Indonesia. An Alternative History

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Indonesia. An Alternative History

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FDONESI A N ALTERNATIVE HISTORY

Malcolm Caldwell

Ernst Utrecht

ALTERNATIVE PUBLISHING CO~OPERATIVE LIMITED v

First Published 1979

Alternative Publishing Co-operative Limited

10 Shepherd St, Chippendale 2008 Sydney Australia Malcolm Caldwell & Ernst Utrecht ISBN 909188 04 1; 909188 30 0 Printed in Australia by Maxwell Printing Co Pty Ltd

vi

PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

One of the two authors of this work, Malcolm Caldwell, was killed in Phnom Penh December 23rd, 1978. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 were written by Malcolm Caldwell. Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 are by Ernst Utrecht. Chapter 5 was written by Caldwell and Utrecht together. Caldwell was an Economic Historian and Political Economist, and Neo-Marxist in political outlook. His sympathies were with the currents unleashed by Mao Tse-Tung, and he was a supporter, not uncritically of the Pol Pot Government in Kampuchea. He travelled widely, and frequently, throughout South East Asia (Viet Nam, Kampuchea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, among others), but also to Mendco, Latin America, the United States, and other countries. His main fields of study were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia - and energy, in South East Asia. His main works: The Wealth o f Some Nations (Zed Press, London, 1977), with Likhor Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973), with Mohame Malaya spokesman Books, London, 1977 and 1979, two volumes), with Ernst Utrecht, An AZz'er~ native History of Indonesia, (APCOL, Sydney, 1979); Indonesia (Oxford University Press, Lon , 1968), and many articles in learned journals, including Journal o f Contemporary Asia, Race and Class, etc. A second book on Kampuchea will appear posthumously during 1979. 1]l

Ernst Utrecht has taught Law and Political Science at a number of Indonesian universities. He was a member of Indonesia's Supreme Advisory Council and is the author of two Dutch books on developments in Indonesia, and many articles. He is a Fellow of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam, a graduate of the University of Leyden, and a Research Consultant to Transnational Comporation Research Project, Department of Economics, University of Sydney. The Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D-C. afforded him their facilities and a grant for writing this work. Why an alternative history? Bourgeois academics have drawn a distorted picture of Indonesia, presenting contemporary Indonesia as a country with problems in process of solution thanks to adherence to the advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, vii

but essentially as a success story and an example for other third world countries to follow. Or, at non~specialist level, as a charming, mystic, feckless society of peasants historically, perhaps racially, ill equipped for modern society who should be encouraged to avoid the pitfalls of industrialization with all the attendant evils. The 'experts' mislead because they see Indonesia as a cornerstone of defense against the Communist threat, a country large enough, and rich enough in resources, to be an anchor for the ASEAN alliance, and

at the same time a lucrative place for investment and a supplier of vital

raw materials for the west . Caldwell worked and taught at a time when orthodox economics was in a state of confusion and coming to be taken less and less serious-

ly. There were almost as many theories as there were economists, the problems besetting the nations burgeoned.Forbidden by pecuniary and class interests from embracing Marxism, many economists in their extremity came to support ever more ruthless applications of antiinflationary measures. Precluded by historical circumstances in the metropolitan countries from applying their text-book measures in full r i g o r , they encouraged their application in third world countries, of which Chile, Brazil, Turkey, and Indonesia are best known examples. Whole populations became their guinea pigs, and in the midst of

opulent living by a few, were consigned to levels of degradation immeasurably greater than that of their ancestors. It was clear to Caldwell that his talents could be put to better use in the third world than anywhere else. The America liberal bourgeoisie, thwarted in China, were again cock-a-hoop during the burgeoning 50s and 60s, and their academic and political opposition was for the most part demoralized or co-opted into the establishment. Encouraged by the hiatus between th.e USSR and China, Viet Nam looked to the thirty-tank operators much more manageable than China had been, moreover, it occupied a key strategic position. Victory would show all the world who was boss and guarantee the 'law and order' American capitalism needed for its continued expansion. The leading western powers, particularly those with Social

Democratic leadership, went along 'in principle', but with some reservations, b y no means convinced that things were as simple as the Americans believed them to be. It is impossible to suppose that there would have been acquiescence at the fire-bombing of unprotected targets had the fifty million Vietnamese been white. Viet Nam was a turning point in world history. As Marx had fore-

told, the lid of a pander's box was opened, and remains open still, and the end is not yet in sight. Caldwell was the committed Maridst scholar par excellence, and

his contempt for those academics who, professing scholarly detachment looked with equanimity upon the deprivations viii

(now, lets not get

emotional about this) brought upon the masses in countries like Indonesia where their theories were put into practice knew no bounds. Their implicit belief that 'the end justifies the means' was anathema to him, for Caldwell opposed injustice of every sort. Although he greatly admired the achievements of the North Koreans, he was well aware that a 'personality cult' had grown about the person of Kim II Sung, and he told the North Koreans so when he visited Pyongyang. He was also a Scot, not unfamiliar with the conditions suffered by the poor in the festering slums of Glasgow - conditions even worse than those in the major English towns. No doubt the fact heightened his class consciousness, and may have helped him to identify with the poor of the third world. I had occasion once to ask him to intercede with a famous Marxist to write an introduction to a book, Caldwell replied that this was not likely to be successful, " . . . the gentleman comes from the other side of the tracks . . . I don't know him nor would I have any chance to meet him, the social circles we move in being quite different . . " Caldwell was indefatigible in his pursuit of truth and a better life for the people of South East Asia and the Third World generally. He taught, and he taught well, and when he wasn't teaching he was writing or speaking or raising funds for causes. He was a great travelled, appear ing suddenly and apparently from nowhere in any number of countries,

.

not only in S.E. Asia but in Latin America, the United States, Australia and elsewhere. The circumstances of Malcolm Caldwell's death at Phnom Penh will probably never be known. The two American journalists with him were unscathed. His death is a great loss to the liberation movements

in South East Asia and the whole progressive world. His pen was feared by a number of fascist and neo-fascist regimes, in particular those of Indonesia, Singapore and others of similar ilk in Southeast and east Asia. Cut down in the prime of his life, Caldwell gave his life to the

social revolution in Southeast Asia, and it will not be easy to replace him.

This book is dedicated to his memory, and it is fitting that for the first time in any western work the perspective is Indo riesrN-centric, and ALTERNATIVE in many respects. David K. Cleaver

Feb. 9 1979

ix

PREFA CE The first four chapters of this work were written by Malcolm Caldwell, the remainder by Ernst Utrecht. However, all the material was done in close collaboration, inevitable differences in style are apparent but have no bearing on content, the philosophy of the two authors was the same. It is hoped that this work will open up an entirely new approach to the study of Indonesian, but not only Indonesian, history. It is the first, as far as we know, "Indonesia-centric" history of Indonesia. Malcolm Caldwell Ernst Utrecht London, England, September 1978

x

INDONESIA xi

GLOSSARY abangang (s) aksel sejfhak

non-pious muslims, (or other religious), with faith diluted. one-sided action, land-grab.

A [fro .ii

stream, flow - also in the sense of "political current",

amb ifalih

take-over - in particular: the nationalisation of Dutch property in 1958.

AMPERA

Ararat Pcnderitaan Rakyat, Message of the People's Suffering Association of Southeast Asian Nations - Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, established in 1967. part of harvest (in kind) given to participants in collectively

"ideology", "thought".

ASEAN Bawon

harvesting of tice fieldsBPI CGMI CONEFO

Bacian Pus at Intelljjens, Central Intelligence Agency. Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Concentration of Indonesian Student Movements. (American) Central Intelligence Agency . Conference of the New Emerging Forces.

DEKON

Deklarasi Ekonomi, Economic Declaration

Depernas

principles of the Guided Economy, 1959-66. Dewan Perantjang National, National Planning Council,

CIA

Dewar Dejeneral Dewar Revolusi DI DN DPA

DPR

. -

the guiding

1959-61. Council of Generals Council of the Revolution, established by the military leadership of the 1 October 1965 coup movement, Darul Islam movement under leadership of Katosuwirjo > established in 1948. Dewar Nasional, National Council, 1957-9. Dewar Petirnbangan Agung, Supreme Advisory Council. Dewar Perwakilan Rakyat, the Indonesian House of Repres-

entatives. DPR~GR FDR FN GMKI

Devan Pewvakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong, House of Representatives Based on Collective Operations. Front Dernokrasi Rabat, Peoplels Democratic Front, 1947-8. Front Nasional, National Front. Gcrakan Mahasiswa Keristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian

Students' Movement. GOLKAR go to ngroyong

Golongan Katya, the military-controlled Functional Groups. collective operation, collective help - in the sense of "Indo-

GSNI

nesian socialism". Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesia Nationalist Pupils' Movement - . movement of youth at secondary

IRRA

schools. International Rubber Regulation Agreement, 1934 .

KAMI

Kesatuan Aksel Mahasiswa Indonesia, United Operations of Indonesian Students.

xii

KAPI KAPPI KBKI KNIL

KNIP Konjltorztasf

Konsepsi Presider

Konstituante KOPKAMTIB KORAMIL KORSTRAD

Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Indonesia, United Operations of Indonesian Pupils. Kesatuan Aksel Pelajar dan Pemuda Indonesia, United Operatio ns of Indonesian Pupils and Youths. Kesattian Buruh Kerakjatan Indonesia, Indonesian Pcople's Trade Union. Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army. Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat,Central Indonesian National Committee - Indonesian Parliament, 1946-9. Confrontation (with Malaysia), 1963-6 Presidential Conception of 21 February 1957. Constituent Assembly , 1956-9 . Komando Pertahanan Keamanan dan Ketcrtiban, Command for Defence, Security and Order. Komando Rayon Militer, Military Sub-district Command military command over villages or small towns. Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat, Army's Strategic Com-

.

mand. KI-IM Manfpoi Mahmillub Masjumi

MPRS NASAKOM

NEFOS NK! NHM NU Pancasfla

PARAKU Perhimi

Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, Royal Dutch Interinsular Shipping. Manifesto Politik, Political Manifest of 17 August 1959. Mahkamah Militer Luarbiasa, Extraordinary Military Court. Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Council. Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, Provisional People-:'s Congress, 1959-71. Nasionalis~Agama-KOMunis, so-operation of Nationalists,

Religious leaders and Communists. New Emerging Forces. Netherlands East Indies. Nederlandse llandels Maatschappij, Netherlands Trading Company. Nahdaltul Ulama, orthodox Moslem party. The Five Pillars, the ideology of the Indonesian Republic. Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara, North Kalimantan People's Army. Perhimpunan Mahaiswn Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Students.

Peta

Pembela Tanahair, Defenders of the Fatherland .

PGRS

Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, People's Guerrilla Army of Sarawak. Persatuan Indonesia Rays, Union of Greater Indonesia. Partai Koinmunis Indonesia, Communist Party of Indonesia. Partai Nasional Indonesia, Nationa1(ist) Party of Indonesia. Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Catholic Students. Partai Rabat Nasional, National People's party. Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia-Perdjuangan Semester, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia-Universal Struggle. Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Socialist Party of Indonesia. Patti Sarekat llslam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Federation. Resimen Pasukan Komando Angakatan Darat, Army's Special

PIR PKI PNI PMKRI PRN PRR!-Permesta

PSI PSS1 RPKAD

xiii

Command Troops. Sandal-pangan

food and clothing, the people's minimum needs.

Sentral Organ Baruh Seluruh Indonesia, All Indonesian Central Workers' Organisation. Sosialismef Indonesia Indonesian socialism Surat Perintah 11 Manet 1966, Presidential Order of 11 SF-1 I-Maret March 1966TKR Tcntara Kean anan Rabat, People's Security Force. '1'k11>11 On the outbreak of the 19454949 struggle for independence,

Kahar Muzakkar joined the guerrillas against the Dutch." Within a short time he became an officer of the so-called "16th Brigade", which consisted entirely of soldiers of non~]ava.nese origin. The first commander of the brigade, Dr Tom Pattiradjawane (who in 1950 became minister of health of the so-called "Republic of the South Moluccas"), was captured by the Dutch during their first colonial war against the Republic, and was replaced by Kahar. Second in command was Joop Warouw, a Menadonese from the northern part of Sulawesi. Relations

between the two soldiers were bad from the outset. Warouw, a Christian, was very much annoyed by Kahar's religious fanaticism and efforts to convert people to Islam. This bad relationship was to play an importand part in the events in South Sulawesi in the early l950's. After the transfer of sovereignty, Colonel Alex Kawilarang was put in charge of the 7th Military Territory Wirabuana in East Indonesia. Command in Jakarta, in particular Colonel Barnbang Supeno, had

given instructions to Kawilarang to appoint Kahar commander of the South Sulawesi Regiment. But instructions, after lending an Kawi]arang's compatriot from religionist, had convinced him

Kawilarang refused to carry out these

ear to Kahar's opponents. Warouw, Mercado in North Sulawesi and cothat appointing Kahar would mean a

serious threat to the Christian community in Makassar, that is, the

Menadonese, Ambonese and Torah inhabitants of the city. Secondly, some Buginese and Makassarese officers of noble descent, among them Majors Andi Matalata and Saleh Lahade and Captain Andi Muhammad Jusuf, had protested against .Jakarta's plans to give to Kahar, a comrnonet and non~Buginese, such a high military post. From the objections on the part of the Buginese-Makassarese aristocracy to Kahar's military leadership, it is clear that Kahar did not belong to that aristocracy. Kawilarang was successful in getting the nomination of Lieutenant-Colonel Mochtar, a Buginese aristocrat, approved by the Central Army Command. The Buginese-Makassarese

C`onsohdan'on, Nation Building and ExperzlmcnzaUcn

95

nobility accepted Mochtar's leadership, although they would have preferred the appointment of Saleh Lahade, a Makassarese landlord, who was married to the daughter of the well-known Javanese nationalist Ki Had jar Dewantoro. It was this irreparable loss of face that made Kahar decide to go

into open revolt against Jakarta. Kahar and his followers disappeared on 5 July. 1950. The next day he proclaimed an Muslim republic in South and Central Surlawesi. In 1958 Kahar's republic became a province of Kartosuwirjo's Islamic state, the D I in West Java. During the first seven years of his rebellion Kahar enjoyed support of a considerable number of Buginese and Makassarese landlords and political leaders who were members of the Masjunri or other local Muslim organisations. The local population supported Kahar not from sympathy with the idea of an Islamic state, but because Kahar's resistance to the central government in Jakarta was an advantage to their economic interests. An extensive illegal export of copra and rice flourished in the coastal areas of South Sulawesi, which were out of range of the eight battalions of the East Javanese Brawijaya Division and the gunboats of the Indonesian Navy. The copra and rice were exported to other parts of Indonesia and to the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, Copra was sent to Singapore and Hong Kong. It was this illegal barter trade, in which many Buginese and Makassarese local leaders were involved, which made them side with Kahar. By 1957, however, they

had turned their .backs upon him, only to continue an even more profitable illegal trade to co-operation with two Buginese military district commanders of the Indonesian Army in South Sulawesi, Andi Sole and Andi Sose. In Pulowali, north of Pare-Pare, Andi Sele had established a prosperous centre of illegal trade with the Philippines, North Kalimantan and Singapore. After the end of the P R R I

-

Permesta rebellion Kahar's power and influence gradually crumbled. He lost his territory and in the early morning of 3 February 1965 he was killed by a company of the Kujang Battalion of the West Java-

nese Siliwangi Division. The so-called "pacification" of South Sulawesi, after almost 15 years and being successively commanded by Colonels Gatot Subroto, Warouw and Sumual, and Brigadier-Generals Andi Matalata and Andi Muhammad Jusuf, had at long last been termi-

nated successfully. It should be noted that Gator Subroto was a Javanese Buddhist, Warouw and Sumual were Menadonese Christians, and only the two last-mentioned commanders were natives of South Sulawesi and Muslims. It is a theoretical question whether the "pacification" of South Sulawesi could have come to a successful end as early as 1953 or 1954, if Andi Matalata had been made Commander of 7th Military Territory

Wirabuana immediately after Gatot Subroto had been deprived of his military leadership by Warouw after the 17 October 1952 Affair.

96

History of Indonesia

Polit.if:.*; during Liberal Democracy

Until 5 u 1959, 'He day Sukarno introduced his Guided Democracy, the Tiidonesians experimented with a system of government which S`u'1,gi:a¢' Srudfvzs. "v'ul. 1, The Haguc,.IBunL:1un.L; 1955. J Th,P Hl1.IrTlb::rget', De CcunrrzunrM-;f:e Besvegfng iN ."»"e:*-:."»:r!ar2nr5[.'Hrrd1L*, Haarlem. 1973; H J . Banda, "the Cc-mmunislz Rebdliazrns ui' ]q"6-27",.l'*l:.f-m r" MsfunlcnlRe1=few, Vial. X8'iI"»r', nl:>.2, 1E?'55: S. Siromquist, "The Communist Liprisings o f 1926-7? in Induncsziaz A F.cinlerprela1.iun". J':,~urnal of .S'm:lheas: /I sierra .*Ir'sfr::;v. 46.

*Lhasa

"~.-"ul, E, rl1:r.2, I9'11?. HJ. Dcnrja and Rum T. N1l;*v'E§»'. The Cunrmrarriw L§r>n.uf,=zg5

:JI F926-2?i»r

frzdn:res:'u. H-eja' Dnnusrrerrrs. Ithaca, New "we-rk. 1*16{};

Rulh T. McKay, :r'?£& Rise* u.r!1rdwlesMrl Lbrnmuaaisrzi. Ithaca. New York. wav';

.

47. L. Palr.tit=1. Cnmmunfxrs in Indonesia, Elev York, 1973, FF-Bl-E2: this WM8. is

8

travesty and cannot be taken seriously,

except perhaps as a mntributiun to, nr illustration of, "CIA-1llanda*in" literature .

48.

Studies of the rise of lndunesian nationalism abound. Again, the following are lnrunded only lu uITurd a departure point: LM. Fluvier, Ovzfrafnhr Val! de Ontwikkeiing der .-Vatienmisclle Heweging in fndbnesia in de Jaffa 1936 for 1942. The Hague! Bandung, l'J53;

198

Hisroryof Indonesia

D. Dahm. Sukarno and the Struggle _a'22r lrldrynexinn Independence, Ithaca, New York, 19691 R. van Neil, The Hrlergerrcé ofrhc Modem [ndonesiarf Elite. The Hague, 1960,

D. Noer, The McJa'erurlst Muslim Afownzenr in Indonesia, F9l'J{II-I942, London. 19T3.

--

40 . For biographies of Sukarno in addition t o Dahmls cited in footnote 46 above - sci: ; J.D. Lunge.. .iukamrn A Polr'zi¢'al 8ingra,r1'hy. London. 1972, Cilldy Adams. Suicurnn, an nrxrrnhiogruplly. is' raid' to Cindy Adams, Indianapolis, 1965, C,L.M. Fenders, The Life and Timex ufSukamo, Cranbuly. NJ. 1974. P.C. Hauswedcll. "Sukarno; Radical Ur Conservatlve"". Indonesia, no,]5, April, 1973. 5 EI

S-:c .*L:i!s8 Za:in1LdL1in, A

5'Ea.r:»rr I1'fSE,w_"' c,1.,l"!m:fr51na'5'l'a', Sydney, 1968. p p l UE-201, tact a brits! a1cLtc:unL

After 197(>-'?`, national pre-occupation with such matters as education. hygiene and unhcr aspects o f wrzliare among lhc

Indonesian rural and urban masses came to the fore. The need may be illustrated hv the fact :had there were onto 178 Indoresins in University in the Indies in 1930-3), and at mere 5,223 :to Dutch nlcdiurrl zechnicai colleges (.T.S. Furnivul1,op.ciL, p.377} out of a population of nearly 60,000,000 Other aspects of the imbalance oflndonesian society precipiturerl by colonialism may be illustrated from Furnivall (for example the material on tax payments on p.34B), but in must be bomc in mind that he was a keen admirer and supporter o f Dutch rule, a slant which undoubtedly colors and limits his narrative. lt is interesting no speculate what he might have written about the Somlt. Africa o f the 1960s and early 19705. The analogy is not strained. 52,

The debate on peasants and revoiutirm is best approached o f course through the writings of successful leaders o f peasant

movements such as Men Tse-lung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Kim II Sung, and their like. Secondary sources of interest include.

Ilamza Afr vi. "Peasants and Revolution", Socialicr Register, London, 1965, Teodor Shu fin, "Class and R:volu1ion",Jnnrnai' of Coanernprirary Asfa, Val. 1,no.2. 19F0, Jack Bolden, China Shakes the World, London' NTH, William Hinton, Fanshern. London, 19?3; A Foster.Career, "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelnpmean"Journal o{Cunrr:mpomry Asia, Vol. 3, nn,l

,

19 . 3. The debate, of course, continues, as docs the struggle.

53. The controversy on whether Indonesians possessed "business sense" [for what it is worth, posing as it does the wrong qwestions in the wrong context) may be sampled in:

W.F. We their et al. (ed:s.], Mdonesihn Econoconics, The Hague, 1961, J j E. Bourke, Ecwwnaics and Economic Policy ufDua! Societies, Haarlem, 1953, C. Geerlz, Pedlars and Princes, Chicago, 1963. 54.

Thu subject o f the Chinese in Suulh East A1211 has produced its own voluminous literature, those interested are referred in essay on :he subject by G. William Skinner in Rush T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia, Inca, New York, 1963, and to the useful annolatcd bibliography on the subject appended thereto .

Chapter Five 1.

Do .longs openly sympanhised with German and Dutch fascist movements during the thirties. See s.L. van der Wal, HaMmerMgen van J'Far. Mn BC de Jung (Memoirs ofB,C. de Jorge), Grnnigen, 1968,

2.

LFM. Salim, I/ifnen jaarBoven-Dtgoel, concenfrarrirkarnp in Nfeuw Guinea; .Bakernaal van de Indonesfsche Onanthande£r}ikheid (I-iftrcn Years Buren-Diogoel, Concentration Camp in New Guinea: Cradle of Indonesian Independence), Amsterdam, 1973.

3.

Literature on the Japanese occupation periods includes the following:

K. de Weerd, 7?re.faparrera Occupation nf !-*I8 Netherlands Eos: Indies, Tokyo, 194-6; DH. Meyer. Japan wind' den oorlog' Documenlen over Java(Japan is winning the War' Documents Conccming Java), Maaalrincht

,

1946; AJ, Piekaar, Ariel: en de oorlog met fapau (Aljch and :he war with Japan). The Haguc,'Bund11ng, 1949: W,H. Elsbree,J'apan 's role in Snurherrsz Asian Nalirmahsf .!W(wernenls, 194045, Cambridge, Mass. 1953,

R.A.A .S,M. Garldasubrata, An Account of fize Japanese Occupation o.tlBa:rlamas Residency, llhaca, New York, 1953 , A A - Zorab, De .fapanse bezerring van Indonesia en Han! valkerrrechrelijke zfidi- (The Iapancsc Occupation o f Indonesia and its

problems in international law). Leiden, 1954, M.A. Aziz, leper's Chmnialism and Indonesia, The Hague. 1955,

HJ. Banda, The Crescent and the Rr'szng Sun, The Hague.lBandung, 1958; LJ. Brugrnans, Nederlmdsch-!ndr'e order Japunse bezeltirrg [Netherlands India under the Iapanese occupation), Franeker, 1960, C. McT. Kuhn, NWfiorzuiisM and Revolruimr in Indunexiu, Ithaca, New York, 1952,

B. Dalim, Sukarno arid lie 5!m88/e trnr Indonesian Indcperrdence, Ithaca, New York, 19691 B. Anderson,Jm'a in rev Time o}'Revv»lurimi, ltharra, New York, I9'?2, L.E.L_ Sluimers, Samurai, Pemuda and S'aka'm'rlsla.' Die Japancr :my Der Rudikalismru in mdonesien um! den Pfziiippirren (Samurai,

Pcmudil and Sakdalislaz Thr: Japanese Radical Movements in Indonesia and the Philippines), Amsterdam, l9?2. "From 19] I lo 1917, there werentleastnincuprisings in east Indonesia (live ill Sulawesi, :md nfhem in Ambon,Ba]l, Lombok and T=rnale}." Ailsa Zainuddh, A Short Marcy of Indonesia, Melbourne, 1963. Sec also Sarene Kanndirdju,"Agmrian

radicalism in Java", in Claire Holt (ed). Culture and Pulnfvs In Indonesia, Ithaca. new York, 1972, 5. Air

The Hel He was the Japanese-levied Auxiliary Armed Forces. which by the and ul' hostilities numbered 25,000 men, officered by Japanese: it was intended to help in the general deface of :he archipelago against the Aili's. The Feta (Pembela Tanali Futherlund Defense Forum) recruited 37,000 liulnncsinn youth br tough and disciplined military training; Pete units were

-

intended for local guerilla warfare against Allied invaders. The Muslim groups hai! their own armed Force the Bariszm Hizbullah! it was fonm.-d later than the others, and never exuaulerl about S00 men. Naturally, experience gained in such service was at a later

dare to sane the nationalist cause well. 6.

in Bernard Dahrn's book one can find a number of examples. In September, Sukarno publicly announced that the Japanese military administration had Made it clear Lhal Japan had subjugated the Dutch and not the Indonesians. Japan had never intended ID conquer Indonesia. Japan had not come to Indonesia with the intention of oppressing the Indonesian people. Apart from Sukarno and the Japanese authorities there was no one among the audience of 2LlU,00D people who knew that o f this state-

mem only the last sentence had originally been fabricated bi' the Japanese, the other two sentences being of Sukalnols own creation. The Japanese oneal[