Indo-Burma Frontier and the Making of the Chin Hills: Empire and Resistance [1 ed.] 1138384607, 9781138384606

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
CONTENTS
List of illustrations and tables
List of abbreviations
Preface
Foreword
Introduction
1 Situating the Indo-Burma frontier within the larger context of British imperial policy
2 Frontier policy: problem of the Arakan frontier
3 Manipur frontier: Kamhau-Sukte and Meitei relations
4 Colonial penetration: explorations, expeditions and resistance
5 Colonial policy backfired: disarmament and resistance
6 Administrative developments: ‘indirect rule’ and the making of colonial ‘agents’
7 The Chin Hills District: towards consolidation
Conclusion
Glossary
Appendices
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

INDO-BURMA FRONTIER AND THE MAKING OF THE CHIN HILLS

This book examines the British colonial expansion in the so-called unadministered hill tracts of the Indo-Burma frontier and the change of colonial policy from non-intervention to intervention. The book begins with the end of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), which resulted in the British annexation of the North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal and the extension of its sway over the Arakan and Manipur frontiers, and closes with the separation of Burma from India in 1937. The volume documents the resistance of the indigenous hill peoples to colonial penetration; administrative policies such as disarmament; subjugation of the local chiefs under a colonial legal framework and its impact; standardisation of ‘Chin’ as an ethnic category for the fragmented tribes and sub-tribes; and the creation and consolidation of the Chin Hills District as a political entity to provide an extensive account of British relations with the indigenous Chin/Zo community from 1824 to 1935. By situating these within the larger context of British imperial policy, the book makes a critical analysis of the British approach towards the IndoBurma frontier. With its coverage of key archival sources and literature, this book will interest scholars and researchers in modern Indian history, military history, colonial history, British history, South Asian history and Southeast Asian history. Pum Khan Pau is Assistant Professor, Department of History, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India. He was Raman Post-Doctoral Fellow at Arizona State University, USA (2014–15). His area of specialisation is in the history of the indigenous tribes of the Indo-Burma borderlands during colonial and postcolonial times. He has published in the Indian Historical Review, Strategic Analysis, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Journal of Religion and Society, Journal of Burma Studies, Journal of Borderlands Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies and chapters in edited volumes.

INDO-BURMA FRONTIER AND THE MAKING OF THE CHIN HILLS Empire and Resistance

Pum Khan Pau

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Pum Khan Pau The right of Pum Khan Pau to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All maps in this book are historical in nature and included solely for representative purposes. The international boundaries, coastlines, denominations, and other information shown do not necessarily imply any judgement concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such information. For current boundaries, readers may refer to the Survey of India maps. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Pau, Pum Khan, author. Title: Indo-Burma frontier and the making of the Chin Hills: Empire and resistance / Pum Khan Pau. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019018705 (print) | ISBN 9781138384606 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429324703 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Anti-imperialist movements—Burma. | Chin (Southeast Asian people)—History. | Chin State (Burma)—History. | Burma—History—1824–1948. | India—History—British occupation, 1765–1947. | Great Britain—Colonies—Administration. | Great Britain—Colonies—Boundaries. | Burma—Boundaries—India. | India—Boundaries—Burma. Classification: LCC DS530.8.C45 P38 2020 (print) | LCC DS530.8.C45 (ebook) | DDC 959.1/04—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019018705 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019980559 ISBN: 978-1-138-38460-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-32470-3 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

T O M Y G R A N D PA R E N T S TO N T H A N G & N O K Z A M PA R E N T S N O K S WA N L I A N & Z E N K H A N V U N G

CONTENTS

List of illustrations and tables List of abbreviations Preface Foreword

1

ix x xi xiv

Introduction

1

Situating the Indo-Burma frontier within the larger context of British imperial policy

6

2

Frontier policy: problem of the Arakan frontier

29

3

Manipur frontier: Kamhau-Sukte and Meitei relations

53

4

Colonial penetration: explorations, expeditions and resistance

86

5

Colonial policy backfired: disarmament and resistance

119

6

Administrative developments: ‘indirect rule’ and the making of colonial ‘agents’

147

The Chin Hills District: towards consolidation

184

7

vii

CONTENTS

Conclusion

207

Glossary Appendices Bibliography Index

217 219 226 238

viii

ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

Maps 0.1 0.2 2.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2

Burma/Myanmar and its neighbouring areas British Burma: administrative districts Arakan Hill Tracts Manipur–Chin Hills boundary map, 1894 Manipur and Chin Hills boundary map, 1880s The Chin Hills District, 1930 The political division of the Union of Burma

xvii xviii 44 162 165 198 202

Tables 3.1 Frontier military posts of Manipur in the south, 1871–72 4.1 Sickness among British troops 5.1 List of Chin/Zo villages visited by the Kamhau Column, 1891–92 5.2 Number of guns collected from each tribe as on 1 April 1894

ix

67 103 121 138

ABBREVIATIONS

ASA FEAP FEBP FPAP FPBP FPEP FSEP FSC FPC IOL&R JASB JBRS NAI WBSA

Assam State Archives Foreign External-A Proceeding Foreign External-B Proceeding Foreign Political-A Proceeding Foreign Political-B Proceeding Foreign Political-E Proceeding Foreign Secret-E Proceeding Foreign Secret Consultation Foreign Political Consultation India Office Library and Record Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal Journal of Burma Research Society National Archives of India West Bengal State Archives

x

PREFACE

The Chin/Zo people are an ethnic group of the Indo-Burma borderlands settled predominantly in the Chin Hills District, now Chin State of Myanmar and its adjoining areas. From the last decade of the nineteenth century when these hills were brought under British rule till 1935, they were under the administration of the British Indian Government. Until relatively recently the Chin/Zo people had not received adequate attention at the hands of historians either in Burma/Myanmar or in India in particular and South Asianists or Southeast Asianists in general, and as a result, the literature on the Chin/Zo remains limited. Standard textbooks on Burma, such as J. S. Furnivall’s Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge 1948), John F. Cady’s A History of Modern Burma (New York 1958), Thant Myint-U’s The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge 2004) and Mary P. Callahan’s Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca 2005) make only sketchy references to the Chin/Zo people. One of the earliest works on the relations between the Chin/Zo and the British was Charles Crosthwaite’s contemporary account, The Pacification of Burma (1912), dealing with Chin/Zo resistance against the imposition of colonial rule. Dorothy Woodman’s The Making of Burma (London 1962) covers much the same ground, but in one chapter. Among the anthropological and sociological studies on the Chin/Zo, H.N.C. Stevenson’s The Economics of the Central Chin Tribes ([1943] 1986) and F. K. Lehman’s The Structure of Chin Society ([1963] 1980) remain standard accounts. A diary of E. H. East in Burma Manuscript (1983), Robert G. Johnson’s History of the American Baptist Chin Missions (1988) in two volumes and Laura Hardin Carson’s Pioneer Trials, Trails and Triumphs ([1927] 1997) not only provide valuable information on the activities of early missionaries of the Chin Hills but also throw some light on the socio-economic life of the Chin/Zo. Vumson’s Zo History (1986), Sing Khaw Khai’s Zo People and Their Culture (1995) and Lian H. Sakhong’s In Search of Chin Identity (2004) are recent studies by native Chin/Zo scholars, albeit with limitations. A very recent work on the Northern Chin Hills is T. Gin Khaw Thang and Pauneikhai Suantak’s Tributary Hill Polity (2017). However, none of these publications deal adequately xi

P R E FAC E

with the Chin Hills, nor did they use archival sources. They are mainly based on published materials. My study of the Chin/Zo people is based largely on primary and secondary sources. The bulk of the work is drawn from archival materials which are examined critically. This is one of the pioneering works on the Zo (Chin-Kuki-Lushai) people of the Indo-Burma borderlands and it is intended to fill the historiographical gap between the colonial ‘NorthEastern Frontier of India’ and British Burma in particular, and South Asia and Southeast Asia in general. This book is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of History, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, India. It would be apt to mention the circumstances which helped in shaping the contours of my academic endeavours. It all began with my grandparents, Ton Thang and Nok Zam. From a remote hill village in the Indo-Burma border, my grandparents moved to the plain of Lamka (Lamka zaang) in Churachandpur District of Manipur chiefly in search of better livelihood and opportunity for the education of their children. This vision of my grandparents to gain education became the guiding spirit of my parents. Toeing the line of my grandparents, my parents Nok Swan Lian and Zen Khan Vung took utmost interest and concern in providing education to their children. They often not only insisted upon their children to study and pursue education, but also devotedly and unsparingly prayed for them even in the middle of the night. It still reverberates in my ears, the late-night prayers of my father for his children. Though it is one of the hardest things to accept the fact that my father is no longer around to see this book, I am happy and fortunate to have my mother around to share all the credits with her (late) husband. I would like to put on record my sincere gratitude to Professor Imdad Hussain who has done me an honour by agreeing to write the Foreword of the book. Formerly Head, Department of History, and Dean, School of Social Sciences, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Prof. Hussain has an indepth knowledge and expertise in frontier and military history, particularly with reference to the North-Eastern Frontier of India. I am immensely fortunate and grateful to have worked under his supervision. It is not only his distinguished scholarship but also his cordiality and friendliness to his scholars, especially to me, that made me feel privileged. Today, if my academic endeavour is of any value, it is because of the mentoring I have received from Prof. Hussain. I would also like to acknowledge the financial support I received from the University Grants Commission (New Delhi) through the award of Junior Research Fellowship (JRF) and Senior Research Fellowship (SRF) during the course of my research. I express my thanks to the faculty and staff of the Department of History, North-Eastern Hill University and also to my colleagues in the Department of History, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, for the academic environment I have shared with them then and now. I am greatly indebted to many friends with whom I had academic interactions and gained a lot of knowledge from their scholarship and expertise: Khup xii

P R E FAC E

Za Go, L. Lam Khan Piang, Kham Khan Suan Hausing, Letkholen Lhungdim, Pum Lam Mang, A. K. Thakur, Vanlalruata Rengsi, Robert Thongkholal Haokip, Yasmin Saikia, Chad Haines, Juliane Schober, David Vumlallian Zou, Sajal Nag, Arpita Sen, David R. Syiemlieh, Khup Khan Thang Taithul, Stephen Khup Chin Pau, Jangkhomang Guite, D. Letkhojam Haokip, T. K. Muana, S. Pau Khan Enn, C. Thang Za Tuan, J. M. Ngul Khan Pau, S. Neng Za Khup, T. K. Suan, Peter Gin Khan Do and many others. Thanks to my brother Nok Khan Langh who helped me in preparing some of the maps. To my elder brother Thang Sian Mang (eldest amongst six brothers and one sister), who sacrificed his own educational pursuit and joined the Army Medical Corps to support the education of his younger siblings, I am greatly indebted. I would have had never gone for post-graduation studies, but might have rather landed somewhere as a private school teacher without my elder brother’s support. The unfailing love, encouragement and support of my parents, my two aunts (Ni) D. N. Manno and (Ni) Niang Sian Cing and their families, my siblings, relatives, in-laws and well-wishers became the backbone of my endeavour. The prayer and timely support, morally and financially, I received from them during the course of my research sustained my interest till its completion. This work would not have seen the dawn of light had it not been for the selfless support and endurance of my wife Niang Van Ngai and our three lovely children Lian Muan Thang Tanghau, Cin Khan Khual Tanghau and Vung San Hoih Tanghau. They are always readily and prayerfully available for me even in my trying and challenging times. What I thought was a disturbance/interruption by my daughter – who often climbs up on my lap and takes control of my laptop while my work is in full swing – turns out to be her contribution to give me some physical and mental relaxation from concentrated and monotonous work. I am extremely grateful to Routledge and its editorial team for their interest in my work and also for the continuous support and cooperation in the process of the publication of this book. Above all, may all the glory and honour be to Almighty God, to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude for His abundant blessings.

xiii

FOREWORD

‘Recent studies of India’s landward periphery have hardly even scraped the surface of the real problem’, wrote Parshotam Mehra, one of the country’s leading historians of the India-China frontier, some four decades ago, ‘namely to provide a framework for reference on which developments on the frontier could be viewed in their historical perspective’. Curiously, in discussing the evolution of the McMahon Line in India’s North East Frontier Mehra has all but ignored its easternmost or Burma-end. This section, extending northwards from the Izu Razi pass to the Diphu pass near the Assam-Burma-China trijunction, constitutes only a small portion of Burma’s equally sprawling eastern and northeastern territorial limits. The annexation of Upper Burma after the third and final Anglo-Burmese War had pushed the eastern frontier of British India to the edge of China’s Yunan Province. The imperial rivalries that created these frontiers, some by negotiation, some others by Britian’s unilateral Declaration, and which brought diverse peoples within the fold of their Empire, has surprisingly not yet attracted the attention of historians. Dorothy Woodman’s excellent if a little dated The Making of Burma (London 1962) is perhaps the only exception. By and large, therefore, it is to the anthropologist Edmund Leach for the Kachins and Frank Lehman for the Chins, we have to turn for any knowledge of these colourful frontier peoples and their brush with European imperialism. In this arid field, Pum Khan Pau’s Indo-Burma Frontier and the Making of the Chin Hills should stand out as a useful and timely corrective. This story when placed within the broader perspective of empire building and the methods of control over conquered territories and peoples should acquire an even greater interest. I shall refer to a few of these. The Chin Hills, now the Chin State of Myanmar, was Burma’s northwestern frontier. It is another if more striking example of how colonial needs created frontiers and, when that need passed, obliterated them. One may recall the disappearance (even in textbooks) of Bengal’s south-eastern and south-western frontiers as the territories that lay beyond them were incorporated into the Presidency by the East India Company. The Chin hills remained a frontier only briefly after the British occupation of Upper Burma. xiv

FOREWORD

The building of roads through these hills to link India with Burma and the laying out of an administrative system together put an end to the Chin hills as a frontier. Conflicting claims by Bengal, Assam and Burma upon this vast country, the Chin-Lushai hills as it came to be called after the annexation of the adjoining Lushai hills (now the Indian state of Mizoram), however, prevented the emergence of a single state as each province retained parts of the conquered territory. The Chin hills largely remained with Burma. But the boundaries of the three provinces, determined on the administrative convenience of each, ignoring ethnicity and common culture have left a potent source for future conflicts. With the re-emergence of the Chin hills as a frontier after the separation of Burma from India (1935–37) and more especially with each of them becoming independent nations that possibility is closer to reality. The India-China border dispute is not the only legacy gifted by Britain to her successor governments in South and Southeast Asia. That European imperial expansion in Asia as in Africa was contested by the indigenous people, which this book addresses, is the second facet that deserves underscoring. British occupation and dominance of the Chin hills was neither easy nor peaceful. The Chin tribes like their western neighbours the Lushais (more correctly known today as Mizos) and the Kachins further away to the northeast took up arms to resist the ‘outsiders’. Their opposition was protracted leading many British officers to use the term rebellion instead of resistance. A useful definition of these terms is made by the editors of that excellent collection of case studies, Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York 1970), Robert Rotberg and Ali Mazrui. ‘Resistance’, they write, is Opposition to external hegemony and occupation prior to the time when the alien power has imposed upon a conquered territory a new administrative framework (whether or not fully effective) requiring obedience to alien values. Rebellion is the militant expression at this later phase. The response of Africans wherever they were able to put up a show of resistance was varied according ‘to the nature of the alien thrust, the indigenous perception of the potency of the thrust, the structure of the society being defended, the political abilities of its leaders, and each side’s deferential access to the modern instruments of combat’. This has also been the experience in the case of many of the tribes in India’s northeastern hills and Burma’s Kachins. We know see it for sure in the Chin hills. We also know now who the Kamhaus were, the subdivisions or clans within the Suktes, the identity of the Sizang, of the Hakas and the Tashons or Taisuns as Pau calls them. So also the various ‘Kuki’ tribes in the northern hills who for long had been a thorn at the side of the Manipur authorities (an appendix at the end of the book showing the proper names of the tribes xv

FOREWORD

incorrectly rendered in British records and contemporary literature and their correct form will be found useful). What comes out in sharper relief is the political structure of the Chins and its bearing on the ‘pacification’ process. The Chin Hills Regulation, into which an administrative system based on the indigenous structure of chiefs and headmen was incorporated, is the Chin hills version of indirect rule. The closing of the brutal military operations and the replacement of the army by military police into which many of the tribes were enrolled, was apparently an aspect of pacification. It was undoubtedly a fundamental feature of colonial policy. The point has been brought out in a study of French colonial warfare in the 1943 version of Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Edward Mead Earle: Different in means (from continental warfare), colonial warfare is also different in goal: it aims not at the destruction of the enemy but at the organization of the conquered peoples and territory under a particular control. As far as possible, it must avoid destruction during the campaign; first, in order to preserve the productive potential of the theatre of operations and thus economize the supplies coming from more distant bases; but more important because the conquered country is to be integrated immediately after the conquest into the ‘imperial’ whole, politically as well as economically. It is in all respects desirable, therefore, that the territory should be in the best posssible condition when conquest has been effected. The problem is not so much ‘to defeat the enemy in the most decisive manner’ as to subordinate him at the lowest cost and in a way to guarantee permanent pacification. These are but a few random thoughts that I felt might help to better appreciate Dr Pum Khan Pau’s study on the Chin hills of present Myanmar. That he has brought to bear on it a personal knowledge of the indigenous political and social systems while still maintaining historical detachment adds to its value. He is himself a Chin or more correctly a descendant of the Tedim Chins who had long settled in the southern frontier of the Indian state of Manipur. Studies on India’s North Eastern frontiers and the neighbouring countries formed an important part of the research programme of the department of History of the North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, which I had the privilege of directing during my years in the university. Pau’s is a significant work under that programme and enriches our knowledge and understanding of an important area on the India-Myanmar frontier. I am certain it will stimulate further work on other equally important frontier areas of the two countries. Shillong, June 2019 Imdad Hussain xvi

Map 0.1 Burma/Myanmar and its neighbouring areas Source: Map reproduced with the permission of CartoGIS Services, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

Map 0.2 British Burma: administrative districts Source: Redrawn by author from a map produced by Map Section, L&R Department, FCO, September 1981.

INTRODUCTION

Empire and imperialism remain as relevant today as in the past, as reflected in the growing popularity of imperial history. However, ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ are blanket terms and demand careful consideration (Doyle 1986; Bush 2006). According to Barbara Bush, ‘empire’ is a bounded geographical entity which is a less loaded term than ‘imperialism’. It inscribes social, cultural and political relations of power between the empire and its subordinated periphery, whereas ‘imperialism’ is a subjective term that is ideologically loaded and conveys a range of conflicting meanings (2006: 2). To Edward Said, ‘imperialism’ means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory (1994: 8). The word ‘empire’ stretches back 2,000 years to the Latin imperium (Bush 2006). According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, The concept comes down to us through a long, primary European tradition, which goes back at least to ancient Rome, whereby the juridico-political figure of Empire was closely linked to the Christian origins of European civilizations. There the concept of Empire united juridical categories and universal ethical values, making them work together as an organic whole. . . . The concept of Empire is presented as a global concert under the direction of a single conductor, a unitary power that maintains the social peace and produces its ethical truths. (2000: 10) Different meanings are ascribed to empire over time as Barbara Bush says, ‘Empire, imperium, reich, commonwealth, all imply expansion of states outside their territory, a widening of geographical space, either by land or sea, extending boundaries of power and influence’ (2006: 1–2). However, Bush further argues that ‘empires have waxed and waned, merged and dissolved for thousands of years and, without such empires, there would be no “modern world”’ (Ibid.: 4). But empire and imperial history is not only about

1

INTRODUCTION

extending boundaries and influence. In this regard, Bush explains that with the postcolonial ‘turn’, imperial history became ‘sexy’. Other disciplines, in particular geography and cultural and literary studies, have muscled in on an area formally dominated by historians and political scientists (Ibid.: 5). Perhaps empire and imperial expansion do not happen without challenge or resistance by the indigenous people. This is clearly explained by Walter Nugent, who says ‘no “new” (to Europeans) region was truly empty. No region of the world, tropical, or temperate, to which people of European stock migrated in the 1870–1914 period, lacked indigenous people’ (1989: 397). With regard to the expansion of British Empire to different parts of the world, Richard Gott argues that ‘the British were for the most part loathed and despised by those they colonized’ (2011: 5). He further says, While a thin crust of colonial society in the Empire – princes, bureaucrats, settlers, mercenary soldiers – often gave open support to the British, the majority of the people always held the colonial occupiers in contempt, and they made their views plain whenever the opportunity arose. (Ibid.) The late nineteenth century witnessed a series of encounters between empire builders and the so-called frontierspeople all across the world, and the encounters in the Indo-Burma frontier was part of such larger imperial expansion. According to Nugent, In the New World, Canada, the United States, Brazil and Argentina confronted relatively weak native peoples whereas Germany, France, and Britain superimposed upon peoples and civilizations older than their own, as in South and East Asia, or at least radically different from theirs, as in Africa and Oceania. The frontierspeople and the empire-builders differed less in who they themselves were than in whom they met. (1989: 397–8) However, frontiers differed from each other, not just geographically but also demographically and culturally (Ibid.: 400). This book is about the encounters and relationships between empire builders and the so-called frontierspeople or indigenous hill tribes in the Indo-Burma frontier in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By taking up this project, it is intended to fill the historiographical gap between Southeast Asian and South Asian studies in general and Burma/Myanmar and Northeast India studies in particular. Today, the Indo-Burma borderlands remain academically understudied, especially through the lens of history and borderlands perspectives, albeit it has become a place of convergence for two area studies – South Asia and 2

INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asia – which have emerged in the post–Second World War period. Hence the relevance of this historical study. The main theme of this book includes the penetration of the British Empire into the so-called unadministered hill tracts of the Indo-Burma frontier; change of colonial policy from non-intervention to intervention; resistance of the indigenous hill peoples to colonial penetration and its administrative policy, such as disarmament and subjugation of the chiefs under a colonial legal framework; and the creation and consolidation of the Chin Hills District as a political entity. It begins with the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), which not only resulted to the British annexation of the ‘NorthEastern Frontier of Bengal’ and extension of its sway over Arakan, but also facilitated their contact with the hill peoples of these frontiers. The period ends with 1935, which marks the enactment of the Government of India Act that led to the separation of Burma from India and thereby changed the trajectory of colonial policy towards the frontier people. Though this work has widely consulted published secondary sources, it is largely grounded on primary documents available in the National Archives of India (New Delhi), West Bengal State Archives (Kolkata), National Library (Kolkata), Asiatic Society (Kolkata), Assam State Archives (Guwahati), and other primary sources accessed from Arizona State University (USA) and elsewhere. The first chapter discusses the importance of the location of the IndoBurma frontier at a crossroads of India’s economic relations with China and Burma in the precolonial period. It seeks to situate the frontier within the larger context of British imperial policy by examining the expansion of the British Indian Empire in the ‘North-Eastern Frontier’ and the debates surrounding the establishment of ‘formal’ empire in Burma. While arguing that the Indo-Burma frontier is a sub-region of Zomia, this chapter also dwells on the land and the people of the Chin Hills, explains the etymology of the terms ‘Chin’ and ‘Zo’ – both of which are being employed in this work to refer to the people of the Chin Hills in general – examines indigenous hill polity and society and the early relationship between the hills Chin/Zo and plains Burmans. The second chapter probes the early contacts between the British and the Chin/Zo people whose lands marched with the frontier of Arakan. It deals with the annexation of Arakan after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824– 26) which brought the British into immediate contact with the Chin/Zo in its northern hills. The main discussion in this chapter is on colonial policy towards the Arakan frontier and the demarcation of an administrative unit and the appointment of a Superintendent of the Hill Tribes in Northern Arakan. This arrangement remained unchanged till the annexation of the Chin Hills. The third chapter investigates British intervention in the affairs of Manipur that in turn paved the way for their coming into contact with the Chin/ 3

INTRODUCTION

Zo in the region south of its borders. The establishment of a political agency in Manipur in 1835 for the defence of the British ‘North-Eastern Frontier’ coincided with the rise to power of the Sukte under their Chief Khan Thuam and his son Kam Hau in the Northern Chin Hills. How did the British visà-vis the Raja of Manipur deal with the rising Sukte paramountcy in the Northern Chin Hills and to what extent was their frontier policy a success is the main thrust in this chapter. What prompted the British to change its policy from non-intervention to intervention in the aftermath of the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86) is critically examined in the fourth chapter. A series of military operations launched by the British against the Chin/Zo and the stiff resistance in the form of guerilla tactics they had encountered from the latter as they sought to take control over the Chin Hills has been closely examined in this chapter. The fifth chapter critically analyses the general disarmament policy of the British and how it severely hurt the Chin/Zo sentiments, who considered guns one of their most prized possessions. It also examines how colonial disarmament policy backfired and resulted in a strong resistance movement, since the disarmament policy made guns the bone of contention between the British and the Chin/Zo. To what extent gun licensing was a success as far as disarmament was concerned is also examined. The sixth chapter analyses colonial discussion and debate over the future civil and military administration of the Chin-Lushai Hills at the Chin-Lushai Conference at Fort Williams in 1892. It analyses the debate over the question of ‘amalgamation’ of the Chin-Lushai Hills, the newly acquired hill tracts which had been divided into three administrative units, and the reasons behind its failure. The boundary demarcation of Manipur and Chin Hills, as an immediate outcome of the failed Chin-Lushai Conference has been critically examined. Also prominent in this chapter is the promulgation of the Chin Hills Regulation Act 1896, which laid the legal framework for the administration of the Chin Hills through ‘indirect rule’, the problem in the Pakokku Hills, and the response of the Chin/Zo to the call for Labour Corps during the First World War. The seventh chapter investigates the extension of the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 to the Somra Tract in 1917 and also to other adjoining areas. By this means the British slowly absorbed the Northern Arakan Hill Tracts in 1928 and the Pakokku Hill Tract in 1930, which finally created the Chin Hill District. But the system of administration was not uniform in the Chin Hills. A large part of directly administered strip of territory outside it was brought under what was called ‘loose political control’ and there were, in addition, pockets of unadministered tracts beyond these. The entire Chin Hills was declared a ‘backward tract’ under the Government of India Act 1919 and ‘scheduled’ or ‘excluded areas’ by the Act of 1935 outside the control of Ministerial Burma.

4

INTRODUCTION

In the conclusion, the main arguments of the chapters are summarised. While the British became informed, albeit partially, about the Chin/Zo through their contact with them in the frontiers of Arakan and Manipur, respectively, such contact did not have any influence to change the conventional non-interventionist policy they had been following towards the frontier. What prompted the British to completely change their frontier policy to intervention was the realisation of the strategic importance of the IndoBurma frontier after the fall of Upper Burma. This was swiftly followed by a series of military expeditions for annexation of the hill tracts. However, the guerilla tactics used by the Chin/Zo and the numerous availability of guns in their possessions became a thorn in the heels of the colonial soldiers who had to resort to the most barbaric means, such as wholesale burning of the crops and villages of the indigenous resisters. At the end of the day, it was through a forceful disarmament policy that indigenous resistance was broken and the British finally took control over the hill tracts in the early 1890s. That the Chin/Zo people, however, did not reconcile to colonial rule is an undeniable fact that had been manifested through the uprisings against their colonial masters during the First World War. Also, the separation of Burma from India by the Government of India Act in 1935 was the beginning of the division of the Chin/Zo people into different nation states in the postcolonial time. With that, the trajectories of the history of Chin/Zo people have also been shaped accordingly. The conclusion also highlights the need to pay attention to the fragmentation of indigenous space by colonial and postcolonial borders and how borders have shaped and dictated identity and belonging of people of the same ethnic community in postcolonial times.

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1 SITUATING THE INDO-BURMA FRONTIER WITHIN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY The Indo-Burma frontier was home to numerous hill tribes who had been divided into several tribal chiefdoms1 before the advent of the British. These areas seemed to have had little geopolitical or economic importance for the British until they annexed Upper Burma in the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86). The war finally established British possessions on both sides of the Indo-Burma frontier, and therefore establishing direct communication between Bengal and Burma had become one of the immediate concerns of the British Indian Empire in the late nineteenth century. As a result, the next decade after the fall of Upper Burma witnessed British encounters with indigenous hill tribes of the Indo-Burma frontier. By the turn of the twentieth century indigenous resistance had been subdued and a new ‘Geo-body’ emerged, which not only left indigenous notion of space, geography and territory irrelevant but also reconfigured and expanded the British Indian Empire covering Burma and the hill tracts of the Indo-Burma frontier. The concept of the ‘Geo-body’, according to Thongchai Winnichakul, ‘refers to the political space defined by the colonial notions of sovereignty and boundaries’ (Winnichakul 1994: 16). Thus the real victim of the emergence of the ‘Geo-body’ was the indigenous cosmography and that this happened when the pre-modern and modern discourse collided, a phenomenon Winnichakul calls ‘politico-semiological operations’ (Ibid.: 18). However, the validity of the new ‘Geo-body’ was challenged, albeit with vested interest, by none other than British colonial officers in Burma who described the annexation of Burma as ‘the accident of propinquity’ (Furnivall 1948: 23), ‘a political accident’ (Craddock 1929: 126) or ‘the accident of contiguity’ (Donnison 1953: 72). In her recent work, Mary P. Callahan describes Burma a ‘territorial and administrative appendage to India’ (2005: 21). In 1937, when Burma was separated from India, it was largely a success of combined colonial-business interests who had lobbied hard with the argument, ‘The Burmans are so different from the peoples of India. . . . They come from a different stock, they speak a different language, their habits and customs and outlooks are different’ (Innes 1934: 194–5).

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What is less known, if not forgotten, in this whole gamut of ‘annexation’ and ‘separation’ processes were the fate of the hill tribes of the Indo-Burma frontier. In the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), the British not only ended Burmese dominance over the ‘North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal’2 but also extended its sway over Arakan and Tenasserim; the second war made them masters of Lower Burma. But the annexation of Upper Burma in the third and final Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86) has been mistaken to be the completion of British ‘conquest of the whole country including the vast expanse of tribal hills areas all-round the frontier’ (Furnivall 1960: 5). Burma was conquered, indeed. But the hill tracts lying between the western border of the former Konbaung dynasty and Bengal remained independent or ‘unadministered’. A memorandum written by the chief secretary to the chief commissioner of Burma to the secretary to the Government of India in 1893 admitted the hills were never brought under any sort of regular administration by the Burmese government; the Chiefs were practically independent; and it was therefore not considered that the absorption of Upper Burma into British India had involved the incorporation into the British empire of the Chin Hills.3 This book probes how the British Indian Empire had to confront stiff resistance from the indigenous Chin/Zo tribes of the Indo-Burma frontier for another ten years after its conquest of Burma before it was able to legally incorporate the hill tracts into the new ‘Geo-body’. Encounters between the British Indian Empire and the indigenous hill tribes of the Indo-Burma frontier have become an important area of investigation among historians and scholars relatively recently. Sandwiched between the Brahmaputra Valley on the west and the Chindwin Valley on the east, the mountainous Indo-Burma frontier cannot be studied in isolation without situating it within the larger context of British expansion to the two river valleys situated on both sides of the frontier. While economic interest was often cited behind British expansion, the importance of geopolitical interest cannot be undermined. That the Indo-Burma frontier is strategically located at a crossroads since the precolonial period is an established fact. It had been a zone of transition for cultural and economic exchange between India and China via Burma that preceded the establishment of the British Empire.

Indo-Burma frontier at a crossroads Indo-Burma frontier lay at a crossroads of India’s cultural and economic relations with Burma and China. Scholars identify three main overland trading networks that passed through the Indo-Burma frontier since early times.

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Two routes connected Assam and Yunnan via the Patkai range and Manipur through Burma, and another route from Bengal via the coastal road passing through Chittagong and Arakan Yoma to Szechuan in China (Stargardt 1971; Gutman 1976; Cederlof 2014; Pemberton [1835] 2000). These routes, which linked China and India through Upper Burma, held key roles in the East India Company’s vision of its ‘North-Eastern Frontier’ in the early nineteenth century (Cederlof 2014: 84). However, strikingly enough, there is no mention of trade networks passing through the Chin-Lushai Hills, a colonial reference to the hill tracts predominantly settled by the Zo (Chin-Kuki-Lushai) people in the Indo-Burma frontier, except in the case of the southern route from Chittagong to Akyab that passed over the ridges to Buthidaung on the Mayu River, and to Paletwa on the upper Kaladan (now in the Chin state) which was in use from about the fourth to mid-seventh centuries (Gutman 1976: 5). In the mid-1870s, the Chittagong-Mandalay route was considered to be the ‘shortest and direct’ one for a possible connection between India and China (Iqbal 2015). These overland routes reflect the strategic importance of the Indo-Burma frontier as passageway between the Brahmaputra Valley and Chindwin Valley in the precolonial period. Burma’s cultural relations with India had a long history. According to G. E. Harvey, ‘The Burmese are a Mongolian race, yet their traditions, instead of harking back to China, refer to India’ (1925: 6). In fact, Indo-Burma cultural and economic relationships in the precolonial period were found more prominently through the sea route, as Sunil S. Amrith argues in his Crossing the Bay of Bengal. He clearly underlines how ‘many forms of connection across the sea outlasted and outlived empires’ (2013: 4). To the English East India Company, which established its first factory at Syriam in 1647, Burma became strategically important for its economic interest in order to dominate the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean (Trager 1966: 12). While development in the Bay of Bengal is beyond the purview of this book, I shall focus on the expansion of the British in the ‘North-East Frontier of Bengal’ and beyond.

Empires in the ‘North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal’ R. G. Woodthorpe was perhaps the first to use the phrase ‘North-eastern frontier of India’ in 1873 ([1873] 1978: 3). A decade later, in 1884, Alexander Mackenzie refers to the ‘North-East Frontier of Bengal’, ‘sometimes to denote a boundary line, and sometimes more generally to describe a tract’. ‘In the latter sense’, he added, ‘it embraces the whole of the hill ranges north, east, and south of the Assam Valley, as well as the western slopes of the great mountain system lying between Bengal and independent Burma, with its outlying spurs and ridges’ ([1884] 2001: 1). It was the expansion of Ava (the capital of the Burmese empire) in the ‘North-East Frontier of Bengal’ in the early decades of the nineteenth century which not only threatened the existence of several kingdoms in the region but also posed a threat to the 8

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interest of the English East India Company. Therefore, it was a challenge for the British to confront Burmese domination in the ‘North-East Frontier of Bengal’. According to a Burmese scholar Thant Myint-U, The main point of tension between Calcutta and Amarapura was to be Arakan. The second arena of contention was in the far north, in Manipur and in the Himalayan states of Assam, Jaintia and Cachar where Ava’s forward policy was meeting with growing British influence and concerns over the security of Bengal. (2004: 17–18) The First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) not only marked the end of Burmese domination of the Brahmaputra Valley and the Barak Valley, but it also saw the establishment of British power in parts of the ‘North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal’ and annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim. For the Bengal Government, the ‘North-Eastern Frontier’ was the land that needs to be ‘secured’ from Burmese greed and from people lacking in entrepreneurship, and placed under British protection (Cederlof 2014: 73). Though Cederlof argues that while most historians view the British decision to advance beyond the market town and administrative centre of Sylhet as a reluctant one (Ibid.: 3), according to Amalendu Guha ‘the Raj appeared on the scene in the guise of saviours of the people . . . but it soon dawned on the people that the Raj had come to stay’ (1977: 2). London and Calcutta initially viewed the provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim as a ‘politically and economically white elephant’; however, by 1830 they realised that strategy outweighed economy in Arakan, where British influence was to be maintained at all costs because Arakan commanded valuable control over the Bay of Bengal (Pollak 1929: 41). The Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852 made the British masters of Lower Burma even as they seek to consolidate their presence in the ‘North-East Frontier of Bengal’. At any rate, the annexation of Assam on one hand and Arakan on the other brought the British in close proximity to the Chin/Zo people of the Indo-Burma frontier.

From ‘informal’ to ‘formal’ empire in Burma The British followed a policy of non-intervention in the ‘North-East Frontier’ and to defend the fledgling territories they had acquired from disturbances that used to come from the hills in the Indo-Burma frontier, they resorted to a ‘frontier defence’ policy by employing irregulars, militia and military, all of which later merged into Frontier Police. Frontier defence posts were established at strategic locations, which essentially became the colonial frontier manned and garrisoned by ‘local forces’ (Hussain 1986, 1992b). While this policy continues in the ‘North-East Frontier’ till the late nineteenth century, 9

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British policy towards Burma was seriously under review in the second half of that century. The outcome was a change in its policy from an ‘informal’ to ‘formal’ empire in Burma which, however, becomes a subject of academic debate. Lord Randolph Churchill, the secretary of state for India, made it crystal clear the need to change policy towards Burma when he wrote to Lord Dufferin, the viceroy, that the Government as a body are strongly in favour of annexation pure and simple [and] I think you will be forced into it by the difficulty of finding a suitable prince who would have any chance of maintaining himself or of giving any guarantees of value for good government. (Myint-U 2004: 160) In other words, London viewed the past 20 years as a failed test of ‘informal’ empire in Burma and thus wanted to switch over to ‘formal’ annexation in early 1880s – but why? Victorian British expansion from ‘informal’ to ‘formal’ empire has been often seen through the model of Gallagher and Robinson’s ‘imperialism of free trade’ (1953). This model rests upon five propositions, one of which says the switch, from informal to formal empire, was normally the prerogative of the ‘official mind’. This model implies that the hyperactive formal empire building after 1880 was reactive or defensive, designed to protect old zones of influence rather than to seek out new ones (Webster 2000). However, P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins argue that Gallaghar and Robinson and their followers misunderstood the nature of the ‘official mind’, which was really the mouthpiece of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ (1993: 8–10, 45). The concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ embraces the ‘decisionmakers’ who ran the imperial government from Whitehall and the ‘men on the spot’ who administered the possessions overseas (Dumet 1999: 9). Though Cain and Hopkins’s idea is also subjected to criticism, Anthony Webster follows it in the context of Burma and argues that the absorption of Burma into the British Empire was the result of gentlemanly capitalists at work (2000: 1005). Webster cited two broad interpretations of the final conquest of Burma. The first emphasises the importance of ‘strategic/geopolitical’ considerations, as developed by D. K. Fieldhouse (1984), particularly the need to defend British India from the expansion of French imperial power on the eastern borders of the empire (Ibid.: 1009). Historians including J. S. Furnivall, D.G.E. Hall, John F. Cady, C. L. Keeton, and Fieldhouse all contended that it was news of the Franco-Burmese negotiations and the potential threat posed by a French-dominated kingdom to the security of British India which enabled British colonial officials to persuade the Government of London that absorption of Burma into the empire was an ‘unavoidable necessity’ (Ibid.: 1010). Fieldhouse’s view was supported by Charles Keeton, who 10

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argues that defence of the Indian Empire was the main motive for British intervention (1974: 337). Lieutenant-General Albert Fytche, chief commissioner of Burma (1867–81), said it was ‘highly prudent on Imperial grounds that we should be in a position to substitute a western ingress to China for the present seaboard approach, destined to be disproportionately shared, if not entirely absorbed by America’ (1878: 120). While agreeing with Fytche and cautioning the ‘hot haste’ of America to secure if possible the command of the Chinese market, Furnivall saw annexation from a wider standpoint as ‘an episode in the rivalry of Britain and France for supremacy in South-east Asia’ (1948: 68–70). A counterargument to the above views came from Dorothy Woodman, Maung Htin Aung and D. P. Singhal, who dismissed the French threat but stressed an ‘economic explanation’. According to Woodman, the ‘French threat was much exaggerated. . . . The French were only too aware of the superiority of British military strength’ (1962: 226–7). This argument was in line with Michael Symes, the first diplomatic envoy of the lieutenant governor of Bengal, who found that French activities in Burma were negligible and that the Burmese had no plan of any sort to play the French against the British in the late eighteenth century (Aung 1965: 22). Toeing the same line, Maung Htin Aung dismissed the French threat and asserted the dominance of commercial considerations in the decision to intervene (1990; Singhal 1981). Recent work of R. Turrell on the case of the Burma ruby mines has also thrown new light on the nature of British commercial interest in Burma, as he argues, ‘Upper Burma was annexed for British commerce’ (1988: 161). In her recent study, Mary P. Callahan also voices a similar tune: ‘At best, the British built a skinny state, aimed at letting commerce flourish (which it did) and at making the colonial state pay for itself (which it never did) by taxation of land and some commerce’ (2005: 21). Drawing largely from Robinson and Gallaghar’s argument that late Victorian annexationism was a defensive response to new dangers, John Darwin adds another aspect, saying ‘local crisis’ which threatened the informal predominance built up decades earlier was the reason behind British intervention (1997: 631). A more incisive picture on ‘local crisis’, in the context of Burma, was given by Burman historian Thant Myint-U. He says, ‘Yangonbased European firms saw no reason why the business-friendly environment of Lower Burma should not be extended to Mandalay and beyond’ (2004: 187–8). But Myint-U also cited the issue of the re-emergence of AngloFrench rivalry in South-east Asia and growing French interest in Thibaw’s kingdom (Ibid.: 189). To those who are working on commerce in Burma, ‘local crisis’ was a situation caused by growing French interest in Upper Burma. According to A. C. Pointon, No consideration could persuade the British Government to use the threat of force against Upper Burma, save one only. That was the 11

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suspicion that France, despite official denials, hoped to extend her growing interests in Indo-China westwards into Upper Burma and might thus become a threat to the special influence claimed and exercised over the commercial policy of that kingdom by its British neighbor. (1964: 22) Thus, the British conquest of Upper Burma in 1885–86 is best explained as an episode of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ defending their interests at the periphery from the threats posed by local social and political collapse and rival imperial incursion (Webster 2000: 1025). While noting the importance of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in promoting imperial expansion, Webster argues that gentlemanly capitalists were providing the all-important link between the periphery and the ‘second bridgehead’ of metropolitan economic interests, which made invasion an irresistible policy option (Ibid.: 1024). The ‘bridgehead’ was the hinge or ‘interface’ between the metropole and a local periphery (Darwin 1997: 629). Since the ‘official mind’ was always susceptible to the pressure of electoral politics and effective lobbying (Webster 2000: 1023; Darwin 1997: 616), in the case of Burma, the commercial interest in the proposed construction of a ‘highway to China’ (Hynes 1976: 974), which needed government assistance, was seen with the political future of Burma. This was one of the reasons why the London chambers of commerce petitioned for annexation on 22 October 1885, followed by a final ultimatum to King Thibaw by the India Office (Turrell 1988: 161). Nicholas Tarling has aptly summed up as follows: ‘the establishment of formal empire seemed to offer the best prospect of securing the peace and prosperity of Upper Burma and our own Imperial and commercial interests’ (2001: 104). With the annexation of Upper Burma in the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86), there was also a change in British perspective towards the IndoBurma frontier. Since then, the British began to see the strategic importance of the Indo-Burma frontier, which they had hitherto considered as a source of raids and plundering activities in the plains under their control. The Bengal Government also viewed the annexation of Upper Burma as materially altering the situation in the Lushai Hills, a contiguous hill tract west of the Chin Hills, which was now surrounded by settled districts under the control of the British Government. ‘Lawlessness could not be permitted to continue in the hills in between’ was the official view of the Bengal Government (Barpujari 1981: 90). The question is: What had changed British attitude, and eventually its policy towards the Indo-Burma frontier? Why did it change? And, what were its implications vis-à-vis colonial policy and practices towards Burma? How did the indigenous hill peoples react to interventionist policy adopted by the British after the fall of Upper Burma?

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Zomia and the Indo-Burma frontier Recent researches have established the Indo-Burma frontier not for its ‘difference and separation’ but for its ‘commonalities and interconnectedness’, which ranges from historical tracing of old trade networks between China and India to analytically ascribing a common form of polity, defined by a lack or absence of the modern state and conceptualised as ‘Zomia’ (Cederlof 2014: 10–11; Saikia and Bhaisya 2017). In 2002, Willem van Schendel coined the concept Zomia, the term being derived from an ethnonym, Zomi,4 which encompasses the highland of Northeast India, Southeast Asia and Southwest China, where a population of about 100 million resides within these countries, officially registered as ‘national minorities’ by each respective government (Schendel 2002). James C. Scott picked up the concept and used it in his analysis of the culture and polity of upland/highland areas of Southeast Asia and Northeast India and south and eastward Tibet (2010). Popular as it is in offering a new perspective to understanding ‘highlanders’ of the region, however, this new concept of Zomia also attracts criticism. A special issue of the Journal of Global History, edited by Jean Michaud in 2010, became a forum to analyse and critique Zomia (2017: 7). Anthropologists have blamed Scott for oversimplifying situations on the ground that are more intricate than his template suggests. Similarly, historians in turn criticise him for selective use of historical facts (Jonsson 2010). To Hjorleifur Jonsson, ‘the case for Zomia is in many ways a very educated white bourgeois US American theory regarding what happens across difference’ (2014). A prominent Southeast Asian scholar, Victor Lieberman, criticises Scott because his ‘evidential base is often too weak to support its theoretical superstructure’, but at the same time appreciates him for his achievement ‘to bring hill peoples into the mainstream of regional history by uncovering their relation to lowland states and societies’. He further adds, ‘Scott has rescued hill peoples from assumption of stasis, primitivism, essentialism, and isolation. He has given them voice, agency, and rationality’ (2010: 336). Notwithstanding the counterarguments, I would argue that the emergence of Zomia as a new area study in the postcolonial times enhances the strategic importance of the Indo-Burma frontier as a link between the Brahmaputra Valley on the one hand and the Chindwin Valley on the other. The recognition of the importance of Burma in colonial studies of South Asia is an added fillip (Saha 2016).

Chin Hills: understanding the land and the people There was no such entity called ‘Chin Hills’ before the expansion of the British Indian Empire in the Indo-Burma frontier in the late nineteenth century. However, these hill tracts were not unnoticed before. According to one

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of the earliest Burmese historians, Than Tun, the Pagan Empire of Burma, which reached its zenith during the reign of Cansu II (1174–1211), mentioned in an inscription dated 1196 that the empire extended from ‘Takon and Nachonkhyam in the north to Salamkre and Sacchitani in the south and from Macchakiri (Chin Hills) in the west to the Salween (River Salween) in the east’ (Tun 1956: 37). The meaning of Macchakiri is not known, but Than Tun uses it to refer to the hills on the east of the Pagan Empire. What is clear for sure is that the Burman Empire and civilisation was limited only within the Chindwin-Irrawaddy plain and it did not climb up to the hills (Aung-Thwin 1985). Founded as a district under the chief commissioner of Burma in the late nineteenth century, the Chin Hills was bounded on the east by the Sagaing and Magwe divisions of Upper Burma, on the north by Manipur, on the west by the Lushai Hills (now the state of Mizoram) and on the south by Arakan. It was located on the western border of Burma between 22°0′ N to about 93°30ʹ E with an area of 13,906.9 square miles (Lehman [1963] 1980: 6). According to colonial record, the population of Chin Hills at the time of British annexation was a mere 89,620 (Ibid.: 4).5 Today, the Chin state is one of the seven divisions, seven states, one union territory and six self-administered zones in Burma/Myanmar. Apart from the Chin Hills, the Chin/Zo people are also spread over in the Hkamti, Somra Tract and KaleKabaw-Myittha plains in Upper Burma. Their kindred tribes, namely Kuki and Lushai in colonial parlance, are also largely found in India’s north-east states such as Mizoram, Tripura, Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, and also in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh where they are known by several tribal and sub-tribal appellations. The general features of the Chin Hills comprise a much broken and contorted mass of mountains and deep valleys. Mountain ranges are generally in a north-south orientation with heights varying from 5,000 to 9,000 feet. Mount Victoria, in the Southern Chin Hills, which is locally known as Khunumchung, is 10,090 feet above sea level (Rigby 1897: 88). It is the highest peak in Burma. Other important ranges include the Letha range (Thangmual), which separates the Chin Hills from the valley of the Myittha, the Imbukklang, the Rongklang, the Liklang, the Lunglen, the Thuamvum (Kennedy Peak) and the Boipa. Rivers and streams intersect all these ranges, the most prominent of which are the Manipur or Nankathe River (Guun in local dialect), the Boinu, the Tiau, the Tuivai, the Tuinan, the Tape, and the Koladan River (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 6). The contiguous hill tracts in the Indo-Burma frontier, which stretched from the Arakan Yoma in the south to the Cachar and Manipur Valleys in the north, were often referred to as the Chin-Lushai Hills in colonial parlance. Colonial rulers and ethnographers broadly categorised the inhabitants of the Chin-Lushai Hills as Chin, Kuki and Lushai, albeit with numerous other

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related clan-based names. Hence, hyphenated names such as Chin-Kuki, Lushai-Kuki and Chin-Lushai were used in colonial records. Linguistically these whole congeries of tribes belong to the Kuki-Chin group of the TibetoBurman family (Grierson 1904: 1), and ethnologically they belong to the same ethnic group called Zo, a generic term and the only all-encompassing one for the so-called Chin, Kuki and Lushai people. The focus of this book is limited to the Chin Hills, nevertheless the making of the Chin Hills District in colonial Burma cannot be studied in isolation without referring to its adjoining areas. Therefore, to refer to the people of the Chin Hills and to situate them within the context of the larger ethnic community of the Indo-Burma frontier, I employ the term ‘Chin’, the officially standardised ethnonym in Burma/Myanmar in the colonial and postcolonial times, along with the generic indigenous term ‘Zo’. While Zo is self-referential and represents indigeneity, Chin, on the other hand, no matter its meaning and its official status in the colonial and postcolonial times, always bears Burmese and colonial legacies. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience and considering the period of my study, I am referring to the people of the Chin Hills in general as ‘Chin/Zo’, albeit I shall use along with tribal/sub-tribal/clan names which were prevalent during the period of this study wherever suitable. According to F. K. Lehman, the Chin/Zo people can be divided into two broad categories based on geography and culture: the Northern Chin/Zo and the Southern Chin/Zo ([1963] 1980). The Northern Chin/Zo are those who inhabited the Chin Hills proper; they were also known as hill Chin/ Zo. The Northern Chin/Zo may again be further divided into three separate tracts. The Chin/Zo who lived in the so-called Tedim tract, the northernmost in the Chin Hills, comprised the Sukte, Kamhau, and Sizang groups in colonial parlance. They included various sub-tribes such as Dim, Khuano, Hualngo, Sizang, Tedim, Saizang, Thado, Teizang, Vangteh, Guite, Vaiphei and Zou. Sukte was the name of a ruling clan, and Kamhau was actually a name derived from the powerful Sukte Chief Kam Hau, which should not be construed as a different clan from Sukte. These sub-tribes had noticeable variations in their spoken dialects (Khai 1995: 13). Today, many of these tribes were found in Manipur and the Lushai Hills (Mizoram) as their settlements have been demarcated by the colonial and postcolonial borders. They commonly identify themselves as Zomi, which means Zo people. The Falam tract is the most thickly populated in the Chin Hills. It was populated by the Sunthla, Zahau, Hualngo, Khualsim, Tawyan, Zanniat, Ngawn, Laizo, and Khuangli sub-tribes. The northerners called them Palamte after their capital Falam; others know them as Pawi. However, they call themselves Sunthla. Officially, the British record them as Tashon, a corruption of Taisun or Klashun, the name of a village immediately west of Falam (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 142–3). The Hakas, Thantlangs,

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Zokhua, Thettas, Kapis and so forth populated the Haka area. The Hakas and the Thantlangs called themselves Lai/Laimi (Ibid.: 152), and they are similar to the Shindu/Shendu/Mara/Lakher (Parry [1932] 1988) of the British records from the Chittagong and Arakan Hill Tracts. The Southern Chin/Zo largely comprises the plains or valley Chins. They are differentiated from the Northern Chin/Zo by their cultural practices. The rites, for instance, of dealing with the dead are different; the Northern Chin/ Zo buried their dead, whereas the Southern Chin/Zo cremated theirs. The custom of face tattooing, which was in vogue in the South, is totally absent in the North (Khai 1995: 6–7). The Southern Chins comprised the Chinme, Welaung, Chinbok, Yindu, Chinbon, Khyang, Sho, Asho, Cho, Khami, Mro and several tribes in Burma such as Anu, Kun, Pallaing and Sak or Thet (Grierson 1904: 9–10). These groups of people mainly lived north of the Arakan and Pakokku Hill Tracts. On the basis of cultural and linguistic differences, Lehman draws a line between the Northern and Southern Chin/Zo approximately along 21°45′ N. The Southern Chin/Zo, according to Lehman, had a relatively poor material culture and a simple social structure, whereas in the North it was more elaborate on both counts (Lehman [1963] 1980).

Etymology of ‘Chin’ and ‘Zo’ It is imperative to make a brief clarification on the etymology of ‘Chin’ and ‘Zo’ in order to help clear the smokescreen of confusion left by colonial categorisation. There are different views on the origin and meaning of the term ‘Chin’. Bertram Carey and Henry Tuck wrote that Chin is a Burmese corruption of Chinese word ‘Jin’ or ‘Yen’, meaning man ([1896] 1932: 3). To Professor Gordon Luce, Chin is derived from the old Burmese word ‘Khyan’, meaning ‘ally or comrade’ (Luce 1959: 26). A similar view was held by Burman scholar Khin Myo Chit, who suggests that Chin was a foreign corruption of the ancient Burmese word ‘Khin’ or ‘Khyen’, meaning ‘brother’ (Hau 1963: 312). Another Burman scholar, Taw Sein Ko, argues both Chin and Kachin (earlier spelt as Kakhyen) signify ‘man par excellence’ (1968: 289). A prominent social anthropologist who had worked a long time among the Chin/Zo, F. K. Lehman, says ‘the term Chin is imprecise’. While saying that Chin is a corrupt form of Burmese word Khyang which means ‘basket’, Lehman, however, admits that ‘no single Chin word has explicit reference to all the peoples we customarily call Chin’ ([1963] 1980: 3). Thus Lehman’s ‘Khyang’ greatly differs from Luce’s ‘Khyan’, for that matter Myo Chit’s ‘Khin’, in its meaning. Captain J. H. Green, who had spent 14 years ‘studying and living among the wild tribes of Burma’ when the Census of India was published in 1933, had this to say: The classification of the indigenous races has been further complicated as the names now applied to them are not their own names, 16

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but those given to them by their neighbours. In many cases these originated as terms of abuse. The words ‘Kachin’, ‘Chin’ and ‘Karen’ appear to be derived from three different pronunciations of the original Burmese word for the wild tribes ‘Kakhyen’. (Green 1933) Though there is no agreement on the meaning of the term ‘Chin’, its Burmese origin is now beyond doubt. The question is: When did the term ‘Chin’ begin to appear as a referent to a particular group of people? In other words, who first used the term ‘Chin’ and to refer to whom? Perhaps, a thirteenth-century inscription of the old Pagan kingdom may be considered the earliest evidence of the use of ‘Chin’, albeit in a varied form, in the context of Burma. So far no one has ever trace its usage earlier than this. One of the inscriptions wrote: ‘The people living on the mountains in the west are ascribed as Khyan’ (Luce 1959: 25). Here ‘the west’ refers to west of Pagan or Central Burma, which was also called ‘Chin Taung’ (cited in Khai 1995: 8). According to Michael Arthur Aung Thwin, ‘approximately 1500 or more stone inscriptions [of the Pagan Kingdom] have been found, recorded and reproduced, in one form or another’ (1976: 15). Centuries later, in 1833, an Italian missionary to Burma, Father Vincentius Sangermano, also mentioned the geographical location of the ‘Chin’ people: To the east of Chien mountains between 20°30′ and 21°30′ north latitude, is a petty nation called Jo. They are supposed to have been Chien, who in progress of time have become Burmese, speaking their language, although very corruptly, and adopting all their customs. ([1833] 1893: 35) The venerable missionary was in all probability referring those living in the plain adjoining the Chin Hills, called later by colonial writers as ‘tame’ Chins, but locally known as Asho/Sho/Hiou. There is no dearth of references to ‘Chin’, albeit in varied forms, in early colonial and missionary accounts. In 1795, Michael Symes (a major in His Majesty’s 76th Regiment) was sent to Ava, the capital of the Burman kingdom, as an envoy of the British. In one of the expeditions across the river, Symes met with ‘a village inhabited by Kayns’, which he called ‘a race of mountaineers perfectly distinct from the Carianers, and speaking a language differing radically both from theirs and that of the Birmans’ (1800: 255). The ‘Kayns’, as Symes believed, were originally inhabitants of the Arakan mountains. After the Burmans conquered Arakan, they had prevailed upon the Kayns, partly by force, and partly by mild treatment, to abandon their native hills and settle on the plain (Ibid.). Francis Buchanan, who was with Symes’s team, also noted ‘Kiayn’, ‘Kayn’ or ‘Kyan’ (a corrupt form of Chin) 17

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which he heard of them when the party first approached Myede on their journey up the Irrawaddy River (1795; also cited in Ro 2007: 100–102). In the translation of the written account of the Burma constellations, Buchanan wrote, ‘The Kiayn are simple innocent people inhabiting the mountains between Ava and Arakan’ (1798: 197). In 1796, Hiram Cox was also sent to Ava and entered in his journal: ‘the country to the westward of them [the Burmans] is inhabited by the people called Caens’, who were independent of Burma (Cox 1821: 419). But after the annexation of Arakan in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26), Lieutenant T. A. Trant (His Majesty’s 38th Regiment of Foot) admitted, ‘The origin of the Khyens is lost in fiction’ (1828: 262). It appears that Chin in its varied forms like Khyeng, Khyen and Kiayn refer to what F. K. Lehman later called the Southern Chin or Plain Chin. Thus, Chin is a Romanised form of the Burman pronunciation of Khyeng/Khyen. It should be noted that ‘Khy’ or ‘Kh’ is pronounced as ‘Ch’ in Burmese (cited in Khai 1995: 67).6 The application of these terms to the Plain Chin suggests that close proximity to Burmans made the two communities culturally ‘bumped’ and intermixed with the former being Burmanised in the process. With regard to the etymology of the term ‘Zo’, there are two broad views. One view seeks to explain Zo as a generic term derived from the name of the progenitor. Hence, Zo descendants are called Zo people. Though the term Zo itself sufficiently represents the name, it is often used by particular groups with a suffix or a prefix mi which implies people. Hence Zomi and Mizo, where the former is a literal form and the latter represents a poetic form. Vumson argues that Zo must have been the head of a clan as per the tradition of naming their clans after the head of each clan (1986: 6). This is actually what K. A. Khup Za Thang tried to establish in his genealogical study of the Zo (Chin) race (1974). Another explanation is based on geographical location. Vumson again gives two climatic zones of the mountainous region settled by the Zo people: the higher part is zo and the lower part is sim or chhim (1986: 6). However, Sing Khaw Khai argues that there are three distinct parts of the hills: zo (topmost), sim (lowest) and lai (middle) (1995: 91). Because Zo people mainly settled in the highest/topmost part of the hills, they must have either adopted the name Zo or rather named the place of their settlement after their name. In this case, Joy Pachuau also subscribes to the dual meaning of Zo, saying, ‘Zo can refer to the people, as well as the hills’ (2014: 127). But the argument that the movement of the Zo from the hot climatic plain to a cold climate in the hills was responsible for the emergence of the term Zo is not tenable. Precolonial and colonial sources will unravel how the so-called Plain Chin also called themselves Zo, albeit in varied forms. Perhaps, a variation of Zo was found in the Manshu, authored by Fan Ch’o in the ninth century ad, where it refers to the Mi-no kingdom, and the Mi-chen kingdom calls its princes and chiefs Shou (Oey 1961: 90). Gordon 18

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Luce identified that the Mi-no kingdom was near the Mi-no River, which is the Chindwin River, which suggests the settlement of the Zo people in the Chindwin Valley before the arrival of the Burmans. He also argued that ‘before the coming of the Mranma (Burman) in the ninth century, the three chief powers in Burma were the Chins (and Sak) in Upper Burma, the Tircul (or Pyu) in Central Burma, and Mi-ch’en (perhaps old Pegu) in Lower Burma’ (1985: 78–80).7 Sangermano noted ‘a petty nation called Jo’ ([1833] 1893: 43) and G. E. Fryer, mentioned ‘Hiou’ or ‘Shou’ (1875: 46). In 1839, Howard Malcolm wrote: ‘The Yaws (Zo) are on the lower waters of Kyendwien not far from Ava. The district is sometimes called Yo or Jo’ (quoted in Hau 1963: 301). It is beyond dispute that Zo in its varied forms such as ‘Jo’, ‘Hiou’ ‘Yo’, ‘Shou’ and the like were local appellations of the people designated as ‘Chien’ or ‘Khyeng’ or ‘Khyan’ who were scattered in the plains between Ava and Arakan. Grierson aptly says, ‘the people do not themselves recognise the name Chin, but call themselves Yo or Zo in the north, Lai in the centre, and Sho in the south, besides many other tribal names’ (1904: 1). Variations of Zo were also found in colonial records of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Lushai Hills (Schendel 1992: 16). In the gazetteer of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Sneyd Hutchinson mentioned the tribes who ‘call themselves Sho and are closely allied to the Chins’ ([1909] 1978: 38). Captain Thomas Herbert Lewin also noted, The ‘Dzo’ tribes inhabit the hilly country to the east of the Chittagong district in Lower Bengal; their habitat may be roughly stated as comprised within the parallels of Latitude 22°45′ N and 25°20′ N., and between the Meridians of Longitude 92o30′ and 93°45′. (1874: 1) Similarly, Robert Blair McCabe, Political Officer of the North Lushai Hills in the early 1890s, also used Zo to describe the Lushai.8

History of Chin/Zo movements Any argument in favour or against the two terms ‘Chin’ or ‘Zo’ in the postcolonial times are largely drawn from the sources cited above. But, after all, what’s in a name? I do not intend to waste more space in search of the ‘meaning’ of these terms; rather I am more interested in ascertaining the group of people these terms represent. Perhaps, no one has ever come up with a more convincing theory beyond what anthropologists F. K. Lehman, Edmund Leach and C. C. Lowis had found on the origin and movement of the Chin/Zo people. Lehman, who had done considerable work on Chin/Zo culture and society, remarks, ‘both the hills and plains peoples have moved about within the general region of Southwest China 19

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and Southeast Asia over considerable distances for many centuries’ ([1963] 1980: 11). Lowis’s analysis on migration movement based on two broad divisions of the Tibeto-Burmans is quite interesting. While dividing into Western (Malikha-Chindwin) and Eastern (Mekong-Salween-N’maikha) groups, Lowis argues that to the former class belongs the Chins and the Kachins of Upper Burma; to the latter belong the Burmans of the Irrawaddy Valley, the Marus and Lashis of the N’maikha, the Lisaws of the Salween and the Lahus and Akhas of the Mekong. A more detail quotation from Lowis is worth reading: Of the Western Tibeto-Burma the Chins or Kukis were probably the first arrivals in Burma. In the far off past they must have appeared on the Irrawady-Brahmaputra watershed and thence, continuing their southerly journey along the western edge of the Province, have worked their way to the southernmost limits of the hills country on the sea-board of the Bay of Bengal. As Chins, Kamis, Mros, Chinboks, Chinbons, Yindus etc., they have been for centuries in occupation of the west uplands, which extend from the north of the Upper Chindwin District (where the Chin merges into the Naga country) along the edge of the Assam uplands- the home of their blood-relatives the Lushais- down to the foot-hills on the fringe of the Irrawady delta, and have had time, by union with the plain dwellers, to form hybrid communities – like the Taungthas of Pakokku and the Chaungthas of Arakan – whose connection with their Chin neighbours is no longer obvious. Save for a few villages in the Pegu Yoma and near the Sittang, the home of the Chins lies wholly to the west of the Irrawady. (1949: 7–8) In a similar line, Major C. M. Enriquez also suggests three distinct and separate waves of migration: the first, Mon-Khmer; the second, Tibeto-Burman, which is further divided into Burmese, Chin-Kachin and Lolo; and the third, Tai-Chinese. Enriquez further argues that initially Tibet was considered the home of the Burmese and allied races. But this theory had given place to Western China between the sources of the Yangtsi and Hoang Ho Rivers. The Tibeto-Burmans left the Yangtsi and Hoang Ho basins in a westerly direction, breaking into several branches, of which one reached Tibet, another turned south and overran Burma in three main streams: Chin-Kachin, Burmese, and Lolo (1923: 77–8). Anthropologist and Kachin specialist Edmund Leach believed that they (hills and plains peoples) did not come as the social and cultural units we know today and cannot be identified with any particular groups of today (1954). Shared myths and legends of different ethnic groups today best reflect Leach’s view.

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A popular account gives us how and when did the Chin/Zo leave their settlement in the ‘west of the Irrawaddy’ and come to the Chindwin Valley and from there scatter again to the hills: The Zo crossed the Chindwin and settled in the Kale-KabawYaw-Myittha valleys and Pandaung hills. Asho tradition says that they lived in the Pandaung Hills and crossed the Irrawady and lived on the east bank of the Irrawady during the Burmese Pagan dynasty. The Shans established a state at Hkamti Long, previously held by a Tibetan prince in about 1000 ad. It started as a military out post of the Nanchaos during the three-side hostilities involving Chinese and Tibetans. After establishing themselves, the Shan began settling in the Hukawng, Mogaung, Kabaw, Kale, and to a lesser extent in the Yaw valleys. The Shans must have been intermixed with the Zo people, as many Zo, in particular the Lusei and the Pawi (Zahau), legends tell us about their times with the Shans. During this period, the Zo occupied the countries west of the Chindwin and Irrawady Rivers-stretching from Khampat/Homalin area in the north to the Yaw country/Pandaung Hills in the south. (Vumson 1986: 35–6) From the plains of Burma, including the Chindwin Valley, the Chin/Zo migrated to the hills in different wave sometime, most probably in the sixteenth century (Lehman [1963] 1980: 25). This is well recorded by one of the earliest Chin/Zo educated diplomats of Burma, Vum Ko Hau: Local tradition has it that the ancestors of some of the people forming the principal tribes ascended the Chin lands from the KaleKabaw and the Myittha River valleys. One group went there by the foothills Burmese village, Yazagyo, and are the clans now inhabiting the northeast region of Tiddim. Another group went up Mount Kennedy from the Kale Valley. They then descended the western slope of Kennedy Peak and settled in Zangpitam above Thuklai Village, Siyin Valley. Later they continued their move to Ciimnuai near Saizang Village, Sokte area. Their descendants spread along various routes from Ciimnuai and are believed to be the ancestors of the present tribes of Siyin, Sokte, Kamhau, Zo and Thado. The remainders moved from the Myittha River valley into the Central Chin country and were the ancestors of the Zanniats, Zahaus, Tashons of Falam and various tribes of Haka. (1963: 297)

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Once settled in the hills, Chin/Zo history began to change. Separated by mountains and deep gorges they became isolated from one another, culturally and linguistically. They became clannish and sectarian. Taw Sein Ko writes of the impact of the changes: The Chins are broken up into a number of tribes or clans, whose basis of organisation is the worship of common tutelary deities, or consanguinity, real or fictitious. Their language presents many dialectical differences, which are so pronounced that they are liable to be taken for linguistic differences. Continual feuds and constant warfare have caused their segregation, and their estrangement from each other. (1968: 282)

Indigenous polity: chieftainship There had never been any centralised authority that administered entire Chin/Zo tribes in the Chin Hills. But the chiefs were themselves autocrat rulers in their respective realm of dominance. The Chin/Zo were divided into a number of village-based polities.9 According to H.N.C. Stevenson, the Chin/ Zo political system was broadly divided into autocratic group and democratic group ([1943] 1986: 14). While the northern and southern hills had autocratic chieftainship, the political system of the central hills was largely democratic. Each chief or ruler had its realm of dominance, whether large of small. The chiefs and his councilors usually assumed all political, economic, social and religious rights over the people, and the villagers owed allegiance to them. As chief of a village, he was entitled to virtually all dues owed directly to rulers by subjects. He had the major share of control over the day-to-day activities of the village. He organised communal works, presided over judicial proceedings, made and enforced rules. He and his councilors collected dues from the administration of justice, some of which went for the payment of communal expenses, but much of which was consumed at public feasts of zu and meat given by the councilors. He could tax the villages whenever he thought fit for the cost of communal rituals. It was from such a divided indigenous space and fragmented identities that the British were to establish the Chin Hills as a political entity and categorised its inhabitants as ‘Chin’ in the late nineteenth century. One of the differences between a chief and a headman lay in the fact that the former’s powers in certain cases extended beyond his own village. In such cases the holdings and connections of a chief were very extensive. He had some control over other headmen, and this gave him added prestige and he was able to consolidate his power in his own village. The distinction between the two has thus been described by F. K. Lehman:

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Within an autocratic supralocal realm there were autocratic headmen. Some had power beyond their own villages and were thought of as chiefs. Haka was the centre of power over a realm of great extent and was so large and wealthy that each of its constituent lineage settlements had its own fully empowered autocratic headman. Each of these was also a chief, so Haka had several chiefs. This was a direct consequence of the very size and power of Haka itself. Smaller centers of power, center of such realms as Zahau in Falam area, had single headmen who could be counted as realm chiefs. This was a mere accident of size and history. ([1963] 1980: 153) This is a much generalised picture; in reality there were considerable variations from village to village or from region to region in the power and functions of chief or headman. The Kamhau-Suktes were ruled by a paramount chief, called Ukpipa or Innpipa (Pau 2009), who enjoyed formidable power and controlled an extensive tract. Each village chief/headman within the jurisdiction of Ukpipa owed allegiance to him and paid all perquisite dues. The Falam tract was administered by a council of elders composed of five chiefs, who were all chosen from the Sunthla tribe and from Falam village (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 149).10 Villages were divided into six quarters, each controlled by elders. Traditionally, the Zanniat and the Taisun were democratic tribes whose villages were ruled by councils of elders (call Nam Kap) representing village quarters (Stevenson [1943] 1986: 14). The position of elders was not attained by merit, but by the vote of the people. According to Carey and Tuck, The members of the Falam council are not looked up to as everyman’s hereditary and lawful lord, as is the case with Chiefs in the north. They are parvenus and aliens, who cannot expect to be treated with the respect which high birth demands and secures in all Kuki tribes. ([1896] 1932: 142–3) In Haka there was no single paramount chief of its own. Each village had a chief, but each such chief had his realm of satellites and allies among the different villages of the Haka area. Early Chin/Zo society was chiefly dominated by various rites which required the service of the clan/village priest. For instance, the founding of a new settlement had to take into consideration various aspects such as the choice of the place, setting up of the communal altar and pillar, water source and so forth, all of which demanded the performance of some kind of ceremonies (Khai 1995: 141). In the early days, a village had no definite

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territorial boundary and the ‘area of a new settlement was ritually defined’ (Ibid.: 143). Vumson says, ‘A village was an independent unit, claiming land about seven miles or eleven kilometers in radius for its cultivation’ (1986: 8). Later on, village territory was defined on the basis of natural boundaries such as rivers. Each village was independently administered by the village headman or chief, locally known as Hausa in Tedim dialect and Khua-bawi in Haka dialect. It is not clear when and how Hausa or Khua-bawi evolved in Chin/Zo society. One popular view was that after the establishment of clan-based villages following the dispersal of population from Ciimnuai village in the northern hills, they had been occasionally at feuds with each other for greater possession of land, procurement of slaves and for other political and economic reasons. In such a situation, villagers felt the need to have a strong and intelligent leader who would administer them, protect them from any aggression and lead them in war against enemies. The strong urge for military leadership, perhaps, led to the emergence of local leaders as village chiefs or Hausa. A chief or Hausa, according to W. W. Hunter, ‘shall direct in war, he is the last in the advance and rear-most in the retreat’ (1973: 30). This does not mean that the chief remained only a military commander. He also had social, economic, political and even religious authority within his jurisdiction. Chin/Zo chiefs quite resemble what Winifred Creamer and Jonathan Haas have to say about chiefship: chiefs or leaders emerged as ‘information processors’ in the face of population growth and increased social complexity. They are the managers of internal interaction between components of the social unit, adjudicators of internal conflict, and managers of foreign affairs. With continued growth in the system, a decision-making bureaucracy coalesces around the chief. . . . At the top of this hierarchy, the chief exercises a form of managerial power based primarily on controlling information coming in from different parts of the system. (1985: 740) The Hausa or Khua-bawi is, therefore, the head of the village. He owned the land and collected taxes such as paddy tax, salt tax, meat tax, bee tax and other dues from the people within his realm of dominance. In effect, the chief is ‘lord of the soil’ and his freemen hold it as his tenants and pay him tithes (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 201). The institution of chiefship was usually hereditary based on ultimogeniture or primogeniture, which depends on the tradition of the particular ruling clan. The chief was assisted by members of the village council called Upa. The Siksek (blacksmith), Tangko (village crier) and Tulpi/Siampi (village priest) were also closely associated with the chief (Guite 1999). The earliest Sukte Hausa was Cin Thang at Lunmual village (Committee 1996: 13). 24

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During this period, the more powerful chiefs of a village were able to exert influence on weaker ones and collect taxes11 from them beyond their jurisdiction, and they succeeded to create a realm of dominance. Such chiefs referred to themselves as Mang, a noble term given to distinguish them from a mere village chief (Khai 1995: 26).12 They are actually what F. K. Lehman calls the ‘supralocal chieftaincies’ ([1963] 1980: 26). The status of a Mang mainly stems from ‘tribute relations’ (Pershits 1979), where the vanquished would give tax or tribute to the conqueror for a stipulated period of time, if not permanently. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century a number of Mangs such as Sukte Mang, Guite Mang and Thawmte Mang had already emerged from the status of a mere clan chief or village headman. They were occasionally fighting with each other for greater political dominance and economic interest. Later on, a paramount ruler known as Ukpi emerged from the Sukte clan, who became more powerful than the Mang. With the rise to power of Kam Hau, another Sukte chief, the entire northern hills were dominated by the Kamhau-Sukte rulers whose sway extended to vast tracts of lands and over several villages. They became the most powerful and most dreaded rulers of the time, even in the contiguous territories.

Methods of warfare The Chin/Zo before the advent of the British were said to be in a perpetual state of conflict. This was largely because of their feuds. Carey and Tuck described the situation as they found it before Pax Britannica was enforced: Amongst themselves the people had innumerable blood feuds which were handed down from generation to generation. Often these blood feuds originated in a quarrel over the price of a mithun, the ownership of a field, the division of inheritance, the price of a wife; the quarrel led to blows, the blows to blood. The feud was then started and blood was avenged in blood only to be avenged again in the same way. Not only did the feud necessitate the spilling of blood of the descendants of the original disputants, but whole villages became involved and innocent blood was as freely spilled as that of the families at feud. ([1896] 1932: 227) The desires for plunder and slaves as well as competition for land were other reasons for conflict. The whole system of Chin/Zo warfare revolved around raiding. Significantly, in the Northern Chin/Zo dialect, the word ‘sim’ means both to fight and raid. A village was seldom attacked openly, except when the attacking forces far outnumbered the defenders or when the village could be taken by complete surprise. The universal method of bringing a refractory clan into a proper state of subordination or to subdue a village was to hang about the paths and fields, 25

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in order to spear or shoot any one they came upon, male and female. This invariably brought the less numerous villages to its knees. The raiding season was approximately from October to March, after the crops had been gathered and when there was no work of great importance to be done in the field. Raids were undertaken by the whole tribe, a clan, a village or even by a handful of young men in pursuit of revenge, plunder or excitement. Prior to a raid, the Chin dispatched spies disguised as traders to visit other villages to collect information. Before taking final decision whether or not to venture into raid, an animal was sacrificed, its liver examined to ascertain whether the spirits were propitious. A proposed raid could at this stage be abandoned if the liver appeared diseased and the omen bad. The most preferred time of raiding was before dawn. In ambuscades they first targeted the men in the middle of the line, the chief and persons of importance. The heads of the slain were never taken inside the village, but were at once stuck up on posts placed outside the village precincts and on the main road to the village, for it was feared that the spirits of the murdered persons would haunt the village if they were taken or kept inside the village (Ibid.: 227). The two British officers quoted above observed that in their resistance to the colonial forces, the Chins/Zo first invariably fought the British in the open or from behind stockades, but when confronted by the rapid-fire rifles resorted to covered-in trenches or to ambushes. The traditional weapons of the Chin/Zo were bows and arrows, spears, and short das. They also used raw hide shields, which were effective against such arms. By the time the British appeared on the scene, Chin/Zo warfare had been revolutionised. This was largely because of their use of firearms. The end of the Napoleonic Wars resulted in the export from Europe of a large number of muskets which reached the coasts of Chittagong and Arakan and into Burmese Empire. From here they found their way into the Chin Hills. Later a further supply came when percussion guns replaced the old flintlock muskets which again reached these hills. Guns were also sold off to the Chins and other tribes by the disbanded Burmese army after 1886. It was this large number of guns in every village that made resistance to the British both intense and protracted (Ibid.: 220–1).13

Chin/Zo-Burman relations Because of the close geographical proximity between the Chin/Zo and the Burmans, there was undoubtedly close interaction between the two. The picture, however, is not clear in the year before the Konbaung dynasty emerged in the mid-eighteenth century. Alaungpaya is said to have recruited Chin/ Zo mercenaries (Chin Levies) in his campaign against Syriam in about 1755 (Harvey 1925: 228). During the same period some Chin/Zo chiefs allied themselves with the Burmans in their wars with Manipur. Trade with the plains of Burma also ensured close contact. Though the Chins/Zo were not 26

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great traders, they brought down items such as beeswax and other forest produce in exchange for salt, guns, gongs, iron and so on. The main markets of hill Chins/Zo in the plains were Yazagyo for Kamhau and Thados, Kalemyo for Sizang, Indin and Sihaung for Taisun and Myittha and Gangaw for the Hakas and other southern tribes (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1980: 215). Interestingly, colonial officials in Arakan and Burma established a relationship between the Chins/Zo and the Burmans. According to Arthur Phayre, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Arakan in 1841, ‘the Khyengs have a tradition that they are direct descendants of some Burmese refugees. . . . The Khyengs and Ku-mis are probably an off shot of the Myan-ma race’ (1841: 684). An American Baptist missionary, Rev. G. S. Comstock, held a similar view (1847). In 1853, B. H. Hodgson remarked that ‘Khyeng’ is probably a corruption of Klang their word for man. The Khyengs believe themselves to be of the same lineage as the Burmese and Arakanese, the stragglers from armies or moving hordes, left in the mountains (1853: 14–15). John Jardine even said, ‘the clans [Burmans] became more or less welded into tribes, as among their “young brothers” the Chins of to-day’ (Sangermano [1833] 1893: vii). It may be said that the Chin/Zo referred to in these accounts must have been plains Chin/Zo who had been not only having a relationship with the Burmans but got Burmanised culturally and linguistically. Perhaps they do not represent the Chin/Zo of the hills. The Chin/Zo used to carry out raids into neighbouring places like the plains of Burma and Manipur for slave and plunder. With regard to this, Lehman remarks: ‘The development in the Northern Chin Hills and adjacent areas which had supralocal organisation, particularly after 1700, was apparently accompanied by gradual intensification of Chin warfare and raiding into Burma plains and into Assam, Chittagong, and Manipur’ ([1963] 1980: 27). Raiding into so-called civilised territory and carrying off booty was often the chief purpose of the emerging pattern of elaborate political and social organisation. They believed that booty obtained by raiding helped provide a new flow of luxury goods into the hills. It gave wealth to the powerful families, which served as capital for the pursuit of peaceful trade that continued alongside raiding. It was to this legacy that the British succeeded after the annexation of Upper Burma following the third and final Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86). Long before that they had already came into contact with the various tribes on the fringes of the Chin Hills, in Arakan’s northern hill frontier and through Manipur with those living immediately south of that petty state.

Notes 1 In the Chin-Lushai hills, prominent chiefdoms which existed before the advent of colonialism were the Sukte chiefdom, Kamhau chiefdom, Sunthla chiefdom, Laizo chiefdom, Sailo chiefdom, Hualngo chiefdom and so on.

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2 The category ‘North Eastern Frontier of Bengal’ has been adapted from Alexander Mackenzie. 3 National Archives of India (NAI) New Delhi, Foreign Political-A Proceedings (FPAP), July 1895, No. 141 Memorandum submitted with Political Department, dated 28 July 1893 from the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma to the Secretary to the government of India, Foreign Department. 4 Zomi is an ethnonym prominent in the Indo-Burma borderlands today. The term Zomi is a combination of ‘Zo’ (which is considered by the people as name of the progenitor) and ‘mi’ (man/people) or Zo people. 5 Later, the Report on the Administration of Burma for the Year 1915–16 gives the Chin population at 110,556 in Chin Hills proper, 17,128 in the Pakokku Hill Tracts, and 22,234 in Arakan Hill Tracts. 6 The sound formerly written Hky or Kh but now pronounced as Ch retains something of its old pronunciation. Today, Burmese currency ‘Kyat’ is ‘Chyat’, and the leader of the National League for Democracy Aung San Syu Kyi as Aung San Syu Chi. 7 For a concise account of early Burma based on recent studies, See (Tarling 1992). 8 NAI, FPAP December 1892, Nos. 42–46; ‘The Lushais call themselves Mizo or Mizau’, and lists 17 ‘castes’, which include ‘Ralte Molbem, Khuangli, Paithe, Taute, Jahau (Yahow), Dulien, Lakher, Fanai (Molienpui) Poi, Dalang, Tangur, Sukte, Mar, Falam (Tashons), Paukhup, Liellul’. 9 See for the system in the Lushai hills in the nineteenth century, N. Chatterjee, The Mizo Chief and His Administration, Aizawl: Tribal Research Institute, 1975. 10 This is because the Shunkla clan had extended themselves at Klaisun, after which the corrupted Taisun named and dominated the entire region. 11 Taxes collected by such chiefs mainly comprised Mim siah/tang siah, sial lampi sap, tuikuang tui siah, in saliang, gam saliang, tuk tha khal tha, inn zangsial lamsa, tuk an khal an. 12 The word Mang is a Northern Zo title conferred on tribal chiefs, probably equivalent to king, or ruler. 13 For an in-depth analysis of firearms as a bone of contention between the British and the indigenous peoples, see (Pau 2017).

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2 FRONTIER POLICY Problem of the Arakan frontier

The province of Arakan which the British acquired after the First AngloBurmese War (1824–26) lay between 21°10′ N and 16°2′ N and covered an area of 16,520 square miles. It was bounded on the east and south by the Yomadoung or Arakan Yomas that runs in a general direction nearly due north and south. On the west was the Bay of Bengal, and on the north was bounded by the Naf River, and the mountain of Wyli, at the source of the Mrosa (Paton [1828] 1980: 354).1 The greater part of the country, from the foot of the mountains to the sea was a Sundarban. The northern hills lay between 20°44′ N and 22°30′ N and 92°35′ E and 93°45′ E, with a total area of 1,500 square miles. Along with the Yomas it was the home of independent tribes known by a variety of names. This was the Arakan frontier, or the hill tracts. Except in the north-east where they marched with the Chittagong hills, its outer limits remained imprecise, but they marched in the north and north-east with hills occupied by tribes, some related to those of the hill tracts, that came to be known more popularly as Chin/Zo, and their country, the Chin Hills.2 After its annexation, Arakan was placed under a commissioner with his headquarters at Akyab. He was assisted by two European officers: the collector (or senior assistant to the commissioner) and a junior assistant. The northern hills formed a subdivision under an assistant. Arakan’s defence rested on one regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, a company of artillery, an elephant battery and a local corps. The last, called the Arakan Local Battalion, which had been raised in 1824 and consisted of Mughs, garrisoned at Akyab and the Kaladan Valley, and occupied posts to the north as far as Dalekmai or Tulukmee, about 160 miles to the direct north of Akyab. It also held posts in the Yomas that separated Arakan from Burma. This local battalion proved extremely useful in defending the frontier of northern Arakan, where the regular troops could never have been employed because of the unhealthy climate of the sub-montane tracts. In addition, a body of 200 burkundazes or civil police was maintained for the performance of civil duties in the province.

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Frontier tribes: early relations In those days, military matters dominated British policy. Burma, after their defeat at the hands of the East India Company, was sullen and another struggle with an avenging Burmese, it was commonly believed, was not unlikely.3 There were a number of passes between Arakan and Burma through which the latter could pour in their numerous hordes. These were the very routes through which a British army would have to advance into the heartland of Ava in case of another war. Their knowledge was ‘most imperfect and unsatisfactory’. In 1826, after the Treaty of Yandaboo, Lieutenant T. A. Trant of His Majesty’s 38th Regiment of Foot journeyed from Ava to examine one of these, the Aeng, known to be the home of a ‘fierce and unconquered tribe’. He provides an interesting account of these tribes and was the first officer to use the term ‘Khyen’ or Chins: The people who inhabit the range of mountains that separate Ava from Aracan, and who are termed Khyen, are very different in character and habits from their Burman neighbourhoods: appearance, the men are much inferior to the Burmese, their countenances being flatter, and not so regular: the dress also differs; it is very simple; a black cloth, striped with red and white, is thrown over the shoulders, as black cloth is worn round the loins, and a black jacket is occasionally used. (Trant 1828: 261) Trant further adds: The Khyens nearest the plains are a quite inoffensive set, and must be distinguished from the Khyens of the further mountains, in as much as they have placed themselves under the Burman government, and are liable to be called upon for their quota of men in case of war, and pay taxes; whereas, the others are quite independent, residing in the most remote and unfrequented recesses of the mountains. These Khyens hold themselves aloof from, and are entirely independent of the rest of mankind, whom they consider their enemies and lawful prey, and acknowledge no sovereign: they herd together in small parties of thirty and forty, and select some fertile spot in the neighbourhood of a mountain stream, sufficiently large to cultivate grain for their consumption. There they erect their miserable dwellings, and, with the produce of the land, consisting of rice and turmeric, contrive to support themselves: the rivers furnish them with abundance of fish, and they will eat any animal, however disgusting it may be. (Ibid.: 262)

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Trant was reporting on the borderlands northeast and east of Arakan beyond which lay the Burmese dominions. In the immediate north were tribes equally little known, though with those nearest to the plains some contact had been established. These were made to pay a house tax of Rs. 3 per year collected by a functionary called the ‘Kyong-oke’ or ‘head of a river district or tract’, who was appointed for this purpose as early as in 1825.4 Some of these who paid tax were the Khumis, but many of their villages still remained outside the acknowledged British frontier. These tribes including Trant’s Khyens had an important bearing on future military operations. One of the major problems in the last campaign against the Burmese was the difficulty in finding men for the commissariat and transport corps who could withstand Arakan’s deadly climate (Pemberton [1835] 2000: 157).5 Major Henry Burney, the Company’s Resident at the Court of Ava, thus told George Swinton, Chief Secretary at Fort William in Calcutta: The Khyens in the neighbourhood of Aeng are we understand amongst the most civilized of their tribe and from that vicinity, and from the hills northward to the Koladyne, as far as our influence extended great number of these mountaineers, all of whom are practiced porters could be assembled at Aeng with little delay, whilst Mugs and other coolies could be engaged for the same service from the different districts of Araccan and Chittagong to meet any demand we can possibly foresee.6 A major difficulty, however, of managing these tribes was their old habit of plundering and raiding villages in the plains. Raids from known Burmese territory, often described as dacoities, were left to Major Henry Burney to sort out with the Burmese Court (Hall 1974: 189–92).7 Elsewhere in the northern frontier of the district the want of accurate information about the tribes, of their habits and habitats, was a serious impediment for the formulation of any policy. By the middle of the 1830s, however, a little more became known of the tribes beyond the British frontier in the north. A report thus speaks of the ‘tributary Khoomis’ paying atah8 to the Lengais, a term which according to the same report was ‘applied by our Khoomis to the Lushais, or a tribe of that numerous race’. There was of course no tribe called Lengais, but the term merely applied as was the common practice of British officers to refer to tribes by the name of villages or their geographical location, to inhabitants of the Lengai range that marked Chittagong’s extreme eastern limits. These Lengais were in 1833 reported to have committed a raid on a village a few miles beyond the northernmost police outpost. Shortly afterwards, they were again mentioned as ‘raiding and being

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raided upon’. In 1838, a small expedition was directed against them and the report on it thus concludes: Soobadar Tsam-baw-ree was dispatched with 80 sepoys to punish the Lengais. He collected all the men of the Koladan, and destroyed the Lengai village, which consisted of over 300 houses. Two Lengai were killed and three women taken captive. Since then the Lengais have all dispersed, and are now settled in the Boheings (Bohmongs) zemindary in the Chittagong District.9 The victims of some of these raids were the Khumis (Lewin [1885] 2005, [1869] 2004, [1870] 1978).10 By 1841 the Khumis themselves had been described as ‘raiders’. In the middle of 1841, a series of plunders on British villages were attributed to them and that winter the first military expedition crossed the British frontier. The clan guilty of the raids was mentioned as Walleng, but their precise identity is not clear. A column consisting of a subedar, a jemadar, three each of havildars and naiks, 70 sepoys and two buglers under Lieutenant Albert Fytche11 of the Arakan Local Battalion moved up into the hills accompanied by Lieutenant Arthur Purves Phayre, the senior assistant commissioner at Akyab in January 1841. The expedition encountered enormous difficulties. Lieutenant Phayre’s report showed what these were: On the 24th January 1841, we were afoot, having a stiff march before us to the village of attack, it being at an elevation of about 4,000 feet above the Sumeng. It stands near the summit where the face of the mountain is nearly perpendicular. About 10 a.m. we were sufficiently near to hear yells and shouts from the village, or rather from men stationed above it, but not a man could we catch a glimpse of; numerous masses of rock, trunks of trees, and other missiles were hurled down by them from above, with the object apparently of intimidating us, for we had not yet advanced sufficiently near for these to take effect. Lieutenant Fytche now judiciously ordered the detachment to make detour from the regular path, and we advanced by the left flanks of the village, having Koomees ahead with dhas, to cut a path through the thick stunted bamboo jungle. (Fytche 1878: 216–17) Phayre then went on to describe the first encounter of the British column with the Khumis, ‘who concealed themselves so effectually that not one of them could be seen, though their position was disclosed by the smoke of their muskets’. This is the first report on the use of firearms by these tribes. Phayre goes on to say: 32

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The detachment now advanced, or climbed, as quickly as the steep, indeed almost perpendicular, nature of the ground would admit of, until they reached the village. The houses were all empty, as was to have been expected. So steep was the spot where the village stood, that the inhabitants, I found, could only leave their houses and go down the face of the hills, or communicate with each other by means of ladders; they had now removed all these and retired to the summit of the hill, pulling their ladders after them. The village consisted as reported about eighty houses. We set it on fire, and after halting here about two hours and a half, we descended the hill, and returned to the place we started from the Sumeng, having had a very hard day’s work. None of our men were wounded save in the feet, by the sharp bamboo spikes with which the hill side was studded in grassy spots where they could be concealed. (Ibid.: 217–18) At the end of his report, Lieutenant Phayre observed, Lieutenant Fytche having returned by difficult mountain paths which no European had hitherto traversed will have the effect of showing many of these tribes that they are much more within our power than they had hitherto supposed, and my intercourse with them will be much facilitated thereby. (Ibid.: 219) Notwithstanding this optimism, the frontier remained periodically disturbed. A good deal of information about the tribes was gathered in the next five years. ‘There are few facts more remarkable in India, than the vast number of tribes which occupy its mountain fastnesses, and which roam each interminable forests; all speaking distinct dialects’, declared Lieutenant T. Latter of the Arakan Battalion in 1846 after a tour of these hills. This peculiarity he found strikingly illustrated in the Arakan Yomas. On the banks of the Koladan he found several tribes: The Khumis, the Mrus (of which there are two tribes, speaking distinct dialects), the Anoos, the Kyaus, the Khons, the Shentoos, and finally the Khyoungthas. Although the languages of all these may have originated from the same stock, yet there is quite as much difference between them as between French and English. The most powerful among them are the Shentoos, who being beyond our frontier, are known to us only by their devastations on those tribes which pay us tribute; the suddenness, secrecy, and never-failing nature of these attacks, cause them to be held, by the rest, in a dread of which it would be impossible to give an idea. The Khons, 33

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who are likewise beyond our frontier, are employed by the Shentoos as guides and spies, and are on that account obnoxious to the vengeance of those clans, who may owe a blood feud to the Shentoos. (Latter 1846: 60) This was the first mention in the Arakan records of the Shindus whose identity was to remain a mystery till the annexation of the Chin Hills after the third and final Anglo-Burmese War (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 16). With the exception of the ‘Khyoungthas’ or ‘the sons of the streams’, the rest of the tribes went under the general term ‘Toungthas’ or ‘sons of the hills’.

Hopkinson’s recommendations In 1847 the Arakan frontier problem was for the first time seen in relation to that of Chittagong’s, where the local officials were facing an uphill task to defend their frontier. That year the first raid by the Shindu from beyond the Koladan Valley was reported from Chittagong. In the belief that the Shindus could be better controlled from Arakan than from Chittagong, several proposals were made with that object in view (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 335). One of the most important was that the Arakan authorities should advance their frontier outposts further north into the hills for a more effective control over the routes usually taken by the Shindus and other marauding tribes. Nothing seems to have come of all this, and in the cold season of 1847–48 two raids were reported, one on the Chakmas and the other on the Phru, both in the Chittagong hills. The raiders were said to have come from the Koladan area, but this time certain villages of the independent Khumis living beyond the northernmost frontier outpost on that river were implicated. In December 1847, Lieutenant Henry Hopkinson,12 principal assistant commissioner at Akyab, led an expedition consisting of 50 Sepoys from the Arakan Local Battalion and 12 other European and Indian non-commissioned officers against the guilty village. Hopkinson moved up into the hills on 24 December and on the following day came up against some Khumi villages. His report, which like Lieutenant Fytche’s went into the details of the difficulties of military operations in these hills, provides an interesting account of tribal warfare: I found Sandys (one of the European Officers accompanying him) busy getting his men under proper cover, the enemy annoying him by a galling fire kept up principally from two block houses-human nests I may call them erected like eagles’ eyries in the lofty branches of two gigantic forest trees, which sprung up from the side of the hill whereon stood the village; the block-houses being actually connected with the village by very ingeniously contrived bamboo suspension bridges, about two feet broad, and which a kick would 34

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sever from their connexion with the door of the block-houses, and hurl into the abyss below. Immediately on our entrance to the village, the women and children, supported by one or two of the ablest warriors of the clan, who were now firing on us, had retired to these block-houses; they were of course quite inaccessible, and we could only silence the fire from them by sharp vollies [sic] from below. However, these at length ceased and very glad I was, for I could not help thinking that each of our bullets might find for its destination the person of some unfortunate woman or child. A few shots came still dropping in from the neighbouring hills, but they did us no harm, and we now betook ourselves to the consideration of the course to be pursued next. (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 526–7) Hopkinson, however, managed to enter some Anoo villages whose chief he was able to pacify. Here Hopkinson sought to impress them by a display of military power rather than by actual fighting: Sandys at my request kindly paraded his men in single rank, making as much of them as he could, and a very satisfactory effect they appeared to have upon the nerves of these wild men. We also treated them to a bugle blast. (Ibid.: 528) Not surprising, from what Hopkinson confessed: We were fortunate to have got off so cheaply. Had the enemy been prepared for us and stood, our loss must have been very severe. In fact, I do not see how we could have taken the place. It was a position that four resolute men might have maintained against a whole battalion; the village was stockaded and the main wicket, the one we gained entrance by, protected. (Ibid.) He next passed through the Khumi settlement of Apoung. It was described as a large fine village. The Khumis at this time were said to be divided into two groups: Aroeng (wild, uncivilised) who remained out the control of the British, and Ayeng (tamed, subdued), completely controlled by the British. From Apoung village Hopkinson moved to Dalekmai (Talukme), reaching that village on 30 December 1847. Here he established contact with the Khon chiefs. An important outcome of Hopkinson’s expedition was the knowledge that beyond the Khumis and other allied tribes lay the formidable Shindus, soon to become a new and disturbing factor in the management of the Arakan’s frontier tribes. 35

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Hardly had Hopkinson returned to the plains than the Shindus began to harry the villages with which he had established contacts. During 1849–50, when raids once again reappeared in Chittagong’s hill tracts, attributed at first to the Lushais but later said to be by Shindus, the whole question of effectively putting down these periodic frontier disturbances from the Arakan side once again engaged the attention of the authorities in Calcutta. Phayre, who had in the meanwhile became Commissioner of Arakan, was less enthusiastic about schemes of frontier defence based on outposts and felt there was no chance of checking the Shindus except through punitive expeditions. The problem dragged on for another four years, when the Government of India finally decided upon a definite policy: It must always be a matter of extreme difficulty to determine the best mode of dealing with savage hill tribes, who regard plunder and murder as lawful and commendable pursuits, and dwell in inaccessible fastnesses with the climate so deadly as to defy approach. The plan of subsidizing the Chiefs, and enlisting the men as soldiers or policemen, formerly adopted in the case of the hillmen of Bhagulpore,13 and more recently in that of the Kookees, has always answered best; and there seems to be no reason why this plan should not succeed with the Sindoos and the other tribes on the Chittagong frontier. The Commissioner of Arracan will accordingly be desired to make an attempt to open a negotiation with the Chiefs of the Sindoo tribe, for the purpose of ascertaining whether, by means of this kind, an effectual stop cannot be put to these periodical forays. (Ibid.: 339) This was a proposal that Hopkinson found fraught with great difficulties. In the first place it was very uncertain whether the Shindus could be contacted at all since their territory was inaccessible. Men employed to communicate with them dared not venture into their territory. Hopkinson even questioned the very idea of negotiating with the tribe: What is to be the basis of negotiation? What equivalent is to be tendered to the Shindus in return for their abandoning their slave trade? Are we to get from them an estimate of their annual income by captives, and promise them the same amount in muskets or rupees? This would be little better than compounding murder and abduction. And, what assurance we have that the composition would be observed in good faith by the opposite side? (Ibid.: 531)14 The Shindus were not, as far as he knew, a people united together and obeying a common head or government. They were split up into numerous clans, 36

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each under its own chief and independent of each other. It would, therefore, be necessary to have separate engagements with each clan. The intransigence of a single clan could ruin the whole scheme. He wondered if the idea of negotiation was based on the belief that the Shindus lived in an acknowledged hill country, or in the immediate neighbourhood of the British. If that was the case it would be unwise even to attempt it because the Shindus were in reality the most distant tribe that ever crossed the British frontier (Ibid.: 532). Hopkinson’s own view was that the intervening tribes between the Shindus and the British should be subjugated and controlled as the first step towards a solution to the frontier problem. These tribes he said should form one administrative unit: There seems a perfect agreement of all opinions on the subject of the Shindoos, that until they are put down, the frontier will always be more or less liable to incursion . . . we shall never be able to get at the Shindoos until we have confederated the intervening tribes and made them our own. (Ibid.: 534) Referring to the suggestion to employ the services of the hill chiefs, Hopkinson said: We cannot attend to enlist and organise hill chiefs and their followers to combine for their own protection, to keep the peace, or, in fact, to do anything at all that we want them to do, unless we have an European Officer placed in direct relations with them. Interference will do more harm than good without we can make it of the most immediate and effective kind. (Ibid.: 533) Hopkinson then spelt out what he thought was the best method of dealing with the frontier tribes: My opinion therefore is that extraordinary authority must be resorted to; that if the pacification of these regions is a measure that has been seriously and earnestly determined as a thing that has got to be done, special agents must be appointed to do it; in a word that both the Kupas Mehal and the Upper Koladan should be placed in charge of European Superintendents. In Araccan an extra junior assistant would suffice for the duty, and I presume that an officer in an equivalent position would equally answer for the Kupas Mehal. The exercise of any powers with which such officers were entrusted must be unfettered by regulation law: and as of course they would be ex-officio commandants of the police levies, which it would be 37

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probably found necessary to make it their first duty to raise, they must be military men. (Ibid.) Finally, ‘in the establishment of superintendency lies the last and only chance of success. If this cannot be tried, or if it is tried and fails, the next best thing is, in my opinion, to leave the tribes altogether to their own devices’. In short, Hopkinson wanted British administration extended to the hill tracts to where the Shindu territory was known to begin. If Bengal and the Government of India did not agree to this he would rather follow a purely non-interventionist policy and have nothing further to do with the frontier tribes (Ibid.: 533–4; Barpujari [1976] 1996: 63).15

Frontier policy: the Bengal government The revolt of 1857–58 and the Government of India’s preoccupation with the reform and reorganisation of the Indian army and police forces delayed a consideration of Hopkinson’s recommendations. Meanwhile, both Arakan as well as Chittagong saw a recurrence of frontier disturbances. Chittagong’s commissioner wanted military expeditions every cold weather, or at least the establishment of combined military and police outposts in both Chittagong and Arakan frontiers. The lieutenant governor of Bengal to whom these proposals were sent set his face against military expeditions: ‘In addition to the extreme unhealthiness of the climate’, said Sir John Peter Grant, ‘there would be great difficulty in distinguishing between those who are in the habit of committing these periodical depredations and those who are favourable and friendly to our rule’ (Ibid.: 340). He was only prepared to distribute arms to the frontier villages or subsidise tribal chiefs to keep the peace in their neighbourhood. Bengal was, however, primarily concerned with the Chittagong frontier where disturbances had been frequent and more intense. And so it was here and not in Arakan that Hopkinson’s ideas for an European superintendent were first implemented. Grant after a detailed review of the frontier problem recommended that the whole country east of the cultivated plains of Chittagong should be removed from the operation of the General Regulations and that an officer, to be called the Superintendent of the Jhoom Tract, should be appointed (Ibid.: 341; Hussain 1992a; Bhattacharjee 1978; Barooah [1964] 1970).16 Act XXII of 1860 was accordingly passed by which the Chittagong Hill Tracts was created as a separate non-regulation district under a superintendent (Barua 1972: 514–19). Before the superintendent could take charge, the Chittagong Hill Tracts were overwhelmed by what was called ‘the Great Kuki Invasion of 1860’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 342–4).17 From then on till the arrival in April 1862 of Sir Cecile Beadon as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, both the 38

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Chittagong and Arakan frontiers remained unusually disturbed. Nobody knew why Beadon’s appointment, however, coincided with the administrative reorganisation of the British possessions in Burma. The commissionership of Pegu (annexed in 1852 following the Second Anglo-Burmese War), Tenasserim and Arakan, which were hitherto independent of one another, the first corresponding with the Government of India and Arakan with Bengal, were constituted into the chief commissionership of British Burma and placed under Sir Arthur Phayre. Bengal’s control over Arakan ceased (Dodwell 1932: 441), but Beadon’s impact on frontier policy in Arakan proved more durable. Bengal’s new lieutenant governor was an ardent advocate of the policy of conciliation and of establishing the personal influence of European officers over the tribes as a means of bringing peace to the frontier. In January 1863 he spelt out, in connection with the Chittagong question, what his ideas were: Every endeavour should be made to induce the Chiefs of the unfriendly tribes not to come in, as it is called, that is, to present themselves before the Superintendent, either at Chittagong or at any other place at a distance from the frontier, but to consent that he should meet them at some spot equally convenient to both parties, and then to enter into written engagements for the future maintenance of peace on the border. (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 346)18 The ‘natural savage pride of the Chieftains’ should not be hurt was his directive. The confidence of the chiefs must be gained before any reasonable engagements with the people would be possible. He went on to describe how this was to be done: One of the best means of conciliating the good will of tribes, like the Kookies, is to arrange an annual gathering of Chiefs at some convenient place in the hills, on which occasion the Superintendent, representing the British Government, should receive trifling offerings from each Chiefs, and bestow on him a present in return, and take the opportunity of hearing and redressing all complaints and grievances, and of encouraging free and friendly communication between the different tribes, and between them and the people of the plains. To attend at such meetings, and to receive a token of friendly disposition from the Superintendent, would soon come to be regarded as a privilege, and the general good feeling of the tribes would be enlisted against any one of them who held aloof. (Ibid.) Finally, Beadon had suggested the importance of granting a small police allowance to each chief to enable him to keep the peace within his own limits 39

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and to prevent his people from attacking their neighbours. It was in the pursuit of such a policy that the youthful Superintendent of the Hill Tracts Police, Captain Thomas Herbert Lewin, undertook a journey to the famed but mysterious Blue Mountain region, beyond which lay the Shindu territory. It was to lead indirectly to the creation of Arakans’s Hill Tracts district. In November 1865, Lewin left Chittagong with a small party on his journey into the unknown wilds east of his district (Lewin [1885] 2005: 146–82).19 On 7 December he crossed the Chittagong-Arakan frontier and reached Dalekmai, described by him as ‘a village on the Koladan consisting of about fifty houses inhabited by Arracanese British subjects’ and ‘the extreme frontier village of Arracan’ (Ibid.).20 From here he progressed to a Khumi village, and on 14 December he reached the ‘village of the Kyaw chief Teynwey’. It was the first strongly fortified village he had encountered in these hills: It contained fifty-four houses, and was situated on the top of a hill about five hundred feet high, looking down on the river, which flowed below in a narrow and somewhat rocky channel. The place was unapproachable on three sides, owing to the steepness of the hill scarp, and was besides surrounded by a strong stockade of unhewn logs, having a frieze or topping intervals, were look-out places and stations for firing. The sole entrance was by a steep winding path leading to triple doors of strong hewn timber plank three inches thick. It was altogether a formidable defensive position, the only weak point being, that the houses, built of bamboo thatched with palm-leaves, could easily be set on fire by rockets or fire-tipped arrows. (Ibid.: 162–3) Here Lewin met a Shindu chief, who had come accompanied by four Shindu women, probably the first European to come into contact with the dreaded tribe. It was in this village on 15 December that he was shot and wounded while sitting in his hut (Ibid.: 167).21 Lewin, found on a makeshift stretcher, at once retreated, reaching Akyab on 20 December. Here he met the touring chief commissioner, Colonel Sir Arthur Phayre, and the superintendent of police, Major Henry Munro, and between them they decided that a second attempt should be made to reach the Shindu country. In early January 1866, the three made a fresh start towards Dalekmai which they reached on the 12th. While Phayre returned to Akyab from there, Lewin and Munro proceeded with a small escort towards the Shindu country. They could not proceed beyond the village of the Kyaw chief. Shindu opposition proved obstinate. Although Lewin’s attempt to march to the confines of the Shindu country failed, his report confirmed Beadon in his opinion that so far as the Chittagong Hill Tract was concerned, protection from 40

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Shindu raids must be sought for on this quarter rather from the action of the authorities in British Burma than from any measure which can be taken by this government.

Phayre’s views: Hopkinson’s proposals revived To the Arakan authorities, the nature of their frontier problem was entirely different from that faced in Chittagong Hill Tracts. The object of the latter authorities was the defence of the frontier against raids by the Shindus from the hills north of Koladan Valley and of preventing the Mrus and other tribes from extending their cultivation further east and thereby coming into collision with tribes more powerful if less known. In Arakan it was not the Shindus who constituted a serious danger but inter-tribal conflicts. This was what the inspector general of police of British Burma, Captain H. T. Duncan, emphasised when reviewing the events of the frontier of the past five years. But he did recognise the fact that the Shindus did constitute a serious problem to the Chittagong officers: The Shindus have never made any attack on our tribute-paying tribes in the Koladyne or neighbouring villages; but they have for some years past committed raids on the outlying villages in the Sunkoo (Shungoo) Valley of the Chittagong District.22 Between the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Shindu country there was a succession of ranges running north to south, covered by dense forest and intersected by mountain torrents, making military movements eastwards exceedingly difficult. It was for these reasons that the Bengal Government wanted British Burma to adopt such measures as would put pressure upon the Shindus to prevent raids in their Hill Tracts. When on 15 January Shindu warriors marched across the hills into the Chittagong Hill Tract and fell upon a Mru village, killing four and carrying off 24 into captivity, the Bengal Government once again urged upon Burma the need to control the Shindus from the Arakan side (Ibid.). This led chief commissioner Colonel Phayre to review the entire problem from Burma’s point of view. Of the tribes that inhabited the Akyab district, ‘the Khyeng, Koomees, and Kamees’ and some clans or communities who lived in the lower hills were in every respect subject to British rule. Others, though within the nominal boundary of the district, were ‘practically independent’. Among these: The Shindoo tribe has always been spoken of as powerful, and as being much feared. They seem to extend not only for some distance within the nominal British Territory, but far beyond it. Their attacks upon the lower tribes, that is, upon those residing nearer the plains, 41

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have of late been more frequent, more bold, and more destructive than formerly. They have also been directed more against the tribes within the Chittagong District and not against those in Arracan. I am unable to account for this change. I am not aware of any Shindoo clans who either pay tribute, or are in the slightest degree controlled by any British authority.23 With the exception of the Shindu, Phayre knew many of the tribes personally, having travelled in the hills considerably. Over all these tribes influence could easily be acquired if contact with them was constant and personal. If for any reason it was interrupted, ‘the wild and fickle people soon forget their promises’, and a chief ‘of whom one may have formed good hope will, perhaps, next be heard of as heading a raid on a neighbouring tribe and killing all who are not fit to be sold as captives’. Hence, the need for some officers over them. In the existing administrative set up in Akyab it could hardly be expected of the district officer, with all his other duties, to effectively supervise the frontier tribes. Of this need for a separate administration under a special officer for these people, he said, he was convinced when he met some of them at Dalekmai along with Major Munro and Captain Lewin. It is necessary to show the Chiefs and tribes who profess to acknowledge British supremacy that they are closely watched; and that, while their grievances will be redressed, their faults and crimes will not be overlooked. It is likewise necessary to overawe those – principally Shindoos – who are now practically beyond the arms of authority, and who require to be impressed with the danger of provoking vengeance by their predatory incursions.24 The appointment of such an officer would be all the more necessary to deal with the Shindus. For instance, there was not the means to gain sufficient information about them and fix responsibility for any raids that they may have made in British territory and recover captives in their possession. Besides, ‘to punish these people at the distance they are and in the country where they live, I know, from my own past experience, to be futile. To rescue the captives is a work of time’.25 Phayre drew the attention of the Government of India to the map of the district of Akyab, which he said showed more than half its land consisting of hills. To the north and northeast, the country was ‘wild’ and ‘inhabited by tribes nominally subject to the Burmese, but practically independent and as little known as the tribes of Central Africa before the days of Burton, Speke and Grant’. Control, he said, must be accompanied in the first place by the exhibition of the power to punish: ‘but no plan can be successful with these people which does not exhibit, resting on the basis of force, the 42

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moral influence of personal intercourse by a European Officer direct with the influential men of each tribe’. And therefore he concluded: From what has been already stated, I need hardly add that I consider the presence of a British Officer in the midst of these tribes as being absolutely necessary. Without that they cannot be controlled, and we cannot acquire that knowledge of their interior condition which is essential, as well to curb their predatory habits, and gradually to improve their condition.26 The officer he recommended would have his headquarters at Dalekmai, to be called Superintendent of the Hill Tribes in Northern Arakan, and would be responsible directly to the commissioner of Arakan, and would have the powers of a deputy commissioner. But Phayre made it clear that such an officer should not be bound down by the civil and criminal codes of procedure. He would leave a wide discretion with the superintendent as regards the tribes and not tie him down by detailed instructions. But generally his functions would be to respect the social customs of tribes paying tribute. Attacks on account of old blood feuds, taking away children as slaves for debts of their fathers or remote ancestors and such like customs must be absolutely stopped. As regards the Shindus, Phayre felt that the superintendent should endeavour to enter into communication with them with a view to finding out: 1

2

Whether any captives now among them can be recovered by ransom or otherwise. The means of doing so peaceably might be left to the Superintendent’s discretion. He might be authorised to pay reasonable sums to liberate captives. With a view to the future, what means should be taken to restrain the Shindoo and other tribes from making attacks.27

Phayre recommended that the new scheme should take effect from 1 October 1866.

The Arakan Hill Tracts The Government of India did not delay its sanction to the appointment of an officer to be styled ‘Superintendent of the Hill Tribes in Northern Arakan’, and to an increase to the new Arakan police organised in 1862 (under the Police Act V of 1861) to meet the requirements of his charge. The Hill Tracts of Northern Arakan or Arakan Hill Tracts, as the new administrative unit was called, was a tangled mass of hills between Arakan and Chittagong and the country towards Burma forming a parallelogram with irregular sides about 100 miles in length and 40 in breadth. The set of rules 43

Map 2.1 Arakan Hill Tracts Source: Adapted from the map prepared by R. H. Greenstreet, Superintendent, Northern Arakan Hill Tracts dated 13 March 1892.

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for the administration of the tract thus defined the extent of the territory placed under this officer: The Superintendent has jurisdiction among all the hill tribes within the following boundary: the whole country drained by the Pee Khyoung and the Koladan River and by their tributaries north of the latitude of the Koladan Police post. They whole country drained by the Lemroo River and its tributaries north of the Yeo Khyoung and by streams joining the Lemroo above that stream.28 The superintendent was to use his influence over the whole country north of the Koladan post. The revenue system, which included a house tax and tribute, was extended to tribes within this area. Those outside British control, that is, tribes not paying tribute or subject to taxation were to be considered entirely independent. Even those who had come within the limits of British control but had not paid tribute were not considered as being under the British. By 1870 the main features of the administration of the Hill Tracts was laid out. The public buildings, court house, police station and even a lock-up had already been constructed in 1868. A police force had been organised, inter-tribal raids became less frequent, trade improved29 and a frontier market at Myouk-toung was reported to be in a flourishing state.30 A report on the progress of British administration in Arakan sums up what had been achieved so far: We found numerous tribes of hill people, acknowledging no authority, constantly raiding amongst themselves, and on their neighbours in the plains and taking or being made slaves; we have introduced law and order within certain defined limits, and that chiefly by the encouragement given to trade, and the security to life and property afforded by our police. Trade in tobacco, cotton, and other hill product is steadily increasing year by year. Most of the hill tribes are placing themselves under our protection, and in the while of the district there is not a single person detained by force as a captive. The tribes who still olive beyond our frontier are in friendly relations with us, and are gradually acquiring that wish to be admitted to our protection.31 A good deal of information had been gathered on the tribes within and without the British frontier.32 These were substantial achievements, but the main problem for which the Arakan Hill Tracts was constituted, namely, checking of trans-frontier raids was not entirely checked. One of the Provisional Rules had laid down: It is particularly necessary to restrain the Shindoo tribe from making attacks. The Superintendent should ascertain and report how 45

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the several clans of that tribe receive salt, and report whether their supply of salt can be made dependent on the British authorities either of Arracan or Chittagong. This should engage early attention.33 Salt, it was discovered, came from the sea coast, but nothing of how it reached the Shindus. Stopping the supply of salt to the tribe as a means of controlling them did not proved an effective instrument. The extensive disturbances in the Chittagong Hill Tracts from 1869 onwards were seen to have their origin in the unsettled nature of the hills north of the Arakan Hill Tracts. In February 1870 Sir George Campbell, the lieutenant governor of Bengal, represented to the Government of India that it was very difficult to get at the Shindus from the side of Chittagong: ‘They could only be really influenced from the side of Burma’ and ‘all that could be done on the south of the Chittagong hills is to extend and strengthen our Police posts to check desultory raids’.34 In fact, that the Shindus and the Khumis were in contact with both the Chittagong and the Arakan authorities complicated the frontier question. These tribes who the commissioner of Chittagong, Lord Ulick Browne, complained committed half the raids in the Chittagong Hill Tracts would afterwards go to the Arakan hills for peaceful purposes (Ibid.). In the beginning of 1868, he had proposed to open communications with the Shindus and Khumis outside his jurisdiction somewhat on the line of Lewin’s attempt about two years earlier. This was abandoned at the opposition of the commissioner of Arakan, who thought that such an attempt might impact unfavourably on his Hill Tracts. Browne, convinced that the Arakan authorities were unwilling that anything should be done from the Chittagong side, sought the Government of India’s intervention. He said, There can be little doubt that communication could be more advantageously effected from Arracan, but to prevent misunderstanding with reference to the present order of the Governor General in Council in the point of communication with the frontier tribes, I should be pleased to receive orders as to whether action is to be taken from this side or not.35 The Government of India, only anxious that no opportunity ought to be lost of influencing the Arakan tribes, merely directed that a system of direct communication between the two administrations should be established to reduce misunderstanding to a minimum. The persistence of the Bengal Government ultimately led the Government of India to direct that the Lushai policy Lord Mayo chalked out for the Cachar and Chittagong frontiers36 should be extended to the Arakan Hill Tracts. Consequently, in 1871 an important administrative change was 46

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introduced into the Hill Tracts. Until then, the superintendent had nominally controlled all the tribes within his territorial boundaries. Under the new system, a definite line of demarcation was drawn between territory under direct administration and that which was not considered desirable to bring under immediate control. The latter was left in the hands of the chiefs, but the superintendent was to cultivate friendly relations with them, influencing them as far as he could but not endeavouring to coerce or interfere. The police force was increased, the outpost at Dalekmai was strengthened and other guards placed at intervals along the line of demarcation, so that the whole line from east to west was regularly patrolled during the fine weather once a week – a very considerable degree of security being thus afforded to the whole of the tract under British control. Additional European officers were appointed. The headquarters of the superintendent moved from Myouk-toung, at the foot of the hills, where it was transferred from Dalekmai a year ago, to Palukwa (Paletwa), about 40 miles further north, so that he was now in the centre of his district, and only 55 miles from the frontier.37 The conclusion of the Lushai Expedition of 1871–72 brought about some changes in frontier policy. ‘Defence and conciliation’, which Mayo had enjoined before his departure and ultimate death in the Andamans, was to be carried out through a chain of military posts from the southern frontier of Cachar and Tripura, down to the Chittagong and Arakan Hill Tracts. Beyond the line of posts, the tribes were to be left to themselves, to be dealt ‘politically’ by frontier officers. There had been some agreement between the Chittagong and Arakan Hill Tracts officers that the shortest and the best line of posts for common defence was one linking the Chittagong posts with those in Arakan to form a continuous line.38 But the Arakan posts could meet Chittagong only if they were sufficiently advanced. To this Burma’s chief commissioner objected, principally on the ground that it was not for him to extend his post to defend Chittagong territory. ‘The fact, however, is that the defence of the Sungoo valley’ in southern Chittagong where the Shindus continually raided, the Bengal government continued to plead with the Government of India, ‘is a matter which can be managed from Arracan better than from Chittagong’. Bengal therefore suggested that it would be very convenient that a tract ‘so essentially Burmese’ and having to be defended from tribes approachable only from the Burma side should be made over to the chief commissioner for both administration and defence: ‘It is very difficult for us to deal with the Shindus at all’.39 The Bengal Government therefore proposed to the Government of India: If the tract exposed to their ravages be made over to British Burma, the same authorities can deal with the matter as a whole, and judge for themselves what plan of defence is best. The Cox’s Bazaar Subdivision of Chittagong, lying between the Sungoo Subdivision and 47

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the Sea . . . largely colonised by Mughs, who are in fact Burmese and speaking in Burmese tongue. It is very remote from Chittagong and practically accessible only by sea. We have great difficulty in properly officering and managing the Subdivision. The Lieutenant Governor would be glad to make this also to British Burma.40 Nothing came of this. The policy and administrative organisation of 1866–70 remained unchanged until they were overtaken by events following the annexation of Upper Burma. The introduction to Carey and Tuck’s The Chin Hills noted: ‘These arrangements hold good to the day and have worked well. The administrative boundary has not advanced’ ([1896] 1932: 16–17), but as Arakan played no role in the final occupation of the Chin-Lushai country, no further notice was taken of the Chin/Zo and the Hill Tracts. In reality at that time, it was in Manipur where major developments were taking place.

Notes 1 After the annexation of Arakan in 1826, Charles Paton was appointed the subcommissioner of Arakan. In the same year he toured the four divisions of Arakan (Arakan proper, Ramree, Sandoway and Cheduba), and found that the population of these four divisions was roughly 100,000. Pemberton thus writes: Its extreme length, from the sources of the Koladyne river, to Cape Negrais, being about 500 miles. Its greatest breadth is found at the northern extremity, where it is about 90 miles across from the Ramoo hill to the central ridge of the Yoomadoung; from the mouth of the Koladyne, due west, to the summit of the mountains, the breadth is about 70 miles; a little south of this point, the coast is very much broken, by a series of islands, bays, and creeks, and the main land trends nearly a degree further east, on the 20th parallel of latitude, from whence a narrow strip of country extends south to Cape Negrais, whose breadth rarely exceeds 20, and is on an average not more than 15 miles across. (Pemberton [1835] 2000: 84; Phayre 1844: 24) 2 The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. V, London: Trubner and Co., 1885, p. 392. 3 In north-east India, from where the Burmese were expelled, this fear of a Burmese invasion or at least a Burmese-inspired tribal unrest largely influenced British tribal or frontier policy. 4 Report on the Progress Made in the Arakan Division from 1826–1869, Rangoon, Burma, 1876, p. 19. 5 Pemberton writes: it was in Arakan that disease appeared to an extent never before known in Indian campaigns, and ran its course with a rapidity which no skill could check, and with a severity which scarcely any remedy was found to alleviate. In weighing the advantages of an advance upon Ava by these several lines of communication, the one by Arracan would appear to be altogether excluded from the comparison, by the frightful mortality which then assailed the division of the army attempting to operate upon it; and if we had no better information now than we

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then possessed of the climate generally, of the comparative salubrity of different localities, and the position, nature, and extent of the pass to be traversed, the most sanguine could anticipate nothing but a repetition of previous misery and disappointment, and the boldest would shrink from the responsibility of recommending an advance through a country of such fearful notoriety. 6 National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi, Foreign Secret Consultation (FSC), 16 September 1831, No. 35; Henry Burney’s report on the province of Arakan. 7 When these disorders continued in spite of the intervention of the Burmese court, Burney suggested to the Arakan authorities that they might adopt the practice of ‘hot pursuit’ of bandits in the Burmese territory. To this the Government of India accorded only a limited approval – no parties were to be sent into Burmese territory, it laid down, in search of fugitive marauders without its express permission. For fuller details of Burney’s work, see Desai ([1939] 1972). 8 Atah was the amount paid for protection or for information of the movements of an enemy so as to escape being attacked by them. 9 Report on Progress Made in Arakan, pp. 19–20. 10 The Khumis of the hill tracts, as also several other tribes, spread over into the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 11 Both Fytche and Phayre are considered as legendary figures in the early history of the British rule in Burma. Fytche, born 1820, joined the Bengal Army in 1839; served in Arakan against the Wallengs in 1841; entered the Arakan Commission in 1845; in the Panjab campaign, 1848–49; at Chilianwala and Gujarat, severely wounded, deputy commissioner of Bassein, 1853; constantly engaged against the Burmese; commissioner of Tenasserim, 1857; chief commissioner of British Burma, March 1867–March 1871; negotiated a treaty with the king of Burma; majorgeneral, 1868; C.S.I.; died 17 June 1892; wrote Burma Past and Present, 1878. Phayre was born on 7 May 1812; son of Richard Phayre; educated at Shrewsbury; entered the Bengal Army, 1828; served in the administration of Burma, 1834–48; in the Panjab, 1848–49; commissioner of Arakan, 1849, and of Pegu, 1852; read the proclamation announcing the annexation of the new territory; interpreter to the king of Burma’s mission to the governor general, 1854, to whom Dalhousie said: ‘As long as the sun shines in the heavens, the British flag shall wave over the possessions’; led a mission to the Burmese Court at Amarapura, 1855; lieutenant colonel, 1859; joined the Bengal Staff Corps, 1861; the first chief commissioner of British Burma, 1862–67; C.B., 1863; went on two other missions, in 1862 and 1866, to Mandalay, then in Upper Burma; K.C.S.I., 1867; lieutenant general, 1877; governor of the Mauritius, 1874–78: G.C.M.G. 1878; wrote his History of Burma, 1883, a work on Burmese coins, and papers for the Asiatics and Royal Geographical Societies; died 14 December 1885 (Buckland 1906: 158, 335–6). 12 Hopkinson entered the Indian Army, 1837; political officer in 1847–48 in the expedition against the Koladyne hill tribes; in the Burmese war, 1852–53, at the capture of Martaban; commissioner in British Burma; commissioner of Assam and A.G.G. on the N.E. frontier; C.S.I., 1874; general in 1889; died 22 December 1899 (Buckland 1906: 208). 13 The reference to Bhagalpur related to the Bhagalpur Hill Ranges, an irregular battalion raised in the 1790s by Augustus Cleveland. It became the model for tribal levies under the East India Company. See Alavi (1998: 155–93). The Kuki Levy, to which the Government of India was also referring, was raised in 1850 on the recommendation of Colonel Frederick Lister, the commandant of the Sylhet Light Infantry, from refugee Kukis from the Lushai hills (Barpujari [1976] 1996: 33–5; Hussain 1992, ch. VII, 185–219).

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14 Hopkinson’s Review of Policy on the Chittagong Frontier in 1856. From Captain Henry Hopkinson, Commissioner of Arracan, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Akyab, 7 May 1856. 15 Interestingly, Hopkinson later showed the same disgust at the government’s inaction in Assam where he became commissioner in 1861. Unhappy at not being permitted to extend British administration into the Naga Hills, in which policy he likewise saw as the only way peace could be brought to the unusually disturbed Naga Hills borders, Hopkinson suggested that the British totally withdraw from the North Cachar Hills and the areas contiguous to Naga territory: ‘there is no advantageous middle course between their thorough occupation or having nothing to do with them’. ‘The Lieutenant-Governor is disposed to think’, the commissioner was told in reply, ‘that the adoption of your scheme for sending ‘military expeditions into the hills’ would be very likely to lead to an indiscriminate slaughter of friends and foes; one of the consequences of which would be that our valuable elephant-hunting grounds would be continually disturbed, and our hunting parties always attacked. The probability of such a result is increased by the fact that the raids appear to be for the most part committed by the distant tribes; while those nearest to our frontier, who would be the first, met with and attacked, are generally believed to be friendly’. 16 This was the well-known Non-Regulation System which originated in NorthEast Rangpur in 1822. 17 On 31 January 1860, a body of 400 or 500 Kookies, after sweeping down the River Fenny, burst into the plains of Tipperah and burnt or plundered 15 villages, killed 185 British subjects and carried off 100 captives. The tribe of Rattan Poea was reported to be the aggressors with the Tiperrah Rajah being allegedly accused as the instigator. This act of aggression was responded to by sending a punitive expedition under Captain Raban in the following July. 18 For a discussion on Beadon’s frontier policy, see Barpujari ([1976] 1996: 135ff). A brief account of Beadon’s administration of Bengal will be found in Buckland’s Bengal Under Lieutenant Governors. 19 On the way he came across villages whose description illustrates the condition of life in these hills: The villagers seemed weighed down with mistrust and suspicion of their kind; they lived in constant dread of attack by hostile neighbours, and with a view to defence they had constructed a strange and quite original stronghold in a lofty tree. Here, at a height of perhaps sixty feet from the ground, in a strong fork of the tree, they had built a bullet-proof houses, of thick rough-hewn logs, loopholed in the sides and floor, which might contain some twenty people. Access to this fortalice was only to be gained in Robinson Crusoe fashion, by a series of ladders, which were afterwards drawn up. It was houses such as this, I suppose, that gave rise to the tales I had heard in Chittagong, of hill tribes who, like monkeys, lived habitually in trees. 20 At Dalekmai also he found strongholds prepared, in which the inhabitants could find shelter in the event of an attack by the dreaded Shendos; these refuges, however, were of a different fashion from the tree-fort of the Pee Khyoung. Broad rafts were made by tying large bundles of bamboos together, and on this basement, comfortable times they had merely to push off into the stream, which here ran broad and deep, and they were secure from their

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enemies; for the Shendus, being mountain men, could neither swim nor manage a boat. 21 ‘I had been sitting cross-legged on a shawl’, wrote Lewin describing the incident, with my back turned to the low door of the hut, occupied with my fiddling, when a bullet entered, and striking me a little below the hip, above the knee. The gun had been fired by one of the hill-guides who had brought me across the hills to the Koladan, and who instantly decamped into the jungle. Whether the shot was accidental, or whether the chiefs had determined to prevent my going any farther, is doubtful. My servant Toby saw the man strolling by the door of my hut, and stooping down to look in, but merely thought he was attracted by the music; then the report of the gun was heard, and the man bolted. 22 FPAP July 1866, No. 124; Captain H. T. Duncan’s report to Colonel R. Macpherson, Secretary to Chief Commissioner of British Burma, 28 February 1866. 23 FPAP July 1866, No. 124; Colonel Phayre to Foreign Secretary. He further added that The Shindoo tribe appears to be more numerous as a people than any other Indo-Chinese hill race which I know. It extends over a large tract of country. The clans are independent of each other as long as they have the power to maintain independence. Their predatory expeditions appear to be organized, as, indeed, they frequently are among the Koomees and Khyengs, by persons of influence, whether Chiefs or not, who collect individuals among several clans into a war party. 24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. FPAP March 1870, Nos. 182–197; From Andrew St John, Superintendent of Hill Tribes to Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson, Commissioner of Arracan, 15 October 1870. Report on the Progress Made in the Arakan Division 1826–1869, p. 21; It further adds: ‘from the commencement of British rule in this country, that the hill people are gradually moving down like stream, sluggish it is true, but with the certainty of gravitation, from the hill to the plains; that trade in tobacco and other hill products had increased considerably ever since 1866’. Report on the Administration of the Hill Tracts of Northern Arakan, 1870–71, pp. 14–15. Report on the Progress Made in the Arakan Division 1826–1869, p. 16. See for instance Superintendent St John’s account and sketches of the tribes in the Administration Report of 1870–71. An attempt was made during 1871–72 to appoint trustworthy and reliable agents at non-tributary villages frequented by the Shindus about 30 miles beyond the frontier. The Administrative Report of that year written by the Superintendent Captain W. G. Hughes (15 June 1872) thus states of the attempt: The resumption by Government of its right to control the salt supply which of all commodities is the most difficult for them to obtain, and want of which is frequent cause of their raiding, – free trade at present precludes our control of it; (but) up to this time all attempts on the part

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of our officers to have an interview with any of their chiefs have proved unsuccessful. 34 FPAP December 1870: Ulick Browne to Ashley Eden, Secretary Bengal Government, 25 August 1870. 35 Ibid. 36 Lord Mayo had ordered that A carefully selected and well-qualified officer should be placed in charge of any difficult tract of country which the ordinary authorities are unable to superintend, and he should have the entire control of our relations, with the tribes, in subordination to the Commissioner. He should have further full means at his disposal to repel sudden attacks, as far as the nature of the country will admit, he should encourage the villagers to resist necessary means, and he should endeavour to acquire such personal influence over the tribes and establish such relations with them as may lead to more frequent and friendly intercourse. The immediate task before such an officer would be to invite the chiefs to a conference; to take engagements from them that they will abstain from them a nominal tribute; to require them to refer to him for adjustment of all matters in dispute between themselves and the villages on the British frontier and so to place the intercourse with them on a sound and improved footing. (quoted in Lalsangpuia 1983: 35) 37 Report on the Progress made in the Arakan Division 1826–1869, p. 14. 38 FPAP March 1874, No. 35; Secretary Bengal Government to Home Secretary, Government of India, 9 October 1871. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

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3 MANIPUR FRONTIER Kamhau-Sukte1 and Meitei relations

Manipur’s southern frontier marched with the most northerly tribes of the Chin Hills, over whom neither Manipur nor the Burmese authorities had exercised any control at any point of time. Before the advent of the British the Raja of Manipur had practically no influence at all, either in the form of tributes or taxation, beyond the valley, particularly in the south (Kamei 2015). Even after the British arrived on the scene after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) Manipur’s southern limits remained not clearly defined.2 However, with the objective to turn Manipur into a buffer state against the Burmese after the war, defending Manipur’s frontier became a cause for serious concern of the British. The intermittent raids and depredations that often come from the tribes of southern hills that really made the administration of Manipur disturbed and uncomfortable was an added fillip. Cognate tribes who occupied vast tracts of land in south of the valley of Manipur were broadly referred as Kukis by colonial rulers and ‘Khongjai’ by the Meitei3 (McCulloch [1859] 1980; Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 140), a term that only later was recognised to indicate several groups or clans. According to George Watt, ‘both in language and facial peculiarities the Manipuris [Meitei] would appear to be a mixed race between the Kukis [Zo] and Nagas’ (1887: 368). No wonder the famous linguist G. A. Grierson also included the Meitei under the Kuki-Chin group (1904). Colonial records often spoke of a north and north-west movement of tribes into Manipur and the Lushai Hills since time immemorial. In fact, the movement of peoples, of the hills and valleys, remained a recurring feature of the history of the region; an official report, written as late as in the 1890s, describes what this was all about: Nothing does more to establish a chief and bring him followers and influence than success in raids upon weaker chiefs, upon the villages of Manipur, Hill Tipperah, and upper Burma, or upon our villages and outposts and tea gardens. In addition to the constant changes in the relative position of individual chiefs, a general movement would

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seem to take place from time to time amongst the people, apparently as if swarms were thrown off from the more crowded forming new communities all round the outer fringe of the tract, and in doing so driving before them the villages which had previously inhabited this fringe. The inhabitants of them are compelled, in consequence of the pressure, to take refuge in our territory or in Tiperrah or Manipur, where they are often followed, themselves or killed or taken captive and their villages plundered by the new-comers. (Chakraborty 1964: 49)4 In February 1831, Captain George Gordon, an officer appointed to organise the defence of the state, reported that these ‘new-comers’ had been raiding some southern villages and carrying their depredation up to the valley of Manipur itself. As he wrote: These aggressors are said to be powerful Kookies who for several years past have been gradually advancing from the southwards amongst the vast maps of mountains, which to the south of Manipur, occupy, without any intervening valley, the whole space between Bengal and Ava. Their present headquarters is said to be about five days in a south-westerly direction from the valley of Munnipore; from which as a centre they are now carrying on their depredations against all the surrounding villages and have with the aid of a few muskets they have by some means acquired in addition to their poisoned arrows, destroyed several not only in the immediate vicinity of Munnipore but also have extended their savages amongst the Baungshes in the direction of Cachar several of whom I have just heard have fled for protection to that country.5 In the early nineteenth century, the British were chiefly concerned with the defence of Bengal’s Eastern Frontier. But after the restoration of Gambhir Singh to the throne of Manipur, who the Burmese were obliged to recognise as Raja by the Treaty of Yandaboo (1826), Manipur was turned into a buffer state between Burma and British Assam. Just before Gambhir Singh’s death in January 1834, however, it had been realised largely as a result of the surveys of Captain Francis Jenkins and Captain Robert Boileau Pemberton made during 1831–32, that Manipur’s rather small population and absence of an economic development made her an ineffective buffer against the Burmese. As the Governor General Lord William Bentinck observed in a minute dated 25 March 1833: ‘The result of our late enquiries have clearly shown that, after an uninterrupted tranquility of seven years, this small State is still considered as totally incompetent to defend itself against a Burmese invasion’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 150–1).6 A new treaty was concluded with Manipur in 1833, by which inter alia, the state was obliged: 54

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In the event of war with the Burmese, if troops be sent to Manipur, either to protect that country or to advance beyond the Ningthee, the Rajah, at the requisition of the British Government, will provide hill porters to assist in transporting the ammunition and baggage of such troops. . . . in the event of anything happening in the Eastern Frontier of the British Territories, the Rajah will, when required, assist the British Government with a portion of his troops. (Ibid.) In terms of a treaty concluded in 1834, the disputed Kabaw Valley was transferred to Burma, Manipur being compensated by an annual grant of Rs. 6,000 (Hall 1974; Kaba 2001). By this the two small chiefships in the north under the Shan Sawbwa or chief, Kale and Sumjok, remained under Burmese rule. Captain Pemberton was the first to conduct a survey (in 1830–31) from the Manipur-Cachar frontier to Arakan after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) and in his Report, first published in 1835, he admitted ‘the territories of Manipur had fluctuated at various times with the fortunes of their princes’. With regard to the southern boundary of Manipur, he said ‘it is very irregular and ill defined’ (Pemberton [1835] 2000: 20–1). According to Alexander Mackenzie, Pemberton’s report submitted on 19 April 1834 says that ‘the Numsaulung River (locally called Tuipu) appeared to have been always considered by the Burmese as the northern limit of the Kule Rajah’s territory in that direction’. He further added: ‘A line drawn from the sources of the Numsailung due west to the Manipur River passes through the northern portion of the country at present inhabited by the Sooties’. Thus Pemberton’s line seems to have divided the Sukte in Manipur, Burma and in independent territory (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 171–2). In fact, Pemberton had very little knowledge of the Sukte country, for he had never visited this place. Unfortunately, Pemberton’s ‘large map’ of 1838, and another one in 1862, which were considered to be the earliest cartographic images of the ‘North-Eastern Frontier’, did not give detailed knowledge of the region although the topography has been meticulously depicted (Cederlof 2014: 82). There may be claims and counterclaims of who the ‘indigenous’ settlers in Manipur were. A recent study on question of ‘indigeneity’ in Manipur argues how the three main communities in Manipur – Meitei, Naga and Kuki – had migrated ‘roughly during the same time’ and, therefore, there is no question of ‘migrants’, ‘foreigners’ or ‘late settlers’ (Haokip 2016: 183). Another study reveals the problem of ‘overlapping territorial claims’ (Piang 2015) among the different communities, particularly among the Kuki and Naga, which was largely rooted in the colonial period and becomes a cause of ethnic conflict in postcolonial times. On 7 February 1835, just before his imminent departure from India, William Bentinck recorded another minute on Manipur, in which he created a 55

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political agency at Imphal, its capital. British objectives were thus spelt out clearly: The preservation of a friendly intercourse, and as a medium of communication with the Manipur Government, and, as occasion may require, with the Burmese Authorities on that frontier, and more specially to prevent border feuds and disturbances which might lead to hostilities between the Manipuris and the Burmese, it may be necessary to retain an Officer in the character of Political Agent in that quarter. Lieutenant Gordon, whose ability, intelligence, and local knowledge have more than once brought favourably to the notice of Government, seems to be well qualified for this situation, and I beg to propose that he may be appointed to it on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,000 per mensem. (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 153) It is thus quite clear that the presence of the British political agent in Manipur had greatly emboldened the Raja. How this was to have a wider implication in Meitei relations with the Kamhau-Sukte of the Northern Chin Hills, the following will explain.

Sukte paramountcy in Northern Chin Hills The establishment of a Political Agency in Manipur coincided with the rise to power of the Suktes, a powerful ruling clan, under Kam Hau in the hills south of Manipur. Though the Sukte tradition traces their power to an earlier period, it was the rise of Khan Thuam of Mualbem village and his initial success in the early nineteenth century that provoked a combination of mang-kua (nine chiefs)7 (Committee 1996: 30) against him, and he was soon obliged to flee to Falam tract and take shelter under the protection of Rallang chief Khuang Ceu by giving tribute to him. With the help of Khuang Ceu, Khan Thuam and his eldest son Kam Hau were able to overcome all opposition. After his position became relatively secure, Khan Thuam returned to Mualbem and consolidated his position by taking revenge against his opponents. He embarked upon territorial expansion in the now well-known Tedim and adjoining region, pushing less powerful tribes towards the border of Manipur in the process. It must be noted that the southern limit of the kingdom of Manipur at this stage did not exceed beyond the valley. Colonel William McCulloch, political agent in Manipur, who studied these tribes and wrote about them, found them in the 1840s scattered around the valley of Manipur ([1859] 1980: 55). From here some were moved on through the hills in the north and south. The Guite and Zou clan/tribe also settled in the eastern border of the Lushai Hills and also to southern Manipur (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 140). What remained of 56

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these clans/tribes in their original home was assimilated into the Sukte fold. Bertram Carey and Henry Newman Tuck, two officers who obtained a firsthand knowledge of the region after its annexation in 1896, best described the impact of the Sukte expansion: The Thados offered a good resistance to Kantum and most of their villages were committed to the flames before they submitted; the Yos either migrated north out of the Soktes’ reach or quietly submitted, and the Nwites did not offer any resistance whatever. (Ibid.: 119) After bringing the entire northern hill tracts up to the border of the valley of Manipur and Falam in the south under his control, Khan Thuam established a compact and strong Sukte domain. He levied all forms of customary dues8 from his subordinate villages (Thang and Suantak 2015: 86–7). A popular folk song thus described the extent of the Sukte paramountcy: Siahtaang kaihna sak ciang Teimei, ka hialna Lamtui hi e. Sak ciang Teimei sang ciang Lamtui, a lai ah kamkei hi’ng e. The English translation: What I rule extends to Manipur in the north, and ends at Falam in the south; Manipur to the north and Falam to the south, I am the tiger in the middle. (Khai 1995: 26) The Manipur border referred to in this song should not be construed with the border later delimited by the Boundary Commission in 1894. After his death in about 1848, Khan Thuam was succeeded by his youngest son Za Pau at Mualbem according to the Sukte tradition of ultimogeniture.9 Kam Hau, the eldest and more capable son, established the village of Tedim during his father’s lifetime. He was temporarily repulsed from there by certain Zous and Thados, but years later, sometime in the early part of the century, he regained Tedim. The village soon attracted a large number of warriors from neighbouring areas and in a short span of time it became one of the largest villages in these hills and the seat of Kam Hau’s power (Thang and Suantak 2015; Mung et al. 2002).10 Following in his father’s footsteps, Kam Hau succeeded in subduing the remaining subordinate tribes and villages of the northern hills. The acquisition of firearms from Burma is said to be the major factor in his and his father’s success. It is, however, not known when the first gun arrived in the Chin Hills and who owned it first. Sukte tradition tells us that when Khan Thuam fled to Falam to take refuge from mang-kua, his eldest son Kam Hau 57

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displayed his mastery over the use of gun by shooting down a dreaded zangsial (mithun) with his gun, which no one else dared to do.11 This incident probably suggests that Khan Thuam and his sons already possessed guns then. Later on, when Joseph Herbert Cope of the American Baptist Mission in Chin Hills published Chin Primer (Zolai Simbu) in 1924, he included: ‘Pau Hau in thau a nei hi’, which means ‘Pau Hau has got a gun’.12 Cope must have taken his information from Chin/Zo oral tradition, which suggests that Pau Hau was possibly the earliest gun owner among the Chin/Zo, albeit his identity and when he owned a gun remains unclear (Pau 2017). Within a few years Kam Hau was recognised as the most powerful Sukte chief and ruled the entire region east of the Manipur River (Nankathe), locally known as Meitei Guun, up to the valley of Manipur in the north, comprising over 135 villages (Committee 1996; Mung et al. 2002). He had become more popular than his brother Za Pau who controlled the region west of that river. With that the villages which belonged to Kam Hau were distinguished from the existing Sukte tract as the Kamhau and the people were often, erroneously, called the Kamhaus in colonial records. The Sukte and Kamhau realms of dominance therefore emerged as two distinct entities, albeit they were from the same family, in early writings and official reports, thereby making a scope for confusion of the people who belonged to the same community.13 They became one of the most dreaded powers in Manipur, Lushai Hills and the Kale-Kabaw Valley. Of the Kamhau-Sukte power, this is what Sir Alexander Mackenzie observed in 1883: The Manipuris consider this tribe to be a much more formidable one than the Lushai. They are a constant source of trouble to them, and have at times rendered the southern portion of Manipur uninhabitable.  .  . . The Lushais hold the Sookties in great dread, and are falling back before them. They are well supplied with fire-arms, supposed to be procured from Burma, whence they also obtain their ammunition. They have never had any dealings whatever with the British government. (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 163) Kam Hau’s power was also felt in the Kale-Kabaw Valley. There were reports of his raids into the villages in Kale, though some of these were said to have been avenged by the Sawbwa, or Shan chief, in 1850. Raids were directed towards Yazagyo, known as the main market particularly for the Kamhau people. This state of affairs had considerably strained the relations between the Kamhaus and the Shans of the valley (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 120). Raiding and headhunting, which were often presented in colonial records as ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’ acts of the hill peoples, were rather highly valued in the traditional hill societies. They were considered as acts of

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‘masculinity’ associated with ‘ultimate heroism and manhood’ (Zou 2005; Guite 2014). The powerful Kamhau-Sukte chiefs always kept Manipur in a state of perpetual alarm. This had not only led to the scattering of other smaller tribes but also threatened the peace in Manipur Valley. It was only after the arrival of Colonel William McCulloch as political agent in Manipur in 1844 that an effort was made to establish peace in the region (Johnstone [1896] 2002: 45).14 There was one important consideration with which this question was linked. The Sylhet-Manipur road, which was then under construction, passed through the Kabui Naga territory (Pemberton 1838). The upkeep of this road greatly depended on the Kabuis who felt constantly threatened by the northward movement of the Kukis. Lushai disturbances in both Cachar and Manipur, which had become intense from the middle of the 1840s, also had acted upon the fears of the defenceless Kabuis. McCulloch’s solution was to plant a line of Kuki colonies as a buffer to the Kabui villages. He thus wrote to E. R. Lyon, superintendent of Cachar, on 26 November 1846: There is ample space for such Kookies as might wish to settle under Munnipore and a strong body of that tribe will be affected to Munnipore settled to the south of the Koupooees would force a bulwark to the latter and consequently tend to the efficiency of the Munnipore road; whilst from the similarity of the languages of all the Kookis tribes there would be in every likelihood that such Kookies would hear of any projected attack of the wild savages of the south and by giving notice to the authorities here they would be unable to prevent it or at least moderate its violence.15 Towards the close of the 1840s McCulloch with the help of Raja Nur Singh carried out the settlement of the ‘Khongjais’. Large tracts were made available to them for cultivation. Some of them were used as irregulars; arms were freely supplied to them and these settlements often came to be called ‘sepoy villages’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 157–64).

Manipur’s abortive expedition and after The settlement of the Kukis, however, did not end the problem of Manipur’s southern frontier. Disturbances continued. In the 1850s the Kamhaus under Mualpi chief Go Khaw Thang raided the Thado Kuki villages of Mombee (Lawmpi)16 and Heeroway. In 1855 Namfow was burnt again by the Suktes.17 The following year an even more serious outrage occurred. An exasperated Chandrakirti Singh, who had in the meanwhile succeeded to the Manipur Raj, felt threatened and decided upon strong military action against the Kamhau-Sukte.

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In January 1857, Maharaja18 Chandrakirti Singh led a 1,500-strong (a Sukte source gives the number to 3,000) (Mung et al. 2002: 30) Manipuri contingent against the Kamhau-Sukte, which also included Kuki irregulars (Shaw [1929] 1997: 48–9). Mackenzie wrote, ‘He was so impressed with the importance of the operations of the expedition being brought to a successful issue that, with the object of encouraging his force, he accompanied in person’ ([1884] 2001: 164). When the military contingent arrived near Tedim, the Kamhau stronghold, Chandrakirti found himself opposed by a combined force of the Kamhau, Sukte, and Sizang. What happened then is best described by Mackenzie: It nevertheless ended in disgraceful flight of the Manipur troops. They neglected to secure the line of communications, provisions consequently became short and, instead of falling back on their line of advance, they, after some skirmishing with the enemy, fled in confusion by another and unknown route, along which it must have been known that they could not possibly obtain provisions Colonel McCulloch who was then Political Agent, believed sheer cowardice to have been the cause of the failure of the expedition. The troops barely left their Rajah, who with some twenty followers, arrived some days after they had reached the valley. (Ibid.) Mackenzie further reported that the ‘Rajah, who, with some twenty followers, arrived some days after they had reached the valley’ (Ibid.). Why the Manipuri contingent ‘fled in confusion’ (Ibid.), lost altogether 287 guns, and got many killed or died in their flight, is not clearly explained by official records. The reasons may be found in other sources. According to Sukte source before fighting actually took place there were exchange of war of words between the two warring parties threatening each other of serious consequences. The Meiteis were not only so overconfident but also underestimate Kam Hau’s power that they talked of dividing his properties, some even sarcastically expressed their lustful desire to sleep with his (Kam Hau’s) wife Ciin Ngul in the event of their victory. The Meiteis ‘exercised a great number of magic, even making them so big that one person could easily swallow up a boat and any other wonderful thing so that they would be seen as invincible’ (Thang and Suantak 2015: 127). The KamhauSukte responded ‘if you shoot us we will open our beehives and release them’ (Mung et al. 2002: 31). Amidst criss-crossing of propaganda, neither side was not daring to step forward and pull the trigger first. Finally, it was chief Za Tual and Eng Tuang who came out to take stock of the situation from Sahei mual (Sahei hill) and found the Meitei commander, Nongmeingakba Singh (Thang and Suantak 2015: 157),19 on duty from a distance. Taking no chance to miss the opportunity, Za Tual, after chanting warring words, shot 60

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the Meitei commander dead. This caused panic amongst the Manipuri forces that they ran helter-skelter for their lives. Even the Manipur Maharaja, who came with a palanquin, had to flee for his life (Committee 1996: 107–8). The strategy adopted by the combined Kamhau-Sukte-Sizang force is worth mention. While they decided unanimously that every adult member must fight against the enemy, children and aged people were to move to Tualzang, Lailui, Teklui, Ngennung, Haupi and Leilum up to Gawngmual where they would slice out pine trees and burn them at night. This was to discourage the enemy that they had been surrounded on all sides. As it turned out, their strategy worked well (Mung et al. 2002: 31). In this war, as the Sukte source claimed, Kamhau-Sukte killed 2,000 Manipuri troops and their coolies. Chief Kam Hau not only claimed up to the Tapei (Chakpi) River but also collected tributes from villages up to that area. People who were involved in collection of tributes include Kam Vial, Hel Khat, Awn Khai, Lian Suan and Tuang Khaw Thang. Sukte also claimed that after the war, the defeated Manipuri Maharaja requested Kam Hau to come to the Tapei (Chakpi) River to settle border peoblem. Kam Hau sent his son Za Tual, who, instead of going to Tapei thinking that it was a disgrace to step forward to one which he had defeated, called the Manipuri Maharaja to Zangdung River where they made an agreement to stop war between them.20 Recent geographical theorists argue that a border is not a ‘territorially fixed, static’ line but ‘a series of practices’ (Noel et al. 2009: 586). Territory is about ownership of space, and the reference to the idea of ownership and defence of space are also at the core of the first geographical conceptualisations of ‘human territoriality’ (Malmberg 1980: 9). R. D. Sack defines territoriality as ‘spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area’ (1986: 20). Thus ‘tribute relations’ (Pershits 1979), where the vanquished would give tax or tribute to the conqueror for a stipulated period of time, if not permanently, was how territorial border of a chief/ruler was measured before colonial cartography came into prominent. In this sense, Kam Hau’s influence and control over villages up to the Tapei (Chakpi) River meant his border stretched to that extent. That Zangdung was later claimed by Manipur as its southern border just because the agreement was made on the bank of this river is a complete distortion of history. With regard to the defeat of the Manipuri troops, William Shaw had recorded a very valid argument. Shaw believed that the reasons behind the defeat of the Manipuris was due to the Kukis, auxiliary to the Manipuri contingent, reluctance to fight against the Kamhau-Sukte, which they considered as their kindred tribe, when they arrived at the battlefield (Shaw [1929] 1997). This was a major recognition of the ethnic commonality of the Kuki of Manipur and the Chin/Zo of the Chin Hills by a colonial officer. At the end of the day, it was the unity and superior war tactics of the Chin/Zo of Northern Chin Hills that made them triumphed over the Meitei invaders. It is said that after the war Chief Kam Hau hosted a victory celebration at his royal palace at Tedim by killing numbers of mithun, cows, goats and pigs 61

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(Thang and Suantak 2015: 130). His wife Ciin Ngul welcomed the warring party (Ibid.: 129) with zu (locally prepared fermented rice beer).21 When victory celebration was started, Ciin Ngul sang her song which she had composed to mark the victory over the enemies who mockingly contested amongst themselves to sleep with her. An extract of the song goes: a. Zaang vuisai leh lia ka sak duang, Dota’n sa bang hawmkhawm ee. b. Tung Pasian in a awilo a, Vangkhua ngalliam khuai banga hangte’n, Do sumlu mual ah suah ee. Free translation: a. The glory of the Ukpinu was the greatest of all, Which can be compared with the elephant. b. The enemies had already contested in advance to sleep with her, However, the warriors had conquered them all with the help of God. (Thang and Suantak 2015: 129–30) In Chin/Zo tradition, every happy/victorious or sad/sorrowful moment was often remembered with orally composed songs which passed from one generation to another. Such songs usually were spontaneously composed and sung at the same time. They serve as important source of information even in modern times. A song is enough to tell the entire tale of an episode or an event. Here is a heroic song composed by chief Za Tual which candidly reveals the victory of the Kamhau-Sukte people over the Meitei: a. Hang kisa e, sak ciang Teimei, keimah bang hang, phuk ing e, b. Keimah bang hang, phuk ing aw e, tuan lui ah naang bang dia’ng (diah ing) ee (Committee 1996: 51) 62

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English translation: a. Daring doth I consider (myself), to have smitten a Northern Meitei, as daring as I am, b. Smitten have I, one as daring as I am, I’ve soaked him in a local river like a bamboo skin.22 Shortly after Chandrakirti Singh returned to Imphal, there was a lull in the relationships between him and the Kamhau-Sukte. This state of affairs, however, was due to, as per official record, the emergence of a new power to the east of the Kamhau-Sukte territory. In the late 1840s as Kam Hau was consolidating his position around Tedim, another tribe was establishing its hold at Champhai, on the western border of the Sukte country, driving out the Thados from there. This tribe, soon to be known as the Lushais, established its control over the fertile region under two brothers, Poibawia and Vanhnuailiana. Of the latter John Ware Edgar, the legendary deputy commissioner of Cachar who knew these tribes first-hand, wrote: (He was) undoubtedly the ablest and most powerful chief. . . . In his youth he seems to have been constantly fighting, and always apparently more or less successful. He fought various tribes to his south known to the Kookies by the general name of Poi and carried off, or induced to accompany him, numerous families of those villages, whom he settled down either in separate villages or in the villages of his own Kookies.23 Edgar further adds that Vanhnuailiana followed the same policy towards the Soktes another family of Kookies, whose head is Kamhow, the powerful chief of Molbhem, and we found hundreds of Sokte families settled among this Lushais in whose villages we have lately been.24 Edgar wrote that in the aftermath of the Lushai Expedition of 1872, and what he was describing actually took place some 20 years earlier. Perhaps, Edgar was the first to employ the term ‘Lushai’. This eastward expansion of Vanhnuailiana and other members of the Lushai family had already established themselves in the west began after 1850, with a drive towards the south-west of Manipur. But he could make no headway because of Colonel William McCulloch’s effective management of that part of the frontier. 63

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Consequently, the Lushais began to exert pressure on the region near the salt springs of Chivu and the south of the Manipur frontier. The preoccupation of the Kamhau-Suktes with the Lushais on their western border as a result gave a free hand to smaller and subordinate tribes to indulge in their own petty raids. In April 1859, it is said, Guite warriors who had quarreled with a Haokip clan of Thados fell upon one of the villages near Sugnu. This was followed by another though less serious raid on Saitol which was burnt and its cattle driven away. These events were sufficient for the Maharaja of Manipur25 to raise a line of stockades on his southern frontier. The location of the posts26 was undoubtedly the limit of the Maharaja’s influence; it was essentially the border of the kingdom of Manipur. This clearly explains that the sway of the Kamhau-Sukte dominance extended up to the valley of Manipur. Not until the Lushai Expeditions of 1869–72 would the Kamhau-Suktes again emerge as an important factor in the politics of the frontier. This may be because of the death of Kam Hau in 1868 and his successor Khaw Cin was not as powerful as his father. Until then the relations between the Lushais and Manipur were not a cause for concern. In 1867 Edgar on a visit to Manipur found out how the Lushais and the Thados had got along with each other: Messengers were sent from time to time to the Lushai chiefs nominally from the Rajah, but really from the Political Agent, and presents were sometimes sent down. These messengers were always Kookies in which Colonel McCulloch could put trust.  .  . . The Munipore Kookies used at that time to shoot over the hunting grounds of the Lushais near the great salt spring called Chiboo, and when they killed anything, they left a hind leg at the spring for the Lushais, who in their turn, when lucky, used to leave a leg for the Thadoes.27 All this tribal camaraderie suddenly came to an end when that some Thados fell upon and killed seven of Poibawi’s men near Chivu, four of whom were hunting while three were making salt. The change in the relations of the Lushais and Manipur was coincided with the retirement of McCulloch in 1866. Based on his experience, on his power of conversing freely and directly with the hillmen, and on his minute knowledge of their affairs, McCulloch exercised strong influenced over the administration of Manipur and ably managed its relations with the tribes. The Manipur officials thus prevented his successor, R. Brown, from getting the same power and influence. In order to solve the problem, Edgar suggested: The Munnipore officials of the Rajah should not be allowed to interfere unless when directed to do so by the Agent, and the Rajah should agree to pass no orders and adopt no measures affecting Kookies without first consulting the Agent.28 64

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On another front, widespread disturbances took place on the ManipurCachar border29 during 1868–69. In November the Naga village of Mentha in Manipur territory was attacked and burned by Vanpuilala and Poibawia, and several captives carried off. On 2 February in the following year, a great attack was made on a stockade in the Kala Naga region, which was strongly garrisoned by Manipuri’s sepoys, by several chiefs among whom one Lenkon was said to be the most prominent. The stockade was taken, and a Manipuri officer and several sepoys were killed. At about the same time some Naga villages were attacked and destroyed. Later in the year, in November a Naga village near Manipur’s Khoupum Valley was laid waste by the Lushais. In fact, the extent of the disturbances was unprecedented – from Manipur in the east to Cachar and Tripura in the west and even south in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The result was the Lushai Expedition of 1869.30 Two military columns armed with mountain guns moved up into the Lushai Hills, one under Assam’s general officer in command, Brigadier General William Frost Nuthall advancing along the course of the Dhaleswar River to the western chief Suakpuilala’s village, and the other under the commissioner of Dacca Division along the Sonai to the eastern villages of Vanpuilala. A third police column also moved up from Sylhet to affect a junction with the general’s forces. The expedition failed, beaten by the weather.31 However, success attended a Manipur force, consisting of 110 Thados or ‘Khongjais’, of whom about 90 were armed with muskets, who had been ordered to cooperate from the Manipur side. A portion of it was able to move up the Sonai River to one of Vanpuilala’s villages, and within sight of the mother village, the headman of which as well as those of Vanpuilala’s villages had offered them submission. The failure of the 1869 punitive measures led to a lengthy correspondence in the middle of 1869 between the lieutenant governor of Bengal, Sir William Grey, and the Viceroy Lord Mayo on the future policy. On these discussions further and more intense Lushai raids on the British, and Manipuri, territory had a powerful impact. Lord Mayo, despite his aversion to military measures, finally sanctioned another punitive expedition into the Lushai Hills (Hunter 1875: 235–7). The details of the proposed expedition he left to the commander in chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, who turned into a huge military expedition. Napier organised two large columns: one, the Left Column under Brigadier General Sir Charles Brownlow, to move against the western Lushai, and the other under Assam’s new general officer in command, Brigadier General Sir George Bourchier from Cachar against the eastern Lushais, principally the group of villages in and around the Champhai Valley.32

Lushai expedition and the capture of Go Khaw Thang Manipur was once again required to cooperate, this time with Brigadier General G. Bourchier’s column with a small contingent of troops. It was believed, 65

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largely on account of the views of John Edgar, Cachar’s highly regarded deputy commissioner, that Manipur was in a better position than the military in Cachar to exert pressure on the Lushais east of the Tuivai River. Bourchier’s idea was to have Manipur’s troops occupy positions along its southern frontier towards the Lushai Hills, with a force stationed at Moirang to operate from that side if necessary. He said, ‘My plan for employing the Contingent is, that a strong line of outposts should be established to the eastward of Tipai Mookh, thus covering my left flank’.33 On 19 October 1871 he thus wrote to Major General Nuthall, the officiating political agent in Manipur: I have to request that you will take steps for occupying strongly a land of posts along the southern frontier of Munnipoor and keeping in the valley near Moirang a small compact force capable of supporting itself to act against the most eastern tribes should information reach you that they have been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdong and others against whom the column I command with advance.34 The selection of posts was left to Nuthall, but he was advised, ‘the summits of the ridges are the natural highways, and seem the most desirable positions extending a far eastward (as possible)’. The duty assigned to the main body of the Manipuri Contingent was to watch the most eastern tribes (Kamhaus) and for this purpose established its headquarters in the neighbourhood of Moirang, Nuthall did not consider Moirang sufficiently advanced to the south to obtain any information of the Kamhaus, much less controlling them. Bourchier accordingly allowed him to move down to Tseklapi, and spelt out the task for the Manipuri Contingent: It is obvious that the eastern tribes will require watching, and this will be the special duty of the Contingent, and will be of a delicate nature. Kamhaus present attitude towards the other tribes might be termed by us to maximum advantage and it is to be hoped that the state of things will continue, but on the other hand, should he undoubtedly have cast in his lot with the other tribes you will be in a position to attack him.35 In accordance with these instructions Nuthall got Chandrakirti Singh to strengthen the frontier defences in the south, 4 of the 12 military posts36 he established being located in the east north of Kamhau. By 15 December 1871 over 1803 Meitei troops and 255 ‘Khongjai’ Kuki auxiliaries, accompanied by two majors and General Nuthall, who was in virtual command, occupied Tseklapi.37 Before the Contingent left Imphal, a Kamhau deputation waited upon the political agent offering themselves for the Lushai expedition and seeking 66

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permission to be allowed to proceed forthwith to attack the eastern Lushai villages. This Nuthall forbade. But on being told by the Manipuris that the Kamhau men had on his refusal were overheard to say that they would do as they pleased, ordered them to send in hostages by 15 December, to ‘enable us to curb their warlike proclivities’. Nuthall seems to have been influenced on this by the two majors. When the hostages did not make their appearance, they expressed to Nuthall their apprehension of Kamhau’s intentions as doubtful. They urged upon him the need to move the force further south to make its influence felt by the Kamhaus and prevent any hostile design on their part.38 General Nuthall, without the permission of Bourchier, moved further south and reached Chivu on 24 December. ‘The superiority of this position’, he later tried to justify, ‘from the object we had in view, viz, to watch and restrain Kanhow, was so apparent that I alone resolved to remain here’. And remain the Contingent did for the next two months, anxiously awaiting developments as Bourchier’s column advanced on to the Eastern Lushai Hills and inflicted heavy punishment in villages implicated in raids into Cachar. By February 1872 sickness appeared in the camp of the Manipur Contingent and provisions were running short. By the close of February 1872, the Lushai Expedition was over and Bourchier had returned to Silchar (Reid [1893] 1976: 26–8). On 6 March Nuthall received a communication from him that the expedition, having been brought to a successful conclusion, the services of the Contingent were no longer required. The next day Nuthall and the Manipuri troops began their march back to Imphal. On the 7 March, the Contingent met with what Nuthall called an ‘unexpected adventure’ at Sitol Subbhum, nine miles from Seeboo (Chivu).39 That Table 3.1 Frontier military posts of Manipur in the south, 1871–72

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Name of Frontier Post

Rank & File

Cavalry

Stockade

Kowpoom [Khoupum] Limetak [Leimatak] Bishenpoor [Bishenpur] Moirung Hills [Moirang Hills] Koomos Chumbupoong Koongsangkool in the Hills in advance of No. 5 [Khongsangkhul?] Muttarook Tseklapi Head-quarters

110 50 50 100 30 100

2 2 10 10 0 10

1 0 0 1 1 0

50

10

1

24 150 150 156

0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1

To the east north of Kamhow’s tribe 9 10 11 12

Shogoonoo [Sugnu] Manchangoway Kengyang [Khengyang] Koongamaroo

Source: FPAP (August 1872, No. 83).

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morning several hundred Kamhaus,40 of whom more than a hundred were armed with muskets suddenly appeared in the Manipuri camp. Among them was chief Go Khaw Thang of Mualpi (Mombi), instantly recognised by one of the Thados as the one ‘responsible for a raid into Manipur a year ago’. The two Meitei majors, Major Sawai Chumba and Major Thangal, after some queries told chief Go Khaw Thang that since he had violated the political agent’s orders and moved into Lushai territory and raided their villages, he should at once proceed and meet Nuthall who was several miles ahead towards Moirang. After failing to persuade Go Khaw Thang to meet Nuthall, the two majors decided to apprehend him. How this was done is thus described by Nuthall: The Majors then .  .  . got the Chiefs into familiar conversation, handed them a percussion marked to try, and asked to try theirs, and having on their way discharged the three muskets of the three Chiefs at once had their seized, whereupon Kokatung (Go Khaw Thang), putting his forefinger in his mouth, gave a war alarm (a whistle), and his force stood to arms, and a momentary struggle ensued; the sepoys however overpowered and made prisoners of 56, and took 52 muskets, with injury to themselves of only four men wounded, all of whom are doing well.41 The prisoners, which the Administrative Report on Manipur Agency said were 57 in number,42 were then marched off to Imphal and placed in irons in jail. Chandrakirti Singh expected to use them in the event of future troubles with the Kamhaus. Nuthall was elated that the ‘loss of so many arms to the tribe will tend to break its power and restrain its preying upon the Lushais at this time of their weakness’, and hoped that the commander in chief and the viceroy would acknowledge ‘the judicious and resolute conduct’ of the two majors.43 But the act of the Manipuri Contingent was strongly condemned by both John Edgar and Bourchier ‘as treachery’. Saying that ‘I do not believe that the Sotes [Go Khaw Thang and his party] had the slightest intention of attacking the Munnipoorie camp’, Edgar strongly maintained that ‘the charge was, in all probability, afterwards invented by the Majors to excuse their own conduct’. He further adds, ‘It is evident that the latter could not resist the temptation of getting possession of the refugees, for the Munnipories are even more eager than the hill chiefs themselves to get hold of Kookie and Naga subjects’.44 It must also be mentioned that Brigadier General Bourchier did not order General Nuthall ‘to go to Cheeboo, which is beyond the frontier, but only to Tsek-la-pi’, which is near Moirang (See Table 3.1).45 It was against his order of only 500 men for the force at Moirang that Nuthall assembled at Chivu a force consisting of 1,554 Manipuri troops, a contingent of 530 Kuki

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and 1,749 coolies.46 The aggressive act of Nuthall and two Meitei commanders beyond their frontier had far reaching repercussions. The apprehension of Go Khaw Thang and the two chiefs who had accompanied him along with their followers and the refugees brings out the complicated nature of the relations of the Kamhau-Sukte with Manipur on one hand and with the eastern Lushais on the other. Manipur had been smarting under the failure of the expedition in 1857 against the raids two years earlier by the very same Go Khaw Thang. The peace that Colonel McCulloch patched between Manipur and the Kamhaus after the expedition proved short lived. Kamhau-Sukte response came in the form of as many as nine raids into Manipur: six under Chief Kam Hau and another three attributed to his successors.47 Thus Manipur used the Lushai Expedition and the military movement south to deal with their bitter enemies, the Kamhaus, the apprehension of Go Khaw Thang being an unexpected bonus. In fact, unlike McCulloch, General Nuthall who stood in for Dr. Robert Brown on the latter’s furlough had little experience of the politics of the Manipur frontiers and failed to understand the motives of the Meitei majors. Feuds between the Kamhaus and the Lushais, as shown earlier, had been long-standing. Many Kamhau villages had been established near Lushai areas; Bourchier’s column encountered one, Engo, situated at 6,700 feet above sea level near the Champhai Valley, composed entirely of Kamhaus. Some Suktes had of course migrated after Kam Hau had established his authority and had settled under the Lushai chief Vanhnuailiana. From 1869 onwards when the attention of the Lushais were diverted towards Cachar, whose tea gardens they constantly plundered, ‘Kanhow and other tribes’ as Edgar reported, ‘were getting more daring in their aggression on their villages’.48 There were reports, for instance, in early February 1872 that ‘Shindoos and Kanhows’ had attacked and cut up two villages, one belonging to Vanhnuailiana’s brother and the other to his son, killing many and carrying off captives.49 Even as Bourchier was on his way towards Lushai chief Lalbura’s village it was sacked by the Kamhaus.50 After the defeat of the Lushais by Bourchier, the Kamhau-Sukte who were under the protection of the former decided to return to their old homes; a thousand immediately sought the protection of the Kamhaus.51 It was these refugees escorted by Go Khaw Thang and his warriors whom the Manipur majors had encountered and apprehended. This was Edgar’s version, and from the available evidence appears to have been the truth: They evidently went into the midst of the camp in perfect reliance (Edgar said of the chief and his men) on the friendlies of the Munnipoorees, for, as the result showed, they put within reach of the latter the women and children as well as the property of the refugees. Their suspicion was not even aroused when the Munnipooree

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officers fired off the muskets of the chiefs, and when each armed man was surrounded by a group of three sepoys. I do not believe that the Soktes had the slightest intention of attacking the Munnipooree camp.52

Kai Khual and his mission A month later a Kamhau embassy led by one Kai Khual,53 and two others Thang Zam and Ling Awi (Committee 1996: 105), was sent by chief Za Tual, the eldest son of Kam Hau, to plead for the release of Go Khaw Thang and other prisoners. However, Kai Khual and his team were informed that so long as a single subject of Manipur remained in their hands no proposition of any kind would be entertained.54 In October 1872 a second embassy consisting once again Kai Khual and others arrived in Manipur bringing with them four women captured a year earlier and an elephant tusk for the Maharaja. From one of the four women, Colonel Mowbray Thompson, Nuthall’s successor as political agent, learnt that the object of the first embassy was to ascertain if whether Manipur intended to release Go Khaw Thang, if not they would attack and destroy all Manipuri villages in their frontier hills. That summer rumours spread in the frontier villages of the possibility of a Kamhau invasion of Manipur. In September a thousand Thados had actually migrated to territories under Burmese control to avoid getting involved in the Manipur-Kamhau conflict.55 This is what Thompson told Kai Khual: It is my wish that peace should be made between your tribe and Munnipoor without further bloodshed. As you appear to have been the aggressor in attacking Munnipoorie villages, it is your duty to make the first friendly advance, and Munnipoor as the more powerful state has a right to demand you shall do so. On your part you should promise by a certain date the captives will be returned, and that you will keep peace towards Munnipoor and her tributaries for the future. If on going back to your Chief he will promise to do the above, I will arrange with the Munnipoor authorities for meeting your good intentions halfway, if on the other hand he will not consent, I fear the Munnipoor authorities will not rest contented until they have taken their Sepoys to Yatole’s village and punished your tribe for their misconduct, by burning their homes, destroying their stores of grains and driving off their cattle.56 The Manipuri officials, however, took the Kamhau’s threat seriously and began military preparations with the object of sending an expedition into the Kamhau country in the winter. John Edgar, who was asked for his comments on the situation on account of his unrivalled knowledge of the frontier and the tribes, was convinced that ‘the Munnipoori officials, and possibly 70

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the chief himself, are determined to avoid a peaceful settlement of their dispute with Kanhow’ and that if they try honestly to make term with the Sooktees, they might be successful, for the latter had shown a desire to avoid fighting, which could scarcely have been expected after the way in which were treated by the Munnipooris during the Looshai Expedition.57 Edgar sounded a note of warning that Manipur should not be allowed to attack the Kamhaus, who would certainly make reprisal on the hill people and so give the Manipur officials an excuse for attacking Kamhaus. The Government of India, anxious to avoid any complications on this part of the frontier, particularly in view of the proposed topographical survey south of Cachar,58 accordingly directed the political agent to sort out Manipur relations with the Kamhau-Sukte.59 The Maharaja was to be given to understand that any unprovoked hostilities with tribes beyond his boundary may involve him in difficulties with Burma and will not receive the approval of the Government of India. Fortunately, Thompson was able, so it seemed, to win the confidence of the Kamhaus. Before the communication of the Government of India reached Manipur, Kai Khual had returned with 26 captives. Thompson was able to prevail upon the Maharaja to reciprocate by liberating an equal number of Kamhau captives. He thus reported to the Government of India: I have been more successful with them than I anticipated. I thought from the sullen manner in which they left me that there was trouble in store for Munnipore, but two days ago I was pleasantly surprised by seeing the same deputation return, accompanied by some 26 captives they made from the Munnipoor Naga tributaries as far back as two years ago. They acted on the advice I gave them. I have suggested the Raja of Munnipore to at once liberate 26 of the captives, which he so treacherously made last March. The Munnipoorie authorities are pleased at my success, and say they have never known the Kamhow tribe to restore captives before.60 Evidently the success of the political agent in settling the border problems on the path of peace removed the imminent danger of another confrontation on Manipur’s southern border. A fourth Kamhau deputation, once again under Kai Khual, again returned to Manipur during the latter part of January 1873 bringing with him 14 other captives. It was reported that Go Khaw Thang had in the meanwhile succumbed to the rigours of prison life in Imphal, but this did not prevent a settlement. That Go Khaw Thang’s death on the eve of finding a solution to the problem is a big question which remains unexplained. It is not known whether the official theory on the 71

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death of Go Khaw Thang ‘due to illness’ was only a cover up on the harsh treatment given to the Mualpi chief. What is on record is that the annual administration report of 1873–74 refers to ‘the occurrence of a considerable epidemic of small-pox both in the valley and the adjacent hills, but most prevalent in the valley proper’. It further says, It is impossible to ascertain correctly what number died from the disease, the Munnipooris themselves estimate the number at about six hundred . . . I have seen numbers of recovered people, in fact a large population, the numbers attacked must have been very numerous.61 This report was in line with the account of Lieutenant R. G. Woodthorpe, Royal Engineers, 42nd Native Infantry (NI), who was part of the Lushai Expedition, as he said the Cachar Column had contacted cholera and when they returned to Cachar many of the force had suffered severely. He further said that Nuthal of Manipur was obliged to retire from Chivu on account of sickness (Woodthorpe [1873] 1978: 313). One can only surmise that Go Khaw Thang who died in Imphal jail might have had suffered from cholera as a result of his contact with the Manipuri Contingent, if not from the Lushais, albeit possible custodial torture was also not ruled out.

The peace treaty of 1873 On 16 March 1873 under the aegis of the political agent, the Kamhau deputation led by Kai Khual and the Maharaja of Manipur signed a peace treaty on the banks of the river at Imphal. On the following day, Thompson informed the Government of India what he had achieved and how: I then told him (Kai Khual) I would arrange with the Raja for the restoration of ten of his clansmen, that being at the rate of one adult for every two children, and also, that if his tribe was prepared to swear allegiance and fealty to Munnipore, I should not insist on their leaving Munnipore territory, but would use my endeavours with the Raja to persuade him to acknowledge them as his subjects, and advise him to release the son of their late Chief Kokatung, who was in jail, and with him swear peace and friendship for the future. To this, Kikoul agreed, and said, we want peace with Munnipore, and shall be done as you say if Kokatung’s son is released, and his dead father’s skull and bones made over to us. I did not like this latter part of the arrangement at all, but on referring the matter to the Munnipore authorities, they, after wasting some time in considering how they should act, decided in following my advice, and said, unless we give up Kokatung’s skull and bones, there will be no use 72

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in swearing peace at all, for the Sooktees or Kamhows will never be satisfied without the remains of their dead are given up to them. I have therefore complied with both their wishes, and peace was sworn yesterday on the banks of the river Eemphal, when, after the oath was repeated, first by a Munnipooris, and then Kokatung’s son, a live dog was cut in halves by the latter, and then all of the ten captives, and Kikoul the chief, drank gun-powder water, which completed the ceremony, and in the evening the whole of those released took their departure for their native hills.62 According to the agreement, both parties restored captives to each other. Kai Khual also secured the release of Sum Kam, son of chief Go Khaw Thang and, what he persistently insisted, the bones of his dead father. However, there were eight more Kamhau captives in the possession of the Maharaja, which was agreed, would be restored after the release of the ten captives still supposed to be with the Kamhaus. Though the Manipur Durbar was very anxious to get Za Tual to come and take oath of allegiance to the Maharaja before they would release Go Khaw Thang’s sons, the political agent dissuaded them from further insisting as such a proceeding might lead to complications with Burma. Neither the political agent nor the Meitei realised that the Kamhaus were merely temporising, only to obtain the release of their chiefs and the remains of their great leader. Memories of their treatment by the Meitei during the Lushai Expedition were too strong and humiliating for them to be so easily and quickly forgotten.

Recurrence of hostilities: the Mualpi Expedition, 1875 Eighteen months later there were reports from Manipur that the Kamhaus were once again on the rampage on its southern frontier. On 11 October 1874 two Anal Kuki villages, Mukoong and Kumsol, in ‘Pemberton’s Enclave’, were attacked and a large number of captives carried away (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 168–9). Dr. Robert Brown, who had resumed charge as political agent after his furlough, visited the villages personally and found them burnt and abandoned. From eyewitness accounts Dr. Brown came to the conclusion that the raids were committed by a section of the Kamhau tribe, most possibly the Go Khaw Thang group, residing at Mualpi. Dr. Brown was for strong measures: I am of opinion that should the Munnipoori desire it, permission (for an expedition) should be granted. I would recommend, however, that Government should not identify itself with the expedition further than limiting the Munnipoori advance to Mombee. From all the information I can glean, and that it is meager, the tribe of Kokatung who inhabit Mombee, and whose villages contain some 73

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five hundred houses, will fight, and will most likely be backed up by the tribes further south.63 Brown’s letter was addressed to Colonel Richard Harte Keatinge, the chief commissioner of Assam, through whom Manipur was to send their reports after the constitution of the chief commissionership in early 1874. Keatinge approved of Brown’s suggestion, ‘for a state situated as Manipur is, a policy of retaliation is the only safe one’.64 With the backing thus of the chief commissioner, Brown held a durbar in his residency on 5 December 1874, in which the following plan was adopted: 1

2

3

4

Any force sent to confine its operation to the group of villages named Mombee [Mualpi], which group it appears pretty clearly furnished the raiders. Mombee, if resistance is offered to be destroyed. If opportunity offers prisoners to be taken who can be afterwards exchanged for captives, now in the hands of the Sooktie clan. Should any negotiation take place after attacking Mombee, the chief object should be to arrange the return of captives. Should the Mombee villagers make no resistance, the Manipuris should insist upon hostages from these villages being given up to be held until the captives are returned. Manipur authorities to report carefully on the progress of the expedition.65

The chief commissioner approved of the plan but made it clear that Brown was not to accompany the expeditionary force since it would be contrary to precedents for British officers or their agents to identify themselves with or join warlike expeditions, which a native prince may undertake.66 Brown was to impress the Maharaja the importance of not permitting any cruelty or treachery like the one committed by his troops during the Lushai Expedition.67 The chief commissioner of Assam through several communications laid down the conditions to be strictly maintained during the expedition. First, the group of villages named Mualpi (Mombee) only to be attacked; second, the Manipuris to send a sufficient force to obviate all chances of defeat, and third, reprisals on women and children to be strictly avoided. The Maharaja accordingly organised an expeditionary force of 2,000 Manipuri soldiers and 400 Thado auxiliaries under the command of majors Sawai Tomba and Thangal.68 The force left Imphal on 19 February 1875. Two days of marching brought them to Sugnu, where they set up a base to attack the Kamhau villages. Shortly afterwards they started for Mualpi and on 20 March, a minor encounter took place near the Diloom River. A group headed by Za Tual’s brother made a determined attack on the advance guard of 300 Manipuris but after one and a half hours the encounter gave in and 74

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retreated to the jungles. Early next morning, while preparation for a major assault was underway, two Kamhau men, Kumteh and Lhungjeelun, came to the Manipuri camp, pleading with them not to advance into their country. The two deputations promised to return all the captives taken from Kumsol village. True to their word, the wife and child of the Kumsol chief were handed over to two Manipur subadars who had been sent to the Kamhau villages for the purpose. On 4 April, Kai Khual, emissary of Kamhau chief Za Tual, and four other chiefs from the Mualpi group of villages came into the camp bringing with them the chief of Kumsool and six other captives and a mithun. The chiefs also promised to get back the remaining captives, which they said had taken into the interior villages. On 9 April, the Manipuri force returned to Sugnu. Five days later they were at Imphal, the capital.69 The expedition was directed against the Mualpi group of villages. What it achieved Brown reported to the chief commissioner: I had an interview with the deputation from Mombi and the messengers from the chief Yatole, and assured them that the only way to show their sincerity was to speedily return the captives. A good road having been made from the south of the villages to Mombi, I have urged on the Manipuris the policy of keeping it open and encouraging communication and trade as much as possible with the Mombi group.70 This was an assessment based on the report of the Meitei majors commanding the expedition. In a subsequent communication Brown expressed considerable doubts on the so-called success of Manipuri arms, having over the years some experience of ‘Munnipoori accounts of their valiant doings when engaged in [such] operations’. He made discreet enquiries from those accompanying the Manipuris and found the official report of the expedition much exaggerated: ‘not a shot was fired at Mombee’, the political agent discovered, ‘and its party seemed to be afraid of the other’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 170). This being so, what the result of the expedition will be it is impossible to say, but I should conclude that matters are as much as they were, and should the Sooties feel inclined to commit further raids upon Munnipoor territory, they are not likely to be deterred by any fear of the Munnipoor Troops. The authorities themselves seem quite apathetic in the matter. (Ibid.) There is some mistake in the record of Thang and Suantak which say the Manipuri commander Nongmeingakba Singh was shot dead in 1875. 75

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As quoted above, Brown, after having probed, says ‘not a shot was fired at Mombee’. Therefore, Za Tual’s killing of the Manipuri commander must be in 1857 not 1875 because, as Carey argues, the Manipuri forces were met by Sukte deputation at the Chakpi (Tapei) River for an amicable settlement. In this meeting the Manipuri major ‘declared that Yetol’s (Za Tuals) sword had been placed in their hands as a token of the submission of the Sokte tribe’, which was strongly denied by the Sukte. They said the major never intended to fight. Thus there was no fighting. The negotiation ended with exchange of captives and promises of peace in the future (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 124). However, as the Kamhau-Sukte had received information that ‘the Maharaja was seriously discussing the question of annexing the Sokte tract’, Khaw Cin, chief of Mualbem, directed all who acknowledged his overlordship to kill every Manipuri whom chance or design might deliver into their hands’ (Ibid.).

Kamhau-Sukte country: annexation proposed Dr. Brown was right. It did not take long to show how fragile Meitei-Kamhau relations were. The expedition apparently had little effect and did not bring peace to the frontier. When Guybon Henry Damant, later to be killed in the Naga Hills, was briefly in Imphal in 1876 in succession to Brown, he found the Kamhaus had become more aggressive and arrogant than before. Even the establishment of additional police outposts on the frontier by Manipur had not been able to keep them under restraint (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 170–1). That year and the two succeeding years saw a recurrence of Kamhau aggression on Manipur’s frontier villages, leading the political agent to remark that the relations between the two was in a ‘most unsatisfactory state’. But as Sir Alexander Mackenzie pointed out that although the Manipur political diaries for 1877 and 1878 contained frequent references to Kamhau raids, it was doubtful if they were entirely to be blamed (Ibid.). The May 1877 raid by the Kamhaus was, for instance, in retaliation for a Manipuri Kuki attack on one of their villages which left 22 dead. These Kukis were also said to have brought in about the same time five Kamhau heads for ritual purposes. Damant’s successor Captain James Johnstone’s attempt at the exchange of visits between Manipuri Kuki and Kamhau villages could never take off. In fact, no Manipuri subject dared visit the Kamhau country. These disturbances were in fact the result of the extremely unsettled conditions in these hills. Inter-village and inter-tribal warfare, often the result of competition over jhum fields or merely of extortion by powerful villages on their weaker neighbours, had led to displacement of villages and kept some of the tribes in virtually perpetual motion. During 1877–78 there was thus a report of an ‘exceptionally large immigration’, of over

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2,000,  from the Kamhau hills into Manipur. Johnstone who met them was quite taken in by their appearances.71 The report further says that these ‘immigrants’ had brought with them a large number of muskets and Johnstone felt that the durbar should encourage the migration so that the Kamhaus will be ‘less formidable than before and Manipur will be relieved of the constant dread of an attack from them’.72 From here Johnstone moved on to recommend the absorption of the Kamhau-Sukte country into Manipur: Whatever may be the defects of the Maharaja’s Government, it is for better than the fearful state of anarchy and barbarism in which these people live, and the subjection of the Sootes to his rule would not only seem the valleys of Manipur, Kubo and Kule from their outrages but in time would have allowed us to join hands with the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and would have thus shut in the Lushai tribes on all sides, and enabled us to take them in flank, thus conducing much to the peace of all the tract of country lying between Cachar and Chittagong.73 The Lushai chiefs were said to be willing to see their sworn enemies brought under British control. So was Manipuri’s Maharaja. And if his opinion that even Burma would welcome such a proposition was true Johnstone was prepared to recommend the Maharaja undertaking it. ‘The cost to us would be small, and through him we should be able more effectually to coerce the Eastern Lushais, if at any time necessary, as they with their Western brethren would then be completely hemmed in between us and our feudatories’. The Kamhau-Sukte were then not in direct contact with the British, but Johnstone said with remarkable prescience, ‘we may be twenty years hence and timely, and to us inexpensive, action now may save trouble and money in the future’. There were good reasons for Johnstone’s concern. As he pointed out: The Sookti Kukis seem to be gradually pushing their way up towards the north and even now are unpleasantly near the Ngnasana route to Burmah, and it is probable unless checked they will eventually at no distant date, occupy the whole of the Yomadoung range which divides Manipur from the Kubo valley. I cannot but think that this move, whenever it takes place, will be to the advantage of Manipur, as it will enable Durbar more thoroughly to control these troublesome people, though it will be necessary to hold them in check, as otherwise they will be making constant raids on the Kubo valley, and thus lead the way to frequent disputes between the Burmese and Manipuris. Even now I hear that the Sootis are a great nuisance

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to the people of the valley of Kule (south of Kubo), to whom they appear to pillage at pleasure.74 A similar movement of tribes was taking place in the Chittagong Hill tracts and was being brought under control of the local officers. There was no reason why the same methods should not be followed towards the KamhauSukte: ‘If this policy is carefully pursued, we may hope during the next twenty-five years to acquire without bloodshed, such an influence as may result at no distant date in the substitution of peaceful acts for war and rapine in these vast and unknown wilds’, Johnstone concluded in his rather long report.75 An incident which occurred in Tipaimukh bazaar in 1883 also supports Johnstone’s annexation policy. Tipaimukh bazaar was at the tri-junction of south Cachar (British territory), Lushai tract and Manipur. It was a sort of central rendezvous for the traders of the Lushais, Kuki, Meitei, and the Cacharis. The bazaar was apparently started under the auspices of the British after the close of the Lushai expedition with the objective to get opportunities for meeting various tribes and improve their relations with them. According to W. W. Hunter, ‘cotton, puri cloth, caoutchouc, and other jungle products are bartered for rice, salt and hardware’ in this bazaar.76 Interestingly, the Kamhau-Sukte also used to sell rubber, wax and ivory and buy cloth and other articles in exchange in this bazaar. The storming of the Sahiblog’s Bazaar at Longlewaishu in Tipaimukh coincided with the visit of J. Knox Wight, officiating deputy commissioner of Cachar, who was on tour with his Frontier Police. On 20 January 1883, about 25 to 30 Kamhau-Sukte raided the bazaar and carried away a young Kuki boy and some goods. Initially, Manipur was believed to have carried out the raid for economic interest, but it was later found out that the attack came from Thungkhaiyam (Thang Khaw Zam), who was cousin of Sum Kam, son of the Mualpi chief Go Khaw Thang who died in Imphal jail.77 Perhaps, Sum Kam and many other Guite families had already moved to Tonglawn (Tornlong), Losau and surrounding areas by this time. But as W. F. Trotter, Political Agent of Manipur, categorically admitted, ‘Sumkam and his cousin Thangkhoiyam are Kamhows, and are in no way subject to Manipur’.78 What Trotter had gathered from the report of ‘some Kuki rajahs’, the deputation he sent to Sum Kam, are as below: Some 40 to 50 men started from the village of Thangkhoiyam (Sumkam’s cousin), as they often do, with rubber, wax, ivory, &c., to barter for salt, beads and other things, and finding themselves in close proximity to what they thought was an unprotected bazaar, they thought it a good opportunity to help themselves to all kinds of articles for nothing, and they were exceedingly astonished when, in

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carrying out their intention, they were fired upon by Wight’s sepoys, as they had no idea that any Sahib or armed force was within miles of the place.79 Earlier, the captured Kuki boy, named Taibong, who was allegedly recovered from the possession of Thang Khaw Zam by the deputation recounted that the party who seized him accompanied him to the country of the Sukte. Taking this as a convenient pretext, Trotter wanted to send an expedition against the Kamhau village where ‘the Maharaja will be permitted to carry out his desire of inflicting the punishment’.80 However, considering that no one was killed or even wounded, and that the whole of the plunder and the captive boy have been restored, the chief commissioner of Assam said the offence may be punished by a moderate fine of Rs. 400 or its equivalent in ivory or gongs. To the Government of India, the chief commissioner recommended expedition to be conducted by Manipur only if there is failure of payment.81 Nothing was known whether payment was made or not and there was no expedition against the Kamhau. In the event it was not from Burma that the British established their control over these Chin/Zo tribes. When during the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86) James Johnstone, now a retired major general living in England, learnt how difficult it was to move Indian regiments from Manipur, the base of operations, into the Chin Hills, he revived his old proposal: the total subjugation of all the Northern Chins through and by means of Manipur, the resources of the state being properly organised under the control of the Political Agent, or I should say, frontier commissioner, as far such as big work you require a big man. Johnstone even sketched out a plan: To organise the Manipur levy under efficient European Officers, and form two regiments; in addition to the force I should, for the first few years, have a battalion of frontier police in Manipur. This force, with perhaps a little extra help, to begin with, should gradually effect the entire subjugation of the Chin country, which, as it was annexed, should be handed over to the Darbar nominally, to be really administered by the frontier Commissioner. Roads would be cut throughout the country, and in a few years a complete transformation would be effected.82 The ‘big man’ for Manipur was not available. At any rate, Manipur’s frontier problem ceased with the annexation of Upper Burma, on one hand, and the annexation of Manipur after the Anglo-Manipur War in 1891, on

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the other. It was, however, not from Manipur but from Upper Burma that the British subjugation of the Kamhau-Sukte in particular and annexation of the Chin Hills in general was to take place.

Notes 1 The hyphenated term ‘Kamhau-Sukte’ refers territorially to the realms of control of the Sukte chiefs/rulers from Mualbem and those under Kam Hau and his successors from Tedim and Tonzang respectively. So, I use the same hyphenated term to refer to the people settled in these two tracts particularly with reference to preand early colonial period. Today the Kamhau-Sukte people are more popularly known as Zomi. 2 Manipur’s boundaries in fact took long to settle. In 1832 the Jiri River and the branch of the Barak River made her western limits towards Cachar, in the north, towards the Naga Hills some understanding was arrived at in 1842, but the exact limits of the state was never settled and the problem remained unresolved till the early 1870s. The Kabaw Valley in the east was handed over to Burma (see below) in 1834–35, but here too the correct boundary was never identified. For the Cachar-Manipur boundary (Barpujari 1963: 10ff; Bhattacharjee 1977: 58); for Manipur’s extension towards the Naga hills, (Barpujari 1970: 146–8; Barpujari 2003: 98, 188–9; Barpujari 1973: 271–80). 3 The inhabitants of Manipur may be broadly divided into three: Meitei, Naga and Zo (Kuki-Chin). ‘Meitei’ is a self-referent of the valley people whereas Naga and Zo (Kuki-Chin) mainly settle in the hills surrounding the valley. I use ‘Meitei’ as an exclusive referent for the valley people and Manipuri as an inclusive term to refer to the Meitei and others who reside in Manipur. For instance, when referring to the Manipuri troops, I mean to say the troops which consisted of Meitei and others within the territory of Manipur, like the Naga/Kuki, for instance. Hence, the Manipuri Raja, instead of Meitei Raja. 4 Birendra Chandra Chakraborty quoted: ‘This was first noticed by Colonel Frederick Lister, who led an expedition into the Lushai hills in 1850–51 and wrote in his report: It would appear that the tribes to the south have been gradually driving one another in a northerly direction; for, first, some Nagas that were located in the Boobun Hills in southern Cachar were obliged by the Tangune Kookies to flit and to take up their abode in the hills north of the Borak, when the Tangunes took possession of their ground, and they having in their turn been driven up by the Chansen and Tadoe tribes, the Tangunes were also afterwards obliged to vacate and to move on into the northern hills, and after them the Changsens were obliged to do so likewise; and the Thadoes, who had been driven up by the Luchyes, a very powerful tribe, first settled about seven years since within eight and ten miles south of this station, and became Company’s ryots, and made themselves useful by cutting timber, bamboos, canes, & c., which they used to bring to market, but after having been located there for some four years, the Luchye Kookies in November 1849 attacked them, burnt three of their villages, killed several of the inhabitants, and took away several of them into slavery, and then the whole of the Tadoe tribe flitted, left the south and settled down in the northern hills. About the same time the Luchye Kookies attacked the villages in Cachar, they committed other atrocities in Sylhet and in Manipur. It

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was the first that had ever been heard here of the Luchyes, and from the inquiries I made, it appeared that they were a very powerful, warlike, set of people, consisting of the Luchyes, Chillings, and Gattaes, and who were said to be also well armed and independent, and residing from eighth to ten days’ journey south of this. And to the south of them again there are the Poe Kookies, who are said to be still more powerful than the Luchyes, and who it is said exact a kind of tribute from them. (Mackenzie 1884] 2001: 287) 5 FPC February 1831, No. 108; Captain George Gordon to Swinton, Chief Secretary to Government of India, Calcutta, 18 February. 6 ‘Its entire population’, Bentinck continued, is supposed not to amount to more than 30 or 40,000 souls and its available revenue to 4 or 5,000 rupees a year. Its situation – surrounded by mountains – excluded it from any great participation in the advantages of traffic, and the whole tenor of the several communications made to Government by the Officers most intimately acquainted with the country proves that at this moment it is without the means of efficiency extending its agriculture. The Levy, consisting, as we are told, of 3,000 men, is shown to be but very imperfectly disciplined and very little under the control of the Officers specially appointed for the purpose of ensuring its efficiency. And although we may fairly assume that, armed as they now are, they would be a match for an equal number of Burmese, we could hardly place any great reliance upon their undisciplined efforts when opposed to the vastly superior force, which, in the event of war, would inevitably be brought against them. Their country is to be regarded principally as an advanced military position for defence of the eastern frontier and its utility must of course entirely depend upon its natural resources, and the efficiency of its military force. (Pemberton [1835] 2000: 48) 7 Nine chiefs who conspired to kill Khan Thuam were Vungh Vial of Saizang, Mang Song of Lamzang, Tun Kam of Vangteh, Do Mang of Lophei, Ciang Phut of Kaalzang, Suan Thuk of Thuklai, Go Mang of Khuasak, Han Kam of Buanman and Kaih Mang of Mualbem. 8 Customary dues collected by Khan Thuam include mim siah, tang siah, tuk tha, khal tha, inn zang sial lamsa, inn saliang, gam saliang and tuikuang sui siah. 9 According to the custom of the Sukte, the elder sons went out into the world and founded their own villages, whilst the youngest son inherited almost all the father’s property and the chieftainship of the tribe or clan, his elder brothers becoming subordinate to and paying him the tribute which is due to the head of the tribe. 10 I am very grateful to my maternal uncle Pu Gin Khan Do Tawmging for giving me a book edited by Khup Za Mung (Mung et al. 2002) when I visited him in Yangon in February 2018. 11 This information has been received through email correspondence from Pa Khup Khan Thang Taithul, who is well versed in the history and culture of Zomi. 12 Zolai Simbu Tan Khat (Tedim Pau) originally published by J. H. Cope as Chin Primer, 1924 (reprint by Zolai Simbu Bawl Komiti, Tedim, 1976), p. 3. I am grateful to Pa Daniel Vung Lian Mang (Tulsa, USA) who gave me a copy of this book in CD format. 13 The terms Sukte and Kamhau will hereafter be used when referring to chiefs and men with respect to the location of their villages either west or east of the

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14

15 16

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25

26

27 28 29

30

Manipur or Nankathe (locally Guun) River. Today, Sukte (often misspelt as Suhte/Sahte) is a recognised tribe in Manipur and other parts of North-East India. Being a clan name, the people prefer to call themselves Tedim Chin within the larger Zo/Zomi ethnic group. James Johnstone writes: ‘Colonel McCulloch’s policy of planting Kuki settlements on exposed frontiers, induced the Government of Bengal to try a similar experiment, and a large colony of Kukis were settled in 1855 in the neighbourhood of Langting, to act as a barrier for North Cachar against the raids of the Angami Nagas’. FPC 19 December 1846, Nos. 164–165. Mombee or Lawmpi located in Manipur. There is another village of the same name which the Kamhau people called Mualpi in northern Chin hills. In all probability the Thados who were the original inhabitants of the village in the Chin hills called the new village in Manipur of the same name. NAI, FPAP August 1872, No. 90; Report by Major General W. F. Nuthall, officiating Political Agent, Manipur, upon the past relations of the Maharaja of Manipur with Kam Hau Chief of the Sukte Tribe, 25 April 1872. In colonial records, the ‘Maharaja’ title had begun to be in use from the time of Chandrakirti Singh for unknown reasons. Hence, I simply follow my source. There are people who confused the war between Meitei and Kamhau-Sukte in 1857 and 1875. While there was actual fighting in 1857 which resulted to the defeat of Manipuri forces, there was no such fighting in 1875. Therefore, Za Tual’s marksmanship shown in the shooting down of the Manipur commander was 1857 incident. This information has been provided by Stephen Khup Cin Pau. To know more on the importance of Zu, see Zu in Mizo Society (Past and Present), Directorate of Education, Tribal Research Institute, Mizoram, 1983. Thanks to Prof. Kham Khan Suan Hausing, Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad for doing me the favour of translating the song into English. FPAP August 1872, No. 70; Edgar to Commissioner, Chittagong, 3 April. Ibid. The Treaty of Yandaboo between the Burmese and the British referred to Gambhir Singh as Raja, and this term continued to be in use throughout the East India Company’s days, after which for reasons not found in any document or report, the ruler was referred to as Maharaja. Existing posts along the Manipur’s southern frontier on the eve of the Lushai expedition, 1871–72: Kowpoom, Limetak, Bishenpoor, Moirung Hills, Koomos Chumbupoong, Koongshangkool in the Hills in advance of No. 5, Muttarook, Tseklapi headquarters, Shooganoo, Manchangoway, Kengyang, Koogamaroo. (FPAP August 1872, No. 83). FPAP August 1872, No. 83. Ibid., No. 70. How little was known of the reasons behind these can be seen in the Government of India letter to the secretary of state on 12 February 1869, which said: ‘We have not yet been informed of the real origin of these disturbances, but it is not un likely that they are in some measure connected with the movements of Kunhye Sing, one of the Munniporee Princes, who is opposed to the present Raja of Munnipur, and has gone into outlawing’ (quoted in Chakravorty 1964: 55). One of the principal reasons was, however, the extension of tea garden deep into tribal territory. This accounts for the tea garden becoming the main targets of Lushai raids (Barpujari [1976] 1996: 139). Apart from Edgar’s Note in FPAP August 1872, Nos. 61–113, see (Mackenzie [1884] 2001; Lalsangpuia 1983).

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31 FPAP December 1869, No. 245; Secretary Bengal to Secretary Foreign Department, Government of India, 17 August 1869. The lieutenant governor thus remarked on the failure of the Expedition, ‘The organization and management of the whole expedition was a more decidedly military character than suitable for expedition of this sort. A small force of picked troops under a select officer and supported by a body of well drilled and well armed police. . . . would be likely to be more successful in such a country against such an enemy or the Looshais than a force having a military organization commanded by an officer of high rank hampered by impeditions [sic] inseparable from a force of that character’. These observations, it will soon be seen, were totally cast in the military authorities. 32 The literature on the Lushai Expedition is fairly extensive (Roberts 1901; Reid [1893] 1976; Woodthorpe 1873; Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 562–83). 33 FPAP August 1872, No. 16; From Brigadier-General G. Bourchier, C.B., Commdg. Eastern District to Colonel P. S. Lumsden, Quarter Master General, 17 October, 1871. 34 Quoted in FPAP August 1872, No. 83; Nuthall to Aitchison, 12 April 1872, submitting final report on the Manipur Contingent. 35 Ibid. 36 The military posts were selected with special reference to easy communication, mutual support, and rapid concentration, and control of supply. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 FPAP August 1872, No. 79; Political Agent, Manipur to Officer Commanding Cachar Column, 13 March 1872. 40 Nuthall reported inhabitant numbering 962 were with them and were desirous to join Kamhau’s tribe. Actually these were Kamhau people who lived in the Lushai hills but took the opportunity to leave the country and move to Kamhau country. See FEAP August 1872, No. 79. 41 FPAP August 1872, No. 79; From Political Agent, Manipur to Officer Commanding Cachar Column, 13 March 1872. 42 Annual Administration Report on Munnipoor Agency for the Year Ending 30 June 1873, p. 9. 43 FPAP August 1872, No. 79; From Political Agent, Manipur to Officer Commanding Cachar Column, 13 March 1872. 44 Ibid., No. 95; J. W. Edgar, Civil Officer with the Cachar Column to Brigadier General Bourchier, 21 March 1872. 45 Ibid., No. 94; From Brigadier General G. Bourchier to Colonel P. S. Lumsden, Quarter-Master General, 20 April 1872. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., No. 90; ‘Report by Major-General W. F. Nuthall upon the past relations of the Maharaja with Kamhow Chief of the Sooti Tribe, 25 April 1872’. 48 Ibid., No. 70; Edgar to Commissioner Dacca Division, 3 April 1872. 49 FPAP March 1871, No. 548; Telegram, Political Agent Manipur (Dr. Brown) to Foreign Secretary, Government of India. 50 The Pioneer of 7 May 1872 thus reported what Bourchier’s column saw on 17 February when they reached the village: ‘Other invaders had been there before them; and signs of war and slaughter greeted on every side. The (temporary) withdrawal of the Manipur contingent from the frontier owing to sickness, had set free the Soktes Kookies – old enemies of the Lushai, who, seizing the opportunity and knowing the panic caused by the advance of the British column made fierce onslaught on Lalboorah under the guidance of Kamhau, their chief’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: Appendix K, 580).

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51 The punishment of the Lushai villages had in fact led to migration of the captive Thados and Suktes in large numbers into Manipur. 52 FPAP August 1872, No. 70, Appendix C; From Edgar to Brigadier-General Bourchier, 21 March 1872. 53 Kai Khual was one of the ministers of Kamhau chief Za Tual. While he with some men came to collect tribute from Khengbum village in 1862 he was arrested by the Meitei Subadars Athokpa and Ooyna, who were on duty at Numfow and Sugnu thannahs. They were sent to jail in Imphal but later released in 1865. Probably it was during his jail term that Kai Khual learnt Meitei language. Ibid., No. 90; ‘Report by Nuthall’. Also see Annual Administration Report of the Munnipoor Agency for the Year Ending 30th June 1875, p. 6. 54 FPAP January 1873, Nos. 441–447; Political Agent Manipur to Secretary Foreign Department, Government of India, 2 October 1872; see also General Nuthall letter of 25 April. 55 Ibid. See Office Note, January 1873. 56 Ibid., 2 October 1872. 57 Ibid. Note by Edgar on ‘Kamhow and Munnipoor’, 20 December 1872. 58 Ibid. See note by Charles Aitchison, 18 January 1873. 59 Ibid., Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, to Political Agent, Manipur, 30 January 1873. 60 Ibid., From Political Agent to Secretary, Foreign Department, 15 December 1872. 61 Annual Administration Report of the Munnipoor Agency for the Year Ending 30th June 1873–74, p. 17. 62 FPAP April 1873, No. 226; From Political Agent to Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, 17 March 1873. 63 FPAP February 1875, Nos. 101–113; Brown to Luttman Johnson, 12 October and 26 November 1874. Deposition of Erabunt: ‘I was stationed with eight other sepoys at an outpost at Setiang (Sehang) a village on the slope of the hills south east of Moirang, our order were to protect the villages and guard a magazine placed there . . . about twelve days ago (from . . . Oct) I was awoke in the early morning by the sound of musketry in the direction of the village of Mushoong about one and half hours journey south. I being incharge of the guard assembled and with the armed villagers mustered fifty men. We started about half an hour after the alarm was given. . . . In about 4 hours we reached the Sombee river . . . after crossing we saw the Kamhaus in dense jungle about two to three hundred strong they werer eating . . . The Kamhaus by this time did not observed us. We shot up a fire on them . . . after which they retreated slowly to the south. We followed and found five dead bodies on the way their heads had been cut off and taken away by the Kamhaus . . . Mukoong had lost 6 men killed and 7 houses were burnt in the attack’. Statement of Mukoong Inhabitants: ‘In the night we were attacked by Lamyang Kookies, who live to the south and had a chief Kokatung (who was formerly a prisoner in Manipur and died there). We turned out and several fled, the others who were armed resisted, we had to retreat, we lost 6 killed and some women wounded. The Kamhaus also seized 23 villagers in all, men women and children . . . There were we think about 30 muskets amongst them, the rest armed with spears, bows and arrows’. Statement of Kumsol Inhabitants: ‘My village is situated quite close to Mukoong and contains 37 houses; on the morning of the same day and about the same time our village was attacked. On being attacked

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the women fled at once, the men attempted to defend the village, each man his own houses. We lost 11men killed, one wounded. The Kamhaus had six killed. . . . they carried off men, women, and children and 5 muskets. We had 25 muskets. The Kamhaus had about 300 men and 30 muskets’. 64 FPBP February 1875, Nos. 46–57; Luttman Johnson to Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, 5 November 1874. 65 Ibid., Brown to Luttmann Johnson, 7 December. 66 Ibid., Luttman Johnson to Brown, 6 January 1875. 67 Ibid., Luttmann Johnson to Brown, 29 December 1874. 68 FPBP June 1875, Nos. 1–4; Brown to Luttman, 25 April 1875, Johnson forwarding ‘Narrative of Expedition by Thangal Major and Tomba Major in charge of the Kamhow Expeditionary force’. 69 Annual Administrative Report of the Manipur Political Agency, 1874–75. 70 FPBP June 1875, Nos. 1–4; Brown to Luttmann, 25 April 1875. 71 Annual Administration Report of the Manipur Political Agency, 1877–78. ‘The men who come to see were splendid specimens of the human races’, wrote Johnstone, ‘late with very powerful frames, altogether the first Kookies, I had ever seen. They told me I was the first European they had ever seen, but showed no unseemly curiosity’. 72 Administration Report 1877–78. In the following year when another hundred Kamhaus made their appearance in Manipur Johnstone found them ‘in no wise inferior to their countrymen’ and noted ‘The dignified air of these noble savages, for noble they certainly are in appearance and demeanour’. 73 Administration Report, 1878–79. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 FEAP September 1883, Nos. 262–284. 77 Ibid., No. 264; From J. Knox Wight Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, 6 March 1883. 78 Ibid., No. 267; From Major W. F. Trotter to C. A. Elliot, Esq., 13 March 1883. Sum Kam and others later moved from Mualpi to Tonglawn (Sumkam khua) which was till 1894 within the jurisdiction of the Chin Hills. 79 Ibid., No. 276; Demi-official. From W. F. Trotter to C. A. Elliot, 22 May 1883. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., No. 262; From C. J. Lyall officiating Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 22 June 1883. 82 FEAP July 1889, Nos. 353–354; Johnstone to Sir Henry Durand, 27 December 1889. Johnstone had further said, ‘When I talk of subjugating the Chins, I contemplate political and pacific measures to begin with, and force only as a last resort. In fact, I propose the same course of treatment as we pursued in the Naga Hills, this time only more consistently. I have no doubt of the result. It is always to be remembered that we made many mistakes in the Naga Hills which might have been foreseen – indeed were foreseen by me – and might have guarded against. These we should not make a second time’.

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4 COLONIAL PENETRATION Explorations, expeditions and resistance

‘The Burmese War officially ended with Churchill’s proclamation on January 1, 1886 but unofficially it had just begun’ (Aung 1990: 187),1 a recent Burmese scholar aptly writes, summing up the more important problem of ‘pacification’ of Upper Burma that followed annexation. In the first two years of the occupation of Upper Burma British energies were directed towards restoring order and eliminating dacoit groups which the abolition of the monarchy and the Hlutdaw,2 the supreme council, let loose throughout the countryside (Harvey 1946: 22–3).3 Referring to the rise of dacoit gangs John Nisbet further adds that ‘seven years of Thibaw’s weak and incompetent rule and the melting away of the Burmese army on the British approach both spread and strengthened dacoit gangs already in existence’ (1901: 105). To the northeast was also the important problem of establishing control over the Bhamo area where Chinese intentions were cause for anxiety. Much for the same reasons British officials moved into the vast area of the Shan States (Woodman 1962: 268). Along the west of the Upper Burma Districts of Upper and Lower Chindwin, of Pakokku and Minbu, lay the ‘wild region’ of the Chin Hills. Here, beyond an interest in acquiring some knowledge of the tribes and their location, the Burma authorities were willing to let well enough alone.

Hill-valley relations: post-war British policy The geographical situation of the Chin Hills between Burma and Chittagong in Bengal, however, gave it an importance very different from the Kachin or Shan Hills. How this shaped British policy in the Chin-Lushai Hills, Sir Charles Crosthwaite, the chief commissioner of Burma, thus wrote in his first-hand account of those years: In the open season of 1887–88 a project for opening up the Chin country from the Bengal boundary in the west to the frontier of Burma proper on the east was started in India, prematurely so far as we were concerned. It was proposed that roads should be made through the hills, communication established, and the hill people 86

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subjugated. The phrase ‘from the Salween to the sea’ was invented and had some effect. (1912: 288–9) Proposal for the construction of roads and communication through the Chin-Lushai Hills came on the backdrop of British interest in the communication between Burma and China. In his lecture at a joint meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society and the East India Association on 1 November 1939, which was published the following year, F. Burton Leach said the annexation of Upper Burma revived the old trade routes between Burma and China. Though there had for centuries been a road across China to Yunnan, thence down to the Irrawaddy River at Bhamo, it was only in 1835 that Captain Hannay made a visit to Bhamo and got information on the route to Yunnan. In 1868, Captain Edward Sladen made a successful visit to Yunnan (1940).4 The question of opening up road and communication in the ‘Chin country’, which lay between Bengal and Burma, after the British annexation of Upper Burma, was, therefore, not surprising. The initiative for this actually came from Bengal5 and the reason for this was explained by David Reid Lyall, Chittagong’s commissioner, in his Note on the Future Management of the Western Portion of the Country between Chittagong and Burma. He said, The position of affairs has greatly altered since the (Lushai) expedition of 1871–72 . . . now, the object is to erase the frontier between Burma and Chittagong, and to make the whole country between as safe as the (Chittagong) Hill Tracts district now is, and to open full communications with the tribes between.6 In order to carry out the new objective, in February 1888 a survey party under Lieutenant John Stewart of the Leinster Regiment was pushed up from Chittagong but met with disaster when it came across a Shindu, but more properly Poi/Pawi, war party under Hausata (Reid [1893] 1976: 39–42).7 The event was to link the ensuing operations in the Lushai Hills to avenge the death of Stewart with the developments in the Chin Hills. Crosthwaite, anxious to avoid new difficulties, was in the beginning not in favour of Bengal’s proposition and prevailed upon the Viceroy Lord Dufferin to negate it. ‘The Chins, however, forced our hands’, the chief commissioner was to lament, ‘and before the rains of 1888 it was clear that it would be impossible to ignore them’ (Crosthwaite 1912: 101).8 Colonel A. S. Reid, who was in the first expeditions into the Chin-Lushai Hills, explains why: The annexation of Upper Burma had saddled the Government of India with the responsibility of protecting Her Majesty’s new subjects 87

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from the inroads of the savages who had been in the habit of raiding the Burmese villages on the frontier, and carrying the inhabitants into captivity and slavery. ([1893] 1976: 60) Situated between the Arakan Hill Tracts and Manipur the Chins/Zo, it will be recalled, were divided by colonial rulers into three distinct groups: the first were the Tedim group (Tedim Chin/Zo), after their most important village Tedim. Below them were the Falam group (Falam Chin/Zo), the most important were the Taisun. To their south was the Haka group (Haka Chin/ Zo). Between the Northern Chin Hills and the Chindwin River forming an enclosure in the Upper Chindwin district was the small Shan State of Kale ruled by a chief called Sawbwa. It had long been exposed to Chin/Zo raids, particularly by the Sizang, who were, according to colonial record, ‘the most frequent and barbarous raiders, burning villages, slaughtering peasants and carrying off many as slaves to the hills’. It was largely due to the internal rivalry amongst the Sabwas, on the one hand, and the Sizang who used to conduct forays into the plain taking advantage of the unstable condition, on the other, that the Kale State was in ‘a most unhappy condition’ (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 21). The Sawbwa Maung Yit who was unable to maintain the peace of the state was replaced by his nephew Maung Pa Gyi. To the north of the Kale State the Kabaw Valley posed fewer problems. It was placed under the deputy commissioner of the Upper Chindwin District and the Kabaw Valley Military Police Battalion was raised for its defence, but not quite the Yaw (Zo) hills at the southern end of the Kale Valley and north-east of the Arakan Hill Tracts. The Yaw country takes its name from the Yaw River which like the Myittha (forming the Kale Valley) rises in the Southern Chin Hills, but takes a southeasterly direction making its way to the Irrawady below Pakokku, the river port of the district of the same name. Its chief village was Gangaw, some 100 miles off Pakokku. The Yaw country was in the beginning left to itself. Towards the end of 1887 after reports had been received of the presence of dacoits four military columns moved in. These gangs were quickly dispersed but British action led to a new difficulty. Among those who fled Yaw where he had taken shelter was Shwegyobyu. This pretender who was described as a guerilla leader had raised a rebellion in the confines of the Chindwin, Myingyan and Pagan districts immediately fled to the Taisun hills in the Chin Hills where he was to complicate British relations with the Chins/Zo (Ibid.). It was largely for these developments that Crosthwaite felt that the Chins/ Zo could no longer be ignored. One of the first things to be done was to get in touch with the various chiefs. The Chin Hills had to be cleared of dacoits, obtain the surrender of captives, and, even though Crosthwaite was still hesitant, the way prepared for an exploring party through the 88

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hills to Chittagong. In the middle of December 1887, the deputy commissioner of the Upper Chindwin District, Captain F. D. Raikes, proceeded to Kalemyo where on the 26th he held a durbar with four Sizang chiefs9 in attendance. Raikes first told them of the installation of Maung Pa Gyi as Sawbwa of Kale. The chiefs were next told that all raids into Kale must stop and that in future such raids would be considered as an act of hostility towards the British government. All raiders were to be made over to the deputy commissioner and all prisoners freed without any excuses. Inducement to trade was also held out and non-intervention in their internal affairs promised. When Raikes brought up the important question of a route to Chittagong through the Chin Hills he was told by the chief spokesman of the Sizang, Tun Suan, that the country west of their villages was occupied by the ‘Laizos’.10 With them they had no dealings and Raikes was given to understand that any attempt made by him to proceed beyond the Sizang-Sakhiling western boundary would lead to complications. The reason why Tun Suan opposed to any exploration from the Sizang-Sakhiling tract beyond the Nankathe or Manipur River (locally called Meitei Guun) was that it may ensue a general panic, which he and the other chiefs would be unable to repress. As far as the Sizangs were concerned, Tun Suan was sure that there would be no hostility, but the panic created by British military column’s presence would have a disastrous effect, and therefore this was the reason why he strongly protested against any advance being made beyond the Letha range (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 23). The durbar ended with presents to the four chiefs. But Raikes’s message was clear in case of Chin/Zo intransigence; it was conveyed through a display of military power. The chiefs were said to have been much impressed. Raikes next proceeded to Indin where he held a similar durbar with the Taisun chiefs, very powerful rulers of central Chin Hills, and repeated what was discussed with the Sizang and Sakhiling, namely: 1 2 3 4

The recognition of the Kale of Sawbwa by the British government. Raids committed by the Sizang Tribe in Kale territory. The encouragement of trade between Chins and Shans on the east and between Chins and Chittagong on the west of the Tashon tract. The advance of an exploring party through the Tashon tract to examine and report on the trade routes through the Tashon tract to Chittagong. (Ibid.)

As regards the route to Chittagong, Raikes this time emphasised the benefit to the Chin/Zo of trade. Chief Con Bik, the spokesman of the Taisuns said ‘that such a route existed he had no doubt, but he knew nothing personally about it, and he considered it unadvisable that any advance should be made through the Tashon hill at present’ (Ibid.: 24). Though Con Bik did not 89

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intend actually to object to the British Government sending a party through his country, he wished to consult the other Taisun chiefs who were not present at the durbar. He also made it clear that he could not guarantee the safety of a party that seeks to venture into the Taisun territory (Ibid.). In this durbar, Raikes once again resorted to a display of British military power for the Taisun chiefs. Major McGregor allowed the Gurkhas who accompanied the party to fire two volleys and five rounds of independent firing. The effect of the volleys on a target at 500 yards quite astounded the Chin/Zo (Ibid.: 25). Raikes’s next durbar was with the Suktes and Kamhaus, albeit the detail of their discussion was not known. In the south negotiations with the Zokhua and Haka were conducted by Captain Eyre, the deputy commissioner of Pakokku district, but met with little success. The three men whom Captain Eyre sent up to the hills to call the chiefs were arrested by the Zokhuas; two were murdered and the third escaped and found his way to the Arakan Hill Tracts, and thence was returned to Captain Eyre at Pagan.

Expedition in 1888–89: Sizang and Kamhau-Sukte resistance It was not trade and trade routes but the question of the surrender of captives, rebels and troublemakers who had taken refuge in the hills that set the British and the Chin/Zo on a collision course. The Chin/Zo themselves precipitated action by their extensive raids in British villages in the Kale Valley. When Crosthwaite learnt that the Taisuns meant to resist British demands, he said, The arrival of a Burman Prince, whether genuine or pretender did not matter, a man with a certain amount of prestige, a good deal of energy, a bitter hatred of the foreigners, gave the Tashons heart, and they determined to take action. (Crosthwaite 1912: 289)11 On 4 and 5 May 1888, some hundreds of Taisun, accompanied by the Shwegyobyu prince, descended suddenly upon Indin and carried off the Sawbwa of Kale to Chingaing to the foot of the hills. Here, on 6 May, he was obliged to save himself by promising to join in the rebellion after which he was allowed to return to his capital. The Shwegyobyu prince, with a mixed force of the Burmans and Chin/Zo, held Chingaing (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 25). The chief commissioner thus sent a force consisting of a hundred rifles under Major Gleig to Kalemyo and Captain Eyre moved up with 150 mounted infantry from Pakokku via Pauk and Gangaw. The Kabaw Valley battalion also moved down to Kalewa. On 26 May the party under Captain Eyre marched to the Yaw country and recovered Chingaing from the possession of Shwegyobyu who fired the village and escaped into the hills. An 90

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ultimatum was at once issued to the Taisuns to deliver up the Shwegyobyu prince and other leading rebels. A similar ultimatum was also sent to the Sizang. Crosthwaite was now convinced that ‘there could be no peace until the Chin tribes had been subdued’. He saw only two courses open to the government: permanent occupation of the country lying below the Chin Hills and to bring it under efficient administration and defence; or to march a punitive expedition into the Chin Hills (1912: 292). Sir John Ware Edgar, now Bengal’s chief secretary, expressed the views of his government to the Government of India: Any plan for dealing with these hillmen should be worked in concert by the Government of Bengal, Assam and Burma. No mistake can be greater than for each of these Government to deal separately with the villagers adjoining its own frontier without reference to those in the vicinity of the other two Governments, or in the center of the tract, because the effect of this would be merely to divert attacks from one portion of the frontier to another, while doing to remedy the real source of the evil which I take to be the belief of the inhabitants of the higher central hills in the inaccessibility of their country and their safety from danger of punishment. It would be very easy to put an end to all this if the Government of all surrounding country were to unite in a steady continuous attempt to open up this unknown tract, and to make its inhabitants feel that they were surrounded on all sides by a single government, with a single aim and single method of working. (Reid [1942] 1974: 4) Yet the Government of India was not prepared for joint operations by Bengal and Burma since British administration in the Chindwin District was not yet sufficiently consolidated to allow them of a ‘satisfactorily full and permanent development of the object which a joint expedition from Chittagong and Burma might be expected to secure’ (Ibid.: 5). Meanwhile the Chin Hills frontier remained very disturbed. On 17 September the Taisuns raided a village near Sihaung. The Zokhua, Haka, and Thetta in the south had allied together, and the Tawa, Kape, Shanpi, Sinsit, Aka, and Lanta villagers, who like the three belonged to the Baungshe12 tribe, were also said to be attempting a combination. The Haka and Zokhua people almost immediately thereafter made two raids into the Yaw country, killing eight and carrying off 28 persons. The Sizang under Khai Kam (Kaikam) also attacked a party of Shans in Kale, killing one and carrying off four boys. Brigadier General Faunce was hurried up to the Kale Valley with certain number of troops and police. Captain Raikes also immediately rushed to Indin. A military police battalion, known as ‘Chin Levy’, was raised for the protection of the Chin Hills frontier (Reid [1893] 1976: 61). 91

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A chain of military outposts was established from Tamu in the Kabaw Valley down to Gangaw, Minywa, and Tilin on the Yaw border. Still the Government of India could not be moved to sanction any extended military operations against the Chin/Zo, a reluctance that can easily be explained by the fact that its hands were full with problems with an expedition to Sikkim. Even the more important Kachin Hills in the North East Frontier of Burma were still far from settled. The Government of India therefore preferred to establish a blockade of the Chin Hills from the vulnerable Burma side. This was the primary reason for the establishment of the chain of outposts. Military outposts also show the limit of British territory. The blockade, however, failed. Chin raids into the Kale Valley continued. On 14 October 1888, Homalin was attacked by followers of the Shwegyobyu, assisted by the Taisuns. Another attack was also made three days later by the Sizangs on a village named Chitpauk, near Yazagyo, in which seven persons were killed and 45 carried off as captives. On the 20th Kambale itself was attacked, Kantha two days later and Kalemyo on the 29th. On that day a party of Kamhaus also raided Khampat in the Kabaw Valley, killing seven and carried off 27 as captives. On 16 November, the Government of India finally yielded to the entreaties of the chief commissioner for action against what it called the ‘unruly mountaineers’ and sanctioned an expedition.13 The object of the expedition was to cripple the Sizangs by delivering a crushing blow. Being not only closely settled near the Kale plain but also one of the most dreaded warriors or raiders the Sizangs became the first target of the British. It was also hoped the Taisuns would at the same time be terrified into surrendering the Shwegyobyu. No action was contemplated in the Kale Valley except for the defence of the frontier for which a military police battalion was raised. The plan of operations was to construct the road and fortified positions on it and pushing forward provisions from one position to another before the military column advanced. As the road progressed and the fortified positions at each stages completed the column was to advance from one post to the next, till the heart of the Sizang country was reached. From here, flying columns were to move out against the Chin/Zo villages. The base of operations was Kambale. In the beginning of December 1888 the first six miles, up to the foot of the hills, was complete and provisions were pushed forward by cart transport. Chin/Zo reaction to this development was swift. On 7 December a company of the Madras Sappers was ambushed by the Sizang while in the process of road-making. From the intensity of the attack it was obvious that the Sizangs and Taisuns had combined and were fighting side by side. ‘After this’, said an official report, ‘brushes with the enemy were continued along, and reconnaissance up the hills invariably resulted in skirmishes’ (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 27). The Chins/Zo even attempted retaliation by

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attacking British posts in the plains, Sihaung and two other villages close by, but were driven back. Brigadier General E. Faunce who commanded the column was not without admiration for his adversaries: Whilst disputing every stage of our advance into their hills the Chins showed considerable tactical ability by taking the offensive in the plains and attacking Shan villages and our posts in the rear of the advancing column. (Woodman 1962: 383) On 30 December, General Sir George Stuart White14 arrived in Kambale. From here he advanced with the troops up to the hills to the second and third fortified posts. The Chin/Zo sought to block British advance by raising stockades on the route while continuing their ambushes on work parties and covering troops. On 27 January the most determined attack was made on British road-makers after which they retreated to ‘some formidable and skillfully constructed stockades’. Sir George White thus described the encounter in his official report: Enemy yesterday attacked our working-party on road above this, and held our covering-party, 40 British and 100 Gurkhas, from 9 till 2, when I arrived and ordered their positions to be charged. We carried all, driving them entirely away, getting off ourselves wonderfully cheaply – only one Norfolk dangerously wounded. Enemy in considerable numbers, using many rifles and plenty of ammunition fired at least 1000 rounds, standing resolutely until actually charged, even trying to outflank us. Their loss probably about eight or ten but they were carried down the Khuds at once. Most difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought. (Crosthwaite 1912: 303–4) The success against the Sizangs took the General to the summit of the Letha range (the watershed of the Myittha and the Manipur/Guun River) from where at an altitude of 8,200 feet he could looked down upon the Sizang villages lying 3,000 feet below. Here on 31 January the fourth post was established followed by a fifth three days later. On 4 February Sir George White accompanied by General Faunce and Major Raikes advanced upon Khuasak with a large force: Norfolk Regiment No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners

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5 officers 1 officer 6 officers 2 officers

176 rifles 2 guns 250 rifles 91 rifles

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The Chin/Zo who were overwhelmed by British troops burnt their villages, with the exception of six houses, before retreating westward. After a few days’ rest at Khuasak to bring provisions and baggage, the column moved forward and destroyed the villages of Buanman and Thuklai. On the 13th the British camp was advanced from Khuasak to Thuklai where Fort White was built after the name of General White.15 The presence of British forces in the heart of the Sizang tract induced the Kamhaus to make terms in order to save them from similar chastisement. On 24 February, a deputation from the tribe arrived at Thuklai with presents and asked that their villages might not be destroyed. Raikes told them that their submission would be accepted and their villages spared if they surrendered all captives in their possession, gave up half the total number of their guns, paid a fine of Rs. 1000, and agreed to pay a light annual tribute. But these terms were unacceptable to the Kamhaus. When it became clear that the Kamhau-Sukte would not fulfil these terms General Faunce accompanied by Major Raikes advanced into the Sukte country with a large force on 9 March. They encountered stiff resistance at Mualbem in which two Gurkhas were wounded. The Saizang people also strongly defended their village at the cost of about 15 brave warriors. On 13 March General Faunce entered Tedim, the home of Kamhau Chief Khaw Cin. It was strongly defended. The Chins/Zo burnt their village before abandoning it when they found their position no longer tenable. The Chins/Zo lost 25 killed and 40 or 50 injured. On the British side four Gurkhas were reported killed. The following day Phailian and Lamzang, two neighbouring villages, were also destroyed. The Kamhaus also lost the chief village of Za Tun on 16 March and the same night Bumzang, the residence of another chief named Lian Tun, the brother of Za Tun, was destroyed. The British forces either destroyed or carried away large stores of grain and other food supplies before returning to Fort White on 20 March.16 After his return from the north, Major Raikes opened negotiations with the Taisun chief Boimon at the Nattan stream (the theoretical, though not the actual boundary between the Sizang and Taisun tracts) but with little success. Meanwhile, the Sizangs and the Suktes sent representatives to Fort White to parley with the British. By bringing with them the fine of Rs. 1,000 on 2 May and surrender of several captives three days later, the British thought that it was an act of submission on the part of the Kamhaus.17 But that was only a temporary relief for the British. The nature and methods of Chin/Zo resistance is best illustrated in the action against the village of Siallum or Tartan. Here a hundred men of the Buanman clan held out under the leadership of Chief Lian Kam. The village fortifications, locally known as Siallum kulh, have thus been described by one of the British officer: The upper stockade consisted of a log-hut, the sides and roof of which were bullet proof. It was connected with a ravine to the east 94

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by a trench about 3 feet wide, 5 feet deep and 20 yards long. The trench was covered with logs and plants flush with the ground. The hut itself was surrounded at a distance of 5 or 6 yards with rows of sharp-pointed stakes about 3 feet high. The second stockade was in the bed of the ravine. Both trench and hole were covered with logs and planks and were bullet-proof. In both stockades, there were a few spaces between the logs through which the Chins fired, and the only way in which they could be carried was by pulling away some of the timber. (Hau 1963: 168; Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 30–1) On 4 May a column consisting of 65 rifles of the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment and 60 rifles of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry laid siege to this village. The Chins/Zo built block-houses in case of surprise by the troops, who actually did surprise them. The first intimation they received of their approach was seeing a fox terrier which was in advance of the troops. The Chin/Zo, men, women, and children, all crowded into the block-houses, approximately 80 in number; they had time to get well into their positions as the troops marched past the village before they saw it. The troops then turned and attacked the block-houses (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 30). The Chin/Zo kept the British at bay for the whole of that day, after which when they ran out of ammunition the British took it by storm after a severe hand-to-hand fight. The intensity of the fighting can be imagined from the fact that the medical officer who attended to the wounded under the most vicious fire from the stockade earned the Victoria Cross (Ibid.: 31).18 The encounter at Siallum was the last action of the first expedition of the imperial forces into the Chin Hills. Thereafter the columns returned to their base at Fort White and settled down for the rains. But the resistance was far from over. As one report stated: ‘The Siyins and Kanhow were now living in encampment near their respective cultivations, and, though beaten and driven from the village sites, they maintained a dogged demeanour, showing no signs of surrender, and worrying us whenever opportunity offered’ (Ibid.). Sir Charles Crosthwaite sums up the result of this operation: Not only had we failed to touch the Taisuns, who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but we were far from having come to terms with the Sizangs and Kamhaus, on which tribes our hands had been heavy. The Kamhaus had made a partial and half-hearted submission, retaining, however, most of their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate silence. Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had been 95

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thought. The Baungshes, moreover, to the south of the Taisuns, including the Zokhua, Haka and Thetta clans, had been continuously on the warpath, and had no communication with our officers since the winter of 1887. (Crosthwaite 1912: 309)19 A Burma official report also admitted: ‘the quantity of their courage and endurance was underestimated’.20 A poem composed by Rev. Sukte T. Hau Go, one of the earliest missionaryeducated Chin/Zo and the first general secretary of the Zomi Baptist Convention in 1953, in respect and memory of those who laid their lives for the defence of their country at Siallum speaks volumes. The poem, as has been inscribed on a stone plate at the site of the fort, goes: Mark ye well this honoured spot. Stained with blood of heroes lain; They to keep our ancient lot, Fought a horde from Great Britain. Mark ye too this historic date, Eighteen Eighty-Nine May Fourth, When for us who born of late, They their precious blood poured forth Sowed the seed of liberty.

Chin-Lushai expedition, 1889–90: three-pronged assault In August 1889, Charles Crosthwaite went up the Chindwin to Kalewa to meet Major Raikes, who was at Fort White as political officer since the close of the late active operations. Raikes had been busy acquiring information of the people and country and endeavouring to induce the Chin/Zo to come to terms. It was clear to the chief commissioner that in the next cold weather the Taisuns would have to be finally dealt with. The subjugation of this most powerful tribe, it was believed, would have a salutary effect upon the others. In the northern hills the broken remnants of Sizangs and Kamhaus still obstinately held out against the British. Crosthwaite, however, decided first to issue a proclamation to the Taisuns. Its content thus states: A British army will march to the Tashon Ywama. The British Government wishes to preserve your tribe, and does not desire to punish you as it has punished the Kanhows and Siyins who have resisted the British forces. The British Government desires from you only two things: First, that the captives taken from Burman villages shall be released. Secondly, 96

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that you shall in the future behaves peacefully, and ceases to attack the subjects of the government. Therefore the Chief Commissioner hereby declares and promises that you will be excused from punishment for the past if you comply with the following terms— That you shall assist the British troops in their march through your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor oppose them; That you shall to the utmost for your power compel the Siyin and Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives. That the Chief shall meet the officer in command of the British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees. That you shall render annually a tribute of two elephant tusks and ten silk pieces to the British Government.21 If the Taisuns complied with these terms, the proclamation added, their lives and property would be spared and the earlier orders requiring them to deliver the Shwegyobyu and other rebels would not be enforced. If, on the other hand, they refused compliance, they were warned that the severest punishment would be inflicted and they would be attacked on all sides and their country would be laid waste. ‘Choose now between the friendship and the enmity of the British Government’, the proclamation concluded. A proclamation in similar terms was also sent to the Haka and Zokhua tribes. Meanwhile, Bengal too was pressing for renewed action in the Chin-Lushai tracts. The punishment meted out by the Lushai Expedition of 1888 to the chief responsible for Lieutenant Stewart’s murder had proved inconclusive. It was the Bengal Government’s view that the annexation of Upper Burma had materially altered the situation in the Lushai Hills which was now surrounded by settled districts under the control of the British Government. Lawlessness could not be permitted to continue in the hills in between (Barpujari 1996: 90).22 The lieutenant governor therefore wanted the Government of India to agree to what he had been suggesting since the past year, namely, to undertake the permanent pacification of the whole tract by means of roads run through it, and the substitution, for the present line of comparatively weak guards, of a central dominant post with an adequate military reserve, and such outposts as might be found necessary. (Reid [1942] 1974: 6) The Bengal Government’s stand strengthened Burma’s demand for another series of operations to complete the work of the last expedition. 97

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At last on 3 September 1889, the Government of India finally agreed to the resumption of operations in the Chin-Lushai Hills. The operations were to be a concerted effort launched simultaneously from Burma, Bengal and Assam, respectively. The official sanction thus states: that Chin-Lushai Operations shall take place ensuing cold weather, the Chittagong column moving via Lungleh on Haka, meeting Burma Column from Gangaw via Yokwa on Haka. On arrival at Haka, flying columns will move northwards against Tashons, and a flying column from Chittagong force will diverge at Lungleh and move northwards to punish raiders on Chengri valley and Pakuma Rani’s village. Also a small column from Fort White against Siyins.23 The scheme of operations drawn up by the commander in chief was approved by the Government of India contained the following objectives: Firstly, to punitively visit certain tribes that have raided and committed depredations in British territory, and have declined to make amends or to come to terms; secondly, to subjugate tribes as yet neutral, but not, by force of circumstances brought within the sphere of British dominion; thirdly, to explore and open out as much as can be done in the time, the, as yet only partly known, country between Burma and Chittagong; and, lastly, if the necessity arises, to establish semi-permanent posts in the regions visited so as to ensure complete pacification and recognition of British power.24 As the military movements from east to west and vice versa were so infinitely to be linked they were to be considered as, one operation, the whole being styled as the Chin-Lushai Expedition. The expedition was placed under the overall command of Sir William Penn Symons and was to consist of two columns, one to operate against the Baungshes in the south and the other against the northern villages. The Southern Column under the direct command of Penn Symons consisted of: 1st Battallion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery No. 6 Company, Queen’s Own Sapper’s and Miners 2nd Battallion, 4th Gurkha Regiment 2nd Madras Infantry Burma Company Queens’s Own Sappers and Miners Total

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The Northern Column consisting of the following was placed under Colonel Charles McDowal Skene (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 34): 1st Battalion, Cheshire Regiment 42 Gurkha Light Infantry No. 5 Company, Queen’s Own Sappers and Miners 10th Bengal Infantry 38th Bengal Infantry Total

300 477 95 460 290 1,622

The road built by General Faunce was made into a mule track. Rations were brought up to Kalewa by steamer and from there to Kalemyo by country boats and thence by bullocks and mules in five stages to Fort White. The rations of Kan proved more difficult, as this base lay 165 miles from the river at Pakokku, and 136 from Kalewa. River transport was not fully practicable, and Kan had to be provisioned by means partly of carts over difficult terrain and partly by country boats. By November 1889 all arrangements had been complete and the troops were ready to take the field (Ibid.).25

The Southern Column: the advance to Haka One of the major difficulties in dealing with the Chin/Zo was the absence of any central authority. The whole country was divided into small villagebased chiefships, each independent of one another. This meant that some villages surrendered or made overtures even so others continued their resistance. H.N.C. Stevenson made two broad division of the political system: autocratic and democratic (Stevenson [1943] 1986). Whereas a democratic political system in the form of the Council of Elders was found in the Falam tract, Haka and Tedim tracts had the autocratic system. The Ukpi (paramount chief) system where the paramount chief/ruler exerted supremacy over numerous villages in the form of tributes relations was found in the Tedim and Tonzang tracts under the dominion of the Sukte (and later Kamhaus) ruling clan. Crosthwaite thus wrote of the problem: The difficulty in dealing with them lay in their want of cohesion and the absence of any sort of tribal bond. With the Chins to the north there were the tribal divisions, more or less marked, with chiefs who could speak, or at any rate profess to speak, for their people. But with the people with whom we were now to come in contact there was absence of political organisation beyond the village, which was usually very small. It is necessary to visit as many as possible of the

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villages concerned in the raids, to receive the submission of each, and to impose fines for misconduct; and as an obligatory condition to insist on the surrender of captives, and the repayment of ransoms, not going back farther than December 1888. Substantial guarantees for the future were also to be exacted. (Crosthwaite 1912: 327–8)26 What is often described in colonial records as Baungshe refers to the Chin/Zo south of the Taisuns which consisted of the Zokhua, Haka, Wunhla and Hanta clans. Carey and Tuck explain the term ‘Baungshe’ had been derived from the Burmese paung (to put a turban) and she, which means ‘in front’. It had been applied indiscriminately to all Chin/Zo who bind their hair over the forehead (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 4). The Zokhua and Haka were the more powerful, the others paying them tribute, and therefore became the object of the Southern Column. On 17 December the first elements of this under General Symons and David Ross as political officer advanced from Kan towards Zokhua. David Ross’s entry in his diary for 18 December shows how difficult the Chin/Zo country was for military operations: We started at 6:40 walking, having sent our ponies back yesterday. At 3½ miles, after a very steep descent, we reached the Laungat creek. From this point the path runs along close to the stream, crossing and re-crossing 43 times up to the Chaungkwa sakan at the foot of the big ascent to Taungdet, the distance today being 13 miles and the total distance from Kan about 22 miles.27 From Chaungkhua, the first important post on the road to Zokhua, notices were issued, actually put up on the road, for the Zokhua chiefs: 1 2 3

A British force will arrive at your village in a few days. If you receive us in a friendly spirit and do not oppose our advance, your lives, villages, and property will be spared. If you wish to be friendly, you should come out to meet the army. Any one coming with a white flag will not be molested.

The Zokhua did not wish to be friendly and began opposing Symons’s advance, firing into camp or ambushing columns or work parties on the road. At Taungtek on 28 December they made a determined attack on the British. Ross’s diary thus records: Just before sunrise we were alarmed by firing from the west of the camp. For some time a brisk fire was kept up into the camp, which was replied by the picket on the west hill, The General then got a 100

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party of Gurkhas and went out in pursuit. About two miles from camp a number of Chins were seen moving about on a ridge along which our path lay. A party of our men went up a hill to the right and on their appearing near the stockade the enemy opened fire, which was silenced by a few volleys, and very soon it was found that they had bolted. From the number of huts found at the place we judged that there must have been over 200 Chins present. The guides say the Chins expected we would run away when they attacked the camp this morning.28 From Taungtek on 5 January 1890, Symons and Ross advanced to Rawvan, a distance of eight and a half miles where the next camp was established. Zokhua was another ten miles and road making commenced before the troops could move forward. Here again, notices were put on the road for the Zokhua chiefs. These read: 1 2

3

You have once tried to resist the British troops, but you were defeated and you ran away. I now warn you that if you persist in trying to resist us, although we do not wish to do so, we shall be compelled to burn your villages and otherwise to punish you. Notwithstanding the folly of your young men, I am still anxious to treat you in a friendly way. If you wish to preserve your villages and property from destruction you should send in one of your headmen to meet me. Any one coming in this way with a white flag will be well treated and will be sent back to you in safety.29

By 9 January the road from Rawvan to Zokhua had almost been completed. That day six Chin/Zo representing two small villages came in and surrendered. General Symons declined to make terms with them separately and preferred to deal with the whole Baungshe groups. But when three Zokhua chiefs came in and offered their submission the following terms was offered. ‘These terms’, W. P. Symons said, ‘were closely observed in dealing with all Chins throughout the expedition’: First, to recognise British supremacy by paying an annual tribute and receiving at all time British officers with friendship and guarantee of safety. Second, to pay a fine for resisting us. Third, to restore all Burmese captives at once. Fourth, to entirely cease from raiding anywhere in Burma or other British territory. Fifth, to assist us in our advance. Sixth, to do no damage to the road or telegraph wires. Seventh, to give up head coolly. If terms not accepted we would burn all villages, destroy grain and crops, and hunt and shoot their people down. If accepted we would first, not annex the country, but leave 101

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administration as before. Second, allow them to keep their guns. Third, that we will do no damage to life and property. Fourth, that we will pay for labours and supplies. Fifth, that we will permit them to trade with Burma. Sixth, these terms, subject to confirmation of Chief Commissioner, to hold for three years, when they may be revised.30 In return they were promised that: 1 2 3 4 5

We will not annex your country, will leave the administration of it in your hands as heretofore. We will allow you to keep your guns. We will do no damage to your lives, houses or other property. (If any damage is accidentally done we will compensate you.) We will pay a fair price for labour and supplies. We will allow you to come down and trade in Burma at times and places to be settled hereafter.31

Symons and Ross then warned them that if they rejected their terms, they would at once proceed to destroy all their villages and lay waste to their country. The Zokhuas accepted these terms, apparently happy at the general’s leniency, and readily promised to build quarters for the British Column at Zokhua. Ross was optimistic that ‘so far as we can judge the submission is real’, but ‘everything will depend on whether the peace party will be able to enforce their authority over the young unruly spirits in the community’. This aspect of the difficulty in dealing with the Chin/Zo, which Crosthwaite realised and feared, was also brought out by Symons in a communication to his superiors in Burma: In addition to employing every artifice in argument and excuse for postponement there was evident, the fact that the Chiefs have very limited authority, and that divided and again subdivided with minor Chiefs in the head villages itself. The head Chiefs understood and are willing to carry out our terms and orders, but they have not sufficient authority to make the people obey them quietly, if at all.32 The submission of Zokhua was in fact complete with the occupation soon afterwards of Haka where a fort was constructed. From here the country towards the Thantlangs, west of Haka, were reconnoitered and on 26 February an advance party from Haka and the Chittagong Column met at Tao some 50 miles to the west (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 36).33 The next and the final objective of the Chin-Lushai Expedition was the Taisun capital Falam. The plan was for both the Northern and Southern Columns to converge by 11 March.

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The Northern Hills: Bertram Carey’s policy In the north, the British objective was the Sizang villages. In November a column from the Cheshire Regiment moved out from Fort White against Suangpi village (where Khup Pau, the Sizang chief, had taken shelter after the destruction of his village Khuasak) and the surrounding villages of Dimpi and Dimlo. Sizang resistance proved most determined. They fought the whole day and most of the night, fixed their own villages and harassed the column on its return to Fort White. Flying columns continued to operate against neighbouring villages, capturing livestock and destroying standing crops. The ease with which these columns could move about was due to the fact that, unlike the Southern Column, there was little sickness among its followers and transport coolies. Table 4.1, provided by Carey and Tuck, shows the extent of sickness in the two columns:

Table 4.1 Sickness among British troops Column

Average strength during campaign

Total Death Invalided Killed Remarks admission to hospital

Northern Column British officers

35

12

British troops

252

277

Native troops 1,380 Public followers 1,300 and coolies

1,031 359

Southern Column British officers

–

9

1(a)

3

32

1(b)

30 39

109 207

61

33

1(c)

26

British troops 310 Native troops 1,315 Public followers 2,073 and coolies

484 1,238 1,738

21 17 96

276 257 1,206

Total all ranks – both columns

–

207

2,122

Source: Carey and Tuck ([1896] 1932: 36).

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(a) Major Gordon Cumming, Cheshire Regt. (b) Private Watson 1st Cheshire Regt.

5 –

1 (d) (c) Cap. Grimshaw, 5th Royal Fusiliers – 1 – (d) Lieut. Foster, 1st King’s Own Scottish Borderers 9

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When Bertram Carey took over as Political Officer at Fort White on 23 December in succession to Major Raikes,34 he discovered that the ‘wholesale burning and destruction’ of Chin/Zo villages – the Siyins had lost all their villages and the Kamhau 17 in the last expedition – had produced no satisfactory results. Not a single chief had surrendered or was on favourable terms with the British. Carey therefore decided to stop further destruction of villages so that he could win over some clan to his side. He pinned his hopes on the Sakhiling as his ‘future ally’.35 This move was important from the military point of view, since the Sakhilings commanded the route to the Taisun capital and orders had been received on 3 January by Colonel Skene to march on to that place to effect a junction with the Southern Column. Carey began by improving the road up to the Sakhiling settlement. A mile and a half short of it, the Yawlu (Zolu) outpost was built and garrisoned. Here he made his headquarters, mixing daily with the Sakhilings and gradually dispelling their misgivings and fears. This paid off, and one by one the headmen ventured into the British camp. Eventually on 17 January the Chief Mang Lun tendered his submission.36 Attempts were also made to get in touch with the Suktes, but a march to the principal village of Mualbem led to an encounter. Dakbong chief Lian Tun warned the column that they march at their own peril. As column continued to move, the Chin/Zo poured volleys into the head of the column from the high hills at a range of 200 yards. In the skirmish, the imperial troops outclassed the Chin/Zo and they burnt their villages. However, they suffered two serious injuries: one private and one havildar (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 38). Mang Lun’s surrender was an important development, as Carey hoped that he could induce others to surrender because the Sizang and Sakhiling are blood relatives, and the Mualbem people in bygone days had harboured the Sakhiling chief’s grandfather when he was in trouble. Carey further said: During the time when I was inducing the Sagyilains to surrender I was also hard at work making friends with the neighbouring Tashon villages and so well succeeded that eventually when I marched to Pate and the Tashon Ywama I not only supplied the column with a large gang of Tashon coolies, but I was also accompanied by all the village headmen on the line of march, who consequently saw the surrender of their Chiefs with their own eyes.37 From Mang Lun, Carey and Colonel Skene learnt that the conduct of the Sizangs would depend on how the British fared with the Taisuns. Carey observed that it was but natural that the Sizang wished to follow the Taisuns’ lead, whatever it might be, and therefore no villages should be attacked until the conclusion of the Taisun march.38 In a note on 28 January, Carey set forth his policy. He said,

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The extraordinary suspicion and mistrust of the tribes is the present greatest obstacle. I am satisfied that the people have really been terrified by last years wholesale destruction, and I wish to try coaxing and the exhibiting of a more friendly feeling and considerate disposition before having to use force of arms.39 However, if negotiation failed to induce the Chin/Zo, Carey had an alternative option put in place: If the negotiations fall through, I shall first advocate the most unflagging hunting of the Siyins, meanwhile treating with Mobingyi and the Kanhaws. If Mobingyi does not take this chance, then that village will be destroyed and the inhabitants hunted. Lastly, if the Kanhaws do not take their chance, their 16 villages will be destroyed and the inhabitants hunted with all the energy that can be mustered. I may find it necessary to punish Mobingyi before the Siyins.40

Final showdown at Falam: temporary submission As per plan, the Northern and Southern Columns arrived on the opposite banks of the Manipur River (Meitei Guun) a quarter of a mile from Falam, on 11 March for parleys with the Taisuns where neither column was opposed. General Symons wired to the chief commissioner: Tashon Chiefs met me on road and tried to persuade me not to advance over ridge near Ywama. We went on encampment 1,000 yards from Ywama and commanding it called a meeting of the Chiefs who point blank refused to pay any annual tribute and professed doubt whether they could or would pay any part of the fine imposed.41 The people did not show any fear at the British advance, nor did the chiefs refused to submit in spite of having allowed them to advance into their very midst. That afternoon, General Symons summoned the Taisun chiefs and read out to them the terms that had already been explained some three months previously by Major Raikes. It was a large gathering, and from Carey’s description of the scene it was clear that it included a variety of Chin/Zo groups: The whole valley, in which formerly lay the original village of Falam, was full of armed Chins, numbering not less than 3,000, men, gathered from all sides; the host seemed to settle itself in groups of from 10 to 100 men; they were quite in demeanor, but held their heads high and seemed quite prepared for whatever might be the result of

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the negotiations. The crowd was a motley one, the Tashon chiefs dressed in the gaudy tartan of the tribes, well armed with bright guns, vermillion and block parti-coloured dah scabbards, and beautifully inlaid powder-horns. The Whenohs were conspicuous by their chignons, which contrasted with the lofty head-dress of their neighbours, the Yahows, who were present carrying the strange ‘Shendu’ chopper-shaped da in basketwork scabbards. Scattered around in bunches were the scowling Siyins, the half-breeds from Tawyan and Minledaung, the semi-independent clique of Kwungli, and the transNankathe tribesmen of Sokte and ‘Poi’ origin. The congregation was armed with a variety of weapons; spears and flint-lock guns predominated, but bows and quivers of barbed arrows were carried by not few. Each man bore his food-supply for a few days on his back. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 39) The stage was set for the final showdown between British troops and almost all tribes of the Chin/Zo at Falam. The next two days were spent in wearisome negotiations by General Symons which, in the words of Crosthwaite, might have driven a less patient man to the use of force. However, the forbearance of General Symons was rewarded, and the tribes gave way. The chiefs, who decided not to pay tribute and intended to fight rather than pay, at last delivered the tribute for 1889 after it was reduced from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 5,000. Why did the Taisun, who held a unique position in the Chin Hills and under whose leadership a coordinated Chin/Zo resistance was planned, succumb to British demands? As many of the tribes from Manipur to Haka and from the Burma frontier to the Lushai Hills owed them nominal allegiance, the Taisuns realised the effect on their prestige if they in common with the petty clans had to pay tribute and acknowledge the supremacy of the white men. It was for this reason that they were impelled to resist the British forces as the strong forces that the Northern Column had seen en route clearly indicated. It was, however, the mobility and power of concentration of the imperial troops coming from two sides, combined with the strong persuasion of the local people to avoid any confrontation that caused the Taisun chiefs to rather accept British terms in full. It was, however, only a temporary submission (Woodman 1962: 393). Having attained their objective, the two columns returned to their respective bases to deal with the remaining Chin/Zo villages. In April General Symons, accompanied by the Haka chief, visited many villages to the south and was everywhere well received.42 He met General Tregear, commander of the Chittagong column, at Haka on 15 April. Meanwhile, in this month the Sizangs, who had promised to submit if the Taisuns made peace had been busier than before, cutting telegraph wires and were in no mood to surrender captives. Carey, it is believed, understood Chin/Zo psychology: 106

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as a small boy cannot resist pocketing a rosy apple which he has spied in his neighbourhood’s unfenced orchard, so the Chin, in like manner, feels irresistibly impelled to carry off the unprotected telegraph wire which he sees so tantalizingly hanging on the very trees in the jungle. Thus he resorted to destroying villages to prevent this and moved out against the scattered settlements known as Kwoonkwoon and the villages Montok, Tanya and Pimpih. The last aided by Suangpi, made a determined fight against Carey’s troops who destroyed their village on 26 March, with the loss of two sepoys killed and a havildar wounded. Another two sepoys were also killed in an ambush on their way back. Reinforcement from the 42nd Gurkhas which arrived in April completed the destruction of all the villages. The Sizang chief and the chief of Pimpih, Dimlo and other villages surrendered during the first two weeks of April. By the end of that month all the Sizangs had made outward submission and had accepted the terms (Ibid.: 394).

Situation reviewed: further operations recommended The Chin-Lushai Expedition officially terminated in April 1890. On 1 May General Symons submitted his report to the chief commissioner in which he said that all the major Chin/Zo groups in the north and south had been severely dealt with but not all had fully submitted to British control. Promises for the surrender of captives and payment of tribute had been made but it remained to be seen whether the Chin/Zo would honour their commitments. It had been clear that it was the absence of a combination among them to which the British owed their success. General Symons very frankly admitted this when he wrote: Difficulties of less importance arise from the jealousies of the chiefs of these communes amongst themselves. Agreement on any point is rarely attained. I have, however, little doubt but that these feuds and jealousies severally and collectively prevented combination and favoured over advance into, and subjugate of, the Southern Chin Hill Tracts. Up to the last moment indecision reigned in their interminable councils, and the delay was fatal to their freedom.43 General Symons also cautioned that negotiation had to be carried on with extreme patience due to difficulty in dealing with the Chin/Zo on account of the number of chiefs with each tribe.44 He, therefore, suggested followup operations for the ensuing winter. Forts White and Haka should by 1 January 1891 be provided with mobile military escorts up to 150 rifles, well found with hill coolies, and capable of remaining away ten days from their base of food supply. Allowing 10 per cent spare, each column with 107

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five officers would require 220 hill coolies. In this way ‘the whole Chin/Zo country could then be worked over and subjugation completed’.45 During the summer of 1890 the chief commissioner reviewed the situation in the Chin Hills. He was satisfied that in the north the tribes around Fort White had practically submitted and that all the headmen had come in and met the political officer. The Sizangs too had given now the greater number of their captives. His policy of allowing each village as it surrendered its captives to rebuild their houses was to continue, but he made it clear that until all captives were restored the Sizangs would not be allowed to trade in the plains. He hoped that the 300 men of the 2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas which garrisoned Fort Haka would maintain British control of the Southern Hills. The most important work that remained in his view was the making of a good cart road from Bengal to Burma possibly passing through Haka. It would therefore be necessary to send out several strong survey parties into the hills to work from Bengal and from Burma. ‘Without road’, his secretary wrote, our hold upon these hills will be costly and apparently useless. With a good road the Chief Commissioner believes the province of Burma would derive much benefit, and that there would be some chance of a stream of immigration setting in from Bengal. Even now Natives of India found their way around by the Manipur and Tamu road.46 As regards the winter operations, Crosthwaite recorded a minute on 31 July in which he pointed out that the leading principle to be kept in view was that operations should be of a conciliatory nature and should not take the form of a harrying expedition. ‘There is no occasion, I think, for any large expedition’, he wrote, ‘and that expenditure should be kept down as much as possible’.47 In August the Chin Hills was divided into two administrative units, namely, the Northern Hills, which included Sukte, Kamhau, Sizang, with headquarters at Fort White under Bertram Carey, and the Southern Hills, which included the Taisun, Haka (Lai/Laizo), and the independent villages, under David Ross with headquarters at Haka. An assistant superintendent of police was attached to each of the political officers. A special allowance of Rs. 200 per month was fixed for the two political officers and Rs. 100 per month for the two assistants.48 Falam, the chief village of the Taisuns, was made the headquarters of the civil administration of the Chin Hills. Kan was linked with Haka and the latter with Fort Tregear. Thus Kale Valley was connected with the Chin and Lushai Hills.

Kamhau-Sukte resistance, 1890–91 The effect of the Chin-Lushai Expedition seemed to have proved salutary. On 1 September 1890, Brigadier General Sir George Wolseley49 and

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Captain Frank Montagu Rundall,50 who temporarily took over from Carey on the latter furlough, were able to hold a Durbar with the Sizang chiefs51 who took an oath of submission and friendship to the British Government. They promised to surrender all slaves and to cease raiding on the plains and cutting telegraph wire (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 43). Seventeen Burman captives were released and Rundall released the two Sizang prisoners who had been caught cutting wires. The submission of Buanman and Sizang clans completed surrender of the entire Sizang tribe that had begun in January 1890.52 As long as the Sizangs held out, the Kamhaus to the north thought they had buffer between the British and themselves. Captain Rundall next turned his attention to the Suktes and Kamhaus. His first objective was to get in touch with Khaw Cin,53 the Kamhau chief, Do Thawng, the chief of Mualbem, and with the chiefs of the Gungal villages. Do Thawng (who escaped to the Taisun village of Gungal, across the Manipur River in January last when the troops visited Mualbem) was trying to induce his former adherents to join him and build a new village. The death of Khaw Cin in early September complicated matters, for the Kamhaus were now divided into two parties, one following Za Tual and the other upholding his young nephew, Hau Cin Khup. Since Hau Cin Khup was a lad of 18 and without influence, Rundall tried to win over Za Tual and through him obtain the submission of the clan. Though he succeeded in establishing friendly relations with Za Tual’s immediate followers he failed to obtain the submission of the whole clan. What was worse, certain Kamhaus began raiding villages in Kabaw and Kale destroying much property and carrying off heads and captives. From Pinthwa village itself 14 Burmans were taken captives. An expedition was sanctioned against the Kamhaus for the winter of 1891. The military base of the Northern Column was shifted from Fort White to the summit of the Letha range within a few hundred feet of No. 5 stockade from Thuklai because of its unhealthy location. From Fort White Captain Rundall, with a large column,54 moved into Tedim, the main village of the Kamhaus, and his base of operations. At Tedim talks with Hau Cin Khup and his group failed. Captain Rundall recorded his meeting with Hau Cin Khup: During our enforced stay delay at Tiddam, Hauchinkup, the young head Chief of the Kanhaws, came from Tungzang to see me and asked me on what terms I would accept the submission of his tribe. I told him that when Yatwel had come in to see me in October last our terms were small, but that since then he (Hauchinkhup) had not only ignored us, but had returned me no answer save by raiding Burma four times. He tried to bargain with me, but I told him he might accept them or leave them alone. I warned him not to try and play fast and loose with me, and that unless the terms were fully

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complied with I would not be content with a moiety, but would attack Tungzang . . . Hauchinkhup went away, and I heard nothing more except rumours that the Kanhaws intended to resist our advance, and that Hauchinkhup’s house having been accidentally burnt, he intended to run away into the Manipur territory. (quoted in Woodman 1962: 400) On 14 February, Captain Rundall accordingly entered Hau Cin Khup’s village of Tonzang, which was a large village surrounded by dilapidated fencing. Each house was surrounded by a stout and high wooden stockade, and the village contained a large number of armed men. While he waited for Hau Cin Khup to formally surrender, Rundall explored the hills to the north, going as far as Lennakot (Sialmong), 80 miles from Fort White. He fined the people of Mualpi for their participation in the Pinthwa raid. When Hau Cin Khup failed to give up captives and surrender by the night on 23 February 1891, Rundall surrounded the village at 4:00 in the morning and stormed the village heavily challenged by its inhabitants: We could see the flashes of the Chins’ guns as they fired out of their houses, and parties of them kept trying to rush through our extended line firing on our men. I had given orders that only those who resisted or tried to escape should be fired on. Some few Chins did manage to get through the unavoidable gaps in our cordon and commenced firing down on our men from the hillsides above them, but the sepoys faced about and drove them off with rapid firing. During a pause in the firing I managed, by means of a friendly Chin, to let the Kamhaus know it was hopeless for them to resist, and that their only chance of saving themselves was to give up their three leading Chiefs as a guarantee that all our terms would be fully complied with, and slaves be restored. This, however, they would not do for some time, and the fire kept breaking out afresh as new parties kept trying to break through rush our cordon. It was not until the Kamhaus learnt that I would open fire, with my two guns and shell the village, follow this up with, and advance of my whole line that the three Chiefs came out and surrendered. They were Hauchinkup, the head Chief, Tankuphau, who had taken a prominent part in instigating raids, and Ngienzathung, the chief of Tungzang, whose son led the Pinthwa raid. I was very loath to open fire with the two guns as the slaughter amongst the Chins would then, have been enormous, and obtaining possession of the three Chiefs would, I knew, be of much use to us. (Ibid.: 400–401; Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 46)

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After obtaining the surrender of 39 captives, including the Pinthwa captives, Rundall returned to Fort White, leaving behind a garrison of 100 men, of the 39th Garhwalis at Tedim.

Building relationship: Hau Cin Khup and the British With the hope to impress upon the Chin/Zo Myo-ok (township officer) Maung Tun Win55 took down the Kamhau Chiefs who were captured at Tonzang, and also four Sizangs, to visit Rangoon and Mandalay in April 1891 (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 54).56 According to the Sukte Chronicles, the British chief commissioner of Burma was greatly impressed by Hau Cin Khup, who tactfully responded to his queries when he asked what the Kamhau chief most desired to have, which the latter replied he wanted to regain his grandfather Kam Hau’s territory and the right to collect taxes/ tributes from it. When the Northern Chin/Zo chiefs had been brought back from their tour to Rangoon, Captain Hugh Rose, who succeeded Captain Rundall on 31 March 1891, summoned a Durbar at Fort White on 23 June 1891. A treaty was signed between Rose and the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup, who was reappointed to rule the Kamhau tract, and all the elders of the clan, including Sukte and Sizang chiefs, with the killing of a mithun. Accordingly, both parties mutually agreed to help each other. The Kamhaus swore to abstain from raiding in Burma whereas the British allow the former to levy traditional taxes from the villages under its rule. The Durbar was a turning point in the relationship between the British and the Kamhau-Sukte people in particular; Chief Hau Cin Khup now became an ally of the British (Committee 1996: 82; Cing and Pau 2005). Affairs in the south In Haka, Political Officer D. Ross’s attempt to mediate in the feud between Haka and Zokhua had the effect of establishing good relations with both. Not quiet with Thetta village, who though prepared to submit had obstinately refused to surrender their captives, it was a delicate situation for the British since neighbouring villages were keenly watching the standoff between the two. In the end Thetta was taunted by these villages into taking a stand against the British. The chiefs had apparently counselled peace, but some of the younger men urged resistance. A series of outrages took place on the Kan-Haka road in December 1890 and Thetta openly avowed their defiance of the British. On 10 January 1891 a column of 135 rifles moved against Thetta. The next day, while only two miles from the village, Thetta put up a determined opposition. An attempt to rush the heavily fortified village failed and the column began to fall back. The chiefs fortunately offered to surrender which

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Ross quietly accepted and retreated to Haka. In early February, Thetta was revisited by a large force of the 39th Garhwal Rifles under its commanding officer to show the flag. Meanwhile, General Thomas Greham arrived at Haka and worked out a detail programme for flying columns to visit villages to the south. In March, Ross with a column of 300 rifles revisited Falam and held a durbar. The Taisuns were made responsible for obtaining the surrender of captives in the hands of the Gungals to the north. The Haka and Fort White columns which had met at Falam as they did during the Chin-Lushai Expedition thereafter returned to their respective bases (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 48). The Haka column again moved out towards the west occupying Thantlang in early April 1891 where it suffered a humiliating defeat in an ambush. The Haka column suffered 13 wounded men (some mortally) and two dead. Lieutenant McNabb who had temporarily succeeded Ross on the latter’s leave, thus reported what had happened: I had not been there two minutes and we just discussing what the total desertion of Hryankan might portend, when the question was settled by the Chins, who opened fire on us from all sides. The Military officers ran to their posts, whilst I, thinking the attack was a mere surprise which would speedily be repulsed, took cover to finish my breakfast, until I was undeceived by seeing wounded sepoys staggering to the water, and finding the enemy’s fire maintained. I then went forward to see if I could be of any assistance and joined the advance guard, where I found that Lieutenant Forbes and Jemadar Amara Singh, had both been wounded. One mountain gun under command of Sergeant Moore came up to reinforce the advance guard and the men being rallied, the enemy were driven back for about half a mile by good, steady skirmishing, two Chins being killed to my own knowledge. Taking up a strong position on a commanding knoll, the advance guard was halted to enable the main body and rear-guard to close up. Leaving the advance guard, I then went back the main body, where I found Lieutenant Mocatta, Officer Commanding, and Lieutenant O’Leary. I then found that two men were dead and Lieutenant Forbes and some 13 other wounded men had to be carried. (Ibid.: 51–2)57 The Thantlang Chief Yahwit was thus fined Rs. 5,000 to be paid at Haka within five days and given an ultimatum to surrender the chiefs Laluai and Koizway who were responsible for the attack on Lieutenant Mocatta’s column. The failure to comply with these terms resulted to another expedition on 2 May 1891 where a column of 300 rifles were sent that destroyed Thantlang and taken hostage the son of Yahwit. 112

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The onset of the rain put a halt to further military activity. On 12 October 1891 the southern chiefs Van Shan and Shan Byit of the Thettas, Yan Reng and Ni Kway represented the Hakas and Thantlangs; and two chiefs from Kapi were taken to Rangoon by the political officer ostensibly to see its sights, but really to impress them of British might. A durbar was held at Government House with these chiefs, where Sir Alexander Mackenzie sought to impress with these words: You have now seen a little of the world outside your native hills, and must have become aware what small and helpless people the Chins are in face of the British power. We should have been quite content to leave you alone in your hills, had you not been fool enough to provoke hostilities by raiding upon villages under our protection, both in Burma and in Chittagong. The Queen Empress now rules over Burma, India, and many more countries, the names of which you never heard, and who had many armies of soldiers and great ships of war under her command, bigger than any of the ships you have seen here. The Queen Empress, I say, cannot allow any subjects of hers to be assailed by enemies of any kind, and as the Chins have behave themselves badly carrying away captives both Burmese and Bengal subjects of Her Majesty, and as the Chin Hills lie right between two portions of Her Empire, we have now taken possessions of the whole of he Chin Hills and you may be sure we shall never go away. We are building forts and making roads and sending many more soldiers there, and we intend to remain there, as I say, forever. All the Chins will now be made subjects of the Queen, and will have to obey the orders of the British Officers. (quoted in Woodman 1962: 404) From the foregoing discussion on a series of British encounters with the Chin/Zo, it has become quite clear that the British tried to act as ‘liberators’ of Burman/Shan captives whose release always become a condition to stop its harsh military campaign in the hills. Raiding had often been presented by the British as a ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’ act of the hill peoples which provoked ‘hostilities’ and invited ‘punitive’ military actions from the colonial army. However, raiding was rather highly valued in the traditional hill societies as an act of ‘masculinity’ associated with ‘ultimate heroism and manhood’ (Zou 2005). What is the justification of resorting to cruel means of military campaign in the form of wholesale burning of villages to stop the so-called barbaric act of the hill people? In fact, British imperial policy was far greater than raids and rescue of captives. After the fall of Upper Burma, construction of roads and communication between Bengal and Burma was the ‘chief object’, to use Crosthwaite’s phrase, and this had been often cited in many 113

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records.58 However, this cannot be carried out without the Chin/Zo tribes being ‘tranquillised’ in order to undertake survey of the hills before construction begun. Thus the tour of some of the important chiefs to Mandalay and Rangoon was an attempt to impress them through the display of British military might and powers. That in the late 1891 the Taisuns were not part of such visiting chiefs was a clear indication to the British that they were yet to subdue the most powerful and centrally located tribes. The following chapter will dwell on a more intense and coordinated resistance movement against British attempt to ‘pacify’ the Chin/Zo.

Notes 1 Aung further says: ‘The Burmese who had paused and waited for the new King to be installed were now convinced that the British had “stolen their kingdom by trick” and that Dufferin, Sladen and Bernard were merely play-acting, and now they joined those who were already waging a guerilla war in the jungles’. 2 The King’s Executive or Supreme Council, the Hlutdaw, consisted of four or five ministers appointed by the king and holding office at his pleasure. It was the highest legislative, executive, and judicial authority, superseded only by the king. 3 Harvey thus writes: ‘But the brigands who had swarmed under Thibaw’s misrule were now joined by his disbanded soldiery and by the more spirited peasantry who could not abide the thought of foreign rule’ (Keeton 1974: 300). 4 Reference to the routes to Yunnan and Burma are also found in (Smith 1939; Fitzgerald 1940; Coryton and Margary 1875; Stargardt 1971). 5 FPEP September 1890, Nos. 64–66. 6 FEAP August 1890, No. 240; Lyall to Chief Secretary, 12 January 1890. 7 Lieutenant J. F. Stewart, of the 1st Battalion, Leinster Regiment, who, in conjunction with Lieutenant J. Mc D. Baird, of the 2nd Battalion, Derbyshire Regiment, was making a reconnaissance to the south-east of Rangamatti, with a view to a new road being opened up, and this part of the frontier, admittedly the weakest, strengthened by the establishment of additional posts. He left Rangamatti on the 16 January 1888, and two days after, information was received at Demagiri, from a friendly chief Saipuia, that a large body of men, from Malliampui Tlan Tlang and Lungten, were on the warpath and proceeding in a westerly direction; Reid’s History of the Frontier Areas p. 1 ff., wrote that Lieutenant J. F. Stewart was killed with two British soldiers and one sepoy at a place only 18 miles from Rangamati, near Saichul Range by a party led by a chief named Hausata on 3 February 1888 (Barpujari [1976] 1996). 8 Dufferin wrote to Crosthwaite, When the idea was originally proposed, I allowed the matter to be taken in hand with some hesitation, as I felt that it would probably prove a premature endeavour, and I saw no special reason for embarking in luxurious enterprises of the kind while the main work on which we are engaged is still incomplete. For God’s sake let us get Burma proper quiet before we stir up fresh chances of trouble and collision in outlying districts. 9 These were Tun Suan, Hau Suan, Do Suan and Hten San. 10 The Hakas call themselves Lai/Laimi. Zo is the generic name. 11 The Shwegyobyu was joined by the ex-Sawbwa of Kale who escaped from Mandalay. Maung Tok San and Maung Tha Dun, two officials of the ex-Sawbwa

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12 13 14

15

who were removed from their posts in March 1887 and later escaped to the Chin Hills, also joined them. The term Baungshe is a Burmese word which simply means ‘long-turban’. The Baungshes are also called Pawi by the Taisuns. FSEP August 1889, No. 59; Report of the Operations on the Frontiers of Upper Burma in 1888–89. Field marshal; born 6 July 1835; son of J. R. White; educated at Sandhurst, entered the Army, 1853, and became colonel 1885, and lieutenant general 1895; served in the Indian mutiny, 1857–58; Afghan war, 1878–80, with the Gordon Highlanders; at Charasia, where he earned the V.C.; at Kabul, Sherpur, in the march from Kabul to Kandahar; Brevet-Lieutenant Colonel; C.B.; military secretary to the Marquis of Ripon, when viceroy, 1880; commanded Gordon Highlanders, 1881; Nile expedition, 1884–85; commanded Brigade in Burma, 1885–86 (Buckland 1906: 449). FSEP August 1889, No. 59; Report on the Operation on the Frontier of Upper Burma in 1889–89. This was how General White described the selection of the post: Having learnt from Major Raikes, C.I.E., that it had been determined to leave a post in these hills from the rest of the year, and having on consultation with him come to the conclusion that our several reconnaissance north, south and west showed this to be the most central position, I selected a site 400 feet above and to the south-west of Toklaing (4,800 feet) which occupied not only so much ground on duty, but was also commanded on three sides, notably from the site where the present post is, which with the permission of Major-General Gordon C.B. and the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, I have called ‘Fort White’. (Hau 1963: x)

16 FSEP August 1889, No. 59. 17 Ibid. 18 Twenty-nine Chins including Lian Kam, the Buanman chief, were killed while 11 wounded. The British lost one officer, Second Lieutenant Michel, and two men of the Norfolk Regiment, while one Gurkha and two officers (Captain Mayne and Sugeon Le Quesne) and six men were wounded. In this action, Captain Le Queens of the Army Medical Corps showed conspicuous courage in attending to Lt. Michel, and was awarded the Victoria Cross. 19 Burmah’s official report thus states: All our advances or demands were met with an obstinate refusal, which led the Chief Commissioner at one time to doubt whether the tribes fully understood the terms with which they were asked to comply. . . . All the villages of the Siyin tribes were destroyed and much of their stores of grain was taken or rendered useless. Seventeen of the Kanhaw villages were also burnt, and it was expected and reported by Major Raikes that these tribes would have been compelled by stress of famine to submit completely to our terms. The mischief which had been done to them or the quantity of their courage and endurance was underestimated. The Kanhaws alone made a partial and insincere submission, while the Siyins continued to resist and to refuse all dealings with us up to the end. (FEAP March 1891, No. 124; J E Bridges to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 27 June 1890) 20 FEAP March 1891, No. 124; J. E. Bridges to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 27 June 1890.

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21 FEAP December 1889, No. 214; Telegram, 29 November 1889; Chief Secretary, Rangoon to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta. (Enclosure No. 1) 22 The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal thus writes: The continuance in our midst of groups of headhunting savages without responsible chiefs, without organizations and not amenable to political control, who yet from their geographical position are enabled to commit outrages with practical impunity upon our territory on all sides of them; while we are put to great and constantly increasing expense to maintain lines of defence which prove ineffectual to protect our peaceful people. 23 FEAP October 1889, No. 58; Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, September 1889. 24 Assam Secretariat, Military A, Proceedings, August 1890, Nos. 27–50 and Nos. 68–152. 25 Regarding coolly arrangement A. S. Reid writes: Next day Lieutenant Colonel King-Harman, with two native officers and ninety-six men of the 2–4th Gurkha Rifles, left Kan for the front with instructions to proceed direct to Chaungkwa, the third post on the way to Zokhua, distant 23 miles, to make the road good backwards to Taung-wadet, and to reconnoiter forwards to Taungtek. He was further directed to report as to whether he could employ British troops on road-making. Coolie transport only taken, namely, 190 Khasia and Naga coolies, and fourteen days’ rations for the whole party. We crossed the Myittha in dug-outs at day break and marched from the Chin bank at 7 A.M., all our baggage being carried by Naga coolies, who were the best with the force for this purpose. They belonged to the Taungkook (Tangkhul) tribe under the Rajah of Manipur, by whom they had been impressed for service, and had been sent up the Myittha from Kalemyo under Major Elliston, who, up to that point, had marched them round from Manipur, north of the Chin Hills. (Reid [1893] 1976: 97) 26 In a note of 17 June 1889, Major Raikes had said, ‘The Haka and Yokwa Chins will fight separately, they are not on sufficiently friendly term with one another to combine’. FEBP September 1889, No. 140, Enclosure No. 4; ‘Route from Myittha to Haka and general information regarding Yokwa, Haka, Wunhla, and Hanta Chins’. 27 FEAP March 1890, No. 134; Diary of David Ross, Assistant Commissioner with the Southern Column, Chin-Lushai Expedition, from the 17th to the 22nd December 1889. 28 Ibid., No. 135; Diary of David Ross from 23 December to 31 December 1890. 29 Ibid., No. 145; Diary of David Ross from 1 January to 7 January 1890. 30 Ibid., No. 111; From General Symons to Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 698 dated 9 January 1890. 31 FEAP March 1891, No. 171; From Brigadier-General W.P.Symons, Commanding the Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force to the Adjutant-General, Madras. Also see, FEAP March 1890, No. 147; Diary of David Ross from 9–10 January 1890. 32 FEAP March 1890, No. 121; From General Symons to District Staff Officer, Burma District, 19 January 1890. 33 This meeting was notable for the recovery of the heads of Lieutenant John Stewart, of the Leinster regiment, and the soldiers who had been killed by Hausata, Shendoos on 3 February 1888, when surveying in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

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34 FEAP March 1891, No. 126; Carey to the General Officer Commanding, the Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force, 7 May 1890. 35 Ibid., Nos. 124–178; Carey to General Officer Commanding the Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force, Report on the Political work in the Northern Chin Hills, 1889–90, 7 May 1890. 36 Ibid., also FEAP April 1890, No. 7; Carey’s Diary for the week ending the 27th January 1890. 37 FEAP March 1891, No. 126; Carey to the General Officer Commanding, the Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force, 7 May 1890. 38 Ibid. 39 FEAP April 1890, No. 8; Note by B. S. Carey, Political Officer, Fort White, 28 January 1890. 40 Ibid. 41 FEAP April 1890, No. 62; Chief Secretary, Burma to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, 19 March 1890. 42 Zokhua gave up five captives and paid a fine of Rs. 500 and a tribute of one mithun. Hakas released 66 captives, paid Rs. 300 and three mithuns. Thantlang gave up six captives, paid Rs. 500 fines and a tribute of three mithuns. Taisuns paid a fine of Rs. 5,000 and a tribute of Rs. 500 and five mithuns. 43 FEAP March 1891, No. 125; From Brigadier General W. P. Symons, Commanding Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, Haka, 1 May 1890. 44 Ibid., No. 171; From Brigadier General W. P. Symons, Commanding Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant General, Madras, Haka, 1 May, 1890. 45 Ibid., No. 125; From Brigadier General W. P. Symons, Commanding Chin-Lushai Expeditionary Force to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated Haka,1 May, 1890. 46 Ibid., No. 124; From J. E. Bridges to the Secretary, Government of India, 27 June 1890. 47 Ibid., No. 132; Charles Crosthwaite ‘Operations in the Chin Hills, 1890–91’, 31 July 1890. 48 FEAP August 1890, No. 248; Chief Secretary, Burma to Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, 18 April 1890, also No. 252; Under Secretary to the Government of India to Chief Commissioner, Burma, 20 May 1890. 49 He entered the army in 1857 and became major general in 1892; served in the Indian mutiny, 1857–58; Afghan campaign, 1878–80; Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel, Egyptian campaign, 1882; Tel-el-Kabir, in the Nile campaign, 1884–85; C.B., Burmese war, 1886–88, as brigadier general; K.C.B., lieutenant general in command of the forces, Panjab, 1897–98, and Madras, 1898–1904 (Buckland 1906: 459). 50 He served in Upper Burma on Staff of General Lockhart, 1886–87; Chin-Lushai Expedition, 1889–90; commanded in the Chin Hills and conducted operations against Kamhaus, 1891; D.S.O., Manipur Expedition, 1891; Waziristan campaign, 1895–96; China Expedition, 1900–1901; lieutenant colonel; author of Manual of Chin Language. Buckland, Biography, p. 367. 51 Chief Thuk Kham of Lunmun and his brother-in-law, Chief Mang Lun of Sakhiling, Chief Khup Pau of Khuasak, Chief Pau Khai of Buanman, and Chief Kam Lam of Sumniang (Hau 1963: 5). 52 FEAP December 1890, No. 73 (Captain Rundall’s diary) 53 The Sukte Chief Kam Hau had eight sons, of whom Za Tual was the eldest and Khaw Cin the youngest. At Kam Hau’s death in 1868 Khaw Cin succeeded, but when he also died in September 1891, he had no issue and the chieftainship was given to the son of Hau Pau, seventh son of Kam Hau. This was Hau Cin Khup.

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54 The column comprised two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery, 150 rifles, 4th Gurkhas, 150 rifles, 39th Garhwalis, and 50 rifles, 4th Madras Pioneers. A transport consisted of 300 Gurkha coolies. Captain Rundall found his transport insufficient to meet his requirements and his difficulties were surmounted by Lieutenant Churchill and the Madras Pioneers, who made the mule track to Tedim via Valvum. 55 Myo-ok Maung Tun Win was an Arakanese, who was appointed to the Chin Hills in 1889; he served with great credit in the Chin-Lushai expedition of 1889–90. He assisted Captain Rundall throughout 1891 and was present at the attack of Tonzang. He accompanied the Kamhau column to Manipur and the Gungal column on its relief march to Lushai and thence to Chittagong. He was a most excellent officer in every respect, being zealous, honest and plucky. His death was greatly deplored by all officers connected with the Chin Hills, both military as well as civil. 56 The Kamhau chiefs included Hau Cin Khup, Ngin Za Thang and two women, and the Sizangs include Khum Lian, Za Vum, Hau Suan, and Khup Lian. 57 Lieutenant Mocatta, collecting his dead and wounded men, pushed on, keeping his column well together in spite of the terrible manner in which he was handicapped by having to carry so many dead and wounded with only two dhoolies. Pushing on under continued fire we came to the Bupi stream, which is commanded on both sides by precipitous hills descending to the nullah in walls of rock, the stream flowing in the gully thus formed. This position was stubbornly held by the enemy, hidden behind trees, rocks and a hastily run-up stockade on the left, others firing from behind huge trunks of fallen fir trees still smouldering from a recent fire. In vain our sepoys attempted to skirmish up these heights. They were too precipitous to be scaled, so, while the mountain guns opened fire on the position on the left, the men crossing the stream, and running through the gully under heavy fire, carried the hill to the right, where, being speedily joined by Sergeant Moore and his section, the later quickly got his gun into action and silenced the fire from the opposite hill. We here halted until every one was up and took stock of our position. We were 40 miles odd from Haka. 58 FEAP March 1891, No. 132; ‘Operations in the Chin Hills, 1890–91’ by Charles Crosthwaite, dated 31 July 1890. Also No. 131; From D. Ross to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, the 8th July 1890.

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5 COLONIAL POLICY BACKFIRED Disarmament and resistance

The Chin-Lushai Expedition and other military expeditions which followed it clearly established the efficacy of small but strong flying columns perpetually in motion criss-crossing the entire Chin/Zo hills. These columns visited village after village and obtained their submission, albeit not fully yet, restored captives, received tributes and most importantly confiscated fire arms as fines. During 1891–92 the system was more or less perfected. That winter, five columns (Kamhau, Nwengal (Gungal) Baungshe, Thantlang and Taisun) were carefully planned and organised, the first two from Fort White and the others from Haka to complete the work of the past season. Their objectives as set forth in the chief commissioner’s minute of 28 November 1891, were: 1

2 3 4

To explore the whole of the hills from the borders of the Chinbok country on the south to Manipur on the north and up to the Lushai boundary on the west; To enable the Political Officers to define tribal limits, settle disputes, levy tribute and generally establish our influence. To dispose once for all the pretensions of the Tashons to supremacy; To punish the Thantlangs for their treacherous attack on Lieutenant Mocatta last year, this being the only definitely punitive work to be carried out.1

Each of these columns adequately supplied with coolie and mule transport, medical units, and entrenchment and cutting tools was self contained. Apart from these, troops were detailed for the protection of the line of communications and as covering troops for road making. Between 25 December 1891 and April 1892, these columns carried out the tasks assigned to them. The Report on the Frontier Affairs of Burma for 1891–92 gives a rather optimistic view of what these had achieved: The hitherto unknown and unexplored tracts inhabited by the Thados, Nwites, Yos, Whenohs, and Nwengals have been explored and placed on the maps and the number and size of the villages ascertained, 119

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the whole of the northern tract having been explored and the people reduced to comparative order. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 79) With regard to slaves, the Report further gives the total number of slaves recovered by Carey and Rose till the end of 1891 was 190; of these 88 were recovered from the Sizang, 32 from the Kamhaus, 11 from the Thados, 11 from the Guite, 36 from the Zahau and Hualngo and 20 from the Gungal Sukte. With these the slave difficulty was somehow settled. Another achievement during the last season was construction of a mule road to Lenacot (Sialmong) from Fort White (80 miles) that continued to the Manipur plain; hence a mule road is now open from Manipur on the north to Haka on the south. Also new lines were opened: a mule track from Kunchaung to Haka and a mule track made by the Chin/Zo themselves from Minywa to Shurkwa (Ibid.: 79–80).2 The reports3 from the columns and the diaries of political officers describe fully the friendliness of their reception by the various tribes. The military, however, was under no illusion that resistance was over. The report cited the affairs of Shurkwa and Botung, as also in the case of Thetta and Thantlang last year, to show that the truce was but a hollow one, and that, while sufficiently cunning not to resist large columns, the Chin/Zo were quite ready to turn upon any small force. It appeared advisable therefore that hostage should be taken from offending villages and deported from the country for some years till the tribes proved that they could be trusted. The recommendations for future political and military strategy suggested a uniform treatment of the northern and southern Chin/Zo by the political officers, and rules to be laid down on the following points: 1 2 3

4

Tracts made by us in Chinland (not main road) to be maintained by the Chins, a small subsidy being paid if necessary. Villages to be made responsible for the burning of our bridges by junglefire or otherwise. Coolie labour to be compulsory at so many coolies for so many houses, and to be paid at a fixed price. Never less than Rs. 1 is paid now, and in some cases Rs. 3 were given this year for a day’s march. The question of disarmament of the Chin tribes (with the exception of a few guns allowed to be retained for shooting purposes) is well worthy of consideration, and indeed seems absolutely necessary for the complete pacification of the country.4

Of all these military authorities were most anxious about the general disarmament of the Chin/Zo, which it considered as absolutely necessary for the ‘pacification’ of the country. Brigadier General A. P. Palmer commanding Myingyan District remarked, ‘The plea that firearms are necessary for 120

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Table 5.1 List of Chin/Zo villages visited by the Kamhau Column, 1891–92 Village

Headman

Tunzan [Tonzang] Fietu [Phaitu] Twi Tum [Tuitum] Lenacot [Lenglakot] Kunum [Khuanuam] Bwankwa [Buan Khua] Twidum [Tuidam] Chenglum [Khianglam] Tungkoer Tanvum, 3 villages Tunzan (?) Tom Vum Tonglorn Ywama [Tonglawn] Lompe [Lawmpi] Quim Cun Henzan [Hiangzang] Balbil Halkum Shwenksan [Suangsang] Hiatsi [Aisih] Lopa Haunwell Ngumngi Shaelsi [Sialsih] Twelmoo [Tualmu] Lie Lue [Lailo] Mwial [Muizawl] Laitwi [Laitui] Shaelpi Old Shaelpi New Heanarn Kaptial [Kaptel] Mwelzaung [Mualzang] Tsayan [Saizang] Cheemmay Phailyan [Phailian] Losow [Losau] Lumzan Old [Lomzang] Lumzan New [Lomzang] Mwelpi [Mualpi]

Haw Chin Kup [Hau Cin Khup] Taungzalyin [Thang Za Lian] Lyin Di [Lian Dai] Howkughwen [Hau Khua En] Mong Sun [Mung Suan] Vumka Shwen [Vum Khan Suan] Kinnung [Khen Nang] Howkaman [Hau Khan Man] Loontung [Lun Tung] Shwenka Tung [Suan Khan Tung] Twungkalet [Tuang Khan Let] Tom Vum [Tom Vum] Sum Kam Ugulshun [Ngul Suan] Loon Hill [Lun Hil] Loonom [Lun Nuam] Karm see [Kam Sing] Voomall Karmdo [Kam Do] Amkatung [Am Khan Tung] Voomvi [Vum Vai] Numlet Nil Shingno [Cinno] Kaishwirk (?) Twungkalong [Tuang Khan Lang] Armtung [Kam Tung] Powshung [Pau Suan] Powkawum [Pau Khan Vum] Powkawum [Pau Khan Vum] Woompow [Vum Pau] Twumtong [Thuam Thawng} Bearna (?) Under headman of Kaptel -doSumsaum Twelkum [Tual Khum] Pongtong -doKampum [Kam Pum] Total

Houses 100 20 35 20 20 40 60 50 30 130 60 20 70 80 30 60 20 15 8 22 20 12 40 23 9 20 90 80 6 35 20 250 35 120 25 22 40 20 1752

Source: NAI, FEBP (January 1893 Nos. 1–17, Appendix 6).

self-defence will therefore become untenable, and disarmament becomes a measure to be urged in the interests of the people themselves as well as from the point of view of military expediency’.5 It was the disarmament question that was to lead to stiff resistance from the Chin/Zo. 121

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Disarmament policy backfired The summer of 1892 had not been free from incidents. During the three months, May–July, there were several outrages on the lines of communication, all ascribed to the Gungal-Sukte and Sizangs. Not much was read into these incidents: the Sizang chiefs had been regularly visiting Fort White and were outwardly most friendly, so much so that in June several Chin/Zo from Thuklai were enlisted as civil police and stationed at Fort White. At Haka and Falam, the only events of interest, says Bertram Carey, who had in the meanwhile resumed his duties at Fort White and, in August after McNabb’s health broke down and he proceeded on leave, took the charge of the Southern Hills, was an unsuccessful attempt to arrest Laluai, the Thantlang outlaw. Manipur’s attempt to apprehend Za Tual, who had taken shelter in the hills immediately south of that state, ended when that chief soon died. Trouble began as early as in May. On the 4th of that month, a column visiting the Gungal-Sukte and Hualngo branch was opposed at the Manipur River (Guun) crossing. Two days later, the military post at Botung was invested by Thuam Thawng, the chief of Kaptel. Carey called it a ‘rebellion’, and was happy to note that the prompt and determined conduct of officer commanding the post ‘had probably prevented the spread of the rebellion, and that no further trouble need be anticipated, although it would be necessary to disarm Kaptel and some of the neighbouring villages’ (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 81). Still, Carey considered the situation annoying rather than dangerous. On 1 September he proceeded to the south on a tour of inspection along with Myook Maung Tun Win. Gun (locally called thau) was considered a very important asset among the Chin/Zo, however, it was not their traditional weapons. Guns had significant place in their socio-economic, cultural, and political life. Traditional weapons of the Chin/Zo include bows and arrows, shields, das etc. They used poisoned arrows which were said to be stuck into a putrefying carcass before use, and the wounds they inflicted by them are fatal and caused by blood poisoning. However, the arrival of guns greatly shaped the entire game shooting, mode of warfare and cultural practices of the Chin/Zo. It is, however, not known when the first gun arrived in the Chin Hills and who owned it first. Colonial sources are silent on this. Sukte tradition tells us that Khan Thuam, the Sukte chief of Mualbem, took refuge in Falam to escape from the conspiracy of mangkua (meaning nine chiefs) of the Northern Chin Hills in the early nineteenth century. During that time Khan Thuam’s eldest son, Kam Hau, displayed his mastery over the use of the gun by shooting down a dreaded zangsial (mithun) with his gun, which no one else dared to do.6 This incident probably suggests that Khan Thuam and his sons already possessed guns then. Chin Primer (Zolai Simbu) was published by Joseph Herbert Cope, an American Baptist missionary in the Chin Hills, in 1924 where he included ‘Pau Hau in thau a nei hi’, which means ‘Pau Hau

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has a gun’ (Komiti 1976: 3). Cope must have taken his information from Chin/Zo oral tradition, which suggests that Pau Hau was possibly the earliest gun owner among the Chin/Zo, albeit his identity and when he owned a gun remains unclear. There are different opinions on when and how did the Chin/Zo possess guns? According to Carey and Tuck, the guns have come into the country from both east and west is demonstrated by the fact that weapons with the names of Burmans in Burmese characters and the names of Indian sepoys in the Persian character have been found stamped on the heel-plates of muskets. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 222) They further added, It is more than probable that when the flint-lock gave way to the percussion-cap gun, the obsolete weapons were sold as old iron in England . . . they were shipped out to ports such as Rangoon and Chittagong to be sold to the natives. (Ibid.: 223) Lehman also suggested the Kaladan River from Chittagong and Manipur were two possible entry routes of guns into the Chin Hills (Lehman [1963] 1980: 25). It thus appears that Upper Burma, Chittagong via the Lushai Hills and Manipur were the three important inlets through which guns had passed into the hands of the Chin/Zo. Three things that the Chin/Zo highly regarded as the most valued possession of a man which also represents masculinity are corrugated iron sheets, a house made of teak, and a gun.7 Therefore, there were competitions amongst the Chin/Zo to possess a gun because of its socio-economic and political value. If you got a good gun, it guaranteed you become a highly respected man in the village. A local saying goes, ‘to get a gun was more difficult for the hill people than to get a wife or children’.8 Guns were so embedded in Chin/Zo society that when the British made a proposal to carry out general disarmament as part of the so-called pacification process, it not only sounded an alarm but backfired. In 1891, chief Thuam Thawng had reportedly convened several councils to discuss and persuade other chiefs to take up arms against the British and prevent their disarmament. He succeeded in convincing Khai Kam, chief of the Sizang, that if the surrounding tribes would combine there would be no difficulty in driving the troops from the hills and thus save their guns. Hostilities were not to commence until the crops were gathered. Messengers were sent around the country and every chief was approached and persuaded to join

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in the common cause. Later enquiries showed what the result was of Thuam Thawng intrigues: All would combine when once the initiative was taken, for the Tashons had not refused to listen to the proposal, the Sagyilain had agreed to fight when the Tashons took the field, and Dok Taung and Howchinkup were young men and moreover related to the Nwengals, and, although they now pleaded that they were averse to fighting, yet Twum Tong calculated that the Soktes could not hold aloof when once hostilities commenced. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 82) Their first step was ‘to remove the Political Officer, the Myook, and the Interpreters, so that there should be none left to advise and guide the troops’ (Ibid.). With this aim in view, they laid a trap to woo the political officer and his assistants. On 21 September, Carey, still on tour, reported to the chief secretary a message he had received from Fort White: During the afternoon I received a telegram from Fowler (which Mr. O’Donnel had sent after me by runner), informing me that he had sent after he had heard that Lushais and Yahows had collected at Kaptial and that Pimpi sympathised with these persons who intended to give trouble.9 That evening Carey recorded in his diary, and followed it up the next day with a telegram to the chief secretary that the rumoured gathering at Kaptel was in all probability not a conference of Chins and Lushais at all, but that, as the cold weather was approaching, the Gungal-Sukte were considering what action should be taken, and whether their programme should be ‘war, flight, or submission’. It appeared, Carey believed, that the Gungal-Sukte would prefer submission if they could obtain advantageous terms, and it was to the interest of government to have no punitive expedition that year. ‘Twum Tong is a very influential man, being a cousin of Doktaung and How Chin Koop’, said Carey, ‘and I am ready to forgive him and his village altogether on payment of 150 guns’.10 For a while it seemed Carey was right. Thuam Thawng sent a message to Fort White in which he said that he ‘repented of his recent misbehaviour’ and asked that the political officer meet him in a Sizang village where he would pay the fine and take a fresh oath of submission. Carey replied to this message from Fowler on the 25th, saying, If Twum Tong of Kaptial surrenders 150 guns to you before 1st November I will pardon him altogether and spare his village, but if

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he does not comply I will coerce him with troops and Tashons and keep an outpost at his village to prevent cultivation. He further advised Fowler to arrange a meeting with Thuam Thawng and talk matters over either at Tedim or Sizang. The surrender of Thuam Thawng through negotiation was what Carey most wanted for it will, he believed, be likely followed by other chiefs. But before that Carey cautioned not to make any terms with the other five villages ‘until we get Twum Tong’s guns’.11 Carey was under the impression that Thuam Thawng’s surrender would instantly be followed by the submission of other villages. Not to lose such an opportunity and to persuade him to surrender peaceably, he sent the Myook Maung Tun Win back to Fort White. He thought Myo-ok Maung Tun Win would manage the negotiations better than Fowler, since he knew Thuam Thawng personally, could talk the language and had a great influence with the chiefs.12 After he arrived at Fort White, Maung Tun Win was able to fix the venue of the meeting at Pumva, a neighbouring friendly village, for 9 October. Meanwhile, preparations for confronting the Myo-ok were in full swing. On the 6th or 7th of October, some 500 Gungal-Sukte had crossed the Manipur or Nankathe River, and were joined by Sizangs from Pimpih village on the Fort White side of the Sakhiling chaung. On the morning of the 9th there lay in wait near the abandoned site of Old Fort White, within eight miles of the Fort, to ambush the Myo-ok’s column. At six that morning, Myo-ok Maung Tun Win, Maung Aung Gyi, Maung Aung Zan, the Myo-ok’s syce, with an escort of three non-commissioned officers and 27 rifles of the 1st Burma Battalion, left Fort White for Pumva. Two Chin police, Tang Shun and Tun U, accompanied them carrying the Myo-ok’s double-barrel gun and his rifle. The Myo-ok’s revolver was carried by Aung Gyi. The escort, a much larger one than usual, was divided into an advance guard and the main body, and the Myo-ok was riding behind the five men of the advance guard. They crossed the site of Old Fort White in safety, and entered the open ground which narrowed into the path running through a belt of thick scrub jungle. Hardly had the advance guard entered this jungle when the Chin police slipped aside and instantly volley after volley was poured into the party from the front and from both flanks. Save one sepoy the whole of the advance guard, the Myo-ok, Aung Gyi, Aung Zan, ten other sepoys and the Myo-ok’s syce were shot down. The main body of the escort at once returned the fire, under cover of which the wounded and the survivors of the advance guard, who were fighting hand to hand with the Chin/Zo, were rescued. The surviving havildar now found the position untenable, being surrounded by howling Chin/Zo in the thick jungle. He therefore drew off his men to the open ground some 200 paces away, carrying all his wounded with him. Hampered as they were with wounded, and in face of such odds,

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it was not possible for them to remove the dead, but the havildar hoped to be able to cover them by rifle fire until a relief party, for which he now dispatched three men, could arrive. The Chin/Zo were now kept at bay, but creeping up in the thick undergrowth they were able to reach the bodies unseen and to strip and mutilate them. The havildar and his men held that position for six hours. At 4 p.m. the beleaguered escort was relieved by a British officer Lieutenant Henegan and 509 rifles from Fort White. A search was at once made for the bodies, which, with the exception of two, were recovered that night together with the head of one of the sepoys. The wounded were placed on stretchers and ponies and brought into the fort, the party arriving at 1 a.m. Next morning another party went out and a further search was made, when the two remaining bodies were found, and all the dead, except the Myo-ok, were buried at Old Fort White.13 Maung Po Lu, younger brother of Maung Tun Win, who went to the place of the incident with the rescuing party, reported that the ambuscade was a well-meditated one, even the policemen who accompany the Myo-ok’s party deserted them before they reached the village.14 On hearing of the ambush of the Myo-ok’s party, Carey immediately alerted every military post and he himself returned to Fort White the next day. Carey’s immediate problem, which he discussed with Captain Caulfield, Commanding Officer at Fort White, was to ascertain who the rebels were, and to use every effort to confine the rebellion to those already said to be implicated, guilty or not guilty, and prevent it from spreading. He would exonerate certain Sizang villages, including Sakhiling. Until suitable retribution was meted out to the guilty he sought to stop the Chin/Zo from trading with Burma.15 With these objectives he ordered the highlands to be patrolled ‘to advertise our presence’. The next day, 12 October, the political officer went to Nashwin village to interview his old friend Za Vum, who was sent to assess the character of the rising, but as he approached it he was greeted with bullets from the Chin/Zo piquets. However, Carey managed to communicate with the Chin/Zo, and told them of his determination to ascertain the innocent and the guilty villages. He next ordered all villages innocent of the 9 October ambush to report to Fort White immediately. A few villages responded and reported to Fort White on the 13th. From these Carey learnt about the guilty and innocent villages. They also gave the information that heavy gun fire had been heard in the Tedim direction and that that post could be surrounded. Carey and Caulfield immediately left for Tedim on the 14th where they summoned all the Kamhaus and Suktes. Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau chief, and several Sukte headmen assured friendship to the British. Carey said, ‘all promised to remain true to their oaths and firm to their allegiance’.16 One ruse adopted by Carey to get that the elusive Chin/Zo deserve mention. Some Chin/Zo from friendly villages had informed him about the possibility of an assault upon Tedim, and Carey sent them to the Gungals 126

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to advise an immediate attack on the post. Though they did appear, firing from long distance, they never ventured out in the open, and ‘consequently we were unable to inflict that crushing blow on the rebels whereby we trusted to steady the wavering and to check the spread of the rebellion’. Since 9 October troops had been daily moving in all directions, but from the 15th onwards a heavy downpour continuously for 16 days and nights halted offensive operations shattering Carey’s hope of wiping out the rebel villages. The deluge, however, did not prevent him from collecting information and working out a plan of operations. It soon transpired that the uprising was confined to the majority of the Gungal villages and one half of the Sizang tribe. The Sakhiling and Buanman clan, of the Sizangs and two Gungal villages and a few Sukte villages, had however remained neutral. The Gungal-Sukte and the Sizangs were the very village that Carey had been considerate towards: ‘What had been the result of this honest attempt to temper the wind to the shorn lamb’, Carey asked in disgust, ‘treachery, barbarous murder, and revolt, which demanded that the generous policy of the past should give way to more stringent measures and that the rebels should now be disarmed’ (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 85). Of the reasons for the uprising and the rebel plan of action, Carey wrote: The fear of a general disarmament (which was not then contemplated) were the causes of the rising, and I now mention that the intention and hope of the rebels was to drive the British from their hills, and their plan of campaign was that the Nwengals should operate against Tiddim, whilst the Siyins should attend to Fort White and its line of communication. The tactics to be adopted were never to make a sustained attacks, but for ever to hang around the posts, shooting the unwary and the stragglers, whilst every convoy was to be ambushed, the plains raided, roads blocked, mules stolen, the telegraph line destroyed, and in short the troops to be so harassed that Government would finally sicken of the task and recall the troops from the hills. (Ibid.: 86)

Colonial counter operations During the remaining days of October and the whole of November the Sizangs carried on their campaign in these hills. The Gungal villages seemed to be less enthusiastic. The new plan conceived by Carey was based on very different lines from the earlier campaigns. The large columns were to break down all combined opposition and to scatter the ‘rebels’. This was done to break the large columns to furnish garrison for the many small outposts to be located in all centres of cultivation and settlements of the ‘rebels’. These 127

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garrisons would then attack and pursue the ‘rebels’, driving them from nullah to nullah, and while giving them no rest, also search out and confiscate all food supplies, both live stock and grain, and thus starve them into submission (Ibid.). This would be followed by reducing the garrisons to provide for escorts for the political and military officers who would make peaceful village to village patrols flushing out the rebels and discovering their country. Carey’s justification of his stringent plan ‘to be adopted if this class of enemy is to be subdued’ by ‘burning him out, driving him into the jungles, and starving him into submission’ (Ibid.) was actually a desperate policy undertaken by a helpless political officer to subdue the Chin/Zo by any means. Since then, wholesale burning of villages begun (Ibid.: 85). Carey’s justification of his plan was that in the plains, disarmament can be effected without destroying villages and starving the people into submission, but in the Chin Hills, the enemy never sustains an attack, never holds a position, and never fight unless the physical features of the country give him every advantage. How, I ask, is such an enemy in such a country to be forced to surrender the arms with which he can be no longer trusted without burning him out, driving him into the jungles, and starving him into submission? But to recommend the use of ‘barbaric’ means to destroy what they called ‘barbaric’ or ‘savage’ people has no justification (Pau 2017). In late October reinforcements arrived at Fort White and Captain Presgrave assumed command. On 2 November the rains ceased, and from the next day operations on the lines chalked out by Carey began. On 5 November, Dimlo was destroyed followed by Sumpi on the next day after a brief skirmish. While minor encounters took place each day, on 10 November the village of Thangnuai was burnt. The same day, a combined force of unfriendly Sizangs and Suktes attempted to capture the mules and cut up the escort party but were driven off. The next several days a large column operated against the Pimpi rebels, who obstinately resisted the British force. The Chin/Zo burned their village on approach of the column, and fired volleys into the camp when the column halted. There was also a report that the Gungal-Sukte in a large force attacked Tedim post with the assistance of Lamzang and Losau villages. They did not, however, venture into close proximity of the post. The Pimpih expedition was followed by an expedition against Montok and Tanya and column finally returned to Fort White on 20 November. Since opposition was so intense and so widespread, Brigadier General Sir Arthur Power Palmer, the general officer commanding, came to the hills on 28 November to personally conduct the operations. One of the saddest parts of the story was that even the GOC not only generally approved Carey’s 128

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plan of campaign but also proposed a more barbaric and harsh measures besides sanctioning more troops (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 86): No. 7 Mountain Battery, R.A. 2 guns Norfolk Regiment 200 rifles 1st Burma Rifles 600 rifles 5th Burma Battalion 300 rifles 6th Burma Battalion 450 rifles Garhwal Rifles 175 rifles 21st Madras Pioneers 550 rifles 28th Madras native Infantry 175 rifles One Company, Queen’s Own Sappers and Miners 100 rifles Total 2,250 rifles and 2 guns Palmer considered ‘to place military posts at all the chief centres of cultivation throughout the hills, to allow no cultivation, to destroy all collections of food supplies, unless and until all guns except those needed for sporting purposes were surrendered’ (Woodman 1962: 411). He thus explained: Such action may appear inhuman but with a people, whose tactics are so evasive that it is impossible to decide matters by general actions, and who, try as we may, are bound to get the better of us at their system of ambuscading and guerrilla warfare, no other course is likely to succeed. Wholesale burning of villages is to be deprecated, but the occasional firing of the houses of chiefs and leading men may accelerate matters. (Ibid.) General Palmer’s scheme was not, however, accepted by the commissioner in its entirety, since it would have involved too great an expenditure of men and money. Still then the expedition was extended, and by December all the principal Sizang villages were destroyed. The Taisun chiefs remained neutral as they did not assist the ‘rebels’ with arms nor did they provide coolies to the British. The flooding of the Manipur River, however, prevented the troops from moving in to Gungal villages. By the end of December, three new military outposts were set up at Phunum, Pimpi and Montok. The posts at Dimlo, Tedim and Fort White were also kept on the alert to operate against the Gungal villages. In early January 1893 the general moved against the Gungal villages with a force consisted of the following (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 87): 7th Mountain Battery, R.A. Norfolk Regiment

2 guns 100 rifles 129

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Queen’s Own Sappers and Miners 1st Burma Rifles 5th Burma Battalion 21st Madras Pioneers Total

30 rifles 200 rifles 100 rifles 50 rifles 480 rifles and 2 guns

On 12 January 1893, the first detachment of troops crossed the Manipur River and reconnoitered towards Kaptel, the principal village and home of Thuam Thawng. On approach of the column the Kaptel villagers set their village in flames. Two days later the entire force crossed the river and occupied the village without any resistance. ‘Kaptyal was surrounded by rebel villages’, says Carey, ‘and from Kaptyal as centre or base, columns and parties radiated daily and in every direction, pursuing the enemy, burning certain villages, and destroying granaries and capturing livestock’ (Ibid.: 88). Though there was strong opposition at Heilei village the column managed to destroy the entire villages. Every village was ordered to clear the jungle and undergrowth for 50 yards on either side of its main road in order to prevent future ambuscades; to surrender the rifles and other arms taken on 9 October and in addition, one gun for every house; and to hand over two hostages by each village as security for their future good conduct.17 Whilst the column was busy hunting for the Gungal ‘rebels’, the outposts at the Sizang tract saw the daily night marches, ambuscades, and invariably successful skirmishes, surprising of rebel camps, the burning of tons of grain and the capture of livestock. In February, villages once regarded by Carey as ‘friendly’ had turned hostile and they assisted and cooperated with the resistance forces in one way or the other. The villages of Sakhiling, Dakbong, Mualbem, Voklak, and Narpi were at once declared hostile and he represented to General Palmer that all cultivation in the Sizang tract should be prevented. In order to bring pressure to what the British called ‘false friendliest’ to make them take a keen interest in the disarmament, a harsher condition was laid down for these Chin/Zo. Not only was their cultivation stopped, but also they were directed to provide fresh meat regularly to the garrisons and to do all the coolie work necessary for the rationing of these posts without payment or remuneration (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 89). When Voklak and Sakhiling garrisons prevented all cultivation by arresting or firing on all cultivators the result ‘was immediate and startling’ observed the political officer. The Sagyilain quickly recovered the stolen government rifles and the Myo-ok’s rifle and gun, and they also collected a quantity of the guns of the rebels and produced those Toungu captives who were in the possession of the Siyins (Ibid.). This kind of barbaric measures imposed by the Imperial power on small hill tribes seriously affected the daily lives of the Chins/Zo. They begged for the withdrawal of the posts and permission for resumption of cultivation.18

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Unable to induce the British towards leniency, they turned to the plains of Burma to steal cattle as an alternative means to procure their livelihood. W. N. Porter, Deputy Commissioner, Upper Chindwin, in his Report on the Frontier affairs of the Upper Chindwin District for the Year 1892–93 explains the predicament of the Chin/Zo: Deprived of their food supplies in the hills, the rebel Chins consoled themselves by cattle-thieving in the valley, especially round Kalemyo. About 54 head of ponies, buffaloes, and cattle have been stolen by them. Some of these thefts were carried out with a good deal of ingenuity and daring, but they had on several occasions to pay the penalty of their temerity. In one case in December at Kalemyo the civil police patrol came on Chins taking away 11 buffaloes, fired into them, recovered the buffaloes, and took a lot of property dropped by the Chins in their flight. On three occasions subsequently parties of military police from the Kangyi and Kalemyo posts followed up gangs of Chin cattle thieves for long distances, overtook and engaged them, and recovered the stolen cattle.19 On 8 March 1893, Carey summoned the Sizangs at Fort White and sternly warned them that the ‘rebel’ leaders should be surrendered and the hostages handed over. He also demanded the payment of compensation and, above all that all petty and scattered hamlets should amalgamate and be settled down in clans in a few large villages (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 90). In other words, village grouping was ordered. Accordingly, the existing 18 Sizang villages were re-grouped into seven large villages all situated on the west of the Letha range. Village grouping was a convenient and strategic arrangement for the British to control the tribes, but it was another form of cruelty. Besides, hostages were taken from each clan to ensure the good behaviour of the tribe. Similar terms were also issued to Gungal-Sukte villages who in addition were to return stolen government rifles. The following chiefs, either captured or surrendered, were deported to Burma: Gungal-Sukte chiefs 1 2 3 4 5

Thuam Thawng, chief of Kaptel Pau Dal, son of Thuam Thawng and leader of the Gungal-Suktes on 9 October Kanhaw, chief of Helei Benar, headman of Muizawl Katwerk, proclaimed outlaw from Kaptel

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Sizang chiefs 1 2 3 4

Kam Lung, chief of the Thuklai clan and headman of Pumva village Do Lian, chief of Siallum (Tartan) Khan Cin, brother of Do Lian Tun Ngo, the head policeman who turned his rifle against the troops on 9 October.20

After General Palmer’s return to the plains on 27 March 1893, Carey also set out for another visit to Tedim where he met the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup. Meanwhile, the headquarters of the Northern Chin Hills was shifted from Fort White to Tedim.

Results of the operations On his return from the Gungal villages, Carey visited the Kamhau and Sukte villages in the north. He successfully punished those villages which turned hostile to the British by supporting the ‘rebels’. At Tedim, Carey met Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau chief, and discussed with him the question of disarmament. When he returned to Fort White, he sent a detailed report of the season’s operations to the chief commissioner on 15 June 1893. The report, which appeared the first to deal with the Chin Hills as a whole, thus states: The expedition lasted from 9th October 1892 to 26th May 1893, that 26,000 troops were employed, that the tactics adopted were the maintaining of many small outposts dotted about the rebel tract, thereby preventing all building and all cultivating, and at the same time destroying all food supplies. The result of the expedition was the withdrawal of 1,647 guns from the Chins, the recovery of five out of six captives who had been raided from Burma, and the transportation of 11 rebel Chiefs and notorious outlaws to Burma including the instigator of the rebellion Twum Tong, Chief of Kaptyal. During the expedition our casualties of all ranks exceeded seventy. Deeply as I regret the loss of my assistant Maung Tun Win and that the Government has been put to the expense of a costly military expedition it is consoling to turn the pages of the histories of the hill tribes of the North-east Frontier of Bengal and to note that the subjugation of Kukis, Lushais, Nagas, Angamis, & c., was attended by similar outbursts of savage passion, and I hope that the result of the expedition will be considered as some recompense for the great expenditure incurred.21 Carey further says that omitting the Sizangs and Gungal-Sukte, all the Chin/Zo tribes behaved well throughout the year with the exception of the 132

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Baungshe tribe, Thantlang, which broke all its oaths and agreements by harbouring a proclaimed ‘outlaw’ and former chief. This conduct resulted in the tribe being heavily fined in guns. Collection of a regular house tax in cash was Carey’s another achievement. He wrote: Up to the year under report a nominal tribute only in cash, ivory, mythun, goats, & c. had been accepted, but this very unsatisfactory system has this year given way to a regular tax based on the Burma thathameda [house tax levied in Upper Burma] system, the rate being fixed at Re. 1 per house.22 The report of the political officer, however, made it clear that some considerable work yet remained to be accomplished (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 100): 1 2 3 4 5

A gang of 127 rebels still carried arms against us. The most notorious Siyin Chiefs, Kuppow [Khup Pau], Kaikam [Khai Kam], Wumlyin [Vum Lian], and Sumshun were still at large. One hundred and seven guns were still uncollected. The greater part of the tribute for 1892–93 was unpaid. The village roads had not been cleared of jungle, an undertaking which was accepted by the Siyins at the time of surrender.

Forty-nine chiefs and Lord Lansdowne After the season’s operations were over Carey visited Rangoon in October 1893, taking with him a party of 49 Chin/Zo chiefs,23 representing almost every tribe in the Chin Hills. This visit was to coincide with the visit of Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy of India to Burma. The Lansdowne presented ten of the principal chiefs with silver dah. But unfortunately, in Rangoon, cholera broke out at the camp of the Chin/Zo chiefs, which incidentally killed eight, and to some extent caused anger in the Chin Hills (Ibid.: 101). The viceroy, who was in Rangoon on 21 November 1893 at Government House discussed with officials the Chin/Zo Policy and ultimately sanctioned the following programme: 1 2 3

An expedition to subdue the remaining Sizang rebels commonly called the Pimpih rebels. A tour through the Gungal tract to complete the disarmament of that community and to collect arrears of tribute and fines. The furnishing, to the Political Officer, of an escort whilst engaged in demarcating the border between the Chin Hills and the State of Manipur. (Ibid.: 103) 133

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A tour to the southern hills to settle village feuds and to collect fines and outstanding tributes had also been sanctioned.24 Final operations Operations towards what the British called ‘final pacification’ immediately recommenced: Captain Presgrave, commanding the Northern Chin Hills, on 21 December 1893 sent three parties of 75 rifles each from Fort White, No. 3 Stockade, and No. 2 Stockade to track down the Pimpih resistance leaders. Lieutenant Sutton was searching the plains of Burma to the Letha (Thangmual) range, Lieutenant Mockler patrolled the north, and Captain Presgrave pushed from Fort White and No. 3 Stockade, all circling the Sizang tract. When Carey returned from the Boundary Commission on 13 March 1894, he found that quite a number of Chin resisters had been either killed or captured. Even those who were assisting the resisting forces had not been left out. One sad incident was the arrest of Do Thawng, Chief of Sukte, just only to incite the Suktes and Kamhaus to purchase his liberty by capturing the Sizang forces. Carey’s method of forcing the Chin/Zo to submit to his control is best seen in his treatment of the Sukte Chief Do Thawng. Carey thus wrote about it: I arrested Dok Taung, chief of the Sokte, at the same time, not merely because one of his villages belong to the rebel gang and Dok Taung would not deliver him up, but also to incite the Soktes and Kanhows to purchase his liberty by capturing the rebels. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 104) In spite of the all-out efforts of the British, it was clear that popular sympathy lay with the resisting chiefs, where 27 chiefs were still at large and determined to resist to the bitter end, and this compelled the political officer to adopt severe measures. He stopped all cultivation in the Sizang tract, villages were fined heavily while the tract was under regular patrol, and every chief and man of importance was made to follow and assist the political officer in collecting guns and information. Since the Sukte, Kamhaus and Sakhilings had been cooperating with the British, the Sizang challenge did not bear much fruit. They had, therefore, no other option but to join their other friends in their submission. They knew that the closure of trade with the plains would really starve them during the rains. Thus finally, on 16 May, Fowler reported that the Sizang chiefs, Khup Pau, Khai Kam, and Mang Pum surrendered with their guns, which had been reciprocated by the release of the relatives of Khai Kam and Khup Pau, who had been under orders of deportation, and the Sukte Chief Do Thawng. In his report to the Home Department later, Carey admitted that Khai Kam is 134

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the most notorious and the most dangerous man in the Chin Hills . . . for the peace of the hills, for the safety of the plains of Burma and in the interest of the Government’s exchequer, he must never return to the hills he is too bold, too ambitions [sic] and too restless to submit to being governed, and besides this the death of Maung Tun Win should be avenged.25 He further recommended that Khai Kam should not be hanged but proposed that he should be sent to Port Blair. Trade with the plain thereafter resumed. Official record says that this late operation amounted to the capture of all the 127 remaining Sizang ‘rebels’ (Ibid.: 103–6). Affairs in the south Meanwhile, in early 1892 a column under the command of Lieutenant M. J. Tighe, political officer, Yawdwin visited the Chinme, Chinbok and Yindu country in the south. In fact, ‘Cho’ is an indigenous term for these tribes who settle mainly in today’s Kanpetlet, Mindat and Matupi areas in the southern Chin state today (Myochit 2016: 15). It was the first time these hills were visited by a British officer. From Yawdwin in the Pakokku Hill Tracts the column established their base at Qui-Lum Tung or Mount Stewart, which was three marches from Mindat, and explored the Northern Chinme country. During January and February, the villages of Lokshe, Bawong, Khrum and Rawe submitted. The political officer described how the headman or thugyi of Khrum village was friendly to him: ‘The thugyi presented me with a goat, and swarms of Chins came up to the camp and appeared very friendly. They were all fully armed and there was no doubting the fact that the village is half Baungshe’. Later in the day when the headmen were interviewed, they agreed to all the British terms and vowed the usual and eternal friendship.26 A second visit was made in late February, this time from their base at Kitchen’s Peak or Baw-Qui-Tung in Mindat Sakan. By the end of the month 13 villages brought in their tribute. Operations, however, continued throughout the next few months with a command from Yawdwin.27 The next year, Tighe visited these tribes again and brought into submission a number of villages. Khrum, the largest village, ‘was swarming with fighting men, numbering several hundreds and who appeared to be waiting the development of events’. But the large advance by the British, including the large coolie transport, which buffled the defenders, impressed the Khrum, who immediately submitted.28 The southern hills remained quiet during the next year with the exception of a few minor incidents. As a punishment to the villages of Thantlangs, Thlangrwa, Hripi and Tao which extended assistance to Laluai, an outlaw, a fine of 50 guns was inflicted and to enforce its full payment a column marched from Fort White, through the Falam and Haka territories in April 135

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1893. Later, on 13 May, the Chief Laluai surrendered to Henry Newman Tuck, the assistant political officer at Haka, and the Thantlang tribe finally paid the price of the unprovoked attack on Lieutenant McNabb’s escort in April 1891. Altogether 282 guns had been withdrawn from this tribe (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 107–8). Tighe could visit only the fringe, from the east of these southern hills. While on the Northern Chinme country he found it extremely difficult to penetrate to the village to the west. In the diary, Tighe records what these difficulties were: I have been so far working under great difficulties owing to the Chinboks systematically denying the exertion of villages to the west of their own hills, and it is only owing to persistent determination on our part to visit this unknown region that they had given in, and was as the clouds roll away a new country appears, studded with innumerable villages, and which reverts the fact that the entire hills, the backbone of which is the Arakan Yoma and which extends from the Yindus on the south to the Baungshe on the north, one thickly populated.29 During January and February 1894 Tuck, accompanied by a column of 150 rifles, visited the Baungshe tract. Passing through the Boinu range and then crossing the Boipa, he visited 18 villages and interviewed the chiefs of more than 30 villages. The column also collected tribute amounting to Rs. 3,000 and withdrew 82 guns (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 107). The recurrence of atrocities authored by Thetta village that refused to recognise the British power, particularly along the Kan-Haka road disturbed the peace of the southern hills once again. A punitive expedition was thus sent under the command of Major Keary and Henry Tuck as Political Officer. The column left Haka on 1 January 1895 and the next day Thetta was occupied without any resistance. Tuck convened an assemblage of the villagers and ordered the total disarmament of the village. Meanwhile, the Zokhuas approached Carey at Haka and begged not to punish for the transgressions which they had been guilty of in the past.30 Though it was not the intention of the British to immediately disarm the Zokhua, Carey says, ‘the chance was too good to be lost and Zokhua was ordered to pay a fine of 100 guns’. The column also visited Shurkhua, Lungno and surrounding village such as Naring, Dongvar and Bwenlon where they affected the disarmament of villages. The columns returned to Haka on 15 February, having taken 936 guns from 37 independent villages belonging to the Zokhua tribe, and included two Haka villages.

Final disarmament and licensing of guns The policy of disarmament which had been relentlessly pursued from 1893 totally broke down Chin/Zo power of resistance. In the Sizang tract seven 136

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villages which existed after the rebellion surrendered guns and showed signs of submission with the exception of Pimpih which later was destroyed and occupied. Disarmament had also been successfully carried out in the Sukte tract. The villages of Mualbem, Dakbong, Voklak and Narpi were fully disarmed. Meanwhile the Taisuns on the south were also similarly disarmed. Carey visited Tedim and surrounding villages including Muizawl in March 1893 where he pitched a camp and withdrew a good numbers of guns from them. He met Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau Chief, and discussed with him the question of disarmament of his tribe. Carey remarked: I had been much impressed with the ready manner in which the Soktes had brought in their guns, and this I felt certain was caused by the example that had been made of the Siyins, and I argued that if the Soktes were so impressed then their relations, the Kanhows, would be equally so, and I informed Howchinkup that he had been a loyal Chief throughout the campaign and that it was not intended to punish his people, but that his tribe is an unruly one, often disobeying his orders, and I advised him to disarm all his outlying villages now whilst they were frightened, and that this action would have the effect of rendering his people incapable of resisting his orders in the future, and would at the same time be an act deserving the approval of Government. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 91) Apart from the 83 guns withdrawn by the officers Hau Cin Khup voluntarily collected 200 guns and surrendered to the British. In the beginning of April Gungal villages such as Sumpi, Heilei, and Kaptel commenced to surrender their guns. The Chief Thuam Thawng surrendered with Government rifle, and Pau Dal, Kitwerk (?), and Chief of Heilei, all wanted leaders of the treacherous murder of the Myook’s party on 9 October 1892 were arrested. Meanwhile, Hau Cin Khup was surrendering the Kamhau guns very satisfactorily to Lieutenant Sutton at Tedim. The Political Officer also sent envoy to induce the Thados and Zous, who were lying north of the Kamhaus, on the border with Manipur, to surrender guns (Ibid.:92). The Political Officer in his Administrative Report has reported results of the expeditions carried out in the Northern Hills during 1892–93. Up to 1 June 1893, altogether 1987 guns were captured or collected in the Chin Hills. Of this number 319 had been surrendered by the Sizangs, 333 by Sukte, 295 by Kamhaus, 403 by Gungal-Sukte, 251 by Taisun, 40 by Zahaus, and 70 by Hualngos, 34 by Hakas, 190 by Thantlang, 5 by Zokhua, and 47 by Independent Baungshes.31 Report of the Political Officer on 1 April 1894 showed that the entire Chin/Zo tribes had been successfully disarmed. 137

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Table 5.2 Number of guns collected from each tribe as on 1 April 1894 Tribes

Guns

Tashon [Taisun] Yahow [Zahau] Whenohs [Hualngo] Hakas [Khalkha] Klangklangs [Thantlang] Yokwa [Zokhua] Independent southern villages Siyins [Sizang] Soktes [Sukte] Sukte-Nwengal [Gungal-Sukte] Kanhow [Kamhau] Thado Total

255 40 76 605 490 140 940 433 340 553 307 123 4302

Source: Carey and Tuck ([1896] 1932: 116).

The major work of disarmament was largely completed during 1895–96 after which began a systematic policy of registration and licensing of guns which the Chin/Zo were allowed to retain. The policy adopted was to allow one gun for every ten houses, though in some cases where the chief had done good work they were allowed more. A certain period was allowed within which the villages were told that they must bring in their guns to be stamped. The measures were carried out in the winter of 1896–97 when after prolonged tours all the big villages were visited. The following year, however, the local officers relaxed their exertion and a large number of villages had still not brought in their guns to be stamped. H. N. Tuck, under whose direction the licensing and registration was carried out extended the time. He was anxious to avoid any action which was likely to raise suspicion and cause the Chin/Zo to hide their guns in preference to having them stamped.32 The result, by 1898–99, was that a number of villages had still not got their ten percent guns stamped.33 That some had the guns and were afraid to bring them was clear to the local officers. The Northern Chins/Zo were still surrendering their guns. Some guns were being brought in from across the borders, from the Lushai Hills and Manipur, and the Chin/Zo officers knew that if this could not be entirely stopped, the next best thing would be to know in whose hands they were. The policy that was adopted therefore was: to extend the time for licensing of guns still further and treat each case on its merits and to continue stamping guns even in excess of the allowed 10 percent in certain cases; that is, guns brought up by their owners to be stamped of their own freewill should be stamped and licensed, but guns extracted by pressure or guns unstamped owing to a search can well be confiscated and, if considered necessary, 138

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a fine can be inflicted as well: cases in which men have brought in guns from Lushai or other parts and kept them without having them stamped would justify a fine being imposed in addition to the confiscation of the gun.34 Before this policy could be carried out it was discovered that the Chins, particularly in the villages in the north, had been rearming secretly on a large scale. Rearmament: Chin/Zo last bid for freedom? The discovery of secret rearmament was made by E. O. Fowler, the Assistant Superintendent35 at Falam in October 1898, while enquiring into the number of guns in the hands of the Chins/Zo should be stamped. It soon transpired that guns had been imported in such numbers that he considered the Northern Hills to be fully rearmed. Fowler immediately called in the chiefs, and after explaining to them the government’s policy of stamping of guns, warned them that the withholding of guns could lead to the confiscation. The chiefs at first denied the possession of any unstamped guns and disclaimed all knowledge of their importation in any large quantities. When Fowler mentioned the names of the owners of the unstamped gun they, however, acknowledged the fact. With rearmament out in the open, guns were again submitted to be stamped. Fowler was nevertheless quite certain that the chiefs had by now never acknowledged the full extent of their rearmament, and that they hoped to lull suspicion by bringing in a few guns. ‘The fact that this extensive rearmament is no longer a secret has caused great uneasiness’, Fowler told Drury, the Superintendent, ‘and meetings to discuss the question have been frequent and much wild talk indulged in’.36 The chiefs had actually decided to hold a general conference at the end of the month, the first such meeting since 1892. Fowler warned them that such an action will not be approved and the village in which it was held will be severely dealt with. The chiefs were apparently frightened into abandoning it, and on 30 October promised to bring in a hundred guns. Fowler’s assessment of the dangers of the situation had not altered: The idea amongst the Chins is that eventually the garrisons in the hills either be withdrawn or so reduced as to render it possible that hostilities may be carried out with success, and for this purpose they will still continue to re-arm as rapidly as possible, and there appears no difficulty in doing so, as guns in great numbers can be purchased from across the Lushai and Manipur borders, and it is from these sources they have been obtained. The Chins have carefully noted the gradual reduction of garrisons of posts, and they hope the reduction will continue, and the idea 139

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that it will so continue till only very small garrisons are retained, appears most prevalent.37 In November Fowler toured the Northern Hills with an armed escort of 80 rifles under a British officer.38 Military posts were established in the Sizang, Sukte and Gungal tracts. The Kamhaus were left to Chief Hau Cin Khup.39 After these tracts had been dealt with work was to commence on the north Falam villages.40 The military authorities would have liked to commence active operations and Sir William Lockhart, the Commander in Chief, was emphatic on the point. As he told the Foreign Department: If the Chins are re-arming in earnest and awaiting the most favourable opportunity to give us trouble, we should, in my opinion, form them to surrender their firearms, and if they refuse to do so they ought to be attacked as soon as sufficient men can be go together for the purpose. It would be the worst policy to let thugs go on drifting. The calling in and stamping of arms seems to me to be a puerile formality leading to nothing.41 Burma was more cautious and in May 1899 Fowler was sent on a tour to the Hualngo area west of the Sizang to find out what was happening. He soon discovered that a lucrative trade in buying and selling of guns had been going on for some time. The Hualngo and the Zahaus for instance obtained guns from the Lushai Hills where disarmament had led the Lushai to sell their guns rather than surrender them. The Hualngos and the Zahaus in turn sold these guns to the Suktes, Gungal-Suktes and the Sizangs. The Kamhaus had brought guns from Manipur as well as from the Lushais.42 All this information was gathered from intense interrogation of some of the Northern Chief.43 News that the British intended to disarm the Chins/ Zo once and for all spread and to anticipate this a local rising took place in May. ‘It is not clear at present how this rebellion originated and it will not be satisfactorily explained until the country is visited next year’,44 Drury told the Chief Secretary even as late as in July. That it was all about disarmament is clear from an account of Laura Hardin Carson, wife of the missionary Arthur Carson, they having only recently established a mission centre at Haka. While disarmament was proceeding and again a leading chief, one Shwe Lien, whom the Carsons had befriended, suddenly walked into their house just days before the uprising. When assured that no one else was in the house besides them Shwe Lien made a startling revelation: He shook with excitement as he told us that the people did not propose to give up their guns. He said Chins loved their guns better 140

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than anything else in the world; that it would be easier to give up wives and children, because they could get plenty more wives and children, but couldn’t get guns. (Carson [1927] 1997: 170) Shwe Lien went on to say that the chiefs had ‘eaten mud’, i.e. taken the sacred oath by mingling their blood, taken from their legs, with earth and eating it, that they would not relinquish their guns but would kill off the British officers, take their guns and take back the administration of the hills. All were to be killed, except the Superintendent who was to be held for ransom in order to make terms with the Government. Just as the Carsons were wondering what to make of the report, a message was received from the Superintendent, who was on tour, that he had received authentic information that there was to be an uprising that night and all white people were to be killed. The Superintendent, E. N. Drury, was told by informer on 20 May that ‘there was to be a general rising in the hills in three days’ Laluai, the Thantlang chief, Kenhai the Rumklao chief and the Yatlier group of the Zahaus were behind the move. Laluai whose tribe had over a thousand guns was to provide arms. The attacking parties to surprise the two military columns out at Yatlier and Youngte villages, and having disposed them out the telegraph lines, attack the permanent posts and then got the British ‘swept out of the hills’. Forty-eight hours later Drury heard two rumours about the rebel plans: one that a large party would attack Falam, and the other that the column at Youngte (Zongte) would be the prime target.45 Drury immediately took precautions, arranging for the defence of Falam, and preparing the garrison to take on the offensive. Attempts were also made to win over some chiefs, or at least ensure their neutrality. At four in the morning on the 23rd a single shot on Drury’s camp at Yatlier Fort signaled the outbreak. Extended Chin/Zo firing at once followed, and was promptly answered by the defenders. Soon the Chin/Zo withdrew. ‘It seemed to me that my information as to a general rising must be absolutely correct’, the Superintendent was now certain, ‘as otherwise a party of Chins would hardly done to attack a well-armed guard of 80 rifles in a good position’.46 At about the same time a settlement of Gorkhas, some of whom were in the dairy business, some five and a half miles from Falam was attacked by around 200 Chin/Zo. The Captain Commanding Falam at once rushed to its rescue, only to find the village destroyed and looted and the headless body of a woman and a child who unfortunately were unable to flee. With some leads provided by the Gurkha who had returned from hiding the Captain followed the raiders for several miles and as he came upon a few remnants of them inflicted severe casualties. After combing the neighbouring villages in search of the rebels and expending 92 rounds of ammunitions he returned completely exhausted to Yatlier.47 141

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The uprising was not a general nature as was rumoured. It was confined to some villages east of the Falam group. The chief of Rumklao was now known to have led as directed the attacks. Drury therefore decided that instead of resorting to extensive military operations as in the earlier years, to make a ‘counter raid’ upon Rumklao. The plan was to cordon off the village while a strong party assaulted it. This worked, and finding himself surrounded. Sum Hlwe the Chief gave in. Hnit Varr, who was implicated in the attack on the Gurkha village was apprehended along with 15 others.48 The occupation of Rumklao village brought Drury in direct contact with the villages with whom he established a rapport. These confessed that they had been ‘led astray’ by their chiefs. Drury assured a deputation from them that he did not want to be severe with the rank and file, but that they would be fined and their mythun driven to Falam at once and that would be given time to surrender their chiefs and leaders in the rebellion. This they agreed to do and even said that: They wished to pull down their Chiefs’ houses. This I agreed to. I also fined Klangrong which had taken part in the rebellion 10 mythun and told them they would be further fined unless they assisted us to capture the leaders of the rebellion and attack on the Ghuka settlement.49 This was not a reversal of the policy of strengthening the position of the chiefs and headmen, as will be seen in the next chapter. In reality, these villages, unlike those in the Northern Hills, were cash in a democratic mould and the people were not without authority. At any rate, as Drury pointed it was ‘now generally known that villages which were forced or induced to join in the rebellion can by assisting us against the people who misled them modify their punishment and they seem inclined to take advantage of this opportunity for withdrawal which is a good sign and has relieved the tension’.50 Altogether 42 prisoners were taken. Laluai was reported to be on the point of death at Thantlang and Drury merely waited until that event occurred to deal with his successor. It was not before another year that the last of the ‘rebels’ were hunted down. The British records do not give any prominence to how the chiefs and other prisoners were dealt with. We have it on the authority of Laura Carson that ‘After trial, twelve of the ring leaders in the insurrection were transported and three were hanged’ (Carson [1927] 1997: 172). The trials also made it clear that disarmament was not the only reason for the uprising. ‘I am of opinion that one of the reason why Laluai instigated this rebellion was because his slave had been released without compensation’, Drury said in concluding his report on the uprising.51 Wholesale releases of household slaves were accordingly stopped in the future. Disarmament however was enforced with greater stringency. 142

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While the process of ‘pacification’ was going on the structure of administration and the policy to be pursued towards the chiefs and headmen were being given their final shape.

Notes 1 FEBP January 1893, Nos. 1–17; Report on the Field Operations carried out in the Myingyan District during the season 1891 and 1892; Also, From Major-General R. C. Stewart, Commanding Burma District to Adjutant-General, Madras Army, 6 June 1892. 2 The report further states: ‘No less than 17 villages have been punished, the fines usually taking the form of guns and other arms’. 3 FEBP January 1893, Nos. 1–17; See General Report of Tashon Column by Major A Howlett; Haka, 1 June 1892; Report on Thantlang Column by Major A.G.F. Browne, 5 March 1892; From Major A.G.F. Browne, Commanding Thantlang Column, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Myingyan District, 5 March 1892; From G. B. Stevens, Commanding Kanhaw Columns, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Myingyan District, 17 April 1892; From Captain Hugh Rose, Commanding Nwengal-Lushai Column, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Myingyan district, 26 May 1892; Précis of Diary of Officer Commanding Tashon Column from the 10th March to the 3rd April 1892; Supplementary Report on Operations of Kanhaw Column from G. B. Stevens, Commanding Kanhaw columns, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Myingyan District, 15 May 1891. 4 FEBP January 1893, No. 3; ‘Report on field operations carried out in the Myingyan District during the season 1891 and 1892’, by Brigadier-General A.P. Palmer, Commanding Myingyan District, on 23 May 1892. As regard labour the Report stated: ‘This need in no way lead to anything like an introduction of a corvee system, but it appears that the time has now arrived for the inhabitants of the country to be made to realize that we are their masters and that they must serve us in the manner we choose to dictate’. 5 FEBP January 1893, No. 3. 6 This information has been received through email correspondence from Khup Khan Thang Taithul, who is well versed in the history and culture of the Zomi (Chin). 7 Thanks to Pa Khup Khan Thang Taithul for this information. 8 For an indepth analysis see (Pau 2017). 9 FEAP February 1893, No. 204; From Carey to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, 11 October 1892. 10 FEAP February 1893, No. 204: The Kaptel know that they will shortly receive punishment, and it is quite probable that Thuam Thawng has incited some Zahaus and Hualngos to come and talk over matters. Tatle Kwa, a Hualngo village, was implicated in the Gungal rebellion last May, and the Chief Nikwe, whom I arrested in Lushai, has a brother Yat Kum, a Chief of the Zahaus. As regards Pimpi, it is unlikely that Pimpi will again rebel, but regarding the behaviour of Chin/Zo one can never prophesy. 11 FEAP February 1893, No. 204: Carey further recorded: ‘On the 21st instant I wrote in my diary, and on the 22nd instant I telegraphed to the Chief Secretary that the rumoured gathering at Kaptial was in all probability not a conference of Chins and Lushais at all, but that, as the cold weather was approaching, the Nwengals were considering what action should be taken, and whether their programme should be war, flight, or submission.

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12 FEAP February 1893, No. 204. 13 Ibid. 14 The version of Maung Po Lu on the incident: ‘Mr. Fowler ordered me to call in Maung Lon of Sagyilain and Karm Tut of Ngun . . . both were sent to arrange a meeting with Twum Tong . . . the Pow Tan of Pumbe, Nowkatung of Shark, a Kaptial and a Mobingyi man come in and said that Tum Tong was willing to meet any Political Officer at Pumba to arrange his surrender. They also told the Myook that Maung Lon, Dok Taung, and all the Chiefs were going to be present, and asked him to bring money to purchase a mythun and liquor as a feast would be the order of the day . . . Maung Tun Win never suspected that anything was wrong, especially as Mang Lon and Dok Taung had promised to come to the meeting . . . I was speedy and so did not accompany the party . . . My brother took Rs.80 to buy a mythun .  .  . Aung Gyi took Rs.140 buy a rhinocerous’s horns from Wum Lyin of Yoe . . . Aung Zan took about Rs. 20 with him . . . The Myook party consisted of Aung Gyi, Aung Zan, a syce, and two Chin Policemen- Tun Ngo and another Pumba man. Tun Ngo carried my brother’s rifle and 20 rounds. The other policeman carried my brother’s double-barrel gun and about 40 rounds. Aung Gyi carried my brother’s revolver and six rounds. The Myook rode his pony and was unarmed . . . Tum Tong had not heard that he was to pay a fine in guns before surrendering. I suspect that the feast promised to be held in honour of the Political Officer was intended to be the time of killing the party . . . I believe that the following have not joined the rebellion- Aung Paw, Ya Wun, Hau Chin Khup . . . I consider that all the Siyins knew of the meditated attack and that Aung Paw along remained at home and that all the rest helped. I went down with the burying party on the 10th. I found enormous ambuscade, – forked sticks for gun rests behind bushes. There are many sham bushes in the ground. I found an empty 12-bore cartridge case and the wrapping of the two Martini packets which proved that our police joined in the attack. The Police left the party just before the place of ambush, I am told. Attack took place between Old Fort White and Pumba, 400 yards from the village. We buried all the bodies except the Myook’s, which was brought in to Fort White and burned’. FEAP February 1893, No. 204. 15 FEAP February 1893, No. 204 and 245. 16 Ibid. 17 FEAP June 1893, No. 84; A Diary of Bertram Carey from 25 January to 4 February 1893. 18 Ibid., pp. 89–90. 19 FEAP December 1893, No. 29; Report on the Frontier affairs of the Upper Chindwin District for the year 1892–93. 20 FEAP September 1893, No. 80; Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills from 1st June 1892 to 31st May 1893. (Appendix, pp. xxviii–xxix). 21 Ibid., Nos. 80–88; Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills from 1st June 1892 to 31st May 1893. 22 Ibid. 23 For list of Chin Chiefs who visited Rangoon, see Appendix B. 24 FEAP January 1894, No. 321. 25 FSEP, July 1894, Nos. 167–177; ‘Detention under warrant of three Siyin chins named Kuppow, Mang Pome and Kaikam’. 26 FEAP February 1901, Nos. 23–26; Diary of Lieutenant M J Tighe, Assistant Commissioner, from the 1st to the 15th February 1892. 27 FEBP January 1893, Nos. 1–17 (H); Report on the work done by the column furnished by the detachment 7th (D C O), Bengal Infantry at Yawdwin to act as

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escort to the Political Officer in the Southern Chin Hills, from date of starting to 25th February 1892. 28 FEAP February 1901, Nos. 23–26. 29 Ibid.; Diary of Lieutenant M J Tighe from 1st to the 15th February 1892. Tighe thus wrote of the Chinme and the Chinbok: ‘I would put the Chinme down as a Chinbok pure and simple as far as his habits and customs go. ‘In appearance there is a good deal of difference between the two and they talk different dialects of the same language, the original tongue being undoubtedly Baungshe. ‘If presumably because the Chinmes occupy another tract of country separated from the Chinboks by a high range of mountains that they go by a different appellation. Both Chinmes and Chinboks are closely allied to the Baungshe, and I would regard the Chinme as the connecting link. ‘There are undoubtedly a number of Baungshe or half-Baungshes among the more northern Chinmes’. 30 FEAP January 1895, No. 102; Notes on the proposed Thetta Operations. 31 FEAP September 1893, Nos. 80–88 (Appendix, p. xxxiv, V Schedule of guns withdrawn from the Chin Hills up to 1st June 1893). Details see Appendix C. 32 FEAP November 1900, Nos. 1–6; Chief Secretary, Burma to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 24 August 1900; See also Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1896–97 and 1897–98. 33 Up to July 1898 some 7,000 guns had been withdrawn from the Chins; FEAP October 1896, Nos. 28–35; Report on the Administration of the South Lushai Hills for 1895–96, General position in the Chin-Lushai Hills, 16 July 1896. 34 FEAP November 1900, Nos. 1–6; Chief Secretary, Burma to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 24 August 1900. 35 FEAP February 1898, No. 273; ‘Change of designation of officers in the Chin Hills’. Also see the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896. 36 FEAP June 1900, Nos. 36–64; E O Fowler, to E N Drury, Superintendent, 6 November 1898. 37 Ibid.; Telegram, Superintendent to Chief Secretary 22 November 1898. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.; Telegram, Superintendent to Chief Secretary, 11 December 1898. 40 Ibid.; Telegram, E. N. Drury to Under Secretary, Burma, 5 June 1899. 41 FEAP January 1900, Nos. 36–64; See Note by General Lockhart, 27 January 1899. 42 FEAP June 1900, Nos. 36–64; Telegram, E. N. Drury to Under Secretary, Burma, 5 June 1899. 43 Ibid.; Note by Assistant Superintendent, Tiddim, 17 April. The chief who gave information were Mang Lun, the most influential Sizang Chief; Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau Chief, Do Thawng of the Sukte, and a few other minor chiefs. The four chiefs who had defied orders for registration of guns were deported to Myingyan jail. Ibid., Enclosure 9, No. 36, Superintendent, Chin Hills, to Chief Secretary, Burma, 12 December 1898. The four were Kokatung (?), Lyimoom, Powkai and Mangshurim. 44 FEAP June 1900, Nos. 36–64; E. N. Drury to Chief Secretary, 3 July 1899; ‘Report regarding the Rumklao rebellion’. 45 Ibid.; Report by Mr. E. N. Drury. 46 Ibid.; Report regarding the attack on Yatlier. 47 Ibid.; Report by Captain Sillery regarding the attack on the Ghurka settlement.

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48 Ibid.; Report by Mr. E. N. Drury of a Counter raid upon Rumklao. 49 FEAP January 1900, Nos. 36–64. 50 Ibid.; Drury added: ‘As these were probably 1,000 rebels I do not think we can proceed against them all criminally; besides the ordinary villages cannot well refuse to join when ordered out by their chiefs, who in their turn may have pressure put upon them by the chiefs of the larger neighbouring villages. I have therefore given out that villages which will a subordinate part will be fined, but that they must assist us to capture the chiefs and men who took a leading part against us’. 51 Ibid.; Report by Drury, 1 July 1899.

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6 ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS ‘Indirect rule’ and the making of colonial ‘agents’ Until 1892, a superior staff consisting of two political officers, one for the Southern and the other for the Northern hills assisted by two assistant superintendents of police and two Myo-oks (township officer) administered the Chin Hills. This arrangement was, however, reshuffled in the latter part of the year after the situation in the hills had considerably improved. In July a single political officers took charge of both the Northern and Southern hills. He was given four assistants with headquarters at Tedim, Falam and Haka. Falam constituted both the civil and military headquarters and the Political offices were moved from Haka and Tedim to Falam (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 99).1 The hills south of the Haka group, included in the map as Baungshe country remained largely independent. South of these were also hills of the Chinboks, Chinmes, Yindus and allied groups. All these remained outside the jurisdiction of the officers at Haka and Falam. Control over them was exercised by the deputy commissioner of the Pakokku district, through a Sub-divisional officer stationed at Yawdwin, and they formed a separate administrative unit called Pakokku Hill Tracts. On 28 September 1892 Bertram Carey, who had taken over as political officer of the amalgamated Chin Hills submitted to the chief commissioner proposals for rearrangement of civil administration.2 This in effect was to regularise the changes recently made. The Government of India approved the main lines of the recommendations and they received the sanction of the Secretary of State on 19 October 1893.3 These in brief were: 1

2

One Political Officer to be in charge of the whole of the hills with headquarters at Falam; to work for the present directly under the Chief Commissioner; to be an officer of the Burma Commission; and to draw the pay and acting allowance of the officer next below him in the regular line plus a local allowance of Rs. 300 monthly. Assistant Political Officers to be appointed at the Chief Commissioner’s discretion up to a maximum of five to be selected at the Chief Commissioner’s discretion from the Commission, the subordinate Civil Service

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3

or the Police. These officers to draw the pay and acting allowance of their respective grades plus a local allowance of Rs. 100 to be increased to Rs. 150 on their passing an examination in the Chin language; one of the Assistants to be stationed at Falam as General Assistant to the Political Officer and Treasury Officer at headquarters and the others to be stationed at convenient points in the hills and to control under the orders of the Political Officers such of the surrounding tribes as may from time to time be placed under them. The Chief Commissioner would also, for the reasons explained in paragraph 8 of Mr. Carey’s letter, allow Police Inspectors, when appointed to be Assistant Political Officers, to have locally and temporarily the honorary rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police and to draw the traveling allowance of Assistant Superintendent of Police. Ministerial establishments to be sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner from time to time as required. For the present Mr. Carey’s suggestion on this head appear suitable.4

Future of Chin Hills: early discussions These arrangements were aimed at the consolidation of the gains the British had achieved over these hills in the past few years. In the adjoining Lushai Hills, the southern region was administered by the Bengal Government while the Northern Lushai Hills remained under Assam after Daly and Skinner established their station at Aizawl at the close of the Chin-Lushai Expedition. Since the entire Chin-Lushai Hills had been peopled by tribes of common ethnicity the question of administering them as one unit and under one administration had in the meanwhile presented itself. As early as September 1891, the secretary of state, noticing that the expenditure in holding these tracts was disproportionate to the area and population, had so directed The existing arrangements, under which these newly incorporated tracts are administered partly from Bengal, partly from Assam, and partly from Burma, according to the province to which each province in adjacent, were no doubt necessary, in the first instance, on a temporary expedient. The secretary further suggested that serious consideration should be given to the control of the Lushais under one administration.5 Till then, what the Government of India had in mind was only the amalgamation of north and south Lushai Hills, whether under Bengal or Assam, but the secretary of state’s dispatch widened the scope of the administrative problem by including the Chin Hills. Independently of this, the Government of India’s Military Department too was considering the question ‘whether any 148

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remedy should be applied in order to obviate the disadvantage of Lushai-land and the Chin Hills falling under three separate civil administrations and three separate military commands’.6 As regards the military occupation of this newly acquired territory, the Chin Hills, it will be recalled, was under the general officer commanding, Burma, the Northern Lushai Hills under the general officer commanding, Assam, and the South Lushai Hills under the presidency command. In September 1891, Major General Sir Edwin Collen, the military secretary to the Government of India, submitted a detailed note on ‘The Military Situation in Eastern India and Burma’, in which he suggested a conference between the lieutenant governor of Bengal, the chief commissioner of Assam, the chief commissioner of Chittagong and general officer commanding, presidency district to discuss this problem.7 Sir Frederick Roberts, commander in chief, India, who knew the Lushai Hills at first-hand, having been in the Lushai Expedition of 1871–72 (1897), endorsed Collen’s note and his suggestion for a conference to sort out the difficulties of divided control, though he saw that it was ‘hardly possible to bring the whole of these districts under one Government, as the frontier line between India and Burma must cross then’.8 But he was quite clear in his mind that Bengal should have nothing to do with the Lushai Hills. The question therefore was whether the Chin-Lushai Hills and the areas connected with it ought to be with Burma or with Assam: As things are at present the territories of these three administrations are gradually approaching one another at haphazard, according as a military expedition starts from one or another province. This obviously cannot last; boundaries must conform to geographical features, and, when possible, to ethnological divisions, and the question must be faced ere long.9 Taking into account such considerations Roberts’ solution was: [to] bring all our relations with Nagas, Kukis, Manipuris, Tipperah, and Lushai under one administration. Whilst the country is in its present unsettled state, the Chief Commissioner of Burma must have a voice in our relations with the Chins; but later on, when these shall have been thoroughly subjugated, and the question has become merely one of the best methods of conducting the civil administration of a settled province, it seems probable that the mountain range bordering the Chindwin Valley on the west (of Burma) well form the most convenient boundary between Assam and Burma.10 The Home Department of the Government of India, who were consulted, welcomed the conference. 149

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The Chin-Lushai Conference, 1892 When these papers were sent to the viceroy, Lord Lansdowne immediately noted that he too had felt that it would be necessary to put an end to the state of things under which the management of the Chin-Lushai tract fell partly to Bengal, partly to Assam and partly to Burma. He approved of the proposed conference and added that Burma’s chief commissioner, Sir Alexander Mackenzie, should also be invited to attend.11 The conference, called the Chin-Lushai Conference, opened in Calcutta on 25 January 1892 under the presidentship of Sir Charles Alfred Elliott, lieutenant governor of Bengal.12 It dealt with a variety of connected questions on the future, civil and military, of the Chin-Lushai Hills. To begin with, the military department set out 12 questions many of which related to matters of administrative and military details, as the basis for discussions. The first, on which depended the others, related to the issue the secretary of state had first raised. On this point the majority of the conference was agreed that the practical inconvenience of the system of the divided administration was as great as it was represented to be.13 Sir Alexander Mackenzie dissented. He seems to have been fully aware of the move to separate the Chin Hills from Burma. As early as in December 1891, he told the viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, about his fears of what the conference was likely to recommend: If the subject-matter of discussion is to be the future administration of the whole Chin-Lushai country, the case would be different, and a very large problem would be opened. Of course it is inconvenient that three different Local Governments and one Native State (i.e. Manipur) should be concerned in the management of the same great block of hills. But it is a mistake to treat the tribes inhabiting these hills as though they were one and the same people. Ethnologically they may be so, but politically they are a congeries of independent, and even hostile communities, looking out of their hills towards the plains from which they severally draw their surplus of salt and (hitherto) of slaves.14 At the conference, Mackenzie set forth his opposition to the proposal in a lengthy Minute which he placed before the members. He argued, I can well imagine that difficulties have arisen from a divided administration in respect of the hills lying between Assam and Bengal, though no evidence has been laid before the Conference on this point. But I know nothing of the existence of any such difficulties between Bengal and Burma – difficulties I mean so great and insuperable as to warrant a disturbance of existing arrangements.15

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While he considered that the policy to be followed in dealing with the Chin-Lushai people should be identical, Mackenzie disagreed that local conditions were identical in the Chin and Lushai Hills. For instance, as regards the tribute or revenue, his officers in the Chin Hills were of the view that the Bengal arrangements were unsuitable for the tribes under their control. The Bengal Government would have liked to extend to the Chin/Zo the plan Robert Blair McCabe16 followed in the North Lushai Hills of levying a certain quantity of rice from each house and ten days’ forced labour from each able-bodied man. Mackenzie quoted his Chin political officer, saying that levying dues in grain would cause unnecessary hardships to villages lying out a distance from the posts. Moreover, grain was not so plentiful in the villages on the Burma side and that the settlements there were permanent while their cultivation was often 10 to 50 miles distant. With respect to corvée, he remarked that supervising and turning such labour to useful account would be difficult. On such grounds, he ruled out removing the Chin Hills from Burma. Only the Arakan Hill Tracts could be amalgamated under one jurisdiction with the North and South Lushai Hills. On 29 January, the conference closed with the adoption of five resolutions. The first stated that the majority were of the opinion that it was very desirable that the whole Chin-Lushai Hills should be brought under one administration, preferably under the chief commissioner of Assam. In view of Sir Alexander Mackenzie’s determined opposition, the conference in its second resolution decided that this step should not be taken immediately. At any rate, not before the difficulties of communications and of supplies and transport were sorted out and all operations in the Chin-Lushai Hills concluded. The other three resolutions were: 1

2

3

The first thing to be done for the control of this tract is to improve the communications between the important places such as Cachar and Aijal, Aijal and Lungleh, Aijal and Manipur, and the posts situated, respectively, on the eastern and western side of the tract. The opening out of these lines is a work of pressing importance. The necessary commissariat staff should also be provided to arrange for transport and supplies, till the tract is able to provide them for itself. The conference is of the opinion that the boundaries of the new administrative area should be, generally speaking, the boundaries of the tract occupied by the savages newly brought under British control, but the details of those boundaries can only be settled after consultation with local officers. The conference is agreed that the North and South Lushai, with such portions of the Arracan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be determined, should be placed under Assam at once on condition that (1) complete

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transport and commissariat equipment for supplies from Chittagong to South Lushai, and from Cachar to North Lushai, are provided; and (2) funds are granted for road and telegraph from Aijal to Lungleh.17 Sir Alexander Mackenzie’s Minute not only left the conference inconclusive as regards the main issue that it was convened to resolve, but gave strength to the Chin/Zo officers to oppose any surrender of territory to Assam. Bertram Carey, whose views on the question Burma’s chief secretary had sought, at once replied that the ‘Chin has nothing in common with the Lushai or Assam but belong to Burma’, and that: It is impracticable for Assam to work Chin land, also that Chin land is as much part of Burma as the Shan States, Karen Hills, etc., and also that all the Chin sympathies and associations have always been with Burma and not with Lushai or with Assam . . . it is more simple and convenient to work this tract from Rangoon than from Shillong, Chittagong, or a central Chin-Lushai headquarters.18 It may be mentioned that Carey’s argument was based on administrative convenience as he had no doubt about the ethnic commonality of the Chin and Lushai people (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 2). In fact, the spirit of the Conference was not to solve the division of the same ethnic group into different administrative units, but to find the most convenient way of administering them even at the cost of the interest of the local population. Burma promptly sent these views to the Government of India.19 During May and June the recommendations of the conference was discussed by the Government of India. Opinions within the government seem to have been divided. One note, dated 30 May 1892 in the Foreign Department thus stated: The policy which the majority of the Conference would lay down seem to be based . . . on the more general ground that three lots of savages pretty close together in a hilly country ought to be under the hand of one expert in dealing with savages. This sort of view is no doubt reasonable on the surface, but it may be refuted by more accurate information. But the Foreign Department officially continued to adhere to their position that the Government of India should aim at bringing the whole tract under one administrative head as soon as this could be done. ‘It is quite possible that the Chins and Lushais are very different’, noted Foreign Secretary Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, ‘but that does not seem to me to be a strong argument against entrusting them to one administrative head. The Chinese

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and Burmans and Talains and Karen are (also) very different’.20 The viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, held on to his views: It has always seemed to me possible that eventually the new district thus created might include everything to the west of the Myittha Valley and of the valley which runs northward from it towards the frontier of Manipur.21 Lansdowne’s view, if passed through, was supposed to bring the entire Zo ethnic community in the Indo-Burma frontier under one political umbrella. But given the divergent opinions, the viceroy was not prepared to rush into this larger question and suggested the relatively modest proposal of attaching the north and south Lushai Hills along with a part of the Arakan Hill Tracts to Assam. ‘I should myself prefer to place it upon record’, the viceroy still added, that whatever steps are now taken, are taken in the belief that they lead in the direction to which I have pointed above, and that, when communications have been improved, we look forward to a larger and more thorough measure of consolidation.22 Lansdowne sought the opinion of his colleagues in Council. Sir Charles Crosthwaite, now a senior member of the viceroy’s executive council, was the first to give his opinion. As a former chief commissioner of Burma, Crosthwaite had wide knowledge about the Chin-Lushai Tract and his views were understandably given due weight in the council. ‘The object of adding the Chin Hills to Assam’, Crosthwaite noted, ‘is to unite all the hill tribes under one Commissioner; and if this could not be done, I presume there would be no advantage gained’. Naturally sympathetic to Burma, he clearly explained why he was strongly against the idea of one administration: I think it is seldom an advantage to separate administratively parts of a country which is by natural conditions related to, or dependent on, one another. The tract in question is so broad and extensive that there has been no through communication from Burma to Bengal. I think it is true that the tribes which raid on Burma and trade with Burmans do not make incursions into the plains on the western side and conversely. It is the interest of Burma to deal with these tribes which must visit the Burma villages on the plains, and will, if permitted, raid on Burma and harbour outlaws from that country. However loyal and zealous the officer placed in charge of the hills may be, the separation of these hills from Burma will inevitably render the Chin tribes less amenable and less disposed to obey the

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Burma officers to help them to pursue and recover criminals from the hills.23 Crosthwaite therefore suggested that our action should be limited to placing the South Lushai country and the Arracan Hill Tracts under Assam, and to transferring to that province the Chittagong District, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Hill Tipperah, and that we should record no opinion in favour of removing the Eastern Chin tribes from the administration of Burma.24 Crosthwaite’s view was strongly supported by three members of the council, and particularly by Sir Philip Percival Hutchins and Sir Alexander Edward Miller, who were convinced that the Chin/Zo should remain with Burma and that their hills should be treated as a separate district directly responsible to a commissioner. While Hutchins ‘fully agree[d]’25 with Crosthwaite, Miller admitted that ‘even if my preconceived opinions had been opposed to Sir C. Crosthwaite’s view, I should have felt bound to give way; his arguments are, I think, quite conclusive’.26 Sir Frederick Roberts and Lieutenant General Sir Henry Brackenbury expressed opinions entirely in accord with the viceroy. The views of these two distinguished military officers, the first an army chief and the second the military member of the viceroy’s council, seemed to be conditioned by the ongoing operations in the Chin-Lushai Hills. Both therefore emphasised the importance of a single military command centrally located in the hills and, as a corollary to this, a single civil administration. Roberts once again pointed out: Whenever we may decide to fix the boundary between the two Administrations, sometime must elapse before the semi-civilised tribes can be prevented from raiding across it, but it seems to me that the line of the Myittha Valley, as suggested by His Excellency the Viceroy, is likely to prove as satisfactory as any other from this point of view, while geographically and ethnologically it possess decided advantages.27 It may be argued that neither Chin Hills naturally belonged to Burma nor the Lushai Hills to Assam. The Konbaung dynasty, till it was annexed by the British in 1885, had never exercised control over the Chin Hills. Similarly, British Assam did not include the Lushai Hills until the later was annexed in the 1890s. Sandwiched between two empires, the Chin-Lushai Hills remained independent until the advent of the British. Therefore, to separately attach the Chin Hills and the Lushai Hills to either Burma or Assam was tantamount to the division of the entire Zo (Chin-Lushai-Kuki) people. 154

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In the end, Crosthwaite’s opinion prevailed. On 23 June 1892, the governor general in council decided: 1 2

3 4 5 6

That all the Lushai Country be transferred to Assam as early as possible. That the Chittagong district be also transferred to Assam. If it is found that there are difficulties in the way of an immediate transfer of the district, the Hill Tracts should be transferred in advance of the rest. That the Bengal and Assam Administrations be consulted as to the expediency of transferring to Assam the whole Chittagong division. That the Burma and Assam Administrations be consulted as to the future position of the boundary between them in the North Arracan Hill Tracts. That with regard to the Chin Hills no declaration of policy need be made for the present. That an estimate of the cost of the transfers now ordered be submitted to the Government of India.28

‘Chin Hills remain under Burma for the present’, Simla telegraphed to the chief commissioner at Rangoon on 2 August.29 That day marked the official partition of the Zo (Chin-Lushai-Kuki) people, and it was one of the greatest blunders the colonial rulers had committed on the indigenous population of the Indo-Burma frontier. The trajectory of Zo history might have changed had this ‘blunder’ not been committed by the British just for ‘administrative convenience’. The call for ‘re-unification’ of the Zo people, first by the Mizo Union in 1946 and followed by other underground and overground organisations, no matter the choice of its nomenclature, are nothing but to correct colonial mistakes in 1892 (Pau 2007).30

Policy towards the chiefs The successful prevention of the separation of the Chin Hills from Burma left the chief commissioner and his local officers free to devote more fully to the management of the tribes. The long series of surveys and expeditions had thrown up a good deal of information on the chiefs, the clans and the villages. It was clear from these that in any future system of management of the Chin Hills, the chiefs would have to be an integral part. To begin with, those chiefs who were deported to Burma for resisting the British were to be replaced. In the north the Sizangs had been thoroughly subdued and disarmed, and by 1893 the inhabitants were ‘completely cowed and the country ripe for more regular and less forcible administration than has been the rule during the first six years of our occupation’. The tribe had 362 houses, divided into four clans. These had occupied six villages,31 which had been destroyed. They were allowed to rebuild them on sites approved by the political officer, at some distance from the plains and near the British posts. Each clan was 155

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allowed to be ruled by its own chief, and each was made directly responsible to the assistant political officer at Tedim. Demands for labour were enforced, as when Carey made them build two posts, one at Thuklai and the other at Tavak, with another ‘standing camp’ at Sakhiling. The chiefs were made responsible for the maintenance of the posts and the roads, the latter to enable the political officers to visit the villages during the rains, a very necessary procedure in the Chin Hills. The same policy was followed towards the neighbouring Sukte. This tribe was for convenience divided into the Sukte (those who lived on the left bank of Meitei Guun/Manipur River), the Gungal-Sukte (those who lived on the right bank) and the Kamhaus. The Sukte comprised nine villages with 492 houses and the Gungal-Sukte comprised ten villages with 714 houses.32 Among the Sukte tract, it was common for a chief to make over a village to his brothers, or uncles, in which case the village paid tithes to the brother and not to the chief, but the brother paid a nominal tribute to the chief in recognition of his overlordship. Here the villages were left to be ruled by chiefs independent of each other and each village was dealt with separately by the assistant political officer. The policy of maintaining the chiefs had been most successful in the case of the Kamhaus where Hau Cin Khup ruled over the whole clan. Carey’s report shows how Hau Cin Khup’s position was strengthened: This Chief is young and ambitious, but unable to maintain his position unaided on account of his youth and the superior influence acquired by his uncles and cousins before his birth. He consequently appealed to me to help him to gain and keep the position which is his by right of birth and custom. I eagerly espoused his cause, placed him in his proper position, and have stood staunchly by him; for this Howchinkup has repaid me handsomely; last year he disarmed his clan and this year he has disarmed several Thado villages for us, including villages which were then claimed and are now owned by Manipur. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 112)33 The Taisun, which was the main tribe of the Falam tract, and their tributaries such as Zahau, Hualngo, Khualsim, Zanniat, Ngawn and Khuangli had a unique system of administration. They were administered by a group of elected chiefs which formed a council. The council attained great dignity and prestige among these Chins and exerted great influence on subordinate tribes. After the British occupation, the council was in a critical condition and members knew that submission to the British would be a death-blow to their position. They also realised at the same time that they had nothing to gain by a quarrel with the British and thus they sought their friendship, even if outwardly. After the successful disarmament of the Taisuns their tributary 156

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villages were released from the bondage of taxation and coercion. The assistant political officer dealt with each village separately. At the same time the existence of the council was recognised. Falam was made the headquarters of the political officer with an assistant. Tributes were levied through the chiefs. There were in the south of the Taisuns some 120 villages comprising Haka, Thantlang, Zokhua and other southern tribes. Though each clan had its own chief, the chiefs of the Haka group claimed supremacy over several villages. Haka power had been acquired by colonisation of extensive territories rather than by force of arms (Ibid.: 156). The majority of the southern villages established as a result of this policy was therefore under the influence of the Haka chiefs. This tract was put under the assistant political officer stationed at Haka. The policy towards the chiefs in these hills was thus not different from that followed in the north. Though the Haka chief was given the authority to settle disputes between their own people, the village chiefs were allowed to rule themselves. Mention may be made of the Chinbons, Chinboks, Chinme and Yindu, who were not under the political officer of the Chin Hills but were administered from Yawdwin in the Pakokku Hill Tracts. In 1892 Lieutenant Tighe, political officer of the Pakokku Hill Tract, visited these tribes and reduced them to submission. He established a base at Mindat and Mount Victoria. Like the Chin/Zo in the north, each village was traditionally ruled by a chief or headman. While many of these were retained, the political officer introduced the system of paid chiefs, selecting them from among the influential men and placing them in charge of each village or group of villages to collect tribute. In order to promote good understanding between the British and the chiefs, the latter were encouraged to make occasional visits to the political officer when they were presented salt, blankets, gongs and the like (Rigby [1897] 2000: 186–7). To sum up, for an effective and cheap administration in the difficult hills, the British continued the indigenous mode of village administration through the chiefs respecting and preserving tribal laws and customs. Thus they retained the existing chiefs and appointed new ones. The chiefs were reduced to a subordinate position and were required to recognise the British supremacy. The Chin/Zo were thus divided into three administrative divisions at Tedim, Falam and Haka. Each administrative division was under the assistant political officer, who was responsible to the political officer. In this way, the British officers became overlords to the Chin/Zo chiefs. The southernmost Chin/Zo remained under the Yawdwin subdivision well into the twentieth century. Despite the claim of the Burma authorities that conditions in the Chin Hills were entirely different from that obtaining in the Lushai Hills, the basic principles of administration through the indigenous system were not dissimilar. In the Lushai Hills, the commissioner of Chittagong, David Reid 157

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Lyall, had first drawn the attention of the Bengal Government to this when he wrote in January 1890 that the nature of the people is such that any attempt at governing (the tribes) minutely would be expensive, and our knowledge of the people and their customs is small. I would, therefore, recommend that for the present the system of government through chiefs should fully be recognised.34 Four years’ experience of the Lushai Hills confirmed the wisdom of the policy. Alexander Porteous, who then held charge of the Northern Lushai Hills, gave a fuller expression to this in 1894: I always held the chiefs of villages responsible for the behaviour of the people, and upheld their authority to the best of my ability. I have repeatedly told them that this policy will be consistently followed, and that, as long as they behaved themselves as they should, their orders will not be interfered with, even though their orders may appear to us at times a little high-handed, and not quite in accord with abstract ideas of justice. . . . In upholding the authority of the chiefs, I have, as a rule refused to take up appeals against their orders on petty case as it only diminishes a man’s authority. (Reid [1942] 1978: 14)35 The policy that Bertram Carey and his officers was working out for the Chin Hills was thus not unique, but part of a system that came to be well known as ‘indirect rule’ or administration.36 What Burma had achieved, however, was to give it a legal framework. But before that it is important to dwell on the boundary the Chin Hills in order to clarify the jurisdiction within which the proposed Chin Hills regulations should come into force.

Boundary demarcation: Chin Hills-Manipur boundary One of the major tasks of the British as they were about to establish control over the Chin Hills was to settle the problem of the northern frontier bordering with Manipur. When the Kabaw Valley was ceded to Burma in 1834, Captain Grant and Captain Robert Pemberton were ordered to proceed to the Kabaw Valley to make it over to the Burmese commissioners. Though Pemberton was ordered to point out to the Burmese commissioner the northern and southern boundaries of the Kabaw Valley, curiously enough, no clear instruction was given to him about the southern border of Manipur. Pemberton found out that the Numsailung (Namsaweng in Burmese, and Tuipu in Chin/Zo) River was the southern border of the Kabaw Valley but

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did not have any idea where its source originated. Thus, he unilaterally ran an imaginary boundary of Manipur across the hills up to the Manipur River, as given in the Agreement of 1834: On the south, a line extending from the eastern foot of the same hills (Muring) at the point where the river called by the Burmans Nansaweng and by the Muneepoorees Numsailung enters the plain up to its sources, and across the hills due west down to the Kathe Khyoung (Muneepooree River).37 In 1834, the British had vague knowledge about the position of the hills on either side of the Kabaw Valley, or of the rivers in it. Pemberton did not go down there to determine it for himself, as the agreement was signed on the banks of the Chindwin.38 Thus, in his Report of the Eastern Frontier of India, he admitted that the southern frontier of Manipur was ‘very irregular and ill defined’ ([1835] 2000: 21). The Treaty of 1834, which mentioned ‘part of the Sootie (Sukte) tribe at present live in Manipur and part in Burmese or independent territory’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 172), was due to Pemberton’s misunderstanding of the frontier areas he had never visited or surveyed. Thus when the boundary was to be demarcated, it was found that the Namsailung/Namsaweng River referred to in 1834 was actually what the Chin/Zo called Tuipu and the Burmans Nanpalaw. From there the boundary was supposed to go up the Manipur River to a certain point, and then west to the Lushai and Cachar border, thus giving a large enclave on the east of the Manipur River to Manipur that became known as ‘Pemberton’s Enclave’.39 The truth is that the hill tracts on the east and west of the Manipur River, which a recent study dubbed as a ‘neutral zone’ or ‘no man’s land’ (Zou 2009: 215), had never been under the control of Burma or Manipur. In 1856, the political agent of Manipur, Colonel McCulloch, remarked ‘the south-eastern portion of Manipur territory had never been explored and that the Manipur authorities had never tried to bring the tribes inhabiting it into subjection’(Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 174–5). In his Account of the Valley of Manipur (1859), McCulloch further stated, ‘To the North-East and South, the boundary is not well defined, and would much depend upon the extent to which the Munnipore Government might spread its influence amongst the hill tribes in those directions’ (McCulloch [1859] 1980: 1). That the Raja of Manipur had little influence beyond the valley is clearly reflected in the location of his frontier posts,40 which essentially marks the limit of his influence and the actual border of his territory. This may be clearly proved from what another Political Agent Colonel Mowbray Thomson said in his report of 1872: ‘The whole tribe seems to be practically independent and not to have been effected at all by the Treaty of 1834 . . . for all practical purposes this tribe should be considered as independent,

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and liable to punishment from either power [Manipur or Burmese] it raids’ (Mackenzie [1884] 2001: 173–4). The main objective of the establishment of the southern frontier posts by Manipur was to defend themselves from Kamhau-Sukte, who had successfully pressed northwards and established their dominance up to the border of the valley of Manipur in the nineteenth century. They were considered by the Manipuris as more formidable than the Lushai, who also used to raid into Manipur (Ibid.: 163). Taking advantage of the Lushai Expedition in 1871–72, the Manipuri Contingent led by two majors and Major General W. F. Nuthall moved beyond Tseklapi (also spelt Jolpi), the southernmost frontier post (see Table 3.1), against order and encamped at Chivu where they captured Go Khaw Thang, the chief of Mualpi, and his followers.41 This incident has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Interestingly, at Chivu Nuthall erected 2½ feet high, 2 feet wide, and about 4 inches thick stone to commemorate his victory over the Lushai.42 A rough translation of the inscription on the big stone goes: In 1793 of the era Sakabda, in the month of Wakching, two Manipuri Majors, Balaram Sing and Tangal Sing, with 130 officers and 2000 men, accompanied by General Nuthall, conquered 112 villages, including Poiboi, Lenkam, & c., and took possession of this salt well, placing there the footprints of the Rjah Chunder Kirtee Sing Maharajah.43 The inscription on the small stone writes: ‘General Nuthall, Political Agent year 1793 of the era Sakabda’.44 As argued in an earlier chapter, neither was the act of the Meitei majors and Nuthall approved by the British nor the Kamhau people recognised the Maharaja of Manipur as their masters. There is no doubt that Nuthall was working at the behest of the Maharaja of Manipur and the commemoration stone erected by him aimed to appease him. However, the temporary occupation of Chivu and the commemoration stone cannot be treated as a confirmation of the southern border of Manipur. Taking serious note of the Manipuris’ infringement on its territory, the Kamhaus prepared to launch military campaigns against Manipur, which greatly alarmed the new political agent, Mowbray Thomson, who left no stone unturned to avoid another confrontation by trying to patch up peace between them, to which he somehow managed to achieve it, albeit it was shortlived.45 Those were the circumstances when E. S. Symes, chief secretary to the chief commissioner of Burma, wrote to the Government of India on 20 September 1892 to seek ‘full power to settle and demarcate the boundary once for all’.46 In 1892, Bertram Carey of Chin Hills also strongly felt that ‘the reality of the boundary is urgent’47 and proposed to the chief commissioner of Burma

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that ‘the Manipur border will presumably be fixed at a distance of 80 miles north of Tiddim in the latitude of Howbi Peak’. He also suggested to keep one assistant political officer at Lenacot (Sialmong) who would control the northern tribes such as Guite, Zou and Thados.48 Burma and Assam agreed that the Boundary Commission should begin the work in March 1893.49 On 21 October 1893, the Government of India instructed: ‘The Commissioners [of Burma and Assam] should have full power and a free hand to settle and demarcate the boundary once for all. If unfortunately, they cannot agree, the decision will rest with the Government of India’.50 But the delimitation of the Chin Hills-Manipur boundary was postponed till 1894 due to the ‘Sizang-Sukte Rebellion’, which was discussed in the previous chapter. It was only on 27 January 1894 that members of the Boundary Commission from Manipur and Burma assembled at Tinzin, a Burman village on the left bank of the Tinzinchaung (Tuisa River). Members representing Burma included B. S. Carey, political officer, Chin Hills, Captain F. B. Longe, R. E. Survey of India and 12 followers, Lieutenant W. H. Dent, 2nd Battalion (P.W. O), Yorkshire Regiment, intelligence officer, and two surveyors, Lieutenant B. Trydell and 50 rifles of 1st Burma Rifles as escort, Sergeant James, and one hospital assistant. Representatives of Manipur were A. Porteous, political agent of Manipur, Captain M. A. Kerr, Lieutenant H. Baillie and 100 rifles, 43rd Gurkhas as escort and one hospital assistant. According to Lieutenant W. H. Dent, the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup and two young followers also accompanied Carey.51 Carey also acknowledged with ‘satisfaction’ the provisions arranged by the Kamhau Chief, who accompanied him throughout his trip, from his villages.52 On 28 January 1894, the Boundary Commission begun the exploration from Tuisa (Tinzinchaung), instead of Tuipu (Nanphalaw, which was claimed by Manipur as Numsailung), as it entered the Kabaw Valley in latitude 23°49′30″ N from the hills on its west up along the course of this stream in a general north-westerly direction to one of its sources called the Khengzoidung, where the first pillar was placed and the last one was on the source of Tuimong River. Altogether eight pillars were erected from east to west. The boundary pillars were slabs of stone facing north and south. ‘M’ (for Manipur) is cut on the north and ‘C.H.’ (for Chin Hills) on the south, and underneath these letters the figure representing the number of the pillar, which commences to be numbered from east and works west. On 1 March 1894, Bertram Carey and Alexander Porteous signed the agreement at Tuikui camp on top of the Lunglen hills. The northern latitude of the line at any point is at Lunglen Hills 24°0′42″ N, while the extreme southern point is 23°49′30″ N, where Tuisa enters Burma. According to W. H. Dent, the reason why Tuisa was chosen instead of Tuipu was because of the government’s instruction, which said ‘the line was

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Source: Adapted from the political agent of Manipur, Alexander Porteous’s ‘Rough Trace of Boundary between Chin Hills and Manipur’.

Map 6.1 Manipur–Chin Hills boundary map, 1894

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to be in the latitude of Pemberton’s line and drawn so as to exclude Lenacot from Manipur’.53 They followed a river line instead of a range of hills because the latter are ‘so ill-defined in that neighbourhood’. Since Carey himself said that, except during the time of Colonel McCulloch, Manipur was never able to control its southern tribes, who often raided the plains and defied the state, why then did he allow Manipur to claim a vast tract of land on its southern hills? In fact, the political agent of Manipur, who was working on behalf of the infant Raja, wished to secure all that Pemberton had given to the state in 1834 and to annex the fringe of villages on the right bank of the river and on the border of the Manipur plain. Unfortunately, he had been wrongly led to believe that there were 91 villages (only half of which actually existed on paper) on the right bank of the river from which Manipur could derive a comfortable income and that the left bank of the river, in addition to the pine forest, which does exist, was capable of producing vegetable and mineral resources in the future.54 That the political agent of Manipur was working at the behest of the Raja of Manipur is undoubtedly confirmed by J. Clerk who remarked: ‘The Political Agent is dependent on the will and pleasure of the Maharaja for everything. His every word and movement is known to the Maharaja. He is in fact a British Officer under Manipur surveillance’ (quoted in Roy 1958: 100). What is less known, if not forgotten, is that the demarcation of boundary between Manipur and the Chin Hills arbitrarily awarded several villages which were under the dominance of the Kamhau-Sukte to Manipur. Carey admitted, ‘By the delimitation of the Manipur boundary Howchinkup lost several villages which his forefathers had conquered and which up to that time had paid him a nominal tribute’ (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 112). Two years before the boundary delimitation, Captain G. B. Stevens, 4th Madras Pioneers and Commander of the Kamhau Column, had visited all the villages of the Northern Chin Hills including those of the Thado, Zou and Guite villages. He went up to Tonglawn (Tornlongs) and Losau (Losow), where the Guite clan had moved from Mualpi, to extract slaves from their possession. Thus villages which had clearly paid tribute to the paramount ruler of the Northern Chin Hills were, after the boundary delimitation, found inside Manipur.55 This argument is strongly supported beyond dispute by Sir James Johnstone’s map of the territory of Manipur, which shows a large tract of land in the south missing from the territory of Manipur before the boundary demarcation. Johnstone was the political agent of Manipur (1877–86), and his map later appeared in his My Experience in Manipur and the Naga Hills (1896).56 The villages which were arbitrarily awarded to Manipur by the Boundary Commission include 19 Zou villages, 15 out of 21 Thado villages, and 13 Guite villages.57 As a result of the boundary demarcation the ‘Thado tribe’, Carey later remarked, ‘now drops out of my books as well as the ‘Yo’ and ‘Nwite (including the Vaipe) which are now included in the Kuki or Kongjai hills of Manipur’ (Carey and Tuck [1896] 163

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1932: 112). Strikingly enough, colonial records inform us that the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup was offered two villages, Litmi and Mwial, in northern Gungal-Sukte as compensation over his loss of 55 villages.58 The question is: How and why did the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup accept the new boundary line that awarded a huge tract of lands under his control to Manipur without a protest? It was not known whether Hau Cin Khup simply accepted the new boundary line or he was forced to do so. What we only know from Carey’s report is that when the Burma party returned to Tonzang on 12 March 1894, Carey appointed Chief Hau Cin Khup ‘to administer all the country from his southern boundaries to the new boundary line on the north’.59 At any rate, it must be remembered that the boundary demarcation came just a couple of years after the British had signed a treaty with Hau Cin Khup at Fort White. Under such circumstances, Hau Cin Khup must have been, perhaps, bounded by the agreement to accept the superimposed boundary, albeit with great reluctance. Also, the boundary demarcation had come after the Kamhau-Sukte in particular and the Chin/Zo in general had been militarily disarmed, subdued and put under control. Therefore, under such backdrop the two British officers in the Boundary Commission dictated terms as they wish. That does not, however, justify the Maharaja of Manipur’s claim through his political agent to Pemberton’s line as his border. History, as discussed above, has proved that even Pemberton’s line was an arbitrary imaginary line drawn by someone who had only superficial knowledge of the areas and the people. The extent of one’s influence and location of frontier posts was essentially the limit and marker of one’s territorial border. A recent study argues that the ‘hills-valley divide’ in Manipur was due to the ‘politico-administrative fiat’ which led to the emergence of ‘totalizing projects’ (Suan 2012: 272)60 in the hills as well as in the valley in postcolonial times. Referring to the problem of the so-called migrants, a label often used by the Meitei in the valley to refer to the hill tribes, David Zou aptly argues that it would be helpful and historically sound to see the inclusion or exclusion of the Zou [and other kindred tribes] population into either Manipur or Burma within the context of colonial Boundary Survey practices and its arbitrary lines of demarcation and practices of ‘awarding’ land and even people to its colonial collaborators. (2009: 217) Indeed, the map of Sir James Johnstone (Map 6.2) speaks volumes about the ‘inclusion’ or ‘exclusion’ and also how the arbitrary line drawn in 1894 reconfigured the boundary and fixed the fate of many Chin/Zo villages. Undoubtedly, the predicament which continues to haunt the hills-valley division in Manipur today is nothing but a colonial legacy and the problem of

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Source: Adapted from Sir James Johnstone’s map showing boundary of Manipur and Chin Hills in 1880s.

Map 6.2 Manipur and Chin Hills boundary map, 1880s

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border making which did not take into account the interest of the communities on the ground. Worst of all, the post-independent boundary between India and Burma/Myanmar, which was mutually agreed in 1967, simply recognised the ‘traditional line’ without any rectification.

‘Indirect rule’: the Chin Hills Regulations By the time of its enactment, British position in these hills was fairly organised. Until December 1894, the Chin Hills had been garrisoned by the military: the northern hills by the 800-strong 1st Burma Rifles with Major Presgrave and eight British officers, and the south by the 6th Burma Battalion under Major Keary. On the recommendations of the chief commissioner, a military police was raised in December 1894 to relieve the 1st Burma Rifles. The northern hills were by now under more effective control. Military changes in the southern hills took a while longer. Report on the administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1895–96 was full of optimism. ‘Peace and order have been maintained throughout the district’ it declared, and ‘trade has increased, and the relations of the Chins with the people in the plains have improved’.61 In the south and west, large portions of the hills, hitherto unvisited, had been explored. Crime, it said, had been satisfactorily dealt with, all fines imposed had been realised and progress had been made in the settlement of the many blood feuds and disputes which existed among the Chin/Zo. The year’s tribute had been paid in full. The political officer concluded his report with the remark: Now that the Chins have been disarmed, no extensive military operations should again be required in the district, and the civil officers will therefore be free to devote their energies to the peaceful development of the country and to improving the condition under which the people live.62 Sir Frederick Fryer,63 the chief commissioner, had long been contemplating the future administration of Chin Hills particularly with reference to the chiefs and the tribes. In January 1896 these found expression in a draft regulation which he prepared in consultation with Bertram Carey. The ‘most convenient plan will be to administer the Chin Hills as a separate district under a Superintendent and such Assistant Superintendents as may be require’. This was the Southern Lushai Hills model of the Bengal Government and, more particularly, the system that had been followed in the Kachin Hills. Indeed, the proposed draft regulation was based on the Kachin Hills Regulation (I of 1895) enacted a year earlier. Second, the Chin Hills had been directly under the chief commissioner from the day it came under British control following the annexation of Upper Burma. This was necessary especially when the pacification and settlement of the hills were in progress. A 166

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change had been made in the administration of the Kachin Hills and in the opinion of the chief commissioner: There is no reason why a Commissioner should not now direct the administration of the Chin Hills in the same way as the Commissioner of the Northern Division directs the administration of the Kachin Tracts; and so long as the present situation remains unchanged, it is desirable that the Chief Commissioner should be relieved of a number of duties with which, except in time of real necessity, it is inexpedient that he should be burdened.64 The draft regulation was intended to provide alternative methods of controlling the administration of the hills. The regulation had been framed so as to reserve to the chief commissioner all powers usually exercised by Commissioner of the division, but a section was inserted enabling him to divest himself of these powers and to delegate them to a commissioner. Provision was also made for the resumption by the chief commissioner of his powers should it at any time seem desirable for him to do so. The commissioner under whom the Chin Hills were to be placed was not named, but it was the intention to attach it to the commissioner of the Central Division. The regulation was to apply only to tracts which were from time to time brought under administration. There were tracts in which administration had not been attempted, and it was considered neither necessary nor desirable to declare any law to apply to them even though they were theoretically included in the Chin Hills. As regards the ‘foreign population’ in the Chin Hills the ordinary law, subject to certain modifications, was to apply. This was Carey’s idea, and was similar to that which prevailed in the Kachin Hills. As regards the definition of the ‘Chins’ it was drafted by Carey himself: ‘Chins’ includes also (a) Lushais, (b) Kukis, (c) Burmans domiciled in the Chin Hills and (d) any persons who have adopted the customs and language of the Chins and are habitually resident in the Chin Hills. The definition given above was recognition of the ethnic commonality of Zo people who had been broadly categorised as Chin, Lushai and Kuki. Perhaps the addition of Burman in the ‘Chin’ group in the context of Chin Hills may be based on the historical relationship between the two communities as discussed in the introduction of this book. In the chief secretary’s letter forwarding the draft regulation, it was made clear that ‘the Regulation aims at the least possible interference with local customs and preserves the autonomy of tribes and villages. At the same time full and sufficient powers are reserved to the Superintendent for the purpose of control and supervision’. The powers and functions of the superintendent and the duties and obligations of the chiefs or headmen were accordingly 167

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defined. The superintendent was to be deputy commissioner, district magistrate, and sessions judge, his assistants, sub-divisional officers and assistant collectors, and would be invested under the Code of Criminal Procedure with necessary magisterial powers. What was crucial for the Chin Hills, however, was the superintendent’s relations with and control over the chiefs, or headmen as the regulation termed them. The term was so defined: ‘headman’ means the chief or head of any clan or village inhabited by the Chins, and includes a council of chiefs or elders. This section heavily curtailed the power and independence of the chiefs. Though the institution of innpi/ukpi (paramount chiefs) in the Northern Hills and Council of Elders in Falam (Namkap) remained untouched, the independence of village chiefs was most affected by the regulations. A clan was any subdivision or section of ‘Chins’ and included a group of ‘Chins’; a village included, ‘a village community’, ‘village lands’, ‘rivers passing through or by village lands’ and a ‘group of villages’. Chapter III was devoted to Headmen and their powers. Section 5(1) of the draft thus stated: Subject to any general or special orders of the Local Government, the Superintendent may appoint and remove any headmen, and may define the local limits of his jurisdiction and declare what clan, or village, or both shall be subject to him. Sub-section (2) added: Where a headman is appointed for a group of villages or clans, the Superintendent may declare the extent to, and the manner in, which the headmen of the villages or clans composing such groups shall be subordinate to the headman of the group. The headmen were given, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, general control according to local custom, over the clan or village or both, declared subject to him. He could levy from them any customary duties and impose such punishments as authorised by local custom. Other sections bound him to keep the peace within his jurisdiction, to comply with all lawful orders of the superintendent or his assistants, to furnish them on requisition and on receipt of payment at rates fixed by the superintendent, supplies of food or labour required by any public servant. The headmen were given the authority of criminal jurisdiction, and could punish with fine in money or goods any person found guilty by him of any offence within such jurisdiction. As regards civil jurisdiction, he could try and decide according to local custom any dispute of a civil nature between persons subjects to his general control and could enforce his decision. The last chapter, Chapter VII, prohibited appeals: ‘There shall be no appeal against any order passed by a headman or by an officer acting under this Regulation’. 168

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Although the headmen were to act according to custom and usage, the overall control and supervision by the superintendent permeated every section of the draft regulation. Section 38(1) for instance proposed: All headmen and all officers in the Chin Hills shall be subordinate to the Superintendent, who may revise any order passed by any such headman or officer, including an Assistant Superintendent. In effect, the power and position of the chief had been redefined and redesignated to become a ‘headman’, a mere ‘agent’ of the colonial government.65 The impact of the regulations needs further elaboration. Carey and Tuck rightly observed that the Chin/Zo chiefs were ‘lords of the soil’ within their boundaries, and, if any aliens wish to enter a chief’s territory and work his land, they must pay him customary tithes. A chief, besides the tithes, which he received as lord of the soil, received tribute from tribes, villages or families which he had conquered (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 201). He also received one hind leg of every animal sacrificed by any of his men for religious purposes, as religious tax called sa-khua (Sakhong 2003: 37). In some cases, the chief also served as village priest. There were two kinds of priest: the village priest known as Tual-siampupa, Khua-sampa or Tual-phuisam in Tedim dialect and Tlangbawi in Lai, and the clan or family priest called Tulpipa in Tedim (Khai 1995: 162–3). It was traditionally believed that the chiefs received the mandate of religious power and political authority from the Khuasiam (Tedim)/Khuahrum (Lai)/Khua-rung (Zotung). Therefore, the Chin/Zo concept of political power is not a human invention but the mandate of the Khuasiam (Tedim), Khua-hrum (Lai) or Khua-rung (Zotung). In fact, political power, religious belief and the economic system were intertwined in chieftainship because, actually, it was not the chief but the god or spirit, which became the guardian of the land or place of settlement. The people observed the social codes not because the gods or spirits to who sacrifices were offered demand, but because they feared the retributive punishment which was bound to ensue if one was indiscreet enough to ignore it. Sing Khaw Khai rightly says, Zo society is the one in which there was no secular authority to enforce social justice nor was there any god or king who gave the moral laws and administered them . . . It is a society where people believe in the existence of an unseen power that enforces social justice. (1995: 147) Traditionally the Chin/Zo can form a new village with or without the permission of the chief. But the regulations prohibited village formation without 169

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the consent of the superintendent, ‘who may, for reason to be recorded in writing, prohibit the formation thereof’. In addition, he had powers to direct the removal of villages. The regulations thus followed the pattern of ‘indirect rule’ on the model of the South Lushai and Kachin Hills. The essential difference between the Lushai and Chin situation lay in the fact that in the former there was only the village chief. Here the policy, described by Chittagong Commissioner David Reid Lyall, was ‘recognising a chief from each village and not recognising any one chief as paramount over any tract or country’.66 In the Northern Chin Hills, the position of Hau Cin Khup had to be recognised and strengthened, while at Falam the importance of the council had to be taken into consideration. The draft regulation was considered in the Legislative Department of the Government of India, which after amendments67 was approved by the governor general in council on 23 July 1896. It was gazetted on 15 August.68

The Pakokku Hills The regulation was at the same time extended to the Pakokku Chin Hills.69 The tribes inhabiting these hills, it may be recalled, consisted of the Chinme, Chinbok, Chinbon and Yindu. The Chinmes occupied the area northwest of the Mount Victoria. The region to the north of this mountain and south of the Maw-Myittha watershed was inhabited by the Chinboks; they were also found in the Chey, Maung and Yaw Valley. The Chinbons inhabited the country round Laungshe and the low hills to the east of the Chinboks. The country located by the Mon River was inhabited by the Yindus. They were also known as Gwepyas or wild Dais. The Pakokku Chin Hills was first visited by Lieutenant R. M. Rainey during the Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889–90.70 Again in 1891, Captain Walker, attache to the Intelligence Department, after exploring the route from Minbu to Akyab, returned to Burma from the Lower Lemroo guard to Laungshe via Kyindwe, thus touching on the southern portion of the country visited by the columns during the past season. The next year, Captain J. Harvey, attache to the Intelligence Branch, surveyed the area around Mount Victoria and the country along the valley of the Mon south-west of Laungshe (Rigby [1897] 2000: 1). The operation under Lieutenant M. J. Tighe, subdivisional officer, Yawdwin, and those that followed had successfully obtained their submission in 1893 as earlier indicated. Tighe had established three military posts at Mount Stewart (Qui-Lum-Tong), Khrum, a village of 150 houses, and Kitchen’s Peak (Baw-Qui-Tong).71 During 1896–97 coordinated operations were carried out by three columns from Mindat, Arakan Hill Tracts and Yawdwin, respectively. The Arakan column was under the command of R. H. Greenstreet, superintendent; the Mindat column was commanded by A. Ross, political officer; and P. Duncan led the Laungshe column. The columns were assigned five major tasks: 170

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1

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3

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To conflict further punishment on the Chinboks of the Chechaung and neighbourhood and on the Yindus of Atetson-Piedaw, who in February last raided the Chinbon village of Swelegyin in the Langshe township and in the following month attacked the Mindat post, and to capture the ringleaders, more especially the Yindus Nga Tinm Nye of AtetsonPiedaw. To punish the villages (believed to be the Yindu villages of Saung and Lok) which committed raids in 1895 and 1896 on the tribute-paying village of Myaing; to recover any captives not yet restored; and to recover the amounts paid by way of ransom for the captives already restored. To visit, survey, and obtain as much knowledge as possible of the Yawdwin charge of the practically unexplored country lying between the administrative boundary of the Yawdwin charge and the Arakan Yomas. To settle the administrative boundary of the Yawdwin charge from a point south-west of Tilin northwards to the boundary of the Haka jurisdiction. To levy or arrange for the payment of the customary tribute by the Chins of the Yawdwin charge and to settle inter-village feuds and disputes. (Rigby [1897] 2000: 6–7)

With these objectives, the three columns started in November 1896 and extensively visited the entire Chinbok and Yindu region. On 3 January 1897 the three columns met at the village of Myaing, a Yindu village west of the Mon lying on the peak Kunumchung72 above Zang-im-nu. On the 7th they summoned chiefs of the villages including Zang-im-nu, Tai-im-nu (Matimataw), M’da, Himchang, and other trans-frontier villages, and held a meeting with them and were feasted at government expense. They were told that nothing was required from them, but they must once and for all abstain from raiding government villages. The chiefs were induced to submit. Three days later, the three columns departed from Myaing: the Arakan column and the Laungshe column returning to their respective bases marching south towards Kindwe, while the Mindat column retraced its steps north-east en route to Mindat Sakan. The operations were finally concluded in May that year (Ibid.: 53). The meeting at Myaing had taught the independent villages that the government on both sides of them was one and the same. The expedition to the upper waters of the Mon had yielded a good knowledge of the entire region to the British. It also successfully forced the Yindus, or ‘cane-belly Chins’, into submission. In general, the operations enabled the British to complete the survey of the Pakokku Chin Hills and bring the people into submission. What remained was the region lying between the administrative boundary between Haka and the Northern Arakan Hill Tracts in the south which had never been explored (Ibid.: 184). 171

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The Pakokku Chin Hills was placed under subordinate political charge of the subdivisional officer of Yawdwin, whose headquarters was at Pasok during the dry season and Pakokku during the rains. The tribes were left much to themselves. The occasional visit to these hills by British officers was found inadequate to keep them under control. It was therefore proposed to place a special officer at some central position to permanently station with sufficient force at his disposal so that he could at once move out to any part requiring his interaction during both the ‘close’ and ‘open’ seasons. A system of ‘paid chiefs of circles’ as in the Arakan Hill Tracts over each valley or group of villages, whose business was to collect tribute from the headmen of villages and to keep the political officer informed as to what is going on, was put in place. Despite these changes troubles perpetrated by non-tribute-paying people on tribute-paying villages still persisted in the region. In December 1900, Khrum village under the leadership of Shung Law attacked Shikhruit, a tribute-paying village, killing six persons and taking four into captivity. A military expedition under the command of W. B. Tydd, assistant superintendent, Pakokku Chin Hills, was consequently sent to punish the offenders in February 1901. The column advanced to Bong, the first village beyond the administrative boundary, and its adjoining villages, which proved to be friendly. The party under Fenn finally visited Khrum and seized two head chiefs, Kwi Nai and Law. However, the leader of the raid, Shung Law, managed to escape. The column halted for three days enforcing orders and taking hostages. In August, the people paid compensation for the murders and took an oath of friendship to the British. The hostages were then released, except one, who died of dysentry.73 The Khrum village was still far from pacified. In early 1903, a military police post at Hilong was temporarily established in the hope that the officer posted there would be able to have an easy communication with Khrum so that a satisfactory and permanent settlement could be effected.74 In May, measures were taken to come to terms with Khrum. W. D. Tydd, the assistant superintendent, engaged transborder men to get information and employed emissaries to seek out the chiefs and elders. He also sent off Chin police to patrol the border. In July, Ge, the headman of the transborder village of Raw, who served as an emissary, brought in the information that the chiefs of Khrum were disposed to surrender to government. Intelligence also arrived that Khrum was rather trying to collect men against the British. Tydd acted swiftly and succeeded in inducing the Khrum chiefs to accept the following terms on 25 January 1904 after they swore friendship on a tiger’s skull.75 1 2

Chief Kwi Hang Ling and Htum Yaw undertook to present themselves once in three months at Mindat or Hilong posts. Khrum was not to harbour Nung Htung Loe and to give him up to the British should he come into their hands.76 172

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It was not before another three years when Shung Law was apprehended.77 While operations in these regions were going on the headquarters of the subdivision officer was shifted to Kanpetlet, on the slopes of Kunumchung or Mount Victoria, some 6,000 feet above sea level. A small force of military police composed largely of Gorkhas under a British officer was placed at his disposal. No attempt was made to integrate these Chins/Zo with the Northern Chins Hills district. Indeed, the Chin/Zo of the Pakokku hills were considered culturally different from the northern neighbours. That is why Lehman made two broad division of the Chin/Zo. The Burma Gazette emphasised this point when describing the Chinbok in 1901: The inhabitants of this tract are practically all animists. The Chinbok men wear a very scanty loincloth, and were seldom seen without their bows and arrows. The women’s dress consists of a frock and a short skirt. The females have their faces tattooed.78 It was some years before this perception was rectified.

First World War and Chin/Zo resistance, 1917–18 At the outbreak of the First World War, there was a call for men from the hill areas of Assam and Burma for the Labour Corps in France. One thousand men each were to be supplied from the three subdivisions of Haka, Falam and Tedim. Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau chief, who had always been loyal to the British since the Fort White agreement in 1891, gave invaluable service by collecting more than a thousand from Tedim subdivision. He was assisted by chiefs Pau Za Cin, Dong Tual and Pau Khaw Mang in raising the Chin Labour Corps. The superintendent of the Chin Hills had happily noted: ‘This response by the Northern Chin is more remarkable when it is considered that there are only about 5,000 males between the ages of 20 and 40 in the subdivision’.79 In Falam subdivision, over 800 labourers had been enrolled. There was minor resistance from the Khuangli village, which spread to a certain number of villages in the Zahau tract. But this was soon overcome.80 Several Chin/Zo chiefs also donated to the war relief fund. Among these Zahau chief Van Ngul and Falam chief Van Hmung donated Rs.1,000 and Rs. 744, respectively.81 The situation in Haka subdivision was, however, different. Laura Carson thus describes what it was: word came that the Government was going to attempt to raise ‘a coolie corps’ from among our people, for service in France. This caused great excitement. One corps had already been raised among the Siyins in Tiddim and efforts were being made to raise another in the Falam subdivision. Haka would be next! All military British 173

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officers and sepoys who could be spared had been withdrawn from the Hills and had gone to France. Civil officers were sent to lower Burma for military training. Haka was therefore left without a British officer and with only a handful of sepoys, most of whom were more boys, no one dreaming that the Haka Chins would make any serious trouble. But there was an undercurrent of tense excitement. One could feel it in the air. There were only three English-speaking people in Haka at the time, two Anglo-Indian men and myself. There was a rumor of trouble and attempted revolt in Falam and our Haka civil officer was hastily recalled from lower Burma, and the sepoy guard for Haka was increased from twenty-six to fifty men. (Carson [1927] 1997: 226) In 1917, B. Fisher, the assistant superintendent of Haka, met various chiefs of the Haka subdivision and told them of the number of men each had to supply in proportion to the number of villages they held. It was this demand that was officially cited as the cause of the outbreak. Laura Carson, who had over the years established a close rapport with the Haka people, received the earliest intelligence of impending trouble on the evening of November 1917 from a Christian convert named Shia Kaw: thirteen village had united, taking the sacred oath that they would attack Haka, kill the sepoys, take their guns and with them clear the Hills of the British and resume their own government . . . the men of Sakta had secreted their women and children in the jungle and carried out six months’ provision for them, and they were spending their time day and night making ammunition, and wait for an opportunity to strike. (Ibid.: 227–8)82 The assistant superintendent who had the matter investigated found Laura Carson’s fears unfounded. Two days later, however, Tsan Dwe, a Christian young man who belonged to an important chief’s family, brought another warning that ‘his brother had seen a large force congregated that evening only about three miles from Haka’. Another investigation was conducted by the assistant superintendent which proved that whatever Shia Kaw said turned out to be true. On the morning of 23 November 1917, after he received another report of an advancing army of 5,000 strong towards Haka, Fisher ordered all his men to take shelter in the ‘Police Lines’ (Ibid.: 227–30).83 This was reported to the superintendent of Falam, who urgently wired Shillong for assistance (Shakespear [1929] 1977: 212).84 The petty officials and the mission workers including Laura Hardin were ordered to take shelter in the police lines where they remained for the next 22 days.

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The next morning a reconnoitering party of 15 mounted sepoys was ambushed near the station. Sporadic firing was heard from a distance. The following day, Hakas were seen rushing into the compound and there was a sharp exchange of firing in which the sergeant’s wife and his daughter were killed. What happened thereafter is described by the same missionary lady: While no organized attack was made during the whole of our twenty-two days inside the Police Lines we knew perfectly well that they could wipe us off the face of the earth at any moment if only they had the courage to boldly close in on us and make the attempt. This they did not; but day after day there was firing into the Lines from the surrounding jungles, usually at too great a distance to do much harm. (Carson [1927] 1997: 233) The Falam-Haka road was cut off, huge trees had been felled across the road on the mountain sides, entanglements had been made out of the telegraph wire and stockades had been raised from the materials taken from pioneer camp buildings. On 12 December, the assistant superintendent managed to clear the road for about 12 miles after 13 hours of hard work to enable a relief column from Kalewa (Johnson 1988: 416). Meanwhile, sporadic fighting had been going on at Zokhua, Khuapi, Aitung, Surkhua, Hnaring, and Sakta. On 16 December, a well-armed 350-strong relief column under the command of Major L.E.L. Burne and four other British officers, and accompanied by the superintendent at Falam, reached Haka. Contingents from the Assam Rifles sent from Aizawl and Kohima had also arrived, and in collaboration with two Burma columns mounted operations against the principal villages of Kapi, Aiton, Surkhua, Naring, Sakta and suffering in the process many casualties, 30 to 40 in number.85 Units from the Assam Rifles also began operations against villages northeast of Tao range, meeting stiff resistance from Buankhua, Buanlun and Thantlang. In February 1918 a combined detachment of Assam Rifles and Burma Military Police moved to Lennakot (Sialmong) in the Northern Chin Hills and then to southern Manipur where the Thados also rose up against recruitment for the Labour Corps.86 The uprising had even spread to Zonghing in Mindat in the Pakokku Hill Tract and to the Southern Lushai Hills, covering the upper Boinu and to Wantu, Laitet and Ngaphai, resulting in extensive operations (Shakespear [1929] 1977: 228; Reid [1942] 1974: 79–89). In early 1919, the uprising was suppressed and leaders were brought to trial. Sixty-one were sentenced.87 Two Haka Faron men, Za Nawl and Hreng Ol, were sentenced to death for killing Tum Hngel and her stepdaughter Sui Zing, and Ral Chum of Hniarlawn for murdering Asing, a Chinese caretaker at the pioneer camp bungalow. The first two hanged themselves in the Haka

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lockup before the sentence could be carried out.88 The other leaders were imprisoned in Haka, Falam, Tedim, and Mingyan jails. Fourteen chiefs and others who were serving out their sentences in the Myingyan Jail were later deported to Taungyi and Lashio. Fines amounting to over Rs. 13,000 were levied on the rebel villages, while punitive labour was imposed on some to construct roads and an artificial lake near Haka, in lieu of imprisonment (Johnson 1988: 423–4).89 Colonel Leslie Shakespear, the deputy inspector general of the Assam Rifles, who was involved in the punitive measures against the Kuki in Manipur, said that situation in the Chin Hills was aggravated by attempts to check slavery, and led to the uprising. Missionary Robert G. Johnson gave a different version: The causes of rebellion were resentment on the part of the nonChristian Chins against the British occupation of their territory, the perceived loss of power on the part of the Chiefs, and the strange new laws and customs that were moulding society in ways alarming to them. The immediate occasion was the formation of Chin coolie corps to go to France and the reduction of British military forces from Burma. (Ibid.: 409–10) Such contentions however do not explain why the uprising was confined to the Haka subdivision, and did not involve the Taisun, Sukte, Kamhau, Sihzang and others who were similarly circumstanced. In fact, the first ripples of the disturbances in Manipur in 1915 had been immediately felt in the Tedim area, but it was the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup, who kept ‘a firm hand on his youngmen’. Likewise, in the Falam subdivision the Taisun chief Van Hmung, the Zahau chief Van Ngul and his son Thang Tin Lian were all loyal to the British. Their contribution to the War Fund and assistance in obtaining labour recruits has already been mentioned. The superintendent had in fact recorded in his annual administration report that: At the outbreak of the Haka trouble various offers of assistance were given by the Chiefs of Falam and Tiddim Subdivisions. Notably the Yahows under Tantin Lyen offered to send a band of 50 men with guns to operate with the Military Police whenever required. Van Hmon the Falam Chief undertook the guarding of the Falam suspension bridge at a time when sepoys could not be spared for his duty. And the Laiyo tribe rendered great help by patrolling the line of the Pao river.90 Both the Tedim and Falam subdivisions had been under the influence of powerful chiefs. In the Tedim area, the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup was 176

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a paramount ruler who exerted remarkable influence on other subordinate chiefs.91 This was not the case in the Haka subdivision, for here some of the more influential chief had only recently been alienated. In 1915 there was widespread damage to troops by rodents and caterpillars in Haka and Falam. The damage was particularly severe in Haka, where 340,000 rats were ultimately killed by the people. Shortage of food, and even starvation was reported from here, and that year the usual supply of foodgrain to the military police, which earned the Haka Chin/Zo considerable profits, became well-nigh impossible. A consequence of this was that the chiefs could not pay their dues to the government and in the following year they forfeited their commission. It was at this stage that orders came for the supply of men for the Labour Corps. Laura Carson thus records the reaction of the chiefs to the order: The Government orders were that no coercion was to be used; but the chief did not understand that. An order to bring in the men meant that they must bring them. Chief after chief came to me and asked what he should do. They said that their people absolutely refused to go to France; that they said they had no quarrel with Germany and why should they go and fight the Germans? They said they would commit suicide rather than go. (Carson [1927] 1997: 227) Undoubtedly, the recruitment for the Labour Corps and reduction of British troops and officials from the hills which left the entire Chin Hills insufficiently guarded were strong inducements.92 The months immediately following the suppression of the uprising were full of hardships for the Haka people. In the operations, several villages had been burned with large quantities of grain. Punitive labour took the men away from the villages and the result was a terrible shortage of food, and almost famine conditions prevailed. ‘One of the leading chiefs told me’, Carson wrote, ‘that for two months he had not had any food whatever except “banhtaw” which is the boiled sprouts of the banana tree. He said there were thousands in the same condition’ (Carson [1927] 1997: 238). The question is: Why did the uprising confine to Haka alone? Did all the chiefs in Haka participate? Whose war was it, anyway? According to J. M. Wright, ‘this rebellion was a rebellion of Chiefs and elders and not a rising of the people’. He further argued that the checking of slavery, freedom of migration granted to villagers and intervention into the payment of dues was the general grievances that hurt the chiefs.93 But to label the war as the ‘chiefs’ war’ just because of the participation of some antagonistic chiefs is not convincing because many chiefs, who also suffered the same grievances, remained ‘loyal’ to the British during the war. At any rate, no matter how small or big the participating chiefs represent, the fight no doubt was for 177

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the cause of the people of Haka in particular and against colonial rule in the Chin Hills in general. Thus, the so-called Haka uprising was the culmination of discontentment and a war of resistance by the Chin/Zo against British rule (Pau 2019).

Notes 1 Bertram Carey was political officer of the Chin Hills. There were four assistants: E. O. Fowler was placed at Tedim in charge of the Sihzang and Sukte tribes; Biggwither at Falam was to look after the Taisuns and their tributaries the Zahaus, Hualngos and the like; Thruston at Haka was in charge of the Haka, Thantlang, Zokhua, and the independent southern tribes; and H. N. Tuck as assistant to Carey. 2 FEAP October 1893, No. 34; From Carey, the Political Officer, Chin Hills to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, 28 September 1892. 3 FEAP December 1893, Nos. 1–3; From the Secretary of State for India (Lord Kimberley) to the Government of India, 19 October 1893. 4 FEAP October 1893, No. 33; From E. S. Symes, Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma to the Secretary to the Government of India, 1 November 1892. 5 FEAP September 1892, No. 9; Secretary of State to the Government of India, 17 September 1891. 6 Ibid., No. 12; Major-General E.H.H. Collen to the Quarter-Master General, 5 November 1891. 7 Ibid., Nos. 9–62; ‘The Military Situation in Eastern India and Burma’, 4 September 1891. 8 Ibid.; ‘Note by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief’, 26 September 1891. 9 FEAP September 1892, Nos. 9–62. 10 Ibid. 11 FEAP September 1892; Notes by Lansdowne, 19 December 1891 and 2 January 1892. 12 Other members were Lieutenant General Sir J. C. Dormer, Commander in Chief, Madras; Sir Alexander Mackenzie, Chief Commissioner of Burma; William E. Ward, Chief Commissioner of Assam; Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department; Major General E.H.H. Collen, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department; and Major General Sir James Browne, Quarter-Master General in India. 13 FEAP September 1892; Colonel Robert Gosit Woodthorpe, who had extensively surveyed the north-eastern region, had submitted a ‘Note on our dealings with savage tribes and the necessity for having them under one rule’ on 1 October 1891 which was laid before the Conference in which he wrote, inter alia: Another thing which strikes one in reading the reports from the different political officers in the Chin-Lushai Hills, is that they are labouring under considerable difficulties in consequence of the whole country not bring under one administration. The Chin-Lushai files abound in instances of difficulties having been caused by the three Governments of Bengal, Assam and Burma having jurisdiction in these hills’. He further wrote, During the expeditions of 1889–90, the Chins were quick enough to perceive that our Generals were working under different orders, and

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they could not help playing them off one against the other, with a certain amount of success, as our knowledge of the country and its inhabitants was very limited. 14 FEAP September 1892, No. 28; Extract of a demi-official from Sir Alexander Mackenzie to Viceroy, 19 December 1891. 15 Ibid., No. 34; ‘Minute of the Chief Commissioner of Burma’, 27 January. Mackenzie and Sir Charles Elliot entered through notes and memoranda that were circulated in the Conference, into a bitter dispute on the subject. See Note by Elliot, 28 January and Mackenzie’s rejoinder, 29 January. Nos. 36–37. 16 Educated at Victoria School, Jersey; sent out to India, 1876; served in Assam; in charge of the Naga Hills; a distinguished frontier officer; did much to civilise the Angami Nags; in the difficulties with the Lushais, showed great bravery and judgement; in February 1897, released captives in their hands; inspector general of police, Assam; killed in the earthquake at Shillong, June 1897; wrote an outline grammar of the Angami Naga language (Buckland 1906: 281). 17 FEAP September 1892, No. 32; Resolutions, Fort William, 29 January 1892. 18 Ibid., No. 45; DO, Carey to Chief Secretary, Burma, 4 February 1892. Also DO from D.J.C. Macnabb to Chief Secretary, 7 April 1892. 19 Ibid., See Notes, K.W. No. 2; Department Notes, 9 March 1892. 20 Ibid., Part VI, Note by Durand, 31 May 1892. 21 Ibid., Note by Lord Lansdowne, 3 June 1892. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., Note by Crosthwaite, 8 June 1892; Crosthwaite further added: all the eastern side of the hills must look to Burma for supplies, reinforcements, and for the maintenance of communications with the civilized country below and for postal and telegraph lines. If the government of Burma has no responsibility for this tract and no interest in it, the officers employed in it will not get much attention paid to their wants. I am arguing on the assumption that the tract will be under the Assam Administration. If it is put under the Burman Administration, the same arguments will apply from Assam point of view even with greater force as the interests involved on the Assam border are more important. It may be said that when all the roads are made and a settled government has been for years established, these objectives will disappear. It may be so. But that time is so distant that it is not within the limits of a practical discussion. 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32

FEAP September 1892, Note by Crosthwaite, 8 June 1892. Ibid., Note by Phillip Percival Hutchins, 11 June 1892. Ibid., Note by A. E. Miller, 11 June 1892. Ibid., Note by Roberts, 16 June, and Note by Brackenbury, 18 June. Ibid., Order of the Council, Military Department, 23 June 1892. The Foreign Department issued necessary orders on 22 July through the Secretary H. M. Durand. See proceedings No. 56 et seq., a telegram and correspondence between Simla and Rangoon. Ibid., No. 50; Telegram, Foreign Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Burma, 2 August. My analysis on how colonial rivalry had impacted the indigenous people is in Pau (2007). FPAP September 1893, Nos. 80–88; Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills from 1st June 1892 to 31st May 1893, Appendix, p. xxix. Ibid., Appendix, pp. xxx–xxxi.

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33 After the demarcation of Manipur-Chin Hills boundary in 1894 (for boundary map, see Map 6.1), only six Thado villages remained with the Chin Hills and the rest went to Manipur. These villages were placed under Hau Cin Khup and he levied tribute from them. 34 FEAP August 1890, Nos. 221–227; Note by David Reid Lyall. 35 In the South Lushai Hills, John Shakespear so wrote of it in his administration report for 1895–96: ‘I am convinced that it is better to uphold the government of the chief and to govern through them. With this view, I have submitted proposals for educating sons of the chiefs’. For a fuller discussion of the Lushai situation see J. Zorema, ‘The Bureaucracy, the Chiefs and Indirect Rule in the Lushai Hills of Assam, 1898–1952’, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, North-Eastern Hill University, 2002, Ch. III: 80–111. 36 For an account of this, see Fisher (1991); Low ([1973] 2014). For its operation in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, see Syiemlieh (1989). For the situation in Africa where it became famous in Nigeria, see Perham (1962). 37 Assam State Archives (ASA), Governor Secretariat (GS), Lib/ R007/S3/81: Diary and Report of the Manipur Boundary Commission 1894 by Lieutenant W. H. Dent, Printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing, Burma, August, 1894. 38 Ibid., ASA, GS, Lib/ R007/S3/81. 39 ASA, GS, Lib/ R007/S3/81. 40 For list of frontier posts, see Table 3.1. 41 FPAP August 1872, No. 83. 42 ASA, GS, Lib/ R007/S3/81: Diary and Report of the Manipur Boundary Commission 1894 by Lieutenant W. H. Dent, Printed by the Superintendent, Government Printing, Burma, August, 1894. 43 ASA, GS, Lib/ R007/S3/81: Diary and Report of the Manipur Boundary Commission 1894 by Lieutenant W. H. Dent. 44 Ibid. 45 Refer to Chapter 3 for detailed discussion. 46 FEAP November 1892, No. 128; From E. S. Symes, Esq. C.I.E., Chief Secretary to the chief Commissioner of Burma to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 20 September, 1892. 47 FEAP September 1893, No. 8; From Major H. Maxwell, Political Agent and Superintendent of State, Manipur (on leave) to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, 1 February 1893. 48 FEAP October 1893, No. 34; From B. S. Carey, Political Officer, Chin Hills, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, 28 September, 1892. 49 Ibid., No. 129 and 130. 50 Ibid., No. 131. 51 ASA, GS, Lib/ R007/S3/81. 52 FEAP October 1894, No. 247; From B. S. Carey, Political Officer, Chin Hills and Burma Boundary Commission to the Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner Burma, 16 March 1894. 53 ASA, GS, Lib/ R007/S3/81. 54 FEAP October 1894, No. 247; From B. S. Carey, Political Officer, Chin Hills to the Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Burma, 16 March 1894. 55 FEBP, January 1893, Nos. 1–17. See Appendix D: From Captain G. B. Stevens, 4th Madras Pioneers, (late) Commanding Kanhaw Column, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Myingyan District, Fort White, 17 April 1892. 56 Refer Johnstone’s map in his My Experience in Manipur and the Naga Hills (1896), reprint as Manipur and the Naga Hills (Johnstone [1896] 2002: 35). 57 FEAP September 1893, No. 80. Also see (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 112).

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58 Ibid., appendices. 59 FEAP October, 1894, No. 247. 60 I wish to thank L. Lam Khan Piang for his helpful comment on the boundary section. For an analysis on claims and counterclaims of territories in Manipur as a colonial legacy, see Piang (2015). 61 See Note in FEAP October 1896, Nos. 28–35. 62 Ibid. 63 Son of F. W. Fryer; entered the Bengal Civil Service, 1864; called to the bar from the middle temple, 1880; commissioner, Central Division, Upper Burma 1886; financial commissioner, Burma, 1888; acting chief commissioner of Burma, 1892–94; officiating financial commissioner, Panjab; additional member of the governor general’s legislative council, 1894–95; lieutenant governor of Burma, 1897–1903: K.C.S.I., 1895. Buckland, Indian Biography, p. 157. 64 FEAP August 1896, No. 198; From Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma to Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 18 January 1896. 65 For my argument on the chief as colonial ‘agent’, see Pau (2015). 66 FEAP August 1890, Nos. 221–227; Note by Lyall on the Future Management of the South Lushai Hills, 2 June 1890. 67 See Appendix A for Extracts from the Regulation and the amendments incorporated by the Government of India. 68 Gazette of India, 15 August 1896, Regulation No. V of 1896. It was also published in the Burma Gazette. 69 After the extension of the Chin Hills Regulation, 1896, the sub-divisional officer was redesignated as assistant superintendent. In 1906 his status was raised to that of superintendent. At the same time the designation of the hills was changed from ‘Pakokku Chin Hills’ to ‘Pakokku Hill Tract’. A ‘lot of worry and delay’ was thereby saved, it was observed, ‘as letter etc. were continually being wrongly dealt with by the post office, and sent up to the Chin Hills’. Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the Year 1906–07. 70 Rainey, who commanded a column of 600 rifles (Chin Frontier Levy), moved from Gangaw along the Chinbok frontier to Laungshe and went to Tilin. The column also visited the Kyay, Kyauksit and Chey Valleys. The Chinbons inhabiting the country south of the Salin and Mon Valleys were made British subjects. 71 FEAP September 1893, Nos. 64–77; From Lieutenant M. J. Tighe, Subdivisional Officer, Yawdwin, to the Deputy Commissioner, Pakokku, 30 March 1893. Also see plan of operations to be undertaken against the hostile Chinme villages of the Upper Mon or Pie Laung by Lieutenant M. J. Tighe, Political Officer, Chin Hills; From Lieutenant M. J. Tighe, Subdivisioinal Officer, Yawdwin to the Deputy Commissioner, Pakokku, 13 June 1893. FEAP February 1901, Nos. 23–26; Diary of Lieutenant M. J. Tighe, Assistant Commissioner from 1st to the 15th February. 72 A very fine view in all directions was obtainable from this peak. To the north, the course of the Mon could be traced to the point where it bifurcates. To the west, the course of the Lemroo and Koladan Rivers could be easily traced by the mist lying along them in the early morning, and far away to the southwest the mist indicated the lowlying ground at the mouth of the rivers along the sea-coast between Hunter’s Bay and Akyab. To the south-south-east rise some very high peaks. 73 FSEP January 1904, No. 39. 74 FEAP December 1903, Nos. 46–47; ‘Measures for the Prevention of Raids by the People of Khrum’ from Burma, Maymyo to the Foreign Secretary, Simla, 7 November 1903.

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75 The most common form of taking an oath is for both parties to kill an animal and paint each other with its blood. While the northern Chin/Zo used a mithun, the southern Chin/Zo took an oath with a tiger’s skull to observe the peace and abstain from doing any unfriendly act. While taking an oath, the parties mutter ‘May the party breaks this agreement die even as this animal has died, and may he who buried outside the village and his spirit never rest; may his family also die and may every bad fortune attend his village’. 76 FEAP June 1904, Nos. 115–116; From W. B. Tydd, Assistant Superintendent, Pakokku Chin Hills, Kanpetlet to N. G. Cholmeley, Commissioner Minbu Division, 20 April 1904. 77 E. J. Dobson, Superintendent, Pakokku Hill Tracts, ‘Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the year 1906–07’. Shung Law had been wanted since 1892 for murder. He was the man behind the Shikhruit raid and the main instigator of the Khrum people to attack Mindat Police Post in October 1902. It was in the middle of December 1906, while the superintendent was on leave, that Shung Law attempted to collect arms against the British spreading rumours that the British was planning to leave the hills. When the news was wired by the inspector of police to the commissioner of Minbu Division, immediate step was taken to deal with the situation. A new superintendent was sent to Kanpetlet. The prompt action of the Superintendent with the assistance of the local people led to the arrest of Shung Law or Shunglungtung and his followers. 78 Burma Gazette, Vol II, p. 393. 79 J. W. Wright, Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year 1916–17. 80 Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year 1917–18. 81 Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year Ended 30 June 1915. 82 The next afternoon Shia Kaw came in again saying that forces were collecting again, both north and south of us, and that Haka was to be attacked within the next three or four days. I told him that the Assistant Superintendent said he had investigated and found conditions in Sakta normal; that women and children had not been taken way; that the people were loyal and that at least ninety were ready to go to France, and that there would be no insurrection. He was greatly excited and distressed and begged us to heed the warning which he had risked his life to bring. That night the Christians asked permission to sleep in the Mission Hospital and Mr. Cope and the teachers patrolled the Mission property all night- but there was not disturbance. 83 Police Line was one of the few Government buildings with a trench around it where sepoys were placed with guns. The best building in the Lines was the station Hospital- a brick building with a small office room, a tiny medicine room and two-fair-sized wards. 84 In early December 1917 the D.I.G. Assam Rifles received a wire from the Superintendent Chin Hills inquiring if he had any knowledge of likely trouble on the Chin Lushai border. The reply stated he had no such knowledge, the only minor trouble known of concerned Zongling in the Unadministered Area towards Arrakan. Twelve hours later came an urgent wire to Shillong from Falam, the headquarters station in the Chin hills, saying the southern Chins had risen, Haka station was surrounded, and begging for urgent assistance. Permission to act having been obtained, D.I.G. sent orders to Captain Falkland, Commandant 1st A. R. at Aijal, to march at once with 150 rifles for Haka, and in a few hours they were en route to cover the 16 marches as rapidly as possible. A few days later another urgent wire from Falam called for more help, and as active trouble had not as yet started in Manipur, Captain Montifore with 150 rifles of the 3rd A R at Kohima was ordered to the Chin Hills, traveling as expeditiously as possible – by

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85

86 87

88 89 90 91

92

93

rail to Chittagong, river steamer to Rangamatti, country boats to Demagiri, whence onwards a fortnight’s hard marching to Haka. B. Fischer, the Superintendent of Pakokku Hill Tracts, reported that on 16 April 1918 a party consisting of Captain Alexander Assistant Commandant, a small escort and himself visited a group of villages known as Chan-im in order to calm the people who were very restless. They were attacked by the Chins killing one military police havildar and wounding Alexander and two others. For details on the Kuki uprising in Manipur, see Shakespear ([1929] 1977: 209– 32); Bhadra (1975); Kipgen (1976); Guite and Haokip (2018). Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year 1918–1919; Some of the most important Haka chiefs responsible for the trouble were and sentenced under section 121 of the Indian Penal Code were Lyen Mo son of Za Err, Van Mang son of Lyen Mo, Kin Hmon son of Lyen Mo, Tyer Non wife of Van Mang, Kup Hmin son of Lwe Sang, Tat Hmon son of Ya Klwe, Ni Kwel son of Kuk Hre, Tan Hnyer son of Lyen Kwe. Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year 1919–1920. Also see Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year 1919–1920. J. M. Wright, Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the Year 1917–18. Chief Hau Cin Khup had won the following awards for his loyalty to the British: Silvermounted Da and a Certificate of Honour in 1901; K.S.M. in 1917; a gun and a Certificate of Honour in 1918; a revolver and a Certificate of Honour in 1919. See Acts and Achievements of Hau Cin Khup, Chief of Kamhau Clan, Chin Hills, Tedim, Mandalay, Burma 1927. E. O. Fowler commanded the 61st and 62nd Chin Labour Corps from the Tedim Subdivision to France. Altogether there were 1033 Chins from Tedim Subdivision consisting of 250 from Sukte tract, 700 from Kamhau tract and 83 from Sizang tract. They left Tedim on 27 May 1917 and returned to the Chin Hills in the middle of 1918 with 56 casualties. The Labour Corps from Falam composed a part of the 78th Labour Company. They were accompanied by the young Lumbang Chief Hlurr Hmung. BL, AAC, IOR&PP, IOR/L/PS/10/724: 1917–20, File No. P-2686/1919.

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7 THE CHIN HILLS DISTRICT Towards consolidation

At the close of the nineteenth century the Chin/Zo were still divided under several separate district administrations. The main area of these hills, the Chin Hills District, measuring approximately 8,550 square miles, with a population of 110,079 according to the census of 1921, formed part of the Magwe Division under a superintendent and several assistant superintendents drawn from the Burma Frontier Service and Burma Civil Service. The southernmost portion of the hills, known as the Pakokku Hill Tracts, with a population of 28,799, largely Chin/Zo, and an area of approximately 3,100 square miles, was separately administered by a superintendent, also under the commissioner of Magwe. The Somra Tract, an isolated tract further north, which was home to a large Chin/Zo population1 fell in the Upper Chindwin District of the Sagaing Division and was administered by the deputy commissioner of that district through a superintendent with the subdivisional officer, Homalin, as his assistant. The powers of a high court in all these Chin/Zo areas were exercised by the commissioners of the respective divisions. The criminal law was the same, with a few modifications, as that in force in Burma proper, but in revenue and general matters the Chin/Zo in the Pakokku and Somra tracts were administered according to the provisions of the Chin Hills Regulation, 1896. The law in the Arakan Hill Tracts was to be found in several Regulations dating from 1874 and was somewhat similar to the ordinary law of India than was in the rest of the Chin Hills.2 In the last five years of that century the extent of the Chin Hills District and Pakokku Hill Tracts were only assumed, and with the exception of the Chin Hills-Manipur boundary which was settled during 1894–96,3 the boundary between the two were not demarcated. In the Arakan Hill Tracts there was for many years an inner administrative boundary to the north. The purpose it served comes out clearly in a letter the Government of Burma wrote to the secretary to the Foreign Department: The tribes within the boundary pay tribute. They are not allowed to commit raids, and they are, as far as practicable, protected from the attacks of tribes without the line. The tribes beyond the boundary 184

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pay no tribute and are not interfered with so long as they do not commit offences within the line. On the other hand, no protection is afforded to them, and if they apply for protection they must move within the boundary: so long as they live beyond the boundary nothing can be done for them.4 This method of management of the tribes, it was said, had proved ‘eminently satisfactory’ and that within the administrative boundary where British control was effectively exercised raids were ‘almost unknown’. A similar system was followed in the southernmost section in the Pakokku Hill Tracts. During 1893–94 it was extended to hills west of the Chin Hills District whereas in the Pakokku Hill Tracts, there were large numbers of ‘unadministered’ villages.5 An inner administrative boundary identified running north to south, from Manipur down to the Haka hills, with the object of administering only those villages east of that line. In the Northern Chin Hills District, the line included Hau Cin Khup’s territory and Sukte on both sides of the Manipur River. To the south the line included the Taisun. Carey whose idea it was thus to separate the administered from the non-administered villages says of this central tract: We must administer the Tashons (Taisun) for several reasons chiefly because they are the leading tribe in the hills; but it is not necessary that we should administer their feudatories, the Whenohs (Hualngo) and Yahows (Zahau), who border on Lushai (hill district) and who do not trouble Burma.6 Further south, in the Haka-Baungshe country, the separation of villages presented greater difficulties. ‘The Hakas own villages very far west and south’, Carey’s note had stated, ‘which are surrounded by independent Baungshe villages, and it appears impossible to divide the Haka tribe, and it is equally impossible to control distant Haka villages and not to control the independent villages in the immediate vicinity’. Carey further explained, Now most of these villages have blood feuds, and before our arrival on the scene continual warfare was resorted to, and I am not certain whether it is politic to let the present comparative peace in this tract lapse into open warfare, which, I think, would be the case were we to exclude the distant Baungshe villages from our control. . . . I also believe that the Southern Baungshes would interpret our action as indicating cowardice, and I am certain that bad characters would cross the administrative border to head-hunt. Here the Boinu River down with its confluence with the Titi Var lake formed the line of separation. This included some very distant Baungshe villages.7 185

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A slight modification of the line was made to include the Thantlang within the administrative limits. There were, therefore, within the two Chin/Zo District two distinct forms of administration. The first was the settled district proper, where revenue was extracted and orders enforced by the British. Beyond these were patches of ‘unadministered’ villages left by the colonial rulers to their own devices. Thus in leaving some of the tribes outside the administrative boundary, Carey had suggested that they be included in a similar arrangement on the Lushai Hills side, ‘thus leaving the Western Chins and Eastern Lushais to settle their own disputes in their own fashion’.8 How these were to be dealt with is set forth in a set of instructions that the Lieutenant Governor had prepared for his hill officers: The policy which has for many years been pursued in respect of these unadministered areas is that there should be no interference with those concerns as long as their inhabitants abstain from raids or attacks on adjacent administered territory. In the case of a raid on administered territory, if the matter is considered of sufficient importance, punishment is inflicted. But in respect of outrages on travellers, the principle laid down has been that the Government accepts no responsibility for the protection of life and property beyond the administrative line.9 This policy was enjoined on all officers, and to ensure their observance and to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the tribes themselves British officers were forbidden to cross the administrative border for any purpose, except with the permission of the government. The stated object was ‘to maintain friendly relations with the tribes and chiefs in unadministered territory’. Therefore, the instructions said: Although frontier officers are not permitted to cross the administrative border, they should encourage the tribes to visit them in a friendly way and should aid them with friendly counsel and advice. Presents may on occasion be exchanged. As another means of conciliating the friendship of people in unadministered tracts and of discouraging the prosecution of feuds, frontier officers should always be ready to settle, or advice as to the settlement of disputes arising beyond the administrative frontier whenever they considered to do so by both parties, though they cannot take any steps to enforce their decisions, and they should endeavour to settle peaceful disputes or quarrels in which people on both sides of the border are concerned.10 One of the major considerations in reducing the area of direct administration was financial. ‘I do not see why a line should not be drawn which will 186

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eventually save the government some part of the large expenditure which will be required to administer the whole Chinland within its geographical limits’, was Carey’s remark when he first made the proposal. This was a policy that appealed to the Government of India. What the deputy secretary, Hugh Daly, remarked in July 1896 when noting on the future administration of the Chin-Lushai Hills seems to have held good for virtually the whole period of British rule in Burma: The amelioration for the condition of the Chins and Lushais is no doubt a very laudable object, but I submit that the Government of India cannot afford to spend large sums on purely philanthropic measures, especially while so much money can be profitable devoted to developing settled and more thickly populated country, e.g., in Upper Burma.11

Control over resources The incorporation of Burma into the Indian Empire opened the Chin Hills to the prospect of commercial exploitation. An application was received as early as in December 1898 for license to prospect for gold and rubies in the hills.12 This threw up the whole question of the ownership of mines and minerals. In Upper Burma the proprietary rights in mines and minerals was reserved to the government under section 31 of the Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation 1889, as amended by Regulation III of 1898. It was under this law that the ruby and jade mines in the Hukawng Valley and Kachin area (and later petroleum) was the property of the British Government. The Chin Hills Regulation did not contain any reference to minerals, nor did the Upper Burma Regulation extend to the Chin/Zo in the Chin Hills. Consequently, there was no statutory law reserving to Government the proprietary rights to minerals. Only in the case of land owned by persons who were not Chin/Zo, section 31 of the Land and Revenue Regulation applied by virtue of section 4(1) of the Chin Hills Regulation. At the time of framing the Chin Hills Regulation, it was never envisaged that these lands could contain valuable mineral deposits. With the application for license for gold prospecting it was soon realised that ‘such a contingency is not improbable’. Steatite was recently discovered though the extent and value of the deposits had not yet been fully ascertained. The lieutenant governor of Burma therefore considered it desirable to declare definitely that Government possesses in the Chin Hills proprietary rights in regard to minerals similar to those which it possesses under the Land and Revenue Regulation in Upper Burma. It is, and always has been, a well understood principle throughout Burma that the sovereign power possesses the right to minerals and 187

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it is undesirable on general grounds that there should be doubt as to the application of this principle to any part of Burma.13 But the lieutenant governor emphasised, in view of the application already made for gold prospecting, there was ‘also special occasion for asserting the right of the Government’.14 As the most suitable method of giving effect to this policy, section 31 of the Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation was by notification extended to the Chin Hills.15 The proviso, under section 3 (2) which stated ‘No other advantage was taken of enactments, shall be deemed to apply to Chin in the Chin Hills’, that provided that the Local Government, with the previous sanction by the Governor General in Council, may, by notification in the Burma Gazette, declare any other enactment to be applicable wholly or to the extent or with the modifications which may be set forth in the notification.16 In the event, the Chin Hills yielded neither any valuable minerals nor any significant mining activity took place. But the Pakokku Hill Tracts was rich in mineral resources. The steatite quarries17 at Lin-no-daung, Wun-u-bin, Paaing near Salin (which was said to have had good quality of steatite) were all mentioned in administrative reports of the Pakokku Hill Tracts from 1905–06 to 1920. Licenses to work the steatite mines were sold by auction. During 1906–07, J. L. Ommanney, assistant superintendent of Pakokku Hill Tracts said, a license to work the quarry at Lin-no-daung quarry was sold by the deputy commissioner for Rs. 350. The licensee paid Rs. 224 per ton for extraction on the spot.18 Annual report of the following year gives the price of the license to work at the same quarry sold for Rs. 585. During 1907–08 41 licenses were auctioned though the figure for the succeeding year was only 27. The administration report of 1908–09 thus recorded: ‘The license to work the Lin-no-daung steatite mine was put up to auction by the deputy commissioner, Pakokku, and as only a very nominal figure was offered it was not sold’. The superintendent, however, rather than see the mine closed, called for local offers and submitted the offer of one Maung Lu Gyi from Saw of Rs. 500 for three years, which was accepted by the commissioner. A license to work the Wun-u-bin mine has also been granted for one year at a nominal rent of Rs. 100: ‘This mine will soon be quite valuable as very good steatite has now been found’.19 Other administration report also informs us that 35 licenses to work cutch20 were issued to the Chin/Zo.21 License to work in the quarries and cutch were renewed or reissued annually. In this way the colonial government laid stringent rules to control the forest and mineral resources of the Pakokku Hill Tracts. The notification extending the Land and Revenue 188

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Regulation illustrates the working of the colonial mind in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its operation can be equally seen in the case of the forest resources of the Chin Hills and Burma. Curiously the exploitation of Burma’s teak forests, and the activities of the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation on which volumes had been written and which figured so prominently in the run up to the Third Anglo-Burmese War and the annexation of Upper Burma,22 faded from public, and later even from scholarly, view. In the case of the Chin Hills the most important teak forests lay between the Myittha Valley on the eastern ranges of the Chin Hills down to the Pakokku Tracts. After the annexation of Upper Burma, the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation apparently carried on the trade without the interference of the vexatious local officers of the old regime. The logs were transferred through the rivers from the Myittha to the Irrawady down to Rangoon. A wife of a Baptist missionary on her way to the Chin Hills from Thayetmyo described what she saw on Burma’s biggest river at the close of the nineteenth century: We glided slowly along (the Irrawaddy), passing many large Burman rowboats; also raft after raft of fine teak logs or bamboos lashed together, upon which were tiny grass huts in which live women and children for weeks together, as the rafts are being floated down the river in order to find a market for the logs and bamboos. (Carson [1927] 1997: 147) In July 1899, in order to regulate felling and trading in teak, the Upper Burma Forest Regulation, V of 1898 was made applicable to the Chin/Zo in the Chin Hills.23 The extension of the Burma Forest Act of 1902 and the rules framed thereunder completed the control of the government over the forest resources. Large tracts containing teak and other timber were declared Forest Reserve over which the Chin/Zo people had no control. Even for lands not included in the Forest Reserve stringent rules were laid down regulating jhum cultivation. Clause 18 of the Rules thus stated: In any area bearing teak trees no person shall burn or otherwise injured any forest produces for the purpose of shifting cultivation except in so far as the practices of such cultivation may be permitted in such area by a general or special order of the Deputy Commissioner or in a Shan State or the Chin Hills, of the Superintendent.24 The next clause was more specific: In any defined tract of public forest land, to which the Deputy Commissioner with the sanction of the Commissioner, or in the Shan State or in the Chin Hills, the Superintendent may declare the rule to 189

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apply, no person shall fell, cut or injure by fire or otherwise any trees or other forest produce for the purpose of shifting cultivation.25 The control the Chin/Zo traditionally exercised over the forest now passed into the hands of the British Government. In both the reserved forest and government lands where forests were located, the writ of the government was final. Government lands or ‘lands at the disposal of the Government’ were defined as lands in respect of which no person had acquired either ‘(a) a permanent, heritable and transferable right of use and occupancy under any law for the time being in force; or (b) any right created by grant or lease made a continued by, or on behalf of, the British Government’.26 The Chins/ Zo of course often disputed this. In the Pakokku Hill Tracts misunderstanding developed between the Chin/Zo and the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation over the extraction of teak trees during 1907–08. The Chin/Zo claimed that the teak forests were their ancestral property and so made no secret of their desire to drive the contractors out of their country. On the other hand, the contractors asserted that it was their right to extract them, a right which they obtained from the government. When the superintendent E. G. Dobson, who was supposed to leave for the Mon Valley, got information about the affair, he warned the Chin/Zo and also asked the corporation agent at Pauk to withdraw his men before solution was reach. Then he held a meeting of both the disputing parties at Mindat. The corporation agent, John Nisbet, and the Chin/Zo attended the meeting and after a good deal of talk resolved the problem.27 How it was solved has not curiously been recorded in the Administration Report. That year the Kyauksit Reserve was notified with a view to preventing deforestation. The cutting of taungyas was restricted and orders were issued that ‘no new yas are to be cut and no teak to be felled without the permission of the Superintendent’. Chin/Zo who were not residents of the Pakokku Tracts were not allowed to enter the area and devastate it of its forest wealth. Only Chin/Zo who were living there had been permitted to remain. Since the superintendent could not effectively cope with the work of visiting yas personally, the Forest Department was instructed to post an officer to assist the superintendent in forest matters. Having gained government sanction, the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation Limited extracted 4,508 teak logs from the Chin/Zo country during the period from 1 June 1908 to 31 May 1909.28

The Somra Tract: extension of the Chin Hills Regulation To the northeast of the Chin Hills and the north of the Kabaw Valley lay the Somra Tract. This virtually independent hill tract also marched with Manipur on her northeast, between the Tizu and Nampanga Rivers. It was a tract of about 800 square miles and inhabited by Kukis and Tangkhul Nagas, 190

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the former on the eastern and southern part and the latter on the northwest corner (Reid [1942] 1974: 163). A large number of the Tangkhuls were spread over into Manipur and the Naga Hills. Both Kukis, largely belonging to the Thado and allied groups, and the Tangkhuls were in the habit of raiding into Manipur, the Naga Hills and into Burma. One of the earliest operations into these hills, to exact reparation for a raid into Manipur, was undertaken in 1897. That year a force of 150 rifles of the 44th Gurkhas and 50 men from the Manipur State Military Police, destroyed Somra Khulen, a large Tangkhul village, apprehended some of the raiders and recovered two heads taken from Manipur. Three years later a combined force of the 17th Bengal Infantry, the Naga Hills Military Police and the Manipur State Military Police visited the Kuki villages on the north of the Tract, imposing fines and arresting chiefs implicated in raids into Manipur and the Naga Hills.29 Again in February 1911, Colonel John Shakespear, the political agent in Manipur, carried out a punitive expedition against the villages of Letkuthang and Papang located in the Somra Tract. Shakespear then urged for the first time that the Tract should be brought under control and should be administered by Burma since it had become a source of considerable trouble to neighbouring territories. The Government of Burma had at various times considered such a measure, in 1908 and again, in 1911 and 1912, but each time it ended with the reluctance to take action mainly because the tribes till then were not a serious threat to its territory. Komyang, the Kuki chief had dominated these hills since 1900 and had successfully kept his own and the neighbouring flock in check. However, after his death some years later the Burmese began to experience occasional raids from this direction. It was for such developments that on 11 September 1915 the Government of Burma proposed the annexation of the Somra Tract. Again on 9 September 1917 the chief secretary to the Government of Burma sent another letter to the Government of India regarding the views of the lieutenant governor about the future management of the Somra Tract. Apparently, there were two groups of Kukis: one under the sons of Komyang, which numbered 22 villages and 496 houses, and the other under Pachei who controlled six villages containing 107 houses, and were largely of the Chassad group. The Tangkhuls were spread over 11 villages and numbered 1002 houses. These Tangkhuls sought the protection of the Government, anxious to be administered as stated in the official reports, and be saved from what was described as their ‘wholesale slaughter by the Kukis’.30 There was some understanding between Assam and Burma that the Somra Tract belonged naturally to Burma and not to Manipur. Only a small portion of it, cross-hatched on the maps, and hence referred to as the ‘cross-hatched’ area which they agreed was clearly in Manipur or in the Naga Hills district of Assam. In May 1916 Assam had recommended to the Government of India that the tract should be placed under Burma, leaving the fate of the cross-hatched area to be decided later.31 191

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With the Government of India agreeing in July 1917, it only remained to be decided under what law the Tract could be incorporated into Burma and brought under the administration of the Chin Hills. The Legislative Department, in whose view the tract was ‘politically an unadministered portion of British India in the Chin Hills’, advised: It would appear that the application of the Chin Hills Regulation to the Somra Tract taken with the definition of ‘Local Government’, in section 3(29), India General Clauses Act, would suffice to place the tract under the Government of Burma. But a notification under section 60 of the Government of India Act, 1915, is not otherwise objectionable.32 Under section 60 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the governor general in council accordingly declared that the ‘Somra Tract in the Chin Hills’ shall be included in the province of Burma. Its boundaries were thus defined: On the north by the Nantalaik or Tazu river, on the east by the Upper Chindwin district, on the south by the State of Thaungthut; and on the west, by the State of Manipur, and the high range of hills forming the watershed between the Nantaleik or Tazu river on the west and Nanwee river on the east.33 The Chin Hills Regulations were ipso facto extended to the tract. The matter relating to the cross-hatched area dragged on several years. There was difference of opinion as to the correct affinities of the ‘cross-hatched’ area. According to Mr. Higgins, the political agent in Manipur, the villages in the cross-hatched area had paid taxes to Manipur State for many years and considered themselves subjects of that state. While it was also equally firmly held by the commissioner, Surma Valley Division, Mr. W. J. Reid, and the deputy commissioner, Mr. H. C. Barnes, that the cross-hatched area ought to go to the Naga Hills. In December 1917, the then commissioner, W. J. Reid, rather modified his views and suggested that the Tangkhul villages in the cross-hatched area might be given to Manipur in exchange for Jessami, a Naga village, in Manipur territory. In the meanwhile, government was preoccupied with the widespread Kuki uprising of 1917–19 and the matter was raised in 1919 and again in 1920 the chief commissioner, Mr. Beatson-Bell, declined to take it up. Finally, however in April 1922 the then chief secretary, A. W. Botham, suggested that the cross-hatched area should be recognised as belonging to Manipur. Sir William Marris agreed and Mr. Reid gave way. A request was made to the Government of India accordingly on 26 April 1922, which was approved. The northern boundary of the area was finally defined in 1923 (Reid [1942] 1974: 93–4). 192

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Political control areas The report on the administration of the Chin Hills for 1912–13 had noted with satisfaction the continuance of friendly relations between the Chins/Zo on one hand and their neighbours, in Burma, the Lushai Hills and in Manipur, on the other.34 But as regards the unadministered tracts there was some apprehension and indeed trouble was expected to occur sooner or later. There were few villages within the administrative border that did not have an interest in the unadministered tracts, particularly with that west of the Boinu River. Intermarriage frequently took place between the administered Chins/Zo and those not under government control and in some cases land formed part of the marriage price. Many of the latter villages were originally founded from parent villages in the Haka Subdivision and so, accordingly to Chin/Zo custom, owed them certain taxes and dues. These were now forbidden to be levied, and the ‘unadministered’ Chin/Zo refused to pay them voluntarily knowing full well that British officers would never interfere in their internal affairs. The chiefs in the borders of the administered tracts therefore often complained that their position was hard to maintain and their responsibilities difficult to fulfill owing to their former resources being thus greatly diminished. The extension of the administrative border therefore took place periodically to incorporate unadministered villages. During 1912–13, for instance, the ‘formal annexation’, in the words of the administration report, of three villages, Shwedang, Mindat and Shoopong, was notified.35 Thus non-interference in the affairs of the unadministered villages, however attractive in theory could not always be followed in practice. The difficulty of the problem is brought out by the superintendent of the Pakokku Hill Tracts when referring to the Chinboks: Divided as the Chinbok clan is, one half in the district and the remainder in unadministered territory, relations are so intermixed, that the way of avoiding complications with the unadministered people when any serious crime takes place in Che, Maung and Yaw Tracts, is not easy to find. The difficulty lies in the fact that when a man from an unadministered village, fearing revenge for wrongdoing, seeks refuge with his relations in administered territory, he is invariably protected and arrangements are made to close the feud by payment of compensation. On the other hand, it is sometimes not advisable to compound our cases when offenders seek refuge in unadministered territory, and with the rudimentary notions of justice, the unadministered headmen do not see why, if we give protection to wrong doers, they cannot do likewise.36 ‘This unadministered territory’, noted the commissioner of the Magwe Division, ‘is not a real frontier but forms an island between the Lushai Hills and 193

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the Arakan Hills to the West and South, the Chin Hills to the North and the Pakokku Hill Tracts to the East’.37 The absorption of these villages, the Commissioner said, was bound to come sooner or later, but the sooner the better. The inhabitants themselves wished for it and the small extra cost involved could be covered by the tribute that could be levied on them. However, these areas were not brought under direct administration as the local officers wished, but in 1921 the secretary of state on the recommendation of the Government of Burma, allowed them in principle to be brought under what in North East India was popularly called ‘loose political control’.38 Every other year civil officers with military police escorts toured a welldefined area collecting tribute and settling disputes. This was the essence of political control. The whole of the Political Control area where control was to be exercise was divided between the hill district of Arakan, the Pakokku Hill Tracts and the Chin Hills district. It needs to be pointed out that beyond the political control area there still remained unadministered tracts. Loose political control seems to have succeeded in the Chin Hills portion. Elsewhere it was less vigorously followed. Lieutenant Colonel L.E.L. Burne whose application of the system in the villages within his Chin Hills District virtually converted them into an administered area thus wrote in 1925 what had been achieved: Raiding was common in the area taken over by me in 1921–22 but it is now practically a thing of the past. The area has been visited nearly every year and there is now little difference between that area and the rest of the Haka Subdivision. House tax is paid in by the chiefs and headmen, guns have been stamped and registered, communications have been opened out, and cases are brought to the Political Officer, for settlement. It is now almost possible to tour the whole of that area with mule transport. Escorts are no longer required and I can move about in that area as freely as I can in the rest of the district.39 Burne at the same time suggested that his methods should be extended to the political control areas included in the Pakokku Hill Tracts. Punitive expeditions such as the combined one from the three districts, undertaken that year against some villages in the unadministered area, were not likely to have any permanent effect. His own Chin/Zo were ‘disgusted’, he said, when they found that the same system of control was not extended to the Matus in the political control area against whom they had a grievance. One village openly told him that ‘since Government refused to adjust their grievances they themselves would take action in their own way and at their own time’.40 What Colonel Burne actually wanted was something more than the vigorous enforcement of loose political control. In effect he wanted direct administration to be extended to all villages around the Chin Hills. Of the 194

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Pakokku area he thus said ‘This area is a source of annoyance to me for several reasons. My border people naturally want to know why they have to pay Rs. 2 tribute, have their guns stamped, have to maintain village communications, have to report all crime, have to refrain from raiding etc., while the Matus are left alone to manage themselves’.41 So under such circumstances, Burne was afraid that the Matus may raid across his border that would invite retaliation from his people. Since there was always a tendency amongst the warriors of his people to join in raids committed by one Matu village against another, it was, therefore, most unsatisfactory for Burne to have an unadministered tract across his border and ‘nothing would please me more than to bring it under administration.42 Burne said that this tract could easily be brought under administration and would be a great saving of expenditure and trouble to the government in the future. The process might take two to three years but would be worth it. Having taken over the Chin Hills, Colonel Burne said in conclusion, it was the duty of the British Government to afford security and protection to those who needed it. But, ‘I do not think we are going to obtain any result by this policy of dashing in and out again’.43 Sir Charles Innes, the governor, as the head of the province had now become under the Government of India Act, 1919, agreed that the policy of periodical tours no longer met the needs of the case and that a system similar to that introduced by Burne in his area should be introduced in the political control area under the Pakokku Hill Tracts. His only condition was that no heavy financial liabilities should be involved. No steps were taken to follow up the Governor’s observations, and there the matter remained for the next two years. When it was reopened it became a part of a much larger question.

Chin Hill District, 1928–35 Meanwhile, a proposal was under consideration for the abolition of the Hill District of Arakan. This district, it will be recalled, was the old Arakan Hill Tracts prior to the annexation of Upper Burma and was now administered by a deputy commissioner of the Burma Frontier Service. The view of most local officers was that it could be adequately administered by an assistant superintendent of the Burma Frontier Service or an extra assistant commissioner of the Burma Civil Service and therefore it was no longer necessary to retain it as a deputy commissioner’s charge.44 Another view was that it ought to be redesignated as the Arakan Hill Tracts and placed under a superintendent as in the Pakokku Hill Tracts, to be administered under the commissioner of the division.45 Further, that certain unadministered parts of the Chin Hills District which were still outside political control and which marched with the Arakan district in the north and east should be administered by that superintendent. The boundaries of the reconstituted Arakan Hill Tracts would therefore have to be modified to include these areas. In 195

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order to follow the same pattern of administration as in the Chin Hills and Pakokku Hill Tracts, the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 should be extended to it superseding the Arakan Hill District Laws Regulation of 1916. On 5 August a detailed scheme was prepared for the transfer of the whole or part of the old unadministered territories assigned to the Arakan Hill district to the Chin Hills District and for the conversion of the Pakokku Hill Tracts into a subdivision of the latter. The argument in the proposal was, as the letter claimed, primarily on the desirability of having, so far as is possible, all the tribes resident in the Arakan Hills under one control’. Also the Burma Government pointed out that ‘as the centre of gravity of the Hill District of Arakan has shifted towards the Lemro river . . . which was difficult of access from Paletwa, the area lying to the north and west of Paletwa was of little or no administrative importance’.46 This is what Burma told the Government of India: The experience gained in dealing with this area has, however, shown the necessity for some modification in the administration of the Arakan Hills District, and His Excellency in Council accordingly proposed to effect the abolition of the Hill District of Arakan by transferring a portion of this area to the Akyab District as a Township with headquarters at Paletwa, the present headquarters of the Arakan Hill District. The remainder of this area, together with the pre-unadministered area which lies to the east of the Arakan Hill district, will be transferred to the Haka Sub-division of the Chin Hills District. That part of the pre-unadministered area which lies to the north of the regularly administered Arakan Hill District for the purpose of dealing with this area invested with the power of an Assistant Superintendent.47 The Government of India gave its assent on 24 September 1927. However, these changes were not carried out for it was soon realised that the August 1927 proposals were unsatisfactory in several respects and needed modification. A year later, in August 1928, a conference presided over by the governor, Sir Charles Innes, and attended by the commissioners of Magwe and Arakan Divisions, the superintendents of the Chin Hills District and Pakokku Hill Tracts and the deputy commissioner of the Arakan Hill District made the following recommendations: 1 2

That the Pakokku Hill Tracts should be amalgamated with Chin Hills District. Certain tracts in the Chin Hills should be part of the Arakan Hill District, and the remainder to be placed under the enlarged Chin Hills District.

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3

That Chin Hills Regulation should be extended over to the old unadministered tracts of the Arakan District.48

These proposals were discussed by the governor in council. The proposal to convert the Hill District of Arakan into a ‘township’ of the Akyab district was reconsidered. It was at the same time decided the district should be called the Arakan Hill Tracts and should cease to be a deputy commissioner’s charge but would remain as an independent one under a superintendent. The governor in council also felt that the time had come to extend to the political control areas the same form of administration as in the Chin Hills in the north. The governor in council had thus noted, it (is) abundantly clear that while the tribes under (the Chin Hills District) control have gladly responded to proper administration, murders and raids prevail in the areas under loose political control, and the periodical tours of civil officers have been treated by the people as no more than incidents to be forgotten as soon as the civil officers have passed. These periodical tours have now served their purpose. The governor in council therefore agreed with the unanimous opinion of the conference that the only remedy for ending this present unsatisfactory affair was to bring the areas under regular administration by extending to them the Chin Hills Regulation. There was of course no objection from the Government of India to these proposals. The Government of Burma carried out the changes by a notification under section 1, sub-section (3) of the Chin Hills Regulation, 1896, which after the sanction of the Government of India was published in the Burma Gazette.49 The notification also clearly laid down boundaries of the Hill District of Arakan and those of the Chin Hills District. The former was at the same time renamed ‘Arakan Hill Tracts’. Its deputy commissioner ceased to exist but as earlier proposed it remained as an independent charge under a superintendent and had the same powers as a deputy commissioner. An additional assistant superintendent of the Burma Frontier Service sanctioned earlier took charge of an additional subdivision of the tract attached to the reconstituted and enlarged Chin Hills District. The notification clearly defined the boundary to which the Regulation was extended: On the north it was bounded by a line running from the point where the Koladan river joins the southern boundary of the Lushai Hills, north and east along the boundary of the Lushai Hills to where it joins the boundary of the Chin Hills District; thence the western and southern boundary of the Chin Hills District to where it joins the

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Map 7.1 The Chin Hills District, 1930 Source: Prepared by the author.

THE CHIN HILLS DISTRICT

boundary of the Pakokku Hill Tracts. On the east bounded by the western boundary of the Pakokku Hill Tracts. On the south and east by a line running due west from the main Arteraw range to a point on the Lemroo river slightly south of Kwiimnu village; thence up the Lemroo river; then due west passing through Taktaung, Lituitaung and Lolitaung Peaks to a point longitude .93 and latitude .21o 31ft; thence in a northwesterly stream meets the hill called Kamran; thence due north up the Ralet stream to its junction with the Koladan river; thence up the Kaladan river to the Lushai Hills border.50 Towards the close of the year the Chin Hills Regulation was also extended to the Arakan Hill Tracts.51 The Pakokku Hill Tracts remained a separate administration under a superintendent till 1930 when it was formally amalgamated with the Chin Hills district.52 The impact of these changes was immediately seen in the very large increase of the Chin/Zo population in the 1931 Census, which showed an addition of 32,958 individuals.53 One of the considerations for keeping the Chin/Zo in one compact administrative unit related to the constitutional changes introduced by the Government of India Act 1919. ‘Burma is not India’, the Montague-Chelmsford Report had declared, and ‘Its people belong to another race in another stage of political development, and its problems are altogether different’. It further pointed out that ‘The application to Burma of the general principles of throwing open the public service more widely to Indians would only mean the replacement of one alien bureaucracy by another’.54 This was about Burma proper, but its ramifications were immense for the Chin/Zo and other tribal areas. It was not until 1921, after considerable demands by the Burmese political leadership and equally considerable reluctance on the part of the British Government that Burma was brought within the framework of the principles of the Act of 1919 by the Government of Burma Act 1921. Burma was constituted into a governor’s province with a reformed Legislative Council and a dyarchical system similar to that obtaining in other provinces in India with effect from 2 January 1923. In principle, a dyarchy system extended a measure of home rule to the province of Burma, under a British governor and his executive council which consisted of the governor, two appointed members and two ministers, who represented and were responsible to a unicameral Legislative Council. However, the governor was to exercise direct rule over the Shan, Kareni, Kachin, Chin (Zo) and Hill tribal areas, which constituted more than 40 per cent of Burma’s total area, and included between 10 to 15 per cent of its population (Trager 1966: 48). The Chin Hills, along with the Federation of Shan States, the Shan States of Hsawnghsup and Singkaling Hkamti, the Somra Tract, the Pakokku and Arakan Hill Tracts, the territory of Hkamti Long and the Kachin Hill Tracts of 199

THE CHIN HILLS DISTRICT

the Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha districts were, however, excluded from the reforms and under Sub-section (2) of section 52 (A) of the act declared to be ‘backward tracts’. As such the Chin Hills remained outside the purview of the Legislative Council in respect of legislation, of voting of expenditure and, except with the governor’s sanction, of interpellation and discussion. The authority of the ministers did not extend to it and the Chin Hills like the other backward tracts remained in the exclusive charge of the governor in council.55 The Burma Frontier Service was constituted with effect from 20 December 1922 to provide officers for service in the Shan State, the Kachin and Chin Hills.56 That the Chin Hills should constitute a well-defined area was a corollary to this policy. Keeping it directly under the control of the governor meant the control of outsiders into the region. There had been considerable uneasiness among the Burmans about the increasing Indian immigration and economic competition. Indeed, such factors had been responsible for the demand for separation of Burma from India that began after 1921.

Recommendations of the Indian statutory commission When the Indian Statutory Commission (ISC) was sent to India, well ahead of its schedule, in 1928, the Association of Professional and Business Men in Burma submitted a memorandum in which it comments on Burma ‘as the most criminal province in the Empire’ (Craddock 1929: 123–4). The then lieutenant governor lamented the reforms ‘had covered up multitude of sins’ (Ibid.: 120), while an independent observer says ‘it has been enough to teach the Burmans thoroughly all such vices as bribery, intimidation, and personation’ (Ibid.: 122). By bringing out the anomalies on the working of the Reforms, colonial and business class had lobbied hard to achieve their goal. Thus even before the Burmans had made up their mind on the question of separation the British in Burma put their case for separation harder to the Simon Commission by advancing another idea: ‘Burma was the milch cow of India’ (Butler 1932: 655). Perhaps this had largely influenced the Commission’s finding when it declared ‘Burma’s interests diverge very considerably from those of India in terms economic, military, constitutional matters’57 and ‘Burma under present conditions pays heavily for defence which she had little concern’.58 In February 1929 when the Commission visited Rangoon, U Ba Pe moved the adjournment motion in the Legislative Council which passed in favour of Burma’s separation from India without a division.59 The final recommendation of the Commission agreed ‘a decision to postpone separation would be so unpopular in Burma as to endanger the working of any reforms which might be given to her as a province of India’ and ‘advise, therefore, that Burma should be separated from India immediately’.60

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Interestingly, however, the Simon Commission which reported in favour of separation and a number of constitutional advances did not recommend any change in the status of the Chin/Zo and Kachin Hills. The reason for this, so explicitly stated in the Report, is indeed a commentary on three decades of British rule in these hills: These Chin and Kachin areas are all unfitted to participate in a constitution on representative lines suitable for Burma proper. Their peoples are educationally backward and have evinced no desire to be linked with the Burmans, who in turn betray little interest in these hill tracts. No change should therefore be made in the position of these ‘backward tracts’ and they should remain under the sole control of the Governor in Council.61

Government of India Act, 1935 In 1935, the British Parliament decided upon a bill that was passed as two acts simultaneously – the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Government of Burma Act, 1935. The provisions of these two Acts were largely identical. The Acts were a fulfilment of the recommendation of the Simon Commission. Part I (Introductory) 2 (1) of the Government of Burma Act says: All rights, authority and jurisdiction heretofore (2 August 1935) belonging to his Majesty the King, Emperor of India, which appertain or are incidental to the government of the territories of Burma for the time being vested in him and all rights, authority and jurisdiction exercisable by him by treaty grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise in, or in relation to, any other territories, are exercisable by His Majesty, except in so far as may be otherwise provided by or under this Act, or as ay be otherwise directed by His Majesty.62 Part XIV, No. 158 (a) further adds: ‘“Burma” includes (subject to the exercise by His Majesty of any powers vested in him with respect to the alteration of the boundaries thereof) all territories which were immediately before the commencement of this Act comprised in India, being territories laying to the east of Bengal, the State of Manipur, Assam, and any tribal areas connected with Assam. “British Burma” means so much of Burma as belongs to His Majesty’.63

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Map 7.2 The political division of the Union of Burma Source: Frontier settled by the Boundary Agreement of 1960 shown as still demarcated, adapted from Dorothy Woodman’s The Making of Burma, p. 567.

THE CHIN HILLS DISTRICT

The Second Schedule Part I stated areas in Burma to which special provisions apply. Apart from others, it includes Chin/Zo inhabited areas such as the Arakan Hill Tracts (annexed in 1866), Chin Hills District (1896), Somra Tract (1917).64 Thus, in effect, the Government of Burma Act 1935 changed the nomenclature from ‘Backward Tract’ to ‘Scheduled Areas’. The separation of Burma came into effect on 1 April 1937. A constitution for Burma which was outlined in Part XIV and Schedules X to XV of the Government of India Act was, in the words of one authority ‘given body in the Government of Burma Act, 1935, and spirit in the Instrument of Instructions from His Majesty to the Governor’ (Donnison 1970: 114). Once again the Chin/Zo and other tribal areas remained outside the scope of the new Constitution for precisely the same reasons that had led to their exclusion from the reform of 1923. They henceforth came to be known as the Scheduled or Excluded Areas, later called Frontier Areas, and remained outside Ministerial control (Tinker 1983: introduction).65 Burma became a chief commissionership in 1862 and a lieutenant governor’s province in 1897. With the Act came into effect Burma practically ceased its connection with the Indian Empire. Interestingly, however, no new boundary was drawn between the newly created British Burma and the Indian Empire. The British government seemed to be least bothered about redrawing a new boundary as the Indian Independence Act 1947 also did not specify any new Indo-Burma boundary. The Act says resolution of the border was left to the independent governments. What is completely forgotten in the entire discourse of ‘separation’ is the fate of the Chin/Zo people. The Chin Hills District, which had been attached to the administration of the province of Burma since 1892, remained with the ‘separated’ British Burma. Rest of the Zo peoples in the Indo-Burma frontier, such as those in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Lushai Hills and Manipur remained in India until the partition of India in 1947 further separated the Chittagong Hill Tracts from India. The question is: Is ‘administrative convenience’ a sole criterion to justify the division of people of the same ethnic community? This may be explained only through further research and analysis especially in the context of transborder Zo people of the IndoBurma borderlands.66 Though I do not intend to go further into post-1935, I cannot refrain from mentioning the fact that transborder Zo people participated in the Second World War with the hope to get reward after the war. They rallied behind their colonial masters at the risks of their lives against Japanese reprisals and they fought guerilla wars against the imperial Japanese forces along the Tedim road67 and other places. Whereas in the Chin Hills the Chin/Zo largely rallied behind the British, in Manipur the Kuki/Zo collaborated with the Japanese; the objective on both sides of the camps were the same: they wanted to get freedom from colonial bondage.68

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Notes 1 The Chin/Zo population was actually the Kukis, mainly of the Thado group. These as well as the Thados in the Chin Hills immediately south of the state of Manipur, were designated by the authorities in Burma as ‘Chin’. 2 Simon Commission Report on India, Vol. XI, p. 561. 3 For detail of Chin Hills-Manipur Boundary, see Chapter 6. Also refer to FEAP May 1894, Nos. 82–99; Demarcation of Manipur-Chin Boundary. 4 FEAP August 1895, Nos. 137–142; E. S. Symes, Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 19 September 1893. 5 FEAP August 1895, Nos. 137–142. 6 Ibid. See Note by Carey, 14 July 1892. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 FEBP May 1909, No. 90; See Department Notes, also FEAP January 1909, Nos. 30–32; Note by Lieutenant Governor, 17 January 1909. 10 Ibid.; In its essential features this was the ‘close border’ system (including modification on it carried out after 1878) on the North-West Frontier (Davies 1975: 18–36; Spain 1977). 11 FEAP October 1896, Nos. 28–35; Note by Hugh Daly, 16 July 1896. 12 FEAP April 1899, No. 133; From the Revenue Secretary to the Government of Burma to the Secretary to the Government of India, 4 January 1899. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. ‘Application of Section 31 of the Upper Burma Land and Revenue Regulation, 1889, as amended by Regulation III of 1898, to the Chins in the Chin Hills’, Captain Hugh Daly, Deputy Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, to Revenue Secretary, Government of Burma, 24 February 1899; and Notification. 16 FEAP April 1899, No. 133. 17 John Nisbet also made mention of steatite quarries in the Chin hills and near the An pass crossing the Arakan Yoma from Minbu to Akyab in his (1901: 41). 18 J. L. Ommanney, Assistant Superintendent, Pakokku Hill Tracts, Kanpetlet, Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the Year 1905–06. 19 Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the Year 1908–09, para 5. 20 Cutch is a very dark-coloured solid extract obtained from boiling chips of the sha tree (Acacia catechu), which grows abundantly throughout all the tracts still under forest in the central dry zone. Its finest and most vigorous development was obtained, however, in the Thayetmyo, Prome and Tharrawaddy districts of Pegu. It was considered next in importance to rice and teak timber among the exports to foreign countries (Nisbet 1901: 439). 21 E. J. Dobson, Superintendent, Pakokku Hill Tracts, Kanpetlet, Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the year 1906–07. 22 See for details on King Thebaw (Singhal 1981; Aung 1965, 1967; Pollak 1929). 23 FEAP August 1899, Nos. 7–11; Captain H. Daly, Deputy Secretary, Government of India, Foreign Department, to Chief Secretary, Government of Burma, 10 July 1899 et seq. 24 The Burma Forest Manual, Rangoon, 1905, containing the Burma Forest Act 1902 (Burma Act IV of 1902) and Rules, Notification and Orders thereunder, p. 40. 25 The Burma Forest Manual, p. 40. 26 Ibid.

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27 Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hills Tracts, Kanpetlet for the Year 1907–08. 28 E. M. Browne, in charge of Superintendent, Pakokku Hill Tracts, Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the Year 1908–09. 29 Ibid., p. 93. 30 Ibid., p. 146. The Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin district thus wrote in his Administrative Report for the year ending 30 June 1917: The various minor Naga villages are said to have been inviting Kuki Chief to join in their quarrels. This has given the Kukis an excuse for buying blackmail, in which Shempu (village) has been the worst offender. The Nagas have only themselves to blame, but all monies levied will have to be restored when communications are again opened. It is not yet possible to give the full facts, and enquiry will have to be made next open season. 31 Ibid., p. 93. 32 FEBP March 1918, No. 12; Demi-official from the W. F. Rice, Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma to Denys Bray Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, 9 September 1917. 33 F&PEAP December 1917, No. 5; Chin Hills (Amendment) Regulation, 1917, Notification No. 403; E.B., Delhi, 11 December 1917. 34 Report Ending 30 June 1913. 35 Ibid. At the same time the boundary between the Chin Hills and the Pakokku Hill Tracts was settled by the Superintendent of the Chin Hills. 36 Report on the Administration of the Pakokku Hill Tracts for the Year Ended 30 June 1917. 37 Ibid. 38 FEAP September 1921, Nos. 1–17; For a brief account of the system in North East India (Hussain 1995). 39 FEAP September 1921, Nos. 1–17. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., ‘I don’t believe they are bad people really’, Burne added, ‘they are ignorant and uncivilized and do not know or understand what laws, order or authority is’. 43 FEAP September 1921, Nos. 1–17. 44 FPEP 1927, File No. 658-X Serial No. 1, Letter from the Government of Burma, 5 August 1927. 45 Ibid., 1928, No. 185; From Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma, 20 September 1928. 46 FPEP 1927, File No. 658-X Serial No. 1. 47 Ibid. 48 FPEP 1928, No. 185. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 The Chin Hills Regulation became a model for administration of the ‘backward tract’ in the North-east Frontier of India’. W. A. Cosgrave, Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, responded to Rai Bahadur Nagendra Nath Chaudhury’s question in the Council meeting in Shillong, gave the following details where the Chin Hills Regulation was extended: to North Cachar Hills subdivision, the Khasi and Jaintia Hills (except the Municipality and Cantonment of Shillong), the Naga Hills, the Lushai Hills, the Mikir Hills Tracts in the Nowgong and Sibsagar districts, the Garo Hills and the Lakhimpur, Sadiya and balipara Frontier

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52 53

54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68

Tracts. See, ASA, Assam Secretariat Private Secretary’s Office, Appointment and Political Department, Political Branch, December 1931, Nos. 845–864; Council Questions Regarding the Chin Hills Regulation in the Province. Census of India 1931, Vol. XI, Burma Part I Report, Rangoon 1933. Ibid., The basis for enumeration, for the first time, was language and race. The numbers of Chins/Zo on this basis was: Somra Tract 7,981; the area formerly known as the unadministered portion of the Pakokku Hill Tracts, 6,650 and the Pakokku Hills amalgamated with the Chin Hills district, 18,327. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Calcutta 1918, p. 129. Simon Commission Report, Vol XI, p. 559. Ibid., p. 225. These posts used to be held by officers of the Burma Civil Service, but in view of the special qualifications and training required, it was found necessary, at the reorganisation of the Burma and Subordinate Civil Services, to establish a separate cadre. At the same time the strength of the Burma Civil Service had to be increased as it was found inadequate. In August 1921 was instituted the Service of Deputy Myo-oks, to be part of, and the ordinary avenue of entrance into, the Subordinate Civil Service. It was designed to supply the Township Officers in heavy charges, and to provide a trained reserve for leave and emergency vacancies among Myo-oks. Appointments to this Service were made half by a Selection Board and half by Nomination. In 1927 a competitive examination was introduced to supersede the latter method, but the results have no so far been satisfactory. ISC, Vol. XI, p. 567. Ibid., p. 571. ISC, Vol. II, p. 184. Ibid., p. 188. ISC, Vol. XI, p. 562. Government of Burma Act, 1935, p. 6. Ibid., p. 60. Ibid., p. 62. See Introduction. These areas which amounts to 40% of the land area of Burma and 15 % of its total population, was placed under the exclusive control of the Governor, ‘in his discretion’, also see ch 7, pp. 101–22. A discussion on the Zo as transborder people from society-centred perspective is available in Pum Khan Pau, ‘Transborder People, Connected History: Border and Relationships in the Indo-Burma Borderlands’, Journal of Borderlands Studies DOI:10.1080/08865655.2018.1438914. For my work on the battles of the Tedim road refer to (Pau 2012). For detail analysis see (Pau 2014; Guite 2010).

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CONCLUSION

The Chin Hills, later known as Chin Special Division (1948) and Chin State (1974) in Burma/Myanmar, came under varying degrees of administrative control of the British after the latter’s annexation of Upper Burma following the last and final Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86). Long before that they had come into contact with Chin/Zo tribes whose lands marched with two frontier tracts, in Arakan and Manipur. The annexation of Arakan after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) brought the British into immediate contact with the Chin/Zo in its northern hills. Though called by a variety of designations, from the name of their villages, clans or sub-tribes, very little was known of these tribes, except that they kept Arakan’s northern frontier in a state of perpetual alarm through their raids and inter-village warfare. For years the British in Arakan were saddled with the problem of the defence of an extensive, ill-defined and difficult mountain frontier and the management of tribes living therein. Lieutenant Henry Hopkinson’s proposal to station a European officer in the Koladan Valley was turned down by the lieutenant governor of Bengal, who wedded to the ideas of ‘non-interference’. The lieutenant governor rather recommended the distribution of arms to the frontier villages or to subsidise tribal chiefs to keep the peace in their neighbourhood. It was only after Colonel Arthur Phayre, who had acquired extensive knowledge of these tribes, became the chief commissioner of Burma and personally went to the Koladan Valley in early 1866 that Hopkinson’s policy was revived, ultimately resulting in the creation of a separate administrative unit and the appointment of a superintendent of the Hill Tribes in Northern Arakan. This arrangement remained unchanged till the annexation of the Chin Hills, though occasional disturbances continued. For the British the Arakan years were not entirely without result. A good deal of information of the tribes had been acquired over the decades, and at the end of it the appellation ‘Chin’ came into more regular official use, albeit the indigenous people had their local appellations such as Shou, Hiou, Sho, Dzo, Khumi, Mro etc. These later came to be called the Southern Chin/Zo. In Manipur British involvement resulted from the relations of that petty native state with the Chin/Zo in the region south of its borders. These hills 207

CONCLUSION

which joined the valley of Manipur in the south marked the northern limits of the Chin/Zo settlements belonging to the group called Sukte, Kamhau, Thado, Guite, Vaiphei and Zou. To the Meitei of the valley of Manipur, cognate tribes living on the fringes were largely known as ‘Khongjai’. The British at this time, that is, from the close of the War with the Burmese, was absorbed with the defence of Bengal’s Eastern Frontier. The establishment of a political agency in Manipur in 1835 for this purpose, however, coincided with the rise of Kam Hau, a Sukte chief at Tedim, whose successful expansionist policy and territorial conquests had greatly threatened Manipur. The failure of Colonel William McCulloch’s ‘sepoy village’ for frontier defence to check Kamhau-Sukte raids led to Maharaja Chandrakirti Singh’s most humiliating and abortive military campaign against Kam Hau in 1857. In another attempt, the Manipuri Maharaja took advantage of the Lushai Expedition in 1871–72 by moving his troops far beyond his southernmost frontier post (see Table 3.1) from Tseklapi to Chivu where they treacherously captured Mualpi chief Go Khaw Thang and a large number of his people. Captain, later Major-General, Sir James Johnstone’s policy to find military solution to the frontier problem by proposing the annexation of the Northern Chin Hills into Manipur, however, was rejected by the government. Colonial policy towards the Indo-Burma frontier completely changed with the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886. Though the British had already come into contact with the Chin/Zo in the south and northern frontiers, it was for the first time that they met on the east, beyond the Chindwin River and its tributary the Myittha. To the British, the ‘ChinLushai Hills’ was a source of trouble which they dealt with by establishing frontier defence system. But as they occupied the Kabaw-Kale Valley, they began to see the strategic importance of the Chin-Lushai Hills and felt the exigency to open communication between Upper Burma and Bengal. Depredations on settlement areas in the Kabaw-Kale Valley and the refugees that some of the Burman leaders of the resistance against the new Government in Burma had obtained in these hills led to a more direct involvement of the British in Chin/Zo affairs. Military expeditions followed survey and explorations of the hill tracts which were then under the control of three distinct groups: the Kamhau-Sukte and Sizang in the north, the Taisuns and others around Falam and to their south the Haka group. These tribes offered stiff resistance to the colonial armies as they began to penetrate into the hills in the late 1880s. They built stockades, fought them out with guerrilla tactics, ambushed road-making parties and reinforcements thereby heavily inflicting on the early intruders. In response, the British resorted to very cruel and harsh measures such as prohibition of cultivation, hot pursuit of resister groups, wholesale burning of villages and crops, search and confiscation of food supplies, destruction of livestock and stored grain and so forth. Military posts were established in important villages and the chiefs were made to supply provisions to the garrisons and provide labour. As the 208

CONCLUSION

British gradually overpowered Chin/Zo resistance, villages were regrouped into larger ones for easy military control. However, the general disarmament policy carried out by the British, albeit it finally curbed and prevented intense and protracted resistance, backfired heavily as the Chin/Zo greatly valued their guns as an important prized possession and therefore fought out to defend them. The Chin-Lushai Conference in 1892, which discussed whether the Chin Hills alongwith the Lushai Hills should form a part of Burma or Assam or a separate Commissionership was a missed opportunity to bring the entire Zo (Chin, Lushai, Kuki) people under one political umbrella. Divergent opinion on the issue of ‘amalgamation’, particularly from Burma officers, stalled the proceedings to remain inconclusive. As the resolutions of the conference were sent to the Viceroy Council, a more intense debate ensued there. It was finally decided that Chin Hills remained under the chief commissioner of Burma, and South Lushai Hills and North Lushai under Bengal and Assam, respectively, to be amalgamated later under Assam. That was one of the finest moment when the British had the opportunity to bring what they often called ‘people of the same stock’ under a single administration. That was not done, and thenceforth the trajectories of Zo history began to move towards different directions as per the terms dictated upon them by the majority group. To consolidate and seal its administration in the newly possessed hill tracts, the British enacted the Chin Hills Regulation in 1896 which provided legal framework for administration based on ‘indirect rule’. Accordingly, the traditional chieftainship was not removed but redesignated as ‘headman’; its power was also redefined. The ‘supralocal’ chieftainships like the Kamhau chief of the northern hills was recognised but turned into colonial agent. For instance, Chief Hau Cin Khup, who turned into an ally of the British after signing an agreement with them following his arrest in 1891 helped collected numerous guns from the villages under his control during the disarmament process. He also supplied 1,033 men during the recruitment drive for Labour Corps in France.1 In 1896, Bertram Carey and Henry N. Tuck published two volumes of The Chin Hills in which they claimed that they were able to identify the tribes and clans and families mentioned in Alexander Mackenzie’s History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal (1884). The two colonial officers in the Chin Hills said: The ‘Sooties’, ‘Sokties’, ‘Kanhows’ are what we know as the Sokte tribe. The ‘Chassads’ or ‘Chuksads’ are known to the Chin as Taksat and to the officers of the Upper Chindwin in Burma as the Kaungse, which latter word is the Burmese way of pronouncing ‘Khongjai’, the Manipuri name given to all Kukis (and Chins) who reside on the border of the plains. The Chassads belong to the Thado tribe. The 209

CONCLUSION

immigrants described as ‘Helot race not actually of the Sootie tribe, but living in villages of their own amongst them’, are what we know as the Yo and Nwite tribes. The ‘Northern Pois’ mentioned by Colonel Johnstone in 1878 are the Yahow tribe and the Lakava Pois’ or ‘Sindhus’ are the Klangklang tribe and the Independent southern villages. The ‘Waipies’ are known to us as the Vaipes; nearly the whole family has left the Chin Hills and is now living in Manipur territory. About 100 houses are included in the ‘Nwite’ or Mal village of Losao. The ‘Hankeeps’ and ‘Hawkibs’ are merely a family of the Thado tribe. The tribes which lie on the immediate south are (1) Thado, (2) Yo, (3) Nwite, (4) Sokte. (Carey and Tuck [1896] 1932: 4) Unfortunately, as Carey and Tuck also admitted, the Boundary Commission which carried out delimitation of the Chin Hills-Manipur boundary in 1894 had arbitrarily awarded a large number of tracts and numerous villages under the control of the Kamhau-Sukte in the Northern Chin Hills to Manipur. The Kamhau-Sukte dominance which had extended up to the southern limit of the valley of Manipur in the mid-nineteenth century had been cut down heavily under the aegis of the colonial rulers who wanted to appease the Raja of Manipur. The Chin Hills Regulation became a model for administration not only for the Chin Hills District but also for many other areas. It was extended to the Lushai Hills and Manipur, to the Somra Tract and Arakan Hill Tracts, and also to several hill districts of British Assam.2 In 1930 the Pakokku Hill Tracts was absorbed into the Chin Hill District as a result of which the population of the district also increased greatly. The Report on the Administration of Burma for the Year 1930–31, mentioned: The Chin Hills District, enlarged last year by the inclusion of Kanpetlet subdivision, have now been further enlarged by the inclusion of such of the unadministered area lying between the Lushai Hills District, the Chin Hills District, the Akyab District, and the Hill District of Arakan, as was not given to Arakan Division.3 By this time the area of the Chin Hills District was approximately 10,750 square miles with a population of approximately 171,237. The Arakan Hill Tracts was approximately 3,142 square miles with population 21,418.4 According to the Census of India 1931 the total number of Kuki-Chin group was 348,9945 which included all the Southern and Northern Chin/Zo. In 1935–36, the Chin Hills District was approximately 10,377 square miles and Arakan Hill Tracts was approximately 3,543 square miles. The populations remained the same with 1930–31 but the slight variation in size of the areas was unexplained.6 But the system of administration was not uniform 210

CONCLUSION

in the Chin Hills District. While a large part was directly under colonial administration, a strip of territory outside it was brought under what was called ‘loose political control’. There were, in addition, pockets of unadministered tracts beyond these. The entire Chin Hills District was declared a ‘backward tract’ under the Government of India Act 1919 and the Act of 1935 renamed as ‘Scheduled’ or ‘Excluded’ Areas outside the control of Ministerial Burma. As the Chin Hill District had become a political entity in Burma, it is important to look into the larger debate over the separation of Burma from India and its impact on the Chin/Zo and its kindred tribes across the colonial and postcolonial borders.

The politics of ‘separation’ and beyond The change of nomenclature by the Government of India Act 1935 did not affect the constitutional status of the hills people, which means that these areas continued to remain outside ministerial control (Tinker 1948). But the Act finalised Burma’s separation from India which came into effect on 1 April 1937. Though the separation was largely based on the recommendation of the Simon Commission in 1928,7 the ideological origin was, however, to be found in the interest of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist’. According to Willem van Schendel, 1937 was not just a separation of Burma from India; it was the ‘first’ partition of the Indian Subcontinent (2005: 270). But this view has not really received adequate scholarly attention. ‘The earliest proposal for separation’, according to F. Burton Leach’s rather revealing remark, ‘came from the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce in 1884 seeking the Chief Commissioner in the financial and general interests of the country’ (1936: 45). Later in 1913, Sir George Scott wrote in the introduction to Joseph Dautremer’s book: ‘Burma ought never to have been joined on to the Indian Empire’ (1913: 10). These two revelations undoubtedly suggested that ‘separation’ had been advocated intermittently for about 50 years or more by the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. The reason for such ideological development was, according to J. S. Furnivall, ‘chiefly because they expected to have greater influence under the Colonial Office than under the Indian Government’ (1948: 166). Thus the origin of the idea of ‘separation’ of Burma from India was to be found in combined colonial-business interest to control the politics and economy of Burma. However, there are also other arguments which justify ‘separation’. Lieutenant Governor Harcourt Butler (Governor of Burma 1915–17, 1922–27) raised the ethnological question, saying ‘the Burmans differ radically from Indians’ (1932: 656). To Lieutenant Governor Reginald Craddock (1917–22), who succeeded Butler, Burma’s incorporation with India was ‘a political accident’ (1929: 126). For another colonial officer, it was ‘the accident of contiguity’ (Donnison 1953: 72). That Burma had never been an integral part of India is the common view of the colonial officers to justify its separation in 1937. 211

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The exclusion of Burma from the constitutional reforms of 1919 on the ground that ‘Burma is not India’ and ‘its problems are altogether different’ aggravated the problem.8 Burmans protest against their exclusion from the reforms, famous Southeast Asian scholar D.G.E. Hall says, ‘took everybody by surprise’ (1981: 626). Even Governor Sir Reginald Craddock openly stated, ‘Never was a country and its people more untimely ripped from the womb of political future progress than Burma and the Burmese, when Mr. Montagu with his magic midwifery from across the Bay of Bengal started to disturb them from their placid contentment’ (1929: 109). The Burmans’ protest paid off: it resulted to the adoption of the constitutional reforms in Burma in January 1923. As a result, diarchy was extended in principle to the province of Burma. However, the Governor was to exercise direct control over the Shan, Kareni, Kachin, Chin (Zo), and tribal hill areas, which constituted more than 40 per cent of Burma’s total area, and included between 10 to 15 per cent of its population (Trager 1966: 48). But when the Simon Commission visited Burma in 1928 they found that diarchy was a complete disaster. The Reforms ‘had covered up a multitude of sins’, Craddock lamented (1929: 120). Based on its field investigations, the Simon Commission came to a conclusion that ‘to postpone separation would be so unpopular in Burma as to endanger the working of any reforms’ and ‘therefore, that Burma should be separated from India immediately’.9 The ‘separation’ had its ripples in other parts of the Indian subcontinent and set a precedent for other anti-colonial movements in India. In his four-page leaflet issued in July 1935, C. Rahmat Ali, who claimed to be the ‘founder of the Pakistan National Movement’, argued: ‘While Burma is being separated from Hindoostan, it remains a mystery to us why Pakistan . . . is to be forced into the Indian Federation’ (Coupland 1944: 200). In 1939 another eminent Muslim leader of the Punjab, Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz, cited the case of Burma as a precedent in his proposal to divide India into five ‘countries’, all of which would be federations in themselves (Ibid.: 203). The Government of India Act 1935 did not draw new boundary between British Burma and British India. District administrative borders between the Chin Hills and its adjoining territories such as Manipur and the Lushai Hills became the recognised boundary between Burma and India. In spite of the Reforms colonial rulers had put in place a separate administrative policy and constitutional safeguard for the indigenous hill peoples in their respective areas. For instance, the Inner Line Regulation introduced in 1873 was intended ‘to cordon off parts of the Northeast from the outside world’ (Zou and Kumar 2011: 159). Similarly, the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 was used as a model to enforce ‘indirect rule’ in the Chin Hills and adjoining areas. Such model of administration had been strongly defended earlier by N. E. Perry and John Hutton when the Simon Commission visited India. But, the Governor of Assam Sir Robert Reid criticised the Act of 1935 for not giving sufficient safeguards to the hill people. In his 1941 Note, Reid even 212

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argued that the future of the indigenous hill peoples would be decided by the British parliament and that ‘it cannot be left to the Indian political leaders with neither knowledge, nor feeling for these areas’ (Syiemlieh 1994: 227). A well-thought-out Note which, however, should not be construed as an urgent wartime proposal, given the timing of its issuance, was presented to the viceroy and the secretary of state for India, who both appreciated it. As it appeared in the last phase of India’s freedom struggle, the Note, no doubt, brought a new dimension to British post–Second World War policy. In short, what Reid truly proposed was a ‘Crown colony’ in between independent India and Burma. R. Coupland’s writing on the ‘British obligations’ has an interesting reading of the proposal: There is one major area which seems to call for special treatment – the hill tracts on the eastern frontier of Assam. They adjoin similar hill tracts on the north-west frontier of Burma. The inhabitants of both areas are alike in race and culture. They are not Indians or Burmans, but of Mongol stock. In no sense do they belong to the Indian or Burman ‘nation’. They constitute a single problem. The relations of one area with the future free India will be similar to those of the other area with the future of free Burma. (1944: 164) Though Reid’s proposal seems to have not really struck a chord in the Indian establishment, Burma felt the heat. The ‘Scheduled Areas’ in Burma comprised a horseshoe-shaped boundary and occupied more than 40% of the territory. So, the Burma government-in-exile in Simla immediately attended to Reid’s Note when it reached there on 3 December 1942 and took decision against amalgamation. Undaunted by the majority decision, Burma’s Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, wrote to the Secretary of State: ‘The hill-men of Assam have nothing in common with the people in the plains but they have everything in common with their neighbouring hill-men in Burma’.10 The case for the proponent of ‘amalgamation’ was strengthened by the participation of the hill peoples, including the Chin/Zo on the side of the British during the Second World War. Though they rallied behind their colonial masters with the expectation to get reward after the war, winning the support of the hill people was indispensable for the British who did not have the expertise in jungle warfare to bog the Japanese down in the mountainous Indo-Burma frontier.11 The difference was more clearly recognised by Dorman-Smith who admitted ‘it would be wrong to include these “staunch allies” [the hill people] in a future Dominion of Burma unless they were agreeable’ (Selth 1986: 499). The White Paper stated: The Administration of the Scheduled Areas . . . would remain for the time being a responsibility of His Majesty’s Government until such 213

CONCLUSION

time as their inhabitants signify their desire for some suitable form of amalgamation of their territories with Burma proper.12 But, surprisingly enough, Dorman-Smith made a u-turn in his policy towards the hill people of Burma. He wrote to the new Secretary of State, Pethick Lawrence, ‘I am now of the opinion that this proposition must now be dropped once and for all’ and ‘I can now see nothing, but trouble ahead in Burma if we attempt to pursue the separate Agency scheme and I would like this matter now to be considered closed’ (Syiemlieh 1994: 238; Syiemlieh 2014). In fact, Dormant-Smith was compelled to change his policy due to rising Burman nationalism. That such a complete turn over in colonial policy at the expense of the interest of minority people is what remains at the root of Burma/Myanmar’s predicament in the postcolonial times. The end of British rule in India and the partition of India in 1947 also sealed the fate of the Chin/Zo people in Chittagong Hill Tracts. With the imminent end of British rule in India, the leadership of the Chittagong Hill Tracts expressed their desire to join the Indian Union. But the British declared the Chittagong Hill Tracts to be part of Pakistan in August 1947 ‘against the will of the local people’ (Ahsan and Chakma 1989: 963). One of the reasons why the ‘Crown colony’ which sounds attractive then as a viable alternative to safeguard the interest of the local and indigenous people got opposed by the local people was that in many hill areas it was perceived as a continuation of chieftainship, who had been used as ‘agent’ by their colonial masters. For instance, the Khasi-Jaintia and the Nagas in the formerly Assam province expressed their strong opposition to the ‘Crown colony’ (Chaube [1973] 2012) whereas the Chin/Zo of the Lushai Hills and Chin Hills rejected the idea because of the nexus between colonial rulers and the chiefs. On 20 February 1947 representative from across the Chin Hills almost unanimously voted out chieftainship in 1948. This day is being remembered and celebrated annually as ‘Chin National Day’ or ‘Zo/Zomi National Day’ or ‘Zomi Nam Ni’ across the border by the Chin/Zo who have been dissected and divided into different nation-states by colonial and postcolonial borders.

Concluding remark The Chin Hills District ultimately emerged as a by-product of the establishment of ‘formal’ British Empire in Burma. The exigencies to connect Bengal and Burma following the annexation of Upper Burma led to British penetration into the Chin-Lushai Hills. For the British control over the Chin/ Zo people, however, did not come as easily as they might have thought of it. They faced stiff challenges from the Chin/Zo who had the expertise in jungle warfare, fought back with European made guns under the ableleadership and command of their chiefs in hostile terrains. British rule was 214

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established only after the British, in their desperation, had resorted to the cruelest and most barbaric policy such as wholesale burning of villages, prohibition of cultivation and starving the people which they could kill to death, and ultimately to disarmament of the tribes etc. Chin/Zo resistance, no matter how well they fought for the defence of their land, sovereignty and prestige, was finally broken by the superior power, superior weapons, supplies and strategy. By overpowering fragmented indigenous polities the British finally established the Chin Hills District as an entity. Thus, submerged into the new ‘Geo-Body’, Chin/Zo notion of indigenous space had been displaced by colonial territoriality. The British Empire not only divided Burma and India but also dissected the Chin/Zo people into different nation states in the postcolonial times. With the separation of Burma from India, the trajectories of the history of Chin/Zo people have also been shaped accordingly. The acceptance of the term ‘Zomi’13 as the original and indigenous name against a Burmese term ‘Chin’ to replace the Chin Hills Baptist Association, an apex body of Baptist churches in the Chin Hills, with Zomi Baptist Convention in a general meeting at Saikah in Haka tract during 5–7 March 1953, was far more than a mere name-changing. It was undoubtedly a spontaneous and a unanimous rejection of colonial legacies by 3000 representatives from all over the Chin Hills (Chin Special Division) and an attempt to identify themselves with an indigenous nomenclature against an imposed alien terminology. This was an important event in Chin/Zo history as it marked the recognition of their true and indigenous common identity which for far too long had been blurred and confused by colonial categorisations and classifications. In fact, the dilemma of colonial ethnographers in applying different categories for the same people seems to have been solved then had it not been for politics that often outsmarted indigeneity and created spaces for confusion afterward.

Notes 1 A recent magazine published in commemoration of hundred years of the Labour Corps gives detail list of Zomi who went to France. The magazine is titled Zomi Piancit Paite Phawkna (Zomi France Labour Corps Memorial) published by Centennial Celebration, 2017. 2 ASA, Assam Secretariat, Appointment & Political Department, Political Branch, December 1830, No. 864. Council question regarding the Chin Hills Regulation in the Province of Assam. The districts where the Chin Hills Regulation was applied were: North Cachar Hills subdivision, Khasi and Jaintia Hills (except the Municipality and Cantonment of Shillong, the Naga Hills, the Lushai Hills, the Mikir Hills Tracts in the Nowgong and Sibsagar districts, the Garo Hills and the Lakhimpur, Sadiya and Balipara Frontier Tracts. 3 ASA, Secretariat Administration, Lib/R008/ S2/44, Report on the Administration of Burma for the Year 1930–31, Part II (Departmental Chapters), p. 8. 4 ASA, Secretariat Administration, Lib/R008/ S2/44 Report . . . 1930–31. 5 Bennison, Census of India 1931, Vol. 9. Hugh Tinker estimated the number increased to 400,000 in 1957 (Tinker 1948: 468).

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6 Report on the Administration of Burma for the year 1935–36, Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1937, p. 12. 7 ISC, Vol. II, p. 188. 8 ISC, Vol. XI, p. 565. 9 ISC, Vol. II, p. 188. 10 India Office Library &Records (IOL&R), L/P+S/12/3115A, p. 20. 11 For more discussion, see (Pau 2014). For the case of the Nagas (Franke 2009). 12 White Paper on Burma Policy: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Burma, London: His Majesty Stationery Office, 1945, p. 11. 13 Refer to the argument of Rev. S. T. Hau Go, one of the most educated Chin/Zo then and also the man behind the campaign for ‘Zomi’. He was General Secretary of Zomi Baptist Convention. See, (Go 1972; Ngaihte 1980; Gougin 1980).

216

GLOSSARY

Atah, the amount paid for protection or for information of the movements of an enemy so as to escape being attacked by them. Bangkua/Inndongta, household council. Bawi, this word has a conflicting meaning in various parts of the Falam area. Among the Shimhrin and Hakas it indicates a chief or headman, as Bawipa or Khuabawi. Elsewhere, and especially in villages with Lushai connections, it means a tefa, a debtor from whom the creditor receives a proportion of the patrilineal kinship dues. Beh-le-phung, patrilineal relatives of the father of the household. Bo, Captain in army, title often claimed by brigands. Chaung, river or stream. Chia, slave, servant. Chhinlung or Sinlung, cave. Dacoit, armed robber, brigand. Dawi, evil spirit; e.g. Inn dawi, household spirit and gam dawi, country spirit. Dhas/das, heavy broad-bladed knife, used for cutting bamboo, banana stem, etc. It is carried in a wooden scabbard on the back and is kept in place by a cord passed over one shoulder and under the opposite arm. The da is carried in a basket-work scabbard plaited in bamboo or cane. Gyi, great, big, suffix applied to people for individual worth and also according to rank. Gaung, Head. As a suffix indicates a headman of some sort. Hausapa, It means a headman in Tedim region, whereas elsewhere it means the senior member of the ‘Feast’s Club’ – the man who has progressed in the Feasts of Merit. Innpipa, paramount Chief or ruler. Jhum, shifting cultivation, slash-and-burn cultivation. Khozing, name of a supreme being. Khual, stranger, estranged brothers or non-members of the tribal community including aliens or foes. Khul, cave. Khyoungthas, sons of the streams. 217

G L O S S A RY

Kyong-oke, head of a river district or tract. Kwoonkwoon, scattered settlements. Lai, the same member of the society, citizen in the political sense, same as Tual. Laizo, the Hakas call themselves Lai, and Zo is the general term by which all the Chins call their race. Lo, a plot in a field of cultivations. Misikhua, the abode of the dead. Myook, township officer. Namkap, Councils of Elders in Falam area. Pasian, God, supreme being, Pathian in Lushai or Duhlian dialect. Pawi, festival eg. Khuado Pawi means harvest festival in Tedim region. The Baungshe people are called Pawi. Pu-sha, the chief god of all the household gods. Saya, teacher, a term of respect: when a special venerable or learned teacher was addressed, Sayagyi (great teacher). Sawbwa, a Shan prince of first rank. Siah, tax, tribute. Sial, mithun (Bos gaurus frontalis). Siampi, village priest. Sikseek, blacksmith. Sila/Shilla, slave, household slave. Sungh-le-pu, patrilineal relatives of the mother of a household. Taung, hill, mountain. Taungya, shifting cultivation, jhum cultivation. Tefa, a debtor who has incorporated his creditor into his patrilineal line, and who repays his debt by giving the creditor a share of the dues of the patrilineal kin. It is popularly used in Falam area. Thakin, ‘master’, designation assumed by members of Dobama Asiayon. Thathameda, house tax levied in Upper Burma. Thugyi, headman in the Southern Chin Hills. Ti huai, evil spirits of the springs. Ton, Feast of Merit or Feast of Celebration. It is known as bawilam or khuangcawi in Haka. Toungthas, sons of the hills. Tual, the same member of the society, citizen in the political sense. Tu-le-maak, patrilineal female cousins. Ukpipa, chief or ruler who collects tribute from several other villages. Upa, elder or senior. Viss, South Indian unit of weight; in Burma equivalent to 3 lbs. 5 1/2 oz. Burmese use the term peiktha for viss. Ya, tree. Ye, water. Yoma/Ywama, backbone. A range of hills. Zu, fermented beer made from millet, maize or rice. 218

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Heads of government of Burma 1862–1948 Chief Commissioners of British Burma Arthur Purves Phayre Albert Fytche Ashley Eden Rivers Thompson Charles Umpherton Aitchison Charles Edwards Bernard Charles Haukes Todd Crosthwaite Alexander Mackenzie Frederick William Richard Fryer

1862–67 1867–71 1871–75 1875–78 1878–80 1880–87 1887–90 1890–94 1895–97

Lieutenant Governors Frederick William Richard Fryer Hugh Shakespear Barns Herbert Thirkell White Harvey Adamson Spencer Harcourt Butler Reginald Henry Craddock Spencer Harcourt Butler

1897–1903 1903–05 1905–10 1910–15 1915–17 1917–22 1922–23

Governors Spencer Harcout Butler Charles Alexander Innes J. A. Maung Gyi (Acting) Charles Innes Hugh Lansdown Stephenson Archibald Douglas Cochrane Reginald Hugh Dorman-Smith Hugh Elvin Rance

1923–27 1927–30 1930–31 1931–33 1933–36 1936–41 1941–46 1946–48 220

APPENDIX A

Colonial officers in Chin Hills District Political Officers Bertram S. Carey (Northern Chin Hills) Ross (Southern Chin Hills) Bertram S. Carey (Chin Hills) H. N. Tuck (Chin Hills)

1892–95 1895–96

Superintendents/Deputy Commissioners E. N. Drury W. Street L.E.L. Burne J. D. Prothero W. R. Head J. M. Wright W. R. Head L.E.L. Burne L. B. Naylor H. J. Mitchell H.N.C. Stevenson J. Poonyo Cooks Leedhams De Glandvilles Thein Maung

1896–1906 1906–08 1908–10 1910–13 1913 1914–19 1919–20 1920–37 1937–39 1939–40 1940–43 1943–44 1944–45 1945–45 1945–46 1946–48

221

APPENDIX B

List of Chin/Zo chiefs who visited Rangoon in 1893 Hakas Kolun 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Shwe Hlyen* Lyen Mo* Na pa* Yat Sum* That Dwin Ra Yin Tha Twe# Five followers (one#)

Chief Chief Chief Chief Chief Policeman Government interpreter

Kotarr 1. Ral Err 2. Lyen Rwa# 3. Ran Dun One follower

Chief Policeman Policeman

Hairon 1. Lwen Seo#

Headman of village

Minkin 1. An Ngan* One follower

Headman of village

Sizang Chins 1. Mang Lun*

Chief of Sakhiling 222

APPENDIX B

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Kim Suan* Maung Pau Ku How Nokataung Tang Shwung Tum Ngo Shin Karm

Headman of Sakhiling Sakhiling Sakhiling Thuklai chief Thuklai Thuklai Sihzang, Terak village

Sukte Chins 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Lam Pau* Thuam Thawng Shin Karm Kai Vum Twel Neen Be Nar

Mualbem Mualbem Headman of Losau Headman of Vangteh Headman of Saizang Muizawl

Kamhaus 1. Put Vum* of Tonzang 2. Karm Tut of Lailo 3. Kaul Gin of Tuzun Falam 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Tat Pyee* Bwemon* Ya Kwe* Kin Shan To Lyin Sulyin Tan No Err Four followers

Councilman Small Chief Small Chief Small Chief Small Chief Small Chief Small Chief

Ralorn 1. Tai Kyil# 2. Mon Sin#

Chief

* Signifies the recipients of silver das from His Excellency the Viceroy. # Signifies died of cholera.

223

APPENDIX C

Chin/Zo names incorrectly written in British documents and contemporary literature and their correct forms. In British documents, etc. Bweman Chaungkua Chibu Doktaung Hele Howchinkup Kaikam Kanhaw/Kanhow Kantum Kaptyal Khoomi Khyen Khongjai Kikoul Klangklang Kochim Kokatung Koladyne Koset Kuppow Kwelshim Lalwe Lamyan Lennacot Lyim Manglon Mobingyi/Mwebingyi Mombee

Correct form Buanman Chaungkhua Chivu Do Thawng Heilei Hau Cin Khup Khai Kam Kam Hau/Kamhau Khan Thuam Kaptel Khumi/Khami Chin Khongsai Kai Khual Thantlang Khaw Cin Go Khaw Thang Koladan Khuasak Khup Pau Khualsim Laluai Lamzang Lenglakot Tum Lian Tun Mang Lun Mualbem Mualpi 224

APPENDIX C

Mwelpi Nwengal Nwite Pow Chin How Sagyilain Saiyan Selbu Shielmong/Lenacot Shindoo Shwimpi Siyin Sokte/Sookti Tankaphao Tartan Tashon Tiddim Toklaing Tornglorng Tunzan Tulukmee Twum Wallawun Whennoh Wumlyin Wunkathe Yahow Yahwit Yatol Yawlu Yoe Yokwa

Mualpi Gungal Guite Pau Cin Hau Sakhiling/Limkhai Saizang Sialbu Sialmong Shindu Sumpi Sizang Sukte Thang Khan Pau Siallum Taisun/Tlasun Tedim Thuklai Tonglawn Tonzang Dalekmai Tong Thuam Thawng Valvum Hualngo Vum Lian Vangteh Zahau Zavit Za Tual Zolu Zou Zokhua

225

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237

INDEX

Account of the Valley of Manipur (1859) 159 Act XXII of 1860 38 administrative developments 147–83; boundary demarcation 158–66; Chin Hills future 148–9; Chin HillsManipur boundary 158–66; ChinLushai Conference, 1892 150–5; First World War and Chin/Zo resistance, 1917–18 173–8; Government of India, recommendations 147–8; indirect rule, Chin Hills regulations 166–70; Pakokku Chin Hills 170–3; policy towards chiefs 155–8 Agreement of 1834 159 Aka 91 Akhas 20 Akyab district 197 Alaungpaya 26 Amrith, Sunil S. 8 Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86) 27, 34, 79, 207 Anoos 33 Arakan frontier, problem of 29–52; frontier tribes, early relations 30–4; Hopkinson’s recommendations 34–8 Arakan Hill District Laws Regulation of 1916 196 Arakan Hill Tracts 43–8, 88, 172, 197 Arakan Local Battalion 29 Arakan tribes 46 Arakan Yomas 14, 29, 33 Argentina 2 Aroeng 35 Asho tradition 21 Assam Rifles 175 Association of Professional and Business Men in Burma 200 Aung, Maung Htin 11

Aung Thwin, Michael Arthur 17 autocratic supralocal realm 23 Ayeng 35 Barnes, H. C. 192 Baungshe 91 Beadon, Sir Cecile 38–40 Bengal Native Infantry 29 Bentinck, Lord William 54 Bentinck, William 55 Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation 189, 190 Botham, A. W. 192 Boundary Commission 57 boundary map 165 Bourchier, G. 65, 68 Brackenbury, Sir Henry 154 Brazil 2 British imperial policy 6–28 British military strength 11 British ‘North-Eastern Frontier’ 4 Brown, R. 64, 73, 74 Browne, Ulick 46 Brownlow, Sir Charles 65 Buchanan, Francis 17, 18 Burma Civil Service 184 Burma Frontier Service 184 Burma Gazette 173 Burmans Nanpalaw 159 Burma Rifles 166 Burma’s cultural relations, India 8 Burne, L.E.L. 175 Burney, Henry 31 Bush, Barbara 1, 2 Butler, Harcourt 211 Caens 18 Cain, P. J. 10 Callahan, Mary P. 11

238

INDEX

Campbell, Sir George 46 Canada 2 Cansu II (1174–1211) 14 Carey, Bertram 16, 23, 25, 48, 57, 76, 100, 103–5, 122–3, 126–7, 131, 136, 137, 147, 152, 156, 158, 161, 167, 169, 185, 209 Carson, Arthur 140 Carson, Laura Hardin 140, 177 Cederlof, Gunnel 9 Chakmas 34 Chaungthas 20 Chinboks 16, 157, 170 Chinbons 16, 157 Chindwin-Irrawaddy plain 14 The Chin Hills 48, 209 Chin Hills District 184–206; control over resources 187–206; Government of India Act, 1935 201–3; Indian statutory commission recommendations 200–1; map of 198; political control areas 193–5; Somra Tract, Chin Hills regulation extension 190–2 Chin Hills Regulation Act 1896 4 Chin-Kachin 20 Chin-Lushai Conference, 1892 4, 150–5, 209 Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889–90 170 Chin-Lushai Hills 4, 8, 14, 87, 187 Chinme 16, 157, 170 Chin National Day 214 Chin Primer (Zolai Simbu) 58 Chins 16, 19, 20, 22, 87, 110, 124, 132, 156 Chin Special Division (1948) 207 Chin/Zo-Burman relations 26–7 Chin/Zo tribes 3–5, 7, 9, 14–16, 61, 79, 88, 94, 95, 99, 105, 107, 108, 114, 120, 125, 126, 128, 131, 134, 141, 159, 184, 208, 215; chieftainship 22–5; Chin/Zo-Burman relations 26–7; clan/village priest 23; etymology of 16–19; indigenous polity 22–5; movements, history 19–22; population 199; raids and 26; rearmament, bid for freedom 139–43; villages 121; warfare methods 25–6 Chit, Khin Myo 16 Chittagong-Mandalay route 8 Chumba, Major Sawai 68 Churchill, Lord Randolph 10 Cin Thang 24

cognate tribes 53 Collen, Edwin 149 colonial agents 147–83 colonial counter operations 127–32; Gungal-Sukte chiefs 131; Sizang chiefs 132 colonial penetration 86–118; ChinLushai expedition, 1889–90 96–9; expedition in 1888–89 90–6; Falam, temporary submission 105–7; Hau Cin Khup and British, building relationship 111–14; Hill-valley relations 86–90; Kamhau-Sukte resistance, 1890–91 108–11; Northern Hills, Bertram Carey’s policy 103–5; post-war British policy 86–90; Sizang and Kamhau-Sukte resistance 90–6; south, affairs 111–14; Southern column, advance to Haka 99–102; three-pronged assault 96–9 colonial policy: affairs in south 135–6; backfired 119–46; final disarmament and guns licensing 136–43; final operations 134–5; forty-nine chiefs and Lansdowne 133–6; operations and 132–3 Comstock, G. S. 27 Cope, Joseph Herbert 58, 122 Coupland, R. 213 Cox, Hiram 18 Craddock, Reginald 211, 212 Creamer, Winifred 24 Crossing the Bay of Bengal 8 Crosthwaite, Charles 86–8, 90, 95, 96, 99, 106, 108, 153–5 Crown colony 214 dacoities 31 Dalekmai 40, 41 Damant, Guybon Henry 76 Darwin, John 11 David Reid Lyall 157–8 Dent, W. H. 161 disarmament policy backfired 122–7 Drury, E. N. 141, 142 Dufferin, Lord 10, 87 Duncan, H. T. 41 Duncan, P. 170 Durand, Henry Mortimer 152 ‘Dzo’ tribes 19 economic relations 3 Edgar, John Ware 63, 64, 66, 68, 70

239

INDEX

Elliott, Charles Alfred 150 empires: defined 1; ‘informal’ to ‘formal,’ Burma 9–12; juridicopolitical figure of 1; in ‘NorthEastern Frontier of Bengal’ 8–9; thin crust of colonial society 2 English East India Company 8, 9 Eng Tuang 60 Enriquez, Major C. M. 20 Eyre 90 Falam tract 16 Fan Ch’o 18 Faunce, E. 93, 99 Fieldhouse, D. K. 10 First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–26) 3, 7, 9, 18, 29, 53, 55 First World War 5 Fisher, B. 174 Forbes 112 Fowler, E. O. 139, 140 France 2 frontier defence posts 9 frontier policy 29–52; Bengal government 38–41 frontiers people 2 Fryer, G. E. 19 Furnivall, J. S. 211 Fytche, Albert 11, 32–4 Gallaghar, John 11 Garhwal Rifles 112 gentlemanly capitalism 10 gentlemanly capitalists 12 Geo-body concept 6, 7, 215 Germany 2 Gordon, George 54, 56 Gott, Richard 2 Government of Burma Act, 1935 201 Government of India 152 Government of India Act: in 1919 4, 211; in 1935 5, 201–3, 212 Grant, Sir John Peter 38 Great Kuki Invasion of 1860 38 Green, J. H. 16 Greenstreet, R. H. 170 Greham, Thomas 112 Grey, Sir William 65 Grierson, G. A. 19, 53 Guha, Amalendu 9 Guite 56 Gungal rebels 130 Gungal-Sukte 156

guns, tribe 138 Gurkha Light Infantry 95 Gurkhas 90, 101, 102, 108, 141, 161, 191 Haas, Jonathan 24 Haka-Baungshe country 185 Hakas 15, 16, 23, 91, 97, 157, 174, 178 Hall, D.G.E. 212 Hardt, Michael 1 Harvey, G. E. 8 Hau Cin Khup 109, 110, 132, 137, 140, 156, 164, 176, 185 Hau Go, Rev. Sukte T. 96 Hausa 24 History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal (1884) 209 Hkamti Long 21 Hlutdaw 86 Hnit Varr 142 Hoang Ho Rivers 20 Hodgson, B. H. 27 Hopkins, A. G. 10 Hopkinson, Henry 207; proposals 41–3; recommendations 34–8 Hripi 135 Hualngo 140 human territoriality 61 Hunter, W. W. 24, 78 Hutchins, Philip Percival 154 Hutchinson, Sneyd 19 imperialism 1 Indian statutory commission (ISC) recommendations 200–1 India’s cultural and economic relations, crossroads 7–8 indigeneity, Manipur 55 indigenous cosmography 6 indirect rule 4, 147–83 Innpipa 23 intransigence 37 Jenkins, Francis 54 Johnson, Robert G. 176 Johnstone, James 76–9, 164, 208 Jonsson, Hjorleifur 13 Journal of Global History 13 Kabuis 59 Kachin Hills 166, 167 Kakhyen 16

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INDEX

Kamees 41 Kam Hau 4, 25, 57, 58, 61, 63, 122 Kamhaus 15, 58, 66–9, 71, 94, 109–11 Kamhau-Suktes 23; country, annexation 76–80; and Meitei relations 53–85; resistance, 1890–91 108–11 Kamhau-Sukte-Sizang force 61 Kamhau tribe 73 Kanhaws 105 Kanhow 95 Kape 91 Kapis 16 Keatinge, Richard Harte 74 Keeton, Charles 10 Khai, Sing Khaw 18 Khai Kam 123, 135 Khami 16 Khan Thuam 4, 56–8, 122 Khaw Cin 64 Khaw Khai 169 Khongjais 53, 59 Khons 33 Khrum 135 Khua-bawi 24 Khuahrum (Lai) or Khua-rung (Zotung) 169 Khua-sampa or Tual-phuisam 169 Khuasiam (Tedim) 169 Khumis 31–3, 35, 46 Khup Za Thang, K. A. 18 Khyang 16 Khyengs 27, 41 Khyens 30, 31 Khyoungthas 33, 34 Knox, Wight, J. 78 Konbaung dynasty 154 Kookees 36 Kookies 54 Koomees 41 Kukis 15, 53, 59, 149, 191 Ku-mis 27 Kupas Mehal 37 Kwoonkwoon 107 Kyaus 33 Kyong-oke 31 Lahus 20 land and people, Chin Hills 13–16 Lansdowne, Lord 150, 153 Lanta 91 Lashis 20 Latter, T. 33 Leach, Edmund 19, 20

Leach, F. Burton 87, 211 Lehman, F. K. 15, 16, 19, 22, 25 Lengais 31, 32 Lewin, Thomas Herbert 19, 40, 41 Lewis, C. C. 20 Lian Tun 104 Lieberman, Victor 13 Lien, Shwe 140, 141 Lisaws 20 Lockhart, William 140 Lolo 20 Lowis, C. C. 19 Luce, Gordon 16, 18–19 Lushai Expedition of 1869 65 Lushai Expedition of 1871–72 (1897) 149 Lushai Expedition of 1872 63 Lushai Expedition of 1888 97 Lushais 15, 63, 64, 69, 124, 149 Lyall, David Reid 87, 170 Lyon, E. R. 59 Mackenzie, Alexander 8, 55, 58, 60, 76, 113, 150–2, 209 Madras Sappers 92 Malcolm, Howard 19 Mang 25 mang-kua 57 Mang Lun 104 Manipur frontier 53–85; abortive expedition and after 59–65; Go Khaw Thang, capture 65–70; hostilities recurrence 73–6; Kai Khual and mission 70–2; Kamhau-Sukte country, annexation 76–80; Lushai expedition 65–70; peace treaty of 1873 72–3 Manipur-Kamhau conflict 70 Manshu 18 marauding tribes 34 Marris, Sir William 192 Marus 20 Maung Pa Gyi 88, 89 Mayo, Lord 47, 65 McCabe, Robert Blair 19 McCulloch, William 56, 59, 60, 63, 64, 69, 159, 163 McGregor, Major 90 McNabb, Lieutenant 112 Meitei guun 58 Michaud, Jean 13 Mi-ch’en 18, 19 Miller, Alexander Edward 154

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INDEX

political space 6 politico-semiological operations 6 politics of separation 211–14 population, Chin Hills 14 Porteous, Alexander 161 Porter, W. N. 131 punitive labour 177

Mi-no kingdom 18, 19 Mizo 18 Mizo Union 155 Mobingyi 105 Mon-Khmer 20 Moore, Sergeant 112 Mranma 19 Mro 16 Mrus 33, 41 Mualpi Expedition, 1875 73–6 Mughs 29, 48 Munro, Henry 40, 41 Myaing 171 My Experience in Manipur and the Naga Hills (1896) 163 Myint-U, Thant 9, 11 Myo-ok Maung Tun Win 125

Raikes, F. D. 84, 89, 93, 96, 105 Reid, A. S. 87 Reid, W. J. 192 Report of the Eastern Frontier of India 159 Report on the Frontier Affairs of Burma for 1891–92 119 Report on the Frontier affairs of the Upper Chindwin District for the Year 1892–93 131 Robert Blair McCabe 151 Roberts, Frederick 149, 154 Robinson, Ronald 11 Rose, Hugh 111 Ross, A. 170 Ross, D. 100, 101, 108, 112 Rundall, Frank Montagu 109–11

Nagas 53, 149 Naga village 65 Nanchaos 21 Napier of Magdala 65 Negri, Antonio 1 Ngul, Ciin 62 Nisbet, John 86 North-Eastern Frontier 3, 55 Northern Chin Hills: Sukte paramountcy in 56–9 Northern Pois 210 Nugent, Walter 2 Nuthall, William Frost 65–70, 160 Nwengals 119, 127 Nwites 57, 119 Ommanney, J. L. 188 Pachuau, Joy 18 pacification process 143 Pakokku Chin Hills 170–3 Pakokku Hill Tracts 147 , 184 , 190 , 199 Palmer, A. P. 120, 128, 129 Pau Hau 58, 122, 123 Pax Britannica 25 Pemberton 163 Pemberton, Robert Boileau 54, 55, 158, 159 Penn Symons, William 98 Phayre, Arthur Purves 27, 32, 33, 39, 40, 207; views 41–3 Phru 34 Pointon, A. C. 11 political control areas 193–5

Sabwas 88 Sack, R. D. 61 Said, Edward 1 Sakhilings 104 Sangermano, Reverend Father 17, 19 Sawbwa Maung Yit 88 Schendel, Willem van 13 Scott, James C. 13 Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852 9 semi-civilised tribes 154 sepoy villages 59, 208 Shakespear, John 191 Shakespear, Leslie 176 Shanpi 91 Shans 21, 58 Shan Sawbwa 55 Shaw, William 61 Shentoos 33, 34 Shindoo tribe 41, 45 Shindus 34, 36, 37, 41–3, 46, 47 Sho 16 Shou 18 Shwegyobyu 88 Siallum kulh 94 Siksek (blacksmith) 24 Simon Commission 201, 211, 212 Sindoos 36

242

INDEX

Singh, Chandrakirti 59, 60, 63, 68, 208 Singh, Gambhir 54 Singh, Jemadar Amara 112 Singh, Nongmeingakba 60 Singhal, D. P. 11 Sinsit 91 Siyins 95, 127 Sizangs 15, 88, 109, 127 Skene, Charles McDowal 99 Sladen, Edward 87 Soobadar Tsam-baw-ree 32 Sookti Kukis 77 sporadic firing 175 Stevenson, H.N.C. 22, 99 Stewart, John 87 Sukte 15, 156 Sukte Chronicles 111 Sukte groups 15 Sukte paramountcy 4, 56–9 Sum Hlwe 142 Sum Kam 73 Sunthla tribe 23 Swinton, George 31 Symes, Michael 11, 17 Symons, W. P. 100–2, 105–7 Tai-Chinese 20 Taisuns 23, 90–2, 97, 105, 114, 156 Tangko (village crier) 24 Tao 135 Tapei thinking 61 Tarling, Nicholas 12 Taungthas 20 taungyas 190 Tawa 91 Taw Sein Ko 16, 22 Thados 57, 70, 119, 175 Thang, Go Khaw 65–70 Thangal, Major 68 Thantlangs 15, 16, 135 Than Tun 14 Thettas 16, 91 Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885–86) 4, 6, 12 Thlangrwa 135 Thompson, Mowbray 70, 71 Tibeto-Burman 20 Tighe, M. J. 136, 157, 170 Tipperah 149 Tircul 19 Trant, T. A. 18, 30, 31 Treaty of Yandaboo 30, 54 tributary Khoomis 31

Trotter, W. F. 78, 79 Tual-siampupa 169 Tuck, Henry N. 16, 23, 25, 48, 57, 100, 103, 123, 136, 138, 169, 209 Tuipu 159 Tulpi/Siampi (village priest) 24 Tun Suan 89 Turrell, R. 11 Tydd, W. D. 172 Ukpi 25 Ukpipa 23 Upa 24 Upper Burma Forest Regulation, V of 1898 189 Upper Koladan 37 Van Hmung 173 Vanhnuailiana 63 Victorian annexationism 11 Vum Ko Hau 21 Vumson 18, 24 Walleng 32 Watt, George 53 Webster, Anthony 10, 12 Welaung 16 Whenohs 119 White, George Stuart 93 William McCulloch 208 Winnichakul, Thongchai 6 Wolseley, George 108 Woodman, Dorothy 11 Woodthorpe, R. G. 8, 72 Yahows 106 Yangtsi 20 The Yaws (Zo) 19 Yindu 16, 157 Yos 119 Zahaus 23, 140, 141 Zam, Thang Khaw 79 zangsial 58 Zanniat 23 Za Pau 57, 58 Za Tual 60–2 Zokhuas 16, 91, 97, 102, 136 Zomia 3, 13 Zomi 18, 215 Zomi Baptist Convention 96 Zou, David 164 Zous 56, 57

243