Institutions of Education: Then and Today: The Legacy of German Idealism 9789004184138, 9789004184152

Citation preview

Institutions of Education: then and today

Critical Studies in German Idealism Series Editor

Paul G. Cobben Advisory Board

simon critchley – stephen houlgate – vittorio hösle garth green –klaus vieweg – michael quante ludwig siep – erzsébet rózsa – martin moors paul cruysberghs – timo slootweg francesca menegoni

VOLUME 2

Institutions of Education: then and today The Legacy of German Idealism

Edited by

Paul Cobben

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

Grateful acknowledgement is made to the Radboud-Stichting and the Istituto per gli Studi Filosofici for the financial support that made this publication possible. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Institutions of education, then and today : the legacy of German idealism / edited by Paul Cobben. p. cm. — (Critical studies in German idealism ; v. 2) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-90-04-18413-8 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Education, Humanistic— Germany—History. 2. Education—Germany—Philosophy. 3. Idealism, German. 4. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804. I. Cobben, Paul. II. Title. III. Series. LC1024.G3I57 2010 370.11’20943—dc22 2010004494

ISSN 1878-9986 ISBN 978 90 04 18413 8 Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS Institutions of Education: then and today .................................... Paul Cobben What is “desirable in relation to our whole state”? An approach to the educational goals of Kant’s first Critique ........................................................................................... Sasa Josifovic Rousseau and the Conflict between the Educations of ‘Man’ and ‘Citizen’ Frederic Neuhouser ........................................................................ Gottsched’s Noble Lie. Moral Weeklies and the Educational Autonomy of Women .................................................................. Matt Hettche The actual meaning of Hegel’s concept of education .................. Paul Cobben Struggle for Recognition, Ethics of Recognition, Loss of Recognition ..................................................................................... Jean-Christophe Merle

1

13

29

53

65

83

Recognition of individuals and cultures ........................................ Ludwig Siep

97

Globalization and the culture of education .................................. Ad Verbrugge

117

Institutional autonomy and political vocation of the University. Which model of the ‘Republic of Scholars’? (Kant, Humboldt, Fichte) ............................................................ Quentin Landenne

141

vi

contents

Is it still possible to recover Fichte’s reflexions about education? Notes on Fichte’s Aphorisms on Education (1804) ............................................................................................... Emiliano Acosta Education, Identity, Integrity. Hegel’s socio-cultural Model of individuality from the perspective of his conception of modern civil society ...................................................................... Erzsébet Rózsa Education in the multicultural society. The search for a ‘second family’ ............................................................................... Paul Cobben Being One’s Own Self in a Fragmented Life. On the Problems of the Classical Ideals of Bildung under the Conditions of Current Social Reality ................................................................... Rainer Adolphi

151

161

187

203

Contributors .......................................................................................

235

Index ....................................................................................................

239

INSTITUTIONS OF EDUCATION: THEN AND TODAY Paul Cobben Introduction Education can be defined as a process of socialization, whereby individuals learn to participate in the institutions of society. Since institutions are continuously developing, education is a life-long experience that concerns all individuals. However, this general concept of education can be distinguished from a more specific understanding of education, namely the education of children into adults I In this specific case, education also means socialization through institutional participation, however, here, participation has temporal limits. The general institutions, in which children are raised to adulthood, include the family, school, societies and friendship networks. This series of institutions could possibly be completed by the church, the university, trainee posts or holiday jobs. It must also be noted that the family is sometimes replaced by substitute institutions, such as public schools or guest families. For adults, education is continued through participation in institutions such as companies, political parties and state. Mass-media (i.e., broadcasting, television, books, newspapers, journals, movies, and the internet) also plays a specific background role in life-long education. Some of the above-mentioned institutions have a long history, whereas others only recently became influential. But, in some senses, the old institutions are also new, because their content has either changed or has become less determined than it was before. The family, for example, can be comprised of one or two parents, or two or three generations. Parents may be of the same, or different, sex. In the event that their parents are divorced, children can belong to two families. In terms of race, ethnicity or culture, parents can either share a background or come from different backgrounds. Within the family, religion can be of paramount importance or be totally absent. Also the institutions of schooling continuously change their goals and forms. Indeed, nowadays education takes place in and through ‘study-houses’, bachelors, fusions, and international exchanges. Also,

2

paul cobben

with respect to their worldview, educational institutions can either have a particular signature or not, and their demographics are also becoming more multicultural. These institutional changes seem to be generated by the developments in civil society. Civil society creates the possibility of breaking ties with an established tradition; it enables one to reflect upon and transform the traditional world, thereby creating the openness needed to import other cultural traditions. Since the institutional context in which people are raised is so diverse, and since civil society’s influence upon them is so variable, the question arises as to how people can develop into citizens who are able to live together harmoniously? And, Should educational processes comply with a body of general criteria if they wish to achieve this goal? Whoever wants to educate, has to standardize. The standard can be very elementary and can consist of teaching certain skills; however, it can also have a broader meaning and be orientated towards norms and values that concern the whole culture. In all cases, the educational standard seems to imply pressure: the one who is educated has to conform to the standard of the educator. An attempt has, however, been made in the tradition of German Idealism to overcome this exact pressure. This tradition understands education as education for freedom, and though pressure is not totally eliminated, it is conditioned: the pressure of education has to be oriented towards the formation of the free personality. This departure points leads to a broad understanding of education. Education is not limited to the activities of parents who raise their children, or teachers who instruct their pupils; but is extended to include the process of socializing occurs in a multitude of societal institutions. In this vein, Hegel cites a Pythagorean response to a father’s question concerning the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct: “Make him a citizen of a state with good laws”. (PhR §153, Anm.) For Hegel, this answer deals with the standard that ‘good laws’ bring about. A state with good laws has institutions, in which the citizen can actualize his freedom. Ultimately, the state embodies human freedom. Of course, the Pythagorean’s answer is unsatisfactory insofar as it partly shifts the focus of the question. How does one know whether a state has good laws and institutions, in which the citizen can actual-

institutions of education

3

ize his freedom? To begin with, the answer presupposes that one has insight into the nature of human freedom, and, subsequently, that one is able to understand which institutions are required for the actualization of freedom. These were precisely the type of questions addressed in the project of German Idealism. Consequently, German Idealism not only attributed a central place for the educational process in its own project, but also to the institution in which the project was embedded, namely the university. After all, the German Idealists purported to have discovered the philosophy par excellence with regard to the true conception of human freedom. Therefore, German Idealists considered it their task to provide insight into the adequate institutions of freedom. And, the education of the elite in the spirit of this freedom was preferably to be entrusted to the German Idealists themselves. If German Idealism has ever occupied the central place that it proponents have attributed to it, it has certainly lost this standing in our times. The bachelor and masters system that has been introduced across Europe after the Bologna Declaration, has once more served to demarcate the position of the modern university: schooling may not be too time-consuming, and has to be functional in terms of the economic process, in which relevant scientific research has become, above all, research with societal relevance. From the viewpoint of German Idealism, many question marks hang over the modern university: German Idealism is not at the center of philosophy, philosophy is not at the center of the university, and the university is not at the center of society. Moreover, the short duration of university studies makes it increasingly difficult to allocate the necessary time for a serious study of German Idealism. The aforementioned considerations supply ample reasons to celebrate the Center for German Idealism’s decennial jubilee with a conference entitled, “Institutions of Education: then and today”. This theme not only corresponds with the basic questions raised in German Idealism, but is also central to the question of whether it is legitimate to study German Idealism in our era. Elaborating on this project immediately raises the problem of institutional differentiation, which characterizes multicultural society. Does the variety of educational institutions not, by definition, exclude the shared conception and realization of adulthood that is presupposed by the thinkers of German Idealism? Or— conversely—does the variety of educational institutions not imply an underlying disagreement with respect to the concept of adulthood?

4

paul cobben

Does it still make sense to assume that our society orients itself according to one conception of adulthood? Does our society still have educational institutions that are supported by all? The contributions collected in this book attempt to show that the tradition of German Idealism can still have a function in the contemporary debate on education: the tradition is not only helpful in raising relevant questions, but can also be transformed into positions which can deal with the pluriformity that characterizes contemporary society. An overview of the contributions If education is understood as education for freedom, the following question arises: In what sense can freedom set standards? In this matter, Kant’s position seems to be clear: free action is reasonable action. In his Enlightenment ideal, free action is defined as reasonable, because it is universal. This universal action finds expression in formal freedom rights, which are ascribed to man on the basis of being human, i.e. man as a reasonable being. The condition of universality seems to contradict the response of the Pythagorean cited above: according to him, freedom is actualized in the laws of the state, i.e. within a particular community. In the first contribution (“The Enlightenment’s ideal of education in Kant’s perception: What can reasonably be wanted?” ), Sasa Josifovic argues that this contradiction manifests itself as a problem of the contemporary world. September Eleven has taught us that the Enlightenment ideals are obviously not globally shared. The cartoon riots have shown that the free expression of opinion can have the result that some feel themselves deeply hurt. From this several conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, it could make clear that the Enlightenment ideals are not universal; on the other hand, it could indicate that the critics obviously are not sufficiently enlightened. Josifovic draws attention to a third possible conclusion: he wishes to show that Kant’s Enlightenment ideal should in itself be understood as focusing attention on the freedom of the actual other. This interpretation is illustrated in an analysis of Kant’s moral law, the categorical imperative. This law not only demands that one does that which one deems to be reasonable, but also determines that that which is reasonable, can always be desired by all. The universality of our freedom concerns our

institutions of education

5

whole situation. Therefore, freedom can especially not mean hurting fellow people. The question as to whether the freedom in which an individual is elevated is, by definition, universal—i.e., whether this freedom is immediately compatible with the freedom of others—is the central topic of the second contribution by Frederick Neuhouser (entitled: “Rousseau on the Conflict between ‘Human’ and ‘Civic’ Education” ). Neuhouser thematizes the problem by discussing the two forms of love that Rousseau distinguishes between. On the one hand, Rousseau defines the amour de soie as follows: “Amour de soi-même is a natural sentiment that inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and that, guided by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.” On the other hand, there is amour propre: “Amour propre is but a relative sentiment, artificial and born in society, that inclines each individual to think more highly of himself than of anyone else [and] inspires in men all the evils they do to one another . . .” Neuhouser maintains that these two forms of love in Rousseau underlie two forms of education: education of the man and education of the citizen. He puts forward the thesis that, in contrast to the common understanding, Rousseau does not wish to play these two forms of education off against each other, but rather raises the question of how both can be brought into a harmonic relation. Rousseau’s division between amour de soie and amour propre is reminiscent of Hegel’s division of the ethical substance of the Rechtsstaat, i.e., Hegel’s division between family and civil society. Although it would be an overstatement to maintain that the family (as described in Hegel) is the domain in which the amour de soie has its place, and civil society the domain in which the amour propre expresses itself, there is a kernel of truth to such a statement. Certainly, the family is involved in the survival of natural individuals, and gives this survival a reasonable (ethical) form. In civil society, individuals are validated in their relations with one another; they are exchangeable persons that oppose one another through mutual competition. Civil society is also the domain of immoderateness, which, in Hegel, can certainly be related to evil. Also, according to this conception, both domains have their own educational goals; Hegel, moreover, looks for ways in which to bring the education of the family and civil society into a harmonious union. At the same time there are important differences: according to Hegel, the family is the domain that is maintained by the woman’s care for her husband and children. Moreover, the woman is

6

paul cobben

only indirectly represented in civil society through her husband’s participation, as the representative of his family. As a consequence, Hegel differentiates between the education of men and women: both parties perform their own gender role. The education of the woman is an underlying theme in the third contribution by Matt Hettche: “Gottsched’s Noble Lie: Moral Weeklies and the Educational Autonomy of Woman”. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the distinction between gender roles was a much debated topic, especially in journals oriented towards the emancipation of women. Hetche deals with the case of Gottsched, the editor of one of these journals. Gottsched himself wrote articles in the journal using different female pseudonyms. This case either illustrates a ‘noble lie’, or expresses a rather worrisome opinion on emancipation. Hegel’s distinction between the gender roles is also one of the topics raised in the fourth contribution by Paul Cobben (“The actual Meaning of Hegel’s Concept of Education” ). Cobben criticizes Hegel because, in linking the distinction between family and civil society to gender roles, he remains too dependent on a natural distinction, thereby underplaying the principal difference between both domains. In the domain of the family, the individual ought to be educated as a particular, non-exchangeable self; in civil society the individual ought to be educated as a general, social self. Through this move, Rousseau’s distinction between amour de soie and amour propre (as it is interpreted in Neuhouser’s contribution) is re-evaluated and situated in the framework of the Philosophy of Right. If the distinction between family and civil society corresponds with the distinction between the non-exchangeable and the social self, the principal problem concerning education for freedom can be reformulated in terms of the relation between the family and civil society. On the one hand, education for freedom means that the individual occupies a central position, and is able to develop as his own self; on the other hand, the freedom of the individual has to be in harmony with the freedom of others. Therefore, education for freedom also means that the individual has to be socialized, and has to learn that the actualization of his individual freedom is simultaneously a moment in the social whole. Hegel tries to reconcile both these dimensions of education for freedom in his concept of recognition. With the help of the concept of recognition, the transition from the individual to the community can be conceptualized without being at the cost of the individual’s freedom. If the individual and the com-

institutions of education

7

munity are mutually recognizable, it means, on the one hand, that the community is recognized by the individual, as a domain in which his freedom is actualized (if he shares the norms and values that underlie the institutions of that community). In this case, participation in the community does not imply conforming to an externally-imposed power. On the other hand, it means that the individual is recognized by the community. The community recognizes that the input of the individual determines that which can be accepted as communal. In this sense the concept of recognition seems to be a key category for charting education for freedom. The success of such an enterprise depends on whether it is truly possible to understand the recognition between individual and community as a mutual recognition. In the fifth contribution (“Struggle for Recognition, Ethics of Recognition, Loss of Recognition” ), Jean-Christophe Merle undertakes a detailed discussion of the concept of recognition, as developed by Axel Honneth. Merle elaborates on the thesis that Honneth’s ‘politics of recognition’ problematically unites a Fichtean and a Kantian element. In accordance with Fichte, Honneth’s concept of recognition presupposes that the individuals who recognize one another share a common goal; but, in accordance with Kant, recognition is linked to the distinct ambitions expressed by individuals in social competition. Merle identifies the common goal as social integration, which means that all individuals in the society are recognized because they are respected by other people. However, those who use integration as the normative standard, risk the loss of social criticism, defined as “a right to freedom of opinion and a right to freely chose one’s own way of life were inconceivable without endorsement of esteem” (p. 95). Therefore, Merle’s criticism of Honneth’s concept of recognition amounts to the observation that the community ultimately enjoys primacy over the individual. In Rousseau’s terminology: there is insufficient room for the amour de soie. This criticism is similar to the criticism raised by Ludwig Siep in the sixth contribution (“Recognition between Individuals and Cultures”), which deals with the concept of recognition, as developed by Fichte and by Hegel in particular. The mediation between the individual and the group, which occurs in the process of recognition, is—in Hegel— embedded in a metaphysical view, in which the group enjoys ultimate primacy. At the same time, recognition is linked with a teleological view on history, in which the Lutheran view on Christianity equals the highest stage in religion. In reaction to this, Siep attempts to develop

8

paul cobben

a concept of recognition that is not saddled down in this straitjacket: “One can argue that the anthropological and culture historical experiences that are more and more shared by all people satisfy to justify the demands of mutual recognition and its stages”. He distinguishes the following stages of recognition, which occur in the learning process of humanity: respect for the other’s integrity, the prohibition to discriminate against the other, tolerance for the other, forms of active solidarity and the “connection of several horizons in a common work”. These stages can not necessarily be based on reason, as the final ground, - but together provide an adequate framework in which to express the basic values of non-western cultures, where—for example—the group and honor play a pivotal role. The relation between the individual and the community is the central theme in the seventh contribution, by Ad Verbrugge (“The cultural dimension of education” ). This relation is considered from the viewpoint of Hegel’s concept of recognition, especially the form that this concept takes at the level of the nation state. Verbrugge argues that Hegel’s concept of the nation state (and generally that of German Idealism) unites (Lutheran) belief and reason. In this conception of the nation state, the university, the secularized church, has a central place. The university is responsible for educating a cultural elite that—in turn—is legitimized as an elite, due to the culture that it embodies and practices. Therefore, for this elite, there exists no fundamental contradiction between the individual and the community: the heart of the community is the national culture, which is determined by the educated elite. After the two World Wars, the national state, and, consequently, also the university lost their credibility in the eyes of the elite. This crisis of the university exploded in the sixties, during the “Second French Revolution”. This ‘revolution’s’ resistance was directed against the national community, which was comprised of the church, the state and the education system. As a result, the intended struggle for the emancipation of the individual degenerated into subjectivism. The objective of the university is social equality: universities have to serve relevant social goals, thereby helping their students to acquire their place in social life. The eighth contribution by Quintin Landenne (“Institutional Autonomy and political Vocation of the University” ), elaborates on Fichte’s model of the university. This model contains many features of the type of university that (according to Verbrugge) existed before the World Wars. Landenne defends the thesis that Fichte’s university is unjustly

institutions of education

9

seen as an authoritarian university (in contrast with von Humboldt’s liberal university). It is true that Fichte views the task of the university as the education of the elite, but this does not mean that the university should authoritatively impose a program on this elite. Rather, insofar as the university is conceptualized as the central institution of society, room is created for Fichte’s philosophical system, which focuses on freedom. Fichte’s freedom is transcendental in nature, meaning that it cannot be instantaneously applied to daily life. A fundamental tension, therefore, exists between this conception of freedom and the demands of society. This means that the leading role of the university with respect to education (and the leading role of the philosophical faculty within the university) should rather be viewed as an immediate leadership: “Upstream, by enlightening the art of governing, and downstream, by ‘fuelling the organization of the education of the nation’ which progressively prepares the renewal of social relations, transformed into relations as an apprenticeship for freedom”. The ninth contribution of Emigliano Acosta (“Is a Recovering of Fichte’s Reflexions about Education possible?” ) is also dedicated to Fichte’s concept of education. This time, however, the ‘official’ Fichte (who concerned himself with the education of the national state’s citizens) is not discussed; rather, the Fichte of the unpublished Aforism on Education, which concentrates on the education of the child in the domain of the family, constitutes the central theme. The main topic is the personality of the child, who needs to acquire his own place, in critical distance to the prevailing culture. This critical distance is obtained, for example, by familiarizing oneself with the ancient classical culture (by learning Greek and Latin). The goal is not to gain ‘dead knowledge’, but to gain better insight into one’s own culture. In this process, the child’s own development and freedom are central, and can be promoted, for example, through study, artistic education (which promotes a sense of fantasy), or sport. Moral and religious education is also important—not in the sense of providing a moralizing doctrine, but by encouraging discussion on living examples. The moral sensitivity developed through education, must lead to some notion of religion. It is important that the child is concerted towards religion in general; the question as to what religion is in particular, is less important. If the concept of recognition is central to understanding the socialization of the individual in the community in a manner which prevents the individual from being absorbed by the community, then this concept potentially has meaning at many levels of society—including

10

paul cobben

both the level of individual assimilation in the state or society, and the level of the sub-domains that constitute the state. The family, for example, should not only be understood as the domain in which the individual develops his amour de soie, but also as a family community in which the child is socialized as a family member. Merle points out that Axel Honneth attributes a unique form of recognition to the several institutional domains: “According to Axel Honneth (for instance Honneth 2003, 214), the current liberal society entails three spheres of recognition: love (regulated according to needs), law (regulated by the principle of equality) and cooperation—for instance, labor relations— regulated according to performance)”. (p. 89) In the tenth contribution by Erzsébet Rózsa (“Education and Integrity of modern Man. Hegel’s social-cultural model in relation to his conception of modern civil society”), the different forms of education that can be distinguished in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right are elaborated upon. This, in effect, means that many forms of recognition are mapped; however, all these forms of recognition are concerned with the individual’s assimilation in the objective institutions by means of his subjective actions. Besides the domains of the family and the state, education mainly takes place (and this is Hegel’s specific contribution) in the dimension of civil society. The significance that education has in the domain of labor is specifically elaborated upon. However, it is of the utmost importance that all forms of education are in an inner harmony, and together contribute, to the formation of the full personality of the individual, on the one hand; and, to the integration of the individual in society as a whole, on the other hand. This is only possible if ‘higher’ forms of education (education in the domain of art, religion and philosophy) also take up their rightful place within this whole. Thus, education is understood in its systemic entirety as consisting of a broad range of specific activities within the distinct institutional domains. The (fourth) contribution by Paul Cobben links up with this interpretation of education in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. However, Cobben’s criticism is that Hegel remains untrue to his own project, and does not do sufficient justice to the unique nature of each domain. The family domain is one-sidedly in the service of the labor domain (which forms a part of civil society), and the domain of civil society is one-sidedly/unilaterally in the service of the state. His core criticism is that, in each domain, the individual is not sufficiently recognized as a (non-exchangeable) moral subject. He attempts to elaborate upon how

institutions of education

11

the structure proposed in the Philosophy of Right would look if sufficient justice were to be done to the moral dimension of the individual. Cobben’s thesis is that there is only room for the cultural dimension of education (as characterized in the work of Rózsa) if the Philosophy of Right is reworked to include this revised structure. This is elaborated in the eleventh contribution by Paul Cobben. Moreover, his criticism leads to a specific consideration of the university. This institution can play an important role in the education of critical citizens, especially of critical citizens who perform their role in the labor process and in civil society. The twelfth contribution by Rainer Adolphi (“Being a Self in a fragmented Life” ) links up with the work of the Neo-Kantian, Heinrich Rickert, “who tries to link a Kantian way of approach and argumentation with the Hegelian goal of an elaborated system (that can also entail antagonistic polarities)”. Under the conditions of contemporary society, in which the self is fragmented, one finds support for the Hegelian view of education, which is shaped in a number of dimensions. In contrast to Cobben, however, Adolphi’s criticism is not that these dimensions do insufficient justice to the individual’s morality, but that the attempt to bring these dimensions together in a harmonic unity does not correspond with the conditions of contemporary society. Contemporary society is divided into many value domains, each having its own criterion for adulthood. Society falls apart in a plurality of domains, which the philosopher, nevertheless, attempts to bring into systematic coherence, without, however, achieving substantial unity. After an elaborate analysis of the German Idealist’s concept of education, Adolphi draws his conclusions. According to him, the crisis which marks this concept of education corresponds with the crisis of the concept of the citizen. This crisis explicates the contradiction that was inherent to the concept of education from the very beginning. The citizen is educated to participate in the political community. Rousseau already foresaw the tension between the individual and the community. Ultimately, this tension leads to an internal tension within the concept of education: besides the importance that it holds for the participation in the community, the concept of education is also orientated towards the reverse, namely the education of the individual’s personality and character. The individual has to develop into a full human being, and, therefore, must not be absorbed by a process of socialization.

WHAT IS “DESIRABLE IN RELATION TO OUR WHOLE STATE”? AN APPROACH TO THE EDUCATIONAL GOALS OF KANT’S FIRST CRITIQUE Sasa Josifovic 1. The Copernican Turn Kant’s so called Copernican Revolution of thought has often been mentioned as one of the major achievements of his philosophy. This metaphor points out his attempt to establish a human self-understanding based on autonomy and independence from any higher authority, such as God. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound by them. (Kant 1987, B 847)1

Once we have gained the intuition that our moral commitments arise from our own reason, we turn to a self-understanding that refuses to accept any principles that do not mach this requirement. But at the same time we face the inevitable necessity to take the full responsibility for all of our actions and goals. Thus we are necessarily driven to make up our mind about which goals are indeed legitimated by the practical reason. The ability to answer this question may count as one of the privileged educational goals of Kant’s philosophy in particular and the philosophy of Enlightenment (Aufklärung) in general. It requires the ability to distinguish between such goals that are of a certain value only in regard to myself at this moment, and such which are of value for everybody in general. But what is of value for everybody?

1 All references according to the original (B) paging of the Critique of Pure Reason from 1787. Translation according to: Critique of pure reason. Introd. by A.D. Lindsay. Translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, New York 1934.

14

sasa josifovic 2. What has a universal value?

Within the scope of his elaborations on the Ideal of the Summum Bonum, Kant draws the three famous questions: “What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?” (Kant 1987, B 833) His answer to the second question is: “Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness” (Kant 1987, B 836). It points out that there is a strict difference between such goals based on the motive of happiness and such that are motivated by the worthiness to be happy. The mentioned worthiness represents the actual aim to be aspired by anybody who decides to do what he ought to. But why do we have to prove ourselves worthy of happiness? Should not we rather aim at obtaining happiness? As long as we asked this question in the framework of a Christian metaphysics, the answer used to depend on God’s will. But what is the actual argument for such a preference after the mentioned Copernican Revolution? It is obvious that this imperative implies a necessary correlation between the worthiness to be happy and the chance to obtain happiness. If Kant had assumed that happiness appears by chance or accident, there would be no need to point out such a correlation, because in this case our actions and the chance to obtain happiness would not be connected by anything but arbitrariness. Consequently, to such an idea we would share the intuition that independently from the way we act, we have no influence to the question of obtaining happiness. Unlike such an assumption Kant develops the idea of happiness as an achievement of freedom, which implies a successful performance of the practical reason, in regard to the matter of the free will as well as in regard to the form of its performance. This implies the ability to control the matter as well as the action. The utter success of this performance corresponds to Kant’s Ideal of the Summum Bonum, which is the ideal expression of his theory of practical freedom and has the following structure: (i) Everybody obtains happiness, which means “the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in regard to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; and protensive, in regard to their duration” (Kant 1987, B 834) (ii) Everybody is worthy of happiness. (iii) Everybody has the intuition that the fact that he is worthy of happiness is decisive for the fact that he obtains it.

kant’s first critique

15

Now there are basically two ways to understand the third sentence: There is either a higher, divine authority to guarantee happiness for everybody who proves himself worthy of it or the expression “worthiness to be happy” means more than a mere disposition. In regard to the claim of the Copernican Revolution of thought we ought to prefer the second interpretation.2 But if being worthy of happiness means more than a mere disposition, it has to contain an imperative to shape the world according to the principles of our reason and to bring it as far as possible into conformity with the practical idea of a moral world. (Kant 1987, 836) Thus our understanding of the mentioned worthiness to be happy turns into a metaphor for a certain kind of activity specified as moral practice. It does indeed contain both connotations, but in regard to the idea of happiness as an achievement of human freedom we shall point out the imperative that refers to the moral practice. Thus we are supposed to do that which will render us worthy of happiness, because we understand happiness as an achievement of our practical freedom, while the mentioned worthiness refers to the successful performance of our practical freedom. But if happiness is understood as an achievement of practical freedom and the worthiness to be happy as the successful performance of practical freedom, we necessarily understand the idea why the worthiness to be happy and the chance to obtain happiness go hand in hand. In this context Kant’s answer to the question “What ought I to do?” implies the imperative to shape the world according to the principles of our reason. An adequate understanding of the principles of reason is therefore a necessary condition in order to be worthy of happiness. Therefore we have to make up our minds about the character of such principles. In this regard we may point out that a major educational result of Kant’s philosophy consists in achieving the ability to generate adequate concepts of possible principles and ends that have a universal structure, implying, that they refer to mankind in general and not exclusively to the individual agent. We could probably put it this way: What do I intend to achieve in regard to my personal benefit and what for the mankind? If we had an innate capacity to answer the latter, there would be no need to study Kant. But since this is not the 2

This preference necessarily leads to a specific interpretation of Kant’s concept of the Primary Highest Good (ursprüngliches höchstes Gut, Kant 1787, 838, and 842) and the Deduced Highest Good (abgeleitetes höchstes Gut, Kant 1787, 839) which points out a metaphorical use of the expressions “Primary Highest Good” and “God”.

16

sasa josifovic

case, the task of a philosophical education consists in developing this ability. In Kant’s own vocabulary this task would refer to the “essential ends of reason”. But what do we mean by using this metaphor? If we assume that Kant has a specific opinion about it, our task is to work it out ourselves, so that in the end it means more than just a metaphor. The relevant considerations are based upon reason which therefore commands what ought to be done. But there is something irritating about the idea that the practical reason commands what ought to be done, because it somehow suggests a limitation of freedom. It looks like there is an agent of the pure practical reason and a patient as a placeholder for myself. The agent seems to command what the patient ought to do. Such a reading necessarily turns Kant’s Philosophy into another version of the classical Christian metaphysics which simply replaces the concept of God by ‘Reason’. To avoid such a misunderstanding I propose to turn to the formula: “Do what you consider to be reasonable”, although I am aware of the danger that such a formula could be understood as an expression of a merely personal will, that Kant calls ‘Willkür’, arbitrariness. We must by all means avoid mixing up Kant’s concepts of ‘Wille’ and ‘Willkür’. ‘Wille’ is based on the successful performance of the pure practical reason, while ‘Willkür’ is associated to the arbitrariness of an individualized will. I won’t elaborate on this matter, because it is common sense. However, the formula “Do what you consider to be reasonable” does not risk supporting the agent theory mentioned above, because it links the performance of the practical reason to the individual agent. Though it contains the obligation to act according to the principles of reason, it points out, that we have the capacity to judge what counts as reasonable, and act according to our own judgments. As far as this ability is concerned, we shall easily agree on the mentioned formula as an expression of freedom. But there is another doubt to be removed: It still contains the restriction to act according to the principles of reason, which excludes the possibility to act arbitrarily (willkürlich) and could be misunderstood as a limitation of freedom. We could suggest that even unreasonable, arbitrary actions may lead to satisfaction, and ask why to restrict our freedom to reasonable commitments only. The answer is based upon an adequate understanding of Kant’s concept of autonomy, which, for a particular reason, contains the potential to set so called intelligible laws in addition to natural laws. Of course, it looks somehow strange if we understand autonomy as a capacity to add some laws to such which already exist, and which we cannot avoid anyway. Wouldn’t autonomy

kant’s first critique

17

rather consist in the chance to overcome some rules or laws? What is the use of adding social laws to the natural laws? Does not such a concept of freedom rather restrict it? I will now turn to answering these questions and point out Kant’s argument for his understanding of autonomy. 3. The concept of autonomy in contrast to natural determinism In Kant’s opinion, the idea to do that which is reasonable does not mean to restrict freedom, because he develops his concept of autonomy in contrast to the causal determination of our actions by natural laws. He intends to prove that we are able to overcome the immediate impulse of sensuous affections. He admits that such affections have a certain motivational power, but he intends to demonstrate that they don’t represent sufficient conditions of our actions. Although we are motivated by sensuous affections, we are able to consider further motives. As far as our physical, phenomenal existence is concerned, we are inevitably determined by the laws of nature. If we agree that there is nothing but our phenomenal existence to describe the human nature, we must also agree that such a thing as freedom is nothing but an illusion. In the context of the antinomy of freedom Kant points out: And here, the common but fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phenomena are things in themselves, freedom is impossible. (Kant 1787, 564)

According to his point of view, the assumption that the phenomenal sphere exhausts all of the reality is deceptive (betrügerisch). It has the injurious influence (nachteiligen Einfluss) to confuse our reason (die Vernunft zu verwirren). Thus only a confused reason would assume that there is nothing real except for the phenomena. On the contrary, a reason which is not confused, must assume that an object of sensation contains more than the mere phenomenal shape. This additional quality of a real object is called intelligible: That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I may be allowed to term intelligible. (Kant 1787, 566)

Thus, we have a phenomenal and a noumenal, intelligible nature. Our physical, phenomenal existence is causally determined by natural laws. But as intelligible beings, we have the capacity to be motivated

18

sasa josifovic

by more than just natural laws. Of course, in the end Kant refers to the moral laws, but we can make the actual point plausible by referring to friendship, love, honesty, duty, property etc. If, for example, we find a wallet on the street, we must pick it up according to the natural laws. But the decision to keep it or send it back to its owner depends on factors which do not belong to the sphere of the mere phenomena, our concept of property for example. This intelligible concept may be the reason why we decide to give it back. The intelligible laws must not contradict the natural ones but they may represent an additional motivation for our actions. Kant’s concept of autonomy refers to our ability to generate such laws or values. Physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this law, that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality. What else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy, that is, the property of the will to be a law to itself ? (Kant 1786, 98)3

But why does Kant speak about laws? Why does not he develop a concept of autonomy as pure arbitrariness? This question concerns what Kant calls ‘practical freedom’, not the concept of ‘transcendental freedom’. Practical freedom is, broadly speaking, the capacity to realize specified ends. In regard to the actual question of autonomy as a restriction of arbitrariness, we must focus on two aspects of practical freedom: a) The capacity to specify ends. b) The capacity to realize ends. Kant’s concept of autonomy as a capacity to set intelligible laws is primarily focused on the realization of ends. He points out that it would be impossible to realize any goal, if we could not assume that there is a necessary connection between our action and its consequence. Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something that we call cause, something else, namely the effect, must be produced; hence, although freedom is not a property if the will depending on physical laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind; otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. (Kant 1786, 97)

3

All references to the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) according to the original paging from 1786. Translation according to: Thomas Kingsmill Abott: Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, London/New York 1898.

kant’s first critique

19

Both, the action A as well as the anticipated consequence C, are phenomena in time, while C follows A. If C followed A arbitrarily, it would be impossible to realize any goal, because whatever action A we undertake, we would not have any influence on C. That means that we could do whatever we want, but we couldn’t achieve anything by purpose. We couldn’t control the results of our actions if there was no necessary connection between A and C on the ground of specified laws. Up to here, we do not have to accept Kant’s moral philosophy to answer the raised question. All we have to take into regard is the possibility to control our actions and generate the estimated results. Thus it is impossible to develop a concept of free will without assuming certain regularity in our actions. But this regularity has to be of a special kind (von besonderer Art), which refers to its intelligible nature in contrast to the natural laws. Autonomy therefore refers to the ability to set certain rules for the performance of the free will and thus regulate what is left open by natural laws, although it belongs to our reality as social beings. Practical freedom, on the other hand, means both, the ability to generate ends or principles as well as the practical realization of the specified ends. As far as we see, the formula “Do what you consider to be reasonable” implies to act according to certain rules but this implication does not at all intend to advocate determinism. It should rather be understood as an attempt to elaborate on the basis of a successful performance of the free will, which implies control. This formula points out that the performance of practical reason is linked to the individual agent. Although I don’t intend to mix up the concepts of ‘Wille’ and ‘Willkür’, I do advocate a stronger consideration of Kant’s theory of the arbitrary, personal will. In the following passage I am going to demonstrate that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant starts to develop his theory of practical freedom from a particular kind of ‘Willkür’. Thus his theory of practical freedom contains a theory of the arbitrary will which doesn’t represent the highest stage of freedom, but nevertheless remains a part of the theory. In the Critique of Pure Reason, B 562 and B 830, Kant opens up the distinction between two kinds of ‘Willkür’: arbitrium brutum and arbitrium liberum. They both refer to a sensual arbitrary will.4 He points

4 I use the expression ‘arbitrary will’ to refer to the German concept of “Willkür’. A sensuously motivied arbitrary will is therefore ‘sinnliche Willkür’.

20

sasa josifovic

out that both of them are sensually affected. In regard to this point, there is no difference between them. But there is a difference in regard to the reaction. Arbitrium brutum refers to an arbitrary will which is affected as well as determined by sensuous impulses while arbitrium liberum, although sensuously affected, isn’t fully determined by this affection. According to Kant, animals don’t have the capacity to overcome an immediate affection, while as human beings we do ‘have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire.” (Kant 1787, 830) A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically affected (by sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium brutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because sensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man of self-determination, independently of all sensuous coercion. (Kant 1787, 562)5 For the human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects the senses; on the contrary, we have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. (Kant 1787, 830)6

Thus we can determine our actions in regard to specified ends. Moreover we can direct our actions to such ends that are “desirable in relation to our whole state” (Kant 1787, 830). This is actually the ability that I refer to as a major educational goal of Kant’s Philosophy, and this is the formula that I propose to use in order to pay account to the question, what is reasonable. But before we turn to elaborating on this particular matter, we should make a note of the fact that Kant starts with a minimal concept of freedom, basically a kind of arbitrary will, Willkür, and moves on to what will be specified as ‘Willensfreihei’ ” in the Critique of Practical Reason. The full potential of ‘Willensfreiheit’ is neither presupposed

5 Die menschliche Willkür ist zwar ein arbitrium sensitivum, aber nicht brutum, sondern liberum, weil Sinnlichkeit ihre Handlung nicht nothwendig macht, sondern dem Menschen ein Vermögen beiwohnt, sich unabhängig von der Nöthigung durch sinnliche Antriebe von selbst zu bestimmen. (Kant 1787, 562) 6 Denn nicht bloß das, was reizt, d.i. die Sinne unmittelbar afficirt, bestimmt die menschliche Willkür, sondern wir haben ein Vermögen, durch Vorstellungen von dem, was selbst auf entferntere Art nützlich oder schädlich ist, die Eindrücke auf unser sinnliches Begehrungsvermögen zu überwinden; (Kant 1787, 830)

kant’s first critique

21

nor contained at this point of his work. Thus the concept of freedom, as a capacity to set and achieve specified ends, is not fully developed yet. The underlying concept of practical freedom rather corresponds to arbitrium liberum and refers to the ability to reflect upon a given sensuous affection, anticipate possible consequences and judge if they are more or less attractive in regard to a particular state of ours as well as in regard to “our whole state”. On the ground of this decision, we either follow the affection, or not. Practical freedom therefore refers to arbitrium liberum considering its motivations (Grund)7 and consequences (Folge). (Kant 1787, 830) Kant points out that this kind of freedom can be proved by experience, referring to our capacity to consider certain principles, while deciding whether to follow a given affection or not. I am pointing out this particular concept of a sensuously motivated ‘Willkür’ in contrast to Kant’s later concept of the free will, ‘Wille’, in order to specify this particular theory, he presents in the first Critique. Of course, the mere fact that he uses Latin expressions, indicates that he possibly stands in Baumgarten’s tradition, but in regard to an adequate understanding of his later theory, these considerations are very useful, because they contain a structure that starts with a minimal concept of freedom and gradually enriches our understanding of this matter, until we achieve the ability to even imagine what may count as “desirable in relation to our whole state”, and may therefore be a matter of the pure practical reason. As I already mentioned: If we had an innate ability to generate such ends or principles, we wouldn’t need to study philosophy. On the other hand, I am trying to understand why the concept of acting in relation to such ends represents a progress in regard to pure arbitrariness. Why does the performance of the free will according to specified rules represent a higher stage of freedom than mere arbitrariness? There are basically two arguments to support this preference: Firstly, the arbitrary will (‘Willkür’) doesn’t generate its objects freely. They are given to it by sensuous affection. Indeed, we could assume that, while we are confronted with arbitrary affections, freedom means the ability to follow our inclination. But in case that we are dealing with affections which are given to us, although we don’t wish to have them,

7 It is irritating to translate ‘Grund’ by ‘principle’, in this context, because in the specified context ‘Grund’ means ‘reason’ or ‘cause’ and refers to our motivations.

22

sasa josifovic

like sadness, heartsickness or greed, we wish to be able to overcome these affections. This experience demonstrates our interest to generate the ends of our will freely. We are not satisfied with the mere freedom to choose between given affections, but aim to control the matters of our own will. The second argument refers to the structure of the free will. Although an arbitrary will could lead to punctual satisfaction, it lacks the potential to generate enduring results. But we do have an interest to achieve enduring ends, or to set universal principles, since this is the ground on which we plan our life. We have the potential as well as the interest to decide for a certain way of life. This freedom of decision is not the same as a mere freedom of choice, because it includes a concept of universal, enduring rules binding on all parties, i.e. the inviolableness of human dignity. The actual argument is: A merely arbitrary will (‘Willkür’) is not able to generate such principles and achieve such ends. The arbitrary will generates principles and attends goals attractive for me personally, in regard to a personal inclination. But we have the capacity to aim at ends attractive for all of us and for ever, such as peace or the inviolableness of human dignity. This structure is described by the formula “desirable in relation to our whole state”. From the perspective of arbitrium liberum it represents a major educational goal to achieve the potential to generate such values. If we start with the fully developed concept of ‘Willensfreiheit’, as Kant does in the second Critique, we must presuppose this capacity. But as we see in the first Critique, Kant elaborates on the concept of practical freedom as a specific kind to execute arbitrium liberum in regard to ends which are desirable in particular as well to general ends. Those which are “desirable in relation to our whole state” are actually objects of the moral reason while the others are objects of the pragmatic reason. As we see: In contrast to Kant’s elaborations in the Critique of Practical Reason, as well as to the common sense about Kant’s moral philosophy, we are starting with a sensuous affection. We see that some problems, like how to generate positive actions when starting from the Categorical Imperative, simply don’t matter here, because we are not at all confronted with such questions. Starting from a given sensuous affection we act in relation to specified ends, of which some are particular and some “desirable in relation to our whole state”. The first ones are arbitrary and thus a matter of smartness (‘Geschicklichkeit’), the latter are necessary and a matter of ethics (‘Sittlichkeit’). (Kant 1787, 851) The performance of arbitrium liberum in relation to particular

kant’s first critique

23

ends doesn’t presuppose much of a reason. As far as the practical reason is supposed to step into action in this area at all, it has two major goals: Firstly, according to the prudential rule, it causes the unity of our arbitrary goals to the end of enduring happiness, ‘Glückseligkeit’, and secondly, it specifies and chooses adequate measures to achieve these ends, or, to put it in Kant’s words: “to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end”. (Kant 1787, 828) In this sphere, the practical reason gives so called pragmatic laws. In contrast to the pragmatic, the moral laws are based on the pure practical reason. Thus they are not empirically conditioned, and are absolutely binding. As a temporary result of our considerations, we may make a note of a historical fact in regard to Kant’s theory of freedom in his first Critique: In contrast to his method in the second Critique, he starts with a sensuously affected, arbitrary will and points out the human ability to overcome such affections and act towards specified ends. Starting from the sensuous affection, we have the inclination to act in a certain way. Kant points out that we are able to consider the possible consequences, and judge their attractiveness. Therefore we can decide to follow our inclination, to act in a way specified by the practical reason, or to remain passive at all. There is one specific reason why Kant privileges the option to follow our reason, namely control, because without controlling our aims, actions and achievements we are lost in arbitrariness and therefore not free to achieve anything. This concept of practical freedom actually corresponds to our intuition that freedom consists in being able to achieve specified ends by undertaking adequate measures. 4. What is “desirable in relation to our whole state”? As already mentioned, there is a structural difference between acting towards aims set up by our senses and such ends that are “desirable in relation to our whole state”. But the latter formula is useless unless we are indeed able to imagine possible ends that correspond to the postulated structure. What is actually “desirable in relation to our whole state”? It is easy to imagine what may be desirable in relation to our personal, temporary state. But, to be able to imagine something that corresponds to the postulated structure includes an adequate understanding of what is essential to all of us as human beings. The ability

24

sasa josifovic

to set and postulate such values represents the highest challenge to our practical reason. And if we agree that the answer to the question, “What ought I to do?” is: “Do that which you consider as reasonable”, we must admit that our ability to do what we ought to, depends on our ability to give account on what is “desirable in relation to our whole state”. Kant himself specifies this formula by “gut und nützlich” (Kant 1787, 830), which means “good and useful” or rather “good as well as useful”. Thus attending that which is “desirable in relation to our whole state” means to act towards ends specified as good as well as useful. In the end, therefore, our will is not directed to that which is good only, but additionally to that which is useful. That is because being worthy of happiness includes the mentioned imperative to be active and shape the world according to the principles of our reason. Kant is aware of the fact that, if we follow our moral principles, we might make the experience that we fail to achieve happiness, in case that the others do not act morally. Therefore he presents the Idea of the self-rewarding morality in order to point out that, in case that all rational beings act morally, they would be authors both of their enduring welfare and of that of the others. He needs this idea in order to elaborate on a systematic unity between the moral and the pragmatic laws, because he assumes that our reason does not contain the contradiction of commanding moral laws as well as pragmatic laws, while assuming that the moral laws make it impossible to achieve the essential end of the pragmatic sphere, namely enduring happiness. But, if there is no such contradiction, the essential end of practical freedom contains universal principles, given by the moral reason, as well as a sphere of their application on the grounds of experience, mediated by the pragmatic reason. Thus acting towards ends “desirable in relation to our whole state” contains the successful performance of the moral as well as pragmatic reason, the first generating universal principles of freedom, the latter specific principles of their realization, and is therefore directed to the essential ends of pure as well as practical reason, namely the worthiness to obtain happiness and enduring happiness itself. If we agree that practical freedom involves moral and pragmatic freedom, we will agree that its essential end is good as well as useful. On the other hand, if we ignore this theory and turn to the second Critique only, we would apply Kant’s usual method to distinguish between the form and the material of the thematic will. The material is given to us empirically, and therefore it can not be object or a sci-

kant’s first critique

25

ence a priori. As far as the will is supposed to be object of philosophy we must focus on its form. According to this distinction Kant turns to the formal regulation of the free will according to the principles of the pure practical reason. The answer to the question “What ought I to do?” can therefore be given only in regard to the form of our will and is finally expressed by the Categorical Imperative. This answer would correspond to Kant’s elaborations in the second Critique, §§ 4–7. But what does this mean to us? Is this the whole educational result of the Philosophy of Enlightenment? Probably it is, in regard to the form, but not at all in regard to the material. The actual challenge consists in bringing both together in a concrete moral judgment. The lack of capacity to judge is actually what Kant calls ‘Dummheit’, dullness, in a footnote to B 173, Critique of Pure Reason. He even exemplifies this phenomenon on the mere academic expertise. Thus the simple reference to the Categorical Imperative may indicate academic expertise as well as mere dullness. In contrast to the idea of a formal determination of the free will, Kant’s thoughts in the Critique of Pure Reason aim at bringing together two spheres of our practical freedom, namely the particular and the universal. According to this theory, the agent of an actual moral judgment has the ability to consider what he intends at this moment and what he intends in general. Or, to put it this way: What do I want to achieve for myself, in this moment, and what do I want to achieve for everybody and forever? In such a situation, we might make the experience that we actually wish for something we don’t approve in general. For example we might say: In general, I don’t approve lying, but at this moment, in this situation, I will lie. Or: According to my current inclination, I will act in a certain way, but in general, I don’t agree with what I am doing now. Of course, this is what Kant calls ‘Willensschwäche’, but nevertheless, often enough, it is a lot of fun to act this way. And if we want to comprehend Kant’s preference of the free will we must get some clarification on the particular reasons for this preference. The major argument for this preference is the contradiction contained in the mentioned cases. If we lacked of ability to set universal values, we wouldn’t ever experience a conflict between our general and our particular will. But since we do have such a capacity, we have to consider what it means to set universal principles and hold on to them. If they are supposed to be universal, they must be binding without exception. Thus, if there is any principle of which we say it is categorically binding, we want it to be binding for all of our actions. Let me

26

sasa josifovic

repeat: If we want to argue with Kant, we must deny the premise that such principles belong to our will at all. If we agree that we do not want anything of this kind, we will not ever experience the mentioned conflict. But if we do, we must agree that each time we act in a way contradictory to our universal principles, we experience an injury of our free will, because we fail to realize a specified universal principle. The optimal case to perform the free will combines the ability to set universal principles and to realize them on the ground of experience. If we agree on that, we must necessarily share Kant’s preference. Of course the major challenge consists in specifying such universal principles. I propose to use the formula “desirable in relation to our whole state” for this purpose. The secondary challenge consists in a successful realization of these principles on the grounds of experience. For example: It is a general principle, and belongs to my own will, that the integrity of human life and dignity must be protected everywhere, always, by everybody, and for the benefit of everybody. Furthermore it is my conviction that famine violates this principle. Therefore I support a humanitarian project to improve the agricultural infrastructure, specifically fighting drought by irrigation, in Africa. 5. A rehabilitation of the pragmatic reason This example already indicates another quality of Kant’s theory of practical freedom in the first Critique by illustrating the imperative to undertake adequate measures on the grounds of experience. Thereby we suggest that a successful structure of practical freedom needs a successful performance of a pure practical reason to generate universal principles combined with an adequate understanding of the circumstances and the decision to step into action according to the given principles. The consideration of the given circumstances is a task for the pragmatic reason. Thus the full development of freedom requires the successful performance of the moral as well as the pragmatic reason. It is common sense in Kant studies that Kant privileges the moral reason, but it is a mistake to ignore the quality of the pragmatic reason. Kant’s theory of practical freedom thus includes a sphere of pragmatism. Of course, in regard to the pure reason, it is of greater interest to elaborate on the question which principles are given immediately by this capacity. But if we point out the task of enlightenment, the pragmatic theory becomes more relevant, because this is the actual

kant’s first critique

27

point which distinguishes the theory of practical freedom from the hope for miracles. To illustrate this point, let’s imagine a morally justified end to be achieved, such as fighting famine. There is a story about Jesus being confronted with this challenge. He decides to act according to his principles and share the food of which he can dispose with the people. Although he does not have enough food to share, he succeeds to feed everybody and they even give some of it back. What makes this story a miracle is the fact that a morally justified principle is attended to be achieved by inadequate measures or more specifically, by measures that contradict the natural laws. If we are supposed to act in a situation comparable with the one described, we must take into regard the natural laws. Moreover we have to pay account to other laws such as those of economy if we want to act successfully. This is a task for the pragmatic reason. Thus we must point out that Kant indeed distinguishes between the moral and the pragmatic reason, while preferring the moral reason in a specific context, but his theory of practical freedom—in contrast to his theory of moral freedom—contains a specific sphere of pragmatism. This answers to the formula “desirable in relation to our whole state” in terms of being “good as well as useful”. Thus the competence to be achieved as an educational result of the philosophy of enlightenment refers to the successful performance or the pure as well as the pragmatic reason. The pragmatic reason is not at all immoral. It is simply another necessary sphere of practical freedom. Therefore I refuse to accept the idea that Kant’s theory of freedom includes moral freedom exclusively while the pragmatic freedom is being ignored or understood as a transitory moment of his theory. In the first Critique he clearly distinguishes practical freedom from transcendental freedom and points out that practical freedom refers to the capacity to perform arbitrium liberum by taking into regard its principles and consequences. This performance is regulated by the moral as well as the pragmatic reason. The optimal development of practical freedom includes a harmonious performance of both spheres of the practical reason. Thus I come to the conclusion that Kant indeed has a theory of pragmatism and point out that he doesn’t intend to disqualify the pragmatic reason at all. Based on the formula: “desirable in relation to our whole state”, we are able to generate universally binding principles. Our pragmatic reason enables us to realize them on the grounds of experience. These

28

sasa josifovic

two capacities define the autonomous human being that arises from the Copernican Revolution of thought and comes to say: So far, then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound by them. (Kant 1787, 847)

ROUSSEAU AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EDUCATIONS OF ‘MAN’ AND ‘CITIZEN’ Frederic Neuhouser Introduction My aim in this contribution is to give a brief account of the principles underlying the educational regimen that Rousseau sets out in the most unwieldy and most neglected of his philosophical texts, Emile. In doing so, I am interested less in issues in the philosophy of education than in the implications Emile’s education has for Rousseau’s political philosophy, and especially for his understanding of how the good of citizenship fits into human flourishing more generally. The argument I construct develops out of a critique of the widely held view that Rousseau’s two positive philosophical works, Emile and the Social Contract, are informed by conflicting and irreconcilable conceptions of human flourishing, ideals that (in Emile) are denoted by the terms homme and citoyen. Implicit in the view I am arguing against is the idea that both ‘man’1 and ‘citizen’ represent genuinely worthy, perhaps even equally worthy, ideals and that—since the two ideals are fundamentally incompatible—realizing one is possible only at the expense of the other. On this view, the human condition is such that it is possible to achieve either the goods of citizenship or those associated with being a man but not both; or, what is more likely, the human condition is marked by a radical Entzweiung, or bifurcation, in which individuals are continually torn between two opposing identities—man and citizen—that defy reconciliation. My principal claim in this paper is that for Rousseau these two ideals are not inherently incompatible and that demonstrating this is a central concern of the philosophical project carried out in Emile and the Social Contract. In fact, I shall argue, Rousseau’s position is stronger than this. For a careful reading of these texts reveals that the ideals of man and citizen are not just compatible

1 Although I render homme as ‘man’ rather than ‘human being’, I do not believe that the philosophical tension examined here depends on homme being a gendered concept.

30

frederic neuhouser

but (in a certain sense) mutually dependent: under the conditions of modern civilization, ‘men’ can exist only if they are also citizens, and, conversely, citizens (of a legitimate republic) must at the same time be constituted as ‘men.’ 1. Distinguishing men from citizens First, it is necessary to say a few words about the concepts ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ and to explain why it might seem that they represent irreconcilable ideals. The main piece of evidence in support of the interpretation I am arguing against2 is Rousseau’s apparently unambiguous declaration at the beginning of Emile that educators must choose between “two contrary forms of instruction:” domestic (or private) education, which forms children into men, and civic (or public) education, which makes them into citizens (E, 39–42/OC 4, 248–52).3 After distinguishing three possible sources of education—nature, things, and men— Rousseau goes on to ask: What is to be done when our [different educations] are opposed? When, instead of raising a man for himself, one wants to raise him for others? Then their harmony is impossible. Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time (E, 39/OC 4, 248; emphasis added).

This passage makes clear that the distinction between domestic and civic education turns on their having not different sources but different goals. (With respect to their source—to who or what does the 2 The locus classicus of this interpretation is Judith N. Shklar’s Men and Citizens (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 3 ‘E’ refers to Emile, or on Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979); ‘OC 4’ refers to vol. 4 of Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959–69). Other abbreviations I use are: DI, for Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, in The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 111–222; LWM, for Letters Written from the Mountain, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, trans. Judith R. Bush and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2001), vol. 9, 131–306; PE, for Discourse on Political Economy, in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3–38; and SC for The Social Contract, ibid, 39–152 (with ‘SC, I.4.vi’ referring to book 1, chapter 4, paragraph 6).

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 31 teaching—both count as education by men.) In specifying the goals of these educations, Rousseau characterizes the ideal of the man in a variety of ways, but the most important of these finds expression in his talk of a man’s existing ‘for himself,’ in contrast to the citizen, who exists ‘for others.’ Since it is not immediately obvious what this distinction amounts to, I cite Rousseau’s elaboration of it in full: Natural man exists entirely for himself. He is a numerical unity, the absolute whole that exists in relation only to itself. . . . Civil man is merely a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is found in his relation to the whole, which is the social body. Good social institutions are those that best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer perceptible (sensible) except within the whole (E39–40/OC 4, 249).

This passage is followed by examples of citizens—of ancient Rome and Sparta—whose common characteristic, according to Rousseau, is that they thought of themselves first as Romans or Spartans and only secondarily (or maybe not at all) as individuals: “A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a Roman; he even loved the country exclusive of himself ” (E, 40/OC 4, 249). The difference between man and citizen, on this formulation, comes down to two related points. First, men and citizens differ with respect to the kind of self-conception they hold: citizens think of themselves first and foremost as members of their respective states and therefore conceive of their own good (or their highest interests) as inseparable from the good of their state. Men, in contrast, think of themselves first as individuals and, like the inhabitants of Rousseau’s state of nature, conceive of their own good (or highest interest) independently of their membership in a political association. The second dimension along which the two differ concerns the source of their sense of value as a self. The citizen “believes himself . . . no longer perceptible (sensible) except within the whole,” which is to say that a citizen of Rome ‘counts,’ or has a sense of himself as valuable, only insofar as he is a Roman, only insofar as he is part of a whole that he (together with his compatriots) regards as valuable and from which his own value (as well as that of his compatriots) derives. Both of these points could be summed up by saying that what characterizes the citizen is a certain kind of dependence on others, whereas

32

frederic neuhouser

the hallmark of the man is self-sufficiency. Rousseau makes the same claim when he says that the citizen’s existence is ’relative‘ (he conceives of himself and senses his own value only in relation to a larger whole), whereas the man’s existence is ‘absolute’. It is striking, and no coincidence, that these are the same terms Rousseau uses in the Second Discourse when distinguishing the two forms of self-love—amour propre and amour de soi-même—that motivate humans and account for the greatest part of their behavior. (The other human motivator is pity, which, in the Second Discourse at least, is said to operate independently of both forms of self-love (DI, 127/OC 3, 125–6).) As this repetition of the two terms suggests, it is impossible to grasp Rousseau’s distinction between man and citizen without first defining the ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ forms of self-love and understanding how they figure in each of the two ideals. I shall argue that the most important difference between man and citizen is a difference in how self-love (in the broadest sense) is configured in each and that the principal distinction between domestic and civic education comes down to differences in the formation, or cultivation, of one or both species of self-love. Rousseau gives his most explicit definition of the two forms of selflove in a crucial note appended to the Second Discourse: It’s important not to confuse amour propre and amour de soi-même, two passions very different in their nature and their effects. Amour de soi-même is a natural sentiment that inclines every animal to attend to its self-preservation and that, guided by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Amour propre is but a relative sentiment, artificial and born in society, that inclines each individual to think more highly of himself than of anyone else [and] inspires in men all the evils they do to one another . . . (DI, 218/OC 3, 219).

There are many claims packed into this brief statement, but three are especially relevant here. First, the two forms of self-love are distinguished in terms of the object, or good, that each inclines us to seek: amour de soi-même is directed at self-preservation, whereas amour propre is concerned with judgments of merit and honor, with how highly one is ‘regarded.’ A being that possesses amour propre, then, is moved by the desire “to have a position, to be a part, to count for something” (E, 160/OC 4, 421); such a being, in other words, feels a need to be esteemed, admired, or thought valuable (in some respect). Second, amour propre is an inherently social sentiment—it is “born in society”—whereas amour de soi-même is a sentiment that affects even the (hypothetical) isolated, unsocialized beings of the original state of nature.

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 33 Third, and most important, amour propre is relative, in contrast to the absolute character of amour de soi-même (E IV, 215/OC 4, 494). ‘Relative’ here means relative to other subjects, and amour propre is relative to others in two respects, each of which distinguishes it from amour de soi-même. First, the good that amour propre seeks is relative, or comparative, in nature; to desire esteem is to desire to have a certain standing in relation to the standing of others.4 In other words, the esteem that amour propre strives for is what is sometimes called a positional good, which implies that doing well for myself—finding the esteem I seek—consists in doing well in relation to (in comparison with) others. This feature of amour propre contrasts with the absolute (non-relative) character of amour de soi-même in that the value of the goods sought by the latter is independent of how much or how little of the same is possessed by others. If we think of amour de soi-même as directed at self-preservation, the point becomes clear: the extent to which my food, my shelter, and my sleep satisfy my bodily needs is independent of how well those around me fare with respect to theirs. In the case of amour propre, in contrast, my satisfaction depends on how the quantity and quality of the esteem I receive from others compares with the quantity and quality of the esteem they enjoy. The other respect in which amour propre is relative and amour de soi-même is not is more important for my project here: amour propre is relative to other subjects in the further sense that, since the good it seeks is esteem from others, its satisfaction requires—even consists inthe opinions of other subjects.5 Amour propre is relative in this second sense, then, because its aim—recognition from others—is inherently social in character. Here, too, amour propre contrasts with amour de soi-même: since the opinion of one’s fellow beings is not constitutive of the goods sought by amour de soi-même, it does not directly and necessarily tie us to other subjects, as does amour propre. Of course, in most circumstances, satisfying the needs of self-preservation will also require, as a means to achieving one’s ends, cooperation with others.

4 In distinguishing amour propre from amour de soi-même, Rousseau emphasizes that the former “makes comparisons” (E, 213/OC 4, 493). Also: “as soon as amour propre has developed, the relative I is constantly in play, and the young man never observes others without returning to himself and comparing himself with them. The issue, then, is to know what rank among his fellows he will put himself after having examined them” (E, 243/OC 4, 534). 5 Rousseau uses this sense of ‘relative’ at E, 39–40/OC 4, 248–9. It is also implicit at E, 213/OC 4, 493, in the claim that amour propre demands that others confirm one’s comparative judgments regarding oneself.

34

frederic neuhouser

Even so, the good one hopes to achieve through such cooperation—if it is truly an end of amour de soi-même—remains external and hence only contingently related to one’s relations to others. This latter point is important because it illuminates the close connection Rousseau asserts between ‘relativity’ (or amour propre) and dependence, on the one hand, and between ‘absoluteness’ (or amour de soi-même) and self-sufficiency, on the other. Amour propre is a fundamental source of human dependence—for Rousseau it is by far its primary source—because it furnishes us with desires and needs that in principle cannot be satisfied except with the cooperation—the affirming, evaluative gaze—of other subjects. In contrast, creatures that lacked amour propre but were otherwise like us could in principle be self-sufficient since the goods sought by amour de soi-même are not defined by or necessarily related to the judgments (or other activities) of others. (This is the main point of Rousseau’s sketch of the original state of nature in Part I of the Second Discourse.) That Rousseau means to draw some connection between citizenship and amour propre is plain enough; what is less clear is what this connection is and why he asserts it. Recall that the main difference between the two forms of education distinguished by Rousseau is a difference in their endpoints, or goals—specifically, whether their aim is to produce citizens or men. But what is it to produce a citizen or a man, and how does the formation of amour propre figure in each? It is reasonable to suppose that, of these two ideals, the former has its source in political philosophy, which is to say, in speculation about the nature of political association and the conditions of its existence. This suggests that, for Rousseau, the guiding aim in forming a child into a citizen is to instill in him the character traits he will need in order for political association to be possible. Civic education, then, would aim at cultivating the desires, beliefs, and self-conceptions of individuals in a way that would enable them, once educated, to endorse or affirm their polity’s general will, or what is the same, to embrace the good of their political community—the good of Rome, the good of Sparta—as their own. Domestic education, in contrast, would receive its goal from a source outside political philosophy,6 or independently of

6 For now let’s call this source moral philosophy, understood as governed by the ideal of individual autonomy. On this construal, Rousseau’s distinction is a forerunner of Hegel’s contrast between Sittlichkeit and Moralität.

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 35 concerns about what political association requires of its members. The first aim of domestic education would be not to make its charges into bearers of the general will but to form them into men, the defining characteristic of which is self-sufficiency: a man is exists ‘for himself’ rather than merely ‘for others;’ his being as a self has a source independent of his membership in a political body. (Beyond this, being a man includes ”being oneself ”, “acting as one speaks”, “decisiveness in one’s choices” and “sticking to “the choices one makes (E, 40/OC 4, 250); in addition, ‘man’ is a universal, cosmopolitan identity, whereas the citizen always identifies with a particular state.) Thinking of the aim of civic education in this way helps us to see how citizenship might be related to amour propre: the latter—or, more precisely, a certain configuration of it—is what makes citizenship possible for beings (like us) who are first and foremost creatures of selflove. Being a citizen involves caring deeply enough about one’s political community to be able freely—and without resentment or regret—to subordinate one’s own particular (or ‘private’) good to the good of the community as a whole. The problem this poses for Rousseau is that human nature as such—prior to any ‘artificial’ intervention such as education—provides no basis for the allegiance to a collective good that citizenship requires. Creatures like us, for whom one’s private good is one’s ‘natural’ first concern7 must be fundamentally re-formed (‘denatured,’ according to the passage cited above) if they are to regard themselves first as Romans or Spartans and to will in accordance with that identity. (Pity, too, belongs to our original nature, but Rousseau makes clear that it speaks only with a ‘gentle voice’ (DI, 154/OC 3, 156) and that its power to move us is weak in comparison with selflove in either of its forms.). The idea underlying Rousseau’s linking of amour propre with citizenship is that it, not amour de soi-même, is the form of self-love that renders the basic self-interestedness of humans compatible with the attitude characteristic of citizens: according greater weight to ‘our’ good than to my own. A being that is moved by amour propre—by the need to achieve standing in the eyes of others—can be brought to care about the collective good in a manner consistent with his own self-love

7 This is what it means to say that self-love is the first principle of human nature (DI, 127/OC 3, 125–6. That self-love (here, amour de soi-même) is first in this sense is made clear at DI, 197/OC 3, 126.

36

frederic neuhouser

if belonging to the polity and contributing to its good are publicly visible aspects of a shared form of life through which he establishes, in his own eyes as well as in his ‘compatriots’, his identity and value as (for example) a Roman or a Spartan. That we are on the right track in understanding Rousseau’s point is confirmed by a series of passages in the Discourse on Political Economy that emphasize the role played by love of the fatherland (l’amour de la patrie) in motivating citizens to embrace the general will and to identify the good of the republic with their own. According to these passages, the love of the fatherland appropriate to citizenship is one in which “this sweet and lively sentiment combines the force of amour propre with all the beauty of virtue” and thereby “endows virtue with an energy that . . . makes [love of the fatherland] into the most heroic of all passions” (PE, 16/OC 3, 255). Later, in expanding on the claim that love of the fatherland depends on harnessing the ‘force’ of amour propre, Rousseau adds that amour propre, when properly habituated, is able to “draw us out of ourselves,” expand the human self (le moi humain), and bring us to care about the larger good (PE, 21/OC 3, 260). And, in an intervening passage, Rousseau says more about how, in classical Rome, individuals’ amour propre was extended to the republic: for the citizens of Rome, “respect for the name Roman . . . roused the courage and animated the virtue of anyone who had the honor to bear it” (PE, 18/OC 3, 257). The talk of respect and honor that accrue both to citizens and to the republic with which they identify suggests a picture of how amour propre animates the souls of citizens. On this picture, citizens win honor not only by distinguishing themselves in their compatriots’ eyes through extraordinary acts of public service but also (and primarily) simply by belonging to the Roman people and participating in its civic life. As described here, citizens of Rome found their honor in civic life by identifying themselves as members of a social group that itself commanded their highest respect. To bear the name ‘Roman’ was an honor for them because of the respect they had for Rome, and the honor of being called Roman was something they won by demonstrating, in their deeds, their faithfulness to the civic norms they jointly recognized as their highest values. Through such conduct they proved themselves to be Romans, and in establishing their identities as such in reality, they experienced Rome’s greatness as their own. Individuals of this sort are “drawn out of themselves” in that they satisfy their need to have a standing for others (they win their honor) by embracing and

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 37 expressing practical identities as members of a larger political group— identities that consist, in part, in an allegiance to certain shared ideals.8 This civic virtue is at root a phenomenon of amour propre because even though there is a sense in which the Roman citizen wins honor in his own eyes—he acts on values he himself endorses, and he achieves, for himself, a kind of satisfaction in doing so—he also expresses his identity as a Roman publicly, in full view of his like-minded fellow citizens, who approve of his actions and respect him because of them. (Rousseau’s implicit claim is that under normal human conditions,9 winning respect from others—for civic virtue, for example—is developmentally prior to, and a necessary condition of, winning it in one’s own eyes.) 2. Normative problems posed by the two ideals That Rousseau acknowledges a moral ideal for humans beyond the one supplied by political philosophy indicates his appreciation of the serious dangers to human flourishing intrinsic to the ideal of the citizen. Not surprisingly, these are the same dangers he associates with amour propre, or more precisely, with the thoroughgoing dependence on others that amour propre necessarily engenders.10 (Dependence in this context is opposed to self-sufficiency: an individual is dependent when he has to rely on the cooperation of others in order to satisfy his needs.) A central insight of Rousseau’s moral and political thought is that any form of dependence carries with it the danger that individuals will be compelled to compromise their freedom in order to satisfy the needs that impel them to seek the cooperation of others. If freedom consists in “not being subject to someone else’s will” (LWM, 260/

8 In linking Roman patriotism with amour propre and virtue, Rousseau makes clear that ‘Roman’ was not primarily a descriptive title but a normative one: to be a Roman was to have a specific practical identity that animated one to perform acts of courage and virtue. This type of identification is grounded not in affection—where citizens desire the collective good because they love their compatriots—but in a normative stance, an allegiance to the civic values that informed Roman life. 9 As opposed to the unrealistic conditions Emile is subjected to, which make it possible for him to avoid the entanglements of amour propre until puberty (e.g., by being removed from family life). 10 For more on the moral threat posed by dependence, see my Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), chapter 2.

38

frederic neuhouser

OC 3, 841)—or, equivalently, in obeying only one’s own will11—then dependence poses a standing threat to freedom since it opens up the possibility that in order to get what I need I may have no choice but to tailor my actions and beliefs to conform to the often arbitrary wills of those on whose cooperation I rely. When constantly faced with a choice between getting what I need or following my own will, it will be no surprise if satisfaction frequently wins out over freedom. The fundamental dependence on the opinions of others that amour propre engenders poses the same threat to freedom: Even domination is servile when it is connected with opinion, for you depend on the prejudices of those you govern by prejudices. To conduct them as you please, you must conduct yourself as they please. They have only to change their way of thinking, and you must perforce change your way of acting (E, 83/OC 4, 308).

Rousseau’s thought is that someone who needs recognition from others will regularly be subject to the temptation to let his actions be dictated by the values and preferences of those whose recognition he seeks and, so, to determine his will in accordance with their wishes or values rather than his own. Moreover, the danger to freedom posed by the dependence created by amour propre is especially acute, for something of great importance is at stake in this passion’s strivings, something one could call the very being of the self (as a moral or spiritual entity). This is the idea Rousseau means to communicate when he says, repeatedly, that in being recognized by others, an individual acquires a “sentiment of his own existence” (DI, 187/OC 3, 193; my emphasis). Although a failure to find recognition from one’s fellows does not pose a threat to one’s physical being, someone who lacks standing in the eyes of others is, as ordinary language acknowledges, a ‘nobody.’ Recognition from others, especially when externally displayed, confers on the self a reality of a certain distinctively human kind: a ‘beingfor-others’ that consists in a public (and hence not merely subjective) confirmation of one’s value and ‘substance.’ This, along with my account of the link between amour propre and citizenship, makes clear that a central feature of the man is self-sufficiency with respect to his being as a self (with respect to his selfconception and his sense of self, or value). The man, unlike the citizen,

11 This formulation is implicit in Rousseau’s statement of the fundamental problem of political philosophy, which glosses freedom as “obeying only oneself ” (SC, I.6.iv).

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 39 is self-defining and self-affirming—he is the source of his “sentiment of his own existence”—and because of this independence he is much more likely than his counterpart to escape the need to conduct himself as others please and, so, to enjoy the paramount human good, freedom.12 It has also become clear why the ideals of citizen and man, together with their corresponding educations, can appear to be mutually exclusive: it is difficult to see how a single person could be both a political being—“a fractional unity dependent on the . . . whole”—as well as an individual (in the original sense of the term): an ‘absolute’ being that is self-defining, self-affirming, and (for those reasons) able to avoid the servitude to others’ opinions that a more social self-conception seems to imply. But is this indeed Emile’s message? As I have already indicated, many interpreters believe that it is.13 It is commonly thought, for example, that the aim of Emile’s education is to produce a man rather than a citizen and that its principal strategy for doing so is to ensure the complete absence of amour propre from Emile’s character, whether by extirpating or suppressing the drive for recognition or by preventing its emergence. Although I want to reject both of these claims, it is important to appreciate why such a reading is tempting. The most important reason is that self-sufficiency of some sort plainly is a prominent goal of Emile’s education. At the end of Book III—as I explain below, the location of these quotations is crucial—Emile is said to have learned to “use his reason, not someone else’s” (and to be able to do so precisely because “he takes no account of opinion”); in the same place he is described as “considering himself without regard to others

12 “To renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s quality as a man. . . . There is no possible compensation for someone who renounces everything. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man” (SC, I.4.vi). In the present context one might argue that ‘integrity’ is a more apt name than ‘freedom’ for what is endangered when individuals need the positive judgments of others. 13 Two otherwise insightful interpreters who seem to take this view are Susan Neiman, who describes the “ultimate goal” of Emile’s education as independence from others’ “reflection as constitutive of his sense of self-worth” (“Metaphysics, Philosophy: Rousseau on the Problem of Evil,” in Reclaiming the History of Ethics, ed. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 156); and Allan Bloom, who claims that “the primary intention of [Emile’s] education is to prevent amour de soi from turning into amour propre” (E, 10) and that the tutor’s aim is to make Emile “intellectually and morally self-sufficient” (E, 27).

40

frederic neuhouser

and finding it good that others do not think of him. . . . He is alone in human society; he counts on himself alone” (E, 207–8/OC 4, 486–8). Yet in order to grasp the role that the ideal of man plays in Emile’s education, it is important to note that, apart from the passage first cited above, choosing between the ideals of man and citizen is not how Rousseau normally formulates the problem of Emile. The issue he is most concerned with, rather, is a kind of disunity or conflict internal to the self that tends to result from the attempt to make a single individual into both a man and a citizen: He who in the civil order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature does not know what he wants. Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or citizen (E, 40/OC 4, 249–50; my emphasis).

The real problem of Emile’s education, I suggest, is not how to make a man in place of a citizen—it is not about choosing between the two ideals—but rather, as Rousseau says very plainly here, to find a way of educating children to become both without generating in them the internal ‘contradiction’ described above. In other words, in Emile no less than in the Social Contract and the Second Discourse,14 Rousseau recognizes the necessity, even the desirability, of living in society as a citizen. Initial appearances to the contrary, the aim of Emile’s education is to make it possible for him to be a man and a citizen, and to live out both identities wholeheartedly, without inner conflict; its aim, in other words, is to devise an education that renders the two ideals psychologically compatible. It is not difficult to understand why Rousseau rejects the strategy of making Emile self-sufficient and free at the expense of making him a citizen: if Emile were only a man, he would be self-defining and selfdetermining, but he would also be isolated and undeveloped; he would miss out on much of the best that human life can offer, including a wealth of goods that depend on having substantive ties to others.15 This is confirmed by the fact that the crowning point of Emile’s educa-

14 In the latter Rousseau makes clear that even if we could return to the original state of nature, doing so would be morally undesirable and represent a “debasing of the species” (DI, 203/OC 3, 207). 15 See, e.g., the Second Discourse, where at the same moment that the birth of amour propre opens the door to jealousy, fury, and conflict, it also makes possible “the sweetest sentiments known to men: conjugal and . . . paternal love” (DI, 164/OC 3, 168).

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 41 tion, in Book V, is his marriage to Sophie and his entry into the state. It could hardly be clearer by this point in the text that Emile is being educated to assume his place in society, including as a citizen. But Rousseau also says this explicitly in Emile’s opening pages: Swept along in contrary routes by nature and by men, forced to divide ourselves between these diverse forces, we follow a composite force that leads us to neither one goal nor the other. Thus in conflict and floating during the whole course of our life, we end it without having been able to put ourselves in harmony with ourselves. . . . If perhaps the double object we set for ourselves could be joined in a single one, then by removing the contradictions of man a great obstacle to his happiness would be removed. . . . I believe one will have made a few steps in this quest when one has read this book (E, 41/OC 4, 251).

And, as if to dispel any doubt that might remain, Rousseau makes explicit towards the end of Book IV the need for Emile finally to enter society, including the state:16 Emile is not made to remain always solitary. . . . If I keep him away from society to the end, what will he have learned from me? Everything perhaps, except the most necessary art for a man and a citizen, which is knowing how to live with his fellow beings (E, 327, 328/OC 4, 654, 655; emphasis added).

But if Rousseau says clearly, and more than once, that Emile is to be both man and citizen, what is to be made of his earlier claim that “one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time”? In considering this question, it is important to give weight to the quotation’s final four words, for if one fails to see that what Rousseau denies is only the possibility of simultaneously forming children as men and citizens, it is impossible to account for the obvious fact that the final stage of Emile’s education (E V, 448–75/ OC 4, 823–60) is devoted to preparing him to assume his place as a member of the state. This instruction for citizenship can be reconciled with the view that Emile’s education aims at making him into a man, once one realizes that his formation as a citizen (in Book V) takes place only after his formation as a man (in Books I–IV). The end result of Emile is not a man instead of a citizen but a man-citizen whose education has proceeded in two stages: the first is governed

16 Other evidence that Emile is being prepared for citizenship is his tutor’s recital in Book V of a condensed version of the Social Contract (E, 458–67/OC 4, 836–49).

42

frederic neuhouser

exclusively by the ‘manly’ ideal of self-sufficiency, while the second provides the product of the first stage with what he needs in order also to be a citizen (and husband), thereby unifying the two educations and accomplishing Emile’s goal of “removing the contradictions” between them (E, 41/OC 4, 251). Before outlining the course of Emile’s education in more detail, I want to consider briefly the philosophical implications of its twostage structure. The presence of the second stage—Emile’s formation as a citizen—suggests, not that Emile and political philosophy represent independent, possibly conflicting projects, as many interpreters believe, but, instead, that the former is subject to constraints imposed on it by latter in the following sense: one condition of a successful education is that it form its charges into beings who are able to assume their place in the state as citizens (as persons who are able to affirm the general will of their polity since they regard its good as their own.) The claim implicit in Emile is that more than one kind of education can meet this political condition: a ‘public’ education (such as Sparta’s), which leaves, however, no space for individual autonomy; and Emile’s ‘domestic’ education, in which formation as a citizen takes place only after a lengthy instructorship in being a man. The essential difference between the two forms of education is not that one produces only men and the other only citizens but rather that Emile’s domestic education produces individuals who, in the end, can assume the role of citizen in a specific manner, a manner consistent with achieving the goods essential to being a man. Of course, the goods in question cannot include self-sufficiency17 in the strict sense. This is because Emile cannot be a citizen (or husband) unless he possesses amour propre (since it is essential to the frame of mind that enables self-interested beings to care deeply and non-instrumentally about the good of others) and because no one who feels the needs of amour propre can be truly selfsufficient.18 Instead, the good that Emile’s domestic education is to secure for him, even as he participates in civic life, is the good that, in the wholly ‘natural’ (asocial) man, is assured by his absolute self17 I would argue that self-sufficiency is not good in itself for Rousseau but only instrumentally, insofar as it is a means to achieving freedom. 18 Rousseau is completely clear about this even if his interpreters are often not: “I would find someone who wanted to prevent the birth of the passions almost as mad as someone who wanted to annihilate them; and those who believed that this was my project . . . would surely have understood me very badly” (E, 212/OC 4, 491). The context makes clear that ‘the passions’ refers to amour propre.

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 43 sufficiency: the good of freedom (or integrity). Here, too, Rousseau is explicit about his aim (even though, again, many interpreters have failed to pay notice): . . . although I want to form the man of nature, the object is not . . . to make him a savage. . . . It suffices that, enclosed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get carried away by either the passions or the opinions of men, that he see with his eyes, that he feel with his heart, that no authority govern him beyond that of his own reason (E, 255/OC 4, 551; emphasis added).

The aim of domestic education, then, is to form citizens who also incorporate the most important virtue of ‘men’: the freedom that consists in seeing with one’s own eyes, feeling with one’s own heart, and being governed only by one’s own reason (rather than being compelled to conduct oneself “as others please”). Moreover, this aspect of Emile’s project can be understood as a respect which moral philosophy—via its ideal of ‘man’—imposes its own constraints on Rousseau’s political philosophy. For the Social Contract can be seen as an attempt to figure out not just how the ideal of the good of all can come to rule the life of a polity but also how the individuals who participate in that life can remain free, or autonomous (governed only by their own reason), in their allegiance to such an ideal. In other words, the Social Contract implicitly rejects certain possible solutions to the problem of political life (how citizens can be brought to care about the good of their polity) because they are incompatible with citizens remaining, in some sense, sovereign individuals. 3. The stages of Emile’s education In this section I outline the principal stages of Emile’s education in order to show how its trajectory is determined by the goals of Rousseau’s project as I have presented them here. I claimed above that Emile’s education falls into two parts: his formation in accordance with the ideal of ‘man’ in Books I–IV and his subsequent formation as a citizen in Book V. Since the first of these itself has two parts—namely, before and after the awakening of amour propre in adolescence—his education as a whole divides into three stages. First, in Books I–III, Emile is raised exclusively “for himself,” or “in his relations with things” (E, 214/OC 4, 493). In this stage his education takes place outside society and is devoted to the proper formation of amour de soi-même and to

44

frederic neuhouser

preserving for as long as possible the dormancy of amour propre, all of which is aimed at fostering in the young child the psychological selfsufficiency on which the ideal of man depends. In the second stage—in Book IV—Emile’s education in self-sufficiency is continued, but with a crucial difference: the onset of puberty, with its awakening of sexual passion,19 makes it impossible to prolong amour propre’s dormancy. With the latter stirred, Emile can no longer be content with existing only for himself, and his education—still carried out in isolation from social relations—must concentrate on forming his amour propre (and pity) so that once he finally enters the institutions of marriage and the state, he will possess the psychological resources he needs in order to exist ‘for others’ while also preserving, as far as possible, the freedom and self-sufficiency he learned as a child. In the final phase, in Book V, the exclusive bond between pupil and tutor is loosened, Emile is instructed in the roles of husband and citizen, and he steps into the social world at last, equipped as well as one ever can be to negotiate the tension between being-for-self and being-for-others that for Rousseau defines the human condition. The task of the first stage of Emile’s education is to ”prepare from afar the reign of his freedom and the use of his forces . . . by putting him in the condition always to be master of himself and in all things to do his will, as soon as he has one” (E, 63/OC 4, 282). Its main principle could be summed up as follows: “until the guide of amour propre, which is reason, can be born, it is important that a child to do nothing because he is seen or heard—nothing, in a word, in relation to others—but only what nature asks of him” (E, 92/OC 4, 322). In accordance with this maxim, Emile is encouraged throughout Books 1–III to develop his natural capacities, to explore the world, and even to learn a trade (carpentry), all in the absence of the evaluating gaze of other subjects. In learning, playing, and working in isolation from others, Emile learns to affirm himself in his newfound strengths and abilities without needing the approval of others and, so, in accordance with (‘true’ or ‘natural’) values that have not been distorted by fashion or arbitrary opinion. This means, for example, that Emile is given free rein to indulge and enjoy his native drive to know—the “curiosity natural to man concerning all that pertains to his interests”—while

19 The close connection between sexuality and amour propre is a prominent theme in Rousseau’s thought that I cannot go into here.

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 45 remaining free of the socially perverted variant of this drive, an “ardor to know founded only on the desire to be esteemed as learned” (E, 167/OC 4, 429). It also means that in judging the results of his carpentry, say, Emile learns to consult ‘natural’ (object-relative) standards, such as simplicity, harmony, and utility, rather than other subjects’ opinions of what is good or pleasing, which are perpetually liable to distortion by an undue concern for what fashion dictates and what social approval requires. The most important result of this “education from things” (E, 38/OC 4, 247) is that before the passions of adolescence force him to give weight to the opinions of others, Emile will have developed a substantial reservoir of self-esteem as well as the capacity to evaluate himself according to transparent, non-fluctuating standards and independently of others’ judgments. By the end of this phase Emile will have learned, as Rousseau puts it, to “make use of his reason, not someone else’s;” to “give nothing to opinion . . . [or] authority;” and, most important, to “think well of himself without regard to others” (E, 207–8/OC 4, 486–8). These are precisely the resources Emile will need if his loss of self-sufficiency in adolescence, once his amour propre is fully awakened, is not to result in enslavement to the opinions of others. In addition to fostering in Emile the types of self-sufficiency just described, the first phase of his education aims to prevent the premature stirring of amour propre20 and, especially, its ‘inflammation’ into a drive that seeks to achieve superior standing in relation to others or, even worse, to dominate or command them. Each of the three books devoted to this phase of Emile’s education contains a prominent example of this pedagogical strategy: in Book I caregivers are instructed in how to respond to the cries of infants so as to avoid arousing in them “ideas of domination and servitude” (E, 48, 64–8/ OC 4, 261, 285–90); in Book II Emile is made to experience the painful consequences of failing to respect the property rights of another— his own beans, planted on another’s soil, are uprooted—for the pedagogical purpose of “preventing him from believing himself master of

20 Despite some of his own statements to the contrary, Rousseau should not be understood as maintaining that amour propre can be completely absent from the child’s character. His example of the crying infant who experiences humiliation at the hands of his nurse (E, 65–6/OC 4, 286–7) indicates its very early presence in human beings. Rousseau’s concern, instead, is to prevent the “inflammation” of amour propre and to minimize the role it plays in the child’s experience.

46

frederic neuhouser

everything” (E, 97/OC 4, 329); and in Book III Emile is allowed to be publicly humiliated—by the magician at the fair—at the moment he first experiences the heady thrill of the crowd’s admiration and an overheated amour propre threatens to seize hold of his character (E, 172–5/OC 4, 437–40). More important than these examples, though, is the rationale Rousseau gives for maintaining the dormancy of amour propre in this early phase: as the quote cited above makes clear, the child’s desire for recognition is to be kept in check “until the guide of amour propre, which is reason, can be born.” The problem Rousseau points to here is not merely a cognitive deficiency, such as an inability to universalize or abstract, either of which would make it impossible for the child to formulate or comprehend the general principles on which reasoning depends. The more important deficiency, I would suggest, is the absence in the young child of the cognitive (but also conative) capacity to view the world from the perspective of other subjects and to be moved by what one sees when one adopts that point of view. Rousseau hints at this idea when he says in Book II: “the child will treat as a caprice every will opposed to his own when he does not perceive (sentir) the reason for it. And a child does not perceive the reason for anything that clashes with his whims” (E, 91n/OC 4, 320n). The philosophical point here seems to be this: the substantive relations to others that amour propre makes necessary are dangerous for the young child because, lacking the adult’s capacity for reason, he can understand the ‘negotiation’ among divergent wills intrinsic to such relationships only as a contest among wills in which domination or servitude—rather than rational agreement—are the only options. The explanation for this, as Rousseau tells us here, is that the child is unable to perceive (or ‘sense’) the reasons that lie behind others’ desires and ends, which is crucial for assessing the validity of the competing claims of other subjects and arriving at principles for resolving them that can be endorsed by all. (This helps to illuminate both what Rousseau has in mind by ‘reason’ and why it is a central principle of this phase of education that Emile “not be commanded,” that he find resistance to his will only in ‘physical obstacles’ rather than in other wills (E, 91, 85/OC 4, 320, 311).) It this precisely this capacity for (moral) reason that as an adult Emile will need to rely on to keep his own self-love (especially his amour propre) in check. And, not coincidentally, it is the same kind of reasoning involved in a citizen’s adopting the perspective of the general will, where legislation must be judged from the

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 47 perspective of how it will affect the fundamental human interests of each citizen. One of the innovative theses of Emile (though it remains largely implicit) is that the very capacity that is called on to solve the problems imposed on human existence by amour propre itself depends on—consists, in part, in a certain reconfiguration of—the same passion whose ill effects it is to combat. For the capacity to take an external evaluative stance towards oneself and one’s actions—the capacity at the heart of moral reason—depends on the ability to see oneself and the world through the eyes of other subjects and to be moved by their judgments of the good. Since it is precisely this capacity that is exercised whenever one is concerned with how one measures up in the eyes of others, amour propre, despite its many dangers, is at the time the element of human psychology that supplies human beings with their most powerful incentive to develop their innate but latent capacity to adopt and accord value to the evaluative perspective of others. It is for this reason that the proper formation of amour propre, rather than its extirpation, is so crucial to Emile’s education and the central focus of its second phase (in Book IV). The awakening of amour propre in adolescence requires a fundamental shift in pedagogical strategy. Now that it is no longer possible to keep the drive for social esteem dormant, focus must be shifted to molding Emile’s emergent amour propre with the aim of rendering his social attachments, including citizenship, consistent with his being a man. This shift in strategy is announced in the following way at the beginning of Book IV: “So long as [man] knows himself only in his physical being, he ought to study himself in his relations with things. This is the job of his childhood [Books I–III]. When he begins to sense his moral being, he ought to study himself in his relations with men [Book IV]” (E, 214/OC 4, 493; emphasis added). Educating Emile with regard to his proper relations to others consists in two main tasks:21 expanding the scope of his pity so as to encompass the human species as a whole and shaping his amour propre by instilling in him a sense for what “rank among his fellows” he is entitled to occupy (E, 243/ OC 4, 534).

21 Obviously, I am abstracting from many complicated details here in an attempt to grasp the essential tasks of this educational phase.

48

frederic neuhouser

The first task is accomplished by furnishing the adolescent’s imagination with an abundance of “objects on which the expansive force of his heart can act—objects that swell the heart, that extend it to other beings” (E, 223/OC 4, 506). In addition to learning of, and being moved by, the pervasiveness of human suffering, Emile is to be brought to see that all men, regardless of social position, experience their pains as acutely as he does his own (E, 225/OC 4, 509), the result of which is that he learns to accord importance to human suffering as such, wherever it is found. The second task is to form Emile’s sense of his own worth in relation to others such that the ‘rank’ he claims for himself is equality with all human beings. (The type of equality at issue here could be called moral equality, the condition that each person’s fundamental interests count for as much as anyone else’s in formulating the principles that govern our actions.) To some extent, this task begins already in the formation of Emile’s pity described above, insofar as extending pity to humanity in general rests on understanding all human beings as sharing a basic condition—the certainty of death and vulnerability to pain, sickness, and need—and implies that no one’s pain matters less than anyone else’s. A further measure aimed at infusing Emile’s amour propre with an egalitarian spirit includes getting him to attach the proper significance to the various forms of inequalities through which individuals, under the sway of badly educated amour propre, attempt to raise their own position in relation to others’. One part of this involves impressing on Emile that inequalities in wealth, power, and social position seldom bring genuine satisfaction to those who have them. (Letting him read history, it turns out, is the best way of accomplishing this (E, 237–40/OC 4, 526–30).) Another involves bringing him to see that such inequalities rarely correspond to differences in genuine merit and that therefore wealth, power, and class advantages are mostly undeserved. Finally, Emile is to learn that even those who have more than others of the genuine human goods— happiness, wisdom, esteem from oneself and others—do not, in any robust sense, merit their advantages. This lesson is especially important for Emile, who, having had the good fortune to receive an exemplary education, will most likely occupy a favored position of precisely this sort and, so, be especially vulnerable to “attributing his happiness to his own merit” and therefore believing himself worthy of what is mostly his good luck (E, 245/OC 4, 536–7).) My main concern here is not the pedagogical effectiveness of the measures Rousseau prescribes but the philosophical principles that

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 49 underlie them. With a little reflection it is not difficult to see that, in having his pity and amour propre fashioned as prescribed in Book IV, Emile is being equipped with precisely the psychological resources he will need—sensitivity to the needs of others and a sense of himself as a human being (a ‘man’), equal in rank to all others—in order to be able, as the citizen of a republic, to embrace the general will as his own. For, as we know from Rousseau’s political philosophy, the general will of a (modern) legitimate republic strives to realize the common good defined in a specific way, namely, as the protection of “the goods, life, and freedom of each member” (PE, 9/OC 3, 248)—or, as I would put it, the satisfaction of the essential ‘human’ interests of all citizens.22 Legislating in accordance with the general will, then, requires of citizens that they be able to imagine and empathize with the situation of ‘each’ (SC, II.4.v) and to accord equal moral importance to the fundamental interests of all citizens. In concluding this contribution, I want to return to the issue of how the projects of moral and political philosophy, broadly construed, together with the ideals of man and citizen that govern them, intersect in Emile and determine its content. I have already suggested that in Rousseau’s positive philosophical works each of the two projects imposes constraints on the other: Emile’s status as a man may not be purchased as the expense of his substantive ties to others (including those of citizenship), and the Social Contract’s solution to the problems of political life must preserve for individual citizens the freedoms associated with being a man, including their sovereign moral authority. Moreover, this mutual constraint finds its rationale in the thought that if individuals were to realize one of these ideals but not the other, they would miss out on some of the fundamental goods that human existence offers, all of which ought to be pursued insofar as achieving them jointly is possible. Rousseau’s insistence that Emile’s education be domestic rather than public, then, is in effect a declaration that there are ideals that ought to govern human lives beyond those implicit in the concerns of political philosophy alone. The full measure of human excellence, in other words, is not exhausted by what political philosophy has to say about how individuals must be formed if its goal—bringing citizens to will the good of the polity as their own—is

22 This characterization of the general will’s ends is consistent with Rousseau’s formulation of the “fundamental problem” of political philosophy (SC, I.6.iv).

50

frederic neuhouser

to be achieved. This is because attending only to the latter is compatible with a form of education—Sparta’s, for example—that makes citizens vehicles of the general will at the expense of their individual sovereignty, their being governed only by their own reason. Modern citizens, in other words, must submit to the general out of their own rational insight into the goodness of the norms they are obligated to follow. As I have attempted to show, a central aim of Emile’s education is to make this possible. In fact, however, the two projects as Rousseau carries them out are even more intimately entwined than this characterization suggests. For, as I suggested at the beginning of this paper, Rousseau’s philosophy as a whole implies that the ideals of man and citizen are not just compatible but (in a certain sense) mutually dependent: under the conditions of modernity, ‘men’ can exist only if they are also citizens, and conversely, citizens (of a legitimate republic) must at the same time be constituted as ‘men.’ Under the conditions of modernity, then, neither ideal can be realized unless the two are integrated. Grasping this point requires bearing in mind that ‘citizen’ in the abstract can stand for a variety of ways of belonging to a state and that citizenship in ancients forms of the republic, such as Sparta and Plato’s model in the Republic, are not equivalent to the (modern, democratic) version of that ideal endorsed in the Social Contract. In the latter Rousseau paints a picture of the legitimate state that is constrained by his (implicit) understanding of the conditions modernity imposes on that project. Among these conditions is the commitment to the moral sovereignty of individuals discussed above,23 as well as the recognition that, for us, the laws of a just state cannot be handed down by God nor given by a philosopherking who enjoys privileged access to the Idea of justice.24 Since neither of these resources is available to us, we moderns are forced to rely on a ‘second best’ solution: just laws must come from—be decided on bythe same finite individuals they are designed to rule. Moreover, since no individual can claim more authority in matters of morality than any other—this counts as a further assumption of modernity—those 23 There is more to be said here, for the content of the general will in modern republics gives expression to the idea of the inviolable moral status of individuals in a further sense: no legitimate law may compromise the fundamental human interests of any individual citizen. 24 Admittedly, Rousseau’s legislator bears similarities to the philosopher-king, but his job is to set up the basic institutions of a just state, not to run them or to participate in the ongoing business of legislating in accordance with the general will.

conflict between the educations of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ 51 laws must issue from a collective will that is constituted through the participation of all individuals and in accordance with the equal moral authority of each. But if ultimate political authority (on earth) is to reside in the decisions of a human collective, the best guarantee of the soundness of those decisions is to ensure that the citizens who make them are constituted as ‘men.’ Achieving justice under modern conditions requires a citizenry that, as a whole, is motivated by the values central to the general will—a commitment to the fundamental equality and dignity of all individuals—and who can deliberate steadfastly and reliably about which political measures that commitment entails. In other words, the modern republic requires citizens who have been formed like Emile, who both finds his own sentiment of self in being a ‘man’ and extends that honorific to every other man, and who relies on his own reason, rather than fashion and the whim of the crowd, to determine what the fact of others’ humanity implies for what we are obligated to do.

GOTTSCHED’S NOBLE LIE. MORAL WEEKLIES AND THE EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY OF WOMEN Matt Hettche One medium for mass education during Germany’s Enlightenment was the ‘moral weekly’ (moralische Wochenschriften). Published consistently throughout much of the eighteenth century, these short periodicals targeted the middle class and landed gentry. Inspired by English models, such as Addison and Steele’s The Spectator, German moral weeklies were designed to encourage the moral and intellectual development of secular society by promoting literacy, self-study, and cultural identity. Although catering to a number of niche audiences, moral weeklies had special appeal to female readers. One of the first and certainly one of the more popular women’s weekly to appear in the eighteenth century was Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen [‘The Rational Female Critics’]. Published in Leipzig in 1725/1726, this periodical aimed to promote educational opportunities for women. Under the pseudonyms of three women, the philosopher and literary critic Johann Christoph Gottsched [1700–1766], perpetrated a ‘noble lie’ upon his reading public by single-handedly authoring and selecting content for each issue. Discussing a wide range of topics, including the role of education in society, correct etiquette and manners for social interactions, and rules for the refinement of German language, Gottsched’s weekly became a standard for social discourse throughout many German cities for a period of over two decades.1 The question I would like to pose in this short paper, and one I think beneficial to consider from the traditional of German Idealism, is whether Gottsched’s ‘noble lie’ (i.e., the approach and content of his women’s weekly) should be seen as a positive or negative contribution to the educational autonomy of women? On the one hand, and in a manner anticipating Kant’s conception of Aufklärung, Gottsched’s

1 Although first published in periodical or weekly form in 1725/1726, Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen had a second and third publication in 1738 and 1748, respectively. See DiFino 1999, p. 12.

54

matt hettche

weekly provides both a voice and forum for the female intellect. If there was a kick-start to independent female thought in the early eighteenth century, Gottsched’s weekly just might be it. Yet on the other hand, given Gottsched’s deep seated commitment to rationalism and the ‘authority of reason,’ his moral weekly might also be viewed as one of the first steps toward the institutionalized oppression of women in the modern era. After all, the weekly, beyond its appearance, was dictated by one male philosopher with very precise views about moral perfection and women’s role in society. My focus in this paper is to resolve the apparent tension about Gottsched’s real or supposed contribution. After reviewing the historical and intellectual context of Gottshed’s weekly, I will address the arguments for and against Gottsched’s positive contribution and then conclude with a brief statement for why we should endorse a sympathetic interpretation of Gottshed’s project. There is an apocryphal story about Gottsched as a young man living in Königsberg that sets up nicely some of the historical realities which precede the publication of his moral weekly.2 At the age of twenty three, Gottsched had just completed an academic thesis and he was invited to speak to the women of the king’s governor’s mansion at the residence of Duke Friedrich Ludwig von Holstein-SonderburgBeck.3 Although not out of the ordinary for new graduates of the University to lecture to members of the aristocracy, on this particular day, ‘the-fix–was-in’ and the Duke had arranged for the six-foot tall Gottsched to be forcibly impressed into the Prussian army. Prussia’s King (Frederick William I, also known as the ‘Soldier King’) was a military fanatic who especially prized his “grenadier guards,” an exclusive corps of tall men, who served as royal body guards.4 As the story goes, after Gottsched’s talk, and in an unexpected twist, the women of the household (including the Duke’s mother, wife, and sister) assisted Gottsched in an elaborate escape to Leipzig and saved him ultimately from a military career. Now whether the events leading up to Gottshed’s exit from Prussia unfolded in this way or not is, for our purposes, not of much concern.

2

See Reichel 1908, p. 94; and Schreiber 1948, p. 15. Gottsched’s acquaintance to Duke Holstein is supported by Gottsched’s poem, published in 1720, celebrating the Duke’s wedding anniversary. For mention, see Mitchell 1995, p. 9. 4 For historical background on Frederick William I, see Clark 2006; Ergang 1941; and Nelson 1970. 3

gottsched’s noble lie

55

Although I imagine a sympathetic biographer would like to identify this episode as pivotal in Gottsched’s life, and perhaps the psychological motivation for why he would later go on to author a woman’s journal, dedicated (at least in spirit) to three women. There is simply no hard evidence anything of the like took place. The reality was that Prussia was entering a period of intense political and intellectual oppression. Literally months before Gottsched arrived in Leipzig, Christian Wolff was arrested for heresy in Halle for advocating secular humanism and rationalism in ethics.5 Religious fundamentalism ran rampant and power was centralized in a militaristic unpredictable dictator. Given Gottsched’s literary aspirations and philosophical agenda, the more centralized city of Leipzig in Saxony, (aka ‘little Paris’) was the obvious choice for his relocation. Another aspect of the apocryphal story that helps flesh out the historical context surrounding Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen involves the very pretense where Gottsched, a middle-class son of a clergyman, would find himself in the drawing room of female nobility. Although by the 1720’s the tentacles of European Capitalism were beginning to take hold in the German nation-states, and certainly more so in larger cities like Hamburg and Leipzig, the social structure in place in rural Königsberg was still more or less traditional. Educational opportunities for upper class females, while available, was afforded through the private instruction of university trained tutors. Anything resembling a formal education for females, beyond elementary education and “finishing schools” (Nebeschulen), was still a long way off. 6 In this respect, the young Gottsched, a newly donned Magister of the University, would have assumed the slow and often haphazard process of academic advancement that would involve lecturing to (and paid directly by) male university students, and from time to time, serving as a private tutor for upper-class families. This was essentially the career path followed by Kant, and without the menacing of Prussia’s ‘Solider King,’ it is not unlikely that Gottsched would have assumed a similar fate. As it turns out, moral weeklies published between the years 1711 and 1750, what is sometimes referred to as the golden age of moral weeklies in Germany, were authored predominately by members of

5 6

For discussion of Wolff ’s heresy arrest, see Hettche 2008. See Petschauer 1976, pp. 56–57.

56

matt hettche

the academic-servant class (i.e., young men in their mid-twenties who would have just recently completed a university degree and who were waiting either permanent employment or further training in Law, Medicine, or Theology).7 The circulation for the vast majority of weeklies was no more than one year and very few received a second edition printing.8 In this light, the appearance and temporary popularity of moral weeklies is perhaps best explained by two converging market forces: first, a steady stream of academic servants willing to compose and edit the weeklies, and second, an increasingly affluent and literate public willing to purchase them. Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen was originally published in Halle, but very quickly (i.e., within two years of its first appearance), was available in over 10 German cities. Its popularity can be credited to its clear and well written prose, as well as its witty, if not sometimes edgy, discussion of issues. Both what was discussed and how it was discussed made it a publication of interest. Issues regarding child rearing, courtship, responsibilities in the home for men and women, language and grammar reform, and the proper goals of education were all reoccurring themes. In perpetrating his ‘noble lie’ on his reading public, Gottsched assumes the personas of three women editors, each alleging their own expertise and unique perspective.9 The eldest of the fictitious editors is Calliste, whose specialty is etiquette.10 Iris, the youngest, has the specialty of gallantry and, in particular, the job of conveying the proper social behavior with the opposite sex. Phyllis, the most extensively or formally schooled of the three, has the primary task of commenting on issues about the German language, and the analysis of poetry and other scholarly pieces. The explicit aim of the publication, which fits in broadly with the genre of moral weeklies as a whole, is to improve the overall moral perfection of humanity by assisting individuals to recognize and correct their own faults. Through discussion of short stories, satire, reviews, and letters the three editors of the weekly cre-

7 The socioeconomic background of moral weeklies in Germany is discussed by Brown 1958; and Currie 1968, especially pp. 75–79. 8 Gottsched’s weekly was an exception in this regard (see p. 53, note 1). 9 There is evidence that Gottsched originally enlisted the help of three other men to help author the content of the weekly; however very soon after the start of the project, each man reneged on their commitment. For discussion, see DiFino 1990, p 23–25; Goodman 1999, p. 66; and Guhne 1978, pp. 14–19 & 28. 10 Gottsched, Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen, I 2, p. 11.

gottsched’s noble lie

57

ate a forum for social criticism. In a more narrow sense, however, Gottshed’s weekly has the central aim to advance the educational autonomy of women. Its design to accomplish this task is carried out in mainly three ways. The first is the self-referencing commentary of the weekly that is facilitated through the various exchanges of the three editors. The rhetorical dynamic of having three individuals debate and express ideas to one another about the focus and content of the weekly provides a way to articulate the expressed goals of the publication, while at the same time, illustrate by example the way rational discourse is effectively carried out. In the inaugural edition of the weekly, for example, Phyllis and Calliste persuade the more ambivalent Iris that a completely women-run periodical is both needed and a worthwhile pursuit.11 After Iris expresses her concern about the possible backlash and potential embarrassment the women face when advancing their project, Phyllis and Calliste meet the younger member’s dissent with assurance and encouragement. Through its collaborative editoralship, Gottshed’s weekly not only provides generational role-models for its female reading public, but it also exemplifies more generally how three rational adults can reach a consensus and mitigate dissent. A second way Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen explicitly fosters the educational autonomy of women is through its straightforward didacticism. In a very pragmatic way, the weekly provides every-day advice about issues related to childrearing, expected behavior for social events, and tips on how to improve physical health. That the advice was coming from a group of informed women, while at the same time addressing issues that any primary caregiver would find interesting, is undoubtedly related to the periodicals’ overall success. Gottsched’s weekly, like others of the day, is resoundingly eudemonistic in its approach to education, where good habits, and physical and mental health are emphasized as a part of a good life.12 A third way that Gottsched’s weekly supports and promotes the educational autonomy of women is through its effective use of ridicule and satire. Tackling issues such as aggressive male courtship, idle gossip, and gambling, Gottsched’s weekly often features stereotypes of

11

Gottsched, Die Vernünftige Tadlerinnen, I 1, p. 4. The eudaemonistic aspect of German moral weeklies is discussed by Schreiber 1948, and Goodman 1999. 12

58

matt hettche

German culture, who through their folly and vice, serve as negative examples to the reading public. The intention here is that by highlighting aspects of a person’s character that is ridiculous in nature, readers are not only amused and entertained by the spectacle that is described, but they are at the same time gently reminded that they too might be inclined to such behavior. In this respect, ridicule and satire have an edifying effect on a reading public, if only it reminds a person of what they don’t want to be or possibly turn into. For Gottsched, this very approach of attempting to correct adult social behavior later becomes an important tenet in his rules for dramatic comedy. In his Essay Towards a Critical Poetics for Germans (1730), for example, he describes that the folly of a comedic protagonist must be both concrete and correctable.13 That is to say, vice cannot be so serve or wicked as to offend or horrify the audience/public, but rather should have a therapeutic effect on the optimistic reform of a person’s character. These rules, as it turns out, are ultimately a catalyst to the repudiation Gottsched would experience latter in his career as an inflexible critic and theorist. Yet, for Gottsched, a philosopher and man of letters trained in the Rationalist Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition, moral perfection and self improvement was genuinely obtainable through rational reflection. It is because an adult, as a rational agent, is able to reflect upon his/her actions, and take steps to both mold and correct his/her character, that makes moral improvement both possible and attractive. In the classic Wolffian sense, education is a life-long commitment that requires duties to self, God, and others.14 Intellectual historians, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, are often at odds with one another on how exactly to characterize Gottsched and his literary accomplishments. On the one hand, he is sometimes viewed as the “Harbinger of German Classicism.”15 His publication record, even by today’s standards, is truly impressive. His interests span works in philosophy, poetry, translations from French and English sources, and dramatic works. Along with his wife, Luise Gottshed, now primary known for her original comedies, the Gottsched’s or the two “Gs” as they are sometimes referred to by literary historians, enjoyed considerable critical acclaim and international attention dur-

13 14 15

See Gottsched 1902; and for discussion, see Mitchell 1995. For a description of Wolffian ethics, see Schneewind 1998, pp. 442–444. See, for example, Mitchell 1995.

gottsched’s noble lie

59

ing the 1730s and 40s.16 Yet Gottsched’s reputation, some believe as a result of Lessing’s harsh criticisms, began to decline in the 1750’s. For much of the second half of the eighteenth century, Gottshed was portrayed by his contemporaries as a ‘literary dictator,’ a fanatic for rules, and intolerant to any personal criticism. According to the American scholar, Lewis White Beck, by the time German literature progressed into early romanticism, Gottsched’s rules and rational prescriptions for poetics reduced him to a laughingstock among his peers.17 Yet the question remains open as to whether Gottshed’s moral weekly contributed positively to the educational autonomy of women during the mid eighteenth century. After all, the publication of his weekly was one of his earliest projects. And differing slightly from his more formal works in dramatic literary criticism, his moral weekly had a much more pragmatic aim. One argument to consider for why Gottsched’s weekly was beneficial for female educational autonomy stems from an idea presented by Kant in his famous 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment.”18 For Kant, ‘enlightenment’ is a person’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity,” where ‘immaturity’ [Unmündigkeit ] means “the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another.” In his essay, Kant urges, in particular, “[d]are to be wise” and “[h]ave the courage to use your own understanding” in matters involving religion, politics, and intellectual discourse. Enlightenment for the individual, according to Kant, involves a self-conscious transition that resembles the transition from childhood into adulthood. Gottshed’s moral weekly, it might be argued, provides the impetus and encouragement necessary for females in German society to think for themselves on issues of social and cultural significance. Rather than a catechism of female expectations, Gottsched’s weekly serves as a forum of discussion among rational female adults, illustrating by example, the correct way to evaluate and mitigate dissent. Although perpetrating a lie on his reading public (undoubtedly a very un-Kantian aspect of his project) Gottsched nonetheless stands as a Vormund (or legal mouthpiece) for the female intellect, speaking on issues important to women at a time when, practically speaking, there was

16 17 18

See Kerth and Russell, pp. xi–xxxi. See Beck 1969, p. 74. Kant [1784] 1991, p. 54.

60

matt hettche

no other women willing and able to do the job.19 But in addition to his construction of three rational and discerning role models, Gottsched’s positive impact on female educational autonomy can also be seen in his many recommendations about the value and importance of educating women throughout the different stages of their life. Therefore, under the façade of female leadership, women are given the sense (if not the blue-prints for) their own indigenous reform movement. Insofar as the seeds of change are found internal to the community poised for transition, it can be convincingly argued that the reality of the transformation has a much better chance of actually taking place. Yet whether Gottsched’s ‘noble lie’ can be viewed in such a charitable light is not at all obvious. In contrast to the description of Gottsched’s project where he anticipates elements of Kant’s conception of Aufklärung, Gottsched’s moral weekly might reasonably be regarded as more destructive to female educational autonomy. Its design, at least on second thought, might be considered oppressive in both an explicit and implicit way. Explicitly, the ideal and roles outlined in the journal for women never really extend beyond the social roles of housekeeper, wife, and mother. The challenge presented here is that Gottsched is not at all motivated to improve the female situation as much as he simply wants women to conform to his own vision of what he thinks they should be. In this light, Gottsched apparently wanted a woman who didn’t spend too much time on her appearance, who understood the vice of gossip and gambling, and who would forgo any serious pursuit of academic scholarship yet still have the poetic sensibilities to discuss the unities in good drama. Through the mechanism of a printed publication, therefore, Gottsched attempted to institutionalize a form of oppression upon his female reading public. Implicitly, it might be argued further against Gottshed that his moral weekly and its basic design, are predicated on a conception of reason and rationality that is oppressive (in-itself). Arguably, the ideals of Gottsched’s ethics are artificially born from the most dogmatic form of rationalism that involves individualism in its most destructive guise, artificial dichotomies, and no real connection to a community

19 It is perhaps important to note that although there were several capable women writers during this time period, there was no women’s journal in press in Germany. This historical fact really defines the thesis of DiFino’s study, see DiFino 1990.

gottsched’s noble lie

61

of consenting adults.20 On this reading, Gottsched’s notion of ‘reason’ conceals an agenda of dominance and consumption that undermines any true realization of the Self. Through the forced implementation of false absolute values, instrumental reason stands as a tyrannical and destructive authority. Gottshed’s moral weekly, therefore, not only alienates women from authentic intellectual discovery but it serves to publicize, and in some sense legitimize, an image of the female intellect that is destine for failure.21 In an effort to mediate the perceived tension over Gottshed’s contribution to the educational autonomy of women, I believe there are two things to keep in mind. The first involves the inevitable difficulty of isolating Gottshed’s historical situation, as well as our own, that allows the question of his positive contribution to be meaningful. The point here is related to something Hans-Georg Gadamer says about selfexamination and historical reflection. In Truth and Method (1960), he writes: [H]istory does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.22

Part of the insight here, when applied to Gottshed, is that Gottshed’s moral weekly cannot fully be taken in isolation from what came before, and in particular, what Gottshed was actively aiming to remedy in his own day and age. A safe description of Gottshed’s historical context, as I noted earlier in the paper, reveals there was a significant amount of political and intellectual oppression surrounding Gottshed’s project. To derive any firm conclusions about Gottsched’s veiled agenda for female oppression should really be tempered by the thought of what existed before and during the realization of his project. We should refrain, for example, from using our own social constructions and expectations to evaluate the roles that Gottshed identifies for women, and at the same time, recognize our own indebtedness to thinkers in 20

For a discussion of similar such criticisms (as they apply to Kant and his conception of reason), see Schott 1996. 21 This general theme is explored in Schmidt 1996. 22 Gadamer 1989, p. 265.

62

matt hettche

the tradition of German Idealism (like Kant, Fichte, and Hegel) who so skillfully articulated the limitations of Gottsched’s Rationalist conception of reason. The second point to keep in mind when evaluating Gottsched’s contribution to the educational autonomy of women is related to what I call his ‘naïve optimism’ for social reform. The idea here is that big projects and major pursuits in life often require an attitude of naïve optimism, if they ever have the hope of completion. If, for example, there is genuine pause and contemplation about the completion of a project’s reality, the enormity of the project (in its totality) in some ways dictates it will never be completed and so should never be attempted. Writing a book, running a marathon, or authoring a women’s moral weekly, are precisely the type of things where the justification starting out can never really match the reasons (day to day) that are needed to sustain them. To bring about real social change, in some respects, requires a childlike idealism and the belief that change is genuinely possible (despite real world obstacles and human prejudice). In this light, if there is a fault in the approach or execution of Gottsched’s project, it doesn’t appear to lie in his intentions to effect real change in the attitudes about women’s education and role in society. In conclusion, by the late 1750s, there was a steady decline in both the number and quality of German moral weeklies. Ironically or incidentally, this is the same time that Gottsched’s own reputation as a philosopher and literary critic began to decline as well. It’s almost as if both the means and method of Gottshed’s rationalism had its window of opportunity to both flower and fade. His contribution to women’s educational autonomy, in hindsight, was neither insignificant nor overly dominating. Gottsched’s moral weekly was an optimistic attempt to bring about institutional change for women and the family by addressing those common experiences that ground not only eighteenth century German society but any society undergoing change and transformation. References Beck, Lewis White. 1969. Early German Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Beiser, Frederick. 2000. “The Enlightenment and idealism” in The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism Edited by Karl Ameriks. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 18–36.

gottsched’s noble lie

63

Brauer, Adalbert J. 1962. Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London. Vol. 17, No. 2. (Dec.), pp. 192–197. Brown, F. Andrew. 1952. “On Education: John Locke, Christian Wolff and the ‘Moral Weeklies.’ ” University of California Publications in Modern Philology 36, pp. 149– 170. Clark, Christopher. 2006. Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600–1947. New York: Cambridge University Press. Currie, Pamela. 1968. “Moral Weeklies and the Reading Public in Germany.” Oxford German Studies 3, pp. 69–86. DiFino, Sharon Marie. 1990. The Intellectual Development of German Women in Selected Periodicals from 1725 to 1784. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. Ergang, Robert. 1941. The Potsdam Führer: Frederick William I, Father of Prussian Militarism. New York: Columbia University Press. Goodman, Katherine. 1999. Amazons and Apprentices: Women and the German Parnassus in the Early Enlightenment. New York: Camden House. Gottsched, Johann Christoph. 1902. “Die Vernünftigen Tadlerinnen.” Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Eugen Reichel. Berlin: Gottsched-Gesellschaft. Gühne, Ekkehard. 1978. Gottscheds Literaturkritik in den Vernunftigen Tadlerinnen (1725/1726). Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz. Hettche, Matt. 2008. “On the Cusp of Europe’s Enlightenment: Christian Wolff and the Argument for Academic Freedom.” Florida Philosophical Review Vol. III, Issue 1. Kant, Immanuel. [1784] 1991. Political Writings. Edited with an introduction by Hans Reiss. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kerth, Thomas and John Russell. 1994. “Introduction,” in Pietism in Petticoats and Other Comedies. Columbia, SC: Camden House. Kord, Susanne. 1998. “Luise Gottsched (1713–1762) Germany.” In Women Writers in German-Speaking Countries: A Bio-Bibliographical Critical Sourcebook. Edited by Elke Frederiksen and Elizabeth Ametsbichler. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 160–170. Martens, Wolfgang. 1968. Die Botschaft der Tugend. Die Aufklärung im Spiegel deutschen moralischen Wochenscriften Stuttgart: Metzler. Milstein, Barney. 1972. Eight Eighteenth Century Reading Societies. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Ltd. Mitchell, P.M. 1995. Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–1766) Harbinger of German Classicism. Columbia, SC: Camden House Inc. Nelson, W.H. 1970. The Soldier Kings: The House of Hohenzollern. New York: G.P. Putnams Son’s Publishing Company. Petschauer, Peter. 1976. “Improving Educational Opportunities for Girls in the Eighteen Century Germany.” Eighteenth-Century Life 2, pp. 56–62. Planke, Birgitt. 1981. “Bürgerliches Frauenbild und Geschlechtsrollenzuweisungen in der literarischen und brieflichen Producktion des 18 Jahrhunderts.” In Frauengeschichte: Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis 5, pp. 6–11. Reichel, Eugen. 1908. Gottsched. Berlin. Schneewind, J.B. 1998. The invention of autonomy: A history of modern moral philosophy. New York: Cambridge Press. Schreiber, Sara Etta. 1948. The German Women in the Age of Enlightenment: A Study in the Drama form Gottsched to Lessing. New York: Kings’s Crown Press. Schmidt, James. 1996. “Introduction: What Is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences.” In What is Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions. Edited by James Schmidt. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1–44.

64

matt hettche

Schott, Robin May. 1996. “The Gender of Enlightenment.” In What is Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions. Edited by James Schmidt. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ward, Albert. 1974. Book Production, Fiction and the German Reading Public 1740– 1800. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

THE ACTUAL MEANING OF HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF EDUCATION Paul Cobben Introduction For some years it has been clear that the Netherlands no longer has an elite, which inspires the confidence of the people. The followers, whom Pim Fortuijn1 could gather around himself in a short time, brought a slumbering discontent to light. Since then, there have been no fundamental changes to the situation. While nearly all leading persons did their best to seduce the people to vote for the European constitution, the result was an injurious refusal—a refusal that was probably more inspired by an aversion to the elite, than by an aversion to the constitution itself.2 Established political parties are no longer sure of their votes, whilst new, unknown groups can count on vote percentages of up to twenty or thirty percent. Why does Balkenende, the present prime minister of the Netherlands, occupy his present position? Not because he has charisma; nor because he has other qualities, which appeal to the imagination. In all aspects the man displays a mediocrity that he, moreover, is able to link with a cultural and moral frumpiness. Balkenende is not an ‘educated man’ in anything, given the classical meaning of the term as someone who is in the forefront of the cultural development of his time. Such an educated man can further be classified as the homo universalis, who is capable of bringing together all cultural dimensions and integrate them in his life and, who is someone who bubbles over with energy, just because of the intense enjoyment that flows from his life as a man of culture. Is this type of leadership necessarily produced by a mass culture that is rooted in democracy? By a culture whose heroes are, in the first

1

Pim Fortuijn was a Dutch politician, who placed the problem of the multicultural society on the political agenda. He was murdered by a political activist on 6 May 2002. 2 In 2005, the proposed European Constitution was rejected by the Dutch voters.

66

paul cobben

instance, sports heroes? By a culture in which one achieves prestige by regular appearances in the mass media? By a culture in which common people can become top-ranking artists within a few months, as a result of a television contest? Does the democratic resistance against innate privileges not degenerate into resistance against all privileges, even when these privileges are the result of many years of developing one’s talents? But of course, a democratic attitude does not need to result in devaluation, understood as the demand that nobody may tower above others. The reverse is also possible: the privileges acquired by the individuals can inspire others to elevate themselves to the same level. In the student movement of the sixties, for example, there was the idea that everybody had the right to an academic education. In this context, ‘academic education’ does not refer to a university that only provides for blinkered specialists, but to one that enables its students to overcome the fragmentation of a lifeworld that is split up in a multitude of sub-sectors, thereby allowing students to acquire insight into the coherence of all things. This type of education offers insight into a cultural totality, and dismisses an understanding of the coherence of the world at its utmost banal level, namely as a coherence that is only determined by the power of money. The goal academic education has, however, always been a topic of discussion, and will continue to be so in future. Already in Hegel’s time there were quarrels pertaining to the question of whether the university had to educate for public positions or for scientific practice.3 In cases where the university is considered to be an institute of scientific practice, the question arises as to how fundamental or how applied the scientific practice is supposed to be. Furthermore, it is still believed that those educated by the practice of fundamental scientific research are, in some ways, also subjected to an education that makes one a better human being. The link between scientific and human education is the concept of reason, and the maxim that Kant gave to the Enlightenment. To be human is to be reasonable. Emancipation is mainly achieved via a reason that knows to break through the narrow-mindedness and dark-

3 Cf. Terry Pinkard, Hegel. A Biography, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 361.

hegel’s concept of education

67

ness of tradition. To be human means above all to be able to make use of your own reason.4 Of course, the type of reason that Kant had in mind had a broader dimension than scientific reason. Besides theoretical reason, he also drew specific attention to practical reason. It is mainly practical reason, the reason of freedom, to which Kant refers when he connects reason with the Enlightenment and emancipation. However, the question is whether this freedom also relates to scientific reason. Kant’s freedom seems to stand alongside scientific reason. This evokes the question of whether scientific education can lead to freedom and to universal humaneness. If this were to be the case, one would have to presuppose that the multitude of sciences can be brought together in a philosophy that can be understood as a philosophy of freedom. Freedom as the education to adulthood seems to have no content of its own. As an empty formalism, it seems to be powerless when compared to reality.5 This is contrary to scientific reason, without which the technological society would not be possible. Scientific reason has little to say about adulthood: it does not supply criteria for norms and values outside of science. It has nothing to report about the life conditions which characterize the multicultural society in which we live. In the concept of reason that is developed by Hegel in his criticism of Kant’s theoretical and practical reason, he not only conceptualizes reason in terms of its internal coherence, but also (following on this) provides a more detailed understanding of human freedom. According to Hegel, human freedom is conditioned by institutions, which are, in turn, normalized by this freedom. This institutional differentiation leads to a concept of education which is composed of many layers. In this paper, I will show that Hegel’s conception of freedom is potent enough to use in a critical analysis of the one-dimensional position that our society attributes to education.

4 I. Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in: James Schmidt (ed.), What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, pp. 58–65. 5 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press 1984: “Kant was right; morality did in the eighteenth century, as a matter of fact, presuppose something very like the teleological scheme of God, freedom and happiness as the final crown of virtue which Kant propounds. Detach morality from that framework and you will no longer have morality”, p. 56.

68

paul cobben 1. The internal coherence of freedom and education in the work of Hegel

Unlike Kant’s view, Hegel’s concept of freedom does not oppose nature. According to Hegel, freedom is not determined by Understanding (i.e., freedom is not defined in terms of that which it is not), but by Reason (Vernunft), which is understood as an absolute concept that transcends all limitations. As a consequence, education aimed at promoting freedom does not oppose theoretical reason, but absorbs it. This, however, does not mean that freedom loses itself in natural or cultural data. Rather, freedom transcends theoretical reason and has an openness with regard to natural or cultural data.6 Therefore, according to Hegel, freedom is not just a quality of a real, biological individual, but of a cultural individual, i.e., of an individual that tries to shape its life within an institutional framework. In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel gives a description of the fundamental determination of culture: “Work [. . .] is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing.”7 In psycho-analytical terms this understanding of culture can be expressed as follows: without the delay of drives, there is no culture. But for Hegel the reverse is also true: without freedom, there can be no delay of drives. This is because the power of freedom is presupposed if we do not act on drives. In culture, the drives are educated and express themselves in the form of institutional actions. Freedom and education are, therefore, internally connected. Freedom is shaped by individuals who educate themselves, and who develop the ability to live according to an institutional order that can be considered an objectification of their freedom. Real freedom is not shaped in life, but in the good life. The transformation of life into the good life requires a process of education. 6 Jan Hollak, Van causa sui tot automatie, Tilburg 1966. “O.i. wordt in Hegels Logik, en daar voor het eerst, een poging gewaagd, op adequate en concrete wijze, de transcendentale openheid van onze eindige menselijke geest als zodanig tot uitdrukking te brengen.” (p. 27). In English: “Hegel’s Logic, according to us, presents the first attempt at adequately and concretely expressing the openess of our finite human mind as such”. 7 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press 1977 (PS) p. 118. In German: “Arbeit ist gehemmte Begierde, aufgehaltenes Verschwinden, oder sie bildet.” The “Bildung” of the work concerns both the laborer, and the product of labor. The translation is ambiguous: the quotation can be read as the work forms the thing, but also as the work forms the laborer.

hegel’s concept of education

69

The elementary relation that Hegel develops between freedom and education immediately forms a criterion that enables us to criticize the practice of education in modern society. Communities in which the good life is shaped can be concretized in several ways, and should, therefore, not only be narrowly understood in terms of the state, but also in terms of a family, culture community, school or university. All communities which form their identity through shared norms and values will do. In this context, education implies measuring oneself against an existing community that consists of people who are already educated all the time. This understanding finds its most elementary expression in the education of children: “In respect of his relation to the family, the child’s education has the positive aim of instilling ethical principles into him in the form of an immediate feeling for which differences are not yet explicit, so that thus equipped with the foundation of an ethical life, his heart may live its early years in love, trust and obedience . . .” (§ 175). Therefore, being educated means keeping company with people who are already educated, and with whom one can identify, or who, at the very least, can serve as role models in some aspects of life. But these traditional communities that offer a context of people who are already educated all the time disappear more and more in the modern world. School-classes are lacking in schools; academic education has degenerated into a number of credit points that can be collected anywhere in Europe. In many cases, the family unit also no longer fulfils the criterion of a community. But the determination of education discussed up until this point is one-dimensional. Education is not defined solely in terms of conformation to a specific tradition. A second step is at least equally important. Socialization within a specific community must be followed by a process of transcendence: education should sensitize scholars to the tradition that defines a given community, and, therefore, to the specific historical form in which the good life is shaped. This aspect of education is of the utmost importance in a multicultural society, because it enables one to be open to many traditions. My thesis is that Hegel, even when measured according to his own criteria, has not adequately elaborated upon this second moment of education. The consequence is a one-sided conception of civil society. The primacy that Hegel attributes to labor not only elucidates Marx’s future criticism, but also seems to have consequences for the one-sided conception of education in our times.

70

paul cobben 2. The transcendence of the family

In the above citation from the Philosophy of Right,8 Hegel’s positive determination of ‘education’ (civilization) is immediately followed by a negative one: “In respect of the same relation, this education has the negative aim of raising children out of the instinctive, physical, level on which they originally are, to self-subsistence and freedom of personality and so to the level on which they have power to leave the natural unity of the family.” (§ 175). Here, Hegel seems to formulate the process of transcendence, which I introduced above. The education of the child is only finished when it can leave the family, and is able to reflect on the specific determinedness of the family. A closer look, however, shows us that there is something totally different happening here. When Hegel states that children are elevated from the natural immediacy of the family into independence and free personality, he does not, in fact, differentiate between the two moments of education. The fact that children are elevated from their natural immediacy has nothing to do with a negative relation towards family life. To the contrary, children participate in the family’s ethical substance when they are elevated from their natural immediacy of the family. If we designate this ethical substance as ‘second nature’, we can say that the child transitions from its ‘first nature’ (as a biological being) to its second nature (as a socialized being that partakes in the norms and values that define the family community). This socialization must be distinguished from the process in which the child grows up and leaves the family as an independent person. This only occurs when the child elevates itself above the natural unity of the family (and, hence, above its second nature). We see that even when conceptualized at the level of civil society (i.e., the domain of a multitude of persons) Hegel’s analysis of a child growing up still leaves no room for the second moment of education (i.e. transcendence). The consequence is that the nature of the ethical substance of the family gets lost. This is because, in order for a child to become an adult, he or she must be assimilated in the System of Needs, in which individuals relate to one another as persons, who exchange the commodities they own. 8 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated with notes by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press 1967 (PR). References to ‘§ (. . .)’ concern this work.

hegel’s concept of education

71

The person is the formal representative of the family in the social domain. The content of the family appears in the social domain as ‘commodity’: positively, as the commodity that the family supplies to the market; and, negatively, as the commodity that the family wants to extract from the market in exchange for the commodity supplied (and which is to be consumed within the family community). In the relation of the person to the commodity, the individual is indeed connected to the particularity of the family. The commodities on the market are the property of the family (understood as a concrete person) and express its particular supply and demand. The particularity of the family at the level of the System of Needs, however, has to be distinguished from the particularity of the family as family, and thus from the ethical substance expressed in the specific norms and values that give family life its orientation (i.e., that determine the family’s particular tradition). However, Hegel fails to discuss the family as family. As a consequence, the education that provides insight into the particularity of the family as family is not thematized. The transcendence of family means that insight is gained into the nature of the family in relation to other families, but not into the particular tradition of the family. 3. Hegel’s one-sided conception of education When Hegel introduces (in § 190) the concept of human need, he distinguishes it from animal need. The animal need is naturally given and, therefore, fixed: “An animal’s needs and its ways and means of satisfying them are both alike restricted in scope.” As a spiritual being, man transcends the animal’s natural fixation: “Though man is subject to this restriction too, yet at the same time he evinces his transcendence of it and his universality, first by the multiplication of needs and means of satisfying them, and secondly by the differentiation and division of concrete need into single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, particularized and so more abstract.” What is remarkable here is that Hegel interprets human needs as a prolongation of animal needs. Human needs can be understood as a multiplication and differentiation of ‘natural needs’. (§ 195) One would rather expect such an opinion from Marx (who understands the needy man in terms of his relation to nature) than Hegel. What makes Hegel conceptualization of human needs so strange is that

72

paul cobben

elsewhere he emphasizes that the reality of man as a spiritual being is only conceivable within a culture community (of which the lordship/ bondage relation is the basic model). According to that view, human need is not conceptualized in relation to the first nature (as is the case of animal need), but in relation to the second one. Here, human need is understood in terms of the norms and values of the family community, which determine the validity of needs. For Hegel, however, the contingency of the family community i.e., its finitude, seems to be identical to its naturalness: contingent traditional facts (which, for children, are the norms and values of the family) are equated with natural immediacy. As a consequence, the contingency of the family community is not discussed, so that the norms and values of the family community seem to be given once and for all and, moreover, the same for all families. Because of this, the two forms of education, which are essential for a free society, do not come to light. Firstly, the original family lacks the learning process that enables children to develop insight into the particularity of the norms and values of the families in which they are grown up. Secondly, at the level of civil society, the learning process, which enables persons to choose particular values and norms according to which they wish to orientate themselves in the family community that they bring about with their own life partners, is also lacking. Before having a closer look at these learning processes that are lacking in the work of Hegel, I wish to elucidate Hegel’s discussion on the process of education. 4. Education in the System of Needs According to Hegel, the education in the System of Needs is differentiated into theoretical and practical education. The theoretical education that Hegel equates with Understanding and language, not only constitutes a “multiplicity of ideas and facts” that develop along with the ongoing division of labor, but also “a flexibility and rapidity of mind, [an] ability to pass from one idea to another, to grasp complex and general relations, and so on.” (§ 197) Therefore, the theoretical development of education consists in the development of an increasingly differentiated scientific insight into reality, and in the power to integrate this insight in an immediate view of the world in an increasingly self-evident manner. According to Hegel, labor’s practical education “consists first in the automatically recurrent need for something

hegel’s concept of education

73

to do and the habit of simply being busy; next, in the strict adaptation of one’s activity according not only to the nature of the material worked on, but also, and especially, to the pleasure of other workers; and finally, in a habit, produced by this discipline, of objective activity and universally recognized aptitudes.” (§ 197) Therefore, practical education results in a disciplining of action that has become second nature, and that makes it possible to function trouble-free in a labor system that is based on scientific and technological insights. The ongoing scientification of the labor system not only results in a growth of social wealth (because specialized labor is more productive), but also in the exclusion of some to participate in this wealth: “despite an excess of wealth civil society [is] not rich enough” (§ 245) This last observation relies on a series of presuppositions. One such presupposition is that the division of labor makes labor less and less complicated, so that less and less education is needed (think back to Marx who defines the labor of the assembly line as the standard of labor belonging to the modern production system).9 For this reason, the potential supply of labor constantly grows larger. At the same time, the technological development of the labor system leads to ever-increasing productivity, thereby lowering the demand for labor. Together, these two factors result in the supply of labor surpassing the demand. The consequence is a surplus of laborers that can in no way be integrated in the System of Needs. On the one hand, the potential supply of labor cannot be integrated by creating extra jobs (this would only further disturb the market relations, because it would generate a supply of goods for which there is no demand).10 On the other hand, the demand on the market cannot be enlarged by giving unearned income to the unemployed, because this makes the unemployed one-sidedly dependent and deprives them of their self-esteem as human beings, i.e., of the freedom that manifests itself in the System of Needs, understood as the freedom to acquire income through one’s own labor.11 9 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Berlin 1969: “Es ist ein Produkt der manufakturmäßigen Teilung der Arbeit, ihnen die geistige Potenzen des materiellen Produktionsprozesses als fremdes Eigentum und sie beherrschende Macht gegenüberzustellen.” p. 382. 10 “As an alternative, they might be given subsistence indirectly through being given work, i.e., the opportunity to work. In this event the volume of production would be increased, but the evil consists precisely in an excess of production and the lack of an proportionate number of consumers who are themselves also producers . . .” (§ 245). 11 “. . . the burden of maintaining them at their ordinary standard of living might be directly laid on the wealthier classes, or they might receive the means of livelihood

74

paul cobben

The logical consequences of education in the System of Needs are unsound: an institutional order departing from the realization of freedom for all, cannot, without contradiction, end with the conclusion that some are superfluous. This can only mean that, somewhere, Hegel relies on incorrect presuppositions; or, that his work contains presuppositions based on historically contingent data. But what data are involved? To say that civil society is not rich enough for all, cannot mean that it is principally impossible to produce enough for all. The modern production system raises productivity and, therefore, is better equipped than ever to provide all members of society with at least a minimum existence. The fact that some are ‘not rich enough’ must be explained in relation to the mechanism of the market: it must be proven that the play of supply and demand is functioning in a way that some necessarily become superfluous. Hegel has exactly this in mind when he assumes that some players on the market can offer no more than unskilled labor. The ongoing scientification of the labor system, interrelated with the ongoing division of labor, results in unskilled labor (the mechanical labor) being replaced by machines. Labor will lose the competition with the machine at the moment that the quantity of the unskilled labor that can be replaced by the machine12 is higher than the quantity required for the production of the machine. Here, traces of Hegel’s appeal to Adam Smith13 come to the fore: the superfluous people, the destitute of civil society, only has meaning if Smith’s doctrine of labor value can be appealed to. However, this appeal, in turn, only has meaning, if mechanical labor, i.e., labor that principally can be replaced by machines, can be made the standard for human labor in general. Such a one-sided view on labor has a certain validity in a society in which unskilled labor is materially dominant, but cannot sustain the argument that civil society is not rich enough in principle.

directly from other public sources of wealth (e.g. from the endowments of rich hospitals, monasteries, and other foundations). In either case, however, the needy would receive subsistence directly, not by means of their work, and this would violate the principle of civil society and the feeling of individual independence and self-respect in its individual members.” (§ 245). 12 “Further, the abstraction of one man’s production from another’s makes work more and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install machines in his place.” (§ 198). 13 Hegel refers to Smith, Say and Ricardo, see § 189.

hegel’s concept of education

75

In contrast to Marx and Smith, Hegel is not one-sidedly connected to the doctrine of labor value. He emphatically maintains that the value of a service in which someone’s personality or spiritual powers are called upon can not just be compared to the value of things.14 Hegel’s argumentation that some are superfluous because they cannot get a job in the System of Needs appears not to be principal. Factually, the supply of unskilled labor may surpass the demand, but precisely because people are spiritual beings, we are able to educate ourselves, and thus offer an alternative supply that matches the demand of the market. Of course, one could object that there may be principal limits to the supply of unskilled labor that the market can absorb. But this line of argumentation also cannot be proven. Firstly, the modern production system is characterized by a dynamic in which the demand of products and services can be infinitely differentiated, meaning that the demand for labor cannot, in principal, be definitively determined. And, secondly, it is always possible to adjust the labor supply by education. This is in accordance with the motto that is nowadays upheld by many institutions of education: one should not provide education for a specific profession, but rather foster a spirit of ‘learning to learn’, as preparation for an occupational career that always asks anew for schooling. Hegel’s thesis that the civil society is not rich enough for all appears to arise from the absolute distinction between a purely theoretical and practical education. Influenced by the reality of his time, Hegel was seduced into separating these two forms of education, and thus paved the way for a Marxist analysis. In such an analysis, the distinction between theoretical and practical education is transformed into the separation between spiritual and manual labor (a separation that Marx characterises as the highest form of labor division).15 Here, the ultimate consequence of practical education is the ability to make oneself part of the mechanical labor process. This makes man an appendage

14 “Counsel’s acceptance of a brief is akin to this, and so are other contracts whose fulfilment depends on character, good faith, or superior gifts, and where an incommensurability arises between the services rendered and value in terms of cash. (In such cases the cash payment is called not ‘wages’ but ‘honorarium’.)” (§ 80). 15 Karl Marx, Deutsche Ideologie, Berlin 1969: “Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung von dem Augenblicke an, wo eine Teilung der materiellen und geistigen Arbeit eintritt.” p. 31.

76

paul cobben

of the machine and reduces labor to purely physical effort.16 The doctrine of labor value can only carry a certain validity under this condition. In support of Hegel, however, one has to object that this form of manual labor is against his theory on the realization of freedom. In human labor, theoretical and practical education have to remain connected. Only under this condition does the reification that takes place through the labor process, become self-reification. Furthermore, laborers are conscious of their participation in a dynamic process in which self-reification is performed again and again, always in a different and more differentiated fashion. Hegel also conceives participation in the labor process as self-reification, as the reification is mediated by a contract between persons and is, therefore, based in a relation of law. Education in the labor process contributes to the reality of formal law.17 Education socializes the person’s nature, leading to the person’s formal and material participation in a social order structured according to general rules of law. Besides the criticism pertaining to the nature of person formulated earlier, the criticism of Hegel’s concept of education through labor follows from the possibility that the education of the person, in Hegel’s view, sometimes allows for the elimination of the person. 5. Education of the moral subject The individual that is educated through labor can participate in the objective relations of the law system. In its objective action, however, the individual is completely replaceable. The particular actions of individuals only have validity insofar as they have a general meaning. In other words, individual actions are only important in terms of whether they conform or deviate from general rules of law. Everyone who violates these rules will be punished, irrespective of the person involved. It may be the case that the rule of law respects the general freedom

16 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, “Alle Arbeit ist einerseits Verausgabung menschlicher Arbeit im physiologischen Sinn, und in dieser Eigenschaft gleicher menschlicher oder abstract menschlicher Arbeit bildet sie den Warenwert.” p. 61. 17 “As the private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this system of needs contains absolute universality, the universality of freedom, only abstractly and therefore as the right of property. At this point, however, this right is no longer merely implicit but has attained is recognized actuality as the protection of property through the administration of justice.” (§ 208).

hegel’s concept of education

77

of individuals, as this freedom can be understood in terms of general rules, but the respect for subjective freedom in law is accidental. The law will only correspond with subjective freedom when a real person has the freedom to determine the rules of law himself and to make his personal well-being the goal of the rules of law. Such a freedom, however, is not conceivable as a general freedom: a rule of law, that serves my well-being, will not necessarily serve the well-being of others. According to Hegel, this problem can be solved at the level of corporations: institutions that have features of mediaeval guilds, modern companies, trade unions and professional organizations. The basic idea is that persons belonging to the System of Needs can be divided up as participants of different branches. Each branch forms a corporation in which the participants relate to one another as in a ‘second family’. (§ 252). As in the normal family, the well-being of the participants of the corporation coincide; but, in contrast to the first family, the access to the second family is mediated by an education that resulted in a professional qualification. Although Hegel rightly maintains that good workmanship is to be framed in an ethical community (i.e., a community with shared views on the good life), at least two fundamental objections can levelled against his attempt to understand this community as a ‘corporation’. Firstly, in his opinion, corporations have a mediating function in the development of the highest form of the ethical community, namely, the good life as it is shaped at the level of the state. Hegel attributes this function to corporations, as he believes that, together, they form an organic unity—a production system, which in its entirety, is in the service of the good life at state level. This assumption is based on a presupposition criticized earlier, namely that the commodities and services produced by the production system can be understood as the ongoing differentiation of the biological individual’s needs, which have their unity in his natural organism. The differentiation of the production system flows from the immoderate differentiation of scientific and technological knowledge, in reaction to the immoderate differentiation of the demand on the market. This demand has no organic self-limits, neither for the individual (whose needs are not natural, but cultural), nor for the state (whose production output is oriented towards the world market, not the state organism). The internal immoderation of the production system’s rationality, i.e., the rationality of Understanding, leads to a second fundamental objection against the corporation: any attempt to immediately understand

78

paul cobben

the labor community as a moral community (in accordance with contemporary business ethics)18 does justice neither to morality, nor to the rationality of the production system. A company selects people because of their professional qualities and enters into a contract with them that is principally redeemable. In this sense, the employee is not a moral individual. The reverse of this argument also holds: the moral individual does not derive the norms and values in which he expresses his subjectivity from the particularity of a production branch. 6. Education and civil society If the free market is not only one-sidedly understood as an economic market, i.e., as a System of Needs, but also interpreted as civil society (in which, for example, free persons exchange opinions), it is possible to overcome the criticism I elaborated upon earlier. This broader conceptualization of the free market firstly necessitates critical consideration of the starting-point of civil society, i.e., the relation between many families. If the family is conceptualized as a community in which the natural reproduction process is performed in the form of a specific norms and values community, then the transcendence of the family in the System of Needs gets another meaning than the one used by Hegel. To explicate this distinction, I will contrast transcendence into civil society with transcendence into the System of Needs (as understood by Hegel). It is true that the person who relates himself to another person on the market has transcended the relations of the family. This is because his relation to others in the market is mediated by commodities and services that are exchanged by means of contracts, however, this does not mean that he has completely left behind the norms and values of his original family. Supply and demand on the marker cannot—as is Hegel’s view—be understood from the perspective of needs that are naturally given. Rather, the needs that underlie the demands of the market are defined as needs established within the framework of the norms and values of the family. Therefore, the education of the market is not to be understood as a socialization of natural needs, but as a process in which the persons learn to distinguish between 18 P. Ulrich, Ch. Sasarin, Facing Public Interests. The Ethical Challenge to Business Policy and Corporate Communications, Dordrecht 1995.

hegel’s concept of education

79

the objective relations of market and production, and the subjective norms and values of the original family. The education of the market is a twofold process: as a person learns to objectify himself, he also gets more insight into the subjectivity of his own norms and values. In other words, he learns to understand the subjectivity of his norms and values as such. Therefore, the education in civil society repeats, at an individual level, what Max Weber describes, at a social level, as disenchantment (Entzauberung). On the one hand, the individual comes to know social objectivity as a rational, scientific objectivity; and, on the other hand, he learns to distinguish his norms and values from this objectivity as a subjective position. However, the subjective reality of norms and values cannot remain alongside the objective world of the labor system. The rationalization of social reality cannot be unilaterally understood as the result of objective mechanisms of competition in the free market, but rather stems primarily from the attempt of real persons to realize their freedom. A rationalized world is based on reasonable principles; the real person can understand it as the expression of his freedom, which, as a reasonable being, he gives unto himself. But, for the person, these reasonable principles of the labor system (which are grounded in a legal system) are still externally given. Therefore, the realization of the person’s freedom is only accomplished when he is able to understand external rules as the expression of his subjectivity. At the level of civil society (which is characterized by a fundamental distinction between person and objective world), this cannot mean—as Hegel thinks—that there must be a transition towards the corporation as an institution of the labor system, in which the person can come to moral self-realization. Rather, in the first instance, the person tries to achieve selfrealization in a moral community that is shaped alongside the labor system. In the moral community, persons do not relate as persons to one another (i.e., mediated by commodities), but as subjects with their own norms and values. Insofar as the subjects recognize their own norms and values in other subjects and express this recognition to one-another, they form a moral community. As in the case Hegel’s analysis of corporations, the concept of the moral community must not be thought of as a singular community: many moral communities exist alongside one another, and the subjects within these communities are characterized by their distinct values and norms. But in contrast to corporations, moral communities are not organically connected. This is because actions in moral communities are not ‘real’ in

80

paul cobben

the sense of corporeal actions. These actions are better understood as communicative action, whereby subjects do not relate to nature, but to one-another as subjects. The moral communities can be embodied as societies of individuals who have the same worldview. It is important, however, that these societies do not constitute traditional denominations, fighting for their survival in a struggle against social rationalisation. Rather, the hallmark of these societies is that they expose themselves to the universal discourse playing out in the public domain, and are prepared to position themselves in this general discourse by means of an ongoing discussion. Religious groups can play this role, but so too can other ideological societies (humanists, liberals, socialists) that for example, manifest themselves in journals, newspaper and institutionalized discussions. The practical education that can be performed in the framework of these societies differs fundamentally from the practical education that Hegel envisages in the labor process. According to this interpretation, it concerns the education of the moral subject, not education for the labor practise. Of course, moral education (and the accompanying moral discussions) cannot stand alone or be isolated from real action in the domain of family and labor. Such isolation would lead to subjectivist opinions, and can ultimately result in fundamentalist and terrorist opinions. Moral education has to be linked to real action and must enable the determination of ethical action. This synthesis, however, cannot be thought of as ethical action within corporations (the second family) as is Hegel’s view. The particular ethical action ought to be shaped in the first family: the individual can choose a partner who complies with his subjective moral views, and try to express these views in the family life that is shared with the partner. The link between morality and labor, however, does not have to be understood from the perspective of a particular ethical action (this would imply the moralization of labor), but from the general ethical action: the realization of good life at state level. Labor is ethical if it is part of a labor system that is in the service of the good life. In modern society, the content of the good life is neither traditionally given, nor can it be one-sidedly determined from a particular moral position in civil society. The determination of the good life demands mediation by political parties that are willing to depart from the moral position of a specific worldview, in order to establish the desirable ethical framework for the production system. Subsequently, at state level, the political parties can try (through

hegel’s concept of education

81

means of engaging in public and parliamentary discussion) to agree on the embodiment of good life. Conclusion Hegel teaches us that education should always be understood as the individual’s integration in a community that consists of individuals who are already educated all the time. However, the central problem is how education, understood in this sense, can be combined with moral education and can do justice to subjective freedom. The central solution that Hegel offers for this problem is the labor community, i.e., a corporation that is only accessible through the individual’s mediation in the free market. This solution, however, is not only objectionable on the grounds that the corporations principally cannot accept all, but also because they are based on a problematic relation to labor: they make labor absolute and are moralizing it. Therefore, Hegel’s solution cannot fence off immanent criticism. The project undertaken in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right i.e., the realization of freedom, can only be done justice when the market is not one-sidedly conceived of as an economic market, but also in a broader sense as civil society. Education that takes place through means of the market attains a double meaning: aside from the education that is performed as a consequence of the rationalization process of modern society, one can distinguish a moral education. The essential problem of education in modern society exists in the connection with, and the integration of, the educated subject in the community of state and family. Although, the argument need not make room for moralized labor, the connection between labor and the good life cannot only consist of the ethical framework through which politics enables labor to operate. Hegel, rightly, assumes that professionals themselves must also develop a conception of what it means to be a good professional. This, however, cannot happen at the level of the corporation, c.q the company. It is my opinion that the institutions of education should take up their responsibility in this field. 1. A market of free labor forces cannot be reconciled with companies in which individuals have a life long career. However, such a reconciliation is less strange (especially in the case of the more highly educated) to assume that individuals are bound to a specific

82

paul cobben

labor domain: such as, economics, jurisprudence, medicine or the humanities. In these domains, individuals can express and develop their particular capacities. These capacities, however, are not moral ones, but rather concern specialized knowledge and skills. 2. Insofar as the educational institutions are public institutions, the question of how the professional training is related to the demands that arise from the framework of the good life (as determined by legislators and politicians), should become a substantial part of the teaching program. At the same time, this can be the departure point for the interpretation of good craftsmanship that has to be developed at the level of the branch organization. At this level, professional training also means integration in a community, namely the professional community that aims to exercise the profession in accordance with the specific interpretation of the good life, as determined by legislation and politics. 3. The tension between specific worldviews, on the one hand, and the institutions of education and the branch organizations concerning the interpretation of good craftsmanship, on the other hand, can be given institutional shape by basing educational institutions on a specific worldview. Members of these institutions can discuss the interpretation of good craftsmanship in relation to their own worldview. This discussion, however, has to involve other worldviews, and also take the general conception of the good life into consideration. Only then, can this approach to worldviews overcome dogmatism, and constructively contribute to the critical discussion that is evoked by an actual interpretation of good craftsmanship. This critical discussion must not only be positively organized through the creation of institutions, but should also be facilitated through, for example, allowing for spare time or stimulating a flourishing cultural society life.

STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION, ETHICS OF RECOGNITION, LOSS OF RECOGNITION Jean-Christophe Merle The current theories of recognition, and particularly Axel Honneth’s, invoke, among other historical references, a thesis of Fichte’s that states that ‘summons’ and ‘impetus’ are provided by one rational being to another rational being as a condition for the self-position, i.e. for self-determination, and for self-consciousness, of a finite rational being. According to Honneth, “It seems beyond any doubt that Fichte’s assumption of a ‘summons’ (Aufforderung) really refers to a communicative act that one cannot consider as the product of subjective elements of constitution (of the subject)” (Honneth 2001, 76). While Fichte’s theory is of increasing interest for the theorists who focus on the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, Kant remains for such theorists as Honneth the defender of a monologist theory. In the realm of education as well—both of children as and of humankind—Fichte and Kant clearly diverge. The fact that the ‘summons’ (Aufforderung) plays a major role in Fichte’s conception might lead one to see a similarity between Fichte’s conception of education and Honneth’s politics of recognition conceived of as social integration. However, Honneth’s politics of recognition combines, rather, a Fichtean element with a Kantian one, in an original, but, in my view, highly problematic way. In Kant’s practical philosophy, recognition does not play any transcendental role in the constitution of either the subject or self-consciousness, and there is no such thing as the Fichtean ‘summons.’ Yet, recognition, from a teleological perspective, is a key function for recognition in a meaning, which is both traditional and closer to Honneth than the Fichtean meaning. In the fourth proposition of the Idea of a Universal History, Kant writes: “Man has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this state more like a man, that is, he feels able to develop his natural capacities. But he also has a great tendency to live as an individual, to isolate himself, since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas. He therefore expects resistance all

84

jean-christophe merle

around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to others. It is this very resistance which awakens all man’s powers and induce him to overcome his tendency to laziness. Through the desire for honor (Ehrsucht), power (Herrsucht) or property (Habsucht), it drives him to seek status among his fellows, whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave.” (Idea for a Universal History Ak VIII:21, Nisbet 44; see also Pädagogik IX:492 about Ehrsucht, Herrschsucht and Habsucht). It is not cupidity, but instead, ambition, lust for power, i.e. stringing for a high rank in society or for social recognition that are quoted by Kant in the first place. Unlike cupidity, which is impossible to satisfy for all people because of the scarcity of goods, ambition and lust of power are impossible to satisfy for all by their very nature, even in a land of milk and honey. Indeed, these things are all relational goods. One cannot fulfill all these conflicting ambitions, lusts of power and this cupidity, precisely because they are conflicting and asocial tendencies. Ambition as a motivation to individual efforts does not contribute only to the increase of the total amount of goods produced. The key function of ambition is rather to develop human talents in their diversity. Indeed, Kant characterizes reason in the finite human being as “knowing no limits to its projects. It has a non instinctive causality, and it rather needs attempts, exercises and learning [Versuche, Übung und Unterricht], in order to gradually progress from one stage of understanding to the next one.” (Second Proposition.) The purpose of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), of which the equivalent in the domain of education is ‘discipline’ exercised by the parents, is not only to determine and to enforce the limit of the freedom of each citizen, in order it not to infringe the freedom of others, but also to enhance the diversity of projects and attempts proceeded by human beings. Kant offers a famous metaphor: “But once enclosed within a precinct like that of civil union, the same inclinations have the most beneficial effect. In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and straight [. . .].” (Idea for a Universal History, Fifth proposition, Ak VIII:22, Nisbet 46) The growth of the tree above itself represents a non–zero-sum-game, because it results in a development into a space that was not previously occupied by other trees, so that the total space occupied by the trees expands. In his course on pedagogy, Kant conceives of the education of children like he does of the education of the entire humankind. He advises

struggle for recognition

85

“that one leaves the child free to do anything from his first age on (with the exception of things that are damaging for him, for instance when he grasps a sharp knife), provided that it does not happen in a way that hinders the freedom of others [. . .]” (Pädagogik, Ak IX:454). Experiments of new ways, i.e. diversity and originality, is the way for an individual to promote the fulfillment of its own ambition, and ambition is the mechanism that provides for the development of the most extended diversity in human kind; finally, law is the way to optimize diversity by optimizing competition. For achieving her ambitions, a human being needs the cooperation of her fellow human beings. She develops a sociality motivated by unsociability (therefore Kant speaks of an ‘unsociable sociability’). This instrumental view on society is the second piece of advice given by Kant concerning education: “one must show the child that it cannot achieve [his or her] goals otherwise than through leaving the others achieve their goals too” (Ak IX:454). Social recognition is the understanding of the respective significance of each person for achieving one’s own goals. In this context, ambitions, development of natural disposition and social recognition is that which constitutes self-identity. Although Fichte elaborates a radically different conception of recognition, it has a feature in common with the Kantian perspective. According to the Foundations of Natural Right, the ‘summons’ is a condition for a finite rational being to ascribe to itself a ‘free efficacy’ upon a sensible world that the rational being posits and determines. According to Kant, striving for social recognition is the mechanism for promoting culture, i.e. the domination of reason over the sensible world. Fichte’s ‘summons’ has two dimensions. On the one hand, the transcendental deduction of the Foundations of Natural Right intends to demonstrate that law is a condition for a rational being to ascribe free efficacy to itself, and The System of Ethics wants to show that moral law is a condition of the same free efficacy. On the other hand, Fichte introduces in the transcendental deduction of the Foundations of Natural Right an empirical fact, which Honneth considers as being ‘irritating’ (Honneth 2001, 69): “The summons to engage in free selfactivity is what we call upbringing (Erziehung). All individuals must be brought up to be human beings, otherwise they would not be human beings. In connection with this, the question inevitably arises: [. . .] who brought up the first human couple? [. . .] A human being could

86

jean-christophe merle

not have brought them up, for they are supposed to be the first human beings. Therefore, another rational being (one that was not human) must have brought them up—obviously, only to the point where humans could start bringing up each other. A spirit took them into its care [. . .]” (Foundations of Natural Right, I 3, 347; Baur 38). In both dimensions there is some difficulty in identifying recognition. With the empirical dimension, it looks more like the ‘spirit’ gives rise to a desire for free agency and recognition than it is real recognition in human beings. Thus, being a human being does not require recognition, a legal system and moral law as a condition, but, rather, the existence of a striving for recognition, which includes a legal system and moral law. Concerning the ‘summons’ of the transcendental dimension, I observe that in it a few key characteristics of recognition are missing. First, whereas the ‘proof’ of the second theorem concludes that “the rational being must necessarily posit a rational being outside itself as the cause of the summons” (I 3, 347; Baur 37), nothing in this ‘proof ’ demonstrates that this second rational being must reciprocally receive a ‘summons’ from the same first rational being. Reciprocal relationship of summons is not mentioned. The possibility of a one-way summons is confirmed by the empirical reference to a ‘spirit,’ which, by definition, is not a finite rational being, and thus does not need to receive any summons. Secondly, it is unclear whether the summons is meant to be a continuous one. The contrary seems to be more plausible and the term impetus (Anstoß) suggests rather a one-time event. The conception expressed by Fichte throughout his lifetime is that in order to begin to exercise its freedom or ‘free efficacy,’ a finite rational being needs an ‘image’ (Bild) or—in his later writings—a model (Urbild). I will not discuss this (problematic) view here in depth, though, a consequence of it is that, once the finite rational being receives this model and has begun to develop it, it has only to develop the consequences of this first principle, as the scholar does, according to The System of Ethics (§29, I 4, 327f., Breazeale/Zöller). Now, recognition is not a onetime occurrence but a continuous relationship. Thirdly, in the deduction, one can find no argument as to why the finite rational being needs to posit and determine more than one rational being granting him the summons. The non sequitur implication from the first to the second sentence of the following quotation makes it clear: “As soon as one fully determines this concept, one is driven from the thought of an individual human being to the assumption of a second one, in

struggle for recognition

87

order to be able to explain the first. Thus, the concept of the human being is not the concept of an individual—for an individual human being is unthinkable—but rather the concept of a species.” (I 3, 347; Baur 37f.) Fichte does not explain what the implication is regarding a second individual to an entire species. If only a second individual is needed, nothing makes it impossible that one individual suffices for the summons to all individuals, in which case recognition among the individuals in society is not necessary for the constitution of selfconsciousness. Interestingly enough, Fichte does not use the word ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the deduction of right. If it really addresses the issue at all, it is rather in the “Subdivision of possible human professions” in The System of Ethics (§§ 28ff.). This subdivision is grounded on the conception that the free efficacy of reason on nature requires the union of all finite rational being in a fight against nature. In this fight, each rational being ought to fulfill the function that fits its skills; and the developing of one’s own specific skills belongs to education, more exactly to the stage of morality within the educative process. Thus, social recognition in Fichte resembles the recognition resulting from the honest fulfillment of a stoic officium. Because a profession is ascribed to each individual according to the skills and utility of this person for the common good, i.e., for the progress of the entire society, recognition is radically disconnected from social competition and efforts related to ambitions, lusts of power and cupidity, it is incompatible with them. Recognition does not result from individual features, but from the dedication to a common goal, even in a lower function. The aptly named “moral teachers of the people” (Volkslehrer) have the specific task to teach the moral principle from which this progress of free efficacy as a struggle against nature results as well as the division of professions. The educative goal is not—like in Kant—that the child experiences free experimentation within the limits of discipline, but rather that the child experiences the imitation and the reiteration of the process accomplished by previous authors, artists, etc. This is exemplified by Fichte’s project of a school of rhetoric in Zürich (Plan anzustellender Rede-Uebungen, II,1, 126f.), as well as the role devoted to the scholars: preserving cultural assets, which is for Fichte the same as knowledge, and relating it to a permanent principle. The scholar, but he alone, is entitled to make this knowledge progress. The other members of society are not foreseen for experimentation. But the decisive point is that all are self-conscious rational beings exercising free

88

jean-christophe merle

efficacy, because they all cooperate in free efficacy upon the sensible world outside of reason. Honneth’s politics of recognition takes over core elements of both Kant’s and Fichte’s conception of recognition and self-consciousness of the finite individual being. On the one hand, Honneth, like Kant, conceives of a society characterized by a diversity of individuals and containing no Fichtean plan designed for the development of skills towards a collective goal. Freedom of options and experiences is the rule within the limits of law. Yet, on the other hand, Honneth wishes society not to grant recognition in a competitive way driven by ambition, lust of power and inequality of skills. According to himself, Honneth “attempts to formulate the category of ‘recognition’ as a fundamental and comprehensive moral concept from which distributive goals can be derived; thus he interprets the socialist ideal of redistribution as a dependant unit within the struggle for recognition,” which Honneth doesn’t conceive of as being a competitive struggle, but as being a struggle for a relatively egalitarian distribution of recognition as a kind of the most basic good. In the following, I would like to show the incompatibility of the two elements of Honneth’s politics of recognition and its failure to provide for a sustainable and desirable principle of distributive justice. I will primarily make reference to Honneth, but also make mention of some other representatives of the politics of recognition, to whom Honneth paid regular attention. The current theories of recognition all share some fundamental elements. First, an individual can constitute himself as a self-conscious subject only in an intersubjective way. This process goes the following way. Each human being A must esteem its fellow B, so that B is able to make a judgment about A which is valid in the eyes of A. Furthermore, A must be able to interpret B’s behavior, which expresses B’s judgment. Finally, the human being, B, must identify the human being A and then esteem A in terms of his true value, i.e. recognize him. Secondly, in the case in which this intersubjective constitution of self-consciousness does not occur, on the grounds that one of these steps should not be completed, recognition must be struggled for by the individual to whom it is denied. Theorists of recognition do not refer to a principle or model of justice but to the experience of injustice, which in turn does not consist of a violation of the norms of justice but in the denial of expectations of recognition. Admittedly, only the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of recognition

struggle for recognition

89

is meant. Thirdly, each era has its own forms of recognition. According to Axel Honneth (for instance Honneth 2003, 214), the current liberal society entails three spheres of recognition: love (regulated according to needs), law (regulated by the principle of equality) and cooperation—for instance, labor relationships—(regulated according to performance). Denial of recognition, which amounts to injustice, can occur in each of these spheres. Although our societies make recognition possible, a ‘progressive conception’ of the spheres of recognition ought to be developed, according to Honneth. What is desirable in this perspective is, on the one hand, a “process of individualization [. . .] i.e. of increasing the opportunities for the legitimate expression of the shares of personality” and, on the other hand, “a process of social inclusion, it means: of increasing inclusion of the subjects in the circle of fully valuable members of society.” (Honneth 2003, 218). Charles Taylor assumes that “there is a link between recognition and identity,” “identity meaning the self-understanding of human beings, an awareness of the determining features through which they become human beings” (Taylor 1993, 13). Thus, a ‘real deformation’ can result from a ‘misappreciation’ of this self-understanding “if either the environment or the society diffuse an image of their self which is reductive, degrading or contemptuous.” (Taylor 1993, 13f.) In the following, I will put aside the interesting debate about whether selfunderstanding constitutes an identity (like Taylor and Renault claim) or not (like Honneth asserts). I will also put aside the very problematic relationship between the spheres of recognition, to which Nancy Fraser rightly draws attention. Here I will focus instead on the following strong thesis of the theories of recognition: Self-understanding is possible only through recognition in a society, i.e. through integration. This does not only mean that human beings must live in the society of other human beings, that they necessarily ought to be confronted to other human beings and that all this shapes their character. The point is that only recognition by one’s fellow human can constitute self-understanding. Recognition is limited neither to merely noticing the existence of a human being by other human beings nor to abstaining from violating her legal freedom. Recognition involves positive esteem. Not only a contemptuous behavior (e.g., a discrimination which violates individual rights), but contempt itself—or even the lack of positive esteem—represents an injustice. A better self-understanding can be achieved only through more reciprocal and unanimous esteem.

90

jean-christophe merle

This demanding thesis raises significant problems. At first sight, it seems plausible that a human being esteems another human being from whom she expects recognition, especially if one considers what is the case with children. Their parents know, and can do, a great deal. The child is dependent on the wide knowledge and abilities of its parents. Even if the child is disobedient, its relationship to its parents is an unequal one. Is the esteem of the child to be recognized to the same extent as the esteem it receives? Even in cases in which the asymmetry is not as extreme as in the case of child and parents there remains yet a problem. Even if one assumes full reciprocity, esteem remains dependent on the circumstances. If one must live in a limited group which one cannot leave, one may be dependent on a reciprocal relationship of esteem. Yet, if the same person knew other ways of life and could choose among further options, she might develop another appreciation of her present life, even if she eventually decided to remain in her present environment. The difference here is between an imposed environment and the same environment when one has chosen it. The latter obviously contributes much more than the former does to the formation (Bildung) of self-consciousness. Even if one thinks of this distinction in abstract terms, the question still remains whether recognition in the meaning of esteem is indispensable for self-consciousness. Once recognition is denied, i.e. once “either the environment or the society diffuses an image of their self which is reductive, degrading or contemptuous,” when does then a ‘deformation’ of the self really occur? Undoubtedly pain results from this denial. Yet, the theories of recognition, too, acknowledge that the need for recognition belongs to the realm of the fundamental anthropologic features and that it does not cease in case of denial of recognition. In the case of a denial of recognition, the need for recognition that is an expectation in the first step, may transform into a struggle, in which the human being tries to impose recognition to the denier. However, if this struggle succeeds, what is obtained is not the true esteem by the denier, but the mere acceptation by the denier of the existence and of the rights of the human being to whom he denied recognition. According to Hegel, the struggle for recognition results in the suppression of the totality constituted by each exclusive individual and its supplantation by the real totality of the universal spirit of the people (Volksgeist). Thus, the struggle for recognition leads to recognition in the institutional sense serving to make possible the coexistence of free human beings. Therefore, the result of a successful struggle for

struggle for recognition

91

recognition cannot be considered to be a ‘real deformation.’ On the contrary, if the reciprocal recognition out of esteem is granted voluntarily, without any need for a struggle, the individual totality remains. Thus, the recognition that one finds in love radically differs from the recognition for which one has to struggle. The former rests on esteems whereas the latter does not. The struggle for recognition of one’s own rights and for one’s sheer existence may be the prerequisite for the affirmation of a human being as an autonomous being, and consequently something indispensable for the formation of the self-understanding. Yet, the fulfillment of the need for recognition through esteem is something else. This point is linked with the another feature of the current theories of recognition. Following Habermas on this point, Honneth rejects the classic political model, which is built on the fear of the absence of freedom, i.e. on the fear of being a needy and vulnerable being dominated by others. Both authors criticize the strategic rationality of such a model. The classic political integration—e.g. the general will in Rousseau—is an integration in a legal and political system which proceeds without taking any consideration of either mutual esteem or denial thereof. Also, in those political theories in which civic virtues are required for the conservation of the legal system, one demands of the citizens nothing but that they provide support to the legal system. Such legal systems provide their fellow citizens only with recognition in a classic meaning. Interestingly enough, Taylor (as well as James Tully, cf. Merle 1998, 268f.) declares himself in favor of the traditional meaning against the meaning of the theory of recognition. Admittedly, he makes a plea for special rights to be granted to specific groups, but he refuses, though, to consider all culture as being equally valuable and deserving of the same esteem. The only equality of value that Tully accepts is the requirement of an unprejudiced judgment when we observe other cultural groups. This unprejudiced judgment means in no way that the close examination of other cultural groups ought to lead to declaring them to be of equal value. Unfortunately, Taylor applies this distinction exclusively on the relationships among cultural groups, not among individuals. But it does not mean, according to Taylor, that the individuals ought to esteem all their fellows as being equally and highly valuable. The integration of the individuals and the formation of the individual identity are rather achieved in another way, namely through either a shared conception of the good or another teleological end (cf. Taylor

92

jean-christophe merle

1993, 55). The members feel recognized as members of a cultural group by sharing the same conception of the good. Also Honneth’s theory of recognition conceives of itself as a “teleological conception of social justice” (Honneth 2003, 213) or of ‘the good life’ (Honneth 2003, 212). However, as Nancy Fraser emphasizes, Honneth’s conception of the good does not consist in either procedural or substantial principles of justice, but only in the good which is recognition and integration for themselves, as well as in the good which is the progress and the development of recognition and integration as such. By so doing, Honneth avoids taking over Taylor’s plea for special rights and exceptions to the liberal legal system. Taylor reproaches a ‘politics of equal respect’ and a ‘liberalism of rights’ showing ‘no openness towards differences,’ “because it cannot ensure what the members of societies with special character really strive for: the survival of their society.” (Taylor 1993, 55) Critics of communitarianism have shown us the limits of this model. First, each such society with a special character submits the individuals who do not share its special character to much more extensive restrictions on their freedom than is the case in liberal societies. Secondly, these particular societies are an obstacle in the way of the development and the transformations which each society must unavoidably experience sooner or later. Consequently, there is a risk of an increasing discrepancy between, on the one hand, the wishes and the needs of the individuals and, on the other hand, an inflexible authority which would then be inclined to increasingly authoritarian reactions. One ought to credit Honneth for taking into account this dynamics of all societies, unlike Taylor. Yet, Honneth misses the intention presumably underlying Taylor’s argument in favor of special rights for “societies with special character.” I consider Taylor’s statement that there are societies whose members all really strive for its traditional organization to eternally survive exactly as it is to be wrong. Now, there certainly are societies in which part of the people—or even a majority of them—wish exactly that. Some of these people may either demand or merely tolerate restrictions on the freedom of their fellows in order to realize this wish. Taylor acknowledges that such a coerced recognition eventually fails to truly realize such needs for recognition. He writes: “Such a judgment obtained on demand is a [. . .] degrading act”, since “the potential beneficiaries of a politics of recognition [. . .] want respect not degradation” (Taylor 1993, 67f.). Unfortunately, again, Taylor applies this remark

struggle for recognition

93

only to the relationships between cultural groups, not between individuals within each cultural group. However, Taylor makes the following distinction between traditional and modern societies (cf. Taylor 1993, 24). In traditional societies, individual identity derives from the position in society, i.e. from what Cicero called officium. In modern societies, the “personal identity, unmistakable and grounded in the interiority of the person” does not enjoy this “self-evident recognition. It must first obtain recognition in an exchange, and this attempt can fail.” Taylor does not mention that in traditional societies, as well, identity has often been a very painful matter, especially for those persons occupying the lowest social positions and having life-long status as such with no hope of any improvement. Instead, what matters to Taylor is the stability of social positions as well as of recognition. Although what matters to Honneth is not either the stability of some forms of established social recognition or of the identity that is grounded on them; both Taylor and Honneth pursue the goal of guaranteeing stability of recognition to all members of society. In other words, the legal and political system has the obligation to care for the social integration of human beings who are equally valuable. Herein consists its normative justification. Honneth asserts: “Each human subject fundamentally depends on an environment of social rules of conducts which are coordinated by normative principles of mutual recognition. The consequences resulting from the removal of such relationships of recognition are defiance and humiliation, which cannot be without damaging consequences for the formation of individual identity. In the opposite direction of the definition of an adequate concept of society, this interlinking of recognition and socialization leads us not to be able to conceive of social integration but as a process of inclusion by the means of regulated forms of recognition. In the eyes of their members, societies represent legitimate frameworks of order only insofar as they are capable of providing reliable relationships of mutual recognition at different levels. To this extent normative integration operates only by way of institutionalizing principles of recognition [. . .].” (Honneth 2003, 205) I do not doubt the existence of a human need to be recognized as equally valuable, but I call into question the theses according to which (1) this need can always be fulfilled, (2) this need ought to be satisfied as such and (3) society ought to care for fulfilling this need as much as possible, which means that society is—either directly or indirectly— responsible for social integration.

94

jean-christophe merle

‘Love,’ which Honneth declares to be one of the three spheres of recognition, is likely to be considered a sphere that includes friendship as well. From Aristotle till Kant, the emphasis has always been on the psychological problem of friendship. Between friends, equality is at the same time required and continuously endangered. The possible causes because of which one can lose friendship are various: A change of opinions or of taste, the begin of a friendship with the enemies of the friend, humiliation, dependence on the help provided by the friend, disappointment that a friend in need does not request help, critique to a friend, treason or mere suspicion of treason, etc. All these causes of the termination of a friendship may occur in any social context. Of course, society can make friendship difficult, as one can observe in some totalitarian regimes, in which each person must fear that the neighbor may spy upon her and denunciate her. Yet, society can arrange no incentive to friendship. Although friends may behave unfairly to one another, which may sometimes lead to the termination of friendship, granting or denying friendship is not usually considered as a matter of justice or injustice. Thus, love as a principle of recognition can neither be considered as an institution nor provide a principle of justice. Love is not even a principle of justice. Love is not even a principle at all: Love and friendship are not, and cannot, be distributed in accordance to need—unlike Honneth’s asserts (cf. Honneth 2003, 14). Also the sphere of labor does not and cannot operate according to a principle of merit and performance. The theory of recognition appears to be the mirror image of another theory which—like the theory of recognition—cannot claim an unlimited validity: that conception according to which competition between human beings is the driving force of a progress which ultimately benefits the entire humankind, although stating that along the way one must tolerate great injustice, pain, humiliation, etc. In opposition to this view, one may observe that competition cannot be advantageous to society except in certain circumstances and that one should resist some effects of competition. The perspective of the theories of competition is an instrumental one that abstracts from the fact that competitors may sometimes also esteem one another. The reverse image of this is the theory of recognition focusing exclusively on esteem as a means toward a just and happy society. The fear of the denial of recognition appears to be the mirror image of the fear of the violation of rights and freedom in the classic political theories. Yet the differ-

struggle for recognition

95

ence is obvious: Rights and freedom can be successfully guaranteed by liberal institutions. Even if recognition could be guaranteed by public institutions, such a guarantee would not be desirable in all cases. The denial of recognition is often an important means of social critique, whether in the hands of a majority or of a minority. Whenever social critique attempts to transform the existing society, it may either—admittedly—aim at social integration—as was the case of the anti-segregation movement in the Southern states of the Union in the sixties—or pursue the contrary of integration—as was the case of the anti-conformist demonstrations of the same years. Mill’s On Liberty made a classical plea in favor of freedom of opinion and of the right to chose freely one’s own way of life, including eccentricity, provided that one remains within the limits of the no harm principle. Now, a right to freedom of opinion and a right to freely chose one’s own way of life were inconceivable without denial of esteem. One justification of these rights is Mill’s epistemological argument according to which even false assertions may be heuristically useful, because they lead to checking and justifying all traditional convictions more carefully. Denial of recognition belongs to the possible expressions of dissent. Even where there is yet no dissent, a segmentation of society into groups which recognize another in a legal person, but not in the sense of esteem, may appear to be an important protection against the tyranny of the majority and against any abuse of power. Therefore, the need of recognition and its fulfillment should not enjoy any systematic priority over social critics. The sociological category of integration should not be considered as a normative standard. In fact, the lack of integration and of recognition may have either normatively false reasons and causes or normatively right ones. The principle of recognition can be neither a substitute for public justice nor a generic concept from which one could derive principles of justice. References Barry, Brian 2001: Culture and Equality. An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb: Plan anzustellender Rede-Uebungen (1789), in: Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky and Erich Fuchs (Eds.), J.G. Fichte-Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1964f., vol. II;1.

96

jean-christophe merle

——: Foundations of Natural Right, trans. Michael Baur, Cambridge University Press 2000 (also quoted according to Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky and Erich Fuchs (Eds.), J.G. Fichte-Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1964f., vol. I,3 & 4). ——: The System of Ethics, trans. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller, Cambridge University Press 2005 (also quoted according to Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky and Erich Fuchs (Eds.), J.G. Fichte-Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1964f., vol. I,4). Honneth, Axel 2001: Die transzendentale Notwendigkeit von Intersubjektivität (Zweiter Lehrsatz: §3, in: Jean-Christophe Merle (Ed.), Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Grundlage des Naturrechts, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 63–80. Honneth, Axel u. Fraser, Nancy 2003: Umverteilung oder Anerkennung? Eine politisch-philosophische Kontroverse, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Kant, Immanuel: Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in: Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press 1970 (also quoted according to the Akademie-Ausgabe, vol. VIII). ——: Pädagogik, in: Kants Werke, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, reprint 1968, vol. IX 437–500. Merle, Jean-Christophe 1998: Cultural Minority Rights and the Rights of the Majority in the Liberal State, in: Ratio Juris 11/3, 259–271. Taylor, Charles 1993: Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer. Tully, James 1995: Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press.

RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUALS AND CULTURES Ludwig Siep The rights of human beings as individuals and the peaceful, respectful and enriching co-existence of different cultures1 certainly belong to the most important goods of the present time. It is especially the duty of politics to save and protect them, and the duty of philosophy to justify them in theory. As can be seen in recent discussions, there is tension between both goods. Since the role and the rights of individuals are defined differently in various cultural traditions, the respect for the rights of a group and the support of their traditions and their way of life might jeopardize the rights of individuals. Conversely, the implementation of individual rights in the face of cultural traditions of groups might endanger the survival of the groups. Moreover the concept of the ‘sovereign individual’, who is entitled to opt for commitments and duties in view of his/her own interests, is perceived as a cultural non neutral concept of the human being. Its proclamation appears as ‘western cultural-imperialism’. In the following I will discuss possibilities for the overcoming of this conflict. In the first part of my discussion a concept will form the starting point, which was developed during the Philosophy of the socalled German Idealism and which is taken up today by many socialphilosophers all over the world: The concept of mutual recognition. First I would like to summarize the theory which has been developed by Fichte and especially Hegel (I). In the second part I will outline a derivation of levels of recognition also with less demanding prerequisites in an anthropological culturally-historic framework (II). Finally a reflection will follow which forms of recognition are necessarily entitled to the individual and which of them can be limited for the benefit of the diversity and the flourishing of groups (III).

1

For further details on the use of the term “culture” in the following see: Siep, Ludwig: Konkrete Ethik. Grundlagen der Natur- und Kulturethik. Frankfurt 2004, 238 ff, 259 ff. and also Taylor, Charles: Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay. Princeton 1992, 69 f.

98

ludwig siep I

The philosophy of ‘recognition’ in German Idealism was developed in order to avoid an individualistic conception, which reduces the state to an alliance of interests, as well as a collectivistic notion, which subjugates the individual to the demands of groups, be it family units, religious communities or states. Most notably within the works of Fichte and Hegel the philosophy of ‘recognition’ represents the attempt of a theoretical mediation between the two afore mentioned competing demands.2 In the following I will summarize this conception in simple terms focusing on modern problems of political philosophy. Fichte already tried to demonstrate that individuals are not isolated ‘atoms’ which just come together in communities through contracts or other conscious acts. Rather, their self-awareness is only possible and viable in a certain relationship to other individuals. According to Fichte self-awareness presupposes the ability to decide to act according to a self-imposed plan. This ability must be made possible through others in two ways: On the one hand, they have to refrain from forcing one and in doing so must leave one freedom of action. On the other hand, someone has to call on me for my freely chosen action. Whoever understands this summons and reacts to it also respects the freedom of action of the other person. In order that this may persist in the long term and independent from arbitrariness and coincidences, a community based on law which is organized according to general rules needs to be established and sanctioned. Hegel understands the self-awareness more integrally than Fichte. It does not only encompass the knowledge of oneself, the other person and the plans of action, but also emotions, inclinations, customs or habits, ways of expression and much more. Therefore a community of law is indeed a necessary precondition of recognition, but not an adequate precondition on its own. Rather, there must exist a wide range of forms of recognition—among them love, legal regulation of conflicts, common customs and traditions, common perceptions of the 2 In Fichte’s Natural Law of 1796/97 and Hegel’s Jena Writings 1801–1807, see Siep, Ludwig: Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Freiburg/München 1979; Wildt, Andreas: Autonomie und Anerkennung. Hegels Moralitätskritik im Lichte seiner Fichte-Rezeption. Stuttgart 1982; Düsing, Edith: Intersubjektivität und Selbstbewusstsein. Köln 1986; Honneth, Axel: The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Translated by Joel Anderson. Cambridge 1995; Williams, Robert R.: Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London 1997.

recognition of individuals and cultures

99

world etc.—in which the individual feels himself in the most diverse respects to be accepted, affirmed, supported within a group, but perhaps also criticized and punished. Hegel aims to integrate the forms of community which are necessary for this purpose into a systematic overall-order with levels of progressively comprehensive and complete reflected recognition. What is already evident in Hegel’s writing and nowadays also developed by many social philosophers, is the mutual dependence of the recognition of the rights of individuals and of the flourishing of certain groups. The individual is neither able to gain self-esteem nor psychological stability without the emotional support and the care of the family as a matter of course, which is not simply agreed through contracts. Without the mutual instruction and support of fellow workers nobody would be in a position to learn a profession. This is also only partly enforceable through ‘vocational training contracts’. It requires a lot of ‘collegiality’ and fairness. Also a certain kind of ‘atmosphere’,3 according to Hegel a group ‘spirit’, is a presupposition. For Hegel, the common tasks, the fulfillment of which provides the individual with the opportunity to experience a meaningful life, must go beyond the private sphere. There needs to be a community based on a legal tradition and the memory of a common history. Its members must be able to decide jointly and publicly about the rights and benefits of an autonomous community—a ‘polis’ according to Aristotle—and act in compliance with these decisions. After all, for Hegel there must be forms of expressive, narrative and scientific efforts to reach the truth, in which one participates and through which one feels supported and allied to others: art, religion and science. In what way und to what extent is the opposition between the demands of the individual and the demands of the group with particular traditions and outlooks on life surmounted by such a conception of recognition? To begin with, the relationship of mutual affirmation between the individuals and the groups to which they belong—family, profession, community based on law and common culture—is necessary for both sides. The individual needs the acceptance and support of a group for his/her self-awareness and self-esteem. For this pur-

3 See Waldron, Jeremy: Can communal goods be human rights? In: Waldron, Jeremy: Liberal Rights. Collected Papers 1981–1991, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1993, 339–369.

100

ludwig siep

pose the group itself needs to be ‘accepted’ in the more comprehensive community of the state, and even beyond a single state. Not only do the groups need to experience equality and opportunities to develop, but also they must have a standing as valuable members of the greater community. Just as the individual is not in a position to achieve the awareness of his/her own ‘respectability’ and dignity without the acceptance of his/ her group, the groups also cannot flourish without the approval, the interest and engagement of the group-members. This is true already of the family but also the profession, the religious community, the states and groups of states with common responsibilities. Without the lively and intentional cooperation of their members, the groups are not able to perform their tasks. Regarding many goods especially of the modern states moreover, the benefits of the individuals and the groups need to mutually complement each other. This is especially true for public and communal goods, which can only be achieved jointly and cannot be enjoyed exclusively.4 This ranges from the quality of environment, health conditions (hygiene), education, security etc. and extends to the cultural standard of art and science in a city or a country. Hegel was clearly aware of the problem that conflicts could arise between the demands for recognition of the individuals and of the group. If the temperaments and characters, the preferences and the sensitivities in the family do not harmonize or are not dovetailed, then clashes can arise, which can escalate into a legal conflict. Such a dispute destroys families—either in their institutional form or in their solidarity, which is normally taken for granted. The relationship between the rights of the individual and group-bonds in the field of labor, of production and of circulation is especially fragile. Here the foundations must be contractual and governed by law, so that the individual can bring out his/her interests and abilities to the full. This requires a market which allows for competition and ‘conquests’ of positions and fields of influence—all within the scope of law. This, however, may lead not only to displacement and exclusion, but also to the formation of social classes and to impoverishment resulting in a loss of legal loyalty.

4 For further details see also Siep, Ludwig: Private und öffentliche Aufgaben. Münster 2005.

recognition of individuals and cultures

101

According to Hegel this can only be prevented by stabilizing countermeasures taken by professional associations (‘corporations’) and the state. Their social and economic measures must simultaneously safeguard the well-being of the individual in the face of catastrophes but allow the ‘culture’ of free enterprise to remain intact. In the state a fierce conflict between the rights of the individual and the demands of the comprehensive group, namely the sovereign single state itself, may occur. The state must indeed intervene in the ownership and the rights of its citizens, in order to safeguard its own existence and sovereignty against external violence—be it war or other forms of external violence, for instance the taking of hostages. It therefore cannot be denied that Hegel is fully aware of the tension between the recognition of the individual and that of the group. But has he found a solution to the problem and can we simply adopt this solution today? I have my doubts about this. The deficiencies in the Hegelian solution lie in my view in two areas: Firstly, inspite of his conception of mutual recognition between individuals or groups of individuals, Hegel has given the latter, above all the—in the Aristotelian tradition—complete and encompassing community, the state, a normative and ontological predominance. In view of our historical experiences with the modern state this can no longer be justified (1). Secondly, his philosophy of history, which is in modern terms unequivocally eurocentric and christocentric, that it is to say aimed at Christianity as the final and absolute religion, stands in the way of an unambiguously pluralistic acceptance of the rights of cultural, ethnic and religious groups (2). Let me add some explanatory notes on these points: (1) Hegel’s philosophy of law as a whole certainly attempts to link the rights and the well-being of the individual with that of the state in such a way that each side in aiming for its goals must, at the same time, promote those of the other. He understands as the strength of the modern states that they allow for the complete development of personal rights, personal convictions and the individual’s personal interests. In spite of this, in Hegel’s writings the status and demand of the institutions, particularly those of the state, remain in principle superior to those of the individual. To prove this, Hegel even considers war to be necessary periodically in order to demonstrate and make people aware of the order of precedence between the private interests of the individual and the sovereignty of the state.

102

ludwig siep

Of course one may argue that the relationship between the rights of the individual and the existence and authority of a state can indeed never be completely symmetrical. One only needs to think of the problems involved in modern terrorism, for instance hostage-taking. If states were duty-bound to save the lives of the hostages in every event and at all costs, small groups of violence-prone individuals would be in a position to blackmail states and to dictate their political decisions. This would undermine the authority of the state and would in the future rob its other citizens, of the protection of a life of non-violence, to which they have a right. Hegel’s own examples for the hierarchy of rights are concerned with states of emergency, above all, with the state of war. In these circumstances the state must limit the rights to life and ownership of its citizens, for instance through military service or the nationalization of private property. In such cases the claims of the state do indeed have priority over the rights of individuals, in order to fulfill the lasting duty of protection towards everyone. But one may doubt that Hegel views the primacy of state rights merely under this perspective. In fact, for him these cases demonstrate that the state represents a higher form of spirit than the single citizens and that its first duty is its own conservation and the consolidation of its role in history. The existence of a constitutional state is not only, as in Kant’s works, an absolute demand of reason. The modern state also inherits the role of the traditional monarchies, to demonstrate glamour and majesty. This becomes apparent in passages like § 323 of the Philosophy of Law. In this passage sovereignty is characterized as “that aspect whereby the substance, as the state’s absolute power over everything individual and particular, over life, property, and the latter’s rights, and over the wider circles within it, gives the nullity of such things an existence [Dasein] and makes it present to the consciousness.” The reasons for Hegel’s ‘essentialization’ of the state as having an absolute existence in the world, analogous to that of the church5 cannot be sufficiently discussed here. But the relationship between the infinite substance of the state and the finite status of the life and rights of the individual in his conception is definitely not simply asymmetrical in the sense in which it is unavoidable for modern constitutional states as well. Furthermore, it also does not seem to be appropriate to

5

However, rather in the understanding of “church” in Catholic theology.

recognition of individuals and cultures

103

the mutual self-recognition in the passages in which Hegel talks about a mutual self-negation of the individual and the community.6 (2) In a similar way the second defect of the Hegelian theory of the recognition between individuals and groups is connected to the metaphysical inheritance of his philosophy, namely to the teleological philosophy of history. Hegel does indeed link reason to history and accepts change and development in institutions, norms and world views. But within this a necessity and legitimacy must rule which is governed by the realization and self-recognition of an immanent being and aim (Telos). Under this premise, he understands history as being a process which begins with the early cultures of Asia and reaches completion with the Europe of his time. Religion and science develop thus, from their beginnings in natural religions right up to enlightened protestant Christianity as completed religion, which can only be surpassed by its ‘translation’ into philosophy. Hegel uses this teleological development of history to assign cultures, religions, but also peoples and races to certain stages of development which he regards as outdated in his time with.7 Without Hegel’s metaphysical concept of history, a solution to the conflict between the rights of the individual and those of culture groups becomes remains a problem. Moderns attempts to find a solution can, however, still profit from the inheritance of the theory of recognition in German Idealism. And this in two respects: Firstly, the understanding of the mutual conditions of the identity, competence and respect of individuals8 and their ‘group of reference’ is still required. Secondly, one will also need a conception of different levels and modes of

6 For instance in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit of 1805/06: “On its side, the universal presents itself . . . [as] sacrificing itself, and thus letting me approach my own”. See: Hegel and the Human Spirit. A translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805–6) with commentary, by Leo Rauch; Detroit 1983, 153. (Translated from G.W.F. Hegel Gesammelte Werke, Volume 8: Jenaer Systementwürfe III). Examples of this “sacrifice” of “the universal” are the state’s expenditure of taxes for the good of the individual (150, 152) as well as settlements and pardons in private and criminal law (146, p. 150 marginal note). 7 I have elaborated on this criticism in: Siep, Ludwig: “Toleranz und Anerkennung bei Kant und im Deutschen Idealismus”. In: Enders, Christoph, Kahlo, Michael (Eds.), Toleranz als Ordnungsprinzip? Die moderne Bürgergesellschaft zwischen Offenheit und Selbstaufgabe. Paderborn 2007, 177–193. 8 The dependency of individuals on groups and their traditions is, of course, different according to the form of society. M. Walzer has pointed out that there is a centrifugal tendency of freely chosen isolation in modern immigrant societies. See Walzer, Michael: On Tolerance. Yale 1997. (Epilogue)

104

ludwig siep

recognition. I would like to take this into consideration in reverse order in the second part of my remarks. II The conception of recognition in the works of Fichte and Hegel is based on the concept of a necessary development of self-awareness and reason from lower to higher levels. In Fichte’s approach there is also such an immanent ‘teleology’, according to which, only the autonomous individual, who completely understands himself and his faculties, rights and duties, is a ‘true’ human or rational being. For this reason these philosophers run the risk of ‘reducing’ people from traditional cultures and forms of life to a lower level of humanity. It is however possible to justify the notion of recognition even without a normative and teleological conception of reason and selfawareness. One could argue that anthropological traits and culturalhistorical experiences, which are increasingly shared by all people, suffice to justify the requirements of mutual recognition and its stages. I can only outline this way of justification in the following. Humans have always lived in groups and are dependent on cooperation. This has been the case at least since the culture of big-game hunters. Furthermore, they are able to specialize within the species.9 In contrast, animals have developed, as a rule, only abilities according to their species. Human beings develop particular skills, which in cultural and social history have become professions within the framework of a division of labor. Humans are, moreover, determined by a lower instinctive predisposition than animals, a long period of childhood and a high learning potential. As modern behavioral studies have shown,10 in comparison to ‘man-like’ primates, human children have, moreover, a particular interest in communication, mutual support and the participation in coordinated activities. The chance to learn as an individual and in a group grants him a high adaptability in various environments.

9

See Osche, Günther: Evolution: Grundlagen—Erkenntnisse—Entwicklungen der Abstammungslehre. 3Freiburg. 1974. 10 See Tomasello, Michael: The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge. 2000.

recognition of individuals and cultures

105

Shared roles in the group, division of labor and the cultivation of specific skills are mutually conditioned. The advantages of this development were recognized by human beings very early on. Abilities and skills, not simply physical strength, fertility and cunning, become increasingly relevant in cultural history for the acquisition of respect and social status. The awareness that it is possible to attain prestige in the eyes of others or to be elevated or humiliated by them influences one’s own self-esteem and self image. In early groups of human beings, the status in the social hierarchy is of great importance in gaining the affection of a mating partner. In cultural terms the significance of honesty, love but also of conceit and contempt has evolved from this. Human beings have always tried to gain status, prestige and acknowledgement by all manner of means (‘tricks’) including subjugation, humiliation and exclusion of rivals. In earlier cultures the best, often fatal method of achieving these aims has been isolation, downgrading and finally expulsion from the group. If a member of the group is left behind, he/she will disintegrate physically and mentally. In later times, above all, group doctrines like myths and religions were used for this purpose. For political or spiritual leaders they ensure divine acceptance (e.g. through descent from the gods or through magical powers). Others are burdened with guilt, signs of rejection, heresy or other reasons for expulsion from the group. In many cases these means of exclusion are connected with ‘proto-medical’ notions concerning the passing on of illnesses, contamination and poisoning (‘water poisoning’) etc. ‘Spiritual’ teachings of this kind, however, cannot be enforced simply by physical domination for long. They must also find acceptance and must in some way ‘be convincing’. Although it is possible to discover such subjugation and expulsion mechanisms in many cultures and religions, the history of cultures which are capable of surviving and developing show a process of learning, which becomes firmly established despite many cultural changes. Natural hierarchies founded on strength, age or gender lose significance. Mythical legends about descent from the gods and magical powers become implausible. In contrast, the belief in a basic equality of human beings gains more and more ground. By skipping many cultural developments I now turn to religions which break away from the limits of tribal cultures, and to the emergence of world views which claim to be universally acceptable. World religions teach that all people are descended from just two parents and that every person is accepted (‘loved’) equally by God. Philosophers

106

ludwig siep

attempt to grasp similar and repeatable perceptions within universal concepts and to link them to causes which all people understand through their own observations and cognitive consequences (logic). Sciences ascertain that biological differences are relatively small and irrelevant for social rights. Artists render the suffering of humiliated persons perceptible and show the worthlessness of forced recognition or the cost of human life spent for the glory of victorious collectives. Subjugated groups, classes and peoples fight for their independence and self-determination. This is, of course, no more a ‘smooth’ path than Hegel’s postulated process of the progress of reason. For a long time religions like Christianity have, for example, taught the salvation for every human being and at the same time legitimized master-serf relations in the family or between classes of the population. They also justified forceful conversions or death penalties for leaving the religious community. Philosophers have always considered their general concepts of reason, as shown above in the case of Hegel, to be compatible with the fundamental differences between races, cultures and genders. Natural scientists have proclaimed ‘socialdarwinistic’, biologistic or racist theories which were already empirically ill-founded and which led, above all, in 20th century Europe to collective extermination. Since the middle of the previous century there is hope that these inconsistencies and relapses in most of the normative theories and legal cultures are being increasingly overcome. Based on the globally and inter-culturally consensus on human rights, social justice and criteria for the treatment of nature (sustainability, biodiversity etc.), which are prevalent today, one can view the development as a process of increasing equality of legal and social claims; not as a necessary but an unstable process of learning which is based on painful common experience. This process of learning consists not only of progress but also of irretrievable losses of virtues and achievements. Some of these were connected with too high a price in human suffering and compulsion. Nowadays hardly anyone would praise great battles as admirable in an ethical or aesthetical sense any longer, but there is no reason to give up every iota of understanding for the heroism of the past. The new forms of heroism manifested in terrorism and the ‘new wars’11 have, at any rate, no longer any convincing foundation in the

11

Compare Münkler, Herfried: Die neuen Kriege. Reinbeck. 2004.

recognition of individuals and cultures

107

face of human experience and the philosophical and legal justification of norms. The modern feeling for justice which is based on the abovementioned experiences and is increasingly interculturally accepted demands fairness towards all partners in any form of cooperation and the adherence to the same rules by all members of a legal community. Above all the privilege of mistreating, humiliating or despising others is refuted in theory and opposed in practice throughout the world. The question of how successful these efforts are can be left open here. It is sufficient to point out the normative consensus about the recognition of human rights. However, the right to belong to a group and the right to feel ‘at home’ in its way of living also belong to these rights. It was shown in the first part, how the philosophers of German Idealism differentiated and systemized the concept of recognition. I would now like to attempt to formulate the levels of recognition independently of such a ‘demanding’ theory. Recognition between human beings is graduated. It is not possible to have a positive emotional attitude to everybody. Many people are not likeable, one rejects some people or competes with them or fights them. Occasionally one considers them to be dangerous and tries to limit their influence. But one can still see oneself reflected in them and can understand their motives, their aims and their desires. If dealing with them is to be ‘worthwhile’, they must be regarded as a serious opponent, as someone with whom one is fundamentally on the same level. The acknowledgement by somebody who one ‘trains’ as an animal is without value—Hegel has already shown this in his famous analysis of the ‘master-slave relationship’. To achieve one’s own recognition one is bound to respect the other person, one must not humiliate him or force him to fulfill one’s own desires. One owes this to him, too, as otherwise one does not do justice to his existence as a human being and to his individuality. For this reason torture or blackmailing someone to fulfill one’s own desires and capriciousness is the greatest evil. Human beings have learned, through such experiences—supported by the ideas of the philosophers of the Enlightenment and German Idealism—to put their relationship on the basis of equal rights. However, this also includes a common will to compel somebody, who does not keep to the rules of mutual respect, to comply with them—by means of an impartial arbiter who observes the rules strictly himself. In the ‘fundamental solidarity’ of a mutual acceptance on the part of

108

ludwig siep

human beings, we also include those members who are barely, or not at all, in any position to exercise independent achievements of either a mental or physical nature. On this level in the history of cultural development of mankind it is possible to differentiate between the following stages of recognition: (1) First of all recognition means respecting the integrity of the other, to see him/her as a person with fundamentally the same feelings and needs. This means not to harm him intentionally (physically or mentally) or even to ‘destroy’ him—not even indirectly by his membership in a group. Nowadays, the exclusion of mutual recognition of humans is concealed by many fanatics by identifying a person with a group of ‘evil beings’, whom one collectively believes one must fight and destroy. This begins with the public destruction of the symbols (e.g. flags) of such groups. (2) On the next level it means not sorting out, belittling or discriminating against others. Not even by not admitting them to participate in groups, or excluding them from the access to rights and goods. This again has different aspects: There are basic processes and activities which must be accessible to everyone for the fulfillment of their needs (including their claim for recognition) and the execution of their rights. These are mostly ‘public’ means and rights—ranging from means of transportation to the right to vote. There are, however, ‘private’ activities and groups the access to which may be legitimately restricted because their goods and values are only attainable in this way (family, clubs, friendship). Excluding people from these particular groups, however, assumes that they have access to other ones—complete isolation leads to destruction. (3) A further level of recognition consists of admitting someone to one’s own circle, even if he originally—because of his background, his socialization or his beliefs—does not belong to one’s own environment. And namely by safeguarding his/her foreignness and understanding that she is simultaneously different and in fundamental matters the same as me. Including someone in this way means tolerance. Tolerance can be understood as the acceptance and approval of people, individuals or groups in a territory or a social realm, in which the tolerant person believes himself to possess a primary claim. Tolerance can also have various levels ranging from mere sufferance to positive interest in the human potential which the other person opens up for oneself.12 12 For further details see Siep, Ludwig: Toleranz und Anerkennung bei Kant und im Deutschen Idealismus (see above note 7).

recognition of individuals and cultures

109

(4) On the level of positive tolerance, one must support and help the other person to fulfill his needs and develop his potentialities. This may be partly achieved in an indirect and anonymous way: through (state-imposed) taxes, through the support of emergency relief measures, educational institutions etc. But one also needs to involve oneself personally when one is, for instance, a witness to an emergency situation. This form of recognition is called ‘solidarity’. (5) If such support is combined with mutual esteem and affection, it can lead to friendship. Friendship is not only a matter of private relations. The conscious sharing of a common history and the support of public institutions can also be a form of friendship (civic friendship) as was already demanded by Aristotle for the cohesion of the polis.13 (6) The comprehensive form of recognition is not just the interest in the enriching different qualities of the other person, but the union of different horizons in a common work. For this, common judgments and persuasions are essential, both regarding to facts and reasons as well as regarding goods and the significance of common tasks. Tasks of this kind can be private, arise in the family, or belong to the professional and social group. It can also be a question of national and supranational tasks to realize goods or to improve the lot of particular people or even of all people in the world. The most extensive and most difficult task today, seems to be the maintaining and promoting of a social and natural ‘cosmos’: a social cosmos in which a variety of cultures and the intermingling of these mutually promote each other instead of colliding or overpowering each other. This means a wellordered society in which, so to speak, church spires and minarets do not tower into the sky and church-bells and calls to prayer do not try to outdo each other etc. It is almost as difficult to maintain a natural ‘cosmos’ in which manifold forms, landscapes, species and individuals exist and flourish, without the earth becoming a victim of monotony through urbanization, traffic systems and industrial agriculture (including the mass-production of cloned animals) etc.14 A variety of traditions regarding such a possible social and natural cosmos has to be engaged in an intercultural discourse which may lead to common activities. Monopolies, dominance and exclusions in this discourse have repercussions on the ability for recognition of cultures and individuals. But the recognition of the other person, the renouncement

13 14

See Aristotle’s Eth. Nic. 1161 a 10 ff. See Siep, Ludwig: Konkrete Ethik (see above note 1).

110

ludwig siep

of violence and dominance in this respect is conversely a prerequisite for living in an enriching, varied social and natural world. III I return to my original question: what is the situation with regard to the recognition of individuals and of groups, above all, when there is a conflict? Within some cultures, especially those with strong hierarchies and with traditional concepts of honor or shame, individuals are still being discriminated against or treated violently on account of their gender or age. In strict religious communities the right of the individual to hold her own opinions, to choose her own way of life, including the clothes she wears, the right to criticize religious authorities and the right to leave the religious community is still being opposed. In ‘heroic’ cultures fighting, conquest and also martyrdom are considered to be values which justify the mistreatment of others and the unscrupulous sacrificing of one’s own life. In authoritarian states the freedom of speech and the criticism of ‘national’ politics and its upholders is considered to be undermining, disloyal etc. Needless to say, these are not the only cases in which the requirements of the individual to the recognition of his/her rights and opportunities for development are suppressed. It is my thesis that levels of recognition 1 to 3, that is to say the respect of the integrity of the other person, non-discrimination and the tolerance of all people are owed to each other and that they cannot be outweighed by the claims of the group.15 In addition, all people have a right to a certain amount of solidarity. However, greater amounts of mutual support, friendship and the collaboration in common tasks are, so to speak, ‘commendable duties’ to which one is at least not legally forced. Neither is it possible to put groups under a strict obligation regarding these higher forms of recognition in relation to their members or to other people, although they are essential for the flourishing of a diverse society.

15

Concerning different types of rights of the group see Pogge, Thomas: Gruppenrechte von Minderheiten. In: Kaufmann, Matthias: Integration oder Toleranz? Handbuch über Minderheiten als philosophisches Problem, Freiburg/München 2001, 188–196.

recognition of individuals and cultures

111

Which rights of the individual may possibly, be restricted for the preservation and flourishing of ethnic, cultural and religious groups? It cannot be those rights which they require for the preservation of their physical and psychological integrity or their access to fundamental rights and opportunities for development and for support in the face of need and suffering. However, it can be justifiable to restrict the rights to participate in private as well as public institutions. Thus, the equality of votes at an election may be restricted in favor of minorities.16 In the case of homogeneous cultures in certain areas it is possible to justify political self-determination. Nevertheless, this has to be weighed up in the face of the rights of the minorities which are created in this way. Also, some of the active choices for the realization of one’s life-plans, such as the choice of a school and the clothing for public assignments could be restricted. To maintain multilingualism in a state or a province it may be a justified measure to prescribe the learning and speaking of a certain language.17 In general, I think one can argue that there is a core of rights or ‘claims for recognition’. This core cannot be outweighed through the demands of groups, to be recognized and supported by their own members, by other groups and by the state. Rather, the groups must adapt their own traditions and norms in order to recognize these individual claims. No tradition has the right to demand the use of force, discrimination or intolerance towards individuals any longer. How can we explain such orders of priority with regard to ‘demands for recognition’? We have already outlined two of the possible justifications. The first one from the ideas of Fichte and Hegel continues a rationalist tradition of philosophy which, in Europe at least since the era of the Greeks, has attempted to derive ethical and legal norms from reason—with a claim for logical necessity. This means that every

16

I cannot share Pogge’s rejection of such group-statistical rights. To me it does not seem to be contrary to basic rights that, for instance, certain minorities are excluded from restrictive clauses in elections (percentage clauses). See Pogge, Thomas: Gruppenrechte von Minderheiten. In: Kaufmann, Matthias: Integration oder Toleranz? Handbuch über Minderheiten als philosophisches Problem, Freiburg/München 2001, 191. 17 See Taylor, Charles: Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay. Princeton 1992. (see above note 1), 55 f. It can only be decided in a difficult process of weighing-up from what point such multilingualism is demanded constitutionally or replaceable by the traditional language of a country or a language to be introduced. In this context also peaceful struggles of groups for rights and influence are certainly necessary. See Honneth, Axel: Struggle for Recognition (see above note 2).

112

ludwig siep

alternative to this justification is, in itself, contradictory. The other justification, outlined in the second part is based on weaker, not finally justifiable hypotheses about the qualities of human beings and culturalhistorical experience, which is shared by many people and may be imparted to those who do not yet share them. Certainly, this mutual communication and understanding can already be difficult within a nation, let alone between different nations and cultures. But the alternative rationalistic justification, too, will not be easy to communicate to all social classes and religious groups. In order to put both justifications to the test, let us look at some of the present day points of issue between traditional and modern cultures. Most of them are a matter of conflict between the values of personal freedom and the values of subordination and sacrifice for the sake of the doctrine and respect of a group. Above all, two ‘group rights’ and the virtue of subordination to them are put forward as against the recognition of individual rights to freedom, namely: firstly, the sense of honor of a group, whether it is a family, a tribe or even a large religious and cultural group which may comprise many peoples, as for instance the Arab ‘nation’. Secondly, the fidelity to a religious community with its holy code of commandments and a religious elite which is responsible for interpreting them. Both concepts are used to justify drastic limitations in the individual rights to follow a self-determined way of life—the concept of honor as in, for example, the choice of a husband or wife or in the behavior in sexual matters or in matters of dress etc. The duty to absolute fidelity to the religious beliefs, it is argued, permits to deny certain individuals the right to leave the religious community. This value also serves to make ethical and legal standards dependent upon the doctrinal authority of a religious elite. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that such subordination does also bring advantages for the individual. Above all, to those individuals who, because of their natural disposition or fate, are unsure of the way in which to lead their lives, unstable in their self-esteem and selfrespect and sometimes even in need of psychological help. It is quite possible for them to esteem safety and security in a fixed group. A moral orientation which is free of doubt and the acceptance of instructions from undisputed authorities often stabilize and make life easier for just such people. Moreover, they can ascribe merits to themselves through the group whereas they would have difficulty in attaining such achievements by themselves. Therefore, it is, as a rule, a matter of con-

recognition of individuals and cultures

113

flict between the values of individual freedom and self-determination, on the one hand, and the security and psychological stability through recognition in a respected group on the other.18 What objections can be raised to this from a rationalistic theory? It seems to me at least to be debatable whether the formulation of generic concepts and logical conclusions excludes such values as honor and fidelity which are incompatible with modern individual rights of freedom. It is likewise debatable, whether a concept of reason and selfawareness which is independent of culture and time really includes individual self-determination in the choice for leading one’s own way of life. It also is a problem as to whether rational thinking is sufficient on its own in the consideration of the goods of freedom versus security. ‘Thinking by oneself’ seems to be rather a value than a form of the correctness of thinking. ‘Reason’ and subjectivity are, as Hegel already emphasized, concepts which contain historical experience with values and standards—even if, in a Hegelian perspective, at the end of this experience reason in philosophical understanding becomes independent from historical contingencies. I have already expressed doubt about this teleological thesis. It is a similar situation with regard to religious truths. Are the ‘superhuman’ inspirations of prophets, which can be found in the holy texts, logically impossible or do they contradict the formal rules of reason ? Is it a contradiction that scholars and sages, who meditate on these writings and know every commentary, are most suitable to derive the correct modes of behavior from them? If certain ideals of scientific knowledge should be valid for all spheres of life, then these questions must be answered in the affirmative. But as to whether they do, is to be doubted at a reasonable level. Furthermore, even within the sciences, as shown by the history of modern research, development has not simply been guided by rational necessities. The authority of scribes for secular matters is not just irrational, but in conflict with the values of autonomy, equality and democracy which are supported by historical experience. These values, however, do not simply follow

18 However, in many cases of simultaneous membership to different groups, cultures and ways of life already the identification of an individual with a particular cultural or religious group is a compulsion which undermines the individual rights to freedom, even the choice of one’s own “cultural identity”. This has especially been pointed out by A. Sen (Sen, Amartya: Identity and Violence. The Illusions of Destiny, New York/London 2006).

114

ludwig siep

from a timeless reason or are the only ones to be justified without contradiction. The alternative weaker justification, which I have outlined in the second part, falls back on basic empirical knowledge about the human being and conclusions of historical experience with values and norms. It concerns discoveries about what makes people suffer and what they experience as valuable human abilities. They can be supported by the knowledge of human nature including the power to think and the ability to reflect, to be self-aware and to act out of conviction. But these do not have to be necessary truths which have always been valid. In the European history we have had sorrowful experience with honor as a principle of social order. This has been brought to public awareness especially through literature in numerous tragic stories of harm and self-destruction through rigorous ideals. It is especially the case concerning the concept of honor with regard to sexuality and its monogamous disciplining. The subordination under heads of families has also been experienced in Europe, since the 18th century at least, as the source of random rule and unnecessary suffering and has been attacked again and again in literature. Even in many religions the liberation of the individual conscience from the ‘word fetishism’ in interpreting holy texts has been the result of a sorrowful history of experience and has been theoretically corroborated afterwards. The same is true for the position of power of religious elites Christian philosophers (like John Locke) have also helped to make it clear that God can only appreciate belief by personal conviction and after personal scrutiny. The freedom to do this presupposes the right to leave religious communities without one’s own existence being at risk. In order for this to come about it is necessary for the state to be independent from religion.19 I shall leave the question open, which justification is, in the final analysis, more powerful and which is more convincing for the ‘average’ person outside research and philosophy. In any case, with both conceptions it is possible to justify that preservation and support is important for the cultural diversity and also for the survival of groups and their traditions, but that fundamental individual rights cannot be 19

Concerning the different forms of the separation between state and religion see Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang: Der säkularisierte Staat. Sein Charakter, seine Rechtfertigung und seine Probleme im 21. Jahrhundert. Publikationsreihe der SiemensStiftung, 2007, 86.

recognition of individuals and cultures

115

dominated. A diversity of traditions and forms of life also certainly increases the freedom of choice of the individual. The stability and respect of groups permits the recognition of special forms of life and releases the individual to some degree from his/her own achievements. In spite of this, the demands of the individual for non-discrimination and equal rights can no longer take second place to traditional customs and hierarchies today. It is not possible to do without those levels of recognition which range from non-violence and non-discrimination to tolerance and to elemental forms of solidarity, not even in favor of the mutual respect of cultures. However friendship, active solidarity and co-operation in common tasks are not to be forced in the same legal way. Yet without them the mutual enrichment between different cultures will not succeed and even the maintenance of a flourishing variety of natural kinds and forms will hardly be possible. In the end, this will have repercussions on the non-violent, tolerant and respectful mutual treatment of individuals as well.*

* Original German publication: “Anerkennung zwischen Individuen und Kulturen”. In A. Gethmann-Siefert, E. Weissner-Lohmann (Hrsg.), Wege zur Wahrheit (Otto Pöggeler zum 80. Geburtstag). München (Fink) 2009, pp. 15–31.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION1 Ad Verbrugge Introduction The primary concern of this lecture is to obtain an insight into the development of our modern institutions of education and the driving forces behind this development. Let me start with a brief methodological remark: as a philosopher it’s my task, duty and ‘honor’ to think about education in a philosophical way. What does this mean? Philosophy can be characterized as ‘radical’ thinking. As such, it is always looking for the ultimate ground, or better, the ‘radix’ of thinking itself, meaning that in the end we have to turn into ourselves to find the answer to our questions. Although this profound ‘inwardness’ is fundamental for philosophy as such, I think it is also decisive for the topic of our conference: thinking about education and institutions of education, the object of our reflection is not something that exists independently outside of us—like flowers or animals do. Being educated ourselves and living and working within institutions of education, we think about these phenomena in an educated way. To put it in Hegelian terms: in thinking about education, the Spirit (Geist) is turning inward and towards itself and by making itself manifest to itself it becomes itself for itself ( für sich), which means that it becomes free. Because the spirit is real in the historical reality in which we live, when we think about our own lives and times we need to reflect both on what they are as well as on how they came to be this way. Accordingly, philosophy has a fundamental historical dimension. To put it in a Hegelian way again: Philosophie ist ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfasst—philosophy is the profound

1 The central thoughts of this contribution are based on my book Tijd van Onbehagen— filosofische essays over een cultuur op drift, SUN, Amsterdam 2004—a book on the inner crisis of our postmodern culture. In spring 2006 I was one of the founders of the Dutch association Beter Onderwijs Nederland (Better Education in the Netherlands) of which I still am the chairman. This association has been quiet successful in the national debate about the crisis in our education-system (see also www.beteronderwijsnederland.org).

118

ad verbrugge

understanding of its own time!2 So at least one thing is clear: to the extent that we are philosophers thinking and talking about education, we always need to think and talk about our own activity in relation to the historical world in which we live. If we do not do this and abstract ourselves from the temporality of our activity, we are not free in a Hegelian sense. How to begin? Instead of losing ourselves in theoretical and/or abstract reflections, let us face the ‘here and now’: the concrete situation that we find ourselves in. I am a Dutch philosopher presenting a paper in English to an academic audience of mainly Dutch, Flemish and German philosophers at an international conference about ‘Institutions of Education’ held at Tilburg University and organized by the Flemish-Dutch Centre for German Idealism. As Socrates has taught us, it is a good philosophical habit to question matters that common sense would consider beyond question. So let me first put forward a simple question: how many of us are native speakers of English? Why do we communicate and philosophize with each other about German philosophy in English? Why don’t we use German as our main language? Would it not be a huge advantage to be able to use the original expressions and vocabulary when discussing Kant, Fichte, Schelling or Hegel? From a philological and historical point of view there can be no doubt at all than that German would be better for this study. Besides that, it is clear that we are talking about a German ‘tradition’ in which the cultivation of philosophical language is not something external to this philosophy but belongs to its inner core. What exactly is the relationship between thinking and language or between tradition and language? Is that not an important philosophical topic itself? Heidegger’s statement ‘Die Sprache ist viel denkender und eröffender als wir.’3—language is more thinking and disclosing than we are—has become a famous remark on the relationship between language and thought. Both poets and philosophers dwell in language and are called to care for it. Heidegger is definitely not the only thinker to stress the importance of language in relation to philosophy. In the second preface of the second edition of his Logik Hegel mentions the difference 2

Hegel, Werke 7, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 26. 3 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 15 Seminare, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1986, p. 205.

culture of education

119

among languages with regard to their suitability for expressing certain logical relations and concepts.4 The German language has specific words, syntactical and ‘speculative’ qualities English or Chinese do not have. When in 1810 Van Gerdt—a former Dutch student of Hegel— offered Hegel a professorship at the University of Leiden, he assured Hegel that he could deliver his courses in Latin, which was normal in the Netherlands at that time. Hegel kindly answered that Latin would do in the beginning, but in the event that he would come to the Netherlands he would prefer to learn Dutch, because the native language is the best for the understanding and appropriation (Aneignung) of science!5 For Hegel the intimate expressiveness and accuracy that is necessary for profound philosophical thought is bound to daily life. However, I do not want to focus on this relationship between language and thought in this lecture as it would lead us away from our main topic. My remarks on the language of this conference serve a different goal. I think most of us would agree that we do not use English on philosophical or scientific grounds. What makes us speak and write English is not philosophy as such, but a certain economical, technical, scientific and cultural development called ‘globalization’. Within this process of globalization the university as an institution of education is undergoing a transformation, although it is not really clear in what way and in what sense this is happening. In my opinion the modernization of the university that started in the sixteenth century has reached its end and is entering the phase of post-modernization. What I mean by this I will try to make clear in this lecture. The intensified globalization of scientific research is only one manifestation of this profound transformation. Some people might be tempted to say that nothing new is happening. Science and philosophy were already ‘international’ in the Middle Ages. At that time Latin was the lingua franca of the Western world, nowadays it is English or rather Anglo-American. Why make such a fuss about that? Our modern world needs a lingua franca in which traders, bankers, pilots, craftsmen, scientists and philosophers can talk to each other. But that is not the point I would like to make here. I’m not discussing the necessity of some kind of shared language for communicating with

4

Hegel, Werke 5, Logik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1969, pp. 20–21. Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, Band 27, Briefe von und an Hegel, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1952, letter 152, p. 299. 5

120

ad verbrugge

people from other countries who speak different languages. Something different and more important is at stake: we are talking about a development in which the criteria used to measure the quality of science and philosophy at the university stipulate English as the main, yes sometimes even as the sole, language in which said quality of thought is measured. But that is not all: the criteria for measuring this quality are based on a model of productivity in which philosophy—and the whole of the so-called humanities—to a large extent has to present its achievements by means of peer-reviewed articles written in English. The strangest thing about it all is that we all know that no great philosopher from the past—from Plato to Heidegger—would have met these standards. Nevertheless we all have to go along with this ‘survival of the fittest’, in which you either publish or perish. During the latest audit of our faculty the committee explicitly mentioned the fact that unfortunately it could not take publications in Dutch into account because the criteria did not allow that. So if you want to survive, you had better adapt to this new situation. But there is a far more fundamental issue at stake than our personal well-being as philosophers: what has happened to our (Dutch) universities in the last decades and is still happening up to this day, is not just a problem of the university or of highbrow culture. The university is one of the highest institutions of education. In my opinion the recent transformation of our universities both indicates and is accelerating a process in which education as such (or at any rate as Bildung) is eroding. Because education is the essential form in which culture is shaped, this means the heart and soul of our culture is at stake. Culture needs teachers—in the broadest sense of the word. In the Netherlands the official title of a full professor is ‘hoogleraar’—supreme teacher—indicating that originally this position at the university was understood in terms of ‘leraarschap’, i.e., being a teacher, an educator. The full professor was the highest universal teacher of our culture. Nowadays one can only become a professor as an internationally acknowledged ‘researcher’—meaning that one is appointed at the university on the basis of a list of peer-reviewed publications, usually articles in international journals. The question whether or not someone really is a universal teacher—i.e., has the knowledge and capacity to teach in a universal way—has almost become irrelevant to an appointment as a professor. So at the university as the highest institution of education scientists make and shape careers and positions on the basis of international publications in the global network of researchers of

culture of education

121

which they are part. Additionally, the article format and productivity standards of modern scientific research mean that the specialization and fragmentation of knowledge is inevitable. In my opinion this tendency by which the postmodern university is gradually reshaped in the above-mentioned way—of course, in some countries and at some universities this tendency is stronger than in others—is part of a cultural transformation that conceals a deep intellectual and cultural crisis of the postmodern Western world. I will try to make clear in this article in what sense this is the case. Of course I am not the first one to make this observation and I am sure I will not be the last, but being original is not my goal. I would like to say in advance that I do not have the illusion that the postmodern university is the institution in which this crisis of our postmodern Western culture can be overcome. It was not the cause of this crisis and it will not offer the solution to it. Nevertheless, as philosophers we should try to understand the times we live in, being aware that ‘with grey in grey we won’t rejuvenate this form of life, but only know it as it is.’6 In line with Hegel I will try to explore this crisis concerning the institutions of education and the postmodern university from a historical and dialectical point of view. 1. The rise of rationalism, the university and the modern nation-state The movement of German Idealism can be seen as an ultimate attempt by German philosophers to reconcile faith and knowledge. By the end of the eighteenth century, especially in France, the discord between faith and knowledge that had started to manifest itself in the middle of the seventeenth century had become an open battle. Although the fierce religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century had died down, many European citizens—especially the bourgeois—longed for social and political reformation. The church and the aristocracy had determined the social and political structures of the institutional and moral aspects of society for ages. The rise of rationality during the seventeenth and eighteenth century pointed to a desire for a more ‘rational’ organization of the state. Referring to a tradition or a transcendent principle was no longer sufficient as a means of justifying certain political 6 See Hegel, Werke 7, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 28.

122

ad verbrugge

and social institutions. As a cultural movement, the Enlightenment was primarily focused on the well-being and freedom of man in his actual life on earth, not on man in the afterworld. And as soon as one defines the state as a human institution that has ‘the happiness of all’ as its ultimate goal (like Bentham did) or is an expression of ‘the general will of the people’ (like Rousseau did), one can no longer appeal to a transcendent principle that determines the social place of man within society. In the concept of the modern state rationality, ethics, organization of society and the goal of politics begin to approach one another. However, the modern state needs ‘a nation state people’ to justify its institutions as a product of self-determination and it needs nationalism to create this nation state people. Therefore the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century showed us that the ongoing emancipation of the citizen into a free citizen with political and social rights is directly related to a growth of nationalism as the new collective identity in which the liberated citizens were united. The institutions of ‘education’ in the broadest sense of the word—from the family to the university—began to take on a more national character. At the same time romantic motives decorated the new space of the nation-state as the rational identity that the Enlightenment proclaimed. Starting among the liberated bourgeois, the identity of the nation-state citizen began to take shape. The ‘spiritual’ space of life became more national and became ‘democratized’, thus creating ‘das Volk’—a ‘nation state people’. The link between protestant (bourgeois) citizenship and national identity that had manifested itself in the rise of Protestantism (which had even created national churches) became looser, but at the same time nationalism became stronger. In this period great national symbols and stories, public celebrations of historic events, the universal cultivation of the native language etc. became important for demarcating the new space of the political entity that had been created. The first steps were taken to ‘secularize’ the domain of the sacred and put an earthly entity in its place: the nation-state. Besides freedom and equality, brotherhood also had to be organized and cultivated in a national way. In the second half of the nineteenth century social rights were introduced to protect and shape the lives of the newly born nationstate citizens, making them feel a member of one big family to live and die for. Compulsory military service was introduced. This what one might call ‘national socialism’ was a political movement that reflected the political and cultural logic of its time.

culture of education

123

Of course, the intellectual and general education of all citizens always was one of the central goals of the Enlightenment. Not only was it the best way to liberate mankind from its superstitions, false beliefs and shortsightedness, but it also was a necessary precondition for mankind’s social and political emancipation in the modern state. Although ‘the’ Enlightenment as an intellectual movement had universal aspirations, its realization had many faces. There’s a Dutch, English, Scottish, French and German Enlightenment, each with its own character, reflecting pre-modern ways of life and religious outlook. Indeed, there are many roads to modernity. Accordingly modern school education, as it developed in the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in Western Europe, was influenced by a concept of education (Bildung) oriented towards the nation-state. To be a citizen of a nation-state implied having national skills (such as reading and writing the native language), national knowledge (such as that of national history and topography) and a nationwide moral outlook. The life-ideal of the bourgeois citizen gradually became an ideal of nation-state education as such, especially in northwestern Europe. Education did not have an instrumental meaning—as in fact it had never had—but ‘being educated in a national way’ was part of the cultural goal of the European nation-state itself and of its citizens. Nationalistic education belonged to modern life in the modern state. Each state gave shape to this in its own cultural way inspired by certain ideal forms of life and characters, like the German ‘Schulmeister’ or the English ‘gentleman’. As natural science, philosophy and the humanities started to transform the cosmological, moral and political outlook of the ‘irrational’ religious tradition during this process of modernization, the church gradually had to relinquish its leading spiritual position within the horizon of the modern state and was replaced by the autonomous university as the new ‘national church’ of rationality. A modern state had to be ruled by reason, not by faith. The emancipation of reason implied the independence and autonomy of the university. The enlightened and autonomous bourgeois is reflected in the university’s new role and form. However, shaped by romantic notions and premodern motives this rational institution had a national signature in its language, method, attitude and institutional organization.

124

ad verbrugge 2. The architecture of Hegel’s spirit: Protestantism, rationalism, language and the modern nation-state

When we take a look at the architecture of Hegel’s System of the Spirit we can see this new order taking shape. While Hobbes saw the holy order of the state as a Mortal God who served the well-being of man, Hegel, in line with the French Revolution and German moral philosophy, understood the modern state as the realization of freedom. Freedom as the outcome of the development of the subjective spirit realizes itself in the objective spirit that consists of ethical life that is governed in a rational form. This objective spirit presupposes an absolute spirit that consists of 1) art, 2) religion and 3) philosophy (including science). Within his system Hegel solved the tension between religion and philosophy, since the true and absolute knowledge of philosophy is the conceptualized inwardness of the same spirit that has manifested itself in Protestantism—not only in its presentation and cults, but also in its ethical realization in the modern protestant society and state. The modern nation-state and its civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) are the reality and truth of this religious belief and mentality (Gesinnung). At the same time Hegel’s modern state presupposes this protestant ethos as the sacred source of its life and immanent soul.7 In line with Aristotle, Hegel understands his own philosophy as the true theology, or even stronger, as a lonely service to God, as the self-conscious presence of its spirit. In philosophy, God as Spirit is becoming in and for itself. The priest has become an absolute self-conscious philosopher.8 Earlier on we mentioned the fact that most of the great philosophers of the past thought in their own language. What caused them to think in these languages? The rise and cultivation of almost all contemporary Western European languages as the new modern media for philosophical and scientific thinking indicated a growing national self-consciousness of the (bourgeois) citizens expressing and shaping their intellectual education in their own native language. Latin had been the Catholic language of the vertical aristocratic society, in which an elite, both in 7

See Hegel, Werke 10, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1970, pp. 355–365. 8 See Hegel, Werke 17, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1969, pp. 340–344.

culture of education

125

a spiritual and social-political sense, governed ‘the rest’. As soon as philosophical and scientific insights had become relevant for all citizens of the nation-state it became necessary for them to be formulated in the native language, not in the exclusive language of an aristocratic elite. The native language is the language of all citizens. The Enlightenment used this language as its medium, because it wanted to enlighten all citizens, not only an aristocratic elite. Long before this national and native transformation of philosophy and science took place at the European universities, the rise of Protestantism had prepared this transformation by translating the Bible into the native language of the common people. Let us not forget that a Protestant preacher in the seventeenth century already derived his status as an authority from his thorough theological education. In the sixteenth century the academic cultivation of the native language for religious purposes became a fact in northwestern Europe. The individualistic, rational and self-conscious tendency in Protestantism has a democratic and anti-hierarchical element that also determines the relationship to the religious source itself. The inwardness of reading the word of God, i.e. the truth, for oneself in one’s own language became an essential part of the true religious life and became in fact a new cultic activity. In time the modern university as the highest form of intellectual education became autonomous and did not serve any other power besides ‘reason alone’. It reflected the free rationality and self-consciousness of the enlightened (bourgeois) nation-state citizens. At the same time it served society by shaping the character and intellectual attitude of its influential citizens; judges, lawyers, doctors, politicians, lawmakers, writers, journalists, teachers, preachers, managers, bureaucrats etc. Why one should learn Latin, Greek or history did not need to be justified at the end of the nineteenth century, it was part of ‘being educated’ for the bourgeois-nation-state citizen. Studying classical culture was a goal in itself for it enriched the spiritual space of national culture. This relation to history had been activated by the Renaissance and once again by Protestantism as its religious counterpart. For Luther going back to the true sources of our faith meant going back to the scripture and becoming spiritually enriched by it. Culturally speaking learning Greek, Latin and Hebrew was not only a matter of theoretical interest, but a self-conscious spiritual necessity for translating and interpreting the word of God in a rational grounded way.

126

ad verbrugge

Since the Renaissance studying classical culture always served our own cultural life, in the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century it became of ‘national’ importance. Why did the Dutch professor Müller work for decades on his remarkable Greek and Latin dictionaries in Dutch and why did Little & Scott put their Greek-English lexicon together? Why did the historian Johan Huizinga publish his famous studies in Dutch? Because they all believed that they were working at the university serving a national and cultural interest, i.e. the education of the national elite, the bourgeois citizens. Publishing their research served the ‘education’, which in this case means the intellectual scope and capabilities, of this national elite; there was no difference in interest between one and the other. Theoria and praxis belonged together. In the nineteenth and twentieth century this elite was intellectually educated in the native language of the people it governed. Therefore this elite was shaped by a national academic tradition that both connected it with and divided it of the common people. A professor was in the first place ‘the supreme teacher’, because education and educating oneself was the main goal of the modern university. The German ideal of Bildung was a national and intellectual transformation of a protestant-bourgeois ethos that, to a certain degree, was present everywhere in Europe. 3. The end of nationalism and the cultural revolution of the sixties— the democratized mass university It is clear that this goal and meaning of the university has changed dramatically in our time. In the same way as the national transformation of science and philosophy was part of great cultural process that started in the sixteenth century, the transformation of the university and the ideal of education in the last decades is part of a cultural process. Globalization is the key word to mark the character of this process, which is not only an economic or technical process, but most of all has a moral and political meaning. To understand the deeper motives of this cultural process we have to take into account its historical and dialectical development. The rise of European nationalism in the nineteenth century had a strong expansive tendency, as became clear in the politics of colonialism by European nation-states. Some of these countries had been colonial powers since the seventeenth century like England and the

culture of education

127

Netherlands; others like Germany and Belgium only had become colonial powers in the late nineteenth century. This expansive nationalism in which the liberated citizen strongly identified himself with national power and material prosperity showed its self-destructive tendency in the First and Second World War. In this cultural suicide of Europe the ideals of the nation-state and the nationalistic citizen lost their legitimacy. The final breakdown of this marriage would take place during the cultural revolution of the sixties, in which a cultural raid was launched on the nationalistic bourgeois citizen who had been willing to commit all those atrocities on behalf of the nation-state. The life of the bourgeois citizen with his bourgeois manners, social behavior and institutions had to be re-formed. To put it bluntly: the system of the nation-state and the ethical life of the bourgeois perverted the life of the individual. Sexually frustrated and disciplined by the nationalistic ‘military-industrial complex’, his hidden anger turned him into a monster on the battlefield. So during this ‘second French Revolution’ the citizen was liberated from the nationalistic ethical life of the bourgeois and its institutions and was emancipated to individuality. This new-born individual had liberated himself from the former ‘primitive’ nationalistic orientation of his culture and was a cosmopolitan with a global moral and political outlook: the international peace-movement, the women’s movement, the anti-Vietnam war protests etc. Especially in Europe, this process of globalization that started after World War II was interpreted with the specific moral outlook of the individual cosmopolitan. Like two centuries earlier this revolution broke out among the bourgeois citizens, most of all among students who longed for a new form of freedom. Again both the church and the state were subjected to fierce attacks. But the emancipation of the individual implied more than that: a critique of all paternalistic and hierarchical structures. Presupposing the principle of individual and immediate self-determination, social relations were critically analyzed in terms of power and material welfare. Philosophically this great cultural revolution had been prepared by post-Hegelian philosophers—Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Marx etc.—in their critique of bourgeois citizenship. Philosophical motives of the past were often mixed with neo-Freudian psychoanalysis and sociological theories. New philosophical methods and ideologies expressed the spirit of those days and became in vogue for the time of one generation (thirty years). Unmasking hidden

128

ad verbrugge

power-relations (Foucault) and demanding horizontal communication and democratic reform (Habermas), the long march through the institutions began. One of the main institutions that this liberation movement wanted to reform was the university itself. As the former intellectual temple of the nationalistic bourgeois culture, the university and its paternalistic rationality had to be unmasked. Inspired by Marx, the activist reformation spirit of this new intellectual elite saw the university as an important institution of the ideological superstructure of the corrupted nationalistic bourgeois. Emancipating the individual implied a reformation of education. Therefore ‘critical theory’ also addressed the organization of the university and its rationality. Traditional structures, disciplines and faculties had to legitimate themselves according to new ‘rational’ criteria. The ideal of Bildung was not enough. In its bourgeois manifestation, it was part of the problem, because it installed the difference between high and low culture and therefore differences of class and social inequality. Teachers legitimated paternalistic and hierarchical relationships because of their superiority in ‘knowledge’. But the meaning of this knowledge itself had to be tested. From a social and materialistic point of view the inner meaning of traditional knowledge was understood in terms of corruption and power relations. Therefore at least three moralistic criteria became decisive for a new concept of knowledge at the university. 1) What ideal of social order underlies a certain body of knowledge? If it implicitly or explicitly is trying to legitimate inequality and nationalistic bourgeois ideals (or even worse fascism) it is bad. 2) What is the use of this body of knowledge for the natural development of the individual and its environment? Is it really serving his or her interest and the integral development of his or her personality or is it only a hidden structure to suppress him or her and legitimate unequal relations? If that is the case, it is bad. 3) What is the use of this body of knowledge with regard to transforming society into an order of socially equal and emancipated individuals who make decisions on the basis of democratic procedures? In the end this ideal of the democratic emancipation of individuals (who must have ‘equal’ social opportunities) would imply the end of universal education as Bildung in its spiritual sense. This happened in two ways: in line with Marxist thought the legitimacy of ‘education’ was determined in a ‘materialistic’ way—relating it to the external circumstances people live in. From such a perspective education determined the economical and social position of the individual in terms

culture of education

129

of welfare and power. This social and materialistic horizon implied both the external democratization of the university, in which it had to become accessible (both in a social and intellectual sense) for the masses and its internal democratization in which students and other members of the university got to have a say in the organization. These democratized ‘masses’ constitute the post-civil identity of the collective of individuals in which the qualitative difference of high and low culture—and therefore Bildung—has vanished. This qualitative difference vanished because the social and economical externalization of the meaning of education found its internal counterpart in the radical emancipation of the inner world of the individual: his feelings, emotions, opinions, motivations, will, sensations— in short his authentic self-experience. Starting among the avant-gardes and students at the university this ‘social subjectivism’ spread among the masses. The institutions, forms and manners of bourgeois citizenship eroded. The ideal of freedom reached its most subjective form; in the open cosmopolitan space of the newborn individual there were no fixed communities or moral boundaries. Everything became fluid for the life-experience of the individual. 4. Contradictions in the new scheme of things—a people and the problem of the nation-state It is important to note that this subjective emancipation of the democratic individual in Western Europe could only be realized because of a strong welfare state that had the institutional power to break up dominant social institutions such as the family and church by guaranteeing the rights of the individual and facilitating his freedom and welfare in a depersonalized, anonymous and bureaucratic way. However, the development of the welfare state in Europe that had begun in the nationalistic state—Nazi Germany was only an extreme example of ‘national socialism’—implied the denial of nationalism itself. The inner contradiction of this new scheme of things was of course that a strong socially interfering state was needed, while at the same time any form of nationalism had to be abolished in order to liberate the individual. But it is exactly the lived experience of such things as community and ‘brotherhood’ that essentially legitimate interventions in the social domain. Therefore this emancipation movement had to justify the social interventions of the nation-state in an absolute moralistic

130

ad verbrugge

way, situating this emancipation—as one of the prime objectives of the nation-state—in a boundless humanistic and cosmopolitan space. From now on the state was held to serve the goals of ‘humanity’, i.e., the brotherhood of man as constituted by individual cosmopolitans. Every new war had to be a war for humanity. At the same time every institution implies that a group of people is willing to unite themselves in this specific institution and share the customs, privileges and obligations of this institution. The particularity of an institution cannot be grounded on a principle in which this particularity has completely vanished. As an example let us take the principle of ‘distributive justice’, which is so characteristic of the modern welfare state. There is no rational ground for restricting this principle to a certain group of people—except for the concrete ideal of nation-state citizenship. It is the vague ideal of ‘brotherhood’ (and the feeling of a shared destiny) that actually legitimates the limitation of this principle to a certain set of people. When the ideal and sense of nationalistic brotherhood has gone, the institution of the state itself begins to erode in its core. At this very moment we are witnessing the erosion of certain states: in Belgium the institutional state is disintegrating because of a lack of solidarity between Wallonia and Flanders, i.e., a lack of Belgium nationalism. The fundamental problem of some sixties ideologies and some of the decade’s famous social and political philosophers (like for example Habermas and Rawls) is that they put forward a constitutional and political order, in which a certain unity and community is presupposed that cannot be defined in terms of individual freedom, democratic procedures, welfare and humanist solidarity. Habermas’s ‘Constitutional Patriotism’ does not explain why exactly these different people should unite and organize themselves in this constitution. Why should the people of Wallonia and Flanders be united in this one state? Are there any arguments for this union that can convince both parties? And what exactly are the arguments in Kosovo or Iraq? Already the willingness to communicate with each other and take into account the arguments and well-being of the other presupposes a certain sense of togetherness that cannot be shaped by this act of communication alone. And as we can witness these days in the fierce debate around Islam and the western world, defining one’s identity in ‘communication’ with others may equally result in polarization and alienation.

culture of education

131

The classical liberal theory of the nation-state has always presupposed a certain ‘common ground’ upon which and out of which the free individuals lived their lives. Most of the time this common ground was the culture of protestant citizenship in which both religion and nationalism shaped the lives of these individuals in their communities. It is clear nowadays that this common ground is eroding. Of course Hegel formulated a fundamental critique on the so called ‘atomism’ of liberalism, both in its ethical, economical and political manifestation. But we should not overlook that in fact Hegel himself was not able to solve the problem of the unity of the nation-state either. The way he works out the ground-structure of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) does not make clear what constitutes the unity of this whole. The monarch as the supreme self-conscious ‘I’ embodies and represents the universal unity of the state, but he does not create it. When we take a closer look at Hegel’s concept of the modern nationstate it demonstrates its ambiguous character. Like Aristotle’s concept of the polis it is both modern and traditional. Hegel accepts traditional social structures such as the status-class society (Ständesgesellschaft). On the basis of his concept of ‘recognition’ he even tries to show these social structures to be the logical realization of freedom. At the same time he uses the modern concepts of choice and self-determination as formal conditions for membership of a certain status-class.9 The spirit of Protestant citizenship determines his conceptual analyses of ethical life in a modern state. For Hegel the good life is realized in one’s nuclear family and profession, the two holy pillars of daily life in the Protestant world. The necessity of work in the ‘system of needs’ is the basic principle of education and determines the differentiation in status-classes. Therefore, the differentiation of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) has a strong economical orientation. A strong inner bond between the various classes is lacking. There is an economic interdependency of working people who recognize each other on the basis of their economic position and their patterns of consumption, but that is about it. Patriotism as a virtue means the ‘fundamental trust in the factual

9 See Hegel, Werke 7, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1970, §206–207, pp. 358–360.

132

ad verbrugge

relations one is living in’ and is not the admiration for the nation-state as such.10 Maybe for Hegel this lack of an inner bond in the organization of the state is not a big problem, because his ideal state is not democratic or liberal, but has in fact a strong aristocratic-bourgeois ground-structure. As Marx rightly observed (and of course criticized), for Hegel the laborer is not a member of a status-class (Stand) and therefore has no honor and recognition at all. He belongs to the mob—in which case one can hardly be called free. Hegel’s state is a status-class-community, like Aristotle’s Ideal Polis. In fact it is the state before the rise of the nation-state. In a way it is a theoretically modernized pre-modern state. It is not a historical coincidence that Hegel wrote his philosophy after the French Revolution and at the end of his life characterizes philosophy as ‘the Owl of Minerva that flies out at dusk’.11 Still, his philosophy of state is a mixture of old and new. He cannot accept the traditional structures of the status-class-state in which freedom and reason are not realized. But that does not mean he wants to get rid of these traditional cultural structures altogether. The French Revolution had proven the destructiveness of the abstract principle of freedom as it broke through the traditional structures of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Therefore Hegel tries to reconcile the principle of personal freedom with the structures of traditional German society on the basis of his rationality. In this way he develops a concept of the ethical life that turns out to be a sort of meritocracy in which reason governs society and the particular freedom of individuals is reconciled with the universal (economical) life. That is why philosophy is the ‘absolute spirit’ of the modern state as the realization of freedom. But Hegel fails to see that his rational and meritocratic articulation of ethical life is part of a cultural transformation in which traditional ‘status-classes’ (Stände) cannot be maintained. Hegel’s concept of civil society foreshadows the end of the status-class and the rise of the nationalistic state. Status-class and free choice exclude one another. In a way Hegel knew that his philosophy of state was ‘outdated’—philosophy could only articulate the truth of a form of life that had become old, it could not make clear the world that was coming. The world that was rising had shown its face in the French Revolution: it was the rise

10 See Hegel, Werke 7, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 413. 11 Ibid. 28.

culture of education

133

of the nation-state of citizens and the end of the status-class-state that Hegel tried to cling on to. It is of course precisely this experience of the erosion of traditional society by modernity that formed the starting point of Marx’s analyses of modern alienation of the laborer. Kant thought religion and language were decisive for the unity of a people, but that did not mean this unity had to be institutionalized in one state.12 Germany at the time was a clear example that this was not the case. The same account holds for Hegel. Both Hegel and Kant acknowledged there was such a thing as ‘a people’ (Volk) with certain characteristics, but the relation between a people and the state is not clear, nor what exactly makes a people a people. The strong identification of the state and a people is typical for the modern nation-state, as it would take shape in the nineteenth century—also in Germany. Kant and Hegel did not give account of the fact that their rational concept of the state needed the ‘irrational’ unity of nation-state citizenship. The state that became focused on ‘freedom’ and ‘good life’ was in need of a new ethical unity to bring and hold the liberated citizens together; this was the ideal of the nation-state in which the citizens were part of a historical people (Volk). In fact Hegel’s concept of the state as the realization of a universal will was in need of a demos in which everyone participated. Reinterpreting this central thought of Rousseau both Kant’s and Hegel’s use of this notion of universal will springs from the rise of the same ‘democracy’ they tried to hold down. In Greece during the fifth century BC and in Western Europe during the nineteenth century, the rise of democracy took place at the same time as the growth of nationalism with its expansive tendencies. The nation state and its citizen is a modern invention. Therefore, the post-modern problem of the national identity of the nation-state is as the same time the problem of democracy as its political expression. The European Union will never be a real democracy as long as there is no European demos and a shared public space. The European Union’s concept of democracy is based on the abstract principle of individual representation, but it cannot formulate what it is that brings these individuals together in this political identity. But what exactly happens to democracy when the political unity of the nation-state and other representative political institutions erodes?

12 See Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis & Zum Ewigen Frieden, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1992, p. 80.

134

ad verbrugge 5. Radical democracy and the problem of representation—the transformation of democracy into a plutocratic technocracy

Democracy in a modern sense presupposes representation. Representation implies a symbolic order and the mutual recognition of people sharing a common good—that means a good way of life. Democracy implies different people uniting themselves ‘in the same spirit’, or at least accepting the institutions they live in. The emancipation movement that started in the sixties had radical democratic aspirations, but in fact undermined the spiritual unity and shared forms that constitute a community or a demos. Although the sixties movement tried to create new forms of community, these attempts did not prove successful. The social externalization and subjective internalization of education made it hard to create new institutional forms that were mutually recognized by individuals. In the end education as such turned out to be a problem, because the meaning of shared forms, the common ideal of good life started to erode. Every formulation of an intrinsic ideal of good life was ‘subjective’—or even worse a hidden attempt to justify a power relationship. Communitarianism was a dialectical response to this crisis, but it cannot solve it because it has not tackled the more fundamental problem of subjectivism in our whole cultural setting. The contradictions in the new scheme of things manifested themselves in the way this subjective emancipation of the individual developed over the decades. In different ways the abstract ideology of the free individual created its own negation, following the dialectical dynamics of subjectivism. The abstract liberation of external powers was a naive fiction. The emancipated individual—mainly focusing on his or her free and autonomous self-experience of feelings, sensations and opinions—turned out to be an interesting ‘resource’ for the commercial entertainment industry. Subjective feelings and sensations as the new locus of authenticity become manipulated and produced by markets and ‘peer groups’. Liberation from the vertical power structures of the national ‘paternalistic’ society only opened up the way for other powers and symbolic idols and icons. Because the qualitative difference between high and low, good and bad had blurred, there was hardly a religious constraint left, nor a strong moral ideal of education holding them back.

culture of education

135

By externalizing the meaning of education to the social world and at the same time internalizing the meaning of education to autonomous self-experience, the sixties movement undermined the possibility of the mutual recognition of individuals. Recognition was reduced to the formal structure of liberalism in which the individual is not recognized in a specific concrete way, but in a universal abstract way. Thus radical democracy turned into a social structure in which individuals have to fight for themselves and their subjective ideals. Each individual has the universal right to participate in procedures in which his claims and projects compete with those of others. As Hegel has pointed out, such a battle for recognition is fought in terms of external ‘success’: it is measured by the external products of action (money, power, fame etc). A formal and external recognition of the individual does not constitute a sound community, i.e., a group of people that is focused on the manifestation and preservation of a certain way of life they hold together. Because of this loss of shared forms of mutual recognition new types of spiritual alienation appeared, both between individuals (within and outside institutions) and between ethnic groups. At this point the possibility of political, administrative and managerial representation is also eroding, as such representation implies the recognition of shared forms and intrinsic standards in which the common good—which is realized in the way people live together—is given shape by the government or the management of an organization. The sixties movement stressed the importance of democratic and legal procedures and the use of rational criteria rather than tradition. Because tradition itself was not a valid argument in the new democratic and ‘experimental’ society, the sixties movement turned towards ‘social science’ to force sudden decisions and thus introduced a new kind of social engineering. When governing and managing become difficult—precisely because of the unavoidable conflict of subjective opinions and personal (or subgroup) interests—‘objective rationality’ is needed to justify the way human affairs are organized. Most of the time this so-called ‘objective rationality’ had and often still has a hidden anthropological, cultural and ideological core in which the abstract free individual is presupposed. Education in a Hegelian sense is the formation of people in such a way that they become recognized members of a community that shares forms and standards of actions in and by which they mutually recognize each other. The cultural revolution of the sixties opened the

136

ad verbrugge

way for external control (the roots of which go back to the Enlightenment), exactly because it undermined the intrinsic value and objective power of traditional education by which people were recognized as a member of a community (family, school, work etc.). Therefore, social science and ‘social engineering’ have become increasingly important to postmodern society. A lack of trust between the members of society reflects the more fundamental problem of the erosion of shared forms in which mutual recognition takes shape. What is the postmodern scientific solution to this problem, especially in those countries in which the state is trying to organize the welfare of its people in a universal and rational way, i.e., in welfare states like the Netherlands? The disorganization of an ethical community, caused by the lack of internal concord, has to be corrected by external means. Emancipation of the individual and its adaptation to the group take place at the same time. Because social interaction becomes atomistic, people are forced to ‘communicate’ and form a ‘community’ in an external way—that means by pressure, control, regulations, power-relations etc. that are ‘scientifically’ justified—but without the sense of an intrinsic value of their actions or the people they relate to. Order is no longer the political self-determination of a group of people, but is becoming a ‘product’ that is produced in a rational and technocratic way. Technocracy is the de-politicized denial of recognition (as the realization of free selfdetermination). Social technocracy is not only characteristic of totalitarian regimes but of every organization in which external control over a group of people becomes the dominant form of management. In this way radical democracy becomes de-politicized by social science and transforms into a social technocracy. Of course this was not the intention of this movement, but this is how its rationality worked out in the long run. And what happened next? By analyzing social relations as hidden power-structures and educational ideals as false justifications of these relations, the sixties movement realized these subjective power relations instead. Because hardly an objective recognized authority remains, social order has to be understood in terms of individuals exploiting their manipulative power over each other. This power is not justified in terms of tradition and authority, but on so-called ‘objective’ and scientific grounds. Within this new scheme of things the ones who manage to control the group on the basis of ‘objective criteria’ are the ones who are in charge, the managers. Where did this managerial control lead us?

culture of education

137

It is important to keep in mind that the rationality of the sixties movement had a moralistic irrational core—the abstract ideal of the free individual. Therefore it is not a coincidence that the cultural revolution of the sixties would meet up with the economical reform that started in the eighties with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. In fact it became one movement. After the breakdown of communism at the end of the nineteen eighties leftwing thought and rightwing economics came together in a ‘third way’. The anarchic and global rise of the ‘new economy’ in the nineties had the cosmopolitan, experimental and individualistic temperament of the sixties generation. New public management was born, creating this ‘new society’ in which all individuals had to be enterprising to realize their potentials. The former state regulation of institutions and social structures were seen as an old form of paternalism. The new rational form in which all organizations had to be transformed used the competition between free individuals as its basic principle. In welfare states like the Netherlands the government started to implement principles, concepts and procedures of the free market in public services like health care and education, often creating quasimarkets. The competition between actors of any kind was presented as the most rational and democratic form of (public) management. The market or quasi-market became the new post-national space in which all human activities were reformed in terms of production, consumption and competition, including the university. In doing so, the market itself was interpreted as the new democratic space of self-determination. Buying products is voting for them. Therefore this competition is how post-national individuals really have to justify their claims and projects in relation to other individuals. Selling your product means making the other buy it. That may seam rational and democratic in a cosmopolitan sense—everyone can choose what he or she buys or not, but in fact it is the end of democracy as a way of taking care of the good life of society as a local political community. The neo-liberal revolution of the nineties was a rise of economic thinking that segregated parts of society in de-nationalized and delocalized self-referential (quasi) markets of producers and consumers in which politics no longer took care of what it means to live in a local community. The only thing left in relation to these self-referential (quasi) market systems of producers and consumers, is the external control of spending and earning money, the effectiveness and efficiency of the process. Under this system, production has to

138

ad verbrugge

be SMART (specified, measurable, accountable, realistic and in time). Technocratic control becomes economic control. For a de-politicized democracy, the last step in this process is the calculation and control of how much money a certain human activity costs society and how much money it produces for society. The calculation of monetary input and output becomes the basic instrument of managerial control in which every activity is evaluated. Therefore the end of this type of control is plutocratic, everything has to be accounted for in terms of money. It is precisely this tendency of externalization and plutocratic control that has changed the role and position of the university dramatically in the last decades. It is the irony of history that the sixties movement in its transformation of culture (and the university itself) prepared this fundamental change in which the university began to lose its spiritual meaning for the formation of our national culture. Critical theory, the democratization of institutions and the subjectivity of the self-experience finally implied the destruction of the difference between high and low culture. Democracy became dominated by popular culture and therefore developed a strong tendency to turn into ‘populism’ (as it did in Ancient Greece), reducing the significance of ‘being educated’ in a fundamental way. Being educated in an ethical or intellectual way is not something that deserves respect in itself or has a decisive political significance. Because of the breakdown of the ethical difference between high and low culture and the de-nationalized liberal outlook on the good life the university is no longer able to formulate the intrinsic value of its own activity. Professors are no longer the highest teachers of the society. The university may formulate an ethical ideal, but it remains dependent on the popularity of this ideal to be effective. Academic knowledge as such has lost the respect it used to be immanently due. In a welfare state like the Netherlands the universities become organized in a technocratic and plutocratic way. Its public legitimacy is now understood in an external way: the university has to serve the projects of individuals or society. It takes part in society as an ongoing process of global production, consumption and competition. Either the university has an instrumental function—it generates knowledge that somehow can be of ‘use’ and be sold—or it simply produces ‘something’ in a global world of self-referential competition: diplomas, articles, books, lectures, conferences etc. What ‘sense’ this production

culture of education

139

of knowledge makes, why we have to know it, why this knowledge should take this form, is sometimes hard to answer. The meaning of this knowledge for the community is unclear; the self-referential justification is segregated and globalized. This is why we are talking and writing English right now. Our use of English at a Dutch conference on German idealism is a sign that the cultivation of the spiritual space of our own local community is no longer a decisive goal of the university. As in the Middle Ages we use a universal language that has no connection to the country we live in and the people we live with. This time it is not Latin but English; but the difference between these practices is huge. Scholastic Latin was the language of Catholicism which shaped the spiritual horizon of Europe in the Middle Ages. The academic elite was part of an aristocratic and theocratic society in which the elite governed their people like sheep. The post-modern academic elite is not an elite in the strict sense. In most countries of Europe the theocratic and the nationalistic university are passing away. We are witnessing the rise of a market-university that is ruled by economy as a plutocratic technocracy in which the language of modern management has become a rootless and global koine—flat English or Anglo-American as a business language. This becomes the dominant atmosphere in which scholarly and scientific articles are produced and sold in the globalized network. In this network academic professors have become production workers who are directed by a bureaucratic knowledge management—whether they like it or not. As long as society ‘buys’ the self-referential delocalized production and consumption of our ‘articles’ we can go on this way. But there is a serious chance the masses will not buy this situation much longer and that anything that does not make any money for society will no longer be paid for. And maybe the masses have some justification for doing so as long as this globalized market-university cannot make sense of its own task within a local society. The university should face the fact that we are in a cultural and spiritual crisis that cannot be solved in an economic way. It is the other way around: the recent economic crisis is part of a more fundamental cultural crisis in which the globalized power of money has become self-referential and empty. The cultural revolution that started in the late sixties reached its dialectical counterpart at the beginning of the millennium. Now the crisis of our globalized and plutocratic economy is bringing on a decisive turn, but do we know where to go from here?

140

ad verbrugge 6. Final remarks on our future

In recent years a countermovement has begun to manifest itself all over Europe. For the voting public ‘standards and values’ were the most important topics of the Dutch elections in 2006. The project of the European Union has lost its shine. At the same time ‘nationalism’ is returning in public debates and politics. In my opinion an explanation for the rise of this countermovement should not restrict itself to the problems of a multicultural society or the threats of globalization as an economical process. I believe the discontent in modern society is related to the process of alienation within traditional institutions (family, work, school, church, government etc.) and in the public domain. This process of alienation is a problem of recognition. Without the recognition of inspiring forms of action—in which members of a community are intrinsically related to each other and give shape to their common good—the sense of community itself is eroding. Within society the need for a spiritual revitalization is growing. Where will it come from? The university? The growing spiritual irrelevance of the university within our culture is reflected in its internationalization and the transformation of its national forms and languages in a globalized academic production network. This denationalized, selfreferential segregation and institutionalization of academic research and education corresponds with the erosion of national culture and the loss of significance of academic rationality within the local culture. Its last cultural achievement—the revolution of the sixties movement—was the beginning of this transformation in which it will lose its spiritual power. Is this the final destiny of our postmodern university or is it willing to respond to the signs of the time? Is it able to take on a new local and cultural responsibility in the raging process of globalization?

INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL VOCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY. WHICH MODEL OF THE ‘REPUBLIC OF SCHOLARS’? (KANT, HUMBOLDT, FICHTE) Quentin Landenne Introduction In this contribution, I would like to try to bring some elements of an answer to the question regarding in which sense the internal organization of the University, as well as its relations with social authorities, constitute an important issue for the political philosophy of German Idealism, or in other words, how far has a real political significance and function to be attributed to the concept of “Republic of scholars” (Republik des Gelehrten)? A basis for our research can be found in the way Kant poses the terms of the philosophico-political problem of the University in the Conflict of the faculties. One of the key issues of this writing of 1798 is firstly to guarantee the independence of the lower faculty of philosophy vis-àvis the authority of State and Church, but also, within the University, vis-à-vis the higher faculties of Theology, Law and Medicine, which are distinct from the first as they immediately respond to the needs of those social authorities.1 But besides this negative freedom, the faculty of philosophy has to control the scientific value of the statutes of the higher faculties and to enter into a long conflict with them in order to inverse the subordination of truth to social utility as defined by the authorities, to gain in influence over the people and to contribute to the public use of reason.2 The Kantian concept of “Republic of scholars” is thus structured by a sequence of three moments: demand for academic freedom, exercise of institutional autonomy in the scientific organization of the University and growth of the influence of scholars over the public.

1 I. Kant, Der Streit der Facultäten, Akademie-Ausgabe VII, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter, 1968 (abbr. AK VII); pp. 19, 20. 2 I. Kant, Der Streit der Facultäten, AK VII, 30, 33, 32–36.

142

quentin landenne

The philosophical successors of Kant attempted to develop this concept of “Republic of scholars”, by concentrating further on the close link between politics and education. More precisely, it is an essential philosophical tension that arises for them between, on the one hand, the claim of institutional autonomy of the University and, on the other hand, the political vocation of the scholars and the temptation of the philosophers to take on the moral-political authority for educating citizens. The contrastive positions of Humboldt, more liberal, and of Fichte, more dirigiste, represent well the two poles of this tension. The objective of the present paper is to start from the confrontation between both models of organization of the University in order to question the relevance of the authoritarian reading of the Fichtean orientation by referring it to the speculative and epistemological issues of his applied philosophy. 1. The organization of the new University of Berlin: two models in conflict From the first decade of the 19th century, the post-Kantian generation of German Idealism finds the historical opportunity to put its reflection on the political dimension of the “Republic of scholars” into practice and to confront empirically to the tension inherent in the educative mediation of political philosophy. With the foundation of the new University of Berlin, from 1807 to 1810, some central philosophical personalities, like Fichte, Humboldt or Schleiermacher, are key figures on the most practical and concrete organizational questions. The context in which their interventions are situated is characterised by three kinds of issue. In the aftermath of the military routs of 1806, Prussia had lost the duchy of Magdeburg and with it the University of Halle; from the historico-political point of view, the idea of minister Beyme to found a University in Berlin corresponded with a necessity for regenerating the German people through education, as well as being a cultural riposte to the Napoleonian invader.3 Secondly, the debates around the organization of this new establishment of higher education implied a philosophico-systematic issue: for the idealists,

3 X. Leon, Fichte et son temps, Paris, Armand Colin, 1959, t.II, vol. 2; pp. 134–136. A. Renaut, L. Ferry, J.P. Pesron, « Présentation », in Philosophie de l’Université, Paris, Payot, 1979; p. 10.

institutional autonomy

143

the University had to institutionalize the systematic requirement of philosophy, to “realize the philosophical as such”, to establish the University as a system in place of the prevailing chaos; in this sense, the positions of these authors are grounded in their systematic orientations and in the way they conceive the relation between philosophy and life. Thirdly, the issue was clearly polemical into the academic world: with his Gelegentliche Gedanke über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn, Schleiermacher strongly replied to the Deducirter Plan that Fichte had written at Beyme’s request in 1807, which plan was already a kind of answer to the Lessons of Schelling on University, written in 1802; the role of arbitrator will fall to Humboldt, who leads his mission of organization of the new University until April 1810. Having listened to the Fichte and Schleiermacher proposals, he chooses the latter’s model, thus rejecting the Fichtean plan for Berlin.4 The reasons for this rejection originate in a real cleavage between the liberal model of Schleiermacher and Humboldt and the Fichtean model of University, discredited by the former as authoritarian. First of all, it is the principle itself of a ‘deduced plan’, transcendentally taken from ‘the depths of the spirit’, which is seen as illusory, shaky and useless.5 Rather than subordinating to the idea of speculative science the system of positive sciences, Humboldt promotes the ideal of science as infinite research (Forschung), and of the University as institutionalizing the constant endeavour of referring everything to this principle of unity.6 Then, far from being directed by a priori rules, the life of science requires “the resources of spiritual forces (power and diversity) and the freedom of action” of scholars.7 Thus the liberal conception must consider as limits to creativity the measures by which Fichte seems to reject “the diversity of conceptions and of systems” within the establishment of higher education, regarding as well the teachers (§18 of the plan), as the access to scientific publications (§62–65) and even the plurality of university bodies into the same ‘political area’ (§49).

4 X. Leon, Fichte et son temps, op. cit., pp. 135–160. A. Renaut, L. Ferry, J.P. Pesron, op. cit., pp. 10, 11. 5 W. Humboldt, Über die innere und äußere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin, in Werke in fünf Bände, Hg. von A. Flitner u. K. Giel, Darmstadt, 1960, Bd. IV, S.255–266; pp. 257, 258, 261. F. Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanke über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn, in Sämtliche Werke, Berlin, 1835ff., III Abtlg., Bd.1, S.535–644; pp. 535, 536. 6 W. Humboldt, op. cit., p. 257. 7 W. Humboldt, op. cit., p. 259.

144

quentin landenne

It is finally the strong paternalistic inspiration and the communitarian and closed model of family that Fichte appears to apply to life in the University, with all the hierarchy, the constraints and the measures of internal policing that it implies (§36, 37), which scares Schleiermacher and Humboldt who prefer to preserve the independence and freedom of the students, notwithstanding at the price of moral disorder.8 If historically the Humboldt liberal model has won the academic battle, not only in Berlin, but surely throughout Europe where its spirit prevails to this day, the cleavage that set it against the positions of Fichte has also had a lasting influence on the authoritarian reading of the latter. The French-speaking school of interpretation initiated by A. Philonenko and continued by A. Renaut and L. Ferry has sought to shed a light on the philosophical grounds of the authoritarianism of Fichte. The explanation would be found in the speculative turn of the Wissenschaftlehre operated after the period of Iena, as well as in the revision of its conception of history which is no more thought of as “the expression of free acts of humans, but as the deployment of an evolution which is fixed within a universal plan”.9 This philosophy of history would pave the way for a philosophico-political authoritarianism, as a result of the ‘explosive mixture’ due to the “addition, to a theory of the ‘Weltplan’ (necessary history), of an activism which has to lead this history (practical theory of history)”.10 P.Ph. Druet even goes so far as to see in the Fichtean State “a system of educative dictatorship, of the philosopher king”, a “hyper-structured State in which every domain of social life is governed by an institution”, by a “huge bureaucracy”.11 Thus, in his Deduced Plan for the University of Berlin, everything happens as if Fichte was reversing academic freedom into its opposite, turning the University into a little totalitarian State and substituting the current governmental authoritarianism with a philo-

8

F. Schleiermacher, op. cit., §5. A. Philonenko, « Fichte » in Histoire de la philosophie, Paris, Gallimard, 1973, t.II, vol. 2, pp. 900–946; p. 939. 10 A. Renaut et L. Ferry, « Présentation » in J.G. Fichte, Machiavel et autres écrits philosophiques et politiques de 1806–1807, loc. cit., p. 32. 11 P.-Ph. Druet, « Le problème du régime politique chez Fichte : Métaphysique et empirie », in K. Hammacher (Hg.), Der transzendentale Gedanke. Die gegenwärtige Darstellung der Philosophie Fichtes, Hamburg, Meiner, 1981, pp. 190–201; pp. 199, 200. 9

institutional autonomy

145

sophical dirigisme based on an “educative dictatorship” or an “aristocracy of knowledge”.12 The obvious interest of this school of interpretation is thus to make unavoidable the following question: starting from the systematic coherence assumed by Fichte, has the authoritarianism detected by these commentators in its political application after 1800 to be considered as a necessary consequence of the speculative system of the Wissenschaftslehre? 2. Fichte: the problem of applied philosophy and the educative mediation of politics I would like to defend the hypothesis that it is precisely the speculative determination of science that turns the empirical application of the Fichtean philosophy into a specific problem of his transcendentalism, a problem which echoes the speculative difference between knowledge and life (Wissen und Leben). The Wissenschaftslehre, with the differentiated unity of its theoretico-practical coherence, generates an essential problem of application, an Anwendungsproblem, which makes for all the originality and the force of its political philosophy. On the one hand, indeed, as Fichte repeats in the Staatslehre, “every science is the base for an action (thatbegründend); there is no empty science, without any connection to action”;13 but on the other hand, “the essence of transcendental philosophy prevents it becoming a way of thinking in life, but it has to consider the I as it is constituting its system of thinking in life. Transcendental philosophy does not create anything”.14 Thus, it is required of the mediating sciences of application, like politics, ascetics or initiation, in order to “fill the gap between theory and praxis [between science and life]”,—but only “insofar as this gap can be scientifically filled”.15 In other words, the hiatus between the transcendental point of view and the common point of view cannot be

12 C. Piche, «La Doctrine de l’Etat de 1813 et la question de l’éducation chez Fichte » in J.C. Goddard et M. Maesschalck (éd.), Fichte, La philosophie de la maturité, Paris, Vrin, 2003, pp. 159–176; p. 170. 13 J.G. Fichte, Die Staatslehre, in Sämmtliche Werke, Hg. von Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 8 Bände, Berlin, Veit & Comp., 1845, (abbr. SW), Bd. IV; p. 394. 14 J.G. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, Hamburg, Meiner, 1994, p. 243. 15 J.G. Fichte, SW XI, 122.

146

quentin landenne

transcendentally suppressed, but calls into play the work of freedom in life, as it is guided by philosophical reflection. This double character or this differentiated unity of applied philosophy by Fichte is clearly taken up in the Staatslehre which presents it from both aspects: as determined from the point of view of life, “the application of philosophy is a moral life”;16 and as determined from the point of view of science, it is a “wisdom, leading life and action”.17 In his Deduced Plan for the University of Berlin, the question of application of philosophy and of “the connection between knowledge and real life” is so central that it constitutes the finality and the raison d’être of the new Academy that Fichte wishes for: this would be, following its concept, a “school of the art of scientific use of understanding”, the art of using knowledge, in full “consciousness of the rules” of acquisition of knowledge, the art of applying it practically in life.18 The application of philosophy is thus presented under its two perspectives: as a penetration of “life within knowledge”, through the personality of the accomplished scholar who continually puts his science into practice, turning the goal of science into the very root of his existence; and, inversely, as penetration of science within life, as a “reflected art” of understanding, training the faculty to learn and to understand how to learn, thus making possible its application in diverse situations of existence.19 With this hiatus between knowledge and life, that makes its application dynamic, transcendental philosophy is essentially practical, but is not immediately prescriptive,20 since the transcendental point of view of science cannot constitute an immediate norm for the common points of view in life, and cannot take the place of the four other Weltansichten, i.e. materialism, legalism, creative ethics and religiosity. This fundamental differentiation between transcendental and common points of view is at the origin of three important characteristics of Fichte’s applied philosophy. First, the transcendental point of view cannot be exhausted in any inferior points of view, but enlightens their own resources and limits in the way freedom has to become real. But the scholar cannot become

16 17 18 19 20

J.G. Fichte, SW IV, 389. J.G. Fichte, SW IV, 390. J.G. Fichte, SW VIII, 100–102. J.G. Fichte, SW VIII 100–102; 110–112. ID, SW VI 354. J.G. Fichte, SW IV, 394.

institutional autonomy

147

a ruler or a government official without devaluating eo ispo his transcendental point of view to the lower views on the world. Even if a scholar takes over a political function, he cannot govern as a scholar, for the non-confusion between the roles of teaching and of governing, that Fichte repeats many a time,21 is based on the speculative structure of the Anwendungsproblem. Second, since transcendental philosophy is not immediately normative, its application consists precisely in reflection on the mediations conditioning the penetration of science in life. Fichte never dissociates the application of a plan from the conditions of its historical applicability, i.e. the conditions of its close comprehension by those to whom it is addressed.22 Third, since such a common understanding supposes a process of collective education and maturation, it is embedded in essential duration and progressiveness.23 Guided by the model (Vorbild) of the rational State projected by transcendental reflection, applied philosophy seeks in the current epoch for opportunities for a progressive and patient transformation of the real State in the direction of this ideal model, always making sure not to jump ahead of the development of this epoch.24 These three characteristics of Fichte’s applied philosophy are well to be found in the Deduced plan for the University of Berlin. If it is obvious that this plan claims to be realizable for his time, it is not to be applied in the same way as a political programme that only needs an authority to be carried out as it is, immediately and completely. The “real and imminent (alsbaldige) realization” that is targeted is first of all the one of the point of departure for the application of the plan, the “little beginning” from which progress would emerge, “step by step and in many stages”.25 The plan is not presented as a programme of rules, but as the scheme of the organic development of scientific life, as the “book of art” (Kunstbuch) of the advent of the transcendental concept of the school of the art of knowledge, showing how this concept, starting from a given situation, can transform the traditional University from inside and prepare the academic relations of the time for an understanding of this organic concept.26 21

J.G. Fichte, SW IV, 252. ID, SW VI 416. ID, SW XI 174, 175. ID, SW IV, 458. J.G. Fichte, SW XI 175–177. 23 M. Maesschalck, « Education et jugement pratique chez Fichte », in J.C. Goddard, (coord.) Fichte, le moi et la liberté, Paris, PUF, 2000; pp. 144, 145. 24 J.G. Fichte, SW IV, 446. 25 J.G. Fichte, SW VIII 107, 183. 26 J.G. Fichte, SW VIII 120, 187. 22

148

quentin landenne

In the light of this hypothesis of interpretation of Fichte’s applied philosophy, how to take into account the reading of the authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies of his political writings like the Deduced plan, which would attest to an “educative dictatorship”? Far from being a necessary consequence of his speculative system, authoritarianism is on the contrary the pathology that Fichte’s political philosophy attempts continually to reverse, as well as he reverses the belief in authority (Autoritätsglaube) on which it is based. The whole Staatslehre aims to overcome the mechanisms of external constraint and the state legalism by establishing an education system which makes possible for the subjects of rights to closely understand the finality of these rights and to take it on as a condition of their freedom. Is it therefore necessary that educators begin governing, and that philosophers take over political authority and power, even though provisionally?27 Fichte cannot be satisfied with such a shift of authority, but aims far more radically at the inversion of the logic of authority, which inversion can be effective only if the difference between scholar and the ignorant is not the principle of a given order (politisches Nachbild), but operates as a principle of the transformation of order (politisches Vorbild).28 The pedagogical finality of law and politics does not mean that the educative system has to be dictatorial, even provisionally, because it would be purely contradictory, the educative relation being determined as the appeal for free spontaneity.29 It is on the contrary the state legal system to become educative by encouraging citizens to form a common understanding as the condition to become rational and to dissolve the belief in authority. But as long as the social distinction between the scholar and the ignorant remains, the difference between the roles of educating and of governing has also to be respected.30 Therefore, the Fichtean University is not a “little totalitarian State”, led by philosophers who impose the scientific organization of society that the people will approve when it will understand it. This University operates first as an “isolated republic”, which, following the example of

27

C. Piche, op. cit., pp. 160, 161, 170, 172. On this opposition between Nachbild and Vorbild, as it could be applied to the political domain, see for example J.G. Fichte, SW VII, 284. 29 J.G. Fichte, SW III 39. 30 J.G. Fichte, SW XI 175. ID, SW IV, 456. 28

institutional autonomy

149

the Closed commercial State,31 liberates itself from external constraints and interests coming from social divisions, in order to reinforce itself intensively from the inside, and to achieve above all in the area of knowledge “the organic union of humanity”. This is the necessary condition for the society of scholars to be able to act outside and to influence the public, upstream, by enlightening the art of governing,32 and downstream, by “fuelling the organization of the education of the nation” which progressively prepares the renewal of social relations, transformed into relations as an apprenticeship for freedom.33 Conclusion The interpretation proposed here of the epistemological issues of applied philosophy tends towards a strong nuancing against the authoritarian vision of the Fichtean model of the « Republic of scholars », to which the liberal model of Humboldt and Schleiermacher would be opposed. Besides an effective difference in degree in exercise of institutional discipline and constraint, this opposition of models refers more fundamentally to the speculative determination of science by Fichte and to his concept of “academic freedom” which is not reduced, as it is by Humboldt, to the sphere of negative freedom granted by the State to students and researchers, but which permits nothing more than what the vocation of scholar demands to him.34 This more demanding and positive conception of academic freedom allows Fichte to work out more profoundly the tension inherent in the educative mediation of political philosophy, which was our starting point since it was expressed in the last two moments of the sequence structuring the concept of the “Republic of scholars” by Kant: the institutional autonomy of the University and the political vocation of scholar, his influence on the public. But this tension remains very much alive by Fichte and never completely dissolves into an “educative dictatorship”, since the authority of the philosopher is effective only as far as full comprehension responds to it, immediately suppressing at the same time this authority as an external one!

31 32 33 34

M. Maesschalck, « Education et jugement pratique chez Fichte », op. cit., p. 149. J.G. Fichte, SW VIII 191. J.G. Fichte, SW VIII 202, 203. J.G. Fichte, SW VI 57–59, 65.

150

quentin landenne

If Fichte is inversing the subordination between the higher faculties and the faculty of philosophy,35 it is not a way of conferring on the latter an immediate prescriptive function, but in order to give impetus to another political dynamic reversing the spirit of authority. With Kant already, the philosopher has not the vocation to take power as such, but the lower faculty has to constitute an efficient counterbalancing power faced with the collusion between the authority in power of a de facto order and the higher faculties which are based on the fact of the texts of these authorities; that is the counterbalancing power of questioning the rational legality of this fact.36 It is precisely this issue—the political issue of transcendental philosophy—that Fichte has radicalized by his dynamic of inversing the logic of authority, by which the scholar has to endeavour to progressively overtake this theoretical-practical collusion between the de facto authority and the authority of fact, in favor of the virtuous circle between the authority of intelligence and the intelligence of authority, for both are conditioned by each other in a dynamic of social learning.

35 36

J.G. Fichte, SW VIII 133. I. Kant, Der Streit der Facultäten, AK VII, 32–36.

IS IT STILL POSSIBLE TO RECOVER FICHTE’S REFLEXIONS ABOUT EDUCATION? NOTES ON FICHTE’S APHORISMS ON EDUCATION (1804)1 Emiliano Acosta In Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Philosophy, education plays a significant role. The issue of education is present in the whole development of his philosophical range of ideas from the Attempt at a Critique of all Revelation (1792) until his so-called Theory of the State (1813). To play a significant role in Fichte’s philosophy means not only to have a place within the systematic explanation of the nature of reason, but also a function in the unceasing task of the realization of reason in the world. Fichte’s philosophy—the doctrine of science (german: Wissenschaftslehre)—conceives the education of Man as an instrument for the accomplishment of Man’s destination and therefore for the improvement of political institutions. Despite its significance as an instrument of justice and freedom we cannot ignore that, on the one hand, Fichte’s systematic concept of education implies the apotheosis of the rational nation state, and that, on the other hand, this conception of education has adopted in our days the appearance of a totalitarian discourse. The systematic concept of education, which Fichte’s philosophy offers, seeks, in fact, to transform individuals into ‘citizens’, to bring unity into the chaotic multiplicity of moral and political opinions.2 This unity is an ideal, which the doctrine of science conceives as the destination of Man.3

1

Aphorismen über Erziehung. In Fichtes Werke. (FW) Berlin, 1971. Vol. VIII, 353–360. I want to express my gratitude to Prof. P. Cobben and Maarten Hanssens (University of Ghent) for their help in the linguistic revision. 2 A very clear exposition of Fichte’s systematic conception of education can be found in the Addresses to the German Nation (Reden an die Deutsche Nation, in particular FW VII, 280 ff.) and in his Theory of State of the year 1813 (Staatslehre—1813, in particular FW IV, 437 ff.). 3 See Fichte’s The vocation of the Scholar (Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten—1794, in particular the first three lessons FW VI, 293–323), see also Acosta, E. “L’annihilation de l’État à partir des concepts d’homme, de société et d’État dans les Leçons sur la destination du savant”, in: Fichte et la politique. Monza, 2008. 401 ff.

152

emiliano acosta

According to this, any particular moral value is per se an obstacle for the realization of Man’s and Culture’s ideal. This conception of education and its corresponding State cannot tolerate the coexistence of other conceptions about this subject because it sees itself as a result of a rational deduction based on the immediate intuition of the absolute freedom of reason. The nature of this freedom and of the ‘Truth’ that goes together with it, has become incompatible with our pluralistic present, not only because this system and this way of thinking and demonstrating have no power of persuasion anymore, but, moreover, because such a theory in its political application has become politically incorrect. For it is a matter of fact that Fichte’s systematic explanation of education takes the form of a totalitarian speech in the proximity of our present. Fichte’s ideas on education are in contemporary social and pedagogic studies merely used to demonstrate the connection of German Idealism with totalitarian regimes, in particular Nazism.4 Thus, the significance of Fichte’s concept of education within his philosophical system doesn’t justify to bring it directly to contemporary debate about education. An immediate access to Fichte’s concept of education, that means an approach without making any essential distinction between our philosophical present and Fichte’s philosophical time, is certainly possible, but through such an attempt we only obtain a historio-graphical subject, not a philosophical one. As we can see, in this point we come across the well-known question about the actualization of our philosophical past. Therefore, our question is not what the individual Fichte wrote in his time, but rather whether an actualization of Fichte’s concept of education is still possible. Regarding this situation, it is our aim neither to condemn Fichte’s educational theory nor to criticize our present from an anachronical point of view, but to present another approach to the matter of education, namely a non-systematical one, as attempted by Fichte in his unpublished Aphorisms on education (from now on Aphorisms). As a guide for our attempt, we want to recall here in Tilburg a dictum of a Dutch philosopher, Spinoza: “non flere, non indignari sed intelligere”.

4 See Burger, H. „Sprachenrecht und Sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichische Unterrichtswesen 1867–1918“, in: Studien zur Geschichte der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, Bd. 26, Wien, 1995. 25 ff.; Brumlik, M. Deutscher Geist und Judenhass. München, 2000; Peterson Th. “Notes on Heidegger’s Authoritarian Pedagogy”. In: Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 37°, N. 4, August, 2005, 599–623.

fichte’s reflexions about education

153

But, what do we want to understand? Neither a person, nor a personal opinion, nor an objective verifiable fact of the history, nor even a philosophical system. We rather want to comprehend ourselves as historical thinkers in tension with our tradition and this in a conscious work of actualization of this tradition. What we want to comprehend is something that in this tension can give us to think. Therefore, we do not analyze Fichte’s conception of education with regard to the scripts where this subject is conceived in its role within the State, for this conception does not produce any tension in today’s educational theories, nor in us. Hence, this conception does not find any place in our philosophical present, although this is the traditional approach to Fichte’s reflexion about education.5 Our reference to the Aphorisms does not have to be understood as an individual, arbitrary choice. We have chosen this script, because we want to know whether it is still possible to recover any consideration made by Fichte about education in order to bring it out as a lively thought in our present, where the fundamental motives of Fichte’s educational theory, i.e., the Nation State, the One Culture, its corresponding Society and the belief in an eternal Truth as well as in an absolute Freedom, do not exist anymore. The life of this thought must appear not only in the fact that this thought can be saved from the accusation of totalitarian speech, but also in the fact that this thought can question us. In other words: that this thought can criticize us by showing our limits. This is certainly not what today’s philosophical researchers mean by ‘actualization’. We follow Boeder’s conception of ‘actualization’ as ‘gegenwärtig’. For Boeder, to actualize a bygone philosophical position means to make from this position a counterpart in our present and against our present.6 If we look for a real counterpart, we will not find it in Fichte’s traditional ‘philosophical’ corpus. Who can accept and defend with arguments in our days the definition of education as a Bildungsfabrik (cf. FW VII, 589), the aim of which is “das Reich”7? In our present we

5 See Soller, A. „Nationale Erziehung und sittliche Bestimmung“, in: F-S, 2. 1990. 89–110; Hammacher, K. Transzendentale Theorie und Praxis. Zugänge zu Fichte. Amsterdam—Atlanta, 1996. 236 ff; Gawlina, M. “Transcendental Philosophy and Its Specific Demands of ‘Paideia’: The Models of Descartes, Kant, and Fichte”, in: Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 7: Modern Philosophy Bowling Green, 2000, 45—56. 6 See Boeder, H. Die Installationen der Submoderne. Würzburg, 2006. 415 ff. 7 Nietzsche, F. W. Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Berlin, 1969. VI, 3, 101.

154

emiliano acosta

can see on the contrary the dead of the ‘Reich’: the Nation State, for which the education through and to freedom was one of its principal tasks. It is an abstract way of thinking to wonder how to re-establish this State. Such a question ignores the differences between our present and its history. In contrast to this procedure, we want this distinction to remain here in order to find in itself some aspect of Fichte’s consideration on education that can still be experienced in contemporary thought. This distinction demands from us that we conceptualize education without linking it neither to any ontology nor to a theory of State. And it is precisely that what the Aphorisms can offer us. For in this script, Fichte, on the one hand, presents the family as the place where the real spiritual development of the child happens and, on the other hand, as a social organization, which in contrast to the concept of ‘family’ in other scripts8 may not be reduced to a moment of the development of individuals into citizens. The Aphorisms are a description of the principal points in primary education. Fichte wrote them with the intention of executing this programme at home for his child and some children of friends. We do not possess the original manuscript written by Fichte. The edition of Fichte’s work by I.H. Fichte, Fichte’s son, offers a text based on two manuscripts elaborated by Fichte’s wife (the organization of the course was assigned to her). We can now find them in the critical edition of Fichte’s work by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities.9 In the beginning, there was the idea, to offer this educational programme only to the friends of his family, but they did not accept it. The plan could only be applied to Fichte’s son, Immanuel Hermann. He was 7 years old at the time, when Fichte wrote the Aphorisms. A description about the application of this programme on the formation of their son can be found in the correspondence of Fichte’s Wife.10 A discourse on education is always a discourse on freedom. To educate a Man—according to Fichte at the beginning of the Aphorisms—means to cooperate in his self-development to freedom. (cf. FW VIII, 353) 8

Cf. FW III, 364 f. and IV, 592. See Fichte, J.G. Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. (GA) Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964 ff. II, 7, 12–22. 10 Cf. GA III, 5, 319. Brief an Charlotte von Schiller, 19.8.1805. 9

fichte’s reflexions about education

155

How can we conceive freedom in this case, so that it does not become a possible instrument for oppression? It certainly must be a freedom exclusively reduced to the sphere of the individual’s life, a freedom constituted by the individual’s—and the citizen’s—emancipation from dogmatism. The Aphorisms present such a conception of freedom. In order to promote this critical disposition of the child, education must be directed to the whole Man, so it must not be specialization. This has to do with a certain aim, a particularity that Fichte tries to avoid, because he does not want to offer here a functional concept of education. An education for any profession is a form of slavery. (cf. FW VIII, 353) We can only transfer this consideration to our present if we comprehend that in our present the opposite of this slavery cannot be Fichte’s absolute freedom anymore. Today, this form of freedom sounds like submission to a universal reason, which is not what we understand by the concept of freedom. In contrast to contemporary conception of freedom an absolute freedom, the product of which is the ‘One Culture’ does not allow any possibility of intercultural dialogue. But if we pay attention to what Fichte proposes in his Aphorisms, we will see that Fichte does not talk about an absolute freedom, but about Man’s liberation from the dogmatism of the public opinion and/or common sense. Therefore, education has to contribute to the formation of a critical attitude towards our world, to everyday life. Hence, the opposite of slavery can be thought of as a freedom from everyday ways of thinking, habits and trends. Therefore, to be free can consist of not to be ‘in’, in other words: if you want to be free, you must not be ‘cool’. Education must contribute to the emancipation of the individual from the dictatorship of the trends which the market imposes every day. Fichte wished an analogous freedom for his son. Let us try to conceive this freedom today and to conceive the education that leads to this freedom through an analysis of the Aphorisms. The first subject mentioned in Fichte’s Aphorisms is the one of the classical Languages: Latin and Greek. Fichte says: there is nothing more convenient for us ‘moderns’ (german: Neueren) than learning these languages. (cf. FW VIII, 354) Why? How does the study of Latin and Greek contribute to reaching the freedom we are looking for? Fichte seems to understand the learning of the ancient languages as the learning of a culture. That is exactly what the classical ancient world meant by HELLENIZEIN: to make somebody Greek, that means: member of a culture, of a way of living, the opposite of which

156

emiliano acosta

was BARBARIZEIN.11 To become Greek means to reach a certain distance from the immediate social, historical and cultural determination of the individual. Therefore, Fichte does not justify the convenience of learning the dead languages through a demonstration of the necessity of this knowledge for everyday life, nor does he try to give an answer to the question about what must be learned first: the modern or the dead languages. The point is rather that the study of the classical languages can collaborate to the creation of a certain distance to everyday life, by which one can observe oneself and one’s world in a different way. Therefore, the study of Latin and Greek can operate as liberation from prejudices in order to obtain a diversity of perspectives. (cf. FW VIII, 354) In this contribution, we are not going to explain which languages have to be learned first according to Fichte. This discussion, which rather concerns the history of learning processes, can be found, for example, in the very beginning of the reflexion about how to learn foreign languages in Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria. More important for us is Fichte’s idea of the possibility of the individual to differentiate itself from its immediate cultural, historical and social environment through the study of the dead languages. This differentiation has an intellectual character, for it has to be understood as a distancing from the quotidian way of understanding the reality. The study of the classical languages can help the individual to realize that the world, which the ordinary language offers us, is not the totality of reality. The immediate world is a ‘haze-world’ (german: Nebelwelt), which can only be comprehended in its nature through opposition to the other world, the underworld of ordinary languages. A person who does not know anything about the existence of this underworld, cannot be aware of the reality of what he or she thinks; it is actually only the shadow of the reality. (cf. FW VIII, 355) In fact, the study of the classical languages can open a hidden world for us in our language. Behind a word, behind its use and significance in everyday life, a completely other way to experience the world, the nature and also the divinity can be hidden. Through the study of etymology we can appreciate how other men in other times have thought and dwelled in the world. A community of speech and thinking certainly dwells in the languages. The learning of the dead languages enables to experience the contrast

11

See Boeder, op. cit. 284.

fichte’s reflexions about education

157

between the present and its history. The everyday reality shows itself as a ‘Nebelwelt’, the Truth of this world hides itself in the words; the words have a history. The distance from the everyday point of view, which can be reached by learning the classical languages, is of primordial importance. For once, this distance is established, the educational process has a defined direction. In effect, according to Fichte the process of education must be based on the recognition of the differences between the immediate reality and a reality, which offers itself only through studium. Modern languages, geography, history, the historical present should be learned in contrast with their past. (cf. FW VIII, 355 f.) This conception of the order in learning reflects a traditional motive in Fichte’s philosophy: the present world, the immediate world can be conceived only in contrast with its ideal, for the ideal is what gives significance to the real world.12 Yet, we should not forget that for Fichte, the experience of the real and the ideal world is an individual one. In this case, one should not follow Kant’s example: the man who interprets the world, without leaving Königsberg. The intuition of the present must be “a lively intuition”. (FW VIII, 356) Hence, the child must have an own experience of the world to know what he or she is talking about. This experience cannot be a passive one. Hence, the child has to learn the productive nature of his reason; in other words: the fact that we vivify knowledge through the work of our spirit. The productive nature of the spirit can be learned, according to Fichte, through the study of Euclides’s Mathematics: the construction in the absolute space. (Cf. ibid.) But Fichte does not want that the study of this construction method brings forth the child to transcendental philosophy. The reason for this is that this philosophy needs a certain freedom in thinking: imagination and/or genius. This kind of freedom can fade if the child is engaged in this philosophy. (Cf. VIII, 357) The importance of imagination brings us to the domain of aesthetics as education of sensibility, and therefore to the education of the body through sports and arts. We say it again: education must be education of the whole man: mind and body. Through the introduction of the body in this educational programme, also the domain of human praxis is included, as well as the region of Morals and Religion. This is the

12

Cf. FW II, 704 WL 1810.

158

emiliano acosta

most important subject for our exposition in order to show a possibility of giving Fichte’s Philosophy a place in our present. Fichte does not offer the child a new Decalog, but a “positive moral education”. (FW VIII, 358) For Fichte, there is no possible theoretical access to morality. Through mere teaching, reduced to explanation and morals judgments, the child can only learn hypocrisy. (cf. ibid.) The moral teacher has to teach through examples, there is no other way. The child can only learn what morality is through observation of a way of living in actu, for moral is an effective real dwelling in the world. But morality does not necessarily have to be understood as a purpose in itself. The child has to receive a religious education too. In contrast to other works, in the Aphorisms Fichte does not mention the necessity of a subordination of all religions to the rational one.13 He goes from morality to religion and not the other way round. What can be a surprise for us is the fact that according to Fichte it is not so important which religion in particular is taught to the child; this is of secondary importance. More crucial for the formation of a child is to have the religion of the community, where the child lives, no matter which one it is. (cf. FW VIII, 359) In contrast to the implicit claim on universal validity in Fichte’s fundamental scripts on education, the Aphorisms presents a particular consideration on education which wants also to be understood as particular. It is not an education for the man as citizen, but as a member of a particular culture. In effect, this educational program is not based on absolute knowledge, but on what we call today situated knowledge. Fichte does not pretend in his Aphorisms to make his consideration for everyone valid. And this is the point which could enable us to bring this discourse to our present, but only as a good piece of advice, i.e. as something that can be accepted or rejected. We have already seen how we can comprehend Fichte’s reflexions in the Aphorisms. Now we have to reflect about its content and wonder: what can we still comprehend as a lively thought today? In the Aphorisms, Fichte presents the conditions of possibility for a particular kind of self-liberation. It is not an absolute emancipation

13 Cf. FW V, 469 f. (Die Anweisungen zum seligen Leben) and VII, 298 f. (Reden an die Deutsche Nation).

fichte’s reflexions about education

159

of the individual from everything, which merely exists as determined by the laws of nature. This is the kind of freedom after which the Self (germ. das Ich) unceasingly strives. On the contrary, the freedom which is offered to Man in the Aphorisms limits itself to an autonomous and critical attitude to everyday reality. This critical attitude is promoted through an education which puts itself against the dictatorship of everyday life. According to this, the education offers the child the possibility to know a different world, which helps him or her to discover the limitations of the everyday world to promote critical thinking and acting. The creation of new points of view and the openness to the historical moments of our world in speech by learning the classical languages, the capacity of productive creativity through mathematics, the capacity of creative passivity through the aesthetics, these are faculties which are communicated directly with the aim of a critical attitude. But, what kind of function can a pre-critical religion have as a subject for critical education? Is it not paradoxical that the child has to learn the particular and dogmatic religion of his community to reach a certain distance to his everyday life? In contrast to the other contents of the Aphorisms, religion has not to be taught in order to develop the critical attitude, but rather in order to be criticized by the individual. So, religion serves education as the dogmatic ground where the critical turn in Man’s mind can happen. Therefore, education must provide the necessary materials so that the individual can bring itself to that moment in which one demands oneself: radically ‘sapere aude’. In the history of Western Philosophy this demand emerges from a truly crisis of all beliefs and all existential certitudes through the critique of the moral values and the relationship of the individual with its cultural community. This demand has not only been the beginning of so-called transcendental philosophy, but also of every serious form of philosophy. For philosophy is not something which can be taught; it rather has to be born freely in the individual as a necessity (german: Bedürfnis).14 Therefore, education must not directly try to form a critical thinking, but to prepare everything in the child, so that the Man can one day reach this particular freedom in thinking and acting.

14

Cf. FW I, 89 (Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre).

160

emiliano acosta

Surely, this particular vision of education cannot be accepted today by everyone. We have to comprehend and accept the pluralism of opinions. But contemporary pluralism, which does not allow the entrance of Fichte’s traditional systematic discourse on public education, cannot forbid the entrance in today’s educational debate of this other consideration on education, which we have found in Fichte’s Aphorisms. We think that Fichte’s reflexions on education in his Aphorisms can contribute to a review of the relation between public education and education in the familiar framework as well as to the discussion about the place of religion and tradition in education. This consideration does not strive for universal validity and, therefore, its contribution to the debate on education today is not to be understood as a correction of today’s educational theories, but as a modest and situated knowledge, which wants to be comprehended as paradoxical, insofar as it places itself beside and against (PARA) the public opinion (DOXA) in our days. Unlike traditional attempts of actualization in philosophy we only want to build a tension between our present and our past through the exposition of some possibilities, which institutional education today cannot give us anymore. The aim of our analysis of the Aphorisms was thus not to demonstrate the necessity of change in the way of understanding education, but only to show the not impossibility of an emancipation from everyday manners of thinking and acting by critical self-differentiation.

EDUCATION, IDENTITY, INTEGRITY. HEGEL’S SOCIO-CULTURAL MODEL OF INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HIS CONCEPTION OF MODERN CIVIL SOCIETY Erzsébet Rózsa Introduction Hegel’s age was one of great changes in Europe. Modern structures were also winning recognition in Germany in the domains of the economic system, social life and in the political structures, organizations and institutions. Hegel had followed and tried to understand this change since his youth. His efforts reached their peak in his main work published during the Berlin period, the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. In this work, Hegel presents the social, economic and political focal points of this time of change in Germany systematically in respect of changes in Europe, above all with regard to the French and English models.1 The “specifically German way” also proved itself as philosophers, scientists and politicians at the end of the 18th century and in the first decades of the 19th reflected on these radical changes, which signified

1 On the context of the Philosophy of Right in respect of the different political models, see: Hegel’s Rechtsphilosopie im Zusammenhang der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte Eds. H.-Chr. Lucas and O. Pöggeler, Stuttgart 1986. On the English model from the most recent literature, see: Politik und Geschichte. On the intentions of G.W.F. Hegels Reformbill-Schrift. Eds. Ch. Jamme and E. Weisser-Lohmann. In: Hegel-Studien Beiheft 35, 1995. On the importance of the british model see especially the contributions by N. Waszek, esp. id., The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel‘s Account of Civil Society. Dordrecht/Boston/London 1988. On the historical development of the concept of education in Hegel, see: O. Pöggeler, Hegels Bildungskonzeption im geschichtlichen Zusammenhang. In: Hegel-Studien 15 (1980), pp. 241–269. On the importance of Schiller’s conception for young Hegel’s idea of education, see: A. Gethmann-Siefert, Die Funktion der Kunst in der Geschichte. Untersuchungen zu Hegels Ästhetik. Bonn 1984, pp. 29–34. On the history of reception of Hegel’s concept of education in H.G. Hotho, see: A. Gehtmann-Siefert, Kunst als Bildungserlebnis und Kunsthistorie in systematischer Absicht. In: Kunsterfahrung und Kulturpolitik im Berlin Hegels. Eds. O. Pöggeler and A. Gethmann-Siefert. Berlin 1983, pp. 247–257.

162

erzsébet rózsa

the transition to modern societies, with the discussion on education.2 This discussion also contributed to the development of modern education in respect of modern political and social institutions.3 Reformation traditions, Melanchton’s philosophical orientation and also the humanist tradition and the Enlightenment entered into this history of ideas oriented discussion. The significance of the humanist tradition for the concept of education is brought out by Gadamer, who finds an explanation for the continuous presence of the concept of education in this tradition. It involves a process that is also fundamental for the establishment of the humanities.4 But it is equally important to point out the principles of a new system of upbringing and education that aims at advancing the development of a ‘higher society’, which, despite all different points at issue in Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schleiermacher, can be registered as a mutual trait.5 It is precisely through this reality- and practice-oriented motive that the classical discussion on education acquired an effectiveness that can be made fruitful for current issues. Alongside W. Humboldt, it was Hegel who integrated not only his theoretical-philosophical deliberations, but above all his practical experiences and insights from the Nuremberg Period into the discussion, thus giving it a broader basis. These years have special significance in Hegel’s life, not only for his concept of education, but also for the systematic shaping of his late philosophy. Alongside the talks to school audiences it is above all the Philosophical Propaedeutic that represents a notable stage in Hegel’s life. Ultimately, the propaedeutic intention of teaching philosophy prompted him to round off his philosophical system contextually: “Against those steps especially the systematic

2 On the discussion on Hegel’s concept of education: Hegels Theorie der Bildung, Ed. J.E. Pleines. Vol. 1: Materialien zu ihrer Interpretation, Vol. II: Kommentare. Hildesheim 1986; U. Krautkramer, Staat und Erziehung. Begründung Öffentlicher Erziehung bei Humboldt, Kant, Fichte, Hegel und Schleiermacher. Augsburg 1979. On Hegel’s concept of the citizen’s education through art see, from the most recent literature: A. Gethmann-Siefert, Schöne Kunst und Prosa des Lebens. Hegels Rehabilitierung des asthetischen Genusses. In: Kunst und Geschichte im Zeitalter Hegels. Eds. Ch. Jamme with F. Völkel. Hamburg 1996. pp. 121, 124–128, 143–149. 3 On the problem of the connection between the modern educational system and the modern State in Germany, see: U. Krautkramer, Der Entwicklungsstand der Bildungsinstitutionen im Deutschland des 18. Jahrhunderts. (note 2), pp. 15–28. 4 H-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen 1960. pp. 7–16. 5 A summary of the approach of these thinkers, see the Volume by Krautkramer (note 2).

education, identity, integrity

163

groundwork of the encyclopedia does not forthrightly seem to be a comprehensive whole in which traces of its genesis are imprinted”.6 Thus, there is a close link between the late education system and the mature system. For this reason, Th. Litt was able to come to the admittedly exaggerated conclusion that Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit does not so much contain a theory of education as a part, but on the contrary is a theory of education in its entirety.7 Hegel’s final systematic work, his Philosophy of Right of 1820, also contains “a theory of education as a part”, i.e. a systematic elaboration of his concept of education. In the system of civil society, special status is awarded to education. But Hegel discusses education above all from a practical perspective. He believed that: civil society offers leeway for the new forms of life, in which “human beings now reached their places in the free floating of this society essentially through the educational system.”8 In the following, an attempt will be made to recapitulate how Hegel developed a theory of educated civil society, in which a possibility for justifying basic attitudes and practices emerged, whose specific qualification consisted in the inclusion of the economic dimension in the discussion on education, which above all in Germany had remained marginal to philosophical interest.9 This essay shall prove that Hegel’s theory of education did indeed pursue a systematic claim that is not resolvable in the system of the Philosophy of Spirit, although this theory is not to be interpreted independently of the scientifically justified and shaped encyclopaedic system. However, the systematic claim can be explained above all by the attempt to show the appropriate place of education in the context of the new social, economic and political structures and the respective forms of life and behavior patterns of individuals as subjects of the modern world. Education is, on the one hand, a structural element in the ‘objective order’ of modern society, but on the other hand it represents an identity-promoting factor for

6 The Nuremberg period had a special status in Hegel’s concept of education. See thereto F. Nicolin, Pädagogik-Propadeutik-Enzyklopadie. In: Hegel. Einführung in seine Philosophie. Ed. O. Pöggeler. Freiburg/München 1977, p. 92, further O. Pöggeler (note 1), pp. 252–254, 258–259. 7 F. Nicolin (note 6), p. 104. 8 Cf. O. Pöggeler (note 1), p. 241. 9 On the importance of the economical dimension for Hegel’s philosophy: G. Lukacs, Der junge Hegel. Berlin 1954; M. Riedel, Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie, Frankfurt a. M. 1969, pp. 75–99; B. Priddat, Hegel als Ökonom. Berlin 1990, esp. pp. 9–21.

164

erzsébet rózsa

atomizing individuals of modern society. The function of education as a cultural, or rather, cultivated form of cognition, activities and the institutional establishments consists directly in moving individuals forward to their own identity as subjects of modern society, and more specifically, to integration in society. With this, education gains a comprehensive practical function that also draws on the higher forms of absolute spirit, art, religion and philosophy. Above and beyond its scientific achievement, philosophy thus acquires the task of contributing to the integrity of individuals and to their integration in society under the prevailing circumstances of a ‘modern world’ burdened with diremptions. O. Pöggeler’s appraisal also seems apt in this respect: “So it is adequate not only to inquire into the details of Hegel’s theory of education, but also into the conception it is based on.”10 The decisive motive of Hegel’s conception of education in his Philosophy of Right consists exactly in the emphasis on the value of the stance of individuals and the practice-stabilizing function: ‘sensible insight’ and ‘stance on reality’ as cornerstones of Hegel’s recommended tenor can be acquired through forms of education. 1. The practical significance and function of education in modern society in the foreground of the scientific system If one does not view Hegel’s system in the framework of the usual objections, for instance, saying it is closed or totalitarian, but on the contrary, as a constitutive factor belonging to his kind of philosophizing, one can make it fruitful for this issue.11 Hegel organized his theory of education in a threepartite structure within the system: the first dimension shows the relation of the Philosophy of Right to the encyclopaedic system.12 The second, central level identifies the system of the

10

O. Pöggeler (note 1), pp. 241–242. On the system issues in the Philosophy of Right from the most recent literature: G.W.F. Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Ed. L. Siep. Berlin 1997. It is only regrettable that the importance of Hegel’s concept of education was not dealt with in the contribution emphasizing the political function of civil society by R.P. Horstmann. Cp. pp. 193–216.—On the same issue see the author’s Versöhnung und System. Zu Grundmotiven von Hegels praktischer Philosophie. Munich 2005. 12 G.W.F. Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by A.W. Wood, transl. by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press 1991 (cited as PR) [original: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. In: H. Glockner (Ed), Sämtliche Werke. Anniversary edition in 20 volumes. 3. ed. 11

education, identity, integrity

165

Philosophy of Right, especially civil society with its economic and social structures and their influence on education as a cultural sphere. The third level is concerned with characteristic phenomena of the ‘newer era’, such as the multiplication, fragmentation and refinement of needs and means, respectively the theoretical and practical education and modes of behavior, which Hegel also discussed in the framework of his theory of education.13 Over and beyond the systematic presentation of the issue of education, Hegel’s insights into some extremely up-todate issues should be kept in mind, such as the right of human beings to ‘be different’ and the singularity owed to his identity with others in thought, or, as the case may be, the ‘traffic’ between peoples and cultures. Hegel thematized these reality-near, practice-oriented insights with regard to his concept of education. In the systematic context of the education issue, it should first be made clear that despite many intersections, upbringing and education should not be confused.14 The first ‘external’ level of the systematic structure of Hegel’s work already points out that upbringing is primarily a family matter, but that education is the task of civil society. This classification of education is justified both from the parents’ aspect and the children’s; consider the ‘right of children’ to be nourished and brought up out of the concerted family assets, or the ‘right of parents’ concerning the arbitrary will of the children, with the aim of constraining and educating them. Thus, despite all the hierarchizing elements, education is interpreted as reciprocative communication and accordingly as a shaping process and a kind of inter-subjective communication in the framework of a community that is promoting claims of individuality and at the same time constrictive, with which the children have an internal and intimate relationship. “As far as their relationship with the family is concerned, their upbringing has the positive determination that, in them, the ethical is given the form of immediate feeling [Empfindung] which is still without opposition, so that their early emotional life may be lived in this [context], as

Stuttgart 1952]; G.W.F. Hegel: Die Philosophie des Geistes. In: id., Sämtliche Werke. Anniversary edition in 20 volumes. 4. ed. Stuttgart 1958. (Sigla: PhdG) 13 On the issue of behavioral patterns in Hegel see by the author: Hegels Auffassung der Versöhnung und die Metaphorik der “Vorrede” der Rechtsphilosophie.—Risse am System? In: Hegel-Studien 32 (1997), esp. pp. 151–160. 14 On the difference between the concepts of upbringing and education see E. Lewalter, Hegels Bildungsgedanke und die gegenwärtige Bildungslehre. In: Hegels Theorie der Bildung. (note 2) Vol. II, pp. 51–66.

166

erzsébet rózsa

the basis of ethical life, in love, trust, and obedience.”15 According to Hegel’s conception, morality should appear substantial for the child as its very own subjectivity. This demand leads to the dual educational principle of independence and obedience, through which the child breaks out of the family to make himself a ‘concrete person’ and citizen of modern society, historically a new ‘creature’. Behind the educational principle of independence, the historical turning point to the modern age can be discerned, which Hegel expounded in its complexity and with its historical, social and economic-philosophical consequences. Decisive in the modern age is how “unlimited free subjectivity” develops as basic principle of modern society, how it awards itself reality, namely through the transference of forms of cognition and practice.16 In this relation, the classification of education in civil society entails it being understood as an own form of individuals’ learning that at the same time represents its generalization through practical activities and social integration. In this connection, the task of education as a cultural form of cognition and behavior of civil society consists precisely in levering ‘concrete persons’, as isolated subjects of modern civil society who have lost the ‘firm ground’ of the old morality, to both a new, own identity and social integration, to a new kind of morality. For this reason it is understandable that for Hegel education already extends ab ovo beyond the boundaries of theoretical cognition: It is above all practical behavior, a ‘stance towards reality’ integrated in and refashioned by practices. This is why, on every level of civil society, education is shown not only as a kind of cognition, but also as a real-social component of modern societies. The general-abstract definition of education as ‘subject’ and ‘substance’ of ‘freedom of the mind’ is transferred to the socio-philosophical meaning of education. Thus, the theoretical and practical behavior of individuals formed through education becomes appropriate practices. In and through the appropriate practices, individuals can achieve an appropriate, balanced relation with the institutions of the modern economic system and the social structure. This construction allows Hegel to reveal an

15

PR, § 175. On the theme of the “subjective” or non-conceptual forms of cognition of the subject see L. Siep: “Gesinnung” und “Verfassung”. Bemerkungen zu einem nicht nur Hegelschen Problem. In: ibid., Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen ldealismus. Frankfurt a. M. 1992, pp. 270–284. 16

education, identity, integrity

167

education-stamped lifestyle for modern individuals, with which he has contributed to a conception of innovative lebenswelt that is still stimulative today. How did he expound on this ‘nesting’ of education in civil society? How did he incorporate cognitions into life practice as ‘theoretical’ elements? The spheres of modern society as ‘world’ seem initially to the individual to be something discovered, separated from him, not his own, but at the same time a challenge with which the individual ‘can make himself great’. The ‘yearning to be great’—an anthropological constant in Hegel—can be fulfilled through education. ‘To become great’, that is ‘the task of education’, as Griesheim notes. It is just this resulting process that confirms that education represents the socio-cultural form with which the gap between the objective ‘world’ and ‘yearning’ as subjective motivation of the individual can be overcome. Education represents the form through which the individual, as subject of the modern age, can engrain himself in the world he initially finds superficial and strange and educe it as his own lebenswelt. In other words: the individual can not only recognize the world, but in this process it can unfold his cognition, his practical skills, generally realize his purposes and motivations and position the world as his own, thereby creating himself. It is just this interrelation of an individual’s theoretical and practical behavior that in Hegel does not set aside education as abstract philosophical thinking about the subject-substance structure of the freedom of mind, but rather, it develops into the interpretation of the concrete, socio-philosophical, phenomenologically interpreted lebenswelt and behavioral patterns of the free, i.e. isolated and atomized individuals in modern society. (Formal) education is also classified in the encyclopaedic system. In his Philosophy of Spirit Hegel defines how that which is system-substantial is realized as the highest content through and in its appropriate forms. Now, the basic form is represented by education on the level of the objective mind. He comments that: both education and upbringing are, however, ‘debarred’ from the subjective mind.17 Further, education is related to the guises of the absolute mind. Education as culture in the broader sense shall have an internal relation to religion, art and

17

PhdG, § 387, note p. 47.

168

erzsébet rózsa

the sciences as elite culture.18 Hegel makes the following remark on the relation between philosophy, religion and education: “But the religion is the truth for all human beings, faith is based on an evidence of spirit which figures as siring spirit in the human being [. . .]. This evidence, which is substantial in itself, [. . .] first takes the shape as that form of education which is otherwise the education of its worldly consciousness and understanding.”19 The affinity between education and religion lies in the form, that both are in the medium of imagination and universal for each—one (education) in a worldly way, the other (religion) transcendentally. As far as the relation between philosophy and education is concerned, philosophy is to be seen as the “Sunday of life” as opposed to education as its everyday. The relation of ‘Sunday’ and ‘everyday’ as lebenswelt arrangements has changed modern civil society, whereby the meaning of education as worldly cognition and skills has been raised radically for life overall. The traditional form of the theoretical attitude to Sunday that is manifested most clearly in philosophy and religion, forfeits significance in the modern lebenswelt. At the same time, as a worldly cultural form pervading all practices, education earns an excellent status in the spheres of modern society. In this connection it also proves that Hegel has linked the systemtheoretical deliberations with the diagnosis of the modern lebenswelt. Hegel also attributed a culture-historical significance to education that is characteristic of the European mind, in that Europeans have made thought, cognition and the “insatiable thirst for knowledge” their principle: “The principle of European spirit is therefore self-conscious reason, which has the self-confidence that against it nothing can be an insurmountable barrier, and which hence touches on everything to thereby become present to itself. The European spirit posits the world against itself, frees itself from it, but sublates this contraposition, takes its other, the manifold, back to itself, in its own simplicity. Here reigns

18 The identification of education and religion as regards the content makes Hegel’s point of view unclear: “Denn es gibt eine tiefere Existenz der Idee, die das Sinnliche nicht mehr ausdrücken vermag, und dies ist der Inhalt unserer Religion, Bildung.” (highlighted by me—E.R.) in: A. Geihmann-Siefen (Ed.), G.W.F. Hegel; Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst. Berlin 1823. Transcribed by H.G. Hotho. Hamburg 1998, p. 5. 19 PhdG, § 573, note p. 459: “Aber die Religion ist die Wahrheit für alle Menschen, der Glaube beruht auf dem Zeugnis des Geistes, der als zeugend der Geist im Menschen ist [. . .] Dies Zeugnis, an sich substantielle, fasst sich [. . .] zunächst als diejenige Bildung, welche die sonstige seines weltlichen Bewusstseins und Verstandes ist”.

education, identity, integrity

169

hence this infinite thirst for knowledge [. . .]. The European is interested in the world; he wants to know it, and appropriate the other that he confronts.”20 This ”insatiable thirst for knowledge“ as the “Faustian nature” of Europeans appears not only in the individual sciences and the postulation of scholarship that is also shared by philosophy, but also in education that is in principle not merely a worldly, but also an empirical-universal form of cognition, which should be made available to everybody.21 But Hegel views the strongly theoretical stance of modern Europe with aloofness: His early, primarily practical basic motives also spur him on in the Berlin Period and pervade the overall concept of the mature system including his concept of education. For this reason, scholarship of philosophy is not the ultimate purpose, but is meant to contribute to the cultivation of the lebenswelt of individuals in modern society.22 In this sense, in Hegel one can talk about education as a socio-cultural model. 2. From the ‘concrete person’ as methodological starting point of civil society to the formation of the citizen as socio-cultural model of individuality The ‘circle’ of upbringing and education draws not only on individual subjects as such, as Hegel ascertains in the chapter on the subjective mind in the Encyclopedia. It is these individuals as persons who represent the fictive-methodological starting point of civil society. The concrete person emerging from the dissolution of the family is to be 20 Ibid. § 393, also pp. 77–78: Das Prinzip des europäischen Geistes ist daher die selbstbewusste Vernunft, die zu sich das Vertrauen hat, dass nichts gegen sie eine unüberwindliche Schranke sein kann, und die daher alles antastet, um sich selber darin gegenwärtig zu werden. Der europäische Geist setzt die Welt gegenüber, macht sich vor ihr frei, hebt aber diesen Gegensatz auf, nimmt sein Anderes, das Mannigfaltige, in sich, in seine Einfachheit zurück. Hier herrscht daher dieser unendliche Wissensdrang [. . .] Den Europäer interessiert die Welt; er will sie erkennen, sich das ihm gegenüberstehende Andere aneignen. 21 On the “endless thirst for knowledge” “unendlichen Wissensdrang” of the “European mind” “europaischen Geistes”, see: E. Rózsa: Beruhrungen eines Volkes mit anderen Völker. Zur Bedeutung der fremden Kulturen in der Geschichte Europas bei Hegel. In: Eur6pai integráció—eur6pai filozófia (European integration—European philosophy) Ed. D. Csejtei and S. Laczko Budapest/Szeged 1999, pp. 135–158. 22 On these two dimensions and functions of philosophy, see in detail by the author: Versöhnung und System. Zu Grundmotiven von Hegels praktischer Philosophie. (note 11), pp. 72–88.

170

erzsébet rózsa

interpreted first of all as the adult in his immediacy who is not yet identical with the subject of civil society, i.e. the citizen; but he shall become a citizen—that is a challenge for him. This starting point refers back to the subjective mind; in § 396 it is explained that: the adult is no longer a child, he is a youth who has not finished with his education and himself. He shall acquire theoretical and practical cognitions and take control of himself i.e. educate himself in order to become ‘a man’ and ‘citizen’. Only the self-educating individual can be in a position to become a citizen of modern society, i.e. attain the ‘viewpoint’ of the citizen as the higher purpose of the social positioning of individuals in modern society. But becoming a citizen can in no way be understood as an individual process, for he will not become a citizen as an isolated subject, but also makes himself a ‘link in the chain’, a member of a multi-membered economic and social structure, also identified by Hegel as ‘objective order’. In the process of becoming a citizen as socialization and self-determination at the same time, the two sides unite: the individual as specific concrete person and as link in the chain, as universality.23 And it is this dual movement of individuals in and through education that constitutes the essential features of the citizen: education is the cultural and cultivated form of the individual and social happening of becoming a citizen. Hegel describes this process as follows: the concrete person emerges as the one principle in the social structure of the modern world that is a mixture of ‘natural need’ and ‘arbitrariness’, i.e. she is not yet educated. So the being-not-yet-educated of the individual represents the starting point of civil society that is confronted with still unfamiliar universality: the ‘world’.24 But the dependency of individuals on universality reveals that the strangeness of the world, which is at the same time the ignorance of individuals, must be abrogated. This is confirmed by the experiences via collisions of the two principles given initially in an unmediated way collected by individuals.25 Herewith, the individual as a concrete person himself realizes that he is indeed dependent on universality. This is why, as a private person, he sees the whole situation

23 On the various meanings oft he image “chain” in Herder, Fichte und Hegel, see: E. Lichtenstein: Zur Entwicklung. des Bildungsbegriffs von Meister Eckhart bis Hegel. In: Hegel’s Theorie der Bildung. (note 2) Vol. II p. 175. He speaks about the “philosophical use of the metaphor of education”. Ibid. p. 179. 24 PR, § 182. 25 PR, § 182.

education, identity, integrity

171

thus, that his own objectives can only be achieved when universality serves as instrument of his own interests and objectives.26 This insight makes substantial persons out of private persons—for purely private reasons. In this process, education is to be seen as the means through which still formal universality and specific, particular subjectivity can and shall be conveyed as separate spheres.27 The importance of individuals’ insights goes much further than the insights and cognition of the concrete person: Everything that individuals achieve here through their cognitions and practical activities becomes extremely important for the evolvement and normal functioning not only of their lebenswelt, but also of the objective structures of civil society. Hegel points this out as follows: “Individuals, as citizens of this state, are private persons who have their own interest as their end. Since this end is mediated through the universal, which thus appears to the individuals as a means, they can attain their end only in so far as they themselves determine their knowledge, volition, and action in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of this continuum. [. . .] [T]he interest of the Idea [. . .] is the process whereby their individuality [Einzelheit] and naturalness are raised [. . .] to formal freedom and formal universality of knowledge and volition, and subjectivity is educated in its particularity.”28 So Hegel also ascribed to education the function of helping civil society to unfold the two principles, the particularity of individuals and their universality, so as to guarantee that these structures function normally, not least in the interests of the individuals themselves. It concerns the mutual evolvement of the two principles, i.e. that of concrete individuals with their own identity and integration in the socio-cultural order, and that of the unfolding and strengthening of the ‘objective order’ of modern society. The latter represents a kind of objective guarantee for the stability of the lebenswelt of individuals who can no longer have considered the ‘firm ground’ of the old morality a ‘firm basis’ for their life. Hegel characterized modern individuals by their ‘vacillating attitude’. Education is one of the most important cultural forms, which can and 26

PR, § 187. Hotho’s transcriptions of lectures put a strong accent on this aspect of education. Cp. Philosophie des Rechts. Nach dem Vortrage des Herrn Prof Hegel im Winter 1822/23. Vorlesungsnachschrift H.O. Hotho. In: K.-H. Ilting (Ed), Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831. Stuttgart 1974, Vol. 3, pp. 580–583. Abridged: Hotho. 28 PR, § 187. 28 PR, § 187. 27

172

erzsébet rózsa

shall contribute to the stabilization of the basic attitude by means of gaining a proper attitude and by integrating individuals into the objective structures of modern society. It is now obvious why the process of education should not only be construed as the possession of theoretical cognitions, but above all as having practical skills and behavior, as Hegel says: the willing and doing of subjectivity. Thus individuals go beyond their immediate interests and purposes: they integrate themselves in the social order of the modern world and make themselves links in a chain. This dual (‘subjective’, i.e. willed, intentional and ‘objective’, practical, realizing) self-determination of subjects in modern society represents in Hegel the thinking that can also explain his view on free choice of occupation.29 The ‘right of free subjectivity’, which has its origins in morality, also occurs in economic and social areas of the modern world. As stated in § 190 and § 191, the ‘duplication’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘refinement’ of needs and means provides endless room for the individual option, which can also carry consequences in the area of social classification of individuals by occupation. The intentional elements of structure show how education relates to the particularity of individuals and at the same time belongs to the nature of the mind, i.e. to the human being in his universality. The relation of education to the inner individual (his theoretical notions resp. practical purposes) is understood as the “formation of subjectivity in its particularity”. It isn’t so much the individuality as above all the particularity by which Hegel characterized the actual concrete person. That also means: In Hegel’s view, individuals’ own and idiosyncratic special interests and inclinations are, different from Kant, not to be destroyed but on the contrary, they are to be unfolded. The unfolding of particularity gains an excellent status in the lebenswelt of individuals in modern society, which Hegel called ‘particular existence’. Hegel also ascribes another, negative meaning to particularity, which indicated coincidence and arbitrariness. Thus, tension also surfaces in the structure of education, as remarked in the annotation of § 187. In this regard, Hegel emphasizes the function of education as

29 K.-H. Ilting interpreted free choice of career as principle of the modern world in Hegel; but the text excerpts do not attest this adequately. S. Hotho (note 27), pp. 634–635.

education, identity, integrity

173

being to negotiate between the poles of this tension: thus, the ‘true’ particularity that is neither an abstract generality nor the arbitrariness of individuals can be accentuated, which is not only appropriate for the form, but also the content of the freedom of individuals. Education provides the appropriate form of special freedom and can contribute to the appropriateness of the content of practices. How does this function? According to Hegel, it’s wrong to interpret education as only something ‘external’ or ‘merely means’. The purpose of the mind, to work off the ‘rawness of knowing and willing’ and to ensure that “this externality may take on the rationality of which it is capable, namely the form of universality or of the understanding. Only in this way is the spirit at home and with itself in this externality as such. Its freedom thus has an existence [Dasein] within the latter; and, in this element which, in itself, is alien to its determination of freedom, the spirit becomes for itself, and has to do only with what it has impressed its seal upon and produced itself.”30 Thus, education becomes a process of mutual identification of initially mutually unfamiliar elements of nature, of arbitrary, particular subjectivity, and the substance of mind, respectively, of morality. It is just this mutual shaping that lends to the particularity of the individual a higher meaning and stability and can animate the initially universal-substantial by way of individual particularities. The concretization of the individual through education is also explicable by emphasizing that Hegel integrated an economically shaped socio-philosophical dimension into his theory of modern civil society, just as he conceived of education as ‘liberation’ and ‘hard work’; “hard work of opposing mere subjectivity of conduct, of opposing the immediacy of desire as well as the subjective vanity of feeling [Empfindung] and the arbitrariness of caprice.”31 Socio-phenomenological significance was also ascribed to education, as Hegel further specifies and differentiates his conception of becoming a citizen as a socio-cultural model. It concerns cultivated behavioral patterns for overcoming particularities: “Education is a general way, with regard to the individual, of determining oneself concerning general maxims and forms, to behave and act in accordance with the general

30 31

PR, § 187. Cf. PR § 187.

174

erzsébet rózsa

modes.”32 How should this be understood? The educated person is a sine qua non for becoming a citizen: his cultivated behavior consists in adjusting to both the traits of the object and the others, i.e. to complying in general, behaving adequate to the ‘nature of the thing’ [‘Natur der Sache’]. The ‘nature of the thing’ refers to the cultivated, i.e. adequate relationship to the object and to the other who partakes at the respective relationship. The educated person does not make himself conspicuous; he goes down the same country lane as everyone else, as Hegel expresses it; his behavioral pattern must be appropriate to the nature of the thing. In the addendum to § 187, Hegel states about the educated person that:33 “By educated people, we may understand in the first place those who do everything as others do it and who do not flaunt their particular characteristics [Partikularität], whereas it is precisely these characteristics which the uneducated display, since their behavior is not guided by the universal aspects of its object [Gegenstand]. Similarly, in his relations with others, the uneducated man can easily cause offence, for he simply lets himself go and does not reflect on the feelings [Empfindungen] of others. [. . .] [E]ducation irons out particularity”.34 So education, as ‘objectiveness’ and ‘cultivated intercourse’, makes appropriate behavior towards things and persons possible. This skill has “harmonized the own willing of the person as comportment”.35 This skill is at the same time of immediate use for the actor himself: he has thereby at least attained the formal conditions to enable him to realize his own ideals. That is in fact its ‘immediate purpose’, which can be fulfilled in this kind of cultivatedness of behavior.36 The cultivatedness of behavior indicates the form of reaching the specific subjective purposes through which it has become a component of the freedom of individuals. “Education is the form of universality which the individual gives itself; this individual who, in the circumstances at hand, behaves in accordance with its ends and means and wants nothing against the circumstances, or against its own states. These ends can be of different kinds, so that education does not determine the content. 32 Cf. Philosophie des Rechts. Nach dem Vortrage des Herrn Prof Hegel im Winter 1824/25. Transcript of lecture K.G.v. Griesheim. In: G.W.F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831. (note 27), Vol. 4, p. 483. 33 PR, § 187. 34 Cf. also Hotho (note 27), p. 583. 35 Cf. PhdG, § 396, also pp. 104–106; Hotho (note 26), pp. 582–584. 36 Hotho (note 27), pp. 584–585.

education, identity, integrity

175

But the true thing as the universal can only come to existence through educated persons, through the form of universality.” “Rational freedom needs for existence the form of education.”37 Through the skills and capabilities demonstrated, Hegel constructed a manifold justified general behavioral pattern as a socio-cultural model in the framework of his theory of education and on the horizon of his conception of the modern age, in whose centre the subjective freedom of individuals stands. The upbringing in the family and at school, learning and the instruction at school represent important educational components, to which, however, an even more important task is assigned in modern society: the preparation of individual persons for becoming a citizen and those practices that prove to be an important stage and guise of individual freedom. Therewith, Hegel models the immediate, individual, specific, but at the same time socio-culturally shaped (self)-positioning of anyone. Thereby Hegel models everyone’s immediate, individually determined, but at the same time socio-culturally influenced (self-)positioning. It now goes beyond the transition to the status of citizen in the broadest sense, which can be achieved through career. It is not identical with the Philistine life, which seems to be painful for the youngling, as Hegel remarks. It is to education that the function is ascribed of preparing the youngling and making theoretical cognitions and practical skills available to him, with which he is integrated into ‘objective conditions’ and ‘practical life’. Thus he will be “quite at home in his special subject”. In order that the youngling can become “a fully finished person”, he must survive this complex educational procedure.38 It is education that prepares the youngling for the lifestyle rooted in civil conditions and at the same time guarantees that 37 Cf. PhdG, § 396, (also pp. 94–109): “Die Bildung ist die Form der Allgemeinheit, die das Individuum sich gibt, das sich den Verhältnissen seinen Zwecken, seinen Mitteln [sich] gemäß benimmt, nichts gegen die Umstände, gegen seine Zustände will. Diese Zwecke können verschiedener Art sein, die Bildung also bestimmt den Inhalt nicht. Die wahre Sache aber als das Allgemeine, kann nur durch Gebildete, durch die Form der Allgemeinheit zur Existenz kommen.” “Die vernünftige Freiheit hat zu ihrer Existenz die Form der Bildung nötig.” 38 Hegel was not an economist as B. Priddat claims in his book Hegel als Ökonom (note 9); despite his admiration of the achievements of the British economic system, he distanced himself from economics, as the remark on § 189 of the Philosophy of Right clearly shows. Economically-politically, Hegel interprets both the achievements of the economic system and the innovations of modern economics, which he had studied above all “on the example of England”, under the premises of his Philosophy of Right rather than those of economics. See by the author: Hegel gazdaságfiloz6fiája (Hegel’s philosophy of economics). Hungary, Budapest 1993.

176

erzsébet rózsa

this remains as the only “space for honorable, far-reaching and creative activity”. In turn, it has been shown that over and beyond the choice of career, as framework of skills, practical cognition gains an excellent status in shaping individuals’ own special lebenswelt. 3. Education as structural element of the modern economic system in the conceptual network of labor, formation, occupation and the appropriateness of the practical activities The section the nature of needs and their satisfaction shows that multiplication, fragmentation and refinement of needs and means are to be understood not just as economic factors, but also as elements of education. Labor represents the concept of the economic sphere in relation to which the role of education for the modern economic system comes to light clearly; labor as an economic concept is ascribed a ‘higher’, i.e., economic-philosophical meaning that is implemented through the concept of education.39 Formation represents the category that lifts labor as an economic concept to the philosophical, whereby labor is linked to education. Labor is to be interpreted as instantaneous interaction with material provided straight from nature; formation indicates the human character of the production. For formation to qualify as the cultural-social character of the action the person should behave both theoretically and practically; this is just what happens in education, to which the kinds and methods of the labor or occupation are now assigned. In § 197 Hegel first discusses theoretical education, then the practical side. This could actually be misleading; one could see a preponderance of theory therein. But in fact Hegel proceeds otherwise. He is consequential and remains true to his early basic practical motives. Here, it is namely a matter of the theoretical cognitions that above all cannot or cannot only be learnt at school, such as “an ability to form such representations [des Vorstellens] and pass from one to the

39 Hegel’s concept of work has a broad contest in the history of ideas, although it cannot be adequately interpreted only with the concept of work of the British economic system, or the dual attempt at justification by A. Smith, or yet with Luther’s concept. Hegel’s concept of education also plays an important role in that he provided the concept of work and occupation with a more complex framework of interpretation. The discussion of this aspect of education would go beyond the scope of this article.

education, identity, integrity

177

other in a rapid and versatile manner, to grasp complex and general relations [Beziehungen], etc.” According to their general classification, education is to be understood altogether as the sphere of understanding with which Hegel does not draw hic et nunc on philosophicalhistorical differences and periods, but points out that this theoretical education should be interpreted as a structural element of the modern economic system as ‘state of the understanding’. It is the economy as central practical sphere of modern society that determines the status and function of theoretical cognitions, and not vice versa. In practical education, first the meaning of labor is highlighted. As was shown above, Hegel ascribed an important status to the career in that he reveals the influence of Protestantism on his practical philosophy.40 Occupation is not the same as labor; the latter relates to the material provided straight from nature. Further, it is more than abstract-human such as e.g. consumption. Occupation is in fact to be interpreted as being in the area of conflict of need and habit, which indicates the importance of the interiorization of the occupation.41 The significance of practical education is now singled out, insofar as it “consists precisely in the need and habit of being occupied.”42 Habit and needs represent a philosophical-anthropological precondition for practical education, at whose hub the economic system now stands. Through the requirement of interiorization, Hegel points to a kind of adequacy of elements of cognition, action and behavior in relation to the object and the whole process of production, which acquires an exceptional status in modern technology. Hegel also discusses this kind of suitability in a different context. In the chapter anthropology in the subjective mind, Hegel shows how the occupation has become completely accordant with the business. This is an essential condition for the youngling to find his place in civil society.43 The appropriateness of his action is also necessary in the sphere of production, both as regards the nature of the material at work and the intersubjective aspects of the economic occupation as division of

40 On Hegel’s concept of habit B. Merker, Über Gewohnheit. In: “Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse”. Ed. L. Eley. Stuttgart 1990, pp. 227–244. 41 PhdG, § 396, also pp. 107–108. 42 PR, § 197 (addition). 43 PR, § 207.

178

erzsébet rózsa

labor. But appropriateness also includes the “habit of objective occupation” which is to be acquired through breeding. So appropriateness is required on the subjective side of practices and practical skills. This appropriateness means that ‘subjective skill’ would hardly be adequate without the objectivity of the occupation, either for the motivations (needs, drive etc.) or for the production itself, which has an excellent status as benchmark here. Appropriateness as objectivity of subjectivepractical activities becomes a basic structural element of the modern economic system. This requirement also indicates a further radical change that lies in specification, division of labor and a completely different kind of use of machines. So the complex of theoretical and practical education is a demand of modern economics that stems from the new kinds of production and consumption. Thus Hegel emphasized that: the complex of macrostructures on the modern economic system is only functional when the complex of subjective-practical elements of education is available. So the complex of habits, skills and basic attitudes of the subjects becomes one of the decisive components of the modern economy system. For this reason, education becomes the internal level of both the economic macrostructures of modern society and the ‘particular existence’ of the lebenswelt of individuals who are integrated in to the socio-economic world through career and occupation and at the same time can remain aloof by way of their lebenswelt. 4. The triumph of formal education and the ‘virtuous citizen’ with moral values and judiciary culture That the citizen, as subject of economic structures and movements, follows his own particular interests and purposes is also reflected in his lebenswelt, although he really should accept that the satisfaction of his own interests only succeeds when he takes the interests of others into account. That is another reason for the socializing the action of individuals, as Hegel explicated in his so-called structure of estates. It is social structure, i.e., a relation of objective-social and subjective-social components, and comprises the correlation between the existing social orders and the practical activities of individuals. The individual not only goes beyond himself, but also beyond his relation to the ‘object’, material: he draws on the inter-subjective and culturally communicated ethical content. Thus, the substantial-ethical lost in the economic

education, identity, integrity

179

structure can return. Integrated in the social structure, the citizen at the same time acquires his ‘ethical disposition’, virtuousness, honor of one’s estate and recognition.44 Virtuousness and honor of one’s estate counterpoint and complement the excellent positioning of the immediate economic structures of the in reality egoistic citizen. As it has been shown: The citizen forms himself and becomes the ‘result’ of a multi-layered educational process. For this reason he is, as subject of the economic structures, not yet identical with the virtuous citizen; he shall first make himself a virtuous citizen. Thereby, education plays a further role. The citizen who works with his own strengths, ‘activity, diligence and skill’, profits not only economically; in addition he acquires ethical values. This is the point at which education, as cultural form, combines economic factors and the social structures and socio-cultural spheres of the ethical and where the special significance of education for social stratification and social integration surfaces. In this respect, Hegel’s polemics is interesting. With the demand for equality he declares, polemicizing, that economic and social inequality is one of the characteristics of modern civil society: The “objective right of particularity” as universal human principle and the “right of free subjectivity” as a historical right of the modern age are the cause of the inequality. But the particularity and with it the inequality crop up not only in the structural elements of economics: assets, means, work, kinds and ways of fulfillment, but also in theoretical and practical education. Thereby, further inner tension develops in the framework of modern society. The (formal) universality of modern civil society makes it possible for everyone to actually position himself as a citizen. But the contextual particularity of motives and practices involves inescapable inequality, insofar as the concrete, socio-economically shaped positioning of the individual contains not only its generalization, but equally its particularization. Just ‘the whole’ of these factors makes the elements on hand ‘special systems’, ‘a difference of estates’.45 Generalization and particularization as two focal points of the (self)positioning of individuals in modern society explain the claim for equality and the real equality, just as the empirical-universal right of individuals, to construct a ‘particular existence’ as their own lebenswelt, in which

44 45

Cp. Ibid.. §§ 199, 200, 201. Ibid. § 203, note pp. 280–281.

180

erzsébet rózsa

the inequality then develops. Education also has the task of providing individuals with an overview of this contradictory situation. In this connection, education is also revealed as a factor influencing and constituting social structuring, which has stratum-specific features.46 According to this model and argumentation, it can now be appreciated why Hegel explains the social structuring of the modern age and the individually shaped self-determination of individuals both by differentiated, sometimes extreme economic elements and by the ethical values to be observed. Hegel’s main argument lies therein, that the individual, in order to become a ‘true’ citizen, must, over and beyond his own activity, diligence and skill etc., be conscious of what is at hand and what he wants to be his own under the given, objective circumstances. ‘Knowledge’ and ‘willing’ as educational components prepare the merging of the ‘private person’ and the ‘substantial person’. This is why education is a kind of alliance of its universality and particularity in which both contextual designations and ethical values shall be included. So education should not be understood as the mere form of the universal; it justifies and at the same time facilitates the introduction of ethical content into a by nature individualized, concrete modern society. Thus this society becomes ‘alive’ and vigorous. The strength of a thus understood cultivation of managed and executed occupations as practices makes the citizen as an individual subject a virtuous, real, free citizen, who is under no circumstances to be limited to the “estate of trade and industry”; the virtuous citizen is understood as a model of the basic stance of the modern individual in the sphere of economic and social structures and assigned to all three estates.47 This notion also shows that the real function of actually formal education can only be implemented through the inclusion of ethics as arrangement of intersubjective and normative components of the mind. In other words, Hegel is of the opinion that only practices oriented to norms and values can become effective in modern society. This insight is reflected in the model of the virtuous citizen. Hegel attributes a further meaning to education in the framework of modern society, which is to be found in the administration of justice. Education that is only cognition and the will is not real education because it does not yet have any validity. Hegel explains the

46 47

Ibid. § 190, p. 272. Ibid. § 209, note p. 286.

education, identity, integrity

181

element of education in the area of tension of economic factors and the administration of justice. As economic elements, needs and work represent something ‘relative’ which is reflected upon in the area of the judiciary; right is now allocated to the modern economic system. Education enters into this relationship insofar as it is able to destroy the abstraction of the judiciary; potentially, it has the option of diffusing legal expertise for the public. In Hegel, the ability to tell right from wrong legal consciousness and individuals’ cognitions of right as legal culture has special significance, which constitutes one of the essential features of modern society. Therewith, education can fulfil a further requirement of modern societies, which is to be understood not simply as ‘knowledge’ of rights, but equally as their legitimization and respectively the meaningful practice of legitimized rights. The legitimization can be implemented by educated, free individuals with ethical values and respectively by the public of modern society. In this context, as regards the differentiated spheres of modern rights, education also acquires a general function of justification, which consists in ‘validity and objective reality’ and also becomes a structural element of modern civil society. This insight also flows into the model of the virtuous citizen as central figure of modern society. 5. Outlook: the right to be different and of the particularity of individuals, peoples and cultures. Some contemporary aspects of Hegel’s theory of education Education was attributed with a universally valid function of legitimization in the area of the differentiated judiciary sphere of modern society, which could also acquire outstanding actuality in the current debate on human rights. As has been shown, Hegel has linked the modern, individual-centered legal culture through ethical content that gains new meaning in the modern world. No less up-to-date is the notion that he has pointed out the right to be different and the right to particularity in view of individuation as one of the principles of modern society, namely in the context of education. In the remark to § 209 Hegel writes the following: “It is part of education, of thinking as consciousness of the individual [des Einzelnen] in the form of universality, that I am apprehended as a universal person, in which [respect] all are identical. A human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German,

182

erzsébet rózsa

Italian, etc. This consciousness, which is the aim of thought, is of infinite importance”.48 The formal universality of the human being and the concrete identity of individuals are ultimately justified in thinking as an anthropological constant; this universality in thinking also legitimizes the right to regard any person as a universal person, independently of concrete, cultural, ethic, religious differences, in sum, of ‘being different’. At the same time, Hegel does not want to ignore the significance of these differences. On the contrary: the historical, cultural, ethic, religious diversity of humans as well as their individualparticular differences are one of the most important components of his overall conception of practical philosophy. Nevertheless, he considers it important to emphasize that there is no right with which cultural,

48 Jeong-Im Kwon speaks about the plurality of cultures in the Berlin Hegel, which is said to be closely linked to his concept of education. In our age, after the end of art, Hegel highlights historical and cultural education as “formal education” to “universality” as the role of art. Because of Hegel’s concept of formal education, the inconclusiveness of historical progress becomes evident. “Since in the modern world only “particularity” and consequently the respectively limited evolvement in the realization oft he mind is possible, “formal education remains necessary, through which we learn to accept as many different things as possible and thus at the same time can assess our own position (in the sense of self-ascertainment) and enrich it (in the sense of progress). Ancient and strange cultures, here especially the oriental world and culture thus gain actuality in Hegel as regards the particular and consequently plural evolvement of the mind in the modern state. Links with this general historical education, the meaning of “art” also persists for as long as it takes over the function of “formal education” through the mediation of the “particularity” of the strange and different and thereby calls our historical consciousness into question (through the confrontation of particularity as reciprocal criticism).” “Da in der modernen Welt nur die “Partikularität” und mithin die jeweils beschrankte Entfaltung in der Realisierung des Geistes möglich ist, bleibt die “formelle Bildung” nötig, durch die wir möglichst vieles Verschiedene, Andersartige, zu akzeptieren lernen und damit zugleich unseren eigenen Standpunkt einschatzen können (im Sinne der Selbstvergewisserung) und bereichern können (im Sinne des Fortschritts). Die alten und fremden Kulturen, hier insbesondere die orientalische Welt und Kultur gewinnen daher bei Hegel in Hinsicht auf die partikulare und mithin plurale Entfaltung des Geistes im modernen Staat Aktualität. Verbunden mit dieser allgemeinen geschichtlichen Bildung bleibt auch die Bedeutung der Kunst “für uns” bestehen, solange sie die Funktion der “formellen Bildung” durch die Vermittlung der “Partikularität” des Fremden und Anderen übernimmt und damit unser geschichtliches Bewulßtsein in Frage stellt (durch die Konfrontation der Partikularität als wechselseitige Kritik) und bereichert (durch die Integration des zeitlich wie kulturell Fremden).” Jeong-Im Kwon, Kunst und Geschichte. On the revival of the oriental world-view and art-form in Hegel’s concept of education: “Zur Wiederbelebung der orientalischen Weltanschauung und Kunstform in Hegels Bildungskonzept”, in: Hegels Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Eds. E. Weisser-Lohmann and D. Kohler. In: Hegel-Studien Supplement 38, p. 161.

education, identity, integrity

183

ethnic or individual being different could be viewed as a reason for the degradation or persecution of individuals or peoples. Hegel argues that the most universal and most common among humans, i.e. thinking and its socio-cultural forms and frames, thus the modern judiciary system and the education system, explains the ‘right to particularities’ and therewith the being different of individuals and peoples. The universal identity of humanity in thinking, which is also expressed in the modern judiciary system, is not abstract, but in this sense a concrete identity evolved through differences, historical-cultural, but also intricately shaped individually. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, we know more than Hegel’s could ever have foreseen why this notion is ‘of infinite importance.’ It is true: the human being is human because he is a thinker; in this we are all identical. But Hegel rightly links this notion with the right of concrete subjective consciousness and the ‘particular existence’ as lebenswelt of individuals; everyone shall know for himself what it is about. But this reciprocal link between the universal and the particular in anyone’s life cannot be made accessible by philosophy alone; this is why, in Hegel, educational forms in modern societies take on the task of disseminating this ‘never-endingly important’ notion. Over and beyond the right per se as ‘protection for particularity’ and for being different, practical forms belong thereto. Education as cognition and skillfulness (in this complex sense: practices) are also inadequate, thus Hegel argues that constitutional guarantees i.e. ‘the law’ shall be introduced, whose task it is to safeguard ‘all valid rules of behavior.’ The development of the complex structure of modern civil society cannot proceed uninterrupted; it is accompanied by extreme social tensions and insoluble conflicts, of which Hegel was no doubt aware. He also shared the demand by the British economy (A. Smith) for own work, although it was clear to him that it does not represent an optimal solution for everyone in every situation, as he admits in § 245. ‘Consolidation’ ‘in the limited circles of civil life’ is characteristic of life-styles in modern society. But, in addition, a life-style occurs that undertakes ‘danger’ and ‘destruction’. This appears in action that finds its natural element in the ocean. But this opens up a new perspective for the ‘traffic’ of human beings, peoples and cultures: the expansion of the modern European age that represents the roots of today’s globalization. In Hegel’s view, this new perspective is at the same time “the greatest educational means” and is of global historical importance. The

184

erzsébet rózsa

significance of the educational means ‘in connection with the ocean’ indicated the future: ‘educated’ civil society is roused to go down this new road. From this perspective, not the colonization, but the freeing of the colonies seems to be the ‘greatest advantage’. Conclusion: the right to be different for individuals, peoples and nations and respectively freedom in the traffic of peoples and nations, which can be achieved through cultural negotiations and education, are Hegel’s ideas, which have lost nothing of their topicality, especially in a world that has become one of globalization. No less topical is the result of available studies that consists therein, that Hegel did not give preference to theoretical education in his Philosophy of Right, but on the contrary, to the practical side.49 He attributes to education as a socio-cultural form the ‘practice-conforming’ and ‘practice-stabilizing’ building up of skills and abilities, activities and behavioral patterns of atomized and unstable individuals in modern society. This conceptual insight is what distinguishes Hegel’s theory of education fundamentally from that of German Idealism and German Classicism.50 The practical orientation of Hegel’s concept of education has its roots in his reception of the British economic system, whose core is to be found 49 In this article, the conception of education in the Phänomenologie des Geistes is not mentioned—Hegel also included economics in the discussion on education in Jena. But his comments therein about the function of education in the process of selfidentification of individuals is not yet very clear, which is closely connected with the overall concept of the work. On Hegel’s interpretation of education in Phänomenologie in view of the reception of the economic system, see by the author: “Bildung, Reichtum und das Problem des Selbst”, in: Hegels Konzeption praktischer Individualität, edited by Kristina Engelhard und Michael Quante, Mentis, 2007, pp. 72–82. On the theory of the modern individual in the Phenomenology of Spirit: “Zur Theorie des modernen Individuums in der Phänomenologie des Geistes.”, in: Hegel-Jahrbuch 2001, First Part, pp. 204–212. 50 There is an ongoing discussion about the crisis in the concept of education, in which J. Mittelstrass also refers to Hegel’s concept. He believes that the theoretical meaning of Hegel’s concept of education and German classicism has been lost. “The concept of a practice-conform and practice-stabilizing education has taken its place, evident for instance in the terminological transition from humanities linked with a high theoretical entitlement to cultural sciences based on less theory-oriented humanities.” “Der Begriff einer praxiskonformen und praxisstabilisierenden Ausbildung ist an seine Stelle getreten., erkennbar etwa auch im terminologischen Übergang von den mit einem hohen theoretischen Anspruch verbundenen Geisteswissenschaften zu den sich an den eher theoriefernen Humanities orientierenden Kulturwissenschaften.” Cp. Der Bildungsbegriff in der Krise. Commentaries by Jürgen Mittelstrass, Volker Steenblock und Walther Ch. Zimmerli. In: Information Philosophie, 2006/2, p. 47. In following it will be shown that Hegel above all in his Philosophy of Right of 1820 endorsed just such a practice-conform and practice-stabilizing education.

education, identity, integrity

185

in his Philosophy of Right, respectively in the complex way in which he discussed educational issues. Thus one can indeed establish that in Hegel educational issues have been aligned quasi ‘transdisciplinarily’ in their economic, socio-psychological and socio-phenomenological complexity.51 For this reason, Hegel’s basic insights about education seem much more topical than one might think.

51 W. Zimmerli emphasizes the significance of this kind of transdisciplinarity in the discussion just quoted (note 47), p. 46.

EDUCATION IN THE MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY. THE SEARCH FOR A ‘SECOND FAMILY’1 Paul Cobben Introduction: Hegel’s Rechtsstaat as an expression of human rights The modern individual is, above all, a bearer of human rights. Human rights are inalienable; in other words; they are not dependent on a specific rule of law, but are ascribed to individuals on the basis of their status as human beings. The inalienability of human rights gives individuals absolute value and, in this sense, makes them free. As absolute rights, however, the human rights are not normal rights; rather, they are natural, or moral rights. This means that they are not only independent from the ruling law, but can, as moral rights, stand in a critical relation to positive law. This critical relation, however, is not unproblematic, as it raises the question as to the grounds of the absolute base of human rights? Can such grounds be reduced to a call upon reason? Or, does the critical relation to positive law rather refer to the fact that human rights are ideological fictions, or, at least, prejudices of Western culture? How do human rights ‘exist’ when they, on the one hand, can be embodied in a law system, but, on the other hand, are not positive rights? In Anglo-Saxon thinking, this problem is often solved by introducing a distinction between the respective modes of existence of the concepts ‘morality’ and ‘right’. The notion of a ‘right’ has an inter-subjective mode of existence, because it is real in a juridical system with an inter-subjective validity. ‘Morality’, however, is ascribed to to the individual, who, in this case, has to be understood as a moral person. The moral person is a corporeal individual with a substantial property, namely the moral conscience. The above solution is, however, not sufficient, because a conscience, understood as a property of a body, is determined by this body and, as a result, cannot be regarded as free. An alternative solution would be to interpret natural law’s mode of 1 This contribution is a translation of the Hungarian version, that was published in Kellék 33–34 (2007), pp. 119–132.

188

paul cobben

existence as inter-subjective. This solution is, however, that the intersubjective mode of existence can only exist positively, although natural law also seems to exist without its embodiment, namely as internal demand. Hegel discusses the immediate relation between right and morality in the Phenomenology of Spirit as the relation between divine and human law. Human law is positive law that is devised by humankind and that determines the behavioral rules of the tradition within which citizens live. However, if there were only human law, citizens could not be regarded as free, as their behavior would be determined by the given tradition. The citizens could only be regarded as free if there were also a divine law distinct from human law. Divine law ascribes absolute value to citizens, who are regarded as an end in themselves and whose interests can never be completely sacrificed to the state as individuals whose only value lies in their ability to serve as a means to defend the state. Divine law is not positive law; rather, it is a moral demand; in other words, the demand made upon humankind to continually remind the shades of deceased family members. In its manifestation as human rights, divine law is absolute and stands in critical relation to the ruling law; in other words, to human law. Hegel, however, understands divine law neither as noumenal law (as fact of reason), nor as ideological fiction. Therefore, the question as to divine law’s mode of existence can again be asked. As a law, divine law is not a property of the corporeal individual. However, as an absolute law, it is simultaneously an internal demand that has absolute validity, regardless of the determinations of positive human law. This again seems to imply one of two alternatives previously mentioned: divine law is either an ideological fiction, which powerlessly opposes the reality of human law, or it is a noumenal law, which exists in its own realm separate from the realm of reality. Hegel seems to decide in favor of the last option when he assigns divine and human law to two separate realms: human law is the law of reality, the law of living persons, and divine law is the law of the underworld, the law of the dead. According to Hegel, however, the distinction between the two realms must necessarily dissolve: a law, which remains unreal ceases to be absolute. Divine law can only be maintained as absolute if the demand which it makes—to continually act as a reminder of the deceased family member—is enacted in the real world—the family must bury the dead ones. Therefore, it seems as though Hegel selects

education in the multicultural society

189

the first option above, because if human law does not permit the funeral, divine law is no more than an ideological fiction. Hegel’s question in the Phenomenology of Spirit is, however, not so much concerned with whether the divine law is an ideological fiction (this is the case to the extent that the community does not survive the collision between human and divine law), as with conditions under which the contradiction between human and divine law can be sublated—which institutional structures must human law possess, in order to be able to take divine law as its absolute essence? Hegel develops the elements of his answer in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the systematic unity of this answer in the Philosophy of Right: human law must be understood as the objective Spirit, by means of which the divine law (understood as absolute Spirit) expresses itself. The absolute Concept of freedom must realize itself in human law, which can be understood as the existence of freedom. Participation in the institutions that express this existence of freedom results in an educational process in which freedom is understood as the absolute essence of human law. This conclusion can be reformulated in terms of human rights. Human rights are essentially moral rights; in other words; they express moments of the absolute Concept of human freedom. As an expression of the absolute Concept of freedom they are transcendental, but not noumenal. The absolute status of human rights is only obvious for those who are educated in a constitutional state, the institutions of which correspond to structures that can be understood as expressing the existence of freedom, as the result of this education is insight into the nature of institutions as expressions of the existence of freedom. The real institutions are, however, specific historical institutions, so that the absolute Concept of freedom transcends these institutions. As an expression of the free nature of humans, human rights are the grounds of the legitimacy of the Rechtsstaat—the institutions of the Rechtsstaat are legitimate if they realize the existence of freedom to a greater or lesser extent (in other words, in a specific historical form). However, the reality of the state, which necessarily expresses itself in the context of a specific historical tradition, seems to contradict the nature of freedom—freedom transcends pre-given tradition. In his Concept of the state, Hegel hopes to have sublated this contradiction between tradition and freedom in two ways. Firstly, the reality of the state can only be understood as world history; in other words, as a multitude of states. A specific state is bound to a specific tradition,

190

paul cobben

but world history sublates this particularity: multiple states offer room for as many traditions. Secondly, the connection to a certain tradition is put into perspective, And this also takes place on the level of the individual state. The institutions of ethical life can be classified into those of the family, civil society and the state. While the family is bound to certain traditions, the institutions of civil society partially mark themselves by a “loss of ethical life” (PR, § 181). This loss of ethical life results in freedom, by means of which the bonds of tradition are broken, which results in an openness to new developments and subjective freedom. This loss of ethical life is already partly sublated at the level of civil society. The new developments and the subjectively educated persons are integrated into ‘the second family’ (PR, § 252); in other words, the corporation, which, like the families, are bound to a tradition. In this case, however, tradition is mediated by the freedom of the loss of ethical life. Finally, the institutions of the state secure a comprehensive tradition, in which the family and the corporation (as its ‘moral roots’, PR, § 255) acquire their own place in the unity of the State. In this way, the tradition of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) is a tradition that is mediated by freedom. 1. Hegel’s constitutional state as mono-cultural state In my contribution, I want to develop the thesis that Hegel, in his Philosophy of Right, has not adequately comprehended the notion of modern freedom. The development of so-called multicultural societies in particular makes clear that corporations should not be understood one-sidedly as institutions of the labor domain. However, the question can be raised as to which meaningful concretization applies with regard to the ‘second family’. In his remark of § 190 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel observes: “[. . .] Here at the standpoint of needs what we have before us is the composite idea, which we call man. Thus this is the first time, and indeed properly the only time, to speak of man in this sense.” This statement is strange, because, in the Philosophy of Right, it is not the concrete human being—the concrete individual—who is thematized, but rather the concrete human being, insofar as it realizes itself as objective spirit. Human beings are only concrete if the moments of the

education in the multicultural society

191

absolute spirit are considered: without art, religion and science human beings are not concrete. The institutions which correspond to these domains, such as academies, churches and universities, are missing in the conceptual development of the Philosophy of Right, or are only mentioned in the margins. Can this omission be explained? In the context of the system as a whole, the objective spirit is clamped between the subjective and absolute spirit: it constitutes the transition from the subjective to the absolute spirit. The question as to how the individual free will (the result of the subjective spirit) can realize itself in the concrete totality of the ‘good life’ (the starting point of the absolute spirit) is thematic. In my opinion, the explanation of the above mentioned ‘omission’ has to do with Hegel’s specific designation of ‘the good life’. In agreement with the modern communities of his time, he understands the good life as a mono-cultural community; in other words; as a community in which, in general, different cultural values are shared—the citizens of the community have a similar worldview in the domain of art, religion and science. The question as to which cultural values are concerned therefore does not play a role. It is true that these values can be different from community to community, but in the conceptual development of the objective spirit it is only relevant that the individual will is adapted bit by bit to a mono-cultural good life. Insofar as there are different religious convictions (e.g. Catholics and Protestants), one religion is dominant (cuius rex, eius religio) and, insofar as there are minorities with deviating cultural or religious values (e.g., the Quaker), one can be tolerant, as long as the moral order is not endangered (see PR, § 270, remark). Therefore, Hegel notes explicitly that ‘the religious conscience’ is not thematic in the Philosophy of Right (PR, § 137 remark). Only the conscience of the objective spirit is thematic—in other words—the conscience which takes as its obligation the realization of the good life in which the moral subject already lives all the time. The mono-culturally interpreted good life in the Philosophy of Right is nonetheless mediated by subjective freedom. This freedom is, however, limited, in the sense that it obviously cannot lead to a multicultural community. Therefore, the question can be raised as to how exactly this subjective freedom must be interpreted.

192

paul cobben 2. Subjective freedom in the Philosophy of Right

Each community, which can be interpreted as the reality of human law, can be considered as an example of the ‘good life’, for the immediate, natural life is transformed into life in the form of freedom. The starting point of human action is no longer the natural drives and desires, but rather the realization of the values and norms of a tradition, as formulated in human law. The use value of things is no longer determined by their capacity to satisfy natural drives and desires, but by the value which they possess for the realization of the ‘good life’. Insofar as the values and norms of the ‘good life’ are only determined by tradition, the good life still allows no room for subjective freedom. From a historical point of view, this room is only created once the labor process emancipates itself from the family and is independently institutionalized in a ‘free market system’ (the System of Needs). The free market enables a subjective supply of use values; in other words, use values, whose quality are not determined by tradition. These use values are manufactured in the context of a labor organization that is itself not determined by tradition. The organization of labor is rather based upon an objective, scientific insight into nature. The knowledge of the scientific and technological laws that underlies the labor process, facilitates a division of labor that is further carried out and standardized by these laws. Therefore, the development of subjective freedom means that the free relationship to nature is made subjective. Freedom is no longer limited to the transformation of natural conditions into traditional conditions (second nature), but the individual emancipates itself in this sense from this second nature, in that it can separate its freedom explicitly from the first nature and know itself as its essence: pre-given nature appears as a recognizable and, in principle, technically controllable nature. This theoretical emancipation from the second nature simultaneously presupposes, however, a practical emancipation from the second nature of tradition. The free individual is a member of a rationally organized labor system, in which it has freely chosen its place based on rationality. A real labor system, however, cannot be understood as an expression of pure insight; it is already framed by traditional conditions all the time—not only because the free individuals have emancipated themselves from the tradition of the family, but also because a real labor system is necessarily a specific system. Although the labor system

education in the multicultural society

193

is dynamic, it is nevertheless made up of specific human beings, who recognize one another as members of the labor system, and, it is, nevertheless, specific use values, that are produced in the labor system. Therefore, the unity of the labor system presupposes that its members share some specific norms and values on any level. After Hegel, the reality of the labor system can only be imagined if its members are simultaneously members of another institution: as citizens they must share a tradition that is mediated by subjective freedom. Thus the question arises as to how individuals can be both members of a free labor system and citizens of a state with a specific tradition. Hegel solves this problem with the help of the notion of corporations that mediate between the labor system and the state. This mediation has an objective and a subjective side. Objectively, the corporation derives its determination from the pre-given unity of the state. The tradition of the good life determines what can be considered use value at all. Thus it determines which branches of production belong to the labor system, and the branches of production provide the corporations with their identity. At the same time, the corporation derives its free form from the labor system, because its work is mediated by the educational forces of the market—in other words, this work is based on scientific and technological knowledge. Subjectively, the corporation mediates between labor system and state, because, on the one hand, the entrance to the corporations is based on free choice; in other words, the individuals can freely apply for the membership of a corporation and are accepted due to their objective qualifications, while on the other hand, the admission to a corporation implies incorporation into its specific tradition. Life in the tradition of the corporation enables an educational process, in which the individual learns to participate, as a citizen, in the general tradition of the state. The inadequacy of Hegel’s solution is revealed when he notices “that despite an access of wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e. its own resources are insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble” (PR, § 245). Thus it appears that Hegel, at the level of the civil society, does not thematize concrete humans, but rather humans who are functional for the labor system. After all, it is clear that the aforementioned poverty of the modern society does not have an absolute meaning. It is rich enough to be responsible for the living costs of each human being. Its poverty is measured “at its own resources”; in other words, it is not rich enough, insofar as the freedom of the free market is interpreted in Hegel’s sense.

194

paul cobben

This freedom has, on the one hand, a negative side, that Hegel expresses as “the loss of ethical life”. The persons in the market have emancipated themselves from the tradition of the family and are susceptible to each product that the market offers them. The positive side of this freedom consists in the fact that each bond is mediated by free choice—the social bonds have the form of a contract between free and equal persons. Karl Marx has already stressed the conditions under which this freedom is insufficient—it is ideological, insofar as persons must sell their labor force in order to survive at all. The freedom and equality of the persons are only real, if their existence as humans is already constantly secure, and does not depend on the possibility of being able to enter into a labor contract. This argument is substantially supported by Hegel, when he formulates, on the level of the morality, the ‘right of distress’ (PR, § 127): If “the personal existence or life” is “in extreme danger”, the person can appeal to a right of distress and push legal property aside. The moral right of emergency results in the fact that, on the level of the ethical life (in other words, on the level upon which the moral ‘ought’ has realized itself), the life of the person is already constantly secure, and as a consequence, the Marxist ideology reproach concerning freedom and equality can be repelled. Nevertheless, Hegel contends that the civil society is not rich enough. The conclusion cannot be that Hegel neglected the consequences of the right of emergency, for, on the level of the corporation, Hegel does attribute a special role to the labor contract. The person, who is accepted as a member of a corporation, does not need to worry about work any longer. Hegel elucidates this by pointing out the difference between the corporation member and the day laborer. The corporation member, “who is, or will become, master of his craft, is a member of the association not for casual gain on single occasions, but for the whole range, the universality, of his personal livelihood”. ( PR, § 252 remark). The corporation is the second family in which “the particular welfare is present as a right and is actualized” (PR, § 255). The problem is, however, that not all persons can be accepted as members of the corporation. In this sense, civil society is not rich enough. The persons for whom civil society is not rich enough cannot realize themselves adequately as moral subjects. For the society they seem to be superfluous, because they are lacking the desired labor qualifications, or, because there are enough alternative persons who share their

education in the multicultural society

195

labor qualifications. Their existence is not secured in such a way that the moral right of emergency would legitimize their resistance against the property order. As long as the sublation of the loss of ethical life remains bound to an educational process that is dependent on participation in the labor process, and this participation is mediated by the free market, the moral self-realization of man cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, the question is raised not only as to whether alternative educational processes can be imagined that would better serve moral self-realization, but also whether these educational processes can be reconciled with the Hegelian conceptual framework. 3. Education in the multicultural society I propose that the contemporary multicultural society offers the basis of experience which enables us to recognize the level upon which the alternative educational processes must take place. It turns out that immigrants, who grew up in another culture, are thereby often excluded from the dominant ethical world (in other words, ‘are not integrated’), merely because they participate in the labor process. The contrast between the different values and norms by which the multicultural society is confronted, cannot be mastered within labor organizations. Only under the conditions of a mono-cultural society, could Hegel assign an educational function to labor organizations. He could, as it were, appeal to a background consent; in other words, to tacitly shared norms and values. The break with tradition, caused by civil society, has only a relative meaning in mono-cultural society. Production and consumption are mediated by the freedom of the market, without affecting the shared norms and values of the nation. Only if the shared norms and values are themselves mediated by subjective freedom, does the sublation of the loss of ethical life not imply a regression behind subjective freedom. The alternative to education in the labor system is education on the level of the culture. Therefore, the question is in what way institutions of cultural education can be conceived, and, whether these institutions can be incorpoarated into Hegel’s thinking. Hegel already connects ‘education’ to work in the Phenomenology of Spirit. There it means: “Work . . . is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing” (PhoS, 118). Here, however, work has, a completely different and more

196

paul cobben

abstract meaning than in the Philosophy of Right. I will clarify in which sense education by means of work can, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, be understood as cultural education. Work, as it is thematized by the Phenomenology of Spirit in the passage mentioned above, is the work of the bondsman, that is carried out in the service of the lord. The lordship/bondsman relation is the initial, inadequate, attempt, to think through the reality of self-consciousness. The implicit thesis is that, for the reality of self-consciousness to be conceived, the conditions of the lordship/bondsman relation must at least be fulfilled. The lordship/bondsman relation clarifies that the reality of self-consciousness can only be understood as an institutional reality. The lord is the representation of the unity and the reason of this institutional reality, and the bondsman is the representation of institutional acting. The lordship/ bondsman relation formulates the minimal conditions under which cultural acting can be differentiated from natural acting. Thematic is only the ‘that’ of cultural acting, not its further contents. Cultural acting presupposes an institutional reality, in which the instinctual laws of natural acting are replaced by the cultural laws of an institutional reality. Which laws these are is not important; it is only important that the freedom of self-consciousness is real in this sense—that self-consciousness practically shows, and is able to transcend the laws of nature in that it is able to serve, instead of these laws, the laws of any cultural reality. Here, education is the result of institutional acting in general, because this acting succeeds to the extent that desire is held in check and can assume a cultural form. The formation of the internal drives is apparent in the cultural shaping of the external nature. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the lordship/bondsman relation; in other words, the immediate reality of self-consciousness, is developed step by step in the concrete human, as s/he is related to the absolute spirit. The human is the bondsman, who understands himself as moral subject and knows that he serves his lord, if he realizes his freedom in and by acting in the real world. Acting in the real world is in a substantial way institutional acting—this time however, it is no longer the undifferentiated institutional acting of the bondsman, but the out-differentiated institutional acting. All those differentiations are relevant which were characteristic for the society forms, whose development resulted finally in concrete humans who could be understood as moral subject: those of the Polis, the Roman Empire and the realm of the

education in the multicultural society

197

education. It are these institutional differentiations, which Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right intended to develop in a systematic way. The excursus to the Phenomenology of Spirit teaches that the education process is not limited to labor stricto sensu; in other words, to the labor in an out-differentiated labor system. It is more important, however, that the Phenomenology of Spirit clarifies how concrete human beings transcend the conditions of a mono-cultural community. They behave as moral subjects to the absolute spirit and know that they realize their freedom in a historically determined culture. This has far-reaching consequences for the project of the Philosophy of Right. Insofar as this work, as objective spirit, develops the transition from the subjective spirit into the absolute spirit, concrete humans can be conceived of as the result of this development—only as a result can the relationship to the absolute spirit become thematic. Hegel, however, thinks that concrete humans are already thematic at the level of civil society. The Philosophy of Right, however, can only bring concrete humans up for discussion if they, departing from its consequences (the relationship to the absolute spirit) reflexively repeat the development of the moral institutions. In this case, the moral subject is not only the conscience who knows that he realizes his content (the good) in moral institutions, but is also the conscience who is simultaneously aware of the fact that it realizes the content only in a certain historical context (according to the specific norms and values of a historical culture). In other words, the moral conscience is simultaneously the religious conscience. As religious conscience, the moral subject is not bound to the specific culture of a mono-cultural society. It is able to select other cultural norms and values. In other words, the cultural norms and values are mediated by subjective freedom. If the moral subject can manifest itself as a concrete human being in civil society, this presupposes (as apparent in the excursus to the Phenomenology of Spirit, that the institutional differentiation of the moral world is already completely developed all the time. Therefore, the institutional reality of the state is presupposed, but this state cannot be determined, in Hegel’s sense, as the mono-cultural state, because a given mono-cultural culture could not be reconciled to subjective freedom. The presupposed state can only formally be determined as the institution in which general freedom is realized as such. The manner in which this freedom is more specifically determined in historical

198

paul cobben

norms and values remains highly uncertain, because these values and norms are mediated by subjective freedom. The norms and values mediated by subjective freedom cannot be understood as the result of a contract upon which the subjects (in other words, ‘human beings’ of the civil society) agree. This is because, on the one hand, it remains problematic as to how it would be possible at all that a multitude of free subjects could achieve a common consent, and, on the other hand, the subjective freedom simply creates room for a multitude of cultures with their corresponding norms and values. Therefore, the shared norms and values must be institutionalized in a multitude of culture communities which are always already given in relation to the subjects all the time. In the multicultural society, these very culture communities take in the place of the ‘second family’ and play their role in the education of humans to citizens. However, it will turn out that the attempt to convert the culture communities into concrete institutions is not unproblematic. 4. ‘The second family’ as culture community The determination of the characteristics of the culture community can at best be elucidated by a comparison with Hegel’s determination of the second family; in other words, of the corporation. Like the corporation, the culture community is not constituted by action that can be understood as an expression of the subjective freedom. The culture community is not a network of individuals, or a circle of friends. Like the corporation, the moral content of the culture community has an objective meaning. This kind of objectivity differs from the objectivity of the corporation. The latter has objectivity in a labor system that serves a mono-cultural community—the corporation is a members of a system of labor division. The objectivity of the culture community, however, has its grounds in the absolute value that underlies the ethical entirety; in other words, freedom. Only those cultural communities whose norms and values can be understood as a certain historical implementation of freedom and equality can be part of a multicultural society. Only if this condition is fulfilled, can the culture community not only avoid coming into conflict with the state, but can also play its role with respect to the education of the citizen—like life in the family, life in the second family is also a preparation for life in the state.

education in the multicultural society

199

Like the corporation, the culture community is also institutionalized as a multitude of cultural communities. Exactly as is case with regard to the corporation, the relationship to this multitude offers to human beings the room for subjective freedom. Individuals can choose self-consciously to which culture community they belong. However, because the objectivity of the moral content of culture communities has another sense than that of the objectivity of the corporation, the danger inherent in the latter that some individuals are actually superfluous can be avoided. In an objectified labor system, accelerated or not by the conditions of the free market, a product is supplied that is dependent on the demand, that is itself generated by the current determination of the good life. In such a system, certain individuals, due to their specific labor qualifications, may be redundant. Such redundancy is not possible with regard to culture communities, as, on the one hand, the culture communities are not linked to one another in a system and are essentially unlimited qua number, and, on the other hand, none of these culture communities can be redundant, because they are the starting point of the multicultural society, and because their combination determines the unity of the good life. The educational task of the culture communities can be subdivided into three relations. Firstly, the relationship of concrete human beings to the multitude of the culture communities can be considered. For the individual, the culture communities form a market with a supply of worldviews expressed in a multitude of norms and values. Negotiation of these views is an educational process, in which the individual must learn which conviction best does justice to his subjective freedom. The second relationship is practically performed in the institutional action of the individual belonging to a certain culture community. In taking this action the individual is educated as a member of a community which holds certain norms and value. The third relationship concerns the relations between the culture communities themselves. All culture communities are part of a state, whose institutions correspond to a standardization, which puts them into the position to express the subjective freedom; in other words, freedom and equality standardize the form of the institutions. The specific determination of the freedom and equality in the context of a certain historical connection is not, however, carried out on the level of the state, but at the level of the culture community. Therefore, the many culture communities are, on the one hand, connected, because they all constitute a certain historical expression of freedom, and, on the other hand, distinct from one another,

200

paul cobben

because they arrange this expression in their specific way. The many culture communities must consequently mediate with one another, in order to be able to live peacefully in one state. The mediation simply does justice to the subjective freedom that has realized itself in the culture communities, if it has the form of a political dialogue. This can be conceived of as a parliamentary democracy, in which the culture communities can be represented by political parties. 5. How can the culture community be determined as a concrete moral institution? As I have stated, the most important problem of my contribution seems to me to be how exactly the culture community can be conceived of as a concrete moral institution. It is easy to identify the culture community with the religious community. As we have seen, the culture community not only presupposes the religious conscience, but Hegel’s concept of religion corresponds to the determination of the culture community as a community of norms and values, in which general freedom and equality are more specifically articulated. The absolute content of religion is freedom. As a particular conception of freedom, religion has, however, no general form, and belongs to a specific community. A second argument in favor of the identification of the culture and religious communities has to do with the contemporary multicultural society in which the contrast between the cultures concentrates on groups, which present themselves as Muslims. There is nevertheless a crucial argument against the above suggested identification. The contemporary society is characterized by secularization—fewer and fewer human beings are inclined to regard themselves as members of a religious community. This observation seems to suggest two alternatives—either there are non-religious communities, which can be understood apart from religious communities as culture communities, or contemporary society is individualized to the extent that the second family cannot meaningfully find a place in it. This latter possibility would result in a fundamental criticism of modern democracy. If the decision in favor of a political party is not rooted in a culture community in which one lives in accordance with a coherent framework of norms and values, the political attitude only depends on the coincidence of the moment. Political elections would degenerate into ad hoc decisions related to specific issues, which are increasingly

education in the multicultural society

201

separable from one another. Under these circumstances a computer democracy would be the most desirable form. But what about the first alternative? Are there culture communities other than religious communities? Naturally, such alternative culture communities existed in former times, for example, socialist, fascist, humanistic or naturalistic culture movements. Now, however, they have either disappeared or became marginal. At the most, these alternative groups are new immigrants, who uphold their original culture. However, for most citizens, this is not a solution. There are essentially many criteria under which citizens can experience a cultural relationship apart from religion—for example, language, regional affiliation, social position, age, ideological emphasis and sexual identity. Which criteria are relevant cannot easily be deduced theoretically. This is rather apparent in practice as those points of view which are experienced as so important that they become a reason for citizens to organize themselves politically. The problem remains as to how it can be that the political ideology of these parties is rooted in the practical life of a culture community. Recapitulatory conclusion Hegel’s statement that the institutions of ethical life that are developed in the Philosophy of Right express the subjective freedom of the modern individual, cannot be confirmed. Hegel’s Rechtsstaat limits subjective freedom, because it is conceived of only as a mono-cultural state. The education towards subjective freedom at the level of civil society concerns only the domain of labor, not the comprehensive cultural norms and values. This restriction can only be sublated if the educational forces of civil society are understood as cultural education. The consequence of this transformation is, however, that the ‘second family’, cannot interpreted as a labor group (as corporation), but rather as culture community. Defining the specific characteristics of the culture community nonetheless remains problematic.

BEING ONE’S OWN SELF IN A FRAGMENTED LIFE. ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE CLASSICAL IDEALS OF BILDUNG UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF CURRENT SOCIAL REALITY Rainer Adolphi 1. Reflection and Reality The idea of education, encapsulated in the German concept Bildung, is perhaps the only one of the projects and concepts of modern times that remains uncontroversial to this day. Reason, subjectivity, ‘freedom’, society, science, progress, but also ‘family’ and the idea of emotive intimacy, the understanding of autonomous art and even the concept of ‘man’ have been questioned. All great legacies of modern times have aroused suspicion. As ideas, they were seen as sharing the same fate as the ideologies. Namely they were suspect of suppressing what is different from themselves, of obscuring factual relations and mechanisms and of participating in supporting dominant ‘falseness’. The suspicion that these ideas raised was that they would collapse into a dialectic of their own and not be able to reach their own fulfillment. Bildung is possibly the only concept in this group for which this does not hold. The potential of this concept remains vigorous. All that is summarized by Bildung—what is ascribed to it and expected from it—seems to remain constant throughout the changes in content that is has experienced. And in cases of rethinking the idea of Bildung, its ‘dialectical’ aspects or at times even its ambivalent aspects are present as much today as they were at the outset. In a nutshell, the thought and legacy of education and Bildung remain a vital, contemporary concept. This concept of modern times did not lose any of its appeal. In this concept the modernity of modern times is still present. Nonetheless today the ideas of education and Bildung are facing critical inquiry, with challenges and revisions that go beyond any of the earlier reflections. This is firstly a positive sign; it is the result of a positive process, because Bildung and the understanding of it are essentially also the practical experiences with Bildung. To name a few of the great educational undertakings: the introduction of compulsory education, vocational education, opening all education for women, founding scientific,

204

rainer adolphi

technical and agricultural higher education systems; the awareness that Bildung and learning are not a temporary juvenile phase of life that ends before or upon entering society, but a life-long task (as well as opportunity), that, among other benefits, preserves the connection to changing society; and the current educational offers for migrants. Secondly, the empirical study of all of the above is also inherent to the concept of Bildung. This is, more specifically, knowledge of how to improve educational institutions, what concrete educational way is truly effective and also the study of the differences between national or federal systems of education, educational landscapes. Thirdly, another aspect that is currently essential to Bildung is the respect for the dignity of the pupil; the abolition of (or at least official social frowning upon) discrimination on grounds of social class and the humanization of the education environment: from Rousseau, Basedow’s Philanthropinum, the Francke Foundations to the abolition of corporal punishment and other cruel punishment that breaks an individual’s spirit. All of the above has enriched our concept and understanding of Bildung. Bildung, once—in the modern period—only an idea, a vision, is today no longer a merely intellectual phenomenon, an idealized concept of a (‘philosophical’) world of thought. It has become reality. As such, it is clearly be interwoven with real social processes. The conceptual field of our thought and debates reflects this. Today, empirical and sociological concepts belong to the discourse about education and Bildung as a matter of course. Addressing this issue requires a continuum of questions and explanations, in which the ‘philosophical’ elements—which include not only philosophy in the narrower sense but also other disciplines from the humanities and cultural studies—stand alongside the actual social state of affairs. The discourse concerning education and Bildung is free from the resolute boundaries that are present in virtually all other pressing questions. ‘Philosophical’ reflections regarding what Bildung should be and what ‘image of man’, goals and values should be conveyed all belong to the understanding of Bildung in the empirical research. And conversely, theoretical contemplations never take place without including concrete phenomena of real social states of affairs and processes. Thus the reality of education and Bildung is surrounded by reflection. The questions are a reaction to reality. But this by no means implies an essentially common attitude towards the task and the goal of Bildung. Instead, the fight over the fundamental principles and issues causes each to excommunicate the other from the discourse. The multiplicity

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

205

of expressions and social processes are discussed only in relation to the fundamental issues and principles themselves, narrowing the discourse. Excessive attention is given to the principles themselves. This excessive attention makes the reflection on the principles seem like a form of unrest, unease and even a general crisis. Despite the breadth of past experiences and the accumulated knowledge there is no field with unequivocal and secure paths. Kant would say it is, for all pathos, a mere ‘groping’ (‘Herumtappen’). This has both internal and external reasons. The problems have become more acute through external circumstances. To name five of the different sides which contribute to the problems becoming more acute: the radical change of society and the decline of a way of life that is based on working and a lifelong, identity-giving ‘profession’; as a result of the migration processes: the different views of Bildung that seem to be self-evident to different ethnic groups, the mental dissonance of the cultural consensus in society and the differences in the experiential backgrounds;1 thirdly, in general the fragmentation of social life in the sub-milieus; the competition between the national education systems, the competition for the human (intellectual and practical) resources that are supported by the institutional systems—this competition is ultimately characterized by ‘globalization’; lastly, the divide between the basic knowledge that makes one an integral member of society— mostly generation specific—on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the indispensable competencies that are necessary for decision making and for potential leadership—this gap is opened anew in the course of the growing importance of the technical and scientific skills.2 All of the above significantly raised the need to clarify what Bildung is and should be. In addition, there is another phenomenon that always appears in corresponding constellations. Whenever there is uncertainty concerning the social ways, excessive demands through the conditions of social life for possible success, or an increasing

1 From the significance of Bildung for young girls and women to the question of whether and how domestic relations, sexuality, religion, the cultural picture of man and role models should be addressed and integrated in the schools and other educational frameworks. 2 In the daily working life, within departments and even more so in the new and typical team working—for instance in the creative job sector—the hierarchies may have become more leveled out. But the same is not true across society as a whole; drive and the necessary technical and scientific skills divide society to an even greater extent.

206

rainer adolphi

complexity of roles, dominant images of immaturity arise. Modern life is accompanied by waves of longing for escaping the grown-up world and its prevalent standards of adulthood. Today’s world is possibly the broadest development of this phenomenon. Nowadays this phenomenon permeates the whole of society, the way society thinks of itself and what it considers prestigious.3 The myth of the innocent and natural is prevalent as never before. The ways of life are interwoven not only with insignia of youthfulness, but also with those of empathy and identification with the childish. At the same time the ideals of growing up are lost to fundamental skepticism and fear of the unknown world of adulthood. Thus processes of education and Bildung are under pressure from several external conditions. This pressure has never been as strong as it is nowadays. Under the preceding five external circumstances a successful Bildung would have to achieve more than ever before. Namely, it would have to accomplish more in the area of individual development, more in the area of individual competency and more in the area of social integrative skills. At the same time, the world of adults, in the form of parents, educators and teachers, is insecure of itself. The fact, however, that these intensified external circumstances have also led to problems of understanding Bildung—difficulties in determining what Bildung amounts to at all—has to do essentially with internal reasons as well. These internal reasons have to do with things that were never taken into account and even seemed irrelevant: lack of philosophy. So far ‘Bildung’ was deemed too steeped in philosophy.4 The concept, especially in its German form and tradition of ideas was considered as laden with old philosophical bodies of thought from the residual mass of the Enlightenment, German Idealism and the 19th century. Additionally, it was atmospherically imbued with the mystical coun-

3 It is a peculiar dialectic that the less having children—and bringing them up—is a normal part of adult life and world as it has always been, the more parenthood (and the wish to ‘get everything right’ in educating and encouraging the children, the wish to optimize education) is increasingly charged with expectations of meaningfulness. And above all, the adult world adapts itself and tries to satisfy what is—supposedly—suitable for the child. 4 And because of the philosophy orientation it was seen as tending towards ideology. This interpretation was yet again broadly unfurled by Bollenbeck, Georg: Bildung und Kultur. Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters. Frankfurt/M. 1996.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

207

termovement of the late middle ages and its picture of man.5 I would rather like to suggest that our understanding of Bildung contains too little, rather than too much, philosophical reflection. There is too little reflection that has kept up with the complexity of the actual state of affairs. In the course of the applied and descriptive research and the current external circumstances Participation has become more central. Bildung and the institutions of education are perceived more and more as the means to a very specific end, namely enabling the individuals to participate in social life. (This implies integrating individuals who come from difficult backgrounds.) But the question that then arises is: What is the kind of the society we desire? Today, with the societies that are proud of the advancements of individuality and individual ‘talents’, the understanding of Bildung— its task and the fruits it can bear—and the social demands that come into view are—much like in the 18th century—once more reciprocally defined. The circumstances of reality become increasingly more complex and the more complex these circumstances become, the more exclusive the reciprocal definition becomes. Due to the often unthinking trend of ignoring what the concept Bildung has evoked since the 18th century, a blank spot in our reflection became even more severe, namely an ultimately positivistic picture of the social reality and the dominant demands of its (economic, interpersonal and theoretic) ‘market’. The expression of this can be found in the current slogans for the aim of the Bildung undertaking. For instance: ‘to create the optimal life prospects for the individual’, optimal namely in the given social reality, or, ‘so that nobody is left out’, i.e. to functionally integrate the individual in the existing social order, etc.6 5 This classical interpretation is well known. Cf. Schaarschmidt, Ilse: Der Bedeutungswandel der Worte “bilden” und “Bildung”. Berlin. 1931. Lichtenstein, Ernst: Zur Entwicklung des Bildungsbegriffs von Meister Eckhard bis Hegel. Heidelberg. 1966. Bollenbeck, Georg: Bildung und Kultur, l.c., chapter II (31–59). 6 The current discourse has two lesser known characteristics. They show how much the goals of Bildung have undergone change. One is the “potentiality” figure of speech. The expressions of these goals transpose the criteria to the (general) opportunity to . . ., ability to . . . (or completely normatively expressed: being mobile or flexible for ‘new challenges’, being regarded as otherwise unhelpful (inert, passive or the like) for the community and the social system). These criteria do not contain any contents or bindings to any contents yet. The second characteristic of the current discourse is the use of superlatives (“the best”, “optimal”, “nobody” etc.). Both of these ways of thinking come from the field of making use of capital, the field of capital appropriation. The contents thereby receive the relative importance of what is opportune for the subject. Their adoption or ‘learning’ serves what is profitable for the individual (for the sake of

208

rainer adolphi

One can see that these seemingly clear objectives are anything but self-justified by looking at the diverging ways of understanding the developing individual and the abilities that the current changes demands from him. An antithetical determination of the Bildung process is formed here. The current images we associate with ‘adulthood’ and social institutions that lead the way to ‘adulthood’ involve simultaneous antithetical ideas: to have enjoyed Bildung and have ideals of Anti-Bildung; knowing-what and knowing-how according to society but also having ‘elitist’, ‘spiritual’ or ‘anarchistic’ antagonism to Bildung, such as distance, scorn of the internalization of learning and of the will to become like the adults. Our conception of Bildung, although it has positive associations that are a heritage of modern times, thus shows itself as so complex that the problems that arise cannot be clearly structured and separated from one another. My thesis is that this, along with the new multi-sided pressure, has to do with the classical modern thought of Bildung, that is, with a certain ambivalence of the classical concept of Bildung itself. In today’s situation these points of internal vagueness lead to precarious sub-determinations and circular determinations. This is a heritage that still shapes our thinking in this field in an underlying way. It unconsciously stands in the background of our orientation in this field. These heritages should be retired not because they are prone to be philosophical or ideological, but because they are not tailored for the current circumstances. In order to avoid the inevitability of the concentration on the current circular definitions I would like to start by examining a pertinent framework question: the logic of the discourse concerning ‘Participation’. 2. The Objective of Bildung—‘Participation’? What does ‘Participation’ mean? What can it mean? To define the objective of education and Bildung as becoming a competent participant is already, as such, less unequivocal than it seems. To think in the

integration or success), or otherwise they are adopted because they present a fact that is not worth rebelling against.—Furthermore, nowadays there is an internal economic pressure on the educational institutions (schools, universities and the like) by giving criteria such as ‘cost’ and ‘output’ more weight. This way of thinking about Bildung is still another, and more elementary problem.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

209

categories of ‘Participation’, as a definition of Bildung, proves itself to be, the more one examines the issue, the more full of prerequisites. ‘Participation’ is obvious where technique and the ability to keep up with the appropriate know-hows are concerned. The necessity of such a way of participating is substantiated by the given social (and gradually also the natural) world. There is an abundance of equipment and instruments that one is expected to ‘understand’ and be able to operate. A similar necessity is true of the participation status itself and the rights that one wants to exercise. To have the status of a participating individual means: to know one’s ‘rights’, where they stem from and why. That is, one is expected to know on the grounds of which principles of normativity one has these inalienable rights. In both cases the general concept of ‘participation’ is justified. It is a thought and pattern of understanding that is taken from the field in which this thought category first appeared, namely the political sphere. The concept of ‘participation’ and consequently the objectives for which education and Bildung pave the way is thought of a process analogous7 to: – being able to express oneself ‘in public’; – being able to participate in decision making (primarily regarding the interests of the community that are relevant for me); – being able to participate (without obstruction or given barriers) in the contest and strife for what promises the best future—for the most appropriate thoughts or the best ‘commodity’ (‘commodity’ in the widest sense, in a respective ‘market’), or for the status and prestige relative to others. In all other cases the objective of ‘Participation’ is strikingly less clear. Participation was, in all societies, never only the participation in the given reality as such. It was never merely participation in the existing social systems, education and Bildung as ways that lead to an appropriate partaking of the subjects in the system. Rather, this was always aimed at the idea or the image of itself that the existing reality has. In the most extreme case the ideal of Bildung cultivated in society has dysfunctional or luxurious, parasitical features. The ambiguousness of what ‘Participation’ means thus comes to the fore. It involves the question concerning what one participates in 7

That it, it is thought of as a sub-process of a social and cultural ‘democratization’.

210

rainer adolphi

and what the status of participation—mediated by the institutions of education and Bildung—concretely is. At least four issues need to be distinguished. These are four different processes of becoming: participation defined through the actual practices; or through the key areas through which society currently defines itself; or through certain qualifications (or habitus)—even if they don’t possess an actual function (for example, ‘ancient languages’ or ‘holy languages’) but have prestige; or participation as an (essentially passive) ability to understand the institutions and instruments of the world and the social processes and thereby eliminating the feeling of the unknown and inscrutable. There is also a second, manifestly weightier ambivalence. The more a society establishes itself on knowledge and Bildung, the more participation becomes a must and not only an ability and an allowance. Lacking skills or competencies, or the rejection of the necessary skills leads to ‘simple occupations’ and to simple, limited alternatives. Being unable to fulfill or rejecting the level of competency in a society characterized by knowledge and Bildung leads, much like the pre-modern social strata, to a stiff class structure. At the same time, participation is experienced less and less as a kind of ‘fulfillment’.8 An expression of the unclarity that characterizes the understanding of what ‘participation’ means is that, instead of reflecting on the reasons for the current demands for education and Bildung that have dramatically increased, one reflects on and questions the contents of what is being mediated through education and Bildung. The debates have narrowed themselves to the internal question of the mediated contents of education: what type of abilities and what type of human character these contents create. This is related to the determination of what ‘one’, as someone who is not excluded from this, must or should be able to do. This is understood as if it were only authoritarian or career-promoting. In the process one loses sight of an essential dimension of the meaning of the framework guidelines. For the guidelines that mediate education and Bildung—classically spoken: a canon that originates in and 8 There is a combination of different reasons for this. Participation is perceived increasingly less as having a meaning in and for itself, because the opportunity for that is taken for granted, namely in the form of the educational offers and the promises that they imply; or because the social life that participation implies is too complex and has become subjectively too discordant; or because the called for ‘flexibility’ and ‘mobility’ plainly undermines the shaping and growing of individual identity; or because the amount of what ‘one would have to be able to do’ no longer seems to be something that one can achieve, which makes the demands seem nothing but authoritarian.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

211

is based on a general conviction—always have complex reasons. Structurally one can characterize this in a threefold way. To be introduced to a canon (in the process of education), to learn it and participate in it means firstly to be given instruments of understanding and of communication. The canon embodies a social basic consensus, a basic commonality: something that in a certain circle all individuals know and are able to do, and are acquainted with as a pattern of judgment and as an operational scheme. In this respect the canon already serves as a pool of uncomplicated understanding and communication models (for this group of people), a pool of pre-existing, simplifying interpretations in concrete situations (‘But this is . . .’, ‘you’re behaving like . . .’, ‘one should do it this way . . .’, ‘I feel like . . .’). Secondly, a canon is (or should be) in accordance with the socially functioning ‘mediums’ in the broadest sense. The essence of the Bildung process encompasses what competences are needed in mature participation: the ability to read the ‘languages’ of the functioning ‘mediums’ and the ability to express oneself in them. Generally speaking, this may include the following: scientific expressions, art, the language of religions (in the plural), social and political ‘rituals’, codes of the institutions and of justice, the press, television, internet, etc. This is, so to speak, the meaning of the ‘hermeneutical’ goal of a canon in the process of Bildung. Thirdly, a canon is determined by and expresses the themes and the problems that are developed and valued by society. This is what is marked as the questions that should be asked. If today, in light of the increasing pressure through the social reality, the goals of education and Bildung are once more doubted and perceived as conventional at best, this triple necessary meaning of existing framework guidelines will be lost. These givens—and this is what Hegel meant by ‘ethical life’ (‘Sittlichkeit’) and its institutions—encapsulated in and perpetuated by that which education and Bildung attempt to mediate, generally mean the forms of the social realm, of being with the other. And it is only in these respective forms of being with the other that the subject can form something individual of its own. Everything else is mere escapism, denial or arrogance on the part of the subject—that, which Hegel called “sich in sich verhausende Subjektivität”.9 And also genetically, this meaning of the ‘canonized’ social 9 Hegel also relates this to the submilieus (like the “corporations”), were they to seclude themselves (for example in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 255 addendum). For the clarification of Hegel’s position in the discourse cf. Rózsa, Erzsébet: “Bildung und der ‘rechtschaffene Bürger’: zu Hegels Bildungstheorie im Rahmen

212

rainer adolphi

givens applies to the personality- and identity-development. These steps take place—even in cases in which one ultimately distinguishes one’s own standpoint, style or character—facing the existing givens of what is worth knowing, the usefulness of techniques, the typical ways

seiner Konzeption der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der Rechtsphilosophie”. In: id.: Hegels Konzeption praktischer Individualität. Paderborn. 2007, 85–102. And id.: “Bildung und Hegels soziokulturelles Modell der Individualität”, in this volume. In that last two, the interpretation of the “Bildung of the individual” (“Bildung des Individuums”) shows exactly the problem that Hegel shares with the whole horizon of classical understanding (see bellow, part IV): to rely on the sole affirmation of the rationality of the social realm and its institutions, and thereby to seal up any form of these institutions against any criterion of critical experience and to lay down the individual ‘price’ of adaptation, and even the subjective ‘suffering’ under the factual educational institutions for the sake of becoming a grown up member of the community.—But this is only one side of the Hegelian reflections, namely the high-theoretical one. Here he argues in a one-sided and fundamental fashion. One is hence in the danger of falling for a rigid Bildung ideology that allegedly relies on Hegel. For this reason I propose to distinguish between five dimensions in Hegel: 1) the ‘higher’ education such as the middle-class education and the explicit institutions of the church, secondary schools and universities, as well as museums, theaters and music halls, also convey the roles of such Bildung in a ‘divided’ reality and the ‘conciliatory’ function of its classical values (‘the Greek culture’), humanistic sciences and art experiences in an increasingly economic society. Here Hegel seems to reflect the conception (and the self-image) of the cultured or refined classes; 2) the practical (and technical) education through familiarizing oneself with the social practices as well as the available equipment and instruments (Hegel associates this mainly with one’s introduction into the “corporations”); 3) Bildung (becoming educated, educating oneself) from the side of individual—the way that the individual forms a generality, namely out of the ‘higher’ education and the techniques, a (“concrete”) generality of its ways of judging, a “general conduct” (“allgemeines Benehmen”) and ‘sense of adequacy’ that results from the broadness of experience, a habitus of generality in which the individual is elevated above himself (this means for Hegel, elevated to the generality of the respective “matter” (“Sache”)); 4) Bildung as a (world historical or social-cultural) state, as a way in which reality is structured—social demands in a world in which commonness of “ethical life” is no longer naturally immediate, but isolates the individuals so that on the way of Bildung (forming oneself in order to have access and affiliation with something) they have to regain their participation in and the sovereignty over the power (“hard reality” (“harte Wirklichkeit”)) of the social existence. In the course of this process they elevate themselves from what was, or seemed to be their nothingness to a state of “worth” (“Gelten”) and recognition (this is addressed in the Chapter “Spirit in Self-Estrangement—The Discipline of Culture” in the Phenomenology of Mind); 5) the Bildung function of the (necessity of) grappling with objects and above all with their ‘resistance’. Here Bildung is seen as an ‘interaction’ relation, first and foremost as the ‘interaction’ with the independence of the things that do not comply with my will (note, for example, the chapter “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage” in the Phenomenology). On the whole the understanding of “growing into” in Hegel is much more complex than expressed in his explicit statements about Bildung, on which the interpretations (affirmative as well as critical) based themselves. In his explicit dicta he has the tendency to be much more ambivalent, at least from today’s perspective.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

213

of acting, the necessity of being able to judge etc.10 A substantially self-determining individual can only distinguish and develop himself in and against the exiting given and its particular condition. The world of learning has a relational character: growing up is always related to a certain given form. In contrast, the affirmative approach to the dominant standards, that is, the understanding of (cultural) ‘tradition’ and of their internalization as beneficial to success, as well as the critique of the necessities and ideology of the ways of Bildung, conceive of this today as mere contents, as the bulk of content in which one must be proficient.11 This narrows the horizon at which the meaning of the objective of the whole process is aimed and by which it is assessed. The result is the unmistakable danger of the empty formulas today. And at the same time the external pressure underlyingly transformed the objective of education and Bildung in general from being something positive into the prevention of a social negative. The objective is now: not losing the contact to society through education, or to be able to keep up with the level of participation. This external pressure of the social reality indirectly raises the expectations from the system of Bildung—until only the basic minimum that prevents any possible disintegration remains.12 On the whole this is like a chain of (re)shuffling; shifting all the classifications in the process of Bildung by redefining every position downward. Through the fixation on a certain, narrow concept of ‘Participation’ and the other corresponding formulas (such as ‘chances of life’) one could lose sight of the structural meaning of life and the reality of learning, according to which and in which one develops one’s own character. This arises not only from the current circumstances but has deeper reasons that rest on matters of principles. These reasons are related to the thought of Bildung as such and to its modern justification.

10 Of which, of course, not everything—but an essential part—is mediated through Bildung qua explicit social undertakings and institutions, but rather through the ‘normal’ daily experience and living with other people. 11 Whereas the ‘ways of handling’ (even the ways of judging (“the faculty of judgment”) that define adulthood) are also conceived of and treated as contents or a canon of contents. 12 In the meantime this often seems to be bordering on the function of social workers and family therapy.

214

rainer adolphi 3. Perspectives on the Education Process. Classical Legacies in Our Thought of ‘Bildung’

The problem of education signified the first crisis of the project of Enlightenment. Education’s becoming an open question was the first issue that the moderns felt obliged to reflect. They became aware that the objectives of their program—being a human being through reason and self-definition—were in deep need of differentiation. The first fundamental turning point is marked by Rousseau’s First Discourse from 1750 about the relation between the knowledge and technique oriented cultural progress on the one hand, and the state of virtues and morality on the other hand. He pronounced the awareness that a) the development of society, that is, the criteria of the cultural progress understood from the perspective of the program of reason, and the level of development of the individual are not parallel. The accumulated accomplishments and forms and artefacts of civilization allow for an easier life, refinement of the senses and ways of interaction, and intellectual and technical mastery over the given conditions—and the question is to what extent the level of development of the individual is influenced by his very living in this world. b) The whole individual is by no means solely the product of his Bildung, which is signified by his level of reason. The skills that one needs to learn in order to be able to achieve something are first of all merely intellectual skills and do not warrant any respective development of one’s human character in the practical and moral life. These intellectual skills even tend to obstruct this development.13 The notion that the development of society and of the individual are two related sides begins with Rousseau. In the space between the two the question concerning education and Bildung unfolds. What begins with Rousseau is the decisive point that turned the social undertaking of Bildung as an absolute goal that one must not reflect upon into a problem in need of clarification. Up to that time there were two (merely varied) social objectives and basic functions. These were, on the one hand, Bildung, its process and the subjective efforts that were involved, which served as the initiation and growing into

13 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: Discours [sur la] question proposée par [l’]Académie [de Dijon]: Si le rétablissement des sciences & des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs. Genève. 1750.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

215

tradition—that is, acquiring the competencies that constituted the cultural tradition from ancient times, and subjectively attaining the respective social roles entitled one to grow into tradition—and, on the other hand, Bildung as attaining the (technical and intellectual) know-hows of society. The perspective of society (in the sense of the accomplishments of society and the institutional forms in which the individual participates), and the subjective side of this participation, are, since then, no longer the same.14 The issue at stake is now rather the ways and the extent to which these influence each other as well as weighing their pros and cons. However, the crucial things that are to be inferred pertaining to the issues of education and Bildung are not to be found in the works of Rousseau.15 One should instead turn to Kant, who consistently thought out what understanding of education and Bildung meets the demands of the reflective understanding of rationality and self determination and is not blindly euphoric. The legacies that are thus related to Kant can classified in four points. (1) Rousseau’s argumentation juxtaposed knowledge (including the technical know how and the convenience that is created through intellectual power) and practical virtues. This is, as such, almost a conventional old opposition of philosophy. Kant’s thought goes beyond this in that he conceived of development as principally a plurality of capacities. Apart from the theoretical-intellectual and the ‘technical’ physical abilities, the understanding of one’s actions and judging 14 And what is reinforced through the negative attributes and is inscribed in the discourse by formulas such as “mere knowledge”, “dry/dead erudition”, “automatic learning by heart” , “pseudo-education”, “half-education” as well as “over sophistication” (vs. “true education”, “a well-educated person”) etc. 15 There are a few weighty limitations in Rousseau’s thought. He no doubt conveyed the idea of natural learning to the thought of the time (with his influential ‘Education Novel’ Émile ou de l’education. La Haye. 1762). However, even if actively critical, this remained limited to the directly natural—in order to stir the emotions of the young pupil—without reference to the connection to society and its forms. Natural learning is conceived of without the telos of the (at least modern) social and cultural world. The existing aspects of the civic living conditions are, on the other hand, only brought up in the context of ‘cultural criticism’. The issues that concern the dimensions of education and growing into society are addressed as refinements, indirectness, making more convenient and as alienation and means of control. Furthermore, his model of the pedagogical relation was the luxury ideal of the (private) teacher (the tutor).—For the importance and influence of Rousseau cf. Bloch, Jean: Rousseauism and education in eighteenth-century France. Oxford. 1995. Py, Gilbert: Rousseau et les éducateurs. Étude sur la fortune des idées pédagogiques de Jean-Jacques Rousseau en France et en Europe au XVIIIe siècle. Oxford. 1997.

216

rainer adolphi

one’s actions, and the interpersonal sensibility—briefly, the theoretical and practical skills—there is above all a third aesthetic capacity that is increasingly invoked since the late Enlightenment. Kant’s view was that this variety, which is what our humanity consists in, does not develop by itself. Developments of abilities in one of these various capacities of man do not imply automatic developments in the other capacities. Furthermore, one cannot assume that the elements of this variety naturally match one another. It is only since Kant that there is a consistent meta-goal, namely an upbringing that is not one-sided, an upbringing that evokes and forms the structural plurality of what we are. This is understood under the topos of the ‘whole person’ (‘der ganze Mensch’) and having the whole spectrum of his capacities in sight in order to integrate them into a harmonious and integral character (Kant uses the term ‘proportionierlich’).16 (2) Kant begins with the point that being human, in the sense of being an adult, also signifies a problem: every individual must first become a fellow-man and this means that man is a being in need of Bildung. What distinguishes man from all other forms of life is the self positioning of his ideas and beliefs through language. This is expressed in the word ‘I’. The individual is aware of his cognitive beliefs about reality, of his goals and values, as well as of his feeling the likes and dislikes as his own.17 He situates these together with the subject-index before himself and others.18 This articulation of the word ‘I’ is also the first step over the power of the contents of consciousness. Thus the feeling for one’s own self has to be strengthened. This means strengthening natural self awareness against the backdrop of society (and nature). Likewise, the other direction is called for; the awareness that one is one of many, who are equal to one, must be made present. One must understand oneself as being and acting in public.19 This is the way to let the concept of oneself as a mere ‘citizen 16 W. von Humboldt uses a similar concept. For Kant cf. Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik. Ed. Rink, Friedrich Theodor. Königsberg. 1803, A 11, 13. 17 More accurately, this is usually a potentiality, but in reality (and in infants as well as in illiterate people this is even more dominant) this slips into an objectivism of consciousness out of which the reflection (of the adult) can place it back into the relationality to one’s self. 18 This is most clearly expressed in the introduction to Kant’s Anthropologie. Cf. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßt. Königsberg. 1798 (A), 2. ed. 1800 (B), BA 3–8. 19 This opposite direction of the process of becoming is likewise to be found in the Anthropologie, ibid. But also, with great pathos, in Kant’s Pädagogik.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

217

of the world’ (‘Weltbürger’)—that “Denkungsart: sich nicht als die ganze Welt in seinem Selbst [i.e. in one’s authoritative subjective self] befassend, sondern als einen bloßen Weltbürger zu betrachten und zu verhalten”—become a habitual way of thinking of oneself. Only in placing myself as a ‘citizen of the world’, that is, in the world and together with others, can I free myself from myself. This is the degree of freedom also against my own situational state of being.20 It is thus a two sided development. And these two sides, individual subjectivity and an awareness of being with others, are constitutive of a process of becoming a human world (in the big course of ‘Humanity’). This process must, at the same time, repeat in every new individual in the form of education and Bildung. The same process must be comprehended and proven true anew in and by every new individual. (3) The crucial point, alongside the ‘external’ aspects that have to be learned, of commanding the theoretical knowledge and the practical know how, is the way of thinking of these things (‘Denkungsart’). This is, more concretely, human judgment (‘Urteilskraft’). This can, according to Kant’s famous comment, only be practiced (‘geübt’), and be developed through given examples (‘Beispiele’).21 The development of this is, however, no direct process. This is not a process of internalized thoughts and judgement paradigms that are practiced and being advanced in course of the interaction with the givens in society.22 Rather, this is essentially related to the images of the self, images of ‘I can’. This is to be understood in the sense of my ability—this constitutes my moral character—to turn against my own state of being, the luring of my desires and the subjective need to claim my worth. This ‘can’ or ‘could’ give me my own ‘value’ (‘Wert’). This is a value that I grant myself in relation to others and of which I am aware.23 I free myself of the slavish (‘knechtisch’) spirit only in such

20

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, BA 8. Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 172f. 22 This would mean: something ultimately socially conventional. 23 „Der scholastischen [that means: the education through the institutions] Bildung oder der Unterweisung bedarf der Mensch, um zur Erreichung aller seiner Zwecke geschickt zu werden. Sie giebt ihm einen Werth in Ansehung seiner selbst als Individuum [—not to feel oneself as dependent on others and on external things, i.e. a (possible human) autarchy]. Durch die Bildung zur Klugheit aber wird er zum Bürger gebildet, da bekommt er einen öffentlichen Werth. Da lernt er sowohl die bürgerliche Gesellschaft zu seiner Absicht lenken, als sich auch in die bürgerliche Gesellschaft schicken. Durch die moralische Bildung endlich bekommt er einen Werth in Ansehung des ganzen menschlichen Geschlechts.” Über Pädagogik, A 36. 21

218

rainer adolphi

images. I free myself also from being a slave to the self-infatuation in my own opinions, resentments and habits. I become free of the bonds to my praxis patterns, schemata of behavior and ‘techniques’ (in the widest sense) that I have taken over or that have become a (reaction) automatism. (4) The process of becoming a full human being is a multidimensional both on the level of humanity or society and on the level of the individual. This process is: firstly, a certain restraining of the raw affects through ‘disciplining’ (‘Disziplinierung’); secondly, the instrumental ability to command aspects of the world as well as oneself—in Kantian terminology, ‘cultura’, ‘cultivation’ (‘Kultivierung’); thirdly, one must develop the sensibility for the social, as well as knowing and mastering the rules and forms of society—generally speaking, one becomes competent in one’s actions and situations of life (the process of ‘Zivilisierung’); lastly, it is the specific process of becoming moral, the ability of self-judgment, the awareness that one is one among the others (‘Moralisierung’).24 In each of these processes (in many respects the elementary ‘disciplining’ is perhaps an exception) the impulse to go further, to reach out to a higher level in one’s actions, stems from the individual.25 The individual’s growing into society is the point of the constant questioning and proving true of what was achieved and insofar as this is not only an internalization of the norms of society this is a source and a criterion of what is new and what is changing. But at the same time, according to Kant, the structure of society has its own development and advancement; it adopts the forms (be it a social system or relation, a system of knowledge or a cultural aspect) that make it more ‘successful’. It is, in today’s language, in a sense an ‘evolutionary’ development of learning of the social system. Here, many completely profane factors cause such a development. And in some respects the nature of society is to lead the way; it embraces—has to embrace—something as its own that would less likely have become reality only out of pure disposition to Bildung.26

24 Cf. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, B 314-319, 321f. Über Pädagogik, A 22–26. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht [1784], A 402f. 25 Cf. Über Pädagogik, A 18–21. 26 Cf. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte, A 392–394, 398–401, 405.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

219

4. The Age of the Antithetical (The Education of Anti-Bildung) The classical understanding of Bildung, as formulated by Kant, has an implicit underside and this has led to an inner discrepancy and conflict in the thought and the institutions of Bildung in the course of the 19th century. The classical idea, with its determinations of the education process and its goals and institutions, assumes certain things that seem foreign to us: assumptions that are outdated, or rather, undermined by reality. The core of these assumptions is the classical corresponding development of achievement and development of the rationalhuman relations in social life—reflected in the ‘institutions’—and of the development of the individual and his personality (‘Persönlichkeit’).27 The very discourse of Bildung and its emergence meant that man, and accordingly, society, have not yet reached all of their possibilities, they have not yet fulfilled their whole potential. The classical understanding, with its discourse of ‘mature and responsible adulthood’ (‘mündiges Erwachsen-sein’)—that is, becoming an adult—depends on the inseparability of the ideas of Bildung and of society. This contained an educational optimism and a social optimism. More precisely, this contained an optimism concerning the social institutions, and concerning the developmental process and life within these institutional forms. These premises, however, seemed to be disproved by reality. The mentality of thinking about education and Bildung changed its color.—The clearest sign for this is perhaps the fact that the school, as a place of education and Bildung, became not only a theme of literature, but one with a negative accentuation. School, the experience of being educated and cultured became—almost analogous to the other compulsory institutions of social integration, much like the casern and its own world of ‘rights’—a symbol of existential negativity and destruction of personality that goes far beyond the classical idea of ‘alienation’ (‘Entfremdung’). Where the classical Bildungsroman

27 And also, the fact that in this process of Bildung of the individual the ‘values’ and ideals of liberality and tolerance of civil (“bürgerlich”, “zivil”) society are mediated against the domestic and rural fixed relations on which there is a traditional insistence. The space of school is also the release from the pure traditional domestic ‘truths’ and values into which one is born and that call for inclusion with the authority of the elders. The ‘discovery of childhood’ since the middle of the 18th century was thus simultaneously the impulse to break the naturalness of the family (and of the rural life assignments).

220

rainer adolphi

once styled a utopia of individuality and of social life,28 loneliness, sexual insecurities (and repression), violence and suicidal despair now became the landmarks that paved the way to social adulthood and society.29 This also belongs to the big progress in which Bildung became reality and is the reaction to this reality—the established dominant forms—of what was formerly a pure idea. The discourse became once again more complex, the new complexity became the experience of the individual situation (the subjection to the obligation to live) in these institutions. As much as this situation intensified at the transition to the 20th century, albeit pointing to something fundamental, it is also more than merely a reflection of an external, transitory crisis. As a whole, this change pertained to the whole mentality of thought, as well as the general mood of society. The new central theme in literature was nothing but its symptom; the change had to do with the classical understanding of Bildung as such. This idea contained many ambiguities that became a breach of the new anti-social thought of Bildung, since the problems regarding the relation between the social process and the personal development were barely expounded on. I will outline a few of these ambiguities: (1) The idea of the simple, ‘good sense’ for the right and true. This is an echo of the Christian idea that the uneducated—the simple man, the child, the natural woman— preserved a healthy feel for things and a have a ‘good soul’. This implies that the access to the important things is possible without—or especially without—education and Bildung. The access to these things is already inherent to man. (2) The circularity that is expressed by the classical question ‘who will educate the educator?’ that is known since Lessing in a oscillation between answers of the revelation theology kind, the avantgarde-theoretical kind and the optimistic progress of

28 To name a few: Jacobs, Jürgen: Wilhelm Meister und seine Brüder. Untersuchungen zum deutschen Bildungsroman. München. 1972. Moretti, Franco: The way of the world. The “Bildungsroman” in European culture. London. 1987. Paul, Jean-Marie (ed.): Images de l’homme dans le roman de formation ou Bildungsroman. Nancy. 1995. May, Anja: Wilhelm Meisters Schwestern. Bildungsromane von Frauen im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert. Königstein. 2006. Chardin, Philippe (ed.): Roman de formation, roman d’éducation dans la littérature française et dans les littératures étrangères. Paris. 2007. 29 This completely new, negative approach is articulated in the German cultural area, for example, in Frank Wedekind’s Frühlings Erwachen (1891), Robert Musil’s Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törless (1906) or Hermann Hesse’s Unterm Rad (1906).

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

221

civilization.30 The fact that this type of a question could be so prominent was the expression, or the consequence, of a type of thinking that was not fundamental enough and not consistent in its entirety.31 In the course of the 19th an automatism of social and scientific ‘progress’ replaced this circularity. The personal sides of the direction of the educational processes and the educationally competent subject were replaced by an anonymous hyper-subject, hyper-determination. (3) The idea of the ‘whole person’ (‘der ganze Mensch’) and of the harmonious awakening and unfolding of the structurally varied capacities (or ‘talents’). This was an elevated normative understanding of unity and balance, according to which the proliferation of the plurality is possible without contradictions, as opposed to the idea of a completely cohesive tendency in character (an integral meta-habitus of one’s subjectivity). Concretely, this means that the (regulative) way one should conceive of a theory of the whole framework that is neutral in its demands—a framework that does not restrict one to the conditions into which one is born, to one’s gender or one’s roles, one that implies that being human is enough—and of the dimension of the conditional undertakings of Bildung and of educational efforts as blended. Critical against one-sidedness, this idea of ‘the whole’ became a vehicle of the ubiquitous want for new experiments to be taken into account and of the widespread dismissal of existing institutions and paths. (4) Lastly the unexplained significance of plain knowledge and ‘technical’ abilities. The lofty ethical goal of Bildung led it increasingly away from this, especially as society was increasingly seen as ambivalent. ‘True’ Bildung seemed to begin where this was not present: refining the individual and pulling him out of the petty instrumental thinking and the factoring in of facts was the upbringing into the world of the ideal. The pure obligation to be competent in order to be able to participate in the practices of social life and not be disconnected from it, seem to be disdainful banalities that do not reflect the true task of Bildung. With the accelerating dynamic of society this caused, at the same time, a split between the generations. This one-sided noble ideal of Bildung caused an opposition of two generations; a respectively older generation that still had the social power in its hands and a generation that 30

Cf. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim: Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. Berlin. 1780. 31 Without such an ambiguity in the theory this type of question could not have received this status.

222

rainer adolphi

was moving up, and which already superseded the former in respect of the required skills and knowledge. With the fading of the promise of ‘society’, the promise for a good society through Bildung, through the upbringing of a new, free man, the ideal of the goal of Bildung split. The ideal and goal fissured into the public and social vs. the personal. Bildung was understood as either a (useful) participation in the process of the scientific and technical progress, or as the inner power and richness of self that is in no way attributable to a functional context and that is adversative to social reality. Nowadays, under the threat of disintegration, the concept of Bildung as a useful ‘participation’ in the process of scientific and technical progress moved up to the position of almost a sole ruler. In contrast, in the phase of the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century the concept of Bildung as a way of resisting assimilation into a functional context and standing in opposition to the demands of society became dominant.32 The great ideas, sketches and programs of the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th century were increasingly characterized by the thought of an ‘Anti-Bildung’. The more modern society became questionable, the more Bildung was understood as the way of escaping the unreasonable demands and constraints of society, as being free from and above society. The different schools of thought share this basic characteristic of the period; they are oriented towards a kind of ‘Anti-Bildung’, an education to a type of ‘anti-man’. The characteristics of this period are: the new, at times exclusive, focus33 on physical education and the sensory, artistic (‘musisch’) Bildung; the idea of Bildung for workmen as the true relevant Bildung for the majority of people, instead of the grand ideals of Bildung (and the institutions and complete canon) of the old, parasitical classes; the powerful conceptions of the Bildung of the ‘inner person’ (in that time understood primarily as the object and even privilege of the churchly or churchly oriented education in an intended polarity against the mental or ‘spiritual’ participation in society, that is, in the ‘modern’ and ‘modern relations’); the new renaissance of a pathos of self-Bildung, of experi-

32 Cf. Conze, Werner & Kocka, Jürgen (eds.): Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. 4 volumes. Stuttgart. 1985–1992; especially vol. II: Koselleck, Reinhard: Bildungsgüter und Bildungswissen. Stuttgart. 1990. 33 This is related to the wish to ‘get out of the city life!’.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

223

encing the world (for example, through traveling widely and exposing oneself to the foreign and exotic), Bildung as experiencing oneself, or, generally, the pathos of the autodidactic. In all of the above the high value of building and upbringing of one’s ‘character’ was propagated. This concept of Anti-Bildung separated and elevated itself from what it considered the plain and mediocre (modern) scientific and technical Bildung, the pool of facts that area available for one to learn, the understanding of society, its ‘functioning’ and normative traditions. But these ideas also drew on the power of the former concept of Bildung. It was a state of a fermentation that had sallied forth. The idea of Bildung was confronted with the success of its realization. It entered an examination of the implementations of its ideas and principles, which occurred in the course of the development of society. This is the crisis of the institutions and the proliferation of the idea. This is also present today as the phase of the reaching the acme. Lastly, this is the crisis of the idea of the citoyen—the citoyen who becomes a moral man in the community and its institutions. 5. The Challenge of a Fragmentary Reality The great social changes of the 20th century and the social and political experiences of this century have robbed Bildung and the established institutions of education of their self-evidence. They robbed them of their evident and consensual meaning. The experience of the failure of Bildung was added to (and hence confronted) the general scepticism that expressed itself in the many new educational projects and experiments of Bildung. This century also experienced highly educated societies that were proud of their Bildung and humanistically educated elites that degenerated into irrational Weltanschauungen and barbarism. The failure of the humane promise of Bildung seemed to belong to the legacy of the 20th century. The theory, helplessly sworn to the old forms, could hardly appropriately counter this sentiment. Since the beginning of bourgeois society the search for the right, true and essentially human Bildung, in opposition to paradigms of tradition, ruling society and existing functional demands, belongs to the reflection about Bildung. Bildung, with its associated promise, was lastly always a critical project of society. The thought of Bildung was the place where one could challenge the established system of knowledge, praxis and normative institutions.

224

rainer adolphi

At the beginning of the 20th century the reflections about Bildung, at any case the ones that were philosophically grounded, lost this contact with reality. The concepts of education and Bildung, even given all the projects and experiments that were obviously present, belonged to the weak ‘academic’ pieces of philosophy at the transition into the 20th century.34 The existing social tendency and the idea of Bildung moved away from each other. Reality caught the theory off-guard. I do see an interesting exception. The idealistic renaissance of that time, and in particular Neo-Kantianism is, unlike other directions, not solely marked by significant theoretical flaws.35 The contribution of Neo-Kantianism contains, according to my thesis, deep philosophical insights about Bildung. This potential is, of course, hidden. In this section I will attempt to delineate this at least in a rudimentary way and in this way to provide an awareness of the theory, which keeps up with the current social-givens. The core of that contribution is presented in the title of this paper: the Problem of being one’s own Self in a fragmented life. This denotes the need for an adequate idea of education and Bildung under the conditions of the current social reality. This, of course, does not hold per se. I do not mean to aim at the Kantian oriented, Interpretative Sociology (‘Verstehende Soziologie’) nor at the cultural studies of the late Georg Simmel, at least not in the present framework.36 Simmel was the one who reflected on the problem of modern individuality and the process of individualization and its constraints in the most significant way. He also reflected on the imminent inescapability of the fragmentation of life, the fragmentation due to ‘standing in’ many different spheres (‘Lebenskreise’).37 But Simmel still thinks of these issues within the framework of an integral, 34 Incidentally, this is also true of philosophical Aesthetics, that absorbed almost nothing of the whole ‘modern’ art. 35 This new idealism is a reaction to the reality of technicalization, scientification, industrialization, the social revolutions that follow and what these things mean for the opportunities of the life of a free, self-determining individual. Accordingly, its true opposition is not the same as in the classical phase of Kant or Hegel. The danger, with which this idealism got in the ring, was Positivism—against a way of thinking that the scientific reflection would only orchestrate the dominant given reality (the social modernization). 36 For this first positioning cf. Adolphi, Rainer: “Kultur statt Geist—ein neues Paradigma in der Wissenschaft? Das von G. Simmel hinterlassene Erbe in der Kulturphilosophie”. In: Wunsch, Matthias et al. (eds.): Von Hegel zur philosophischen Anthropologie [forthcoming]. 37 For instance, the classical theme of the ‘division of labor’ that is further formulated in the social studies since the Philosophie des Geldes. Leipzig. 1900.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

225

whole ‘Soul’ (‘Seele’) or ‘character’ (‘Charakter’ of one’s ‘Persönlichkeit’) that are obtained from within.38 Furthermore, he did not take the modern side—the individualization and fragmentation—into account in his few pedagogical texts.39—However, the thematic reflections on education that can be found in Neo-Kantianism (in the narrow sense of the Neo-Kantian school) also only hint at what can be developed from this idealistic renaissance. All of them think in terms of the conventional bourgeois ideals, in the ‘humanistic’ terms of education and institutions of the 19th century, that are furnished with a new rationale that seems to be very sophisticated. In any case, this is very abstract and ‘idealistic’.40 Neo-Kantianism as a general phenomenon is therefore a philosophy that is articulated in different directions and is very broad (the breadth of which was dominant—one might say—in the whole philosophical thinking in Europe for centuries). However, at the same time, it did not fulfil its whole potential. This is true, incidentally, for other fields as well, but it is especially true of the way in which its understanding of what it means to be one’s self influenced the conception of education and Bildung. The true potential of the updated German Idealism, which Neo-Kantianism wanted to be, can be found in the figure that possibly expresses this in the most implicit manner, namely Heinrich Rickert. His Idealism tried to connect the Kantian way of approach and argumentation with a Hegelian orientation towards the spreading of a ‘System’ that contains antagonistic polarities. This is precisely the way in which he introduced a complex concept of being one’s self and the respective educational and philosophical implications.

38 This can be seen, for instance, in his influential “Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur”. In: id.: Philosophische Kultur. Leipzig. 1911, 245–277. 39 Cf. Schulpädagogik. Osterwieck. 1922. 40 For instance, the great pedagogical works of Jonas Cohn, Bruno Bauch and Richard Hönigswald, but even the so-called “Social Pedagogy” of Paul Natorp. Cf. Cohn, Jonas: Geist der Erziehung. Pädagogik auf wissenschaftlicher Grundlage. Berlin. 1919. Id.: Befreien und Binden. Zeitfragen der Erziehung überzeitlich betrachtet. Leipzig. 1926. Bauch, Bruno: “Über die philosophische Stellung der Pädagogik im System der Wissenschaften”. In: Vierteljahresschrift für philosophische Pädagogik. 1917. Id.: Die erzieherische Bedeutung der Kulturgüter. Leipzig. 1929. Hönigswald, Richard: Studien zur Theorie pädagogischer Grundbegriffe. Stuttgart. 1913. Id.: Über die Grundfragen der Pädagogik. München. 1926. Natorp, Paul: Sozialpädagogik. Stuttgart. 1899. Id.: Allgemeine Pädagogik in Leitsätzen zu akademischen Vorlesungen. Marburg. 1905. And id.: Pädagogik und Philosophie. Paderborn. 1964. And more general: Litt, Theodor: Die Erziehungsphilosophie der Gegenwart und ihr Einfluß auf das Bildungsideal. Leipzig. 1924.

226

rainer adolphi

One can find this especially in the period between 1910 and the mid 1920’s, with the two key works “Vom System der Werte” and System der Philosophie.41 Rickert’s insight was that different demands of consideration and of participation that have to be met, approach us by the unfolding of the social and cultural conditions of life. What unfolds is a structural variety that can only be made unitary at the cost of narrowing life. Each part of this multiplicity appears as a specific ‘sphere’ (‘Sphäre’) of meaning and values, and consequently, of life. With the unfolding of the social and cultural conditions of life, the following spheres necessarily develop: (a) – Spheres of the human standpoint—spheres that only become truly ‘personal’ (‘persönlich’) and individual in this process, – and next, or opposite, to these spheres, spheres that require ‘objectivity’ (and are understood as such). So the personal and the objective develop next to each other. And likewise, both of these develop as ‘spheres’: (b) – where the individual and its actual aspirations and actions are completely immersed in the experience and its meaning (such as in art, or the domestic cares and relations, friendships and human sociability); – where one’s aspirations and doings stand and are increasingly understood as a kind of cooperation in a task that encompasses many generations and even humanity, a cooperation that is a process that extends into the future—one understands his doings as a small contribution to this that will someday be outdated (for instance, in the project of the scientific ‘understanding of the world’, or that of the ‘just society’);

41 Rickert, Heinrich: “Vom System der Werte”. In: Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur. Vol. 4 (1913), 295–327. Id.: System der Philosophie. Erster Teil: Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie [only this part was published]. Tübingen. 1921.—In the following the ideas and the potential of this Rickert perspective will be examined as a whole; I will not give, therefore, any multitude of particular details and references.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

227

– where the need for transcendence is stirred (this occurs, for instance, in religion or in mystical thinking); – where the individual ‘exists’ as a searching being and aspires to transcend himself and the mundane (for example, in the aspiration to go beyond oneself in the search of a philosophical explanation of the world or in the love of another person). Progressing culture is therefore more than freeing man from ignorance, fears and the accustoming to power relations through reason and self determination. This progress is also the path to a world and an experience of the world that are, inevitably, increasingly more complex. These different areas do not simply develop—against each other—according to their own logic and grammar into diverging systems of thought and participation. Rather, they require the interweaving of the individual in all of them. In order to be able to participate in the process as a fellow human being, I am expected to have different orientations and concerns. The power over us results from the fact that these areas are connected to human primal reality of significances. This is, at the same time, the point of normative criteria, the point that provides the opposition to the raw givens (an opposition that is strengthened though ‘Bildung’). Rickert characterizes these as certain ‘super-historical’ (‘überhistorisch’) moments of the structure of the human world of meaning, which underlie the individual and historical manifold of knowledge, abilities and the normative. Their status constitutes the fundamental spheres of values (‘Wert’-‘Gebiete’). They constitute the general different spaces of orientation, which increasingly grow apart as culture advances. In these spheres every meaningfully possible subjective knowing and ability are devised—knowledge and ability of the individuals follows the specific logicality of each of these spheres and can only be understood (by the individual and by the others) in terms of each sphere and its logicality. They do not only imply different worlds of the respective actual ‘Goods’ (‘Güter’: science, art, ethics/law etc.). Rather, fundamentally different ways of behavior (judging, perceiving, norm setting etc.) correspond to these spheres. Rickert shows eight (two times four) such possible spheres of meaning: – In the ‘objectivity’ attitude: the Scientific, the Aesthetic, the Mystical and the Philosophical.

228

rainer adolphi

– In bringing the personal life and the standpoint of the subject to bear: aiming at a moral-normative standard of human coexistence, according to the principle of the well-being of one’s personal community (‘eudaimonistically’), the importance of one’s religious beliefs in a personal God, and one’s erotic love relations (‘the beloved other’ / ‘our love’). Given this conception, the understanding of individual development underwent a radical change. It became more complex by a whole dimension. An education process belongs to every sphere, out of the practices of every sphere a characteristic education (or socialization) ideal emerges, an ideal of ‘adulthood’ and competence.42 In effect this requires multiple aims and ways of achieving adulthood. The more advanced the cultural development and the more ‘modern’ the state of society, the more these aims and their paths are known. In every field, including the related ‘techniques’, one needs an introduction and Bildung in order to master it. One needs to be acquainted with the rules and principles of the respective field. Bildung is required in order for one to know the norms of one’s practices. Furthermore, Bildung allows one to resist being completely pulled by the power of these fields and being a system conforming pin in the respective dominant logic of the field. Thus there are several kinds of undertakings that allow the individual to be a full (fellow) subject: – The levelheaded ‘scientific’ study of causality, the acknowledgement of facts and causal relations. – The cultivation of an ‘aesthetic’ sensitivity—not only in the detached sense of (high) ‘art’, but also the cultivation of the competence for (recognizing) the aesthetic phenomena of reality (nowadays this increasingly implies that one learns to appreciate the social and political realities in relation to their mediums and ways of symbolizing). – Building a disposition of being a citizen among other citizens and of being engaged in an improvement of the social circumstances for the sake of a ‘just society’.

42 As well as an ideal of what has to be rejected as ‘improper’ behavior and thoughts for ‘the adult’.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

229

– The intimate humaneness towards the other and living a harmonious, fulfilling life. – Developing religious sensibility (‘Religiosität’: with the help of one’s religious tradition)—in order to establish, in this personal relationship to one’s God or gods, a dialogical standard, even if it may be utopian (to the point of an inner revolt, uprising or rebellion à la Hiob). – Learning to be passive, to stand in awe; and the ability of resisting the external imperatives and demands.43 – The path of the philosophical (‘philosophisch’) search. – Finding the beloved (‘geliebt’) other, the fidelity to the singular concrete other in his/her finitude and imperfection. In this going beyond oneself one finds oneself as well. These are, necessarily, matters of our own full life with the respective value and significance profiles of the culturally and socially formed spheres of value (‘Wert’-‘Gebiete’). The special insight that this contains in modern times, however, is the reflection on the expectations and demands that one faces. One is expected to participate in different spheres of life and has the experience of a forced plurality of life and of the paradigm of the self in a reality of expectations and possibilities that is increasingly fragmented. Every individual lives, through his ways of interaction, in a world of forms and, concretely, of goods. In every step of the way one is educated through participating. One is, in other words, brought up by the existing reality that makes certain demands. Only some of these things44 are a deliberate undertaking. Being brought up by reality: letting this process develop without the option of distancing oneself from it either in practice or in thought would have the certain grave consequences. 1) Remaining at the mercy of the ‘ideologies’ that are fed by one’s actual participation. 2) One would also remain at the mercy of the needs for these goods, needs

43 The religious (actively and personally) and the mystical (contemplative, cancelling oneself as an individual in one’s own naturalness and stirring of desires) are, for Rickert, the pertaining original polarity regarding our human direction towards the transcendent. 44 Today this is even more prominent—with the ‘discovery of childhood’ since the time of Rousseau and with the awareness of the necessary ‘lifelong learning’, resulting from the change of the life and work conditions, as well as with what became in the late modern world less and less a matter of course.

230

rainer adolphi

that are created or evoked by the existing reality. This would necessarily be a life that passes one by, a life that is only executed but not created by oneself. One’s life would remain captivated by the dominant facticities that one has participated in establishing. 3) Moreover, one would remain caught up in the maelstrom of the different ‘Weltanschauungen’ and torn by one-sided ‘Weltanschauungen’ that are borne out of the plural life of participation. Out of the different value fields the respective Weltanschauungen (or, more accurately, the manifestations of the Weltanschauungen)—from ‘scientism’, ‘aestheticism’, ‘moralism’ etc. to ‘eroticism’—would take possession of the people. This would happen not only in relation to of the respective philosophical ideologies.45 The task of the designated undertakings of the education as paving the way to competent adulthood is hence lastly to raise awareness of this plurality and, on the other hand, of the enticement of the one-sided ways of thought and sensibility. Through this the search for the form that holds true for oneself is initiated. This was once reflected in the thought of ‘maturity’ (‘Mündigkeit’). Rickert did not develop this as such, as a thread in his theory. However, in effect this is just what his theory means. His theory reformulates this aim under the conditions of a fragmentary reality of the demands and possibilities of life.46 It shows in what way this has to be refined. The current ubiquitous rhetoric of ‘maturity’, however, is, in comparison to the old thoughts of ‘maturity’ and the ways in which Rickert can and should be refined, at best a hackneyed pathos. And it has contaminated the discourse of education and Bildung with this pathos. 45 This would be, for instance, a specific (historical, social, cultural) “scientific” paradigm, a specific interpretation of the principles of order and justice, etc. 46 This assertion requires qualifications since Rickert is, without a doubt, led by a ‘culturally’ noble concept of human circumstances and social realities. This is manifested in two dimensions or levels. On the one hand he classically grasps all that exists only from the side of the subject, as an intentional creation. For this reason the internal references and the momentum within the relations of a given cultural world remain almost completely out of sight. That is, the implicit demands that they (for instance, the references and the developmental dynamics of an existing ‘scientific system’ or existing ‘social order’) imply in order to remain independent in face of the power of the process and hence more “mature” (‘mündig’) remain almost out of sight. On the other hand, certain ‘profane’ fields do not appear at all in Rickert’s own concept and are accordingly not included in the process of becoming an independent and competent individual. These fields are, for instance, the whole economy, as well as technical knowledge. Rickert views these fields and what they mean for life as, at best, an (instrumental) subform of the true “fields of value”, rather than as a phenomenon of its own, a separate problem or as a task for the understanding of what upbringing, education and Bildung are.

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

231

6. (Epilogue). The Lure of Success In view of the accomplishments of the reflection of past constellations an alienation from the things that seemed to be self-evident is brought about. Rickert’s conception of the pluralism of the fields or spheres of values creates a relative distance to the current charged discourse about Bildung. The discourse is charged with the conflict between different basic principles of thought. It brings back the awareness to the side of the reality of becoming an independent person that was lost in the pathos of the Bildung polemic. Bildung, this project from the legacy of modern times, is a success story. This undertaking and its formed institutions are—and one can say this justly despite the new problems that arise—a success story on the whole. This remains the case with all the new insights and the, at times, ambivalence of this idea in its early stages. Many critical insights, namely corrective ones, belong to this path: insights into the—in the earlier stages once—corporeal, haptic, creative and ‘artistic’ repressions, into the repressing sides of school and university as ‘establishments’, into the transported ideologies, including the outmoded ‘cultural’ ideologies, into the relativity of ‘class’ of a dominant canon and the arrogance of the ‘educated class’, and lastly, into the self-referentiality of an established teacher-position and the small ‘fabrications of life’ of the socially dominant self image of the educator. We reflect in a state of luxury. We live in a world in which Bildung and what was achieved in the name of Bildung in terms of the social advancement, one’s own choice of the paths of life, and more broadly, participation, became a matter that is self-evident. There are, to be sure, pressing questions and these are the ones standing behind the motivations for disputations, self-reflection, the publication of discussions and conference-undertakings. It is for this reason that being skeptical about Bildung, which implies the new ideas of the escape into the complete otherness, of the heroic opposition to the demands of Bildung and of society (that seem to oppose the natural and its own impulses), would be merely a luxury complaint. This would be the complaint of the one who owes most of all, including one’s own opportunities, to Bildung and the social efforts in the name of Bildung. The success of this whole undertaking was made possible not least through philosophical dimension. With this I return to the opening question of this paper. This is the question regarding ‘reflection and reality’. The idea behind the modern undertaking of Bildung, especially its philosophical derivation and purpose is something that makes itself

232

rainer adolphi

unrecognizable the more successfully it functions. The success—that Bildung and its institutions have become reality—produces a certain self-description. The structure of this self-description consists in construing oneself as the instance that leads to social participation, the instance that mediates the competencies of the individual for social participation. This emerging self-description of the established ‘System of Bildung’47 positioned itself ahead of the philosophical justification and the awareness of the problems that it contained, which were once primary. Declining the old thought that stemmed from philosophy was a manifestation of long existing open issues that, under the current social reality—and therefore under the increasing demands on the Bildung system—only appears on the surface. It is precisely these givens of reality that make the concepts of Anti-Bildung, which want a completely new upbringing of people, less sufficient than ever for the actual situation.48 These sketches of Anti-Bildung increasingly prove themselves, instead, as residues of the old socially anchored ideas of Bildung and their intellectual radiance. The condition requires much more a social awareness.49 It requires the awareness of the contingencies and the awareness that these contingencies and conditionalities should be mediated in the process of Bildung. These contingencies are subject to beliefs and suppositions (‘knowledge’, convictions), and

47

Qua one of the social subsystems. But, conversely, the glance into the supposed ‘good times’ is just as insufficient. With the success of the concepts of Anti-Bildung, the absorption of its impulses into the general social Bildung system, a new Anti-Anti-Bildung formed itself in the last three or four decades. This happened with the high note that lamented the decline of the authority of the educator and of the image and prestige of adulthood in general. Above all, waves of such instances are present in the media: in the lament of the weakening of the ‘natural’ subordination relation between the young and the old, the decline not only of the true Bildung, but also of all (western) cultural level. The access influence on the social conditions that is related to this lament does not examine the changed circumstances of reality, but rather makes the established ideas of education, now the ones of the Anti-Bildung and the institutions that were infected with these ideas, responsible (with the names “the 68ers” and their authority-fleeing ideas of society). For this reason this complaint does not see the structural meaning (see above) of the social givens and the commitments (‘canon’) that it seeks to strengthen.—I am not sure to what extent Ad Verbrugge (see his paper “The Cultural Dimension of Education”, in this volume) keeps away from the shallows of the hackneyed cultural authority-rhetoric. 49 Likewise, it requires the awareness of impracticability—the recognition that certain things in the education process can not be controlled or ‘reprogrammed’, but that one needs to allow certain things simply to grow. 48

being one’s own self in a fragmented life

233

actions, regardless of how high the education; they exist as long as one is involved with the community and asserts oneself in certain functional forms of the social world. It requires, furthermore, conceptual thought that can rise up to the challenge of the awareness to the problem, of the givens of the current social reality. It would therefore not be a bad move to adopt some of the characteristics of the connection of Kantian and Hegelian thought that is present in the theory of Rickert’s theory. Regardless, the following is always true: where a good educator is found, no theoretical reflection and program is needed. Where a good educator exists, the process of becoming a whole person, a complete fellow subject, finds its good and humane path. A good educator, who embodies the Eros of Bildung, is always more helpful than the polished and perfected concept of education. And such an educator recovers even the dumbest concept. Education, Bildung, is a singular object of reflection. As such, its crucial factor is its embodiment in the individual people. This cannot be secured by any theory nor destroyed by any thought. Translated from German by Rina Tzinman

CONTRIBUTORS Emiliano Acosta is since 2008 postdoctoral researcher at Ghent University (Belgium), Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences. His previous and current research focuses on historic philosophical questions concerning the classical transcendental philosophy (Kant and Fichte) and the so-called Radical Enlightenment and their contribution to the contemporary debate on pluralism, tolerance, freedom of press and individual freedom. Important publications: “Vier Bedeutungen des Wortes Nicht-Ich in Jenaer Periode Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre”, in: S. Rapic/M. Pfeiffer (ed.), Das Selbst und sein Anderes. Festschrift für Klaus Kaehler, Freibourg/München, 2009, pp. 98–108. “L’annihilation de l’Etat à partir des concepts d’Homme, de societé et d’Etat dans les Leçons sur la destination du savant”, in: J.C. Goddard/J. Rivera de Rosales (ed.), Fichte et la politique, Monza, 2008, pp. 401–413. Rainer Adolphi is Professor of Philosophy at Technische Universität Berlin (Germany). Area of specialization in the field of history: as well Philosophy of German Idealism as the general history of thinking in 19th and 20th century; systematic specialization mainly in the field of practical philosophy, espacially: Theory of Culture, Anthropology, Social and Political Theory, Theory of History, Hermeneutics and Theory of Education. Many publications in the mentioned research domains. Paul Cobben is Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University (The Netherlands) and chairman of the Dutch-Flemish Center for German Idealism. His publications focuses on practical philosophy, combining a systematic and historical approach. Among his books: Das endliche Selbst (1999), Das Gesetz der multikulturellen Gesellschaft (2002), Hegel-Lexikon (ed.) (2006), The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the Form of Right and Morality (2009). Matt Hettche is an Assistant Professor of Marketing at Christopher Newport University (Newport News, Virginia USA). His research interests include topics in European intellectual history and the history of philosophy. He is a recent contributor to the Journal of the History

236

contributors

of Philosophy (with an article on Descartes) and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (with an entry on Christian Wolff ). Sasa Josifovic is research assistant at the University of Cologne (Germany), and his area of specialization is the classical German Philosophy. His PhD dissertation on Hegel’s Theory of Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit (original title: Hegels Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins in der Phänomenologie des Geistes) was published 2008 in Würzburg. He also contributed one Chapter to a forthcoming publication on the Phenomenology of Spirit together with K. Appel, T. Auinger and W. Grießer: “Von der sinnlichen Gewissheit zur gesetzprüfenden Vernunft”. Quentin Landenne achieved his Master in political sciences and in philosophy (Brussels, Berlin). He writes his PhD on the systematic problem of applied philosophy by Fichte; transcendental Theory of perspectives. (Université Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium), Centre de Théorie politique). Recent article: “Spéculation et liberté dans la philosophie de l’histoire du “Caractère de l’époque actuelle” de Fichte (1804–5)”, in: Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 2009/4, Paris. Jean-Christophe Merle is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tours (France) and the University of Saarland (Saarbrücken) (Germany). Monographs: Justice et Progrès, Paris, 1997; Strafen aus Respekt vor der Menschenwürde, Berlin, 2007; English: German Idealism and the Concept of Punishment, Cambridge, 2009. Edited volumes: Fichte. Grundlage des Naturrechts, Berlin, 2001; Globale Gerechtigkeit, Stuttgart/Bad-Cannstatt, 2005. Co-edited volumes: Weltrepublik. Globalisierung und Demokratie, Munich, 2002; Modelle politischer Philosophie, Paderborn, 2003; Leviathan Between the Wars, Rechtsphilosophische Vol. XI 2005. Frederick Neuhouser is Professor of Philosophy at Barnard College, Columbia University (USA). He is the author of three books: Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality and the Drive for Recognition (2008); Actualizing Freedom: Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (2000); and Fichte’s Theory of Subjectivity (1990).

contributors

237

Erzsébet Rózsa is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Debrecen (Hungary). Since 1991 research stays and guest professorships in Germany. Management of the Graduate School of Humanities. Many publications in Hungarian and in German on Hegel’s Philosophy, on the Lukács-School and on the Theme of European Culture. Recently she works on themes of applied ethics in relation to research and discussions in Germany. Among her books: Texte zum Studium von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie (together with F. Nyizsnyánszki), Budapest, 1985; Hegels Wirtschaftsphilosophie, Budapest 1993; Philosophien der Phronesis, Budapest. 1997; (Ed. together with M. Quante) Vermittlung und Versöhnung. Die Aktualität von Hegels Denken für ein zusammenwachsendes Europa, Münster 2001; Versöhnung und System. Zu Grundmotiven zu Hegels praktischer Philosophie, München, 2005; Hegels Konzeption praktischer Individualität. Von der Phänomenologie des Geistes bis zum enzyklopädischen System, Paderborn 2007. Ludwig Siep teaches philosophy at the university of Münster (Germany). He is chairman of the Central Ethics Committee of Stem-Cell Research (Berlin), head of the Center for bioethics at the University of Münster, member of the Northrhine-Westphalian Academy and corresponding member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. His fields of research are practical philosophy, history of philosophy, especially German Idealism, and applied ethics. Among his books: Hegels Fichtekritik und die Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 (1970, Japan. Transl. 2001); Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie (1979; Italian Transl. 2007); Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus (1992); Der Weg der Phänomenologie des Geistes (32001); Konkrete Ethik (2004, Japan. Transl. 2006); (Ed.), Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (22005). Kommentar zu John Locke, Zweite Abhandlung über die Regierung (2007). Ad Verbrugge teaches philosophy of culture at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (The Netherlands). He is the author of two books: De Verwaarlozing van het zijnde (The Negligence of concrete Being)—a critical study on Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Tijd van Onbehagen (Time of Discontent) philosophical essays on postmodern (Western) culture that has become a bestseller in the Netherlands. He is co-founder and chairman of BON, Beter Onderwijs Nederland (Better Education in the Netherlands), an association that plays an important role in

238

contributors

the Dutch debate about the current institutions of education. Both in Leiden (2002) and in Amsterdam (2008) he wan the best-teachers award of the university. With his critical publications on education, postmodern culture, management, financials etc. and his public performances on radio and television, he has become one of the leading Dutch philosophers in the public domain.

INDEX ability, 13–16, 18–21, 23–26, 47, 68, 72, 75, 98, 109, 114, 176, 181, 188, 207, 209–211, 217, 218, 227, 229 academy, 146, 154 accomplishment, 151 acknowledgement, 105, 107, 228 action, communicative, 80 adolescence, 43, 45, 47 adult, 46, 58, 70, 170, 206, 216, 219 adulthood, 1, 3, 4, 11, 59, 67, 206, 213, 220, 228, 230, 232 aesthetics, 224 affections, sensuous, 17 aforism, 9 age, 54, 55, 61, 63, 85, 96, 105, 110, 161, 166, 167, 175, 179, 180, 182, 183, 201, 212, 219 agenda, 55, 61, 65 alienation, 130, 133, 135, 140, 215, 231 ambiguity, 221 ambition, 84, 85, 88 amour de soie, 5, 6, 7, 10 amour propre, 5, 32–39, 42–49 antinomy, 17 aphorism, 152–155, 158–160 apotheosis, 151 application, problem of, 145 apprenticeship, 9, 149 arbitrariness, 14, 16, 18, 21, 23, 98, 172, 173 arbitrium brutum, 19, 20 arbitrium liberum, 19–22, 27 architecture, 124 aristocracy of knowledge, 145 artefact, 214 article, 121, 176, 184 artist, 66, 87, 106 assimilation, 10, 222 association, 31, 34, 35, 117, 194 asymmetry, 90 author, 55, 56, 165, 169, 175, 184 authoritarianism, 144, 145, 148 authority, 13, 15, 45, 49, 50, 51, 54, 61, 92, 102, 112, 113, 125, 136, 141, 142, 147–150, 219, 232 automatism, 218, 221 autonomy, 6, 8, 13, 16–19, 34, 42, 53, 57, 59–63, 113, 123, 141, 142, 149

avant-garde, 129 awareness, 89, 98–100, 104, 105, 113, 114, 204, 214, 216, 217, 218, 224, 229, 230–233 awe, 229 battles, 106 Baumgarten, 21 behavior, social, 56, 58, 127 being, human, 11, 20, 23, 28, 29, 47, 48, 49, 66, 73, 84–91, 93, 94, 97, 104–108, 112, 114, 163, 165, 168, 172, 181–183, 187, 190, 191, 193, 197–200, 214, 218, 227 Belgium, 127, 130 belief, 8, 62, 105, 114, 124, 148, 153 bible, 125 bifurcation, 29 Bildungsfabrik, 153 biographer, 55 blue-prints, 60 bondsman, 196 bourgeois, 121–129, 132, 223, 225 branch organization, 82 branches, 77, 193 brotherhood, 122, 130 bureaucrat, 125 calculation, 138 canon, 210, 211, 213, 222, 231 capacity, 15–18, 20–22, 25–27, 45–47, 120, 159, 192, 216 Capitalism, 55 career, 54, 55, 58, 75, 81, 172, 175–178, 210 categorical imperative, 4, 22, 25 Catholic, 191 causality, 18, 84, 228 change, 2, 65, 105, 161, 203, 208, 223 chaos, 143 character, 11, 15, 33, 34, 39, 45, 46, 58, 75, 89, 92, 122, 123, 125, 126, 131, 146, 156, 176, 210, 212–214, 216, 217, 221 child, 9, 10, 34, 44, 46, 56, 70, 85, 87, 90, 154, 155, 157–159, 166, 170, 206, 220 childhood, 47, 59, 104 childish, 206

240

index

childrearing, 57 Christianity, 7, 101, 103, 106 citizen, 2, 9, 11, 30, 31, 34–37, 41–43, 49–51, 91, 101, 102, 121–127, 133, 142, 148, 154, 171, 188, 191, 193, 198, 201, 228 citizenship, 29, 34–36, 38, 41, 47, 49, 50, 122, 127, 129, 130, 131, 133 citoyen, 29, 223 civic education, 30, 32, 34, 35 civic virtues, 91 civil society, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 69, 70, 72–75, 78–81, 84, 124, 131, 132, 163–171, 173, 179, 181, 183, 184, 190, 193–195, 197, 198, 201 civilization, 30, 70, 214, 221 clarification, 25, 211, 214 class, 48, 53, 55, 56, 128, 131–133, 204, 210, 212 class, upper, 55 classicism, 58, 184 clergyman, 55 clubs, 108 co-existence, 97 collision, 189 colonialism, 126 commodity, 71 communication, 104, 112, 128, 130, 165, 211 communitarianism, 92, 134 community, 4, 6–11, 34, 35, 60, 69, 70–72, 77–82, 98–101, 103, 106, 107, 110, 112, 129, 130, 134–137, 139, 140, 156, 158, 159, 165, 189, 191, 192, 197–201, 207, 209, 212, 223, 228, 233 community, culture, 69, 72, 198, 199, 200, 201 community, family, 10, 70, 71, 72 community, moral, 78, 79 community, political, 11, 34, 35, 137 community, religious, 100, 106, 110, 112, 200 competency, 206, 210 competition, 5, 7, 74, 79, 85, 87, 94, 100, 137, 138, 205 concentration, 208 conditions, health, 100 conduct, 2, 13, 28, 36, 38, 39, 43, 173, 212 conflict, 5, 25, 26, 40, 41, 97, 100, 101, 103, 110, 112, 113, 135, 141, 177, 198, 231 conscience, 114, 187, 191, 197, 200 conscience, religious, 191, 197, 200

consensus, 57, 106, 107, 205, 211 consent, 195, 198 conservation, 91, 102 consolidation, 102 constitution, European, 65 consumption, 61, 131, 137–139, 177, 178, 195 contest, 46, 66, 176, 209 contract, 29, 30, 40, 41, 43, 50, 76, 78, 194, 198 contradiction, 4, 8, 11, 24, 25, 74, 113, 114, 129, 189 conviction, 95, 101, 191, 232 co-operation, 115 Copernican Revolution, 13–15, 28 corporation, 77, 79, 81, 190, 193, 194, 198, 199, 201 cosmopolitan, 35, 96, 127, 129, 130, 137 cosmos, 109 countermovement, 140 courage, 36, 59 courtship, 56, 57 craftsmanship, 82 creature, 34, 35 crisis, 8, 11, 117, 121, 134, 139, 159, 184, 205, 214, 220, 223 critical theory, 128 criticism, 7, 10, 11, 57, 59, 67, 69, 76, 78, 81, 103, 110, 182, 200 criticism, immanent, 81 crowd, 51 cultivatedness, 174 cultivation, 32, 105, 118, 122, 124, 125, 139, 169, 180, 228 culture, 1, 2, 8, 9, 58, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 85, 91, 95, 97, 99, 103, 104, 113, 117, 120, 121, 125–129, 131, 138, 140, 153, 155, 158, 167, 168, 178, 181, 182, 187, 195, 197, 198–201, 212, 220, 227 cunning, 105 cupidity, 84, 87 danger, 16, 37, 38, 194, 199, 212, 213, 224 death, 48, 106 death penalties, 106 debate, 4, 57, 89, 130, 152, 160, 181 decalog, 158 decline, 59, 62, 205, 232 defiance, 93 degradation, 92, 183 demand, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 92, 101, 102, 111, 141, 159, 166, 178, 179, 183, 188, 199

index democracy, 65, 113, 133–138, 200, 201 democracy, parliamentary, 200 demos, 133, 134 dependence, 31, 34, 37, 38, 94, 99, 212 dependency, 103, 170 descent, 105 desire, 20, 32, 33, 37, 45, 46, 68, 84, 86, 121, 173, 195, 196, 207 despair, 220 destination, 151 destiny, 113, 130, 140 destruction, 108, 114, 138, 219 dialogue, 155, 200 dictator, 55, 59 dictatorship, educative, 144, 145, 148, 149 differentiation, 3, 67, 71, 77, 131, 146, 156, 197 dignity, 22, 26, 51, 100, 204 disappointment, 88, 94 discipline, 73, 87, 149, 212 discourse, 30, 32, 34, 36, 40, 53, 57, 59, 80, 109, 151, 154, 158, 160, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 214, 215, 219, 220, 230, 231 discovery, 61, 219, 229 discrimination, 89, 110, 111, 115, 204 disenchantment, 79 displacement, 100 dissolution, 169 diversity, 84, 85, 88, 96, 97, 114, 115, 143, 156, 182 division of labor, 72, 73, 74, 104, 105, 178, 192, 224 domestic, 30, 32, 34, 35, 42, 43, 49, 205, 219, 226 domination, 38, 45, 46, 85, 105 drive, 39, 44, 45, 47, 178, 205 duty, 18, 97, 102, 112, 117 earth, 51, 109, 122 eccentricity, 95 education, 1–11, 16, 29–32, 34, 35, 39–50, 53, 55–58, 62, 66–85, 87, 100, 117–121, 123–126, 128, 129, 131, 134–137, 140, 142, 143, 147–149, 151–155, 157–185, 189, 195–198, 201, 203–215, 217, 219, 220, 222–225, 228, 230, 232, 233 education, civic, 30, 32, 34, 35 education, practical, 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 165, 177, 178, 179 education, theoretical, 72, 176, 177, 184 educator, 2, 120, 220, 231–233 election, 111

241

elite, 3, 8, 9, 65, 112, 124–126, 128, 139, 168 emancipation, 6, 8, 66, 67, 122, 123, 127–130, 134, 136, 155, 158, 160, 192 emergency, right of, 194, 195 empathy, 206 Empire, Roman, 196 ends of reason, 16 engineering, social, 135, 136 Enlightenment, 4, 13, 25, 26, 27, 53, 59, 62–64, 66, 67, 107, 122, 123, 125, 136, 161, 162, 206, 214, 216 entertainment, 134 Entzweiung, 29 environment, 89, 90, 93, 100, 108, 128, 156, 204 epoch, 147 equality, 95 Eros, 233 esteem, 7, 32, 33, 45, 47, 48, 73, 88–91, 94, 95, 99, 105, 109, 112 ethics, business, 78 etiquette, 53, 56 etymology, 156 evil, 5, 39, 73, 107, 108 excellence, 3, 49 exclusion, 73, 100, 105, 108 existence, minimum, 74 experience, 1, 21, 22, 24–27, 45, 48, 58, 88, 92, 99, 100, 106, 107, 112–114, 129, 133–135, 156, 157, 195, 201, 212, 213, 219, 220, 223, 226, 227, 229 faculties, 104, 128, 141, 150, 159 faculty, 9, 20, 120, 141, 146, 150, 213 fairness, 99, 107 family, 1, 5, 6, 9, 10, 37, 61, 62, 69, 70–72, 77–81, 98–100, 106, 108, 109, 112, 122, 129, 131, 136, 140, 144, 154, 165, 166, 169, 175, 188, 190, 192, 194, 198, 200, 213, 219 family, second, 77, 80, 190, 194, 198, 200, 201 famine, 26, 27 fantasy, 9 fascism, 128 fate, 55, 112, 203 fatherland, 36 fellow-man, 216 fertility, 105 fidelity, 112, 113, 229 finality, 148 foreignness, 108

242

index

formation, 2, 10, 32, 34, 41–43, 47, 48, 90, 91, 93, 100, 135, 138, 154, 155, 158, 169, 172, 176, 196, 220 fragmentation, 66, 121, 165, 176, 205, 224, 225 France, 121, 215 freedom, 2–7, 9, 14–27, 37–39, 42–44, 49, 63, 67–70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 84–86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 110, 112–115, 122, 124, 127, 129, 130–132, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 151–155, 157, 159, 166, 167, 171, 173–175, 184, 189–201, 217 freedom, academic, 141, 144, 149 freedom, practical, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21–27 French Revolution, 8, 124, 127, 132 friendship, 1, 18, 94, 108–110, 115 fulfillment, 85, 87, 91, 95, 99, 108, 179 gender, 6, 64, 105, 110, 221 gender role, 6 general will, 34–36, 42, 46, 49, 50, 51, 91, 122 generation, 127, 137, 142, 205, 221 genius, 157 German Idealism, 2–4, 8, 53, 62, 97, 98, 103, 107, 118, 121, 141, 142, 152, 184, 206, 225 Gesinnung, 124, 166 globalization, 119, 126, 127, 140, 183, 184 goal, common, 7, 87 God, 13, 15, 16, 28, 50, 58, 67, 105, 114, 124, 125, 228, 229 Greece, Ancient, 138 Greek, 9, 125, 126, 155, 156, 212 guidelines, 210, 211 guilds, 77 habit, 73, 118, 177, 178 happiness, 14, 15, 23, 24, 41, 48, 67, 122 harmony, 6, 10, 30, 41, 45 heart, 8, 43, 47, 48, 69, 120, 215 Hebrew, 125 heritage, 208 heteronomy, 18 hierarchy, 102, 105, 144 history, 1, 7, 39, 48, 63, 83, 84, 96, 99, 101–105, 108, 109, 113, 114, 123, 125, 138, 144, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 176, 189, 190 homme, 29 honor, 8, 32, 36, 37, 84, 110–114, 132, 179

horizon, 123, 129, 139, 175, 212, 213 housekeeper, 60 humaneness, 67, 229 humanism, 55 humanity, 5, 8, 32, 48, 51, 56, 104, 130, 149, 183, 216, 218, 226 humiliation, 45, 93, 94, 105 husband, 5, 42, 44, 112 ideal, 4, 14, 31, 37, 40, 42,-44, 50, 60, 88, 123, 126, 128, 129, 130, 132–134, 137, 138, 143, 147, 151, 152, 157, 209, 215, 221, 222, 228 ideal of man, 40, 44 identity, 35–37, 53, 69, 85, 89, 91, 93, 103, 113, 122, 129, 130, 133, 163, 164–166, 171, 182, 183, 193, 201, 205, 210, 212 illusion, 17, 121 imagination, 48, 65, 157, 168 immaturity, 59, 206 immigrant, 103 impetus, 59, 86, 150 inalienability, 187 inclination, 21, 22, 23, 25, 83 independence, 13, 39, 70, 74, 106, 123, 141, 144, 166, 212 independence, 212 individual, 5–11, 15, 16, 19, 31, 32, 34, 37–40, 42, 49, 50, 59, 61, 68, 71, 74, 76–80, 83–91, 93, 97–104, 110–115, 127–130, 133–137, 152, 153, 155–157, 159, 167, 169, 170, 172–175, 178–184, 187, 188, 190–193, 199, 201, 206–221, 224, 226–230, 232, 233 individualism, 60 individuality, 107, 127, 165, 169, 171, 172, 207, 220, 224 inequality, 30, 88, 128, 179, 180 inflammation, 45 influence, 2, 14, 17, 19, 100, 107, 111, 141, 144, 149, 165, 177, 215, 232 injustice, 88, 89, 94 institutions, educational, 2, 3, 4, 82, 109, 204, 208, 212 instruction, 30, 41, 55, 99, 175 instructorship, 42 integration, 7, 10, 81–83, 89, 91–93, 95, 110, 111, 164, 166, 169, 171, 179, 182, 208, 219 integrity, 8, 10, 26, 43, 108, 110, 111, 164 interaction, 136, 176, 214, 217, 229 interiorization, 177

index interpretation, 4, 10, 15, 30, 54, 80, 82, 144, 145, 148, 149, 162, 167, 176, 184, 206, 207, 212, 230 intersubjectivity, 83 intolerance, 111 intuition, 13, 14, 23, 152, 157 inwardness, 124, 125 Islam, 130 isolation, 44, 61, 80, 103, 105, 108 journal, 6, 55, 60 journals, 1, 6, 80, 120 jurisprudence, 82 justice, 10, 11, 50, 51, 76, 78, 81, 88, 92, 94, 95, 106, 107, 151, 180, 181, 199, 200, 211, 230 justice, distributive, 88, 130 justice, social, 92, 106 justification, 62, 93, 95, 104, 107, 112, 114, 139, 176, 181 king, philosopher, 144 know-how, 209, 215 knowledge, 77, 82, 87, 90, 98, 113, 114, 120, 121, 123, 124, 128, 138, 139, 145–147, 149, 156–158, 160, 168, 169, 171, 192, 193, 204, 205, 210, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221–223, 227, 230 knowledge, aristocracy of, 145 Kosovo, 130 labor, 10, 11, 68, 69, 72–82, 89, 94, 100, 104, 105, 176, 177, 178, 190, 192–195, 197–199, 201 labor, division of, 72–74, 104, 105, 178, 192, 224 labor, manual, 75, 76 laborer, 68, 132, 133, 194 language, 38, 53, 56, 72, 111, 118–120, 122–126, 133, 139, 156, 201, 211, 216, 218 languages, dead, 156 Latin, 9, 21, 119, 124–126, 139, 155, 156 law, 4, 10, 18, 50, 56, 76, 77, 85, 86, 88, 89, 98, 102, 141, 148, 187–189, 192, 227 law, divine, 188 law, human, 188, 189, 192 law, natural, 16–19, 27, 187, 188 law, divine, 188, 189 laziness, 84 leadership, 9, 60, 65, 205 lebenswelt, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 176, 178, 179, 183

243

legacy, 203, 223, 231 legalism, 146, 148 legislator, 50 legitimacy, 103, 127, 128, 138, 189 liberal, 9, 10, 89, 92, 95, 96, 99, 131, 132, 137, 138, 142, 143, 144, 149, 219 lie, noble, 6, 53, 56, 60 life, 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 22, 26, 36, 37, 40–43, 49, 55, 57, 58, 60–63, 65–72, 77, 80–82, 90, 93, 95, 97, 99, 102, 104, 106, 110–113, 115, 119, 121–127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138, 143–147, 153, 155, 156, 159, 161–163, 165–168, 171, 175, 183, 190–195, 198, 199, 201, 204–207, 210–214, 216, 218–222, 224, 226, 228–231 life, ethical, 69, 124, 127, 131, 132, 166, 190, 194, 195, 201–212 life, form of, 36, 121, 132 life, good, 57, 68, 69, 77, 80–82, 92, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 191–193, 199 life, political, 43, 49 life, social, 8, 144, 161, 205, 207, 210, 219–221 life, sunday of, 168 life-plan, 111 line, assembly, 73 livelihood, 73, 194 love, 5, 10, 18, 32, 35, 36, 37, 40, 46, 69, 89, 91, 94, 98, 105, 166, 227, 228 loyalty, 100 Lutheran, 7, 8 machine, 74, 76 magister, 55 management, 135–137, 139 manuscript, 154 market, free, 78, 79, 81, 137, 192, 193, 195, 199 marriage, 41, 44, 127 martyrdom, 110 Mass-media, 1 master, 44, 45, 106, 107, 194, 228 master-slave relationship, 107 mathematics, 157, 159 maturation, 147 maxims, 173 mediation, 7, 80, 81, 98, 142, 145, 149, 182, 193, 200 medicine, 56, 82, 141 mentality, 124, 219, 220 merit, 32, 48, 94 message, 39 metaphysics, 14, 16, 18, 39

244

index

Middle Ages, 119, 139, 207 minority, 95, 96 modernity, 50, 123, 133, 203 money, 66, 135, 137–139 moral, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22–27, 34, 37, 38, 43, 46–51, 53–63, 65, 76, 78–82, 85–98, 112, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 129, 134, 142, 144, 146, 151, 152, 158, 159, 178, 187–191, 194–200, 214, 217, 218, 223, 228 movement, student, 66 multilingualism, 111 multiplication, 71, 165, 176 nationalism, 122, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 133 nation-state, 55, 121–127, 129–133 nature, 3, 9, 10, 17, 19, 30–35, 39–41, 43, 44, 58, 68, 70–73, 76, 80, 84, 87, 106, 108, 114, 151, 152, 156, 157, 159, 169, 172–174, 176, 177, 180, 189, 192, 196, 216, 218 nature, human, 17, 35, 114 nature, second, 70, 73, 192 nature, state of, 31, 32, 34 Nazism, 152 Nebelwelt, 156 necessity, 13, 18, 40, 103, 111, 119, 125, 131, 142, 156, 158, 159, 160, 209, 212, 213 need, 14, 15, 21, 32, 34–36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 66, 71, 72, 81, 86, 90, 91, 93–95, 100, 103, 111, 112, 117, 118, 125, 133, 140, 177, 194, 205, 210, 214, 216, 217, 224, 227 negotiation, 199 Netherlands, 65, 117, 119, 120, 127, 136, 137, 138 network, 120, 139, 140, 176, 198 norms, 2, 7, 36, 50, 67, 69–72, 78, 79, 88, 103, 107, 111, 114, 180, 192, 193, 195, 197–199, 200, 201, 218, 228 obedience, 69, 166 obstruction, 209 occupation, 172, 176–178 officium, 87, 93 ontology, 154 opinion, 4, 6, 7, 16, 17, 33, 38, 39, 44, 45, 71, 77, 81, 95, 119–121, 140, 153, 155, 160, 180, 191 opinion, public, 155, 160 oppression, 54, 55, 60, 61, 155 organization, branch, 82

organization, labor, 192, 195 originality, 85, 145 output, 77, 138, 208 paradigm, 229, 230 participation, 1, 6, 7, 11, 51, 76, 104, 189, 195, 207, 209–213, 215, 222, 226, 227, 229–232 particular, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16, 19–22, 25, 35, 54, 56, 59, 61, 71, 72, 76, 80, 82, 92, 99, 102, 104, 108, 109, 132, 151, 152, 158–160, 171–174, 178, 179, 182, 183, 190, 194, 200, 213, 224, 226 particularity, 71, 72, 76, 78, 130, 155, 171–174, 179–182, 190 party, political, 200 passion, 44, 47 pathology, 148 pathos, 205, 216, 222, 223, 230, 231 patriotism, 37, 131 pedagogy, 84, 152, 225 people, 2, 5, 7, 8, 27, 36, 65, 66, 69, 74, 75, 78, 84, 87, 90, 92, 101, 104–110, 112, 114, 119, 120, 122, 125, 126, 128–131, 133–136, 139, 141, 142, 148, 174, 211, 213, 216, 222, 230, 232, 233 perfection, moral, 54, 56, 58 periodical, 53, 57 persecution, 183 personality, 2, 9, 10, 11, 70, 75, 89, 128, 146, 212, 219 persuasion, 152 philosophy, 3, 6, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20–22, 25, 27, 29, 34, 37–39, 42, 43, 49, 50, 58, 62, 63, 67, 70, 81, 83, 97, 98, 101–103, 111, 114, 117–120, 123–126, 132, 141–153, 157–165, 167–169, 175, 177, 182–185, 189–192, 196, 197, 201, 204, 206, 215, 224, 225, 232 philosophy, moral, 19, 22, 34, 43, 63, 124 philosophy, political, 29, 34, 37, 38, 42, 43, 49, 98, 141, 142, 145, 148, 149 philosophy, transcendental, 145–147, 150, 157, 159 poetry, 56, 58 polis, 109, 131, 132, 196 politician, 65 power, 7, 17, 20, 35, 48, 55, 66, 68, 70, 72, 84, 87, 88, 95, 102, 114, 125, 127–129, 134–136, 139, 140, 143, 148, 150, 152, 212, 215, 216, 221–223, 227, 228, 230

index power-structures, 136 practice, 15, 66, 69, 107, 142, 146, 162, 164–167, 181, 184, 201, 217, 229 practice, scientific, 66 preacher, 125 prejudice, 62 prestige, 66, 105, 209, 210, 232 priest, 124 principle, 10, 25–27, 34, 35, 44, 46, 74, 76, 86–89, 94, 95, 101, 114, 121, 122, 127, 130–133, 137, 143, 148, 166, 168–170, 172, 179, 192, 228 privilege, 107, 222 process, labor, 11, 75, 76, 80, 192, 195 process, learning, 8, 72, 156 productivity, 73, 74, 120, 121 profession, 75, 82, 87, 99, 100, 131, 155 proof, 86 property, 18, 45, 71, 76, 84, 102, 187, 188, 194, 195 prosperity, 127 protestant, 103, 122, 124–126, 131, 181 protestantism, 122, 124, 125, 177 puberty, 37, 44 publication, 53, 54, 56–60, 231 pupil, 44, 204, 215 qualification, 77, 163 rationalism, 54, 55, 60, 62, 121, 124 reason, 5, 8, 13–28, 32, 39, 43–47, 50, 51, 54, 60–62, 66–68, 73, 84, 85, 87, 88, 102–104, 106, 107, 111, 113, 114, 123, 125, 132, 141, 151, 152, 155, 157, 163, 166, 168, 169, 178, 179, 183, 185, 187, 188, 196, 201, 203, 212, 214, 227, 230, 231, 232 reason, ends of, 16 reason, moral, 22, 24, 26, 27, 47 reason, practical, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 23–28, 67 reason, pragmatic, 22, 24, 26, 27 reason, scientific, 67 reason, theoretical, 67, 68 Rechtsstaat, 5, 187, 189, 190, 201 reciprocity, 90 recognition, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 33, 38, 39, 46, 50, 79, 83–95, 97–101, 103, 104, 106–113, 115, 132, 134–136, 140, 157, 161, 179, 212, 232 redistribution, 88 reflexions, 9, 158, 160 reform, social, 62 Reich, 153

245

reification, 76 relationship, 83, 86, 89, 90, 98–100, 102, 107, 118, 119, 125, 134, 159, 165, 174, 181, 192, 197, 199, 201, 229 relationship, master-slave, 107 religion, 1, 7, 9, 10, 59, 99, 101, 103, 114, 124, 131, 133, 157–160, 164, 167, 168, 191, 200, 201, 205, 227 religiosity, 146 renaissance, 125, 126, 222, 224, 225 republic, 30, 36, 49, 50, 51, 141, 142, 148, 149 republic of scholars, 141, 142, 149 reputation, 59, 62 research, 3, 66, 113, 114, 119, 121, 126, 140, 141, 143, 204, 207 resentment, 35 resistance, 8, 46, 66, 83, 84, 195 responsibility, 13, 81, 140 revision, 144, 151 revolution, Copernican, 13, 14, 15, 28 revolution, cultural, 126, 127, 135, 137, 139 revolution, French, 8, 124, 127, 132 richness, 222 right of emergency, 194, 195 right, individual, 89, 97, 112–114 right, moral, 187, 189, 194, 195 role, gender, 6 role-models, 57 Rome, 31, 34, 36 salvation, 106 satire, 56, 57, 58 satisfaction, 14, 16, 22, 33, 37, 38, 48, 49, 176, 178 scholar, 59, 86, 87, 146–151 school, 1, 55, 69, 87, 111, 123, 136, 140, 144–147, 162, 175, 176, 205, 208, 212, 219, 222, 225, 231 science, 67, 99, 100, 103, 119, 120, 123–126, 136, 143, 145–147, 149, 151, 191, 203, 227 segregation, 95, 140 self, 5, 6, 11, 13, 20, 24, 31–40, 42, 44–46, 51, 53, 57–59, 61, 70, 72–74, 76, 77, 79, 83, 85, 87–91, 93, 98, 99, 103, 104–106, 111–114, 122, 124, 125, 127, 129, 131, 134–140, 154, 158–160, 168, 170, 172, 175, 179, 180, 182, 184, 195, 196, 199, 205, 208, 212–218, 222–225, 227, 229, 231, 232 self-awareness, 98, 99, 104, 113 self-conception, 31, 34, 38

246

index

self-confidence, 168 self-consciousness, 83, 87, 88, 90, 124, 125, 196 self-definition, 214 self-description, 232 self-determination, 20, 83, 106, 111, 113, 122, 127, 131, 136, 137, 170, 172, 180 self-esteem, 45, 73, 99, 105, 112 self-experience, 129, 134, 135 self-liberation, 158 self-position, 83 self-preservation, 5, 32, 33 self-reification, 76 self-subsistence, 70 self-sufficiency, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, 44, 45 self-understanding, 13, 89, 91 sentiment, 5, 32, 36, 38, 39, 51, 223 September Eleven, 4 service, military, 102, 122 servitude, 39, 45, 46 sickness, 48 skills, 2, 82, 87, 88, 104, 105, 123, 167, 168, 172, 175, 176, 178, 184, 205, 206, 210, 214, 216, 222 slavery, 155 socialist, 88, 201 socialization, 1, 9, 11, 69, 70, 78, 93, 108, 170, 228 society, 1–7, 9–11, 32, 40, 41, 43, 53, 54, 59, 61–63, 67, 69, 70, 72–75, 78–85, 87–90, 92–95, 103, 109, 110, 121, 122, 124, 125, 128, 131–140, 148, 149, 153, 161, 163–173, 175, 177–181, 183, 184, 190, 193–201, 203–223, 228, 231, 232 society, civil, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 69, 70, 72–75, 78–81, 84, 124, 131, 132, 163–171, 173, 179, 181, 183, 184, 190, 193–195, 197, 198, 201 society, liberal, 10, 89 society, multicultural, 3, 67, 69, 140, 195, 198, 199, 200 soil, 45 solidarity, 8, 100, 110, 115, 130 soul, 120, 124 sovereignty, 50, 101, 102, 212 spare time, 82 Sparta, 31, 50 specialization, 121, 155 species, 32, 40, 47, 87, 104, 109 speculation, 34 spirit, 3, 48, 55, 68, 75, 86, 90, 102, 103, 117, 124, 127, 128, 131, 144, 150, 157,

163, 164, 167, 168, 173, 184, 188–191, 195–197, 204, 212, 217 spirit, absolute, 124, 132, 164, 191, 196, 197 spirit, objective, 124, 190, 191, 197 spirit, subjective, 124, 191, 197 spontaneity, 148 sport, 9 stability, 93, 99, 113, 115, 171, 173 stabilization, 172 Standesgesellschaft, 131 state of nature, 31, 32, 34 state, constitutional, 102, 189, 190 state, nation, 8, 122, 133, 151 strategy, 39, 40, 45, 47 strivings, 38 student movement, 66 subdivision, 87 subject, moral, 10, 76, 80, 191, 194, 196, 197 subjectivism, 8, 134 subjectivity, 61, 78, 79, 83, 113, 138, 166, 171, 172, 173, 179, 203, 217, 221 subjugation, 105 subordination, 112, 114, 141, 150, 158, 232 substance, 5, 38, 70, 71, 102, 167, 173 success, 7, 14, 57, 205, 208, 213, 223, 231, 232 summons, 83, 85, 86, 87, 98 Summum Bonum, 14 Sunday of life, 168 superstructure, 128 supply, 3, 67, 71, 73–75, 78, 192, 199 survival, 5, 80, 92, 97, 114, 120 system, 3, 8, 9, 11, 70–80, 85–87, 91–93, 96, 117, 124, 127, 131, 137, 143–145, 148, 152, 153, 161–164, 166–169, 175–178, 181, 183, 184, 187, 191–193, 195, 197–199, 207, 209, 213, 218, 223, 225, 226, 228, 232 System of Needs, 70–75, 77, 78, 131, 192 system, labor, 73, 74, 79, 80, 192, 193, 195, 197–199 system, law, 76, 187 system, legal, 79, 86, 91, 92, 148 system, production, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 137 task, 3, 9, 16, 26, 27, 44, 48, 56, 57, 87, 109, 117, 139, 151, 164–167, 175, 180, 183, 199, 204, 207, 221, 226, 230 teacher, 120, 158, 215, 231

index technocracy, 134, 136, 139 telos, 103, 215 termination, 94 terrorism, 102, 106 theology, 56, 102, 124, 141, 220 theory, critical, 128, 138 time, spare, 82 tolerance, 8, 103, 108–110, 115, 219 trade unions, 77 tradition, 2, 4, 21, 58, 62, 67, 69, 71, 99, 101, 111, 118, 121, 123, 126, 135, 136, 153, 160, 162, 188–190, 192–195, 206, 215, 223, 229 traffic, 109, 184 transcendence, 69–71, 78, 227 transcendentalism, 145 transformation, 60, 62, 68, 119–121, 125, 126, 132, 134, 138, 140, 147, 148, 192, 201 transition, 6, 59, 60, 79, 162, 175, 184, 191, 197, 220, 224 translation, 13, 18, 68, 103, 187 treason, 94 trust, 69, 131, 136, 166 truth, 5, 61, 99, 124, 125, 132, 141, 153, 157, 168 tutor, 44, 55, 215 understanding, 1, 2, 5, 9, 13, 15–17, 21, 23, 26, 29, 32, 36, 48, 50, 59, 66–69, 72, 77, 84, 85, 89, 91, 102, 103, 106, 108, 112, 113, 118, 119, 146–148, 156, 160, 168, 173, 177, 203, 204, 206–213, 215, 219–221, 223, 225, 226, 228, 230 unity, 11, 23, 24, 31, 39, 70, 77, 130, 131, 133, 134, 143, 145, 146, 151, 189, 190, 193, 196, 199, 221 universal, 4, 5, 14, 15, 22, 24–26, 35, 67, 80, 83, 84, 90, 96, 103, 106, 120, 122, 123, 128, 131–133, 135, 136, 139, 144, 155, 158, 160, 168, 169, 171, 173–175, 179–183 university, 1, 3, 8, 9, 11, 30, 37, 39, 54–56, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 95, 96, 118–123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137–144, 146–149, 151, 164, 231 Unmündigkeit, 59

247

upbringing, 85, 162, 165, 167, 169, 175, 216, 221–223, 230, 232 validity, 46, 72, 74, 76, 94, 158, 160, 180, 181, 187, 188 value, 11, 13, 14, 31–33, 36, 38, 47, 60, 74, 75, 76, 88, 91, 107, 112, 113, 136, 138, 141, 152, 164, 187, 188, 192, 193, 198, 199, 217, 223, 229, 230 value, labor, 74, 75, 76 value, universal, 14, 25 violence, 101, 102, 110, 113, 115, 220 virtue, 5, 32, 36, 37, 43, 67, 112, 131 virtue, civic, 37, 91 virtuousness, 179 vocation, 8, 142, 149, 150, 151 Volk, 133 Volksgeist, 90 Vormund, 59 votes, 65, 111 war, 101, 102, 127, 130 War, World, 8, 127 wealth, 40, 48, 73, 74, 193 welfare, 24, 127, 129, 130, 136–138, 194 well-being, 77, 101, 120, 122, 124, 130, 228 will, collective, 51 will, free, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 191 will, general, 34–36, 42, 46, 49, 50, 51, 91, 122 wisdom, 48, 146 Wissenschaftslehre, 145 woman, 5, 6, 60, 220 world, 2, 4, 8, 15, 24, 44, 46, 47, 62, 66, 69, 72, 77, 79, 82, 85, 88, 97, 99, 102, 103, 105, 107, 109, 110, 118, 119, 121, 127, 129, 130–132, 135, 138, 143, 147, 151, 153, 155–159, 163, 167–170, 172, 178, 181, 182, 184, 188–190, 195–197, 204, 206, 209, 210–215, 217–221, 223, 227, 229–231, 233 World War, 8, 127 world, sensible, 85, 88 worldview, 2, 80, 82, 191 youngling, 175, 177