Indians in the First World War: The Missing Links [1 ed.] 9353289262, 9789353289263

Table of contents :
Dedication
Disclaimer
Contents
List of Illustrations
Foreword • Lord Bhikhu Parekh
Appreciations
1. Historiography and Rationale of the First World War
2. Declaration of War: Empire and Problem of Nationality Laws in a Colonial Situation
3. Theatres of War: Indian Soldiers’ Participation
4. Indian Recruitment and Rewards
5. Prisoners of War: Evolution of the Concept of Prisoners of War
6. War Ferment in India: The Press, Publicity, Propaganda and Censorship
7. The Great War in Indian Memory
8. The Deep Scars of the War: A Fissured Legacy
Appendix
Annexures I–IV
Bibliography
About the Author
Index

Citation preview

Foreword By

Lord Bhikhu Parekh

INDIANS in the

FIRST WORLD WAR The Missing Links

ARAVIND GANACHARI

Copyright © Aravind Ganachari, 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2020 by SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I-1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India www.sagepub.in SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 18 Cross Street #10-10/11/12 China Square Central Singapore 048423 Published by Vivek Mehra for SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd and typeset in 10.5/13 pt Berkeley by AG Infographics, Delhi. Library of Congress Control Number: 2019954923

ISBN: 978-93-5328-926-3 (HB) SAGE Team: Abhijit Baroi, Syed Husain Naqvi and Kanika Mathur

To my oldest, respected and dear friend Shri Shrinivas R. [Shinappa] Kulkarni who inspired me, in 1970, to come to Mumbai for higher studies at Bombay University (now University of Mumbai).

Thank you for choosing a SAGE product! If you have any comment, observation or feedback, I would like to personally hear from you. Please write to me at [email protected] Vivek Mehra, Managing Director and CEO, SAGE India.

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Disclaimer 1. The city ‘Bombay’ was renamed as ‘Mumbai’ in 1996. For the reason all the correspondence and official records of the period under study bear the name Bombay, it has been retained in this volume for convenience. Also, in this volume, we have retained ‘Bombay Presidency’ as the name of the administrative unit because during the period this study was conducted it was known by that name. 2. ‘Untouchable’ and ‘Mahar’ are derogatory and offensive words. However, in this volume, they have been used in the historical context. Even today, the Mahar Regiment has not changed. It is in this category these words are used without meaning to hurt anybody’s sentiments. The author.

Contents Illustrations  xi Foreword by Lord Bhikhu Parekh xiii Appreciationsxvii Chapter 1. Historiography and Rationale of the First

World War

1

Chapter 2. Declaration of War: Empire and Problem of

Nationality Laws in a Colonial Situation

18

Chapter 3. Theatres of War: Indian Soldiers’ Participation

40

Chapter 4. Indian Recruitment and Rewards

69

Chapter 5. Prisoners of War: Evolution of the Concept

of Prisoners of War

164

Chapter 6. War Ferment in India: The Press, Publicity,

Propaganda and Censorship

216

Chapter 7. The Great War in Indian Memory

290

Chapter 8. The Deep Scars of the War: A Fissured Legacy

316

Appendix  332 Annexures I–IV334 Bibliography366 About the Author380 Index381

Illustrations Figures 2.1 Flag of British Indian State 2.2 Indian Forces Unloading Baggage at Alexandra Dock, Bombay during the First World War

19

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8

44 45 53 57 58 59 61

Western Front - Flanders Western Front - Trench Lines Mesopotamian Theatre of War Gallipoli, Salonika and Dardanelles Gallipoli Campaign Indian Soldiers in Gallipoli Indian Soldiers in Trenches during Gallipoli Campaign Indian Soldiers Wearing Gas Masks in Trenches in Gallipoli 3.9 German East Africa 4.1 Rao Sahib Title Medal Awarded to Dr Pandurang Hari Wagle of Belgaum 4.2 Another Medal Awarded to Dr Pandurang Hari Wagle 4.3 Facsimile of the Sanad Given in Recognition for Recruitment and Other War Efforts 4.4 Victoria Cross 4.5 The Knight of the British Empire

21

61 63

154 155 156 157 158

 xii   Indians in the First World War

5.1 POWs Including Indians Held by Turkey During WW I 166 5.2 Ahmednagar Prisoner of War Camp During World War I 173 5.3 Prisoner of War Camp at Belgaum for Hostile or Enemy Women in the First World War 183 6.1 Bombay W W I Relief Fund Stamp 6.2 Disabled Indian Soldiers Being Trained at the Queen Mary’s Technical School, Bombay 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10

244 287

First World War Memorial - India Gate at New Delhi 305 Rudyard Kipling, Spokesman of British Imperialism 307 Sir Edwin Lutyens (1869–1944) 308 The Canopy in Front of the India Gate 310 Indian Sailors’ Home War Memorial, Bombay 311 A Tablet Errected in the St Thomas Cathedral for Royal Marines Who Died 312 Three Lions on the Bombay Port Trust War Memorial 312 World War I Memorial at Bombay Port Trust 313 Parsi World War I Memorial at Khareghat Colony, Bombay314 World War I Cemetery at Sewri, Bombay 315 Tables

5.1 Total Number of Admissions under Each Prevailing Disease184 5.2 Average Annual Strength of the Camp 184 5.3 Number of Admissions to the Hospital 1914–1920 185 5.4 Number of Major Surgical Operations Performed Successfully185 5.5 Number of Admissions due to Infectious Diseases 185

Foreword At the outbreak of the First World War, Britain was not in a position to fight Germany on its own. It sent an expeditionary force to France which was no match for the Germans. It had to turn to its Empire for military assistance, especially India, which contributed more than the rest. The Indian contribution was at various levels. It contributed 1.4 million volunteers of whom about 50,000 died and about 65,000 were wounded. They fought well, winning 13,000 medals, including 12 Victoria Crosses. They fought in some of the fiercest battles, including Givenchy, Neuve Chapelle and Festubert. Wounded Indian soldiers were treated in the converted Royal Pavilions in Brighton, East Sussex, England, and other places. They enjoyed equality with their British counterparts, except that they had no freedom of movement and were kept behind barbed wire, guarded by sentries. India supported Great Britain with doctors, nurses, cooks and clerks. Aside from suppliying a huge amount of jute for sandbags, it also supplied wheat and rice for feeding the army and the British civilian population. It raised a loan running into approximately £2 billion. It provided approximately 170,000 animals, including horses, mules and camels, about 146,000 rifles and 550 million bullets. Not only government sources but also private individuals and princely rulers from India contributed to Great Britain’s war efforts. Indian experiences were well reflected in the letters that Indian soldiers wrote to their families. The letters must, of course, be read with care because many of these soldiers were illiterate and had to

 xiv   Indians in the First World War

dictate the letters. They also knew that their letters were subjected to censorship and had to develop a coded language to make their point. ‘Black pepper is used up fast’ and ‘too great an expenditure of black and red pepper’ meant that Indian soldiers were used as cannon fodder. Letters from the Western Front, mainly France, were fuller and more detailed. Indians had been there for two to three years and wrote about French houses, roads, treatment of women and their love affairs. Some of these soldiers had liaisons with French women and even recommended the sexual practices they had learnt from them. Probably they also taught the French women some new techniques and helped build up a silent and unacknowledged fusion of knowledge in such intimate areas. India’s participation in the War raised several issues of great importance. Volunteers came from different castes and religions. Naturally, they brought their traditional prejudices with them. The army had to negotiate these differences and both accept and modify them. High-caste Hindus sometimes refused to take orders from lower caste officers. That challenge had to be addressed. Indians fought a distant war, which raised the question why they had joined such a war and what it meant to them. Fighting a war, which was the occupation of the Kshatriyas, raised the caste status of those involved and encouraged recruits from the ranks of the untouchables. Indian fighters thought that they were helping the British and naturally their leaders expected a quid pro quo in the shape of greater self-rule. The British thought the Indians were doing a job like others and saw no reason for gratitude or concessions. Indian soldiers fought like the British which raised their sense of self-worth and gave them equality in their own eyes as well as those of their opponents. Some British officers agreed to it, whereas others thought that equal military capacity did not signify equal capacity for self-rule. There were also some controversies about the motives of the Indian volunteers. A few Indian leaders considered them wholly mercenary, ready to serve their colonial masters in return for a decent income, and called them anti-national. Others, often the volunteers themselves, thought of their contribution as patriotic and an expression of their loyalty to the cause of freedom. Indian soldiers saw India through different eyes on their return. They had now acquired a better understanding of the British and seen both the glory and the sordidness of Europe.

Foreword   xv  

The First World War then involved significant changes in the Indian society and polity. It was not a marginal military phenomenon operating on the territorial and social borders of India; rather, it deeply affected the Indian society, caste structure, demand for Independence, Indian view of itself and so on. These changes need to be carefully articulated and examined. Some Indian writers have done interesting work in this area, Aravind Ganacheri being one of them. On the basis of primary research and deep familiarity with Indian history and contemporary political reality, he explores these changes from a historical and theoretical perspective. He provides new material, throws new light on things that are already known and offers an Indian view of the First World War. This is one of the best books on the subject and deserves to be widely read and commented upon. Bhikhu Parekh, House of Lords, UK

Appreciations The term ‘ACKNOWLEDGEMENT’ has always struck me as a misnomer that carries with it more an obligatory recognition of debt than the valued recognition that appreciation implies. How to convey the gratitude that comes from those treasured friendships nourished by trust and care that in turn enable bolder ventures and more engaged critique? Ever since I stumbled upon those uncatalogued files of the Political (War) Department of the period 1914–1921, in 2002, at the Maharashtra State Archives, Mumbai, it became a passion and an obsession to know more about India’s staggering contribution in terms of manpower, material, finance and labour to the war effort in the First World War. What pained me the most was that in the 700 odd universities in India, we do not teach even a sub-topic about Indian role in the First World War. Why this memory amnesia has been one question I have not been able to sufficiently fathom. With the passage of time, the brunt of this obsession of mine was borne by my post-graduate students at the University of Mumbai and by my friends to whom I narrated the new-found information, and who heard me without making sullen faces. It is to them I owe my gratitude for their appreciation and encouragement. My first thanks must go to the Heras Institute and Sir Dorabji Tata Trust who awarded me a fellowship by invitation to complete this volume. Their encouragement, financial support and trust in me finally shaped this volume. A different set of thanks are due to Dr Joan Dias,

 xviii   Indians in the First World War

my esteemed friend and the Director of the Heras Institute, and Dr Angelo Menezes, the Principal of St Xavier’s College, Mumbai, without whose help, kind words and time, this volume would not have been possible. Many of my peers in the profession have rendered me invaluable help by giving me encouragement and providing me proper insights into this study. They are: respected Lord Bhikhu Parekh, a political theorist and Labour member of the House of Lords; late Professor G. P. Deshpande; late Professor Y. D. Phadke; late Professor Ram Bapat; Professor Dr Usha Thakkar, Director, Mani Bhavan; Professor Y. Vaikuntham of Hyderabad; Professor R. C. Thakran of Delhi University; Dr Bruce Meyer of Georgian University, Barrie, CA; Professor Sanjoy Bhattacharya of Cambridge University; Dr Rajkumar Hans; Dr Radhika Singha of Jawharlal Nehru Uiversity; Professor Raja Dixit and Dr C. R. Das of Pune University; Professor Umesh Bagade of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University; Dr Vedpal Rana of Delhi University; Dr Arun Bhosle of Shivaji University; Dr Ramdas Bhatkal, eminent political scientist and owner of Popular Prakashan; and my former colleagues at the University of Mumbai—Professor Vasanti Damle and Professor Kishor Gaikwad, Professor Krishna Pannikar, Dr Kultar Singh Cheema, Ms Asmita Mohite and Ms Megha Bhagat. I owe special thanks to Mr Ramu Ramnathan, playwright, columnist and a theatrical director of repute, whose innate interest in the topic was a source of unceasing encouragement. My special thanks to those friends who gave me, all these many years, their constant moral support every morning at the MIG Club at Bandra—Dr Nimish Sampat, Uday Ajgoankar, Prem Sumaria-Shah, Suresh Jaju, late Gurvinder Singh Sahni, Dr Chandrakant Patankar, Dr Vijay Deshmukh, Dr Prakash Gawankar, Dr D. V. Chandran, Niket Dave, Vikram Bhanushali, Akhilesh Raju and Manish Bubna. Their unremitting love and affection helped me maintain my mental balance in the face of physical and mental adversities. I also owe a lot of moral gratitude to Dr Shailesh Deolankar, Dr Damodar P. Wagle, Sudhir Bailur, Professor Sharad Mestry and Dr Jayant Deshpande of

Appreciations   xix  

Thane, Dr Flory Dsouza, Professor Mandar Thakur and Dr Madhumita Bandopadhyay. My deepest appreciation goes to the staff of the Maharashtra State Archives, in particular, Shri Thomre, Mrs Surve and Shri Pawar, who have always been helpful; and to Inspector Arjun Walekar, Vijay Kadam and Mrs Namrata Alaknure, ACP of Maharashtra State Police Headquarters without whose help this volume would not have taken shape. I am very grateful to Shri Nitin Chitnis, a well-known photographer, for spending so much time for me. My son Aditya and daughter-in-law Vaidehi make my world afresh with love and life-force every day. I am equally grateful to Shri Abhijit Baroi and his team at SAGE Publications for their unstinted support for the publication of this work. To them and many others who have assisted along the way, know that you have all in your way contributed to whatever virtues this volume may possess; its failures, to trot out yet another of those ageold yet unavoidable clichés, are all solely due to its author. Aravind Ganachari Mumbai

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War

1

Historians—both professional and popular—have debated long on the origins of the First World War and written voluminous text about the strategies and battles, particularly its destructive aspect. While many scholars have written on political and diplomatic history of this conflict, others have written about the ruinous economic effects of this war. This war has been described by many in most ambivalent terms—‘an early warning sign of the later war’; one that ‘set the pace for the most murderous century in human history’; one that ‘brought about sense of modernity’. Historians wrote the history of war in terms of military operations as seen from the commanding heights of monarchs and their courts, politicians and their cabinets, and on the battlefield, generals and their staff. They explained how and why the war occurred, probed the deepest motivations of those who made decision to take up arms, analysed the weapons of warfare and the strategy with which the war was fought, and investigated on those at home as well as those in the fighting forces. The First World War, which the British called as ‘the Great War’, was fought by the major European powers between 1914 and 1918, which dragged on for more than 4 years, involved millions of men, women and children, conducted across a baffling array of fronts, in the west of Europe with its trench-line and in the east, in the Alps and the Carpathians, in the deserts of Egypt and Mesopotamia, in the rocky mountainous Turkish Gallipoli, and the savannas of Africa, on the world’s seas and beneath them and—for the first time in history— in the air above the earth’s surface. Largely the historians treated the First World War as a European affair and, hence, their writing was

 2   Indians in the First World War

dominated by Eurocentric approach. Again, historiography of this conflict was overshadowed by the Second World War. In recent years, many historians have rejected frequently posed alternatives—the alliance system, the press, domestic sources and the four culturally based ‘isms’ of nationalism—social Darwinism, imperialism and militarism—as ‘inadequate’ or ‘indeterminate’. They have also firmly rejected the alternative argument—that the war happened by accident, inadvertence. This rejection, combined with their focus on the key decision makers and the contexts and motives for their decisions for war, returns the discussions of the causes of war to an appropriate focus—human agency, the actions of individuals. In 1961, the West German scholar Fritz Fischer, professor of medieval and modern history at the University of Hamburg, published his famous thesis—Griff nach der Weltmacht, on German war aims during the First World War. In it, he claimed that German rulers had followed a pre-planned policy during the July crisis of 1914, which was deliberately aimed at provoking armed conflict on European-side scale while making it look as if the Allied powers, especially the Russians, had made the first aggressive move towards war. He argued that in the years 1914–1918 the Reich leadership developed a set of annexationist war aims on the continent, which were very similar to those pursued by Hitler during the Second World War. Furthermore, he claimed that these aims were not just the preserve of the German military and Pan-German extremists but were supported by all political parties in the Reichstag and by a whole group of industrialists, academics, newspaper editors and statesmen.1 Fischer’s findings unleashed an enormous and, at times, very heated controversy, especially in West Germany where the ‘war-guilt lie’ had always been contested very vigorously by the predominantly conservative political establishment, but also to some extent in Britain, France and the United States. His book came in the background of the building of Berlin Wall and Cuban Missile crisis. The years 1955–1970, roughly the period central to Fischer’s work, marked a period of soul-searching among British historians. The scope of 1

Stibbe, ‘The Fischer Controversy over German War’.

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   3  

historical research and the methodologies underpinning it were challenged and found wanting. Developing a broader perspective was part of that renewal process and Geoffrey Barraclough did draw attention to that perspective in 1964 and deplored ‘the retarding influence of conservative forces fighting to preserve as much as possible of the old European-centred world’.2 The charge of inward-looking inadequacy was taken up most famously by E. H. Carr. In his 1961 Trevelyan lectures at Cambridge, he denounced ‘the parochialism of English history’ whose suffocating ‘dead hand’ lay on the profession.3 Although Carr’s assertion was severely rejected, and, by the end of the 1960s, the heat generated by Fischer Controversy had evaporated, its immediate impact in comparison to Germany was limited as the arguments advanced by Fischer appeared scarcely radical to them. The Fischer controversy’s contribution to historical writing on the First World War has been mainly its approach beyond parochial national lenses, which was a dominant feature before. The idea that European culture changed profoundly at the turn of the 20th century, and the First World War was the catalyst factor in bringing about, in hastening and popularizing this change, usually characterized in terms of arrival of ‘modernity’ has been much debated by the historians. How the First World War has come to be remembered and become a major concern for British historians, eclipsing earlier scholarly preoccupation with war-guild and its political consequences. A growing historiography is developing over the cultural legacy and memory of the conflict. This search for cultural legacy began with Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory, published in 1975, which has left a deep and lasting influence.4 For Fussell as well as for many others who have written about the 2 Otte, ‘Outcaste from History’. In April 2013, Journal of Contemporary History brought out a special issue on ‘The Fischer Controversy after 50 Years’. For details, read, Mombauer, ‘Introduction: The Fischer Controversy 50 Years’. Also read, Steinberg, ‘Old Knowledge and New Research’. This is the summary of the Conference organized by the German Historical Institute in London from 13 to 15 October 2011. 3

Ibid., 380.

For a detailed and excellent study of the impact of this book on cultural historians of the First World War, read, Smith, ‘Paul Fussell’s the Great War’.

4

 4   Indians in the First World War

battlefield experience in the Great War, the memory of this conflict was shaped by remarkable talent of British writers such as Wilfred Owen, Robert Graves, David Jones, Isac Rosenberg and Siegfried Sassoon. In arguing that the experiences of the trenches created the predominantly ironic view of the world evident in ‘modern’ literary sensibilities, Fussell suggested that the Great War was the watershed in contemporary history not just in the number of dead and damaged bodies, but also in the way in which the conflict refashioned the British imagination. The weight of Fussell’s discussion fell not on what the soldiers in the trenches experienced, but rather on how they remembered and wrote about the experience. Although Fussell’s classic is subjected to much criticism by a variety of scholars, for different reasons and for his selective study, nevertheless, he introduced ideas and viewpoints that taught historians how to look afresh at the forms, which mediated understanding of the experience of war.5 By limiting ‘modern memory’ only to the British war poets and authors, Fussell set his own limitations. The literary output of the soldiers of the dominion armies like Canada and Australia, and also of other Allies such as America, was significantly missed.6 A noteworthy mention could be made here of Canadian Poetry and Prose of the First World War edited by Barry Callaghan and Bruce Meyer.7 A more prominent omission is the work of Mulk Raj Anand—Across the Black Waters (1939). But despite some omissions in Fussell’s work, his book was certainly path-breaking, in bringing a subtle and all-pervading change in the historiography of the First World War. Besides, prominent work on the topic of remembrance and grief could be cited here—Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning by Jay Winter.8 Rather than debating the 5

Heathorn, ‘Historiographical Review’; Also read, Wohl, ‘The Myriad Faces of War’.

Tylee, ‘The Great War in Modern Memory’. This article is an excellent analysis of how Paul Fussell was very selective in his literary study and consequently repressed literature of many soldiers from different nationalities.

6

7 I am grateful to my friend Dr Bruce Meyer of Georgian University, Canada, for presenting me with this copy in 2008. A foreword to this book is written by Atwood, We Wasn’t Pals.

The other work Winter and Sivan, War and Remembrance. Paperback edition. Also read, Leed, ‘The Great War’. This review explains how the work of J. Winter, which is based on demographic material, is inconclusive. 8

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   5  

degree to which the First World War was the midwife of modernism, Jay Winter provided a systematic challenge to the view that this war formed a cultural watershed based on modernist aesthetic. His book examined memory as an expression of mourning in both its public and private manifestation. The renewed interest of this topic can be read through the two Anglophone book series—The Legacy of the Great War and Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare—both edited by Professor Jay M. Winter, which were important additions to the field. Catherine Moriarty rightly remarks, Operational and strategic analyses of the First World War have now been replaced by an emphasis on the direct impact of this conflict on combatants and non-combatants, their families and communities, those who experienced the war, but there is now an additional emphasis on the legacy of this experience. The remembering of those who were involved directly has been complicated by additional layers, the memories of this first-hand remembering by subsequent generations and it public and cultural constructions.9

The historiography of the First World War can be broadly and aptly divided into six interrelated themes by Belinda Davis. 10 The first concerns the extreme variety of experience under the ravages of war. The second topic examines identity in war: how this informed one’s relation to the war. This influenced the third theme, that of public sentiment towards the war over time. The fourth looks in turn at the impact of war, both short term and long term. The fifth is the question of what kinds of ruptures and continuities the war represented, and more specifically, whether and how the war ushered in modernity. The sixth and the final theme is that of memory and memorializing the war. The material culture of remembering is a collection of the official and the personal. It includes that which was created by institutions, items of uniform and pay-books; as well as handwritten diaries and letters; souvenirs and scribbled postcards; memorials, be they imposing 9

Moriarty, ‘Review Article’.

Davis, ‘Review: Experience, Identity, and Memory’. This is an excellent historiographical review and gives a formidable bibliography.

10

 6   Indians in the First World War

structures within large cities or local stone in village roadsides, are the most public component of the material culture of war remembrance. Historians have now begun to explore new dimensions of the First World War by probing such themes as family work and welfare, death and degradation in the literature of the Great War,11 the status of women12 working in munition factories, the ‘Khaki Fever’13 in the early days of the War in England and the shell-shock neurological disease, which the soldiers suffered. Now, the history of the war is no longer that of the ‘English Tommy’ but of his fellow soldiers from around the Empire and his counterparts across the wire. It is about those who fought and those who cooked, transported and laboured; it is about the nurses,14 workers in munition factories; it is about those women in the French-occupied territory who physically and mentally suffered at the hands of billeted soldiers15; and on the land, it is about the fund and morale-raising activities of conservative women, the poor, the rich, the brave and the afraid, the hero and the deserter. II Historiography of the works relating to India’s participation in the First World War primarily includes the following works: The Indian Corp in France by Lt Col J. B. Mereweather (Indian Army) and Sir Frederick Smith,16 which gives an excellent account of bravery shown 11

Bogacz, ‘Review: The Upheaval of War’.

12

Vellacott, ‘Feminist Consciousness’.

Woollacott, ‘Khaki Fever’ and Its Control’. The excitement, which reportedly gripped young adolescent girls/women at the sight of troops in towns, cities and near army camps, was identified as sexual, and named ‘Khaki Fever’; Also read, Ferris, Sex and the British, Chapter 4 ‘Interfering Toads’—The Nation at War’ (54–75) is very illuminating about how the First World War brought about changes in sexual morals in England. 13

Watson, ‘Khaki Girls, VADs, and Tommy’s Sisters’; Also read, Harris, ‘In the “Gray Battalion”’. These nurses from Australia and New Zealand also served and attended the wounded soldiers in Lady Hardinge Hospital in Bombay. Their group photograph is also available.

14

Gibson, ‘Sex and Soldiering in France and Flanders’. This article makes a fascinating reading on the issues of sex, ‘amateurs’, prostitution and venereal diseases among the soldiers; also read, Cooper, ‘Review Article’.

15

16

Mereweather and Smith, The Indian Corps.

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   7  

by the Indian soldiers in France and Flanders, and the difficulties faced by them in the trench warfare; With the Indians in France by James Willcocks,17 a source often quoted by many European bureaucrats in India like Col Patrick Cadell of Bombay Government (BG) and the author of the History of the Bombay Army. Of course, there is a tendency among few Western scholars of discounting the appreciation of the Indian forces by Willcocks. So is the work of Maj Gen Sir Charles Townshend My Campaign in Mesopotamia (1920), which candidly confesses in the ‘Preface’: Such history is difficult to write when the events are recent and the susceptibilities of soldiers have to be encountered; but when I reflect that official documents are sometimes exaggerated as regards success, while reverses are diminished and glossed over, I prefer to tell my own story and to write it from diaries, for there are more certain and more legitimate way of impressing public opinion than a plain statement of facts which cannot be disputed and the bearing of which cannot be misunderstood.18

There are two releases of the official account—India’s Contribution to the World War I by M. B. L. Bhargava (n.d.)19 and India’s Services in the War—Vol. III, United Provinces (1922). Both these accounts are published from Lucknow. The first, authored by a Brahmin and which bears a foreword by Wazir Hassan, a prominent Muslim League leader of UP, is a well-thought-out official release. The second is the third volume in the series of accounts officially released, which only endorses that perhaps, the government came out with accounts of each province but which are now not traceable; and that it has foreword by Wazir Hassan, perhaps is to placate the Muslim population hurt by the treatment meted out to the Caliph. Most of the secondary books refer only to Bhargava’s account but make no reference to the other. A third official publication, List of Princes and Chiefs in Political Relations with the Government of Bombay and their Leading Officials, Nobles and Personages (1931), also gives fairly good account of the contribution 17

Willcocks, With the Indians in France.

Townshend, My Campaign in Mesopotamia. Maj Gen Townshend, the Commander of Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ in Mesopotamia, was taken as a prisoner of war by the Turks. When the war ended, he brokered the peace with the Turks. 18

19

This is no publication date but Mr Wazir Hassan’s foreword bears date 1 July 1919.

 8   Indians in the First World War

made by the native princes to the war effort. Besides these, another publication marked ‘confidential and for official use only’, Field Notes, Mesopotamia (February 1917 and containing 327 pages), is an excellent account of the British interests, the growing nature of their military involvement and the climatic difficulties faced by the Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia.20 One of the earliest works in India on this topic was an edited work by DeWitt C. Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan, published way back in 1978. It contains significant contributions from N. Gerald Barrier, Satyendra Dev Pradhan, A. C. Bose, Krishan Saini, Stanley Wolpert and Judith Brown. New research explorations based on literature, similar to Paul Fussell but on different aspects emerged in works such as Touch and Intimacy in First World War Literature (2006) by Santanu Das,21 in which Das investigates the centrality of touch in a range of testimonial documents—poems, letters, diaries of soldiers and nurses. He explores the wounding impact of the monstrous industrial warfare of the First World War on real bodies. An important contribution to the literature on Indian soldiers’ participation is by David Omissi’s Indian Voices of the Great War—Soldiers’ Letters, 1914–1918 (1999).22 While he acknowledges the Eurocentric nature of the histories of First World War that hardly take note of India’s contribution in terms of manpower, equipment and transport, animals and finance, he considers it sad that the British imperialism did not pay any attention to India’s hopes and aspirations for home rule. Despite the handicap of being aware of nuances of Indian languages and cultural expressions, he for the first time brought out that small body of letters written by Indian soldiers had survived the imperialist censors. The centenary year of the beginning of the First World War evoked a renewed interest among the historians—both Indian and European. Significant additions in this respect are many. If I die here, 20

Field Notes, Mesopotamia.

21

Das, Touch and Intimacy.

22

Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War.

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   9  

who will remember me? India and the First World War by Vedica Kant23 (2014), a coffee table book interspersed with extremely good and rare photographs is the positive aspect of this work. So is the coffee table book with rare photographs—Indian Troops in Europe, 1914–1918, by Santanu Das24 (2015). Shrabani Basu’s work, For King and Another Country—Indian Soldiers on the Western Front 1914–191825, uses a different literary genre in her lucid narration of the historical account for common consumption; nevertheless, she deserves all appreciation for her effort. She illustrates how mostly illiterate Indian soldiers on the Western Front took pride in fighting for ‘their’ King—the mai-bap. She narrates the bravery of the 11 Victoria Cross (VC) Indian winners from undivided India. But she has omitted the nine Europeans who got VC as members of Indian Army.26 Perhaps, George Morton-Jack wrote The Indian Army on the Western Front—India’s Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War with preconceived notion that Indian soldiers were useless and were a burden on the British forces. He fails to make a distinction between Dominion Armies of Australia, New Zealand and Canada on the one hand and colonial dependencies like India. While Australia and Canada enjoyed Dominion status from the second half of the 19th century, could impose tariffs on imports of manufactures from the UK and could refuse licences to banks incorporated in the UK, without seeking permission of the British parliament, such freedom was entirely denied to India and Indians had a decision-making role. India was totally controlled by the Home government, the Secretary of State for India and his India Council, and the British parliament.27 This work suffers from race 23

Kant, India and the First World War.

24

Das, Indian Troops in Europe.

Basu, For King and Another Country. Her work starts with half the poem by Sarojini Naidu.

25

The nine Europeans who got VC as personnel of Indian Army were; Lt F. A. DePass* of 34th Poona Horse, Lt W. A. Bruce* of 59 Scinde Rifles, Lt J. G. Smyth of 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, Maj Gen M. M. Wheeler* of 7th Hariyana Lancers, Captain J. A. Sinton of Indian Medical Service, Maj G. C. Wheeler of 9th Gurkha Rifles, Captain E. Jotham* of 51st Sikhs, Captain J. J. Andrews* of Indian Medical Service, and Lt W. D. Kenny* of 39th Garhwal Rifles. Persons with asterisk received VC posthumously.

26

27

Bagchi, ‘Indian Economy and Society’.

 10   Indians in the First World War

and imperial bias against Indians. To show how Indian Army fought in an uncivilized fashion on the Western Front, Christian Koller quotes: ‘Indians might have cut off German ears or heads, if such acts had an important element in their traditional warfare, perhaps as a means of trophy collecting’.28 The author forgets that the very British media called the Germans as ‘monsters’ and ‘Huns’. By and large, all these works are Eurocentric, present mainly the British version of story based on the records located in British Library, Imperial War Museum and other related archives in UK, and deal with Western Front alone. Priya Satia’s article on Mesopotamia29 advances a farfetched argument of how the Indian colony that performed much of the task was a matter of pride for Indian nationalists as well as British imperialists, for whom it offered yet more proof that their Empire was not the malevolent, grasping force or anachronistic geopolitical extravagance its critics made out to be, but a benign and effective mechanism of global improvement and nation-building.

A latest work in this line is India and World War I, by Roger D. Long and Ian Talbot (2018).30 Many of the works that have been produced on this centennial occasion tend to be repetitive in nature, but with some variations. Some of the articles on Mesopotamia by Douglas Goold (1976), John S. Galbraith (1984) and Tan Tai-Yong’s article on ‘Punjab and the Home Front’ are very illuminative. In recent years, Ravi Ahuja’s articles on Indian Soldiers in German captivity is a significant addition. So are the articles on ‘non-combatant Indian labour force’, deployed in both France and Mesopotamia, by Radhika Singha,31 an aspect which has been squarely neglected by most historians. Her articles are primarily, rather solely, based on the sources located in National Archives in New Delhi and Mumbai and, therefore, they make significant contribution 28

Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on the Western Front.

Satia, ‘Developing Iraq’. Such articles in line with the programme of Cambridge School historians, try to extol the British Empire’s beneficence. 29

30

Long and Talbot, India and World War I.

31

Singha, ‘A Short Career of the Indian Labour’, 1–3; and ‘Finding Labour from India’.

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   11  

to historical research. This is a brief historiographical review of Indian participation in the First World War. III A brief note on methodology and sources utilized in this volume is necessary. Hardly any literature did exist that gave information about India, nay Bombay, during the First World War—India and the World War I edited by DeWitt C. Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan32; and Walter Leifer’s Bombay and the Germans33 (1975), which is a collection of articles. Even S. M. Edwardes, who has written the Gazetteers of Bombay and Bombay City, The Bombay Police and many other books, does not make any mention about the happenings in Bombay. In fact, as the then Police Commissioner of Bombay City, he was one of the main actors in Governor Lord Willingdon’s Bombay administration. Paucity of literature by the Indian nationalists could perhaps be attributed to strict and harsh surveillance of the police under specially promulgated Defence of India Rules. The basic strength of this volume lies in using vast archival material available, but hitherto unused, in the Maharashtra State Archives (MSA) located in Bombay, now Mumbai. Since Bombay was the main port of embarkation and disembarkation of troops as well as of all officials, also, it was an economic hub of the country, all the material supplies for war were transported through the Bombay dockyards, it was also the main theatre of nationalist’s agitation, where the wounded Indian soldiers first arrived; hence, awareness about what was happening elsewhere was much more here than places like Delhi, Simla or Calcutta. The official records of those turbulent days are specially maintained in the Archives under a special category named Political Department (PD [War]), Civil Supplies Department, Home Department (Special). What is equally important are the intelligence records of Bombay Presidency named Bombay Police Abstracts of Intelligence (Confidential) of those relevant years that are preserved in the Maharashtra State 32

Ellinwood and Pradhan, India and the World War I.

33

Leifer, Bombay and the Germans.

 12   Indians in the First World War

Police Headquarters. To access these records, one needs permission of the Home (Special) Department of the state government. The records relating to confiscation and liquidation of enemy properties during the First World War are maintained under ‘Hostile Enemy Trading Concerns’. Besides, these are the records of other concerned departments of Bombay administration that shed much light on this topic. Many of these files were still in the rudimentary form of cataloguing. The information gathered from these sources only confirmed what Mulk Raj Anand narrated in the novel Across the Black Waters (1939). It was on the basis of these records, I first wrote the article ‘First World War: “Purchasing Indian Loyalties”—Imperial Policy of Recruitment and “Rewards” ’, in the Economic and Political Weekly,34 in 2005. The present book is an extension of that work. There are many contemporary accounts of European British bureaucrats as well as their counterparts in the English press, which have escaped scholars’ scrutiny. Col Patrick Cadell’s The History of the Bombay Army (1938)35; The India I Knew by Sir Stanley Reed, the then editor of the Times of India, Bombay (1952)36; India—Stepmother by Claude H. Hill37 of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and W.R. Lawrence one who wrote The India We Served (1929)38 are very significant in revealing and decoding the official mind. B. G. Horniman’s writings as editor of Bombay Chronicle are most revealing as a source. He not only knew the European officials well and moved with ease and comfort in the bureaucratic circles but was also close to the nationalists belonging to Tilak and Jinnah faction. He was brought to Bombay Chronicle by Pherozeshah Mehta on the 34

Ganachari, ‘First World War’.

Col Patrick Cadell was Secretary, PD and later Chief Secretary of the BG under Lord Willingdon during the First World War. After the war was concluded, he was knighted. He also co-authored with Sir Stanley Reed, India: The New Phase, in 1928. 35

36

Reed, The India I Knew.

37

Hill, Claude H. 1929. India—Stepmother. London: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd.

Lawrence, The India We Served. Walter Lawrence was close to both Lord Curzon and Lord Kitchener. In fact, he was the mediating factor. As Commander of Chief of British Expeditionary Forces in France, Lord Kitchener appointed Lawrence to arrange medical assistance for wounded Indian troops at Brighton in 1915.

38

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   13  

condition that allowed him editorial freedom to take Tilak’s line of thought. For the BG officials, he was virtually pain in the neck, to the extent that eventually they deported him to England. His unpublished memoirs written in 1924 give much insight into those turbulent years 1913–1919. IV

The Rationale At the outset, a cursory glance at the magnitude and quantum of contributions India made by way of combatant and non-combatant personnel, the material and animals it exported to various theatres of war, and the monetary assistance it offered, besides the expenditure of Mesopotamian campaign that was charged to the Indian exchequer, would show how India massively supported the war efforts. On the outbreak of the First World War, the combatant strength of the Indian Army, including reserves, was 194,000 Indian ranks; enlistment during the period of war for all branches of the services amounted to 791,000, making a total combatant population of 985,000. Of this number, 552,000 were sent overseas. As regards the non-combatants, the pre-war strength was 45,000; an additional 427,000 were enrolled during the war; and 391,000 were sent overseas. The total number of Indian personnel was thus 1,457,000, of whom 943,000 served overseas. The figures given here do partially differ between those cited in India’s Contribution to the First World War, an officially compiled text, also quoted by Santanu Das in Indian Troops in Europe 1914–1918, and in the official records in British Library.39 According to these sources, the figures given are at the outbreak of war, the strength of the army in India was British officers 4,744, British other ranks 72,209, total British 76,953, Indians serving 159,134, Indian reservists 34,767, total Indian combatants 193,901, Indian non-combatants 45,660 and grand total 239,561. The figures given in British Library/L/MIL/17/5/2381 are total number of men, animals and stores despatched from Indian ports during the period August 1914 to November 1918 personnel 1,302,394, animals 172,815, supplies and stores 36,918,346 tonnes, total recruitment combatants 826,868, non-combatants 445,592, total 1,272,460, medical personnel 1,394, assistant surgeons 646, and sub-assistant surgeons 1,209. These figures match with the one given by Santanu Das, Indian Troops in Europe, 19.

39

 14   Indians in the First World War

Casualties officially stated amounted to 106,594, which excluded 36,696 deaths from all other causes such as lack of medical help. The number of animals sent overseas was 175,000. No department was more closely connected with the war or did render full cooperation than the Railway Department. The great increase in the military traffic produced by the war synchronized with the serious shortage of shipping, and thus threw open the Indian Railways a volume of traffic, normally sea-borne, which they were never designed to carry. The principal portion of the steel output took the form of rails and fastening for railway work, the Tata works having provided 985 track miles of the supplies. During the 9 months from March to November 1918, a total of 59,000 tons of Indian cement was used for war efforts. Engineering materials such as steel plates, galvanized and black iron sheets; steel or iron beams, girders, bars, angles, and other rolled sections; and steel wire ropes, steel scrap, tin plates, copper tubing were regularly supplied. The value of tanned hides from Madras supplied in terms of pounds up to 31 March 1918 was £5,908,528, and from 1 April 1918 to November 1918, it was worth £2,638,656; the value of tanned hides supplied from Bombay for the same periods was £520,175 and 339,407; the value of raw hides from Calcutta, Karachi and Rangoon was £385,775 and 469,191, making it a total of £6,821,477 and 3,447,254, respectively. The recruitment of technical staff commenced early in May 1916. From that time to the end of October 1918, a total of nearly 150,000 of all classes were sent overseas, representing an average of 5,000 a month. Of this staff, the skilled classes may be taken, roughly, an equal in number to the unskilled. Railways, inland water transport and works have absorbed the largest numbers; the proportion being: railways 67,000; inland water transport 56,000; works 11,000; and all others 16,000. Apart from these categories, 293,152 and 50,000 personnel for both Iraq and France, respectively, including noncombatant labour corps composed of menial laborers, mule riders, drivers, scavengers and such other activities that were considered inferior work were also recruited. These labour corps were deployed for construction of roads, irrigation, docks, wharfs, quays, storage units, barracks and railways necessary for military use.40 40

Singha, ‘Finding Labor from India’; and ‘A Short Career of the Indian Labour’.

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   15  

The total net contribution from Indian revenues towards the cost of the war did amount to £135.8 million to the end of 1918–1919. A further sum of £13.8 million was paid in 1919–1920. In the Government of India (GOI) Finance Department, despatch shows that the percentage of defence expenditure to net public revenue during this period: in the UK was 43.9; in India 35.8; in the self-governing dominions 12.7; in the crown colonies and protectorates 8.1; while for the whole Empire the percentage was 38.2.41 The resources of the Royal Indian Marine were similarly taxed to the utmost. The inauguration of extensive scheme of irrigation and agricultural development in Mesopotamia made heavy additional demands on India during the years and the extension of railway in the same theatre of war continued to make serious inroads on available rolling stock and material. During the war, 1,855 miles of railway track, 229 locomotives and 5,989 vehicles were sent out of India.42 These officially stated figures and statistics are indicative of the nature and quantum of active participation of the Indian troops during the First World War and which was deployed in the following theatres of war: France, East Africa, Egypt and most importantly in Mesopotamia. Unlike the first three, the last one was primarily carried out by debiting the expenditure to the Indian treasury and was exclusively planned and executed by the British Indian military think-tank of the Army Department situated at Simla. The controls of Mesopotamian campaign only shifted to the War Office after the Mesopotamian Commission (MC) made a severe indictment of this campaign. As the war reached a critical phase, there was a constant as well as steadily increasing demand for ‘native’ recruitment to Indian Army, for deployment in all the above-mentioned theatres of war. The statistics quoted above are from imperial records found in Mumbai and in British Library, and they show how India was bled white in this virtual inferno. Yet, despite this huge contribution in every department of life, the memory of the First World War does 41

All these statistics are from British Library/L/MIL/17/5/2381.

These statistics are from a ‘Note’ written by the Commander-in-Chief in India, addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, and published as Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette dated 25 July 1919. MSA/ PD/WAR/1919/File No. 119-W.

42

 16   Indians in the First World War

not form even a footnote in any historical account of India for the past 100 years. That it is not even taught as a sub-topic in the 700 odd universities in India shows how during the colonial period it was a ‘repressed memory’ and even after India attaining independence, it does not find relevance in the agenda of the political parties in power. Collective memories originate from shared communications about the meaning of the past that are anchored in the life-worlds of individuals who partake in the communal life of the respective collective. As such, collective memories are based in a society and its inventory of signs and symbols: Memory seems to reside not in perceiving consciousness but in the material: but in the practices and institutions of social or psychic life, which function within us…. Such collective memories exist on the level of families, professions, political generations, ethnic and religious groups, social classes and nations.43

Collective memory is conceptualized as a result of interaction of three types of historical factors: (a) the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, (b) the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions and (c) the memory consumers who use, ignore or transform such artefacts according to their own interests. Since memory is always evolving and contingent, it often privileges the interests of the contemporary. Historical representations are negotiated, selective, present-oriented and relative. India’s massive contribution has remained a ‘failed’ collective memory—a ‘forgotten’ World War lost between the national movement against British colonial state on the one hand, and the trauma caused by the suspended civil liberties and the atrocities committed in Punjab culminating in Jallianwala Bagh incident on the other. The vocabulary of memory studies includes terms such as ‘national memory’, ‘public memory’ and ‘vernacular memory’. This terminological diversity obscures the fact that the majority of contributions to the field of memory studies continues research agendas that used to sail under separate colours. Indeed, the war period were the days when civil liberties were totally suspended by the repressive colonial state, which probably accounts for the absence of expression in literature 43

Kansteiner, ‘Finding Meaning in Memory’.

Historiography and Rationale of the First World War   17  

produced by the nationalists. Hence, it was a ‘repressed memory’ of a nation in the making. ‘Public memory’ was the one that was officially endorsed or produced memories and that task was performed by the Imperial War Graves Commission mainly to boost the idea of British Empire. Grass-root memories, which are called as ‘vernacular memories’, are so widely scattered and limited that they hardly contribute to evolve a common historically shared experience. Diversity equally exists among the scholars in their approach to the contribution of India as a colonial dependency towards the First World War. A majority of research works on this topic are Eurocentric in nature and primarily based on the source material from European archives. Many of them tend to highlight the role of the Empire and loyalty of the ‘poor and coloured’ Indians. And any research based on archival records maintained by the colonial state that reveals the repressive and high-handed character of the then British Indian state’s conduct of the war effort is dubbed and neglected as ‘nationalist and revisionist’. While the academics in England and India write differently, the interests of the contemporary political structures in both the nations have hardly any concern in the actual historical details. It is only on the centennial occasion that, for the first time, some isolated interested parties have taken an opportunity to project their collective memory of the First World War in popular annals of Indian history. However, now that this moment has passed, the Indian memory of this world conflagration will most likely again disappear, despite all efforts. The effort in this book is to explore and retrieve that lost Indian memory, which was so latently lying in the Mumbai archives.

Declaration of War Empire and Problem of Nationality Laws in a Colonial Situation

2

When the Austrian Prince Franz Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo, there was a chorus of assurance from the Home Press, writes Sir Stanley Reed, the editor of the Times of India, that this need not disturb the peace of Europe. Two dissident notes were struck. The leading Socialist newspaper in Germany Vorwaerts declared that this meant war; The Times of India in Bombay wrote that the War was inevitable. Moreover, the Times urged the community to be prepared for at least 3 years of war.1 On 5 August 1914, The Gazette of India notified: ‘War has broken out between His Majesty and Germany’. Such notifications were issued in respect of war against the AustroHungarian government and Turkey on 13 August and 2 November 1914, respectively.2 Once again in the history of the Empire, the hour found the man. The declaration of war was not an hour old before Lord Hardinge, the enthusiastic Viceroy of India, pledged ‘India’s last man and last gun’ to the common cause; there was no reliance on Britain for reinforcement; there was unstinted service to every battle front. Once the war was declared by England, India was dragged into it as part of the Empire. One finds different kind of language being used in the English press (see Figure 2.1) and in the utterance of the officials in India, as the need for participation of Indian Corps in Western Front 1

Reed, The India I Knew, 96–97.

Notification No. 6-W for declaring war against Germany; No. 212-W against Austria; and No. 2493-W against Turkey, The Gazette of India (Extraordinary), Foreign and PD, MSA/PD/War/1914/9-W. This declaration was in response to an incident that triggered the war, namely, on 28 June 1914, Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne was assassinated by Bosnian Serb terrorist named Gavrilo Princip at Sarajevo.

2

Declaration of War   19  

Figure 2.1 Flag of British Indian State Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:British_Raj_Red_Ensign.svg

was urgently felt. The European war became an occasion for a crusade that saw the mobilization of an extraordinary language filled with abstract euphemistic spiritualized words and phrases under which were buried the realities of modern mechanized warfare. Articles and editorial with titles like ‘Renewal of Youth’, ‘Glorious Baptism of Fire’, ‘War and Sacrifice’, ‘Fight for Liberty of Civilization’ regularly appeared in the press not only in 1914 but throughout the war. The outbreak of the ‘Great War’ brought about many kaleidoscopic changes in British India. Human reactions to war are infinitely complicated and delicately coded. Had the war quickly come to an end, and closely marked in favour of the Allies, everything would have resumed to normal as soon as peace was declared. But when the prospect of an easy and rapid victory for the Allies faded away, the British administration—both at home and in India—began to realize that their work calls for a serious output of all their energy and strength. In consequence, the easy-going disposition of the earlier months gave way to a feeling of stress in which the bitterness normal between belligerent nations became intensified. Also the way in which the war was prosecuted by the German forces, both by land and sea, added to this feeling and gradually turned it into almost a frenzy of hatred and detestation. This feeling gradually grew into an intense desire to obliterate every vestige of everything even remotely German from the face of the Empire. With Germany and Austria being declared as ‘hostile countries’, instructions were issued by the GOI to detain subjects belonging to

 20   Indians in the First World War

those nationalities in India. Crews of merchant ships belonging to these countries were now to be detained as they were considered liable to be drafted into service of Reserve Landwehr or Seewehr of either of these powers. All male Germans between the age of 20 and 40 years, and Austrians between the age of 21 and 34 years, liable to military service in their respective countries, were to be rounded up as ‘Prisoners of War (POWs)’. Later, the Ordinance of 1915 substituted the military age mentioned earlier, by 17 to 45 for the Germans and 19 to 42 for the Austrians. Only the officers of the merchant ships and civilians belonging to these nationalities, who had means of livelihood and could be vouched for by British subjects of standing, were to be given ‘parole’. Besides, ‘enemy subjects’ not belonging to military age were given option to leave India between 15 and 30 September 1914.3 The removal from or the refusal of residence in a defended port (which meant Bombay and to a lesser degree Karachi) or in an important military centre in the case of Germans or Austrians subjects was considered a matter of paramount necessity. The Consul and Vice-Consuls of USA were to represent the interests of these subjects and were to be allowed access to the POW camps. This was done under the instructions of the then US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan.4 A strict censorship of all correspondence of the POWs was instituted. Local Civil authorities were asked to call on foreign Consuls to register and submit lists of their subjects living in ‘defended ports’ and were to warn them not to have any adverse communication of news. Should any person were to raise objection, his expulsion was suggested. But special care was solicited, particularly with friendly foreigners, to avoid wounding their susceptibilities. All Germans and Austrians were to be put under police surveillance, and it was specially suggested that ‘it should be done as secretly as possible and as far as practicable by European agency’. Furthermore, it was instructed that ‘enemy subjects’ No. 22246-7 (AG-2-G) Confdl., dated 28 August 1914. MSA/PD/WAR/1914/54-W-III. It was stated that the onus of proof that they were not liable to military service did rest with the individual concerned. Those who were refused ‘parole’ were to be interned in the Prisoners of War Camps.

3

4 William Jennings Bryan was the Governor of Nebraska and later became President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State. He was very sympathetic to India. In 1906, he castigated the British rule in India, comparing it with Czarist rule in Russia.

Declaration of War   21  

Figure 2.2 Indian Forces Unloading Baggage at Alexandra Dock, Bombay during the First World War Source: German Consulate, Mumbai. Reproduced with permission. Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

should report themselves to a police officer having a rank not lower than Assistant Superintendent of Police, thereby eliminating Indian police officers.5 Initially, the overenthusiastic GOI thought that Bombay being an important harbour needs to be protected and, hence, denied entry to the foreign vessels of neutral as well as friendly countries and disallowed disembarking of their crew at Bombay port (see Figure 2.2). Though they were allowed to dock for fuel and other technical purposes, territorial limits were fixed for the movement of crew of such vessels by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) and the Commissioner of Police (CP) of Bombay.6 This evoked sharp reactions from allied 5

Telegram No. 581 (Confdl.) dated 8 August 1914, MSA/PD/WAR/1914/54-W-I.

No. 3504/120-d, 4 October 1914. MSA/PD/WAR/1914/54-W-II. S. M. Edwardes suggested that the crew of the neutral vessels could move in the area: ‘Starting from Princess and Victoria Docks, the area bounded by Frere Road up to Carnac Bridge, Carnac Road, Hornby Road Esplanade Road, from Floral Fountain to Rampart Row, Apollo Street, Marine Street, Mint Road past Town Hall, again Frere Road and Ballard Pier’. 6

 22   Indians in the First World War

governments, namely the American, French and Japanese, which were conveyed through their respective Consuls. They cited the clauses of treaty obligations signed with Britain, complained that it amounted to abrogation of their treaty obligations and rights and hence demanded immediate exemption. Although the demand was conceded, the BG made a veiled suggestion to the Imperial government to take a hard line against ‘enemy’ trade, commerce and industry: ‘So far as the Bombay Presidency is concerned the Governor-in-Council would gladly subscribe to a policy which would have the effect of restricting within the narrowest limits the opportunities afforded to Germans and Austrians to engage in trade.’ The government not only sought the dismissal of Germans and Austrians employed in civil departments,7 but looked at it as a God-sent opportunity to take over all their firms in favour of English business interests. The administration, as in all cases, tried to fix the things in legal fiction. Thus, the legislation enacted for this purpose—the Hostile Trading Firms Act of 1915—was meant to legally arm them.8 Under Section 3 of this Act, the Governor General appointed Mr P. S. Mellor as the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns for the purpose of receiving money due to enemy subjects and prohibiting any deal with German or Austrian subjects. Officials were appointed as liquidators to dispose of the property or industrial/ trade assets of the POW.9 Even the correspondence between Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador to England10, and Sir Edward Grey of the British Foreign Office between December 1914 and March 1915 with regard to respecting the rights of the subjects of belligerent nations shows how England clamoured for a hard line. Censuring the British attitude, Mr Page criticized that, 7

No. 5893/165 (Confdl.) JD, ibid.

8

This is confirmed by Kincaid, British Social Life.

MSA/Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns (Revenue Department) File No. 62 of 1915–1916. Following firms were taken over by Mr W. J. Burrows as a liquidator to wind up or close the business—Firms of Harry Greayer, Messers Saloman Brothers Ltd of Mr Leopald Zwicker, M/s Heine & Co Ltd., M/s Alois Schweiger & Co Ltd, M/s E. G. Fulep, M/s C. Hummel, M/s Joseph Blum, M/s Standes & Co, Farbenfabriken Bayer & Co Ltd, M/s M. Lucius & Brunning Co Ltd, M/s Volkart Brothers, Berlin Aniline Co Ltd File Nos. 53/55/57/61/62 MSA/Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns/1915–1916.

9

10

For W. H. Page’s role in the First World War, see Hendrick, The Life and Letters.

Declaration of War   23  

though nearly five months have passed since the war began, the British Government have not materially changed their policy and do not treat less injuriously, ships and cargoes passing between neutral ports in the peaceful pursuit of lawful commerce, which belligerents should protect than interrupt…the commerce between countries which are not belligerents should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it is a necessity…. Mere suspicion is not evidence, and doubts should be resolved in favour of neutral commerce, and not against it….

Without taking any cognizance of Mr Page’s criticism but justifying the British stand, Sir Edward wrote, It is unfortunately true that in these days, when trade and finance are cosmopolitan, any war—particularly a war of any magnitude—must result in a grievous dislocation of commerce including that of the nations, which take no part in the war. Your Excellency will realise that in this tremendous struggle, for the outbreak of which Great Britain is in no way responsible, it is impossible for the trade of any country to escape all injury and loss, but for such His Majesty’s Government are not to blame.11…We recognise with sympathy the desire of the Government of the United States to see the European War conducted in accordance with the previously recognised rules of international law and the dictates of humanity….12

Defending British position, Sir Edward further bemoaned: Modern history affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the defenseless and non-combatant population in the territory that have been in German military occupation…. Every war is a calamity which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants but also on neutrals. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships.

The GOI immediately retrieved their position and reassured the privileges of the neutral as also the allied powers regarding their trading facilities in Bombay.13 Furthermore, a covert suggestion was made 11

Grey to Page, 10 February 1915, MSA/PD/WAR/1915/282-W, 7.

12

Grey to Page, 13 March 1915, MSA/PD/WAR/1915/282-W.

Ibid. Not only Henry D. Baker protested against such restriction but also the French and Dutch Consuls too. The Consul for Japan stated that the Asiatic

13

 24   Indians in the First World War

suggesting a tough line against ‘enemy’ trade, commerce and industry. It said, ‘So far as the Bombay Presidency is concerned the Governor-inCouncil would gladly subscribe to a policy which would have the effect of restricting within the narrowest limits the opportunities afforded to Germans and Austrians to engage in trade’. The proceedings of a Committee specially constituted by BG consisting of Col Marshall, GOC, Bombay, Capt Hewett, Mr S. M. Edwardes, the CP and L. Robertson, the Secretary, PD, BG, throw much light on the immediate steps taken by the Bombay administration. Most of the German and Austrian merchant ships, being ‘enemy’ ships, were not allowed to disembark at Bombay but were to sail to the port of Marmgoa, which was a colony of the neutral Portuguese. An embargo on oil and coal was imposed for these ships, ‘the object being to prevent such ships from getting coal so that ultimately they might surrender’. Measures were to be taken to prevent coal being sent to Marmgoa by rail. They suggested that detention of ‘enemy’ crews in the prison accommodation on shore would not be desirable. The Committee also discussed the question of German and Austrian prostitutes residing in Bombay, as they were thought to be dangerous in times of war. Since it was thought that no foreign vessels would be immediately leaving the harbour, to put such people (the prostitutes) on a British vessel could be embarrassing to the Commander. The confused BG urged the GOI to instruct regarding the policy to be pursued in dealing with ‘enemy foreigners’.14 The months immediately following the War saw indiscriminate capture and internment of many German and Austrian merchant vessel crew.15 Lists of foreigners of all nationalities, with a special emphasis on Germans and Austrians in Bombay, were immediately prepared Foreigners were exempt from the provisions of the notification as they were members of Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 14

Ibid. 54-W-I.

One of the first enemy merchant vessels, which was captured and the 67 crew interned was from the ship—‘S.S. Franz Ferdinand’. The other ships captured were ‘Cape Antibes’, ‘Kerrimoor’, ‘Varzin’, ‘Wartenfels’, and ‘Lindenfels’. MSA/ PD/WAR/1914/123-W.

15

Declaration of War   25  

which provided details regarding their occupations, professional address and also their affiliations to the Clubs—German Club, Bombay Club, Royal Yacht Club, Byculla Club and Bombay Gymkhana.16 Warning was issued to the editors of the Times of India, Advocate of India, Bombay Chronicle, and Bombay Gazette, not to publish any information relating to naval and military precautions undertaken for the defence of Bombay, embargo on coal and oil, movements of British ships and movements of troops. Even vernacular newspapers such as Kesari, Jame-i-Jamshed, Akhbar-i- Saudagar, Gujrati, Arya Sudharak, and Bombay Samachar were warned against writing on any topic such as German preparedness.17 Also, the BG lent their tacit support to the anti-German Society of India promoted by one G. Scrinzi, a musician and former resident of Triest. Hatred is not only a complement of a war but the greatest moral asset of a nation at war. But when hatred becomes intense, it generates, to borrow the phrase of Emmanuel Miller, ‘a neurosis of war’.18 A feeling of jingoism became very evident with the progressive deterioration of international situation not only among many people in Europe but among ‘White’ British subjects in India too. Anonymous letters were Immediately, a minute scrutiny was made in September 1914. It contained information regarding 91 Germans and 31 Austrians, of which the statistics of membership to various clubs was as follows: German Club = 37 Germans and 11 Austrians; Bombay Club = 11 Germans and 3 Austrians; Bombay Gymkhana = 5 Germans and 2 Austrians; Royal Yacht Club = 2 Germans and 1 Austrians; Byculla Club = 1 Austrian. MSA/PD/WAR/1914/8-W.

16

17 MSA/PD/WAR/1914/2-W; Later in 1916, many newspapers were severely reprimanded for writing articles such as The Times of India wrote ‘Turkish Atrocity’ (2 April 1916); The Bombay Chronicle wrote ‘Sir John Hewett: Angel of Vision’ (3 April 1916); Phoenix wrote ‘A German Review of the War: Policies and Strategies’(5 February 1916), Mahratta wrote ‘Why is England fighting the Enemy?’ (7 May 1916) and Jam-e-Jamshed wrote ‘The New Aerial Torpedo Peril’ (28 March 1916) MSA/ PD/WAR/1916/41-W. During 1915–1916, the government distributed pamphlets in schools and colleges, to create favourable opinion on their side such as ‘Why are we at War—Great Britain’s Case’, ‘Gr. Britain and the European Crisis’, ‘The War, its Causes and its Messages’ MSA/PD/WAR/1915-16/281-W.

After the Second World War was over in 1945, Emmanuel Miller edited a volume entitled The Neurosis of War, detailing the way war produced hatred and consequent loss of human reason.

18

 26   Indians in the First World War

addressed to Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, demanding the clamping of ‘martial law’ in Bombay. They warned that, As Englishmen are fighting a powerful enemy, Your Lordship seems to have very little to do beyond attending banquet and balls, and have your photograph taken with a wedding party or at a polo match…. If you don’t wake up now, we will find you never will; and one day, you will find a Native Governor appointed in Bombay instead of your successor— Lord Chelmsford! There are a few shambles going on in Bombay, that no Governor would tolerate for a single day.

Such attitude not only smacked of parochialism but of being racist. The administration was accused for their alleged ‘happy-go-luckyWe are-Englishmen-you-know’ attitude, and raised a hue and cry for appointing some Germans to certain key positions. Why do you permit certain Germans to remain here? Why are they allowed to carry on business under assumed names? Why are they permitted to carry firearms? Why is a Swiss electrician (but really German) allowed to work in the Alexandra Dock? Why is a German foreman working there too? Why is the Assistant Dockmaster in Alexandra Dock an Italian?… ‘Legislation’ and ‘naturalization’ and duly reporting themselves to the police, are the German bluffs that keep these men in places today…. Now or never is the time to wake up, put the whole city under martial law, and arm every civilian in India.19

Detailed investigation in each case by S. M. Edwardes, the Police Commissioner of Bombay, showed that many Englishmen cried foul on trivial matters relating to Germans. It was pointed out that the case of German foreman and Assistant Dock-master of the Bombay Port Trust were naturalized British citizens residing here for a very long period and were certainly not of military age.20 By mid-1915, the BG received clear instructions from Governor-General’s Office that, ‘any German or Austrian—both non-Gazetted and Gazetted officers

Letter by ‘A Midshipman on half-pay’ dated 20 November 1914. The phrase ‘happy-go-lucky-We are-Englishmen-you know’ is mentioned in this letter. Also, an earlier letter by ‘Veritus’ dated 4 October 1914. MSA/PD/WAR/1914/54-W-III.

19

20

Ibid.

Declaration of War   27  

in Civil departments should be immediately discharged’.21 This only shows how with the passage of time hatred became so intense that such jingoistic outcry led to a kind of psychosis and phobia. This psychosis was further heightened by another eventful episode. An incident, stray though, that took place on the Indian shores shook the British Indian administration and created great commotion among the people. On 5 September 1914, the German light cruiser SMS ‘Emden’,22 better known as the ‘The Swan of the East’, entered the Bay of Bengal, capturing or sinking several vessels, including a Greek collier and an Italian freighter. On the night of 22 September 1914 at 10 o’clock at night, it entered fully lit Madras harbour and fired some 130 rounds of ammunition setting fire to two oil tanks, damaging a merchant ship and some building, including a house, possibly the Pantheon Club.23 The Emden episode, which caused much anxiety and panic among the public—both Indian and European—received wide media coverage across the country. In fact, it was India’s first taste of what the ‘total’ war was like. In Bombay, the reverberation of this incident was felt engagingly provocative, as it was the most important port of embarkation and disembarkation of troops and other war-related materials. The panic it caused is vividly described by some of the memoirs and writings of some officials. Sir Stanley Reed, the acerbic editor of the Times of India, who worked with the government stated: No. 5893/165 (Confdl.) JD, Signed A. F. Kindersley, Under-Secretary to GOI. PD/ WAR/1915/295-W-II.

21

22 The German light cruiser Emden was built at Danzig in 1908. She sank more than 40 English and 15 Allied merchant ships and caused a havoc in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. She was herself sunk by the Australian cruiser Sydney, off the coast Cocos Keeling Islands on 9 November 1914. 23 Das, Indian Troops in Europe, 30–31. The importance of this book lies in the fact that it has two remarkable photographs showing the damages caused by the firing from the cruiser, Emden. The author claims one of them to be the Pantheon Club. This excellent work contains many photographs hitherto not published. The author also denotes that this incident caused so much consternation among the masses that even it finds an expression in Kazi Nasrul Islam’s poetry and that he had not only undergone military training during the First World War but actively participated in the Mesopotamian campaign.

 28   Indians in the First World War

The appearance of the German raider Emden in Indian waters stirred them not a little. That unease grew into something not far from panic when shells were thrown into the harbour of Madras. Excited citizens rushed to Lord Willingdon anxiously to enquire into the danger of Bombay and the answer was characteristic. ‘The most vulnerable place is Government House at Malabar Point, which would be easiest to reach from the guns of a hostile ship. I am not going away’. That mot raced round the bazaars; it had a tranquillizing effect far surpassing any reasoned statement—even if any such had been possible with the elusive Captain Müller and his cruiser turning up at all sorts of unexpected places, and never more destructive than when the Chief Naval Officer announced that the seas had been swept clean. Even with the pains and fears of war long past the years of Lord Willingdon’s governorship are green in the memories of all who lived and worked in those golden days, memories the more vivid when for no small part of the time the lead was given under distressing personal loss, their eldest son, the hope of the House, was missing during the advance from the Marne, and fragmentary hopes based on illusory reports from various quarters only prolonged the agony of suspense.24

The account given by the editor of the Times of India, Sir Stanley Reed in his memoirs The India I Knew, is further confirmed and the fears and anxieties caused by the raids of German cruisers are vividly recalled, by none other than the Governor-General of India and Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge himself, in his reminiscences—My Indian Years 1910–1916: We had many moments of anxiety when large convoys of ships loaded with troops and very inadequately guarded were crossing the Indian Ocean to Aden owing to the very successful raids of the German cruisers Emden and Koenigsberg which destroyed an enormous amount of British shipping in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. Had the Emden met one of our convoys she could, by the superior range of her guns, have destroyed the convoy and the ships protecting it without any risk to herself. Happily, after a very adventurous career during which she shelled the town of Madras, she was caught by an Australian cruiser and after a gallant fight was completely destroyed. The Koenigsberg was also run to ground in river on the coast of East Africa and destroyed by aeroplanes.25 Reed, The India I Knew, 84–85. Sir Stanley mentions the name of Captain Müller, who commanded the cruiser Emden. He also makes reference to Governor of Bombay, Lord Willingdon, who lost his son in the trench war in France.

24

25

Hardinge, My Indian Years, 103.

Declaration of War   29  

The reportage in media of such occurrences produced a flood of wild rumours. One such example of this kind is the police intelligence report from Poona: I have not the least doubt that the rumours that are circulated in Poona and cause a great deal of unrest, are due to Germans who disseminate them through their servants. Rumours like the Collector of Ratnagiri having to supply the ‘Emden’ with provisions undoubtedly emanate from German sources. I have heard that a proprietor of a Hotel has told his clients they won’t behave long as the Germans are coming. I am having enquiries made, and hope, if the facts are as reported to bind him over under Section 110 (f). Several of the Germans on Parole in Poona, now that their fear is over, are, I hear, beginning to talk pretty freely and the less we have here the better. I trust therefore that no more Germans will be sent here. Edwardes has just sent me L Hamberger and E Schirmer from Aden. I have put them on daily parole and I wrote to him to ask for details as I would consult the GOC on them as regards sending them to Nagar. He replies that he let them go to Poona as they were ‘very respectable persons & one of them represented a British firm in Aden &c.’ But German ‘spies’ are not necessarily disrespectable and the cleverer and better educated they are, the more circumstantial would be the rumours they disseminate. He adds in his reply that he now understands that the GOC Bombay wanted Schirmer to be sent to Nagar. I have also had the following sent to me to live in Poona by Government. Oppenheimer, who appears to me to be a most suspicious and bumptious individual…Madam Clara Hellmanova, Austrian, has also been sent on a journey license by the CP, Madras. She seems a curious personage.

Such rumours circulated wildly at that time. II The most obvious and immediate change the ‘Great War’ brought about was that events now appeared to proceed by a series of seismic upheavals and human cataclysms. The first issue that surfaced among Bombay administrators was that of determining nationality laws. The law of nationality, which determines the relation borne by private individuals to sovereign states, is a distinct branch of public law. In times of peace, the population of a country presents an appearance of uniformity, and citizens and aliens mingle freely, carrying on the ordinary business of life with each other, apparently regardless of the

 30   Indians in the First World War

question of allegiance. But, when a country is cast into the crucible of war, the question of nationality is seen to be of vital importance to the state and the component parts of its population are quickly separated into citizens or subjects, allies, alien enemies and neutrals. The British Empire appears to have grown piece by piece to its present proportion, without any pre-conceived plan. It is a strange conglomeration of many nationalities from Europe under one sovereignty, of countries so widely separated geographically, and people so widely separated ethnologically, and appears to be a haphazard arrangement without the elements of sympathy and essential unity. It is an interesting coincidence that only a few days after Great Britain had declared war against Germany and Austria–Hungary, the new British imperial law of nationality received its third and last reading of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Bill in parliament. This law was passed on 7 August 1914, and took effect on 1 January 1915.26 For the first time, it provided a means under which Canada, Australia and other outlaying dominions of the British Empire could confer, through naturalization, citizenship in the British Empire besides in the particular dominion concerned. ‘With the British, law is primarily a matter of expediency and common sense, and law follows fact than fact law’.27 In a federation, it is important to draw a distinction between ‘nationality’, which determines the relation of a person to the supreme sovereignty, and ‘citizenship,’ which determines the relation of a person to that part of the federation in which he resides and performs the ordinary civic duties. The question of naturalization was gradually evolved during the proceedings of Imperial Conferences held between 1901 and 1911. The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act was introduced to the House of Commons primarily as an amending and consolidating measure that would ensure that a British subject anywhere is a British subject everywhere. The Act established that all individuals 26

Flournoy, ‘The New British Imperial’.

27

Ibid., 871.

Declaration of War   31  

born within ‘His Majesty’s dominion and allegiance’ acquired British nationality.28 The Act was followed shortly by a 1918 amendment. War concerns allowed the British-born wife of an enemy alien to resume her British nationality through naturalization procedures. The basic principle that a woman’s nationality followed her husband’s was not altered. During the war, British-born women with alien nationality were deprived of more rights, particularly those married to the enemy aliens. The Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 prescribed that all aliens must register with the police. Austrians, Germans and others were interned during the war. A large group of British-born women married to alien men were imprisoned, although this was done because of ‘overt acts of disloyalty’ rather than solely because of their marriage to enemy aliens. Even after the war ended, those women married to aliens continued to be subject to restrictions. Under the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) of 1919, registration with the police continued and British-born wives and widows of Germans found their property confiscated as security for the German war debt.29 The war also strengthened the arguments against allowing alien women to become British on marriage to British subject. ‘The degradation of White women in the Eastern harem’ was a powerful image created in the West and used to fulminate against mixed- race marriages. Fear that women were particularly vulnerable to the sexual depredation of colonized men had been a part of the imperial experience since the uprising of 1857 in India. Popular concerns regarding liaisons between White women and Indians in the metropolis increased. White women of the working classes in particular were believed to be susceptible to the attraction of non-Whites.30 Such were the concerns in England and her White dominions during the war and after. The British Nationality and Status of Alien Act was further amended in 1922 expressly to allow British men to transmit their nationality to children born outside the British Empire, thus ensuring the longevity of British communities overseas. 28

Baldwin, ‘Subject to Empire’.

29

Ibid., 534.

Ibid., 538. The race riots in Liverpool in 1919 were in part caused by resentment against White women marrying black/brown merchant seamen.

30

 32   Indians in the First World War

However, the issue of nationality in the context of colonies like India, which were not White settlement colonies but merely nonWhite dependencies, had a different experience. The issue of immediate importance for the British administration in India was the need for defining law regarding nationality, so as to determine who is a foreigner, and that too an ‘enemy foreigner’. The Foreigner’s Act III of 1864 was invoked and its provisions were immediately enforced throughout India. Though the Foreigner’s Bill was introduced by Henry Sumner Maine31 and passed in 1864, it was originally passed in the year of the Revolt of 1857, primarily as a temporary measure terminable in December 1859. Since then, it was continued on purely contingency basis, as a preventive measure. Although this legislation was hardly put into operation, the local governments, when referred, expressed the need for a permanent enactment.32 When enacted, it became Act No. III of 1864. This Act defined ‘foreigner’ as ‘a person not being either a natural-born subject of Her Majesty or a Native of British India’ and empowered the local governments to order any foreigner to leave the country. But it was conditional upon the GOI that the enforcement of provisions regarding establishment of a system of granting licences to foreigners to reside in India and the power of searching and examining 31 Henry Sumner Maine was the Law Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council for the period 1861–1872. He authored the book The Village Communities East and West. After his tenure as the Law Member, he went back to take up the post of Regus Professor of Law at Oxford University.

When the Foreigner’s Act was to be terminated in December 1859, the GOI consulted the local government the desirability of an enactment. Although hardly it occasioned the need of having such a measure, the local governments replied in affirmative. The Government of Bombay said ‘…the Act appears to have been brought very little into play in the Bombay Presidency, but when a necessity has arisen for enforcing it, it appears to have worked satisfactorily. The Government of Bombay would therefore recommend the continuance of Act XXXIII of 1857 as a permanent enactment.’ Expressing a similar view, the Madras Government felt that the Act should be perpetuated with some modifications. Maine, the Law Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, therefore proposed that only the four sections of the Bill ought to be in operation and the remainder should be put in force as the necessity arises. 16 December 1863. Abstract of Proceedings of the Council of Governor General of India assembled for the purpose of making Laws and Regulations under the Provisions of the Act of Parliament, [hereinafter Abstracts of Proceedings of C. G-G of I], 1863, Vol. II., 113–114.

32

Declaration of War   33  

for the purpose of identification required notification. The sections XIX–XXIV of this Act make the objective clear that it is mainly concerned with foreigners arriving by foreign merchant vessels.33 Not until 1914, the GOI hardly felt the need to enforce the provisions of this Act. Not surprisingly, in the 40 years preceding 1914, nationalism in Europe gained ground rapidly. It was a function of both social and political changes, not to mention international situation that provided plenty of pegs on which to hand manifestos of hostility. The term ‘nationalism’ was in fact coined in this period of political xenophobia. The sheer weight and pace of change in this period explains why occasions for friction between European groups multiplied.34 Scores of millions of people were too patriotic or apathetic to prevent the Great War by a movement towards European unity upon frank and generous lines. Unlike the European situation, the Europeans in the Indian colonial context lived very differently. In the aftermath of the Revolt of 1857–1858, the problem of relations between the European planters and Indian labourers working on their estates was not merely an economic one, it automatically spilled over into a more serious question of the relations between the two races.35 Issues like European vagrancy after 185836 and such other further complicated the problem. Henry Maine, who as a Law Member of Viceroy’s Executive Council introduced the Foreigner’s Bill and which was passed into an Act III of 1864, a measure aimed at giving the government certain powers with respect to ‘Foreigners’ and ‘to prevent the subjects of foreign states from residing or sojourning in British India, or from passing through or travelling therein without the consent of the government.’37 The word ‘Foreigner’ was defined as ‘a person, not being either a natural-born subject of Her Majesty within the meaning of the Statute (3 & 4 William IV, Chapter LXXXV, Section 33

Acts Passed by the Governor-General of India, 1864.

34

Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism.

35

Gopal, British Policy in India.

36

Ganachari, ‘White-Man’s Embarrassment’.

This Act III of 1864—An Act to give the Government certain powers with respect to Foreigners, received Governor-General’s assent on 12 February 1864. Acts Passed by the Governor-General of India, 1864, MSAs/Judicial Publications. 37

 34   Indians in the First World War

81) or a Native of British India’. It empowered the local governments to apprehend and detain such foreigners in safe custody. This was also intended to regulate the large traffic of alien vessels and their crew who happened to be of ‘White colour’ and being from the lower class sailors often behaved rudely. It was felt that these people were required to be distinguished from the British. But this problem was not as seriously felt in the 19th century as to enforce this measure sternly. Henry Maine, as the then Law Member of the Governor-General’s Executive Council, also moved in 1869 the Bill to provide legislation for the purpose of suppressing European vagrancy in India, in which the phrase ‘person of European extraction’ was used in defining a White vagrant, and also the term coined—’European British subject’.38 It was finally passed into an Act XXI of 1869, on 18 September 1869. The discussion on the bill in the Viceregal Council and the final passage of this Act truly reveals the official mind in a colonial setup. For the first time, the term ‘European British Subject’ was defined in terms of ‘blood category’ and was essentially expressed in racist terminology. Accordingly, the term included ‘persons of European extraction’ born in ‘Europe, America, the West Indies, Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, Natal and Cape Colony in South Africa’.39 The scope of this definition was further clarified when in 1872, B. H. Ellis, a Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, introduced an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code, seeking extension of criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects. Though the amendment was negatived, the discussion it solicited in the Viceroy’s Executive Council clearly 38 Abstract of Proceedings of C.G-G of I, 1869, Vol. VIII, 239–42, 293–319. The scope of the term ‘European British subject’ included ‘persons of European extraction’ including American and Australian. Also MSA/JD/1869/Vol. 25/1049 Part III; Bombay Government Gazette, (16 April 1874); While initiating this amendment, Mr Bayley stated that

Some difficulty was felt under the existing definition with regard to persons who are not of pure British blood, although of legitimate descent. Many of these were virtually in all respects as natives of this country… (and) that it should not include persons commonly called Eurasians or East Indians…. (Abstract of Proceedings of C. G-G of I, 1874, Vol. XIII) 39 MSA/JD/1875/Vol. 88/1441. When the European Vagrancy Act No. XXI of 1869 was repealed by the European Vagrancy Act No IX of 1874, this definition was given. It continued to be in vogue in matters connected with Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code throughout 19th century.

Declaration of War   35  

indicates how the entire European community, irrespective of their different nationalities in Europe, merged into one vis-à-vis Indians.40 Though the term ‘European British Subject’ was freely used in lexicon in India, its racist slur was not repeated in any Acts or amendments, and also interpretations, perhaps for being too explicit. Section 4 (u) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 (Act No X of 1872) defined ‘European British Subject’ as: (a) Any Subject of Her Majesty born, naturalized or domiciled in the UK of Great Britain and Ireland, or in any of the European, American or Australian Colonies or possessions of Her Majesty, or in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope; (b) any child or grandchild of any such person by legitimate descent.41 It was made clear that since ‘Masculine’ included females, the descent had to be looked into through male descent only. Despite such a tone-down effect of the interpretation of this term, the racist interpretation did lay in its background. Its clearer definition was made during the Ilbert Bill Controversy (1883), which was aptly termed as ‘White Mutiny’ when the ‘White’ bureaucracy and the European planters’ class raised hue and cry over the fear of being judicially adjudicated by native judicial officers. Interestingly, during the colonial period, when an Englishman left his native land and settled himself in a foreign country, he lost imperceptibly his insular peculiarities. And the country in which he took up his dwelling place happened to be Asiatic one, the Englishman merged in the European. In India, the Englishman, the French, the German, the Austrian, the American and even Australian and White South African became one nation—the European, and in cases of distress and trouble, they acted as brothers in arms and formed one fraternity. This European–English racial solidarity was further strengthened by the European outcry that took place during the Ilbert Bill Controversy42 and continued all through until the outbreak of the First World War. Abstract of Proceedings of G-G of I, Vol. XI, 1872. Discussion on Criminal Procedure Bill, 391–449.

40

41 D. E. Cranenburgh, The New Code of Criminal Procedure, Act No. X of 1882; and As amended up to April 1894.

In February 1883, the Law Member Sir Courtney Ilbert introduced a Bill seeking to abolish the principle of jurisdiction based on race. For details, see Gopal, British Policy in India, 149–151.

42

 36   Indians in the First World War

It is against this background the popular Indian perception of ‘White’ people was that of a monolith ruling elite, since they could hardly distinguish between various European nationalities. To them, all White-men were of one nationality, namely, ‘European British Subject’ as defined by the British Indian state. The definition of ‘European British subject’ not only remained unaltered during 19th century, but continued until the outbreak of the World War. Since it was the first time that one White man was fighting against another, the administration was perplexed and bewildered with the problem of presenting the façade of White man’s solidarity and superiority with the Indian masses on the one hand, and resolving the issue of redefining who is a British subject of the Crown territory and distinguishing it from the ‘alien’ enemy subject, on the other. Naturally, the enemy subject had to be defined in the context of the Foreigner’s Act and that the explanation had to be consistent with the scope provided by the British Nationalist and Status of Alien Act of 1914. Immediately after war was declared, the whole of Act III of 1864 was extended throughout British India. The Asiatic and non-Asiatic foreigners, except Germans and Austrians, were exempted from the scope of Act III. In the changed circumstances, a modified version of the Act III was promulgated as an emergency measure and published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated 20 August: The Foreigner’s Ordinance 1914 (III of 1914). This ordinance was further amended as Ordinance IV of 1914, to include contingent matters such as: that foreigners residing or being in British India, shall be prohibited from carrying on trade, or business or form of dealing with any property— movable or immovable, and shall carry on trade or business, subject to such conditions and restrictions as the Governor General in Council may impose….43

To provide for the control of persons entering British India, whether by sea or land, in order to protect the state from danger of anything prejudicial to its safety, interest or tranquillity, another Ordinance No. V was promulgated on 5 September 1914, which was further amended 43

MSA/PD/WAR/1914/54-W-III.

Declaration of War   37  

as Ordinance VI (14 October 1914) to cover even the companies carrying trading activities with enemy state. Again, two ordinances—VII and VIII, dated 14 October and 14 November 1914—were promulgated to amend the earlier Foreigners’ Ordinance. Furthermore, under the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914, the administration in India made clear that only the natural-born subjects of the Crown territories were British, and rest of the Europeans other than Germans, Austrians and ‘European Turks’ were declared as ‘alien allies’. Furthermore, a Proclamation was made on 10 April 1915 that listed the articles of trade to be treated as ‘Contraband of War’. Among the articles listed were: Raw Wool, Wool tops and noils and woolen and worsted yarn; Tin, chloride of tin, tin ore; Castor Oil, Paraffin wax; Copper iodide; Lubricants; Hides of cattle, buffaloes and horses; skins of calves, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for saddler, military boots, or military clothing; Ammonia and its salts whether simple or compound, ammonia liquor; Urea, analine and their compounds.44

In the declaration of war between Great Britain and Ottoman Turkey, the government of Bombay immediately visualized very farreaching ramifications with regard to their relations with the Muslim population in India. For the Muslims spread all over the Islamic domain, the Caliph of Turkey was not only temporal head but also their religious and spiritual head. Benjamin Guy Horniman, the maverick editor of the Bombay Chronicle, from the beginning of the Great War, showed an attitude of whole-hearted support for the Allied cause, until the bitter disappointment, which was in store for him as the struggle progressed. While supporting the cause unreservedly, the Chronicle did not resort to slavish adhesion to all the measures and actions of GOI, which marked and often besmirched their policy during the war, and went on to condemn the methods of oppression pursued in some quarters in the matter of recruitment and the raising of war funds. Furthermore, the Chronicle No. 3734-W, dated 10 April 1915, Legislations and Orders Relating to the War (Second Edition), Published by Government of India, 1915, British Library, L/ MIL/15/5/2380/1.

44

 38   Indians in the First World War

refused to be silent on the question of Turkey and the Khilafat. It took a strong line on the need for the British government to make it clear that there would be no attempt to interfere with or qualify the sovereignty of the Sultan. Horniman published in the Chronicle three articles of Kaikushroo Ardeschir, a person who had been lecturing in Egypt during the early days of the War and one who was well conversant with the affairs of European politics and had travelled through Europe, on the issue of Khalifat exposing duplicity of the British government. Kaikushroo was not a Muslim but a Parsee, but his articles provided incisive vision into the issue. One of those articles impressed upon the GOI the intensity of the feeling, which was being aroused among the Muslim community by the rumours emanating in British press denoting the transfer of Khilafat by the British to a new Mahommedan Potentate, either in Egypt or the Hedjaz. An attempt to set up such personage could never have been acquainted with the history of the Khilafat and the sentiments of Indian Muslims. Immediately after the publication of these articles, Horniman received summons from the PD Secretary, L. Robertson, that disclosed about Horniman having received a communique from GOI reprimanding the attitude of the editor of Chronicle on such a sensitive issue. A surprised Horniman shot back: ‘Mr. Robertson, my responsibility as an editor is my own affair, and do not propose to be instructed by you or the Government of India…’ Around the same time, the Chronicle also published some letters from Shaukat Ali on the treatment of Mohammedan pilgrims in the ships of Turner, Morrison and Company. The result of it was Messers Turner, Morrison and Co., of whom Wardlaw Milne was the then Head Director, filed a suit against Horniman and the Chronicle for a `150,000 damages. The case never came before the Court, owing to the intervention of another senior bureaucrat—Claude H. Hill, known for tactfulness—on behalf of the BG. Hill pointed out that, in the disturbed state of Mohammedan opinion, it would be very unfortunate a matter of this kind, which had to be fought out in the open. The effect of such a case against Turner, Morrison and Co., might create a suspicion and doubt in the minds of the Mohammedan community against the government and that too when in the serious situation created by War. Finally, a curtain was drawn through the mediation of Hill on this issue and an assurance was sought from Horniman

Declaration of War   39  

that he would not publish any more things about the Muslim pilgrims going to the Haj. This episode shows how the Government of Bombay and also Delhi were very sensitive about a private case as it would cast shadows on Muslim public opinion during the time of War. During 1915, not only was there the acute controversy regarding the meeting of Muslim League in Bombay, but the question of how Turkish Sultanate was going to be dealt with at the end of the War—assuming the Allies would be victorious—the question of the integrity of the Khilafat assumed critical proportion. Fearing that war with Turkey therefore might anger the Indian Muslims and that this could cause rupture among the Indian Muslims regarding their loyalty to the British crown, the BG came out with a statement by way of an unsolicited explanation that holy places and shrines of the Muslims will be immune from attack or molestation by the British naval and military forces. In a way, it was an attempt to placate the Indian Muslims so that they may not join the nationalist agitation. Accordingly, the British, French and Russian governments, who took active interest in the affairs of the ‘Sick Man of Europe’—the Ottoman Turkey, patronizingly gave assurances regarding their policy of non-interference with pilgrims from India to the holy places and shrines existing in Turkish Empire.45 To ensure loyalty of the millions of Indian Muslims to the British Crown, the BG solicited resolutions not only from several influential Muslims but also from the sundry Muslim organizations in remote villages spread all over the Presidency, condemning Turkey’s alliance with the Axis powers in the War.46 Thus, the BG sought the earliest opportunity to clarify their stand on what they considered a very sensitive issue, that their war against Turkey be not treated as confronting Islamic world, and hence evoked their unflinching loyalty.

45

MSA/PD/WAR/1914/9-W.

MSA/PD/WAR/1914/130-W. A few examples could be cited: Balsad, Mohammedan Sepoys, Bohras and Ghanchis of Godhra in Gujrat, Vijaydurg, Bankot, Ratnagiri, Guhagar Peth, Shirpur, Malwan in Konkan, Jamkhandi, villages Murgod, Ramdurg, Kudchi in Belgaum district, Dhule, Miraj, Sukkur, Karachi, West Khandesh, Khojas of Thana, and many others.

46

Theatres of War Indian Soldiers’ Participation

3

In the second half of the 19th century, the British government regarded India as what Lord Salisbury remarked in 1882 ‘Jewel of the Empire’ and was regarded by most of the British administrators as ‘an English barrack in the Oriental Seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them’.1 Indeed, India was an essential constituent in the British imperial system, from which its prestige, power and wealth stemmed from in large measure. In the last three decades of the 19th century, the fears of Russian invasion of India across the North-West Frontiers was much imagined by the authorities in London and in India as well. The only serious military commitment which the British planners admitted before the turn of the century was the possibility of meeting a Russian invasion of India across the North-West Frontier.2 This threat existed mostly in the minds of British generals. Britain and Russia came closest to war on the issue of Penjdeh incident in 1885, but even then the likelihood of a Russian expedition was hardly more than remote. Nevertheless, the threat of invasion was the principal rationale for the nature and size of the Army in India and this consideration precisely guided Lord Kitchener’s reforms of the Indian Army during his time as Commander-in-Chief between 1902 and 1909. Although the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 considerably reduced the burden of Imperial defence and consequently eased the pressure of Russian threat, the Indian military planners continued to treat Russian invasion as their main threat. 1

Lucas, The Empire at War, cited by Jeffery, ‘An English Barrack in the Oriental Seas’.

2

Vambery, ‘England and Russia in Asia’; and ‘Will Russia conquer India?’

Theatres of War   41  

Since armies need enemies to justify their existence, the Russian invasion and insecure North-West borders with its proximity to the Balkan area where Russia showed much interest in the second half of the 19th century served as the most potential threat for which Indian military force had to ready themselves. Thus, in 1913, nearly twothirds of the entire force was set aside to act as Field Army, namely out of a total 234,000 men, 152,000 served as Field Army. Another principal function of the military forces in India was internal security, which comprised of two parts: British units stationed temporarily in India on the ‘Cardwell’ system, and the Britishcommanded Indian Army. Before the Revolt of 1857, the proportion of British to Indian soldier had been almost one to nine, but following it no one had been prepared to risk continuing such a low ratio. With the introduction of reforms in the Indian army after the Revolt, the ratio was brought to one British soldier to two Indian soldiers, a ratio generally adhered to until the outbreak of the First World War. This ratio remained the central tenet of Indian military administration and a crude index of mistrust. But during the First World War, the demand for troops was so high that this ratio was dropped and Indian soldiers were drafted at will. It was to the extent that by November 1918, the ratio dropped to nine Indian soldiers to one British. After the war, all the same, the pre-war ratio was immediately restored. One of the important functions of the Indian army in India, as was perceived in London than in Delhi, was to have it as an imperial military reserve. India provided not only an immense reservoir of manpower but also acted as a cheap, convenient storehouse for a large British army contingent in India. Expenditure of more than 75,000 British troops was borne by the Indian taxpayer. This was a source of friction among the British authorities in London and Delhi for a long time even before the World War. Although it was a generally accepted convention that expeditions on the frontier or in Burma would be paid by the Indian establishment, the position was much less clear on the issue of deployment of Indian troops in Africa and China. The issue came for hot discussion among the authorities in London when Indian troops were despatched to reinforce British garrison in Malta in 1878. In 1882, after Gladstone’s government returned to power, Indian troops were deployed to supplement British forces in

 42   Indians in the First World War

Egypt. Finance was the bone of contention among the authorities in Britain and India, which was investigated by the Royal Commission in 1895 and by April 1902 a solution acceptable to both authorities was achieved. Accordingly, it was resolved that India should bear all primary financial responsibility for those geographical regions in which she had a direct and substantial interest. That included expenditure incurred on account of Egypt, Suez Canal, Persia and Afghanistan. Again, it was not until 1898 that Indian troops were first employed in colonial garrisons. By 1914, the Indian troops were regularly employed for garrisons in Egypt, the Indian Ocean, Hong Kong, Singapore and China. However, there were no financial quibbles when the empire went to war in August 1914. By October 1914, two Indian infantry divisions were fighting in Flanders in France, six battalions were sent to East Africa, a large force was despatched to Egypt and similarly a brigade was sent on ad hoc basis to defend British interests, especially the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s installations in Persia. During the First World War, Indian troops were massively engaged in Flanders in France-Belgium; in Mesopotamia (today’s Iraq), Suez, Persia and the Gulf region; in the Gallipoli in Greece; East Africa, and at many minor theatres of conflict. Indeed, eleven Indians were awarded the Victoria Cross in all these battlefields (see Figure 4.4 and Annexure 2)

The Western Front—The Flanders in France In spite of severity of the weather and their unfamiliar surroundings they behaved with great gallantry but suffered terrible losses in the trenches…. I had previously succeeded in obtaining the right of Indian soldiers to receive the Victoria Cross for bravery and they won two Victoria Crosses within their first month in France. Very few survived to return to India. It was curious that the two Gharwali battalions composed of men who must originally have been a cross strain between Rajputs and Ghurkas, and who were rather looked down upon in the Indian Army, fought the best. They earned the first Indian V.C. Only fifty men survived of the two battalions and they came to General Willcocks and asked that they might be allowed to return to India in order that their own people might know what they had done. The General supported the request, but it was refused by higher authority, who did not understand or sympathise with Indian sentiment…. —(Viceroy Lord Hardinge in My Indian Years (1910–1916))3 3

Hardinge, My Indian Years, 100.

Theatres of War   43  

For centuries, the lower basin of the river Rhine had been a zone of tension among the European powers and this was rekindled in the First World War. The London treaties of 1839 and 1867 had defined the boundaries of Belgium and Luxemburg, and had placed the two states’ neutrality under international guarantee. Hence, southern Belgium and the Grand Duchy became major producers of iron and steel, as well as coal and iron ore. Around them were established the French metallurgical complexes in the Nord and in Lorraine, and those of Germany in Westphalia. After the campaign of 1914, the countries were seen by France as an invasion corridor, which must in future be sealed off. It was German violation of British guarantee of Belgium’s neutrality that brought Britain and France to the threshold of war. Hence, it was here on borders of northern France and Belgium that the major trench war was fought between Germany and the Allies. The Allied forces fought the war in Western Front for 4 years and 3 months (August 1914–November 1918)—both sides locked into the infamous trench warfare. Permanent trenchline had been dug running from Nieuport, on the Belgium coast, all the way to the Swiss border, with the notorious Ypres Salient built in. What sort of trench warfare was that? This is adequately elaborated by Paul Fussell in his The Great War and the Modern Memory, first published in 1975. Fussell himself participated in the Second World War, which is known from his dedication of this book. But he gives a detailed account of the trenchline and the kind of life soldiers had to grope in endlessly. This also gives an idea of the monstrousness of the trench warfare in which the Indian soldiers were catapulted into. The description of the trenchline given by Fussell in 1975 finds confirmation in the novel written much before in 1939, by Mulk Raj Anand entitled Across the Black Waters, which truly portrays the psyche of the Indian soldiers fighting in the France—Flanders. The trench-line consisted of a series of parallel excavations running for 400 miles down through Belgium and France, roughly in the shape of an ‘S’ flattened at the sides and tipped to the left. From the North Sea Coast of Belgium, the line wandered southward, bulging out to contain Ypres,

 44   Indians in the First World War

then dropping down to protect Béthune, Arras and Albert. It continued south in front of Montidier…, and finally attached its southern-most end to the Swiss border at Beurnevisin, in Alsace. The top forty miles— the part of north of Ypres—was held by the Belgians; the next ninety miles, down to the river Ancre, were British; the French held the rest, to the south. The total length of the numerous trenches occupied by the British could be estimated to about 6,000 miles (see Figure 3.1). One finds 12,000 miles of trenches on the Allied side alone. The British part of the line was normally occupied by about 800 battalions of 1,000 men each. They were concentrated in the two main sectors of the British effort: the Ypres Salient in Flanders and the Somme area in Picardy. These two sectors had the appearance of two distinguishable worlds (see Figure 3.2). The Salient, at its largest point about 9 miles wide and projecting some 4 miles into German line, was notable for its terrors of concentrated, accurate artillery fire. Every part of it could be covered from three sides. The rear area at Ypres was the battered city itself, and by the end of the war Ypres was flattened to the ground.

Figure 3.1 Western Front - Flanders Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

Theatres of War   45   Germany and Europe in the First World War

Riga

SWEDEN IRELAND

DENMARK

Baltic Sea Königsberg

Copenhagen

North Sea Kiel

Od er

Brussels Liège BELGIUM

rne Ma

Western Front

GERMANY Frankfurt

Przemysl GALICIA

Freiburg Munich

SWITZERLAND

Danube

Vienna

AUSTRIA - HUNGARY

Milan

Marseilles

Western and Eastern Fronts as of November 1914 Central Powers and Associates N Entente Powers Neutral States Joined Entented Powers after 1914 Joined Central Powers after 1914 Front 0 100 200 Miles

Florence

SERBIA

ITALY* CORSICA SARDINIA

Rome

Adriatic Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Odessa

Budapest

Belgrade

SPAIN

Kiev

Cracow

LUXEMBOURG

Belfort

FRANCE Bordeaux

ine

Rh

ine Se

Paris

la Vistu

Lodz

Rhine

Verdun

Warsaw Brest-Litovsk

Berlin

Antwerp

Langemarck English Channel Ypres

Atlantic Ocean

Bremen

HOLLAND

London

RUSSIA

Hamburg

e Elb

BRITAIN

Minsk Eastern Front

Tannenberg

MONTENEGRO

ROMANIA*

Bucharest

Black

Danube

Sea

BULGARIA** Sofia

Constantinople ALBANIA GREECE*Dardanelles

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Figure 3.2 Western Front - Trench Lines

The sector of the Somme was known—at least until 1 July 1916— for its greater largeness of dimensions and security. German fire came generally from only one direction. But then there was the Somme mud, and with rains these trenches along Somme were freezingly cold. There were normally three lines of trenches: (a) The front-line trench was anywhere from 50 yards or so to a mile from its enemy counterpart; (b) Several hundred yards behind it was the support trenchline. And several hundred yards behind was the reserve line. There were three kinds of trenches: firing trenches; communication trenches, running roughly perpendicular to the line and connecting the three lines; and saps, shallow ditches thrust out into ‘No Man’s Land’, providing access to forward observation posts, listening posts, grenade-throwing posts, and machine gun positions. The end of a sap was usually not manned all the time: night was the favourite time for going out. A firing trench was supposed to be 6–8 feet deep and 4 or 5 feet wide. On the enemy side, a parapet of earth or sandbags rose about

 46   Indians in the First World War

2 or 3 feet above the ground. Into the sides of trenches were dug one- or two-man holes (‘funk-holes’) and there were deeper dugouts, reached by dirt-stairs, for use as command posts and officers’ quarters. On the enemy side of a trench was a fire-step 2 feet high on which the defenders were supposed to stand, firing and throwing grenades, when repelling attack. A well-built trench did not run straight for any distance, but a good trench zig-zagged. The floor of a proper trench was covered with wooden duckboards, beneath which sumps were a few feet deep designed to collect water. Moving along a trench thus involved a great deal of weaving and turning. The entanglement of barbed wire had to be positioned far enough out in front of the trench to keep the enemy from sneaking up to grenade-throwing distance. The British trenches were wet, cold, smelly and thoroughly squalid. Compared with the German works, they were decidedly amateur. In contrast, the German trenches, as the British discovered during the attack on the Somme, were deep, clean, elaborate and sometimes even comfortable. In the three lines of trenches, the main business of the soldier was to exercise self-control while being shelled. Flanders and Picardy have always been notorious for dampness. It is not the least of the ironies of the war for the British that their trenches should have been dug where the water table was the highest and the annual rainfall the most plentiful. The trenches were always wet and often flooded several feet deep in water. It was only in the beginning of 1917, thigh boots or waders were issued to the soldiers. Men were not the only living things in the line. They were accompanied by their lice, which the professional delousers (those who used a substance or device, which removed lice) in rest positions behind the lines could do little to eliminate. The famous rats also gave constant trouble. Dead horse and dead men—and parts of both—were sometimes not buried for months and often one could smell the frontline mile before you could see it. Incidentally, steel helmets were provided only at the end of 1915. The causes of civilian incomprehension were numerous. Few soldiers wrote the truth in the letters home for fear of causing needless uneasiness. If they did ever write the truth, it was excised (removed

Theatres of War   47  

or deleted) by company officers, who censored all outgoing mail. The proximity of the frontline with the civilians of Europe—England and France—brought the knowledge of trenchline to the general public. But for the Indians who were cut off by a long distance, postal letters were the only contact with the near and dear. But that too was officially proscribed by the censors, lest the knowledge of the monstrosity of the war could hamper the recruitment drive in India. Equally, since commission in the British Indian Army was denied to the Indians, the recruits were entirely from lower strata of society; only the medical personnel that were deployed in the theatres of war consisted of educated Indians. Yet, whatever little evidence of the soldiers’ letter has survived today was partly brought out by David Omissi in his work Indian Voices of the Great War—Soldiers’ Letters 1914–1918 and this small body of evidence gives much information about the perceptions of the fighting Indian soldiers in the Western Front. Most of the letters, which have survived ‘layers of filtration’ at various levels, belong to 1915–1916 and are from the soldiers fighting on the Western Front. It would be worthwhile to quote some of these letters that speak the mind of the soldiers. A soldier belonging to the Garhwal Rifles writes to his father, exasperatedly and without any hope of survival: It is hard to endure the bombs, father. It will be difficult for anyone to survive and come back safe and sound from the war. The son who is lucky will see his father and mother, otherwise who can do this. There is no confidence of survival. The bullets and cannon-balls come down like snow. The mud is up to a man’s middle. The distance between us and the enemy is fifty paces. Since I have been here the enemy has remained in the trenches and we in ours. Neither side has advanced at all….4

For the subaltern Punjabi Rajput soldier, it was something, which he could express in Indian mythological terms: ‘This is not a war. It is the ending of the World. This is just such a war as was related in the Mahabharata about our forefathers’5 (29 January 1915). Rifleman 4 A soldier belonging to 39th Garhwal Rifles writes to his father on 14 January 1915, sited by Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 27–28. 5

Ibid., Letter dated 29 January 1915.

 48   Indians in the First World War

Amar Singh Rawat of Garhwal Rifles gives a vivid expression of the gory side of the conflict (wrote on 26 March 1915): My fate is now very lucky, that I am alive while all my brethren have been killed. All those who have been wounded are saved and the rest are killed. Such a scene has been enacted as when the leaves fall off a tree and not a space is left bare on the ground, so here the earth is covered with dead men and there is no place to put one’s foot…. When we reached their (German) trenches we used the bayonet and the Kukri, and blood was shed so freely that we could not recognize each other’s faces; the whole ground was covered with blood. There were heaps of men’s head, and some soldiers were without legs, others had been cut in two, some without hands and others without eyes…. I have heard that Pandavas and the Kauravas had a great war, but their battle could not have been so great as this one.6

The same soldier wrote to his friend in Uttar Pradesh, India: The condition of affairs in the war is like leaves falling off a tree, and no empty space remains on the ground. So it is here: the earth is full of dead men and not a vacant spot is left. As many of the men get wounded they live—the rest are killed. One has to stay on top of corpses and even sleep on them, because not an empty place remains anywhere….7

A South Indian Muslim soldier writes from the hospital ship to his friend in India: The war is a calamity on three worlds and has caused me to cross the seas and live here. The cold is so great that it cannot be described. Snow falls day and night and covers the ground to a depth of two feet. We have not seen the Sun for four months. Thus we are sacrificed. I have neither sleep by night nor ease by day. In the world there could never have been such a war before, nor will there be again….8

Indeed, a Sikh soldier writing from a hospital in England mentions this conflict as ‘a devil’s war’. Allah Ditta, a Punjabi soldier, informs his father about the dehumanized nature of the war: ‘Here the people 6 Ibid., Letter dated 26 March 1915, 45. He concludes this letter by saying that, ‘In the time of calamity these four things are tried—faith, fortitude, friend and wife.’ 7

Ibid., Letter dated 1 April 1915, 45.

8

Ibid., Letter dated 9 February 1915, 35.

Theatres of War   49  

are being butchered as a butcher slaughters goat. The man who will return to his country, will be a man of exceptional fate’.9 Sowar Sohan Singh mentions in his letter survival was hope and death pervaded the battlefield, ‘Here thousands of lives have been sacrificed. Scratch the ground to a depth of one finger, and nothing but corpse will be visible’.10 Havaldar Ghufran Khan Afridi writes about another danger of the trenches: ‘Our people have many lice in their clothes, and they bite terribly. They are worse than a rifle bullet’.11 An example of how some Indian soldiers used Hindu mythological imagery expressions is found in the letter of a wounded Garhwali soldier: The fighting is of five kinds. First, there are the aeroplanes which move about dropping bombs and causing great havoc. They are like the great bird of Vishnu in the sky. The next is the battle of the cannon which is earth-splitting. Then there is fighting on the sea…. In the fighting with rifles the bullets fall fast like hail…. Nearly two thousand men have been killed. About four thousand have lost arms or legs and many have lost their sight…. Here an extraordinary amount of rain falls and the men’s feet become frost-bitten from the snow.12

The Germans used poisonous shells and asphyxiating gas during the trench warfare, which caused health hazards.13 Subedar Mir Dust of Pathan 55th Coke Rifles, who had won VC for exceptional gallantry wrote: I am in England. I have been twice wounded, once in the left hand, of which two fingers are powerless. The other is from gas…. I have got the Victoria Cross. The Victoria Cross is a very fine thing, but this gas gives me no rest. It has done for me.14

9

Ibid., Letter dated 23 April 1915, from the Flanders.

10

Ibid., 10 July 1915, 76.

11

Ibid., Letter dated mid-April 1915, 55.

12

Ibid., 12 June 1915, 36.

13

Ibid., Letter of Jaginal Singh from Bournemouth Hospital, dated 7 June 1915.

Ibid., Letter of Subedar Mir Dust, VC, dated 12 July 1915, 77. The use of such gas is also mentioned in the letter of a wounded soldier Subedar Khan who wrote from Pavilion Hospital, on 6 July 1915, 76.

14

 50   Indians in the First World War

As much as the European soldiers and also the politicians who predicted a short war, nobody even slightly imagined the protracted nature of the conflict and as the days went by, war weariness crept not only into European soldiers but also the Indian soldiers fighting in the Western Front. It seems the soldiers had no idea of the kind of thing to come in 1914, but gradually they realized the unending nature of the life and death situation. Hence, they, similar to the European soldiers, started finding ways of using different methods of malingering to avoid the trench duty, which is evident from some of the letters.15 However, the wounded soldiers were sent back again and again to the trenches once they were fairly recovered. Since enthusiasm among the uneducated Indians to visit Europe and the monetary considerations were primary motives of joining the British Expeditionary Force, most of the recruits could not and did not imagine what was in store for them. Therefore, what is interestingly observed in these letters is that the soldiers on the battle front are frantically urging to their kith and kin in India not to enlist in the Army.16 This was the experience of all soldiers—White and Brown or Black; English, French, Belgian, German, Austrian, Indian or belonging to every nationality. The hideous and frightful nature of this trench warfare could reach the civilian European society much faster because of the proximity and the soldiers/officers writing to their near and dear at home. But the case of Indian soldiers was different in many ways, as censorship at various levels filtered the contents and the British colonial masters did not permit any information of battlefield to reach the far-off Indian natives under the pretext of vital information.

Ibid., Letter of Mohammed Gaki Khan dated 6 June 1915. There are many letters of this kind, 67.

15

16 Ibid., A Wounded Sikh soldier from a Hospital in England, 14 February 1915; Letter of Havaldar Abdur Rehman dated 20 May 1915, 61; Letter of Naik Main Ram Jat from Kitchener Hospital, dated 9 June 1915, 69; Letter of Asim Khan from Brighton Hospital, dated 19 March 1915, 44, to cite a few.

Theatres of War   51  

The Mesopotamian Campaign: Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ Before one writes about this theatre of war, it would be interesting to understand the British political interests, which provide a background spectacle, to understand why the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ had to fight so intensely. The political situation in Baghdad and Mesopotamia is intimately connected with that in the Persian Gulf. At the end of the 19th century, the British occupied a paramount position at Baghdad and held practically a monopoly of the navigation of the Tigris. Almost the whole of the trade of these regions was in British hands. In 1910, 87 per cent of the trade of the Persian Gulf was still British. In the beginning of 1900, first rumours arose regarding the prospect of constructing the Baghdad railway project. It was then reported that the German promoters would directly negotiate with the Sultan for a concession of land in Kuwait harbour to use as a terminus, without regard to the Shaikh. Such developments alerted the British in safeguarding their interests, with the advent to power of the Young Turkish Party in the Persian Gulf since 1908, which was markedly inimical to the British interests disturbed the situation. Although, in 1901, the Turkish government had agreed to recognize the status quo in the Persian Gulf, it now proceeded to intrigue with the Shaikh of Kuwait and tried by many offers to induce him to accept Turkish nationality. These intrigues coincided with the efforts of Germany to strengthen her commercial position in the Persian Gulf. The Turks seized every pretext to pick a quarrel with the British. The defeat of Turkey in the Balkan War of 1912 greatly changed the political situation, for the rise of a strong Balkan hegemony whilst it weakened Turkey in Europe. This also had the effect of denying to Germany the direct road to Constantinople and Turkey in Asia. Turkey’s defeat in the Balkans led to widespread lawlessness and it was rumoured that the outbreaks were engineered by the Russians. Anti-Turkish disturbances in Basra continued till March 1914 though there was no serious uprising.

 52   Indians in the First World War

The execution of a part of Sir William Willcocks’ irrigation scheme for Mesopotamia was now entrusted to Sir John Jackson and Company. The first section of this scheme, namely, the construction of the Hindiyah barrage, was complete in December 1913. When war broke out in 1914, the British and Turkish governments were on the point of signing an agreement settling all the disputed points regarding the status of Kuwait, the Baghdad Railway and Navigation of the Shatt-al-‘Arab. As important as the political situation then prevailing, it would be apt to know the geographical conditions of Mesopotamia to understand the difficulties undergone by the British expeditionary force ‘D’ in that theatre of war. Mesopotamia as a whole was the lowland portion of the basin of the ancient Asiatic rivers, Euphrates and Tigris, in contradiction to the Armenian and Kurdistan hill country, which formed the high-lying portion of the basin. Mesopotamia itself was again subdivided into upper and lower parts (see Figure 3.3). The upper part, namely, Al Jazirah (the island between two rivers) extending south as far as Baghdad, and the lower Mesopotamia formed Iraqi-’Arabi continuing to the Persian Gulf. The eastern boundary was the Turko-Persian frontier and on the western side was the Arabian tableland, rising very gradually from the lowland controlled by various independent and semi-independent Arab tribes and chieftains. Actually, nowhere is the Mesopotamian land more than 100 feet above sea level. The main features of the region are the two rivers, Euphrates and Tigris, which approach fairly close to one another in Baghdad, and then turn apart to unite finally at a place near Qurnah. From Qurnah downwards, the stream is known as the Shatt-al-’Arab. Between Baghdad and Qurnah, the main streams are connected by several channels and intermittent watercourses. Around Qurnah and between Amarah, there are extensive marshes, but below Qurnah traverses a flat and fertile plain, which is covered with artificially irrigated meadowlands. At Muhammareh (Persian territory), 40 miles above its mouth and 20 miles below Basra, the Shatt-al-’Arab is joined by Karun from Persia, and here properly begins the delta, of which one arm is navigable. For 6 months in a year, this delta is converted into a swampy district, through the melting of the snows in the Caucasus mountains and occasionally by the action of the autumn rains. The

Theatres of War   53  

Bosphorus (Istanbul Bogazi)

Cau

Black Sea

casu

Constantinople (Istanbul)

Gallipoli

Anatolia

Trebizond (Trabzon)

Asia Minor (Turkey)

Smyrna (Izinir)

Sarikamesh (Sarikamis)

s

Transcaucasia Armenia

Erzerum

Bitlis Adana

Van Mosul Rive

Cilicla

Persia (Iran)

ris r Tig

Syria

Cyprus

Rive

r Eup

Mediterranean Sea Palestine

Jerusalem Azrae

Sinai Desert

hraie Baghdad s Ctesiphon Kut-al-Amara Mesopotamia Hanna Dujaila (Iraq)

Amara Kurna

Jordan

Egypt Red Sea

Basra Abadan

(Saudi) Arabia

Persian Gulf

Figure 3.3 Mesopotamian Theatre of War

Shatt-al-’Arab is the river formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates above Basra, and flowing into the Persian Gulf at its northwestern extremity. It is navigable as far as Basra by any vessels, which are of moderate height and weight.

The Physical and Climatic Difficulties of the Mesopotamian Theatre of War17 Iraq is a vast plain of alluvial clay unrelieved by a single range, hill or natural eminence of slightest importance; it is low-lying area throughout, even Baghdad—560 miles from Fao—is only 112 feet above sea level. 17 The climatic conditions and the traumatic experiences undergone by the British Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ have been recorded by the British Indian Army in a ‘confidential’ dossier prepared by them 1917, for the information of its forces. This is a most valuable information and has not been used by almost all writing on the Mesopotamian campaign. Field Notes, Mesopotamia, 55–62.

 54   Indians in the First World War

Along the western border of Iraq, the sterile Arabian desert comes close to the Euphrates, which has no right-bank effluents and, therefore, at no time provides water for either wells or streams that might be an aid to military operations in the desert country. On the eastern border, the plain stretches away to the Persian Mountains, which follow roughly a line running parallel to the left bank of Tigris. Between these boundaries so defined lies a country difficult to describe in detail, because it is rarely the same for more than a few weeks together. It is an area of marsh and desert, of river and lake, where a rise of the water level amounting to only a foot or so will alter the whole face of the land and convert into a huge expanse of open water, or into an impassable morass, what was an arid desert only a few days before. A fall of water will almost equally quickly lay bare scores of square miles of thick brown mud that only needs time to dry to become capable of supporting most military traffic. But when the water recedes, it generally does so wholesale, leaving behind not even so much as a solitary pool for troops to draw upon; where it remains, it is held in brackish marshes and is probably unfit for human consumption. Nor does rain elevate matters; in fact, it makes them rather worse. The average annual rainfall is only 6.43 inches, of which not less than 5 inches are, as a rule, distributed over the period from the beginning of November to the end of March. The amount of rain in those 5 months is little enough, but it is the nature of the fall rather than its sparseness that causes the trouble. In Mesopotamia, slow and steady rain is almost unknown. The storms are frequently of great violence and accompanied by hail and strong gales; occasionally they continue into April and they were particularly bad during April 1916. They come with remarkable suddenness and may bring all troop movements to a dead stop in a few minutes. They do not, as a rule, last long and the worst recorded at Basrah in March 1916, only lasted about half an hour in that time; however, it did a good deal of damage. The so-called ‘flood season’ has little or nothing to do with the rains and owes it being almost entirely to the melting of the winter snow in the Causasus and in the Highlands of Asia Minor hundreds of miles away. The rivers commence to rise early in January and reach their high level at the end of March. April and May are the principal months

Theatres of War   55  

for floods, which begin to subside early in June and are generally over by the end of July. The period of lowest water is in the months of September and October. The rivers are kept within their banks only by means of marginal dams, or ‘bunds’, constructed almost throughout their length from the headwaters to the Persian Gulf. These ‘bunds’ are composed of loose earth just heaped up at the edge of the river, and they are generally less than 6 feet broad and only 3 or 4 feet high. When one goes up the rivers during the floods and observes that the surface of the water on which the steamer floats is a foot or two above the level or the surrounding country, the importance of the bund and its apparent unsuitability for its work is strongly felt. However, in war time, the bunds are of even more vital importance, while whole tracts of country may be rendered untenable. It is a curious fact that nearly all the watercourses connected with the rivers are distributaries and not tributaries. How does the direction and force of the wind affect the troops’ position then? The actual position of lakes are occasionally greatly affected by the direction and force of the wind. Certain lakes were observed to be extending on one side or contract on the other for as much as 1 or 2 miles when a strong wind from the North has succeeded a strong wind from the South. These changes do not take place gradually either. Troops may encamp at night on good dry ground with little or no water in sight and yet find by daybreak that a broken bund, a shifting lake, or the effects of seepage have made it impossible to stir from the camp, which may itself be under water. Indeed, so great is the risk of unpleasant surprises, and so deep is the mud at times, that causeways come miles in length have sometimes to be built. Along with them, troops, guns and transport move in the direction required, and when they reach their journey’s end, the camps they occupy, or the trenches they man, must often be reasonably sure of not being flooded out before the morning. As much as the physical condition of the Mesopotamian terrain, the temperature equally played a crucial role. In Basra, the maximum shade temperature recorded in the year 1915 was 115°F, while in 1916, the highest temperature recorded was 112.2°F. The minimum

 56   Indians in the First World War

temperature in Basra for 1915 was 36°C and for 1916 it stood at 32°C. What it shows is that the climate of Iraq is one of extremes. The hot weather begins in May and ends about the beginning of October, the hottest months being June to September, both inclusive. In November, the weather is cool, and in December to February, it is decidedly cold, especially upstream, where the temperature not unfrequently falls below freezing point. March through April are warm and unsettled, with occasional thunder and dust storms. Lack of trees means lack of wood, including firewood, and has to be imported from India and elsewhere. To the lack of wood must be added absence of stone, which has therefore also to be imported. There are consequently no metalled roads in the country beyond those made by Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ and all houses were of little benefit to the Army, because they were rarely at the places where they were most wanted. Hence, majority of them were most unsuitable as billets. Before the British came to Iraq, the open street was the public latrine of the lower orders. That also became a great issue of concern for the Indian Expeditionary forces, as lack of sanitation compounded the medical problems faced by the troops.18 Since the Mesopotamian campaign was carried out by the British Indian Army at Simla and expenditure debited to the Indian exchequer, one of the major problems faced by the Indian government then was the fight against the Muslim Turks and the Sultan who was also a Khalifa, a temporal and spiritual head of the Muslim world. The Indian Army think-tank realized this only when some of the Battalions refused to go to Mesopotamian war. In January 1915, three Pathan companies of the 130th Baluchis refused to embark at Rangoon when they learnt that they were destined for Mesopotamia. Consequently, Subedar Major Sultan Mir was court-martialled and dismissed, and all 90 Afridi rebellious soldiers were arrested and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for desertion. In March 1915, The Mesopotamian casualty figures as described in ‘Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire’ are: 11,012 Killed; 3,985 died of wounds; 12,678 died of sickness and diseases; 13,492 missing and prisoners; 51,836 wounded and disabled. These figures, as mentioned in the records available in London, are quoted by Ansari, ‘The Bombay Presidency’s’. 18

Theatres of War   57  

Sher Khan of 127th Baluchis was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment, Wazir Naik received 5 years’ and Alla Mir Jemadar was courtmartialled and dismissed.19 The Indian Army Command thereafter had to hold back Muslim soldiers for other theatres of war and had to deploy only non-Muslims in Mesopotamia.

Gallipoli Campaign and Indian Soldiers This was one of the worst theatres of war where the Indian combatant and non-combatant forces were deployed. It was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the War (see Figure 3.4). Allied troops landed there in April 1915 and spent some months on the small peninsula

Figure 3.4 Gallipoli, Salonika and Dardanelles 19 Letter of Bahadur Sher to Lance Naik Badshah Mir (129th Baluchi, March 1915, cited in Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War, 38.

 58   Indians in the First World War

Suvia Bay

Ari Burnu Lone Pine Gaba Tepe Maidos (Eceabat)

Aegean Sea

Gallipoli peninsula Dardanelles

CAPE HELLES V Beach

W Beach

Figure 3.5 Gallipoli Campaign

of land guarding the Dardanelles Straits. This campaign was planned in London with the belief that, the occupation of Constantinople (now called Istanbul) would have paralysed Turkey as an ally of the Central Powers; it would block their path to the Middle East and thus avert danger to Egypt, the Persian Guld and India; it would have secured the neutrality, if not active cooperation of the Balkan States, and especially of Bulgaria…. The subsidiary and more immediate consequences of success in the Dardanelles, such as the supply of munitions to Russia, and of Ukranian wheat to our Allies, were also to be considered.20

The Gallipoli campaign (25 April 1915 to 9 January 1916) was a land-based element of a strategy intended to allow Allied ships to pass through the Dardanelles, capture Constantinople and ultimately knock down Ottoman Empire out of the war. But Allied plans were based on the mistaken belief that the Ottomans could be easily overcome. The 20

Nevinson, The Dardanelles Campaign.

Theatres of War   59  

Figure 3.6 Indian Soldiers in Gallipoli Source: German Consulate, Mumbai. Reproduced with permission. Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

Dardanelles, a narrow 60-mile strip of water that divides Europe from Asia, has been a great strategic significance for centuries. Carefully secured by international treaty, it was closing of the Dardanelles that eventually brought the Ottoman Empire into the war at the end of 1914. At dawn on 25 April 1915, Allied troops landed on the Gallipoli peninsula in Ottoman Turkey. Gen Sir Ian Hamilton decided to make two landings, placing the British 29th Division at Cape Helles and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corp (ANZAC) north of Gaba Tepe in an area later dubbed Anzac Cove (see Figure 3.6). Both landings were quickly restricted by determined Ottoman troops and neither the British nor the Anzacs were able to advance. Trench warfare quickly took hold, mirroring the fighting of the Western Front. Casualties mounted heavily and, in the summer, heat conditions rapidly deteriorated. Sickness was rampant, food quickly became inedible and there were vast swarms of black corpse flies. In August, a new assault was launched of north of Anzac Cove. This attack, along with the fresh landing at Suvla Bay, quickly failed and stalemate returned. The military aim was not achieved and it was eventually called to a halt; the final Allied troops were evacuated in January 1916.

 60   Indians in the First World War

In this campaign, the 14th Sikh regiment (as part of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade) was virtually wiped out, losing 379 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and men in one day’s fighting on 4 June 1915. Nearly 16,000 Indian troops (see Figure 3.5) fought alongside the Anzac (Australian and New Zealand—Maori) troops and also French Senegalese troops. Besides these, 3,000 non-combatants were drafted as Indian Labour Corp (ILC).21 There were heavy casualties, not only from the fighting, but from the extremely unsanitary conditions. Of the estimated 213,000 British casualties, 145,000 were from illness. The terrible problems were caused mainly due to intense heat, swarms of flies, body lice, severe lack of water and insufficient supplies. The hot climate, putrefying bodies and sanitary conditions led to huge swarms of flies at Gallipoli, which made life almost unbearable. The flies plagued them all the time, covering any food they opened and making it impossible to eat anything without swallowing some of the insects with it. Gallipoli had extremes of weather. During the summer months, it was blistering hot, which helped the spread of disease and flies, and also made the men’s tiny water rations feel even more adequate. But the temperature could also plummet, and in autumn and winter of 1915, the troops were shivering in their light uniform. Large numbers suffered from trench foot and frostbite. Torrential rain hit the peninsula in November, which flooded the trenches, (see Figure 3.7) broke down the parapets and soaked the men. The high casualty rates of the campaign—coupled with the risk of being shot by snipers if any attempt was made to bring in the dead form out in the open—meant that putrefying corpses were common. These only added to the unhealthy conditions, providing places for flies and disease to thrive. One of the worst problems of disease the troops suffered was dysentery. The small Gallipoli peninsula terrain was inhospitable, characterized by rocky ground with little vegetation and hilly land with steep ravines. Complex trench system developed as the situation descended into an uneasy seize-like state (see Figure 3.8). British Library, (Formerly India Office Library), L/MIL/17/5/2390. The information in this file is recorded by the end of 1969.

21

Theatres of War   61  

Figure 3.7 Indian Soldiers in Trenches during Gallipoli Campaign Source: German Consulate, Mumbai. Reproduced with permission.

Figure 3.8 Indian Soldiers Wearing Gas Masks in Trenches in Gallipoli Source: German Consulate, Mumbai. Reproduced with permission.

 62   Indians in the First World War

The Gallipoli campaign was a disaster for Britain. Most of the historians of the First World War have mentioned about the MC that outlined failure on a major scale but hardly anyone has made reference to the Dardanelles Commission22 constituted by the British Parliament in early 1916, to investigate failure of this campaign. The Report expressed: (a) that conditions of military attack should have been studied before as the difficulties of the operations were much underestimated; (b) that the planning was done on the baseless assumption that the resistance would be slight and advance rapidly and that the Turks would be defensive; (c) that there was no supply of forces with the necessary drafts, gun ammunition, high explosives and other modern appliances of war; and finally, (d) the indecision of the policymakers as well as the top military brass in carrying out this operation. The sum and substance of this Report drives home the basic point that the British politicians and policymakers’ indecision was very decisive not only in this failure, but also in all other theatres of war, though they always were engaged in shifting the blame game. In 1918, the British government published ‘Report on the Statement of British Prisoners of War in Turkey’ that gives the following disturbing information: ‘According to this Report, 16,583 British and Indian officers and men were taken as prisoners by Turkey during the War. Their welfare and the conditions in which they were kept were of great concern to the British and Indian Governments’.23 This campaign had two important ramifications: (a) for the Ottomans, it was a brief respite in the decline of their empire, and (b) through the The members of this Dardanelles Commission were Sir William Pickford [Chairman]; Earl of Cromer [died in 1917]; Andrew Fisher, former Prime Minister of Australia; Thomas Mackenzie, former Prime Minister of New Zealand; Sir Frederick Cowley; Lord Clyde, Privy Councilor, Stephen Gwynn, Member of Parliament (MP); Walter Roch, MP; Admiral Sir William May; Field Marshal Lord Nicholson. The Commission in its report published in 1919 enumerated in detail the causes of the failure of the campaign and censured by name a number of military officials, most notably Gen Sir Ian Hamilton. Also, Winston Churchill has been largely blamed for the failure of the British forces during the campaign.

22

Report on the Statement of British Prisoners of War in Turkey, published by His Majesty, 1918, Miscellaneous No. 24 (1918).

23

Theatres of War   63  

emergence of Mustafa Kemal as one of the campaign’s leading figures, it also led to the foundation of Modern Turkey.

The War in German East Africa The East African campaign was one of the subsidiary campaigns during the First World War but, for Indian Army, it was one of the important theatres of war since the responsibility of this campaign laid directly with the Indian Army. German East Africa (see Figure 3.9) not Caravan route G

German offices

© StampWorldHistory  1891

Local issues

Kisumu

BRITISH EAST AFRICA

UGANDA Lake Victoria

BELGIAN CONGO

RU ANDA UR UNDI

Nairobi Indian Expedititonary Force

GERMAN EAST AFRICA Ujiji Tabora Lake Tanganyika

Lamu

G

Mombasa Wuga Tanga Pangani Bagamoyo

ZANZIBAR Zanzibar G

Morogoro German East Africa

Dar es Salaam MAFIA

Protectorate 1885

NYASALAND

Lake Nyasa

NORTHERN RHODESIA

Taveta

Witu Kipini

British occupation issues/Nyasaland Force

Figure 3.9 German East Africa

INDIAN OCEAN

German East Africa Leased territory 1890 

MOZAMBIQUE

GERMAN EAST AFRICA Belgian occupation issues British occupation issues

Kilwa

KIONGA

0

150 Kilometers

MAFIA KIONGA

British occupation issues/Mafia Protuguese occupation issues

300

 64   Indians in the First World War

only cut off the vital lines of British communication from the Cape to Cairo in Egypt but also provided Germany with a naval base from where German ships could operate in the Indian Ocean and threaten British navy. The importance of this campaign in terms of trade with African colonies is succinctly brought out by Colonel Patrick Cadell, the Secretary of the BG: The danger, however, of leaving German East Africa as a base for commerce destroyers, as well as a threat to British interests in Africa, became manifest, and the Home Government called upon the Viceroy to provide a force of 8,000 men, with the ultimate aim of conquering German East Africa.24

From the German point of view, retaining this colony brought her close to challenging British commercial interest on the Arabian Sea. Hence, Indian government was asked to despatch its units in the beginning of August 1914. The primary object of the expedition was the capture of Tanga, an important port in dangerous proximity both to Zanzibar and Mombasa, and the terminus of the German Northern Railway. In this campaign, 17,525 Indian troops participated, who belonged to those units, which were not considered fit enough to fight in the European theatre of war. These units also included the Imperial Service Troops, which were not considered as good as the regular units of the Indian Army. The Indian force in East Africa was known as the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’. They were later joined by two local units—King’s African Rifles and some British units. After March 1916, a South African Force consisting about 18,700 troops joined the campaign along with Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’.25 The reason for sending such ill-trained force, which was not equipped with modern weapons of war, by the Indian Army think-tank was because they grossly ignored as well as underestimated the quality of hostile opponent troops. The first major battle between the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’ and the German troops took place at Tanga in November 1914. The Indian force was commanded by Maj Gen Aitken who was not familiar 24

Cadell, History of the Bombay, 276.

25

Pradhan, ‘Indians in the East African Campaign’.

Theatres of War   65  

with the local conditions. The German force, which was only 1,200 as compared to the British Indian army, was commanded by von Lettow Vorbeck, who was well acquainted with the local conditions and was also an able commander. Despite the numerical difference in the respective armies, the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’ was defeated, due to many reasons such as lack of cohesiveness among its forces, weariness and travel fatigue, and lack of preparedness before being deployed for military operations. Cadell succinctly summarizes the episode: Following the failure at Tanga, the British position throughout 1915 was precarious. The railway on which the communications with Nairobi and Uganda depended lay close to the German frontier and vulnerable at many points. The Germans were then superior in numbers as well as in training and equipment. They accomplished very little, however, they occupied Tanga on the British side of the frontier. The campaign was maintained by Von Lettow with a determination that deserved all credit. His inferiority in numbers and ultimately in equipment was largely counterbalanced by the fact that his Europeans were hardy veterans inured to the climate, while his Askaris were natives of the country carefully trained and of good fighting quality. They fought on interior lines with the advantage of mobility, while the forces opposed to him were composed of men of many races, who suffered severely from sickness and were depended on long lines of supply. Von Lettow recognizes that ‘regiments like the 129th Baluchis which fought in Flanders were without a doubt very good’, but adds that they could not be expected to stand the fatigues of African warfare for a prolonged period, and were filled with young soldiers. The European regiments from South Africa were of varying quality and suffered greatly from sickness, while the native African troops were new and required considerable training. Von Lettow was greatly assisted in this stubborn resistance by three considerations, the dense bush which favoured the side that was generally on the defensive, and could prepare its position; the black cotton soil which impeded all movements after rain; and the climate. The amount of sickness among the British troops was vastly increased by the impossibility of keeping the men properly fed….26

After this disaster at Tanga, the British Indian force maintained a defensive position until the arrival of the South African troops in March 1916, under the command of Lt Gen J. C. Smuts. Even Maj 26

Cadell, History of the Bombay, 280–82.

 66   Indians in the First World War

Gen Aitken was replaced by Maj Gen Wapshare. By that time, even the Indian Expeditionary Force became well acquainted with the terrain and showed great resilience. In making military advances, Gen Smuts also had not only to come to terms with climatic conditions but also to undertake repairs of roads, rail-lines and bridges. It was only in November 1918 that German forces could be pushed back and were eventually forced to surrender on 25 November 1918. In Sir Patrick Cadell’s words, The successful result of the campaign, in spite of early setbacks and natural difficulties perhaps greater than in any other theatre of the war, may be claimed to have been largely contributed by the four Bombay regiments engaged in it. Mention may perhaps also be made of the Maxim-gun Company supplied by the European Volunteer Corps in India to which the Bombay Volunteer Rifles contributed the bulk of the men, as well as its commanding officer, Captain F.H. James. This company saw much service and suffered a large proportion of casualties, both from wounds and from disease.27

In this campaign, the Indians of the Mountain Batteries and the engineering unit of the Indian Army played a vital role in the final outcome of the campaign. Although the Indian forces lacked uniformity in training and were very badly equipped with modern weapons as compared to the Germans, more casualties occurred because of the tropical diseases common in East Africa than in actual battle. In this regard, how the Indian Medical units played a significant role is described by an Indian doctor Dr Limaye in his war memoirs, who was himself a member of the Indian Medical Unit.28 Significantly, Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India during that turbulent period of the Great War, made incisive comments in his reminiscences about the East African campaign: I will try to recall the most salient features of India’s effort during the twenty months of war which included the concluding period of my Viceroyalty…. In September (1914) a mixed Indian division was sent to 27

Ibid., 285.

28

Limaye, Sainyatil Athavani.

Theatres of War   67  

East Africa. This expedition was an unfortunate affair in which India held no responsibility…. I did what I was told but expressed my disapproval of expeditions managed abroad by Government Department at home, with my knowledge of the failure of such expeditions when run by Foreign Office in past in Nigeria, Somaliland etc., and gave my opinion that it was a mistake to fritter away one’s efforts in side-shows…. One Indian regiment, especially selected by General Sir Edmond Barrow, ran away at the first shot into the sea, throwing away their arms and accoutrements and swimming for the transports. This happened to be one of the regiments that I regarded as worthless and wished to abolish but failed to do so owing to the obstruction of O’Moore Creagh, then Commander-in-Chief.29

Viceroy’s words explain how untrained Indians were thrown into the vortex of a war in an unknown terrain.

Afghanistan: The Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 The land route from Europe to India and the Indian Ocean is guarded by a natural land fortress, Afghanistan. German schemes for the conquest of Central Asia date back to the First World War. A German mission had made its way to Kabul in Afghanistan in 1916. Its leader was Wilhelm von Hentig, who later became the chief of the oriental section of the Nazi foreign policy. The purpose of this mission was to incite the predominantly Moslem Afghans to join the war and create a diversion in Britain’s backyard, namely, the North-West Frontier province (NWFP) of India. The advance of German troops to the Don river and the Crimea in 1917 appeared to justify vastly more ambitious schemes. However, the plan for a campaign in Central Asia, like so many audacious projects hatched by the German military leadership in the First World War, was shelved but not scraped. Afghanistan is the gateway to India and did hold the key position along the only highways of war afforded by the geography of SouthWestern Asia. The Hindukush, consisting of many ranges, forms the basic topography. Its relatively low passes provide the easiest access to India locked in by the deserts of Baluchistan. Because of its central position astride the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan has always 29

Hardinge, My Indian Years, 101.

 68   Indians in the First World War

played an important role in the long military history of Asia since the days of Alexander and 1,500 years later Genghiz Khan. Afghanistan—though the essential passage land of Central Asia—is the communication officer’s nightmare. Barren wastelands alternate with snow-capped mountain ranges and intense summer heat with severe winter cold. Improvement in world communications and the shift of the centres of political power in the course of last two centuries have deprived Afghanistan of its old strategic importance. From the 1840s onward, Britain and later Czarist Russia were engaged in military operations against the so-called ‘unruly’ Afghans. In the 19th century, the British Indian colonial administration fought two Afghan wars—the first during the time of Lord Ellenborough and the second during Lord Lytton’s Viceroyalty, but without much success. Though the British troops repeatedly stormed Kabul and Kandahar, the tribesmen proved themselves master of guerrilla warfare and inflicted heavy losses on their European invaders. It was against such a background that the third Anglo-Afghan War was fought during 1919–1921, more so as an extension of First World War hostilities.30

30

Strausz-Hupe, ‘The Anglo-Afghan War’.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards

4

I The First World War not only caused a change in the imperial policy of recruitment but more importantly brought into scrutiny the very nature and purpose of Indian Army—its composition, administration and function. Therefore, a closer look at pre-war situation, though brief, is necessary to throw light on Indian Army’s preparedness for overseas engagements. And, once the war escalated the situation, demand for more and more ‘Indian’ recruits was pressed hard. In societies with caste and caste-like social system, the problems of the social implications of military organization become even more complex. Different patterns of recruitment have very different social, political and ideological implications. With regard to recruitment to British Indian armed forces, it would be worthwhile to trace the mischief caused by the colonial military policymakers who, in the post-1857 revolt, formulated lists of characteristics, which allegedly separated one community from another, for the purpose of identifying so-called ‘martial races’ from which Indian soldiers could be recruited.1 While reorganizing the Indian army in the post-1857 revolt, the Jonathan Peel Commission had the task of identifying social groups and regions from which ‘loyal’ soldiers could be recruited. The principle it emphasized was that the native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes and mixed promiscuously through each regiment.2 Recruiting of soldiers was seen more in terms of Farooqui, ‘Divide and Rule?’ This article gives an excellent analysis of how the concept of ‘martial races’ was brought into the Indian army recruiting pattern.

1

2

Ibid., 50.

 70   Indians in the First World War

the communities to which they belonged rather than as individuals. Caste, religion and ethnicity or race became more crucial while enlisting a soldier. Greater Punjab now became a major catchment area for the Bengal Army. By late 1870s, the Bombay Army and Madras Army began to be looked upon as being definitely inferior to the Bengal Army. The Commission set up in 1879, under the chairmanship of Ashley Eden, reconfirmed the policy enunciated by the Peel Commission. During the 1880s, a novel doctrine was spelt out, which divided Indian society into two broad categories, namely, martial and non-martial. The term ‘race’ was used in the sense of a well-defined group that had several common physical features. Courage was not considered an aspect of individual’s personality, but a racial quality. If one belonged to a community that was ‘racially’ brave, only then could one be courageous.3 Accordingly, most of the ‘martial races’ were concentrated in the north- western corner of the Indian empire mainly Sikhs, Pathans, Baluchis and some selected Muslim communities, besides Gurkhas and Dogras. The quality of being martial declined as recruitment moved from among the southerners and others from western and eastern India. When political systems are engaged in warfare, they tend to draw more heavily from low classes4 and low castes for manpower according to the intensity and duration of conflict. War may provide a great, albeit unintended, opportunity for social mobility for such groups, although with the onset of peace such opportunities rapidly fade way. This cyclical pattern characterized recruitment in India both before and after the creation of the modern Indian Army.5 Pre-British peace-time Indian military establishments were dominated by aristocratic warrior elites; when a campaign was undertaken, the peasantry volunteered or was conscripted for the 3

Ibid., 53.

The term ‘class’ is used in the same sense as was used by the British. It was considered synonymous with clan, caste, race and religion, and comprised the unit of recruitment. Thus, Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Deccan Muslims, Marathas and so on were all classes.

4

5

Cohen, ‘The Untouchable Soldier’.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   71  

duration of the conflict only. In Bombay Presidency (Maharashtra), something different evolved due to the Maratha6 rule—the royal phase under Chhatrapati Shivaji and later under the Peshwas, since the 17th century. The military formation was diluted by bringing non-kshatriyas into the fighting force, which included both the lower castes and peasantry, as well as the high-caste Brahmins. This system prevailed until the collapse of Peshwa rule and the beginning of the British rule in Maharashtra in 1818. In the years before the Revolt of 1857, the Mahars of Western India were probably the most heavily recruited section of the British Army. The British also recruited at various times: Bhils, Santals, Mhairs, Moplas, Ahirs, Minas, Christians, Kolis and other scheduled castes and tribes.7 After the Revolt, the Army was reorganized. The Chamar recruitment from the Bengal Army was substantially reduced and were replaced by another untouchable caste, the Mazbhi Sikhs,8 a change which reflected the growing Punjabization of the Indian Army. When the Revolt of 1857 broke out the Mazbhis were drawn into the British Indian Army and formed the First Sikh Regiment. To counter-balance the high-caste Bengal Army sepoys, a large number of Jats, Gurkhas, Sikhs and Pathans were added to those units. Since the increase of military activities in North-West, these classes became more popular among the British recruiting officers and, as a consequence, the untouchable recruitment gradually shrank. By the 1870s, the untouchable caste units in the army had given a good account as a fighting force. The term ‘Maratha’ here is used to denote territorial denominator and not caste denomination. It was in the later Peshwa period, that it became a caste denominator.

6

7

Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, Appendix Two.

The Mazbhis were Chuhras (a sweeper caste) who had converted to Sikhism and were patronized by Raja Ranjit Singh, who tried to recruit them for the Khalsa army. Although high-caste Sikh communities objected to their integration into the Khalsa army, they were formed into separate companies. After the defeat of the Khalsa, the Mazbhis saw no active military service for several years until the Dogra Maharaja of Kashmir, Gulab Singh, recruited them as pioneer troops for his own army. 8

Importantly, they were useful for him to overseeing his Muslim subjects. For more details, see Cohen, ‘The Untouchable Soldier’, 455.  

 72   Indians in the First World War

Despite this favourable show as an armed force, low-caste units were gradually reduced in size and number between 1870 and 1914. The military view of the martial race theory attempted to judge the reliability and ability of different military classes according to their recent combat experience. The person responsible for such an approach and in the termination of low-caste recruitment was Lord Roberts, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army during the years 1885–1893.9 Naturally, pure-racist theories of military competence were invoked and it came to believed that untouchables were by birth and varna inherently unmilitary and, therefore, of little use for the British. A more concrete racial theory was developed later by Gen Sir O’Moore Creagh, Commander-inChief of the Indian Army during 1909–1914, and one who succeeded Lord Kitchener. Besides, before the World War I, there were situations in which high-caste soldiers were reluctant to obey orders from low-caste NCOs. The British colonial administration used this fact to argue against the recruitment of all Mahars but the latter countered by pleading for separate regiments for Mahars, or separate companies attached to Muslim regiments. They expected a fairer treatment from the Muslims than their Hindu coreligionists.10 As the war of attrition progressed during the First World War, such theories were found irrelevant to the problems of recruitment and rather it retarded recruiting efforts. In 1914–1918, the Mahars were again permitted to enlist in the Indian Army. After being with Madras battalion for a while, they were given their own unit, the 111th Mahars, which was disbanded after the War.11 The Mazbhi Sikhs, who were heavily recruited during the First World War, were afterwards The tenure of Frederick Roberts as Commander-in-Chief saw a major reorientation in practices of recruitment. Between 1893 and 1902, the British carried out large-scale imperialist expansion in Africa under the military leadership of Roberts and Horatio Herbert Kitchener as his deputy. In 1892, Roberts was honoured with the title of Lord Roberts of Kandahar. During Lord Curzon’s tenure Kitchener became Commanderin-Chief of the Indian Army.

9

10

Navalkar, The Life of Shivaram.

11

Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, 297–98.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   73  

retrenched until 1932. Eventually, their unit was disbanded but only to be again recruited during the Second World War. Thus, the ebb and flow of untouchables in and out of the Indian Army and their participation in military affairs seems to be closely related to the intensity of warfare. This recruitment was part of a broader trend of untouchable seeking employment outside of the traditional village economy and social stratification. It also gave them high esteem of the military among village masses. Pride, self-reliance and increased solidity were very important to the untouchables. After the First World War, the Mahars were again banished from Indian Army, only to again recruited during the Second World War. Against this policy, on 18 June 1941, Dr B. R. Ambedkar raised the issue with British colonial administrators by writing a letter12: The Mahars have been a martial people. The army of the East India Company which successfully fought against the army of the Peshwa was recruited from the Mahars. The last battle between the Peshwa and the British was fought at Koregoan in the Poona district. There is a column at Koregoan raised by the British to commemorate the battle. On the column are inscribed the names of the soldiers who fell in the battle on the side of the British. Nine out of ten names are of Mahars. The recruitment of the Mahars continued up to 1892 and in all the wars the Mahars have proved their martial qualities. All of a sudden the recruitment of the Mahars was stopped in 1892. Ever since the Mahars have nursed a grievance against the British government for what they regarded as ungrateful conduct. There is much justification for this grievance, for there can be no doubt that without the help of the untouchables the British would never have been able to conquer India.   The Mahars carried on a great agitation against their banishment from the Army. But it bore no fruit. It was during the war of 1914 that the British government under necessity lifted the ban and raised one Mahar battalion. It was raised at the fag end of the war and the battalion had no opportunity to go on war services and show its mettle. It was posted in Wasiristan in the North-West Province, and it is on record while almost every battalion stationed in the NWFP lost some rifles and ammunition to the Pathans, who are in the habit of raiding ammunition and rifle depots to arm themselves, the Pathans did not succeed in stealing a single rifle or a single cartridge from the Mahar battalion. It was accepted that the British government, having enfranchised the Mahars for military purposes, would continue the 12

Ambedkar, The Times of India.

 74   Indians in the First World War

Mahar battalion, and add to it more Mahar battalions. But instead the British government, on the excuse of economy, disbanded the Mahar battalion. This caused great bitterness in the minds of the Mahars. When the present war came, the Mahars hoped that their turn would come. But the steps taken by the British government in the early stages of the war only added insult to injury. The Mahars were only wanted for labour corps and not for the combatant ranks. The labour corp is safer than the combatant ranks, but the Mahars wanted to join the combatant ranks.   One of the banalities of the British government in India is this distinction between martial and non-martial classes. Nothing has been more disastrous. It is a pity that so great a catastrophe as the war was necessary to force the British government to give up this senseless distinction. It is stated that government have decided to raise a Mahar battalion. The credit must go to H. E. the Governor of Bombay. On my making it a grievance he took up the matter with the Central government and brought it to a successful conclusion. I appeal to the Mahars to take advantage of this opportunity, both for their sake as well as for the sake of the country, and I also appeal to the British government to keep faith with the Mahars and not to disband them from the Army after the war is over.

In 1893, the old Presidential Armies were amalgamated. Consequently, their separate commands and staff were effectively abolished in 1895. Again, up to 1905, there had been two high officials in charge of the administrative and executive work of the Indian Army—namely the Military Member of the Council and the Commander-in-Chief.13 This dual control and divided responsibilities were changed, and the whole burden of responsibility was placed on the Commander-inChief. In actuality, during Lord Curzon’s time, both the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief Lord Kitchener14 clashed over the question of military administration, as Kitchener objected to the system whereby transport and logistics were controlled by the ‘Military Member’ of the Viceroy’s Council. Although the offices of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member were held by a single individual under Lord Kitchener, 13 The Military Member of the Council was in charge of what one may designate the administration of the Army, and it was through him the demands of the Commanderin-Chief for the Army came to the Viceroy’s Council, though the Commander-in-Chief was an extraordinary Member of that Council.

Lord Kitchener (1850–1914) was the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army during the period 1902–1909.

14

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   75  

senior officers could approach only the Commander-in-Chief directly. In order to deal with the Military Member, a request had to be made through the Army Secretary, who reported to the Indian government and had the right of access to the Viceroy. There were even instances when the two separate bureaucracies produced different answers to a problem, with the Commander-in-Chief disagreeing with himself as Military Member. This became known as ‘canonization of duality’. Thus, the whole of the administrative and executive work of the Army became concentrated in the hands of one man, permanently located in Simla, who had a duality of responsibility. The combination of these duties could not adequately be performed by one man in time of war, and the existing organization was at once overcentralized at its head and cumbersome in its duality below. Kitchener did not exaggerate when he wrote to Lady Salisbury that ‘the Army in India was distributed higgledy-piggledy’. He gathered up the threads in his strong hands and substituted for this empiricism an Army organized in nine divisions, each self-contained and ready to move as a coherent force, leaving adequate protection for internal security.15 The constitution of the personnel of the Indian regiments had been largely altered by Lord Roberts16 and Lord Kitchener. But neither these changes nor the regrouping of the Divisions and Commands had yet been tested by war. The industrial development of Bombay profoundly affected recruitment pattern. The want of industrial labour for Bombay raised a formidable competitor for the manpower of Konkan and Deccan, which largely contributed recruitment from a number of castes of varying status, especially the socially depressed. Feeling of growing intolerance against such castes as not only the Mahars but also less socially stigmatized Kolis, Bhandaris and Malis among the higher caste army recruits led to closing valuable sources of recruitment. Interestingly, the main administrative drawbacks of the Indian army are succinctly pointed out by none other than the then editor of 15

Reed, The India I Knew.

Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts (1832–1914) handed over the position of Commanderin-Chief of Indian Army to Lord Kitchener on 12 December 1902. 16

 76   Indians in the First World War

the Times of India, Sir Stanley Reed in his memoirs—The India I Knew 1897–1947. He wrote: The responsibility for any administrative defects which developed as the operations expanded far beyond anything contemplated, or for which the Indian Army was organized, lay with the Home government. The pace of reform was slowed down during Kitchener’s last two years—another illustration of the general wisdom of the five year’s appointment—and there were two outstanding soldiers ripe for the succession. Sir Edmond Barrow, a sound administrator with honourable experience on the Frontier; Sir Beauchamp Duff, whose work lay in the realm of administration. No one who came in contact with Duff in the heyday of his powers could fail to appreciate that he was in the presence of a distinguished man. So the India Office fell back on seniority and selected Sir O’Moore Creagh.   During the five wasted years of his command the India Army stagnated. The numerical strength of the Forces was not reduced, but the spirit of progress disappeared. The exceptional men Kitchener had called to commands, high and low, passed to other appointments; the dead weight of seniority as the avenue of promotion was clamped down on the Army… (The GOI was not ready to spend money despite its financial reforms on equipment of the armies.)   This was the inheritance to which Duff succeeded. If the command had come to him in the fullness of his powers when Kitchener retired he might, and probably would, have driven forward to completion the reorganization which had yielded such useful results. But when the command came to him he was five years older—five years of detachment from the serving soldier, five more years at the desk. As soon as he was seated at Army Headquarters the war was upon him and he was deluged with paper work. His devoted Staff mistakenly erected a zareba between Army Headquarters and the armies at home and abroad. From this zareba he emerged for the periodical meetings of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, but otherwise, he was but a dim figure behind a thorny hedge. His Staff might, and could, prevent the fighting men from coming in contact with the Chief; they could not debar tongues from wagging, and they wagged very freely indeed.   [Beauchamp] Duff, it may be added, had seen no regimental or field work since he was a major….17 17 Ibid., 102–103; The importance of this source lies in the fact that Reed had free access among the top echelon of the bureaucracy both in Bombay and Simla. Though this memoir is written in 1952, it seems he had preserved extensive notes of his editor days at the Times of India.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   77  

Such was the situation when Sir O’Moore Creagh, who was nicknamed No more K, succeeded Lord Kitchener on 9 September 1909, as Commander-in-Chief. During his regime, a strong and continuous pressure in the direction of economy was exercised, with the support of the Viceroy, over the detailed demands of the Military Budget. Reduction was made on the assumption that the Indian Army need not contemplate the likelihood of collusion outside India with the army of a European power. Hence, the provision for the equipment, organization and transport of the Indian Army was regulated by the requirements of frontier warfare, especially the tribals on the Afghan border. The proportion of field guns per division was cut down to a very low point.18 The Territorial Armies were armed with an old pattern rifle and no maxim guns, their batteries consisted of four instead of six guns each, and the guns themselves were of an obsolete pattern.19 As no increase to existing expenditure was to be sanctioned, practically the number of divisions available for immediate mobilization was reduced from nine to seven.20 Formerly, the bugbear of Russian invasion of India was some check on such economic stringency, but this possibility had been regarded as almost eliminated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. The Commission, which sat in 1912, therefore, considered that the annual military expenditure should be limited and that the maximum external danger to which India was exposed was a war with Afghanistan in combination with the Frontier tribes. One finds concern against this being voiced by officials. Sir (Col) Patrick Cadell, who was the Chief Secretary to BG during those eventful years of the First World War and besides having military background, and one who authored History of the Bombay Army (1938),21 thinks that the 18

While training the Indian soldiers, the ratio was one gun for five soldiers.

19

Government of India. 1923. India’s Contribution.

20

MSA/PD/WAR/1917/292-W.

Cadell, History of the Bombay Army. Not only the book is dedicated to Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, under whom he served as Chief Secretary, but even the foreword is written by Lord Willingdon. The account of those eventful years is more of an official account, for Cadell seemed to have been a typical Bombay bureaucrat who was averse to any liberal attitude vis-à-vis the Indian leaders. pp. 254–275. 21

 78   Indians in the First World War

preparation of the Army was even more hampered by ‘the parsimony with which the demands of the Military Department had been treated by the Financial Department of the Government of India.’ However, he also laid the blame on ‘the clamours of Indian politicians, who always regard the reduction of military expenditure as the panacea of all social difficulties.’ He further adds that, In addition to the large number of troops sent to four major theatres of war, it had to conduct or assist in many minor scenes of fighting, from West Africa to Northern China, and to furnish many garrisons. Yet the idea of economy died so hard that even in the year 1915 the Finance Member of the Government of India could announce that the principle economy in his budget was in the Military Estimates. The consequent lack of adequate provision was destined to add materially to the difficulties and to the sufferings of the Indian troops, particularly in Mesopotamia, the only theatre of war in which the military forces and supplies were, until well on in the war, under the management of the Government of India, though in East Africa there was at the outset joint control with the Colonial Office.22

Sir Patrick well understood the difficulties that existed in the recruitment drive in Western India, having distinct features of the Maratha character. This is evident from the explanation so succinctly and candidly described by him: In the first place large portion of Bombay Presidency, such as Gujrat, had never produced any soldiers, while in other areas, such as Kathiawar and Sind, the classes once inured to arms, had never taken kindly to enlistment in disciplined forces, and desuetude had blunted their military spirit. Moreover, recruitment even in the areas which produced soldiers had always been local and confined to particular areas. For example, though the Konkani Parwaris or Mahars had originally enlisted freely and had fought, as we have seen, gallantly in all circumstances, their more numerous brethren in the Deccan had no tradition of enlistment. Even among the Marathas of the Deccan, recruitment had in practice been confined to a few districts. Individual villages would have their own partiality for particular regiments to which their young men would go. The chief obstacle, however, to widespread recruitment was the limitation to particular castes or sects: in effect, the pure Maratha and the Deccani Muhammadan. Shivaji’s Army 22

Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, 256.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   79  

had been truly national or at least territorial. All castes had been welcomed into it, and indeed at that time the Maratha did not rank high in the social scale, and did not consider himself greatly superior to other castes which shared the country with him. The same principle was applied in the early Bombay regiments, in which the Brahman rubbed shoulders with the outcaste, and Hindu, Mussalman, Christian and Jew lived and fought side by side. The introduction of class companies from the North of India and the increasing supremacy of caste, which has always won its battles in India, brought this excellent system to an end. The Maratha became especially caste conscious. Not only did he despise the outcaste: he refused to recognize classes probably largely descended from the same stock as himself, such as Deccan Kolis, the Bhandaris and the Ramoshis or Berads, and claiming a Kshatriya descent, he sought to differentiate himself from classes such as the Mali and the Dhangar who were undoubtedly his own brethren. The field of recruitment was thus limited. The small number of recruits annually required to keep up the Mahratta and Deccani Mussalman companies and squadrons, was easily enough obtained by regimental parties and Area Recruiting Officers: but the system could not stand the demands of a world-wide war… But the sources were too limited, and the old system of military recruiting parties was inadequate…. (Emphasis is mine)23

Indeed, Sir Patrick showed how the theory of ‘martial races’ and the caste-based military formations, as practised by the bureaucrats in Delhi and Simla and the Northern parts of India did not hold truth and on the contrary became an impediment for recruitment drive in this part of India. Cadell further illustrates what should have been done in recruiting campaign and what sort of administrative hurdles came in the way: It was necessary to obtain the whole-hearted cooperation of the Civil Administration, and to widen caste limits, before numbers adequate to the need and proportionate to the population could be obtained. Yet in spite of the crying need for men the sanction to enlist from other castes was only obtained from Army headquarters after delay and difficulty. The Mahars, for example, the Parwaris of the old Army, were anxious to enlist, 23 Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, 296–297. In recognizing the distinct nature of the Maratha character, Sir Patrick was not the first European/British bureaucrat. Much before him, Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was the first Governor of Bombay Presidency in 1819, mentions Marathas under Chhatrapati Shivaji in the 17th century Deccan in his work History of British India, as a nation, in deed, something akin to the concept of ‘nation’ as that concept was not yet born.

 80   Indians in the First World War

yet when approval was obtained after much local pressure, the recruits were first ordered to join Madras battalions at St. Thomas’s Mount. Ultimately a battalion was formed at Bombay, which was given a place in the line as the 111th Mahars. Companies were also formed of the discarded classes which, every case, had in ancient days furnished men for the Bombay regiments. The castes from which such companies were formed were Berads (including Ramoshis), Bhandaris, Bhils (Khandesh), Brahmans (Deccani and Konkani), Chambars, Christians, Kolis (Deccani), Lingayats, and Telegus.24

When the First World War broke out, the Indian Army was thus suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to participate largely in an external warfare for which no preparation had been made. There were other inherent defects in the Indian Military system such as the small number of British Officers, the non-existence for any practical purpose of any Reserve of Officers. In short, there was a lack of preparation for a war against large and fully equipped hostile armies. The Indian Army was submitted to a test for which it had neither equipment nor experience. It is important to gauge the kind of adversity the Indian troops had to undergo, and to which fresh recruitment was sought to replenish the dying or the dead Indian soldiers. If this was the case of the combatant soldiers sent to different theatres of the First World War, the position of the non-combatants recruited as ‘followers’ was no different. In the beginning of 1916, the Indian Infantry division, which had borne the brunt of initial thrust of the trench warfare, were shifted to Mesopotamia. Although some scholars have attributed this shift to the failure of Indian forces to match up to the European forces, some contemporaries like General John Wilcocks who appreciated and placed full-throated compliments to the bravery of the Indian forces are said to have done that out of generosity. Perhaps this kind of slant against Indian soldiers’ contribution on the Western Front insinuates racial bias. Yet, the Indian Cavalry was retained until March 1918. From June 1917, companies of ILC totalling 50,000 non-combatants began to disembark in France, Ibid., 297–298; The Mahars were an untouchable community in Maharashtra. The Ramoshis and Bhils were the tribals who were criminalized communities as a result of British forest policies. The Bhandaris were the one who did toddy liquor work, the Chambars were the cobbler community and the Kolis were a fishermen community.

24

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   81  

which were to enable the transfer of White labour required in other places. Also, on 24 March 1917, the War Office requisitioned India for 18,286 horse and mule drivers to replace the British supply and divisional artillery columns. They began to arrive in batches. Even in August 1919, there were still 680 Indian laborers in northern France, along with 14,441 artillery drivers.25 If this was the case in France, of those sent to Mesopotamia, 293,152 non-combatants were sent to Mesopotamia. These non-combatants remained there until the end of the hostilities in 1921. In the First World War, these units acquired the politically more acceptable title of the Indian Labour or Porter Corps. These men were formally enrolled as ‘followers’, a description that relegated them to the lowest institutional rung of the Indian Army, and one who had lowest standard for kit, food, pension and medical care. All these labour were brought under the category ‘coloured labour’. Persons in this category were recruited from ‘aboriginal’ and tribal communities of Assam and Burma26; tribals of Kumaun region as well as Ahirs in United Provinces (UP); tribals from Chota Nagpur in Bihar and Orissa; Bhils (Adivasis) and Berads (a criminal tribe) from Khandesh in Bombay Presidency and Moplas on the West coast. Some people were drawn from Bhandaris (todi sellers), Deccan Kolis (fishermen) Lingayats, Bombay Telagus, Singhi Mahomedans, Chambhars (cobbler community) and the low-caste people from Gujarat. Surat district provided a very large number of labourers, both skilled and unskilled.27 These simple people of the forests were now suddenly catapulted into the incinerator of industrialized war in Western Front. In this regard, the GOI utilized the services of rural intermediaries, including Zamindars, and jobbers who procured labour for railways and other public works, the revenue and police officials and the village headmen. These people were lured into enlistment by offering economic enticements; for some, it was an escape from the oppressions of revenue and forest officials as well as

25 Singha, ‘A Short Career of the Indian Labour’. This is an excellent study of the enlistment of non-combatant Indian labour force. 26

For more details, read, Singha, ‘Finding Labour from India for the War’.

27

A ‘Note’ on Recruitment, in MSA/PD/WAR/1918/282–W, Part ‘B’.

 82   Indians in the First World War

the plantation owners; for others, it was an opportunity to make two ends meet amid inflation, famine and pandemic diseases. The British Indian administration devised innovations in enlisting non- combatant labour by tapping the convict prisoners in Indian jails. Between October 1916 and July 1919, approximately 16,000 convict prisoners were sent from India to serve in the Jail Porter and Labour Corps in Mesopotamia.28 Most of these were used as transport (artillery drivers) and unskilled labour in France; for river-training work, for construction of river banks and railway tracks in Mesopotamia and as Agricultural Corps for Salonika and Mesopotamia. A special rockcutting company was created for Southern Persia. For labour recruited from convict prisoners, promises of remission of sentence were given. Some were contracted for a specific tenure and when they finished their term were forcibly detained by playing of words in the contract. Of course, the management of the criminal convict labour was a hazardous task as they would not mind physical and sexual assaults on other labourers. European prisoners were normally appointed on higher salaries as clerks for supervisory work. In 1916, the MC remarked in their report on sanitation: We may observe that the lack of sweepers for military work, not only in the different camps but also in the various hospitals and on river-steamers, is a serious matter, particularly since the recent outbreak of Cholera. Further, in some cases, who are not of proper caste have been sent out with hospital and sanitary sections as sweepers. We think that a very large addition to the staff of sweepers in Mesopotamia is urgently necessary and that more care should be taken to ensure that men of the proper caste only are sent for this work. If the terms now offered are not sufficiently attractive, the expediency of temporary men on more liberal terms will have to be considered.29

Naturally, lower-caste members of the sweeper community from Gujarat were enlisted by offering them luring terms. In addition to this, 1,602 prisoners were recruited for miscellaneous services and many of them were for enlisted for sweeper work. 28

Singha, ‘Finding Labour from India for the War’, 412–13.

The Mesopotamian Commission Report, 1916, 96. MSA/PD/WAR/1917/291-W, 160–61. 29

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   83  

II

The Royal Indian Marines It is a fallacy among some scholars to hold the view that the Royal Indian Marine was the Indian part of its navy. Therefore, it is necessary to trace the origin and its function of this establishment. The East India Company was authorized by the Charter of Charles II and James II to maintain an armed naval force for the defence of its possessions and for the prevention of interference with its trade monopoly. This force eventually developed into the Indian Navy, with its headquarters at Bombay and was subject to the supreme control of the GOI, but in actuality immediately under the supervision of BG. Another marine service, called the Bengal Marine, was also established, with headquarters at Calcutta and was immediately under the Bengal government. The above organizations remained in existence from 1830 to 1863, when it was decided to transfer to the Royal Navy such duties as were of a warlike character, the transport of troops and stores and other civil duties being relegated to a local service not subject to martial law. The local service thus constituted was designated the Indian Marine and was split up into two divisions, the Eastern and Western, with Superintendent of Marine to each division, and stationed at Calcutta and Bombay, respectively. In 1877, the title of the service was altered to Her Majesty’s Indian Marine, which was brought as a whole, including the Dockyards, under the direct control of the GOI and was administered by a Royal Navy Officer called the Director of the Indian Marine, with headquarters at Bombay. In 1892, its designation was changed to Royal Indian Marine. In peace time, the ships of the Royal Indian Marine were unarmed, their normal duties being to convey troops and stores from port to port in India (including Burma and Aden) and from India to Colonial stations and vice versa in Indian waters, which implied for this purpose the high seas between the Cape of Good Hope on the west and the Straits of Magellan on the east, and all territorial waters between those limits. They were also liable to convey troops between India and

 84   Indians in the First World War

England, whenever such a course was authorized by the Secretary of State for India. Among their normal duties were to furnish station vessels for Aden, Port Blair and Rangoon; to survey the coast and harbours of India and Burma and the Indian Ocean between certain defined limits; to visit lighthouses; to relieve distressed or wrecked vessels; to be in charge of the lights and buoys in the Persian Gulf; to supply trained and efficient officers to maritime local governments for employment as Port Officers and Engineer and Shipwright Surveyors; to maintain and keep in efficient condition dockyards at Bombay and Calcutta; to construct and maintain in efficient condition vessels for military duty at Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Rangoon; and to suppress piracy. So were amongst the various duties entrusted to the Royal Indian Marine up to July 1914.30 Owing to the sowing of mines in Indian waters by enemy minelayer in the early part of 1917, it became necessary to institute measures of protection at the various defended ports. The actual direction of mine-sweeping and patrolling originally devolved on the Royal India Marine, who were able to rely on the assistance and advice of the local naval authorities. After some months, the direction of mine-sweeping at Bombay was placed under naval control, owing to the importance of the port. But it was the duty of the Royal Indian Marine to provide suitable vessels and supply the requisite personnel to man them. ‘Out of its comparatively small establishment including 21 officers, 9 warrant officers and approximately 300 ratings of the Royal Indian Marine gave their lives in the war.

The Mesopotamian Fiasco—‘No Man’s Child’ In the story of the military successes and reverses of this campaign, there constantly crops up almost from the day of the landing of the force, evidence of shortage of transport of all kinds, of the antiquated equipment of the troops, of grave deficiencies in medical personnel and material, occasional shortage of rations at the front, and a great, if not total, lack of comforts. To use the current expression, the force from the first was ‘illfound’ to meet the privations and hardships inseparable from campaigning in Mesopotamia, and as its number increased bad went to worse. General 30

GOI, India’s Contribution, 210–219.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   85  

Gorringe graphically gave expression to the feeling which he considered pervaded the force, when he said: ‘It was believed to be a side-show and no man’s child.’ Though these colloquialisms undoubtedly err on the side of exaggeration, it is impossible to deny that there was some foundation for them. Indeed, in a sense such haphazard expressions go right to the root of the causes of the failure and reverses, as will become apparent when we investigate why this expedition did not receive from either of the great military supervising staff in London or Simla that care and attention, which were necessary to the exceptional difficulties of climate and country which it had to encounter.31

The Mesopotamian campaign where Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ comprising 185,491 British army personnel, 326,656 Indian combatants and 348,735 non-combatant soldiers32 fought the war, was a complete disaster until the War Officer took the control of operations in 1916. The above observation of the Parliamentary Commission, which investigated the factors that contributed to the fiasco of Mesopotamian campaign speak of themselves. In this theatre of war were one of the highest number of casualties and, therefore, it is important to have a closer look at the report of the MC that did lay responsibility of the Mesopotamian fiasco officials both in India and in England. It is also important to note how the contemporary officials and semi-officials perceived this monumental failure. Persons who took active part like Sir Charles Townshend wrote in 1920 My Campaign in Mesopotamia, which in itself is a good account of the campaign but when the question of giving evidence before the MC came, he stayed back. While Edmond Candler wrote in two volumes in 1919, The Long Road to Baghdad, and Martin Swayne wrote in 1917 In Mesopotamia. Between 1923 and 1927, F. J. Moberly wrote an official account of this campaign in four volumes entitled The Indian Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918. Among the recent well-researched articles are by Douglas Goold33 as well as by John S. Galbraith,34 which are excellently researched and The Mesopotamian Commission Report (hereinafter The MCR), 1916, 96. MSA/PD/ WAR/1917/291-W.

31

Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914–1918, cited by Das, Indian Troops in Europe, 19.

32

33

Goold, ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamian’.

34

Galbraith, ‘No Man’s Child’; Also read, Rothwell, ‘Mesopotamia in British War’.

 86   Indians in the First World War

deal more with the way the campaign was carried out, but they scarcely discuss the Mesopotamian Commission Report (MCR) and their observations. On the other hand, some scholars such as Priya Satia35 have argued that the Indian involvement in Mesopotamian expedition was considered by both the Indian nationalists and the British Imperialists as a matter of pride; and that ‘their empire was not the malevolent, grasping force or anachronistic geopolitical extravagance its critics made it out to be, but a benign and effective mechanism of global improvement and nation building’. Thereby, an inventory case made for ‘the British construction of wartime colonial development as a process of national transformation’. Hence, the focus in this section is on various layers of failures—administrative, military, systemic and the lack of medical provisions—that resulted in the loss of Indian soldiers, which is not only highlighted by the MCR but also by the then contemporary officials and non-official British people in India. III When the war broke in 1914, there were in the British Empire two great military administrative organizations—one in England and the other in India, at Simla. In self-governing Dominions such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, there were self-supporting local forces under the control of their respective governments. But the War Office in London and the military departments in Simla were the only complete military organizations equipped for the planning, despatch, control and supply of expeditions beyond their respective territories over the sea. As a preparation for such operations, the Intelligence Department of each of these organizations had assigned to it certain territories within and concerning which it had to collect and collate topographical and other information during times of peace, and in the event of their becoming theatres of war, which could be utilized by the respective organizations. Accordingly, Asia was divided between the Imperial and Indian War Intelligence Departments. A line was drawn through Arabia from 35

Satia, ‘Developing Iraq’.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   87  

Akaba to Basra, all north of that line belonging to Whitehall, all south to belong to Simla. Basra was thus given to India, Mesopotamia to Great Britain—a somewhat incoherent division of responsibility, in view of the fact that Basra inevitably has to be base for any operations in Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf. The collection of information relative to Persia and patrolling of war vessels in the Persian Gulf came under the control and policy of Indian government. Mesopotamia being at the head of the Persian Gulf was not looked upon by the War Office as an area requiring special attention, as it was within the radius of action of India, though outside their sphere of intelligence. The likelihood of a war with Turkey in alliance with Germany did not seem to India to be a reasonable probability. Therefore, the Simla Intelligence Department did not prepare any scheme before 1914 for military operations north of Basra. In addition to these two Military organizations, there was a Military Department at the India Office in London, under the authority of the Secretary of State for India, with whose advice he controlled and decided the general military policy of India. Interestingly, this department was not organized for the purpose of directly managing a campaign. It was, nevertheless, through the instrumentality of this Department that the Mesopotamian campaign was started. At the beginning of the war, it was generally believed by the Intelligence and General Staff that Mesopotamia was ‘no man’s child’, or rather, was the foster-child of both Simla and Whitehall, the acknowledged child of neither. The War Office had its gigantic task of expanding a small army into one of national dimensions, and at the same time of organizing a series of expeditions abroad, towards which the Indian Military authorities were compelled to contribute largely both in the shape of personnel and material. Besides, Simla had to provide security in North-West Frontier. Lord Hardinge succeeded Lord Minto as the Viceroy of India in November 1910, after a distinguished career in diplomatic service and also as a permanent Under Secretary in Foreign Office, from 1906 to 1910 under Sir Edward Gray. Until the outbreak of World War, Hardinge was considered as the most successful as well as popular Viceroy. His pre-war policy about the Indian Army and also his plans about the future of Mesopotamia played a significant

 88   Indians in the First World War

and controversial role in the Mesopotamian expedition during the World War. The Viceroy was quite aware of the weakness and deficiencies of the Indian Army he had inherited. In his opinion, it was run by ‘three fairly intelligent old women’, Generals Percy Lake, Alymer and Burbury, and besides had a very low opinion of the Commander-in-chief General O’Moore Creagh, ‘an old man with one foot in the grave’.36 His main policy before was aimed at reduction of military expenditure and retrenchment. His considerations for this view arose from the declining revenues from opium, and as a consequence of domestic pressure to spend more on internal improvements. Consequently, he appointed a committee in 1912 to report on the army and to decide if reductions were possible, which was divided and hence submitted two different reports. Hardinge and Secretary of State Lord Crewe naturally went with the majority report, which supported economy measures and retrenchment. The result was that military preparations in India had been adversely affected by the pervasive atmosphere of economy and the GOI followed a policy of retrenchment with the concurrence of the home authorities. However, he vigorously and successfully backed Sir Beauchamp Duff to succeed O’Moore Creagh, with a belief that Duff’s administrative skills would improve the military organization.37 Lord Hardinge and his government felt that Indian Army was never intended or been expected to by London to prepare an army to meet a European power. The Indian government was, at first, lukewarm on a proposition, which it did not originate. The scope of the expedition grew, and its members increased, continuing to make a constant drain upon Indian resources. The objects of the expedition up to April 1915 had been defined to be: (a) that it would checkmate Turkish intrigues, (b) that Hardinge Papers, Letter to F. A. Maxwell, 18 August 1913, quoted by Goold, ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamian’, 920. This is an excellent and well-articulated article on the responsibility of Hardinge in carrying out the Mesopotamian Expedition.

36

Sir Beauchamp Duff was considered as a ‘Lord Kitchener’s man’. After the indictment by the Mesopotamian Commission in 1917 for his role as the Commander-inchief in the Mesopotamian fiasco, which he refuted, Duff committed suicide in 1918.

37

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   89  

it would encourage the Arabs to rally round the British and get firm allegiance of the Sheikhs of Muhammerah and Kuwait, and (c) that it would protect all the oil installations at Abadan. Almost from the very outset of the expedition, the political importance of occupying Baghdad was urged by Indian government’s agent in the Persian Gulf and a move endorsed by political officers in Simla, and in Whitehall, both at the Foreign Office and the India Office. The successive advances from Basra to Kurna, and gradually to Kut, though considered as necessary defensive operations, were partially prompted by this ambition. The Indian government at Simla, which gave half-hearted consent in the initial phase, later became active advocate of the advance to Baghdad, which India Office reluctantly accepted. A careful examination of Lord Hardinge’s role with reference to the Mesopotamian expedition reveals that he was keen on having a forward policy in that region from the beginning. India under Lord Hardinge responded both generously and loyally when war broke out in August 1914. Indian soldiers were sent to France, despite longstanding opposition in London from a large quarter of the officials, largely as a result of a commendable insistence by the viceroy.38 The acrimonious correspondence that took place between Lord Kitchener, Lord Hardinge and Secretary of State Lord Crewe reveals that demands were continually made for more Indian forces by Lord Kitchener, the war Secretary, which were resented by Lord Hardinge who felt that India had been ‘bled white’. In this matter, Lord Crewe had to act as the ‘honest broker’.39

38 Hardinge, My Indian Years, 99. He wrote in his memoirs, ‘Immediately, two complete divisions of infantry and with one division of infantry in reserve…they were ordered to proceed to Egypt, Malta and Gibraltar, but I protested vigorously and demanded that these splendid divisions should be sent to France, pointing out the slur that would be imposed on India by the presence of Algerian and Senegalese troops in the French Army in France, and that the patriotic enthusiasm for the war in India would receive a serious damper if the activities of the Indian divisions were restricted to garrison duties in the Mediterranean. After some pressure my view was accepted by the Cabinet and these fine divisions arrived in France just in time to fill the gap in the British line….’ 39

Goold, ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamian’, 925.

 90   Indians in the First World War

The situation in Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia progressively grew more alarming in the weeks after the outbreak of war with Germany. Naturally, attention was drawn from various quarters towards a belief that the British interests in the Gulf should be protected by a force from India. Concerns were first raised mainly by the Admiralty about the safety of their oil installations on Abadan Island and the pipeline along the Karun river into Persia. A studied caution was equally voiced that any act to prevent German–Turkish adventure in this area might adversely affect Indian Moslem opinion. Dictated by domestic concerns, Lord Hardinge’s initial response reveals that he favoured a cautious approach. On 5 November 1914, Britain declared war on Turkey and India immediately sent a brigade for a short military action. The town of Basra was captured on 23 November 1914 and then the forces were pushed towards a victory at Kut-al-Amara on 29 September 1915. Though Lord Hardinge initially did not see any need for further action, he changed his mind after a visit to the Gulf at the beginning of 1915, after which he concluded that Basra needed to be protected against Turkish raiders and troublesome Arabs. His increasing enthusiasm for a forward policy became further evident in April 1915, despite initial hesitations, when General Barrett was replaced by General Sir John Nixon as the Commander-in-chief of Expeditionary Force ‘D’ in Mesopotamia, a man known for forceful activity and one who wanted to push further to Kut. Notwithstanding a stream of warnings of the dangers involved from first Crewe and then Austin Chamberlain, who had succeeded as Secretary of State,40 and also being aware of the deficiencies of the Expeditionary Force, Hardinge seems to have been taken in by the early successes. It is now clear that Lord Hardinge’s imperial aspirations in Mesopotamia dates as far back as May 1911. He entertained thoughts much beyond purely military considerations,41 his pre-war policies towards Indian Army, In May, the first wartime coalition was formed, and Austin Chamberlain replaced Lord Crewe as secretary of state for India. Though Chamberlain had cautious approach to the military adventure, he clarified that he would pursue Crewe’s line and pointed out that the generals on the spot would have to state actual state of affair. This was complied with by Gen Nixon.

40

41 For details, see Goold, ‘Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamian’, 929–932. Lord Hardinge dreamt that with proper irrigation Mesopotamia could become ‘one of the

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   91  

his policy of advance and his plans for the future of Mesopotamia played a controversial role in the expedition. Despite his dreams of imperial designs in Mesopotamia, the viceroy was well aware of the weaknesses of the Indian Army that was despatched over there. He describes in the memoirs My Indian Years 1910–1916: About three months after the outbreak of war twenty-nine Territorial batteries and thirty-four Territorial battalions were sent from India to replace British troops. They were welcome in a denuded state in which India found herself, but they had to be trained, armed and equipped. Their rifles were no better than gas-pipes, and for clothing they had only what they stood up in and that had no pretence of fitting. One battalion had 500 unserviceable rifles, all marked ‘D.P.’ (drill purpose). As for the artillery, the guns could not be fired as the breechblocks, instead of having fittings of asbestos, had wood painted to look like asbestos, and ammunition was marked ‘Dangerous and not to be used for practice’! Nevertheless, the men were very superior and intelligent and after six months’ training with proper guns, rifles and clothes, some of these Territorial batteries became very smart and efficient, and were employed on the frontier and in Mesopotamia.42

The Viceroy seems to have been without remorse for his action and shifted the blame on others, including War Office: During the first three months of the war the attitude of Turkey inspired much misgiving, but it was very necessary that, owing to the attitude of the Mahomedans in India, no provocation for war should be given…. I only wish we had remained there (Basra) and never advanced further, since India had by that time been bled white by the War Office, and when India’s need became pressing and requests were made for drafts, machine-gun, aeroplanes, bombs etc., they were in almost every case refused. (Italics mine)43

It is equally important to understand how the faulty organization of the Indian Military administration grossly contributed to the Mesopotamian fiasco. Up to 1905, there had been two high granaries of Europe’, also a fruitful area for Indian colonization, extended trade and commercial development of British interests apart from her traditional interests in the Gulf, and possible control of the southern section of Baghdad railway. 42

Hardinge, My Indian Years, 106–107.

43

Ibid., 102.

 92   Indians in the First World War

officials in charge of the administrative and executive work of the Indian Army—namely, the Military Member of Council and the Commander-in-Chief. By ‘Indian Army’ meant Indian Military Establishments, as there was always a large proportion of British Army stationed in India, and these troops were charged on Indian exchequer. The Military Member of the Council was in charge of the administration of the Army, and it was through him that the demands of the Commander-in-Chief for the Army came to the Viceroy’s Council. The main purpose of this division of work was to leave the Commander-in-Chief free to perform his executive duties, while the Military Member remained at the seat of the government. For a while, the Military Member was abolished and in his place a Supply Member was appointed to Viceroy’s Council. This post too was soon abolished. Thus, the whole work of the administrative and executive work of the Army came to be concentrated into the hands of one man, who had a duality of responsibility as Military Member of the Viceroy’s Council and Commander-in-Chief. While there was centralization at the head of the administration, a cumbrous dualism remained below. These two departments, though under the same individual, were kept separate and distinct, and they were separately maintained. The Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity as the executive head of the Army, may think and order something in his department which in his subsequent capacity as Military Member in another department he may like to unthink and counter order. This astounding system attained inordinate dimensions of minute writing; of check and counter-check, reference backward and forward of papers and proposals in the administrative departments of the Army. The result was wastage of time and energy, which reflected very damagingly on the wartime field operations. Investigating into this kind of systemic failure, the MC observed in its Report: Those engaged in secretarial work seem to have forgotten that minutewriting is not the end all and be all of Army administration; it is only an instrument for the coordination of efficiency and economy…. If, by undue expansion, it fails to achieve these ends, it tends to promote the very administrative evil it was intended to counteract.44 44

The MCR, 99–100.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   93  

An important feature of this period of war was the communication system between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy and their respective Executive Council, which had an important bearing upon the management and conduct of the Mesopotamian campaign. The means of communications between them, according to the Statute, came under three heads—‘Public’, ‘Urgent’ and ‘Secret’. In addition to those authorized statutory communications, it was always the practice of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy to communicate privately, by both telegram and letter. While the official communication correspondence remained in the government files, the private telegrams and letters, which were supposedly to be of supplementary and explanatory of the official telegrams sent, were property of the sender and they were not necessarily recorded on the files of the Department. The substitution of private for public telegrams in the years just before the War and during the following years so developed as to become almost regular channel of communications. The consequence of this was that matters relating to the Mesopotamian campaign were privately exchanged without being informed to and without consulting the members of the Executive Council. As the Council of the Governor General was not consulted, it was never held responsible for what occurred in the Mesopotamian campaign. It was, therefore, a systemic by-pass. The isolation of the GOI from any contact with public opinion was almost inconceivable. Although the seat of the actual governance was shifted from Calcutta to Delhi in 1911, Simla was the remote hilltop in the Himalayas, where the bureaucracy actually worked, and the Army establishment had its headquarters. Simla has been well known for its remoteness and inaccessibility, which renders it singularly unsuitable for the residence of one high official who has to discharge a mass of military responsibilities including supervision of overseas expeditions. It disconnected him from ground realities of war. The ground reality of bureaucratic isolation and its fallout is best described by the then editor of the Times of India, Sir Stanley Reed: Well, if the Commander-in-Chief was so isolated in the hilltops that he did not know what were the conditions at the front, or if he was misleading the Government, what was the duty of a responsible newspaper? We did not hesitate long. We (Times of India) published a strong and minatory leading article exposing the grievous sufferings of the troops, and then did a thing

 94   Indians in the First World War

which was wrong, and might have brought serious trouble in its train, we argued that there would be no real improvement until there was a change in the High Command in India, and a change in the command at the other little Simla which had been set up at Basra.45

Sir Stanley further adds how the administration at Simla was unaware of newspaper reports cautioning the authorities of grave situation, but when enquired by the home authorities, the government at Simla promptly dismissed those reports as wild rumours generated by dissatisfied elements: Curzon described Simla as the workshop of the administration, and work there was in plenty. Pallid officials scorned delights and lived laborious days – with papers. The nearest newspapers were published at Lahore and Allahabad, six hundred miles away. The Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore never pretended to be more than provincial organ, and the Pioneer of Allahabad was a daily magazine printed in Dustypore rather than a modern journal. For newspapers with an All India outlook Simla had to wait for the arrival of the dailies of Calcutta and Bombay, which were forty-eight hours old by the time they were received…. The senior officials derived their knowledge of Indian politics largely through the confidential memoranda of the Central Intelligence Bureau. Now with all its merits it was a tainted source. Inevitably, the department looked on and recorded the worst sides of political activity; regular perusal of its records produced a jaundiced appreciation of the fast-growing political forces; everything which was natural and healthy was ignored.46

Since the great mass of the troops, stores, and reinforcement for Mesopotamia embarked from Bombay, and at the same port the disembarkation of the huge number of sick and wounded returning from that country took place, neither Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief visited that port during the crisis of the war, nor was any permanent member of the Headquarter Staff been stationed there. Everything to be done was attempted from Simla. Requisitions 45 When Sir Stanley Reed published a strong leading article exposing the grievous sufferings of the returning troops and the insufficient medical aid available to them in the Times of India, the editor felt that he was on for serious trouble and reprimand from the Delhi administration and in particular the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. But he chose to telegraph the entire article to the Home Government. 46

Reed, The India I Knew, 108–09.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   95  

and indents for stores, applications for leave and other matters, all of which could have been settled at Bombay, but as a rule, had to go to Simla before they could be complied with. The MCR too candidly admitted that ‘Civilians and non-officials in Bombay know more of what was going on in Mesopotamia than the Headquarters Staff at Simla’. Consequently, it noted, ‘Ignorance at Headquarters produced skepticism, and this skepticism was supported by the optimistic reports officially received from Basra’.47 IV

The Surrender On 29 April 1916, the British garrison at Kut-ul-Imara surrendered to the Turks after a siege of 147 days. In total, 3,000 British troops, 6,000 Indian and 2,000 camp followers, under the command of Maj Gen Charles V. F. Townshend, all in various stages of malnutrition, were marched into captivity, out of which only 30 per cent were to survive finally. Kut was relatively a small village with no special features but did have some strategic significance owing to its position on the Tigris. The retention of Kut by British forces was not important for reasons of military strategy, rather it was important for the effect its loss would have on British prestige and was thought to be essential to the maintenance of British power in India and British precedence in the middle east. The decision to attempt the capture of Baghdad that resulted in the disaster at Kut was made on political rather than military grounds.48 The apparent ease with which Townshend defeated numerically superior Turkish troops encouraged the Asquith government to believe that with a modest buildup of forces, he might capture and hold Baghdad. This belief was also shared by both civilian and military authorities in 47

The MCR, MSA/PD/WAR/1917/291-W.

Galbraith, ‘No Man’s Child’. This is an excellent article explaining how the campaign in Mesopotamia was carried by the British Expeditionary Force ‘D’, which ultimately led to the disaster in the Battle of Ctesiphon during the march towards Baghdad and the consequent surrender of Kut-ul-Imara. 48

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London and Simla. Besides, were also the thought that such a move to capture Baghdad might restore prestige of the British, which had suffered grossly due to the dismal failure of the Gallipoli campaign and the repulse at Loos on the Western Front, which had cost over 60,000 casualties.49 Sir Stanley Reed ruminates with bitterness at the brusque attitude of both the Viceroy and his officials on the one hand and the Indian military brass on the other: If anyone has the patience to read the second volume of the official history of the Mesopotamian campaign he will find how this mad project was tossed to and fro between the Mesopotamian Command and A.H.Q. in India, between the Viceroy and the Cabinet; he will find the truth. General Nixon in command knew that, with his health failing his career was coming to an end and he was naturally anxious to round it off with a resounding success.   Sir Percy Cox, the able and experienced Political Officer sought to close the road to Teheran seeing that the Germans were suing every lever to bring Persia into the war. Grave warnings came from Townshend, the sword arm of the Mesopotamian Forces, who had won continuous success against the inferior Turkish troops. He was convinced that advance was strategically unsound and that the force available was inadequate. Beauchamp Duff, whatever his later errors, saw the position clearly. There is vivid in my memory a frank talk with him at Simla in the later months of 1915; I had been specially invited to visit the hill station for the purpose of this discussion. ‘The strategical key to Mesopotamia’, he said, ‘is Amara. Every mile we move beyond Amara our transport position—shall we use the portmanteau word logistical?— grows worse vis-à-vis the Turks. Every mile the Turks move below Amara their strength weakens. I was reluctant to sanction the move to Kut, but that has been done; I am pressed to agree to an attack on Baghdad, but will not do so without the guarantee of at least two divisions of reinforcement.’(Emphasis is mine)50

The advance was sanctioned; the battle was heroically fought; a tactical success was gained but could not be made good in face of arriving Turkish divisions. So, where did the blame lay? Hardinge placed it squarely on the shoulders of Nixon, whose responsibility was great, as any examination of his despatches could 49

Ibid., 359.

50

Reed, The India I Knew, 98–99.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   97  

reveal. The real responsibility was otherwhere. In this regard, Sir Stanley Reed recalls the discussion that took place between him and Hardinge, while he was passing through Bombay and was finally leaving Indian shore for England on 4 April: he (Lord Hardinge) stayed with Willingdon at Government House and asked me to see him the morning before he sailed. After touching on the main features of his administration, he spread a great map depicting the plans for the relief of the beleaguered garrison and wound up his explanation by saying: ‘I am not entirely happy about Kut.’ ‘You do not mean to tell me sir,’ I asked, ‘that you think Kut is going to be relieved?’ ‘I am assured,’ was his answer, ‘by the Commander-in-Chief that there is not the slightest doubt of the success of the operations.’51

This answer was perhaps arrogant, felt Sir Stanley as the authorities in Bombay knew more of the conditions in Mesopotamia than the Army Headquarters. Sir Stanley could not forbear saying: ‘I cannot believe Kut will be relieved. It is a question whether surrender comes before we have suffered twenty-thousand casualties, or after we have sustained that loss’. Hardinge pondered for a moment and closed the discussion: ‘The pressure brought to bear on me from London to sanction the advance as a counterblast to the pending evacuation of Gallipoli was so intense that I dare not refuse my consent.’ By the time the attempt to relieve Kut was abandoned the casualties were twenty-three thousand…. (Emphasis is mine) In Sir Stanley Reed’s estimation, for the failure, and for all the terrible sufferings to the garrison and the relieving force which accrued, the British Cabinet, and the British Cabinet in the main, must be held guilty. There are no meaner pages in the history of the British Army than those which disclose the attempt of the politicians to conceal their own laches (gross negligence) by besmirching the immense services of India and her Army.52

Similar to what Europeans like Sir Stanley expressed candidly is found in the opinion of Colonel Sir Patrick Cadell, who was one of 51

Ibid., 98–99.

52

Ibid., 99–100.

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the high-ranking officials of the BG and one who wrote History of the Bombay Army (1938), Apart from the severity of the continual fighting, the climatic conditions had been most trying. High degrees of heat combined with extreme humidity caused may casualties, the flies were terrible and the troops were suffering from fever and beri-beri. It had not been possible to replace the casualties in the British regiments, and both they and the Indian battalions were sadly weakened. Moreover, the medical arrangements were known even in Bombay to be markedly insufficient, though it was not till after the battle of Ctesiphon that they entirely broke down….53

To highlight the actual contribution of the Bombay Army, Sir Patrick further quotes Maj Evans: In spite of mistakes made by civilian and soldier alike: in spite of the horrors after Ctesiphon, the misery of the wounded, the heat, the sickness, the desolation of the empty desert and the 97,000 casualties that the campaign cost,54 the troops that fought in Mesopotamia can rest secure in the knowledge that they added imperishable glory to the record of the Imperial Army. Of that glory the old Bombay regiments had their full share. Twenty out of the twenty-six Bombay infantry battalions had been engaged, besides three second battalions. A pleasing recognition of their gallantry was the grant of the title of ‘Royal’ to the 117th Mahrattas for their steadfastness and valour. This great honour was also bestowed on the Bombay Sappers and Miners.55

It appears that the administration also had apprehensions about the loyalty of Muslims soldiers while fighting against the Turks, whose ruler was also the spiritual leader of the Muslim world. Hence, in the initial period, non-Muslims soldiers were largely deployed in Mesopotamian campaign. The Mahratta regiments took distinguished share in the victories of the early portion of the campaign at Kurna, Shaiba, Kut and Ctesiphon.56 53

Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, 268.

Sir Patrick gives the exact figure in the footnote as 92,501, which he says is mentioned in the Official History, Vol. IV, 331. One does not find these volumes. 54

55

Cadell, History of the Bombay Army, 274–275.

56

‘Note’ on Recruitment, MSA/PD/WAR/1918/282-W.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   99  

V Bombay was the great military distribution centre in India. It was the main port of embarkation for the immense forces, which were sent overseas; it was also the place of arrival for those returning from the various fronts. After the failure of the major attack on the Turkish positions in Mesopotamia, when the weary British troops were battering themselves to pieces in futile attacks on the strong trenches at Es Sinn, there was a dreadful stream of broken men pouring into the city. In Sir Stanley’s words, ‘The sick and the sorry who ought to have been treated as convalescents were returned in ordinary troopships; thousands who ought to have been regarded as hospital cases were moved in ill-found transports. If Sir Wyndham Knight, the GOC in Bombay, had not taken a grave decision, and provided hospital accommodation far in excess of that sanctioned by Army Headquarters, there would have been a far worse breakdown’.57 The nonchalant attitude of the high officials located in Simla is described by Sir Stanley Reed. It so happened that the Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, Sir William Meyer, was visiting Bombay to tackle with a currency development that threatened the convertibility of the rupee, which would have shaken the confidence not only of the commercial community of Bombay, but also would have seriously affected the peasantry of the country. As it was the monsoon season and government House was also closed, he stayed with Sir Stanley in Bombay. After exchanging some pleasantries, the editor asked the Finance Member if nothing could be done to stem the tide of human misery in the form of wounded and disabled soldiers who were flowing into the city. The reply he gave, Sir Stanley felt, was ‘arresting’. ‘You stagger me’, Meyer said ‘At our last Council meeting, shortly before I (Meyer) left Simla, the Commander-in-Chief assured us that everything in Mesopotamia was now in good trim’.58 Indeed, the Commander-in-Chief, located at the isolated hilltop of Simla, was surely misleading the government, and so was the Viceroy 57

Reed, The India I Knew, 100.

58

Ibid., 101.

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cooling his heels. Hence, Reed felt it was the responsibility of the most powerful Anglo-Indian newspaper of the country to make the exposé. The Times of India published a strong and minatory leading article exposing the grievous sufferings of the troops. The article also argued that there would be no real improvement until there was a change in the High Command in India, and also a change ‘at the other little Simla which had been set up at Basra’. It was a frontal attack on the high military command during the campaign and Sir Stanley was quite aware of the serious trouble it would bring in its trail. He knew that such a move would set in reverberations in high official circles. ‘Then the wigs were on the green’, writes the editor. Lord Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, fully seized the situation and informed Sir Stanley, ‘Your article on Mesopotamia hit everything on the head and was excellent in every way’. Soon, he received a telegraphic message from the Viceroy asking the contents to be communicated to Stanley Reed. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, informed that the said article was embarrassing and amounted to personal attacks on the General exercising command in the field and which is ‘calculated to undermine the discipline among his troops’. He further added that ‘such an attack emanating from a newspaper like the Times of India renders the position of the government vis-à-vis the vernacular Press extremely difficult’ and would not be tolerated. He also informed that Reed’s strictures were conveyed to the home authorities in London ‘uncensored’. Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief, protested to the Viceroy regarding the contents of the telegram. Though the Viceroy was right in warning the paper, Stanley Reed felt, but ‘the protests and warnings did not improve an intolerable situation’. For Reed, there was no falling back as the risk was taken with open eyes. So, he wrote a letter to Lord Willingdon and which he thought could be forwarded to Lord Chelmsford, communicating that the ‘grave step was taken with a full sense of responsibility and assuring that, “no further exposure would be made” ’. Besides this, Reed wrote a private letter to Willingdon conveying much the same terms but adding that ‘in similar circumstances the paper would do exactly the same again and disregard the consequences’. Lord Willingdon forwarded both the letters to the Viceroy and also wrote a covering letter in which he

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   101  

made a ‘robust expression’ that ‘there was hardly a word in that article with which I disagreed!’59 Immediately, the matter accelerated with the home authorities in London and had its ripple effect in both Simla and Bombay. This episode narrated by Sir Stanley in his memoir under the chapter, ‘The Ferment of War’, reveals how Bombay was placed in the thick of activity and not one high official visited Bombay to grasp the ground reality faced by the returning wounded soldiers. Such was the grave situation in Bombay that even the Europeans in Bombay, in particular, the Times of India, which had all through the colonial period acted as an extended arm of the executive, felt outraged at the apathetic attitude of the high government officials cooling off at Simla. Even the MC passed severe strictures against the arrangements at Bombay and confirms what was expressed by Sir Stanley Reed: The great mass of the troops, stores and reinforcements for Mesopotamia embarked at Bombay, and at the same port disembarkation of the huge number of sick and wounded returning from that country took place. Sir Beauchamp Duff as Commander- in-Chief never visited that port during the crisis of the war, nor was any permanent member of the Headquarter been stationed there. Requisitions and indents for stores, applications for leave, and other matters, all of which could have been settled in Bombay, had to go to Simla before they were complied with. The views and opinions of those returning sick and wounded never reached Simla officials. Civilians and nonofficials in Bombay knew more of what was going on in Mesopotamia than the Headquarter Staff at Simla. Ignorance at Headquarters produced skepticism and this skepticism was supported by the very optimistic reports officially received from Basra. If some real news filtered through to officials at Simla, they were treated as rumours, not worth taking note of. Bombay, Calcutta, London, the Houses of Parliament, and many private individuals, both in India and England, were aware of what was going on in Mesopotamia, but Simla and Delhi officials were unmoved.60 59 Ibid., 101–03; Reed further writes that 10 years later, he had an occasion when he was presiding the function in London where Lord Chelmsford, the ex-Viceroy was to speak. That time, Reed said, ‘for five years I trembled at his slightest frown, and when he (Lord Chelmsford) quitted India he had grave misgivings whether he ought not to have left me, in the words of the Indian patriots, rotting in gaol’. Reed writes, Lord Chelmsford slyly retorted that ‘he did not recognize our respective relations in these terms….’ 60

The MCR, 104–105.

 102   Indians in the First World War

Even Valentine Chirol in his book India, written in 1926, bemoaned the stark reality, Only the casualty lists filtered down to them (Bombay officials) slowly, and the calculated optimism of official publications was gruesomely offset by the return of the sick and wounded of whom the steady stream from Mesopotamia brought home too often tales of mismanagement and defeat, startlingly corroborated by the thunderbolt of the Kut surrender, just after Lord Hardinge had handed over the Viceroyalty to Lord Chelmsford….61

A recent article published in Indica, entitled ‘Curing, Comforting, Coping: The ‘War Hospitals’ in Bombay, 1914–1918’,62 gives an excellent account of the War Hospitals organized for the wounded and convalescent soldiers returning from Mesopotamian and German East African campaigns. Sir Claude H. Hill, ICS, who served the BG during those turbulent days of the war, writes in his Indian memoirs India: Stepmother, about the medical assistance provisioned for the stream of wounded soldiers returning to Bombay: it happened that the new buildings for the Natural History Museum and the Science Institute (bearing Lord Sydenham’s name) were approaching completion... in time to receive their melancholy complement of wounded and disabled from the distant battlefields. And as one of those responsible for the administration of the Museum Hospital in the early months of the struggle, I am glad here to testify to the generosity and public spirit of the citizens of Bombay…. Work parties labored incessantly; doctors— Hindu, Mahomedan, Parsi and European—gave their service unstintedly and gratis; men and women visitors of every colour, creed, and race offered their help; and Bombay citizenship did all it could for the relief of suffering and the alleviation of pain…. Endeavors were made to supplement the official supply of wooden legs with articulated limbs through private beneficence…. In the majority of cases, as was discovered later in their homes, the proud possessors of these used them only as exhibition toys and confined practical usage to the ordinary wooden limbs.63

61

Chirol, India, 160.

62

Pandya, ‘Curing, Comforting, Coping’.

63

Hill, India—Stepmother, 205.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   103  

VI The Mesopotamian expedition was a total disaster on nearly every count. The magnitude of the fiasco was so pronounced that a Commission of Inquiry was appointed by an Act of the Parliament under the Chairmanship of Lord George Francis Hamilton in late 1916, to enquire into the operation of the war in Mesopotamia.64 The MC did not spare neither the home authorities nor the Indian government, and submitted its detailed report in 1917, even while the war was in progress. Detailing its findings, the Commission observed: in the first instance, the expedition was equipped as if for frontier warfare against undisciplined tribes armed only with rifles. Except this campaign, the rest of the theatres of war were controlled and conducted by the Home government and debited to imperial funds. But the division of responsibility between the India Office (Whitehall) and the Indian government, with Viceroy at Delhi and Army headquarters at Simla, the former undertaking the policy and the latter the management of the expedition, was unworkable. The attempt in India to entirely control and regulate the wants of the expedition from Simla was an administrative mistake, as the great mass of troops, stores and reinforcements for Mesopotamia embarked at Bombay and at the same port the disembarkation of the huge number of sick and wounded returning from that country took place. Many who were called upon to testify before the Parliamentary Commission expressed that GOI did not realize the immensities of the issues raised by the war and the 64 It was called Mesopotamian Commission. Following were the members of this Commission: Lord George Francis Hamilton as the Chairman, The Earl of Donoughmore, Lord Hugh Cecil MP, Sir Archibald Williamson MP, George Hodge MP, Commander Josiah C. Wedgwood MP, Admiral Sir Cyprian Arthur George Bridge, and Gen Sir Neville Gerald Lyttelton. They were authorized to inquire into the origin, inception and conduct of operations of War in Mesopotamia, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded and the responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it had been to minister to the wants of the forces employed over there. This commission went through voluminous evidence collected and collated in Mesopotamia and India by the Vincent–Bingley Commission. MSA/PD/ WAR/1917/291-W.

 104   Indians in the First World War

administration’s response to the necessities of the situation was not whole-hearted. But as the dimensions of the war grew and the character of the issues became more pronounced, the Viceroy at Delhi, the Army headquarters with its Commander-in-Chief at Simla and the Secretary of State for India in London failed to realize the magnitude of the emergency. The successive advances from Basra to Kurna, to Amra and to Kut, were defensive in character. But the advance to Baghdad in October 1915 was an offensive movement based upon political and military miscalculations; attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparations. The MC made a special and detailed critical indictment of the war efforts at all levels on two major issues, namely, the river and railroad transport, and the lack of medical assistance to the soldiers on the battlefield due to bureaucratic ‘misuse of reticence’. Some of the facts noted by the MC were as follows: In January 1916, the GOI sent Sir George Buchanan, a civilian who had been in charge of the Port of Rangoon, with a view to his becoming Director General of the Port of Basra, and to reorganize the traffic and facilities of the Port. He was not formally given any formal appointment indicating the position he was to hold or specifying his duty, though a titular designation was given to him, namely that of Director General of Port Administration and River Conservancy. Since differences soon ensued between Sir George Buchanan and Sir John Nixon, the Commander of the Expeditionary Force ‘D’, the former’s powers were so limited that he felt slighted. After a short stay, Sir George returned to India and he sent his report to Simla on the conditions as he found them at Basra. Around the middle of 1916, Sir George Buchanan was again sent back to Basra with full control of Basra port and he radically reorganized the port and traffic management. In mid-1916 when the War Office took over the charge and responsibility of the expedition in Mesopotamia, much energy was spent in building wharves, increasing the facilities and generally making the port more capable of meeting the growing demands. Much of the material required for these activities had to be manufactured in England and United States and involved heavy expenditure. Early in the Mesopotamian campaign when operations were on a minor scale and not very far from tidal water, there seems to have

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   105  

been no thought of special river hospital steamers. The need had not then been felt. In February 1915, a hospital barge, the ‘Bengali’, was offered by the Bengal government and accepted, but was foundered on the voyage. Replacement was not asked for. Between February and August 1915, various communications passed between Mesopotamia and India concerning requisitioning of motor launches. When the request was not complied with, native boats called mahailas were used for removing sick and wounded. These arrangements were only for local and short-distance transport. The sick and wounded were brought down the river and put on steamers and barges, which were normally used for transporting troops, animals or supplies. On 13 August 1915, Surgeon-General Hathaway made application to the Inspector-General of Communications of Basra, in which a special hospital steamer was mentioned for the first time to convey sick and wounded. He suggested that a tug or two mahailas could be supplied as an alternative. The steamer and tug were refused on the ground that all were required for movement of troops and supplies, and thereafter Surgeon-General Hathaway did not carry the matter any further. On 10 December 1915, India cabled London demanding four hospital steamers to be built in England. On 1 March 1916, it was finally settled that two hospital steamers to be built in England and two in Calcutta. The first hospital stern-wheel steamer named ‘Sikkim’ with accommodation for 144 wounded soldiers arrived at Basra about the middle of March 1916—1 year and 5 months after the campaign had commenced, and about 4 months after the battle of Ctesiphon, which had resulted in disaster for the British Expeditionary Force ‘D’, accounting more than 3,500 casualties. It was only after this disaster that the War Office took charge of this campaign, which supplemented the provision largely. The conclusions the MC did draw from these facts were: General Nixon was responsible for advancing without sufficient river transport to meet all needs, which in turn involved inability to set aside special steamers to be fitted for hospital use. Surgeon General Hathaway showed little foresight; even his small request of 13 August 1915 for an improvised hospital steamer or tug was not urged persistently or with sufficient emphasis. In this matter, the solicitude and initiative shown by the Commander-in-Chief in India were too late.

 106   Indians in the First World War

The actual facts showed that the attitude of Army Headquarters at Simla regarding railroad transport were no different than that of river transport. The authorities in India and in England decided not to proceed with the construction of the railways as proposed by Sir John Nixon, the GOC the Mesopotamian expedition, on the ground of expense. As the proposal involved considerable expenditure, it was submitted to the Finance Department, but was not considered by Sir William Meyer, the Finance Member, until 5 October 1915, when he forwarded to the Army Department. On receipt of this note, the Commander-in-Chief Sir Beauchamp Duff discussed the question of constructing railway between Basra and Nasariyah, with Sir Percy Lake, the Chief of the General Staff. The Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that the proposal was rejected on the ground that ‘The large expenditure involved could not in our opinion be justified either on political or commercial consideration’. Hence, both Sir John Nixon and the Home government were informed about the refusal. On this issue, the MC concluded that the railway was refused because Sir Beauchamp Duff did not agree with Sir John Nixon’s estimate of its military necessity. Besides, the Indian government were not prepared to put the proposal before the Secretary of State, because they were afraid that the expenditure might ultimately fall upon India. In January 1916, Sir Percy Lake, who was in favour of railway construction, had succeeded Sir John Nixon in command of Mesopotamian expedition. Sir Percy Lake was so impressed with the finality of the decision of GOI refusing railway construction that he did not raise the issue until April 1916. It was not until the War Office took over the administration in addition to the control of the campaign in July 1916 that the railways were really pressed forward as the urgency demanded. Interestingly, the cost of all the railways in Mesopotamia, according to the estimates, was less than the cost of river craft, and that if the railways had been authorized at an early date a portion of the river craft might have been unnecessary. Although the railway from Basra to Nasariyeh was strongly recommended by General Barrett on 28 February 1915 and also supported by General Nixon on 14 August 1915, the proposal was dealt with a

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   107  

tardy manner by the Indian government, and was negatived by them in November 1915 on the ground that it did not justify the expenditure involved. It was only when asked for by the third GOC the expedition, General Lake, and under pressure from the War Office in April 1916, that the Indian government consented to the proposal, and awoke to the necessity of railways for the expedition. All these grossly contributed to the problems of troop movement, regular supplies of ammunition and equipment and transporting the wounded and sick soldiers back. As regards the medical breakdown, the MC was greatly facilitated by the report of Commission instituted by the GOI, of which Sir William Vincent was the Chairman and Maj Gen Bingley and Mr E. A. Ridsdale were the members. Their report, known as—‘The Vincent–Bingley Report’, was much appreciated by the MC for their accuracy of facts. On 23 November 1915, that is, before the battle of Ctesiphon concluded, a telegram was despatched from Army Headquarters in India to Basra pointing out the desirability of organizing a fleet of Hospital River Steamers on the Tigris, but such an intimation came too late to be of any practical value, in meeting or easing the sufferings of those who were wounded in this battle, and in the retreat, which followed immediately afterwards. Surgeon-General Hathaway who, in April 1915, became Principal Medical Officer in Mesopotamia, was until August 1915, of opinion that tugs and specially fitted mahailahs would be an efficient substitute, an opinion that the MC did not concur. Evidence showed that the officers in-charge of Force ‘D’ contemplated a far lower establishment than was laid down for a frontier campaign and that the actual number of medical personnel deployed in Mesopotamia during long periods was far below even this meagre scale. The MC blamed ‘the failure throughout the campaign to provide land ambulance transport for the wounded’ and considered matter to be one of great moments, as it was the cause of intense sufferings and in many cases marred the chances of recovery. Lack of arrangements for purifying drinkable water for supply to the troops at the front resulted in outbreak of cholera. After the debacle at Ctesiphon,

 108   Indians in the First World War

Surgeon-General Hathaway candidly confessed, that ‘had the authorities in India or at home had any inkling of the true affairs at the beginning of December (1915) special efforts might have been made at any rate to reinforce the medical personnel in Mesopotamia in view of future operations’. A large number of patients got no treatment until they reached Basra. It was only at a late period of enquiry that the terms of reference of VB Report were enlarged so as to include the earlier part of campaign. Moreover, the chief medical officers responsible during this earlier period, Colonel Hehir in Mesopotamia and Surgeon-General Babtie in India, were not available as witness before that commission. Hence, Vincent-Bingley Report did not cover medical administration up to the summer of 1915. Col Hehir however submitted his official reports sent to Surgeon General Babtie in India, which amply justified his concern for the insanitary conditions, the need for proper water supply, the measure he adopted to cope with a possible outbreak of malaria, the danger of scurvy arising from the deficient ration for the troops, the need for typhoid and small-pox vaccine and anti-tetanus serum. The ration remained, generally, fixed as was decided in 1912, and though some additions were made in May 1916, in the summer of same year a very serious outbreak of scurvy occurred amongst the Indian troops in Mesopotamia, which caused the death of 7,500 in 19 weeks. The Vincent-Bingley Report held the Chief Medical Officer in Mesopotamia, Col Hehir and the Director of Medical Services in India, Surgeon-General Hathaway (which was located at Simla) squarely responsible. Finally, in May 1917, the Commission, in order and sequence of responsibility, fixed the liability of this fiasco: Sir John Nixon, in India and in-charge of the Campaign in Mesopotamia; the Viceroy Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army; in England, Sir Edmond Barrow, the Military Secretary of the India Office, the Secretary of State for India, Mr Austen Chamberlain and the War Committee of the Cabinet.65 65

Ibid.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   109  

VII The publication of the MC Report had immediate after effects among the Indian nationalist press. The foremost among them in Bombay was the scathing attack made by the editor of Bombay Chronicle, Benjamin Guy Horniman. He doubted if the findings of the MC report in any manner justifies the forming of a definite opinion as to the justice done to the issues it raised. He pointed out in the article ‘The Lesson of Mesopotamia’, that the object lesson of the similar Commission of Inquiry showed that it was composed of ‘politicians thirsting for somebody’s blood’, which is ‘hardly a body that one can look to for a calm, judicial and impartial finding’. Hence, he felt, the MC report would ‘prove to be in any greater degree worthy of public confidence’. The fact that the Prime Minister Lloyd George who as a member of the War Cabinet was twice censured by Royal Commission; Lord Hardinge who was the Chairman of a Royal Commission that censured Secretary of Ireland, now stands as a victim of censure himself by another commission, Horniman thought it was a political blame game publicly played. It also showed that as public memory is short, such censure was an eyewash and persons responsible are quietly rehabilitated to other positions of power. He also deplored how some of the journals in England and India sought to establish with ‘malignant persistency’ that the advance to Baghdad was forced upon an unwilling military commander by ministers who were looking for some spectacular adventure to cover up their blunders. Horniman quizzed, in what respect Lord Hardinge’s responsibility was any greater than that of War Cabinet and Secretary of State?66 Horniman continued his indictment in a series of four articles in Bombay Chronicle, under the title ‘Mesopotamia –And Its Moral’.67 Fundamentally, Horniman argued that the ‘Mesopotamian muddle’ for the first time gives ‘a valid glimpse into the working of the dangerously obsolete bureaucracy by which India is still governed’. He Horniman, A Friend of India. This book was published by Lakshmidas Rawjee Tairsee, a known nationalist of the Tilakite group.

66

67

Ibid., 241–257.

 110   Indians in the First World War

quoted scathing castigation meted out to Indian bureaucracy in the English press—from the Globe (England): The Indian bureaucracy is revealed as a grossly ignorant of that which it was the plain business of the bureaucrats to know, as utterly reckless of the lives of men for whom it was responsible, as fawningly obsequious to those above it, and as unapproachable and insolent to those below. That is the bureaucrat all over. It is a sin to doubt his omniscience and blasphemy to correct his mistakes. Arrogant incompetence is the badge of his tribe, and if the Mesopotamia Report does not stir the people of Britain to a firm resolve to keep under strict and vigilant control, they will richly deserve to perish beneath his blighting rule.68

In analyzing the causes of this colossal failure, the Guardian (England) commented on the ‘pervert psychology of the Government of India’, quotes Horniman, ‘That powerful institution has laboriously built up a false tradition of sacrosanctity. It has become a ‘law unto itself satisfied of its own infallibility’. Horniman showed how at every level from top to bottom—from the British cabinet and the Secretary of State down to the Viceroy and his Councilors—every person evaded his responsibility by placing the blame on others and argued for a substantial reform of the constitutional machinery that governed India. The example he cited was of how Secretary of State gave evasive replies in the Parliament to Commander Joshua Wedgwood’s searching question on Annie Besant’s internment in Madras. He also showed how the bureaucracy refused to take any action even after ground realities were adequately informed to them and were brushed aside by terming them rumours. Everyone in the British administration hardly bothered about the MC report once the initial reaction subsided. The bureaucracy at all levels both at home and in India was back again with their policy of ‘repression and conciliation’—to repress the Extremist element in Indian leadership and to conciliate with those showing obsequious loyalty. Horniman’s acerbic, hard-hitting criticism gradually became Ibid., 241. The four articles written by Horniman under the title, ‘Mesopotamia— Its Moral’, produced a salutary effect on the public opinion and on the Home Rule movement. 68

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   111  

more intense in the course of time, particularly after the Jallianwala Massacre, finally resulting in his forcible deportment to England in 1919. Even Sir Stanley Reed, as editor of the Times, a newspaper that normally acted as an extended arm of the imperialist executive, was disillusioned with the official attitude: If India did not become, in a later phase, the arsenal of democracy, it was the reservoir for the manpower which made final victory possible. These services are half-forgotten now—their influence on the political development of India was scarce mentioned in the later discussion on constitutional reform—but they were powerful forces leading to the fulfilment of British rule.

The War Conference and the Indian Leaders’ Response The ramifications of the Mesopotamian disaster in the context of Home Rule League movement and the on-going efforts to forge unity of the Congress and Muslim League culminating into the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress under Tilak and the Muslim League leaders M. A. Jinnah and Wasir Hassan, which acknowledged communal representation as provided under Morley–Minto Reforms, were many. Chelmsford came to India as Viceroy, replacing Lord Hardinge, in April 1916 with his mind made up that a declaration of British policy was necessary. On 14 July 1917, Austen Chamberlain resigned as the Secretary of State over the Mesopotamian affair.69 On 18 July 1917, within a week of his performance in Parliament over the Mesopotamian debate, Edwin Samuel Montague, who had been Under Secretary of State for India (1910–1914), was appointed as Chamberlain’s successor at India Office. Montague was anxious that any declaration of British policy must include the word ‘selfgovernment’, not only because it was so current in Indian nationalist discourse thereby in a way to placate their demand, but because he feared that its avoidance might lead to dissatisfaction and hamper the There was never any suggestion that blame be attached to Austen Chamberlain, but as Secretary of State for India, he felt it was moral obligation to resign as his department was involved in the conduct of the Mesopotamian campaign.

69

 112   Indians in the First World War

recruitment and thus defeat the very purpose of making a declaration.70 Thus, followed the 20 August 1917 Montague Declaration in the House of Commons, which outlined the British policy towards India in future: The policy of His Majesty’s government with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.71

Chelmsford’s viceroyalty marked the mobilization of the Princely States not only as a counterpoise to the nationalist upsurge under Home Rule League agitators but was intended to seek utmost and unreserved cooperation to the war effort in terms of men, money and material. The Princely States had responded to the imperial call from the beginning of the war without any reservation.72 In recognition of their obsequious loyalty during war, Chelmsford announced at the Second Conference of Princes and Chiefs held at Delhi on 5 November 1917 that he contemplated an early establishment of a Council of Princes, which was intended to become Chamber of Princes. The Princes as the third side of the Indian power struggle received legitimation from the imperial authority when Maharaja of Bikaner, along with Sir Satyendra Sinha and Sir James Meston of the Indian Civil Service, were nominated to represent the country at the Imperial War Conference.73 The place accorded to them at the Delhi War Conference and Bombay War Conference in 1918, was in pursuance of that policy. At this juncture, in adhering to the policy of Divide and Rule, and to neutralize the growing nationalist unrest and Hindu–Muslim Unity pledged at Lucknow, the British not only sowed the seeds of Muslim For further details regarding the factors that led to the declaration by Montague on 20 August 1917, see, Mehrotra, ‘The Politics Behind the Montague’.

70

71

For further details on this subject, read Danzig, ‘The Announcement of August’.

For offer of personal services to the war by the native princes, see MSA/PD/ WAR/1917/3-I-W; 1918/3- I and II; AND 1919/30-W.

72

73 Das, India: From Curzon, 59–60. Sir James Meston was the Lt Governor of the United Provinces.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   113  

separatism, but suddenly brought the Princes and Chiefs out of woods, and further sought to drive a subtle wedge between Dravidian and Aryan by sponsoring the non-Brahmin movement. By appointing Southborough Commission in 1917 to enquire into the possibility of extending communal electorate to other communities, the government made an ingenious bid to split the Hindu community by encouraging the untouchables to put claims that they were a sub-nation entitled to separate electorate. These machinations were perhaps not a part of an overall conspiracy but bureaucracy’s mere regional manifestations of self-defence. What then was Bombay Presidency’s contribution to recruitment for the First World War? Prior to the First World War, Bombay Army had a large number of regiments, which contained many persons outside the Presidency, though they were recruited in Bombay. At the beginning of the war, a few hundred recruits were annually obtained from the Presidency. The official statistics showed the following increase in the pre-war figures74 of recruitment as combatants and non-combatants: From August 1914 to 31 July 1915

10.5 times increase

From August 1915 to 31 July 1916

16 times increase

From August 1916 to 31 July 1917

27 times increase

From August 1917 to 31 July 1918

88 times increase

Of course these figures of the Bombay Presidency are not inclusive of (a) labouring population who were enlisted but being born in other provinces were credited to those provinces; (b) a large number of lascars belonging to the Bombay coast who did take part in the maintenance of British shipping upon high seas and (c) also the labourers who in the early stages of the campaign in Mesopotamia went to that place for railway and other works. Nearly 60,000 men from Bombay Presidency took share in the early stages of war.75 The 74

For source of this table: MSA/PD/WAR/1918/282-W.

The Mahratta regiments took a distinguished share in the victories of the early part of the campaign in Mesopotamia—at Kurna, Shaiba, Kut and Ctesiphon. They also had to share heavy casualties, some of them dying of plague. Ibid.

75

 114   Indians in the First World War

advance made in recruitment from early 1917 onwards was due to the exertions of the Recruiting Staff, the local officials and the ‘loyal help of private gentlemen’. In late 1916, when German offences mounted high, Allies casualties soared and that necessitated the want of more recruits. Hence, in early 1917, Central Recruitment Board in India was constituted to procure recruits. It consisted of Sir William Stevenson Meyer, the Finance Secretary, GOI, as President; and the members were: Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyer, Sir Claude Hamilton Archer Hill, Sir William Henry Hoare Vincent, Lt Gen Havlock Hudson, Adjutant Gen of India, Maj Gen A. H. Bingley, The Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior, The Maharaja of Bikaner, and Capt K. G. Feiling of the Royal Scots Fusiliers as Secretary. Similarly, provincial and local recruiting boards were constituted. The Central Recruiting Board fixed the quota for procuring recruits to the Provinces and in turn the demand for fixed quota was fixed to each district and to the villages periodically.76 A monthly quota of over 4,000 fresh recruits was assigned to Bombay Presidency. This was later increased to 6,000 per month. As this quota could not be obtained, it called for more concentrated efforts for procurement, despite the difficulties owing to the exceptional demand upon its labour market and its large number of industries.77 At the beginning of the war, recruits in the Bombay Presidency were obtained only from the Mahratta caste and the Deccani Muslims, the former contributing the largest share. These Mahrattas were procured from the areas of Ratnagiri, Sawantwadi State and Kolhapur State. The fact that others did not come forward for enlisting in the Army and Deccani Muslims disappointed, despite the efforts of their leaders, it was obviously necessary to narrow the recruitment gap. The local authorities therefore sought permission of the military 76 British Library, L/MIL/17/5/2152, Military Record Room No. 205; ‘Recruitment in India – Before and During the War of 1914 – 1918’, 196. But the information given in this file is the same as published in India’s Contribution to…, and it gives only official sanitized version and does not mention any ‘persuasive methods’ used by the government; Also, L/MIL/17/5/2390. In this file is given the Statement showing what India contributed in officer troops and establishment as well as war material since the outbreak of the First World War. 77

Ibid.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   115  

authorities at Simla to the enlistment of new classes. In this way, the formation of special companies and battalions of the following classes was sanctioned: Deccani Brahmins, Mahars, Bhandaris, Berads, Bhils, Deccan Kolis, Lingayats, Bombay Telugus, Indian Christians, Sindhi Mohammedans, Chambhars and inhabitants of Kathiawar.78 The Mahars had excellent tradition in the Bombay Army and their recruitment had been checked and they were excluded only because of the caste feelings of other high castes rather than any defect of their own. Despite Dalit orchestration of their martial race heritage and their petitions and meetings by Gopal Baba Valangkar79 and Shivaram Janba Kamble,80 requesting restitution of occupational and social rights, the Indian army stereotype of the martial races based on elite Aryan Kshatriya values continued to dominate until the early years of the First World War. The war in 1914 brought about renewed efforts from the Mahar community to enter the Indian Army. Vitthal Ramji Shinde, one who founded the Depressed Classes Mission Society of India and devoted his entire life for the upliftment of the untouchables, petitioned to the BG in March 1916 requesting to re-employ Dalit soldiers in the army. Rango Govind Naik and Papannna Jalliah Thayade of the Belgaum Depressed Classes Mission, Ganpat Govind Rokade from Ahmednagar and Shivram Janba Kamble from Pune also held a united meeting in Belgaum in October 1916 to petition for Mahar military service.81 Pressed by the escalation of war in 1916–1917 and a great need for soldiers, the GOI finally removed the prohibition on Mahar military recruitment in February 1917.82 Four companies of Mahars were raised, mostly from the Konkan, and formed into the 78 Ibid. In other provinces, they recruited the tribals such as Santhals, and tribals from Garo, Khasi in Assam.

Valangkar, Vinanti Patra; Anarya Dosh Pariharak Mandal Petition to His Excellency the Commander-in- Chief of Bombay Presidency, Pune, 1895.

79

80 Navalkar, The Life of Shivaram; Also see for Valangkar and Kamble, Gangadhar Pantavane.

They also sent petitions after the war, urging the government that Mahar recruitment to Indian Army should be a continuous affair. See Naik, Naidu, and Thadaye, Petition to Lord Rawlinson.

81

82

Constable, ‘The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race’.

 116   Indians in the First World War

111th Mahar Infantry. Despite this change, caste distinction was maintained and men belonging to non-martial castes were not inducted into companies and regiments of the martial castes. Practically in every district and in many talukas, recruiting committees were formed. Funds were raised to establish collecting depôts in which the recruit remained for a few days before he was dispatched to his unit. However, the officials regretted that men belonging to higher castes, such as Brahmins, by and large held aloof. To solicit brahmin recruitment special companies were raised such as Deccani Brahmin Company. The German offensive in France and the Turko-German attempt to move eastward across the Caspian were the outstanding features of the war in early 1918. The effect of this development on India was twofold: first, there was a prospect of war spreading to the direction of Indian frontiers due to Russia’s withdrawal from active participation by signing Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1917) with Germany. This necessitated a further searching examination of India’s military position and its resources. Second, it involved a further and large demand for men than had hitherto been contemplated. Not only did it become necessary to increase the armies in India and overseas, but the extreme urgency of concentrating British manpower on the Western Front threw upon India the additional obligation of replacing the British soldier wherever he could be spared.83 Earlier on 12 June 1917, the Indian Defence Force and the War League, established by the government in the early days of the war to seek recruitment of Indians, published a mischievous report in the Time of India, under the title ‘Hopeless Failure of Recruitment of Indians’. The said article was published by the government with the ulterior motive and argued that the Indian nationalists should not demand any kind of Swarajya or Home Rule for themselves after the conclusion of war, since they have contributed least to the recruitment drive. A fitting reply was published in the Times, by Dr Motiram B. Velkar, a close colleague of Tilak, refuting the allegations levelled 83

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/119-W.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   117  

against the Indian leaders.84 Such malicious reports were published with a view to checkmate the growing Congress–Muslim League unity efforts. But the reverses in early 1918 on various war fronts forced the government to tone down their hostility considerably and adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Indian leaders. Under such exigencies of war, the British Prime Minister sent a telegram to the Viceroy, both confidential and secret, which in turn was forwarded to the Governor of Bombay on 13 April 1918: While it is early yet to estimate the final result of the present battle, it is quite clear that the fundamental problem before the allies is the enemy’s man power.   Unless the enemy succeeds in achieving his full purpose in this battle, which we have good hope of preventing his doing, he will certainly refit as rapidly as possible in the hope of striking another blow before we are ready to meet it. He has proved his capacity in this battle to drive in the Western front. The future course of the war therefore depends on our ability to refit our armies as fast as we can, and the difficult time is June and July. In order to do this, we shall have to draw upon all available resources.   At the same time the area of the war is spreading steadily eastward…. Recruiting, I know, has been exceptionally good in India lately & I have no doubt that this new effort on the front of the Germans at tyrannizing over the world will awaken India to see more clearly the danger which menaces her. I think therefore that you should take this opportunity to do everything in your power to increase Indian establishment for war, not only in troops but in railway materials and military equipments of all kinds….85 (Emphasis is mine)

Immediately, a War Conference was held in Delhi on 27–28 April 1918, participated by native Princes and prominent people, including M. K. Gandhi and Dadasaheb (G. S.) Khaparde. The most significant omissions at this meeting were the Home Rule League leaders, that is, B. G. Tilak, Dr Annie Besant and their Extremist party. It was decided in the Conference to raise and train an additional 500,000 combatants within a year. The entire bureaucratic machinery from Central Recruiting Board, 84

Velkar, Lokmanya Tilak.

85

MSA/PD/WAR/1918/290-W.

 118   Indians in the First World War

Provincial Recruiting Board down to the lowest level was re-geared to achieve the target. To stimulate the movement, a gratuity was granted to every man who completed the recruit’s course, and in addition, a war bonus was sanctioned, payable every 6 months, to every Indian (Junior) non-Commissioned officer such as Subhedar to Hawaldar and soldiers. The monthly intake of combatant recruits rose from 16,000 in May to over 37,500 in September 1918.86 At this Delhi War Conference, the Viceroy spoke of his immediate concerns: If the war were to stop tomorrow, the tale of India’s share in the Great War would form no unworthy page in her glorious annals. Her sons have fought not without glory on every front…. There is one matter, however, which is in the domain of the Imperial Council, with regard to which I must make brief allusion. I refer to finance. We have had to meet large military expenditure and the heavy Council drawing required to finance exports of national importance; and the strain, which the provision of these large amounts in India has thrown on us, has been mainly due to the difficulty of supplementing our resources by specie remittances on a scale commensurate with our requirements. Remittances in the form of gold have been limited by the necessity of conserving the central gold resources of the Empire and the Allies, while in the case of silver we have been prevented from obtaining the supplies we desired by the large competitive demands of other countries for this metal.87

Bearing in mind the political agitation by the nationalist, he whisked away their demands by saying, ‘The liberty of the world must be won before our aspirations for the liberalizing of Indian political institutions can acquire any tangible meaning. And surely no one can say that India has any cause for complaint on this score…’ and urged the Indians to concentrate their energies to ‘prevent the tyranny of the German Empire from engulfing the whole world’. The Maharaja of Baroda, while moving the resolution of loyalty, appealed to the sense of ‘patriotic duty’. This sentiment was repeated by the Begam of Bhopal, the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior, the Maharaja 86

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/119-W.

87

GOI, Proceedings of the War.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   119  

of Bikaner, Raja of Mahmudabad and also by Maharaja of Patiala, extoling the virtues of the British Empire, ‘which stands for justice, for equal rights and righteous relations’.88 As one of those who supported the resolution of loyalty, Surendra Nath Banergea said, If I were 40 years younger, I should have deemed it the pride and the privilege of my life to have enlisted as a private soldier in the Bengali battalion now fighting in Mesopotamia. However, that may be, such is our unalterable faith in the supremacy of the moral laws that govern the universe, that we are firmly assured of the ultimate success of the Allies, of the complete vindication of the principles for which they are fighting, of their extension to our people, and our eventual participation in this triumph…89

S. N. Banerjea lacked the political insight and the courage of his convictions and toed the line with pro-Indian European thought in the matter. There is no mention of Indian forces fighting in the First World War in his The Making of Indian Nation. He later went to England in 1919 as a deputation of Moderate Party and on his return became minister of local self-government under diarchy with Lord Ronaldshey as Governor of Bengal. Srinivas Shastri’s take on this was, ‘…that peril is not less than German domination. We all know what that means, it is not merely the spoliation of wealth, it is not merely the destruction of towns but it is the dishonouring of women. It is further enslavement of the people, and saddest of sad things, when we become slaves of Germany we would probably be compelled to fight in her armies and be used for the further enslavement of the people of Asia….’90 It was indeed an orchestrated display of obsequious loyalty in which others such as Mahrrao of Kutch, Maharaja of Alwar, Maharaj Rana of Dholpur, Maharaj of Kapurthala, Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyer, A. C. Mozumdar and Sir N. G. Chandavarkar joined in chorus. One exception to this chorus was Gandhi. He was reluctant to attend this War Conference at Delhi, since he argued that all war and 88

Ibid., 20–24.

89

Ibid., 34.

90

Ibid., 41.

 120   Indians in the First World War

fighting was wrong, and that he would be no party to any measure designed to further armed conflict. How he was dissuaded from actively opposing the resolutions at this Conference is narrated by Claude H. Hill, a seasoned senior bureaucrat: I had to report any failure with Gandhi to Lord Chelmsford. The latter arrived at 8 o’clock on the morning fixed for the first full session, and was good enough to consent to Gandhi at 10 am. Having tried every possible with that charming, gentle and unpractical visionary, I had not much hope of any change; but Lord Chelmsford, as a last resort had the inspiration to say, ‘Then, Mr. Gandhi, you prefer to acquiesce in the principle of Might, through Militarism, which the Allies are at present combating?’ That argument—so elementary that one had neglected it—clinched Gandhi’s decision to take no step in opposition to the proposals.91

The reactions of the panic-stricken Bombay bureaucracy to the Prime Minister’s appeal are not only illuminating in their approach, their apprehensions, fears and difficulties, but also reveal the ‘other methods’ they used to seek ‘voluntary’ recruitment work. C. N. Sedon, Commissioner, Central Division, commented, ‘We are in serious danger. A German triumph, the ruin of everything that matters to us…. We must not be crushed by the Teutonic attack or dominated by Germany. We must concentrate on avoiding that fatal catastrophe….’ He suggested that the administration should immediately suspend all activities such as building new roads and bridges, carrying city surveys, all the intricate problems that arise out of revenue, agricultural, irrigational and educational systems, which involve heavy expenditure; and that Poona racing could be stopped and the energies could be diverted to war.92 Responding to Sedon’s suggestions, L. Robertson, the Secretary, PD, BG, first dismissed any action against racing: ‘racing affords healthy amusement to a large number of men who are convalescent after having been wounded or having contracted disease in the field’ and noted that the income obtained there from could be utilized for war charities. He believed that the civilian population should be dealt by ‘comb out’ operations, 91

Hill, India–Stepmother, 251–252.

MSA/PD/WAR/1918/290-W, C. N. Sedon, Commissioner, Central Division, BG to L. Robertson, Secretary, PD, BG. (Confdl.) 17 April 1918. 92

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   121  

and that a quota be allowed to each village, which could ‘chose the men required by ballot or any other suitable method’. He, however, was in favour of cautious introduction of ‘a measure of compulsion but the name may be avoided & the measure could be applied gradually’. He wrote, ‘I understand that in the Bijapur district, Mr. J.N. Karbaji (the Collector) is working “voluntary” recruitment by allotting a quota of men to each village & requiring the village to produce the number thus fixed; Commissioner, Southern Division, informed me that he had no complaints.’93 Sedon also pointed out difficulties faced in recruitment work and his comment on Brahmins shows official bias against them: I admit with much sorrow that voluntary recruiting is poor. But I cannot see what can be done…Southern Division is better than Central Division because it contains Ratnagiri & Sawantwadi which always have supplied a large number of recruits…. Our ordinary administration is worked through the Brahmanas. Here in recruiting we have the Brahmanas either against us, or at least not helping us. The only way of getting more men that I can see is to get the Brahmanas on our side and to give them the same position in the military machine as they have in the Civil, i.e. Commissioned and non-commissioned rank. It is a pretty problem but there it is. (Emphasis is mine)94 93

Ibid. Note on Sedon’s suggestions. 18 April 1918.

Ibid., Sedon’s suggestions in a letter dated 22 April 1918. This shows how Government’s prejudices against the upper castes, notably the Brahmins was so strong. This is also reflected in the expressions of other members of the bureaucracy. Even the Sedition Committee of 1918 expressed its marked bias against the Brahmins in the one page ‘Introduction’ to their report. It stated: 94

It was not long before the Brahmin minister and his descendants became the rulers of the Deccan with the title Peshwa. They had their court at Poona and the government became both in substance and appearance a Brahmin government. During the long minority of one of the Peshwas the de facto ruler of the Deccan was the minister Nana Peshwa…. It was the Chitpavan government so established which was overthrown by the British late in the second decade of the 19th century. The Brahmins were employed by the British the subordinate administration, but they had lost their commanding influence, and certain discontent and longing for a return to power naturally remained. It is among these Brahmins of the Poona district that we first find indications of a revolutionary movement. The Sedition Committee was headed by Mr Justice Rowlatt, and the other members were: Sir Basil Scott, Justice C. V. Kumarswami Shashtri of Madras High Court, Sir Verney Lovett, P. C. Mitter of the Bengal Legislative Council, and J. D. V. Hodge, ICS.

 122   Indians in the First World War

Such bias against the Brahmins of Maharashtra was common amongst the White bureaucracy, similar to what Charles Kincaid wrote through the good offices of Valentine Chirol in the article ‘The Chitpawans of Chiplun’ in London Times in 1910. The government always held the Brahmin intellectual leadership in utter suspicion for outmanoeuvring the official policies. A Memorandum submitted on 17 April 1918, by F. W. Anderson, Settlement Commissioner and Director, Land Records, Poona, to Chief Secretary George Carmichael, BG, sums up general British attitude in the initial days of the First World War and also shows both ambivalence and bewildered state of mind of the bureaucracy: It is necessary to recapitulate the situation in Europe. It is sufficient to refer to the urgent call for every possible assistance which has been issued and to remember that at home the military age is raised, all exemptions overhauled, and all non-vital industries suppressed, and no effort spared or cost counted in the effort to secure victory. At the beginning we carried on the War in too supercilious and sporting a fashion, as though engaged in a game against children, in which it was undignified to appear pressed to put out one’s full strength. I take it that those sentiments have now gone, or must go. When the house is on fire, we do not wait to complete our usual day’s work before we bother to put it out, nor do we say that we cannot allow anyone to enter the house or throw water on the flames for fear of spoiling the curtains and the door mats…. Rather I find everywhere the most earnest desire to do more, but a feeling of despair that no practical way of doing more can be found or else that it is no use advocating any further steps unless Government take the lead…. I would first consider the question whether we are to weigh the pros and cons?…Is there a limit to the pay and compensation which we should give to a combatant willing to go into the fight? A more complex case would arise when a proposed measure would give some assistance immediately for the War but would entail a considerable loss of revenue or of administrative efficiency, or in some other way, either now or hereafter. In either of these cases, complex or simple, dare we say that the cost of helping on the War is too great and therefore should not be paid? Metaphorically, if we are on a sinking ship, would there be any part of the cargo which would be too valuable to throw overboard in order to save the ship itself? Should we say ‘we cannot throw overboard that gold because it is worth a million? Better let the ship sink, which will mean the loss not only of the gold, but of everything else on board and all the crew.’ Put in that form, I think the answer to our question must be that if a genuine crisis has to be faced, then there are no pros and cons to be weighed. It is not a question of whether it is expedient to succeed, but anything and everything

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   123  

which can help must be done. What is at stake is more than the efficiency of an administration. It is more than the reputation for sagacity and calmness of a bureaucracy. Anything that holds out hope of advantage must be wholeheartedly tried and not desisted until it fails.95

He scribbled another letter the next day after reading Viceroy’s emphasis on ‘concentration on the prosecution of war’, in the Pioneer dated 17 April 1918. How Anderson as well as other high officials in the bureaucracy were baffled by Gandhi’s recruitment drive on the one side and his soul-searching Satyagrahas on the other is reflected in his letter of caution addressed to Mr Carmichael about Satyagraha in Kaira: One M. K. Gandhi, preaching the annihilation of all government, and purely anarchical doctrine in Gujrat is of more danger than all the measures he advocates. [Why cannot he, by the way, obey his own conscience somewhere out of India and let the Kaira people discover their own conscience without his aid? Even a pure Tilak Home Rule Government in full blast could not allow such doctrine as Gandhi publishes in the Times of India this morning.] But the policy of extreme concentration on war does have the effect of risking a dangerous stir in the Orient against the ‘setting sun’, nevertheless it is a risk we must run. Putting of the risk only makes it worse, we cannot go on governing a continent on the foundation of hypocrisy. Win the war and all financial credit for reconstruction and all prestige in the East come back to us in full measures. But lose the war, refusing meanwhile to recognize or utter the truth, and we shall lose it without any salvage even from the wreck….96 (Underlining and bracket as in the original text)

The fact that Gandhi was unconditionally helping recruitment made the administration bypass this caution. Except that Anderson’s analogy with the conditions at home was thought mistaken, G. Carmichael, L. Robertson and all other Secretaries of BG concurred with the suggestions. All chose to ignore that part of Anderson’s letter, which concerned with ‘sagacity and generosity’. After the Delhi War Conference, the Home Rule Leaguers felt most affronted. This is reflected in the speech of Lokmanya Tilak MSA/PD/WAR/1918/290-W. This Memorandum was submitted in response to the British Prime Minister’s and in turn Viceroy’s appeal for all out efforts for winning the war and the need to have more recruits to fight on the battlefront.

95

96

Ibid.

 124   Indians in the First World War

on the theme ‘The Present Political Situation’ delivered on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Home Rule League movement at Roypatta (Madras Presidency) on 21 April, and which has been recorded verbatim by the intelligence officers.97 Tilak was emphatic in demanding: India must be granted Home Rule as a war measure, apart from our question of fitness, apart from the question of liberality, apart from the question of justice, apart from the question of race, apart from the question of continent. This Home Rule to India was a necessary as a war measure if the Empire was to be saved…. Home Rule is being granted to Ireland as a war measure, war measure under the necessity of a psychological principle backed up by pressure from America. (Emphasis is mine)

Tilak questioned the basis of the composition of the War Conference, its predominance of Native Princes and of having majority of officials. He argued that neither the Native Princes form a part of British India nor they are peoples’ representatives of their state. He felt that it was absurd for the ‘loyal’ of people of India to make a condition with the government and further clarified: My idea of loyalty is this. I say we do not impose any condition upon Government; but we bring to the notice of the Government the psychological law that you cannot compel a man to do a thing unless you please him at the same time. It is a psychological necessity, not a condition imposed by us. Before people determine to fight for the liberty of other nations, they must be assured that they will enjoy that liberty in their own home. It is not a condition made by us. If any one made that condition it is human nature…. We are prepared to cooperate with the Government, we are prepared to defend our motherland against any possible danger from the North-West, whether real or imaginary, we are prepared to defend, but at the same time we cannot enthusiastically defend, zealously defend, unless in our heart of hearts we are convinced that we are fighting for our own country…. India cannot now fight a battle for her motherland unless we, the sons of India are made to feel that it is their motherland, and in that motherland they possess a birthright of managing their own affairs. (Emphasis is mine)98 Bombay Presidency Abstracts of Intelligence (BPPAI)/No. 19/Vol. XXXI/11 May 1918/ para 576 (g). The meeting was presided over by Mrs Annie Besant and those who attended included Sir S. Subrahmanya Ayyar, S. Kasturiranga Ayangar, C. P. Ramaswami Ayyar, B. P. Wadia, P. Nagbhushanam and the Hon. K. V. Rangaswami Ayyangar. 97

98

Ibid.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   125  

He then condemned the selective approach of the British government to agree to grant right to self-determination as proposed by American President Woodrow Wilson, to the German colonies after the war and not to India. On the contrary, what the British colonial masters resort to in the name of stopping political agitation and propaganda is by repressive measures—by another legislation, by another Press Act, another Seditious Meetings Act, or another ordinance under the Defence of India Act? That seems to be the object. To the British officials, Tilak was thus the greatest thorn in their governance and in such a vitiated atmosphere was convened the Bombay War Conference. With instructions from the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon immediately mobilized the administration in organizing a Provincial War Conference at Bombay on 10 June 1918, to pass resolutions of loyalty and working out a scheme of the War Purposes Board. The official records show how the bureaucracy deliberated in detail regarding the composition of the invites, constituting War Purposes Board and the sub-committees, and drafting the resolution of loyalty towards His Majesty, as also the agenda of the Conference.99 Gandhi had protested against the exclusion of B. G. Tilak, Dr Annie Besant and Ali Brothers at the Delhi War Conference. He had conveyed his protest not only to the officials but to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy as well.100 He wrote: ‘it was a grave blunder not to have asked them, and I respectfully suggest that the blunder could be partially repaired if these leaders were invited to assist the government by giving it the benefit their advice at the Provincial War Conferences which are to follow….’ He candidly confessed that no other Indian leader present at the War Conference at Delhi had the charisma and influence with the masses as Mr Tilak. The agenda, the composition, the sitting position on the dais was discussed with minute details by discussing it in the Governor’s Council with other members—G. C. Carmichael, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola, Sir J. B. DuBoulay, L. Robertson. MSA/PD/ WAR/1918/282-W. 99

M. K. Gandhi to Sir Claude Hill, 26 April 1918; M. K. Gandhi to the Viceroy, 29 April 1918; Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. It should be remembered that Gandhi was very close at this time with Ali Brothers, as he had forged a unity with these Muslim leaders on the question of Khilafat Movement. Also, Tilak had personally visited Gujrat to support the cause of the farmers of Kaira, which Gandhi had espoused at this time. 100

 126   Indians in the First World War

On the eve of the Bombay War Conference, he had similarly conveyed to L. Robertson.101 The carefully crafted list of invitees, besides the high-level officials, included the Maharaja Shahu of Kolhapur, the Maharaja of Cutch, the Chief of Sangli, Jamsaheb of Nawanagar, Sir Dorab J. Tata, Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy, Mr Purshottamdas Thakurdas, Mr N. B. Saklatwala, M. K. Gandhi, Rango Govind Naik of Belgaum, Sardar Y. T. Mirikar, G. K. Deodhar of Seva Sadan, Sir Narayan Ganesh Chandavarkar, M. A. Jinnah, Barrister Maulavi Rafiuddin Ahmed and of course the leaders of Home Rule League—B. G. Tilak, N. C. Kelkar, B. G. Horniman, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Vitthalbhai Patel, S. R. Bomanji, and many others. An assurance was given by the Private Secretary to the Governor Willingdon that they would be allowed to speak and that their suggestions would be considered if they attended the conference.102 The proceedings were orchestrated to the last detail. Speeches were communicated beforehand to the respective speakers. The officials were anticipating that, ‘person like Tilak, Horniman or Jamnadas Dwarkadas may wish to get up and make remarks which may lead to disharmony’. Care was taken to have at least one lady speaker, and the choice was made between Mrs Ramabai Ranade and Mrs Kashibai Kanitkar, to speak on the man-power resolution. The reasoning was: ‘She should be an Indian who should appeal to the womanhood of India to further recruiting in all its branches’. The final choice was Mrs Ramabai Ranade. She was approached beforehand and the lines which she was to speak on the ‘loyalty resolution’ were explained to her.103 Under the War Purposes Board, sub-committees were formed: (a) Man-Power Committee, (b) Resources Committee and (c) Publicity Committee. The Man-Power committee was further subdivided: (i) Indian Army Recruiting, (ii) European and AngloIndian Recruitment, (iii) Indian Defence Force—Indian Section

M. K. Gandhi to L. Robertson, Chief Secretary, PD, BG, June 9, 1918, CWMG, 421–422. 101

102

BPPAI/XXXI/1918/No. 27/Para 918 and 943–h.

MSA/PD/WAR/1918/282-W; for this effort perhaps, she was subsequently rewarded with Kaiser-i-Hind medal.

103

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   127  

and European Section, (iv) National Service Bureau. The Resources Committee was similarly subdivided.104 On the 10 June 1918, the Conference opened with the address of the Governor Lord Willingdon, who made certain unsolicited remarks against the Home Rule agitators: ‘there are a certain number of gentlemen some of whom have considerable influence with the public, many of them members of the political organization called Home Rule League whose activities of have been such as late years that I cannot honestly feel sure of the sincerity of their support, until I have come to a clear understanding with them…. These gentlemen must be perfectly well aware that no promises of the kind they seem to desire can possibly be given without full constitutional sanction….’105 The Maharaja Shahu of Kolhapur,106 Maharao of Cutch, the Chief of Sangli, C. H. Setalwad, Sir Dinshaw M. Petit and many others made well-orchestrated speeches, as demanded by the officials. Mrs Ramabai Ranade obliged the government more than she was expected to: that the people are most loyal and steadfast in their devotion to the Throne and will continue to do sacrifices…. The soldiers of India are fighting valiantly on the battlefields and are not shirking from danger to the life in spite of the general feeling in the country that Government have not thought it fit so long to place implicit confidence in the people. A time has come when a vigorous campaign must be carried…. Some parents and especially mothers of young recruits will naturally feel unwilling to send their sons to face death on the field of battle. Yet the woman of India, though educationally backward, know full well the duties and the responsibilities of the rulers and the ruled. The ancient mythology and history have taught them these Prominent Indians on the Man-Power Committee were Shahu Maharaj, the Jam Saheb, the Chief of Sangli, N. B. Saklatwala, M. K. Gandhi, Yeshwantrao Mirikar, R. G. Naik, G. K. Deodhar. On the Indian Defence Force Committee—Indian section were C. H. Setalwad, R. P. Paranjape, Bhulabhai Desai, M. R. Jaykar, H. P. Mody, and J. D. Davar. Importantly, the Publicity Committee consisted of Sir Stanley Reed (Chairman), K. Natarajan, W. R. Kothari, editor of Jagaruk, Principal of J. J. School of Art, the Orient Translator, the Director of Public Instruction, E. G. Pearson and the Divisional Recruiting Officer, with C. G. Freke, Under Secretary. Man-Power Committee. Ibid. 104

105

Ibid.

Nowhere in the government records in matters concerning the First World War, the Maharaja of Kolhapur has been referred as Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj.

106

 128   Indians in the First World War

lessons. The noble advice of Shrikrishna to Arjun has led the Indians to believe that victory on the battlefield brings with it glory and the reward for one who dies in the action is the attainment of heaven. It is this belief which will in the end lead even the women in this country to send forth their scions to fight their king’s battle and thus to protect their motherland from foreign invasion.107

She was later rewarded with Kaiser-i-Hind (First Class) for her well-rehearsed speech. When called upon to speak, Tilak at the outset expressed deep sense of loyalty to His Majesty and attempted to bring to the notice of the government ‘the popular feeling that Home Defence and Home Rule must go together’. Though he positively stated that he was not moving any amendment to the Resolution, the Governor Lord Willingdon preempted Tilak’s speech, interrupted and disallowed further speech by calling it an amendment and a political discussion on the loyalty resolution. A near similar thing happened in the case of N. C. Kelkar too. This prompted a walk-out by Tilak and his group consisting of N. C. Kelkar, B. G. Horniman, S. R. Bomanji and Jamnadas Dwarkadas. Later, cabling the happenings of the day to the Secretary of State, Edwin Montague, Willingdon described Tilak’s speech as ‘a perfunctory expression of loyalty’ and ‘a discourse on politics’. Many spoke on the second resolution moved by Mr G. C. Carmichael regarding manpower and resources, notable among them were M. A. Jinnah and Sir Narayan Chandavarkar. Expressing loyalty at the outset, Jinnah was frank to protest against the manner in which Tilak and Kelkar’s speeches were scuttled by the Chair: I was pained, very much pained that Your Excellency should have thought fit to cast doubts on the sincerity and loyalty of the Home Rule party. The Home Rule party is as sincere and as anxious to help the defence of our motherland and the Empire as any one else. But the difference between us and the government is only regarding methods…. We say there must be a national army, a citizen army, and not a purely mercenary army. That is the difference….’108 107

MSA/PD/WAR/1918/282-W.

108

Ibid.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   129  

Jinnah was not interrupted by the Chair. Sir Narayan Ganesh Chandavarkar’s speech exuded obsequious loyalty. Without making reference to Tilak, he defended Governor’s ruling by saying, ‘a loyalty resolution ought to have no “buts” and “ifs” ’. He shamed the general masses by making assertions that ‘this war is the first unselfish war in the history of the world’, called India’s participation providential and said, India is called upon by the voice of God, by the voice of man through His Majesty to suffer, to stand up, for what? Not for our hearths and homes, they are defended by God, not for petty considerations, not for political reform, prospective or future…(and) if India stands up for the cause of humanity unconditionally on the present occasion, then her name will be written in the Book of Life, but if, on the other hand, she says that she will do so on certain conditions, then India will deserve her name blotted from the Book of Life.109

The Bombay Chronicle, under the editorship of Benjamin Horniman, on 12 June 1918, published a statement signed by Tilak, Jamnadas Dwarakadas, S. R. Bomanji, N. C. Kelkar and B. G. Horniman explaining reasons for their walk-out. They felt that the Governor deliberately attacked Home Rulers, made unwarranted accusations and threw unjustified aspersions upon them. The whole procedure at the Conference was felt inequitable and unfair, ‘a hide-bound programme of resolutions and procedure prepared in the Secretariat’ and designed as completely to defeat the very purpose. ‘His Excellency added a highhanded indefensible exercise of his authority as Chairman.’ His own speech was distinguished by political discussion of a most controversial character.110 In an article ‘Lord Willingdon’s Blunder’, Horniman blamed ‘the oligarchy of officials consisting of Mr. Carmichael, Sir James Du Boulay, Mr. Cadell and Mr. L. Robertson’, of composing various bodies they constituted, ‘of men who are entirely out of touch with popular sentiments and whose only qualification for the roles thrust upon them is that they are in touch with officialdom’.111 109

Ibid.

The Bombay Chronicle, 12 June 1918, ‘Home Rulers and the War-Lord Willingdon’s High-handed Action’. Also, MSA/HOME DEPT.(HD) (SPECIAL)/1918/398-J. 110

111

‘Lord Willingdon’s Blunder’, in Horniman, A Friend of India.

 130   Indians in the First World War

Annie Besant’s article ‘Sincerity’ in Bombay Chronicle on 14 June 1918 was more piercing: The partiality of the Governor was as marked as his sincerity. The Maharaja of Kolhapur talked about politics, Sir Dinshaw M. Petit talked politics, Mr. Setalwad talked politics; but their politics agreed with those of the Governor, who had opened with a political speech; only Lokmanya Tilak and Mr. Kelkar [N.C.] were out of order when they also talked politics, not the politics of surrender but the politics of men who loved their country, and in whom desire for freedom was not dead…. He forgot that he was not speaking to Englishmen when he said that ‘the appeal has now come from the mother country’. The mother country of Indians is India, not Britain. We are not Colonials, nor India is of immemorial antiquity; the child of a young European country. Nor are we ‘Citizens of the British Empire’; we are merely dependents. Are we not inhabitants of that Empire’s ‘Great Dependency?’112

Horniman later recounted in 1925 that when the invitation was extended to the Home Rule Leaders, there was certain amount of caution before accepting it. They suspected that the invitation meant only to record approval of a series of ‘cut and dried’ resolutions. Preliminary enquiries of the Home Rulers in official quarters resulted in a written assurance from Lord Willingdon through his Private Secretary that there would be free criticism and open discussion on any proposals put forward.113 The undertaking was blatantly defied by the Governor himself by making deliberate and disparaging comments on Tilak and the Home Rule leaders. The idea of the official world regarding loyalty seemed to be that there should be suspension of all criticism of administration, leaving the officials free to do as they like, whether their acts trespassed on the controversial field or not. Every effort to assert political claims was treated as an attempt to ‘embarrass’ the government, and the war was treated as bar to laud assertion of political statements. The notes of the bureaucracy on the walk-out by the Home Rulers disclose their biased, non-conciliatory animus by pursuing an approach that was self-defeating in seeking cooperation for recruitment 112

HD (Spl.) 1918/398 –J, 299–301.

Bombay Chronicle, 29 January 1925, ‘Special Congress Session and After….’ That the Government had conceded to the Home Rulers the right to offer criticism is corroborated by Gandhi’s letter to Lord Willingdon after the Bombay War Conference. 113

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   131  

and war efforts. The Chief Secretary P. R. Cadell’s suggestions were: (a) To forbid the extremist press to discuss the War Conference, any topic directly or indirectly dealt with in the agenda of the conference. (b) The introduction of pre-censorship, particularly to deal with Kesari, Bombay Chronicle, Mahratta, Sandesh, Message and Young India. (c) To stop Mr Horniman, Mr Bomanji, Mr Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Mr Kelkar and Mr Tilak from public speaking. Furthermore, he suggested: ‘I think that Mr. Horniman should be interned at Aden, Mr. Tilak in Burma and Mr. Jamnadas in Larkhana. We need not intern Mr. N. C. Kelkar’.114 James DuBoulay concurred with all the suggestions but cautioned, ‘We cannot however take action under the Defence of India Rules for failure of cooperation, not in anticipation of opposition’. Willingdon, J. Carmichael and other members of his Executive Council, except Sir Ebrahim Rahimtoola, totally agreed with the suggestions. Sir Ebrahim’s suggestion was, ‘Let Government give them a long rope and let these people have for a short time full liberty to openly show their hatred’. The Collector of Kaira, Mr Ker, had different opinion regarding the walk-out. His letter only demonstrates how confused they were. He wrote to the Secretary, PD: the reason was that they knew they could not get recruits in any numbers, and were afraid that if they attempted it and failed they would expose the hollowness of their claims to be leaders of the people. I think this was the reason because once when Mr. Gandhi was talking to me about recruitment he told me he had seen Tilak about it, and later in the same conversation he said, ‘some of my friends tell that I am riding for a fall’. This is confirmed by his speech to his friends at Nadiad on June 17th; he said he had consulted Tilak and they agreed with him, but they doubted whether the Ryots would accept these views. Tilak preferred to force a quarrel and walk out of the Conference rather than to join up and risk ‘riding for a fall’.115

Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, in a demi-official confidential letter dated 24 June 1918, responded to Lord Willingdon: Let me refer to paragraph 18 [regarding censorship]. I quite agree with the policy which you lay down therein and your government is the best judge of the psychological moment for action; but I may suggest this for 114

Palande, Source Material for a History.

115

Unofficial letter Ker to L. Robertson, 27 June 1918. MSA/HD (Spl.) 1918/398- J.

 132   Indians in the First World War

your consideration? I hope that action will follow immediately on decision and that there will be no interval between the two. Let me give a concrete instance of what I mean. If you decided to deport Horniman, be sure that there is a vessel ready to start for Aden on which he can be put straightway. We don’t want farewell speeches and addresses. It would be better in my opinion to hold your hand for a day or two rather than that this should occur.116 (Emphasis is mine)

Willingdon’s action was condemned in public meetings by almost all nationalists including Annie Besant. Urging discretion, Khurshed F. Nariman’s letter in Bombay Chronicle entitled, ‘Words and Deeds— What has the War Conference Done?’ succinctly summed up the proceedings: It appeared to be a grand success. The Assembly was certainly very large, consisting of the pick and elite of Western India. The Maharajas, both Indian and English, decked in their best attires, and the Merchant Princes of Bombay, couple with the usual ornamental decoration of the ladies, must have really given a very imposing appearance, as pleasing to the eye, as speeches and sermons of some gentlemen were, jarring to the ear…. Sir Narayan Chandavarkar’s sermon on ‘eternal verities’ was indeed very interesting, but would it not have been more appropriate for his Prarthana Samaj meeting than in the War Conference? No doubt some of their written speeches were as pleasing to the ears of the heavens, as the applause they drew. But these speakers are perhaps the least aware that they have unconsciously done the greatest harm to the cause they had assembled to espouse and support. By their action and speeches they have been successful in alienating one man and party that could have given real help to recruiting both men and materials. Mr. Tilak and his party are no doubt detestable and intolerable to bureaucratic views. His political views are simply abhorred by many…. But can any man deny that he holds the masses, particularly MSA/HD(SPL.) 1918/398-J. Eventually, after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and the succeeding events in Punjab made Horniman to write a book on that topic entitled— Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty in which he made scathing indictment of the British administration. He called it as the horrors of Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s ‘The Reign of Terror’ during the administration of Martial Law, and his deliberate concealment carried out with the connivance of the Government of India. He held the Secretary of State, the Viceroy and the Government of India, and Sir Michael O’Dwyer and his Martial Law administrators responsible for the carnage. So disturbed was the government as a result that exactly in the manner described above, Horniman was picked up from his office of Bombay Chronicle, the police by then got his personal belonging from his residence and was deported to England in 1919. 116

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   133  

the fine martial masses of the Marathas of the Deccan, under his grip, and that one word from him would collect more recruits than a dozen flowery speeches from a dozen philosophers like Sir N. Chandavarkar…. If these gentlemen had the success of the cause at heart, they should have restrained their personal feelings and even if they considered him a nuisance or an evil, should have put up with him, as a necessary and indispensable evil. The influence that he wielded with the peasants and masses of Gujrat and the Deccan when he toured in the villages and the remote corners on a mission to collect funds for the Home Rule Deputation is fresh in the minds of all, people flock to him in thousands, worship him like a demi-God and money poured in abundance…. Unless wiser counsels still prevail, it is feared the situation might grow much worse….117

A public meeting of the Bombay leaders was held on 6 June 1918 at Shantaram Chawl, in Girgaum, Bombay, to protest against Lord Willingdon’s conduct at the Bombay Provincial War Conference. It was made quite clear that the Home Rulers attended the Conference over the assurance given by the Private Secretary of the Governor that they would be allowed to speak and that their suggestions would be considered if they attended the Conference. This meeting was presided over by Gandhi and other prominent leaders attending were B. G. Horniman, M. A. Jinnah, K. M. Munshi, Sayyid Hussain and N. B. Vibhakar. Mr Jinnah said that with regard to Lord Willingdon and his speech at the Conference he did not wish to say more than that it was the greatest possible blunder. Lord Willingdon had undoubtedly insulted the whole of the Home Rule party. The action of Lord Willingdon was a personal matter and so long as he did not withdraw the insult, they could not possibly attend any meeting at which he presided. He was prepared to accept the statement with regard to the German menace, but Government had not resorted to methods and measures which would enable them to utilize the man-power of India….118

All other leaders repeated the same opinion. Soon after the Bombay Provincial War Conference, a Special Session of the Congress was held on the plains of Marine Lines in Bombay on 29 August 1918, which was attended by nationalist leaders of all 117

Bombay Chronicle, 14 June 1918.

118

BPPAI/XXXI/No. 27/6 July 1918/943 – (h).

 134   Indians in the First World War

hues. In this session, decisions were unanimously taken, which reiterated the demands for self-rule and autonomy. The insult caused by Lord Willingdon had so upset the general public in Bombay that the masses led by the Extremist leaders such as Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Horniman, Dr Sathey, Dr Velkar and others led a tirade against raising Willingdon Memorial. When the historical Willingdon Memorial meeting took place at the Town Hall, on 11 December 1918, to raise a memorial as a fitting gift for the departing Governor, the protesters raised a mayhem and eventually the meeting had to be dispersed without any transaction. The idea of Willingdon Memorial was thus consigned to dustbin of history.119 How did the Indian nationalists react to the outbreak of war in 1914? Their responses are worth noting. Dadabhai Naoroji wrote to the Viceroy on 10 August 1914, ‘I trust this the greatest struggle for liberty, honour and righteousness will end gloriously to the credit of England and the good of humanity’.120 On 14 August, a similar statement expressing deep loyalty towards the Crown was made by Pherozeshah Mehta. Surendra Nath Banerjea spoke in a similar vein at Calcutta. When the Imperial Legislative Council met, Surendra Nath Banerjea suggested that the cost of the Indian expeditionary force should be borne by the Indian exchequer. In December 1914, when the Indian National Congress met at Madras, it passed a resolution conveying its unswerving allegiance to the British connection and expressed ‘its resolve to stand by the Empire at all hazards and at all costs’.121 Lala Lajpat Rai, ‘the bête noire of the Europeans in India’ publicly invited cooperation of the Indians ‘in the world struggle’.122 Gopal Krishna Gokhale was in England when the war broke out in connection with Public Services Commission. Although the Commission resumed its work in August 1914, its work no longer seemed important in face of the war, which was gradually assuming

119

Velkar, Lokmanya Tilak, 78–80.

Naoroji to Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, 10 August 1914, quoted by Nanda, Gokhale: The Indian Moderates, 446.

120

121

Nanda, Gokhale: The Indian Moderates, 446.

122

Ibid.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   135  

global character. And his own views of the war were no different in those early months of 1914–1915 from that of Dadabhai Naoroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, S. N. Banerjea and others. He was working hard to get 35–40 per cent of Indian representation in ICS, both at the imperial and provincial services, but the European members of the Commission were not prepared to concede. By October 1914, exasperated with the opposition, he lost interest in the Public Services Commission and thought of submitting a separate minority report along with his other Indian colleagues—M. B. Chaubal and Abdur Rahim. The war had pushed the question of Indian reforms to the background and with the terrible holocaust in Europe and also due to his failing health, he felt it wise to return home from England in November 1914. Cardiac asthma, aggravated by his 17-year-old diabetes, the tiresomeness and tension of the long sittings on the Royal Commission and the English winter had played havoc with his deteriorating physical constitution. On his return to India until his death on 19 February 1915, Gokhale was seriously engaged in unity talks between Extremists and Moderates. He was ready to walk halfway towards compromise but the Pherozeshah faction was unyielding.123 He had gained an impression in Whitehall that India was to be given a substantial advance ‘on the road to self-government’. Even in Bombay, Lord Willingdon requested Gokhale to suggest constitutional reforms which he considered essential and immediately practical. The draft which Gokhale pencilled 2 days before his death, envisaged provincial autonomy for the provinces.124 B. G. Horniman later recalled that Gokhale had ‘with him ready prepared the outline of a scheme which curiously enough was based on the model of the German constitution’.125 His effort to work on such a scheme was short-lived as he soon passed away on 19 February 1915. The void created in the national politics due to Gokhale’s death was followed by the death of Pherozeshah Mehta’s death on 5 November 1915. Among his last public appearances on the platform are two 123

Ibid., 460–470.

124

Ibid., 469.

125

Bombay Chronicle, ‘A Year of Constitution Making’.

 136   Indians in the First World War

which stand out. The first was the meeting held in the Town Hall on 13 August 1914, to give expression to the feeling of loyalty and devotion, which the war had aroused amongst a large section of the people, and the second an impressive gathering held at the Town Hall on 5 March under the chairmanship of Lord Willingdon to mourn the death of Gokhale. An event of special significance at this time was the appointment of Pherozeshah as Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University at the request of Viceroy Lord Hardinge in March 1915. But soon after his collapse in the Bombay Municipal Corporation in March 1915, he kept shuttling between Bombay and Deolali (his rest house on Nasik Road) fighting against failing health due to his old kidney trouble and weak heart.126 He could not even deliver the convocation address at the Bombay University as its vice-chancellor, let alone taking active interest in the national politics. War was declared on 4 August 1914 and Gandhi reached London on the 6 August. He did not ignore the war, but again his response was highly personal, the result of prolonged agonizings of conscience. He felt that Indians residing in England ought to ‘do their bit in the war’. He immediately felt that a voluntary Field Ambulance Training Corps could be raised in the circumstances similar to the one he had raised during the Boer War in South Africa. But soon had differences with the Commanding Officer officially allocated to the Ambulance Corps, when Gandhi claimed to be an unofficial leader and representative of the Corps. A compromise was patched up by the India office and which was facilitated by his being bed-ridden due to pleurisy. The rationale of his unconditional support for war efforts can be traced in his autobiography: I knew the difference of status between an Indian and an Englishman, but I did not believe that we had been reduced to slavery. I felt then that it was more the fault of individual British officials than of the British system, and that we could convert them by love. If we would improve our status through the help and cooperation of the British, it was our duty to win their help by standing by them in their hour of need.127

126

Mody, Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, 360–369.

127

Gandhi, The Story of My Experiments.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   137  

In supporting the war efforts, he resolved his mental predicament about ahimsa by convincing himself that: When two nations are fighting, the duty of a votary of ahimsa is to stop the war. He who is not equal to that duty, he who has no power of resisting war, he who is not qualified to resist war, may take part in war, and yet whole-heartedly try to free himself, his nation and world from war.   I had hoped to improve status and that of my people through the British Empire….128

Having resolved this dilemma, the issue never plagued his mind throughout the course of the First World War. Gandhi, who received the Medal of Kaiser-i-Hind (first class) in 1915,129 was a ‘recruiting sergeant’ for the British from the beginning of the World War. While carrying his individual satyagraha against the exploitation of indigo workers by the European plantation owners, Gandhi and E. L. L. Hammond, Chief Recruiting Officer for Bihar and Orissa, were in correspondence regarding raising a labour corps in Champaran for services in Mesopotamia as early as in December 1917. Hammond’s letter130 is self-illuminating regarding the official methods of impressing upon the Indians the so-called ‘economic’ benefits of joining as recruits: We need men for Mesopotamia or for the Railway Training Depots at Gaya and Puri whence after 2 and 3 month’s training they would be dispatched to Basra. We give an advance of `30. The men get `15 per month while in India, and `20/- in overseas. `3 capitation fee for each man brought in. Cannot you in course of your tour point out the great economic opportunity now offered?. If one man from a household goes he can remit `8 per month to his family and still have `100 or 200 according to the duration of the war as undisbursed pay to start him in life on his return.

Unlike Tilak, Gandhi was for unconditional support to Imperial war efforts. Though he disagreed with Tilak, he was forthright in 128

Ibid., 396.

129

MSA/PD Proceedings for July 1915, 185, No. 881.

ELL Hammond to M. K. Gandhi, 13 December 1917 and 18 December 1917, CWMKG, Vol. 14, Appendix VI, 539–540.

130

 138   Indians in the First World War

criticizing official treatment of Tilak. He said, ‘That we have been loyal at a time of stress is no test of fitness for Swarajya. Loyalty is no merit. It is a necessity of national existence all the world over. That Loyalty can be no passport to Swarajya is a self-demonstrated maxim’.131 In April 1918, at the outset he protested to the Viceroy for not inviting Tilak, Mrs Besant and Ali brothers to the War Conference in Delhi and that they were ‘among the most powerful leaders of the public opinion’. But he was equally forthright in criticizing them and reiterating that If I could make my countrymen retrace their steps, I would make them withdraw all the Congress resolutions, and not whisper ‘Home Rule’ or ‘Responsible Government’ during the pendency of the war. I would make India offer all her able-bodied sons as a sacrifice to the Empire at its critical moment; and I know that India by this very act would become the most favoured partner in the Empire and racial distinctions would become a thing of the past…. It will be national suicide not to recognize this elementary truth. We must perceive that, if we serve to save the Empire, we have in that very act secured Home Rule….132

He called the War Conference as ‘definite step in the consecration of our lives to the common cause’. He called the stopping of Tilak and Kelkar by the Governor at the Bombay War Conference, ‘a serious blunder’. He wrote to Willingdon, ‘They had been informed on your behalf that they could offer criticism but they could not move an amendment…. Your action has made the position of workers delicate and difficult and if Mr Tilak is an enemy of the government or of the Empire you have undoubtedly strengthened his hands in the pursuit of his course…. Will you most publicly express your regret for the blunder or send for both of them…possibly win over the Home Rule party, and also nip in the bud an agitation that is bound to spring up in the country’.133 But at a public meeting following the Bombay War Conference Gandhi stated that, ‘It is impossible to ignore or insult Mr Tilak and his followers. Mr Tilak is an idol of the 131

CWMKG, Vol. 14, 55.

132

CWMKG, Vol. 17, 7–9. Gandhi’s letter to Viceroy, 29 April 1918.

133

Ibid., 63; Letter to Lord Willingdon, 11 June 1918.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   139  

people. He wields over thousands of men an unrivalled influence, his word is law to them…. The insult offered to him, and through him to the Home Rule Leagues, is, therefore, an insult to the nation at large’ but was quick to add to his old rhetoric, ‘It is my special and personal opinion, not shared perhaps by any one else, that it would have been better still if he had preserved dignified silence; …That loyalty must indeed, be skin-deep which requires a wall of protection against criticism….’134 In his early days of his leadership in India, Gandhi did not leave any opportunity of criticizing Extremist leadership: That we should return good for evil was not said of angels but of men. The ‘manliest course’ is never to deviate by a hair’s breadth from the straight and narrow path; and Home Rule Leaguers are nothing if they cannot be manly.135

However pragmatic he appeared, Gandhi used every type of argument in support of enlistment, many times contrary to the doctrines he held so dear to his heart, that is, the ends and means theory. In a speech at Ahmedabad, he said, ‘To wipe out the blot on the face of Gujrat, people should take to careers in army. This is the best way of learning to defend Ahmedabad, should it ever be raided’. While speaking at Ras in Gujarat on June 26, he said, Voluntary recruiting is a key to swaraj and will give us honour and manhood…soldiers’ death on the battle-field makes them immortal, if the scriptures are right, and becomes a source of joy and pride to those left behind. From the death of Kshatriyas will be born the guardians of the nation and no Government can withhold arms from such men…. A national army could be thus created instead of a mercenary one. Our mightiest weapon, Satyagraha, is always with us. But he cannot be a Satyagrahi who is afraid of death. The ability to use physical force is necessary for a true appreciation of Satyagraha. He alone can practice ahimsa who knows how to kill, i.e. knows what himsa is….136 (Gandhi’s) Gandhi’s speech at a public meeting held at Shantaram Chawl, Girgaum on 16 June 1918 as reported in Bombay Chronicle of 17 June 1918.

134

135

Ibid.

136

CWMKG, Vol. 17, 100–101.

 140   Indians in the First World War

At a meeting at Kaira, he further argued: Many men died of plague and cholera and so it would not be a hard thing to die in the war. He was ready to go to the war if the people would come forward. He was not a member of the Home Rule League. To receive military training was the stepping stone to acquire Home Rule, and each and every member of the Home Rule League should join. It was rumoured that Indians were placed in the first row and were killed, but he did not believe this. The English were a fighting race and he did not believe that such a people would remain in the rear and send others to the front. If, however, such a time came he would himself object, and unless he were shot he would not allow all the men to be so killed.137

He also pleaded that, ‘If I fail in the attempt this time, you may conclude that my tapascharya is imperfect as yet. He who does not know how to lay down his life without killing others may learn to die killing’.138 To Annie Besant he wrote, ‘If we supplied recruits, we should dictate terms. But if we wait for the terms, the War may close, India may remain without a real military training and we should be face to face with a military dictatorship….’139 He also appealed to Jinnah for making an emphatic declaration regarding recruitment, but in vain. When he realized indifference from the general public to his appeals, Gandhi issued many leaflets appealing for enlistment. Judith Brown sums up his effort: On the issue of recruiting he stood alone, misunderstood and opposed: by becoming the raj’s ‘recruiting sergeant’ he alienated his potential political allies, bewildered his friends and jeopardized his local power bases. But he felt it was the greatest problem he had faced in his life: his struggle with it devoured both his interior and physical energy….140

He continued doggedly with his recruiting rhetoric until confined to a sickbed in mid-1918. During his illness, Gandhi had more time 137

BPPAI/XXXI/No. 25/Para 910/Kaira.

138

Ibid., Vol. 15, 453–456.

CWMKG, Vol. 17, 116; For details on Annie Besant’s work on Home Rule, see, Mortimer, ‘Annie Besant and India’.

139

140

Brown, Gandhi.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   141  

for reflection and he began to resolve some of the ‘riddles’. Even he had no ‘master-key’ to the ‘riddles’ that he was facing in connection with the war. He was a little concerned with the rights and wrongs of the conflict: Indian interests occupied his attention most. He went much further in compromise than he had done when engaging in non-combatant ambulance work in South Africa. It was in fact only after the First World War, when his faith in the British Empire waned and his belief in the efficacy of Satyagraha as a weapon to free India increased, that Gandhi’s dilemma grew less acute.141 Lokmanya B. G. Tilak had been a long supporter of recruitment to army. Since February 1917, he wrote many articles in Kesari and Mahratta, exhorting people to join army but wanted recruitment on self-respecting terms, that is, Commissions for Indian officers, equal pay, purely Indian regiments, which ought to be controlled by Indians, all these to be achieved to make a national army and not a mercenary one.142 In an article entitled, ‘Conditions of Cooperation’—Bargain by all means’, he listed his terms of cooperation in war efforts and made following demands: 1. An early and a satisfactory pronouncement on the political reforms. 2. Opening Military Staff Colleges in India and admission of Indian thereto freely and without distinction. 3. Grant of large portion of H. M.’s commissions to Indians in the Army. 4. Admissions to all departments of the Army, Navy and the Aircraft. 5. Immediate raising the pay of the Indian sepoys. 6. Grant of a reasonable proportion of King’s Commission to qualified Indian NCOs. 7. Framing of a scheme of a citizen army for India. 8. Permanently throwing open the right to join to Volunteer Corp to all Indians alike. 141

Brock, ‘Gandhi’s Non-violence and His’.

‘He Vel Aahe, Lashkarat Shira’, Kesari, 27 February 1917; ‘Samrajyachya Garaja, Ani Yeti Amachya Kaja’, Kesari, 30 April 1918; ‘Conditions of Cooperation: Bargain by all means’, Mahratta, 23 June 1918, to name a few. 142

 142   Indians in the First World War

9. Making permanent provisions for giving military education to all boys in Colleges of all sorts. 10. Amending the Arms Act. 11. Provision for giving physical education to boys in secondary schools. 12. Stopping the present abuses in the working of Army and Labour Corps. 13. Formation of entirely non-official boards in the districts for this purpose; and, 14. Allowing such non-official agencies, as may be willing to undertake recruitment in particular areas. The conditions mentioned by Tilak had the complete endorsement from the Congress Committee. The Congress Committee met at the rooms of Bombay Presidency Association, on 4 May 1918, with Mrs Annie Besant in Chair and attended by Tilak, Gandhi, Shrinivas Shashtri, G. S. Khaparde, Dr Munje, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer, and B. P. Wadia, showed total agreement with these conditions.143 Furthermore, Tilak showed examples from the British history how Magna Carta, which ensured civil liberties was obtained by the people when the government was under pressure of foreign affairs. Such examples are plenty in the history of Spain and Ireland, he argued. Speaking at pan-supari felicitation meeting immediately after the conclusion of Imperial War Conference at Delhi, Tilak spoke: The British people promised to give Ireland Home Rule when they saw they could not do without assistance of Ireland. Why should those very people not give Home Rule to India?... The bureaucracy dose not want to give you self-government but they want to be protected by your giving lives. Why should the bureaucracy be unwilling to give their own lives? I should say to them ‘First make a self sacrifice yourselves, and then we shall follow you’…. Five or ten days ago I was afraid to give out my views like these in such distinct terms, but that the Emperor has said so, I can make bold to say so distinctly as I can. The Magna Carta was obtained by the people of England when they got the opportunity to have it in the reign of King John. Therefore, I say all depends on time. Such time

143

MSA/HD (Spl.) 1918/398-J.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   143  

comes in history and then evolution takes place. Evolution does not take place of itself. It takes place when the time comes, that is when people take advantage of Time….144

‘The difference between the so-called bargainers and the so-called nonbargainers is’, Tilak said, ‘after all a difference merely in the emphasis to be put on the avowal of the readiness to help or the avowal of the readiness to demand, both the avowals however going together indissolubly as a conjunct proposition’. Reporting Tilak’s speech at a meeting held in Bombay, the article in Mahratta stated that: Let the government give the Indians responsible positions in the Army and treat them fairly and then they would get the requisite number of men. Should the government treat the Indians fairly and equitably, he [Tilak] would promise them at least 5000 men from Maharashtra alone, although he was sanguine that he could get at least 25,000 men. He had come to the meeting to say that if the government could grant them their demands as set forth in the resolution he was prepared to give 5000 men to them. Should he fail in keeping to his promise, he was quite prepared to give `100/- as a fine for every man less than that number, and he was ready to give his Cheque for `50,000/- in case of the non-fulfilment of his promise…. That to talk about [Tilak’s] insincerity was the bureaucracy’s favourite game….145

While ridiculing the argument that the recruitment might financially benefit the recruits, Tilak spoke to the mill-hands at Bombay: They now feel why they are not getting recruits readily. Of course no one would like to endanger his life for `11/-. You mill-hands get more than `11/- in your mills. Had the Indian people been accustomed to think that they are being treated as part and parcel of the Empire they would certainly have thought it their duty to endanger their life for the Empire. But they question, why should they fight and for whom they should fight. If we are to remain repressed as we are it is better to die of plague than to die in war….146 Report of a meeting held at Shantaram Chawl on Friday 3 May 1918. HD (Spl.) 1918/398–J.

144

Mahratta, 23 June 1918, article: ‘Mr. Tilak’s Challenge’ and sub-titled as: ‘A Challenge to Lord Willingdon’.

145

146 HD (Spl.) 1918/398–J, 127. Tilak spoke at a meeting of mill-hands held at Ramdas Mill Near Elphinstone Road in Bombay, on 24 March 1918.

 144   Indians in the First World War

In a true Mahratta spirit, Tilak reiterated his view on conditional recruitment at a meeting held at Kirloskar Theatre, Pune, on 22 June 1918, and pointed out that, …in Shivaji’s time, though this nation, nay Maharashtra, was overcome by such plight, when Aurangzeb brought salaried Mughal soldiers into Maharashtra, those who then defended Maharashtra were not recruits caught in this manner…. How did Shivaji get these 50-60 thousand men? By paying money to them? By impressing (literally catching) them at the Pandharpur fair?147

Tilak’s articles and speeches at this time brought him under close official scrutiny. J. Crerar, Acting Secretary, JD, BG, noted, The speech is of the type that has now become usual; it gives the Extremists a loop-hole to make the most of the situation as it may develop without actively assisting government. If the recruits come in numbers wanted, they can exploit the fact to press for concessions and if voluntary recruitment fails, they can turn around and say ‘We told you so?’ You cannot arouse the enthusiasm of the people until you give them the incentive of the early grant of self-government: So give it! And it seems pretty clear from the whole run of speeches by the Home Rule leaders, that their aim is to damp the ardour of the people and kill the voluntary recruitment scheme in advance…. Bad as this is Tilak in his concluding remarks…he has twisted His Majesty’s message to mean a direct intimation that they should exploit England’s life and death struggle to wring political concessions from her. The reference to wresting Magna Carta from King John makes Tilak’s suggestion perfectly clear and it is for consideration whether this disloyal and mischievous distortion does not merit Tilak being served with a notice under the Defence of India Rules prohibiting him from further speechifying for the present. It is a matter of grave national moment that the GOI should get all the recruits they can within the next few months: the left handed cooperation the Home Rulers are offering can but exercise a check on the flow of recruits, but when Royal sanction is quoted to what amounts to practically an inducement not to join up till self-government is granted, it would appear to be time for drastic action to be taken148 Ibid., Meeting held at Kirloskar Theatre on 22 June 1918, and addressed by Krishnaji Prabhakar Khadilkar and B. G. Tilak.

147

148

MSA/HD (SPL) 1918/398-J.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   145  

Finally, on 31 July 1918, B. G. Tilak was served with an order prohibiting him from giving lectures, speeches or addresses, both public or private, on anything relating to War and Recruitment. The order signed by the BG Secretary J. Crerar stated thus: …in the opinion of the Governor of Bombay in Council there are reasonable grounds for believing that you have thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and the defence of India…is pleased to direct you [Tilak] to abstain from making any public speech without the permission in writing of the District Magistrate of the District in which you propose to make such a speech, or in the City of Bombay, of the Commissioner of Police. This prohibition extends to any public lecture or address, and in this order, the expression public speech, lecture or address includes speech, lecture or address delivered to the public or any class or portion of the public, notwithstanding that it may be delivered in a private place, notwithstanding that the admission thereto may be restricted by ticket or otherwise.   This prohibition, however, does not apply to any speech confined to the subject of constitutional reforms made at a special Session of the Indian National Congress summoned for the purpose of discussing that subject.149

This ban order—termed as ‘Gagging Tilak’—was universally denounced by all the nationalists.150 This prohibiting order was not first of its kind. Earlier in 1916, the official perception of Tilak and his co-agitators was that, they were especially critical of ‘bureaucracy’ Order signed by J. Crerar, Secretary to BG, dated 31 July 1918. HD (Spl.) 1918/398–J. The order, which cited Rule 3 of the Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules, was widely criticized by all. B. G. Horniman was the leading editor to criticize it in Bombay Chronicle, dated 5 August 1918. The Mahratta of 4 August 1918 published this order under the title ‘Mr. Tilak Gagged: Defence of India Act Again Abused’.

149

The Mahratta published an article explaining Tilak’s attitude toward ‘recruiting’, on 4 August 1918. It also published Tilak’s letter to Gandhi:

150

With reference to the declaration made by me at the public meeting under your presidency held in Bombay on the 16th instant, I now send this letter containing definitely the declaration I meant to make. If the people are authoritatively assured by the government that the recruits enrolled in India will have equal opportunity as Europeans for being trained at Military Colleges…in case if I fail to do (recruitment of 5,000 people) so, I undertake to pay rupees 100 for the shortfall of each recruit…. He sent him a cheque of `50,000, only to be returned if an assurance was not given in 2 months.

 146   Indians in the First World War

in speeches and newspaper articles on the one hand and proclaiming their loyalty to the Crown and the British Government on the other. To silence him, on 12 August 1916, Mr Tilak was bound over by the District Magistrate of Poona to be of good behaviour for a year. Fortunately for Tilak, the High Court of Bombay quashed Magistrate’s order on the ground that speeches taken as a whole were not likely to create disaffection against the government. Now, with such restrictions re-imposed on his public activities, which meant virtually sealing his mouth, Tilak chose to go to England to fight the Chirol Case.

The Recruitment and ‘Rewards’ Apart from the fact that the war in the initial years was thought by the then British leadership to be a short affair, it was also plagued by procrastination and indecision about their role in the war. Also, the British political crisis between the Liberals, the Unionists and the Conservatives over the issue of ‘conscription’ did create an atmosphere of uncertainty. Not only all these factors had ramifications on British war policies but had concurrent effects on recruitment of soldiers in India. It is in this context, a cursory look at the then issues in British politics would explain how an air of uncertainty prevailed in England and why decisions regarding conscription were taken as late as in 1916. H. H. Asquith, the Liberal Prime Minister, called for resignation of his fellow cabinet ministers on 17 May 1915, without himself resigning. The publication of Col C. Court Repington’s ‘shell’ despatch regarding ‘the alleged deficiencies of high explosive shells’ in the Times on 14 May 1915 led to the resignation of Lord Fisher from his position of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty. This incident, it was feared, would trigger most disastrous effect on the general political and strategic situation. In fact, the formation of a coalition government between the Liberal Asquith and the Unionist leader, Andrew Bonar Law, immediately after the Lord Fisher incident, centred around the issues concerning war policy and measures concerning munitions and recruitment. The Unionist leadership and the press had been vocal about their demand for conscription and other extreme measures.151 The Liberal Prime 151

Fraser, ‘British War Policy’, 1–5.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   147  

Minister and their other leaders such as Reginald McKenna and Walter Runciman claimed that a conscript army on the continental scale would break the economy and the pound. Their ‘Liberalism’ stood for Free Trade, laissez-faire, voluntarism, temperance and anti-militarism. They argued that compulsion, state interference, the heavy taxation of the rich and other courses suggesting socialism were not outside the recourse of liberalism. But the early decades of the 20th century were not favourable to the moral and intellectual outlook of the Liberals. The Prime Minister Asquith did not foresee a war of more than a few months and, hence, did not think of the need for any drastic domestic war policies. The Committee of Imperial Defence was not prepared for the huge continental involvement that the war entailed, or for the financial, manpower, industrial or supply problems involved. The Liberal cabinet members informed the Unionist colleagues that the British economy would not stand unlimited recruiting without a catastrophic collapse of the export trades and of internal stability, followed by a collapse of foreign credit and the means of continuing war.152 By May 1915, the strategic outlook of the Allies, so hopeful in March, had become gloomy, with a stalemate at Gallipoli as in France, and a Russian ‘spring offensive’ turned into a massive retreat. Liberal hopes of winning the war by blockade—mild by later standards—were more difficult to justify as the German war economy and organization strikingly produced a sustained offensive power on all fronts. In such a situation, it was increasingly felt that Lloyd George would be more suitable to head the coalition. Besides, Lord Kitchener, a member of the Committee for Imperial Defence, had already quarrelled over the withdrawal of the ship Queen Elizabeth from Dardanelles. He further embarrassed the government by declaring that the military operations at Gallipoli could not succeed. The government was now accused of being a body of amateur strategists who through their civilian-dominated War Council had promoted a fiasco in defiance of their chief professional advisor, Lord Fisher. It was admitted in the presence of Fisher that the Gallipoli operations had degenerated into a ‘permanent state of siege’ and could not be abandoned without military disaster or the collapse of British prestige in the Balkans. 152

Ibid., 6.

 148   Indians in the First World War

Serious conflict between Kitchener and Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in France, further escalated the matter. Kitchener did not allow war correspondents, but Sir John French admitted Col Repington, military correspondent of the Times to his headquarters as his personal guest. The Times of May 14 carried an edited despatch from Repington attributing failure to the want of an ‘unlimited’ supply of shells. His real complaint was the lack of heavy artillery.153 Repington’s disclosure on shortage of shell ammunition was immediately followed by Sir John French’s resignation. Following this crisis, how Asquith had to make way for David Lloyd George to head the coalition towards the end of 1916 is a wellknown story and needs no repetition. But strategic indecisions of this kind contributed in no mean way to Britain’s military losses on most of the fronts. Gradually many of the Liberal Member of Parliaments voted for conscription, though they did so without enthusiasm. Conscription was now the only alternative to military disaster. Adapting Liberalism to wartime conditions has frequently been cited as a principal cause of that party’s rapid subsequent collapse.154 Eventually, on 5 January 1916, a bill entitled ‘Bachelor’s Bill’ providing for the compulsory enlistment of single men into the British army was introduced in the House of Commons. Later in May 1916, another bill was introduced extending the principle of eligibility for conscription to all men, regardless of marital status between the ages of 18 and 41. All these developments had major reverberations in India both for the European population expecting their actual participation in the war as well as for deciding the internment of enemy or alien persons.155 In the first 2 years of the war, Britain attempted to limit its contribution on land, providing instead naval and financial support. This 153

Ibid., 15.

The impact of the policies adopted by the Liberal War Committee and the division among the Liberal leaders over the issue of conscription during 1914–1916 is excellently discussed in, Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Committee’. 154

Ibid., In the enforcement of military service, the most controversial curtailment of individual liberty was imposed during the prosecution of the war. Slogans were raised such as ‘a fight for Liberty, for British ideals and Liberalism’ which meant fight against ‘Prussian Militarism and Tyranny’.

155

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   149  

strategy was practically unrealistic, and when Russia had concluded armistice with Germany in 1917 and a large part of French army had given in to German sustained attack, the British focus shifted to further east where German expansion could be blocked by an easy victory against Central Power’s ally—Ottoman Turkey.156 Earlier British Allied forces had suffered heavily during the Gallipoli campaign, which was carried out during 25 April 1915 and 9 January 1916. On 29 April 1916, the British Expeditionary Force ‘D’ had to surrender to the Turks at Kut-ul-Imara in Mesopotamia. Against such reverses, David Lloyd George had replaced H. H. Asquith as the British Prime Minister in December 1916 and Georges Clemenceau had become Premier of France in November 1917. They had come to power because they represented an energetic will to victory that had been lacking in the ministries of predecessors. In April 1915, the British Expeditionary Force in Western Front held a front of 38 km, while the French held 711 km. In 1916, the BEF held 142 km while the French 632 km. By 21 March 1918, the British and the French were facing 44 more divisions than previously engaged, because having settled with Russia, the Germans were able to return troops to Western Front. In March 1918, German Commander General Erich Ludendorff launched the first of the five series of attacks against the British and the French lines on the Western Front. This crisis showed how critical each nation’s manpower policies had become.157 Naturally, it had far-reaching reverberations in the recruitment drive in India. Not only the result was the Delhi War Conference but also a clamour for an aggressive recruitment drive. VIII For the European population, it was near conscription. They were not sent to the front but were enlisted in non-combatant supervisory work. For many, it was a short route for promotion, a ‘cussy job’ Greenhalgh, ‘David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau’. This is an excellently articulated article bringing out the nature of differences between Britain and France over the issue of manpower.

156

157

Ibid.

 150   Indians in the First World War

and perhaps if he occupied relatively high social status amongst the Whites, a knighthood.158 A Bombay University Corps was raised, which received humiliating treatment as they were first called ‘Privates’ and then styled ‘Student Sepoys’ and again called ‘Privates’, and were denied the equipment and privileges of ‘British privates’.159 The recruitment campaign was not without its excesses, which were very common. Aggressive recruiting campaign carried out by the official recruiting parties are described in detail in the confidential Bombay Presidency Abstracts of Intelligence (BPPAI). Some of the examples are described here. Natives who had been to annual Pandharpur pilgrimage to Vithoba temple were rounded off and forcibly recruited.160 Many of such reports appeared in Bombay Chronicle edited by the firebrand Benjamin Horniman, an Irish Tilakait and Extremist. The Police Intelligence Reports give many interesting accounts regarding recruitment. Sometime after the war started, the Berads, officially declared criminal tribe, of the villages around Wantmuri went into hills because of a letter from the collector to the Desai of that place enquiring if these tribals could be sent to the battlefront as coolies. The result was that hardly any labour could be available for forest wood cutting, a job normally done by the Berads, who for fear of forcible recruiting had escaped into the hills.161 In October 1917, questions were asked in the Governor’s Legislative Council by D. V. Belvi, Gulam Mohd Bhurgvi and Shridhar B. Upasani against forcible recruitment and compulsion regarding ‘war loans’.162 Letters were published in Bombay Chronicle of 10 May 1917, under the heading ‘war loan Zoolum’. There was an instance of commotion and near riotous situation in Kolhapur when some persons Bombay Chronicle, 8 January 1925. Horniman describes how the Indian Defence Force comprising Europeans in Bombay was formed in ‘IDF Drills and Parades- Vision of a “Cushy” Job and Knighthood- Some Amusing Incidents’. 158

159

Bombay Chronicle, 6 May 1918.

160

Kesari, ‘Lord Willingdon Yancha Attyachar’, 18 June 1918.

161

BPPAI/1915/Vol. XXVIII/No. 3/23 January 1915/Para 65.

Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Governor of Bombay, 1917, Vol. LV, 308, 666, 713, 975.

162

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   151  

were allegedly picked up from the famous Goddess Ambabai Temple and confined as recruits. Shahu Maharaj had to personally intervene in this incident and quell the furious mob.163 In a separate incident, the Political Resident of Kolhapur writes about a fracas between the villagers of Chinchali and the Recruiting party. He sends his report to the Intelligence Department, which is revealing as also the fear it instilled in the minds of general populace: On the 26th February 1916 I received a telegram from the Recruiting Officer, Mahratta and Deccani Muhamadans to the effect that two Sepoys of the 117th and two of the 116th had been seriously wounded by Chinchali villagers and that a Naik was missing. I at once wrote to the Acting Dewan that Superintendent of Police and a Special Magistrate should be deputed to Chinchali for enquiry…, though the Maharaja and the Inspector of Police had been at Chinchali nothing was known of the matter. On the 2nd instant I received a letter from the Officer Commanding Depot 117th Mahrattas, forwarding a report from the Havildar of the Party of the 117th to the effect that 2 of his regiment and 2 of the 116th were injured, and that the Inamdar of Chinchali had these men beaten in his Wada, and three enlisted recruits were taken away from them, as also money from the Sepoys…this case does not appear to be an ordinary quarrel between the villagers and the Recruiting Party—that the matter was now very serious and that exemplary punishment would be required.164

The case in Poona district was yet another. The District Magistrate writes: I have just returned from a tour in the Koli country—western part of Khed and Ambegoan. The people knew nothing and care nothing about war. They have an occasional anxiety lest they should be seized and sent to serve as soldiers: e.g. Bhimashankar Fair was poorly attended this year, and the Kolis said they had heard coming on the way that some Saheb-log had come especially to the Fair to get recruits—these rumours they believe had kept many away. Again at Ambegoan (the big Koli bazar) there was a great scare one bazar day, about ten days ago. The new Police Fauzdar came riding to the bazar on a horse. A rumour spread that he had come for recruits—the bazar was empty in five minutes.165 163

Political Department Confidential Proceedings for 1917, 127–137.

164

BPPAI/1916/XXIX/11 March 1916/para 310.

165

BPPAI/XXIX/No. 14 of 1916/para 432/1 April.

 152   Indians in the First World War

The Ahmednagar case is worth quoting for it elucidates how officials tried hard to procure the recruits. The District Magistrate of Ahmednagar writes: I am trying to get in touch with both followers of all sorts and recruits for combatants. Through the mission [American mission] I have secured one Bhil with some influence, and got Captain Gehan to give him some pay and send him out to recruit along the Mula river. The Bhils are ready to come in some numbers for East Africa, but as things were really moving, the Poona authorities regretted that they had to call halt, and now I find it very difficult to get move on. All Mamlatdars and Police Sub-Inspectors are to look-out for possible recruits and I hope the mission will help still further…. Combatants—I am getting influential men in all talukas to tackle groups of villagers and every attempt will be made to arouse a little enthusiasm. Major Hunter has given me `100 to spend on organizing and I am meeting the Sangamner leaders in a few days. I can promise nothing but the old Sardar (Mirikar) thinks there is just a chance like this and I am trying it hard. Dhangars (Shepherds) who are enjoying commensality with Marathas are also being tried. I understand that there are some districts like Sholapur that are bad recruiting areas and it might be a good plan to put on a Special Assistant Collector who knew Sholapur well to wander about his old haunts and try to rouse people. I should think it is quite useless to put on anybody to work in a district he does not know.166

Similar incidents in 1917 about the Bhils from West Khandesh area are reported.167 The fright that was experienced in the Mofussil areas was not uncommon in urban Bombay. A revival of scare among the Ghati labourers of the Bombay markets that able-bodied individuals are taken by force by recruiting parties for military service was reported. The report said: The scare started in the Mulji Jetha Market but this was allayed largely through the good office of Rao Bahaddur Setalvad. This morning a report was spread that a Ghati had been taken away from near the Carnac Bridge and in consequences all the Ghatis working in the Mandvi bazar have struck work…. I have been told that the ‘persuasive’ methods of the recruiting parties are also getting more vigorious. 166

BPPAI/XXIX/No. 15 of 1916/Para 472.

167

BPPAI/XXX/No.42 of 1917/para 1087[a]/20 October.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   153  

Quite different from these methods was that a Circular letter to all temples and Mosque Committees in Kanara district was issued, instructing them that ‘it would be rank ingratitude and disloyalty’ not to invest their savings in the Indian war loans. The main problem with the entire system was that recruitment was mainly confined to the existing districts, which were traditionally considered as catchment areas. By 1916, many of these areas were showing signs of drying up. Although some minor civil officers had been appointed to assist the local recruiting officers, it was found that recruiting operations were still hindered by the absence of effective coordination between the local district officers and the recruiting officers. As a result, village officials and the police subinspectors often found themselves in confusion. The state used many rural intermediaries as military contractors. All forms of local influence in the province, from local officials to landed aristocracy and social notables, were mobilized by the government to stimulate recruitment to the army. At times, the ex-soldiers who worked as military contractors were paid from the state treasury to accompany the new recruits to the training depots. A cursory look at the list of ‘rewards’ would show how such persons were aggressively used in the recruitment campaigns. While using these local influences, the intermediaries of the state had to not only induce and procure more and more recruits, but they had to ensure that resentment against enlistment was contained and would not develop into social unrest. This was not only true of the Bombay Presidency but also of Punjab too.168

168 Tai-Yong, ‘An Imperial Home-Front’, 374–376. There are glaring contradictions in author’s writing: at one place he writes,

That the war had such an impact on the soldiers and resulted in such heavy casualties was hardly surprising. The war in Europe was a major departure from the military experiences the Indian soldiers had been used to: little fighting, not much of hardship, and plenty of rewards and gratuities. (p. 382) And at another place he contradicts himself: ‘some of the letters accused the British making extravagant use of the native troops while sparing the British troops from horrors of the trenches….’(p. 383).

 154   Indians in the First World War

Figure 4.1 Rao Sahib Title Medal Awarded to Dr Pandurang Hari Wagle of Belgaum169 Source: Dr. D.P. Wagle. Reproduced with permission.

What is equally interesting is the monetary incentives, which were given to the recruiting agents and contractors as ‘rewards’. The official records are replete with lists of those private people who helped in procuring recruits. A large amount was spent to pay the capitation for recruits, `3 per recruit was paid by way of incentive. If a person procured around 20 recruits, he was recommended for the title of Rao Sahib, besides the capitation amount. If a person obtained around 50 recruits he was recommended for the title of Rao Bahadur along with the monetary reward. If he would fetch around 200 recruits, he was recommended for the reward of land measuring 6 acres, and that too mostly of his choice, plus monetary rewards. Furthermore, an amount of `100 was additionally paid to that person as ‘Khillat’. This was more of a bonus, an amount other than the capitation fee they got.170 There were no hard and fast rules about the norms for recommendation for ‘rewards’. Titles like Rao Sahib (see Figure 4.1), Rao Bahadur or Khan Bahadur were not awarded to all as a rule, but social standing of the recruiting agent/contractor and his upper caste status were also 169 I am grateful to Dr Damodhar P. Wagle of Belgaum, for providing the picture of the medal awarded to his grandfather Dr Pandurang Hari Wagle. 170

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/119-W.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   155  

taken into consideration for recommendations to the higher authorities in Simla (see Figure 4.2). Many times, even though a socially lower rank person did exceptional recruiting work, he was still not given such title. Social hierarchy was maintained in distributing these titles. It appears that the British administrators were careful enough to maintain social hierarchies and caste gradations. Recruiters belonging to lower caste categories were rewarded with ‘turban’, ‘Sword’ and ‘citation’ as a mark of memento. Some were rewarded with a ‘Sanad’ for recruiting as well as other war efforts (see Figure 4.3).171 The list of those recommended for such honours is very exhaustive. The rationale behind granting ‘Sanads’, Swords and Medals for exemplary service in recruiting was that such awards would secure loyalty of their progeny. Only on the recommendations of the provincial governments, the Army Department at Simla gave their sanction. Some belonging to the lower section who devotedly cooperated were given a citation, which was referred as ‘Mention’. All this kind of confidential correspondence is classified under the heading ‘Rewards’ (see Annexure 4).

Figure 4.2 Another Medal Awarded to Dr Pandurang Hari Wagle172 Source: Dr. D.P. Wagle. Reproduced with permission. MSA/PD/WAR/146–W. This file gives tabulated list of those recommended for award of titles/rewards/Sanads/Swords for recruitment effort. This list is given as an example. Please see Annexure 4.

171

I am grateful to Dr Damodhar P. Wagle of Belgaum, for this photograph of the medal awarded to his grandfather in the post-World War period.

172

 156   Indians in the First World War

Figure 4.3 Facsimile of the Sanad Given in Recognition for Recruitment and Other War Efforts Source: MSA/PD/WAR/1918/146-W.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   157  

A special ‘medal’ called ‘Bronze Star’ was given to some social bigwigs for exceptional work in supporting war efforts as well as recruiting. 173 Another medal was specially minted and rewarded for recruiting effort. The rationale given for this was that not only loyalty of the said person so awarded is appreciated but loyalty of his progeny towards the British Empire would be ensured. Not only recruiting effort was duly rewarded but other services were also rewarded with titles of ‘Order of the British Figure 4.4 Victoria Cross Empire (OBE)’,174 ‘Member of the Source: Gaira, Marzban Jamshedji, Indian Order of Merit (IOM)’, The Contribution of the Parsee ‘Knight Commander of the Order Community during the First World of British Empire’ (KBE) (see Figure War ( 1 9 1 4 – 1 9 1 8 ) , S o r a b j i Burjorji Garda College Trust, 4.5), ‘Knight Commander of the Parsi Cultural Division, Navsari, Indian Empire’ (KCIE), ‘Knight 2016. Copyright Navsari Parsee Commander of the Order of the Panchayat. Reproduced with Star of India’ (KCSI), ‘Member of permission. the Order of British Empire’ (MBE), and ‘Kaiser-i-Hind’ (see Annexure 2). Those rewarded also included many European officials as well. Their lists—the names mentioned therein—are large in number. The most notables who were decorated with the title ‘Kaiser-i-Hind’ for recruitment propaganda and trying to sway people to enlist were M. K. Gandhi and Mrs Ramabai Ranade. One fails to imagine what reasoning the British had to use the German word ‘Kaiser’ in the award of this title, except that it MSA/PD/WAR/1918/327–W; PD/WAR/1919/226–W. Such lists were periodically issued and many of them were also printed in the Imperial Government Gazette, printed by Army Department at Simla.

173

174 A list of persons so decorated with ‘Order of British Empire’ is found in MSA/PD/ WAR/1919/195–W. This is not an isolated instance found in a file, but such recommendation lists were sent by the provincial governments periodically.

 158   Indians in the First World War

could be Anglo-Saxon affinity. There are many files in the MSAs that give such recommendation lists sent by the respective provincial government periodically to the Army Department, Simla. Once approved, the list of these persons decorated with highsounding titles were printed in the government gazette. Lists of those persons rewarded with titles Rao Saheb, Rao Bahadur, Khan Bahadur/Turban/Sword/Medal were not printed but are abundantly found in the official records.175 If a person to be rewarded with Indianized title Figure 4.5 The Knight of the British Empire like Rao Bahaddur was either Muslim or Parsee, he was given the title of Source: Gaira, Marzban Jamshedji, Khan Bahaddur instead. In northern The Contribution of the Parsee Community during the First World India, these titles were modified to War ( 1 9 1 4 – 1 9 1 8 ) , S o r a b j i Rai Saheb and Rai Bahaddur. In most Burjorji Garda College Trust, of the provinces, Zamindars were Parsi Cultural Division, Navsari, offered Honorary Commission as a 2016. Copyright Navsari Parsee reward for recruiting services and to Panchayat. Reproduced with stimulate them to further efforts.176 permission. To placate the Indian nationalists, those who aggressively acted as willing and enthusiastic ‘collaborators’ of the British such as Justice N. G. Chandavarkar, M. B. Chaubal and others were rewarded with Knighthood for their support to war efforts. Satyendra Prasad Sinha, who was the President of the Indian National Congress Session held in Bombay in 1915, was first given the title of ‘Sir’ and later elevated to ‘Lordship’, much to the displeasure of many racist White members of the House of Lords. MSA/PD/WAR/1917/191–W; PD/WAR/1918/146–W; PD/WAR/1919/119–W; PD/ WAR/1919/148–W Names mentioned for rewards of medals and citations in the services in War; PD/WAR/1920/194–W & PD/WAR/1921/54-W: Grant of Swords, Sanads, Turbans and so on, for good recruiting work. 175

176

India’s Services in the War, Chapter II, 3–16.

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   159  

Few native princes such as the Maharajas of Bikaner and Patiala were decorated with military ranks such as Colonel, a rank which was not given even to Chhatrapati Shahu and the Maharaja of Baroda. Loyalists like the Maharaja of Bikaner and Lord S. P. Sinha were given such prominence in the post-war events that they were nominated as Indian representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, much to the consternation of both the Extremist and Moderate leaderships in India. Royalties of the Native States who contributed generously towards recruitment, war loan bonds, materials help such as tents, motor cars, ambulances and hospital material and spaces were rewarded with decoration of honorary military ranks of Lieutenant/Captain and Major. Many files are replete with jealous complaints against each other from these native princes about the military ranks given to them, and slavishly pleading the government for upgrading their rank. The ruler of Bhavnagar state was so overenthusiastic that he issued special medals for rewarding Indian soldiers of his state and to those who were inmates of hospital and convalescent home in Bhavnagar.177 While the stories of recruiting excesses found in the BPPAI have been cited above, there was criticism in the Indian press as well. B. G. Horniman, the editor of Bombay Chronicle, made a scathing indictment of the methods officially used in recruiting campaign, in his book Amritsar and Our Duty to India. He felt that the recruiting drive ‘might have been a success if the government had not refused Indians access to the commissioned ranks’, and this created a prejudice in the minds of the people. Another factor for failure was the fact that they had been ‘hopelessly officialised and conducted in many instances by the methods of the old English press-gangs in the French wars’. Further, he deserves to be quoted in full text: Popular leaders, some of whom were actually clamouring for conscription, were distrusted and ignored, and recruiting committee were composed, for the most part, of officials and their nominees, who in turn were distrusted by the people. In the Punjab and elsewhere the method adopted 177

MSA/PD/WAR/1917/199 – W.

 160   Indians in the First World War

was indent on each district and village for the number of recruits that it was considered it ought to produce, and then leave it to the local officials to see that the complement was forthcoming, using such methods of ‘pressure and persuasion’ as they thought fit. Some of the methods employed, such as trumped up prosecutions and actual cruelties on the person to enforce recruitment have been revealed before the Hunter Committee... But that was too dangerous an expedient for a government that rules by force…. It must not be assumed that coercive measures, which is the proper English for Lord Willingdon’s ‘pressure and persuasion’ were necessary. The loans could have been raised as well by the reasonable and productive methods of securing popular cooperation. But in the country districts the ‘indent’ system prevailed. Local officers had to make returns of the lending capacity of the areas in their charge, and subordinates, feeling that their reputation for efficiency depended on results, entered with zest, down to the police constable, on the task of exhorting the highest amount that ‘pressure and persuasion’ could produce. All over India one heard the stories of this campaign of extortion from people who could not afford to pay. The story of what occurred in a taluka in the Bombay Presidency may be quoted, for it includes the zoolum both of war loan and recruiting methods. Here the local mamlatdar, or petty collector, followed what appears to have been a not infrequent practice of sending out summonses on official printed forms, under the Land Revenue Code calling upon the people to appear before him ‘in regard to the war loan.’ Then he descended on a village, summoned certain villagers to appear before him, arbitrarily made out a list of the amounts they were expected to pay, and closed the village well until such time as they paid. That particular case was fully exposed. But Lord Willingdon’s Government, far from being shocked, after a perfunctory investigation issued the communiqué condoning ‘pressure and persuasion’.   The following year the mamlatdar, having received this recompense of encouragement, followed similar method in obtaining recruits. Summons on this occasion were sent out on printed forms under the ‘Recruiting Act’ a statute, which had no existence except in his ingenious brain, and men were taken by force. The people’s patience, under the 2 year’s strain, broke down when he seized the assistant priests of a temple, had them forcibly shaved and proposed to hand them over to the recruiting officer. An angry mob surrounded his bungalow, and after allowing his family to escape, burnt it to the ground with him in it. That was a direct outcome of the condonation of oppression, and now the village has to pay a punitive police tax, though several people were hanged or imprisoned for the crime. A great deal more might be written to expose the scandals attending these recruiting and war loan campaigns, but the present object is served if enough has been said to show the kind of harassment, which the Indian

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   161  

people bore with remarkable patience through out the war, ever looking to the end, which was to bring them relief from these oppressions and emancipation from their political shackles.178

No wonder, the BG could not stomach such acerbic attack and immediately arranged for B. G. Horniman’s deportation to England. Rural poverty, total reliance on agriculture, which depended entirely on inclement weather Gods, the ever-increasing land revenue of the state, the fleecing village moneylenders, the supercilious village officials and the police and the promise of special pay and allowances during the period of war were the factors that resulted in recruitment of many a poor villagers. What sort of economic compulsion prompted or lured many a peasant and the like to join the war as soldiers in rural India, which was true not just of Punjab but the rest of the country as well, is succinctly described by Mulk Raj Anand in his novel, Across the Black Waters, written in 1939: For when they first joined the army these legionaries did so because, as the second, third or fourth sons of a peasant family overburdened with debt, they had to go and earn a little ready cash to pay off the interest on the mortgaged of the few acres of land, the only thing which stood between the family and its fate. Of course, these second, third and fourth sons ‘sprung from the lions of tigresses’, as the recruiting sergeant used to call them, living the confined of small interests in the remote villages of the hills and plains, were sensitive to the elegant cut of the tight white trousers, the double stud tunics, the shapely turbans with red under-turbans and the well-oiled soft shoes which the Sarkar gave as regulation mufti to the sepoys to be paid for, by installments, when they went home on furlough. And though five or six rupees they could save out of the eleven rupees standard pay could not feed the insatiable greed of the landlord or moneylender, it helped to feed the pigeon-bellied grandmother and to make up the gaps in the arrears of rent for five years ago to the Sarkar. Besides, the soldier pledged to fight the battles of the King-Emperor, brought the necessary prestige to keep the local policeman at bay, and to bail out brothers, fathers, or uncles, who were arrested for non-payment of rent or debt. And, of course, always the proud family imagined that the second, third, fourth son would win promotion, a sudden prize, a grant of land, or a life-pension 178

Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty, 23–27.

 162   Indians in the First World War

for conspicuous bravery in battle, and that would help them to pay-off all arrears and start clear of all the misery once again with full possession of the land.179

The author does not fail to narrate the social reality of what happens when occasionally a soldier returned home: But, occasionally, one man in the village returned, with a stripe on his arm or a star on his shoulder, or a medal on his chest, and demanded a large dowry before he would wed the daughter of any worthy in his brotherhood. And the young men of the village looked at him and soon the recruiting offices of the district became busier.180

Anand describes that information about rewards was the chief preoccupation of the sepoys…the inspiration of it what spurred them on to battle. How happy would be the dear ones at home if only a ready sum could help to pay even a tenth part of the moneylenders’ interest or towards the repair of the roof which had been washed out by the last monsoon before the drought!181

What Mulk Raj Anand wrote about the rural situation in Punjab was equally true of other areas like Bombay as well. This is reflected in a short story titled ‘Premache Tarayantra’, written by Shantabai Bhide in Marathi, in the magazine Gruhalaxmi in 1927. In this story, the main protagonist Mukundrao, a graduate from a Bombay medical college, is in love with Shashikala, the heroine, joins the medical team in Mesopotamian theatre of war, for earning extra allowances, which were specially promised.182 Sadly, he succumbs to the injuries received from enemy grenades. Many doctors enlisted for field services primarily for economic incentives. While recruiting non-combatants for France, Salonika and Mesopotamia, economic enticements were offered to the tribals from 179

Anand, Across the Black Waters, 168.

180

Ibid., 169.

181

Ibid.

Bhide, ‘Premache Tarayantra’. I am grateful to Dr Jaswandi Wamburkar for bringing this story to my notice.

182

Indian Recruitment and Rewards   163  

Garo, Khasi hills of Assam, ‘aboriginals’ of Santhal Paragana and Chota Nagpur, tribes of Doms from Gorakhpur, Saran and Champaran,183 Bhils and Berads from Khandesh in Bombay Presidency, and such other people. The utilization of tribals for labour force was commonly followed in all provinces. In UP, for example, special companies of Jadobans and Gwalbans Ahir were raised. So was from Kumaun region.184 The administration also enlisted jail convicts for labour work in Mesopotamia. Their services in war were treated as work against their jail sentence. European prisoners were normally appointed as clerks over other convict labour.185 The jails of each province supplied ‘volunteer’ convicts for labour work in Mesopotamia.

Singha, ‘Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq’. This is an excellent study that shows how the British government procured non-combatant labour force for Iraq and the economic incentives they gave.

183

184

India’s Services in the War, Chapter II, 3–16.

MSA/Judicial Department/1917/No.689, Part VI—Convicts; This file contains agreements form for conditional remission of sentence, cited by Singha, ‘Finding Labor from India for the War in Iraq’, 430.

185

Prisoners of War Evolution of the Concept of Prisoners of War

5

A large-scale problem for the principal belligerent nations in the First World War was that of the treatment of civilians of enemy nationality in their respective jurisdiction. Earlier, at the outbreak of war between France and England in 1803, Napoleon held some 10,000 English civilians, but apparently without making any claim that he could rightfully make them POWs. Rather, his act was one of retaliation against the British for their initiation of hostilities by capture of French merchants without a declaration of war.1 Under considerations of national safety measures and the possible unfortunate effects at home of mishandling it, the problem assumed far-reaching importance only during the First World War and the need for clear law as well as positive action was felt thereafter. The problem of the classification of non-combatant persons of enemy nationality in the jurisdiction, the custody of those considered dangerous to the interests of the state in residence, restraints upon liberty of others and the matter of alien enemy property, thus, assumed great importance. Statutory definitions of alien enemy became important in the First World War, especially in connection with legislation on trading with the enemy and the administration of alien enemy property. It is a striking fact that while there are elaborate provisions in treaties regulating the treatment of combatants who become POWs, no comparable rules were established as to civilians of enemy nationality resident in a belligerent nation. For the combatant POWs, the rules and regulations were accomplished by the adoption of the 1864 Geneva Red Cross Convention and the Second Hague Convention. Although in 1

Wilson, ‘Treatment of Civilian Alien Enemies’, see fn. 10, 32.

Prisoners of War   165  

the Annex to Hague Convention IV of 1907, there were provisions restricting what might be occupant belligerents to residents of the occupied territory, no single general convention to regulate the treatment of civilians of enemy nationality was perfected at The Hague Conference of that year.2 Prison psychosis differs from captivity psychosis, in which the individuals concerned, and the surroundings are entirely different. Prison psychosis is the psychological reaction of a criminal who has been sentenced by a court for a crime and who serves in an institution set up specifically for the punishment of offenders. Captivity psychosis is the mental reaction of a soldier who has been captured by an enemy and thus made a POW. He bears no stigma for being such a prisoner.3 Also, in general, the mental or psychological stability of a POW varies according to the stage of captivity or the time factor. The isolation and the indefiniteness of the time of confinement within the stockade or enclosure or fort create a certain sense of futility among the prisoners, which becomes more acute as the months pass. The endless hoping and waiting creates a restless expectation, uncertainty and a demoralizing melancholia, which is often hard to combat. When the period of imprisonment extends to 5–6 years, the problem of mental balance becomes serious for some prisoners. The harmful psychological effects of long-term confinement can hardly be imagined. The experience of POWs in the First World War was instructive for belligerent nations on both sides, and also in a way was a dress rehearsal for the longer and more serious Second World War involvement. 2 Ibid., 33; On 27 July 1929, delegates signed at Geneva the new multilateral convention on POWs, with a more complete ‘code’ of rules than The Hague Convention IV had provided. In 1934, at the Fifteenth International Red Cross Convention, held in Tokyo, a plan was presented for a convention, which would look into the protection of civilians of enemy nationality in the territory of a belligerent or in territory occupied by him. Despite these efforts, during the Second World War, Germany under Hitler deployed services of more than 6 million of foreign prisoners of which half of them were civilian prisoners forcibly used as labourers for their industries. All these prisoners became victims of Nazi persecution. 3

Lunden, ‘Captivity Psychoses Among’.

 166   Indians in the First World War

Figure 5.1 POWs Including Indians Held by Turkey During WW I Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

Millions of soldiers, sailors and civilians suffered in prisons (see Figure 5.1). The most comprehensive agreement on POWs, the 1907 Hague Convention, was inoperative because two of the minor belligerents had not signed it. More importantly, national hatred and scarcities of material resources further dictated stringent war prison conditions. Also, the governments on both sides rounded up hundreds of thousands of their own residents of enemy birth and put them in internment camps. These prisoners had no clear status or protection in international law and they fell victim to intolerance on the home front. Until the joining of United States in Allied forces in the First World War in April 1917, after 3 years of neutrality, its diplomatic officials had gained valuable experience acting as intermediaries among the internment camps on both sides, and helping to relieve families in distress. After American entry into the war, the Swiss Legation, in charge of German interests in India and other counties, inspected the internment camps, talked privately with the German internees and suggested some improvements. While the interned German crewmen were cooperative, partly because of humane and fair treatment they received, the outside

Prisoners of War   167  

general public clamoured to complain that the prisoners were ‘coddled’ and ‘pampered’ and lived in luxury as though on an ‘enforced holiday’. More serious was the fact that the internees suffered from what officials called ‘barbed-wire sickness’. The internees suffered increasingly from close confinement and a sense of isolation from the world. The families separated due to internment of men and women folk at different places caused more anxieties for both partners. Military censors stationed at the camps, anxious to detect any hidden messages, made matters worse by causing long delays, confiscating letters and expunging most of the meaningful ‘news’ in the mail. In addition, most of the civilian internees were tormented by uncertainty. Who were their accusers? What were the charges? How long would they remain in confinement and would they be able to stay in the country after the cessation of hostilities? Most prisoners in criminal prisons knew answers to such questions but not the civilian internees. Often personal reputations were ruined, and families at home depended on charity for survival. Because of the strain, several internees suffered from mental breakdown. Besides these inevitable hardships, there were other problems. The Army Department’s administration of the camps was too decentralized. The Adjutant General’s Office assumed overall control of the internment programme and provided general supervision. Men from Inspector General’s Office visited the camps about every 6 months to report on the conditions and make recommendations, but each of the Camp Commandant (normally retired Colonel put on active duty) enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in solving daily problems. Unfortunately, in practice, none of the directors appointed at the outset understood or agreed with the spirit and intent of the Army Department’s regulations issued from Simla. Occasionally, the Swiss Minister sent agents to officially inspect the camps and talk privately with the internees. But between the visits, months frequently elapsed before an individual or a group complaint could be reported through formal channels, be investigated by the Army Department and perhaps be mitigated. The Army Department in most cases stood by the story reported by the Adjutant General and normally concurred by the local collector of the district.

 168   Indians in the First World War

For a while, the labour question created the most controversy. But soon were issued general work rules, which specified that the interned civilian had not to perform any labour except ‘for their own welfare or the upkeep of the Camp’. Aliens who wanted to earn extra spending money could volunteer to work public or private projects in the precincts of the camp. While food was rationed, anybody wanting more could buy food or if he had additional money he could buy food for others. However, the definition of the camp ‘upkeep’ was not sufficiently clear. Majority of the troops were activated reservist, and one who were considered unfit for overseas duty were appointed as guards. The guards and the inmates perceived each other as enemies, not to be trusted, and attempted escapes or disruptions in camp precipitated by disagreements over rules and regulations kept everyone on edge. Inmates from diverse backgrounds, the Jesuit professors and preachers, along with the uneducated sailors, and unaccustomed to military regimen tended to squabble among themselves and with the authorities. Disciplinary measures became commonplace. Normally camp officials punished an internee’s insubordination or refusal to work on clean-up details by curtailing his mail and visiting privileges, by forcing him to do extra work around the grounds or in extreme cases by sentencing him to 2 weeks of solitary confinement on bread and water. These above observations are from the voluminous correspondence available in the archives, between the Camp Adjutant, the American Consul in Bombay, Henry Baker and later the Swiss Legation agent Mr Ringer; the letters of internees pleading for parole or for joining with their spouses residing elsewhere; and the official replies given by the Army Department to the Foreign Secretary at London. The camp records are well crafted but read between the lines; they give a different picture. Another problem that besieged the Bombay officials was the internment of ‘White’ prostitutes of enemy nationality. While one finds many names of the arrested White prostitutes, one does not get sufficient information about their place of internment. Much of the misery associated with the camps was inevitable consequences of long detention or the result of the obstinacy and animosity of the civilian suspects. But adding to the hardships were

Prisoners of War   169  

administrative oversights and lack of sympathy, drab quarters and tight restrictions on outside communication. Adherence to the formalities of international law guaranteed little in terms of daily comfort of the internees. There are hardly any research works on these issues related to the internment camps during the First World War, except Jean-Noel Grandhomme.4 II Until recently, the historiography of the First World War focused on the inter-combatant fight and violence between opposing armies. However, within the new wave of historiography reassessing the nature and scope of military violence in 1914–1919, one type of violence has been overlooked—violence against ‘POWs’. Despite recent upsurge in publications on the occasion of centenary of the beginning of the First World War, violence against the POWs has received little scholarly attention.5 Violence against the civilian POWs provides a valuable insight into the fluid boundaries of military violence that had developed by 1914–1918, and reveals the strain that the British military administration experienced during this conflict. Defining violence against civilian prisoners remains problematic. Clearly shooting, bayoneting, beating or hitting prisoners must be considered violent practices. It also includes a prisoner’s right to bodily integrity; in other words, their right to a special consideration when sick. The differential treatment of captives based upon nationality broke with the idea of standard, universal treatment for all POWs, which pre-war international law had sought to establish, under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The internment of enemy civilians resident in Bombay during the First World War has remained an overlooked aspect of historical 4

Grandhomme, ‘Internment Camps for German’.

5

Jones, ‘The Final Logic of Sacrifice?’

 170   Indians in the First World War

research. Not surprisingly, citizens of enemy states—the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians—who found themselves in Bombay when the war began would not be considered harmless but, on the contrary, potentially dangerous. They were suspected of espionage, organizing acts of sabotage, encouraging pacifism and defeatism. Even some nationals of allied countries were considered as ‘suspect from a national point of view’. Suspicious individuals were expelled, placed under surveillance or arrested for executing secret plans. Those arrested were later deported or interned in concentration camps. What sort of German-Austro-Hungarian people were interned? 1. Number of people belonging to these nationalities, not of military age but people working in different industries, hotels and so on; their spouses and children. 2. Individuals captured from ships at sea or at the port of Bombay of alien nationalities. 3. Jesuits–Catholics, belonging to the enemy nationality; nuns belonging to Franciscan Order. Some had simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time. They were evacuated by rail car to Ahmednagar fort so that they could be well monitored. Bombay being the port of embarkation and disembarkation for British India needed to be well protected. Being a vulnerable port due to all military troops being despatched from this port to various theatres of war, their movements needed to be kept secret. Although the administration surveyed many alternatives for setting up of POWs camps, the decision to zero it down to Ahmednagar was arrived due to its previous history. After the conclusion of the Boer War in South Africa (1899–1901), the British government in London had decided to intern nearly 5,000 Boer POWs in India. The Commander-in-Chief of Indian Forces favoured in locating these prisoners in different places such as (a) Kodaikanal, (b) Dapoli, (c) Panchmarhi, (d) Bellary and (e) Dehra Dun, with a guard of half a battalion in each spot selected.6 Since location of Ahmednagar fort 6 Secretary, PD, GOI to the Adjutant General in India, Simla, No. 918-B, 9 March 1901, MSA/PD/WAR/1901/464 and PD/WAR/1902/240.

Prisoners of War   171  

for the camp offered advantages of organizing proper surveillance, finally the Boer POWs were interned there. They were brought to Princes Docks (Wadi Bunder), Bombay from Transvaal, South Africa, and further conveyed to Ahmednagar fort by two special trains on 24 April 1901.7 Thereafter, Ahmednagar fort was always considered by the British Indian administration to be a safe haven not only for the German-Austrian POWs during the First World War, but for lodging Indian political prisoners from time to time. Notable among these was the internment of the members of the All India Congress Working Committee after the passage of the Quit India Resolution on 9 August 1942. Those interned between August 1942 and March 1945 included Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,8 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Vallabhbhai Patel, Govind Vallabh Pant, Dr Sayed Mahmud, Dr P. C. Ghosh, Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Acharya Narendra Dev, Shankarrao Dev, Harekrishna Mehtab and J. B. Kriplani. The official correspondence between the POW camp record office and the Secretary, PD, BG, gives the following information about the POW camp conducted at Ahmednagar.9 Also, at the closing of the Camp, the government prepared a dossier on the ‘history of the Camp’. Following information is culled from these records. The camp was first formed in 1914, the site selected being within the Fort on the open ground to the North. Later as the number of POWs increased, the camp was moved from the Fort to the British Infantry Lines and Artillery Barracks. The two trains conveying Boer POWs left Bombay for Ahmednagar on 24 April 1901 at 18.50 pm and 19.15 pm under strict police vigilance at all the stations where the railway stopped. No. 2832, PD/WAR/1901/464. Interestingly, a State Prisoner named Khumar Kaluba and his seven accomplices were imprisoned in the fort before the arrival of Boer Prisoners. They were removed to Belgaum fort. 7

The most famous intellectual product of this internment at Ahmednagar was Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India and also, Maulana Azad’s acclaimed compilation of epistolary essays in Urdu—Ghubar-i-Khatir.

8

MSA/PD/WAR/1920/166-W; Information regarding the POWs Camp at Ahmednagar is mainly based on this source. Since this is an official report, it gives an impression that everything was organized and does not give the difficulties faced by the Prisoners/Internees.

9

 172   Indians in the First World War

The prisoners were divided into three Camps: Camp A:

It accommodated middle-class people and crews of captured German ships. It provided accommodation for 850 prisoners. Camp B: This was meant for people of superior position— commercial men and employees who were in comfortable billets in India before the War. Accommodation for 386 was provided for this category. In 1917, the Officers’ camp was added to B Camp, increasing the number to 434, inclusive of first-class accommodation. Parole camp: This was reserved for those who gave up their parole, did not attempt escape, nor did take up arms against Great Britain or her Allies during the Great War. Accommodation for 450 was provided in this category. Camps A and B were surrounded by barbed wire and was patrolled by soldiers and guards. The Parole camp was open, and the occupants could walk about freely within a radius of 5 miles except in the direction of the Ahmednagar city, that is, native town. They were not allowed to enter villages. Camp A was in the fort for segregation purposes, as these prisoners were suspected as potential threat.

Accommodation The internment camp comprised of the British Infantry Barracks, Artillery Barracks and buildings, especially built for the POWs. The British administrative establishment claimed that each of the three camps had a theatre, recreation and lecture room, a mess, canteen and coffee shops. It was also claimed that the prisoners were provided with an iron cot, mattress sheets, pillows, blankets and a mosquito net; and also proper sanitation was regularly maintained. But in actuality, the picture was entirely different. In April 1917, a camp to accommodate 84 convalescent POWs from Ahmednagar was opened at Ramandurg, a wooded plateau about 3,500 feet above sea level, near Bellary (see Figure 5.2). This camp was enlarged in 1918 to hold POW convalescents. They were

Prisoners of War   173  

Figure 5.2 Ahmednagar Prisoner of War Camp During World War I Source: File No. MSA/PD/War/1920/166-W. Reproduced with permission from Maharashtra State Archives. Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

accommodated in tents. Buildings were provided for a hospital, and men recommended on medical grounds were allowed to sleep in a building. Prior to the formation of the camp at Ramandurg, convalescent POWs were sent to Dagshai in the Murree Hills.

Management of the Camp Each camp consisted of several barracks. POWs especially elected by their fellow mates and approved by the Camp Commandant were appointed room Captains. The duties of the room Captain were to assist the staff in maintaining order, report to the Section Sergeant about any matter bearing upon the well-being of the POWs, to ensure that every case of sickness was reported to the higher authority and to arrange for the safe custody of the valuables of those admitted into Hospital. He was responsible for supervising cleanliness and sanitation of barracks under his charge.

 174   Indians in the First World War

Over every 100 POWs, 1 British NCO was appointed as a Section Sergeant, whose duties mainly included: maintaining discipline and reporting any disturbance at once, calling the roll of the Sections at certain hours and carefully inspecting the buildings in their Section. In ‘A’ camp, each section had its own representative on the camp committee and they elected one as a Secretary and one as a spokesman. ‘B’ camp did not have a camp committee but selected one spokesman, and it was through him matters were conveyed to the Commandant’s office. Parole camp selected from the room Captains four as committee members and two as spokesmen. Besides these members, each nationality had its representative. The duties of the camp committees were as follows: a. To investigate complaints brought before them by individual prisoners and submit them to the Commandant. b. To bring to the notice of the Commandant any defects in sanitation and any irregularity. c. To make out lists of articles required by POWs to be purchased by value paid by post (VPP) and submit them to the censor.

Food Rationing The following was the daily scale of rations supplied free by government to all POWs, except officers who were drawing pay: bread 1 lb; milk 4 oz; butter 1 oz; rice 2 oz; meat 12 oz; salt 1/3 oz; sugar 2 oz; potato 10 oz; tea 1/3 oz; vegetable 6 oz; and pepper 1/12 oz. Any officer who desired to draw ration was permitted to do so on payment of 7 annas per dime.

A coffee shop was maintained in each camp at which POWs could buy such articles as they required. Imported articles with certain exceptions were alone prohibited. The prices were controlled by the authorities and approved by the camp committees. POW were also permitted to purchase all but imported goods by V.P.P. through their camp committees. The average monthly purchases by V.P.P. amounted to about `4,000.

Prisoners of War   175  

Clothing All POWs were allowed to bring into the camp their personal effects, clothing and so on, but POWs could purchase such items through V.P.P. Those who could not afford to purchase essentials were supplied free. The prisoners had to wash their own clothes, else they could pay for laundry and get them washed by one of their fellow inmates. The officials claimed that ‘with the exception of ordinary fatigues, there was no compulsory labour’, but prisoners could take up any occupation on their own will and were paid for their work. Inmates who were proficient in trades such as motor repairs, carpentry, dentistry, watchmaking, picture framing, tailoring, piano-tuning and painting were allowed to practice and received their orders from the neighbourhood, payments being made through the camp authorities. Each camp had its own barber and inmates had to pay him for services. The POWs were allowed to walk within a certain area, namely, up to 5–6 miles to the eastern side of the fort, which was the opposite side of the city. They were allowed ‘one route march’ into the country per week under an escort. Arrangements were made in the camp to hold regular religious services conducted by German Roman Catholic Priests and Protestant Ministers. When some inmates complained that there was no place for pulpit for their Chaplin while addressing the services, they were told to stand on their baggage trunk and use it as a pulpit for religious services. A plot of ground was set aside in the British cemetery for the burial of POWs who died in Ahmednagar, in the centre of which was erected a block of stone with a brass plate inscribed with the date 1914–1919. Each grave had a head stone with the name of the POW, native town, age and date of death inscribed on a plate of brass. However, the administration did not fail to mention that crosses on such burials, costing `10 each, were provided by the government. The perimeter of the interned Camps ‘A’ and ‘B’ was lit with Kitson lamps placed at intervals of about 50 yards; 59 lamps were acquired for this purpose. Oil and lamps were supplied for the lighting of barracks. The Kitson lamps did not prove very satisfactory as they were constantly going out of use, and required a large staff to be kept all

 176   Indians in the First World War

night by the contractor to look after them. A proposal was initiated for the use of electric lamps in the camp towards the end of 1914 and again in 1918 but was negatived. The official correspondence describes that majority of offences occurred in ‘A’ camp where there were many sailors and prisoners of low status. The number of convictions was as follows: 1. Summary awards, which included offences against the censor and camp regulations: 509. 2. Military courts, which included escape attempts. In total, 18 persons tried to escape and 17 of them were recaptured. These were punished by the Military Court under the powers of the commandant. Rules for their trial as well as maintenance of discipline were specially laid down by the Military Department. Total number of prisoners dealt with under this category: 47. The summary awards included offences against the censor and camp regulations. There were 18 escapes of which 17 were recaptured, and the other was run over and killed by a train near Goa. Parole was only granted to those inmates who wished to take either on medical ground or similar reasons. No inmate was allowed to leave the interned camp except under escort, and all on transfer from one station to another were escorted to their destination.

Accounts On arrival in camp, each POW gave up all Indian currency, foreign currency and valuables, which were deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank and a stipulated sum from among that was disbursed to the prisoner weekly. Foreign currency and valuables were returned to the prisoner on repatriation. The camp accounts were maintained by a British Military Officer, who was assisted in clerical work by five POWs. To avoid actual handling of large sums of money—which was received daily from Banks, Mercantile firms and from prisoners’ relatives and friends inside and outside India—the Indian money order system was extensively used. A Post Office Savings Bank account was opened for the whole camp

Prisoners of War   177  

in the name of the Commandant, and all money were credited to that account. It is stated that average weekly receipts amounted to approximately `14,000. At the Post Office, details of all remittances were entered in a book, showing name of prisoner, number and source of money order and the amount received. On return to camp, the amount of each remittance was posted to the credit of the POW concerned in an acquittance book. This book contained all transactions regarding receipts, transfers and disbursements, and was signed by the prisoner concerned on the weekly pay day. After depositing the receipts in the Post Office Savings Bank, the Accounts Officer withdrew sufficient funds to pay the camps in the following week, which amounted to approximately `12,000, at the rate of `30 to each prisoner. Each prisoner who had an account was given a receipt, the details of which were entered in the Acquittance Book and every withdrawal of amount was entered and signed by the Accounts Officer. Certain POWs received remittances from their respective firms in India as a compassionate allowance, where they were serving prior to their internment. But this was discontinued in December 1916 by a GOI order. The government subsequently decided that POWs who were members of hostile firms in liquidation and had no private funds invested in the custodian of enemy property should receive a destitute allowance of `30 per month according to their status in their respective firms. The destitute allowance commenced from December 1917 and a sum of `43,572 was disbursed under this arrangement to 75 POWs. POWs who wished to assist prisoners who had no private funds were allowed to make transfers from their accounts and the amount thus transferred was disbursed on the following pay day. Accordingly, entries were made in the transferee’s acquittance book. Relief Funds were received from following 19 international organizations, with the moneys received and disbursed aggregating to `235,565: 1. Hamburg Red Cross Fund. 2. Bangkok Relief Fund. 3. German East Africa Fund.

 178   Indians in the First World War

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Java Relief Fund. Manila Relief Fund. New Year’s Gift Fund (from America). Cologne Red Cross Fund. Volksspende Relief Fund (from Germany). German Colonial Fund. Emperor Relief Fund (from Austria). American Relief Fund. Kreigespended Relief Fund (from Bangkok). Dutch Indies Relief Fund (from Siam). Siam Relief Fund. Dye Industry Charity Fund (from Germany). Interest Relief Fund (relinquished by POW from their post office interest). 17. Bombay Relief Fund (collected by Germans in Bombay prior to internment in 1914). 18. Foreigner’s Relief Fund (collected by Germans in Calcutta before 1914). 19. German Relief Fund (Remitted by German and Austrian Governments at the rate of 10 shillings monthly). To avoid confusion, these funds were deposited with Messers Cursetjee & Sons, bankers, and were administered by the various camp committees as the occasion arose. Disbursement from these funds was carried out by the accounts officer. The accounts of the camp were audited by Lieut E. T. Sanders Military Accounts Department.

The Censor Office The Censor Office was organized in November 1914. Before that time, letters were censored either by the Commandant or by the Adjutant. The rules which then governed censorship were recorded in the ‘General Rules for Prisoner of War’ numbers 15 to 18. In November 1914, Army Schoolmaster Orr was appointed Asst Censor and later on Mr Edwards of the Indian Police became the Chief Censor. The number of outgoing letters allowed was one letter and four Post Cards per week for every POW.

Prisoners of War   179  

At first, all outgoing and incoming letters and parcels were free of postage but on 26 March 1916, a GOI order published in the camp allowed free postage on letter packets not exceeding 50 grams in weight. Until October 1917, all incoming correspondence from Europe was censored in London and was then looked into by the camp censor office. The length of outgoing letters was doubled in 1916, four sides of ordinary letter paper being allowed instead of two as before. These additions necessitated an increase in the censor staff. Mr Edwards had been succeeded by Lieut Corin and later Lieut Hudson and Collins were posted, making a total of four censors as well as an NCO who superintended the writing of the Post Cards. The approximate number of receipts and despatches dealt within a normal month was: Incoming

Outgoing

Letters

13,000

6,000

Books

400

—

Parcels

400

—

Post Cards

—

14,000

In October 1918, practically the whole of the work of the censor office was transferred to Bombay from Ahmednagar, with the exception of the censoring of inland mail and of all parcels and books and the running of value paid system. Lt Corin went to Bombay, Lieut Collins to his unit and Mr Orr remained in the camp office. When the general censorship of mail ceased in 1919 and the Bombay officer was closed down, the whole of the POW mail was again dealt within the camp office. Mrs Cortlandt Anderson and Mrs Kidd were posted as Asst Censors in December 1919. The censor office consisted of two rooms and no one except the censors were allowed to enter. From the censor’s view, outgoing correspondence was considered more dangerous, as it could communicate to the enemy political and military news of sensitive nature, could inform complaints, which might lead to reprisals, or could inform their friends and acquaintances in India of the unwanted conditions of the camp. Incoming correspondence was dangerous chiefly because in many cases codes

 180   Indians in the First World War

and other methods of evading the censor were used. Hence, it demanded a close scrutiny under the direction of the London censor, and any matter of importance was quickly conveyed to the home authorities. In this connection, it was found that Austrian censorship was stricter than the German. The usual method of evading censorship tried by the POWs were as follows: 1. Writing underneath stamps: Therefore, every stamp was torn off letters and parcels before delivery to POW. 2. Simple codes: In the majority of cases, these were easy to detect and if any doubt existed in the censor’s mind as to the honesty of a letter, it was withheld. News was conveyed by this method for it was not hard to write what to a stranger is a perfectly straight-forward letter, yet which conveys another meaning to the addressed, who is acquainted with writer’s private life. Although nothing worthwhile could be leaked through this method, the censors kept close watch on that POW’s letters and any suspicious case was noted for future reference. Furthermore, a blacklist of the likely offenders was maintained. 3. Dotting underneath letters: By fine dots underneath the letters, messages were conveyed. For example, ‘We are before everything else looking forward to the early repatriation although we are well treated’. In fact, the words conveyed were ‘We are badly treated.’ It was observed that this method was in great favour with POWs, especially on the printed post cards. Also, fine dots were pricked underneath letters with a sharp pin, and these were not easy to detect, mentions the official report, except by means of a magnifying glass. To circumvent these attempts, a special NCO was assigned to write post cards for the POWs. 4. False sides to letter: Paper was cut to the size of the side of an official POW envelope and gummed in carefully. On the inner side of this false side, a message was written. This of course could be detected only by careful scrutiny on the part of the censor. 5. Invisible ink: This was found to be the most dangerous method employed. A number of secret inks required careful treatment before they could read. The officials found that the first use of

Prisoners of War   181  

secret ink made by POWs was by means of urine, saliva and milk. Heat easily disclosed any message written in these liquids. It was suspected that certain POWs were using secret inks more difficult of disclosure. Iodine fumes was the most successful detecting agent employed, but the censors found that the means of discovering at their disposal were neither sufficient nor convenient, considering the volume of outgoing correspondence. To prevent any tampering with the letter after examination by the censors, the censor room was strongly barred and each letter was stamped and put into a special box, which was locked and placed in a cage. A sentry was posted to guard this room. Another sentry was stationed for round-the-clock duty at the camp post office to prevent any POWs on parole from posting letters. German POWs, one from each camp, was employed as post orderlies, who undertook the sorting and distribution of the incoming mail, after censorship. They also notified parcels that had been sent for the prisoners in the camp. All incoming parcels—inland and foreign—were opened in the presence of owners. Certain articles such as liquors, scents and medicines and so on as enumerated in Army Council Instruction 252 of 1917 were destroyed. Many attempts by the friends of the POWs to conceal messages in the parcel were discovered. The officials observed that letters concealed in sausages, in walnuts, in soldered tins containing soups were not uncommon. Hollow cigars and cigarettes were another favourite means of evasion. A difficult method to discover was the gumming together of two pages of a book with news concealed between. All such methods mentioned in the official communique inadvertently makes clear that all was not well in the POW camps at Ahmednagar.

Medical History of the Prisoners of War Camp at Ahmednagar On 21 August 1914, the first arrivals entered the camp, which was at that time located in the Fort, and consisted mainly of E. P. Tents, with subsidiary buildings. A medical inspection room was maintained in the Fort Camp, controlled by a British medical officer, assisted by POW medical men and other inmates who acted as sick attendants.

 182   Indians in the First World War

Trivial cases were only treated in the Fort, all others who required medical treatment being sent to the British Station Hospital. As a rule, British troops and POWs were not however treated together in the same ward. As the strength increased, it became necessary to vacate the Fort Camp, owing to lack of accommodation, and in 1915 all POWs were moved into the Royal Army Barracks and Wellesley Barracks, which had previously been occupied by the British Artillery and Infantry Unit stationed at Ahmednagar. With the increasing strength, it also became necessary to organize separate hospital accommodation for the camp. For this purpose, two barracks in Wellesley Lines, in close proximity to the British Station Hospital, were taken over and equipped with 50 beds. Dr Finck, late German Consular Surgeon at Calcutta, was given a free hand in the treatment of the sick in hospital, under the supervision of the Officer Commanding, British Station Hospital. This practice was discontinued, the official records claim, owing to certain grave abuses of the privileges enjoyed by the POW medical staff and personnel. The general duties were carried out by the Indians of the Army Hospital Corps, under the supervision of British Station Hospital. Later, special wards were allotted for surgical, medical, infections and eye cases. Highly infectious cases such as those suffering from small pox were treated in the infectious ward for British troops, which was well isolated from the camp. Men were protected against enteric fever, small pox, plague and so on by frequent protective inoculations, so as to prevent epidemic disease in the camp. During the year 1918, the POWs suffered from epidemic influenza, which swept all over the world. The disease caused 637 admissions to hospital and reported 11 deaths. If a sick POW did not like the method of sickroom cookery for the British sick, only at a special request German or Austrian cooks were employed in the camp hospital. Separate dispensaries for treating trivial cases were maintained for A and B camps and for the Parole camp. A camp for convalescents and for those whose health was likely to suffer from continued internment was established at Ramandurg in Bellary district, a healthy hillstation, which was formerly a convalescent camp for British troops. It had a capacity of 300 people and was always filled to capacity. Another camp was established at Takdah for unfit men whose health did not permit further internment in

Prisoners of War   183  

Ahmednagar. Yet another camp was maintained at Yercaud for men over military age and were unfit for military employment. All these camps were primarily hill stations. In a few cases in which it was certified by the medical authorities that it was desirable, in the interest of health that the men should return to their families, they were permitted to proceed to the civil camp for married families at Belgaum (see Figure 5.3). A glance at the annual return shows clearly that the following were the prevailing diseases: malaria, digestive disturbances, dysentery, venereal diseases, myalgia (rheumatism) and debility. A large number of the internees had resided for many years in the tropics, and had suffered from malaria and dysentery. Of those internees who came from East Africa, nearly all arrived suffering from active malaria and dysentery, and many from chronic malarial Cachexia. By far, majority of admissions for digestive complaints were of a

Figure 5.3 Prisoner of War Camp at Belgaum for Hostile or Enemy Women in the First World War Source: File No. MSA/PD/War/1920/166-W. Reproduced with permission from Maharashtra State Archives. Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

 184   Indians in the First World War

Table 5.1 Total Number of Admissions under Each Prevailing Disease Malaria

531

Venereal diseases

144

Digestive complaints

534

Myalgia

144

Dysentery

186

Debility

98

Source: MSA/PD/1920/166-W.

temporary nature, due to indiscretion of diet. There was a fairly large number of men who arrived suffering from very long-standing venereal diseases. Few cases of venereal diseases were contracted locally by men on parole. It was noted by the camp authorities that there seemed to be a widespread impression in the camps that those who could show the greatest number of admissions to hospital would have the best chance of early repatriation. Despite the above official information, another important facet on which Tables 5.1–5.6 throw sufficient light is the medical history of the camp. There was total lack of basic medical facilities at the POW camp and many times the patients had to be treated in the infection wards for British troops, which was well isolated from the camp. These tables show the medical history and the kind of diseases inmates suffered: Table 5.2 Average Annual Strength of the Camp Year

Average Annual Strength

Admission to Hospital

Deaths

1914

254

181

4

1915

1,156

592

1

1916

1,316

531

6

1917

1,565

724

4

1918

1,989

1,491

14

1919

1,544

812

8

Source: MSA/PD/1920/166-W.

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Table 5.3 Number of Admissions to the Hospital 1914–1920 Malaria

531

Digestive complaints

531

Dysentery

186

Venereal diseases

144

Myalgia

144

Debility

98

Source: MSA/PD/1920/166-W. Table 5.4 Number of Major Surgical Operations Performed Successfully Number of Major Surgical Operations Performed

Completed Successfully

Partially Successful

Failed

Deaths

148

6

1

1

156

Source: MSA/PD/1920/166-W. Note: This number does not include any surgical operations performed on POWs sent to Poona or Bombay as recommended by the doctors at the Camp.

In addition to malarial fevers and dysentery, following infectious diseases occurred: Table 5.5 Number of Admissions due to Infectious Diseases

Diseases Enteric fevers

No. of Admissions

Deaths

55

5

Smallpox

8

0

Influenza

654

11

Plague

1

1

Cholera

4

1

Sandfly fever

69

0

Chicken pox

2

0

Relapsing fever

2

0

31

1

Tubercle of lungs

 186   Indians in the First World War

Diseases

No. of Admissions

Deaths

Number

Remarks

Deaths: Cause of Death Nephrites

2

Contracted in East Africa and died 10 days after arrival

Bayonet wound

1

The man was bayoneted while trying to escape and died.

Diabetes

2

Enteric fever

5

Plague

1

Acute alcoholic poisoning

1

Colitis

1

Sclerosis

1

Valvular disease of heart

2

Suicides

2

Cholera

1

Epithelcoma of tongue

1

Cerebral abscess

1

Appendicitis

1

Influenza

11

Cirrhosis of liver

1

Gunshot wound

1

TOTAL

One by hanging and one by drowning

After operation During the epidemic of 1918 Shot by sentry.

37

Source: MSA/PD/1920/166-W.

True, violence served as an important tool for discipline from the very outset of the POW camp. However, by 1918, the use of violence had become less and less rational and had become disproportionate to the intended result. Although general orders were issued that prisoners were not to be mishandled, no action was taken to punish mistreatment and great latitude was given to lower command levels. A bizarre incident took place in October 1914, when a sentry at the POW camp at Ahmednagar murdered a German prisoner. The correspondence

Prisoners of War   187  

in this regard illustrates how war dehumanized and created fissures in the earlier sense of unity among the Europeans in colonial India. It also reveals how war freezes minds and sensibilities were lost. The District Magistrate of Ahmednagar P. J. Mead, who supervised the POW camp, reported to the Secretary, PD, BG: German Prisoner of War bayoneted by Sentry on Saturday night and died. I have discussed with the General, but we cannot ascertain precisely what laws apply. I attach a note giving my view, but I feel certain that I have overlooked something, and I shall of course take no action except in consultation with the military authorities, who have deferred the question for orders. I suggest proceedings are nearly finished. I should suggest that any obvious mistake in my view be pointed out confidentially. I will then report officially all facts or take any other action indicated. It is just possible however that the situation is one for which the law has not provided— prisoners of war camp in a country where no war is in progress—in which case the occurrence must be regularized by special orders if necessary. It is unthinkable that a sentry should be put on trial in our court for a military act like this. There is a rumour in the bazar that the man was not trying to escape at the time, but I do not think that anybody supposes that his military authorities have exceeded their powers in any way.

His appended ‘Note’ further stated I understand that the question whether any offence punishable by ordinary law should be dealt with by Court Martial or Competent Civil Court, is governed by the provisions of Section 4 of the Army Act and that under proviso (a) a soldier who commits manslaughter in Nagar must be tried by the Sessions unless the offender was on active service.   An active service is defined in Section 189 & the question arises whether a sentry who acting under orders, kills a prisoner of war is part of a force engaged in operations against an enemy & therefore on active service and could be tried by court-martial. The definition of enemy—Section 190 (20) seems to make this doubtful, but it seems beyond all reasonable doubt that some enactment must protect a sentry who is given specific orders in accordance with the Hague Convention. I understand; and pending a decision on the law point involved, I proposed to take no action, beyond having an inquest held, and awaiting any request for action which the military authorities may make….

The Secretary’s note on this is very conclusive and shows how the British always tried to fix everything in a legal fiction:

 188   Indians in the First World War

It will be a matter of argument whether it is a case of active service or not as the sentry forms part of a force engaged in guarding prisoner of war that is enemy. I think under Section 41 of Army Act the case would be tried by court martial if Nagar is 100 miles in a straight line from Bombay as the Bombay High Court which could try on assuming that there is an offence of this nature in the case of a European British subject. An examination of the map indicates that Nagar is more than 100 miles in a straight line from Bombay. I think therefore that the case should be tried by Court Martial.

While endorsing the above action of the Magistrate and the Secretary, the Governor exhorted caution: Provided the sentry was European British subject, which is not definitely stated but seems probable. (Emphasis is mine)10 Despite great stride forward in regularizing the laws and customs of war accomplished by the adoption of the 1864 Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1899, it contained no provision for penal sanctions for the killing or maltreatment of POWs and, except for a provision for pecuniary responsibility on the part of the offending state, the same was true of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Both these provisions did contain provisions requiring that POWs be humanely treated, prohibiting the killing or wounding of those who had surrendered, but the events of the First World War clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of such provisions standing alone.11 With the outbreak of World War in August 1914, the American Consul in Bombay, Mr Henry Baker, undertook the responsibility of protecting the interests of the civilian Germans and Austrians in Bombay. But after United States joined the World War in 1916, 10

MSA/PD/WAR/1914/78-W-I.

Leview, ‘Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment’. ‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties’, created by the Preliminary Peace Conference in January 1919, listed two offenses specifically directed against the POWs: ill-treatment of wounded and employment of POWs on unauthorized work. In 1929, 47 nations gathered at Geneva and drafted and signed the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of POWs. This convention was intended to supplement, not to replace, Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to The Hague Conventions. But in actuality, these clauses went for a toss, when Hitler forcibly employed nearly 6 million POWs, half of them civilian, in their war industries.

11

Prisoners of War   189  

this responsibility was taken over by the Consulate of Switzerland, K. Ringerr, and in turn he reported to the Swiss Legation, German Division, London, which was in close association with Swiss Red Cross Commission. The report he submitted after his first visit to the POW camp at Ahmednagar and Belgaum on 23 April 1917 is not available. He visited the two POW camps again during the Christmas and the New Year Holidays and submitted his detailed report after conferring with the camp authorities, the camp committees, and the individual prisoners, to the Swiss Legation in London on11 January 1918. Coming from a neutral agency, this report throws much light on the working of those camp.12 At the outset, Mr Ringerr reaffirmed that the physical condition of both the camps was not only good but the administrative authorities were taking every precaution to make the prisoners’ life comfortable. Regarding the Ahmednagar camp, the report raised the following issues: 1. In the beginning, the prisoners were allowed to transfer moneys between themselves. A prisoner who had a certain amount of money to his credit in the accounts of the camp was allowed to help another prisoner who might have been in monetary difficulties by transferring a certain amount of his money to the other prisoner’s account. Since this privilege was abused in some cases, the authorities stopped this practice. As the money matters have grown worse, many of the prisoners whose funds have given out completely have no other alternative than to borrow money from their fellow members pending arrival of funds for them from home. The prisoners, in the present circumstances, complained that less stringent attitude be taken in this matter. Mr Ringger suggested that such matters be first taken up with camp committees for their approval and a more lenient approach be taken. 2. Hitherto the prisoners who had funds at their disposal were allowed to draw `30 every week. But this amount was reduced to `20 since November 1917. The prisoners requested that the MSA/PD/WAR/1918/52-W, Report of the Consul for Switzerland, dated 15 January 1918.

12

 190   Indians in the First World War

original amount be restored, else such restrictions could directly cause further destitution in the camp. 3. Some of the civilian prisoners were originally paid out of the money realized through the liquidation of hostile firms, but since this practice was stopped, those prisoners who were dependent on such liquidation proceeds were given a government allowance of `50 per month in the case of managers and `30 per month in the case of assistants working in those firms. This system was entirely managed by the local governments.   However, the Bengal and Burma governments did not comply with, which created problems for the prisoners from those areas. 4. The prisoners also requested that they be informed about the disposal of their property as well as their shares, by the custodian of enemy property. 5. The Swiss Consul raised an important issue of repatriation of those cases of prisoners who on medical ground deserved to be repatriated. Of course, he was aware of the fact that repatriation could only be possible if both the belligerent nations could come to mutual understanding. The four cases he described were those of: (a) Heinrich Neuman, a case of advanced diabetes and whose repatriation was recommended a year ago; (b) Lieut E. H. Weiss, whose leg was fractured by a bullet and required further operation; (c) Herman Carl Muller, who had a leg amputated and unless he was not operated further he would not be able to wear artificial leg; and (d) Erich Taube, who required specialized medical treatment but who did neither apply nor pressed for his repatriation. Furthermore, he also mentioned a special case of POW Wagner (No. 1981), who suffered from hernia in such an advanced state that an operation would not guarantee his well-being. Wagner was taken as a POW while he was ill in the hospital at Dar-es-Salaam and whose family was still in East Africa. Ringger regretted that these POWs had unfortunately be resident in a tropical climate for all these many years instead of European weather. In case of Belgaum camp, Ringger made very similar observations as in the case of Ahmednagar camp, which could be sorted out at the camp level. Importantly, he mentions that a large number of

Prisoners of War   191  

combatant prisoners from German East Africa were lodged at Belgaum and Ahmednagar. Significantly, he made reference to two other camps (Annexure 1) located at Ramandurg and Yercaud. The camp in Ramandurg in Bellary district was a temporary health camp to which prisoners were sent from Ahmednagar when they required a change on medical ground, and they could return only after the Medical Officer’s fitness certificate. Ramandurg, presently known as Ramgadh, in Bellary district was a hill station, 3,250 feet above sea level. It had a military sanatorium for the British soldiers who wanted a reprieve from the oppressive heat of Bellary where they were stationed.13 The camp in Yercaud14 was started for civilian prisoners who had been selected for repatriation. A few combatant POWs from Ahmednagar who were above 45 years of age were sent to this place. Unfortunately, not much information is available in the official files about these camps at Ramandurg and Yercaud. The issues raised by the Swiss Consul were clarified both by the District Magistrate of Belgaum as well as by officials from BG.15 A close scrutiny of the correspondence between L. Robertson, Secretary PD, BG, between H. Wheeler, Secretary, Home Department, GOI, E. L. Sale, the District Magistrate, Belgaum and H. Lawrence, Commissioner, The Imperial Gazetteers say that the Sanatorium had barracks and a hospital build in 1855 and was designed to accommodate 70 soldiers and had 15 bungalows belonging to various residents of Bellary. Ramandurg, as it was known during British period is now called as Ramgad [Lord Rama’s fort]. This place earlier formed a part of Sandur State founded around 1713 by a Maratha nobleman, Sidalji Ghorpade.   Around 1817, Sandur was annexed to the Peshwas Dominions. After the fall of Peshwa rule in 1818, Bellary was transferred to British India and on 1 July 1818, Sandur State formally became a British protectorate. Presently the place is more known for iron ore mines.

13

14 Yercaud is a little-known hill station in the Shevaroy Hills in Tamil Nadu, just about 33 km from bustling road and rail junction of Salem. The nearest airport is Tiruchirapalli. It is not as well known as Ooty or Kodaikanal hill-station; however, it retains pristine and primeval natural locale.

E. L. Sale, District Magistrate, Belgaum to the Dy. Secretary, PD, Bombay, No. War-12, dated 26 February 1918. PD/WAR/1918/52-W.

15

 192   Indians in the First World War

Southern Division, BG reveals the problems faced by the authorities regarding the Belgaum camp. A proposal for the establishment of a ‘family camp for hostile aliens’ was first made by the BG on 1 July 1915 and in due course it came into effect.16 Initially, the official view was that once the prospective repatriation of non-combatant aliens would take place, the existence of such a camp would not be necessary. Though a few women were repatriated, quite few women along with their children whose husbands were interned at Ahmednagar, still remained at Belgaum. Many of them were Austrians and only a few were of German nationality, but a great number of them were British and allied or had neutral nationality born of wives from German prisoners, one who could not be categorized as dangerous. Many petitions in this regard were addressed to the American Consul, who looked after their interests and also to the BG, for uniting such families. Special rules for the inmates were framed at a meeting held in the camp between the Superintendent of the civil camp and the Secretary, L. Robertson, on 22 July 1915, on the supposition that married men were shortly to be sent to join their wives at Belgaum. The principal object of these regulations was ‘to prevent communication between the inmates of the Camp and the people of the town, and to obviate the risk of money being utilized for bribery and corruption for purposes prejudicial to the State’. Many high officials felt that a close vigilance was required on the expenditure by many of the female inmates; their outgoing correspondence be screened; and also their visits to the bazars be prevented. Doubts were also raised about a fairly large native staff of the Mess contractor. Truly, the entire atmosphere seems to have been filled with suspicion. In the initial days, when ‘parole’ was granted to seven anxious husbands interned at Ahmednagar, they came down to meet their spouses and children at the Belgaum camp. This fact also compounded the situation.17 The GOI was approached again for turning this camp into joint family camp of ‘hostile aliens’. Now, more restrictions were imposed, bazars were organized in the confines of the camp; correspondence was screened, and accounts were investigated; civil police vigilance was L. Robertson, Secretary, PD, BG, to Secretary, Home Department, GOI, No. 8633-W, PD/WAR/1916/125-W-I.

16

H. B. Lawrence, Ag. Commissioner, Southern Division, BG to the Collector of Belgaum, No.SR-181 of 1916, 5 February 1916, MSA/PD/WAR/1916/125-W-I. 17

Prisoners of War   193  

increased and punishment under Indian Penal Code for any inmates breaking the disciplinary code was recommended. A list of women inmates was made who could be united with their spouses under different types of medical emergencies. III

The Enemy Jesuits and Tribulations For one section of European society in India, the outbreak of War certainly turned out to be an abridgement of hope, namely, the German and Austrian Christian missionaries belonging primarily to the Roman Catholic Church—Jesuits of the Society of Jesus—and to a lesser extent to the Franciscan order and of the Basel Mission. Once the prospect of a limited military engagement started fading, the British people gradually recognized the stark reality of a prolonged war. The easy-going and humane attitude of the earlier period now gave way for bitterness, which got intensified as the war progressed endlessly. The way in which the war was prosecuted by the German forces in the notoriously known trench warfare as well as on sea and air (the Zeppelin raids) gradually turned the feeling of anxiety into frenzy and detestation not only against the German fighting forces but against the German nationals all over the places. This feeling gradually escalated into an intense desire to obliterate every trace of everything even remotely German and Austrian from the face of the Empire. And to the passion of animosity was added an impression that the German spy system was more systematic, widespread and penetrating than was supposed. To the fact that a given resident is German was now added a suspicion that, being a German, he could be a spy. The air was thus filled with accounts, real or imaginary, of instances of treachery far subtler and far more nocuous than could have been imagined. This gave rise to a movement, which demanded far more stringent treatment, culminating the universal internment of all ‘alien enemy subjects’ without exception. Such an attitude was predominant not only in England but also in British India. Now, every German, no matter what his avocation, ruthlessly came to be classed as ‘an undesirable alien’ and was treated as a suspicious character forbidden to enter or reside in British territory, or be deported if already residing there.

 194   Indians in the First World War

The situation certainly became serious for all Germans who happened to have their residence or place of occupation in India. The question of internment of German and Austrian nationals resident in British territories was one that had taken a good deal of time to come to the fore. In the initial period of war, it was hardly viewed seriously, and very little was done compared to what they faced later. The number of ‘alien enemies’ interned was comparatively few and confined to young men; and grounds of exemption even for these were readily entertained. In 1915, the BG had fairly liberal attitude and that is reflected in the notes of Secretary L. Robertson, BG, and forwarded to the Governor: First as regards the male missionaries. It may be ordered that all those who are not very old or infirm should be sent to Ahmednagar for internment; Jesuit fathers being sent to the civil camp, others either to enter civil camp according to their age. The Jesuit Society has an institution at Khandala with suitable buildings, and I think the best thing to do will be to intern there on parole all the old and infirm Jesuit fathers along with those who are already there about 12 in number. The District Magistrate should be consulted as to whether any special surveillance is required for them. It might be suggested to him that they should not be allowed to proceed beyond certain defined limits and all their correspondence should be subjected to censorship. A special case is that of the Archbishop of Bombay himself, the Most Rev Father Jurgens. In dealing with him, we should perhaps bear in mind the outcry of Cardinal Mercer of Belgium by the Germans. He is very old man and infirm. I have had many a conversation with him since the declaration of war, and I don’t think he is pro-German at all and I should be prepared to leave him in Bombay, if he cares to stay there, bringing his correspondence under censorship. The only place which he may be allowed to go would be Khandala. The next people to be considered are the Nuns of the Holy Cross of Liege. They have put forward the plea that the German-born sisters are not really German by nationality now. The same plea however can be put forward on the same grounds with reference to the older Jesuit fathers, and I do not see how we can exempt them from the general orders regarding teaching and missionary work on this ground. At the interview which Superioress Ismelda had with His Excellency on Monday last it was suggested that they might be confined to their Convents on the understanding that they would abstain absolutely from all teaching work or all intercourse with the children in the Convents….18 18

MSA/PD/WAR/1915/295-W, 118–19.

Prisoners of War   195  

Had the war quickly come to an end and markedly in favour of the Allies, the probabilities are that the great bulk of German resident in most parts of the British Empire would have remained unmolested, and everything would have resumed the normal as soon as peace was declared. But the war dragged on to an insufferable length and it resulted in a 4-year-long bloody protracted war. When the prospect of an easy and rapid victory for the Allies long since faded away, the British people began to realize that their work is ‘cut out’ for them, which calls for a serious output of all their energy, strength and resources. Furthermore, the British Indian administration was more stringent than the home government regarding matters concerning ‘aliens’. The home government invariably sided with the judgement of the Indian government, which was even acknowledged at that time in the Parliament. The Germans in particular and Austrians, who fell under this category, namely, ‘undesirable aliens’ were divided into two sets: (a) Laymen, either merchants or professional men, or employees in business firms; and (b) Christian missionaries, some Protestant and some Catholics. The cry for internment, taken as a whole, made no distinction between these two classes, being merely based on the fact that all, whether clergy or laity, belonged to the detested category of ‘Germans’. With regard to the lay section, there was an increasingly suspicious additional motive, namely the desire to break down the preponderance of German trade and substitute British trade in its place. As against the missionaries, there were no specific charges or suspicions like these, but the general scream was that, why missionaries should be treated with more leniency than laymen? The ostensible plea in their favour was that they were engaged in spiritual works calculated to benefit the people at large. The argument that they were involved deeply in works of education, which government so deeply valued, now in the altered situation made no dent in the official mind and carried little weight with the agitators. But the fact that these missionaries were Germans and who were involved with the public mind, for most of the British they became object of distrust and mistrust that they could be fomenting anti-British sentiment among the people, especially among younger student population.

 196   Indians in the First World War

The changing attitude towards ‘Foreign Religious and Philanthropic Enterprise within the Empire’ was noted in the confidential Memorandum of India Office during the Imperial War Conference of 1918.19 It stated that, even after the outbreak of war in 1914, the British government was determined to maintain its previous attitude of friendliness towards the purely religious work of German and Austrian missionaries. Speaking on behalf of the India Office and Colonial Office in the House of Commons on 27 August 1914, in reply to a question asked, Mr C. Roberts said His Majesty’s Government is confident that sympathetic consideration will be extended to German and Austrian missionaries engaged in purely religious work…and the grants made by Government to them for educational and medical projects were continued.

The Memorandum further elaborates: In India, by January 1915, the Government of India had received good evidence that it was the deliberate policy of Germany to extend the political influence throughout the world by educational and other philanthropic schemes, and subsequently a remarkable report upon world-wide German educational institutions, established solely with a view to maintaining the efficiency of German ‘kultur’ and of disseminating German propaganda, came to light. Evidence accumulated to show that hostile literature was being despatched to India under cover to German and Austrian missionaries, and they were credited with causing the general unrest and alarm…. Particularly noticeable was this unrest in those districts of Madras occupied by the Basel Mission…. Similar unrest in Bombay was attributed to the propaganda of the German Jesuit priests there. Correspondence indicating hostile sentiments was intercepted. In consequence it was decided that action must be taken against individual enemy missionaries, and these, with a few exceptions, were first interned and subsequently some were repatriated. Enemy missions, continued to receive as before, from public funds, grants amounting to £13,000 per annum, and except for the removal of enemy members of their staff, their activities were not interfered with. But in July 1915, it was decided that grants from public funds could be no longer be paid with propriety to enemy institutions. The grants were stopped and arrangements were made for the work to be carried on by British or neutral agencies….20 19

MSA/PD/WAR/1921/23-W, 37–38.

20

Ibid.

Prisoners of War   197  

In the early months, the Senior Father or Principal of each institution at which the Holy Fathers worked had to give a written guarantee that he will be responsible for his own and the good conduct of the Fathers under his care. No Jesuit Father of enemy nationality was allowed to leave Bombay without the requisite licence. However, they were exempt from daily roll call at the Police Station.21 By June 1915, the German and Austrian Christian missionaries came in for sharp scrutiny of the Government. A reference in regard to the question whether the missionaries of enemy nationality be allowed to remain in India made by the BG to the GOI shows the rupture: the action hitherto taken by the Government of Bombay with reference to missionaries of hostile nationality has been to intern all except a few whose services were considered to be indispensably necessary in order that the important educational institutions might remain open. The Local Government has where necessary assisted the managers of subventions with the view of their engaging competent teachers of non-hostile nationality as substitutes for interned priests… the time has now arrived for the consideration of the questions involved on a wider basis…. His Excellency in Council has no hesitation in pronouncing in favour of total exclusion.   Hitherto the older German missionaries, specially the Jesuits, who have come to this country, have been able to claim with some show of reason that they have lost their German nationality. But this is not the case with the younger men, and as the old men die or retire, their places will be taken by men thoroughly imbued with the German spirit. In view of the state of feeling in Germany, at present with Great Britain, and the systematic teaching of hatred of England, the Governor in Council cannot contemplate without grave concern the probable result of leaving in German and Austrian hands the conduct of any part of the education of the younger generation of Indians, nor of allowing general missionary work to be carried on by missionaries of German and Austrian nationality, anywhere within the territories under his jurisdiction.22 (Emphasis is mine)

While the BG was appreciative of the regenerative and philanthropic role the missionaries had played, their total distrust in matters concerning trade and industry, and missionary educational enterprises was due to the publication of a memorandum by German government 21

MSA/PD/WAR/1914/8-W.

No. 4435-W, dated 17 June 1915, Secretary, PD, BG, to the GOI, Home Department, MSA/PD/WAR/1915/295-W-I. 22

 198   Indians in the First World War

entitled German Schools in Foreign Lands in Berlin in August 1914, which the BG came to possess in mid-1915. Although the name of India was not mentioned in it, the BG and the GOI thought that, ‘the main purpose of which was to endeavour to spread German ideas and German civilization throughout the world by means of these schools and to assist by money grants schools that were successful in this direction’.23 The educational activities of the Roman Catholic Church primarily concerned with St Xavier School and College, and two orphanage schools including St Stanislaus School and orphanage; also Queen Mary’s School at Mazgoan. A 6-month notice was served on them to discharge the services of the ‘hostile’ Jesuit priests and Lay Brothers. Failing to obey notice, it was proposed that grant-in-aid to those educational institutions be withdrawn. At that time, St Xavier’s School had on roll 2,000 students, while St Xavier’s College had 700 students on roll; and the orphanages ‘sheltered a large number of children of the class for which the GOI had displayed special anxiety’. Since the withdrawal of government grants could result in the inevitable collapse of these institutions, the BG felt that the only other options left were either to step into the place of the managers of the institutions and maintain them at a cost, which would not be less than 400,000–500,000 a year, and in that case the government would have to buy the building, furniture and so on from the Society of Jesus, or to take over by an act of the state.24 The BG informed the GOI that though the educational institutions in the Bombay Presidency are almost staffed by priests and lay-brothers of German nationality, and the local controlling authority (the Archbishop Herman Jurgen) is a German, these institutions cannot be described to be of German nationality as they are part of a worldwide missionary enterprise of the Roman Catholic Church, whose final controlling authority is in the hands of the Pope. The government also thought about the viability of buying out their educational institutions, but after much deliberation gave up the idea as a financially unprofitable proposal.25 Also, looking MSA/PD/WAR/1915/295-W-I; Confidential letter of the Secretary, BG to Secretary, Home Dept., GOI, PD, No. 4435-W, 17 June 1915.

23

24

Ibid.; PD letter No. 4674-W, 2 July 1915.

25

Ibid.; PD letter No. 4674-W, 2 June 1915.

Prisoners of War   199  

at the large Roman Catholic population in Bombay City and its neighbourhood, the BG felt injudicious to approach the issue on the above lines. The BG made two categories in this regard: (a) those to which it is considered desirable that the government grant should continue to be paid on the condition that all hostile aliens are discharged from the staff within 3 months; and (b) those from which the government grant at present received should be withdrawn. The St Xavier’s School and College, St Stanislaus School at Bandra and St Mary’s Convent and the orphanages attached to these institutions were brought under the first category. The proposal to discharge ‘hostile aliens’ employees in Civil Departments and in the Department of the Secretariat were immediately implemented. But the Secretary, BG, L. Robertson, did not fail to pass order without making explicit mention: The University and local bodies should also be approached by government in the Educational and General Departments respectively, with a view to similar action being taken against hostile aliens who may be in their employ. In the case of the University this would extend to the employment of hostile foreigners as examiners as well as in the capacity of lecturers and professors.26 (Emphasis is mine)

Against such intimidating official attitude, Rev Ernest R. Hull of the Society of Jesus, an Englishman himself and an editor of the Examiner, wrote articles in his paper on 24, 31 July and 7 August 1915, in defence of the German and Austrian members of the Society of Jesus and to put forth the point of view of the Roman Catholic Church. These articles were put together, edited and brought out in a book form—The German Jesuit Fathers of Bombay: By an Englishman Who Knows Them.27 It outlined a detailed account of the philanthropic work carried out by the Jesuits—irrespective of their nationalities whether English, German, Austrian or any other—for past 60 years in India in the field of education and tribal welfare.28 They also served the needs of 26

Ibid., No. 5205-W dated 4 August 1915.

27

Hull, The German Jesuit Fathers of Bombay, MSA/PD/WAR/1915/16-W-I.

Ibid. In 1854, by way of a beginning, the Southern or Deccan portion of the Vicariate was officially placed in the hands of the Jesuits; but as Dr Hartmann remained administrator, he took occasion of the urgent needs of Bombay to bring most of the Fathers down there. Next year, that is, 1855, he announced that a

28

 200   Indians in the First World War

the Catholic soldiers and civilians. Rev Hull questioned the rationality of the British administration as to why this hitherto trusted body of men should now suddenly be taken away from their labours, thereby depriving the people of certain benefits just because of their German nationality. The real question was, he wrote, to decide whether the German Fathers were likely to abdicate their humanitarian responsibilities and act in any way detrimental to British interests, namely, by playing the spy or informer or instilling anti-British ideas into the British subjects, or attempting to divide loyalties. If this question can be settled in the negative to the satisfaction of the British government, then it seems difficult to find any sound or cogent reason why the Fathers should be interned. He also attempted to show how with the emergence of German Empire after 1870, the Prussian ascendancy was Protestant in tone and the political ambition was to create a thoroughly Protestant state. On the other hand, the territories joined with Prussia in achieving German unification were mainly Catholic, which incurred the odious charge of being disloyal to the Prussian throne. As a result, the Catholics suffered persecution under the Prussian military rule. Rev Hull tried to show the intolerance of the earlier German and now the British government towards German Jesuits. He pointed out that a German living outside his native land was bound to answer the call to military service if legitimately made. Besides, all those ordained in major Christian Orders were ipso facto exempt from active school, which would qualify for a University, would soon be opened under the care of the Jesuits. In 1856, it was actually started at Mazgoan and, in combination with the European orphanage, soon developed into St Mary’s Institute, later known as St Mary’s School on Nesbit Road in Bombay. In 1867, it was registered as a private High School, and received its first grant-in-aid from the Government. The Jesuits, who in 1858 received full possession of Bombay-Poona Mission, next opened a Young Gentlemen’s School in the Fort area. Another day school was also started in Cavel in 1860—the origin of St Xavier’s. It was due to Bishop Steins that the building plot and funds were acquired for the building of a suitable pile to accommodate this school—the work of which was carried on by Bishop Meurin in 1867 and following years, thus giving rise to the present High School building. The College course was added in 1869 and passed its first BA student in 1871 and its first MA in 1873. In 1909, a hostel was added to the establishment. St Stanislaus Institute at Bandra was founded by the Jesuit Fathers in 1862, whose pupils were originally orphans and boarders. But the School soon came to be frequented by day-scholars, and has always been the chief educational establishment in Bandra (now a suburb of Bombay).

Prisoners of War   201  

military service. Even then no such call reached any of the Jesuits in Bombay and had it reached the British government, they would not have allowed them to proceed. He reminded that ‘Freedom from a narrow and selfish patriotism is a characteristic note of the Society of Jesus, extending its activity over so many countries and often combining member of different nationalities to work together in lands foreign to them all….’ To term every German as ‘a potential spy’ ‘is a frightfully suggestive phrase calculated to play on the imagination of thousands who do not realise what it means’. Hull expressed that the apprehensions and fears of internment of the German Jesuits in present times arise because of apparent similarity with ‘the Prussian self-assertion, militarism and culture—supposed to impregnate the body and soul of every German subject, and to penetrate into the very marrow of his bones’. In trying to show how substitutes from British or non-hostile clergy was difficult to acquire, Hull pointed out that, It is quite certain that if all the German fathers still on Parole in the Mission were interned, a very large part of the work would have to be given up, unless help were secured from other sources. The Jesuit staff of the whole Mission consists of 124 men out of whom 95 are German subjects. Of the 95 Germans, 44 have already gone for internment, 51 remain at their work (on parole). If these 51 were to be withdrawn there would remain only 27 priests and 2 lay Brothers. No matter how these 27 priests spread themselves out, they could not possibly fill up the space normally occupied by 124 men. Each of the Mission districts must at least have two men each, in order that the Mission itself may escape obliteration. For the industrial works skilled lay-brothers are required. The Cantonment and railway ministrations cannot be given up, and one priest will have to attend to several scattered stations. In this way about 17 of the Fathers will be necessary for the mofussil; and there will be only about 10 left to divide among the colleges and five schools, normally staffed by more than 60 men…the problem before the Superiors is, how to find 51 substitutes for 51 prospective internments. Every possible effort has been made to meet the threatened emergency. Every available neutral Jesuit Father now in Europe has been summoned back to India by the next boat; but they are not more than five. Begging letters have been sent out in all directions, both in India and Europe…. The secular clergy of Great Britain amount to 1803, of whom 215 are retired and many are in services abroad. Every diocese is crying out for men, and complaining that the clergy are not enough for the needs of the people. They, too, certainly have not a man to spare.

 202   Indians in the First World War

To show how these institutions had contributed to the intellectual development of Bombay, Reverend Ernest Hull also quoted Mr (later Sir) Patrick Cadell, who in 1912, was the then Municipal Commissioner of Bombay and had visited St Xavier’s School and College: ‘No one who takes any interest in the future of Bombay can fail to observe the good work done in its leading high schools; and among them St Xavier’s High School and College takes a place which is a prominent indeed….’29 To Rev Hull, the German Fathers of Bombay were, for all practical intents and purposes, naturalized British subjects and their professional and spiritual activities fostered a spirit and a sense of being British subject. In this regard, he cited the examples of a few German Jesuit Fathers: Father Hillenkamp,30 military chaplain at Colaba; Father Frenken,31 the veteran missionary of the Dharwar district; the venerable Father Dreckmann32 of St Xavier’s College; Father Martin,33 who was Principal of St Xavier’s School for 12 years and later became parish-priest at Jacob Circle in Bombay. 29

Ibid., 11.

Father Hillenkamp, born in 1844, joined the Order at the age of 18, left Germany for good at 24 and never returned to Germany thereafter. Out of 47 years spent in India, he had been military chaplain to the European troops for over 36 years and during those years did enjoy close acquaintances and intimacy with English officers such as Sir George White, Sir Archibald Hunter, Sir Oriel Vivash Tanner, General Luck, General Sir James Brown, General Sandeman, Sir Edward Bradford, and Earl Roberts. With all anguish Rev Hull wrote: ‘This is one of the long-serving veterans whom some people would like to see interned as a “potential spy”’.

30

Father Franken, born in 1846, entered the Jesuit Society in 1871, left Germany for good in 1872, came to India in 1877 and since then he has been a missionary Father for the Canarese people at Dharwar. In the famine years, about 1878, he gave his house to the starving men, women, and children, whom the local people endearingly called ‘Franklin’. 31

In 1915, he was a worn-out man tottering on the brink of grave, and yet interned at Ahmedabad. Born in 1840, joined the Order at 19 years’ age, left Germany in 1872, and came to India in 1874, and since then he was teaching in St Xavier’s. He became a Fellow of the Bombay University in 1882 and was the Principal from 1884 to 1910, also a Syndic and Senate member of the University for 20 years. He was also one of the oldest members of the Natural History Society, and since 1902 one of its Vice-Presidents. After giving up the post of Principal, his health collapsed and became decrepit, confined to the four walls of his room.

32

Father Martin, born in 1858, left Germany for good in 1869 at the age of 11 and never returned. He renounced his German citizenship in 1874, spent 5 years in

33

Prisoners of War   203  

Equally, it was difficult for the Church authorities to procure substitutes of neutral Jesuits. Every available neutral Jesuit who was then in Europe was summoned back to India, but that number was not more than five. Many French and Belgian clergy were drawn into the war and the Germans were now interned in India. Hence, substitution of interned Jesuits was getting more and more difficult. Besides, the practical difficulty arose from the fact that any new procured Jesuits did not know the vernacular language, which made them redundant in carrying specific tasks. The Roman Catholic Church authorities in Bombay also addressed a petition in this regard to Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, which stated that in recognition of their contribution the Jesuits be allowed to carry philanthropic and humanitarian work in India.34 The government reply to these petitions was brusque and blunt: the Government of India are constrained to maintain the position that their general policy in this matter has been deliberately adopted for good reasons of State, they regret that they are unable to reconsider it. It is recognized that there may be individual instances in which exceptions to the general repatriation which has been ordered may justifiably made…Local Governments have been given a discretion to deal with such applications, England. Came to India in 1892, has one brother who was also a Jesuit in India and another brother, a Jesuit in America. For 12 years, he was Principal of St Xavier’s School and at the beginning of the War was parish-priest at Jacob Circle (Now known as Sant Gadge Maharaj Chawk). 34

Ibid. Following considerations were placed before the government: Out of 95 German Missionaries in the Bombay-Poona Mission, 54 have so far been interned…. It is impossible to secure from elsewhere substitutes for 50 men; and even if time is given, the number of substitutes obtainable will be very few… (a) Sixty years of religious, educational and philanthropic work, including the raising up of a sunken Catholic community to its present satisfactory condition; (b) Education on a large scale, not only of Catholics but also of the general public, whereby many thousands of loyal citizens have been brought up; (c) Important work for the depressed and criminal tribes, now showing good results with unlimited possibilities in the future—all of which has been acknowledged by the Government to be good and useful work for the general well-being.

A case was argued in favour of Brother Zimmer, who worked among the Kathkaris of Kuna near Khandala.

 204   Indians in the First World War

but each must be judged on its personal merits…. The GOI regret that they cannot, on this ground alone, alter the line of action upon which they have decided with the approval of the Secretary of State.35

However, the BG was in no mood to make any exceptions, and the GOI towing the same line turned down the appeal. Only a few exceptions were made: (a) the Archbishop of Bombay, Rev Hermann Jurgens, who was German by birth, was allowed to remain in Bombay. The explanation as to why he was being left off by the administration was: ‘We should perhaps bear in mind the outcry that occurred over the treatment of Cardinal Mercer of Belgium by the Germans’. It was ostensibly to avoid the same type of commotion among the Catholic community. But he was virtually under house arrest. He was ordered to be repatriated to either Germany or Holland. But he declined to be repatriated and chose to remain in Bombay under house arrest. (b) A certain number of old and infirm Jesuits were allowed to be interned in the Jesuit institution at Khandala instead of being sent to Nagar. (c) Rev Martin Durach, a Roman Catholic Chaplin, was allowed to remain at the same place in view of his tottering old age. (d) The German-born nuns of the Holy Cross of Liege were interned in the Convents at Ahmedabad, Bandra, Panchgani and Karachi, respectively. Only a nun, Sister Mary Gabriel, being dangerously ill was allowed to remain in Bombay. All these were ordered to abstain absolutely from all teaching work and any contact with the children was forbidden.36 The other persons exempted were Mrs Else Smidt, who was very ill, and Ms Januschke, who was at American Mission Hospital at Miraj. In August–September 1915, the government decided to repatriate many German and Austrian women and children, and men of non-military age not interned at Ahmednagar. The GOI stated that, No. 2885, dated 31 August 1915, H. Wheeler, Secretary to GOI to Reverend Archbishop A. L. J. Kenealy, Simla. MSA/PD/WAR/1915/16-W.

35

36 No. 5498-W, PD, 19 August 1915., MSA/PD/WAR/1915/295-W-I. The Nuns are mainly Sisters of the Order of the Holy Cross of Liege. A similar concession was granted to three Austrian Sisters of the Community of Daughters of Charity of Cannossa in Italy. Another relatively large class of exemption was that of British wives of German and Austrian subjects.

Prisoners of War   205  

‘The prolongation of the war has materially altered the situation and has intensified its bitterness. The feeling now aroused increases the probability of harm from the continuance of these people here, while adding to the strain of effective supervision’.37 Detailed lists were prepared of those who were to be repatriated. But the available records do not clearly state whether the missionaries from that list were ever repatriated. Perhaps, a few might have been repatriated. Not until the beginning of 1915, any attention was paid to the question of providing shelter for the wives and children of detained POWs. One does not find in the official records the actual number of people repatriated, but the fact that volumes of applications from the near kith and kin of the people interned prompted the BG to establish Hostile Women’s camp at Belgaum fort, is sufficient enough to get a faint idea about how the families exerted to cope with the anxieties of War resulting in the uncertain future of their near and dear. Plenty of applications are found in the official records, both for seeking exemption from repatriation and internment at Ahmednagar. A scrutiny of these applications reveals that the interned males asked for exemption from repatriation if the spouse happened to be in India. A few demanded that they also be repatriated, when they learnt that their spouse were to be repatriated. Most of these applications were forwarded through the auspices of the American Consul—Mr Henry Baker. Few exemptions were granted. In the case of Miss Giebler, who worked in the Salvation Army, Ahmedabad, exemption was granted because of the guarantee given by the Territorial 37 Ibid. Also, the statistics of the persons to be immediately repatriated to different destinations was thus:

Men

Women

Boys

Girls

Total

1. To Germany

64

56

29

24

173

2. To Austria

28

1

–

–

29

3. To Holland

51

–

–

–

51

4. To America

3

3

–

–

6

146

60

29

24

259

Total

Of the total women, 27 were wives of the POWs interned at Ahmednagar. Source: MSA/PD/WAR/1915/295-W-II, No. 6521-W, 30 September 1915.

 206   Indians in the First World War

Commander, Col Stevens, on the condition that she would not leave the Salvation Army precincts. Miss Elizabeth Frommhold, a nursing sister working at S. P. G. Mission, Ahmednagar, was exempted from repatriation but had to go to the Hostile Women’s camp at Belgaum. Although Father Ferdinand Hillenkamp, SJ, Military Roman Catholic Chaplain at Colaba was exempted from repatriation due to his old age, but was interned at Khandala. In another instance, Father Hutchmacher died on 21 February 1916, and the Archbishop requested the government to allow replacement by Father Trenkamp, with the suggestion that he be technically marked ‘interned at Khandala’. On this proposal, L. Robertson, the Secretary, PD, BG, remarked: We must steadily exert pressure to exclude the German from any active participation in ecclesiastical work. Here is a good opportunity & I would tell Rev Hull that we regret….38 The government categorically ordered that he ‘must not preach or officiate at divine services’.39 This not only shows how the administration interfered in the day-to-day life of the Church, but that their action was enthused by obsessive patriotism. Brother Zimmer’s case was very unique. He worked among the Kathkaris, the tribals from Kuna, a place little away from Lonavala. He wanted permission to stay overnight at Kuna when monsoon was bad, instead of being interned at Khandala. But the government had disparaging ideas, However valuable his work may be, the Society has had ample time to make other arrangements to carry it on, and it should no longer be entrusted to German agency. Far more important missionary and educational enterprises than the Kathkari settlement have had to dispense with their enemy personnel and we cannot possibly justify, either to ourselves or others, this solitary exception.40

The Secretary, BG, Mr Curtis and Rev Hull visited the Kuna settlement personally. The former seemed to be inclined to keep Brother Zimmer 38

MSA/PD/WAR/1916/16-W.

39

Ibid., 295-W-Part II.

40

MSA/PD/WAR/1916/16-W.

Prisoners of War   207  

at Kuna, but resolutely thought against it as that ‘would be a very strong exception to the rule that no enemy mission or missionaries should be allowed to work in our Presidency, and (that) this policy has been fully accepted by His Majesty’s government’. The case of German-born Roman Catholic Archbishop Hermann Jurgen is sardonic in detail and nightmarish in nature. He was allowed to stay at Bombay but under house arrest, as the administration feared that his internment at Ahmednagar could cause commotion in the Catholic community. He was coerced into making a declaration and a ‘Will’ that all the bank accounts and the immovable properties that stood in his name did not belong to him personally but were held by him as Archbishop and Head of the Diocese, and that he had no personal claims on any of them. In total repugnance he stated, ‘I have the following personal belongings i.e. three pectoral crosses, three rings, three staffs, four mitres, one processional cross, some pontifical vestments all of which I give to the Very Revered Aloysius Gyr to be given to my successor as Archbishop’. When Rt Rev Hermann Jurgen died in Bombay on 28 September 1916, an ex-parte probate of the Will executed on 11 August 1915, was granted to Rev Aloysius Gyr, the testator being an ‘enemy subject of German nationality’.41 The property and monies were thus secured by the administration. The Bombay Chronicle published a report on 7 September 1917 regarding the grant of probate. This was a petition by the executor of Rt Rev Herman Jurgens, deceased, late Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bombay, and of German nationality for grant of probate of his will dated 11 August 1916. The point decided was interesting because of the question involved, namely, the grant of probate of wills of deceased enemy subject, His Lordship held that probate should be granted on condition that no payment is to be made to any enemy subject wherever resident, or to any person of whatever nationality resident in any enemy country. T. J. Strangman, Advocate General appeared for the petitioner. 41

Bombay Chronicle, ‘Deceased Enemy Subject’s Will’, MSA/PD/WAR/1915/16-W-I.

 208   Indians in the First World War

His Lordship delivered following judgment: This is an ex-parte application for the grant of probate of the will dated 11 August 1916 of Rt. Rev. Herman Jurgens, the late R.C. Archbishop of Bombay, who died in Bombay on 28 September 1916. The testator was an enemy subject of being German nationality. The petitioner, who is a Swiss subject, is the Superior of Propaganda Mission of Bombay and Poona and Administrator Apostolic of the Archdiocese of Bombay and as such is in charge of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical properties in the Bombay Presidency, pending the appointment of a successor to the late Archbishop. On the hearing of the application the Advocate- General suggested that the grant should go in a similar for to that adopted since the war by the Probate Division in England, which in effect prohibits payment to enemy subjects whenever resident, or to resident in an enemy country, on pain of forfeiture of the grant. This seemed to me the proper course and I accordingly gave certain verbal amendments so as to bring English form up-to-date and to adapt it for the use in India.

It was then pointed out by the Advocate-General to the Judge that the English form in this regard was too wide and ought not to be adopted, as it would prohibit payment to enemy subjects resident in India and that the condition as to revocation of the grant was of doubtful validity in India. It was also pointed out to the judge that the question in the present case was to some degree academic as by the will of the testator expressed stated that all property in his name was held by him (the Archbishop) in his name as trustee for various Roman Catholic Charitable or ecclesiastical purposes, and that his only property consists of certain ecclesiastical vestments and ornaments which he gives to his successor in office; and that ‘his only assets are those vestments etc. which are valued at `1,500’. Finally, the Judge granted the probate on the condition consented by the Counsel for the applicant, that no portion of the assets shall be diverted or paid during the war to any beneficiary or creditor who is a German or Austro-Hungarian or Turkish or other enemy subject, wherever resident.42 Although the administration had earlier decided that the Jesuits would be repatriated and thereby the lists prepared, it seems that, as war progressed, the official attitude became more stringent and 42

Ibid.

Prisoners of War   209  

the said repatriations were not carried. In December 1915, 25 additional Jesuits were moved to Ahmednagar POW Camp. Immediately, a report/article featured in the Swiss newspaper, the Neue Zurcher Nachrichten, dated 10 March 1916, alleging human rights violations and harsh and ill-treatment of Roman Catholic missionaries of enemy nationality in India. This was brought to the notice of the Secretary of State for India and the British Foreign Office at London. This was brought to the notice of Secretary of State for India by the British representative at Berne. The Pope referred this matter to the British foreign office. The official communiqué was in the form of a letter addressed to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office, which was not only curt but aggressive in tone: ‘As it would appear undesirable to furnish an additional excuse for the silent sympathy of the Vatican for the Central Powers, I should be glad to be furnished with material for publishing a reply to these charges’.43 But the article in the Swiss newspaper dated 10 March 1916 is quite illuminating in terms of apprehending ‘enemy’ missionaries and the conditions in POW camp at Ahmednagar. The sum and substance of the communication that appeared in Neue Zurcher Nachricheten was Owing to the scarcity of Roman Catholic Missionaries of British nationality in India the Holy See has sent out a large number of German and Austrian missionaries. Four diocese: Bombay, Poona, Bettiah and Assam, possess German Bishops or Apostolic Prefects as well as missionary staff composed almost exclusively of German and Austrian priests and lay brothers…. Upon the outbreak of war the local authorities assured the missionaries that they had nothing to fear and that they might remain peacefully at their posts. In consequence of their reverses in the war the resentment of the British against the Germans in India assumed formidable proportions and the policy of individual internment was soon adopted. In December 1915, 25 German Jesuit were removed from their schools at Bombay to the fortress of Ahmednagar where they were not treated as civil prisoners which they in reality were, but where they were placed in the camp for military POWs as though they had been taken on the battlefield…. The entire number were arrested without 43

No.14, Consular, Berne, March 14, 1916. MSA/PD/WAR/1916/16-W.

 210   Indians in the First World War

previous warning at their respective institutes under the most humiliating circumstances and in most cases they were seized by coloured police who marched with fixed bayonets through the villages where they had been living and enjoying respect of the inhabitants; in many cases the prisoners were not even permitted to take even their hand luggage with them, while at one station 7 Franciscan missionaries were seized at the very moment when they were sitting down to their mid-day meal which they were not allowed to finish. On arrival at the Fortress of Ahmednagar each prisoner was weighed and measured and marked like an ordinary galley slave. Even venerable Prelates such as Dr Becker, Apostolic Prefect of Assam, were forced to carry their baggage into the camp with their own hands and to fill their straw mattresses themselves while they were confined in company with rough sailors and adventurers of every description, no furniture such as chairs or tables being given them and nothing beyond a washing basin which also served as an eating bowl. There was only one meal a day and if any of the missionaries desired to purchase additional provisions these were sold to him by a Government Official at a prohibitive price…. The tin sheds in which the missionaries are interned are bitterly cold in the winter and intolerably hot in summer; during the rainy season the floor is nothing but an expanse of mud and all the premises are crawling with vermin. Among the prisoners are three doctors of theology, several priests from the Seminary at Mill Hill who were sent out to India in the days of Cardinal Vaughan…. The monks are forbidden to attend the Parish Church of Ahmednagar although it is only at a distance of about 50 yards from the Camp. They are obliged to say Mass before dawn using a trunk placed between their beds for an Altar…. In August 1915 the American Consul visited this camp and succeeded in obtaining an amelioration in the lot of some among the missionaries both as regards their quarters and the class of fellow prisoners with whom they were confined. Since that date the visit of the American Consul has not been repeated and no complaints sent by the prisoners abroad in writing are ever allowed to proceed as the authors of such letters are invariably punished while the correspondence is confiscated….44

Similar complaints were repeated in the despatch of the Vatican to the Foreign Office at London, and in turn was communicated to the concerned officials of the BG. The government sought an inquiry and reports were invited from P. J. Mead, the District Magistrate of Ahmednagar and Commandant of the POW camp. All the officials in India and at the British Foreign office presented an altogether different 44

Ibid.

Prisoners of War   211  

picture, and showed that the issues raised in the article were not only trivial but blown out of proportion. For example, regarding ‘carrying of baggage by prisoners’, it was commented: ‘It was not compulsory to carry their own baggage, they could always arrange with fellow prisoners of the labouring classes to do this kind of work and all other kinds of service for a small payment’. About the difficulty of performing mass, the District Magistrate wrote, Some makeshift was inevitable. In the civil camp where there was ample room one barrack was set apart as a Chapel. Five altars were erected. It was impossible to allow the prisoners of war to attend the Roman Catholic or the English Church. Apart from the difficulty of supervision such permission would have been strongly resented by the ordinary congregation.

They, on the contrary, quoted in conclusion a doctored remark of one Dr Finck, a German detenu, that ‘the health of most of the prisoners had improved remarkably since their detention’. On the contrary, they concluded, His Majesty’s Government are confident that when the history of the war is written and events come to be viewed dispassionately, the treatment of German and Austrian Missions in India will be found to have been both chivalrous and humane—the outcome of a policy that was only proved impracticable in the end by events beyond the control of the British Government.

Despite such attempts of rationalization and justification, the official reports unwittingly show how the reality was far from it. For example, prisoners were not allowed to have money more than `30 per week. Any excess amount than what was permitted had to be deposited with the Commandant, and out of which weekly amount was given. From this amount, they could buy additional foodstuff as well as menial services. Like the combatant POWs, they were subjected to the military rigours of ‘route marches’. But that was to be to the opposite direction of the city, with the express purpose that the entire exercise be kept away from Indian’s knowledge. The Basel Mission, though based in Switzerland, was thought to be intimately connected with Germany. Hence, the GOI was

 212   Indians in the First World War

extremely strict in dealing with those missionaries. Intelligence reports showed them that the Basel Mission missionaries had strong nationalistic feeling towards Germany.45 Although its headquarters was based in Switzerland, the fact that the German Kaiser was its largest subscriber made matters more suspicious. It was alleged that Herr Dipper, the German Director of the Mission had stated: ‘we are not a Swiss society, and we are not an international society but a German society….’ Believed to be closely connected—both financially and politically—with Société Commerciale des Missions, Basel, whose profits after deducting 5 per cent dividend given to the shareholders went to Basel Mission, the GOI after fruitless negotiations for 2 years sought liquidation of the Société Commerciale and winding-up of Basel Mission in December 1917. In January 1916, the government opened a Hostile Women’s camp at Belgaum to accommodate women and children of the POWs interned at Ahmednagar.46 Later on, it was converted to Joint Family Enemy Camp, where many husbands interned at Ahmednagar were united with their spouses and children. One finds many applications for such reunion. However, they were not allowed to enter the main bazar or the area where the natives stayed. A camp at Sholapur was opened in early 1917 to accommodate mainly Germans and mostly women and children. In April 1917, a camp to accommodate 84 convalescent POWs from Ahmednagar was opened at Ramandurg, a wooded plateau about 3,500 feet above sea level near Bellary. In a misguided bid for enhanced commitment to the nation and the War, the British officials in India played a role in fomenting a sentiment against the German Jesuits, which in reality was far more to exacerbate suspicion and prejudice against them, as to project them as representatives of the enemy. While the First World War was still in full swing, the matter relating to the foreign and alien missionaries came up for discussion in December 1917. A Conference of the representatives of the 45

MSA/PD/WAR/1916/69-W.

46

MSA/PD/WAR/1916/125-W-I.

Prisoners of War   213  

Foreign Office, Colonial Office and India Office along with the representatives of both Protestant and Roman Catholic Missionary Bodies took place at India Office in London, under the chairmanship of Lord Islington, on 12 and 14 December 1917, where not only the future British policy towards the missionaries of all denominations, especially India, was discussed but their apprehensions were also voiced.47 There were many suggestions from both sides. The Chairman stated Our difficulty is as regards the effects of these proposals on native opinion, more particularly in India. We very much fear that it might give critics of our rule in India a handle if discussions were to arise with regard to these proposals…. I am representing the view of our Committee; and on that Committee is represented a considerable knowledge of the educated community in India. I might perhaps read an extract which appeared in the Hindu, which was quoted with approval by the Indian Social Reformer. And the Hindu reads as follows: ‘There is at least one important interest, one body of European opinion which least merits the charge of consisting of birds of passage, which is with a few exceptions sternly opposed to the agitation fomented by our contemporary (the Madras Mail). What we want to point out is that the missionaries of India form a body of men who are entitled to claim that they have a real stake in the country. They have rendered vast services to the country in the matter of education and social amelioration. These missionaries besides have large vested interests in the matter of schools and colleges and consequently can claim, if any portion of the European community can, to be heard. What it may be pertinently be asked is the value of the claim that European opinion is solidly behind it. When one section of it—and what Indians would undoubtedly regard as the most important section is so clearly against the campaign of race-hatred while signs are not wanting that there is an influential body of opinion among other sections which is clearly at variance with the methods of the Madras Mail.’ This indicates, I think, that Indian opinion might very easily lay hold of proposals of this kind and use them as weapons to attack the Government as interfering with the assistance which representatives of other nations are giving to India in bringing enlightenment: and it might create in the minds of Indians a feeling of suspicion with regard to the motives behind our rule….48 47

MSA/PD/WAR/1921/23-W.

Minutes of the Proceedings of a Conference of Representatives of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and India Office with representatives of Protestant and 48

 214   Indians in the First World War

This shows how the British government at Home and in India were caught in a predicament—between their goal of ‘civilizing mission’ and the prospective Indian native perception. The issue was further discussed in the Imperial War Conference of 1918 and the enormous correspondence between the Foreign Office, India Office, and the Embassies of America, Australia and Canada, shows the difficulties encountered in arriving to a conclusion. There was also a lot of correspondence between India Office and the Vatican, in which His Holiness proposed to establish new Missions in India. Eventually, what was suggested to Edwin Montague, the Secretary of State, by the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford on 28 August 1917, became basis of future policy of the British Indian government after 1921. Accordingly, when the civilian camps were closed around May 1920, the interned Jesuits were given option that they could still stay back in India by acquiring licence from the government. For that they could only be granted licence subject to signing an agreement vouching loyalty to fulfil any conditions imposed; in the case of a foreigner taking up educational work, the essential condition was to give a whole-hearted undertaking to inculcate and promote loyalty to the Government in the minds of his pupils and to endeavour to make them good citizens of the British Empire.49

After having survived the ordeal of indefinite internment, which finally ended as per the clauses 225/226 regarding the ‘interned enemy civilians’ under the Treaty of Versailles signed on 28 June 1919,50 the experience produced demoralizing melancholia. Not Roman Catholic Missionary Bodies (Confidential), held at India Office, London, on 12 and 14 December 1917.  MSA/PD/WAR/1921/23-W, 10–11. The Roman Catholic Missionary Bodies were represented by Father Donnelly, S.J., of South Africa. Lord Chelmsford to Edwin Montague, the Secretary of State for India, No. 33, Home Department, Simla, dated 28 August 1917, MSA/PD/WAR/1921/23-W. This letter is also signed by his Executive Council membersC. C. Monro, W. S. Meyer, Claude H. A. Hill, C. Sankaran Nair, G. R. Lowndes, G. S. Barnes, and W. H. Vincent.

49

The Treaty of Versailles signed on 28 June 1919, is of printed 233 pages of A 5 size paper. It is found in MSA/PD/WAE/1919/328-W.

50

Prisoners of War   215  

only the confinement but their loyalty held in suspicion; also, the conditions laid on them by the colonial state in the post-World War period, almost all of the interned Jesuits felt humiliated. They did not prefer to live in India under the needle of suspicion, with their intentions doubted; either they went back home or some chose to live in the service of Jesus by choosing places where they could stay with honour and respect. These Jesuits were then replaced by those who belonged to Spanish and Portuguese nationalities, the prominent among them who came to work in St Xavier’s College was historian Father Heras.

War Ferment in India The Press, Publicity, Propaganda and Censorship

6

During the period 1905–1910, there was considerable increase in the publication of books and newspapers hostile to British rule in India. Quite aware of the fact that publications were both a symptom and a cause of unrest, the GOI came up with many repressive measures against the Indian press besides the available 153-A and 124-A of the Indian Penal Code.1 The native press became more vocal in its criticism and even admired revolutionaries, though tacitly. Surveillance of literary works in the pre-First World War was common in the British India.2 The administration came out with two repressive legislations against sedition-related offences—the Newspapers (Incitement to offences) Act VII of 1908 and the Seditious Meeting Act of 1908. The first empowered the District Magistrates to confiscate the printing press used or intended to be used for publishing seditious matter.3 The title of the second legislations made the intentions of the government clear. This was followed by swooping prosecutions and convictions of nationalist editors including Tilak and S. M. Paranjape. With the sudden rise in the revolutionary activities in 1909, the GOI requested Lord Morley to accord sanction to the Press Act in India. The conflict between the conservative Viceroy Lord Minto and liberal Secretary of State, Lord Morley, which complicated the situation, represents the tension between the British theoretical adherence 1

Barrier, BANNED—Controversial Literature, 16.

For an excellent review of literary, especially in Bengali language, surveillance, read, Darnton, ‘Literary Surveillance in the British Raj’.

2

A case was registered under this Act against D. K. Phadke. He printed the newspaper Hindu Punch, which had carried a seditious article. The press was confiscated. The Bombay Law Reporter, Vol. XII, 120–121.

3

War Ferment in India   217  

to democratic ideas and in practice the ultimate recourse to repression as a means of political survival.4 It also reveals differing perceptions on the Indian situation, by the GOI and Lord Morley, as in the case of the passing of the Indian Press Act of 1910. Afraid of a hostile reaction from English public opinion and the ‘Friends of India’ members in the Parliament, Morley refused the permission for the enactment. Sir William Lee-Warner, senior member of the Council of the Secretary of State, found Morley difficult to convince and, therefore, devised a different plan.5 He asked Charles A. Kincaid, member of the Bombay Governor’s Executive Council, who was in London on furlough, to write articles on the seditious climate fostered by the native papers, with a view to strengthen his hands. Kincaid approached Valentine Chirol, the Director of Foreign Intelligence of the Times (London), through his friend R. E. Enthoven. Sir Valentine, himself an imperialist, promised to do the needful. Thus, by using the good offices of Sir Valentine, Kincaid wrote four articles in the Times: (a) ‘A Seditious Play of the Deccan’, critique of the Marathi play Kichak Vadh by Krishnaji Prabhakar Khadilkar; (b) ‘Mr Tilak and the Seditious Deccan Press’, in which Tilak’s influence on Indian youths was described; (c) ‘The Chitpawans of Chiplun’, and finally, (d) ‘Ancient Indian Theories of Government’. These articles were published under the by-line ‘A Political Correspondence’6 in January 1910. Upon publication of these articles, there was a hue and cry raised in the British press about the volatile atmosphere in India. Morley immediately conceded the demand of the GOI and the Indian Press Act was passed on 9 February 1910. This bill, though was originally ‘the child of that reactionary of reactionaries’ Sir Herbert Risley, was piloted in the Imperial Legislature by none other than Mr Satyendra Nath Sinha, during his brief term of office as Law Member in 1910. For this act, he was later rewarded with the title ‘Lord’. This act, along with the Defence of India regulations proclaimed at the onset of the 4

Das, India Under Morley.

5

Ganachari, Nationalism and Social Reform.

6

Tikekar, The Kincaids.

 218   Indians in the First World War

First World War, provided the bureaucracy abundant powers to crush even a semblance of protest against the official policies. Positive measures were required to ensure that the military potential of Indian empire could be mobilized. Hence, it necessitated, first, that India supplied recruited soldiers in sufficient numbers to sustained war efforts; second, that domestic conditions in India must be sufficiently kept tranquil to permit the ‘denuding’ of the country’s armed forces. In achieving these goals, coercion and persuasion had to play a major role.7 Interestingly, the carefully designed war-time propaganda was organized in a scientific manner during the First World War by almost all belligerent countries—the Allies as well as the Central Powers. Consequently, public opinion is evolved from the composite reactions of the people at large; their fundamental attitudes, prejudices, passions and aspirations being expressed in the definite opinions of their leaders. The most effective means of forming and controlling wartime public opinion is through organized propaganda. Because public opinion is a changing thing, propaganda is not static and cannot be standardized. The definite purposes of war-time propaganda in every belligerent country were to maintain the morale of the armed forces of the state, create a favourable state of mind at home, diminish the morale of the enemy and influence favourably neutral opinion concerning the reason, justice and necessity of the conflict. The control of home opinion was a fundamental requirement of war propaganda because a favourable public opinion is a prerequisite to the successful prosecution of a modern war, which is not only waged on the land, air and sea fronts, but also on the economic and moral fronts. Even the deliberate development of the spy mania was also, at the outbreak of war, an effective means of mobilizing opinion and arousing all groups to immediate joint action.8 7

Kaul, Reporting the Raj.

Lutz, ‘Studies of War Propaganda’. This article, written in 1933, is an excellent account of how war-time propaganda was considered necessary by all the belligerent countries of the conflict. 8

War Ferment in India   219  

The propaganda campaign was designed to construct the war against Germany as ‘a moral crusade’. The use of chivalric imagery in the representation of British society and war from the Victorian period to 1918 and beyond was to project the use of military force to achieve imperial expansion. As a part of state policy, the First World War chivalric propaganda was accompanied by increasing censorship. Censorship was public and menacing in Britain, and more so in its colonies like India. Unlike Asquith, Lloyd George fully recognized the role of the press during the war and upon becoming the Prime Minister he moved quickly to centralize the propaganda machine. A new Department of Information in London was set up in 1917 and after a while his friend Lord Beaverbrook became Minister of Information. With this, not only it greatly contributed towards his own rising influence but evolved the propaganda organization. Since India occupied a strategic place in the scheme for the imperial war effort, imperial publicity and propaganda received a new impetus. Though there were informal and ad hoc methods of official influence on the press until 1914, India was now subjected to official suspension of civil liberties but also general wartime censorship. Telegraph censorship was instituted within India in August 1914 and a detailed list of English and vernacular newspapers suitable to receive official advertisements and or consumption by Indian troops was prepared in every province. Messages from India were censored by the Press Bureau in London, and news sent to India was channelized through the Indian Chief Censor.9 What was suppressed by the censors was—any information that could be useful to the enemy, and all news which could distress the people, for instance, discussion of the war and its consequences, its costs and so on.10 One of the first acts of the British government when war was declared in 1914 was to cut the cables between Germany and United States, and, throughout the war, a close watch was maintained on telegraphy and wireless communication. But this was laid out in the area of open war 9

Ibid., 123.

10

Demm, ‘Propaganda and Caricature’.

 220   Indians in the First World War

where the enemy was openly distinguishable. Much more difficult was the task of classifying and controlling opinion and information in the domestic press. Here the problem was not discovering an enemy, but of assessing the degree of dissidence.11 In April 1870, the first cable message was sent from London to Calcutta. Except for a failure due to an earthquake in 1871, after which contact was quickly reinstated, the cable network continued until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. During the War, the Indo-European Telegraph Company remained non-operational, only to be resumed in 1921.12 Lansbury’s Herald and Hyndman’s Justice, with their support for the Russian revolution, open attacks on the Raj and generally radical tone, were strictly proscribed from import into India. Henry Cotton’s India was also tailed. Some of the articles from that paper appeared in Bombay Chronicle besides its editor Benjamin Guy Horniman being very critical of government measures. Anti-British literature and pamphlets by the radical student groups/émigrés in Europe and United States and their sympathizers were thoroughly subjected to intelligence scrutiny. The Defence of the Realms Act, 1917, was used to prohibit such proscribe literature by calling it seditious. The socalled ‘German-Indian conspiracy’, with German consular funding for the production and dissemination of ‘seditious literature’ including newspaper like Ghadr—published by the Indian revolutionaries led by Har Dayal, with bases in San Francisco, Washington, New York, Idaho and Seattle—was of continuing concern for the British Indian administration. Even before beginning of the War, Indian government in Delhi requested John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, to periodically inform beforehand about objectionable material. But Morley was quite reluctant to comply to such a request, since any such repressive measure provoked inconvenient questions in the parliament. From the beginning, there were considerable restrictions on the news about Indian troops on the Western Front. Positive publicity 11

Hopkin, ‘Domestic Censorship’.

12

Hamill, ‘The Social Shaping of British Communications’.

War Ferment in India   221  

was the central element in the wartime policy. Publicity, the supply or release of information of a factual nature which is designed to provide the public in general with an opportunity for each individual member to formulate opinions for himself and to act according to his own ‘conscience’. Propaganda by contrast is: an attempt to influence the attitudes of a specific audience, though the use of facts, fiction, argument or suggestion—often supported by the suppression of inconsistent material—with the calculated purpose of instilling in the recipient certain beliefs, values or conviction which will serve the interests of the author, usually by producing a desired line of action.13

The use of propaganda as a systematic instrument of national and foreign policy was of 20th century origin and its roots can be traced to the First World War. While announcing casualties among the Indian troops, special care was taken to publish the exploits of Indian troops, the dietary and religious arrangements made for them, and the way wounded were treated. This was done to reduce the risk of disaffection and increase recruitment. The decision to house the wounded in Brighton Pavilion14 and the King’s visit to the Indian troops and to award medals for gallantry were given wider publicity to invoke Indian troops unflinching loyalty to the Emperor and the Empire. 13

Taylor, Projection of Britain, cited by Kaul, Reporting the Raj, 9.

14

Lawrence, The India We Served, 269–271; Sir Walter Lawrence writes in his memoirs: In 1914, on the day of the funeral of Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener sent for me and asked me to act as his Commissioner, to advise and inform him regarding the arrangements in France and in England for the sick and wounded Indian soldiers…. I made up my mind that Brighton would be best place for the wounded Indians…. I wanted something with a roof, and in one day I secured the Dome and Pavilion, a fine school and the specious Infirmary, which was known afterwards as the Kitchener Hospital…. The patients in the Pavilion Hospital gloried in the thought that they had lain in their King’s own Palace. Each hospital had its Mosque for the Muslims, and a Gurudwara (for Sikhs)…. The Moslem inmates of the Pavilion made the point that they were guests in the King’s own house. I gained a new knowledge of the mentality of Indians, sitting with them and listening to their strange impressions of this wonderful new world into which they had tumbled.

 222   Indians in the First World War

In 1916, the Indian government gave Punjab authorities permission to publish a newspaper named Fauji Akhbar, which featured stories on the war, service problems and recruitment, for distribution among the troops. This paper was aimed to achieve two goals, first, to project the benefits of British rule and, second, the need for loyalty.15 In order to counter the rumours prevailing in bazaar, the copies of this paper in Marathi and Urdu language were distributed in Bombay Presidency.16 The India Office in 1916 realized the value of making films for effective propaganda. Two reels were prepared: ‘Britain Prepared’ and ‘the Battle of the Somme’. These were given lavish publicity in local newspapers and were screened in Punjab and other provinces. The India Office then proceeded with a scheme to sell ‘Loyalty’ postcards. The front side of the card was shown with a fluttering British flag and the following verse underneath: ‘Symbol of Freedom, Truth and Right, Proud Neath Thy Folds Our Soldiers Fight, Each With His Life Thy Cause Defends, and Heaven to Each Its Blessing Sends’. The India Office initially printed more than 4 million cards in Indian languages—Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Marathi, Gurumukhi, Gujarati and Bengali—and sold them through booksellers in major Indian towns. Encouraged by the success of the ‘card’ propaganda, it soon brought out 36 different cards (a million copies each) with a different variety of messages.17 Another way of carrying the propaganda was by arranging lectures. Some names found in the files are of S. S. Mehta and Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed. Mehta carried a lecture tour during the period August–October 1914. With Turkey joining the war, Rafiuddin Ahmed lectured in Muslim-dominated areas explaining official viewpoint. After the war, Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed was rewarded with the position of Minister of Education under Dyarchy in Bombay Presidency.18 Copies of the Urdu translations of Professor Muir’s ‘Britain’s Case Against Germany’ 15

Barrier, BANNED—Controversial Literature, 73.

16

MSA/PD/WAR/1915/135-W.

17

Ibid., 75.

MSA/PD/WAR/1915 -16/280-W & 281-W. Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed had been the one who had served earlier in England as the tutor of the Queen Victoria in Persian and by 1920 was quite a senior man. Also, MSA/PD/WAR/1915/6-W and MSA/PD/ WAR/1916/16-W. In these files, one gets names of many who delivered war lectures. 18

War Ferment in India   223  

were freely distributed to the schools and libraries throughout the Bombay Presidency.19 Nothing bore the imprimatur of the Indian Central Publicity Board; the issuing agency was the Oxford University Press, and copies were sold at a penny. A clever artist was discovered at Army Headquarters and effective posters printed by the Raja Ravi Varma Press in Bombay. Very soon, our own illustrated review of the war was made available and circulated in its hundreds of thousands….20 The India Office employed pictorial paper propaganda by means of publications like Al-Hakikat to advertise British naval and military strength and friendship for Islam. Within India, the government undertook to distribute thousands of copies of Al-Hakikat at a very cheap cost, through press representatives and other official and nonofficial organizations. Editors of important newspapers from Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Allahabad, Lahore and Karachi were instructed to give positive publicity to officially circulated news. In October 1914, the Secretary of State authorized the publication by G. B. Allen of Akhbar-i-Jung, a weekly paper in Urdu for native troops of the Indian expeditionary forces in Mesopotamia. The editor was excolonel of Indian Army and the paper contained accounts of the war as well as general Indian news. At the insistence of Walter Lawrence, authorities were persuaded to come out with Gurumukhi edition.21 Propaganda activities in London were broadening in scope by the establishment of the Ministry of Information. Kipling worked as an informal advisor and wrote abundantly about the ways to conduct propaganda. Beaverbrook also invited editors of Indian newspapers to visit Britain and the Western Front to report directly from the theatres of conflict. All expenses for the trip in 1918 were undertaken by the Ministry of Information. After a long-drawn search, five editors were chosen: representing the vernacular press of Punjab was Mahlub Alam, editor of Paisa Akhbar, Hemendra Prasad Ghosh, editor of the 19

MSA/PD/WAR/1915/283-W.

Reed, The India I Knew, 110. The well-known artist was Raja Ravi Varma. His workshop and press were located at Kurla in Bombay. 20

21

Kaul, Reporting the Raj, 127.

 224   Indians in the First World War

Dainik Basumati, represented Bengal press, Gopal Krishna Deodhar, editor of Dnyan Prakash, represented the moderate press of Bombay, S. Kasturiranga Aiyer, editor of the Hindu, represented Madras, and finally, J. A. Sandbrook, editor of the Englishman represented European papers in Bengal. The selection altogether was not totally to the satisfaction of the government, as Ghosh was considered a suspect for being anti-government and Aiyer was known as a supporter of Annie Besant. To satisfy the long-standing demand of the Viceroy, the India Office established the Central Publicity Bureau in Simla in 1918, with Sir Stanley Reed, editor of the Times of India of Bombay, as vice-chairman and one who had de facto control. This authority supplied literature, pamphlets, posters, films, slides, photographs and cuttings from British and foreign journal to India. To ‘counterpoise’ malicious writings of the Kesari, the government of Bombay provided direct subsidies to vernacular newspapers such as Jagad Vritta.22 In India, official attention was first drawn by some newspapers such as al-Hilal, Comrade, Humdard and the Zamindar, who were critical of the attitude of the Allies towards Turkey, emphasizing military preparedness of Turkey. The issue of Comrade dated 26 September 1914 was considered a good illustration without explicit criticism of Russia and France. So were the articles in Pioneer, similarly considered. It was suggested by the bureaucracy the need to take stringent action against those ‘writers’ who were deemed to be prejudicial to safety of interests and tranquillity of the state, or interests of the Allies. They also proposed that all matters published should be subject to prior approval of the censor. As a result, penalty of printing uncensored matters was to be forfeiture of the press. As a war measure, jurisdiction of the courts was limited and powers were conferred upon the District Magistrates to suspend issue of a paper likely to cause disturbance of public tranquillity. Pre-censorship necessitated appointment of special censor staff to deal with offending newspapers neglecting prior warning.23 Even the use of Bombay Regulations XXV of 1827 22

Ibid., 129–30.

The Under Secretary Mr Shepherd’s minute, dated 20 October 1914 and also Letter of H. Wheeler, Secretary to GOI to L. Robertson, Secretary, BG, Political and Home Department, dated 21 November 1914, MSA/PD/WAR/1914/2-A-W. 23

War Ferment in India   225  

was suggested. But this created confusion and misconception among the Indian press fraternity, as they enquired with the Deputy Chief Censor, Army Headquarters whether they may publish such and such announcement and so on. Wheeler then made clear to the BG that it was not the job of Deputy Chief Censor to scrutinize these matters except to the telegrams. He further clarified: Since prevention is preferable than cure, the Government of India are willing to consider that it might be advantageous for the local Governments, to assist the Press in discriminating what may be right and what should not appear in its columns…. Whether there is any such demand is a matter of fact of which local Governments can best judge,…. Such an arrangement would not be analogous to that of the Press Bureau in England, which actually issues statements of facts. Here items of Government intelligence go out, and must continue to do so, so communiqués; foreign news is mainly derived from Reuter’s cables, and there remains only the information which newspapers may gather for themselves from other sources. It would be rather as an advisor as to the publication of news of last description, and as to articles and comments on the position generally, that any Government officer would come in…. Assuming the adoption of some such scheme, the Government of India considered it to be a matter for the Civil, not Military authorities….24

At the outset of war, the only censorship started was under the military authorities, primarily the cable centres, and the censoring of the telegraphic news was its first concern. From telegraphic censoring, it drifted into postal censorship and, also to a certain extent, to the supervision of information published in the press. The Army Department was at the outset very opposed to any decentralization, with the result that various messages and letters, not necessarily military significance, were submitted to headquarters of orders. Subsequently, the Army Department found the work getting rather beyond their power, and agreed to matter, mainly of internal importance being made over by their local censors to an officer to be designated by the local government. At the same time, the censor was not under control of the local government, though they were supposed to keep the local civil officers in touch with the Deputy Chief Censor. Such centres in Bombay Presidency were at Bombay, Karachi and Belgaum. H. Wheeler’s letter No. 2561, 13 November 1914, to Chief Secretary, BG, and through him to PD, Ibid. 24

 226   Indians in the First World War

When Turkey joined the war, the suggestion was made to local governments that they might establish a civil telegraphic censorship at various other places. This was considered to be the affair of the local government and not subject to military control. The BG put on a staff at Poona, which they later found to be necessarily large, which primarily looked into telegrams.25 In many cases, warning was issued to many newspaper presses not to publish certain information.26 Serious problems also arose when some of the Indian newspapers republished from English paper extracts with reference to the war. The officials felt that, ‘while in England these items are taken at their proper value, in India their tainted origin is not always sufficiently emphasized, and there is a tendency to regard them as authoritative contradiction of Reuter’s telegrams, and, when they have filtered down into the cheaper vernacular broadsheets they provoke considerable alarm among the generally ignorant classes. In the case of the less reputable journals this may not be altogether unintentional, but in the majority of cases such extracts are doubtless inserted as the basis of an article of comment, but unless the accompanying explanation are very explicit, there is an opportunity for misunderstanding’.27 In dealing with such reproductions, which were considered as an infringement of terms, Ordinance I of 1914 was promulgated. A telegram dated 27 December 1914, from the home government, London, illustrates how the government tried to control the inflow of true news: Accounts of sinking of the ‘Audacious’ by striking a mine off the North Coast of Ireland in October last are now beginning to reach India through American newspapers. The War Officer desire no mention of the incident in British newspapers and ask for the cooperation of the Indian Press of that end.28 Wheeler’s confidential letter to J. H. DuBoulay, Secretary, BG, No. 2779, 6 December 1914; Ibid.

25

26

MSA/PD/WAR/1916/41-W/Part I and II.

27

Wheeler’s confidential letter No. 2661, 30 November 1914, Ibid.

28

Telegram No. 5784/U, 27 December 1914, Ibid.

War Ferment in India   227  

Again, packets containing copies of ‘Ghadr’ published in San Francisco were intercepted and the addressee were consequently trailed.29 To cope up with the perpetual onslaught of the Executive on books, journals and presses under the powers of the Indian Press Act of 1910, it was in the Indian National Congress Session held at Bombay in 1915, the Press Association of India came into being. The irony was that the resolution to that effect was passed with strong condemnation of the Press Act, which the Congress President Mr (Lord) S. N. Sinha, who had fathered it in the Imperial Legislative Council in 1910. Interestingly, Sinha had never been an active member of the Congress and had no claim to be the Congress President. But with the wrangles of Moderates and the Extremists, he was an acceptable candidate. The Act in operation fulfilled the worst fears and predictions of those who had refused to be bamboozled into the belief that it was ever intended to be anything but a weapon to check inconvenient criticism and when necessary and possible stifle the critic. By 1915, the operation of the Act had become a scandal that it was impossible for those responsible for the conduct of newspapers longer to ignore. The Press Association of India was heralded primarily to protect those who were liable to be injured or penalized under the Act. The Association was formed at a meeting, which was held in the Subject Committee (presently CWC of Congress) tent, with Mrs Besant, Rangaswamy Iyengar among other well-known Indian journalists, including B. G. Horniman, being present.30 In 1917, things had become so bad that it was decided to send a deputation from the Press Association to present a memorial to the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford in Delhi. The Memorial was drafted by Horniman and his colleague Syed Hussain. The deputation consisted of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Mr Jamnadas Dwarkadas, H. P. Mody, B. G. Horniman, among others. Horniman reminisces the meeting: Lord Chelmsford looked ineffably childish as he stood up and with illdisguised temper, bore the unmistakable impress of the handiwork of Sir Reginald Craddock, the Home Member. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was 29

MSA/PD/WAR/1916/100-W.

30

‘The Congress and the Press Act…’, Bombay Chronicle, 4 September 1924.

 228   Indians in the First World War

bursting with righteous anger and the desire to speak his mind, Jamnadas asked me, sotto voce in the middle of the Viceroy’s reply if we had not better get up and go. I felt very much like agreeing and leading the way to the door, but with the Christian sweetness and patience, by which I have always been distinguished, I restrained and we listened to the end… Lord Chelmsford invited deputation to ‘look at the statistics of the operation of the Act.’ He had evidently not looked at them himself or he could not have been guilty of dishonesty of relying on the partial and misleading figures supplied to him, in the face of the return, which told quite a different story…. The Return showed that 173 presses out of 241 had been stifled at their birth by the demands made on them for security, while 28 out of 55, already existing from which security had been demanded, were forced to close down. Again 105 prospective newspapers had been similarly prevented from ever coming into existence. But as “Bombay Chronicle” pointed out at the time, the speech exhibited all the features of ‘unabashed advocacy’.

In 1919, resolutions passed by the Mohammedan community praying for the maintenance of the temporal power of Caliph were sent to the Viceroy,31 which caused great consternation to the Indian government. Immediately, the editors of all the newspapers were warned and asked to refrain from the use of the word ‘Jehad’ or ‘Holy War’ in any reference regarding Afghan hostilities.32 Steps were taken for the distribution of copies in English, Persian and Pushtu of a manifesto signed by about 130 Afghani residents in Punjab contradicting the lying by the Amir of Afghanistan.33 So also the Viceroy’s proclamation to the people of Afghanistan printed in vernacular languages were distributed in all Muslim-dominated areas.34 Later, Mrs Besant, who edited two papers, New India and Commonweal, was interned in her house in Madras, while the Ali brothers, Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, were also arrested in Delhi. Tilak was so chased by the Bombay officials to frame him in legal ambit that he chose later to go to London to fight defamation in the Chirol Case. 31

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/364-W.

32

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/511-W.

33

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/514-W.

34

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/515-W.

War Ferment in India   229  

Inflation, Famine, Control and Distribution of Food Supply This is not a statement or explanation on the economic conditions in the Bombay Presidency. Many competent scholars have already dealt with the economic conditions during the war and also during the succeeding years leading to the Second World War.35 The following information is about the administrative measures taken up by the BG during those tumultuous years. The information is gathered from the official records/files available in the state archives and from the contemporary writings. It was always remarked that all Indian finances really resolve themselves into a gamble in rain. Since more than 75 per cent of the population depends even today upon agriculture for its subsistence, the first requisite in determining the prosperity of the country has always been a favourable monsoon. Now in the year 1918–1919, the average precipitation of rain over the whole of the plains of India in the monsoon period was 19 per cent. Normally, in India, crop failures are only partial, and shortage in some area is offset by good harvests in others. But in 1918–1919, there was no province which did not suffer from a shortage of the monsoon either partial or complete. The result was that the crop failure of 1918–1919 was one of the worst on record during the decade. This was preceded by a millet crop failure in the previous year and at a time when prices had already begun to rise under the pressure of global demand. It produced effects, which the best efforts of the administration could only palliate or mitigate but not control. Fortunately, for the country as a whole, the main harvest of the two previous years in 1916–1917 and 1917–1918 were comparatively good, the millet crops failed over large areas. Despite these problems, India did its best to provide food supplies for the Allies during the war. A Foodstuffs Commissioner was now appointed whose duty was to restrict the export of foodstuffs and to control their distribution. Besides conserving the 35 Bagchi, ‘Indian Economy and Society’; Chandavarkar, ‘Workers’ Politics and the Mill’ and The Origins of Industrial; Balchandran, ‘Britain’s Liquidity Crisis’; Gallaghar and Seal, ‘Britain and India Between’; Balderstone, ‘War Finance and Inflation’; Tooze and Fertik, ‘The World Economy’.

 230   Indians in the First World War

supplies of food in India, the administration also supplemented them by imports of wheat from Australia. This was arranged through the Royal Commission on Wheat Supply.36 With the outbreak of hostilities, the cessation of commercial relations with the Central European powers, who in the 12 months preceding the outbreak of the war had been increasingly good customers of India’s raw material, caused considerable dislocation. Both the exporters of raw cotton from Bombay and of raw jute from Calcutta lost in Germany one of their best markets. Also, with the Allies entering upon an indeterminate period of trench warfare on the Western Front, an enormous demand arose for sandbags. The Indian Munition Board was created as a department of the GOI from 1 March 1917, to control and develop industries with special reference to the needs of the war, to regulate contracts, to limit and coordinate demands for articles not manufactured or produced in India and to apply the manufacturing resources of India to war purposes with the special object of reducing demands on shipping. The years between 1917 and 1919 saw export of commodities of vital national importance to meet the increasing demands of the Allies. Activities of this department rapidly increased in the following years. During this period, this Board took over the organization in its entirety of all the government ordnance, clothing, hide and leather factories. The Board also controlled the production of woollen and worsted goods in the existing mills to meet army requirements; it assumed responsibility for the shipment of raw and tanned hides, which were very largely utilized in the manufacture of leather for army boots; it provided railway track, rolling stock and plant to Mesopotamia, Egypt, East Africa, Aden and the Persian Gulf. It established a government tent factory; it centralized the purchases of jute goods; it constituted a river branch to take over the work of constructing vessels for water transport; it formed a timber branch, which nearly shipped 200,000 tons of bamboos, beams, plants and scantlings to Egypt, Mesopotamia Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India—during the year 1919, 55th Number, London, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 64–65 and 82. 36

War Ferment in India   231  

and other theatres of war; it controlled the products of the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur in steel and pig iron. It obtained enormous quantities of miscellaneous engineering plants and stores, chiefly for Mesopotamia and East Africa.37 A special officer was appointed to arrange for the purchase and shipment to Europe of wheat and hides and the Director-General, Commercial Intelligence, was placed in special charge of the arrangements in connection with sandbags, raw jute and shellac. The control over the import and export of goods to and from British India was exercised under the Import and Export Goods Act, XI of 1916, which was passed for this purpose.38 The restrictions imposed in the earlier period was chiefly aimed at preventing supplies from reaching the enemy. Before the war, Indian opium with its low morphine content had little chance of competing in the market for the manufacture of morphia. But, in 1915, on the cessation of the supplies from the Ottoman Empire, a demand for Indian opium sprang up in London and export to England reached considerable proportions. It was thought that a profitable and legitimate outlet would be secured for Indian opium if Turkey could be ousted permanently from her predominance in the market for medical opium. The policy of supplying opium directly to the governments of importing countries in the East Asia instead of selling it by auction to private traders was steadily pursued, thereby a large measure of control over the trade in the non-China market was secured. The internal control of opium production in Malwa opium producing track was also secured by the cooperation of the Gwalior and Indore Darbars.39 In July 1916, the Enemy Trading Ordinance gave the government wide powers in regard to the firms of hostile or enemy associations. Under the powers granted by these ordinances, rules were issued 37

Ibid., 83–84.

Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India—during the year 1916–1917, 53rd Number, London, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, 7–8. 38

39

Ibid.

 232   Indians in the First World War

prescribing the method in which enemy business concerns were to be wound up. In September 1916, this ordinance was re-enacted and the loopholes were plugged, and passed as Act XI of 1916. Steps were taken to completely eliminate firms owned by enemy subjects resident in Bombay mainly, by appointing an official liquidator. Even though most of them had been in operation for many decades and had no connection with either Germany or Austria, their pleadings were set aside and in the process 143 firms were wound up and only 14 were permitted to trade under stricter conditions. Those permitted were the ones which were essential for British war purpose. The amount of enemy property held in India was investigated and entire liability was vested with custodian of enemy property.40 The question of industrial improvement was raised in the Imperial Legislative Council session of 1915 and was decided that a Commission should be appointed to examine and report upon the possibilities of further industrial development in India. Some Indian members were anxious for measures of tariff protection, but these were specifically excluded from the terms of reference. A strong British and Indian Commission was constituted in May 1916, under the presidency of Sir Thomas Holland, who had been the Director of Indian Geological Survey, and after retirement had taken up the assignment as Professor at University of Manchester and as a consulting geologist. He arrived in India in early May 1916, and toured through the country in the winter of 1916–1917. There were, however, some complaints from leading Indian businessmen that the Commission was a device on the part of the government for postponing the grant of solid assistance to Indian industries, and perhaps, an attempt to provide an opening for British capital; a very strong exception was taken for the exclusion of tariff question from the terms of reference. In November 1917, the members of the Commission reassembled in Bombay and eventually submitted their report in the spring of 1918. One important result that accrued immediately from investigations of this Commission was the institution of Munition Board under the 40 There are nearly 800 files in the MSA located at Mumbai, under the title Hostile Enemy Trading Concerns.

War Ferment in India   233  

presidency of Sir Thomas Holland, which worked towards coordinating government demands for all war supplies, except food and forage, as well as assisting manufacturers to deal with these demands. A need for proper reorganization was felt between Indian industrialists and various departments of the government with regard to purchases for war. Accordingly, official indents began to pass through the hands of Munition Board, who, with the help of local controllers in various provinces, regulated the uninterrupted supplies.41 The Finance Member, Sir William Meyer, announced on 1 March 1917 that, in pursuance of two resolutions moved by Indian nonofficial members and carried in the Council on 8 September 1914, and 24 February 1915, the GOI had informed the home government of their willingness to borrow the largest sum that could be raised as a war loan, to make a special contribution of £100,000,000 to the war, and put forward proposals for increasing Indian resources in order to meet the consequent recurring liabilities. Consequently, he announced the raising of import duty on Indian fabrics into England from 30 to 70 per cent. That meant the removal of long-standing protection in favour of Lancashire cotton traders. This caused strong reactions among the English cotton traders in London, who were pacified by an assurance of review by the Secretary of State Mr Chamberlain, after the war would be over.42 Until 1914, strikes in the cotton textile industry were largely confined to particular departments and mills; increasingly after the war, they were coordinated across the industry as a whole. Rising prices and unprecedented profits which accompanied the post-war boom led to the demand for higher wages supported by two general strikes.43 The profits were largely shared by the capitalist class and hardly reflected in workers’ wages. From these profits, a large share was remitted to the British investors in Indian industries. Lovett, A History of the Indian, 100–102; Sir Verney was a high-ranking member of the Indian bureaucracy and held the post of Director of Geological Survey of India; and returned to England in April 1919. 41

42

Ibid., 133–134.

43

Chandavarkar, ‘Workers’ Politics and the Mill’.

 234   Indians in the First World War

Documents marked as ‘Secret’ from the MSA located in Mumbai reveal that the measures and policies adopted were put in a report format (Memoranda) by each of the departments of BG Secretariat during the period 1914–1919. These were preserved, making such suggestions for future guidance as the experience then gained could come in handy should such a situation arise again. In hindsight, one could think of such action as presaging the Second World War, which came too soon. These documents are found in the files of 1939 when the Second World War began. In 1921, a meeting of the Secretaries in Home, Revenue and General Departments was held, which decided to prepare a detailed note by each department of the measures adopted during the course of the war. This was to be on the lines of notes prepared by Political and Revenue department and the decision was then approved by the Governor and his Executive Council. Accordingly, similar ‘Memoranda’ was prepared by Home, General and Public Works Department. All these Memoranda were intended to form a supplement to the War Book prepared by the BG.44 Though these records are not traceable yet, a few files that have been located give an account of the measures undertaken by some of the departments in Bombay. The Revenue Department Memoranda contained two appendices A and B. Appendix A contains notes prepared by J. P. Brander, ICS, who held the post of Civil Supplies, Bombay, from May 1919. Appendix B contains a note on the operations of the Foodstuff Control Department in Sindh prepared by Sir J. L. Rieu, ICS. Part A of the Appendix A is a note compiled by the office of J. P. Brander and part B contains his own observations, stating his experience and views as to the general policy, which ought be adopted should war, acute famine or revolution occur. At the end of Mr Brander’s note was appended a note by Sir Patrick R. Cadell, who was then Director of Civil Supplies, Bombay during 1918–1919. Sir Patrick’s remarks were intended to supplement and in few cases to correct the memo prepared by J. P. Brander. 44

MSA/Political and Services Department (P&SD) File No. 10-W-I: War Supply.

War Ferment in India   235  

The note mentioned above gives the following account. From the beginning of the war in August 1914 until nearly the third year, no deficiency of foodstuff was felt but subsequently on account of the continued demand for food grains for military purposes, prices rose steeply and the situation turned worse due to the bad monsoon in 1918. Early in January 1918, some unrest was noticed in Bombay city, especially amongst the working classes, caused by the rise in prices and rent. There was some looting of food shops in the mill area. The conditions in the mofussil were not less threatening. The government, therefore, took immediate action and appointed Chief Secretary of Revenue Department as a Controller of Prices to deal with the situation. The duties which he was entrusted were: 1. Prevention of cornering and holding of stocks. 2. The establishment of shops under the agencies of either Municipality or government where articles of necessities would be sold at fair price. 3. Cooperation with the Military authorities for military requirements. 4. The fixation of prices at private shops with the proper machinery for the enforcement of prices so fixed. The controller had under him two or three inspectors who inspected cheap grain shops and the progress of removal of rice from the docks. He was assisted by an advisory committee in the discharge of his duties. Most of the members of this advisory committee were drawn from the commercial community. It was also thought necessary to have an experienced and influential person to deal with the merchants. Hence, Mr S. C. Batliwala, an assistant in the firm of Messers Ralli Brothers, was appointed as the Assistant Controller of Foodstuffs, to accomplish this task. Later on, it was found necessary to appoint another officer to assist the controller in the general work of the office. He did this work till December 1918, when an officer of the standing of a Famine Commissioner was appointed to the post of Director of Civil Supplies. This post was first held by Mr B. C. Reade, one of the partners in the firm of Messers Gill and Company (Cotton merchants), who was also Deputy Secretary in addition to the newly created ‘War Purposes Department’, which was in charge of the Chief

 236   Indians in the First World War

Secretary, Sir Patrick Cadell. Mr Reade was subsequently replaced by Mr Keating, ICS, who prior to that held the post of Director of Agriculture. The Director of Civil Supplies, Bombay, who was also Controller of Prices, communicated directly with the Foodstuffs Commissioner of the GOI. The post of Foodstuffs Commissioner was created by the GOI in 1918. The officer holding this post was the central authority to deal with the all-India food question. He was to decide the quantity available in surplus provinces and arrange for despatch to deficit provinces to consignees licensed by the Director, Civil Supplies, for sale at controlled prices. The Foodstuffs Commissioner, Bombay, acted as the Secretary to Government for Foodstuffs and submitted concerned papers directly to the members of the Governor’s Council. He corresponded with the railway companies and requested them to regulate traffic. The railways were under the control of the Controller of Traffic with the Railway Board. The other duties of the Director of Civil Supplies were: (a) to consider the stocks of foodstuffs and other necessities, (b) to receive and examine applications from merchants and others for the movement of traffic to their places and (c) to issue railway priority certificates. During the duration of war, transport difficulties also had increased considerably. The GOI, therefore, took measures to economize and regulate transport by introducing a system of railway priority certificates. Goods traffic for this purpose was divided into (a) urgent, (b) preferential and (c) ordinary, the first two classes being subdivided into (i) military and (ii) civil. Preferential traffic in classes (a) and (b) could be moved only on the authority of priority certificates issued by special authorized officers. Ordinary traffic required no certificates. A priority certificate was valid for 21 days from the date of issue. The grains, which were controlled, were wheat, gram and rice. For these grains, monthly allotments were given to the importing provinces and the importing Director of Civil Supplies issued the priority certificates, while the exporting Director of Civil Supplies countersigned them before transmission to the railway concerned and supervised that the exports did not exceed the allotment. The Assistant Controller of Foodstuff, Mr Batliwala, looked to the grain supplies of Bombay city. The Railway could transport authorized

War Ferment in India   237  

grains. Rice especially was transported by railway from Calcutta and the Central Province on licences issued by the Assistant Controller of Foodstuffs and latterly under passes from the Director of Civil Supplies. On the arrival of rice in Bombay, the selling price was fixed by the Assistant Controller according to the quality, and merchants were accordingly to sell their stocks to those who possessed written authority from the Assistant Controller to buy the rise at a fixed rate. In addition to supplying the City, this controlled rice was despatched to Ratnagiri and other Konkan districts between November 1918 and January 1919. The government imported on their own account 77,000 tons of rice from Burma. The great portion of this rice was handed over to merchants to sell at controlled rates. Messers Ralli Brothers acted as agents. The government lost about `900,000 in this transaction. Up to March 1919, merchants were asked to sell at controlled prices on penalty of losing their licences if they did not do so. This attempt to control prices, however, failed. Profiteering was rife. Assistant Controller had to take over all rice imported from Burma. For this purpose, it was arranged with the steamship companies that no importer should be allowed to clear his rice from the docks without the countersignature of the Civil Supplies Officer on the bills of lading. For some time, all licensees from the districts came to purchase rice freely from the importers in Bombay. As this was not satisfactory, the District Officers were asked to appoint one or more agents for their districts to take over such rice as was allotted by the Director of Civil Supplies from time to time. The Agent was required to be in Bombay to take rice whenever allotted by the Director of Civil Supplies and to distribute the rice among the dealers of his tract according to the orders of the District authority. Complaints were received that the rice allotment did not reach their destination in full. To ensure safe despatch, seven firms were appointed in April 1919. They were responsible for the work and were required to deposit guarantees for the proper control of business. This arrangement worked more satisfactorily and continued till the end of May 1919. Later on, when rice stocks became ample, detailed control over the distribution of rice to districts was abolished and all buyers were allowed to take from any of the seven firms and despatch where they wanted to. More normal trade conditions were established and the GOI abolished inter-provincial restrictions on movement of

 238   Indians in the First World War

Indian rice from April 1920. Under the allotment system, Bombay Presidency was hardly allowed any quantity of Indian rice and was supplied with only rice from Burma. So far as wheat was concerned, definite monthly allotments were made to this Presidency by the Foodstuff Commissioner, from Punjab, UP and CP. Allotments to districts were made by the Director of Civil Supplies. For Bombay City, a committee consisting of nominated grain merchants was created, who recommended the persons and quantities to be allowed to them. A similar procedure was obtained in the case of gram allotments. The GOI removed restrictions on the inter-provincial movement of wheat and gram from May 1920. Arrangements were also made by the GOI for the import of wheat from Australia. As regards other grains, namely, jowar, bajra, pulse and so on, they were regarded as uncontrolled grains and no quantity for exports from a particular province was prescribed. Only priority certificates were required from the Director of Civil Supplies of the importing Provinces. Indian states in Presidency were treated as a rule as British districts for purpose of Civil supplies. In the case of Kathiawad States, they were also treated like British districts but when it was suspected that there was illicit export of food grains from the ports to the Gulf ports, a strict watch was kept over issue of priority certificates for transport of grains. The requirements of the Portuguese territory were included in those of Bombay. This arrangement was brought to the notice of the Foodstuffs Commissioner. But as it was treated as foreign territory, monthly allotments of food grains were sanctioned on the recommendation on the Consul General of Portugal at Bombay. Priority certificates and sea permits were given to those merchants who were recommended by the Consul-General up to the sanctioned allotment. The Sind district had a separate Director of Civil Supplies. But he had to coordinate with Bombay as regards supplies of Burma rice. In the case of movement of food grains by rail within the Presidency, a pass was given by the Collector of the importing district. This did not secure priority but it was an authority to the railway to carry the goods. If any foodstuffs were to be brought to Bombay, the sanction of the exporting Collector was obtained. Movement by sea of foodstuffs within the Presidency or outside was also

War Ferment in India   239  

regulated. The despatch of goods from Bombay or any other port in the Bombay Presidency (excluding Sind) to any other coastal port in India required a pass signed by the Director of Civil Supplies. In the mofussil, the Collector controlled the distribution of Burma rice to the wholesale and retail traders. Collectors were also asked to form at their headquarters a Committee of merchants and consumers to meet every week to keep close touch with supply, distribution and prices. Mamlatdars were asked to constitute such Committees for the Talukas. Price of Australian wheat was regulated according to Bombay price. As regards other items, other than Burma rice, Collectors were advised that price control would not be successful except in case of cheap grain shops. Besides making special arrangements for supply of rice, wheat and other foodgrains, the GOI framed special rules for the control of prices. A Rule 11-J was introduced in the Defence of India Rules of 1915 whereby the local government or persons authorized by it was empowered to ask for stocks of an article of trade from any trader to fix the maximum price if necessary in the interest of the public. But the previous sanction of the GOI was required to make a declaration under Rule 11-J of the rules in respect of a particular commodity. The GOI also advised the BG to use another war measure, namely, Ordinance IX of 1914, which empowered the Local Government to commander stocks of an article of trade if it was found that it was unduly withheld from the market. Overseas exports of food grains were controlled by the GOI. The Director of Civil Supplies was not directly concerned with this work, but he forwarded for disposal applications for their export to the Collectors of customs who carried out the details. The supply of Kerosene oil was short and its price increased very steeply. There was much profiteering and hoarding of stocks. Control of kerosene was instituted under the Defence of India Rules. Retail prices per bottle were fixed for Bombay City. In the mofussil, the supply of kerosene was regulated as follows: 1. Allotments were made to districts by the controller in consultation with the oil companies.

 240   Indians in the First World War

2. Price was fixed and control over companies’ agents and retailers was exercised by local officers with the assistance of local committees. 3. Supervision over distribution was exercised by the local committees. The grass was also declared controlled by the GOI under Rule 11-J. The price was fixed. V. P. Bhiladwala, a leading grass merchant, was appointed as Assistant Controller to take possession, to distribute and sell grass at authorized rates. Owing to war requirements, the supply of petrol for civil needs was not sufficient until 1918. It was, therefore, deemed necessary to introduce a system of rationing petrol to motor car owners in the city and districts. Part B of Appendix A of Brander’s note mentions that he was definitely against all inter-provincial restrictions on free trade, which were imposed in 1918–1919. He mentions that the attempts to control the distribution and prices of rice mentioned above were more or less a failure. In his opinion, the control should be minimum or nil. The business should be kept in the hands of the trader. The Director of Civil Supplies should concentrate all efforts on increase of supply. Control can only succeed when government controls the whole supply and distribution of a commodity beginning from purchase, export–import and the distribution to the wholesale and retail trade. He further suggested that the lines on which the machinery to deal with similar problems should be organized in the event of a war in future: In a future war, there will, no doubt be a high executive authority in the Government of India, like the Foodstuffs Commissioner, who will tour about and settle most matters by demi-official correspondence with the provincial Directors of Civil Supplies. The Director of Civil Supplies will be the executive officer for the province. He will act as a Secretary to Government, signing official letters to the Government of India, and sending or taking papers direct to the Honorable Member. The Director of Civil Supplies has often to make important decisions immediately, and should be a fairly senior officer. He should dispose of business more by telegram than letter. A shorthand writer is indispensable. Especially in Burma rice control, he has

War Ferment in India   241  

often to meet the assaults and criticism of the Burma big millers, the Rice Commissioner, Burma, the Government of India, the Bombay Indian Rice Merchants, the Bombay Agents of the Burma big millers, and the Bombay City public, all or any. It is not possible to please all of these conflicting interests and views, so he will be wisest if he makes his own line. Issue of Press Notes to inform and soothe the public is an important part of his business. His general line should be, as above stated, to aim at increase of supply, not at regulation of prices and of rationing, to keep the business in the hands of the ordinary traders, to avoid issue of priority certificates, to get the railway companies to give priority to food and other import supplies on fixed line of policy, to avoid taking up any detailed business such as giving allotments to individuals, to keep the public informed and soothed by Press Notes and by some use of an advisory Committee, to keep Collectors from interfering with the normal course of trade, as some of them tend to do, to maintain friendly personal relations with railway officials, oil company officials and traders in the various lines. He may require one or more assistants, who must be tactful. If he arranges to leave the management in the hands of the ordinary traders he will only require a small establishment.

Sir Patrick Cadell did not concur with the opinion expressed by Brander that in future priority certificates should be abolished. Sir Patrick felt that the essential points to be observed for the directions of civil food supplies are well summarized by the Commissioner in Sind, J. L. Rieu. They are: 1. The necessity of closely watching the food situation at all times. 2. The necessity, when control is brought into operation, of endeavouring to keep trade as far as possible on normal lines. 3. The great advantage arising from and the steadying influence on prices of the opening at the earliest possible moment of cheap grain shops at all important centres. 4. The necessity for publicity propaganda and for enlisting the cooperation of leaders of communities. 5. The favourable position of Karachi for instituting a real control of prices when occasion arises. 6. The possibility of utilizing, in the event of a crisis, the resources of the Supply and Transport Department, which usually has immediately available in various depots large stocks on hand which can be provisionally released without difficulty.

 242   Indians in the First World War

7. The desirability of the relaxation of control at the earliest possible date. 8. The need of keeping readily at hand charts to indicate prices of food-grains and wages on the lines of statistics supplied through the medium of the Labour Gazette, Bombay.

The Indian War Loans In June 1916, a communique was issued by the Government of Madras, which forbade Dr Besant and her two lieutenants from attending or taking part in any meeting, or from delivering any lecture or speech; from publishing or procuring the publication of any writing and placing all correspondence under censorship. Mrs Besant took leave of her public in a letter to the press and wrote: Indian labour is wanted for the foreign firms. Indian capital is being drained away by the ‘war loan’ which is to bring no freedom to India, if the autocracy has its way. Indian taxation is to pay the interest on the war loan will be crushing. When that comes, India will realize why I have striven for Home Rule after the war. Only by that can she be saved from ruin, from becoming a nation of coolies for the enrichment of others.45

In Sir Verney Lovatt’s opinion, ‘Her real crime was that she had awakened in India national self-respect’. Again, her article ‘The Great Betrayal’ in the New India issue of 2 May 1917 was most hard hitting and attracted her final internment in Madras to desist her from political activities. She wrote: That vote (at the Imperial War Conference in London 1917) compels India to remain a plantation, that which the East India Company made her, destroying her indigenous manufacturers to that end, the manufacturers which had created her enormous wealth, the wealth which lured the Western nations to her shores…. The policy which reduced the Indian masses to poverty and brought about the Rebellion of 1857, consisted of keeping India as a reservoir of raw materials…. The Imperial Conference now proposes to continue the process, but to deprive India of the small advantage she possesses of selling her raw material in the open European 45

Cited by Lovett, A History of the Indian, 137.

War Ferment in India   243  

market, and thus obtaining a price fixed by the need of competing nations. She is to sell her cotton within the Empire and the dominions, fixed in a market controlled by them, fixed to give them the largest profit and reduce her to the lowest point…. She will be paid the lowest price which her necessities compel her to accept, and will become the wage-slave of the Empire…. She is the great betrayal of India by the GOI nominees, but they have made one thing clear. Unless the coming of Home Rule is hastened, so that India is freed before the great battle for Imperial preference is fought out, India will be ruined. The trio of government delegates, in concert with the Secretary of State for India, have voted away all hope of India’s industrial regeneration.46

The Times of India of 19 January 1917 contained an intimation of the intention of the GOI to raise an Indian war loan, the details of which were to be announced at the time of presentation of the financial statement of 1917–1918 in March. Patrick R. Cadell, who was then the Chief Secretary, BG, expressed that ‘the success of the loan will depend not so much on the individual subscription from the big firms and the well-to-do in the large cities, as on the response from the masses of the people in the cities, towns and villages’. It was therefore felt necessary that the appeal should reach the masses and, hence, it was decided to solicit the unofficial help by forming local committees for carrying out the propaganda.47 The Bombay War Loan Committee consisting of Bombay bureaucrats was formed on 19 February 1917. This Committee met in the Secretariat on 21 February, to appoint additional members; to appoint Executive Committee; and to chalk out the programme with prospective speakers at the public meeting to be held at a later date. The Governor, then, had an interview on 22 February with the prominent newspaper editors and sought their ‘cooperation in pushing the Indian war loan’, educating the public, highlighting the advantages of investing in loans. He harped again on the same cord of how the British army and navy had kept India in peace; also, how Ibid., 139. The three delegates to Imperial War Conference in London were the Maharaja of Bikaner, Sir James Meston, Lt Governor of the United Provinces, and Sir Satyendra Sinha, member of the Bengal Executive Council. 46

P. R. Cadell’s letter No. 260, Finance Department, 24 January 1917, MSA/PD/ WAR/1917/96-W-I.

47

 244   Indians in the First World War

Figure 6.1 Bombay W W I Relief Fund Stamp Source: Bombay Chronicle, 15 June 1918. Reproduced with permission from Maharashtra State Archives.

the people of England were undergoing hardship and privations, thereby urging the people to pay back their loyalty by taking war loan bonds. Since he convened a public meeting on this issue on 6 March, he expressed (see Figure 6.1) minatory request to bring out a war loan edition of their newspaper on 5 March. A summary prospectus of the war loans was to be made available at the Accountant General’s office for all newspapers on 1 March.48 On 27 February 1917, a very urgent order was issued by the BG, stating that an advertisement would be published every week in the supplement to the Bombay Government Gazette until 15 April 1917, which would be translated by the Oriental Translator into Gujarati, Marathi, Kanarese and Urdu for publishing in vernacular press. It was also stated in the order that the managers of important newspapers49 would publish the advertisement twice a week from 2 March till 15 April 1917. 48

Secretary L. Robertson to James DuBoulay, dated 22 February 1917, Ibid.

The important newspapers included The Times of India, The Bombay Chronicle, The Advocate of India, The Anglo Lusitano, The Sanj Vartaman, the Jam-e-Jamshed, the

49

War Ferment in India   245  

A public meeting of the Bombay citizens was convened at the Town Hall, on this issue on 6 March 1917, with the Governor, Lord Willingdon in Chair. The proceedings were opened by T W. Birkett, the Sheriff of Bombay, who uttered the same phraseology as the need for ‘unselfish sacrifice, self-denial and service of every citizen throughout the Empire’ and urged, ‘Now the call of the motherland of the Empire has come to India to help her in her hour of need….’ Speaking on this occasion, Sir Narayan G. Chandavarkar welcomed the announcement of Sir William Meyer in the Imperial Council on the issue of Indian war loans and described the situation as ‘an opportunity for demonstrating India’s desire and ability to take full share in the mighty struggle’. He further spoke in hyperbole language that implied ‘servile loyalty’: Without meaning to flatter I should say at the outset that the speech which His Excellency has made, deserves to be written in letters of gold in the present and future history of India, because of the ring it has of the true Englishman, of the genuine imperialist, and above all, of the sober, sound and farseeing lover of India in general and Bombay Presidency in particular…. In welcoming the opportunity afforded to us by the war loan, in pledging ourselves to do all we can to make the loan an unqualified success worthy of India, we discern with the eyes of faith that we are today helping our soldiers in making the future of India brighter than ever by writing its pages as they have been writing with the pen of their swords and the ink of their heart’s blood. We meet here to help, in widening and deepening the basis of India’s growing status as an integral part of the British Empire in the gigantic struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.

Similar tone was also conveyed by Sir Dorabji Tata.50 The Times, on the same day, wrote an article with a header: ‘Well, good-bye, old chap, and good luck! I am going in here to do my bit, the best way I can. The more everybody scrapes together for the war loan the sooner you will be back from the trenches’. The editor of the Times then read out to the members of the war loan committee as well Praja Mitra and Parsee, the Indu Prakash, the Akhbar-e-Islam, the Kaiser-i-Hind, and The Islamic Mail. The Order is signed by A. F. L. Brayne, Under Secretary, BG., Ibid. 50

Ibid.

 246   Indians in the First World War

as the Executive Committee, with C. Crerar and Cowasji Jehangir as Secretaries.51 There are also many letters from the native princes of Cutch, Limdi, Rajkote, and many others expressing their willingness to invest their money in War Loans. Chhatrapati Shahu’s letter states: I wish to encourage Jahagirdars, Inamdars and all people of my state, rich and poor, to give their quota to the Fund. I am ordering rigid economy in the State and postponing expenses in matters and on works, which may well stand over. I have ordered the work of the great irrigation tank and canal to be stopped for the present. The Abkaree revenues are likely to increase by the introduction of the Madras system which I have ordered. That also will help me a great way to subscribe to the war loan.52

How much the native rulers invested in the war loans is found from the table given in the subsection entitled ‘War Gifts’. To what extent the government carried programme of war loans can be surmised from the fact that the ex-King of Burma—King Thibau—was put under house arrest in a place in Ratnagiri in Konkan. Both the ex-King and his eldest daughter were officially paid a monthly sum. They were coerced into investing two-thirds of that monthly allowance regularly in the war loans by the Indian Government.53 The official War Loan drive was not without excesses in many provinces. For the poor village masses, it was ‘war loan Zoolum’ and 51 Following names were included in the War Loan Committee: Sir Basil Scott, Mr Carmichael, Sir J. Heaton, Sir Jamshetji Jijibhoy, Sir Ebrahim Rahimtulla, D. E. Wachha, Sir Dinshaw Petit, T. W. Birkett, Mr Justice Macleod, Sir Shapurjee Broach, Sir Frederick Sprott, Mr Phiroj C Sethna, B. G. Horniman, Joseph Baptista, M. B. Chaubal, Mr Lionel Curtis, Sir Narayan Chandavarkar, Sir Stanley Batchlor, Justice Beaman, Justice Shah, Sir Chunilal V Mehta, Sir Sasson David, Sir Cowasji Jehangir. P. R. Cadell, Sir Dorab Tata, Sir Stanley Reed, N. M.Hogg, Chimanlal Setalvad. The Executive Committee members were: T. W. Birkett, Sir Sasson David, Sir Jamshetji Jijibhoy, Sir Stanley Reed, D. E. Wachha, Sir Chunilal V Mehta, P. R. Cadell, Lallubhai Samaldas, M. N. Hogg, R. Aitkin, R. Barlow, A. J. Billimoria and Rahimtulla Karimbhoy. 52 Letter under the Kolhapur seal dated 4 March 1917 to L. Robertson, Secretary, PD, BG. Ibid. While the letter is signed as Shahu Chhatrapati, nowhere in the official records he is mentioned by that title but referred only as Maharaja of Kolhapur. 53

MSA/PD/WAR/1918/1399—‘War Loans’.

War Ferment in India   247  

the how revenue officials of the village used obnoxious methods and coerced peasantry is described by B. G. Horniman in Amritsar and Our Duty to India: It must not be assumed that coercive measures, which is the proper English for Lord Willingdon’s ‘pressure and persuasion’, were necessary. The loans could have been raised as well by the reasonable and productive methods of securing popular cooperation. And it is only fair to say that in the large cities, where the light of the day prevails, this was done to a considerable extent. But in the country districts the ‘indent’ system prevailed. Local officials had to make returns of the lending capacity of the areas that their reputation for efficiency depended on results, entered with zest, down to the police constable, on the task of extorting the highest amount that ‘pressure and persuasion’ could produce. All over India one heard the stories of this campaign of extortion from people who could not afford to pay. Without going to the Punjab, the story of what occurred in a taluka in the Bombay Presidency may be quoted, for it includes the zoolum both of war loan and recruiting methods. Here the local mamlatdar, or petty collector, followed what appears to have been a not infrequent practice of sending out summons for official printed forms, under the Land Revenue Code, calling upon people to appear before him in regard to the war loan. Then he descended on a village, summoned certain villagers to appear before him, arbitrarily made out a list of the amounts they were expected to pay and then closed the village well until such time as they paid.54

In Horniman’s opinion, such cases were not isolated episodes.

The Indian Defence Force: 1914–1920 The only form of compulsory military service employed in India during the war was applied to European British subjects. In 1820, an Act was passed empowering the East India Company to raise contingents of volunteer infantry, but it was not until 1869 that the scope of the Volunteer Force, under the GOI, was expanded and defined. Prior to the outbreak of war, it has been realized that the volunteer system in India was unsatisfactory and, as the war progressed, it became obvious that equality of sacrifice was necessary despite the fact that the small Horniman, Amritsar and Our, 31–33. The word zoolum denote general oppression and coercion. 54

 248   Indians in the First World War

non-official British community in the country were for the most part engaged in essential occupations. From the beginning of the war, the volunteers had been freely used, especially in Bombay, for a variety of duties normally performed by garrison troops, such as embarkation work and as escorts to POW; and many joined the army and the Indian Army Reserve of Officers. But of the Force as a whole no compulsory use could be made so long as the Indian Volunteers’ Act prescribing local limits of service remained in existence. From time to time, various resolutions were passed by Chamber of Commerce and other bodies favouring some form of compulsory service for able-bodied Europeans, but it was not until the beginning of 1916 that the depletion of British troops in India made it necessary to formulate a scheme by which the Europeans remaining in the country could be employed for its defence. Towards the end of the year 1917, the Indian Defence Force was constituted under a special Act No. 111 of the Imperial Legislative Council. The object of this measure was a more extensive use of volunteers and other European British subjects resident in the country to replace regular troops on internal security dispositions and thereby release British troops for service overseas. Enrolment was made compulsory for all European British subjects between the ages of 16 and 50, those between the ages of 18 and 41 being liable for military service anywhere in Indian, and those above the age of 41 for local military service. At the same time, the Act provided for persons other than European British subjects who should offer themselves for general military service to be enrolled in the local corps specially constituted. This part of the measure was hailed by the government as granting an opportunity to Indians to take part in home defence without liability for service overseas. However, the response of the Indians was not only disappointing, rather they questioned the government’s intentions. On 2 February 1917, the Registration Ordinance was published by which every male European British subject between the ages 16 and 50 was compelled to register his name; place of residence; date of birth; whether single, married or widower; number of dependents, if

War Ferment in India   249  

any; as well as various details regarding his profession or occupation. The exemptions from these included persons nor ordinarily resident in British India, members of His Majesty’s naval and military forces other than volunteers enrolled under the Indian Volunteers’ Act and certain minor categories.55 The process of registration was carried out with little difficulty and shortly afterwards the Indian Defence Force came into operation and remained in force during the continuance of the war and for a period of 12 months thereafter. Briefly by the terms of this Act, every male European British subject, with the exceptions outlined above, between the ages of 18 and 41 was deemed to have been enrolled for general military service and thereby liable to serve in any part of India, whilst those between the ages of 41 and 50 were deemed to have been enrolled for local military service. Youths from 16 to 18 were liable to military training only. In the autumn of 1918, three amendments to the Act were introduced whereby men over 50 were permitted to volunteer for service in the Defence Force; men under 41 were made liable to service in any part of the world; and all persons deemed to be enrolled for military service under the Act might be called upon to take up or continue any employment in any industrial concern under government control, declared to be of national importance by the Governor-General in Council. This later amendment, however, was never enforced owing to the termination of war. It was believed that the maximum number of enrolment in the European Branch of the Indian Defence Force throughout India amounted to 44,500. On 1 October 1920, the Indian Defence Force was replaced by voluntary organizations called the Auxiliary Force, the European British subjects and the Indian Territorial Force for non-European British subjects. However, Horniman gives the other side of the Indian Defence Force, of which he was also a member during 1917–1918, in one his reminiscences written in January 1925 under the title ‘IDF Drills and Parades—Vision of a “Cushy” Job and Knighthood’. With a few 55

Government of India, India’s Contribution, 201–209.

 250   Indians in the First World War

exceptions of men like Sir Stanley Reed, the editor of the Times of India, Mr Patrick Cadell, the Secretary, BG, Mr Noel Paton and Mr Wardlaw Milne, and most of the Europeans in Bombay became members of this volunteer corps. Since Horniman belonged to that class between the ages of 40 and 50, he and others of his category were liable only for garrison service in Bombay City and its neighbourhood. He recalls: I think many must have regretted that I was not liable for service out of Bombay, in which connection I may mention the incident of one of my European friends calling upon me to tell me that he could say with certainty that, if I would volunteer for service of any kind out of India, I should be given a commission at one and ‘cushy’ job. The same gentleman came at a later stage to press me to abandon my opposition to the Willingdon Memorial, and went as far as to describe in alluring terms that honours that had been bestowed on a fellow-journalist, for his support to the government on the ‘right lines’ and to express his conviction that a knighthood was instant prospect for me if I only ‘behave’ myself.56

Horniman also describes how drills and parade were conducted every day. Since he was in the bad books of the bureaucracy, when he once remained absent due to severe lumbago, police along with Dr William Nunan, visited his house to check whether he was malingering. To most of the Europeans, the Indian Defence Force (IDF) was an expression of ‘White-man’s solidarity’.

The Contributions of Princely States How the First World War helped to promote the fortunes of a variety of interest groups such as the princely states rulers in Bombay Presidency, as they used it to establish their own patriotism and other social virtues in order to shore up support for their unrelated goals gets illustrated in the following tables. Following information sent to the GOI vide Letter No. 2165-W, dated 16 April 1919,57 is selfexplanatory about the nature and content of the contribution made by the Indian princely states to the war efforts in the First World War. 56

Horniman, Bombay Chronicle.

57

MSA/PD/WAR/1918/167-W: ‘War Gift’.

Name

His Highness the Jamsaheb of Navanagar

The Raj Saheb of Wankaner

Kumar Shri Gamhirsingji Vakhatsingji of Vala

Kumar Shri Krishnachandra Kalubha of Bhavnagar

The Raja of Baria

Sr. No

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

1. Personal services Service

Served as an additional member on the Staff of General Edwardes, Commanding the Seventh Cavalry Brigade. Granted temporary and Honorary rank of Lieutenant with effect from 2 January 1915. Returned invalidated to India on the 11 June 1915.

Granted Honorary rank of second Lieutenant and proceeded to the front with the Raj Saheb of Wankaner.

Granted Honorary rank of second Lieutenant and proceeded to the front with the Raj Saheb of Wankaner.

Granted Honorary rank of Captain and attached with two Kumars to non-combatant unit with which the ambulances are working in France.

Went on active service in November 1914, and served in France. Proceeded on leave to London where he presented the Fleet of Kathiawar Motor Ambulances to His Majesty. Returned to France and, in December 1915, returned to India on account of family affairs. Appointed to the Staff of the GOC the British Army in France but has not returned to duty there.

Remarks

(Continued)

The Chief of Mudhol

The Raj Saheb of Akalkot, Sholapur Agency

The Nawab of Savanur

Captain Bala Saheb Daphale, Served on the staff of GOC, 17th Indian Infantry Brigade, brother of the Chief of Jath and Force ‘D’ and returned invalidated in May 1915. Has been Political Attaché, Kathiawar appointed Recruiting Officer.

Kumar Shri Vijayadar, Heirapparent, Dharangadhra state

His Highness the Maharaja of Idar, Mahi Kantha

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Service

6.

Appointed to General Watson’s Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, which proceeded to Egypt, but returned from active service on account of family affairs.

Served for a few months as Honorary Personal Assistant to the Commandant of the St. John Ambulance War Hospital, Dehra Dun.

Served as Aide-de-camp to the GOC Vi (Poona) Division Area. Returned to Bombay from Basra in April 1915.

Being on tour in England was attached to the Reserve Cavalry at Shorneliff. Subsequently served on the staff in France.

Served as an additional member on the staff of the GOC 32 Imperial Service Infantry Brigade, Mediterranean Force. Sailed on the 14 April 1916 and returned to India in August 1916.

Served with the unit with which his motor ambulances are working in France. Has now returned to India.

Name

The Chief of Jamkhandi

Sr. No

(Continued) Remarks

Captain Zorawar Singhji of Bhavnagar, Kathiawar

The Nawab of Sachin, Surat Agency

Mirzada Gholam Ali Khan Talpur of Khairpur

Aga Cassim Shah

The Chief of Savantwadi

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

After training at a Cadet Corps, he is to be posted as Honorary Second Lieutenant to Infantry unit. Has joined No. 2 officer Cadet Battalion, Pembroke College, Cambridge. Afterwards served in Mesopotamia.

Granted Honorary rank of Captain. Served as A. D. C. to Maj Gen Stewart with the East African Force. Returned to India in March 1916.

Granted honorary rank of Second Lieutenant, Served as Assistant Transport Officer Lucknow Cavalry Brigade Headquarters in France.

Attached to the staff of General Tighe with Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’. Sailed on 16 October 1914 and returned invalidated from East Africa on 13 December 1914. He was under fire in two actions and acquitted himself creditably.

Was placed in command of the Bhavnagar Squadron of the Imperial Service Cavalry posted at Karachi on garrison duty. Subsequently proceeded on active service and was awarded the Military Cross.

4.

3.

His Highness the Maharaja Agreed to lend the services of 1 officer and 50 mounted men without horses from the Bhavnagar Imperial Service Lancers of Bhavnagar as reinforcement to Indore Mounted Escort, to train horses for government in remount depot, Basra.

2.

Offered three doctors for ambulance work

His Highness the Jam Saheb of Navanagar

His Highness the Nawab of Janjira

Proposed to organize a small body of ex-cadets for Indian Transport and Ambulance. Worked as Interpreters.

His Highness the Jam Saheb of Navanagar

Loan of 16 signallers from the Janjira Imperial Service United. The Corps was afterwards disbanded in 1917 and the Nawab paid `6,000 as contribution being the amount of their upkeep for 1917–1918.

Offered to train and equip 1,000 men for active service

450 Imperial Service Lancers for active service. They are to be sent as reinforcement to the Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers in the event of the Jodhpur Darbar being unable to furnish reinforcements for their regiment in future.

His Highness the Jam Saheb of Navanagar

Imperial Service Troops

Imperial Service Troops

Thanked and accepted.

Not utilized

Not utilized

Posted to Karachi for Garrison duty.

Offer accepted and troops served in Egypt and Gulf

Offer accepted

Agreed to give a contingent of 1 officer and 34 rank and file without camels from the Khairpur Camel Corps as reinforcement in the Alwar Camel Corps.

His Highness the Mir of Khairpur

1.

Remarks

Number of Men Offered

Name

Sr. No.

2. Offer

The Raja of Baria

The Chief of Jamkhandi

The Hon. Sardar Dulabava Offered to raise a corps of Volunteer Horse from among the Raisingji, Thakor of Talukdars of Gujarat. Kerwada, Gujarat

The Talukdars of Gujarat

His Highness the Maharrao of Cutch

His Highness the Maharaja Raised a special Kolhapur Battalion named the third/tenth of Kolhapur Kolhapur Mahratta Light Infantry.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Accepted Now being disbanded in 1919

Not utilized

`45,000 a month till the end of the war towards the maintenance of a Regiment of Indian Infantry at the front.

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Last two offers not utilized.

16 men selected.

Offered to raise a force of 500 volunteers for active service.

Offered to train 150 men and proceed on active service with them.

40 Sowars and 100 men from the Jamkhandi Police force.

100 trained men and 100 recruits, 25 despatch riders.

20 Body Guard Sowars and 70 Infantry men.

His Highness the Nawab of Palanpur

7.

Offered to raise an Imperial Service Unit of 150 Infantry

The Chief of Mudhol

250 Police officers and men

His Highness the Maharaja Imperial Service Corps of 32 horsemen. 25 despatch riders of Idar 3 followers

6.

5.

Name

His Highness the Mir of Khairpur

His Highness the Nawab of Junagadh

His Highness the Jam Saheb of Navanagar

His Highness the Raja of Rajpipla

The Maharaja of Lunawada

The Raja of Banoda

The Hon’ble Mr Justice Macleod, High Court, Bombay

Sr. No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

a. Aeroplanes

3. Offer of gifts and offer in cash and in kind

`32,500 for an aeroplane.

`3,000 towards the cost of the Solanki flight of six aeroplanes presented by the Rajput Chiefs and Thakors in Central India, Rajputana, UP and Bombay

`10,000 towards the cost of the Solanki flight of six aeroplanes presented by the Rajput Chiefs and Thakors in Central India, Rajputana, UPs and Bombay.

One armed aeroplane £2,250 paid.

`100,000 for the purchase of aeroplanes.

Three armed Aeroplanes.

One military aeroplane in connection with the Sind Aeroplane Fund.

Gifts

Remarks

H. H. the Nawab of Radhanpur

Sir Sasson David, Bombay

Sir Shapurji B. Bharucha, Bombay

The Residents of Aden

The Chiefs and Talukdars of the Mahi Kantha Agency

Residents of Ahmedabad

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

`120,000 for the purchase of aeroplanes.

`23,404-6-0 for the purchase of an aeroplane.

`36,187 for the purchase of Aeroplanes.

One aeroplane.

One aeroplane.

`20,000 for the purchase of a tank or aeroplane.

An aeroplane was purchased

His Highness the Maharaja of Idar

The Chiefs of the first four classes in Kathiawar

His Highness the Jamsaheb of Nawanagar

Thakor Saheb of Limbdi

The Thakor Saheb of Rajkot

The Chief of Sangli, Southern Maratha Country states

The Shaikh of Mangrol

The Chief of Mudhol, Southern Maratha Country.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

b. Motors

Nine accepted

15 motor cars.

One 36 hp Halford 3½ tonne motor lorry.

One 1½ tonne Fiat Motor for conversion into an armoured car, with `21,000.

Accepted

Accepted and sent to the AQMS for disposal.

Accepted

`30,000 for motor ambulances A ‘Ford’ motor car for use in connection towards the war.

Accepted

One motor car for use as an ambulance.

One motor ambulance car for service in Bombay City with Accepted cost of upkeep.

Accepted

Accepted.

Accepted

One motor car for use as an ambulance

A fleet of fully equipped Ambulance cars for service at the front under the command of the Raj Saheb of Vankaner (`192,333-14-9 were subscribed towards this and a fleet of 21 motors purchased).

One 9.5 hp Detroit Car for ambulance purposes and `2,000 for purchase of accessories.

Two motor cars.

The Chief of Jamkhandi, Southern Maratha Country

Kumar Shri Vijaydevji of Dharampur state

The Nawab of Sachin

Maharaja Shri Hamirsinghji of Danta, Mahi Kantha.

Sardars and Ryots of Kolhapur state

The Raja of Balasinor

The Raja of Bansda

Malek Zainkhanji Jorwarkhanji of Dasada

The Thakor Saheb of Morvi

Sardar Sayedna Taher Sayfuddin, High Priest of the Borah Community

The Jamnagar state

The Kolhapur Durbar

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Accepted Accepted

`39,000 towards motor ambulances and their upkeep for one year. `9,000 for a Vulcan motor ambulance

One motor car.

One motor ambulance.

One motor car for the use of the wounded in Poona.

Two motor ambulances.

One overland motor car

Accepted (Continued)

Given direct to the Imperial Relief Fund

Accepted

Given direct to the Imperial Indian Relief Fund

Accepted

Given direct to the Imperial Relief Fund

Accepted.

`15,000 for a motor ambulance or any other requirement of the Indian Expeditionary Force

Two motor ambulances

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted

Two motor cars with chauffeurs.

Loan of a motor car for the sue of the military authorities.

Three motor ambulances.

Shri Sadgum Narayan Maharaj of Kedgoan, Poona District.

His Highness the Maharaja of Bhavnagar

The Raj Saheb of Vankner

27.

28.

29.

The Honourable Khan Bahadur Offered to place his motor car at the disposal of Rustamji Jahangirji Vakil, Ahmedabad government for the use of conveying wounded soldiers returning from the Front.

25.

Ranjitsing Surajsing Padvi, Chieftain of Kathi, West Khandesh

The Talukdars of Gujarat through the Hon. The Thakor of Kerwada

24.

26.

Messers Ardeshir Rustomji & Co., Proprietors, Victoria Bakery, Bombay

23.

A motor ambulance.

A motor ambulance.

Offered the loan of a motor car of the Military Authorities.

`20,000 to be spent on an aeroplane or a motor ambulance to be named after his estate.

The amount has been included in the ‘One Day Fund’.

`11,000 to be utilized for a motor ambulance.

Accepted.

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted

Not utilized.

Accepted

Accepted

Offered the loan of a motor car for the use of military authorities.

`5749-10-1 for a motor ambulance.

The District Police of Bombay Presidency

22.

Accepted One motor car. Has offered to contribute `5,000 per annum for the duration of the war. He is also contributing the cost of maintenance of a war of 12 beds for officers in the Lady Hardinge Hospital, Bombay.

The Sheikh of Mangrol

21.

(Continued)

His Highness the Maharao of Cutch

His Highness the Maharaja of Idar

His Highness the Mir of Khairpur

The Chiefs of the four classes in Kathiawar

His Highness the Nawab of Radhanpur

The Raja of Baria

The Chief of Sangli

The Chief of Mudhol

The Chief of Jamkhandi

The Nawab of Sachin

Maharana Shri Hamirsinhji of Danta

The Nawab of Palanpur

The Raja of Rajpipla

The Raja of Sunth

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

c. Tents

2 tents

1 tent

1 tent

1 tent

2 tents

4 tents

2 tents

5 tents

3 tents

Offered to get the tents made

25 tents

5 tents

4 tents for the benefit of British Army horses

19 tents

17 tents

5 tents

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not Utilized

Accepted

Not utilized

(Continued)

The Raja of Chhota Udepur

The Cambay Durbar

The Chief of Miraj (Senior)

The Chief of Miraj (Junior)

The Raja Saheb of Akalkot

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

(Continued)

4 tents

2 tents

1 Shamiana

1 hill tent; 1 hill tent and 1 Swiss Cottage

1 Shamiana and 2 Tents

Not utilized

Not utilized

Not utilized

Forwarded to the Kirkee Arsenal as directed by the GOI

Not utilized

25 trained horses of the Imperial Service Lancers in exchange for an equal number of untrained horses to be trained The Administrator has offered 3 horses and 15 ponies on behalf of the minor Nawab.

His Highness the Maharao of Cutch

His Highness the Maharaja of Idar

His Highness the Mir of Khairpur

His Highness the Nawab of Junagadh

His Highness the Nawab of Junagadh

2.

3.

4.

5.

His Highness the Maharaja of Bhavnagar Horses

His Highness the Raja Saheb of Wankner

7.

8.

Three Mounted Infantry ponies

Has offered three Indian Cavalry horses

9 Pack ponies

15 Supply and Transport (S&T) Riding ponies

3 horses for Indian Cavalry Units 21 Mounted Infantry Ponies

3 infantry chargers.

200 cavalry horses.

His Highness the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar

6.

42 camels and saddles 100 baggage camels

61 horses and 10 mules

30 horses

His Highness the Maharaja of Kolhapur 40 horses

1.

d. Horses, Mules, Camels and Bullocks

(Continued)

Accepted

40 accepted

Communicated to the GOI.

12 horses accepted.

Accepted

Accepted

14 were accepted

5 were accepted.

His Highness the Raj Saheb of Dhrangadhra

The Nawab of Radhanpur

The Thakor Saheb of Palitana

The Chief of Manavadar

The Thakor Saheb of Rajkot

The Chief of Sangli

The Chief of Ramdurg

The Chief of Jasdan

The Chief of Kurundwad Junior

Meherban Malojirao Nanasaheb Ghorpade of Mudhol

His Highness the Thakore Saheb of Morvi

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

(Continued)

Two horses for New Indian Cavalry Unit

Four horses

Two horses

Two horses for New Indian Cavalry Unit and five pack of ponies

10 pairs of bullocks

27 horses

Offered to present 12 horses to government from his private stables

Horses

Horses, has offered to present five Indian cavalry horses five Infantry chargers from the state paddock

Has offered three horses and one pack pony

Has offered to present to government: three Indian Cavalry horses and two Mounted Infantry ponies

60 horses

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted

Five accepted

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted

The Thakor Saheb of Limbdi

The Thakor of Chuda

His Highness the Maharaja of Navanagar

The Chief of Manavadar

Shamsul-Ulama Pir Shah Mardan, Shah 15 camels for military purposes of Kingri, Sukkur

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

Offered 12 horses

Has offered 50 camels

Offered four camels

Has offered 10 camels

Has offered one camel

Kumar Shri Sherbulandkhanji, Shareholder of Bantwa

21.

Has offered one camel

Kumar Shri Umarkhanji Shareholder of Bantwa

20.

Accepted

Four accepted

Three accepted as being suitable

Two accepted as being suitable

Four accepted as being suitable

His Highness the Maharaja of Kolhapur

His Highness the Jam Saheb of Navanagar

His Highness the Maharaja of Bhavnagar

His Highness the Thakor Saheb of Gondal

The Thakor Saheb of Limbdi

The Raj Saheb of Vankner

The Thakor Saheb of Rajkot

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

e. Hospitals and so on

Accepted

Accepted

Accepted Accepted

`5,000 towards the current expenses of the Lady Hardinge War Hospital, Bombay.

`1,025 towards the upkeep of 50 beds in the Lady Hardinge War Hospital, Bombay.

Offered a portion of his guest house for the use of convalescent officers

`1,000 to be utilized in supplying artificial limbs to soldiers maimed in the war.

`2,000 towards the expenses of the Accepted Lady Hardinge War Hospital, Bombay

Accepted

Accepted

Not utilized

Offered to place 50 beds at his capital at the disposal of government for the sick and wounded.

Prince of Wales Hospital at Staines.

Proposed to establish a convalescent home for sick soldiers returning from the Front.

The Raja of Baria

His Highness the Maharaja of Baroda

His Highness the Raja of Rajpipla

Junagadh Durbar

Seth Baldeodas Shivanarayan

Surgeon of the American Presbyterian Mission Hospital, Miraj, SMC states

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

The Chief of Thana Devli

9.

10.

Sonkunvarba of Rajkot

8.

Offered to admit 10 English soldiers into the Hospital and treat them free of charge, giving special attention to surgical cases.

A septic furniture and other things of the value of `3,000 presented to the Lady Hardinge War Hospital.

Offered to take care of 24 wounded Indian soldiers and officers.

Offered to open a convalescent home in Nanded for 15 Indian officers in the cold weather.

Offered his palace on Malabar Hill at Bombay for use as a hospital for officers.

Not utilized as there is ample hospital accommodation available at present.

(Continued)

Thanked but the Military authorities stated that the offer could not be accepted.

Thanked but the Military Authorities stated that the offer could not be accepted.

Accepted

Not yet utilized

Accepted

`3,000 for ambulance purposes.

Offered to take into his state hospital for treatment, either 6 native officers or 12 wounded sepoys in addition to his own wounded men.

Accepted

`55 towards the expenses of the Lady Hardinge War Hospital.

Her Excellency the Lady Willingdon, CI

The Raja Saheb of Akalkot

The Raja of Bansda

16.

17.

18.

(Continued)

Has offered to arrange for the board, lodging and other comforts of six Indian convalescent soldiers till the end of the war.

Has generously undertaken to accommodate in his palace at Akalkot two military officers at a time.

Established the Queen Mary’s Technical School for disabled Indian soldiers.

Offer is being communicated to the military authorities.

Offer is being utilized by the Military authorities.

It is maintained by a monthly subscription from the Women’s Branch of the Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund and by large donations from the Western Turf Club and the Bombay Presidency Branch of Imperial Indian Relief Fund. The Institute building at Byculla has been placed at the disposal of the Committee, rent is free by the executors of the late Sir Jacob Sasson. Its aim is to take over for a period of 6 months or more soldiers and followers of the Indian Army of all ranks and classes who have been pensioned as unfit for further service whatever. To provide them with clothes, food and necessaries, and teach them a trade so that after a course of training they will have means of supplementing their pensions and will be able to live in comfort

His Highness the Maharaja of Idar

The Thakor Saheb of Limbdi

Chief of Kathiawar of the 1st four Classes

The Minor Nawab of Junagadh

1.

2.

3.

4.

4. Other gifts in cash and kind.

Offered to defray the cost of erecting quarters for the Kathiawar Company up to `100,000 and to permit the use of the Junagadh Uttara at Rajkot should it be required for military purposes.

Have agreed at the request of the Agent to the Governor in Kathiawar to contribute a sum of `10,000 as a recruiting fund to meet the incidental expenses, which are paid in British India from funds subscribed by the public.

Two machine guns costing `5,000

20,000 Smooth bore M. H. cartridges, 15 pistols with Ammunitions.

9 Shigram with 9 pairs of bullocks to serve as ambulance carts.

16 China Magazine rifles with 900 cartridges

13 No. 303 Lee Milford Magazine rifles with 900 cartridges

21 H. M. Rifles and the cartridges

Accepted by the GOI.

(Continued)

The Agent to the Governor has asked the Agent of the Bank of Bombay, Rajkot Branch to open an account to be styled the ‘Kathiawar Recruiting Fund Account’ to be operated on by the Agent to the Governor in Kathiawar. The GOI have been informed.

Accepted

Not utilized

The Raja of Baria

Meherban Narayanrao Bala Saheb Ghorpade, Jahagirdar of Icchalkaranji, Kolhapur Feudatory.

The Raja of Dharampur

Mr Gangadhar Vinayak Karpe, Sub-Registrar of Shahda, West Khandesh.

Maharaja Shri Hamirsingji of Danta

Esaji Tajbhoy Borah merchant, Bombay

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

(Continued)

Accepted

Offered to place at the disposal of government 17,000 square yards of land with large bungalow for use in connection with the war.

Offered to place at the disposal of government `50,000 in war loan stock as contribution towards the expenses of the War.

Offer communicated to the Military Authorities.

Offer has been accepted by the GOI. The Certificates with conversion warrant have been sent to the Controller of Currency, Calcutta

Offered to subscribe `2,000 towards the provision of Thanked and informed that his a Dreadnought by the Princes and people of India. proposal would be borne in mind.

Accepted

Accepted

`1,000 towards the expenses of the war.

`40 being one month’s pay to government for the war.

Accepted by the government

One-half company of the state imperial service troops to be enlisted in the 3/8th Gurkha Rifles.

£1 million of hand baled hay.

Accepted by the government

`75,000 annually for the duration of the war for war purposes to be utilized in such a manner as desired by government.

Messers A. M. Jewanjee & Co. Stevedors etc. Bombay & Mombassa

Ranjitsing Surajsing Padvi, Chieftain of Kathi

Thakor Gambirsinghi Dipsingji

The Maharaja of Porbandar

Messers Motichand and Devidas, Solicitors, Bombay

13.

14.

15.

16.

Accepted

Accepted

Contributed a sum of `500 to the Women’s Branch of the Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund to commemorate his installation on the Gadi on 16 June 1917.

`100,000 per annum for war expenses as long as the war lasts.

(Continued)

Offer communicated to the Military Authorities.

Accepted.

Paid `20,000 into the Taloda Sub-Treasury in response to an appeal for contributions to the war loan, but requested that it may be considered as ‘help’ and not as a loan.

Offered to place 2,300 square yards of land at the disposal of the BG for the use of the Military Authorities.

Offer communicated to the GOI, the Colonial Office, London, and the Military Authorities.

Accepted offer communicated to the Military Authorities

Offered to accompany the Indian Expeditionary Force to British East Africa and to place their entire resources at the disposal of military authorities, both in Bombay and Mombassa.

1) the Wellington News for the accommodation of horses and men. 2) All available rooms in the Taj Mahal Hotel Bombay, with free board.

The Indian Hotels Company Offered to place at the disposal of the Military Limited Authorities:

12.

11.

Mr Morarji Vasanji, Bombay

Raigavda Lakhamgavda Vatandar Patil of Lat under Ichhalkaranji

The People of Cutch through the Marrao of Cutch

His Highness the Maharaja of Bhavnagar

The Maharani of Jam Saheb of Navanagar

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Offer communicated to the Military Authorities.

Offer referred to the GOI.

Thanked

Thanked

Published a weekly magazine of war news in Gujarati Accepted at cost of `16,010.

Presented material for construction of a railway line 40 miles in length with engine, wagons and other equipment.

`4,468-12-10 for the purchase of machine guns

`500 to the War Fund to be spent in such manner as The contribution was forwarded government thought best. to the Bombay Branch of Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

Offered free use of certain land.

Messers E. D. Sasson & Co., Offered the personal services of their staff and Bombay undertook to give any information that may be respecting locally made cotton goods.

19.

Gift accepted by the GOI.

`2,000 towards the expenses of the War

Khan Sahib Khair Baksh Khan Laghari of Sejawal

18.

Thanked the Women’s Branch of the Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund arranged for the distribution of the books.

Offered 6,030 copies of Hindi books costing `2,000 for Indian soldiers serving at the Front.

The Shri Venkateshwar Press, Bombay

17.

(Continued)

The Chief of Thana-Devli, Kathiawad

Amra Vala, Talukdar of Luni, Borath Prant

25.

26.

1. The interest on the loan to be contributed direct to the Lady Willingdon War Fund up to the termination of the war. The principal amount of the loan with the interest thereon to be placed at the disposal of the Government of Bombay for being spent on any charitable or benevolent purpose in connection with the war after peace is declared.

Offered to subscribe `1,500 to the war loan on behalf of his state on the following conditions:

1. The interest on the Loan to be contributed to the Lady Willingdon War Fund up to the termination of the War. 2. The principal amount of the loan along with the interest thereon to be placed at the disposal of the Government of Bombay for being spent on any benevolent purpose as the government would deem fit. 3. The monthly sum of `300, which has been subscribed since the commencement of the war towards the War Fund, will be continued until its termination.

Offered to buy war loan for `20,000 on the following conditions:

(Continued)

Accepted by government. Chief has been asked to purchase war loan through the Post Office.

The Chief has been asked to buy the war loan through the Post Office and the bonds to government through the Agent to the Governor in Kathiawad. He has also been informed that condition 2 will come into force when peace is declared.

Rao Bahaddur Vishamdas Nihaldas.

The Raj Saheb of Wankaner

The Chief of Jasdan, Gohilwad Prant

The Chief of Kurundwad (Junior)

The Maharani of Danta

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

(Continued)

Accepted The offer was communicated to the Honorary General Secretary and Treasurer of the Fund and reported to the GOI for information. Amount was forwarded to Maj Hirsch, IMS, who is in charge of the School.

Offered in June 1918 `20,000 towards the expenses of the war.

Interest realized on `30,000 of war loan as long as the war lasts to the Women’s Branch of the Bombay Presidency War & Relief Fund to be utilized for such purposes as Her Excellency Lady Willingdon thinks fit.

`100 towards the maintenance of Queen Mary’s Technical School for disabled soldiers.

Offered to place `3,000 in war loan stock at the Accepted by the GOI. The certificates disposal of the government as a contribution towards with conversion warrants have the expenses of the war. been forwarded to the Controller of Currency, Calcutta

The offer was accepted by the GOI and Rao Bahadur was thanked in suitable terms.

Lent a country boat in connection with an experiment to tow country craft to Mesopotamia. The experiment proved unsuccessful, and damages were sustained by the work engaged in towing. The Rao Bahadur asked that the cost of repairing the boat together with that involved in conveying her from Korti to Karachi and the pay of the personnel of the vessel while engaged on towing work may be considered as a gift towards the War

The Chief of Mongrol

The Administrator of the Palitana state

His Highness Mir Haji Noor Mahomed Khan

The Political Agent, Savantwadi on behalf of the Minor Chief.

Rana Amarsinghji of Bhadarwa

Gulam Mustafa Khatib, Landowner Bhiwandi

The Thakors of Sudasna

The Maharana of Danta.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

H. E. the Governor has requested that the interest on the bonds should be paid to the Bombay Branch of the Imperial Relief Fund.

The offer was not accepted as there are no beds in the Lady Hardinge War Hospital, which is only hospital maintained by the Bombay Branch of the Imperial Indian Relief Fund.

Accepted

The amount has been credited to the Imp. Relief Fund at the Thana Treasury Accepted Offer accepted and has been communicated to the GOI.

`500 to the Godhra Branch of Women’s War & Relief Fund on the occasion of his installation on the Gadi of his state.

`100 to government for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of war.

Offered in February 1918 `100 per month towards the war till its termination.

Offered from February 1918 `200 per month towards the expenses of the war till its termination.

(Continued)

The contributions have been sanctioned.

`2,500 to the Bombay Branch of Imperial Indian Relief Fund and `1,000 to the Women’s Branch of the Bombay Presidency War & Relief Fund.

Fund.

A sum of `31,142-9-1 as his contribution to the war. Accepted

Offered on behalf of the minor Chief to pay to such War Fund as H. M. the Governor may approve the interest on `50,000 of War Bonds repayable in 1920 for which the state has applied.

Offered to provide a few beds till the end of the war in some war hospital under the patronage of His Excellency Lord Willingdon.

His Highness the Nawab of Janjira

The Nawab of Sachin

His Highness Nawab Saheb of Junagadh

The Jahagirdar of Ichhalkaranji

His Highness the Nawab of Palanpur

The Raja of Baria

His Highness the Raja of Rajpipla

The Raja Saheb of Dharmapur

The Raja Saheb of Wankaner

His Highness the Maharaja of Porbundar

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

(Continued)

Accepted

Offered in May 1918 `25,000 a year as long as the war lasts and for five years at least.

Accepted Accepted

Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted

`10,000 towards the war

Relinquished his claim to the sum of `50,000 subscribed to the war loan of 1917 and contributed towards the war. Interest on the sum was not collected by His Highness.

`75,000 for 1918 and `30,000 annually from the 1 June 1919 for the duration of the war.

Offered in June 1918 `100,000 annually for the period of the war. Also `200,000 paid on 23 May 1918.

Offered `35,000 a year for the period of the war.

Offered `20,000 towards the expenses of the war.

Offered in 1918 `100,000 annually as long as the war lasts.

Offered in 1918 `500,000 a year during the Accepted continuance of the war to be devoted to war purposes.

Accepted

Offered `50,000 towards the expenses of war.

His Highness the Maharaja of Navanagar

His Highness the Maharaja of Navanagar

His Highness the Maharaja of Dhrangadhra

The Shiekh of Mangrol

Mr Gangadhar Vinayak

His Highness the Maharaja Jam Saheb

His Highness the Chief of Bhor

The Raja of Chota Udepur

The Maharana of Danta

The (new) Nawab of Palanpur

Thakor Vajesinghji of Ilol.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted

Accepted

Accepted and being made in the Imperial Indian and Relief Fund. Accepted

Offered in June 1918 `5,000 a year for the period of the war for war purposes.

`50 for war purposes.

`50,000 for the erecting of the further lines required for the Kathiawar Company.

`10,000 towards the fund started by H. E. Lady Chelmsford for the education of children of Indian soldiers who die in action.

Offered in August 1918 `25,000 this year and the same amount every year as long as the war lasts towards any war purposes.

`20,000 on his own behalf; `10,000 on behalf of the Maharani in the Indian war loan.

`25,000 for war purposes.

Accepted.

Accepted

Offered in June 1918 `2,00,000 towards the expenses of the war

Offered in January 1919 3½% Promissory Note worth `5,000 towards the expenses of the war.

Accepted

Offered in April 1918 `300,000 a year during the continuance of the war.

Offered in April 1918 `300,000 a year during the Accepted by GOI. First instalment of continuance of the war to be devoted to war purposes. `200,000 received.

`142,000.

Lady Landsdowne’s Fund (Officers’ Family Fund)

`12,500 `14,500

The Naval Relief Fund

Young Men’s Christian Association National Emergency Fund

Women’s Branch, Bombay Pre-War & Relief Fund (Poona Branch)

Station Hospital, Poona.

`500

`3,000

`500

`97,500

St. Dunstan’s Home for the Blind

Christmas presents to the wounded soldiers

`97,500

Lord Kitchener’s Memorial Fund

`5,000

`7,500

The Blue Cross Fund

`7,500

`7,500

The Montenegrin Relief Fund

The Servian Red Cross Fund

`20,000

The French Red Cross Fund

Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (For War Purposes)

`15,000

The Belgian Relief Fund

`7,500

`125,000.

Women’s Branch, Bombay Presidency War & Relief Fund

The Belgian Red Cross Fund.

`190,000.

The Imperial Indian Relief Fund, Bombay Presidency Branch

5. Donations made by the Western India Turf Club to War and Relief Funds for the Year 1917–1918.

`40,000 `40,000 `30,000 `30,000 `20,000 `10,000 `10,000

East Indies Station Naval Fund

Queen Mary’s Technical School For Indian Soldiers (Disabled)

Women’s Branch Bombay Pre. War & Relief Fund

Soldiers Institutes at Poona and Kirkee (through Maj Gen M. J. Tighe)

YMCA Army Branch Comforts for Indian Troops

Karachi Brigade (through Brig Gen Fowler)

Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops Fund for permanently disabled Soldiers and Sailors.

`5,000 `3,000

Soldiers’ Institute at Belgaum (through Mr Lambert)

For Comforts in Military Hospitals at Poona at `500 per month

`1,500 `1,500 `1,000

Bangalore Soldiers Aid Fund

Blue Cross Fund (Mrs Pearson)

Senior Wesleyan Chaplain, Bombay (Active Service Hut)

From October

`6,000

At `600 per month from May 1917

For Comforts of Indian wounded Soldiers at Bombay and Motor Drivers

`50,000

`100,000

`25,000

Imperial Indian Relief Fund, Bombay Pre-Branch

Our Day Fund

Surgeon Gen with the Government of Bombay for purchase of three sets of X-Ray apparatus and Sterilizers

 280   Indians in the First World War

6. Contributions to Various War and Relief Funds. a. Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund. Subscription from public (received in cash)

`5,683,536-13-3

Subscription from public (received in securities)

`17,600-00-0

Subscription from Bombay Municipality

`30,000-00-0

Subscription from Commissioner of Police, Bombay, on account of American Mission Hospital Basra; Interest received Interest accrued to date but not due for payment

`5,076-00-0 `407,990-10-7 `32,944-2-8 `440,934-13-3 `6,177,147-10-6

b. Women’s Branch of the Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund Donations and Subscriptions 1914 and 1915

`835,098-0-11

1916

`350,257-14-5

1917

`198,244-6-5

1918

`73,088-5-8 `1,456,688-11-2

Proceeds Great War Sale 1916

`540,736-7-7

Exhibition of Foodstuff 1917

`249,074-9-7

c. East Indies Station Naval Fund 1915

`90,434-13-3

1916

`112,891-5-9

1917

`123,428-6-4

1918

`184,113-1-10 `510,867-11-2

War Ferment in India   281  

d. French Red Cross Fund Total from September 1914 to 31 December 1914

`62,073-2-0 `16,012-10-0

Total from January 1915 to 31 December 1915 Total from January 1916 to December 1916

`10,330-3-5

Total from January 1917 to December 1917

`5,846-5-0

Total from January 1918 to December 1918

`12,717-6-6 `106,979-11-0

e. Belgian Relief Fund Children Relief Fund. 7 September to 31 December 1914

`113,105-0-6

–

Year 1915

`174,499-15-7

–

Year 1916

`152,592-3-5

`185,774-1-9

Year 1917

`48,767-43-8

`6,755-7-9

Year 1918

`5,904-1-0

–

The following donations to War Funds and Charitable Institutions have been made by the Committee, Western India Turf Club, for the year 1917–1918. J. Reynolds, Acting Secretary, Western India Turf Club King George V Anti-Tuberculosis League King George V Anti-Tuberculosis League (Second donation)

`200,000 `8,000

Lady Willingdon Maternity Home

`100,000

Our Day Fund

`100,000

Imperial Indian Relief Fund, Bombay Presidency Branch

`50,000

East Indies Station Naval Fund

`40,000

Queen Mary’s Technical School for Indian Soldiers (Disabled)

`40,000

Women’s Branch Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund

`30,000 (Continued)

 282   Indians in the First World War

(Continued) Seaman’s Institute, Bombay

`30,000

St. Dustan’s Home for the Blind

`30,000

Lady Landsdown’s Fund (Officer’s Families Fund)

`30,000

Acworth Leper Asylum

`30,000

Acworth Leper Asylum (second donation)

`20,000

Soldiers Institute at Poona and Kirkee (through Maj Gen M. J. Tighe)

`30,000

YMCA Army Branch, Comforts for Indian Troops

`20,000

Basra Turf Club

`20,000

League for Mercy, Bombay

`15,000

Bombay European Relief Association

`15,000

Karachi Brigade (through Brig Gen Fowler)

`10,000

Sasoon Hospital, Poona

`10,000

Sir J. J. Hospital, Bombay

`10,000

Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops Fund for Permanently disabled soldiers and sailors

`10,000

St. George’s Hospital Nursing Association

`7,500

Gokuldas Tejpal Hospital, Bombay

`7,500

For comforts to Indian Wounded Soldiers at Bombay

`6,600

And Motor drivers at `600 per month from 1917 Indo-British Insititute, Bombay

`6,000

Adams Wylie Hospital, Bombay

`6,000

Soldiers Institute at Belgaum (through Mr Lambart)

`5,000

Pechey Phipson Sanitorium, Nasik

`5,000

League for combating Venereal Diseases, Bombay.

`5,000

Widows Fund for Indian Policemen

`4,000

For comforts in Military Hospitals at Poona at `500 per month from October

`3,000

Bangalore Soldiers Aid Fund

`3,000

Bombay Education Society.

`3,000

Victoria Memorial School for the Blind

`3,000

War Ferment in India   283  

Widows Fund for European Police Subordinate Officers of the rank of Inspectors and Sergeant

`3,000

Sasson Hospital Nursing Association

`2,500

Fund for providing passage for the wives and children of European Police Subordinates to England or the Hills in cases of sickness.

`2,000

J. J. Hospital, Nursing Association

`2,000

Ripon Road Orphanage School, Byculla

`1,500

St. Joseph’s Home and Nursery

`1,500

Institute for deaf and mute, Bombay

`1,500

Blue Cross Fund, (Mrs Pearson)

`1,500

Bombay Scottish Education Society

`1,000

Scottish Orphanage, Mahim

`1,000

Society for the Protection of Children in Western India

`1,000

Royal Army Temperance Association, Simla

`1,000

Senior Wesleyan Chaplain, Bombay (Active Service Hut)

`1,000

Punch Houd Mission Dispensary, Poona City

`1,000

Anglo-Indian Collegiate Hostel, Allahabad

`1,000

Convent of Jesus and Mary, Bombay

`1,000

Girls Friendly Society, Bombay

`1,000

Bombay Presidency Released Prisoners Aid Society

`1,000

Convalescent Home, Khandala

`600

Edulji Framji Albless Leper Asylum, Trombay

`500

Home for Aged, Secunderabad

`500

Seva Sadan, Bombay

`500

Mount Poinsur Orphanage, Borivli

`500

Convent of Jesus and Mary, Poona

`500

Salvation Army, Mahratta Hd. Quarters, Poona

`500

Clare Road Convent, Bombay

`500

Parel Convent, Bombay

`500

Pensioners School, Poona

`500

Salvation Army, Territorial Hd. Quarters, Byculla

`300 (Continued)

 284   Indians in the First World War

(Continued) Salvation Army, Rescue Home, Mazagoan

`300

St. Ignatius School, Jacob Circle, Bombay

`300

St. Peter’s Orphanage, Khandala

`300

Girls Guides Association in India

`300 `944,700

Total

Pandemic Influenza Amidst the turbulent days of the First World War, general masses of Bombay were facing severe food scarcity, prices of all food grains were soaring, the recruitment drive, particularly in the labour district, had driven them to the wall, high taxation and political repression added to their misery, and in such trying situation, Bombay Presidency had the misfortune of being visited by a worst epidemic in early 1918—the pandemic influenza. Fortunately, a few scholars have written excellent articles on this topic. It is on the basis of these article, this piece of information is being written.58 Between January of 1918 and December of 1919, the H1N1 strain of influenza raced around the world, infecting some 500 million people. An estimated 50–100 million people died, making it the worst pandemic since the Black Death that ravaged mediaeval Asia and Europe. In 1918–1919, the highest toll for any single country was in India, where a shocking 17–19 million people died of this epidemic, more than all the military casualties sustained in the First World War. Most Indians in rural areas were left unattended. The 1918 flu’s symptoms were so extreme that it was often initially misdiagnosed. Doctors believed that they were dealing with cholera, typhoid or dengue fever. Worldwide, this strain killed approximately 20 per cent of the people who contracted the disease. The influenza first arrived on Indian shores at the city of Bombay on 10 June 1918 and it appeared in UP and Punjab in July and August. The second Mills, ‘The 1918–19 Influenza Pandemic’; More importantly, Ramanna, ‘Coping with the Influenza Pandemic’.

58

War Ferment in India   285  

outbreak, which appeared in September, was virulent in the Western, Central and Northern provinces of India. Seven Indian police sepoys, including one patrolling the Bombay docks, became ill with a non-malarial fever and were hospitalized. By the 19th century, shops and offices around the cities closed down as thousands of sickly employees stayed home from work. The Health Officer J. A. Turner describes the situation of Bombay in June 1918, as a ‘huge incubator, withy suitable media, already prepared for the insemination of germs of disease’.59 The Bombay officials, as usual, held the crew of ship, which had been docked in the port, as responsible for the introduction of this disease and attributed the Indian insanitary conditions in general for the epidemic. It was also contended that there were cases in jails outside Bombay Presidency in 1917 and a local epidemic in Salsette in April 1918, but the officials did not take much cognizance. The June outbreak lasted 4 weeks and took nearly 1,600 lives. Turner remarks that unlike cholera, smallpox and plague, where the causative agents were known and their spread could be controlled, influenza came ‘like a thief in the night, its onset rapid, and insidious’.60 The second wave of this epidemic began in September, which was believed to have started in the Deccan and then travelled to the coast. It was found to be especially fatal among those between the ages of 10 and 40; mortality was estimated at 1,086,758 for the months of June–December 1918, the peak being in October. The failure of the south-west monsoon in 1918 and the resultant crop failure had already severely affected the Bombay Presidency. This had caused influx of migrants to Bombay from rural districts affected by acute food scarcity and the escalating prices. Their appalling living conditions, ill-ventilated and congested dwellings, added to their woes.61 Though the government medical relief fell far too short to cope with the gigantic task, much needed help came from the voluntary Indian organizations, in terms of money and also medical care from Indian 59

Ramanna, ‘Coping with the Influenza Pandemic’, 87.

60

Ibid.

61

Ibid.

 286   Indians in the First World War

doctors.62 The matter of medical attention was compounded by the absence of many doctors who were on military duty on warfronts. Although epidemic visitations like that of cholera, smallpox and plague were known to Indians, this influenza epidemic came at a critical juncture when the government was more interested in the war effort and hardly had time to tend to the suffering people.

Medical Care for the Disabled Soldiers What sort of medical assistance was provided to the wounded Indian soldiers of the Western Front—in France and Flanders—is found in the official report of Walter Lawrence.63 But hardly any information exists on the medical care to the disabled (Annexure 3) soldiers, except the article of Shubhada Pandya.64 Interestingly, the MC had assigned Vincent–Bingley65 to investigate failure of medical assistance at the Mesopotamian Front. They had visited Bombay in person and inspected the medical help provided at ‘Victoria’, ‘Alexandra’ and ‘Freeman Thomas’ Hospitals in Bombay. They made certain observations: a special mention of the efforts of Surgeon-General Sir Pardey Lukis, ably assisted by Brig Gen Knight, in Bombay; the work at Victoria Hospital was led by Maj Hepper, R. E. on behalf of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway; that ‘Lady Hardinge’ Hospital and ‘Marine Lines’ Hospital were specially meant for Indian soldiers; and that comforts and medical accessories of various kinds were supplied to the sick and wounded by various charitable institutions.66 62

For details see Ramanna, ‘Coping with the Influenza Pandemic’.

See Annexure; Other than this Report, is the Vincent–Bingley Report, which was a part of MCR 1916. 63

The only work on this subject is of Pandya, ‘Curing, Comforting and Coping’. Pandya’s information is largely based on the official document, India’s Services in the War, Vol. 4. But nevertheless, the article is very informative. 64

65

MSA/PD/WAR/1917/291-W.

Vincent–Bingley list these prominent charitable institutions: (a) The Indian Council of the Order of St. John, (b) Lady Carmichael’s Bengal Women’s Fund, (c) The Women’s Branch Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund, (d) The Madras War Fund, (e) The Indian Soldiers’ Fund, (f) The Joint Committee of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John. Interestingly, they do not mention any Indian charitable institution 66

War Ferment in India   287  

The other hospitals that provided medical aid to wounded soldiers were: for the White soldiers, The Gerard Freeman Thomas War Hospital, The Cumballa Hill War Hospital (established in 1907 as the Bomanjee Dinshaw Petit Parsee Hospital), The Taj Mahal Palace War Hospital, The Maharaja Gaikwar Officers’ War Hospital, The Parel Enteric Depot; for the Indian soldiers, The Marine Lines War Hospital, The Dadar Labour Corps War Hospital, and Queen Mary’s Technical School for Disabled Soldiers (see Figure 6.2) (actually it was part of Robert Money Technical School, adjacent to Queen Mary’s Missionary School).67 A segregation on the basis of race and colour was always maintained, as in England. Nearly 10 Launceston nurses from ANZAC

Figure 6.2 Disabled Indian Soldiers Being Trained at the Queen Mary’s Technical School, Bombay Source: Bombay Chronicle, 23 August 1918. Reproduced with permission from Maharashtra State Archives. Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

that have been mentioned by Pandya and Ramanna. Marzban Jamshetji Giara’s work, The Contribution of Parsi Community during the First World War (1914–1918), gives photographs of 49 Parsi doctors who served at different theatres of war. But he does not provide information about medical care in Bombay. 67

Pandya, ‘Curing, Comforting and Coping’.

 288   Indians in the First World War

(Australia and New Zealand) served in various military and station hospitals meant for the Whites in India.68 Sir Walter Lawrence’s report gives a ‘rosy’ picture of the medical help provided to the Indian soldiers at Brighton. And a few pictures of the Brighton Royal Palace Hospital for Indians, in many of the books that have been recently published literature, show how care was taken in projecting English humanitarianism for common consumption. Interestingly, Jeffrey Greenhut, historian at the US Army’s centre of Military History, gives an account of how cross-racial contact intruded into the medical measures set up for Indians arrived in France and went into action.69 The British initially proposed that the major hospital for Indian wounded be established at Orleans, but the French objected that this would place too large a strain on their railroad. Instead, they suggested that the wounded be evacuated to England or Algeria. As the wounded piled up, the War Office was forced to accept that some Indians would have to go to England. It was only reluctantly the hospital at Brighton had to be started.70 Greenhut thinks that perhaps the possibility of sexual contact between Indians and Englishwomen may have been a factor, a view supported by the letter from Secretary of State Crewe to Lord Hardinge: No doubt these great halls are just the place to turn into wards, airy and easy of supervision. In other aspects Brighton seems to me a bad place, since even if ‘Arry has to some extent enlisted,’ Arriet is all the more at a loose end and ready to take on the Indian warrior.71

Sir Walter Lawrence, who was assigned the task of organizing the Brighton Hospital by Lord Kitchener, and writing to a member of Viceroy’s Council, echoed this view in 1915: My one anxiety about these hospitals in England is the women question, but so far we have not had any scandal, and I hold very strongly that the 68

Kristi Harris, ‘In the “Grey Battalion”’.

69

Greenhut, ‘Race, Sex, and War’.

70

Ibid.

71

Quoted by Greenhut, ‘Race, Sex, and War’, 73.

War Ferment in India   289  

Indian soldiers, in spite of great temptations, have behaved like gentlemen. The great difficulty is the Indian personnel of the Hospitals. We could keep the Indian sick and wounded within the precincts of the Hospitals, but it is impossible to lock up the Indian subordinates of the various Hospitals. I am making perpetual inquiries, and we have a very efficient plain-clothes police system at Brighton.72

Even the Mail Censor, E. B. Howell of ICS, echoed the same anxiety: The troops in hospital rather resent their close surveillance, but it is obviously better to keep a tight hold on them than to allow them to conceive a wrong idea to the ‘izzat’ (honour) of English women, a sentiment if not properly held in check would be most detrimental to the prestige and spirit of European rule in India.73 (Emphasis mine)

Although the official position of the British government was to oppose arbitrary actions based on race, it made hardly any impact on the War Office. On 29 May 1915, the Daily Mail published a picture of an English nurse standing behind a wounded Indian soldier. An immediate furore resulted. The War Office absolutely and totally condemned the employment of women nurses with Indian troops and forbade the services of women nurses with Indian troops. Actually, the photograph had been taken at a hospital where White women nurses were not used with Indian soldiers, and the two had been brought together only for the benefit of the photographer. Consequently, The Army Council ordered that all members of the Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Nursing Service Reserve be withdrawn from the Pavilion and York Place hospitals in Brighton, and requested that similar action be taken at the Lady Hardinge Hospital in India.74 However, such incidents were not uncommon in both England and India, and the racial distance was thus maintained by the government between ‘We’ and ‘Them’—the distance between the rulers and the ruled. 72

Quoted by Greenhut, ‘Race, Sex, and War’.

73

Ibid.

Ibid., 73. The Lady Hardinge Hospital was not a military hospital under the control of the War Office. It had been established by donations of money and property from interested persons for the care of Indian sick and wounded. Furthermore, the nurses employed there were not members of the nursing services but civilians under contract. 74

The Great War in Indian Memory

7

Is there aught you need that my hand withhold, Rich gifts of raiment or grain or gold? Lo ! I have flung to the East and West, Priceless treasures torn of my breast, And yielded the sons of my stricken, womb – To the drum beats of duty, the sabres of doom. Gathered like pearls in their alien graves, Silent they sleep by the Persian waves, Scattered like shells on Egyptian sands, They lie with pale brows and brave, broken hands. They are strewn like blossoms mown down by chance, On the blood-brown meadows of Flanders and France. Can you measure the grief of the tears I weep Or the pride that thrills thro’ my heart’s despair And I hope that comforts the anguish of prayer, And the far and glorious vision I see Of the torn red banners of victory? When the terror or tumult of hate shall cease And life be refashioned on anvils of peace. And your love shall offer memorial thanks To the comrades who fought in your dauntless ranks, And you honour the deeds of your deathless ones, Remember the blood of martyred sons. —Sarojini Naidu, The Nightingale of India

I Every nation that fought in the Great War produced war writing in its own image; each had its own ironic register and infections, echoing the political as well as cultural consequences of the conflict. Fiction, memoirs, short-stories and plays reveal wealth of evidence as to the war’s mobilization of motifs and images derived from the classical romantic, the religious traditions of a nation expressed in its literature.

The Great War in Indian Memory   291  

In The Great War and Modern Memory written in 1975, Paul Fussell assumed the universal importance of English literature in determining ‘modern memory’. The influence of this book has been deep and lasting. In arguing that the experience of trenches created the predominantly ironic view of the world evident in ‘modern’ literary sensibility, Fussell suggested that the First World War was a watershed in contemporary history. The impact of this war did not lie in the number of people who died but in the way in which it refashioned the British imagination. His discussion fell not on what the soldiers in the trenches experienced. The perception of the Great War as being primarily about service, and especially in the service of front-line soldiers, because it was dominated in the literary accounts of the war written by participants from the educated middle class, effaced the most common perception of the conflict as work.1 And it was authors of this class, of whom many were highly educated men and women who volunteered for service and largely new to the actual participation in war and deeply imbued with a need to record their wartime experience, who produced the books that did so much to create the bitter and disillusioned memory of the Great War. These authors were Robert Graves, David Jones, Siegfried Sassoon, Issac Rosenberg, Wilfred Owen and Edmond Blunden. They emphasized the need to remember the Great War as a tragedy rather than a triumph, achievement or crusade. Much war poetry was reactive. What many soldierpoets could not stomach was the loftier version of civilian romance about the war. Such writing in poetry and prose, the ‘high-diction’ of the patriots, was worse than banal; it was obscene. The importance of Fussell’s work lies in the fact that he upstaged the earlier writings that painted the Allied war in a sanitized and romanticized by the sentimental, the loony patriotic. Soldiers in Fussell’s book appeared far more often as the victims of violence than its perpetrators.2 Fussell noted his own military experience prudently and pleasingly by dedicating his book to the memory of Edward Keith Hudson of 410th Infantry, who was ‘Killed beside me Heathorn, ‘Historiographical Review’, 1106–1109. Also read an excellent review article, Davis, ‘Review: Experience, Identity and Memory’.

1

2

Smith, ‘Paul Fussell’s the Great War and Modern Memory’, 252.

 292   Indians in the First World War

in France, March 15, 1945’. To quote John Keegan who wrote for the year 2000 edition: ‘Paul Fussell’s Great War and Modern Memory introduced an entirely new and creative way of writing about the war and the literature it generates. It has been a profound influence on historians and literary critics alike....’3 Fussell’s book, like all classics, has been thoroughly deconstructed by many scholars. But questions were raised about Fussell’s work by Claire M. Tylee, whether the memory was very selective, was concerned only about the memory raised in the writings of British literary memory which tied into an analysis of British culture, and also was it racially biased being concerned about the Whites only?4 She argues that Fussell’s concept of British culture was very selective as it excludes women’s experiences from contributing to cultural memory, and it betrays a concern with racial identity. Importantly, Fussell makes no attempt to bring to the surface the experience of the Indian soldiers who fought for Britain. Interestingly, many recent works also project how Indian soldiers’ letters project their loyalty to the British Crown and, thereby, the Empire and fail to notice their fears, apprehensions, their trauma, disillusionment and despair. In this regard, she refers to one great novel in English that deals with Great War experience, Across the Black Waters, authored by Mulk Raj Anand.5 Perhaps the omission of this novel written in 1939 from Fussell’s work could be, says Tylee, because Anand was one of ‘Them’ (the Black/Brown) rather than one of ‘Us’.

3 Ibid., 248. Others who have written on the First World War literature, Martin, ‘British Prose Writings’; Cole, Sarah. 2001. ‘Modernism, Male Intimacy, and the Great War.’ ELH 68(2): 469–500; Gilbert, ‘Soldier’s Heart’. 4

Tylee, ‘The Great War in Modern Memory’.

Mulk Raj Anand, born on 12 December 1905 in Peshawar, in present Pakistan. He died on 28 September 2004, in Pune. His Father was Lal Chand and mother was Ishwar Kaur. Among his famous novels are Untouchable, Coolie, The Village, The Sword and the Sickle, The Big Heart and The Private Life of an Indian Prince. Educated at Amritsar and at the University of Cambridge (1929), as a celebrated novelist, he was awarded with the prestigious Sahitya Akademi Award for writers in English. He was also decorated with the award of Padma Bhushan. With Raja Rao and R. K. Narayan, he is regarded as the founding father of English fiction in India. 5

The Great War in Indian Memory   293  

Historians and literary critics have not paid adequate attention to Mulk Raj Anand’s novel Across the Black Waters, which was written long before. This novel truly represents Indian memory of that monstrous Great War and deserves critical analysis. Similar to Paul Fussell, Anand has dedicated this novel to his father—Late Subhedar Lal Chand Anand, MSM of 2/17 Dogra Regiment. Perhaps, this indicates Anand’s deep interest about this subject and minuteness with which he has penned the character of Lalu. This book was sketched out in a rough draft at Barcelona, Spain, during January and April 1937 and was entirely written while in Chinnor, Oxon, between July and December 1939, says the author. This novel portrays a simple story about the ultimate futility and sorrow of the First World War. It is a journey not just from the small rustic village in Punjab to Flanders in France, from being a farmer to a soldiers’ life on the battlefield, but from a soul that nurtures one that kills. It unfolds a saga of changing India, from an oppressive, poor, caste-ridden and stagnant village life to one ‘where one can dream dreams’. Lal Singh, nicknamed Lalu (Sepoy, 2 Company, 69th Rifles), the protagonist of this novel, is a Sikh peasant youth who feels stifled by the endless petty tyrannies, its manipulative machinations of the village bigwigs, mired in poverty, debt and social rigidity. Rebellious and freespirited, Lalu flees from an unjust and imminent arrest, finding refuge in the army in the midst of the First World War. Hastily trained, Lalu’s regiment is pitch-forked from rustic Punjab into the soul-grinding trench warfare in Flanders in France. Going to France was a thrilling adventure for Lalu, like he says, ‘the pride of the beggar who suddenly finds wealth’.6 But France also provides a new window to the life and world of a free people. This made Lalu to reflect and introspect Indian society on the one hand, and also revealed how the European White men had also their own fissures. Besides, Anand brings out in this novel how British imperialism in India had shaped their attitude towards the ‘Black Indians’, as against the liberal French; the kind of hostile natural conditions of Europe in which Lalu and his compatriots were catapulted into; how the multi-lingual Indians had to surmount 6

Anand, Across the Black Waters, 9.

 294   Indians in the First World War

the problem of language barrier by an exchange in the language of gestures. Anand comments, ‘what was strange, the mime worked. And soon there was complete understanding between East and West’. The English soldiers were by and large addressed by all as ‘Tommies’ and the same expression is used by Lalu while chatting with other Indian soldiers. In India, all the Europeans merged into one nationality and gave an impression that the White man was homogeneous in nature. But soon Lalu and the other character Kirpu were surprised to find that at some point of time in history how ‘Angrezis’ and ‘Fransisi’ were enemies, and that one White man could fight against the other by calling him ‘Hun’—the predator. What was noticeable to Lalu and others was the behaviour of the English in Europe, which was different from that while being in India, and that ‘Somehow the English always conceal their emotions’. When Lalu had seen a few African soldiers talking openly to girls in the Cafes and the French ‘Sahibs’ did not mind it, he felt surprised and noticed, ‘for the English did not like even the brown-skinned Indians to look at white women…, the English sahibs did not like the growing familiarity between the sepoys and the inhabitants of French country’.7 Uncle Kirpu, another fellow soldier of Lalu, mirrors the universal truth: ‘All men in all countries are perhaps the same. At least all are equal in the grave’. The nature of trench-life narrated by Mulk Raj Anand is so vividly true that it resembles with the one described by the soldier-poet writers referred by Paul Fussell: The reference to the atmosphere was so depressing so that they were again possessed by their doom and sat silent and glum…and the murky, greenish grey sky was the exact colour of the roof of hell which the sages in India spoke about, where the souls of the sinners were subjected to ordeals, first of trailing through the mud of marshes, full of slimy, ravenous rats and blood sucking leeches, then through a forest of tangled bushes and thickets of thorns, then to wait in misery, naked and cold and hungry, for the coming of rain which was to wash them clean of their sins, for the ordeal of fire which was to purge them, and for the final judgment before the throne of Brahma seated in all his glory on the mighty throne…. What a world! What a country! What a war!8 7

Ibid., 77.

8

Ibid., 108.

The Great War in Indian Memory   295  

What sort of a mindset the Indian soldiers had while fighting in Flanders? After all, as combatants insisted time and again, for them, combat was not war, but murder—their memories of killing did not match their pre-held scripts of what war was about. The narrative of the self, the sense of identity—disintegrated in the buried memories of wrongdoing. Perhaps, in the aftermath of war, combatants were reluctant to speak about killing not out of modesty but because they wanted to avoid facing a ‘humiliating memory’. This is brilliantly painted by Anand in Indian cultural context: The response of the sepoys seemed to as if they had resigned themselves to their kismet…. A passionate people, prone to sudden exaltations and depressions, more faithful than any other if they believed, they were neutral in this war, because this was not a war for any of the religions of their inheritance, nor for any ideal which could fire their blood and make their hair stand on end. Ordered about by the Sarkar, they were as ready to thrust their bayonets into the bellies of Germans as they had to disembowel the frontier tribesmen, or their own countrymen, for the pound a month which the Sahibs paid them. But they were like conscripts, brutalized and willing to fight like trained bulls, but without a will of their own, soulless automations in the execution of the army code, though in the strange dark deeps of their natures, unschooled by the Sarkar, there lay the sensitiveness of their own humanity, their hopes, their fears and their doubts. And as if convinced by centuries of faith that the sentinels of Yama, the God of Death, alone would be able to awaken them from their bored somnolence in the corridors of their journey to the netherworlds….9 (Emphasis mine)

The character Daddy Dhanoo in the novel represents that category of people who were blindly in awe of Sarkar; thereby had mentally incapacitated and made them servile; and who considered obeying Sarkar as their ultimate ‘Dharma’. The author then comments further: ‘This all-pervading sense of “Dharma” spread like an invisible cancer through his system, the cancer which had eaten him, till there was not much vitality let in the resources of his hardy hill-man’s will….’10 The Indian soldiers had resigned to fate and had come to terms that there was no final return home, which Anand wryly describes: ‘And 9

Ibid., 109.

10

Ibid., 115.

 296   Indians in the First World War

now the dugouts in the waterlogged trenches he had left seemed like a comfortable home in view of the uncertainly of the future’.11 Anand describes in realistic details about the rural poverty, the oppressive revenue officials, the fleecing moneylenders, ever demanding near and dear, the lurking threat of implication by the village policemen, on the one side and the prospect of a respectable future, coupled with economic enticements, on the other, that lured the young villagers into enlisting for war. What Anand pictured was not true only in Punjab but the rest of the country did not differ either. He expresses that ‘information about rewards was the chief preoccupation of the sepoys…the inspiration of it what spurred them on to battle’.12 Anand’s characters Lalu and Kirpu have a roving eye, which perplexes them with contradictions of what they observed in the Western world with the social realities faced back home. Kirpu’s remarks are so very telling: ‘There are no untouchables in this country. And there is no consideration of pollution’. Lalu’s letter written from the trench camp in Flanders to his mother in ‘British’ India about the life in the West makes a penetrating commentary on Indian beliefs and attitudes: 1. that the soldiers were fed well before being taken to the front-line trenches; 2. that in the West, cows give a pitcher full of thick milk, and requests that his brother ought to feed the cattle properly on straw, greens and oil seeds, unlike in the village back home where the cattle are fed on grain sifted out of its dung; 3. writes about the billet that belongs to a farmer where they respect dignity of labour and nothing is held as lowly work; 4. that, unlike in India, the peasants here do not borrow money from moneylenders, but from the bank at a very low interest; 5. my French mother is just like you. She is very kind to me. The old lady of the billet does not brood over the loss of her son in war but on the contrary loves me like her own son; 11

Ibid., 32.

12

Ibid., 169.

The Great War in Indian Memory   297  

6. women here walk in public without purdah and look straight into the eyes of men. They read, write, play, ride on horses and play cards, but no one dares to call them immoral for these things; 7. that it is not considered wrong for men and women to like each other and there is nothing bad in it; and 8. the Sarkari newspaper carry propaganda that the enemy is savage Hun, one who commits shame upon women, to kill children, to defile the shrines of his own faith. They may be class apart from other Sahibs, but they look the same and sometimes greet us across the trenches.13 Mulk Raj Anand explains how the war left deep irrepressible scars on Indian soldiers’ memory and calls them ‘the dehumanized toy of destiny’ ‘in the muteness of obedience’ to ‘their Emperor’. Lalu is taken as a prisoner, though he first thought of being dead but soon came to senses to realize being dragged by the Germans to their trench and perhaps a prisoner of war. Upon returning home, Lalu is demoralized in the army in disgrace, and without the reward of a piece of land of his own to farm, upon which he had set his eyes. And in the next novel, angry and rootless, he elopes with his childhood sweetheart and is fortuitously drawn into Indian’s gathering independence movement. Mulk Raj Anand fittingly captures the puissance of the Punjabi and Hindi idiom to faithfully bring alive the sights, smells and sounds of Indian landscape and its people. Unlike the European war-writers, Indian soldiers have hardly left any literature on the First World War. The fact that largely they were recruited from rural countryside, belonged to the economically poor social strata, speaks much about their communicative skills. Besides, the official draconic censorship at many levels proscribed whatever they wrote by way of letters in their dehati vernacular language. That Indians were not given any commission in the army kept the educated classes away from enlistment, one who could express themselves. While the English soldiers had no language barrier and were better educated, they were not far off from homelands; hence, their literature 13

Ibid., 186–187.

 298   Indians in the First World War

on war could immediately reach the civil society, despite official censorship. The distance between the battlefield and India forbade any news about their war experiences to percolate into Indian social memory. The collective does not possess a memory, only barren sites upon which individuals inscribe their shared narratives, infused with power relations. Therefore, Indian masses and their leaders, it seems, could hardly have real knowledge of the horrendous experiences faced by the Indian soldiers. Alongside, the Defense of India Rules suspended all civil liberties, stringent press restrictions curtailed the publication of any news about war that leaked into India. Also, the length and breadth of India is so vast, any news about the war was like a drop of water into the ocean, and such information could hardly form any public outcry in a repressive political atmosphere. Yet, whatever few letters of the Indian soldiers from the Western Front in France have remained in the Imperial archives have been extricated by David Omissi, and thereby rendered a yeomen service to Indian memory of the Great War. His book contains extracts from 657 letters during the period 1914–1918.14 In the foreword, Mark Tully appropriately comments: It’s a sad reflection on British imperialism that the contribution Indian made willingly in the hope that its loyalty to the Empire would be rewarded by home rule was not fully recognized or remembered. India itself was not free, so it wasn’t in a position to recognize that contribution…. The lack of political identity in 1915 thus served to rob Indian soldiers not just of an acknowledgement of their role, or the commemoration of their sacrifice, but also of their place in history.

Nevertheless, David Omissi appears to have some cultural bias against Indian soldiers when he comments, more petulantly, in the ‘Introduction’: As they arrived, these underequipped troops, fed piecemeal into the front line in an attempt to stem the German rush between Ypres and La Bassèe. The 129th Baluchis were the first Indian unit to see action, near Wytschaete Omissi, Indian Voices of the Great War. The breakup of these 657 letters per year is as follows: 1914: 2; 1915: 204; 1916: 252; 1917: 172; and 1918:27. None of these letters belong to any other theatre of war other than France.

14

The Great War in Indian Memory   299  

in Belgium, in late October. Decorations were liberally bestowed in these fierce little actions, including the first Victoria Cross to be received by an Indian.15 (Emphasis mine)

The reason why Indian soldiers fought, in his opinion, was: Even more important than ‘mercenary motives’, however, were the traditional concerns of shame and honour. Judging from their letters, Indian soldiers fought, above all, to gain or preserve izzat—their honour, standing, reputation or prestige…. The quest for izzat was driven by negative as well as positive impulses…. Most Indians soldiers, it seemed, had an intense fear of shame….16

In an effort to highlight imperial superiority and their servile loyalty towards my-bap Sarkar, Omissi seems to have failed to capture Indian soldiers’ despair, hopelessness, their resignation to fate in the face of death, their brutalized minds now trained to kill enemy or to get killed, and being in a so distant and environmentally hostile atmosphere, so vividly expressed by them and embedded in the Indian cultural nuances. For example, to compare the Great War to Kurukshetra fight of Mahabharat is to denote its unparalleled nature. Despite the cultural limitations but with a sense of deference, it must be stated that Omissi’s work is a remarkable contribution to Indian memory of the Great War. The memory of this war in Indian literature is scattered in various vernacular languages and needs to be retrieved. The celebrated IndianBangladeshi poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899–1976), a poet, musician and a revolutionary, joined Indian Army in 1917 and fought in the Mesopotamian campaign. It would be worthwhile to investigate how war impacted his poetry. In the present work, acknowledging linguistic limitations, emphasis is mainly laid on the war literature in Marathi language, so commonly spoken in the erstwhile Bombay presidency. For the first time, writing on the Great War was serialized in the Marathi magazine Chitramaya Jagat (Pictorial World) in 1914–1915, but was abruptly discontinued. 15

Ibid., 3.

16

Ibid., 12–13.

 300   Indians in the First World War

Perhaps the only published war memoir in Marathi language is Sainnyatil Athwani (War Memoirs) (1939) by Dr Govind Gangadhar Limaye.17 Except that it is mentioned in a write-up on the internet, this memoirs has escaped the attention of scholars.18 In 1918, Dr Limaye received a temporary commission in Indian Medical Service and as a part of 87th Punjabis, he served in Mesopotamia. Before that he had a brief stint at the East African front and later brought back to serve during the operations in Mesopotamia (1918) and against the Kurdistan in 1919 and in quelling the Arab rebellion in 1920. He was given a temporary rank of Lieutenant on 26 February 191819 and was promoted to the rank of Captain on 26 February 191920 in Indian Medical Service. He returned home when the peace treaty was signed after the Third Afghan War of 1919–1921. Originally, the memoir was serialized in the Marathi monthly magazine Masik Manoranjan in 1923–1924. The distinctiveness of Dr Limaye’s memoirs lies in the fact that it is based on the notes he maintained during the war period and the letter he sent home. The book interspersed with plenty of photographs, sketches and maps. But the sad part is that the quality of the print is too poor to be taken up for reprint. But the photos and the maps are too elucidative. To add to these, there are some cartoons relating to war, which appeared first in Bombay Chronicle. The memoirs bear a foreword by Lt Col J. M. Hunt of the 5th Battalion, 2nd Punjab Regiment, who was Dr Limaye’s senior colleague during those years. It also has a preface penned by General Nanasaheb Shinde, retired Chief of the Baroda State Army. Perhaps, it was at his instance he brought out this book. Limaye was born in 1895, and, after medical graduation, he joined the Indian Medical Services at age 23.

17

Limaye, Sainnyatil Athwani, xvi + 201, with maps and photographs and plates.

The write-up on the internet is by Murali Rangnathan. The book is available in Mumbai Marathi Sangrahalaya, Naigoan, Mumbai.

18

19

The London Gazette, 5 November 1918, 13014.

The London Gazette, 29 August 1919. He was promoted to this rank along with Dr Vasant Dinanath Madgoankar (29 January 1918) and Dr Narayan Raghunath Shahane (16 July 1918). 20

The Great War in Indian Memory   301  

There are accounts about the adverse climatic conditions of Mesopotamia, the scarcities of basic necessities with which they had to carry medical assistance close to the battlefield, which finds concurrence in the earlier report of Vincent–Bingley Medical Report—a part of MC’s task. While attending the injured at the battlefront on 12 October 1920, Dr Limaye was hit by a bullet and was injured in the foot. Besides the narrative of his war experiences, in a separate note, he gives much information about the logistics, the food available, the remuneration paid and such other things. One admires the versatility of his character, his effervescent enthusiasm in composing war limericks in English and also sketching and photographing skills. That many doctors, mostly Maharashtrians, Gujaratis and Parsees, joined the medical services at the battleground for pecuniary gains is well known.21 Such enlisting of doctors is also found in a contemporary short story penned by one Shantabai Bhide in 1927 issue of monthly Marathi magazine Gruhalakshmi.22 Shantabai was a graduate from Pune. The story in brief is about a character named Shashiprabha, a melodious singer, and Mukundrao, her brother Shridhar’s classmate from medical college and one who accompanies her on violin. After a while, love blossoms between Shashiprabha and Mukundrao, and culminates in marriage. Mukundrao is from an economically poor background and had incurred a debt of `5,000 for his education. He sees enlistment in medical service during the First World War as an opportunity to earn some extra money to pay off his debt. Shridhar also joins him. Despite initial reluctance from Shashiprabha and her family for joining on field medical service in Mesopotamia, he finally convinces her by assuring that the medical personnel are always kept behind the battlelines. Though separated now, they have regular A detailed list of Parsee doctors, along with their photographs, who served during the First World War is found in Gaira, The Contribution of the Parsi Community, 43–57.

21

Gruhalakshmi or the Ideal Woman, Year 1, Issue 5, October, Sampurna Gosht: ‘Premache Tarayantra’ (Wireless Machine of Love) pp. 25–28. Interestingly, its editors—Tara Tilak and Peroj Aanandkar—were women. I am grateful to Professor Umesh Bagade of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, for bringing this story to my notice.

22

 302   Indians in the First World War

communication. After initial feeling of loneliness, Shashiprabha busies herself in constructive work. But one evening while playing violin, she gets a premonition of something untoward happening, and it turns out to be the news of Mukundrao’s death in Mesopotamia due to bullet injury. With intense feeling of the loss of love, she faints, collapses and eventually dies in joining her beloved in the other world. The story confirms how many Indian educated doctors joined medical war services for pecuniary gain, something similar to Dr Limaye. A very important article in Marathi entitled Mahayuddha ani Mahilavarg (World War and the Womenfolk), authored by Sitabai Sawant, appeared in the magazine Gruharatnamala of 1919.23 At the outset, the authoress gives a review from the ancient history of both West and India, of how women have rallied behind their husbands in times of war and peace. She categorically remarks that women have rendered invaluable help to man without any expectations of returns. Perhaps, she writes, with the possible exception of Kaikai, a character in the mythological epic of Ramayan. She then comments on the ‘unprecedented human-sacrifice’ of the 1914–1918 World War,24 a period in which womenfolk contributed enormously to sustaining industrial as well as agricultural output. She also records that Indian women have similarly contributed substantially to the recruiting drive. In this regard, she denotes, as a part of the recruiting campaign, the government got published in many newspapers, biographies of such women who helped the menfolk during war times. However, in the present times, she gibes, womenfolk from advanced European nations have demanded adequate political rights in return and have claimed their rightful place in national political life. This is the noticeable difference between womenfolk of the past and present. Indeed, the war has immensely contributed to the advent of women in national politics, and that, even India has not escaped from permeation of such revolutionary thoughts, she remarks. The present war crisis has brought radical changes in the lifestyle of women, but not without Sawant, ‘Mahayuddha ani Mahila-varg’. Reprinted in Karve, Stree-vikasachya Paaulkhuna, 183–189. Apparently, this lady appears to be from Maratha caste from Konkan area. I am grateful to Dr Jaswandi Wamburkar for bringing this article to my notice.

23

24

Ibid., She calls it abhut-purva nara-yadnya, 186.

The Great War in Indian Memory   303  

some adverse effects. She observes an ascent in promiscuity as well as a desire to stay away from the institution of marriage among the European women. While Sitabai Sawant advocates good changes for the womenfolk, she cautions against the imminent dress rehearsal of some bad effects visible in the Indian context. The article concludes with a cautionary note about the ill effects of the War. From the tenor of the article, it appears that Sitabai Sawant was not only well educated but had fairly good observations of both Western and Indian societies. Indeed, there is need for greater effort still to retrieve such scattered Indian, indigenous memory that lay hidden in vernacular languages. ‘Beautiful’ memorials conceal the corpse. ‘White-tombs’ hide men’s bones. Memorials are erected to compel us to forget the dead, mutilated bodies. Tombs exist to honour the dead, but also to hide them in so far as they are dead, to conceal the corpse and ensure that death as such is no longer visible. This act of concealment is essential. Soldiers die in order to give rise to the community. We adore their naïve devotion. Like Christ, they die for all of us. We love the idea that men sacrifice their lives. But we don’t want to be reminded of the ugliness of the dead and mutilated bodies. (Rene Girard, in Things Hidden from the Foundation of the World, 1987)

‘Grief is a state of mind, bereavement a condition. Both are mediated by mourning, as set of acts and gestures through which survivors express grief and pass through stages of bereavement’, wrote Jay Winter, in his remarkable study of the collective remembrance of the Great War and the culture of commemoration.25 Some memorials were religious in character, others primarily secular. Hope is the central theme in secular commemoration of the Great War. It is expressed in a multitude of ways, some commonplace, some profound. But there is another level on which to understand the wave of construction of these monuments after the Great War. They were built as places where people could mourn. And be seen to mourn.26 An attempt is made here to investigate the nature and context of Indian war memorials of the Great War and its contextualization of specific strategies of 25

Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, 29.

26

Ibid., 93.

 304   Indians in the First World War

representation. Questions are raised as to why the First World War memorials like the India Gate at New Delhi or the Bombay Port Trust memorial do not form a part of Indian collective memory, its loss and its grief. Interrogations are made as to understand why is this cultural amnesia. For the present-day Indian public memory, ‘India Gate’ is known more as a tourist spot and the handiwork of Sir Edwin Lutyens, the architect who designed it. The history of collective memory is the result of a complex process of cultural production and consumption that acknowledges the persistence of cultural traditions as well as the ingenuity of memory makers and the rebellious interests of memory consumers. The negotiations among these three different historical agents create the rules of engagement in the competitive area of memory politics, and the reconstruction of these negotiations helps us distinguish among the abundance of failed collective memory initiative on the one hand and the few cases of successful collective memory constructions on the other.27

For this purpose, one should conceptualize collective memory as the result of the interaction among three types of historical factors: the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore or transform such artefacts according to their own interests.28 Hence, on the basis of these parameters, it is important to find out the mind of the British memory makers, that is, the Imperial War Grave Commission, while constructing the memorial, for whose consumption was the memorial constructed, and how was it received, why did it not make any cultural reference to Indian tradition, and what sort of memory was later superimposed on it, by the Indian memory consumers. The cultural memory, therefore, comprises that body of reusable texts, images and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose ‘cultivation’ serves to stabilize and convey that society’s self-image. Memory is valorized where identity is problematized. 27

Kansteiner, ‘Finding Meaning in Memory’, 180–181.

28

Ibid., 189.

The Great War in Indian Memory   305  

Figure 7.1 First World War Memorial - India Gate at New Delhi Source: Author’s own photo.

The most important and imposing First World War memorial in India is at New Delhi—The India Gate (see Figure 7.1). Some of the commonly known facts about this war memorial are as follows. It was a part of the work of Imperial War Graves Commission, under the leadership of Fabian Ware, which was constituted during the Great War on 10 May 1917 for constructing permanent war cemeteries and memorials for the soldiers who died in fighting for the British Empire; and to cultivate images of sacrifice, equality and unity in the developing British collective memory.29 The cornice is inscribed with The industrialized warfare and high death toll in the early months of the war stunned much of Europe and it occupied minds of many including Fabian Ware, an educationist and former newspaper man, whose efforts were to give the dead honourable burial. He first formed Graves Registration Commission in February 1915, which was later renamed as Imperial War Graves Commission when, on 10 May 1917, it received its charter from the King giving it a status as the sole organization charged with the remembrance and maintenance of the Empire’s war dead. 29

 306   Indians in the First World War

the ‘Imperial suns’ while both sides of the arch have INDIA, flanked by the dates MCMXIV (1914 left) and MCMXIX (1919 right). Below the word INDIA are inscribed words in capital letters: TO THE DEAD OF THE INDIAN ARMIES WHO FELL HONOURED IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA EAST AFRICA GALLIPOLI AND ELSEWHERE IN THE NEAR AND THE FAREAST AND IN SACRED MEMORY ALSO OF THOSE WHOSE NAMES ARE RECORDED AND WHO FELL IN INDIA OR THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER AND DURING THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR.

Besides, the names of 12,516 soldiers of Indian Army, both European and non-commissioned Indians, who died during 1914–1919, are inscribed on the inner and outer surfaces. The foundation of the AllIndia War Memorial was laid by the visiting Duke of Connaught on 10 February 1921. All India War Memorial was inaugurated by Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin, 10 years after the foundation stone laying ceremony, on February 12, 1931. The 42-m-tall India Gate stands on a low base of red Bharatpur stone and rises in stages to a huge moulding. It is a hexagon complex, with a diameter of about 625 m, covering approximately 306,000 m2 in area. The architectural style of India Gate war memorial, which has been compared with the Gateway of India in Bombay, and the Napoleonic Arc de Triomphe30 in western Paris, was designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens,31 who was member of the Imperial War Graves Commission along with Rudyard Kipling, whose poetry exuded as the spokesperson of British imperialism in India (see Figure 7.2). The Commission wanted a man of imagination and one who knew the soldier, as literary advisor and persuaded Rudyard Kipling for the position. The war became a harsh reality for Kipling when his only son Lieut John was killed in action at the Battle of Loos in September 1915. He finally accepted an invitation from Fabian Ware, the Chairperson, 30 Inspired by the Roman triumphal arch like the Arc of Constantine, outside the colosseum in Rome, this monument honours those who fought and died for France in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, with the names of all French victories and generals inscribed on its inner and outer surfaces. Beneath its vaults lies the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier from the First World War.

Sir Edwin Lutyens—born on 29 March 1869 at Kensington, UK, and died on 1 January 1944, Marylebone, UK. Most of the buildings including Viceroy’s Lodge, which is now called as Rashtrapati Bhavan, were designed by Sir Edwin.

31

The Great War in Indian Memory   307  

Figure 7.2 Rudyard Kipling, Spokesman of British Imperialism Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rudyard_Kipling_(portrait).jpg

to join the Imperial War Graves Commission, and remained its advisor and member for 18 years until his death on 18 January 1936. After the Armistice on 11 November 1918, the Commission’s work truly began on an international scale. The most time-consuming responsibility for Kipling during his years at the Commission was the drafting of special inscriptions for the war cemeteries, monuments and memorials. The first major inscription that Kipling drafted was for the Stone of Remembrance designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens (see Figure 7.3). He also designed 65 war memorials in Europe, including the highly regarded Cenotaph in London, in 1919, the first national war memorial erected after the First World War. Two of the most important British war memorials, the Cenotaph32 in Whitehall and the Memorial to the Missing at Thiepval on the Somme,33 are the works of A cenotaph is, literally, an empty tomb, and by pronouncing its presence as the tomb of no one, this one became the tomb of all who had died in the war. In the heart of London, in Whitehall, it brought the dead of the 1914–1918 war into history. It did so without the slightest mark of Christian or contemporary patriotic or romantic symbolism.

32

33 The Thiepval memorial to the Missing of the Somme is a war memorial to 72,246 missing British and South African soldiers who died in the Battle of Somme between 1915 and 1918. It is near the village of Thiepval, Picardy in France. Built between 1928

 308   Indians in the First World War

Figure 7.3 Sir Edwin Lutyens (1869–1944) Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cc/Edwin_Lutyens.jpg

Sir Edwin Lutyens and show the specific features of abstract funerary art, so different from wartime commemorative forms and from postwar exercise in civic or religious art. It was Rudyard Kipling who also drafted the inscription on the India Gate. Indeed, any mention of God, the Cross and any religious symbolism was avoided to give it a secular nature, but the glory of the Empire was all evident on this memorial. and 1932, it was inaugurated by the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VIII) in the presence of Albert Labrun, President of France, on 1 August 1932. It has a memorial arch, interlocking arches of four sizes, 140 feet high above the level of adjoining cemetery. Inscription on the internal surface of the memorial reads: Here are recorded names of officers and men of British Armies, who fell on the Somme battlefields between July 1915 and February 1918 but to whom the fortune of war denied the known and honoured burial given to their ‘Comrades in death’. Lutyens took the form of the triumphal arch and multiplied it. Four such arches describe the base of the memorial, their height is two and half times their width, and they are superseded by a series of larger arches placed at right angles at base. Just as in the case of Cenotaph Lutyens managed to create an embodiment of nothingness. Architectural historian Vincent Scully has described the face of Thiepval as ‘a silent scream’ a cry of protest against the unimaginable sufferings of the Battle of Somme (105). His monument to the missing at Thiepval is not a cry against war, but an extraordinary statement in abstract language about mass death and the impossibility of triumphalism.

The Great War in Indian Memory   309  

Originally called the All India War Memorial, and at what stage of history the name changed to India Gate is not known. Of all the First World War memorials, the only other memorial, which bears the word ‘Gate’ in its name is of Menin Gate Memorial at Ypres in Belgium. This memorial straddles one of the main roads that led soldiers to the frontline during the First World War and commemorates fallen soldiers whose graves are unknown.34 Nothing of the sort took place in Delhi to build a triumphal arch as a war memorial. This indicates that the British government wanted to glorify the Empire and imposed their memory on the Indian people, which would epitomize ‘India’s loyalty to the British Empire’. There was no question of Indian people’s grief, sentiments or memory involved. Thus, Lutyens–Kipling combine of the Imperial War Graves Commission perfectly raised the memorial as visualized by the colonial masters and it was raised to impress the Indian masses the imposing power and glory of Imperial Britain. This British imperial conception was further reinforced when the British Indian government constructed The Canopy opposite India Gate (see Figure 7.4), in 1936, in which was instituted a statue as a part of tribute to the just deceased Emperor of India—King George V of Britain.35 It remained there during the colonial period. On 13th August 1965, the members of the Samyukta Socialist Party covered this statue in tar and defaced its imperial crown, leaving a photo of Subhash Chandra Bose at the monument. In 1968, it was removed and relocated to Coronation Park in New Delhi. Indian war memory was inserted into the India Gate memorial, when in 1971, following the Bangladesh Liberation War, a small simple structure, consisting of a black marble plinth, with reversed rifle, capped by war helmet, bounded by four eternal flames, was built beneath the soaring Memorial Archway. This structure, called Amar Jawan Jyoti, or the Flame of the Immortal Soldier, has since 1971 served as India’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. This memorial was 34 Some 54,896 names of Commonwealth soldiers who gave their lives during the war are inscribed on a Memorial wall. The triumphal arch, designed by Sir Reginald Bloomfield, leads to a barrel-vaulted passage through the mausoleum.

The 70-feet tall (21.34 m) marble statue of King George V in his coronation robes was crafted by Charles Sergeant Jagger.

35

 310   Indians in the First World War

Figure 7.4 The Canopy in Front of the India Gate Source: Author’s own photo.

inaugurated by the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi, and thus Indians began to see this monument as an integral part of Indian collective memory. As a memorial ritual, wreaths are placed at the Amar Jawan Jyoti on Vijay Diwas and on every 26 January, by the Prime Minister of India, Chiefs of the Armed Forces and other dignitaries. A memorial site of the First World War in Bombay is at Indian Sailor’s Home Society located at Masjid Bunder (see Figure 7.5). It lies exactly under the dome of the Home and its circular ceiling has the adage Heaven’s Light Our Guide, as well as the motto of the five pointed Star of India, an insignia used on the Imperial Indian blue flag of the Royal Indian Marines. It also bears an inscription in the bold letters: Here are recorded in the lasting honour and the remembrance the names of the 2223 seamen of the Royal Navy, the Royal Indian Marines and the Merchant Navy who fell in the Great War and whose grave is the sea. The walls are lined with brass plaques listing the names of the deceased sailors in alphabetical order along with the names of the ships they

The Great War in Indian Memory   311  

Figure 7.5 Indian Sailors’ Home War Memorial, Bombay Source: Author’s own photo.

belonged to. This memorial is maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the inscription is drafted by Rudyard Kipling. An exactly similar memorial mentioning names of those Royal India Marine who died at sea is also located in the St Thomas’ Cathedral in Bombay. Another notable First World War memorial in Bombay is located at Ballard Estate (see Figure 7.6), erected by the erstwhile Bombay Port Trust in front of the gate of Alexandra Docks, now renamed as Indira Docks. On the memorial are the words: This memorial commemorates the employees of the Bombay Port Trust who fell during World War I, 1914–1918, and also the Port Trust’s contribution to the war effort (see Figures 7.7 and 7.8). This well-crafted sandstone memorial, with brass plaques on three sides, furnishes information about the extent to which Bombay Port, especially her docks, provided services to the war efforts during the Great War. The numbers mentioned therein are staggering: 1,870,000

 312   Indians in the First World War

Figure 7.6 A Tablet Errected in the St Thomas Cathedral for Royal Marines Who Died Source: Author’s own photo.

Figure 7.7 Three Lions on the Bombay Port Trust War Memorial Source: Author’s own photo.

The Great War in Indian Memory   313  

Figure 7.8 World War I Memorial at Bombay Port Trust Source: Author’s own photo.

troops and personnel embarked and disembarked at the Docks; 3,046 transports and 668 hospital ships dealt with; and 2,228,000 tons of military stores shipped from this port. The first transport ship left Bombay shores on 21 August 1914, just 17 days after the declaration of war by Britain. The Port Trust railways also ran 2,073 troop and hospital trains to Bombay to facilitate troop movement and that of the injured to and fro from the city. The Docks here repaired and refitted 494 ships involved in the war effort. This number and quantum of tonnage shipped defies all imagination. The only communitarian war memorial of the First World War was raised by the Parsi community at Khareghat Colony, in Bombay (see Figure 7.9). A memorial cenotaph to commemorate the memory of

 314   Indians in the First World War

Figure 7.9 Parsi World War I Memorial at Khareghat Colony, Bombay Source: Author’s own photo. Disclaimer: The image resolution is low due to its archival nature.

Parsi Zoroastrians who died in the Great War was erected at the head of the steps leading to the Tower of Silence at Khareghat Colony. It was inaugurated by Sir Jamshedji Jejeebhoy on 19 April 1928,36 at the instance of Sir Cowasji Jehangir. A marble plate on the cenotaph, which bears names of 46 Parsis, with the age of 16 mentioned against their names, who died doing duty in the First World War. The following inscription in Gujarati is affixed on this column: Nemse Te Ahura Mazda, Ashaunam Vanghuheesh Surao Spentao, Fravashyo Yazamaide, meaning—‘Homage to you, O Ahura Mazda. We revere the noble, brave, holy fravashis who perform good deeds’. It is one of the very few war 36 Parsee Prakash, Vol. VI, 265–266, cited in Gaira, The Contribution of the Parsee, 146–147.

The Great War in Indian Memory   315  

Figure 7.10 World War I Cemetery at Sewri, Bombay Source: Author’s own photo.

memorials erected by civilian subscription of a community. Also notable is the war memorial raised at Sewri, also in Bombay (see Figure 7.10). The collective does not possess a memory, but barren sites upon which individuals inscribe shared narratives, infused with power relations. It was a memory of war that was deliberately, indeed passionately, exclusive and exclusionary. The memorials in New Delhi as well as Bombay, the war literature of the Indians, give an idea of how in perpetuating imperial memory, the Indian memory was repressed. The sanitization of war and the repressed memory of this experience in itself was a form of violence. For the British as for the French, commemoration was a ‘communal activity’, creating in this sense as well new deceptive ‘fictive kinship’. By raising common memorials for all commonwealth soldiers, by inscribing together names of both the White and the Black soldiers, sometimes much to the distress and dissatisfaction of their fair complexioned surviving kith and kin, the Imperial War Graves Commission used very illusive phrases such as ‘death united’, thereby subverting the memory of colonial people like Indians to fit a uniform ‘official memory’. This is in itself a form of ‘cultural imperialism’.

The Deep Scars of the War A Fissured Legacy

8

No country suffered economically more severely from the War than India. The bulk of the population having been involved in agriculture dependent on inclement weather, poverty of her people has been perennial. They live in a permanent state of indebtedness. When people talk, indignantly wrote B. G. Horniman, a contemporary and editor of Bombay Chronicle, of the ‘prosperity of India during the War’, they ignore the fact that the wealth is distributed among a small capitalist class, in which foreign element plays a large part. Prosperity has never assailed the patient lives of the toiling masses, whose condition of drudgery is such, that they are sufficiently grateful if they get from day to day the bare amount of simple food which enables then to sustain their short lives, which end mostly at or before middle age. It does not need a very vivid imagination to realize how heavily the burden of war fell upon a people whose economic condition is so deplorable.1

The government did nothing to lighten the burden and, on the contrary, aggravated it by giving egregious lectures by the officials—high and low—delighted in being so far removed from actual theatre of war. The expression used by Lord Hardinge that India was ‘bled white’ in the early days of the war applied to her condition throughout the 4.5 years that it lasted. Enormous quantities of foodstuffs, that would otherwise have been utilized for home consumption, were continually sent out of the country for the use of the armies in the field. Every sort of commodity 1

Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty, 24–25.

The Deep Scars of the War   317  

and material that could be used for military purposes was, of course, ‘controlled’ in the interest of the government. That led to the control of wheat, coal, hides and such other commodities. The suffering masses patiently bore all scarcity until the later part of 1917 when pent-up feelings of the people produced a food riot in Bombay. The government finally yielded to the demand for control of rice and other commodities, in which most rampant profiteering had been carried on at the expense of the people. Large quantities of rice had to be imported into India from Burma. But when it reached Bombay, the distribution fell into incompetent hands and in the hands of those who were not free from suspicion of corruption. Despite the efforts, the suffering people hardly got any relief. This led to black marketing, hoarding of foodstuffs. With soaring inflation, the government and the private enterprises hardly paid attention to increasing remuneration of their employees. The profits of war for Indian industries during this period were only garnered by Indian mill owners and the English investors, leaving the industrial workers in the quagmire. The immediate result of this was the rise of All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) and the strikes. If there were strikes in the earlier period, they concerned specific departments of the industries, but now began the phase of general strikes. Sir Valentine Chirol, who was Knighted by the Crown on 1 January 1913, visited India for the third time for 18 months—from January 1916 to August 1917, in connection with the libel brought against him by Lokmanya Tilak. During this stay, the general atmosphere he witnessed, both among the European bureaucracy and the Indian public, candidly reflects the underlying mood: But the War lasted too long and was conducted in fields and under conditions too remote for all but a very few Indians to follow its vicissitudes with any real understanding, and the long casualty lists gradually converted the unquestioning confidence into wide spread doubt as to the final issue of the War. The growing urgency of official appeals for more and more recruits and the intensive methods of recruitment adopted tended to create an impression that without the continuance of Indian help the Empire would be lost, and many of the returning Indians were not slow to strengthen that impression by the individual tales of derring-do…. Amongst the urban

 318   Indians in the First World War

classes the more conservative and orthodox, to whose customs and beliefs Western civilization was still repugnant, saw the negation of its vaunted superiority in the horrors of a barbarous war between Western nations which was to bring it to shame and ruin. Those whom Western education had brought into its orbit and who derived their political aspirations from English history and literature began to clamour for the immediate application to India of the Allies’ repeated declarations that the War was a war for freedom. For the extremists England’s hour of danger meant the appointed hour for the downfall of the raj.

What was the price India had to pay for Empire’s conflict for freedom and liberty? Chirol, though an Imperialist, had some incisive and penetrative insights about the impact of this War: Thus, whilst the final victory was for most Englishmen a proof, however dearly purchased, of the tenacity and superiority of his own race, the fact that England had won made far less impression in Indian than the price that the poorest amongst them had to pay for it in the aggravation of their daily struggle for existence. Add to all this the demoralizing effect upon profoundly ignorant and superstitious peoples of a series of destructive visitations during the very last years of the War—not only one or two serious famines in some provinces and a recrudescence of the bubonic plague, but two appalling outbreak of influenza which in the course of a few months attacked scores of millions and actually killed nearly twelve million. As the victims were for the most part men and women between eighteen and thirty-five, the vitality of the whole country was lowered for year afterwards, whilst its moral equilibrium was profoundly shaken by so terrible a manifestation, as popular opinion held it to be, of the wrath of the gods and of the impotency or worse of an alien and impious Government…. Far removed as India was from the actual frightfulness of war, all these different circumstances contributed to create a scarcely less mysterious repercussion which culminated in the years of political and religious frenzy after the War…. For she had fallen under the spell of Gandhi’s extraordinary personality, the most striking and for a time the most forceful figure that had ever conjured up for her a vision of her ancient past since she had first come into contact with the West. He had the ascetic qualities of saintliness and a fervor of religious faith which are still chiefly needed to move the masses, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, and for once in the modern history of India he was able for a short time to rally the support of both Hindus and Mohammedans by associating the slogan of Swaraj.2 2

Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing, 256–257.

The Deep Scars of the War   319  

Sir Stanley Reed, the editor of the Times of India, aptly commented: If India did not become, in a later phase (in post-World War I period), the arsenal of democracy, it was the reservoir for the manpower which made final victory possible. These services are half-forgotten now—their influence on the political development of India was scarce mentioned in the later discussion on constitutional reform—but they were powerful forces leading to the fulfillment of British rule.3

Ever since the First World War began in August 1914, the British government in India followed a double policy of repression and conciliation. Immediately, the colonial Indian government suspended all civil liberties by proclaiming Defence of India Rules—virtually enforcing something similar to Martial Law. Public opinion was continually irritated and provoked by the persistent endeavours to repress legitimate political propaganda and muzzle the Press. At the beginning of war, there was an appeal for the suspension of all controversy, to which the Indian leaders cordially responded and loyally conformed, until it became clear that this was to be a one-sided arrangement. The ‘no-controversy’ pact could hardly be expected to last under these conditions, especially when it was found that the war was not regarded as a bar to the conduct of political agitation in England, and other parts of the Empire.4 Public meetings were trailed by police surveillance teams. When the War began, G. K. Gokhale, the towering Moderate leader of Indian National Congress, was in England and died soon after his return in January 1915. Another leader of note was Sir Pherozeshah Mehta, for whom Lord Hardinge specially came to Bombay in April 1915 to request him to become Vice Chancellor of Bombay University, also died in September 1915. Hardly there was any Moderate leader of national repute with whom the government could negotiate. Tilak was brought to Poona from Mandalay where he was sentenced to transportation for 6 years, was released on 17 June 1914. Obviously, he was a leader of Extremist faction of Congress, 3

Reed, The India I Knew.

4

Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty, 28–29.

 320   Indians in the First World War

left in the political arena. Soon after his release, his immediate task was to file libel case against Valentine Chirol for wrongly labelling him in his work, as the ‘Father of Indian Unrest’. The government also tried to implicate him in the Tai Maharaj Case in 1915. But in 26 March 1915, the higher court delivered a judgement in favour of Tilak and the earlier judgment given by Justice N. G. Chandavarkar in this case was not only reversed but was very seriously criticized. Tilak was fully exonerated from all charges brought against him. Though Justice Chandavarkar had favoured the government by delivering adverse judgements against the nationalists earlier, particularly after this case, the public image of Justice Chandavarkar substantially eroded in the eyes of the common people. In 1916, Tilak was again brought under the legal scanner for sedition for his speech at Solapur and Belgaum. But this time Barrister Jinnah ably defended him and got his acquittal.5 Perhaps, this case had many ramifications; it brought Tilak and Jinnah close and both felt the need to thrash out differences so as to work unitedly. The parleys between Tilak’s Extremist faction of Congress and Jinnah, who represented the All India Muslim League, primarily took place in Bombay. It was decided by both the Congress and the Muslim League to hold their respective sessions in Bombay in December 1915. How the BG, especially the Bombay Police Commissioner S. M. Edwardes, played a dubious role in subverting this event by scheming and supporting the opposite Muslim League group of Sardar Suleiman Cassim Mitha; how attempts to sabotage with the help of deploying goondas; and how police purposely remained silent spectators, revealing information is found abundantly in the files of Bombay Police Abstracts of Intelligence of those years. Despite all machinations of S. M. Edwardes, Suleiman Cassim Mitha and his supporters, Tilak and Jinnah succeeded in bringing about a historic reproach among the two dissenting factions in the Indian history for the first time at the Lucknow Session of both Congress and the Muslim League in December 1916.6 For the first time, the British policy of ‘Divide and Emperor v. B. G. Tilak, The Bombay Law. Also, Ganachari, Nationalism and Social Reform, 86. 5

6

For details see, Owen, ‘Negotiating the Lucknow Pact’.

The Deep Scars of the War   321  

Rule’ seemed to lack the force and the consequent unity between the two sounded a different tune to the British officials—both in India and at Home. In the face of military reverses, as a conciliatory and assuaging measure, the British officials in London thereby felt the express need to make a declaration of British policy towards India. Thus came the ‘20 August 1917 Declaration’.7 Tilak wanted to exploit the war situation to his advantage and, hence, formed Home Rule League 1 May 1916, with the explicit demand of Swarajya for India. He undertook whirlwind tours throughout the country to galvanize the Home Rule movement. Curiously enough, Mrs Annie Besant started her own Home Rule League in September, in the same year. The government became more repressive and barred Tilak from visiting Punjab, put Mrs Annie Besant under house arrest, interned both Ali brothers—Shaukat Ali and Mohammed Ali, the editors of Comrade of New Delhi. Earlier the government denied Tilak passport and visa to visit England to fight the libel case in Privy Council against Chirol. Restrictions were imposed on Tilak on delivering any speech concerning the War and the BG entertained ideas of transporting him to Burma again. Even he was equally aware that the officials were waiting for an opportunity to somehow incriminate him legally. On 26 March 1918, the Second Home Rule League Conference was held in Bombay, which elected Tilak, G. S. Khaparde, B. C. Pal, R. P. Karandikar and N. C. Kelkar, to represent League in England. They left Bombay on 1 April on the official assurance that the requisite permission would be received by them when they reach Colombo. At first, permission was given for this deputation to proceed up to Suez but soon the Colonial Secretary under the orders of War Committee of the British Cabinet informed them of being denied further permission. The GOI accordingly asked them to submit their passports and the deputation had to come back. Sceptical about the 7 Danzig, ‘The Announcement’. This is an excellent article that explains how the British politicians such as Lloyd George, Balfour, Milner, Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, felt the compulsion and the role of Lord Curzon in the deliberations convincing others that nothing would pacify the Indian leaders except inserting the word ‘responsible’ government in the declaration; Also read, Mehrotra, ‘The Politics Behind the Montague’.

 322   Indians in the First World War

result of allowing Tilak and his deputation, the GOI finally gave him permission on specific conditions, to attend the libel case filed by him against Chirol.8 At last, under several conditions, iniquitous limitations, Tilak left for England on 24 September 1918 along with his legal advisor R. P. Karandikar, colleague Vasukaka Joshi and personal assistant Ganesh M. Namjoshi. After the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, Tilak wrote a congratulatory letter to the British Prime Minister regarding Allied armies’ victory. As a result of the changed situation, restrictions on Tilak regarding his political activities were removed by the BG. With Tilak out of India, the Indian government heaved a sigh of relief and thus embarked on a course of unprecedented repression. The Allied armies’ victory brought country-wide officially sponsored celebrations of peace.9 In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, when unrestrained jingoism became inappropriate in Britain, the Empire Day, which was started as a ritual celebration of British empire since its introduction in 1904, was successfully incorporated within the ritual of commemoration. Its festivity presented as the righteous celebration of what was held to be a set of social facts—the primacy and destiny of Anglo–Saxon race, the virtuous progression of the British empire, and the common bond of an ‘imagined community’ inhabiting a vast and far-flung empire.10 Armistice Anniversary (11 November 1919) was observed all over India at the desire of the King Emperor, marked by ‘a momentary pause for the reverent NIA, Home Department, October 1918; RK, III 128, cited by Divekar, Lokmanya Tilak in England, 82. The conditions were: (a) that he would only come for the purpose of the Libel Case and would leave as soon as the Case is finished; (b) that he would restrict himself only to the activities concerning the Case and would abstain himself from all political agitation of any interest during his stay; and (c) that no Home Rule or Congress delegate or other political supporter would accompany him.

8

9 MAS/PD/WAR/1919/239—I-W, II-W, III-W. Also, PD/WAR/1920/96-W. These files are replete with details of peace celebrations in places far and wide in India, and in many district and taluka levels as well. 10 English, ‘The Empire Day in Britain’. The chief promoter of Empire Day was Reginald Brabazon, the 7th earl of Meath, in 1904. On this day, rituals of veneration of union flag were performed, lessons and lectures were arranged, which centred on the teachings of the superiority of Anglo–Saxon race and its civilizing mission, the empire story and the vast extent of the British empire.

The Deep Scars of the War   323  

remembrance of the glorious dead’.11 As an expression of continued loyalty, the officials organized in India the Empire Day celebration. The Indians had tremendous hopes of getting adequate reforms towards self-government in the post-war scenario, but soon they were disillusioned. Their troubles, however, were not confined to their economic sufferings and the colonial state’s oppressive and iniquitous methods of raising the sinews of war. The repressive measures brought about by the colonial government from the time armistice was signed on 11 November 1918 leading to the worst massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, in Punjab, on 13 April 1919, only a span of 5 months, and that too in a region that had given the maximum soldiers in the war effort, is the darkest phase in the history of colonial India since the Revolt of 1857. It is not the purpose of the present author to narrate these events, which have been adequately researched by very competent scholars.12 Only a few facts could be cited by way of reference from the research works. The Defence of India Rules, which had suspended civil liberties as a war measure in 1914, were further regularized instead of being terminated at the close of the war. The economic hardships, inflation, scarcity of foodstuffs, unprecedented loss of life due to epidemics of influenza, to which were added the official repressive measures such as censorship, trials and suppression of even a slightest allusion to legitimate political agitation, new draconian legislative measures, all these and such other, contributed in no mean way to the widespread dissatisfaction in India in early 1919. The Indian aspirations, heightened by the August Declaration in 1917, were sorely belied by the Montague–Chelmsford reforms crafted by the Round Table group in London and by Lionel Curtis, James Meston, Lord Marris and, most importantly, Sir Valentine Chirol. This reform was seen as a poor recompense and was rejected by both Congress and the Muslim League. The introduction of Rowlatt Bills added insult to the injury. The first bill passed into law on 21 March 1919 as the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, provided for trial of political offenders by three High Court judges, with no jury or right to appeal. Trials could 11

MSA/PD/WAR/1919/365-W.

Sayer, ‘British Reaction to the Amritsar’; Dutta, Jallianwala Bagh. Tuteja, ‘Jallianwala Bagh’; Kumar, ‘The Rowlatt Satyagraha’.

12

 324   Indians in the First World War

take place in camera, and hear evidence, which would not be admissible under the Indian Evidence Act. In the face of universal protest, the second Rowlatt Bill was eventually dropped, which would have made possession of seditious publication an imprisonable offence. Gandhi launched Rowlatt Satyagraha in Bombay, which had reverberations in other parts of the country.13 The later events such as detention and deportation of Satyapal and Dr Kitchlew, the consequent peaceful protest leading to the most gory act of Jallianwala Bagh, on 13 April 1919, are of common history to be repeated. No wonder, the effects of the war continued beyond 1918. If the earlier wars were renowned for their atrocities, the First World War acted as a kind of ‘School of atrocities’ from which the English officials in India seemed to have learned all too well.14 Some of the British politicians out rightly condemned Jallianwala Bagh incident and General Reginald Dyer’s heinous act, prominent among them: Winston Churchill, the Secretary of War at that time, called it ‘a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation’; Herbert Asquith termed it as ‘one of the worst outrages in the whole of our history’; A. J. P Taylor called it, ‘the decisive moment when Indians were alienated from British rule’. But there were quite a few blind supporters: Rupert Furneaux attributed Dyer’s action to arteriosclerosis which he suffered; English officials in India hailed him as ‘Savior of Punjab’. Edward Thompson,15 commented, ‘If I were Indian, 13

Sayer, ‘British Reaction to the Amritsar’, 135–136.

Negro soldiers of the 24th Infantry had been executed after the Houston race riots of 1918, and in the so-called red summer of 1919 race riots occurred in 25 US cities. According to George E. Kent: ‘During the first year of post-World War I, whites lynched seventy blacks—ten of the group being soldiers still in uniform. Fourteen blacks were publicly burnt—eleven while still alive.’ Claire Tylee remarks, ‘It is not surprising that it is a distressing heritage Fussell would rather avert his eyes from. Yet by claiming cultural kinship with white Europeans, he perpetuates cultural invisibility that Black American experience as a kind of burial alive.’ Tylee, ‘The Great War in Modern Memory’, 74. This narration of what happened to the Black Americans is so similar to the people of Punjab in the Jallianwala Bagh incident. And yet the British Indian government talked of cultural kinship with White Europeans in the trench warfare.

14

Father of famous historian, E. P. Thompson and one who penned that little booklet The Other Side of the Medal, which narrated the horrors of the British suppression of the Revolt in 1857–1858. 15

The Deep Scars of the War   325  

I should find it almost impossible to forgive’; ‘To Indians of every race and religion, Amritsar was a flashlight. It revealed what their rulers thought of them’.16 The Indian reaction was one of being flummoxed. Gandhi wrote, ‘We do not want to punish Dyer. We have no desire for revenge. We want to change the system that produced Dyer’.17 B. G. Horniman, the vibrant editor of the Bombay Chronicle, immediately wrote the book Amritsar and our duty to India, castigating Dyer’s heinous crime, and called the Punjab situation as ‘The horrors of Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s Reign of Terror, during the administration of Martial Law, and his deliberate plan of concealment carried out with the connivance of the Government of India’. Horniman’s articles on the Amritsar Massacre wore out the patience of the authorities. Public indignation was roused to an unparalleled degree, with the result that one fine morning in April 1919, the writer of the articles disappeared from the shores of India. The BG, in a swift move, deported him immediately to England, without charge or trial. For nearly 7 long years, Horniman remained in exile from the land of his adoption. During his sojourn in England, he carried on a vigorous campaign for India and flooded the British press and platform with Rowlatt Act wrongs in the Punjab and elsewhere; so much so that the British Cabinet was forced to make a declaration on India. To an article written by Asaf Ali criticizing the official policy in Punjab, Syed Hussain, illustrious deputy of Horniman at Bombay Chronicle office, titled it ‘Devils dance while Angels weep’. To Gandhi, Horniman and alike, Dyer was an accursed mentality and a vicious racist attitude. Tilak, who had lost the libel case against Chirol,18 rallied around the Labour Party member of the Parliament to make a case for India. 16 Sayer, ‘British Reaction to the Amritsar’, 132–133. He mentions this in the footnote and reveals that it was E. P. Thompson who brought this information to his notice. 17

Ibid., 133.

In letter to his nephew D. V. Vidwans, dated 26 February 1919, he wrote from London: 18

There was as you know no evidence to prove the charges. But the Judge made a monstrous charge to the jury, ignoring the difference between political and private character as suggested in Carson’s argument…. We have tried a game

 326   Indians in the First World War

He petitioned for being Indian member at the post-war Paris Peace Conference; and even addressed a letter to Georges Clemenceau, the French President, but without success. In an article entitled ‘The Present Situation in India’ in The Socialist Review: A Quarterly Review of Modern Thought, he commented about British public opinion on the official repressive measures in Punjab and the Amritsar Massacre: the British Press seems to be not well informed as to the true nature of these events, and guided by official information, it is evidently misleading the British public into believing that the riots and disturbances in India are the first symptoms of an open rebellion which must be suppressed by coercion and militarism at any cost. They believe, or led to believe, that India is under the best possible government it could get and that its dumb millions are happy and contented, and that it is only few agitators who are causing the mischief by their anti-British propaganda….19

From England, he urged his followers to follow Gandhian leadership. One of the long-standing and fundamentally indisputable interpretations of war’s short-term legacies is of radical domestic discontent, leading in numerous cases to the dissolution of existing governments; and also strong protest movements against imperialist colonialism. At the close of the World War, political crisis developed in most of the British possessions—Zughlul Pasha in Egypt, Dr Sun Yat Sen in China, Reza Shah Pehlvi in Iran; formal rule was challenged in their effort to throw off Western imperialism. Even the May Fourth Incident in 1919 showed the depth of Chinese resentment against the West and Japanese alike. Ataturk Kemal Pasha, who overthrew the oppressive regime of the Ottoman Turkey, soon forced the Allies to reverse the humiliating Treaty of Sévres (10 August 1920) by negotiating afresh an honourable peace by signing Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923). India and failed and we shall have to pay…The Jury and Judge looked upon it as a Government case and Mr Montgomery was watching the case in the court openly on behalf of the Government. I am sorry that even in England you could not get a Jury to dispassionately judge of the evidence in the case…. All went on the theory that if Tilak succeeded, it would be disaster for the Government…. (Divekar, Lokmanya Tilak in England, 567–568) Macdonald, The Socialist Review, reproduced in Divekar, Lokmanya Tilak in England, 701.

19

The Deep Scars of the War   327  

was no exception to this rule, and in the twilight years of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak—the greatest proclaimed foe of the British imperial rule—a new phase of national agitation in the form of ‘Satyagraha’ started under the leadership of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Unlike the earlier political agitation, which the British in India were accustomed to suppress, Gandhi removed the fear of the terror of law, in which law was used as an instrument of coercion, and brought the masses in political agitation. Perhaps the explosive situation in Punjab and the resulting Jallianwala Bagh incident was so gruesome and produced such great mental trauma among Indians that the grief caused by the First World War seemed to have been put into shade. In the World War, human sensibilities were eliminated in the process of being ‘turned into devilish machines to kill and to be killed’. Generally, the memory of violence refused to be silenced, but erupted in painful memories, nightmares. But its most common manifestation was melancholia, a mourning process in which the object of loss was absent, creating an undefined and free-floating anxiety. The deaths in the war were officially commemorated in a unified fashion. As Annette Becker has observed, ‘The dead stole their day of glory from the survivors’.20 This was true not just of Indian soldiers but also of all those who died in the First World War. The difficulty in translating experiences of combat into a public discourse was not only the outcome of a clash between imperial military establishments in England as well as the repressive colonial Indian state on the one hand, and the Indian civilians who were fed on the controlled as well as highly censored media on the other. In commemoralization of the memory of the ‘dead’, whether by the Imperial War Graves Commission or by such other agencies, those who survived this war; who suffered from the sullen guilt of killing and of violence, of brutalizing and dehumanizing impact of war; those who suffered from life-long melancholia were completely forgotten. The vital importance of mourning and memorialization

20

Annett Becker is quoted by Davis, ‘Review: Experience, Identity, and Memory’, 128.

 328   Indians in the First World War

was ‘not one of soldiers’ guilt for surviving but rather a cynical envy for the dead’, who were honoured, while they, ‘living memorials’ shared little of the honour, they had been wounded on the battlefield in innumerable ways.21 The debilitating effect of the First World War on the mind and body, of sullen guilt; not only for having killed but for having survived when so many others had been killed, and effects of war-weariness produced disastrous effects on many soldiers—both English and Indian, mainly in the form of shell-shock disease. During the First World War, commanders and military psychiatrists believed that soldiers broke down and succumbed to shell shock, because they had not been sufficiently hardened. Many English soldiers were courtmartialled and a few of them executed for cowardice and for refusing to fight, but much later it revealed to the authorities that they suffered from a disease of war-weariness, which was called shell shock. In 1922, War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell-Shock, chaired by Lord Southborough, concluded that civilians did make natural warriors and much effort was required to turn them into competent soldiers: Training must be simple, continuous and varied, and men must be trained with one purpose, viz. to fight. Because mot troops were not regulars but had volunteered or been conscripted into the army and trained in great haste, they had not had the time to build up an effective mechanism to deal with fear and anxiety.22 Kristi Harris describes the kind of war wounds the soldiers suffered in the First World War:

21

Bullets, shrapnel, high explosive shells, trench mortars and hand-grenades caused the vast majority of soldiers’ wounds…. New military features such as aircraft, flame throwers, great defensive belts of barbed wire crucified men; batteries of machine-guns and massive concentration of long-range artillery mechanically slaughtered soldiers.’ The phrase ‘cannon fodder’ was obvious to those nurses extracting metal pieces from bodies—whether the result of ‘pineapple bombs’ which spat tails of fire in their wake, missiles called ‘coal boxes’ that burst with high explosive effect, or ‘whizzbangs’. With the many wounds came a constant round of dressing and redressing, many men having multiple serious injuries…. Many new illness in their patients were found such as trench foot, trench fever, and Shell-Shock. (Harris, ‘In the “Grey Battalion”’, 30–31) 22

Jones, ‘The Psychology of Killing’.

The Deep Scars of the War   329  

In reality, hand-to-hand fighting was rare during the First World War and most killing was impersonal. In total, 59 per cent of casualties were a result of artillery, and three times as many men were killed by shells as by bullets. In recent times, Jay M. Winter, the Charles J. Stille Professor of History at Yale University, whose focus of research is the First World War, and is renowned for his work Sites of Mourning, Sites of Memory, and many more, spoke on ‘Shell-shock in the First World War and after’. The event was organized by Poletayev Institute of Theoretical and Historical Studies in Humanities. He commented that shell shock was a condition identified first in the First World War. The number of men who suffered from this condition indicated psychological and neurological injury, and widely underestimated. Official statistics stated that between 2 and 4 per cent of all men wounded were shell-shocked. Today, it is possible, Professor Winter said, to correct these figures to show that between 20 and 40 per cent of all wounded in the 1914–1918 war suffered from shell shock. That means, millions of men were misdiagnosed, undiagnosed and received no pension for this disability. Their care rested on the shoulders of their families, who bore the burden of treating shellshocked men for decades after the war.23 Many eminent scholars in recent decades have authored excellent articles on this neglected issue and in fact The Journal of Contemporary History brought out a special issue in the year 2000.24 These research works have focused on European countries of both warring sides. But some of the recent writings on Indian forces on Western Front have accused Indian soldiers of malingering and self-inflicted wounds. One cannot deny existence of such things but there cannot be sweeping

23

See, https://hist.hse.ru/en/news/148760883.html

The Journal of Contemporary History carried following article on ‘Shell-shock’ in its special issue, Vol. 35, January 2000: Mosse, ‘Shell-Shock as a Social Disease’, 101–108; Bourke, ‘Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma’; Winter, ‘Shell-Shock and the Cultural History of the Great War’; Roudebush, ‘A Patient Fights Back’; Leed, ‘Fateful Memories’; Lerner, ‘Psychiatry and Casualties of War’. Others who have articles on this issue before, are—Leese, ‘Problems Returning Home’; Elsey, ‘Disabled Ex-Servicemen’s Experiences of Rehabilitation’; Bogacz, ‘War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England’; Jones, ‘The Psychology of Killing’.

24

 330   Indians in the First World War

statement of such accusations against majority of forces in all theatres of war. Unfortunately, we do not have any data that can be used to investigate the affliction of shell-shock disease among Indian soldiers. If in Professor Jay Winter’s considered opinion the ratio among British soldiers could be 20 to 40 per cent, one could imagine what could be the rate among the Indian soldiers. Perhaps, the letters of Indian soldiers published by David Omissi gives an indication of how they had become war-weary and the distance from the motherland on the contrary plunged them in despair and hopelessness, and resigned to fate. Most of the Indian soldiers being uneducated, what sort of employment they got after the war? What happened to their pensions? What happened to their salaries when they were on active duty in a far-off place? Almost all Indian soldiers came from rural background, where marriages take place at much early an age, and what happened to the war widows? Such questions go unrequited for want of evidence but that does not repudiate the existence of such post-war problems for Indian soldiers. The only picture that is available is of providing wooden foot and some kind of training to these disabled soldiers in Bombay. In all matters of public welfare, the colonial government was by and large indifferent. These and such other issues of the returning soldiers were overlooked by the administration and forgotten by the Indian masses, as a result of the bewildering pace of the Indian national movement. Perhaps, instead of carving out a place in popular memory, a dominant Indian collective memory was thus created. This memory is a war of futility and meaninglessness, caused by accident, led by incompetent, sadistic or hypocritical generals and politicians, but fought by decent, yet deluded, soldiers who endured tremendous deprivations and unrelenting hardships, ultimately dying alienated and disillusioned in unprecedented number. Shortly after becoming the President of France, President Mitterrand warned his ministers: ‘The bankruptcy of history teaching in our schools and universities has become a national danger.... A people who loses its memory, loses its identity’. This is true for India too. It is time for free independent India not just to acknowledge the role of

The Deep Scars of the War   331  

Indian soldiers in First World War or to commemorate their sacrifice, but more importantly, to properly place them in world history. Historians have adequately made pathological dissections of the causes and other related issues. Such dissections are made on dead bodies, but our mankind is a living body. The beginning of the Great War and the murderous historical events that subsequently followed it seemingly gave an impression that war is the constant of life. But far from it, now after 100 years, we need to put things behind us and let us celebrate the survival of hope—a hope for mutual co-existence, a love for humankind and reassure ourselves of our responsibility towards maintenance of Universal Peace.

Appendix Appendix A: Ahmednagar Prisoner of War Camp Camp Staff Commandants

From

To

Maj Bingham

August 1914

30 November 1914

Lt Col C. J. Morse

1 November 1914

25 November 1918

Col A. A. J. Johnstone

26 November 1918

Close of camp (May 1921)

Asst Commandants Lt Col J. A. Loudon

26 April 1916

28 June 1917

Lt Col W. Cortlandt Anderson

4 July 1917

2 March 1920

W. C. Edwards (Indian Police)

21 December 1914

Not known

August 1914

23 December 1916

Lt H. J. George

5 December 1916

23 December 1917

Capt S. Brichta

26 June 1917

19 April 1920

28 November 1914

Close of camp

1 April 1915

Close of camp

1 November 1914

March 1919

Adjutants Capt C. T. Wright Warren

Quartermaster Maj R. Coulter Accounts Officer Maj W. Thomas Chief Clerk Inspector of Army School Lt G. A. White

Appendix   333  

Camp Staff Commandants

From

To

Army Schoolmaster J. C. Orr

23 November 1914-

2 March 1920

C. W. Crafton ICS

April 1916

10 May 1916

Second Lt C. H. F. Tacchella

10 May 1916

16 November 1916

Camp Censors

Second Lt Henning

22 November 1916

21 December 1916

Second Lt E. J. Corin

18 December 1916

22 November 18

Second Lt J. E. Hudson

3 April 1917

28 February 1918

Lt Cooper

4 August 1917

22 February 1918

Lt L. Collins

5 November 1917

31 October 1918

Second Lt E. B. Clements

28 February 1918

21 October 1918

Mrs Cortland Anderson

1 October 1919

12 February 1920

Mrs Kidd

1 December 1919

12 January 1920

Source: MSA/PD/WAR/1920/166-W Note: The camp was finally closed in May 1921.

Annexures Annexure 1: List of Married Women in the Civil Belgaum Camp (recommended by the District Magistrate, Belgaum, for the privilege of living with their husbands) Name

Remarks

Mrs M. T. Born

Because she is a Eurasian, almost a pure Indian.

Mrs Butcovich

This lady, an Italian, is very ill and her husband is nursing her. I recommend he be allowed to remain on.

Mrs Dittmann

Is English by birth and has never been in Germany; met and married her husband in South Africa.

Mrs Divo

A Eurasian; has never been out of India; her husband is over the original military age.

Mrs Fulep

Is an Austrian; suffers from heart trouble; has three little children and requires her husband’s help in managing them.

Mrs Godeke

Is a half-caste French African; has always lived under the British flag; her youngest child’s health is poor, and she requires help.

Mrs Libel

Both she and her husband are Austrians; her husband is an invalid and he requires her nursing.

Mrs Mau

Has three children under 4 years of age, the eldest is blind and all are constantly ill; her husband would greatly help her.

Annexures   335  

Name

Remarks

Mrs Moravek

A Russian; has never been in enemy’s country, her husband is half- Russian, they talk Russian together. She talks no German but very little English; her husband interprets for her; the medical officer has reported her mentally defective.

Mrs Rubbert

A Eurasian and very helpless; has a large family who are far beyond her power to manage alone; has frequently appealed to me for help.

Mrs Schoff

Though Austrian by birth, she left her country with a baby in arms and always lived in British colonies; her husband has been years away from Germany. During the last 40 years, her belongings have frequently fought for the British.

Mrs Walla

A very nervous Austrian woman with three children, one or other is always ill. She is ill and is in bed now for weeks, the baby is also now ill; if the husband does not come, she must have properly trained nurse.

Mrs A. Schultz

An elderly German who is half blind, she should have her husband here to look after her.

Mrs Yeck

Austrian, she has been seriously ill for a long time, she is very depressed, her husband’s presence would do her more good than medicine.

Mrs Schmidt

Has not been repatriated due to illness. Requires her husband’s help.

Mrs Meyer [Rangoon]

Is to undergo an operation and requires her husband’s help during convalescence.

Mrs Meyer [Bassein]

Owing to illness will require her husband’s help.

Mrs Annie Fostner [Karachi]

She is an Englishwoman and has five children.

Mrs Lilian Eunice Gartner [Bombay]

She is an Englishwoman and has two sons aged 19 and 4 and a daughter aged 21 years.

Mrs Helen Margaret Seybot [Bombay]

She is an Englishwoman and has three children.

Mrs Ethel Venifred Tessman [Bombay]

She is an Englishwoman and has an infant.

Mrs Minnie Volandt [Bombay]

She is a Eurasian and has never lived outside Bombay.

 336   Indians in the First World War

Name

Remarks

Mrs Yelitch [Bombay]

Her husband is an Alsatian who has been away from Austria for 35 years. He has been exempted from repatriation and permitted to live with his wife at Belgaum and Bellary. In the government letter No. 2218-W, dated 20 March 1916, the GOI Army Department has been requested to permit Yelitch (Jr.) who is a POW at Ahmednagar to proceed to Bellary to fetch his parents to Belgaum and it would be a help to the parents if he is permitted to remain at Belgaum. There is also a daughter.

Mrs Anna Racek [Bandra]

She has been allowed as a special case to reside in the neighbourhood of Bombay to enable her little daughter who is paralytic to receive the electrical treatment, which alone can save her from becoming a cripple for life. She will be sent to Belgaum after some time and as she has also another child; it is desirable that she should have the assistance of her husband.

Mrs Fett [Bombay]

She is an Englishwoman and has two children.

Mrs Kaifer [Bombay]

She is an Armenian and is a daughter of a school master in Bombay. Her husband was a British subject.

Source: MSA/PD/WAR/1916/125-I.

Annexure 2: The Victoria Cross Awardees in the First World War

The Victoria Cross

Annexures   337  

[Regimental No. Name, Rank and Corps, Theatre, Place and date of Bravery] 1. 4050. Khudadad Khan, Sepoy, 120th Duke of Cannaught’s own Baluchis—Belgium, Holleboke—31 October 1914 2. 1909. Darwan Singh Negi, Naik, 1-39th Garhwal Rifles—France, Festubert—23/24 November 1914. 3. * De pass, Lieutenant F. A., 34th Prince Albert Victor’s Own Poona Horse—France, Near Festubert—24 November 1914 4. *Bruce, Lieutenant W. A., McC, 59th Scinde Rifles (Frontier Force)—France, Near Givenchy—19 December 1914 5. 1695, Gobar Sing Negi, Rifleman, 2-39th Garhwal Rifles— France, Neuve Chapelle—10 March 1915 6. Mir Dust, Jamadar, 55 Coke’s Rifles (F. F.) attached 57th Wilde’s Rifles (F. F.)—Belgium, Ypres—26 April 1915. 7. Smyth, Lieutenant J. G., 15th Ludhiana Sikhs—France, Near Richebourg L’Avoué—18 May 1915. 8. 2129. Kulbir Thapa, Rifleman, 2nd and 3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles—France, South of Fauquissart—25 September 1915 9. 2008. Gobind Singh, Lance-Dafedar, 28 Light Cavalry, attached 2nd Lancers (Gardner’s Horse)—France, East of Peizieres—1 December 1917 10. *Wheeler, Major G. G. M., 7th Hariana Lancers—Mesopotamia, Shaiba—12 April 1915 11. 3398. Chatta Singh, Sepoy, 9th Bhopal Infantry—Mesopotamia, Wadi—13 January 1916 12. Sinton, Captain J. A., Indian Medical Service—Mesopotamia, Orah Ruins—21 January 1916 13. 561. Lala, Lance-Naik, 41 Dogras—Mesopotamia, El Orah— 12/13 April 1916 14. 1605. Shahmad Khan, Naik, 89th Punjabis—Mesopotamia, Near Beit Ayeesa—23 February 1917 15. Wheeler, Major G. C., 2nd–9th Gurkha Rifles—Mesopotamia, Tigris at Shumran—23 February 1917 16. 4146. Karanbahaddur Rana, Rifleman, 2nd/3rd Queen Alexandra’s Own Gurkha Rifles—Egypt, El Kefr—10 April 1918

 338   Indians in the First World War

17. *Badlu Singh, Resaldar, 14th Murray’s Jat Lancers attached 29th Lancers (Deccan Horse)—Palestine, West Bank of river Jordon—23 September 1918 18. * Jotham Captain E., 51st Sikhs (Frontier Force)—Indian Frontier, Tochi Valley—22 October 1919 19. *Andrews, Temporary Captain H. J., MBE—Indian Medical Service, Waziristan—22 October 1919 20. *Kenny Lieutenant W. D., 4th-39th Garhwal Rifles—Indian Area, Waziristan—2 January 1920 21. 1012. Ishar Singh, Sepoy, 28th Punjabis—Indian Area, Waziristan—10 April 1921. *Person who got VC posthumously. Total: 12 Indians 9 British 21 All of them belonged to Indian Army and Indian Medical Service. In Western Front [France and Flanders]

9

In Mesopotamia

6

In Egypt

1

In Palestine

1

On Indian frontier

1

In Waziristan

3

Other Medals awarded:





Imperial Service Order (ISO)



Distinguished Service Order (DSO)

Annexures   339  







Knight Order of the British Empire



Order of the British Empire

The Military Cross (MC)

St. John Ambulance War Service Medal

* Source: Giara, The Contribution of the Parsi. Note: I am grateful to this author for these pictures.

Annexure 3: Report of Sir Walter Lawrence on the Hospitals for Indians in England, dated 9 March 1916 Press Communiqué—Arrangements made for Indian Sick and Wounded in England and France: REPORT BY COLONEL SIR WALTER LAWRENCE TO Field Marshal… Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, Secretary of State for War: 1. In accordance with your verbal instructions of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to submit a report of the working of the Indian hospitals and convalescent establishments in England and France. I have informed Your Lordship from time to time of the more important matters, which have come to my notice during my visits of inspection in England and in France, and I have been in close

 340   Indians in the First World War

touch with Sir Alfred Keogh at the War Office and with Sir Arthur Sloggett at General Headquarters since you appointed me to act as your Commissioner on 19 November 1914. 2. At that date, it had just been decided that Indian sick and wounded must be brought to England, as it was found inconvenient to move them by rail to the south of France. Excellent hospital ships had been equipped for the special requirements of the Indians, but the hospital accommodation in England was inadequate and unsuitable, and several hospital ships full of wounded Indians were lying at Southampton unable to discharge. The only accommodation ready for the Indians was that afforded by summer hotels at Brockenhurst, which were overcrowded, and as winter had set in, it was undesirable to put the wounded and sick into tents. The hut hospital, built by the War Office at Brockenhurst and known as the ‘Lady Hardinge Hospital’, would not be ready for some months, and in order to get the Indians under cover, it was necessary to indent on the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley, and on its complement the Red Cross Hospital. These two splendid hospitals were, however, specially required for the British Army; the aid they gave in grave emergency could only be regarded as temporary. 3. After a visit to Brockenhurst and to the convalescent dep t at Barton, I came to the conclusion that the neighbourhood was unsuitable, as, apart from the dampness of the climate, there were no large buildings, which could be adopted for hospitals. The problem was to get the Indians quickly into warm and dry buildings, as they suffer greatly from a wet and cold climate, and it was essential to concentrate in one or two localities. The British wounded could be sent any part of the Kingdom, but the Indians, owing to their special requirements, must be kept together. I suggested to you that Brighton might prove a suitable locality, and you at once authorized me to secure accommodation there. In a few days, after consultation with the Brighton authorities, I succeeded in obtaining the Pavilion, the York Place Schools, and the grand block of buildings now known as the Kitchener Hospital, which provided 724 beds, was opened on 14 December 1914. Its oriental character, its charming gardens and the careful and elaborate arrangements made to safeguard caste rules and to respect Indian

Annexures   341  

peculiarities and prejudices rendered the Pavilion Hospital as ideal haven to the Indians after the storm and stress of Flanders. But equal care was bestowed on the York Place Hospital (600 beds) and on the Kitchener Hospital (2000 beds). 4. The Brighton Hospitals have been twice visited by the King and Queen, who were accompanied on the second occasion by Princes Mary, by Queen Alexandra, by yourself, by Lord Crewe and Mr Austen Chamberlain. On each occasion, warm testimony to the excellent conduct of the Indian soldiers has been given by the Brighton authorities, and on the other hand, sincere appreciation of the generous aid and cooperation of Brighton has been expressed. But as I know perhaps more than others of the quiet and steady work, which has been done by Mr Otter, Mayor of Brighton and by Mr Gentle, the Chief Constable, I would ask that some official recognition of their services should be made. The state has obtained most admirable public buildings at a trifling cost through the goodwill of the Mayor, and these buildings have been protected from ever anxious risk of fire by the untiring efforts of the Chief Constable. Owing to the excellent behavior of the Indian soldiers and also to the vigilance and cooperation of the Chief Constable, there has not been a single scandal nor a regrettable incident, so far as the Indian soldiers were concerned. They have all—officers and sepoys—behaved like gentlemen, and they have left behind them pleasant memories in Brighton. 5. Official reports have been submitted regarding these Brighton Hospitals from which Your Lordship will learn that the death rate has been extraordinarily low, and that the percentage of men returned to the firing line has been satisfactorily high. I as a layman can, from my frequent visits and conversation with the Indians, vouch for the devoted care, which the officers of the Indian Medical Service and their subordinates bestowed on Indians at Brighton. Nothing was omitted. The great preoccupation of the officers was to heal and to tender the men fit for the fighting line, but they knew that beyond the physical healing much depended on the mentality of the sepoys. Every effort was made to keep them cheerful and to provide the simple comforts, which mean so much to the Indians. The Gift House at Brighton,

 342   Indians in the First World War

under the able management of Mrs Bailey, was of great assistance, and apart from comforts, the Indian knew that every precaution had been taken to ensure that his caste scruples would be respected. Caste committees were in appointed in each hospital, and, as you will gather from the letter, which I have from time to time submitted to you, and from the answers to your own questions when you inspected Brighton Hospitals, the Indians were satisfied that all was in order. Every facility was given for religious observances, and one religion vied with another in subscribing to their places of worship. The fast of Ramzan was duly kept. It was pointed out to the Mahomedans that they were exempt from the fast as they were on a journey. But they all protested that they were not on a journey, but honoured guests of their King’s country, and as the inmates of the Pavilion put it, ‘In their King’s own Palace’. I could quote numerous letters from men who have been in hospital to show how greatly they appreciated the arrangements made for their comfort and well-being, but the address presented by the Indian officers to the King at Buckingham Palace last month will suffice. I append it to this letter. 6. As beyond my slight experience as an inspector of hospital on King Edward VII Hospital Fund I knew about hospitals, I sought advice and criticism from all sources.   The only criticism I heard was that the hospital for the Indian soldiers in England were too good. To this, the answer was obvious and easy. For men who had come from India to an uncongenial climate to fight, nothing in the way of hospitals could be too good, and further it would be impossible to have one standard for the British and another for the Indian soldiers. As Netley Nurses were employed as ‘supervising sisters’ with the happiest result, and at the Pavilion and the York Place Hospitals ‘supervising sisters’ were maintained until the exigencies of Gallipoli called them away. At the Lady Hardinge Hospital, sisters worked throughout and I am convinced that the old-fashioned idea that British nurses were out of place in an Indian hospital is wrong. I have had much correspondence with influential Indians on the subject, and they urge that, in the larger civil hospitals in India, Nurses are employed. There can be no doubt that the presence of a ‘supervising sister’

Annexures   343  

improves and smartens the appearance of a ward, and if it had not been for the scarcity of Nurses, I should have persisted in asking for Sisters, at any rate for the operating theatres. One reason that made it easy to dispense with Sisters was the excellent and devoted service of the British hospital orderlies. These men took at once to the Indians and the Indians responded to their kindness, and one of the many curious and unexpected results of bringing Indian soldiers to Europe will be the good feeling and comradeship, which have been established between the Indian and men of this country. I cannot speak too highly of the work and conduct of the British hospital orderly. 7. I must also mention another peculiar feature of the Indian hospitals. When it was decided to bring the Indian wounded to England, there were no personnel available, and owing to language difficulty and to caste requirements we had to scour the seaports to obtain Indians for service in the hospitals. Soon after the outbreak of war, some 281 Indian students in Great Britain came forward into the Indian Volunteer Ambulance Corps. These were medical students and men who were studying law, engineering and commerce. In total, 198 students were actually employed. They set to work in the finest spirit and rendered most useful and loyal service dressers, dispensers, clerks and superintendents of kitchens. They did work which in India they would have scorned. They were full of genuine love for England, and hatred of the Germany.  As personnel arrived from India, it became necessary in the interest of economy to discharge the Indian students, but some remained to the end. Of these, two of the best workers Mr Sahai and Mr Chuni Lal lost their lives on the S. S. Persia. 8. It is not necessary to tell Your Lordship of the details of food, separate slaughterhouses and waiters for different religions and castes; of the arrangements for drinking water, baths, lavatories, etc., as your intimate knowledge of India renders this superfluous. Some may have thought that the officers of the Indian Medical Service were overelaborative in their arrangements, but they knew their business, and the result of their minute precautions is that not a word has been suggested by the sepoys of the violation of caste.

 344   Indians in the First World War

  In France, where the burials and cremations are under the military authorities and in England where cremations has been carried out by the same agency, the greatest pains have been taken and everything has been done to the complete satisfaction of the Hindus and Mahomedans. At the Jesuit College, Boulogne, we have a cemetery for Indians, the only one in British area, which has a headstone on every grave. Cremation is most thorough and His Highness the Raja of Rutlam expressed his warmest thanks for the way in which Hindus were cremated. Everywhere in France the greatest care has been taken, and when the war is over, I understand that government will erect suitable memorials to mark the places where the Indian soldiers lie. I have visited all the places where Indians have been buried and cremated in France. Full records have been kept and on historical as well as on political grounds, it seems most desirable to erect worthy memorials to the Indians who fell so far from their homes. 9. I have also urged that memorials should be erected at Brighton and elsewhere, to mark the fact that hospitals for Indians were established in England. I am convinced from information, which I have received that the kind treatment of Indian soldiers in England has had a most beneficial effect in India, and it will be a wise policy to emphasize our nation’s appreciation of the loyal bravery of the Indians in the field in France, and their admirable behaviour in the hospital in England. 10. I have in my numerous letters to Your Lordship described the Mont Dore Hospital (500 beds) at Bournemouth, the Lady Hardinge Hospital at Brockenhurst (500 beds) and Convalescent Depot at Barton (1500 beds) and Reinforcing Depot at Milford-onSea. In every detail, the system was the same as in Brighton. In the summer, the climate in Brockenburst and Barton was congenial, but in the winter, it was too damp for the Indians. 11. The hospitals are now closed and the last Indians left England on and instant. Though the reception of the Indians has added to the heavy labours and anxieties at Southampton, I am of opinion that the labour has not been in vain. Source: MSA/PD/WAR/1916/208-W.

Sir Shapurji Broach

Lt Col Dinshaw Khambata, V. D., Khan Bahaddur (No. 50 in lit ‘B’ pp. 233 and 275 Comp. 191-W of 1917)

Jehangir Ruttonji Dubash, J. P.

1.

2.

3.

On the outbreak of war in August 1914, the old established firm at the head of which was Khan Saheb R. J. Dubash (who was granted the title for services rendered during the South African War 1899–1902) were called upon to produce the large and varied supplies required for the Indian Forces sent overseas and the Firm’s knowledge of the supply and transport requirements and the quantities necessary for Indian Troops rations

Khan Saheb recommended

Name put forward by BG for a mention.

Mention in the despatch.

Has arranged for the reception and entertainment at the railway station of all Indian sick and wounded who have arrived at Poona and has met them himself. Is an active member of the Committee for the Indian War Hospital. Has done excellent work in every way during the War.

Retired as Head, Asst. S. & T., Western Command

Merchant and Contractor, Bombay

Has already been recommended by BG for inclusion in one of the classes of the Order of British Empire

Mention in dispatches

Has lent his house—Modi Mansion, Poona, for the use of the Willingdon Soldiers’ Club for the duration of the War, and given a donation of `3,000 to assist the Club.

Merchant, Bombay

Annexure 4: List of Persons with Recommendation for ‘Reward’

Mr Manock-Shaw Nowroji Mehta

Rustomji Shapurji Mistry

Hormusji Dosabhai Patel

4

5.

6.

Bombay Municipality, Inspector Water Department

Bombay Port Trust, Bombay

Merchant, Bombay

Reward

Mention

Rendered great assistance in the early stages of the War when large number of troops were detained in Bombay.

Mention in despatches

The work done by Mr Rustomji Shapurji to assist the Embarkation authorities is in my opinion worthy of recognition. He possesses great driving capacity.

Has supplied motor cars free for the removal of sick and wounded. Has also presented a building rent free for the duration of War as an office for the Women’s Branch Imperial War Relief Fund.

was a factor of the very great importance during the period of the very heavy strain of work in the first year of the war. They supplied. They supplied everything required and of the very best of strictly reasonable prices and by their loyal assistance many difficulties were overcome. Mr J. Dubash, J. P. was closely associated with his father Khan Saheb Ruttonji Jamsetji Dubash, in all the business done by the firm and as the active outdoor working member of the firm has been constant and assiduous in his attention to business and rendered very valuable service.

Recommended by W. Knight, Commandant Bombay Brigade

Recommended by W. Knight, Commandant Bombay Brigade

Dr Manchersha Dhanjibhai Dorabji Guilder (No. 49 of comp. 194-W of 1917)

Dr David Judah (No. 49 of comp. 194-W of 1917)

Dr Govind Krishnaji Raji (No. 49 of comp. 194-W of 1917)

Dr Vinayak Narayan Bhajekar (No. 49 of comp. 194-W of 1917)

Dinshwa Edulji Mahava

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

St. John Ambulance Asso. Supdt. Parel Division, Bombay

Recommended by W. Knight, Commandant Bombay Brigade. Already given the title of Rao Bahaddur. Recommended by W. Knight, Maj Gen, Commandant, Bombay Brigade

Mention

Kaiser-i-Hind Medal

Has given his services as Hon. Surgeon since the opening of the Lady Hardinge War Hospital in 1914. These services have been of the greatest value.

Recommended for the most praiseworthy selfdenial and whole heartedness of his work in the organization of the reception and distribution of sick and wounded in Bombay

Hon. Surgeon, Lady Harding War Hospital

Recommended by W. Knight, Commandant Bombay Brigade

Mention

For his unselfish help during the first 18 months of the war in volunteering and parties of sick and wounded up country at a time when no medical officer were available.

Local Doctor

Recommended by W. Knight, Commandant Bombay Brigade Recommended by W. Knight, Commandant Bombay Brigade

Has given his services as an Honorary Physician. He has also carried on in addition the duties of Radiologist with great success.

Physician, Lady Hardinge Hospital.

Reward

Reward

Has given his services as an honorary Surgeon without stint. Has worked very hard in cause of the wounded and is a very capable conscientious and very pain-taking worker.

Surgeon, Lady Hardinge War Hospital

Dosabhai Framji Panthaki

Dorabji Nusaewanji Marker

Gustadji Nusserwanji Guzdar

Jehangir Edulji Laher

Kalapesi Sohrab Rustomji

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Recommended by W. Knight, Maj Gen, Commandant, Bombay Brigade Recommended by W. Knight, Maj Gen, Commandant, Bombay Brigade

Recommended by W. Knight, Maj Gen, Commandant, Bombay Brigade

Kaiser-i-Hind

Messers. Monicrieff Bredin and Co. Proprietor

Poona Vol. Rifles Sergeant

Kaiser-i-Hind

Kaiser-i-Hind

For his help and cooperation in superintending the distribution of sick and wounded and his remarkable help to the members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade both singly and collectively. He has carried out his self- imposed duties in a most unselfish manner. For his personal devotion and at the docks since March 1916 and looking after the creature wants of the newly arrived sick and wounded from overseas distributing to each and all soda water, lemonade, ginger beer, tea and coffee at his own expense.

For the most assiduous care and attention bestowed on the sick and wounded by daily attendance and help at the Docks and stations ever since the outbreak of war

Ditto Clerk

Recommended by W. Knight, Maj Gen, Commandant, Bombay Brigade

Kaiser-i-Hind

Recommended for his most praiseworthy and devotion and skill in organizing the work of the Cosmopolitan Division in connection with the reception and transfer of sick and wounded from overseas into Bombay Hospitals

Ditto Supdt. Cosmopolitan Division

Recommended by W. Knight, Maj Gen, Commandant, Bombay Brigade

Kaiser-i-Hind Medal

Recommended for his most untiring devotion and zeal in superintending the work of the Parsi Division at the Docks and Railway Stations in connection with the reception and despatch of wounded.

Secretary, Parel Division, Bombay

His Highness Maharana Shri Vijaysinghji Chhatrasingji, Raja of Rajpipla.

Meherban Chintamanrao Dhundiraj alias Appa Saheb Patwardhan, Chief of Sangli.

Meherban Sir Parshuramrao Ramchandrarao alias Bhau Saheb Patwardhan, Chief of Jamkhandi.

2.

3.

Name

1.

Sr. No.

Has taken keen interest in recruiting and has granted many concessions in his state.

Has rank of Captain

In the case of both Raja of Rajpipla and Chief of Sangli, it is recommended that if good recruiting results are shown, they may be advanced to the rank of Captain later on.

Honorary rank of Lieutenant.

Has taken interest in recruiting.

Has taken keen interest in recruiting and has granted many concessions in his state. Produced a very considerable number of recruits from a small state.

He has not produced many recruits from his state yet, but is a member of the Provincial Recruiting Board.

Honorary rank of Lieutenant

Services Rendered

Remarks

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

Rewards for Their Service in ‘Recruiting’ Drive

The Honourable Ibrahim Haroon Jaffer of Poona

Seth Manordas Harakchand of Nadiad

Byramji Naoroji Patel of Surat

5.

6.

Name

4.

Sr. No.

Obtained 100 recruits. Accepted no rewards but gave them to his agents.

A mill owner of advanced age who has given considerable help to recruiting and came forward with funds to start a Recruiting Depot. His example led others to help.

This gentleman rendered valuable service at the commencement of the War in allaying Mahomedan feeling against the declaration of war against Turkey and in inducing his caste men to come forward to enlist. He produced about 100 recruits and has rendered other services to the state in supplying hospital and so on with furniture without charge.

Services Rendered

Khan Saheb

Rao Bahaddur

Khan Bahaddur

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal) Remarks

Ramjivan Jagannath Soni, merchant Sholapur

Marutrao Kadam, Mankari to the Chief of Jamkhandi

Dattajirao Ghatge, Village officer, Kolhapur

11.

12.

13.

Ambalal Madhavlal Lakhia, Mamlatdar of North Daskroi, Ahmedabad

9.

Chandkhan Malutab Khan, Shevgoan, Dist. Ahmednagar

G. V. Kalkot, Acting Mamlatdar of Hubli, Dharwar

8.

10.

Dossabhai Manekshaw Vakil, Contractor, Surat

7.

Produced 15 recruits and hopes to secure more.

Directed all recruiting in Jamkhandi

Given money and clothing to recruits, and assisted in the management of the success. A willing worker.

Sword of honour.

Rao Saheb

Khan Saheb

Rao Saheb

Has given the greatest assistance from beginning and is the main support of recruiting in Ahmedabad

Has worked hard in getting men in a district which has not done well.

Rao Saheb

Khan Saheb

Gave good help to recruiting officers and produced many recruits.

Obtained 50 recruits. Takes no rewards but gives them to his agents. Still doing good work.

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Name

Shahazada Bahaddur, Civilian Recruiter and Contractor, Bombay

Vishwanath Yeshwant Patel of Wambori, Ahmednagar

Bhau Narayan Sawant, Police Patil of Tarandale, Ratnagiri

Balkrishna Purushottam Naik, Police Patel, Madhewada, Karwar

Raghunath Narayan Uparkar, 3rd Class Head Constable, Savantwadi.

Sr. No.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Actively assisted recruiting parties in collecting 121 recruits.

Majority of recruits in Karwar were persuaded by him to join. Accepts no reward.

A well-to-do Patel and Inamdar. Takes no reward. His village produced proportionately more recruits than any other village in that part. Personally persuaded 25 Marathas to join.

Provided 15 recruits. Good helper.

Brings in 50 to 100 recruiters a month. Several of his relatives are officers in the Indian Army. A man of good standing.

Services Rendered

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Remarks

Gopal Raoji of Padhambe, Chiplun, Military Pensioner

Sitaram Sadu Dalvi, Constable Savantwadi.

Bhau Sitaram Savant, Constable Savantwadi

Shaikh Hussain Abdulla Codad, Constable, Savantwadi

Adam Mahomad Khan, Constable, Savantwadi

Narayan Bhoj Savant, Constable, Savantwadi.

Shaikh Usman Mohamad, Constable, Savantwadi

Ibrahimaga Inusaga, Constable, Savantwadi

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 12 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 20 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 18 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 25 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 29 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 54 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 69 recruits.

Assisted in securing Mahar recruits and accompanied to Secunderabad to create confidence.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Sword of Honour if no medal is to be given.

Name

Vishun Zilba Parab, Constable, Savantwadi

Lakshman Sambhaji Naik, Constable, Savantwadi.

Dhondu Ladu Pasta, Village Fouzdar, Kalamist

Surji Babli Rawool, Village Fouzdar, Sangeli, Savantwadi

Bhadoba Vishnu Samant, Village Fouzdar, Kalasuli, Savantwadi

Vishnu Dewu Chougule, Village Fouzdar, Majgoan, Savantwadi.

Tato Appa Ghadi, Village Fouzdar, Sonavde, Savantwadi

Sr. No.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

Himself collected and helped in securing 18 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 19 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 20 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 27 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 44 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 11 recruits

Actively assisted recruiting parties in securing 12 recruits

Services Rendered

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Remarks

Tukaram Venkoba Dalvi, Village Fouzdar, Kalasuli, Savantwadi

Dattatraya Ramchandra Naik, Village Fouzdar, Nerur, Savantwadi

Vithu Dewu Dharma, Village Fouzdar, Vasargoan, Savantwadi

Ragho Appaji Rawul, Village Fouzdar, Verla, Savantwadi.

Dewu Sabaji Dhuri, Village Fouzdar, Kolgaon, Savantwadi.

Jairam Atmaji Savant, Village Fouzdar, Shivadaon, Savantwadi

Vithuji Laxman Jadhav, Village Fouzdar, Digas, Savantwadi.

Shankar Kano Palao, Village Fouzdar, Humermalla, Savantwadi

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

Himself collected and helped in securing 14 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 15 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 15 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 16 recruits

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Himself collected and helped in securing 18 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 16 recruits

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Himself collected and helped in securing 18 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 23 recruits

Name

Ganu Ladu Rawul, Village Fouzdar, Shirshinge, Savantwadi

Balu Bap Savant, Village Fouzdar, Village Ambadpal, Savantwadi

Gangaram Gopal Dhuri, Village Fouzdar, Salgaon, Savantwadi

Shankar Dhondu Dalvi, Village Fouzdar, Vilaoada, Savantwadi

Hari Bapuji Warang, Village Fouzdar, Tulsuli, Savantwadi

Krishna Bapuji Naik, Village Fouzdar, Sarmal, Savantwadi

Arjun Madnaji Parab, Village Fouzdar, Padwe, Savantwadi.

Sr. No.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

Used his influence in securing 10 recruits.

Used his influence in securing 11 recruits.

Himself collected and helped in securing 11 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 11 recruits

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Himself collected and helped in securing 13 recruits

Himself collected and helped in securing 12 recruits

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Remarks

Himself collected and helped in securing 14 recruits

Services Rendered

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

Krinsha Hari Gavas, Village Fouzdar, Sasoli, Savantwadi

Babu Sak Dhuri, Village Fouzdar, Savantwadi

Vithu Bapu Parab, Village Fouzdar, Anao, Savantwadi.

Fakirgawda, Police Patil of Betigeri, Dharwar.

Sangappa Neralkatti, of Hubli, Dharwar

Virbhadrappa Bashattappa of Hubli, Dharwar

Balu Bhiwaji of Ambaoli, Police Patel, Ratnagiri.

Keshao Lakhoji Sakpal of Ambaye, Police Patel, Ratnagiri

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

Obtain 26 recruits.

Obtained 20 recruits.

Obtained recruits and gave help.

Obtained recruits and gave help

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Used his influence in securing 10 recruits.

Collected 10 recruits and helped recruiting materially.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Used his influence in securing 10 recruits.

Used his influence in securing 10 recruits.

Name

Rama Balawant Mane of Takli, Belgaum

Rev. R. F. Hoogwerf of Hubli, Dharwar

Rev. De Sa of Gadag, Dharwar.

Rev. W. Stover of American Mission, Ankleshwar, Broach

Pir Khan, Acting Havildar, 114th Marathas, Poona.

Sr. No.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

He has himself recruited 55 men in 2½ months and his party has obtained 107 fit recruits. His work has been exceptionally good.

Has produced 25 Christian Bhil recruits.

Procured 20 recruits and has done good work.

Has taken great interest in recruiting and sent considerable number of recruits. As a non-official, he has done useful work in recruiting. Has secured over 50 recruits and has given much help in securing members for the AngloIndian contingent from Hubli.

Sent his two sons as recruits and secured 2 or 3 others.

Services Rendered

Monetary Reward and Sanad

Thanks of government and certificate

Thanks of government and vertificate.

Thanks of government and certificate.

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal) If medals are not to be given promptly, these individuals may be granted Turbans.

Remarks

Havildar Baji Rao More of 117th Marathas.

Lance Naik Laxman Kale of 3rd Sappers and Miners

Purushottam Lalubhai Mehta, Head Clerk of the Mamlatdar of North Daskroi

Khan Saheb Munir Khan Dost Mohd. Khan of Dapoli, Ratnagiri

Hyem Reuben, Chief Constable, Political Agency, Palanpur

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

Sanad.

He has along with No. 9 in the list given the greatest assistance from the beginning and is the main supporter of recruiting in Ahmedabad.

Has secured 15 recruits and rendered very useful service to the Cantonment Magistrate Decsa in securing and dispatching camp followers for different Army Departments.

Sanad.

Sanad

Monetary reward and Sanad.

Has done excellent work as a party Commander and has himself recruited some 30 recruits.

Has rendered great help to recruits. Secured 40 recruits. Takes no reward but on the contrary gives money out of his pocket for the purpose.

Monetary reward and Sanad.

He has produced considerable number of recruits from the Indapur taluka, an extremely difficult district to ‘recruit’, he stands out as a model of what a party Commander should be.

Name

A. Y. Khanolkar of Khanoli, Taluka Vengurla, Ratnagiri

D. S. Dalvi, Kulkarni of Araoli, Taluka Vengurla, Ratnagiri

R. S. Nabar, Kulkarni of Shirode, Taluka Vengurla, Ratnagiri

Subedar Shaikh Amin, Transport Recruiting Depot, Kirkee

Havildar Jehangirkhan of 117th Marathas

Lieutenant Sitaram Chogle, Landlord and military pensioner.

Sr. No.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

Was long working as an Honorary recruiting officer till appointed a paid recruiting officer.

In four months has obtained 143 recruits and has tact and ability.

In two and half months he collected 100 recruits and was of the greatest help to recruiting generally. Sanad

Sanad

Sanad

Sanad

Has worked well in producing recruits from his village.

Has worked well in producing recruits from his village

Sanad

Gave rewards out of his own pocket for Bhandari recruits.

Services Rendered

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

The question of the grant of land to him is under the consideration of this government.

The question of the grant of land to him is under the consideration of this government.

Remarks

Subedar Major Shaikh Chand Bahadur, pensioner, E.A.R.O., Bombay

Khot Daffedar Hassan Shah, Transport Recruiting Depot, Kirkee

Aspandiar Rustomji Irani, Government Contractor, Poona

Rao Saheb Parashuramrao Sidramrao Shinde of Ghosarwad, Kolhapur

73.

74.

75.

76.

This Maratha gentleman living in the Kolhapur state but owns lands in Eksarbe, Chikodi Taluka, District Belgaum. He served as the

Obtained 93 recruits many of who are motor drivers. Accepted no subsistence money or rewards but frequently gave money to recruits. Presented `400 towards cost of Cinema Films for recruiting.

An old soldier who has lost promotion by being posted to the Transport Recruiting Depot. He rendered excellent service in aid of recruiting.

He has rendered valuable help to recruiting in Bombay and successful recruiting results in Bombay are mostly due to his untiring energies and resource. He holds the Order of British India, 2nd Class.

Received title of Rao Saheb for recruiting work.

Government, No. 360-R, dated 7th March 1918.

Recommended separately for 2nd Lieutenantship (Please see entry No. 6 in the list appended to the letter from this.

The question of promotion to Commissioned rank might be considered by the Military authorities.

The question of the grant of land to him is under the consideration of this government.

Name

Rao Bahadur Rango Govind Naik of Belgaum.

Tammaji Shrinivas Kulkarni, District Asst. Recruiting Officer, Belgaum and Southern Maratha Country states

Sr. No.

77.

78.

Sanad if medal is not to be given.

While working as Mamlatdar of Chikodi in 1916–1917, he induced Marathas

Medal

Made Member of the Order of the British Empire for recruiting work.

Remarks

He has been most energetic in obtaining recruits from Mahars in the Southern Division.

Chairman of a Committee of Maratha Inamdars of Patils of the Chikodi taluka, which was appointed in 1916 to try and stimulate interest in recruiting among the Marathas in the villages in the Krishna valley in the Chikodi taluka. He has taken much trouble to help recruiting, attending meetings at many places distant from his village and speaking whenever required.

Services Rendered

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

Laxman Balawant Desai, Patil of Gunji, Belgaum

Anantrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, Amir-ulUmrao, Inamdar of Madhbhavi, Belgaum

Lingayya Naidu, Cantonment Inspector, Belgaum

Shaikh Madan Apabhai, Mamlatdar of Belgaum

Pensioned Sepoy Atmaram Daji Jadhav of Takli, Belgaum

Pensioned colour Havildar Ganapatrao Subhanrao Jadhav of Takli, Belgaum

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

Turban if medal not given.

Turban if medal not given.

Employed as Recruiter under the District Recruiting Officer.

Sanad if medal not given.

No. 83 and 84 worked jointly to get recruits among the Marathas and obtained 10 recruits.

Endeavoured hard since the beginning of the war to comply with numerous requisitions from the supply officer, Belgaum, for followers of all kinds.

Sanad if medal not given.

Sword if medal not given.

Honorary recruiter since 1916. Obtained a number of recruits.

Worked hard in getting Mahar recruits from the Konkan

Turban if medal is not given.

Obtained 20 recruits.

Narayan Dave of Anand, Kaira Civilian Recruiter

Sagannak Abask of Shirkhal, Ratnagiri, Military Pensioner Sepoy

Ganapat Govind Mahar of Ahmednagar

Anand Raghu Bhil of Sada, Ahmednagar.

Pandurang Raoji Sambhare of Pulshi, Satara

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

Source: MSA/PD/WAR/1918/146-W, 58–59

Name

Sr. No.

He helped recruiting collector personally by arranging meetings.

He sent his own son to be enlisted and provided 20 Bhil recruits. A good helper.

Sanad if medal not given.

Sword of honour if medal not given.

Turban if medal not given.

Sword if medal not given.

Helped in recruiting of Mahars

He helped recruiting collector in recruiting Konkani Mahars

Sanad if medal not given.

Remarks

Produced about 50 recruits in 2 months

Services Rendered

Reward Recommended (In Addition to the Grant of Medal)

Annexures   365  

The BG Gazette, June 20, 1918, (PART I) 1139–1142, reprints a notification by the Government of India, Army Department, Political Department, Bombay, No. 4550-W, dated 17 June 1918. It is a list that mentions the names, which have been brought to the notice of the Government of India for valuable services rendered in India in connection with the war up to the 4 August 1917. It is a list of 226 names, which include the senior most European bureaucrats and Indian officers from Secretariat, Police and other departments including Bombay Dockyard, Port Trust and other allied departments, and also the doctors who rendered service. Source: Maharashtra State Archives/Political Department/ WAR/1918/146-W. This is only to cite as an example. Other files that give similar information are: MSA/PD/WAR/1919/148-W medals and citations for service in war; MSA/PD/WAR/1919/195-W recommendations for award of title OBE; MSA/PD/WAR/1919/119-W grant of titles; MSA/PD/ WAR/1919/9-W. grant of titles; MSA/PD/WAR/1921/12-W grant of titles; MSA/PD/WAR/1918/327-W award of Bronz Star (1914); MSA/ PD/WAR/1920/194-W rewards—grant of swords, sanads, for good recruiting work.

Bibliography Unpublished Records 1. Relevant Records from the British Library (Formerly IOL), London. 2. Relevant Records from the National Archives, New Delhi. 3. Relevant Records from the Maharashtra State Archives: a. Political Department (war) files—180 Relevant Numbers. b. Hostile Enemy Trading Concerns’ Act—400 Relevant files. c. Revenue Department—Relevant files. d. Home Department (Special)—Relevant files. 4. Bombay Police Abstracts of Intelligence, Maharashtra State Police Headquarters, Mumbai Published Records—Books and Articles 1922. India’s Services in the War, Vol. 3. Lucknow: United Provinces, Newul Kishor Press. Adas, Micheal. 2004. ‘Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the AfroAsian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology.’ Journal of World History 15(1):31–63. Albertini, Rudolph von. 1969. ‘The Impact of Two World War on the Decline of Colonialism.’ Journal of Contemporary History 4(1):17–35. Ambedkar, B. R. 1941. The Times of India, June 18. Anand, Mulk Raj. 1939. Across the Black Waters. London: Jonathan Cape. ———. 2016. Across the Black Waters. Delhi: Orient Paperbacks, 5th New Edition. Bagchi, Amiya Kumar. 2014. ‘Indian Economy and Society During World War One.’ Social Scientist 42(7/8):5–27.

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Lovett, Verney. 1921. A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement. London: John Murray, Third edition. (First published in February 1920) Lucas, Charles. ed. 1926. The Empire at War, Vol. I, 56–7. Lunden, Walter A. 1949. ‘Captivity Psychoses Among Prisoners of War.’ Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1931–51) 39(6):721–33. Luthy, Herbert. 1971. ‘India and East Africa: Imperial Partnership at the End of the First World War.’ Journal of Contemporary History 6(2):55–85. Lutz, Ralph Haswell. 1993. ‘Studies of War Propaganda, 1913–33.’ The Journal of Modern History 5(4):496–516. Macdonald, J. Ramsay. 1919. The Socialist Review 16:213–22. MacKenzie, S. P. 1994. ‘The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II.’ The Journal of Modern History 66(3):487–520. Marquis, Alice Goldfarb. 1978. ‘Words as Weapon. Propaganda in Britain and Germany During the First World War.’ Journal of Contemporary History 13(3):467–98. Martin, Christopher. 1990. ‘British Prose Writings of the First World War.’ Critical Survey 2(2):137–43. Mayer, Arno J. 1966. ‘Post-War Nationalisms 1918–19.’ Past and Present 34:114–26. McDermot, John. 1978. ‘The British Foreign Office and Its German Consuls Before 1914.’ The Journal of Modern History 50(1):D1001–34. McMillan, James F. 2000. ‘Women’s Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France During the First World War.’ The Journal of Modern History 72(4):997–99. Mehrotra, S. R. 1963. ‘The Politics Behind the Montague Declaration 1917.’ In Politics and Society in India, edited by C. H. Philips, 71–96. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Mereweather, J., and F. E. Smith. 1919. The Indian Corps in France. London: John Murray, 2nd edition. Mills, I. D. 1986. ‘The 1918–19 Influenza Pandemic—Indian Experience.’ Indian Economic and Social History Review 23:1–40. Mody, Homi. 1963. Sir Pherozeshah Mehta—A Political Biography. New York: Asia Publishing House. Reprint (First printed in 1921). Mombauer, Annika. 2013. ‘ “Introduction: The Fischer Controversy 50 Years on” and “The Fischer Controversy, Documents and the ‘Truth’ About the Origins of the First World War.” ’ Journal of Contemporary History 48:231–40. Moore, R. J. 1967–68. John Morley’s Acid Test: India 1906–10. Pacific Affairs 40(3/4):333–40. ———. 1993. ‘Curzon and Indian Reform.’ Modern Asian Studies 27(4):719–40. Moriarty, Catherine. 1999. ‘Review Article: The Material Culture of Great War Remembrance.’ Journal of Contemporary History 34(4):653–62. Mortimer, Joanne Stafford. 1983. ‘Annie Besant and India 1913–17.’ Journal of Contemporary History 18(1):61–78.

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About the Author Aravind Ganachari received the post-graduation (1972) and doctoral degrees from Bombay (now Mumbai) University. Prior to joining the University in 2000, he was an Associate Professor with Government of Maharashtra’s I. Y. College for 28 years. He became Professor in 2008 and after being in the teaching profession for 42 years, he retired from Mumbai University’s History Department as a Professor & Head in April 2013. Dr Aravind has published three books so far—Gopal Ganesh Agarkar: The Secular Rationalist Reformer (2005), Nationalism and Social Reform in a Colonial Situation (2005) and Gopal Ganesh Agarkar: Buddhipramanyavadi Vicharwant ani Thor Samajsudharak (Marathi, 2016). He has published more than 40 articles in national and international journals and volumes, participated in many international conferences at the University of Georgia, Ontario, CA; Simon Frazer University, British Columbia, CA; and University of Loughborough, Leicestershire, UK. His research interests include articles written on a variety of subjects such as intellectual history, sedition, social history, Gandhian philosophy and cultural history which includes proscribed Marathi Theatre. He worked with Dr Aroon Tikekar as Research Associate for writing sesquicentennial history of the Mumbai University. He has also worked for more than 15 years as ‘Advisor/ Expert’ on the Archives Committee of the Government of Maharashtra. He is also associated with many official bodies of Government of India’s HRD ministry. He is now working on a book entitled Staging the Nation: Marathi Theatre’s Encounters with Colonial State.

Index ‘My Indian Years 1910–1916’ Viceroy’s views, 91 ‘The Making of Indian Nation’, 119 Across the Black Waters, 4, 43, 161, 293 Act III of 1864, 32–33 extension, 36 Act XI of 1916, 232 Act XXI of 1869, 34 Afghanistan Third Anglo-Afghan War, 67–68 Al-Hakikat, 223 alien allies, 37 alien enemies, 194 Allied armies, 322 Allied cause support from Horniman, 37 Allied forces, 43 Allied governments, 22 All India Congress Working Committee, 171 All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), 317 All India War Memorial, 309 All-India War Memorial, 306 Amar Jawan Jyoti, 309 Anglo-Russian Agreement, 77 Anglo-Saxon race, 322 Arab rebellion in 1920, 300 Armistice Anniversary, 322

article Conditions of Cooperation – Bargain, 141–142 Hopeless Failure of Recruitment of Indians, 116 Sincerity by Annie Besant, 130 Words and Deeds, 132–133 Asia division, 86 Auxiliary Force, 249 Baghdad railway project, 51 Balkan War defeat of Turkey, 51 Bangladesh Liberation War, 309 Basel Mission, 193, 211 Bengal Marine, 83 Boer Prisoners of War, 171 Bombay military distribution centre in India, 99 Bombay Chronicle, 207, 325 Bombay Government, 320 Bombay Governor’s Executive Council, 217 Bombay Port Trust, 311 Bombay Regulations XXV of 1827, 224 Bombay War Conference list of invitees, 126 meeting of leaders, 133

 382   Indians in the First World War

Mr. Ker’s letter to Secretary, PD, 131–132 serious blunder, 138 Bombay War Loan Committee, 243 British imperialism, 298 British Indian state, 18 British literary memory, 292 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 30, 37 amendment, 31 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Bill, 30 British policy India in future, 112 Mr. Page critism, 22 Sir Edward reply to Mr. Page, 23 British public opinion, 326 British trenches, 46 Bronze Star, 157 Brother Zimmer’s case, 206 bubonic plague, 318 burials and cremations France, 344 Burma big millers, 241 Canopy, 309 caste committees, 342 Central European powers, 230 Central Publicity Bureau, 224 Chinese resentment, 326 civil food supplies directions, 242 civil supplies, 238 Civil Supplies Officer, 237 collaborator, 158 collectors, 239 Colonial Secretary, 321 communication system Secretary of State and Viceroy, 93 complaints, 237 conceptualize collective memory, 304 Congress Committee meeting with Bombay Presidency Association, 142

Contraband of War, 37 Controller of Prices, 235 cremation, 344 dead commemoralization, 327 debilitating effect World War I, 328 Defence of India Rules of 1915, 239, 298, 319, 323 Defence of the Realms Act, 1917, 220 dehati vernacular language, 297 Delhi War Conference, 117 Gandhi an exception, 119 Gandhi’s protested, 125 Gandhi’s view, 138 Home Rule by Tilak, 142–143 Lokmanya Tilak’s view, 123 Viceroy’ concerns, 118 delousers, 46 Department of Information, 219 Depressed Classes Mission Society of India, 115 Director of Civil Supplies, 236, 238, 240 disabled soldiers medical care Army Council, 289 hospitals, 287 Mesopotamian Commission, 286 Viceroy’s Council, 288 women nurses, employment, 289 Divide and Rule policy by British, 321 East India Company, 247 effervescent enthusiasm, 301 enemy Jesuits and tribulations administration, 208 anti-British sentiment, 195 applications, 205 Archbishop, 207 Basel Mission, 211

Index   383  

Bombay Chronicle, 207 British Empire, 195 British Government, 214 Brother Zimmer’s case, 206 Catholic community, 204 Church authorities, 203 complaints, 210 educational activities, 198 exceptions, 204 German and Austrian missionaries, 196 GOI, 204 government role, 198 Hostile Women’s Camp, 212 human rights violations, 209 Imperial War Conference of 1918, 214 indefinite internment, 214 Indian administration, 195 memorandum, 196 misguided bid, 212 missionaries, 195, 197 Pope, 209 Prussian ascendancy, 200 Roman Catholic Church, 199 authorities, 203 Swiss newspaper, 209 tin sheds, 210 Enemy Trading Ordinance, 231 English soldiers, 294 European British subject, 34 definition, 36 European bureaucracy, 317 European society in India, 193 European war-writers, 297 European white-man, 293 Famine Commissioner, 235 federation nationality and citizenship, 30 finance, 42 firing trench, 45 First Sikh Regiment, 71 First World War, 305, 327

articles on Mesopotamia, 10–11 Bombay Presidency’s contribution to recruitment, 113 casualties stated, 14 catalyst factor of European culture change, 3 Catherine Moriarty rightly remarks, 5 combatant and non-combatant contribution of India, 13–17 contribution from Indian revenues, 15 debate on origins, 1 early warning sign of the later war, 1 East African campaign, 63–67 feature, 93 features in early 1918, 116 fought by, 1 Fritz Fischer’s book findings, 2–3 Gandhi, recruiting sergeant, 137 GOI, denied entry of foreign, 21 historiography and rationale, 1–17 historiography of India’s participation, 6–11 Ilbert Bill Controversy, 35 immediate change brought, 29 Indian recruitment and rewards, 69 inherent defects in Indian Military, 80 Jay Winter’s point of view, 5 lectures at Cambridge by E. H. Carr, 3 letter from Indian soldiers, 49 memorandum, 122 memorial site, 310 memory, British writers’s contribution, 4 methodology and sources utilized, 11–13 new dimensions by historians, 6 recruitment of technical staff, 14 Rhine, zone of tension, 43 Royal Indian Marine resources, 15

 384   Indians in the First World War

Shrabani Basu’s literature, 9 six interrelated themes, 5 Flanders soul-grinding trench warfare in, 293 flood season, 54 food grains case of movement, 238 Foodstuff Control Department, 234 Food-stuffs Commissioner, 236 foreigner definition, 33 Foreigner’s Bill, 32–33 Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, 188 French metallurgical complexes, 43 frightfulness of war, 318 front-line soldiers, 291 Gagging Tilak, 145 Gallipoli campaign Indian soldiers, 57–63 weather conditions, 60 Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1899, 188 German fighting forces, 193 German-Indian conspiracy, 220 German trenches, 46 Ghati labourers, 152 goods traffic, 236 Government of India (GOI), 19, 321 Government of India vide Letter No. 2165-W dated 16th April 1919, 250 Governor of Bombay telegram by British Prime Minister, 117 Griff nach der Weltmacht, 2 Hatred, 25 Her Majesty’s Indian Marine, 83 History of the Bombay Army, 7

Home Rule League, 321 Home Rule party, 128 Horniman’s articles, 325 hostile countries, 19 instructions, 20 no adverse communication of news, 20–21 no leave granted, 20 Hostile Trading Firms Act, 22 humiliating memory, 295 Ilbert Bill Controversy, 35 Imperial Legislative Council session of 1915, 232 imperial military reserve, 41 Imperial War Conference in London 1917, 242 Imperial War Conference of 1918, 214 Imperial War Graves Commission, 304, 307 Import and Export Goods Act, XI of 1916, 231 India, 102 India Gate, 304 India Gate memorial, 309 Indian Army Commander-in-Chief, 74–75 soldiers of, 306 Territorial Armies, 77 Viceroy’s observation, 88 Indian-Bangladeshi poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899–1976), 299 Indian businessmen, 232 Indian civilians, 327 Indian collective memory, 304 Indian cultural context Anand views, 298 Indian Defence Force 1914–1920, 116 enrolment, 248 garrison service, 250 Registration Ordinance, 248 registration, process, 249

Index   385  

resolutions, 248 volunteers, 248 Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ Mesopotamian campaign, 51–63 Indian Munition Board, 230 Indian national movement, 330 Indian Nation Congress Session, 227 Indian Press Act of 1910, 217, 227 Indian soldiers, 342 opinion, 299 Indian Voices of the Great War— Soldiers’ Letters, 47 Indian Volunteer Ambulance Corps, 343 Indian War Loans Abkaree revenues, 246 communique, 242 gigantic struggle, 245 indent system, 247 issues, 245 labour, 242 Land Revenue Code, 247 Oriental Translator, 244 policy, 242 public meeting, 243, 245 Rebellion of 1857, 242 wage-slave of the Empire, 243 India’s Contribution to the World War I, 7 India’s Services in the War—Vol. III, 7 India’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 309 internal security principal function of the military forces, 41 inter-provincial restrictions, 240 Iraq, 53 Jagad Vritta, 224 Jewel of the Empire, 40 Jonathan Peel Commission, 69–70 kaleidoscopic changes in British India, 19

Land Revenue Code, 247 living memorials, 328 London treaties, 43 Lord Roberts, 72 loyalty resolution Tilak’s speech, 128 Lutyens–Kipling, 309 malignant persistency, 109 martial law demand from Governor of Bombay, 26 Masculine, 35 Masik Manoranjan in 1923–24, 300 MCMXIX, 306 memoirs bear, 300 Mention, 155 mercenary motives, 299 Mesopotamia, 52 adverse climatic conditions, 301 campaign, 299 British administration behaviour on report, 110 conclusions, 105 direction and force of wind, 55 early phase, 104 Indian expeditionary force, 63 observation of Parliamentary Commission, 85 physical condition of terrain, 55 ramifications, 111 report publication effects, 109 features, 52 Mesopotamian Commission, 101, 286 task, 301 Mesopotamian Commission Report ignorance at headquarters, 95 Mesopotamian expedition failed act, 103 objects, 88 situation in Persian Gulf, 90 Mesopotamian fiasco, 85 blame, 85 Commission’s report, 92

 386   Indians in the First World War

faulty organization of the Indian Military, 91 no man’s child, 88 Mesopotamian muddle, 109 military forces principal function, 41 Minto Reforms, 111 mobilization of Princely States, 112 modern memory, 291 Mohammedan community resolution, 228 mot troops, 328 M.S.M. of 2/17 Dogra Regiment, 293 multi-lingual Indians, 293 Muslim League, 320 My Campaign in Mesopotamia, 7 mythological epic of Ramayan, 302 nationalism, 33 nature of trench-life, 294 nineteenth century second half of, 40 three decades, 40 nonchalant attitude of officers, 99–100 non-China market, 231 Ottoman Empire, 231 overseas exports, 239 pandemic influenza, 284 Bombay Presidency, 285 epidemic visitations, 286 insemination of germs, 285 mortality rate, 285 symptoms, 284 pathological dissections, 331 Penjdeh incident, 40 Political and Revenue department, 234 Port Trust railways, 313 Portuguese territory requirements, 238 Press Act, 125 Press Association of India, 227 pre-war figures of recruitment, 113

Princely States rulers, 250 offer, 254 aeroplanes, 256 bullocks, 263 camels, 263 gifts, cash and kind, 269 horses, 263 hospitals, 266 motors, 259 mules, 263 tents, 261 personal services, 251 priority certificates, 238 prisoners of war (POWs) administration survey, 170 alien enemy, definitions, 164 Army Department’s administration, 167 barbed-wire sickness, 167 Belgaum camp, case, 190 camp accounts, 176 Ahmednagar, 332 Belgaum Camp, 192 censor office, 178 clothing, 175 convictions, 176 deaths, 186 evading censorship, method, 180 food rationing, 174 internees, 183 laws and customs, 188 malarial fevers and dysentery, 185 management, 173 medical history, 181, 184 official correspondence, 173 parcels, 181 physical conditions, 189 relief funds, 177 sickroom cookery, method, 182 Swiss Consul, intervention, 191 violence, 186 Camp Commandant, 167

Index   387  

camps, 189 civilian internees, 167 comprehensive agreement, 166 concentration camps, 170 disciplinary measures, 168 enemy civilians, internment, 169 First World War, historiography, 169 guards and inmates, 168 international law guarantee, formalities, 169 interned German crewmen, 166 isolation, 165 military censors, 167 national safety measures, 164 psychological reaction, 165 The Hague Conference, 165 treatment of civilians, 164 violence, 169 Privy Council, 321 proceedings of Committee, 24 Proclamation, 37 prosperity, 316 Provincial War Conference, 125 public indignation, 325 Public Services Commission, 134 Gopal Krishna Gokhale’s contribution, 134–135 purchases of jute, 230 Ramzan, fast, 342 Rebellion of 1857, 242 recruiting campaign dos and don’ts, 79–80 recruiting of soldiers Commander-in-Chief, 74–75 Dr B. R. Ambedkar’s letter, 73–74 First Sikh Regiment, 71 flow of untouchables in and out, 73 Greater Punjab, 69–70 industrial development of Bombay, 75 Mazbhi Sikhs, 72–73 Royal Indian Marines, 83–84

recruiting sergeant, 137 recruitment campaign, aggressive, 150 problem with system, 153 rewards, 146–163 supporter, Lokmanya B. G. Tilak, 141 work difficulties faced, 121 recruits in Bombay Presidency, 114 repression and conciliation, policy, 319 resolution of loyalty supporter Surendra Nath Banergea’s view, 119 Revenue Department Memoranda, 234 Revolt of 1857, 323 Rewards, 155 Royal Indian Marines, 83–84, 310 Rule 11-J, 239 Rupert Furneaux, 324 rural poverty, 161 Sainnyatil Athwani (War Memoirs), 300 Samyukta Socialist Party, 309 Sanad, 155 Savior of Punjab, 324 sea permits, 238 Second Home Rule League Conference, 321 Secretary of War, 324 sector of the Somme, 45 Seditious Meetings Act, 125 seeds of Muslim separatism, 113 sense of patriotic duty, 119 Shell-shock disease, 328 Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, 4 soaring inflation, 317 Special Session of Congress, 133 Stone of Remembrance, 307 strikes, 317 cotton textile industry, 233 supply of Kerosene, 239 surrender Kut-ul-Imara to Turks, 95–98 Swiss Red Cross Commission, 189

 388   Indians in the First World War

Territorial Armies, 77 theatres of war direction and force of wind, 55 Indian soldiers’ participation, 40–68 Mesopotamian campaign, 51 physical and climatic difficulties of Mesopotamian, 53–63 The Foreigner’s Ordinance 1914, 36 The Great Betrayal, 242 The Great War, 1 The Great War and Modern Memory, 3, 291 The Great War and the Modern Memory, 43 The India I Knew 1897–1947, 76 The Indian Corp in France, 6 The Journal of Contemporary History, 329 The Lesson of Mesopotamia, 109 theory of martial races, 79 Third Afghan War of 1919–1921, 300 threat of invasion, 40 treaty obligations, 22 Treaty of Lausanne, 326 Treaty of Sévres, 326 trench British, 46 line, 43, 47, 50 firing, 45 types, 45 warfare, 49 well-built, 46 Vincent–Bingley Medical Report, 301 Vitthal Ramji Shinde, 115 Voluntary recruiting Gandhi’s view, 139 war conference, Indian leader’s response, 111–146

declaration articles and editorial, 19 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 30 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Bill, 30 Gandhi, recruiting sergeant, 137 Gandhi’s efforts by Judith Brown, 140 Gandhi’s response, 136 instructions, 20 law problems in colonial situation, 18–39 no adverse communication of news, 21 Proclamation, 37 Vorwaerts, 18 profits to Indian industries, 317 relief funds, contributions, 280 War Committee, 321 war; declaration The Gazette of India, 18 War Ferment in India Anti-British literature, 220 British press volatile atmosphere in India, 217 censorship, 219, 225 civil telegraphic censorship, 226 Fauji Akhbar permission, 222 hostile reaction, 217 Imperial Legislature, 217 informal and ad hoc methods, 219 pamphlets, 220 positive measures, 218 positive publicity, 220 pre-censorship, 224 propaganda, 221 propaganda activities in London, 223 public opinion, 218 revolutionary activities, 216

Index   389  

telegram dated 27 December 1914, 226 telegraphic censoring, 225 urdu translations, copies, 222 War League, 116 War Loan Committee, 245 War Loans, 246 War Purposes Board, 125 sub-committees, 126 wartime commemorative forms, 308 well-built trench, 46 Western civilization, 318

Western front letter from Indian soldiers, 47–49 severity of weather, 42 Western India Turf Club to war & relief funds donations made, 278 White Mutiny, 35 Willingdon Memorial, 250 Winston Churchill, 324 With the Indians in France, 7 Your Lordship, 343