosophy. We have failed to reflect on our reality, which has been negated and dismissed by that philosophy which has laid claim to universality. Colonialism is not a thing of the past, but remains effective in the present. This is what Quijano’s term aims to theorize for us today in the alleged age of post-colonialism. To the coloniality of power, namely to the ways in which colonialism still conditions global relations, we must add philosophical coloniality, that is, the ways in which philosophical claims from the colonies and peripheral countries remain always suspect and never worthy of philosophical consideration. Now, philosophical coloniality presents two faces: (1) One is the metropolitan face: that developed in the center of the world systems, and which, due to the claim to universality of its European metropolitan regional philosophy since the sixteenth century, negated and

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marginalized the contributions of the pre-Cartesian ethical and political philosophy that flourished during the period of the First Early Modernity. These contributions and appropriations have either disappeared from or been written out of the histories of modern philosophy. (2) The other is the peripheral face: in the global South—because of the prevailing and unquestioning acceptance of the supposed evidence that said European philosophy is the universal one, and which has imposed itself throughout the last few centuries—peripheral philosophy is thought to be either non-existent or not worthy of study. This presupposes ignorance of the regional philosophies of the periphery about their origins (prior to and together with that of European modernity); a negative evaluation of the significance of its own philosophies throughout the last 500 years; and the definition of philosophy (in the colonial philosophy of the South) as commentary regarding the European modern philosophy (that has a universal claim) that denies even the very existence of the South’s own philosophies. In addition, there is a marked tendency—in this colonial philosophy of the South—toward argumentation that they are allegedly useless, or superfluous, or even impossible. Philosophical coloniality, in the South, then means that colonial philosophy, in a negative sense, is that which is practiced at the periphery by those who act pursuant to the premises of Eurocentrism and who deny their own regional and local philosophies. From the perspective of the center, modern philosophy negates all other philosophies (from the South) and categorizes them as being equivalent to mythological, folkloric, conventional, backward, particularistic, or pseudo-philosophical thinking.

Agenda for a South-South Philosophical Dialogue Liberation from Philosophical Coloniality The concrete historical processes of national or regional liberation in the face of European colonialism9 lay the foundation for the emergence of a philosophy of liberation from colonialism that marked a creative moment that should be taken into account. These political, economic, and cultural moments of liberation must also be considered in relation to a philosophical process as well. We must also attend to the fact that since philosophy is born intertwined with political praxis, it contributed to laying the foundation for a justification of this age of emancipation from colonialism. It will be necessary therefore to be especially attentive to the historical reconstruction of the philosophy of the South (in singular or plural, for it is also necessary to highlight the “phi-

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losophies” of the South). It is simply impossible to conceive of an autonomous, creative, truly free philosophy in the South within the tortuous, suffocating limits of the political, economic, and cultural horizons of a community that has been colonized, subjugated, exploited, and oppressed. As Augusto Salazar Bondy wrote in 1969, in neocolonial Peru it is very difficult to construct an authentic philosophy in a dependent, colonial context. The post-colonial situation (which is not exempt from neoliberal or other new economic, political, geopolitical, or epistemological variants of colonialism) is the contemporary framework of conditions that make liberation from colonial philosophy possible within the context of a new stage of creativity. In my view, this is the current responsibility of philosophers claiming to be thinkers who regard the reality that surrounds them, as European philosophers did in the context of their reality, in its metropolitan and colonial context. This goes much beyond merely being the commentators of philosophical works from which a great deal can be learned, but which (as it must be understood) are the expression of thinking grounded in another reality. To confuse European or United States’ reality with ours simply constitutes a fallacy of dislocation.10

The Affirmation of the Ancestral Cultures of the South Philosophy does not imply an isolated process of theoretical production. Instead, it is one that involves a commitment to the world around us. The claim to the absolute autonomy from the world is what characterizes the efforts of a certain school of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy, which nonetheless supposes all of the history of philosophy from the Vienna Circle to the philosophy of language in the British Isles. This type of philosophy dismisses the history of philosophy as such, while in fact, all of this, of course, must be situated in specific cultural worlds and philosophical cultures, located in the universities of certain countries, and in particular historical moments with concrete characteristics that explain their emergence, development, and current crisis. The Frankfurt School, French existentialism, and phenomenology—all argued that a philosophy abstracted from its cultural, economic, and historical context is impossible. Thomas Kuhn demonstrated that scientific revolutions (and thus those of a philosophical character as well) depend not only on intra-scientific events but also on extra-scientific factors that help determine their emergence. Nevertheless, for their part, Eurocentric or Western-centric philosophies in the South, in post-colonial countries such as Latin America, Africa, or Asia, equally seek to practice a universal philosophy such as that of the

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modern European type within their own cultural horizon.11 This compels them to accept certain apparent forms of evidence that constitute unquestionable dogmas within modern European philosophy, such as that philosophy itself is of Greek origin marked by the transition from myth to logos. However, this formulation is inaccurate. Today, it is widely recognized that long before Greece there was philosophy in the Mesopotamian kingdoms dating back to the fourth century BCE, and in Egypt. Thales of Miletus, the first recognized Greek philosopher, came from a family of Phoenician origin (Dussel 2011). Regarding the relationship between mythology and philosophy, Aristotle considered the latter to be a form of mythopoiesis. Greek philosophy as a whole (beginning with the preSocratics such as Thales of Miletus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Parmenides) was completely immersed in a world permeated by myth. For example, the psykhe (soul) in Plato is but a myth of Hindustani origin, which cannot be demonstrated by means of empirical evidence. What are the Enneads of Plotinus but an expression of the metaphysical cosmic mathematics characteristic of Egyptian culture? Based on the assumption (according to the modern European definition of philosophy) of the allegedly irrational and anti-philosophical character of myths and religious narratives (which instead were characterized by Paul Ricoeur as rational philosophical narratives based on symbols), modernity negated any validity of the philosophical narratives that contained myths of the cultures of the South, including those of China and India dating back millennia. The same is true for the Iranian-Aristotelian tradition of scientific and empirical character in the Arab world. In order to reconstruct the philosophies of the South, it is necessary to counter the influence of modern European secularism, to restore the validity and significance of the traditions of these regions of the world, including those of a mythical character, and to subject them to an adequate hermeneutical interpretation. It is the methodology of interpretation (hermeneutics), which is philosophical; but the text or narrative subjected to this process can be mythical, poetic, or non-philosophical, and the result of this interpretation is thus hermeneutically a work of philosophy. We must recover the symbolic narratives of our ancestral cultures in the South, regardless of whether they are philosophical, mythical, or religious in character (even those texts categorized as theophanic or revelatory), to subject them to a philosophical labor within the overall framework of the process of reconstructing our traditions. The local reality of the South, to which I have alluded, is enveloped in myth, as is that of modern philosophy, and must be considered a humanist, rational, and symbolic point of departure for a history and philosophy of the South (Hinkelammert 2009).12

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The Philosophy of the South as a Critique of Coloniality In addition to considering the themes suggested so far in this essay, the situation of South America (as differentiated from that of “Latin” America as a whole) in particular, and that of the “Arab Spring” or “Jasmine Revolution” are key indicators of deep processes of political renewal that also demand correspondingly new levels of philosophical reflection. The point of departure must be an understanding of the epistemologically colonial character of philosophy—of its methods, themes, use of sources, manners of discourse, the reality in which it is immersed and the community to which it is directed (whether it be the philosophical, intellectual community, or the peoples of the post-colonial world, which is in process of liberation). I also believe that priority should be given to a question that has arisen in dialogues between Arab and Latin American intellectuals: What were the causes that led to the virtual “disappearance” or loss of overall creativity of the philosophies of the South after the emergence of modern European philosophy? Once this question has been fully explored (here I only sketch an initial approach), a philosophical analysis must be developed, which is focused on the destructive tendency of philosophical colonialism with regard to the impact of modern European philosophy. In the absence of this sort of critique of the coloniality of each of the national, regional, or continental philosophies of the cultural entities of the South, subsequent philosophical creativity and symmetry throughout the South will be impossible. When I refer to “symmetry” in this context, what I am suggesting is the need to develop a psychological attitude and a normative approach that would make it possible for those of us in the South to consider and treat academic colleagues in Europe and the United States as “equals.” We should free ourselves of false respect for knowledge with claim to universality that could be negated by philosophers in the South once they possess the historical, cultural, and philosophical tools of the same quality as their colleagues in the metropolitan centers. At minimum, this would enable our peers in the South to uncover the signs within us of an inadvertent Eurocentrism or Western-centrism that we have ignored. The accusation of Eurocentrism (expressed in terms of either ignorance of the South or as ignorance of one’s own Eurocentrism) puts colleagues from either the center or the periphery in an uncomfortable and unaccustomed situation. With regard to the philosophies of the “North” and of the “South,” the imputation of Eurocentrism destabilizes both—the previously assured centrality and universality of the former and the assumed superfluity or dependency of the latter—thus casting doubt on the ultimate superiority of the philosophy of the “North” before the philosophers of the “South.”

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When a philosopher from the “periphery” falls into the trap of formulating a Eurocentric judgment (for example, due to their ignorance regarding the history of philosophy in the South), a well-informed philosopher could exclaim: “What you are reflecting is the expression of a Eurocentric philosophy that judges what is in fact unknown to you.” It is likely that in dealing with these issues, the confident, secure professors at the “center” may lose their serenity or get angry, which would only make things worse (intensifying the arguments deployed against his or her positioning), or might react constructively and begin to reflect and accept the criticisms proffered. It is only at this stage that a slow dialogue between the philosophy of the North and that of the South can truly begin—which is so necessary, yet virtually nonexistent—within an ethical framework of symmetry, respect, and openness to the truth.

The Unfolding of a Philosophy of the South: Philosophical Themes for a South-South Dialogue I believe that a necessary precondition for fertile South-South dialogue in the future is that critical philosophers from the global South (not those who simply teach or comment on the philosophers of the North) undertake deep discussions, with sufficient time, to determine which are the problems, themes, and hypotheses for reflection on which they should focus in the future. These meetings would provide participants the opportunity to explore each of the most fundamental themes or hypotheses to assess their deeper significance within a community of dialogue, and allow them to arrive at the levels of consensus that, in turn, could lay the basis for a truly planetary philosophy. A key priority for the initial stages of development of a network of philosophies of the South should be study, debate, exposition, and publication of histories of philosophy in each of our countries, continents, and regions. It is notable that the first histories of the national philosophies of the South are beginning to appear.13 At the same time, we must also prioritize the publication of the classical works of the philosophies of the South, ideally from their origins, but at least since the end of the fifteenth century. To achieve these objectives, it is also crucial to avoid a kind of fundamentalism that would lead to the exclusion of, or mere commentary on, other philosophical currents (beyond those of the South, including those rooted in European modernity). The exclusionary approach is disdainful of dialogue and fails to have due regard for the best of European modernity. The latter conceives itself as modern, but does not serve the interests of the South as a community of reference. At the same time, the philosophical

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community of the European or Western center disdains the South for its lack of originality. Its contributions are dismissed as, at best, simply “registering” the latest intellectual productions from Europe or the United States with commentaries that come too late and lack any real importance either in the South (because of their culturally distant character) or in the center (because they lack creativity and a vanguard quality). Those of us who are able to effectively combine proficiency in our own regional tradition within the South and the knowledge of the latest achievements of European or United States’ philosophy, together with a commitment to shed light on contemporary aspects of the regional or local reality in the South, will be best positioned to contribute creatively to the new philosophical reflections. Those contributions along these lines, which address and describe relevant, previously unknown themes, have the potential to become a kind of spearhead for philosophical thinking that is both innovative and well founded. Philosophers of the South are uniquely situated to reflect critically on the ethical, political, anthropological, ontological, and epistemological dimensions of our realities in the context of examples such as Latin America (given the contributions of its political experiences of transformation in Bolivia, Venezuela, or Brazil), China (amid its hyper-industrial revolution), India (with its developments in electronics), and the Islamic world (in the wake of the “Arab Spring” or “Jasmine Revolution”). Precision, seriousness, well-founded argumentation, relevance to one’s own reality, beauty in the process of exposition, pedagogical and explanatory quality, and a sense of conviction are all characteristics that should be reflected in the contemporary philosophies of the South. In this manner, the community of philosophers of the center will “learn” about new themes, with new methods, within the framework of a dialogue enriched by new participants. The philosophy of the South meanwhile will revive its creativity (annihilated at the end of the fifteenth century, with the inception of the coloniality of knowledge that extinguished the philosophies of the South).

Premonitions of the Dawning of a Pluriversal Transmodern Age A decentering of the world system is currently taking place before our eyes regarding countries with increased political, economic, and military autonomy. This includes the emergence of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) among others, along with the intensification of economic crises in Europe and Japan and controversy regarding the limits of US militarism, which lays the foundation for the following questions:



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CHAPTER TWO TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN A CONFLICTED WORLD RAÚL FORNET-BETANCOURT

Philosophical reflection on the multifaceted theme of dialogue, and in particular on “dialogue as an idea” and “dialogue as an experience,” raises questions regarding the conditions of the possibility (or impossibility) of dialogue itself. A philosophy of dialogue or, more modestly, the attempt to conduct philosophical reflection on dialogue in the context of the real world—a world so shaken by violence—should in my view begin with the consideration that for us, as human beings, dialogue is as much an idea as it is an experience. I point this out right at the start because of its signifi1 cance and centrality to the theme of this chapter. The expressions “dialogue as an idea” and “dialogue as experience” help us to see from the outset the tension between the “ideal” and the “real,” in which context the whole experience of dialogue is realized. These two dimensions of the matter that here concerns us are valid as subject matters by themselves, and could indeed be treated separately. In this context, I speak of this tension to highlight the problematic relation between theory and practice that can be observed on the horizon of what we call dialogue—or, more properly, dialogues. From this point of view, then, the theme of this chapter leads us to the theory and practice of dialogue; in other words, how we understand and practice dialogue in the processes of communication that we initiate or in which we are engaged in some way, and which can be carried out in very different manners for each dialogue. The first part of the chapter analyzes the role of dialogue as a process of critical self-examination and revision of the historico-cultural and existential conditions under which we currently practice it. The second part addresses questions about the possible contribution of philosophy to intercultural dialogue in a conflicted world.

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A Dialogue that Sustains Our Humanity From these preliminary reflections, we can deduce that certain expectations are incumbent upon everyone who engages in the dialogic process. Primary among these expectations is the duty for participants to ask of themselves how they will handle the problematic relation between theory and practice in the dialogic process. Thus, reflections on these aspects and expectations that I have proposed as a means of approaching the issue that concerns us here are united in a question to ourselves that we cannot avoid. This question is a crucial one, for any other question about the thematic complex of dialogue, theoretical or practical, first requires us to pose this question to ourselves. In other words, each question that we have in relation to dialogue is a question that ultimately refers back to us. Dialogue is an appeal to our humanity. It is an “interpellation” to human beings.2 An in-depth analysis reveals that a dialogue for us as human beings is neither an “object” of investigation, nor an external instrumental dimension, but a constitutive part of our most intimate human reality. Much more than merely part of the human condition, dialogue is the primordial substance from which human beings—with corresponding ambivalence—develop their humanity and discern their situation in the world. Succinctly stated, a dialogue is what sustains the very nature of our humanity. In this sense, one can say that the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin was right when he spoke of humankind as a conversation—a conversation through which we as human beings can come to knowledge of our authentic selves and true destiny in the world or, if one prefers, our historical vocation (1923, 343; cf. Heidegger 1981, 33ff.). This perspective was further developed in a range of philosophical currents during the twentieth century, and from very different positions.3 If this perspective is valid, then we have some grounds upon which to insist that all reflection about dialogue has to take into consideration that the constitutive fundamentality of dialogue for and with us exists prior to any instrumentalization or instrumental “use” of dialogue, or any programming of discursive strategies. This means that as human beings, prior to beginning any communication, we are already in dialogue. In other words, the dialogism of history, that sustains us and from which we emerge, is a necessary condition for human beings to be able to enter into dialogue. For a better understanding of this idea, before continuing I propose to interject two brief observations designed to clarify the concept of dialogue presupposed here. The first refers to the distinction between dialogue and discourse, which becomes even more illuminating in the context of our

Toward a Philosophy of Intercultural Dialogue in a Conflicted World

45

analysis, since many today think that “discourse” is a much broader concept than dialogue. They only speak of dialogue—when they speak of it at all—in the sense of a “special form of discourse” (Heit 2006, 227). However, this interpretation is questionable because it is based on the idea that we live in a “post-metaphysical” era—a problematic idea. The reference to the term “post-metaphysical era” implies that this is an era in which the normal form of communication is composed of discourses that search at most for “agreement” within the framework of the structures of democratic public opinion. This supposes that the extant diversity of the predominant criteria (interpreted relativistically) makes any strong affirmation of a truth claim suspicious or impossible. In contrast to this tendency toward the subordination of dialogue to the dynamic of discourses, I advocate an account that recognizes the line of demarcation between dialogue and discourse precisely through the question of its relationship with truth or, in other words, through the question of the possibility of universal comprehension in diversity. Therefore, as used herein, dialogue is understood to mean that “conversation” that, since Plato, has characterized an intermediate space in which both diversity and unity take are present: a differentiation and encounter with differences, and at the same time a call for a “gathering” of the expressed diversity (Heidegger 1977, from 168; Waldenfels 1990, from 43). This also means that an existential and interpersonal dimension rooted in the life world is always present in dialogue. By contrast, in discourse this dimension is concealed by the dynamics of depersonalized structures and institutions. The second observation aims to elucidate the assertion that we human beings emerge from dialogues and are self-actualized through dialogues. Given the limitations of space, let me simply point out the following: this assertion must be understood against the background presupposition that tradition and community are constitutive of humanity. The human capacity for dialogue is transmitted, and the transmission is realized through tradition and community: hence the necessity of memory. Indeed, without memory, human beings lose the possibility of relating, or of maintaining an appreciation of the history that enjoins them to conversations and facilitates their present conversations. History is contradictory, having both positive and negative aspects. It has its dark side, with many incidents of violence and inhumanity—being in large part a history of the negation of our humanity. Nevertheless, we should recognize that history is also the place where the memory of humanity (Ricoeur 1955) is formed and transmitted. It is this memory that

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commits us to humanity—to dialogism. In contrast, lack of memory of the past is more than an exclusive affirmation of the present; it is a fracture of the link with history, or the detachment of human beings from tradition and community. In this way, we condemn ourselves to an inability to speak, viz., to suicidal isolation. I would add that, in addition to the emphasis on the necessity of relating with tradition and community, no less important is the idea that the essence of dialogue is listening. We are able to speak with one another because we are able to listen to one another (Hölderlin 1923, 343). But now let us return to our point. From what has been said so far, we find that treating the subject matter of dialogue as a question to ourselves signifies, in the first place, the task of examining our genealogy and biography. This task is precisely a review of the quality of what the conversations of the past have contributed to what we are now, as well as a review of the way in which our life and our coexistence constitute dialogue in the present day. In other words, to deal with dialogue as a question to ourselves is an extremely critical task that implies both the work of cultural critique and the “examine of consciousness” at the singular level of biographies. This task is of paramount importance, in my opinion, since the quality of the theory and practice of dialogue in our epoch depends principally on our disposition toward a critical examination of the heritage that transmits our culture to us, as well as to the personal identity that crystallizes in the biography of each as a point of orientation for thinking and acting. This critical self-examination and revision of the historico-cultural and existential conditions under which we currently practice dialogue and think seems to be especially necessary because—as I have already indicated—we are dealing with the discernment of the consequences of a history marked by contradictions and contingency. This means that we also need to consider its other side: the underside of history—that dark side of our history that, through forms of power and domination, has introduced a “counter-finality” into historical development (Sartre 1960). It contradicts the dialogism of human beings, but we internalize it, thus making the continuation of its presence and influence in history possible. We have seen this demonstrated in many past and current conflicts throughout history until this very day. Only in the light of this historical contradiction between dialogue and domination can we understand how fragile and how much in peril is dialogue or, more exactly, human beings themselves as dialogic beings. Considering this background, it is likewise understood that, in reality, perspicacious discernment means—precisely within the

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47

framework of contemporary conditions—the task of elaborating an ethics that would be politically relevant and that would contribute to the protection of the threatened humanity of human beings and of life in general. The second part of this chapter is an attempt to contribute to this task. Nevertheless, I would like to make it clear that I understand my contribution as focused and limited, referring only to some aspects of the philosophical grounding of the necessity of intercultural dialogue in our epoch.

Notes for a Philosophy of Intercultural Dialogue In the previous part, I highlighted, on the one hand, the dialogic nature of human beings and, on the other hand, that the realization of human dialogism is taking place within historical conditions which hinder it. This realization moves within the conditions characterized by a twofold contradiction: a structural contradiction in history and the existential contradictions of the human condition we all share. After taking this into account, the philosophy of intercultural dialogue should then begin by discussing the conditions under which dialogue is thought and practiced today, understanding that it is as much a product of global historical conditions as it is of existential conditions. A philosophy of intercultural dialogue needs to take both dimensions into account in order to avoid proceeding one-sidedly and, thus, to avoid falling either into a structuralism that forgets the subject or a subjectivism that forgets the world.4 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will mainly focus on world historical conditions, emphasizing that they constitute the principle context within which the personal dimension must be viewed, and to which, unfortunately, I can only refer in passing in this chapter. In addition, this emphasis on historical conditions is important in this context to highlight the socio-political significance of a philosophy of intercultural dialogue in our historical present. Highlighting the role of philosophy in this sociopolitical context is more important than emphasizing the contribution of intercultural reflection to the philosophical understanding of the existential experience of dialogue. Hence, at this existential level of analysis, our approach in some respects coincides with the works of the well-known representatives of dialogic and personalist philosophy, such as Martin Buber, Emmanuel Mounier, and Józef Tischner. Let us start with the first question, concerning the historical conditions under which today we have to think about and practice dialogue. At the risk of being accused of adopting the attitude of the terrible “simplificateurs” criticized by Jacob Burckhardt (1980, 203), I would like to say the following in regard to the complex subject matter in question:

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the conflicted character of the world, which presently underpins the theories and practices of dialogue, cannot be explained by the controversial diagnosis of the world political situation in the twenty-first century referred to as the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996). Rather, it is the result of a long process that begins, from the philosophical point of view, with the predominance of calculative reason during the modernity of Central Europe, and in its political aspect with the unbridled expansion of European colonialism beginning in the fifteenth century. The epistemological and political violence that underpins this history of the “reduction” of the other is, in my opinion, the key to understanding the conflicted character of our present time. The objectivizing instrumentalization of the world, toward which calculative reason has led us, as well as the total negation of communication that resulted from alleging that colonialism was the only basis for interpreting the world, are what enabled the enforced silencing of the other. This enforced silencing was, in turn, necessary to drive history on the path of destruction and selfdestruction that continues to the present day, and which defines our present world precisely as conflict-ridden and belligerent. The list of examples that one is able to provide as proof of these destructive processes is unfortunately very long: • wars (including those which are not reported!) that reveal humanity’s self-destruction; • exploitation of nature, which under Western civilization is “growing”; • the ecological crisis caused by unsustainable “progress”; • social exclusion indicative of the ever-deeper division of humanity into rich and poor, and which has to do, above all, with the dissemination of different types of strategies for the globalization of neoliberalism; • contempt for traditions that provide meaning (imposed as a consequence of the supposed necessity of the modernization of humanity). These examples clearly illustrate the conflicted character of our contemporary world. But upon looking deeper, we can see that what they really demonstrate is that this conflicted character has a great deal to do with the lack of dialogical relations and communication, with the silencing or the loss of the word. They show, for example, that during the present epoch, we are not in dialogue with nature. Nature seems to be only a “resource,” and, as such, it is meant to be dominated and exploited.5 Likewise, they show that we have failed to maintain dialogic relations with our fellow human beings. As a result of the “anthropological revolution,”

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which has been carried out with the deployment of the organizing principle of modernity oriented toward the logic of money and private property,6 the principles of community and solidarity have been displaced from social dynamics by selfishness, competition, and thoughtlessness. Thereby, they give rise to the so-called society of cut-throats, within which dialogue is replaced by rivalry, mistrust, and conflict. In this context, I should add that this “mutism,” or loss of the word, that overwhelms our social relations is seen in stark relief in relationships with those whom we call “foreigners” or “outsiders.” We confront them as an alterity that is different from the diversity of those with whom we share a common language and who are classified as still “belonging” to our world. In other words, because the alterity of foreigners is unfamiliar to us and does not “fit” within our system, we are bewildered and deem it “bothersome.” Moreover, even when we enter into a relationship with a foreigner, it is a relationship marked “by distance within the relation” (Simmel 1968, 549; Fornet-Betancourt 2002, 49–59). Be that as it may, the main problem is the mutism that prevails in the social relations of our time and which is the origin of many conflicts, because it represents the forced result of the systematic destruction of diversity and of the silencing of the word of the other. What can philosophy contribute to intercultural dialogue under such historical conditions? This is the second question with which I would like to continue my reflections. I begin by indicating that latent in this question is another troubling issue, namely, whether philosophy is impotent against the powers and machinations of the historic world. From this point of view, this question brings us even further toward a broader issue concerning the role that ideas play in history. It looks at the self-understanding of philosophy or the doubts that philosophy can have in a given historical period about its function in the world. With this theme, we find ourselves before an even wider horizon, on a path which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. But for the purpose of my reflections here, two aspects are important, and I will limit myself to them. One aspect of this is that philosophy—presuming the historical effectiveness of ideas—should take its role as a science (and wisdom!) of reason seriously and publicly expose not only the plausibility, but also the merits of reasonable solutions. Furthermore, philosophy should make an effort to incorporate the “culture of reason” into public opinion (Kant 1968). In my view, one moment of special relevance in this task is to make evident the immanent irrationality in the historical relations of our world. This means, precisely, that philosophy should show that the prevailing mutism is a real “dead end” or, said in a positive way, should show the path of

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dialogue as the only reasonable alternative leading toward the true humanization of history. The other aspect is that philosophers should overcome their doubts and uncertainties about the efficiency of their own work. Perhaps one might object that, with this proposal, the problem is personalized. But in this respect, I would like to respond that the philosophers are those who articulate philosophy. Philosophy, in reality, can only deliver what philosophers produce with their work—in dialogue with tradition, of course! The answer to the question about the possible contribution of philosophy to intercultural dialogue in a conflicted world will depend, then, fundamentally on the attitude of philosophers; an attitude that precisely finds its concrete expression in the themes philosophers address, as well as in the methods they employ. Let us leave any doubt about the meaning of philosophy to those who confuse it with sterile thinking concerned only with itself. In contrast, if philosophers create a philosophy that is active in the world, they will attempt to contribute, despite all of the difficulties, to the accomplishment of the historical mission of philosophy that is proper to its task. Therefore, we can assert that philosophy’s contribution to intercultural dialogue in a conflict-ridden world consists precisely in defending and rehabilitating “the culture of reason” as an answer to the aphasia that condemns the world and human beings to conflicts. But how can philosophy make this contribution in the present day? This is the third question, to which I will now turn. In this regard, something has already been said, above all with respect to the responsibility of philosophers. Much in fact depends on whether we, who practice philosophy, are willing to take into consideration the problems of our epoch and to work with methods that not only grant presence to philosophy in the public sphere, but that furthermore are able also to articulate its engagement and action in the present social and political world. This idea highlights the importance of the contextualization and historization of philosophical thought. In addition, the intercultural reorientation of philosophy is another indispensable factor in the proposed task. Thus, my conclusion is: under present conditions, philosophy will be able to carry out its contribution to intercultural dialogue only if philosophy itself becomes intercultural. This challenging task of self-transformation implies the following moments: • criticism of narrow Eurocentric determination of the “culture of reason,” and, based on this,

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• the restructuring of the culture of reason in the light of a dialogue of diversity, from which follows • the transformation of culture of reason into an open space of relations wherein the “polylog”7 of multilingual diversity is carried out; and consequently, this will create the condition for the possibility that • the culture of reason would become appreciative of diversity and become a facilitator for equilibrium (or harmony) in diversity. These are not all of the moments of transformation but, to me, they appear to be fundamental for the intercultural transformation through which philosophy is empowered to contribute to the world and by which human beings may recover language as an experience of a dialogic multilingualism.8 Only such a philosophy—one that has developed as a science and wisdom of reason through an open process of attentive and listening, passing through cultural diversity—will be able to contribute to breaking with the mutism of prevailing relations and to mark the emergence of dialogue as a path on which all participants really experience that their speaking has meaning because the other is fully present. The alternative to this mutism, indicated by an interculturally transformed philosophy, is that of a dialogue in which multilingualism means the experience that all the participants of a conversation are necessary and wanted. In this intercultural dialogue, each interlocutor should be able to experience the mutual needing of one another. Such an experience makes it possible for each to live and witness how the others are necessary for each of us, and at the same time how each of us is necessary for every other. In this sort of dialogue, the rule that “murder is suicide” is evident (Hinkelammert 2011). It is precisely this aspect that, for me, constitutes a relevant contribution by philosophy to intercultural dialogue in today’s world.

Final Observations In the reflections just presented, I have tried to expose, above all, the theoretical base of the contribution that, in my opinion, philosophy is able to make to intercultural dialogue in the context of the conditions of our present time. Although I tried to take historical conditions into account, I should nevertheless admit that it is not the practical or socio-political aspect that is the focus of my argument, but precisely the above-mentioned dimension of theoretical grounding. At the beginning of the chapter I addressed the problem of the relation between the theory and the practice of dialogue. It would be a misunderstanding to conclude that mine is merely a “theoretical contribution.” For,

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independent of the argument concerning the power of ideas, it is necessary to highlight the contextual character of the presented reflections. That is to say, it is a theoretical base that is thought from the world and for the world or, said more concretely, to facilitate dialogic thinking and acting in a world dramatically affected by various kinds of conflicts. The “logical” continuation of this “theoretical contribution” by intercultural philosophy is, therefore, to critique the asymmetries of power, hegemonic pretenses, marginalization of so-called traditional cultures, and the social exclusion of a large part of the world population. The politics of balance and of global justice is the “translation” of the indicated contribution. Finally, I would like to return to the question raised in the first section, about the relation between dialogue and truth. In this regard, I would also like to avoid a possible misunderstanding. Unlike postmodern philosophy (see, for example, Vattimo 2009), intercultural philosophy is not dismissive of either universality or truth. Both are, for intercultural philosophy at least, regulative dimensions that help us to avoid having cultural diversity become arbitrary relativism or dialogue becoming merely indifferent chatter.9 Translated by Edward Demenchonok with the assistance of Lori Gallegos

Notes 1.

This text is the translation of “Hacia una filosofía del diálogo (intercultural) en un mundo conflictivo” (Toward a philosophy of [intercultural] dialogue in a conflicted world) (Fornet-Betancourt 2012). 2. Intercultural dialogue is facing a hermeneutical challenge, which requires rethinking the existing theory of understanding. We need to broaden the existing horizon of our understanding by including the other’s perspective as a source of meaning that has equal originality and dignity. We need to transform our way of thinking into the place of dialogical meeting with the other, who represents a different perspective, culture, and form of life. Thus, meeting with the other is “interpellation” from the other’s horizon of understanding. Interpellation is not only from the other’s perspective, claiming recognition of the other’s freedom and dignity. Interpellation is also an expression of the meaning of an alternative order for human discourse, which is different from the partial aspect of meaning from my perspective only. Intercultural philosophy is looking for a new interpretative paradigm, which emerges precisely when the interpretation of one’s own and of the other results in a common and mutual interpellation, in which the voice of each and every one is perceived at the same time as a model of a possible interpretation as well (Fornet-Betancourt 2001, 41, 30). As Enrique Dussel wrote about the role of interpellation as ethical consciousness in the process of human liberation, “for many years, liberation ethics insisted in the ‘interpellation’ by the Other of a receptive person (who has ears to hear) as the origin of the process of liber-

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ation. . . . When someone ‘in the system’ is moved by the victim’s explicit interpellation and accepts, in a receptive manner, taking ‘responsibility-for-the Other’, another moment of the pre-discursive ethical-preoriginary reason is accomplished” (2013, 302–303). 3. I refer here to the diversity of approaches within the so-called paradigm of language in the twentieth century from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. I am also thinking of the decisive contributions of other philosophers of different provenance, such as Martin Buber, Ferdinand Ebner, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Mounier, and Paul Ricœur (cf. Apel 1976; Braun 1996; Coll 1990; Meyer and Pleger 2006; and Hösle 2006). 4. As an example, we can point to the objections of Jürgen Habermas against Judeo-Christian dialogic philosophy (cf. 1981, 39–64; 1997, 112–135). 5. The cosmological crisis expressed in this civilizing tendency was the topic of the XIII Seminario Internacional del Programa de Diálogo Norte-Sur (FornetBetancourt, ed. 2009). 6. See the analysis of this process in Boeckelmann (2004); Brodbeck (2009); and Fornet-Betancourt (2000), among others. 7. About the concept of the “polylog,” see Wimmer (2004), especially 66ff. 8. For a deeper analysis of the intercultural transformation of philosophy, see Mall (1995); Wimmer (1990); and Fornet-Betancourt (2001, 2007, 2009). 9. See Fornet-Betancourt 1997; Wimmer 2003; Yousefi and Mall 2005.

References Apel, Karl-Otto. 1976. Transformation der Philosophie [Transformation of philosophy]. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Boeckelmann, Eske. 2004. Im Takt des Geldes: Zur Genese modernen Denkens [The disposable contact: Toward the genesis of modern thought]. Springe: Zu Klampen. Braun, Edmund, ed. 1996. Der Paradigmenwechsel in der SprachPhilosophie [The language paradigm shift in philosophy]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Brodbeck, Karl-Heinz. 2009. Die Herrschaft des Geldes Geschichte und Systematik [The domination of disposable history and systematics]. Darmstadt: WBG. Burckhardt, Jakob. 1980. Briefe /9 Der Rücktritt vom historischen Amt und sein Nachspiel [Withdrawal from the historic office and its aftermath]. Basel: Schwabe. Coll, Joseph. 1990. Filosofía de la relación interpersonal [Philosophy of interpersonal relations]. Barcelona: PPU. Dussel, Enrique. 2013. Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

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Fornet-Betancourt, Raúl. 1997. Lateinamerikanische Philosophie zwischen Inkulturation und Interkulturalität [Latin American philosophy between inculturation and interculturality]. Frankfurt/M.: IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. —. 2000. “Zur philosophischen Kritik der Globalisierung” [Philosophical critique of globalization]. In Kapitalistische Globalisierung und Befreiung: Religiöse Erfahrungen und Option für das Leben [Capitalist globalization and liberation: Religious experience and the option for life], edited by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, 55–80. Frankfurt/M.: IKO, Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. —. 2001. Transformación intercultural de la filosofía: Ejercicios teóricos y prácticos de filosofía intercultural desde Latinoamérica en el contexto de la globalización [Intercultural transformation of philosophy: Theoretical and Practical Exercises in Intercultural Philosophy from Latin America in the Context of Globalization]. Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer. —. 2002. “Hermeneutik und Politik des Fremden” [Hermeneutics and the politics of dtrangers]. In Justin Stagl. Verstehen und Verständigung: Ethnologie, Xenologie, interkulturelle Philosophie: Justin Stagl zum 60. Geburtstag [Understanding and sgreement: Ethnology, xenology, intercultural philosophy for Justin Stagl’s 60th], edited by Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, 49–59. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. —. 2007. Interkulturalität in der Auseinandersetzung [Interculturality in conflict]. Frankfurt/M.: IKO, Ver. für Interkulturelle Kommunikation. —. 2009. Tareas y Propuestas de la Filosofía Intercultural [Tasks and proposals for intercultural philosophy]. Aachen: Mainz. —. 2012. Interculturalidad, Crítica y Liberación. Aachen: Mainz. —, ed. 2009. El lugar de la tierra en las culturas. Un diálogo de cosmologías ante el desafío ecológico [The place of the earth in cultures: A dialogue of cosmologies facing the ecological challenge]. Mainz: Wissenschaftsverlag. Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. “Der Deutsche Idealismus der Jüdischen Philosophie” [German idealism of Jewish philosophy]. In Philosophischpolitische Profile [Philosophical-political profile], 39–64. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. —. 1997. “Kommunikative Freiheit und negative Theologie” [Communicative freedom and negative theology]. In Vom sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen Ausdruck: Philosophische Essays [From sensory impression to symbolic expression: Philosophical essays], 112–135. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

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Heidegger, Martin. 1977. Gesamtausgabe: 5: Abt. 1, Veröffentlichte Schriften 1914–1970, Holzwege [Complete works. Vol. 5/1, published writings from 1914–1970, off the beaten track]. Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann. —. 1981. “Hölderlin und das Eesen der Dichtung” [Hölderlin and the essence of poetry]. Vol. 4 of Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins dichtung, gesamtausgabe [Explanation of Hölderlin’s poetry, complete works]. Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann. Heit, Helmut. 2006. “Politischer Diskurs und dialogische Philosophie bei Jürgen Habermas” [Political discourse and dialogic philosophy of Jürgen Habermas]. In Zur Heschichte des Dialogs: Philosophische Positionen von Sokrates bis Habermas [History of dialogue: Philosophical positions from Socrates to Habermas], edited by Martin F. Meyer and Wolfgang H. Pleger, 225–236. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Hinkelammert, Franz J. 2011. “Lo indispensable es inútil. Sobre la ética de la convivencia” [What is indispensible is useless. On the ethics of coexistence]. In Das Menschliche Zusammenleben: Probleme und Möglichkeiten in der heutigen Welt [Human coexistence: Problem and possibilities in today’s world], edited by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, 33– 46. Aachen: Mainz Verlag. Hölderlin, Friedrich. 1923. Sämtliche Werke: Historisch-kritische Ausg. [Complete works: Historical output]. Vol. 4. Berlin: Propyläen-Verlag. Hösle, Vittorio. 2006. Der philosophische Dialog. Eine Poetik und Hermeneutic [Philosophical dialogue: A poetics and hermeneutic]. München: Beck. Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kant, Immanuel. 1968. Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of pure reason]. Vol. 3/1 of Werke. Edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt/M.: de Gruyter. Mall, Ram A. 1995. Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen: Interkulturelle Philosophie—eine neue Orientierung [Philosophy in comparative cultures: A new orientation]. Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges. Meyer, Martin F. and Wolfgang H. Pleger, eds. 2006. Zur Geschichte des Dialogs: Philosophische Positionen von Sokrates bis Habermas [History of dialogue: Philosophical positions from Socrates to Habermas]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Ricœur, Paul. 1955. Histoire et Vérité [History and truth]. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

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Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1960. Critique de la raison dialectique [Critique of dialectical reason]. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Simmel, Georg. 1968. “Exkurs über den Fremden” [Essay about the stranger]. In Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung [Sociology: Inquiries into the construction of social forms], edited by G. Simmel, 509–512. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Storm, Theodor. 1923. Sämtliche werke [Complete works]. Vol. 4. Edited by Albert Köster. Leipzig: Insel-Verlag. Vattimo, Gianni. 2009. Addio alla verità [Farewell to truth]. Rome: Meltemi. Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1990. Der Stachel des Fremden [The thorn of foreigners]. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Wimmer, Franz Martin. 1990. Interkulturelle Philosophie. 1. Geschichte und Theorie [Intercultural philosophy: 1. History and theory]. Vienna: Passagen-Verl. —. 2003. Globalität und Philosophie: Studien zur Interkulturalität [Globalism and philosophy: Studies in interculturality]. Vienna: Turia and Kant. —. 2004. Interkulturelle philosophie: Eine einführung [Intercultural philosophy: An introduction]. Vienna: WUV Facultas. Yousefi, Hamid Reza and Ram A. Mall. 2005. Grundpositionen der interkulturtellen Philosophie [Fundamental positions of intercultural philosophy]. Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz.

CHAPTER THREE SOCIAL IDENTITIES: CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION1 JORGE J. E. GRACIA

Much of the conflict that permeates the world today is the result of clashes between cultures, religions, races, nations, and ethnic groups. Underlying these divisions that separate peoples are their social identities, what I am and the group, or groups to which I belong: I am Catholic, you are Muslim; I am white, you are black; I am Hispanic, you are Anglo; I am Israeli, you are Palestinian; I am a Kurd, you are an Arab; I am a Turk, you are German; you and I are both Hispanic, but you are Puerto Rican, I am Cuban; and so forth. The conflict is between you and me, one and the other. Is there a way to establish dialogue and resolve these conflicts? I am not sure, but I am certain of one thing, namely, that any headway in this direction has to begin with an understanding of what social identities are, how they develop, and how they function. But it is not easy to reach such an understanding. Indeed, the difficulties raised by the notion of a social identity are many, complex, and confusing. They have at least two sources: first, the very notion of an overall and general social identity for a group; second, the fact that this kind of identity seems to dissolve into many other, more particular, identities. For example, we are Americans, but also some of us are Latinos or Jewish. Some Latinos, in turn, are also Puerto Rican or Cuban, and some Jews are Argentinian whereas others are Mexican. Can we make sense of this? Can we talk meaningfully about general identities, such as Latino or Jewish, while still talking meaningfully about less general identities such as Argentinian or Cuban? These questions take on added significance when the social and political implications of using social identity labels are considered. Two difficulties are particularly vexing. The first is a version of the old problem of the one and the many: how is it possible for someone to have an overall, general identity, such as Latino, and at the same time have oth-

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er, less general ones, such as Mexican and Tarahumara? Does it make sense for the same person to have several group identities, and, if so, how is this to be understood? Can we be culturally Hispanic, religiously Muslim, racially black, ethnically Latino, and nationally Mexican? The second problem has to do with the question of what social identities entail. Does having these identities entail common properties that constitute the ground for the identities and the distinction between those who have them and those who do not? At first our intuitions seem to justify this idea, but upon reflection serious difficulties come up. It is far from clear that the members of a group that signals a social general identity of the sort Latino, Jewish, Chinese, or Russian are, share any properties. In this chapter, I suggest that social identities present us with at least two major dilemmas. One is a choice between what I label “essentialism” and “eliminativism,” and the other between “generalism” and “particularism.” Both are obstacles to the proper understanding of social identities, thus contributing to misunderstandings and potentially to conflict among peoples. Instead of opting for one of these and thus falling into a dialectic that will lead to more of the same that we have had so far, I propose to adopt a third alternative to the first dilemma that favors neither essentialism nor eliminativism. This, in turn, makes it possible to avoid choosing between generalism and particularism, which is a good thing, because both positions have something valuable to offer in context. In short, I reject the dilemmas and propose a more nuanced solution to the understanding of social identities that should open the way for dealing with the social and political significance of these identities and avoid some of the conflicts to which they give rise or to which they contribute. This opens the way for a better understanding of cultural, ethnic, national, and racial differences and similarities. I call this the “familial-historical view of social identities.” Before I turn to the difficulties that are the topic of this chapter, I need to repeat that social identities come in great variety, and it would not be possible to do justice to many of them here, let alone all. Instead of trying the impossible, I will focus on a kind of social identity that has received considerable attention recently, namely ethnic identity, and which has the advantage that some of the problems posed by social identities can be easily illustrated by it. Let me begin by noting that the issue I take up here and the solution I offer to the difficulties it poses are closely related to two other topics that have received some attention. The first concerns the number of identities that persons can have. Can I have only one, is there a limited number I can have, or is that number limitless? The second topic concerns the way these various social identities are related to each other and how they are negoti-

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ated by both individual persons and particular groups. What difference does it make, personally and socially, if a person is both Italian and Arab, or is Latina and Jewish? What of a man who is Anglo but gay and one who is Anglo but heterosexual? Even a superficial perusal of these cases indicates that there are differences, sometimes significant, between them, because social identities often include behavioral patterns and views about gender orientation and sexuality. Matters become even more complex when we consider national identities in particular, because in some cases, the same terms are used to refer to them that are used also to refer to ethnic ones, for example. “Mexican” is used to talk both about Mexican nationals and ethnic Mexicans whether the latter are also nationals or not. So how do these different identities function within an individual person and within society? This topic is generally discussed in the literature under the label “intersectionality.” Obviously, both the question concerning the number and kind of identities persons have and those concerning the issue of intersectionality are related to the questions I raise here, and whatever one concludes about the former will affect the latter. However, it would be impossible to give these topics the kind of treatment they deserve, and so I must put them aside for another time.2

Two Dilemmas Let me begin by formulating the two dilemmas mentioned in the context of ethnic identities. The nature of an ethnic identity and how it differs from other kinds of identities is a matter of debate. But for our purposes, rather than present a view of ethnicity, it should suffice to give some examples: Latino, Hispanic, Polish, Italian, Mexican, Russian, Ashkenazi, Jewish. Note that some of these terms are used also to denote national identities (Mexican, Polish, and Russian), but one can distinguish between the national/political use of the term and the ethnic one. Mexican can be used to refer to a Mexican national, that is a citizen of Mexico, and ethnically to refer to a person who belongs to a Mexican ethnicity. Here is the first dilemma to which I alluded: Either there is one general ethnic identity for a social group, or many particular identities. If there is one general identity, then there cannot be many particular ones, and if there are many particular ones, then there cannot be one general identity.

According to this dilemma, we cannot maintain that I am both Latino and Cuban, or American (when this is taken in an ethnic rather than a political

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sense) and Latino, for example. I am one or the other; to be one precludes that I am the other. Let me call this conundrum the “Generalism versus Particularism Dilemma.” The idea is that more general ethnic identities preclude more particular ones, and vice versa, because one can have one and only one ethnic identity of the sort we are talking about. In the example we are using, the general Latino identity precludes more particular identities, such as Cuban or Mexican, and each of these particular identities precludes a general one. The same happens with other such general and particular ethnic identities. We must, therefore, choose one of these and discard the talk about the other. The problem is that, no matter which horn of the dilemma we choose, we end up dissatisfied. The rejection of an overall ethnic identity appears to be as unsatisfactory as the rejection of particular identities, because members of the particular group in question both understand and feel right when they are described as belonging to other ethnic groups. I both understand and feel right when someone describes me as, say, Latino and Cuban, and the same happens with a Mexican. The second dilemma runs as follows: Either there is an essential set of properties entailed by an ethnic identity or there is not. If there is such a set, all those persons who instantiate the properties in the set share in the identity. But if there is no such a set of properties, then there is no group of persons who share the identity.

According to this dilemma, I cannot maintain that I am Latino or Cuban, or have the Latino or Cuban identity, unless I can point to a set of necessary and sufficient properties that I share with other Latinos or Cubans. Let me call this the “Essentialism versus Eliminativism Dilemma.” The thought here is that an essence is necessary for the concept of a group identity. Latino or Cuban identities require essences, otherwise they do not exist. But this dilemma, just as the first, leaves us dissatisfied because neither of its horns is acceptable. The facts seem to contradict it: we seem not to share an essential set of properties with the members of the ethnic groups to which we belong, and yet we seem to have these identities.

Generalism versus Particularism Let’s consider the Generalism versus Particularism Dilemma first, and let’s use the case of Latinos as an illustration to help us understand the issues at stake. Latinos have clearly been concerned with both general identities, such as Latino or Hispanic, and particular identities, such as Mexican or Puerto Rican. We tend to be either generalists or particularists.

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In philosophy, the concern for a general identity reveals itself among Latinos in discussions about whether there is such a thing as a Latino philosophy and the kind of characteristics it has. The first attempt in this direction is found in Juan Bautista Alberdi’s Ideas para presidir a la confección del curso de filosofía contemporánea en el Colegio de Humanidades, written in 1842. The project has continued among thinkers as diverse as Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla ([1969] 1992), Enrique Dussel (1973), and Francisco Miró Quesada (see Gracia and Jaksiü 1988). This effort has also extended beyond philosophy to peoples themselves; authors such as José Vasconcelos (1957) and Eduardo Nicol (1961) have argued for overarching identities, Latino or Hispanic. The search for particular identities is evident in discussions of the character of various regional and national philosophies and of peoples from certain regions or nations. Philosophers have repeatedly addressed the identity of Mexican or Peruvian philosophy, or of the Mexican or Peruvian peoples, for example. Among those best known for their efforts in a general direction are Félix Schwartzmann (1950) and Leopoldo Zea (1948). Among those who tried to find what is characteristic of particular peoples, is Samuel Ramos ([1934] 1963). It would be interesting to discover a pattern from the more general to the more particular, or vice versa, in these discussions of identity. Say that one could find that discussions of more general identities occur first, chronologically speaking, and that it is only because of the difficulties associated with this enterprise that the discussion shifted to particular identities. Or, alternatively, suppose that discussions of more particular identities precede discussions of more general ones. But there appears to be no such a pattern. The search for more general identities does not always occur first, and it continues while the discussion of more particular identifies is under way: Ramos’s (ibid.) emphasis on Mexicanity (mejicanidad) is balanced out by Nicol’s (1961) emphasis on Hispanicity (hispanidad). The reverse is also the case: Vasconcelos’ interest on Latin America as a whole precedes the more nationalistic emphases of later thinkers. In this, the situation in Latin America is somewhat different from the situation we encounter in the discussion of identity in the United States. In this country, discussions of a more general identity, such as American identity, seem to occur first. The founding fathers and others made attempts to pin down an identity for the newly established country. But more recently, the focus has shifted to other, more particular, identities: black, African American, Latino, Hispanic, Puerto Rican, female, gay, and so on. Even within these more particular identities, there has been a narrowing or particularization. In this connection, the case of Latinos is instructive, be-

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cause the discussion seems to begin with a more general approach, such as Latino or Hispanic identity; but later we find challenges to this general concept and an emphasis instead on more particular identities, such as Puerto Rican, Cuban American, and Mexican American. Yet, this has not stopped the talk about more general identities in the United States. Indeed, if we look at analyses of black or African American identity, we see that it goes back a long way, well into the nineteenth century and the work of Alexander Crummell and W. E. B. Du Bois (1897, 5–15; or Du Bois in Bernasconi 2001, 84–92). The concern with a general American identity is still in full swing (Appiah 1992, chap. 1). In spite of these differences, the logic of identity displays similarities in the United States and the Latino world. Perhaps the most important is that, no matter how the discussion begins, the tendency is to address issues that are both general and particular, although the authors engaged in these controversies are often polarized and opposed to each other. Concerns for identity in Latin America fall into two quite distinct groups: those that favor more general approaches and those who do not. There are some authors who go so far as to reject identity altogether except at the individual level, a development that mirrors the situation in the United States.3 The arguments proposed by generalists and particularists may be characterized in three ways: some are a priori, some a posteriori, and some pragmatic. The a priori argument is most commonly found in philosophy, the a posteriori argument is particularly evident among historians, and the pragmatic argument is often proposed by political scientists. Curiously, all three kinds of argument are used by the two factions mentioned. For example, many philosophers who argue against the idea of a general Latin American philosophical identity, such as Risieri Frondizi (1948, 158–170), do so based on an a priori conception of philosophy. They claim that philosophy, like physics and other disciplinary enterprises, is interested in truth, and truth has no national or ethnic alliances. It would be preposterous to argue that mathematics can be Latin American or French in the sense that the mathematics done in Latin America or France are significantly different from the discipline practiced in Spain or Germany. Likewise, for these authors, it makes no sense to claim any kind of identity, whether general or particular, for philosophy. This argument is a priori because its conclusion is derived from a presupposed conception of philosophy as a universal discipline which is not adopted on the basis of experience. Those who oppose this point of view respond also based on an a priori, although different, conception of philosophy. They argue, as Zea does (1988–1989, 33–42; 1948, 165–177), that philosophy, unlike other disci-

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plines of learning, has to do with particular cultural and historical points of view and, therefore, its conclusions are colored and affected by these points of view. In this sense, philosophy develops an identity depending on the time and place in which it is practiced. Latin America, in virtue of its historical location, provides a unique vantage point that gives Latin American philosophy a particular identity different from other philosophies. Again, the argument is a priori in that it is based on a presupposed conception of philosophy not based on experience. The conception in this case is particular and perspectival. The a posteriori argument, used to support general or particular identities, argues from a consideration of observable facts. Interestingly, here also the same kind of argument is used to support two conflicting points of view. For some the facts clearly preclude the notion of any kind of general identity, whereas for others they confirm it. Consider again the case of philosophy. Those who oppose the notion of a more general identity point to the enormous variety of philosophical styles and positions that Latino philosophers have adopted throughout history, asking rhetorically: What do they have in common? More concretely, for example, what does scholastic philosophy have in common with positivism, or phenomenology with analysis as these philosophical perspectives are found in Latin America? At the opposite end, we have those who find some unity in Latin American philosophy, for example. Some of them argue that there is a concerted effort in every period of development in Latin American philosophy to search for freedom and liberation, and that this search arises from the marginal and oppressed situation of Latin America (Dussel 1973; see also Rivano 1965; and Gracia 1992a, 1992b, 95–105). This, they claim, not only gives unity to Latin American philosophy, but distinguishes it from other philosophies, such as French or German philosophy, which are philosophies of what Enrique Dussel (1973) has called “the Center.” Some also argue that Latin Americans in general display attitudes that distinguish them from, say, Anglo Americans, clearly indicating that there is an identity at play. Vasconcelos (1957) figures prominently among those who argue thus; more recently, liberationists such as Dussel (1973), as well as more traditional authors such as Juan Rivano (1965) and Augusto Salazar Bondy (1969), echo similar claims. The argument is often made that these factual characteristics are the result of a history of colonization and exploitation common to all of Latin America. Finally, the pragmatic approach focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of the use of general notions to describe particular phenomena. Those who oppose such use bring out the counterproductive consequences of general approaches to situations marked by very different conditions at

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the local level (ibid.; see also Dussel 1973; Rivano 1965). It is one thing to talk about economic development in Argentina, where the population is largely educated and European, and another to do it in Bolivia, where most of the population is uneducated and of pre-Columbian origin. Indeed, this applies even within the same country: it is one thing to speak about the economic situation in Mendoza and another to do so about El Chaco, both provinces in Argentina. Differences in geography and natural resources make it difficult to apply the same economic analyses and measures in different locations throughout Latin America—the pampas are different from the Andes, the Amazonian basin from Patagonia. What is true of economics is also true elsewhere. On the other hand, those who argue pragmatically in favor of a general Latin American identity point out, for example, that there is a common history to Latin America, as well as many cultural threads in its population. How can we ignore that most of Latin America was conquered and subjugated by Spain and Portugal? Aren’t Spanish and Portuguese the predominant languages in the area? Don’t the overwhelming religious leanings toward Roman Catholicism count for anything? One need only look at the architecture of the region to see common elements. Additionally, the history of colonial oppression serves to create a common experience. To ignore these facts, they argue, is to ignore the Latino reality. Who is right? In thinking about the Latino world, should we take the particular route and discard the general, or should we take the general and discard the particular? This is the dilemma, and one that stirs the passions. Proponents of either side are adamant about how wrong the other side is. Just as happens between proponents of general Latino or Hispanic identities in the United States and those who oppose them in favor of such identities as Dominican or Venezuelan, there appears to be no meeting point, no compromise, acceptable to the opposing sides. Generalists are wrong, according to particularists, and particularists are wrong, according to generalists, and that puts an end to the discussion. Of course, the real conundrum is that the arguments offered for these positions, whether a priori, a posteriori, or pragmatic, are evenly divided. But do we have to take sides? Is there any way to mediate what appears to be two irreconcilable views? Before we can answer these questions, it is helpful to take a look at the assumptions made by generalism and particularism. Indeed, it is my claim that these assumptions set up the logic of the Generalism versus Particularism Dilemma and are responsible for the apparent irreconcilability of these positions. These assumptions are revealed by the second false dilemma mentioned earlier: Essentialism versus Eliminativism.

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Essentialism versus Eliminativism Essentialism is the view according to which things have essences and essences consist of sets of properties that characterize the things that have those essences. In common philosophical jargon: sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. Thomas Aquinas was an essentialist with respect to human nature, for example, because according to him, human beings share a set of properties specified in a definition that expresses their essence: Humans are rational animals. If one is an essentialist with respect to Latino identity or Mexican identity, one holds that there is a set of properties that characterizes anyone who is Latino or Mexican. At the opposite end of the spectrum, we have the view that there are no essences. Jean-Paul Sartre was an eliminativist with respect to human essence. His position is known as existentialism rather than eliminativism, because he argued that humans exist (whence the term existentialism), but what they are (their essence) is the result of their individual free choice. I prefer to call it eliminativism in this context, rather than existentialism, for two reasons: its negative claim about essence and the fact that this term is used in the recent literature concerned with social identities (see McGary 2007, 155–169). According to Sartre, we are free to choose what we want to be, and there is no set of properties that we necessarily share. When this view is applied to our question, the answer is that there is no such a thing as a Latino, or even a Mexican identity, for there is no essence to them. There are only individual identities forged by individual humans. The kinds of arguments given for essentialism and eliminativism duplicate, to a great extent, the arguments given earlier for generalism and particularism, and so, there is no need to repeat them. Some are a priori, some a posteriori, and some pragmatic. It is not difficult to find them in the literature on identity produced in Latin American countries, and certainly they are frequent in the philosophical literature in this country. A similar situation to the one described earlier ensues: a sharp disagreement which appears to be unresolvable. On the one hand, some authors favor identity at group level, whether general or particular, and on the other, some object to any identity except at the individual level. What are we to do, then? The a priori arguments mentioned would take us into the murky waters of the very foundations of philosophy. There is no point in even trying to pursue this line of thinking because philosophers are quite divided about these issues. The a posteriori arguments seem to lead nowhere, in that it is not the facts that are disputed but the facts considered relevant. Again, this seems to lead us to presuppositions that it would be too difficult to evaluate except by going into areas that are too far from our topic. Finally, the pragmatic arguments do not seem to be

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convincing insofar as, again, the advantages and disadvantages emphasized by the opposing factions seem to be rather selective and depend on pre-established goals. Are we at an impasse, then? Here is a suggestion for getting out of the situation, in three parts: First, the dichotomies on which the contrary positions examined are based are misguided. Second, the first dichotomy, between generalism and particularism, is based on the second, that is, that between essentialism and eliminativism. Third, the second dichotomy, between essentialism and eliminativism, relies on a misguided notion of identity. In short, I claim that the alternatives from which to choose are not just essentialism and eliminativism, or generalism and particularism, but that there is a third alternative to essentialism and eliminativism that, if adopted, also opens a third alternative to generalism and particularism. The notion of identity does not require that one subscribe to essentialism or that identities be exclusive of each other. It is possible for the same person or persons to share a variety of identities, some of which are more general and some less general. One can be Latino, Mexican, and Tarahumara. But how is this possible? By taking into account the relational, contextual, and historical nature of identity.

Four Basic Questions about Identity One way to make this point clear is by asking four questions: (1) How do identities function? (2) How do identities arise? (3) How do identities endure? (4) What does having an identity entail? The first question intends to ask for the uses we make of identities. Let’s look at a concrete case, say, me. I am Cuban, but I am also considered to be Latin American and Latino. It would be difficult to contradict anyone who says that I am one of these, and, in fact, I feel quite comfortable when I am described in these ways. I was born in Cuba, of Cuban parents. When I hear Cuban music, I have difficulty keeping my feet still. I love hot weather, the beach, the sweet/sour humor from the island, and the easygoing, friendly attitude of Cubans. When I encounter a group of Cubans at a gathering, I tend to gravitate toward it because I feel comfortable in the company of Cubans, never mind their political allegiance. A few years ago, when I decided that I was going to collect art, I decided to collect Cuban-American art. What kind of pieces do I collect? All sorts, but some

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of them clearly have a connection to my particular Cuban experience. One example is Alberto Rey’s painting, El Morro, one of the architectural icons of Havana. El Morro is a fortress that guards the port of Havana, and is the first and last thing one sees when arriving or departing by boat from the Havana harbor. Rey’s painting is done mono-chromatically in shades of grey, which is exactly what I saw in 1961, as I was leaving the port at dusk on my way to West Palm Beach. Would I have acquired the painting had I not been Cuban and have had the experience of leaving? Perhaps— because it is a stunning rendition of an impressive structure. But the fact that I am Cuban and the painting arouses certain feelings and memories surely had something to do with it. But I am also Latino, am I not? I feel that way in particular when I travel to Europe, or when I am in the company of Anglo Americans. I am not part of them in some significant ways. I am from another part of the world, and they agree. For some Spaniards, those with stereotypical ideas and prejudices against Latin Americans, who indiscriminately lump all of us together, I am a Sudaca (even coming from Cuba), and for Anglo Americans I am a Latino. Moreover, I share a strong kinship with the places I have visited in Latin America. I have traveled almost everywhere in Mexico—indeed, I know Mexico better than most Mexicans. I can identify with the food, the music, the courtesy of the Mexicans. I am married to an Argentinian (yes, they are Latinos too, in spite of what many of them think). So I have learned to cook bife a la plancha, and dulce’e leche sends me to Olympus (it is almost as good as dulce’e guayaba). And I feel Latino. I have strong ties to other Latinos in the United States and elsewhere. With them, I feel something different from what I feel when I am with Latinos who live in Latin America. I also act Latino. Indeed, I was the founding member and first chair of the American Philosophical Association Committee for Hispanics in Philosophy; so I have been committed to a certain course of action, promoting the interests of Latinos for some time. Whenever possible, I try to help Latino graduate students and young philosophers in their careers, and often I encourage them to learn something about their intellectual heritage. These examples illustrate both feelings of solidarity and certain actions I take. I feel Cuban, Latin American, and Latino, but I also act in certain ways, gravitating toward Cubans at parties, collecting Cuban-American art, visiting Latin American countries, eating certain foods, and promoting the interests of other Latinos and of Latino cultures. Let me summarize the point by saying that I both feel and act in accordance with my Cuban, Latin American, and Latino identities. These are two major functions of identities: they generate feelings of solidarity with certain people and they give

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rise to certain actions that otherwise would probably not take place (see Appiah 2007). Now for the second question: How do identities arise? Well, how did I become Cuban and Latino? Surely the factors involved are many and variegated. The tendency these days is to focus on one factor to the exclusion of others. I constantly hear the mantra that the United States government created Hispanic identity—this in spite of the fact that the term “Hispanic” was in use long before United States bureaucrats adopted it to refer to people like me and that it was picked by United States bureaucrats precisely because it was available. I also hear that United States international policies created Hispanic identity—and this in spite of the fact that Latinos were talking about themselves as a group long before there was a United States at all. The first distancing and contrast developed in Latin America was not between Latin America and the United States, but between criollos (descendants of Iberians born in Latin America) and peninsulares (born in Iberia), although the membership of these divisions fluctuates from place to place. I have not yet heard that Cuban identity was created by anybody, but perhaps some will argue that it was the United States again that is responsible for it. If this were true, then I really would be a rather curious artifact, created by the United States. Am I? Just tell the father of the Cuban nation, José Martí, that he was a United States created artifact! He talked about Hispanics and “our America” long before United States bureaucrats thought of putting all of us together under a label. Do I want to deny that there is some truth to the claims concerning the influence of the United States on Latino identities? Of course not. American foreign policy, American bureaucrats, and the American government have had to do with the creation of much that I am. But, contrary to what many believe, the United States is not as powerful as they think. Indeed, it has proven to be very ineffective insofar as it often fails to accomplish much that it tries to do in the world. Although it is true that the United States may have been responsible to some extent for the creation of some Latino countries, and United States bureaucrats have helped consolidate a Hispanic identity in this country, it is just not the case that this extends to all countries of Latin America or makes the United States government and its bureaucrats solely responsible for Latino identities in the United States or elsewhere. My identities are not exclusively the result of an act or acts of political or economic fiat, American or otherwise, although such acts may have contributed to them. There is more to their origin than this. Any one-sided attempt to analyze the origin of my identities, and for that matter of any

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other identities, is simply inaccurate. Identities are the result of complex historical processes that shape us individually and as groups. Isolation contributes to them, provided that there is also some other identity with which they can be contrasted. Being an island is certainly a major factor in the development of a Cuban identity. Particular events tie people in certain ways and separate them in others. A war, a dispute, a treaty, a natural disaster, topography, an invasion, government actions, migrations, economic forces, the publication of a book, all these are important factors in the construction of identities. Some of these factors do not consist in conscious efforts to create identities; indeed, most of them do not. The formation of identities involves both conscious and unconscious factors. In the contemporary philosophical jargon, identities, including social ones, are the result of both “internal” (what we think) and “external” (causes other than our thought) factors. This is the answer to the second question concerning how identities arise. What are we to say to the third question, how do identities endure? Well, how is it that I personally endure as Jorge J. E. Gracia? We must acknowledge that the key to the answer is that I change and yet remain the same. Certainly I am not the baby that wet its diapers during the early 1940s. I might get to the stage of wetting diapers again if I live long enough, but somehow that situation will not be the same as it was then. I remain the same while I also change. Change is of the essence when it comes to endurance, and this applies to social identities. Cuban identity has changed and has been affected by events during the past one hundred years, and the same could be said about Latino identity. This very discussion might affect Latino identity insofar as it might modify how some of us think about it and promote events— publications, discussions, and so on—that will influence not only our feelings, but also our actions. Change is of the essence for some identities; survival requires adaptation and adaptation involves change. Consider the need for change in organisms. Evolution demonstrates that change is necessary for the survival of species, and the same could be said when it comes to organic individuals. We survive because we adapt to new circumstances. How is it that some species have endured whereas others have been annihilated? How is it that I am still alive while many of my friends from high school are dead? Without change, most species, and individuals, would die out in time as a result of the challenges they have to face in their environment. Now let me turn to the fourth and crucial question: what does having an identity entail? We know that an identity is a source of feelings and actions, it originates through conscious and unconscious historical pro-

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cesses, and it is subject to change. If this is so, then it would seem that the two dichotomies we considered earlier fail to explain what Latino identity, or for that matter any other group identity, is. Essentialism appears misguided insofar as it does not allow for change. If an identity entails a fixed number of unchanging properties, then endurance is doubtful. Yet, the fact that an identity is a source of feelings and actions points to its existence, so eliminativism cannot be right either. Indeed, the discussion of the various identities that have a claim on me, some more general (Latino) and some more particular (Cuban), indicate that the generalism-particularism dichotomy also does not work. But, then, in what does an identity consist, and what does it entail? Clearly, it cannot consist of a set of unchanging, essential properties. Identities need to be conceived as flexible, contextual, historical, and relational. The position I propose, the Familial- Historical View, satisfies these conditions. I have discussed it in greater detail elsewhere in the context of Hispanics in particular and ethnic groups in general, and therefore here I limit the presentation to its fundamental tenets in order to avoid duplication. Let me apply it to the case of Latinos.

The Familial-Historical View of Latino Identities Alexander Crummell and W. E. B. Du Bois were the first to make use of the notion of a historical family to explain the unity of social groups, but they did it in the context of race. Crummell gives only a sketchy idea of what he has in mind, and therefore is of no help to us here. Du Bois is more specific. After rejecting the nineteenth-century biological view of race, he presents his sociological position in an often quoted passage: the history of the world is the history, not of individuals, but of groups, not of nations, but of races. . . . What then is a race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally common blood and language, always common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life. (Du Bois 2001, 74, emphasis added)

A race is a family that always has a common history, traditions, and impulses, although other things, such as language and blood, also enter into the mix. Elsewhere Du Bois returns to the kinship provided by history: one thing is sure and that is the fact that since the fifteenth century these ancestors of mine and their descendants have had a common history; have suffered a common disaster and have one long memory. The actual ties of

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heritage between the individuals of this group vary with the ancestors that they have in common with many others. . . . But the physical bond is least and the badge of color relatively unimportant save as a badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas. (Du Bois 1940, 117, emphasis added)

This is still not enough for our purposes, because Du Bois does not sufficiently dwell on what he takes a racial family to be, or specify what he means by history and the pertinent aspects of it for his view. The vagueness of this position has led to a number of criticisms and interpretations. Is Du Bois an essentialist or a non-essentialist? He seems to waver. If his view is essentialistic, then it would be of no help to us insofar as we need an alternative to essentialism. If it is not essentialistic, then we need more than he has given us in order to apply the view to Latinos. I propose, instead, to use the version of the familial-historical view, which I have proposed elsewhere, and apply it to ethnic identities in general and to Latinos in particular (Gracia 2000, 2005). It is more developed, containing some of the specific elements missing in Du Bois, and can effectively answer the objections based on the difficulties posed by the individuation of races and ethne. Here is the formula: Ethnic identities are identities of ethnic groups, and ethnic groups are groups of individual humans that satisfy the following conditions: (1) they belong to many generations; (2) are organized as families and break down into extended families; and (3) are united through historical relations that produce properties which, in context, serve (i) to identify the members of the groups and (ii) to distinguish them from members of other groups.

The fundamental tenet of this formulation is that ethnic groups, such as Latinos, Mexicans, or Kurds, are best conceived as constituting extended historical families whose members have no identifiable properties, or set of properties, that are shared by all the members throughout the existence of the familial groups. However, the historical connections that tie them give rise to properties that are common to some members of the groups and, in context, serve to distinguish them from other social groups. The lack of common properties accounts for the lack of agreement concerning any particular conditions, or even kinds of conditions, that are necessary and sufficient for ethnic groups in general, or in particular. Even the most superficial consideration of available research points to difficulties in the identification of any such conditions. According to the familial-historical view, then, we must abandon the project of trying to de-

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velop essentialistic conceptions of those identities. The relations that tie members of ethnic groups and the properties some of them share account for their individuation and identification. The common properties that this view rejects are significant first-order properties. I am not speaking about trivial properties such as the property of belonging to the group, or second-order properties such as identity. I mean primarily phenotypical or genotypical properties, such as skin color and capacities, or cultural properties, such as tastes and values, frequently associated with ethnic groups. This means, in turn, that in order to be Latino or Kurd, it is not necessary that one share a first-order property (or set of properties) with other members of the group. Latinos may lack Spanish fluency and be Latinos, just as Jews may be atheists and be Jews. Indeed, contrary to what some philosophers and sociologists think, it is not even necessary that members of ethnic groups name themselves in particular ways or have a conscious sense of belonging to the groups. Some of them may, in fact, consider themselves so and even have a consciousness, or sense, of themselves as a group, but it is not necessary that all of them do. After all, children and people suffering from Alzheimer’s disease cannot be expected to have a sense of their ethnic identity and yet their identity is not questioned for that reason. Ethnic groups are tied by the same kind of thing that ties the members of a family. We are related, as mother is to daughter, as grandparents to grandchildren. The notion of family does not require genetic ties. One does not need to be tied by descent to other members of a family to be a member of the family. Indeed, perhaps the most important foundation of a family, namely marriage, takes place between persons who are not related by descent but by contract. In-laws become members of families indirectly, again not through genesis. The same applies to ethnic groups: it is not necessary that one share a property or set of properties with all others who belong to the ethnic group. Are all Latinos conscious of a Latino identity? Do all Mexicans have a sense of themselves as Mexican? How about the campesino lost in the ravines of the Copper Canyon? How about the descendants of the Maya living in isolation, somewhere in Yucatan? This extends to knowledge of the group’s history. Being a member of an ethnic group does not entail knowing anything about the history of the ethnic group, and even less having an accurate knowledge of that history. History generates relations that, in turn, generate properties among members of ethnic groups and serve to unite them and to distinguish them from others in particular contexts. The use of the Spanish language is one of the properties that unites many Latinos and can serve to distinguish us from other ethnic groups in certain contexts. Some Latinos in the United

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States’ southwest are united by their knowledge of Spanish; this serves also to distinguish them from most Anglos who live in that part of the country. They speak Spanish as a result of certain historical events, such as the invasion and colonization of the southwest by Spaniards in the sixteenth century. Had these events not occurred, these Latinos would not know any Spanish. The same could be said about other ethnic identities, such as Mexican identity. Do all Mexicans have to share something that characterizes them? Do they have to share values, a biological feature, a physical mark, or even a cultural trait? There seems to be nothing like that which ties all Mexicans, this in spite of the strong efforts of the Mexican government at ethnic homogenization for the purpose of nation building. Mexicans share a history, a past, and certain relations that tie them in various ways. Factors such as territory, religion, political organization, and values need not be common to everyone who shares in the Mexican identity. But everyone who shares in this identity must be tied in some ways to other people who share in it. The ties, however, can be different, and they can also change throughout time and location. Identities are messy, just as reality is. There are no Euclidean triangles in the world; the Euclidean triangle is an idealization. Yet, the notion of a triangle is of much use to us. Likewise, it is not necessary that there be neat, clear, and fixed boundaries between ethnic groups, be them Latinos and non-Latinos, or Cubans and Chinese, just as there are no such boundaries between families. Although historical events and relations tend to generate common properties in ethnic groups, such properties are usually restricted to certain periods, regions, or subgroups within an ethnos. Latino identity, for example, entails both unity and distinction in a world of multiplicity such as ours. Unity and distinction are easily understandable when there are properties common to all the members of a group, but such properties are not necessary. The unity and distinction of Latinos can be explained as long as there are relations or properties that tie each member of the group with at least one other member without assuming that there are common properties to all members. Of course, in most cases, the tie will not be with just one member, but with several, as it happens with families. Indeed, the number of members involved is not as important as the various ties and whether these ties are significant for the ethnic group. It is not possible to establish what these ties are for all ethnic groups, but the particular group and its historical reality determine what they are in each case, and so they may vary substantially. The single most important requirement for Jews to be Jewish is that their mothers be Jewish. But other ethnic groups single

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out the father, and many do not have this kind of genetic requirement, but are more concerned with other human relations and with culture. The unity of certain ethnic groups, such as Latinos, Cubans, Argentinians, Brazilians, and Tarahumarans, does not involve commonality; it is a familial-historical unity founded on historical relations and the properties they generate in context among members of the group. This is one reason why membership in the groups that share identities are neither permanent nor closed. Latino identities, like all identities, are fluid, open, and changing; those who share in them come and go, enter and leave, as they forge new relations among themselves and with others, which depend on particular and contingent circumstances. If we use the familial-historical view of ethnic identities, we can understand how these identities do not require that we subscribe to essentialism. There is no essential core of properties required for an identity of the sort ethnic groups have. But the lack of an essence does not entail the lack of an identity; it does not entail eliminativism. The view I propose recognizes that when the classification of particular persons comes up, there will be cases in which classification is clear and some in which it is not. A Cuban American, who came from Cuba last year, does not know English, and lives immersed in a Cuban-American environment is surely Cuban American. I think I have shown above that I am obviously Latino: I act Latino, I feel Latino, both Latinos and Anglos think of me as Latino, and I was born in a country that is part of Latin America. On the other hand, Bill Clinton is not Latino. He does not think of himself as Latino, he does not act Latino, others do not think of him as Latino, and he was born in the United States and from non-Latino ancestry. So it seems that the cases of the Cuban American mentioned, of Bill Clinton, and of myself are clear and decidable. But not every case is like this. What do we make of my granddaughter Clarisa. Her mother is my daughter, but her father has pure English ancestry and was born in Canada. She takes after her father’s family in looks and temperament, although I like to think that her best qualities come from my family. Is she Latina? And what will we make of her children if she turns out to marry another Anglo, and they never have any contact with Latinos? These are cases in which Latino identity is up for negotiation. But this should not militate against the idea of a Latino identity. That the case of my great grandchild is difficult to decide, or perhaps even impossible, or that the decision needs to be made contextually and in terms of negotiation, does not alter the fact that I am Latino and Bill Clinton is not. This point can be elucidated by noting that many of our concepts have members that clearly belong, some that clearly do not belong, and others

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that are unclear. A mistaken assumption about ethnic categories is that they must have clear and strict boundaries so that their membership is never in doubt. This is quite out of step with the conditions under which we accept many of our most valued categories and concepts, so there is no reason why we should impose on ethnicity conditions without which we are willing to do in other cases. Consider, for example, as common a concept as, “most of the Xs,” as we use it when we say “Most of the students who are taking my course in ethnicity this semester will pass it.” Everyone understands what this means, but when one looks at the situation more closely, it is clear that the membership of the category is clear in some instances but not in others. Say that the course has twenty students enrolled. In this case, it is clear that “most of the students” does not refer to one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten students, for none of those numbers would represent “most” of the students. Nor is it twenty, for that would be all of the students. It is also clear that most of the students would cover nineteen, eighteen, and seventeen. But once we get below seventeen, questions arise. Can one consider eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen to constitute most of the students? Interestingly enough, the total number of students affects also the numbers in doubt. If the course has an overall enrollment of ten, then clearly one-six and ten are not most of the students; nine and eight do constitute most of the students; but what do we make of seven? Here it is only one number that seems to be in doubt, rather than the six numbers in the case of twenty. Now, if we increase the number of students to fifty, then we will find that the number in doubt is even larger than in the case of twenty. Two things are clear from this example. First, the category “most of the Xs” has members that are in doubt and members that are not. Second, the exact number of members that are in doubt depends very much on the particular number that constitutes the totality, which means that it results from contextual factors particular to the situation. None of this, however, stands in the way of our using the concept “most of the Xs,” and certainly we do not think any less of the category to which this concept refers because of it. There is no reason, then, to assume that, because a particular category has an undetermined membership, it is useless or must be abandoned. Similarly, this applies obviously to the category of ethnic groups. The familial-historical conception of ethnic groups serves to explain in particular how the same person can share in different identities, for the conditions of one identity need not preclude another. I can be Latino and Cuban. If there is no fixed necessary set of properties that I have to have for membership in each of these groups, the grounds for incompatibility

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between these identities diminishes considerably. There is always the possibility of accommodation and negotiation, particularly when change is essential for identity preservation. Finally, the adoption of this position makes clear that the use of more general labels to describe more general identities does not entail rigid parameters of homogenization; nor does it exclude the use of less general labels to indicate more particular identities. This is important insofar as a great objection against all talk about general identities is precisely that they homogenize and preclude the use of more particular ones. If I have to choose between being Latino and being Mexican, someone says, I prefer being Mexican, for that is closer to me. But if we adopt the familialhistorical view of ethnic identities, this kind of conflict and choice is not inevitable. For each of these labels indicates something important about me; this is not a set of properties that defines and confines me. Indeed, this opens the doors to the resolution of ethnic conflicts, and can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to other social identities that have been the source of much strife. It can also serve to make room for dialogue and intercultural understanding. A Latino identity is a historical marker. It tells me that I am, here and I am now, a part of a group within which I fit in many ways. It does not tell me that I am like everyone else in the group and different from everyone else who does not belong to the group, or that I have been and will continue to be what I am. Rather, it tells me that I am part of the group because I am related in various ways to other members of the group and that I have properties that these relations generate in context with some members of the group, and that all these relations and properties set me and other members of the group apart from other groups. I am not part of those other groups because either I have no relations with their members or because the relations I share with them do not justify membership and thus identity, or even because I do not share with them certain properties that in context identify the groups that have them. Clearly I am not Jewish—I share no history with the Jews and there are no properties resulting from that history that I also have. Also, the citizenship relation I share with other Americans does not warrant Latino identity, because citizenship is not an ethnic marker for Latinos, although the culture I share with Latinos might. In conclusion, to reject essentialism does not force us to reject general identities, and to accept the value of particular identities does not prima facie preclude general identities. That ethnic groups share no essence does not mean that they do not share a general identity. The same applies to more particular identities: that we are Latinos does not entail that we reject the Mexican identity some of us have, or vice versa.

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We do not need to choose between generalism and particularism. We can be Latinos, Mexicans, and Maya, or French and Jewish. General and particular identities can, and do, coexist. The Essentialism versus Eliminativism Dilemma and the Generalism versus Particularism Dilemma are based on a misguided conception of identity. If we adopt the familial-historical view of ethnic identities, and use it as a model to understand other social identities, the dilemmas disappear. In addition it opens the doors to dialogue and understanding, diminishing the possibility of conflict and strife among peoples from different cultures, races, ethne, and nations. So, yes, I am Latino and Cuban, among many other things, and all these identities serve to describe me, give rise to particular feelings in me, and function as sources of action for me. And my understanding of what I am in familial-historical terms allows me to think of others who have different social identities that I, not as enemies or aliens, but as people like myself, with a certain kinship and history.

Notes 1. This is a revised and extended version of Jorge J. E. Gracia’s “Identities: General and Particular” in his Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity (2008); it is reprinted with the permission of Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. 2. For recent discussions of intersectionality, see José Medina (2003) and Linda M. Alcoff (2006). For a discussion of Medina’s article, see the exchanges sponsored by the Symposia on Gender, Race, and Philosophy in May 2005. Accessed May 14, 2012. http://web.mit.edu/sgrp. 3. For a discussion of this position see Gracia’s Hispanic/Latino identity (2000, 21– 26). J. L. A. García rejects the use of identity (2007, 45–77); see also Hollinger (2006, 23–31).

References Alcoff, Linda M. 2006. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self. New York: Oxford University Press. Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2007. “Does Truth Matter to Identity?.” In Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia, 19–44, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. —. 1992. In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. Corlett, J. Angelo. 2003. Race, Racism, and Reparations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Du Bois, W. E. B. 1897. The Conservation of Races. Washington, DC: American Negro Academy.

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—. 1940. Dusk of Dawn: An Essay toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept. New York: Harcourt, Brace. —. 2001. “The Conservation of Races.” In Race, edited by Robert Bernasconi, 84–92. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Dussel, Enrique. 1973. América Latina: Dependencia y Liberación [Latin America: Dependency and liberation]. Buenos Aires: Fernando García Cambeiro. Eriksen, Thomas Hyland. 1997. “Ethnicity, Race, and Nation.” In The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration, edited by M. Guibernau and David Rex, 33–42. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Frondizi, Risieri. 1948. “¿Hay una filosofía latinoamericana?.” [Is there a Latin American philosophy?]. Realidad 3: 158–170. García, J. L. A. 2007. “Racial and Ethnic identity?.” In Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia, 45–77. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gracia, Jorge J. E. 1992a. “La liberación como foco utópico del pensamiento latinoamericano” [Liberation as a utopian focus in Latin American thought]. In La utopía en América: Simposio internacional sobre el quinto centenario [Utopia in America: International symposium on the fifth centenary], 28–44. Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo. —. 1992b. “Zea y la liberación latinoamericana” [Zea and Latin American liberation]. In América Latina: historia y destino. Homenaje Leopoldo Zea [Latin America: History and destiny. Tribute to Leopold Zea], 95– 105. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. —. 2000. Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell. —. 2003. Old Wine in New Skins: The Role of Tradition in Communication, Knowledge, and Group Identity. 67th Marquette University Aquinas Lecture. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press. —. 2005. Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. —. 2008. Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell. —, ed. 2007. Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. —, and Iván Jaksiü, eds. 1988. Filosofía e identidad cultural en América Latina [Philosophy and cultural identity in Latin America]. Caracas: Monte Avila. Hollinger, David A. 2006. “From Identity to Solidarity.” Daedalus (Fall): 23–31.

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Jenkins, Richard. 1999. “Ethnicity Etcetera: Social Anthropological Points of View.” In Ethnic and Racial Studies Today, edited by Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, 85–97. London: Routledge. Mayz Vallenilla, Ernesto. (1969) 1992. El problema de América [The problem of America]. 2nd ed. Caracas: Ediciones de la Universidad Simón Bolívar. McGary, Howard. 2007. “Racial Assimilation and the Dilemma of Racially Defined Institutions.” In Race or Ethnicity? On Black and Latino Identity, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia, 155–169. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Medina, José. 2003. “Identity Trouble: Disidentification and the Problem of Difference.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 29 (6): 655–680. Mendieta, Eduardo. 2001. “The ‘Second Reconquista,’ or, Why Should an ‘Hispanic’ Become a Philosopher?” Philosophy and Social Criticism 27 (2): 11–9. Mignolo, Walter. 2000. “Latinos (and Latino Studies) in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity.” In Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race, and Rights, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Pablo De Greiff, 99– 124. New York: Routledge. Miró Quesada, Francisco. 1976. El problema de la filosofía latinoamericana [The problem of Latin-American philosophy]. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Nicol, Eduardo. 1961. El problema de la filosofía hispánica [The problem of Hispanic philosophy]. Madrid: Tecnos. Oboler, Suzanne. 2000. “It Must Be a Fake! Racial Ideologies, Identities, and the Question of Rights.” In Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race, and Rights, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Pablo De Greiff, 125–146. New York: Routledge. Ramos, Samuel. (1934) 1963. El perfil del hombre y la cultura en México [Profile of man and culture in Mexico]. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Rex, J., and D. Mason, eds. 1986. Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rivano, Juan. 1965. Punto de partida de la miseria [Misery’s point of departure]. Santiago: Universidad de Chile. Salazar Bondy, Augusto. 1969. The Meaning and Problem of Hispanic American Thought. Edited by John P. Augelli. Kansas City: Lawrence Center for Latin American Studies of the University of Kansas. Schwartzmann, Félix. 1950. El sentimiento de lo humano en América [The sense of human in America]. Santiago: Universidad de Chile. Thompson, E. P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Pantheon Books.

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Vasconcelos, José. 1957. Obras completas [Complete works]. 4 vols. Mexico City: Libreros Mexicanos. Vincent, Joan. 1974. “The Structuring of Ethnicity.” Human Organization, 33 (4): 375–379. Weber, Max. 1997. “What Is an Ethnic Group?.” In The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Migration, edited by M. Guibernau and David Rex, 15–26. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Zea, Leopoldo. 1988–1989. “Identity: A Latin American Philosophical Problem.” The Philosophical Forum 20 (1–2): 33–42. —. 1948. “En torno a una filosofía Americana” [On American philosophy]. In Ensayos sobre filosofía en la historia [Essays in the philosophy of history], 165–177. Mexico City: Stylo.

CHAPTER FOUR BAKHTIN’S DIALOGISM AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE DOUBLE-VOICED WORD AND TRANSCULTURE EDWARD DEMENCHONOK

Dialogic relationships . . . are an almost universal phenomenon, permeating all human speech and all relationships and manifestations of human life—in general, everything that has meaning and significance. —Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 1984, 40

The movement for recognition of cultural diversity was a hallmark of the second half of the twentieth century. However, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, with the neoconservative and hegemonic shift in world politics and the “global war on terror,” this movement has been countered and reversed by the tendencies toward ethnocentrism, fundamentalism, hegemonic exceptionalism, suspicion of “others,” and the antipluralist politics of “integration.” The political course toward domination is obviously not friendly toward ideas of plurality and dialogical relationships among equals. This policy seeks its justification in ideological fundamentalism and concepts of “culture wars” within societies and a global “clash of civilizations,” which, in turn, invite violence and seem to become self-fulfilling prophecies. In the predominant political discourse, the current situation of the world is framed as a Manichean dilemma between hegemonic globalization and “culture wars,” or between Big Brother’s neo-totalitarian security and the privacy of citizens, and so forth. The way in which the dilemma is formulated implies that there is no alternative other than to accept the current political course. Yet this course of hegemony and domination has failed to provide either stability or viable solutions to urgent socioeconomic and global problems; instead it has exacerbated them.

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The challenge implied by this false dilemma can be met with resources from the thinking of what at first sight may seem to be an unsuspecting source: namely, Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975), whose concepts remain relevant in our time. Among the useful concepts from his corpus are not only his famous terms—chronotope, carnival, culture of laughter—but also such central categories as dialogue, double-voiced word, polyphony, and outsideness.1 The Bakhtinian concept of “outsideness,” which means an ability to see things from an outside perspective and to think beyond schemata, raises the following questions: Is any current situation really predetermined? Do people have no choice but to accept the status quo, trading civil liberties for neo-totalitarian security, cultural identities for homogenizing “integration,” and the right to peace for stability based on unlimited use of force by a global empire? Bakhtinian images of a popular carnival and laughter, with the mocking decrowning of a king, challenging official dogma, can help us to liberate ourselves from illusions and fear. We can further ask: What alternative to this grim determinism could there be? What better, more constructive models of social and world development are desirable and realistically possible? The failure of the hegemonic course evinces the necessity of abandoning it and opening an opportunity for regaining a robust democracy, initiating peaceful and collaborative international relations, reducing the gap between the wealth and poverty, and recognizing cultural diversity and dialogue among equals. In a broader sense, before we identify any feasible alternative, we first need to examine the root causes of the problems. One alternative can be conceived in terms of the Bakhtinian contrast between the one-dimensional monologic world of stereotypes and authoritarian dicta versus the pluralistic dialogic world of creative thinking, recognition of the others as equals, personal moral responsibility and shared co-existence, and an openness toward the cultural-historical creativity of individuals. Dialogic philosophy, championed by Bakhtin and Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, and Eugen RosenstockHuessy, among others, provides us with a vision of human beings and society based on the principles of dialogue and communication on all levels—individual, intersubjective, social, and cultural. The implementation of these principles aims to transform the traditional world into what some call a “dialogic civilization.” Recent quests for dialogue have shown the relevance of this trend in European thought. Bakhtin’s philosophical legacy is an inexhaustible source of guiding insights and inspiration for thinking through these issues. Being one of the major representatives of dialogic philosophy, he put forward the idea of

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the universal character of dialogue, and showed that dialogism permeates all human relationships (1984, 40). He stressed that all language and thought are dialogic, underscoring “the dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself” (293). As Michael Holquist suggests, “dialogue is an obvious master key to the assumptions that guided Bakhtin’s work throughout his whole career” (2002, 15). Indeed, the idea of dialogue, as developed by Bakhtin in its many aspects and applied to various fields of the humanities, became his signature term for a phenomenon seen in multifarious areas of philosophy: epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, axiology, and social philosophy, as well as the philosophy of language. Dialogism refers to human communication using natural language. It deals with relationships among persons engaged in that communication. Dialogic relationships form the very foundation of all human activities—self-consciousness, intersubjective relationships, cognition, and cultural creativity—from the personal level to the most general level of dialogue among cultures. Bakhtin’s thought remains a participant in today’s ongoing dialogue regarding cultural identity and diversity of cultures and their relationships, as is evident in continuing publications and conferences about various aspects of his legacy. Publication of Bakhtin’s collected works (1996– 2012) provided a more comprehensive view of his philosophical thought, which has stimulated further discussions about his ideas. Many researchers try to approach Bakhtin’s legacy in a “Bakhtinian way,” as living thought—manifold, open, and dynamic—and in dialogue with it. They attempt to reconstruct it, to actualize the heuristic potential of his ideas in our contemporary context, and creatively use his ideas in developing their own analysis and theories. In this chapter, drawing on the works of Bakhtin, I will articulate the manifold aspects of dialogism and its role in intercultural philosophy. The method is to argue immanently, moving from within the analyzed positions and revealing the possible next argumentative steps that are implicit yet not fully elaborated. I will examine the relevance of Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy and its influence on recent works by Russian scholars, and discuss how his work can inform emerging theories regarding intercultural and inter-philosophical dialogue. In the first part, I briefly review some of the main concepts of Bakhtin’s philosophy. In the second part, I focus on the concept of dialogism in Bakhtin’s philosophy of language, especially the theory of the double-voiced word, as reconstructed by Liudmila A. Gogotishvili and developed in the phenomenology of indirect speech. The third part addresses dialogue in spiritual practice and the dialogue of spiritual traditions, as examined in Sergey S. Horujy’s works. He asserts that personal

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communication is helpful in enhancing dialogue between diverse spiritual traditions. In the fourth part, I discuss outsideness, creative understanding, and freedom as elaborated in Mikhail N. Epstein’s theory of transculture. The essay generally argues that rich opportunities exist for dialogue in spiritual and cultural traditions, which serve as the grounds for striving for a better alternative to the state of affairs that exists in today’s world. The realization of the dialogic potential ultimately depends on us.

Bakhtin’s Dialogic Philosophy Bakhtin is a stellar representative of the exceptionally creative period called the “silver age” of Russian culture, and of the Russian and German philosophical debates of the boom period of European humanistic thought in the first decades of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, that process was interrupted by the dramatic turn of history when Europe plunged into wars and revolutions. Working under harsh conditions of repression, Bakhtin was able to continue to contribute to this line of thought and, as a survivor-messenger, pass it on to a new generation that was striving for a more humane world. He published Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics) in 1963, and Tvorchestvo François Rabelais i narodnaia kul’tura srednevekov’ia i Renessansa (The work of François Rabelais and folk culture of the Middle Ages and Renaissance) in 1965, at the time of the post-Stalinist thaw, which was a sensational event in the USSR and abroad. In terms of Bakhtin’s concept of outsideness, these works provided a new perspective for looking at the existing regime, challenging its universalistic pretensions, showing its relativity (and temporality) in the pluralistic world, and offering suggestions for better alternatives. In the Western Europe and the Americas, Bakhtin’s works sparked a great deal of interest not only among philosophers and literary theorists, but also among a broad range of intellectuals. The dialogic approach challenged the monologism that had determined most of modern philosophy since Descartes. His philosophical principles were definitely not detached from the realities of the contemporary world. His ideas of individual freedom, recognition of the other, plurality, and dialogic relationships resonated with individuals and movements who protested against domination in its many forms and the dehumanizing economic-political system, and those striving for civil liberties, social equality, recognition of cultural diversity, and the awakening of a global consciousness. As a philosopher, Bakhtin was “discovered” rather belatedly, mainly after the publication of his early philosophical works, in which the key concepts of his philosophy were introduced. He became known for his

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groundbreaking works in philology, literary criticism, aesthetics, and cultural theory. Nonetheless, as I mentioned elsewhere, these diverse aspects of his creativity were first rooted in his philosophy, which must be credited as the reason why they became so influential (Demenchonok 2001, 127– 132). A study of “Bakhtin the philosopher” shows that his life’s work aimed to present an integrated philosophical worldview.

Personalist Ontology and Its Ethical Dimension One of Bakhtin’s innovative early works, Toward a Philosophy of the Act (1993), was written around 1920, but could not be published until 1986. It concerned the main problems facing Western philosophers, while continuing the tradition of Russian thought. In it, Bahktin provided an original response to the problems faced by neo-Kantianism, Wilhlem Dilthey’s historical knowledge, and Georg Simmel’s philosophy of life, in their efforts to find a firm basis for the human sciences. He undertook a critical analysis of previous philosophy, turning first to romantic and postromantic aesceticism. He pointed out the main, ethical deficiency of the “philosophy of life,” writing that life can be consciously comprehended only as an ongoing event within the context of concrete responsibility: “A philosophy of life can be only a moral philosophy” (56). Bakhtin’s ideas were similar to those of Martin Heidegger, although they were elaborated about five years earlier than Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time; 1927). Both thinkers, without knowing each other, were working in the same philosophical area. Both focused on human individuality, defending it from depersonalizing ideology and power. However, Bakhtin not only anticipated Heidegger’s ground-breaking ideas, but expressed a more fruitful approach to the problems conceptualized by German philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. He was nearer than Heidegger to the methodological innovations of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, such as its ethical aspect (as found, for example, in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s works [1999]). If Toward a Philosophy of the Act had been published in the 1920s (instead of in 1986, as actually happened), this would likely have led to an accelerated development of the hermeneutic trend in Western Europe even before World War II. (Soloviev 1988, 50)

Bakhtin identified an important dimension of the problem of understanding. It consisted of understanding moral effort as actualized in the spatial and temporal moment, while at the same time being identical and common to all human beings. It pertained to the continuity of duti-

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fulness (the “ought”) preserved in the conditions of the consciously comprehended uniqueness of the individual “being-there.” According to Bakhtin, understanding can never happen only from the point of view of the self: it requires the outside perspective of the other. Thus, understanding is dialogic and, ideally, in dialogue, we respect differences and interact with others in an ethical way. Bakhtin developed the concept of an individual who actively participates in being and self-realizing, and who has a moral obligation to assume responsibility for personal uniqueness and being. The key concept is “act” or “deed.” He emphasizes that “the actually performed act in its individual wholeness is more than rational—it is answerable” (1993, 29). A position of an “answerably” (responsibly) or “participatively” acting person is defined within the moral realm; the imperativeness of choice and responsibility for deed are rooted in the “fact of my non-alibi in Being” (40). This means that as a human being, I have no excuse for the ongoing event of my existence, and my place in it is best understood as an act, a deed. As he writes, “I am actual and irreplaceable, and therefore must actualize my uniqueness.” Thus, “my unique ought arises from my unique place in Being” (41). An act of our actual experiencing “must acquire the unity of two-sided answerability—both for its content (special answerability) and for its Being (moral answerability).” Moreover, the special answerability “must be brought into communion with the unitary and unique moral answerability as a constituent moment in it” (2–3). This means that the unity of moral law and of an act is possible only on the basis of an act, and of the inclusion of the law within a context of an act. Thus Bakhtin provides us with an insight in approaching the central problem of contemporary ethics. Of note is that an act occurs in the relation of one human being to another human being who in turn is capable of acts. Additionally, Bakhtin’s philosophy is personalist. A unifying teleology that is both personalist and dialogic coherently links the variety of his philosophical endeavors. He considered the dialogic nature of consciousness and personality to be constitutive of human personhood; he viewed dialogism as inseparable from human persons between whom dialogue takes place. He focused on individuals—speaking of dialogism of consciousness, intersubjective relationships, cultural creativity, and a variety of conflictive social relationships—in dialogue with themselves or others. He characterized the cultural, social, and natural world of Being as shared co-being (co-existence) with others. In notes made in 1970–1971, Bakhtin concisely summarized some key tenets of his philosophy regarding the event of Being, self-consciousness, I-other relations, dialogism, language, and freedom:

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When consciousness came into existence . . . the world changed radically. . . . It stopped simply being and started being in itself and for itself (these categories appear for the first time here) as well as for the other, because it has been reflected in the consciousness of the other (the witness and the judge): this has caused it to change radically, to be enriched and transformed. . . . The reflection of the self in the empirical other through whom one must pass in order to reach I-for-myself (can this I-for-myself be solitary?). The absolute freedom of this I. But this freedom cannot change existence, so to speak, materially (nor can it want to)—it can change only the sense of existence (to recognize it, to justify it, and so forth); this is the freedom of the witness and the judge. It is expressed in the word. (1986, 137–138)

Dialogic Relationships between I and the Other in a Shared Event of Being Based on dialogism as the foundation of the humanities, Bakhtin developed dialogic versions of ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of language. In this approach, “the dialogue among cultures and the dialogue between the humanities and humanity” is more important than scientific precision (Epstein 2012, 57–68). Bakhtin’s core philosophical ideas and principles were expressed in his early philosophical works (Toward a Philosophy of the Act [1993] and “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” [1990a]), and then were further elaborated, albeit in different and terminologically transformed ways, in his later works in the context of his philosophical anthropology, moral philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of language, and religious philosophy. Among these ideas was criticism of monologic thinking as opposed to dialogic thinking, which would be fully developed in his later works, as well as themes of I-other relations and outsideness. Among the various “turns” that accompanied the transition from classical to contemporary philosophy (ontological, hermeneutic, linguistic), Bakhtin saw the turn from the monologic paradigm of idealistic classical philosophy to the dialogic paradigm as the main event in twentieth-century philosophy. In the monologic world, everything is divided into two categories: true and false. The consciousness of different individuals is replaced by the unity of a single consciousness, which takes a metaphysical form of the consciousness in general: an “absolute I” or “Absolute Spirit,” and so on. Any true judgment is not related to an individual, but is attributed to the context of a monologic system of thinking. Criticizing this sort of philosophical monologism, Bakhtin argued in favor of dialogic principles. As he pointed out in his 1929 Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo (Problems

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of Dostoevsky’s art), “in the monologic world—tertium non datur: a thought is either affirmed or negated or ceased to be a fully meaningful thought” (2000, 59). In contrast, Bakhtin argues in favor of the plurality of consciousnesses and of ways of knowing. He holds that the notion of truth itself is not limited to only one consciousness, but that truth requires a plurality of consciousnesses. By its nature, truth is social; it emerges at the point of contact among various consciousnesses: “On the basis of the philosophical monologism any substantial interaction of consciousnesses is impossible, and therefore any substantial dialogue is impossible” (ibid., 60–61). Bakhtin stressed the necessity of the dialogical overcoming of CartesianKantian monologism. In Bakhtin’s philosophy, dialogism is intimately related to the concept of the other and to I-other relationships (also “otherness,” “the other individual”). These concepts are key to his revision of Western metaphysics and rethinking the foundations of human existence and co-existence. He grounded a personalist understanding of Being as the co-being of I-other interrelations, as “the unitary and once-occurrent event of Being” (1993, 12). Dialogical relationships between I and the other (and ultimately between I and the Absolute Other) constitute the structure of Being understood as an “event.” This fundamental ontological structure determines the forms of existence and the forms of thought, language, and cultural meaning as such. For realization of an event of Being, at least two personal consciousnesses are needed: “co-being of being.” His analysis aims to help us come closer to an understanding of “the architectonic structure of the actual world-as-event” (61) which is revealed within the absolute coordinates of I and the other. Bakhtin speaks of the “two-plane character of the valuative determinateness of the world—for myself and for the other” (ibid., 74). I and the other are architectonically two value-centers of life, different yet correlated with each other. He continues, “it is around these centers that all of the concrete moments of Being are distributed and arranged” (ibid.). He approaches the philosophical one-and-many problem through a phenomenological grounding of the ontology of “Being as event” (bytie kak sobytie) or “event of Being” (sobytie bytiia), taking Being as fundamentally constituted through human activity. Bakhtin’s ontological valorization of the word “event” (sobytie) points to its etymology in Russian, in which sobytie can also literally mean “cobeing” or “being with,” indicating an event that is shared simultaneously—co-existence (Holquist 2002, 25). He formulates the dialogic principle of responsibility or “answerability” (otvetstvennost’) as a personal task of

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unifying various phenomena of moral reality (such as arts and life, for example) based on their common social-ontological ground. His concept of outsideness architectonically means my ability to be the other in relationship with others. While Bakhtin characterized existence as the unique and unified event of Being, at the same time he emphasized the plurality of perspectives of its participants. Actual Being as an event is determined to be uniquely important not in or by itself, but precisely “in correlation with my own obligative uniqueness” for me myself from my own unique place (1993, 46). The same is true for the others’ perspectives. Thus, I and the other are both participating in the same event, each from our own position. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the valuative world-pictures of every participant from their unique places: The truth [pravda] of the event is not the truth that is self-identical and selfequivalent in its content [istina] but is the rightful and unique position of every participant—the truth of each participant’s actual, concrete ought. (Ibid.)

Unitary Being as event is defined architectonically, and its “parts” are its participants, that is, the others to each other, with their engaged “participant thinking” which makes it possible to grasp the unitary event simultaneously from inside and from outside of the concrete experience.

I-for-Myself, the Other-for-Me, and I-for-the-Other In the majority of the historical types of cultures that Bakhtin examined, he saw one side of a relation either elevated or suppressed in I-other relationships. This tends to neutralize the opposition of the sides until sameness of both sides is achieved, thus creating an illusion of either mutual isolation or blending, resulting in an illusory psychological or social unity. He attributed the disharmony of the interrelations between I and the other to the predominant orientation of culture toward one abstract universal consciousness, such as the rationalistic epistemology or monologism. On the contrary, Bakhtin views I and the other in opposition within the unity of the event of Being; yet each retains its uniqueness and equality of value. He describes I-other relationships as simultaneously mutual outsideness and connectedness in one co-being: as independentinterdependent or “non-fused yet undivided,” or “unconfused and inseparable” (nesliiannoe i nerazdel’noe).2 Bakhtin criticizes ethical theories that prioritize either the I (Max Scheler, Georg Simmel, and philosophical idealism) or the other (material-

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ist or pragmatic ethics). He argued that the ethical way to surmount this kind of inequality is to see in an abstract “other” a concrete “you.” In aesthetics, I-other relations are presented as relations between an author and a hero with various kinds of asymmetries (the author suppresses the hero or the hero suppresses the author, or the revolt of the hero, and so forth). In the polyphonic novels of Fyodor Dostoevsky, Bakhtin sees a solution to this problem: the authorial position presupposes polyphonic dialogic intersections of the voices of the characters without the domination of the author’s voice. Neither the author nor the hero dominates, nor is the author-hero relation neutralized within an undifferentiated general consciousness. Instead, the voices of each are equally distinctive, preserving the creative core of the author, within the polyphony of the novel (Gogotishvily, 2003, 368–370; 2006, 179). The same idea of the “non-fused yet undivided” or “unconfused and inseparable” dialogic I-other relationship is also expressed in Bakhtin’s philosophy of language, where he interprets relationships of the voices within the double-voiced word, which is formally a single syntactic construction that actually expresses two dialogically related voices (Gogotishvili 2006, 147n7). (This topic will be analyzed in the section below, entitled “Dialogism of a Double-Voiced Word.”) Using Dostoevsky’s novels as his examples, Bakhtin writes that everything in them “tends towards dialogue, towards a dialogic opposition, as if tending towards its center. A single voice adds nothing and resolves nothing. Two voices is the minimum for life, the minimum for existence” (1984, 252). Dialogism combines two interrelated qualities: diversity and coexistence. On the one hand, Bakhtin asserts the difference between I and other, underscoring the ideas of diversity and of the plurality of perspectives. He writes about “the clear demarcation of two consciousnesses, their contraposition and their interrelations” and “a tense dialogic struggle” on the boundaries between individual’s own words and the other’s words (1986, 142–143). On the other hand, he emphasizes the dialogic coexistence of I and other as co-participants in event of Being. For him, “active agreement/disagreement . . . stimulates and deepens understanding.” Creative understanding is result of dialogic “co-creativity of those who understand” (ibid.).3 Bakhtin writes that I love the other as “another,” and not as myself, but “the other’s love of me sounds emotionally in an entirely different way to me . . . than the same love of me sounds to him, and it obligates him and me to entirely different things” (1993, 46). The unitary event of love has a common center, but two points of reference for its realization, because an event of love is realized in the relationship between two different individuals, I and the other.

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In Bakhtin’s theory, all the values of actual life and culture are concentrated around the basic moments in the architectonic of the actual world of the performed act or deed: “I-for myself, the other-for-me, and Ifor-the-other” (1993, 54). It suggests the inequality of the I and the other in the sense of the primary orientation of moral consciousness and deed toward the other, rather than toward the self. This prioritizing the other over the self stands in contrast to ethical systems in which “I” is considered more important than “other” (for example, Georg Simmel and Max Scheler). For Bakhtin, the values of what ought to be are correlated with I, while the values of what is are correlated with the other. The ought can be related by the acting I only to its self (but not imposed on the other), and in this sense “universal” values are not merely abstract and declarative ones, but they are the actual and operating motives of actions or deeds. I assume the ought, while providing an “ethical-aesthetical kindness to the other,” and this altruistic relationship is actively realized through my responsible act or deed. The meaning of this architectonic contraposition of I and the other is expressed in the fundamental moral principle of “absolute self-exclusion” (absolutnoe sebia-iskluchenie, or exclusion of self, self-exception) (Bakhtin 1993, 75). This principle of self-exclusion from the values of the present-on-hand Being implies favoring the other and imparting these values to the other. Paradoxically, within the architectonics of the unity of the event of Being, this contraposition symbolizes moral and aesthetic love, while union symbolizes the hidden animosity of a forced union. Traditional “theoretical ethics” was unable to grasp this principle of self-exclusion; thus, its articulation was an innovative characteristic of Bakhtin’s moral philosophy. He noted that this principle constitutes not only “the sense of all Christian morality” but also that it is “the starting point for altruistic morality” (ibid.). The theme of I-other relationships raises the question of the correlation between the principle of self-exclusion from the values of the present-onhand Being and the concept of outsideness. Bakhtin believed in the general outsideness of any I to any other. However, he also stressed the radical differences in the forms of outsideness as used in ethics and aesthetics. In ethics, it is a moral principle of self-exclusion, while in aesthetics, it refers to the outsideness of author, hero, and reader. How are we to understand self-exclusion and the participation of the self (the I) in the event of Being? Consider that in ethics, a moral subject is understood as “being outside” in relation to the other, but participative in the event of Being. An ethical deed is a real action that is realized within a

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concrete given circumstance, and which, therefore, is transformed into an event of Being. The principle of self-exclusion was introduced by Bakhtin at the end of an unfinished fragment of Toward a Philosophy of the Act (1993, 75), leaving open questions about its meaning and its possible development. Therefore, it has been subject to various interpretations. Liudmila Gogotishvily proffers an attempt at the reconstruction of the possible meanings of this principle. According to her, the initial meaning of this principle presupposes an exclusion of self from the values of the presenton-hand Being. However, she believes that after consideration of the whole text of Toward a Philosophy of the Act, it seems that an embodiment is needed in order to be able to really accomplish a moral act as an event of Being. Apparently, this refers to two simultaneous events: I can be thought of as entering into eventful relations with the outside world and— simultaneously—with the Absolute Other. In the first event, the I is understood to be sacrificially excluding itself from the values of the world and from embodiment in it, while in the second event, the I is thought to have received embodiment as “a gift” from the Absolute Other.4 Bakhtin refers to the inequality of the I and the other with respect to value in Christianity (we should relieve the other of any burdens and take them upon ourselves) and to altruism, which evaluates the other’s happiness and one’s own happiness in completely different ways. He writes: In Christ we find a synthesis of unique depth, the synthesis of ethical solipsism [individuals’ infinite severity toward themselves, i.e., an immaculately pure relationship with oneself] with ethical-aesthetic kindness toward the other. . . . Hence, in all of Christ’s norms the I and the other are contraposed: for myself—absolute sacrifice, for the other—loving mercy. But I-for-myself is the other for God. . . . What I must be for the other, God is for me. (1990a, 56)

Participative Outsideness, Active Agreement or Disagreement, and Creative Understanding Dialogue is a phenomenon of personal being. A human being is not a closed self-sufficient entity and does not have the fullness of knowledge of the world. A person perceives the world only from a certain perspective. Thus a person needs to go to a certain context, beyond his/her own point of view and to assume a position of “outsideness,” to be in dialogue with the others and ultimately with the Absolute Other. In this regard, Bakhtin wrote about dialogue not only as communication, but as metaphysics of personality and meaning.

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As mentioned above, one of Bakhtin’s key concepts in his theory of dialogism is outsideness. This term is also used in conjunction with modifying terms, for example, “participative outsideness” and “mutual outsideness.” Thus, I must transcend the limits of my own self. Bakhtin pointed out the principle of outsideness and the “advantages of outsideness (spatially, temporally, and nationally)” for understanding (1986, 141). According to him, in dialogue, “question and answer presuppose mutual outsideness” (168). For understanding to occur, “it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding—in time, in space, in culture” (7). As an object of understanding, one needs a perspective other than ones’ own: “our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space and because they are others” (ibid.). The other is a “mirror” for me, and vice versa. I and the other occupy positions of outsideness to each other, thus reciprocally making possible our greater understanding and growth of both the self and the other, and true dialogue. Understanding is a dialogic and creative process. The relations of the understood and the understanding subjects are complex. However, Bakhtin sees advantages of contraposition and interaction of two consciousnesses, of “active-dialogic understanding (disagreement/agreement),” which stimulates and deepens understanding (1986, 159). Bakhtin stressed “the importance of reaching, digging down to the creative nucleus of the personality” (168). Understanding presupposes openness to the “other’s assimilated words” (ibid.). The assimilation and appropriation of another’s word transforms it into one’s own word, bringing both together into a hybrid of “one’s own-another’s” internalized word. Any understanding is “the dialogic movement” of correlation of a given text with other texts and reinterpretation, in the new contexts—in my own context, in the past, present, and in the anticipated future one (161). Understanding supplements the text: “Creative understanding continues creativity and multiplies the artistic wealth of humanity. The co-creativity of those who understand” (142). The axiological center of others’ visions of their lives and the axiological center of my vision of the others do not necessarily coincide. I, from my own unique place in the event of being, affirm the validity of others’ being, and vice versa. I also need others’ “meaning-related outsideness” and their axiological posture: In my last word, I turn to the outside of myself and surrender myself to the mercy of the other (the ultimate sense of deathbed confession) . . . This position of outsideness makes possible (not only physically, but also morally) what is impossible for me in myself, namely: the axiological affirmation

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As an example of the role of outsideness in understanding, Epstein mentions that the distinctiveness of Russian culture can be perceived more deeply from the perspective of non-Russian culture, and vice versa. This is true with regard to any culture: the essence of “male” culture may be more deeply perceived by females; the essence of “white” culture may be more deeply perceived by blacks; and vice versa (2012, 60). Being in the position of outsideness (“being beyond”) is an advantageous situation even for understanding oneself. One can never understand oneself from within; another’s point of view must be taken into full account, even if this “otherness” is only fixed in one’s own consciousness. The relation of otherness and different positions of outsideness generate what Bakhtin called “the excess of seeing.” This “excess of my seeing, knowing, and possessing” in relation to all other human beings is founded in “the uniqueness and irreplaceability of my place in the world” and my position of outsideness (1990a, 23). This is advantageous because in my dialogue with you, we can combine my “excess” or surplus with your surplus, share our visions of things that each of us see from our own perspectives, and, in doing so, better understand ourselves and each other and have a more complete version of the event of our joint existence. Bakhtin extends the principle of outsideness to the realm of cultures, drawing an analogy between the self-consciousness of an individual and the self-consciousness of cultures. Similar to individuals, for each culture, another culture is needed to provide it with an outside perspective to surmount its one-sidedness and better understand itself: “It is only in the eyes of another culture that the foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly” (1986, 7). Bakhtin emphasized the creative nature of understanding. The importance of the other does not mean accepting only the other’s perspective at the expense of neglecting one’s own perspective or forgetting one’s own roots. Completely identifying oneself with another culture and viewing the world only through the eyes of the foreign culture would be a kind of reverse one-sidedness, neither adding anything new nor enriching understanding: “Creative understanding does not renounce itself, its own place in time, its own culture; and it forgets nothing” (1986, 7). Instead, contact between cultures should be a dialogic encounter just as between I and the other. Furthermore, the perspectives provided by both cultures can create a deeper understanding and a new meaning:

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A meaning only reveals its depth once it has encountered and come into contact with another, foreign meaning: they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, these cultures. (Ibid.)

Creative understanding implies that understanding is the result of one’s own active position in a Socratic-like questioning—from one’s own unique place in the event of Being. This means seeking answers to questions in the foreign culture and engaging in dialogue with others, through which new meaning is generated. This is a reciprocal and mutually benefiting relationship. We seek answers to our own questions in the foreign culture; at the same time, the foreign culture benefits from our questioning because we raise new questions that the foreign culture had not previously raised itself. Thus, the foreign culture reveals “its new aspects and new semantic depths,” enriching and deepening our understanding (ibid.).

Dialogic Encounters between Diverse Cultures Bakhtin’s works contributed to the theoretical grounding of the ideas of cultural diversity and dialogue. He challenged the “centrist” view of culture and universalistic claims that present the dominating culture as superior and its canon as a “model” for the others. His thesis of recognition of the other includes valuing the plurality of cultures. Plurality does not mean isolated, separated factions, but rather an interrelated diversity. In contrast to Oswald Spengler’s concept of closed cultural worlds, Bakhtin viewed the unity of a particular culture as “an open unity” (1986, 6). His theory conceptually embraced various aspects of the dynamic life of culture, with shifting boundaries and “border zones” of mutual influence and creative interaction of various areas of culture. (I shall return to the idea of border zones in the section below, entitled “Transcending Borders.”) Neither does Bakhtin’s pluralistic view mean cultural relativism in a negative sense, as a rejection of transcendental meaning and universal values. Some interpretations of Bakhtin’s concepts take them in isolation, understanding them too abstractly and in an absolute sense, and then interpret them as contradictory and relativistic. However, in Bakhtin’s thought, they are interrelated and contextualized. One of the causes of such misinterpretations was the paradoxical reception of Bakhtin’s works. They first attracted the attention of the French structuralists Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov. In the structuralist interpretation, Bakhtin’s ideas of dialogue and dialogism were presented in

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light of a theory of communication rather than as a metaphysics of human existence as “co-being.” His works became known through translations to Western readers in a reverse order, starting with Tvorchestvo François Rabelais i narodnaia kul’tura srednevekov’ia i Renessansa, which was his first book to be published in English, under the title Rabelais and His World (1968). Thus, he was perceived at first only as the author of the ideas of “chronotope,” “carnival,” “the culture of laughter,” and, related to them, ambivalence of culture. At that time, readers were still not familiar with his previous Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics; 2002), which presented a comprehensive view on the theory of dialogism and culture, and which is crucial for understanding his later works. Upon closer examination, the concepts of laughter and carnival challenged the monologic way of thinking; they were directed against the universalistic claims of authoritarian power, showing that it is temporal and not absolute. Bakhtin was concerned about the general crisis of culture manifested in the gap between the “objective” culture, which is developing by its own immanent laws, and a real living human being (the gap between the “meaning of culture” and the motives of the creative actions aiming to develop that meaning). He was interested in the forms of self-defense of culture against its domination by any agent who attempted to impose control over individuals. “Relativization referred not to ontology, but to modality,” first of all to the predominant monologic orientation of an individual with regard to culture and being (Gogotishvili 1992b, 128). The relativist interpretations of Bakhtin’s concepts have been criticized by various authors who point out that his statements should be understood in the larger context of his complete works, considering his thought and his philosophical position as a whole (Bibler 1991; Batishchev 1992; Averintsev 2001). Bakhtin’s theory contributed to the dismantling of the one-dimensional “monolithic” view of culture and to a deeper understanding of the diversity of cultures. He stated that “the most intense and productive life of culture takes place on the boundaries of its individual areas.” At the same time, he indicated that “the boundaries of these areas are not absolute” and emphasized “the interconnection and interdependence of various areas of culture” in “culture as a whole” (1986, 2). Of note is that the expression “dialogue of cultures” is a metaphor, although one which is heuristically rich as a concept, describing the mutual influence of cultures. The actual dialogue takes place among individuals,

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as representatives of different cultures. In contrast to the view of cultural relations as an “objective process” (similar to deterministic historicism) of interaction between “objective” cultures, intercultural dialogue refers to the relationship of living human beings with culture. Through culture, individuals are engaged in a search for answers to their existential questions and creativity.. Bakhtin understood the uniqueness of each individual and their dialogic communication and co-existence as based on shared values. He expanded the meaning of “dialogue” to include intercultural relations. Analogously, the “dialogue of cultures” takes place between original cultures complementing each other on the common ground of universal human values. He wrote, “Such a dialogic encounter of two cultures does not result in merging or mixing. Each retains its own unity and open totality, but they are mutually enriched” (1986, 7). Bakhtin’s theory embraces both diverse and uniting aspects of culture. He reminded us about “the differentiated unity of the culture of the epoch in which it was created,” revealed in great time (ibid., 2, 5). He wrote: There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). . . . At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival. (170)

Bakhtin’s thought is dialogic in the broadest sense of the term, opposed to monologic thinking, which means a narrow view of the world from just one’s own perspective, a blind belief in the infallibility of theories and that individuals can possess “absolute truth,” the pretense to be the “last word,” the deterministic view of society and history, and authoritarian power. Bakhtin grounded the idea of dialogism. The dialogic worldview embraces openness to the other and collaborative relationships, an ability to consider others’ viewpoints and interests, aiming at mutual understanding and co-existence, and a willingness to cooperate in search for the truth and solutions to common problems. It also implies a concept of an open history which is result of human actions, and thus an ethics of responsibility of each of us for our choices and the consequences of our actions, which affect the others and ultimately the future of humanity.

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Dialogism as a Constitutive Characteristic of Language As we noted above, dialogue lies at the heart of Bakhtin’s philosophy of language. He holds that dialogism, and all linguistic phenomena related to it, is a constitutive characteristic of language. He writes that the internal dialogism of word grows organically out of a stratified and heteroglot language, and “this double-voicedness in prose is prefigured in language itself (in authentic metaphors, as well as in myth), in language as a social phenomenon” (1990c, 326). Moreover, the roots of novelistic dialogues “always reach deep down into the internal dialogic essence of language itself” (405). As a mode of human communication using natural language, dialogism refers to relationships among persons engaged in that communication. Therefore, to more fully understand dialogism, it is necessary to understand how these relationships are connected to language. As Michael Holquist noticed, discussions about these relationships frequently formulate the issue as a question of primacy: Is dialogue a metaphor Bakhtin extracts from language’s communicative aspect and then applies to other categories outside the limits of language? Or is it the other way around, is dialogue a master principle governing existence that then finds a particularly paradigmatic expression in the language of conversation? (2002, 41)

Bakhtin suggests that we approach the matter not as an “either/or” dilemma, but as a not-exclusive “both/and” issue. Holquist shows Bakhtin’s dialogism as characteristic of a broad range of relations, but mostly related to language. It is a kind of epistemology that seeks “to grasp human behavior through the use human beings make of language” (ibid., 15). Bakhtin pioneered an original approach to the study of language, which was (and largely remains) beyond the scope of linguistics. He argued that the multifaceted dialogic relations cannot be the subject only of linguistics and its methods, but rather need a multidisciplinary approach. Bakhtin called his study “philosophical,” not limited by a linguistic, philological, literary, or any other approach, but performed “on the borders of all the aforementioned disciplines, at their junctures and points of intersection” (1986, 103). He conceives language as living dialogue, which is the realm of metalinguistics, or the study of language in its relationship to other aspects of culture.

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The Dialogic Nature of Language and Metalinguistics One of the apparent paradoxes of the perception (or rather misperception) of Bakhtin’s work is his emphasis on the dialogic nature of language, while at the same time holding critical views on linguistics. His criticism of linguistics and emphasis on metalinguistics may give the impression that he developed his concept of dialogue outside linguistics. However, we need to take a closer look at the historical context of the development of his philosophy of language. Bakhtin developed his innovative approach to the philosophy of language in contrast to the early twentieth-century currents such as formalism and structuralism.5 The predominant concept of language was at the level of the general system—abstract and impersonal. Instead, he focused on speech acts of individuals, in which their interactive communication occurs. Here, within the individual consciousness of speakers and their communication with listeners (others), dialogical relationships emerge. Bakhtin articulated the role of an internal dialogue in the formation of speech and consciousness. Inner speech is related to consciousness, and consciousness is related to activity.6 At that time, discussions about linguistics were focused on language in general and the formal sentence, but drew attention to speech and utterance. Accordingly, dialogic relations cannot exist among concepts, judgments, or the elements of a language, and they do not reside within the language system as it is studied in linguistics. Rather, dialogic relations need to be studied as semantic relations among utterances, as the relations of utterances to reality, and to the speaking author in the larger dialogue of speech communication (1986, 118). For Bakhtin, “dialogical relations among utterances that also pervade individual utterances from within fall into the realm of metalinguistics” (ibid., 114). This expresses the trans-linguistic or meta-linguistic character of the understanding of a word (or an utterance). In developing his conception of metalinguistics, Bakhtin extended the theory of double-voicedness of the word, which had been shown to be present in novels, into the entire sphere of language. Metalinguistics has since become an area of analysis of dialogic relations. In grounding his theory about “the dialogic nature of language, which was a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view,” Bakhtin drew attention to “dialogized heteroglossia” as manifested in the diverse “low genres”—on the stages of local fairs, at buffoon spectacles, street songs, folk sayings and tales (skaz), ironic anecdotes, parodies, and in various forms of stylizations—as opposed to the official unifying linguistic center of the nation (1990b, 273–275). In relating these speech phenomena to the con-

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cept of double-voiced word or “double-voicedness,” Bakhtin used the term “indirect speech” (nepriamoe govorenie): utterances expressing indirect (not literal) meaning. This term, in Bakhtin’s own accentuation, became one of the central notions of his philosophy of word (2012, 28). He also mentioned the use of social dialects and various forms of stylizations, as well as “indirect, refracted speech” found in novels, which are literary devices for expression of the author’s intentions and values (ibid., 45).7 Although Bakhtin’s dialogism was a challenge to the linguistics of his time, there was not an insurmountable chasm between his view and the conventional view. He placed the study of dialogic relations beyond the limitations of traditional linguistics, but not completely outside the field. Instead, he called for its rethinking and renovation (Gogotishvili 2006, 140–142). He emphasized the role of language variation and the idea of subjective usage depending on external elements such as social and cultural factors, rather than merely on the interplay of formal elements. Bakhtin attempted to integrate the terminology of dialogic relations with the categories of linguistics (e.g., through elaborating on the notion of “text as utterance”). In so doing, he provided insight about how linguistics and other human sciences could be reconceived in light of his dialogism.

Dialogism of a Double-Voiced Word The Bakhtinian approach to dialogic relationships is from the linguistic consciousness of an individual. The main vector of his concept of dialogue is directed toward the dialogic relationships of various voices and languages within a single individual consciousness. In contrast to the traditional, purely linguistic approach to the concept of dialogue, Bakhtin offers a broader and more dynamic view of dialogic relations as the interplay among the voices of its participants as integral personalities. Unlike an over-simplistic understanding of dialogue, reducing it to “crude” forms of dialogism as polemics or parody, he argues for a deeper understanding of dialogue. Dialogic relations involve: confidence in another’s word, reverential reception (the authoritative word), apprenticeship, the search for and mandatory nature of deep meaning, agreement, its infinite gradations and shadings (but not its logical limitations and not purely referential reservations), the layering of meaning upon meaning, voice upon voice, strengthening through merging (but not identification), the combination of many voices (a corridor of voices) that augments understanding, departure beyond the limits of the understood, and so forth. (1986, 121)

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Dialogic relationships are expressed in many ways, ranging from a real dialogue between individuals to its artistic use in literary works, especially in the polyphonic novel. A dialogic orientation is a property of any word, and it is the natural orientation of any living word: “On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word” and inevitably enters in a living interaction with it. “The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object. A word forms a concept on its own object in a dialogic way” (1990b, 279). Bakhtin uses the term “slovo” (word), which in Russian has a broad range of meanings, embracing any spoken or written communication from a single interjection to a whole literary work (cf. the Greek logos). He creatively applies this multidimensionality of the meaning, enriching the term further with his own meanings. He speaks of “dvugolosoe slovo” (doublevoiced word), “filosofiia slova” (philosophy of word), and “Slovo v romane” (The Word in the Novel), which is the title of one of his essays (2012). Any translation has its challenges, and Bakhtin’s writing is especially difficult to tackle because of the many different connotations of “slovo” that he uses. In extant translations of Bakhtin’s works, “slovo” is inconsistently translated, sometimes as “word” and sometimes as “discourse,” which is not quite accurate.8 French translations of Bakhtin’s term “slovo” have included “mot,” “discours,” and “parole,” while in English “word” and “discourse” have been used. These multifarious translations of the term have resulted in a distortion of Bakhtin’s semantic-axiological position. Consequently, slovo as a general, inclusive, and multidimensional term, encompassing a multitude of interrelated meanings, is broken down in translations into narrow and disparate aspects. His expression dvugolosoe slovo (double-voiced word), when translated as “double-voiced discourse,” is confusing, because Bakhtin was talking about slovo as an utterance that contains two different and interrelated voices within the same single syntactic construction. For him, double-voicedness is a general characteristic of slovo as “word” or “utterance,” which does not depend on whether it is used as a part of any discourse. In my opinion, if there is no compelling reason to translate “slovo” as “discourse,” it would be preferable to opt for “word” (while explaning the rich scope of its meanings in Bakhtin’s works), which is what I do with my own translations. Bakhtin was interested in the dialogic life of words as expressed in novels as a window to understanding the inner world of consciousness, motives, and actions of individuals in their relationships to themselves and to others. Thus he was not satisfied with the conventional methods used by

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the linguistics of his time, and suggested the use of extra-linguistic methods and a multidisciplinary approach in his proposed metalinguistics. In describing his methodology, Bakhtin makes several points. Dialogic relationships exist in the sphere of word, which by its very nature is dialogic. At the same time, dialogic relationships are extra-linguistic and they are the subject of metalinguistics. They cannot be separated from language, but language lives only in the dialogic interaction of its users (2002, 205). Dialogic relationships are impossible without logical and semantically referential relationships, but they are not reducible to them: in order to become dialogic, they must be embodied, become the word or an utterance, and receive authors as creators of the utterance which express their position. They must become personified utterances, expressing positions of various subjects, and entering into the dialogic relationships (206).9 The word can have a dialogic meaning only if it expresses the position of the subject behind it, to which it is possible to react dialogically. Dialogic relationships can permeate utterances and can exist at various levels and be expressed in many ways. The dialogic approach can be toward the whole utterance as well as toward any signifying part of an utterance, and even toward an individual word, if it expresses another person’s position, and if within it two voices clash and interact dialogically (1984, 184). Dialogic relationships within the double-voiced word are a focal point of Bakhtin’s metalinguistics. Gogotishvili has developed an original approach to Bakhtin’s philosophy of language. She elaborates on Bakhtin’s ideas of the double-voiced word and dialogic nature of language. Her interpretation and sometimes reconstruction of Bakhtinian thought contributes to the elucidation of some of the ideas implicit in it. She approaches the concept of the doublevoiced word from the linguistic perspective and develops a phenomenology of indirect speech. Her elaboration on this concept is based on the idea that acts of consciousness can direct attention either toward what she calls the “position on” (position on which the attention is focused), or toward the “position from” (position from which the attention is focused). From the dialogic perspective, the main attention is paid to the position from which the speech is produced and the changes of the positions or perspectives from which the meaning is expressed. She terms this notion a “point of speech” or “a particular source of meaning.” The starting position is the I, and the opposing positions to which the alternating starting position is changed in any utterance are defined by the other pronouns. Dialogic relationships among the voices of individuals are expressed linguistically in the multifaceted interrelation between the pronoun categories “I,” “you/thou,” “he/she” (the other), “it,” and “we.” The changes of the sources of mean-

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ing, which are realized between the positions as expressed by the pronoun categories, reproduce an ideal pattern of the relationship of the participants of the real acts of communication (1992a, 145). Gogotishvili distinguishes different types of points of speech (the particular sources of meaning), which realize the dialogic relationships. One of them is called a “speech center,” which is a position belonging to either the speaker or to any other subject expressing a certain meaning. Doublevoicedness is closely related to the alternation of speech centers. Another type of alternating points of speech refers to the relationships between I and thou (the listener), which is termed the “communicative position.” A third type of alternating points of speech is a “diapason of participation,” when the change of meaning is related to the shifting of the speaking point from a conditional “I” to “we” and to “all.” Within a text, an absolute I is impossible, and thus the other penetrates into the internal linguistic processes of the individual consciousness (Gogotishvili 2006, 595).10 The dialogic relationship between a conditional I and a “we” is a fundamental characteristic of each genre and style of speech.11 As a methodological tool, Gogotishvili uses the analogy of the relationships of the voices of the double-voiced word with the predicating act, while analyzing thematic and tonal double-voiced predications.

Toward a Phenomenology of Indirect Speech Bakhtin stated that the double-voiced word “inevitably arises under conditions of dialogic interaction, that is, under conditions making possible an authentic life for the word” (1984, 185). In supporting his theory, Bakhtin provided examples of “‘nondirect speaking’—not in language but through language, through the linguistic medium of another—and consequently through a refraction of authorial intentions” (1990c, 313). His concepts are ultimately correlated to the category of dialogue, which is at the center of his philosophy of language The relationships within a real dialogue are fairly obvious as an exchange of syntactically independent remarks between at least two participants, the rejoinders of which are syntactically independent. Much more difficult to grasp and explain linguistically is the dialogic relationship between two voices within the same utterance, a double-voiced word in Bakhtin’s terminology, which is a single syntactic unit. As Bakhtin indicated, the basic characteristic of any double-voiced word is the simultaneous presence of two voices (of two speakers) within the same syntactical construction. However, he did not elaborate this idea linguistically. One possible and heuristically promising approach in the

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linguistic analysis of this phenomenon is to compare the relationship between the two voices to the relationship between subject and predicate in the act of predication. Gogotishvili has successfully applied this predicative interpretation in exploring the syntactic relationships between two voices within one utterance. Within a real dialogue, each rejoinder contains some statement, being in this sense the predication act. It is stated not only about a direct object of dialogue, but at the same time (albeit indirectly) about a previous rejoinder (which, in turn, is also the predication act). In Bakhtin’s sense, dialogic relationships between rejoinders are somewhat analogous to the relationships between two acts of predication. Within the double-voiced word, there are also dialogic relationships between two voices, but they have specificity, because they take place within one syntactic construction. Within the double-voiced construction, both voices must, by definition, be syntactically interrelated, while at the same time remaining two distinctly different voices. A linguistic analysis helps to resolve this apparent paradox. It reveals a certain similarity between the real dialogue and the two voices within the same utterance, which facilitates a better understanding of the dialogic nature of a double-voiced word as well. In Bakhtin’s theory, Gogotishvili sees some insights for a heuristic revision of linguistics in general, leading to a rethinking of the traditional principles of reference, predication, and the predication act itself as a basic linguistic process. She places Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy and his philosophy of language within the context of the current discussions regarding the phenomenon of indirect expressions of meaning in language. She explores what Bakhtin called “indirect speech,” applying a phenomenological method, which was also used by Bakhtin in his version. The term “indirect speech” implies that there is a certain meaning that is expressed indirectly, while it is expressed through speaking as a linguistic process. Attention is focused not on an utterance as an object outside of consciousness but on the conscious processes of creating and understanding speech; in other words, not on the objectivized semantics and structure of “text,” but on the speech “acts” of consciousness and their forms of separation and combination, etc. Gogotishvili elaborates on the “phenomenology of indirect speech”— an expression born from combining Bakhtin’s accentuation of the term “indirect speech” and Merleau-Ponty’s term “phenomenology of speech.”12 This approach applies phenomenological concepts, such as the peer “noesis” and “noema,” terms introduced by Edmund Husserl to designate correlated elements of the structure of any intentional act. The intentional process of consciousness as described phenomenologically is called noesis

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(from the Greek ȞȩȘıȚȢ [noƝsis] “concept”, “idea”, “intelligence”, “understanding”), while its ideal content is called noema (from Greek ȞȩȘȝĮ “thought”, “perception” or what is thought about). Phenomenological description of the mental activity and subjective intentions is called “noetic analysis.” Every intentional act has noetic content, which gives meaning or sense to an intentional act. Thus the focus on speech presupposes the primary interests in noesis. In the Bakhtinian approach, language is always a hybrid noematicnoetic phenomenon. Phenomenological reflection can clarify the noematic-noetic forms of hybridity, which make it possible to express indirect meanings. Gogotishvili examines the elements of indirect expression in Husserl, whose approach to language is particularly fruitful for the study of indirect speech and provides a comprehensive view of this issue. The phenomenology of indirect speech assumes a broader view of phenomenology. It presupposes two aspects. First, that not one, but several linguistic acts are always present in each utterance, which influence the indirect forms of meaning. Second, that each utterance contains not one, but several different types of the sources of meaning or instances of speaking, which alternate, thus producing effects of indirect meaning. Indirect speech is result of the combination of these two aspects (2006, 426). Gogotishvili shows the analogy between the relationships of the voices of the double-voiced word and the predicating act, with the goal of exploring the coordination of dialogue with the predicating act. Applying this methodological approach, she offers a solution to the apparently paradoxical situation of double-voicedness based on the suggestion that the voices of the double-voiced word should be seen as syntactically distributed in analogy with the positions of subject and predicate. Thus, the voices obtain a syntactically equal status. This adds a syntactical concreteness to the idea of double-voicedness.

Thematic and Tonal Double-Voiced Predications In “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” (1990a), and then in Problems of Dostoyevski’s Poetics (1984), Bakhtin showed that in the doublevoiced word, there are two subjects—“author’s voice” and “another’s speech”—and two predicates, coming from different speakers. The another’s voice has its own direct referent. The author’s voice, which is directed to this referent, also has an additional referent, namely the “another” word itself, which is the “subject” of the author’s speech and its additional “referent,” and is different in its nature.

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Bakhtin further elucidated his conception of double-voicedness by analyzing several examples of heteroglossia in novels. He focused on a double-voiced word, or what he termed a double-accented and double-styled hybrid construction: an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two “languages,” two semantic and axiological belief systems. (1990c, 304)

Within the limits of a single syntactic whole or of a simple sentence, there is a division of voices and languages; even the same word can belong simultaneously to two languages, and thus has two contradictory meanings or two accents (305). Bakhtin points out “the collision and interruption of various accents within the bounds of a single syntactic whole” which accommodates in itself “the accents of two voices” (1984, 224–225). Gogotishvili examines these insights in her linguistic analysis of Bakhtin’s examples from a phenomenological perspective as well, confirming his concept of the dialogism of the double-voiced word. In doing so, she applies her concepts, such as the “position from” which speech is produced, “points of speech,” and a “speech center”—a position belonging to either the speaker or to any other subject expressing a certain meaning. The speech centers periodically shift from the author’s, to another’s, and back to the author’s speech center, thus expressing double-voicedness. One such example of a hybrid construction, cited and analyzed by Bakhtin, is from the Dickens novel Little Dorrit (1953), which exposes the hypocrisy and greed of common opinion: That illustrious man and great national ornament, Mr. Merdle, continued his shining course. It began to be widely understood that one who had done society the admirable service of making so much money out of it, could not be suffered to remain a commoner. A baronetcy was spoken of with confidence; a peerage was frequently mentioned. (Bakhtin 1990b, 306)

In her linguistic analysis, Gogotishvili examines this passage as an example of the semantically expressed (thematic) double-voicedness, which she calls a “thematic predication.” She indicates that formally, the subordinate clause comes from the speech-center of the “another’s opinion,” but actually it is the authorial speech; nevertheless, two voices sound equally clearly. The subordinate clause coming from the authorial speech has two referents. First, this subordinate clause makes, together with another’s speech, a reference to Merdle. Second, this subordinate clause has an addi-

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tional referent: another’s speech itself (here—“the common opinion”). An expression of another’s speech as authorial referent (and of the secondary referential) is: “Merdle had done society [an] admirable service.” An expression of the secondary authorial predication to this referent is: “What the common opinion considers the admirable service to society is of making so much money out of it.” The second predication has here a thematic character. Thus, within double-voiced word constructions there are realized simultaneously three predicative acts: one coming from another’s speech, and two coming from the author’s speech. The distribution of the voices according to the positions of a subject and a predicate as the basic syntactical disposition of double-voicedness is realized precisely within this secondary authorial predication: the voice of the another’s opinion is placed within the position of the subject, while the authorial voice is placed within the position of the predicate (Gogotishvili 2006, 152). In applying her concept of the “position from” which the speech is produced, she calls a point of speech from the position of the first person (“I”) a “speech center-I” (from the author’s perspective, it is an authorial speech center). It interacts dialogically with voices coming from another’s speech center. In phenomenological terms, the second act originating from speech center-I, which is dialogical and directed toward another’s voice, can be thematized and have a direct semantic expression within the double-voiced construction itself. In this case, a double-voiced utterance has noetic meaning in addition to the semantics (616n20). In dialogic communication, not only is what is said important, but also how it is said: an intonation or tone of voice, which can express emotions ranging from a high peremptory tone to an apologetic or begging one. The same is true for written communication and dialogues in literature. Through artistic means, literary works can convey tonalities of the author and protagonists. Tonalities can express the emotional-volitional state of mind and of speech: disposition, mood, sentiments, and emotional reactions—approval or disapproval, laughter or seriousness, fear or joy, etc. For Bakhtin, tonality is defined by a transcendental axiological horizon of the inner experience. Tonality is formed from within one’s consciousness and is directed toward its object. As he wrote, the performed act has to do only with a person and an object “given to it in individual emotionalvolitional tones” (1993, 53). This means that “I can . . . orient myself in this world as in an event” only in cognitive, ethical, and practicoinstrumental categories, and “this is what determines the outward aspect, the ‘face,’ of each object for me—determines its emotional-volitional tonality, its value, its significance” (1990a, 98). He stated that pronouncing a word is an activity, which involves a certain relation (a certain axiological-

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volitional tonality) expressed in the intonational aspect of the word. In literature, the author expresses an evaluation through the word: the word reproves, caresses, humiliates, beautifies, and so on (2003, 319). Bakhtin illustrates the expression of tonality in a hybrid construction in a passage from Ivan Turgenev’s Virgin Soil: “But Kallomyetsev deliberately stuck his round eyeglass between his nose and his eyebrow, and stared at the [snit of a] student who dared not share his ‘apprehensions’” (quoted in 1990b, 318). The construction has two accents: the ironic intonation of the author and the mimicking of the irritation of the character. Gogotishvili associates the term “tonality” with an important aspect of the Bakhtinian concept of double-voicedness, which he related philosophically to modality and axiology, and to a notion of intonation within the linguistic context (2006, 155). Tonalities or intonations within the doublevoiced word play their role in expressing dialogue as an interplay of voices in the “tonal double-voiced word” or “tonality-based double-voicedness of the word.” Tonality can occupy the syntactic positions of subject or predicate (156). She analyzes the above-mentioned passage to illustrate what she calls “tonal double-voiced predication” (a predication realized through tonality), and points out that the authorial voice is predicated three times: first, Kallomyetsev itself; second, “the [snit of a] student”; and third, a predicate of another’s word toward this student. In the second and third predications, the authorial second voice (similar to the example with Merdle) has two vari-directed referents: first, a student; and second, a predicate of Kallomyetsev’s speech about this student (157). Likewise, in the first case (with Merdle), the tones of different voices enter among themselves in basic predicative relationships: the tone of another’s speech takes the position of a syntactic subject, while the authorial tone takes the position of predicate. While in the first example, the secondary predication took place between the thematic components, in this second example, a syntactic subject is a tone which is predicated by the tone as well. The same “hidden” syntactical mechanisms are operating within both thematic and tonal versions of dialogic predication (158). In terms of the phenomenology of speech, the constitutive specificities of double-voiced constructions are: two speech points (speech center-I and another speech center), two intentional objects (noemas), and three predicative acts (ibid., 615). For example, in the passage, “the student who dared not share his ‘apprehensions,” there are simultaneously given Kallomyetsev’s noesis from the another’s speech center toward the student; the primary noesis from speech center-I toward this student; and the secondary noesis from the speech center-I directed not toward the student but toward an intentional object: the axiological component of the another’s speech

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act, namely toward the social meaning directed toward this student from Kallomyetsev’s point of view. Although the last noesis is semantically “invisible,” as Gogotishvili notes, it is a tonal accentuation of another’s noesis we simultaneously feel: an irritated tone of the utterance about the student by Kallomyetsev himself, as well as the ironic tone of the author’s voice regarding this utterance (ibid.). This phenomenological analysis shows some general characteristics of double-voicedness: First, within the double-voiced constructions, from the speech center-I always proceeds two acts (one toward the general noesis and the other toward the another noesis or on its component); in other words, double-voicedness always contains two vari-directional noeses of the leading voice. Second, there is a splitting of the focus of attention of speech acts originating from the speech center-I. In the example with Kallomyetsev above, which has two different intentional objects, the attention is simultaneously directed toward both sides: toward the student and toward another’s speech about him. This example also shows the combination of linguistic tonalities: the speech center-I expresses Kallomyetsev’s tonality and dialogically deposits over it its own tonality. According to Gogotishvili, within double-voicedness not only these but also other methods of expression are possible, such as dramatization of the acts of consciousness in their various combinations (ibid., 615). This shows the possibility of describing double-voicedness in phenomenological terms. Bakhtin’s conception implies that the linguistic specificity of another’s speech as a second referent consists of its functional transformation from an external referent’s speech into an immediate syntactic subject. The thesis about predicative syntactic relations between the voices is essential for the understanding of the double-voiced word. In the light of this analogy, Bakhtin’s thesis of double-voiced construction can be understood as a distribution of the voices on the positions of subject and predicate, which are independent and interdependent—analogically to the independence and interdependence of the rejoinders of a real dialogue. The principle of the distribution of the voices within the framework of one construction according to the positions of a subject and predicate indicates the middle path between the extremes of an absolute autonomy of voices on the one hand, and their absolute mutual dissolving on the other. Bakhtin’s interpretation of relationships of the voices within the doublevoiced word as independent-interdependent or “non-fused yet undivided” or “unconfused and inseparable” (nesliiannoe i nerazdel’noe) is a linguistic expression of the dialogic I-other relationships (ibid., 147n7). The crux of the linguistic enigma of the double-voiced word is in the dialogic character of the author’s secondary predication. This is possible

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because the position of a subject is occupied by a predicate of another’s speech. The predication of the statement, coming from the first voice by the other statement coming from a second voice, results in dialogism of the relationship between subject and predicate; that is, a dialogic relationship expressing agreement, disagreement, irony, etc. (ibid., 158). Dialogism means that between a subject and a predicate of the secondary predication of a double-voiced word, a semantic relationship exists— not an arbitrary statement of meaning. The immanent semantic relationship between the subject and predicate is a consequence of the dialogic nature of this predication (any statement regarding another’s statement contains a semantic “bridge” between them). Dialogue itself is a form of semantic relationship. This understanding of dialogue has far reaching implications. Gogotishvili suggests rethinking semantics itself, based on Bakhtin’s intentional-personalist approach toward the sphere of meaning as a reflection of the general orientation toward dialogue. Bakhtin viewed semantics as included within his theory of “intentionality of stratification of language,” based on a personalist (but not on an analytic or synthetic) criterion of division, contrasting or connecting the components of meaning, including the tonality of meaning (which is absent in the pure semantics approach). At the center of this version of semantics, and therefore at the center of the secondary predication of the double-voiced word, are neither analytic or synthetic relations of the meanings among themselves, nor immediate relationships of the meaning of speech to the object, but rather “relations of a word to another’s word about the same object, and through it about an object itself” (ibid., 162). As Bakhtin wrote about the element of address, inherent in any word in Dostoevsky as directed to and connected with another word, “there is only the word as address, the word dialogically contacting another word, a word about a word addressed to a word” (1984, 237). Everything is said in response to other statements and in anticipation of future statements, and everything has a meaning as a part of a greater whole within a constant interaction between meanings. This analysis shows a genetic kinship of the secondary predication in the double-voiced word with dialogue. The double-voiced word is not only twofold, but it is also singular—and this unity is as important as the presence of its dialogically interrelated voices. The analogy with the predicative act supports Bakhtin’s concept of the syntactic structure of the double-voicedness as archetypical. This reveals a deeper and more comprehensive, fundamental character of dialogic relations than has previously been thought.

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Dialogism and Polyphony How is the combination of two or more voices within one utterance related to the problem of the relationship between dialogism, monologism, and polyphony? (Note: here, “monologism” is used in the linguistic sense, characterizing an utterance, and should not be confused with Bakhtin’s criticism of a narrow “monologic” thinking in a social-cultural sense.) Commentators often ask the following: If, according to Bakhtin, dialogism is the universal characteristic of speech, how can it be squared with his concept of monologism? Formulating the problem in this way, as a dilemma between absolute dialogism and absolute monologism, implies an apparent contradiction in the relationship between these concepts. Bakhtin’s approach was different: in his linguistic analysis, dialogue and monologue are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated. The principal borders lie not so much between dialogic and non-dialogic relationships per se, but rather inside the dialogic space. Within it, the degree and forms of the dialogism can be various. According to Gogotishvili, Bakhtin distinguishes three degrees of dialogism: dialogic relationships as such (a real dialogue), a polyphonic type of these relationships, and a “monologic” degree of dialogic relationships (2006, 168). The distribution of the voices according to the positions of subject and predicate provides equal audibility in the utterance. At the same time, however, in the monologic version, the author’s voice dominates over another’s (the hero’s) voice. Another’s voice still preserves its immediate singular audibility. Nevertheless, the author’s position is higher on the hierarchical scale and monologically superior to another’s position. Moreover, the authorial speech center represents not an absolutely direct but only a conditionally direct word of the speaker, and the speaker’s ideas are expressed not only through the author’s voice but also through the combination of all other voices expressed through all alternations of the speech centers within an utterance. Therefore, an absolute monologism is impossible. In combining two—dialogic and monologic—aspects of the double-voiced word, Gogotishvili comes to its ambivalent formula as a “monologic version of dialogism” (ibid., 172). Overall, a predicative interpretation of Bakhtin’s conception of doublevoicedness suggests that this conception is directed toward fundamental principles of language. It shows the necessity of a modification of the traditional understanding of these principles, and the restoration of the lost linguistic archetypes, foremost that of the archetype of a predicative act. This archetype is viewed as double-voiced, and thus as analogous to an ambivalent formula of double-voiced constructions, having simultaneously

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a dialogic and monologic nature (ibid., 173). The analogy between doublevoicedness and the predicative act shows their substantial similarity. How is dialogism related to polyphony? If polyphony is a type of dialogic relationship, how is this manifested linguistically? Bakhtin borrowed the term “polyphony” from music as a metaphor for describing Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel: “A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices” (1984, 6). This novel with its “dialogic principle” is contrasted with the traditional novel, termed “monologic” or homophonic (single-voiced or singlethought), in which characters transmit the author’s ideology and a single consciousness. Polyphony means the coexistence of different voices as equals, unmerged into a single perspective, and not subordinated to the voice of the author. Bakhtin saw the birth of the polyphonic principle, albeit in its embryonic form, already manifested in Dostoevsky’s early short stories. As he writes, the “consciousness of self is constantly perceived against the background of the other’s consciousness of him—‘I for myself’ against the background of ‘I for another’” (ibid., 207). He stresses the centrality of the concept of a “hidden dialogue with some other person on the theme of himself” (ibid.). Bakhtin analyzes the compositional unity of Dostoevsky’s novella “The Double” (1945) as an interchange of the double-voiced constructions, which combine the “first” hero’s voice (by the protagonist, Golyadkin) and the narrator’s voice. Bakhtin asserts that the whole work is constructed entirely as an interior dialogue among three voices: The same set of words, tones, inner orientations is passed through the outer speech of Golyadkin, through the speech of the narrator and through the speech of the double, and these three voices are turned to face one another, they speak not about each other but with each other. Three voices sing the same line, but not in unison; rather, each carries its own part.” (1984, 220)

This is not yet polyphony, but no longer homophony, and the counterpoint is implied in the very structure of the word. The dialogic principle of relationships among the different voices within the double-voiced word remains the same in Dostoevsky’s later novels, in which it was further developed into a more mature polyphony. The specific character of polyphony, according to Bakhtin, consists of the interrelationship between internal dialogue (or “microdialogue”) and external, compositionally expressed dialogue, presenting a more complex and profound picture of the intra- and inter-subjective relationships.

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Bakhtin describes the variety of the compositional strategies and techniques employed by Dostoevsky in the polyphonic structure of his novels. These include the simultaneous use of the variety of the types of words, such as the vary-directional double-voiced word, internally dialogized word, and the other person’s reflected word. The various combinations of these techniques include hidden polemic and hidden dialogue. He also draws an analogy between internal dialogues (microdialogues) of the heroes and the structure of external, compositionally expressed dialogues in the novel. He points out that Dostoevsky is unique in how he uses a special distribution of these various types of words among the basic compositional elements within the unity of the polyphonic novels (2002, 227). In the polyphonic structure, the principle of voice combination of the voices of the hidden, internal dialogue is preserved, although in a more complex and profound form, in its interrelation with external dialogue. Dostoevsky always introduces two characters in such a way that the voice of each of them is linked with the internal voice of the other. Within the polyphonic external dialogue, in the dialogue of two characters, the rejoinders of the one partially coincide with the rejoinders of the other’s interior dialogue. An essential interrelation between the borrowed words of one hero and the internal and secret word of another hero is the principle for structuring Dostoevsky’s dialogues. The voice combination of internal dialogue and its interrelation with external dialogue result in the extraordinary power of his dialogues (ibid., 283). The analogy of relationships of the voices of the double-voiced word with the predicating act, traced in Gogotishvili’s analysis, explicitly demonstrates Bakhtin’s idea of the archetypical character of the syntactic structure of the double-voiced word. This also holds in Bakhtin’s description of polyphony. The matter is not the number of voices but the type of relationships among them: domination of one voice in monologism versus an equality of coexisting voices in polyphony. Within a polyphonic novel, neither the voice of the author, narrator, or hero dominates; they are equal. As Gogotishvili puts it, the crucial condition for polyphony is not the “small” syntax of the unified construction but the “big” syntax of a composition of the text (2006, 175). In the polyphonic novel, each predicating voice of one double-voiced construction repeatedly changes its syntactic status, transforming itself within the other double-voiced construction from a dialogic predicate of the double-voiced word into a syntactic subject of the dialogic predication. As result of the series of such interchanging alternations of the syntactic positions, all the voices of a polyphonic novel ultimately become “equal”: equally represented (predicated) and equally representing (predicating). The author’s voice periodically comes

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to occupy the position of a syntactic subject. Within polyphony there is no any permanently dominating voice (that is, a voice permanently remaining in the position of predicate) (179). An example of the translation of another’s voices from the position of predicates to the subjects and vice versa can be found in Bakhtin’s comments about Raskolnikov’s inner speech in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment (1964): Characteristically, his inner speech is filled with other people’s words that he has just recently heard or read. . . . He relates all these persons to one another, juxtaposes or counterposes them, forces them to answer one another, to echo each other’s words or to expose one another. (Bakhtin, 1984, 238–239)

Because all the voices “sound within a single consciousness, they become, as it were, reciprocally permeable” (ibid., 239). Gogotishvili note that linguistically, to become “reciprocally permeable” means “to enter directly into the predicative relationships within the same double-voiced construction” (2006, 180). The dialogue of voices is also realized within the other predicative acts of the series of the doublevoiced words. The linguistic approach and the use of predicative terminology make it possible to translate Bakhtin’s general idea of polyphony into the concrete syntactic language of his theory of double-voicedness. In polyphony, alternating of the same voices according to the syntactic positions of a subject and a predicate produces an effect of mutual predication of voices, their alternating as a subject and a predicate. The polyphonic dialogue of voices is analogous to the real dialogue, which is also an alternating mutual-predication of rejoinders. Polyphonic mutual-predication is realized not within one construction, but against the background of the utterance in general, namely within a polyphonic series of the syntactically and sometimes compositionally separated double-voiced constructions. As Gogotishvily points out, the unity of the double-voiced construction needs to be understood broadly—as the unity of the double-voiced predicative act, which can take place beyond the formally grammatically unities of the syntactically separated fragments (a “roaming” character of the dialogic predicative acts). A polyphonic construction combines simultaneously both thematic and tonal dialogic predications. Gogotishvily formulates the linguistic principle of polyphony as “an alternating by turns of the same voices according to the syntactic positions of subject and predicate within different but interrelated double-voiced words” (ibid., 177). The linguistic formulation of the polyphonic principle provides a syntactic

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ground for the philosophical ideas of the equality of the voices and of their dialogue within polyphonic novel. Overall, the analysis of the double-voicedness, through its analogy with the predicative act, is heuristically fruitful. It confirms an archetypical connection between dialogue and predicative acts. It provides a linguistic interpretation of the properties of the double-voiced word (and the related concepts of monologism and polyphony). The concept of dialogism of the double-voiced word, elaborated by Bakhtin at the linguistic level, serves as a basis for a better understanding of his concept of dialogism at the philosophical level. Accordingly, it also provides a deeper interpretation of his theory of language and of his dialogic philosophy. The analysis provides further arguments in support of the Bakhtinian idea that dialogism, and all linguistic phenomena related to it, is a constitutive characteristic of the language as such. Consequently, the various forms of dialogue related to language (including a dialogue of cultures) bear this “genetic” dialogic property immanent in language.

Spiritual Practice and Dialogue of Spiritual Traditions Dialogism of human consciousness and personality is present in the internal dialogue and relationship of individuals with themselves. The maxim “Know thyself” can be helpful not only for understanding oneself, but also as a guide to the nature of all human beings and, thus, others. A better understanding of one’s “inner universe” and the inner practices of individuals helps us to open ourselves to and better understand relationships with others, and thus facilitating dialogue. Dialogism is manifested in many ways in the so-called practices of the self (pratiques de soi) and of self-formation, including spiritual practices. Michel Foucault, Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze, Pierre Hadot, Sergey Horujy, and other philosophers have examined this anthropological reality, of which spiritual practices form an important category. Such practices are exemplified by spiritual traditions, such as Hesychasm, Sufism, and Tibetan Buddhism, which are holistic practices of the self. Sergey Horujy examined practices of the self and spiritual practices within the framework of his theory of synergic anthropology, which asserts that a relationship of synergy (Greek synergia, “cooperation”) exists between God and human beings, resulting in harmony and cooperation between Divine and human energies. Synergic anthropology explores the rich philosophical and psychological potential of the traditions of spiritual practice and applies it to a new comprehensive anthropological model. Classical European philosophy viewed human beings based on the

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concepts of subject, essence, and substance. In contrast to that view, which presumed the existence of a certain “nature” or “essence” of human beings, a new theory characterizes human persons in terms of “energies.” While Aristotelian and all classical metaphysics conceived of energy as a completing element of some essence (entelechy, idea), Horujy viewed energy as a starting element of actualization of some possibility—the energy of an “open” event. In other words, he interprets energy in its ontological content as being-action, realized in events. This ontology includes three horizons of being, which are formed by real, virtual, or transcendental events, the last of which are related to the mystical experiences (1998, 17). Human energies can realize each of these sorts of events. In the discourse of energy, ontology obtains a dialogic character—a collaboration of human energies with energies of the Other, which involves activity of human consciousness and represents “ontodialogue” (18). To be human is a two-sided or relational event of inter-action (a kind of dialogue) between self and Other, which brings the individual closer to the Divine energy that exerts a formative and constitutive role. This new approach to the comprehension of anthropological reality is focused on anthropological experience, which can be described phenomenologically. Foucault characterized the practices of the self of the Roman stoics as anthropological experiences in which a human being practices self-transformations involving all the levels of human organization aimed at achieving a goal (1986). Horujy’s approach of synergic anthropology is close to that view in its logic and methodology, but is it based on the experiences of world spiritual traditions, foremost on the spiritual practices of the Eastern-Orthodox Christian hesychasm. Hesychasm (from the Greek hesyhia, “stillness, rest, quiet, silence,” meaning solitary and silent peace) is an ascetical and mystical practice that emerged with Christian monasticism in the fourth century, and which continues today. This tradition is “a classical system of spiritual practice: a step-by-step process of ascending toward holistic self-transformation and actual ontological self-transcending” (Horujy 2010, 28). Spiritual practice is a hierarchical anthropological process in which individuals strive to transcend their ordinary mode of being. As such, it is a holistic practice of the self oriented to a meta-anthropological goal (telos). Its final goal, “the complete unity of the practitioner’s energies with the Divine energies, is called deification, or theosis” (ibid.). Søren Kierkegaard stated that the constitutive purpose of human beings is to open themselves to join with God, and this opening is the only way to acquire selfhood, or to form personality and identity. This understanding is

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similar to Horujy’s concept of unlocking in the hesychast anthropology, in which the human beings’ synergistic relationship with God is the way to human personality and identity formation (Horujy 2008, 6). The individuals’ task is to open themselves to Divine energies and achieve synergy with them, forming their constitution: “unlocking himself toward the other mode of being (or, more correctly, toward genuine being)” (Horujy 2013, 7). Thus, “the main anthropological principle inherent in hesychast practice is exactly the principle or paradigm of the constitution of man in the ontological unlocking” (ibid.). The question arises: Is it possible to extend or generalize this principle to other domains of anthropological experience? In his analysis, Horujy shows that hesychast anthropology opens the way to the reconstruction of the anthropology of other spiritual practices created by world religions. Each of them has its own specific structures and properties for practices, but they also include universal structural elements common to all. This common ground includes the universal paradigm of ontological unlocking. In applying this concept to the situation of an individual in the contemporary world, Horujy distinguishes its aspects: the ontological, ontical, and virtual unlocking. This paradigm serves as a core of a new anthropology, which is nonclassical, nonessentialist, and subjectless (ibid., 11). Hesychast spirituality attracted Dostoevsky’s attention. At the beginning of his work on The Brothers Karamazov, he made a pilgrimage to Optina Pustyn’ Monastery, the main center of Russian hesychasm. There he found inspiration for many aspects of this novel. Horujy examines this novel in reconstructing Dostoevsky’s view of human beings and of hesychast spirituality. In this project, he relied on Bakhtin’s analysis of Dostoevsky’s poetics, as the way to anthropology through the prism of poetics. The poetics of the polyphonic novel are built out of personal elements, but they are also anthropological, which makes it possible to reconstruct the anthropology of the novel, conceiving it as a polyphonic ensemble of “individual anthropologies.” In the world depicted in The Brothers Karamazov, there is an instance or an ethical center, embodied by ascetic-monastic elders, such as the Elder Zosima, who possesses high spiritual, valuative, and moral authority. While deeply personal, at the same time, spiritual practices have a dialogic dimension, including the master-disciple relationship and the connection to the spiritual tradition. In notes made in 1970–1971, referring to the meeting of two consciousnesses in the process of understanding, and as an example of the role of the second consciousness and the outsideness of an observer, Bakhtin mentions an episode related to one of its central characters, the monastic elder Father Zosima, who listens to a confession from a

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“mysterious visitor” (1986, 136). Horujy stresses the personalized nature of the discourse in Dostoevsky’s novels as a plurality of personal subdiscourses, representing the voices of definite persons and their consciousnesses. Each personal voice-discourse develops autonomously while in dialogue with the voices of the others: “Thus the world of the novel has the nature and structure, corresponding to the famous Bakhtin concept of ‘polyphony,’ or many-voiced dialogue of free and equal persons-voices” (Horujy 2008, 2).

Dialogical Encounter in the Depths Synergic anthropology is a new paradigm that opens to the human personality space for creativity and full self-realization. It is based on the personal inner practice in dialogue with spiritual tradition. Inner practice is an individual occurrence. However, it is not realized in a vacuum, but rather in dialogue with others, and it is connected with some comprehensive historical and social wholesomeness, with a spiritual tradition. Horujy defines spiritual tradition as “a community devoted to the cultivation of a certain spiritual practice” (2012, 5). Inner practice and a spiritual tradition are a meta-anthropological strategy. In relation to this, there are “associate practices” or side practices of a spiritual-cultural tradition (as expressed in literature and arts). Hesychast prayer is usually cultivated in small, dedicated ascetic communities. But Hesychasm may exert a deep and sometime decisive influence on the larger society. Horujy also explores what could be called the function of the anthropological model or anthropological school, and the influence of its spiritual and moral authority on society, which produces broad anthropological and social implications. As a result, some people emerge in the society who, without being ascetics stricto sensu, nevertheless adopt its values and some techniques of its “practices of the self,” conform to the spiritual tradition, and orientate themselves toward it in their way of life: “they realize anthropological strategies, adhering to hesychast anthropology” (2008, 7). Through studies of the inner practice of an individual in dialogue with a spiritual tradition, such as hesychasm, Horujy highlights the role of spiritual tradition as a medium that connects individuals with community and with wider spheres of global reality. The main reason for this lies in the ontological and meta-anthropological nature of the inner practice. Spiritual tradition includes the organization, interpretation, and examination of the experience, which provide direction and individual help in the movement toward a meta-empiric goal.

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Spiritual tradition is an inter-personal and trans-individual experience; it is a result of the efforts of many generations of practitioners, by which is developed many psychical and hermeneutical procedures and methods. At the same time, it is nourished and maintained through the incessant spiritual efforts of its practitioners. In addition to being a social phenomenon, spiritual tradition turns out to be an especially personal anthropological (and meta-anthropological) experience. Both inner practice and spiritual tradition are considered to be ways to transfer the anthropological phenomena onto broader levels of the global reality. Although each spiritual tradition is unique, spiritual traditions are not isolated; they are dialogically related (Lochhead 2012; Westoby and Dowling 2013). To the existing philosophical grounding of intercultural and interreligious dialogues, Horujy adds more support from his theoretical perspective, according to which each of the steps of a hierarchy of increasingly profound and differentiated forms of communication aims at personal transformation. In hesychasm, these forms gradually approach the paradigm of the trinitarian Divine Being, called in Greek “perichoresis” (from the Greek peri-, “around” and chorein meaning “go forward” or “contain”), and in Latin “circumincession” (from the Latin circum-, “around” and incedere meaning “to go, to step, approach”). The term means the “interpenetration” of the three persons of the Trinity. It describes a “timeless process of permanent mutual exchange of being, like usual communication is the exchange of information” (2012, 6). It is ontological or absolute communication: “This form of communication characterizes Divine being, which is considered in Christianity to be personal (hypostatic) being” (ibid.). In comparing spiritual traditions such as classical yoga, Tibetan tantric Buddhism, Taoism, Zen, Islamic Sufism, Roman Catholic spiritual exercises, or Eastern-Orthodox hesychasm, Horujy shows that despite their differences, spiritual practices share some universal ontological, methodological, and anthropological elements. For example, Christian hesychasm and Buddhism both represent the meta-anthropological strategies and well developed methodologies of spiritual practice. They also have substantial similarities in how their practitioners view reality. The contacts between spiritual traditions and their dialogue are a part of the intercultural dialogue. He also points out some of the tradition-dependent elements of spiritual practice. The universal elements of spiritual practice can facilitate communication among people from different religious backgrounds and dialogue between their respective traditions. Without delving into the very complex, delicate, and sensitive issue of faith and dialogue among spiritual traditions (or their respective religions),

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we will touch only on some theoretical aspects of this dialogue.13 Spiritual tradition is the core of any religion. An advancement of a dialogue of spiritual traditions is essential for paving the way toward a dialogue among different religions. Horujy distinguishes two different models of dialogue between spiritual traditions: one formal, the other more personal. Briefly, the formal approach is based on the principle that, in the encounter of spiritual traditions, all discussions must be based on the common aspects only, excluding all subjects and problems on which the participants of dialogue differ. The task of dialogue is to focus on the common elements, discuss them comprehensively, and to reach agreement among all the participants regarding these common elements, which should determine their mutual relations and secure their harmonious character. This model is currently predominant, and it may work well at the beginning of the dialogic process, mobilizing the potential of mutual accord and countering extremist trends of mutual intolerance and aggression. However, the formal model puts limitations on the space of the dialogue, excluding all the distinctions of the participants. The shortcomings of such a formalized, reductive approach are obvious: it ignores all the profundity of spiritual experience and its concrete features that are specific and unique to each participant. This kind of limited dialogue cannot go indepth and achieve any real rapprochement between its participants; neither can it have any profound influence on the situation. The more personal alternative is the model of dialogue based on the paradigm of personal communication. It involves face-to-face communication of living persons who possess unique personal and spiritual experience. It is not based on identical and coinciding features only. Although divergences of participants can provoke mutual estrangement, participants’ differences do not hinder communication; rather, they spark mutual interest and stimulate the dialogue: Personal communication can involve, in principle, any contents of the inner world of its partners including the structures of their personality and identity, and for this reason such communication can create real closeness, profound, and stable ties between them. (Horujy 2012, 5)

Personal dialogue, as compared with formal communication, is more meaningful and profound; it opens the opportunity of complete selfrealization to its participants. Is it possible to capture the personal nature of spiritual experience and apply it to the social character of communication in large communities? Certainly, that would not be an easy task. Nevertheless, Horujy argues that it is possible, but only under certain conditions. These conditions are dis-

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covered by dialogic philosophy, including studies by Bakhtin (see also Theunissen 1965; Casper 2002; Stawarska 2009; and Bergman 2012). First, such communication should be informal and unofficial. Second, genuine interest in the participants’ personal experience should be what stimulates such interactions. The third precondition is mutual trust: “My openness to the Other and my readiness to exchange personal and spiritual experience with him/her is possible only if I have trust in the genuineness of the Other’s spiritual experience” (Horujy 2012, 5). Personal communication is helpful for enhancing dialogue between diverse spiritual traditions. In a dialogue based on personal communication, differences can stimulate and deepen dialogic encounters. In the profound interaction of spiritual traditions, dialogic parties may influence each other and each may adopt some elements of spiritual experience that are different in each others’ traditions. Horujy called this the “encounter in the depths,” in which “two radically different spiritual worlds, out of the depths of their experience, become capable to see and appreciate the profundity of the experience of each other and exchange elements of this experience” (ibid., 6).

Philosophy for the Dialogue of Civilizations We have seen that dialogue is a universal phenomenon that permeates all manifestations of human life and all relationships from the personal to the social and intercultural. This view is grounded by dialogic philosophy, developed by Bakhtin, Buber, Ebner, Rosenzweig, and RosenstockHuessy, among others. Horujy articulated the role of dialogic philosophy in elaborating a view of human beings and society based on the principles of dialogue and communication on all its levels: individual, intersubjective, and social. Accordingly, human consciousness is dialogic and participative. Human thinking is also dialogic and hence verbal, i.e., using language. Individuals share their personal lived experience with each other. Human personality is constituted in the actualization of its dialogic relation to the other. Thus, human personhood is constitutively social. Dialogic philosophy asserts that “participation is a necessary condition of any autonomy” (2012, 2). Dialogic philosophy propounds the principle of democracy of universal participation as the necessary basis for society: It also puts forward a sophisticated dialogical conception of culture treating entire human culture in its totality as a united creative universe. All inhabitants of this universe are represented by their works. . . . In this sense, Plato, Confucius, Kant, Heidegger e. a. as well as all local cultures are en-

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Dialogic philosophy offers an alternative to the existing world of violent and homogenizing globalization. In contrast to the concepts of the “clashes of civilizations,” it stands for dialogue among civilizations. The principles of dialogic philosophy, argues Horujy, can be considered as a kind of theoretical basis of a new, dialogical civilization (ibid.). The conception of dialogical civilization provides a heuristically fruitful framework for approaching the issues of cultural diversity and collaborative coexistence in the interrelated world. The enhancement and cultivation of dialogue of cultures and the dialogue of spiritual traditions is crucial for the advancement to a dialogical civilization.

Cultural Diversity and Transculture Bakhtin’s corpus made a huge impact in Russia and worldwide. He, along with Aleksei F. Losev, Dmitry Likhachev, Sergey Averintzev, and some other Russian philosophers, laid a theoretical foundation for “culturology,” the discipline that investigates the diversity of cultures and their common underlying principles (Demenchonok 2004, 354–356). In tune with the Russian philosophical tradition,14 they promoted a view of culture as a whole, recognizing the diversity of these “wholes” as multiple national and historical types of cultures, each having its own formative principle. Bakhtin insisted on: the study of culture (or some area of it) at the level of system and at the higher level of organic unity: open, becoming, unresolved and unpredetermined, capable of death and renewal, transcending itself, that is, exceeding its own boundaries. (1986, 135)

These two aspects of culture—diversity and unity—were articulated, each in its own manner, in the works of Bakhtin and Losev (see Losev 1930). Culturology “studies culture as a whole, as a specific function and as a modality of human being” (Flier 1998, 370). According to Epstein: Culturology investigates the diversity of cultures and their modes of interaction and functions as a metadiscipline within the humanities, the aim of which is to encompass and link the variety of cultural phenomena studied separately by philosophy, history, sociology, literary and art criticism, etc. 1999, 15)

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It is roughly analogous to “cultural theory” and “cultural studies” in the English-speaking world, though it is broader and bears some methodological distinctions. Culturology distances us from the culture to which we belong by birth and education, and thus prepares us for free cultural creativity. It offers an integrative knowledge of the various parts of culture. A culturologist is a “universalist,” participating in the diversity of cultures. According to Bakhtin, culture is capable of “transcending itself,” and this capability has manifested in culturology as a critique not only of specific areas within a particular culture, but also of any given culture as a whole. In the early 1980s, in the course of the development of culturology in Russia and its evolving toward transcultural theory and practice, the concept of transculture emerged. As Epstein writes, “if culturology is selfawareness of culture, then transculture is the self-transformation of culture, the totality of theories and practices that liberate culture from its own repressive mechanisms” (1999, 24). Bakhtin’s ideas of outsideness, freedom and creativity, and dialogue of cultures found their creative elaboration in the theory of transculture. Transculture, along with intercultural philosophy, champions ideas of cultural diversity and dialogue. The theory of transculture was developed in response not only to the disregard of cultural diversity by authoritarian and hegemonic powers, but also as an attempt to find an alternative to the postmodern concepts of multiculturalism and deconstruction. Although transculture shares with postmodern thought a critique of the ideology of cultural domination and a defense of cultural diversity, at the same time it is critical of the limitations of multiculturalism and it provides its own views of cultures and their relationships in today’s world.

Transculture: Beyond Globalism and Multiculturalism The term “multiculturalism” has become a fashionable, albeit vague and controversial, notion used in two broad ways: descriptively and normatively. In the policies of liberal multiculturalism (multikulti), mere lip service is frequently given to the development of diverse cultures: the other’s “right to exist” is acknowledged, but while considering one’s own culture or truth to be superior or absolute, and the dominating culture retains its control. It offers a deterministic view of culture, which tries to explain cultural phenomena as conditioned by their ethnic, racial, or gender origins. It implies an essentialist connection between cultural production and ethnic or physical origin. For example, a literary work is not a selfexpression of its author as an individual, but a “representation” of the essence of the author’s gender, race, and ethnicity. In this approach, the real

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human being is missing. Multiculturalism reduces culture to its racial, gender, or ethnic origins. Diverse cultures are categorized into a few rubrics such as “male,” “female,” “homosexual,” “white,” “black,” “Latino,” “Asian,” and so on. The cultural landscape is presented as fragmented kaleidoscopic images, a “cultural mosaic” or “salad bowl” as opposed to a homogenizing “melting pot.” In this picture, however, something important is missing: the relationships between cultures. The recognition of cultural diversity invites other questions about their coexistence and dialogic relationships. This is the crux of contemporary debates. The interaction of cultures in an interrelated world is a reality, and it can range from the poles of war-like conflicts to dialogic and collaborative relationships. Which of these potential scenarios prevails ultimately depends on us. It is high time for critical reassessment of the weaknesses of multiculturalism and separating the wheat from the chaff—for rethinking the issues of cultural diversity in today’s world in order to find the theoretical guides and working strategies for the flowering of diverse cultures in dialogic relationships. Bakhtin’s ideas help us to better understand ways toward promoting both cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. The failure of multiculturalism and deconstruction stimulated efforts by many philosophers to find an alternative theoretical view of cultural diversity free from determinism and representation, and to rethink the matters of identity/diversity and relationships among cultures. I have analyzed such alternatives elaborated in theories of intercultural dialogue and transculture elsewhere (Demenchonok 2010, 455–473). At the center of his analysis, Epstein places the individual and its situation in the cultural environment, which is affected by homogenizing globalization and multicultural fragmentation. He is critical of both the socalled global culture spread by globalism, which implies PanAmericanism, and the concept of liberal multiculturalism. Each of these is one-sided and limits individuals’ freedom and creativity. The prospects of either globalism (the canonization of one homogenous global “mass culture”) or mosaic multiculturalism (a multitude of cultures that are closed and isolated) look equally grim. Both are characterized by determinism. Globalism presents itself as an irreversible trend of world development and a “model” for all nations. Multiculturalism postulates an insurmountable dependence of culture on the ethnicity, race, gender, or sexual orientation of its representatives. It is possible to have a combination of these two determinisms: one horizontal, represented by globalism, and the other vertical, represented by multiculturalism. These deterministic concepts leave no freedom of choice

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for the individual whose fate seems to be to either accept cultural homogenization or to serve as a specimen of some ethnic or gender identity (Epstein 2009, 329). However, rejecting determinism and assuming that a human being “is freedom” and “is condemned to be free” (Sartre 2007, 29), we may still find a way out of these ideological traps of dependencies toward an open space of autonomy and freely chosen cultural identity and creativity. One example of such an alternative approach is Epstein’s concept of transculture as a model of cultural development that differs from both leveling globalism and isolating pluralism. He elaborates the concept of transculture as a different model of cultural development, defining it as “an open system of symbolic alternatives to existing cultures and their established sign systems” and “a way of expanding the limits of our ethnic, professional, linguistic, and other identities to new levels of indeterminacy and ‘virtuality’” (1999, 24–25). Transculture is: a meta-cultural realm beyond any national, gender, or professional culture, a mode of being, located at the crossroads of cultures. Transculture is an emerging sphere in which humans position themselves free from the limitations of their primary, “inborn,” naturalized cultures. The elements of transculture are freely chosen by people rather than dictated by rules and prescriptions within their given culture. (Epstein 2012, 301–302)

Transcending Borders Based on Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy, Epstein develops a critical philosophical-methodological approach to the analysis of cultures. He connects Bakhtin’s concept of outsideness to Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Husserl claimed that any act of consciousness is “intentional” and directed toward something located outside of consciousness. Looking at the same principle from a different perspective, Epstein further concludes that if consciousness has its object outside of itself, then consciousness itself is “exotopical” in relation to its object: “Consciousness transcends its objects; moreover, it is the force of transcendence as such” (2009, 332). Application of this principle to culture leads to the concept of transculture. What are the limitations of culture that need to be surmounted by the transcultural model? Culture is liberating in that it frees human beings from the material dependencies of nature. Culture also liberates us from the restrictive fate of being only a “political,” “economic,” or “technical” human being. However, it also creates new, symbolic dependencies—on

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customs, traditions, conventions, and values, which persons receive as members of particular groups. Culture imposes its limitations with its own idiosyncrasies, manias, phobias, ideological indoctrination, and information filters, which tend to create an oppressive cultural environment for its members, leading to a new process of “denaturalization,” or, more precisely, “deculturalization.” Transculture is the outcome of such a process of interaction between cultures. Transculture is the next step in the ongoing human quest for freedom— in this case, the liberation from unconscious predispositions and prejudices of one’s own culture, in which one was born and educated, and a variety of artificial, self-imposed cultural identities (Epstein 2012, 60). It is also the liberation from “the prison-house of language” (Jameson 1972). Transculture transcends the boundaries of individual cultures, thus liberating us from “those symbolic dependencies, ideological addictions, patriotic infatuations that belong to us as members of a certain cultural group” (Epstein 1999, 24). The Bakhtinian approach, used in contemporary analysis, helps us to move from multiculturalism to interculturality and transculturalism. Transculture is a new emerging sphere in which human beings position themselves outside their “inborn” naturalized cultures. It is a new sphere of cultural development that transcends the borders of global “mass culture” and self-enclosed particular traditional cultures (national, religious, ethnic, racial, gender, sexual, youth, professional, etc.). As Epstein notes, transculturalism is not simply a method based on the value of outsideness, but also “a mode of being located at the crossroads of cultures” (2012, 60). The multicultural model presents the pluralistic world of self-enclosed cultures, each valuable in itself. Its deterministic view of culture reduces culture to its racial, gender, or ethnic origins, viewed in terms of “representation.” The multiculturalist view of culture was criticized by the other trend of postmodern thought—deconstruction, but the latter was unable to provide a valid theoretical alternative. Deconstruction, on the other hand, denies any determinism, including “origins,” as our own constructions. Jacques Derrida, for example, stressed that identity “implies difference within identity” (1997, 13–14). The transcultural approach goes beyond the limitations of both multiculturalism and deconstruction. Indeed, there is an internal paradox of postmodern thought: multiculturalism is stressing “collective identities,” while deconstructionism is stressing “internal differences.” As an attempt to find a conscious, positive resolution of this postmodern paradox, Epstein argues that origins need to be acknowledged in order to be exceeded by the cultures that “relativize”

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natural identities, and as the next step, they must undergo a transcultural movement that demystifies cultural identities. Thus, cultural pluralism would become free from determinism and representation, and deconstruction will become positive and constructive, “a creative history of disorigination and liberation.” As he writes, “transculture is the next stage in the ongoing human quest for freedom from the determinations of both nature and culture that tends to grow into our second nature” (2009, 342). Epstein suggests that we should move from the postmodern concept of “difference” (différance) to that of interference, of “dispersion” of the symbolic values of one culture in the fields of other cultures (2012, 39). Within the interferential model, cultures are not considered to be selfenclosed or isolated. Instead, this model opens up perspectives of cultures’ self-differentiation and mutual involvement. Transculture implies diffusion of initial cultural identities as individuals cross the borders of different cultures and assimilate them. The critical self-consciousness and the openness of cultures to interrelations can lead to their mutual “interference” and to building new trans-cultural communities. In contrast to the politics of “divide and rule,” transculture aims to “liberate by unifying”: it frees individuals from their innate or acquired restrictions and enables them to be dialogically open and freely conjoined into a genuinely complete and harmonious unity. The Bakhtinian approach recognizes all cultures as valuable in themselves, while considering the historicity and limitations of each of them. Cultures are inherently insufficient when isolated from one another. The awareness of a culture of its incompleteness and of the possibility of other cultures stimulates reaching for something beyond its own borders. Thus, they should be open to contacts and interactions with other cultures that complement their own. This requires humility and openness rather than being consumed by pride in self-identity or self-conceited exceptionalism. Bakhtin’s famous thesis that proposes that the life of cultures takes place on the boundaries is central to the concept of transculture, in which its deep meaning is articulated. Cultures have boundaries or border zones as areas of contact and interaction with other cultures. Thus, on the principle of transculture, they can transcend their borders. Boundaries play a certain constitutive role in protecting the uniqueness of each culture and in resisting the homogenizing intrusion of globalization. On the other hand, in contrast to the self-enclosed isolation of some cultures within their own boundaries, intercultural philosophy and transculture argue for a mutual openness and dialogic interaction of cultures, leading to their more intense and productive life.

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Striving for Freedom and Creativity Calling for individuals’ freedom from the dependencies imposed by the dominating cultures and self-imposed by cultural identities, the transcultural approach invites us to take the next step—toward cultural selfconsciousness and creativity. Culture is a process and product of human creativity, living within and between people and through the people. Transculture overcomes the isolation of the symbolic systems and value determinations of the existing cultures and broadens the field of a new cultural creativity. This creativity occurs at the boundaries of our own culture and at the crossroads with other cultures through the experience of our own cultural search, wanderings, experiments, and dialogue with others. This means an engagement and activities of individuals as subjects of cultural creativity. Transculture does not promote any particular value system and it cannot be described in positive terms, as a set of specific cultural symbols, norms, and values. As suggested by the prefix trans- (from the Latin, meaning “across”), “trans-culture” resides in the area of “being beyond.” As soon as we try to define transculture, it recedes further into the area of “being beyond.” Transculture does not mean adding yet another culture, but rather transcending into the “meta-cultural beyond.” It is an openended “transcultural movement.” Still, none of these elusive features of transculture implies relativism. Instead, as elucidated by Epstein, transculturalism provides a new approach to rethinking the concept of universality. Critical universality does not prescribe any pre-established value system or canon identified with any particular culture. Rather, it articulates a critical philosophicalmethodological approach, at the heart of which is Bakhtinian outsideness and the critical distancing in relation to any existing culture, including one’s own native culture. Critical universality is humble and self-critical of the time and locus of its truth claims. As distinguished from the metaphysics that was focused on the general as a quality common to many objects, here, “universal” refers to one object in as much as it possesses the qualities of many. Plurality itself can be viewed as an aspect of universality (internal diversity or multidimensionality). It has nothing to do with the neglect of the individual and the particular; rather, it is recognition of the individual’s inherent potential of diversity. Universality means diversity as a property of a single individual or a single culture insofar as it can include the diversity of others. In contrast to globalization, which disseminates identical models of “mass culture,” transculture views cultural diversity and universality as an asset of one individual.

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Thus, one individual can belong to many cultures. Unlike multiculturalism as a superficial multiplication of differences, concrete universality means a capacity of a single individual or a single culture to be different from itself, to incorporate the multiplicity of others, and to embrace the value of universality. Critical universality orients us toward the whole picture and approaches different cultures as interrelated integral parts of the comprehensive human culture. Thus, each culture can be viewed and evaluated by its relation to this diverse universality. Universality is viewed as internal diversity of individuals, their dialogic openness to others and selfidentification primarily as members of humanity. The transcultural conception may raise a question: Can we escape the formative impact of our native culture and the influence of the cultural milieu in which we are living? Epstein’s remarks help to clarify this issue. While transcultural criticism is focused on deterministic views of culture, it does not mean negation of the conditioning role of the inborn culture as well as “learned” cultural experiences. Transculture does not disregard our cultural “body,” the scope of symbols and habits we inherit or acquire through family, education, or professional and social life in society. Just as our life in culture does not disregard our physical body, but enriches its symbolic meanings as expressed, for example, in dance and other cultivated body activities, transculture does not disregard our cultural bodies either, but transforms and enriches them. Epstein stresses this inclusive characteristic of transculturalism by contrasting it to the homogenizing globalism and hegemonic cosmopolitanism, which ignore the cultural diversity of nations and ethnic, racial, and other minority groups: “Transcultural persons fully identify with their roots in a certain cultural ground, while not clinging to them” (2012, 61). At the same time, transculture is a way of transcending all established cultural identities, and it has its cosmopolitan dimension as related to humankind as a whole. In this respect, transculture seems to bridge both the cultural diversity of individuals and their identification with humanity as a whole. At the personal level, transculture refers to the efforts of individuals to overcome their identification with specific cultures and open themselves to others’ cultures. On a more general level, it is a process of interaction between cultures themselves, in which more and more individuals find themselves “outside” of any particular culture and its limitations, and beyond any fixed ethnic, racial, ideological, or other identity. These two levels are interrelated, resulting in what can be called a “transcultural dialogue.” At the heart of Bakhtin’s personalist and dialogic philosophy is the idea of freedom. As he wrote about I-other relations and creativity: “This freedom cannot change existence, so to speak, materially . . . it can change

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only the sense of existence” (1986, 137). He distinguished this freedom from “relative freedom,” which can become a vulgar material force that changes material existence but is detached from meaning. “Creativity is always related to a change of sense and cannot become naked material force” (138). The transcultural perspective brings new meaning to our relationships with culture. While transculture does not release us from our “primary” cultural bodies, it is changing their meaning, their “sense of existence.” Thus, it plays a transformative and liberating role. Epstein explains this role of transculture in reference to Bakhtin’s statement regarding freedom. The sense of the existence of a certain cultural tradition with its rituals and symbols is changed when interwoven in the transcultural context. From a transcultural perspective, the existing cultures get a broader meaning, and the individual’s relation to them is different: they should no longer be imposed nor blindly accepted only because they represent a tradition or a dominating culture, but rather, they should be equally available to each individual and chosen freely. As individuals, we can freely choose among cultural elements, providing that they are not dictated by the rules of any given culture. “As a transcultural being, I can adhere to any ethnic or confessional tradition and decide the degree to which I make it my own,” writes Epstein. This transcultural condition gives a new meaning to all elements of existing cultures. He compares this condition with Bakhtin’s concept of outsideness: “This realm beyond all cultures is located inside transculture and belongs to this state of not-belonging” (Epstein 2012, 62). Transculture is creative; it uses the palette of all available as well as possible cultures—similar to an artist in choosing colors from a universal symbolic palette to combine them creatively in a new way in a painting: At its higher levels, transculture integrates many cultural traditions and sign systems and embraces a universal symbolic palette, from which individuals can freely choose and mix colors in order to paint their selfportraits. (Epstein 2009, 343)

This analogy is noteworthy: the precondition of such creativity is freedom. Transculture is considered to be a new phase of the process of human liberation. Multiculturalism paved the way from the dominance of one canon to the diversity of cultures. Transculturalism moves further, from the diversity of cultures to the even greater diversity of individuals, helping them to transcend their rigid cultural identities. The global society is viewed as “the space of ultimate diversity: diversity of free individuals rather than that of fixed groups and cultures” (ibid., 349–350).

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In conclusion, Bakhtin put forward the idea of the universal character of dialogue, and showed that dialogism permeates all human relationships. His dialogic philosophy provides us with a vision of human beings and society based on the principles of dialogue and communication on all levels—individual, intersubjective, social, and cultural. He holds that dialogism, and all linguistic phenomena related to it, is a constitutive characteristic of language. This leads to the conclusion that the various forms of dialogue, related to language (including a dialogue of cultures), bear in themselves this inherent dialogic property immanent in language. Bakhtin’s dialogic philosophy shows its relevance in providing us with insights with which to surmount the dogmas of deterministic, essentialist, relativistic, and other one-sided aberrational views of culture. It helps us to become free from a dependence on the stereotypes of thinking, imposed either through ideological manipulation by dominating power or as selfimposed identities. It also provides us with insights and inspiration for approaching culture as an open and diverse field of human freedom and self-expression, in dialogue with the others, as subjects of cultural creativity. The realization of this dialogic potential ultimately depends on us. This provides encouraging support to the efforts of those who want to cultivate dialogic and harmonious relationships toward ourselves, others, diverse cultures, and the social and natural world within which we are living.

Notes 1.

Chronotope: from the Greek ȤȡȩȞȠȢ (time) and IJȩʌȠȢ (space), literally “timespace.” The term used by Bakhtin to express the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships in literature. The chronotope is a central element in Bakhtin’s theory of meaning in language and literature. It reveals the ambivalent relation of the temporal and spatial characteristics of meaning in its artistic representation and reception. It is also the analogue of any point of view concerning meaning as a position determined with regard to co-being and person. Carnival: the concept used by Bakhtin to characterize the genres of the serio-comical as linked to carnivalistic folklore and carnivalized literature. “The primary carnivalistic act is the mock crowning and subsequent decrowning of the carnival king . . . Under this ritual act of decrowning a king lies the very core of the carnival sense of the world—the pathos of shifts and changes, of death and renewal” (Bakhtin 1984, 124). It is the atmosphere of “joyful relativity” as opposed to an official rhetorical seriousness related to fear and dogmatism. Culture of laughter: closely related to carnival ambivalence and carnival laughter. In the Medieval and Renaissance cultures, Bakhtin saw the struggle between “popular culture,” characterized as grotesque and laughter, and “the official culture of the ruling classes,” which is characterized as seriousness. The carnival laughter is “the laughter of all the people”; it is universal in scope, being directed to everyone; and “the entire

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world is seen in its droll aspect,” in its derisive relativity (Bakhtin 1968, 11–12). He stressed its “essential relation to freedom” (89). It overcomes fear. Dialogue is a written or spoken conversation between two or more persons, including in literary composition and theatrical performance. In the twentieth century, the notion of dialogue was articulated in “dialogic philosophy” (Buber, Rosenzweig, and Bakhtin, among others), and in existential philosophy as a means to counter social alienation in mass society. Bakhtin sees dialogue as a characteristic of human life: there is no word, no thought, no meaning that does not enter into dialogic relations with the other. Double-voiced word: the concept stating the simultaneous presence of two voices within the same word or utterance as a single syntactic unit. The double-voiced and internally dialogized word is in an intense relationship with another’s word, being addressed to a listener and anticipating a response. Polyphony is a concept borrowed by Bakhtin from music (meaning two or more voices or simultaneous lines of independent melody, but all harmonizing) as a metaphor for describing Dostoevsky’s multi-voiced novels, whereby the author’s and heroes’ voices interact on equal terms. Outsideness, also exotopy or extralocality (vnenakhodimost’), means an ability to distance ourselves from any object of reflection and to see it from the outside, and an ability to think beyond schemata. We can adequately understand certain culture if we distance ourselves from it, that is, transcend its boundaries. 2. This expression was used in Bakhtin’s Toward a Philosophy of the Act, where in explaining the concept of my non-alibi in Being, he wrote about “a non-fused yet undivided (nesliiannoe i nerazdel’noe) affirmation of myself in Being” (1993, 41). Sergey Averintsev, in his comments about this passage, wrote: “Unconfusedly and inseparably (nesliianno i nerazdel’no) are words in which, in the dogmatic definition by the Fourth Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) the relation of the divine and human natures in the one person of Jesus Christ is described” (2003, 454n45). 3. As Michael Eskin wrote about Bakhtin’s metalinguistics of dialogue, “coexistence transpires as the fundamentally active give and take between consciousnesses,” that is, between persons who are discursively and dialogically constituted; thus, “a person’s most fundamental co-existential activity reveals itself indeed as an act of authoring,” which signifies dialogic activity (2000, 88–89). 4. See the analysis of the principle of “absolute self-exclusion” in Gogotishvili 2003, 356–382. 5. In contrast to the semiology (study of signs and sign processes) rooted in Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralism, and the semiotics related to Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism, one of the sources that influenced Bakhtin’s ideas was a theory of the sign system called “deep semiotics,” based on the presumption of the fundamental role of an individual as a source of meaning, in giving a meaning and in understanding (Tulchinsky 2011). That was related to the tradition represented, for example, by W. von Humboldt, which, in Russia, was further developed by A. A. Potebnya and L. S. Vygotsky. To this tradition also belong such Russian philosophers as G. G. Shpet, P. A. Florensky, and A. F. Losev, and the poet O. E. Mandelshtam. 6. Ideas about an inner speech, similar to that of Bakhtin, were also developed by L. S. Vygodsky and G. G. Shpet, who emphasized the role of symbols and of

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language, the assimilation and internalization of which influences inner life and consciousness. A “living word,” including the use of intonation, did not fit into schemata opposing subject and object (Tulchinsky 2011). 7. Bakhtin distinguished “indirect speech” from Saussure’s parole (“speech,” understood as concrete instances of the use of language by a linguistic subject in contrast to langue as the principles of language). Both Saussure and Bakhtin begin with the assumption that language should be studied from the perspective of those who actually use it, namely of the individual speaker. However, they differed in many respects. In particular, Saussure failed “to discover a dialogic relation between the self/other aspects of language as they are present in individual speakers” (Holquist 2002, 46). Bakhtin had “his own way of mapping the relation between signified and signifier, one that constantly insists on difference and simultaneity, rather than symmetry” (ibid., 47). Bakhtin opined that the translation of parole as “individual speech” is inadequate, since it implies, in the spirit of Saussure, merely an individualization of the general language in the sense of a system of general language norms. In this case stylistics is understood as a linguistics treating individual languages or a linguistics of the utterance (“linguistique de la parole” in Saussure’s terminology) (Bakhtin, 2012, 16–17). For Bakhtin, the activity of intelligent speaking is correlated not with language as langue, but with the artistic “architectonic form, which is axiologically oriented toward the content (a possible event) related to it” (1996–2012, 1:311). The unity of literary work is “not in what and about what it speaks but in the feeling of the activity of intelligent speaking” (ibid., 318). 8. The translation of slovo as “discours” in French and “discourse” in English can be explained in part by the fact that Bakhtin’s works first attracted the attention of French structuralists Julia Kristeva, Tzvetan Todorov, and others, and were interpreted in a structuralist manner. This interpretation and translation is associated with the discourse theories developed within structuralism and postmodern theories, such as by Michel Foucault. In their interpretation, discourse is viewed as the aggregate of utterances whose source is unknown; discourse has no “human subject,” and it implies a dimension of unconsciousness. But this is contrary to Bakhtin’s thought. His philosophy of language was developed as an alternative to structuralism. He was not associated with any discourse theories, poststructuralism or “death of the subject.” Instead, Bakhtin was a personalist thinker, stressing the importance of the other as a subject rather than an object. Moreover, in the intellectual and political environment in which he was living, discourse was associated with the ideology of authoritarian power (Sériot 1985). 9. Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist associate Bakhtin’s concept of word with its “embodiment”: the word becomes real and substantial when people engage in dialogic interaction with one another, and language is “the bond that holds the community together.” They write, “in Christ the word was made flesh, and a primary feature of Bakhtin’s concept of language is his emphasis on the materiality of the word.” Although “meaning is not completely coincidental with the sign, but it is not possible without it” (1984, 86). Alexander Mihailovic refers to Bakhtin’s notes made in 1970–1971 regarding language and speech communication: “Metaphysics and the philosophy of the word. Ancient teachings about logos. John”

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(Bakhtin 1986, 152). He comments on the reference to John 1:1 that “Bakhtin explicitly connects both theoretical and applied linguistics to the Johannine philosophy of the word” (2001, 123). 10. Translations from Russian are mine. 11. See more about the concept of point of speech in Gogotishvili (2006, 592–632). 12. Merleau-Ponty believed that regarding language, phenomenology can be only that of “speech,” expressing the point of view of a speaking subject. 13. Western theologians such as Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich, and Josef Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI), among others, have systematically analyzed the theoretical aspects of the dialogue of religions. See, for example, Tillich’s Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (1962). 14. The main motifs and topics of Russian philosophy are bound together by a striving for wholeness as a desirable state of humankind, both as a social body and individually. It is expressed in the concept of sobornost (spiritual community of jointly living people), meaning a free spiritual unity of people both in religious life and in the secular community, and the relations of brotherhood and love. This concept was developed by Alexey Khomyakov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Pavel Florensky, Sergei Bulgakov, and Nikolai Lossky. Vladimir Solovyov developed the ideas of “positive wholeness” (vse-edinstvo, or unity-of-all), and “Godmanhood,” and he philosophically grounded universal moral principles in his concept of the “justification of the Good” (2010).

References Averintsev, Sergei A. 2001. “Bakhtin, smech, khristianskaia kultura” [Bakhtin, laughter, and Christian culture]. In vol. 1 of M. M. Bakhtin: pro et contra [M. M. Bakhtin: For and against], 468–483. St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute. —. 2003. Kommentarii [Comments]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected works], edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and N. I. Nikolaev, 1: 438–456. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1968. Rabelais and His World. Translated by Hélène Iswolsky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —. 1984. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Translated and edited by Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. —. 1986. Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Translated by Vern W. McGee. Edited by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. —. 1990a. “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” In Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Works by M. M. Bakhtin, translated by Vadim Liapunov, edited by Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, 4–256. Austin: University of Texas Press.

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—. 1990b. The Dialogic Imagination. Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Edited by Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. —. 1990c. “Discourse in the Novel.” In The Dialogic Imagination, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, edited by Michael Holquist, 258–422. Austin: University of Texas Press. —. 1993. Toward a Philosophy of the Act. Translated by Vadim Liapunov. Edited by Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. Austin: University of Texas Press. —. 1996–2012. Sobranie sochinenii [Collected works]. 7 vols. Edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and others. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. —. 2000. Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo [Problems of Dostoevsky’s art]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected works], edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and L. S. Melikhova, 2: 5–176. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. —. 2002. Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo [Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected works], edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and Liudmila A. Gogotishvili, 6: 5–300. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. —. 2003. “K voprosam metodologii estetiki slovestnogo tvorchestva” [Toward a methodology of the aesthetics of verbal creativity]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected works], edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and N. I. Nikolaev, 1: 265–325. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. —. 2012. Slovo v romane [The word in the novel]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected works], edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and Vadim V. Kozhinov, 3: 9–179. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. Batishchev, Genrikh S. 1992. “Dialogism ili polifonism?” [Dialogism or polyphonism?]. In M. M. Bakhtin kak filosof [M. M. Bakhtin as a philosopher], edited by Liudmila A. Gogotishvili and Pavel S. Gurevich, 123–141. Moscow: Nauka. Bergman, Shmuel Hugo. 2012. Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber. Translated by Arnold A. Gerstein. Albany: State University of New York Press. Bibler, Vladimir S. 1991. Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, ili Poetika kultury [Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin or the poetics of culture]. Moscow: Progress-Gnosis. Casper, Bernhard. 2002. Das dialogische Denken. Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner und Martin Buber. [Dialogic thinking: Franz Rosenzweig, Ferdinand Ebner, and Martin Buber]. Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber.

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—. 1992b. “Varianty i invarianty M. M. Bakhtina” [Variants and invariants by M. M. Bakhtin]. Voprosy filosofii 1: 115–133. —. 2003. “Kommentarii” [Comments]. In Sobranie sochinenii [Collected Works], edited by Sergey G. Bocharov and N. I. Nikolaev, 1: 351–438. Moscow: Russian Dictionaries. —. 2006. Nepriamoe govorenie [Indirect speech]. Moscow: Iazyki Slavianskikh Kultur. Gogotishvili, Liudmila A., and Pavel S. Gurevich, eds. 1992. M. M. Bakhtin kak filosof [M. M. Bakhtin as philosopher]. Moscow: Nauka. Heidegger, Martin. 1927. Sein und Zeit [Being and time]. Halle a.d.S.: M. Niemeyer. Holquist, Michael. 2002. Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge. Horujy, Sergey. 1998. K Fenomenologii Askezy [Toward the phenomenology of ascesis]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Gumanitarnoi Literatury. —. 1999. Filosofiia i askeza [Philosophy and ascesis]. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press. —. 2008. “The Brothers Karamazov in the Prism of Hesychast Anthropology.” Paper given at the Conference, “Art, Creativity, and Spirituality in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov.” Worcester, MA: College of the Holy Cross, April 10–12. Accessed September 24, 2013. http://synergia-isa.ru/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/hor_karamazov_bost on_2008_eng.pdf. —. 2010. “Slavophiles, Westernizers, and the Birth of Russian Philosophical Humanism.” In A History of Russian Philosophy 1830– 1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity, edited by G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole, 27–51. New York: Cambridge University Press. —. 2012. “Contribution of the Eastern-Orthodox Tradition to the Formation of the Dialogical Civilization.” Accessed May 31, 2013. http:// synergia-isa.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/hor_dialog_cicvlization.pdf. —. 2013. “The Project of Synergic Anthropology: Spiritual Practice as the Basis for a New Conception of Man.” Paper presented in Krakow. Accessed July 18, 2013. http://synergia-isa.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 05/horuzhy_talk_krakov_1_2013.pdf. Jameson, Fredric. 1972. The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lochhead, David. 2012. The Dialogical Imperative: A Christian Reflection on Interfaith Encounter. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers.

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CHAPTER FIVE TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE MARC LUCHT

In a successful conversation [both partners] come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were. —Hans-Georg Gadamer

Friedrich Nietzsche identifies nihilism as an overall feeling of the “valuelessness” of the world such that: Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is lacking . . . [and] the categories “aim,” “unity,” “being,” which we used to project some value into the world—we pull out again; so the world looks valueless. (1968, sec. 12A)

Writing in the wake of the triumph of Enlightenment secularism and its associated commitment to scientific rationality, Nietzsche argues that nihilism arises from a cultural disillusionment attending the collapse of our faith in the unconditionality of the putatively rational (and ultimately utilitarian and anthropocentric) categories hitherto used to make sense of the world. If we have the expectation that meaning and measure are be anchored in and justified by an absolute foundation, then discovering that foundation’s contingency or absence results in a disappointment with all meaning. “Now that the shabby origin of [traditional categories and] values is becoming clear,” Nietzsche says, “the universe seems to have lost value, seems ‘meaningless’ . . . [and the question] ‘why?’ finds no answer” (ibid., sec. 7; cf. sec. 2).1 This sense of the arbitrariness of value leads to a kind of feeling of cosmic indifference, a feeling of the pointlessness of existence, and those

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normative measures and standards hitherto relied upon for orientation begin to dissolve, losing their authority. In the first part of this chapter, I sketch a picture of cultural and philosophical nihilism, and examine the manner in which nihilism’s subversion of meaning and value threatens intercultural dialogue and peace. In the remainder of the chapter, I explore the manner in which phenomenology can offer an alternative to a nihilistic vision of life, and point out some of the resources phenomenology has to offer reflection about intercultural dialogue. Martin Heidegger argues that nihilism arises largely from two metaphysical commitments orienting Western thought: the sharp division between subject and object, and the distinction between fact and value together with the reduction of what counts as real to just one side—the fact—of that distinction. The latter commitment, on which I shall focus in this chapter, is tied especially closely to the authority of the natural sciences. The more scientific and technical modes of thinking are taken to be the sole legitimate modes of access to truths about being, the less it is that anything not subject either to quantitative representation or technological subjection to practical ends will be regarded as anything more than the correlate of mere subjective interpretation or preference. Indeed, Nietzsche shares Heidegger’s view of the link between nihilism and the authority of mathematical-technical modes of rationality: A “scientific” interpretation of the world, as you understand it, might therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in meaning. . . . But an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world. Assuming that one estimated the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas: how absurd would such a “scientific” estimation of music be! What would one have comprehended, understood, grasped of it? Nothing, really nothing of what is “music” in it! (1974, 335–336)

Whereas Nietzsche typically emphasizes the impossibility of appeal to transcendent normative measures given the demise of traditional metaphysics and the secularist rejection of religion, he recognizes as well the futility of the attempt to ground value upon immanent measures given a mechanistic world as represented in the mathematical sciences. This latter point is Heidegger’s primary focus. In the following, I shall develop in more detail Heidegger’s view of the connection between the exclusive epistemological authority of the sciences and nihilism. For modern theory since the seventeenth century, Heidegger argues, the being of all beings is interpreted a priori as sheer material objectivity,

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or “the totality of material corporeality in its motion” (1977a, 119). Our conception of nature is conceived a priori as “the self-contained system of motion of units of mass related spatiotemporally” (ibid.). This conception makes possible the rigorous objectification of nature required for the precise results generated by modern scientific inquiry: the equivalence of the real with extended matter (and with determinate quanta of energy) makes possible the formulaic representation of nature in terms of quantitative magnitudes. Empirical research is conducted always presupposing this model of nature. Thus, only those phenomena conforming to it are taken as legitimate objects of research, are taken to be at all: “whatever is comes to stand as object and in that way alone receives the seal of Being” (132).2 In other words, Heidegger thinks that, whereas the details of the particular laws governing the interaction of objects are subject to discovery in subsequent research, a conception of the essence of Being has always been decided upon in advance, and any research will be conducted presupposing and always confirming this decision. Only those beings that were stipulated in advance to count as real ones will be subject to investigation. Scientific research methods and operative notions of justification and evidence will all be designed appropriately for investigation solely into determinate quanta of matter and energy. Heidegger claims that this interpretation of Being, which he entitles metaphysical, has come to be decisive even for our common sense ideas about and ordinary perception of the world. Increasingly, theory orients our common sense views of the nature of reality. In this regard, modern theory is characterized by a Cartesian structure. For René Descartes, secondary qualities such as colors do not inhere as real properties in the thing which appears colored. Similarly, for us, phenomena that initially do not appear to be either matter or energy are subject to the attempt to be reduced to and understood in terms of quantitatively measurable primary qualities, or else are passed over as something “merely subjective.” Thus, for instance, we tend increasingly to think that phenomena such as hope and humor are reducible to the disposition of neurons in brains, and phenomena such as the frightening, the good, the proper, and the vile are conceived not as real properties of things, but as mere artifacts of judgments we make and feelings we have about things. The implications of such a view can be seen, for example, in education, where educators appear to believe that what is real in learning, or “real learning,” must be quantitatively measurable. We see increasing emphasis placed on quantitative assessments of student learning, as if learning things such as Socratically inspired philosophy—with its emphases on recognition of our own ignorance, on wonder, on intellectual liberty and the critique of convention, on

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openness to new perspectives, on tenacity, and on virtue—is reducible to determinate bits of data and measurable “outputs.” Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics provides another classic example of the consequences of such a metaphysical interpretation of Being. Kant understands the world of experienced, phenomenal nature essentially in Newtonian and mechanistic terms. Thus, when he performs his analysis of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment, it turns out that judgments of taste are not strictly about the “beautiful object” at all, for beauty and ugliness are not properties that can be assessed in a determinate judgment. Taste, for Kant, is nothing like a perspicacious ability to discern in an object some property that constitutes its beauty. Thus, judgments of taste refer not to the judged object, but back to the judging subject and to the way in which the subject is affected by its encounter with the object. We assert that something is beautiful because our apprehension of it arouses within us certain kinds of pleasure. The judgment that something is beautiful, therefore, is subjective, cannot be either true or false, and teaches us more about the person making the judgment than about the thing judged (1987, sec. 44, 75). Heidegger observes that, with modernity, our understanding of the significance of art is relegated, therefore, to the discipline of aesthetics, and the “art work becomes the object of mere subjective experience” (1977a, 116). Everyone has his or her own taste, and, as neither objective nor real, beauty cannot be isolated or measured. Instead, qualities such as beauty and ugliness are relative to each person’s distinctive sensibility. The equivalence of the real with what is quantitatively representable renders nature appropriate not only for the goal of precise, objective knowledge of it, but thereby also for technological manipulation. A world of objects is a world subject to intervention and manipulation. As Descartes already knew, the objectivity of a being allows for the measurability presupposed by the project of acquiring mastery over that being. Heidegger holds that beings are interpreted as material objectivity ultimately so that they become appropriate material for technological control. His point is that theoretical reflection, which in its commitment to neutral objectivity so often seems and presents itself as normatively neutral, as disinterested or unbiased, actually aims at dominion. If he is right, then from its very inception modern ontology has presupposed a normative bias, for it contains within itself the express orientation towards subjugating the natural world. (The point would hold for the human sciences as well as for the natural sciences, as thinkers such as Michel Foucault have argued, because psychological theory and sociological theory are oriented toward the control and normalization of human behavior.)

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Theoretical representation is finally in the service of the will to power, and, as such, in the modern age, the “earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as unconditional objectification. Nature appears everywhere . . . as the object of technology” (Heidegger 1977g, 100). Theory’s aim, Heidegger says, has been to convert nature into a “gigantic gasoline station” (1966, 50). He thinks that this systematic subjugation affects the way in which we take the world, the manner in which we even see it. One of his most thoughtprovoking claims, then, is that technology consists not merely in devices, but is connected with a way of revealing or representing. Increasingly, he thinks, we attend, even in our ordinary lives, to nothing but objects and resources. Increasingly, even objective properties recede behind function. Ever more we experience culture as distinct from nature, we experience ourselves as separate from the world, and we encounter the world always and exclusively in terms of its capacity to contribute to the satisfaction of our goals. Attending primarily to those features of the things that bear upon our projects, we allow ourselves to be responsive to the world merely in its possible instrumentality. What is the connection between scientific and technical modes of representation, on the one hand, and nihilism on the other? Heidegger claims that the triumph of technical rationality results in a nihilistic “darkening of the world,” in which phenomena such as beauty and moral categories are no longer regarded as real, as part of the world (1990, 38). For him, the metaphysical interpretation of nature is reductive, for being is much richer than mere objects and resources, and the delivering over of beings to a universal objectification and the homogenization of all significance into instrumental value correspond to a loss of meaning. The reduction of a being to an object results in a divorce of thing and (its) meaning. In other words, the process of objectification fractures or disaggregates the thing into separate meaning and object components, and, for modern theory, it is only the object side of that distinction that is considered real. If the real consists in nothing but physical objects and the forces that move them, then phenomena such as significance and value come to be relegated to the sphere of the merely subjective or unreal. They are not properties of the world, but are taken to be functions of the ways in which creatures with language and culture interpret the world. Values are not factual, they are not to be found within material nature. So, increasingly, they appear less than fully real and seem subjective and arbitrary. The distinction between fact and value combined with the reduction of the real to the former side of that distinction threatens to result in the senselessness of all value. Thus Heidegger understands nihilism to be something like the pervasive and

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global loss of any mattering—and this loss is a direct consequence of modern metaphysics. For the thinking grounded on modern metaphysics and its reduction of the real first to material objectivity and then to mere resource, ontology is performed by the natural sciences, and must be distinguished from disciplines such as ethics. In education, as I suggested, we see the consequences of nihilism in the expectation that quantitative tools for assessment will reveal the ways in which teaching either is or fails to be successful. In philosophy, one sees the consequences of such nihilism in the devolution of the attempt to understand the human encounter with the beautiful into the modern discipline of aesthetics, and in the slide of ethics into emotivism, relativism, theories of ideology, or one of the numerous currently popular “naturalistic” descendants of psychologism and sociobiology. Aesthetics and ethics, as dealing with values, meaning, and imperatives, threaten to become merely subjective—their subject matters come to be regarded as functions of contingent human preferences or conventions or interests, or, perhaps, as the accident of our biological constitution. Since the imperatives that obligate us are not to be found within the catalogue of material objects or resources, they are not subject to empirical measurement or technological manipulation, and thus, are taken to be less than fully real. Ethics, therefore, risks sacrificing its connection to truth, and, as such, risks losing its authoritative capacity to obligate or forbid conduct. As Heidegger puts it, for modern metaphysics, “Because [material] nature is what-is, freedom and the ought are not thought as Being. The opposition of Being and the ought, Being and value, remains” (1993, 72). Put differently, more existentially, when nothing is seen as inherently valuable, we find ourselves adrift in an alien and indifferent world. Once this recognition takes hold, the beliefs about value that provided many of our endeavors with their significance and justification seem to evaporate as ungrounded. One threat attendant upon belief in the subjectivity of value and the arbitrariness of moral categories is that either human motivation devolves into mere hedonism and the culturally conditioned pursuit of self-interest, or human endeavor itself comes to be seen as irrelevant. Thus, as David MacNaughton asks: once we have realized that there are no objective values can we go on caring about and fighting for the things we value, or shall we become convinced that nothing matters . . .? [The commitment to the unreality of value] threatens to undermine the beliefs about the nature of value which give many of our activities their point. (1988, 12–13)

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Such nihilism threatens intercultural dialogue because it refuses to acknowledge the existence of firm standards on the basis of which disputes about norms can be adjudicated. If values such as “oughts” and aesthetic properties are taken to be merely conventional, or simply as matters of ideology, cultural heritage, or individual preference, then disagreements about them are not resolvable either by rational argument or through appeal to the disclosure of objective measures. There would be no justification for the expectation of rational harmonization of differing views through the disclosure of commonly recognized criteria or standards. One danger this view poses is that normative disagreements then seem capable of being resolved only through means such as propaganda, bribery, or threat of force, and moral discourse devolves into little more than the attempt to convince others to do what we want them to do. As Alasdair MacIntyre puts this point in a discussion of emotivism (also committed to the non-objectivity of moral norms): The generalizations of the sociology and psychology of persuasion are what I shall need to guide me, not the standards of normative rationality. If emotivism is true, this distinction is illusory. For evaluative utterance can in the end have no point or use but the expression of my own feelings or attitudes and the transformation of the feelings and attitudes of others . . . . The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences and choices of another with its own. Others are always means, never ends. (1984, 24)

Alternately, disagreements about the propriety of conduct may perhaps be diffused through bland appeals to “tolerance,” which is itself a value difficult, if not impossible, to justify given a commitment to the conventionality of norms. However, appeals to the “live and let live” attitude of tolerance in the absence of additional non-conventional norms also seem morally inadequate. A broad commitment to merely tolerance leaves undetermined what sorts of conduct are finally intolerable, if any. Moreover, if tolerance indeed is to have limits, it is unclear how we might establish the intolerability of some particular kind of conduct in the absence of some other objective norm. More seriously, such appeals risk our resting satisfied with that to which Dan Sperber (1982) refers as cognitive and cultural apartheid. A commitment to tolerance might have the unintended consequence of our cutting ourselves off from each other. There is no reason to turn to the other for insight into the limitations of our own commitments and practices. Rather than seek out opportunities to learn about each other and improve our principles and conduct through mutual engagement, debate, and the contest of ideas, a commitment to an attitude of “live and let

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live” risks our resting satisfied with the righteousness of our own ways of doing things. At the same time, such an attitude seems to offer little motivation for trying to convince others to alter and improve their practices— even those that strike us as troubling morally—or even to learn about the reasons for such practices. Envision, for instance, neighborhoods characterized by increasing political homogeneity: liberals or conservatives, for instance, choosing as neighbors only people who share their political views. As opportunities for encounter and dialogue become less frequent, so do the opportunities for people to learn from each other, and the possibilities of mutual understanding and intellectual growth grow ever fainter. In a discussion of relativism in cultural anthropology, Stephen Galt Crowell observes: the attempt to counteract the political effects of the situation of asymmetrical power relations . . . by the expedient of an epistemological or ontological relativism that precludes the possibility of cross-cultural evaluation altogether has the undesirable effect, among other things, of making the intended “cultural critique of ourselves” impossible. (1998, 28)

Thus, especially troubling from a moral point of view is the idea that appeals to tolerance, rather than to a mutual openness to criticism, might originate in an attempt to render ourselves immune from moral criticism or censure. Such cultural apartheid threatens baleful epistemic consequences too. As Kant notes, rationality is not self-correcting, and sound thinking requires us to resist what he thinks of as logical egoism by testing our arguments and principles through critical dialogue with others, especially with others with whom we disagree.3 In the end, appeals to tolerance risk our relieving ourselves of the burdensome yet vitally important task of working together to correct or improve our moral commitments through robust engagement in dialogue, mutual criticism, and the joint pursuit of what is best. The lesson to be derived from Heidegger’s analysis of nihilism is that the exclusive emphasis on scientific and technical rationality poses a threat to attempts to avoid violence through authentic dialogue, for scientific rationality assumes the non-existence of those norms and values the disclosure of which could make possible the genuine resolution of disagreements. If we are not committed to the reality or objectivity of moral value, then we will not entertain the possibility that we could be wrong or mistaken in our normative commitments. We might alter those commitments perhaps because our preferences changed, or because we might be convinced that holding to them no longer seemed to be in our self-interest, but not because we had allowed ourselves to be persuaded rationally that they

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were grounded in false beliefs about what was good, or just, or beautiful. If we relinquish the idea that beliefs about norms might be true or false, that they capture or fail to capture some normative state of affairs, then dialogue threatens to collapse into the attempt to bring others to believe that their self-interest lies in doing things as we want them to do them. Dialogue becomes little more than the struggle for influence and power among diverse interest groups. Genuine dialogue, however, presupposes our openness to being changed by the dialogue, and to being changed by the new apprehension or insight that such engagement can make possible. Compelling alternatives to a nihilistic vision of life are to be found in the work of Immanuel Kant and in the phenomenological tradition. Kant holds that reason, in its theoretical employment, is limited to the scientific representation of nature (or to analysis of the conditions of that representation), and has no capacity to disclose norms. Phenomenal nature is knowable only as mechanism; meaning and value are not to be found there. For Kant, however, ethics need not collapse into anything like emotivism; for in its practical employment, reason has the capacity not to discover but to legislate an authoritative and absolute moral standard in the form of the moral law.4 Kant’s contribution to debates about the legitimacy and objectivity of moral standards is well known. Another compelling response to nihilism is developed in the phenomenological tradition. The remainder of this chapter explores the resources that phenomenology and its attempt to enrich our conception of world by attending to its normative dimension can offer to reflection about intercultural dialogue. Many phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl, Heidegger, and Erazim Kohák, explore the possibility that the representation of nature as nothing but determinate magnitudes of matter and energy is reductive and overlooks real dimensions of the world such as value and meaning. (Indeed, Kant, in the Critique of Judgment, already begins to shift toward a more phenomenological position. There, he suggests that reflective judgment has the capacity to orient us within a world of which we are a part and that is felt—though not known—as meaningful.) Phenomenological attention to what Crowell calls the “space of meaning” enables the disclosure of real (and not merely conventional) norms, and thus can help counter the nihilistic tendencies of contemporary common sense and its impoverished view of being. In a short essay about Edmund Husserl’s notion of intentionality, JeanPaul Sartre writes: [Things] abruptly unveil themselves to us as hateful, sympathetic, horrible, lovable. Being dreadful is a property of this Japanese mask, an inexhaustible and irreducible property which constitutes its very nature—and not the

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Chapter Five sum of our subjective reactions to a piece of sculptured wood. Husserl has restored to things their horror and their charm. He has restored to us the world of artists and prophets: frightening, hostile, dangerous, with its havens of mercy and love. . . . [If] we love a woman, it is because she is lovable. (Sartre 1970, 5)

Phenomenology attempts to enrich our conception of nature by developing a set of descriptive methods that enable disclosure of dimensions of the world inaccessible to the mathematical empirical sciences. For phenomenologists such Husserl and Heidegger, reality does not consist merely in what is measurable quantitatively; instead, they argue, meaning and value are incorporated into the constitution of nature itself. Nature is primordially significant. Heidegger observes that attending to such significance is what is at stake in Husserl’s injunction to return to the “things themselves.” He entitles the “other thinking” (1977c, 207) that he is attempting to develop in response to the ubiquity of technical rationality Denken or Besinnung: “To venture after sense or meaning (Sinn) is the essence of reflecting (Besinnen)” (1977f, 180). Calculative, scientific thinking, he says, “is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is” (1966, 46). Yet, as Joseph Fell notes, Heidegger thinks “the fundamental supportive and orienting meanings that reflection seeks in the subject’s interiority, in immanence, have not originated there, but have occurred antecedently in the world” (1994, 95). Heidegger seeks to penetrate beneath the theoretical biases shaping our thinking. He reminds us of what he believes we always, on some level, already know: We recoil from something with horror because it is horrible or vile; we love people because they are lovable; we strive to preserve something because it is worth preserving. To use an example from Erazim Kohák, the chipmunk’s significance is not “reducible simply to the role he fulfills in the economy of nature. There is not only utility but also an integrity, a rightness to his presence” (1984, p.70). Heidegger seeks to remind us that we live and are involved within a primordially, naturally meaningful world whose structures orient our involvement, and that this world is already “unconcealed” whenever “man” “unlocks his heart” and engages in ordinary “shaping and working, entreating and thanking” (1966, 18–19). As Heidegger sees it, nihilism stems from a reductive, impoverished ontology. In technical rationality, things are represented as inert matter or determinate quanta of energy. However, Heidegger believes that we have tended to operate within too narrow a conception of the nature of the thing. Being, for him, is much richer than mere material objectivity. He wants to cultivate a way of thinking with the capacity to allow beings to show

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themselves undistorted by the theoretical-scientific prejudices that narrow our attention to only those features of the world that are objective and serviceable. Kohák says, “With respect both to ourselves and to nature, we need to suspend all theory and ask, without prior ontological prejudice, just what it is that in truth presents itself in lived experience itself” (1984, 22). What this application of the phenomenological reduction accomplishes is a view of “the nature of reality for which Husserl argues strenuously,” the disclosure of being as “intrinsically meaningful being, not mere being on which meaning must first be imposed” (48). The phenomenological project, then, is a sort of rehabilitation of the ancient idea of the cosmos. As Hans Jonas puts it, Heidegger’s thinking is a paganism that “deifies the world” (1964, 220). Heidegger thinks of nature in terms of the ancient notion of physis, of which the material nature of modern science is only a reductive and “confused echo” (1993, 72). He intends phenomenology to heal the breach sundering thing and meaning, thereby restoring values such as the “ought” to being. Heidegger’s phenomenology leads to a moral realism. The reintroduction of significance into nature bears upon morality because it forges a connection between ontology and the disclosure of measures directing moral conduct and commitment. How something matters will determine how I comport myself toward it. Since meaning is real, this means that to know what something is, is already to know the kind of claim it makes: to recognize that someone or something is dignified is already to know that that being is deserving of respect. Heidegger asks us to cultivate a valuesensitive vision, a responsive sensitivity to the meaningfulness of the world around us. Our very apprehension of the world will help us achieve a proper orientation within it, will help guide and ground our conduct. Heidegger says, “He who truly knows what is, knows what he wills to do in the midst of what is” (1989, 67). He urges us to attend to beings in such a way that they “reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them” (1977d, 127–128). The phenomenological commitment to an originally meaningful world can be of great benefit to efforts to make sense of the possibility of genuine dialogue. For one thing, phenomenology offers hope of the possibility of isolating real, non-relative, non-conventional norms. Dialogue then could consist not merely in the manipulative attempt to compel others to act as we want them to, but in the joint attempt to determine what is best. In such a case, disagreements may indeed be resolvable not just through compromise or compulsion, but through the disclosure of objective, jointly recognized norms. Since bias can occlude our apprehension of meaning,

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one challenge participants in a dialogue would face, then, would be to help each other secure more disinterested viewpoints from which to consider a situation. Participants could help each other “see more clearly” by pointing out distortions introduced by theoretical assumptions and self-interest. Moreover, if Heidegger is right, scientific and technical modes of thinking contribute to nihilism by reinforcing a reductive vision of the world. Such thinking is unsuited for the apprehension of value. The detachment of pure cognition, he says, does not have the capacity to “discover anything like that which is threatening” (1962, 138). Accordingly, many phenomenologists, such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, have turned to disciplines such as art and literature as capable of attuning us to dimensions of the world typically overlooked in more traditional models of theory. Phenomenology reminds us that dialogue must not restrict itself to technical matters accessible best to scientific, instrumental, and economic rationality, but should incorporate exploration of the multiplicity of ways in which phenomena manifest themselves as significant. In this respect, feeling and other affective dimensions of experience must come to play a role in dialogue. Intercultural dialogue capable of considering and evaluating norms should be informed by a kind of multicultural “aesthetics” of natural and cultural phenomena, that is, by attention to the diverse modes in which the meaningful phenomena constituting situations come to presence. For example, dialogue should be informed by attention to the structures of experiences of phenomena such as friendship and enmity, the beautiful and the ugly, places both built and wild, family life, humor and disgust, moral comportment, gift giving, honor, peacemaking, entertainment, the divine and religious devotion, time, and the sources of comfort, alienation, aspiration, and boredom. At the same time, phenomenology can give hope to those searching for common ground with interlocutors from even very alien cultures. Some thinkers stress those differences of language and custom that distinguish cultures. They often argue that such differences are so radical that crosscultural understanding is impossible. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, for instance, argue that the meanings of words are tied to culturally specific conventions, and that concepts can never be disentangled from idiosyncratic cultural variables. There can be no “pure observation language” (1982, 39–40). Thus, they argue for the impossibility of perfect translation and for a kind of relativism of conceptual schemes. According to Barnes and Bloor, a “common core of belief shared by all cultures” is nothing but a “purely imaginary construct with no empirical basis at all” (ibid.). Among many anthropologists and philosophers, the radical otherness

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of the other is reputed to render members of different cultures nonunderstandable to each other; people are, so to speak, locked into their own culturally specific worldviews. Sperber remarks that a cultural relativist holds, “all conceptualized information is cultural. What we think of as the sky, birds, eyes, tears, hunger, death, fall, in other cultures, under concepts which differ from our own, and are therefore perceived differently. . . . Hence it would be unreasonable to expect translations to preserve propositional content across languages” (1982, 155). Thinking about the conventional determination of concepts leads cultural relativists to go further than the sorts of subjectivism or relativism about norms that are grounded in the representation of reality as mere material and dynamic quantity. For the cultural relativist, we not only possess no way of adjudicating disagreements about values, but we have very little hope of even making sense of those beliefs people from alien cultures hold about nature and reality. Sperber notes that were cultural relativism true, one consequence would be that a belief that is irrational from the perspective of one culture might well be perfectly rational from the perspective of another. In the final analysis, there could exist situations in which people from different cultures simply could not understand each other. Indeed, if it were not merely the case that propositions about empirical matters differed among cultures, but were those a priori beliefs or postulates that serve to shape a worldview “within which the rationality of beliefs is to be assessed” to differ, translations would be ruled out in principle, and different cultures might well remain utterly closed to each other (Sperber 1982, 156). Sperber argues against the possibility of radically incommensurable worldviews on several grounds, including the absence of any model of cognitive development that could explain the brain’s capacity to determine an indefinite number of possible worlds. He claims that ethnographic evidence does not support the idea of radical cultural relativism.5 Kwame Anthony Appiah suggests that early ethnographers may have exaggerated cultural differences because, after spending long years living among alien people, the stories with which they returned “had to be news. So, naturally, the ethnographer didn’t usually come back with a report whose one-sentence summary was: they are pretty much like us” (2006, 14). Yet, he notes, people from different cultures are, in fact, very much alike. They may sing different kinds of songs, dance different kinds of dances, tell different kinds of jokes—but they all sing, dance, and joke. Appiah observes that the people anthropologists encountered: smiled, slept, had sex and children, wept, and, in the end, died. And it was possible for this total stranger, the anthropologist, who was, nevertheless, a

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One danger that the view of the cultural relativist poses to dialogue is that it undermines our attempt to reach consensus and understanding with people from different cultures. If the possibility of intercultural understanding is dismissed as impossible because of a commitment to the idea of radical, unbridgeable alterity, there is no reason for us to work to try to understand each other. As Gadamer says: [every] conversation presupposes a common language, or better, creates a common language. Something is placed in the center . . ., which the partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one another. (1992, 378)

If relativism were true, as Appiah puts the point: at the end of many discussions, we would each have to end up saying, “From where I stand, I am right. From where you stand, you are right.” And there would be nothing further to say. From our different perspectives, we would be living effectively in different worlds. And without a shared world, what is there to discuss? . . . Relativism of that sort isn’t a way to encourage conversation; it’s just a reason to fall silent. (2006, 30–31)

Again, we are left with a sort of cultural apartheid. Phenomenology offers a rejoinder to the despair of the cultural relativist, for it has the resources to help excavate the commonalities required to make meaningful dialogue possible. Phenomenology provides the means to uncover the variegated and shared life-world constituted by our pre-reflective, everyday, embodied orientation toward things. Husserl reminds us that the life-world is the always antecedently given horizon for “all activities and possible praxis” (1970, 142), and that this “universal horizon” is co-experienced as a shared world: Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each “I-the-man” and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this “living together.” (108)

He claims that the life-world, this meaningfully articulated background against which all of our care and conduct occurs, possesses a general structure, and that it underlies all relativity and even cultural difference:

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But when we are thrown into an alien social sphere, that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified or verifiable, are by no means the same as ours. . . . [Yet] the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative. (139)

What is this common general structure? To take one example of the kind of thing Husserl has in mind, we could note that our perspectival, perceptual apprehension of things is correlated with bodily autonomy, which, therefore, has an important role in the constitution of experience. If we continue to look at something while walking around it, for instance, or while moving first toward and then away from it, the series of visual “exhibitings” of that thing “are related back to correlative multiplicities of kinesthetic processes having the peculiar character of the ‘I do,’ ‘I move’ (to which even the ‘I hold still’ must be added)” (Husserl 1970, 161). Yet the successive perceptions of the various sides or facets of the thing are subject to a continuous synthesis enabling us to be conscious of all these perceptions as perceptions of the same thing. Each visual aspect: gives me something of the seen thing. In the continuous alteration of seeing, the side just seen ceases being actually still seen, but it is “retained” and “taken” together with those retained from before; and thus I “get to know” the thing. . . . In seeing I always “mean” it with all the sides which are in no way given to me . . . . Thus every perception has, “for consciousness,” a horizon belonging to its object. (158)

What this means, for Husserl, is that experience is constituted by an active synthesis of unification, in which multiple visual, auditory, and other sensory representations are unified to make possible the consciousness of a single object, an object which can always be further determined. Experience consists in part of synthetic unities of multiple representations, and is always capable of further enrichments of meaning. These possible enrichments in part are made possible and conditioned by embodiment. As such, Husserl claims that any apprehension of a thing co-implies a horizon of “co-functioning manners of appearance and syntheses of validity,” and that this horizonality is part of a “universal a priori” (ibid., 159). All embodied human beings experience things in the world as capable of being determined more richly by bodily movements. Although occurring at different points in time, all human beings will experience those further determinations as further unfoldings or disclosures of the same things. For example, if I look at one side of the tree outside my window, and then, while blinking my eyes, walk around and look at its other side, and then rap on the

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tree with my knuckle, all my visual and auditory impressions will combined to constitute a single consciousness of the single tree. Crowell notes that the phenomenological attention to lived experience undermines the legitimacy of notions such as radical alterity by uncovering: a stratum of unspoken, though hardly “humanly meaningless,” familiarities such as come to light when, as quoted by Sahlins (1995, 185), New Guinea women recount how their perception of the foreigners underwent revision: “We had sex together and then we knew they were men.” This is not practical rationality, but it does point toward the phenomenologically common world. . . . [Features of this world] function to make any communication possible, [and thus] must be pre-cultural. Hence the issue is not really one of finding cross-cultural universals through comparative analysis, but of uncovering a stratum of what may be described as embodied subjectivity or intercorporeality. . . . [The] fact that such a “quasi-transcendental” reflection is possible checks the claims of skeptical relativism, for it shows that the existence of different discourses about what is real is made possible by a shared hold on reality. (Crowell 1998, 22)

The intercorporeality to which Crowell refers might include phenomena such as the fact that human beings from all cultures have the capability of handing things to each other (and in much the same way, for these things are not then, say, absorbed into each other’s bodies), and that, as Kant recognized, the fact that most human beings have different right and left hands, contributes to the way in which we orient ourselves in space. To take another example, people even from very different cultures may inhabit the same space, jointly articulating those spaces by co-designating (peacefully or through conflict) certain regions as mine, yours, or ours, or determining areas for eating, others meant for sleeping or playing, and still others as meant for passing through on the way to somewhere else. They might experience each other within those places as too close, as uncomfortably distant, as properly belonging, or as out of place. Admittedly, pointing to the intercorporeally constituted co-world does not offer very much illumination to attempts, for example, to resolve complicated and pressing moral and political disputes. But phenomenology’s disclosure of a shared dimension of meaningful being at the background of all of our differences can remind us of important ways in which we are, after all, not so different from each other. It gives us hope that we can uncover enough shared experience to make cooperation, understanding, and genuine dialogue possible. The important point here is that this shared world horizon lies as a common background for our engagement within the world, serving as reservoir for an abundance of possibilities that di-

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verse people may appropriate and determine in various ways, and function to make any communication whatsoever possible. Such disclosure of the common context that makes possible what so often appears as irreducibly other and alien can help orient intercultural dialogue by reminding us of the ever-living possibility of mutual understanding. It points to those shared features of human being-in-the-world that might be able to serve as a foundation for the resolution of differences and a sense of community. Moreover, as argued above, phenomenology’s pointing to the possibility of non-relative norms can orient attempts to resolve disagreements peacefully. It provides hope that dialogue is not pointless or merely manipulative, and that through dialogue and mutual criticism, we can isolate jointly recognized measures, enabling us to correct and improve moral commitments and facilitating consensus. Such dialogue permits us to work together to clear the way to shared moral progress.

Notes 1.

Nietzsche does not advocate anything like nihilism, and it should be stressed that his view is that a secularized universe only “seems” meaningless to those laboring under illicit and unrealistic presumptions about the conditions of significance. 2. Heidegger argues that this metaphysical interpretation of being is provided with its transcendental foundations by Descartes’ analysis of extension. After Descartes, for whom all of non-mental being is representable quantitatively, “a fateful constriction” of reality occurs . . .” (1985, 185). Even if against his own intention, by demonstrating the promise of the quantitative representation of nature, Descartes also prepared the ground for contemporary physicalist and naturalistic representations of the mind. 3. For a richer discussion of this point with respect to Kant, see Lucht 2009. 4. As phenomenal nature consists only in mechanism, there could exist within it no norms awaiting discovery. Kant rejects the rational appeal to transcendent measures in traditional theology and metaphysics as an illicit and deceptive attempt to “lead us beyond the field of possible experience” (1965, A642/B671). As he also rejects the possibility that human beings enjoy intellectual intuition, and thinks it morally inadequate to ground value in something as subjectively variable and arbitrary as feeling or tradition, he is left with no alternative but to re-conceive practical reason as legislative. Given Kant’s philosophical commitments, if reason were unable to project actively authoritative norms, there would be nowhere to find them, at least not in philosophy, and ethics would become irrational. His ethics, therefore, can be seen as the attempt to solve the important problem of how to preserve the legitimacy of moral discourse given the nihilistic consequences following the great success of the Cartesian-Newtonian models of nature. 5. See, for instance, Sperber’s discussion of the Bororo’s red macaws (1982, 152– 153). Initially, when Bororo men reported to anthropologists, “We are red macaws,” there seemed to be a clear instance of a system of rationality utterly alien

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to so-called Western commonsense. Later research indicated that, among the Bororo, only men self-identified as red macaws; red macaws are kept as pets by only Bororo women; and, in a largely matriarchal society, many men feel dependent upon and subordinate to women. What at first appeared to be evidence of differing conceptual schemes turned out to be an instance of metaphorical and ironical speech. Perhaps earlier anthropologists judged these sorts of reports as evidence for relativism of conceptual schemes because they had no confidence in the ability of people from so-called primitive cultures to speak with irony, or poetically.

References Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Barnes, Barry, and David Bloor. 1982. “Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge.” In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 21–47. Oxford: Blackwell. Crowell, Stephen Galt. 1998. “There Is No Other: Notes on the Logical Place of a Concept.” Paideuma 44: 13–29. Fell, Joseph P. 1994. “Seeing a Thing in a Hidden Whole: The Significance of Besinnung in Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik.” Heidegger Studies 10: 91–109. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1992. Truth and Method. 2nd rev. Edited and translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad Publishing. Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper. —. 1966. “Memorial Address.” In Discourse on Thinking: A Translation of Gelassenheit, translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, 43– 57. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977a. “Age of the World Picture.” In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, 115–154. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977b. Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964). Edited by David Krell. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977c. “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), edited by David Krell, 193–242. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977d. “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” In Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), edited by David Krell, 373–392. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977e. “The Question Concerning Technology.” In The Question

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Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, pp. 3–35. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977f. “Science and Reflection.” In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, 155–182. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1977g. “The Word of Nietzsche.” In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, 53–112. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1985. History of the Concept of Time. Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press —. 1989. “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In Poetry, Language, Thought, translated by Albert Hofstadter, 17–87. New York: Harper & Row. —. 1990. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press. —. 1993. “Overcoming Metaphysics,” translated by Joan Stambaugh. In The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, edited by Richard Wolin, pp. 67–90. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hollis, Martin, and Steven Lukes, eds. 1982. Rationality and Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell. Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Jonas, Hans. 1964. “Heidegger and Theology.” The Review of Metaphysics 18 (1): 207–233. Kant, Immanuel. 1987. Critique of Judgment. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. —. 1965. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kohák, Erazim. 1984. The Embers and the Stars: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral Sense of Nature. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Lucht, Marc. 2009. “Toward Lasting Peace: Kant on Law, Public Reason, and Culture.” In Between Global Violence and the Ethics of Peace: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Edward Demenchonok, 303– 326. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2nd ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. MacNaughton, David. 1988. Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. London: Blackwell.

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Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1968. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books. —. 1974. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1970. “Intentionality,” translated by Joseph P. Fell. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1: 4–5. Sperber, Dan. 1982. “Apparently Irrational Beliefs.” In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 149–180. Oxford: Blackwell.

CHAPTER SIX EUROCENTRISM, HOSPITALITY, AND THE LONG DIALOG WITH CHINA ANDREW FIALA

Behold, my son, the absurdities to which pride and intolerance bring us, when everybody wants others to think as he does, and everybody fancies that he has an exclusive claim upon the rest of mankind. —Rousseau, Émile, 2007, 255

The cultures of the world have been in contact and conflict for millennia. Religious and cultural traditions develop out of their interaction with one another. When there is genuine dialogue and a spirit of hospitable exchange, there can be mutual development that enriches the parties. But this can be undermined by the urge to evangelize, the tendency toward ethnocentrism, and a retreat to unthinking fundamentalism. One antidote for such reactionary resistance is to understand just how deeply interconnected world cultures and religions have become. One significant and often overlooked focal point for such a form of global understanding is the interaction between Europe and China. European culture has been involved in a dialogue with China for nearly 800 years. There was a period of mutual hostility that was, in part, a reaction of China against European aggression but we are now renewing connections and rediscovering this centuries-long global dialogue. A reexamination of this dialogue can help us understand how European and Chinese philosophy have influenced each other. We can learn from this exchange why we need to be more hospitable to one another and learn to avoid the sorts of hostility and aggression that interrupted this long dialogue.

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Dialogue and Eurocentrism Jürgen Habermas—one of the best contemporary theorists of dialogue and intercultural encounters—claims that the way forward must involve decentering the West: Insofar as the intercultural discourse on human rights is conducted in a spirit of reciprocal recognition, it can lead the West to a decentered understanding of a normative construction that is no longer the property of Europeans and may no longer exclusively reflect the particularities of this one culture. To be sure, the West still retains privileged access to the resources of power, wealth, knowledge in our world. But it is in our best interest that the Western project of developing a just and peaceful global civilization should not be discredited from the outset. Thus the Judeo-HellenicChristian West must reflect one of its greatest cultural achievements, the capacity for decentering one’s own perspectives, for self-reflection, and for self-critical distancing from one’s own traditions. (2006, 155)

Habermas is right: modern European culture must not claim hegemony. Only when such hegemony is broken—decentered, to use Habermas’s term—can genuine dialogue across cultures take place. Such decentering will be facilitated by recognizing that there are already centuries-long connections between European and Chinese cultures. European culture was already well on the way toward decentering during the Age of Discovery and the Age of Enlightenment. Indeed, it may be the case that there never was really any “center” that needs to be decentered, since European Christianity has always been in contact and conflict with other cultures. The last bastion of Eurocentrism may well be found in the idea that European Christianity was somehow immaculately conceived and that it owed no debt to other cultural spheres or epochs. Even Habermas falls prey to the idea that European Christianity was once innocent, pure, and uncontaminated by foreign influence. For him, to say that religion has become “modern” is to say that it has lost its “epistemic innocence,” as he put it in an interview with Eduardo Mendieta. Habermas concludes, “this is why fundamentalism is the false answer to an epistemological situation which demands insight into the inevitability of religious tolerance and imposes on the faithful the burden of having to endure secularization of knowledge and the pluralism of world pictures regardless of the religious truths they hold” (2002, 151). Habermas’s point is that religious tolerance is inevitable because globalization and the growth of religious diversity within our own societies forces us to see religions in conflict with one another. In such a circumstance, we are within the epistemic situation of modernity: where there are

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open questions about religion, value, and truth. But—I maintain—this epistemic situation is not unique to “modernity.” Indeed, it has always been the case that European Christianity developed out of and in conflict with other cultures: from the development of Christianity out of Roman Judaism to the encounter with China in the late Middle Ages. For Habermas, the contemporary phenomenon of fundamentalism is a deliberate retreat from modernity that is in denial of the present epistemic situation. As he puts it in an interview with Giovanni Borradori, fundamentalism represses cognitive dissonance: This repression occurs when the innocence of the epistemological situation of an all-encompassing world perspective is lost and when, under the cognitive conditions of scientific knowledge and religious pluralism, a return to the exclusivity of premodern belief attitudes is propagated. These attitudes cause such striking cognitive dissonances since the complex life circumstances in modern pluralistic societies are normatively compatible only with a strict universalism in which the same respect is demanded for everybody—be they Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist, believers or nonbelievers. (2004, 32)

Habermas maintains that once religious plurality appears on the scene, it is no longer possible to return to the point of epistemic innocence from which religion is supposed to have originated. In a modern, globalized world, in which there is obvious religious diversity, religious fundamentalisms deliberately deny and repress the need for tolerance. This helps explain why Habermas thinks that, in the long run, it may be impossible to tolerate some forms of religious fundamentalism. He claims, “a fundamentalism that leads to a practice of intolerance is incompatible with the democratic constitutional state” (1994, 132–133); he concludes, “in multicultural societies, the national constitution can tolerate only forms of life articulated within the medium of such non-fundamentalist traditions” (133). Critics such as Cynthia Willet worry that such a denial of fundamentalism can systematically disenfranchise a large number of people (2001, 8–9). One might reply to this sort of criticism by saying that fundamentalism disenfranchises itself—and indeed discredits itself—by denying the obvious fact of religious pluralism. Indeed, we can offer further support to the Habermasian argument by stressing that there is no “immaculate conception” of religion, such as even Habermas appears to suppose. Most of the world’s religions developed out of a context of plurality. Buddhism develops out of Hinduism. Hebrew monotheism emerges against the background of tribal polytheism. Christianity develops out of Judaism and in response to Roman paganism. Islam grows out of the polytheistic

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context of the Arabian peninsula (with Jewish and Christian monotheisms lurking in the background). And European Christianity—and European philosophical modernity—develops out of a long conflict and connection with a variety of cultures, including the Chinese. The European encounter with China is a complex one. It involves European colonial and imperial interests. It is connected to crusading religion and, oddly enough, the struggle for control over the Christian “holy land”—as the European Christians wanted to make an alliance with the Mongol Khan rulers of China during the thirteenth Century. This relation is further burdened by the tendency of European philosophers to be Eurocentric in their understanding of the world and world-history—especially since G. W. F. Hegel schematized world history in a way that denied the importance of China. European Christians have tended to think that the Christian-European worldview has an “exclusive claim upon the rest of mankind” (Rousseau 2007). But this exclusivism did not go uninterrogated; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, and Arthur Schopenhauer, to name a few examples, each offered a criticism of some forms of Eurocentrism. The exclusive universalism of Christian monotheism can easily become intolerant and aggressive. This is true of other versions of exclusive universalism—Islam, for example. World-historical clashes have occurred when exclusive universalisms come into contact, for example, during the Islamic expansion into Europe, the Reconquista, and the Crusades. Intolerant and aggressive expansionism is not only a problem for monotheism or for Christianity alone. Mark Jurgensmeyer (Jurgensmeyer and Jerryson 2009) and Lloyd Steffen (2007) have each contributed to a broader understanding of religious aggression that is not confined to Christianity. But European and Christian exclusivism or exceptionalism has had the largest impact on the world—through centuries of European colonial and imperial expansion. The Eurocentric worldview has been subjected to numerous critiques (see Dussel 1995, 1998; Kanth 2005). Ella Shohat and Robert Stam define Eurocentrism as: the procrustean forcing of cultural heterogeneity into a single paradigmatic perspective in which Europe is seen as the unique source of meaning, as the world’s center of gravity, as ontological “reality” to the rest of the world’s shadow. Eurocentric thinking attributes to the “West” an almost providential sense of historical destiny. (1994, 1–2)

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Eurocentrism is ultimately connected with exclusivism and universalism. This has several elements. The “evangelical urge” holds that Christian and European culture should be universally disseminated. Moreover, there is a tendency to want to translate an alien culture into the terms of one’s own culture—we can call this the “ethnocentric fallacy.” When evangelism and ethnocentrism combine, there is a recipe for cultural misunderstanding. We see this clearly in the example of European Christians who went to China during the Age of Discovery. They tried to find something in Chinese thought and philosophy that corresponded to their own experience of religion. As the Jesuits struggled to make sense of Chinese culture in European terms, they also tried to push European Christianity onto the Chinese.

Early European Christian Encounters with China It is significant that the European encounter with China develops out of the Christian Crusades. Even prior to Columbus’s voyage to the Western Hemisphere, European explorers and missionaries had been expanding the European Christian sphere of influence through the Crusades. I use the term “European Christian” here as a reminder that there were, and are, other versions of Christianity in the East, including not only Greek and Russian Orthodox but also Nestorian or Assyrian Christianity. Of course, one might note that there are even problems here in terms of identifying a “European” versus “non-European” Christianity, as there was a long history of interaction between Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Levantine/Asian versions of Christianity. We must set that issue aside in this paper. We will focus here on the way that Nestorian/Assyrian Christianity was an important component of the European Christian encounter with China. This is a reminder that the struggle between European Christianity and the rest of the world was also a struggle within Christianity—as part of an attempt to establish the one true Church in opposition to other forms of Christianity. This fact reminds us that it is somewhat inaccurate to claim that Christianity ever did experience the sort of epistemic innocence that Habermas attributes to it. The Nestorian version of Christianity was present in China, as early as the seventh century (cf. Chen 2009). Although Nestorian Christianity died out in China, it was eventually reintroduced with the invasion of the Mongol Khans. As early as 1220, European Christians had been in contact with the court of the Great Khan, asking for an alliance with the Mongols, who were sympathetic to Nestorian Christianity. The alliance would have been directed toward a joint Crusade against Muslims in the Holy Land. Gen-

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ghis Khan replied in 1246 by demanding that the Pope should travel to the Mongol Court and submit to serving the Khan. As well, in the 1240s, the Mongol ruler of Syria, Baichu, had sent an embassy to Pope Innocent IV, who was residing in Lyons. The Pope sent the embassy back with a letter, Viam Agnoscere Veritatis, which offered the Catholic Church as the only path to salvation. This long-distance argument continued via Niccolo and Maffeo Polo, the father and uncle of Marco Polo. Niccolo and Maffeo were Venetian traders who left Constantinople and made it to the court of Kublai Khan in Dadu (modern day Beijing) in 1266. They returned to Europe with a request from Kublai Khan for the Pope to send one hundred educators to China to teach about Christianity and European culture. By 1274, the Polo expedition—with young Marco now in the entourage—had returned to China with a couple of Dominican friars, who apparently did not complete the entire voyage. According to Marco Polo, the Great Khan had instituted a form of rule in which Tartars, Saracens, and even Christians ruled over the Chinese locals, which angered the indigenous Chinese. The Khan is reported to have been tolerant of religious diversity. Polo reported that the Great Khan revered each of the four great prophets of humankind: Christ, Mohammed, Moses, and Sogomombar Khan. He relates that the Khan explained, “I honor and respect all the four, and seek aid from them, as any one of them may really be supreme in heaven” (1845, 99). He explains that the Khan would have converted to Christianity had the Pope only sent missionaries who were able to persuade him. Significantly, the Mongol Khan did not mention Taoism, Buddhism, or Confucianism here—the religions most closely associated with China. This is an indication that Chinese culture was not itself “immaculately conceived,” since the Mongol invaders instituted new cultural models that were at odds with prior “Chinese religion.” This medieval episode reminds us that Europeans have been in dialogue with China for nearly 1,000 years. Moreover, this dialogue is part of a larger story that includes the struggle within Christianity, between Western and Eastern versions, and the struggle between Christianity and Islam, by way of the Crusades. This story continues as the European Renaissance developed out of European Christianity’s conflict with Islam. The Renaissance begins with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks and the end of the Byzantine Empire in the 1450s, which drove Greek scholars westward toward Italy, especially Florence. The Copernican revolution in astronomy (1540s) was made possible by developments in Muslim thought: by the work of Al-Battani (known in Europe as Albategnius) and the development of algebra (itself a word with Arabic roots). In 1492, the Muslims were driven out of Spain, and Columbus departed Spain,

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seeking a western route to China. Marco Polo’s travels, which became a popular novel of sorts, provided part of the inspiration for Columbus’s journey. In other words, it was the encounter with China that drove the westward expansion of the European Christians into the “new” world. As European culture flourished after Columbus, philosophical modernity developed along with Reformation theology, political liberalism, and enlightenment science. Enrique Dussel has argued that the efflorescence of European modernity was made possible by the conquest of the Americas and the African slave trade, which created surplus capital that provided the material conditions for the possibility of the development of modern science, politics, and philosophy. In Philosophy of Liberation, Dussel says, “before the ego cogito there is an ego conquiro; ‘I conquer’ is the practical foundation of ‘I think’” (1985, 3; also see 1995, 23–24). It is not surprising—given the economic and military hegemony of Europe—that Western concepts provided the primary frame of reference for newly developing sciences such as anthropology, linguistics, or the study of religion. Consider, for example, the very notion of religion. The term “religion” as an abstract concept is now used to include a variety of quite disparate phenomena such as Nestorian Christianity, Islam, and Taoism or Buddhism. The concept of “religion” developed in European languages as Europeans struggled to make sense of the ongoing encounter with diverse cultures with different approaches to value and meaning, different rituals and practices, in faraway places. The broad notion of “religion” is one that develops out of the encounter with diversity. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, one of the leading scholars of contemporary religious studies, has provided an extensive history of the term religio, which indicates that the term only becomes widely used in Roman and early medieval times as a way of contrasting Christian ritual practice with traditional pagan practices. Moreover, religion as a concept comes to be thematized, as it were, after the fact: as reflection on a practice that is no longer habitual or unquestioned. Smith concluded, “the rise of the concept of ‘religion’ is in some ways correlated with a decline in the practice of religion itself” (1991, 18). Ethnocentric presuppositions about religion posed a problem for Europeans in the encounter with Chinese culture. Europeans sought to make sense of Chinese traditions from within a framework that assumes monotheism to be the highest development of basic theism and that Western Christianity had an exclusive claim on the truth. Christians had long been accustomed to dealing with the differences between pagan polytheism, Jewish and Muslim monotheism, and heretical versions of Christian theology. But European Christians were unprepared to make sense of Chinese

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thought in its Taoist and Confucian aspects. Was Chinese culture and thinking a “religion” in the Western sense? As the Jesuits and others took their missions to China and began a closer inquiry, there was a serious open question about the status of Chinese culture and the use of the term “religion” to describe what was found in China. This question remains open today in the field of religious studies, where there is a growing recognition of the difficulty of using the term religion to describe the vast array of global cultures. In China, during the European Age of Discovery, the Mongols were overthrown by the Han Chinese and the Ming dynasty was established. During this time, Confucian and Buddhist elements in culture were emphasized as a counterpoint to the Mongolian cultural hegemony that had been overthrown. When Jesuit missionaries arrived in China as early as 1552, they encountered a China that was developing itself in opposition to the previous Mongolian rule. These missions to China were important for the European Catholic church: St. Francis Xavier himself, founder of the Jesuit Society of Jesus, died while en route to mainland China, on the island of Shangchuan. Portuguese traders established a permanent settlement in Macau that included Jesuits in the 1560s. A more permanent presence in China was established by Matteo Ricci and Michele Ruggieri in the 1580s. Ricci and Ruggieri had some difficulty in obtaining entry into China and gaining the trust of the Chinese. At first, they shaved their heads and dressed as Buddhist monks with the hope of gaining trust. Eventually, as they realized that the Christian message was being confounded by the Buddhist connection, they changed their manner of dress and style of hair to that of the Confucian mandarins (see Fontana 2011). It was Ricci and Ruggieri who first made the effort to learn Chinese; they compiled a bilingual dictionary (see DuBois 2011; Jensen 1997). They tried to understand the indigenous Chinese religions, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism (of course, it must be noted that Buddhism itself was a foreign import to China). Ricci wrote Tianzhu shiyi (True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven) that attempted to explain Christianity in Confucian terms. Ricci understood the affinity between Confucianism and Christianity in terms of a monistic and hierarchical ordering of the universe. He made it clear that he thought that Buddhism and Taoism were wrong—a point that he thought paralleled Confucian disdain for Buddhism and Taoism. This episode is decidedly one-sided. Christian missionaries attempted to understand Chinese culture to improve the opportunity for evangelism. But this was also connected to a genuine fascination with Chinese culture. They wondered, for example, about the status of Confucius—as prophet or

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messiah—and about the question of whether theism fit within the purview of Chinese thought. The President of the American Academy of Religion (AAR), Kwok Pui Lan, recently described this encounter in her presidential address, “Empire and the Study of Religion,” at the AAR’s November 2011 Annual Meeting in San Francisco. She pointed out that there was a mutual effort during this era that was aimed at understanding—a genuine sort of dialogue. European scholars attempted to understand Chinese culture, and the Chinese attempted to understand Western Christian culture. This dialogical period did not last for long, however. As the Christian missionaries became more aggressive, the Chinese hosts reacted accordingly, eventually banning Christianity in the eighteenth century. The philosophical conversation in Europe about Chinese thought reflected these changing relations between European and Asian powers. It is fairly obvious that European views of China and Chinese philosophy changed, in part, in reaction to political events. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Leibniz provided a sympathetic approach to Chinese philosophy—as explained in his Novissima Sinica, for example (see Stichler 2010). One interesting feature of Leibniz’s appraisal of China is his belief that the Chinese were wrong to have embraced a sort of pacifism. He claims this, even while recognizing that Chinese pacifism was very close to the spirit of Christ. He seems to be saying that the advantage of Western culture is that it had developed beyond Christian pacifism. He puts it this way in his Preface to Novissima Sinica: They [the Chinese] despise everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men, and almost in emulation of the higher teachings of Christ (and not, as some wrongly suggest, because of anxiety), they are averse to war. They would be wise indeed if they were alone in the world. But as things are, it comes back to this, that even the good must cultivate the arts of war, so that the evil may not gain power over everything. In these matters, then, we are superior. (1994b, 46)

Leibniz goes on to praise the advancement of China in terms of ethics and politics. He says that the Chinese have attained a higher standard than Europeans in terms of courtesy and respect. He imagines that Europeans could benefit from being educated by missionaries from China, who are experts in ethics and what he calls “practical philosophy” and “natural religion.” He argues that the Chinese can benefit from Christian missionaries who can teach them fundamentals of theology:

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Chapter Six But it is desirable that they in turn teach us those things which are especially in our interest: the greatest use of practical philosophy and a more perfect manner of living, to say nothing now of their other arts. Certainly the condition of our affairs, slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we need missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology. (Leibniz 1994a, 51)

The irony here may not have been noted by Leibniz himself—that European missionary zeal is at odds with the sort of courteousness and ethical comportment that he praised in the Chinese. Leibniz’s positive image of Chinese culture reflects the political realities of his time. The Imperial Court of China proclaimed the Edict of Toleration in 1692, which allowed Christianity to be practiced in China. European intellectuals widely admired the edict as indicating the progressive nature of Chinese culture. It was during this period that Leibniz offered his reflections on the value of China. He continued to be interested in Sinology for much of his life. In a later work, “The Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese” (1716), he discussed the differences between Chinese and European theology. He counseled caution when judging the Chinese culture, as a reproof against the more aggressive Christian missionaries who wanted to impose Christianity. He explained: China is a great Empire, no less in area than cultivated Europe, and indeed surpasses it in population and orderly government. Moreover, there is in China a public morality admirable in certain regards, conjoined to a philosophical doctrine, or rather a natural theology, venerable by its antiquity, established and authorized for about 3,000 years, long before the philosophy of the Greeks whose works nevertheless are the earliest which the rest of the world possess, except of course for our Sacred Writings. It would be highly foolish and presumptuous on our part, having newly arrived compared with them, and scarcely out of barbarism, to want to condemn such an ancient doctrine simply because it does not appear to agree at first glance with our ordinary scholastic notions. (1994a, 78)

This cautionary remark reminds us of the spirit of hospitality that is so important for genuine dialogue: the customs of hospitality encourage guests to be tolerant and open-minded when visiting and encountering a new culture. Hospitality is more closely associated with the courteous, respectful, and pacific approach of the Chinese than it is with the aggressive, foolish, and presumptuous (to use Leibniz’s terms) approach of the Christian missionaries, who preyed upon the Chinese and exploited Chinese hospitality.

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After the Ban on Christianity in China Unfortunately, as the Church pushed for more stringent theological conformity in its Chinese mission—e.g., condemning the Chinese practice of venerating ancestors—the Chinese policy of toleration was reversed under the new Emperor, Yongzhen, who banned Christianity in 1724. This repression of Christianity in China led some Europeans—such as Montesquieu—to revise their previous appraisal of China. Montesquieu claimed in The Spirit of Laws that China is a despotic state based on fear (1949, bk. 8). This idea would resurface in Hegel’s Philosophy of History ([1899] 1956) and Hegel’s casual dismissal of China and Chinese philosophy. This negative appraisal was a significant change given that European intellectuals widely admired Confucian thought as a sort of deistic system, which could be used as a model for European enlightenment. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Europeans knew quite a lot about China thanks to the Jesuits and to Leibniz; they often thought that China was to be praised for its advanced culture, including its advanced moral and political systems. One explanation of the shifting appraisal of China was censorship in Europe, which was part of a general reaction against anti-Christian thought. A significant case in point is that of Christian Wolff. Wolff followed Leibniz in praising Chinese thought, especially Chinese moral thought in his 1721 lecture, “The Practical Philosophy of the Chinese” (1992, 145–186). Although Wolff did criticize Confucianism somewhat for its atheistic orientation, his criticism was not sufficient for the European censors. Unfortunately for Wolff, his praise for the Chinese made it seem to the censors that he was also praising atheism. In response, Wolff was expelled from Prussia under penalty of death. He fled Prussia, ending up in Marburg. This controversy with the court of King Frederick Wilhelm I created a stir in Europe that Voltaire noted in his Philosophical Dictionary: “Some European writers, who had never been in China, had pretended that the government of Pekin was atheistical. Wolf had praised the philosophers of Pekin; therefore Wolf was an atheist [original spelling from the translation]” (1901, 53). For Voltaire, this closed-minded syllogism was a symbol of European intolerance. This closed-mindedness on the part of the European censors contributed to Voltaire’s contrarian conclusion that, with regard to morality, Europeans could benefit from studying Chinese moral philosophy. Voltaire mocked—in a passage dripping with sarcasm—the outrage that the Jesuits felt on being expelled from China: The Jesuits had obtained permission of the emperor of China, Cam-hi, to teach the Catholic religion. They made use of it, to instill into the small

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Chapter Six portion of the people under their direction, that it was incumbent on them to serve no other master than him who was the vicegerent of God on earth, and who dwelt in Italy on the banks of a small river called the Tiber; that every other religious opinion, every other worship, was an abomination in the sight of God, and whoever did not believe the Jesuits would be punished by Him to all eternity; that their emperor and benefactor, Cam-hi, who could not even pronounce the name of Christ, as the Chinese language possesses not the letter “r,” would suffer eternal damnation; that the Emperor Youtchin would experience, without mercy, the same fate; that all the ancestors, both of Chinese and Tartars, would incur a similar penalty; that their descendants would undergo it also, as well as the rest of the world; and that the reverend fathers, the Jesuits, felt a sincere and paternal commiseration for the damnation of so many souls. (ibid., 50)

Voltaire agreed with Rousseau that it was exceedingly odd for the European missionaries to expect that non-Europeans would take seriously Christian missionaries who proclaimed that eternal salvation depended upon submitting to a far-away Pope residing on a minor river in Rome. With this sympathy and interest among Europeans in mind, it is odd that by the time we get to Kant and Hegel, we end up with a somewhat ignorant dismissal of China and Chinese culture. In his lectures on physical geography, Kant says, for example, that Chinese Buddhism is simply a degenerate form of Christianity that remains mired in paganism. In The End of All Things he claims, “Chinese philosophers, sitting in dark rooms with their eyes closed, exert themselves to think and sense their own nothingness”; for Kant this is a state in which “the understanding is simultaneously exhausted and all thinking itself has an end” (2001, 228). Perhaps this is a useful description of something like Chan or Zen, but it is certainly not what Confucius was after. Now, with Kant especially, there is no excuse of ignorance, since Kant had Wolff and Leibniz as predecessors. One explanation of the different interpretations of Chinese thought that we find here is that the metaphysical worldview of Confucianism, at least, had much more in common with Leibnizian philosophy than it did with Kant’s transcendental idealism (see Reihman 2006). It is also significant that Leibniz’s fascination with China included an interest in pictographic writing, which he thought would be of use for developing a lingua philosophica that could unite Europe and the world (1981, bk 3; also see Mates 1986, 183–188). Hegel’s rejection of Chinese thought is connected to his view that hieroglyphic languages, such as Chinese, are not able to express the kinds of philosophical concepts that can be expressed in alphabetical (European) languages (see Fiala 2002; 2004). For Hegel, thinking remains limited when the connection between the pictograph and the object it is supposed to represent is too concrete ([1899] 1956, 135). Hegel

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maintained that, in a system of alphabetic writing, there is an advantage insofar as the number of basic signs is simpler and fewer. Hegel thought that the Chinese written language prevented the development of science— along with the development of morality, politics, and religion (134). As Hegel put it, “the distinguishing feature [of China] is, that everything which belongs to spirit—unconstrained morality, in practice and theory, heart, inward religion, science and art properly so-called—is alien to it” (138). Such a philosophical explanation is not simply ignorant ethnocentrism. Hegel also rejected the cosmopolitan Leibnizian aspiration for sophisticated philosophical reasons, denying that it would be possible to unite Europe in the way that Leibniz imagined because of the social and political ontology that Hegel developed in his philosophy of Objective Spirit. Nonetheless, one suspects that there really was some sort of ethnocentric or racial bias at work in Hegel. Throughout his work, Hegel dismisses nonEuropean culture as inferior. This racist thread ran through Herder, Hume, and can even be found in Kant. Hegel’s dismissal of non-European cultures, however, leaves him ignoring entire continents—Africa and the Americas. Like Montesquieu, Hegel dismisses Asia entirely, as “Oriental despotism.” Moreover, even though Hegel was aware, for example, of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s study of Asian culture and language, he doggedly maintained that European culture and language were superior. Hegel recognizes, for example, that Sanskrit was the original language from which Greek, Latin, and German developed. However, for him, this historical connection is of less interest than the fact that these European cultures have “done their best to forget Indian elements of culture” (ibid., 143). There is no denying that for Hegel, European culture represents the pinnacle. Nor can we deny that Hegel should have known better. Europeans of the time were not ignorant of the evils of slavery or of the enlightened elements in Chinese culture. But they could be remarkably blind to the fact that material conditions influence racial and cultural ideas. Moreover, they often seemed to ignore the fact that European colonialism could be blamed for the inhospitable reception that Europeans received at this time in Asia. It is remarkable, then, that Kant does show some awareness of the problem. In his discussion of hospitality in Perpetual Peace (1991), Kant recognizes that the European Christians have been bad guests in the places they have invaded—a point to which we will return in the final section with a more explicit discussion of hospitality. Schopenhauer is another exception. In his essay “Sinology,” Schopenhauer noted that it was the “pertinacious zeal” of the Jesuits that prevented them from trying to understand Chinese thought (1907). The Jesuits were more interested in

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converting the Chinese than in learning from them. However, Schopenhauer commits a similar sort of cross-cultural blunder. Schopenhauer, as is well-known, is very sympathetic to Buddhism. So, he is more interested in the Buddhist heritage of China. This leads him to state that Taoism is completely in harmony with Buddhism; it also leads him simply to dismiss Confucianism. Of the wisdom of Confucius he says, “judging from translations, it is a rambling, commonplace, predominantly political, moral philosophy, without any metaphysical support, which has something peculiarly insipid and tiresome about it” (ibid., 361). Nonetheless, Schopenhauer’s analysis and approach is, for the most part, remarkably perceptive. He recognizes the problem of Sinology as one that results from attempts to move outside of one’s own cultural presuppositions in order to be able to encounter an alien culture in its own authentic self-expression. For Schopenhauer, the chief difficulty is that Europeans wanted to find the concept of the monotheistic God in China. For several generations, Europeans were unable to comprehend that monotheism could not be found in Buddhism, Taoism, or in Confucianism. Schopenhauer also seemed to think that monotheism was ultimately intolerant. In “Religion,” Schopenhauer (in the voice of Philalethes) says that Buddhists are remarkably tolerant and that monotheists are not: As a matter of fact, it is only to monotheism that intolerance is essential; an only god is by his nature a jealous god, who can allow no other god to exist. Polytheistic gods, on the other hand, are naturally tolerant; they live and let live; their own colleagues are the chief objects of their sufferance, as being gods of the same religion. This toleration is afterwards extended to foreign gods, who are, accordingly, hospitably received, and later on admitted, in some cases, to an equality of rights; the chief example of which is shown by the fact, that the Romans willingly admitted and venerated Phrygian, Egyptian and other gods. Hence it is that monotheistic religions alone furnish the spectacle of religious wars, religious persecutions, heretical tribunals, that breaking of idols and destruction of images of the gods, that razing of Indian temples, and Egyptian colossi, which had looked on the sun three thousand years, just because a jealous god had said, Thou shalt make no graven image. (1942, 44)

Schopenhauer over-generalizes here. There are intolerant and inhospitable Buddhists in the world, and some monotheists are tolerant and hospitable. But his basic point fits with his sympathies for Buddhism and his recognition of the way that European intolerance and inhospitality developed from the missionizing zeal of the Europeans who set out to conquer the world in the name of Christianity.

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Hospitality as a Solution The evangelical urge and ethnocentric bias of European Christianity helped to cause long centuries of Eurocentric colonialism. One solution to this is a better understanding of hospitality: that hosts should extend a welcoming hand to strangers and that visiting strangers should refrain from imposing upon their hosts. Most of the world’s religious traditions teach that it is important to extend hospitality to strangers. Common sense appears to tell us that a hospitable world is a better one. Even if we begin with a commitment to rational self-interest, it is easy to develop an ethic of hospitality. Self-interested individuals benefit from a world that is generally more hospitable; and hospitality is often reciprocated in a world that has developed a basic and universal “law of hospitality.” But the notion of hospitality can be manipulated. Obnoxious guests can complain of poor treatment, when, in fact, it is the guests who are at fault. This was part of the problem with the European encounter with China, as the Jesuits became pushy and aggressive. Another problem occurs when hospitality is interpreted in ways that are clearly ideological. When Francisco Vitoria, for example, claimed that the Spanish had a basic right to trade and to proselytize in the Americas, he grounded that right on the basic right of hospitality, which he found in the “law of nations”—as outlined in the Christian tradition. He argued that strangers have a basic right, grounded in biblical scripture and in natural law, to be received hospitably ([1532] 1964). He concluded on this premise that “refusal to receive strangers and foreigners is wrong in itself.” Furthermore, he suggested that, when the natives refused to grant the right of hospitality, the Spanish had a right to respond aggressively. He assumed that the Spanish deserved to be welcomed by the American natives with hospitality, and that the natives had no right to exclude the Spanish. For Vitoria, the notion of hospitality included the right of the Spanish to trade with the indigenous Americans and to proselytize and convert them. But he did not extend his reflection in a way that considered whether the Spanish were behaving well when they landed without invitation upon distant shores, forced the natives to trade, and forced them to adopt an alien religion. Robert Wai and Garrett Brown have each traced a less ideological and more humane notion of hospitality to the writings of Bartolomé de Las Casas (who worried about European conquest in the Americas) and especially to Kant’s ideas about cosmopolitanism. Brown writes: In its most general formulation, the idea of hospitality has related to the cordial and generous reception of strangers that is both receptive and open-

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Wai explains that the Kantian development of the notion was offered as a response to the narrowly ideological idea found in Vitoria. He concludes, “Kant clearly rejected the expansive interpretation of a cosmopolitan right of hospitality as a right to trade or a right to occupation. Kant accepted that a host society could have ethical reasons for refusing to trade with a foreigner” (2011, 164). Kant’s “Third Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace” requires “Universal Hospitality.” Kant defines hospitality as a matter of right, and not simply as a matter of philanthropy. He says, “hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory” (1991, 105). It is important that Kant—echoing Vitoria, although without the biblical references—uses the language of right here. For Kant, hospitality is not merely a gift. Rather, it is a requirement of justice grounded in respect for the dignity of persons. Moreover, Kant believes that it is one of the conditions for the development of peace. Not only should strangers be received with hospitality but visitors should behave in a way that merits the hospitality offered. Kant requires the visitor or guest to behave well. In fact, his discussion of hospitality is primarily focused on a critique of Western colonialism. He notes that Western colonial powers had been behaving “inhospitably” and “unjustly” across the globe—invading, enslaving, and exploiting native populations (1991, 105–107). Kant claims that certain Muslim peoples (the Barbary Pirates and Arab Bedouins) have a history of inhospitable behavior toward strangers. However, he implies that most of the nations who behave inhospitably toward Western powers are justified in doing so. He singles out China and Japan as examples of nations that were justified in their lack of hospitality toward the West. He says the China and Japan have “wisely placed restrictions” on Westerners. Additionally, Kant points out the hypocrisy of Western colonial powers who “make endless ado about their piety, and who wish to be considered as chosen believers while they live on the fruits of iniquity.” For Kant, the development of a cosmopolitan system—and the development of world peace—requires that visitors behave within proper limits and that guests receive strangers with due respect. For him, it seems that a significant problem is that aggressive

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Western powers have violated the spirit of hospitality by behaving as poor guests. Hospitality has been deconstructed in recent continental philosophy— the concept is not as easy to grasp as we might think (cf. Derrida 2000; Derrida and Caputo 1997; Mauss 2002; Conway 2009). But in the long run, it is the development of a “law of hospitality”—as applied to both hosts and guests—that stabilizes encounters across cultures. Hospitality is required as a condition for the possibility of further intersubjective communication. An ethic of hospitality lies deep in the heart of the Western Christian tradition. Still, European Christians have often behaved badly. They have failed to live up to the standards of hospitality. Voltaire, Kant, and Schopenhauer each noted this. At times, the cultures who received Christians offered hospitality at first but then noticed that their guests had become aggressive. They were within their rights to expel them—as the Chinese did to the Jesuits. But one hopes that we have finally learned something from the long centuries of interaction between European Christianity and China. Habermas’s notion of the decentering of European Christianity with which we began has been well under way for centuries. European culture is no longer at the center of the world. Indeed, it was erroneous to believe that it had ever truly been at the center, since European Christianity has always been in conflict and dialogue with nonEuropean cultures. This leaves us with a decentered world, which is the truth of the world as it has always been. There is no “center”; rather, there are cultural spheres that overlap and develop against and with one another. In such a decentered world, we are each simultaneously both guests and hosts, engaged in a dialogue that has been going on for millennia. It is now time for us to learn how to behave well—as hospitable hosts and as humble and receptive guests.

References Brown, Garrett. 2010. “The Laws of Hospitality, Asylum Seekers, and Cosmopolitan right: A Kantian Response to Jacques Derrida.” European Journal of Political Theory 9 (3): 308–327. Chen, Huaiyu. 2009. “The Encounter of Nestorian Christianity with Tantric Buddhism in Medieval China.” In Hidden Treasures and Intercultural Encounters: Studies on East Syriac Christianity in China and Central Asia, edited by Dietmar Winkler and Li Tang, 195–214. Münster: LIT Verlag. Conway, Trudy. 2009. “From Tolerance to Hospitality: Problematic Limits of a Negative Virtue.” Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 16 (1): 1–13.

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Derrida, Jacques. 2000. Hospitality. Stanford: Stanford University Press. —, and John Caputo. 1997. Deconstruction in a Nutshell. New York: Fordham University Press. DuBois, Thomas David. 2011. Religion and the Making of Modern East Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dussel, Enrique D. 1985. Philosophy of Liberation. Translated by Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books. —. 1995. The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity. Translated by Michael D. Barber. New York: Continuum. —. 1998. “Beyond Eurocentrism: The World System and the Limits of Modernity.” In The cultures of Globalization, edited and translated by Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press. Fiala, Andrew. 2002. The Philosopher’s Voice: Philosophy, Politics, and Language in the 19th Century. Albany: SUNY Press. —. 2004. “Linguistic Nationalism and Linguistic Diversity: Locating Hegel between Fichte and Humboldt.” Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1): 159–183. Fontana, Michela. 2011. Matteo Ricci: A Jesuit in the Ming Court. Translated by Paul Metcalfe. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Habermas, Jürgen. 1994. “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Gutman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. —. 2002. Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity. Edited by Eduardo Mendieta. Cambridge: Polity Press. —. 2004. Fundamentalism and Terror. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. —. 2006. Time of Transitions. Edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. (1899) 1956. Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. New York: Dover Publications. Jensen, Lionel M. 1997. Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization. Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press. Jurgensmeyer, Mark, and Michael Jerryson. 2009. Buddhist Warfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. Perpetual Peace. In Kant: Political Writings, edited and translated by Hans Seigbert Reiss, 93–130. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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—. 2001. “The End of All Things.” In Religion and Rational Theology, edited and translated by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, 217– 232. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kanth, Rajani K. 2005. Against Eurocentrism. New York: Macmillan. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1981. New Essays on Human Understanding. Edited and translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennet. New York: Cambridge University Press. —. 1994a. “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese.” In Writings on China, edited by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, 75–138. Chicago, IL: Open Court. —. 1994b. Preface to Novissima sinica. In Writings on China, edited by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, 45–60. Chicago, IL: Open Court. —. 1994c. Writings on China. Edited by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont. Chicago, IL: Open Court. Mates, Benson. 1986. The Philosophy of Leibniz. New York: Oxford University Press. Mauss, Marcel. 2002. The Gift. London: Routledge. Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. 1949. The Spirit of Laws. New York, Hafner Publishing Co. Polo, Marco. 1845. The Travels of Marco Polo. New York: Harper. Reihman, Gregory M. 2006. “Categorically Denied: Kant’s Criticism of Chinese Philosophy.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33 (1): 51–65. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2007. Émile. Middlesex: Echo Library. Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1907. “Sinology.” In On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 359–371. London: George Bell. —. 1942. “Religion.” In Complete Essays of Schopenhauer, 3: 1–46. New York: Wiley. Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. 1994. Unthinking Eurocentrism. New York and London: Routledge. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1991. The Meaning and End of Religion. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Steffen, Lloyd. 2007. Holy War, Just War: Exploring the Moral Meaning of Religious Violence. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Stichler, Richard N. 2010. “Leibniz and Confucius: The Foundations of Cultural Exchange.” Paper presented International Society for Universal Dialogue, Beijing China. Vitoria, Francisco. (1532) 1964. De Indis et de iure belli: relectiones [The Indians and the rights of war: Reflections]. Translated by J. P. Bate and H. F. Wright. New York: Oceana. Voltaire. 1901. Philosophical Dictionary, translated by William F. Fleming. Vol. 4 of Works of Voltaire. A Contemporary Version. 21 vols. New York: E. R. DuMont.

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Wai, Robert. 2011. “The Cosmopolitanism of Transnational Economic law.” In Cosmopolitan Justice and Its Discontents, 153–177. New York and London: Routledge. Willet, Cynthia. 2001. The Soul of Justice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wolff, Chrisian. 1992. “The Practical Philosophy of the Chinese.” In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Wolff, and others, Moral Enlightenment, 145–186. Sankt Augustin: Institut Monumenta Serica.

PART II IN SEARCH OF HARMONY IN DIVERSITY

CHAPTER SEVEN “HARMONY IN DIVERSITY” AND DIALOGUE AMONG CULTURES XIN RU

The values of global ethics and intercultural philosophy are promoted through international philosophical dialogue. This is a significant issue of widespread public attention across the world today. As a Chinese scholar, I would like to offer my opinion, proceeding from the idea of “harmony in diversity” advocated by Chinese traditional philosophy. Let me begin with the situation of the contemporary era. I think all of us would admit that the world is experiencing profound and complex changes. Acceleration of economic globalization has promoted and enhanced global economic integration and regional economic cooperation, as well as greatly strengthened interrelation and interdependence among regions and nations. Radical development of science and technology, particularly the progress of transportation and telecommunications, has overcome geographical obstacles that separated people in the past, and connected different parts of the world into a real whole. The world is changing rapidly and becoming increasingly small. Consequently, the prophecy of Marshall McLuhan about “Global Village” in his The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (1962) has become true. Though people have different comments and views on the effect of globalization and development of science and technology, this has turned out to be an irresistible trend in the contemporary world and a reality we have to face, regardless of being for or against it. The globalization and development of science and technology has exerted a tremendous influence on many aspects of the world including economy, culture, and social life, among others. Nevertheless, it is a double-edged sword indeed. Properly handled and used, it will give humankind a rare opportunity for development, enabling some developing countries, which originally lagged behind in economic growth, to more quickly narrow the gap with the developed countries. In the meantime, globalization will also make the

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world face severe challenges, meet great uncertainties, and encounter enormous risks. German sociologist Ulrich Beck took the contemporary world as a “risk society” (Risikogesellschaft). The global risks he listed include: risks of international politics, economic risks, ecological and environmental risks, scientific and technological risks, and risk of war. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, these risks that Beck had mentioned previously almost all appeared one after another preceded by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the present-day world, the shake caused by the world financial crisis that followed that event is still lingering; local wars subside here and rise there; and moreover, humankind is repeatedly menaced with new wars, conspicuous problems in eco-environment, recurring contradictions and conflicts between ethnic groups and between religious beliefs, so on and so forth. Unbalance in development, unfair distribution of social wealth, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor will have serious impact on world peace and stability. All these are far from the peaceful, fair, and harmonious world to which people of all countries look forward with high hopes. To solve the above-mentioned thorny problems is the common interest of all nations in one sense, and crucial to the future of humankind in another sense. The successful realization of this aim must rely on an active participation and concerted efforts of every country, not on any single country—not even the strongest superpower or powerful allied group of nations. Strengthening the dialogue and exchange among different civilizations and cultures and promoting mutual understanding among the peoples of all the nations will form an indispensable basis for upgrading friendly cooperation and concerted effort to confront and deal with these challenges. When people talk about cooperative relations among countries, they usually focus their attention on political, economic, and even military cooperation, but they pay less attention to cultural cooperation. Actually, political, economic, and military relations are important, as it is, but often these have in part, sometimes even exclusively, utilitarian goals. As for advancing mutual understanding among the peoples of all nations, culture plays a far-reaching role, as it can go deep into the mentality of people and take root in their hearts in contrast to the above-mentioned relations. In my view, culture diffusion and exchange are borderless and boundless by nature. They will serve to promote dialogue among different cultures and pluralistic development, inspire cultural consciousness and identification of the peoples of all nations, make different cultures co-exist in harmony, and achieve common prosperity. Cultural exchange plays a special and important role in pushing forward friendly cooperation among the people

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of all countries, keeping world peace on the basis of mutual understanding, and mutual planning development for the common good of humanity. How then can we conduct a fruitful dialogue among cultures? I hold that the idea of harmony in diversity advocated by traditional Chinese philosophy may serve as an alternative for conducting such a dialogue, if we give it a modern explanation with particular reference to the status quo of the world. The concept of “harmony” appeared in ancient China. Its earliest evidence can be found in inscriptions on oracle bones and on ancient bronze objects during the Shang and Zhou Dynasties ranging from 1600 BCE to 256 BCE. Later, the idea of harmony became one of the basic concepts of traditional Chinese culture through textual research, analysis, and explanation by some ancient thinkers. For example, Shi Bo, of the West Zhou Dynasty (around the seventh century BCE), brought forth the idea that “Harmony fosters diversity while homogeneity undermines sustainability” (Zuo 1994, 348). He hereby proposed a philosophical view in order to discover the distinct meanings of “harmony” and “homogeneity.” He believed that harmony is consistency and unity of different things through which cosmic inventory comes into being and develops, while “homogeneity” is the aggregation of things of the same kind that denies contradictions and differences. Thus, homogeneity cannot give rise to new things. Hence, Shi Bo advocated the principle of “protecting harmony and rejecting homogeneity.” Confucius, founder of Confucianism as the keystone of Chinese philosophy, made a further analysis and elaboration of the concept of harmony, taking it as a noble pursuit of value. He put forward a principle of harmony in diversity in the Confucian Analects, regarding it as the standard for making a distinction between gentle men and mean men. Confucius said that a gentle person aims at harmony but not at uniformity. A mean person aims at uniformity but not at harmony. His remark means that the gentle person has moral integrity, stresses unity, and can tolerate dissenting views, while the mean person sets up a clique to pursue selfish interests and exclude those who hold different views. Confucius also championed the idea that “harmony is most precious” in the Confucian Analects. He thereby affirmed the social value of harmony, taking this as an ideal way to run the state. Moreover, he attached great importance to the idea of “achieving harmony by humanity” to attain harmony in society and human relations. Other thinkers of neoConfucianism carried forward this line of thought. They made an in-depth exploration of the concept harmony from many aspects, and even treated harmony as a condition and universal law from a cosmological viewpoint.

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In addition, they extended and applied the idea of harmony to various fields, such as nature, society, human relations, ethical attainment, and aesthetic appreciation, among others. Thinkers of other schools of thought, for example, Laozi and Zhuangzi of early Taoism, also recommended the idea of harmony, but they placed more emphasis on “the harmony between heaven and humanity,” and emphasized a harmonious condition of the natural world despite talking about “harmony of men” and “harmony of hearts” as well. Abundant ideological materials concerning harmony in such Chinese classics as Guanzi (Guan Zhong 1965), I Ching (The book of changes) (Legge [1899] 1963), The Doctrine of the Mean and The Great Learning (Legge 1966), Annals of Spring and Autumn of the Lü State (Lü Buwei 2000), and the works of philosophers in the Song, Ming, and Qing Dynasties. Over more than two thousand years of Chinese thought, we see the tendency for different philosophical schools during different historical periods all approach, analyze, and expound the idea of harmony in various ways. From this discourse, a philosophy of harmony took shape there from. It may be said that this is one of the special features of Chinese philosophy and a consistent track in Chinese culture from earliest recorded time until the present. It can give us enlightenment with regard to the global context we encounter today. What is meant by harmony? I think its basic meanings include reconciliation and concord. As a philosophical concept, harmony’s primary premise is acknowledgment of the objective existence of different things in the world and confirmation of their diversity and discrepancies. Then it moves to make appropriate adjustments, allocations, and arrangements in the light of contradictions and divergences to reconcile those existents in a proper mode. Finally, the aim of harmony is to take those existents as an integral whole and lead them to a harmonious development to achieve a real concord among them. “Harmony in diversity” is intended to maintain and keep up with the diversity of things. Just because of diversity, there are distinctions and differences, and accordingly, there are questions about mutual reconciliation and harmonious development. If all things are homogeneous and uniform, free from distinctions and differences, there is no diversity at all. Without diversity, harmonious development would be out of the question! In such a case, the world would become lifeless and stagnant. How monotonous it would be then! Diversity is not only a universal form in the objective world, but also a source of vigor and prime mover of world development from the perspective of harmony in diversity. This is suitable for the natural world, and more suitable for human society and its top intellectual achievements such

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as culture and thinking. Just as we cannot imagine that complicated and diversified things will show a single form or single color, human society will never adopt a single model of development, create only a single culture, have a single ideology, or a single type of value system. Because of diversity, the natural world is bright, colorful, and full of life. Because of diversity in the development of human society, people can create rich and splendid cultures in various forms and styles. It is by virtue of diversity that we can enjoy brilliant and magnificent spectacles on the historical stage. Prosperity of human culture relies on its diversity. The cultural world is like a garden containing many sorts of flowers. Like a flower, each culture has its distinctive color and fragrance, and bears its particular properties and values. According to some opinions, the era of globalization will witness two tendencies: one is that the development of world civilizations will tend toward convergence and the other is that cultural diversity will gradually disappear. I think this is a serious misunderstanding. The actual conditions are exactly the reverse. Economic globalization has greatly strengthened connections and exchanges among the peoples of all nations and religions. Instead of eliminating their respective particular properties and differences, it will only make indigenous cultures acquire new vitality and move toward pluralism. The maintenance of plurality of culture has been fully affirmed and generally identified by the international community. The General Conference of UNESCO unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in November 2001, recognizing culture diversity from the viewpoint of “the common heritage of humanity.” The Declaration clearly points out that cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. To conduct dialogue and exchange among cultures in the spirit of harmony in diversity is to respect and maintain cultural diversity on the one hand, and on the other hand, to absorb new vigor and useful nourishment from “the common heritage of humanity” to benefit the creation of today’s new culture. The ideal state, which Chinese traditional philosophy pursues, is captured in this passage: “All things are nourished together without their injuring one another. The courses of the seasons, and of the sun and moon, are pursued without any collision among them” (Zisi 1995, 57). This indicates that different things, cultures, and ways of thought should peacefully coexist in harmony; each of them will go along its own way and vitalize the diversity of further development. This has become an age-old fundamental principle, to which Chinese ideology and culture have adhered since ancient times.

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Even though the principle of harmony in diversity emphasizes cultural diversity, it actually does not deny common, universal factors in cultures. Cultural diversity is in no way diametrically opposed to universality and commonality. On the contrary, universality and commonality are contained in diversity. Since many and various cultures in the long process of history were created by humanity, they have the common nature of having met living demands of human beings, in expressing their thoughts and feelings, and to some degree, they embody common values of humanity that manifest the commonality and universality of human nature. However, as cultures emerge and develop under given objective circumstances and socio-historical conditions, they have their own particularity and characteristics that are distinct from others. When Chinese philosophy stands for harmony in diversity, it also seeks common ground while maintaining existing differences (qiu tong cun yi). Because of both common ground and differences among cultures, it is necessary and possible to appeal to dialogue and exchange. Nonetheless, to maintain cultural diversity and preserve each other’s cultural particularity does not mean encouraging cultural conservatism. The true meaning of harmony is not to passively agree with the maintenance of the status quo, but to actively advocate taking the initiative to conduct dialogue and exchange among different cultures. This kind of dialogue and exchange should not result in “one-eliminating-another” or “one-assimilating-another.” Instead, every culture should be on equal footing with others. We should seek mutual understanding through mutual communication. New vitality gained from the outside world improves and enriches culture to achieve common development, common prosperity, and complete harmony. This is achieved through learning from others’ strong points to offset our own weak points and drawing on and assimilating excellent achievements and positive factors from other cultures. Only accomplishing all these goals can be then called real harmony. History has shown that once a culture becomes self-enclosed and cuts off connection and communication with other cultures, it will gradually lose its motivating force for advancement; it tends to be rigid and on the wane regardless of whatever brilliant achievements it enjoyed in history. This could be seen as a law of cultural development. Although the idea of harmony originated in traditional Chinese philosophy, we could find the similar views in the works of some Western philosophers. For example, according to Pythagorean thinking in ancient Greek philosophy, “harmonia” belongs to an important category and means the connection and reconciliation of different things, such as the combination and concord of different tones in music. As long as any ratio

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fits a particular figure, it is a harmony that can produce an aesthetic effect. Heraclitus, another ancient Greek philosopher, said too, “The combination of mutually exclusive things and different tones will make a perfect harmony.” They believed that harmony results from the combination of different things. Among modern Western philosophers, George Santayana held “the harmony of the whole which does not destroy the vitality of the parts.” His opinion is also close to the basic meaning of harmony in diversity. Therefore, I hope that when we conduct dialogue among different cultures today, the idea of harmony in diversity will be understood and accepted by most. My hope is that we will make every effort to find out the complementary meaning of different cultures to promote a cultural blend and achieve harmonious development of world cultures as a whole on the basis of fully acknowledging differences and respecting cultural diversity. Historically, dialogue and exchange among cultures have always been carried out, sometimes conscientiously and sometimes unconsciously, sometimes willingly and sometimes passively. Of course, there was also no lack of contradictions, clashes, impediments, and breaks of the dialogue in the meantime. But now the situation has greatly changed. Under the conditions of globalization, if we would carry on dialogue and exchange among cultures conscientiously, constantly, and sustainably, we must establish some basic principles that all the concerned parties of the dialogue will accept, and some norms to which everyone will adhere. I would like to take the liberty to suggest some of my opinions for your reference in conformity with the idea of harmony in diversity: First and foremost, all the parties of the dialogue should acquire awareness of globalization and have a common goal. We should understand that the world is a whole. Regardless of being political, cultural, or mental, the barriers that separate ethnic groups in the past should be removed. The British poet Rudyard Kipling, in “The Ballad of East and West,” proclaimed, “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” This mentality is an error of the times, which we should overcome. We all live on a common planet willy-nilly, we face common global problems, and we have common interest. Culture should by no means be aimed at conquering and ruling the world, but at being conducive to building a peaceful, fair, and harmonious world. This is the soundest reason to engage in dialogue among cultures. Second, the dialogue should be conducted on the basis of full equality. Just as we admit that all people are born equal, all cultures created by humanity should be also on equal footing. Though different cultures are uneven in length of their respective history and have different influences, they

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all are component parts of human culture as a whole. With the same value, these cultures all contribute to the development of human culture. We are unable to judge which culture is born better. So, all cultures should have equal rights to join the dialogue. The era when some people tried to rule the world through a single culture has gone forever. Any attempt to make a single culture a universally applicable model, and then to impose it on others will end in failure. Every culture and every ethnic group should be respected. Facing the tide of globalization, every ethnic group has the right to maintain its cultural characteristics and to choose a way of cultural development, suited to itself, in the light of actual conditions. Third, the dialogue needs a friendly atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect. If we view other parties as competitors or even as potential opponents but not an equal partners and friends in cooperation, and if we take the dialogue as a contest of soft power and a struggle for discourse power but not an opportunity of furthering mutual understanding and learning from one another, the dialogue will be hard pressed to succeed. Our attitude toward other cultures should be without prejudice and without preconceived ideas. We should undertake in-depth research into other cultures with goodwill and be modest to learn and absorb the best features from them. Of course, we should have a sense of pride for our own culture. However, while we enjoy deep affection for our cultural tradition, it is also necessary that we be fully aware of its weaknesses and deficiencies to avoid blind arrogance and falling into self-centered conditions. Fourth, all the parties of the dialogue should have the spirit of tolerance, by which they acknowledge and tolerate the differences among cultures. We should particularly learn to respect and adopt a right attitude toward those things different from ours. Living under the different social systems and cultural backgrounds, and having different values, religious beliefs, and social customs, we should not request everyone to accept the same standard. Divergences in the question of culture are normal. Yet these contentions can be smoothed over and mitigated through patient dialogue. Even if the concerned parties do not reach a consensus immediately, to preclude conflicts, it is necessary to have large-mindedness, patience, and tolerance, putting the differences aside for the time being and preventing contradictions from intensification. In this way, we will never see the realization of Samuel P. Huntington’s prediction that the world will move toward intensive “clashes of civilizations” due to cultural and religious differences (1996), but we do hope to see, as suggested in Nathan der Weise (Lessing 1966), that the people with different religious beliefs should respect and tolerate one another.

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Sure enough, it is by no means easy to achieve the above-mentioned principles in practice. Yet, if the vast numbers of people of both academic and cultural circles can give a due consideration of the principles in conducting dialogue and exchange among cultures, it will benefit maintaining world peace and stability, enhance mutual understanding among the people of all nations, and contribute to harmonious development and prosperity of world cultures in all possible domains.

References Guan Zhong. 1965. Guanzi. Translated by W. Allyn Rickett. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Shuster. Legge, James. [1899] 1963. The I Ching: The Sacred Books of China, the Book of Changes. New York: Dover. —. 1966. The Four Books: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius. New York, Paragon Reprint Corp. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. 1966. Nathan der Weise [Nathan the wise]. Berlin: Ullstein. Lü Buwei. 2000. The Annals of Lü Buwei = (Lüshi Chunqiu): A Complete Translation and Study. Translated by John Knoblock. Stanford: Stanford University Press. McLuhan, Marshall. 1962. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

CHAPTER EIGHT A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY IN A HARMONY-CONSCIOUS CULTURE KEPING WANG

What China has been preoccupied with all along in her history is the constant pursuit of prosperity and peace in the country (guotai minan). This pursuit is the main concern not merely of the public authorities, but also of the entire populace. Now it is identified with the scheme to build “a harmonious society” (héxié shehui) under market socialism that has featured an economic boom during the past three decades or so. This chapter attempts to examine some teleological aspects of the scheme from the perspective of Confucianism as a harmony-conscious cultural heritage. Thus, it will look into the following points: what the Chinese people think; the orientations of the harmonious society; the importance and measurement of harmony; the distinction between harmony and uniformity; the dialectic mode of harmony versus conflict; and the building process of the harmonious society as such.

What Do the Chinese People Think? In the Introduction to the Chinese Way of Thinking, I made a remark with particular reference to the ideological status quo of China as follows: As the renaissance of China is coming along with its economic boom continuing in the past three decades, the old but rejuvenated nation in many domains has once again become the focus of the whole world. Naturally there arises a question about what the Chinese people really think at a time when viewing the rapid development and increasing influence of their country. This question seems to be not simply one of curiosity, but one of knowledge for the sake of mutual understanding. To my mind, the question itself implies at least two most primary dimensions: one refers to the specific content of their thinking (i.e. what) while the other to the particular

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In my opinion, this state of affairs is basically attributable to the fact that the transcultural interaction in China is by no means phenomenal. It is, however, fundamental in that it leads to the reconsideration and even transformation of some political, cultural, and ethical Chinese values in principle—values that are blended with endogenous ones from Chinese tradition and the heterogenous ones from its Western counterpart. Therefore, it can be seen as the natural fruit of globalization in the social setting of contemporary China. In the more than thirty years since the 1980s, we have witnessed in China a socio-economic reform facilitating the historical endeavor “to keep the country in peace and the people at ease.” Now China is confronted simultaneously with both more challenges and more promises. The challenges are mostly domestic ones derived from problems with the widening gap between the rich and the poor, epidemic corruption, poor resource supply, and pressure for environmental protection, among others. Thanks to social and economic reform, the promises mainly involve such things as an open-door policy, effective governance, initiatives in infrastructure construction, and huge domestic needs for all-round development across the country in its entirety. In order to bring the challenges under reasonable control while further enhancing the potential for the promises to be actualized, a chain of strategies have been introduced and promoted. As is noted currently in China, what is overwhelmingly eye-catching publicity are the two catchphrases standing for two priority strategies: goujian héxié shehui, building a harmonious society, and the other, weihu shehui wending, meaning preservation of social stability. It is generally assumed that the former strategy is intended to work by means of social justice, economic equity, and better welfare as principal determinants of social harmony, while the latter strategy is intended to work by virtue of ideological guidance and other applicable measures as major determinants

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of social order. In practice, both of them go hand-in-hand to maximize the potential for the harmonization of human relations and the amelioration of social environment in a positive sense. They are, therefore, considered to be two sides of one coin with focus on a harmonious society.

The Harmonious Society in Question With respect to the harmonious society (héxié shehui), the scheme was initiated as early as 2004. From 2005 onward, the scheme has been given the highest priority on the agenda of both the central and local Chinese governments. According to the outline of its blueprint, which is conceptual rather than specific, the harmonious society is assumed to bear such primary features as democracy, rule of law, equity, justice, trustworthiness, friendliness, social dynamic, stability, and orderliness, as well as harmonious correlation between humanity and nature. These features are determinate in their respective degrees, involving almost all the domains of a modern society. In other words, the scheme to build the harmonious society appears to be an experimental project associated with politics, law, economy, human relations, environmental ethics, and the like. It is, in fact, proposed in contrast to the social reality, which is saturated with potentially disharmonious phenomena relating to such challenges and problems as I have mentioned previously. These challenges and problems are liable to create and form disproportionate interest, division, grouping, and discrepancy owing to resource and market monopoly associated with power deals, which are working to upset and even undermine the ongoing reform process, social structure, and national mentality. All this tends to jeopardize social stability and order as key determinants to procure the apparent prospect of social development and economic growth altogether. In my observation on the current context of China, the scheme to construct the harmonious society is rather an ambitious but pragmatic alternative. Public authorities, therefore, treat it seriously rather than rhetorically at various levels. Teleologically or functionally, it is comprehensive by nature. It could be perceived in at least five interrelated scopes. First and foremost is the economic scope. The project is so designed to reduce social tension among all walks of life, tension that is mainly evoked by the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and meanwhile, by the epidemic corruption of some government officials in various positions. Tension of this kind is conducive not simply to growing hatred against the rich and privileged, but also to the destructive mood of the poor and the deprived who occupy a lion’s share of the labor market. It is thus plunging into jeopardy human relations and social cohesion that are

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the most decisive of all initiatives for ensuring social stability and economic growth. Consequently, it has resulted in the adoption of some new policies for the promotion of social justice and economic equity. According to a recent report, the introduction of some new measures aims to increase the income of low salary earners by 14 percent annually in the twelfth Five-Year Plan (2012–2016). In addition, it has brought forth a nation-wide strategy for balanced and healthy development to narrow the discrepancy between East and West China. In the political field, the harmonious society is proposed as an alternative to contain the problems, explicit or implicit, of societal instability. Public complaints of considerable intensity have been voiced about the unfair distribution of social wealth in certain sectors, and about the high frequency of conflict caused by some of the harsh measures taken for the rapid urbanization. Some of the problems are closely related to the dramatic interaction and interest-game between profit-driven developers and vulnerable victims who are under-paid when they are forced to move out of their old houses and lands that happen to be encircled in the new zone for reconstruction. They are going so far as to disturb the social normality and civilian mentality to the extent that some victims organize themselves to stop the development work and challenge the public authorities to protect their lands and defend their rights. All this makes the governments at different levels become so prudent that they try hard to set up relevant regulations in favor of the vulnerable in particular. In the social domain, the harmonious society is championed as an approach to harmonizing human relations while appeasing psychological anxiety and frustration among the populace. The key factors that tend to endanger human relations involve social injustice and economic inequity. The leading causes of anxiety and frustration are closely associated with self-interested and vanity-ridden behaviors as are demonstrated in certain respects of social life largely owing to material fetishism. As is observed in the neighborhoods in the megacities, people tend to become indifferent to their neighbors who are in need of assistance. Such a phenomenon is an obnoxious deviation from the Chinese tradition of cooperation and coexistence. To restore the tradition, increasing numbers of well-educated social workers are dispatched to the neighborhood communities. They are expected to upgrade the efficiency of public service and the proficiency of social management altogether, the ultimate objective of which is to coordinate and conciliate the interrelationship among neighbors with the aim of nourishing the community spirit of mutual care taking. Subsequently, in the field of ethics, the harmonious society is recommended as a drive to foster such virtues as compassion, righteousness,

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trustworthiness, friendship, mutual tolerance, and reciprocal help, among others. These virtues are conventionally respected and exercised, but they have been somewhat weakened during the processes of modernization and globalization that have exposed the Chinese majority to diversified moral values under market economy and social change. Some of the values are intended to pursue, for instance, the common good and fellow citizenship under communitarianism and collectivism. Others refer to personal interest and self-development under egoism and individualism. They comprise a kind of “collected soup” that works to impact the mores and codes of conduct of the people. To counterbalance the negative effects, the moralitybased convention of ideology is to be rediscovered as an integral component of the harmonious society. In addition, relevant educative programs are designed not merely to consolidate private morality among family members, but also to cultivate public ethics among fellow citizens. Finally in the cultural realm, the harmonious society is advocated as part of the Confucian heritage, in which harmoniousness is always emphasized as a solution to social strife or conflict in one sense, and as an ideal of good governance in another sense. In the present-day context of China, the scheme to establish a harmonious society largely corresponds to the old notion of the society in great union (da tóng she hui) based on the harmony-conscious cultural heritage in Confucianism. According to this heritage, the conception of hé as harmony is most fundamental because it is the ultimate end rather than the expedient means. Accordingly, it is expected not only to harmonize human relations (xiehe renlun), but to retain social stability (shehui wending), which will then be able to actualize the final goal of retaining the country in peace and the people at ease (guotai minan). For this reason, promotion of the harmonious society is easily understood and widely accepted by Chinese citizens. Judging from all these five interconnected scopes, we may have arrived at a tentative conclusion that the harmonious society of this type bears a resemblance to a multifold community. That is to say, it is not only an economic, political, and moral community in principle, but also a cultural community by nature. Hence, the scheme to build a harmonious society could be conceived as a form of social practice on the one hand, and a kind of cultural expectation on the other hand. By “social practice” I mean social management of high efficiency that is chiefly intended to meet the needs and tackle the problems in the economic, political, social, and ethical domains. This practice is grounded on “piecemeal engineering” for pragmatic instead of utopian purposes. To fulfill these purposes, it demands an institutional transformation above all. Therefore, it calls for a complementary and integrative use of both Chinese and Western values to

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upgrade the institutional system underlying the social management. This is by no means an easy matter as it pertains to a transformational process from a transcultural viewpoint. By “cultural expectation,” I mean facilitation of a better way of life to satisfy cultural, psychological, and even spiritual needs. This expectation is essentially leagued with the conception of harmony as a most important cultural ideal. The ideal itself is deeply rooted in the national mentality and constantly stressed in the Chinese cultural heritage. In principle, it serves as the inherent and ideological basis on which the harmonious society could be conjectured and even constructed at its best, the basis that largely lies in the ethos of harmony-conscious tradition peculiar to Confucianism in particular. This being the case, further elucidation and examination of the basis will be offered in the subsequent passages.

The Importance and Measurement of Harmony The Chinese idea of harmony (hé) first came into being in antiquity. It was coined as a synonym for social order in peaceful times, but as an antonym to social chaos in warring periods. In the former sense, it was usually commended for the maintenance of social stability and the continuation of social development. In the latter sense, it was proposed as an approach to restoring social stability and making peace out of warfare among competing states. The advent of the conception of harmony itself can be traced back to The Book of Changes (I Ching) (Legge [1899] 1963), allegedly the oldest classic of Confucianism. In this work, “great harmony” (tai hé) is alleged to have originated from the union of the yin and yang, and is considered to be a productive force “by which all beings are created and on which they thrive, thus bringing a state of ultimate peace to the world” (Yu Dunkang 1991, 53). It is through Confucius that the notion of harmony has become the highest form of achievement in Chinese political culture throughout history. It attempts to ensure and actualize social order or stability by which further development is rendered possible, and in which every member, from old to young, male and female, will live a good and just life. The ideal is institutionally nurtured by a cultural system that stems from two categories known as rites (li) and music (yue), which functions to moralize one’s conduct and humanize one’s heart. As we read in the Confucian Analects (Lun yü): In the process of conducting the rites, seeking harmony is the most valuable principle (li zhi yong, he wei gui). Of the ways prescribed and cherished by the ancient sage-rulers, this is the most beautiful and

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therefore followed alike in dealing with matters great and small. Yet, if harmony is sought merely for its own sake without having it regulated by the rites, the principle will not work in fact. (Confucius 1979, 1:12)1

The rites in ancient China would be employed comprehensively as a kind of performing art on certain occasions of social interaction including ancestral sacrifice and divinity worship. The performance would involve not only rules of proprieties or rituals, but also music and dance combined. In its actual process of organic cooperation and integration, harmony is the ultimate aim in view of unity in variety. However, the artistic effect of harmony in this case would go beyond aesthetic appreciation, extending symbolically into the social utility of harmony in political praxis such as cooperative and efficient leadership. Notably, according to Confucius, harmony as the keystone of good leadership serves in a manner similar to that in music. It radiates upwards to the superiors, and downwards to the subordinates, thus facilitating concord and cohesion among people from all walks of life in society. This is the chief reason why the ancient sage-rulers prescribed and cherished the principle of harmony. In order to retain its function, they would also regulate it by means of rites in accord with specific situations. All this suggests that a more reasonable measurement of harmony lies in the rites as institutional rules and codes of conduct on the one hand, and in the principle of correctness that works according to specific situations involved on the other. Otherwise, it will end up in vain when harmony is attained for harmony’s sake by eradicating all the dynamic differences involved. At this point, it involves a principle of distinguishing between harmony and uniformity, which I will discuss in the following section. Incidentally, the harmonious effect in music performance is integrated with its aesthetic, moral, social, and political counterparts. It is romantically imagined and exposed by Xunzi in his Yue lun (Discourse on music): When music is performed within the ancestral temple, lord and subject, high and low, listen to it together and are united in the feelings of harmonious reverence (hé jing). When music is played in the private quarters of the home, father and son, elder and younger brother, listen to it together and are united in the feelings of harmonious kinship (hé qin). When music is played in village meetings or clan halls, old and young listen to it together and are joined in the feelings of harmonious obedience (hé shun). (2003, 652–653; cf. Hsün Tzu 1963, 113)

On this account, the importance of harmony is not simply confined to the artistic performance of rites for the sake of aesthetic contemplation and

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appreciation. It is analogically extended to the domain of political governance, family ties, and community affinity as well. Thereby, the social order can be secured and human relations harmonized at a time when government officials are united in feelings of reverence, family members are united in feelings of close kinship, and citizens of the community are united in obedience. All this is characteristic of a possibly harmonious society in the general sense of this term. However, what is said about the multifunction of music is somewhat exaggerated. For music could work as Xunzi depicts it only under ideal conditions, which is doubtful under actual conditions. That is why Mozi, a contemporary of Confucius, attacks both the making and performing of music from a perspective of negative utilitarianism, as in his essay “Fei yue” (Against music) (see Mo Tzu, 1966; Wang 2008, 48–67). Nowadays, the notion of harmony is inherited and reconsidered with little reference to music except in a metaphorical sense. It is stressed as being composed of diversity in unity, in which diversity is as important and indispensible as unity. For harmony cannot be what it should be without either diversity or unity as illustrated in a symphony orchestra. More frequently, it is perceived as a social ideal and applied to the harmonization of human relations in one sense, and to the coordination of social classes in another sense, to create a better society for its citizens in all. In practice, it is employed to reinforce the public awareness of social harmony, and reduce the intensity of social strife between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the vulnerable, and the privileged and the deprived. Because its traditional influence is deep-seated in the national mentality, it serves naturally as the internal basis of the harmonious society, and accordingly plays a crucial part in this regard.

The Distinction between Harmony and Uniformity The importance of harmony is embodied not just in political and social aspects, but also in creative and productive aspects. This merit of harmony (hé) is set out in contrast to the demerit of uniformity (tóng). The former consists in the unity in variety that is believed to nourish and produce myriad things. The latter is made up of the sameness in singularity that is assumed not to have long continuity. The Guo yu states: Harmony is able to create the myriad things whereas uniformity is unable to keep long. By harmony is meant to harmonize and reconcile one thing with another in an unlimited number, and it is therefore able to grow increasingly and attract even more things. By uniformity is meant to add the same thing to its like in a limited number, and it is therefore to be no long-

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er used when the addition is finished. For the similar reason, a single sound does not compose any appealing music; a single color does not make any beautiful pattern; a single flavor does not cook any tasteful food; and a single thing does not stand out in the absence of the other to be compared with. (Zuo Qiuming 1994, 348)

Hence, in leadership and the conduct of state affairs, the merit of harmony is to be recommended whilst the demerit of uniformity is to be abandoned. That is to say, if the government employs officials with different thinking strategies and observations, and then has them harmonized in a creative manner, it will help improve the efficacy of governance and will be conducive to further development of society. If the government employs officials with identical thinking modes and opinions, it will easily attain general agreement but have far fewer alternatives when confronted with a variety of issues or problems. The former case tends to occur in openminded democracy and leads to flourishing prospects, while the latter case tends to take place in close-minded authoritarian governments and leads to decline. The open-minded democracy is favored here because it is expected to be collective and constructive in a communitarian sense. It is supposed to be more reasonable and applicable in the social setting of China today. Aside from the political dimension, the distinction between harmony and uniformity is also reflected in the doctrine of human relations championed by Confucianism. When talking about the marked discrepancy between the gentleman (junzi) and the petty man (xiaoren), for instance, Confucius emphasizes the principle of harmony (hé) in a sense of harmonizing human relations while downplaying the intention of forming a clique with no moral restraint. The two principles of harmony (hé) and uniformity (tóng) indicate two different value systems and kinds of action. The former is oriented toward the community good and grounded on the virtues of reciprocal benevolence, human-heartedness, kindness and love (ren), and righteousness or justice (yi). This is possible only when one’s personal cultivation develops into the high state of gentility and enables one to go beyond one’s own interests. The latter is directed toward the individual good and determined by one’s own desires (yu) and profits (li). It is confined to selfishness and, therefore, works at the cost of others’ welfare. Either harmony (hé) or uniformity (tóng) suggests a kind of means preconditioned by personal values. The former is intended to integrate and reconcile organically certain things for a higher telos related to the collective-based many, whereas the latter is intended to impose a pattern on all things for a lower telos related to the self-centered few. Accordingly, the

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polite person as a moral being tends to persuade and convince people using reason as he considers things most duly and appropriately in all possible aspects. He is so capable and trustworthy that he will win support, respect, cooperation, and even submission from others. The petty man, as an egoist, is always ready to attain his own interests of various kinds by imposing his will upon others, or to impose a pattern of thinking and behavior within a clique or gang by force; in other words, to coerce conformity upon members of the group. Or, he might turn into a yes-man, pleasing people around him for the sake of a pretentiously harmonized relationship at the expense of the preconditions or principles concerned. Such a relationship is definitely false and short-lived, as it disguises his real intention to serve his personal purposes and practical interests. This type of personality is, therefore, said to be xiangyuan (a person who appears honest and cautious but is actually pretentious as a name-dropper or deceiver). It is by nature “a thief of morality” (de zhi zei ye) who will ruin all the virtues (Confucius 1995a, 17:13). Confucius’ conception of harmony (hé) and uniformity (tóng) is generally moral and thus confined to the undertakings of human relations, personal cultivation, and state governance. When traced back to its original source, more of its significance can be discovered. It is derived from what Yan Ying says about the categories of harmony (hé) and uniformity (tóng) in the soup allegory (Wang 2004, 402–422).2 Yet, it must be pointed out that Ying’s description of harmony as a principle focuses on the positive aspects of unity in opposites only. His knowledge of the dialectic relations revealed by means of harmony is so limited that he fails to detect the intrinsic struggle or conflict among the opposites. In a word, the soup he proposes is a collective soup in harmonious proportion. Likewise, his understanding of unity remains at the level of reconciliation. Philosophy of this kind is obviously intended to supply a theoretical foundation of political reformism. Such reformism is, to my mind, worthwhile if compared with any blood-shedding revolution or inter-civilization clashes in whatever rhetoric or propaganda. In this sense, it is relevant to the construction of a harmonious society in the present-day China.

The Dialectic Mode of Harmony versus Conflict The discussion of harmony cannot be adequate without looking into conflict. For this pair of antithetic categories can nurture a kind of dialectic mode of interrelationship. The dialectic mode as such calls for a reasonable treatment of the interactive connection between harmony (hé), opposition (făn), and conflict (chóu). Accordingly, it acknowledges the objective

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existence of opposition and possible advent of conflict within things and among persons, but it claims that the final solution to conflict is hidden in the power of harmony. The whole idea is expressively condensed in Zhang Zai’s aphorisms as follows: As there are forms or aspects of things, there are their opposites within (you xiang si you dui). These opposites will likely stand in opposition to what they do [dui bi fan qi wei]. Opposition leads to conflict (you fan si you chou). Conflict is then to be harmonized and resolved (chou bi hé er jie). (Wang Fuzhi 1975, 25)3

Detected in this hypothesis is a dialectic feature. It exposes the natural existence of the opposites among things or beings, and the interdependent relationship between the opposites as such. As a result of the interaction and contradiction between the opposites, there arises opposition and then conflict in a probable sequence. However, conflict will be eventually removed as the two sides develop into unity by virtue of harmonization or reconciliation of the opposites within. Harmonization (hé) in this context is distinctive from an imposed pattern (uniformity, tóng). The former is ready to accommodate and reconcile differences in pursuit of a common ground, while the latter rejects any differences and attempts to uniform all by one frame of reference as if it is exclusively single-tuned or singletracked. The emphasis on harmonization or reconciliation in this regard corresponds to the conventional focus in ancient Chinese thought on the value of unity in variety or harmony in diversity and thus bears an important message in many fields of human practice. Consider political culture. The principle of harmonization without conformity to a pattern encourages an organic synthesis between rule of law and rule by virtue according to the specific social setting and cultural legacy in China. It preserves the differences but seeks a common ground among them. By so doing, would it be possible to set up a complementary interrelationship? The principle is highly conditional in that it is designed to integrate the positive and constructive while keeping aside the negative and destructive. However, it has no intention to deny or conceal the existence of opposition and potential conflict. Rather, it lets them interact to the extent of complementing and benefiting each other instead of turning them into chaos or dropping control in a laissez-faire manner. It takes into due consideration the suitability of cultural soil. As has been proved historically, rule of law grows well in one cultural soil, but not so in another due to unfavorable conditions. If transplanted by force, disregarding the specific circumstances, it is liable to wither or become distorted. This reminds us of an allegory that reads:

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Chapter Eight In China the River Huaihe marks a borderline for different geographical features. As is usually proclaimed, when an orange tree is planted to its south, it bears sweet and edible fruits. When it is transplanted to its north, it bears bitter and non-edible fruits. They all look alike in appearance but different in taste. (Kiu 1991, 145)

This allegory means that the same tree planted in different soils and climates will produce different things. Metaphorically it implies that the similar rule of law introduced into different cultures and institutional systems will lead to different forms or transformations in respect to the final consequences. In the specific situation of China, the implementation of the rule of law at the early stage could be mixed up with the rule by law in certain aspects. Thus, it seems to me to require an appropriate cultivation of the political or legal “soil” by a process of a nation-wide educational program in this regard. For rule of law as a legal institution and democracy as a political constitution could work properly and effectively only when the civil ideology and social environment are relatively mature for such praxes. In my observation, there are a number of fairly successful cases as a consequence of this kind of experimentation. For instance, Germany, Japan, and South Korea, among others, would be considered to be nations without democratic tradition in their political cultures. Definitely, such a form of experimentation is a progressive project instead of a radical revolution that appears to be tempting at the outset but often becomes more destructive than constructive soon after its sparkling eruption. Moreover, it needs eventually to be expanded and safeguarded by economic development rather than by political institution alone.

Conclusion The foregoing pondering over harmony-conscious cultural heritage is only a brief consideration of the intrinsic basis of constructing a harmonious society in the Chinese context. Frankly, when it comes to the real possibility of building such a society, this basis will count only when it is sustained by at least two most practical pivots: peace and justice. Herein peace indicates not merely domestic social stability but also a peaceful international environment, which provides the external determinant. Justice denotes not simply the principle to secure social equity and civil society, but the effective rule of law and the accountability of good governance, which make up the institutional determinant. Without the external and institutional determinant, the internal ground could go nowhere in a realistic sense. Rather, it would become no more than pure wishful thinking. As regards the status quo in China as a whole, I personally hold to the

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view that China is still in an elementary stage of structuring her political democracy and legal system in the light of the rule of law. Therefore, it is plausible to say that she is not yet adequate to accomplish this harmonious society in the near future with respect to the necessary social premises and institutional conditions required. The formation of such a society requires a long and progressive process instead of a stop-gap solution to current challenges and problems. Nevertheless, it can be predicted that, when the process is accomplished with success, it will transform Chinese society not merely into a relatively harmonious and stable one, but also into one that is civil and open. This being the case, those who will benefit from it will encompass not only the Chinese people who occupy a fifth of the world total population, but the people of many other nations who are preoccupied with peace and development. This can be justified by the considerable contribution made by the Chinese economic boom to the whole world in this critical time of financial meltdown, debt crisis, and global recession that confronts us all. The harmonious society in the context of China is not supposed to be freed from any social issues and challenges at all even when it is actualized to a considerable extent according to its blueprint. At best, it will help improve the capability and efficiency of social management in the economic, political, cultural, educational, and public service sectors under the premise that social justice and economic equity are solidly established in accord with the rule of law and Chinanized democracy in a globalizing manner. Naturally, there is no short cut in this process, but a long march along a rough road in the true sense of this term. As luck would have it, the harmony-conscious cultural heritage in Confucianism can play a positive role in the building process of the harmonious society. It encourages a perseverant spirit in this regard that encourages Chinese citizens to redouble their efforts toward the final destination while making light of the hidden difficulties or ups and downs to be encountered on the way ahead. Thus, they are striving on, as it is, and looking forward to the future from a relatively optimistic point of view. For the majority of Chinese citizens are not merely conscious of the priority goal to “keep the country in peace and the people at ease” for the sake of living a better life, but they are also highly aware of the hard fact that they cannot afford to run into any social chaos or live in a disorderly situation. Otherwise, most of them will be apt to fall into the first victims of such a situation as is so believed among many of the senior citizens who have had bitter experiences during the chaotic and hard times both in China and other countries in the past.

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Notes 1.

The English translation here is modified with a particular reference to that of the same passage in these two versions as follows: (1) “Of the things brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable. Of the ways of the Former Kings, this is the most beautiful, and is followed alike in matters great and small, yet this will not always work: to aim always at harmony without regulating it by the rites simply because one knows only about harmony will not, in fact, work” (Confucius 1979, 1:12, 61). (2) “In practicing the rules of propriety, appropriateness is to be prized. In the ways prescribed by the ancient kings, this is the excellent quality, and in things small and great we follow them. Yet it is not to be observed in all cases. If one, knowing how such appropriateness should be prized, manifests it, without regulating it by the rules of propriety, this likewise is not to be done” (Confucius 1995b, 1:12, 69). 2. The quotation is taken from Zuozhuan (Zuo’s Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals, Zhaogong 20, 522 BCE). My translation of this soup allegory follows: “Harmony (hé) is different from uniformity (tóng). Seeking harmony is like making a soup. One uses water, fire, vinegar, soy source and prunes all together to stew with fish and meat. The chef mélanges harmoniously all the ingredients for a tasteful soup. In the process of making, he adds something more into it when finding its taste a bit too light; and he reduces something less when finding its taste a bit too heavy. The gentleman enjoys such a soup because it keeps one’s mind in peace. The interrelationship between the ruler and his courtier should be correspondingly similar in this case. When observing what the ruler thinks right contains something wrong, the courtier points out the wrong aspects and meanwhile reinforces the right aspects. When observing what the ruler thinks wrong contains something right, the courtier points out the right factors and meanwhile rules out the wrong factors. By so doing, the governance is retained in peace and harmony without violating the rites such that the masses are freed from the mind of competitiveness and contentiousness. . . . The ancient sage-rulers used to adjust the five flavors (sweet, sour, bitter, spicy, salty) for soup and harmonize the five sounds (gong, shang, jue, zhi, and yu, that parallel the five-note scale of 1, 2, 3, 5, 6) for music in a metaphorical sense that they did this in order to ensure the calmness of their minds and accomplish their conduct of state affairs. . . . But there arises a problem if what the ruler thinks right or wrong is readily and repeatedly considered right or wrong by the courtier called Ju. This is just like making a soup with water only. It will be tasteless and no one would like to have it. It is also like playing the same note by the musical instrument of qin-se. It will be boring and no one would like to listen to it. The same is true of the idea of uniformity (tóng).” 3. The English rendering is slightly modified with particular reference to Wing-tsit Chan (1973, 506).

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References Confucius. 1979. The Analects. Translated by D. C. Lau. London: Penguin. —. 1994. Analects of Confucius. Translated by Cai Xiqin and Lai Bo. Beijing: Sinolingua. —. 1995. The Confucian Analects. Translated by James Legge. Changsha: Hunan chubanshe. Hsün Tzu. 1963. Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press. Kiu, K. L., ed. 1991. Yanzi chunqiu [Historical anecdotes of Yanzi]. In 100 Ancient Chinese Fables, 144–145. Beijing: Zhongguo Duiwai Fanyi Chuban Gongsi. Legge, James. (1899) 1963. The I Ching: The Sacred Books of China, the Book of Changes. New York: Dover. Mo Tzu. 1966. Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press. Wang, Keping. 2004. “A Multicultural Strategy: Harmonization without Being Patternized.” Skepsis, 15: 402–422. —. 2008. “A Debate on the Functions of Music.” In Spirit of Chinese Poetics, 48–67. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. —. 2009. Chinese Way of Thinking. Shanghai: Shanghai Brilliant Publishing House. Xunzi. 2003. “Yue lun” [Discourse on music]. In The Xunzi. Translated by John Knoblock. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Yu Dunkang. 1991. “The Concept of Great Harmony in The Book of Changes.” In Confucianism and the Modernization of China, edited by Silke Krieger and Rolf Trauzettel, 51–62. Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag. Zhang Zai. 1975. “Taihe pian” [On great harmony]. In Zhangzi zhengmeng zhu [Commentary on Zhang Zi’s works], edited by Wang Fuzhi, 1–28. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Zuo Qiuming. 1994. “Zheng yu,” in Guo yu, 347–350. International Conference on Popular Beliefs and Chinese Culture. Changsha: Yuelou Shushe.

CHAPTER NINE FOUR ASPECTS OF HÉ (HARMONY࿴) IN DAOISM XIA CHEN AND YAN LIU

This essay will focus on the concept of “hé” (harmony,࿴) in connection with its application in Daoism. In Daoism, the idea of hé is applied to the harmonious relationship between yin and yang, between man and nature, between mind and body, and between “I” and others. It regards nature, individuals, and society as one dynamic, interactive organism, and it shows the way to transform ourselves to be in harmony with nature, with ourselves, and with others. The Shuowen Jiezi (宜ᩥゎᏐ, Chinese Words and Characters Explained) was the first Chinese dictionary compiled in the second century CE. According to its annotation, the character 嗒(of which the simplified spelling is ࿴and the Latinized transliteration is hé) is composed of two parts: The shape of the first part, 㱫 (yuè) represents its meaning, which is a kind of three-hole bamboo pipe, usually played in concert with other instruments). The second part, ⚻ (hé), has the same pronunciation as hé (harmony), and is often used as a substitute for the character ࿴ (hé) in meaning as well. The character as a whole originally implied that the tones from different instruments ought to be coordinated with each other to produce a mellifluous piece of music; noticeably, this implication has been preserved in most Chinese expressions related to the word hé as harmony. In Daoism, the original meaning of hé as related to tone denotes coordination, harmony, and balance among all things. All oppositions and discrepancies are merged into one organic whole through interaction and balance between yin (㜷) and yang (㜶). “Oneness of man and heaven” (ኳேྜ୍), “the heavenly Dao diminishes the excessive and replenishes the deficient” (tianzhidao, sunyouyu er bubuzu, ཙѻ䚃㸪ᦏᴹ։㘼㺕н ㊊), and “perfection in both body and mind” (ᖒ⾎‫ء‬࿉) all signify im-

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portant ways to reach harmony between nature and civilization, humanity and society. Imbalance between yin and yang, heaven and earth, individual and community, and body and mind may lead to calamities, social disorder, poverty, diseases, and all kinds of maladies. “Our lives are to mirror the operation of the Dao, which contrasts markedly with Western images of God as creator, father, ruler, or judge” (Kirkland 1995). So Daoist teaching focuses on how to achieve the state of hé, how to cultivate an ideal harmonious relationship among heaven, earth, and humanity, and how to keep coordination, harmony, and balance forms an alternative philosophy. Daoism lays down an explicit and important principle in terms of hé as harmony that may serve as a valuable inspiration to modern cultural pluralism and offer a more harmonious worldview.

Mingling and Balancing Yin and Yang: The Original Meaning of Harmony in Daoism The notion of harmony in Daoism is indubitably one of its key concepts, closely related to terms like Dao (㐨), qi (animating force; ẻ), yin and yang (㜷 and 㜶), and you and wu (᭷ and ᪢). The origin of heaven and earth is accounted for in terms of the two forces, yin and yang, which are the two essential aspects of the Dao, out of which all beings are formed. So, harmony among myriad things is realized through rotating, coordinating, and balancing yin and yang. It is so depicted, for instance, in the Daode jing (䚃ᗧ㓿): The Dao produces the One. The One turns into the Two. The Two gave rise to the Three. The myriad things contain yin and yang as vital forces, which achieve hé (harmony) through their interactions. (Wang 1998, §42)

Here, the word hé implies the harmonious state of yin and yang. This sentence was further explained in the book of Huainanzi (Ὶ༡Ꮚ, 13) like this: Thus it is said, “Dao begins with one.” One (alone) however, does not give birth. Therefore it divided into yin and yang. From the harmonious union of yin and yang, the myriad things were produced. (Major 1993, 108–109)

Myriad things contain yin and yang as vital forces, which achieve harmony through their interactions. Harmony between heaven and earth is the essential factor for the nature to develop spontaneously. Thus, the concept of hé herein refers to the harmonious union of yin and yang. That is to say, harmony and balance of yin and yang are two

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core parts in hé—through the fluxing and balancing interactions of yin and yang, myriad things are produced and maintained. Therefore, hé enjoys a high status. Laozi said, “to know harmony is called the constant; to know the constant is called discernment” (Wang 1998, 55). With this belief, Daoism regards the very harmony between yin and yang as an attainable perfection, applies it to the interpretation of ideal order in nature, life, and society, and extends it to the government of a nation. This is demonstrated by the following sayings: To unite the kingdoms, to lead government officers, and to harmonize the common people. (࿘♩, Zhouli) For heaven and earth to unite harmoniously is the great principle of life. (⎽Ặ᫓⛅ Lushi chunqiu) As for the qi of heaven and earth, nothing is greater than its harmony [hé ]. As for harmony, by it yin and yang are regulated, day and night distinguished, [and so] it produces beings (Ὶ༡Ꮚ, Huainanzi 13). (Major 1993, 108–109) As for the yin and yang, the yin and yang essential in the central harmony. When the qi of central harmony gains, the ten thousand beings will flourish; people will live harmoniously and the rule of the sovereign will bring peace. (Wang 1960, 20)

Yin and yang in the Daode jing was later annotated by religious Daoism as two kinds of qi, the blending of which produces three concepts, i.e., yin-qi (qi that kill, 䱤≄), yang-qi (qi that brings life, 䱣≄), and zhongheqi (qi that harmonize, ୰࿴ẻ), or as heaven, earth, and human beings. These three aspects are to be perceived as an organic whole. On the one hand, the harmony among them insures the spontaneous growth of myriad things as well as the advent of the era of Great Peace (taiping, ኴᖹ). On the other hand, if any of the components—heaven, earth, or human beings—are out of the function, their communication and harmony will be reduced to disorder. This would result in natural disasters or social turbulence. Human beings thus become one of the three key members of the relationship and play a key role in these triplet interactions, for humanity is capable of breaking balance. Human beings stand in the central position of cosmic organisms and, therefore, are uniquely designed to protect, pass, and refresh the qi of central harmony and maintain the harmony of cosmos and the spontaneity in which the myriad things will healthily grow. They never stand in isolation or separate themselves from nature. Each person is obligated to limit overgrowth of selfish desires and protect the spontaneity of the environment.

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Unfortunately, the golden ages marked by harmony among heaven, earth, and humanity that might have existed during ancient times, some time close to the age of Eden recorded in the Bible, was interrupted and diminished as a consequence of the accumulation of humanity’s wrongdoings. As is said in the Taiping jing: When the order is destroyed, not only the king is the culprit, but all the people under heaven are guilty; the sin can be passed down to later generations and gradually accumulate. All the guilt is due to people performing astray from Dao. (Wang 1960, 205)

The doctrine of inherited guilt (chengfu, ᢎ峇), transposing cosmological language into ethical reasoning, postulates reasons for human diseases, sorrows, natural disasters, and social calamities, alleging that all these are due to the accumulation of people’s improper deeds. That is to say, people are given life by heaven and are reared by earth. If they become unscrupulous and unconscionable, heaven and earth shall grieve over their ailments, and thus produce abnormal phenomena to punish their children. Yet, by the same token, if people act felicitously with regard to their surroundings, blessings and happiness will be granted to them and to their subsequent generations. In a word, crucial factors for the inter-relations among humanity, society, culture, and nature are spiritual and ethical. Humanity is responsible for either the deterioration or harmonization of life. Doctrines of this kind are intended to guide us to take measures for a spiritual life so that we can bequeath a sustainable living space to future generations.

Oneness of Heaven and Humanity: The Harmony of Humanity and the Natural World Their inland geographical circumstances and the autarkic agricultural economy have long nurtured the Chinese notion of Oneness of man and heaven. This is opposed to the tradition that humankind should conquer nature. British scholar Tong B. Tang expressed his fascination with this Chinese tradition by saying: The Chinese tradition is remarkably different. People never go out their way to conquer the nature, nor do they try to know about nature by means of critical analysis, instead, they aim to reach and maintain accord and harmony with the nature. Their scholars pay significant attention to the kind of wisdom which takes the subject and object into one unity and guides the coordination between human and nature. The Chinese tradition is entirety and humanistic; it denies the separation of science from aesthet-

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ics and ethics, sense from kindness and beauty. (Quoted in Rongjing Ge 1991, 257)

Two schools of thoughts, Confucianism and Daoism, emphasize the oneness of heaven and humanity in pre-Qin China (221–206 BCE). These doctrines differ in their emphasis on different aspects of hé; Confucianism attaches importance to the moral properties of heaven, adapts them to person-to-person relationships, and devotes all its effort to modify heaven in a social, political, and ethical way. The legitimacy of ethical rules is, in its turn, measured according to the model of heaven. Daoism emphasizes a model of nature more than just the consideration of person-to-person relationships. It tends to explore life in terms of human-nature relationships. It says in the Daode jing, section 25: Man follows the way of earth. Earth follows the way of heaven. Heaven follows the way of the Dao. And the Dao follows the way of spontaneity (Daofa ziran, 㐨ἲ⮬↛). (Wang 1998, 231)

The key point is in the last sentence: “the Dao follows the way of spontaneity.” Daode jing regards spontaneity or “self-so-ing” as the core part in the chain of humankind. Man, earth, heaven and the Dao all follow the principle of spontaneity. Here, ziran (⮬↛) indicates the spontaneous and natural state, the fundamental harmonious relationships in human societies and in the whole universe. Drawing an analogy between heaven and humanity, Daoism contends that human beings and heaven share something similar, which initiated the theory of mutual correspondence between heaven and humanity. According to this correspondence, people and nature can influence each other, just as the Taiping jing said, “Human can draw images from the heaven, and heaven can draw images from humanity” (Wang 1960, 673). Thus, heaven responds to people’s benignity with kindness, while it responds to their wrongdoings with punishment. As for the relationship between humanity and nature, Daoism claims that human beings should treat nature under “the law of Dao,” that is, they should regard and treat all beings from the viewpoint of a cosmic holism rather than of the individual ego. The reason for this admonishment is that human and all other beings are viewed equally from the perspective of Dao, “Therefore the Dao is great. Heaven is great. Earth is great. And man is also great. There are four great things in the universe, and man is one of them” (Wang 1998, Daode jing, §25). The Zhuangzi borrowed a saying from the god of the North Sea:

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From the broad and powerful view of Dao, there is no discrimination between human and other beings, and it is wrong for human beings to boast their intelligence and reduce nature from the status of a friend to that of something subordinate to our utilitarian purpose. Zhuangzi has thoroughly related the equity of myriad things and concluded, “heaven and earth were born together with me and the myriad things are one with me” (ibid., 18). Furthermore, human beings and other beings can even transform into each other, as in the mysterious Zhuangzi fable, Zhuangzhou mengdie (Zhuangzi dreams of being a butterfly [ᗉ࿘᲋⼖]). One day, Zhuangzi fell asleep and dreamed that he was transmuted into a butterfly. When he awakened, he was too confused to discern whether it was he who had dreamed of the butterfly or it was he who was in the dream of the butterfly. Such is a vivid picture of the interdependence and mingling of all beings. Daoism has introduced impartiality to all the creatures. Thus it is the presumption and egoism of humanity that impose the ranking system onto nature. For “Daoism believes that there is no substantial gap between human and nature, because everything is linked with others immanently” (Po-Keung Ip 1983, 5). In entirety, human beings and other beings in nature belong to the same organic cosmic organism, which denies the dualistic view of humanity and nature. However, modern industrial societies commonly employ the notion of duality of humanity and nature, and thus, humanity has undergone tremendous inflation of egoism. Human beings act as a dominant master over the cosmos and drastically damage their environment. By contrast, Daoism, with its belief that “all forms have the nature of Dao,” confirms the value of all beings. So, we can say that Daoism, extending its love to humanity, all other living beings, and even all the creatures in the cosmos, nourishes the broadest concern for life. In this unique paradigm of Daoism, people learn about nature with the intention to join and love rather than control it. Humanity and nature are equal; though, “humanity is not only the son of heaven and earth, but also the elder brother of all the other beings” (Wang 1960, 340). Humanity is in charge of “assisting heaven to give birth” (88), “helping earth nurture life” (124), and “facilitating all beings to grow spontaneously by inaction” (ibid.). “Assisting” here should be in conformity with the nature of all beings rather than being carried out by force. In this manner, Daoism con-

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verts the idea of “conquering the nature” into “nurturing nature according to the harmony of heaven and earth,” which directs people to assist heaven and earth in keeping ecological balance and natural beauty.

Cultivating Oneself: Harmony of Body and Mind Another important aspect of harmony in Daoism has been the harmonious relationship between body and mind. The “fostering life” or “selfcultivation” (yangsheng, ඿⏕), meaning to lead a simple, harmonious, and meaningful life, aims to achieve the perfection of both mind and body. The idea has the potential to deepen and enrich our thoughts and provide new paradigms for our health, especially for people who resist interventionist urges and cultivate the Dao—a cosmic practice that is as powerful and trustworthy as it is natural. Each individual being is particular and non-replicable, so individual life is of sacramental value. Daoism has sufficiently recognized this holiness of life. It says that among myriad things, “human life is the primary thing.” “Life” is so important that it is often employed as the alias of Dao, such as in the saying, “oneness of life and Dao.” Also, “valuing life” (guisheng, 峝⏕) in Daoism, which renounces the contrived pursuit of fame and material gains and goes in for a true person relieved from disorientation of humanity, has become a valuable way of self-cultivation. Many modern human beings seem to be convinced that “civilization” means “getting away” from nature, so when going earnestly after the material indulgence, they gradually get numb, ignore their true feelings, and leave the meaning of life in oblivion. Daoism suggests that, if everyone gets down to self-cultivation, and step-by-step approaches the spontaneous, powerful, and reliable cosmic origin, the world will, in the meantime, undertake subtle and universal alterations. In Daoism, the person who has grasped and acquired the path of Dao will be entitled as the “perfected person” (zhen ren, ┿ே), which means a person that has kin-spirits with Dao, heaven, and earth. Such persons preserve themselves by cultivating themselves; after that, through nondirective deeds, they can be concerned about, help, and even convert other people. That course is called “huamin” (transforming the people, ໬Ẹ). Zhuangzi said, “in our dealing with and friction with other things, we gallop forward on our course unable to stop. Is this not sad?” (Mair 1994, 14). Zhuangzi points out that for people to be obsessed with material things, to give up self-control, or go with the flow is sad and pitiful. According to Jeffrey F. Meyer, in order to overcome or obviate this kind of predicament:

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One of the significant actions taken by Daoism toward its ideal of valuing life is the cultivation of oneself, especially inner cultivation. According to the Daoist view, humanity and the universe are based on the same pattern—Dao, and there is a circulation and exchange of qi between humanity and the cosmos. This being the case, the cultivation of elixir to lengthen one’s lifespan and the operation of the cosmos observe a common mechanism. Consequently, the cultivation of human life needs to be performed in accordance with the natural environment. For instance, the periodical circulation of the moon and the sun affects the tempo of human individuals’ physiological activities, including the blood and qi function in human bodies. In light of this truth, the cultivation should be carried out by balancing the interaction of yin and yang in strict coordination with the waxing and waning of the sun and the moon, so that people can join in the spontaneity of the cosmos and achieve the oneness of humanity and heaven. Daoism regards the body as a spiritual eco-system. Life beings are arranging and adjusting their activities according to the timing for energy acquisition. Such being the case, the cultivation of the inner elixir (neidan, ෆ୹) would be equal to a special renovation on the inner world of the human body. The series of practices in religious Daoism take coordination between micro cosmos and macro cosmos as their code, for instance, maintaining inner vigor, “fostering life,” medicine, music, and commandment. In Daoist cultivation, the practitioners, with the knowledge that humanity and the cosmos share common structure, laws of movement, and system, and can finally reach an ideal order in their inner world by cultivating their temperament, dissolving the clash between soul and flesh, transcending the conflict of body and mind, and meanwhile coming closer to the spontaneity of cosmic. Daoist rites involve a pious religious emotion for nature and a concern for the harmonious coexistence of everything on earth. Last but not least, the best place for life is the Daoist “grotto heaven and blessed earth” (Dongtian fudi, Ὕኳ⚟ᆅ). These are also holy places for Daoists to perform self-cultivation, and endowed with profound natural beauty. Dongtian fudi is usually favorable for deep communication between human beings and nature. While the humanity-nature harmony relies on the coordination of body and mind as well as on the purification of human beings’ inner selves, the

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human body constitutes the natural aspect of human life. This “landscape of the body” implies that both the physiological and moral aspects of people are contained in the scope of self-cultivation. Through Daoist cultivation, the Daoists would finally accomplish a religious goal. As put by contemporary scholar Kristofer Schipper: The emphasis on the self, on the personal relationship to the Dao implies, also with respect to the preservation of the natural environment, that each person is responsible for the Dao, each person embodies the Dao. The preservation of the natural order therefore depends absolutely on the preservation of this natural order and harmony within us and not on some outside authority. The environment is within us. This Priority of the inner world is one of the crucial tenets of Daoism. The outside crisis and dangers are overcome and transformed by the transforming of our inside world, i.e. to purify and reshape the environment through the harmony of ourselves. All beings are transformed through that. With perfection attained, the body will radiate harmony that is beneficial to its environment. (2001, 92)

We modern people have been realizing that the crux of happiness is not concealed in the outer but resides in the inner self. Thus, the salvation of the world begins with nothing but the conversion of the individual. That is that on which religious Daoists focus their effort—through self-cultivation, absent-mindedness and excessive desires would be dispelled and the purgation and coordination of the body system regained. The goal of Daoist practice is the establishment of harmony on different levels: between the body and mind of the individual, between the individual and its surroundings, and between the individual and the cosmos. The ultimate, ideal level of attainment is one of oneness, of merging oneself with environment in a sense of cosmic union that alone can lead to the complete fulfillment, and further, the transcending self. Individual cultivation is the hinge to achieve health for oneself, and much more significantly, for the community, nature, and eventually the planet.

The Heavenly Dao Diminishes the Excessive and Replenishes the Deficient: The Harmony of Society When applied to politics, hé is rendered as “the heavenly Dao that diminishes the excessive and replenishes the deficient.” It accentuates the principles of equity. Daoism encourages altruism such as “benefitting the society by aiding the weak community and ferrying the endangered to

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security” (jishi duren, 㳶ୡᗘே), or “valuing pliancy and remaining benevolent especially when one is mighty” (guirou shouci, 峝ᰂᏲ㞤). It is the way of heaven to take from what has in excess in order to make good what is deficient. The way of man is otherwise: it takes from those who are in want in order to offer this to those who already have more than enough. (Daode jing, §77; Wang 1998, 254)

That is to say, the law of nature is always removing the surplus resources from the rich to make up for the poor. People who, wallowing in money, do not show any sympathy for or donate to the poor who are starving to death are guilty forever. The sustainable development is a development not confined to the economic growth but having equal consideration for the poor to create more opportunities for them to participate in the decisionmaking process of their own life. We pay attention to fact that poverty is the major issue of global problems; a fair social development should aid and give more rights to the poverty-stricken people, especially impoverished women. So another important aspect is the situation of women. Daoism is quite different from some other cultural traditions in its attitude toward women. Daoism values softness and modesty. Equality between the sexes comes from the idea of the balance between yin and yang. The Book of Great Peace says that the nature of heaven and earth is half yin and half yang. Since the world distanced itself from Dao, discrimination against women has become widespread, leading to yin being diminished and to the loss of equilibrium between heaven and earth. The lonely yang element, without a companion, began to wither and dry up (Wang 1960, 34). Daoism’s concept of the equality between man and woman may restore balance and be a valuable contribution to modern culture and society’s sustainable development. By the same token, to ensure that the developing countries progress in a balanced way, developed countries should limit their consumption of resources and productions and donate the surplus part to the developing countries who have been struggling for basic need for life. In governing to ensure a peaceful and prosperous society, governors should learn from the way of heaven by adopting the principle of wuwei, i.e. “to govern through non-action (wuwei erzhi, ᪢ᷢ⪋἞).” Too much interruption will definitely destroy the harmony. Moreover, “The Dao invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone” (wuwei er wubuwei, ᪢ᷢ⪋᪢୙ᷢ). Liu Xiaogan (ี➗ᩒ) explains that the combination of wu (no, ᪢) and wei (action, ᷢ) seems to indicate, yet does not mean “taking no action” or “governing the world by doing nothing.” Actu-

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ally, it refers to “being as non-being,” “action as non-action,” or “actions that appear as almost nothing”; that is, to restrain human actions in a certain scope. It is a special guideline for governing advocated by Laozi: The theory of wuwei prefers natural, gradual, and moderate style of conduct and opposes movements exercised intensively, coercively, dramatically, and in a large scale. Evidently, the former is close to the spirit of wuwei, and the latter is against it. (Liu Xiaogan 2001, 317)

Thus, wuwei actually represents a principle of following spontaneity, and, if taken by all people as their code by which to live, it will increase our hope to realize a harmonious society. On one hand, the principle of wuwei in Daoism asserts that everybody on earth has the ability to adjust themselves according to the fluxing of their surroundings. Thus intervention on them should be as limited as possible. On the other hand, Daoism also insists that helping others is a virtue from a cosmic view, apart from exhorting people to cultivate their inner vigor on principle of spontaneity. Persons who merely care about promoting their skills and capability to change things, but ignore the cultivation of morality, would never reach immortality. So, Holmes Rolston, an environmentalist and philosopher from the United States, when commending Daoism for its reciprocal interaction of yin and yang, regarded it as not only an explanation for cosmic movement, but also a sagacious guidance for human’s behavior. Significantly, this ideal contains a special ethics that makes the best of both worlds, as was related by David L. Hall in 1987: Taoist ethics is in fact a sort of aesthetics in which we are “enjoined” to be spontaneous (tzu-jan)—that is, to act (wu-wei) in harmony with things by deferring (wu-chih, we-wei, wu-yu) to the intrinsic excellences (te) of items encountered and by enjoying acts of deference directed toward us by virtue of the appreciation of our te. (187)

In general, the concept of hé, under the eminent guidance of wuwei, which embraces both aesthetical and ethical perfection, is aspiring after the universal valuing and treasuring of life, in which all beings are born and coexisting in a peaceful and friendly way. In a broad and deep sense, Daoism has a great concern for the justice in social development. As for social justice, here should be listed its three major aspects: equal rights for people of the same generation in production and distribution, equal opportunities for different generations of people to

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take advantage of the resources, and justice in relationships between men and women. Evidently, these ideas can find their counterparts in Daoism, especially when the idea of hé as harmony fully embodies the law of balancing between yin and yang, and individual and society. Daoism treats heaven, earth, and humankind as one organism. It shows great respect for the health of people’s minds and bodies. Unfortunately, modern economy masks a disfigured planet. Consequently, the balance of our life and culture has been substantially damaged. Then, what must be undertaken nowadays are reparative positive interventions, including administrative policies, education, international academic communications, and cooperation among social communities must be undertaken. In conclusion, under the circumstances of globalization, we consider cultural diversity to be as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. The four aspects of hé in Daoism may provide an inspirational and profound vision for protecting cultural pluralism, social justice, and the environment.

References Chuang-tzu. 1998. Wandering on the Way, Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Zhuangzi. Translated with introduction and commentary by Victor H. Mair. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Girardot, N. J., James Miller, and Liu Xiaogan, eds. 2001. Daoism and Ecology: Ways within a Cosmic Landscape. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hall, David L. 1987. “On Seeking a Change of Environment: A QuasiTaoist Proposal.” Philosophy East and West, 37 (2): 160–171. Kirkland, Russell. 1995. “Religious Daoism.” In Encyclopedia of Bioethics. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan. Kung, Hans, and Karl Jose Kuschel, eds. 1993. A Global Ethics—The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions. London: Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions. Liu Xiaogan. 2001. “Non-Action and Environment Today: A Conceptual and Applied Study of Laozi’s Philosophy.” In Girardot, Miller, and Xiaogan, Daoism and Ecology, 315–340. Mair, Victor H. 1994. Introduction and Notes for a Complete Translation of the Chuang Tzu. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies.

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Major, John S., trans. 1993. Heaven and Earth in Early Han Thought: Chapters Three, Four, and Five of the Huainanzi. Albany: State University of New York Press. Meyer, Jeffrey. 2001. “Salvation in the Garden: Daoism and Ecology.” In Girardot, Miller, and Xiaogan, Daoism and Ecology, 219–236. Po-Keung Ip. 1983. “Taoism and the Foundations of Environmental Ethics.” In Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence, edited by Susan Armstrong and Richard Boltzer, 539–544. Boston: McGraw Hill. Rongjing Ge, ed. 1991. Daoist Culture and Modern Civilization. Beijing: China People’s University Press. Schipper, Kristofer. 2001. “Daoist Ecology: The Inner Transformation: A Study of the Precepts of the Early Daoist Ecclesia.” In Girardot, Miller, and Xiaogan, Daoism and Ecology, 79–94. Wang, Keping. 1998. The Classic of the Dao (Daode jing): A New Investigation. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Wang, Ming. 1960. Taipingjing he jiao [ཚᒣ㓿ਸṑ, Collations of the book of great peace]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. (Annotated with text in traditional Chinese characters [Fantizi].) Zhu Xi. 1963. Zhongyong [The doctrine of the mean]. Commentary by Wing-tsit Chan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER TEN WHITEHEAD’S CONCEPTS OF NUMBER AND HARMONY: THEIR BACKGROUND, TRANSFORMATION, AND USE LEONIDAS BARGELIOTES

Careful analysis of Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of number and harmony points to Pythagoras, who saw the cosmos in terms of number and mathematical ratios or harmonies. Number, according to his conception, underlies all physical reality and is the beginning, the source and principle of all existents. The function of number is so important to later Pythagoreans, such as Philolaus, as to consider it as “guide and master of human thought” (Navon 1986, fr. 4, 11), while Archytas extends the exact mathematical relationships to beautiful composition. As Aristotle has put it, “[the Pythagoreans] construct the whole universe out of numbers” (Metaphysics 1080b16–21). No wonder that Whitehead has stated that this “bold generalization” by the Pythagoreans is the starting point from which our modern mathematization of physical phenomena has developed. Whitehead’s all-inclusive, self-contained, metaphysical system, an “organismic universe,” as he calls it, essentially involves its own connections. In this regard, there are perspectives of the universe not only, for the “number three,” but also for the “color blue,” and of any other definite occasion of realized fact. Perhaps a better example of this connection is the society of an organism, in which all of its members feel each other, grasp each other, and are interwoven in patterned contrasts. Number and spaces, the mathematical entities, are the ultimate stuff out of which the real entities of our perceptual experience are constructed. Whitehead recognizes the importance of the Pythagorean concepts of number and harmony as they have been expressed mainly by Plato’s

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dialectic of opposites and by the musical scale and harmony, which clearly indicate the applicability of mathematics to physical phenomena and, in human experience, to the dialogue of cultures and mutual understanding.

Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism One of the main interests of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is to provide a ground for unification of the various dualisms or “bifurcations” of the nature of things. He is the first scientist and philosopher in modern times who felt the need for unification of blind emotions of human experience with advanced scientific concepts; the fusion of the sentimentality of art with rules of succession of science; and the analytic discrimination, “the red glow of the sunset with the molecules and electronic waves” (1955a, 29). In short, he sought the unification of mathematical concepts with immediate sense qualities. Hence, Whitehead endeavored to construct a “coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of experience can be interpreted” (1929, 5). That is, he sought “a system of ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in the natural science” (vi). This is Whitehead’s adequate concrete metaphysical principle, applicable to everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought. It is outlined in his principle of connectedness, the “iron necessity of the universe upon which lies the ‘harmony’ of logic and metaphysics” (1958, 27). This idea is better expressed in his “philosophy of organism” the outcome of “our co-ordinated knowledge,” according to which: you cannot confine any important reorganization to one sphere of thought alone. You cannot shelter theology from science, or science from theology; nor can you shelter either of them from metaphysics, or metaphysics from either of them. There is no short cut to truth. (1960, 77)

There is no better elucidation of this interdependence than Whitehead’s description of organism: The body pollutes the mind, the mind pollutes the body. Physical energy sublimates itself into zeal; conversely, zeal stimulates the body. The biological ends pass into ideals of standards, and the formation of standards affects the biological facts. The individual is formative of the society and the society is formative of the individual. Particular evils infect the whole world, particular goods point the way of escape. (ibid., 85)

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Facts themselves, which are any particular science seeks to establish, presuppose metaphysics with regard to the world as a whole. The world thus disclosed is, through and through, interdependent. The significance of Whitehead’s ambitious program can be realized only by the two basic concepts of the philosophy of organism, namely, number and harmony. In terms of these two concepts, one can achieve the correlation of the mathematical with the immediate sense qualities of our experience; the dialogical interrelation of the various contrasts and conflicting views; the unification of the aesthetic feeling in its various levels; and a harmonious world. These concepts can be traced back to Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle—among others—and are supported by arguments drawn from the philosophy of organism itself.

Historical Background Pythagoras Pythagoras is known not only as the most famous figure of philosophy and as a great seeker of truth and wisdom but also for his conceptions of cosmos, number, harmony, the “music of the spheres,” and of the organized life. These concepts foreshadow the empirical and scientific flowering of neo-Platonic studies (Iamblichus, Proclus, Plethon) and of Renaissance thought down to modernity—including the philosophy of organism. In his cosmogony, Pythagoras divides cosmic creation into the three levels of being—Monad, the principle of all things; indeterminate Dyad, which derives from the Monad and serves as a passive material to it; and numbers, which arise from monad (unity/God) and the indeterminate dyad. In this, he is alluding to mythical and mystical traditions alike.1 The main central tenet of Pythagorean philosophy held that the Divine Mind (Nous) instilled Number (Arithmos), that is the conscious proportion or the harmony of phenomena, into created things (Navon 1991, 40), thus producing the ensouled (empsychos), intelligent (noeros), and aesthetically perfect and spherical cosmos. This concept was carried down through the neo-Platonic cosmology, mainly by means of Plato’s Timaeus, transformation of Aristotle and of Whitehead, to the modern era. The mathematical and physical discoveries of the Pythagoreans, which account for the unity and the diversity of cosmos, for the particular and the whole as well as for their interrelations, were of importance for Plato’s interplay of opposites as well as Whitehead’s philosophy of organism—the “interweaving of qualitative fact with quantitative composition” (Whitehead 1967, 153). The combination of limit-odd with the unlimited-even,

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for example, resulted from the imposition of the limit principle on the unlimited. It produced the organic unity of cosmos, whether this unity is the source of the many or is derived from the combination of the two principles. Thus, number became the source of both the unlimited and the limit, which fitted both the universe as a whole and everything in it (148). Pythagoras is also known as a founder of the organized life within the rules of a particular society. Herein, the ethical concept of life mediates between the whole of the polis and individual persons, just as the Pythagorean mathematics mediates between the dialectic of philosophy and the irrational nature of immediate experience. There are no better exponents of the philosophy of the ancient Pythagoreans on both number (arithmos) and harmony (armonia) than the teachings of Philolaus2 and of Archytas.3 Arithmos, then, is that divine, cosmic harmony, which creates and arranges all things in a beautiful, aesthetic order or form or harmony. For the Pythagoreans, number had a mystical significance and independent reality.4 The function of numbers not only explained the physical world, but also symbolized moral qualities and other abstractions. They could express the love for the agreement of all things, and become the reconciling principle of the limiting form and the unlimited stuff of the all-embracing Eleatic Being and the Herakleitean flux, better, the reconciling “force” of the things of sense perception and the ordered soul, of the divine nature and the human art, especially music. Numbers are intimately connected with harmonia, meaning primarily the joining or fitting things together, which the Pythagoreans equated with number and associated with music. The generalization of number could apply to the whole heaven and become the harmony of the spheres (De Caelo 290b 12), while the numerical ratios, which determine the “concordant intervals of the scale” (Politics 531a), and constitutes the sacred art, could be connected with moral ideal of measure and balance and included in the studies of higher or liberal education. Plato has understood the “wise men” dialectically, in the sense that the geometrical order of the world established as a cosmos, and that communion and friendship and orderliness and measure and justice bind together heavens and earth, the gods and men (Gorgias in Plato 1988, 507–508). The contribution of Pythagoras to mathematical sciences and orderliness of cosmos is as much evident in Plato’s dialectical philosophy as the latter is evident in Whitehead’s philosophy of organism.

Plato Plato’s view of the cosmos is the divinized view of the Pythagoreans transformed and adjusted to his own cosmic scheme. According to this

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scheme, the metaphysical properties of nature should produce a harmonious and well-ordered cosmos and preserve, at the same time, its wonder (cf. Theaetetus 155c–156a; Phaedrus 274c–d). His procedure can be explicated as follows: (1) Plato acts as a physicist, who starts from the knowledge of the metaphysical properties of nature to produce a harmonious, well-ordered cosmos, rather than as an astronomer, who uses his knowledge of the mathematical and geometrical properties of heavenly bodies to determine their attributes (cf. Geminus, fragment quoted by Simplicius in Phys., 2, 2; Heath 1932, 124–5; Navon 1991, 73). Thus, in Timeaus (35a), the Creator (Demiurge) constructs the cosmos in harmonious proportions, while the World-Soul is composed of the Sameness, the Difference, and the Being, whereas the Being is a mean proportion between the other two. From these were created the three types of being: spirit (unchanging); astral (intermediate); and physical (changing). The Demiurge then distributes the whole into a set of geometrical proportions, which form two series of numbers: first the powers of two (1, 2, 4, 8) and, second, the power of three (1, 3, 9, 27) (ibid., 35b). Between each two successive numbers, Plato sets two mean proportions: the harmonic mean and the arithmetic mean (35c–36a). This whole series represents the notes of musical scale, extending to four octaves and a major sixth. This is, actually, an effort by Plato to represent the whole Pythagorean structure of cosmos based on mathematical/musical harmony, and to apply the above-mentioned series into a scheme of the heavenly spheres in correlation to human soul. Thus, it is apparent that Plato’s Demiurge forms the planetary spheres and their sizes, which correspond to the two series of numbers, by following the Pythagorean intuitive line of thought and policy and by using the Pythagorean divinized harmonious proportions of cosmos, of number (arithmos) and of harmony (harmonia). Aptly, Eros is known to be the oldest divine artist, transforming chaos into cosmos. The blessed and happy cosmos is, therefore, the “telos of love,” the outcome of love for a balanced and harmonious achievement. (2) It is the mathematical good, mathematical knowledge as has been presented by the Pythagorean Plato, which fascinated the philosopher of organism. For Plato, in contrast with Aristotle and in agreement with Whitehead, the acquisition of mathematical knowledge resembles more the character of religious initiation than of mere instruction or research. For Plato, arithmetic “draws the souls upwards . . . never allowing anyone to offer it for discussion mere collections of visible or tangible bodies” (Politics 525d). Similarly, the objects of geometrical knowledge are “eter-

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nal, not subject to decay,” and they tend to draw the soul toward truth and to produce a philosophic intelligence for the directing upwards of faculties which we wrongly turn earthwards” (527b). Astronomy, too, as a pure mathematical science, must turn the soul’s gaze upwards, not literally to the sky, but to the realm of “real being and the invisible” (529a–d). “A invisible harmony is better than a visible” (Heraclitus, fragment B54), can only be found by the soul animated by an anticipating urge in the right direction (Voegelin 1952, 68). Thus, man will find the truth of the human affairs when he opens his psyche to the truth of God, which means a conversion, the turning-around from the untruth of human affairs to the truth of the Idea (Politics 518d–e). (3) Of equal importance for Whitehead is the Platonic synthesis of the arts. The invisible harmony, already defined, can be found in the aesthetic synthesis of the arts and the ways of life inspired by the divine Muses, which constitute its religious-mystical background, unquestionably accepted and revered. The human soul, inspired by the Muse with “divine madness” (ȝĮȞȓĮ) creates “music” (ȝȠȣıȚțȒ), the highest blessing of human existence, without which life would not be worth living (Plato, Phaidros 244b; 245b–c, in Mueller 1965, 149). From this point of view, the artist becomes a universal mirror reflecting the whole scale of physical and human existence, whose symbols Plato presents to our apprehension. That aesthetic nature is included in significant human art is important in that it shows the existing analogies between aesthetic nature and human expression. It shows that our environment is an essential element in any aesthetic education, and that an aesthetic education has to harmonize the natural bodily forces with the cultural aspirations of humanity. The aesthetic unity of soul and man and the symbolic fusion of body and soul constitute the foundation of the true community and “of our national culture.” It celebrates itself in great national festivals and becomes aware of itself in the artistic glorification of its historical past. Hence, “the true Muse is the companion of reason and philosophy” (Politics 548b–c), for the aim of the philosopher is to discern the nature of soul, divine and human, its experiences, and its activities. Eros, as aesthetic love in response to the call of the Muse, transfigures the given stuff into an expressive image of life (cf. Symposium 196e). It motivates true artists and distinguishes them from the unmusical (ȐȝȠȣıȠȞ). Only the philosopher poet can unify these two conditions (cf. Laws 4 719c–d; 7, 801b–c), and kindle the divine love, the “poetic fire” (Symposium 196e) in the souls of others (every one of us is a poet when we are in love). As a good dialectician, Plato understands the aesthetic life as a blessed

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union with the appearance of beauty (cf. Politcs 403c). This shows the inadequacy and helplessness of a purely aesthetic culture. Man’s soul is open to the transcendent Whole and is opposed to the charms of beautiful appearance. There is a need for it to go beyond beauty and art to evaluate beauty and aesthetic life with reference to the whole of reality. The ideal whole of reality without any visible embodiment, is “beyond [any given] being in power and dignity” (509b). It is easy from the above to gather that Plato’s contemplation of beauty transcends the beauties of the earth, bodies, practices, and sciences until one arrives at the knowledge of beauty itself and the essence of beauty, the “divine beauty,” the “pure and clear and unalloyed . . . the divine beauty in its uniqueness” (ibid., 211a–b). Beauty then is the whole of all those levels and the opposites contained in them, while art imitates beauty. Only by active participation and imitation of beauty may any sensible appearance be judged beautiful. But every work of art is a concrete whole of opposites, made visible to imagination and philosophical self-comprehension, while “beauty in and for itself,” which man enjoys, is the “only home he has in this world.” “For when man has brought forth and reared this perfect beauty, he shall be called the friend of God, and if ever it is given to man to put in immortality, it shall be given to him” (Symposium 212a). The same is true for Whitehead’s footnote as outlined in his notions of truth, beauty, peace, and harmony and traced in our exposition of Pythagoras and of the Pythagorean Plato. Whitehead is indebted to all these notions, particularly that of beauty. What is left for us to consider is his famous footnote of the Platonic philosophy, which the philosopher of organism has doubtfully restricted to Western philosophy.

Whitehead’s Metaphysical Scheme and the Levels of the Ladder Whitehead has transformed Plato to his own scheme of thought and philosophy of organism to the same degree that Plato had transformed Pythagoras. Thus, Plato can be called the measure and the mediator of transformations. Like the Pythagorean number, which could construct the whole universe, Whitehead’s system of ideas could interpret every element of human experience and bring together aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world that have their origin in natural science. The ideas, as he puts it, can bring together, “the dangers or desires, the triumphs and delights, the hopes and fears with the process of abstraction, of simplification and of generalization of science; the red glow of the sunset with the molecules and electronic waves”

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(1955a, 29n1). This is mainly expressed by the principle of connectedness of things, in which the emphasis is given to the emotion of human experience, interpreted, integrated, and transformed into higher and more complex categories of feelings.5 Though the system of organic philosophy is (in process and language) that of relativity, the ladder of ascent is similar to that of Pythagorean Plato. We can easily identify four levels in what follows, namely: mathematical and the mathematical physics; kinship and prehension; aesthetic values of nature and art; and the intensities of higher aesthetic contrasts. (1) The first level of the ladder, basic for our inquiry, is Pythagoras’ doctrine of “interwoven patterned contrasts,” such as realized in actual entities and eternal objects. Like the “bold generalization” of the power of the Pythagorean number, Whitehead explicitly recognizes that mathematical entities are the ultimate stuff out of which real entities of our perceptual experience are constructed. Their involvement covers all the branches of knowledge and grasps the “full law of the interweaving of qualitative fact with geometrical and quantitative composition” (Whitehead 1958, 23). Hence, Whitehead’s statement, “we have in the end come to a version of the doctrine of Pythagoras, from whom mathematics and mathematical physics, took the rise” (36). His advice to the mathematicians and scientists was to give a coordinated type of knowledge, which takes account of the full range and depth of the connectedness of things, to “provide an adequate analysis of the relationship between the mathematical and the physical” (Leclerc 1972, 350). Whitehead’s indebtedness to the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of number and harmony is fundamental because of its profound insight into the nature of things, which affected the mathematization of things, although he transforms it toward the creation of a more complex speculative philosophy and philosophy of science. Like the Pythagorean construction of the “whole universe out of numbers,” his speculative philosophy is a construction aiming at the ground of its application. As he puts it, “both science and metaphysics start from the same given ground—work of immediate experience, and in the main proceed in opposite directions on their diverse tasks” (1917, 113–114). In following the Pythagorean Plato—and, in some cases, Aristotle’s biological teleology—Whitehead believed in the ultimate rationality of the universe, that philosophy should “seek the forms in the facts” and that these forms are systematically interconnected. Since he also believed that the pattern thus displayed has affinities with the pattern found in mathematics, it is important to understand how he connected this pattern with his philosophy of organism.

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In the first place, a comparison of the general conditions of logical reason with the discovery of mathematics concerned with the totality of these general abstract conditions clearly shows their applicability to the relationships among the entities of any one concrete occasion. They themselves are interconnected in the manner of the pattern—to use the terminology of the organismic philosophy (Whitehead 1958, 29–41). No wonder then that Whitehead calls this reasonable harmony of being, which is the requirement for the unity of complex occasion together with the completeness of realization of all that is involved in its logical harmony the “primary article of metaphysical doctrine.” This means, “from the reasonable togetherness and the ability of thought to penetrate into every occasion of fact, we come to an insight into real connections, and can proceed to the knowledge exemplified in that same occasion” (41) and consequently, to the philosophy of organism. The task of that philosophy is to join three distinct factors in an organic unity: the movement of thought; the eternal objects thought about, whose real connections are revealed when we think truly; and the possible exemplification of these connections in the physical world. To summarize thus far, the philosopher of organism was guided by the Pythagorean-Platonic account of mathematics. By avoiding the misreading of the “traditional rationalism” or “traditional empiricism” and René Descartes’ dualism, it sought an objectively real pattern for mathematical reasoning rather than a subjective order, as self-evident axioms or even as premises of a deductive system of thought, which, in Whitehead’s view, are “under suspicion” (1929, 12). The misreading could be avoided by the task of the philosophy of organism, which explicates the process of togetherness and separation, which is inherent in facts and sciences; to themselves and to their transformations. Both are required for a true method of discovery used by natural science. Whitehead’s advice to physical science concerns the reconsidering of its foundations toward a more concrete view of the character of real things, and of conceiving of its fundamental notions as abstractions from direct intuitions (1958, 135). Physical science, like mathematics, must avoid the unfortunate bifurcation of the strange world of molecular interaction on the one hand, and of our perception on the other. It is the function of physical science to include our sensory experience within nature, to consider our perception as being themselves natural events, and to exhibit the interconnectedness of spatio-temporal relations upon which is based our knowledge.6 The new categorical scheme for physical science, then, concerns the concept of event introduced as “the ultimate of natural occurrence,” a thing “grasped into a realized unity,” which replaces the old scheme of

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simple location, that is, the notion of a thing existing at a particular here and enduring through a succession of instantaneous nows (ibid., 226). According to the concepts of simple location, minds that observe nature are supposed to be different sorts of things from the nature they observe. On that view, the ordinary objects of sense perception (a castle seen at a distance, a planet in the sky) are considered to be unreal. They are actually only material particles that cause changes in the observer via his sense organs. The consequences of such conceptions, though stated in modern terms, are too destructive for our culture as they were in Pythagoras’ and Plato’s time. For example, for physicists and philosophers who affirm the “truth” of the dominant categorical scheme, nature is “a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merely the hurrying of material endlessly and meaninglessly.” But from this point of view, it is we, not the rose, who should get the credit for the scent; we, not the nightingale, the credit for its song. “The poets, then, are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self-congratulations on the excellence of the human mind” (ibid., 80). But the poets are right in refusing to believe scientific dogma about the unreality of secondary qualities and by insisting on the endurance and interpenetration of things that “bear witness that nature cannot be divorced from the aesthetic values . . . arising from the cumulation of the brooding presence of the whole on to its various parts” (ibid., 127). The explanations based upon the developments in twentieth-century physics (such as discoveries about properties of electrons) have made the interpretation in terms of simple location, otherwise called “dominant scheme” and the “ideal science,” that is, the mechanical explanation of all natural phenomena, hopelessly complex and contradictory. Take, for example, the problem of disconnected entities. Disconnected entities make inference, causal action, and change impossible and problematic. It is impossible, for instance, to define velocity without some reference to the past and the future. This means the introduction of a present instance without duration would be destructive for science and its assumptions.7 The new philosophy of organism also explains the ambiguity of the continuous or discontinuous existence of an electron when it traverses its path in space. This is of utmost importance not only for the quantum physics but also for philosophy and multicultural understanding. The ambiguity arises if we use the apparently undifferentiated endurance of matter (as now accepted for sound and light), that is, when we conceive each primordial element as a vibratory ebb and flow of an underlying energy, or activity. In accordance with the organismic conception of event as prehensive unity of all manifold aspects of nature, the “system forming the primordial

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element, is nothing at any instant. It requires its whole period in which to manifest itself” (ibid., 55). The difference between the two conceptions is crucial: if material is taken as fundamental, then the property of endurance is an arbitrary fact at the base of the order of nature. But if organism is taken fundamental, the property is the result of evolution. Thus, the manifold aspects of nature prehended into events have led to: (a) a replacement in physics of the old notion that nature can be explained in terms of locomotion of material, with the notion of the “vibratory locomotion of a given pattern as a whole,” on the one hand, and the “vibratory change of pattern” on the other hand; and (b) to a new aspect of science, which is neither purely physical, nor purely biological. “Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of smaller organisms” (ibid., 191, 150). Hence, no fundamental difference exists between physics and biology. The same is true between the relatively simple organisms studied in physics and biology and those much larger and richer organisms called men (Jones 1969, 323). The importance of this reconsideration for our education, culture, and behavior is evident. We are now able to distinguish between abstraction and immediacy. Instants and particles should be considered, not as high abstractions, but as stuff of immediate perception. “Instants are derived from duration . . . particles from events” (Whitehead 1956, 159). Quantum phenomena are thus translated into a pervasive characteristic of nature through the concept of rhythm, which Whitehead identifies with “life,” and then the rhythm itself with aesthetic contrast. The essence of this “natural rhythm” is the fusion of sameness and novelty, that is, a rhythm conceived as a process whereby creation produces natural pulsation, which forms a unity of historic fact (Whitehead 1958, 37). That was the “most important interest” in nature that had been left out by the science to which Whitehead opposes a nature conceived not only as a unity but also as a living organism. Thus, the concepts of an old epoch have been transformed into the terms of a new epoch. The terms of kinship and of prehension constitute the second level of ladder. (2) The terms “kinship” and “prehension” are used to express a society of entities in an organism feeling each other, in a way that their unity constitutes a “process of appropriation of a particular element.” This can be achieved by the “prehension” which “grasps together” and by which the organism appropriates what it needs from the characteristics of the environment. The interconnected whole, therefore, must include the elements of “danger and desire,” “triumph and delight,” “hope and fear.” This is the principle of interconnectedness of nature that can be discerned in the life that lies below the level of consciousness and its quality, in what

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Whitehead calls the “theatre for interrelations of activities” (Whitehead 1966, 140). The interrelations within bodies tend to embrace that which is agreeable and to exclude or expel that which is ingrate (Whitehead 1958, 68). In this noncognitive process of appropriation of a particular element, the organism “prehends,” grasps together into unity, what it needs from the characteristics of the environment. Every prehension consists not only of the “subject” which prehends the “datum” and the subjective form, which is how that subject prehends that datum, but also of emotions and valuations. Whitehead has realized that the “dichotomies,” the “bifurcations” as he calls them, made the world the victim of the principle of division, of the “ideal opposites” and of the paradoxes they manifest (Levi 1959, 530). The interconnections of the philosophy of organism have been used for a criticism and healing of the various dichotomies and bifurcations, particularly those in the arts. Neither physical nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse together as essential factors in the composition of “really real things,” which interconnections and individual characters constitute the universe (Whitehead, 1966, 150). The key to this “metaphysical synthesis of existence” is the “values of nature” (Whitehead 1955b, 28), a synthesis that entails rejection of the postulation of boundaries between physical fact, on the one hand, and value and mental intervention on the other. These three factors—physical, mental, and axiological—are essentially related. (3) Since science has neglected connectedness in favor of the abstract, to redress the imbalance, Whitehead turns to English poetic literature, particularly to William Wordsworth, for whom nature cannot be divorced from the aesthetic values. Thus, “we gain,” Whitehead points out, “from the poets the doctrine that a philosophy of nature must concern itself at least with six notions: change, value, eternal objects, endurance, organism, interfusion” (1958, 127). What Wordsworth found was the whole of nature as involved in particular instances: the aesthetic intuitions of mankind which the “mechanism of science” had left out; the element of value permeating through and through the poetic view of nature which must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something” (ibid., 93). In this multi-termed process of prehension, value is included as the intrinsic reality of an event (Whitehead 1929, 427). The aesthetic unity in this unifying process binds together the contrasts involved in artistic creation. This tension holds true for all arts: where there are contrasts, they struggle for unity; where there is unity, they struggle for contrasts. It is possible, however, for this kind of prehension to be intensified in the harmonies of enduring shapes of values, which merge into higher in-

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tensities of feelings and aesthetic attainment. Insofar as there is a disposition of emphasis to maximize the intensities of feeling through the massiveness and depth of contrasts there is an order in the universe. In Whitehead’s own words, “the intense experience is an aesthetic fact and the order of conformal feelings is an aesthetic principle” (ibid., 427). (4) The culmination of the organismic scheme can be seen at the fourth level, notably, in the notions of Eros, Psyche, and peace, and their application to our experience and dialogue of cultures.

Culmination and Application of the Scheme Whitehead uses the terms “Eros” and “Psyche” to introduce measure and balance and coordination of higher aesthetic contrasts leading up to the notion of peace or harmony of harmonies. The first of these aesthetic contrasts is appearance and reality. (1) The familiar contrast of appearance and reality discussed by Plato is significant for the philosophy of organism. From the functional point of view, appearance is the perception of the individuals in their final elimination, while reality is that from which the new occasion springs. Appearance preserves the intensities that properly derive from reality and the massive feeling transferred to it either of harmony either of discords. Appearance is then the basis for the experience of harmony with a foreground being of enduring individualities carrying with them a force of subjective tone, and with a background providing the requisite connection. It is, in other words, the transformed reality after synthesis with the conceptual valuations. “The great harmony,” as Whitehead puts it, “is the harmony of enduring individualities, connected in the unity of a background” (Whitehead 1967, 281). (2) Whitehead’s second contrast of truth and beauty is also important. He defines truth as the conformation of appearance to reality, and beauty as a mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience. In contrast with the Platonic tradition, beauty is a wider and more fundamental notion than truth, because its relevance is both to the intrinsic constitution of nature and to the products of the human-made society. Whitehead points out, “the teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty” (ibid., 265). The “perfection of Beauty” is the outcome of the subjective forms of prehensions, which are jointly interwoven in patterned contrasts. This intermingling does not exclude discordant feelings, the “aesthetic distraction.” In Whitehead’s terms, “some admixture of Discord is a necessary factor in the transition from mode to mode” (ibid., 266). That is, the intermingling of Beauty and Discord lies in the nature of

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things. Progress itself is founded upon the experience of discordant feelings. Beauty, also, requires contrast with discord, which is fundamental in the creation of new intensities of feelings. Beauty demands order, but cannot exist without disorder, which discord introduces. The image of God is used to contrast the temporary world, namely, its “shipwreck” for the introduction of needed contrasts, such as: joy and sorrow, freedom and necessity, good and evil. Philosophy once again returns to its dialectical opposites. Whitehead thus recognizes the value of discordance. The value of discord is a tribute to the merits of imperfection. The general character of truth, on the other hand, can be traced in a widespread instinctive conviction about the existence of an order of things. But truth has also a narrower meaning, as the conformation of appearance to reality. Whitehead’s Platonic interplay of opposites is evident. If beauty is related to appearance alone, it does not necessarily involve the attainment of truth. In the absence of truth, beauty is in a lower level, with a defect of massiveness. In the absence of beauty, truth sinks into triviality. In organismic terms, “Truth matters because of Beauty” (ibid., 267). Thus, the function of truth is to serve beauty and to promote beauty of feeling. Truth then is a requirement for the attainment of supreme Beauty. “The Truth of supreme Beauty,” Whitehead writes, “lies beyond the dictionary meaning of words” (ibid.). There is, therefore, a gradation of beauty because of its relation to truth. Truthful beauty, however, is the harmony resulting from a conformation, a synergism, of appearance and reality, of clear patterns of conscious experience and the dim, massive patterns manifested through the microcosmic real. (3) The philosophy of organism ends with the notion of peace or harmony of harmonies, which completes the panorama of a civilized life, the perfect attainment of coexistence and of a peaceful way of life. Whitehead distinguishes this general quality of peace as harmony of harmonies from love and tenderness and from impersonality and egotism, since it “calms destructive turbulence and completes civilization” (ibid., 285). In his effort to define “peace,” Whitehead reminds us of the mystic and intuitional language of Pythagoras and Plato when they had to reveal a broad and secret doctrine. His definition of “peace” as a broadening of feeling, due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, un-verbalized, yet momentous, in its coordination of values, points to that direction. It effects the removal of the stress from the soul’s preoccupation with itself and the surpassing of personality. Therefore, “Peace” is primarily “a trust in the efficacy of beauty” (ibid., 285), but peace itself is in need of truth since attainment of the latter belongs to the essence of peace. The realization of peace has as its objective that harmony the interconnections of which involve truth.

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Nevertheless, these “Platonic” interrelated general notions are not inherently sufficient to develop a complete concept of civilization, because no logical argument can demonstrate the gap between them; similarly, the feeling of incompleteness relates to the notion of transcendence, which, in turn, is essential for peace, among others. Plato’s “footnote” is again, and finally, inevitable. The secret of the union of the interrelated opposites is that it attains through incompleteness its end, the harmony of harmonies (ibid., 296). This is the inevitable and realistic conclusion of the philosophy of organism.

Notes 1.

“I myself believe that when these people—the Egyptians (who name the supreme god, whom they believe to be one with the universe)—call the monad Apollo, the dyad Artemis, the hebdomad Athena, and the first cube Poseidon, it is like what is established and assuredly enacted and written in sacred rites [hieroglyphics]” (Diogenes Laertius 1958, 323-5). Cf. Plutarch, 9–10 quoted in Evangeliou 2006, 32). 2. Philolaus says, “the power, efficacy, and essence of number is seen in the decade; it is great, it realizes all its purposes, it is the cause of all effects; the power of the decade is the principle and guide of all life, divine, celestial, or human. . . . Indeed, it is the nature of number which teaches us comprehension, which serves us as guide, which teaches us all things, which would remain impenetrable and unknown for every man. . . . By means of sensation, number instils a certain proportion, and thereby establishes among all things harmonic relations, analogous to the nature of the geometrical figure called the gnomon; it incorporates intelligible reasons of things, separates them, individualizes them both in finite and infinite things…it is in all its works, in all human thoughts, everywhere indeed, and even in the production of music. . . . Truth is the proper, innate character of number” (1990, 133–134). 3. Archytas extends the exact mathematical relationships, as they exist in geometry and numerical proportions of measurements, to beautiful composition to account for the particular and the whole. “For the mathematical studies appear to be related. For they are concerned with things that are related, namely the two primary forms of Being” (fragment D 47 (35) B1). 4. “Number was responsible for harmony, the divine principle that governed the structure of the whole world” (Guthrie 1971, 213). Aristotle had already stated, “they construct the whole universe out of numbers,” that they supposed the “elements of numbers to be the elements of things,” and that they saw cosmos in terms of number and mathematical ratios or harmonies (Aristotle, 1992, A5, 985b 23–26, M6, 1080b 16–21). 5. There are four phases of feeling: Conformal feelings, conceptual feelings, simple comparative feelings and complex comparative feelings or intellectual feelings (Whitehead 1929, 287, 290; Bargeliotes 1984, 75, 110).

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6.

Whitehead distinguishes two types of perception: “cognizance by adjective” and “cognizance by relatedness.” The former is the perception of sensory quality: the patch of redness, or the thunderous sound; the latter is based on the knowledge that nature is an interconnectedness of spatio-temporal relation, a closed system of related things (1922, Chap. 4). 7. Whitehead eloquently elucidates this concept: “a biological organism is a unity with the spatio-temporal extension which is the essence of its being. This biological conception is obviously incompatible with the traditional ideas . . . the concept of unities, functioning and with spatio-temporal extensions, cannot be extruded from physical concepts” (1919, 3).

References Aristotle. 1992. Metaphysics. In Aristotelis metaphysica, edited by Werner Jaeger. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bargeliotes, L. 1984. ȅ ĮȞĮșİȦȡȘȝȑȞȠȢ ȣʌȠțİȚȝİȞȚıȝȩȢ IJȠȣ Alfred North Whitehead [The reformed subjectivism of A. N. Whitehead]. Athens. Diogenes Laertius. 1958. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. 1–2 of Loeb Classical Library. Edited by Robert Drew Hicks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Evangeliou, Christos. 2006. Hellenic Philosophy, Origin and Character. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Guthrie, W. K. C. 1971. A History of Greek Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hampshire, Stuart. 1972. “A New Philosophy of the Just Society.” The New York Review of Books, 15 (3): 34–39. Heath, Thomas Little, Sir, ed. and tr. 1932. Greek Astronomy. New York: E. P. Dutton. Jones, W. T. 1969. A History of Western Philosophy, Kant to Wittgenstein and Sartre. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Leclerc, Ivor. 1972. The Nature of Physical Existence. New York: Humanities Press. Levi, A. W. 1959. Philosophy and the Modern World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mueller, G. 1965. Plato the Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic. New York: The Philosophical Library. Navon, R. 1991. The Harmony of the Spheres. El Paso, TX: Selene Books. —, trans.1986. Philolaus fragments, 4, 11. In The Pythagorean Writings. Kew Gardens, NY: Selene Books. Plato. 1988. Platonis Opera. Edited by Ioannes Burnet. New York: Oxford University Press. (This multivolume edition includes Gorgias [vol. 3],

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Theaetetus [vol. 1], Phaedrus [vol. 2], Timaeus [vol. 4], and Symposium [vol. 2] among others of Plato’s works). Voegelin, Eric. 1952. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Whitehead, Alfred North. 1917. The Organization of Thought. London: Williams and Norgate. —. 1919. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press. —. 1929. Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan. —. 1955a. The Concept of Nature: Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November, 1919. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. —. 1955b. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press. —. 1956. The Aims of Education. New York: Mentor. —. 1958. Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan. —. 1960. Religion in the Making. New York: The World Publishing Co. (1926 Lowell Lectures) —. 1966. Modes of Thought. New York: The Free Press. —. 1967. Adventures of Ideas. New York: The Free Press.

CHAPTER ELEVEN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE IN A DIVERSE WORLD XIUJUAN CHEN

The process of globalization has witnessed a consistent promotion of cultural encounters between different regions and nationalities of different cultural traditions. This process has been accompanied by varied forms of clashes and conflicts that have led to the progressive formation of a multicultural world. In this world, what challenges will contemporary Chinese culture face? What is the prospect of further development? Which path should be taken to develop Chinese culture? All these issues are important in regard to the cultural debate among in the current Chinese academic circle. Discussions on these topics reveal not only a conscious reflection upon China’s cultural position in the multicultural world, but also a deep concern about the future development of Chinese culture. This paper will first give a brief account of the cultural discussions among Chinese scholars in recent years, and then investigate a basic way to cultivate cultural awareness and to strengthen national cultural identity and confidence in this multi-cultural world. Subsequently, it will go on to argue that the fundamental path of developing Chinese culture lies in reinterpreting traditional Chinese culture in a modern way through cross-cultural dialogue and exchange in accord with the principle of cultural diversity. All this will help Chinese culture become an indispensable part of universal human culture in a pluralistic world.

Globalization and Chinese Cultural Issues Globalization is a process of transformation which has witnessed profound changes in world history. Traditional small communities’ characteristic of homogeneity, isolation, and self-sufficiency are progressively replaced by a modern pluralistic world characterized by heterogeneity, openness, and

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integration. This change has expanded the exterior space for the development of national cultures; it has nevertheless challenged the traditional themes of national cultures and led to a tension between such core ideological elements as unique national values, distinctive cultural traditions, and universal values needed for creating a pluralistic world order. Although history has witnessed annexation, subjection, oppression, and coercive integration among different cultures as they co-existed, all these praxes could not truly dissolve the differences and conflicts among different national cultures. As a matter of fact, they could sometimes make the situation worse (Tang Yijie and Le Daiyun 2011, 111). It goes without saying that cultural issues are extremely important to the existence of a nation. A national culture is, so to speak, a means of livelihood of a nation. If a nation loses its unique culture, it means the loss of means of livelihood (Fei Xiaotong 2005, 5–7). As early as sixty years ago, the renowned Chinese scholar Qian Mu pointed out the core status of cultural issues during the development of all nations. In his book The Gist of Culture, he said, “The problem in today’s China or even the world is not only a martial, economic, political or diplomatic one, but a cultural problem of the whole world. All problems stem from the cultural problem and thus should be solved from the cultural perspective” (1998, 1). Any nation in the world, large or small, strong or weak, exists in its distinctive way of life and mode of thinking on the earth we share together, and contributes a unique part to human civilizations by virtue of her distinctive cultural tradition. As observed in the modern times, a Chinese cultural problem mainly stems from the transition of traditional Chinese culture under modernization and globalization. China’s modernization is a prolonged process accompanied by the features of “passivity, exogenesis and defense” (He Zhonghua 2009, 63). In this process, Chinese culture, originally a selfsufficient system, has undergone radical changes and constant inrush of Western cultural ideas and values. Since then, Chinese people have entered into a more than century-long course of passively accepting Western cultures and ideas, during which not only independence of traditional Chinese culture has been intensely impacted, but its values and functions have faced huge challenges and doubts. After analysis, Yu Keping points out: for some people, to achieve modernization of traditional Chinese culture, the priority is to criticize the traditions as Chinese feudal autocratic cultural traditions include contents that are incompatible with modern market economy and democratic politics such as restraining human nature, opposing freedom and equality, valuing agriculture while despising commerce. Generally speaking, traditional Chinese culture is in opposition to modern-

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ization, and thus the biggest barrier to the achievement of modernization. (Yu Keping 2006, 15)

At the turn of the century, with the advance of globalization, the phenomenon of cultural “self-colonization” has occurred in China; many scholars have expressed their concern about it. Self-colonization of national cultures is strikingly demonstrated in the following two aspects: First, as Western cultural hegemony gradually corrodes the national cultural identity and debases national cultural confidence, some people think that science and culture of developed countries are more advanced, while those of developing countries is unsuitable for modern society and thus need to be revised. Second, some people become accustomed to adopting Western thinking and viewpoints to examine the world and themselves, speaking in a Western way, as if only by this means can they “synchronize with the world.” Over the course of time, these two aspects will together generate in the mentality of the people a strong sense of cultural inferiority, which will inevitably lead to the mistaken idea and wrong path of “self-colonization.” Cultural self-colonization has a huge negative impact on the development of national cultures. Regarding this, He Zhonghua once asserted, “The mindset of cultural ‘self-colonization’ is not only the result of loss of cultural self and self-awareness but in turn further promote the loss” (2009, 63). In addition, some scholars point out that at the turn of the century, Chinese intellectuals should stand on the high ground of promoting East-West integration and the use of Chinese concepts and style of discourse to reinterpret Chinese ideological traditions. Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by Western concepts and style of discourse and thus become affiliated to Western ideological system (Jullien 1994, 18). The majority of Chinese scholars have reached a consensus on the development of Chinese culture under the impact of modernization and globalization. They propose that to reexamine the functions of traditional Chinese culture and resist the trend toward “cultural colonization,” “cultural self-consciousness” must be cultivated in people. Cultural selfconsciousness is a proposition and concept that was proposed by Fei Xiaotong in the 1990s: The concept of “Cultural self-consciousness” is like a small clue from which we can see how things will develop, that is to say, from the problems of nations with small populations we can see those of the Chinese nation or even the common problems of the whole world. The significance of it lies in that people from a certain culture have ‘a thorough knowledge’ of its culture, knowing its origin and formation process, characteristics and development trend, which thus helps strengthen the independence in cul-

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Fei Xiaotong repeatedly emphasizes the importance of keeping cultural consciousness and seeking common ground while reserving differences under new conditions of the new century: “In a sense, cultural selfconsciousness is a specific manifestation of advocating the cultural outlook of harmony without sameness” (2001, 16). Therefore, cultural selfconsciousness is, so to speak, a response of Chinese ideological circle to the challenge of cultural globalization and a representation of Chinese cultural outlook of “harmony without sameness” in the multi-cultural world. This remarkably forward-looking concept and proposition has drawn great attention and general acknowledgement from scholars at home and abroad. In my view, cultural self-consciousness can reasonably interpret the concepts of cultural globalization and cultural diversity while adding new things to Chinese cultural traditions and expound them in a modern way. Only in this way can we strength national cultural identity and cultural confidence and effectively resist the trend toward “cultural colonization.”

Cultural Globalization and Cultural Diversity Cultural globalization is a very controversial concept in the eyes of Chinese intellectuals. Some scholars at first opposed using this concept for they thought that, in this way, they could protect Chinese culture from the impact of foreign cultures to the utmost extent. Thus, at the beginning, “cultural globalization has experienced strong resistance in Chinese language context” (Wang Ning 2002, 267). But now more and more scholars have begun to accept the concept of cultural globalization and believe that it has already become or will inevitably become an objective fact with the advance of the economic globalization process (Yu Keping 2006, 19). Yu Keping has conducted an analysis of this viewpoint and concluded that there are at least two reasons to support it. The first is that the global circulation of capital, technology, information, goods, and labor has not only broken down the political and economical barriers of national states, having profound impact on their economic and political systems and on the cultural barriers, deeply changing their social cultures and ideas. His second reason is that when Western developed countries brought their capital, technology, and goods to developing countries, they also brought their values and life styles. As business progresses and mass culture becomes popular, cultural globalization gradually shows the trend toward Westernization and Americanization and even obscures the original identities and characteristics of national cultures. In the presence of strong Western cul-

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tures, the national cultures of developing countries become extremely vulnerable with their original cultural traditions severely corroded and their national cultural identifications weakened. One striking representation of this in China is that today’s young people, under the profound influence of Western culture, have already become indifferent to traditional Chinese festivals while keen on Western festivals such as Christmas and Valentine’s Day, among others. I personally assume that cultural globalization in terms of its essence and implied force is a process of contradiction saturated with both conflicts and opening-up tendencies. In other words, it causes cultural crises in all nations across the world on the one hand, and on the other, provides the opportunity for further development to all national cultures. Cultural globalization has made all national cultures interconnected one way or another, just as Li Zonggui said, “It is a process of all national cultures gradually reaching a consensus on some common concerns of the whole world by means of positive interaction” (2002, 4). Based on this understanding, I hold that Chinese people should take up such an attitude toward cultural globalization: They should not deliberately avoid this type of globalization, but they should reasonably interpret and actively participate in it. Cultural globalization is accompanied by cultural diversity. The homogeneous property of cultural globalization will have different impacts on national and regional cultures. Yet cultural characteristics of different nations and regions and differences between them will continue to exist. Cultural diversity has its root in the differences and diversity in local cultures or national cultures. Wan Junren asserts: Each and every culture is, first of all and in most cases, local and national and any cross-cultural value goal and value identification must base on this premise unless the boundaries between nations and countries don’t exist anymore, as it is concerned with the reason for existence and fate of a nation or country. (2001, 48)

As the economy is increasingly tending toward globalization, we should pay more attention to cultural diversity and differences and we need more mutual communication and equal dialogue among different cultures. Against the background of cultural diversity, cultural universality and nationality, global culture and local culture, general value of culture and individual development of culture are symbiotic and interdependent. To acknowledge the symbiosis of diverse cultures means not only to respect the cultural options of each nation, but to endow each nation with the responsibility of respecting the cultural options of other nations. The twenty-first century is a multicultural era, as Le Daiyun affirmed,

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“different cultural communities and ecologies should be protected for only mutual understanding, complementation and attestation between different cultures can promote the development of human culture” (Le Daiyun and Le Pichon 1996, 3). In the era of globalization, nations all over the world have displayed a development pattern of cultural unification and cultural diversity coexisting, and cultural universality and cultural particularity combined. Objective history shows that no single force, including globalization, could remove the differences between national cultures. Therefore, we should protect the cultural particularity of the Chinese nation and preserve the autonomy of Chinese culture under the premise of respecting cultural diversity so as to avoid the danger of rendering Chinese culture obscured and colonized during the globalization process.

Misunderstandings and Interpretations With the objective process of cultural globalization and objective trend toward cultural diversity, the development of traditional Chinese culture calls for an accurate understanding of it. Meanwhile, it requires a new interpretation of its characteristics and basic values and a new transformation of its components in the present-day context. However, there have been some mistaken ideas among Chinese academics for years about the positioning of traditional culture, which, to some extent, have negatively influenced the innovation and development of the culture of Chinese nation. First, there are two extreme standpoints regarding the relationship between traditional Chinese culture and Western culture: “inferiority policy,” and “superiority policy.” For instance, Du Weiming points out in Conflict and Dialogue between Civilizations: “Superiority policy” means comparing the essences of one nation’s own culture with the dregs of other nations’ cultures so as to highlight the superiority of the national culture; while “inferiority policy” means comparing the dregs of one nation’s own culture with the essences of other nations’ cultures so as to highlight the inferiority of the national culture. (2001, 129)

The former will easily lead to blind cultural arrogance and exclusivism, which will, in the long run, lead to cultural closeness and backwardness. The latter will inevitably lead to total Westernization of one nation’s culture because it regards Western culture as the most supreme culture. In the end, this will lead to the mistaken idea of giving up the national cultural traditions. This wrong idea has existed for nearly a century in China. Lin Yusheng argues in The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, “one of the most

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striking features of Chinese ideological history of the twentieth century is the emergence and continuation of the firm attitude of total repudiation toward Chinese traditional culture heritage” (1986, 2). In connection with this, with regard to the developmental path of traditional Chinese culture, a discrepancy exists between cultural localization and cultural internationalization. The former advocates that the national culture should take the developmental path toward “localization,” while the latter argues for the path toward “internationalization.” Regardless of which path is taken—accepting the premises either that the traditional culture is superior to foreign cultures and therefore it need not learn things from the outside world, or that the traditional culture is inferior to foreign cultures and it is not appropriate for it to learn from the outside world— each indirectly reflects fear of foreign cultures and thus results in the belief that we dare not boldly absorb advanced things from foreign cultures and have no desire to transmit our traditional culture abroad. Consequently, traditional Chinese culture can neither obtain supplements from foreign cultures and effectively spread itself to other nations, nor enjoy substantive development and innovation. Second, some Chinese academics tend to attempt to discriminate “superior” or good national cultures from “inferior” or bad ones. For example, some claim that traditional Chinese culture is the greatest cultural tradition in the world and will become an international culture that dominates the whole world in the new century. Others think that traditional Chinese culture is not adaptable to a modern economic pattern and thus should not be looked upon as Chinese mainstream culture since it will end up being assimilated by the rational Western culture. This being the case, a deep concern arises, particularly regarding the second viewpoint. As Gong Qun states: Globalization itself is a process of strong Western civilization’s spread into other regions, which has endowed the global culture with the distinct features of strong Western civilization. The sense of homelessness caused by modernization or globalization will lead to the awareness of cultural identification crisis, which will again generate a feeling that the local culture is of great significance to the nation. (2002, 8)

I believe that it is unrealistic to draw an artificial distinction between good national cultures and bad ones. Culture is the last mark to distinguish human ethnic groups, second only to human physical characteristics. Any nation’s culture will certainly be conditioned by its historical background and national sentiments, and the development of any nation must be based on its traditional culture. Therefore, for any nation’s development, it

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should not distinguish which nation’s cultural tradition is better or worse than the other. Third, there is great confusion between living “cultural tradition” and dead “traditional cultural artifacts.” Cultural tradition, hiding in the depth of a nation’s consciousness, is inherited unconsciously, which is exactly the difference between nations. Cultural tradition is alive and constantly accommodates itself to the external environment, the vitality of which lies exactly in the accommodation. Meanwhile, it is a fundamental impetus to constantly create all kinds of cultural artifacts and make new interpretations of history and the reality. Certain Chinese representatives of modern Confucianism produced the 1958 manifesto, Declaration to the World for Chinese Culture, the driving force behind which was Xu Fuguan; it stated: “We, at first, appeal those who study Chinese academic culture at home and abroad to positively acknowledge that Chinese culture is a living thing” (Zhang Junmai 1986, 627). Otherwise, “Chinese historical culture is equivalent to a pile of lifeless and spiritless cultural artifacts like dead fossils” (629). In terms of culture, “tradition” and “past” is as different as “tradition” is “alive” while “past” is perhaps “dead.” A culture is only alive and fresh when it is regarded as a nation’s outlook on life (He Zhonghua 2009, 63–64). The leading cause of the confusion between cultural tradition and traditional cultural artifact is the lack of a dynamic understanding of the cultural tradition in one sense, and the failure to discriminate the implied meaning of “cultural tradition” from that of “traditional cultural artifact” in another sense. This leads some to treat Chinese culture the way they treat historical relics. Traditional cultural artifacts are the products of certain traditional cultural activities such as architecture, painting, sculpture, music, literature, food, clothing, and the like. They are all manifestations of some cultural tradition, yet have the epochal character of temporality. Therefore, what we should inherit and develop is cultural tradition as Chinese outlook on life rather than traditional cultural artifacts proper. Finally, there is great confusion between the “inner core” and the “surface” of traditional Chinese culture among Chinese scholars who cleave to its surface yet stifle its inner core, which is originally full of vitality. For example, whenever traditional Chinese culture is mentioned, people tend to think of associations such as the Peking opera, Three Cardinal Guides and Five Constant Virtues of Confucianism, or the hermit philosophy of Taoism. In fact, all these just comprise the surface of traditional Chinese culture. At the inner core of Chinese culture is the doctrine of “harmony between man and nature,” which runs through the philosophy of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. This concept is not only Chinese people’s

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outlook on life, but a world outlook and ecological view that emphasizes harmony, co-existence, and co-prosperity between humanity and nature. It does not contradict the culture required for the development of modern society. But we have long had a superficial understanding of traditional Chinese culture and have exerted great efforts to preserve its surface. For instance, in recent years, people have mainly manifested their craze for traditional Chinese culture through external forms including the ceremony of worshipping Confucius, wearing Han style Chinese clothing, opening training courses on Chinese culture, and so on; nevertheless “they do not realize that the sign of cultural maturity is in-depth thinking and creative elucidation” (Zhang Rulun 2010, 8). We have lost many development opportunities as a result of cleaving to superficial things in the past. But now, we should rethink what is the value of the inner core of traditional Chinese culture and how to preserve it reasonably. I personally believe that the true value of a culture lies in its inner core, which can give life and vitality to it, rather than the surface. Superficial things are relative, constantly changing with the times; the inner core is the true source of a nation’s cohesion because of its rich humanistic concern and thus has potential for development. Based on the thoughts presented so far, I would like to conclude that under the new circumstances, when cultural conflict in the world becomes increasingly acute, the highest priority is to revive Chinese national culture. This revival should not merely be a return to the past, but a creative elucidation of the traditional culture to discover the most essential values that are relevant and closely linked to other nations’ cultures. In this regard, we also need to accelerate and deepen intercultural dialogue and the communication and integration between one nation’s own culture and other nations’ cultures to gradually incorporate the particularity of national culture into the universality of human culture.

Mode and Path of Developing Chinese Culture In the current context of globalization, the society of each national state should be highly open, and the development of any nation should therefore be inseparable from its exchange and cooperation with other nations. Global economic integration and the general existence of market economic system will surely require all nations to adapt their traditional cultures to the cultural pattern of development under modern market economy. Thus, all national cultures would tend to progress toward a world culture. Of course, an internationalization of a tradition does not deny its particularity since the attempt to preserve its particularity doesn’t contradict its internationalization. Indeed, to preserve a tradition is the basis of

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the internationalization of culture because only a limited part of a national culture is retained to distinguish it from other national cultures. Fang Shinan writes: As human modes of practice and means of livelihood possess universality, there are some similarities between local cultural values, which is the basis of mutual communication, exchange and even integration between values of diverse cultures. Additionally, the differences and diversity of human modes of practice and means of livelihood render the local cultural values of each nation its own distinct and unique individual characteristics, which as an indispensable part of human cultural value system will represent human nature from different perspectives and in different forms. (2001, 64)

Only when we try to promote the internationalization of our traditional culture can we better cleave to our nation’s cultural traditions. In the future, cultures in the world will typically not be isolated national cultures but rather dialogically interrelated cultures as integral parts of a unity and diversity of world culture. Culture as a manifestation of value and condensation of spirit has characteristics different from those of economy and politics in terms of its internality and depth. Therefore, the construction and development of contemporary Chinese culture is twofold: On the one hand, it should highlight its “inward” focus, that is, “to discover the essences of traditional Chinese culture and creatively transform it” (Li Zonggui 2005, 102). On the other hand, it should highlight its “outward” focus, that is, to “increase the attraction of culture and influence of cultural value of national states in the world” (Li Xiaoxiao 2011, 6). In the process of transforming a traditional culture from localization to internationalization, a great cultural tradition will inevitably and gradually be accepted by the world. Hence, people should use the reasonable components of their cultural traditions to transform the components of current global culture that are incompatible with the development of their society and direct the process with reasonable manners and long-term strategies. During current cultural discussions, scholars have paid so much attention to the developmental mode and path of Chinese culture that they put forward a lot of constructive suggestions. All this serves as an important impetus to the reconstruction or transformation of Chinese culture during the period of globalization. One of the recommendations for further consideration advocates that in the multi-cultural and open era, it is more crucial than ever to actively “discover” national cultural resources, revive traditional Chinese culture, and critically acknowledge cultural particularity and identity of certain

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nations to get Chinese nation’s traditional culture deeply understood and widely spread. It is correspondingly critical for people to “focus on the knowledge foundation of traditional Chinese culture and regard traditional culture as a knowledge system to study and introduce it.” This requires much effort “to transmit and revive traditional Chinese culture by means of systematically organizing, discovering and teaching its relevant knowledge” (Yu Keping 2006, 17). One of the practical ways to revive traditional Chinese culture is to establish a research institute of Chinese culture and Confucianism, set up various Chinese culture training schools, and offer a variety of Chinese culture courses. For example, the year 2005 witnessed the establishment of the School of Chinese Culture by Renmin University of China. The School was then empowered to conduct programs for undergraduate students. Additionally, a collation program for Confucian and classic literature was launched in the academic research field in 2012, when the Advanced Institute for Confucian Studies of Shandong University initiated a “Compilation of Confucian works.” This project is the first comprehensive and largescale collation of Confucian works in Chinese academic circles, which is intended not only to facilitate Confucian studies but to explore new resources and expand provision for relevant humanistic studies. All this will enhance the scholarship and development of traditional Chinese culture. Another recommendation proposes that during positive cross-cultural communication, people should face up to the impact of foreign cultures, and understand and accept “others” with a broad mind in order to “reconstruct” a national cultural pattern that corresponds to the requirements of the time and society. Proponents of this proposal think that the diversity of interest groups and cultures caused by the development of market economy will inevitably require people to acknowledge more principles of conduct. Therefore, it features in this era an appeal to accept some common criteria of value and respect for the global culture of increasing universality, thus making it an extremely important direction to study and develop culture from the perspective of cultural globalization. However, cultural diversity is a global characteristic, and economic and cultural globalization will never eliminate national cultures and different national spirits and cultural traditions. Thus, it is also championed that “various nations all over the world should hold onto the principle of respecting each other’s development of culture, find the merits of its own culture and those of other nations and share with each other to achieve common development” (Fei Xiaotong 2001, 5). Finally, it is highly recommended that people should do their utmost to make constant innovation and transformation of Chinese culture during the

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process of inheriting the essences of traditional Chinese culture and absorbing the outstanding achievements of Western civilization. Meanwhile, they should actively explore and practice effective ways of spreading Chinese culture to the world and export outstanding achievements of Chinese culture in a way that is acceptable to other nations in the world. Nowadays, as China’s economic strength has been constantly enhanced, various forms of cultural exportation projects are aimed at improving China’s soft power of culture. Cultural exportation is of strategic importance to the construction of contemporary Chinese culture, just as Wang Yuechuan said: “When China is striving to learn from Western modernization, we should move forward from a century’s ‘cultural absorption’ to contemporary Chinese ‘cultural exportation’” (2004, 106). At present, Chinese cultural exportation strategies include the translation and exportation of books and records of traditional Chinese culture, exportation of folk arts, and establishment of Confucian Institutes overseas for the purpose of introducing such essentials of traditional Chinese culture as calligraphy, martial arts, folk music, and the like. By so doing, Chinese culture can be rendered accessible across the world and thus become an indispensable type of cultural resources in the global multi-cultural system. In conclusion, the global economic pattern today is basically formed by developed countries that dominate the world. This unfair pattern has determined the unfairness of cultural exportations from Western countries to underdeveloped countries. This being true, China as the largest developing country must make a selective use of the pattern with particular reference to the specific requirements of her own economic and political construction and cultural development. Since the cultural crisis caused by homogenizing globalization results in the loss of national particularity, China must be more active in preserving the uniqueness and independence of her culture. In cultivating cultural consciousness, she should adhere to the rationale of “around China and for China” during cross-cultural communication. Moreover, China should retain and develop her cultural pattern on the basis of adopting Chinese concepts to interpret Chinese ideological traditions. She should never copy the cultural patterns of other nations and should avoid their ideological influences. Just as it is expected in the new century, a “responsible, cooperative and pluralistic” pattern of world culture can be constructed only when all national cultures across the world respect each other, seek harmony without sameness with each other, and integrate what they value most into each other through equal-footing dialogues and exchanges. The fundamental path of developing Chinese culture lies in reinterpretation of traditional Chinese culture in a modern way through cross-cultural dialogue and ex-

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change in accord with the principle of cultural diversity. All this will help Chinese culture become an indispensable part of universal human culture in a pluralistic world.

References Du Weiming. 2001. Conflict and Dialogue between Civilizations. Changsha: Hunan University Press. Fang Shinan. 2001. “The Coexistence and Dual Structures of Globalization and Cultural Indigenization.” Makesi Zhuyi Yanjiu 4: 57–67. Fei Xiaotong. 2001. “Creating a Harmonious but Different World Community: A Speech at a Conference of the IUAES.” Sixiang Zhanxian (Ideological Front, or, Thinking), 6: 1–5, 16. —. 2003. “Guanyu ‘wenhua zijue’ de yixie zibai” [Notes on cultural selfconsciousness]. Xueshu yanjiu 7: 5–9. —. 2005. “Some of the Confession of ‘Cultural Consciousness.’” In Cultural Awareness and Social Development, edited by The Committee of the Preparation for the World Forum of the 21st Century Chinese Culture, 3–8. Hong Kong: Commercial Press. Gong Qun. 2002. “Global Culture and Local Culture.” Nankai Xuebao, 5: 6–9. He Zhonghua. 2009. “Chongsi zhongguo wenhua de Xiandaixing mingyun” [Rethinking the fate of modernity of Chinese culture]. Lilun Xuekan 7: 63–5. Jullien, François. 1994. “Challenges to Chinese Culture in the New Century.” Twenty-First Century (Hong Kong) 4: 17–25. Le Daiyun and Alain Le Pichon. 1996. Foreword to Kua wenhua duihua [Cross-cultural dialogues]. Shanghai: Shanghai Culture Press. Li Xiaoxiao. 2011. “A Strategic Blueprint for Chinese Socialist Culture: Interview with Yi Junqing, Director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau.” Chinese Social Sciences Today 241: 1–16. Li Zonggui. 2002. “Cultural Globalization and Construction of Contemporary Chinese Culture.” Nankai Xuebao 5: 4–6. —. 2005. “Wenhua Yanjiu de Fansi yu Qianzhan” [Retrospect and prospect of cultural studies]. Tribune of Social Sciences 8: 97–107. Lin Yusheng. 1986. Zhongguo yishi de weiji: wusi shiqi jilie de fan chuantong zhuyi [The crisis of Chinese consciousness: Radical antitraditionalism in the May fourth era]. Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Publishing House. Qian Mu. 1998. “Wenhuaxue dayi” [The gist of culture]. In Qian Binsi Xiansheng Quanji [The collection of Mr. Qian Binsi], 1–3. Taibei: Lianjing Press.

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Tang Yijie and Le Daiyun. 2011. “The Promotion of the Integration of Multi-Cultures in the World.” Civilization 6: 110–111. Wan Junren. 2001. “Jingji quanqiu hua yu wenhua duoyuan lun” [Economic globalization and cultural pluralism]. Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 2: 38–48. Wang Ning. 2002. “Quanqiu hua shidai de wenhua lunzheng he wenhua duihua” [Cultural disputes and dialogues in the era of globalization]. In Quanqiu hua: Xifang hua hai shi zhongguo hua [Globalization: Westernized or Chinesized], edited by Yu Keping, 258–268. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. Wang Yuechuan. 2004. “‘Faxian dongfang’ yu dongxi wenhua hudong: Zai zhongguo shehui kexue yuan yanjiusheng yuan de jiangyan” [The discovery of Orient and the cultural interaction between the East and West: A speech at the graduate school of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences]. Shanhua 5: 92–106. Yu Keping. 2006. “The Logic of Chinese Cultural Development under Variation of Modernization and Globalization.” Academic Monthly 4: 14–24. Zhang Junmai. 1986. A History of New Confucianism. Taiwan: Hongwenguan Press. Zhang Rulun. 2010. “Dangdai zhongguo de wenhua mingyun: cong chuantong zou xiang xiandai” [The fate of contemporary Chinese culture: From tradition toward modernity]. Wen hui Bao 28 (August): 1–12.

PART III INTERCULTURAL PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUE FACING WORLD PROBLEMS

CHAPTER TWELVE THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUEST FOR PERFECT JUSTICE WILLIAM L. MCBRIDE

The philosophical quest for perfect justice, which has haunted Western thought from the time of Plato’s Republic down to the late twentieth century as exemplified in the writings of the late John Rawls and his followers, stands in striking contrast to the massive injustices, rooted in relations of dominance and subordination that pervade the real world. Rawls’s great popularity especially, but by no mean exclusively, in the Anglophone world makes his work an interesting case to study in the context of intercultural dialogue. Paradoxically, given Rawls’s comparatively egalitarian proclivities, there now exists in American society, taken by him as a model for his theory and presented as a “nearly just” one, a widening gap between the very rich and the poor. At the same time, the recent aggressive foreign policy of the American government owes more to the spirit of the Rawlsian philosophy, especially as seen in his late work, The Law of Peoples (1999), than might at first be suspected. In this essay, I first briefly discuss the nature of the philosophical quest for perfect justice and offer some initial reservations concerning it. I then fill in some of the cultural and historical background that helps to explain Rawls’s role in the objektiver Geist (objective spirit) of his generation. Next, I contrast Rawls’s aspiration to offer a theory sub specie aeternitatis with the evolving realities of economic disintegration in his homeland (and worldwide) and new global phenomena, with the latter of which his later work is at best ill-equipped to deal. These two realities are by no means entirely disconnected. The notion that we can describe the basic nature of the perfectly just society and that, according to that description, the society in which we live is a “nearly just” one, are ultimately pretentious illusions. These illusions have been promoted above all by Western liberal democratic theorists, and they need to be critically revised. Of course, the word “justice” should not be allowed to disappear from our vocabularies. Instead, false expectations concerning it need to be

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abandoned and philosophers concerned with the phenomena with which traditional philosophies of justice have been occupied need to adopt a different orientation. I propose a reorientation toward theories of injustices. This is important in light of the possibility of some broader theory of society—a theory that would at once be less reliant upon alleged transtemporal concepts such as “justice,” and less ready uncritically to accept the basic institutions and practices that dominate the present era. In conclusion, I consider the philosophers’ task, as theorists of injustices, to pursue a critical analysis of the social system. As a philosopher raised in the Western tradition, with all of its positive qualities and its flaws, I suppose I might be expected first to think, when the word “justice” is mentioned, of Plato’s Republic. I have taught that book in a class on social and political philosophy almost every year for several decades. As an undergraduate student taking a similar course, I happened to mention this fact to the Vice-President of my university, who held a doctorate in Government from Harvard University. He replied, in words I will never forget, that that was a good thing, since one could not consider oneself to be an educated person until one had read through the entire Republic at least three times. While that short statement, if taken literally, is filled with errors and biases of several kinds, not the least of these is its Eurocentrism, nevertheless I have always considered it to have some kernel of truth. The Republic is, after all, more than just another great book. It is greater than most and filled with wisdom—as well as with a great deal of folly, of course. And it is, to refer to the title of my essay, the epitome of the philosophical quest for perfect justice. But in fact, when I hear the word “justice” invoked, I do not first think of Plato, but of another Western sage of a very different kind, William Shakespeare. Many years ago, no doubt before I read Plato for the first time, I had memorized a speech by the lawyer in disguise, Portia, in Shakespeare’s play The Merchant of Venice which begins with the words, “The quality of mercy is not strained.” Near the end of this short text, which is Portia’s plea to the creditor, Shylock, not to demand that the merchant give him the pound of his flesh to which he is legally entitled in lieu of a failed debt payment, she says, “And earthly power doth then show likest God’s / When mercy seasons justice.” The point, of course, is that there is something higher than justice, understood as the proper execution of the law, and that that something is mercy. If, then, as Aristotle says, man is not the best thing in the universe, neither is justice. Justice is not the best thing even if, that is, we could all agree on exactly what it is. But we can never reach any such agreement. To cite another of my favorite texts, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social

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Contract, “All justice comes from God, who is its sole source; but if we knew how to receive so high an inspiration, we should need neither government nor laws” ([1762] 2008, 41). Therefore, he says, we must establish laws and conventions, or else the wicked will prosper and the good will suffer. This attitude helps to explain why it would seem a little odd, or at least a little exaggerated, to speak of a theory of justice either in Rousseau or indeed in a number of other writers on social and political philosophy in the Western tradition. One other such writer, about whom there was, nevertheless, a spate of articles concerning his views on justice, especially during a certain period about twenty years ago, is Marx. It is a fact that he seldom used the word in any of his writings. It is also a fact that his colleague Frederick Engels, at least, says at one point that the conception of eternal justice “belongs among those things of which Mülberger [a contemporary writer] correctly says, ‘everyone understands something different’” (1935, 92–93)—in other words, that it is hopelessly relative. So it would seem, as some commentators believe, that Karl Marx, in one important passage in Das Kapital (Capital) ([1867] 1936), is asserting that the “trick,” as he calls it, whereby money is converted into capital through the mechanism of extracting surplus value from workers, is, nevertheless, just within the terms of the capitalist system itself. What would be unjust under capitalism would be, simply, fraud. While I do not personally consider this extreme relativist interpretation of Marx with respect to justice to be the end of the story, and have tried at some length to show just why it is not (for example, if a system were to be regarded as perfectly just within its own terms and no legitimate perspective outside the system existed from which to cast doubt on its justice, then how could Marx go on to show, in one of the better rhetorical passages in his book, that it is based on a “trick”?), I still think that we can respect Marx for his strong reluctance to cast his critical theory primarily in terms of justice. It is one of my principal purposes here to give qualified support to this reluctance.

The Rawls Era However, the theme of justice, more than any other single theme, dominated discussion in social and political philosophy especially in the Anglophone world during the final quarter of the twentieth century. As we all know, this fact is attributable above all to the influence of one philosopher, John Rawls, who wrote the long A Theory of Justice (1971) and who also, after publishing some essays and collections of essays and lectures, most notably Political Liberalism (1993), produced the rather short The Law of

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Peoples near the end of his life. This last work was intended in some ways to extend the theory of justice, which Rawls had originally confined within the boundaries of a single abstract nation-state, to the global sphere, which was beginning increasingly to supplant justice as philosophy’s central theme—and not only within Anglophone nations. What I would like to do in the next few pages is to offer an overview of the period in question as it relates to social and political philosophy, to justice and other themes, such as peace and harmony, and to the realities of our world. The period constitutes the major portion of my professional career, and so, in a way, I shall also be heeding Edward Demenchonok’s recommendation that I share my ideas and experiences, as well. I had always been interested in social and political philosophy, as my opening story about my conversation when I was an undergraduate would suggest, and yet that very period, on into my years of graduate study, has been labeled, “the heyday of Weldonism.” I suspect that not everyone in this readership, not even among those from Anglophone countries, is familiar with this reference, and in a sense, that is as it should be. T. D. Weldon was a British philosopher, the author of a scholarly book on Kant, who, essentially, applied the theory of ethical noncognitivism, notoriously articulated in A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic (1952), to the political area. To cite just one sentence from Weldon’s opening statement, he identifies as his second objective “To show that the theoretical foundations of political thinking which are claimed by Democracy, Hegelian idealism, and Marxism are all equally worthless” (1960, 14). Now, he further claims that this is not as devastating as one might think, because we are still entitled to offer comparative appraisals of different political systems. However, the effect of his position was arguably to put a damper on philosophical discussion of politics and societies within the United Kingdom, certainly, and to some extent the United States and British Commonwealth countries as well. Some have noted the interesting coincidence between its early years of circulation (the first edition was published in 1953, with reprints in 1955 and 1960) and the period of political repression in the United States known as the “McCarthy Era,” so named for the United States Senator who was leading a notorious anti-Communist crusade. Weldon himself would, I am sure, have been horrified to see this connection made. He was a very intelligent man who, according to the late Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, a teacher of mine who had known him, had been emotionally damaged by having played some decision-making role in the Royal Air Force bombings of Germany during World War II.

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This brief background helps to explain the comparative dearth of major works in social and political philosophy in Anglophone countries during the generation following World War II—roughly from 1945 to 1970 if we think of twenty-five years as constituting most of a generation. Many textbooks and articles that have appeared ever since then in these countries have suggested that Rawls’s book on justice revived the field virtually all by itself, as it were. However, this is an extremely exaggerated and inaccurate account, as I am sure most readers are aware. First of all, there was a vast world outside the Anglophone sphere in which major theoretical work was being undertaken during those years. Varieties of Marxism constituted one, but by no means the only, alternative tendency. Indeed, the so-called heyday of Weldonism was the beginning of the heyday of what has been denominated “Western Marxism” in many countries, not just in Western Europe and the former Yugoslavia with its then-flourishing “Praxis Group,” but also in Africa and even to some extent in North America. Among other tendencies, among many examples are the writings of Passerin d’Entrèves himself, which were strongly influenced by the natural law tradition, and of Norberto Bobbio, his friendly rival at the University of Torino, who was originally influenced above all by legal positivism but who moved into many new and original areas of political analysis during his very long life. All of this historically and philosophically important activity notwithstanding, it remains the case that A Theory of Justice made a huge impact as soon as it burst onto the scene, and continued to do so, far beyond the confines of the Anglophone sphere, for years thereafter. Rawls’s name was already well known in some American philosophy circles, above all because of two articles, on two concepts of rules and on justice as fairness (1955, 1958), that were more sympathetic to utilitarianism than his later work was to be. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the number of his publications between the year in which he completed his doctoral dissertation, 1950, and the time at which A Theory of Justice appeared was really not great by some contemporary standards; this was an era in which the academic world, or at least academic philosophy, had not yet succumbed to the mad worship of quantitative measurement. But Rawls was somewhat unique in the extent to which, during that interim period, he circulated portions of the long manuscript on which he was working to colleagues elsewhere, with a view to soliciting their critical comments. He was always, at least in principle, very open to receiving criticism and sometimes to modifying his writing on the basis of it. At last, in late 1971, Harvard University Press offered the work to the reading public, and the Rawls Era began in earnest.

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Political Theory sub Specie Aeternitatis I can say, as a simple matter of fact and without in any way wishing to be vainglorious, that a review that I wrote of A Theory of Justice was among the first to be published. It appeared in the April 1972 issue of the Yale Law Journal, an issue devoted to recent works in legal and political theory. It was accompanied by a second review of Rawls’s book by the late Joel Feinberg. With intended deep irony, I titled my review “Political Theory sub Specie Aeternitatis: A New Perspective.” The Latin phrase was taken from the final page of A Theory of Justice. There, Rawls says that to see our place in society from the perspective of the so-called “original position,” the thought-experimental device that he employed at the outset to allow him to speculate about just what principles of justice the denizens of this position, deprived of specific factual information, would choose is to see our place from the perspective of eternity—“to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view”(1971, 587). The words “a new perspective” in my title were meant to question Rawls’s grandiose claim in his concluding passage. I went on, of course, to offer some detailed criticisms, among the earliest in print of the tens of thousands, or perhaps more realistically hundreds of thousands, of critical remarks about nearly every aspect of the theory that have since seen the light of day. I have no intention of reiterating those specific criticisms here, as legitimate as I still consider them to be today. However, I would like briefly to consider the original Rawls phenomenon—I mean, the phenomenon of this work, A Theory of Justice, rather than, at least at this point, of his later publications—in historical perspective. In the one earlier review with which I was familiar when writing mine, in a February 1972 issue of The New York Review of Books, the late Stuart Hampshire had said, in words that I then cited, that Rawls’s work was “the most substantial and interesting contribution to moral philosophy since the war, at least if one thinks only of works written in English” (Hampshire 1972, 34). I remain grateful even now to Professor Hampshire for adding that final qualification, which shows that he was not as insular as many of his colleagues. Just what contributed to making A Theory of Justice such a long-lasting “hit,” so to speak? Of course, it is very well-structured and on the whole well-written, though I doubt that anyone would call Rawls’s prose particularly beautiful. Its basic points are, on the whole and with some exceptions, rather clear, even though some of its central concepts are, upon closer examination, not explained with full adequacy. A good example of this is that the first of Rawls’s two central principles, equal liberty, is at the

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center of discussion in only one of the book’s eighty-seven sections. Moreover, despite careful argumentation throughout the work, Rawls frequently invokes “intuition” at crucial points in lieu of more rigorous argument. I regard Rawls as having played a major role in giving that word, used in a far less formal way than it was by Descartes, for example, a much greater importance in Anglophone philosophical discussions in subsequent years than it deserves. Furthermore, despite the book’s great length, the core of Rawls’s theory of what justice is, namely, the so-called “difference principle,” according to which inequalities in goods distribution are justifiable only to the extent to which these inequalities will benefit the least well-off members of a society, is not only rather simple, but, as Rawls himself acknowledges, somewhat derivative. It is a creative variant of Vilfredo Pareto’s conception of optimality, or optimal efficiency. So, granted that the book is serious and impressive in many ways, what is it about A Theory of Justice that made it so much of a magnet for discussion in the ensuing years? One cannot entirely disregard the prestige of the institution, Harvard University, with which Rawls was affiliated—a prestige that no doubt also contributed, some years later, to the popularity of a work by one of Rawls’s Harvard colleagues, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, about the alleged intrinsic merits of which I am far less confident than I am in Rawls’s case. But it may be more important to consider the Rawls phenomenon sub specie historiae, so to speak—that is, as having occurred at the right time and in the right way. Hegel’s notion of objektiver Geist, the objective spirit of an age, is relevant here. It would be well worth devoting more space than has been allotted to me here to considering just how A Theory of Justice incarnated that spirit for its time. Allow me make just a few brief suggestions along these lines, while recognizing just how difficult it is to achieve any precision in this area. Most of the Rawls generation—the thirty years from 1971 until 2001, the year before his death and the year of the World Trade Center attacks—was characterized by comparative prosperity in the world’s more advanced countries, a dramatic growth in the cult of consumerism, and American hegemony. Rawls’s work was, it could be argued, an embodiment of all of these things, but in a philosophically very respectable form: modest, not strident, and eminently rational. The period of protest was past, so that civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, to which Rawls did devote several short sections in his book, were on the wane, and the Vietnam War, the American role in which Rawls had opposed, soon drew to a close. Rawls insisted that his principles of justice could be instantiated in a socialist as well as in a capitalist society—indeed, there are some social

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democratic threads in the middle of his work. However, his emphasis on justice as above all the distribution of “primary social goods,” as he called them, and his almost total disregard of the non-distributive aspects of the topic were clearly most compatible with a market economy. Moreover, while the level of abstraction of the ideal parts of his theory, which constituted the majority of the book, made it impossible to identify wholeheartedly with any specific country, no reader could possibly have doubted that his own United States was his principal historical point of reference, even if he had not included a footnote to the effect that the history of the United States Constitution had served as something of a model for his account of how parties in the original position might move from having adopted their basic principles of justice to implementing them in political institutions. At the same time, while implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, endorsing American values and virtues, Rawls was careful to avoid the appearance of being simply a defender of the existing order. It was obvious that the ideal distribution of primary social goods in accordance with Rawls’s “difference principle” was not the same as the actual distribution of these goods in contemporary American society. For it would have been clearly impossible, assuming per impossibile that the measurements theoretically required by Rawls’s theory could ever be carried out in reality, to assert that the vast imbalances in the actual distribution were justified by the greater benefits they entailed for the least advantaged citizens. No, Rawls never pretended that the hegemonic American society had fully realized his requirements for perfect justice. Instead, when he considers civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, he uses the expression “nearly just society” (or sometimes “reasonably just society”) to characterize his own and others like it, if any there are. Such nearly just societies, he says, must be democratic and well-ordered—Rawls was a great lover of order—but it might be possible to find within them such injustices as the denial “to certain minorities” of “the right to vote, to hold office, or to own property and to move from place to place” (1971, 372). On one hand, Rawls allowed that such a situation might justify the exercise of civil disobedience in a “nearly just society.” On the other, given the complexity of the matter, he held that civil disobedience based on the perceived failure of a society to conform fully to the difference principle would not be justified. My own reaction to this particularly revealing and, some might think, somewhat surprising passage in Rawls’s text is that, in order for a society to qualify as “nearly just,” he has set a pretty low bar. I shall return to this point shortly when I leave Rawls and return to the more general issue of the quest for perfect justice.

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The Global Arena: “Infinite Justice” and “Enduring Freedom” Let me say a little about the later Rawls to round out my historical view of him as a paradigmatic philosopher of his time. As time went on, he became less confident about the superiority of his theory in all respects— this was noted by many of his followers and to the disappointment of some. He became more concerned about the problem posed by dogmatic groups, especially religious groups, whose beliefs militated against their agreeing to a democratic consensus on certain matters. In this respect, Rawls was prescient. He anticipated, in a sense, the rise to centrality, on the world stage, of religious fundamentalism. He began increasingly to emphasize his self-identification with “political liberalism.” The Law of Peoples was his contribution to the growing dialogue about global matters, including global justice, in which the Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie (International Federation of Philosophical Societies) has played such an important role. Indeed it has played and will continue to play a far more important role than Rawls could ever have hoped to do, even had he lived longer or written more. I say this particularly because, in my opinion, this work illustrates the limitations of his entire approach in a much more evident way than did any of his earlier writing. Here are a few of the characteristics of The Law of Peoples that strike me as especially salient for present purposes. For one thing, it makes no effort to apply the core notion of Rawls’s earlier work on justice, the difference principle, to the global arena. While admitting to the society of nations the kinds of states that Rawls calls “decent hierarchical societies,” it makes much of excluding those that he calls, in language borrowed from the United States State Department, “rogue states” or “outlaw states.” In contraposition to the themes of peace, harmony, and justice, it often reverts in disturbing ways to questions of war. For example, Rawls advocates the retention of nuclear weapons by liberal democratic states and argues that it may indeed be appropriate sometimes to wage war against what he calls “unreasonable societies.” I suggest that a connection exists between the Rawlsian perspective— especially as found in The Law of Peoples but going back as well to his Theory of Justice—and the politics of self-righteous arrogance that characterized global American policy only a few years ago. We tend to forget very quickly the crises and corresponding shibboleths of even a few years ago. But it may be recalled that the military response of the Second Bush Dynasty, as we used to call the George W. Bush administration, to the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, was originally supposed to

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be called Operation Infinite Justice. However, someone in that administration was sufficiently sensitive to point out that, in Islam, justice, and especially infinite justice, is attributable to God alone. Therefore, to give an American military operation that name could be seriously offensive. So, the name was changed to Operation Enduring Freedom, although in the end, if I may play on the word “enduring,” the United States government arguably gave the Iraqi people, in particular, much more “freedom” of a certain sort than they were able to endure. Nevertheless, the original reference to justice captured very well the attitude of those who had control of the American war machine at that time: We know what justice (and, incidentally, democracy) is, and we will impose it on these backward peoples who until now have lacked it. I believe that this reflects, in a crude and brutal way, the spirit of the Rawlsian philosophy, which characterizes the writings not only of Rawls himself—who personally was, as I have already insisted, somewhat modest and willing to change his position if he could be persuaded that he was wrong—but also, and in many cases more so, of the practitioners of a ubiquitous philosophy for which Rawls’s work served as a paradigm during the late twentieth century. What this sort of philosophical enterprise aims to do is to answer, with as much precision as possible, the question of what justice is—that is, to identify those principles, the realization and implementation of which will result in the just society, and ideally, because this is supposed to be the domain of ideal theory, in the perfectly just society. The activity can be pursued as a kind of intellectual game similar to Socrates’s metaphor of hunting in The Republic, where at one point he announces his discovery that justice is the condition in which everyone performs the activity to which they are best suited, like searching far and wide for quarry that all the while has been lying at his feet. For Rawls, the game consists of considering various formulae for justice that have been proposed in the past, such as, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” and relying on our so-called intuition to decide, through a process of reflective equilibrium, not only or primarily which ones seem to us as individuals to be the closest to the truth, but above all which ones would be chosen, by consensus, by the bloodless parties in the original position. In the case of both Socrates and Rawls, and in many others by whom, all too often, the spirit of dialogue is less well respected than it was by them, the underlying assumption is that there is—to use a geographical metaphor that has been very popular with some philosophers—a domain to be investigated and charted that is not yet fully known, and about which mistakes have been made, as we see in early maps in which the contours have been distorted. Call it, if you please, the moral or ethical domain.

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That is the game that has been played, and that continues to be played, by the philosophers of justice. It is, of course, a deadly serious game, the best players of which deserve our respect.

A Reorientation toward Theories about Injustices But suppose that justice is simply not that sort of thing—that there can be no perfectly just society, or nearly perfect just society in which only a few elements are slightly out of order. Metaphors of hunting or of equilibrium or of geography are just that, metaphors, and misleading ones at that, devised as aids to help us attain insight into an alleged absolute reality, with perfectly clear contours, that, in fact, does not exist in that form. Suppose, in other words, that Marx and Engels were essentially right in their reluctance to couch any of their arguments in terms of an alleged ideal of justice, which is supposed in some way to be eternal, sub specie aeternitatis. What I am suggesting is not exactly the same as the interpretation of a few of Marx’s remarks that I have noted, to the effect that justice is purely relative to each socioeconomic system. No, there is a sense in which justice, even if it is not the absolute domain of certain principles that so many philosophers have supposed it to be, has reality as a vague but powerful ideal—the ideal of a perpetual struggle against injustices, as I shall argue here. Moreover, that ideal is not, as the great noncognitivist legal philosopher Hans Kelsen notoriously declared, an irrational one—not unless one accepts a very narrow, largely Western, conception of rationality. It is certainly not reducible to the demands of particular legal systems and the prejudices of those who control them, whether it be Shakespeare’s “strict court of Venice” or a modern institution called a “Department of Justice.” In other words, even if justice is not the domain of clear contours that so many in the history of Western philosophy have asserted it to be, while at the same time disagreeing profoundly as to just what those contours are, I am not contending that the word “justice” should be allowed to disappear from our vocabularies. I am maintaining, instead, that false expectations concerning justice need to be abandoned and that traditional philosophies of justice need to adopt a different orientation. What might that orientation be? I have already suggested that it should focus, in an ordered and reasoned way, on the identification and analysis of the most salient injustices of the time. To identify injustices does not require a prior definition of perfect justice, but merely a recognition that a certain situation is characterized by eliminable, or at least minimizable, negative features—practical contradictions—that partially or entirely sup-

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press the development of the potentialities of some human beings in that situation. Above all, I mean relations of dominance and subordination. With this reorientation of philosophical emphasis, the era of Rawls and of the type of ideal, self-congratulatory liberal democratic theory whose practitioners think of themselves as inhabitants of “nearly just societies” comes to an end. Theories that are critical of the vast injustices that characterize the real world in which we live can then come to the fore. I believe that the time is ripe for such a reorientation. In fact, it has already begun. As one example, I would like to point to the work of my compatriot and friend, the late Iris Marion Young, who died long before her time. The first decade of the present millennium—I do not for a moment forget that this designation of a new millennium, and specifically of the decade 2001–2010, is purely contingent on the intrusion of an event celebrated by one religion, Christianity, into a world over which people coming out of that tradition have achieved hegemony—has been characterized above all by two crises, the crisis of terrorism and the crisis of economic disintegration. By “terrorism,” we should understand both the attempts by deeply alienated individuals and groups to cause destruction and spread panic within entire populations, and the counter-terrorism of some state entities, which has produced similar effects, citing the first kind of terrorism for its justification. By “economic disintegration,” I mean the ongoing chain of events whereby the processes of globalization, which a few years ago were being widely cheered by some while arousing great concern to others, have enmeshed large portions of the world’s population in a network of suffering in very complex ways that are still only partially understood. We can be certain a priori that, in this One World which is ours, these two crises are interrelated. For the “philosophers of the future” (to use Nietzsche’s expression), who are and will be the theorists of injustices rather than theorists of justice, the first task will be to identify the most salient contradictions, the most salient instances of dominance and subordination that help to explain these crises. That is not as impossible a task as it might at first seem. For example, we have the testimonies of some Islamic terrorists concerning the situations of extreme injustices, as they perceived them, such as the unequal treatment of natives and settlers in parts of Palestine that led them to take up their cause. We have the public record of the enormous incomes of some leading personalities in the world of finance compared with the vast numbers of individuals forced to abandon their homes in the United States. Often the foreclosures are the indirect result of financial manipulations of some of those same extremely wealthy personalities.

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But, some might claim that this approach will entail the involvement of philosophers in empirical realities. Exactly so. The idea that philosophy must confine itself to abstract, universal principles and that it becomes involved in ephemeral empirical facts at its peril is as much of a prejudice, a prejudice envisioning some ideal form of philosophy that has no real independent existence, as is the prejudice concerning an ideal form of perfect justice. In fact, the two prejudices are closely linked. At the same time, we should not assume that having recourse to empirical facts and data entails that philosophers must abandon all reference to principles. Certainly not! It is by going back and forth between empirical realities and the world of principles, and by using the realities to cast the principles in a critical light, that philosophy best carries out its unique task—the task that led in olden times to the designation of philosophy as the “queen of the sciences.” But that is just another metaphor, as problematic as most. The reorientation toward theories of injustices that I am suggesting cannot and should not be reductive—compressed to the discovery of one or two fundamental contradictions that would supposedly explain all the rest. Still, one example seems to me to be especially important. It has been at the historical root of much of Western thought over several centuries and has encroached on the thinking of much of the rest of the world as well, to the great disadvantage of other traditions and cultures. Simply put, this is the idea that the pursuit of individual profit, the maximizing of selfinterest, can and indeed should serve as the basis of a social ethic oriented to the common good. In other words, it is the worship of the “bottom line” as an ethical standard that has, for many, become a kind of religion. The acceptance of this unethical principle as an ethical standard has laid the foundation for justifying the extreme inequalities with which our world is so riven. These inequalities militate strongly against peace and harmony. A concrete expression of this idea was the chain of events in which some financial traders took actions to maximize their personal commissions and company profits, in the months leading up to the economic crisis, while they were fully aware that these actions would bring great losses to the public at large and even to some of their own clients. These traders now say in their defense that what they did was not illegal, that they were acting in accordance with the central principle of the system, which is profit-maximization. BUT THOSE ACTIONS WERE UNJUST, as not only a few professional philosophers but also many members of the public at large have observed. The philosophers’ task, as theorists of injustices, is to pursue a critical analysis of the system.

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In sum, to repeat a point made at the beginning of this essay, there are things in the universe, such as mercy, which are higher than justice. The notion that we can describe the basic nature of the perfectly just society and that, according to that description, the society in which we live is a “nearly just” one is an ultimately pretentious and arrogant illusion. In most recent times, such illusions been promoted above all by Western liberal democratic theorists, and so, as a product of that general culture, I feel most comfortable when engaging and criticizing it. But I am also confident that wisdom coming from other cultures and other philosophical traditions can be of great use in supporting this engagement and criticism. The challenge of universal dialogue is precisely to bring these other voices to bear in the discussion. In conclusion, to show that my thinking about these matters has, for better or worse, remained substantially stable over four decades, I shall conclude by citing the final paragraph of my early review of A Theory of Justice: Students of law and philosophy both are likely to derive tremendous benefit from the abundant resources of moral reasoning that A Theory of Justice has to offer. The book exhibits a high degree of internal consistency, and it is generally, though by no means perfectly, clear in defining its terms and in stating and carrying out its purposes. But readers, in the philosophical spirit of Socratic rather than of Rawlsian ignorance, should retain a certain skepticism concerning the ultimate validity and value of the book’s project. Such skepticism is most meaningful in light of the possibility of some broader theory of society—a broader theory that would at once be less reliant upon alleged trans-temporal concepts such as ‘justice,’ and less ready to accept uncritically the basic institutions and practices that characterize the present era. (1972, 1003)

References Ayer, A. J. (1952) Language, Truth, and Logic. Dover Publications. Engels, Frederick. 1935. The Housing Question. New York: International Publishers. Hampshire, Stuart. 1972. “A New Philosophy of the Just Society.” The New York Review of Books 15 (3): 34–39. Marx, Karl. (1867) 1936. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: Modern Library. McBride, William. 1972. “Political Theory sub Specie Aeternitatis: A New Perspective.” The Yale Law Journal 81 (5): 980–1003. Rawls, John. 1955. “Two Concepts of Rules.” Philosophical Review 64 (1): 3–32.

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—. 1958. “Justice as Fairness.” Philosophical Review 67 (2): 164–194. —. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. —. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1762) 2008. “On Law.” In The Social Contract, translated by G. D. H. Cole. New York: Cosmo Classics. Weldon, T. D. 1960. The Vocabulary of Politics. Baltimore: Penguin.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN NO DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BOTH REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION ENRIQUE DUSSEL

Some key themes currently being debated in political philosophy have origins in contemporary Latin American political praxis.1 This theoretical debate, which has primarily included Latin American thinkers, has an evident impact on concrete instances of political praxis since political actors, citizens, activists, and representatives explicitly or implicitly ground their political activities in theoretical foundations. The relationship between political theory and political praxis explains why liberal forms of representative democracy come to be equated with the definition of democracy as such; or how the quasi-anarchist position in favor of the project of radical participatory democracy, which takes the form of permanent assemblies, ends up appearing as the obligatory stance of left social or political movements; or, by the same token, the exercise of political leadership is required to take the form of a populist dictatorship. Theoretical diagnoses of this kind distort political praxis, undermine the efforts of activists ideally guided by altruistic principles (although we should not forget the popular saying, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”), and frequently negate in practice the possibility of successfully engaging in necessary political democratic activities. Let us then set out our meditation on some of the themes that today immobilize political will and hinder it from acting more creatively, actively, jointly, and clearly. In general, the current tendency is to frame the issues involved in such debates in terms of antagonistic extremes such as participatory democracy versus representative democracy, strengthening of the state versus dissolution of the state, and democracy versus political leadership. These terms are evidently framed as if they were antithetical, with each appearing to exclude the other.

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The contrary approach would be to demonstrate that, in fact, the two poles in each dichotomy are not mutually exclusive, and that they must instead be articulated together dialectically, in such a way that each term enriches the other. Thus, they can be defined mutually in relationship to each other. The aim of this text, then, is to relate these terms as complementary and not as antagonistic. We might then overcome the initially framed polarization between them in the following way: participatory democracy articulated with representative democracy, strengthening of the state from the horizon of the dissolution of the state, and the exercise of participatory democracy with political leadership. This dialectical articulation of these non-antagonistic terms will guide the exposition. Here I develop one of these three theses, participatory democracy articulated with representative democracy. One thesis could be formulated thus: Participatory democracy has absolute priority over every “delegation” of power, that is to say, over representative democracy. I accept, and will prove, that effectively participatory democracy possesses an absolute priority, because it is the essence of the exercise of power, which exists prior to every delegation, which I have called “potestas.” (Dussel 2008, third thesis; 2009, 59, §14)

Representation is institutionalized as delegation; participation is exercised in action and can be institutionalized. There is then a participatory potestas. The representative function is government, that is to say, the actualization of contents (material moment); participation is propositional (it makes known and demands the fulfillment of needs or demands) and, furthermore, it oversees (fiscalizadora: watches as a panopticon,2 punishes or acknowledges and rewards what is worthy; this is the formal moment of legitimation). Political parties are institutional mediations re-linked to representation; participation originates in the good judgment of civic common sense. It is not identical with political parties, but is prior to and much more than them. Institutionalized critical participation does not need political parties (although they are not negated in principle), given that it is the movement, the mediation for critique, the transformation and overseeing of the institutions of representation (and of the state). Modernity took up cases of republics characterized by the participation of citizens as its points of departure (for example, Venice). Slowly, through the struggles of the bourgeoisie against the nobility, and at first supporting itself on the principles of absolutist monarchy, forms of representative democracy were created that gradually evolved beyond the constraints of

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absolutism. The United States Constitution was the first of its kind, since the English parliament was still a representative institution that supported a monarchy and the privileges of the nobility, which began to manage this framework in service to its own interests, even though ultimate power was wielded by the bourgeoisie. Given this perspective, we can argue that modernity affirmed the need for a representative form of democracy, manipulated by the bourgeoisie in the face of the decaying power of the feudal nobility. But the bourgeoisie was quite careful to impose limits on the participation of some groups (minorities) and some sectors of civil society that were subjected to prevailing forms of domination. These groups were only conceded increased rights of participation as the result of struggles. The objective of the bourgeoisie throughout this process was to contain these struggles within the limits necessary to permit the effective management of the mechanisms of representation necessary to sustain a hegemonic bourgeois project. This led virtually all movements of political resistance to support anarchist precepts, which assumed that the just and adequate government for the people had to be one framed in terms of direct participation against the aforementioned structures of bourgeois representation and its concomitant pretensions of universality. Thus was born the false antinomy between the position assumed by so-called political realism in defense of representative democracy (which culminated later in liberalism) against the option that was interpreted to be utopian (non-feasible in practice) in character and that insisted upon the full participation of the people identified with anarchism. According to this formulation, the only two possible options are either to identify with liberalism and support representative democracy as the only viable mode of governance, or to be a revolutionary (or anarchist) and support participatory democracy. Again, the confrontation between these options is defined in terms of the assumed antagonism between representation and participation. Nonetheless, both terms are inadequate and insufficient when grasped in isolation from each other. Their apparent opposition, in fact, constitutes a false contradiction, because they reflect two related terms within a single co-determining relationship, where each requires and is dependent upon the other for completion. Each separately is necessary but not sufficient, and sufficiency can only be achieved through their articulation. Instead of an authentic contradiction, what is at work here is the differentiation of two moments that together constitute a mutual, correlative relationship necessary to achieve a minimum and sufficient definition of democracy. Until today and throughout modernity: (1) unilateral representative democracy has increasingly demonstrated its evident defects until

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culminating at present in a monopolistic fetishization of political parties that corrupt the exercise of state power; (2) at the same time, the ideal of a fully realized participatory democracy has never been effectively institutionalized because it has been monopolized by anarchist positions that have demonstrated their empirical impossibility (for example, when a government is attempted only on the basis of a community of direct democracy in permanent assembly, as exemplified by the few months of the Paris Commune, or in the context of the initial experience of “All Power to the Soviets!” in Russia during the October Revolution). My argument here instead is that an articulation of both moments or aspects of, namely, a democracy that is both feasible in practice and legitimate (in terms of both representation and participation), implies a qualitative leap beyond modern bourgeois politics. It also implies a leap beyond the “real socialism” of the twentieth century, which practiced neither participatory nor representative democracy, because the ambiguous formulations of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” or “democratic centralism” were not objectively democratic at all (Dussel 2009, chap. 3; Dussel 2001, chap. 7, 8, esp. 145).3 What is needed is a new model of a political system that can be articulated with a trans-modern and trans-liberal civilization, which is transcapitalist from the economic point of view (Dussel 2012). The idea is not simply to improve on the achievements of liberalism. Instead, we must define an alternative point of departure upon the basis of new premises that would make it possible to articulate participation with representation in a way never imagined within a liberal regime (but which, by the same token, would not be considered feasible from an anarchist perspective). Such a revolution would be quintessentially political in character and would be equivalent to the common ownership of the means of production in the economy field proposed by Karl Marx in his vision of economic revolution. This is a political revolution that Marx was not able to formulate in an empirically possible form because he inadvertently assumed the existence of a contradiction between the two terms of the relationship described above: participation versus representation. To achieve such goals, a new kind of political reflection is necessary. We must rethink how we describe power itself and discern at all levels the bifurcation that gives life to its exercise: participation and representation. Everything that is political begins (and ends) with participation. Contrary to John Stuart Mill’s affirmation in his work Considerations on Representative Government (1861), we ought to indicate that the democratic political system begins by being that of direct participation. Direct participation, however, is only feasible in face-to-face interaction with the com-

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munity, at the grass-roots of political community beneath the municipality or county levels. But the impossibility or infeasibility of reaching governmentality only through representation (in the decisions and the exercise of power, when the number of citizens increases), requires the need to think of a new way of organizing a participatory democracy that would be possible institutionally. It is often argued that when a community is made up of a large population—dozens of millions of citizens—direct participatory democracy is impossible to implement. Thus, to reach a political consensus in such a context, it is necessary to mediate the participation of all of the individual members of the community through a smaller, proportional number of representatives. The political institution of representation emerged on this basis, within the framework of humanity’s most ancient political systems, many millennia ago (Dussel 2011b). But this supposed solution does not preclude a need for a clear political consciousness of the fact that processes of representation are not automatically transparent or adequate for the purpose of reflecting the judgment of each individual. This implies admitting the risks entailed by the nonidentity of the represented and the representative, which can manifest in a series of possible failures. For example, the representative may fail to transmit the will of the individual members of the collective organ so that the body of representatives as a whole can resolve disputed positions that arise as part of the process of delegated exercising power.4 Representation is always understood as an ambiguous mediation that can devolve into a kind of fetishization, or bureaucratization, viz., in the mere manifestation of the decision of the will of the representative and not of the singular community of the represented. Once representation is understood as a necessary but ambiguous institution, it will be necessary in turn to articulate it with a more developed form of participation that goes beyond the assembly of individual citizens at the base who act through the mediation of forms of direct democracy. This implies the need to rethink everything we have formulated up until this point. In effect, the potentia (see Dussel 2009, thesis 2) is political power in itself, whose exclusive and ultimate source is always the political community as such. To become real, that is to say existent, it must posit itself as an institutionalizing power in relationship to a possible potestas, which is the institutional totality of the political system. This positing of the political community cannot but be participatory, in which individual members as such will have to make the fundamental decisions necessary for the possible political system. We ought to understand that this positing

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is an ontological presupposition, which is empirically implemented in an implicit manner, because every really existing political community originates always from a given a priori institutionality that is always historically organized. (Even the species homo presupposes the emerging institutionality of primates, which organize in terms of group relationships under the oppression of a dominant male.) It would be impossible to imagine an empirical situation (or state of nature) wherein a political community, without any kind of institutionality, would posit itself primordially in the situation of deciding what political system it wanted. In such a case, Francisco Suárez’s formulation would be confirmed in practice. He suggested that the only possible regime of government under natural law (hypothetically previous to all kinds of institutionality or potestas), prior to any kind of historical regime, would be “democratic,” since at its inception it would have to democratically decide what system should be adopted. But from a contemporary perspective, it must be said additionally that this already implies a form of “participatory democracy” (an issue Suárez could not have imagined). Still, this would be a system without representation yet, because such “representation” would be the result of a decision that presupposed an antecedent “participation.” Ontologically speaking, human beings are physically and cerebrally singular. Their metabolic or anatomical organization reaches to the limit of their skin, the membrane that delimits the inside and outside of the living being. Like all living beings, human beings are situated in a precise physical situation, which cannot be occupied by any other physical body at the same time. At this naïve level of the “thingly reality” (la realidad cósica) of the human being, the singular individual is, nonetheless, in relationship with other real things (from the physical universe, to the Earth as the planet where each person lives, to stones, trees, non-human animals, and other human beings who, like them, are physically real). Taking a further step, on one hand, each person enters into relationships with all these things in a very different way from all those other beings. Because of the cerebral development of their subjectivity, human beings are unique in having a world (at least in the Heideggerian sense), and they have a much more developed level of intersubjectivity than any of the higher non-human animals. On the other hand, the human intersubjective world constitutes a totality of intersubjective and real relations that presuppose a community. In other words, the singular human being is born inevitably to and grows up culturally within a community. The actual relationship of each singular individual with the community as a whole is an a priori moment constitutive of their own subjectivity. It is through language that an individual undertakes communication within this

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context. In engaging in participation, human beings situate themselves to become “part” of the “whole” actuality of human practices. Participation is thus a communicative praxis; it is to put oneself in communication with others. Thus, participation is the first real relational moment of the singular human being in its community, and is thereby constitutive of that community. This means that if each individual did not enter into communication with others, and did not participate in actions in common, they would become isolated and, as such, would perish. At the same time, the community would disappear as well. Human life is lived communally. Without this acting in community, or communitarian action, there would be no life, because each living being is the fruit of an immense quantity of completed systemic functions, which cannot be carried out effectively on an individual scale. This describes a solipsistic situation in which life itself becomes impossible. “To be in community (ser comunitario)” is the epitome of participation; it is to be actually part of the whole that the part always presupposes and without which it could not live. In other words: to be an effective part of the whole is to participate, which is a substantive aspect of a human being qua human, that is, as a historical, cultural, and political “being in community.” Because of this, the potentia or political power that resides in the community is always the participation of singular individuals within the collective whole. If the word potentia (in addition to force) indicates the possibility of a future actuality (the potential of a possible act), participation is precisely the actualization of the potentia as potency (as both force and possibility). (Marx uses these ontological distinctions in Grundrisse [(1858) 1973], referring to living labor as a “power” or “possibility.”) In the “Lesser Logic,” G. W. F. Hegel adequately understood that possibility (Möglichkeit) is situated before future reality that is actualized (Wirklichkeit), and as activity (Taetigkeit) (1970, 284, §144). In exactly the same way, participation of all of the members of a political community is the actual exercise of power as activity: as an activity that consists in joining its concrete corporality and its committed subjectivity with that of other members of the community to grant existence to community as such. A political assembly does not exist without participants. The political participation of each participant constitutes an act (entelékheia in Greek) that brings the political community as such into existence. Participation is the primordial mode of the to-be-political, and, for that reason, of political power as such. Political power is woven around the participation of singular individuals within the whole of the community. Without participation, the polity disappears: political power loses its foundation. To participate is to take charge of the community, to assume responsibility for others. It is

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the first expression of the will-to-live, given that isolated individuals close in upon themselves. They neither collaborate with nor can count on the community. This is a state of autistic suicide. Many causes of non-participation exist, but all of them are political pathologies that must be avoided. A community with political power is a strong, vital, participatory, entity characterized by a sense of mutual responsibility. The will-to-live and the kind of unity that is the product of consensus and of the abundance of means that make political life possible are the fruits of the active participation of all of the singular members of a political community. The process whereby excluded or indifferent citizens participate anew in the political community can be expressed as follows: X represents the political power of that community, a represents the existent political order, b represents future political order, and 1 represents a new instance of participation, then Xa < Xa+1 = Xb. This is a process of potentiation (sometimes termed “empowerment”) or increase in the power of the community. When the marginalized or excluded sectors of a community become conscious of the importance of political participation and irrupt collectively as actors in the creative construction of history, the power of the weak is increased. Participation (1) is transformed into surplus power (p); this is the hyper power of the people that “enters” as a creative source (Xa+p = Xb), and, thanks to the “state of rebellion,” is able to be an innovative transformation of the ruling political order (Dussel 2008, theses 11, 12). From the opposite perspective, the fact that citizens abandon their participation in the political community (for example, because of the fear caused by tyranny imposed upon the community to deter or prevent participation) can be formulated inversely as: Xa > Xa-1 = Xb. This illustrates how the power of the political community is weakened as the apparent or fetishized power of violent domination imposes itself upon the people. Non-participation is the loss of political power. Participation thus also has the meaning associated with the concept of an existential moment (to use Martin Heidegger’s terms). The being-with (Mitsein) (the “us” of the community beyond the “I,” which is analyzed linguistically by Carlos Lenkersdorf concerning the Mayan peoples) is actualized through participation. This is the being (to be) of the political, as I have indicated. Subsequently, the development of the concept of participation goes from being merely be-participatory (Sein) to positing itself as a foundation (Grund). It posits itself as essence (Wesen). In effect, participation is the essence of what appears phenomenologically in the horizon of the political field as totality. All political entities phenomenalize themselves, appear, or are interpreted from the perspective of this founda-

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tion. This is how actions and institutions appear in the political field as modes of participation; these are manners to participate. We say, for instance, that some agreements are “legitimate.” Legitimacy is the characteristic of a phenomenon that has the particularity of that which has been agreed upon as the result of reasons expressed within a context where there has been symmetrical participation by those affected. Frequently no attention is given to the fact that participation is the essential moment of legitimacy. Without participation, there is no legitimacy, since what is symmetrical or legitimate is impossible without the presence or participation of those who ought to express the reasons that would make possible the agreements regarding the needs of those affected. For this reason, what is agreed upon would be illegitimate due to the absence of the affected, because of their non-participation. Now we can understand that the ground of legitimacy is the active presence (as will to participate, with reasons that demonstrate their necessity) of the affected. The active presence in the community of those who can articulate discursively political arguments can only be fulfilled empirically through participation, which is nothing other than the effective presence as part (the citizen) of the whole (the community). The symmetry to which I refer here is the adequate mode of participation; if participation were not permitted, one could not speak of symmetry at all. Those affected are defined as such because they are suffering the negative effects of not having been able to participate in previous debates to defend their rights and receive the benefits that would allow them to avoid being affected negatively. In this way, we can see how the concept of participation is the substance of the definition of the legitimate. This concept is so self-evident that it would seem not to require any further explanation. Participation at its moment of origin is neither legitimate nor illegitimate (Marx said that it cannot be said whether living labor has exchange value). The issue is situated at a different level from that of legitimacy, because, as I have noted, it is the foundation or essence of legitimacy. Participation has primordial dignity (not legitimacy) and is sovereign by nature. More, sovereignty is the self-reference in action of the participation of the members of the community that posits itself as an effectively existent community. The community posits itself as sovereign (first act) thanks to the participation in action of its members. As such, it is the foundation of the legitimacy of the representation when it decides to create representation as an institution and to elect a representative who exercises power in a delegated manner (second act). But sovereignty itself is not legitimate, if it is understood in the sense that I want to express that it is more than legitimate: since what are, in

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fact, legitimate are the acts and effects (laws, institutions, etc.) of the exercise of sovereignty, of participation in action. Another way to express this is by the following analogy: The maternity of the mother is not filial in character, since this is instead the foundation of the daughter’s filiation. The citizen’s participation is an inalienable institutionalizing right (before being constituent), and has the dignity of the political actor as a substantive constituent moment of political community. This is why representation always comes later and will be a feasibly necessary moment or aspect determined by instrumental reason, which is situated only at the level of potestas (the grounded phenomenological order), and which is an aspect of institutions created to carry out political life, but is in no way the substance of political life. Meanwhile potentia or political power as such of the community is always essentially presupposed as participation. When the political community of participants posits itself as an institutionalizing power—when it decides in a participatory manner to create institutions—it must do so on the basis of the participation of the members of the community. This institutional positing of political power sunders potentia and potestas (the institutional structure at the service of the community). The potestas or institutional structure must be democratic in character, but once again, the first possible foundational type of democracy is participatory democracy, since it determines the necessity of providing itself with representatives to make the concrete exercise of political power possible. This representative exercise has representation or delegation as its essence (in its broadest sense, not as a limited mandate) of the power of the community in a singular individual from the same community, who being part of it, represents the whole community. This way of organizing the political system is called representative democracy, which requires legitimacy to exercise delegated power with justice and efficacy. Evidently, representative democracy is no longer the generic name or synonym of democracy as such, but instead, it is a secondary moment of democracy, which is understood as an integral legitimate regime; it is characterized by the delegated exercise of power. Thus, it was born in potestas, or in the institutional political structure, a complex, mutually articulable system of participatory-representative democracy that bourgeois modernity liberalism has not discovered, much less practiced. Neither the political left movements has been able to adequately describe it,5 which has lead to multiple dead-ends, unnecessary aporias, and contradictions with lamentable effects. The deepest, most far-reaching revolution of the twenty-first century will be the liberation of political communities organized in representative

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democratic states. This will slowly institutionalize a participatory democracy of the impoverished majority of civil society. This presupposes an accelerated growth in the people’s consciousness regarding political problems, in their knowledge of institutional mechanisms, and in the defense of their rights for which they should fight. When people spoke of socialism, they were only thinking of poverty and the exploitation of the working class and the lumpen sectors of capitalism, which certainly should be overcome. Sometimes, however, the political critique of liberalism (which in the political field is the analogue of capitalism in the economic field) was ignored. This critique was enunciated from the perspective of the community’s primordial exercise of its political power through the full participation of its citizens (which should additionally make itself evident in the participatory democratic decision-making processes in the enterprises within the economic field). Marx discovered this issue in the heroic experience of the Paris Commune in 1871, but he was not able to adequately formulate the institutional dimensions of the issue within a political theory capable of articulating participation with representation (Mészáros 1995, chap. 3, §4, chap. 11, §2). Today’s revolution is deeper and will have greater consequences, because it is the condition of possibility of all the others, and, furthermore, it is fulfilled analogically in all practical fields. A people engaged in the exercise of sovereignty, which is what political self-determination is, can decide its national and international political economy. With respect to the issue of minorities, for instance, when the majority of the conservative parties take control of congress or parliament (majority that is sometimes the political-party machine “mandate” of minorities of the community that nonetheless have in their hands the exercise of the power of the state), can only have a real solution through participation. Even if the minority, as a collective organ of the representatives (which, in fact, can be the majority of the political community), cannot exercise power at crucial moments in the congress or institutions of judicial power, it has recourse through active participation and through the mobilization of the affected. (Even if a group is a minority in a representative state organ, it can be a majority in the streets, because those who suffer injustice today are the majority.) Yet, it would be best to have participatory institutions that would be the constitutional and legal voice through which minorities could articulate their exercise of their institutional rights. The constitutionalization of this participation would take form in rights, such as the right to repeal mandates, for instance, which is in fact a new political institution of overseeing (fiscalizadora) participation, so that this minority be respected and taken into account in the representative organs. Without its

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active participation, a minority’s arguments will never be accepted (except if it is a de facto majority) in the organs of representation. The issue then is to use our imagination to project the existence of a more complex political system wherein modes of participation and representation are accorded differentiated functions. However, above all, we must creatively project a political system in which participation achieves a sufficient degree of institutionalization (which is why institutionality should not be confused with the extent to which the system has a representative character) at the various levels at which the exercise of political power is determined to be necessary. We should take a further step to develop this argument. Three (not two) different instances of the exercise of institutional power (potestas) must be distinguished (Diagram 1). In effect, the potestas, understood as an institutional totality (or the objectification of the potentia or power of the political community) has three primary instances, which have not been considered as such in any modern political philosophy. This is a new issue and a point of departure for the political revolution of the twenty-first century. A Participation that makes demands6

B Participation that governs7

C Participation that controls8

Potestas (State in the strictest sense) Diagram 1. The three instances of the exercise of potestas.

In the first instance (A), in terms of the dimension of “participation that makes demands” (the first function of the Citizen’s Power in the new Constitution of Venezuela), the political community, the sole site or seat of sovereign political power (potentia), becomes a self-conscious whole that demands what it needs from itself (see Leyes del poder popular 2011; Álvarez 2010). This means that it is the members of the community who articulate their needs through the mechanisms born of institutionalized participation (in the different levels of the institutionalized exercise of power: potestas). This process of interpellation is oriented to the representative institutions at all levels to which it is directed, revealing its material, formal, and feasibility demands (arrow A).

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This is the new theme of participatory democracy that considers demands made in its “interpellative” instance, which must be adequately institutionalized and which should never be relegated merely to neverfulfilled promises of candidates in the electoral campaigns of political parties. Such would be unacceptable because it would imply leaving the essential material moment of all forms of politics to the good will of the representatives who govern (this moment is characterized as “piloting” the representation of the state). Thus, the fulfillment of the will as will-to-live, as material needs of the community, would be left to the arbitrary will of the representatives. In the second instance (B), in terms of the “representative that governs” (for example, in the functions proper to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government), managing the demands of the community, which constitute the very content of the exercise of institutional or delegated power, as the implementation in practice of the government of the State. This is the theme of representative democracy (the only fully institutionalized experience of modern liberalism). In a third instance (C), in terms of the “participation that controls” (the second function of participation as spelled out by the Citizen’s Power; in Venezuela there are five powers or branches), the emphasis is upon supervisory power (observa—as effective power, a supervising police, the last instance of coercion even upon judicial police or the army itself), which involves compliance by the representative institutions (B) of the requirements and needs promoted by the political community (A) for their fulfillment. Even the judicial branch must be supervised by the Citizen’s Power: its supervising function is superior to its judiciary function. The Supreme Constitutional Court (last instance of judgment of the entire political system of the State) is made up of candidates proposed by the proposing (propositivo) Citizen’s Power.9 The Supreme Court proposes potential lists of nominees, whose definitive members are elected by direct vote of the political community as a whole. This is the whole theme of participatory-supervising (participativo-fiscalizadora) democracy, which directs the auditory institutions that supervise representation. Is it possible to institutionalize participation as something different from institutionalized representation? In my opinion, many experiences of different forms of institutionalized participation can be identified (from community assemblies at the neighborhood or village level to social movements of many different kinds) that do not imply representation based upon the political demands of political parties, and the fulfillment of representative democracy (which I do not describe as “liberal” in charac-

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ter, since it lacks the co-determining participatory dimension and thus inevitably fetishizes representation) (Diagram 2). b

c International

10

8. International

7. Intern. regions

b

c Inter. regions

6. Federal11

b

c Federal

5. Regional

b 12

b

14

b

4. Provincial

3. Municipal

15

2. Communal

c Regional d13

c Provincial c Municipal 16

b

Executive council

a 1. Direct community, assembly at the base17

d a Communal council direct from the base18

a Participatory power that makes demands

d Representative power that governs

c Communal a c Direct community, assembly at the base a Participatory power that controls

c Potestas Potentia Participatory political community Diagram 2. Different vertical levels of possible articulation of participatory and representative in the future democracy Clarification of Diagram: Arrows: a indicates the ascending direction of participatory institutionalization; b indicates the direction of participation that demands (based on needs); c indicates controlling (evaluative, fiscal) actions of participation with respect to representative power; d indicates the representative direction of delegation of power. Numbers 1 through 8 refer to the eight levels of the exercise of power delegated in representation or exercised in participation. In the democratic representation the delegated power must be exercised as power grounded in obedience (“those who rule must rule by obeying”). In the democratic participation the power is exercised as the sovereign power (“those who rule19 must rule by ruling or commanding”).

At level 1, representative democracy is also present because the community assembly in the district, or the direct political-democratic organization in the base, below the level of the municipality or district (in the United States), also exercises representative power (this does not

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replace the immediate organization of direct democracy, informed and convened by the electronic networks, as we will see later). This is also referred to as Communal Council, as are, for example, the neighborhood councils, or the communal assembly. This is the level that is celebrated, with reason, by anarchism; it is the truth of anarchism. The problem not solved by anarchism consists of the institutionalization of other levels without eliminating the representative institutions. For its part, liberal or modern democracy focuses on organizing its representative dimensions (levels 3–8 in Diagram 2), but ignores all of the relevant levels of participatory institutions. As I have suggested, the founding fathers of the United States had some inkling about the need to articulate representative democracy with participatory dimensions (Arendt 1990, 248). However, they were never able to organize it in practice because of the opposition of dominant groups that feared the effects of real democratic participation of the majority of the people. Such participation was necessarily poorer within a capitalist system—the same capitalism that the liberal system considers to be in the “very nature of things” in the economic field, and which complements the political domain within the framework of the liberal system. Had some form of participatory democracy been implemented, the poor would have ended up constituting a majority of those elected as representatives, but this never happened. The well “managed” representation by the system of liberal representation made it possible for the minority elite to dominate, continuously exercising representative power over oppressed masses. But the nonobedience (no-obediencial) of representation is grounded in the real and institutional non-participation of the people (an exclusion already written into the institutions defined by the constitutions of the United States). Representative power thus fetishizes itself, as it self-referentially affirms itself as the ultimate site or seat of power (potestas) located in institutions of representation and not in the political community itself (potentia). The participatory power of the political community or of the people can be alienated (but not fetishized) when it ceases to have a clear consciousness of being the ultimate seat of the exercise of power, when it does not know how to decide what is best from the standpoint of its own interests, or when it is mistaken in the election of candidates and in the election of the best representatives, but essentially when this power is not institutionalized as a daily effective participation of the people. In such cases, the common sense of the citizenry has lost its grip. One of the most powerful contemporary instruments to weaken and even alienate a community in the context of its participatory action of

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electing representatives (which is only one of the several duties of participation20) is the power of media moguls—“mediacracy” (la mediocracia). This is why the struggle to recover the media and put it in the hands of the people is essential as a prerequisite for real democracy. Communications media can be democratized through the participation of different institutions of civil and political society—as opposed to leaving them in the hands of the transnational corporations that dominate the business of media—in the creation and use of electronic communication media and by creating radio, television, electronic, debate and study networks, as well as organs of social, cultural, university, artistic, and professional action. For example, Argentina has a new Communication Media Law in which 33 percent of the sector belongs to the State, 33 percent to civil society and communities, and 33 percent to private (national or transnational) entities. It is a global novelty worthy of imitation. However, true revolution lies in the electronic means of communication: through networks of communication in the hands of the citizens, millions of participants can know, debate, and decide on common actions. This technological revolution is as, or perhaps even more, important than the Industrial Revolution produced by the steam engine in the material process of production of commodities in the economic field, because it touches human relations themselves and the sphere in which economic and political decisions are made. Analogously, and to even a greater extent, these electronic means of communication have enabled rebellion among citizens outraged by the corruption and the monopolistic exercise of political power in the hands of the representative organs of the state. Examples include Tahrir Square in Egypt and the Sun Square in Madrid. This constitutes a communicative revolution among citizens that transforms the material means of the production of political decisions. Oppressed citizens of the world: Organize participation in electronic networks and we will be millions! We will be communicating instantaneously in real time throughout the entire small planet Earth to defeat the oppressive bureaucracies of corrupt political representation—not numerous elites united to the transnational financial and capitalist bureaucracies that exploit all peoples of the world, including those of Europe and the United States. For this, we have to institutionalize participation. In conclusion, participatory democracy ought to be articulated with representative democracy, and both ought to be institutionalized at the eight vertical levels of political institutionality. Translated by Eduardo Mendieta

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Notes 1.

Translator’s note: This text is extracted from the author’s “Democracia participativa, disolución del Estado y liderazgo político” [Participatory democracy, dissolution of the state and political leadership] (2011a, 27–48). It is a translation of only one out of three theses Dussel formulates in the chapter. This section has been selected because of its striking and original formulations, as well as their obvious contemporary relevance. 2. In participatory democracy, Michel Foucault’s surveillance and punishment would be carried out not as a form of domination in the direction from above to below, but as a justice from below in direction to above, granting to government the content of its activity and preventing impunity at the case of the corruption or fetishization of power (which is what is the illegitimacy of delegated power) in formal procedures. 3. When I refer to “democracy” here, I am referring to an institutional political system of legitimacy, which is in no way limited to the context of a liberal democracy. 4. The presentation of proposals of a general character and oriented toward the interests of the community as a whole that are carefully thought out and wellfounded requires schools and associations of political studies that permit the presentation of such projects, which would also educate and train candidates for political office. This is a key task for political parties. If there were only one party with these characteristics, then only one project of this kind would be presented. The Central Committee of that party might argue that there are internal currents within it. But if these currents have full autonomy of debate then they are acting in fact as if they were political parties in themselves. But in practice there has not been such autonomy and full freedom of discussion in parties of this kind within the context of really existing socialism. Furthermore the representatives of these currents were not elected directly by the political community as members of different currents with varying political projects. This lack of pluralism in addition to the failure to elect representatives as members of groups with differing political projects invalidates the representative democratic (not liberal) character of such processes as such, and does not guarantee full participation either, because they lack the institutions that would permit its sovereign exercise. In the end these are questions then that must be debated honestly within the contemporary Latin American left and throughout the world more generally. 5. Attributable to an understandable lack of confidence in bourgeois liberal modes of representation, criticized from a perspective that assumes (direct democratic) participation is not attainable if it is not institutionalized at the four levels of exercise of state power. However, now it is possible to institutionalize participation. 6. The demands ought to be planned. The issue of governance through planning can be seen in Venezuela in the Ley orgánica de la planificación pública y popular [Organic law of public and popular planning] of 2010. 7. Mexico’s Zapatistas (Zapatista National Liberation Army [EZLN]) in Chiapas proposed two opposing concepts in this context: between the domination exercised by power premised upon liberal principles (los que mandan mandan mandando [“those who rule do so by ruling,” or commanding]); and the just exercise of power .

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(los que mandan mandan obedeciendo [those who rule do so by obeying]). But both of these exercises of power are representative in character. If we refer instead to participatory power everything shifts. It is then the whole community, the people in the participation, who “rule by ruling” (or commanding), but it is the just representative power which “rules by obeying.” 8. The control function exercised by institutions of participation can be consulted in Venezuela’s Ley orgánica de la Contraloría social, which established the institution known as the “Social Comptroller”. 9. The adjudicative power (of “judgment”) of the judicial branch must be distinguished from the power of “control” (or of “observation” regarding the sovereign capacity to fix penalties) of Citizen’s Power, which is a key innovation of Venezuela’s revolutionary constitution. On the other hand, since the power of control can culminate in the need for a “trial” or other kind of quasi-judicial process (for example, in the context of the “revocation of the mandate” of an elected representative, and even of a judge belonging to the judicial branch all the way up to the highest instance, the Supreme Court), it must be clarified what kind of “trial” this is and who should conduct it. This is because it could be the same judicial power which does so under certain conditions or by means of the Supreme Constitutional Court which depends upon the Citizen’s Power or branch, since it would be unacceptable to imagine a spontaneous “people’s trial” or public “lynching.” The governability of representation can always be assured in equilibrium with the necessary participation of the political community. 10. There are organizations on a global level (such as the United Nations) (8), and international regional organizations or confederations (7) such as the European Union, and Asian, African, or Latin American regional institutions. 11. Often wrongly referred to as “national” (6), because frequently the State is actually “plurinational” (as the Bolivian State is correctly denominated today). This then is the state referred to in terms of its specific, “federal” or “unitary” character in the US. In Venezuela the maximum participatory institution at the “national” or “federal” level is the new Citizen’s Power or branch of power (which is the fifth in addition to the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, and Electoral Powers or branches). Regarding Citizen’s Power (Del Poder ciudadano), see Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2000, Title V, Chapter IV, Articles 273– 291. This must be better defined and strengthened in terms of its functioning. 12. Also denominated “state” (4) (for example, the state of Sinaloa in Mexico or of California in the United States, or the Laenden in Germany) constituted by municipalities, counties, boroughs, or similar entities. Some states include interstate or inter-provincial “regions” (5). 13. The corresponding representative institutions (provincial states with their governors, congresses, etc.) 14. In the United States this unit is denominated “county”; within Mexico’s Federal District they are known as “delegations,” etc. In current Venezuelan legislation, the term employed is comuna [comune or community]. 15. See the Ley orgánica de las Comunas. 16. Ley orgánica de las Comunas, title 4, chap. 2. Chapter 1 has reference to a Communal Parliament (already an institution with a representative character).

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17.

Already a kind of institution, for example, the Neighborhood Assembly of a small village, which is not the seat of a municipality or county: “district.” 18. See for example Ley orgánica de planificación, title 2, Del Consejo communal (Regarding the Communal Council). 19. This “ruling” is not by representation (and therefore does not have a fetishized character), but instead rules in its own name as a mechanism of participation, the people, the foundation of all legitimacy. 20. Because this is a duty it is absolutely obligatory, not voluntary. This is the act by which the citizen delegates power and is for this reason of great importance. One of the manipulations of liberalism is to relegate this duty as if it were merely an optional task. Just as respecting traffic laws is not optional, there are many reasons that serve to justify the people’s duty to elect their representatives.

References Álvarez, Víctor. 2010. Del estado burocrático al estado comunal [From bureaucratic state to communal state]. Caracas: Editorial Horizonte. Arendt, Hannah. 1990. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books. Dussel, Enrique D. 2001. Hacia una filosofía política crítica [Toward a critical political philosophy]. Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer. —. 2008. Twenty Theses on Politics. Translated by George CiccarielloMaher. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. —. 2009. Arquitectónica [Architectonics]. Vol. 2 of Política de la Liberación [Politics of liberation]. Madrid: Trotta. —. 2011a. “Democracia participativa, disolución del Estado y liderazgo político” [Participatory democracy, dissolution of the state and political leadership]. In Carta a los indignados [Letter to the outraged], 27–85. Mexico: La Jornada Ediciones. —. 2011b. Politics of liberation: A Critical World History. London: SCM. —. 2012. “Transmodernity and Interculturality: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Liberation.” Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1 (3): 28–59. Hegel, G. W. F. 1970. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse [Encyclopedia of the philosophy of science in outline]. Vol. 8 of Werke. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Leyes del poder popular [Laws of popular power]. 2011. Asamblea Nacional Venezuela. Caracas: Talleres Gráficos. Marx, Karl. (1858) 1973. Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. New York: Vintage Books. Mészáros, István. 1995. Beyond Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press. Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Considerations on Representative Government. London: Parker, Son, and Bourn.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CULTURALLY DIVERSE WORLD EDWARD DEMENCHONOK

The idea of universal human rights is perhaps the greatest achievement of civilization. It serves as an instrument of emancipation. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines universal rights, meaning that they apply to all human beings equally and at every time, regardless of state, race, or culture. They prescribe universal standards for the equal treatment of human beings in areas such as the inherent human dignity, civic equality, security, law enforcement, political participation, free speech, and education. However, today’s world is enormously diverse socially and culturally, representing a broad spectrum of political systems, economic development, cultural traditions, religions, personal identities, etc. For some, these two propositions—universality and diversity—seem incompatible. Some believe that universal human rights are insensitive to the distinct values of diverse cultural traditions of some societies. Others are concerned that overemphasizing the culturally specific values diminishes the fundamental freedoms and rights of democratic participation, and can be used as a justification for authoritarianism. A theoretical expression of this contraposition is the ongoing argument between universalism and cultural relativism. But is the protection of the inalienable rights of each human being and identification with humanity as a whole incompatible with the recognition of identities and the protection of the cultural diversity of nations and minority groups? Can universal human rights and cultural diversity be reconciled through the dialectical interplay between universality and singularity, identity and difference, sameness and otherness? There is a tension between the universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realization in the socially and culturally diverse world. Human rights are related to both morality and law. As universal moral norms, human rights refer to every human being, but as legal rights they can be realized only within the particular legal community of a

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nation-state. The provisions of the United Nations Charter provided a basis for the development of international human rights protection. In theory, human rights are a safeguard against the abuse of power. With the juridification of human rights, enshrined in international law, the possibility arose that they might be guaranteed and universally enforced by an international body. However, the language of human rights is often misused by the powerful as a tool of domination. Two methodological perspectives have come to the forefront as helpful for rethinking the concept and policies of human rights: one is the view of universal human rights as a regulative principle for the evaluation and critique of any state, including a democratic one; the other examines the project to promote universal human rights within the context of power and hegemony. Human rights are indispensable for any viable political project that genuinely aims to advance toward more harmonious society. The concept of universal human rights gives us a normative yardstick for evaluating the policies of any state, and it is vital for progressive political change. Hence, we have the role of human rights as critique. However, powers that are more interested in the status quo and domination are reluctant to adjust their policies to comply with human rights norms. Instead, they try to reinterpret these norms to justify existing policies. This involves a critique of human rights. The universality of human rights is challenged by the advocates of “Asian values,” which are frequently invoked by governments in an attempt to ward off scrutiny of their human rights records. On the other hand, philosophers in the non-Western human rights discourse address cultural diversity and identity issues. Thus the question remains: How to better understand these complex issues and to find constructive approaches to accommodate cultural diversity within the international human rights norms without jeopardizing the human rights system? Another challenge is posed by the instrumentalization of human rights by powerful states for self-serving political purposes. The concept of human rights, newly redefined in terms of promotion of democracy and regime change, is used as a justification for unilateral “humanitarian interventions,” which leaves open the possibility of abuse by the hegemonic superpower for its own geopolitical and economic self-interests. Anyone who reflects on human rights in today’s world is confronted with a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the need for protecting human rights has never been so urgent as now, a time when human rights are trampled by wars, state-sanctioned torture, unrestricted (and unlawful) invasion of privacy by “surveillance states,” and mass poverty. Stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons and the ecological crisis pose an existential

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threat to humanity. On the other hand, the task of the philosophical grounding of human rights, not to mention their genuine implementation, seems never to have been as difficult as it is in today’s world, which is threatened by hegemonic globalization, the flip side of which is ethnocentrism and fragmentation, either in the form of nationalism or pseudouniversal imperial claims. The ideological abuse of the ideas of democracy and human rights as a justification for the superpower’s invasions and occupation of sovereign states compromised these ideas in the very act of supposedly pursuing them. The period since 2001 has been dominated by a boundless “global war on terror,” which has overshadowed human rights problems. The permanent state of war that has ensued is used as justification for unlimited governmental power, including the infringement of civil rights and the sweeping surveillance violating the privacy of citizens. The attempts to justify the policies that violate human rights were made by reinterpreting and challenging the Geneva Conventions (which prohibited torture) and habeas corpus, as well as by claims to set new norms. Such policies have been criticized from different perspectives. Critics point out that in a diverse and interrelated world, the utopia (or rather dystopia) of a global hegemony is a failed project. In drawing attention to the root causes of human rights violations, they argue that the problem of human rights protection and implementation will never be solved by force or by the unilateral actions of either one nation or a group of nations operating within the framework of power politics and domination. Instead, the true solution to the problems of protecting human rights can be achieved only by peaceful means, through the collaboration of all the nations, based on strengthening international law and institutions (such as a properly reformed United Nations), and aiming for a gradual realization of the ideal of cosmopolitan order. Philosophers and political scientists are concerned about challenges that today come from certain policies of human rights that instrumentalize them. They are also concerned about the ideologies which are challenging the core principles of human rights, provoking the so-called crisis of legitimization with respect to human rights. Debates over the compatibility of human rights with Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, or Asian values are framed in such a way that they pose as the central problem whether and to what extent various cultures and religions can be considered as supporters of human rights. This provides a new stimulus for discussions regarding the theory of human rights. Universal human rights, regardless of the differences in the political systems of various societies, are the last line of defense of human freedom

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and dignity. Philosophy, with its commitment to open-ended and critical thinking, must contribute to an in-depth analysis of human rights issues and their possible solutions. First and foremost, an important task of philosophy is the grounding of human rights. To surrender the normative or regulatory ideal (the world as it ought to be) is precisely to give ourselves over to an order of power that would shield itself from any scrutiny and accountability. We have no choice but to redouble, rather than to abandon, our efforts as philosophers and intellectuals to address the great existential and political questions that today threaten humanity. In rethinking past intellectual achievements, we can rediscover their rich heuristic and philosophical potential and creatively apply them to contemporary experiences. One source of inspiration for thinking through these questions can be found in the works of Immanuel Kant. He was a true visionary. He placed the individual at the center of his political philosophy and appealed to human reason as that which can be used by individuals to empower themselves to work their way from dependence to independence, from heteronomy to autonomy. He believed that the respect for law in a republican state would lead toward establishment of a similar system of law in international affairs, and that law-governed states would form a peaceful federation of free states. An international system would eventually evolve toward a cosmopolitan order of law and peace. In Kant’s legacy, we can find arguments against some of the contemporary tenets that are challenging the concept of human rights from historicist, neoconservative, and religious perspectives. His legacy also provides the theorists, such as those using the discourse-theoretic approach, with insights for a rethinking of universal human rights in a culturally diverse world. In this chapter, drawing on the works of Kant, I will address some of the issues in today’s discussions regarding universal human rights in a world of diverse beliefs and practices. In the first part of the chapter, I will discuss Kant’s political philosophy, including his critique of historicism, and then analyze his concept of human rights as freedom and his ideal of cosmopolitan order, arguing for their relevance. In the second part, the analysis is focused on the attempts by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Michael Perry to ground the concept of human rights on the basis of religion, as well as their denial of the possibility of a rational philosophical grounding. The thesis here articulated is that their claim that religious worldviews provide the only intelligible foundation faces serious challenges in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. In the third part, with Kant in the background, I analyze the non-religious philosophical concepts of human rights. I will also provide an overview of some important attempts to go beyond Kant, while retaining the insights worth preserving. I will focus

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mainly on the discourse-ethics approach to justification of human rights by philosophers such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Rainer Forst, and Seyla Benhabib. As the chapter unfolds, I will argue for universal human rights as a regulative principle or normative standard for the evaluation and the possible critique of all states, including democratic ones. The chapter culminates with an analysis of human rights in relation to the current debate on cosmopolitanism. I conclude that the true solution to the problem of protecting human rights can be achieved only by peaceful means, based on strengthening international law and upholding those institutions and transnational democratic movements which aim at a gradual realization of the ideal of a cosmopolitan order of law and peace.

Kant’s Perpetual Peace: An Unfinished Project It could be argued that modern liberal political thought, emerging from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, truly began with Immanuel Kant’s 1795 Perpetual Peace (1996e). This programmatic text, partly anticipated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 1756 “Abstract and Judgment of Saint-Pierre’s Project of Perpetual Peace” (1991), offered a peace program as a solution to social and international antagonisms, with planetary harmony as its main goal. Probably the most visionary project on the topic of its time, it remains a shining exemplar for us even today. Emerging in response to perpetual wars, despotism, and bloody revolutions, it was radically different from many social utopias, such as Hobbes’s Leviathan or G. W. F. Hegel’s historicism, which presented historical necessity as some fetishistic altar upon which human lives are sacrificed in the name of the future “progress.” Kant’s project was the “realistic utopia” (Habermas’s expression; 2012) that combined the ideal with a realistic approach to its possible implementation, analyzing the root causes of antagonisms and wars, and offering practical steps for their solutions. In contrast to historicist determinism, Kant developed a concept of history that was open, or at least capable of being directed by human action. This view of history entailed moral responsibility; in fact, history became the horizon for the moral accomplishment of humanity, where its crooked timber would be straightened.

Deterministic Historicism versus an Open History Shaped by People One of the contributions of Kant’s philosophy of history was his challenge to deterministic historicism and his development of an alternative concept of an open history. Historicism refers to a holistic doctrine of

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historical evolution rooted in the thought of nineteenth-century philosophers such as Johann Gottfried von Herder, G. W. F. Hegel, Henri de SaintSimon, Auguste Comte, and Karl Marx. Notwithstanding the different forms it may take, historicism expresses the idea that society can be comprehended as a whole through time. By obtaining knowledge of the inner necessity of historical progress, we might thereby come to predict and guide the course of future human development. Historicism became a form of teleological historical determinism—the secularization of divine providence. In as much as historicism is rooted in the secularization of God’s immanence in the world, it is the philosophical expression of idolatry. History, or rather, historical necessity, becomes a fetish, or a sacrificial altar upon which human beings are immolated. Various versions of historicist concepts are characterized by teleological determinism, the idea of benevolent Providential necessity, relativization of unconditional moral norms, juridical nihilism, attempts to justify injustice and violence as the means of progress, and interpretation of the present as a full and necessary truth of the past, ignoring unrealized possibilities. The origins of historicism can be traced back especially to the works of Herder and Hegel. Herder developed a teleological conception of history as a form of pantheistic progressivism, arguing that history has an overall purpose as the realization of “reason” and “humanity,” and that it is discernible from the way in which cultures have built upon one another (1968). Meanwhile, Hegel, in Lectures on the Philosophy of World History declares, “reason governs the world, and that therefore world history is a rational process,” that it is possible to comprehend “the divine providence plan,” and that knowledge can provide an insight into historical necessity (2011, 79, 84). For Hegel, history has a knowable pattern and moves toward an end result. The world-spirit, which embodies the Providential Idea, is expressed by the passions of individuals. Individuals, here, are means, tools, or stand-ins for the world spirit. Their frail lives are sacrificed upon the altar of the Absolute. What he considered the realization of Absolute Spirit, evolving progressively with a “logic” of its own, translated in human affairs into what he called “the cunning of reason,” that is, human beings are always at the mercy of historical logic that is intractable to them. The problem with Hegel’s view of history is that it is complacent, self-confident, beyond good and evil, and nourished by a thinly disguised secular theodicy. His dialectic and the idea that struggle is the essence of the human situation played its role in the Marxian version of historicism, resulting in the concept of class struggle, glorification of revolutions, and the claim to knowledge of historical necessity which was then equated to the moral good of all.

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The first philosophical challenge to historicism can be found in Kant’s writing. His philosophy of history was an alternative to the then emerging historicism, with its progressivist embellishment of history. Unlike philosophers who were dreaming of utopian harmony, placing it either in the idealized past or in the imaginary future, Kant approached history more realistically and analytically, and thus in a more heuristically fruitful way. He recognized social antagonisms, but at the same time tried to find a civilized solution based on the rule of law, which aimed at preventing despotism and violence and providing conditions for more harmonious social relationships among individuals within a law-governed civil state. In his article published in 1784, entitled “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” (2011), Kant is ironic about a bucolic “harmony” attributed to the historical past of humankind living “in an arcadian pastoral life of perfect concord, contentment and mutual love” (111–112). This would not be a desirable future, because all human talents would remain in a dormant state and “human beings, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would give their existence hardly any greater worth than that of their domesticated beasts” (112). Instead, in accordance with the Enlightenment’s motto “Sapere aude!” (“Dare to Know!” or as Kant translates it: “Have courage to make use of your own understanding!”), Kant encourages the reasoning public to see history more realistically, as permeated by conflicts and struggles (1996a, 17). We should not close our eyes to social conflicts, but think of their best possible solutions. Kant gives an example of philosophical reasoning on the causes of such social conflicts, finding a rational approach to their solutions through establishing a “law-governed social order.” Within this context, he addresses the problem of social antagonism, viewing it not only as a fact of life but also as a factor stimulating social-cultural development. In the fourth proposition of his Idea he writes, “The means nature employs in order to bring about the development of all its predispositions is their antagonism in society, insofar as the latter is in the end the cause of their lawful order” (2011, 1111). Kant’s use of the term “antagonism” needs clarification. During the past century, modern writers have frequently associated this term with the Manichaean idea of irreconcilable trends, such as uncompromising class struggle, a “clash of civilizations,” and an endless “global war on terror.” But Kant’s view of antagonism has nothing to do with justification of revolutions or wars. His meaning is closer to its Greek etymological roots (anti-, against, agonizestha, struggle, and agon, contest) meaning an opposing force, counter-action, or contrariety of things or principles. He explains, “Here I understand by ‘antagonism’ the unsociable sociability of

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human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society” (ibid.). Thus, as Kant intended, the meaning of “antagonism” is close to the term “competition”— not in the sense of a capitalist economic competition, but rather as a competitive individual contest driven by desire for honor, power, or property. This drives a person “to obtain for himself a rank among his fellows, whom he cannot stand, but also cannot leave alone” (ibid.). This resulted in the first true steps from crudity toward culture. These desires motivate humanity’s development of its natural capacities, for the human being abandons idleness and plunges instead into labor and toils, so as to find the means of liberation from them (112). Antagonism and the necessity of managing it in a civilized manner stimulate an establishment of the rule of law. Kant further elaborates upon the concept of a law-governed social order. At the heart of Kant’s “Idea” is the prospect of “the achievement of a civil society universally administering right.” It is formulated as “the greatest problem for the human species” (112). But how to achieve this goal? For Kant, this task can be fulfilled only through establishing a society which “has the greatest freedom, hence one in which there is a thoroughgoing antagonism of its members,” but which also sets limits to this freedom in order that it can coexist with the freedom of others under external laws of “a perfectly just civil constitution” (112). Furthermore, the problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution cannot be solved without “a lawful external relation between states,” when the nations will “go beyond a lawless condition of savages and enter into a federation of nations,” where every state will have equal rights and security (ibid., 114). This will lead to “a universal cosmopolitan condition” (118). Ten years later, in 1795, these ideas were elaborated in Kant’s comprehensive project “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1996e). If the human being is “an animal which, when it lives among others of its species, has need of a master,” who should be such a master? (2011, 113). Kant warns against an illusory reliance on “benevolent rulers”: even a person who obtains the highest authority with the servile agreement of loyal people is “yet a human being” who may very well abuse his unchecked power. In this sense, “out of such crooked wood as the human being is made, nothing entirely straight can be fabricated” (ibid.). As an alternative, Kant stresses that every human being needs to be one’s own master. To vertical authoritarian power, he opposes the horizontal relationship of the citizens, equal before the law in a democratic society.

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Kant goes beyond the social structure and toward the minds and hearts of individuals, appealing to their reason and moral consciousness. He points individuals toward their role as responsible citizens, enlightened and morally mature. Only the cultivation of the moral and legal consciousness of the people can provide a favorable milieu for their formation as citizens and the growth of good political leaders. Within “a precinct” of civil union, restricting unconstrained freedom, human beings will coexist peacefully and their inclinations will develop beneficially. He compares the influence of law-governed social order and culture on individuals to the growth of straight trees in a forest, which, seeking air and sunlight, compel each other to “achieve a beautiful straight growth” (113). Humanity’s unsociable sociability compels it to self-discipline and creativity, the fruits of which are achievements in culture, arts, and fine social order. Kant’s ideal of human beings’ self-mastery is closely related to the idea of moral self-discipline. We preserve our freedom by remaining our own law-givers. Within this view, the concept of “master” means not an external coercion but rather self-restraint, self-discipline, and self-control. Kant distinguishes between civilization and culture. We are civilized in terms of social decorum and propriety. However, we are cultivated in a high degree by art and science. The idea of morality is present in culture. The task of becoming genuinely enlightened citizens requires that persons acquire the ability for autonomous thinking and acting, culminating with a consciousness of law “grafted onto a morally good disposition” (ibid., 116). This coincides with Kant’s idea of the reformation of the moral consciousness of peoples and societies. On this reformation, as well as on the progression toward a perfect civil constitution and a universal cosmopolitan condition, depends the solution of the greatest challenge that humanity is facing and which can be superseded through its own efforts.

The Human Right to Freedom Kant’s political thought and philosophy of law are intrinsically related to his ethics. They were developed against utilitarianism in morality and paternalism in politics. Although the categorical imperative (universal moral law) is a single principle, Kant distinguishes its three formulations: the principle of universality, the principle of the intrinsic value of each person, and the principle of autonomy. For Kant, morality and right (Recht—legal right) are intrinsically related, and both can be expressed as the categorical imperative. Transcendental ethics has from the very beginning contained a powerful theoretical-juridical potential, and Kant’s philosophy of law provides its closest conceptual-juridical continuation. Mo-

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rality and right in the transcendental-practical doctrine function as two equally important and complementary parts of a single liberal deontology. For Kant the notion of right is ethically grounded, and it requires the idea of a constitutional state. According to Kant, there is only one innate right: the birthright of freedom. “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (1996d, 393). This principle of innate freedom already presumes the innate equality of every human being, the right to be independent, and to be one’s own master (sui juris). In the context of the categorical imperative of right, Kant formulates the concept of human rights. He is talking about the right of an individual as freedom. Freedom is the sole original right; it is inherent to each human being by virtue of his or her humanity. From the concept of freedom the whole concept of an external right is derived. From the idea of freedom it follows that individuals living within the civil state as a state of law are free, equal, and self-dependent. This concept is opposed to a more utilitarian interpretation of rights and political paternalism. Kant’s philosophy helps us to better understand the meaning of the definition of human rights as inherent and inalienable, as formulated by Thomas Jefferson in the United States Declaration of Independence. Kant makes these meanings explicit, and he elaborates on the moralphilosophical explanations of humanitarian rights. The term “inalienable rights” meant that fundamental human rights are “inherent” or “imprescriptible,” thus recognized as belonging to human beings forever. The forgotten meaning of “inalienable” is that individuals are not allowed to surrender their rights or relinquish them for any pragmatic considerations. Since no citizens are allowed to relinquish their freedom, similarly, no nation as a whole is allowed to do so either. Therefore, human beings, by recognizing their fundamental individual rights as “inalienable,” have an obligation to exist as politically free forever. Kant distinguishes between natural and acquired rights. The natural right is the sole original right, and it consists of freedom. It is an internal right. It is different from an acquired right—an external right, secured by a legal act. The human right to freedom indicates the original unity of the meaning of human rights. Kant elaborates the concept of autonomy, distinguishing its three varieties: moral, utilitarian, and civic. Autonomy is the ground of ethics. Kantian ethics is based on the conviction that our will is free. He emphasizes that persons, as the subjects of morally-practical reason, are not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others, or even to their

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own ends, but are to be prized as ends in themselves. The human “possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth),” deserving the respect of others, and reciprocating respect of their dignity as well. “And this selfesteem is a duty of the human being to himself” (1996d, 558). Kant outlines the theory of right in accordance with the concept of freedom. A social relationship characterized by freedom among individuals under coercive laws is implied in the concept of a civil constitution. A law-governed social order, however, doesn’t mean one based on external coercion only. External coercion is ethically justifiable only to the extent to which individuals are conscious of the limitations of their capacity for self-discipline, and thus voluntarily accept external (including legal and even coercive) assistance to their autonomy. This has nothing to do with a subjection to despotism. Insofar as individuals agree to be under the power of moral law, they may accept only an external coercion that is legitimate, that is, reasonable and regulated by law. Moreover, Kant did not mean a blind acceptance of law. According to him, we are free only insofar as we obey the law to which we agree, and which is legally exercised. We preserve our freedom by remaining our own law-givers. Kant defines the civil state as a lawful state, based on a priori principles according to which every member enjoys freedom as a human being, equality as a subject, and independence as a citizen (1996c, 291). Kant strongly opposed moral utilitarianism. Similarly, his philosophy of law was developed with systematic criticism of political paternalism (which keeps people dependent). For a paternalistic government, treating its citizens like immature children and thus infringing upon their freedom, is “the most despotic of all” (1996d, 460). Even if a government were successful at providing for the people, its despotism would remain contrary to law and moral freedom. Raising moral and legal objections against the abuse of power by rulers, Kant equally rejects servility on the part of the citizens, seeing it as the flip-side of paternalistic despotism. Citizens who rely on the state and give up their civil liberties in exchange for the promises of protection and benefits, actually pander to the authoritarian trend of power. Kant argues against considering autonomy as a bargaining chip: freedom must not be exchanged for welfare. No money in the world can buy human dignity and freedom. When citizens are “paternalized” by government, they become dependent on it and lose their freedoms. The opposite of paternalism is the rule of law, which is the basis for civil society. The rule of law is granted by three types of legal norms: human rights, legal guarantees of social equality, and democratic rights (or the rights of an active citizenship). The principles of right should guaran-

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tee the citizens’ independence from paternalistic wardship and, on the other hand, guarantee their security within the state. Kant philosophically justifies the individual’s right to political freedom. Individuals have both the opportunity and the responsibility to make use of their minds, thus becoming enlightened and active citizens. His philosophy gives the individual firm ground for striving to realize his or her rights and thus the possibility to be the master of one’s own destiny. Since every society is related to all other societies, it needs peaceful outer conditions for its internal freedom; thus the free citizens of a republican state must seek peaceful relations with other peoples and establish peaceful alliances, and, ultimately, a voluntary federation of free states. The culmination of Kant’s philosophy of law was his vision of lasting peace through the lawful league of nations—which would serve as an alternative both to lawless anarchy and to the Leviathan of a “world republic” (as despotic universal monarchy). Therefore, the categorical imperative is threefold: the imperatives of morality, right, and peace; and each of them is in the form of a categorical imperative. This shows the genuine ethical foundation of law and politics. Kant warned against claims to knowledge about historical necessity. Although he sometimes used terms such as “Providence” and the “intention of nature,” interpreted by some philosophers (for example, Max Adler and Karl Vorländer) in a historicist manner, Kant’s philosophy of history was, in fact, developed as an alternative to emerging historicism, as already noted. He laid the ground for criticism of the further ideology of historicism, including its contemporary versions,2 and anticipated the modern concepts of open history (implying moral responsibility), as well as the humanitarian and legal criteria of social progress. In analytically discerning the root cause of the greatest challenge that humanity is facing and its solutions, Kant appeals to human reason—not mystified Hegelian “objective reason,” but a subjective reason of human beings as rational beings—and to the consciousness of humanity as the subject of historical development. People pay a heavy price of repeated wars and degradation if they fail to heed the voice of reason. Kant did not pretend to construct any sweeping comprehensive picture of universal history. Instead, he approached history in a humble but heuristically productive and morally sensitive, humanistic manner. His view of history is related to his conception of human beings as rational beings capable of moral autonomy. The individual is not determined by historical necessity, but is oriented in history through theoretical concepts, which are merely plausible assumptions. This has nothing to do with a blind belief in “progress” or the sacralized State of benevolent rulers. Instead, Kant ap-

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peals to the individual’s reason and moral conscience, stressing the role of moral principles and the rule of law as the basis for human actions in establishing peace within society and among nations. The Kantian concept of the human right to freedom and his political philosophy provides us with an indispensable key for making sense of the complexity of the human rights issue today. Put simply, today’s tasks of promoting and protecting human rights and lasting peace are inseparable from the necessity of restoring the genuine meaning of human rights and of the role of citizens in striving for their implementation. Kant’s proposed solutions—establishment of the rule of law within society and in the international arena, a peaceful federation of free states, enlightenment of the citizenry and their representatives, and the foundation of a cosmopolitan law in accordance with the idea of human rights—remain apt and urgent.

Attempts at the Religious Grounding of Human Rights in a Pluralistic World3 In the twenty-first century, policies and ideologies which threaten to reverse the achievements in the area of human rights have provoked deep concerns among philosophers, political scientists, and human rights activists. They are concerned about the ideologies which challenge the core principles of human rights. This stimulates discussions regarding the philosophical grounding of human rights in a pluralistic world. Some of the challenges to the concept of human rights come from attempts at their religious grounding. In the West, the idea of human rights has been traditionally rooted in Christian theology, but has grown beyond its theological origin. The religious interpretation of human rights emphasizes the genealogy of human rights discourse, which derives from assumptions about God as the architect of the moral order in the universe and supreme legislator over human beings, endowed by God with certain inalienable rights. Contemporary adherents of this interpretation attempt to show what they purport to be the necessary conceptual dependence of human rights upon one religious conviction or another. Their premise that the idea of human rights can and must be grounded religiously is accompanied by skepticism regarding all secular justification of human rights. They view religious and secular approaches as mutually exclusive. However, proponents of the religious grounding of human rights face problems given our culturally diverse world, in which there are many religions as well as many peoples with non-religious worldviews. Religious

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arguments of justification may be convincing for some, yet not convincing for others. However, regardless of the possible strengths and weaknesses of the religious arguments, the problem arises from claiming that only they provide the “true” justification, dismissing any secular philosophical justification as invalid. The adherents of the religiously grounded concept of human rights— Wolterstorff, Perry, Hans Küng, and Max Stackhouse, among others— have in common their claims about the religious roots of the idea of human rights, and their dismissal of the non-religious philosophical justification for human rights. This approach would create difficulties for the project of globalizing human rights, because in a culturally and religiously diverse world, people with different views about religion and persons with non-religious worldviews would have difficulties in accepting the legitimacy of human rights based on some religious grounding that they do not accept to begin with.

On the Capacities Approach to Human Dignity Wolterstorff develops a version of the religious approach to the justification of human rights. He traces the origins of natural inherent human rights back to the Hebrew Bible and Christian scriptures, and elaborates on their theological articulation. He argues that natural rights are grounded in the worth of the right-holders, in the equal and ineradicable dignity that we each have qua human being. Thus, theorists need to identify the feature or relationship of human beings on which that dignity supervenes, and that would ground human rights. He considers this feature to be the relationship of human beings to God. From this perspective, Wolterstorff criticizes the secular philosophical concepts of dignity for appealing to certain capabilities that human beings possess. As an alternative, in looking for a theistic grounding of natural human rights that would not in any way involve a reference to human capabilities, he turns to the worth-imparting relation of human beings to God: to the idea of God’s redemptive love for every creature who bears the imago Dei. Human rights inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by God’s love: “Natural human rights are what respect for that worth requires” (2008, 352, 360). The conviction of God’s love for each and every human being equally provides the believers with a distinct way of grounding natural human rights. Also, the conviction is that God holds human beings accountable for doing justice; and human beings must treat each other justly, in ways that properly reflect their worth (ibid., 89, 361).

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Wolterstorff further argues, “it is impossible to develop a secular account for human dignity adequate for grounding human rights” (ibid., 325). He attempts to prove this thesis by targeting Kant’s philosophy: Almost all secular attempts at accounting for the dignity that grounds human rights do so by appealing to certain capacities that human beings possess; and almost all of those, in turn, follow Kant in appealing to the capacity for rational agency. (2011, 148)

His criticism is focused on the Kantian celebration of the human capacity for rational agency and autonomous legislation. He considers Kant “the paradigmatic representative of this approach” and adverts to “the fatal flaw in Kant’s capacities approach to human dignity“; thus his critique is supposed to be the testing ground for the adequacy of secular philosophy (2008, 325, 333). Wolterstorff charges Kant’s grounding of human rights with three problems. First, he alleges that Kantian ethics implies that rational beings differ in worth, thus in dignity. But Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative, on the concept of dignity (sometimes referred to as the practical imperative or principle of dignity), clearly displays the intrinsic value of persons: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (1996b, 80). Kant sees humanity itself as possessing fundamental worth—dignity. Humanity in a human being is what makes each person worthy of being treated as an end. It has absolute value. In contrast to “things” as the objects of inclination, which have only a conditional and relative value, rational beings as “persons” have an intrinsic value: dignity. One possesses dignity by virtue of one’s humanity, and all members of the humankind have it. Kant explained human dignity in relation to reason, holding that humanity is dignified because of its rationality. Human beings are capable of understanding the implications of the universality of the maxims of their actions. They are capable of legislating moral law unto themselves. Human beings have the capability to make autonomous rational choices, to set ends for themselves, and to guide their actions by values they consider reasonable to accept. Dignity is associated with respect for the categorical imperative, granting it unconditional authority by grounding it in the nature of free rational agency. The principle of morality derives its authority from the fact that it is by acting from the principle that we exercise our free agency. According to the categorical imperative, no one individual may be reduced, or reduce itself, to mere means or objects. In the language of rights, this means that every member of the human race possesses hu-

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man rights. The dignity of human beings must be considered in the way in which they are entitled to be treated. Second, Wolterstorff attempts to relativize the Kantian concept of intrinsic human worth, presenting it as allegedly implying a so-called differentiated dignity. He notes that individuals differ in their intellectual performance and in their amount of technical skills, and that their rational capacities develop as they mature. Thus he argues, “the capacity for rational agency comes in degrees, so the worth a human being has on account of possessing the capacity also comes in degrees,” which violates “the equal-worth proviso” (2011, 148). He goes on to state that because the capacity for rational agency comes in degrees, resulting in different worths, it is “inextricably linked to the differential dignity that supervenes on the particular extent of the capacity one possesses and one’s competence in exercising it” (149). He attributes this “highly differentiated dignity” to the capacity approach, and concludes that this approach fails to justify the idea of equal dignity. However, he does not specify which capacities he considers as having degrees, and how such degrees can be established or measured. If he means by capacities some technical or intellectual performance skills of individuals, such particular skills are still not identical with the general capacity for rational agency, which is the fundamental rational capacity of human beings. Possessing or exercising such skills is not identical with human worth. It is also unclear how dignity can be “differentiated.” Wolterstorff’s interpretation of rational capacity as fragmented and dignity as differentiated (and thus relative), is a hypothetical and artificially constructed argument. However, technical skills, intellectual abilities, and moral wisdom should not be taken for granted; thus the necessity for each person to develop them and to make efforts at intellectual growth and moral self-perfection (in the Enlightenment sense of learning how to think for oneself). This implies the importance of education. But this should not be confused with the philosophical level of analysis. The philosophical approach to the rational nature of human beings leads to conclusions regarding the general capability of a person to set ends, act according to reason, and have the intrinsic worth and dignity constitutive of humanity. Wolterstorff’s interpretation of rational capacity is akin to certain narrow, specialized, and technical views on reason (such as the rational choice theories) and its role in human life. By contrast, Kant’s conception of reason is flexible and open-ended, and it cannot be reduced to any techniques, rules, skills, or methods of calculation. For Kant, reason is a faculty or capacity to think and act according to norms. It is the capacity of the lawgivers themselves to give themselves norms and to follow these

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valid and recognized norms. Being rational is the capacity to think and act for reasons, and to govern one’s own life. The Kantian concept of human rational capacity does not imply inequality in worth and dignity. Each human being, as rationally selfgoverning according to universally valid norms, has dignity or absolute worth. Therefore the worth of every human being is equal. Kant’s ethical theory is grounded in the idea of the dignity of the rational nature of every human being. As he writes: For, nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it. But the lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. (1996b, 85)

Third, Wolterstorff criticizes philosophical justifications for human rights for ontologically distinguishing human from non-human animals and drawing stark differences in their capabilities. He accuses the capacity approach of not including in the “circle of dignity” those human beings whom he considers to lack the capacity for rational agency (such as Alzheimer’s patients who are no longer capable, and the mentally impaired who have never been capable, or infants). Here he deploys the so-called argument from “marginal” cases associated with “species-ism” in discussions regarding “nonrational” human beings and the rights of non-human animals (some which are highly intelligent and sociable, such as dolphins) (2011, 146–147). Accordingly, if human beings incapable of rationality are worthy of moral considerability, it would be inconsistent to deny nonhuman animals with similar capacities the same moral consideration. Thus, either marginal human beings and animals are both morally considerable, or neither is. This apparent dilemma implies that either animals do not have rights of their own or that human rights will always trump nonhuman animal rights. He concludes that the capacities approach cannot adequately protect the equal moral worth of all human beings: that it would elevate some non-human animals having capabilities above the threshold of moral dignity, while depreciating those human beings who lack said capacity and thus “fall outside the circle of dignity” (2008, 330). Wolterstorff’s arguments are questionable. Marginal cases do not disprove the fundamental human characteristic of rationality. Reason is considered to be constitutive of human nature, identified with the ability to self-consciously change attitudes and with the capacity for freedom and self-determination. The argument from marginal cases has been criticized

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by scholars, who consider it too blunt to explain why animals have rights and insensitive to human beings who lack some rational capacities. According to Kant, treating a human being as “an end in itself” means treating him or her as a rational being: “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (1996b, 79). Rational beings are those who are capable of reasoning about their conduct and who freely decide what they will do based on their understanding of what is best. They are treated as responsible and may be rewarded or punished for their actions. Still, children or mentally incapacitated persons are not considered lacking their human dignity, and they deserve humane treatment. Children are included in the Kantian moral universe on the consideration that childhood is a stage in the life of a person who normally develops autonomy. The proper treatment of children should fully consider the rational capacities that they are in the process of developing. We should treat children “as persons in the extended sense— that is, beings with the same right to life and concern for their welfare as persons in the strict sense” (Wood 2008, 103). With regard to children with intellectual disabilities, many theorists prefer more inclusive approaches and more adequate strategies that provide guidance about the moral responsibilities adults have toward children. They agree that the potential of children with intellectual disabilities is morally considerable.4 Rainer Forst argues that dignity is the universal human worth, including children and mentally disabled persons. He differentiates between the passive status of having rights and its active exercise. In grounding his concept of human rights on the moral right to justification, he argues that “dignity is a relational term,” the implications of which can be clarified by way of discursive justification. He asserts that each person is an “authority” in the space of reason: This also holds true for persons who cannot use their rights to justification in an active sense, such as (to some extent) children or mentally disabled persons; the passive status of having that right does not depend on its active exercise. (2010, 734n79)

Some scholars argue that the moral standing of mentally ill or incapacitated human beings comes from their membership of a species in whom the rational capacity is the norm. The criteria of their proper treatment differ from those for fully competent agents, considering their interests and respect for their level of self-government. This includes a differentiation between those who are responsible for their actions and those who are not, such as mentally ill people, who are not in control of themselves and therefore cannot be “held accountable.” Thus people must still treat them in a humane and caring way.

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According to Kant’s doctrine of virtue, “a human being has duties only to human beings (himself and others),” since any person’s duty to any subject is morally constrained by that subject’s will, and this subject must be a person, “since the human being is to strive for the end of this person’s will and this can happen only in a relation to each other of two beings that exist” (1996d, 563). Since animals have no self-consciousness, we have no immediate duties to them, and “our duties to them are indirect duties to humanity” (Kant 2001, 212). We have a duty to ourselves to show kindness toward other beings. Kindness, sensibility, and even gratitude toward non-human animals are, in themselves, seen as virtues, or, perfections of character, while the cruelty toward them is seen as a vice, a failing. If we treat non-human animals cruelly, this damages our moral character, which ultimately leads to inappropriate treatment of other human beings. Kant insists that agonizing physical experiments must be abhorred. It is permissible to kill non-human animals for food and other human needs, but this should be done quickly and painlessly. Beasts of burden should not be overworked and then cast aside: Even gratitude for the long service of an old horse or dog (just as if they were members of the household) belongs indirectly to a human being’s duty with regard to these animals; considered as a direct duty, however, it is always only a duty of the human being to himself. (Kant 1996d, 564)

For Kant, non-human animals are “an analogue of humanity,” and thus when we observe our duties to them as “analogues” of our duties to human beings, we thereby “cultivate our duties to humanity” (2001, 212).5 Wolterstorff warns that the practical implementation of the Kantian approach would have negative consequences for society and would result in greater inequality: “So in a society founded on Kantian principles, where it is widely held that nothing else than rationality determines worth . . . we must expect that the less rational among us will be systematically demeaned” (2008, 391). But Kant’s concept of human rights does not imply any hierarchy or inequality in worth among persons based on their levels of rationality or any other capacity. Kant formulated the concept of human rights based on the innate right of individuals to freedom. This principle of innate freedom already presumes the innate equality of all human beings, their right to be independent, and to be their own master. Existing inequality in social status and wealth, or dependence of individuals upon the will of others, however, is “in no way opposed to their freedom and equality as human beings, who together make up a people” (1996d, 458).

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Kant’s philosophy contains a radical criticism of social life, which remains relevant today in many respects. Accordingly, through the faculty of reason, we have the capacity to criticize or correct everything, including our own misunderstandings of reason itself. Kantian ethics is critical of the dehumanizing tendencies in modern society. He stressed the importance of the political public sphere: it is the public use of reason, which is not restricted by authorities, but makes it possible for us to address a broad audience and to form justifications that anyone may accept. Kant insists that “the public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings” (1996a, 18). I believe that Wolterstorff’s fears about a society founded on Kantian principles are misguided. In today’s world, the demarcation of inequality among people lies not along the line of “rationality,” as Wolterstorff suggests, but is mainly determined by the power structures which concentrate wealth and economic-political domination in the hands of the power elites, leaving the rest of the people dependent and their rights infringed upon. The problem is not that society is founded on the rational principles of Kantian ethical, legal, and political philosophy, but rather that these principles are not implemented consistently and decisively enough. The Kantian project of a lawful society and a peaceful world order has been derailed by the counter-tendencies of anti-democratic domination, exploitation, ideological indoctrination, power politics, imperialism, and wars. Today’s neoliberal “free market” economy and its politics, dominated by big corporations, impose technocratic “instrumental rationality,” the effects of which are depersonalization and dehumanization. This is the opposite of human reason and the values promoted by humanistic philosophical and political thought. Kant starts his inquiry into politics from the standpoint of the free individual resisting the controlling and repressive practices of social power structures. He proposed the core human right—freedom—as a principle on which individuals can base their rights to be their own masters, and thus independently pursue their own happiness. Kant’s philosophy, representing humanistic thought, provides powerful intellectual means and inspiration to those striving for human rights.

Is Human Dignity Synonymous with Sacredness? Perry expounds on the morality of human rights. He argues that the morality of human rights is grounded in the conviction that human beings are sacred and that “the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious—

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that there is, finally, no intelligible secular version of the idea of human rights” (2000, 35). Perry’s argument for the religious grounding of the idea of human rights follows from what he considers to be the unintelligibility or inadequacy of its secular justifications. For him, the morality of human rights is beyond the reach of secular philosophical thought. He attributes this inadequacy to what he calls the intellectual convictions of many secular thinkers that are akin to the Nietzschean proclamation of the “death” of religious and metaphysical thinking (2007, 29). But the spectrum of philosophy cannot be reduced to what he calls “Nietzsche’s thought.” Perry’s quick dismissal of non-religious philosophical attempts at justification for human rights asserts a privileged, if not exclusive, role for the religious grounding of human rights. Attaching inherent dignity to the religious term “sacred” shifts the human rights discourse into the religious realm, and thus makes secular justification disadvantageous or irrelevant since it does not use the term “sacredness.” The term “sacred” is associated with the religious notion of holiness. Some philosophers tried to adopt this term, claiming that its meaning can be interpreted in both a religious and a secular way. Ronald Dworkin, in commenting on debates about euthanasia and abortion, points to a nonreligious conception of human rights using a notion of human sacrality in a secular sense. He argues that the sacredness of the human being can be considered as a secular but deep philosophical belief. Dworkin treats human life as “sacred or inviolable,” and uses terms “sanctity” and “inviolability” interchangeably (1993, 73). He sees sacredness as not only inherent in human beings, but also as creatively produced by them. Accordingly, human life is inherently valuable because human beings are self-creating. This progression from being created to creating—the idea that human beings design their lives and thus create themselves—adds a secular meaning to “sacred.” Dworkin believes that the definition of “sacred,” combining both religious and secular meanings, can serve as a common ground for bringing together the religious and non-religious persons who share the “common commitment to the sanctity of life” as a unifying ideal (101). Perry’s main objection to Dworkin’s conceptualization of secular sacredness is focused on his view of a human life as a masterpiece of natural endowment and human self-creation. He calls the secular version of sacred weak and subjective, in contrast to the religious version of “sacred in strong/objective sense” (2000, 29). He presumes that dignity and sacredness are synonymous, that the sacredness of persons can only be understood religiously, and thus concludes that “the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious, because the conviction is an essential, even founda-

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tional, constituent of the idea” (ibid.). However, religious belief in “the sacred” and in the sacredness of human beings is a subjective conviction of believers. To be convinced of the sacredness of all human beings, one must already believe that God exists to bestow human sacredness. Ari Kohen, in analyzing Perry’s and Dworkin’s concepts, concludes that the “maximalist” task they set for themselves (and failed to complete) is one both impossible and unnecessary. It is impossible, “because the idea of secular sacredness is one that cannot be made sense of,” and it is unnecessary, “because the concept of sacredness is not required to ground the idea of human rights in the way that Perry suggests” (2007, 84). Perry distinguishes between the morality of human rights and the law of human rights, and considers such morality as the ground of the law, including the international law of human rights. Assuming that the morality that supports the law of human rights is religiously grounded, the whole project of human rights is viewed as related to religion. For Perry, the secular international human rights documents, such as the International Bill of Human Rights, are actually premised on a religious idea. In fact, however, neither the language of the International Bill of Human Rights nor any other modern international human rights document contains the word “sacred,” when asserting the inherent dignity of the human person. In these documents, human rights express demands concerning a treatment of human beings so that they may actualize their human potentialities.

A Quest for a Wider Framework to Ground Human Rights The great world religions express, in one way or the other, the ideas of human dignity, respect for the other, and equality of persons, which resonate with the idea of human rights. However, the exclusively religious approach to human rights and the claim that religious worldviews provide the only intelligible foundation face serious challenges in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. The attempts of Wolterstorff, Perry, Küng, Stackhouse, and similar theorists at defending human rights exclusively on religious grounds have been criticized from various philosophical and religious perspectives. The critics point out that not everyone shares the same idea of God and the God-created universe, and also that there is a variety of religions beside Christianity. Brian Orend writes that many reasonable people are asking for more than assertions about souls and God, and that “appeals to metaphysical properties are neither necessary nor sufficient to ground human rights-holding status” (2002, 45). In analyzing these theorists, Kohen, for example, concludes that they fail to fulfill the conditions of inclusivity, persuasiveness, and practicality,

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which are necessary for an adequate justification of the idea of human rights. In a culturally diverse world, an appeal to only one religion, such as Christianity, would mean privileging it over other religions, thus marginalizing them and excluding persons with non-religious worldviews. Instead, an inclusive and compelling foundation for the idea of human rights “must speak to the largest possible number of people from the greatest number of different traditions” and must also provide persuasive reasons for its account. Otherwise it “leaves us with human rights that are partial and local, as opposite to universal” (2007, 132). Grace Kao, in summarizing her analysis of the attempts of these theorists at religious grounding of human rights, concludes that their claims— about equivalence between the concept of sacredness and inherent dignity, the religious roots of the idea of human rights, and humanity’s exalted status over all other animals—express the primary maximalist conviction that “the human rights project requires either some underlying religious vision or even a specific theological vision to the potential exclusion of others for its long-term success” (2011, 54). This implies that the legitimacy of the human rights project itself turns on the truth of those religious convictions themselves. Kao suggests that theorists who are expounding the non-religious grounding of human rights need not justify a secular conception of human sacredness. Instead they need only to supply “an adequate secular defense of the idea of inherent human dignity from which international human rights law proclaims itself to have been derived” (50). The discussions between the adherents of religious and non-religious approaches show the theoretical challenges faced by the attempts at conceptually grounding the idea of human rights. The religiously oriented theorists contextualize their approach to the justification of human rights within the comprehensive vision and values of their respective religions. Their maximalist strategies contend that human rights must be grounded religiously in order to be theoretically coherent and normatively valid. However, their claims that a non-religious grounding of human rights lacks sufficient theoretical coherence or persuasion are exaggerated. One factor behind these claims is an overly broad definition of what religion is, so that anything that is ethically realist or metaphysical could be included. The other factor is “confusion and even conflation between the normative and the motivational” (ibid., 149). But the argument that religion can motivate people to pursue good better than philosophy should not be a sufficient reason for disavowing a philosophically grounded normative claim. Kao argues for a “negotiated and mediated approach” between the extremes of religious and non-religious poles through combining some of their ideas. She concludes that we can make the most sense of the human

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rights claims “when we embed them within an ethically realist framework,” but “value realism itself could be supported on either religious or non-religious grounds” (ibid., 8–9). However, in the atmosphere of postmodern skepticism—regarding an appeal to human nature, or essentialist metaphysics in ethics, or any common philosophical presumptions—many theorists minimize the scope of their justification of the idea of human rights by avoiding any contentious philosophical or religious premises. Without deep philosophical commitments in justifying the universal validity of human rights, they would deaden their critical edge. Attempts at philosophical justification of the universal validity of human rights should not be theory-thin. Among philosophers there is broad agreement that, in a pluralistic world, a wider framework is needed to ground the idea of human rights.

In Search of Alternative Approaches to Grounding Human Rights Practice sometimes runs ahead of theory, giving theorists new insights for reflection. This was the case in the emergence of the International Bill of Rights, consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Covenant. The UDHR states in Article 1, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Its language echoes that of the United States Declaration of Independence, but without mentioning the Creator or with any religious connotations. The UDHR presupposes the existence of fundamental rights grounded on the dignity and worth of the human being. This grounding, neutral to the controversies surrounding religious and philosophical “comprehensive doctrines” or any cultural perspectives, made it possible to reach a consensus regarding a legal document universally acceptable for people in a culturally diverse world. The Commission on Human Rights, which drafted it, was representative of the global community. It was adopted on 10 December 1948 without a single vote cast against it at the United Nations General Assembly—the highest international forum, expressing the will of humanity. The UDHR demonstrated a new consensus approach to the justification of human rights. Jacques Maritain, who helped draft the Declaration, believed that reaching a consensus on practical standards could pave the way via cross-cultural dialogue toward a broader agreement throughout the world “not only on enumeration of human rights, but also on the key values governing their exercise and on the practical criteria to be used to secure respect for them” (1949, 17). This questioned the traditional attempts at deriving a set of human rights from a single foundational source

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(human nature, the Creator, or Reason). It signaled a pluralistic approach to grounding, the possibility of multiple foundations for human rights, which opened the opportunity for people with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds to come to an agreement on the core human rights as justifiable for them or at least not conflicting with their worldviews. Human rights were thought of in terms of political practice. This consensus-based approach anticipated theoretical insights by John Rawls, such as his conception of an “overlapping consensus” on political principles of justice. The experiences of the United Nations in adopting these documents is frequently cited by the theorists discussing the grounding of human rights in pluralistic world and their legal and political functioning as the safeguards designed to protect the rights of individuals. During the last decades, the traditional conception of human rights has been a subject of criticism and there has been a search for alternatives to it. Within this traditional conception, human rights are understood as moral rights that all individuals have by virtue of being human. Some theories derive human rights from some basic and universally acknowledged feature of human beings, others from the idea of human dignity, of personhood, of agency, of autonomy, of basic capacities, or of “the sacred.” But as their critics indicate, any attempt to derive the content of human rights from the essentially human will result in a list that is either too restrictive or too broad. This conception also fails to explain the role that human rights discourses play in contemporary international politics and law. In reaction to this, some philosophers have abandoned traditional attempts to ground human rights in human nature and argued for multiple foundations. As alternatives, they have tried to develop more novel philosophical accounts of human rights as alternatives to a more traditional natural rights account. Two alternatives became influential. One is the “political conception” of human rights, influenced by the work of John Rawls. Some of its contemporary theorists view human rights as norms that secure conditions for inclusion and membership in any political society, while the others view them as constraints obligating any coercive social institution. Human rights are understood as the associative relations (or “relations of recognition”) in which individuals find themselves. They are also understood as political claims based on the leading human rights documents, public declarations, treaties, laws, and constitutions (Cohen 2010; Beitz 2011). This is not to say that human rights are not also moral concepts; rather, the focus is on their primary usage as political claims that citizens make against governments and political institutions. They challenge the established arrangements and demand a new settlement.

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The other alternative that has risen to prominence is an account of human rights from the perspective of discourse ethics. Both of these approaches seek to develop an account of human rights that does not depend upon metaphysical or religious doctrines.

The Discourse Ethics Approach to Human Rights Discourse ethics, following a tradition of critical theory, is critically rethinking and reassessing the traditional concepts of human rights. The discourse ethics approach to human rights was first developed by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas, and more recently by Rainer Forst, Seyla Benhabib, and James Bohman. It aims to provide a rational account of human rights that is free from controversial philosophical or religious assumptions that could stand in the way of a broader consensus on human rights. In contrast to a “moralizing” conception of human rights as a set of fixed moral rights that can be determined independently of the collective deliberation in a public sphere, discourse ethics seeks to promote a discursive approach and intercultural dialogue. Apel, in undertaking his project of a transformation of philosophy, elaborates on a philosophical grounding of discourse or communicative ethics. In contrast to the traditional paradigm of grounding through deriving something from something else (deduction, induction, or abduction), the new approach is based on a strict transcendental-pragmatic reflection on the presupposition of arguing. Apel argues for unconditional normativity as a possible and necessary condition for ethics. He is concerned with the transcendental and ultimate grounding of discourse ethics. It emphasizes intersubjectivity, moving from the monologic voice of Kantian ethics toward the dialogic voice of communicative action. This approach transformed Kant’s transcendental argumentation into transcendental-pragmatic argumentation that looks at the procedures for the justification of ethical judgments in terms of pragmatic consistency and not in terms of logical consistency (Apel 1997). Discourse ethics is at once universalistic and teleological. It also indicates the inherent correlation between the structure of rational discourse and the intrinsic rules and norms that are morally relevant for human interaction. The normative contents of discourse ethics include the principles of justice, reciprocity, respect, tolerance, solidarity, and co-responsibility. Habermas highlights the paramount importance of human rights as “the sole recognized basis of legitimation for the politics of international community” in a diverse and conflicted world (2001, 119). However, the human rights discourse, which has been argued on normative terms, raised

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questions about the validity and content of human rights and the relevance of their legitimation, as developed in the West, to other cultures. Habermas analyzes the hermeneutical reflections on the starting point of a human rights discourse among participants of different cultures. In critically assessing their differing and sometimes opposite views, he draws a fine line between tradition and innovation, between Western and non-Western concepts, and between the universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realization. He highlights what he considers to be sound ideas in the Western heritage and in the ideas of non-Western theorists, contrasting them with the extremes of Eurocentric or any ethnocentric pseudo-universality and of religious fundamentalism. Habermas’s assumption, that the standards of human rights emerged from an attempt to answer challenges posed by a social modernity— experienced first in Europe and later on in other regions of the world as multiple versions of modernity—helps to better understand the common roots of these standards. Thus, human rights and their legitimization is not exclusively an invention of Western civilization, but an answer to general social challenges faced by the contemporary world. In the sociallyculturally diverse world, the answer found by the West is not the only one, or even necessarily the best one. Habermas argues that human rights are not simply moral rights, but are “Janus-faced,” related simultaneously to morality and to law: they have both their moral content and the form of legal rights (2001, 118). The core of the debate lies in the individualism and secular character of human rights that are centered in the concept of autonomy. Habermas analyzes the controversy between the individualistic character of human rights and the collectivist “Asian values.” The latter emphasize the priority of the community over the individual, making no clear distinction between law and ethics, and insisting on individuals’ subordination to the community-based ethos rooted in a cultural tradition. On the one hand, Habermas points out the blind spot of neoliberal individualism, which ignores the fact that legally protected human rights are derived from the intersubjectively recognized norms of a legal community. On the other hand, he shows the failure of the collectivist thesis that the claims of the community have priority over individual legal claims. An opposition between individualist and collectivist views of human rights can be avoided if an approach to fundamental legal concepts considers “the dialectical unity of individuation and socialization processes” (126). Habermas approaches the problem of cultural identity and diversity in terms of the liberal conception of equality and human rights. Considering the legal person as the bearer of subjective rights makes it possible to de-

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rive cultural rights directly from the principle of the inviolability of human dignity. He argues that it is precisely the universalistic principle of civic equality that, based on law, can serve as a safeguard against the restriction of basic individual rights in the name of collective rights of culture groups. Only those group rights are legitimate which can be derived from “the cultural rights of the individual group member” (2005, 20). These problems can be solved only from the perspective of egalitarian universalism, which orients civic solidarity toward a solidarity among “others,” universalistic constitutional principles and human rights. The concept of autonomy, including the liberties of citizens vis-à-vis the state and third parties, is challenged by fundamentalists—Islamic, Christian, Jewish, etc. They insist that their truth claim is absolute and should be enforced by political power. This leads to an exclusive character for their polities. Legitimations based on this kind of worldview “are incompatible with the inclusion of equally entitled non-believers or persons of other persuasions” (Habermas 2001, 127). In drawing on Kant’s concept of autonomy as the capability to bind one’s will by normative insights that result from public use of reason, Habermas shows its connection to a legitimation through human rights (1997). Citizens are politically autonomous when they give themselves their laws, and this idea of self-legislation is implemented in the model of a constitutional assembly, which affirms basic rights. It also underpins the procedure of democratic will formation that establishes political authority “on a mode of legitimation that is neutral toward worldviews” (2001, 127), which makes a religious justification of human rights unnecessary. This legitimation grants equal rights to all citizens regardless of their beliefs. The pluralism of worldviews exists not only between the nations but also within societies. The conflict of cultures in a globalized world requires that peoples, regardless of their cultural and religious differences, agree on norms of coexistence. Habermas emphasizes that mutual toleration and cultural cross-fertilization does not necessitate compromising the authenticity or truth claims of religions. Instead, it enables their “equally entitled coexistence” within the community. Reflexive self-understanding leads to a growing awareness that one’s own religious truths must conform to publicly recognized secular knowledge and be defended “in the same universe of discourse” (ibid., 128). Discourse ethics provides a broader approach to grounding human rights. In it, the concept of the “public sphere,” introduced by Habermas in his first book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, plays a heuristically important role (1991). His study of the nature of public opinion in democratic societies foreshadowed his later interests in problems of

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legitimation and communication. The public sphere emerged as a social space between individuals and government authorities, in which people could meet and have critical debates about public matters. It was an open space in which all reasons could be expressed and debated. In recent years, Habermas has turned increasingly to questions of religion, including its role in the public sphere (2002; 2008). He believes that philosophy must take the phenomenon of the existence of religion in the public life of liberal democracies seriously, particularly as “a cognitive challenge” (2008, 108). He gives credit to John Rawls’s recognition of the “fact of pluralism” and of the political role of religion in the public sphere. According to Habermas, in modernity, politics shifted to civil society based on the public use of reason. Civil society, however, should also consider religious perspectives and the “vital semantic potentials from religious traditions,” which continue to be key sources of the values of ethics of multicultural citizenship. To be available for wider political culture, religious sources must be “translated” in a way that is understandable to secular people. Habermas suggests that the potential “truth contents” brought by religious people to public discourse be translated into a secular vernacular, a “universally accepted language.” This translation is a task that falls to religious and secular citizens alike who are engaged in the public use of reason. He scrutinizes Wolterstorff’s criticism of Rawls’s political liberalism, wherein Wolterstorff objects to translation and rejects “the whole idea of legitimation based on a reasonable background consensus on constitutional essentials” (134). Habermas responds, saying that the cultivation of a “postsecular” stance would facilitate the incorporation of the ethical insights of religious traditions into a “postmetaphysical” philosophical thinking (140–143). Because the public sphere is a realm of rational argumentation, it requires the ability and willingness to participate in open debate. Nevertheless, the crucial difference between faith and knowledge remains. “The ethos of liberal citizenship demands that both sides should determine the limits of faith and knowledge in a reflexive manner” (2008, 2). Not all religious language can be translated into secular terms, and for this, informal public discourse would be appropriate. Thus, Habermas considers it necessary to keep public discourse within the realm of what can be shared. He stresses that the proposed version of an ethics of citizenship may only be expected from all citizens equally “if both religious as well as secular citizens already have undergone complementary learning processes” (140). The constitutional state is supposed to ensure that different communities of belief can coexist peacefully on the basis of equal rights and mutual tolerance. These matters should be approached from the perspective of

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egalitarian universalism. Mutual recognition requires that religious and secular citizens be willing to listen and to learn from each other in public debates (Mendieta and VanAntwerpen 2011). Intercultural dialogue is essential for justifying and interpreting human rights. It is an alternative to solipsistic reflection on one’s own worldview and culture, attempting to unilaterally identify the norms that can be justly universalized. Habermas elaborates a deliberative framework for intercultural dialogue to determine the content of human rights. There is a need for philosophical reflection on the hermeneutic situation of the participants in the debate and their presuppositions. Engaging in intercultural dialogue requires participants from different cultural backgrounds to seek mutual understanding. Discussions on human rights among representatives of different cultures confirm the normative contents of the tacit presuppositions of any discourse whose goal is mutual understanding. They are aware that a consensus based on conviction can be reached only under conditions of symmetrical relations among them—“relations of mutual recognition, mutual role-taking, a shared willingness to consider one’s own traditions with the eyes of the stranger and to learn from one another” (2001, 129). In drawing on Habermas’s discourse theory, Jeffrey Flynn stresses the vital role of intercultural dialogue in developing a non-ethnocentric conception of human rights for a culturally diverse world. As he writes, “the intercultural dialogue on human rights provides an opportunity to submit putatively universal claims to critical interrogation, but this process should be guided by the aim of reconstructing a more defensible, decentered universalism” (Flynn 2014, 9–10). The relations between the rich “center” and the poor “periphery” of the world system are far from being symmetrical: the nations that concentrate power and wealth also dictate the terms of the normative structure of global society. They also have a record of misusing the universal language of human rights for self-serving political purposes. Therefore, striving for a more symmetrical dialogue on human rights also implies the necessity of more symmetry in economical and political relations, of abandoning hegemonic unilateralism, and establishing multilateral cooperation among sovereign nations as equals.

Grounding Human Rights on the Moral Right to Justification Within the framework of the discourse ethics approach, Forst makes a systematic attempt to build a theory of human rights and global justice. He advocates a critical theory of justice grounded on what he calls the basic moral right to justification, following Habermas’s idea of an ethical dis-

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course. His idea is that people have a right and duty of reciprocal justification in the domain of shared institutions. For him, a discourse theory of political and social justice is not a purely procedural theory resting on a “neutral” foundation. Rather, it rests on a moral principle of justification, namely, on “the substantive individual moral right to justification” (2011, 5). From this foundation it is possible to derive a substantive idea of human rights as rights that no one can with good reasons withhold from other persons. Forst asserts the right to be respected as a moral person in terms of a right to, and the capacity for, the reciprocal and general justification of morally relevant actions and norms. This right reflects the status of a participant in a discourse as entitled to reasons which are acceptable or at least ones that cannot reasonably be rejected. He writes: The moral basis for human rights . . . is the respect for the human person as an autonomous agent who possesses a right to justification, that is, a right to be recognized as an agent who can demand acceptable reasons for any action that claims to be morally justified and for any social or political structure or law that claims to be binding upon him or her. Human rights secure the equal standing of persons in the political and social world, based on a fundamental moral demand of respect. (2010, 719)

Human rights provide the equal standing of persons in the social world, based on a moral demand of respect. Forst argues that a moral justification for human rights has to be a universally valid and “reflexive” one, which means that the very idea of justification itself is related to its normative and practical implications: since any moral justification of the rights of human being must be able to redeem discursively the claim to general and reciprocal validity raised by such rights, then such justification presupposes the right to justification of those whose rights are in question. (Ibid.)

The principle of justification allows one to make statements about indispensable rights. According to Forst, from the general principle that each human being should be respected as a subject of reciprocal and general justification, it is possible to construct a general conception of human rights that protects personal integrity. This conception still needs a legalpolitical transformation into basic rights. The moral right to justification is quite abstract and requires political argument among citizens to give specific interpretation to a list of human rights. Human rights entail personal and social-political rights, necessary to establish “a structure of justification“; they also entail those substantive rights that no one “can reasonably deny to others without violating the

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demands of reciprocity and generality” (2010, 737). This means that persons have the basic right to live “in a society where they themselves are the social and political agents who determine which rights they can claim and have to recognize” (ibid.). Human rights confer upon agents a political power “to codetermine the conditions of one’s social and political life” (740). They protect against unjustifiable social harms. The principles and rights that result from moral constructivism form the normative core of what Forst calls “political constructivism.” Since moral construction can only lead to a general list of rights, they can only be concretely justified, institutionalized, and realized in social contexts, that is, within a legally constituted political order. In contrast to a natural law theory, this construction model is a way that basic justice is discursively situated, appropriated, and integrated within political contexts by the participants themselves. At the same time, this theory can identify a list of human rights that cannot reasonably be withheld from persons in any social context without violating their right to justification. Forst invokes universal moral principles as aspirational norms expressed in human rights documents. At the same time, he analyzes the polity and the normative deep grammar of struggles against injustice as expressed in the language of human rights. Human rights are political claims citizens make against the governments and political institutions. They are forged in struggle to achieve mutual recognition and political justice. This approach combines moral and political constructivism. According to Jean L. Cohen, through a reflection on the pragmatics of protest Forst “uncovers the idea of moral personhood it entails and the related concept of a universal right to justification regarding official coercion,” and also provides “a strong moral justification of human rights generally.” This leads to a list of human rights that cannot withheld from a person, and “these in turn provide a dynamic normative referent for struggles for the concrete realization of such rights” (Cohen 2008b, 598–599).

The Unity and Diversity of Human Rights The discourse-theoretic approach to human rights is also developed by Benhabib. Her basic assumption is that all human beings are capable of “communicative freedom.” This means that they are capable of saying “yes” or “no” to an utterance whose validity claims they comprehend, and can act accordingly. In building on Habermas’s assertion of a speech-act immanent norm that the hearer has the right to accept or reject the reasons presented by the speaker, Benhabib identifies the obligation of speakers

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and hearers to provide reasons in support of the validity claims raised in their respective utterances. She writes: In order to be able to justify to you why you and I ought to act in certain ways, I must respect your capacity to agree or disagree with me on the basis of reasons the validity of which you accept or reject. But to respect your capacity to accept or reject reasons the validity of which you may accept or reject means for me to respect your capacity for communicative freedom. (2011, 67)

Among the formal preconditions of discourse are: the equality of conversation partners, their symmetrical entitlements to speech acts, and reciprocity of communicative roles. Each of them can question and answer and initiate reflection including about the rules of discourse itself (ibid., 71). As the next step, this implies a basic moral right: as a moral being capable of communicative freedom each individual has a fundamental right to have rights (ibid., 68). She borrows the phrase “the right to have rights” from Hannah Arendt (1979, 296), but reinterprets it in her own way. Benhabib distinguished two different meanings of the term “right“: in the moral sense, and in a juridico-civil sense. Arendt views this right as a political right, as the right to membership in a political community. Benhabib reformulates this right as the claim of each human person “to be recognized as a moral being worthy of equal concern and equally entitled to be protected as a legal personality by his or her own polity, as well as the world community” (2011, 62). Her justification strategy seeks to synthesize Arendt’s concept with the insights of discourse ethics. As a third step, this basic moral right is connected to a broader set of human rights. One has a “right,” that is, a moral claim to be recognized by others as “a right-bearing person,” entitled to a legally instituted schedule of rights. For example: “I can justify to you with good reasons that you and I should respect each others’ reciprocal claims to act in certain ways and not to act in others, and to enjoy certain resources and services” (ibid., 66). In the set of rights, some of them are about liberties, meaning the freedom to do or to abstain from doing certain things, while the other rights claims are about entitlement to resources. Similar to Habermas, Apel, and other theorists of discourse ethics, Benhabib’s concept is related to Kantian ideas of freedom, autonomy, and cosmopolitan order, rethinking them in a contemporary context. Basing her position on the Kantian “principle of right,” Benhabib writes that it establishes how a juridico-civil order, which would be in compliance with the moral law of respect for the freedom of each, can emerge. Its features are generality, formal reciprocity, and equality. Thus, a polity based on the principle of rights respects each individual as a moral being.

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Benhabib reformulates Kant from a dialogical discursive perspective and the idea of communicative freedom. In a justification of the principle of right, instead of reflecting on what each individual could will to be universal law for all, discourse ethics is focused on which norms could be considered to be valid by all those who would be affected as participants in discursive moral argumentations. A moral justification of human rights has to be universally valid. Thus, it presupposes the right to justification in order to fulfill through discourse the claim to general and reciprocal validity raised by such rights. A discourse-theoretic account of communicative freedom is focused on “those justificatory processes through which you and I, in dialogue, must convince each other of the validity of certain norms” (2011, 67). Benhabib further relates the right to justification to the human capacity for communicative freedom. The discourse-theoretic approach views the human agent as an individual embedded in contexts of communication and interaction. An individual needs to be respected and recognized as a member of the community and as “a right-bearing person.” According to Benhabib, the right to have rights also involves the acknowledgement of one’s identity as a generalized and concrete other. The standpoint of the “generalized other” requires us to view each and every individual as a being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves, thus expressing the norm of respect. By contrast, the standpoint of the “concrete other” requires us to view each and every human being as an individual—with concrete history, individuality and collective identity—thus anticipating experiences of altruism and solidarity. Our relation to the other is governed by the norms of equality and complementary reciprocity, thus treating the other in accordance with these norms, “I confirm not only your humanity but your human individuality.” Such reciprocal recognition of each other involves political struggles and learning processes within and across classes, nations, and religious faiths: “Universalism does not consist in an essence or human nature that we are all said to have or to possess, but rather in experiences of establishing commonality across diversity, conflict, divide, and struggle. Universalism is an aspiration, a moral goal to strive for” (2011, 70). Benhabib is aware of the difficulties involved in moving from a speech-act immanent norm to a claim regarding a basic moral principle, such as “the right to have rights,” and then moving from a basic moral principle to the content of human rights as a set of rights and liberties. On the one hand, Benhabib argues that the right to have rights is a general moral principle rather than a set of rights. She distinguishes between “the principle of rights” and “the schedule of rights.” On the other hand, the

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appeal to human rights offers both “a minimum to be maintained and a maximum to be aspired to” (ibid., 72). In this, she appears to suggest that the right to have rights does have content. Through reflection on the abstract moral principle itself and the conditions required for the exercise of “communicative freedom,” an elaborated set of rights can be determined. However, Benhabib tries to moderate the tension between these two claims. She views the right to have rights as an abstract principle that can be interpreted differently by different political communities. The content of human rights must be developed by the citizens themselves through the exercise of their democratic freedoms, which she called “democratic iteration.” “Through democratic iterations, citizens articulate the specific content of their schedule of rights, as well as making these rights their very own” (2011, 75). When the claims emerging out of social struggles and human rights movements gain recognition within international norms, they achieve the status of human rights. Referring to post-World War II national liberation struggles and human rights movements, as well as the UDHR and other international humanitarian law documents, Benhabib writes, “the public law documents of our world are distillations of such collective struggles, as well as of collective learning processes” (ibid.). The justification of human rights through a discourse-theoretic account of communicative freedom differs from the other approaches, such as the metaphysical approach of natural rights theories, the possessive individualist selves, the agent-centric human rights conceptions, or the Rawlsian approach. Unlike the metaphysically grounded theories of natural rights or possessive individual liberal theory of rights, justification through a discourse-theoretic account of communicative freedom is viewed as a dialogic practice. Unlike agent-relative accounts, in which human rights are viewed as an enabling condition of the exercise of agency, the discourseethic strategy emphasizes reciprocity in the mutual justification of the agent-specific needs. As Benhabib writes, “my recognition of your right to have rights is the very precondition for you to be able to contest or accept my claim to rights in the first place” (2011, 70). There are methodological differences between the Rawlsian and discourse-theoretic approaches. One concerns the use of counterfactual thought experiments and situations of dialogue. The Rawlsian approach respects the pluralism of worldviews by counterfactually imagining what the participants of the debate may hypothetically agree to, according to these theorists. In contrast, the discourse-theoretic approach respects the pluralism of worldviews “by framing and encouraging a real rather than a virtual dialogue” among the participants as a practice through which a reasonable agreement among them may be achieved. “Discourse ethics is

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intimately related to political and institutional practices of communication, justification, contestation, and further argumentation” (ibid., 83). There is another methodological difference. Benhabib sees the problem of “methodological holism” in Rawls’s works, which results in theoretical simplification and abstraction from the complexity of the “lived history” of traditions and worldviews with frequently clashing interpretations. It also attempts to avoid “normative cosmopolitanism,” by insisting that peoples and not individuals are the agents of global justice. Thus, the liberal tolerance it advocates results in “liberal indifference” (2011, 82–85). In contrast, the discourse-theoretic approach considers individuals as the agents, which accounts for the complex coexistence of traditions and clashing worldviews among peoples and within the same country, as well as the complex cultural conversations that have taken place through human history within different cultures about human rights, equality, and justice. Human rights are not only the universal criteria for the evaluation of any state, including a democratic one. They are also the important means for resolution of discord among societies and improvement of international relations. This constructive role of human rights discourse is articulated by Benhabib, who extends her concept of democratic iterations beyond societies toward the international arena. Processes of democratic iteration are interrelated with complex cultural dialogues among people in a global civil society. The assumption that all cultures are incomplete is crucial to the development of a multicultural conception of human rights. Only through free dialogue in free public spheres can the members of a society develop their self-identity. But entrenchment in an ethnocentric mindset that opposes “our culture” to “theirs” represents “totalizing discourses” that play into the hands of authoritarian power. Instead, cultures are shaped through an agonistic account of self-other differentiations. The engagement of the members of society in a complex dialogue makes it possible to look at themselves from the perspectives of others and to enlarge their perspectives. Inter- and intra-cultural dialogues are deeply intertwined. As Benhabib writes, “Human rights are also enabling conditions, in the legal and political senses, of ‘uncoerced democratic iterations’ among the peoples and cultures of the world” (2011, 76). Discourse ethics contributes to the effort to reconceptualize the normative grounds for human rights in a pluralist world. It attempts to ground human rights in “relations of recognition” and in “communicative freedom,” and thus avoid controversial metaphysical and religious assumptions. Some scholars, however, question what they perceive as its ambiguity. On the one hand, in the discourse ethics theory, the “speech-act immanent obligations” present in our communicative interactions are viewed as

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the basis for a grounding of basic human rights. (Of note is that this theory opposes “moralization” and the idea that a canonical list of human rights can simply be derived from a “true” moral theory.) On the other hand, the discourse theory suggests that human rights should be elaborated by the participants themselves in the context of their own reflection upon the institutions and constitutive practices that shape human rights, of their “democratic iterations” and social struggles. Thus, for example, Kenneth Baynes’s question regarding normative foundations for basic rights: “Are rights derived in a strong sense from the conditions of ‘communicative freedom’ or are they developed from the participants’ own reflection upon their ongoing and continuously changing practices and institutions?” (2009, 1). In identifying some of the challenges confronting the discourse ethics, Baynes turns to the ideas provided by the “political conception” of human rights. Human rights are understood as conditions for inclusion in a political society. Its theorists do not expect to discover a basis for human rights in a few moral ideas and to formulate a determinate list of rights. Human rights are conceived primarily as international norms aimed at protecting fundamental human interests and securing for individuals the opportunity to be included and to participate as members in a political society. These international norms also provide a normative framework and yardstick for evaluating the conduct of political societies and governments. Human rights are understood as “the constitutive norms of an emerging global practice” (Beitz 2011, 212). Cohen develops the political conception of human rights and a conception of sovereignty that has acquired a new dimension: the status of being a member of the international community with the right to participate in global governance institutions that make coercive decisions affecting all states and their citizens. Sovereign equality and human rights are two interrelated legal principles of the dualistic international system and both are needed in order to make it more just. It has a cosmopolitan dimension, which means that there should be no individuals or outlaw states denied a legal persona or membership in the international community and that “the project of recreating lawless zones and rightless individuals symbolized by the Guantanamo detention center, is not within the sovereign discretion of any state and can be challenged legally” (2008b, 596). Both Baynes and Cohen attempt to mediate between a discourseethical and a political conception of human rights. Baynes opines that the discourse-theoretic approach to human rights is “not as far removed from a political conception as might initially be supposed” (2009, 2). Although these two approaches differ on how an account of human rights might best be conceptualized, they both seek to avoid controversial metaphysical or

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religious assumptions that could hinder reaching a broader consensus on human rights. Baynes points out that various international, transnational, and nongovernment organizations, acting beyond the boundaries of the nationstate, together with the movements of social protest, create new conditions for human rights and thus alter their content. In a global community, human rights are not limited by a minimal humanitarian concern; rather, they are “international norms that attempt more generally to respond to the changing conditions of political inclusion and membership in an increasingly pluralist world” (2009, 19). An important task of philosophy is to clarify the place of human rights in these broader discourses and practices.

Human Rights and a Cosmopolitan Order to Come The catastrophes of the twentieth century have given new impetus to Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan order. The genuine realization of human rights on a global scale is inseparable from the prospect of evolution of the international system toward a cosmopolitan order.

Human Rights as Universal Criteria for Evaluating All States Human rights are of paramount importance for humanity. Human rights, being universal, serve as regulative principle or normative yardstick for evaluating and critiquing all states, including democratic ones. This crucial role of human rights is obfuscated by interpretations which deny, directly or indirectly, the universality of human rights. The challenge comes not only from relativism (in its communitarian or postmodern versions), but also recently from the pseudo-universal “imperialist claim that the political form of life and the culture of a particular democracy” is an example for the rest of the world (Habermas 2006, 35). This poses the problem of the foundational relationship between human rights, democracy, and international law. Some neoconservative and neoliberal theorists equate the principles of international law with the legislative autonomy of a democratic state, thus denying the existence of a universal criteria for the evaluation and possible criticism of the democratic states and attributing to them self-sufficient infallibility. Moreover, this calls into question whether there is legitimate ground for the critical evaluation of any state, including a democratic one, “from the outside,” from the perspective of universal law, such as human rights. Western liberal democracies, in forging their constitutions and laws, have also contributed to the development of international law. There now

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exists an internal relationship of sorts between democracy and law, and democratic legislation potentially can be open to a universalistic dimension. A democratic state can provide the necessary conditions for citizens to freely discuss moral and legal norms, aiming for consensus. The fundamental rights of citizens are grounded in the constitution of a democratic state. But is the legislative role of democracy in the constitution of positive law (by the sovereignty of a people) enough to ground universally valid law, or the validity-claim of “human rights” as international law? A tension exists between the plurality of particular democratic states— with different interests and normative reservations—and the universal principles of international law, for example, human rights, which direct us toward a cosmopolitan legal order. First, the nation-states represent a diversity of cultures and political systems, including differences among traditional Western democracies. Second, each state as a self-maintaining system has its own political and economic interests, competing with the other states in the world market economy. Third, there is also the limitation of the cognitive point of view of each state, so that even a “benevolent” hegemon as a self-appointed world trustee of human rights cannot be certain that it was really acting in the interests of those it paternalistically claimed to be protecting. Due to these differences of interests and political discourses, no one particular democratic state can claim an impartial and disinterested representation of the interests of the other sovereign states, nor could its legislation be only a pure expression of universal “principles of law” (such as human rights). As I mentioned elsewhere, the philosophical justification of the universal regulative principle for the evaluation of states is vital for their improvement and for the politics of human rights (Demenchonok 2009, 274– 275). Discourse ethics contributes to the philosophical grounding of human rights, thus affirming their role as a regulative principle. This theory emphasizes intersubjectivity and dialogism of communicative action. This approach transformed Kant’s transcendental argumentation into transcendental-pragmatic argumentation. It provides a moral foundation for human rights and thus for the law of a liberal-democratic state as well as for international law. Discourse ethics seeks to show how “human rights as political rights of free and equal citizens in shaping and criticizing all public institutions could be ensured” (Apel 2007, 65). According to the principle of discourse ethics as the ultimate foundation of a macro-ethics of humankind, all conflicts between human beings ought to be settled in a way free of violence. Its moral foundation places universally valid international law above any positive law of any particular state and provides a regulative principle

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for external normative critique with regard to human rights. Universal law secures the rights of human beings as cosmopolitan citizens. From its perspective, any national law can be challenged if it contradicts human rights. In light of this cosmopolitan dimension of international relations, citizens can democratically promote the necessary reforms and changes in the policies of their states. The role of universal human rights as criteria for the evaluation of all states makes possible the critique not only of the brutality of authoritarian regimes, but also human rights violations within democratic states (including the treatment of immigrants in the United States and the European democracies). States violate the human rights not only of their citizens but also rights of the citizens of other countries. These criteria are also applicable for the evaluation of the foreign policy of the powerful states, holding them accountable for human rights violations as the result of their military invasions and wars, including the inhumane treatment and torture of foreign nationals labeled as unlawful enemy combatants or terrorists.6 This shows that the project of the hegemon-centered world through domination and use of force is at odds with world peace and human rights. Its implementation undermines the role of international law and institutions as means for maintaining world peace and protecting human rights.

Hegemonic “Humanitarian Interventionism” versus the International Rule of Law and Institutions Scholars distinguish several phases in the discourse of human rights, which are loosely correlated with the major “turning points” in the history of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The outcomes of World War I drove nations to establish the League of Nations (1919), which was the first attempt to implement a Kantian project of perpetual peace. After World War II, there was the second attempt—the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the express purpose of which was to maintain world peace and to promote human rights. The UN became an alternative to politically organized violence. Its International Bill of Human Rights was the expression of the notion that human freedom and dignity is the nucleus from which a multidimensional, universally valid system of human rights might be derived. The morality of individual rights was crystallized in international law, which was adopted by consensus at the United Nations as the most authoritative international body, thus establishing the foundation upon which the idea of human rights can rest. Insofar as it underscored a commitment to the inherent human dignity of every human being and newly highlighted the relationship between maintaining peace

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and fundamental human rights, the UN Charter summed up the aspirations of most of the world’s peoples for a new international order based on peace, respect for human rights, and cooperation among states in solving socio-economic and global problems. The UN Charter, however, still reflected a dualism in the law’s normative orientation. On the one hand, there is a primary orientation in international law toward the preservation of peace by prohibiting the violation of the sovereignty of individual states. On the other hand, there is also a concern for human rights and, in the case of their brutal violation, enforcement through a mandate from the UN Security Council (thus limiting the sovereignty of states). In his political philosophy, Kant addressed the tension between these two orientations. Initially, in his 1793 “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice” (1996c), Kant thought of an analogy to the civil state among individual human beings: all states should freely submit themselves to “a universal state of nations” (1996c, 309). But he feared that such a world republic could become “a universal monarchy” and “a soulless despotism.” Two years later, in “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1996e), he made an important step in further developing his cosmopolitan ideal. Instead of the idea of a world republic, he suggested its substitute—an idea of a federalism of free states, a voluntary peaceful league of nations (foedus pacificum) (327). As a solution to the dualism described, he called for a transition from an international to a cosmopolitan order. Cosmopolitan law unifies peoples globally, thus yielding strong pacifying effects, and thus facilitating the implementation of human rights. He envisioned a lawful democratic society of enlightened citizens within a peaceful league of nations, gradually evolving toward a cosmopolitan order of law in accordance with the idea of Human Rights. Unfortunately, those UN practical steps toward creating a peaceful world were obstructed by counter-tendencies in the form of power politics and hegemonic geopolitical ambitions, which fueled the Cold War and handicapped the human rights movement. The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities for the pacification and juridification of international relations and created expectations for the implementation of human rights in the world. However, the neoconservative “revolution” and the shift in United States’ policy to hegemonic unilateralism derailed this process. As a variety of scholars have pointed out, an obvious tension has arisen between the superpower’s self-proclaimed commitment to promote universally accepted values (human rights) and its self-interested politics as the world’s hegemonic state.

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The traditional “transcendental” or normative aspect of human rights has become obfuscated, and it has come to be viewed as firmly seated in concrete political communities, governmental institutions, and positive law. Legality has been replaced with a “moralization” of international politics grounded in the ethos of a hegemonic superpower. Human rights discourse obtained a new function, that of the justification of sanctions and “humanitarian” military invasions, framed as “enforcement” of international human rights law. International law has been stripped of its normative content as a means for holding states accountable for their treatment of their citizens, and is instead reduced to governmental techniques, social constructivism, and “nation building.” Human rights, newly redefined in terms of democracy promotion and regime change, ironically became one of the main factors in the crisis of international law. Neoconservative ideology7 and politics were implemented in the Bush Doctrine. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided an occasion for the United States to rationalize a qualitatively new discourse of a “global state of emergency” and the need for a permanent “global war on terror.” The American citizens became the hostages of the militarization of life at home, and the expansion of superpower’s war-making abroad led to infringement of citizens’ civil liberties. Within the security discourse, human rights were newly redefined as “human security,” and the notion of sovereignty redefined as the responsibility to protect. This essentially erodes the concepts of human rights and sovereign equality. The global security regime imposes “imperial” sovereignty, thus undermining international law and institutions, including the United Nations, seeking to transform them into instruments of hegemonic domination (Cohen 2008a, 457). The result has been a neo-totalitarian global security paradigm that is inhospitable to human rights. “Imperial” designs are at odds with the quest for freedom within the socially and culturally diverse world. The “global war on terror” and the United States’ invasion of Iraq in violation of international law were accompanied by grave abuses of human rights, including those at Guantánamo Bay and the Abu Ghraib prison, policies on detentions, euphemistically called “enhanced” interrogations, which amount to nothing less than torture, and warrantless wiretapping and sweeping surveillance of ordinary American citizens. Under the pretext of providing security and protecting citizens from “terrorists,” their privacy is invaded and their civil liberties infringed upon, or taken away. For example, the terrorist surveillance program, started under the Bush administration by executive order and continued under the Obama administration, authorizes the United States National Security Agency (NSA), to monitor, without search warrants, phone calls, Internet activity (including e-

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mail), text messaging, and other communication involving any party believed by the NSA to originate from outside the United States, even if the receiver is located within the United States. The hegemonic “surveillance state” spreads its electronic mass surveillance globally (Harris 2011). George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) was chillingly prophetic. But who will protect “paternalized” citizens from Big Brother’s high-tech tyranny? Michael Ignatieff, expressing frustration over the lack of public support in the United States and Western Europe for the use of force in response to humanitarian crisis in other countries, calls it “a crisis of democratic legitimacy.” He points to the disillusion and mistrust of the people regarding their governments as a result of past abuses of “humanitarian interventions” as a pretext for predatory wars: The core problem is public anger at the manipulation of consent: disillusion with the way in which leaders and policy elites have used moral and humanitarian arguments to extract popular support for the use of force in Iraq and Libya, and then conducted those interventions in ways that betrayed their lack of true commitment to those principles . . . Immanuel Kant was right that when the people bear the cost of war and get a chance to tell their leaders what they think, they are reluctant to authorize it. (“The Duty to Protect, Still Urgent,” New York Times, September 13, 2013)

At the center of the dispute is the path toward achieving the declared goals of peace, international security, and human rights protection: whether through updating and strengthening international law and institutions, the legally established procedures and collective actions of an inclusive world organization, the United Nations—or via forcibly imposed unilateral decisions of a “benevolent hegemon.” The dream of a hegemon-centered and totally controlled world order, a global “Leviathan,” may give the semblance of near absolute power and security, but this has already proven to be a failed project. Hegemonic unilateralism is incompatible with human freedom and the sovereign equality of the nations in a socially and culturally diverse world. Nor can the imposition of democracy and human rights by military force or by the unilateral actions of either one nation or a group of nations (con-dominium) succeed in the long term—it will only further undermine international law. This policy is itself the source of wars accompanied by destruction and massive violations of human rights. Ironically, human rights fell prey to “war in the name of human rights.” Thus, in cases where this kind of policy invokes humanitarian reasons for its justification, its means are actually contrary to

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its proclaimed goals, undermining collective efforts to establish a peaceful and just world order. The universal human rights cannot be adequately realized either by individual democratic states or by a hegemon-centered “world republic,” operating within the traditional framework of power politics. In the words of Habermas, “Precisely the universalistic core of democracy and human rights forbids their unilateral imposition at gunpoint” (2006, 34–35). The reliance on force neither solves the problem of human rights violations, nor other socio-economic and global problems. Rather, it makes them even worse while also generating new problems and perpetuating the violence. The hegemonic project affects not only world politics but also international law and institutions. It also hinders the constitutionalization of international law—the process envisioned in Kant’s conception of a “cosmopolitan condition”—which since the establishment of the United Nations had become more evident in emerging international constitutions and institutions. The constitutionalization of international law tends toward cosmopolitan law. This process, which traditionally has been criticized by the “realists,” has also been criticized by neoconservatives. As Habermas writes: “The behavior of the American government admits only one conclusion, namely, that from their point of view international law is finished as a medium for resolving conflicts between states and for promoting democracy and human rights” (2006, 103). Moreover, “the project of a new liberal world order under the banner of a pax Americana” advocated by the neoconservatives “raises the question of whether the juridification of international relations should be superseded by a moralization of international politics grounded in the ethos of a superpower” (ibid., 116). Along with attempts to diminish the role of international law by disingenuously opposing it to morality, there is also the tendency to change its function from an emphasis on constraining the use of power to legitimizing its unilateral use: in short, creating a “hegemonic international law” as a tool for the superpower’s policy (Vagts 2001, 843). International law and institutions are subject to hegemonic “capture.” Many theorists are also concerned about the possibility of the hegemonic distortion of humanitarian and universalizing concepts into “humanitarian imperialism” or “imperial cosmopolitanism.”8 These concepts have become a battlefield between competing projects of the future world order. In this regard, the urgent challenge facing contemporary theorists—and political actors—is to find new ways to avert the ominous trend toward the “hegemonization” of international law and humanitarian concepts. Legal scholars and philosophers see it as their task to critically deconstruct ideo-

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logical justifications of the power structures developed by a hegemon, and to find the ways to liberate both international law and international institutions like the United Nations from hegemonic domination. A new theoretical approach to human rights is needed to guide the exploration (and possible creation) of alternatives in collective arrangements without the active support of the hegemon. From Kant, we already know the dilemma between a “world republic” (a despotic universal monarchy) and a peaceful federation of free states. The implementation of the imperial-centered project would mean that the evolution of the international system based on the sovereign equality of states would be derailed, substituted by a hegemonic “world republic” and imperial law, rather than progressing toward a cosmopolitan order. Kant’s concepts of human rights and of cosmopolitan order are intrinsically interrelated. He saw the individual as a microcosm enjoying human rights within the macrocosm of the cosmopolitan world community; each was a side of the same coin. The human right to freedom can be effectively realized within the favorable conditions of a cosmopolitan order, which remains both a precondition and an ideal. In turn, the promotion of human rights would strengthen the principles of justice and the rule of law domestically and internationally, thus supporting the cosmopolitan law. For Kant, a cosmopolitan order was no mere utopia, but a feasible long-range project for humanity. He saw grounds for hope regarding a gradual progress toward perpetual peace in three tendencies: the “spirit of commerce” and the unifying power of world trade; the republican constitution, offering a prospect of peace when the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide whether to declare war; and the function of the political public sphere and the “transcendental principle of publicity” of all lawful claims (1996e, 336, 322, 348). Behind Kant’s claims lies a moral duty to realize political opportunities to create the conditions for peace and human rights protection. He stressed that it makes our “duty to work toward this (not merely chimerical) end” (337). Kant’s project, however, remains largely an unfinished agenda, perhaps an elusive ideal of planetary harmony, when seen against the globalization of violence and the violence of certain forms of globalization. In his philosophy of history, neither “harmony” nor the self-destruction of humanity are predetermined. In contrast to deterministic historicism, he developed a concept of open history as containing various possibilities: the realization of one or the other potential possibilities (from best to worst) depends on choices and actions of people as subjects of history. He outlined basic alternatives that humanity faces, and he appealed to human reason to become conscious of them as a guide in making choices and actions in shap-

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ing their own future. So far, humanity has paid a heavy price for failing to constrain escalating violence. Ultimately, whether the people will establish and implement the rule of law and a peaceful federation, aiming for a cosmopolitan order, depends on the choices they make. Against this background we can better see the necessity of an alternative, represented by a cosmopolitan ideal, awaiting future implementation. We can see the desirable characteristics of this future cosmopolitan order through its contrast with a project of imperial world domination: it is better known by what it is not. This approach makes space for a cosmopolitan imagination to emerge by critically deconstructing the existing structures, which currently obfuscate our view of the better future.

Toward a Cosmopolitan Order of Law, Peace, and Human Rights In the twenty-first century, facing old and new social and global problems, cosmopolitanism is more urgent than ever before. It is particularly important as an alternative to an imperial unipolar world order. It provides a normative focus for international political theory by placing the individual human being at the center of global politics. Its theorists are critical of the anti-democratic tendencies in the current international order and the democratic states. Consequently, they have striven to develop a cosmopolitan democracy model for a world society. Among its principles are moral universalism, rooted in Kant’s philosophy, which promotes the idea that every human being is qualified for equal membership in the universal human community; juridification of basic rights as the process of democratic legitimation; and the development of transnational institutions as the basis for juridical norms and principles of cosmopolitan justice. The approximation toward the ideal of a cosmopolitan order requires the constitutionalization of international law, as well as a transformation of international relations. There is a growing number of international organizations, creating the possibilities of governance beyond the nation state. The concept of constitutionalization of international law, rooted in Kant’s idea of the cosmopolitan constitution, aims for a transnationalization of the achievements of the constitutional state. It points toward a solution to the problem of how to civilize political power in legal terms and extend the rule of law beyond national borders. The authors, who emphasize the necessity of the plurality of the sovereign states in a culturally diverse world, are developing the concept of constitutional pluralism (Cohen 2008a). Habermas develops the concept of postnational constellations and of the juridification of international relations, in the sense of a transformation

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of international law into a cosmopolitan constitution (2006, 149). He elaborates a proposal for a political constitution for a pluralistic world society without a world government. It consists of a global three-level system: national, transnational, and supranational: In a multi-level global system, the classical function of the state as the guarantor of security, law, and freedom would be transferred to a supranational world organization specialized in securing peace and implementing human rights worldwide. (2008, 333)

The treatment of the problems of underdevelopment, the ecological crisis, and of averting other collective threats will be addressed within the context of transnational negotiation systems. At the same time, Habermas points out the obstacles to the realization of this project. One of them is “a growing democratic deficit,” when the citizens are not included in supranational decision-making processes, which therefore lack legitimacy. “Global governance is a euphemistic term for the undemocratic character of the institutionalization of international relations,” which is rather a proliferation of “technocratic regimes” characterized by paternalism (2013, 5). He states that the democratic legitimation process will be able to extend beyond the nation state only when it can combine the three building blocks that are constitutive for every democratic system: the “people” as the bearer of political will-formation; the “state”; and the “legally constituted community of citizens” as a voluntary association of free and equal individuals (5–6). Using as an example the current European Union crisis, Habermas illustrates the existing trend toward technocracy, when the major decisions are made without the involvement of the citizens, thus shifting the burden of the crises to the shoulders of the disadvantaged social groups. The stumbling block is the lack of political solidarity. Habermas provides a philosophical analysis of the concept of solidarity. Solidarity has its ethical dimension (somewhat similar to Hegel’s “ethical life” or Sittlichkeit), but it is not synonymous with “justice” either in the moral or the legal sense of the term. Solidarity is “the trust-founding Sittlichkeit of informal social relations that, under the condition of predictable reciprocity, requires that the one individual ‘vouches’ for the others” (ibid., 9). Habermas refers to political solidarity (as distinct from national or corporate solidarities), which involves “struggling to discharge the promise which is invested in the legitimacy claim of any political order” (10). A cooperative project undertaken from a joint EU perspective to promote growth as a whole would require political solidarity. The citizens “must push for further political integration in order to extend their control over quasi-natural economic

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forces and recover a democratic balance between politics and the market” (11). Needless to say, the call for the political solidarity of peoples in striving for their long-term interests (and a better future) is relevant to other countries in the world. Many philosophers writing on human rights have viewed them from a cosmopolitan perspective. Martha C. Nussbaum observes that, two centuries after Kant, cosmopolitanism seems to be in grave jeopardy in many countries, including America. She emphasizes that protection of human rights, of the rights of women or minorities, requires the collective efforts of the international human rights movement, the governments and nongovernmental organizations (1997, 49–50). Contemporary cosmopolitanism tends to be responsive to diversity and power relations in today’s global conditions. The variety of views is reflected in the different adjectives used to characterize a cosmopolitanism for our times: imperial, patriotic, liberal, moral, rooted, situated, decolonial, critical, reflexive, dialogical, etc. Amid the diversity of voices in the current debate on the philosophy of cosmopolitanism, two main tendencies can be identified: one toward an emphasis on identification with humanity as a whole and world-citizenship, and the other toward an emphasis on the protection of the cultural diversity of nations and minority groups. To the “imperial” version of cosmopolitanism these philosophers oppose critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism. There is also a difference between more centered and more de-centered models of legal and political cosmopolitanism. Yet for all of these philosophers, Kant serves as a source of inspiration in the search for solutions to today’s problems. While most of them believe that Kant’s theory needs substantial modification, they all insist that it continues to possess normative relevance. The discourse on cosmopolitanism helps to clarify some of its own normative claims, at the core of which is the dialectic of difference and identity, otherness and sameness. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Ulrich Beck, Seyla Benhabib, David Held, Walter Mignolo, and Martha C. Nussbaum are among the philosophers who have elaborated a concept of critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism. They critically assess the concepts of cosmopolitanism and argue for noncoercive and egalitarian cosmopolitan politics. They envision a cosmopolitanism that is democratic, inclusive, responsive to cultural diversity, reflexive in the sense of a self-critique and awareness of one’s own epistemic standpoint, and committed to genuine dialogue. Cosmopolitan claims imply universality claims. The traditional claims to speak univocally for a notion of the universal understood as projected from a single point of view (that is, an abstract universality) are criticized by the adherents of diversity, who consider such claims to be expressive of

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an ethnocentric pseudo-universality; the critics also point to the use of such claims in the “imperial” interpretation of cosmopolitanism. These philosophers are looking for universalism that is not the unwarranted generalization of some of the Western particular views. Beck indicates the need to counter this distortion of universalizing concepts when he asks: “How can we devise a limited, relativistic, or contextual universalism that successfully squares the circle of affirming universal norms while neutralizing their imperialistic sting?” (2006, 59). This new concept of universalism is elaborated by the theorists of dialogic cosmopolitanism. They suggest that the universal as such ought to be inclusive of the other: of those excluded, the subaltern, the stranger, and the marginalized. According to Beck, such a contextual universalism is to be produced by a dialogical imaginary that sets out from recognizing that we imagine others just as the others imagine us. This is an interactive process of arriving at cosmopolitan vision through an engagement with a dialogical imagination that opens up the spaces of mutual recognition and transformation. Beck argues for the necessity to recover an authenticity of cosmopolitan openness to otherness and tolerance of difference. He indicates that there is a growing demand for a “hermeneutics of the stranger.” In opposition to hegemonic globalization, Mignolo offers his concept of “de-colonial cosmopolitanism.” Cosmopolitanism can no longer be projected from one point of view and within a single logic as a monologic discourse. Dialogic cosmopolitanism emerges from the various spatial and historical locations of the colonial (and imperial) difference. This refers to global processes of “de-Westernization” and “decoloniality” as delinking from the matrix of Western power and as a movement toward global futures in which human beings are not exploited and the natural world is not undermined. De-colonial cosmopolitanism should adopt what he calls the locus of enunciation of the subaltern. It should be oriented toward “pluriversality,” or a combination of diversity and universality that Mignolo calls “diversality.” Instead of a homogenous world centered on an ideology or a state power, de-colonial cosmopolitanism is “a cosmopolitanism of multiple trajectories aiming at a trans-modern world based on pluriversality rather than on a new and good universal for all” (2010, 111). Dialogic cosmopolitanism is self-reflexive and also reflexive of the point of view of the others: “Reflexive cosmopolitanism is a universality plus difference that reflects on its own conditioned claims. It is thus . . . diversality plus reflexivity of historical contingency” (Mendieta, 2009, 252). It is guided by contextual universalism. This is “the universalism of the other, an ‘other’ that is neither metaphysical nor radical alterity, but another that is always a historical and concrete ‘other’” (ibid., 254).

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Held refers to Kant in sketching an idea of a “new cosmopolitanism” and what he calls “the cosmopolitan model of democracy.” He argues that we can specify a set of principles that express the idea of each person having equal moral significance, which he termed a “layered cosmopolitan perspective” (2005, 18). Bohman interprets Kant’s idea of federalism as the federation of international societal communities within a cosmopolitan public sphere. He considers the importance of human rights as the normative basis of transnational democracy (2007). Cosmopolitanism faces difficulties stemming from the necessary boundedness of democratic authority and the historically specific expressions of national solidarity by ethnicity. Benhabib notes that the culture of human rights has shown the dialectical play between sovereignty and cosmopolitan right, in which nation-states are simultaneously affirmed and denied. The central problem is how to imbue the cosmopolitan moral ought with a legal and enforceable status for individuals as well as states and governments. She examines the processes of “democratic iterations” and “jurisgenerative politics.” We still live not in an age of cosmopolitanism, but “in an age of cosmopolitization,” anticipating its realization: “The interlocking of democratic iteration struggles within a global civil society and the creation of solidarities beyond borders, including a universal right of hospitality that recognizes the other as a potential co-citizen, anticipate another cosmopolitanism—a comopolitanism to come” (2006, 177). Theorists whose work embodies a cosmopolitan perspective represent a heuristically fruitful approach to the problem of human rights. They endorse the constitutionalization of international law (with a pluralistic understanding of constitutionalism) and the strengthening of international institutions, such as a properly reformed United Nations, as well as transnational democratic movements as vehicles for the realization of a cosmopolitan order. This analysis has shown that the true solution to the problem of protecting human rights can be achieved only by peaceful means, based on strengthening international law and institutions and aiming for a gradual realization of the ideal of the cosmopolitan order of law and peace.

Notes 1.

Emphasis (italics and bold) here and in other quotes are as shown as in original. Historicist determinism and the cult of history has its various surrogates, reappearing as the cults of technology, of the “invisible hand” of the free-market neoliberal economy, of ethnocentric (and xenophobic) “democracy,” and of the messianic role of a “chosen nation” as a self-appointed global democratizing force. 2.

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One can see the main features of historicism lurking behind the technocratic theories of industrial-postindustrial society as well as in the neoconservative doctrine with its “imperial designs.” Historicism was criticized by some twentieth-century philosophers. Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time was a reaction against the modern concept of time underlying the teleological representation of history and Hegel’s historicism. Heidegger argued that only Dasein (the Being of humanity) is primarily historical, and from Dasein emanates the historicity of any other processes as a result of human activity (including the so-called worldwide history). Society “has” history, but a human being has the ontological privilege of “being history.” Karl Jaspers developed his concept of open history in opposition to historicism. He analyzed present polarized tendencies as possibilities that represent an antithesis “between the path to world empire or the path to world order” (1953, 196). The flaws of historicism have been exposed in the broad critique of modernity from postmodern and postcolonial perspectives. To the totalizing view of history, Jacques Derrida opposes a plurality of histories and of the discourses of the future. Philosophy and theology of liberation criticize the concept of the “end of history” as an apology for the status quo. They emphasize that the developing nations, burdened with stinging social-economic problems, do not want to “close history.” 3. This, and the following part, is a revised and extended version of my 2012 essay “Human Rights in a Pluralistic World” in Skepsis 22(1): 42–76, and is reprinted with the permission of the publisher. 4. Amy Mullin, for example, argues that children with intellectual disabilities are morally considerable: “relationships characterized by reciprocity of care are morally valuable, that both the potential to be in such relationships and the actuality of being in them are morally valuable, and that many children with significant intellectual disabilities have this potential” (2011, 291). 5. Some philosophers see alternative perspectives in Kant’s approach, supporting views on which we have duties to every human being and significant duties regarding non-human animals, duties that involve concern for non-human animals because of their nature. In his interpretation of the Kantian approach, Allen Wood concludes that we have duties toward animals based on the worth of humanity to which the animals, their life process, and behaviors are “analogues,” and that “we should treat non-human living things—the higher mammals, for instance—as beings whose health, desires, and contentment matter to us” (2008, 103–104). 6. Apel has stated that the US invasion in Iraq, under the pretext of human rights protection and “spreading democracy,” has shown that its policy of a world hegemony poses an “imminent danger for the freedom and the very conception of international law.” It also has shown that “the idea of law in the sense of the universal conception of human rights cannot be adequately realized either by particular democratic states or by a world state as despotic superpower” (2007, 59). He continues, “the primordial discourse of humanity is a meta-institution” and it should be the concern of a global reasoning public, but it cannot be represented by the hegemonic superpower. Instead, the UN is the meta-institution of global discourse and it must be strengthened by reforms. In contrast to an imperial universalism, Habermas argues for an “egalitarian universalism.” The idea of equal treat-

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ment, related to the law of peoples and to the vocabulary of human rights, can serve opposition and liberation movements as the standard for an ideological critique of the abuse of “spreading democracy” by hegemonic power. He differentiates between the pseudo-universal “imperialist claim” and “the universal validity claim” which binds the West “to the procedure of democratic self-determination and the vocabulary of human rights” (2006, 35). 7. Neoconservative ideology is underpinned by the basic tenets of historicism, in its hegemonic version, as conceptualized in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992). Fukuyama claimed that the American neoliberal version of global economics had triumphed and that “liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government,’ and as such constituted the ‘end of history’” (xi). In constructing his concept of “a coherent and directional Universal History of mankind,” he follows the historicist approach of Hegel, Marx, and Alexandre Kojève, while providing his own teleology of the historical process as heading toward the global spread of the Western “model” under the leadership of the “benevolent hegemon.” He attempts to explain the directionality of history by the “logic of modern natural science,” as the version of techno-economic determinism, “which (unlike its Marxist variant) leads to capitalism rather than socialism as its final result” (xv). He also borrows “Hegel’s non-materialist account of History, based on the ‘struggle for recognition’” (xvi). For Fukuyama, neoconservatism represents the ideology and movement toward this post-history, and United States has an exceptional “mission” in implementing it around the globe. This meta-narrative of “historical necessity” is used as justification for the imperial policy of the superpower, including its wars and other negative consequences as collateral damage of “spreading democracy.” 8. Human rights are traditionally viewed as based upon the primacy of international law over a state’s jurisdiction. But an imperial state, aiming for global domination, claims to speak on behalf of the other nations of the world and to legislate international law. Few analysts are surprised by “the desire of a hegemon to foster bargaining outcomes favorable to itself or its conception of what is good for the international community” (Malone and Khong 2003, 14). Terry Nardin concludes his analysis that the rhetoric of human rights now “provides an ideological rationale for American empire” (2005, 25). In summarizing this tendency toward the hegemonic transformation of international law, Nicolas Guilhot observes that humanitarian interventions and “the new political technologies associated with the promotion of human rights” have become the symptoms of the changing nature of law: “it ceases to be international law proper and becomes, as some jurists have suggested, imperial law” (2008, 512).

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Mignolo, Walter. 2010. “Cosmopolitanism and the De-Colonial Option.” Studies in Philosophy and Education, 29 (2):111–127. Mullin, Amy. 2011. “Children and the Argument from ‘Marginal’ Cases.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3): 291–305. Nardin, Terry. 2005. “Humanitarian Imperialism.” Ethics & International Affairs 19 (2): 21–26. Nussbaum, Martha C. 1997. “Kant and Cosmopolitanism.” In Perpetual peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachman, 25–57. Malden, MA: MIT Press. Orend, Brian. 2002. Human Rights: Concept and Context. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press. Owell, George. 1949. Nineteen Eighty-Four. New York: Harcourt Brace. Perry, Michael J. 2000. The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries. New York: Oxford University Press. —. 2007. Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1991. “Abstract and Judgment of Saint-Pierre’s Project of Perpetual Peace.” In Rousseau on International Relations, edited by Stanley Hoffmann and David P. Fidler, 53–138. New York: Oxford University Press. Vagts, Detlev F. 2001. “Hegemonic International Law.” American Journal of International Law 95 (October): 843–848. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 2008. Justice: Rights and Wrongs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. —. 2011. Justice and Love. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Wood, Allen. 2008. Kantian Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN GANDHI’S CONTRIBUTION TO NON-VIOLENCE AND GLOBAL PEACE Y. V. SATYANARAYANA

Mohandas Gandhi was not a systematic theorist and academician. His ideas and actions were an outcome of the influences exerted on him from various sources of Indian and Western traditions, of his contacts with diverse kinds of people, of his innumerable experiments with truth, and of his ceaseless struggles against untruth or evil. His thought evolved over time primarily as he engaged in political struggles, first in South Africa as a revolt against the practice of apartheid, and later in India against British rule in India’s struggle for national independence. A proper understanding and appreciation of his ideas and actions is only possible within the context of the struggles in which he participated. Gandhi was greatly influenced by the Indian philosophical, ethical, and religious tradition. His contribution in thought and action inevitably referred to those traditional precepts and practices. His genius lies in the fact that he chose certain traditional concepts and practices to which he was attracted and gave them new meaning and life. He expanded them from the individual to the social realm and applied them in an appropriate manner to resolve a variety of social, political, economic, and religious conflicts in a non-violent way. For this reason, Gandhi repeatedly said that he had not invented anything new, but that he tried to restate the old principles already present in ancient Indian texts or scriptures. Truth and non-violence are the two basic concepts on which Gandhi developed his thought. His significant contribution was the unity of theory and practice. Mere theory devoid of practice in life did not appeal to him very much. He never preached anything that he did not practice. He spent his whole life in the relentless search for truth, which could be known not in theory but in practice. As a fighter and leader of the masses, he might have thought that any political action devoid of thought and reflection causes people to drift away from truth and causes them to experience emo-

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tional outbursts. Gandhi’s experiments with truth and non-violent direct action, the various strategies and techniques he employed for mass mobilization during the struggle for independence, and constant change in his ideas and programs to conform to realities on the ground, indicate his conviction of the unity of theory and practice. Referring to the essential unity of thought and practice Gandhi said, “Philosophy without life corresponding is like a body without life . . . I know that in this land of ours we have enough philosophy but little life” (quoted in Sheean 1949, 187). Another significant feature of Gandhi’s thought was that he never believed in the principle of absolutism. All his ideas and actions were grounded on the doctrine of the Buddhist “middle path”, or what Aristotle advocated as the “golden mean,” the mean between two extremes. The doctrines he preached and the struggles he fought strictly adhered to the doctrine of the middle path; he never allowed extremes to enter into his thought and action.

The Concept of Non-Violence in Indian Tradition Non-violence has been at the core of Indian tradition from time immemorial; almost all its philosophical systems and religious schools accorded supreme value to it. Jainism, the religion of non-violence par excellence, teaches non-injury to all life. The idea of non-violence was rooted deep into the Indian soil through the teachings of Vardhamana (599–527 BCE), the last prophet of Jainism. Jainism was born as a reaction to the sacrificial discipline of IndoAryan Brahmanism. It strongly opposed slaughtering animals in the name of yajna or sacrifices offered to gods for attaining worldly possessions. The doctrine of non-violence took a more positive form and was further strengthened by Buddha, through his teachings of love and compassion to all beings on earth. Asoka was the first Emperor who declared nonviolence as the state policy. He applied it to the affairs of the state and successfully solved socio-political problems of his time by non-violent means. Gandhi was greatly influenced by the traditional Indian concept of nonviolence. In Indian tradition, the doctrine of non-violence was practiced as a personal value rather than a social value. By attributing social value to non-violence, Gandhi enriched this traditional concept of non-violence and applied it to the collective sphere of social life. His contribution lies in transforming the personal value of non-violence into a technique of nonviolent social action.

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Distinctive Features of Gandhi’s Concept of Non-Violence Gandhi defined non-violence as refraining from “causing pain to or killing any life out of anger, or for a selfish purpose, or with the intention of injuring it” (Young India, October 21, 1926, 363). For him, violence means “a violent intention behind a thought, word, or deed, that is, an intention to harm” (Harijan, February 19, 1936, 362). He did not view nonviolence as a negative virtue. It is not merely abstaining from violence or a state of harmlessness, but a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evildoer (Harijan, February 25, 1920, 2). However, it does not mean supporting evildoers to continue doing wrong or cooperating with their evil acts, but resisting evil acts without hatred or doing harm to them. The basic aim of non-violence is not to humiliate opponents, but to change their hearts and minds. Gandhi made a distinction between persons and their deeds. Respect for human dignity is a prime concern of Gandhi, as it was of Immanuel Kant. For this reason, Gandhi wanted to see people and their deeds separately from two different perspectives. He maintained that the doer of the deed, whether good or wicked, always deserves respect or pity as the case may be. He firmly believed in the precept “Hate the sin, but not the sinner.” He complained that this precept is rarely practiced, which is the reason hatred is generated and spreads throughout the world. The philosophy of non-violence aims at moral transformation of the individual, rather its destruction. Since the same spirit or divinity resides in all people, Gandhi argued that there is a possibility for reforming even the meanest of them. He believed in the inherent goodness of people and their capacity for improvement. He is of the opinion that no human being is so bad as to be beyond redemption, and no human being is so perfect as to be justified to destroy whom he considers wholly evil. The imperfections of human beings in the present would not negate the possibility of their development to perfection in the future. Gandhi asserted, “In the application of the method of non-violence, one must believe in the possibility of every person, however depraved, being reformed under humane and skilled treatment” (Harijan, February 22, 1942, 49). This optimistic view of human perfection logically led him to the conclusion that we should convert the opponents rather than destroy them. The doctrine of non-violence works on the basis of the moral principle that one must “cooperate with good and non-cooperate with evil.” Gandhi argues that many of the evils existed in the world because we cooperated with them or tolerated them. To eradicate evil from our world, he suggested that every person must make it a policy and work on the principle of

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cooperation with the good and non-cooperation with evil. The Christian ethic of “love” had a great impact on Gandhi. He not only included the idea of love in his concept of non-violence, but also extended it and made it as the main plank of his technique of non-violent resistance. He applied the principle of love even to opponents and wrongdoers to bring a change in their hearts and minds. Gandhi’s concept of non-violence should not be understood as inaction or non-action. It is neither a resignation from fighting against wickedness, nor a meek submission to the will of the evildoer. It is an active condemnation of untruth, without violence, anger, or ill will. It is an active and effective non-violent fight against all wickedness, or putting one’s moral force against the will of tyrants to win them over by love. From the beginning of his public life in South Africa until his death, what he preached and practiced was “non-violent resistance to evil,” which can be distinguished from the Christian doctrine of “non-resistance to evil,” and the pacifists’ method of “passive resistance.” He believed that evil cannot be replaced by evil, but by good. In other words, physical force is to be opposed, not by the same physical force, but by moral force. In 1926, in a letter to Wilhelm Wattenberg, Gandhi wrote: Non-violent resistance to evil does not mean absence of any resistance whatsoever but means not to resist evil with evil but with good. Resistance, therefore, is transformed to a higher and absolutely affective plane. (Quoted in Satyanarayana 1988, 133)

Gandhi made a clear-cut distinction between non-violent resistance and passive resistance. Passive resistance, according to Gandhi, is a weapon of the weak, of the unarmed and helpless. It is a “coward’s expedient” (quoted in Pyarelal 1969, 10). As a matter of principle, it does not avoid violence; a passive resister would resort to arms if he could. It is an expression of one’s anger against opponent, and thus, there is no place of love in it. The underlying aim of passive resistance is to harass the opponent and force him into the desired course of action. Gandhi held that “passive resistance, unlike non-violence, has no power to change men’s hearts” (Harijan, July 20, 1947, 243). On the contrary, non-violent resistance is an expression of the purest form of love.1 It is based on the virtue of forgiveness, pardon of an offender, or ceasing to feel angry. It precludes anger, hatred, distrust, and deception. It is the weapon of the brave and is based on highest form of moral courage or soul force. It does not aim to injure or destroy, but to convert opponents and turn them into allies. The moral force of a non-violent action compels the opponent to start negotiations on equal terms.

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Non-violence, for Gandhi, is not simply a personal virtue. The religion of non-violence is not merely meant for sages and saints, or prophets and devotees, but is also meant for the common people. Like any other virtue, “it is a social virtue,” that can be cultivated at the national scale and on an international scale (Harijan, January 7, 1939, 417). Its practice is not limited merely to the individual level, but it can be practiced “by groups, communities, and nations” (Harijan, March 2, 1940, 23). It is based on the principle that what holds good in respect of one person equally holds good for the entire universe. Gandhi argues, “all virtue cease to have its use, if it serves no purpose in every walk of life” (Harijan, July 26, 1942, 248). Another important contribution of Gandhi is inculcating the spirit of fearlessness into the minds of all people who were inert, fearful, weak, and without hope and faith. By preaching the message of fearlessness and courage to the emasculated people, Gandhi made them like fearless soldiers to fight against the mighty power of British rule. He argued that the fear of imprisonment, fear of loss of property, or fear of death demoralizes human spirit (Harijan, September 1, 1940, 268).2 He believed that true non-violence is impossible without the possession of unadulterated fearlessness (Harijan, July 15, 1939, 201). An individual who does not conquer all forms of fear cannot practice perfect non-violence. Hence, Gandhi carried out the message of fearlessness; it was his greatest gift not only to the Indian people but also to the entire humankind. Although Gandhi was very timid during his childhood and youth, later he developed a sort of aversion to fearfulness and cowardice. The Maritzburg incident in South Africa, where he was insulted and physically pulled out of the first class railway compartment on the basis of racial discrimination, brought a tremendous change in the growth of his psyche, and the inevitable outcome of this incident is the invention of a new technique of non-violent resistance to evil (Gandhi 1972, 82).3 Gandhi says that non-violence and cowardice cannot go together, because non-violence requires immense moral courage. Hence, there is no room for fear or cowardice in his creed of non-violence. Despite being a firm believer in non-violence, Gandhi has gone to the extent of saying that he “would prefer violence rather than cowardice” (Young India, August 11, 1920, 260).4 This does not mean that Gandhi has given some concessions to non-violence; rather, it shows his aversion to cowardice.

Satyagraha or Non-Violent Direct Action Satyagraha, or non-violent direct action, is a technique developed by Gandhi to resolve all forms of social conflict in a non-violent way. It is a

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technique of mass action wherein the ideal of love governs in the place of hatred and killing. Therefore, it is considered the most cultured way of bringing desirable changes in the hearts and minds of the opponents against whom it is launched. It brings a kind of moral transformation in the persons against whom the technique is launched. Satyagraha, as a technique of social action, is based on three fundamental principles: truth, non-violence, and self-suffering. A proper understanding of these three principles and a skillful application of them will determine the effective functioning of satyagraha. Gandhi’s concept of truth is derived from Indian tradition, which refers to two great personalities, a king named Harischandra and a boy named Prahlada. The story of King Harischandra is told in the epic Mahabharata. Harischandra sacrificed his kingdom, his wealth, and his wife and child for the sake of truth. This story captured Gandhi’s heart and from it he got great inspiration to practice truth. The story of Prahlada is found in Bhagavata Purana. The boy Prahlada disobeyed his father for the cause of truth; consequently, he suffered untold hardships. Gandhi found an illustration of “soul force” in this story and later he developed the technique of satyagraha modeled on it. Gandhi was did not particularly care about how one defines God. In the beginning, he believed, “God is Truth,” but later, he corrected that conception and preferred to say, “Truth is God,” because even an atheist cannot deny the necessity or power of truth (1957, 5).5 He made a distinction between truth as absolute (infinite and universal) and truth as relative (a means to realize the Absolute Truth). Since it is not possible for humanity to realize Absolute Truth, Gandhi thought we must hold to the relative truth till we realize absolute truth, and live up to it as we conceive it. For Gandhi, truth is the end and non-violence is the means. As truth is relative, what appears to be truth to one person may appear to be false to another. Therefore, no one should claim that his or her view is final; we must prepare to concede another’s view also from the other’s standpoint. For this reason, no one has the right to coerce others to act according to his or her own view of truth (Harijan, November 24, 1933, 6). This type of approach to truth gives opportunity to non-violent resisters to correct their own errors, if any, in the pursuit of truth. The pursuit of truth never admits inflicting violence on opponents. That is why Gandhi advocated nonviolent means for arriving at truth. Contrary to this approach for arriving at truth, adherents of violence do not believe in the relative nature of truth, refuse to hear the viewpoints of opponents, and claim their view is correct and final.

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The Dynamic Nature of Non-violence In 1922, in his famous statement at the Great Trail, Gandhi said, “Nonviolence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed” (Young India, February 23, 1922, 166). He explained non-violence as uttermost selflessness, which means complete freedom from a regard for one’s body. Individuals who desire self-realization, that is, Truth, can only achieve it by completely detaching from their bodies, which means making all other beings feel safe around them. That is the way of nonviolence. Followers of non-violence must love their friends and enemies in the same manner. They must apply the same rules of love to the wrongdoer or a stranger as they would do to their wrong-doing parent or child. The practice of non-violence, according to Gandhi, requires the greatest courage. He says that the gift of life is the greatest of all gifts, and a votary of non-violence must be prepared to sacrifice that gift of life for the cause of truth. Non-violence, in its active form, necessarily includes truth and fearlessness. A cowardly person cannot practice non-violence because moral courage is an essential requirement of non-violence. Thus, Gandhi’s concept of non-violence is both active and militant in its character, rather than meek submission to evil or quietism. In a sense, the relevance of satyagraha, as a technique of mass action, is based on this dynamic and assertive character of non-violence.

Potentiality of Self-Suffering The doctrine of “self-suffering,” as a technique of social action, is the unique contribution of Gandhi to the contemporary world. Tapasya, or self-suffering, is one of the severest disciplines of Indian tradition, which has been practiced by countless numbers of seers and saints with a desire to attain spiritual liberation. Individual seers undertook Tapasya, as a means to moksha, or spiritual realization, at various times in Indian history. Gandhi adopted this traditional spiritual discipline, which had traditionally been practiced at individual level, gave it a new connotation and extended it to the realm of group or collective sphere, and included it as an integral part of his technique of satyagraha. Gandhi held the fundamental conviction that people cannot secure basic things of life by reason alone, but that they must be purchased by means of self-suffering. Just as violence is the law of the jungle, so also non-violence and self-suffering is the law of human beings. Violence or the law of jungle operates on the brute principle that might is right, and thus, its basic aim is inflicting suffering on others. Therefore, Gandhi be-

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lieved that self-suffering is infinitely more powerful, and that it is a superior virtue to the law of jungle “for converting the opponent and opening his ears, which are otherwise shut, to the voice of reason” (Young India, November 5, 1931, 341). Self-suffering is grounded on one’s willingness and readiness to fight and die for a right cause on the basis of certain principles and values. It requires unusual courage and freedom from fear. It is an efficient and effective instrument of social persuasion and conflict resolution because even the most powerful persons cannot resist the power of self-suffering. It is a potent force of appeal to the opponent to change his mind and will for the sake of truth. Self-suffering, when applied properly for a genuine cause, will bring the desired ends and defeat untruth and evil. Self-suffering, based on love and compassion for others, differs from the doctrine of violence. It is an act of inflicting suffering on one’s own self, rather than inflicting suffering on others. An individual who voluntarily and cheerfully engages in self-suffering does not experience pain or discomfort of suffering, because suffering is transmuted into an extreme form of joy. Gandhi himself engaged in self-suffering on many occasions. On the basis of his personal experiences, he said that true suffering brings its own joy, which surpasses all other joys (Young India, March 19, 1931, 41). However, there are some thinkers who considered Gandhi’s doctrine of self-suffering as a form of masochism. To view self-suffering as a form of masochism appears to be an incorrect interpretation because it is a powerful moral weapon for an earnest person who commits to fight for a just cause in a non-violent way, when faced by some conflict-situation. Since the gift of human life is the greatest of all gifts, no sensible individual will cheerfully engage in self-suffering and be prepared to sacrifice life itself for a right cause unless it produces the desired goal with a sense of satisfaction and joy to the sufferer. It is not unusual for individuals, especially in India, to suffer or even sacrifice life for the sake of defending honor and self-dignity, or for achieving higher goals for the benefit of their fellow beings.6 The act of self-suffering or even sacrificing one’s life for a noble cause is not only considered the most civilized means for achieving the desired goals, but is also regarded as a supreme value.

Salient Features of Satyagraha The technique of satyagraha formulated and practiced by Gandhi, for resolving all social conflicts and for achieving desired goals in a nonviolent way, discloses a high degree of moral and intellectual originality. It is a powerful non-violent weapon based on strong moral force, and there-

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fore, it should not be applied unless all other alternative strategies to resolve the problem, such as negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation, have been exhausted. It should only be used as a last resort to correct the wrong or untruth. Gandhi said, “Since satyagraha (insistence on truth) is one of the most powerful methods of direct action, a satyagrahi (a person who offers satyagraha) exhausts all other means before he resorts to satyagraha” (Young India, October 20, 1927, 353). The success of a satyagraha movement is essentially based on the legitimacy of the cause as well as the means employed to resolve the conflict. Gandhi always advocated the need for adopting morally acceptable means for attaining morally justified ends. His position on means and ends seems to be almost similar to the ethical position of Immanuel Kant. Gandhi argues that the end cannot justify the means; good consequences can never be attained by evil means. He believes that the goodness of an act not only rests on the motive of the moral agent, but also depends on the means adopted to attain the end. To defend his argument, Gandhi cited the following illustration: If I want to deprive you of your watch, I shall certainly have to fight for it; if I want to buy your watch, I shall have to pay you for it; and if I want a gift I shall have to plead for it; and according to means I employ, the watch is stolen property, my own property, or a donation. Thus we see three different results from three different means. (1938, 72)

Thus, Gandhi’s non-violent weapon of satyagraha can be used by any person who has moral power, purity of mind, and good will. This technique is based on truth, works through non-violence, and achieves the desired end through self-suffering. The scope of satyagraha is wide and a single individual, or a group, or the citizens of an entire state or nation can apply it. As there is no hatred or violence in this method, it can be applied against one’s nearest and dearest to bring change in their minds and wills. Self-suffering and self-sacrifice are the unique features of satyagraha, which distinguishes it from all other methods of nonviolent action. Gandhi repeatedly said that the self-sacrifice of one innocent person for a just cause is a million times more potent and morally superior than sacrificing a million men who die in the act of killing others. The basic objective of satyagraha is reform of individual at the moral level and thus bring a change in hearts and minds. The significant feature of satyagraha lies in educating the masses about the issue to be resolved; arousing consciousness in them; maintaining unity among the sufferers; eradicating fear in their minds to fight against untruth; and to provide them an organization as well as legitimate leadership

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to lead the struggle. Thus, the technique of satyagraha can effectively resolve all disputes between one person and the other, between one group and another group, or between one group and the state. Gandhi successfully led many struggles by adopting these strategies and techniques during independent movement. Gandhi developed a variety of techniques to be employed in a satyagraha movement to resolve a struggle. Depending on the nature and strength of the struggle, the followers of satyagraha may apply various techniques, such as non-cooperation, civil disobedience, and fasting. Gandhi applied and tested all these techniques in various social, political, economic, and religious struggles that he launched during India’s independence movement. Non-cooperation means not to cooperate with individuals and institutions as a protest against their evil practices. It includes agitation, strikes, boycott of offices, processions, etc. In other words, non-cooperation completely paralyses the normal life activity of people. It compels the opponent to make a room for negotiations on equal terms with the agitators, and gives way for a settlement on honorable terms for both the parties involved in it. Civil disobedience is a type of non-violent rebellion against the unjust laws of the state. The civil resister violates the unjust laws of the state in order to bend the government to the will of the people. It includes breach of laws and ordinances, courting arrests, boycott of legislative bodies, no-tax campaigns, and non-cooperation with government. It brings the functioning of the government to a complete stop until finally the government invites the agitators for negotiations and settlement. Fasting is one of the important and most efficient moral weapons used to convert or change the will of the opponent. This technique is applied as an appeal to the good sense of individual persons or to the persons who are managing an institution to evoke the best in them. It includes conscious self-suffering, which discloses one’s moral courage against the will of the opponent, and finally prepares the way for negotiations and discussions on equal terms. Fasting unto death is the last and the most potent weapon of satyagraha. It includes sacrificing the life of a person or persons who offer it, and therefore, Gandhi warned people that it should be used only with utmost discretion. Various fasts undertaken by Gandhi time and again produced tangible results, as in the case of fast unto death that he undertook against the inhuman practice of untouchability.7 There are two different types of methods for resolving social conflicts arising between individuals, groups, and nations. The first method is based on physical strength; it attacks the opponent by the force of coercion or aggression, which inflicts suffering on the opponent or enemy, resulting in

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counter violence and bloodshed to both the parties involved. On the contrary, the second method, grounded on moral strength, counters the opponent through moral force or soul force by inflicting suffering on one’s own self, resulting in love, good will, harmony, understanding, and cooperation between the two parties involved. To oppose untruth or evil through violence, war, or terrorism, would lead to counter violence and it becomes a law unto itself. Long ago, Buddha showed a way to overcome violence and war, not by the same principles, but by means of their opposites. His doctrine is based on the principle, “Hatred does not cease by hatred, but by non-hatred.” The same doctrine applies to violence, war, or terrorism. We cannot overcome these evils by resorting to counter violence, counter war, or counter terrorism, but by employing the principles of non-violence, peace, and through the method of persuasion and negotiations on honorable terms to arrive at truth. Gandhi was greatly attracted to this Buddhist doctrine and he formulated the technique of satyagraha on the basis of this dictum to resolve all forms of social conflict, thereby minimizing violence to the extent possible. The history of humankind discloses that the technique of violence or war, as a means for settling disputes and quarrels between people and nations, has failed to bring peace in the world. The basic reason for the failure of this technique is that it aims at annihilation rather than adjustment, and therefore, it cannot produce a just and permanent settlement. Furthermore, instead of settling the differences and conflicting interests that cause friction, it aggravates the conflict between the parties involved in it, resulting in loss of life and property. After the painful experiences of the two world wars coupled with the realization that an atomic holocaust could mean the end of human civilization, we have come to realize that no utility can come out of violence or war. We are compelled to contemplate alternative, effective methods that can replace violence and war, and bring peace in the world. In disgruntled situations, we realize the need for a social technique that can solve our disputes, redress our wrongs, reduce our disparities, and eradicate our inequalities and injustices. We feel the need for an alternative institution to violence and war; one that is not wild or destructive in its aim and not barren or unproductive in its results. In other words, we need an effective substitute for violence and war, or a new form of institution that can wage a war by means of a forceful moral weapon, without inflicting violence in retaliation and without loss of life and property. In such a baffling situation, we can profitably turn toward Gandhi’s method of satyagraha, a non-violent weapon, which can conquer evil by good, untruth by truth, egoism by altruism, enmity by friendliness, and

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brutality by gentleness. The Buddhist doctrine that hatred cannot be ceased by hatred, but by non-hatred, forms the underlying principle of satyagraha. Gandhi’s unique contribution to the contemporary world is his method of satyagraha, an infallible and effective means for resolving all social, political, and economic evils, which are responsible for various kinds of conflicts at the national and international level. During India’s struggle for independence, Gandhi and his followers not only fought a non-violent battle against the British colonial government, but also waged a struggle against various social, economic, and religious conflicts and disputes, and settled them without large-scale destruction of life and property. Thus, satyagraha, as a new and novel method of solving social conflicts, proved its efficacy and practicability in the Indian context. Satyagraha, as a technique of applying moral force on the opponent, can be employed anywhere, by any group or by any nation. Some skeptics maintain that what has been true of India may not be true in the context of other cultures and other countries. But the doubts expressed by such skeptics have been proved incorrect by Martin Luther King Jr. and Nelson Mandela whose cultures were non-Hindu and non-Indian. They used techniques Gandhi and his followers used successfully in India in the United States and in South Africa to attain desired goals. Gandhi believed that violence produces counter violence, and it becomes a law unto itself. Violence originates from anger, hatred, enmity, ill will, and selfishness. Violence, war, or terrorism, as methods of resolving social conflicts, will result in colossal destruction of human life, property, and natural resources. Just as darkness cannot be removed by darkness but by light, so also violence, war, or terrorism cannot be overridden by their counterparts but by their adversaries. On the contrary, nonviolence originates from love, compassion, good will, harmony, and selflessness. A nonviolent approach for resolving social conflicts results in harmony, cooperation, and understanding between two parties involved in a conflict. Despite a great non-violent war waged by Gandhi and his followers against the mighty British Empire, the existing good relations and cooperation between India and the United Kingdom now is an undisputed fact. This lends support to the claim that the non-violent approach is the only alternative for eradicating violence, war, and terrorism that are disturbing human minds all over the world and to bring peace and prosperity to humankind.

Gandhi’s Approach to Global Peace Gandhi was essentially a peace loving man. He emphasized the purity of means for attaining noble ends. A genuine peace could never be

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achieved through violence, war, or repression. Any peace treaty signed at the point of a bayonet may be, at best, a truce, but it cannot bring enduring peace. An enduring peace, as Gandhi believed, can only be assured by non-violent means. The present crisis of human civilization is the direct result of the loosening hold of moral values and ethical ideals. Unless humanity grows in its intellectual and spiritual character in proportion to its scientific and technological stature, the future of humankind will be at risk. Universal moral principles and values rather than mere economic planning or political adjustments for ensuring peace must govern the affairs of the world. The primitive morality of “an eye for an eye” is impractical because it ends up leaving every one blind. Therefore, it should be replaced by “return good for evil” or “bless those that curse you.” Is peace possible in a world where a vast majority of people live under conditions of ignorance, poverty, hunger, injustice, and tyranny? Gandhi held that peace is necessarily connected to human rights and social justice. He taught that a hungry man cannot be fed with doctrine. It was his firm conviction that political freedom devoid of economic freedom is a mockery as long as people starve, go naked, and pine away in voiceless anguish. Hence, political freedom must be coupled with economic freedom, which enables the poor and the starving people to enjoy the fruits of political freedom. Thus Gandhi observes: A starving man thinks first of satisfying his hunger before anything else. He will sell his liberty and all for the sake of getting a morsel food. Such is the position of millions of the people in India. For them, liberty, God and all such words are merely letters put together without the slightest meaning. They jar upon them. If we want to give these people a sense of freedom we shall have to provide them with work . . . which would give them at least the barest living. (Young India, March 18, 1926, 105)

Therefore, any scheme for establishing peace in the world must take into consideration the conditions of toiling masses all over the world. Exploitation of one person by another person, one nation by another nation, and injustices and inequalities exist in many societies appear to be the primary causes of violence and sources of many national and international conflicts. The structure of global realities and relationships, as they exist today, requires a sharing of fortune and misfortune, happiness and misery, pleasures and sorrows that transcend national boundaries. Peace must have its roots in fraternity rather than in fear. Gandhi believed that global peace might not be possible unless the present world order is replaced by a new

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social order that would be committed to non-violence and exploitation free world social order. In the history of humanity, there has always been a desire for peace in the human mind. In spite of many wars, humankind has endeavored to establish peace in the world and accepted peace as a necessary condition for the progress of human civilization. After the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear war has not only been viewed as barbarous, but we have realized that theoretically, it is possible to extinguish humankind altogether. In such a challenging situation, our differences of race and religion, class and color, nation and ideology are irrelevant and meaningless. We have to devise a realistic and practical way by which humanity will not bring about its own destruction. The toiling masses all over the world are the worst sufferers from the mad arms race. Resources that could be used to improve the living conditions of people all over the world are being spent on what may be called “the death sentence for humankind.” If a fraction of what we spend on armaments would be diverted to social welfare, we could provide education, health, and other ingredients of social well-being to every individual in the world. We could make every area fertile and habitable; we could develop world’s resources for the benefit of all humankind. The spirit of justice could unite the whole of human race. This would help to eliminate fear, hatred, and bigotry among individuals and nations. The imperfections of the existing world social order necessitated Gandhi to visualize an ideal social order wherein all humanity could realize its potentialities and lead a happy and peaceful life. Gandhi’s ideal society was based on the moral evolution of the individuals. If people become genuinely non-violent, morally elevated, mutually affectionate, learn to cooperate, and show aversion to anti-social activities, then society will be elevated to a higher plane of culture. Gandhi honestly accepted that his ideal of non-violent world social order may not be possible in the present state-of-affairs at the global level, but he believed that there is hope for realization of such an ideal global social order in future, as a result of social evolution and moral progress of individuals.

Concluding Remarks In an age of nuclear weapons, we are left with a choice of either living together or dying together. The invention of nuclear weapons has brought about the ancient truth that nothing welds people together more quickly than the imminence of common disaster. Non-violent technique seems to be the only solution to the world armed with nuclear weapons.

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Humankind, with creative reason and rational judgment, has the capacity to find ways and means to meet the challenges posed by the forces of destruction, which have become a great threat to the survival of humanity. To bring a change in the hearts and minds of people who believe in the ideology and methods of violence, war, or terrorism, and to meet the challenges posed by them, a non-violent approach alone seems to be the only appropriate one. It is an approach based on persuasion, negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation between conflicted parties. It offers an opportunity to the parties involved in the conflict to sit together, exchange their ideas, express their grievances, and come to an understanding on equal, honorable, and reasonable terms to resolve their differences across the table. Then, if the talks fail to settle the issue, finally the technique of satyagraha might be applied to bring a change in the attitude of the opponents by brining moral pressure and the pressure of public opinion to bear against them to come to an agreement and resolve the conflict peacefully and permanently. The greatest problem that haunted Gandhi was how to strengthen, protect, and practice the doctrine of non-violence in a world dominated by violence. In the present state-of-affairs that is dominated by violence and terrorism in the world, the only legitimate alternative for a better future of humankind is to put into practice the traditional Indian teachings of nonviolence preached and practiced by Gandhi in a modern way. In fact, any new invention at the beginning appears to be small, but if we practice it with a firm conviction, the rest will follow of itself. Gandhi never believed or claimed that whatever he said or practiced is final. He lived in a particular historical situation, confronted with specific problems of his time, and tried to resolve those problems in his own way. His entire life was a life of experiments with truth. The conditions that led to the origin and development of his technique of satyagraha may be different from the current conditions and expectations of the people. As Gandhi believed that practice is the test of fitness, it is the responsibility of his followers and admirers from all over the world to improve his precepts and techniques, especially his technique of satyagraha or non-violent direct action, in the context of current challenging conditions of terrorist violence. If Gandhi happened to be with us today, he might have sharpened the technique of satyagraha and made it more effective to meet the current challenges confronting humankind. The United Nations Organization and its member countries recognized Gandhi’s contribution to non-violence and global peace, and the UN very aptly declared Gandhi’s birthday (October 2) as a non-violence day.

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As envisaged by Gandhi, let us hope for a new philosophy of global understanding and cooperation, a new system of universal moral standards and values, and a new non-violent global social order in the years to come, wherein all humankind can live in peace, prosperity, and harmony.

Notes 1

Gandhi said, “Passive resistance is a negative thing, and has nothing to do with the active principle of love. Satyagraha proceeds on the active principle of love which says, ‘love those that despitefully use you. It is easy for you to love your friends. But I say unto you, love your enemies’” (Harijan, May 14, 1938). 2 Gandhi held, “The votary of non-violence has to cultivate the capacity of the highest type in order to be free from fear. He racks not if he should lose his land, his wealth, his life. He who has not overcome all fear cannot practice ahimsa (nonviolence) to perfection” (268). 3 During his stay in South Africa, Gandhi was confronted with the problem of racial discrimination. One day, as he was traveling by a train in a first class carriage, a white man who entered the same carriage in the middle of the journey objected to Gandhi’s traveling in the same carriage, because he was a “colored” man. Gandhi refused to leave that carriage because he was traveling with a first class ticket. Then the white man complained to a railway officer, who told Gandhi to go to the van compartment. Gandhi refused to go; the railway officer called police and the constable pushed Gandhi out of the compartment. The train left the station without even taking Gandhi’s baggage. He spent the entire night in severe cold considering whether he should return to India without minding the insult or fight against the racial discrimination. Finally, he decided to fight against the deep disease of color prejudice. This incident stimulated him to launch a crusade against racial discrimination by staying in South Africa and sharing the suffering of his people that resulted from white rulers’ discriminatory legislation. 4 Gandhi asserts, “I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonor” (Young India, 8 November 1920). 5 Gandhi observed, “The word Satya (truth) is derived from Sat, which means being. And nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why satya or truth is the most important name of God. In fact, it is more correct to say that Truth is God than to say that God is Truth” (Young India, July 30, 1931). 6 I had personal experience of the following two satyagraha events launched in recent times. Consider, for example, in 1956, when an intense agitation was started demanding a separate state, by dividing the then Madras state into two states. The political rulers of the state as well as at the national level did not respond positively. Then, an ordinary man such as Potti Sreeramulu, had undertaken a “fast unto death”

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and continued his fast for fifty-six days. Finally, he sacrificed his life. Within hours, both the state and the central governments conceded to the demand for a separate state; eventually, Andhra was formed. Again, very recently, in April 2011, social worker Anna Hazare undertook a fast for thirteen days against the Government of India at Delhi for an effective and meaningful legislation against corruption at the higher level. People from all parts of India in large numbers supported his fast and finally, the Government of India conceded his demand for legislation. 7 There was a belief among some sections of the people of Hinduism that touching the body of a person belonging to the lower order of the society was unsacred. For this reason, the people of the lower order were kept away from the area where higher order of people reside; they were not allowed to enter into Hindu temples for a long time in the history of India. After independence, the Government of India brought out legislation against this inhumane practice. Now it is rarely practiced in India. Credit for this reform goes to Gandhi, who launched an intensive satyagraha movement against the practice of untouchability and brought those people who were formerly considered to be the lower order into the main stream of the nation.

References Gandhi, M. K. 1938. Hind Swaraj [Indian home rule]. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing. —. 1957. Yeravada Mandir [Ashram observances]. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing. —. 1972. An Autobiography. Translated by Mahadev Desai. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing. Pyarelal. 1969. Gandhian Techniques in the Modern World. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing. Satyanarayana, Y. V. 1988. Marx and Gandhi. Visakhapatnam: Andhra University Press. Sheean, Vincent, 1949. Lead, Kindly Light. New York: Random House.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN AFTER BABEL: JOURNEYING TOWARD COSMOPOLIS1 FRED DALLMAYR

Jerusalem aedificata ut civitas —Psalm 122

In the earliest times, after the great flood, the Bible tells us, “the whole earth had one language and few words.” The people took hold of a stretch of land in order to settle there and gain means of subsistence. They soon developed skills as artisans and even ventured into the fields of construction and engineering. After they had acquired sufficient competence and self-confidence, they said to each other: “Come, let us build ourselves a city and a tower with its top in the heavens, so that we make a name for ourselves and not be scattered upon the face of the earth.” As the construction of the tower was beginning to take shape, the Bible story continues, God was not pleased with the endeavor and said to himself: “Look, they are one people . . . and this is only the beginning of what they will do and nothing [in their view] will seem impossible for them.” Hence, God came down and “confused the language” of the people and “scattered them from there over the face of all the earth.” Therefore, the story concludes, the place was called “Babel” because there “the Lord confused the language of all the earth” (Genesis 11:1–9). The story is memorable at all times, but especially in our age of globalization, when there are initial glimmers of “cosmopolis” or an emerging global city or community. The biblical account holds several lessons worth pondering, but especially these two. First, the present global convergence happens “after Babel,” that is, after the scattering of languages and peoples. This means that we cannot proceed from a presumed unity or univocity of humankind, but have to take seriously the diversity or multiplicity of languages, customs, and cultural traditions. Hence, any move or journey in the direction of cosmopolis today can only occur in the mode of

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sustained dialogue, the mode of cross-cultural and inter-religious interaction. Second, the biblical account should caution us against placing our trust exclusively or even predominantly in our engineering capacity, that is, our capacity for instrumental fabrication or construction. The journey toward cosmopolis, one might say, cannot rely solely or even predominantly on our quality as homo faber or designing architect. Going beyond the narrow confines of anthropocentrism, the journey has to make ample room for dialogue and listening, for the humanizing demands of education, ethics, and spiritual insight. Differently put: homo faber has to yield pride of place to homo loquens, homo quaerens, and homo symbolicus.2

Building a (Global) City Thus, in embarking on a global endeavor today, we cannot take as our model the work of the early peoples after the great flood. A better model to follow would be the teaching of the philosopher Plato—although even here we have to make several corrections or modifications. As is well known, in The Republic, Plato sets out to discuss the meaning of “city” or political community (polis) and especially to specify what is required for a city, particularly a good or well-ordered city, to exist. For Plato, or rather for Socrates as the protagonist of the dialogue, the origin of the city resides in human need. In his words, “A city, I take it, comes into being because each of us is not self-sufficient but needs many things.” Since different people need many different things, the point is to “gather many persons into one place as partners and helpers, and to this common settlement we give the name of ‘city’ (polis)” (Plato 1956, 165–171). The most basic and commonly shared need is for survival or subsistence, and to satisfy this need provision must be made for foodstuffs “so that we may live and be.” Closely connected with this requirement is the need for clothing, for shelter or housing, and for different utensils. So room must be made in the city for farmers, weavers, builders, shoemakers and the like; soon other occupations will be added. In this way, Socrates says, “carpenters and smiths and many other such craftsmen become partners in our city and make it big.” Traders and merchants will also be added as the city becomes more affluent or opulent. At this point, however, a query or objection is raised whether we are in the presence of a properly human city or whether we have built a “city of pigs” (or fit only for pigs), since the only concern seems to be survival or physical well-being. Responding to this query, Socrates introduces the higher concern for ethical well-being and justice. To meet these demands, the city needs to be well-ordered and well-governed—a task which is placed into the hands of

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a caste of “guardians” and, ultimately, a philosopher-king (Plato 1956, 165–171). Plato’s imaginary polis or city constructed “in speech” remains memorable and instructive. Its great value resides in its insistence on a “higher” purpose or telos: the goal of justice and ethical well-being as the loadstar of civic life. Despite its inspiring quality, however, we need to modify Plato’s city in a number of respects, especially if we shift our focus from the city to cosmopolis. First of all, since contemporary striving for cosmopolis happens after the dispersal of humanity into a multitude of languages, customs, and cultural traditions, we cannot accept or take as a model the relatively uniform or homogeneous character of the Greek city. Although Plato recognizes different individual aptitudes and functions, his model does not start from the premise of different languages and cultures. The second aspect in need of modification is the vertical caste structure of the Platonic city, a structure predicated on the sharp distinction between physical survival needs and “higher” ethical aspirations, between material and spiritual dimensions of human life. Even Aristotle objected to the presumed superiority of an ethical elite (saying, for instance, that the quality of a food depends not solely on the opinion of the cooks but also, and importantly, on that of the eaters). For him—and for us following his lead— the concern for survival (esse) and for ethical well-being (bene esse) are more closely linked or interdependent. What we do chiefly want to retain from Plato’s model, however, is the accent on justice and shared well-being (what Aristotle called the “good life”; Politics, 1280b32).3 To some extent, we also follow Plato’s dialogue in trying to build the global city from the ground up: by proceeding from material survival needs to normative concerns, or from nature to culture. Like any city, cosmopolis cannot exist, much less flourish, without adequate natural and material resources, that is, without sufficient provision for livelihood and material well-being. Here, modernity introduces a consideration which was not yet prominent in Greek antiquity: the awareness that civilization or city life cannot be purchased at the price of ecological spoliation or the devastation of natural resources. When nature is eroded or wasted, the preconditions of civil life are jeopardized. True enough, awareness of this correlation was not entirely lacking in ancient times. One of the many lessons of the Babylonian epic, Gilgamesh, is that, properly, human life depends on the symbiosis of nature and culture, poetically expressed in the friendship between the city ruler Gilgamesh and Enkidu, the man of the wilderness. In modern times, however, this insight has been largely forgotten or shunted aside. Progres-

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sively, science and technology have been celebrated as the cure-all for social and material ills; but today it is clear that the “cure-all” cannot cure itself or is itself a source of disease. The process of global warming and a host of natural catastrophes demonstrate the fragility of our natural habitat and the fact that nature’s resources are not infinitely renewable.

Material Inequality In addition to ecological resources, the material conditions of human life are dependent on modes of economic production and exchange. Here, another huge problem arises for cosmopolis, equal to global warming: namely, the haphazard, lopsided, and largely inequitable distribution of wealth and economic resources. Under the impact of modern liberal individualism and market economics, economic activities are undertaken less and less with a view to the common good (in Aristotle’s sense), and more and more for the sake of private gain. As this development proceeds, social solidarity increasingly gives way to inequality, particularly to class division or stratification. In recent times, this process has reached its culmination in the system of corporate and financial capitalism—a culmination which revealed its grim side in the financial “meltdown” of 2008–2009. As detailed in a report of the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, the income of Americans from wages or salaries declined significantly between 1959 and 2007 while the shares derived from dividends and from interest more than doubled; income from capital gains rose from 1.6 percent to 8.2 percent in the same period. In the words of Harold Meyerson, analyzing the report: The big money, in other words, was in big investment, and it went overwhelmingly to the rich. In 1962, the wealthiest 1% of American households had 125 times the wealth of a median household. By 2009, that gap had increased to 225 times the median. (Economic Policy Institute, “The State of Working in America,” cited by Harold Meyerson, “In the Taxing Debate, Find Out Where the Money Is,” South Bend Tribune, April 22, 2011)4

Such a steep discrepancy of wealth is clearly incompatible with any idea of social well-being or the common good. It is also at odds with a measure of social stability which requires the reining in of extreme wealth and poverty in favor of a common middle ground. In the sage words of Aristotle, As “the best way of life is one which resides in the mean [or middle]” so “the best form of political society is one where power is vested in the middle class. . . [Hence,] it is the greatest of blessings for a state

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that its members should posses a moderate and adequate property” (Politics, 1295a24, 1295b29; 1946, 180, 182). Obviously, what goes for a single polis also goes for the emerging cosmopolis. Unfortunately, under the impact of globalization and neoliberalism, the system of economic stratification evident in the United States is projected or transferred to the global arena. The trend, sad to say, has been going on for some time. According to the Human Development Report issued by the United Nations in 1999, global inequalities in income and living standards had by that time reached “grotesque proportions.” For example, the combined wealth of the world’s three richest families (about $135 billion) was greater than the annual income of 600 million people in the economically least-developed countries. Whereas in 1970, the gap between the richest one-fifth of the world’s population and the rest of the world stood at 30:1, by 1990 it had widened to 60:1 and at the end of the century to 74:1. The same United Nations report also disclosed that, between 1995 and 1999, the world’s richest people doubled their wealth to over $1 trillion, while the number of people living on less than $1 per day remained steady at 1.3 billion. A similar picture was painted by the World Bank in its World Development Report of 2000/01. At the dawn of the new millennium, the average income in the richest twenty countries was thirty times the average in the poorest twenty countries—a gap that had doubled in the last forty years (Falk 1999; United Nations 1999; World Bank 2000; Dallmayr 2002, 67–84). Things have not changed much during the last decade. In its Human Development Report of 2010, titled “The Real Wealth of Nations,” the world body noted problems and growing disparities especially in the area of social and economic equality. Despite some advances in terms of people’s health and education in some regions, the Report stated, the past years “have also seen increasing inequality—both within and across countries— as well as production and consumption patterns that have increasingly been revealed as unsustainable.” The disparities are especially evident in the field of global income distribution. We read: Despite aggregate progress, there is no convergence in income because, on average, rich countries have grown faster than poor ones over the past 40 years. The divide between developed and developing countries persists: a small subset of countries has remained at the top of the world income distribution, and only a handful of countries that started out poor [like India and China] have joined that high-income group. . . . Hence, the gaps in human development across the world, while narrowing, remain huge.

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Despite some improvements on the level of average measurements, the Report adds, income inequality during the past few decades “has risen in many more countries than it has fallen.” For example, in most countries of the former Soviet Union as well as many countries in East Asia and the Pacific Rim, income inequality today is higher than it was a few decades ago. The Report also points to the connection between economic disparities and the financial crisis or meltdown in 2008, a crisis “which caused 34 million people to lose their jobs and 64 million more people to fall below the $1.25 a day income poverty threshold” (UNDP 2010). Anyone seriously yearning for cosmopolis cannot possibly remain complacent about this maldistribution of economic means. Close attention to inequality is dictated, first of all, by the looming danger of civil strife, possibly a global civil war. In the crisp language of Aristotle’s Politics, “The masses become revolutionary when the distribution of property is unequal” (126b). But the deeper reason is that stark maldistribution thwarts the striving for human and social well-being in a community. In the felicitous words of the United Nations report: The central contention of the human development approach is that well-being [Aristotle’s eudaimonia] is about much more than money: it is about the possibilities that people have to fulfill the life plan they have reason to choose and pursue. Thus, our call for a new economics . . . in which the objective is to further human well-being” (ibid.).5

To remedy the plight of maldistribution and to advance the prospect of equity on a global level, some thoughtful people have proposed a number of remedies. Already in the 1970s, Nobel laureate economist James Tobin proposed a tax on all currency transactions that then would go into a global distribution fund. Subsequently, the “Tobin tax” idea has been reformulated in several ways, especially to include all global financial transactions, but always with a similar purpose. Giving the idea a religious or theological underpinning, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks invoked the biblical notion of “tzedakah,” meaning a just distribution of resources in light of a substantive conception of the common good. As he stated pointedly, tzedakah aims to remedy a social condition where “a few prosper but the many starve,” where “not all have access to good education, health care, and other essential amenities” (2002, 113–116).6

Cultivating the Common Good Removing gross material disparities is an important requisite in the building of cosmopolis. But by itself it is insufficient and will be ineffec-

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tive unless it is coupled with the cultivation of a social ethos, a sense of duty, social responsibility, and shared well-being. Here again, Jonathan Sacks is right on target when he writes, “It is difficult to talk about the common good when we lose the ability to speak about duty, obligation and restraint, and find ourselves only with desires clamoring for satisfaction.” The blame, in his view, must be attributed to “the dominance of the market” focused exclusively on private gain and, more broadly, to the modern (Western) infatuation with individual self-centeredness which has “eroded our moral vocabulary” and “social landscape.” In this context, Sacks refers appropriately to philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1984) and its complaint about the growing incomprehensibility of the older vocabulary. As a result of this semantic slide, “virtues once thought admirable, like modesty, humility, discretion, restraint” have become “dusty exhibits in a museum of cultural curiosities.” In eloquent language, Sacks seeks to recover the socializing and humanizing quality of virtues, their ability to sustain networks of relationships as an antidote to divisiveness: “The rewards of the moral [or ethical] order are great. It creates an island of interpersonal meaning in a sea of impersonal forces.” Differently put, ethics is “an attempt to fight despair in the name of hope, and recover human dignity”; it is “civilization’s greatest attempt to humanize fate” (Sacks 2002, 32, 78). What is needed to recover social ethics from oblivion is the good example of elders and public leaders, and the transmission of ethical and religious teachings through education. Here we touch on a crucial fiber in any possible future cosmopolis—but a fiber that is still undervalued and underdeveloped. Sacks refers to an important resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (of 2002) that, through the intermediary of the World Bank, funds should be provided to secure universal education throughout the world by 2015. But he also points to a steep hurdle, namely, that education is still “far too unevenly distributed” and that “of the world’s children, 113 million do not go to school.” Still, the immensity of the task does not dampen his spirit and his conviction that education holds out the best chance of “moving us forward in the long, hard journey to universal human dignity.” Sacks is ably seconded in his spirited conviction by American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum, especially in her Cultivating Humanity (1997) and Not for Profit (2010). As she writes in the later study, education plays a crucial role in transmitting and sustaining ethical modes of conduct and invigorating the practice of civic virtues. In performing this role, education relies on schools and on many other factors:

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For Nussbaum, education is “a huge agenda” which must be implemented with constant awareness of local situations and possibilities. Above all, “it must be addressed not only through educational content but through exemplary pedagogy,” what she calls “Socratic pedagogy” (see Sacks 2002, 136, 140–141; cf. Nussbaum 1997 and Dallmayr 2007). When properly pursued, the task of ethical education is supported and underscored by religious teachings and good religious practices (although that synergy can be subverted by either secular or religious extremism). It is in this domain that Rabbi Sacks’ text issues its most stirring plea: not to impose a uniform doctrine on people everywhere, but to recognize or discern in the variety of religious faiths glimmers of a dimension which is “not for profit” and which we call “divine.” As he writes, our global era summons the world’s faiths to a supreme challenge: “Can we find, in the human other, a trace of the Divine Other? Can we recognize God’s image in one who is not in my image?” More concretely put, “Can I, a Jew, hear the echoes of God’s voice in that of a Hindu or Sikh or Christian or Muslim or in the words of an Eskimo from Greenland speaking about a melting glacier?” (Quite appropriately, the cover of his book carries a picture by Pieter Brueghel the Elder titled The Tower of Babel.) For Sacks, religions at their best are not accomplices of worldly powers, but rather expressions of “deep dismay” at some of the features of our world: “its inequities, its consumerism and exploitation, its failure to address widespread poverty and disease.” Different religions express this dismay in different languages and with attention to different local or regional conditions. At this point, Sacks introduces one of his most startling thoughts, namely, that the proposition at the heart of monotheism is “not what it has traditionally been taken to be: one God, therefore one faith, one truth, one way.” Rather, the contrary needs to be affirmed (in our time “after Babel”): that “unity creates diversity,” that “the glory of the created world is its astonishing multiplicity.” This, he adds, is “what I mean by the dignity of difference” (2002, 17–18, 21).

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Global Citizenship Recognition of difference, to be sure, does not entirely cancel mutual bonds or a sense of interconnection. This is particularly true when (following Plato’s dialogue) we move from the level of material needs and social arrangements to the normative level, and first of all, that of citizenship. As in any city, members of cosmopolis must be able to claim the status of citizen irrespective of their economic, ethnic, or religious background. Differently put, they must enjoy a qualitative (or normative) equality, especially in and before the law. Aristotle is emphatic on this point: citizenship is not a matter of kinship, lineage, or any personal association, because it is established in public law. In his words, “A citizen is best defined by one criterion: an individual who shares in the public administration of justice and in [the possibility of] holding public office” (Politics 1274b32; 1946, 93). This does not mean that relevant distinctions are entirely discarded. All republics have certain age qualifications for the exercise of political rights and the holding of public office; usually, a distinction is also made between natural-born and naturalized citizens. Above and beyond these factors, recognition of the “multicultural” character of most present-day countries or states may entail acceptance of certain differences inside the citizenship category itself. This point has been particularly advanced by political theorist Iris Marion Young in her critique of “the ideal of universal citizenship.” Although morally appealing, this ideal—in Young’s view—has often forced marginalized or minority groups to assimilate to a dominant cultural and civic model neglectful of their situated needs. To correct this bent to conformism, she argued, “we need a group differentiated citizenship and a heterogeneous public where relevant differences are publicly recognized as irreducible”— though without abandoning concern for the “common good” and the need “to decide together the society’s policies” (Young 1995, 175–176, 181–184; see also Young 1990). Pursuing this line of thought further, we need to remember our condition “after Babel,” the dispersal of humankind into different cultures and languages. In this situation, cosmopolis cannot possibly be a uniform legal and political structure hegemonically controlling the world; it can only mean a shared aspiration nurtured and negotiated among local or national differences. In the prudent words of Charles Taylor, “We have no choice but to be cosmopolitans and patriots, which means to fight for the kind of patriotism that is open to universal solidarities against other, more closed [or chauvinistic] kinds” (1996, 121). What this comment brings into view is the need for a layered or “multiple” citizenship where people might be citizens both in a particular city (or cities) and in the cosmopolis. This idea

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is favored especially by proponents of “cosmopolitan democracy,” that is, a cosmopolis making room for national or local forms of democratic selfgovernment. The idea of a multiple (including cosmopolitan) citizenship is designed to impose ethical restraints on national chauvinism and on the ambitions of hegemonic global elites. What is needed for its functioning is not properly a global state but “a global community providing protection against the overwhelming power of the nation-state to its citizens and the power of multinational corporations over people’s lives” (van den Anker 2002, 167–168). In particularly eloquent language, the constraining as well as enabling role of layered citizenship is emphasized by Richard Falk, who describes cosmopolitans as “citizen pilgrims,” that is, as citizens journeying toward a just and peaceful cosmopolis. He states, “I have used the metaphor of ‘citizen pilgrim’ to describe the spirit of a sojourner, committed to transformation that is spiritual as well as material, that is promised on the wholeness and equality of the human family” (2002, 27–28).

Institutional Arrangements Although largely ethical and aspirational, cosmopolitanism cannot entirely ignore the need for institutional arrangements. In this area, supporters of cosmopolitan democracy have advanced numerous proposals aimed at reforming and strengthening existing global institutions. In this regard, Richard Falk has made a strong plea for restructuring the United Nations, including a reform of the Security Council to provide for a more equitable representation of the world’s major regions; the establishment of a new People’s Assembly; and the granting of broader jurisdiction to the World Court. In addition, he has argued in favor of the extension of “geogovernance” into the domains of environmental protection and global market regulation (1995, 163–179). Proposals of a similar kind have been sponsored by many international political theorists such as David Held, Daniele Archibugi, and others. Held, in particular, has introduced a long list of “cosmopolitan objectives” for both the short and the long term, a list the implementation of which is designed to lend to cosmopolitanism a measure of institutional concreteness and stability. What one might wish to add to his list is the provision for a global “truth and justice” or “truth and reconciliation” commission where peoples and societies would be able to air grievances regarding inflicted wrongs and injustices in the hope of accomplishing a more equitable settlement. What none of the cited sponsors advocate, however, is the erection of a global state or super-state—a modern “tower of Babel”—

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endowed with the power of centralized management and control. In Held’s words, global democracy: is the only grand or “meta-narrative” which can legitimately frame and delimit the competing “narratives” of the good. It is particularly important because it suggests a way of relating “values” to one another and of leaving the resolution of conflicts open to participants in a political dialogue. (Held 1995, 111, 116; see also Held 2010)

Held’s comments are pertinent to our situation “after Babel,” throwing into relief the question animating or rather troubling the present pages: can we or should we reconstruct the ancient tower, now in the form of a global super-state? Not surprisingly, the sidelining of this option (by defenders of global democracy) is unsatisfactory and a provocation for international “realists” wedded to the primacy of “sovereign” power and the imperative of a central command structure. Although frequently advanced as a firm dogma, however, this primacy has been called into question by a long line of political or ethical-political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and beyond. With specific regard to cosmopolitanism, the danger of an imperial despotism (implicit in a global state) has been clearly outlined by Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace, which opted for a loose federation or lateral Bund (1970, 93–130). As is evident already in its title, Kant’s treatise expressed an ethical vision or (what Sacks calls) a “covenant of hope”: a hope predicated on the progressive maturation and transformation of humanity.7 At this point, we come back to the notion of “homo symbolicus” and to Falk’s metaphor of “citizen pilgrims” journeying toward a state of “wholeness” or cosmos in the world. Seen from this angle, cosmopolis itself is ultimately a metaphor or parable: a parable for a condition of humanity that exists not only “propter peccatum” (for the correction of evil through force), but as a projection and anticipation of the good life. Another traditional metaphor for this condition or cosmos is “Jerusalem” (or Mecca, Banares, or “Pure Land”). As the Psalmist says, “Jerusalem is built like a city, bound firmly together” (Psalm 122). He adds: “Pray for the peace of that city; may they proper who love you. Peace be within your walls, and abundance within your towers!” This sentiment agrees with an inspiring line placed over the entrance to the Basilica in Montserrat, Spain: Urbs Jerusalem beata dicta pacis visio (Jerusalem is called the beautiful vision of peace).

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Notes 1

This chapter was first published in Fred Dallmayr’s book Being in the World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis (2013); it is reprinted with the permission of the University Press of Kentucky. 2 The meaning of the Latin terms are, in sequence, “man” the tool-maker, the speaker, the inquirer, and the symbolizer. On the letter term compare, for example, Edward H. Henderson (1971, 131–150). 3 In Aristotle’s words, “a pilot will judge a rudder better than a ship builder; in the same way, the diner—not the cook—will be the best judge of a feast” (Politics, 1282a8). See also: “The end and purpose of a polis is the good life [eu zen], and the institutions of social life are means to that end” (1280b32); and “We may therefore lay down that all associations aim at some good; and we may also hold that the particular association which is the most sovereign and includes all the rest, will pursue this aim above all and will thus be directed toward the highest of all goods” (1252a). The first point regarding the uniformity or homogeneity of Plato’s imagined city was also noted by Aristotle who, in his critical comments, goes so far as to say, “a city which becomes more and more unitary eventually ceases to a polis at all” (1261a; cf. 1946, 1, 40, 120, 126; and Dallmayr 2007). 4 Relying on data from the US Commerce Department, Meyerson also points to the increasing tendency of “outsourcing” labor: “US multinationals eliminated the positions of 2.9 million American employees during the past decade, while adding 2.4 million in other lands” (ibid.; cf. Bartels 2008; and Soss and Hacker 2007). 5 The report in this context pays tribute to Karl Polanyi’s “brilliant exposition more than sixty years ago of the myth of the self-regulating market—the idea that markets could exist in a political and institutional vacuum. Generally, markets are very bad at ensuring the provision of public goods, such as security, stability, health, and education. . . . Without complementary societal and state action, markets can be weak on environmental sustainability, creating the conditions for environmental degradation, even for such disasters as mud flows in Java and oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico” (cf. Polanyi [1945] 1957). 6 Referring to Human Development Reports and other available data, Sacks states that “by the end of the millennium, the top fifth of the world’s population had 86 percent of the world’s GDP while the bottom fifth had just 1 percent. The assets of the world’s three richest billionaires were more than the combined wealth of the 600 million inhabitants of the least developed countries” (2002, 29). These and similar findings support his complaint that global capitalism represents a system of “immense power” whose effects in terms of maldistribution constitute “a scar on the face of humanity” (28; cf. Dallmayr 2005, 209–217). 7 In Sacks’s words, “We are not in sight of a global contract whereby nation-states agree to sacrifice part of their sovereignty to create a form of world governance. There is, however, an alternative, namely a global covenant. Covenants are more foundational than contracts. . . . Covenants are beginnings, acts of moral engagement. . . . There is at least a starting point for a global covenant in which the nations of the world collectively express their commitment not only to human rights but also to human responsibilities, and not merely a political, but also an economic,

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environmental, moral and cultural conception of the common good, constructed on the twin foundations of shared humanity and respect for diversity” (2002, 205–206).

References Aristotle. 1946. The Politics of Aristotle. Translated by Ernest Barker. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dallmayr, Fred. 2002. “Globalization and Inequality: A Plea for Global Justice.” In Dialogue among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices, 67–84. New York: Plagrave Macmillan. —. 2005. “Appendix A: The Dignity of Difference: A Salute to Jonathan Sacks.” In Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents, 209–221. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. —. 2007. In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. —. 2013. Being in the World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Dower, Nigel, and John Williams, eds. 2002. Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. Falk, Richard. 1995. “The World Order between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions.” In Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, edited by Daniel Archibugi and David Held, 163–79. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. —. 1999. Predatory Globalization: A Critique. Cambridge: Polity Press. —. 2002. “An Emergent Matrix of Citizenship: Complex, Uneven, and Fluid.” In Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction, edited by Nigel Dower and John Williams, 15–29. New York: Routledge. Held, David. 1995. “Democracy and the New International Order.” In Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, edited by Daniel Archibugi and David Held, 96–120. Cambridge, UK: Polity. —. 2010. Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities. Cambridge: Polity. Henderson, Edward H. 1971. “Homo Symbolicus: A Definition of Man.” Man and World 4 (2): 131–150. Kant, Immanuel. 1970. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” In Kant’s Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, 93–130. New York: Cambridge University Press. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2nd ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

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Nussbaum, Martha C. 1997. Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. —. 2010. Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Plato. (1956) The Republic. Book 2, 369C–375A. In Great Dialogues of Plato, edited by Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse, 165–171. New York: New American Library. Polanyi, Karl. (1945) 1957. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. Sacks, Jonathan. 2002. The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations. London and New York: Continuum. Soss, Joe, and Jacob S. Hacker, eds. 2007. Remaking America: Democracy and Public Policy in an Age of Inequality. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Taylor, Charles. 1996. “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism.” In For love of country?, edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen, 111–121. Boston: Beacon Press. UNDP. 2010. Human Development Report. Accessed March 8, 2013. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010. United Nations. 2000. Human Development Report 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van den Anker, Christian. “Global Justice, Global Institutions, and Global Citizenship.” In Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction, edited by Nigel Dower and John Williams, 158–168. New York: Routledge. World Bank. 2000. World Development Report 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. —. 1995. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship.” In Theorizing Citizenship, edited by Ronald Beiner, 175–208. Albany: State University of New York Press.

CONTRIBUTORS

Leonidas C. Bargeliotes was born in Olympia of Peloponnese and graduated from the Theology and Philosophy Schools at the University of Athens. He has a PhD in philosophy from Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, US. Since 1975, he has been teaching philosophy at the University of Athens, where he is now Emeritus Professor. He has been President of the International Society for Universal Dialogue, and is currently the President of the Olympic Center for Philosophy and Culture. Among his authored and edited books are Plethǀ’s Philosophy of Ethics (1974), Philosophy and Sciences (Greek, 1988), Hellenocentric Philosophy (1993), Philosophy and Inquiry in Education (1994). He has also published many scholarly articles. He is co-Editor of the journals Skepsis and Celestia. Xia Chen is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, China. She has also been a visiting scholar at Harvard-Yenching Institute, SOAS of the University of London, and Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Brown University, in Providence, Rhode Island, US. Her specialty is Chinese Philosophy and Religions in China, concentrating on Daoism. She is the author of Dao jiao quan shan shu yan jiu (Studies of Daoist moral tracts; 1999); the co-editor and contributor to Zong jiao xue yuan li (Principles in the study of religions; 2003); and editor of Dao jiao sheng tai si xiang yan jiu (Studies of Daoist ecological thoughts; 2010). She is one of the translators for Dao jiao yu zhong guo chuan tong wen hua (Daoism and traditional Chinese culture; 1996); Mading lude shen xue yan jiu. (Martin Luther’s theological thoughts; 2002); Ren lei de zong jiao (Man’s religions; 2005); and Dao fa zi ran: Dao jiao yu sheng tai (Daoism and ecology; 2012). She has also contributed numerous articles to scholarly journals. Xiujuan Chen is Associate Professor at Shandong University in Sandong, China, and a Research Fellow at Post-Doctoral Mobile Station of Philosophy at Shandong University. Currently her academic research is supported by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation and Independent Innovation Foundation of Shandong University (IIFSDU). Her main interests are in political philosophy, cultural study, and civil society. Her publications in-

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Contributors

clude “A Study of Western Contemporary Cosmopolitanism,” Philosophical Trends (2010) and “Civic Education, Civil Society Cultivation and Modern Appeal of Good Governance,” Journal of Shandong University (2009). Fred Dallmayr is Packey J. Dee Professor of Political Science and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, US. He is a political theorist and philosopher specializing in modern and contemporary Western thought as well as non-Western political thought (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism), cross-cultural dialogue, and global human rights. He is a past President of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (SACP). In addition to numerous journal articles, he has authored nineteen books and edited eleven others. Among his recent books are: Dialogue among Civilizations: Some Exemplary Voices (2002); Hegel: Modernity and Politics (new edition, 2002); Peace Talks— Who Will Listen (2004); In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times (2007); Being in the World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis (2013), and Mindfulness and Letting Be: On Engaged Thinking and Acting (2014). Edward V. Demenchonok has worked as a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and is currently a Professor of Foreign Languages and Philosophy at Fort Valley State University in Georgia, US. He is listed in 2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 21st Century and is a recipient of the Twenty-First Century Award for Achievement in Philosophy from the International Biographical Centre, Cambridge, England. He is a past President of the International Society for Universal Dialogue. His numerous books and articles are in the fields of the philosophy of culture, social philosophy, and ethics. His most recent publications include “Filosofía intercultural para la convivencia en el mundo diverso e interrelacionado” (Intercultural philosophy for coexistence in a diverse and interconnected world) in Mundo da vida, interculturalidade e educação (2013); “Direitos humanos, ética da libertação e a democracia cosmopolita” (Human rights, liberation ethics and cosmopolitan democracy) in Educação, participação política e direitos humanos (Education, political participation and human rights) (2011); and “Latin American Philosophy and Interculturality,” Archiwum Historii Filozofii i MyĞli Spoáecznej (2013). He is also the editor and contributor to Between Global Violence and Ethics of Peace: Philosophical Perspectives (2009) and Philosophy after Hiroshima (2010).

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Enrique Dussel is currently Interim Rector of the Autonomous University of the Mexico City (UACM) and Professor of Ethics in the Department of Philosophy of the Autonomous Metropolitan University, Iztapalapa, in Mexico City. His work is concentrated in the fields of ethics and political philosophy. He has authored more than fifty books, including Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion (2013); Carta a los indignados (Letter to the outraged, 2011); Politics of Liberation: A Critical World History (2011); Twenty Theses on Politics (2008); Beyond Philosophy: History, Marxism, and Liberation Theology (2003); Philosophy of Liberation (2003); Towards an Unknown Marx: A Commentary on the Manuscripts of 1861–1863 (2001); The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation (1996); The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity (1995); and Ethics & Community (Liberation & Theology) (1994). Andrew Fiala is Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Fresno, and Director of the Ethics Center at Fresno State. Fiala has a BA in Philosophy from UCLA and a PhD in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University. He is the author of several books, including The Philosopher’s Voice (2002), Practical Pacifism (2004), Tolerance and the Ethical Life (2005), What Would Jesus Really Do? (2007), The Just War Myth (2008), and Public War, Private Conscience (2010). Fiala is also co-editor of the journal Philosophy in the Contemporary World. Raúl Fornet-Betancourt was born in Cuba and has a PhD in philosophy and philology from Salamanca University (Spain). Currently residing in Germany, he is Professor at the University of Aachen and of Aquisgrán University in Bremen. He is founder and the editor of Concordia— International Journal of Philosophy, and a coordinador of the program of the North-South philosophical dialogue. His numerous books include Interculturalidad, crítica y liberación (Interculturality, critique and liberation, 2012); Tareas y Propuestas de la Filosofía Intercultural (Tasks and proposals for intercultural philosophy, 2009); Interkulturalität in der auseinandersetzung (Interculturality in conflict, 2007); La interculturalidad a prueba (Interculturality standing the test, 2006); Zur interkulturellen Kritik der neueren lateinamerikanischen Philosophie (On intercultural critique of recent Latin American Philosophy, 2005); Interculturalidad y filosofía en America Latina (Interculturality and philosophy in Latin America, 2003); Transformación intercultural de la filosofía: Ejercicios teóricos y prácticos de filosofía intercultural desde Latinoamérica en el contexto de

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Contributors

la globalización (Intercultural transformation of philosophy: Theoretical and practical exercises in intercultural philosophy from Latin America in the context of globalization, 2001); and Latein-amerikanische philosophie zwischen inkulturation und interkulturalität (Latin American philosophy between inculturation and interculturality, 1997). Jorge J. E. Gracia was born in Cuba, educated in the United States, Canada, and Spain, and has a PhD from the University of Toronto. He currently holds the Samuel P. Capen Chair in the Departments of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the University at Buffalo and is a State University of New York Distinguished Professor. He is the author of seventeen books, which include Painting Borges: Philosophy Interpreting Art Interpreting Literature (in press), Images of Thought: Philosophical Interpretations of Carlos Estévez’s Art (2009), Latinos in America: Philosophy and Social Identity (2008), Surviving Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century (2005), Old Wine in New Skins: The Role of Tradition in Communication, Knowledge, and Group Identity (2003), ¿Qué son las categorías? (What are categories?, 2002), How Can We Know What God Means? The Interpretation of Revelation (2001), Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective (2000), Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundations of Knowledge (1999), and Filosofía hispánica (Hispanic philosophy, 1998). In addition, he has published over 200 scholarly articles and has edited more than two dozen volumes in subjects such as metaphysics, hermeneutics, medieval and Latin American philosophy, ethnic and racial issues, and philosophy of religion. Yan Liu is currently Professor at the Institute of Transcultural Studies at Beijing International Studies University, China. She took the MA from Sichuan University, and PhD from Beijing Normal University. She has been a visiting scholar at University College Dublin of Ireland and at Brown University (USA). Her research interests are comparative literature, feminist literature, and transcultural studies. She has been working on modernism from Western to Chinese, and has published three books including The Beginning of Modern Criticism: On T. S. Eliot Poetics (2005), and The Space-time Narrative: On James Joyce’s Ulysses (2010). Marc Lucht is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Alvernia University in Reading, Pennsylvania. Holding a PhD from Emory University, his scholarly work focuses on phenomenology, environmental philosophy, aesthetics, and ethics, and he has published on Kant, Tolstoy, Santayana, and Nie-

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tzsche. He is the author of an essay “Toward Lasting Peace: Kant on Law, Public Reason, and Culture,” in Between Global Violence and the Ethics of Peace: Philosophical Perspectives (2009) and “Animal Rights in a Democratic Context,” Skepsis, (2012). He is a co-editor of the volume Kafka’s Creatures: Animals, Hybrids, and Other Fantastic Beings (2010) and the author of the Introduction to the volume. William McBride is Arthur G. Hansen Distinguished Professor of Philosophy in Purdue University. He was co-founder and first Director of the Sartre Society of North America, Executive Co-Director of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, President of the Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française, President of the North American Society for Social Philosophy, and President of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP). He has published well over 100 book chapters and articles. The four most recent of his nineteen authored, edited, and co-edited books are Philosophical Reflections on the Changes in Eastern Europe (1999), From Yugoslav Praxis to Global Pathos (2001), Calvin O. Schrag and the Task of Philosophy after Postmodernity (with Martin Beck Matuštík, as co-editor, 2002), and Social and Political Philosophy, Volume 2 of the Istanbul World Congress Proceedings (2006). Xin Ru is Senior Fellow and Professor of the Institute of Philosophy, and Vice President of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Chinese National Committee for UNESCO Affairs, the Committee of Academic Degree of the State Council, and the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, (1984–1988), among others. He is also Chairman of Chinese Association for Contemporary Philosophy, and the Chinese Association for Aesthetics. He was a graduate of St. John’s University in Shanghai (1949), and the holder of Fulbright Fellowship in Harvard University (1981–1982). His academic interest is in philosophy, aesthetics, and cultural studies. His main publications include A Critique of Hegel’s Theory of Category (1961), Essays on the History of Western Aesthetics (vol. 1, 1965; vol. 2, 1983), On Western Philosophy and Aesthetics (1987), and In Quest of Beauty (1992). He is also the editor of A History of Western Aesthetics (vols. 1–4, 2008) and Information China (1989), among many others. Y. V. Satyanarayana earned his MA in 1974 and PhD in 1980, both in philosophy, from the Andhra University, Visakhapatnam (India). He was a Professor of Philosophy and currently is Emeritus Professor at the Andhra University. He is specialized in the areas of social and political philosophy,

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Contributors

Gandhian philosophy, ethics, and applied ethics. He is the author of Marx and Gandhi: A Comparative Study of Social Philosophies (1998); Ethics: Theory and Practice (2009; second ed. 2010); and Medical Ethics: Principles and Problems (2013). He has published more than twenty-five scholarly articles in different areas of philosophy. He participated and presented papers in more than sixty-five national and international seminars and conferences. He was awarded Emeritus Fellowship by the University Grants Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, and currently he is working on a research project “Business Ethics.” Keping Wang is a fellow of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, university professor of Beijing International Studies University, honorary member of Olympic Center for Philosophy and Culture, deputy at large of International Association of Aesthetics (IAA), and Vice President of Chinese Society of Foreign Literary Theory and Comparative Poetics. He was formerly Vice President of International Society for Universal Dialogue (2010–2012), visiting fellow of St. Anne’s College of Oxford University (2000), guest Professor of the School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry of Sydney University (2010). His academic interest is in aesthetics and ancient philosophy. Among others, he has authored: Reading the Dao (2011); Chinese Way of Thinking (2009); Spirit of Chinese Poetics (2008); Ethos of Chinese Culture (2007); Chinese Philosophy on Life (2006)’ Plato’s Poetics in the Republic (2005), and The Classic of the Dao: A New Investigation (1998).



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