Indonesia’s Secret War: The guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya [paperback ed.] 0868615196, 9780868615196

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Indonesia's Secret War

INDONE:SIA'S SECRET WAR

The guerilla struggle in Irian Jaya

ROBIN OSBORE

AIen & Unwin Sydney I]ondon Boston

Du 14q , 5 • Cy8 21985

© Robin Osbome 1985 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved.

First published in 1985

Allen 8c Unwin Australia Pty Ltd 8 Napier Street, North Sydney, NSW 2060, Australia George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd Park Lane, IIemel Hempstead, Herts HP2 4TE, England

Allen 8c Unwin lnc. Fifty Cross Street, Winchestcr, M.ass 01890, USA National Library of Australia Catalo guing in publication entry :

Osbomc, Rot)in. Indonesia's secret war.

Includes index. ISBN 0 86861519 6 (pbk.).

;:.n£;I:c;:;,:,a=ppa:I:3c¥::£eg:;:;n[Eaenn{aL¥tg63_ 320.955'1

Library of congress Catalog Card Numt)er: Typcset in 10/11 Bcmbo by Graphicrafc Typesetters Limited, Hong Kong

Printed in Hong Kong

C3ontents

^tkl`owlcdgments ^I`\lri`vlntions I ,I,,,I,mry ML,I,,,

Ill'r('ll\'ction

I

l'r{)l`` S,ibang to Merauke

I

['rol``Sorongto Numbay

`

lllcllcwopM

'1

l'I`L'`1(lisc lost

'1

ll\"tofthcborder

ll,,,,I,Jt,rll,I

r,,,„r',|,(I

rwLl1/I

^l,I,,i,,,'lx lll'll,x

F.o_rAr_nolqC:ApJnr,bor_nBlackuiaterrrfugeecamp, West Sepile, Papua_Neu) Guinea,1984. Md:y he gr6u/ up to see u)hat his late fall.er envisaged.

And for my ouin son, Max, born in the same year.

Acknowledgments

Much appreciation is due to Anne Schillmoller, who set me on the ti.ack at a crucial moment and tolerated living with a writer who lacked a word processor. Also, for their help, Tom Mclndoe, Helen

jarvis, Doug Miles, Michael Van hangcnberg, Greg Pgulgrain, Hank di Suvero, Bob Bums, Dehis Reinhardt, Geoff Heriot, Rob Walls and Margaret Olah, of Rapport, Peter Boyle, Lyn Fisher and Gil Scrine.

In PNG: Neville Togarewa of the T!./7tef a/PNG, Alfred Sasako of N!.wg!.#i. N!.ws, Chris Pash, Sean Dorney, the Poof-Cowri.cr and the Office

of the Public Solicitor.

The work of carmel Budiardjo and the Tapol group in London has also been of great use.

I would especially thankJohn lremongcr, publisher, for his faith in the project, and others at George Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

CIIrrenay note

All dollar amounts mentioned in the text are Aust. S unless indicated otherwise. The abbreviation `K' means Papua New Guinea Kina. The r,`tc of the Kina in January 1985 was K1 = A$1.40. Indonesia's currency, Rupiah, has been generally converted into dollars for convenience sake.

Abbreviations

AAP ABC

Australian Associated Press newsagency.

ABRI

Angkatan Berseoyata

Australian Broadcasting Corporation Republile Indonesia.

Indo-

nesian Armed Forces

ACFOA AMA

Australian Council for Overseas Aid

CDC

Commonwe.alth Development UK-fmanced aid body

CSIS

Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Associated Mission Aviation. Catholic-run airline

Corporation.

Uakarta)

GKI

GPL

Gereja Krlsten Ivi{li. Indonesien EvanBdied Church (Protestant) Gcrtlkcl" pe#gctcaw /i.clr (`wild terrorist gangs').

Indonesian Government's name for the OPM

movement

ICJ

lnternational Commission of Jurists

IGGI

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia. Consortium of aid donors to Indonesia which comprises six countries, including Austrahia, and three institutions

JIO KOPASSANDHA KOPKAMTIB

Australian Joint Intelligence Orgahisation

LBH

Lcmb4g4 Bow/#4# Hwfewm (Legal Aid Institute).

Indonesian red beret commando unit

Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. Indonesian military intelhigence body

Jtobreviatious

|X

Based inJakarta and working mostly on human rights cases

MAP

Missiomry Aviation Fellowship. Protestant-run airline

NAACP

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (US)

NIO

National Intelligence Organisation of Papua

OAU OPM

New Guinea Organisation for African Unity Onganisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Move-

. ment). De Facto Government formed by Pemka group of OPM. Provisional Revolutionary Governmem formed by Victoria group of OPM

PAPENAL

Pasuhan Pemliebasan Nasional (INat3ionel Ltoera-

tion Group). Military wing of OPM's Pemka faction. Also called TEPENAL

PEMKA

Pemulil.an Keadilan (the Comma,nd for the Restoration of Justice). One of OPM's two main

groups PKI

Partai Komunis Indonesia. Indonesinn Communist Party, illegal after 1965

PNG

Papua New Guinea Peoples Progress Party of Papua New Guinea. Led by Sir ]ulius Chan

PPP

RAAF TAPOL

Royal Australian Air Force

;:ai:::::s°;'a`..'``feA]?ocrt°hncy:ai°er`opf°±to£:ad]opnri{%n# based organisation campaigning fc)r human rights in Indonesia

TPN

Tentara Pelnbebasan Nasional. Nattor\al Llbera,-

tion Forces, military wing of OPM's Victo`ria faction

UNCEN

Unii)ersitas Cendraulasih. UniIversLty o[ Cendlawasih (`Bird of paradise'). IrianJaya's university at Abepura, near jayapura.

UNGA UNHCR

United Nations General Assembly

UPI WCIP

United Press International

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees World Council of Indigenous Peoples

Glossary

BALIEM (BALIM)

Main valley in West Papuan highlands

BIAK

Island off north coast of West New Guinea. Includes the nearby island of Numfor

BRONCo

The OV-10 counter-insurgcncy aircraft, supplied to Indonesia, and other states, by the USA

HOLLANDIA

Dutch name for the capital of West New Guinea. Now Jayapura

IRIAN JAYA

lrian: i\cronyi:rL 6or Ikut Republile Indonesia Anti-

Nctfocr/4flds (`follow Indonesia against Holland'), an

Indonesian slogan from t:he campaign to acquire

West New Guinea. From Jry4# - s.teamy land rising from the sea (Biak language). /cly4.. victoric>us KABUPATEN

(Indonesian) Administrative district, headed by an official bearing the title bwpa/I.

KIAP

Patrol officer in PNG, especiauy during Australian time

KOMPAS

Indonesian daily newspaper, Catholic backed

KONOR

Leader of r:ligious-based resistance movement:, centred in Biak

KORERI

Messianic religious piovement prorising freedom to believers after the return of the Saviour

MARKAS

Military command headquarters. Used by ABRI

and OPM

caossary

XI

Freedom. Used by Indonesian nationalists during fight against Holland, and later by Papuan nation-

MERDEKA

alists in struggle against Indonesia MUFAKAT

Consensus decision-making

MUsyAWARAH

The process of seeking decisions through group consultation and discussions. (From Arabic)

NDANI (DANI)

Umbrella name for inhabitants of Balim valley region. Actually the name of only one clan

NUMBA¥

Papuans' name for jayapura, the capital of lrian jaya. Sometimes, Port Numbay PNG's leading political party. `Papua - New Guinea Union'

PANGU PATI

PAPUA BARAT

West Papua (Malay)

PEPERA

Pc#c#fwa# Pcwdapa/ R4ky4f. Determination of. the

People's. Opinion. Indonesian acl.onym for the `Act of Free Choice' in West lrian in 1969 Rencana Pembangunan Lilna Tahun. Indonesia.'s five-

REPEI.|TA

year plans for development, launched in 1969. The current plan is Rcpelita-IV, 1984-89 TEMPo

.

Indonesia's

leading

news

magazine,

published

weekly TRANSMIGRASI

lndonesia's Transmigration programme, aimed at alleviating population pressure on Java, and to an extent Bali, by moving large numbers of peasants to the outer islands

VICTORIA

OPM faction launched by Seth Rumkorem. For `Victory,

Introduction

Incoverage, early 1984 highlighted two violent the episodes, usually which secret received war in Irian .widcsprcad jaya. On press 26 March a Cessna owned by the Catholic church landed at the tiny Indonesian outstation of Yuruf, near the Papua New Guinea border. After its Swiss pilot brought the plane to a halt, guerillas of the Free Papua Movement, OPM, emerged from the surrounding bush. Most carried traditic)nal weapons, although a couple had shotguns. Soon afterwards, two Indonesian passengers on the aircraft were shot dead at close range.

Around hidnight on 21 April, a famous Melanesian anthropologist from lrian]aya named Arnold Ap was induced to leave his prison cell in the capital, ]ayapura. Ap had been arrested the previous November and accused of involvement with the OPM. Several days later, Papuans discovered the bodies of Ap and another detainee, Eddy Mofu. Both showed evidence of torture. Ap had died from either bullet or bayonet wounds to his stomach. Inquiries about Amold Ap's fate were made in September 1984 by NSW parliamentarian]ohn Dowd, the leader of a delegation from the International Commission ofjurists (Australian section) to the refugee camps in PNG which housed 10 000 Papuans who had fled lrian]aya. In the Blackwater Creek camp, two informants told the Icj visitors that while Ap was held by the Red Beret commandos he had been tortured by electric currents, beaten with rifles and burned with cigarettes. One ,informant, who had known Ap for some years, told Mr Dowd that he had seen Ap's body after death and that the arms were broken and there were bayonet wounds in Ap`s side and stomach.

Indonesia's secret war

The Indonesian Government stated publicly that Amold Ap had been shot dead at some distance during a gun battle between the occupants of a small boat in which he was trying to flee lrian and a police patrol boat. It would not comment on allegations of Ap's having been tortured, but insisted that he was a known OPM helper. The OPM, Org4"!.sas!. Paplj¢ Mcrdefe4, has been fighting Indonesian rule in West New Guinea since 1969. In the overseas press we are often told that the OPM consists of small groups of `T-shirt guerillas',

poorly armed, who evade capture by crossing into PNG. For the border-based OPM, this is largely true. But the resistance extends throughout the territory it calls West Papua. It comprises fighters, both regular and part-time, as well as an underground network. The author, like most other visitors to lrian ]aya, believes that the great majority of west Papuans support the OPM's goal of an independent state. The OPM is also found overseas, notably in PNG, Vanuatu, Holland and other parts of Europe. It poses a far more serious challenge to Indonesian rule than many outsiders think, or theJakarta government adrrits. In 1962, regarding itself as the successor to all of the Nethcrlands' former empire, Indonesia sent troops to `West lrian'. The military presence remained and the harsh treatment of Melanesian Papuans fostered resistance. After seven years of Indonesian control, the resistance became formaliscd under the name OPM. The Indoiiesian Government refuses to acknowledge OPM as a movement of national liberation. Instead, it describes the guerims as gangs of `wild terrorists' whose hopes for secession threaten, albeit in a minor way, the

8nit#.:frtahnek::P[unb¥f;[£o¥ejI:onn:toafcctipe:eth;:tt°hfef[Cj:[a,:s°±:;ersats£:ne]]p::: gramme which has forcibly alienat:ed clan land and which hopes to swamp the Pal)uan population with sponsorcd settlers from lndonesia's heartland of Java. As a result of Transmigration and abuses of human rights, 10000 Papuans fled lrian Jaya in mid-1984 to seek safety in PNG. This refugee exodus was more than 1 per cent of the indigenous people. The OPM has almost no foreign allies, certainly not PNG or Australia which have tried hard to improve their relationship with Jakarta. Both countries have emphasised that Irian Jaya is a part of Indonesia and thus an `internal matter'. There is self-interest in this position. Australia enjoyed a favourable balanc.c of trade of $187 million with Indonesia in 1983. It hopes to reach an amicable settlement on the massive oil and gas deposits in the seabed of tlie so-called Timor Gap. Australia wishes to dl.aw closer to ASEAN countries, of which Indonesia is the largest. Further, both Australia and Indonesia are part of the US-backed alliance in the region. For

htroduction these reasons, Australia can become a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights yet turn a blind eye to Indonesiari practices in lrian Jaya. For example in lateJune 1984, Prime Minister Bob Hawke told a press conference that there was a `sound argument' in favour of Transmigration. He was not greatly concerned about the case of Arnold Ap, seeing no parallel with the plight ofjailed dissidents in the` USSR. PNG fears not a disruption of trade with Indonesia -it has almost none - but an attack by its populous and somewhat beuigerent neighbour. It is also conscious of supporting the Australian view. An annual aid grant of $300 million from Canberra helps keep PNG close to Canberra. Successive PNG governments have tried to deter the OPM from crossing the border, with little success. The remote border zc)ne is almost impos-sible to police and will remain so, even when the present fourteen border markers are increased to 40. Nor will the new Border Agreement of 1984-89 help, for public opinion in de.mocratic PNG runs strongly against the Indonesian presence in lrian and inhibits any overt move against the OPM. PNG's Present policy towards its neighbour has been described as `reactive': when Indonesia acts in a way that angcrs Port Morcsby, for

instance by sending troops across the border, PNG reacts by lodging protests. Critics have urged PNG to adopt a less passive role. In mid-1983, a PNG foreign affairs officcr, Tom Mclndoc, penned a

memo advocating that a more appropriate policy would bc for PNG to `takc up with the Indonesians reported cases of harassment, killings, unfair land dispossession etc. It is the kind of approach that would stand up to international scrutiny, and one that the Government would be least likely to have rctrcat from'. So far, PNG has not moved towards this position, although in late 1984, when it complained about Indonesia for the first time in the UN, its stance appeared to be changing. 1984 was a watcrshcd year. The OPM's most sigrificant move was its quest to end the factional fighting that had split the resistance for nearly a decade. It was the year when two of the main architects of the Indonesian takeover, Adam Malik and Ellsworth Bunker, died. A third, Sir Garfield Barwick, kindly agreed to be interviewed for this book. If pressed to speculate on the future prospects of a free `West Papua', I would reply that such a state may emerge, but it could take many

years, perhaps generations. To people who have been there for millennia, this is not an intolerable dchy. An independent state, or a

province with considerably more autonomy than at prcscnt, would be likely to result from political pressure onJaka[ta, rather than a military

Indonesia's secret war

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From sabang to Merauke

Aboutmigrants 50000 from years Asia ago, began during arriving the in the lastplace `icewhich age', is seaborne now an island called New Guinea. The first arrivals drifted ashore involuntarily; soon, however, deliberate voyagers were undertaking the trip. There were three broad races of migrant peoples, Negritos, Papuans and Melanesians. Today, `Mclancsian' is used to describe the descendants of all these peoples. It has also been applied to the migrants who settled in other parts of the South Pacific: Melanesians are the majority people in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands; the indigenous minority in `Kanaky', French-occupied New Calcdonia; and about the same size

as the imhigrant Indian community in Fiji. Australia, too, has Melanesians, comprising two distinct groups. The oldest is the Torres Strait people who lived in the area when there was still a land-rink between Australia and New Guinea. The second group comes from those Melanesians who were blackbirded from Paciflc islands to work the sugar plantations in Quecnsland. ' The term derives from the Greek word mc/4, meaning `black', and was coined by the French navigator Dumont d'Urville in 1832. It was adopted by European cxplorcrs who regarded New Guinea as the western edge of the `islands of black-skinned people' which formed a kind of Melanesian archipelago. Nowadays, even the unaccustomed foreign visitor is likely to perceive this generalisation as simplistic.

After only a few days in New Guinea, east or west, most foreigners can distinguish many contrasts between regional peoples, skin colour being only one of them. So .diverse are the Pacific's Melanesians that they account for less than 0.1 per cent of the world's population, yet

hdonesia's secret war speak up t:o 25 per cent of the world's languages. But while the t:erin lnay seem less than scientific, anthropologists have concluded that to talk of a `Melancsian' race is valid because of the many shared characteristics of the peoples. Some of these criteria, like the composition of ear wax, are arcane to the outsider. `Papuan' is also used to describe the peoples of.New Guinea. It, too,

has a foreign derivation, although it may not have come from the Malay language, as is often claimed. It seems to have been better known to the Moluccans to whom it meant `no father', implying that New Guineans lacked strong leaders to protect them from slayers. The Papuans themselves were less concerned with any racial silllilarity than with the myriad differences between their clan groups. The most obvious distinction, that between the three main immigrant waves, was the tip of an iceberg below which lay thousands of cultural units. Many of these were linked together in language groups, known as pfey!¢c, and often became loose pohitical confederations. Iiven so, a

great many different tongues existed. In modem Papua New Guinea (PNG) there are more than 600 mutually unintelligible languages amongst a population of 3.5 million. In 1963, at the time Holland handed over West New Guinea to Indonesia, it had listed more than 2001anguages among 500000 pec)plc in an estimated population of 700000. (Today's Melanesian population of lrian jaya is put at one million, 80 per cent of which is in the interior.)

After millennia in New Guinea, the imrigrants had distributed themselves through much of the landmass and offshore islands. They settled in groups whose sizes were governed by ecological conditions, such as food resources, as well as social criteria such as marriage customs. Some communities numbered a few hundred members, making them the largest of the `mini-states'. Many groups had only 50 members. Regardless of size, every clan confederation viewed people of a different cultural-linguistic unit as foreigners, even if they lived in the next valley or island. There were many influences which caused groups to co-operate or, alternatively, come to blows. They included property, such as livestock and trade items,i and customary laws, including taboos. But the key clcmcnt in relations was the clans' attitude towards what became, in time, their traditional land. To them, land involved more than fixing boundaries between points on the earth's surface, for: In addition to arable land, dwelling sites, burial and ceremonial

grounds, and nan-agricultural land utilised for hunting and collecting, the following should be mentioned: paths and rights-of-way; strategic locations for trade or defcncc; streams, wells, springs and fords; stone quarries, salt wells and deposits of clay and rare earths; off-shore and fringing reefs; bird rookeries; ccc)nomic trccs of all types - coconut,

From Sabang to Merauke sago, Arcc4, Call4ri.i(//I I.llcJi.cliwl Uava almond), Pandanus, breadfruit and

so on; and such natural features as caves, rocky outcrops, and groves that may bc signiflcant to particular social groups by reason of their mythological association. 2

Over thousands of years, the people formed such close links with the land that it came to own, them, as well as vice versa. This symbiosis can be seen in sharp contrast with the attitude that developed in some other socic.tics, notably the Anglo-American. In non-Aboriginal Australian society, for instance, land ownership confers various rights, such as that to exclude outsiders; the right to alienate the land, that is to transfer title to an outside interest; and the right to derive income from others who may use the land. Silndar customs apply inJava, Indonesia. In contrast, tradit:ional New Guinea society believed in the right to exclude outsiders, but held different views about the other two areas: Rarely . . . are i'nc]ividuals empowered to alienate on [hcir own initiative

any part of a group estate. In any case, it js more common for people to transfer themselves than their land - that is, by affiliating thcmselvcs with different cstatc-holding kin groups, people acquire rights to new

:incfrsfi¥rhi`eerrge::nuqpusi.sEii:g''?::::p.:#:n.g:fa:ii:igch.t=:ointfecp::t:::s,:i use is virtually non-existent; there was no landlord class in the

p[e-contact societies of Papua New Guinea. Occasionally gifts or payments are made in consiclcratic)n of grants to temporary usufrucc but, even if regarded as income, such payments are not generally Signiflcanc in economic terms.3

When a clan's land rights were infringed by outsiders, `intemational diplomacy' ensued. Contrary t:o popular belief about New Guineans, war was not their flrst resort. Rather, aggrieved clans would seek cc)mpensation for the rights abused, or property damaged, in commodities such as animals or trade items like beads. In some cases they sc)ught alliances with potentially hostile communities through marriage links. The New Guinea clans were early believers in the doctrine of its being better to `jaw-jaw' than to `war-war'. But disputes could not always be solved by peaceful means and inter-clan feuds, sometimes full-blown wars, did develop and were |`xaccrbaced by the notion of paying-back the enemy to settle past scores. However, the casualty rate in these battles was low. Each •`xchange produced a few deaths at most and perhaps twice that nlimber of serious injuries. The defence of a clan's pride was as iniportant as the defence of territory, perhaps even more so as the acquisition of land was seldom an aim. One of these tribal dramas was documcnted in the film Dead B!.ffds,

Indonesia's secret war

made by a team from Harvard University's Peabody Museum towards the end of Dutch control in West New Guinea. By the time the researchers arrived in the highland Balim Vauey, the different clans of the Ndani people were apparently.locked into a pat€em of c.oninuing intergroup war. Ndani villagers built t:all observation towers from which they could see the approach of hostile outsiders. When warfare broke out, it took the form of setpiece battles held in neutral territory between the clans' land. Fighting was adjourned when certain conditions prevailed, including sufficient casualties and the coming of night with its supemafural forces. In contemporary PNG, clan rivalries still have a habit of developing into warfare, especially in the Highlands provinces. This warfare has escalated in recent years to the point where it is causing much damage, particularly to local economies. Thousands of coffee trees and other cash crops have been destroyed by rampaging warriors. Only a few of these fights make the pages of the PNG press, but iveekly reports from provincial police stations often list up to ten clashes. So concerned is the PNG Government that it has legislated an Inter-Group Fighting Act (1978) and iliitiated inquiries into the

phenomenon. Many Australians who worked as feiqu in the pre-independence administration believe that flghting has increased because officers do not take a sufficiently tough stand against warring villagers. In the old days, they say, the threat of retribution kept the clans in a state of peace. Anthropologists, sociologists and senior PNG policemen counter that the Australians did little to alleviate the causes of tribal animosity. While this complex debate seems likely to continue in PNG for

some time, the propensity for tribal fighting in western New Guinea has been approached in a more resolute way by the present administration there. Describing the official response to an outbreak of clan warfare amongst the Ndani in the mid-1970s, an Indonesian policeman has recalled how: The responsibility for establishing peace was placed in the hands of the army. Hundreds of troops were flown in to the airstrip at Wamena

(administrative capital of the Balim) and in lighter aircraft to smaller airstrips elsewhere in the valley, including some of the mission airstrips. Some troops wcrc pa[achuted in. The soldiers went on sweeps through the villages, threatening and sometimes beating the Ndani, but not killing many. Then the army brought helicopters in for the final part of the strategy. A numbc[ of village leaders were arrested, and put into the helicopters. They had never been in aircraft before and were frightened. Worse was to come. The helicopters took off and flew over the nearby hills. There, at a height of about three hundred metres, the tribal headmen were pushed to their deaths.4

From sabang to Merauke

5

Not suprisingly, the Ndani were dissuaded from their intergroup fighting. But in the process, prcvic)usly warring clans came to realise

that a new enemy existed - the Indonesian Government -and they began to unite to face this common threat. (In PNG, too, fighting clans have jointly fought police.) By 1977, many Ndani had become staunch supporters of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) which had

#tsfe,dheeisnedw.A:rs:a:eig.a,:.Jnaywahf:ii.d.euc;f:.a'gn.et:,aetr:efl?,rc,,ac|o::ec::::: to the area, the Balim erupted in dcfiance of foreign rule. Voting, such as it would have been, was suspended and elite commandos were rushed in. The mhitary cracked down on the resistance with ferocity. An Australian journalist who managed to enter the area was told by officials that up to 900 tribal rebels had been killed.5 It would have taken many years of. traditional battles to achieve such a. death toll. A reputable Jakarta newspaper, Kowip4f, reported that the Balim River was flowing with bodies. For six weeks, many local people lost their appetite for fish.6 An indication that harsh official treatment of the Ndani was a regular occul.rencc in the late 1960s was gleaned by anthropologist Karl G. Heidcr who conducted extensive ficldwork in the Balim. One`interesting project entailed asking 60 Dani schoolchildren for 50 different responses to the question `What do people do?'. Heider's aim was to get a picture of how the Dani viewed their world. One regular answer was: `They tie people and put them in water'. The foreigner asked what this meant and was informed that the procedure was an

`tp_a_ones_ism po_Lee pro.ctiee'

(Jnl

Of Anthrapological

Research,

31.

1975). (It may be noted that the behaviour of officials in Australianrun PNG was not always impeccable either. In KI.4p, his history of the white patrol officers, James Sinclair recounts some harrowing tales, including the 1949 case of Kiap Roy Edwards whose mountain

p.atrol near Tapini intending to clear up a series of murder investiga-

*oh::hesn,dnec€a.¥£tFFo€:::dE,:;dhL:s:[af,;vaeeshcer,£pbeerdsgso£Fags::]t:::;ce: arson, perhaps worse'. Edwards was tried and sentenced to six months imprisonment; over 60 convictions were recorded against others in the patrol.) The roots of the Asian-Melanesian antagonism date back to ac least the seventh century when seaborne merchants from Sriwijaya, the great Buddhist empire of South Sumatra, arrived at the New Guinea cc)ast in pursuit of natural produce. Later came other traders, mostly Malays and Chinese but also some Arabs. As C.D. Rowley mentioned in The New Gwl.#ca y!./J4gcr, a common reaction by the Papuans was to cast powdered lime in the direction of the newcomers, hoping to invoke magic chat would exorcise the demoliic presence. In time

Indonesia's secret war

there was some peaceful trading but mostly the Asians just took bird-of-paradise plumes, beche-dc-mer, scouted #iasol. bark and medicinal ingrcdicnts. Far worse was the acquiring of a `commodity' for which no payment was made at all: Papuan slaves. From this carly time the peoples of the Indonesian archipelago began to believe that the black-skinned, crinkly-haircd Papuans were a primitive, and savage race, and that the only way to `civilise' them was by using force. The acquisition of land was not one of the traders' aims and in centuries they made no serious efforts to establish pcrmancnt foot:holds ashore. But concuirent with trading, the forcigncrs made strong attempts to introduce t:heir Islamic religion. Thcsc were unappreciated, partly due to local indiffcrcnce towards a code which outlawed

t#eusi.}gs::o:::Fa±ocr]c°i;[rycc]fi€i::'cfi:.ecds.Tn;ti`6o¥,CyheGs:]annc,:hhcfi±bi:rhc: Luis Vaez de Torrcs, wrote of his voyage westwards along the south coast of New Guinea that: At the tel.mination of this land wc found Mahomctans who were clothed with artillery for service, such as falconets and swivel guns and

:#euasccE. t:tL:¥m8°th:°;]cqc:e:;fnfa:::nE::.?le Who are called Papuans The campaign had litt:le success in prompting Melanesians to abandon their traditional concepts of religion. Centuries of contact with Asia 1)rovided few imports of value to the

Papuans. The main one was the Malay language which today forms the lingua franca of west New Guinea; it is no less useful for being the tongue of the Indonesian occupiers. While there had been some violent clashes between coastal and island Papuans and the Asian visitors, relations were characterised more by a standc>ff than a state of war. Certainly there was no occupation, although claims have since been made that a degree of effective control was exercised over New Guinea by one Asian power grou|)ing based in what is now a part of Indonesia. This `historical' claim to the Wcstcrn half of the island was invoked by the Indonesian

govel`nment in 1949, when Holland agreed to withdraw from its East Indies but announced it would kccp West New Guinea. It has been repeated through the 1980s. Any validity it may have rests

i::t:a]LLycL:::5e£:*og:i::ath:nMLa3j:gaABet¥ep]racvtaLn2egs:_pcoc]t53:]pcaonut:€ mentioned that the western part of New Guinea formed a part of the Majapahit empire. But the historian D.G.E. Hall has noted that, so far as the asccrtainablc facts go, the state of Majapahit was limited to East Java, Madura and Bali. Modern lndonesia's claim over New Guinea

:isL:a:eastteso¥¥?dao:e:gar:::finbtu?tahdecnLLnm]p6o6r:aE:ti¥::a]::i::n*inu€ctahs:

From Sabalig to Merauke

Under this agrccmcnt the whole area, including New Guinea, was to have bccn controlled by the Tidore sultan as a proxy for Holland. The arrangcmcnt was reconfirmcd in 1797 by the Dutch governor for the Moluccas, and continued after Holland formalised its claim to New Guinea in the next century. Yet an indication that one sultan exercised less than total control was contained in a letter written in 1869 by Sultan Wahab Alam regarding the visit to New Guinea of a Dutch naturalist, C.B.H. von Rosenberg. The Sultan's agents were urged to protect tile naturalist lest the Dutch Government make trouble. The closest link, bctwecn, the Muslims of'Tidore and the Papuans seems to have been forged on Biak, where from the sixteenth century some local sailors were operating as pirates, often on the sultanate's behalf. The relationship between Papuans and the outside world began to change when European sea-powers arrived at New Guinea. The `discovery' of tlle island was act.idental, a by-product of the spice trade centred in the Moluccan islands to its west. In 1545 the Spanish seafarcr Ortiz Retez, on his way to Panama, claimed the mainland and nearby islands in the name of his king and called the territory `Nueva Guinea' (New Guinea) because of the population's supposed resemblance to the Guineans of Africa. However the Spanish never returnc.d and the modcm-day name for the island js their only legacy. The spice trade was first monopoliscd by Portugal, hence the colonisation of. Timor. Later, the Netherlands came to dominate in spices and founded an empire on them: the Indies. In 1605 a Dutch captain, Willem Janz, commanded his nation's flrst ship to reach the New Guinea mainland. The newcomers presented, in more ways than one, a taste of things to come: while fetching water ashore, nine ofJanz's crew were killed by tribesmen and reportedly eaten. New Guinea had

gained a daunting reputation. The Papuans were regarded by white explorers as even less hospitable than Australia's Aborigines. Another Dutch mvigator, Jam Carstensz, had encountered both peoples in 1623 and concluded that those at the western cnd of New Guinea were `cunning, bold and evil-naturea'.

Unlike the Asian traders, the Europeans wanted not the produce of New Guinea, nor its strongest males and loveliest maidens. They sought permanent footholds ashore, settlements from which they could control the sea-lanes of the Spice Islands. The first Europea_n base was established by the British on 25 October 1793, the anniversary of the coronation of King Gecirge Ill. At Dore Bay, near the

prcsenc-day town of Manokwari in the Bird's Head region, Cape. John of the India Company proclaimed of `NcwHayes Albion'. TheEast scttlcment, a logwood stockade, the wasterritory named Fort, Coronation. Two years later, plagued by disease and prompted by

Indonesia's secret war

conflict with its European rivals in Asia -`tribal warfare' as a modern West Papuan writer, Franzalbert ]oku, has described it - Britain dismantled t:he fort and withdrew from West New Guinea. Holland's dedicated imperialists eventually outmanoeuvred other European competitors and in 1828 sent explorers to the beach with a

flag. The site of their fever-ridden outpost - called Fort Dubus was at present-day Triton Bay, on the southern coast of the neck of the Bird's Head (yogc!feap in Dutch). It came under constant attack from locals, both by land and sea, and was evacuated in 1836. During their first year of establishment the Dutch proclaimed sovereignty over the western half of.New Guinea up to the 141st meridian east of Greenwich, excepting that section nearest to Tidore which would remain the province of that island's sultan. In 1848 the Netherlands Indies Government issued a decree confirming the arrangement. The sultanate, which had been making things difricult for the Dutch, was mollified but, as noted earlier, it had less than total control in practice

(In 1901 Holland exchanged Tidorc's rights for a compensation payment and incorporated West New Guinea into the overall Indies.) `Netherlands New Guinca' occupied 47 per cent of the island. In

1884, within ten days of each other, Britain and Germany claimed their slices, 26 per cent and 27 per cent res.pectively. Although flrst to stake its claim, Holland was the slowest to follow up with administrative control. Offlcial cxpenditurc did not begin until 1898 and for the next 30 years, most activity was performed by missionaries or geological sul.veyors. In 1907, the oil compahy Royal Dutch Shell

was formed between Dutch and British interests with the aim of tapping the area's suspected wealth. By 1935 fifteen oil seepagcs had been found and there was talk of these being the richest oilfields in the world. At this time, Dutch and US mining interests also discovered mineral deposits in the island's interior, the most promising of which were at the mountainous outcrop which today'hosts the huge Freeport copper operation. A rewarding discovery of another kind was made in 1938 when an aircraft from the Archbold cxpcdition landed on the Balim River, adding the Grand Valley to the map and establishing contact with the Ndani peoples. For the flrst 80 yeal.s of Dutch control, New Guinea had little relevance to the rest of the Indies. A lonely place with no amenities, it was considered a backwater for colonial administrators. The hub of the empire was in distantJava where, by the 1920s, Holland needed every capable officer it could muster. Resentment against colonial rule had risen to fever pitch which broke out, in 1926-27, to widespread rebel]ioi`, promoted by an emergent wave of Indonesian nationalists. A number of communists were included in their ranks. Holland decided to quell the uprising, and dissuade future troublemakers, with

From Sabang to Merauke a pohicy of internal exile. The location it chose was New Guinea, in

particular a place named Tanah Merah (`red earth'), about 300 kin up

the Digul River from the southern town of Merauke. The peml camp was an inland Devil's Island. Prisoners who survived the experience described it as being in the worst malarial district of New Guinea, surrounded by thick jungle and headhunting tribes. In her memoir Rcvo/f `!./. P4radl.sc, about lndonesia's nationalist period, K'Tut Tantri

recalled meeting a youngjavanese boy in 1932 whose father had been taken away by Dutch soldiers years earlier. He was sent off to die in New Guinea, the boy said, to the place known as the `land beyond the moon'. The largest single group banished to Tanah Merah comprised about 800 people, including women and children, who had formed the core of the rebellion in Java. Because of the prison's isolation, the Dutch built no walls around it. Instead they made it clear that escape was tantamount to suicide. Four men did manage to gce a.way, however, after three years intcrnmcnt. Guided by Papuan villagers through country unexplored by the Dutch, thrcc of the prisoners arrived on the coast near Meraukc. After being restored to health, they were ferried by other friendly Papuans around the underbelly of New Guinea to t:he territory which Australia had, by then, inherited from Britain. Other Papuans took the escapers by fishing boat to Thursday Island, at the northern extremity of Austrahia. Unfortunately for the Javanese, Australia was a better Dutch ally than the headhunting tribes. As an Australian supporter of the Indonesian republican cause complained at the time, `thc Scullin Labor government put them on a ship and packed them back to a Dutch concentration camp'.8 Although the Dutch jailcd nationalists in places throughout the archipelago, the camp up the Digul River became the most potent symbol of colonial oppression. A number of plays were written about the harsh life there. One veteran, a communist named Abdul Karim, toured Sumatra with a theatre troupe which hc called Diguhiana in its honour. The flurry of artistic endeavour spawned by the camp was tolerated on the grounds that pubhicity would act as a deterrent to other independence-seekers. It had the reverse effect and, moreover, the plight of the Tanah Merah prisoners was destined to prove an international embarrassment to Holland. This was precipitated by the occupation of West New Guinea. Japan, which gained Holland's surrender in 1942, was already established elsewhere in the archipclago. In 1943, sccing a similar fate for New Guinea, even the less accessible south, the Dutch loaded 500 Indonesians who remained at Tanah Merah aboard a steamer which set sail for Australia. In B/acfe Ar/7iad4, a classic account of Holland's waning colonial days, Rupert Lockwood described the MV Bof/I as the first ship to land convicts in

Indonesia's secret war

10

eastern Australia for nearly a century. In Australia the Indonesians managed to communicate their status to sympathetic unionists,

particularly waterside workers, and a political campaign was launched

:no:?deL:c:ses]::]tf.]t:i:LeA:;tterra]#ori:V#anrm2:n:ing:]g::ue]dthma:sF:iLat:E Indonesians at two camps in New South Wales and others in an outer Brisbane suburb which now bears the name Tanah Merah. When the Dutch fled New Guinea they left behind them only fifteen government posts, mostly on the coast. Mission sites, both Catholic and Protestant, were more numerous. Such education or health services that the `natives' received were more likely to have come

from the church than from the administration. As Japan swept southwards wit:h its eyes on Pacific bases and the oilfields around Sorong, it propagandised about liberating the region from white imperialism. It omitted to add that the replacement was

:h°atts[et]£;da:t:n:.a:tr;r°ynt%u:J:g:I;:Saeted:o¥tnr:t];::a[:£;]anc:i:;Ersoho°kw:g dissent.

Even during the less turbulent Dutch time, there had been violent protests over policies such as forced labour. These protests started in

the nineteenth century and continued into the 1930s. The Schouten islands, of which Biak is the largest, became the focus of anti-Dutch sentiment. This was due to the emergence of a messianic movement based on traditional beliefs. The roots of the Koreri movement lay in an ancient lcgcnd which predicted that the Lord, called Manseren Mangundi, would return one day to free the people. The legend began with the hero figure Manamakeri who visited the underworld but was refused permission to stay. Returning to earth, he made wine, which was stolen. He hatched a plan to catch the thief and soon did so. The thief turned out to bc the Morning Star, known as Kumiseri, or Sampari. In return for releasing Sampari, Manamakeri obtained certain magical powers. One of these was a fire rit:ual whereby hc transfol.ned himself into a young man and became known as Manseren, `Thc Lord'. Hc preached the Koreri doctrine of peaceful living, but was disappointed when the people failed to match its requirement. He departed the islands, heading westwards. Early accounts of the story did not talk speciflcally of his return. After 1860, however, there was a mounting belief that if the people encouraged him with devout behaviour, Manseren would return and implement a heavenly existence on earth. The Korcri movement gave birth to a number of prophets, leo"or, who claimed to be children of the Messiah and promised that his second coming was imminent. Many feo#or led their followers into battle against the colonials. For example, in 1884 the headman of

From Sal)ang to Merauke

11

Mokmer, Biak, attacked a Dutch ship, killing its captain. Later, Christian elements were incorporated, with Jesus becoming synonymous with Mansercn. The Koreri movement experienced an upsurge in 1939 when a woman named Angganita Mcnufandu sought seclusion oil a small island after the death of her husband and three children. She was suffering from beriberi as well as grief. After supposedly being visited by Manseren she was healed. Angganita, who had taken the title of `Maiden of]udca', began to preach Koreri. Initiauy she directed her ire at the foreign missionaries -the first to come were from the Utrecht Society in 1862 -who, she alleged, had stolen the last page of the Bible before giving it to tlic locals, thus depriving them of the knowledge with which the Europeans had achieved so much material wealth and power. When her peaceful lnethods achieved nothing from the Dutch, she urged overt action. By May 1942, Angganita was inside a Dutch jail. Leadership of the movement passed t:o a convictcd murderer na,med Stephanus Simiopiarcf who was in charge when the Japanese arrived in June. Angganita remained in prison. The Korcri movement had dcvcloped a distinctly nationalistic tone. As sociologist Bryan Wilson has noted, Koreri was regarded by many observers, including a Dutch administrator of the time, De Bruijn, to be less of a religion than a self-conscious Papuan cultural nationalism. Howcvcr as a churchman, F.C. Kamma, had written, the Korcri believers represented a diverse range of. positions, both in their interpretation of the Mansercn lcgcnd as well as their degree of active resistance to the Japanese. One Koreri policy was to urge Papuans to fly the Dutch t:ricolour upside-down to symbolise reversing the roles of local people and the occupiers. Then a special Papuan flag was created, featuring the Morning Star, whose magic had provided vital assistance to Manseren in his quest for divinity. It was behieved that the flying of flags bearing the star would attract supernatural help for the struggle against foreign mortals. The belief has continued to the present day, with flag raisings being the commonest form of nonviolent protest against Indonesian rule. It was one. of these, on 9 February 1984 which began the chain of events which led to 10 000 Papuans fleeing IrianJaya for sanctuary in I)NG. Today, the Morning Star, which outsiders know as Venus, has become the symbol of the OPM. Its supernatural significance has not been forgotten. (The name `Koreri' has even become institutionalised in the Indonesian capital where a clubhouse for the lrianese communicy bears the name Wi`s/7!4 Korcrl. (Koreri House).

Another part of the Korcri movement's campaign was for a political-military federation linking `West Papua' (P4j?#4 Bflr¢C) with

America, Britain, Holland and China. However tlie first problem was

Indonesia's secret war

12

the Japanese presence. According to Konor Stephanus himself, the Papuans had a special destiny, and to support this belief he pointed to an Allied bombing raid on the north coast town of Manokwa7i in which many Japanese but no Papuans had been killed. Boosted by a

f:e:::gooffLnev:::edrs:b]tHLtey,I:;:apstanoufsApnpgrgoaa:;ht:f:::o]::tat::;C:f±tFh: Morning Star flag; removal of those Indonesians who had come during the Dutch time; freedom for West Papua according to its old customs: and economic advance for Papuans. Stcphanus was arrested for his efforts, taken to Manokwari and executed. His followers then attacked a Japanese ship and many of them were killed too. At Mokmer, the Japanese machine-gunned crowds of supporters who had settled on an airstrip with Konor Stephanus' brother, Jam. Another Koreri group on Biak, under Korinus Boseren, had sticks which they believed Manseren would change into rifles. But their faith in invulnerability also fared badly when met by the invadcrs' fire-

power. Japan's impatience brought a once-magical movement down to earth with a thud. Korcri believers started I:o show a distinct

prefcrcnce for taking up proper weapons which, while mostly of the traditional kind, included a few flrearms lost by the enemy. The Koreri cult has been described as beginning with the use of indigenous myth as a passive and non-vic)lent millemrian reaction to Administration and mission control. It ended by the creation of well=organised and disciplined bodies which used armed force in the effort to drive the forcigncrs from Papua.°

This development was not unique to New Guinea, for elsewhere colonials had often been inclined to interpret religious activity as political activity . . . colonial action in response to such political interpretations of religious

activities has somctimcs had the cfrcct of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Religious practices or meetings have been prohibited and leaders persecuted as political rebels, and have thereby bccn induced to become rcbcls, their religious ideas undergoing appropriate modification to become ideological justiflcations for revolutionary activity."

Japan pursued a similarly harsh approach in other parts of New Guinea and met with equally angry responses. But nowhel.e was opposition as well co-ordinated as in the Manscrcn-prone areas. By the 1940s the Schouten region, especially Biak, was the part of west New Guinea that had been in most contact with the outside world. This influence, combined with its particular social structure, made it less. tribalised than New Guinea in general and so mol.e capable of unity.

]apan's war-time policy in New Guinea, similar t:o that in Southeast

From Sabang to Meraulse

13

Asia, emphasised the importance of stifling local dissent and recruiting native labour, quickly. Frustrated in their efforts, Japanese officers ol.dered the relocating of whole villages, the torturing and killing of many Papuans and the forcing of whole families into hard labour. Their behaviour generated more hatred than Holland, the oftdenounced white imperialist, had in a century. And it was to no avail, for in February 1944 an American-led force took the capital of Hollandia. Biak, a more important base forjapan, required a stiffer fight, but by August, all of New Guinea had bccn won for the Allies. Some of the Koreri followers believed that the arrival of the US ships and their bounteous cargoes heralded the return of the promised Messiah. When little of the new wealth changed hands, they were disappointed. However the foreigners were viewed as liberators, and even today one can hear special pleasure expressed by West Papuans at the presence of black soldiers amongst the US forces. In an attempt to cultivate influential Indonesians in occupied Java, the Japanese had sponsored a number of organisations, one of which was the Body for Researching Indonesian Independence (BPKI). Most of the nationalist leaders were BPKI members. They included the subsequent president, Sukarno, his vice-president, Mohammed Hatta, and Mohammed Yamin. In July 1945, the month before the nuclear bombing of Japan, two meetings of the BPKI were held to discuss boundaries. The voting outcome registered 39 ballots for an Indonesia comprising `the former Nctherlands East Indies, including that they called New Guinea, the North Borneo Territories of sarawak, Brunei and Sabah, Malaya, Portuguese Timor and the surrounding islands'. Sukamo and Yamin voted in this way. Nineteen of the delegates votedjust for the Netherlands territory, including West New Guinea, while six voted for the Dutch Indies with the exclusion of New Guinea. Mohammed Hatta was one of this minority group, arguing that those who voted otherwise were being expansionist and impcriahstic. Hc rc.jccted Prof. Yamin's assertion that the Papuan people were Indonesian, saying they were .Melanesian. The future vice-

president made a plea for West Papuan self-determination, insisting that the Papuans had a right to bc independent. Denouncing the BPKI's demand for Papua, Hatta said: It is possible that wc shall not be satisfled with Papua only and that we may want to include the Solomons and so on as far as the middle of the Pacific Ocean"

The majority view prevailed and the incorporation of West New Guinea into an Indonesian republic, looking ever less likely to be a part of a Japanese co-prosperity empire, became a goal of the nationalist movement.

IndonesiaL's secret war

The tl:ickle of returning Dutch became a flood after the surrender of

Japan in August 1945 and from the cnd of world War 2 the history of West New Guinea became far more intertwined with Indonesia than it had bccn. On 17 August, two days after the defeat ofJapan but prior to its formal surrender to the Allies in September, the Indonesian nationalists proclaimed independence. Their leader Sukamo, had had many years of imprisonment by the Dutch. Although he had never languished in Tanah Merah, some of his comrades were veterans of the New Guinea hell-camp. The Proclamation deflned the new Indonesian state as stretching from the western tip of Sumatra to the eastern island of Ambon. New Guinea was not mentioned, although later observers have said that, being a part of the Netherlands Indies, its inclusion was taken for granted. In the turbulenc four years betwccn the proclaiming of a free Indonesia and Holland's relinquishing of its rule, few people had time to discuss the future of the `land beyond the moon'. Instead, the anti-colonial focus was the island of Java, where on 8 September forces from the British-led South-East Asia Command, under I.ord Mountbatten, landed with instructions to secure territory which could be handed over to the Netherlands. The ferocity of the returning Dutch population towards Indonesians greatly surpassed its resistance to the Japanese invaders. Even 40 years later it is not a pleasant experience for a European to be on the streets of Ujung Panjang

(formerly Makassar) on the anniversary of the massacre ordered by the infamous Dutch colonel, `Turk' Westerling. In the main island, Java, the Dutch Air Force, with British assistance, bombed nationalist strongholds which included urban centres. Byjuly 1946 all islands east of]ava had been transferred from Allied control to the Dutch. Late that month, the head of the Netherlands adminstration, Dr H.I. Van Mook, organised a conference of dele-

gates from the eastern archipelago. His aim was to create a federal United States of Indonesia, comprising four autonomous regions. During the conference Van Mook was confronted with some strong demands for an Indonesian I.cpublic. But an even stronger plea was voiced by the delegate from New Guinea, Franz Kaisiepo, who had arrived at the conference site in Malino, South Sulawesi, dctcrmined to press his pcople's views. During the talks Kaisiepo made it clear to both the Dutch and Indonesians present that Papuans wanted nothing to do with an Indonesian republic. They knew it would swallow them up. Hc requested that Holland rule West New Guinea separately from Indonesia and suggested a new name for the territory - Iryan. The word derived from the language of Biak and meant `steamy'. It was applied to the appearance of mainland New Guinea when viewed from offshore: a hot, shimmering land, rising from the sea. The word

From Sabang to Merauke

15

would later be adapted by Indonesia into the acronym IRIAN, short for the slogan `Follow the Indonesian republic (in the struggle) against the Netherlands'. The co-optiiig of'thc term by Indonesian propagandists would greatly anger West Papuans, wllo would come to resent being called Irianesc (orcJ#g Jr!.¢)1).

The Malino Confcrcncc, like others that would follow it, achieved nothing in the way of compromise. Armed conflict between Indonesians and the Dutch continued. By 1947, Holland had stationed 150000 troops in the archipelago, but while they delayed independence they did nc)t prevent it. The nationalists' ci.y of A4crdcA.a./ was taken up by all Indonesians and in

time by much of the world community. The USA was the key factor. Strongly opposed to European colonialism, as long as successor regimes were anti-comlnunist, it pressured Holland to withdraw. Britain, less committed to a free Indonesia because it was occupied with its own colonial problems, tried to extract itself from the matter. This proved difficult, and Allied troops remained until late 1947. Austrahia rcgardcd the archipelago as its defence shield and preferred that the Dutch remain, rather than hand over the country to a regime which, alarmingly, showed signs of including communists in its ranks. This was the view of the nrinister of external affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt, although less so that of the Labor prime minister, Bell Chifley, who felt tllc matter was essentially betwccn the Dutch and the Indonesians. Neverthclcss, Chifley tended to favour Dutch resumptictn of power, as long as they would guarantee to adopt more cnlightc.ned policies. Like Evatt, his main concern was for Australia's future. Australia, whose security was iiivolved, was directly affected. To achieve security in the Pacific, it was vital that those with colonies should adopt policies ensuring political, economic and social progress for the indigencs. '2

Holland did not take kindly to such pressure, nor to Australia's attempts at internationalising the matter. Relations between the two countries deteriorated, made worse by an Australian union ban on loading cargoes bound for the Dutch in Indonesia. Unable to break this c.mbargo, the ALP gc)vernment engaged the Australian armed forces to help move Dutch military pel.sonnel and equipment to the Indies, an action that antagoniscd Sukarno's republicans. In March 1947 Holland made an agrcemcnt 'with the Indonesian nationalists, the Cheribon, or Linggajati Agreement, providing for the formation of a United States of Indonesia which would remain a part of the Netherlands, at least until 1949. As a result, Holland suspended hilitary operations against thci guerillas aiid their civilian

Indonesia.s secret war

supporters. But within months the agreement had failed and the

;gh:,ii,g;;ij:h:?!e:n:acdi:;p?ue;:fo::::i:::i:a;ik;::¥jr;ai:e,:ia;::ij:;::fne;,;;;,e:fio;v;:tujiu;; aversion to intemationalisation would change markedly when it came

:;eto::e[]i:b]:n::;:!{,::n{:;h:e;e£[:g¥x::!¥;::a:st:in:e[;:][in;in6:e2r:I:a:nfr:;h;#s¥::i:d:e:s; beganportrayingtheterritoryasseparablefromt:hclndiesinthecvent of a nationalist takeover.

:£O;t;;:a;i];:s,:|]i:!tr;Oii}::::i:e::i;c£:I:!9iiiu;fi[;yi:::ih::C,i:;O[cv¥sa€;i:[r:a:i'b;eE::i In time Evatt, too, became angercd by the violence of Holland's actions although he was still favouring a conciliatory position when the future of Indonesia was finally broug.ht to the UN Secul.ity Council. With the USA now backing an intcmational committee,

iii|:;;:gj;iiriiig;;:i!;:;:i§i!;i:::;;i;:i:;::e;;::;;ii:d;ii;ijjjs:°±j§ii!jd:§i; %PoC::tc]]?,:S:ea]€bbe:gti:nasgae]:;bai:€tBeu::|ayfi;:::su]::ngmfi:£:ct::s:::::;ti¥

a;its:o:f;th:;:hit:j£:e:h:a:::%e¥i:t£:ijit;(i:n;:b;ehn':o:i)cpe¥;;:°:i:ir:[bfuh:e::Sh::::a°te!

:=n!n;:i:i;ni::4:9iriaij:y;;i:t;.e:;n:C=::u:t:h:;::rii::oij§;tts:he;c:i¥E§xi:ies;S;::°§fij:i any trans.fer [o Indonesia. h addition to Evatt's argument, which was mainly strategic, it added the belief that the Papuan people had more in common with those in Papua and New Guinea than Indonesia, and that their future should lie in the eventual integration of the entire

F[om Sabang to Merauke

17

island. Aust:ralia encouraged Holland to this end, adding that it would co-operate with the Dutch in the island's defence. However Australia did not favour an indcflnite colonial status. Its ideal solution for West

New Guinea was a UN trusteeship, pending, in a time-frame that was not defined, an act of self-dctcrmination by the Papuan people. Holland's lcadcrs, to give them some credit, felt likewise but in the meantime New Guinea was a bargaining chip to use with their own pcoplc. The retention of. the territory provided a face-savcr which allowed the ti.ansfer of the rest of the Indies to pass the Dutch I)arliament with the necessary two-thirds majority. When the Round Table Conference began at The Hague in 1949, the Dutch were determined not to cede sovereignty of New Guinea; the Indonesian nationalists believed it to be an integral part of the coming republic. It was the latter who compromised. Their attitude was put succinctly by an Australian journalist who covered the Indonesian revolution: The Republicans, who had gained so much in four. years of frantic plotting and counter-plotting, wcrc not disposed to haggle over a trifle which they were sure they could pick up later if they wished.W

So in return for immediate indepcndcncc they accepted a postponeincnt clause suggcstcd by an Australian member of the UN Commission, Mr T.K. (Tom) Critchlcy, who would later serve as ambassador in Jakarta. The conference resolved that West New Guinea should remain in s/a/ws q#o, with its future to be the subject of negotiation within a year. A West Papuan dclcgate to the conference, Johan Ariks, expressed the strongest opposition to any talk of surrendering his country to Indonesia. Ariks came from fighting stock - the Arfak tribes of the Manokwari area. During World War 2, his son had been executed by the Japanese after being caught with a band of Papuan and Dutch guerillas. Ariks himself had been active in the resistance. He was a well-educated man, having been schooled in a Dutch-run seminary on Java. He spoke Dutch and Malay, and his passion regarding the future c)f New Guinea, like that of Franz Kaisiepo before him, shocked the Indonesian delegation. Almost twenty years later, by then an old man, hc would direct the Arfaks' massive revolt and eventually die in an Indonesian jail.

While Ariks' view. was common amongst West Papuan leaders, some held diffcrcnt convictions. In October 1949, three Biaks, Lucas

Rumkorem, Corinus Kery and ]ulianus Tarumaselly formed the Independent Indonesian Party at Bosnik, the aim being for Dutch New Guinea tojoin Indonesia. They planted a pine tree to symbolise the party's growth. The men were discovered by Dutch intelligence and the party declared iuegal. When Rumkorem went underground,

Indonesia's secret war

18

forming the Bird of Paradise Reserve Army (Te„(ara Tj4da%gfl#

:T#i::a¥ho4fi#!r:aismw::;:tu%eesip:ed°£P:*°:1;p:a:t:!igfi:::£t:9:I:af£:rl:Sn:gnk;:hit Indonesia made him an officer in its navy.

:;!tnoe;ia:;ru;;:asst:ylh;=Lfci:ta:net;:f::n;s::::-eke:,:n:c:s:::::s:Tna:np:osor:te:I::isef They regarded a takeover as inevitable and aimed to back the winning side. To the bitter disappointment of most, the strategy failed. Today, several OPM leaders are former Indonesian collaborators.

brg:#t:1:s¥eera:s:f]:E:n:so;:nhdadTaa]%:edctohnefi::epnucbeLcPso:Frupcat:t::sfrEa£

;I:egre::i°eatou::toarrga:1::'t¥eh[*e:°gau::e:aadd=nb[::fact?o::[atscrfi?rsst :taunngcecdwfio:fanc::satem:Ovuersda]:tdr]c::c|:rtist:5tarT:d8::sc]:Fsm::tin::a extended over the whole area formerly controlled by the Dutch. Two minlsterial conferences met to discuss New Guinea's future, but failed

tog;I:;.5o?fi;£:tA::t::]e;;en¥:;Ccrnn°mfeunrtthhca[da:Lea:::iahta::g,°:a]:'h°:hc conservative Robert Menzies coming to power. The foreign policy

§]pa:£odreT[¥absas:srt;caus]aatneg_c[:mam:t:tscmTeaT:h::gfhsepe:i::s:Ea,n:te::¥ so, the PKI's mounting success in Indonesian politics was giving Australia concern. In the elections of 1955, the PKI won six million votes, 16 per cent of the total, and became Indonesia's fourth largest

3:I;ye.rf[un];oa::;:;e,catkoa::a,tThoe]yceaadr:r];antc€e]:t:ae]c]aa::at£::f:os::o:do]s: East and West Java. By 1963 it would have 6.5 million members, making it the largest communist party outside the USSR. Forthisreason,aswellastheculturalcontrast,Australiadidnotwant Indonesia to acquire West New Guinea. Dr Evatt and the ALP, now

:Er::t:oas:t5oti,eafiree,::e::a:so:Eocuo,:n:so.tlged3:e=1iannatceodmb*So=e=::sa The government's view encouraged the Dutch considerably. Holland

fi;#::I:i;Cd:1:d:drnp:a:s]sYead:nz:At:::d:]a:[ia:::Snuoc:h:;h::a:Sa;]t,°d:e:rt:h:cgi:ogrdd:c:I:]g:I:¥ac:nt:

gis:t,dp;:ap:i:;csr:;Hso;fic:::dypc:o:n:crc::I::dcee:s¥nt;b:e;:ad:::de:::]h:ecpa:1:::g:O::Bsd::E]: vowed that within a decade there would be Papuans trained to run an administration.

From Sabang to Merauke

19

Colleges and acadcmics were established to train military and police officers, health workers and a range of bureaucrats. However there was no uirivcrsity and little scope for non-government employment. By the end of the `ten year plan' the indigenous labour force numbered only 19 000, out ofa census population of717 055, and over half were in lowly official service. In that same year, 1961, the immigrant population comprised 15 500 Europeans and 16 600 Asians. The latter

were mostly Indonesians who had been brought to New Guinea by the Dutch to form the middle-stratum of the colonial bureaucracy; appropriately trained Papuans did not exist. For the local people,

dealing with the government mean dealing primarily with the Indonesians who, by and large, felt racially superior to the darkskinncd `primitives'. This middle layer of society made little attempt to disguise its feelings and as a result intercourse between the races was often tense. Furthermore, Holland had made no serious effort to open

:ltltcc:°put:trt:'Sfi;ns:::j°]ro'c¥h:::;:::srhwa:{cth:opn::::::i::lil:efheE:::si:; towns. Investment funds were made available for small enterprises such as restaurants and taxi operations, but ordinary people received no help. Political uncertainty dctcrrcd significant investment fi.om the I)rivate sector.

For Holland, the cost of trying to bring New Guinea into the modern world outstripped any economic bcnefits. In 1950 the territory's deficit was A$4.4 million, about half of its total expenditure. Ten years later Holland was spending $43.7 million, for a deficit of $35.6 million. And even that, wrote economist Ross Garnaut, was an l`ndcl.estimate of the metropolitan subsidy since nearly half of all I.cvcnues represented internal administrative transactions. In addition

::::ict¥eapsa:tiuebns::'n:Lacli:=::ntth:fD°;Fcehr::,:::rsy?:nd,ngbygove-Although the results of Holland's belated effort were uneven, they Lll`onc by comparison with developments in Indonesia during the 1950s. The republic's economy deteriorated: thcrc were food shormgcs, a lack of consumer goods and, on top of it all, mounting corruption. Politically, too, the contrast between the two places was |irowing. While regional rebellions in Indonesia threatened to fragI`lcnt the republic, long-tribalised New Guinea was moving, albeit /|lowly, towards cohesion. Aware that time did not favour it, Holland lmd, from 1944, begun encouraging a Papuan elite which could be

F,,`k`::|yerestparbe]:::::sasinh]cndi8::t°ufagp°u::[snmwehn:t°trtai¥eadrt::d°Dn:::i: /)I)oiisored institutions like the School of Administration, the Police

(:`{::1;:`cLsn]8n:hcg=°:vacntdo;haerdpsaL::::e:a:tpa:leo:ndTC:eh::tbh:::aTi:dL,e]and]tE%

IndonesiaL's secret war

20

nationalist movement. These men came from various parts of New Guinea, but for some years any regional rivalry was shelved in the interest of self-improvement. Later in this heady period of emergent nationalism a split developed between those from Biak island and the mainlanders, especially those in the Hol]andia area. The split was tactical as well, wit:h the Biaks believing that anti-colonial Indonesia would be a better ally in the freedom drive than the Dutch, with their vested interest. Later they would fum against Indonesia. The mainlanders continued to rest their hopes with Holland. Prominent names in this Papuan elite wcrc Nicolaas jouwe, Franz and Markus Kaisiepo, Marthin lndcy, Amos Indey, Lukas Rumkorem, Silas Paparc, Herman Wayoi, ]ohan Ariks, Eliczer Bonay, Hcrman Womsiwor and the Mandatjan brot:hers. By 1957, Holland had estabhished a better record oflocalisation than in Australia's colony. About 30 per cent of government posts were held by Papuans and the goal of 95 per cent Py 1970 seemed within

reach. While there was plenty of room for criticism - for example,

:aapsu:a:.:eu]sd];Ter°]:Cuus?;i:rthdgrh:rorpe:S;tia°nnsshTdtbheeenDaunt::uenncdceda¥o°ru: local parliament to be formed in 1961.

:ths::::°€nte]S:La:p¥de:i;C::;;::a:lfLa¥§f::S:::lil:a:i:doe:js:)n:§d:::::P:]]:°:sr:tL:ntca:; minister of the interior, Idc Anak Agung, has since put it, the nccd to `bring West Irian into the fold of the rcpublic' was an article of faith for the new nation's lcaders. The drift of `Irian' away from Indonesia

provided President Sukarno with an opportunity to rekindle his people's nationalist emotions and, further, to divert their attention from their economic plight. The captivating lcader borrowed a slogan the Dutch had used to describe the spread of the archipelago, rendered ic in the Malay language and launched a campaign promising that Indonesia would one day extend `from Sabang to Meraukc'. The former was a small island offnorthem Sumatra, while Mcraukc was in the southeast comer of Dutch New Guinea. For years this was Sukamo's catchcry as` he addressed rallies that often numbered a million people. To push his claim to the world, Sukamo despatched envoys abroad, giving special emphasis to nations newly emerged from colonialism. Brochures were printed with `historical' reasons to support Indoncsia's claim. One of these, West Jr!.a" -A# Es5c/ifi.4/ P4ri a/J#do"cs!.4, was printed by the Indonesian embassy in Canberra for circulation in Australia. The brochure assured readers that Indonesia had no claim to territories such as North Borneo nor, falsely as it has turned out, the eastern part of Timor Island, which.had never been

part of the former Dutch East Indies. However West Irian was

From sabang to Meranke

21

different. Not only was it Dutch but it had been a part of Indonesia during the kingdom of. Majapahit. On top of that, it had been under the rule of the Sultan of Tidore since 1660. As Ali Sastroamijoyo noted in his memoirs, Indonesia won the support ofprimc ministers' confcrenccs in Colombo and Bogor (1954) and the Afro-Asian Convcrence in Bandung (1955). In 1957, Indonesia's foreign minister, Dr Subandrio delivered a melodramatic speech to the UN Political Committee saying that `self determination' has lately bccn invented and introduced into the

s¥,e£:::::arnmf::t::enmw.;;hr:::radptpo,;;a:;s:Tr:afnthweo¥]edth=:[aannfns,fi:cotntcheapttwoef should accept also the same concept with regard to the other islands or regions of Indonesia and consequently accept the disintegration of the Indonesian National State.

Subandrio went on to make grand boasts about independent lndonesia's achievements and give reasons for the desirability of extending its control to lrian. One of these was the fear that the arrival of more white settlers in lrian would threaten the status of lndonesians living thel.e. Nowhere did his speech mention concern for the future

;;:;:s|:::ge:ei:o::o::;o¥i.£::i:::ag:¥:p:ltea|nr:ahn:hFsli:::i:ori¥;uo:::n:: in the rc.al intcrcsts of the international community, `including, of cc)urse, our neighbour, Australia'.

In New Guinea, Australia was also a neighbour with Holland. In November 1957 the two signed a co-operative agreement to `pursue policies directed towards the political, economic, social and educa-

*oh::La[€::::e[=e:n:h:fe:i:oE:::c]::::dthge:rogt::;;i:cr::saE[n:tyTanTnf: ngreement promised that this process would continue uninterrupted `lintil such time as the inhabitants of the territories will be in a position

to determine their own future'.

:;;:fi:nu::;gee;s:;:g:E:i:s:t|,:ra!;i:?!e:::d:ecrd:e:i.::rt;dhg::sh::e::u:fi:rp,t::e;:`d::ti:oEj halves of New Guinea as well as other countries. As an observer said,

::c::Lsarprf£:sB[utacEpae]:,oef]k[eodftttcas,::€Lc:[feE::;ctrs;na::::d:::b;::: New Guinea further out of lndonesia's reach. Speaking for what

i:`..£8:rt,b:pctae]|edfotrhe:::nntsa:iv::£V:hF?t.agtsj;#u[rncta[ew:eur'rittt:y?LE::

:`'£Ps::Z'mG:ausgchmw*]et|a%'u:::a:°s[:efeth#esaa[°dfAu¥tTaiTar:a:eueisdngL;:

IndonesiaL's secret war

22

the western half from Holland. The government still supported the Dutch presence. All of these positions conflicted with lndonesia's which, signifi-

:taynt£¥:p¥taedtftetr;:]t::rph]tet]:fcsr:i`f:[dseTerfi::a:[hoen;::::ngatc[:snhar[i::dmi:::: UN's charter. Equally contradictory was the strong support for indigenous peoples' rights which had been expressed by the AfroAsian Conference held in Indonesia two years earlier. Yet the world was not fully convinced by lndonesia's case. Three times the UN General Assembly had debated `West lrian' and failed to give Sukarno the two-thirds majority to back his claim. When Indonesia refused pressure to have the dispute tried by the International Court it became clear that peaceful negotiations were nearing an end. Their deathknell was sounded when Sukamo expropriated Holland's remaining investments in Indonesia. War was in the wind but it soon appeared that Holland's greatest ally, Australia, would shy away from a conflict with Indonesia because its own allies did not want one. The Mcnzies government,

knowing that neither the US nor Britain wished to go to war with Sukamo, despite their distaste for his politics, began to back down from its earlier position. It was much criticised by the ALP during the 1959 Parliament although it seems unhikely that Labor in govemmcnt would have behaved much differently to Menzies. The Dutch, meanwhile, continued their belated development drive. Its results were praised by an Australian official who toured the colony. To facilitate regular reports, Australia stationed a liaison officer, Pat:rick Mollison, in Hollandia. His reports, also favourable to

the Dutch, were frequently brought to the attention of prime Minister Menzies and R. G. (later Lord) Casey, the minister for exterml affairs. But Australia had made up its mind and the new view was aired during the visit of Dr Subandrio. A joint statement revealed that Australia would not resist a transfer of sovereignty if it took place `by

peaceful processes and in accordance with intemationally accepted principles'. The ALP's Dr Evatt protested strongly. When the minister for territol.ies, Paul Hasluck, met Dutch leaders in Holland the next year he was told they understood that Australia had to consider its future relationship with Indonesia. They said Houand did not wish to fight Indonesia, particularly without support from the US and Britain. According to Hasluck, the Dutch were inclined, against their better judgement,

to introduce self-

government before the proper time had arrived in the hope that world

::;::°snei?_::|derbne;na8a£::tanNyca;tag:;::a:T6d°nesiaonanewlyindepen_

From sabamg to Merauke

23

l'resident Sukamo was aware of Holland's strategy and determined

i:rptrhe:efiTspttt:ineHh]h:sL:dL;E:;:::sC:od:?cafdoE::SSn this irredentist obsession. So, with the failure of

our UN gambit, the time has come to take the gloves off, and adopt a frankly pro-Jndoncsian stance while there's still time Co gct some political capital out of it. We, the Dutch and Australians, must face up to the fact that in time wc'll have to accept Indo hegemony c)vcr West lrian anyway and might as well roll with the punch.

Another memo advocated that the Administration sell Australia on the proposition that a pro-Bloc, if not communist,, Indonesia is an infinitcly greater threat to them, and us, than lndo possession of a few thousand square miles of cannibal land.

The Australian government, staunchly anti-communist, was not hard to convince. Australia's efforts to urge a peaceful settlement were spearhcadcd by its external affairs minister, Sir Garficld Barwick, who had the full blessing of his prime ,minister. In 1962-63, I was in midships. The greater pal.t of our government hadn't yet shed the conscqucnccs of the earlier relationship, nor had they come to terms with the new. I never had any trouble with Sir Robert (Mcnzics) about what was to be done. More, oddly enough, with a good part of the cabinet . . . Mcnzics and I had had a long

a:;°Ct]££ti°g:,a]rndcttcd;¥:S£;reesEa[rre;:nt.?,acceptmyjudgementaboutquitca

Barwick felt that the Dut:ch were not going to `put up much of a show, militarily' but also thought that Indonesia was incapable of moving even a brigade of troops across the long sea distance. On balance, he, and so Australia, believed that Holland's days were over and he said as much to his counterpart, Joseph Luns, whom he regarded highly. Barwick recalled that: As things stood then, the landmass of Indonesia was tremendously important to Australia. Thcre's nothing we could do with a hostile

indoz`esia's secret war

28

Indonesia, that could bccomc a threat to us. They have a lot of natural wealth,\ and also a good deal of natural talent. They're by no means inefficient people. And consequently it seemed to me that the time had come to mend fences. Mind you, Evatt had courtcd them in his tim6, but neither Spender nor Casey had. They'd gone the other way, they'd been Dutch-oriented, European-oriented. I felt the time was right for a complete change of. front, and that's what I did. I don't think Labor pcoplc had mulch disagreement . . . they were decolonising `bugs' - without considering the consequences. I never felt any opposition frc)in the Opposition. It was within the party, they had to bc convinced. One of the fortunate things for mc was that Menzies and I got on pi.etty well togcthcr. At no stage did he interfere.

The work of Sir Garfield and other foreign decoloniscrs seemed to bc coming to fruition in March when representatives of the two parties began talks in the US. rndonesia's delegation was led by Adam

Malik, then ambassador to Moscow. The mediator, appointed by UN Secretary-General U Thant, was the American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker. For the occasion he made available his country estate,

Huntland, near Washington. But within five days Sukamo had recalled his officials. Holland's response was to deploy more troops in New Guinea, boosting its complement to 7600, including Papuans. In April, Sukarno ordered the Mandala operation t:o begin. About 130 paratroops were dropped near west coast centres. According to Indonesia, they were young volunteers, and Gen. Nasution said they would continue to come, and be supplemented by regulars if necessary. 75 000 regular troops were stationed on nearby islands. The Indonesian commandos, who were in fact regu.lars, fared badly, suffering from tall jungle trees that snared their descent and, once on the ground, from a hostile population. To their surprise, the.y were not greeted as liberators. Many were killed, others turned over to the Dutch. In total, wrote Hamish MCDonald in S#/!qrco's J#do#efi.a, an estimated 1419 troops dropped on New Guinea. Two hundred and sixteen of them wcrc killed or never found, and 296 captured. This detail about Mandala's achievement did not flgure in Suharto's biography; he only expressed surprise that his men did not receive warmer welcomes. Some of the personnel in the Mandala force would later become

prominent in Indonesian military life: Suharto (president); Ali Murtopo (intelligence chief and minister); Benny Murdani (planner of the 1975 East Timor takeover and ABRI chief); Sudomo (admiral and minister); Dading Kalbuadi (ABRI commander for East Indonesia and leader of an attack on Balibo, East Timor where four Australian

joumahists were shot by commandos). The force also included a man named Untung, who later led the Revolutionary Council which was

From sabang to Merauke

29

part of the coup events in 1965. Suharto has since said that he was aware of Lt-Col. Unfung as a `man with a radical lefust ideology'.

The PKI was a strong supporter of the lrian takeover. The Indonesian vice-president, Dr Hatta, called it the most demanding voice apart from the president himself. Another lninister has agreed that the PKI was the `most vociferous segment of all'. The PKI had adopted this position in 1950 when D.N. Aidit became the party's secretary-general. Prior to that it had favoured autonomy for the territory, albeit within the republic. In May 1962, prompted by a second wa+a of paratroops, Holland's prime minister sent a letter of concern to U Thant about lndonesia's actions. The Netherlands Government's peaceful and constructive approach to the New Guinea question was recently again clearly demonstrated by the positive Nethel.lands reaction to the proposals of Mr Bunker, the mediator acting under your auspices, when -although Indonesia had interrupted the talks -the Govemmcnt declared itself prepared fully to discuss with Indonesia all the aspects of the said proposals . . .

While Indonesia persevei.cs in regularly committing aggressive acts against the territory . . . thereby flagrantly violating the first principles of its membership of the United Nations . . . the Indonesian behaviour diminishes the possibility of eventually having confidencc in the

achievement of a really born flde settlement for the further developmcnt of the Papuans towards self rule and free choice of their own future. Finally the Netherlands . . . wishes to . . . lend its fullest and most

positive co-operation to your personal efforts . . . to flnd for the inhabitants of this non-self governing territory an honest and just / sc)lution on the basis of article 72 of the Charter of the UN .... 22

u£Yoe::t:artceerd¥wTi?£n]tnrdeop:]ees€a:h::i:oWs::Ldd:;step:e:sr°tpoerthfi:ra:t: unless Sukamo agreed. Holland's response was to boost its troop strength further. Soon it stood at 12000, enough to repulse any invasion Indonesia seemed capable of mounting, at least for long enough to embarrass President Sukarno in front of his own people and the world. According to the Indonesian-born academic Rudy de Iongh, the military leaders were reluctant to expose the elite troops and the newly acquired mihitary equipment to the dangers of open warfare. There were simply too many problems: the terrain, hostile inhabitants and long supply lines, especially in the swamp areas. Sc) althoughjungle skirmishes continued, t±e last phase of the West New

Guinea campaign was fought around the conference table in New York with a background noise of sabre-rattling from Jakarta. Negotiations reconvened in July and were completed by August.

Indonesia.'s sea'et war

Holland capitulated, agreeing to transfer its administration to an

interim UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) from 1 October. Dutch New Guinea was to become Indonesian West lrian on 1 May 1963.

At the beginning of 1962 President Sukamo had dubbed the year the `Year of vlctory' and in his independc.nce day address, on 17 August,

he concentrated on this theme when he referred to the successful negotiation in America. He disclaimed personal credit for the liberation of West lrian, an unusual lapse into modesty. The victory which. we have achieved is not a `personal victo:y' of whomever. Don't make a mistake about this. This victory is a vlctory of History. Every struggle against colonialism will end with the victory of.those who flght for freedom, because History has always shown that those who flght for freedom will win. On the contrary, every struggle which aims at the safeguarding of colonialism will lose because that is the law ofHistory. We have acted in accordance with the law of.History and therefore we have won. The Dutch have violated the course of History, so they have lost. Therefore, we must not bc too conceited about our victory.

Soon after Holland's ratification of the transfer document, but before the UN forces arrived, jungle-weary Indonesian commandos emerged from the bush and began to asscl.t their rule over the Papuans in rural arcas. Much of the small `invasion' force was located in southern Irian and the leader of the troops near the main centre of Merauke was Captain L.B. (Bemy) Murdani. Twenty years later, as a full general, he would be the supreme commander of Indonesia's armed forces and widely regarded as the country's leading military `hawk'. In the Meraukc area, wrote Syd#cy Nor/1I.#g Hcr¢/c/ journalist

Pat Burgess in September 1962, Murdari's was a name that stood for fear and hate (T'foc Sww, 24 Sept.). The guerilla's response was: `They

fear me because they` don't know me. If they knew me they would not bc frightcncd'. Burgess commented that he agrccd. The subject of papuan self-determination was covered by deferring it until sometime `before the end of 1969'. To satisfy Sukarno, it was agreed that the Indonesian flag could be flown in `Irian Barat' from 1 January 1963.

This `New York Agreement' was also dubbed the `Bunker Plan', in honour of the UN mediator. However in David Marr's biography, Bclrwi.ck, it is suggested that the plan was more accurately the `Barwick Plan', in that its creator was the Australian minister. Sir Garfleld, while stressing that his department made valuable contributions, has agreed.23 Describing the plan he said that:

From Sabang to Meraulre

31

Thcrc were sensibilities to bc satisfied as far as pc)ssible, and that plan did it gently, or relatively gently, and whilst I felt there would be a considerable section of the Dutch population that would feel badly

about it -including the quite considerable colony of Indonesians there -my indicator wasjc)c Luns himself. I ncvcr had any trouble cxp[cssed to me by him.

Another Australian insider has recorded that the Dutch foreign minster, having tried so hard to bring West Papua into being, seemed I:o have become heartily sick of the whole matter. It was said he could not even bear to mention the subject. A member of the Dutch embassy in the US told an Australian representative to the UN that, by the end of the negotiations, Holland had come to have little interest in an act of self-determination and was only concerned that a facade of respectability should bc maintained.24

PI.ivatcly, many Dutch and Australian officials held grave conc.ems about West Papua's future under Indonesian rule. Barwick himself has said that at the time he expected trouble because the `domjnant'

Javanese were taking over the Melanesians. There would inevitably be trouble whcn borders separated people of like ethnic derivation. The Australian haison offlcer in Hollandia, P.J. Mollison, has recalled feeling that the Papuans would `go backwards under the Indonesians'.25

Similar feelings, expressed on occasion with much passion, were voiced in the neighbouring territory of PNG. Politicians, both local and Australian, denounced the capitulation to Sukarno, while as far away as New Ireland, pcoplc criticised Australia and the US for acting in a weak, immoral way and committing West Papuans to an uncertain future. The prominent pohitician John Guise (later Sir]ohn, PNG's governor-general) organiscd a petition to the UN, and even went to New York on behalf of his `Melanesian brothers and sisters'. Before long, refugees from the west would confirm people's fears.

The first response of educated Papuans was to convene an urgent meeting of the National Committee. Organised by the president of the Parna party, Herman Wayoi, and a member of the New Guinea Council, Nicolaas Tanggahma, it attracted about 90 West Papuan leaders. They agreed, reluctantly, to accept the transfer of their liomeland and to co-operate with the UN and Indonesian administrations. However they demanded that the UNTEA respect their flag and anthem, and insisted that the promised plebiscite be held in 1963. As it turned out, none of thcsc demands was met. The UNTEA period became one of de/ac/a Indonesian control during which all expressions of West Papuan nationalism were outlawed.

Indonesia's secret war

The National Committee mccting was the first time that the West Papuan elite had been in a solely nationalist mood rather than expressing sentiments in favour of either Holland or Indonesia. The leaders felt betrayed by the former and apprehensive of the latter, which was already suggesting that there was no need for a plebiscite.

F::?nwoowu|:ri,:[dse]ttoaErsT]'[utF[eo:,anpgu:::rpc]]::efthclrfaithlntheuN. Even before the UN peacekeepcrs' arrival an exodus began, led by the Dutch, only 20 per cent Qf whom stayed into the UNTEA period. Dutch bit:terncss over the loss of New Guinea was typified by their burning of the yacht club in Hollandia's harbour. A more serious farewell act, which occurred in Manokwari, was the encouraging of ]ohan Ariks to fight a guerilla war to keep Irian in the world spotlight. The Dutch remined Ariks that in 1945 Allied forces had left behind over a thousand wcapoiis, incltiding bren and machinc=guns. Some of these weapons, which were in dumps on Biak and north coast centres, soon found their way into tribal hands. The evacuating Dutch wercjoined by a small number of key West Papuans who had worked strongly against Indonesia. Nicolaas ]ouwe and Markus Kaisiepo were amongst the prominent ones who fled to Holland. Herman Womsiwor and Ben Tanggahma went to a less likely spot, Dakar in Senegal. This `Senegal Group' has since dcvelopcd links with ot:her black peoples, including Americans. Those who remained, deciding to give Indonesia the benefit of the

doubt, included Ariks, the Mandatjans and Awoms, Eliczer Bonay, Franz Kaisiepo and Amos lndey. Bonay became the first governor, while others were given places in lrian's assembly or in the national Peoples Representative Congress in Jakarta. The West Papuan leaders who chose exile, mostly those in Holland, vowed to lobby actively abroad. Some would become conspicuous in the corridors of the UN. More importantly, they began political

groups. jouwe formed the Committee for Freedoni for West Papua (KKPB) and a National Liberation Cou`ncil; Kaisiepo declared himself president-in-exile and formed the Chamber of Representatives. Although the two men fell out, they sought to create a united resistance in their homeland, the Papuan National Front (FPN). To this end, they established links with Papuans at home, using under-

ground channels. Two decades later, these links, and others forged by newer leaders, remain open. They have been used to convey information in both directions and propaganda materials. The existence of the Netherlands-based nationahists was important as late as 1984. For example, details of the pending release of a Swiss pilot captured by the OPM were revealed to the Swiss paper So##f4gs B/I.cfe by Nicolaas

jouwe a day before they were discovered by the government of PNG.

From sabang to Meraiike

33

0n this occasion the communication chain began with an OPM military unit commanded by James Nyaro, hidden in the jungle of. the PNG-Irian Jaya border region. The next link was in the PNG provincial capital of Vanimo, where messages arrived by courier. Telephone calls were made to Port Morcsby, and from t:he.re to Delft, Holland, the home ofjouwe and some of his gi.oup. While]ouwe, often called West Papua's elder statesman, would not have had the power to veto the pilot's release, he was kept informed. The arrival of the UNTEA's 1537-strong security force gave the West Papuans little cause for optimism: most of the troops were Pakistani who, being Muslim, took a dim view of the importance of pigs to local society. For its part, mostly-Muslim Indonesia had 1500 commando-s in West lrian. In theory their role was to assist the local police. But as the political analyst Pctcr Savage noted, the paratroops killed a Papuan policeman a month after the last Dutch ship embarked for Europe and they began to use harsh tactics to counteract nationalist sentiment. Incidents were engincercd in several main centres and used as pretexts for I:ctaliation.

The military combined with the Indonesian bureaucracy to encourage Papuans to endorse the pro-Jakarta line. This maintained that Indonesia was one country and that a plebiscite in Irian was unnecessary and impractical to organise. Groups and individuals who opposed such views were dealt with harshly. The case of one dissident leader, Pcrmenas Toku, was not unusual. joku, a member of the Hollandia

::uhf:I;oh=ga::]Contst,aieendtc°c!]ankeadrt:ofi::gL:d[:it:]nneas:La?sn.8:tti]:kfeFTL:g.Y Returning to his home at Scntani, near the capital which had been renamed Kota Baru (`New Cicy'), he was detained by soldiers at midni.ght on 19 December 1963. Later, according to the Tapol organlsation, Joku was killed. UN officials reported, discreetly, that the local people were being treated badly. One UN obsc.rver, lose Rolz-Bennett, discovered that Papuans who tried to approach him were being imprisoned, and sometimes tortured. Similarly, people who had fled to neighbouring PNG, and been returned by Australia because of uNTEA's guarantees, were beaten up. Papuans in this category were also from the local elite, mostly teachers and students. The then-governor, Eliezer Bonay, who later turned against Indonesia and fled abroad, recalled in 1981 that brutality after the takcovcr occurred on a wide scale. `The prisons everywhere were full', he said. Describing his role as governor, Bonay commented that hc was nothing more than a puppet of Indonesian officialdom. In addition, the economy was treated as lndonesia's spoil of war. One foreign visitor has recalled that:

IndonesiaL's §ecnet war

34

i,Ee:::Sa¥i;;hc:?Pile:dd;leg:ts;h:es¥t,:¥;¥=ta:of:C:Ys:::c]:To:o:;i:;:;]i°tgr°¥cS:1;;:[i;

;ip::aia:i:,!f:.a:;ti::a:tt:rft:::pt::t:a;es::i:;co==n:tf:t'j:r::fa:iraan;::I:sk?ntcEfi:r:airtg:;l=t;i

iia::;i::I:§iiiijjuid;Cd:i::f;:i::§ieii;:tit:;i:;a;i:;:br!iiojih::ij;t;i§:i:t:g§;°eii:di;:y:ei:o;;I; from the UN (over his opposition to Malaysia). The money was

;£rze:s:sign;t%;;:nt[;:sEt::fn[a;€t:I:;n::t;u:k:a;:;:sT:ego;:CFre:s;]n::;¥c:h:tfc¥uo:t: the graves of most of the 79 Indonesians who had died there. A

;::eir;:joifss:i::°i:n;e:iu!;:g:;:i::;:;:y;;£a:s:Cu|iihi:i:jeep:S::;;S;id;{a;iuoiaie;i§¥;;!s;;c:b:u;:s§: :::A::o[:::hn::tsL`;a;:kspgr:sn§[a:rhE.a;untfl:::]na_1:crda,ck[:]danjas;aTerfgeE:eaatt:tE:: connection between the two provinces was announced. At a mass meeting ofjavancse farmers, Indonesian vice-premier Chairul Salch,

:si::f:.tepd[aenT]£rcart:Off:rfiouTatcerdoro€etdh!aevvae::utah,es:ct:;cELoepnut[:tfefo%toe6

javTa£:Sew[r:hTr:s;a[]r;aonf.tEteyu¥ej%AoPnec#j;r6a3ns¥Erpa]ne::,ache

if[a|::Pe;:;::ti:d;'::P:;o.:::e:Sig::#:i;i;c,5:::;,;pc:ri:irig|:;::|¥ai:ob:e:?c;i:o|::I;:u,::S;:::i settlement sites for incoming Javanese. Indonesia's policies were

::i:r£:€a:¥:Eeos:t:::ra:;::::Esth¥hfebs:gpaanp:rar;vc,I:tgearse:E:e¥#aptut]a:; had no ally except their own people:

ii::;n:t;ns;:;0:I:yi::::g::;:::eai§;;:lil::g:°:;;ju;:t::e:i§:tk:a:g:e:::;i:tap¥:i;iis;t:I;1;:if:c8::,i:i;i:

From Sabang to Merauke

35

ers and political exiles in Dutch New Guinea, the UNTEA, and the Indonesian pre-1969 administration . . . Finally, left with nowhere else to turn, elements of the educated petty-bourgeoisie have turned inwards and sought to make linkages with the peasant and proto-peasant masses and have chosen the road of. organised armed struggle.28

The scandal.d-bearer for this struggle was called the Org¢#i.sqfi. Pap#4 MendcA24, or Ol'M; it derived from the FPN, the political front that had been urged by jouwe and Kaisicpo from Holland and established later in West Papua. In practice, the OPM's founders were from the Arfak people, many of whom had been trained in the Dutch-created Papuan Volunteer Corps. In 1960 a large barracks was built in Manokwari. Before Arfak leaders would endorse the project, they had insisted that the Dutch allow a sizeable proportion of Arfak recruits. Back in their villages they held supplies of. weapons air-dropped by tlic US forces during World War 2. Other arms were obtained from tllc Allied dumps that had been revealed by the Dutch. . The flrst act of rebellion was performed not with foreign arms but with bow-and-arrow and traditional clubs. Equally in line with ciistom was the fact that violence occurred only after attempts at negotiation had fai]cd. The act:ack took place on 28 July 1965, two l`1onths before the fall of sukamo and the takeover by Gen. Suharto. As John Ryan outlined in I/}c HoC Lawd, some Arfaks had complained to the authoritics about the lack of jobs as well as shortages of food nnd other necessities. They were arrested for their efforts and only rclcased after the `big man', Ariks, appealed to the Indonesians. The ^rfaks, angered further by demands that they declare publicly their

[#]]:%;oar:na::nfs];:,d;tE:1::r:::i;:fs:£rc::dntt:::::akcsksnfi:]TofeBdF:;s;:: `s !f the volatile Arfaks, 20 000 strong with the support of the nearby l\nnsiki people, had been awaiting such conflict. Some of the gueriuas micl that the fighting was like the exciting tribal battles that their elders ||,`(I recounted. ]ohan Ariks, although 75 years old, took off into the l||lls and organised hit-and-run missions against Indonesia. More ii()lclicrs were killed and several Arfak detainees broken from jail. ^l)RI troops were reluctant to enter the mountains, so, when the li`volt widened, the Indonesian commander called for air strikes L|r()`ll`d Manokwari. Troop reinforcements, eventually numbering ti{lv(`i`,il thousand, were brought in on passenger planes chartered from [1`|` Indonesian airline, Garuda. Another part of the military's strategy `}[``:t%yp]rnfgta]::£:::ty.hichusedbibhicalquotationsurgingthewisdom

l'llc Arfak rebellion continued for two years. Then Ariks was I ||`t``rcd and some of his lieutenants killed. jailed without trial, he •llt``l two years later. But the uprising did not collapse. The leadership

IndonesiaL's secret war

3:stcahss:rmmeyd:eyrgLe:::,wg:r#.:::aAa£;¥,;c:tyhoeusnugppa:rdt:£tah::[faT:: guerilla whose brother, Frits, was establishing OPM groups in Biak. The resistance in lrian came as welcome news to Papuans living in

gi:dse;tta:ri:;jnfi;:LhE:::a:=::,:ih[;:1;=n::;¥g:°inhR:e;:iEeI:ga:r%::i::h::=tar¥[:ti recalled that `from then on, many students spent time training with

i;ie::aiki!::]r;;i::#;;jii::k;i:oeii;;jia;#r:;a§di;:I::i:;I;i:::a:dn;i;J;:agi§§.;itv;;fiis;;:;; attempt on his own life was foiled when an armed crowd outside his

?t°uTeeny]eenatd::,t?:mwcr:on:hde°::.o;Tahnedptehr:;ns,i:ctdhaotp:Lac£'sast¥:Sa[:; killing him. , Indonesia's campaign against the mountain-based gueriuas intensified when their attacks came closer to Manokwari. On one occasion the Arfaks set fire to a large supply of aviation gasoline. The authorities were angry with Governor Bonay who, they felt, was being unsupportive. In 1964, Bonay was removed from office and sent to Jakarta for reindoctrination. When this failed, he was returned

:on[:;:fya;daranr.I::tefi:;E:r#€er:£:]tsToass::::nzd¥rat:.res:¥ehs:romyaet: ¥:setni:,:::aB:C!Coa:d:hoaktot,he]¥s¥e°du':I:::'st?:Cg::tfr[°c:]nctoe±'faeanncdee;r:

%rpe#£ngetfebTr::[cfx:i:]seev::emn:ea:¥ej:set;ceg:oordpcafou:;;,b:#:svee:::pb]: were to bc shot. Many were, according to author John Ryan.

ac::s:ar]x;:t€zhtaheoE]ra:]c:owr[_ng;n:;atL{:rdo¥:S;ta:I.;na,p:aon[s%ars¥eo[::;

1iie:Eoge:;:ad;cn:ti::3;::ns;:e;;f;I;iaa;;oic::::ii::I;a;f;d:ioen?:i::eiygigcy¥ffof

shouted, `Givc us freedom . . . your tl.oops have killed our people at

Manokwari'. After visiting lrian, he returned to Poi.t Moresby and denied reports

::n2c°e°d°e:atph::nsod:a:h;;;:iaenhya°dub]e::gknflcie2d°°b°ecba°u::Csthpe[i:duopn?:sE: revolution was being carried out in lrian and the Manokwari tribes had to obey. At the same time, a Papuan leader, Silas Paparc, who was formerly

From Sabang to Merauke

37

pro-Indonesian, went to Jakarta and told the parliament that 1000 AI.faks had been killc.d by soldiers and aerial bombardment. Later it was alleged t:hat as many as 3500 had died. In 1968 Indonesia appointed a new military commander to lrian, 13rig-General Sarwo Edhie. Three years earlier, during the violence that had followed t:he fall of Sukarno, Edhie had gained a I.eputation

for toughness. But his initial approach to the lrian uprisings tended to bc more accommodating than his predecessor. Late that year he obtained the surrender of Mandatjan whom he dcspatched ro Jakarta as a `New Year's present' to the government. The guerilla leader was

granted amnesty and officer I.ank in the Indonesian army, but the appointment was only symbolic. Furthermore ABRI did not manage to catch Frits Awom who took over the leadership with a vow to go on fighting until Indonesia shot him or hanged him in the Manokwari marketplace. Not long after the Arfak rcsistancc had begun, the Indonesian press aiinounced the start of the Transmigration programme to lrian. In February 1966 a hundred Javanese families embarked by ship as government-sponsored settlers. Half were to settle near Sukarnapura, the rest near Meraukc in the south. The land had been acquired from its traditional occupants. There was no mention of the procedure used for its alienation. Inspired by the Arfak's revolt, Papuans in other places declared their

support for the OPM. Small but determined uprisings were staged around Sukarnapura, Fakfak, Kaimana and Sorong. In the Balim Valley, Ndani tribcspeople at Bunggiak revolted. They were offended that Indonesians thought their semi-nakedness, especially the penisgourd, unciviliscd; and they feared the wrath of their gods if they acceded to demands to drop their clans' names in favour of calling themselves `Indoncsians'. Instead they incurl.cd the wrath of ABRI, which sought to enforce its will. Reports about this in the PNG press were dismissed by Indonesia as `OPM propaganda'. In these areas, Coo, fighting continued after Sarwo Edhie's arrival. By late 1968, Mcrauke was also a focus of anti-Indonesian revolt. The official newsagency, Ai!far4, reported rebel movements in the nrca and pcoplc fleeing across the border into Australian PNG. Near Sorong the death of fourteen soldiers in an OPM ambush was followed by shelling from the sea. Vinages named Sausapor and Makbon suffered many casualties. Then marines were put ashore. Edhie's approach to the Manokwari revolt seemed successful at first. He had released about half of an admitted 152 pohitical prisoners 1nd claimed the surrender of 9000 gueriuas. According to him, 2000 0PM rebels remained in the hills and betwccn them they boasted only 200 weapons. ]ournalists, rarely allowed access to Irian, were given a

38

mdonesia's secret war

sta::ro;hceotn¥ied[:rcab|::i:ScEpast°h:hcca£:t:oof:t:,Z.::at|Zatw]::[odn:::a::d.::

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¥§:;S!:;i!::i:i:s:i:;:ci;::e`;ieii:;:i¥di:;:;:i:i:o;i;fh;;ri:;;;;:¥g;i:I:;ie:i±oji;rii§i:c:tit

From Sabang to Merauke

39

nationalism. In keeping with traditional custom, they had adopted armed struggle when all peaceful attempts to resolve their conflict with outsiders failed. For their part, Indonesians believed they had consolidated their nation's historical boundaries, from Sabang to Meraukc, despite friction at the eastcm extremity. (As well, of course, as having had some problems with the peoples of Acch, North Sumatra, and Ambon in the Celebes.) The convictions of both the Wc`st Papuans and the Indonesians were to bc reinforced by the Act of Free Choice.

2

From sorong to Numbay

n 1 April 1968 the Bolivian ambassador to _____..^^J,,.^1a^war^r the United Nations, ...,. i 1 _

±'e:n`aLJj; 6`rvtrz_-S.;n; :;idii;at although he was ready to leave for 0[hr;;:ntJoa¥:I:;iTsP:revp[::t:::.i:Ce[d°i[drn[octcs;:;;i;.:h'c"rueua's.;-n`,";ircE-;-a= lava to supervise the Act of Free Choice, Indonesia had asked

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would apply. These included:

1

:1::SaudL::;not:tsrai:v:aarrrcL:i (:4ubt„pW4Lftc?1) rtchpartei:|tat:I:: ccr::tnecdL:ft°e: :#:

handover from UNTEA. 2

These councils would give a clear formulation of whether or not Indonesia was to continue in control. The councils would adopt a process known by an Indonesian word #lwsy4wara/i, deriving from

3;;::i:|g;:i;i-:::S::;:i:;;::,;::;;;#ri:,::;#i.;;eiiE;!i:::uiet;::d:gfr::i;:t;%;;: I:oavdcd:t:::at£::sas:umag[Sy.Werctobeguaranteedfl.eedomofspeech,

From Sorong to Nl]rnbay

41

Originally Ortiz-Sanz's mission was to have comprised 50 members but it was reduced to sixteen, which included backup personnel. This was mostly due to the efforts of Indonesia which pointed to the Agreement's hope that the budget be kept to a minimum. After two months prompting by Ortiz-Sanz, Indonesia produced a paper outlining dcvclopmcnts to date. Sujarwo, the head of Indonesia's mission dealing with the Act, was persuaded to explain the plebiscite to the nine lrian councils. Details of his talk were run in a jayapura-based newspaper, after which Indonesia considered it had adequately publiciscd the Act to the 700000 Papuans. Although few dared to voice fears about lndonesia's plans publicly, West Papuans abroad were lobbying. One prominent critic was Nicolaas jouwe who pleaded with Secretary-General U Thant for a one person-one vote plebiscite. Like ocher leaders, Jouwe knew that this was their last hope. But U Thant refused, a decision that was announced with evident pleasure by Brig.-Gen. Ali Murtopo, a special adviser to President Suharto. As Brian May noted in Tfoc J#dowcs!.4# Trc!gedy, the president himself gave

advance warning of his intentions when he told a departingjournalist from Reuter's that any Papuan who opposed lndonesia's retention of lrian wou-ld be guilty of treason. For different reasons, this revelation upset not only the Papuans who lcamcd of it, but diplomats from Australia, Britain and the U. S. Efforts were made to explain Suharto's

Loa|:mwcanst:sd;Ts:rdro,:i?:ra=;`raeti%::i#,nil:suh..::eni,i:o|¥en.fFneuAt;:'i 1969, any ambiguity was cleared away when Suharto told a gathering of paratroops that the `retum of West Irian into the fold of the mothcrland' was irrcversiblc. The paratroop regiment, said theJakarta press, was made up of veterans of the Indonesian revolution. In fact they were about to leave for lrian to cc)mbat a new rebellion that had just erupted there. During this same month, as May reported, the Indonesian mission on the Act met with the nine councils in lrian and explained the official view of what had been named the Pcj)era, an acronym for the `Dctcrmination of the People's Opiliion'. The aim was not to question Indonesian control, rather to satisfy the wishes of the former colonials. It was stressed that universal suffrage was impractical because of the country's difficult terrain and low educational level. No reference was made to OI.tiz-Sanz's suggestion that a one person-one vote system could at least be followed in urban areas such as Manokwari and Jayapura, as had happened during the Dutch-run elections for the New Guinea Council. When news of lndonesia's groundwork reached Holland it generated such public protest that President Suharto had to cancel his planned visit to The I-lague. This opposition had no effect in Irian where the provincial assembly approved the establishment of eight consultative assemblies

42 Indone§iaL's secret war

::;:i::#i:;i!ia;oir:i:i;;;;;its;:;ii:;ij,;;i:csi;;;i::ec:do:a;;:d:I:iai;i;i:::;i;iEgit;:;s[:f;:iin;:;

lain:iia;;[§g:s:§ai:i:i;ijzi;e§:;§i:ei;£;;ij:ji]§:::;i:;:i:s:;;iri;ji:;i:iia:i:::i:i;{ni:n:i:e:n;:f

;i;tt§:I::;;n;;:s;;1;;s;:;::hr;jr;o::ongj:i;;1;:d;:i;§j::e;;e:;g:;;;c:;::i;:::::I:;::e§je;;:u;i:I:i:r Age#ce Fra#ce Pi.csse, confirmed the comment.

::;:;:::;i;s;::i:n§j]:i:i;j8;i::e;;t:¥s;:2;;;lit;t;;::;:;i:;a;;:i;p;;;es:p;j]a;:i:e:e;:;;;:i:u:; =;gdsb:::dsnsd:;:t::nat:ri:n°o;c;ep£:b:i:1::a,::b::S::1;::f::h|e:#T:;rs:::::c'sts::1;:::?:Pry:

From Sorong to NIimbay

43

turn, Indonesia suffered some casualties, bc)th by the stolen arms of

police deserters and the traditional weapons of villagers. Again, Indonesia distributed leaflets quoting passages from the Bible to urge deserters to return to authc>rity. Fifteen years later, in the .PNG border area, the military would invoke the scriptures in an attempt to persuade deserting Papuan soldiers and police to return to tile fold. In practice, ABRI showed little respect for the church, especially those clcments which were not prepared to turn in OPM members. A Dutch missionary, Father Tctro, had been slapped in the face by an officcr after t:he priest complained of soldiers looting missions. One of Tetro's staff was shot while rowing his sister I:o safety across a lake. Due to a lack of food in the countryside, and strong Indonesian measures, the uprising did not last long. Within weeks most of the

population had returned home, although few were willing to participate in surrender ccrcmonies staged by the authorities. Further prcssurc from Ortiz-Sanz resulted in the declaration of an amnesty of sorts throughout the countl.y. Over three hundred pohitical detainees

were released. On the other hand, OPM people told foreignjourmlists, a number of OPM leaders who surrendered were murdered, including Perminas Awom from the Arfaks, and his comrade, Abncr Asmuruf, who had been dubbed the OPM's chairman in the mid1960s.

Soon any hint of OPM activity was again being met with considerable ferocity by Indonesian forces. Brian May, for Agc#ce Fra»cc Pressc in Jayapura, reported that troops pursuing the captors of a councillor who favoured Indonesia had shot a Papuan dead, looted houses and burned possessions, including Bibles. On the south coast, near Mcrauke, people of the Muju clan attacked an ABRI camp, killing tllrce soldiers with knives and axes. They were avenging the deaths of some Bupul tribesmen, a more timid I)eople, who had tried to flee nftcr army harassment. Biak island, long a centre of rebellion against foreigners, also became active in the period preceding the Act. Here, too, many I)npuans were arrested and treated harshly. One detainee was Mathew Major (Mayer), then aged scvcntcen. Years later Mayer would flee to I)NG and reccivc sanctuary there; in 1984 he fled again, this time to ^11stralia, where he caused a furorc by claiming refugee status.

|``nc(iatL::gi|Sptd:ie:t;°rrsobny::ud,°:eesi::r:::h;r5t;es'mMe:ryees:S:£f;ctfa#: ll.olll 50 to 60 Papuans. W/c wci.e forced to sleep on top of each other as there was not enough #|)ncc for us all to sleep on the floor. The older and sicker ones would (`i`{l lip sleeping on the bottom, and each moming there would bc three

Indone§iaL's secret war

44

orfou[deadatthebottomofthccell.Duringthistimcwewerefedonc

;:i:;;ini:i;:!idr;::::3j;;:f::nidiicic;o¥!?ise:r;e\i:o;nij:ir;:;i;a;ts;ieji;ire;i:z¥t;iiitsiii¥i have scars on my forehcad from this treatment.3

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ija§pg;::3j:i:;£:I:::::t:i::::adit:::::;[¥:[a;d§[i;:rg;ii;:tie:sri€e;iai:£;;t;;:!{ij:s?i:Ie;:oie;i:I:: ;:e:is:::1i:g:it;:;,::I:i:I:e:a?d:e:;;:|`,a:gdecrs:n3ci#:;ei::Tw?cegiLae;f!ct::¥:: Australian officials.

GUT::afsusftor:]i:ine£:ih£:;tr[teiscs¥:::sC:]ot£.asreddsbt¥epra*nfn:epeiE:sa.Noenwe

:ji:i;;f;;§o;dgi:%i:b§j;m¥a:i:;;€s;S;in;S;e;tog;dci°i:i::i§jm¥::;I:I:a::S::a:rihiijiin: :ou[roonp[:f]:mc,o:::i:L]]ssTs::tat.:s£:¥;rent;i;gEso;fo:oonudrcbmo::ne¥a£:;ftt,1: colonialism on the part of Indonesians.'

West Papuan nationalists, mostly from the safety of Holland, made frequent pleas to their counterparts amongst the elite in PNG. Parliamentarians were struck by the appeals of Herman Womsiwor, whose mother was from Aitape, in the West Sepik province. As well as the OPM, and its village supporters, a favourite target of

From sorong to NIirnl]aiy

45

the mostly-MushimJavanese was the pig. Thousands were shot, the aim being both to `purify' society and intimidate Papuans. In some areas a protein deflciency resulted. Another consequence of Indonesia's emphasis on security was the postponement of a new anti-malaria campaign. As a result, hundreds of Papuans were to find the bite of the anopheles mosquito just as deadly as ABRI's bullets.

After the flrst seven years of Indonesian rule the OPM was still only a fledgling movement:. By no means was ic the instigator, or co-ordinator, of all anti-Indonesian activity. But it had bet.ome the symbol of resistance and managed to liaise between nationalists in Irian's different regions. For example, coastals played a part in the Enarotali uprisihg and OPM couriers had even walked up to the

rBe;1;er:,Vaac]:eoyinpAa]:%dwbeyst:aaE::n;[¥:rgcire::flusc]:gr::uu::I,S:::i:[n°t: throughout the territory. These were distributed to other OPM leaders and foreign observers. They were released overseas as well, especially at the UN.

]ournalist Brian May has recalled I)eing told by an OPM man in jayapura that the movement had twenty leaders, placed in major centres, and 5000 fulltime members. A Papuan pastor went even further, telling May: `We are all OPM'. In the main centres t:he government had gone to great pains to impress. Papuans were encouraged to fly Indonesian flags and to appreciate that the shops, almost empty of goods a few months earlier, were being restocked. This crash programme was intended to

prove lrian's prosperity to the UN team, foreignjoumalists and the urban elite. Almost nobody was convinced. The economy was still in chaos, despite the release of the FUNDWI grant from Holland, caused by lndoncsia's rejoining the UN. Inflation was topping 2 per cent a month; there were few employment oppotunities, especially for Papuans, who were looked down on by Indonesian entrepreneurs and government alike. Many. foreigners were approached by Papuans who complained that Indonesia was `tidak baik' (no good) and begged them to ten the world the truth. Ortiz-Sanz recorded in his subsequent report that the UN mission received 179 petitions from Papuans, many urging the establishment of a Free West Papua State. Complainants spoke of repression by the army, the continuing detention of political prisoners and the abuse of democracy. One of these petitions was given to Ortiz-Sanz on 11 April by a crowd of 2000 demonstrators. They were dispersed by Indonesian troops and armoured cars. In the countryside, where most of the population lived, Indonesia was even less popular. In the Lake Sentani area in late May, a Maj.

46

mdonesia's secret war

i::¥°eu:11:°s;n::t:h:Ce?£uc:nty:o:fet:t:I;;:;I:;da::Oii:;:e:I:e;d;n]h:°P?rh:et¥tsf:fi:ca.t.ai:;

:;o:;i:",;;miaJk:e7a3,.;:rf:;:i:1S:P?a::::;:peg.:f:i::e'a,d:e:;?I;:en:at:i,Ysi¥:i; dissenters `on the spot'.

At the end of May, Ortiz-Sanz received the election schedules he

i:danbet::::qvu::;t#aodr£:e:ecto[=;;epe:t[Ee:::e#:rca:¥adnedp]faykfa,i regencies and was under way in other areas. The disclosure of this

:£:tt:o:::,:r;;::;:e;ouc:o:fire:::o:;2d_esan:t::£::::::y:ry:hfocj:afi±a:t:tdtoorfe::oyr:u;s::a: overnight stop in Biak.

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;i:;;::;i:;i:§ac:o:I:e{±:e:;:o¥o::;¥;u:;::jiat;i::e§e;:I:i§iie;_a:i::::::zo;i;;:;¥id¥:;i;:;;i:si:

;jo;i::::i;i;i::i;ti;§o:°,a§n[§;;i:i;:s]i°;::;isc:::s:0::;:{i:i:::i;;it:ia;§iiisiI;§¥€,ii:[e€i;§ji recollection of the Act was an Indonesian officer using a thick cane to

#¥od:]nd'€:?cp]uen]an:]Ompoous;i;O:o]rn[:d::cets[.::E;1:n;nwYeanm[concaa]ssO;::: less passive, like the crowd of nearly 3000 at Bosnik, in Biak, which

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From Sorong to Numbay

47

f7I#sy4w/4rafe. The first meeting took place ac Merauke on 14 July. It

was attended by the ambassador of Houand and the Australian ambassador, Gordc)n Jockell, later.to head the JIO intelligence body. Neighbouring Asian countries were represented by the Thai ambassador. Merauke was festooned for the occasion. Slogans were chanted by officials, patriotic songs sung, food and tobacco handed out to attract a ci-owd. The mood of orchestrated gaiety was lost on the 175 assembly members who wcrc kept in a guarded complex and allowed to attend only official functions. During the meeting, twenty of the members spoke in favour of lrian's remaining with Indonesia. Then all 175 voted in this way. The first round was over and the foreign observers were off. Not for some time would they learn that six of the twenty Papuans who had spoken for Indonesia had been killed by their angry followers. On the day of the mccting the Syd"cy Momi.#g Hcrct/d editorialised, under the blunt heading `Neo-colonialism', that . . . the altcrnativc to an lndc)nesian colony is an independent West New

Guinea, aided by the UN, by the Ncthcrlands and by Australia and looking forward ultimately to political association with an independent casterri New Guinea. In realistic terms, by ignoring the fact that New Guinea is ethnically and geographically an entity and that all the `musyawarah' in the world cannot turn Melanesian Papuans into

Indonesians, we are helping to prcparc the ground for a Papuan irredentist movenient and laying up grave trc)uble in store for New Guiiica and consequently for ourselves. Where else in today's world would the dictum bc accepted that a people was tc)c) primitive ever to be free?

The leader describc.d as `huriliating' the unwillingness of Australia to do or say anything to upset the rulers of Indonesia. Within a wcck another meeting was scheduled to occur in Nabire, Administrative headquarters for the Paniai Lakes district. Before it could convene, an uprising had broken out at Enarotali. Thousands of vilhgers had left their homes and gone bush; this time it seemed, l``orc pc.rmancntly, for women had begun building food gardens on I.hc mountain slopes, while their menfolk attacked Iiidonesian I),ltrols on many frc)nts. As journahist John Ryan noted in Tf!c Hof /.4/lf/, bow-and-arrow was the most common weapon, but Papuan l`lll`ibers resulted in scores of Indonesian casualties. Another hazard lol. chc soldiers were deep man-traps, hard to spot, with spikes at the l'octom.

'rhis second Paniai revolt was denied by the authorities and ign`ored

i:y(,:]L::s]fa°raepL§:]n°t:Sderovuetrs:dc[rnstt:Cth:I::::sC:n°tfhcsupcahnLta:ka::e=C5;;;reyfl: v``i`niit by representatives who had cast their vote in favour of the

48

mdonesia's secret war

|ec[t?:So:rc°hTs!::tao¥ear:dsa;¥]°_%€:]eAtfe.rm#at:#uhd[:fri::,€Jt::Wfi:;:i: interior.

t:;:;;:t;;±j;:::::t;;:i[;;::I:y;:;;.;:;i;°;ig;;:::i;;:;;s;jdiji::n;§ihis;;:jt;:;s;:;i€::o:;;

--

`

--`-`

TheSanzReportwassubmittcdtotheUNmNovembcr"Its

:::e;£jt;:u:jjic#£g:ig:g:i;e;:b;i:{i:i:js:¥:s:t;:ofu::::d::gEe:n%eunttt}:e:¥c¥::fEt'i'::I I;so%r;n:tl:o:nmTfou¥n:[c¥y;::::se:tn¥::s:ts;:;eu£:tna¥e:o:v:ehr:£¥t::ee::s[::s;;::syw:eEr: delivered:

From Sarong to Numbay

49

My delegation has so far bccn unable to find ollt why it was cons-idcrcd acceptable to the Sccrctary-Gene[al's Rcpresentativc in West lrian to agree to a formula of free choice on the basis of /)Hlsyatu4r4fo consultations - with one thousand notables appointed by the Indonesian Govcmmcnt, something which was not clearly stipulated in the origiml Agrcemcnt . . . (Zambia) I should like to recall here that the Gcncral Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV) c>f 1960, dcchred that the inadequacy of.political, economic, social or educational prcparcdncss should never serve as a pretext for delaying indcpcndcnce in any country. (Togo)

No society could be said tc) bc so primitive and no terrain so

geographically difflcult in the modcm world that the vital exercise of democratic govemmcnc should bc indcfinitely denied to its peoples . . . (Sierra Lcone)

We arc not convinced by the argument that the principle of #ji/5yatvardfo was the only political method which could be understood by the people . . . Indeed, we are told that undc[ the Ncthcrlands Administration a type of democratic system known as the `whispering vote' had been successfully used. Further, in Australia.n Papua New Guinea, which is characteriscd by the same difflcul[ gcographical features and is inhabited by the same so-called undcvclopcd peoples, the principle of. `onc man, one vote' is being successfully used, and a somewhat enlightcncd policy is being applied thcrc in leading the peoples towards eventual self-rule.

(Gha-)` Ghana tried to amend the resolution to provide for another Act of Free Choice in 1975. In the process, it launched a verbal attack on Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of Indonesia, which had criticised the Africans for attempting to place qualifications on the takeover. The amendment was opposed by 60 votes to 15, with 39 abstentions. In the ensuing vote on the resolution proper, there was no opposition

and a nine member reduction in the abstentions. Non-African abstainers were Venezuela, Brazil, Israel and Barbados. In Australia, a number of backbenchers from both sides of parliament protested strongly against the Act. Labor's Charles Jones, later a minister in the Whitlam government, complained that `nobody seems concerned that there should be independence for coloured people from other coloured people'. He called the election in lrian a `gerry-mander' aiid, like]im Killen MP ten years earlier, mourned the lost opportuiiity of creating an island state. The ALP enshrined in its policy the belief that a proper act of self-determination should be granted to the West Papuans. This remained as policy for several years but was nllowed to lapse.

The UN had been the West Papuans' final chance. To the last, they bi`lieved it stood for human rights and justice, and would somehow

Indonesia'§ secret war

50

;::g§,:e:a:rt:hoe:¥eoe:peoa¥i:e:a:1.:dch:ah:e:::s:;e:g[;ie:hf,::chw::#r:[i:s?ci;c|?n::1: £:;u;h;rakngn°[rygah=;S£T[8h?epdMfucrct]ise:ntihecnt:ewdnts;tEec;e°]i::gf]fiTc:::-toff

in:vye::rts,thaeii°oP#:cahdsduebvsec]r:8:g::t:h::eart].eosn:]fgr:gi°onfa[a¥:::

;::p:u::[sa[cA;s::in:;:s[:£m::u:tv:;=];:;:c:droobv;epr:s:]a:s[[::h£:%;:;ut[€j;:ejsE;afiEr:¥t;: :[xTeer:Oat::rnrt,`tTre]:::8uocrhd:sntE:csceti:p;isos::[E¥tAwu::r[ad[[:'es[:1:1::ea:i:: outsiderstoincitethePapuansonacourseofresistanceforwhichthey

ifui:i;%e;:s;h;::e:;i]:i;:ij::I.;:;!i:;:#;gi:i::::ii:tc:§:P;rp¥ai;i;:a:i:d;§j::::]ia::t:i:ei:ii 1963-69varywidely.Atthetime,journalistPcterHastingssaidfrom 2ie§j;§a§::s§ei::i:y:::i*!*t:ii:;ag;i:i;:er;u:a§t:di:I;;i;ri:i::e{;i:;|ij!°;9;Ci:osi::i:::!a°t::i:;:0:

:Fa°nrtr-j[eerms8°ta[e¥ca:I:°oiu6Vp]X£,:h;Ccte[aor:¥g:g:Ledveccnreya:::Sg'a°tft[hned:]nme: of the Act. Organising, rather than attacking and provoking retalia-

From sorong to NumbaLy

51

massacre of 500 villagers in the Lerch district. (These incidents were described to Tapol by Seth Rumkorcm in 1984.) Acts sucli as these enraged a number of pohiticised men who had been willing to concede the authorities a last chance to show their goodwill. Some of them had military ski]ls, learned from the Dutch and the Indonesians, and when they joined the OPM in the jungle they were able to make valuable contributions. The best-known of these people was Seth ]afeth

Rumkorcm, then 37 years old, who came from Manduser viuage in the cast of Biak. His father, Lucas, was an early supporter of Indonesian rule. Seth went bush in June and formed a regular guerilla force that operated under his command for the next t:welve years until he went into exile. Seth Rumkorcm began his working life as a boc)k-keeper for the Royal Dutch Airline in Biak. Hc spent nine years with KLM. In 1962, like many Biaks, he grcctcd the Indonesians witll enthusiasm. He

gained acceptance to the Army's infantry academy at Bandung in]ava. After two years he graduated as a second lieutenant, specialising in Intelligence, and was posted to the elite Diponegoro Division. Iie moved to Jakarta with his wife, Sylvania. Later, two daughters, Yvonne and Ycra, were born th.ere. The young Papuan officcr started to get into trouble. In late 1964j Rumkorem was detained by rilitary police for secretly trying to thwart a government-staged demonstration in favour of the Act of Free Choice. He was held for three months and then put under house arrest which ]astcd until November 1965, two months after Sukamo fell. Two years later he was arrested for insisting that Indonesia make a clear statcmcnt about the plcbiscitc. Hc spent most of 1967 in gaol and was t:hen sent back to Biak. From his time in ABRI Intelligence he was

already aware of human rights abuses committed by the army in the course of its duty. He was most upset to learn that the situation in]ava was being repeated in his homeland. In an interview in Lc)ndon for the Tap8l bulletin, he has recalled how local people were in the habit of coming to his father to protest their ill-treatment. They spoke of being tortured with implements such as hot irons, sting-ray tails and electric current. One case he heard of in 1969 involved Esther Yanteo, the head of a girl's school in Serui. Accused of OPM involvement, she was stripped during interrogation and burned with cigarettes on the sexual organs. Rumkorcm said relatives told of how in Jemburwo, another island, soldiers raped women, put sand in their vaginas and sealed men inside sacks and dumped them at sea. Before long Rumkorem would have ample opportunity to witness harsh practices. In March hc was re-arrested by a special Navy unit for alleging that the Pcj)cr4 was being organised in a fraudulent manner.

52

mdonesia's secret war

i;;i;;;s;ia{;i;§i§i::::i;:;i::;;gi:vg{a§:i;:i:;i:::;;;;;:iti¥i;:i:i;i:isn:h;:i;Iai: uns:rmE:::=a¥raess:Tp±,esofadsu:Lnegnt:eo£:iotfoFr,eaey:phuoriac.e,8:dsaefiteerrii :::aft::°mnesdh;¥eans£Cec:S:£t°.::::]tnhge°hi?]¥Sympathles,asuspicionhc

]#t:t::c::i:::;I:i:[t::r:uE:;0;c?lie:d;?ph#tes??sari::tr]::%'eeoba%a::r¥c:J:'Ofa:':

!y:uS°igiji:0::fn{;:;i:::o:in:ae;;1;:gfo;;!s:,t;:n::I;;IS;t::ns:t:::;:t±;e:i°ig,y:cat;ae;i;ie}:;1:;i munists, and the USSR's military support well known. TheTPNhadnomorethanafewscorementostartwith,andevcn less modcm arms. The final test for new members was for theln to

i:joa;nl;:;:::Tie:::e::aei::1y::a::R:I:Its:thgent::ersacc:i:t:h:;:in£;:a:a:mrooe£:1:n:t:3, ?a:;cr:gcT:as[ef]:±]sshwTtehntur°bnanthseu#:er:I::esInadditlontheymain_

arc:?v4:;et;rfr?tohLe::T::s¥::fotc¥°e:ti:i:i:e:rr]!;:a:P:h;:¥W:au:Lhcc;i:u::so¥::r'cl:i:e

3:t¥r::bFp:r]r:::u;cegfab:yale:I:g£:e=js:r]s¥£;:s:oe:]fl=;:t:::t:oj;o:#;:p:I:ors;t,%s:;tnE: OPM's support, in one capacity or another. Wapai, too, paid for his involvement.

i:¥c:r:rJ:arg;;ts:t::ai:I:*j:ydbLa:t;;:;:iLj°gn:v:enfnet:|Cew¥:a#Y:h:oa:r:::i¥:I:t|L::sab¥]`nd; During a later period in custody, he was

n;;ske[Cnk;adcta:::::t::c::,uonn:[thwea:Caabdo::tsoc:eeriyu::::e'd].°]S:Ca:nosrca::es: ]onrtd°e:ete::Ct]Ca::dtabk]::a,fn°t]:Cadfo?cfi::rwr£::g'£5°wucrr:::t'g::::;uYeedw#: stood in line and heard our comrades being shot one by one, and their

From Sorong to Numbay

53

bodies falling into a. grave . . . I prayed fervently, and wept so much that the cloth covering my eyes became soaklng wet. My prayers, it seemed, were answered for I suddenly heard a motor-eycle app[c>ach. An officcr alighted with an order that prisoner No. 41 (that was me) should return to the prison.6

The other main guerilla figure of this time was Jacob Prai, born in 1942 in the Ubrub area of the border zone. Although Prai came Co the resistance by a route far different to Rumkorcm's, he was also a product of the Papuan elite. Like the Biak leader, he had visited Jakarta. But in sharp contrast, he had always opposed Indonesia. While their views were destined to converge, Rumkorem's earlier involvement with the military would sit uneasily with Prai, especially after the two fell out over other matters in 1976. After that, as set.ret OPM documents show, Prai referred to Rumkorem as an `early traitor to the West Papua cause'. In late 1962, after the UNTEA had moved into West lrian, Jacob Prai helped start an independence group called the Papuan Youth Movement and later became its chairman. While a. law student at Cendrawasih Univesity (UNCEN) at Abepura, near the capital, Prai kept up his liaison with anti-Indonesian youths. Then, as today, the

UNCEN campus had many government spies amongst Indonesian and even Papuan students. This led to Prai's arrest in 1968. His

:hn;::rhs:t¥r€:yvscF;VL:tbe:I:;ernetc:Eeddpboyhaacca:I-;t:5:ni:::.Kubla>Who Most students were strongly against the Indonesians but very frightened. As a result, they didn't do much. ButJacob was different. We even used to see outsiders, Chinese sometimes, going to his room for

I:r:;;:1:,S:i:g:;n::ehh:ji!1:C:1:s::a:e:a:s:orl:g¥:::::h:::4ekc,:no::u:e±:T:;h:;X±¥p:e:j;a:eleowTh::f were going across to PNG. lie was also very energetic in helping local people to market their produce, things like crocodile skins. He was the

;oeT£::ea.,Eg:aasn::I::ftthheebfiTrsst;::::hmeecnarfi::;[3Eeat:::::er:gefoopn,et,: =n:Cvre::£nvt:7rsity. I think he Was a good man to be helping lead the

Prai's activities attracted the government's attention. One day, free of studies, he left the campus, coincidentallyjust before an armed

guard came to question him. The guard remained outside his room all day. When he returned late in the afternoon Prai was arrested and taken to gaol. Within a week he managed to escape from prison and did not give Indonesia a Second chance: hejoined Rumkorem's group

'bnu:hkej:#:eagberionfg:nn%::g]:onu°ntdmp]:i.?t:¥a:Xapfi:all::e]'nhtkheet::pptfaa]ka]::dtehr;

54

Indonesia's sec*et war

:;;lgi:it;i:iji;;;ij:;i;i::ii:i:iin;;i:e::i:i;i;:;;:I:ci;i;ie!i;ii:E::i:;i;i:;iii:ii,::

ii]oX:t:¥:::til:e:dr¥J]:0::1;d:bsh::rh:°rl:n:sfh;;¥e:;:e?:C6:8:-ns7:0:::r'e:ds:t:ae5::iae:?u°¥r€

``.

`

`

i:i;ci::;os:ai;ga;ng-:af!;i;:;:o:;ii;:i;:::i;e:g;;:::;:n3i;i:;:::;:it;:;::Eri:eei;:ei:os;;::ii;: land.Theonlychinkintheanti-communistarmourwasRumkorem's

From sorong to NIrmbay

55

belief that,the TPN force was in such urgent need of weapons that it should solicit some from the Eastern bloc. Prai, on the other hand, favoured self-sufficiency, believing that as the wc>rld community had turned its back on West Papua it was futile to hold out further hopes. Russia and its followers, for example, had voted in the UN in favour of the Act of Free Choice, despite President Suharto's known detestation of communism. China was seen as a possible ally, but no assistance emanated from Peking. The TPN held lrixed feelings towards West Papuans abroad. While Rumkorem maintained cordial links with Herman Womsiwor he was unenthusiastic about the other leading cmigres in Holland, Nicolaas ]ouwe and Markus Kaisiepo. He considered ]ouwe to be extravagant in his statements on the OPM and unjustifiably. boastful about his conti-ol over its guerilla force. Indicating that his views about the OPM's `elder statesman' had not changed over the years, Rumkorem said in 1984:

jouwc engages in a lot of fantasy, and his attitude is very unstable sometimes to the West, somctimcs to the East, sometimes northwards, then southwards. Today he concocts a plan, tomorrow he abandons it and makes others. Recently he put forward the idea of West Papua obtaining autonomy within the Indonesian republic. This is totally umcceptablc to us. lie hasn't leaned from history that it is impossible to trust Indonesia.8

From overseas the Victoria group received propaganda material but little else. Certainly not their hoped-for arms. Military `equipment' was supplies like red shoulder-boards for attaching to army shirts. These usually came in through PNG. Most importantly, however, they were sent a draft constitution for West Papua detailing the goals of the proposed state and its administrative workings. The preamble to the 129 articles acknowledged God Almighty as the Creator of all the World and scresscd that t:he Rcpubhic of West Papua would be founded on Brotherly Love. It decreed citizens to be those autochthonous Papuans who took an active part in the fight for libc[ation and foreigners who may be naturalised in accordance with statute. The /i./!g//¢jin"4 was declared to be Mahy, unless a future government decided otherwise. When it was approved later, the constitution would be printed as a handsome blue-cover booklet, embossed in gold with the state seal of the crested Goura pigeon carrying the Morning Star flag and the motto `One People - One Soul'. It was declared to take effect on the Day of I'roclamation, a date that was left bhnk in the document's early drafts.

b[}PguringH:i]Cag:e=[::S:t:15:t[Ze:rji[]tgh7etjRnugiektohreeintreercnec;:;ende:i:tat::

56

Indonesia's secret war

from Herman Womsiwor, coded, like most OPM communications,

:::]esfi:::tt*eoJm°suL¥:I:r::£`r;ass::anne:'gnuget3hfi]::=oanp+°uVs'uS::;:

hoped it would be possible to pre-empt such a move by declaring

9.esst::?tuaj:i:g::e:ndseL::e#e°sTC£.a:uhae.y5Cr[[tgt_h£:::bR°u°itkc:::ib]]£¥;

!rij:dy;s:jc;a:£:ilo:Ie;yoaiid::i:i!::::rse°aih:er:ysu:;;:ad::I:r:::;;I::rec;£fiio:ami:i;S:£ ::t`hnes:::]nngg]ea:ter¥:o:;notEst|aetef[]rnsta:rn.:i:g:s::yt.h:te:a;sgraet:e¥#8; other supporting groups, including the American Black organisation,

NAACP.

AtBti:ke]nndt::jbuunseh;hReu:okb°];:#]t:::;:°htehaed:fur:rnt::sin;::i:ahra#r:s:e; settlement about 100 kin south of]ayapura and a few hours walk from the bc)rder. The TPN had attacked the post unsuccessfully in Scptem-

:ecfrzeofwtfrc;sp;e£¥ioouust¥:;:.a,%.[J:11?gt?he?p£:::Ps:£:trecr;a::nraagd';nogti:

iT::I:::a:,:;;I:;rugs:e:::,t?;;sdpefr:e[;t!ios::eceo=eanntylFs:::1Snygmabuodl::=cefo:i:; PROCLAMATION

:§jj]u;i:ct:§v;;:5:;ja;net:i:I::,,;:;:,:db:,:i:::{r;]¥y±a[:j{j*F]t;oo%tj;;:;;d{::j{tt;¥;d{a¥cstp::r;;#f jure).

:1:¥r:o%!y:1:tE;::ba;Su;:i:tee;ept|e'Ct:ebekefi:e¥:nt:]tnhdeep¥:ited;tt,hnatthteh[: Victoria, July lst, 1971

In the name of the people and

government of West Papua President

Seth I. Rumkorem Brigadier General

theTbhiLSs£:nmg:::gcL::tfi:£e£°tromfatLa;iYn%Vtehr::Lhgehg:oertLi]eas[n¥:1::gLabnas:kTLE:; *Local name for jayapura

From Sorong to Nutay

57

Indonesia's secret war

58

gji;€i:::;i::€i;Gin;:;ii§i:t;§ni;:ii:§i::I:;I::::;i;;::;i;¥¥:i::;::ir§a;:;!i;:i:::;:t{::;:i:!§C;t

with the network of OPM sympathisers and, in time, news of the

ii:;ia:t;°ri:t:;}y:W:i;c;Pr::i:a:s:€e:i§!air::ufn::#c;ici:ey::e;ritti:is:nsis%ifiia]i;Ch:::a§:n;°:ii:f ?nnai:Smwo::]£ebnet.m[a:nfaa::es:n]:e]a]t;;[y,eanr:'8e#C]:::edrci!:n;#[LcfLt;

;::o;:t:rE;:p:o;?:a:Sdpve::tt:°gf:1;e£;°enN¥':t;I:a[::ni;:b;P:::,::n€eo[:nfi::[tisye::m3:

:jag:i;::;I:ofcg!f:a:oef:;:rv::e:uiih.:ni:i:5oi:p;rie:ai:¥u:t:if:i¥:ta;u:o:I,s:1;S:::a::::,:::E:;::

:;::;§j:;:§c:;t;ai;i:;i::±];i;i;:;:;;:;:i.:::iij;1;i:€ieiv!ii[;::;:ii:i;:;ih:::;;:;;;;:::I;€d;::i:I:i::

i;:i:;t[:y;tiii::;i;;;;°ii;i;¥;t:i:i:c§pi§c;:igii!:n;;;;§]n;i:r]i;;;o::;i;::i:;i:iijii:i:Tvij;ijsi ill:;::::ntt::dia§;:ibaa:ii{i;n;:et:at:§ia:t;e:ta:s5:i::hf;;i:t¥:p::s¥id::a[:::i::i:t;,!s::si;r:ee:;;i:I:

tit:p:.:n::t,!h?o|E:,:¥,:;c:o#pT:pel,yE:evi=g:nft:ie=;ne;;:T:e:,ia:n:tse;ae:sstga!1:e:d`tnit:

From sorong to Nulnbay

59

PNG border, a zone where the guerillas moved at will and ABRI feared to tread, it should have been clear that many dispossessed villagers would join the TPN's ranks. However Indonesia pushed ahead with such policies and showed little restraint with dissenters. hi so doing, it set the pattern which continued into the 1980s. Indonesia's way of handling dissent began to move away from the deployment oflargc troop strengths towards a more active role for the security agencies, particularly KOPKAMTIB whose officers were military men and little interested i'n the civilian laws of the land. Even in Java, the body set to work with enthusiasm, flllmg its detention cent:res with a range of dissidents, including students, Muslim activists, artists and writers. IrianTaya, where rebellion was in the making, became a prime focus of attention. Backed by the military, whose numbers had now dropped by half, KOPKAMTIB intimidated elements of the Papuan population: academics, bureaucrats with suspect loyaltics, village heads, the unemployed. According to OPM leaders, many key people were killed, poisoning being a

popular inet:hod. Others were made to disappear, their whereabouts never discovered. An OPM source estimated that 20 per cent of Papuans had experienced detention at some time. Recalling these days, Rumkorem has said that the fate of Marthin Luther Waren was typical. After he had signed a relcnsc document, he was allowed out in August 1972, and Daan and Kalaopas (his friends) saw him being offered a lift in a non-military vehicle by an intelligence offlcer. Marthin left with this

man, and since then no-one knows what has become of him. The vehicle had the number DS 101, a well-known vehicle involved in similar disappedrences injayapura. Now, when his relatives ask about him, the prison officials say hc is no longer there, and show his signed release order.t'

Predictably, such an approach won few `hearts and minds', but it did not send people into the bush i.n huge numbers. However ic

generated sympathy for the OPM amongst the majority which lived under Indonesian control. If the Papuan pastor had exaggerated in 1969 when he said that everyone was pro-OPM, the judgement seemed to be coming to pass. Local feelings were antagoniscd further when, in 1973, West Irian was renamed `Irianjaya' (Victorious Irian), in line with the existing name of the capital, ]ayapura (Victory City). Any victory clearly did not belong to the Papuans. As the situation deteriorated on the west of the border ic improved rapidly on the eastern side, in PNG. Australia's ex-colony received self-government in December 1973 with independence to follow soo_n. The ec.onomy was developing well and extensive localisation

Indonesia's secret war

60

had occurred in the public service. For the West Papuans it was a demonstration of what should have happened to them, and as such was immensely frustrating. So was the attitude that PNG's new leaders seemed to be taking towards their less fortunate cousins in Irian. The policy was an inheritance from Australia. In a confidential letter, PNG's minister for defence, foreign relations and trade, Sir Albert Maori Kiki wrote in 1974 that: In view of the toughening of our attitude to border crossing by TPN members our ofricials now fear that the TPN, particularly in the concentration based in the secret camp known as Markas Victoria, are becoming desperate and that there is a danger that our own patrols on

fi::s£::e:gfnth£Eaoj:g,erh:d;gbh:cbfi:dat;:cukre:.ffiTc:,;:s,at:LeyeAru:fr:[Sacncrff:;% Commission's) . . . indicating that the TPN had extended their influence quite widely among villages on our side of the border and to a depth in the area behind Vanimo not previously suspected and that there was considerable evidence that the movcmcnt was aimed at both the Indonesian and PNG governments ... Early this year, at my direction, a substantial toughening up of the attitude tc)wards border crossers known to bc members of the dissident organisation was instituted . . .

You will appreciate that it is very difficult to control trmsport and movement of individuals in the area concerned and that owing to the maze of human foot tracks, the use of rivers and streams as rights of way and similar factors, it is almost impossible to completely cut off traffic in items valuable to the dissidents such as food and shotgun ammunition. It sccms very likely that we will bc able to bring to a halt the passage of such supplies through the mails but this will not stop human carriage across the border. As a result of my discussing this with the Chief Minister (Somare) wc have decided firstly to continue . . . the strengthening of all types of officials in the particular section of the border area. This includes the

rye::[antEc::tt:ftfeffiic,;sas`]Sae[nntc`::'vnegm:::1.foe. Who may in my way be

Sir Albert was proposing that a platoon of the Australian-run territorial army, the Pacific Islands Regiment, be stationed in the border for at least several months. This would deter the TPN and please Indonesia. He ruled out the notion of engaging in joint

Pak9#;:]8owh;:Fdtahsee:;ne:°onfcsse;:rnest=gea:Fisntg:h:ii:::re[:;;dopM|eaders, the aim, he said, being to ehiminate the friction that armed guerilla

#§tpe:?:°f:t:h::sL:nh::ViLi:i+;:::ra:u:Ss*:e:d:¥o:tE::I:nddfn:e:Sts]1a;:ap¥u:avn:s¥n%snit:a:

`highest level'. Not surprisingly, the t:alks became bogged down over

From sarong to Ntimbay

61

ihe:ds:nbJicfi_°]fgt7h4Ca9tph¥hfo°:::ko;:tgh]:tsd]5sttr::8tg::.m°=:sS[::hermoefe#:gag:: and later PNG ambassador to Indonesia, Benson Gegeyo. Attending were Kiki and several senior offlcials, including at least one Austrahah. On the OPM side were Rumkorem, Prai and a handful of other

iueecrt]]]|ags'sat:rTcedu;se]a]:ebxu-[g::e;Eeore:£rraj:E]t:tin:oT£:n:ng:]ya::: member of the PNG team: itrrawnagse:::i;°£:::!yaE€c'°o°#*koeu]gevde:°:t]sngbe;sntt°toand[:cmo[ucraab::

£:]¥:::jr:;:t¥Cfg:1:°!V=°:uns;Stfacar:oats¥;s:c:1rfy:d::I:s::bfoat:h::]fir:]r:;t::e:;¥i]:su:g::h;% threatened by the ltldoiies`ian army.'`

J:h:}£en:;:¥f;a:;;a:I;:tit:g;::ti;e;!js:C;#t;:!n;:::9#::oSK¥:n€t:hu:;:::;t;wfi;:;ar:::e:;i PNG I.cfuscd to recognize their government and would take firm action against any OPM members using its soil. The talks broke down and were abandoned. With this stalemate in place, PNG reached independence on 16 September 1975. Two months later, Indonesia invaded Portuguese East Timor with a degree of brutality that alarmed PNG leaders and angered many citizens. Students surrounded the Indonesian embassy and burned its flag. The Timor takeover made it much more difficult

i:erefoNmG_::nJducsdt]fpya;u:::.Cy°fc°-°Peratlonwlthlndonesiaagainst Caught bctwcen an increasingly hawkish Indonesia and a reluctantly hostile PNG, the TPN force intensifled its efforts to consolidate.

¥:ui;;¥raaat¥fi;i:s:t:;;:h;ee:C§e:p::gig::t;;riit:stey:srfan:]dfi6ts:ui:£:Eje::;::i;its::ta:;dj;i:

¥d}:Ie:::i::rs;;;lid:::;;:§t;;i::£i;d:h:::::i:::¥;:dii:::;i:Ii;:b:ioi§§:iii°§i]:d::ui:itjji press, by villagers who had fled.

br]Pfest:jtfu]:Steda:*enr:t:ec:::'opr¥9e#onp°rteg:::]ttfes£L:i:riacnroascst;I:;

Indonesia's secret war

62

over. Not the least reason was that the task would have been impossible for anything short of a large army divided into a myriad of smau patrols which could live off the land. PNG lacked both requirements. Its whole defence force numbered less than 3000 and

fbi:::11:cni:Lnnc±L:Steh:Off::;iLcfaoLrs:tph°or:tfi:Off?wmdai;:::Sfi:Sr.ei:;i°epnsLs¥]enr; their rations. This meant either withdrawing for a time, or being provisionedbyairdropswhichwouldalertguerillasformilcsaround. Another complication was that under PNG's constitution the police, not the army, had authority to make arrests. At best the soldiers could

::[ey*:tvhe.:a¥edna;T:Picatrscth:aTph°eh::1:tfti°an'h::dbtehe:eregcconue:::]£gyastnh': then-commander of the force, Brig.-Gen. Ted Diro: roh=c';yd;r;oVuC:.;e:nuas{:fiamged::8:hoeess,LL¥PbL:):hLgn8t:Ts,!'kedetalnmg

The situation greatly irked Diro and his senior officers who believed that their political leaders were dithering, and worse, denying the militaryaccesstoborderintelligcnce.Itwasalsotingcdbyinter-scrvicc rivalry with the police force, which the military felt to be as inefficient as the pohiticians.

|npoyne]s:a77jopi;dr°en:::eT:Smc:j%%ruoess_a:5debre:S::t[:°n::inpcidGt!`]a: not take decisive action against the OPM. They believed that lndone-

;;adp¥ct±;I:n::i;air:oC:h::a:,i:|B:r::¥n::;h:C;ia::Cce:n:t[Pati:S:C:ati:;:pS::±a:oil:n::f their own, codenamed `Electric Shock'. It has since become known as the `coup that never was', for its target was not the OPM but PNG's

l::wpt::;ecg:o;::,*o:r::a:c¥o:s:;§d:e:c:*pva:]g;::lg:a[inlsttrta:[h:%vdpefh:je;t:9::rEe:i rehearsals of the coup were held, involving a col.c force of 30 officers and twenty cnlistcd men. Trial runs were done in jeeps and trucks which rumbled through the capital after midnight. On neither occasion wcrc they detected. It has been said that not even the wives of

:he:]e:Le°dtttchr;;rshuusspbe::edds'toaLbt:°d:::g:nniu:catnE::t#oarge]snbeyxht|te:t:I of night.

dos:gBn:]fi;C%:Z'.t*:cadrj::,'Swpiaonc¥na;,rriveeda[tehdatt:h[en8°pn#}:';raeTe:acsesiPNG was thought most undesirable. Before Electric Shock could take place, news of it rcachcd the Somare government. The army's rival, the police, was put on 24-hour

From sorong to Nt]mbay

63

;fe;:::cbi::;til::I::;i,i:y:iy:ail,fi;;:i:::si:::!`;¥:esiui;:i-i:s:t;I,ie:n;t:;;;eo:fii:t|i:I;; that Diro met secretly with the OPM's Setli Rumkorem ac the Moem

E::::rc]tss]£o¥:T£:yAw¥raered:t::mt[hnecydctoou[adtT::svtec:ropt::ng[£b::: engaging in solo diplomacy with the OPM. It was possible that he

§[g:a::i:1;s;i¥::o:kju:£¥:g:,;i::I::et±h:::rfc:¥:¥;t;¥;s:i;::;o:t;§n:lag:fi::;i;]j future.

ROLead:::;.?irB'isromh::b:::ed]:ms]]sTchda,ra:;p:i:a.t:::p,to]a::cE:sds]a:£:

1::C±:e:ris:£koe:d:i;;a!#i:e:c:;n::a::|io=:er!aatketahrt:itFet;::ho:d::af::tuta;#::1: border zone.13

The irony was that in his secret discussion with Rumkorem, Diro

::;sa:::efntfiF:ei8':h¥;a:I:o::t:::hg¥uo:rg::::li±f::n:n:os°¥:I:¥a:P:I:orrga¥s:h:asgt ]gnu:i]:]ac]frocruc::tfaE[:e:wL=.£f]:oe:fi8ur]cda][hyayea:tecednr::]uk][t:g-wa]fijnptr::pe According to Prai at this time, the force remainng loyal to Rumkorem numbered no more than 50] while his own followers, traditional border dwellers like him, could be counted in the hundrcds. The acrimony of the feud that had developed between the two

Eaod;:sv:rada:t:rd:,:ebt£:tohTrpat:da]proaft;rad]:n:gsra:eu¥.bc::sna;:dst::nmg:i; :°on:i8e£::]ey'w::thhe°dugrhn:3;7a,StTeuahusatsra:FaenT:Vbca?s::t::]°np;a°knaer::: Richard Woolcott, went to lrian briefly and said that no more than twenty rebels wel.e left. As he visited no areas under OPM control, and met no leaders, it can be assumed that his estimate was based on information given to him by officials.

;§iidieiifr:°tie§:;;:ri:;;::jijei[::a:;F¥t;;::I;:§cnioini::;ii;I::i:i:°i;;:Sis:ee:ga;i::Ciij:jet;:d:ba::i:; that 1605 guerillas and viuagc supporters had been killed, with a loss of 425 Indonesian troops and 800 wounded. OPM leaders ovel.seas

Indonesia's secret war

64

said that between 3000 and 5000 guerillas remained. On the other hand, Irian's military commander, Brig. Imam Munander, said tlie OPM had been reduced to `scattered remnants' and did not constitute a threat.

The conflict was indeed a setback for the resistance, but it did liot achieve lndonesia's goal of destroying the OPM prior to the national election of mid-1977.

:]':[n¥:;1:o±:,a±:9efz7c:oh;;::i:y:i:t:Cad:Ci:u:£e:ne:I:o::r°Os%Sa:,::sVc¥e¥h:euEt`r::¥::: :::;::anrttso°fc:ucrhr:]Pntrhera°c:[gohn?uatttaa[c¥:Sfto;ihoew¥g°b];E[re°r:inrcec;I::gins:I:;hnagt

:oraiTc]od]:::;ot:;:]f.tnbE::]raTin8aDeFactoGovemment,with|inks

;;::rt;;t§a„::::tEdi:a;§s;i:;r£:p¥¥;t§;:;I::i:i:eir;o:;:b:ej{;;:;§€a¥::ja;gejr:;;;I:e:d: communist world. Rumkorem also accused Prai of dealing with

ie;:;i:e°i:i;a;i:ia:i;:]ier!j:hi:ce;jsii::::i::S:tt§°;:°:;::jir;p;£ate;;i;aii:d:i;;t:;:;i:e;:;i:i;;:ii acronym `Pemka' (Pcn"J!.foa# Kcadi.tan) - the Restoration of Justice. Its armed wing was named the National Liberation GI.oup (P4swfe%

FromSorongtoNIimbay

65

Pcmbcbaja" Nafl.o#40, Papenal, or Tepenal.

Those who remained with Rumkol.em were mosdy Biaks, tike him, or people from the Tanah Merah area. The seriousness of the rift was shown a few months later when one ofprai's guerillas, Yerct Wayoi, led an attack on the Victoria faction at a sago-gathering place called Suhampa, on the PNG side of the bc)rder. Injuries were sustained, and some hostages taken by the

attackers. When news of the fighting reached Rumkorem, who had relocated to a permanent camp site near Bonay Beach on the north coast, the Biak felt the rift must be healed before things became even worse. He attempted to conciliate with Prai, but his overtures failed. The feud was destined to continue, with val.ying degrees of ferocity, until early 1984 when, with both Prai and Rumkorem living far from New Guinea, the resistance began to develop a unifled command. Until then, both Victoria and Pemka would regard each other as enemies, only surpassed by the Indonesians. As the Papenal c.ommander in the Paniai Lakes district put it in a letter to Pemka headquarters, West Papuans in the other group were the `enemy under the same mosquito net'.

The groundwork done by OPM during the preceding years began to pay off, for although uprisings met with strong reactions by ABRI forces, the resistance gained publicity, both inside lrian, mostly by woi.d of mouth, and overseas. At the time, few details were learned by outsiders; journalists were prevented from visiting the battle zones, while foreigners living in lrian chose to remain silent about the bloody events there. Indonesia insisted that the fighting was not politically motivated, with its foreign minister, Adam Malik, describing the conffict as only `tribal clashes'.

The first news of fighting came, as expected, from the border area. At Arso, a transhigration zone close to Jayapura, Pap,uans attacked

sAe:tRLupn°a::dasn:f°tv:,e,rags::snsfl::;::fi;a]g°N%,Twhfe::S#::t[|]]atL£:i: stories. The number of refugees rose when fighting spread to a series of more southern villages. Aiccording to a press release from the Senegal-based OPM group, the Indonesian president had again stepped up the pressure on ABRI to capture the OPM's headquarters. Earlier, four battalions of paratroops and two of marines had been brought in from the military complex at Ambon, in the south Moluccas. The release alleged that PNG had moved troops from its `Australian officered' defence force into the border area, thus completing the threat that Foreign Minister Kiki had made to Scth Rumkorem. As a result of this, it was claimed, a battle broke out between Papenal guerillas, who had been evacuating villagers wounded by airstrikes, and PNG troops. When the guerillas

Indonesia's secret war

66

yh'etidroev¥;::e[:dNo:ess;:Ldffcor:c:saps=:.eodn:renneta¥?hfle]ag::Sdearns;]Taagedeodf

gia¥::sac:=:i:d:re::;:ie;¥ei::r:ehfiS°ir!:;;:kefd:in;¥tlii:eg:i¥¥:aa:d#j:;£:a:Tj;:i Fais:,::pbue::::ur:::to,:::::siJ3::tsfaa#finGdTnoFe::r¥:#:,mwehoof ::iof]n8ehsFa:g'p:?:e::Piri:u:I::ithwa:snadpe::Fe:asybe::ndyr°::tes:dt¥stha: sensationalist. However it was confirmed by some Australian airforce officers who had been in lrian on a mapping survey.

i:::;:yfii:;¥airljo:iii:t::;;u:;:i:;i;i;;t;iiet:i:ejiisi;n::h:tieae;;ijiri{:tiiiibi:y:;icf:ii;

;ji;ai;i:§j:S:e;i:i:;i;iiyiiijs::g;i§;d;b;i:;;;:i§::;;i§i;¥;i;;;jh;i:ijci:}i;:ii§:;b:;;i!::i:i;::;i

fo:ss:,;11:c:;:::1:I;;;;:sh:;y:¥::I:eea:fi:;:v:e:I:e:srt:h:enfp[:s:;:;sTsaedFe::;:rsfn€g::yos::o:i

ii°[a:ts:::rs:k;c£:::::::o:Sn:Cid:at:t:o::ddri::p:n;¥:c;;r§¥a,tifisi:n;Ct.;ee;i:;n;y;uo:ts::;%ja; naked. Some less subtle conflict between the races had been recorded as earlyas1973,whenanAustraliangeologistintheBalicmwrot:einhis diary that: Recently, a Dani was shot while working on a bridg:. The Dani had

i;iuost:h%:fr:a:I:;:ya:1;ctud::n:t:o:r::sL:r:y!:¥a:S:¥h:;?cnig¥ai?:a¥i:htc-°£::o:oEi::gg:a:

i§]i§:h!e;:n=:i:t::[isai°;;:c::e::t;?:::T;h:Cyn[:t:d:ii:oS;a[£Sg:t:h:eotah::t,?,C£:ge:°¥Pd]fie::T:i:

From sarong to Numbay

67

A year later, Robert Mitton wrote that an army representative has been beating people. Apparently, they did something to displease

him, so he lined up many of the able-bodied men and beat them about the calves with a club, then pushed them in their Sunday best into the mud.

Mitton also observed with alarm that the Indonesian presence had brought tapeworms to the Baliem, and missionary nurses said the situation was becoming disastrous. In the Paniai area, 17 per cent of the population had the cyst manifestation. The local pig population had also become infected with a parasitical disease. By the time the election teams arrived in 1977, the Baliem

population was seething with rescntlnent. This soon tuned to violence, despite the Ndanis' total lack of modern arms. One lnissionary who witnessed an attack on an army post said that the Ndanis were extraordinarily brave. Abc)ut 30 or 40 troops wcrc bcsciged by the tribals, who had only traditional weapons. The Danis crawled up a long open drain, under continuous firc from mortars and machineguns. Incredibly, none were hit and the Indonesians were tcrrified, aiid firing wildly. The troops were preparing to flee for their lives when an officer threatened to shoot any dcsertcrs. Then the Danis `flred' and retreated. There were no Indonesian casualties cithcr.`5

A different kind of encount:er was the downing of a twin-engine aircraft, under charter by ABRI, after being hit by rifle shots from the ground. It crashlanded at Karabaga strip, with two soldiers dead. In another incident, an ABRI patrol was attacked by about two hundred people whose main demand was that the army keep away from the election polling.

An official account of these clashes, and others, was provided by an ABRI intelligence report which was leaked to the Tapol organis`ation. It listed 47 examples of insurrection, ranging from the declaration of a Free West Papua to bloody exchanges. The largest took place on 28 April, at 1.30 a.in., when about 4000 people surrounded and attacked Tiom, an administrative post, using firearms as well as village weapons. A day later the people withdrew after `strafing su`pport from helis'. In respcmse t:o such events, Indonesia flew special commandos into the Baliem, landing them at the many small airstrips. The Ndanis' highly successful counter was to plant heavy stakes in the runways to prevent the planes landing. Greatly angered, Indonesia

progressed to aerial bombardment, and in so doing abandoned any pretence at pacifying the Bahicm through negotiation. So determined was ABRI that it carried out missions regardless of foreign observers, notably a team from the RAAF which was engaged in the mapping

Indonesia's secret war

68

?npde:ant::.:.tEahtefi:i:Fo::ept::tm°,fwAhu]:thr:::isud:iu%:|ar`odq:ro:sgrhae¥c:;tte°r crews, had been working in lrian from 7]uly. One of the officers has recalled that:

i§;§ii:r:,e;t§:;t{;i;::i:i:;a;#;§ij::i:i:tia;ici:i:;I::{ij;i:§v;ol:!ii:,::;;a::!fii*:i:ai;#;i;i were wiped out.

Another RAAF officer remembered raising the attack with mission-

::;:ino:?CTBhae']e#;s:::a:lee;s:gi°o[sdt[tyhapcrsout::t:nctcsuE[:n=esAt::I:,::°a:: :i:yuki'e;a]tdhatth3tet,:evy]s¥se;eo:e,`du:tea:;::e,S,::aakn:uticp;:bmh]Cs[s¥obne;a::i come to an end.

J;;iu;i;§[s:tt§h;ii:;:o€;E;¥;:c:;;:i;:id:i:;::;;:i:,i:ii::i:ijo;§§;:ta;I;;:ni:;¥§i:::::;:a;ii

?iTieagcc:?E:sri;,nasr;rig[:tnecdyv::::::ht£:;c::n°gs,°,gc]aund:n:t:icek;od],on:a;rnbgY July 10 Many paratroops around the Oksibil area. Wc were told they were `on exercise'.

;|:ge?[as£:da,sat;'pparcea£]t:;Eua::oma*e]anthtehr:t}egvhc'raaTd:;a:hTAFm'ss'On

i:i:£i:eats:eil:;::b#;:e;I;e:¥o|s:i:ny;i:]p¥::a;h:{isi'[ii:c;%ata::c:eaBT?s:t:I:t€bc¥ko:i:;i: ;:u:gu£:I:;:t]£th::i:S:±a§::d::n:|r:e!see%?:Li:t:asr?*E:6:fJ(an£::::L£:)k::tdpn¥

ofTttet£:trFo'i;i:;i::skhFd{,Ssi°.?h;To[sr:a:fY.a:,a:yht::n:tbguoto8ui!.et°t::

far:t:tr:a:]cao:s¥:?1:h:add:ATs::ftogr:c?sn;€e!:ni:1;I:;1:n:I:r:m£;sfr:S;::¥r:Seobp£]::;:re;_ 1ians noted with some amusement that the Indonesian soldiers were frightened of them, apparently because the SAS had defeated

From Sorong to Numbay

69

ABRI para-commandos in Borneo during Sukamo's `Confrontation' campaign.

Twelve SAS men were winched down to the crashed helicopter, but withdrawn when they confirmed that the Iroquois had met an accident.

Another RAAF aircraft that, the officers said, could have come to grief was a Pilatus engaged in mapping photography. When the plane returned to Wamena after one sortie it was discovered to have been hit

LEcaks:negt]a:a::tt£,::dw:rsopTrp:]fot¥;Fhhoet:3:anpdhipcage:::g:tdtift;e::±tno; of the box was an RAAF crewmember. The air force men were amazed by the accuracy of the OPM -presulning the shot had been fired by the guerillas - who managed to hit a moving aircraft, no mean feat for even an exf)erienced shooter. After that the mapping operation was suspended for nearly a year. Another Australian observer was a civilian pilot named Terry Doyle who, for the past eight years, had flown Fokker F27's from Darwin to a small airport which served the Freeport copper mine, south of the Baliem Valley. The minesitc was located near a company town, Tembagapura (`Copper Town') which stood at an altitude of over 2000 metres. Doyle considered it to be one of the most beautiful areas in the world. On 22]uly, when he arrived at Timika airport, he was greeted by an American employee of Freeport. He said to me, `You'rejust in time to see a bunch of coons get their arses shot off'. Apparently the two Bronco OV-10s on the grc)und were going off to strafe Akimuga, a village about 40 kin away. S104 and S114 were the planes' numbers. The word `village' is misleading really. because it was more a series of villages almost linking up, and extending up to five miles. Well over a thousand people, I would say. I later learned the reason was that the local people had ejected two policemen from the area. The planes strafed the place until they ran out of ammunition. I got airbomejust after it started and flew right over it, although quite high, climbing through about 12 000 feet. You could see the smoke and dust rising, with the huts burning. It was very indiscriminate. Over the

::€;:4[t:°:ido*e:£atth:h[enyd°wneersc;a:e:;'°dtestedrjfunscsir,9j"Spokeenough According to Doyle, it was this attack which provoked the villagers into sabotaging Freeport's pipeline which transported the copper and

gold mixture from the 6000 metre high mine down to the sea. The damage to the pipeline was later estimated to have cost the company US$11 million.

The angry villagers had not acted alone, for Papenal guerillas travelled on foot from the bol.der region to give support. Prai's

Indonesia.'s secret war

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iE::P[:P:y;'£?=ti;n:::°!;8i::=Pcia8:[ias:ia¥eih:a:t°d£¥::oi:ri[hy:i:X;:p:§ii:de:f:]is:I;;i %t::tset:£stty:::b::]nysf:t;::s:Fvaenst:tr::eF.[LT€ee]f6h¥r;sesrz:,uats::£soa:d::: Peg::pwd::,kDn:#]rTcaiiedthate|ectricityhneswerealsoattacked, bridges destroyed and airstrips blockaded.

:fhfaavt:acckT°hne;hbeu::Peed`;:efucea[Tnes::1:ast:omnct::ghASTahre::[Wka:eawgtr£:;dheaaf

i}:t:hy:£°i¥;;:;;:h:;:i::n;:ieftx§a:t:;3e:o;pr:¥:S:e:ddjw:¥;i{£fe:;[i::a:n;::C:Su;;i;¥:;;: bearingtheirsignatules.Theirorientationwasnationalist,ratherthanat all factional.

ia:::nh:ar:=t:rEeee=oa:1:I:I::::n;:§hia:t:e:|o°pfppsyaw::h:ep:t:rgi;V::ia:|fdtafy:S*L¥::hEsti:n; foot.

ij:i::;i;i;a::ji°i;ii:;i:i§z;[ij§;o;:;;;:nt:i§i:;i,i:e:i;;i:;d:::je:;[ijn:ij:::i8;i:i;:;ri;;;;:;1;ii

i:,ie:i,:ail::n;:ce:s*u;:¥:;:::c:td¥f:;:r]tomp[¥;:a:t;iEn¥:ra;e;iy::;:;]}a;s;n¥|%:t;r;,¥eir:hs;:;'i the OPM.

:hee£:t:%!.:hgc€::aa:c;oyfi];i]t:gen:S::a;€nr:i:mop:e|:c:]t:fi:;'r°efi:g°n:rnsg¥:S:t:;I:¥n:i:t condensed milk and food for distribution to the `villagers. But the

;;i.,:k::;ji:a:ei::o:f;;rhc:jnis;:osc:;o:I:,::ei;iE:e;I,:,f;;e,i::e:t¥ptr,;o;;ni:es:o;i:F;r;e:::e;;::tE: B:i]t:svt;gDt;::etfcb:;revnet:;heartc:::toocfotnhcee:nToe:eu::[xdt::sT::¥eccai[a[fi;s:;

From Sorong to Nulnbay

71

fat pay-packets were at stake. However there were a few exceptions, John Hanscn for instance, who fellow-Americans referred to as the `Indian agent'. Doylc said that: He was appointed by the Company as a local liaison officer. He worked closely with the villagers and encouraged them to start a vegetable

growing concern to help supply the mining town. But he fell foul of the Indonesians because they didn't like anyone having contact with the natives. They felt outsiders might promote the `false' idea of their

owning the land -for which they'd received little or nc) compensation. They dealt with Hansen by fl[ing bullets around his feet, like in a cowboy movie. Get out of town, or else! We had to fry him out in a bit of hurry. His replacement was `Woody' Holtz, an ex-colonel from the Vietnam war. He helped start up a brick-making operation, using local materials. Another of his jobs was mc)nitoring what left the area through the Timika airport. When he discovered that the Indonesian army and police were stealing huge quantities of goods of all kinds, he

jacked up on them. Then they came down on him. They kicked him out with a rcpcat of'thc previous scenario: bullets around the feet.

An inside view of the assault\ on Akimuga was contained in a document entitled `Full Report on the Irian jaya Situation', prepared by the OPM shortly afterwards. According to this, the ABRI sweep was code-named Opcra5i. Thjijpa5 (`Annihilation'). Some of the events were described in gruesome detail: In all villages the Army passed through, houses and churches were bumcd, pigs and chickens were shot sensclcssly, men, women and children were shown no mercy but were shot and killed . . . in Kampong Dila, a tribal leader named Nalogolan Kibak had his throat cut like a goat and a bucket was fillcd with his blood. Then, led by Lt-Col. Soekemi, the military area commander from Nabire, the tribal leaders, teachei.s and pastors of the area were forced to drink the blood

- they were forced at gunpoint, and treated cruelly like robbers and not as if by an army that knew the rules of war.

Another village, named Kuyuwagi. was surrounded by an army unit commanded by a Capt. Rudy and bombarded heavily. Aftcr' being killed with bayonets, pcoples' bellies were tom open and their entrails pulled out and twisted arc)und sticks like rope. After that, stones, cabbages and leaves wcrc put inside the bodies and they were

just left there like wild beasts without souls. Pregmnt women were bayonetcd through the vagina and torn open to the chest and babies inside cut in two. Men who had bccn shot dead had their penises ciit off and put in the mouths of the women, while the mouths of the men were opened and placed facing the vagim and anus.

An OPM field report at the time said that some of the Indonesian troops in the operation were Papuans who belonged to Battalion 753,

72

hdone§ia's secret war

::::dtfenbs:rr:enr;.d:s¥:£br:3°trE'esfe°rs:]adr;de::::Pr:#k]a:Sdohnceas:::a:::::

Ftc:ae,rds,'ra£°b:::goctddtehaejr:nwtng§:Oap::inEfl::na:?:Iud::::#e:tecavge:i;

xi]sog?ea:ct:s:teo¥ai':rnda:I:nogu::O]:Ern€s?aynaorfT[%:|e:nvgoargteksi:s:;

:a:ji::cia;g:e:iLne:g::teL°goffi::n¥s'tsouLcg°r:n:::i:s:::niijL:t:h::n::SL::if%:e:°fspLfehri:saLr°£:t:t:ci::

thel.e were 1800 Indonesian troops in the bush, with a further 3000 on

----

`

``

-:`

```-

```

From Sorong to NIimbay

73

treated roughly and only released several months later when a ransom of supplies was paid to the OPM. The aftermath of the ambush was

photographed by the OPM. The picture, later given to Associated Press and wired overseas, was of poor quahity, but it showed the two dead men and the disabled helicopter surrounded by Papuans bearing bows-and-arrows and a few guns. Again ABRI hit back with airstrikes from Broncos, bombing villages on both sides of the border and sending more refugees into PNG. The reprisals became even fiercer following a second kidnap, involving junior officials. PNG inteuigence was kept informed by interviewing many border-crossers. When searches by army commandos failed to locate any OPM headquarters, or capture any notable leaders, Indonesia began to question the validity of its tactics. A now general, Mohd. ]usuf, had taken over the defence ministry and was saying that the army should not try to `modemise' Irian ]aya by force. It was not necessary to pursue OPM guerillas, hc felt, only to react to deliberate provocation. Yusuf's approach was dubbed a `smiling policy'. It was mistrusted by most Papuans, but greeted enthusiastically by a few. The most notable supporter was Marthin Tabu, who again surrendered, claiming that solne of his `uncontrolled followers' had staged the helicopter raid and kidnap. Contrary to stories that he had been killed in custody, or imprisoned for thirty years, Tabu was free when introduced to a visiting academic from PNG, John Kolia, in jayapura in 1981. Dr Kolia was told that neither Tabu, nor another ex-guerilla Yeret Wayoi

- who had earlier led a Pemka attack on the Rumkorem force - had been punished by Indonesia. But he noted that Tabu seemed to be closely guarded by the authorities. This was supposedly to protect

±]h:fvri°s:o;P:Z:::5:db¥hraet'ai':;:°s:eps::a::§£e[[ead.:?caht]Sp:°t![°oTetrhs; officials and suspected that he rather enjoyed the comfort and limehight he was basking in. Kolia later visited the speaker of the provincial assembly who, while a captive of Tabu's group, had been forced to eat dirt. The speaker said he held no grudge against Tabu. In mid-1984, then aged 46, Tabu surfaced publicly in]akarta where he was working as a security guard for a real-estate company. In an interview for Tempo magazine, Tabu said that hike his father he had been a customary `big man' of the Yamas area in the border region. He claimed that 700 families were under his power, and that they controlled a large section of land. Tabu likened himself to a famous clan leader from the Baliem Valley, Obahorok, who had angered Indonesia in the late 1960s when he participated in a kinship ceremony, although not marriage as then reported, with an American

journalist Wynn Sargent. Ms Sargent was expeued from Indonesia.

Indonesia's secret waLr

74

La;:rh]9±:::r°vr[°e*,dic::ruesa±Sh:uhpapd°]f:i:°erdtt|ee8°pvfam]=:;:9,fearing

ii;t;¥:e[:fi§b:yoaas§;i;i:a:jnsg:n:]f!ei:Ida;::ci;p,{e,:j:s¥;:::pi:;tl};i;::;ebEd;:e;io:§ii::;:e;::n;; Their aim, he said, was for a government which would beneflt all people. After Pi.ai, he became the movement's president, but in 1980,

Le:I;;:gotfh:hecrr&re:fBh::eYacyosiiea=daodeu::t?tafto;a.stsha:d€:.PtriEa:ka¥ fir:nstter€s::dn:£ta¥'hheei:;dd'naontdbae]::i:ddte°te];Vtieo:iaalTh¥:ag[hy::rrAa3kR[ internal document of August 1980 noted that `Brig.-Gen.' Tabu was

bme;nv:dh::djafif:rt`afufrotFearb::tteraroyge:tr[.ORe::fn,:egv:[o05a?::tj;a:aht:rwha: given a house to live in with his wife and five children.

lil:n:i::n:1;:fie?f:1:[e:rte:Sf:tfu:;?tt:hii|go:t,::o:¥eT¥bEj?::t:::hT:=h,a:n;:or5;:f prefer another year or two getdng to know Jakarta, and in August

;;tffln:;i:i::=i:ii;:i:a:bte:cn:::a;a;:sf:o::ag:;:e:n::Li|a:;n:I,::e:,PFaede:re::rt:e::t:;t his own village had become a transmigration site, and this did not

;:°i;ta:;ci;.i¥R€f:£vigi;oihiei;7¥::§j:;I;o¥ac;a;1::d:aiii¥:d:;:;t:i::i:;s:s:::;:dar:I: i:cf::i:e.I;ol:I:,d:.i:gg:I:oei!Pa:t:;io:faet:Ieinairo.nf:i:o;?va:.,£;ofeiasi:a::i:s:c;:I: :8Omoet:::::izt:::rf[:Se::|eaxnt:ri:]onradt:rt?oerbe:::t::?reaon:[i,g¥::ttsYhocur`e: :tess.:tga:ecset,e:[t:E%ta[:gc°cnnets]s:aye°mue[:t¥s°sut:da£:yE]::ogpt:Sb;°afe=:rk°nyo:h:

E:::dpoc=[,[efh:i::t::t[:rgnatt::rnoa:]ssto]t]adcat:jctsyacg::#tnc:ofi::s¥:stmp]:g[::: abioha:s=*]s¥ei:a::uafst:r::tde!`[ag::::d:isdcerea€':;hnc85teF::::e6ovem_ ment of Nicolaas Jouwe, criticising him too for talking of terrorism. The release noted the PRG's disgust at lndonesia's invoking Christian-

From Sarong to Numbay

75

ity in its efforts to pacify the population. As had happened during the Arfak revolt, and would be repeated in 1984, the government had issued leaflets urging villagers to free any Indonesian prisoners and obey the law. In this press statement, as with many others that preceded it, the PRG showed that while it still followed the Christian religion it was moving to a more sociahist stance. Indonesia had become notjust a colonial country but a `fascist military clique' bent on oppressing its own peasantry as weu as the people of west Papua. Propaganda aside, it was clear that Indonesia's offensive had taken a high toll from the OPM. Life in thejungle had been made even harder for the guerillas, many of whom had been there for years. A number of stalwarts chose to join the refugees in their flight to PNG. Among their ranks were Jacob Prai and his deputy, Otto Ondowame. Although only 34 years old, Prai had been in the bush for a decade and was in poor health. Seeking medical trcatmcnt and eager to push the OPM case with the Somare government, he crossed the border in September and was arrested in nearby Vanimo after trying to make contact with the PNG cabinet. Prai claimed later that he had been tricked into going to PNG. Prai, Ondowame and Nicolas Meset, an Air Niugini pilot whose father was a senior official in lrian, were apprehended at the home of an Australian, Fred Eiserman, who had been made a `special member' of OPM earlier in the year and authorised to act on Pemka's behalf overseas. It was hoped that Eiscrman c.ould assist in the quest for arms as well as generate publicity in the foreign media. The men were held in custody for months. After some complex diplc>matic negotiations, Prai and Ondowame left for Sweden which had granted them asylum. Eiserman was deported to Australia. According to the Age PNG correspondent, Mark Baker, the PNG Government's initial feeling after the removal of prai was euphoria, but it abated when PNG intelligence received reports that the OPM was regrouping and that its new leadership, organised on a more collective basis, was shc)wing signs of being more radical than Prai's. PNG's spy network on the border, more efficient than lndoncsia's, revealed that the guerillas right not be prepared to lie low for as long as earlier OPM groupings when they had suffered severe punishment. Further, that they were now willing to ac.cept communist help, if offered. Indonesia also learned of this, probably through informal liaison with the Australian offlcers in PNG intelligence. It was not long before Gen. Yusuf's `smiling policy' was quietly abandoned and

pre-emptive actions by the army and KOPKAMTIB stepped up. Deep in the jungle, frequently changing camps to avoid detection, the leaders of the `new OPM' planned a strategy to meet the latest chauenge. Seth Rumkorcm and his close followers, although moving

76

Irdonesia's secret war

;8jhrf:anTe:ebd°:i:rLagr8eoa;¥e:easn:tinov;:efetn°tJs°t;]r]tdh;:;Lrd:adn:Su.t%;t:: means dead.

3

The new OPM

Inproduced August a1980 Irianonjaya headquarters of KOPKAMTIB secl.etthe repol.t the security situation. The document was authorised by KOPKAMTIB's local chief, Brig.-Gen. Santosa, who was also the province's military commander. Copies were issued to relevant parties.I The report's aim was to brief various security

groups on a planned operation, coded O1/KAMDA/VIII/1980, to eliminate `GPL' rebels from the districts of Jayapura, Merauke and Sorong. Providing background, KOPKAMTIB said that the cultural level of the people of. Irian ]aya was `still extremely low' and oral communication with them was hard. On the tactical level, it noted the difficulty of distinguishing between the `true core strength of the GPL' and the people who supported it. Papuans had a tendency to shelter GPL activities, particularly if those involved were members of their own family. This had produced a GPL strategy known as the `curtaln of the masses' (fi.rai. masf4) which allowed the ambushing of small

.ABRI patrols and posts and the disruption of other government activities. Following such attacks, guerillas were able to hide their weapc)ns and melt back into the population. Rural areas, where most people lived, presented the greatest cover. `Generally speaking', the report said, `the GPL has never defended a base area if attacked by ABRI patrols. They will avoid the patrols or escape to areas they consider more secure'. The ability of the OPM to seek sanctuary in PNG was not considered to have great significance. This view contrasted with Indonesia's statements, both publicly and in private to PNG and Australian officials, that if the border could have been sealed the OP^A would soon be elinnated.

IndonesiaL's secret war

78

|n:ohneesrL:?°arst::iTta:nthte°irn:esp:#gtrr::::ha::dLefadeetrhsogsn°ynnti: bol.der area these included:

£j;::::i:ay:,;u:ar;rg:p:::wea:±y£;;ae¥:p£;p;::;S[,;a:::::#tGct:h:ea¢eta:,:s:hfe::o:;[fi;e± mountains in PNG. Core strength, about 30 with a mass following of about 3000 spread over the area between Mamberano and Tami rivers. Arms: 5 Mousers, 2 Garraiid, 2 FN-45, 1 AK, 1 Thomson and others.Tabu'sbrotherMathiashadcomeoutofthcbushandwasunder

;;i;lie;ijr::n;;i§:;:i;:t;;§je:;:ii;t;:g::;n!iii¥;;ri:g;:;;h;;i:iii:;:;:yi:;i[:;¥y;;R::;; ¥o:,:;cLj,:;2d;j¥;;Lr§%;L6;:::u:n:d:sek::o;i:tahncdL%:::,pCoo;:1:tar:::tEcovfe2aoL weapons.

]Lo„c:;:wT]::,:hgcr;fhp;v£L°:nnadge¥t:uLbn,a::.#::eanfrcaarmmasssanfi:I::a¥::1:n°a: Weapons.

The report nc)ted I:hat the groups around the northern border area

;i:§i:;i;;ir§;i;i;i;:i:I:itijir;:il;¥::ai;c:a::;ir:::;;ij::joi:::S{aec:gh;jill;:i:!v:;::;fii°:i;:::f; was less informed about the `GPL' situation in Merauke and Sorong.

fr:a:I;eiae!so:jn;;;:h:si:f;k;f:a:dn::i:e¥.a.:i!:a!c:ur:vE:e::,:,c:f,:i:e::se;`r;e::gh;!

I;i:::a;jut:;jg:a{;;::fi;i:::i:;:i:iji[;:;i;ii::;jyij:i::;:i:h:;:ji§:i::i::;;r;;:s;1:i::::i:;;I:ii;I;;n;i:;::igiid:

:;¥n;:%a§a;iohii;t:;a::I;iy:]a;ifi';y;:i.;i;e;i;i:¥[rie¥§i[e:tr#ai§is;1;!C;;ii;n;nye:T|i;S;;;:iai[; sabotage.

The new OPM

79

In these areas, too, the OPM could be expected to preface atta.cks by

:1:S:I::S:;?y]1tnfoaj;itrt]f:nt:ssaavue]r#R[P;SoSs'tbsfl:tnyd::t::aptpb°:i:rd°:£: `curtain of the masses'.

The report also said that the OPM was penetrating into towns with the aim of forming `separatist networks' amongst the public, government officials and ABRI members. In the bush, military training was carried out with `GPL cadres' drawn from youths who had fled and villagers who had been swayed by the Free Papua ideal and its act:endant `empty promises'.

Rebel intelligence activity was said to be found in `every area, town and villagc' and difficult to detect because it was not formally organised. Around OPM base areas were watching/listening posts from which the guerillas could `easily observe the surrounding arca'. Communication between the bases, and other areas, was peformed by couriers who took advantage of the natural cover. Using briefings such as this, the military-security apparatus stepped up its offensive against the OPM. By 1984, the military commander of Irian: Brig.-General Sembiring, could go on the public record as announcing that, since 1982, 593 0PM fighters (called by him `GPL') had surrendered or been captured, and 5886 of their supporters. He told Koii!p4s (19 0ct.) that the `GPL' was a spent force. But I.ather than improving the law and order situation, and gaining the support of the villagers, the ndlitary campaign of the early 1980s

:i:d6dp°Mn}sy::nak]::n::ettdhje±:nc£:]hpt°hpeu+:ti°ncvenmore,andthusswell While there were few overseas press stories on the situation, due to the inability ofjourmlists to visit lrian, A5I.clwccfe magazine was able to rep.orc in late 1980 that `alarm bells' were ringing because guerilla

actlvity, which had simmered down over the previous 18 months, had flared anew with a deadly vengeance. The report, which was blacked out in Indonesian-distributed copies of the journal, referred to information smuggled out of lrian indicating that six census-takers had been killed in the jungle at the headwaters of the Mamberamo River. The action was said to have been in retaliation for the continued detention of Marthin Tabu at the ABRI headquarters in Jayapura known as `Dok 5'. Even with a force of over 3000 troops, and technical support, the military's response to such incidents was limited by the harsh terrain and the difficulty of enlisting local support. As Seth Rumkorem has put it: We hold one great advantage c)vcr the Indonesians in the area of transport and communications. To transport even a platoon of men is very difficult for them. Thejungles, rivers, mountains and marsliland

80

Indonesia]s secret war

a:{:u¥he[Syta::::taonmteedr[ta:nthTse,rfu:[i¥£:itest]°ant:aoY::e::I;::hriav¥eb:e[:

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them and take their weapons. This avoids heavy armed conflict with Indonesian forces. 2

:re:ioi:£°abs°:rgr;:::C1¥:;::a:d¥r:ard;°T:°:SC:ai:e::::SAfi?:1:C:i:a:;a:jrir:om;ii: ::s:pd:eta:::=¥j:]l:::a:cBeaj:t:tLj::gnwb+:[tc:te:r:::ho::ntiittpso¥]:v%tg:a::¥r]n=u,i::O±tc:e:i and so to avoid the likelihood of clashes.

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The new OPM

81

able to use this weapon to destroy them because we also need the support of their voice, especially in our political campaign overseas.1

Although it is unlikely that Prai's plea was passed on to the Vanuatu authorities, or for that matter to PNG, Rex Rumakiek would indeed face many problems before leaving for Port Vila. Two months after the letter was sent, the PNG govcmment ordered Rumakiek to

;:::::cdneerdt;Sdter;:::h::C:omae:isj'rdt:::n::;yeonrt:::dhismd::aartr:i:.gel: camp in a remote part of PNG. Indonesia, which delivered protest notes to PNG, added to the pressure, as did Australia which, noted a UPI report, was providing 30 per cent of pNG's $700 million annual budget and did not wish PNG to cl.cate tension with Indonesia. Rumakick remained in limbo for several months before being allowed

i;:ia¥:.e€:nfe::edde'rthoeo±e:as¥:aak:nagct:::rp:°fpAguas:rda[]S]ta]nexnde[nlate Another of prai's letters, this one sent direct to the chairman of the

:teacFkacot:at was apprchcnded, illegally, by the PNG police off Rabaul and the passen-

gers arrested. After a year in PNG they were deported to distant Greece, although Vanuatu, privately, had indicated that it would take

§::kk:::hmo.tfh::8gpr#s::f::tperhs±:i]ta]en:i::arcets['odne:itb°a€]tsheHpeRr:;u::g the offer and thus lost the chance of a quick resettlelnenc in the Pacific region. Following a route somewhat similar to Prai before him,

Rumkorcm found himself being sent to Europe. The UNHCR felt

:I:C=n¥a:osubf:Cjesnt€:Srtbaanuc;,b£:Wweeevne:,hethtew:e:I;a£Sctt%rnevtinetmthre:: maimed.

Those who followed Rumkorem into exile included a lawyer, Fred

Indonesia's secret war

94

Athaboe, who had spent more time in Indonesian gaols than on legal work, and a teacher, Luis N`ussy, whose earliest recollection of his own school days was ABRI's coming to beat up the children. `For

rcaf:n=kno::En:aTdn';h¥tu£Seyh]Snaadh£[nmh;rse:a¥neadpptE:::]°onfhisorigmal leaders, Uri Yoweni, whom he named as the new defence minister, Philemon Yarisetouw, TPN commander, and Simon lmbiri. He

Cia;:gemdf[tchaenyt]},adth3e°°v:cut:rr'][:asm:#tetr:e:ainef[omdiverseregional

;:s:o::P:S;si?I:c.j:i;i:a:ri:::h:¥iaa;:gr:e:X:ao:fi:t:eep:e::mkfi:a:_%]J:aa:ce::£sac'Pt:§taiprc:I: :::ayt.e.TThtedseafiTnecemix]£E?e]ie:n]dncpoe:Eaa':d]::,de5sohn;:[danDde]rt:y?a£::a:

±'£sgh#:it:S;all:¥a:[hotn;,e€i;o:u:r:S;flcg:a:fif;g¥:[engc::S.c:,re;Se::;:as;S.thw[stehvctrhae]

i;f}:iia:riee£:;:Eij]:e:?se::d;d:t;O:i::tays:t¥!r:;¥::::;I:i:f€s];n::;t:¥;::n::I;?4ia§::;;is;1;s: E::onr::1::tse*hfi:rhtahdeFe,dtt::eocretfte;ronnAnu:ra:]Ta[¥r:#:dDt:tacthf:::i: ifiriymta9k3e°rs.BAocbc°::[rnngt]°n?:::¥'rywE;8¥,asti:tcpravr]teyw;da?yart:sstter:1.£; authorities and sent back to Indonesia. On the other hand, the new president, `General' James Nyaro was a

:o:;:i:i:L:1:ieeFs:;slhn:gre:?:s::iioifetE];ke¥eB:fif¥ia::de¥:I;:;:d:ai,o::g::1:!£t:£];; married to a German woman, who had accompanied him to gaol

:::;::,,g:i::cega:pne:,,nT.y:i:b=:Ei:di:sd-igs8e2=oHre`=::T::ina:g::b4`6: From exile, Scth Rumkorem outlined the situation in his homeland,

si!l¥aE,tith::s;af:i6::%:oii:etrin:t#ora:s:ii|a;ga:::jd;e;::#|:n=f:aft:o:i?::iir::e|:i:Injig:, were in Indonesian hands. Much of the Sorong area was a `1ibei.ated zone', while Wamena and Meraukc were also controlled largely by

9fpo¥fen¥:v::Ldde£?::)?:Stga::LrcLsiasthheadaLsiarat;:a::anct:]ys]::I:gnet¥::iaetetgt flgLhnt ::e::d:I:::LayT]°brceratthcadT ireevsLa°i::L¥he resistance had been im-

The new OPM

95

plementing a `village advancement programme' through which it was laying the foundation for policies that would be adopted postindependence. The programme included literacy work, agricultural training, the forming of co-opcrativcs and political education. We arc making the necessary preparations for the Papuan people to become involved later on ln our own economic efforts. We don'C pursue a policy of 100 per cent free enterprise or 100 per cent socialism, as some third world countries do; instead we'vc chosen a mixed system. Take for cxamplc, timber logging. There is plenty of timber to be had. The gpvernment need only wol.k to reach agreements with those countries interested in exploiting West Papuan timber, then once agreement has been reached, local communities can work jointly with fc)reign companies. Our revolutic>n must, as far as possible, retain its Mclanesian identity, and many customs will serve as the basis for importmt social, political

::dp:ca:]psoo¥fo{:as,t;:::oopncsr;:i;tcc{%:t:e;noduj:cnoo]:c::tx:esdocj::%:eu:sr:F: and poor. Hopefully we should be able to avoid the class cc)nflicts which disturb so much of the world. Many countries scorching for indcpendence and modcmisation have abandoned their identities . . . This is a

#tua:hjsas::i°o*`:FckYye:cusctangj:eoae::::::::'s::jt#ght!justhow Rumkorem denounced lndonesia's development strategy for lrian ]aya, especially Transmigration, saying that Papuans would become foreigners in their own land, poor people in an abundantly rich country. He said that the liberation movement aimc.d at encouraging traditional ways of life to continue alongside new ideas. However his cadres sought to discourage certain old ideas, cargo cultism for instance.'`' According to Victoria's leader, the OPM had widespread support, with young peop]c continually jc)ining the ranks. Papuan youths studying in Java were also helping. Discussing OPM's strength, he said that the Victoria headquarters had 500 guerillas, with members in all ccnl:res on standby for any major offensive. He estimated the Pemka force as having 800 people in the north and the same number in the south of the border zonc.. Around Frccport and Enarotali there were about 2000 fighters. In all, llc said, the forces in West Papua numbered between 30000 and 50 000. As a rcsulc of this, and the disadvantageous terrain, Indonesian

;:::posfs;:::ot:sfca{:£g::gghuhrcbEcn]tatrf::thoepo#:snsTvac]:d:;eonbs].ev:sTr::ecg; was capable of generating more arms supplies than previously. The ex-ABRI officer noted that he had studied lndonesia's antiguerilla tactics, known as `territorial warfare' (I.crfl"g t#!./4y4), as well

ns the methods used in the Malayan emergency and the Indochina

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war Ol)M.s strategy was to cnsurc that the govcriimcnt rcmaiiicd Isolated from the mass of the l'apuan pcoplc. One way this had bccii achieved was to fc>rm a spccial Tl'N unit which h.id the task of countcring lndonc.slam propaganda amongst the population. A13R1's `fencc of legs' tactlc, Involving swccps against gui`rillas bchiiid a cover of unarmed civiliaiis, could not work in West l'apua as it had in East Timor bccausc thejunglc terrain did not pcrmit it Rumkorcm vowed that OPM's ultimate goal was a `truly mtioml liberation war'. At about the same tinic, back ln th{` fic`ld, thi` hc`ad of the l'cmka group outliiicd his vicws on the struggle. James Nyar() claimi`d that hi` commanded i`p to 35 000 gucrillas throi`ghoiit the laiid and they wcri` dcdicatcd to fighting until mdepcndc`ncc` wwer back to the indigenous people within twelve months.

At day's end the WCIP endorsed the following resolution on West Papua: Whereas the Act of Fr.ee Choice conducted in West Papua was a fraud, Whercas Indonesia has cngagcd in a delibcratc and sustained policy of

genocide and ethnocidc in West Papua for the last twenty years,

Eep|:r%seihnees¥:labnre.s,ii:.sp::p,`feo:yv::tniaepn:ao?apvae.::eR:;s%t:fnebaY Be it resolved that the Pacific condemns the Indonesian colc)nisation in West Papua, and the pcrpet[ation of genocide against the indigenes of that country.

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Be it further resolved that the Paciflc region supports the struggle for independence of the indigenous West Papuan people and demands that a proper plebiscite be held to determ]nc the will of the people.

Furthermore wc rcqucst the Governments of Australia and New

Zs::::anndc,ea:omteh=E:i::cfctshE[:Tt?:=n=;t:::i::Pnevcaos,i::i.scoatio-ogive ]oku's visit activated an important but previously neglected link in the OPM's chain of potential support, the Australian Aboriginal community. While in Canberra he met with the indigenous head of the Aboriginal Affairs Department, Charles Perhins, and said that their discussion wcm well. Not long afterwards, members of the Aboriginal Land Rights Support Group were asked in questionnaires whether they felt the movement should become involved in the West Papua issue. Intcresc was keen, especiauy on the land rights issue which was seen t:o have close pal.allels in both Australia and IrianTaya. Three months later, Joku was thwarted in his attempt to travel to

Panama for the WCIP's world conference. As a PNG citizen he could not be stopped by PNG. So Australia delayed his transit visa for long enough to ensure that he could not catch his flight to America. Joku remained in PNG, unable to push the OPM cause to the important forum. In August, the OPM had further international contact when a West Papuan emigre named Adolf Tombo, representing Seth Rumkorem, addressed the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva. Rumkorem, who should have attended the meeting was detained at Athens airport on a bureaucratic technicality and prevented from leaving Greece. His comrade told the gathering that West Papuans had never acknowledged lndonesia's claim to the territory. Tombo said the OPM was investigating the number of people who had died or disappeared since the takeover and it had reached 110 000 so far. He also claimed that a number of people who tried to flee to PNG in early 1984 had disappeared after being intercepted by Indonesian forces.

Another forum which provided encouragement for the OPM was August's Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in Port Morcsby. While official proceedings ignored lrian, an informal get-together was convened by the Melanesian countries, excluding F;I.i. Fr Lini expressed support for West Papua, managing to precipitate a split bet:ween PNG's prime mhister, Somare, and foreign affairs minister, Namaliu. The latter had become disenchanted with Indonesia after its jets infringed PNG airspace and Jakarta's leaders bc.haved uncooperatively. Also present at the meeting was a Kanak

leader from New Caledonia, Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Silnilar discussions took place after-hours during the South Pacific

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Forum meeting in Tuvalu, with Michael Somare remaining unsympathetic to OPM. The 1983-84 period saw the OPM make considerable progress in the quest to promote itself as the altemative leadership of the western half of New Guinea. The journey was by no means over, but it had advanced immeasurably from the tribahsm of old and, to some extent,

;reoaTstfit:1:awl::ntth:a:tp;|O.:%]:::e¥nh.£tiakdo::afuaenddt5:ar.:s¥iaen;::nn:he: generation of OPM members, both in lrian]:ya and overseas, were asserting their dcte[mination to avoid internecine rivalry, even if this meant ignoring their older leaders. With 10000 refug6es in PNG keeping lrian ]aya in the news; Indonesia's Transmigration plan facing its severest criticism ever; and PNG's leadership becoming increasingly annoyed with Indonesia, and vice versa, it seemed to matter little that West .Papuan factions in Port Moresby were stiu doing battl`e through the columns of the T!.mcs a/ PNG, a paper edited by the Sentani-born Franzalbert ]oku, whose family was pro-Pemka. Regular complaints went to the Ti./"cs from other groups, especially the Biak community, represented by Eli Marjen. In August 1984, Toku angered other OPM supporters by giving credence to a claim that a would-bc exile to Australia, Mathew Mayer, had gone south t:o seek weapons. The suggestion, whether true or not, was regarded by many West Papuans as indiscreet.

re,su:=eede,:e5oY,e#osroes£:;:sf,:::uygcg:5stst,hua:Joa[us,,a¥Eoorfa€nrievceer:::y (sponsored by a Rcuter's scholarship for journalists), had been won over by lndoncsia's prominent ally, the USA. Joku's response was that he had written nothing in his stories that was not already known to the intelligence services of PNG, Australia and, probably, Indonesla.

It was even possible that joku had overlooked some connections.

::iixuanTt;I:upocncetefotrh¥teitaT:emwb#rthhaedgAounsetrtao]{Anusi::i':'g:::: an aspiring refugee, or arms buyer, but as an agent in the service of

?h¥;::r¥e[9a,ad?dMa:yfru::;][£:v:°bdeye'nperx°pbcac%tt:ei[a?;[cnon4:::I:I;'tai Austl.alians who were potential OPM supporters, and even suppliers of arms. The aim was to `flush them out'. Instead Mayor chose

L°ef[esaesrt:h:h:Se:;a]:on¥::nbassheodw°nn:td#:;eer9sf]::ida%;:::Wb];dgACu:: tralian leaders, especially the prime minister, Bob Hawke, and Bill Hayden.2+

The Mayer case even resulted in the resignation of the chairperson of the govemmcnt's top-level refugee policy body, known as the

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Dctcrmination of Refugee Status (DORS) committee. The chairperson of the inter-departmental DORS, a Canberra solicitor named Bernard Collaery, said he could not c.ontinuc his work because of political pressure being exerted in `sensitive' refugee cases. This had culminated in the case of. Mathew Mayer whom the government had wished to send back to PNG, where he was a permissive resident, as quickly as possible. Most pressure had come from Foreign Affairs, through the minister, Mr Hayden. There was much cmbarrassmcnt when the affair became public. If Mayer had once had spy connections, they were shelved in the legal battle over his status in Australia. .A spirited defence by his lawyers, a legal-aid centre in Brisbane, resulted in the Federal Court ruling that government documents on his case must be released to him. At this, the government appealed to the full bench of the court. Its determination to get rid of Mayer, wllo was telling the media he was an OPM member and in fear of his life in PNG, was not helped by Michael Somare's comment that Mayer would be sent back to Indonesia if he retumcd to PNG. Somare was especially angered by Mayer's claim that he had been involved with ABC-TV's controversial interview with OPM leader James Nyaro. During 1984 the OPM did much to promote its struggle, both actively against Indonesia and through diplomacy overseas, especially in the Pacific region. The role of the resistance movement was summarised by the W'lcsl Pflpwaf. Objcrvcr, a littlejoumal that had been

produced for many years .by cmigres in Holland. Answering the question of who would protect the Papuans oflrianJaya. Wespo said: The OPM - Organisasi Papua Merdeka - the Liberation Movcmcnt of the West Papuan people, togcthcr with the ones who support them. The OP.M sees national liberation as the only real, structural solution

:°erc;h=;:;P]uaannds,.csna]#:::°h:,ae[s]:bjenratt£:|a¥i[[oP;etx::rt:hn:eps:::sa.%Sfr°m

4

T

Paradise lost

he `New Guinca' settled by Mclaiiesians was abuiidant in natui-al

wealth. From the earth ;nd waters they harvested food. The

jungles provided timber for housing, as did other plants such as banana-palm, bamboo and rattan. Traditional medicines were made. The people dcvelopcd complex systems of ritual behaviour. One aspect was the attribution of holy symbolism to crcaturcs indigenous to clan areas. Totemic figurcs included crocodiles, turtles] snakes, fish and that most famous of New Guinea's indigcnes, the bird of paradise, later killed in huge numbers for women in Europe to decorate their high-fashion hats. Ritual ceremony, and much of daily lifc as well, involved body decoration, and again nature provided the materials. Shcus, feathers, flowers and bark were some of the things used. Another was gold which had been found in many parts of the island and worked into ornamentatic>n. By the twentieth century, goldsmithing seemed to have vanished from New Guinea civilisation, as indccd from other nearby areas, Borneo for example, where the ancient people had similar knowledge. But as late as 1867, when one Australian explorer returned from the island, it was noted that the natives were exhibiting ornaments made from gold. According to A.K. Collins, the reputation of New Guinca's mineral wealth had spl.cad to Aborigines on

Australia's north coast who, when shown gold, pointed towards New Guinea and said that the commodity was to be found there in abundance. Collins spoke of a shipwrecked sailor who had travelled in the interior and seen gold nuggets strewn about on the banks of streams `like potatocs'.

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In short, the place was a Pacific `EI Dorado' although largely inaccessible. This did not affect the early Asian traders who were content to do other business with Papuqn coasta.I dwellers. The European powers wllich sought to contro'l West New Guinea were concerned more with its proximity to the spice islands than with sccking the territory's own wealth. The hostility of the Papuans and the difficult terrain were strong disincentives to resources exploration. This began to change from the 1930s when geology had advanced sufflciently for foreign interests to recognise West New Guinea's immcnsc potential. In 1936 a Dutch team trekked through the central highlands and discovered an enormous mountain of ore, which ic named Ertsbcrg. Fifty years later, it became the site of the Freeport

project, one of the world's richest copper and gold mines. While Holland was toc> early to pioneer a minerals boom it was able to reap the c)ilflelds which had been discovered near Sorong prior to the outbreak of the war. Japan also had its eyes on the Sorong fields, but was unable to dcvclop them. After the war, Dutch and US oil interests began an intensive operation which, by 1954, was employing over 5000 pcoplc, 441 of thc.in Europeans. At.this time the colonial government also encouraged the development of small-scale industries such as plantation crops, crocodile skins, some timber-cutting and prawning. Despite tliis flurry of economic activity, Holland's cost of running New Guinea far outstripped any financial gains. In 1950, its deficit was about half the total expenditure of A$10 million; a decade later, the deficit had rocketed to $35.6 million. The political uncertainties of the time compounded the problem. This changed almost immediately after Indonesia took control, despite President Sukamo's distaste for foreign capitalists, and vice vcrsa. Almost overnight, poor New Guinea became rich West Irian. Holland's minimal development effort in New Guinea has often been cited by Indonesians as the reason for the country's persistent

problems. Government ministers and ambassadors have complained that Irian is a dilemma inherited from the Dutch, insisting that it must never be compared with PNG, where so much Austrahian money was spent. These Indonesians have been less willing to explain the political contrasts between PNG and the province, cspccially as it was in this field that Holland achieved greater progress than Australia. For convenience, Indonesian policy in lrian Jaya can be divided into three main areas: economic and administrative; socio-cultural; and the maintenance of law and order. Clearly, there is considei-able overlap. The Transmigration programme, for example, has implications in all three areas.

On balance, it would be hard to conclude that lrianJaya has become

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anything but an internal colony: the population's resources al.c exploited without perrission being sought or due compensation paid; their traditions are derided; their land alicnatcd in the `national interest'; their political rights subsumed by the need for republican unity; their human rights abused in an organised manner. By the same

yardstick, PNG has become a self-governing neocolony of Australia. Many West Papuans, particularly those living in PNG, regl.ct this but describe it as preferable to the situation in IriarL Indonesia's policies in all three areas have heightened Papuan

antagonism and served to boost the popularity of the OPM.

Economic and administrative policy When it withdrew from West New Guinea, Holland attempted to both salve its conscience and genuinely assist the Papuans by bestowing a farewell gift of US$30 milhion to set up the Foundation of the

United Nations for the Development of west lrian (FUNDWI). By today's standards, the sum may not appear large, but on a per capita basis it was almost twice the total foreign aid rcceivcd by India in the

years 1950-67. The money was made available in 1962; it could not be used until Indonesia rejoined the UN in late-1966. The next year, Indonesia announced a revised five-year developmcnt plan for West lrian, its first draft having been rendered unworkable by the nation's high inflation rate. It comprised thirteen major project areas which would use up almost all of the FUNDWI

grant. These were concentrated in projects which had only slight relevance to the majority of Papuans. Aviation, for example, accounted for one-third of the Dutch money. Other items included large industry and the export trade. Neglected were agriculture, forestry, public health and small-scale industry. The UN said it had reservations about the plan and would use the proposals simply as

guidelines. A team of uN consultants, headed by Charles Wolfjr of America's Rand Corporation,went to Irian to work with the lndonesiam planners. They were appalled by what they saw and realised that a

good deal of the $30 million would be needed to replace the Dutch capital assets that had been ruined since decolonisation. If proper

development was to be set in motion, at least twice the FUNDWI sum would be needed. Indonesia was in no position to make large contributions and the world community was disinterested. UN officials said the Dutch grant would last three or four years, and expressed their hope that something could be achieved within that time. Indonesia's attitude disturbed them. The authorities insisted on concentrating the developmcnt funds in areas which had shown most resistance to Indonesian

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rule. Manokwari and Biak were the main two. Almost completely ignored were the province's highlanders, an estimated 320 000, or 30

per cent of the Melanesian population. Another Indonesian tendency which disturbed the foreigners was a disregard for the rights of the local people. A strong warning was voiced by an Australian anthropologist, Dr Ron Crocombe, who advised Indonesian planners to ensure that mutually satisfactory agreements were reached over the exploitation of vil]agc-owned resources such as timber and coastal fishing. If this did not happen, hc warned, Indonesia would encounter tribal resistance and eventually the FUNDWI money would be wasted. Crocombc's advice was based on his experiences in PNG.I He was ignored. The consultants cobbled together a compromise plan with their Indonesian counterparts. It included allocations for the resurrection of the transport system, as well as money intended for village-level development. They set up the lrian jaya.Joint Development Foundation whose aim was to foster agricultural activities in Papuan villages. The foundation would have a long-term lifespan, unlike the other projects. In 1984 it was still operating, although some observers had noted that its insistence on `economic viability' meant that areas in most need of assistance were overlooked in favour of more aggressive

communities which showed they could turn a profit. The early results of the FUNDWI operation were observed by foreignjoumalists when lrian]aya was opened to them in 1969 during the Act of Free Choice. Many saw it had achieved tittle to date and felt pessimistic about future prospects. Already it was clear that a large amoiint of this $30 million was to be wasted through muddle; at that stage all FUNDWI had done since making a survc.y in 1967 was to build fifty houses, in addition to twenty

five supplied by the government, for an extravagently paid band of intermtic)nal bureaucrats, few of whom would have been given comparable jobs in private enterprise.2

Indonesian participation compounded the problems. Corruption niid inefficiency were rife amongst the officials charged with carrying out the new province's development. Irian was regarded as lndonesia's `Siberia' and top officials were loathe to go there. In addition, the crowded heartland of the republic, Java, was the preoccupation of I)lanners and their westcm advisers. As a result, the most experienced Indonesians in Irian were soldiers, sent there to suppress Papuan revolt.

The local economy, as elsewhere in Indonesia, was in dire straits nlld the central government was unable to resuscitate ic alone. In accordance with its free enterprise beliefs, the `New Order' govern-

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ment of president Suharto sought the participation of private capital. As this was lacking in Indonesia, it looked to overseas sources, offering generous incentives. These included tax concessions and the right to repatriate profits. The whole strategy was formulated in the first of the country's Five-Year Development plans, Repclita-1, which

¥:a:s:to:1:ta:r|i:bef:I:rT:ed:;;;;I;7[fanrte:st:;:=:;;n;::ea¥n:anhu:oal:i:n::sdp;e:cotE:a:y:sr]ai]r!;: Joairfi:eFdasdhgardeadte9i:::|t::1;:oTu°csttiv°[:;I:::]anr:ise.DA:tt':::,9±ct,hteh:r°er:nag hope for a revival. Joint US-Indonesia search teams launched a new

programme and soon found black gold in ample quantity. Timber and fishing operations were already under way, with Japanese interests providing lnost of the necessary capital. The most promising area of au was lrian's mineral resources, known to the ancient people, `discovered' by the Dutch and eyed hungrily by the Americans. US Steel showed interest in nickel deposits in the Cyclops nountains near jayapura, while the French Atomic Energy Agency negotiated over ui-anium in the Vogelkop area. The fi[st conglomerate in, however, was the Freeport Sulphu.r Company, owned by US stockholders. The focus of Frecport's attention was the 4758 meti.e mountain which had bccn spotted by Dutch navigator Jam Carstensz from his ship in the Arafura Sea in 1623. It is the highest peak between the Himalayas and the Andes. What the Dutch had come to call `Carstensz Top' captured the imagination of a young geologist I.I. Dozy who, in 1936, spent 57 days of trekking through t:he jungle and over mountains to reach the northcm wall. After six more days, Dozy and his Shell Oil colleague A.I. Colijn discovered a huge outcrop of copper mineralisat:ion which they named `Ertsberg', Dutch for Copper Mountain. However the remoteness of the site, and the later occupation of Holland by the German army, resulted in Dozy's report being shelved. It was discovered by accident in 1959 and the contciits passed on to Freeport Sulphur which considered the findings as ample justification to consider diversifying into copper. In 1963, Freeport negotiated a copper prospecting concession and

by 1969 - the year of the Act of Free Choice - it reported an unexpectedly high ore grade of2.5 per cent mixed, as is often the case, with extractable gold. The commencement of the massive operation rated only a small mention in Tfoc W4`j S/rcefjowrw4J of 12 August 1969

where it was announced that Freeport had reached an agreement for

Japanese smelters to purchase a major portion of the copper concentraces. The local company would be called Freeport Indonesia lnc. So keen were the Japanese to obtain regular supplies of the metal

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that they signed a letter of intent to loan US$20 million to the mining Company.

Frccport's three-year development phase began the next year and finally ate up $160 million. The mine, located at 3713 metres, was

given a projected life of 30-40 years. To support the mine's construction, Tcmbagapura (`Copper Town') was built to house the workers. Top-level technicians tended to be American; skilled construction workers Filipino or South Korean. Although several hundred local people began work in unskilled jobs, their number had dropped to forty by the cnd of the construction phase, and of those only four held semi-permanent positions. The wage for most of the Papuans was around US10¢ per hour, paid `in kind' at the request of the government. Freepo[t's opening ceremony was attended by President Suharto who expressed pleasure that lndc)ncsia could work so closely with large overseas intel.csts (Indonesia had by then acquired a 15 per cent

equity in the company). Mining operations, began, helped by a three-ycar tax holiday that was later estimated to save Freeport between $15 and $25 million. In addition, Freeport was not asked to pay land rent or royalties to the local pcoplc, and it had no speciflc obligations for development of the immediate area or province at large.

The venture has paid off handsomely, although the full extent of Freeport Indonesia's earnings has not' been disclosed, presumably bccausc of the criticisms that the mine has attracted. However its accounts for the first three-quarters of 1980 revealed gross sales of US$122 973 000, with the Indonesian government earning $22 million in taxes. In 1983, by which time the Ertsberg ore body was nearly exhausted and operations had moved to an adjacent body, Gunung Bijih Timor, copper receipts totalled US$125 million, gold, $27 million and silver, $11 million. The company has maintained a high level of activity into the 1980s, using a mixture of European, Asian and Indonesian, but few Melanesian, staff. Its president was Ali Budiardjo, a retired ABRI general. A number of foreigners involved with Freeport have been critical of the project. One was the late Robert Mitton, an Australian geologist who spent several years in Irian]aya. Mitton was no critic of mining /jcJr se. In one of the diaries published after his death he had noted that it was `intellectually fashionable' in certain quarters to assume that mining companies were evil; but if a country like Indonesia was going to become economically viable, it nccded revenue from mining. Iolowcvcr he was enraged by what he saw at Freeport, and he expressed his feelings to a high-level seminar on devclopmcnt in llcighbouring PNG:

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Frceport's social and economic relationship within Irian Jnya shows a dismal record. An overriding profit motive and a centralist govcmment policy have resulted in a classic situation of colonial exploitation. . . . The only outsiders with a detailed knowledge of (the local) Damal language and customs were the Protestant missionaries but, owing to the initial lack of cooperation, Freeport were satisfled to ignore them. The people themsclvcs had no spokesman. The lriancsc leaders chosen to represent certain regions in the 1969 `Act of Free Choice' had no political influence and no power even to prcscnt a group complaint: Their brief political role was meaningless oucsidc their

official function - to provide justification for the permanent inclusion of lrian jaya into the Indonesian Republic. Although traditional land-ownership is recogniscd under Indonesian Adrf law, the allencompassing rights to the wider resources that arc the mainstay of hunting-gathering societies arc not rccogniscd. Consequently, when the question of land payment arose it was only considered from the viewpoint of direct disruption of village gardens. Waa village, close to the proposed town site, was the only group affcctcd and was accorded mint)r compensation. Freeport disregarded the morality of the government actions, which they regarded as a car/c bra/]chc for develc>pmcnt. Rcmctte from criticism,

they were able to proceed without environmental impact studies and the necessity for developing a social conscience . . . Freeport's lack of policy in dealing with the local people can only be summed up as `If we igriorc them, perhaps they'll go away'. However the people of waa and

:ast;:rgaaiiyh%€rJe°dftnotca::i::t;:oTi:Vf;rnogi::€erthfgch¥is;I:nacrcea::ihhcej:;£tna: enthusiasm for the Company soon turned to discord . . .3

Mitcon said lndonesia's response had been to strengthen military and police posts in the area. It was only a short step from here to the

::p.::nds;|a:o,:agi:gc:fst,?ea:i::,I::::i::,¥:shca:I:yeienngnh.u,g:,qi:avn.tiJeea one of the OPM's top planners, Otto Ondowame. A Freeport employee who felt the traditional landowners were cheated was pilot Terry Doyle. He placed most blame on the authorities, who had even dictated the company's staffing policy. Out of the three thousand or so people, Frceport was told it in_ust emplo.y staff from certain other parts of Indonesia. Say, 300 from Menado, 300 from Ujung Pandang, 2899 fromJava . . . The poor locals didn't get much of a look-in at all, and anyway life was made so

:anrp::a|Sac:tut:rstch.:Th:h#:Faenyesci:::a,ne'steE:::::dco;:iirgo:ij:gwtfserge:ii; on and wished that it would have disappeared.4

That this feeling had not changed by 1983 was noted by an Australian mining executive who visited the site and observed that

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armed soldiers were in the habit of riding on Freeport's machines. Freeport's methods of estabhishment and subsequent operation can be contraste.d unfavourably with t:wo similar mining projects in PNG. The vast copper and gold deposits on Bougainville Island and in the Star Mountains, near the border, were created by the same upheavals of the earth's tect:onic plates that made Mt Ertzberg. The lodes were of a similar richness and quantity. The land in which they were located was also under the traditional ownership of Melanesian villagers. In the case of Bougainville, the Australian-PNG government and the BCL company decided to alienate the land, but paid compensation to the villagers and guaranteed to undertake local development. However the `trickle down' to the North Solomons area struck the Bougainvilleans, many of whom were well educated and politically aware, as a poor deal. In September 1975, shortly before

:c¥foffceaE[cyng:]n£:::ftfitcc[¥nt:.]efht:;::%::LST;:ayr,]ngs;s;::nt±:ztc:nuc]:£: from the mine had reached K90 million; projections put average income at K60 million a year. The dispute was resolved, to an extent, the next year. The result was a greater flow-on for local development, including the establishment of a special' business arm for the provincial government. Another aspect of this mine's operation was the presence of a strong trade union, a factor that had not even been considered for the Freeport project. There was also a public share issue. The other PNG example, the Ok Tedi project, is a mountain of copper and gold that was stumbled on by an Australian fei.ap on

partrol. The complex tale of how the Mt Fubilan site became a US$1000 million mining investment has bccn well told in Richard jackson's book Ole Tcdi... "c Pof o/ Go/d. There are many sharp contrasts with Freeport. The first is that the PNG government sought in immediate 20 per cent equity in the project, and borrowed with considerable skin on the international money market. Over the life of the mine, receipts from shareholder dividends and taxation will be in the order of us$4 billion. Of this, some $120 million will be allocated for development of the poor Western Province. While Westem's politicians have criticised their province's share as inadequate, it will greatly overshadow the Freeport situation. There was no attempt to alienate local land for the mine. Instead,

the traditional owners of ok Tedi and its surrounds were approached

:|yc;h=g:|vde:ne¥fi::acndd,:s5:,dot,oh:op::.eer:,t:haYB|iedts:tsausn,|[Ee.1:s::: |o its prayers, they were dealt with politely and the scope of the

!'i:a°jc:teYa:opur,°dp:re[ey;Xhp::;n=]d;[nvg]d::eer%;opn:e:cttuwaausyb;::gch:£]:ks: No-one wanted them to run away in fright when they saw their first

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roaring bulldozer. In addition the government was armed witli two hefty volumes of an environmental impact study which stressed the various facets of nature which would be preserved. This, too, was explained to the leaders of the 9000 strong Min, Ningerum, Awin, Yonggom and Suki peoples. In late 1981 a five-element compensation agreement was concluded bet:ween Ok Tedi Mining Limited and the local villagers. Based on various levels of yearly payment per hectare, depending on us.age, as well as pa.yments into a trust fund, the 'agreement guaranteed a minimum of K320000 per year in the mid-1980s, not including royalties. Furthermore, the payments were to be adjusted for inflation. There was some protest over the plan, mainly from tile occupants of the actual mine site at Kiunga/Telefomin. They felt they deserved special consideration, while the only advantage was the. promise that they would bc given prcfcrence over equally qualified pcoplc in employment. As few of them had education or expcricncc in construction and mining work, this seemed hypothetical. In carly 1983, with the mine's construction phase under way and few local people in jobs or being trained by the Bechtel company, which had also constructed Freeport, villagers laid seige to the Kiunga airstrip. They blockaded the strip with fuel drums and resisted all peaceful attempts to disperse t:hem. Their demand was forjobs, but as PNG's minister for minerals commented to the author, thejobs did not exist. Bechtel had already experienced delays, some of them self-created, and was unwilling to sponsor an on-job training programme that was not in its contract. The government managed to defuse the crisis, but not before local leaders threatened to seek help from OPM guerillas. Since then Ok Tedi has suffered other setbacks, mostly caused by toxic wastes threatening the environment. Some people have said that a problem could occur if relations between PNG and Indonesia deteriorated to the point where Jakarta restricted passage of Ok Tedi ore barges along the Fly River which forms the international boundary. Nevertheless, the handling of the project, whose scale compares with Freeport's, outshone its lrian counterpart in every respect. Other mining projects were launched during lndonesia's first five-year plan. Overseas interests were successful in locating commel.cial quantities of copper and gold, tin, nickel, cobalt and silver as well as more oil and, now, natural gas. For the year 1980, with the Repelita-3 plan started, the Indonesian treasury estimated that the state had eamcd US$1938 million in revenue from mining interests in lrian ]aya. This surpassed the province's budget 25-fold. Local communities have not accepted the situation passively. Pet:itions and letters of complaint have been sent to Indonesian authorities, but routinely ignored. In May 1980 villagers from the area

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surrounding Freeport addressed a long list of grievances to the Irian governor, asking him to assist them.S No changes were effected. Nor did matters improve following the revelation by TcmjJo magazine four months later that highland people from the mine area had been forcibly removed from the huts they had built on the outskirts of `Copper Town' and resettled in the lowlands at Timika. There, Tempo explained, the people felt ill and unhappy. Other authoritative reports spoke of diseases, especially malaria, sweeping through the resettlemcnt kampongs. Quoting local sources, Tc/7lpo'f journalist said one epidemic had killed 216 children, over 20 per cent of the infant population. Still nothing changed. Nearby, Freeport continued its lucrative business which added millions of douars every month to the cc)ffers of the central government. The OPM has often complained about the exploitation of lrian's resources, both publicly arid in their internal correspondence. Actions against foreign-owned busiiiesses have been justified on this ground. In November 1981, during the kidnap of hostages from the Malaysian-run Holtckang timber concern, OPM leaders criticised President Suharto for allowing foreigners to exploit the Papuans' resources. They felt that violent action was the only course left to them. `Our aim is to drive all the foreign businessmen, including Indonesians, from our land', one letter said. The hostility felt towards the mining men is repeated against chc

people who harvest the province's timber land fish, although the nature of their operations tends to prc)vide for less vulnerable base Camps.

The most graphic example of the unjust exploitation of timber has occurred in the swampy Asmat region of the southern coast. It was here that Michael Rockefellcr had spent most of his time in lrian, collecting the Asmat people's superb woodcarvings, and later dying after ignoring' the advice of his tribal boatmen. The inland Asmat region contains large quantities of various timbers, especially ironwood which is highly prized for railway slccpers and piers. Since the carly 1970s, Indonesian military officials have been organising the local people into logging teams to go upriver, far the trees using traditional methods, and then transport them downstream. The heavy trunks are lashed between canoes. The laborious work has been classified by its overseers as fecr/.d b#4k/I., a term which implies that the

villagers are performing their tasks as a labour of love, and thus do not expect to be well compensated. The Asmats' opposition to this system was well publicised in 1982 when the daily Kompas detailed the .ii.rangements. Other critics have been the American Cathohic bishop of the area, and the editor ofaJayapura-basedjournal, Tiffl Jrl'4#, who wclit to the Asmat and found that the people were being whipped and

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beaten by soldiers, as well as intimidated with firearms.6 Dr Malcolm Walker, an Australian anthropologist who spent two

years in lrian with a UNESCO project, has described t:he involvement of the army and police in the Asmat ironwood business as `pure exploitation'. He said the labour was hard and dangerous, and the rewards trivial: in exchange for logs, Indonesian officials gave plastic buckets, sarongs, tobacco, notebooks and pencils. Sometimes the

ru°crgked¥£:t::gft:::Eo:tr:ue::n'o°tc::st:£*::S:orb:I::::ts:opt:]kBe; 1975, virtually all the forests in the Baliem Valley had been felled to provide materials for government building p.rojects in the capital, Wamena. He said the felling was a `police action' carried out against the wish of the Ndani people (Pacigiv Js/4#ds Mowfwy January 1975).

Other observers have expressed concern about the environmental aspects. It has been said that Irian]aya, which is 75 per cent covered by

primary forest, will be most unlikely to escape the Indonesian government's policy of massive forest exploitation of the outer islands and the concurrent notion of environmental destl.uction as a tool of social change. This policy has entailed the clearing of swathes of land by mechanised logging and the reforesting of it by planting fastgrowing tropical trees designed to produce ceuulosc on a short rotation. It is regarded by the nation's planners as a way of bringing `unused' land into the cash economy (paper by R. and V. Routley, Destructive Forestry). In Irian it has a second benefit. Inroads can be made to jungle sanctuaries that may be used by OPM guerillas

or their support network. Nevertheless, World Environment Day, 5 June, is marked in lrian with great official enthusiasm. The timber industry has provided litde employment in the processing area. Much of the timber exported leaves as raw logs. The processing camps that do exist are usually staffed by Indonesians from outside lrian.

The local people have also become discontented with the way in which flshing grounds have been managed. Both north and south coasts contain valuable marine resources. The deep waters between

Jayapura and Sorong are rich in skipjack and other tuna species; the shallow Arafura Sea is a habitat for prawns. Some analysts have called the gulf the richest prawning ground in the world. Yet the local Papuans have received slight compensation for the licensing of foreign companies to fish traditional waters. Most overseas capital has come from Japan and even there the industry has come in for some strong criticism. In 1984, a group of Japanese researchers produced a detailed report on the impact of their country's fishing industry in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted that:

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Foreign enterprises Uapancse particularly), with larger capital and modern technology, are adding complex burdens to the traditioml lives of already suffering fisher people. Fisheries of greater capacity, from trawlers on the one hand to land-based industrial sectors on the other, are causing them problems . . . The words of a Japanese manager of

CE]AMP (Sumitomo Shoji'sjoint venture in Indonesia), `Ifthe shrimps

S:tahpopuetare'att;tegnsrr:mwpp,I es:FoP];i :t:rpetat:.7business, Since we can live

The largest Japanese concern operating in the province is P.T. West Irian Fishing Industries (WIFI), a US$6.5 million investment.

Although WIFI had mamged to increase Indonesian ownership in the

:gel:::[ysEraor:;:spbe:s::n::o[oTngefi:oc:n;abpya£:7m8;::¥;su5£terve:adtftoh:: move than anything. In 1978, WIFI's sales topped $6 milhion, with

cases of frozen shrimp being exported to Japan in the company's own refrigerator-ship or others chartered in Japan. For the Papuans the rewards were negligible. As in the timber industry, few jobs have resulted for local people, despite undertakings to the contrary. For example, Japanese compames engaged in turn fishing agreed to train locals in that industry's techniques so that at a future time they could engage in business for thcmsclves. No such training was given. The few Papuans in employment have been restricted to unskilled tasks. This parallels the Situation in other resource areas, including the largest earner of all, the oil industry. The situation that has come to prevail in lrian has surprised few observers. In 1974, economist Ross Garnaut predicted that: Within a decade lrianjaya is likely to bc a very large net contributor to central government rcvenues. Yet only a very small proportion of the indigenous population will benefit directly from these developments . . . The new industries based on natural resources will generate much empl.oyment . . . but most of these opportunities will be utilised by immigrants from other parts of Indonesia.8

Papuans are especially critical that the revenucs derived from the I)rovince have not been better used in such vital areas as public health. As late as 1984, said the Indonesian press, famines were occurring. Some 500 died in Kurima from famine-related diseases between August and November 1984. There have also been outbreaks of serious illnesses such as typhoid, cholera and malaria, all of which could probably have been lessened if more funding occurred. The most controversial subject of all has been the land question. The acquisition of clan land for resource projects has caused much nngcr; but it pales beside the ful.ore created by Indonesia's Trams-

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migration programme. The idea of sponsoring `transmigrants' occurred to the Dutch last cehtury. Alarmed by ]ava's high population, which was miniscule compared with the 95 million who live there today, the colonial government sent some peasants to less crowded Sumatra. In 1936, prompted more by concerns about Indonesian infiltration, they sent

:Fbe.:::trs:rainnsd=TE:ar:is :: Nwe.¥kG:;:::. pTaons,t:?i.tEseyn¥a:I-end::::::: Other kinds of. migrants included the loyal Eurasians who settled on farms around Fak Fak and Merauke. Modern lndonesia's intentions were signalled in the five-year plan launched in 1969. This noted that the republic's most populated island, Java, was growing ac a rate of over 2 per cent per annum and that both t:he agricultural and industrial sectors could have problems in absorbing the increase. A birth-conti.ol programme would be promoted to reduce growth in the longer term. The main strategy for the short term was to be a pc>licy of `transmigrating' large numbers of the

poorest people away fromjava in order to provide a breathing space. Two other advantages were said to be the providing of a better life for the peasants and the fostering of development in the outer islands. The

Javanese wcl.e attributed with having more skills -not just different skills - than the Mclancsians. Before long, 18 of lndonesia's 26 provinces would bc receiving transmigrants. (From 1985, even its

27th province -East Timor -will be.) For eleven of the provinces, government investment in transmigration would constitute the largest single component in their development budgets. In lrian ]aya in 1978/79, spending outstripped the cost of social programmes by more than 2000 per cent. The five-year target of Repelita-1 was set at 181700 people; the destination for 60 per cent of them was Sumatra, which remained the

i:;emfo]rg%e_%%:::¥o°n:se;:ih;t;:'dat]othm°:8:ott:rtta;goe:;£]¥;Cor:aps:#i::¥; ]aya's role in the first plan was negligible, although by the third its share had risen to 7 per cent. In Repelita4, 1984-89, Irian was earmarked to receive 20 per cent of what had become a national 5-million target. Indoncsia's birth-control and transmigration initiatives were welcomcd by intcmational bodies and foreign-aid backers. Most had been urging it to face the reality of its population `crisis'. The World Bank cmergcd as a strong suppc)rter of transmigration and became its major funder. But not everyone agreed. Many development experts felt that the programme was based on a false premise. They argued thatjava, like many other `over-populated' parts of the world, did not suffer from too many people and too few agricultural resources. Rather,

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the relationship of hunger to land turns out not to bc a question of

quantity; hunger has far less to do with the amount of land than with who controls it. Who controls the land determines how it will be put to use, if at all, and who will beneflt from its fruits . . . Neither the size nor the growth rate of a country's population is today the cause of hunger. Both hunger and rapid population growth are sy/wpfot)if of the same

fi:ena:;oi;zt::i:sfe::trii:Eaa,ngr:3:::1?eofetshoeu=c:U:oEiytyali:uj:;ngfromthc Implicit in this argument was the need for I)olitical change. Not

surprisingly, it was ignored by the planners of the `New Order' government. To have acted otherwise would have been to begin a radical restructuring of Indonesian society, a pohicy that would affect not only their class interests but in many cases their personal fortunes. Foreigners were not alone in querying the vahidity of transmigration. A renowned Indonesian ecologist, Prof. Otto Soemarwoto, predicted that the programme would remain `insigniflcant' as a factor in reducing the population density of Java, adding that any attempt to boost the numbers would be beyond the government's capability in terms of budget, logistical support and other infrastructural requirements. But transmigration pushed, or rather stumbled, ahead. One problem was in encouraging]avanese to leave home, despite their poverty and the promises of a utopia elsewhere. In this regard a Javanese proverb may be cited: `If it rains gold in another place, and only stones here, it is still better iri]ava'. In the carly years of the programme, hcavyhandedness was the government's rule-c)f-thumb. Conimu-nities targeted for transmigration were organised into leaving, sometimes at

gunpoint, by the army. Ti./iic magazine wrote that migrants were sent off against their will, dropped into trackless, sometimes malarial

jungle with little more than an axe and a govcmment exhortation to grow rice. Mostly, travel was by ship and thejourneys were slow, hot ind crowded. By the time they arrived, many settlers were in no inood for pioneering a new life. They deserted, went back to Java and lnade their way to the big cities, especially Jakarta, where they joined the ranks of the urban dispossessed. In time, Indonesia's Transmigration Department began to address the worst problems and sought more funding from abroad. The settlers started to travel by air, the plane in question bc.ing Lockheed's transporter, the Hercules. As its corporate advertising said, thi's could

8|i¥tcaa::i%_¥:td:°o:¥:eL:rvg:;ta:rea:iT#::±L°nno:nt:oaft:iyAtd;oeipo]:i::: `n air-conditioned Hercules. Bccausc of Hercules, Indonesians could bc settled in their new homes the same day they left Java. (Although ic was only revealed later during US Senate hearings into

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the `Lockheed scandal', President Suharto had intervened personally to direct the Lockhced agency for Indonesia towards a company run by a family associate.) While much had been done to ease the passage of the setders, little attention had been paid to conditions in the host areas. Site identificltion was a great problem, with many transmigrant villages bein.g

prone to drought or flood. But the worst oversight, to put it charitably, was the disregard for people who already lived in settlement zones. From the late 1970s local resentment came to a head in Lampung, south Sumatra, where villagers protested to Jakarta about the transmigrant flood. So strong were the complaints that the government agreed to cut back the quota drastically. Significantly, the feelings of fellow-Asians were taken into account, while similar complaints from the Melanesians of lrian Jaya, the area chosen to accept the unwanted surplus, wcrc ignored until 1984. Then, the

government showed signs of recognising that transmigradon was angering Papuans and in turn swelling the ranks of the OPM. Despite setbacks, the government repeated its commitment to tramsmigration, saying that developments injava left ic no choice. In 1980, Agriculture Minister Sudarsono announced that landless peasants had increased by half a million in the past three years, and now mumbcred eight million. Further, that eleven million farmers cultivated less than 3 ha. while 43 per cent of all java's farm families worked 0.8 ha or less. The official view is that the islands of]ava, Madura and Bali, where over 90 per cent of lndonesia's population live, have at least 23 million more people than the land can support. While there are 690 people per square kilometre in]ava, the outer islands have far less.

Kalimantan, in Borneo, for example has only twelve and lrianJays, three. Again, some development experts have insisted that such figures give only the symptom of the problem, not the causes. Although a law placed upper limits on the amount of land that individuals could own, the law was being ignored. Absentee landlordism was rife; land was being split into smaller parcels; pcasants wcrc being crippled by debts to pay for the costly fcrtiliscrs and pesticides that the new high-yielding rice varict:ics required. Gangs of bonded labourers were roving across Java, while tenant farmers were being faced with a `divide-into-four' system (mrap4l) where the owner supplied all the inputs except labour and took three-quarters of the harvest:.

The 1979-84 transmigration target for lrian jaya was set at around 150 000 people, one-eighth of the Melanesian population. Indonesia produced a detailed map of the province showing proposed sites. The heaviest c.oncentration of transmigrants was to be along the border zone, ranging south fromJayapura and north from Merauke, with a

gap in the middle where mountains made settlement impossible.

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Vcteranjournalist Pctcr Hastings was one of the observers to not:e that while the fertile land near Merauke was suitable for rice cultivation, settlement along the border was intended more for making inroads into territory where the OPM was active (SycJ#ay Moml."g Hcr4/cJ, 18 April 1984). The planned Trans-Irian Highway, with feeder tracks to

:iaen::T8::i°enn:ahTspi'e;::g]:hda:°£ttaav;emmwhi;tsa:g:jrge:::.Caa:ocffed.oFs°a¥,.%;:, along the border. It said the purpose was no different to that of the sites along the coastline.

Transmigrants to lrian were to receive the same as those going elsewhere. Each family would get 3.5 ha of land, sufficient to produce their own food as well as some cash crops. One hectare would be for food crops, 0.25 ha for the houseplot, and the balance for income generation. Economic activity seemed to be promoted more vigorously in the coast:al sites, tending to confirm the thought that, on agricultural criteria alone, the border was not the best place for settlement. In the more fertile areas, Javanese farmers were organised on a nucleus estate basis, with the. 'smallholders cultivating rubber, oil

palm, cocoa and other crops. Continuing assistance was promised by the World Bank. Britain's Commonwealth Development Corporation, another helper, began setting up a business which showed the direction the programme could take. Experienced Javanese farmers near Ransiki, on the north coast, were encouraged to grow cocc)a on 4000 ha to supply a chocolate factory run by a company, P.T. Coklat Ransiki, formed with CDC assistance. Indonesia agreed that this was

a good example of how transrigration could promote development in the outer islands. As well as mostly-cleared land, settlers received free food for a year,

plus keroscnc, seeds and farm tools. After this time they were expected to be self-sufficient. Houses were provided, laid out in neat

i[i!l:a:::':c|¥:;g;eaTh:coaTo:a;n,se?::ft:¥:::B.P;Pcla::rsec::=::ay:t:il:t:in?a::t;erinwfs::: c.iinps. The cost of transmigration was high, about $15 000 for each family, excluding any allowance for infrastructure such as roads or the military. Foreign support was massive, however. For Repelita-3, the \X/orld Bank approved a soft loan of us$130 million, about the same f`s in the previous plan. In 1982, the World Food Programme, UNDP and FAO promised to provide settlements with food aid worth $27 ||`illion; $1.2 million worth of staff training to setders; and, in classic biireaucratic style, $400000 for monitoring how the other monies wcrc spent. The combined programmes of such agencies, and certain countries had contributed a total of $600 milhon tojakarta's efforts by 1985.

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By 1984, the programme was still falling far short of its goals. The transmigration population in Irian was about 70000. Other Indonesian settlers there, known as `spontaneous' migrants, numbered 160000. There were about 1.2 million Melanesians. Nationwide, transmigration had managed to absorb less than a fifth ofJava's population j.#creasc. One UN body, the ILO, said it had made only a `minimal impact' 6n Java, where even migrants from outer islands had exceeded those moving away by a massive 250 per cent. Transrigration's impact on Irian was marked, however, because of the land issue. In earlier years, when targets were lower, the government had used some restraint in acquiring clan-owned land for sites. But its choice was limited: only 0.5 per cent of Irian's land is deemed favourable for agricultural development, plus a further 2.5 per cent if primary forest is cleared. While offlcials disapproved of offering compensation for uncleared land, they conceded that local society did make use of the bush for hinting and food gathering. What they rejected str6ngly was the Melanesian belief in land being inalienable. The idea of leasing land for transmigration, rather than buying it freehold, did not suit their plans and they believed that the bringing of development infrastructure such as roads and schools was compensation enough. According to OPM leader Seth Rumkorem, the problem had come to a head about 1974, after which time it became impossible for Papuans to negotiate land matters with the government. As lrian's scttlcr quota increased, so did official heavy-handcdncss. Trickery, threats and then blatant intimidation by the army occurred. An example of this approach may be seen from the transcript of a secret interview between a KOPKAMTIB officer and a man alleging he had been swindled of his land. The complainant was not Papuan, but a Javanese Muslim and ex-soldier. The man, Karsikun Suwamo, had acquired the land from a traditional owner, Yacobus Dene, who `sold it when it was still secondaryjungle'. That customary land should not be sold or bought had not mattered. Suwamo t:old the intelligence officer that he was a veteran of lndonesia's liberation struggle and in 1964 had volunteered for the Multi-Purpose Pioneer Team for the Development of lrian jaya. In 1973, on the instruction of the province's military chief, Brig.-Gen. Soecrisno, he had successfully `found' 10000 ha of land for an army transmigration settlement (known as TRANSAD). After that he was

given his own land and he retired from the army to live on it:. His problems had begun in 1980 when the Irian governor, a non-Papuan, inspected his village, at Sabron, near the border. There had been no waning, and I was taken aback. At the time I was making soyabean cake (lc/iipe) at the cdgc of the road near the river . . .

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the Governor ordcrcd the party to stop and have some fried fc/flpc,

green coconuts and tea. Then the Governor asked me: Could you develop this business? I replied: Sir, I could if I had the capital. Then he said to go to his house on Wednesday and he would give me the capital.

Suwarno kept the ap|)ointment and was handed Rp250000 in cash.

The KOPKAMTIB interviewing officer asked Suwamo if the governor had set any conditions on the money. Suwamo said he hadjust been asked to send some fef7!pc when it iva`s made.

Two months later, Shwarno was summoned to report to a Capt. Imam Subckti of tlie intelligence uliit, KOREM 172. There, he was asked if he had a debt with the governor. He agreed that he was given lielp and if that was considered a debt, then `yes, I acknowledge it'. He was ol.dered to give a written promise that he would repay the money withiri six months or hand over 0.5 ha of his cleared land. Later he imnaged to meet the governor, who denied that he wanted the loan repaid.

Soon, Capt. Subckti came to see him, this time with a Sgt-Maj. Wiro. They threatened Suwarno, saying that the land considered as security had now increased in size. It included land that was planted with coconuts, coffee and fruit trees. The confrontation became licated, and one army man drew his pistol. Suwamo was left with transfer papers to sign, and in due coui.se he did so, but not before the Sgt-Maj. sent a warning to him through a village messenger: `Don't

you know I'm Wiro and when I shoot, I shoot straight'. Suwamo then received a document Stating that Capt. Subekti had bought his land for Rp750 000. In t:he envelope was Rp20 000 in cash,

E%:::ewntt]retah:o°unn[tyo¥i?smocr::I:tit[o¥na,S#8#:;dHpeayd:tc]bdaecdk:: ¢hc governor. But the province's top official refused, saying, `1 gave `Ip that money as assistance'. Protesting to KOPKAMTIB, Suwarno s,lid:

What I want done, because this land really does belt)ng to me, is for the

government to use its discretion to resolve the matter, and that the land bc returned to me, because it's the place where I farm and make a living for myself and my family.

The hapless Javanese did not recover his land for, as he was told by ICOPKAMTIB, he had signed the transfer, even if he claimed later that he was afraid.18

Although an example of a private swindle, rather than an official

i;!';:::s:1:ob:Ir;::b::S:aeall5nel?::::::t:lEF:c:tel::in;:1i;:hfa,d:::::,?Td:.:;.::::i::n: |'lghts, and ordered off their land by the govemmcnt which then pays

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whatever compensation it considers adequate'. As a result, he ex-

plained, people were turning to the OPM for help. For aggrieved Papuans there was much risk in appealing to the authorities. This was highlighted in 1983 when, according t:o Tapol, the head of a Land Rights Protection Group in theJayapura area was arrested and his son killed. By the end of 1984, some 24 fr#/!s/)!j.gr4si. sites had been established in Irian and over 700 000 ha of land alienated. Typical large settlements

were those at Koya and Arso, in the northern region, which each held over 2000 Javanese in neat rows of houses roofed with sheet iron, Local Papuans expressed strong opposition, claiming that the establishing of nucleus estates, to grow mainly oil palm, had taken away their sweet potato gardens and sago stands. Smaller sites, usually in

remote areas, contained only a few hundred people. Some of the settlers were ABRI families, placed there for security purposes. A few of the people were Papuans, known as `translocals', who had been encouraged, sometimes forcibly, to leave their villages and scck a more `civilised' life. A decree by President Suharto stipulated that Papuans should bc offered up to 25 per cent of places in the settlements. Few were enthusiastic, especially if faced with the double insult of being `translocatcd' back to land fl.om which they had been evicted. Papuan reluctance was admitted by the district chief of Merauke, Yacob Patippi, who, said Tapol, complained in 1984 that

people feared leaving their villages because the land would bc taken by the government soon afterwards. Also, water supplies were better in the villages. Around Merauke, the largest transmigration zone of all,

people had asked the govemmcm to direct the `translocal' fund allocation to the improvement of traditional villages, but this had been ignored. He said people were bitter about the expenditure of large sums on transmigration, and much less on ordinary` development. When the Rcpelita4 target was announced, Papuans realised the full extent of the transmigration threat. Between 1984 and 1989 it was hoped to move one million settlers into lrian, 20 per cent of the national total and an influx that would result in Papuans being outnumbered in their own land. Some months later, for no given reason, the target was revised to 760000, and later still to about 685000,

where it stood in early 1985. In 1983, the author visited airports in Irian and saw Hercules transports roaring in, sometimes twice a day, bearing their human cargoes. The transmigrants emerged clutching their meagre possessions and were clearly surprised to see so many black faces. Java, they said, was nothing like this,10000 arrived between 1984 to early 1985. Rather than being welcomed as the bearers of farming skills, the

Javanese soon realise that they are viewed with hostility, a feeling

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cmphasised by the ABRI presence at sites. Attacks by OPM have made relations between scttlcrs and Papuans worse. This reception has disappointed manyJavanese and fostered strong feelings of alienation. While they appreciate owning land, often for the first time in their lives, they tend to look back nostalgically at]ava where it only `rained stones' for them. But the numbers have kept coming. In Merauke alone, said lndonesia's radio service in late 1983, 400 people a month were arriving for settlement. Two-thirds of the district's 12 600 sq kin had been allocated for transmigration. Similar expansion was planned in

:i]:n:,pf;thsiti:-g`daf%r:£dgvnjsceo::u|:anndc£:,sea¥ae::eTorkingwithlndonesiato As the transndgration figures have risen, so has a chorus of criticism of the programme. In December 1984 the Minority Rights Group (New York) wrote a strong and detailed letter of protest over transmigration funding to the president of the World Bank, A.W. Clausen. The 1984 regional meeting of the WCIP condemned the programme; ACFOA and human rights observers from the British parliament petitioned members of the IGGI group which met in I-lol]and to discuss aid commitments to Indonesia for 1984-85. They argued that aid should bc contingent on Jakarta improving its human rights record in lrian ]aya and East Timor. Their plea was ignored. Indonesia got its US$2450 million aid package, up from the previous

year, and a commendation from IGGI for its `decisive and timely' economic policies.

Papuans themselves have criticised all aspects of the programme, including the bureaucracy which administers it. Of the 357 people cinployed by the province's Directorat:e for Transmigration, only 27 nrc Papuan, none of whom rate higher than junior clerical staff. Ofricially, Indonesia has defended the programme, conceding at most that ways of overcoming local problems must be developed. In 1984, tl`c director of the policy advisory group, CSIS, said that transmigralion had to be done in such a way that it won't dcstablise the people in lrianJaya, in relation to their development, to their way of living, to their culture

;riau[itdh::tt:nbi;*aatn[e:o°nu;din::''a3gr;;:::;-:i::i:][i:aary:oac!:I::::thjr:: approach at the same time . . . land ownership is not an insurmountable I,roblem."

One way that Indonesia hoped to `improve' the scheme was by the

%';i:iidng||o.fJri;::t.o.eth,,I.ese,i:?:|i:ie=,,nTs:::Fi;:oc::i.:::nEd:s;,eyhTpcs? HTcater transmigration efflcicncy. No doubt the government remained

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firlnly committed. In mid-1984 the transmigration minister, Martono, was boasting in Jakarta that a number of African countries had asked Indonesia to lend them expert:s who could advise them on transmigration. Perhaps these nations, like Indonesia, hoped to boost loyalty in their own countries by sending people from the ruling tribes into secession-prone areas. Another durable supporter of Indonesia's goals has been the World Bank, which in 1982 released a booklet on tribal peoples and economic development. The document acknowledged that tribal attachment to land was widely felt, but said it need not impede governmem actions. Land rights, access to tl.aditional lands, and maintenance of transhuman routes are vital to the economic, social and psychological well-being of individual tribal members, as well as for the maintenance of the group's cultural stability. Those natioml governments that are signatory to the UN charter and require bank assistance can be guided by the UN Declaration of Human Rights,1948 on tribal issues and land title. This is often difficult to accomplish because most tribal peoples hold land in common, demarcated only in the perception of their members. Land is regarded as a common good, tc> which individuals have rights of use, but which cannot be alienated. The tenure is in the nature of a trust in

which all members - dead, living and unborn - arc co-sharers. Co""nel tiutho, o[ group ten]irc, Iiiay I.eed legislative iiii.ouatioli oli lhe p4r! a/- fl iiati.oil; such innovations are neither unknown nor especially

:g;i:lea.cT?:f#c=:n:iicgurseseiri::ii:i:iiieie#ags?sv:rdnd=dc,nts,which Paradc)xically, the same document promises that the Bank will not support projects on tribal lands unless the society agrees with the objectives of the project and unless the borrower government gives an assurance that there will be no harmful side effects (page 3). In practice in Irian Jaya this has not been observed. Faced with such determination, the OPM has come to believe that nothing short of West Papuan independence will put an end to transmigration. Should this occur, what would be the OPM's' attitude to those sett:lers already in place? According to Seth Rumkorem: - These people are quite innocent. They have been forced or encouraged

by Indonesia to go to West' Papua. This problem presents us with a

great challenge. It would be inhuman of us to return them tojava where there js no more hnd for them, and no future. Wc would like to be a state with many ethnic groups, and wc would like to have an open immigration policy which encourages skilled people fi.om all over the wc)[ld to help develop our country and its abundant mtu[al resources. There would of coul.sc be a number of difficulties; the Papuan pcoplc are at a stage where they cannot compete with people coming in from outside. This is why now, even more than after our liberation, wc have

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to bring up their level of social, political and economic awareness to

match the immigrants. We do not belicvc that thejavanese transmigrants sho.uld be sent back to Java, although there arc many Papuans who do. They should be allowed to stay, but unfortumtely most of them are not well educated, and they do not have skills to offer which Papuans don't yet have. This may sound very inhuman, but the transmigrants would have to become second-class citizens, wc would have to' discriminate positively in favour of the native inhabitants. This is not our fault. The Indonesians

:ivtch:I;:ogbh]:=S[g¥na:anrgsc;;.:n:cki|'scaift:::g:agnnt££e°Pouu]:ti?gnitT::::,°f: determination. Because of this, a strong anti-Indonesian sentimem has developed among Papuan people, and an extremely complex situation has been made worse by the transmigration policy. If Indonesia were to recognize this right, we would cooperate in finding a solution to the transmigrant problem bcforc it becomes worse. Those who agree with mc believe in a humanitarian solution. But we nccd to consider very carefully how wc would handle such a delicate prc>blem. 'We have suffered enough already because of it. I.

The general administration Of lrian Jaya has also contributed to Papuans' discontent. In 1969, after the Act of Free Choice, Indonesia created a special Section for lrianJaya within the Interior Ministry. In theory, provincial authorities were given control of a number of government functions. In practice, the lrian section dominated all planning because it provided the so-called autonomous departments with their funding and staffing. Since then, another source of funding has been added. Known as `INPRES' (Presidential Instruction), it is a national plan whereby money can be allocated from a special fund under the direct control of the President. INPRES projects have been regarded as

ikopwRpi3ci:i:lstFnoFr:ahntE:sv:absc::tu:::u,roe:ut|E;i::::::s£.e:::cchx.aoTsP|l: villages where lhissions were already providing satisfactory education.

Currently, two bodies oversee the spending of funds in lrian, operating in conjunction with the national planning body, BAPPENAS. The flrst, Irian's planning agency, LAKBANGDA, is c.haired by the governor of the province. His deputy is the provincial military commander. At the political level, the governor and the Provincial Consultative Assembly (DPRD) formulate I)olicies in areas where the local authorities have jurisdiction. In reality, however, it has been an n(lvisory group of military officcrs, called MUSPIDA, which directs

I,]c'i,i,g::rdtearn:i€|ia::|ni:.casi°cot::I:EP#iuesghoavse:nn:¥sthhaev:Pups:aari:;Cbcee°nf I)npuans, their decisions have been constantly overruled by the

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military, down to local level. One former governor, Eliezer Bonay, has said that he was nothing more than an Indonesian `puppet'. Like several other governors, he came into conflict with his masters and was arrested. Later he fled to PNG and in the early 1980s, to Holland. In line with its policy elsewhere in Indonesia, the govei.nment has introduced a new system of administration t:o Irian ]aya's villages. Called the def4 system, its roots lie, as would be expected, in the orgarisational pattern of rural Java. The key figure is the village head (faap4/fl dc54) who is the point of contact for full-time government official, the subdistrict administrator (c4m4f). The village head maintains a logbook of his people's activities, including census figures and financial responsibilities to the state. To qualify for the post, the man

(throughout Indonesia the heads are male) must be literate and able to speak Bahasa Indonesia. The government takes pains to select people who appear sympathetic politically, an casier task in]ava than it is in Irian. In theory, the des4 head has to be elected from several candidates; but in practice the winner must be sanctioned by the bwp4fl., the district's overall administrator. The election of a person

with known hostility towards the govcmment would not only be vetoed but be likely to incur the wrath of officialdom. This political structure is resented by the Papuans for two reasons. Firstly, it contradicts the traditional way of appointing village chiefs which, depending on the local custom, inc.luded factors such as inheritance and the prestige of certain individuals. They also dislike the close liaison that the dcs4 system produces between middleranking bureaucrats, the evcl.-present rilitary and Indoncsia's ruling

political grouping, GOLKAR. Election time in the province has seen an increased army presence in rural areas, with added pressure being

placed on Papuan leaders to promote GOLKAR's platform. Melanesiam reluctance to assist the government has resulted in intimidation and, when this has failed, widespread vote-rigging. During the 1982 Indonesian election, PNG intelligence told the author it had learned of full ballot boxes being returned to jayapura from the countryside before polling days had even come around. Predictably, GOLKAR won over 80 per cent of the vote, roughly the total which would have voted for a free West Papua if a true referendum had been held.

Socio-cultural policy lndonesia's leaders have never been in doubt as to the value of papuan culture. In the early days of the takeover, Foreign Minister Subandrio explained that Indonesian policy towards the people was to `get them down out of the trees, even if we have to pull them down'. Nearly two decades later, Daoed Yusuf, education minister in the Suharto

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cabinet, said the government was doing its best to modernise the society but that its traditions `need time to be abolished'. A recent foreign rinister, Dr Mochtar, has attacked foreigners who suggest that Indonesia should try to preserve Irian's culture rather thari seek to change it. Such people are themselves racist, the minister said, and his government had no intention of trying to create a `human zoo'. During a lengthy interview on Austrahian TV, Dr. Mochtar explained Indonesia's views cleagy. Culture is a changing thing, and I think it's a mistake to want to preserve a certain culture and freeze it at a certain time. Apart f[c)in the question whether it is worth retaining. We are evolving whether you

like it or not into what we would like to bc a common Indonesian culture. What wc are doing in lrian jaya is to introduce the Iriancse, which are admittedly c)f a diffcrcnt cultural level, into the mainstream

?:.Imf::;Sfr]]]!bfi:apna:t[odf°tE':;=i¥n:?;Carne;Sa::#4ingwrongwiththat Since the beginning, Indonesia has believed that its mission in Irian was to `civihise' the people. To this end, schools have been built in alinosc every village. The Bahasa Indonesia language has been pushed strongly and the speaking of tribal languages in public made a sign of virtual treason. In no other part of the republic do local people face si`ch censure for speaking their own tongues. One irony is that l>npuans speak better Bahasa than many transmigrants, as the latter l`scd mostly the Javanese languages in their home villages.

forocnu]|ytur:ac|e::[aysoh::,t::hgoooT[enr;Tne:I:£sahno¥heodu;|gB:Otferactceodg¥;ii:rge:t[ayt than in Java; even so, its pronouncements have been patronising and, jn the following instance, untrue. Advocating that special text-books bc produced, the education miliister said in mid-1984: I can imagine how difficult it is for lrianjaya school-children to learn a song in a text book with words not in line with their hire-style and traditions. For example, the childrcn's .song 13aligul. tidur ku terLls niaiidi, tidak lupa liienggosole gigl. Habis mondi,

klitolong ibu, inelnbersihkan teinpal lidurku. (ALfte[ get ng up,I take a.ba:th.

I`ot forgetting to brush my teeth. After washing, I help mother and tidy l,p my bed.) How can the lrian jaya children know the beauty of this song, when they never take a bath, never brush their teeth and never know what a bed is like?`5

Schools and colleges in lrian teach no local history, except how the I)rovince was `libe[ated' from Holland. Emphasis is given to mainotrcam Indonesian history, especially that of]ava. As elsewhere in the co`intry, nationahism has become a fetish for teachers, with the

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anthem `Indonesia the Great' being sung in class and students assembling beneath the state flag. Importance is placed on loyalty to the five-point national philosophy, Pancasila, which in theory

guarantees social justice for au. Publicly, the government pl:omotes such ideals through the active Information Department. Street banners and posters exhort citizens to

;:£apr::tbgu:vr:.::I:::tcfeoa]:|c;e[sn¥]:t:OtE:[oruagdio[::8nTe¥;,:::n:ts]:t%]fhrtoe= give daily news of the president, and his officials, opening schools, bridges, farming projects. Again, the material focuses on the inner islands, especially Java; Papuan faces are seldom seen. The same applies in drama and other entertainment shows. In accordance with the national slogan, `Unity in Diversity', all Indonesians are encouraged to foster their ethnic traditions. The constitution, too, explains that the `highest peaks of traditional regioml variations' are important parts of national culture, as indccd are regioml languages. In Irian, however, these traditions are viewed by the administration as primitive and undesirable. To become civiliscd, people must do things in the proper Indonesian way. Cultural homogeneity has become the ideal. For this reason, foreign influences are as suspect as `Melanesianism'.

Since Holland's time the torchbearer of. western thought has been the church. Its existence in Irian became precarious after the Indonesian takeover. In early 1965, for example, the government came into conflict with the Catholic church in the southern Agats area. Wrote author]ohn Ryan, the Bishop resisted efforts to remove students into

government schools and a priest, Fr John Smit, was accused of insulting Indonesia by calling the local people `Papuans'. Smit was marched at gunpoint to the Agats pier, then forced to kneel and beg the forgiveness of an Indonesian officer named Fijmbaj. The priest refused and was shot dead. Fijmbaj received ten years jail, but was secretly released after three months. The official view of t:he church has changed little, although today antagonism is not reserved for foreign pastors. Secret documents show that the government harbours deep suspicions of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), a mostly Christian grouping." There were an estimated 500 000 members of the Protestant churches in 1984, and 300 000 Cathohics. Yet contrary to\ Indonesia's fears,

church authorities had registered few protests about the situation in lrian until the refugee flood after February elevated the province to national prominence. Yap Thiam Hien, vice-chairman of the Legal Aid lnscitutc in Jakarta said it was a `macter for regret' that the churches had been keeping silent. This changed markedly in September when Protestant church officials from Indonesia, PNG and

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Aust:ralia met in Bali and agreed to work together in `ncw efforts for justice and reconciliation' in Irian. Delegates agreed to implement more development projects and expressed concern about Indonesia's transhigration scheme. It has often been said that Indonesia promotes the Muslim rehgion over Christianity, hoping that converts will somehow become more loyal to the state. Certainly the work of many foreign lrissionaries in lrian has been hampered, mainly through visa restrictions. Echoing the Agats episode, there have been strong efforts t:o attract pupils away from church-backed schools and into the government ones. But the government has placed no grefLemphasis on promoting Islam: ic is more concerned with political loyalty than spiritual matters. In addition, Islam has become a focus of anti-government sentiment in

J.,ai:saidac::ctie|::agjTih¥oAu:dR,Sece.=om::::i:t6:n:nkouurrdaagj:gsafEr::e: speech at Wamena in December 1984 that the government was not I)ushing Islam.

Another method of promoting the official message has been the (lispersal of Social Task Forces throughout rural areas. Like many I)rogrammes, this has faced scvcre problems. In mid-1984, social workers complained that they were unhappy with their lives in Irian, citing discomfort as the main cause. The province's rough roads were a major source of discontent. Java was apparently more to their liking. The govcrnmcnt has been especially keen [o settle Irian's population in what it calls `permanent' villages and to promote the concept of `fixcd' agriculture. Official doctrine holds that slash-and-burn farm-

ji`g, or hunting-and-gathering, are primitive practices which must be flbandoned. In the words of August Marpaung, Indonesia's ambassa{lor to Australia, in 1984: `We are trying to teach them to have a decent 8tnndard of life, have a permanent village and work the fields, which is l``ore productive than hunting fi-om one area to another'. IIis remark iBllored the highlands people, who had cultivated crops for millennia, |`ot to mention the fact that most Papuans were happy with their ways of acquiring food and did not want lndonesia's guidance. After all,

I)cople on the PNG side of the border were managing without it. Nevertheless the government announced in 1984 that 125 000 tribal fu`iilies would be resetded, if possible, within the present five-year

I:|fl`:.tThhe]So¥eai:Cgv:af]Cadhboyuss]°ncja:oafap£[resxmfi;:I:]t::]#ers¥]abna£[S£:ia[;]Se°sT l`l`nr Nabirc. Irian's governor, a Papuan named ,Isaak I.Iindom, said |liat some people in the province, the Baudis c>f Yapen-Waropen for (`,t{amplc, had not even seen fire and that they lived from the animals lllcy hunted, eating them raw and sleeping in trees. Such people were

I)rinie candidates for resettling, a process that would give them farm

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implements, food and other daily necessities - but only for a few months. In 1984, because of increased OPM activity in the region bordering PNG, there were signs that resettlement villages akin to strategic hamlets were being organised. There, the population could be controlled by the military. Such a policy had been pursued in East Timor for several years and both the deputy governor of Irian, Brig.-Gen. Sugiyono, and the ABRI commander, Brig.-Gen. Sembiring, were Timor veterans. Indonesia's aim in lrian has often been described as the `acculturation' of Papuans and their `assimilation' into the mainstream. Many observers have condemned the plan, describing it as cultural genocide. But some well-placed outsiders have supported it on the grounds that its outcome is inevitable, although it will be painful for Melanesians in the interim. Yet there is a precedent to the contrary. Successive Australian governments sought to `assimilate' Aborigines into white society until, in the early 1970s, the policy was abandoned as being both inhumane and unworkable. Its prospects in Irian seem no better. However, the governor, Isaac Hindom, predicted in early 1984 that within 50 years the lrian people would no longer have their curly hair, but be `straight hairs' like the Indonesians. Further, said Hindom, the process could be hastened by increasing the Transhigration programme. The province could accommodate up to twelve million settlers. Such remarks by the governor were denounced by his fellow Papuans abroad, although some who knew him said that he was merely echoing the words of his Indonesian masters. He may even have been tongue-in-check all along, for in November 1984 sources in

jayapura, said Governor Hindom had been questioned by authorities in connection with security matters. The government apparently believed him to be an OPM sympathiser (N4£i.oiiaJ TI.f)!cs, 30 Nov.1984).

I,aw and order Like the Dutch colonials, Indoncsia's two republican governments have had a poor human rights record. Under Sukarno, people viewed as dissidents were harrassed and often imprisoned, while Suharto's reign began with officially encouraged purges, mainly against the Left, which resulted in up to one million deaths. Since the `New Order' regime took power in 1965 the role of the armed forces in society has increased greatly. Most of the nation's top pc)liticians and bureaucrats are serving or retired ABRI officers and they have shown litde patience with the govemmcnt's critics. Intellectuals, worker representatives and, more recently, dissident Muslims have been intimidated and gaoled for lengthy periods. These state actions have

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usually been in breach of the constitution and the criminal code, and contrary to international conventions. Due to official pressure, courts have found political detainees guilty of various crimes against the state. Defence lawyers, also facing intimidation, have been loathe to press appeals. Their clients have spoken of the ghastly conditions that exist behind the walls of Indonesia's gaols and ndlitary detention centres. In its Torfwrc I.# I/ie E!.g/I/I.cs report, Amnesty Intemationa] said it had

been told of many irlst:ances of torture in Irian being carried out by ABRI units and the KOPKAMTIB force. The latter was set up to `rcstore orde[' during the turmoil of 1965, but never disbanded. It has become a main perpetrator of extra-judicial action, especially in the field of interrogation. Since 1983 the chiefenforccr ofsummaryjustice lias been the Kopassandha red beret force which has shot thousands of alleged crillrinals injava as well as nationalists in East Timor and lrian Jaya.

Many Indonesians feel the government has betrayed the ideals of the republic. One ex-dctaince in Java, a student named lbrahim Zakir, has said:

What makes mc rcscntful is the fact that the same colonial system (as the Dutch) is now opcratcd by people whose skin is the same brown as mine, whose hair is as black as mine, who speak the same language that I use. I would be more proud if those who now try me were white, fair-hcadcd, blue-cyed; because at least I could feel relief that my people had not taken a system which for hundreds of years had oppressed them, as a system with which to oppress their own people.]7

The effect of Indonesian methods has been even greater on Papuans whose experiences with Holland were not as harsh. New Guinea l`ostcd the most notorious penal camp in the Dutch colony, but it was llot built to house indigenous troublemakers. Since Irian became an `official' part of Indonesia in 1969 ic has been I.cgarded as a province with a special security problem. In 1984 the (lircctor of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) said lrian had the worst lll`man rights record in Indonesia and hoped that offices could be cst,`blished there to assist people. Mulya Lubis a Sumatran, exprcsscd concern that the new criminal code, introduced in December 1981, W.1s being ignored by the authorities. Dctainces were held for cxccssivc periods without charges being laid or trials being planned; evidence was often unreliable and sentences harsh. In addition, many prisoners accused of OPM involvement appeared to be in

%°c:::i:£:i}tco°:::t;?anw;:rds,;:a;asttetdriey°nhatfeb:::ea3:::Sd;°:::€:Z tortured-

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That KOPKAMTIB and other groups have mistreated captives has been shown by photographs of forrfuer detainees, both alive and dead, taken by their families and friends. The `subtlety' shown by security forces in some other countries has seldom been exercised in Irian. If KOPKAMTIB interrogations are any gauge, these methods have been successful in extracting information from detainees. Hc>wcver, many records of interview show strong nationalist sentiments being expressed by detainees. These records, typed on A4-sized sheets bearing KOPKAMTIB's stamp, start by seeking family infoI.nation, as well as detainees' own histories. A question-and-answer format, then begins; often, interviews occupy 30 pages at a sitting. One batch of documents for 1982 confirmed that suspects were being kept in custody or ordered to rctum for further sessions. Prisoners were asked to name their friends and contacts, and to explain OPM's organisation. In March 1981 for example, Colombus Merabano was interrogated by a Warrant Officer Musta'[d. Aged 24 and unemployed, he was being held in Ifargunung prison, near Sentani. According to Tapol, this gaol has a number of underground concrete bunkers which can be flooded with water and turned into drowning cells. Merabano told his interrogator that he had once 'tried to enlist in the Indonesian Navy but been refused. After that he took to the bush and became responsible for OPM's recruitment bureau. His unit, from the Pemka faction, coinprised 30 men .who had fivc fircarms: `Onc Garand, one Thomson and threcJapanese guns . . . ammunition, 30-40 rounds. The prisoner said they had trained in jungle movement, self-defence and bayonet attacking. Q: A:

You brought a gun with you when you came in from thcjungle. Where did that come from? I found two Mausers in.a cave near the fewflai. grass around Old

Mamda vilhge. The wood was broken but they could still bc fircd. I took one and the other went to Yance Hembring (a unit leader around the Genycm transmigration site).

Later, the prisoner gave other names as well as reveahing details of

OPM methods: Q: A:

What code-signs do the GPL use now? 1 Beating on the trunks of trees as a sign that friends are coming. 2 Wearing a red headband as a sign of friendship. 3 Stripping the bark from trees as a guide for finding a friendly post . . . if GPL members see a tree with bark taken off, they beat on the trunk of that trcc.

Another captive in 1981 was Onesimus Ompe whose secret record of' interview shows that he named contacts as well as providing an

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account of the formation of OPM-Pemka's Revolutionary Council in 1979:

I and about twenty other friends were appointed members of the Revolutionary Council on the 23rd of December at Imonda, district c)f Waris, at about 3.00 on Saturday morning at lan official ceremony witncsscd by top Papenal officcrs and Military Ai.ca commanders and participants numbering 100 or more. The Inspector of ceremonies was Marthin Tabu and the Commander was Major Yam Sewi. We were all made to take the oath standing, all of us raised our hands and took the oath in the Christian maimer . . . Members of the Council came from maiiy places, including the Highlands. The Inspector said something like: `On this day you have taken the oath. In carrying out your task you will bring understanding to the people in your area until they comprehend our OPM struggle'.

Ompe went on to tell the authorities that the members had several main points to convey to the people: Indonesia must be asked to recognise a West Papuan state; such a state would be founded on Christianity; armed force was to be avoided whenever possible; and OPM leaders overseas wcrc waging the same struggle. As the .long interrogation continued, Ompe told the officer that he no longer believed in the freedom movement. He `fully realised' all his past mistakes and promised not to rcpeac them. This outcome was found in numerous other secret transcripts, as was a negative response to the final question: `Did you feel that there was force or pressure applied by the interrogator?'. Records of interview were signed by the detainees. Another successful interrogation for KOPKAMTIB was the questioning in late 1980 of Franciscus Wayne, a 24-year-old who had moved from distant Paniai to study and later to work as an administrative assistant at a teachers college. Orphaned ac four months, Wayne, a strong Catholic, evidently had a hard life under Indonesian rule. He admitted t:hat in the previous July he had participated in a

group which phnned' to raise the Morning Star flag at the Abcpura market-place. If my group and I had succeeded in raising the Papuan flag and bccn able to defend it so that it could be seen by both the Indonesian govcrnmcnt side and by sympathiscrs of the Papuan State whom we had made ready for action around that place, the warfare between the two sides could have broken out.

Wayne said that being a scoutmaster he had hoped to organise the flag-raising behind the subterfuge of. a boy scouts outing. During the 4 September interview, one of. many to which he was subjected, hc iiamcd a score of OPM sympathisers, including Laurenz Doga who,

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within two years, would go bush and become Pemka's defence minister; at this time, Doga was still a student ac the university. Wayne was released, but he was in custody again the next year. It may have been that hc was one of those people who, Papuans allcgc, are pressured by Indonesia into spying on the OPM. Tapol has published cases of prisoners who were released in order to spy but, after proving unsatisfactory, were rearrcsted and then extermimted. Wayne was questioned in connection with the laige-scale attack that

Po:¥iohn:dh:]P:;;:cdat:a:hfafubaenpunraam:I.£r#ep=';:EuPsuro]:8;¥ttchr:

:£±;i:stLeeadbe];s;:::t%%:h¥fgF+B:fefi:cbre::,cuas::g¥eas¥:oeno£:rz;:fe:: KOPKAMTIB apparently believed him. In 1982, the body of willem

Jo°nk:'ba:::hg.WFitvhetE:;:fcJa°rT£::Iou;ar;Sa:°u::g8:i°e:cpd?S:hde;ynsfg:S£:cken bound up in the sacks and thrown into the ocean nearjayapura. At the same time, three UNCEN students were picked up for questioning. According to a human rights document produced by OPM-Pemka supporters in Port Moresby, drowning in this manner had taken place

?;:c,au£::gesr,xS;a;emjenn)Taedrat::.erh[a:dts9a7n8d:::syt,:Ida,;Tnedd'w::e2p:::npt]: weighted copra bags and dropped in the sea. Celsius Wapai, a refugee in PNG, has recalled that in late 1981, while hc was detained in lrian by an intelligence unit, twenty human heads were buried in the vicinity of the unit:'s office. `1 myself saw these heads of OPM members', hc told Tapol. `One of them, as I recollect, was the head of someone who was blind in one eye'. Hc knew of other I'apuans who had been forced to dig their own graves before being bludgeoned or bayonetcd to death. On one occasion t:his brutal treatment of prisoners resulted in internal military inquiries. In December 1980 a Javanese warrant officcr named Soeyoto, a Protestant, gave a KOPKAMTIB investi-

gating offlcer details of the execution of two OPM suspects, Pilemon Wcnda and Oscar Kaso. Soeyoto, a cypher expert who had seen action in sevel.al parts of Indonesia, acted as driver for the detainccs and some soldiers, led by the same Capt. Subckti who had helped swindle land from the fcmpc seller. The prisoners were taken to a bushy place, blindfolded and then killed. One of the executioners was Sgt Wiro Sudarmo, who also figured in t:he /ew!pc case. The Papuans wel.e beaten to dcat:h with iron implements. `From the road I only heard the sound of the beating', Soeyoto said, adding that he was `merely a subordinate taking orders to drive the detainees'. The KOPKAMTIB investigator seemed not to believe Soeyoto and it appeared unlikely

the matter would be taken further.

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Interview documents also show that Papuans can bc defiant during interrogation, especially in the early stages. Detainees in the 1980s have been denouncing Indonesia's economic exploitation of lrian and its racialist practices. An ABRI corporal of Melanesian descent said he hadjoined a flag-raising group because in the army he had `suffered so

much and so long and never had any attention from my superiors'. Perhaps the bluntest sl:atemcnt was made by Felix Yaung who said the OPM hoped to throw Indonesians out of Irian jaya. By Indonesians wc mean anyone with straight hail.. The motivation is that those with straight hair control all employment and the native lrianese cannot be given cmploymcnt in any ficld. After we've thrown out the straight hairs, we']l cstat]lish a new state, the State of Papua.]8

By the conclusion of his interview, Yaung too, seemed to have moderated his stance towards authority. Amnesty International's 1983 report noted that in mid-1982 there wcrc reportedly more than 400 pi.isoncrs being detained for political reasons in jayapura, Wamena and Fakfak alone. The human rights group understood that thcrc were more of such people in other places, including Serui, Biak and Manokwari. Like other groups, including the International Red Cross, Amnesty had not been auowed to visit lrian to observe the situation at firsthand. But it was convinced that `prisoners of conscience' did exist there.

KOPKAMTIB, whose powers in Indonesia are almost limitless, has spcarheadcd t:he secret war against the OPM. Few cases are brought to court and less still arc publicised in the press. Papuans in all p.`rts of lrian have come to regard harassment and disappearances as a regular facet of Indonesian rule. While poisoning was a common lncthod of eliminating prisoners in earlier times, in the 1980s the inilitary have been likely to batter, strangle, stab or shoot their chosen victims.

More overt actions against the OPM and suspected sympathisers have taken the form of military operations, often lengthy, focused in rural areas. On several occasions, they have been publicised by the

govemmcnt, although the soldiers' behaviour has only received coverage abroad. In 1984, Seth Rumko[em's statement to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations histed ABRI's main operations: Opcru5i Ti//llp4s (`Crush') 1964-68, under Gens Ka[tidjo and Bintoro. S4drr (`Awareness') 1969, under Gen. Sarwo Edhie. W/.b4w4 (`Authority') 1970-74, Gen. Acub Zainal. Ki.fei.s (`Chipping Away') 1977, Gen. Imam Mumndcr. G4/4"g (`Support', or the `smiling policy') 1981, Gen. Santoso.

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Sapw Bcrsi.h (`Clean Sweep') 1981-84, under Gen. Santoso and the

present commander, Sembiring.

:h::¥:S:h::t:ainht:a:cLt::bi:slat:o:n::o`f:::aa;tr:a:Ln°a:do§i::¥}::FIG::]r¥::o;v::::9:8:4;d:: November 1981, Sen. Cyril primmer (ALP) asked in the Australian Senate for details of reported battles between Indonesia and OPM. Hc suggested the government use its intelligence personnel in the area to provide facts. In reply, the government said it could do no such thing

;§§:e[I;::I:3¥:[a:p;:;nn:Ecg:i;;a:,;in;ye;jt:i¥c::::a;££;n:.g:e:nsft:r§s:ru§je]a;in:::;¥e::: In|une 1982, NI.wgi.w!. Ni.ws reported that Indonesian army planes had

E:gT,b,::;raesa:,:::::edMaacnr::sT::Iba.r:::rtfreo:i:ihe%feT::itic,ng?1%. Most Papuan deaths in lrian have resulted from these military operadons. The Pemka group in Port Moresby has estimated the death ton as being 150000 since 1962. After investigations, the Anti-Slavery Society in London in 1983 said it could be 200000.

ph:s;1:crfjet]:npgr:s':i#`aoknaer:a?sbfeuatd:t:[¥tnoft£:[tTna:1:nhs;tpti:u.:nds,g¥:::

3,i:sn€:t::cEtt::ng::o6;edne;cfdseeoduut::;esda¥:sctopma:u.:tnesda;e.tah¥:::i:t: destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious

group. Melanesians are aghast at the world's indifference. A recent book on genocide has sought to explain this lack of support by arguing that UN members collude in order to 1)rotect each othel.s'

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::¥o::st:ac:::pn:;:I:n::co:£ec:c:a:I:i:fi:u:1:I:St:tfa::§¥sfar;#.:io!::fro:d¥dr¥rcs;aena::E: and high-level training from the US, BI.itain, France, Germany,

a:Sbtfr]:shaatioannsd;net:.:n],Sroare[ia[s:dT°]n=So]:.yn°[un]£o::sTa¥]]ge8t5°_§:°±°undgg::: about 45 per cent of the military's development funding (which

{°;::'kcei,dASA8:s]fr£,#];:2)]¥::ett;8:?.rna:rs°t=[[fa°nre]aE:at]oda££k:ei[:: averaged $10 million in recent years and has included s¥pplying Sabre

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from 1974, some 1032 Indonesian military personnel have undertaken training or study visits to Australia. Indonesia's largest rilitary supplier is the USA, which has been a strong supporter of president Suharto since he came to power in 1975. If Indonesia lacked jet-fighters, counter-insurgency aircraft, helicopters, troop transports, jeeps, patrol boats, bullets, bombs and napalm, it would have to enter-thejungle on foot and face the OPM on its own terms. The results would be disastrous; instead ABRI moves in strength and with much technical support. Irian jaya, t:he llation's only battle zone until East Timor joined it in 1975, has suffered greatly from the military's campaigns. Today, every part of lrian has a military presence. Often it is only a two-man outpost, but it will have radio links with larger bases. Air support or reinforceincnts can be brought in quickly, a situation understood by local people.

Wc.stern nations have given so much support t:o President Suharto, and been so uncritical of excesses, that on Independence Day, 1984, Indonesia's leader could boast with impunity of how ABRI had been pcrformipg its `historic duty' of being society's `stabilising force'. In fact the combination of ABRI's open and covert approaches in Irian

Joatyca_theandthdeosia£?:hi:eodp:?:tpor:V£::eflt:da±dnet%r:em¥:,m#teedti:£rt:i;as;tn°jrny; lmjority had become more disenchanted with Indonesian rule than ever.

The two-pronged strategy, which was to produce a major upheaval the following year, intensified in October 1983 when extra Kopassan(tha paratroop-commandos wel.e mc>vcd to lrian. The regiment's reputation preceded it. For several years Kopassandha forces had been in East Timor', while in]ava, blame for the executions of thousands of alleged criminals had been laid at its doorstep. Moreover, the man who had built up the regiment, Benny Murdani, was now lndonesia's military chief. Its deployment to [rian, was prompted by signs that the OPM was unifying and that the uprising Rumkorem had been I)lanning for some time was fast approaching. A number of the troops were ordered to adopt plain-clothes and be ready for special assignments. It soon became clear that they would be operating under Jakarta's orders, rather than those of the provincial military chief. Their focus was the Papuan elite in ]ayapura and ii`tcllcctuals associated with the university, bc>th students and staff.

Another target was t:he lrian jaya Development Informa'tion Service Centre (II.jadisc), a non-government group aided by the Asia Foundalion, which circulated `grass roots' advice through a journal, K4bar D¢rj. K4#!po#g (`Village News'). Hoping to pro-empt dissident activitics and gain more intelligence about the OPM, Kopassandha arrested

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i:g:i;=o;n#:::e£;Ej:I:I;a:h:a]o:u_a;eE:t:;;3;:n;;d:a:;a;jhfin;:¥:h::fin:g:o§:;;jer:1:9v::; basin.

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=Oh:::ton':;aapnj;nc::]ct[ac]t[¥ste6en:eo;i::]seudp:rnvtFsroor:OJ:g¥Ls£::i:]a![s£]ann: Dr Malcolm Walker, who worked on a UNESCO subcontract. Walker trained Ap in field-work techniques and considered him a

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u£%Ewrfsa:F]P:°ryeec€n:Sy:::schuardate°srta:i,sthheedeat::g°£gicyan?u]ieuunmde:: financed collection of Melanesian artifacts. But his most valuable work was in the field of song and dance. In 1978 he formed a cultural

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freedom if they were devout and true to their customary beliefs. Ap became a latter-day fro"or, one who played guitar, danced, sang and painted. His colleagues, many from Biak, gave him their full backing. Christianity was also an important element, for the Bible, like the oral legends of.ancient times, promised thatjustice would eventually come to the righteous. Most Koreri believers 'were active members of t:he Evangelical Church (GKI). In 1982, according to New Guinea-watching journalist Geoff Hcriotc, there had been a plan for Ap's followers to take to the streets in protest, holding Bibles in the air. Heriot, in his J#cil.cl/!-P4clfic program-

me on ABC radio, spoke of.a supposed increase in Bible sales prior to that time. However the planned demonstration did not occur. One of Ap's friends since childhood was Biak-born Rex Rumakiek, who fled in 1970 to PNG, and later Vanuatu. Visiting Sydney seven inonths after the death of Ap, Rumakiek confirmed to the author that Ap was considered a ko#or by the Papuans. In English, this would translate as a philosopher, or a saint, who had

many powers. These people always think good thoughts, have a true understanding of life and can even foresee the future. For example, Amold prcdictcd his own death well in advance. He knew that his destiny was inevitable. In that regard you could make a comparison with the death of Christ.

Rumakiek explained that there were more ko"or in lrian, and from I)laces other than Biak, but Arnold Ap had been the best known. Equally well known was his staunch belief in the freedom cause. Ap also saw beyond the ideal of papuan nationalism to the politics of Indonesia at large. On trips to Jakarta he had met with a range of human rights activists, most of them anti-Suharco. They, too, .`dmi[ed him and it was clear that he had become a convincing advocate for change in lrian. These aspects of Ap's work were not unknown to the authorities. On several occasions he had been questioned but, because of his

i)crfu::inngentc.e,dfse;:::es..|Ei:yewvietrhhaenyb.e::me:.Fpotr:I:::ufii:ey:a:n8ef; foreign visitor noted that he was cautious in conversation, skirting nlatl:ers about Indonesian rule. Another said Ap had told him: `Let's make the most of this evening, for I can only invite you to my home ollce'.

On the surface, it seemed that the official pressure did not greatly nfrcct him. He was a genial man: his appearance, more rotund than in a.`rlier years, boosted this impression. Yet he knew that trouble was in Store. He voiced this one night, late in November 1983, after a Mambesak performance staged for a party of Indonesian dignitaries,

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including the wife of Gen. Murdani. During the dancing, Irian's deputy governor, Sugiyono, had admired a bird of paradise that

:::::hdcpbai[rtd°tfoA#'rssc#d::.Eeassuogugve:::.tAapt;haes%ar:::;anko:e:::; :faasrtahr::;rpdei:u.nmdpo°it;notnpfrr:a:otF,eAC;,°sr£;n::0;rs'[Sand5esfi'obwuetv':rwAaps gave the bird to the wife of lndonesia's strongman. Later, Mambesak members .protested to him. Apart from anything else, the bird was a protected species and it was illegal to take it out of the province. Ap replied: `Hopefully this gift would prove useful to mc in Jakarta should I ever be arrestcd'. He was only half-joking and, as it turned out, the gift was no use to him at all.

froTmheh;:ehx:=:t:ryn::an]L.3c?ot¥:sv#::satn93g;t4::S]sdinAapn¥nai::£:: car. His family was not informed of his whereabouts, a detention centre in ]ayapura named Panorama. Soon the Jakarta paper Si.#4r Harflpa# learned of Ap's arrest and publlshed a story. The paper was strongly reprimanded by authorities and the editor forced to fly to jayapura to apolc>gise and to hear the `true' story. This was the first of many attempts by the govemmcnt to disseminate false stories about Ap,s fate.

tre9t:dA[P:Sabc:::]dfatnhceeL::3|fi€[:;:i;u::or:::::::dc:hdaet,t£:ieet[ay;nteoeE: charged and tried promptly. While the plea was being considered, the

a:Tr|a;-:ae£5::t:oa::eTnpdt°t£:Fs::[rtuaorf:h9e84r:a:ge:]afic]e;hft°]::Wpei:r Amongst the refugees was Ap's wife, Corrie, who was several months pregnant, and their three children. On 20 February, Ap and four other Kopassandha prisoners were handed over to the police. Charges against him were prepared. They ccntred on an alleged liaison with t:he OPM, especially the Genyem area group, led by Yance Hembring. This was conveyed to his employers at the university, who realised he would not return t:o work

:o.I::ige::#p::epF:nrpf:?:at:at:u;o:|Pd=:|Sstc!i::,?heprgoo-voe:nMmcnLtaiea[a known this for some time, based on `hard evidence'. After Ap's demise, Seth Rumkorem, in a telephone inte'rview from Athens for ABC radio, said Ap was not only an OPM member but the `home affairs minister in my government (the PRG)'. It seemed that the roles of ethnologist, feo#or and OPM member had merged.

dh[a?a:I::idhir:g:'dsAfhfi:u::r]e[fi:i[:::tit:Pvr]:I::drie¥:£ebre¥n°P=Ssstar:= ated. His co-detainees said they had also been tortured. Soon Ap was

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allowed day-visits from the gaol, accompanied by officials. He was taken to the UNCEN campus, to show students he had not disappeared. Back in gaol, he was granted a radio and visits from GKI Pastors.

In distant Jakarta, four Papuan students decided to publicise Ap's situation, and human rights abuses generally, by writing a letter to the Indonesian parhiament. Soon, they were being harrassed by the mihitary. Realising their days of freedom were limited, they hatched an ingenious plan. At a set hour on an appointed day, they would cntcr the Dutch embassy and seek political asylum. They communicat:ed the plan to journalists in Holland and acted to t:heir schedule. A mere hour later, journalists rang the Dutch foreign ministry and .1sked if some Papuans who had just sought refuge in the Jakarta embassy would be treated lawfully. Houand agreed, and in due course tlle four flew out of Indonesia, despite street protests orchestrated by the government in both Jakarta and lrian ]aya. The incident showed that the new generation of papuans is prepared to trust few governinents but has lcamed the value of the foreign media. Ap's detention attracted consideration attention overseas. Sym-

pathisers in PNG hoped that the government would intercede with Indonesia; but PNG, keen I:o improve relat:ions with]akarta, did not move. Australia may have acted similarly were it not for the close interest shown in the case by Sen. Alan Missen who had long been concerned abc)ut events in lrian and Timor; he was chairman of the

parliament's Amnesty group. In the Senate, hc asked the government to seek details on Ap's status and was told later that this had been done in Jakarta by tlle ambassador, Rawdon Dalrymple. But, despite Australia's supposed influence with Indonesia, noted by Foreign Minister Hayden on many occasions, the intcrvent:ion would be to no avail. Missen's next statement to the Senate, on 31 May, referred to the `late Arnold Ap'. At 8.00 p.in. on Saturday 21 April, Pastor Bonay of the GKI sought

permission to visit Amold Ap and say prayers with him. The next day was Easter Sunday. The pastor was allowed to meet with Ap and three of his co-detainees. At 9.00 p.in. Bonay went home. It was the last time he saw Ap alive. At about midnight, the five prisoners left their ceus in the company c)f a Papuan guard, Pius Wanem, a man who apparently had a drinking problem. What happened next is known only to the Kopassandha troops who monitorcd the `cscapers' movements. According to journalist Peter Hascings, they had offered Pius a large suln to stage tile bogus escape (Sycfroey Mor#i."g Hcr4Jd 27 August 1984); Corporal

John Kraar, a descrte[ who fled to PNG, said it was Rp. 500000.

On the Monday, the body of Eddy Mofu was found by fishermen

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in the sea near Base-G beach, the American wartime headquarters close to ]ayapura. The body was heavily bruised, swollen and hardly identifiable. On inspection it showed signs of disfigurement consistent with torture. The shock to the Mofu family was profound. In 1979, Eddy's father Baldus had died ac the hands of the military. Arnold Ap's body was discovered in the mortuary of Aryoko

:t°SoP::ae]JAYtahpouur:h°::e2£6#a[cbxeaE::ubaene:u::edryh:craet::?i:idr¥p= marks on the wrists and wounds in his stomach, she was courageous enough to inform Ap's friends before the body could be secretly buried. When the news got out, the authorities had to deliver Ap's body into the hands of his family. He was buried on 1 May, with over one thousand mourners at his funeral. Two of the other escapers later turned up in custody, while the fifth, Alex Membri, managed to gain the safety of a PNG refugee camp. There, he said he had left the Ap group before it had departed in a hired taxi for Base-G where a

m°£;:;bd°e:tthw:Sasw:£atinegptu°bit,:k:yt:£emg:°v::fe::.ntthenextweck.Its

timing was impeccably tasteless, coming during a seminar on lrian jaya's development being hosted in]akarta by the lndonesianjournalists Association and attended by local and foreign guests. During the proceedings, an ABRI officer began passing the word that the Irianese

:issscfod:;.t'Eeri::]a¢eSP;:raedsbheoecnkgd';e:nth;££esaot:em:at::s:ts°u:;::Poeufsr.°# the coming weeks, as more details emerged, many questions would be asked. Had Ap been beaten? Why were the wounds which had evidently caused his death -bullet holes said some sources, bayonet marks said another -so close together? Wouldn't an cscaper be shot more randomly, perhaps even in the legs t:o prevent a getaway? Indonesia stuck to its story, only elaborating after strong pressure was applied from abroad. Ap, it said, had been caught as he waited on the coast for a boat that would take him around the headland to PNG. He had been shot and had died of wounds in the stomach on the way to hospital. An advance on this story came from Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar, who told a press conference injune that Ap and two guards from the gaol had been intercepted at sea when the boat in which they were fleeting ran out of fuel. A kind of bull-horn was used to ask them to surrender. Then suddenly the guards started to fire on the partol boat, which was returned, causing casualties, amongst which was M[ Ap.2'

Mochtar said Indonesia had not given the full story earlier because it

::]ctutshaeti:mess,S;be::::;nag?n;ens;i::tdraa]ia;s¥oa:yf°wnodu:i:oa5;:8;:subt:i;€;:::

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He also criticised a st:atement condemning the kilhing made by 130

prominent Australian academics. Mochtar surprised the press confer-

::cnea±yes%[rne¥gtnh:t:E:ss:::::o;i:t::¥%ao:pee;rn6Efvceonn::cths,mE:aan: The next day, the diplomat was revealed to be Australia's ambassador, Dalrymple. Commented Peter Hastings in his weekly column: In almost 40 years injoumalism this is the first time I can recall the Foreign Minister of an important country citing an `unnamed ambassador' as the source for a ministerial statement. (Syd/!ey Momi.wg Hcr4/d, 2 July, 1984).

Perhaps the mihitary had told Mochtar the real story but he, aware that Dalrymple believed the shoot-out version, decided to go with it publicly. It was also possible, that relations between the `dovish' Mochtar and the military `hawks' had deteriorated to such a degree chat cooperation had ceased and he was forced to clutch at straws. In late July, John Kraar, a police deserter then in PNG'§ Blackwater

refugee camp, said Ap and several friends had hiddeti for four days in a coastal cave. Their boat had been unable to face the heavy seas and a rcplacemcnt was, in theory, being sought. Pius Wancm had returned Co jayapura. At 7.00 a.in. on the flfth moming, Ap left the cave to l`rinate. A burst of gunfire hit him and hc fell to the beach below with wounds in his stomach. When Kopassandha troops reached his body, tllcy saw he was not yet dead. A soldier bayonetted the Melanesian.

#[:ctsAfifo]=etdh:nvi°e::ypda¥£unagn£::?£e¥.I;taryh°Spitalaftersingingsome After Ap's death, many Mambesak members who were still free decided to go bush, several to PNG. The folkloric troupe ceased to exist in its once-united fashion. Any remaining members were told by the authorities that if they wished to perform publicly they must sing llot of Papuan culture but of the unity of Indonesia. One former nssociate of Ap, Sam Kapissa, was warned in September 1984 that l`nless he Coed the hine, a fate similar to Ap's awaited him. By November he was reportedly under arrest in Biak, along with a community leader, Mr Wompere. Few Papuans had time to dwell on the demise of Mambesak because Kopassandha's work was by no |ncans over. In the jungle remained hundreds of OPM fighters and thousands of village supporters. The government saw them as posing ns much of a threat to security as the urban elite. Between March and

J,i::Col:££:A:c%:du;:'gtstomr°evfi::etehsr::agchh]rnugrafir8a,Stietthr%:pS:adr]Cdhf::

il`1i:r°:::i:::[n:trl°tnhs:ype£:::Cat:;eerts::£°£:€e[ntdr::teesfaia:ndoppr#;da: recorded in the ICJ's 1984 report on the refugee crisis, the spearhead of the ABRI offensive was said to be the `red hats' - Kopassandha. In

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the early stages, villagers were caught unawares and suffered deaths, beatings and destruction of property. As usual, the `unclean' village

:;::a¥:;:ng°tE:]£:rfd°err:::!:tmparna;t;Cae;u¥n?eflnedn.enwasdv°afntcteozaAmBP£E,: arrival. By September, most border crossers were fleeing because of rumoured ABRI activity, rather than actual encounters. The refugees of 1984 were the latest, but probably not the last, Melanesians to vote with their feet. One of them trav\elled inside the belly of his mother, Corric Ap. In August, the baby boy was born in PNG and named after his later father: Arnold C. Ap. Had his father been living, people said, the boy would have received a traditional name like his three brothers, called after the Sun, the Warrior and the

g:na:g;:£esp#]:I:yfasna,`s[a°t::.n4:::]qwAe€t:rand;s:te[eonn,°:Fops::uta°n*ca[tet?: and sought to live by his beliefs. In so doing, he became a martyr the Papuans will never forget. InJanuary 1985 an Indonesian court, sitting inJayapura, wrote the last chapter in the Amold Ap case. On trial were four Papuans accused of infringing the country's subversion laws and specifically of aiding the escape of Ap and his co-detainees. The men were]onas Rejauw, a student, two bureaucrats, Bob Souwcla and lzaak Arobaya -and the 24-year-old prison warder, Pius Wanem, whom obscl.vers believed to be the lynchpin of the military conspiracy which ended in Ap's death. While the outcome of the trial was not publicised in lrian]aya, a copy of the 35-page judicial finding was sent to the aut:hor shortly afterwards. Testimony was heard from flvc witnesses, two of whom had bccn

i::eri.is_°=:gewjtz[€:i:i:acAh:;e:::amnadfnae:£adgcanzc]:ctchnod]Cdr[endg¥:Ste:: 9mm bullets. The prosecution, led by an ABRl lawyer, developed the following sequence of events: Pius Wanem drugged the coffee of two

:i[:°c?ugk:ayr.di:Tcdat¥ch::otuh;¥ofi:LLea;I::t:;gg::±.b:itFhe:ry¥eepa:I::dafno: Base-G beach. There, they gave a pre-arranged code using llt matches but because of a heavy sea, the waiting boat could not come asliore. Eddy Mofu tried to swim the thirty metres to the boat, but dl:owned. The next move was the vaguest part of the trial transcript, noting only that Ap was shot dead as a .rcsulc of a `Kopassandha operation'. No explanation was given of how the Red Beret:s got wind of the location.

toTtec|¥daon:e¥.agnros:aptewoars£O:#t[ityy:{tf`Oamn:it:;£;,a;d.::dwh:::.± ¥£::etEteer:Crecdcet]°v::VgeanoLy:earri:Cot:3:[t°::ecn°rw:uatne::°hfi¥:na£€[:chaaifa ahalf'yc.ars.ItremainedtobcseenhowlongMrWanemwouldserve.

5

East of the border

he roots of PNG's `border problem' with Indonesia lie in t:he colonial carve-up of New .Guinea when Europeans drew an imaginary line through the island. As the twentieth century dawned, Holland, Germany and Britain wcrc developing their territories in the imperial mode. While World War 1 altered the foreign ownership of New Guinea, with Australia taking over Germany's holding, it did not change the largely unmarkcd border. Nor did World War 2 which saw Holland flee New Guinea, with its prisoners from Tanah Merah in tow, and later return on the coat-tails of the Allied forces. By 1962, when Indonesian pressure on Holland reached its peak, Australia had firm control of the eastcm Territory of papua and New Guinea, albeit under UN trustccship. The following year, it shared a land border with an Asian neighbour. For the diplomats in Canberra, Sukarno's Indonesia was the worst neighbour possible, short of a communist state. Further, they expected trouble between Indonesians and their l`cw Melanesian subjects. The rclcvant minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, has said that no-one harboured illusions about lndonesia's view of the

T

#:i±*dnetEcpr::Plc. [t Was the land that Sukamo wanted, not those The trickle of refugees across the border came as no surprise to Australia, which promised that their cases would be examined Sympa.thetically. In 1962, Barwick told Parliament that: As far as I am concerned, any questions which arise, whether under the heading of political asylum or any other, will be entertained land decided from a very high humanitarian point of view.I

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One problem was in determining where the border lay, and to this end Australia and Indonesia began the process of positioning markers. Eventually there would be fourteen of them along the 760 kin

:a°rT;€::ge(£onul]y98fi:ufo;Er::itaend.°3as:ggkafne?ttt£:t2,62aoa:tehs:auEEdfnb::: `most co-operativc' in this exercise.

lic anger in Australia over the `sellout' to

|ndA.fl:::i:,o:::d;ur::::fi:i down-; but the ffight of hopeful rcfugecs to PNG did 'not. In 1965, two days before the so-called communist coup attempt in Jakarta, the Australian minister for territories explained to

ELaerrh:a:eg:::tee::::;ne£:ganp:::;¢r:::sof::I:agpruoaunna::]Foa:s;taAyTncgrocsos:Ira be given, entitled to special consideration for the granting of permissive residency in the Territory. Those crossers who could not convince the Australian border officers were to be fed, well looked

#::csag;tieetun[enxetdmt:n:ij,a?h:Sm`]enx;gtee:1::::ys'e:Sthpa:S:;t[he.fu[gitrpv::: case would be influenced by `factors of common humanity'.

to][enratnht:f;:::fy,h:h¥:eve;,er€T::rga:]aa;se;::i.]cea£:nbeot;jeuesnt;;fe¥ra;s:::: and the border guards. There was also a personality clash between the

:,oa£:;caaT¢h;hnctE:fifngaec:ve¥,ajtare;txu€rt:amha::b::I:I:::d*°deThe:::1:i:

Fo!;i::[t!e|nci:eE!:.::ol:fi;f`,ah#:tr|?,eoTrery:dsne?E¥:ee:?:d?gi:s::a::;:u;a:1gor: Kenu, alleged that genuine rcfugecs were being repatriated by Austra1ia and later punished by Indonesia. In reply a Department of Territories spokesman said there were no reports of punitive measures being taken against anyone sent back to West lrian. The story of one aspiring refugee, a former official of the Freedom Committee of West Papua, was recorded by acadelric Paul van der Veur (New Gw!.#c4, Dec.1965). The border-crosser alleg.ed that he had been sent back by Aust:ralian officials after seeking permissive residen-

:?;:ypa¥u:aFoe::lei::tsi:ewTfi:natnhat#inhteh:ab:S[?t£::r:srceat;::.:; £aonr3:ra;gstatfonro::i::e:;ie%:y[nt:6s5uBsr:i:netnctd|:::::rot:ctohipYarT::nt8 authorities, the Papuan family said they wel.e told the Australians couldn't permit them to stop. The fei.ap told them that this was the order from `on top'. By the time of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, the refugee trickle had become a steady stream. Already, about 1900 had entered PNG and been allowed to stay in `refugee villages' in the border region. A

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further 1700 crossed during the three months voting period of the Act. Some claimed that the Australian fei.qu had chased refugees away `1ikc animals'. The Sow/# Paci);c Posf of 11 June 1969 said that at least 28

Papuans were conflrmed to have been kiued by the Indonesian troops in the border zone. Many repatriated Papuans chose to establish their own camp-villages and these were the catalyst for the first illegal crossing of the border by ABRI troops. It began when soldiers attacked a camp in the nol.them region, claiming that the inmates were not refugees but OPM guerillas. The Papuans fled eastwards with ABRI in hot pursuit. Soon the troops arrived at Wutung, in PNG, where they fired on the assistant district officer and his two men. The k!.ays withdrew in terror and Austrahia responded by despatching a force of 50 police and rilitary to the border. A few days later, a second Indonesian unit crossed up to twelve miles into PNG and fired shots at a refugee camp containing 250 people. A fortnight later, an Australian patrol six miles inside PNG was attacked and four carriers, all originating from lrian, reported killed. (Sowffe Pflcifc Post, 28 May 1969, Awsfrdji.4w, 6 June 1969) Despite such provocation, Australia

chose not to confront Indonesia. Its response was to transfer many of the refugccs away from the sensitive border, to distant Manus Island. Australia was in no doubt as to lndonesia's prime concern: the OPM. In a message to Canberra in 1972, the PNG administrator, Les Johnson, said Indonesia was especially interested in concluding a new agreement to govern the movement of people and goods across the border. Indonesia, sc)ught closer Australian cooperation, ideally to the cxtcnt of joint border patrols. Johnson advised that Australia should exercise caution, one reason being that for the two countries to `gang up' against an indigenous movement could have political repercussions in PNG. This factor would continue to inhibit PNG's |]ost:indcpcndence goveriimcnts. Oddly, given lndonesia's great concern about the OPM, Johnson accepted its version of the movement's Strength. The rebels in question are the last known armed band opposing Indonesian rule in West lrian. Their hard core apparently numbers some 30 or so, but they also rcccive occasional support from local tribes. In military terms they arc no more than a nuisance to the Indonesians: but they are a political embarrassment.2

Since then, similar underestimates have been voiced by Australian diplomats as well as by journahists visiting the border region. Most liave written of the `T-shirt guerillas'. A classic description came from the Sydray Mor#!."g Hei'4/d's foreign editor, Peter Hastings, who wrote in 1983 that the OPM `boasts more dark-glasses than guns'. By 1985, however, he was able to observe that the OPM `must now be rccognised as an increasingly effective political organisation'.

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PNG's new leaders viewed the OPM differently, believing that guerillas along the border had the capacity to create serious problems between PNG and its neighbour. This was explained to OPM leaders during a series of secret meetings arranged by PNG's foreign minister, Albert Maori Kiki. The liaison began in 1973 and lasted until after independence in late 1975. OPM's leaders, including Rumkorem, Prai and NIcolaasJouwe said they would not abandon their struggle and as a result the meetings ended. Kiki was disappointed, but not prepared to co-operate fully with Indonesia. Indccd, he was worried that military heavy handedness might increase the determjnatlon of OPM and escalate the problem for PNG. Using Australia as a conduit to

Jakarta, Kiki urged that: The Indonesians should be encouraged to treat the OPM activities as low-level dissidence not constituting a military threat.3

Canberra's response, unhkc Kiki's message, has not been `leaked'

publicly so it is unsure whether the advice was sent to lndonesia's leaders. If it wcrc, it achieved little success for over the next four years Indonesia mounted large-scale opel`ations against OPM suspects, the net effect of which was to antagohisc more Papuans and drive thousands across the border seeking safety. By the time-this pi.ocess

was well advanced, PNG had become impatient with the OPM and embarked on an about-face, supporting Indonesia in all regards exc.ept that of active border patrolling. Then, as today, it was not domestically acceptable for PNG troops to flght their `Mclanesian brothers'. Instead the police were made responsible for border supervision, a move which did not please the defence chief, Ted Diro, who had close links with his former Australian mentors and accepted their view that Irian was Indonesia's `internal affair'. Diro advocated a soldier's solution: frontier justice. Privately he felt concerned for the Papuans of lrian, but he believed it was impossible to convert this into a policy

which would protect PNG's interests. The majority of the PNG leadership agreed, including Prime Minister Somare. But in a democratic state they would not risk the consequences of Diro's hardline. The rift between the soldiers and the ministers led to the `coup-thatnever-was' and, some, years later, gave publicity to the above manoeuvrings (ABC `Background Brieflng', 21 Aug. 1983). A test of the PNG public's opinion on Indonesia took place only two months after the country's independence. When Indonesia invaded East Timor, students in Port Moresby besieged the Indonesian embassy. Backed by many politicians and bureaucrats, they accused Indonesia of expansionism, likening Timor to Irian, and expressed concern that PNG could be next on its agenda. Despite assurances from Australia, PNG's leaders wel.e alarmed. But their position was

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impossible. If Port Moresby had alienated Jakarta, two of the three tenets of its new `Universalism' foreign pohicy would have bccn destroyed in the flrst months of independence. As the policy document showed, these wcrc the aims of establishing friendly relations with `as many countries as possible' and PNG's being `regarded as a bridge or link bctwcen South-East Asia and the South Pacific'. Pragmatism triumphed over sentiment. PNG remained silent. The Timor invasion sparked anger in the ranks of the OPM where

people wellby'undcrstood by a European colony being `liberated' `voluntcers''what fromwas the meant Indonesian armed forces. From the

jungle, Seth Rumkorem wrote to Maori Kiki asking PNG t:o recognize the OPM and arrange talks with Indonesia at which the OPM's Provisional Revolutionary Government would be represented. Kiki penned an angry reply, saying that PNG had severed contact with West Papuans overseas and wished to advise Rumkorem, as the effective head of the OPM, that the `whole problem' was now viewe.d as an internal matter of Indonesia. PNG would take these steps:

1 2 3 4

Ask the Indonesian government to.withdraw the PNG-requested suspension of military operations. Treat any appearance of uniformed OPM members as a hostile act. Deal with any OPM members found in PNG as illegal immigrants or hand them back to Indonesian authorities at the border. Take action to cut off .any assistance to the OPM by residents of

PNG. From early 1976, PNG started backing its threats with action, as far as this was politically acceptable. The plan was pursued somewhat covertly; Co minimise reluctance by Papua New Guinean offlcers, much of the work was performed by contracted Australians, many of whom had close links with Australian intelligence. Clearly, the OPM was now being `ganged up' on, a development that did not escape its lcade[s' attention.

In 1977, Michael Somare sought to boost relations with Indonesia by undertaking a state visit. En route to Jakarta, his party stopped in

Jayapura. Somare was introduced to a line-up of Melanesians. As he shook each person by the hand, Indonesian observers felt that a great diplomatic victory was being scored. But, as Somare told some staff in 1983, the experience moved him greatly. As he looked into the Papuans' eyes, and felt their hands tighten, he realised that they were his blood brothcrs. Again, foreign policy prevailed and s.oon Somare was in Jakarta to bc grcctcd by a nineteen-gun salute and a warm welcome from President Suharto. Somare told the press that the border questic)n had dominated official talks but asserted that PNG would guard its independent

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status. As it transpired, however, OPM. was the only unwelcome

party in PNG. A blind eye would be turned to all but the most provocative of Indonesian incursions. Before going home, Somare even floated the idea of an offlcial Indonesian military presence in PNG. He hoped that ABRI officers might lecture at the]oint Services College in Lae. The proposal attracted much criticism in PNG. It appeared as if Somare's visit to Jakarta implied approval of Indonesian policies in lrian. During the first months of 1977, leading up to the Indonesian election in May, niilitary action was stepped up. For PNG, the first repercussion was felt when the press announced a des|)erate threat by OPM's Nicolaas Jouwe, later denied, to engage in `Arab-style tcrrorism' to gain recognition for the West Papua cause.

There was a tightening of security in the capital, especially around the

premises of the Indonesian, Australian and New Zealand diplomats. The OPM-Victoria group denounced]ouwe and pledged their loyalty t:o the PNG government. A few days later, the Pemka faction struck back. Rumkorem, with fivc followers, was ambushed along the border by Tapenal guerillas who had orders to `eliminate' him if he resisted arrest. In fact he escaped. At this time, news arrived that Rumkorem's vice-president, Herman Womsiwor, had died of a heart attack in New York, where he had bccn petitioning the UN. The focus of attention was firmly back on the border where refugees had begun arriving in numbers which matched those during the Act of Free Choice. Whole familics told the PNG press stories of harsh military actions. Not all were from the border region; many came from as far away as the highlands, after weeks of hard walking. They said the elections had been disrupted, and abandoned in a number of places. One group, totalling 218 villagers, crossed into Wcstem Province in a single week and requested permissive residence on the grounds that they were afraid to return home. Indonesia seemed keeri to confirm such fears: a patrol entered PNG in late May, looking for OPM members, and shot dead a West Sepik villager. PNG announced it would send the rcfugces back nevcrthelc.ss. Tony Siaguru, then foreign affairs secretal.y and chairperson of the Border Committee, said t:he refugees decided to leave when infol.ned of. PNG's policy. `It is fair to assume that they agreed I:o return home', he stated, cryptically.

Despite more Indonesian provocation, PNG pursued its policy of suppressing information on border events. This drew strong criticism in parliament, from both the opposition and the govemmcnt's backbenchers. Kiki broke his silence by contacting his Indonesian counterpart, Adam Mahik, seeking reasons for the refugee exodus. Hc sought a promise that anyone sent back would not be punished. Malik gave this assurance and explained that `tribal clashes' had been the

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disruptive factor. He criticised the foreign media and alleged that the

problem had been whipped up by OPM supporters in PNG. This satisfied Somare who said PNG was obliged to honour the 1974 border agreement with Indonesia, which provided for cross-border movement for customary purposes but the detention of illegal bordercrossers. `We want to maintain gciod relations with our neighbours', the prime minister explained. `We will not tolerate any dissidents trying to create problems for three million Papua New Guineans. It is not my wish to get involved in internal Indonesian affairs.' Many observers, including the Mclancsian Council of churches and the PNG Journalists Association, believed the refugees were neither the by-product of tribal flghting I]or fulltime `dissidents', rather just villagers. Indccd, if they were mostly OPM then t:he movement must have grown far larger than official estimates: the refugee influx had now reached 1500, with more coming daily. To investigate the status

of the arrivals, Tom Unwin, head of the UN Development Programme in PNG, was asked by the UNHCR to visit the holding camps on the border. When he returned to Port Morcsby he said the West Papuans had `good reason' to leave Irian. This conclusion did not

please Somarc, nor his foreign affairs offlcials, and it began a period of tension between the government and the UNHCR which has lasted until the present time. In August, Unwin released t:his report on the border. It asked legal advisers to prepare a case which would argue for refugee status for those people who had managed to remain in PNG. The process would only come to fruition several years later, shortly before Unwin's departure, when the refugees in the Wabo and Yako camps were flnally allowed to merge into the PNG community. The same month, Somare's Pangu Pati formed a new coalition

government which included Julius Chan, of the Pcople's Progress I)arty, as finance minister. It seemed set for a five-year term and hoped that domestic matters, rather than Irian ]aya, would dominate its thinking. The rcfugcc flood had slowed to a trickle and the decision about what to do with the `illegal border-crossers' had been left in abeyance.

But the lrian problem would not go away. When delegates to the I)NG-hosted Sotlth Paciflc Forum arrived in Port Morcsby, they were greeted by protestors carrying pro-West Papua placards and distributing what one newspaper called `bundles of rebel literature'. A message fromJacob Prai asked the Paclfic lcadcrs to appeal against `Indonesian atrocities' in both lrianTaya and East Timor. Prai made a special plea for Australia to stop its mapping operation in Irian, saying Indonesia would use the maps to bomb villages which supported the liberation i`iovcment. In its sessions the Forum dodged the Irian issue, a course

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that continued through 1984. Hoping to work more closely with Indonesia, PNG sent a bc)rder liaison group to jayapura. Again, it was PNG which compromised,

:gr::;dnegrttahkaettphaesstersa:Ft:ou£:[bve[s.[Stssu:de;:;:::ge]rndt¥:]iegr;4Wa::e::Sehnet: According to A#fclr4 newsagency, this would allow people to travel from one country to the other without repeating normal immigration

procedures each time. Yet this seemed to ignore the existing arrangement, which specifled that such people were not subject to formalities. Had Indonesia been overruling this provision? No-one followed uP

th:n£%t]t;oC3:'r°F;77rii::Ei::ts:i£::S:Sen|atsonNe:;r+ao;:Edtoag3;dnr.essthe UNGA. To his critics, it seemed an ideal opportunity t:o gain

;dnet£::::]d°naa]s:?n:.Pna:h¥tt:°crkt::raft::::ad]fi[:rm:pa;I::sS;tne:d'[tss°A=:ar:

=o::cr::yfi;rBtahcek;::¥fa'mais:::i:d¥np6uE::¥g.:i;'n:er:1::i:h;th;etn¥£: same cruelty was occurring on his own doorstep. `How can he talk about human rights when he condones the oppressive Indonesian regime in West Papua? They are our pcople'. Bais proposed a

::rie]£::|s:t:rnjt:i:ab:y;r:o:ug:i;:e:a:;¥:ie:uge±:a::alsos?ap:r:t:::ar]:n:s:teEc:::B:a:1::: comments were also ironical; in 1984, as Pangu's justice minister, he was launching criminal proceedings against refugees. Another MP, Kala Swokin, demanded a real act of free choice in Irian, failing which PNG should withdraw its mission fromJakarta and call on the UN to investigate the reasons for the recent crossings. `Can we continue to refuse to harbour the refugees and keep sending them back, only to be herded into prison camps to `disappear' under the Indonesian hands?' The government answered such criticisms, somewhat limply,

:i::upg*GACct::idFn°::[gffotdff::rso#e;:|St[enrd:;tet:£ras.°ZLfi:¥a;eTrt°]ast:]r: Lowa would be accusing Somare of `bowing down' to his neighbour. Australia's turn to be embarrassed came in the same month when an operative from its high commission was revealed to have been spying on the local West Papuan community. The spy, Lindsay Burridge, had approached an Australian economist at the university seeking details of students with lrian backgrounds. It was one of the worst mistakes that Australia had made in PNG, for the academic, Prof. Brian BI.ogan, was no admirer of the Australian intelligence services. Brogan told both the PNG government and the press about the

itpsr:::?asbaey:xgpLetc:e¥°tuoni:gdt°coannfta:¥:t?aeLLLi:ttF]::'t:e;€gn3eursrt:.aia::

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high commission confirmed Burridge's ][0 link but claimed hc w.is working with the knowledge of PNG. If so, it was more likely tlmt hc liaised covertly with its intelligence group than with the country's leaders: ]ulius Chan, acting as prime minister, lodged a formal protest and spent four hours in a meeting with the high commissioner, Tom Critchley. The latter, it may be remembered, had links with]akarta's leaders going back to the days of Indonesian independence. Furious at the revelation, 500 students from the University of PNG rallied on the high commission's grounds, tearing branches from trees, trampling on flower-beds, spitting betel juice on the building and smearing mud on closed-circuit television cameras. In a petition, they swore to `skin alive' any person found spying on their campus. Burridge was returned liome. Then it was PNG's turn again. Shortly before its new foreign minister, Ebia Olewale, left forJakarta to meet Indonesian leaders, the head of the West Papua De Facto Government, Nicolaas Touwe, flew in from Holland. On arrival, Jouwe announced a revised Pemka cabinet, included in which were naturalised PNG citizens and perrhissive residents. Somare was criticised for allowing such an overt provocation to Indonesia. The loudest voice belonged to Noel Levi, MP, who said Olewale must have been aware of]ouwe's visit. Levi went on to attack the `Universalism' foreign policy. `Surely we must get around to choosing particular friends', he urged. Later, as foreign ininister in the Chan government:, Levi would institute a new policy, known as `Selective Engagement', which made it even clearer that l'NG favoul.cd \Irian as an Indonesian province, not a free state. The pcilicy would be retained by his successors from Pangu. While this wrangle continued, Olewale decided to cmulatc his predecessor, Kiki, by arranging secret meetings with the OPM. In

iftperr;,]bt;7d8efbe:tche:1::.raafi?,dt:;:rt°keo:e¥beyreTbor:;gst:gt:ruv:pin::toe;agnhdt hours with Prai and, next day, five with Rumkorem. He announced that they had been told to remove their camps from PNG or risk being attacked. Siaguru had said: `We know where your camps are and we'll bum t:hem down if you don't move them out of our territory'. Unusually, Indonesia added its voice, saying that PNG must not have a `double loyalty'. The embassy's information officer, Siregar, boasted that Indonesia had the strength to wipe out the rebels but that it would bc `detrimental to our development . . . Too many lives and a lot of energy and money would be wasted'. Siregar denied that ll`donesia had territorial designs on PNG, an apparent reference to a 8ccret Indonesian document that had recently been published. The (locument, which came allegedly from the defence department, was i`n outline of Indonesia's plan to take over PNG. The operation,

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code-named `Bird of Paradise', detailpd thirteen steps comprising subversion and military action. At the time, it was decried as an OPM forgery. It has since become known t:hat the document was genuinely Indonesian, but not official. In fact it was part of a theoretical exercise being studied by trainee officers at an ABRI academy in Java.1 Despite its anger at the OPM, the PNG government was determined not to be an Indonesian puppet. Before leaving for Jakarta,

0lewale implied he would bc talking tough. He said PNG would

ieasr]£to::[e::u::bfe°]:.J°±netpbr°or£::£attro°]S;:cnudssmtahkeefi:]teua:et:aft::rwma]Ss::: residents who remained politically active, saying that the matter

right be rcferi:ed to the UNHCR. Wc want the Commissioner to find countries which will accept them. Indonesia wants us to return them . . . but we can't force them to return because wc would be contravening the UN Convention on Refugees.5

It was interesting that PNG should have raised the Convention, for it was not a signatory and in later years would insist that it had no such obligations regarding refugees. By the time Olewale returned home he had swung around. Observers noted that he was not the first leader from PNG, or Australia, to be wooed successfully in Jakarta. He reported that Indonesia was suspicious of PNG, which for its part should take decisive action against `the people who are working against lndonesia'. 0lcwale repeated the policy line that OPM was a domestic matter, `but once it spills over on to our side of the border, it is also our concern'. During his visit, Olewale had met with lndoncsia's new

i:;rae#yT;nn;atfra'stDi;#::,htaEe¥eufueTiaaa:::a:.?f[::n¥seiL.;Strs::,P.i]¥[go;i of the governor's offlce in Dili. PNG soon showed that it would back its promises with action. On 26 June, it launched a military c)pcration involving 360 troops stationed at flve locations along the no[them sector of the border. It was named Rawsi.ti!kw/I.fe, Pidgin for `getting I.id of intruders quickly'.

Although PNG officials confessed the action was partly a public relations exercise, Raws!.r"lew!.fe managed to squeeze the OPM between

the two countries' forces. But the operation backflred on PNG almost immediately when 100 Indonesian soldiers were discovered on the east of the border. Indonesia's ambassador, Busiri, said that the border was not a line that could be seen and it had been dark. The troops withdrew. Later, in clear daylight, a PNG vinager saw a helicopter reconnoitre the settlement of scram, followed by a larger ci.aft which, in three trips, offloaded 45 soldiers who pitched tents and camped for three days. The villager told the press that the exercise had been

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watched from the bush by PNG soldiers. Reports in the PNG papers again embarrassed the Indonesian embassy. Worse was to come: in early July, Indonesia began strafing villages close to the border and even PNG's forces had to withdraw to avoid possible clashes. One report said Mr Somare had been forewarned of the offensive and had asked that it bc restricted to a line five miles from the border. Ambassador Busiri said that 700 troops were deployed on the border. In a two-week period, about 300 villagers crossed into PNG. They told the UNHCR's Tom Unwin that many homes had been burned by soldiers and their villages strafed by aircraft. Unwin said he was convinced that punitive raids were in progress. In parliament, Somare faced intensive questioning, especially over the army's role, but denied the army had been used unconstitutionally to help Indonesia `round up and kill our black brothers', as one MP alleged.

Somare promised that the rcfugecs, now numbering 700, would not bc sent back against their will. He added that the border force had been reduced to only thirty men. The debate saw the cmcrgence of a new critic of PNG border policy. The opposition leader, Lambakcy Okuk, had earlier gone to Irian, as well as East Timor, and returned with glowing accounts. Now he had changed his views; later, as Chan's deputy, hc would become the cabinet:'s strongest advocate for a free West Papua. In August, more results of the Indonesian offensive came to light.

Thirteen members of Prai's Tepenal force sought asylum in PNG. After announcing this, Olewalc dropped a greater bombshell: 700 villagers had come across a few days before the guerillas, fearing reprisals from ABRI troops. Hc said another 180 villagers were awaiting a suitable opportunity to cross.

Later in the month, meetings took place which would not become public until the next year. At the appropriately-named Smugglers Inn, ` hotel in Madang, far from the border, Jacob Prai met with a French gun-r.unner and, at the cost of his military career, Col. Tom Poang. OPM placed orders for 500 Armalite rifles, ammunition and field radios. The weapons did not come through and within a month, battered by the Indonesiaii pressure, Prai came out of the jungle once more and was arrested in Vanimo. So began a tug-of-war over Prai niid his deputy, the muscular Ondowame. Indonesia insisted they be sent back to stand trail for treason, but the PNG public inundated the I)I.css with letters urging clemency. Students raised $4000 to bring a

qiieen's counsel froin Australia to fight the case. When Dr Mochtar visited PNG in December he was accosted by 500 demonstrators. On n quieter note, Prai's lawyers were mounting determined appeals. Four months after his capture, and two months after his gaol sentence had expired, Prai was still being held in Port Moresby's

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maximum security prison. The government refused his request for transfer to a detention camp where he could be reunited with his family. When a batch of regional countries - Australia, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa and Fiji -I refused tc) take Prai and Ondowame, the PNG government blamed the UNHCR for its lack of success. The tension continued to mount:. A month later the animosity was ended by Swedcn's offer to accept the exiles, along with two members of the De Facto cabinet, Amos lndey and Darius Maury, and Nicolaas Mese.t. Their immediate finilies would also be taken. PNG wasted no time in relieving itself of the unwelcome rebels: the day after the Swedish announcement they were put on a plane. The foreign minister declared optiristically that PNG hoped to see a new era of peaceful devc.lopment for the people of Irian Jaya. 0lewalc added: `My whole thinking is that by creating

:::Cue::nhde:rstt:nod;ne%pYeescoafnvt::Pys:i#:I:let:#;1:::otj]past;::V;::::¥ side by side'. In response, Indonesia despatched a delegation to begin

talks on a new five-year border agreement to replace the one that would expire in November. Just before the offlcials arrived, PNG arrested two West Papuan visitol.s from Holland, Max lrecuw and Tan Sek Tai, who had brought a sum estimated at 20 000 Dutch guilders to give to Rumkorem's agents in Madang. Both men were deported, an act that further pleased Jakarta. In June 1979, Indonesia's President Suharto visited PNG. The government greeted the general cordially; some of the public demonstrated loudly. One protestor was Utula Samana, probably PNG's most radical thinkers who within a few years would be the premier

|Onfdtohnce::.Posruti::to¥v:P]:pwraosv]ennccea;:ud|attti::I;:]nc:a:eL;:eendce]c:sfttE¥ communique releasedjointly with Prime Minister Somal.c: `The two leaders agreed that measures should be taken in accordance with the laws prevailing in their respective countries against elements misusing their respective territories by conducting any hostile act against the other,. During the last months of 1979 there were no major crossings. Indonesia's `smiling policy', while not devoid of one of a smilc's characteristics, mmely teeth, was less brutal than earlier. In December

the new Border Agreement was signed. As usual, there was no provisionforjointpatrols,butaJointBordercommitteewascstablish-

::r;eneihecn?°£:::a:,Poe::;:]eas'S:onrYt:aua:t;%rn°a€uacnedc[c°uS:tror:I::;?n£;rTdt: crossers and stipulated that such people would not be subject to normal immigration procedures providing that their movement was only temporary and not for the purpose of I.esettlement. Both

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governments agreed to discourage the construction of villages or other pcrmancnt dwellings within a five-kilometre zone on either side of the border. Article 8, covering Security, noted that: In a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and in order to maintaln and strengthen the existing good neighbourly and friendly relations, the I:wo Governments shall continue to actively co-operate with one another in order to pl:event the use of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the Border Area as sanctuary, staging areas or bases for any kind of hostile or illegal activities against the other.

Another significant point was the agreement for nationals of either country `to navigate freely throughout t:he boundary waters of the Fly River Bulge'. As the sole passageway to and from the Ok Tedi mine lay along the Fly, the matter involved such huge sums of money that a treaty was necessary in order to protect, as much as possible, PNG's future revenues from the project. Although signed in December, the agreement became operative in February 1980 and as a result the Pangu-led government had barely a month to enjoy whatever beneflts it offered. On 11 March, SirJulius Chan, now out of somare's coalition, moved a parliamentary vote of no confidence against the prime minister. When the numbers were counted, Chan had control of the government. Ir`_ accordance with the constitution, there was no need to go to the people. The two main

parties in the new coalition were Chan's PPP and Okuk's National

%ahr:Z:kTnhou;in?i:skfegcaii:;:atg:udte[Eratny,:;[aT±eFt;E],Sieras*[apy%[toh:ut8t foreign affairs portfolio. This plum fell to Noel Levi who, coming from the offshore province of New Ireland, was unlikely to have ethnic sympathy for border-dwelling clans. Chan's early months of power were characterised by a feeling of shock about his takeover. The OPM, however, felt things could be no worse than under Somare, a feeling which heightened when SirTulius sent troops to assist Vanuatu defeat the Santo secessionists. The OPM saw Chan's decision as an act of Melanesian solidarity. But its faith in him was short-lived. On a visit to Canberra, Chan prorised that troops would also be sent to crush any guerilla activities that were carried on inside PNG.

]%;rti£:e£:ofi;:I:e£;eon::[a:t;ba;:i:?e:nednt:ur:a€iac'in£Sj,[Wbj:'h°on£:ubr:dT;:? %ek::I::erv:rh::ha::rtkynto°wa::a:¥n¥::Skce:;?6ditionswcdonotintend At a state banquet injakarta a few days later, Chan praised Suharto as a `widely admired world leader' and called the border agreements a

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`high point' in the neighbours' relations. It would not be long until

Chan was taking a different view of Suharto and his Irian pohcies. Shortly after the prime minister returned from Indonesia, a group of 103 West Papuans, hungry and sick, came across the border. PNG said it could not afford to kee.p people who were fleeing only from econolric hardship. PNG made its stance even clearer when it raided the Port Moresby premises of OPM-supporter Henkjoku and a house in Madang. The NIO claimed it had intercepted a letter posted in Turkey by a mysterious `Mr George' who was a Soviet agent. The NIO said the letter was only the tip of the iceberg. In response, ]oku said that after 35 years of struggle, West Papuans were politically mature enough to run their own affairs. Of lriore serious concern were the Wabo and Yako camps, which still housed about 200 people, some classified as OPM supporters. The Wabo camp had been built by the government to house workers for the planned Purari hydro scheme. When the dam was scrapped, the huts were used to accomodate those refugees previously at Oksapmin, closer to the scene of Indonesian military activities. Both camps were adminstered by the UNHCR and both had been a scene of frequent clashes between the two main OPM fact:ions. To prevent further fights, the two groups had taken to living in separate `lines'. When the government announced its intention to close the camps, Tom Unwin remarked that the UNHCR welcomed the demise of `these expensive and undesirable places' but hoped it vyould lead to the absorption of the residents into the wider community. Foreign Minister Levi said that many were not bona fide refugees, despite having lived in the camps for two years, and might bc sent back across the border. But the government relented and announced the release of all the camp inmates except frve `security cases' who were to be sent to UNarranged exile abl:oad. One of these was Eliezer Bonay, the first Papuan governor of lrian]aya. Another was John Hamadi, a 30-yearold graduate who had worked in a language laboratory in lrian Jaya before fleeing in 1978. Shortly afterwards Hamadi would be fleeing again, this time from the PNG authorities when he failed to show up to take his paid ffight to Switzerland. An order for his arrest was issued and police said they believed him to be hidden amongst the Port Moresby student population. One local journahist managed to interview Hamadi before students whisked him away. The refugee said he had been told in the camp: `You are dangerous and your stay here would jeopardise the security of this nation'. Conflrming that Hamadi was being held on the UPNG campus, Students Council leader Gabriel Ramoi warned the government against trying to remove the refugee. The official response was to

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arrest Ramoi who was found guilty of harbouring Hamadi but released on a K100 bond. This threat did not help the authorities locate their quarry who, in 1984, remained at large in PNG. Gabriel Ramoi,

by then an MP for the ruling Pangu Pati, would still not speak of his whereabouts. At this time, mid-1981, emigres in PNG decided that more should be done to publicise the West Papua cause. After deliberation, they agreed on holding a Melanesian Sohidarity Week to include cultural events as well as a South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal. The aim of this mock court was to try Indonesia for its actions. Chosen to chair

the six-person tribunal was J3ernard Narokobi, a well-known PNG intellectual who had been a national courtjudgc. All other members were PNG-bc)in and included an MP, Tony Dais, lawyers and academics. An American civil rights lawyer, Hank di Suvero, was in:::oS£:scia[wpa:°gs]evceu=:i.eopportun[tytoappearinitsowndefencc.A `summons' was delivered to its embassy, headed: `In the case of the

People of West Papua, complaimnt, Vs. the Republic of Indonesia, defendant'. It advised that Indonesia was entitled to be represented by

;::I:;f];to:?;I::a:]:t8c:'edbuotnff]t£::t:::fna°ntdt°thaepB::rc'e:d::::°j::;i continue. The embassy ignored the demand and told the press it would have nothing to do with the tribunal. Many of PNG's leaders also con-

sdaeLT:heedytchoeuLpdrj9ecoc;:::Lgs:.tEee¥Lo;::I:ietfte,r.oCp°cun=t::=Pdre°dd:tctrt::ie::g accepting refugees. But Chan said the tribunal was being allowed because it was the right of the people to express themselves. Over two nights, the tribunal heard testimony from eleven witnesses, including the ex-governor, Bonay, only just released from refugee camp. The stories told were brutal and anti-Indonesian. After all testimony had been heard, the tribunal accused Indonesia of violating the lntcmational Bill of Human Rights and of genocide. It found that the Indonesian Government had `a case to answer' on twelve speciflc violations of intcmational law and announced that the

flndings would be forwarded to the UN Secretary-General for `appropriate action'.

Although it lacked jurisdiction, the tribunal received wide press coverage, both in PNG and overseas, and grcatly angered Indonesia.

i::°wnegenprt°ht:Sttsw¥e::u=tar::st°Tph¥yG;::]ihecoe:tej:::°tuorege::i::]r°a:: duringJ.ulius Chan's term as prime minister untilJakarta was actively supportlng the re-election of Michael Somare in 1982. The tribunal had directed the pubhic's attention once more to the

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border and Julius Chan wcnc there to take a look for himself. He

.:n:sgp;:fgcd::tsFc::oT:a:h&eg:s:fp:,:tr¥e:e:n:ebo:%ore:Itv:t:¥::tzar:£§[fir¥gaefi£:tdt[jeFbap;:i:: settlement of Wutung, the focus for many crossings over the years,

theA!tacrrt¥h¥av]}#t5h°a°n¥ae,tdretsh::;nhs[E:Chtet::dbe°r::::dmtireki:;i]ngsof

:i:t%rr€eerrp;:sP]seeyahn°dh;got;[Set:rie#:::£e:C::;1:e:::eti:d°ot:::I::ds:' Onepurposeiofchan'svisitwastoinspectthegovernment'sbordcr development programme, vali!ed in that year at around K2 million

i¥:I:°ci§;°f,¥![a:;e].S:]°;:c:,igd::::t;°::;§jii:t¥::::h:;P;;i,:;:itc:;::¥o:i:i;a;Sasi5:::C;:g;:f :F:g:::€irwwa:ut[hda't;[nni[omn:'s£::Oedxupc:nadft:rr?:na]sO::na:e:::Eh:roe:eww[taf

i:a:vfc%:a:]e!3C;fi#o:£tstai::`;#£:af€t]:c:;:v:i.|gatrg:e::°w%e;1:¥hp;Sitghe:a:tc¥;t:b:bdrs:enee:n[fin:8r

;:fi;sE%:rf;::n:;::ii:;:;;p:€;±¥:jd;;p:a;i:;;uj.;;:ai,i::in;;i3,,i:I;lei;I;ojnsf;:f:i;::;io;n:i:i amn]ge:d¥;:6o[:£;t:::c:ctvn,tg:o:p:e:st:u:a:,::1:::gce]3tp:I:i:€¥r::e5eNWGesTSsapdue:::: earlier classed as permissive residents, and deported them to Indonesia

forallegedinvolvementinOPMactivities.TwolcftfamiliesinPNG.

i::era::r[::s:]¥Fn:e;;os:11:x:;:I;p¥ri!;I,£!:¥e?£a¥;v:toeo:k=ju:t:n:'o:r£]:Smf:I:rnsdofi;:h: Levi had carried out his threat that anyone jeopardising PNG's national security would be met with stem government action. But hc insisted that the men would be weu treated: Indonesia had promised. Two weeks later. the minister said the men had been visited in

]Fauyrat£:::tzeayfo:ec;rgen:{E;:rcstgEo:opabned::;cnnd::bbseT:a;:::afftEaphpe¥;

:e::a:h:fi;C]{t:e:I;:::[nbt:a:kci:Ztt;;M:le:;a:¥;?eios::ie:rte::0:P:inn:#ics:#[[:npdg:rt:°f detention. Noel Levi was further encouraged by the govemment's uncovering

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of another plot aimed at smuggling foreign weapons to the guerinas. This time the arms were said to be of Cuban as well as Soviet origin. The alleged perpetrator, Hcnk.]oku, confirmed an approach to Cuban sources in Sydney. So wha-t, hc asked, if countries willing to assist West Papua were communist. When you are drc)wning, you don't care who rescues you. Another aspect of the plot, said the NIO, was the visit of student activist Daniel Kapi to North Korea. He hoped to find a safe way of bringing vyeapons into New Guinea. But there were no prosecutions and it is unlikely that any arms were forthcoming. Although the Chan coalition had been disunited, it maintained solidarity on foreign policy. Then Iambakey Okuk broke ranks and leaped to the defence of the West Papuans. In so doing he created the election issue which would bc synonomous with his name until the middle of 1982 when the coalition, much to lndonesia's relief, lost

offlce. Launching his campaign, Okuk said that 99 per cent of thinking people in PNG supported the OPM and that Indonesia should be ashamed of itself. He focused his attack on Transmigration, even writing articles in the foreign press about it. The scheme was `an inhumane act against the Melanesians', he wrote in the N4li.o#4/ T!.oncf,

predicting that more West I'apuans would cross seeking refugee status. Predictably, Indonesia was aghast at such criticism from PNG's deputy leader and it responded thl.ough its embassy newslet:ter. The slanging match continued, with Chan trying to mediate. He sought peace with Indonesia, but to keep his fragile coalition intact, he needed Okuk. In the latter regard, hisjob was made more difficult by the release of the new `Selcctivc Engagement' policy which spoke of `evcnts and conditions' in Irian as `internal affairs' of`Indonesia. The

HLt:£:LaL:£r::Ldd:sht::;:L]ts;£S::tpw¥cGn'Serte£::Icons:hLt?mwcL:?jati:eigatLbo°nua[ interest'. It was drafted largely by an Australian consultant, Dr Ted Wolfers of Macquarie University in Sydney. The govcrnment's own actions seemed 'to lend credence to Okuk's fears. In January 1982 it decided to evict the last refugees from the Yako camp and deport 29 of them to Indonesia. Initially, most refused to budge. They were then split up along faction lines, with the Rumkorem group being taken to the border at Wutung and Prai loyalists being left at Bewani. Both were told to find their way across the border. Two days later the former group had returned to PNG, a move that received unusual support from the conservative Pos£Cowri.cr: `They deserved better treatment from their fellow Melanesians . . . Their basic right to be informed of the Government's plan could have softened the impact of an unheralded officer arriving on the scene with bad news . . . Refugees, illegal or otherwise, deserve

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humane treatment . . . it appears the Yako 29 got a shabby dcal' (14

JanTu:I? i:93).after the refugees' return, more trouble flared With

;ii::;;y:shgup::%Ggc:::h;:ei:e:s:o:uter:chce¥w::;:1;]£h=:::t:fii¥=:;:cdo[¥iga:u;S:[fanf j#igoerdoefsfi?c£:[nsag]etha::1;it;;SivEhsea]edmtbhaesysywdeersecr£:i:t:;W:e=,eno:: possibly having the rank of colonel. During the same wcck, several refugee women and children in

yean:.Foom¥.er#euyn£[ae£3::::La:::utrha::eouc::;;:wNe£#egr]srio:;E::dantg

jet;u¥iis1:ltd:ai§a::ne:o!iei:i§j:aoi:;ir:ii:iu;:o:ii;sfijctie:r];S;:i:fei;::::;;ii:d;ae;:d::E;::]i:i :trrg°unfesnYs',ma#£:'igEe:i:ryn£:;db.enbaegmu:hmn°g',a£:;s:gb:h[actsjtsi:d`,T:rha:

¥d::ije;sE;:p!a::ie:i|::;::t:I;p#iE;:;ig;:i,:i::.:s;::y:;;eyiir;i:::;.iiir!fi;::i about the true situation with regard to the OPM. You are also aware that in almost every case the media distorted those press I.eleascs until

;hfyG¥::idai:to:tmuuT::eco[gFos:::::.apd'hrTst:,pc:atrheentiyedr[eag::t:eudnnt]hna: `undistorted' news.

While Okuk continued to insist that PNG should never `1ick anyone's boots', the government was doing its bestz to support

~:a:°E::::.geBsui]fi:::pp¥t;h:Sh:e8apm#:e:S;tnhge[yHd;itfi:Ckua]:.gs:[emhbne: camp, Indonesian troops crossed into PNG several times. To make

Faanttt::soT[::sde;daahtet];ceo#::ec::;rig:tthhoeh[:i:scs:omnT7ankd:I;n:]r::.;a;e8:

!r:ae¥tcsh¥e:t:e:ai::t];§e;lit:d¥o:::°:::y§;:nar{:as¥adi:;It:;S;°si¥|a::Sj:iSrae:i::[s:I: ar:::nsaof,t::etr:e]£O:tag:£'t::;eavseeii£|::[nEeerpetdcowme]s:8r:v5rr.o€i:::t¥nodf :ra:::]dn:tr:]uxgtoa]dv£:::g:apdeefi3rehf:o]:::d],:gfe¥Fsbeep¥:n:;5neas:::+ee:

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nineteen Papuans back across the border. Minister Levi was angry at last, complaining that people were subjected to physical threats on PNG soil. Indonesia was not concerned: the incident occurred on the day that vote counting began in PNG's election and it felt sure that Chan would lose. Furthermore, it wanted him to, especially as this would reduce Okuk's prominence. Jakarta made no secret of its auegiance. On 29 June, the newspaper of the ruling Golkar group, Sw4ra Karya, ran an article praising Somare and predicting that his victory would improve relations between the neighbours. This apparently meant that ABRI provocations would cease, for at the same time an al.my helicopter had repeatedly buzzed the mission which earlier hosted Gen. Santoso. Behind the scenes, PNG was aware of more ABRI activity. As a senior defence force officer told a seminar in Port Moresby, the Australian-run signals station at Vanimo was intercepting Indonesian communicat:ions and had broken the codes. The location of ABRI troops was capable of being detected. Finally, ]ulius Chan's patience broke and he moved against both his antagonisers, the OPM and Indonesia. The former he sought to combat by changing border patrols from 30-man detachments to 5-man tinits with a radio. They were to be prepared to apprehend illegal crossers. He even investigated whether the soldiers could be sworn in as special constables to give them powers of arrest. They could not. Indonesia he confronted in writing, drafting a frank letter to Prcsidem Suharto (Appendix Ill). Chan noted that relations had deteriorated from a high point in 1980, mostly because of unauthorised crossings by armed Indonesian nationals. He also protested about the Swaya K4ry4 article. While couched in diplomatic language, the letter was PNG's most direct response to Indonesia in its history. However it was never read by Suharto. Without Chan's knowledge, an offlcer of the Department of Foreign Affairs told the author, the letter was destroyed on the orders of departmental head Pauhias Matanc. Instead ctfgoing to]akarta in a diplomatic bag, the letter went into t:he dcpartment's shredder. Matane, like Indonesia, had felt certain that Chan's days were numbered and when the election results came through, he was right. The well-organised Pangu Pati won a landslide and was set to form a

govcmment in its own right. During the transfer period, West Papuans remained in the public spotlight. One incident involved ten deportccs who fled from the Vanimo wharf while awaiting a boat that was to take them back to jayapura. When an army boat bearing the Indonesian flag appeared, the men ran away, eluding guards. Foreign priests at t:he lnission which had lodged the Papuans were charged with aiding illegal immigrants. They were defended by their bishop, Frjohn Etheridge, who not many years earlier had been an clcctrician

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in Adelaide. He has since become a key figure in the northern border area.

When Michael Somare resumed leadership after a two year absence, he hoped for i rapid peace with Indonesia. But ic was not to be. The next two years were more tense than any period since independence.

The tl.oubles began in late August, 1982 when OPM's Seth Rumkorcm, with a small party, began the voyage by motorised outrigger towards Vanuatu. They were good seamen and encountered few navigational prc>blems, although strong seas nearly caused the canoe to capsize. After progressing eastwards, resupplying on the way, they decided to put into Rabaul to restock for the long ocean leg. PNG authorities, who had been monitoring them, decided to pounce. A

police boat intercepted the party and escorted it into port, charged with illegal entry. The new gQvemment made it clear that the men should receive heavy sentences, even be handed over to Indonesia. When the case came to coul.t, a Public Solicitor lawyer argued that they were bona fide voyagers en route to another country and should

i:da¥:?:?etn°tL[::€tfi:flat::#hrepn°:leo::Lr]:¥L£La°dm±gaeF:hr:haer:'e:?a#:X the Rabaul magistrate discharged the group from custody, the courtroom audience cheered. The government announced, testily, that it would appeal. Later, not wishing to lose face twice, it dropped the idea.

ot#c:*::Ta,ss£:#¥sbfer:aemmee:::e]:I::I::]rreesctea.:::ftsg.;fiAssoufpcp[::i:sr::: raised K500 for them, and the UNHCR assumed responsibility for

fig:I:ggtuheer'[;1:I:ae::r°.:Kh?s°:aoarg°a:tdh.saRnud::,°ieaT'a]:,:ikjndga;°]tnhitEE PNG press. He stressed the great contrast between life in PNG and lrian, a difference caused by `only a line on the map'. As they waited for a country to accept them, Rumkorem's group grew bored with their existence. The weeks became months, and then nearly a year. Pacific countries declined to accept them; Vanuatu, because Rumkorcm would not drop his claim to bc head of the whole OPM. So did many European ones. In November 1983 Rumkorem was granted temporary asylum by Greece and he left PNG the following month, wearing a donated pair of long trousers. The

government breathed a sigh of relief. PNG's new foreign minister, Rabbie Namaliu, suffered particular embarrassment over the Rumkorem fiasco. Namaliu came from Rabaul and so his own constituents saw daily evidence of the minister's problems in handling Indonesia. Usually, the refugee question did not have such impact so far from the border.

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Namaliu, like his predecessor, Levi, travelled to Jakarta sooll ,1fto`` coming into office. Back in Port Moresby, he directed his boL'tlel' officers t:o assist in a new operation against the OPM. The chos¢I] target was a group of illegal immigrants in the bc)rderjungle. Hc sai(I they were armed OPM members. The plan, known as P4i.#j.in Mi/r//A!

(`hunting the cassowaries' in Pidgin) involved over one hundred men. But the `cassowaries' escaped, apparendy tipped off by sympathetic villagers. Troops were ordered to destroy their huts and food gardens. The operation was called `the biggest mess-up ever' by a foreign affairs official.

One `cassowary' who slipped through the net was Fred Pieger, the deportee who had been sent back to lrian and later escaped. PNG now believed he would try to rendezvous with his wife and children, who were on Manus Island. Pieger was flnally caught in June 1984. Somare hoped that the future cfflciency of such operations would be improved by the replacement of the defence commander, Brig.-Gen. Gago Mamae, by a sometime Pangu politician, Col. Ken Noga, then the military attache in Canberra. Pangu's leaders felt that Mamae had not moved against the OPM with appropriate zeal. Noga would be more responsive to political directives. Like the force's first commander, Ted Diro, he was an action man. At:tention was distracted briefly from the border by violence and intrigue in Port Moresby. In December, a 25-year-old West Papuan highlander named Simon Allom murdered an Indonesian embassy official. The victim, Meinard Poluan, 'was the driver for the Indonesian military attache, Col. Ismail, suspected by PNG of being an intelligence agent. Allom was caught at once and details of the case leaked out. The driver, too, was said to be a spy whose brief entailed surveillance of West Papuans in PNG. Allom had been one of his lielpers, recruited after the c.losure of the Wabo camp. Poluan was stabbed to death inside the embassy's residential compound. The case produced bad publicity for Indonesia, suggesting that in PNG it was spying, and in Irian Jaya it was behaving so cruelly that it produced unbalanced Papuans like Allom. The case was heard before the chief justice, Sir Buri Kidu. In testimony. Allom said his OPM activities had led to his imprisonment in Sorong gaol in 1977. One of his gaolers was the decc.ased, an intelligence officer. Allom claimed that during his incarcei.ation in Sorong he was abused,

g:x±[:all;¥aass;::t]e€;:±cTeatg.eLoes]seae]£jEeahfi::LsceeenLE:¥a:£efi::qaTseon:X OPM supporter, killed by the Indonesians; his mother disembowelled while she was pregnant and thrown into a fire; his two sisters raped by soldiers and, then sticks pushed through their anus and left to die. His two brothers were also murdered. He claimed to have

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witnessed bombings of villages. In fact the whole tally of events which Allom said had occurred at his home village, Akimuga, near the Freeport mine, appeared to conflrm, in both timing and physical description, accounts of the massacres given in OPM documents (Chapter 2). Prompted by these things, he struck back. Allom said in his testimony: I stabbed him with the knife, which penetrated straight to his liver. I

g::[bneai:iga::,tti:11:€te:i::da.Thdep,:L[;:,t:acmkehiofi:tt.°ri:ecai,gehdt,S#ae£:,da:£a fell down to the flooi.. I wcnc to . . . cut the telephone line but . . . I

saw Meinard get up and walk out and I left the telephone hine and followed him. I kicked him on his backside and hc fell down the steps . . . hc was not dead yet and Ijumpcd down and held him by his hair. I stabbed him with the knife and it penetrated between his shoulder and neck. I bit him on the neck . . .

Allom had then fled arid Poluan died soon afterwards. Delivering judgement, Kidu C.j. ruled out provocation as a defence, saying that the intervening years should have given time for the accused's passions to cool. Yet his verdict, guilty of premeditated murder, did not result in a life sentence for Allom, but fifteen years hard labour. Allom's ,counsel was Bernard Narokobi, who had chaired the Human Rights Tribunal two years earlier and was himself said to be a target of the Indonesian spy ring. Narokobi felt that the 15

year sentence was harsh, given Allom's background. Expatriate judges considcl.ed that the sentence was too lenient. Indonesia agreed, but did little except complain to its friends amongst the Australian diplomats. Early in 1983, the refugee problem arose again. This time, accord-

ing to the government, the number crossing was about a thousand. As usual, an increase in Indonesian military activity was believed to be a reason. Church officials inside Irian said that food shortages had also precipitated the exodus. `Shcer neglect' by Indonesian authorities was believed to have resulted in villagers from remote areas walking hundreds of kilometres along the bush tracks. Tony Siaguru, acting for Rabbie Namaliu, insisted that the refugee flight was Indonesia's affair and downplayed it. Siaguru had actually chosen not to offend Indonesia by suggesting that food shortages could have occurred: he

::sss]enrspfsesreess:::6Sfunin:i]:%::cbeuprj,e,£'anggery*;a:iaa]£t::nbgo:fne; from one stand of sago palms to another, seeking food. Then the road incursions were spc)tted.

In April, a PNG survey helicopter photographed a stretch of the southern border. When the photos were inspected, PNG discovered

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that construction of a section of the Trams-Irian Highway, heading north from Merauke, had entered its territory in two places. A third

E;isii:gyww:a:sin|:;t`,:::e¥cr.:?d:3:;ek!m=:ut!i:s.k3ep:I,:::;:o:fd:afa::kdet:i;:I: entered by 4.5 kin. Foreign Secretary Matanc showed the pictures to the Indonesian embassy and requested that road construction stop. Indonesia said it could not provide an early response from officials in lrian. This seemed odd, given that the embassy's newsletter had once

Spfuk:tnan°effie£°tt;][#e;I::tk¥e;onr:°;:e¥::::;yscahnedd±i?clap:reae.t[ngand raised the road incursions. The PNG public, he pointed out, was in an uproar over the trespass. He said later: It was a difflcult negotiation because, from tlie start, the Indonesian delegation was not convinced that tlic road had actually crossed into

:r¥s:i:;rs:£t#c¥p:aE:::i:neds:hmeemd¥tfat;TE::tofrcapbhe;;:::dTfg:Cot:I: actual crossings. The next day, with two technical advisers, the

:[F:a;:g:t:I:jb¥j;:v=*fi3cfrd¥1]::#t:I:aa:ofa:tyo;;§a:]¢:;ap::vC::i;g:I:et;*e5koc:; n°As°nJ¥];enftTh:1:::Ccers6s:iuntg£:ntdhicee;dedtowardsMeraukelaskcdthe chairman, `Well Mr. Chairman, are you now convinced?' He said as he looked back at the winding road for the last time, .Not yet until we have carried out a satellite rcading'.7

::tor::osuet:ertahLem:I:::;fi::c[t:g:sne:;fatr°o:rdc.gr£:;ih:C:°asssL:tgt:Labnudtcad8r::

Jcax:satnecds:ne:hg:nse;:sm¥;Oarheaa:8O#itntB:'c]:#rwdipdat£:eesr]digFsgur|:aur:g apologise to PNG, by which time any goodwill that existed for

IEdo°wne£]:ai:b:e¥k:nhgadfobree#s:amg:rde..EEd::ir]:i]::dht:ebT:|gs`"£u#L"es: backwardstopleaseourWesternneighbours,theyappeartodelightin kiching his feet away'. Many Papua New Guineans felt that road construction so close to

;h:e:i:i;;::¥g::ntc:O#:a¥sc±s;fez;t:wi:e:s:i:::c:ssiaiay::aan:t];n:t:e|:}e;netnu:e]:;rt:;; personnel were expatriates and they soon came into coiiflict with other

::dne;::regxu::tgrj;t£Syi:dt::e¥a[?I.dforba:td[en:t:::sT:;:Sue:di#TtE: NIO was the victor and fl.om 1983 it became the body responsible for

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border intclligcnce. In many peoples' eyes, it had poor credentials for the job. During a visit to lrian by a delegation ofprovincial premiers, a suspicious Australian member of the party was repc>rted to Indonesian ofricials. The man, Bob Welsh, was detained for questioning. As

it turned out, however, Welsh was an NIO agent who had been sent with the delegation t:o report on their movements, as well as the situation in lrian. His main quarry was said to be the premier of Morobe, Utula Samana, a staunch Melanesian nationalist. It was Samana who tuned Welsh over to Indonesia. Although Mr Somare said there had been nothing covcrt in Welsh's presence, the head of the NIO, Charles Ali, called the affair a `grave error', which in publicity terms it was. Despite popular opinion, the government strove to improve relations with Indonesia. Pursuing this goal, it reverted to the familiar if unsuccessful strategy of direct discussions with OPM leaders. Unlike

in earlier times, PNG's officials were not well acquainted with OPM's field commanders. They knew that]ames Nyaro and others would not even leave thejunglc for talks in Port Moresby. Instead they invited the stalwart Nicolaas jouwe to represent the Pemka faction. He met with PNG leaders, including Somarc, and heard the usual request that OPM must abandon its struggle, or at least stay out of PNG. Even if he had agreed, jouwe did not have sufficient authority to cnfoI.ce such a decision. He returned to Holland. Next to arrive, also from Holland, was Dick Kereway, considered to be one of Rumkorem's supporters in Europe. Kercway did not even have the chance to meet PNG's leaders. When his luggage was inspected at]ackson's airport, he was discovered to be carrying cartridge cases, cordite, instl.uctions for making ammunition and a supply of West Papuan leaflets. He, too,

returned to Holland. PNG abandoned its hopes of gaining OPM's co-operation. West Papuans' opposition to Indonesia was expressed clearly when

Dr Mochtar visited PNG in August, on his way through the Pacific currying support .for lndonesia's case in the UN's East Timor debate. During his stay, Mochtar arranged a special mccting with ex-Irian residents. The confrontation was mediated by foreign affairs officcrs, and English the language used. When Mochtar asserted that people in Irian were allowed to criticise govcmment policy, the editor of the Tl.mcs a/PNG, FranzJoku, responded: `Yes, and those who have done so are now six feet underg[ound'. It seemed that every development in PNG's relationship with Indonesia was somehow negative. Even Somare's cabinet were capable of damaging things. When the defence minister, Epel Tito, went to Aust:ralia in late 1983, he spoke on national radio about a meeting with his opposite number, Cordon Scholes, and the foreign minister,

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Bill Hayden. He had warned them about lndonesia's aggression, saying he was `absolutely sure' it would attempt a takeover of PNG within twenty years. When asked the Australians' response, Tito replied: They said I was mad. And are you?

certainly not.8

0n his return to Port Moresby, Tito was told to exchange his portfolio with Boyamo Sali, who held the less controversial position of media minister. A year later, during Sali's first official trip to Canberra, he too criticised Indonesia, saying that PNG was angry that it had received no apology for the destruction of food gardens by ABRI troops in mid-1984. But when he returned home, he was not censured by Somai.e, for by then, PNG indeed was angry with Indonesia. The soldie[s in question, numbering 53, almost au

Jc:V£;C:ea'me:icrseudh:=3:,J::5e±9m84;::;€ccaF*.grTefitedi:sT:g:I:rd°e:?di8 thatched huts burnt to the ground and, the destruction of 10 coconut trees, 171 banana plants, 109 bctel-nut palms and other tree crops.

Soc:']£grdFyorec:%:girl::stcearrvTotE¥[rBnaa]Lessa]:ntFr:esoa[g:er|sea::de:;:;

|nudt:::ssaaT[rhaat;O;of::ekds:Z`t?iaakba::at.dfdnn::fii:]sa:opnr:.t:%ewf:v]eo€r::g every means', the new minister complained, `and have failed'. His remark was an apt summation of PNG's diplomatic record with Indonesia since the first of an eventual 10 000 refugees had left lrian the previous February. And it would I.emain so for the whole of 1984. The largest refugee exodus in Irian's history began after the OPM's unsuccessful attempt to raise the Morning Star flag outside the

provincial assembly building in jayapura. When Papuan troops deserted from Battalion 751, taking their weapons with theln, ABRI launched an extensive operation against suspected OPM supporters. According to a Papuan official in the government, many households in the capital and nearby Sentani were entered by troops and searched. No warrants were shown. The same official claimed that motor vehicles were commandeered from the few Papuans who owned them. If they refused, he said, they faced arrest. The operation's prime target was the educated people whom Indonesia classed as the core of the OPM. By late February, 245 of such people had crossed into PNG, some travelling by foot, others in outrigger canoes. Like refugees in other parts of the world, they brought few possessions and expressed fears of returning. Most said they would never be happy until West Papua's freedom was achieved. Later, this same desire

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would be expressed by many of the rural refugees who were described as `simple villagcrs' by PNG officials. Clearly the fleeing Melanesians matched the usual international

criteria for refugees, namely having a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, political opinions and so on.

Yet PNG, hoping to deter further refugees, declared them to be `illegal' or `non-traditional' border crosscrs and announced that all of

the 84 males in the first wave would be charged under the Migration Act. The government said PNG had never signed the UN's Convention and Protocol on refugees and so felt it had no legal obligations. Initially the men pleaded guilty to the charge, but after being granted legal aid from the public solicitor, they changed their minds. Their lawyer felt the arrests were unconstitutional; insiders alleged that

political pressure had been put on the police. This was denied, unconvincingly, by Inspector Billy Ni. Prior to appearing in court, the refugccs said they feared that death awaited them if they went back to lrian. Some spoke of i `blacklist:' of names which Indonesia was concentrating on. Others said the 'reprisals had been indiscriminate. Yance Hembring, the OPM commander from Genyem, alleged that ln Nimboram area, Indonesian commandoes burn down houses, shot domestic animals at will and raped women and children under nine years-`,

The court hearing, conducted by different magistrates in moming and afternoon sessions, was a curious affair. While all.the refugees

were found guilty, only those from the morning session received gaol terms (of six weeks). The rest were given suspended sentences. Apparently the second magistrate had been less responsive to the wishes of PNG's leaders. Certainly public sympathy favoured the West Papuans. Aftel. all, they had declared themselves to the authorities, not tried to elude custody. Soon, those who were gaoled went on a hunger strike, while the public solicitor launched appeals. In less than a fortnight, the dctainecs were out on bail. They were put in a holding camp near Vanimo. Later, they were moved to a second site, named Blackwater because of the polluted nature of the water supply. It was an area for which traditional landowners had no use. There, as a UNHCR official observed, the West Papuans grouped themselves in accordance with their ethnic origins and, to an extent, their occupational backgrounds. Supporters of different OPM blocs hivcd together, unHke in ea.rlier refugee camps where the split had been along factional lines. This indicated a new unity in the resistance. Indeed, both main factions had been involved in the planned uprising in February.

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:::E;::gdorf:;a?s::fi:::I:a[n=dcr:i:r:::c;yesE:,:r!,::;,£::I::ac,hfd:e:I::dgopnksa:: delegation. On his return, Matane made his displeasure known to

:affidc:ae[:;I:sat::dtoo£[:c:::I:ge::tnhs]:[ev:Oprr::leo:e#:tnhs'oE;ys;]rdo'v]pn¥g °afl£[acr]taa]:'F::tnhecr:fthwe}°h:d:::,esteeT::aTeor:[dytt°w:e[gr:aciaetsee°h:db:tan]:t°of PNG in recent times, and these were common criminals. If PNG

::ieevs:d6::ttT[:rgefrea°t:ieehaapdpgaerde'd`ttom:;:ri::¥.:::hfeu]i]:::I::t*ea]: the presence of two senior Indonesian intelligence officcrs, posing as minor bureaucrats.

5hi#:h:o;#.;c;;;e;:i;ills:::h:et:;{jft;{„;::c¥¥g:e§:o:;¥n:n:n::t:o:;I:;ne:ttr:aae:;:;:;:i;::a::t could be made. Michael Somare even offel.ed to act as an `honest

broker' between Indonesia and the OPM, an approach that drew no

fee:Spa::?faocEnJeasI::tac.ufusria=,tlraard::::::etgr;::eodn:s!f,soffertohe,p PNG's hopes of co-operating with Indonesia faded further in late

#;C[Fcdwbhyetnhct¥%A:tcr%gshcc:r]S5±a=efrntco°5far8:gdt:re:teedF:gp[:;:oe:: overtheGrecnRiverpatrolpost.Govemmentofficcrsatthepostfled

gu:t:r:t:h::n:a:sfh::§utai=:toa::I:hd%[e:¥;oui;tntntoeuw:¥::e:I::1:sp:o:n;s:E[;pofip:e::ii: planes had buzzed Grccn River, for there were no OPM guerillas in

;:]3oooan:e;sa]::g;;+t:£voe:r:I:;:ev¥o]]n¥:et:c::REf;::jargu::tr::t:::g;¥h:pr;:::§t:etd¥a:: 5::¥:t°€::n[nadd°vn,::]dano#::::;?.tri]hn]'sngwea¥ercco[::r[anr;r£:on:i:h::[r¥:: agreement. The incident later drew several explanations: it was a sonic

§h:¥:G:h:aia:;:1;gal:tcih[;t;s:;:Ca:ii::e;di;ira§j;ip:t;;::n:I:is:a±d::y[fi¥t;:¥a!i:s:;°:!e±ai¥i; ;:Xalhg[is:fit;h:e:¥i'[!:=i*;t;a§ii:ebie¢:I;S::¥b::s§!S;fifiist°¥n]j:::;:;]S;::=P;°;:I:t;]c:ui;¥jj known to be an intelligence officer. Later, Ismail returned to Jakarta

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-recaued, said PNG, expelled said lsmail in an interview with Te/ilj)a magazine. It was clear, however, that PNG had made ever.y effort to minimise the embarrassment to Indonesia. After the crosslng, it had pressurecl the local media to kill the story, an attempt that worked with the government-run radio network but failed with the independent newspapers. It seemed t:hat thejets ivere not the only ABRI activity in lrian, for more Papuans kept appearing at PNG's border posts. Some were urban refugees, but many more were village people and th?y told stones of military harassment. Several months later, refugees in nine camps inside PNG were intcl.viewed by members of a dclcgation from the IC]. Tlie party included a Dutch priest, Fr L. Van der Berg, who had been a missionary in IrianJaya for many years. In the Green River

camp the IC] was told by two men from Umuaf, in lrian, that Indonesian troops had killed eight of their number who had remained behind, as punishment for those who had left. A young man.said the soldiers had later destroyed the houses, gardens and animals. In the Blackwater camp the IC] also heard allegations c>f Indonesian brutality. One refugee at Blackwater spoke of having left Irian in 1978, and returning in 1982 under a promise of safety. He said he had been put in

gaol for three months. For the first fortnight he was beaten constantly. He vomited blood for two days after being kicked in the ribs. He was also beaten with rifle butts. The man feared the same treatment if he went back now. Another man said that his brother, an OPM member, had been caught by soldiers, trussed to a pole like a pig, and shot. Alarmed by the refugee flow, PNG sent Rabbie Namaliu to Jakarta for talks with Indonesia's leaders. Sir julius Chan said the meetings should have bccn held in Port Moresby; the problem was not PNG's fault. Namaliu had two days of tense discussions, during whi`ch he met the ABRI chief, Gen. Murdani, who took his customary hard line. The foreign minister later reported to parliament that while PNG regarded Irian]aya as an internal affair, it was concerned at the way the province was being administered. In his absence, the acting minister, Tory Siaguru, had said that PNG should seek assurances that Papuans in the border area were not being deprived of their land by the Transmigration programme. Together, the two miristers' statements constituted the strongest official criticisms of Indonesia since the heyday of lambakey Okuk. Observers felt that PNG may have become emboldened in its dealings with Indonesia because of the publication in Australia of some leaked cabinet documents, the `Strategic Basis' papers, which indicated that Australia would defend PNG in the (unlikely) event of an at:tack by Indonesia. After copies of the N4CI`o#a/ Tl.#!cs newspaper

reached Port Moresby, government sources said, PNG's leaders felt

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heartened that they might not have to confront Indonesia alone.'° When Mr Namaliu addrcsscd PNG's parliament, now sitting in a fine new building, he confirmed the huge increase in the refugee flow. Since February, the number of `illcgal border crossers' had jumped from a few hundred I:o 6800. They were coming across all parts of the border and, unlike the urban people of the original flow, who now totalled about 1000, most were rural villagers. A month later, when the number of refugees had reached 8000 and was still mounting, Mr Namaliu said that the border crossers would soon start returning home. Meanwhile, Indonesia would give PNG about K22 000 worth of relief funds. At the time, the amount seemed substantial but, as the refugees kept coming, it was soon gone. Although Indonesia had refused t:o allow international monitoring of any repatriation, officials from PNG's embassy inJakarta would, Mr Namaliu said, be permitted to visit lrian and ensure that people were not punished for their decision to flee. He did not explain how the small PNG mission, few of whom spoke Indonesian, could have peformed such a task. The refugees themselves wcrc telling officials and church workers that they would not return until they were sure that ABRI's operation had been called off. Their fears were compounded, rather than allayed, when Gen. Murdani announced that the border crossers were viewed as `criminals' and would be treated accordingly. Also ignored in Namaliu's statements, and then denied by him, were claims in the press that PNG had bccn trying to deter refug€cs by denying t:hem food supplies. The prospect of starvation was raised by the Bishop of Vanimo, John Ethcridge, as carly as March while a bricfing paper given to Mr Namaliu in August also warned of the possibility. A senior official revealed that the health department, which favoured food and medical relief, was at odds with foreign affairs. However Mr. Namaliu felt the crossers had been in poor shape for some time and PNG should not have to make up for Indonesia's apparent neglect of people in remote areas. According to him, only the more political, urban crossers needed regular aid; the mral majority would soon be going back. When 100 refugees from rural arcas died of starvation-associated illnesses, ire government was acutely embarrassed and decided to restore food and medical aid, helped by foreign support. PNG sought to explain the refugees' deaths as `a series of serious -

but not necessarily intentional - misjudgements, unforseeable difficulties - both natural and man-made ~ and a tragic failure to get information to the Central Govemmcnt quickly enough'. " This was questioned by Brian Brunton, an Australian-turned-PNG citizen, who was professor of law at the University of PNG. Brunton investigated the govel-nment's actions prior to the deaths and concluded that

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its policy was deliberate. The refugee population realised how few official friends it had.

Popejohn Paul 11 visited PNG as part of an Asian-Pacific tour which included an inspection of refugee camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border. In Thailand, he expressed his compassion for the mostly non-Christian lndochinese; in PNG, he declined the opportunity to visit refugee camps where church services were a part of daily life and where his own Catholic priests had become active in relief work. Petitions from refugee groups did not sway him, nor did a wellput)licised ccasefire by the OPM. Like western countries such as Australia and the US, he was apparently willing to condemn commuiiist countries, but ignore an exodus from a nation which belonged to the `free world'. The West Papuans were greatly disappointed. They were also alarmed by PNG's continuing insistence that it had no international obligations to harbour them. The government said that as it was not a sigmtory to the UN's Convention and Protocol on refugees, it need not offer sanctuary to border crossers, even those who seemed in the greatest fear of their lives, such as the first wave fromjayapura. The UNHCR urged the Somare government to accept its help, arguing that the body had solved refugee problems in other parts of the world, especially Affica, amidst tensions between hostile neighbours. Since World War 2, it said, the UNHCR had repatriated or resettled 14 million refugees, making it one of the UN's most successful organs. It would not be a criticism of Indonesia to invite an expanded UNHCR.participation. PNG also heard the argument that in accol.dance with customary intcrna.tional law, even non-signatories to the UN's rcfugce charter were expected to adopt the policy of non-rcfoulcment (forcible return) of refugees, allowing them san€tuary until a solution could bc found. Thailand and Malaysia, for example, had never signed the pacts, but they allowed lndochinese to enter their countries. PNG was not impressed by the argument, nor

by the suggestion that as a member of the UN it had endorsed a set of guidelines in 1980 governing refugee repatriation criteria. These included the right of refugee communities to send observers to their homeland to inspect prevailing conditions; and the need for international monitoring.12

In reply, PNG simply criticised the UN for being an ineffective body. Within two months, when the refugee flow toppcd 10000, PNG would ask the UNHCR to help cope with what had become a major problem. $600000 of its funding would come from a special cash grant from Australia, allc)cated to the refugees in November to provide aid while they `await voluntary repatriation'. If the government was turning its back on the refugees, many individuals were sympathetic, as was the media. In Port Moresby, a

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newly-formed West Papua Refugees Welfare Society received strong support. Michael Somare's daughter, Bertha, organised fund raising in schools. Whenever the government hinted that refugees would be sent back, aga.inst their will if necessary, journalists wrote of the impending moves. Appeals streamed in from local and overseas observers. A suggestion that the PNG military would enforce the I.cpatriation alarmed many people. It smacked of. the approach being adopted on the other side of the border. The OPM, too, benefitted from the media attention. By May, joumahists from both PNG and Australia were allowed access to the refug.ee camps. While staying in Vahimo, several managed to arrange meetings with OPM guerillas in the nearby bush. The most publicised interview was conducted bet:wecn ABC-TV's `Four Comers' and OPM lcaderjames Nyaro. The PNG government believed it had been held on PNG soil, and insisted that it not go to air. If it did, Mr Somare threatened, the ABC would not be allowed to station a correspondent in PNG. The matter generated much controversy in Australia, with ABC staff insisting that the interview had been obtained legitimately, if covertly, and ABC management asserting that representation should not bejeopardised. Several years earlier, the network had been banned from Indonesia because of critical coverage of East Timor and another ousting would mean no direct news from a second neighbouring country. In the end, management backed down, but not before ABC chairman, Ken Myer, had offended Somare by alleging that PNG was a less democratic country than Australia. After the programme was screened with the Nyaro segment intact, PNG announced that correspondent Sean Dorney would not be granted an extension of his work permit, even though he had no involvement with the programme. It regretted the decision, as Domey was married to a Papua New Guinean and was considered, in the words of Mr Somare, a friend of PNG. Domey's last dispatch, flled in September, should have been more embarrassing to PNG than the Nyaro interview. It noted that Tomy Gcrard, an OPM commander in Irian's southern area, had consolidated guerina activity in recent times and was now communicating with the Port Moresby press through letters posted by his followers in Kiunga, near the Ok Tedi mine. Even PNG's friends, many of whom were Australian, had to recognize that the OPM was a crucial factor in lrian politics. When a leading Australian opposition parliamentarian, the conservative Michael Hodgman, visited the refugee camps injune he concluded that Australia could no longer turn a bhind eye to the situation in Irian ]aya. For several months, PNG and Indonesia spoke 9f an imminent return of t:he refugees. Each time it was raised, individuals and groups

Indonesia's secret war protested. In Port Moresby, university students demonstrated; from abroad, the UNHCR, Amnesty International and parliamentarians asked for a humane policy to be followed. One of the strongest

appeals came from Warren Dutton, another naturalised Papua New Guinean, who represented a Western Province clcctorate in the parliament. He had been ]ulius Chan's police minister. Dutton reminded Mr Namaliu of his frequent assurances that people would not be repatriated until they had been interviewed and their status determined. He said it would not be possible to interview all of them before the end of 1984. Sensitive to such pleas, which had the support of many of his own ministers, Mr Somare continued to seek assurances from Jakarta. Despite reports in the Indonesian press that Irianese were returning home `in droves', there was almost no movement. One refugee to return was Magdalene Hamadi, whc) made a brief visit for her grandfather's funeral. When she returned to PNG, she spoke of continuing military harrassment. Confirming this, more people left lrian. Groups of 500 and 200 crossed in September. Said one cl.osser: I had to make the grave decision to lead my people away from our traditional land, into 'PNG. Thejoumey was done in secret and it took a week. We scavenged for food along the way and avoided being noticed by `red berets' of the Indonesian army. My people and I fled from our ancestral home because of increased Indonesian military prcscnce and their brutal process of colonisation that threatened to wipe out our cultural identity as a Melanesian people. The hard times began in 1977 ..,. with the brutal killing of one of our teachers. Many pcoplc fled into the bush. Some were caught, harassed and killed. Others heard reports of their villages being destroyed, along with food gardens. There wcrc always stories about the Javanese transmigrants; church dcsccrations, shootings and disappearances. The OPM started going from village to village urging us to join the resistance i'n struggliiig for the complete independence of West Papua.u

A provincial official from West Sepik visited]ayapura and was told secretly by I'apuan bureaucl.ats that PNG should `not send a single refugee back'. He heard stories that coastal villages near the border had been shelled by Indonesian navy ships, while in other villages, `thc inhabitants, from animals and young babies to the oldest person, had been massacred'. The refugees' feelings were made clear to Indonesia when a joumalist from Temj7o was allowed to visit the Blackwater camp. Susanto Pudjomartono arrived at the camp, with Foreign Affairs officials, to see the urban refugees waving Morning Star flags and singing the West Papuan anthem. When they realised he was from Indonesia, the refugees threatened him and chased him away. He was

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F=h:£atr:::;::s`:i:asf:oi;a'Fen:3v?'ifea:rtc,iuaAie:i:otgp:e,::;o:.oicl:,::I.,fl,:%::I:t! siam Council of Churches did not even manage to enter Blackwatcr, for it was told in Vanimo that the refugees had refused to meet the six

members. The group went home. In August, 1984 it appeared that repatriation plans were nearing completion. Mr Namaliu said that PNG was only waiting for a written assurance from Indonesia that refugees would not be

punished. Dr Mochtar had given a verbal promise and, as soon as it was formalised, movement could begin. PNG insisted that the army give a pledge too, but with Gen. Murdani still calling the border crossers `crimimls', it was slow in coming. By September, Mochtar secmcd to have overcome the opposition of the military. He delivered the pledge to Namaliu in New York, where the t:wo ministers were attending the UNGA. Although PNG was relieved, it, and Mr Namaliu particularly, had by now lost patience with Indonesia and chosen to denc>unce it to the UN Assembly. Mr Namahiu's speech, which unlike Chan's letter of complaint to Jakarta two years earlier did not finish up in his department's shredder, complained about lndonesia's lack of response to recent protests: On several occasions in recent years, we have protested to the lndonesiam Government against what wc believed to be violations of our territorial sovereignty. Thcsc violations have inclu ded the intrusion into our territory by rilitary aircraft, destruction of a village near the bc>rder and the road construction of a major highway at four points into Papua New Guinea . . . my government has not been satisfied with official response to most of our protests.

Regarding the influx of 10000 refugees, he said no-one should `lose sight of the circumstances which have caused the people in the camps to leave their homes. Those circumstances are not of the PNG Government's making'. " It was the first time that PNG had internationahised the matter. Dr Mochtar said hc was `stunned' by the speech and warned that in future Indonesia would deal in a firmer way with any PNG criticisms of his country. `We have been too patient all this time', he added ominously.

By then, Indonesia had built ten refugee processing complexes along the border. Each contained sets of barracks and was staffed by doctors, priests and the usual ABRI presence. Sugiyono. the deputy governor, said that Indonesia was ready to start receiving the border crossers back. In PNG, however, many refugees suspected the complexes to be little more than detention centres. They felt their aim

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might be to punish people who had fled Indonesia and to ensure that repatriates did not continue to support the OPM. A similar strategy had been pursued against Fretilin in East Timor. The refugees stayed put, existing on the new flow of foreign aid. The UNHCR estimated that it cost $3 per person daily. Two-thirds of the crossers were in PNG's Western Province, adjacent to Merauke, the scene of intensive transhigration activity. Although living a temporary lifestyle, camping in tents and bush-material huts, they began settling in for what looked like a long stay. Around the Catholic mission at Kamberatoro, refugees cleared a space for a playing field. In other locations, West Papuans constructed outdoor churches, dug wells and even planted food crops. In the distant capitals of Pol.t Moresby, Jakarta and Canberra, leaders pondered over solutions to the crisis. PNG said that the `political' refugees could be resettled in a third country. It criticised members of the South I'acific Forum for not doing more to help. Indonesia insisted that everyone would .be welcome to return, and had no need to feel afraid. Australia said the matter was between the two neighbours, but that it could mediate if both parties requested. In late October, the two neighbours signed a new five-year Border Agreement, essentially an update of the one formulated by Australia and Indonesia a decade earlier. It was at least a sign that diplomatic niceties were continuing. In the hope of averting future problems, a new clause was added to the agreement, requiring each country to notify the other of military exercises near the border. Dr Mochtar visited PNG to sign the agreement and in a joint statement with Mr Namaliu said it marked a `new era in the promotion of close neighbourly co-operation'. Howcvcr the era got off to a shaky start when, on 4 November, a delegation of Indonesian and PNG offlcials cntcred the Blackwater camp with the aim of convincing the refugees that they could return home safely. After the refugees learned of the Indonesian presence, 800 men, women and children marched on the team chanting, `We don't want to see their faces. We ran away because these people threatened our freedom. We are Papua New Guineans'. Many refugees vyaved pictures of the late Amold Ap. His son, Amoldjr, a few months old, was carried aloft. The seven Indonesians were then attacked with sticks and stones. All were injured and needed hospital treatment. The worst injuries were suffered by a Melanesiari on the Indonesian team. The team's Jleader, Deputy Governor Sugiyono, received cuts. The demonstration was finally dispersed by PNG police riot squads which used tear-gas. It greatly angered Indonesia, which said that the mission would not: return to PNG until the leaders of the Blackwater protest were punished. Although at least one person

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-Henkjoku -had wamcd of trouble, PNG replied that it had been t:aken by surprise. It had believed that the small police guard on hand would be enough. Nine refugees were arrested. The chief magistrate of varimo stepped down from the case beca.use he was `familiar' with the conditions which had led to the protest. A less sympathetic bureaucrat:'s action came from Laurence Sapien, the hero of the Holtekang hostage rescue, who slapped two women refugees and was charged with assault. Later, he was convicted of assault and fined. The `Vahimo Nine' fared better: three were let off on good behaviour

bonds and the others. discharged from custody. Relations between the neighbours declined further when an Indonesian army patrol entered PNG a week after the demon stration, apparently seeking water. Ic was guided by two Melanesian villagers. At the same time, clashes between ABRI and the OPM wei.e reported near the border. An OPM member, Rex Rumakiek, visiting Australia at the time, said he had leaned that the army sweep was in response to the OPM's killing of 25 troops the I)rcvious month. The OPM, he claimed, had attacked a forward base at the mouth of the Tami River, about 20 kin from the border. Almost all of the ABRI platoon were killed. Since then, troop strength had been increased to company size. OPM supporters in the area were expecting retaliation. Alarmed by the signs, Prime Minister Somare gained the approval of PNG's National Security Council for troops to be posted to the border. A Defence Force platoon was flown to Vanimo to boost the strength of the local barracks. Their brief was to take over border supervision from the police. It remained to be seen how they would react if confronted by either of the two enemies. The troops were stationed in the northern area and as a result failed to detect two important border crossings in October-November. The

first was by OPM commander James Nyaro who entered PNG for secret talks with the then-leader of the opposition, Fr John Momis. News of the meetings embarrassed PNG's leaders. The second crossing was by 570 refugees near Kamberatoro mission and 90 others at Green River. They said they had battlcd through jungle for five weeks. Six people died. Over twenty years had passed since West New Guinea was incorporated into Indonesia, yet its i]eople were more reluctant than ever to live under foreign rule. In Sydney, a leading architect of the transfer, Sir Garfield Barwick, said developments did not surprise him at all: `It is the new `Ulster' in our part of the world'. He, like the other diplomats involved, always suspected that Indonesia would treat the Melanesians badly. What Barwick had underestimated was the ability of west Papuans to fight back and the reluctance of pNG's indigenous leadership to seal the historically disastrous border.

Postscript

8y much mid-December of the refugee 1984,population after conducting in the border detailedcamps, interviews the PNG with government told the press it estimated that 5000 refugees had shown an intcrcst in returning to [rian Jaya voluntarily. However the press was not told that a core group of 102 men, women and children had been selected to begin the repatriation programme. These people had fled the area near Arso in April 1984 and when they arrived in PNG they had almost immediately begun tening officials that they wanted to return home as soon as military activity quietened down. As, a. result they were targetcd as being probable early repatriates. And such they would become, although not in the manner they had hoped. On Friday the 21st, the day on which Michael Somare announced a cabinet reshuffle, including John Giheno, the police minister, to replace Rabbie Namaliu in foreign affairs, Arso refugees were separated from the rest of the people in the Blackwater camp. At 4.00 a.in. on Saturday the refugees received a rude awakening when the PNG

police riot squad arrived and directed them to pack their few belongings and prepare to go home. According to the Catholic Bishop of vanimo, John Etheridge, the refugees had expected to be taken by

truck to the border and left to return home the way they had come on foot. `Of course they were very surprised to have been woken up and readied for departure without any advance warning', said the bishop, who was in regular contact with the Blackwater inmates. `But they were even more confused', he told the author, `to discover that their point of. departure was the Vanimo wharf, which bore no apparent relationship with the border area where they had lived'.

Postscript

191

At 7.30 a.in. the refugees were put onto an Indonesian passengercargo ship and told that their destination was]ayapura, Irian's capital, only an hour's trip around the adjacent headland. When this was announced, t:wo young males ran from thejetty and managed to get away. The ship sailed at about 10.00 a.in. and arrived inJayapura to a

grand welcome from the Indonesian government. Leading the reception party was Irian's military commander, Brigadier-Gen. Sembiring, and the governor, Isaac Hindom. After speeches and a welcoming feast, the repatriates were introduced to the Indonesian media which duly reported that the border crosscrs were now coming home in large numbers and the crisis seemed ovei.. Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar made a subsequent statement that 2000 refugees had already returned and the rest were expected to follow soon. But what was being touted as a success story in Indonesia was a furore in PNG where the government drew strong criticism for its alleged collusion with Indonesia. A week earlier, former minster Namaliu had been inJakarta for talks on t:he refugees -after which he commented that a_ military agreement with Indonesia providing for joint patrolling and the right of `hot pursuit' would be `ideally suited' to the problem at hand - and had presumably agreed to the repatriation plan. Bishop Ethei.idge said it had been a `bad move' to round up the refugees under t:he cover of darkness; Fr Greg Mongi, a PNG priest and secretary of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, urged the govcmment not to bc a party to `displacing the lrian Jaya people' (Tj.//Ies o/ PNG 30 Dec. 1984). Another critic, albeit

privately, was the UNHCR whose officials had been patently excluded from monitoring the repatriation, despite many months of dedicated work in refugee relief. The UNHCR was peeved because the governments of both PNG and -in a policy reversal announced in mid-December - Indonesia had said that the intcmational body would be invited to participate (Sydficy Mom!.#g HeraJc! 14 Dec. 1984).

Responding to the criticism, PNG's Foreign Affairs department said the refugees were `asked' to go on the ship because of fears (by

PNG) of OPM harassment and in order to safeguard the health of the wolnen and children. The explanation did not convince the TI.mes a/ PNG which observed that Arso was closer to Vammo than jayapura; and that the road from ]ayapura did not even go as far as Arso. The Indonesian pl.css said the refugees had been built new houses in the village of workona, Arso, about a hundred in all. S!.#¢r Hclrapa#, one of whose journalists had been allowed t:o accompany the refugees on t:heir boat trip, wrote that they were keen to remm home and had a bright future working on the agricultural nucleus estates that had been set up in Arso in recent years. The paper, a well-rega.rded one, did not explain why the villagers' houses needed rebuilding, namely because

Indonesia's seoret war

192

they had been burnt and damaged by Indonesian commandos during the Operation Satay aimed at routing the OPM. Despite lndonesia's apparently concihiatory attitude towards those who had broken state laws by leaving the country without permission, it made clear its determination to control dissent. On a Christmas visit to the Balim Valley centre of Wamem.the. national defence chief; Gen. Murdani, gave a speech threatening harsh measures against Irianese who sought to make trouble over ethnic or rdigious issues. Indonesia was one country, despite its diverse nature. He gave an assurance that the Jakarta government had no intention of `Islamicising' Irian Jaya.

On the other side of the New Guinea border the PNG authorities

as]::e:hF°u¥;eoduss]gtn:h:i:et::Stu;:5i:att°y?gehsppe°:I;Cuyy°fi:ot±eth¥eAtu:tar:E:: media, the government announced new conditions restricting visits by foreign journalists. To visit PNG a correspondent would have to

;::ixefi::i:;sscaei°md:?ts::c:dmv;::;.tfe[]as:p°hfc:i::::i:rt:e¥£[::g,atE€ questions the journalist wished to ask must also be submitted. In mid-January 1985 the new foreign minister, Mr Giheno, even said that his Austrahian counterpart, Bill Hayden, Imght not be perndtted to visit the refugee camps on the border if 'such a request were made. Asked to comment, Mr Hayden said he felt that an inspestion of the refugees' conditions would be worthwhile. Hc was eventually refused

permission but not before he arrived at Kiunga where a chartered aircraft (costing Australian taxpayers $6000) awaited to take his party to remote Kungim camp. At the same time, several leading Australian newspapers presented beginliing-of-year analyses of foreign pohicy matters and concurred that the PNG-Irian Taya border was the Hawke Labor govemment's most pressing problem. While it would remain so for the early months of 1985, the matter that demanded Canberra's immediate attention was the other Melanesian liberation struggle in New Caledonia. In this case Australia was

#[:ogrtt°h:i:]kg£:owfrtahteh]:i;tgeenco°u]s°nrdae[]apn°e?i::sFt:a::e:e:gc::5.[nBgu: there was a potentially dangerous consequence of Australia's stance because an autonomous Kanak state, albeit financially dependant on France, would be a certain source of support for the West Papuan Cause.

While the attention of the media remained firmly on New Caledonia, the refugees along the PNG border stayed put, no longer in the limelight and wondering how many more days, or even years, they would have t:o spend in idle exile.

Sources

Books Adams, Cindy S#k4r#o My Fri.owd Gunung Agung, Singapore, 1971 Amarshi, Azeem; Good, Kenneth and Mortimer, Rex. De„e/apme#£ a_n_d .Dep?nde_ncy, The Political Economy Of Papua New Guinea Cfxford

University Press, 1979

8=o::s:yb:,n;e::aatinodnaAhTo{,h„:e,£t,cfrdes,E;got;;;;5f„mMnce,:,„ye,5,:93:;vets;ty of the South Pacific, fiji, 1982 Powus.,. lan_The Australian Trusteeship, Papua New Guinea, 1945-75 Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980 Dunn, James T!.nor, A Pcop/a Be/rayedjacaranda Press,1983 Hall, D.G.E. A Hi.story a/Sowffe-E4sf A5i.a Macmillan,1970 Harrer, Heinrich I Come//om ffrc S/o#c Age Rupert Hart-Davis, 1964 ELF+Tsk, P^an} A T!xpf F.o^r .Pu.ilgif tg; Austir_al_ion Administration i; Papua a#d Nci„ Gw!.#ea 19J1-196j Melbourne Univesity Press, 1976

E:Sgt|:g,S'[::te(redT)e"A:,%;:;ao,a:;°`,'„em;a:"„ZP*°cffec8„:„he:Shirt:ib]o9u6r9ne University Press, 1973 Indonesian Government Wcsf Jri.4# - A# csjc#f!.aJ parc a/ J#do#es!.4 Indonesian Embassy, Canberra, 1961 jackson, Richard Ofe Tedi... Tfee Pot oj-GOJd R. Jacksc>n, Port Moresby, 1982

Jprme, `]"` E_ast T|lr2r^. Nationalism and Colonialism Universky o[ Queensland Press, 1978 Kolia, John Jri.a„Jaya 1980's Aklat/Indonesian Embassy, Hong Kong, 1982

Indonesia's secret war

194

Lappe, Frances Moore and Collins, Joseph WorJd Hw#ger.. Tc# Mycfe5, Institute for Food and Development Policy, Sam Francisco, 1978 Leifer, Michael J#cJo#cfi'a'5 Forcig# PoJi.ay George Allen & Unwin, 1983 Lockwood. R`apert Black Armada: Australia and the struggle Jar Indclnesian independence 1942-49 Hale 8c irernongel,1982 Marr, David B¢rw!.cfe George Allen & Unwin, 1980 May, Brian Tfoc J#do#esi.4# Tngedy Routledge 8c Kegan Paul, London, 1978 May, Romld I. (ed,) Tfoe I"do#cs!.a-Papw4 Nctv Gwi.#c4 Border.. Jri.af.csc

Nationalism and Small State Diplomacy Austrihia.n National Universtry, 1983

May, Ronald I. and Nelson, Hank (eds) Mc/4#csl.4.. Bayowd D!.ycrs!.£y

Australian National University, 1982 MCDonald, Hamish Sl//j¢rfo's Jrldo"eel.a Fontana/Collins, 1980

Mitton, Robert The Los/ WorJd oJ-I/j.4#Jaya Oxford University Press, 1983

Mortimcr, Rex Sf#bbor# Swryiyors Monash University, 1984 Renou[, Allan Let]ustice Be Done, The Foreign I.olicy Of Dr H.V. Evatt

University of Qucensland Press, 1983 Rocder, O.G. Tfec Sim./I.„g Gc#cr#J Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 1969 Rowley, C.D. The New Gwl.#ca V!.//agcr Cheshire, 1965 Ryan, John I/!c Hot La#d, Focws o# Nctv Gwi.jlc4 Macmillan, 1970 Sastroamijoyo, Ali MI./csCo"es o# #!y /.owmey (C.L.M. Pcndcrs) University of Queensland Press, 1979 Sharp, NIonie The Rule Of the Suiord, The Story Of West Irian RIbb\e Books/Arena, 1977 Sinclair, James KJAP, A#s/r¢JI.a's P4/roJ QLrfccrs I.# Pap#4 Netv Gwl.#,ca Pacific Publications, 1981 Southwood, ]ulie and Flanagan, Patrick Jwdo#cs!.a.. Law, Prap494"d4 awd Terror Zed Press, London, 1983 Tantri, K'Tut Rcyo/C I.# Paradl.fc K'Tut Tantri, 1970 Ti\po\ West Papua: The Obliteration Of a Peaple Tapo\, London._ 1983 Walsh, Richard and Munster, George Docwmc"fs o# Awsfr4`!.a" De/cwcc and Foreign Policy 1968-1975 Walsh a:nd Munster,1980 White, Osi:net Parliament Of a Thousand Tribes, Papua Neui Guinea: The Story Of an Emerging Nation Wren, 1965 ql/H]ey. TceLth When the Sky Fell Dcluln, The Destruction Of the Tribes Of

the Sydney Region, 1788-1850's Conins, 1979 Wfison, Bry8In Magic and the Millenniuin, Religious Mouements Of protest among Tribal and Third-Wclrld Peoples Pa,latin, 1975

Papers and articles Amdt, H.W. `Transmigration: achievements, problems, prospects',

Sources

195

Bulletin Of Indonesian Econoinic Studies (ALINU , Ca:hoerr8.) Dece;mbe[ 1983

Dick, Gerry `Where t:he Ice Age lingers', Pa#or¢m4 (Ansett) November 1984 Hcidcr, Karl G. `What do people do? Dani auto-ethnography', JowmaJ Of Anthropological Research Vol.. 31, 1975

International Commission of ]urists (Australian section), `Reporc on lnission to Papua New Guinea 2-16 September 1984 concerning the refugee status of "border crossers" from Irian Jaya', Sydney, December 1984 de Iongh, Rudy `West lrian Confrontation', Swkar#o's Gw[.dad J#do#csi.4 T.K. Tan (ed.) jacaranda Press, 1967 Routley, R. and V. `Destructive forestry in Australia and Melanesia', Tfoc MeJcmcs!.4ri E„y!.ro"mc#.j Papers to Ninth Waigani Seminar, Port

Moresby, 1975. John H. Winslow (ed.) ANU, Canberra, 1977 Savage, Peter `Petty bourgeoisie and proto-peasants: from nationalism to national liberation in West lrian''. Paper for Class and Class Analysis conference, Sydney, October 1977. Published in As!.4# Swrvey vol. 18 no. 10, 1978

`The nationalist struggle in West Irian: the divisions within the \Ibera.tlon movcmcnt' , Australia and Neu} Zealand Journal Of Sociology vol. 14, no. 2, 1978

van dcr Vcur, Paul, `West Irian's refugees - what is permissive residence?'. New Gwi.wca December 1965/January 1966

Notes

Chapter 1 1

The Melanesians of the Torres Strait have bccn treated badly by Australia. During World War 2 there was a recruitment drive in the islands, hclpcd by a slump in the pearling industry. In the army, Islanders found they were paid £3.10.0 a month, compared to the £8-£9 given to comparable whites. They struck, and wcrc forced to work at gunpoint. Forty years later, in October 1983, Canberra announced that 800 Torres Strait Islanders, and some Aborigines, would be paid a total of A$7.4 million to make up for lost wages. Papua New Guineans who assisted the Australian war effort arc still waiting for compensation, estimated at K8 million. In Octot)er 1984 Australia agrccd to repay the debt. The 1982 documentary film Ai!gc/s a/ War presents the veterans' views

2

lan Hogbin (ed.) A#//irapo/ogy I.# Papw4 New Gwi.#cc! Melbourne Univcrsi-

3

ty Press, 1973, p. 106 ibid. p. 107

4

Indonesian police officer, interview with author, Balim district, Irian Jaya, Dec. 1982. Name withheld.

5

Deiris Reinhardt in Nali.oil Rcyl.CWJ, 21 September 1977

6

Ko/xpaJ, 28 November 1977

` 7

8 9

Letter from de Tor[es, in Manila, to the King of Spain, 12 July 1607. Cited in "hiittaker et al. Doculiietlts atid Readiligs il. New Guiliea History: Prc/!i.slory /a 1889. jacaranda Press, 1975, p. 191 Rupe[t I.ockwood B/acfe Ar/tiada Hale and lremonger, 1982, p. 19 Peter Txro[seley The Truliipet Shall Soulid clad in B[yan "lilson Magic atid j„c MI.lJc#/I/.win Paladin,1975, pp. 204-5. The subtitle of wilson's book

indicates how valuable a source it is on this sut)ject: `Religious Movements of Protest among Tribal and Third-World Peoples'.

Notes 10

11

197

Txl[ison Magic and the Millel\iiitn p. 196

Tapc>l Group Wcsl Papw4.. "c Ob/I.fora/i.otl oj.a Pcap/c Tapol, UK,1982, p.16

1.2

AIAI\ Renou[ Let Justice Be Done, The Foreign Polity Of `Dr H.V. Evatt. University of Queensland Press, 1983, p. 165. This biog€aphy has been of much assistance, cspccially chapter 8, `The Indonesian Revolution'.

13 14

ibid. p. 173 0srnar Txlhiite Parliaiiieltt Of a Thollsatld Tribes, PNG, the story Of all ciilcrgi.iig i!4/I.oj[. Wren, 19e5, p. 236

15

Ross Garnaut is a former economic adviser to the PNG government. In 1983-84 he was working for Australian Prime Minister Bc>b Hawke. After visits to lrian]aya and research with demographer Chris Manning, he produced lriatiJaya: The Trausiforlrlatioil Of a Melanesian Economy AL:N`J

Press, Canberra, 1974. Their statistics and conclusions arc valuable, if

now somewhat dated. 1.6

Paul ll:asluck A Titne For 13uilding.. Aiistralian Administration in PNG,

19j:1-f963 Melbourne University Press, 1976, pp. 366-7. The former ministcr's memoirs provide an inside, but rather restrained view of events. As he noted, the cabinet papers will be closed for some years yet. 17 The emergence of west Papuan nationalism has been well covcrcd by an Australian academic who uses the pseudonym `Peter Savage'. See `The Nationalist Struggle in West lrian: The Divisions Within the Liberation Movement.s AIIstralia alld New Zealalld Jollrllal Of Sociology. vo\.14, rio.

2, June 1978. `Thc Natic)nal Liberation Struggle in West lrian: From Millenarianism to Socialist Revolution' A5I.4/I SI/ryey, vol. 18, no. 10, 1978. On this point, also see John Ryan Tfac Hof L4wd, Focwj ojt New Gili.#e4 Macmillan, 1970, p. 190 lists the many parties, platforms and 18

2:

personalities. Savage Op ci./ As/.4w S!iryay, p. 984

i::#uwr°# g'c4hcikesfn"g':4rd5Lrpri26T3/,o„s„]d D4y5 Andre Deutsch, 1965, p. 464. An inside view of the Kennedy period. jFK reportedly said the same 'abouc the country of Laos, soon to be fought over by the US.

21 22

23 2,4

Sir Garfield Barwick, conversation with author, Sydney, 10 April 1984 Netherlands Prime MinistcrJ. De Quay, letter to UN Secretary General, U Thant, 16 May 1962 Barwick, conversation with author, 10 April 1984 lanDowus The Auslraliaii Trusteesl.ip, Papua New Guinea,1945-75 ALust.

Govt Publishing Service, 1980. The official account of PNG under 25 26

27

Australian rule, p. 230 P.I. Mollison, conversation with author,13 July 1984 Savage, Op ci.i Asi.a" Swn/ey, p. 984, quoting Paul van der Veur of ANU, Canberra.

Peter Hastings `The Indonesian-PNG Relationship', 1976 unpublished paper, p. 7

28

Savage ANZJS p.143

Indonesia's secret war

198

Chapter 2 1

Brian May Tfrc Jiidotic5i.arl Tngedy Routledge & Kcgan Paul, 1978, p. 169. May, rcprcscnting Age/Ice FrHf!cc-Prc5fc ncwsagency, covered the Act of Free Choict:. Ch. 5, `The United Nations Fiasco', provides much detail.

2

Peter Savage Asi.a" Swrvcy p. 988

3

Mathcw Rak Rain Maycr, statement to Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs in support of claim for refugee status in Australia, Brisbane, 2 July 1984 1812th Plenary Meeting of uN General Assembly, 24th Session, agenda item 98, 19 November 1969

4 5

T¢po/ Bii//e!i./[ No. 63, May 1984, p. 9

6

I.bl`d no. 61, Jam. 1984. p. 5.

7 8 9 10

Bob Kubia, interview (unaired) with ABcjournalist Geoff Heriot, Port Morcsby, 1978 Tapol Bulletin no. 62, March 1984, p. 7 ibid no. 63, May 1984, p. 9 I.cttcr to I.es Johnson, Australian administrator of PNG, from Albert Maori Kiki. Contained in cable from Austi.alian High Commission, Port Moresby, to Canberra, 6 March 1974. Cited in compilation of lcakcd secret papers, Doculnents on Australiali Drfence and Foreign Policy 1968-

11

r97J Richard Walsh and George Munster (eds and pub.) 1980. See chapter 9, `Decolonising PNG', pp. 319-26 Informant, name withheld, conversatlon with author, Port Moresby,

12

Nov., 1981 ABC Radio, 84cfagro!ii7d Br!.cj/Jg, 21 August 1983. Producer Geoff

Heriot, former PNG corrcspondcnt. 13

The story of the coup was first told in the SydJJcy Momi.JJg Hcr4/d byJohn

vWo:cue:htei,retv:dast:£3Ceret££attedo.f[:xT%So::nTfi;I:ego;ann::8d3ercE;Cbne::iscg:# 14

15 16 17

preparations on ABC Radio's `Backg[ound Briefing'. Robert Mitton I/Ic Lost War/d o/ Jrl.afl /ay4 Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 227. The young Australian had spent some years in PNG and lrian as a geologist with large companies. Hc developed a strong interest in Papuan cultures, collected tribal art and took many photographs. This book is a fine pictorial record as well as an account of Mitton's disillusionment with Indonesian rule. Missiomry statement, name withheld, 1984 Conversations bctwccn fc)rmer RAAF personnel and author, Aug. 1984. Names withheld. Terry Doylc, conversation with author, Aug. 1984, Canberra. After finishing work with Frceport, the pilot qualified as a lawyer in Austi.alia.

Chapter 3 1

Thereport, one of50 copies produced, was captured by the opMin 1981 when it ambushed a minibus carrying senior offlcials, including apparently the provincial police chief. OPM members brought the document, and

199

Notes

others, to PNG for the purpose of exchanging it fc)r asylum. They were unsuccessful. It was given to the author by an anonymous source. Other secret Indonesian documents quoted in this volume were taken by a Papuan civil servant who defected to PNG. These were `lcakcd' to the author, again anonymously, after hc left the PNG government.s employ. 2

Tapol BIIIletin no. 62. March 1984, p. 9

3

Over the years, much OPM correspondence has fallen into the hands of PNG intelligence, both from agents and from thc intercepting of couriers. Some has bccn shared with Australia and, in turn, Indonesia. This connection has resulted in West Papuans being arrested. It is

4 5 6

7 8

presumed that the OPM documents quoted in this volume have already passed along this pipeline. They were given to the author anonymously. Letter fromj.H. Prai in Sweden,13 October 1980 Prai to Fisor Yarisctouw, Pemka HQ, Papua Bara[. 10 November 1980 0PM Task report 005/5/LT/1981. Infantry Major Wellyp to Pemka Chief-of-Staff in Numbay. Tapol Wcsf P4p#a pp. 81-3. Includes photos of some women detainees. 0PM-Papcml's `Report on cmergcncy invcstigation', 16 November 1981

9 10 11 12 13

I.H. Prai to Col. E. Bemcy, June 1981 I.cttcr to ABC correspondent Sean Dorney, 9 October 1981 Department ofForeign Affairs 8c Trade press release, 67/82, 27 May 1982 Laurence Sapien, conversation with author, Vahimo, December 1982 John Holloway, Australia's deputy ambassador to Indonesia, conversation with author, Jakarta, December 1982

14

Hank di Suvero, former lccturcr in law, University of.PNG, convcrsadon with author, Sydney, August 1984

i: f£€°:af;I:`ec`i'i': Fe°iie€2riaFbaerecnh pte9r%'tepnpt: |7n-i9a'tcni°6862: 'fo¥afs:a9n8c4e', 5.N]8 officials in Vanimo confiscatcd letters from an American missionary based in Irianjaya. They were written by a man named W. Mes w`ho said that divine revelation had led him tc) believe that West Papua would one day be free. PNG's NIO detected overtones of the messianic Korcri movement. It felt that, in combination with Christian fervour, the idea could be volatile. Research showed that the Indonesiaii Bible Soc`iety had

r7

£]asct,#u[::4:,Zj°7i!?,?,;;;i-;i°[;Sit;;::S iny]ii:red s asako of N|.wg,.„,. Nilts

18

Report of visit to PNG boi.der camps, 27-30july,1984 by Christian aid workers. Names withheld at their I.cquest.

19

Wydcr's kidmp attracted much media attention and he was interviewed at length by Dagmar Stcinemann of' the Swiss Weekly, Soti#/ags BJl.cfe.

The information given here, much of it unpublished at the time, was 20

provided by Ms Steinemarm to the author in Sydney, May 1984. `Four Comcrs', 26 May 1984, rcpo[ter: Alan Hogan. As usual with foreign intcrvicws of OPM members, Nyaro was expected to voice his fcclings in English. Like most of his comrades, it is not one of the languages which he speaks well. Thus, his response appeared vague and stilted.

Indonesia's secffet war 21 22 23

200

T!.mcj a/ING 8 March 1984. By Neville Togarewa. Ti.mcj a/PIVG 26 July 1984, `Vanuatu party backs the OPM'. World Council of Indigenous Pcoplcs, 27 June 1984. Present: E4sl Timor-lose Rz\rnos-Holta.. Kat.aky (New Caledotiia)-August Siapo., Frenchoccwp!.ed Po/y/i€si.a-]acqui van Bastolaer; Wcs! Papl/4-Henk joku; Net" Zec]J4)]d-Dr Rangi Walker; Hawal.i.-Francis Kauhuane, Rob Burgess, Hrydon Burgess., Mii:roltesia-Roman Bedor., Australia-National Aborigiiial

24 25

Co#grcfj-Ossie Cruse, Patrick Malone, Bill Hollingsworth. The WCIP consists of indigenous pcoplcs who do not control their own country. Former intelligence officer, name withheld. Conversation with author, October 1984. Wcj/ Papwaw Ofuc"cr, Vol. 7:4, 1984, p. 20. Sold by subscription (P.O.

Box 38033, 6503 AA Nijmegen, Netherlands)

Chapter 4 1

Fc)r details of FUNDWI's findings and plans, see John Ryan I/Ie Ho/ L4t!d pp. 247-58. Paul Hasluck A TI./ilc/orJ3l/I./dl./lg p.114 c.f., and p. 319

2 3

c.f. on Australian land policies in PNG. Brivn May The ltidonesian Tngedy p. 196 Robert Mitton `Devclopmcnt of the Freeport Copper Mine', Paper to Ninth Waigani Seminar, Port Morcsby, May 1975. See TAG MCJ4il€si.a» E/iyi.ro/I/iicj!/John H. Winslow (ed.), ANU,1977, p. 367

4

Terry Doyle, conversation with author, August 1984

5

Tapol Ob/i.ler4!I.ot! a/a Pcap/g pp. 43-4

6

The Asmat timber scandal has bccn well described in Tapol's book, pp. 46-51 Awlpo, Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, Vol. 16, 1-2, 1984. pp. 103-4. `Fishcries in Asia and the Pacific -japan's Involvement and its Problems', by Yamaka Junko c/ 4J.

7

8 9

Garnaut and Manning Jri.4il/¢ya p. 81 Francis Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins War/d Hi/iig€r.. Tew M'y!/if Institute for Food and Development Policy, USA, 1978, p. 9. Although Indoncsia's landlord problem is less chronic than, say, India's (Rex Mortimcr S!I!bbom S!iryJ.tJorJ p. 44) land ownership has been concentrating alarmingly in recent times (Tapo/ Bl!//c/I.w no. 67, Jam. 1985, pp. 16-18)

10 11

KOPKAMTIB report on the interrogation of Karsikun Atmc) Suwamo, 10 November 1980, by Sgt Dccky Gardjalay Jusuf wanandi, CSIS, interview with ABC Radio's `Indian-Paciflc', 21

12

July 1984 "lorld Back Tribal Peoples and Economic Deuelapliielil - HIIIiian Ecologic

13

Co#jl.cJcr4!I.a/!s World Bank, Washington, 1982, p. 19 Tapol Bulleiiti, No. 63, May 1984

14 15

Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, interview with Huw Evans on ABC-TV's

`Pressure Point', May 1984

Jlldo/!cji.a TI.wlcs 14 June 1984, statement by Education and Culture

Minister, Nugroho. In fact Papuan children bathe often in rivers and the sea, sleep comfortably and cat little refined food to require teeth cleaning afterwards.

Notes 16

201

Secret report by KOPKAMTIB, August 1980. The PDI, one of lndonesia's three political parties, comprises both Christian and nationalist

17

elements. The intelligence group believed that in lrian the strongest PDI component was the Protestant-backed Parkindo (Partai Kristcn lndoncsia) and that it was using religion to gain electoral support. The report also fcarcd that the PDI was penetrated by `separatist individuals. from the OPM. These wished to both disrupt elections, as had happened in 1977, and to attract mass support for a free West Papua. julic Southwood and Patrick Flanagan J"cJoiicsi.a - L4tv, Propaga/ida 4#d Terror Zed Press, 1983, p. 141. This study examines the state's security apparatus in detail.

18

KOPKAMTIB documents cited arc included in the so-called `Wapai Papers' brought to PNG inJuly 1982 by a refugee named Celsius Wapai, and given to the govcmment. In a secret memo on 5 October 1983 the Director General of pNG's NIO, Charles Ali, called them the `first real hard intelligence to come across the border'.

19

Leo Kuper Ge/!oci.de.. I/j Po/I./I.c4l Ufo I.„ /Ac 20/fo Ceil!wry Pelican, 1984.

£ehvo;ex:sdefntthhee€ugees#o°n":'f'££Vy`.C;;c?fiTcg:Satt;]o9n8s4'h:Z#oatrybe¥nax::[r[: 20 21

outspoken over Irian Jaya. Arcfl4, No. 67 1984, obituary by Han.k di Suvero. The Syd/Icy Momi./Ig H6r¢/d 11 June 1984, from despatch by AAP's Leigh Mackay in Jakarta

Chapter 5 1

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 15 August 1962. Cited in New Gwincajoumal, Dec.1965-Jam.1966, `Wcst

lrian's Refugees -What is permissive residence?' by Paul van der Veur. ? 3 4 5 6

P?quments or. Australian Deifeltce alrd Foreign I.ollcy 1968-1975 C:hopter 9. ibid

7 8 9

Niugini Nius 21 April 1983 ABC-Radio, `PM,' September 1983 Ti.mcs a/PIVG 1 March 1984

10

11

Nafi.ow Reyi.etv 1 February 1979, `13 Steps to Moresby', by Helen Ester Post-Cowri.cr 11 May 1978 Posf-Cowr!.er 10 December 1980

Na!l.oj!aJ Ti.mc5 5 April 1984 & 12 April 1984

Hon. John Nilkarc, PNG Minister for Provincial Affairs. Statement to

parliament, August 1984. The case against the government was presented in `Refugees, Human Rights and lrianJaya: A Critique of poliey', address by Brian Bruncon to conference on `PNG and Australia: PNG Perspectivcs', ANU, Canberra, September 1984, pp. 6-10. 12 For details of refugee law, see Law4ji.ajournal, Vol.1, No. 3,1981, pp. 229-284 .An Appraisal of the Development of the Protection afforded to Refugees under Intermtional Law'. 13 Ti./rlcs a/ENG 13 September 1984

i: ¥:,:;oR;Lju¥:i;I::: apd*r6S:nts:st¥dNfhft. Su9acntt°obehrai9g€'t Pbpe.e:-u8nder suspicion.

Appendix •-,..:...;.`.f:.i:PRIME MINISTER PAPUA NEW GUINEA

26 Jul.y 1982

His Excellency General Soeharto President of t:he Republic of Indonesia

5:i:::aTe!&:8NESIA Your Excellency ,

::::::sC::t:::aE:¥ni::::::::::::::::::::I:fLEh:h:e:::: t:hat a

Ez3::e:3:::£;;;::e!::i::::::;I:i:::::i::I:::::::::q::5::::ed ¥n:::::::.on Border Arrangement:s between Papua New Guinea and

harmonious r#:c£:::::n€::w==im:u:i:a¥±:n:?a fostering of ,a

:i:::::::::;i;;::i:;;::;i!::ii;i::iiii;:!i;;Eii;::i::ii;es, point in our developing relations".

iii:;iii!;:;:ii::;:ii:::;;i:::ii;i:;;:;i;i;;i:;:;ii:ii:i::;;:e which we have achieved so far''.

Recently, however, our relationship ha.s been

3:::::::¥ :;f±: :::e:SaEh:a=:::±E s : £m::;u:Eo:i::dw:::a ::rry±n8 weapons .

.

.

.

/2

Appendix

2().'

In the period from May 15 to July 3 t:he

!!::i:::::::i:::::;:I ::p::::: :::::::::: I:i::::::::: ;:::sad :::;:::.:::::i::::x§!::;:::nc::a:£a:nt::y:::::;ftT*::

::;::i:::;::!!i:i;::i:::i::::!¥i;::i:::i!:::!!::::a:!::;:i sovereignty.

:::::::I:€:::::::e!;8:h:i::;::::::5P::::::ig!::::e:£:S,98o

Jakarta accord.

g::a::::::o:;o!!;::n!:::i::::;:;::::::i:::::::uE::o::rlnto But my Government contitiues to believe that our

:::::::::i:g:¥£::::::ri:::¥i!::::;:¥::i¥:::n:a;°t:n::::LE:th seek t.o rest::et::rb:E:i::d::1:inEh:°s::5:::t::ec±:::1; :ill possible.

E£:°R:5:3E£:g§:S::::i:;:!ipE:::::::;::::h:;:1::;i::::i::EL:f recognition on the intermacional st:age on numeroug occasions.

Irian ]aya a:°::eE:::::rig: I:8a:£d t::d8:e:::::I::bels in

¥:E¥np:g;:,N:::5§::a:::n:i;:nE::;c:teal:3±::::u:o3::;::o:ffor

;i::::;i::I:;i:i;:!!i::iiiii;i::!i;:i!::;::ii:;;;i::I:;:en±:g qliest:ioned about their purpose.

be disarmed. [f|:d=: :e::::: ::: ::::¥i:!i::3P3::pE:e¥oS:::: a:#: ::g:£B::o#e:pST±::ai: i:::i::=¥:

I believe t:hat t:he .

.

./3

Indonesia's secret war -3-

If a person informs ciur aut:horities that: he has

!i:::;!!!;;::;:::::;:i:i:;:::::::3gi::i:::::8::i:i:;:e:i:iE If we are satisfied that a person meets one of

:::::v:fi:::I;::;:::a;::i:;:::::;::i:::;!::::i:i::;::::X::mwe t:emporary sanctuary.

5:rE:: ::::g::!:;: gj:: :::!!;::::::#::::::: ::;i.:i: E::::; detailed in our joint Border Agreements.

However the traditional crossers are not excepted

::::a::s:;%:I; ::pg: E::dG:::e:::e::!;eps::;::::? to carrying For your inforTi]ation, ''a weapon" in Papua New

Guinea can mean not just firearms but ot:her inst:ruments such as bows and arrows, axes and spears.

;;:::;::i::i:;:i¥::i:;:;:;:::::;:;:::::i:p:::o::::3::::s:n ;::::::;:::c;i::w!;:;!i::i::!i;::i;;!i:i:i::i;i:::::;:::h::I i:?:e:E:e:p5:o:::at:s : c:fo:u:o:E:i: t!;y I:a:::a:::::m5::g e:o crossers.

I made a public statement to [hls effect on

July 7.

in our med±a¥yaE::s:a;i::3m:¥tEh:h±:5e=:::¥:g I:g:n::::r€ge

i::::::::::;::o::::¥eoEo:a:E:¥:13:::=:: ::: ;:E:::: i::d tE:os e

!EI:::::::iT::i::;:i:::i::i:!g!i:i;:!i:i;i;::ii!:;:r!:i:atiew .

.

. /4

Appendix

205

-4-

desirable th¥:. I:::::g::I;|gg 83¥:::m€;ttE:g::::i::n:: !:ShLy expressed in the Border Arrangements.

.--...

`

-.

:::ag:o:a::::n:;:::::!!:::i::;:::::: E:::t::a:e;:::e:::ts of 3:::pg; :r 1 ; §!:;0::d tE:wj:i:: t:On::i; :p ::e n§::i:cia:;a: on The story was tit:led "Former Prime Miniscel.

i::i::::i;':.g:ie:::E::I:#::in:::::::;::g::hwf::g:i;:::i::a next: Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.

!!:;;i:!i::=::::i;::i:i;::i::;ii:I:i;::i;ii!i;:i:;?!i;:i::es

:!!;;:i:::;i;:i;;i::i:¥;::i!!:;:;i::i!!:;;:i;i;;i;::::::

!i;:ii!ii::ii::i:i;:::;::::ii!:;:i;;¥i!;i:i::i:i:i;;::::;ave It has been made clear to t:he senior members of

i!!:ii!ii:ii;:::!!;;i:g:i!!f!:i;::;!!!:i:!i:ii:i::w:5ts3:::ar ' ' '/5

hdonesia.'s secret war -5-

€:::::I:g:g e:: ::;:!::::::;:3!::E:::::y::: Ei:::!i::: New anti-Indonesian pronouncement:s.

E::c&::!t:Ee:::;;:::::::::::::E;:I!3::i::::::e!:::::::?toou:::a border be handled by the Joint Border Committee.

i:1!aE: ::3v::n;::::: : ::f:::::::in:::::::!iF::::: :::Ef t:::t i:¥:i:::it ::d±:o::t::c::3:? that the Proceedingg will be

::;::3!::to::l i:!::i:5y t:::::!!::::::: ::i::a!:!ngu:::a highest consi8::::io::ur EXcellency, the assurances of my Yours sincerely,

JULIUS

CHAN

Prime Mini3Cer

Index

AAP (Australian Associated Press), 102, 154

Allom, Simon, 72, 175, 176 ALP (Australian Labor Party), 15,

18, 21, 22, 49,110,146,192 Corporation),109,113,149,158, AMA (Associated Mission Aviation), 103 185 Abepura, Iriaiijaya, 88, 143, 144; scc Ambc)n, Indonesia, 14, 65 Amnesty lntcrmtional, 141, 145, 186 4/jo UNCEN

AB C (Australian B roadcasting

Angkatan Berscnj ata Republik lndoiiesia, sc€ ABRI ABRI (Angkatan Bcrscnjata Ap, Amold, xiii, xiv, xv, 92, 97, 98, Republik Indonesia), (Indonesian Armed Forces), 26, 34, 35, 37, 42, 99,107,148,149,150,151,152, Aboriginals, Australian, 7,114,140

153, 154, 188; scc also Mambesak 43, 44, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, cultural group 77, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89,Arfak pec>ple, 17, 43; rebellion, 17, 90, 91, 92, 95,101,102,103,119, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 75 123, 124, 130, 132, 133, 139, 140, Ariks,johan,17, 20, 24, 32, 35 141,145,146,147,152,153,154,Arso, Irian]aya, 65, 78, 81, 87, 132, 190, 191 157, 160, 164, 165,172, 173, 179, 181,182,183,187,189; desertions, Asia (also Asians), 5, 6, 7, 8,19, 22, 44, 47, 109 99-100; jcc 4Jfo

KOPASSANDHA, KOPKAMTIB ACFOA (Australian Council for

Associated Mission Aviation, f€c

AMA Australia; aid to ABRI, 146; aid to

PNG, xiv, 81; on communism in Overseas Aid), 133 Indonesia, 18, 156, fel.apj `in New Act ofFree Choice, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, Guinea, 4, 5, 44,121,156,157; military in New Guinea, 60, 66, 53, 54, 55, 64, 94,109,110,117, 67, 68, 75, 99, 157; refugee 118,120,135,156,157,160 Africa (also Africans), 22, 25, 48, 49, 134, 146

policies, 112, 113,155, 156, 157,

158; support of Dutch, 10, 15, 18,

mdonesiaL's secret war 20, 21, 22, 31; scc 4lso ABC;

Aborigimls;jlo; Maycr, Mathew;

RAAF Australian Associated Press, scc AAP Australian Broadcasting

Corporation, j€c ABC Australian Council for Ovcrscas Aid, fee ACFOA AustralianJoint Intelligence Organisation, jccjlo Australian Labor Party, 5cc ALP Awom, Fritz, 36, 37, 38 Awom,joel. 98, 99,100 Awom, Perminas, 36, 43, 89, 98

208 Cendrawasih, University of; 5ec

UNCEN Chan, Sirjulius, 54, 161, 163, 165. 167,169,170,171,172.173,182, 186, 187; sc€ 4/ro PPP

Chin (also Chinese), 5,11, 23, 55, 124

C.ommunism (also communist). 8, 15, 27, 36, 52, 54, 75, 80, 96, 107, 156, 171, 184; scc 4/so PKI

Commonwealth Development Corporation, fcc CDC Dc Facto Government (OPM), 64, 74, 81, 82. 87,163,166; fcc ciJfo

PEMKA Baliem (Balim) region, Irianjaya, 4, Derey, Alcx (Donald), 78, 85, 89, 5, 8, 37, 46, 56, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 124, 192

90, 91, 94

Barwick, Sir Garfield, xv, 27, 28, 30,Diro, Ted, 62, 63, 158, 175 31,155,156,189

Doga, Lawrence, 108, 143, 144

Bemcy, Elkianus (Elky), 78, 80, 82, Domey, Sean 185 Doyle, Terry, 69, 70, 71,120 84, 89, 90, 94 Dutch, the (also Holland, Biak, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 20, 23, 24, 43, Netherlands), xiv, xvi, 2, 4, 6, 7, 44, 46, 51, 94, 99,100,112,117, 145. 148

8,

9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,

Bias, Tony, 99,162,169,179

26, 27, 35, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48.

BIackwator, PNG, refugcc camp,

49, 51, 54, 87, 88,109,110,115,

xiii, 99,100,102,180,182,186, 187,188,190

Bonny, Eliezer, 20, 32, 33, 36, 50, 136, 168, 169

border agreements (Indonesia and PNG), xv, 92,161,166,181

Borneo (also North Bomco), 13, 20,

116,118,126,140,141,151,155;

98:C2];,P3|::rta!nnsi:jra]nr!aany;;yta8ro]9,' UNTEA, 30 Dutch: withdi.aw from lrianjaya, 10, 30-34, 116; 5cc a/fo UNTEA,

FUNDWI

69,114,128 East Timor, 61, 82, 97,101,126, Britain, 7, 8, 9,11,14,15, 22, 41, 70, 133, 140, 141, 146, 147, 159, 161, 129, 133, 146, 155; see aha CDC, 165,178,185,188; fcc 4/fo Timor TAPOL

Brunton, Brian 183 Bunker, EIIsworth, xiv, 28, 29, 30

Edhie, Brig-Gen. Sarwo, ,37, 38, 42, 48, 145

Eisenhower, Dwight D. , 23 Enarotali, Irianjaya, 42, 45, 47, 85,

ca]t8,01;2C,€;,u#](8]2S,0|93,th|8]5;,CS|)23=;j' 138,143,172,188,191; see a/jo

AMA; Etheridge, Bishop]ohn CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) , 129

95, 105; see ¢/fo Paniai revolts

Ertzbcrg mining area, Irianjaya; fee Freeport mining area Etheridge, Bishopjohn, 105. 183, 190, 191

Evatt, Dr H.V.,15,16,18, 22, 28

hdex

209

Fakfak, Irianjaya, 24, 37, 46, 78,

buildup, 23; Soviet support of, 23;

Transrigration Programme, xiv,

126, 145 Fiji,1,111,166

xv, 37, 58, 61, 74, 87, 88, 95, 96.

France,1, 48,118,146,192

108,112,115,125,126,127,132,

Free Papua Movement, Jcc OPM

133, 134, 135, 139, 140, 146, 170,

Freeport mining area, Irian]aya, 8,

182; leaves UN, 34; rejoins UN,

69, 70, 86, 95,115,118,119,120,

45,116; Jcc a/so ABRI;Java;

121, 122, 123, 176

Jakarta; KOPASSANDHA; KOPKAMTIB; Mandala

FUNDWI (Foundation c>f the United Nations for the Development of West lrian), 45,116,117

Genycm, Irianjaya, 88, 150, 180 Gcrakan pcngacau liar; fcc GPL Gcreja Kristen Injili; scc GKI Germany, 8, 146, 155 GKI (Gercja Kristen Injili),149,151 Golkar group, 64, 103, 136, 173 GPL (Gerakan pengacau liar, `wild terrorist gangs'), 58, 77, 78, 79, 101,142; fe€ 4/jo OPM; PEMKA

group; TPN Greccc, 93,111,174

operation; PKI; Suharto; Sukamo Indonesian Evangelical Church (Protestant) ; Jcc GKI Internatic)nat Commission ofjurists, 5CC ICJ

IrianJaya (also Dutch New Guinea, Irian, West lrian, West New Guinea, West Papua); Dutch appropriate, 8; Dutch leave, 10, 28-34,116; fishing,117,118,124, 125; Indonesia takes over, 28-34, 69,141; Indonesian development plans for,116-136; Indonesian socio-cultural policy, 34,136-140; mining, 8, 86,115,117,118,119,

Hague, The, 24. 26, 41, 108 IIastings, Peter, 50,129,151,153, 157

120,121,122,123; name declared, 14-15, 59; oil, 8,10, 86,115,118, 125; timber, 86,115,117,118,123,

Hawke, Bob, xv,112,192

124, 125; see a/jo Act ofFrce Hayden, Bill, il2,113,151,179,192 Choice; border agreements;

Hcmbring, Yance,142,150,180 Hc)lland, jcc Dutch Hollandia, IrianJaya, 20, 22, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34 Holtckang kidnapping, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97,172,189

Icj (Intermtional Commission of

:rnticnh;g:Ova:`frpoT::E:ning;;Ftir:ebpe°r;t Indonesia, transmigration

programme; jayapura; New Guinea, land alienation; refugees Islam, fec Muslim Ismail, Col. Sebastian, 72, 175, 181, 182

Jurists), xii, 153, 154, 182

Indey, Amos, 20, 32, 166 Indey, Marthin, 20, 24 Indonesia; displaces Dutch in lrian jaya, 28-34; p4fsi.wl; expropriates

Dutch holdings in Indonesia, 22: independcncc, 14, 17, 23; invades East Timor, 61,158-9; Irian Jaya, attacks on, 5, 28, 29, 42, 61, 63-4, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 79, 87-9,100,103,165; military

Japan (alsojapanese), 9,10,11,12, 13,14,17,115,118,124,125

Java, Indonesia, xiii, 3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17,18. 31, 34, 36, 37, 45, 48, 51, 59,117,120,127,128,129,132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 147

jayapura, IrianJaya, xii, 33, 34, 37, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 56, 59, 63, 65, 72, 73. 74, 77, 78, 79, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97,

210

indonesia's secret war

148, 149, 150, 153; 5cc a/5o Ap, 98. 99,100,101,118,123,124, Amold 128, 132, 136, 140, 144, 145, 147, 150, 152, 159, 162, 170, 173, 177, Manamakcri, 5cc Krcri movement Mandala operatic)n, 26, 28, 38 179,181,186,191

jlo (Australian Joint Intelligence Organisation), 47,112,162,163

joku, Franzalbert, 8,112,178 joku, Henk, 82, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111,112,168,170,171,189

Mandatjan, Lodcwijk, 20, 24, 32, 36, 37 Manokwari, IrianJaya, 7, 12, 17, 24, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 89, 94, 98,100, 117,145,146

jouwe, Nicolaas, 20, 24, 32, 33, 35, Manseren, f€c Krcri movement

41, 56, 58, 61, 64, 74, 80, 82, 87, Matane, Paulias, 173, 177, 181

May, Brian, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 Mayer, Mathew, 43, 44,112,113 Membci.amo River, IrianJaya, 78, Kaisiepo, Franz, 14,17, 20, 32, 36, 42 79, 97, 148 Kaisicpo, Markus, 20, 24, 32, 35, 87 Menzies, Robert, 18, 22, 27 Kambuaya, Alex Rubcn (or Merauke, I[ianJaya, 9, 20, 23, 30, 37, `Victor'),104,105,108 39, 43, 46, 47, 48, 56, 77, 78, 83, Kennedy, John F„ 26, 27 94, 126, 128, 129, 132, 133, 144, Kiki, Sir AlbertMaori, 60, 61, 65, 158, 160, 163, 178

158,159,160,163

KOPASSANDHA (Red Beret commandos), xiii, 74, 97, 98, 101, 147, 150, 153, 154

KOPKAMTIB, 59, 75, 77, 78, 88, 98,130,131,141,142,143,144,

145

Korcri movement,10,11,12,13, 99

Legal Aid Institute, 5cc LBH

Lcmbaga Bantuan Hukum, see LBH

177, 188

Missiomry Aviation Fellowship, jce

MAF Mochtar, D[, 137, 150, 152, 153, 165,178,181,187,188,191

Mofu, Eddy, xii,151,152 Moluccas, 6, 7, 65, 82,110 Murdani, L.B. (Denny), 28, 30,139, 147,150, 153, 182, 183, 187, 192 Murtopc>, Ali, 28, 41, 46 Muslim (also Muslims, Islam), 6', 7, 24, 33, 36, 45, 59, 82, 139, 140, 192

I.evi, Noel,163,167,168,169,170, 173, 175 NAACP (National Association for

LBH (I.embaga Bantuan Hukum, Legal Aid Institute), 98,138,141, 150 Lini, Fr Walter,108,109,111

Luns, DrJoseph, 25, 27, 31

theAdvancemcntofcolored Pcoplc, US), 56 Nabire, Irianjaya, 42, 47, 71,105, 139 Namaliu, Rabbie,101,106,111,174, 175,176,181,182,183,186,187,

Madang, PNG, 61,165,166,168

MAF (Missionary Aviation Fellowship), 68, 103 Majapahit empire, 6, 21 Malaysia (also Malay, Malays), 5, 6,

190, 191

National Association for the Advancement of colored Pcoplc,

jcc NAACP Natioml Committee (of New

20, 34, 55, 89, 90, 95, 123, 184

Guinea Council, Irianjaya), 25,

Malik, Adam, xiv, 28, 37, 65, 160 Malino Conference, 14, 15 Mambesak cultural group, 97, 98,

National lntclligcncc Organisation of Papua New Guinea, 5ce NIO

31' 32

Index National Liberation Council, OPM, 32, 58, 87

2'J 'I

Ortiz-Sans, Fcrmnclo, 38, /I(), £11,

42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48

National Party, see PARNA Ndani people, 4, 5, 8, 37, 46, 66, 67,Pangu Pati,161,162,163,167,16(J, 68. 124

173,175; scc a/so Somarc, Micl"i`l

Netherlands, fcc Dutch New Caledonia,1,109,111,192

Paniai Lakes area, Irianjaya, 47, 65, 67, 85, 87, 97, 143 New Guinea, 4,12,14,16,17,18, Paniai revolts, 42, 45, 47 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, ,29, 38,Paparc, Silas, 20, 24, 36 47, 107; land alicmtion, concept PAPENAL (Pasukan Pemb ebasan of, xiv, 3, 58, 71,116,121,130; mining, 8,114,115, oil, 8,115;

Nasioml), 5cc PEMKA group,

OPM

pre-World War2.1-3, 5-10,11,

Papua New Guinea, scc PNG

13,114-115,155; timber,114,115

PARNA (Natioml Party, Dutch

New Guinea Council, Irianjaya, 25, 31, 41; elections, 24-25; rec a/so

National Commjttec New Zealand,110,111,160,166

NIO (National Intelligence Organisation of papua New Guinea), 98, 99,112,168,171, 177, 178, 187

Nyaro,James, 33, 94, 96, 97, 98,

New Guinea), 24, 31,167 Partai Komums Indonesia, 5ec PKI Pasukan Pembebasan Nasional, fcc

PEMKA group, OPM PEMKA group, OPM (Pemulihan Kcadilan, also PAPENAL, TEPENAL), 65, 72, 73, 75, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 89, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 108,112,142,143,144; Freeport

104,105,106,107,113,178,185,

sabotage, 69-70; Prai forms, 64;

189; 5cc 4/Jo PEMKA

split with TPN, 64; Yuruf kidnapping 103-105; jcc a/jo

Bcmey, Elky; Derey, Alex; Nyaro, James; Prai, Jacob; De 122,146,167,185 Facto Government 0kuk, Iambakcy, 87,165,167,171, Pcmulihan Kcadilan, scc PEMKA

Ok Tedi, PNG, mining project,121,

172, 173, 182

group' OPM

Pcoplcs Progress Party ofpapua 0ndowamc, Otto, 70, 75, 120, 165, New Guinea, Jcc PPP 166 PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia), 16, 0PM (Organisasi Papua Merdcka, 18, 29, 107 Free Papua Movement): conflicts PNG (Papua New Guinea) border 0lewalc, Ebia,163,164,165,166

between TPN and PEMKA,

crossings, 61, 62, 65, 66, 75, 77, 64-65, 80, 81, 82, 84, 93, 97, 107, 90,155,158-182; independence, 160; constitution, 55, 58, 97; 61; Indonesia, co-operation within lrianjaya,163,164,165,166,170, groups listed, 78, 87; indepcndcncc 172; mining, 121,122; resistance to proclamation, 56, 58; Jcc ¢lso Arfak rebellion; De Facto Govcmment;I OPM, xiii, xiv, 43, 60-61,106,

GPL; Holtekang kidmpping; PEMKA; PNG, border crossings; Provisional Revolutionary Government; TPN; National Liberation Co uncil Organisasi Papua Mcrdeka, fcc OPM

112,163-168,170,173.175;

self-government from Australia, 59, 121; scc 4/so Blackwater camp;

border agreements; Chan, Sir Julius; NIO; Ok Tedi; Port Moresby; rcfugccs; Somare,

A.

hdonesiaL's secret war

212

Michael

Scmbiring, Brig.-Gen., 79,100,140,

Port Moresby, PNG, xiv, 33, 36, 62,

191

63, 72, 81, 87, 91,104,105,107, Scntani area, IrianJaya, 33, 45, 85, 111,112,146,156,158,159.161, 86, 89,103,104,112,142 163, 165, 168, 173, 175, 177, 178, Serui, Irianjaya, 24, 99,100,145 179,182,184,185,186,187,188 Siaguru, Tony, 160, 163, 176, 182

PPP (Pcoplcs Progress Party of

Simiopiarcf, Stephanus (Konor),11, Papua New Guinea), 161, 167; fcc 12 4/jo Chan, Sirjulius Solomon Islands,1,121,166 Prai,Jacob, 53, 54, 55, 61, 63, 64, 65, Somarc, Michael, 44, 60, 62, 75, 93, 69, 70, 75, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 96,102,111,112,113,158,159, 93,104,106,112,158,161,163,

160,161,162,163.165,166,167,

165,166,170,171i scca7so OPM,

169, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179,

PEMKA, TPN

181,184,185,186,187,189,190;

Protestant church, see GKI, MAF, 10, 52, 68,103,120,138,144

sac 4/so PNG, Pangu Pati Sorong, Irian]aya, 10, 24, 37, 56, 72,

Provisional Revolutionary Government (OPM), 74, 75, 87, 93; scc ¢/so TPN

South Pacific Forum, 96, 108, 109,

RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force),

Soviet Union (USSR), xv, 23, 26,

77, 78, 86, 94,100,104,115,118, 124 110,111.112.161,188

67, 68, 69 Ransiki people, 94, 129

Red Beret commandos; scc

KOPASSANDIIA

52, 55, 168, 171

Suband[io, Dr, 21, 22, 136 Sugiyono, Brig.-Gen.,140,187,188 Suharto. 26, 28, 29, 35, 38, 41, 50,

refugees (Irianjaya into PNG), xii,

55,118,119,123,128,132,136,

140, 147, 149, 159, 166, 167, 173, 177

xiii,11, 33, 44, 65, 75,100,101, 102,107,108.110,111,112,113,

152-192; see a/so Bhckwatcr

camp, UNHCR, Wabc) camp, Yako camp Round Table Conference, The Hague,1949,16,17,18

su54a,rz;,.i::i;,,i:,,ig''38',32,,3Z,i 35, 37, 51, 69, 86,115,140,155

Sumatra, 14, 20, 39, 82, 128 Sweden, 75, 80,166

Royal Australian Air Force, jce

RAAF

Tabu, Malthin, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79,

Rumakick, Rex, 36, 54, 80, 81, 93,

83, 89, 143

Tanah Mcrah prison camp, 9,14,18, Rumkorem, Lucas, 17, 20, 24, 51 34, 155 Rumkorem, Seth, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55,TAPOL (UK human rights 56, 58. 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, organisation), 33, 51, 67, 84, 87, 109, 149, 189

75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 92,

132, 142, 144

93, 94, 95, 98.104,111,112,130, Tcmbagapura, Irianjaya, scc 131,134,145,147,150,158,159, Freeport mining area 160,163,166,171,174,178; scc

Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, see

abo TPN, OPM Ryan, John, 36, 47, 138

TPN, Victoria group, OPM TEPENAL, 5€c PEMKA group,

Santosa, Gen.,145,172,173

Tidorc, 6, 7, 8, 21

OPM

Index

2»

Timor, 7, 13, 20, 28, 159; jcc a/so EastUNTEA (United Nntiolts

Timor TPN, Victoria group, OPM

Joe,:p,o:2:y3=,X3C;,u;]5V,C46,L,5§or[ty,, Unwin, Tom,161,165,168 52, 54, 55, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 73,U Thant, 28, 29. 41

(Tcntara Pembebasan Nasional) ,

78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 93, 94, 96, 103, 104, 160; independence Vanimo, PNG, 33, 60, 75, 81, 91, 92, 96,105,163,165,172,173,180,

proclamation, 56; split with PEMKA, 64; Jcc a/so OPM; Piai,

183,185,187,189,190,191

Vanuatu, xiv,1, 80, 81, 93,108,109,

Jacob; Rumkorem, Scth; Provisional Revolu tionary

149, 167, 174

Government Wabo refugcc camp, PNG, 161, 168,

UNCEN (University of

170, 175

Cendrawasih, Abepura, Irian

Wamem. Irianjaya. 46, 68, 69, 81,

Jaya), 53, 64, 86, 97, 99, 100, 144, 85, 88, 93, 94, 124, 139, 145, 192 146, 148, 151 Waris, Irianjaya, 56, 78, 87, 89, 143

UNHCR (United Nations High

Wayoi, Herman, 20, 31 Wayoi, Yeret, 65, 73 100,101,102,161,164,165,166,WCIP (World Cc)uncil of Indigenous

Commissioner for Refugees), 93,

168,174,180,184,186,188,191

Peoples),100,111,133

United Kingdom; fee CDC; scc a/so

West New Guinea; joe lrianjaya TAPOL, Britain West Papua; jcc lrianjaya United Nations, xiv,16,17, 21, 22, Whitlam, Cough, 21, 49 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,Womsiwor, Herman, 20, 32, 44, 55, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 93, 56, 61,160 94, 96,104,108,110,111,116, World Bank, 126, 129, 133, 134 124, 130, 134, 145, 146, 148, 155, World Council of Indigenous 160,161,162,168,169,178,180,

184, 187; fcc aJfo FUNDWI,

Ortiz Sans, Round Table

Confcrcnc.c. UNHCR, UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority; 5cc UNTEA

Peoples; fcc WCIP World War 1,155 World War 2, 10. 12, 13, 14, 17, 24, 35, 155

Wutung, PNG, 66, 78, 84, 157, 170, 171

United States ofAmrrica, xiii, 8,11, 13,15,16, :2, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28,Yako refugee camp, PNG, 161, 168, 30, ..].. 35, 41, 48, 70,112,115. 171 llF, 127,146,147,162,181,184; Yarisetouw, Fisor, 80, 94, 107

see also NIAACP

Yarisetouw, Philemon, 78, 94