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India Migrations Reader
 9781138677722, 9781315559377

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
CONTENTS
List of figures
List of tables
Notes on contributors
Introduction: the changing faces of Indian migration
1 Migration policy reforms in India: some reflections
2 Diaspora and development: critical issues
3 Migration and gender empowerment: emerging issues
4 Mobility of women workers from South Asia to the Gulf: stakeholders’ responses
5 The global economic crisis and governance of human mobility
6 Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia: prospects under the Nitaqat law
7 Internal migration in India: are the underclass more mobile?
8 Politics of conflict and migration
9 Capitalist development and the informalization of labour markets in India
10 Inclusive growth and economic crises: labour migration and poverty in India
Index

Citation preview

INDIA MIGRATIONS READER

This volume brings together critical and landmark studies in Indian migration. It: •

• •

covers a range of key themes – emigration policy in countries of destination and origin, development and remittances, gender issues, impact of the global financial crisis, conflict and inclusive growth; looks at new and emerging patterns in Indian migration; and includes chapters by major scholars in the field.

The book will be useful to scholars and researchers of development studies, migration and diaspora studies, economics and sociology. It will also interest policymakers and government institutions working in the area. S. Irudaya Rajan is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India.

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INDIA MIGRATIONS READER

Edited by S. Irudaya Rajan

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 S. Irudaya Rajan The right of S. Irudaya Rajan to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-67772-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-55937-7 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

CONTENTS

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors

vii viii ix

Introduction: the changing faces of Indian migration

1

S . I RU DAYA R AJ AN

1 Migration policy reforms in India: some reflections

16

S . K R I S H N A K U MAR

2 Diaspora and development: critical issues

24

D I L I P R ATH A A N D SO N IA P L AZA

3 Migration and gender empowerment: emerging issues

45

J AYATI G H O S H

4 Mobility of women workers from South Asia to the Gulf: stakeholders’ responses

74

R A K K E E TH I M OT H Y

5 The global economic crisis and governance of human mobility

89

BIMAL GHOSH

6 Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia: prospects under the Nitaqat law K . C . Z AC H A R I A H , S. IRUDAYA RAJA N A N D JO L IN JOSEPH

v

102

CONTENTS

7 Internal migration in India: are the underclass more mobile?

122

R . B . B H AG AT

8 Politics of conflict and migration

141

S . I RU DAYA R AJAN , VIJAY KO RRA A N D RIKIL CHY R MANG

9 Capitalist development and the informalization of labour markets in India

148

M O U S H U M I B A SU

10 Inclusive growth and economic crises: labour migration and poverty in India

162

A R J A N D E H A AN

Index

185

vi

FIGURES

I.1 I.2 I.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Emigration clearances: Kerala and Uttar Pradesh Emigration clearances: Kerala and Bihar Emigration clearances to countries of destination: Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates Diaspora: first and second generations, 2010 Indian Diaspora 2011: non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin Top 10 recipients of migrant remittances Top 10 recipients of migrant remittances as a share of GDP Population of Kerala and Saudi Arabia Population in the age group 15–39 in Saudi Arabia and Kerala Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia and the UAE Age distribution of emigrants from Kerala, 2011 Percentage of emigrants with 12th standard or higher levels of education Percentage of emigrants with a college degree Employment sectors of emigrants Percentage increase in the number of people in the 15–39 age group, 1989–91 through 2031–41 Reasons for return of emigrants for Saudi Arabia and all destinations, 2007–09 Interstate net migration in India, 1991–2001 Migration rates by MPCE, rural India, 1999–2000 Migration rates by MPCE, urban India, 1999–2000 Migration rates by social categories, 1999–2000

vii

3 3 4 29 30 32 32 104 105 110 111 112 113 114 117 119 130 135 136 136

TABLES

2.1 Diaspora in Australia and the US 3.1 Estimates of percentage of female migrants in stock of total migrants, by major area 4.1 Major conventions and protocols of the ILO and the UN on migration 4.2 Age restrictions imposed on international migration of female domestic workers 6.1 Educational attainment of emigrants 6.2 Percentage of emigrants with given educational level 6.3 Employment status of emigrants in selected countries 6.4 Percentage distribution of emigrants by industry 7.1 Percentage of internal and international migrants based on place of last residence, India, 1971–2001 (in millions) 7.2 Percentage distribution of internal migrants by sex and duration of residence at the place of enumeration, 1981–2001 7.3 Size and growth rates of migrants by type of movement, India 1971–2001 7.4 Size and growth rates of migrants by streams of migration, India 1971–2001 7.5 Sex ratio of migrants by migration types, 1981–2001 (males per 1,000 females) 7.6 Sex ratio by rural and urban streams, 1971–2001 (males per 1,000 females) 7.7 Reasons for migration in India, 2001 7.8 Correlation of matrix showing relationship between migration, poverty and development variables at state level (N = 32), in 2001 viii

29 46 77 79 112 112 113 115

125

126 127 128 131 131 132

133

CONTRIBUTORS

Moushumi Basu is Associate Professor at International Organization Division, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. R. B. Bhagat is Professor and Head at Department of Migration and Urban Studies, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, India. Rikil Chyrmang is Doctoral Fellow at Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, India. Bimal Ghosh is Emeritus Professor at Colombian School of Public Administration, and Fellow at Institute of International Policy and Diplomacy, University of Tadeo Lozano, Bogotá, Colombia. He is also Senior Fellow at Global Migration Centre, the Graduate Institute Geneva, Switzerland. Jayati Ghosh is Professor of Economics at Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Arjan de Haan is Program Leader, Supporting Inclusive Growth at International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada. Jolin Joseph is Doctoral Candidate at York University, Toronto, Canada. Vijay Korra is Assistant Professor at Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, India. S. Krishna Kumar is former member of the Indian Administrative Service and a consultant in the areas of urban governance, emigration policy/ legislation and diaspora mobilisation, based in Bangalore, India. ix

CONTRIBUTORS

Sonia Plaza is Senior Economist at Development Economics Prospects Group of the World Bank. S. Irudaya Rajan is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India. Dilip Ratha is Manager, Migration and Remittances Unit and Head, Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) at Development Prospects Group of the World Bank. Rakkee Thimothy is Associate Fellow at V. V. Giri National Labour Institute, Noida, India. K. C. Zachariah is Honorary Professor at Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, India.

x

INTRODUCTION The changing faces of Indian migration S. Irudaya Rajan

The first India Migration Report (IMR) was released in the year 2010 with the support from the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, and the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India. Due to its popularity among the migration scholars both in India and abroad, I decided to bring out the annual reports for four consecutive years from 2011 through 2014 with new themes, covering subjects from the social costs of migration to diaspora and development. On the completion of five years, Routledge decided to bring out a box set comprising a series covering five years of publication of the Indian Migration Report and released it on the 90th birthday of K. C. Zachariah, honorary professor at CDS. Between 2010 and 2014, 88 chapters in the IMR annual series were published. During the 10th migration training session organized at the CDS, one of the young participants asked me the following question: can you bring out the best 10 chapters from the IMR series as a compulsory reader in migration studies for beginners? This reader is the answer to that question. The publication of this migration reader will mark the completion of the 10th year of the Research Unit on International Migration (RUIM) sponsored by the MOIA at CDS from 2006. Over the past 10 years since the establishment of RUIM in 2006, several migration studies were funded both by the MOIA and other funding agencies such as the European Commission, Rockefeller Foundation, Asian Development Bank, World Bank, International Labour Organization, International Organization for Migration, International Development Research Centre, Migrant Forum Asia, United Nations Fund for Women, United Nations Fund for Population Activities, Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala, 1

S . I R U D AY A R A J A N

Department of NRI Affairs, Government of Goa, State Planning Board, Government of Kerala and State Planning Board, Government of Tamil Nadu. At the time of the inauguration of the RUIM in 2006, the CDS completed two rounds of Kerala Migration Surveys (KMSs), which were funded by the Indo-Dutch Program on Alternatives in Development (IDPAD) through the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi and the South Asian Network of Economic Institutes. The CDS completed the sixth round of the KMS in 2013, maintaining the panel data on KMS households over the past 20 years – 1998–2003, 1998–2003–2008, 1998–2008, 2003–2008, 1998–2013, 2003–2013, 2008–2013 and 1998–2003–2008–2013. The CDS undertook the Goa Migration Survey in 2008 and the Tamil Nadu Migration Survey in 2015 on its own and is also in discussion with the Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Bihar to conduct migration surveys based on the KMS model in these states in the near-future. In addition, the CDS research team has provided technical support for conducting Gujarat Migration Surveys both by the Gujarat Institute of Development Research and International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai and the Punjab Migration Survey by the Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, Chandigarh. At the time of writing this introduction, the sixth IMR has been released, the seventh IMR is in the press (Gulf Migration) and the eighth IMR is in progress with the theme of Indian migrants in Europe. In addition, in 2012, the CDS launched the global journal Migration and Development, which is published by Taylor and Francis. Four volumes and eight issues of the journal have already been published. Started with two issues a year, the journal grew to three annual issues since 2016 and this is expected to become four annual issues from 2018. Looking at international migration, the global financial crisis has brought new changes in both the states of origin and countries of destination. For decades, Kerala was the leading state in terms of labour migration according to Emigration Clearances Required (ECR) data. However, since 2009, Uttar Pradesh has jumped ahead of Kerala and continues to occupy the prime position in terms of ECR data to date (Figure I.1). In 2013, even Bihar overtook Kerala in terms of ECR data and the trend continues (Figure I.2). It is expected that Rajasthan will also overtake Kerala in a few years from now. So we should be ready to undertake migration surveys in the new emerging states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan! 2

INTRODUCTION 250.00 200.00 Uttar Pradesh

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Figure I.2 Emigration clearances: Kerala and Bihar

With regard to the destination countries, our analysis indicates that around 95 per cent of labour outflows were to six key destinations in West Asia (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar) since 1988. This trend continued until 2002, with 75 per cent going to these countries that year. In 1994, Saudi Arabia led with 65 per cent of the annual labour outflows from India followed by the UAE. In terms of absolute numbers, barring 1999, Saudi Arabia attracted the largest number of Indian labourers (Irudaya Rajan and Joseph, 2013). This is true also for 2002. The available labour outflow statistics reflect that over the years, the Gulf countries have remained the prime destination for Indian workers. Even in 2008, 96 per cent of migrant labour left Indian shores for the six countries in the Gulf. The UAE tops the list, receiving 41 per cent of the workers from India, followed by Saudi Arabia with 27 per cent (Irudaya Rajan and Remya Prabha, 2008). 3

S . I R U D AY A R A J A N 400 350 300 250 200 150 S. Arabia 100 U. A. E. 50

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Figure I.3 Emigration clearances to countries of destination: Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates

Interestingly, Saudi Arabia has not only emerged as an important destination for Indian workers since 2009 (Figure I.3), but it has also moved to number-one position, with the destination attracting Indian workers even at the time of the financial crisis and continuing to do so even in 2015 (Irudaya Rajan and Narayana, 2012).

Organization of the reader I have selected 10 chapters from the first five IMR series – two chapters each from each of the five IMRs. The selected chapters allow readers to get the flavour of the migration issues emerging in India – migration and diaspora policy, gender, internal migration, the global crisis and Nitaqat and the linkage between migration and poverty. In his chapter, S. Krishna Kumar forcefully argues for migration policy reforms in India on the basis of five important components – the context, outline of the policy, the need for an inclusive policy on international migration rather than emigration, deregulation of international migration and a new legislative framework (Krishna Kumar, 2010). As the founding secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004, he articulates a vision that promotes a migration policy based on migration research done at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) and outside the CDS (see the major works on migration by the CDS: Zachariah, Mathew and Irudaya Rajan, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2001a, 2001b, 2009; Zachariah, Prakash and Irudaya Rajan, 2003, 2004; Zachariah, Nair and Irudaya 4

INTRODUCTION

Rajan, 2006; Zachariah, Kannan and Irudaya Rajan, 2002). His ideas of policy reforms and reflections are based on his work as chairman of the Migration Policy Group set up by the CDS (Centre for Development Studies, 2012) as well as chairman of the migration policy Drafting Committee set up by the MOIA several years ago (see also Krishna Kumar and Irudaya Rajan, 2014). Of the several contexts that he lists in connection with the migration policy outline, one which particularly attracted my attention is the failure of governance across passport, emigration, recruitment and visa systems. As a nodal ministry, MOIA needs to articulate its broader policy on international migration because India, like some other developing countries, is simultaneously the country of origin, transit and destination. He critically examines the legislative framework of the Emigration Act as ‘protection by exception’ and strongly recommends the discarding of the two types of passports in India – Emigration Clearance Required (ECR) and Emigration Clearance Not Required (ECNR). He requests the Government of India to move towards the new system of a single class of passports for all citizens, irrespective of the applicant’s educational qualifications and emigration destination (Krishna Kumar, 2012). At the end, he argues for a new legislative framework for international migration based on the model of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). While Krishna Kumar articulates an argument for a new migration policy for India, Dilip Ratha and Sonia Plaza emphasize the need for a diaspora policy in terms of diaspora and cross-border economies, diaspora and development paradigms and dual citizenship, as well as for making the best use of embassies and consulates in the destination countries (Ratha and Plaza, 2014). In this context, they also discuss the concept and definition of the term ‘diaspora’. For instance, the Government of India defines diaspora as comprising all overseas Indians which includes Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-Resident Indians (NRI). However, diaspora includes not only first, second and third generations and beyond, but also 1.5 and 2.5 generations. Up to 51 per cent of Australia’s population comprised first and second generations of the diasporic community in 2011, whereas the corresponding proportion in the population of the United States was 22 per cent in 2010. In terms of numbers, the Indian diaspora’s presence is significant in the United States of America, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada, Mauritius, Oman, Singapore and Australia, and India continues to maintain its 5

S . I R U D AY A R A J A N

lead as the largest receiver of remittances in the world. Surprisingly, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi has made an official visit to almost all the countries with a sizeable Indian diaspora. This indicates Government of India’s commitment to work in partnership with the diaspora on its new path of development. Dilip and Sonia discuss the importance of diaspora bonds and the linkage between diaspora, trade and investment, skills and technology transfer. Finally, they elucidate the importance of migration and remittances in facilitating the ‘eight millennium’ development goals (now, sustainable development goals) with facts and evidence. While the first two chapters in this reader discuss migration and diaspora policy, the next two chapters examine gender empowerment and migrant women issues in the Gulf. Using extensive global data on migration, Zlotnik (2003) argued that women often outnumber men among international migrants. Based on this, Jayati Ghosh explored the gender-sensitive approach to migration, socio-economic context of migrants in the sending countries and the problems faced by women migrants at the destination (Ghosh, 2010). With an excellent global overview of the subject, the author organizes the chapter into the following broad categories: leaving home, being away, the effects of migration and links with home, with the closing section dedicated to migration and public policy. This chapter is one of the background chapters used for preparing the United Nations’ (2009) Human Development Report which deals with barriers to migration. The most fascinating part of the chapter is the 16 proposals put forward on matters of public policy on migration and gender. These include (a) collection of both qualitative and quantitative data on women’s short-term, long-term and seasonal migration patterns, assessment of the problems they face during the life cycle of migration, before leaving home, at the destination and on return; (b) gender-sensitive laws and regulations affecting both internal and cross-border movements; (c) making health monitoring systems more gender-sensitive (d); reducing the isolation of women emigrants in certain occupations such as domestic work; and (e) making transfer remittances easier and safer for women migrants. The migration narratives of women workers are complex and require gender-sensitive policies (Piper, 2008). While Ghosh (2011) articulates gender-sensitive policies, Rakkee Thimothy (2013) examines the mobility of women workers from South Asia to the Gulf – one of the biggest migration corridors in the world – and assesses the stakeholders’ 6

INTRODUCTION

response at the global and regional levels as well as in the countries of origin and destination. Though vulnerability to exploitation starts right at the recruitment process (Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar, 2011), emigration policies in South Asia are unequal in their treatment of men and women (Oishi, 2005). This is partly due to the paternalistic attitude of the state towards female migrant workers (Kabeer, 2007). Rakkee argues that restrictive migration policies have reduced the possibility of regular and legal migration, forcing women to adopt risky processes to migrate, quoting examples from Nepal (Nepal Institute of Development Studies, 2010) and India (Bindhulakshmi, 2010). To conclude, the migration of women workers offers immense scope for the social and economic mobility of both individuals and families and reshaping of gender relations at both the micro and macro levels. Is South Asia ready to explore this through a gender-sensitive migration policy? Since the India Migration Report was first published (Irudaya Rajan, 2010), two important events occurred that significantly impacted the life of migrants – the global economic crisis and the Nitaqat law imposed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In view of the importance that these events deserve in migration literature, I devoted the India Migration Report 2012 with the theme – Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittance – (Irudaya Rajan, 2012). I have included two chapters in the reader that describe how these two crucial events affected migration and remittance trends – both globally and in the Gulf. Based on the analysis of an earlier crisis, viz., the Great Depression of the 1930s, Bimal Ghosh (2012) argues that over the medium- and long-term period, all the structural drivers of migration will remain exactly the same. It is important to manage migration effectively during a crisis, failing which would cause serious tension and conflict in the host society. Citing from one of his earlier works, Ghosh (2007) discusses the constraints of the international framework for managing migration at length: the lack of shared goal or a ‘common good’ between the origin and destination countries, the absence of reciprocity of interests between the two countries and the absence of a hegemonic power to sponsor and safeguard such a regime. It is expected that by 2025, the global migration system will become more stable and the framework of cooperation will work under much reduced tension. The stability would come about through the decline in the pressure to emigrate (especially through irregular channels) as a result of an improved economic and political scenario in 7

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migrant-sending countries such as India, China, Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea, and also in countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, South Africa and Vietnam. However, our analysis of the impact of the global economic crisis on migration and remittances in South Asian countries and the Gulf clearly indicates the resilience of both emigration and remittances (Irudaya Rajan and Narayana, 2012). With our experience in examining the trends in Gulf migration since 1988 through several rounds of KMSs (Zachariah et al., 2003; Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), Zachariah, Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph (2014) take a relook at the trends in emigration from Kerala to Saudi Arabia, including emigration prospects under the Nitaqat law. According to the annual reports of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, unskilled worker movement patterns in the Gulf have changed partly due to the global economic crisis. For instance, in 2008 (before the global crisis hit the United Arab Emirates), 349,827 unskilled workers left for the United Arab Emirates, as against 228,406 to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 2009, the number who went to the United Arab Emirates declined to 130,302 persons, indicating an absolute decline of 198,104 persons (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2010). This declining trend continues to prevail, with the number of emigrants reaching 224,033 during 2014–15 which remains lower than the pre-global crisis level of 2008 (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). On the other hand, the number of unskilled workers who went to Saudi Arabia stood at 228,406 in 2008, increased to 281,110 in 2009, 289,897 in 2011, 357,203 in 2012, and slightly declined after the Nitaqat, reaching 329,937 in 2014–15 – an absolute decline of 27,266 persons. Compared to the decline in emigration to the United Arab Emirates caused by the global crisis, the decline in the emigration to Saudi Arabia due to the Nitaqat is minimal. According to the KMS of 2011, about 52,000 emigrants from Saudi Arabia returned to Kerala in 2010 and the corresponding number was 45,000 in 2008. They returned much before and after the enforcement of Nitaqat law because migration to the Gulf is temporary labour migration. Despite Saudization efforts, the country continues to depend on foreign labour to fill both high and low-skilled jobs. Programmes for the development and training of a local labour force have been too modest to expect a significant short-term reduction in the pressure on the Saudi labour market, and at least for now, migration appears to be the answer to the demands of this dynamic economy. 8

INTRODUCTION

Similar trends are also reported in the sixth round of KMSs (Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2015). One neglected area in migration research is internal migration and the factors associated with it. This also has to do with the lack of the availability of a large-scale database other than the census which comes out every 10 years (Irudaya Rajan, 2011). The new data sets on internal migration include the National Sample Surveys, India Human Development Surveys and state-level migration surveys conducted in Kerala, Goa, Gujarat, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. The reader includes two chapters that provide information on internal migration and its economic, social and political dimensions. Using the decennial censuses, Bhagat (2011) documents the trends in internal migration, distribution of internal migrants by duration of residence, size and growth of migrants by type of movements such as intradistrict, interdistrict and interstate, gender, migration streams (rural to rural, urban to urban, rural to urban and urban to rural) and also the reasons for migration. About 30 per cent of India’s population are migrants as per the place of last residence definition; 62 per cent fall under the intradistrict movement category, 69 per cent of the intrastate migration constitutes the rural-rural stream, and 39 per cent of the interstate migration is rural to urban. Females outnumber males in internal migration. While 50 per cent of the women report marriage as the reason for their movement, 29 per cent of the men report the quest for employment as the driver of migration. At the time of writing this introduction, the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India had not released the 2011 data on migration. I gauge that internal migration in India is likely to be around 400 million. Using a correlation matrix based on the relationship between migration, poverty and development, Bhagat argues that there is a strong correlation between per capita income and in-migration and a moderate correlation between per capita income and out-migration. Thus, the relationship between migration and poverty is complex (Skeldon, 2002). Finally, based on data from the latest rounds of National Sample Surveys, Bhagat concludes that migration rates are higher among groups with the highest monthly per capita expenditure and that the rates decline at the lower income strata. In the current scenario, poor and uneducated migrants find it difficult to live in cities. In this context, Irudaya Rajan, Vijay Korra and Rikkil Chyrmang (2011) document the politicization of internal migration at the destination states based on the recent attacks on North Indian migrant workers in Maharashtra, Goa, Meghalaya and Assam. 9

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It is due to the non-implementation of Interstate Migrant Workman Act, 1979 (Menon, 2011). The last two chapters in the reader discuss the informalization of labour markets and the links between migration and poverty in the context of the inclusive growth policies of the erstwhile Congress-led government in India. The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) estimated that 77 per cent of the Indian population consists of the poor and vulnerable segment living on less than Rs 20 a day (NCEUS, 2008). Even more than six decades after Independence, the Indian state has failed to provide certain guaranteed rights related to work and employment to the vast majority of its workforce. About 93 per cent of the country’s workers are employed in the informal sector which lacks both safe and proper working conditions. HarrisWhite (2005) estimated that informal sector contributes 60 per cent of net domestic product, 31 per cent of agricultural exports and 41 per cent of manufacturing exports, and is a key constituent of the Indian economy. In this context, Moushumi Basu (2013) seeks to examine the shifts that have taken place in the role of the state vis-à-vis the market in meeting the needs of the extremely vulnerable segment of migrant labour employed in the informal sector, and provides a historical overview of the process of capitalist development and the way the labour markets have traditionally been regulated in India. In doing so, Basu (2013) documents informalization and its consequences, providing evidences from the recent labour unrest violence in Yanam district of Puducherry in January 2012 and the Maruti plant in Haryana in July 2012. Labour migration has always been considered a livelihood option for many workers to diversify their work and for economies to adjust labour supply in times of crisis. However, Arjan de Haan (2012) takes a long-term view and examines the patterns of migration and their links with poverty since the early 1990s as well as the social policies of Congress-led government that have become inclusive of poor labourer migrants. Historically, economic crises can have enormous impact on migration, both short-term and long-term, and direct and direct. The economic crisis of 1929 led to a decrease in international migration and the return of large numbers of internal migrants due to decline in employment opportunities. Quoting from the Labour Commissioner’s report, de Haan (1994) reports that in 1931, 60,000 jute workers – one fifth of the total number of workers – were dismissed as a result of 10

INTRODUCTION

trade depression and that their employers ‘melted like a snow in summer’. The 1973 oil crisis led to a fall in labour migration into Europe but a boom in Asian labour migration to the Gulf (Irudaya Rajan and Kumar, 2010). The 1997–98 crisis had a similar impact, but it was a short-term one (Castles and Miller, 2010). This is also true of the 2008 global financial crisis (Irudaya Rajan and Narayana, 2012). The impact of migration on poverty is difficult to decipher because of the diversity and selectivity of migrants, the difficulty in calculating the cost of migration and the complexity involved in isolating the impact of remittances from broader household strategies. Analysis of the impact of migration using household survey data needs to be practically limited (Joe et al., 2011). The Government of India’s 11th Five Year Plan expressed the hope that accelerated growth would lead to increased migration. However, Srivastava and Sasikumar (2003) argue that the legislation to protect interstate migrants has failed because regulatory authorities are overstretched, the state sees migrants as a low priority and acts like the Inter-State Migrant Workman Act remain without teeth (Menon, 2011). The inclusive growth policy pursued in India would make a great leap forward if these initiatives are forcefully promoted across the Indian economy and the labour market.

References Bhagat, R B. 2011. Internal Migration in India: Are the Underclass More Mobile? Chapter 2, pp. 7–24 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2011. India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict. New Delhi: Routledge. Bindhulakshmi, P. 2010. Gender Mobility and State Response: Indian Domestic Workers in the UAE. Chapter 7, pp. 163–181 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2010 India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Centre for Development Studies. 2009. Background Report for National Policy on International Migration. Research Unit on International Migration, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. De Haan, Arjan. 1994. Unsettled Settlers: Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calcutta. Hilversum: Verloren. De Haan, Arjan. 2012. Inclusive Growth and Economic Crises: Labour Migration and Poverty in India. Chapter 12, pp. 225–248 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2012. Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances: India Migration Report 2012. New Delhi: Routledge. Ghosh, Bimal. 2007. Managing Migration: Towards Missing Regime. In Antoine Pecoud and Paul de Guchteneire (eds). Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People, pp. 97–118. Paris; New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

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Ghosh, Bimal. 2012. The Global Economic Crisis and Governance of Human Mobility. Chapter 1, pp. 1–13 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2012 India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittance. New Delhi: Routledge. Ghosh, Jayati. 2010. Migration and Gender Empowerment: Some Issues. Chapter 6, pp. 134–162 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2010. India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Harris-White Barbara. 2005. India’s Market Society: Three Essays in Political Economy. New Delhi: Three Essays Collective. Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed). 2010. India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed). 2011. India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. (ed). 2012. India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittance. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. and Jolin Joseph. 2013. Adapting, Adjusting and Accommodating: Social Costs of Migration to Saudi Arabia. Chapter 9, pp. 139–53 S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2013. Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances: India Migration Report 2013. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S., Vijay Korra and Rikil Chyrmang. 2011. Politics of Conflict and Migration. Chapter 6, pp. 95–101 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2011. India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. and Prabhat Kumar. 2010. Historical Overview of International Migration. Chapter 1, pp. 1–29 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). Governance and Labour Migration: India Migration Report 2010. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. and D. Narayana. 2012. The Financial Crisis in the Gulf and Its Impact on South Asian Migration and Remittances. Chapter 5, pp. 74–93 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2012. Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittances: India Migration Report 2012. New Delhi: Routledge. Irudaya Rajan, S. and G. Remya Prabha. 2008. India. Asia Pacific Migration Journal. Volume 17, Nos 3–4, pp. 277–86. Irudaya Rajan, S., V. J. Varghese and M. S. Jayakumar. 2011. Dreaming Mobility and Buying Vulnerability: Overseas Recruitment Practices and Its Discontents in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Joe, William, Priyajit Samaiyar and U. S. Mishra. 2011. On Examining MigrationPoverty Nexus in Urban India. Chapter 15, pp. 236–256 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2011. India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict. New Delhi: Routledge. Kabeer, Naila. 2007. ‘Footloose’ Female Labour: Transnational Migration, Social Protection and Citizenship in the Asian Region. Working Paper No.1, International Development Research Centre Working Papers on Women’s Rights and Citizenship, Canada. Krishna Kumar, S. 2010. Migration Policy Reforms in India: Some Reflections. Chapter 11, pp. 243–250 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2010. India Migration Report 2010: Governance and Labour Migration. New Delhi: Routledge.

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Krishna Kumar, S. 2012. International Labour Migration: Global Words, National Leads and Local Deeds. Chapter 16, pp. 303–321 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2012. India Migration Report 2012: Global Financial Crisis, Migration and Remittance. New Delhi: Routledge. Krishna Kumar, S. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2014. Emigration in 21st Century India: Governance, Legislation and Institutions. New Delhi: Routledge. Menon, M.N.R 2011. Can the Licensing-Inspection Mechanisms Deliver Justice to Interstate Migrant Workmen? Chapter 7, pp. 102–107 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2011. India Migration Report 2011: Migration, Identity and Conflict. New Delhi: Routledge. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2010. Annual Report. 2008–2009. New Delhi. MOIA. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2011. Annual Report. 2009–2010. New Delhi. MOIA. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2012. Annual Report. 2010–2011. New Delhi. MOIA. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2013. Annual Report. 2011–2012. New Delhi. MOIA. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2014. Annual Report. 2012–2013. New Delhi. MOIA. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. 2015. Annual Report. 2013–2014. New Delhi. MOIA. Moushumi, Basu. 2013. Capitalist Development and the Informalization of Labour Markets in India. Chapter 16, pp. 270–282 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2013 India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS). 2008. Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganized Sector. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. Nepal Institute of Development Studies. 2010. Nepal Migration Year Book 2009. Kathmandu: Nepal Institute of Development Studies. Oishi, Nana. 2005. Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies and Labour Migration in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Piper, Nicola. 2008. Gender, Migration and Development: Trends and Issues. In Regional Thematic Working Group on International Migration Including Human Trafficking and International Organization for Migration. Situation Report on International Migration in East and South-East Asia. Pp. 163–176. Bangkok: IOM. Ratha, Dilip and Sonia Plaza. 2014. Diaspora and Development: Critical Issues. Chapter 1, pp. 1–20 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2014. India Migration Report 2014: Diaspora and Development. New Delhi: Routledge. Skelton, R. 2002. Migration and Poverty. Asia Pacific Population Journal, Volume 17, No.4, pp. 67–82. Srivastava, Ravi and S. K. Sasikumar. 2003. An Overview of Migration in India: Its Impacts and Key Issues. Paper Presented at the Regional Conference on

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Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia, 22–24 June, Dhaka. Stephan, Castles and Mark J. Miller. 2010. Migration and the Global Economic Crisis: One Year on. http://www.age-of-migration.com/na/financialcrisis/ updates/migration_crisis_april2010.pdf (Accessed 10 December 2015). Thimothy, Rakkee. 2013. Mobility of Women Workers from South Asia to the Gulf: Stakeholders Responses. Chapter 18, pp. 296–309 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). 2013 India Migration Report 2013: Social Costs of Migration. New Delhi: Routledge. United Nations. 2009. Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers – Human Mobility and Development. New York: United Nations Development Programme. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001a. Gender Dimensions of Migration in Kerala: Macro and Micro Evidences. Asia Pacific Population Journal, Volume 16, No.3, pp. 47–70. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001b. Migration Mosaic in Kerala: Trends and Determinants. Demography India, Volume 30, No.1, pp. 137–165. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2009. Migration and Development: The Kerala Experience. New Delhi: Daanish Publishers. Zachariah, K .C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012a. Diasporas in Kerala’s Development. New Delhi: Daanish Publishers. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2012b. A Decade of Kerala’s Gulf Connection. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2014. Researching International Migration: Lessons from the Kerala Experience. New Delhi: Routledge. Zachariah, K. C. and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2015. Dynamics of Emigration and Remittances in Kerala: Results of the Kerala Migration Survey 2014. Centre for Development Studies Working paper No.463, Thiruvananthapuram. Zachariah, K. C., S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph. 2014. Kerala Emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects Under the Nitaqat Law. Chapter 16, pp. 229–248 in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed). India Migration Report 2014: Diaspora and Development. New Delhi: Routledge. Zachariah, K. C., P. R. Gopinathan Nair and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2006. Return Emigrants in Kerala: Welfare, Rehabilitation and Development. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers. Zachariah, K. C., K. P. Kannan and S. Irudaya Rajan (eds). 2002. Kerala’s Gulf Connection: CDS Studies on International Labour Migration from Kerala State in India. Centre for Development Monograph Series, Thiruvananthapuram. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001a. Impact of Migration on Kerala’s Economy and Society. International Migration, Volume 39. No.1, pp. 63–88. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2001b. Social, Economic and Demographic Consequences of Migration in Kerala. International Migration, Volume 39. No.2, pp. 43–72.

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Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2003. Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: Determinants, Differentials and Consequences. Orient Longman. Zachariah, K. C., B. A. Prakash and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2003. The Impact of Immigration Policy on Indian Contract Migrants: The Case of the United Arab Emirates. International Migration, Volume 41. No.4, pp. 161–172. Zachariah, K. C., B. A. Prakash and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2004. Indian Workers in UAE: Employment, Wages and Working Conditions. Economic and Political Weekly, Volume XXXIX, No. 22, May 29 2004, pp. 2227–2234. Zlotnik, H. 2003. The Global Dimensions of Female Migration. Migration Policy Institute, Migration Information Centre. Washington, D.C.

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1 MIGRATION POLICY REFORMS IN INDIA Some reflections S. Krishna Kumar

Introduction International migration from India has had a long history. Scholars note many distinct phases of international migration, including at least three in the twentieth century. The first immediately after independence was mostly to the UK. The second, since the mid-1970s to the Gulf, was triggered by the oil boom and has continued with ebbs and flows. The third to the USA in the 1990s was led by IT. Post-independence migration has not been driven or supported by any policy. Though the Emigration Act of 1922 was replaced by the Act of 1983 largely at the instance of the Supreme Court, no attempt was made to articulate a policy governing international migration. With the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) as an independent ministry in 2004 and the assignment to the MOIA of the work relating to international migration, formulation of a policy on international migration began to receive attention. The MOIA signed an agreement with the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in 2006, under which a formal request was made in 2007 for a draft policy on international migration. CDS set up a Migration Policy Group that would draw upon not only the work of the migration unit but also the work done by other units of the CDS in the broad area of development so that issues cutting across disciplines could be addressed in the draft policy. An approach to the policy was prepared and sent to the MOIA. This was finally discussed with the MOIA in January 2008. The MOIA’s comments have been factored in while finalizing the present draft of the policy.

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The context The context of international migration from India has changed significantly since the creation of the MOIA in May 2004. Certain features of this change deserve to be noted. First, the trend rate of growth of the Indian economy went up significantly to 8.7 per cent per annum during 2004–2008, with an annual target of 9 per cent for the Eleventh Plan period of 2007–2012. Faster growth has led to tremendous shortage of labour, particularly skilled but also less skilled. This in turn has led to increased wages across sectors. It is therefore no longer necessary for our workers to go abroad to earn high wages and save something for the family. Internal migration to large metropolitan centres like Mumbai and Delhi or even regional growth poles like Bangalore or Hyderabad provides less risky options. Dr C. Rangarajan, the Chairman of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister, predicts that India will reach full employment status by 2012. While self or service sector employment accounts for most of the new jobs created, it is clear that severe lack of work opportunities at home no longer drives emigration even in Kerala. Young people in certain regions of other states may be in a similar socio-economic situation that Kerala was in when Gulf emigration started but with opportunities growing within India, they are likely to grow out of the emigration craze sooner. Second, the high growth in Asia led by China, India, and the other tiger economies is in sharp contrast to the low growth of the OECD economies. There are now fears of a recession in the USA and the UK. So at all skill levels, economies like that of India are likely to provide more job opportunities in the years to come. There are instances of large India construction firms relocating labour from their sites in the Gulf countries to India. Third, working conditions in many countries are becoming difficult, if not intolerable. Incidents in the Gulf and even the USA of workers protesting against delays in payment of wages and poor working conditions are on the increase. Fourth, despite the rapid growth of the economy and of employment in India, the number of persons cleared for emigration has been increasing every year. There are also increasing instances of irregular migration and of stranded Indian workers rescued in different parts of the world. CDS studies show that many Indians working in the Gulf

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reached there on other than regular work visas, suggesting the widespread collusion and abuse of the system. Finally, apart from the malpractices of the recruitment industry, there is a broader failure of governance across the entire regime of passport, emigration, and visa systems. The number of fake passports, travel, and employment documents in circulation greatly erodes the very credibility of the system to such an extent that to the victims, overseas nations, and international agencies, the government appears to be part of the problem rather than of the solution. On the positive side, because of migration within regions such as Europe, new opportunities of replacement migration are coming in the way of Indian workers. Countries like Poland, whose workers move within the EU, are now seeking formal agreements with India to access workers with particular skills to replenish their manpower. If these opportunities are properly harnessed, India will also be able to diversify the geographical destination of its overseas workforce away from the Gulf to Europe and even other regions. Thus, any policy that is formulated needs to factor in the current context of international migration and respond to the emerging challenges as well as opportunities.

Outline of the policy Clearly, the proposed policy has to be a policy on international migration and not merely a policy on emigration from India. The latter is far more restricted in terms of skill levels and geographical coverage. MOIA, as the nodal ministry, needs to articulate a broader policy on international migration because India, like most other countries of the world today, is simultaneously a country of origin, transit, and destination. As a large democracy and a leading economy of the world, India needs to develop an unambiguous position on international migration, cutting across ministries, that is then articulated in the policy. Second, given the changed context in India and the world, the proposed policy has clearly to focus on temporary rather permanent migration. This implies that the policy would consciously acknowledge and take into account issues associated with return and reintegration. Third, consistent with the shift away from emigration, the policy has to focus on facilitation and management rather than protection as narrowly defined hitherto under the Emigration Act, 1983. Even protection has to be given a broader content that includes insurance 18

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and other risk mitigation products that the international migrant can be educated to make informed choices about. Fourth, the policy has to take cognizance of the fact that in the international migration chain, there are many links both within and outside India and while the policy should allow for the government to work with various stakeholders, it should not hesitate to prosecute violators of the law in appropriate forums. In this context, it may be particularly important to move away from the mindset of blaming the recruitment industry for all the ills of the system and concede the need for a new system that cannot be so easily abused by all and sundry. It is India’s international credibility that is at stake. Finally, the new policy would require a different legal framework to enforce its objectives and ensure that the rights of the migrants are safeguarded.

An inclusive policy of international migration rather than emigration India has operated hitherto in a policy vacuum in so far as international migration is concerned. The legislative framework of the Emigration Act focused on a narrow concept of protection delivered through the protectors and the protector General of Emigrants. The scheme of the Act permitted protection to be delivered by exception to only those with poor educational qualifications or to those going to destination countries with a relatively poor record of honouring workers’ rights. Over a period of time, this led to an ‘adverse selection’, with the less qualified workers, exploitative employers, and greedy middlemen getting together to defeat the objectives of the system. This vicious cycle needs to be replaced by a virtuous cycle where skill development is demonstrably well rewarded and workers seek legal channels and make informed choices about going overseas for work. This approach of ‘protection by exception’ for some and ‘deemed protection’ for the others has also meant in practice that even among workers, there is no tracking of those at the higher end of the skill spectrum or of those going to all but a handful of countries. This greatly hampers attempts at gathering information about international migration and building up a database which could then be a building block for the database on overseas Indians or the Indian diaspora. The way to outgrow the limitations of the colonial legislation on emigration is to recognize the multidimensional and multi-layered nature of international migration. Given this, the one dimensional 19

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approach of ‘protection by exception’ has to be replaced by a broader concept of facilitation and management that recognizes the need for the government to cater to the varying needs of those deciding to migrate for employment. This recognition should then lead to fundamental changes in how the entire system deals with itinerant workers right from the time they apply for passports to the time they board a plane to report to their employers. In India, through administrative instructions rather than by legislation, a dual system of passports has been introduced since many years. All passports are classified, ab initio, into two categories: those in respect of which Emigration Clearance (is) Required (ECR) or those where Emigration Clearance (is) Not Required (ECNR). Conceived perhaps as a means to safeguard the emigrant worker by stamping the passport appropriately, this has hardly served the purpose. Passport is a constitutional right subject to eligibility and governed by a separate law. It should not depend on the outcome of the emigration process decided under a different law. The government must therefore move towards a system of a single class of passport for all citizens irrespective of their educational attributes or intended emigration destinations. This will be far going reform that will, over time, enable citizens to take responsibility for their own decisions on international migration. A related weakness of the present system is that despite the ECR stamping or otherwise and despite data on emigration clearances, the government has no information on those who have actually migrated for work. The Embarkation Card filled by all departing passengers contains information that is not shared between the Bureau of Immigration and the Protector General of Emigrants. Attempts to share the data on emigration clearances and getting confirmation on actual departures have not been successful. This greatly compromises decisionmaking supported by hard facts and even the ability to respond to cases of distress or hardship.

Deregulating international migration The process of reform of international migration that begins with passport reforms should be carried to its logical conclusion by bringing emigration clearance within its ambit. As already explained, emigration clearance is the exception, as people with ECNR passports and adequate educational attributes going to the most developed countries in the world do not require it. The question arises as to why emigration clearance cannot be done away with altogether. 20

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This may run counter to conventional administrative wisdom that usually calls for greater controls when existing controls prove ineffective. However, a little reflection based on the empirical work done by CDS on Kerala and other scholars elsewhere shows that emigration clearance does not guarantee the workers anything and does not offer them even first aid, let alone protection, against exploitation at home and abroad. This arises out of the basic fact that protection and welfare of workers can only be guaranteed under local labour laws. In countries where the law discriminates between domestic and foreign workers or excludes certain categories of workers from the purview of labour legislation, emigration clearance in the country of origin merely adds to the costs and not to the benefits. The fact that despite the emigration clearance being in place, many travel for work on other visas or have the ECR suspended further underscores the purposelessness of the existing system. The time has therefore come to admit that the existing system does not and will not work and look for feasible alternatives. The one alternative worth exploring is how the concern for the protection and welfare of the migrant worker can be secured through non-government entities, preferably in a competitive environment. This is the essence of the deregulation process that must become part of the proposed policy. Such deregulation will have a number of components, including delicensing of recruitment, corporatization of the recruitment industry, scrapping the emigration clearance system, doing away with attestation of the employment contracts, certifying minimum wages, etc. In addition, the government could cause advisory services to be provided to workers on a voluntary basis. This is not a bad alternative at all as empirical work shows that a majority of less skilled workers go by the advice of families and friends when making emigration choices. The entire charade under the Emigration Act can therefore be replaced by a modern, technology-backed advisory service that is available at the option of the itinerant worker or his family. There will be no change in the legal status of the worker. Apart from advisory services, the government can play a proactive role in getting insurance companies to offer a wider range of insurance products, including group insurance products that can be availed of by batches of workers such as painters, carpenters, drivers, etc. Most importantly, the government can play a proactive role in signing bilateral agreements with destination countries that provide an umbrella under which temporary migration of workers and professionals can take place. Such agreements will not alter the nature of 21

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the laws of those countries, at least in the short run. However, they can provide a valuable platform for Indian missions abroad and even MOIA to pursue long-term reforms of the labour market in those countries. This will also receive the support of agencies like IOM, ILO, etc. who are working towards managing international mobility. Over a period of time, they will lead to better convergence of the objectives of the origin and destination countries.

A new legislative framework As it is easier to prepare a fresh draft than redo a poor first draft, it would be better to go in for fresh legislation governing international migration rather than tinker with the present legislation that is still stuck in the emigration and protection mindset. While putting together such legislation will be a detailed drafting exercise, the elements of the new legislation can be spelt out and stated in the policy. The proposed legislation can cover international migration in general and provide the basis for the government to manage it light-handedly. It can be a piece of modern legislation based on re-engineered systems and procedures and backed by IT. Second, it can bring all international migration into its fold so that the data is complete but without necessarily prescribing too many controls. Third, even data collection can be made easier by enabling large employers to provide information in bulk and by permitting on-line provision and updating of data. Fourth, it can bring in mitigation of risk associated with international migration as a public objective and work with entities that provide insurance products to achieve that objective. Finally, the legislation can provide the legal basis for measures that facilitate return and reintegration.

Summing up The proposed policy should therefore be developed as an inclusive policy on international migration and should have deregulation as its overarching objective. It should be supported by a new legislative framework. With regard to overseas work, the situation today is not dissimilar to the situation that prevailed in India in the 1980s when the equity markets were beginning to be patronized by small investors, many of whom were duped by the brokers and fly-by-night companies. Slowly, but steadily, the government developed a framework to deal with the entire sector and set up the Securities and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI) through an administrative order, later giving it statutory basis. 22

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As the independent regulator, the SEBI has been able to make India’s financial services industry one of the best regulated in the developing countries, capable of supporting a domestic investor base several magnitudes larger than what it was a decade ago and responding to overseas portfolio and institutional investments. SEBI has delivered all this because, over a period of time, it has come up with regulations covering different aspects of the work of financial intermediaries and imposes deterrent penalties on defaulters. The Ministry of Finance has ensured the autonomy of the SEBI as the regulator. Hence, at a strategy level, the problems faced in emigration in India today can be conceptualized as the stirrings of a nascent overseas employment services industry waiting to take off under proper regulation and guidance. In this view of the matter, the entire exercise can be looked as an effort to facilitate this take-off under a twenty-first century legislation that posits the setting up of an independent regulator to oversee the Indian employment services industry. This would be a conscious ‘strength’ and ‘opportunity’ view, rather than a ‘weakness’ and ‘threat’ perspective of the matter. Such an approach would be entirely consistent with India’s spectacular turnaround following the liberalization and deregulation reforms since the 1990s. Ultimately, any reform at a country level is an attempt to unleash the productive energies remaining bottled up in the economy. No one could have predicted the extent of entrepreneurial talent that the reforms initiated in the 1990s would set free. Similarly, in relation to employment services, India can and should try to harness the talent available and direct it into proper channels under professional supervision and regulation. This is the surest way of succeeding in managing international migration, most of which is for employment anyway.

Acknowledgements The research work reported in this article was supported by the research grant available at the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram.

Note S. Krishna Kumar is former Chairman of the Migration Policy Group at CDS.

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2 DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT Critical issues Dilip Ratha and Sonia Plaza

The fastest way to eliminate poverty and share prosperity is to allow the poor to migrate to a richer destination. Emigrants help their countries of origin by sending remittances, stimulating Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), improving access to foreign capital markets, providing grants for development, establishing contacts to promote trade and investment, and transferring technology and know-how through, for example, professional associations, temporary assignments of skilled expatriates in origin countries, and the return of emigrants with enhanced skills. The research on diaspora issues has expanded in the last decade. However, there has been less progress in the following issues: (a) developing an agreed definition on what ‘diaspora’ is, and (b) building a methodological approach to calculate the number of diaspora abroad for each country. It is important to define diaspora in order to count it. This chapter will present some of the definitions of diaspora that are being used in the context of the migration agenda and in public policy context by policymakers. Data collection on diaspora has not been undertaken systematically. The authors conducted 48 interviews with government officials and diplomats of embassies in Washington DC, Paris, London, Pretoria, and Abu Dhabi to understand the role embassies are playing in enabling their diaspora to make economic contributions to their countries. We found few differences among embassies, including from developed and developing countries, in this respect. We also found that all the embassies lack adequate information regarding the number of migrants in a diaspora (especially since registration is optional) (Plaza and Ratha

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2011). Thus, there is a need to develop a methodology to gather data where possible. Most research on the contributions of diasporas to development in origin countries focuses on highly-educated migrants living in Europe and the United States (US). But both low- and high-skilled diaspora members – whether outside or inside developing countries – make contributions to their homelands (Crush 2011). Developed and developing countries are beginning to implement policies to boost flows of financial resources, skills and technology from the diasporas. In the first section of this chapter, we look at the different definitions of diaspora. The second section presents some basic data on the size of the world’s diaspora living in the US, Western Europe and Australia, as well as comparisons with the overseas Indian numbers. A tentative conclusion is that the potential contribution of world’s diaspora may have been underestimated. In the third section, we discuss the contributions of the diaspora with the final section summarizing and discussing policies that some countries are implementing for promoting diaspora contributions.

Definition of diaspora A ‘diaspora’ can be defined as people who have migrated and their descendants who maintain a connection to their homeland (Ratha et al. 2011). For more specific definitions according to the US Department of State and the definition used by the African Union, please see Box 2.1. Some countries use a legal definition to define their diasporas as all persons who are of that nationality and their descendants. It includes all the descendants who can acquire citizenship. It varies by country. In the case of Ireland, the right to become an Irish citizen terminates at the third generation. Italy, Israel and Japan grant citizenship based on jus sanguinis or blood kindship. Other countries define their diaspora broadly independently if they have a citizenship from that country. For example, India defines diaspora as all overseas Indians which comprise Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). ‘Overseas Indians are a strong bond with their country of origin. This is reflected in their language, cultures and traditions that have been maintained, often over centuries, and continue to be vibrant and unique’ (MOIA n.d.).

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Box 2.1

Defining Diasporas

The US State Department defines ‘diasporas’ as those migrant groups who share the following features: (a) dispersion, whether voluntary or involuntary, across sociocultural boundaries and at least one political border; (b) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (c) a commitment towards keeping the homeland alive through symbolic and direct action; (d) the presence of the issue of return, though not necessarily a commitment to do so; and (e) a diasporic consciousness and associated identity expressed in diaspora community media, creation of diaspora associations or organizations, and online participation (Department Telegraph 86401, US State Department). This is different from the definition used by the African Union, which defines the African diaspora as ‘consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union’.a Estimating the size of a diaspora is complicated by several factors such as place of birth, time of emigration, citizenship and questions of identity (Ionescu 2006). For example, estimates of US-based diasporas are constructed using the ‘place of birth for the foreign-born population’ available from the US census. Most European Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, Japan, and the Republic of Korea classify immigrants based on the ethnicity of the parent, which results in higher estimates of the stock of immigrants compared with a classification based on place of birth. Temporary immigrants may be considered as part of a diaspora but may not be captured in immigration statistics. Note: aThe African Union considers its diaspora as the sixth regional economic community (see African Union 2005; UN-OHRLLS 2010).

Estimating the size of the diaspora Inadequate data and understanding of the diasporas impair efforts to increase the contributions they can make to origin countries. Changing that should be a high priority for the global community interested in harnessing diaspora resources. Estimates of the size of the different 26

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countries’ diaspora vary depending on the data and definition used. The majority of the estimations are based on the ‘stocks of migrants’ and ‘foreign-born’ data. Thus, many countries seem to underestimate the size of the diaspora since they do not include second and third generations. In the light of the differences in the methodologies used in assessing the diaspora of the regions, a comparative and systematic study of the diaspora in the US and that of the other nations that adopt alternative methods is to be done. Questions about place of birth and parental place of birth are used to define the first, second, and third-or-higher generations. First-generation and second-generation estimates The OECD presents information on native-born children of migrants aged 15 and over which includes OECD European countries, the US and Australia (OECD 2012). This data indicates that the size of the second-generation diaspora is about 45.3 million. Thus, taking the migrant stocks and the available second-generation data into account, the size of the diaspora rose to 277 million in 2013 (from 261 million in 2010). According to the OECD, this 45 million includes data of children counted twice if both their parents had been born abroad in different countries. This figure grossly underestimates the true size of the global diasporas. First, ‘first-generation’ migrant stocks are almost certainly underestimated (consider, for example, the undocumented migrants in the US or a large number of uncounted Bangladeshis in India or Zimbabweans in South Africa). The majority of the studies present data according to the definition of ‘people born in other country’. This definition captures only first-generation migrants; it excludes children and grandchildren who may have ties to origin countries. If we use first-generation migrants, the number is roughly 215 million in 2010 and 232 million in 2013. This is the most frequently cited estimate of migrants stock based on United Nations (UN) estimates. Although this data incorporates part of the 2010 round of census, the new data undervalues the number of first-generation diaspora. For example, the immigration data for the Gulf countries is not complete. China, India, South Africa, South Korea, and the US do not have an accurate number of foreign-born migrants since several of them are undocumented and not captured in the censuses (World Bank 2010). In a number of countries like the US, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, the censuses do not include the question on the country of birth. 27

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Technically, this makes it difficult to track the diaspora because in reality the foreign-born who have acquired citizenship are not considered foreign nationals in the country anymore. Since diaspora refers to people who have migrated and their descendants maintaining a connection to their homeland, it is important that the place of birth of every citizen and foreign national be rightly recorded. Second, data on ‘second-generation migrants’ in countries other than those in Europe, US and Australia are not available. Definitions of ‘second generation’ also differ. For example, in the European Commission (EC), Eurostat, ‘ “second-generation migrants” refer to two different groups of immediate descendants of migrants. The first group, with a mixed background, is defined as persons who are native born and who have one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent. The second group, with a foreign background, is defined as persons who are native born with both parents foreign born’ (Eurostat 2011:143). As per the OECD definition, the ‘native-born children of immigrants’ are those children aged 15 and above with at least one parent being foreign-born and living in an OECD country. Thus, if a child has both parents born abroad in different countries, he or she is counted twice. In the US, ‘second generation’ refers to all persons born in the US with one or both parents born outside the country. However, there are also other definitions in the literature referring to the term: (a) 1.5 Generation: children born in their home countries but brought to a new country before the age of 12; and (b) 2.5 Generation: native-born children where one parent is first generation and the other parent is second generation. Third, higher generation diasporas also have strong economic and emotional ties to the origin countries, and again data is not available for almost all countries. The top 20 origin countries for first- and secondgeneration migrants are shown in Figure 2.1. New data for first- and second-generation immigrants in Australia and the US Table 2.1 presents information about the first- and second-generation immigration streams with updated data from the Australia 2011 Census and the US 2010 Census. For the purpose of classifying the newborns in Australia belonging to the second generation on the basis of origin we adopt the following method. If the parents originally are 28

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Figure 2.1 Diaspora: first and second generations, 2010 Source: UN Migrant stocks, European Union Labour Force Survey, 2008 ad hoc module (Eurostat); US Current Population Survey, 2008; Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, 2009; OECD (2012).

Table 2.1 Diaspora in Australia and the US Country

Native First Second Diaspora FirstBorn (in Generation Generation and Secondmillion) (in million) (in million) Generations (in million)

Australia 16.2 Census, 2011 US 1998 271.4 US 2010 269.3

Diaspora as Percentage of Total Population

6.0

2.2

8.2

51

28.7 39.9

28.6 19.7

57.4 59.6

21 22

Source: ABS (2012); OECD (2012); Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2013); Pew Research Center (2013).

from two different countries, the mother’s birthplace is given priority while identifying the origin of the child. Hence, if the mother is born abroad, the child’s origin will also be traced on that basis. According to the numbers of the ‘Annual Demographics File’ of the US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 1998, there 29

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were 28.6 million people born in the US with both parents born abroad, or with the mother born in the US and the father abroad, or with the father born in the US and the mother abroad. In 2012, the second-generation population had declined. However, according to a 2008 Pew Research population projection, by 2050, ‘an estimated 37 per cent of the U.S. population . . . will be immigrants or the children of immigrants’ (Pew Research Center 2013: 13). According to the US American Community Survey, there were 48 million people of German ancestry and 35 million of Irish ancestry compared to only 4.5 million Germans and 1 million Irish first- and second-generation migrants (see Figure 2.1). Of course, such ancestry data provides an upper bound estimate of diasporas in the US. The true figure is somewhere between ancestry figure and that for the firstand second-generation migrants. The Pew Research Center provides an estimation of 177.7 million of third or over generations in the US.

Indian diaspora Origin countries also use different definitions of diasporas. For example, India uses three categories: NRI, PIO, and Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). Figure 2.2 presents the numbers for the Indian diaspora.

Figure 2.2 Indian Diaspora 2011: non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin Source: MIOA (2012).

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There are about 10 million NRIs living in different part of the world. The main concentration of NRIs is in the Gulf. The number of PIOs is estimated to be about 12 million from which the largest group of PIOs live in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the US, South Africa, Mauritius, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and Nepal. The total number of overseas Indians reached 22 million in 2012 (see Figure 2.2). India does not allow for dual citizenship but offers an identification card that entitles migrants to specific rights. It issues a PIO card that allows for entry without a visa during the period of its validity. The card also allows a person access to all facilities in the matter of acquisition, holding, transfer, and disposal of immovable properties in India in matters relating to the acquisition of agricultural/plantation properties. However, this card does not allow one to vote.

Contributions of the diaspora Both sending and receiving countries are beginning to implement policies to boost flows of financial resources, information and technology from diasporas. Remittances Migrants from developing countries sent at least US$401 billion in remittances to their countries in 2012. Remittances remain a key resource flow far exceeding official development assistance as well as private debt and portfolio equity. India, China, the Philippines, and Mexico remain the largest recipients of migrant remittances, though smaller developing countries, such as Tajikistan, Liberia, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, and Moldova receive the most as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). The true size of remittance flows, including unrecorded flows, is believed to be significantly larger. Remittances are the most tangible link between migration and development. Remittances tend to be relatively stable, and may behave counter cyclically – because relatives and friends often send more when the recipient country is in an economic downturn or experiences a disaster. Remittances have been more stable than foreign direct investment, private debt, and equity flows. Nevertheless, even small fluctuations in remittance inflows can pose macroeconomic challenges to recipient countries, especially those with large inflows. Remittances play an important role in reducing the incidence and severity of poverty (see Box 2.2). 31

Figure 2.3 Top 10 recipients of migrant remittances Source: Aga et al. (2013).

Figure 2.4 Top 10 recipients of migrant remittances as a share of GDPa Source: Aga et al. (2013). Note: aData on remittance inflows and GDP are for 2011, the latest year for which official GDP data is available.

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Box 2.2 How Migration and Remittances have Contributed to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 2000–15 Goal 1: Remittances directly reduce poverty of migrants and their families, offering a vital lifeline for millions of people and a powerful driver of shared prosperity. Evidence from Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and other regions suggests that remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty, as well as indirectly stimulate economic activity. For example, remittances appear to have reduced the share of poor people in the population by 11 per cent in Uganda and 5 per cent in Ghana. Goals 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6: Migration and remittances lead to increased investments in health, education and entrepreneurship. In some countries, remittances contribute to better school attendance, higher school enrolment rates, and additional years in school. Remittances may increase expenditure on education by helping finance schooling and reducing the need for child labour. Girls’ school attendance and educational attainment rise from the receipt of remittances (e.g., Pakistan, Peru). Adolescent girls and women who migrate find opportunities for employment and skill acquisition. Migration also allows women migrants to find greater voice within families (and yet these girls face difficulties and risks at every step of the migration process). However, women are also more likely to act as a safety net for their family back home. The gains to people who move are also important. Research has found that migrants from the poorest countries, on average, experienced a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling of school enrolment rates, and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality after moving to a developed country. This is an important benefit since the earnings of working-age migrants are also likely to depend heavily on their education level, age, gender, occupation and sector of work, and employment status. Remittances contribute to better health outcomes by enabling household members to purchase more food and healthcare services, and perhaps by increasing information on health practices. Several studies found that higher remittances per capita were associated with greater access to private treatment for fever and

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diarrhoea. Remittances reduce overall child mortality (a 1 per cent increase in remittances reduces the infant mortality rate by 1.2 per thousand in Latin America). In Sri Lanka, the children in remittance-receiving households have higher birth weight. Migration has been observed to increase health knowledge, which has led to lower rates of infant mortality and higher birth weights in Mexico as well as greater access to maternal care. Increased mobility of workers can, however, contribute to the spread of communicable diseases such as HIV: male Senegalese migrants were found to have higher rates of HIV-prevalence as compared to non-migrants from the same origin area. However, remittances and access to knowledge facilitate treatments for HIV and malaria. Goal 7: The effects of migration on climate change, on the other hand, are less understood. When migration is induced by a conflict or a natural disaster leading to a sudden inflow of migrants, the displaced people may resort to unsustainable activities in the absence of other means of survival, exacerbating existing environmental problems or creating new ones. Sometimes they move into marginal areas where they are still more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. On the other hand, migration can stimulate the adoption of new techniques and raw materials, leading to more environmentally-friendly production and consumption practices. Migration is itself a mode of adaptation to climate change. Goal 8: Remittances can play an important role in improving access to information and communication technology. Households in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda receiving international remittances also have higher rates of access to mobile phones, radios, televisions, and computers. In short, international and internal migration give rise to a complex set of effects, many of which contribute to achieving the MDGs. Migration and remittances can be a valuable complement to broad-based development efforts. Yet migration and remittances should not be viewed as a substitute for official development aid, as it is private money that should not be expected to overcome structural obstacles such as poor public infrastructure, weak rule of law or poor governance.

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They help households diversify their sources of income while providing a much needed source of savings and capital for investment. Remittances are also associated with increased household investments in education, entrepreneurship and health – all of which have evidence of the fact that the impact of remittances on economic growth is mixed. Many migrants transfer funds to households in origin countries for investment purposes. Data from household surveys show that African households receiving international remittances from the developed countries in the OECD have been making productive investments like buying agricultural equipment, building a house or a business, purchasing land, and improving a farm. The global remittance market is undergoing a major structural change with the increasing popularity of mobile phone- and internet-based remittances. Yet, regulations to combat money-laundering and financial crime have become a roadblock to the adoption of these new technologies for cross-border remittances. There is an urgent need to revisit these regulations. Also it has become imperative now to address whether these new technologies should be regulated under banking regulations or telecom ones, and how the operational risks that might arise can be addressed. Developing countries are paying more attention to remittances and diaspora wealth. There is a broad agreement in the development community now that remittances should be facilitated by reducing remittance fees, and linked to microfinance, financial inclusion and capital market access. Investors and credit rating agencies are paying attention to remittances in the analysis of sovereign creditworthiness. Diaspora bonds Diaspora members can act as catalysts for the development of capital markets in their countries of origin by diversifying the investor base, introducing new financial products, and providing reliable sources of funding. Also many countries are considering issuance of diaspora bonds to tap into the wealth of their diasporas. Diaspora bonds can tap into the emotional ties – the desire to give back – and potentially help lower the cost of financing for development projects back home. According to Nielsen and Riddle (2007), emotion, sense of duty, social networks, strength of diaspora organizations, and visits to the origin country are important determinants of diaspora investment. A diaspora bond – a retail saving instrument marketed only to the diaspora members – can be an effective tool to tap diaspora wealth (Ketkar and Ratha 2010). Through retailing diaspora bonds at small 35

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denominations ranging from US$100–1,000, the government or a reputable private corporation in a developing country can tap into the wealth of relatively poor migrants. Besides patriotic reasons and the desire to give back, a diaspora investor may be willing to buy diaspora bonds at a lower interest rate than the rate demanded by foreign investors. In the past the governments of India and Israel have issued diaspora bonds to raise approximately US$40 billion dollars, often in times of financial crisis.1 Ethiopia and Nepal have issued diaspora bonds in the last two years, but were unsuccessful in mobilizing funds.2 One problem was limited marketing and publicity. In general, countries where the diaspora groups are politically opposed to the government or those facing governance problems may find it difficult to issue diaspora bonds. Diaspora investors, like other investors, will be concerned with the government’s willingness and ability to service its debt. Thus, factors such as government reputation, rule of law and protection of property rights will also influence diaspora investors’ decisions to invest in their countries. Ketkar and Ratha (2010) underscore three reasons why there are still very few issuances of diaspora bonds. First, there is limited awareness of this financing vehicle. Developing-country policy-makers would benefit from technical assistance aimed at improving their understanding of how to structure bond offerings, how to register them with regulatory agencies such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and whether or not such instruments need to be rated by rating agencies. Second, many countries still have little concrete knowledge of the capabilities and resources of their diasporas. And, third, in some cases diaspora members may not trust their home country government. Potential issuers of diaspora bonds, however, should be reminded of the risks associated with foreign currency debt. Considerations must be given to prudential risk management before taking on additional debt. Potential volatility in diasporas’ incomes and disruption in relationship with diaspora can also occur rather quickly in some countries where political risks are high. Finally, large foreign currency inflows after a bond issuance require careful macroeconomic management, especially of the exchange rate. Trade, investments, skills, and technology transfer Migrants facilitate bilateral trade and investment flows by matching producers of consumer goods in one country with appropriate 36

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distributors in the other, and assemblers with the right component suppliers (see Gould 1990, 1994; Javorcik et al. 2006; Docquier and Lodigiani 2007; Docquier et al. 2011; Leblang 2011; Naghavi and Strozzi 2011). Some governmental agencies and private firms in several countries are tapping their diasporas to provide market information about the countries in which emigrants now live. Activities include the establishment of diaspora trade councils and participation in trade missions and business networks. Other countries are offering diaspora members the same benefits and rights as domestic investors. Involvement of the diaspora in sending countries’ economies can take several forms (Kuznetsov 2006; Plaza 2008): (a) licensing agreements to provide technology transfer and knowhow between diaspora-owned or managed firms in host countries and sending country firms; (b) direct investment in local firms, as a joint venture; (c) knowledge spillovers when diaspora members assume top managerial positions in foreign-owned firms within their country of origin; (d) networks of scientists or professionals to promote research in host countries directed toward the needs of sending countries; (e) temporary or virtual return, through extended visits or electronic communications in professional fields such as medicine and engineering; (f ) return to permanent employment in the sending country after work experience in the host country. There are different types of diaspora knowledge networks.3 Scientists and R&D personnel networks provide knowledge, mentoring expertise and finance (venture capital). Professional and business networks are regional or local networks of skilled diaspora members located in larger cities (Saxenian 2002, 2006). Indian professionals helped to promote India as an outsourcing destination for instance. Relevant associations provide technical assistance and organize conferences, investment forums to match investors with counterparts at home, and recruitment fairs. More industrialized labour-sending countries with large skilledmigrant populations have also been able to tap their expatriates and develop some form of mentor–sponsor model in certain sectors or industries. How the knowledge is transferred varies according to the different types of diaspora networks mentioned here. The skills of the diaspora can be utilized by establishing knowledge exchange networks. China, Chile, India, Ireland, and Scotland have developed professional and business networks amongst the diaspora. In some 37

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countries, encouraging the growth of private-sector networks may be more effective than direct government involvement in establishing links to the diaspora. Governments can help facilitate diaspora networks through the internet, professional associations, embassies abroad, and cultural events. Collective remittances Several diaspora groups have begun to contribute financial and nonfinancial resources to its homeland countries, although large-scale investments have not yet emerged. Organizations have been created in Europe, the US, Canada, and some other countries. These organizations pool resources and support their villages or friends. In some cases, they send funds for development purposes, such as constructing a school, providing supplies to schools or hospitals, supporting orphans, and training new migrants arriving at the destination country. A few governments have offered matching grants for remittances from diaspora groups or Home Town Associations (HTAs) to attract funding for specific community projects. The best known of these matching schemes is Mexico’s 3-for-1 programme, under which the local, state and federal governments all contribute US$1 for every US$1 of remittances sent to a community for a designated development project. Little evaluation of the impact of these programmes has been done (World Bank 2005).

Summary and conclusions The central question regarding migration is not whether there should be more or less of it, but how countries make the best out of it in terms of remittances and developmental impact through timely policy amendments and exploitation of circumstantial opportunities. Our review suggests a number of areas in which future research and debate will be needed to improve policy formulation related to diaspora contributions. These include how to make remittances more effective as tools for poverty reduction and development in migrants’ countries of origin and how to tap into the vibrant communities of the diaspora and work with them as development partners. This chapter covered a diverse range of diaspora issues and provided a number of experiences that are relevant for policy-makers in both developed and developing countries. The main findings are as follows.

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Understanding the diaspora Efforts to understand the size and characteristics of the diaspora should be a high priority for countries interested in harnessing diaspora resources. Lack of adequate data on the diaspora impairs efforts to improve the contributions the diaspora can make to the origin country. Many migrants are not counted in national surveys, and many descendants of migrants still have emotional ties to the country of their ancestors. Case studies indicate that networks of diaspora families and friends send funds for development purposes such as constructing schools, providing supplies to schools or hospitals, supporting orphans, and supporting small-scale projects. However, little is known about the scale or impact of such activities. More work is needed to estimate the size of the diasporas and in a bilateral matrix format. Also more frequent surveys of diasporas would go a long way in understanding their attitudes toward the present government and emotional and financial ties with the country of origins. Identifying different generations will also allow us to analyze the changes in waves of migration, their economic and educational attainments, as well as present a picture of how different the second generation is from 10 years ago.

Diaspora and cross-border economics Diasporas facilitate cross-border trade, investment, and access to advanced technology and skills. Diaspora networks play an important role in cross-border exchanges of market information about trade and regulations. Diaspora members may also invest directly in origin countries, or provide their expertise to assist investments by multinational firms. Compared with other foreign investors, members of diasporas may accept lower interest rates on loans to home countries because they have (a) emotional ties to home countries, (b) better access to information may allow them to lower risk premium as compared to other foreign investors, or (c) they may have local currency liabilities that makes them less worried than other investors about the potential for currency devaluation or the forced conversion of assets denominated in foreign currencies to local currencies. Diaspora bonds targeted at nationals residing abroad can open opportunities for investment and facilitate investment in their home countries.

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Diaspora and development paradigms Harnessing diaspora contributions in the area of trade, investment and technology requires a supportive business climate. Property rights, security, elimination of red tape, and good infrastructure encourage diasporas to invest back home. Diaspora members may be more willing than other investors to take risks in their own country, but such investments require favourable working conditions (De Haas 2006; Page and Plaza 2006). Allowing of dual citizenship Diaspora members sometimes maintain residences both in their origin as well as destination countries. In other cases migrants have a primary residence abroad but return to their origin countries every year to support specific activities. Thus, citizenship and residency rights are important determinants of a diaspora’s participation in trade, investment and technology transfer with its origin country, and make it easier to travel and own land. Making the best use of embassies and consulates These institutions can play a key role in reaching out to the diaspora. Steps that could improve embassies’ engagement with diasporas include outreach programmes to gain more information, the training of embassy staff for contacting diaspora members and facilitating investment and trade contacts, and the use of embassies as a vehicle for marketing investment and financial instruments such as diaspora bonds. At home, government initiatives have taken various forms, from the creation of dedicated ministries that deal with migrant communities to the addition of specific functions to such ministries as foreign affairs, interior, finance, trade, social affairs, and youth. In summary, members of the diaspora are playing a role in helping their country develop. The first stage of any successful diaspora policy is an assessment of who the diaspora are, where they are, their interests, objectives and strategies, the actors and main interlocutors, their capacities, and the main obstacles to their involvement in development projects, etc. Without this assessment stage, activities can miss the target and fail because of a lack of understanding of diaspora interests, capacities and needs.

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Finally, more multidisciplinary analysis is required to guide policy. Even with all the solid empirical studies on the linkages of migration trade and investment available, many questions remain unanswered. For example, there is more need to understand the contributions of both low- and high-skilled diaspora members – whether in the North or in the South.

Notes The views and interpretations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent. 1 According to Chapter 3 in Ketkar and Ratha (2009), the Development Corporation for Israel (DCI) has raised well over US$25 billion from diaspora bonds since 1951. Jewish diaspora investors paid a steep price premium (perhaps better characterized as a large patriotic yield discount) when buying DCI bonds. The State Bank of India (SBI) raised US$11.3 billion through three issues of diaspora bonds, particularly when ordinary sources of funding for India had all but vanished in 1991, following the balance of payments crisis, and in 1998, after the country conducted nuclear tests. 2 See Negash (2009) and Mersha (2009) for a description of the Ethiopian Diaspora Investment Potential and Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation’s (EEPCO’s) Millennium Bond. See Plaza et al. (2011) for a comparison of the two Ethiopian issuances. 3 For example, associations of Chinese and Indian immigrant scientists and engineers exchange information and collaborate in research and development (R&D) projects with scientists in their countries of origin (Saxenian 2002). Financing local sabbatical stays for researchers living abroad as well as the opportunity to teach short courses or workshops are good measures to promote exchange. African associations under this category include the International Society of African Scientists (Delaware) and the Ethiopian Scientific Society (Washington DC), among others.

References African Union. 2005. ‘Report of the Meeting of Experts from Member States on the Definition of the African Diaspora’. 11–12 April, Addis Ababa. Aga, Gemechu Ayana, Christian Eigen-Zucchi, Sonia Plaza, Ani Rudra Silwal, and Dilip Ratha. 2013. ‘Migration and Development Brief 20’. Development Prospects Group, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, 19 April. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2012. ‘Births, Country of Birth of Parents, Australia – 2011’. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/Details Page/3301.02011?OpenDocument (accessed 21 November 2013).

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Crush, Jonathan. 2011. ‘Diasporas of the South: Situating the African Diaspora in Africa’, in Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha (eds), Diaspora for Development in Africa, pp. 55–78. Washington DC: World Bank. De Haas, Hein. 2006. Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries. Oxford: International Migration Institute. Department of Immigration and Citizenship. 2013. ‘Australia’s Migration Trends 2011–12’. Economic Analysis Unit, Strategic Policy and Innovation Division, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Government. Docquier, Frédéric and Elisabetta Lodigiani. 2007. ‘Skilled Migration and Business Networks’. Development Working Paper no. 234, Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, University of Milano. Docquier, Frédéric, Elisabetta Lodigiani, H. Rapoport, and M. Schiff 2011. ‘Emigration and Democracy’. Discussion Paper no. 5496, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Eurostat. 2011. Migrants in Europe: A Statistical Portrait of the First and Second Generation. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Gould, David. 1990. ‘Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Implications for Trade, Welfare and Factor Returns?’ PhD Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. ———. 1994. ‘Immigrants’ Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implications for U.S. Bilateral Trade Flows’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2): 302–16. Ionescu, Dina. 2006. ‘Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers’. Migration Research Series Paper no. 26, International Organization for Migration, Geneva. Javorcik, Beata S., Caglar Ozden, Mariana Spatareanu, and Cristina Neagu. 2006. ‘Migrant Networks and Foreign Direct Investment’. Policy Research Working Paper no. 4046, World Bank, Washington DC. Ketkar, S. and D. Ratha. 2009. Innovative Financing for Development. Washington DC: World Bank. ———. 2010. ‘Diaspora Bonds: Tapping the Diaspora during Difficult Times’, Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy, 1(2): 251–63. Kuznetsov, Y. 2006. Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad. Washington DC: World Bank. Leblang, D. 2011. ‘Another Link in the Chain: Migrant Networks and International Investment’, in Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha (eds), Diaspora for Development in Africa, pp. 79–102. Washington DC: World Bank. Mersha, Genet. 2009. ‘The Gilgel Gibe Saga: The Bond and Dilemma of Ethiopian Diaspora for a Description of the Main Features of the Millennium Bond’. Ethio Quest News, 5 April. http://www.ethioquestnews.com/ Perspective/Gilgel_Gibe_Saga.html (accessed 29 November 2013). Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). n.d. ‘India and its Diaspora’. http://moia.gov.in/accessories.aspx?aid=10 (accessed 21 November 2013).

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———. 2012. ‘Population of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs): Country Wise’. http://moia.gov.in/writereaddata/pdf/NRISPIOS-Data(15–06–12)new.pdf (accessed 31 October 2013). Naghavi, Alireza and Chiara Strozzi. 2011. ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Migration, and Diaspora’. IZA Discussion Paper no. 5864, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Negash, Minga. 2009. ‘Ethiopian Diaspora Investment Potential and EEPCO’s Millennium Bond’. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. http://www. ethiopianreview.info/2010/minga-negash-ethiopia-diaspora-investmentpotential-article-march-2009.pdf (accessed 29 November 2013). Nielsen, T. M. and L. Riddle. 2007. ‘Why Diasporas Invest in the Homelands: A Conceptual Model of Motivation’. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers. cfm?abstract_id=987725 (accessed 31 October 2013). Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2012. Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas. Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. Page, John, and Sonia Plaza. 2006. ‘Migration, Remittances and Economic Development: A Review of Global Evidence’, Journal of African Economies, 15(2): 245–336. Pew Research Center. 2013. ‘Second-Generation Americans: A Portrait of the Adult Children Immigrants’. Pew Research Center, Washington DC. http:// www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/02/FINAL_immigrant_generations_ report_2-7-13.pdf (accessed 21 November 2013). Plaza, Sonia. 2008. ‘Mobilizing the Diaspora: Creating and Enabling Environment for Trade, Investment, Knowledge Transfer and Enterprise Development’, in Raj Bardouille, Muna Ndulo and Margaret Grieco (eds), Africa’s Finances: The Contribution of Remittances. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press. Plaza, Sonia and Dilip Ratha (eds). 2011. Diaspora for Development in Africa. Washington DC: World Bank. Plaza, Sonia, Mario Navarrete and Dilip Ratha. 2011. Migration and Remittances Household Surveys in Africa: Methodological Aspects and Main Findings. Washington DC: World Bank. Ratha, Dilip, S. Mohapatra, C. Ozden, S. Plaza, W. Shaw, and A. Shimles. 2011. Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills and Investments. Washington DC: World Bank. Saxenian, A. L. 2002. ‘The Silicon Valley Connection: Transnational Networks and Regional Development in Taiwan, China and India’, Science Technology and Society, 7(1): 117–49. ———. 2006. The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS). 2010. ‘Statement at the African Union Consultation with the African Diaspora in the U.S.: Building Bridges across the

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Atlantic’. http://www.unohrlls.org/en/orphan/791/ (accessed 21 November 2013). Unites States Census Bureau. 1998. ‘Current Population Survey, March 1998: Annual Demographic File’. Unites States Census Bureau, US Department of Commerce. http://www.census.gov/prod/techdoc/cps/cpsmar98.html (accessed 21 November 2013). World Bank. 2005. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. Washington DC: World Bank. ———. 2010. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. Washington DC: World Bank.

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3 MIGRATION AND GENDER EMPOWERMENT Emerging issues Jayati Ghosh

Introduction Migration is a multidimensional phenomenon which can have many positive effects as it expands the opportunities for productive work and leads to a wider perspective on many social issues among migrants and among the population of host countries. But it can also have negative aspects, usually in the nature of work and work conditions and possibilities for abuse of migrant workers by employers and others. Migration has a complex and multi-layered relationship with human development: while conditions of human development in the home country determine both the need for and the nature of economic migration, the process itself generates many and often differing human development effects upon the home and the host countries. Gendered analyses of the process of migration, whether within or between countries, are fairly recent. Similarly, the migration of women has only just begun to be recognized in official statistics and independent analyses. But this does not mean that such migration by women is new. Women currently make up around half of the world’s migrant population, and this is without taking into consideration short-term and seasonal movements, many of which are unrecorded. Zlotnik (2003) points out that globally, the number of female migrants has been large and increasing, both in terms of the sheer number of women involved as well as in terms of their share of the world’s migrant stock. According to her, ‘The majority of female migrants, like the majority of all migrants, are currently living in developed countries, particularly in Europe (29 million) and Northern America (20 million). In those 45

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countries, women often outnumber men among international migrants. In the developing world, the 32 million female migrants present in 2000 were still outnumbered by their male counterparts, but not by much.’ Table 3.1 provides some indication of the quantitative significance of women migrants in the total stock of migrants in 1970 and 2000. While female migration is now more recognized, there are still some common stereotypes about its nature: that it is mostly women and girls accompanying the male heads of their household, or it is predominantly undertaken by young, unmarried women, mostly for marriage or for some defined work enabled by contractors. Yet the migration of women for reasons other than marriage is both more widespread and more complex than is often suspected. Indeed, there is a remarkable diversity of migration patterns among women, and such diversity has increased along with recent economic and social changes in both the sending and receiving locations. Women migrate for long and short periods over short and long distances. They move for many reasons, of which marriage is only one and among which work is becoming increasingly significant. Young women dominate in migration, but older women migrate as well. They move with or without their families. Both single and married women migrate. Indeed, there is growing evidence of women who have borne children moving for work, leaving the care of their children with family members who remain at home. Table 3.1 Estimates of percentage of female migrants in stock of total migrants, by major area

World Developed countries Developing countries Africa Asia* Latin America & Caribbean Northern America Oceania Europe* Former USSR

1970

2000

47.2 49.0 45.7 42.7 46.6 46.8 51.1 46.5 48.0 48.0

48.6 51.0 44.6 46.7 43.3 50.2 50.3 50.5 51.0 52.1

*Excluding countries of the former USSR. Source: United Nations, Trends in Total Migrant Stock. The 2003 Revision, quoted in IOM, World Migration Report (2005: 396).

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Migration patterns are highly gendered, in terms of the causes and consequences of movement. It is true that marriage remains an important factor, since virilocal residence patterns still dominate in most societies. So a large part of female migration, whether internal or across borders, is for purposes of marriage or because the husband is moving. But international migration for work shows clear demarcations and separate niches for male and female labour. Male migrants tend to be concentrated in the production and construction sectors, and to a much lesser extent in service activities. Female migrants, by contrast, are dominantly found to be working in specific service activities – in the domestic work and care sectors, as well as in entertainment work. In this chapter, specific issues that are important in creating a more gender-sensitive approach to migration are explored in more detail. In the second section, the socio-economic context of the sending location for women migrants is examined. In the third section, the issues and problems of women migrants in the process of migration and in the destination country are discussed. The fourth section takes up the question of the manifold and complex gendered effects of migration, while the fifth deals with migrant relations with the sending households and the problems of returning migrants. The final section provides some recommendations for public policy for migration through a gender lens.

Leaving home Women leave their homes for a variety of reasons, in many different ways, and for varying periods of time. In this, of course, they are not dissimilar to male migrants. Following upon and extending the analysis of the World Migration Report (2003: 9) several different types of migration can be identified, as follows: 1 2

3

4

orderly permanent migration, which is legal migration from one country or area to another without eventual return; return migration, where migrants return to their country or area of origin, either voluntarily or involuntarily, after spending a period of at least one year in another country; forced migration, in which the movement of the migrant is involuntary and usually the result of events such as natural disasters, armed conflicts, or other displacement; irregular migration, whereby migrants seek to gain a new country or area of residence through illegal means; this can reflect 47

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5

individual movement without intermediaries; or smuggling, which is the assisting in illegal migration to another country with the goal of receiving material benefit for the services provided; or trafficking, which is the forced migration of people through the use of coercion or fraud; very short-term or seasonal migration, as a result of the search for livelihood and productive income opportunities, which is an increasingly prevalent feature of many developing societies. This includes seasonal migrants, frontier workers, and even very long distance weekly commuters.

Obviously, the nature of the migration will depend upon the home conditions, and will in turn be an important factor in determining the effects of migration. Thus, demand-driven migration in response to changing labour demand and differential wages is very different in terms of impact than distress migration resulting from displacement. Migration by women occurring after marriage because of virilocal residence patterns, or because male heads of household have migrated, similarly cannot be clubbed with migration that is essentially an escape from family or what are perceived to be oppressive conditions in the native place. But even in each of these types of migration, the conditions facing women migrants and the implications for their lives are very different from those of their male counterparts. A critical question underlying such differences, and often determining the nature and effects of women’s migration, is: Why do women move in the first place? While it is common to segregate migration for work from other forms of movement, such as marriage or family migration, forced displacement, flight from wars or violence, and so on, the reality is that in the destination countries these different types often intermingle in actual patterns of migrant life. Thus, while family migration may not be driven by women’s need to find work, once women have moved they may enter the labour market and face similar conditions to those who have moved with the express purpose of finding work. Also, even women moving as economic migrants may do so for very different reasons: because they can command higher incomes for their skills and work in the destination country; or because they are simply desperate to flee from extremely poor and harsh conditions in the home location; or because they want to build a nest egg of savings (as dowry, for example, or to sustain family members back home) as part of the life cycle plan that involves eventual return. All this suggests that a simple 48

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typology of reasons for women’s migration may not capture the rich complexity of actual processes. The basic demand and supply forces driving women’s migration for work are quite different from those of men. Since female migrant workers are dominantly in the care and entertainment sectors, demand for such workers is less dependent upon the economic cycle and more dependent upon longer run demographic and social tendencies in the receiving countries. Ageing societies require more care providers. Societies in which women are more active in paid work participation, especially in higher-income activities, need more domestic workers. However, male and female migration patterns are not completely unconnected. A wave of male migration often leads indirectly to a subsequent wave of female in-migration, not necessarily through marriage but because of changing labour markets. Thus, a male-centred culture of entertainment tends to create a demand for female entertainment workers, and this demand grows with the greater presence of male migrants in the destination area. It has been pointed out (CEDAW 2008) that this may be associated with the significant increase in the number of women migrating alone as wage workers. But women migrating as part of families, either with their parents or husbands, or as part of family reunification, still constitute a very important segment of migration by women, and indeed it is the dominant cause of migration for women coming into Europe, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (IOM 2008). As such, family migration is dominated by women. But increasingly, as women become independent migrants and move as heads of households, they also become initiators of family reunification processes that lead to the migration of their family members. Family migration has broader effects on labour markets, which are often not recognized because family migration itself is so under-studied. The movement of women as part of family migration changes the nature of social reproduction among migrants and creates new sources of labour that can enter formal or informal labour markets. Social norms and conditions are crucial in determining the ability of women to migrate alone. Many societies have very strong social controls on the movement of women, and these may be combined with legal bans or constraints on women’s out-migration, based on such attributes as age, marital status, pregnancy, or maternity status, requirement of permission to migrate from the male head of household or other male relative, and so on. In addition, the nature of gender relations in the sending society is a crucial determinant of both 49

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the ability of women to migrate and the pattern of migration. In a study based on the census data of five Latin American countries that lie along a continuum of gender relations ranging from patriarchal to matrifocal systems, Massey, Fischer, and Capoferro (2006) found very different patterns of female migration relative to male migration. In the two highly patriarchal societies (Mexico and Costa Rica), female householders displayed very low rates of migration compared to males, and marriage dramatically reduced the chances of female out-migration. But in the more matrifocal societies of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, the ratio of female to male migration was much higher, in some cases exceeding their male counterparts, and marriage or cohabitation seemed to have no effect upon the probability of female outmigration. Puerto Rico, which occupied a middle position in terms of gender relations, also seemed to blend the two migration patterns. But even in patriarchal societies, patterns of female migration are changing. A study based upon a sample of 3,186 temporary migrant women from rural areas of two of the major sending provinces of China (Zheng and Xie 2004) found a remarkable diversity of migration patterns. Nearly two-third of the women in the sample were married on each of their first through third trips. The proportion of married women migrants accompanied by their husbands while migrating was about equal to those who migrated without their husbands. Having children did not seem to deter migration either: migrant women relied upon relatives and husbands to care for their children when they migrated, or simply brought them along. It is generally acknowledged that women tend to be disadvantaged in the process of migration compared to men. To begin with, differentials in previous education and training impact upon their ability to access or decide upon particular kinds of jobs in the destination. They are also less likely to get full and reliable information, which makes them more dependent upon recruiting agents as well as more vulnerable to exploitation by them. As a result, there are often cases reported of exploitative fees charged to potential women migrants, as well as physical and sexual abuse by recruiting agents. Since women generally have fewer assets, in cases where the migrant woman is not going as part of a household decision, she may be forced to take on large loans to pay for the expenses of the journey, implying greater liabilities in the future. In addition, there are barriers to migration created by officialdom, which often operate disproportionately against women migrants, especially those 50

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who are less skilled and come from poorer households. McKenzie (2005) notes that passport costs (which vary greatly across countries, and in some cases were as high as half the per capita annual income of the country) and legal restrictions on emigration affect the ability of potential migrants to access job opportunities elsewhere, and these barriers are likely to be higher for women. The very process of migration may be quite different for women, especially when they are travelling on their own. Certainly there are specific problems that male migrants do not usually face. There are the well-known dangers of physical or sexual abuse by agents or escorts. When travelling alone without escorts, whether within or across borders, women are particularly susceptible to violence of different kinds and threats to personal security. In cases of illegal or undocumented migration, there are possibilities of being abandoned by escorts, or facing legal and other official barriers that can even lead to arrest or deportation. In Asia, women migrants have come dominantly from three countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. In the Philippines, women migrants have outnumbered their male counterparts since 1992, and in all these countries women are between 60 and 80 per cent of all legal migrants for work (Asis 2003). The majority are in services (typically low paid domestic service, as caregivers or housemaids) or in entertainment work. While Filipina women tend to travel all over the world, women from the other two countries go dominantly to the Middle East and Gulf countries in search of employment. Around 56 per cent of the migrant workers from Sri Lanka are women employed as housemaids, who go to work dominantly in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Legal migration from Indonesia is dominated by women taking up domestic work in Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. Elsewhere in the region, restrictive regulations have in some cases reduced legal female migration, but may have increased illegal migration, or trafficking. It is undeniable that the growth of an ‘immigration industry’ in many developing countries, particularly but not exclusively in Asia, has greatly facilitated both legal and illegal female migration. But while such intermediaries have enabled the growth of migration, they can also be the very cause of the greater vulnerability of women migrants. Because of the poor access to information that most women migrants face, they are much more likely to use recruitment agents and labour contractors to enable migration for work. These intermediaries often charge exorbitant fees, and patterns of dependence can create a 51

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range of exploitative practices. This in turn means that they are more likely to be burdened with large down-payments involving the accumulation of significant personal debt and periodic payments out of wages, as well as greater dependence upon the intermediaries even when they are arrived at the destination employment. Also, because women migrants in general tend to be less educated and have more limited access to information, they are more likely to use informal or illegal channels, making them even more vulnerable. The migration of skilled professional women is obviously less likely to be under exploitative conditions. However, it has been noticed that women are in a minority in most migration streams involving skilled occupations, except when there is a clear preference and specific policy measures in the host countries, for example the measures in the US, Canada, and Japan to attract nurses from the developing world. When women move as dependents, rather than on their own or as the principal breadwinner, they may be going to situations in which their own skills and qualifications are not adequately recognized, so that they are then forced to take on jobs that are well below their level of qualification or expertise. This can also inhibit their access to settlement services.

Being away At the destination, migrant women are often subject to different kinds of discrimination. This is true especially in labour markets, because of highly gendered notions of what is appropriate work for women, which can result in women migrants being crowded into care activities, paid domestic work and informal sector occupations to an even greater extent than in the home situation, and often despite higher qualifications. In addition, since female migration is so little recognized in official discourse, this creates contexts in which women migrants are not provided the relevant information about employment opportunities and their own rights and entitlements in the destination area. This domination in informal and care activities makes women migrants less able to ensure for themselves much of the legal protection of workers that would otherwise prevail in the destination area. Such work, especially domestic work, is often excluded from the legal framework surrounding work contracts. Thus this work does not come with legally enforceable contracts that protect the workers, and so allows for exploitative work conditions involving long hours without overtime payment, absence of other rights, and so on. Such women workers 52

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typically also do not benefit from freedom of association, even when it is legally permitted or encouraged in the destination country, and therefore do not have many of the rights that collective action by workers and trade unions would try to provide for workers. This may be why it is so regularly found that women migrant workers on average experience lower wages than male migrant workers in similar situations, even when they are equally qualified and engaged in similar or identical activities (ILO 2004). They are also apparently more likely to face problems such as delayed wage payment or even non-payment of full wages, or transfer of wages into accounts that they cannot access. Obviously, irregular immigration status exacerbates the risk of exploitation of women migrant workers, who may be more likely to accept very adverse conditions simply for fear of being exposed and possibly deported. In addition, it has been found in a number of destination countries with migrant workers from different host countries, that labour markets exhibit wage discrimination by country of origin. For example, one study (Oishi 2005) found in that in the receiving countries of Asia, Filipina domestic workers received higher wages than those from Indonesia or Sri Lanka, at least partly because of their knowledge of English and awareness of local laws and regulations. Women migrant workers are more likely to face more additional accreditation and employment hurdles than men, even though these are rarely documented (Iredale 2004). In some cases this is also because women who have been forced to move with male members of the family are forced to accept whatever job is available regardless of their own qualifications. There are also problems of skills recognition because of gender bias, or ethnic or national origin, or non-recognition of qualifications earned in the home country. Nurses from developing countries who find work in countries like the US, UK, and Canada have been found (ILO 2004: 57) to face problems like ‘lack of recognition of skills and previous experience leading to systematic deskilling, channelling into “non-career” grades in unpopular spedalties, and the “ethnic penalty” which results in restricted access to training and poorer career progression’. In OECD countries in general, women migrants from non-OECD countries are more likely to be unemployed or to be involved in jobs that are well below their level of qualification that locally born women. For example, in 2004 (with the exception of Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland), less than 60 per cent of immigrant women aged 15–64 years had a job (OECD 2007). In New Zealand, although 53

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Chinese and Indian immigrant women are more likely to have completed final school certificates or higher degrees than the national average, they have higher levels of unemployment and lower incomes (Badkar 2007). This reflects not only the difficulty in get ting their foreign qualifications and training recognized in the local job market, but also language problems and social factors such as the effect of gender attitudes within the immigrant community and in the country of origin. Research in Britain has shown that mothers born in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa are more likely to not be in paid work when their children are young (Vertovec 2006). In general, even skilled migration tends to have quite distinct gender divisions. Men predominate among those moving within transnational corporations and in the information technology and scientific sectors (OECD 2002). This can partly be explained by the demand structure: for example, 88 per cent of the Green Card permits in Germany in 2000 were taken up by men (SOPEMI 2001, quoted in Badkar 2007). Of these, the vast majority were scientists from Eastern Europe, even though there is no gender imbalance in this regard in the sending countries in that there are almost as many women scientists in Eastern Europe. Some studies have also found that skilled female migrants are particularly subject to ethnic and racial discrimination when seeking employment (Basnayake 1999).

The international division of household work: the case of migrant Filipina domestic workers Domestic service is one of the most common occupations of women migrants from developing countries to developed ones. This is particularly true in some European countries like France, Italy, Spain, and Greece, as well high-and middle-income countries in Asia and the Gulf states. In the 1990s, this was also encouraged by official policies: a significant proportion of the migrants who entered Italy, Greece, and Spain through the quota system were women domestic workers, and they also dominated among those migrants who were subsequently regularized. For some developing countries, this is now the major component of migration: in Sri Lanka between 1996 and 2001, housemaids were between 75–91 per cent of all female migrants, and more than half of all migrants (Siddique 2004). 54

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The migration of women workers can lead to an international transfer of the job of providing care, as is illustrated by the example of migrant women workers from the Philippines. Many such women perform domestic tasks – the labour involved in social reproduction – that are still the lot of women in the more developed industrial societies in Europe or North America, or the more dynamic and rapidly growing developing parts of Asia such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, or the oil exporting countries of West Asia and the Gulf. They thereby potentially free such female labour for more active participation in the paid labour market, and contribute to the economic growth of the receiving country. At the same time, their own household responsibilities back home must be fulfilled by other women, since the gender division of labour at both ends of the migratory spectrum still leaves women primarily responsible for doing the domestic work. This housework back home is often performed by women relatives such as mothers, sisters, and daughters. But the very large wage differentials across sending and receiving countries can allow such migrant workers in turn to relegate their own domestic work by hiring poorer local women to care for their own children and perform necessary household tasks. In turn, such women may even be migrants from rural areas who have come into cities and towns in search of income. Parreñas (2000) describes the condition of one woman who is simultaneously a domestic worker for a professional woman in Rome and an employer of a domestic worker in the Philippines. ‘When coming here, I mentally surrendered myself and forced my pride away from me to prepare myself. But I lost a lot of weight. I was not used to the work. You see, I had maids in the Philippines. I have a maid in the Philippines who has worked for me since my daughter was born twenty-four years ago. She is still with me. I paid her three hundred pesos before and now I pay her one thousand pesos.’ Several features of the process are highlighted by this example. First, the gender division of labour permeates and even drives the migration process, creating demand in the receiving society and enabling migration from the sending society. This reflects the fact that in both regions, women have been unable to negotiate a more equal division of labour within the household, so that social reproduction remains their responsibility. 55

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Second, this three-tiered involvement of women in the international transfer of domestic labour becomes an important, even if often unnoticed, feature of the accumulation process in the host society. It becomes an important factor driving economic booms, even if its role is not as explicitly evident as the feminization of export-oriented manufacturing, for example. It also contributes to the growth of the sending economy through the mechanism of remittances. Third, it leads to the social phenomenon of ‘diverted mothering’, which has been defined as the process in which the ‘time and energy available for mothering are diverted from those who, by kinship or communal ties, are their more rightful recipients’ (Sau-ling Wong 1994: 69). Historically, this was observed among black female domestic workers in the United States, who had to leave their children behind, saw them infrequently, and instead lavished their time, attention, and love on other more privileged children whom they were paid to care for. But this description can now be just as easily valid for women from developing countries who perform paid domestic work and child care functions in rich industrial countries. And, in turn, their own children back home could then be the recipients of diverted mothering from even lower paid domestic workers. This is not always an easy process. Parrenas quotes a Filipina woman working as a caregiver in Italy, who is herself the mother of a two-year old and a five-year-old child: ‘Sometimes when I look at the children that I care for, I feel like crying. I always think about how if we did not need the money, we would all be together and I would be raising my children myself.’

Women migrant workers are often also the victims of unequal access to basic public services, including most importantly health services. This is particularly important given the special needs of women especially with regard to reproductive healthcare. Especially in informal activities and domestic work, there is typically inadequate or no provision of maternity benefits and even the possibility of dismissal on pregnancy. There are also reports of overcrowding and poor conditions of housing, especially in women-dominated workplaces. One important and emerging area of concern is the greater vulnerability of women migrants to HIV-AIDS infections, which has been 56

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already noted empirically in sub-Saharan Africa (UN-INSTRAW 2005). This reflects several features. Women are in any case biologically at greater risk of infection than men. The migration of both men and women often involves separation from partners and the greater possibility of engagement in short-term sexual relationships, given migrant lifestyles. Women most often work in the informal trading sector or domestic work, which subjects them to poor working conditions and low pay, sometimes forcing them to resort to sex work to supplement their income. In such a context, gender discrimination can constrain women migrants’ ability to access information and testing related to HIV-AIDS or to negotiate the use of protective methods. All these features are of course greatly compounded by social contexts that migrants may face of gender-based violence, abuse, and coercion. When there is trafficking, sexual exploitation, prostitution, or forced marriage, the exposure of migrant women to the risk of infection increases significantly. Further, the study of sub-Saharan Africa found that just as migration has increased the spread of HIV, HIV-AIDS itself has increased population migration, as HIV-infected persons migrate to obtain care from health facilities or relatives, or AIDS orphans migrate to live with relatives or seek income-earning opportunities. Another study by UNDP-INSTRAW for the Arab region (2008) has found that limited preparedness and poor access to information and services render women vulnerable to HIV. Abusive and exploitative working conditions and lack of redress mechanisms trap women in a vicious cycle of poverty and HIV vulnerability. However, so-called corrective measures often exacerbate the problem: thus, HIV testing in both countries of origin and host countries may breach migrants’ rights and typically is not migrant-friendly when it is undertaken without consent, counselling, confidentiality, or other support. Similarly, the deportation of HIV-positive migrants by host countries and the absence of reintegration programmes in countries of origin can be devastating for the health, wellbeing, and livelihoods of migrants and their families. These various difficulties faced by women migrants may be com pounded by institutional constraints. Local trade unions typically do not concern themselves with migrant workers, and even less with female migrants. In some cases, migrants are explicitly not allowed to join local unions by law, and even when this is allowed, migrant women usually face additional obstacles in joining unions and face other kinds of resistance and hostility from other workers because of perceptions that they are driving down wages and working conditions 57

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in the host countries. Usually, the only substitute for such union protection is through the NGOs that are focused on providing services and protection to migrants, but their coverage is limited in geographical and quantitative terms. Quite often, legal systems in host countries do not adequately provide rights to migrant women workers. For example, in many countries, family reunification schemes are based on the male breadwinner model and exclude women migrants. In some countries there are even formal constraints imposed on access by women migrants to the legal system, such as loss of work permit on filing a case against an employer. But in addition there are other social, cultural, and economic barriers that can prevent them from accessing and benefiting from all their legal rights. One basic constraint is often lack of sufficient knowledge of the local language and consequent inability either to be fully aware of their own rights or lack of ability to go through the required channels to demand their rights. Women migrants, especially those in domestic work but also those engaged in factories and plantations, may be under the constant watch of employers and therefore not be able to communicate with others to compare situations or report abuse. There is the possibility of hostility or indifference of officialdom. Lack of outside contacts and isolation from peers, fear of reprisal, and other methods such as withholding of passports by employers all contribute to a web of exploitation and have been found to be a major cause of prolonged exploitation of women migrants in some cases. Several governments have recognized these problems and taken some positive legal steps and other policy measures to address them (ILO 2003). For example, the Canadian government has explicitly incorporated gender concerns into its national immigration programme, with every new immigration policy and legislative issue subject to the test of gender impact. The protection of domestic workers has been highlighted by several countries. In Jordan, the Ministry of Labour in 2003 endorsed a special working contract for non-Jordanian domestic workers, which strengthens the coordination between Jordan and sending countries, and guarantees migrant domestic workers the right to health insurance, medical care, holidays, and other rights in accordance with Jordanian workers and international human rights standards. The government of Chinese Taipei has endorsed punitive measures for employers who have committed wrongdoings such as non-payment for three months, violation of the terms of the contract, physical or other abuse, and has allowed such workers to transfer to other employers. 58

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Adverse conditions of migrants are obviously much intensified and aggravated in conditions of forced migration and trafficking. But there is often a fine line between voluntary migration and trafficking in women (and girl children). Trafficking is a widespread problem which is on the increase not only because of growing demand but also because of larger and more varied sources of supply, given the increasingly precarious livelihood conditions in many parts of the developing world. An increasing number of women trafficked to Europe, for example, are of central and eastern European origin (IOM 2003), reflecting the impact of economic destabilization and high unemployment consequent upon the transition to capitalist economic systems. Indeed, it has been argued that there is a distinct relationship between trafficking for prostitution and similar activities and the level of unemployment in the source area (Siddique 2004). But trafficking is also on the increase from rural areas of the developing world where the peasantry has been hit by agrarian crisis, or in societies afflicted by violent conflict or ravaged by natural calamities. A substantial amount of trafficking of both women and children occurs not only for commercial sex work, but also for use as slave labour in factories and other economic activities such as domestic or informal service sector work. It is true, of course, that the worst and most abusive forms of trafficking are those which relate to commercial sexual exploitation and child labour in economic activities. Nor is it the case that trafficking occurs mainly through coercion or deception: there is significant evidence to indicate voluntary movement by the women themselves, especially when home conditions are already oppressive or abusive, or at least voluntary sending by the households of such individuals, given the poverty and absence of economic opportunities in the home region. Traffickers lure their victims by means of attractive promises such as high paying jobs, glamorous employment options, prosperity, and fraudulent marriages. When there is employment, however badly paid, precarious, and in terrible conditions, it may still be preferred to very adverse home circumstances. This in turn means that those who are employed through trafficking may not always desire to return home, if the adverse economic and social conditions that drove the original movement persist. Also, the possibilities of return to home communities with safety and dignity are often limited, given the chances of being stigmatized and not easily reintegrated into the home society. Typically in popular discourse, male migrants are portrayed as central characters of border-crossings, and especially in informal ‘trafficked’ 59

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migration, women figure not as protagonists but as characters endowed with little or no agency. However, the easy correlation that is generally drawn between trafficking and entirely coercive criminality, and the perceived need to respond to it simply with greater regulation and monitoring, may also be too facile. Andrijasevic (2008) draws on accounts by eastern European migrant women trafficked into Bologna, Italy to reveal some of the intricate processes that constitute the conditions for trafficking. Her study covered young women from Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Croatia, and FR Yugoslavia who arrived in Italy through trafficking networks and worked as street prostitutes under different degrees of confinement and in conditions of economic exploitation by one or more third parties. She notes that, as has been found in several other studies, the majority of women who migrated through trafficking systems knew beforehand about the type of work, even though they were often unaware of the very adverse conditions they would work under. For her respondents, entering into a prostitution contract emerged as part of a bigger migratory project, and at the time of the interviews, all of the respondents had already exited prostitution. Andrijasevic argues that trafficking as such is an inadequate category to account for the complexity of current social–political transformations in Europe and women’s experiences of international migration. Rather, it is necessary to tackle the issues of migration in relation to the formation of the European Union and its enlargement eastward. In this context, trafficking emerges as intrinsically linked to the interception of undocumented migration, the enforcement of border regimes, and the tightening of immigration regulations, such that making use of trafficking networks becomes one of the few available means of informal labour migration for the women. Stricter immigration controls may increase the costs for intermediaries, but they also increase the amount of migrants’ debt and raise the level of control such third parties exercise over migrants. Quite paradoxically then, increased control over migrants’ mobility is likely not to lessen but rather to heighten the involvement of organized crime . . . This shows that in which borders – created through material and juridical means of controlling the movement of people – create the conditions for the existence and proliferation of trafficking. In this respect, the juridico-material formation of borders and its impact on migrants’ lives constitutes a crucial element to be considered in the analysis of the trafficked women’s accounts of migration. 60

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All this makes the problem of dealing with trafficking much more complex than is generally appreciated. Quite apart from the juridicolegal aspects of border control, there is the need to attack the causes of such informal migration. Thus, it is important to address the issues of economic vulnerability, marginalization, and attitudes to women which encourage such movement. The specific home economic contexts and sudden changes in economic environment that lead to desperation for livelihood are obviously important. Environmental disasters and development-induced risks such as displacement are also known to play a role in increasing the incidence of trafficking.

The effects of migration The picture of women’s migration today is complex, reflecting the apparent advantages to women of higher incomes and recognition of work, as well as the dangers and difficulties associated with migrating to new and unknown situations with the potential for various kinds of exploitation. The desperation that drives most such economic migration, and the exploitative conditions that it can result in, should not be underestimated. But it is also true that the sheer knowledge of conditions and possibilities elsewhere can have an important liberating effect upon women, which creates a momentum for positive social change and gender empowerment over time. Similarly, Chant (1992) notes that where there is heavy male out-migration, as in Costa Rica, Kenya, and Indonesia, the women become more autonomous, whether the absence is temporary or long-term. Of course, when the main earner is absent, it is also true that survival may be jeopardized when access to resources is limited. In most labour-surplus developing countries, labour migration  – especially temporary migration for work – can have very positive effects on the economy of the sending country, on the balance of payments, and also upon the lives and income opportunities of women migrants. There are positive human development implications as well, emanating partly from the material improvements consequent upon remittance incomes which can raise families out of poverty and enable more expenditure on health care and education of the young in the household, and partly from the greater awareness and cultural exposure associated with the very process of migration. Such migration can also be beneficial to host economies in terms of reducing cyclical or structural labour shortages, avoiding bottlenecks due to specific labour shortages, and so on. 61

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At the same time, there are also costs and dangers involved to sending countries, to the women migrants themselves, and even to host countries. There can be shortages, especially of skilled and professional workers, which create ‘brain drain’ problems in sending countries. Women migrants, especially those who are less skilled, less educated, and migrating as part of a survival strategy of sending households, may be subject to varying degrees and forms of exploitation and discrimination in host countries, as outlined in the earlier section. Indeed, several studies (Kibria 1993; Espiritu 1997) have critiqued the view that engagement in paid employment directly leads to the empowerment of migrant women. This is because of the simultaneous prevalence of disempowering forces, such as gender ideologies in immigrant communities, and women’s disadvantaged labour market location in the host countries. Clearly, the issue is complicated and cannot be treated in a uni-dimensional manner. Based on a study of Korean immigrant women in the USA, Park (2007) argues that the contradictory co-existence of empowerment and disempowerment not only describes structural and ideological conditions of immigrant women’s changed lives, but also is embedded in and produced by women’s efforts to make sense of and cope with new realities in the host society . . . women’s own agency is involved in organizing meanings of their changing realities. Simultaneous workings of empowerment and disempowerment which are pervasively present as dual sides of immigrant women’s everyday reality not only reflect their precarious locations in systems of inequality in the host societies, but also their resourcefulness and agency to resist assimilation into disadvantageous locations in the US economic and racial hierarchy. There is some evidence that the pattern of economic migration may be changing in ways that are based on more empowerment of women. Inglis (2003) points out that whereas earlier the migration of women into Australia was dominated by less-skilled women accompanying their husbands or entering as part of family reunification programmes, the pattern has been changing in recent years to allow the entry of more professional and skilled female entrants on their own. This has been further accentuated by the shift in immigration policies away from encouraging manual labour towards more skilled activities as well as care work. 62

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Within countries, internal female migration has often driven the economic boom. This is particularly the case in export-oriented activities. The exporting zones of countries as far apart as South-east Asia and Central America have been dominated by female labour, a significant proportion of whom have migrated from rural areas within the country. In Bangladesh, for example, the garments industry is dominated by female migrant workers from rural areas, who typically receive less than 30 per cent of male wages in the same industry (ADB 2001). Kawar (2005) points out that the aspirations and expectations of women shape both the process of migration and its results. According to her, From an individual perspective, most women migrate to overcome poverty and limited viable employment opportunities in their home country. Most see their employment as temporary to achieve certain personal/family objectives (e.g. savings to establish a business, build a house, pay debts or for the education of the children). However, these objectives are difficult to achieve in the short-term or over a single contract period due to a variety of reasons: problems with debt bondage, withholding of wages, receiving less wages than original contract, lack of knowledge on money management and savings, among many others. This means that the women stay longer than anticipated or go back and forth in migration cycles between source and destination countries. But the delayed return is not always only because inadequate savings or other constraints. It is possible that migrant women workers start appreciating the freedom and autonomy that come from earning their own livelihood and are willing to continue in the destination area even when it involves significantly lower wages than those received by local workers and adverse and demanding working conditions. In a study of migrant women from Veracruz working in maquiladoras in Reynosa, a border town of Mexico, Petros (2006: 21) found that the process of moving had other attractions and created changed perceptions among the young women themselves. ‘Not a single woman I interviewed at the border expressed a desire to return home permanently. Women shared with me that they were proud of having “gotten ahead” and progressed 63

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in life by going to work in the maquiladoras. The majority of my female interviewees had never worked outside of the home before relocating to Reynosa. Most of the women expressed contentment and satisfaction with their work and had acclimated themselves to the lifestyle en la frontera. Despite a palpable nostalgia and longing to reunite with family members back home, returning to Veracruz was out of the question for these women.’ Similarly, Mills (1997) documents the complexity of emotions and goals that determine and condition the desire to migrate and experience of migration of women from rural Thailand who go to Bangkok to find work. She notes that they ‘confront significant social and economic constraints as low-wage, low-status migrant labour: yet experiences of exploitation in the workplace are widely mediated by aspirations for and participation in new patterns of commodity consumption’. She argues that among Thai migrant workers, participation in Bangkok’s mass market commodity culture is one of the most salient aspects of their time in the city, and aspirations for it (which may be more important than just the freedom of city life) are significantly influenced by cultural transmission through television. This allows the young women workers to perceive that they have somehow compensated for the poor wages, long hours and often oppressive work, urban congestion, and unsanitary residential conditions that they experience as migrants. In general, despite adverse conditions of work and life, most female migration (except in trafficking circumstances) provides some redeeming features for the women concerned, mainly through an increase in their own autonomy, agency, and self-confidence. Numerous studies have found migrant women declaring that ‘my life changed’, as expressed by the rural women of Ecuador who had come into the city of Guayaquil (Zambrano and Basante 2005).

Links with home The same patterns of gender discrimination that affect the ability of women migrants to travel at all or to take advantage of the new location also affect their ability to send their savings home in the form of remittances. There are a number of constraints that are typically experienced particularly by women migrants, in terms of saving from their wage incomes and transmitting savings safely through regular channels. First, many women migrants have to make larger payments 64

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to recruitment agents and middlemen, often incurring large debts that they have to repay out of their earnings. Since women migrants typically earn less than men, this obviously reduces their ability to save or remit money home. In addition, there are other problems that affect the ease of money transfer, such as to isolation (particularly for domestic workers), cumbersome procedures, language barriers, and high transaction costs. This is a great problem since they are in general earning less than men. Then again, women may further face familial obligations to remit all their earnings to their families in ways that may not be expected of men. For example, single women may be expected to financially support even extended family members at home. Initial findings of an ongoing UN-INSTRAW (2008a, 2008b) study indicate that gender patterns and family dynamics influence the ways in which decisions are made on migration and remittances. While remittances in Albania and Morocco constitute an important factor in the alleviation of poverty, the persistence of patriarchal attitudes within households means that men tend to be the recipients and managers of family remittances, leaving women with little capacity to independently manage the allocation of household resources. However, in the Philippines, migration and remittances have had a number of positive impacts on gender equality in the Philippines, and not only because they have increased and diversified the employment opportunities available to women. It was found that women were actually often chosen over men to receive and manage regular household remittances, because of women’s traditional role as caregivers and domestic administrators in the Philippines and their consequent in-depth knowledge of the household’s basic needs. Of course, the fact that a majority of migrants from the Philippines are women must have affected this trend. In turn, it was found that the investment of remittances in children’s studies has increased their levels of educational attainment, particularly among the daughters of migrants, opening up new opportunities for future generations of women. In Lesotho, patterns have varied substantially as a result of the decline of the mining industry and growing textile and clothing industries in South Africa. Remuneration for male migrants continues to be higher than for women, but the availability of jobs for men is much more limited. Women migrants, on the other hand, face more obstacles in sending money home to their families due to their lower wages. Field studies in the Dominican Republic demonstrate the role of remittances in guaranteeing the food security of migrants’ home 65

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households, particularly in households in which older adults depend on their children’s remittances. Of course, the migration of male members of the household can also have adverse implications for the families left behind. Chaney and Lewis (1980) have argued that the migration of males to cash earning opportunities off the farm can be a major factor endangering smallholder agriculture, particularly the production of local food. The absence of able-bodied men places great burdens on the women left behind to carry on the agricultural work and care of their families. Further, with cash remittances, the family left behind shifts production and consumption patterns and thereby creates a dependency on remittances, resulting in loss of self-sufficiency both in food production and material necessities. There can be other non-material consequences of both male and female migration for family dynamics. The UN-INSTRAW study finds that spouses of male migrants report uneasiness and feelings of loneliness and miss the help of their partners for decision-making affecting the family or for the organization of life with the children. They can also experience high levels of anxiety and stress associated with the unknown life conditions of their partners abroad. Problems of families separated by the migration of working mothers can be particularly acute, especially when the children are young. The problems of returning migrants also show some gender differentiation. Some of these result from legal and official procedures: thus, in several countries women migrant workers face sex- and gender-based discrimination, which can include compulsory HIV and AIDS testing for women returnees and even moral ‘rehabilitation’ for young women returnees who are seen to be victims of trafficking. There is also evidence of high increased personal and social costs of return for women migrants, as compared to men, without adequate gender-responsive services. For example, men may return to a stable family situation whereas women may find disintegration of the family on their return, with their very absence from home being regarded as the cause of such disintegration. At the other end of the migration spectrum, when skilled women return home, they often face a range of problems associated with tensions resulting from a disjuncture between their own aspirations as highly skilled and educated returnees and local gendered perceptions and modes of discrimination that inhibit their full economic, social, and political participation in their own communities and societies, in accordance with their own aspirations (Rozario and Gow 2003). 66

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Migration and public policy Obviously, there is a need for more proactive policies regarding migration, which are sensitive to its various gendered dimensions. It is unfortunate that most national and international policies with respect to migration are still designed with the male breadwinner model in mind. While the phenomenon of growing migration is now more widely recognized, the absence of comprehensive statistics, the poor monitoring of actual migrants, and the relative of invisibility of women in the official statistics all remain crucial problems that constrain the capacity for effective policy formulation, simply because not enough is known about the extent and nature of the processes of migration and especially about women migrants. Currently, very few host countries have legislation specifically designed to protect migrant workers, and there is little official recognition of the problems faced by women migrants in particular. The same is true for the sending countries, which accept the remittances sent by such migrants, but without much fanfare or gratitude, and tend to make little attempt to improve the conditions of these workers in their employment abroad. Women migrants, who typically are drawn by the attraction of better income and living conditions or by very adverse material conditions at home, are therefore in a ‘no-woman’s land’ characterized by a generalized lack of protection. It is notable that the lack of recognition of migrants’ problems and the specific concerns of women migrants are evident not only for cross-border migration but even for internal migration within countries, which in many places can be as fraught and problematic as international migration. In this context, official policy has to draw a fine balance between increasing opportunities for women migrant workers, protecting and regulating the conditions of their migration, and ensuring social harmony in the host countries. There are several levels of intervention that are required, and the role of different social actors and agencies in enabling and improving the conditions of women’s migration all need to be specified. CEDAW (2008) has already made a number of excellent recommendations with respect to these issues, which are not repeated here even though all of them deserve support for speedy implementation. Some further proposals that have emerged from the discussion in this chapter are highlighted here: 1 Emphasize adequate data collection and quantitative and qualitative research, first of all to identify women’s long-term, short-term, 67

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2

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and seasonal migration patterns, and then to identify the specific needs of and problems faced by women migrants at every stage of the migration process, including return. Ease the legal barriers constraining the access to migration of women. Sex-specific bans and discriminatory restrictions on women’s migration on the basis of age, marital status, pregnancy or maternity status should be repealed, as well as restrictions that require women to get permission of the spouse or male guardian to obtain passports or to travel. Make the laws with respect to internal and cross-border movement more gender-sensitive and conscious of the specific problems faced by women. There are specific concerns about the extent of regulation of cross-border movement: very easy immigration policies can create routes for easier trafficking; but conversely, tough immigration policies can drive such activities underground and therefore make them even more exploitative of the women and children involved. The specificities and complexities of the trafficking processes, as well as the economic forces that drive them, need to be borne in mind continuously when designing the relevant policies. Encourage more public awareness and recognition of the important productive roles played by both paid and unpaid women’s work, especially in the context of migration. This requires encouraging the mass media and other forms of dissemination to contribute to awareness-raising on migration issues, including on the contribution of women migrant workers to the economy and their vulnerability to exploitation and discrimination. Regulate and monitor recruitment agencies and broaden access of women migrants to other channels. In addition to preventing recruitment agencies from exploiting women migrants, it is necessary to develop other channels, both governmental and nongovernmental, to provide or facilitate free or affordable gender and rights-based pre-departure information and training programmes that increase awareness about legal rights and entitlements, job opportunities and nature of contracts, problems that may arise in the journey or at the destination, possibilities of protection at each stage of the migration process, and agencies that provide help or support in the destination. Ensure access of all migrants to basic rights. This is important even for migrants within countries because typically many citizenship rights are residence-based, requiring some paper proof of local residence. This affects not only political rights (such as the 68

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7

8

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ability to vote) but also socio-economic rights such as access to crucial public services such as health, nutrition, and education. Short-term and seasonal migrants within countries thereby get excluded, as do cross-border migrants without sufficient local tenure of residence. These problems are particularly acute for women migrants who require greater support in terms of nutrition and reproductive health services. Encourage international recognition of degrees and qualifications earned in the sending countries so as to ensure that migration does not involve a de-skilling process for women who cannot put their capacities to full use. Make health monitoring systems more gender-sensitive. For example, when pre-departure or post-arrival HIV/AIDS testing and other health examinations are required, they must be respectful of the human rights of women migrants and be sensitive to ensuring voluntary compliance, providing free or affordable services and avoiding stigmatization. Ensure access to information about rights and legal redress to women migrants in the destination areas. These include information about access to all public services, especially health services, as well as availability of legal assistance when required. This would also require making the provision of such services more women-friendly, for example by posting more women officers in the required offices. Ensure equal access to all legal and other rights to women migrants in the destination areas. States must ensure that the laws and labour codes provide women migrant workers the same rights and protection that are extended to all workers in the country, including the right to organize and freely associate. This includes ensuring the legal validity of contracts of women migrant workers and special attention to creating and implementing labour laws in occupations dominated by women migrants such as domestic work and entertainment. Reduce the isolation of women migrants in particular occupations, such as domestic work. This includes monitoring to ensure that passports are not confiscated by employers, that all labour laws and regulations are upheld, and that women migrants have access to support groups and networks. Ensure full legal rights of women migrant workers in the destination countries. This involves repealing laws and rules that prevent women migrant workers from using the courts and other systems of redress. Such laws can include loss of work permit that results in loss of earnings and possible deportation by immigration authorities 69

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when a worker files a complaint of exploitation or abuse and while pending investigation. Free legal aid should be provided to ensure that poor migrants have access to legal assistance. Make the remittance of income easier and safer for women migrants. Women migrants tend to use informal channels of remittance more because of inadequate knowledge or lack of public access, so special measures need to be taken to provide assistance to women to access formal financial institutions to send money home and to encourage them to participate in saving schemes. Remove gender discrimination in legal aspects of immigration and in family reunification schemes. Bans and discriminatory restrictions on women’s immigration should be done away with, such as visa schemes that restrict the employment of women migrant workers in certain jobs where men predominate, or exclude certain female-dominated occupations from the visa scheme, or prohibit women migrant workers from getting married to nationals or permanent residents, or forbid becoming pregnant or securing independent housing. Similarly, family reunification schemes for migrant workers should not be directly or indirectly discriminatory on the basis of gender. Provide special services for trafficked women, which also recognize their own needs, difficulties, and aspirations and do not impose specific socio-cultural attitudes upon their activities or future movement. Facilitate legal, social, and economic conditions for returning women migrants. Women who wish to return to their countries or places of origin should be able to do without threat of coercion or abuse. There should be special socio-economic, psychological, and legal services aimed at facilitating the reintegration of women who have returned.

Acknowledgements The original version of this article was published as the Human Development Research Paper No. 4 of the United Nations Development Programme of Human Development Report 2009.

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———. 2008b. ‘Gender, Remittances and Local Rural Development: The Case of Filipino Migration to Italy’. Dominican Republic: UN-INSTRAW. http:// www.un-instraw.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=556. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). 2005. Gender Equality: Striving for Justice in an Unequal World. Geneva: UNRISD. Vertovec, S. 2006. ‘The Emergence of Super-diversity in Britain’, Working Paper no. 25. Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. Zambrano, Gloria Camacho, and Kattya Hernández Basante (eds). 2005. My Life Changed: Female Migration, Perceptions and Impacts. Ecuador: Centro de Planificación y Estudios Sociales (CEPLAES), UNIFEM. Zheng, Z. Connelly and Z. Xie. 2004. ‘Patterns of Temporary Migration of Women from Anhui and Sichuan Provinces of China’, The China Review, 52. Zlotnik, H. 2003. ‘The Global Dimension of Female Migration’ Washington, D.C.: Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute. www. migration information.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=109.

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4 MOBILITY OF WOMEN WORKERS FROM SOUTH ASIA TO THE GULF Stakeholders’ responses Rakkee Thimothy

This chapter examines the responses of the stakeholders to the migration of women workers from South Asia. Stakeholders engaged in migration governance often adopt various strategies to modulate cross-border population movements, of course with varying degrees of success. With the migration landscape becoming increasingly heterogeneous, existing stakeholders are redefining their roles, while new actors/forums are emerging and exerting a powerful influence. These have become vital to understanding the nuances of the migration process, outcomes and problems and the approaches to managing migration. In this context, stakeholders’ responses to women migrants, who constitute half of the international migrant stock and often migrate for work without family, deserve considerable attention. Migration narratives of women workers are complex and call for gender-sensitive policies (Piper 2008). Several factors at the laboursending and-receiving countries’ end intervene in and impact upon how women reproduce/liberate their traditional roles and how they respond to and (re)negotiate opportunities/vulnerabilities in the process. Policy discourse on migration often addresses issues related to women in a haphazard manner, particularly with regard to low-skilled workers (UNDP 2009). This chapter argues for a rights-based perspective that takes into account the agency and empowerment of migrant women both as a desired outcome and as a policy driver. This would require a set of policies to promote employment and protect the human rights of migrants so as to strengthen the migration – development nexus (ILO 2010). 74

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The chapter analyzes the responses of stakeholders drawing on the experience of South Asia, a region that has emerged as the most important source of migrant labour in general and women migrants in particular. Contemporary labour migration from South Asia is primarily directed to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which also holds true for women’s migration from this region. However, it is important to note that feminization of international migration has not altered the dominant sexual division of labour. The majority of women migrants from South Asia are engaged in low-skilled occupations and a relatively lower percentage is composed of semi-skilled or skilled workers. The South Asian region in general has followed policy measures to restrict the migration of women workers rather than to promote it. As the majority of women workers are engaged in low-skilled occupations like domestic work, they are at a higher risk of physical, sexual and emotional abuse, including confinement, underpayment or nonpayment of wages, as well as a range of other kinds of abuse, since their living and working conditions are entirely dependent on the personal relationship between the worker and the employer. To a large extent, vulnerabilities in the migration cycle arise from the predominantly personalized recruiting networks and lack of adequate control over private recruiting agencies (Rajan et al. 2011). To make the situation worse, workers are tied to their employers by the kafala (sponsorship) system prevalent in the Gulf countries, which allows very little scope to end abusive working conditions. Assessments of international migration flows have often discounted the crucial role of regulatory regimes in shaping the processes and outcomes of migration and individual choices. Host countries have to balance the demand for cheap and low-skilled labour with the increasing demand for indigenization and anti-immigrant sentiments. Similarly, labour surplus-sending countries have to balance the need for a vent for large-scale unemployment and critical foreign remittances with protection against rampant exploitation of their workers. Regulatory regimes of both the sending and the receiving countries have to respond to contradictory pressures and changing economic environments, simultaneously encompassing restriction, protection and promotion of migration. The complexity of the migration processes, the contradictory pressures of the regulatory regimes and the ambiguous position of women migrants with regard to their vulnerability at the workplace and changing gender roles at home have posed several new challenges for both State and non-State institutions. These range from the emergence of new institutional actors to new instruments and 75

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measures adopted by existing institutional actors. This chapter also traces changes in the regulatory regimes governing migration between South Asia and the Gulf in the context of women’s migration.

Responses of the stakeholders This section attempts to examine the responses of stakeholders, at global, regional and national levels, to the migration of women workers from South Asia and efforts made at ensuring their rights. As will be discussed, existing institutional structures in place are insufficient to ensure human rights protection to migrants. To complicate the matter further, while no international institution has a specific legal protection mandate applying to all migrants in the world (IOM 2010), there seems to be a lack of coherence between stakeholders working at all levels towards ensuring rights of migrant workers. Responses at the global and regional levels The United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have passed a number of resolutions and drawn up a number of Conventions for the member states to follow in safeguarding the rights of migrant workers in general and those of migrant women workers in particular. The major Conventions and Protocols of the ILO and the UN relating to migrants and women migrants are provided in Table 4.1. Though the two early ILO Conventions on Migration (Convention 97, Migration for Employment, 1949; and Convention 143, Migrant workers Convention, 1975) do not differentiate between fundamental human rights and migrant worker rights, the UN ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant workers and Members of their Families, 1990’ distinguishes between human rights of all migrant workers and additional rights enjoyed by migrant workers with a regular status. The overwhelming emphasis of all the Conventions is the freedom, dignity and protection of migrants in a foreign country. Consequently, the Conventions have generally addressed some key themes of migration, such as the right to migrate and right to information on safe migration, right to unionize and collective bargaining, social security of the migrants, right against trafficking and smuggling, etc. The Convention passed by ILO in 2011 (Convention 189) guarantees right of decent work to domestic workers. A major lacuna of the UN and ILO conventions is the low level of ratification by both the labour-sending and-receiving countries. 76

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Table 4.1 Major conventions and protocols of the ILO and the UN on migration ILO Conventions

UN Conventions

UN Protocols

C 97 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 C 143 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 C 181 Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 C 189 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000

Source: Compiled by the author from ILO (2004, 2006).

For instance, in the South Asia–Gulf migration corridor, except Bangladesh no countries have ratified any ILO or UN Convention with respect to migrant workers. Given this, little can be expected from the well-crafted instruments of these organizations towards ensuring the rights of the migrant workers. To overcome the impasse, at least partially, the ILO designed a Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration in 2005. This framework for action is non-binding on the member states and addresses the need for gender-sensitive migration policies that address the special problems of female migrant workers. Bilateral agreements between laboursending and -receiving countries are becoming an important means to ensure the rights of migrant workers. Compared to the international instruments, bilateral agreements are less time consuming, easily negotiable and give more responsibility to the nations involved in migration to discourage fraudulent practices in the migration process. Many South Asian labour-sending countries have entered into bilateral treaties with the labour-receiving Gulf countries. Intergovernmental agencies like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) are making considerable efforts to improve the condition of migrants. The IOM engages in research on migration policies 77

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and holds international dialogues as well as Regional Consultative Processes on migration. It initiated a ministerial-level consultation of labour-sending countries in Asia at Colombo in 2003, which has subsequently come to be known as the Colombo Process. Its fourth meeting, held at Dhaka in 2011, was on the theme of ‘Migration with Dignity’. The GFMD is making several efforts to highlight issues faced by migrant women workers. For instance, in 2011, GFMD held two workshops: the one in Dubai focused on the need to strengthen the pre-recruitment initiatives and the institutions facilitating migration, and the workshop in Ghana looked into the complex policy challenges facing the global domestic work industry in the areas of labour legislation and human rights. This is a welcome move given the evidence that the initial emphasis of the GFMD was on remittances, rather than migrants’ rights (Böhning 2009). Responses at the national level Government responses in South Asian countries The South Asian countries made a break with the colonial legislation of emigration in the 1980s, corresponding with the massive flow of migrant labourers to the Gulf. In recent decades, many of the laws made in the 1980s have been either amended or replaced by new ones. Changes in the laws on migration have been propelled by the need for sending countries to cope with heightened migration flows and to overcome the loopholes in the laws, particularly regarding the functioning of recruiting agents. A striking aspect of the emigration policies of the South Asian countries as noted by Nana Oishi (2005) is that the policies do not treat men and women uniformly. Despite the increasing presence of women in migration flows, especially as workers, the migration policies in both the sending and receiving countries in the South Asia– Gulf migration corridor tend to be gender-stereotypical. Migration policies in the regions are often formulated placing women at the margins, reproducing existing gender stereotypes – women as victims of all kinds of violations and incapable of deciding on cross-border migration. The State intervenes to protect and control women, thereby curtailing the right of women to make their own decisions and earn a decent living. As noted by Ratna Kapur (2005), the construction of women as ‘victims’ delegitimizes the movement of women in search of work. Further, they are left with no option apart from depending on 78

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informal and often illegal agents, increasing the probability of them ending up in trafficked networks. Oishi (2005) explains the relevance of the concept of ‘social legitimacy’ to analyze women’s migration processes in South Asia. She defines social legitimacy as ‘a particular set of social norms that accept women’s wage employment and geographical mobility and that establish an environment conducive to international female migration’ (ibid.: 21). The concept not only seems to mould society’s attitude towards female migration, but also influences State policies promoting, regulating and/or controlling their mobility. Kapur (2005) narrates how the categorization of migrant women by the State into groups – such as potential victims and those outside the scope of victimization (women travelling alone and those travelling with family) – often leads to half-baked solutions. Taking the point further, P. Bindhulakshmi (2010) questions (il)legality and (il)licitness in the migration of female domestic workers and the role played by the State in the process. Situating the debate in the migration of domestic workers from Kerala to the UAE, the author cites instances of women relying on channels that are often very risky because of delays in the official procedures related to migration (ibid.). As noted in Table 4.2, age is used as a crucial variable to restrict international migration of women workers, particularly that of domestic workers. In Pakistan, women must be at least 35 years of age to work abroad as domestic workers. The situation is ironical, considering that the Pakistan National Emigration Policy (NEP), 2009, highlights the low share of Pakistani women workers in international migration and stresses the need to substantially increase their share ‘in occupations considered safe’. As noted by Naila Kabeer (2007), in South Asian Table 4.2 Age restrictions imposed on international migration of female domestic workers Country

Condition

Bangladesh India

Women must be at least 25 years old Women must be at least 30 years old or should have completed matriculation Women must be at least 18 years old Women must be at least 35 years old Women must be at least 21 years old

Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Source: Compiled by the author.

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countries the paternalistic attitude of the State towards female migration is also visible in the restrictions imposed on destinations and occupations chosen by women workers. For instance, in 1998, Bangladesh banned women from going abroad as domestic workers, which was later revoked. Incidentally Bangladesh is contemplating the enactment of a new law to replace the Emigration ordinance, 1982. The draft of the new legislation – the overseas Employment Act, 2011 – has in its Preamble a reference to all the relevant ILO Conventions and the UN Convention of 1990. The most important feature of the draft law is that it highlights the rights aspect of migrants and is designed to curb fraudulent activities in the labour recruitment process. India too has a track record of banning recruitment of domestic workers to certain countries, say, Kuwait, (this ban has since been dropped). Women migrating as domestic workers to around 18 countries (including all GCC countries) who have not completed matriculation and are below the age of 30 years still need emigration clearance. In Sri Lanka, a ban imposed by the government on the migration of women with children aged below five years to work as domestic helps, on the pretext of ‘minimizing social disruption at home’, was also revamped. Restrictive migration policies have reduced the possibilities for regular and legal migration for women, forcing them to adopt risky processes to migrate. For instance, in Nepal, due to the alleged sexual abuse and death of a migrant woman worker named Kanu Sherpa in the Gulf, which made headlines in Nepalese media, migration of women to Gulf countries was banned in 1998 through a Cabinet decision and was restored only in 2003. A new law, the Foreign Employment Regulation, 2008, was introduced replacing the Foreign Employment Act, 1985. The new law stresses an important point: prohibition of gender discrimination in sending workers for foreign employment. One provision in the law stipulates that international migration from the country is possible only through the Kathmandu airport. However, it is estimated that around 30–40 Nepalese women fly daily to the Gulf countries through India (NIDS 2010). As argued by Claudia Mora and Nicola Piper (2011), migrants’ vulnerability is affected not only by labour conditions at the destination, but also by their sense of entitlement and their notion of rights at the country of origin. Ideally, State responses to the migration of women workers need to be augmented in addressing specific vulnerabilities at each stage of the migration cycle. It is a well-documented fact that the position of low-skilled women migrants becomes vulnerable at the pre-departure stage itself. For instance, in some countries such as Bangladesh, very 80

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little information is handed out to intending migrants before migration (Siddiqui 2008). This adversely affects the women migrants who migrate under strenuous conditions. Though pre-departure orientation forms a decisive aspect of pre-migration counselling, many migrant women have reported that their travel to the cities for making arrangements for migration, such as attending pre-departure orientation, has made them vulnerable to harassment and exploitation (UNDP 2008). In South Asia, countries like India conduct no formal, compulsory pre-departure orientation; this omission might accentuate the vulnerability of Indian women migrant workers abroad. The experience of Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and Nepalese domestic workers in the Gulf reveals that migrants who went without pre-departure orientation training faced numerous difficulties in working in the destination country because of their lack of knowledge of the customs or language of that society, as well as of the operation of modern household appliances found in affluent homes (Khatri 2007). Government responses in GCC countries All the GCC countries follow the sponsorship system called kafala to manage the flow of workers. By virtue of its constitution, the kafala system ensures that there is a constant supply of migrant labourers, although they continue to be temporary residents (Winckler 1998). Under the kafala system, kafeels or sponsors recruit labour either directly or through intermediaries, such as recruitment agencies, according to permits granted by the concerned ministries in the Gulf countries. Initiated as a legal system of labour recruitment, the kafala has degenerated into one in which the national kafeels become ‘sleeping partners’ and recruit labourers for other employers and thereby engage in activities like visa trading, which pushes the migrant workers into difficulties (Baldwin-Edwards 2011). The inconsistency between the short-term political and economic objectives of the kafala system and the structural realities of the labour market has led to longstanding structural dependence between the employer and the worker (Khan and Harroff-Tavel 2011; Shah 2009). Of late the kafala has come under the scanner as it has led to visa trading and promoted irregular migration (Shaham 2009). Further, the system undermines the rights of migrant workers and forces them to remain in exploitative situations with little choice (Kapiszewski 2001). However, as noted by Martin Baldwin-Edwards (2011), other than in a couple of countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which have initiated steps to reform the 81

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kafala, this practice of sponsoring migrant workers remains widely prevalent in the Gulf countries. Yet another important means of controlling labour in the Gulf is a policy of nationalization of the labour force, adopted following the rising share of immigrants in the population and the labour force, and a decline in the economic boom after the initial euphoria of the 1970s. Though initiated from 1985 in Kuwait and 1988 in Oman, the strategy was followed more aggressively after the 1990s after Saudi Arabia’s involvement. A drastic change is also evident in the way Gulf countries view labour inflow; from viewing it as satisfactory/too low in 1976, all Gulf countries except Bahrain have found the migration level to be too high and initiated policies to lower it by 2009 (UN 2010). Strategies adopted for achieving nationalization include: restricting the entry of migrants in certain sectors; prescribing quotas on employment of non-natives; reserving the major chunk of public sector jobs for nationals; strict implementation of immigration rules; increasing the skill levels of native workers; and increasing the cost of hiring and living of foreign workers. Differential wage rates for the same work by nationals and non-nationals are widely prevalent in the Gulf. As noted by Baldwin-Edwards (2011), among the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia seems to have the most effective policy, reflected in the steady decline in the number of non-natives in their labour force, as mentioned previously. The policies of different Gulf countries with respect to foreign labour are depicted in Box 4.1. Nationalization of the workforce or the policy of gradually replacing the migrant workforce with a national one has a direct effect on the recruitment and social security of the migrant workers. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are moving towards a policy of health insurance being paid by migrant workers. The UAE has a degree validation fee for migrant workers, while Saudi Arabia imposes a direct tax on migrant workers. Children born to migrant workers in the Gulf countries have no special status and are covered by their parents’ sponsorship. Sponsorship ceases for male children at the age of 21, and girls upon marriage. After the stipulated age, the person must be registered either as a student or as employed in order to have a legal residence in the Gulf. Women are technically allowed to remain on their husbands’ residence permits, depending on their husbands’ income. Though several strategies have been adopted by Gulf countries to reverse the lower labour force participation of the native labour force, especially of women, because of cultural reasons and paucity of skilled labour, the extent to which such policies will be successful is open to 82

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debate. Even in countries like Bahrain where the quality of the labour force is considered to be better (Kapiszewski 2001), this seems to be an issue. However, it also needs to be mentioned that such policies of nationalization of labour force are occurring at a stage when sending countries are actively involved in negotiating the living and working conditions for migrant workers abroad, and are moving from controlling migration towards facilitating the outflow of workers. Several positive initiatives have been undertaken by the GCC countries to improve the condition of migrant workers. The UAE has taken several measures since the mid-2000s to assist migrant workers in recouping unpaid wages. Electronic bank payment of wages was made compulsory from 2008. The government has facilitated employment transfers, enhanced the legal rights of workers vis-à-vis employers and introduced compulsory health insurance for all workers including those in domestic service paid by sponsors from 2008. Employment contracts for domestic workers have been instituted recently protecting their rights to pay, accommodation, healthcare and working hours. The UAE recently, in January 2011, introduced regulations on the functioning of recruitment agents, by which they have banned Prudential Regulation Authorities (PRAs) from ‘collecting any fees or sums of money under any designation from the recruited worker, directly or indirectly’ (GFMD 2011). Similarly, in Bahrain migrant workers have been allowed to change employers without obtaining the consent of the employer.

Box 4.1

Labour Market Strategies for ‘Nationalization’

A Policies Aiming to Reduce the Demand for Immigrant Labour 1 Raising costs of hiring foreign 4 Tax on non-diversity of workers (Bahrain, Kuwait, nationalities (i.e., >30 per Oman) cent any nationality) (UAE) 2 Closing of employment 5 Reducing labour-intensive in specific sectors of projects in the public sector professions (all GCC) (Kuwait) 3 Ceiling of proportion of 6 Preferential award of government contracts to private foreign workers in the company (Saudi Arabia, companies satisfying nationKuwait, the UAE) alization quota objectives (Oman) 83

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B

Policies Aiming to Reduce the Supply of Immigrant Labour

1 Health insurance paid by migrant worker (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE) 2 Degree validation fee (UAE) 3 Direct tax on migrant worker (Saudi Arabia) C

4 Restrictions on visa issuance (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia) 5 Deportation of irregular migrants (all GCC)

Policies Aiming to Increase the Demand for Indigenous Labour

1 State subsidy (up to 50 per 4 Directing new labour cent) of private sector pay for market entrants to the native worker (Saudi Arabia) private sector (all GCC) 2 Quotas for natives in public/ 5 Promoting education and private employment (Saudi training in technology and Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar) medicine (all GCC) 3 Development of economic sectors for nationals’ employment (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) D Policies Aiming to Reduce Local/Immigrant Wage Disparities 1 Reform/near-abandonment 3 Subsidies for hiring of indigof the kafala system (Oman, enous workers (Saudi Arabia) Bahrain) 2 Taxes on hiring migrant workers (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman) Source: Adapted from Baldwin-Edwards (2011).

Responses of civil society organizations Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have emerged as an important link facilitating safe migration of women workers from South Asian countries. They provide a range of services like raising awareness on safe migration; providing pre-departure orientation, including skill upgradation; and organizing migrant workers, among others. Migrant Services Centre (MSC) and Action Network for Migrant Workers (ACTFORM) are two prominent organizations in Sri Lanka 84

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engaged in advocacy, lobbying and campaigning on migrant-related issues. The ACTFORM publishes and distributes handbooks and a vernacular quarterly newsletter, organizes events on migrants’ human rights, prints informational posters, and runs press and electronic media campaigns (Gamburd 2010). The Shikkha Shastha Unnayan Karzakram (SHISHUK), the Bangladeshi Ovibasi Mohila Sramik Association (BOMSA) and the Welfare Association of Repatriated Bangladeshi Employees (WARBE) are the prominent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Bangladesh active in the field of migration. An important goal for the SHISHUK is to prevent low-skilled, loweducated Bangladeshi women migrants from falling victim to fraudulent recruiting agents and traffickers. The BOMSA, an association managed by returnee women migrants, follows a community-based approach and operates at the pre-departure stage. The organization depends on informal groups or one-to-one discussion sessions, in contrast to similar programmes organized by the government, which are usually brief and impersonal. The WARBE utilizes the experience and knowledge of returnee members. It helps migrants in assessing travel documents, visas and job contracts, spreads information about recruitment agencies with a dubious record, involves the migrant’s family at all stages of the process, offers counselling, etc. In Nepal, Pourakhi, an NGO formed by returnee women migrant workers, organizes sensitization programmes and awareness campaigns on migration at regular intervals, and prepares and disseminates information, education and communication materials on safe migration issues with the support of various partner organizations. In the GCC countries, civil society groups and NGOs work under severe constraints as they are closely monitored by the governmental agencies. However, there are some NGOs like the Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS) of Bahrain, established in 2005, which provide shelter for abused women workers and give them physical and moral assistance by working along with the respective embassies of the migrants. Trade union activities in relation to migrants’ rights have a nominal presence in the Gulf and South Asia. Gulf countries in general have a track record of restricting the rights of workers, particularly that of migrants. For instance, labour laws in Bahrain grant limited rights to both citizens and non-citizens to form and join trade unions. Migrant workers excluding domestic workers can join trade unions though they cannot bargain. In Kuwait, barring domestic workers and maritime employees, all others including migrant workers can join trade 85

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unions. Workers in Oman, other than those in the armed forces, public security institutions, government employees and domestic workers, enjoy the right to form unions. The law in Oman allows for collective bargaining according to the terms and conditions of employment, including for wages and hours of work. In Qatar only one trade union is allowed – the General Union of workers of Qatar; non-citizens cannot become members of the workers’ committee but can become members of the joint labour management committee. The right to strike is allowed but not for civil servants and domestic workers. In Saudi Arabia, the labour law does not allow for labour unions; there is no provision for protections of the right to strike work and collective bargaining. In the UAE, workers are not allowed to form unions except in the case of professional bodies, and labour law excludes domestic workers, agricultural workers and government workers.

Concluding observations International labour migration is entangled in a web of hierarchies created by class, race and gender. This chapter argues for gender-sensitive policies to address vulnerabilities faced by women workers and to strengthen the nexus between migration and development. Migration of women workers offers immense scope for social and economic mobility and reshaping of gender relations at the micro and macro levels. However, there is a need to incorporate gender sensitivity in stakeholders’ responses, and recognizing the ‘right to migrate’ and ‘rights of migrants at work’ would be a starting point to strengthen positive outcomes of migration in general and that of women migrants in particular.

Note This chapter is based on a research publication, Migration of Women Workers from South Asia to the Gulf, by Rakkee Thimothy and S. K. Sasikumar (New Delhi: V. V. Giri national Labour Institute and UN women, 2012).

References Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. 2011. ‘Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: national Patterns and Trends’. Paper no. 15, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics, London.

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Bindhulakshmi, P. 2010. ‘Gender Mobility and State Response: Indian Domestic workers in the UAE’, in S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.), Governance and Labour Migration: India Migration Report 2010, pp. 163–81. New Delhi: Routledge. Böhning, Roger. 2009. ‘Getting a Handle on the Migration Rights–Development Nexus’, International Migration Review, 43(3): 652–70. Gamburd, Michele Ruth. 2010. ‘Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant workers’, in Nicole Constable (ed.), Migrant Workers in Asia: Distant Divides, Intimate Connections, pp. 61–88. New York: Routledge. Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). 2011. ‘Private Employment Agencies – New Regulation UAE’, 7 April. http://www.gfmd.org/en/ pfp/practices/item/178-private-employment-agencies-%E2%80%93-newregulation-uae (accessed 30 August 2012). International Labour Office (ILO). 2004. Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy. Geneva: International Labour Office. ———. 2006. ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-Binding Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration. Geneva: International Labour Office. ———. 2010. International Labour Migration: A Rights-Based Approach. Geneva: International Labour Office. International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2010. World Migration Report 2010 – The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. Kabeer, Naila. 2007. ‘ “Footloose” Female Labour: Transnational Migration, Social Protection and Citizenship in the Asia Region’. Working Paper no. 1, International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Working Papers on women’s Rights and Citizenship, Canada. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2001. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Reading: Ithaca Press. Kapur, Ratna. 2005. ‘Travel Plans: Border Crossings and the Rights of Transnational Migrants’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 18: 107–38. http://www. law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss18/kapur.pdf (accessed 10 November 2011). Khan, Azfar and Hélène Harroff-Tavel. 2011. ‘The Implications of the Sponsorship System: Challenges and Opportunities’. Background Paper, ILO Regional Office for Arab States, Beirut. Khatri, Sridhar K. 2007. ‘Labor Migration, Employment and Poverty Alleviation in South Asia’. Paper no. 15, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS), Kathmandu. Mora, Claudia and Nicola Piper. 2011. ‘Notions of Rights and Entitlements among Peruvian Female workers in Chile’, Diversities, 13(1): 5–18. Nepal Institute of Development Studies (NIDS). 2010. Nepal Migration Year Book 2009. Kathmandu: Nepal Institute of Development Studies. Oishi, Nana. 2005. Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Piper, Nicola. 2008. ‘Gender, Migration and Development: Trends and Issues’, in Regional Thematic working Group on International Migration Including Human Trafficking and International Organization for Migration, Situational Report on International Migration in East and South-East Asia, pp. 163–76. Bangkok: International Organization for Migration, Regional Office for Southeast Asia. Rajan, S. Irudaya, V. J. Varghese, and M. S. Jayakumar. 2011. Dreaming Mobility and Buying Vulnerability: Overseas Recruitment Practices in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Shah, Nasra M. 2009. ‘The Management of Irregular Migration and Its Consequences for Development: Gulf Cooperation Council’. Working Paper no. 19, ILO Asian Regional Programme on Governance of Labour Migration, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, International Labour Organization, Bangkok. Shaham, Dahlia. 2009. ‘Foreign Labor in the Arab Gulf: Challenges to Nationalization’, Al Nakhlah, Fall 2008. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/Fall 2008/DhaliaShahamANformat.pdf (accessed 10 November 2011). Siddiqui, Tasneem. 2008. ‘Migration and Gender in Asia’. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in Asia and the Pacific, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 20–21 September, Bangkok. United Nations (UN). 2010. World Population Policies 2009. New York: United Nations. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2008. HIV Vulnerabilities of Migrant Women: From Asia to the Arab States, Shifting from Silence, Stigma and Shame to Safe Mobility with Dignity, Equity and Justice. Colombo: United Nations Development Programme. ———. 2009. Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Winckler, Onn. 1998. Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Kuwait. Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.

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5 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN MOBILITY Bimal Ghosh

The world migration system has been under increasing strain for more than four decades. The strain stems from a gathering mismatch between rising emigration pressures and dwindling opportunities for legal entry (especially of low-skilled workers). Instead of trying to bring these two powerful contradictory trends into dynamic harmony through pro-active inter-state cooperation, nations have continued to follow mostly reactive and inward-looking policies and taken shortterm or ad hoc measures to manage migration. This has produced a string of perverse results: human and economic costs have risen sharply while the opportunities for enhancing world stability and welfare gains have been largely forgone. The present economic crisis has worsened the situation. If joblessness and poverty continue to rise or remain at a high level in the coming years, derailing the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) timetable, and if, instead of strengthening their cooperation, nations become more inward-looking and reactive in their migration policies, it would be difficult to avoid domestic and inter-state tension; world recovery, too, will be slowed down. Like its predecessors in the past, the present economic crisis will not last forever. Some analysts are foreseeing a ‘business as usual’ scenario for migration in the post-recession future. According to this view, once the recession ends and recovery takes hold, migration will continue to flow as in the past because the structural reasons that drive intercountry movements will remain unchanged. It is important to remember, however, that some of the policy or practical measures taken during a crisis could have long-term effects 89

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on the future configuration of migration. It took several decades for international migration to recover from the impact of the restrictive immigration measures taken by countries such as the US (United States)1 and France just before and during the Great Depression of the early 1930s and their adverse effect on the social climate. Equally important is the fact that if migration is not effectively managed during a crisis, and instead becomes a source of serious tension and conflict, host countries – advanced or developing – could be unduly reticent to admit immigrants for many years to come. The corrosive scars can last long. Furthermore, as indicated later in this chapter (third section), it is far from certain that over the medium to longterm all of the structural drivers of migration will remain exactly the same as they are today. Many of the policy and practical measures I have outlined elsewhere (see Ghosh 2011)2 to respond to the recession-driven changes in the configuration of migration and global labour markets would call for close and genuine cooperation between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, without which they will not make much headway. The pre-existence of an agreed international framework for cooperative management of migration would have made it possible to avoid much of the strain being placed on the migration system by the crisis and the resulting widespread concern. It would also have made it easier to launch the necessary remedial measures through closer international cooperation. Nations could have moved forward with greater confidence, avoiding panicky reactions and knee-jerk policy measures as we are witnessing today. The recession has no doubt signalled some fledgling but ominous signs of anti-immigrant and restrictionist trends in both rich and poor countries and regions. This might imply a shift further away from international cooperation. On the other hand, if the gravity and urgency of the migration situation lead nations to work more closely and initiate some joint action to meet the immediate challenge, this could very well open up a new opportunity for closer inter-state co-operation on a lasting basis and serve as a stepping stone towards the establishment of a common international framework for improving governance of human mobility. Clearly, this would only happen if, unlike during the Great Depression, nations resist the temptation of becoming isolationist and inward looking. The agreement reached at the recent Group of 20 (G-20)3 summits in London and Pittsburgh (and the follow-up work currently being done by the group’s finance ministers and central bankers) to 90

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develop a harmonized global approach to the financial crisis and the acceptance of the need for international policy coordination to ensure orderliness, transparency and confidence in the financial sector, augur well for a similar approach towards improving global governance of human mobility. In times of crises, just as nations can become panicky and short-sighted, they can also become more willing to accept change. Common challenges, as a recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report put it, evoke common responses (UNDP 2009: 3). Sadly, however, unlike the ongoing global efforts to better manage the financial system, no major new initiative has, as yet, emerged to develop a framework for inter-state cooperation to improve governance of human mobility.

Looking back through history Attempts to build inter-state cooperation on migration within a global framework are not new. In 1927, the League of Nations explored at some length the possible adoption of an international convention to ‘facilitate and regulate’ international exchange of labour. Since then, a long series of initiatives have been taken to develop such a framework. (For details and a chronicle, see Joel P. Trachtman [2009: xv–xvii]). The latest academic initiatives in this area include: a research project on the international law of economic migration (supported by the W. E. Upjohn Institute, and executed by Trachtman at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), and on global mobility regimes (led by Rey Koslowski at the University of Albany, and supported by the MacArthur Foundation). Also of interest are the observations made by the UNDP in October 2009, just before the Third Session of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in Athens: There are calls to create a new global regime to improve the management of migration: over 150 countries now participate in the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Governments faced with common challenges, develop common responses – a trend we saw emerge while preparing this report. (UNDP 2009: 5) However, the reality is that, despite numerous eloquent pronouncements and a plethora of consultations, governments and inter-governmental organizations have so far remained sluggish in giving a concrete shape to the proposed international framework. 91

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The constraints: how real are they? Given the strange paradox, the question could well be asked: how realistic is it to expect nations to agree to adopt and adhere to a common international framework for managing migration? Three main reasons are generally cited as major constraints to the development of such a framework: (a) the lack of a shared goal or a ‘common good’ between origin and destination countries; (b) the absence of reciprocity of interests between the two groups of countries and asymmetry in their bargaining strengths; and (c) the absence of a hegemonic power to sponsor and safeguard such a regime (Ghosh 2007: 97–118, 2009). How valid are these arguments? This is discussed in the following sections. Lack of a common good All civilized states have a collective, as well as an individual, stake in maintaining international stability and peace and promoting economic progress. Orderliness and predictability of human mobility are among the essential conditions for achieving these goals, and they constitute a ‘common good’ that can underpin a global agreement on migration, fully in keeping with the tenets of regime theories. However, individual states also have differing, even conflicting, interests on many individual issues, depending on the country-specific situation and the type of the migratory flows. But it is precisely this diversity of state interests that offers the potential for bargaining based on trade-off or reciprocity, as practiced in trade negotiations, thereby creating the potential for each state to be a net gainer at the end of the deal. Absence of reciprocity There are a number of possible areas of reciprocity that can be explored. These include: trade-offs between opportunities for legal entry in destination countries and readmission of irregular migrants by countries of origin; availability of negotiated categories of skilled personnel from origin countries in exchange for destination countries’ acceptance of some of the origin countries’ low-skilled workers; and unmet demand for labour in host countries’ seasonal industries and occupations generally shunned by locals and the supply of such labour from origin countries. Some scope also exists for negotiating reciprocity between 92

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the movement of rich countries’ high-level personnel as intra-company transfers under Mode 3 (commercial presence) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)4 and the temporary entry into industrial countries of service-providing professionals from developing countries both as employees and as self-employed persons. Additionally, significant trade-offs can be worked out between predictable labour supply from origin countries and alleviation (at least in the short to medium term) of the growing strain on social security funding and slowing down of demographic decline in receiving (industrial) countries. Reciprocity of interests across sectors – for example, access to destination countries’ labour markets in exchange for liberalization of origin countries’ specific product markets, as recently discussed as part of the Doha Round of trade talks5 – also holds some significant promise. The interlocking reciprocity of interests in these and other potential areas plays its part in ensuring a high degree of symmetry in the bargaining powers of both sides. Since more and more countries (at least 25 per cent according to a recent global survey by the International Labour Organization [ILO]) are becoming involved in simultaneously sending and receiving migrants on a relatively large scale (ILO 1999), the protection and treatment of immigrants (and avoidance of ‘tit-for-tat’ practices) also becomes an important area of reciprocity; this too adds to the symmetry in the bargaining powers of the two groups. Although often ignored or forgotten, it is important to note that this makes the protection of migrants’ human rights and good governance of human mobility so closely interwoven (Ghosh 1995, 2003). Although the principle of reciprocity of interests has underpinned some of the existing bilateral agreements between migrant-sending and -receiving countries – as in the case, for example, of readmission agreements – its full potential for building inter-state cooperation still remains to be explored. Outside the European Union (EU), formal reciprocal commitments have generally been confined to issues such as readmission, remittances and planned recruitment, and have taken place in a bilateral or sub-regional/regional setting. Unlike in the case of trade, neither the governments nor the inter-governmental organizations have explored the range of reciprocity that can be negotiated within migration and across sectors, providing an enduring basis for inter-state cooperation. In a recent study on economic migration, Joel P. Trachtman (2009) proposed a structure of a multilateral legal framework within which states could negotiate commitments based on reciprocity of interests, 93

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thereby unlocking significant mutual and global welfare gains. In doing so, Trachtman follows a ‘positive list’ approach (under which each state specifies sectors or migration areas in which it would allow entry taking into account its own conditions and interests) to commitments for openness. This thus ensures flexibility, allows for the gradual application of the approach to openness, and makes it politically more realistic (see ibid.: xv–xvii).6 Both migrant-sending and -receiving countries could benefit by giving systematic attention to this avenue of action and by developing their analytical research to identify various areas of reciprocity and negotiating skills to overcome bargaining problems and facilitate efficient co-operation, be it at the bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral level.7 Hegemonic power vs collective inter-state leadership The role of a hegemonic power, as posited in regime theories, has significantly evolved over time, signalling a decline in the influence of one or more hegemonic powers in world politics and the potential emergence of a multi-polar world society. Not surprisingly, in recent years, several international agreements or regimes were initiated and/ or subsequently sustained by collective initiatives in the UN (despite the absence of any hegemonic support or even resistance from one or more hegemonic powers). In these cases, collective consensus-building rather than hegemonic leadership has been the driving force.8

The outlook for the future: migration in 2025 If mutual confidence and commonality of interests are essential cornerstones for building durable international cooperation in managing migration, the proposed framework, based on a set of transparent and predictable norms and principles, is clearly the answer. Such cooperation should, ideally, take the form of an overall framework agreement as a soft instrument (for instance, a solemn declaration) supported by a set of autonomous, but inter-related sub-regimes in the form of soft and hard instruments, depending on the nature of the issues or areas concerned. Admittedly, as long as there are sharp economic and demographic imbalances between rich and poor countries, there is likely to be some tension in managing migration, despite the existence of an agreed framework for cooperative action. It is conceivable, however, that by 94

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2025 the global migration system would become more stable and the framework of cooperation would work under much reduced tension with the framework agreement itself contributing to a less fraught environment. The expected stability would come from three main sources. The first is concerned with declining pressure for emigration – especially through irregular channels – as a result of an improved political and economic situation, including in particular high rates of economic growth in a number of migrant-sending and other developing countries such as China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Korea. Several other countries, including Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, South Africa, and Vietnam, too are making rapid strides. The growth prospects of these counties have led banks and financial institutions to introduce new acronyms, wider than BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) that was coined nine years ago, in order to attract investor interest.9 In recent years, many of these countries have witnessed a much faster rate of economic growth than the rich countries and they probably will continue to do so in the coming years. Even if a few suffer slowdowns, the general trend is unlikely to be reversed. Between 2005 and 2010, GDP increased by 25 per cent in Brazil, 47 per cent in India, and 69 per cent in China. This compares with an increase of just 5 per cent in the US, 4 per cent in the Eurozone and 2 per cent in the United Kingdom (UK). Even without China and India, emerging and developing country economies grew by 5.2 per cent in 2010. The shift is also reflected in the relative shares of the two groups in global GDP. In 2000, rich countries accounted for 63 per cent of global GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP); it fell to 53 per cent in 2010. There has been a concomitant rise in the emerging countries’ share in global output, with China and India accounting for 80 per cent of the increase. It is true that, as concerns income per head, these countries remain way behind the rich countries, and it will take them a long time to bridge the gap. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Ghosh 2005a: 181, 2005b), more than the absolute level of income, it is the rate of growth and the perception of the future performance of the economy that influences people’s decision to migrate. As the economic outlook in these and several other middle- and low-income countries continue to improve, many who would have otherwise moved abroad would prefer to stay at home. This does not mean that inter-country income or wage differential will cease to be of relevance to movements across borders. However, it can be expected that even the wage differential between the two 95

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groups of countries – especially at the upper ends of the tradeable sectors – will start coming down, as it had happened between rich and poor countries of Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Williamson 2002), and is now happening in countries like India in certain sectors such as information technology (IT) and pharmaceuticals. Between January and July 2010, each of India’s top three groups in the IT sector had to increase pay by 10–20 per cent, and the cost relating to poaching by competitors hit a record US$2 billion according to analysts. In several of these countries, labour productivity is rising rapidly. Labour productivity in India and China, for example, is estimated to be growing at more than five times the global rate. This will help in pushing wages up. Much of the present tension in South–North flows stems from increasing pressures of low-skilled migrants, including those who enter, or try to enter, through irregular channels. But as some of the low- and middle-income countries make rapid strides towards higher levels of growth and income, a change in the characteristics of migrants and composition of flows is likely to take place; this too, as explained further in the chapter, will contribute to lessening the tension. Elsewhere I have made a distinction between migrants who are desperate to move because of joblessness, poverty and hunger (‘survival migrants’) and those who move in search of better opportunities abroad (‘opportunity-seeking migrants’) (Ghosh 2007). The former move under compulsion, have little to lose and hardly care about the risks involved. By contrast, for the latter, migration is a matter of rational choice. They cross borders after a relatively careful assessment of the possible costs and benefits of the move and would generally avoid the risks of illegal entry. They are also normally better equipped to migrate, more informed about conditions in the destination country, and are likely to be more easily accepted by the host society. If higher growth in low- and middleincome countries is accompanied by better distribution of income and job creation (an important condition), there would be a decline in the pressure of low-skilled migration, especially through irregular channels, which is now a main source of tension. True, it is possible that at the same time increased earnings may make it possible for some new people in these countries to move abroad, but most of them are likely to be opportunity-seeking migrants. Thus, the shift in the composition of migration would help in reducing tensions in South–North migration. The second area of anticipated stability relates to rapid and rather unexpected changes in fertility rates in both poor and rich countries, 96

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which suggest that demographic imbalances may soon be a less powerful driving factor in inter-country migration. Apart from China, which has had a one-child policy since the early 1970s, in many parts of the developing world (such as Brazil, Indonesia, Iran and even in some areas of India) fertility rates are falling astonishingly fast (Bongaarts 2009; The Economist 2009). According to the latest available figures, the rate of India’s population growth (medium variant) is now hovering around 1.4 per cent a year; by 2010–25, it will fall to 1.10 per cent. These countries are racing through the demographic transition to reach the replacement rate of fertility that is consistent with stable population. If poor people would have greater access to population planning facilities, the fertility rates in many more countries would also drop. A number of countries in Asia and Latin America are having a bulge of working age adult population that has the potential to help them over the coming decades in both capital accumulation per head and rapid economic growth. In 2020, the median age in India will be 28, as against 38 in America, 45 in Western Europe and 49 in Japan. At the same time, significantly enough, in an increasing number of rich countries (such as France, Italy and Sweden) fertility rate is rising again to reach the replacement rate. The combination of these two trends has important implications for future migration: just as the decline in birth rates, coupled with economic growth in less affluent countries, will reduce the demographic push for emigration, the rise in fertility rates in rich countries will lower the demographic and labour market-related demand that encourages immigration. Stability in population growth should contribute to stability in migration flows. This, in turn, will contribute to the diffusion of at least some of the existing tensions, especially those affecting South–North migration. Helping this process, there will be, as discussed in the next section, a concurrent rise in South-South migration, with an increase in the number and diversity of both source and destination countries across the developing regions. Finally, stability in South–North migration is also likely to be helped by technological progress and lifestyle changes in rich countries, especially for the younger generation. The increased use of labour-saving and automatic appliances for household work such as cleaning and gardening as well as for low-skilled jobs in farming and industrial processes should reduce the demand for low-skilled workers. These jobs are generally shunned by local workers and the unmet labour demand is met by bringing low-skilled, low-wage immigrant workers from poor countries, often encouraging inflows of irregular immigrants 97

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who are cheap and also more docile because of their precarious legal status. The tensions that the situation is now causing are likely to be diminished in the future. Increased South–South migration Increased South–South migration will run alongside expansion of trade and economic links among countries in the South. According to recent figures, South–South remittances are now already an important part of global flows of migrant remittances; and they are set to show further increase in the years ahead. In the past, developing countries had focused on efforts to develop collective action in the context of North– South negotiations. Economic and technical cooperation among them, though often a subject of public announcements, had, in practice, remained limited. Things are now changing. A number of developing countries are establishing new economic links through trade, aid and investment, including outsourcing, with their counterparts elsewhere. Some new movements of people are already taking place as part of the process, and prospects are opening up for more to follow. India, like China, has long been noted for its diaspora networks across the globe, including developing regions. What is striking however is that the economic and related migratory links among developing countries are now extending in several new ways and forms. For instance, Indian technology and other companies, including Infosys and Tata, have now 17,000 Indian and non-Indian employees in South America and the Caribbean – a trend which was hardly noticeable before 2000. Increased South–South migration will emerge as part of the ongoing, wider process of economic rebalancing between North and South. The adoption of a framework agreement on migration at the global level, as discussed previously, can facilitate these fast-moving changes and help ensure that the movements will be more orderly and predictable, with much less negative externalities than what we are witnessing now. The forthcoming sessions of the GFMD and the UN High-level Dialogue on Migration should be geared to building the consensus needed to attain this objective. No less important is that the G-20, which so far has kept away from the issue, should take up this challenge and make it part of its agenda. India is among the key players in the G-20 and other international fora: it is also an important migrant-sending and -receiving country. It is in a position to play, together with other like-minded countries, an important catalytic role in making this happen. Separately, but 98

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linked to this wider process, India can pursue the proposal for a multilateral agreement (or sub-regime) on labour migration based on intercountry reciprocity of interests in labour markets and across different economic sectors. In doing so, it can revamp and redesign the interesting proposal it had already made during the recent Doha round of trade negotiations – intakes of categories of migrant workers by capital-rich countries in exchange for liberalization of developing countries’ specific product markets.

We are standing at a crossroad Is it unrealistic to think of better managing human mobility through an agreed framework of inter-state cooperation? Is the scenario envisioned above too holistic? I don’t think so. The initiative is certainly within our reach. But much depends on whether nations (not just governments, but also the other principal actors – notably civil society and the private sector) are prepared to seriously take up the challenge of international migration, just as they have now started doing to better manage global financial flows in the wake of the recession. Their response to the pressing migration issues, which are linked to the economic crisis, may very well set the course – either by opening up new vistas of change for better governance of human mobility or reaffirming the old ways of trying to muddle through the migration morass.

Acknowledgements An earlier and shorter version of this essay was used as a background paper for the World Migration Report 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2010.

Notes 1 The US Immigration Act of 1924, which took effect in 1928, imposed serious quota restrictions on the annual flow of new immigrants from most countries. 2 The list of policy and operational measures suggested provide a benchmark against which a country’s current capacity to deal with different aspects of migration policy and management over the short to medium term could be assessed. The present chapter deals only with the governance aspect. 3 See http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (accessed 19 October 2011).

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4 GATS Mode 3 relates to service delivered within the territory of a country through the commercial presence of the supplier in another country. 5 Migrant-sending countries may agree to liberalize some of their product markets (for agricultural commodities or manufactures) if, in exchange, the destination countries accept some additional labour migrants from origin countries. For example, during the Doha Round, India offered freer access for rich countries’ specific goods to its markets if such countries accepted some additional labour migrants. 6 This is very much in line with the principle of ‘regulated openness’ as envisioned by the New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People (NIROMP) project, supported by the United Nations (UN) and several European governments. 7 For a discussion of the reasons why a multilateral framework enjoys certain advantages over bilateral and plurilateral settings see Joel P. Trachtman [2009: 271–96], and Bimal Ghosh [2000: 235–39]. 8 Under the conventional regime theory, an international agreement (or regime) is not viable unless it is sponsored and sustained by a hegemonic power. Recent developments in international relations have shown that this need not always be the case, and the regime theory itself is evolving in recognition of this trend. A typical example of such developments is the establishment of the International Criminal Court, which was initially opposed by some of the major powers but has become a reality. The same largely applies to the adoption of the 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The emergence of the G-20 is also indicative of the same trend towards collective inter-state initiative in the economic arena. 9 The US-based bank, HSBC, for example, has suggested CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa); while the Standard Chartered Bank has proposed ‘seven percent club’ for countries with regular Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 7 per cent a year or more.

References Bongaarts, John. 2009. ‘Human Population Growth and the Demographic Transition’, in Roger V. Short and Malcolm Potts (eds), The Impact of Population Growth in Tomorrow’s World. London: The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. The Economist. 2009. ‘Fertility and Living Standards: Go Forth and Multiply a Lot Less’, 31 October–6 November. Ghosh, Bimal. 1995. ‘Movements of People: The Search for A New International Regime’, in Commission on Global Governance (ed.), Issues in Global Governance: Papers Written for The Commission on Global Governance, pp. 405–24. London: Kluwer Law International. ——— (ed.). 2000. Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2003. Elusive Protection and Uncertain Lands: Migrants’ Access to Human Rights. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

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———. 2005a. ‘Economic Effects of International Migration: A Synoptic Overview’, in World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. ———. 2005b. ‘Managing Migration: Interstate Cooperation at the Global Level – Is the Emergence of a New Paradigm of Partnership Around the Corner?’, in Interstate Cooperation and Migration. Geneva: Berne Initiative Studies/Swiss Federal Office for Migration/International Organization for Migration. ———. 2007. ‘Managing Migration: Towards the Missing Regime’, in Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (eds), Migration Without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People, pp. 97–118. Paris and New York: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/Berghahn Books. ———. 2011. The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where Do We Go From Here?. Geneva: The International Organization for Migration/The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration. ILO. 1999. Migrant Workers. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Trachtman, Joel P. 2009. ‘Negotiating Global Disciplines on Migration’, in Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth Freedom. Michigan: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. http://www.upjohninst.org/publications/titles/ilem.html (accessed 4 October 2010). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2009. ‘Overview’, in UNDP, Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, pp. 1–5. New York: United Nations Development Programme. Williamson, Jeffrey G. 2002. Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

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6 KERALA EMIGRATION TO SAUDI ARABIA Prospects under the Nitaqat law K. C. Zachariah, S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph

A majority of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries exhibit demographic imbalances, to different degrees, owing to a high percentage of non-nationals in the population, and their expanding youth populations. Demographic trends have a decisive influence on a country’s economic, labour and population policies and migration is a key social policy intervention that allows governments to control and regulate the volume and nature of its demographic base. Beginning in the 1970s, the GCC has woken up to the challenges posed by its shifting demographics and implemented a series of corrective policy measures that aim to bring about governmentally administered changes in population – both quantitative and qualitative. The Kerala–Saudi Arabia migration corridor is a product of unique geopolitical, economic, sociological, and religious dimensions that have historically linked both places together. In Saudi Arabia, much like other countries of the GCC, demographic factors such as ageing, small or shrinking populations, together with burgeoning economic opportunities and vast resources, have long acted as pull factors for migrant workers from the Indian subcontinent. Saudi’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 was US$693.73 billion and its per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was US$9,163. In contrast, Kerala’s State Domestic Product (SDP) was US$31.9 billion in 2011 (about 4.6 per cent of Saudi’s) and per capita SDP was US$1,040 (about 1.1 per cent of Saudi’s). Low per capita income and slow economic growth induced many Indians (notably from Kerala) to seek their fortunes on Gulf shores. However, migration is only one component of a complex chain of processes that shape the sociopolitical landscape of a country. A 102

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comparative evaluation of the demographic dynamics of Saudi Arabia and Kerala affords critical insights into labour market characteristics, current government policies and the potential outcomes of these policies for Kerala and the wider Indian subcontinent.

Demographic rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s Nitaqat law The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country in Western Asia by land area, constituting four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula. However, it has a small population relative to total land area of 2,148,690 km. Saudi Arabia is among the fastest growing nations in the world in terms of population growth. The Kingdom’s population grew threefold from 7.3 million in 1975 to 27.1 million in 2010. Of this, foreigners account for upwards of 8.4 million. In comparison, Kerala’s total land area is only about 39,000 km but population-wise Kerala is marginally ahead of Saudi Arabia; the difference is about 15 per cent. Kerala’s population in 2011 stood at 33.4 million with about 2.3 million people from the state living abroad. This situation was very different in the past and is presumed to look very different in the future. The population of Kerala in as far back as 1881 was greater than the population of Saudi Arabia in 1951. At the time, Saudi’s population of about 3 million was about one-fourth of Kerala’s population of 14 million. Kerala continues to lead in terms of absolute population figures however; the rate of population growth has significantly receded. Saudi Arabia is quickly closing the gap. By 2021, Saudi’s population is projected to be at par with Kerala’s, each about 34 million, and by 2051, Saudi’s population is expected to be about one and half times the population of Kerala (Figure 6.1). Alongside exponential population rise, the Kingdom’s labour markets have witnessed specific demographic pressures that triggered the move towards immigration caps and work-force regulations. First and most noticeable is the Kingdom’s youth boom. Second, these new entrants into the labour market lack adequate skills and training required to participate in the economy and effectively contribute to economic growth. As a result, the Kingdom continues to be directly dependent on expatriate human resource. Third, the irregular entry and stay of unauthorized migrant workers has further undermined the position of citizens in the Kingdom. These demographic realities are unavoidable. Given the growing need to employ local youth and balance new and emerging challenges, 103

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Figure 6.1 Population of Kerala and Saudi Arabia Source: Prepared by the authors based on various censuses of Kerala and data obtained from UNDESA (2011).

it seems instrumental to analyze the localization policies against the backdrop of broader demographic and development processes. Youth bulge One of the defining characteristics of contemporary Arab societies is the large and expanding youth population. The size and trend of population in the young working ages in Saudi Arabia are critical factors in determining the country’s migration policy. In 1951, population in the age group of 15–39 years in Saudi Arabia was only about 25 per cent of the corresponding population in Kerala. By 2011, the number of persons in the age group 15–39 in Saudi exceeded that in Kerala by nearly 20 per cent. The demographic contrast between Kerala and Saudi is all the more startling when populations in the emigration-prone ages are compared. Emigration from Kerala stemmed primarily from the young working age population. Nearly 90 per cent of the emigrants from Kerala were in the age group 15–39 at the time of emigration. The gap between Kerala and Saudi in the matter of population in the young working ages is set to widen very rapidly in the coming decades. The expected numbers in 104

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2051 are 15.4 million in Saudi and just 7.6 million in Kerala. The Kingdom’s unprecedented ‘youth bulge’ has not yet crested, which means the country faces the problem of providing an additional 100,000 jobs per year for those Saudi nationals aged 20 or under who shall enter the work force in the next two decades. These large cohorts of young (and oftentimes unemployed) people pose a cascade of socioeconomic and political challenges for the Saudi government (Figure 6.2). Education and training deficit The Saudi population pyramid paints a picture of a burgeoning young working population – a good sign for any developing economy. However, local youth are ill-equipped to enter the workforce and contribute productively to the Kingdom’s development. In a country where over 51 per cent of the population is below 25 years, education is a vital and strategic area to enhance strong long-term sustainable economic growth and employment opportunities for citizens. Saudi Arabia may benefit from a demographic dividend; a surge in productivity and growth as those workers join the labour pool but the dividend pays off only if the country provides its youth adequate

Figure 6.2 Population in the age group 15–39 in Saudi Arabia and Kerala Source: Prepared by the authors based on various censuses of Kerala and data obtained from UNDESA (2011).

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educational and economic opportunities to develop their skills. Currently the skill level of nationals is painfully lacking and there are concerns about quality and market suitability of graduates. Often, nationals are also prohibitively expensive to employ in lower-level positions. Thus, Saudi Arabia faces a complex challenge – that of attracting and retaining talented overseas employees with critical skills while ensuring jobs to its swelling working-age populace. The sharp contrast between Saudi Arabia and Kerala in terms of education and other human resources is also an important factor in the tightening of the labour market in Saudi Arabia. According to the results of the demographic survey conducted by the Department of Statistics and Information, Ministry of Economy and Planning, in 2007 the incidence of illiteracy among the Saudi population was 13.7 per cent whereas Kerala boasted of close to 100 per cent literacy. These percentages have been on the increase steadily in recent years. Investment in human capital has become a top priority for the Saudi government, as is evidenced by the tripling of spending on education since 2000 – growing from SR 105 billion in 2008, SR 122 billion in 2009, SR 137 billion in 2010, and SR 150 billion in 2011 to SR 204 billion in 2013. The Education Ministry’s 10-year strategic plan (2004–14) to overhaul the education system is an important milestone that can help unlock the country’s invaluable human potential and ensure lasting growth and a knowledge-based economy. Over-reliance on expatriates Much has been said regarding the dependence of GCC economies on the temporary immigration of foreign workers to offset relatively small national populations, low local participation rates and skill shortages. In recent years however, Saudi Arabia has witnessed an upsurge in fertility rates and population growth, leading to a gradual rise in the proportion of the population that is of working age. Despite this increase in absolute numbers, the share of nationals in the labour force has not seen commensurate increase. In 2010, unemployment rates rose to 13 per cent among all males and were estimated to be as high as 35 per cent among males between ages 20 and 24. This has resulted in large reserves of unemployed locals, particularly youth and women causing the country to continue its dependence on foreign labour and expertise. While immigrants constitute only a third of the population, they comprise two-thirds of the total labour force and over 88 per cent of the private sector labour force according to a report by the Saudi 106

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Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) in 2008, latest figures indicate that private labour force participation rates of expatriates are as high as 95 per cent. In 2005 two GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), hosted as much as 3.3 per cent and 1.7 per cent of all migrants in the world respectively and this trend has continued steadily despite upheavals such as the Global Recession and Arab Spring. This relentless demographic ascendance adds a potentially destabilizing dimension to the interdependencies that have long bound Saudi Arabia to the state of Kerala. Rapid demographic changes coupled with the presence of a sizeable non-national workforce produced some of the most intense pressures on labour markets observed anywhere in the world (World Bank 2004) sparking considerable resentment and anxiety among Saudi citizens. Status of immigrants Although entry and stay of foreign workers is regulated under the kafala or ‘sponsorship system’, loopholes exist that allow workers to bypass state controls and join the labour market without being tied to a specific job or employer. In addition, annual pilgrimages to Mecca (Haj and Omra) open doors to thousands of foreigners for overstaying the visa making it impossible to accurately estimate the stock of foreign workers in Saudi at any given time. The operation of informal economies and migration intermediaries has further encouraged both irregular and regular migration flows (ILO 2009) and the large-scale settlement of illegally resident immigrants. As a result, low-wage sectors are vastly expanding, thus perceptibly flattening the wages across such sectors and escalating the need to resolve the status of the illegally resident population.

Saudi’s labour localization policies and the Nitaqat law While policy-makers recognize the lasting contribution of expatriates to the country, a revamp of the size and quality of the foreign workforce is long overdue. The Saudi Arabian government has framed institutional arrangements and programmes through which it aspires to influence demographic change and shed its current migrant-dependent economic model by increasing the proportion of native workers in Kingdom’s labour force. Two such policy measures were introduced as prophylactics against impending demographic downfall: ‘Saudization’ and ‘Nitaqat’. 107

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Saudization ‘Saudization’ refers to an implicit policy programme undertaken by the Saudi government since 1994 to amend the imbalances in the labour market and increase workforce participation of citizens to an economically sustainable level. This is also an attempt to recapture and reinvest the immense capital fleeing the country through foreign labour remittances, estimated at 20 billion SR annually. The basic principle of the system was the need to appoint a certain percentage of Saudi citizens in all the establishments existing in the Kingdom. The percentage varied in accordance to the activity of the establishment. Generally it was fixed at 30 per cent. The system, however, did not achieve the desired objective. These quotas were widely resented by businesses that were forced to pay above-market rates for low-skilled and unmotivated local workers. More than 6.5 million expatriates are currently working in the private sector. This compares with only 700,000 Saudi workers, constituting 10 per cent of that value. Moreover, 2 million work visas were issued during the preceding two years. The continued overwhelming dependence of the private sector on foreign workers outweighed the bureaucratic controls on both foreign and national companies in obtaining visas and ongoing government efforts to promote labour nationalization. The government required a strategic rethink to mitigate, if not solve, the local unemployment quandary.

Nitaqat More recently, the Saudi Arabian government has been trying to revitalize the localization policy, considered critical to the long-term stability of the country. The Kingdom’s latest indigenization strategy – ‘Nitaqat’ – came into effect on September 2011. The main obstacle faced under the previous system was that it was impractical to apply one fixed percentage across all sectors and industry verticals. Nitaqat’s requirements vary from segment to segment, ranging over 6 per cent for construction jobs to 30 per cent for oil and gas extraction and over 50 per cent for banks and financial institutions (for firms with under 500 employees) (Audi Sal Audi Saradar Bank 2013). This programme divides the labour market into 41 activities and each activity is grouped under five sizes (Giant, Large, Medium, Small, and Very Small) resulting in 205 categories in all. The performance of the establishment in the localization of jobs is to be 108

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evaluated by comparing it with similar establishments to have fair standards for the evaluation. After the evaluation, Nitaqat classifies these establishments into Ranges (Excellent, Green, Yellow, and Red) based on the ratio of the citizens working in the establishment. The motive behind applying the Nitaqat system is to make the appointment of Saudi citizens a competitive advantage in the various establishments in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Labour (MoL) in Saudi Arabia granted several advantages to Excellent and Green categories by giving them the eligibility to issue work visas for the development of new businesses. Furthermore, the MoL will give them the ability to sign contracts with non-Saudi workers from the establishments of the Red and Yellow ranges. This will result in granting the establishments that have achieved high rates of localization the opportunity to appoint nonSaudi workers from among the available talent pool in the Kingdom. In contrast, the establishments in the Red and Yellow Ranges will be forced to speed up the localization of the jobs or lose control over the non-Saudi workers in the establishment and not be allowed to obtain new work visas to appoint non-Saudi workers or set up subsidiaries or branches. Alongside expulsion or deportation of undocumented workers after the grace period, it promises a system that will reliably identify those who are authorized to work in Saudi Arabia and prevent identity theft/spurious visas as well as end the hiring of future unauthorized workers. It offers a ‘path to legality’ to illegally resident expatriates and mandates that all workers be accounted for on a public database. Overall, Nitaqat has the potential to introduce much-needed market adjustments to enhance the efficiency of the private sector.

Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia was the preferred destination for emigrants from Kerala in the early years of Kerala emigration to the Gulf countries. According to the Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) 1998, Saudi Arabia had 38 per cent of the total number of emigrants from Kerala. The UAE ranked only second with 27 per cent. By the turn of the 21st century, however, Saudi Arabia lost some of its glamour in comparison to the UAE. From 1998 to 2003, the proportion of Kerala emigrants in the UAE increased from 31 per cent to 36.5 per cent while in Saudi Arabia it decreased from 37.5 per cent to 26.7 per cent. Between 2008 and 2011, migration flows to the UAE ebbed by 3.2 percentage points 109

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owing to the recession; at the same time emigration to Saudi Arabia increased by 2.2 percentage points. Saudi Arabia remained, however, second to the UAE in emigration from Kerala (Figure 6.3). Sex composition Emigrants from Kerala are predominantly males regardless of destination. The overall proportion of female emigrants is only about 12–13 per cent. Among Kerala emigrants to Saudi Arabia, females are even fewer – only 9.8 per cent. In 2008, the proportion of females among Saudi emigrants was 7.9 per cent while contrastingly that among emigrants from Kottayam district was 53.9 per cent. This is presumably because emigrants from Kottayam included a large number of nurses and nursing assistants. Age distribution Nearly 70 per cent of Saudi emigrants were aged between ages 25 and 45 years. Only 1.5 per cent were 60 years of age or older. For a single

Figure 6.3 Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia and the UAE Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Surveys of 1998, 2003, 2008, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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five-year age group, the largest proportion was in the age group 25–29 years – about 21 per cent. The average age of the Saudi emigrants in 2011 was 35 years. The average Saudi emigrant is slightly older than those in other Gulf countries. At the time of the survey, the average age of Saudi emigrants was 34.96 (33.05 for all destinations) while the average at the time of emigration was 24.78 (26.39 for all destinations) (Figure 6.4). Educational attainment On almost all counts, Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia are relatively poorer in educational attainment compared to Kerala emigrants in other countries. Among Saudi emigrants, only 28.3 per cent have completed 12th standard. This compares with 39.9 per cent among all emigrants from Kerala. The corresponding proportion is as much as 44.5 per cent among emigrants in Kuwait, 42.1 per cent among those in Qatar and 41.8 per cent among emigrants in the UAE (Figure 6.5). The average years of schooling of Saudi emigrants (9.5 years) are the same as that of all emigrants from Kerala. However, Saudi’s average is lower than that of the UAE, Kuwait and Oman (Tables 6.1 and 6.2; see also Figure 6.6).

Figure 6.4 Age distribution of emigrants from Kerala, 2011 Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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Figure 6.5 Percentage of emigrants with 12th standard or higher levels of education Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Table 6.1 Educational attainment of emigrants

Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman All Kerala

Average Years of Schooling

Proportion with 12th Standard or Higher

9.5 9.8 9.8 9.4 9.7 9.5

28.3 41.8 44.5 42.1 36.0 39.9

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Table 6.2 Percentage of emigrants with given educational level

Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman Kerala

12+

Degree

No Formal Education

28.3 41.8 44.5 42.1 36.0 39.9

11.1 17.5 18.3 19.2 12.0 18.4

5.0 8.1 15.3 6.8 6.0 9.3

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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Employment status Two-thirds of Saudi emigrants from Kerala were employed at the time of emigration, about a fifth was unemployed and one-eighth was not in the labour force. Employment ratio among emigrants in Saudi (66.7 per cent) is much higher than that in other GCC countries. Consequently, the proportion of those outside the labour force is much less in Saudi (Table 6.3). Sector of employment The vast majority of Kerala emigrants in Saudi work as labourers in the non-agricultural sector. They constituted 43.5 per cent in Saudi, 43.7 per

Figure 6.6 Percentage of emigrants with a college degree Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Table 6.3 Employment status of emigrants in selected countries

Employed Unemployed Not in Labour Force Total

Saudi Arabia

UAE

Kerala

66.7 20.8 12.5 100.0

50.0 32.2 17.8 100.0

54.1 26.7 19.2 100.0

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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cent in the UAE and 42.4 per cent across the GCC. Self-employed emigrants were 14.6 per cent in Saudi as compared to 11.5 per cent in the UAE or 12.2 per cent for all emigrants (Figure 6.7). Industrial affiliation of emigrants The largest proportion of Saudi emigrant workers is employed in the ‘transport and storage’ industrial group, employing 22 per cent of working emigrants. The corresponding percentage for all emigrants from Kerala is 17.6 per cent, and only 15.2 per cent among emigrants in the UAE. About 19 per cent of Saudi emigrants are employed in construction-related industries, compared with 17 per cent among emigrants in the UAE. The principal occupation of Saudi emigrants from Kerala is sales. More than one-fourth of the emigrants are sales persons. Other occupations in which large numbers of Saudi emigrants are engaged are: drivers of motor vehicles (10.8 per cent), barbers/hair dressers (5.2 per cent), construction workers (4.3 per cent), electricians (3.3 per cent), and nurses/nursing assistants (3.2 per cent) (Table 6.4).

Figure 6.7 Employment sectors of emigrants Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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Table 6.4 Percentage distribution of emigrants by industry Industry

Saudi

UAE

Kerala

Agriculture and Fisheries Mining and Quarrying Manufacture Electricity, Gas, Water Construction Trade Repair of Cars, Household Goods Hotels and Restaurants Transport and Storage Finance Real Estate Business Education, Health, etc. Personal Services Others Total

14.5 0.6 5.2 2.2 19.1 18.4 2.8 2.5 21.9 0.6 0.1 5.1 5.4 1.7 100.0

13.0 0.9 5.8 3.1 17.0 18.6 4.8 5.9 15.2 1.0 0.6 6.0 4.8 3.1 100.0

12.1 0.6 5.6 2.7 18.7 16.9 4.2 4.5 17.6 1.0 0.3 7.1 5.5 3.2 100.0

Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2011 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

Emigration prospects With the stricter enforcement of Nitaqat law from July 2013, emigrants without appropriate emigration documents will have to leave Saudi Arabia. According to several media reports, around 2 million foreign workers are expected to lose their jobs and return due to the tightening of the Nitaqat law. In this context, the growth prospects for Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia are thrown into question. Prognosis based on past trend In recent years, emigration from Kerala to Saudi Arabia followed an uneven path. Between 1998 and 2003, the number of emigrants decreased by 4 per cent. In the next inter-survey period, 2003–08, the number of emigrants increased marginally by 2.7 per cent. Between 2008 and 2011, there was a sharper increase of 14 per cent. Is the acceleration in emigration during 2008–11 a trend-setting development? Not likely. 115

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The steep increase during 2008–11 could be explained by the relatively larger impact of the global recession of 2007–08 on the UAE than on Saudi Arabia. A growing number of emigrants in the UAE, who lost their jobs as a result of recession, moved instead to Saudi Arabia. The acute increase in the number of emigrants in Saudi during 2008–11 should be treated as a special case, and not as indicative of a long-term trend. Consequently, if the past trend is any guide, emigration to Saudi Arabia in the coming years is likely to be relatively stable, experiencing neither large decreases nor significant increases. Demographic trend as a determinant of future emigration As stated earlier, Kerala emigrants stem predominantly from the young working ages. In the past, nearly 90 per cent of the emigrants were between 20 and 39 years of age at the time of emigration. The number of persons in this age bracket has been decreasing steadily in Kerala since 2001. It would decrease more sharply in the coming decades. On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, population in the young working ages has been increasing in recent decades and would continue to increase for some more years. Under these circumstances, the prospects for any increase in emigration from Kerala to Saudi Arabia are dim. In fact, if demographic trends are the only determinants, future emigration should be from Saudi Arabia to Kerala, not the other way around! Under such unfavourable demographic conditions, how is it that Kerala continues to send out large numbers of emigrants to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries? The answer lies in replacement migration. Every emigrant that goes out of Kerala state is replaced by an in-migrant from another state in India. What is lost through external migration is replaced by internal migration from other demographically-rich states within the country (Figure 6.8). Prognosis based on wage differentials The average wage among unskilled workers in Kerala has increased from `150 to over `450 during the past 10–12 years. On the other hand, corresponding wages in Saudi Arabia did not increase as fast as it did in Kerala. Wage differential among unskilled labourers between Kerala and Saudi Arabia has narrowed down considerably in the last decade. As wage differentials between the two regions flatten out, it

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Figure 6.8 Percentage increase in the number of people in the 15–39 age group, 1989–91 through 2031–41 Source: Prepared by the authors based on various censuses of Kerala and data obtained from UNDESA (2011).

will naturally depress the rate of migration. At the same time, the cost of emigration from Kerala has increased precipitously. Under these circumstances, emigration from Kerala to Saudi is likely to follow a downward slope. Competition from other states in India Another factor that could stand in the way of acceleration of emigration from Kerala is competition from other states within India. The number of emigrants from other states across India is increasing much faster than that from Kerala. This is indicated by the number of Emigration Check Required (ECR) passports issued in various states in India. The number was highest for Kerala ever since statistics became available. However, since 2008, more passports were issued in Uttar Pradesh than in Kerala. In 2011, the number of ECR passports issued in Uttar Pradesh was 155,300 as compared to just 86,780 in Kerala. The number from Kerala is likely to decrease further while

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that from other states is likely to increase. In addition, the wage rates in these states are much lower than those in Kerala. These statistics point towards a possible decrease in emigration from Kerala, not only to Saudi but also to most Gulf countries. Lessons from recent history: the impact of the global recession of 2007–08 on migration The Global Recession of 2007–08 was said to have had a considerable impact on the economy of Gulf countries, especially the UAE. In 2009, the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) undertook a special study to assess the impact of the global recession on the employment and return emigration of Gulf emigrants from Kerala and arrived at the following conclusions. The number of Kerala emigrants who returned due to the recession was not as large as originally projected. Even as some returned, new emigrants and some former emigrants returned to the Gulf. Recession was not much of a deterrent for re-emigration. Household remittances at the state level in fact increased during the recession months, although there were several households whose remittances decreased. In terms of return emigration during the recession, migration experience in Saudi was similar to that in other Gulf countries. About 7–8 per cent of the emigrants who were in Saudi in 2007 returned home during the recession period. Among them, only about 30 per cent returned because of recession-related reasons as compared to 36 per cent for other Gulf countries. Thus, the impact of recession on Saudi emigrants was much less compared to that of other Gulf countries. Nitaqat and emigration prospects In a normal year, a fairly large number of Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia return to Kerala. It is part of the normal emigration process, not only for Saudi but also for all Gulf states. For example, according to KMS 2011, about 52,000 emigrants from Saudi returned to Kerala in 2010. The corresponding number was about 45,000 in 2008. They returned much before the enforcement of Nitaqat law. The number of Kerala emigrants in Saudi who applied for emergency certificate (3,610) is only 7 per cent of the number of emigrants who returned in 2010, three years before the enforcement of the Nitaqat law (Figure 6.9). 118

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‘Dirty Jobs’ and emigration prospects It is a paradox that in Kerala today, high unemployment rate (above 10 per cent) and non-availability of workers in several occupations co-exist. This occurs due to the unwillingness of Kerala youth to do ‘dirty jobs’ involving manual work. There is a stated preference towards white-collar jobs and government services. Alternatively, many prefer to remain unemployed and live on remittances sent by relatives abroad. Such work not taken by Kerala workers is undertaken by replacement workers from other states. The same is the case in Saudi Arabia. With the enormous wealth of the country augmented by mounting oil prices, the locals are not willing to accept manual labour. In the absence of local workers, critical sectors such as construction and maintenance are manned by emigrants from India and other countries. In the past, street cleaning and other sanitation work have been hit hard by the Saudization programmes as almost all workers in this

Figure 6.9 Reasons for return of emigrants for Saudi Arabia and all destinations, 2007–09 Source: Calculated by the authors based on the data collected through Kerala Migration Survey, 2009 conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.

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sector were foreigners. This section suffers from unstable job conditions, low wages and expendability, thus making it difficult to draw native workers to take on entry-level and menial jobs. Saudi ministry officials have realized that the percentage of mandatory employment of Saudi nationals in contracting companies that carry out sanitation and street cleaning projects cannot be maintained and will have to be reduced. The same thing would be true in jobs requiring high skills, as Saudis with the necessary technical qualifications may not be available for some more years. Emigration begets emigration There are now nearly 600,000 Kerala emigrants in Saudi Arabia. There is considerable empirical evidence that suggests many of the new emigrants to Gulf countries are from households of former emigrants. Once a household becomes accustomed to emigration and remittances from emigrants, networks facilitate the perpetuation of this connection.

An uncertain future Demographics alone cannot explain how swiftly labour market reform has become Saudi Arabia’s preoccupation. There is sound economic rationale behind a move to place the country’s development in the hands of its own citizens. An equally significant factor would be economic expansion in Kerala. Kerala’s demographic contraction is well underway, but its economic expansion supported by inputs from its emigrants is still in progress. By the very nature of migration phenomena, it is difficult to develop a statistical model to predict future emigration trends to any country. Migration flows depend not only on demographic, economic and social macro-determinants, but also more importantly on political decisions of the government in power. At first glance, current political trends do not seem to favour Kerala migration to Saudi Arabia. Naturalization and immigration control is a high-ranking issue on the Saudi political agenda, which has considerably strained its relation with India and other South Asian sending countries. It is a commonly held belief that recent immigration policies have made the goals of better wages, improved working conditions and upward mobility ever more distant for many expatriate workers in the Kingdom. On the other hand, we have seen past India–Saudi emigrations persist not withstanding three decades of increasingly restrictive immigration 120

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policies and the financial crisis. Although the Saudi government is formally complying with Nitaqat, it has opened avenues for ‘legalization’ of workers and even shifting of workers from one sponsor to another. Under these circumstances, we recall the main thrust of the report on KMS 2011. Emigration from Kerala to the Gulf countries (including Saudi Arabia) has seemingly reached its point of inflexion. In the coming years, Kerala’s emigration to Saudi is likely to witness a considerable downswing from the present level, albeit gradually. Despite Saudization efforts, the country continues to depend on foreign labour to fill both high- and low-skilled jobs. Programmes for development and training of a local labour force have been too modest to expect a significant short-term reduction in the pressure on the Saudi labour market. At least for now, migration still appears to be the answer to the demands of this dynamic economy.

References Audi Sal Audi Saradar Bank. 2013. Saudi Arabia Economic Report 2012. Lebanon: Audi Sal Audi Saradar Bank. International Labour Organization (ILO). 2009. ‘International Labour Migration and Employment in the Arab Region: Origins, Consequences and the Way Forward’. Thematic Paper, Arab Employment Forum, International Labour Office, 19–21 October, Beirut. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). 2011. ‘World Population Prospects: The 2011 Revision’. Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm (accessed 20 December 2013). World Bank. 2004. Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract. Washington DC: World Bank.

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7 INTERNAL MIGRATION IN INDIA Are the underclass more mobile? R. B. Bhagat

Introduction Several researchers believe that migration in the Indian subcontinent has been historically low. Kingsley Davis (1951) has attributed this to the prevalence of caste system, joint families, traditional values, diversity of language and culture, lack of education and pre-dominance of agriculture and semi-feudal land relations. However, the rapid transformation of Indian economy, improvement in the levels of education, transport and communication facilities, shift of workforce from agriculture to industry and service activities provided new impetus to the mobility pattern during colonial times and after independence. India embarked upon the new economic policy in the year 1991 – popularly known as liberalization of the Indian economy. The basic features of the new economic policy are to reduce governmental expenditure in order to reduce fiscal deficit, opening up of the economy for export oriented growth, removal of governmental control and licensing and encouraging private participation for competition and efficiency. Both the supporters and critiques of the new economic policy believed that economic reforms would increase internal migration. The proponents believed that the new impetus would boost economy and job opportunities leading to increased pull factors conducive for accelerated rural-to-urban migration. On the other hand, the opponents held that economic reforms would adversely affect the village and cottage industries and impoverish rural population leading to increased rural– urban migration (Kundu 1997). Although there was considerable success in achieving economic growth from 2 to 3 per cent of growth in 122

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GDP in the pre-reform era to over 6 per cent during 1991–2001, its impact on internal migration in general and rural-to-urban migration in particular has not been assessed. The latest Census of India 2001 throws several interesting results in respect to the internal migration, its regional pattern and the contribution of rural-to-urban migration in urban growth (Bhagat and Mohanty 2009). The paper argues that push factor has not been more important in influencing internal migration. As a result, it is not true that the poor and disadvantaged are migrating more than non-poor and the advantaged. Although migration is emerging as an important phenomenon from economic, political and public health points of views (Bhagat 2008), migration research finds low priority among Indian demographers. This is partly because since the early 1990s with a paradigm shift in the demographic research tilting to the issues of reproductive health, the interest in migration research in general and internal migration in particular has dwindled considerably. This is also reflected in the new datasets, namely Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) – known as National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) – an Indian version of Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), and District Level Health Surveys (DLHS) which did not consider migration as an important variable affecting the health status in general and reproductive health in particular.1 On the other hand, the wealth of data available in Indian censuses on migration is grossly neglected by Indian demographers who are busy with data collection exercises funded by external agencies (Bose 2003). Thus we find very few recent demographic studies on India’s internal migration, its causes and consequences. This study presents the trends and patterns of internal migration during the last three decades based on census and National Sample Surveys (NSS) and argues that people belonging to the lowest socioeconomic categories are less migratory than otherwise.

Data and method Since the beginning of twentieth century, data on migration based on place of birth has been collected by Indian census. However, since 1971 migration data were also collected on the basis of place of last residence and duration of migration. Thus, it is possible to study the period migration since 1971 compared to the study of lifetime migration of earlier decades. The criterion of place of last residence gives the migration information related to the last move of the migrants. It is also helpful to capture the return migration. This study is based on the place of last residence criterion of defining migrants by the 123

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Indian census. The village and towns are lowest units for determining the place of last residence. Any residence change within the village or administrative town/city is not considered migration. Data on migration were provided as change in residence elsewhere in the district (within district), from one district to another within the state (interdistrict), and from one state to another state (interstate). Within district and between districts are clubbed in this study, which represents intra-state migration. Administratively, India is divided into 28 states, 7 Union Territories and 585 districts as reported in 2001 Census. Districts are the lowest unit for which migration data are available. Interstate migrations are generally long distance migration compared to short distance of intra-state migrations. Migration data based on place of last residence are also available by rural and urban areas. International migrants (immigrants) are also enumerated, but this study is confined to internal migration only. Moreover, Indian census does not provide information on Indians migrated abroad (emigration). Thus, it is not possible to study net international migration from census data; however it is possible to study net interstate migration within India. Also, since 1981 census, reasons of migration have been also added in the census questionnaire. Apart from the census, the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) – a wing of Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation – also sometimes included a question on migration based on place of last usual residence as a part of their employment and unemployment survey. The place of last usual residence is defined as a place (village or town) where the migrant had stayed continuously for a period of six months or more before moving to the place of enumeration. In contrast to NSSO, Census does not put any duration limit in defining the place of last residence. In the latest NSSO round (55th round) pertaining to the year 1999–2000, it gave information on migration by monthly per capita consumer expenditure (MPCE), and migration of the socially disadvantaged ethnic groups known as a Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (NSSO 2001).2 Both census and NSS data have been used in this study. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with trend and pattern of migration using indicators like proportion of migrants to total population, distribution of migrants by location and streams of migration, sex ratios and reasons of migration based on place of last residence data from the census. The second section presents migration, development and poverty using indicators like in- and out-migration rates at the state level based on place of last residence data from the 2001 census (i.e., migrants with duration 124

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0–9 years divided by population of respective states in the base year 1991) which are correlated with per capita income, literacy rates, poverty ratio, and infant mortality rate, etc. The last section on migration and socioeconomic characteristics is mainly based on NSS data on migration based on place of last residence for the year 1999–2000. The definition of migration used in NSS is mentioned above.

I Trend and pattern As per 2001 census, the total number of internal migrants was 309 million based on place of last residence that constituted nearly 30 per cent of the total population. Although the number of internal migrants has doubled since 1971, the proportion continues to be around 30 per cent since 1971 except in the 1991 census when it declined to 27 per cent to the total population. It is generally accepted that migration slowed down during the decade 1981–1991 as a result of increased unemployment and sluggish growth in the Indian economy. On the other hand, the proportion of immigrants constitute only 5 per cent of India’s population in 2001 – a decline of 3 percentage points – was observed from the level of 1971 (see Table 7.1). Table 7.1 Percentage of internal and international migrants based on place of last residence, India, 1971–2001 (in millions) Census Total Internal % Internal International % % of Total population migrants migrants migrants International migrants 1971 1981 1991 2001

548.1 659.3 814.3 991.8 (1,028.6)

159.6 200.5 220.7 300.9 (309.3)

29.1 30.4 27.1 30.3 (30.0)

8.1 6.0 5.9 5.0 (5.1)

1.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 (0.4)

30.6 31.3 27.83 30.8 (30.4)

Source: Based on migration data of 1991 and 2001 censuses of the Registrar General of India (Government of India 1991, 2001). Census of India 1971, Series 1, Part II- D(i) Migration Tables; Census of India 1981, Series 1, India, Part VA & B (i), Migration Tables (Table Dl and D2); Census of India 1991, Series 1, India, Part V, D series, Migration Tables, Vol. 2, Part 1, (Table D2); Census of India 2001, Table D-2, Compact Diskette, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, New Delhi. Note: The census was not held in Assam in 1981 and in Jammu and Kashmir in 1991. The figures for India from 1981 to 2001 exclude these two states. The figures for 2001 census including Assam and Jammu and Kashmir are given in parenthesis.

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Most of the immigrants are the displaced persons who opted for India during the partition of the country at the time of independence in 1947. Also, many came to India at the time of the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. The declining proportion of immigrants shows that many older immigrants who came to India half a century ago have died. Table 7.2 presents percentage distribution of internal migrants by sex and duration of residence. Nearly one-third of males and onefourth of females reported duration of residence 0–9 years in 2001 compared to half of the male migrants and one-third of female migrants in 1981. The decline in the share of migrants with 0–9 year duration is accompanied by a large proportion of male (26 per cent) and female (10 per cent) migrants not reporting duration of migration in 2001 census. Out of the 300.9 million internal migrants, about 44 million did not report duration and majority of them (77 per cent) were short distance migrants (intra-district migrants). It is possible that many of them would be temporary and circular migrants who might be simultaneously holding their residences at the place of origin and place of destination and as such they have considerable difficulty in reporting the duration of residence at the place of enumeration. Table 7.3 shows that majority of migrants are intra-district migrants (62 per cent). Most of these migrants are females who customarily Table 7.2 Percentage distribution of internal migrants by sex and duration of residence at the place of enumeration, 1981–2001 Duration

Less than 1 year 1–4 5–9 10–19 20 + Not stated Total migrants (in million)

1981

1991

2001

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

8.5

3.7

5.0

2.2

4.5

2.1

26.1 16.6 20.9 20.9 6.7 58.7

17.0 14.7 23.6 37.2 3.6 141.8

21.5 15.3 20.6 23.3 14.1 59.5

15.3 14.9 24.8 36.4 6.3 161.2

18.0 13.2 18.0 20.0 26.1 86.5

13.9 13.6 23.9 36.4 9.9 214.4

Source: Same as for Table 7.1. Note: The census was not held in Assam in 1981 and in Jammu and Kashmir in 1991. The figures for India from 1981 to 2001 exclude these two states.

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Table 7.3 Size and growth rates of migrants by type of movement, India 1971–2001 Type of movement

Size 2001 Percentage Growth Rate % (in million) distribution 1971–81 1981–91 1991–2001 2001

Intra-district 193.5 Inter-district 74.6 Interstate 41.1 International 5.1 Migrants All Migrants 314.3 Total Population 1,028.6

61.6 23.7 13.1 1.6

24.9 44.3 28.1 −9.1

8.3 13.7 11.7 −6.1

37.0 26.3 53.6 −13.4

100.0 –

27.0 24.7

9.8 23.7

34.7 21.4

Source: Same as for Table 7.1. Note: Migrants unclassifiable by type of movement were excluded.

change their parental households and join their husband’s households after marriage (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). The share of interdistrict and interstate migrants is 24 and 13 per cent respectively. However, it may be noted that the growth rate of interstate migrants was very high (54 per cent) during 1991–2001 compared to previous decades. There is no doubt that the interstate mobility considerably increased during 1991–2001 coinciding with India’s economic liberalization programme initiated in 1991, but migration flows at the state level continues to be towards the developed states, namely Maharashtra, Haryana, Delhi, Punjab and Gujarat. The growth rate of interstate migration was 80 per cent in Maharashtra followed by Haryana close to 70 per cent, Delhi 63 per cent, Punjab 56 per cent and Gujarat about 50 per cent during 1991–2001. These states attract population from almost all states. On the other hand, most of the remaining states have been out-migrating but all of them were not poor. For example, from the state of Kerala which is socially and educationally the most developed state of India, a large population is also out migrating to the Gulf countries (Zachariah, Kannan and Irudaya Rajan 2002; Zachariah, Mathew and Irudaya Rajan 2003). It is also important to study internal migrants by streams of migration in order to assess the role of economic and social factors influencing migration. The streams of migration are: from rural to rural, from rural to urban, from urban to rural and from urban to urban areas. From the viewpoint of push or pull factors, rural-to-urban migration 127

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is the most significant stream. The net rural to urban migration is an important component of the urbanization also. It is estimated that net rural to urban migration (14.3 million) contributed one-fifth of urban growth during 1991–2001 (Bhagat and Mohanty 2009). On the other hand, interstate rural to rural migration shows the regional disparity in the levels of agricultural and infrastructural development. On the other hand, urban to urban migration shows increased movement from one city to another related to work and business. Although urban to rural migration seems to be least preferred due to rural and urban gap in basic amenities, the rural areas near to the metropolitan cities are the attractive locations for many retired and rich people. Many of the urban residents may go back to their villages to look after their parental property like land and house. Table 7.4 shows the streams of migration by intra-state (intradistrict and inter-district) and interstate movements. The rural to rural stream of migration constituted 68 per cent of all intra-state migrants, compared to 28 per cent in case of interstate migrants. On the other hand, rural-to-urban migration forms 15 and 39 per cent of intra-state and interstate migrants respectively. The growth rates of migrants by streams of migration show that there were significant decline from the decade 1971–1981 to 1981–1991 due

Table 7.4 Size and growth rates of migrants by streams of migration, India 1971–2001 Streams of Migration

Size 2001 Percentage Growth Rate (%) (in million) distribution 1971–81 1981–91 1991–2001

Intra-state Rural to Rural 161.0 Rural-to-Urban 36.3 Urban to Rural 11.0 Urban to Urban 25.8

68.6 15.3 4.7 11.0

19.8 45.1 32.9 57.9

10.7 20.1 10.1 5.2

16.8 16.4 −4.3 43.1

Interstate Rural to Rural Rural-to-Urban Urban to Rural Urban to Urban

28.2 39.3 4.9 27.4

13.8 42.5 15.9 28.4

9.1 16.6 11.4 15.5

46.6 76.4 1.5 28.0

11.0 15.3 1.9 10.7

Source: Same as for Table 7.1; migrants unclassifiable by rural–urban status were excluded.

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to severe economic crisis India faced in the years close to 1991 when new economic policy of liberalization of the economy was launched. The impact of economic crisis was visible on the slowing down of all streams of migration during 1971–1981 to 1981–1991. On the other hand, with economic recovery, we find a very high increase in the urban to urban migration within the states as well as rural-to-urban migration between the states during 1991–2001. Along with very high growth in interstate rural to urban migration, other migration streams except urban to rural also maintained their tempo of growth during 1991 to 2001. India is a union of 28 states and 7 union territories. However, only few states are in-migrating states, and notable among them are Punjab, Haryana, Delhi, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka. On the other hand, most of the other states are net out-migrating states. This shows the regional imbalances in the pattern of migration closely reflecting the unbalanced regional development of the country initiated during the colonial rule and got accentuated in the decades after independence. Even the new era of economic liberalization and economic reforms has not reduced the regional inequality and imbalances in the migration pattern of the country (see Figure 7.1). Male vs female migration In both short distance (intra- and inter-district) as well as long distance (interstate) migration, women dominate the migration pattern. Table 7.5 shows that sex-ratio (male/female) had been declining from 1971 to 1991 in all types of internal migration which indicates increasing participation of women in internal migration in India. This is also found true when sex-ratios are calculated by streams of migrations which are presented in Table 7.6. It is observed that in India, women primarily migrate due to marriages or move with the earning member of the households unlike Southeast and East Asia where female migration has resulted through the pull factors generated by labour intensive industrialization and expansion of urban based services (Skeldon 1986). However, the sex-ratios derived from the 2001 Census shows the reversal of the trend of the increasing feminization of migration until 1991. This is because more participation of males in most streams of migration in recent times. It also indicates that males have more benefitted from the growing prosperity and employment opportunities in recent times. 129

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Jammu & Kashmir

Himachal Pradesh

N

Punjab W

Chandigarh Haryana Delhi

E

Arunachal Pradesh

S

Sikkim

Uttar Pradesh Rajasthan

Assam Nagaland Meghalaya Manipur Tripura Mizoram West Bengal

Bihar

Gujarat

Daman & Diu

Madhya Pradesh

Orissa

Maharashtra

Dadra & Nagar Haveli

Andhra Pradesh

Net out-migrating states In-migrating states (% Net migration rate)

Goa Les than 1.5 Karnataka

1.5 - 2.5 2.5 - 3.5

Pondicherry Lakshadweep

Tamil Nadu Kerala

More than 3.5

Andaman & Nicobar Islands 0

10

50

100

150 KM

Figure 7.1 Interstate net migration in India, 1991–2001 Source: Prepared by the author based on migration data of 1991–2001 (Government of India 1991, 2001).

Reasons of migration It is possible to know the broad reasons for migration from the census since 1981. The same list of reasons continued in 1991 and 2001 census as well except that the reason ‘Business’ was added in 1991 and the reason ‘Natural Calamities’ was dropped from the list in 2001. 130

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Table 7.5 Sex ratio of migrants by migration types, 1981–2001 (males per 1,000 females) Migrant type

1971

1981

1991

2001

Intra-district Inter-district Interstate International Migrants All Migrants Total Population

336 604 1,059 1,151 473 1,075

312 530 914 1,143 430 1,070

281 456 802 1,073 383 1,078

323 481 865 1,085 422 1,072

Source: Same as in Table 7.1.

Table 7.6 Sex ratio by rural and urban streams, 1971–2001 (males per 1,000 females) Streams

1971

1981

1991

2001

Intra-state Rural to Rural Rural-to-Urban Urban to Rural Urban to Urban

285 920 600 913

246 849 542 819

214 748 481 716

166 750 506 783

Interstate Rural to Rural Rural-to-Urban Urban to Rural Urban to Urban

592 1,719 1,074 1,189

476 1,478 920 1,025

393 1,278 708 912

391 1,392 747 923

Source: Same as in Table 7.1.

An additional reason of ‘moved after birth’ was added in 2001 census after it was felt that a large number of mothers moved to either their natal residence or to a place with better medical facility for delivery. Whereas the women are not treated as migrants at these temporary place or residence, the children born are treated as migrants when they accompany their parents to their place of normal residence. Though technically this is migration, the place of birth being different from the place of enumeration for the children born, it was useful to separate this from other categories. Table 7.7 provides details of reasons for migration in case of migrants by last residence. It may be seen that the reasons for migration in case 131

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Table 7.7 Reasons for migration in India, 2001 Reason for migration

Number of migrants (in million)

Total migrants Work/ Employment Business Education Marriage Moved after birth Moved with households Other

Percentage to total migrants

Persons

Males

Females

Persons

Males

Females

309.3

90.6

218.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

29.4

25.8

3.6

9.5

28.5

1.7

2.7 3.3 155.5 15.7

2.3 2.3 2.1 9.2

0.4 0.9 153.3 6.5

0.9 1.1 50.3 5.1

2.6 2.6 2.4 10.2

0.2 0.4 70.1 3.0

40.9

17.0

23.9

13.2

18.9

10.9

61.6

31.6

29.9

19.9

34.8

13.7

Source: Census of India (Government of India 2001). Table D-3.

of males and females vary significantly. Work or employment was the most important reason for migration among males (28.5 per cent), whereas marriage was the most important reason for female migration (70.1 per cent). About 5 per cent migrants were reported ‘moved after birth’ as the reason for their migration. A comparison with earlier censuses reveals increasing importance of employment or work as reason of migration in case of both males and females. Number of male migrants with duration 0–9 years reporting employment or work as a reason of migration increased by 49 per cent compared to 24 per cent increase among female migrants which shows that the growth rate in female migrants due to employment has been much less compared to the males migrating for employment. This has led to the reversal of the declining sex-ratio of migrants in recent times as discussed in the previous section.

II

Migration, development and poverty

In order to assess the role of economic factors in influencing migration, an attempt is made to see if any correlation exists between the

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various indicators of poverty and development with that of in- and out-migration rates at the state level. Due to limited availability of data, the analysis is confined to 32 states and Union Territories or UT (India has 35 states and UT). The states of Punjab and Maharashtra are the most developed in terms of per capita income followed by Haryana, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. On the other hand, states of Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan show per capita income below the national level. In these low-income states, the low economic growth persisted in the 1990s, and as a result interstate disparity in income levels has widened. Also, except Punjab and Haryana, the low-income states derive larger share of their state’s income from agriculture (EPW Research Foundation 2003). Table 7.8 presents correlation matrix Table 7.8 Correlation of matrix showing relationship between migration, poverty and development variables at state level (N = 32), in 2001 Variables

In-migration rate (interstate)1

Out-migration rate (interstate)2

% Urban literacy rate % Rural literacy rate Urban IMR Rural IMR Per capita income % Share of non-agricultural sector to GSDP % Urban poverty % Rural poverty % of Non-agricultural workforce

.084 0.257 –0.287 –0.260 0.827** 0.690**

0.009 0.237 –0.169 –0.304 0.589** 0.441**

–0.274 –0.454** 0.640**

–0.209 –0.274 0.491**

Source: Estimated by the author. Note: IMR-infant mortality rate; GSDP-gross state domestic product. *Significant at 5 per cent level; **significant at 1 per cent level. 1 In-migration rate =

In-migration during 1991−2001

2 Out-migration rate =

Total Population1991

× 100

Out-migration during 1991−2001 Total Population1991

133

× 100

R . B . B H AG AT

between measures of in- and out-migration rates with that of the per capita income, literacy rates, percentage of non-agricultural workforce, share of non-agricultural sector in gross state domestic product, proportion of population below poverty line (estimated by Planning Commission based on calories intake of 2,400 in rural and 2,200 in urban areas), and infant mortality rate. The per capita income is very strongly correlated with in-migration rate and also moderately with out-migration rate. This means that with higher level of income, the states not only show higher in-migration but also higher out-migration rates. For example, it is generally believed that Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are two most out-migrating states which show out-migration rates close to 30 per thousand as per 2001 census, similar to the level of out-migration from Haryana which has been an in-migrating state. Similarly, high in-migrating states/UT like Delhi, Chandigarh, Mizoram, Goa and Punjab also show high out-migration rates. Also, the share of non-agricultural sector in gross state domestic product as well as in workforce is also having positive relationship with both in- and out-migration rates. It may be seen that literacy rates, rural and urban poverty and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) are not significantly related with either in or out migration rates but a significant negative association exists between rural poverty and in-migration rate. It must be admitted that the relationship between poverty and migration is complex (Skeldon 2002), but insignificant relationship between rural poverty ratios with out-migration indicates that push factors are not effective. There are several reasons why push factors are not effective in accelerating out-migration from rural areas. The low level of education and skill of rural population is one of the most important reasons combined with high cost of living in cities, lack of squatting places where poor can encroach particularly in big cities, hostile city government including judiciary who pass orders of evictions declaring them illegal occupants of city spaces on public litigation petitions. The public opinion on migration in cities is extremely hostile against poor and unskilled migrants who are also blamed for all woes of the cities particularly for deteriorating transport facility, environment and sanitation. In this situation, it is very difficult for the poor and uneducated migrants to survive in cities. Earlier studies also point out that it is not the poor who move out from the rural areas but those with some education and capital (Oberai and Singh 1983; Skeldon 1985).

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III

Socioeconomic characteristics of migrants

The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) provides information on migrants by monthly consumer expenditure of the households (NSSO 2001: 37). The migration rate was as high as 23.3 per cent in the highest monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) category in rural areas in 1999–2000. This goes down systematically with rate being as low as 4.3 in the lowest MPCE category (see Figure 7.2). The same is true for urban areas as well, and the corresponding percentages were 43.3 and 10.5 per cent respectively (see Figure 7.3). This shows that migration rates are higher in higher expenditure/income groups and vice versa. It is also possible that some of migrant households have improved their income level after migration, but for majority of the households it seems to be very unlikely situation. NSSO study further reports that the socially disadvantaged groups like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not more migratory than the rest of the population (see Figure 7.4; NSSO 2001: 30). As per 2001 census, about 14 million people had migrated citing work/ employment as a reason of migration during 1991–2001. The literacy

Figure 7.2 Migration rates by MPCE, rural India, 1999–2000 Source: NSSO (2001).

135

Figure 7.3 Migration rates by MPCE, urban India, 1999–2000 Source: NSSO (2001).

Figure 7.4 Migration rates by social categories, 1999–2000 Source: NSSO (2001).

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rate among rural-to-urban migrants who reported work/employment as a reason of migration was much higher compared to the rural literacy level. For example, the literacy rate was about 85 per cent among intra-state and 75 per cent among interstate rural-to-urban migrants compared to rural literacy rate of 58 per cent at the national level. The level of education of migrants was also found to be higher than the nonmigrants. For example, among migrants moving from rural areas, the percentage of migrants with 10 years and more education was 41 per cent among intra-state and 30 per cent among interstate migrants compared to 18 per cent among non-migrants in the rural areas in 2001. This indicates that the migrants belong to higher educational status categories compared to their non-migrant counterparts. This is also because those who have higher levels of education or economic assets find it easier to establish linkages with urban economy through socio-cultural channels, put their foothold in the city and avail the opportunity offered through migration (Kundu 2007). The migrants are not necessarily poor is true for those who change their residence either on permanent and semi-permanent basis. The data presented above largely deals with permanent and semi-permanent migration. However, this may not be true for temporary and seasonal migration. The NSSO has also made efforts to capture the seasonal and temporary migrations which are not generally captured in the census exercises. It is found that many people make frequent visit to a workplace in a year’s time, particularly during off season. The seasonal and temporary migrants work for short duration in activities like construction, brick making, stone quarrying, fisheries, plantation, rice mills, paddy cultivation and harvesting, etc. NSSO tried to estimate the seasonal and temporary migration by asking a question: whether anybody stayed away for 60 days or more from the present usual place of residence for employment or in search of employment during the last 365 days preceding the date of survey. About 10 million were estimated to be seasonal/temporary migrants, out of whom 1.7 million were located in Uttar Pradesh, 1.5 million in Madhya Pradesh, and 1 million each in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The seasonal and temporary migration is an important livelihood strategy of India’s poor who are mainly located in the tribal and forested tracts of mid-India.

IV

Conclusion

The push and pull factors have dominated much of the understanding of migration. Push factors like low income, low literacy, dependence 137

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on agriculture and high poverty are cited as some examples associated with place of origin. On the other hand high income, high literacy, dominance of industries and services are the pull factors associated with place of destination. It has been found in this study that both in- and out-migration rates have significant positive association with per capita income, percentage of work-force and share of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) in the non-agricultural sector. This means that higher income and sectoral transformation of economy from agricultural to non-agricultural sector is associated both with higher in-migration as well as out-migration rates. In other words, the areas which are experiencing higher in-migration are also the areas with high out-migration rates as well. On the other hand, poverty is not found related with increased out-migration at the state level. Neither per capita monthly expenditure nor social categories of households indicate that migrants largely come from disadvantaged sections of Indian society. It appears that push factors are not effective in influencing permanent and semi-permanent migration as it is generally believed. However, this cannot be said equally about temporary and seasonal migration.

Acknowledgements The Original version of this article appeared in the Asia Pacific Population Journal 25 (1): 27–46, and is reprinted here with the permission of the author.

Notes 1 In three rounds of National Family Health Survey (NFHS) surveys started in the early 1990s, the third round of NFHS (2005–2006) incorporated a question on migration such as ‘how long have you been living continuously in the current place of residence’. If somebody said ‘always’, that person would be classified as non-migrant or otherwise a migrant (National Family Health Survey 2005–2006). This is an important development and should spur migration research focusing on migrant and non-migrant differentials in fertility, reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and child mortality, etc., in the coming days. 2 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are a group of castes and tribes respectively declared by the President of India under the Constitutional provision for receiving government supports like reservation in jobs, admission in educational institutions and development programmes. The Scheduled Castes constitute 16 per cent and the Scheduled Tribes constitute 8 per cent of India’s population.

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References Bhagat, R. B. 2008. ‘Assessing the Measurement of Internal Migration in India’, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 17 (1): 91–102. Bhagat, R. B. and S. Mohanty. 2009. ‘Emerging Pattern of Urbanization and the Contribution of Migration in Urban Growth in India’, Asian Population Studies 5 (1): 5–20. Bose, A. 2003. ‘Population Research: Deteriorating Scholarship’, Economic and Political Weekly 38 (44): 4637–639. Davis, Kingsley. 1951. The Population of India and Pakistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1961. ‘Urbanisation in India: Past and Future’, in Roy Turner (ed.), India’s Urban Future, pp. 3–26. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dyson, T. and Pravin Visaria. 2004. ‘Migration and Urbanisation: Retrospect and Prospects’, in Tim Dyson, Robert Cassesn and Leela Visaria (eds), Twentyfirst Century India: Population, Economy, Human Development and The Environment. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. EPW Research Foundation. 2003. Domestic Product of States of India 1960–61 to 2000–01. Mumbai: EPW Publication. Government of India. 1991. Census of India. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner. ———. 2001. Census of India. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner. Kundu, A. 1997. ‘Trends and Structure of Employment in the 1990s: Implication for Urban Growth’, Economic and Political Weekly 32 (4): 1399–405. ———. 2007. ‘Proceedings of Dr C. Chandrasekaran Memorial Lecture on Migration and Exclusionary Urban Growth in India’, IIPS Newsletter 48 (3/4): 5–23. Jones, Gavin and Hsiu-hua Shen. 2008. ‘International Marriage in East and Southeast Asia: Trends and Research Emphases’, Citizenship Studies 12 (1): 9–25. Oberai, A. S. and H. K. M. Singh. 1983. Causes and Consequences of Internal Migration: A Study in the Indian Punjab. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. National Family Health Survey 2005–2006 (NFHS-3). 2007. vol. II, International Institute for Population Sciences, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO). 2001. Migration in India 1999– 2000. New Delhi: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. Skeldon, Ronald. 1985. ‘Migration in South Asia: An Overview’, in L. A. Kosinski and K. M. Elahi (eds), Population Redistribution and Development in South Asia, pp. 37–63. Boston: Redel. ———. 1986. ‘On Migration Patterns in India During the 1970s’, Population and Development Review 12 (4): 759–79.

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———. 2002. ‘Migration and Poverty’, Asia-Pacific Population Journal 17 (4): 67–82. Srivastava, R. and S. K. Sasikumar. 2003. ‘A Review of Migration in India, Its Impact and Key Issues’. Paper presented at the Regional Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia, 22–24 June, Dhaka. Sundari, S. 2005. ‘Migration as a Livelihood Strategy,’ Economic and Political Weekly 40 (22): 2295–303. Premi, M. 1980. ‘Aspects of Female Migration in India’, Economic and Political Weekly 15 (15): 714–20. Thadani, V. and M. P. Todaro. 1979. ‘Female Migration in Developing Countries: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis’, Working Paper 47. Centre for Policy Studies, New York: Population Council. Zachariah, K. C., K. P. Kannan and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2002. Kerala’s Gulf Connection. Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies. Zachariah, K. C., E. T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2003. Dynamics of Migration in India: Determinants, Differentials and Consequences. Hyderabad: Orient Longman Private Limited.

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8 POLITICS OF CONFLICT AND MIGRATION S. Irudaya Rajan, Vijay Korra and Rikil Chyrmang

‘When I open my door I see a Bihari working outside.’ Raj Thackeray1

Introduction In India, migrant population is around 30 per cent of the total population according to the 2001 census. The proportion of migration has not come down over the decades; rather, it has seen a tendency to rise, indicating the important role that it plays in the economy and lives of a larger section of the poorer population (Kundu 2007). Migration is mainly due to expected rather than real income differences between the rural and urban sectors (Todaro 1976). On the other hand, migration is also impelled by push or distress factors at home such as lack of employment, low wage rates, agricultural failure, debt, drought and natural calamities (Lee 1966). The existing literature also suggests that labour migration enhances competitiveness and boosts economic growth, albeit to a modest degree. But there are winners and losers, with low-skilled, older native workers more likely to see their jobs security threatened by mobile, younger migrant competitors (Spencer 2003). The mass migration from the less developed to the more developed regions has resulted in clashes between the migrants and the indigenous population, and this was a prominent occurrence in post-Independent India. The subject related to cultural identity and job opportunity between local and migrant workers is a widely contested issue in the Indian context (Katzenstein et al. 1998). The problem arises when the migrants become more successful than the native population in terms of occupation and wage earning capacity. The differences in skills could also lead to the

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migrants having a greater advantage and a higher chance of getting the jobs. On this account, the local people who are at a disadvantage become envious of the migrants which ultimately leads to the outbreak of violent conflict between the two groups (Weiner 1978). In recent times, the free inflow and outflow of migrant population is a much debated issue in India due to strong resistance by the local people who fear the loss of their cultural identity and employment opportunities. Consequently, the incidents of violent attacks on migrants by the locals are growing in some parts/states of the country. The recent attacks on north Indian migrant workers in Mumbai, Assam, Meghalaya and Goa are a typical example of such incidents. In this context, this chapter discusses how and why internal migration is being politicized and its consequences in India based on the emerging literature on the subject.

Politicization of internal migrants in India The Constitution of India allows its citizens to move freely to any part of its national boundary either for seeking employment or to settle down. The economic backwardness in some states forces labour and the farming population to migrate out of their places to other prosperous regions/states in search of employment and better opportunities. Sometimes, the local people feel that presence of the migrants may lead to loss of cultural, ethnic identity and economic opportunity and thereby create social tensions. Thus, the attitude of the locals turns hostile towards the in-migrants. This results in certain political parties/ organizations trying to take advantage of the situation and politicise it for their self-interests. The prominent examples of such incidents are the attacks on migrants from Bihar and other North Indian states in Mumbai (Maharashtra), Assam and Meghalaya. Mumbai Mumbai, the commercial capital of India, attracts mass migrants for employment, livelihood and business purposes. The total number of in-migrants during the last decade is quite high in Mumbai (15 per cent), and most of them are from outside the state (Census of India, 2001). In the name of ‘Mumbai for Mumbaikars’, political parties like the Shiv Sena and Maharashtra Navanirman Sena (MNS) used the in-migrants issue for their political advantage. Their main agenda is to protect the Marathi language and demand 80 per cent of the jobs 142

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for natives. The political approach of the Shiv Sena centred on the concept of Bhumiputra (sons of the soil), the idea that Maharashtra inherently belonged to the Marathi community. The Shiva Sena especially attracted a large number of disgruntled and often unemployed Marathi youth, who were attracted by Bala Saheb Thackeray’s charged anti-migrant oratory (Katzenstein et al. 1998). Thus Siva Sena started attacking south Indian communities in Mumbai during 1970s and now the MNS has begun to assault north Indian migrants, particularly from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. These attacks are against the spirit of the ‘Indian Constitution’. Yet, such assaults on migrants by their own fellow citizens continue to take place, which is leading to social unrest and discontentment in society (ibid.). Goa Until recently, Goa was one of the most peaceful states in the country. However, problems have started in recent times due to the exodus of people from other states. As in the case of the Mumbaikars, the Goans also started feeling that presence of outsiders (in-migrants) would lead to loss of their cultural and linguistic identity and social tensions. Hence, their main concerns are to protect their cultural identity and the Konkani language (Sharma 2004). In this context, it is important to mention the ‘Goan Identity Movement’ which is a movement set up to mobilise Goans to work together in a civilised manner to save Goa, its land and its unique identity. The overall vision is ‘to have a world-class state with a unique identity’ (Mesquita 2009). Other major endeavours of this oraganization are to: promote Konkani, Goan traditions and culture; stop land sales to non-Goans; and enact migrant controls to keep the demographics in favour of Goans and provide employment/economic opportunities to Goans, including non-resident Goans (ibid).2 The former Chief Minister of Goa (2004–2005), Mr Manohar Parrikar3 stated that a small state like theirs could not afford to bear the burden of thousands of ‘cheap’ migrant workers which could cause social tension if slums sprung up. Further, he mentioned that: ‘I cannot stop migrants from coming to Goa, nor am I forcing anyone out. But I am trying to create conditions whereby migration is not encouraged’. Hence, the government was trying to create conditions – such as increased mechanisation in the construction industry – that would bring down the number of people migrating to Goa for work (Sharma 2004). Similarly, Vaz (2008) stated that Goans will be strangers in their 143

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own land in future. Their identity will fade away and they will be left repenting for having flirted with danger and damaged their birthplace. It is time, he said, for Goans to wake up and initiate programmes to save their identity from the onslaught of migrants. Assam In different periods of human history, Assam experienced the influx of different groups of people from diverse parts of the country for different purposes. With the development of the tea, oil and coal industries, the demand for migrant labourer has increased. Migrants are mostly interstate, coming from Chotanagpur, Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and Madras (Griffiths 1967). Besides the tribal groups in the region, a new class of people has come into existence as a consequence of prolonged interactions among cultures of the in-migrants and those of the indigenous people (Weiner 1978). The problem started during the 1970s and 1980s due to fear of demographic change and competition for resources. In-migration was certainly not the only cause for the increasing unemployment and poverty in the state, but it was also linked with the protection of the cultural identity and ethnicity of the aboriginal tribal population (Singh 1987). The clash occurred when the migrants became more successful than the native population in terms of occupation, business and wage earning capacity. It was then that the local people, who were at a disadvantage, became envious of the migrants. Subsequently, tensions erupted between local population and migrants which eventually led to clashes between them, and became a prominent feature of post-Independence politics of the state (Vandekerckhove 2009). In the initial period, the settler in-migrants from Bihar, especially the Adivasi communities, fought for their rights to be recognised by the Government of Assam and for their demands to be fulfilled. Protests were raised by these Adivasis against the government for failing to implement the reservation on par with the Scheduled Tribe (ST) communities. This led to the outbreak of violent conflict with the local people of Assam. The indigenous population of Assam started killing the Biharis living in different districts. In recent times, violent attacks by local organizations turned on the temporary migrants who came to the state for employment purposes from Bihar and other north Indian states. The issue became more complex with the entry of a political party called Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) (Singh 2008). In fact, settlers and 144

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in-migrants issue became more tricky and serious over the years; the failure to solve the issue can be regarded as due to lack of political will and determination both at the state level as well as at the level of the Central Government. As Assam is the gateway to the North-east of India, the migrant issue and the prolonged conflict it has caused could also affect the prospects of the region as a whole (Vandekerckhove 2009). Meghalaya The territory of Meghalaya used to be in Assam and it got separate statehood in 1972. At that point of time, most of the Assamese and Bengali people remained in the newly formed Meghalaya state. Since then, it continued to receive more in-migrants from other states. In fact, some of the areas in Shillong city are fully occupied by the migrant settlers. The issue of non-tribals or outsiders was first raised by student organizations such as the Khasi Student Union (KSU). Meghalaya being India’s only matrilineal state/society/system of marriage, marriages take place between the local tribes and the non-tribal (settlers) at regular intervals. This aroused the movement or protest for ethnic cleansing of the non-tribal in the state at different point of times, due to fear of losing of property right after marriage and loss of rich tradition and cultural identity. As per Meghalaya state laws, a non-tribal cannot buy land in his name, but non-tribals take advantage through marriage system. It is on this ground that the majority of the tribal community supports the movement against ‘non-tribal’4 settler and/or in-migrants. Even most of the political parties in the hill state join the mass movement against the non-tribals. However, a political party emerged from the nontribal community which tried to safeguard and protect them. Many parties demanded a work permit be made compulsory for those who wish to come to the state as they wanted to stop/control the inflow of the migrants. However, this political stance caused the issue to continue rather be resolved. Like Meghalaya and Assam, most of the other states in the region, too, have similar issues with outsiders.

Conclusion Though the Indian constitution allows its citizens to move freely from one place to another within its national boundary, people in some of the states do not favour the entry of migrants due to the fear of job loss, and loss of cultural, language and ethnic identity. Political parties 145

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such as the Shiv Sena and MNS in Mumbai have been making very strong protests against non-Maharashtrians and assaulting in-migrant labourers from other states. These differences in peoples’ perceptions give rise to internal conflict and communal clashes. Correspondingly, opposition to in-migrants seen in the other states like Assam, Goa and Meghalaya is of a similar kind. Even if India has the Interstate Migrant Workmen Act, 1979, it does not help migrants because of the lack of proper implementation and monitoring. Migration policies should be strengthened and implemented with a proper mechanism to ensure a safety net for internal migration in India. Civil society can act in favour of the protection of migrant workers and this can also influence the policy and action plans of the government.

Notes 1 Stated in a news channel, New Delhi Television (NDTV). He is the founder of Maharashtra Navanirman Sena (MNS), a political party, which claims to be working for the Marathis. 2 Mesquitqa (2009). 3 Cited in Sharma (2004). 4 Non-Khasi tribes are considered as ‘Non-tribal’ (including all types of in-migrants).

References Griffiths, Percival. 1967. The History of the Indian Tea Industry. London: Weidenfield and Nicholson. Katzenstein, Mary Fainod, Udai Singh Mehta and Usha Thakkar. 1998. ‘The Rebirth of Shiv Sena in Maharashtra: The Symbiosis of Discursive and Institutional Power’, in Ammrita Basu and Atul Kohli (eds), Community Conflicts and the State in India, pp. 215–38. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kundu, Amitabh. 2007. ‘Migration and Exclusionary Urban Growth in India’, IIPS News Letter 46 (3 & 4): 5–23. Lee, S. Everett. 1966. ‘A Theory of Migration’, Demography 3 (1): 47–57. Mesquita, Arwin. 2009. ‘The Goan Identity Movement’. http://www.goamag. net/gim. Accessed 8 July 2010. Singh, B. P. 1987, ‘North-East India: Demography, Culture and Identity Crisis’, Modern Asian Studies 21 (2): 257–82. Sharma Ravi. 2004. ‘Migrant worries’, Frontline, 20 November–3 December. Singh, G. 2008. ‘Illegal Migration, Insurgency, and the Political Economy of Assam’, Strategic Analysis 32 (2): 305–15.

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Spencer, Sarah. 2003. The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change. USA: Blackwell Publishing. Todaro, M. P. 1976. ‘Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology and Research Priorities’, International Labour Organisation (ILO), Geneva. Vandekerckhove, Nel. 2009. ‘ “We are Sons of this Soil”: The Endless Battle over Indigenous Homelands in Assam, India’, Critical Asian Studies 41 (4): 523–48. Vaz, Armstrong. 2008. ‘Goan Identity Erodes with Onslaught of Migrants’. http://www.merinews.com/aticle/goan-identity-erodes-with-onslaught-ofmigrants/135616.shtml. Accessed 8 July 2010. Weiner, M. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ———. 1993. ‘Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly 28 (34): 1737–746.

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9 CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT AND THE INFORMALIZATION OF LABOUR MARKETS IN INDIA Moushumi Basu

The Indian experience with development provides an important case study. Predominantly capitalist in orientation, traces of feudal life still exist in certain parts of the country that pose a challenge to the democratic norms of modern society.1 Bonded wage labour as opposed to free employment, small-scale labour intensive manufacturing units vis-à-vis larger and fully-automated units of production, and the co-existence of a relatively small organized sector with a massively huge and heterogeneous unorganized sector are a few reflections of the complexities involved. It has been estimated that roughly 77 per cent of the total Indian population, totalling 836 million people, consists of the poor and vulnerable segments of the society, living on less than `20 a day (NCEUS 2008: 6). However, poverty as a condition of social life is more than just low or inadequate income. It encompasses several other dimensions such as isolation, vulnerability and powerlessness. Moreover, such deprivation is not natural, or out of bad luck or a matter of choice, but a state of chronic destitution arising from the absence of the most essential and basic of resources. Keeping the broader theme of the volume in mind, the present chapter seeks to provide a historical overview of the process of capitalist development and the way labour markets have traditionally been regulated in India. The interplay between the institutions of the state and market has been the subject of much political, economic and social debate in the last few decades. Both the state and the market are amongst the many institutions that govern the relationship between individuals living in a particular society. The State, having the authority and the legitimate power to exercise coercion, shapes the way the 148

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market functions. The market in turn, steeped in non-market institutions like caste and kinship networks, relies on these for its sustenance and growth. Markets vary in their openness – a given market is not necessarily open to all potential buyers and sellers. Differentiation in class, caste and gender plays an important role in determining to a large extent the question of who participates in the market, under what circumstances and terms. Focusing specifically on the Indian experience, the chapter seeks to document the shifts that have taken place regarding the role of the state vis-à-vis the market in meeting the needs of extremely vulnerable segment of migrant labour employed in the informal sector in India. Historically the formal end of 200 years of colonial rule in August 1947 provided a momentous opportunity for social and economic transformation. From 1757 – the year the East India Company established its control over Bengal – till the very last years of colonial rule, India remained a prized possession of the British.2 An ideology of ‘paternalistic benevolence, occasionally combined with talk of trusteeship and training towards self-government’, thinly veiled the realities of the Raj (Sarkar 2000: 1).3 The unsatisfactory diffusion and denial of the accrued benefits to a large majority of the native Indian population, along with gradual impoverishment under colonialism, provided the immediate imperative for an indigenously designed, self-reliant programme of development. Amid other developing countries that gained independence around the same period, the relatively better position of India gave rise to genuine expectations that despite the grinding poverty, the country would manage to embark on a successful programme of national reconstruction and development. India benefited from a rich stock of natural resources, an industrial base which by the standards of other colonies was fairly broad and advanced, a bureaucratic and administrative apparatus, and lastly, a political leadership committed to a programme of modernization. It is interesting to note that while the very political strategy of building up a mass movement against colonial rule had required the nationalists to espouse Gandhi’s critique of industrialization and centralized state power as the curses of modern civilization imposed by European colonialism, Gandhi’s vision of national self-sufficiency through a vibrant and largely self-reliant village economy was considered to be too impractical and unrealistic at the eve of Independence (Chatterjee 1995: 201). Instead of the Gandhian model of community-based decentralized development, a centralized model of planned development was 149

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adopted, in the hope of rapid industrial and economic transformation, very much influenced by the theories of socialist development. The central core of the development policy was a move towards a capital-intensive, public sector-led programme of heavy industrialization. The strategy ‘did not draw its principal inspiration from a reasoned analysis and assessment of the political economy of the country, its resources, social structure and the immediate needs of its people’ (Brass 1994: 275). Instead, it drew upon the very model of the modern industrial economy that the freedom struggle had criticized severely in its drain of wealth theory. The initiation of an aggressive policy of industrialization minus commensurate attention to other equally more important goals of development therefore left much to be desired.4 While a popularly elected representative form of government provided both the legitimacy and the mandate to the Executive to determine the vision and course of development, the Executive in India retained a degree of autonomy from the civil society in determining the goals and objectives of development. The Westminster model of parliamentary democracy in fact replicated the colonial practice of giving the Executive de facto powers to decide, plan and execute all policies related to national and regional development. A strong consensus existed among the political leadership and the immensely powerful bureaucracy concerning the central importance of industrialization in laying the groundwork for development. While the Government formally announced the abolition of zamindari and placed ceilings on land ownerships, these concerns were considered to be of secondary importance to the industrialization that continued to be closely identified with modernization. While it is understandable that the situation prevalent at the time of independence was a complex one, the failure of the Indian State to undertake a proactive programme of social reconstruction and development remains an anomaly. For example, on the issue of caste, while in 1955 the Government passed the Untouchability (offences) Act, which made its practice in any form a punishable offence, there was little that was done in concrete terms to tackle the issue of caste-based discrimination. While the Act provided protection against social disabilities imposed on certain classes of persons by reason of their birth in certain castes, it did not cover social boycott based on conduct.5 In other words, there was no affirmative action to regulate customary practices that prohibited persons belonging to lower castes from using the same wells, attending the same temples or marrying persons from other castes. Constitutional provisions provided legal guarantee 150

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of greater equality; however, in practice, considerable inequalities persisted. The majority of those belonging to the lower caste either worked as agricultural workers or continued to engage in traditional occupations, such as flaying and scavenging.6 Therefore, while economic growth and democratic arrangements buttressed the legitimacy of political authorities by providing economic rewards to the upper-class urban professionals and the rural landed elite, the majority of workers in both agricultural and industrial sectors received relatively little benefits from this growth. Studies undertaken have in fact shown that the pattern and process of development in fact strengthened the primordial system of caste-based loyalties. The Community Development Programme, instituted in 1952, serves as a useful illustration of the inherent limitations of a process of development biased against persons coming from lower castes. Although the first phase of the programme focused on the improvement of social amenities such as schools, health centres, roads, wells, etc., the major beneficiaries were upper-caste elites; lower-caste workers, who constituted the majority of the poor, continued to be both physically and socially deprived of the benefits of such investments. This brings us to the important discussion about the legal guarantees offered by way of rights in the sphere of economic and social development to citizens.

Rights, entitlements and well-being While rights constituted an integral theme of the nationalist movement and were accorded special importance in the Constitution of India, the conceptualization of development in the post-Independence period was ironically bereft of the rights framework. India, it may be noted, was one of the few countries that constitutionally accorded equal civil and political rights to both men and women at a time when certain countries such as Switzerland continued to deny to its women the right to franchise. A separate section (Bakshi 2000: Part III, Articles 12–35) was devoted to rights that were considered to be fundamental in the new Constitution. These were essentially rights of a civil and political nature delineating limitations or restrictions on the actions of the State, such as equality before law; the right to freedom of speech and association; and rights against discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, and birth. However, given the fact that at the social level there were certain bottlenecks that impinged on the enjoyment of certain freedoms, affirmative action constituted an important part of 151

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the responsibility that the State had towards the protection and promotion of civil and political liberties. The protection of economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand was more implicit. Placed in a separate section as ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ (ibid.: Part IV, Articles 36–51), this set of rights was included to serve as policy guidelines for successive governments to build upon the ideal of a democratic welfare state as set out in the Preamble.7 A commitment to ‘equal pay for equal work for both men and women’, ‘conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities’, ‘the ownership and control of the material resources of the community . . . to subserve the common good’, ‘right to work, to education and to public assistance in case of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement’, etc. were some of the important principles enumerated in this section (ibid.). While legally the Constitution made the State explicitly responsible for the protection and promotion of civil and political rights, the State’s responsibilities towards the protection of social, economic and cultural rights were relatively less explicit. At the time of Independence while non-justiciability of Directive Principles was justified on the grounds that ‘a State just awakened from freedom with its many preoccupations might be crushed under the burden’ (GoI 2003: 12),8 there were demands from certain representatives to make the Directive Principles of State Policy justiciable. While the constraint on resources was invariably an important consideration it is debatable whether financial constraints provided the sole justification for the State to refrain from assuming direct and binding obligations in development. The Kerala experience with development clearly counters such reasoning. Following independence in 1947, while Kerala continued with the legacy of allotting a substantial share of public resources to social investments, this was not the case for the rest of India. Given the arbitrary nature of obligations towards development, the issue of justiciability certainly merits attention. While there is no disagreement over the fact that the State has an obligation to improve the standard of living of all its citizens, there is relatively little consensus over whether such a responsibility should be made legal and justiciable, creating positive obligations for the State to undertake certain policy steps in order to fulfil and provide for the social and economic needs of individuals. This is where the protection of legally enforceable social and economic rights, as opposed to merely aspirational rights, enters the debate. Legal acceptance of rights implies that States 152

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are under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil such rights. The obligation to respect involves a positive affirmation on the part of the State not to undertake any action that would cause obstruction or hindrance in the process of the fulfilment of rights. The protective function of the State is the most important as well as manageable aspect of the State’s obligations, as the State’s role in the protection of economic, social and cultural rights is very similar to its role as protector of civil and political rights. The responsibility of protecting calls upon the State to safeguard the rights and freedoms of individuals from negative actions arising on account of unethical practices. Moreover, the State also has the positive obligation to facilitate and aid the process of rights realization by undertaking affirmative action that guarantees suitable opportunities and means for citizens to realize their needs. The next section takes up the specific case of labour to substantiate and take the discussion further. With the second largest population in the world, labour is one area that is never in short supply in India. Yet in the 60 years and more of independence, one of the most obvious failures of the Indian State has been its inability to provide certain guaranteed rights related to work and employment to the vast majority of the work force. This is particularly so because technically the organized sector, where labour laws and regulations operate, amounts to only 7 per cent. For the remaining 93 per cent of the total work force that is employed in the informal or the unorganized sector, rules and regulations laid down by the State do not directly prevail. While basic principles governing state policy as enshrined in the Constitution implicitly call upon the State to ensure safe and proper working conditions for all workers, the legislations prescribing principles and procedures are however restricted in their application to workers in large industries. The organized sector is one defined as employing 10 or more workers with power or 20 or more workers without power. An informal sector unit by that logic is one employing fewer than 10 workers leading to a situation whereby a preoccupation with size becomes the defining criteria for intervention by the State. Transposed at the macro level, the statistics reveal a most alarming picture. Estimated at comprising 60 per cent of net domestic product, 31 per cent of agricultural exports and 41 per cent of manufacturing exports, the informal sector is a key constituency of the economy (Harriss-White 2005: 5). By virtue of the size of employment that it supports, it undoubtedly forms the inevitable backbone of the Indian economy. Increase in employment figures (1990–2005) shows a recorded growth in the numbers employed in the informal 153

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and unorganized sectors of the economy, leading to what has been described as the ‘informalization of the formal sector’. The work force employed in the informal economy comprises mainly four categories of workers (NCEUS 2008: 6). These are: (a) Wage Workers in the Unorganized Sector: Workers employed directly by employers, agencies or contractors. These include casual and temporary workers, migrant workers and those employed by households as domestic workers. (b) Self-Employed in the Unorganized Sector: These are persons who operate farm or non-farm enterprises and engage in home-based production. Workers in this category usually include unpaid family workers also. (c) Unprotected Wage Workers in the Organized Sector: Unprotected workers are mainly in the categories of regular, casual and contract workers who remain unprotected because of noncompliance of the provisions of existing laws. (d) Regular Unorganized Workers: Persons working for others and getting salary or wages on a regular basis in return. The informal sector therefore constitutes a most diverse group. The percentage of workers employed in agriculture is more than the nonagriculture segment. It is estimated that the agricultural sector employs 65 per cent of self-employed and 35 per cent of casual workers. In the non-agricultural segment, the work force is divided between the self-employed (65 per cent), regular (17 per cent) and casual (20 per cent) (NCEUS 2008: 4). The informal sector is also characterized by a wide array of wage arrangements such as piece rate, wages paid to an individual on a daily basis, family wage, and payments in money and kind. The fact that there is no security of wages in terms of what they receive as payments and at what frequency makes them vulnerable and open to exploitation. Ranging across a wide array of professions, this category also constitutes the most vulnerable sections of the Indian society. For example, majority of the wage and self-employed workers in the rural nonagricultural unorganized sector are landless and sub-marginal landholders with very small land holdings of less than 0.4 hectares. Social networks also play a crucial role in determining entry into labour markets. Low levels of education amongst the Scheduled Tribe (ST), SC and OBC population constrain their entry into the organized sector 154

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market, confining them to being casual workers without any social security or legal protection for life. Available estimates show that only 0.4 per cent of the unorganized sector workers receive social security benefits like the Provident Fund, a figure that has virtually remained unchanged in recent years, despite the rhetoric about the need for social protection for the needy.

Law and the regulation of labour markets The laws governing labour relations, like many other spheres of public life in India, have their antecedents in the colonial past. Among the earliest statutes found are the workmen’s Breach of Contract Act (1859), the Employers’ and workmens’ (Disputes) Act (1860), the Trade Unions Act (1926), the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act (1946) and the Industrial Disputes Act (1947). Brought into being by the British, these Acts did not seek to directly address the interests of the working class. In fact, British capitalism as it operated did not really seek to alter the primordial relations of production and instead sought to take advantage of these to secure and run their businesses. This reliance on local and regional networks continued to be in vogue even amongst the Indian bourgeoisie. Unbroken practices and perpetuation of continuities made the promise of a new beginning appear illusory. The Directives Principles of State policy enshrined in the Constitution however did play a significant role in influencing the State to undertake some progressive legislation. For example, in 1948, the Central Government enacted the Minimum wages Act and the Employees State Insurance Act to address certain issues related to the welfare of workers. This was followed by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act (1970), the Equal Remuneration Act (1976) and the Inter-State Migrant workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service Act [1979]). However, with the onset of liberalization, pro-active intervention by the State has once again receded to the background. In enforcing the new rules, it has been the judiciary rather than the Executive that has been more pro-active.

Informalization of work force One of the areas where the shift in public discourse is clearly apparent is in the increasing advocacy of contract labour by agencies of the State. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act (1970), enacted to regulate the employment of casual labour in select establishments, 155

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provided for its abolition in certain circumstances. Recognizing the fact that workers were too easily exploited by contractors, the Act sought to emphasize the responsibility of the principal employer in ensuring that the payments and working conditions as stipulated by law were met in practice. The Act was based on the premise that contract labour would gradually be replaced as more jobs came to be regularized. In 1982 in an important case – PUDR v. Union of India (better known as the Asiad case), involving wide-scale violations related to non-payment of minimum wages to the contract labour employed in construction of complexes associated with the Asiad Games – the Supreme Court passed a landmark judgement. The Court upheld that the right to life guaranteed was not merely confined to physical existence or to the use of any faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed, but that it also included within its scope and ambit the right to live with basic human dignity and the State cannot deprive anyone of these precious and invaluable right because no procedure by which such deprivation may be effected can ever be regarded as reasonable, fair and just. In another significant judgment – Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union (1996) – the Supreme Court upheld the right of workers employed on contract to be automatically absorbed after a significant passage of time in the regular work force. Following an eight-year struggle by workers in the Bombay (now Mumbai) airport and other airports, the Supreme Court in November 1996 abolished the contract labour system in all airports for sweeping, security guards and cleaning staff and directed the airport authorities to absorb the roughly 2,000 workers in these categories in Bombay (Mumbai), also potentially benefiting the thousands of workers in these categories in dozens of airports in the country. It also, in a correct and broad reading of the Contract Labour Act, upheld the right of contract workers to be absorbed directly as permanent workers on the abolition of the contract labour system. Almost several years later in a series of judgements, the Supreme Court reversed its own understanding of the use of contract labour. It now argued for the regularization of contract labour as the standard practice. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Others v. National Union Water Front Workers & Others (2001), a constitution bench of the Supreme Court clubbed together several existing cases and overturned the landmark Air India judgement. The five-judge bench made the following observation: Neither S.10 of the CLRA Act, nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides 156

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for automatic absorption of contract labour. Consequently, the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the concerned establishment .  .  . by abolition of contract labour, the principal employer would be compelled to employ permanent workers for all types of work which would result in incurring high cost by him. This could well be yet another reason for not providing automatic absorption.9 In 2006 in another case – Secretary State of Karnataka v. Umadevi and Others (2006) – a five-judge Constitution Bench once again reiterated the argument offered in the Steel Authority of India judgement. While considering the plea that casual workers employed over a long period of time should be absorbed in the regular work force, the Court held: While it might be one thing to say that the daily rated workers, doing the identical work, had to be paid the wages that were being paid to those who are regularly appointed and are doing the same work, it would be quite a different thing to say that a socialist republic and its Executive, is bound to give permanence to all those who are employed as casual labourers or temporary hands . . . the court ought not to impose a financial burden on the State by such directions, as such directions may turn counter-productive.10 The contrast between the positions taken by the Supreme Court in the Asiad case (PUDR v. Union of India [1982]) and subsequent judgements on labour (for example, Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Others v. National Union Water Front Workers & Others, [2001]; BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India [2001]; Umadevi and Others v. Secretary State of Karnataka [2006]) marks the shift in attitudes that has followed. In the Asiad case where the Supreme Court extended the scope of the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution (Right to Life) to include the right to livelihood along with the ‘right to live with basic human dignity’, in the 1990s the judiciary refrained from making any such connections. In cases involving the violation of rights in the course of privatization, the Supreme Court has strongly made a case for the exclusion of economic policies from the purview of judicial review in its judgements in Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd v. Union of India (1990), Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. 157

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Limited and Another v. Reserve Bank of India (1992), Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others (2000), and BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India (2001).11 In the BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India (2001) case, the Supreme Court actually reversed its own ruling delivered in National Textile Workers’ Union and Others v. P. R. Ramakrishnan (1983) that supported the right of workers to be consulted in the decision-making involving the closure of the industry concerned.

Informalization and its consequences Over the last two decades, there has been a perceptible shift towards greater informalization, occurring within the larger framework of neo-liberal reforms, across both the public and the private sectors in India. Operationally, contractualism manifests itself in many forms. First and foremost, it essentially creates a divide between permanent and the contractual labour, even when the nature of work is more or less perennial and permanent. Second, this in effect de-enfranchises the professional identity of a select set of workers, excluding them from the purview of existing labour laws and the protection that they render. In studies conducted about labour-related agitations over the past two years in different parts of the country, informalization stemming out of contractualization has emerged as a major cause of friction and unrest amongst workers. The outbreak of violence in Yanam, Puducherry (January 2012) and the Maruti plant in Manesar (Haryana) in July 2012 are two very recent examples of the violent trajectories of growth underlying the development process in India. Constitutionally speaking, there are wide-ranging provisions the State could fall upon to justify legislations favouring workers including those employed in the informal sector. For example, fixation of minimum wages, securing a living wage for workers, condemning unfair labour practices, compelling employers to conform to labour laws, curbing bonded labour practices, and so on. Contractualization of employment has taken many new forms and structures that have had an important bearing on the whole question of rural and urban livelihoods. Living wages mean wages sufficient for workers and their families to live on without privation. Minimum wages can be termed as living wages that ensure not only bare physical subsistence but also the maintenance of health and decency. In the last 20 years and more, not only have laws related to minimum wages remained stagnant, but more importantly, a huge differential in terms of wages has also been 158

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established between permanent and contract workers. Legally, the argument that ‘such a development paradigm is necessary, and its consequences, inevitable, is untenable’, as upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Nandini Sundar and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011). Development as an activity is open to contestations and the resolution of these differences is an important sub-text of the larger discussion on development, one which in the final analysis, in both theory and practice, has a significant bearing on the overall relationship between development, nationhood and citizenship.

Notes 1 For an elaboration on the interface between feudalism and capitalism in modern Indian society, see Balagopal (1988); Banerjee (1980); Beteille (1974); Gandhi and Shah (1991). 2 For a more exhaustive commentary on the economic consequences of colonial rule, see R. P. Dutt (1970); R. Dutt (2006). 3 Administrative charges levelled by the British Government, euphemistically referred to as the ‘home Charges’, came to £17.3 million in 1901–02, of which interest on railways made up for £6.4 million, the interest on India Debt £3 million, army expenses £4.3 million, stores purchase £1.9 million and pensions £1.3 million (Sarkar 2000: 25–27). This ‘drain of wealth’ propounded by early nationalist leaders such as Dadabhai Naoroji to highlight the exploitative relationship existing between Britain and India represented a potential surplus that if invested properly within the country might have helped raise India’s income considerably. 4 The reluctance of the political leadership to undertake structural reforms has been theorized in the works of many scholars such as Partha Chatterjee (1995), Sudipto Kaviraj (1999), Gunnar Myrdal (1992), and others. Both Chatterjee (1995) and Kaviraj (1999) have borrowed Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution to describe the context in which the new claimants of power, lacking the social strength to launch a full-scale assault on the old dominant classes, opt for a path in which the demands of a new society are satisfied in small doses, legally in a reformist manner – in such a way that the political and economic position of the old feudal classes is not destroyed, agrarian reform is avoided and the popular masses are prevented from going through the political experience of a fundamental social transformation. Myrdal (1992) on the other hand uses the ‘soft state’ analogy to describe very much the same phenomena. According to him there is unwillingness among the rulers to impose obligations on the governed and a corresponding unwillingness on their part to obey rules laid down by democratic procedures. 5 In Devarajiah v. Padmanna (1961), the Supreme Court of India interpreted the objective of Article 17 of the Indian Constitution relating to the abolition of untouchability as proclaiming the end of the inhuman practice of treating certain fellow human beings as dirty and untouchable by reason of their birth in certain castes.

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6 For a review of caste-based discrimination in India, see Omvedt (1995); Shah (2004: 118–36); Srinivas (1966). 7 The Preamble to the Indian Constitution calls upon the State to secure the following ideals for all its citizens: ‘justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, equality of status and of opportunity and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation’. 8 The Constitutional Advisor to the President of the Constituent Assembly, B. N . Rao in fact suggested an amendment that would make the Directive Principles enforceable in a court of law. However, the amendment was not carried out, as it did not find favour with the majority in the Constituent Assembly. 9 From the Supreme Court judgement in Steel Authority of India Ltd & Others v. National Union Water Front Workers & Others (2001) SCC1, AIR 3527. 10 From the Supreme Court judgement in Secretary State of Karnataka v. Umadevi and Others’ (2006) SCR953. 11 ‘Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courts to sit in judgement over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert bodies’ (from the Supreme Court judgement in Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited and Another v. Reserve Bank of India [1992]).

References Bakshi, P. M. 2000. The Constitution of India. New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing. Balagopal, K. 1988. Probings in the Political Economy of Agrarian Classes and Conflicts. Hyderabad: Perspectives. Banerjee, Sumanta. 1980. In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India. Calcutta: Subarnarekha. Beteille, Andre. 1974. Studies in Agrarian Social Structure. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Brass, Paul R. 1994. The Politics of India since Independence. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Chatterjee, Partha. 1995. The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dutt, Rajni Palme. 1970. India To-day. Calcutta: People’s Publishing house. Dutt, Romesh. 2006. The Economic History of India: In the Victorian Age 1837–1900. New Delhi: Low Price Publications. Gandhi, Nandita and Nandita Shah. 1991. The Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Contemporary Women’s Movement in India. New Delhi: Kali for women. Government of India (GoI). 2003. Constituent Assembly Debates. New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat.

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Harriss-White, Barbara. 2005. India’s Market Society: Three Essays in Political Economy. New Delhi: Three Essays Collective. Kaviraj, Sudipto (ed.). 1999. Politics in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1992. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New Delhi: Kalyani. National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS). 2008. Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of Livelihoods in the Unorganised Sector. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. Omvedt, Gail. 1995. Dalit Visions: The Anti-Caste Movement and the Construction of an Indian Identity. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Sarkar, Sumit. 2000 [1983]. Modern India 1885–1947. New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers. Shah, Ghanshyam. 2004. Social Movements in India: A Review of Literature. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Srinivas, M. N. 1966. Social Change in Modern India. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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10 INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND ECONOMIC CRISES Labour migration and poverty in India Arjan de Haan

Introduction: migration as safety valve Economic crises can have enormous impact on migration, both shortterm and long-term, and direct and indirect. The economic crisis of 1929 led to a decrease in international migration, and the return of large numbers of internal migrants as employment declined. For example, in February 1931, almost 60,000 jute mill workers – about one-fifth of the total – were dismissed as a result of the trade depression, and according to the labour commissioner the employees ‘melted like snow in summer’ (quoted in de Haan 1994: 27), returning to their villages of origin.1 The 1973 oil crisis also led to a fall in labour migration, which in Europe was succeeded by a period of migration for family reunification, and in Asia by booming migration to the Gulf (Rajan and Kumar 2010). To some extent the 1997–1998 crisis in Asia had a similar impact, but this was mostly short-term. In most cases, declines in job opportunities during crises were accompanied by protectionist measures; however, after 1997 employers in Asia soon asked for ensuring sufficient labour supply (Castles 2009; Migration DRC 2009). The effect of the 2008 crisis is still unfolding, with continued financial instability, budget cuts in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, high unemployment, and a distinct political shift and resurging anti-immigrant sentiments. Since 2008, international migration has been affected with new migration declining. However there appears to have been little return migration, partly because migrants may not be going home if they fear they may 162

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not be able to return, and because conditions at home are equally bad (Castles and Miller 2010). International remittance declined by 6 per cent in 2009 as compared to the year before, but was expected to be picking up again in later years (Ratha et al. 2010). Internal migration too was affected, particularly in the areas and industries that were most closely linked to the global financial and economic crisis, such as the diamond industry in Surat, which is discussed later in the chapter. In coastal China an estimated 20 million jobs were lost, and tens of thousands of factories closed down throughout 2008. While many workers returned to their areas of origin during the Spring Festival of 2009, closely monitored by the government, many also stayed back, or in fact returned early to make sure that they were able to get a job when the economy stabilized. Labour migration has often been considered a safety valve: for workers to diversify livelihood sources in case of needs, and for economies to adjust labour supply in up- and down-turns. This chapter argues that this view is too limited and that migration is an integral part of economic development and processes of production and accompanying insecurity, through patterns of mobility that are structured historically and socially. In the case of India, migration patterns have not changed much as a result of the crisis, which is partly a result of the fact that the impact of the global crisis was cushioned in India, but also because patterns of migration are closely inter-twined with both organization of production and social structures, which are changing but only gradually. This chapter therefore takes a longer-term view, and enquires whether it is likely that patterns of migration and their links with poverty have changed since the early 1990s, and whether current social policies under the Congress-led government have become inclusive of poor labour migrants.2 Within this, it focuses on the migration patterns of deprived social groups, to analyze whether migration does form a route out of poverty, and whether specific policies for these groups exist or should be recommended. This discussion is placed against the on-going debates on changes in patterns of employment and job creation in India during the period of economic liberalization (Chandrasekhar 2010; Ghosh 2010), under the ‘inclusive growth’ policies since 2004, in the light of around 93 per cent of India’s workforce being under ‘informal employment’ (Sengupta 2009), and growing inequalities (Sarkar and Mehta 2010). The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses general and global findings on the links between 163

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poverty and labour migration, focusing on population movements that remain within national borders, which is most relevant from a poverty perspective. This is used in the sections after that to describe changes in migration patterns in India. The concluding section discusses the implications of these insights for the notion of inclusive growth, and reflects on the analysis of migration and possible policies to enhance migrants’ well-being and ability to participate in India’s ‘disequalising growth’.

Facts and questions about migration and poverty The subject of migration remains contested. While there is generally a preference for, or at least acceptance of, people moving when there is a demand for labour, there are equally strong voices arguing for reducing the number of immigrants, as currently in Europe (Harris 2010) – voices that become stronger at times of crises. Academically, disciplinary differences regarding approaches to understanding migration continue to exist. As described in more detail in ‘Inclusive Growth? Labour Migration and Poverty in India in the 21st Century’ (de Haan 2010), the literature on international migration can be summed up as follows, highlighting that while there are general lessons regarding migration, links between migration and poverty are deeply context-specific. Movement of people is much more common than is usually assumed, and has existed for much longer than often acknowledged. Moreover, recent international migration literature tends to neglect the fact that most migration remains within the Global South (UNDP 2009), and national borders – much of that therefore remains unrecorded and barely discussed after the 2008 crisis, for example. Labour migration also takes many forms, of which the classic rural–urban transition is only one: movement of entire households is also merely one of them, and a more common form is the movement of one member of the household who retains links with his/her origins, migrating for varying periods of time. The question of who migrates does not have a simple answer. In different contexts, socio-economic groups migrate, prompted by various capabilities, opportunities, and differentiated access. Most regions and countries have varying propensities for migration to specific kinds of destinations and opportunities: simple push–pull models tend to be inadequate to explain the complexity of segmented migration streams. The poorest people may not be able to migrate, and the most 164

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poverty-stricken areas do not necessarily have the largest numbers of migrants. The phenomenon of chain-migration leads to a great deal of path dependency in terms of migration patterns.3 With technological change, migration has tended to become more selective, with fewer opportunities for unskilled workers. Gender and age are crucial to understanding migration processes. There are no generalities about whether men or women migrate, despite a great deal of path dependency and gender stereotyping. In most places, young men might be over-represented amongst migrants, thus constituting particular gendered and household impacts, but women have always been mobile as well, moving for ‘traditional’ female occupations and newer ones – including unskilled and semiskilled manufacturing and service sector jobs (Gaetano and Yeoh 2010). Female migrants tend to be particularly vulnerable and suffer from labour market discrimination and violence. Reasons for migrating are diverse. Statistical data tend to record only one reason for migration, thus underestimating the complexity of migration. Migration often arises from desperation, lack of work, or indebtedness. For many households, seasonal migration is part of regular household strategies. But much migration is also driven by the hope or idea of better opportunities, and broadening horizons, or is part of the rites of passage for young men and women. Consequences of migration are equally diverse. At the household level, migration usually improves income and well-being, but often tends to maintain levels of living. Areas of origin usually show clear signs of migrant remittances, but there appear to be relatively few cases of transformation of areas, thus also suggesting that migration tends to be part of regions’ economies rather than initiating economic development, or causing severe brain drain (de Haas 2007; Papademetriou and Martin 1991). The question of impact on areas of destination has received relatively much attention, but assessments tend to vary – from migrants enhancing growth and well-being, to being a drain on local economies and upsetting local cultures.

Indian migration trends: are they changing? Movement of workers across the Indian subcontinent is an age-old phenomenon. This depends on changing patterns of economic development, and is partly related to levels of poverty, but with little evidence that migration contributes to reducing regional disparities. The poorest states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh provide the largest numbers of 165

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migrants, who tend to move to richer areas like Delhi, Maharashtra and Gujarat. The patterns of movement are also prompted through chain-migration – with Kerala and Punjab being prime examples with respect to international migration – but similar segmentation of migration streams exists within India. The speed of urbanization in Asia – including India – has not been as fast as often assumed. The rural–urban transition is happening at moderate speed, and evidence suggests that this is associated with increased unaffordability of India’s cities in terms of land and basic services, and slum clearances, with observers fearing that this ‘exclusionary urban growth’ is likely to intensify in the future (Kumar 2010; Kundu 2009). According to the NSS data, the percentage of urban households that had moved during the previous year went slightly up – from 2.2 to 3.3 per cent – between 1993 and 2007–2008 (NSSO 2010: 16–17). Definitions of migrants and sources of data matter a great deal. According to the Census of India 2001, 309 million people were migrants based on the place of last residence – with more than two-thirds being female – and there was an increase of 27 per cent since 1991 (see Bhagat 2011 for an extensive discussion on the Census of India 2001 data). Using NSS data – excluding marriage migration to get a better perspective on labour migration – about 10 per cent of the total population was classified as migrants, and this percentage has hardly changed (see de Haan and Dubey 2006 for a comparison between NSS data for 1987–1988 and 1999–2000). According to the data, the out-migration rate for males from rural areas was 9 per cent, and for females 17 per cent in 2007–2008; this includes a large proportion of marriage-related migration. NSSO (2010) presents most the recent changes in migration – including all categories of migrants – between 1983 and 2007–2008, and these are discussed in Chapter 1 of the India Migration Report 2011 (Rajan 2011: 1–6) as well. The proportion of migrants in both urban and rural areas has gone up by 3–5 percentage points, but this is entirely due to increase in female migration. The proportion of male migrants declined in rural areas and stayed the same in urban areas. In both years, intra-rural migration was still the most important form of migration (for further discussion, see Rajan and Mishra 2011). Much of the movement of labour in India has remained circular.4 This is of course the case with migration for seasonal occupations, particularly in rural areas (Deshingkar and Akter 2009; Deshingkar and Start 2003; also compare with Jha 2008), especially those with 166

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a high concentration of out-migrants from India’s poorest areas, for instance, western Orissa.5 But workers involved in urban occupations also tend to maintain links with areas of origins.6 This is confirmed by casual observation regarding domestic and other workers in cities, where very few have severed links with their villages of origin even if working in the city for many years. My own research among industrial labourers in Calcutta showed the same (de Haan 1994). The return of workers during the 1931 crisis was indeed part of a pattern of circulation, which was only very gradually changing, as my fieldwork in the early 1990s showed, with many workers remaining one foot in both urban and rural areas, and many moving back as the industry was in structural decline. In her research in the summer of 2009 for her MA dissertation, Astha Kapoor (2011) found similar patterns of responses: When the factories didn’t reopen in November [2008] after Diwali, many of the workers left for their villages . . . Return migration .  .  . was a logical option in this case because the cost of living in the city is significantly higher than that in the villages. Most of the people who moved back had land to go back to, which means that the ties to the city are often superseded by the ties to the village because of the existence of agricultural land . . . However . . . even though the realisation of the crisis had set in by December, the masses only moved back in April . . . after the school exams of the children finished . . . a number of workers chose to struggle for a few months for the sake of their children’s education. (ibid.: 45) There is thus no contradiction between relatively low rates of urbanization, and high levels of population mobility. Apart from the fact that much migration remains within rural areas, the rural–urban migration too in many cases is a continued circular process, rather than constituting the classic rural–urban transition.

Migrants’ characteristics: a macro–micro paradox Most of the existing research describes individual motives for migration. The NSS data highlights that migration for marriage is quoted as the reason for 90 per cent of rural female migrants, with ‘search for employment’ as the factor for 18 per cent of migrants according to the 1987–1988 NSS data and 14 per cent in 1999–2000 (de Haan and 167

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Dubey 2006).7 In 2007–2008, 61 per cent of households had migrated for employment-related reasons, while only 10 per cent individuals had migrated for employment-related reasons – 46 per cent among men, and 1 per cent among women. While of course economic opportunities are central to labour migrants, field studies tend to reveal a variety of motivations for migration, shaped by conditions at origin and destination, and by the patterns of recruitment and migration networks. Family structure shapes both the urgency and limitations to migrate,8 as larger families tend to have a greater need to diversify resources, and the ability to maintain labour inputs when part of the family migrates. Age is key of course in terms of employment possibilities (young men having most opportunities) but also in terms of a rite of passage, and the drive within youngsters to explore the world outside their immediate vicinity (and sometimes, away from parental control). Similarly, social–cultural factors structure migration patterns, including in terms of female migration and labour force participation, as discussed further in this chapter. Reasons for migration are very complex, and simple categories may lead to serious misreading of broader patterns, such as in the case of female migration ‘for marriage’. Studies on migration of the poorest workers have argued that it is inappropriate to conceptualize this along the model of individual choices postulated by neoclassical and dualist models. According to Jan Breman (1985), with capitalist production and old exploitative socio-economic relations in western India, labour migration leads to, and is part of, extreme forms of deprivation; while David Mosse et al. (2002) show the conditions of bondage in migration processes amongst Adivasis. These forms of migration are usually organized through labour contractors, who often are moneylenders in areas of origin. A variety of studies show the diversity amongst labour migrants. The recent NSSO report on 2007–2008 data (NSSO 2010) lists the incidence of migration among different income groups, showing a higher propensity of migration of households in the top income deciles than in the lower ones.9 In line with this, we found for 1987–1988 and 1999–2000 that poverty rates amongst migrants were much lower than amongst non-migrants, and the average years of schooling of migrants were higher, in both years, and in both rural and urban areas (de Haan and Dubey 2006). The Indian Village Studies project also showed that migrants were educationally better placed than nonmigrants (Connell et al. 1976). However, we also suspected that the group of migrants was diverse, and found that inequality – measured 168

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by a Gini coefficient of household consumption – was higher amongst migrants than among non-migrants (de Haan and Dubey 2006). Patterns of landownership amongst migrants also illustrate diversity. John Connell et al. (1976) showed that the landless were least likely to migrate. K. N. S. Yadava et al. (1997) found a positive relationship between landholding and migration in India (and that migrant households are socio-economically and educationally relatively betteroff). In a comparative study in the 1980s, Amarjit S. Oberai et al. (1989) showed that in Bihar the poor and landless were (slightly) more likely to migrate; in Kerala the middle peasantry migrated more often, and in Uttar Pradesh all landed groups except the largest cultivators migrated frequently. While there is some degree of path dependency, these patterns change over time, as Arvind Das’s narrative (1985) about a village in Bihar shows, where sons of landowners were amongst the first to migrate, followed by the less well-off. An identical pattern has been detected with respect to the international migration from Punjab, where better-off earlier migrants sponsored the less well-off (Pettigrew 1977). Similarly, such diversity is demonstrated by data on the caste background of migrants. Indentured labour migrants formed an average broad-middle sample of India’s rural population (Tinker 1974), a pattern that seemed to be continued in the migration to the old colonial industries (de Haan 1994). Ben Rogaly et al. (2002) showed how caste is responsible for segmented migration streams in rural West Bengal. Jan Breman’s seminal work (1985) in western India stressed on the overrepresentation of lower castes and Harijans in circular migration. In the study of Mahabubnagar village in Andhra Pradesh, Vijay Korra (2010) observed that all Reddy (powerful caste) households had a migrant in urban areas, whereas migration to rural areas was much more common among Madiga (Dalit) and landless marginal farmer households. NSS data provides information about migration among different castes, though under-recording may be particularly serious here, as the types of migration of the most deprived groups may remain unrecorded more often than that of those better-off. Analysis of NSS data for 1987–1988 and 1999–2000 highlighted striking differences in the mobility of social groups: the proportion of recorded migrants among Dalits and Adivasis is on an average lower than among other groups (de Haan and Dubey 2006).10 NSS data for 1999–2000 and 2007– 2008 referring to migrant households suggests a slightly different picture, with a somewhat lower proportion of migrants amongst Dalits, 169

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but higher share of migrants amongst Adivasis in urban areas – a fact that may be related to reservation. Patterns of migration change over time. Priya Deshingkar et al.’s re-survey (2008) in Madhya Pradesh showed that circular migration had become more beneficial and empowering for the poor, while also bringing greater returns to those with skills or strong social networks. It also showed increased participation by higher castes (and women) in migration as opportunities became more rewarding. In Palanpur in western Uttar Pradesh, higher castes were more prominently represented among migrants in 1983–1984, but in earlier years lower castes had secured outside jobs (Lanjouw and Stern 1989). Thus, a micro–macro paradox seems to emerge from this brief overview. National-level data highlights that migration is selective, with opportunities biased against the poor, which may be reinforced with technological change. But micro studies show very high rates of migration amongst poorest and socially marginalized groups, including in bonded and child labour. To ensure a better insight into the dynamics of migration and its relations to poverty, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of migration is needed, as demonstrated with respect to the gendered nature of migration.

Gender and age structure migration Migration in India, as elsewhere, is strongly gendered, with regional and class differences, thus structuring the potential of migration to be an inclusive force. Census and NSSO data shows very low rates of female labour migration: between 70 per cent (in Kerala) and 94 per cent (in Bihar) of women in migrant households quote marriage as the primary reason for their move, though their labour force participation increases after marriage (Shanthi 2006: 22–25). Many studies show that women do migrate, but often face more barriers to mobility and access to opportunities.11 They receive lower wages, particularly in rural and casual urban occupations, and if they have low levels of education.12 They are highly represented in extremely exploitative occupations like sugarcane cutting (Teerink 1995), which are likely to go unrecorded in national statistics. The under-recording of this female migration in the Census of India and the NSS can be related to the fact that respondents are required to give only one reason for migration and that working women that move for marriage are not recorded as labour migrants; cultural inappropriateness to

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emphasise economic role, particularly vis-à-vis male interviewer; and the emphasis on primary and full-time work (Shanthi 2006: 5). Gender patterns of migration vary spatially and temporarily. For example, across India patterns of female rural-to-urban migration have differed in northern and southern India, with the south having higher rates of female migration (Singh 1984).13 This has been related to cultural norms, in particular northern Indian practices relating to the seclusion of women that affected rates of female out-migration and employment. Gendered patterns of labour migration also change over time. In the early 20th century, manufacturing industries had a substantial proportion of female workers, which declined gradually, thus contributing to a very low percentage of female labour in India’s formal employment. Mirroring a global trend, since the 1980s there has been a gradual trend of increasing female employment, in new manufacturing and service-sector jobs, and into self-employment (Rustagi 2010). Apart from signalling gradual changes in migration patterns of migration, this may also be reflecting the pattern of increasing disparities within the labour market, with the bettereducated benefiting more, while many remain trapped in poverty, and particularly women and children confined to the unregulated informal sector.

Impact of migration The question of the impact of migration remains difficult to answer because of (a) the diversity of migrants and selectivity of migration, (b) the difficulty of calculating costs of migration, and (c) the complexity of isolating the impact of migration and remittances from broader household or livelihood strategies. Analyzing the impact of migration using household survey data tends to be particularly limited,14 and needs to calculate the investment migrants and their families have to make before moving as well. Remittances have been among the most important impacts of migration in India. There is increasing evidence about the amounts that migrants send home and their effect clearly visible in states like Kerala. International migrants on an average sent back `52,000. Migrants within India remitted `13,000 on an average – hence, as 19 per cent of households reported an out-migrant, this is not an insignificant contribution.15 Over 90 per cent of the income was spent on household consumption goods, confirming micro-study findings that show that

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remittances lead to limited investment. A small share of remittances in rural areas was used for debt repayment, whereas in urban areas savings and investment were a more common way of utilizing remittances. However, there are many negative sides to migration. Migrants may have to return without savings and remitting – a fact that may go unrecorded in the statistics – and even be unable to earn back the investment. Many migrant labourers have no option but to take children along (Smita 2008), thus potentially contributing to increased child labour and gaps in education, and thus possibly further transmitting poverty across generations. Health of migrants is adversely affected by poor living and working conditions, increased exposure to infectious diseases, lack of access to health care, and emotional stress related to the movement. Ravi Srivastava and S. K. Sasikumar’s conclusion (2003) that despite positive impacts on incomes and investment internal migration from poorer areas functions as a ‘safety valve’ is still valid. At the bottom of the income hierarchy, the benefits from migration are likely to be least, and in cases of bonded labour, migration may actually reinforce conditions of bondage (Mosse et al. 2002). The NSSO data also appears to confirm the hypothesis postulated by Michael Lipton (1980) that migration can increase inequalities, as the better-off can afford to invest in migration opportunities (including international) that are likely to have higher returns. Remittances for rural households in the lowest income group were on average one-quarter of that for those in the highest income group; while this may still be progressive because other sources of income are even more unequally distributed, migration on an average reinforces initial inequalities. The impact of migration thus continues to constitute major questions, conceptually, empirically, and politically. The questions are increasingly important, as labour markets and migration patterns appear to become increasingly unequal. This poses a major challenge for the debate on inclusive growth.

Migration and the paradigm of inclusive growth [M]igrant workers are the most vulnerable and exploited among the informal sector workers, and have not received any attention in the labour policy . . . effective and large-scale effort for vocational training in the labour intensive occupations is required . . . amenable to the special needs of the entrants to informal labour markets. In the destination States, the focus of public policy

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(including Labour Policy) should be to improve the conditions under which the bulk of these in-migrants live and work. (Planning Commission 2007: 74)

The Government of India’s 11th Five Year Plan expressed the expectation that accelerated growth would lead to increased migration (ibid.: 21). The recent World Bank report Accelerating Growth and Job Creation in South Asia (Ghani and Ahmed 2009b), which attributes great importance to labour legislation as a cause of underutilization of labour, assumes that labour mobility is ‘the natural mechanism for promoting faster and inclusive growth regionally and globally’ (Ghani and Ahmed 2009a: 26). They argue that mobility within South Asia’s countries is low, with 96 per cent of the Indian population living in the state in which they were born, and attribute this to large distances, poor infrastructure, cultural factors, language and poor education, as well as policies preventing migrant workers from using safety nets in states to which they have migrated (Ghani and Ahmed 2009a: 26).16 However, the accumulated knowledge does not bear out the conclusion that mobility is low. Neither is there clear evidence that patterns of migration in India are changing substantially. The NSS and the Census of India confirm that proportions of migrants have not been increasing. The data even suggests a decline in rural male migration, and increasing selectivity – which would be in line with evidence on patterns of job-less growth and growing regional in-equalities in India. At the same time, micro-studies show that while some migration does contribute to socio-economic improvements, other forms of migration can be hugely exploitative. This section therefore argues that public policy is critical for beneficial outcomes of migration, and thus for making economic growth more inclusive. First, policy objectives tend to have a strong bias towards reducing numbers of (internal) migrants. For example, rural development programmes and the social protection schemes like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) often include an objective to reduce numbers of out-migrants, often specifically referring to (but not defining) ‘distress migration’.17 Emerging evidence does show that the NREGA led to some decrease in distress migration from villages, with workers stating preference to work in and around their villages, rather than bearing the social and other costs of migrating elsewhere in search of work (Sengupta 2009: 220, 223). Moreover, the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) is hopeful that ‘programmes have made a significant contribution in not 173

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only enhancing income levels of the poor but have been helpful in stemming the rural and urban migration of the poor also’ (Sengupta 2009: 251). This emphasis on reducing migration per se is problematic. Migration tends to be part of households’ established livelihood strategies, which they are unlikely to give up easily, and public policy should focus on supporting these strategies rather than trying to minimize this. In fact, evidence shows that it is as likely that migration will continue or even increase with development (as enhanced resources become available and access improved) as decrease. Patterns of migration usually change, but mobility is part of societies’ development paths (many Indian states with high rates of out-migration also have substantial in-migration). This does not imply a call for a laissez-faire approach to policy on the presumption that migration leads to optimal outcomes; rather, policies that try to reduce exploitation of migrants should be based on an understanding of the complexity of migration patterns, motives and outcomes, and take into account migrants’ perspectives. Second, migrants often remain invisible in policies, law and statistics. This can enhance the vulnerability of migrants, excluding them from social services and rights. While there is a wealth of empirical studies on migration in India, the insights from the complexity of migration do not sufficiently inform the large-scale data collection. The NSS data may be under-recording migration, but also and perhaps more importantly insufficiently recognizes the complexity of migration processes, including with reference to female migration. We need a much better understanding of the changes in migration and employment that are now reflected in the 2007–2008 data. And when migrants are visible in empirical studies, they tend to be portrayed as victims – of economic exploitation, sexual oppression – thus denying migrants’ agency (Kapur 2010). Much of the analysis of migration has departed from a dualistic model, with its emphasis on the gradual absorption of a labour surplus into a modern sector. This also appears to be the perspective in the 11th Five Year Plan (Planning Commission 2007: 63).18 For decades this modernization and transition from rural and informal into an urban modern sector has happened at a moderate pace, and there is recent evidence of continued stagnation and even some reversal of growth in the modern or organized sector. A focus on this slow transition tends to ignore the multiple forms of labour mobility that happens with those two sectors of the dual model. This theoretical focus may feed into public and policy debates, which tend to have – or at least obtain 174

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at points of time – an anti-migrant bias. Policy makers tend to regard migrants as vagrants, or a threat to social order, and/or to national or regional identity. There is also a risk that the assumption of half-way existence on the road to modernization may hinder creative thinking about ways in which migrants can be supported. As the quote at the start of this section shows, the 11th Five Year Plan is explicit in the recognition of a severe gap in policies vis-à-vis migrants.19 However, the dominant policy paradigm has been to improve the investment climate through which jobs would be generated, and support provided to the poorest through the flagship schemes (with the NREGA seen as supporting employment, whereas it is primarily a cash transfer scheme). There is little in terms of legislation and policies to support labour. The NCEUS recommendations that focused on support to the informal sector seem to have been shelved. Improvement of employability of and conditions for migrants, thus, does not appear to be high on the agenda, as even support to the ‘informal sector’ appears unpopular amongst policy makers. While more policy analysis is required in this area, the conclusion of Ravi Srivastava and S. K. Sasikumar (2003) largely seems to hold: ‘legislation (regarding migrants) fails because regulatory authorities are over-stretched; the state sees migrants as a low priority’ (ibid.: i), and acts like the Inter-State Migrant Workman Act remain without teeth. Moreover, many social protection schemes tend to have a ‘sedentary bias’, focusing on the ‘resident’ population, and tending to exclude migrants. Working mostly in the informal sector, migrants tend to lack work-related social security, and are seldom unionized. Migrants may not have access to the PDS and housing schemes. Schooling may not be available to migrants, particularly if they move seasonally. Health care and even immunization may not be accessible, either because of an absence of or large distance to health care centres and anganwadis, or because of discrimination against groups of migrants.20 Finally, the policy gaps vis-à-vis migrants are larger for India’s socially deprived women and men – including Dalits and adivasis – than for other migrants. While micro-studies highlight the large numbers of people moving for casual work, often over short-distance, the macro data shows continued under-representation of the most deprived in labour market and migration statistics. Over and above invisibility and lack of supportive policies or anti-migrant hostility, they suffer from stereotypes and denial of basic rights, as it is unlikely that their social identity becomes irrelevant after they move, even though some of the worst forms of caste discrimination are less prominent in 175

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urban areas. Marginalized migrant groups suffer additional barriers to accessing health and education provisions. Similarly, they are discriminated against in the labour market, as migrants as well as Dalit and Adivasi women and men. Important programmes to address the discrimination against deprived groups have been in existence for decades. There have been significant achievements notably through affirmative action. However, disparities between groups have not disappeared, and the political emancipation has not been accompanied by a similar decisive process of social transformation. Programmes for the excluded have by and large conformed to the welfarist model of India’s social policy. As stressed by Shenggen Fan et al. (2000), the policies have not addressed some core aspects of discrimination, particularly in the sphere of labour markets, and the challenges to address the multiple disadvantages of being migrants and socially stigmatized thus remain. Thus, while national policy does recognize a policy gap in addressing the exclusion of migrants, much remains to be done to make growth more inclusive at the national level.21 These challenges are particularly large for women and most deprived groups, for whom ‘regular’ forms of deprivation are augmented by the sedentary bias of public policies.

Conclusion: supporting migrants While many micro-studies describe the often extreme vulnerability and exploitation of migrants in India, macro-studies have continued to struggle with the role of migration in economic transformation, including during periods of crises. This chapter argues that an interdisciplinary approach is needed to chart the complexity of migration dynamics and how they relate to poverty and well-being. These questions are increasingly pertinent, as the policy objective of inclusive growth is an explicit response to the knowledge that India’s economic model has produced high growth figures, but with increasing inequalities and without a transformation in terms of absorption of labour within a ‘modern’ or ‘formal’ sector. A key insight into migration patterns globally and within India is that while migration is critical in many households’ livelihoods, it does not by itself produce structural change. People’s responses to opportunities are structured by initial economic, political and even social– cultural conditions. Migration can and does enhance well-being of individuals and the broader economy and society. But often migration reinforces inequalities within areas of origin, substantial benefits go 176

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to the better-off and well-connected regions, and extreme exploitation including bonded and child labour may be intensified through the grip of labour contractors and moneylenders. The changes in migration patterns over the last two decades appear to reflect the uneven growth pattern India has been experiencing, with increasing inequalities, and limited creation of ‘decent’ jobs. Patterns have not been stagnant, with, for example, women playing an increasing role in the labour force and migration. But macro data indicates that those better-off are benefiting more from opportunities provided through migration than lower-income groups, while micro-level studies continue to show severe discrimination against poor migrants. Not much macro-data is yet available to assess the impact of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and beyond on migration, but while the impact on international migration and remittances has been less dramatic than expected, internally the crisis is likely to have reinforced patterns of circular migration. This chapter has argued that inclusive growth policy can do more that at present to address the exploitation and exclusion of migrants. New social protection schemes like the NREGA unquestionably enhance the well-being of the poor during periods of downturn in the economy, but also as a more general safety net. But more can be done to enhance the participation of migrants in the growth process. This ought to start from accepting the reality of labour outside the modern sector, among which migrants occupy a specific position, as economic growth has not and will not in the near future substantially change the structure of employment, with over 90 per cent in the so-called informal sector. A range of initiatives shows that social policy does not need to exclude migrants and their families (see, for example, Smita 2008). Rural livelihood programmes and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have experimented with support programmes for migrants, to ensure that they can avail of their basic rights and have the necessary identification and documentation. Impressive examples include Janarth’s schools for children of sugarcane migrant workers in western Maharashtra, SETU’s education interventions to prevent migration of children to unsuitable work sites in Gujarat, and Vikalpa’s support to children of migrants in villages in Bolangir and Nuapada districts in Orissa. National-level Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) has introduced special schemes for out-of-school children, and encourages states to work with NGOs to reach children of vulnerable groups. Ravi Srivastava and S. K. Sasikumar (2003) argue that labour legislation can 177

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be enforced more strictly, with modification of laws where necessary. Advocacy campaigns can be mounted to address stereotypes about migrants, and migrants’ awareness of rights can be strengthened. The inclusive growth policy would make a great leap forward if these initiatives are forcefully promoted across the Indian economy and labour market.

Notes 1 R. N. Gilchrist, Labour Commissioner for the Government of Bengal, 1932 (de Haan 1994: 27). 2 This builds on de Haan (2010). 3 Hein de Haas (2008) reviews theories of chain migration and Jyoti Parimal Sarkar (2010) describes the process with respect to Bangladeshi migrants in India. See Iversen et al. (2011) for a theory of recruitment using networks and incentive mechanisms, with empirical testing using 1999–2000 National Sample Survey (NSS) data. 4 The National Council for Rural Labour (NCRL) estimated the number of seasonal and circular migrants in rural areas to be 10 million; while other estimates suggest at least 30 million (Smita 2008: 5). 5 ActionAid estimates that approximately 2 million people migrate from the predominantly tribal districts of western Orissa to work in brick kilns of Andhra Pradesh (ibid.: 11). 6 NSSO (2010) shows 12 per cent of the population to consist of ‘return migrants’; the relatively smaller number of migrant households as compared to household members migrating suggests that migration remains predominantly circular. 7 Over 50 per cent of urban male migrants quoted ‘employment related reasons’. 8 The pattern of circular migration described above is more adequately captured in the context of a family-oriented migration model (Parida 2010). 9 For short-term migrants, this was the reverse (NSSO 2010: 93) but the numbers of recorded short-term migrants are very low. 10 For an analysis of the corresponding 2001 Census data, see Bhagat (2011). 11 For example, see Mukherjee (2001); Mehra and Gammage (1999); Neetha N. (2011) with respect to female domestic workers. 12 S. Madeshwaran (2010: 467) finds particularly high female/male differentials among scheduled caste regular rural workers. 13 K. Shanthi’s analysis (2006) of the 55th round of the NSS shows slightly higher incidences of female migrants who were ‘never married’ in southern states and West Bengal. 14 For example, William Joe et al. (2009) analyse the net gain of rural–urban migration based on the probability of migrant and non-migrant population in different income quintiles (1999–2000 NSSO data), and show that migrants have much lower probability to be in bottom quintiles than nonmigrant population in areas of origin. As they acknowledge, this does not provide information about individual households’ income.

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15 Source: NSS data 2007–2008. This estimate is far below that of private transfers by the Reserve Bank of India. Remittances are particularly high in Kerala, Goa and Punjab, with recently a rapid increase in Uttar Pradesh. For a detailed analysis of national and international remittances, see Tumbey (2011). 16 The idea that migration in India has been low historically has a long genealogy in colonial and early post-colonial periods (Bhagat 2011). Various studies use net migration as evidence of labour mobility (Cashin and Sahay 1996; Purfield 2006), thus largely missing complicated patterns of migration. Kaivan Munshi and Mark Rosenzweig’s emphasis (2009) on permanent migration also biases their perspective on why mobility in India is ‘so low’. 17 According to the NREGA guidelines, its basic objective is to ‘enhance livelihood security in rural areas by providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in a financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work.’ Other objectives include generating productive assets, protecting the environment, empowering rural women, and reducing rural–urban migration. 18 See Harris and Todaro (1970); Hatton and Williamson (1992); Lewis (1954); Ranis (2003); Todaro (1969). 19 The Plan argues that if basic minimum conditions to the new migrants are not available, economic growth should be restrained. It argues for better implementation of legislations for migrants, through the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1976; the Building and Other Construction Workers (Cess) Act, 1976; the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923; the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; and the Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Bill, 2007 (Planning Commission 2007). 20 The National Rural Heath Mission (NRHM) recognizes the specific health needs of migrants as a group, but it is not clear whether separate initiatives for migrants are included. 21 Jayati Ghosh (2010: 157–60) building on the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) recommendations lists a number of essential proactive policies related to migration and gender empowerment.

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and U.S. 28–30; first-generation estimates 27–8; members 35, 37, 39–40; remittances 31–5; second-generation estimates 27–8; size, estimation of 26–30; trade, investments, skills, and technology transfer 36–8; understanding 39

African Diaspora 26 Asian labour migration 11 Bahrain migrant workers 83 Basu, Moushumi 10 Breman, Jan 168 capitalist development 148–59 Centre for Development Studies (CDS) 1–2, 4–5, 16, 21, 23, 110–15, 118–19 chain-migration 165–6 citizenship 25–6, 29, 40, 159 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): responses of 84–6 Connell, John 169 contemporary labour migration 75 contract labour 155–7 cultural identity 141–5 Das, Arvind 169 Davis, Kingsley 122 Deshingkar, Priya 170 developed countries 20, 33, 35, 45–6 diasporas 1, 5–6, 24–31, 35–40; bonds 6, 35–6, 39–40; collective remittances 38; contributions of 25, 31–8, 40; critical issues 24; and cross-border economics 39; definition of 24–6, 30; and development 1, 5, 24–41; dual citizenship, allowing of 40; embassies and consulates, use of 40–1; first- and secondgeneration immigrants, Australia

economic crises: inclusive growth and 162–78; labour migration and poverty 162–78 economic policies 122, 129, 157 emigrants 8, 24, 37, 104, 109–20; age distribution of 111; protector general of 19–20 emigration 4–5, 8, 17–19, 22–3, 51, 78, 95, 97, 104, 110, 115–18, 120–1, 124; clearances 5, 20–1, 80; policies 7, 78; time of 26, 104, 111, 113, 116 Emigration Act 5, 16, 18–19, 21 emigration prospects 8, 115–20; competition, states in India 117–18; demographic trend 116; ‘dirty jobs’ and 119–20; global recession of 2007–8, migration 118; Nitaqat and 118; prognosis, past trend 115–16; wage differentials, prognosis 116–17 female migrants 45–7, 54, 57, 126, 132, 165 female migration, patterns of 49–50 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 24

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GCC countries 80–1, 83, 85, 107, 113 gender empowerment: and migration 45–70 gender-sensitive policies 6, 74 Ghosh, Bimal 7 Ghosh, Jayati 6 global economic crisis 89–91; common good, lack of 92; constraints 92–4; hegemonic power vs. collective interstate leadership 94; history 91; migration in 2025 94–9; reciprocity, absence of 92–4; South–South migration 98–9 global financial crisis 2, 7, 11 Gulf countries, labour-receiving 77 Gulf emigrants 118 Gulf emigration 17 Haryana 10, 127, 129–30, 133–4, 158 HIV vulnerability 57 host countries 37, 45, 52–3, 57–8, 62, 67, 75, 90, 92 immigrants 26, 28, 30, 54, 62, 82, 90, 93, 106–7, 124–6, 164 immigration 20, 29, 70, 97; women’s 70 immigration policies 62, 68, 120 inclusive growth policies 10–11, 163, 177–8 India Migration Report (IMR) 1–2, 4, 7, 134, 166 Indian diaspora 5, 6, 19, 30–1; see also diasporas Indian economy 10–11, 17, 122, 125, 153, 178; liberalization of 122 Indian migration: changing faces of 1–11; trends, changing 165–7 Indian population 10, 173 informalization: and consequences 158–9; rights, entitlements and well-being 151–5; of work force 155–8 informal sector 10, 149, 153–4, 158, 175, 177 in-migrants 116, 142–6, 173; issue 142, 145

in-migration rate 133–4, 138 internal migrants 125–7, 142; distribution of 9, 126; large numbers of 10, 162 internal migration 4, 9, 17, 34, 67, 116, 122–38, 142, 146, 163, 172; data and method 123–5; development and poverty 132–4; male vs. female migration 129; reasons of 130–2; socioeconomic characteristics, migrants 135–7; trend and pattern 125–9 international migration 1–2, 4–5, 10, 16–20, 22–3, 60, 67, 75, 79–80, 86, 90, 162, 164, 166, 169, 177; deregulating 20–2; inclusive policy of 19–20; managing 23 inter-state cooperation 91, 93, 99 Inter-State Migrant Workman Act 10, 11, 146, 175 interstate migrations 9, 124, 127 interstate rural-to-urban migrants 137 Kabeer, Naila 79 Kapoor, Astha 167 Kapur, Ratna 78 Karnataka 129–30, 133, 157 Kerala 1–3, 8–9, 17, 21, 79, 102–7, 109–21, 127, 152, 166, 169–71; censuses of 104–5, 117; economic expansion in 120; emigration, to Saudi Arabia 102–21; population of 103 Kerala emigrants, in Saudi Arabia 109–10; age distribution 110–11; educational attainment 111–12; emigration prospects 115–20; employment, sector of 113–14; employment status 113; industrial affiliation of 114–15; sex composition 110 Kerala Migration Surveys (KMSs) 2, 8–9, 103, 109, 118, 121, 130 Kerala–Saudi Arabia migration corridor 102 labour laws 69, 85–6, 153, 158 labour markets 10–11, 22, 48–9, 52–3, 55, 81, 83–4, 93, 99, 106–8,

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148, 154–5, 171–2, 175–6, 178; law and regulation of 155 labour migrants 168, 170 labour migration 2, 10–11, 61, 77, 99, 141, 162–78; facts and questions 164–5; safety valve 162–4 labour mobility 173–4 labour-sending countries 77–8 Maharashtra 9, 127, 129, 133, 137, 142–3, 166 male migrants 47, 49, 51, 59, 65, 126, 132, 166 male migration 49–50, 65 marriage 9, 46–50, 82, 127, 129, 132, 145, 167, 170 Meghalaya 9, 130, 142, 145–6 middle-income countries 96 migrant Filipina domestic workers 54–6 migrant households 135, 169 migrant labour 3, 10, 75, 149 migrant labourers 78, 81, 144, 172 migrant population 141–2 migrant remittances 31, 98, 165; recipients of 32 migrants: characteristics 167–70; international 6, 19, 46, 124–5, 131, 171; interstate 11, 127–8, 137; intra-district 126; intra-state 128; opportunity-seeking 96; returning 47, 66 migrant stocks 27, 29 migrant women 50, 52, 55, 57, 58, 63–4, 76, 78, 79, 81; empowerment of 62, 74; issues 6; temporary 50 migrant workers: convention 76; female 7, 49, 63, 77; male 53; recent attacks on North Indian 9, 142; returnee women 85; rights of 76–7, 81 Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS) 85 migration 4, 6–11, 33–4, 45–52, 60–3, 65–8, 74–81, 85–6, 89–94, 96–8, 121–9, 131–5, 141, 162–74, 176–7; data on 9, 123–5, 130; discrimination, women 52–4, 57,

62; distress 48, 173; economic 45, 61–2, 91, 93; effects of 61–4; family 48–9; forced 47–8, 59; gender and age structure 170–1; and gender empowerment 45–70; home, links with 64–6; impact of 171–2; inclusive growth, paradigm of 172–6; interstate 9, 124, 127; intra-state 124; politics of conflict 141–6; and public policy 66–70; reasons for 9, 124, 130–2, 135, 137, 165, 168, 170; and remittances 6–8, 33–4, 65, 171; rural 128; safe 76, 84; seasonal 48, 137–8, 165; semi-permanent 137–8; temporary 21, 61, 137; urban 122, 128–9, 174; women’s 45–52, 61, 67, 75–6 migration patterns 47, 50, 129, 163–5, 171–2, 174, 176–7; diversity of 46, 50 migration policies 4, 77–8, 89, 146; gender-sensitive 7, 77; restrictive 7, 80 migration policy reforms: context of 17–18; international migration 19–22; legislative framework 22; outline of 18–19 Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) 1, 4–5, 8, 16–18, 22, 25 monthly per capita consumer expenditure (MPCE) 124, 135–6 Mosse, David 168 National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 124, 135–7, 166, 168 Nitaqat law 7–8, 102, 107, 115, 118 non-migrants 34, 137, 168–9 Oberai, Amarjit S. 169 Oishi, Nana 78 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 26–7, 29, 35, 53–4, 162 out-migrants 167, 171, 173 out-migration rates 9, 49, 124, 133–4, 138, 166, 174

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politicization, internal migrants 142–5; Assam 144–5; Goa 143–4; Meghalaya 145; Mumbai 142–3 population growth 97, 103, 106 poverty 162–78 remittances 6–8, 31, 33–5, 38, 56, 64–7, 69, 78, 93, 118–20, 171–2, 177 return emigration 118 return migration 47, 123, 162, 167 Rogaly, Ben 169 rural-to-urban migration 123

South–South migration 98 Srivastava, Ravi 177 stakeholders’ responses 74–6; GCC countries, government responses 81–3; at global and regional levels 76–8; at national level 78–84; South Asian countries, government responses 78–81 Thai migrant workers 64 Thimothy, Rakkee 6 trafficking 48, 51, 57, 59–61, 66, 68, 76

Sasikumar, S. K. 177 Saudi Arabia 3–5, 7–8, 51, 82–4, 86, 102–7, 109–12, 115–16, 119–21 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) 106–7 Saudi emigrants 110–11, 113–14, 118 Saudi government 105–6, 108, 121 Saudi’s population 103 Saudization 108 seasonal migration patterns 6, 67 Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 5, 22–3 self-employed emigrants 114 sex ratio 124 South Asia–Gulf migration corridor 77 South–North migration 96–7

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 91 women: immigrant 53, 62; movement of 49, 78 women emigrants 6 women migrants 6, 33, 46–8, 50–8, 61–2, 64–70, 74–6, 81, 86; exploiting 68; married 50; potential 50; returnee 85; vulnerability of 51, 56 women workers 52, 75, 79–80, 84, 86; abused 85; migration narratives of 6, 74; migration of 7, 55, 74–6, 80, 86; mobility, to Gulf 74–86; young 64 Yadava, K. N. S. 169

188