Instructional personnel in wartime schools of the defense establishment

Citation preview

INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL IN WARTIME SCHOOLS OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

A Dissertation Presented to the Faoulty of the Graduate School University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

by Wendell Austin Hammer July 1950

UMI Number: DP23999

All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Dissertation Publishing

UMI DP23999 Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

f

K. D

E'i ’' S ' I

TTfM d isse rta tio n ,

^ 5-i A recent survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion indicated these measures are generally approved by the people of the nation. Sixty-three percent thought that government spending on defense should be increased, (The Los Angeles Times, part I, April 30, 1950, p, 44*)

5 of such national concern.

They obviously consider the

measures as well as the objective to be very important.^ It would seem only logical that they would also regard as important a problem whose solution may make attainment of the objective more certain* Importance to future military personnel*

"In military

training, whether you teach the right information poorly or teach the wrong information in the best possible way, you may kill your students."10

This observation by a civilian

educator well expresses the imperative need for competence among wartime military instructional personnel*

A civilian

teacher may, and sometimes does, teach poorly or teach the wrong information well without doing his students physioal harm; for the examinations they take possess neither the validity nor the objectivity of a projectile’s trajectory or a thunderstorm’s turbulence.

A teacher in a wartime training

situation, on the other hand, enjoys no such academic freedom— he must teaoh the right information in the most effective way possible if he would meet the grave responsi­ bility which his students1 lives place upon him.

9 in another AIPO survey, forty percent of those polled ranked war or threat of war as "the most important problem facing the entire country today." (The Los Angeles Times. part I, May 5, 1950, p. 20.) 10 Raymond Gregory, personal interview, April 4, 1950.

6 Admittedly, such teaching oalls for a degree of competence which is not plentiful, either in or out of the Defense Establishment,

But it is essential for,

If the armed services do not realize the need for an enlightened educational system in whioh there is no room for mediocrity, this nation is doomed,^ Such competence, moreover, can be seoured for an educational program not by chance, but by design— by long-range and carefully formulated planning.

The problem of this investi­

gation was directly concerned with such planning for the wartime educational programs of the Defense Establishment, Importance to the Defense Establishment,

"Only the

best can be aviation cadets" is a type of slogan which is heard and seen frequently today— and carefully developed selective devices lend a degree of validity to the asser­ tion,

News releases make liberal use of the "fastest," the

"highest," and similar superlatives when describing the performances of military weapons— and detailed planning and

clt. The point that has just been made is referred to repeatedly throughout this report as the Compe­ tence hypothesis," It holds that only superior profiolenoy among wartime military instructional personnel can be considered competent. Its validation derives from the most fundamental of all human needs— the need for survival, survival of the nation and of the culture, survival of the individual himself* It is referred to as being an hypothesis in the face of such apparently sound validation because it was apparent during this investigation that some individuals are unwilling to accept its validity to the point of supporting measures aimed at its realization.

7 testing make such claims possible.

Inasmuch as personnel

and materiel are both dependent upon instruction to become militarily effective, It would seem to be both consistent and essential that careful planning be undertaken to prooure instructional personnel who would also prove to be "only the best" if called on in a war of the future.

The grave respon­

sibility of protecting the nation which is charged to the Defense Establishment can hardly permit it to ignore the importance of such planning. Importance to the educational profession. The problem of meeting the instructional needs of military eduoation in times of war relates very closely to the educational profes­ sion*

In fact, a number of the educational specialists, both

civilian and military, who were consulted during the investi­ gation felt that it was essentially a problem for the educa­ tional profession.

This view may have been based on certain

of the following considerations:

(1) the demand upon all

citizens, including school people, for military servioe in times of war; (2) the new role of eduoation as a military service in wartime; (3) the great need that modern war creates for training; and (4) the unique qualifications which civi­ lian institutions and educational personnel possess for providing for this need. From the time of Captain Nathan Hale, a teacher from New London, Connecticut, members of his profession have been

8 offering their services, and lives, to their oountry in times of war.

In the last war alone, nearly 100,000 public school 12 teachers entered the armed services, while other branches of the profession contributed additional thousands. That members of the educational profession should thus serve in wartime seems to be both consistent and right. For the records of history show that this nation’s wars have been fought primarily by civilian soldiers;1^ and so long as Americans retain their belief in universal military service in time of war, qualified civilians from all professions can rightly expect to serve.

At this point, however, a new

consideration enters. Whether or not members of the profession relish the responsibility, modern technological and Ideologieal warfare has made education the nation’s first line of defense.^ Moreover, this responsibility is not confined to periods of hostility; it continues in peacetime as well as in wartime. In times of peace, eduoation Is mankind’s most promising means for avoiding war.

For if "wars begin In the

minds of men,"^ they most certainly must be prevented In

12 Frank W. Hubbard, personal letter, March 22, 1950. 13 See Appendix C. 1^ John M. Swomley, Jr., Militarism in Education, pp. 3-70 presents negative implications of ihls"irevelopment. 15 Ibid.. p. 4.

9 the minds of men— a task which only eduoation oan hope to perform. Education is also a powerful weapon in winning wars. Our educational system can save us the most valuable and irreplaceable single element in a military crisis— time. The better prepared /educated/ our young men are when they enter the Army, the quicker /"sic 7 they oan be trained.1& Just as important in winning wars is the need for civilian institutions to continue educating those individuals upon whom the security and well-being of the nation so vitally depend.

The following situation must never again be

permitted to occur: War has increased the need of the nation for technical and professionally trained manpower; yet, at the same ,) time, it has decreased and nearly stopped the flow of ' able-bodied men into these fields so essential to thej national health, safety, and interest. War has also brought a tremendous increase of our dependency upon specialized knowledge and skill but has sharpely curtailed the training of selected individuals for service in these fields.17 Education outside the Defense Establishment has contributed to the winning of wars in still another way. Beginning with the 525 colleges and universities under the 18 short-lived Student Army Training Corps of World V/ar I,

^

Ben Lear, "Schools and the Army," p. 39.

H Francis J. Brown and M. H. Trytten, The National Stake in the Imperative Resumption of Training for the SciehtTTic ferofessionsT p." 1. m Alonzo G. Grace, Educational Lessons from Wartime Training, p. 211.

10 civilian institutions and their faculties have come to assume wartime defense roles of considerable importance*

In

World War II, approximately eight hundred institutions, of which 663 were at the college level or higher, engaged in 19 training personnel for the armed services. And while there is lack of agreement, both in and out of the Defense 20 Establishment, as to the merits of this development, civilian institutions would probably conduct an even larger share of the specialized training required by the armed 21 services should another war occur. The question whioh quite logically arises at this point relates to the ability of civilian school people to provide the type of training that is given in schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

While a final answer to

22 this question must wait upon the findings of other studies, certain pertinent considerations might be mentioned. It would seem to be quite true that a number of courses offered In schools of the Defense Establishment must

19 Ibid.. pp. 209-210. 20 See pp. 93-94 21

J* Harold Fox, personal interview, April 5, 1950; Francis J. Brown, personal interview, April 3> 1950; An Appraisal of Wartime Training of Individual Specialists in Army lirTForces, p, 45; "draining Activity— Trie College Draining Program," pp, 176-184* 22

See the study recommended by this Investigation, pp. 181-82.

11 be conducted by personnel who have had extensive specialized military service.

These courses, however, are probably 23 fewer in number than is commonly supposed. Furthermore, a large proportion of the courses seem to be closely related 24 to courses conducted in civilian schools. With the exception of such specialized subjects as pilot training and military intelligence, it seems to be most likely that civilian teachers could, after a brief period of orientation, take over the instruction of courses now offered in schools 25 of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Importance of the problem in view of the probable

nature of a future war. Perhaps it is in order to discuss certain implications which the nature of a future war might hold for the problem’s importance.

Admittedly, such an

excursion would be taken more appropriately in a Sunday supplement than in a research dissertation; there are, however, oertain developments already observable whioh provide clues as to the characteristics of a war of the future.

These characteristics would probably include the

22 Brown, loo, olt. ^

See Appendix B.

25 it should be born in mind that in World War II, the schools of the Defense Establishment were largely staff­ ed by "civilians in uniform," a high proportion of whom had no previous experience or training in instructional duties.

12 following:

(1) the war would involve this nation suddenly,

possibly beginning as a full-soale surprise attack; (2) it would be more "scientific* than past wars; (3) it would place this nation in an inferior position so far as the amount of its manpower is concerned; and (4) it would be a "total war" in the sense that every individual, civilian or military, would be called on to perform certain essential duties* One convention that a democracy such as the United States must observe is that it never be the aggressor.

Its

enemies must be accorded the privilege of choosing the time and place for the outbreak of hostilities.

This convention

imposes military handicaps which the nation must be prepared to overcome.

One of these handicaps is a shortage of time--

time to arm and train a counterattack. Never again will our Nation have months of relative immunity after the outbreak of war to mobilize, train, and equip an effective fighting force. Our preparation must be such that we can stand alone from the very beginning of the attack— and win. & The lesson is too The United States be no opportunity chance to rely on

plain for the next aggressor to miss: will be his first target. There will for our gradual mobilization— no the efforts of others.27

Nothing is more important in this air-atomic age than

A Profeg&ffl for National Seourity, p. 8. Kiag#

2? Henry H. Arnold, George C. Marshall, and Ernest J. War Reports, p. 415*

13 to b© ready. . . . If we are not ready, this nation might never even have a chance to retaliate.2® This probable shortage of time relates to the problem in two ways:

(1) it makes peacetime planning for wartime

needs, including instructional personnel, all the more essential; and (2) it places an even higher premium upon competence among wartime instructional personnel of the Defense Establishment. The first is quite self-evident.

If no time is

available after war begins for the planning that is proposed by the problem as being essential, then it must be undertaken in peacetime. An immediate "stand-by mobilization" plan. . . . is needed to prevent a shooting war or to win one if such is "forced upon us."29 The second way that a shortage of time relates to the problem— by making competence among instructional personnel more essential— is no less significant.

A sudden outbreak

of war would probably not, as has been contended, find train­ ing waiting on the production of materiel, the construction Opt

W. S. Symington, Dally News, p. 8.

29 B. M. Baruch, as reported in Daily News. May 19* 1950* p. 12. An AIPO poll which followed inis declaration revealed that the American public was willing to submit to such an over-all mobilization plan. (Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1950, p. 29.)

14 of training facilities, or the outcome of planned counter30 attacks. One need but recall the stove-pipe artillery, the cow-pasture air fields, or the hotel-lobby classrooms so common in the early training programs of World War II to visualize the problems which a sudden desperate war situation 31 would pose upon military training. The point, however, is not that training in wartime has never, and very probably will never, wait on materiel production or strategic developments.

It is that the

handicaps to effective teaching which a shortage of training facilities and time impose would place an even heavier responsibility on the instructor— it would be even more essential for him to measure up to the competence hypothesis 32 already discussed. For, to scramble an educational proverb, the nearer teaching approaches the log, the more a Mark Hopkins is needed on one of its ends. There can be little doubt but what a future war would be more "scientific/' at least in materiel, than wars of the past.

And every scientific advance in weapons or support

30 This view was expressed by two of the individuals listed in Appendix A. 31

' The AAF Officers Candidate School had begun the instruction of cadets within five days after its establish­ ment was first proposed. (Arnold, Marshall, and King, 0 different specialized

9 An Appraisal of Wartime Training of Individual Specialist In ArmyTlinPoroes. p. X* See pp. 63-64* ^ Brehon Somervell, "Education and the Army," pp. 185 and 186; George C. Marshall, Henry H. Arnold, and Ernest j r . King, The War Reports, p. 264. 12 Ibid., p. 137.

61

jobs.

13

The total output of Army Ground Forces schools 14 alone during the war was 569»385• The most lusty of the Army*s family, the Air Forces, furnished some eye-opening figures of its own.

In the

course of the war, its training commands operated 150 15 schools which as many as 400,000 students attended at one time,

16

and from which almost 2,000,000 specialists were 17 graduated. Moreover, owing to the fact that some of these specialists attended more than one course, the Air Forces was able to count a final aggregate of 3»108,243 separate 18 graduations from regular courses of instruction. Training in the Navy. seemed no less remarkable.

The Navyfs training program

At the close of the war,

September, 1945# the Navy numbered a total of 3#408,347

19

*3 "Education in the Armed Forces," p. 7; Alonzo G, Grace, JSduoatlonal Lessons from Wartime Training, p. 114; R. Nfli’es and’ C7 R."Spain, Audio-Visual Aids in the Armed Services, p. 3* ^

Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, o£. cit.. p. 308.

15 The Offlolal Pictorial History of the AAP, p. 105. 16

An Appraisal of Wartime Training . . ., p. 4.

^ Loc. cit. 18 Graoe, ££. cit., p. 12. ^

Arnold, Marshall, and King, oj>. cit.. p. 706.

62

personnel of which about ninety percent had received ad20 vanced training as specialists. A total of 954 schools were in operation at that time with a total of 510,000 21 22 students receiving training in 450 different specialties. The problems of rapid expansion.

The training

problems posed by the vast enrollments outlined in the preceding paragraphs were further complicated by the fact that these enrollments were crammed into a short period of time.

Furthermore, in reaching these enrollments, the

military training programs had to expand tremendously. Statistics from the Havy’s Bureau of Aeronautics illustrated this tremendous expansion.

The number of

individuals receiving training in aviation schools annually from July 1, 1940 to June 30, 1945 were as follows:

6,320; 23 20,097; 87,763; 136,932; and, 118,499— a total of 367,711. The problems— including instructor need--which such rapid expansion created in the training programs were well stated in the following quotations:

20 21

"Education

in the Armed Forces," p. 71.

Grace, op. cit*, p. 10.

22 Ibid.. p. 114; Miles and Spain, loo, cit. 2 3 "Aviation Training, 1940-1945," p. 69.

65

Statistics are lifeless. To say that the AAF Training Command and its predecessors trained nearly 2,00,000 specialists in the 44 hectic months between Pearl Harbor and VJ-day conveys nothing of the vast scope of training activities. . . . the figures fail to show that many of those men received intensive and highly specialized training lasting the better part of a year, that courses had to be developed in subjects completely unknown a year or two previously, that training programs had to be revised again and again to fit them to the swiftly changing patterns of aerial combat.2^ Statistics on numbers of graduates can't pioture the gigantic problems created when the numbers of students /and instructors/ had to be increased fourfold, sixfold, tenfold in a single year. • . *25 Instructor-*student ratios in World War II.

The

preceding paragraphs have reported maximum enrollments within the various training programs.

With these statistics, it

was quite obvious that if the instructor-student ratios within the programs were known, it would require little mathematical skill to arrive at the approximate number of instructors which were needed in these programs and, more important to this study, an indication of the number that might be needed in a future war.

Fortunately, some data were

found on these ratios.

These tasks actually fell, in most instances, upon the individual instructors in the schools. (The investigator's personal experiences.) An Appraisal of Wartime Training. . ., p. 4«

64

In the Navy: The instructor— student ratios vary with the nature of subject matter* * . . An instructor in mathematics at U. S* Naval School, Electricians Mate, for instance, can successfully teach a much larger number of students than an instructor teaching watch repair. * * • The instructor-student ratio for service schools considered as a whole is in the neighborhood of 1 to 10*2S In the Army Air Forces: After maJteing a study of the desired ratios, the Technical Training Command in October 1942, Issued a directive establishing an ideal ratio of 1 to 5 and an absolute minimum of 1 to 8 for all technical training programs. Standard ratios also were established in several flying training programs* • . • Unfortunately, the desired ratios were not always maintained, especially when the number of students increased suddenly* In basic pilot training, for example, shortages of flying ins^uotors sometimes forced the ratio as high as 1 to When these ratios of the Army Air Foroes were related to ratios which prevailed in other phases of its training 28 program, some of which ran as high as 1 to 40 or 50, an over-all ratio of 1 to 10 seemed to afford a reasonably accurate approximation of what maintained, if not of what should have been*

Thus, the schools of the Navy and of the

Army Air Forces utilized about the same instructor-student

Education and Training* While these ratios relate to post war training programs, roughly the same ratio pre­ vailed during World War II* (W* B. Mitchell, personal interview, March 16, 1950*) An Appraisal of Wartime Training* * *. p. 13* Boyd C. Shafer, "Military Training in World War II," mentions ratios in Air Corps preflight schools as high as 1—30 and 1**50# (P* 1040)*

65

ratios In World War II, When the maximum enrollments in the Navy and Army 29 30 Air Forces sohoolst 510,000 and 400,000, respectively, were subjected to this 1 to 10 ratio, approximately 51,000 and 40,000 instructors were shown to have been utilized at 31 a given time in the respective services. Although no information was obtained on instructorstudent ratios in other branches of the armed services, this 1 to 10 figure would seem to offer a suitable point of departure in planning for future over-all military instructor needs* Summary*

The foregoing data seemed to justify

the following summation: 1.

The need for specialized instruction for military

personnel in World War II was great, running to as high as nine out of every ten military personnel. 2*

The numerical need for instructors was likewise

great, requiring about one teacher for every ten individuals

30 31

See footnote 21, p*

62.

See footnote 17, p.

61.

It does not follow, of course, that all of these Instructors were engaged in what is commonly considered as classroom-type instruction.

66

receiving specialized instruction at any one time* 3*

This need for instructors in great numbers was

paralleled by a need for obtaining them rapidly following the outbreak of war* THE NEED FOR INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL TODAY Introductory statement.

The present need for instruc­

tional personnel in schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force was next examined.

It was felt that if information could

be obtained on (1) the number of students and instructors now in schools of the Defense Establishment, and (2) the trend in the number of courses being offered, that the conclusions arrived at for the last war might be modified in the direction of the need for instructional personnel in a war of the future* The number of personnel now in military schools. At the time this investigation was begun, no data promised to be so easily obtained as those relating to (1) in the preceding paragraph*

Such simple data as the number of

students enrolled in service schools and the number of instructors teaching them caused little worry.

These

statistics, however, have been repeatedly requested of all three services, personally and by letter, and to date

67

they have not been obtained*

32

The trend in the number of courses now offered in sohools of the Defense Establishment*

Some information,

however, was secured on the number of specialized courses now being offered in service schools and on the trend in this number. According to the latest revised listings of these ■5

courses, the Array is offering 347# 33 the Air Force, 279.

o i

the Navy, 376,

and

A review of successive revisions of the publications which provided the foregoing totals, revealed that there has been a steady increase in the number of courses offered in service schools.

In the latest revision of the Air Force

source, twenty new courses were announced while but seven

The following quotations illustrate the problem encountered: "The information which you have requested is not available to this office nor to any one particular office in the Department of the Army. This information would have to be compiled, in all probability, by The Adjutant General. Whether or not this information can be released to you as an individual cannot be determined at this time." (From an Army Correspondent.) "It would require a major researoh project to determine this number and having determined it, its accuracy would be doubtful*" (A Navy correspondent.) ^

T*16 Army School Catalogue, pp. 8-3SB.

^

List of Navy Sohools and Courses, pp. 2-25*

35

Training Prospectus for United States Air Force Personnel, pp* A-x to W-2o•

68

were listed as discontinued*

36

An eight-percent increase 37 was shown in the latest revision of the Navy source. The trend that was thus indicated seemed to be highly significant in view of (1) the large proportion of previous­ ly trained specialized personnel retained from World War II, and (2) of the decreasing number of military personnel on 38 aotive duty* Summary.

The foregoing data seemed to justify

the following summation: 1.

The number of courses offered in service sohools

are increasing while the number of personnel within the Defense Establishment are decreasing* 2.

The quantitative need for instructional personnel

in the Defense Establishment is, consequently, becoming proportionately greater* t h e n e e d f o r i n st r u c t io n a l p e r s o n n e l in t h e fu t u r e

Logic and data relating to the third source of information by which the need for instructional personnel in a future war might be established— the probable nature of

^

jbjjd,, revision sheet.

^

kist of Navy Schools and Courses*

38 The three services have Just completed a reduction in their commissioned ranks amounting to several thousand in each*

69

that future war--were presented in Chapter I.

39

Consequently,

it was deemed advisable to repeat only the inferences which were indicated there. On the assumption that a future war would undoubtedly involve this nation more suddenly, be more complex, and utilize more highly technical equipment, than did World War II, it was concluded that such a war would require: 1.

Proportionately more military personnel to

receive specialized training. 2.

Longer periods of specialized training.

3.

A higher average level of training.

4.

Proportionately more instructors.

5.

Instructors possessing a higher level of oompe40 tanoe in both subject mastery and teaching ability. SUMMARY Summation.

The need for instructional personnel in

schools of the Defense Establishment in the event of war has both a qualitative and a quantitative interpretation. The Importance of these personnel is indicated by logic and supported by official opinion.

The numerical need is

approximated through the following statistical evidence.

39 See pp.

11-18.

It should be noted that the evidence which was found on present trends corroborates these inferences.

70

In World War II as many as nine out of every ten of the personnel involved received some form of specialized training*

As many as 510,000 in the Navy and as many as

400,000 in the Army Air Forces received such training at a given time. The instructor-student ratio for the over-all train­ ing programs of the Navy and Army Air Forces was approximate­ ly 1-10. The number of specialized courses offered today in the Army, Navy, and Air Force are 347» 376, and 279» respectively.

The number of such courses is increasing in

the face of a gradual " P- 133• 33

^

Grace, 0£. cit., p. 194.

34 Howard 0. Johnson, "An Analysis of the Factors Contributing to the Success of Military Training," p. 55.

108

Enlisted instructors were selected . . . from among graduates of individual schools. About ten percent of the graduates were selected at Reserve midshipmen . schools.35 As schools expanded it became the practice to hold over a certain number of graduates to act as instructors.36 More and more they had to obtain instructors from their own graduating classes.37 • • ♦ instructors were selected from among the graduates of early classes who possessed suitable qualifications.38 The number of requisitions . . . left the school authorities to the selection of instructors from the ranks of graduating olasses.39 The great mass of instructors in all courses came from the training programs themselves.W Certain aspects of this procedure of using student graduates as instructors were undoubtedly desirable. Since the schools had the candidates under prolonged scrutiny and were free of competition for their services from other agencies, they were able to select from graduating classes the new lieutenants best qualified as instructors.^1

35 Carstater, personal interview, March 27, 1950. "Training Activity— Field Administration. . .," •

p. 10. ^

Shafer, op. olt.. p. 676.

38

"Training

of Officer

Candidates,” p.

42.

^ "History of Military Training, Judge Advocate Generali Department,” p. 3* ^

An Appraisal of Wartime Training. . ., p. Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, op. olt.

p. 30.

20.

109 Instructors were selected from unassigned personnel who completed subcourses In above-average manner and had demonstrated as a student leadership and teaching qualities.^2 On the other hand, this procedure embodied the hazard, not always confined to military training, of instructional Inbreeding. Among the steps taken to meet this problem /shortage of instructors/ were: 1. Pressing graduates into service as instructors without sufficient training. Although it was done widely, this led to a vicious circle— it resulted in inferior instruction, which produced still more inferior graduates from which to select new instructors.43 Early emphasis on subject mastery.

At the beginning

of World War II, both services seemed to consider knowledge of, or skill in, the particular course content as being the primary requisite of an instructor. During the early part of the war and before, the armed services stressed the mastery of subject matter to the virtual exclusion of pedagogical training in the education of instructors.44 Experience under wartime training conditions, however, doon proved that military Instructors also needed to know how to teach.

42 "study of Signal Corps Enlisted Schooling, 1939 1944," p. 23. ^

Appraisal of Wartime Training. .

^4 Grace, op. clt., p. 198.

p. 24.

110 At the beginning of the war many old chiefs were used as instructors at both the recruit stations and service schools. • • • Many of them, however, despite the length of their experience were not oapable of communicating their knowledge to the trainees and were temperamentally unsuited for teaching.45 . . . instructors had been selected for the most part on the basis of knowledge of subject matter, without reference to prior teaching experience. Within a few months it was realized that a special guidance program for instructors would have to be introduced if the most effective results were to be obtalned.46 In some training programs, in fact, experience led to the conclusion that of the two requisites, subject mastery and teaching proficiency, the latter was the more valuable in a prospective instructor. Between those available who knew but had not taught the subjects and those who had taught some ^Ji&derline in original/ subject in high school or college, we chose the latter group. We decided it was better to use personnel who knew how to teach than to use those who knew the material but could not instruct.47 A more satisfactory solution, of course, was afforded by Instructors who possessed both subject mastery and teaching proficiency, especially when the latter had been gained through training in the field of mastery.

45 "Training Activity— Field Administration. . .," p. 19. i£.

* "History of the Instructor Guidance Program, The Engineer School, 23 June 1943 - 30 June 1945tn P* Also commented on in "Organization for Military Training in the Office of the Chief of Engineers," p.3* 47 Quoting Major Metfessel in "History of the Western Flying Training Command, 1 January 1943 to 31 December 1943"

Ill Especially in technical fields, instructor training has proven more meaningful if it is carried on in the subject matter area of the individual instructors.^ lq

Use of former civilian teachers. ^

The shortage of

instructors plus the need for teaching proficiency may have contributed to the rather general use of former civilian educators in the training programs of the Army and Navy. Some of these were enlisted personnel: Though great numbers of the country’s finest educational minds did not enter the Military Service, the Army obtained through enlistment and selective service a wealth of talented men for training adminstrators and instructors.50 Other educators were given direct commissions as offioers: . . . if necessary, men were commissioned from civilian life specifically to teach in highly technical or professional courses. ...

a majority /of preflight school instructors/ were

W Goodman, Curriculum Implications of Armed Services Educational Programs. P» 51 * See pp. 123-35Shafer, 0£. clt.. p. 10. Also oommented on in Education in the ArmedH§eryloes. p. 41; "History of Training of Military Government— 'A Summary. • . pp. 96-100. 51 "A Summary of the Training of Army Servioe Forces Medical Department Personnel," p. 108.

1X2 directly commissioned.

52

During 1942 the AAF began to procure professional teachers for ground instruction in most of its flying schools. By July 1943 these men, now for the most part commissioned officers, had been distributed* • *, and ^ the worst problems in ground instruction were overcome?^ In a Navy procurement program of this type, men at the Ph.D* level in such fields as physics, chemistry, and mathematics were given direct commissions and assigned to the college V-12 and Reserve Midshipmen schools as instructors and supervisors.^ A great amount of comment regarding the contributions which civilian educators in uniform made to the training programs of the Defense Establishment was reviewed.

The

following quotations are typical: . . . there were 150 commissioned officers working in the /Ra.vjr7 training program. Of these, 140 were teachers, administrators, or supervisors in civilian life.55 The thousands of former educators who are scattered throughout the military establishment have made them­ selves felt. . ._* I don't know how we could have made it without them.

52 Shafer, 0£. cit., p. 1040. 53 Ibid.. p. 1096. 5k Oarstater, loc. cit. 55 Schorling, and others, oj>. cit*. p. xvi. 5^ Quoting General Edwards, loc. cit.

113 Former teaohers were universally praised as military instructors.^ It would be extremely difficult to establish which groups of instructors were the best, but it did appear • . . that the former high school teacher did make the best instructor* . . . It is probable that the former high school teacher did as much to increase the know how of teaching in military schools than /"sic 7 any other single group.53 Where former teachers were the teachers in these courses, the teaching was excellent.59 My own personal feeling is that in general the teaching done during indoctrination was of very low caliber. . . . The few good instructors had had previous experience.60 One general difference between Army and Navy practioe In utilizing offioers who had had previous teaching experi­ ence should be noted.

The Navy assigned most of them to

administrative or supervisory duties.

The Army, especially

its Air Foroes, used them primarily as instructors. Varied background of instructors.

"Military instruc­

tional staffs contained men and women from almost every walk of life." x

This and the following statements are readily

5*1 One account commended their "pedantic ability." 5& Johnson, op. cit.. p. 53• 59 Dorothy Sohaffter, What Comes of Training Women for War, p. 34, quoting former Waos. Loc. cit. wx Johnson, op. cit.. p. 50.

114 understandable in view of preoeding data. Only two of our original instructors had ever had any teaching experience. They had various backgrounds. I was a salesman; Captain Spyker was a landscape artist; Captain Stubbins was just out of engineering school; Major Hewitt was a bank auditor, and Rotary speaker; Major Chase was a lawyer* We had several farmers and grocery clerks.62 -Another source speaks of "civilian flyers and air crew graduates, garage mechanics and college

professors."*^

One writer found a certain advantage in having instructors with backgrounds unrelated to their subject matter:

"Since they are not lawyers they do not dissipate

time questioning the legality of decisions of the Comptroller General.”^

But the Navy saw nothing beneficial in the

situation: It soon became apparent that standard curricula would not result in standardized training programs unless com­ petent Navy personnel were sent to the field to interpret and explain them. . . . The truth of the matter was that some of the newly-recruited instructors would not have recognized a curriculum if they had seen o n e . 65 Establishment of instructor schools.

The variety of

instructor backgrounds, the widespread use of Reserve personnel and students as instructors, the need for

62 "History, Army Air Forces Central Flying Training Command," p. 327* 63 The Official Pictorial History of the AAF. p. 105* ^

"Schooling of Commissioned Officers," p. 43.

65 "Training Activity— Standards and Curriculum Division,” p. 185*

115 standardization in instruction, and the Influence of the mass influx of trained educators were items which may have contributed to the establishment of instructor training programs throughout the Army and the Navy, In the Army Ground and Service Forces schools, these programs tended to be more-or-less informal courses given in connection with other school curricula. All schools conducted some form of training for new instructors. The training took the form of relatively brief orientation courses on teaching techniques, followed by supervised study and rehearsal in the committee to which the instructor was assigned,66 In the Army Air Forces, instructor training was generally provided in central instructor schools; although informal inservice training was also carried on at a number of schools. In the Navy, instructor training programs were, until late in the war, generally conducted at the individual training stations.6^

These programs tended to become less

formal and more functional as time went on.

The earlier

formal methods are criticized in the following excerpt: • • • the methods of teaching were to a great extent academio, modelled on civilian educational institutions.

66 Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, op. oit.. p. 304. Also commented on in Grace, op. eit•, p. ToS. 67 Grace, op. oit.. p. 107, 6® For an exception see

pp. 126-27.

116 This type of training might be suitable for officers, but it was wholly inappropriate for enlisted personnel who had to be taught to perform specifio tasks in the shortest possible time*69 Low status of instructors*

It was indicated by the

data reviewed that while there were great variations within the services, instructors as a whole generally did not re­ ceive the recognition which the importance of their duties m e r i t e d . T h e little evidence to the contrary consisted of sundry verbal accolades bestowed upon instructors by wellmeaning but equally well-removed-from-the-situation individuals of high rank.?1 A practioe which may have both contributed to and resulted from this lack of regard was that of overlooking instructors when promotions were The lack of a T/0 prevented promotion and it was a high they worked conscientiously time, even though they held entire of 1945.73

made.?2

these men . . . from any tribute to these men that often on their own free the rank of private for the

69 "Training Activity— Standards and Currioulum Division," p, 186. ?° Could this have been a militarized American more? ?^ Such compliments are scattered throughout Marshall, Arnold, and King, The War Reports: see footnote 56, p. 112. ?2 It should be noted that none of the following excerpts is from Navy sources, ?2 "History of Training, Special Service Companies," p. 31.

117 Promotions among ground school instructors were slow and far between compared to those for officers in other duties*74 /In eighteen months onl^7 twenty-nine of the 183 second lieutenants had been promoted to first lieutenants; none of the first lieutenants had been promoted to captain.75 It was generally felt that for an officer instructor . . ♦ the maximum rank of captain £Krmy Air Forces/ would be adequate.76 Another practice associated with the low status of instructors was that of assigning, and retaining on duty, individuals who were totally inadequate as instructors.77 This practice was sometimes paralleled by the assignment of individuals to instructional duties without regard for their personal desires In the matter. Officers . . • were arbitrarily assigned as instructors whether they wanted such an assignment or not. As a result there were some who did not oooperate.78 The general use of over-age, physically unqualified, or other combat-deferred personnel as instructors may have figured in the lack of prestige among instructors»7^

And

7^ "History of the Western Flying Training Command," p. 649* 75

"History, Army Air Forces Central Flying Training Command," p. 177* Many of these held Doctor^ degrees. ^

An Appraisal of Wartime Training. . .. p. 23*

77 Ibid.. p. 25* 7^ "A General History of Quartermaster Training Practice in World War II," p. 133* 7^ Grace, op. cit., pp. 56 and 57; "History of Mili­ tary Training," p. 3; Chafer, o£. pit., p. 1044*

118 the practice of assigning officers to instructional duties as a punitive or disciplinary measure or as an interim duty while disqualified for operational duties most certainly did not improve the situation,®0 Perhaps Captain Edwards voiced the soundest reason for the general dislike, or fear, of instructional duties when he attributed it to feelings of personal inadequacy on the part of men in the service.®1

Experience at the Navyfs

Norfolk Instructor Training School tended to corroborate this view; Approximately 10 percent of the students, upon entering the schodl, state that they do not wish to be instructors. The number dwindles to less than one percent by the date of graduation.82 Mowhere, perhaps, was the disregard for the importance of instructors felt more painfully than among those who had been recruited from college and university faculties.

On the

assumption that his remarks merit careful consideration in military training circles, one of these individuals is quoted at length: The general reactions and attitudes of the teachers were strongly negative . . . the entire setup and the treatment of the teachers appeared to them as a

Personal knowledge of the investigator. Edwards, personal Interview, April 4, 1950. 82 Caspar!, "Help the Navy and Yourself with Instructor Training," p. 2.

119 calculated insult and degradation of the profession. • . . They found their activities, inoluding their teaching, minutely regulated by men who were generally unqualified and who frequently openly expressed their contempt for teaohers in general and for those on the field in particular.^3 . . • there were many college and university professors and deans, and high-sohool superintendents, principals, and teaohers among the so-called ground-school instruc­ tors, who were not allowed to break into the elite administrative groups. . . . The head of the school for a time was a former automobile salesman. The head of one academic department was said to have been a ferti­ lizer salesman. 84 • . . the feature of the system that rankled most was the nature of classroom inspections. The emphases in these inspections were not on teaching but on what is known as "military discipline" and on the physioal condition of the room. Some inspectors made it a practice to sight down the window shades to see whether they were drawn evenly, If they were slightly irregular, the unhappy instructor might be given a low rating.®5 . . • the pilot-training sohool Jjiretllghtf was not directed and controlled by educators. . . . Suppose that the administrative staff of the pilot-training sohool had been placed in charge of the hospitalI What would the doctors have said and done?86 Competition among and within the services for instructors.

There appeared to have been a considerable

amount of competition during the early phases of the war

83 Alfred R. LIndesmith, "Teaohers in Army Air Forces," p. 404* 84 Ibid., p. 405. 85 Ibid., P. 406. 86 Ibid.. p. 407.

120 for qualified civilian i n s t r u c t o r s C o m p e t i t i o n among branches of the Army Itself was indireotly revealed by the following excerpt: Prior to November 1942 there were two principal agencies procuring officers from civil life. One was the Officer Procurement Branch. . . . The other was the Army Specialist Corps. . . . In addition, the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces as well as the various services of the Services of Supply, including the service oommands were engaged in relatively independent and competitive procurement.88 Competition between agencies of the Army and Navy was also reported by the Army Air Forces Study: Another difficulty was the competition with other servioes, such as the Navy, for what material was available. . . . A number of good prospective in­ structors were lost to the Air Foroes because of its Inability to match Navy offers.89 Use of combat returnees as instructors.

Early in the

war, combat returnees were eagerly awaited for assignment to instructional duties.

This view was later modified as more

and more returnees became available.

Where these individu­

als possessed "both combat experience and instructional ability, / F h e ^ were strong additions to the schools."9°

87 "Officer Procurement During World War II," p. 2; "Annual.Report of the Army Service Forces for the Fiscal Year 1943,” V* 139; Johnson, op. oit.. pp. 53 and 54* 88 "Officer Procurement During World War II," p. 8. An Appraisal of Wartime Training. . .« p. 20. 90 Loo. cit.

121 But that too few possessed the latter requisite ia indicated in the following excerpts: It was the oonsenaus of responsible sohool authorities . . . that despite increasing numbers of oombat veterans on their staffs the quality of instruction had deolined noticeably in late 1943 and 1944*91 The power to convey information clearly, enthusiastically, and foroefully seemed to be unrelated to the qualities of a battle leader.92 . . ♦ many lacked the job. As a eliminated

combat returnees assigned as instructors ability or the temperament required for the result they constituted the bulk of those from instructor training.93

One instructional handicap attributed to returnees by several sources was their tendency to "teach practices fol94 lowed in particular situations and theaters of war." As one director of training said,"I got my instructors together and told them to quit fighting the Battle of Sicily in class. Common practices in instructor selection.

A des­

cription of instructor procurement procedures which generally prevailed throughout the services seemed to be appropriate before turning to the discussion of speoific procedures in

91 Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, o£. cit.. p. 303* 92 Loo. oit. 93 An Appraisal of Wartime Training. . .. pp. 22-23* Men,"

^ "The Quartermaster Corps Schooling of Enlisted p. 6. 93 palmer, Wiley, and Keast, op. oit., p. 304.

122 the next section.

Two sources presented summaries of

these procedures. An element of similarity ran through the majority of the programs of instructor selection, which had the following features in common: (1) Potential instructors were selected and earmarked at an early stage in their technical training on the basis of their qualification cards; (2) those Individuals selected as potential instruotors were carefully observed and reported on by their instructors, , (3) potential instructors were called before a committee for an interview to determine their in­ terest in teaching, their general background of experience ' and trailing, and general aptitude for instructor posi­ tions ,9o Training programs which were most satisfied with their instructors followed established procedures in selecting both civilian and service instructors. These procedures made use of all obtainable evidence about the prospective instructor, seoured from as many of the following sources of information as were applicable: 1. Army and civilian academic reoords. Usually only those who had completed their training in the upper 20 to 25 percent were considered, 2.

Civilian occupational or professional experience,

3. Desire to instruct. of prime importance,

This factor was considered

4. Instructor selection tests. In some oases • • • special tests were employed to select instructors, , . , 5.

Efficiency ratings in previous duties,

6. Army General Classification Tests, mechanical aptitude tests, and other general ability tests. 7. Personal data, such as age. marital status, and qualifications for overseas duty.97

9^ Grace, op. cit., p. 194. 97 An Appraisal of Wartlme Training. .

p. 20.

123 SPECIFIC INSTRUCTOB PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES Introductory statement •

Evidence reported in the

preceding section seemed to indicate that instructor policies in World War II were generally characterized by expediency* There were, however, instances in which a concerted and con­ tinuing effort was made to secure instructors according to a more-or-less definite plan* reviewed in this section*

Four of these experiments are No attempt is made to present

complete accounts of the experiments; only the aspects which directly related to problems of this investigation are re­ ported.

A pertinent problem for whose solution data were

provided by the experiment is stated at the beginning of each account* The Navy Physical Education Program experiment * mmmmmmmmBmmtmmmmmrnm

To

what extent can civilian specialists be utilized as enlisted instructors in a wartime military training program? The Director of the Navy Physical Education Program, Gene Tunney, was apparently in accord with Navy practice when he decided that petty officers would provide the best instruction for his program. enlisted instructors were:

The reasons he gave for using (1) most of the students were

enlisted men and later would serve directly under petty officers; and (2) "When you put stripes on his sleeve, the man stops being an Instructor and starts being an

124 administrator. "98 In line with this policy, a total of 9704 men were sent through the Navy Physical Instructor's School and assigned to duties under the rating of Chief Boatswains Mate and, later, Specialist

(A).99

These ratings were given

to qualified individuals directly from civilian life until voluntary enlistments were terminated in December, 1942. Thereafter, they were assigned after the individuals had completed their training at the Physical Instructor's Sobool.100 Requirements for these ratings originally included being a graduate of a college with special training in physical education.

This was changed in 1943 to

a minimum of two years of college and professional experience as a teaoher in the field of physical trains ing or as a member of a college varsity team in one or more highly competitive sports. . . .101 These requirements were later lowered again and again as qualified individuals became harder to find. It was the original intention that these speoj&ists

98 "Training Activity— Field Administration. . .," p. 501. 99 Grace, 0£. oit.. p. 70. 100 "Training Activity— Field Administration. . p. 508. 101 Loo. cit.

125 would be used exclusively for physical training activities. However, After Pearl Harbor the training stations were swamped with recruits, and company commanders , . . were sorely needed. The Specialists (A) filled the need well. Their training was therefore shaped to prepare them both as physical fitness instructors and company commanders.103 A large number of these specialists were subsequently com­ missioned as officers and performed valuable servloes in a variety of capacities throughout the Navy training program.1®**’ To return to the problem posed at the beginning of this discussion— the extent to which civilian instructors can be utilized as enlisted instructors in wartime— the following quotation seemed to provide an answer: • • • because of training, teaching experience, and temperament— greater patience, for instance— they were superior as instructors to the old chfcfs whom they replaced.105 The Navy Air Teohnloal Training Program experiment. Should subject mastery or teaching ability be the primary qualification for civilian instructors recruited for wartime instructional duties within schools of the Defense Establishment?

103 Ibid.. p. 20. 104 Ibia.. p. 507. 1°5 ibid.. p. 21.

126 Civilian instructors were utilized for two purposes by the Technical Training Command of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics:

(1) to provide instruction in teaching methods

to service instructors; and (2) to serve as instructors of naval air technicians.

In the first instance, eleven "expert

teaoher-trainers," on the payroll of the United States Office of Eduoation, were assigned to the Chicago Teacher Training *«rvZ Center when it opened on December 7» 1941* These eleven figured in the subject-mastery-versus-teaohing-abillty problem only indirectly when they were criticized for being too academic in their methods and too far removed from the teaching situations in which their students* students would have to function. In the second instance, civilians were secured to instruct enlisted technicians in response to a need whioh first arose in the summer of 1941*

Prior to that time,

enlisted personnel--primarily retired or first class ratings — had comprised the instructional staffs.

These individuals

had become so subject to transfer, however, and their teaching proficiency was so low that it was decided to

106 "Aviation Training, 1940 - 1945," p. 92. The date given may be in error, falling as it did on a Sunday. 107 "Training Activity— Standards and Curriculum Division," p. 186.

127 replace them with civilians "save for training in subjects of a highly confidential nature."108 Approximately’ twelve hundred civilians were selected 109 and sent to the Chicago Teacher Training Center 7 for preservioe preparation* Upon the arrival of these civilians at the Center, a significant discovery was made: • . . provisions had been mad© for the establishment of the Teacher Training Center * . * because of the belief that the civilians wbald be mechanics and would require training in teaching methods. Later, in aotual prac­ tice, it was discovered that most of the applicants were teachers who had to be trained as mechanics in order to be useful,110 Out of the modifications whioh followed this discovery, developed the present Navy instructor training belief that instruction in teaching methods is best given in connection with the subject field in whioh the student will do his instructing. The implications which this experiment seemed to hold to the problem of the discussion were that:

(1) both

subject mastery and teaching ability are essential; and (2) neither can be omitted in plans which aim to provide for instructors in a war of the future.

108 "Aviation Training," p, 90, 109 Loo. pit. 110 Ibid.. p. 94.

128 The Army Air Forces Technical Training Program experiment*

To what extent can draft-exempt civilians be

relied on to serve voluntarily as instructors in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment? Civilian instructors had been used along with mili­ tary instructors in Army Air Corps technical training 111 programs since World War I* But the outbreak of war placed suoh a demand upon enlisted personnel for operational and combat duties that it was deolded to use civilians exclusively as instructors* On June 23, 1942, directives were issued by Head­ quarters, Army Air Forces, whioh "emphatically stated that no enlisted men would be assigned as instructors" in the future*

112

A concerted effort followed to procure

civilian instructors who were "not subjeot to eventual military induction* This effort promised for a time to be successful* "Eight hundred civilian instructors were aoquired in the latter two weeks of July 1942.

But the supply of

qualified individuals who were willing to apply for the

111 •♦History of the AAF Technical Training Command and its Predecessors, 1 January 1939 to 7 July 1 9 4 3 P* 472* 112 Ibid., p. 476. 113 Ibid.. p. 478. 114 Loo, oit.

129 assignment was soon exhausted. As we shall see, the most serious obstaole was the lack of civilians in sufficient numbers who were qualified for the work and at the same time not subject to military induction through Selective Servioe.H5 The shortage of instructors had become so critical by the end of the year that it was decided that the policy of using only civilians should be abandoned. The difficulties that had arisen were set forth at length in a letter, 15 December 1942 . • • and were described as a "very serious situation. . . . " At the date of the letter the instructor staff of the radio schools was 1000 below the number then actually required. H o Consequently, in January, 1943* "it was directed that no additional civilian instructors were to be aoquired."H7 And the policy was adopted of returning inducted instruc­ tors to other schools for whioh they were qualified.

Later

this policy was changed to permit their return to the schools from which they had been inducted. As for the problem

ofthe discussion, it might

concluded that in the absence

be

of plannedinstructorprocure­

ment coordinated on a national basis, draft-exempt oiviliana cannot be regarded as an adequate source from which to obtain

13-5 ibid.. p. 476. 116 Ibid.. p. 479. 117 Ibid., p. 486. Loo. oit.

130 instructional personnel to staff wartime schools of the Defense Establishment. The Army Air Forces Flying Training Program experih r m m m im m h i

mmmmmmm

ment.

M

m

p h m

m

iw

w im m in m m im m m H

m m w hm B bm m m m m

To what extent can individuals from the faculties of

secondary schools and institutions of higher education be utilized as commissioned-offioer instructors in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment? Perhaps no one training program in World War II was forced to expand so extensively or so rapidly as that of the Army Air

F o r c e s .

That part of the program whioh was

carried on by theFlying Training

Division and its

counterparts was unique for another reason.

earlier

Because of the

nature of its subject matter and the educational level of its students, flying training could for the most part be best given by instructors at the professional or officer level.

120

Thus, the situation was favorable for what proved to be the only large-scale plan by which highly trained civilians were given direct commissions as officers expressly for the purpose of serving as instructors in schools of the Defense Establishment.

two years. Study.

The a AF increased its units 12,000 percent in (Marshall, Arnold, and King, op. oit.. p. 104*)

120 This was the finding of the Army Air Forces (An Appraisal of Wartime Training. . .. p. 23*)

131 The plan was carried out under What have since become widely known as the first and seoond "Snyder Boards.” This designation came from the individual who was most instrumental in initiating and administering the instructor procurement procedures whioh they effeoted— Lieutenant Colonel (then) -Alva W. Snyder* The First Snyder Board was formed as a result of a request by Headquarters, Gulf Coast Training Center for official authorization to commission 796 highly trained pedagogues * . • in the AUS, in grades consistent with their qualifications and civilian income, as Ground Sohool Instructors. . , . On 25 April a speoial procurement board was named. * . • This board canvassed the states in the Gulf Coast Training Center and appointed approximately 500 men as first or seoond lieutenants between May and September 1942.121 The Seoond Snyder Board was, like the First, a board set up by the Gulf Coast Training Center for obtaining instructors from colleges and universities within its geographical area.

It had counterparts, however, In both the

Eastern and Western Flying Training Centers; and all of them operated under an authorization granted by The Adjutant 122 General’s Offioe on November 4 t 1942.

121 "History, Army Air Forces Central Flying Training Command," p. 173• See Appendix E for the personal comments of Mr. Snyder on the problems and activities of this board. 122 This information came from the basic histories which are cited in the preceding and subsequent footnotes.

132 Each of the training centers was authorized to appoint up to one-third of a total of four hundred first lieutenants and six hundred seoond lieutenants*

These ap­

pointees were to possess the following qualifications;

(1)

draft classification other than 1-A^2*^ (2) over thirty-five years of age;^*2^ (3) qualified at least for limited military service

(4) presently teaching in a college or university 126 or in an AAF ground sohool; (5) ability to teach one of the following subjects— mathematics, physics, meteorology, automotive engineering, navigation, radio, history, maps and charts, photography, cryptography, and electrical or meohanical engineering.

127

'

Of the first 923 individuals procured, 152 or 17 percent had a doctoral degree, 372 or 40 percent had a master’s degree, and 399 or 43 percent had a baooalaurate degree or less.

12&

A study made in 1944 of 220 of these

"History, Army Air Forces Eastern Flying Training Command, 7 December - 1 January 1943$" P* 17. D°o* clt. Loo* oit* 126 "History, Army Air Forces Central Flying Training Command,” p. 175« This requirement was later lowered to include high school teachers* See material oredited to footnote 129» next page.

koo* cit

*

128 Shafer, 0£. clt** p* 1041.

133 /

Officers who were still in the Central Flying Training Command revealed additional statistics which may be roughly applicable to all officers obtained by the Snyder Boards. Their ages ran from 22 to 58 years and 6 percent had been elementary teachers, 46 percent high sohool teachers, 27 percent college or university teachers, 12 percent voca­ tional school teachers, and 9 percent had had no teaching experience of any klnd.3^ When the performance of these men were reviewed in full, two conclusions seemed justified: / (1) as a group they performed above average; and (2) a significant number of them were not happy in their assignments.

Their above-

average performance was directly substantiated by the following evaluation: The efficiency rating of the 220 Ground School instruc­ tors procured by the Second Snyder Board shows these men to have turned in a fine performance* . . * Apparent­ ly few problem officers developed in the group.130 The low morale which prevailed among some has been attributed to several factors:

(1) the selection boards

undoubtedly made certain commitments as to rank and promotion

129 "History, AAF Central Flying Training Command," p. 17S. There seems to be some grounds for doubting the accuracy of these statistios--they did not check out when related to others from the same source. Regardless of their accuracy, however, they reveal that the requirements listed on the preceding page were generally violated. x30 ibid., p. 184.

134 131

which were later broken; *

(2) while many* individuals of a

high educational level were obtained, their training and experience had frequently been in fields which left them unhappily unprepared for the subjects they were called on to teach;1^2 (3) the habits and.attitudes of some did not permit them to make a satisfactory adjustment to military 133 life; (4) in some cases highly qualified individuals were assigned to teach subjects whioh could have been handled just as well, or perhaps better, by instructors from the hlgh-sehool or vooational-school levels

and (5) these

experienced and highly trained educators were placed in too many instanoes under the direct educational administration of officers with little or no knowledge or experience in the educational field* To return to the problem of the discussion, the Snyder Board experiments seemed to indicate that, when properly selected, assigned, and administered, members of the faculties of civilian schools and colleges can provide

Itold*, p. 181; "History of the Western Flying Training Command," p* 649; Lindesmlth, oj>* oit** p. 405* *-32 "History, AAF Eastern Flying Training Command," p. 17. LoQ» oit* 134 Trytten, personal interview, April 6, 1950. 3-35 s 0 © p #

119.

135 superior instruction in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment. SUMMARY Summation.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II,

neither the Army nor the Navy had formulated plans or policies to govern the procurement of instructors for its schools.

This oversight was not officially corrected until

long after the critical need for instructors had subsided. Service schools in the meantime resorted to a variety of expedients in order to obtain instructors. Throughout the early phases of the war there was a general and continual shortage of Instructors.

Inefficient

and tension-producing competition occurred both within and between the Army and Navy for individuals qualified to instruct.

Reserve officers, civilians, students, and In

some instances, individuals barred from other duties were assigned to Instructional duties. These duties were generally accorded a low priority of importance, as were those who performed them. Practices whioh came to be generally followed throughout the services In the procurement of instructors included: careful review of the individual's background; close pre-assignment observation by his superior officers or instructors; and a personal interview with one or more

136 of the sohool*s training personnel. There were a few noteworthy experiments in instructor procurement.

Civilian physical education specialists were

used as enlisted instructors in the Navy Physical Education Program.

Civilian educational specialists provided instruc­

tion in teaching methods to other civilians employed as instructors in the Navy Air Technical Training Program.

The

Army Air Forces tried unsuccessfully to replace its enlisted technical instructors with civilians; and it utilized a large number of professional teachers as commissioned-offioer instructors in its flying-training schools. Findings.

The primary purpose of this chapter was to

present data which would contribute to the establishment of v

criteria for the guidance of planning to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime military schools.

In

view of this purpose, the following findings appeared to be especially significant: 1.

Instructional procurement plans are needed in

order to prevent in times of war: (a) a shortage of teachers for civilian and military schools; (b) unhealthy competition within and between services for instructors; (c) training hampered by the assignment of untrained, inapt, and inept individuals to instructional duties; and (d) training hampered by a low level of importance being accorded instructors and their duties.

137 2.

When Reserve officers are called from their

civilian status, they are generally in need of refresher training before they assume wartime instructional duties. 3.

The use of student as instructors tends to lead

to deterioration of a schoolfs instructional proficiency. While civilian instructors perform well in wartime military schools, they sometimes create problems of morale. 5.

Qualified civilian instructors who are also

draft-exempt are difficult to procure on a voluntary basis in time of war. 6.

Educators, both in and out of uniform, can make

essential contributions to wartime military training programs• 7.

Subject mastery and teaching proficiency must be

accorded co-equal Importance as instructor requisites.

CHAPTER 711 CRITERIA FOR INSTRUCTOR PROCUREMENT PLANNING INTRODUCTION Chapters IV and V presented data which seemed to justify the need for planning to insure that wartime schools of the Defense Establishment would be staffed with competent instructional personnel*

Chapter 71 reviewed data bearing

on instructor procurement in World War II in order to pro­ vide additional evidence upon whioh criteria for instructor procurement planning might be established.

It is the pur­

pose of the present chapter to arrive at these criteria through a synthesis between data previously reported and the opinions of certain educational and planning specialists. The content of the chapter is organized under the following section headings:

Procedures; Respondents;

Criteria Proposed to the Respondents; Criteria Added by the Respondents; Criteria Finally Selected; and* Summary* PROCEDURES Introductory statement.

Although the procedure

followed in selecting criteria was outlined in Chapter II* its brief restatement seemed to be in order here. One of the special problems whioh the Investigation encountered was associated with the total laofc of criteria

139 to guide the formulation of instructor procurement planning* It was a problem, moreover, which could not be avoided, for criteria are essential to purposeful and efficient planning. Procedural steps *

The soundest bases upon which these

cr

criteria could be established seemed to be provided by data from two sources:

(1) the instructor procurement procedures

of the Defense Establishment in the past; and (2) the judge­ ment of civilian and military planning and training special­ ists*

It was therefore decided to submit criteria derived

from lessons of the past to such specialists for their evaluation, modification, and supplementation in the hope that the outcome might yield the criteria desired in the Investigation. As a first step, a list of eleven criteria was pre­ pared with the assistance of certain faculty members and graduate students at the University of Southern California who had had experience in military training programs of World War II.

Later, following a preliminary review of past and

present practices in the procurement of instructors for military schools, this list was revised into the form shown in Table I1 and Appendix D.

^ See p. 146.

140 These revised criteria were then submitted, either personally or by mail, to nineteen civilian and military specialists who evaluated each on an essential-desirableundesirable scale and added such other criteria or comments as they deemed to be appropriate. The responses thus obtained were then evaluated in the light of other pertinent data which the investigation had procured.

This evaluation resulted in the establishment

of fifteen oriteria which are listed and discussed later in this chapter. RESPONDENTS Introductory statement.

While oriteria were being

readied for evaluation, the procedure of choosing specialists to make the evaluation was under way. considered

Two oriteria were

in selecting these individuals:

(1) their past

experiences; and (2) their present responsibilities.

It was

believed that both should be of a nature which would afford the specialist an interest in, and knowledge of, the over­ all problem of instructor procurement in times of war. It was possible to seleot most of the individuals identified with civilian education well in advance of the field phase of the Investigation, for their educational experiences and present responsibilities were well known. Selection of individuals associated with military training,

on the other hand, had to be deferred until the field study had revealed who were best qualified.

The following nine­

teen men, nine eivlllan and ten military, comprised the H a t of those finally selected. Civilian specialists.

The name, present responsibi­

lity, and, where appropriate, the significant experiences of each of the nine men chosen from civilian education follow: Franois *T, Brown; Staff Associate, American Council on Education; World War I veteran; Executive Secretary, Advisory Commission, United States Armed Forces Institute, S, M, Brownell; President, New Haven State Teachers College and Professor of Education, Tale University, Harold Fox; Dean, School of Education, George Washington University; headed the study which lead to the Navy’s present program for training educational adminis­ trators, Willard E, Givens; Executive Secretary, National Education Association; instructor in the Naval Officers Training School, Mare Island, California, In World War I; member of the United States Air Foroe Air University Board of Visitors,

2 And, who were available for personal consultation.

142 Raymond Gregory; Assistant Commissioner for Vocational Education, United States Office of Education; World War I veteran; Assistant Director, Rural War Production Training; advisor to the USAFI program during World War II* Earl I. McGrath; Commisioner of Education, United States Office of Education; Assistant Director, Education and Training Division, War Manpower Commission; Officer in Charge, Educational Services Section, Bureau of Naval Personnel* Raleigh Schorling (deceased); Professor of Education, University of Michigan; headed the only objective survey of military training in sohools of the Defense Establishment made while World War II was still in progress*** M. H. Trytten; Director, Office of Scientific Person­ nel, National Research Council* George F* Zook; President of the American Council on Education (since retired); initiated the Amerioan Council S t u d y m e m b e r of the advisory group for the establishment of the USAF Air University and of that institution's Board of Visitors*

3 For a discussion of this study, see pp* 37 and 39# ^ For a discussion of this study, see pp. 42 and 45*

143 Military training specialists.

The following ten

officers and civilians were selected to represent the Defense Establishment viewpoints; Dr. Sidney Adams; Career Development and Classification Division, Office of the Director of Training, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Dr. Harry Belknap; Dean of Graduate Training, USAF Institute of Technology; veteran of World War I; served as a commissioned officer in the Army Air Forces1 officer procurement activities of World War II. Admiral Louis Denfeld; retired Chief of Naval Opera­ tions; headed Navy training In World War II as responsible officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Captain H. &. Edwards; Chief, Technical Training Section, Bureau of Aeronautics, United States Navy. Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon; Special Assis­ tant for Air Force Academy Matters; the officer officially responsible for the Snyder Board programs for commissioning civilian teachers for assignment to instructional duties In Army Air Forces schools during World War II* ^ Lieutenant Colonel Ike Harrison; Human Resources Branch, Headquarters, United States Air Force; participated

5 For a discussion of these programs, see Appendix E and pp. 130-135*

144 In the

Army

Air Forces Study#

6

Colonel Lloyd Hopwood; Deputy Director of Personnel Planning, Department of the Air Force# Mr# A. H# Onthank; Direotor of Civilian Personnel, Department of the Army* Colonel W* F* Renta; Chief, Technical Training Branch, Headquarters, United States Air Force# Mr# Alva W. Snyder; United States Army Air Forces, Retired; initiated the World War II professor procurement 7 programs which bore his name— the Snyder Boards* Submission of criteria for evaluation* the oriteria questionnaire form

Copies of

into which the eleven

tentative criteria had been incorporated were submitted personally to fifteen of the foregoing individuals, and by mail to Admiral Denfeld, Mr. Snyder, Dr* Brownell, and Dr* Schorling. CRITERIA PROPOSED TO THE RESPONDENTS Introductory statement*

All but one of the forms

submitted to the respondents were returned*

This fine

^ For a discussion of this study, see pp. 39-42# ^ For a disoussion of these programs, see Appendix E and, pp. 130-35* 8 See Appendix D*

145 response was paralleled by extremely helpful data among the responses*

These data were of two types;

(1) a check evalu­

ation of the eleven proposed criteria on an Bssential-Desirable-TJndesirable s c a l e a n d

(2) annotated material consisting

of comments on the eleven criteria, additional oriteria, and comments regarding these additional criteria*

10

*■

Data obtained from the check evaluation proved of limited significance when submitted to statistical examination. Although a number of evaluations were made on each criterion, many respondents qualified their evaluations by comments of one kind or another*

Other respondents failed to check

certain of the criteria, which could have meant that the criteria were found distasteful overlooked or not understood*

11

12

or simply that they were

All of these limitations

should be born in mind when the results of the oheck evaluation are noted in Table I* One finding only seemed warranted by the oheck

9 See Table I on the next page. ^ Data relating to other aspects of the investiga­ tion were also obtained from these responses* ^ In the case of proposed criterion 8 on pages 157 and 153, general disapproval was recorded in the annotated comments while ten respondents failed to check it. ^ The entry of a question mafck (?) by some respon­ dents gave no definite clue in this situation.

TABLE I EVALUATION OF PROPOSED INSTRUCTOR-FROCUREMENT PLANNING CRITERIA BY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EDUCATIONAL SPECIALISTS

Proposed Criteria

J Essential

lo Does the plan provide a sufficient number of teachers to fill that portion of the wartime need of the Army# Navy# and Air Force for instructors which cannot be adequately filled by their regular personnel?

—

Undesirable

21#

None

2e Does the plan provide for the selection of individuals who have already demonstrated superior teaching ability in fields related to military and naval curricula?

9 —

64#

5 —

36#

None

3o Does the plan enable participating individuals to acquire first-hand# up-to-date knowledge of the subjeot matter and methodology of their teaching assignments within the Defense Establishment?

11 —

73#

4 —

27#

None

7 —

47#

cn 44

3 —

1 1

idjt

CD

11

Desirable

None

5 0 Does the plan avoid uneconomical and tension-producing competition for the better teachers among the Army# Navy# and Air Force?

13 —

87#

CM

1 1

*

H

None

Will the plan attraot the most highly qualified type of instructors and retain them as participants?

10 ~

67#

4 —

27#

1

—

06#

—

08#

4 0 Does the plan encourage free and easy interchange of ideas and methods between Defense and civilian education?

60

7. Does the plan provide a continuing means of securing young replacements for participants who become over-age or inactive?

8

—

61#

4 —

31#

1

8#

6

—

75#

2 —

25#

None

5 —

42#

None

Can the plan be established with a minimum of new legislation?

9e Can the plan be readily established under the present administrative and training organization of the Army# Navy# and Air Force?

7—

10.

4 —

40#

6

—

60#

None

8

67#

4

—

33#

None

Can the plan be established with a minimum of expense to the government?

11. Does the plan aim at selecting only the best qualified individuals without regard to their race# religion, or color? ___________

_______________ ____________

_

_ _

.. ... .... ....... ...................

_ _

........

—

58#

_

* The firBt number in each case refers to how many specialists checked the criterion in the category; the second or pementage number refers to the percentage of checks in the category in relation to the total number who checked the criterion. >'

147 evaluations: the respondents were In general agreement that all eleven oriteria were either essential or desirable provided they were intertrepreted or modified in certain ways*

Thus* the foous of attention in the search for infor­

mation which would be helpful in arriving at oriteria shifted to the second type of data provided in the responses— the annotated material* Each of the eleven oriteria whioh were submitted to the specialists for evaluation is stated in the ensuing paragraphs, followed by (1) the results of its check evalu­ ation, (2) its annotated comments, (3) other data revealed in this investigation which are related to it, and (4) its restatement in the form shown to be the most appropriate , by the preceding data* Proposed criterion 1*

Does the plan provide a

sufficient number of teachers to fill that portion of the wartime need of the Army, Navy, and Air Poroe for instruc­ tors which cannot be filled by their regular personnel? Check evaluation:

Number of checks— fourteen;

essential— eleven; desirable— three; undesirable— none* Annotated comments: a* Not all of the best teachers are teaching* • • • There are probably other sources, e*g*, certain sales personnel, attorneys, and others who have had teaching experience* b*

This need would be very difficult to estimate.

148 c. When we /¥he NavyT speak of civilian instructors, we are thinking primarily of those people from civilian life who have a thorough knowledge of sound educational techniques and will fill such key billets as instructor training and supervision, control of training programs for the development of sound currloulums, standard testing methods, and the use of those other educational techniques which lead to very high standards and stan­ dardized instructional methods• d*

See additional criterion 5, page 166*

Other related data; a*

A shortage of qualified instructors prevailed

during the early phases of World War XI * ^ b.

In times of war, Regular instructors are generally

needed in duties which command higher priority than does instruction.1^ e*

Regular personnel could not fill more than a rela­

tive few of the instructional duties which war creates*^ d*

Certain courses of instruction in schools of the

Defense Establishment require instructional personnel who 16 have had long and specialized military service* e*

The quality of instruction in military schools,

as in all schools, is dependent to an important degree upon 17 the quality of the educational leadership provided. ' 1i

.. .

13 See pp. $91-103. Xl* See pp. 103-104. *5 see pp. 62 and 83. See pp* 10 and 11* 3-7 See pp* 118 -19*

149 Restatement of the criterion:

The foregoing data

indicated that the criterion was justified but that it should have been phrased as follows:

The plans should

provide for sufficient instructional personnel to meet the needs which would develop in wartime. Proposed criterion 2.

18

Does the plan provide for the

selection of individuals who have already demonstrated superior teaohing ability in fields related to military and naval curricula? Check evaluation:

Number of checks— fourteen;

essential— nine; desirable— five; undesirable— none. Annotated comments: a. Superior teaohing ability is probably more impor­ tant than that it be in fields related to military and naval curricula. b. These individuals should also be flexible— willing to adopt new ideas, able to adopt to a military situation. o. • . . i t would be helpful to have civilian educators wMith previous knowledge of Navy currioulums and methods, but far from essential /the respondent is speaking of educational specialists/T On the other hand, if we assume we are talking about the classroom instruc­ tor, this question immediately changes from desirable to essential. Related data: a*

Superior instructional profioiency which is

^ Several respondents advised that the oriteria be stated positively rather than in question form.

150 essential in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment is dependent upon both thorough knowledge of subject matter 19 and superior teaohing ability* b.

In many Instances, curricula of military schools

have their counterparts in civilian educational institu­ tions.^ c.

The same techniques which make for superior

instruction in civilian schools achieve superior instruction 21 in military schools. d.

The probable nature of a future war would not

permit time to be lost in the acquisition of subject mastery or teaching ability after its outbreak.^2 Restatement of the criterion:

The foregoing data

indicated that the criterion was justified but that it should have been phrased as follows~The plans should seleot individuals for wartime instructional assignments who have demonstrated superior proficiency in fields similar to those assignments.

See pp. 109-11. See appendix B. 21 , the best practices in the armed services were a reflection of the best thinking In civilian education." (Oraoe, Educational Lessons from Wartime Training, p. 99.) 22 See pp. 11-14.

151 Proposed criterion 2*

Does the plan enable partici­

pating individuals to acquire first-hand, up-to-date knowledge of the subject matter and methodology of their teaohing assignments within the Defense Establishments? Oheck evaluation:

Number of checks— fifteen;

essential— eleven; desirable— four; undesirable— none. Annotated comments: a. There are a number of situations where this could not be done. Fire control, for example, is so technical that the instructor must come from within the force. b. It would not be necessary for all of this know­ ledge to be aoquired through first-hand experience within the Defense Establishment. c. An exception might be necessary with regard to classified material. Belated data: a.

Keeping up to date on instructional techniques

and subject matter is essential to being prepared for immediate assignment in the event of war to instructional duties.2^ b.

A limitation of the Organized Reserves as a

wartime source of Instructional personnel is their lack of 1 i ' ! 24 effective refresher training for their experienced members.

23 gee p. 88. Loo. olt.

152 o.

The quantitative need for instructional personnel

in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment is so great that it is physically impossible in peacetime to provide first-hand experience in their mobilization assignments to more than a fraction of those which would be needed.2'* Restatement of the criterion:

The foregoing data

indicated that the criterion was justified but that it should have been phrased as follows— The plans should provide a means by which individuals who are selected for wartime instructional assignments can receive up-to-date knowledge of the subject matter and methodology of those assignments* Proposed criterion

Does the plan encourage free

and easy interchange of ideas and methods between DefenseEstablishment and civilian education? Check evaluation:

Number of checks— fifteen; essential

— seven; desirable— eiaht; undesirable— none. Annotated comments: a* The School of Education at George Washington University and the Navy’s training programs have been mutually benefltted through their close cooperation in recent years. b. . . . under our theory of operation it is an essential method of our system since it is predicated upon a blending of educational and Navy "know-how."

2-> See p. 82.

153 Belated data: a*

Because of the traditional practices in the armed

services of frequently rotating experienced instructors to other assignments and of using former students of a sohool as instructors, their schools are particularly vulnerable to the hazards of instructional inbreading*

Consequently, a

means for maintaining a continual stream of fresh ideas from sources outride the military training programs would seem to have significance to the Defense Establishment*2^ b.

Many opinions and several research studies have

been reported on the implications and lessons which World War II military training holds for civilian education*2^ Perhaps an educational program so extensive, so comprehen­ sive, and so well financed as that presently maintained by the Defense Establishment can also offer interesting and valuable lessons to civilian education* c*

2g

The excellence of World War II training programs

of the Army and Navy was largely the result of civilian 2Q education^ know-how* 7

26 See pp. 107-08. 27 Chapter III reviewed several of these studies. 2® See Appendix B. 29 See pp. 111-13.

154 Restatement of the criterion:

The foregoing data

indicated that the criterion was .justified but that it should have been phrased as follows— The plans should en­ courage and facilitate the interchange of ideas and methods between Defense Establishment and civilian education in times of peace as well as of war* Proposed criterion Jj>*

Does the plan avoid uneconomi­

cal and tension-producing competition for the better teachers among the Army, Navy, and Air Force? Check evaluation:

Number of checks— fifteen;

essential— thirteen; desirable— two; undesirable— none* Annotated comments: Belated data:

None*

There was unregulated competition

among service agencies for qualified Instructors during World War 11,30 Restatement of the criterion:

While all the data

indicated that this criterion was justified, it seemed to be subordinate to additional criterion 2 on pages 163 and 164* Proposed criterion .

The plans should provide Instructional

personnel who are ready for their wartime assignments at the time they are needed* This oriterion aims at a need which is essential to the planning envisioned in this investigation.

With ori­

terion k it aims at preventing another "too little and too late" situation* Criterion 6.

The plans should atttaot peacetime

participants who are capable of performing wartime instruc­ tional duties in a superior manner* Any planning which aims at wartime mobilization must of necessity be formulated and implemented in times of peace.

This in itself presents a problem in view of the

apathy which traditionally besets America in peaoetlme toward precautions against the possible outbreak of war* When those who would be primarily called on to participate in %a peaoetime phases are, for the most part, members of a profession which sometimes adds antipathy to apathy,^ the

See footnote *>5» P* 169.

172 problem becomes still more difficult.

Nevertheless, Its

solution seems possible, but only through Intelligent planning of the highest order. Criterion £.

The plans should provide for maintaining

the interest and cooperation of those selected as peacetime participants. The problem which attracting participants presents is probably exceeded by that of -maintaining their active par­ ticipation.

Wise and judicious administration of the plans

must follow their formulation if this oriterion would be met. Criterion 8.

The plans should provide a means for

replacing peaoetime participants who become inactive. This criterion would lend effectiveness and permanence to the plans.

Participants lost through attrition, whatever

its cause, must be replaced promptly by qualified personnel* Criterion £.

The plans should provide a means by

which individuals who are selected for wartime instructional assignments can receive up-to-date knowledge of the subject matter and methodology of those assignments. This oriterion aims at two objectives:

(1) keeping

participants in the plans interested and active; and (2) keeping them prepared for immediate assignment in the event of war.

While both of these objectives would probably be

173 best effected through periodic instructional experience in schools of the Defense Establishment, physical limitations would require most participants to be kept up to date through less direct means* Criterion 10*

The plans should encourage and facili­

tate the interchange of ideas and methods between civilian and Defense Establishment education in times of peace as well as of war* This oriterion aims at justifying the plans and the measures which they would effect on a basis other than as a precaution against war.

Money, time, and effort spent in

military research and development have paid peacetime divi­ dends through improvements in products used in everyday life. It would seem only reasonable that similar dividends should accrue to education in general from the money, time, and 57 effort now being spent in military education. Criterion 11.

The plans should be of a type which

can be readily implemented under the current administrative and training organization of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This criterion would tend to keep the plans realistic and practical and, thus, usable*

57 5ee Appendix B*

174 Criterion 12.

The plans should be oapable of imple-

mentation with a minimum of oost to the nation* This oriterion needs no comment. Criterion 13*

The plans should be flexible.

This oriterion recognizes that for the plans to be realistic, they must provide for, or be oapable of adjusting to, whatever conditions and situations might develop in the event of war.

Suoh flexibility must be based on careful and

continuing study of all factors whioh might affect military and oivilian education during a future war. Criterion 14.

The plans should be coordinated with

others which are ooncerned with the wartime utilization of the nation1s trained manpower. The foregoing criterion is stated at this point not because it is less important than those preceding it, but because the action it calls for is best done last.

As was

so aptly stated by one individual who has had extensive experience in personnel planning: If you want to make plans of this type, you must gc| ahead as if in a vacuum and disregard other claims which have been, or might be, made upon the services of those involved. Only after you have achieved what yoh believe to be an ideal plan is the time right for coordinating it with other plans.56

56 Trytten, personal interview, April 6, 1950.

The purpose of oriterion 14 is to insure that the intellectual resources of the nation are utilized prudentially--that each individual is assigned to the duties in in which he is best qualified to contribute in the event of a major war*

Quite obviously this measure would require

some individual or some agency to be responsible for effecting the coordination* Oriterion 15*

The plans should be frequently revised*

This oriterion recognizes that planning for a continuing need cannot become static*

The rapid developments

in military weapons and strategy and the unstable inter­ national situation today demand that plans which they direct­ ly affect remain fluid and in step* SUMMARY Summation*

Two sources provided data upon which

criteria for instructor procurement planning were based: past experiences in military instructor procurement and the opinions of educational and planning specialists*

Eleven

criteria, derived from past experiences, were submitted to nineteen oivilian and military respondents for evaluation, modification, and supplementation* Out of a synthesis of data received from these respondents and of data obtained elsewhere in the investi­ gation, fifteen criteria were developed*

Findings#

It was the purpose of this chapter to

report the establishment of criteria by which planning for the nee$ in wartime for military instructional personnel might be guided and evaluated.

The fifteen criteria

arrived at are listed in the preceding section of the chapter.

59 see pages 168-75*

CHAPTER VIII PLANNING PROPOSED FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF WARTIME MILITARY INSTRUCTIONAL PERSONNEL INTRODUCTION v

Preoeding chapters have reported the need for planning to staff the wartime schools of the Army* Navy, and Air Force and have established criteria to guide such planning.

It is

the purpose of the present chapter to outline what this investigation has indicated the planning should be. The chapter’s presentation is organized under the following section headings;

Planning Proposed by Others;

Planning Proposed by this Investigation; Evaluation of the Planning Proposed by this Investigation; and, Summary. PLANNING PROPOSED BY OTHERS Introductory statement.

A number of individuals who

had observed the conditions which accompanied the lack of planning for instructor procurement in World War II have suggested measures aimed at preventing their re-occurrence in the event of another war.

While these measures fell far

short of the goals prescribed by the criteria of Chapter VII, they were Instrumental in shaping the planning which is outlined later in this chapter.

They are reported without

comment in the paragraphs which follow.

173 Interchange of Instructors*

A Navy suggestion:

One officer of the regular Navy who held a most re­ sponsible position in the V-12 Program has recommended that oapable young officers be made available from time to time to accept teaching positions in colleges and universities so that they may be made aware of the facilities and opportunities for training that exist in the institutions. Pre-mobilization instructor training*

Another Navy

suggestion: It has been noted that many of the weaknesses in train­ ing were a result of unpreparedness* Consequently most of the following comments are made with a view to avoiding that situation in the event that the task should ever have to be done again* * . • likewise, it is recommended that at the approach of an emergency schools for instructors be established particularly for the larger programs such as indoctrination, midshipmen, and NBOTC, but also for the highly technical programs such as radar, torpedoes, rockets, and ordnance and gunnery • • • graduates who have not joined the Beady Beserve would provide a pool of potential instructors.2 An instructor reserve*

A recommendation of the Army

Air Forces Study During peacetime, all graduates of specialist schools should receive training as instructors in that specialty* Those successfully completing the instructors course should be assigned in appropriate MOS with greater opportunities for advancement in both training and tactical units* These men make up the "instructor reserve*" Those failing the instructors course should

1 "Training Activity— The College Training Program," p* 133* 2 "Training Activity— Field Administration. • *,” p# 233* 3 For a discussion of this study see pp. 39-42*

179 be assigned in accordance with their primary MQS. They will have benefited from the additional training even though they proved unsatisfactory as instructors. Since the primary function of peacetime tactical units is to maintain proficiency and develop new tactics in anticipation of war emergencies, instruetor-speclalists should be assigned to each unit to supervise continuation training. At the outset of an emergency, to prepare for expan­ sion in training, all available members of the Instructor reserve should immediately be ordered to training establishments, subject to rotation as described below. Initial training should concentrate on producing capable instructors. These new instructors, plus the instructor reserve, would provide an adequate staff for expanding training facilities* Early graduates not qualified as instructors should be assigned to tactical units. A well-planned rotation policy should be put into effect as soon as possible, notation from training units should be coordinated with rotation from tactical units to allow for the absorption of properly qualified tour-completed specialists into the training programis. Returning personnel should receive careful indoctrina­ tion, stressing the fact that returnees still have responsibilities to the service and can still make /' valuable contributions. • • these men should be retrained to reacquaint them with training procedures and to famil­ iarize them with the latest advances in technique.**' (

An instructor specialist group.

A. W. Snyder’s^

suggestion: My thinking at the moment is that if this planning were my problem, I would explore the cost and possibilities of setting up a specialist group within the Defense

^

Appraisal of Wartime Training. * .. p. 24*

5 For a disouasion of Mr. Snyder’s background, see pp. 13G->5 Appendix E.

180 Department and design a special Inactive Duty Training plan for these instructors— and then see that the right type of eager men were assigned to administer the train­ ing program. There are many Regular officers still in the service that were very close to the problem during the last war. Their experience would be very valuable in implementing such a program. The universities would help a great deal, I am sure,6 Educational corps,

Both McGrath and Gregory mentioned

a plan which each had participated in recommending while connected with World War II military training activities. This plan, in essence, would create an Educational Corps in the Army, Navy, and Air Force to parallel such other specialist groups as the Medical Corps and the Corps of Engineers,

Its members would be recruited, or given

commissions as officers, directly from the educational profession or be Regular personnel who had been sent to universities for graduate and undergraduate training in the fields of education.

Responsibilities of these corps would

include the administration and supervision of, and the pro­ vision of instructional services to, the schools of their respective military services,7

^ Personal letter, May 1, 1950, 7 Earl 3“, McGrath, personal interview, April 5» 1950; Raymond Gregory, personal interview, April k$ 1950,

181 PLANNING PROPOSED BT THIS INVESTIGATION Introductory statement*

Certain measures which this

Investigation has shown to he necessary in military instruct tor procurement are reported in this section*

No attempt is

made in this report to go beyond a brief introduction of each measure} details must be filled in by further study and experience* While some of the measures may already have been undertaken,® all are recommended as being essential to the eduoatlonal programs of the armed services In time of war* Inasmuch as these measures were derived from data reported earlier in this dissertation, no documentation is offered; they are, however, evaluated in a subsequent section in the light of the fifteen planning criteria established in Chapter VII. The measures are proposed in the logical order of their accomplishment, the first three being preliminary in nature and the last two, administrative* Proposal 1*

A survey of the curricula offered in

schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force* Appendix B of this report lists the courses currently offered in schools of the Defense Establishment and indicates

8 Plans which may have been classified "top secret" were not available to this investigation*

182 which of these contain subject matter that might be taught, with but a minimum of orientation, by individuals who have had successful instructional experience in related civilian courses.

This indication was based on a superficial review

of course descriptions and, ©nsequently, is not sufficiently accurate to serve for planning purposes. It is therefore proposed that a comprehensive survey /

be made, and repeated at appropriate intervals of time, of the courses currently taught in schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

This survey would be made by a team composed

of civilian and military curriculum and instructional speoialists and would aim at two objectives:

(1) to determine

the extent to which these courses might be taught in wartime by oivilian Instructors who have had successful experience in related fields; and (2) to determine the extent to whicjh these courses might be taught in wartime in civilian schools and colleges. Inasmuch as. curricula, personnel, and facilities of all levels and types of educational institutions would be involved in this survey, it is further proposed that it b£ made under the sponsorship of a national educational organi­ zation whose membership encompasses as many of these insti­ tutions as possible.

The American Council on Education would

seem to be well qualified in this respect.

Proposal 2m

A study of the extent to whioh

instructional personnel would be needed by schools of the Army* Navy* and Air Force in a future war* Before realistic plans for wartime instructor procure ment can be formulated* it is necessary to know the approxi­ mate number of personnel whioh would be needed.

The present

investigation has pointed out the general need* but an assessment of specific needs was beyond its scope. It is therefore proposed that a study be made, and repeated at appropriate intervals of time, which would aim at two objectives:

(1) to determine the appoximate number

of instructional personnel whioh would be needed in each subject area under the various conditions whioh might accompany the outbreak of war; and (2) to determine the probable rate at which these personnel would be needed under each of these conditions following the outbreak of war. Because of the highly classified nature of the infor­ mation with whioh this survey would deal* it is proposed that it be 'made by a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force group composed of highly qualified training specialists working closely with war plans personnel. The outcome of this survey* when related to the findings of the preceding curricular survey should define the number, and the assignment areas, of the Instructional personnel for which the planning must provide.

184 Proposal 3.

A national inventory of instructional

personnel• Once the number and type of personnel needed in war­ time military education have been learned, the focus of attention would turn to the source from whioh they would be prooured.

This source would basically have to be the

civilian teaching

profession.^

It Is therefore proposed that an Inventory be made and corrected annually of all the nation's Instructional personnel. Many state departments of education already have made provisions for collecting and keeping on file information relating to accredited teachers and other educational per­ sonnel under their jurisdiction.

An inventory of the type

proposed should be made by an organization which maintains regular channels of communication with these state agencies. Consequently, it is further proposed that the United States Office of Education be assigned the responsibility of making and maintaining the inventory. The data which would be needed for planning purposes would not be many.

The following might suffice:

name, age;

sex; marital status and dependents; degrees held or other evidence of training; subjects or duties in which qualified

9 other sources mould provide a few.

185 and extent of experience; whether or not a member of the Organized Reserves; whether or not a conscientious objector; physical limitations; and an indication of the individuals relative proficiency* Proposal /fc*

Establishment of policies by the Army,

Navy, and Air Force to govern the assignment and tenure of military instructional personnel* While it must be granted that many experienced in­ structors in the Regular service would, in the event of war, be needed in operational and combat duties, the fact remains that such personnel must provide instruction in a number of the more specialized courses*

Furthermore, large numbers

of civilian school people would probably be enlisted, drafted, or commissioned at such a time*

These personnel

should certainly be utilized where they might make their i

greatest contributions to the war effort#

Finally, two of

the preceding proposals and all whioh follow are aimed at securing civilian instructional personnel to supplement Regular service instructors in time of war* In view of the foregoing considerations, it would seem strange indeed if the Army, Navy, and Air Force failed to establish policies for the effective utilization of their own experienced instructional personnel in times of war*

186 The nature of these policies would have to be determined from time to time through careful study within the respective services; however, they most certainly should be aimed at preventing a repetition of the malpraotioes of World War II which are outlined in Chapter VI of this disser­ tation*

These policies might incorporate aspects of the

proposals reported earlier in this chapter; they might follow the example of the Air Foroe education career p l an;^ or they might represent entirely new innovations*

The

important point, however, is that there must be policies— policies aimed at:

(1) lifting instructional duties in

wartime to the position of importance and priority they deserve; (2) lifting the general proficiency of wartime instructional personnel above the mediocrity to whioh praotices based on tradition and convenience would other­ wise doom it; and (3) utilizing experienced instructional personnel in capacities through which they might mahe their maximum contribution to the war effort. Proposal

Establishment of a national reserve of

instructional personnel. When the need for young and physically qualified

^

For a discussion of this plan see pp* 80-81.

137 individuals^ for operational duties in time of war is con­ sidered in relation to the paralleling need for instructional personnel, one inference becomes clear*

Prudential utiliza­

tion of manpower would require a high proportion of the instructional duties to be performed by Individuals not qualified for combat or operational military service* It is therefore proposed that a reserve of instruc­ tional personnel be organized on a nation-wide scope* This reserve would be made up of men and women who (1) are deferred, for reasons of sex, age, or physical condition, from combat or operational military assignments; and (2) are experienced in instructional duties similar to those which are performed in wartime schools of the Defense Establish­ ment*

In the event of a major war, these individuals would

be assigned as needed, and in the status deemed appropriate, to educational programs of the Defense Establishment.^ This reserve of instructional personnel would be legally and physically separate from any of the present military Reserve organizations.

It would be loosely

organized, and it would secure, maintain, and control its membership entirely on the voluntary bases which are outline^ in the next four paragraphs*

^ Some of these programs might be carried on in civilian schools or colleges.

The names of prospective members would be seoured from the inventory files discussed tinder proposal 3* names would be selected with two criteria In mind;

These (1) the

ability of the individual, so far as it could be determined, to perform a particular military Instructional assignment in a superior manner;

12

and (2) the distribution of membership

In suoh a way that no one civilian institution or locality would lose a disproportionate number of its teaohers during times of war* The Individuals thus selected would be tendered invitations to accept memberships in the instructional reserve*

Because of the number whioh would be involved,

most of these invitations would have to be proffered by mail although BOTC or other locally stationed Regular personnel might be utilized for this purpose in some instances*

The

invitations would explain that membership would entail a moral obligation in the event of war to accept an assignment to instructional duties similar to those In which the indi­ vidual has had civilian experience; and, that he would be similarly obligated during times of peace to become familiar with whatever information is furnished relating to the sub­ ject matter and methodology of his potential assignment*

Individuals from all levels and types of sohools would thus be eligible*

189 The individual oould then signify his acceptance of membership be returning a signed statement to that effect to the office which proffered the invitation.

Memberships

would be similarly renewed each year. The scope of the potential need which the membership of this reserve would be prepared to meet would require that it be relatively large.

And the fact that, in the absence

of legislation to the contrary,^ members would be but morally bound to acoept their wartime obligation would re­ quire a somewhat larger membership than would otherwise be necessary— those whose sense of duty might be affected by the outbreak of war would have to be allowed for.

Moreover,

the number required by each servioe would not be equal, Inasmuch as schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force vary in the extent to which personnel of the type provided for in this proposal can successfully participate. The problems of how to inform members of the nature

,

of their duties and how to keep them abreast of new developW ments might be solved as follows.

Upon his acceptance of ,/ i

i

membership in the reserve, the individual would be given a ’ description of his potential wartime duties.

This descrip­

tion might take the form of course syllabi, lesson plans,

Legislation now under consideration for the control of manpower during times of national emergency would, if enacted into law, assist the implementation of this parti­ cular proposal.

190 et oetera; and it would be assembled in a permanent-type loose-leaf binder.

Thereafter the individual would receive

a periodical, probably monthly, devoted to reporting new developments in subject matter and methodology in schools of the armed services,1^

The pages of this publication would

be perforated and punched to facilitate the removal and in­ clusion in the loose-leaf binder of whatever of the informa­ tion might apply to the recipients prospective duties* Other features of this proposal are discussed further in the section on evaluation* Proposal 6.

Establishment of a cadre of instructional

personnel within the Organized Reserves. This investigation has shown that certain requisites would be needed by those who would bear the brunt of instruc­ tional duty in military schools during the early phases of a future war.

Among these requisites are superior competence,

immediate availability, and a continuously up-to-date acquelatanoe with the duties to be performed.

The only estab­

lished means by which such requisites might be obtained seems /

to lie within the framework of the Organized Reserves* It is therefore proposed that a cadre of instructional personnel be built up within the Army, Navy, and Air Force

14 The Technical Data Digest now published free from security classification by the Central Air Documents Office (Army-Navy-Air Force) might serve as a precedent here.

191 Reserve programs which would be immediately available in the event of war to perform instructional duties or to assist others to perform them*

These personnel would thus provide

both the temporary service of staffing the expanding schools until others could be procured and oriented, and the contin­ uing service of organizing, administering, and training personnel for the over-all programs of instruction* The members of the cadre would be commissioned offi­ cers of the Reserves functioning on a "mobilization-assign15 ment"basis* ^ As such, they quite naturally would be subject to all the privileges, benefits, and obligations which legally relate to Reserve personnel. It is proposed that membership be limited to individu­ als possessing thorough training, experience, and superior proficiency in the various instructional fields and that, for reasons of long-range economy, they be relatively young at the time they are commissioned as members*

The procedure

by which these members might be selected follows* All interested instructional personnel would be invited to apply for membership, provided they are qualified

15 As defined in Air Force Regulation No. 45-3# 5 August 1949# "mobilization assignment" is "duty for whioh an Air Force Reserve officer volunteers and is assigned in an inaotive duty status in anticipation of war or other National emergency*" Each officer thus assigned knows in advance what his wartime assignment will be, and he is afforded periodio tours of aotive duty— two weeks usually— in that assignment*

192 as to age* physical condition, citizenship, and other respects for commissioning in the Reserves.

Air Force Regulation Ho*

45~15# 23 September 1949# which applies to the appointment of professional and technical specialists in the Reserves, offers a precedent for this application. After the applications are received and processed, the professional superior of each applicant who seems to be especially well qualified would be requested to submit a confidential evaluation of the applicants proficiency and potential worth to the cadre.

These evaluations would then

be reviewed and the applicants who emerge as most capable of performing instructional duties in a superior manner, and who are otherwise qualified, would be offered a commission 16 in the appropriate Reserve organization. Each officer thus commissioned would be provided with the materials described in proposal 5*

And, at least once

each three years, he would be obligated to perform a twomonth tour of active duty in the instructional duties and type of school or office to which he would be assigned in the event of war. The two-month tour of active duty, which probably could be arranged during the summer-vaoation period which most oivilian teachers enjoy, would be utilized for three

The rank to which each individual would be commis­ sioned would be based on an age-experience criterion.

193 purposes:

(1) to obtain basic orientation as an officer;

(2) to observe and participate In the instructional duties of his mobilization assignment; and (3) to observe the operational activities

which graduates from his mobili­

zation assignment are called on to perform.^ Individuals selected for the cadre would probably come from all levels and types of civilian institutions. But inasmuch as a large proportion of the education provided in military schools is technical or vocational in nature and involves students who are at about the upper secondary level, a majority of the members would probably be secured from the staffs of trade and vocational departments in schools at the high-school and junior-oollege levels. This Reserve cadre would require a comparatively small membership, the primary emphasis being on quality rather than on quantity.

While the number would have to be determined

through further study, a total of one thousand for each of the three services— three thousand in all— might be reason­ able for purposes of planning. This proposal is discussed further in the section on evaluation.

U It should be noted that the presence each year of a substantial number of these Reserve officers in the schools would leave Regular instructors free to spend time Y in operational assignments and thus increase their own worth as instructors. (This was suggested by Dr. Adams, personal / interview, March 31* 1950.)

194 Proposal X*

Establishment of a joint Army-Navy-

Air Force office to administer proposals 5 and 6* The two preceding proposals outlined procedures of selection, indoctrination, and utilization of personnel whloh would be both extensive and unique*

Apparently no one

office now exists which is capable of accomplishing these duties on an interservice basis. It is therefore proposed that a joint Army-NavyAir Force office be established at the departmental level which would be charged with the following responsibilities: (1) the selection of personnel to comprise the membership of the instructional reserve and of the Reserve cadre dis­ cussed in proposals 5 and 6; (2) the maintenance of all records relating to members of the instructional reserve; (3) the maintenance of records relating to the qualifica­ tions, tours of duty, and proficiency of members of the Reserve cadre; (4) the administration of matters relating to tours of duty for the Reserve cadre; (5) the collection, preparation, publication, and distribution to members of the instructional reserve and the Reserve cadre, as outlined in proposal 5, of information pertaining to the Instructional programs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and (6) such other responsibilities as further study reveal to be appropriate.

195 Th© staff of this offlo© need not be large, but the capabilities of its members should be extremely high. should possess th© following general qualifications:

All (1)

successful instructional and administrative experience in civilian or military sohools; (2) thorough training in the fundamentals of teaohing and educational administration; (3) experience in the collation and preparation of instruc­ tional materials; and (4) proven ability to "get along" with others. Specialized assignments within the staff would include: (1) an administrator who, for several reasons, might best be a civilian educator who is known and respected nationally by the educational profession; (2) a publications editor, either civilian or officer; (3) a publications technician, civilian or officer; (4) officers to represent, and to handle information relating to, the schools of each of the services; and (5) certain other personnel which more detailed planning and subsequent experience might Indicate to be necessary. This proposal, like the others, is discussed further in the section on evaluation. Proposal 8,

Over-all coordination by the Manpower

Division of the National Security Resources Board. Many of the individuals who would be sought as members of the instructional reserve and the Reserve cadre would nb

196 doubt have been included in other plans for the wartime utilization of trained manpower.

There would quite obvious­

ly have to be a central body to coordinate these conflicting needs and to initiate, coordinate, and evaluate the planning proposed in the preceding paragraphs of this section. It is therefore proposed that over-all coordination of the foregoing proposals be placed in the office whioh has been officially designated to plan for wartime manpower utilization, the Manpower Division of the National Security Resources Board. EVALUATION OF THE PLANNING PROPOSED BY THIS INVESTIGATION Introductory statement.

A problem whioh underlay the

formulation of the planning proposed in the preceding seotion requires consideration at this point.

How well does

the planning measure up to the fifteen criteria which were established in Chapter VII for its guidance and evaluation? It Is the purpose of this seotion to evaluate the planning in the light of each of the fifteen criteria. Criterion 1,.

The plans should be formulated on a

nation-wide scale by cooperative action among representatives of the educational profession, the Defense Establishment, and other interested groups and agencies. Proposal 1 would determine the extent to which civilian instructional personnel and civilian schools might

197 b© used in wartime through a survey conducted by a team of civilian and military educational specialists.

Proposals 5

and 6 would establish an instructional reserve and a Reserve oadre composed of civilians working in cooperation with military educational specialists.

And proposal 7 would call

on civilian and military educational specialists to provide joint administration of these plans. Criterion 2.

The plans should select individuals for

wartime instructional duties solely on the basis of their ability to perform those duties in a superior manner. No mention is made in proposals 5 and 6 of restrict­ ing membership in the instructional reserve and Heserve cadre on any suoh discriminatory bases as race, sex, politics, and religion.

Such conditions as willingness to participate,

age, and physical oonditlon apply equally to all individuals and oan hardly be considered discriminatory.

The provisions

of the proposals are aimed at securing and retaining as members only those individuals who would be qualified to perform their wartime duties in a superior manner. Criterion 2 *

Plans should select individuals for

wartime instructional assignments who have demonstrated superior proficiency in fields similar to those assignments. Proposal 3» the national Inventory of instructional talent, is aimed indireotly at meeting this criterion; and

198

the procedures outlined in proposals 5 and 6 for the seleotion of members for the instructional reserve and Reserve cadre are directly in line with it* Superior proficiency among those selected for the Reserve cadre could be readily assured through: (1) the method of their selection and (2) their performances during tours of active duty.

The proficiency of those in the

instructional reserve, however, would be more difficult to 1# ascertain* Perhaps the best solution would lie in careful evaluation and, where warranted, elimination at the time they are called on for wartime duty* Criterion /^*

The plans should provide for sufficient

instructional personnel to meet the needs which would develop in wartime. Under proposals 3, 4$ 5> and 6, the following five sources of instructional personnel would be provided:

(1)

the regular instructional personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force who ,would be available in limited numbers during * the early phases of an emergency; (2) an unpredictable number of experienced school people who would have enlisted or have been drafted or commissioned from civilian life, and who would be well qualified, after a period of orientation, for instructional assignments; (3) the Reserve

IS

The indications of proficiency mentioned on page 182 would quite probably be somewhat limited in validity.

199 cadre of highly qualified instructional specialists who, though limited in numbers, would be able to provide instruc­ tional services while training and orienting others to perform similar duties; (4) the combat-deferred instructional reserve whose members would be available in sufficient numbers, after but a minimum of orientation, to meet a large part of whatever need might develop for instructional personnel; and (5) the nation-wide Inventory of instructional talent which would make readily available the names of additional personnel who might be called on for instructional duties.19 Criterion

The plans should provide instructional

personnel who are ready for their wartime assignments at the time they are needed. Proposal 4 would retain a substantial number of Regular, experienced military instructional personnel in the wartime schools.

Proposal 6 would make immediately available

a small but highly talented cadre of individuals who, through their civilian training and experience, their

^ It was recounted on pages 127 and 128 how draftexempt civilian instructors did not constitute a reliable source of wartime military instructors. There is thus an implied weakness in proposal 5* However, the emergency legislation whioh is under development by She NSRB and which might make all citizens subject to a form of draft in times of war would largely eliminate this weakness.

200 periodic two-month tours of active duty, and the information provided them between tours, would be fully prepared for the responsibilities they would be required to assume with the outbreak of war*

Proposal 5 would make available a large

number of combat-deferred individuals whose civilian train­ ing and experience and the information regularly distributed to them would have partially prepared them for their wartime duties.

While most of these individuals would probably

require a short period of preservice orientation, such might well be completed by the time the expanding training program would require their services. Criterion 6.

The plans should attract peacetime

participants who are oapable of performing wartime Instruc­ tional duties in a superior manner. This criterion would always be critical in planning of the type proposed here.

It is believed, however, that it

is adequately met by proposals 5 and 6. Proposal 5 would attract qualified members for the instructional reserve in a number of ways.

(1) Each

prospective member would be tendered a personal invitation based on his selection from among the nation's entire resources of instructional talent. powerful psychological appeal.

This should exert a

(2) Each prospective member

would be assured of being called on to perform duties in wartime similar to those in which he has already had

201 successful experience. deterrent to membership.

This should remove a psychological (3) Each prospective member would

be assured that membership would entail no compulsory timeconsuming duties in peacetime. to busy school people.

This would be important

(4) Each prospective member would

be assured that the acceptance and retention of membership would be entirely voluntary.

(5) Finally, what would

probably have the greatest attraction of all, individuals who would otherwise be considered unfit for military service would through acceptance of membership be afforded an opportunity to serve actively in a most vital phase of the military defense of the nation.

Probably few of those

invited to become members would be entirely immune to such an assurance of their personal and social worth. It is believed that proposal 6 would attract qualified members for the Reserve cadre for certain of the foregoing reasons as well as others.

(1) The assurance

that in the event of war the prospective member would serve in a capacity for whioh he is best qualified should appeal to individuals who, for the most part, would be subject to compulsory military service.

(2) The periodic two-month

tours of duty at full commissioned-offioer pay and allowances, coming at times when the prospective member might otherwise be unemployed, should prove financially attractive.

(3) (

The opportunity for professional growth afforded by

202 participation in other educational programs should attract the type of personnel who would be most wanted in the cadre* (4) The opportunity to take expense-defrayed summer-time trips to schools located in more-or-less distant sections of the nation should prove attractive to prospective members and their wives (or husbands). Criterion

The plans should provide for maintain­

ing the interest and cooperation of those selected as peace­ time participants. The aspeots of the proposed planning whioh were outlined under the preceding criterion as being attractive to prospective members should also serve in maintaining their participation as members.

However, the maintenance

of active memberships over a period of time might pose a much more diffioult problem than would the attraction of memberships in the first place.

Assurances given must be

affirmed, suggestions offered by members must be acknowledged and, if sound, made use of, correspondence must be promptly and tactfully handled.

In short, administration of

the highest order would be essential in maintaining active participants.

It is believed that the inter-service office

recommended in proposal 7, whioh would be staffed by individuals thoroughly acquainted with the work and interests of civilian school people, should provide this type of administration*

203 Criterion J3.

The plans should provide a means for

replacing peacetime participants who become inactive. The annual renewal of memberships among the instruc­ tional reserve would afford a means for retaining a full and active membership in that organization.

The annual inventory

of instructional talent would make names available from among whioh new members could be selected to replace those lost. As for the Reserve cadre, when once established it would probably require not more than a few dozen replacements each year.

These replacements could be carefully selected

from among the applications which no doubt would accrue. Criterion £.

20

The plans should provide a means by

which individuals who are selected for wartime instructional assignments can receive up-to-date knowledge of the subject matter and methodology of those assignments. Proposal 5 outlined how each member would receive materials relating to his wartime assignment, and how he would be kept up to date through a periodical devoted to the publication of the latest developments in subject matter and teaching methods in schools of the Defense Establishment.

20

Applications for Reserve commissions as research specialists whioh are currently being received in Headquar­ ters U.S. Air Force are predominantly from teachers in high schools and small colleges. (Personal examination of these applications, April, 1950.)

204 Members of the Reserve cadre would supplement these means of keeping up to date with the two months of participation in their wartime assignments which they would be afforded every three years. Criterion 10.

The plans should encourage and

facilitate the interchange of ideas and methods between Defense Establishment and civilian education in times of peace as well as of war. The proposed planning conforms to this criterion in two ways.

On the one hand, the civilian school people who

would be members of the instructional reserve and the Reserve cadre would, through the materials distributed to them, receive a continual flow of information on the latest developments in military education.

And the tours of duty

taken by the cadre members would acquaint them thoroughly with what schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have to offer civilian education. In this respect, it is probable that lessons provided by World War II training have been utilized by civilian education only to the extent that those who understood and reported them have returned to the nation's classroomst Under the Reserve cadre proposal, the observers would return regularly to their civilian work.

Moreover, the fact that

each of these observers would be highly competent in his civilian work would tend to secure attention and respect ’ *

205 for whatever ideas or practices he might bring back from the schools of the Defense Establishment* On the other hand, because certain practices tend to make it especially vulnerable to the hazards of instructional inbreeding,

21

military education remains in constant

need of fresh ideas from outside sources*

This need might

be well provided for through the participation of Reserve cadre members in educational programs offered in the schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Inasmuch as each of the

members would be highly proficient in his civilian duties, he would tend to bring the best of civilian thought and 22 practice with him. The essential point here would be that what he might offer to the military schools be recognized, 23 accepted, and utilized, graciously and with due credit. Criterion 11*

The plans should be of a type whioh

oan be readily implemented under the ourrent administrative and training organization of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

21 See p. 109. 22

He would also bring civilian viewpoints of Defense Establishment. This could be very valuable. 23 it should be noted that public relations of the highest order could accrue to the Defense Establishment through the Reserve cadre. This group of superior civilian school people would serve as effective interpreters of defense matters and military life to a large audience of potential voters and military personnel. Likewise the teachers of the instructional reserve, through their active identification with the Defense Establishment, should be a positive public relations factor.

206 Proposal 4, th© establishment of policies to .govern the assignment and tenure of Regular service instructors in time of war, would simply call for the performance of what is already an implicit responsibility of administrative and training organizations within the Defense Establishment*

As

for the establishment of the Reserve cadre and the joint administrative office, a number of precedents for each exist within the training and administrative organizations* Criterion 12*

The plans should be capable of

implementation with a minimum of cost to the nation* Hone of the proposals would seem to call for the expenditure of an excessive amount of money. Proposal 1, the curriculum survey, could be effected for but a moderate outlay of money.

Proposal 2, the

instructional need survey, would simply be an activity of a type which military personnel are presently being paid for doing*

Proposal 3, the national inventory of instructional

personnel, would entail little expense in view of the channels which the Office of Education presently maintains for collecting similar data. Proposal 4# policies to guide the assignment and tenure of Regular service Instructors, would again be an action of a type for which military personnel are now paid for doing.

Proposal

the instructional reserve, would

require only sufficient money to pay the costs of

207 administration mentioned for proposal 7, below* Proposal 6, the Reserve cadre, if a membership of one thousand per service were decided upon would, upon the basis of two-month tours of active duty every three years, cost the equivalent of less than sixty Reserve offioers on active duty per service throughout the year*

Nor would the

long-term expense be high in view of the small number which would eventually become eligible for retirement pay and other benefits.

For that matter, the Reserve components

of

each of the services might well consider the advisability of substituting the members of the cadre over a period of time for a thousand of its less essential members.

Thus

implementation of the proposal would incur little additional cost. Proposal 7 i the joint Army-Navy-Air Force office, would Involve a moderate expenditure of funds.

Several

civilian specialists might have to be hired; although some of these might already be on the government payroll in less essential capacities.

Salaries for clerical workers and

costs related to the collection, preparation, and distribu­ tion of training information would add substantially to the expense.

The total cost of this office, however, would

probably not be unduly high in view of the actual and potential value of the services it would render to the nation.

208 Proposal 8, coordination by the National Security Resources Board# would entail little additional expense. Criterion 13.

The plans should be flexible.

The surveys upon which the proposed planning would be baaed and the means through which it would be administered and coordinated should satisfy this criterion.

The instruc­

tional personnel provided for in time of war might readily be shifted from one school or course to another as required by the developing situation. Criterion Ik-

Th© plans should be coordinated with

others whioh are concerned with the wartime utilization of the nation1s trained manpower. Coordination is specifically provided for in two ways:

(1) within and between the services, it would be

effected through the joint office recommended by proposal 7; and (2) coordination of th© proposals with other demands for trained personnel would be effected through the Manpower Division of the National Security Resources Board, as outlined in proposal 8. Criterion 15*

The plans should be frequently revised.

Proposals 1, 2, 3» and 4 contain specific provisions for periodical repetition of the actions they contemplate. Proposal 5, the instructional reserve would review and renew its membership annually.

The provisions of proposal 6

would not prevent frequent revision in the planning.

And

*209 proposals 7 and 8 provide for coordination, of which revision is an intrinsic aspect. SUMMARY Summation.

Several plans have been recommended which

aim at supplying, or improving the proficiency of, military instructors in times of war.

Each of these plans presented

ideas which helped shape the planning which was proposed in this ohapter. The findings of this investigation indicated that an eight-point program of planning is necessary to provide for the wartime need for competent military instructional personnel.

These eight points included the following

actions; 1.

Accomplishment of a survey of the curricula

offered in schools of the Defense Establishment to determine the extent to which civilian instructional personnel and civilian educational institutions might be utilized for military instruction in wartime. 2.

Accomplishment of a study to determine how many,

how rapidly, and for what purposes instructional personnel would be needed by schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the event of an outbreak of war. 3.

Establishment and maintenance of a national

inventory of instructional personnel.

2X0 4.

Establishment of policies by the Army, Navy, and

Air Force to govern the assignment and tenure of Regular service and recruited instructional personnel in times of war. 5.

Establishment of a national reserve of instruc­

tional personnel who would through age or physical condition be exempt from combat or operational military service. 6.

Establishment of a cadre of highly competent

instructional personnel within the Reserve programs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 7.

Establishment of a joint Army-Navy-Air Force

office to administer and coordinate the two preceding proposals. 8.

Provision for over-all coordination of the

planning by the Manpower Division of the National Security Resources Board. Findings.

It was the purpose of the chapter to

outline what this investigation has shown that the planning for wartime instructional needs of the Defense Establishment should be. proposed.

An eight-point program was consequently When this planning and that which had been

previously recommended were examined in respect to the fifteen criteria established in Chapter VII, the following findings seemed justified;

211 1.

None of the plans whioh have been previously

recommended would be sufficient in scope or in detail to provide for over-all wartime needs for military instructional personnel, 2*

The eight-point program of planning proposed in

this chapter would provide for these needs.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS INTRODUCTION It is the purpose of this concluding chapter to review the material and findings which the preceding chapters have reported.

Significant aspects of the investigation,

its principal findings, the conclusions which were derived from the findings, and the recommendations which the findings and conclusions seemed to warrant are summarized under the f ollowing section headings t

Summary of the Problem

and its Investigation; Summary of the Principal Findings; Conclusions; and, Recommendations. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS INVESTIGATION Statement of the problem.

The purpose of the

Investigation was to determine what planning is needed to provide for the wartime need for instructional personnel in schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

In order to

achieve this purpose, solutions were sought for the following problems; 1.

To what extent is planning to meet the need for

instructional personnel in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment necessary?

213 2.

What criteria should guide planning to meet the -

f

need for instructional personnel in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment? 3.

What planning might be formulated to meet the

need for instructional personnel in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment? Importance of the problem.

The problem of the

investigation was found important for the following reasons: 1*

The problem was deemed important to the nation

beoause competent instructional personnel are the key to the training upon whioh the military effectiveness of the manpower and materiel now included in mobilization planning depends. 2.

The problem was deemed important to future mili­

tary personnel because their survival in combat is directly affected by the quality of their training and, in effect, the profioiency of their Instructors. 3.

The problem was deemed important to the Defense

Establishment because instructional personnel must unite manpower and materiel before they can be used as weapons in meeting its primary responsibility of defending the nation. 4.

The problem was deemed important to the

educational profession because it aims at exploring ways 4*n which members and facilities of the profession might be prudentially utilized in times of war.

214 5.

The problem assumes even greater importance when

related to the probable nature of a future war*

A shortage

of time, increased use of technical materiel, and the necessity for off-setting possible superior numbers of enemy manpower with superior materiel and training make it imperative that mobilization planning provide for competent instructional personnel. Methods of research employed in the investigation* It was found necessary to employ the following methods of research in order to obtain data relating to the problems of the investigation: r"*

1.

An historical study of past practices and

experiences. 2*

A library study of documentary materials relating

to present practices and policies* 3*

Personal interviews with civilian and military

educational and planning specialists. 4.

A questionnaire appraisal survey of civilian and

military educational and planning specialists. 5.

Written correspondence with educational

specialists. Sources of data.

Data were obtained directly from

oivilian and military eduoational specialists; and from documents located at the following depositories:

215 1.

Civilian libraries including the Library of

Congress and the Library of the United States Office of Education* 2*

Libraries, historical sections, archives, and

other offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force* Belated studies*

While no study has been made of the

specific problems of this investigation, the following studies related indirectly to these problems and provided many valuable data to the investigations 1#

The survey of training in schools of the Army and

Navy made in the summer of 1945 under the leadership of the late Raleigh Sohorling by a group of Michigan school administrators.

This survey was reported in, Raleigh

Sohorling, and others, Swords Into Ploughshares * 2.

The survey of training in schools of the Army Air

Forces made in the autumn of 1945 by a team of officers under the direction of Headquarters, Army Air Forces*

This

survey was reported in AXL Appraisal of Wartime Training of Individual Specialists in Army Air Forces. 3*

The comprehensive study on the implications of %

training in the armed services to American education made In 194§ under the sponsorship of the American Council on Education*

This study was reported in nine monographs and

summarized in a tenth, Alonzo G* Grace, Educational Lessons from Wartime Training*

216 4* The survey of education in schools of the United States Air Force made in 1949 by a team from the Division of Vocational Education, United States Office of Education. This survey was initially reported in a communication from the Office of Education to the Air Force.

It was reported

later along with the results of a follow-up study by the schools involved in# A Study of the U.S. Office of Education Report on the Schools of the Air Training Command. 5.

A Master's dissertation by Howard 0. Johnson and

a number of unpublished historical and administrative studies made by personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also touched on the problems of the investigation. SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS Introductory statement.

The more significant find­

ings of the Investigation are listed under the specific problems to which they related. Need for planning.

The first problem of the

Investigation was the extent to which planning is necessary to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment.

Findings relating to

this problem follow: 1.

Instructional personnel perform the vital

function of wedding materiel and manpower to form an effec­ tive fighting force.

217 2.

Technical specialization is increasing in the

Defense Establishment, and more training is required for longer periods of time and at a higher level than in the past. 3*

The consensus among responsible spokesmen for the

Army, Navy, and Air Force is that instructional personnel play an essential role in military training. 4.

In World War II, the Army provided specialized

training to "a high percentage" of 8,300,000 personnel; the Navy gave advanced training as specialists to about ninety percent of 3*408,347 personnel; and the Army Air Forces counted a total of 3*108,243 separate graduations from specialized courses of instruction. 5.

In World War II, as many as 510,000 Navy and

400,000 Army Air Forces personnel were enrolled in specialized courses at one time. 6.

In World War II, the training programs were

forced to expand rapidly— as high as 12,000 and 8,000 percent in twenty-four months in the Army Air Forces and the Corps of Engineers, respectively. 7.

In World War II, the over-all Instructor-student

ratio for specialized courses in the Navy and Army Air Forces was about 1 to 10. 8.

Instructional personnel .are currently needed in

schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide for approximately 350, 375, aud 280 separate courses,

218 respectively* 9*

The number of courses offered in schools of the

Defense Establishment is increasing in the face of a gradual decrease in total personnel* 10*

A future war would probably involve this nation

more suddenly, be more complex, and utilize more highly technical equipment than did World War II* 11.

The Army presently rotates instructional

assignments regularly among its commissioned and higher noncommissioned personnel; it maintains no instructor schools, as such; and it, apparently, has made no special provisions for retaining experienced instructional personnel in their assignments on a career basis* 12.

The Navy rotates instructional assignments

regularly among its commissioned and higher noncommissioned personnel, although it uses a higher proportion of the latter than the Army and the Air Force; it maintains two instructor training schools; and, it apparently has made no special provisions for retaining experienced instructional personnel in their assignments on a career basis. 13.

The Air Force rotates instructional assignments

among its personnel, although it is currently making provisions to retain certain noncommissioned and commissioned personnel in training assignments on a career basis; it has established a number of instructor training schools for both

219 enlisted and commissioned personnel. 14*

As recently as 1949, there were many inferior

instructional personnel on duty in schools of the Air Force. 15•

Most of the experienced instructional personnel

within the Organized Reserves are veterans of World War II. 16.

The Organized Reserves are presently obtaining

few instructional personnel among their new members. 17.

Provisions for heaping instructional personnel

within the Organized Reserves up to date on subject matter and methods in use in schools of the Regular Defense Establishment are generally inadequate or nonexistent. 18.

The original--World War II--level of proficiency

among instructional personnel now in the Organized Reserves was about that of the average civilian teacher. 19.

There is presently no conclusive consensus as

to the extent to which civilian educational Institutions might be, or should be, utilized in the event of war for instruction of the type now offered in schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 20.

World War II afforded no adequate precedent for

a program of wartime instructor procurement. 21.

No evidence was found which indicated that plans

have been formulated to provide for the wartime need for instructional personnel In schools of the Defense Establishment•

220 Planning criteria*

The second problem of the

investigation was the criteria which should guide planning to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime sohools of the Defense Establishment.

Findings relating to

this problem follow; all but the last three of these findings relate to World War lit 1.

Throughout the first years, neither the Army nor

the Navy established policies to govern the over-all procurement and utilization of instructional personnel. 2.

Instructional duties were generally treated as

being of minor importance. 3*

Throughout the first eighteen months, the need

for instructional personnel in both the Army and Navy far exceeded their supply. 4.

The Organized Reserves supplied many instruc­

tional personnel, but these were in general need 6f preservioe training. 5.

Navy Air and Army Air Forces sohools used Civil

Service instructors extensively early in the war. 6.

The practice of a school’s procuring instructional

personnel from among its student graduates was general throughout the Army and Navy. 7.

Subject mastery and teaching ability became

generally recognized as essential instructor requisites.

221 8.

Former civilian teachers and educational

specialists were used as enlisted and commissioned instruc­ tional personnel extensively, though haphazardly, and with highly satisfactory results, 9*

Both the Army and Navy found it necessary to

establish preservioe and inservice instructor training programs. i

10*

Instructional personnel were frequently accorded

an inferior degree of recognition* 11*

There was competition within, and between, the

Army and the Navy for the better qualified Instructional personnel* 12.

As a general practice, instructional personnel

were procured on the basis of certain of the following: academic records, experience, personal interests, previous efficiency ratings, Intelligence and aptitude tests, and such personal data as age, marital status, and physical oondition* 13.

In the Navy, selected civilian physical educa­

tion teachers proved highly satisfactory as enlisted and commissioned leaders in the physical fitness and other training programs. 14.

In the Navy Air Technical Training Program,

civilian teachers were used to Indoctrinate service

222 instructors in teaching methods and to instruct service technicians, 15.

In the Navy Air Technical Training Program,

civilian teachers and civilian technical specialists used as instructors were frequently found too academic and too lacking in teaching ability, respectively, 16.

When the Army Air Forces Technical Training

Program attempted to replace its service instructors with civilians, it found that a sufficient number of qualified instructors could not be secured on a voluntary basis. 17.

-Almost two thousand university, college,

and high school teaohers were given direct commissions in 1942 by the Army Air Forces and assigned to instructional duties in sohools of the Flying Training Command, 18.

The professional teachers who served as

commissioned-officer instructors in the AAF Flying Training Program were generally highly satisfactory as instructors; but there was some discontent among them owing to improper subject assignments, lack of promotions, poor educational administration, or individual Inability to adjust to militaay life. 19.

Eighteen civilian and military eduoational and

planning specialists were in general agreement as to the

223 considerations which should enter into criteria to guide the formulation of plans to meet the wartime need for instructional personnel in sohools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 20.

The opinions of the eighteen specialists

regarding planning criteria were generally substantiated by data from World War II experiences and from other sources. 21.

Fifteen planning criteria were derived from a

synthesis of data from informed opinion, experiences of the past, developments of the present, and from probable future developments. Plans for procuring instructional pfiraonnftl.

The

third problem of the investigation was the planning which might be formulated to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment. The findings under this problem are summarized in the section on Recommendations. CONCLUSIONS Introductory statement.

The conclusions which seemed

justified by the findings of the investigation are listed under the specific problems to which they related.

224 Need for planning#

The first problem of the

investigation was the extent to which planning is necessary to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime schools of the Defense Establishment.

Conclusions relating

to this problem follow: 1.

Instructional personnel play an extremely critical

role in the functions of the Defense Establishment. 2.

The role of instructional personnel in the

Defense Establishment is increasing in importance. 3.

Vast numbers of instructional personnel are

needed for wartime military education. 4*

The number of instructional personnel needed in

military education would be proportionately higher in a future war than in World War II. 5.

Only superior proficiency can be considered

competent among wartime military Instructional personnel. 6.

The level of competence demanded of military

instructional personnel is becoming higher. 7*

A future war would probably require large numbers

of highly proficient military instructional personnel within a short period of time after its outbreak. 8.

Practices presently predominating In the Defense

Establishment for the selection, assignment, and rotation of instructional personnel tend to provide only an average, or mediocre, level of proficiency.

225 9.

Most of the instructional personnel that would be

needed in wartime military education must come from sources outside the Regular Defense Establishment. 10.

The Organized Reserves in the event of war could

provide some experienced instructional personnel. 11.

The number of experienced instructional personnel

in the Organized Reserves is gradually decreasing. 12.

The over-all profioienoy of experienced

instructional personnel in the Organized Reserves is decreasing with the passage of time from its original mediocre level. 13.

A future war, therefore, would call for large

numbers of highly proficient instructional personnel which neither the Regular nor the Reserve components of the Defense Establishment can presently provide. 14.

While large numbers of competent instructional

personnel must be procured from non-military sources in the event of a future war, apparently no plans have been formulated to provide for their procurement. 15*

Thus, planning for the wartime instructional

needs of the Defense Establishment is necessary. Planning criteria.

The second problem of the

investigation was the criteria which should guide planning to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime

226 sohools of the Defense Establishment. which Were finally decided upon in the

The fifteen criteria investigation

of this problem follow: 1.

The plans should be formulated on a nation-wide

scale by cooperative action among representatives of the educational profession, the Defense Establishment, and other interested groups and agencies. 2.

The plans should select individuals for wartime

instructional duties solely on the basis of their ability to perform those duties in a superior manner. 3.

The plans should select individuals for wartime

instructional assignments who have demonstrated superior proficiency in fields similar to those assignments. 4.

The plans should provide for sufficient

instructional personnel to meet the needs which would develop in wartime. 5.

The plans should provide instructional personnel

who are ready for their wartime assignments at,the time they are needed. 6.

The plans should attract peacetime participants

who are capable of performing wartime instructional duties in a superior manner. 7.

The plans should provide for maintaining the

interest and cooperation of. those selected as peacetime

227 participants. 8.

The plans should provide a means for replacing

peacetime participants who become inactive. 9•

The plans should provide a means by which

individuals who are selected for wartime instructional assignments can receive up-to-date knowledge of the subject matter and methodology of those assignments. 10.

The plans should encourage and facilitate the

interchange of ideas and methods between Defense Establishment and civilian education in times of peace as well as of war. 11.

The plans should be of a type which can be

readily implemented under the current administrative and

\

training organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 12.

The plans should be capable of implementation

with a minimum of cost to the nation. 13# 14.

The plans should be flexible. The plans should be coordinated with others

which are concerned with the wartime utilization of the nation*s trained manpower. 15*

The plans should be frequently revised.

Plans for procuring instructional personnel.

The

third problem was the planning which might be formulated to meet the need for instructional personnel in wartime

228 sohools of the Defense Establishment.

The conclusions

under this problem are summarized in the next section. REC OMMENDATIONS Introductory statement.

The following recommenda­

tions were found by this investigation to be neoessary steps in planning to provide for the wartime need for instructional personnel in military education: A curricula survey.

A survey should be made of the

curricula offered in schools of the Army, Navy, and Air Force by a team of civilian and military curricular and instructional specialists, possibly under the sponsorship of the American Council on Education.

The purpose of this

survey would be to determine the extent to which civilian instructional personnel and civilian educational institu­ tions might be utilized for military education in times of war. An instructional needs study.

A study should be

made by training specialists and planning personnel of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to determine the approximate number of instructional personnel which would be needed, the rate at which they would be needed, and the assignments in which they would be needed under the various possible wartime situations.

229 An Instructor inventory*

An inventory of the nation*s

instructional manpower should be made and corrected annually, possibly by the United States Office of Education* Military Instructor policies*

The Army, Navy, and

Air Force should each establish policies to Insure the proper utilization of Regular service instructional personnel and of members of the educational profession enlisted, drafted, or commissioned from civilian life during times of war. An instructional reserve*

A nation-wide voluntary

instructional reserve should be established.

This reserve

would be made up of draft-exempt civilian teachers and educational specialists, who would be afforded means for Keeping up to date with the subject matter and teaching methods of schools of the Defense Establishment, and thus would be available if needed in the wartime military educational program. A Reserve cadre *

A cadre of highly oompetent civil­

ian instructional personnel should be established on a mobilization-assignment basis within the Reserve programs of the three services.

These personnel would be fully

prepared through periodic two-month tours of active duty in schools of their respective services to assume the responsibilities of instructing students, training new instructors, and organizing, supervising, and otherwise

230

administering the military educational program of a future war. A >1olnt administrative office.

A joint Army-Navy-Air

Force office should be created to administer the two preceding plans and to coordinate the instructional needs of the three services. Over-all coordination.

The Manpower Division of

the National Security Resources Board would be assigned the responsibility of initiating, coordinating, and evaluating the actions proposed in the foregoing recommendations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

232 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bibliographical references are listed under the following headings:

Books and Pamphlets; Periodicals;

Newspapers; Army Materials; Navy Materials; and, Air Force Materials* BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS A Program for National Security* The Report of the Fresi_ lent *s Advisory Commission on Universal Training* Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947# BJornstad, A* W. , Training Management, the author, 19^6*

Omaha:

Published by

Brown, Francis J. and M* H. Trytfcen, The National Stake in the Imperative Resumption of Training for the Scientific Frof essToHsT'" A"^peclar^b'uITetTn" 1!ssue79i>« Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, April, 1950. "Officer Personnel." An un-numbered volume in "United States Naval Administration in World War II." An unpub­ lished manuscript, Director of Naval History, Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1946. Personnel Administration. Bureau of Naval Personnel ' Bulletin So. 10^48. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1949, RESTRICTED. Ruffner, Ralph Windsor, "The Evaluation of an In-Service Training Program with Special Reference to the Training Program for Service School Officers, United States Navy." Unpublished Doctor*s dissertation, George Washington University, Washington, D. C., October 15, 1948. "Schools and Courses Available to Marine Corps Personnel." Marine Corps General Order Number 42, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 26 September 1949*

240 Teaching Manual for Naval Officers. A reproduction of a graduate study made by ifolin