India in South Asia: Challenges and Management [1st ed.] 978-981-13-2019-4;978-981-13-2020-0

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxxv
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
India’s Afghanistan Policy and Perceptions (Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy)....Pages 3-17
India’s Perception of Bangladesh and Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Examining the Internal Dynamics in India (Smruti S. Pattanaik)....Pages 19-34
Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations (Rajesh S. Kharat, Chunku Bhutia)....Pages 35-55
Perceptions on India–Maldives Relations Over the Decades (T. C. Karthikheyan)....Pages 57-74
India and Nepal Relations: Politics and Perceptions (Sangeeta Thapliyal)....Pages 75-91
Perceptions of Pakistan in India (Amit Ranjan)....Pages 93-106
‘Perceptions and Policies’: The State of India–Sri Lanka Relations (N. Manoharan)....Pages 107-120
Front Matter ....Pages 121-121
Overwhelming Majority of Afghans Has a Positive Perception of India ( Archiwal)....Pages 123-131
The Dynamics of Bangladesh–India Relations: From a Paradigm Shift to a Challenging Era? (Delwar Hossain)....Pages 133-151
Bhutan–India Relations: The Shifting Bhutanese Perceptions and Geopolitical Gambit (Dhurba Rizal)....Pages 153-171
Nepal–India Relations: At a Critical Juncture (Keshav Bashyal)....Pages 173-185
Understanding Pakistani Perspective in the Prism of Pakistan–India Relations (Wardah Irum, Devika Mittal, Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal)....Pages 187-202
Contemporary India–Sri Lanka Relations from Sri Lankan Perspectives (S. Chaminda Padmakumara, S. M. D. P. Harsha Senanayake)....Pages 203-213
Front Matter ....Pages 215-215
India as Soft Power (Farooq Sulehria)....Pages 217-233
Rise of India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ Worldview (Vibhanshu Shekhar)....Pages 235-251
Indian Foreign Policy and Extra-Regional Powers (Alan Bloomfield)....Pages 253-267
India’s Maritime Security and Policy: An Imperative for the Blue Economy (Rashmi Singh)....Pages 269-289
Correction to: India in South Asia (Amit Ranjan)....Pages C1-C2

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Amit Ranjan Editor

India in South Asia Challenges and Management

India in South Asia

Amit Ranjan Editor

India in South Asia Challenges and Management

123

Editor Amit Ranjan Institute of South Asian Studies National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore

ISBN 978-981-13-2019-4 ISBN 978-981-13-2020-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0

(eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950960 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For My Parents

Acknowledgements

Writing acknowledgments are the most difficult part of any book or project. One acknowledges only those whom the author remembers at the time of writing. However, writing is an on-going process, so is thinking about what one has to write. Sometimes, while looking at someone or staring at an object or talking to a friend, an idea enters one’s mind which takes the shape of a book or other writing. Truly speaking, I do not remember when I thought about working on this theme. Therefore, I am grateful to all whose names are not in the list, and some of those whom I even do not know. In one way or another they helped me conceptualize this book. However, there are some individuals and institutes who have helped me in the process of developing this work. I am grateful to all of them. First, to my parents and family members. At the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), I am thankful to my colleagues who provided me with a competitive but friendly atmosphere. Thanks to the Chairman of ISAS, ambassador-at-large Mr. Gopinath Pillai, Professor Subrata Kumar Mitra, Mr. Vinod Rai, Dr. D. Subbarao, Dr. Iftekhar Chowdhury, Mr. Hernaikh Singh, Dr. Gyanesh Kudaisya, Dr. Dipinder Singh Randhwa, Dr. Amitendu Palit, Dr. Ronojoy Sen, Dr. Jivanta Schoettli, Dr. Shrikant, Dr. Sojin Shin, and Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy. The publisher deserves a special mention because of the team effort their staff put into the raw material supplied by the author. They gave it a Midas touch to transform raw material into a beautiful-looking product. For this, I am thankful to Nupoor Singh and her team from Springer. Finally, this book would not have been possible without respective contributors. I am grateful to each one of them. While editing this book a few times feelings came into my mind that this would be my last book as an editor, but it was temporary which, thankfully, did not stuck with me. Life moves on, and so is editing.

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About This Book

As mentioned repeatedly, challenges India faces in its neighborhood are because of perceptions; hence, this book looks at perception of neighbors in India and how India is perceived in the respective South Asian countries. It is divided into three sections: the first section of the book looks at India’s perceptions of its individual South Asian neighbors; second section is on how South Asian neighbours perceive India. Different from the two, third section deals with the themes which do construct certain perception of India, and discusses how India has been able to manage South Asian affairs. Primary objective of this book is to understand and know how a neighbour perceive India and vice-versa? what neighbours think of India. Therefore, the editor did not put any constraints on the contributors except on some methodological issues. As a result, a few of the papers in this volume have been very critical toward India. There are words, phrases, sentences, statements, and views to which I do not agree; however, I think that it is good to know about them so that there could be further discussion, debate, and arguments on them. One may disagree with the views of some contributors but it does not mean that they do not exist, and if it is so, its better to know them instead remain ignorant. An usual disclaimer applies that the respective authors are responsible for the facts, references, and views expressed in their respective chapters.

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Contents

Part I

India’s Perception of Its South Asian Neighbours

India’s Afghanistan Policy and Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy India’s Perception of Bangladesh and Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Examining the Internal Dynamics in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Smruti S. Pattanaik

3

19

Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rajesh S. Kharat and Chunku Bhutia

35

Perceptions on India–Maldives Relations Over the Decades . . . . . . . . . . T. C. Karthikheyan

57

India and Nepal Relations: Politics and Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sangeeta Thapliyal

75

Perceptions of Pakistan in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amit Ranjan

93

‘Perceptions and Policies’: The State of India–Sri Lanka Relations . . . . 107 N. Manoharan Part II

Neighboring Countries’ Perception of India—‘Elder’ or ‘Big Brother’

Overwhelming Majority of Afghans Has a Positive Perception of India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Archiwal The Dynamics of Bangladesh–India Relations: From a Paradigm Shift to a Challenging Era? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Delwar Hossain

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Bhutan–India Relations: The Shifting Bhutanese Perceptions and Geopolitical Gambit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Dhurba Rizal Nepal–India Relations: At a Critical Juncture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Keshav Bashyal Understating Pakistani Perspective in the Prism of Pakistan–India Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Wardah Irum, Devika Mittal and Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal Contemporary India–Sri Lanka Relations from Sri Lankan Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 S. Chaminda Padmakumara and S. M. D. P. Harsha Senanayake Part III

India in South Asia

India as Soft Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Farooq Sulehria Rise of India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ Worldview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 Vibhanshu Shekhar Indian Foreign Policy and Extra-Regional Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Alan Bloomfield India’s Maritime Security and Policy: An Imperative for the Blue Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Rashmi Singh

Editor and Contributors

About the Editor Amit Ranjan, Ph.D. is Visiting Research Fellow at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

Contributors Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He has served as a research scholar for the Central Asian Institute, Islamabad, and as a senior research fellow for the Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University. He is also the author of a book Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian Muslims. Archiwal is a Kabul based writer and researcher and frequently writes on social and political topics. Keshav Bashyal, Ph.D. teaches at Department of International Relation of Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. He has received his Ph.D. and M.Phil. from Center for South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India and M.A. in economics from Tribhuvan University, Nepal. He has wide ranges of publications including Nepal–India relations, International migration and other development issues. Chunku Bhutia, is currently posted in Sikkim Government College, Burtuk, Gangtok, India. She completed her M.Phil. and Ph.D. in South Asian Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. She has served as the Head of the Department, Political Science in Namchi Government College, South Sikkim, India.

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Editor and Contributors

Alan Bloomfield, Ph.D. works at the University of Western Australia. He researches Australian and Indian foreign policy, and international norms. He has written two books and has published in leading journals including Review of International Studies, Pacific Review, Contemporary Security Policy, Australian Journal of Politics and History, and India Review. Delwar Hossain, Ph.D. is Professor of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh and concurrently the Director of the East Asia Center, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is the author of Globalization and New Regionalism in South Asia: Issues and Dynamics (2010) and co-author of Partition and Conflict: The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (2015). Wardah Irum is a Research Assistant at School of Politics and International relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. She is also a part of Aaghaz-e-Dosti, a citizen diplomacy initiative for peace-building between India and Pakistan. T. C. Karthikheyan, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations, Tamil Nadu Open University, Chennai, India. He holds his Ph.D. in South Asian Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and was a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi before moving to his teaching career. He had published several research papers in peer reviewed journals and edited books. His areas of research interest include Non-Traditional Security issues in South Asia, Small Island States, Sustainable Development and Environmental Challenges, Indian Ocean and Maritime Security. Rajesh S. Kharat, Ph.D. is former Chairperson, Centre for South Asian Studies, School of International Studies and former Chief Advisor, Equal Opportunity Office, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He did his Ph.D. from South Asian Studies, School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is teaching since 1991, first at Mumbai University, and then at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has written 30 research articles. He is also author of five books BHUTAN: Political Transition and Democratisation. (Ed.) (2018), BHUTAN: Contemporary Issues and Perspectives (Ed.) (2016), Foreign Policy of Bhutan (2005), Tibetan Refugees in India, (2003), and Bhutan in SAARC: Role of Small State in Regional Alliance, (2000). Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy is Deputy Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and coordinator of its Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS), New Delhi, India. Her research focuses on the security dynamics and politics in South Asia (specifically Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh), Central Asia and West Asia. Her research covers issues in international security such as domestic and transnational terrorism and organised crime, armed conflict, WPS, geopolitics, political stability, peace processes, and governance and rule of law. Prior to joining IPCS, she was the Content Manager at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai. She is also Member, Advisory Council,

Editor and Contributors

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Women & Peace Studies Organization (formerly RIWPS), Afghanistan and has been a South Asia Visiting Fellow at the Henry L Stimson Center, Washington, DC. N. Manoharan, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of International Studies, Christ (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru, India. He also served at the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), New Delhi. He was South Asia Visiting Fellow at the East–West Center Washington and is a recipient of Mahbub-ul Haq international award for research. His areas of interest include internal security, terrorism, Sri Lanka, Maldives, human rights, ethnic conflicts, multiculturalism, security sector reforms and conflict resolution. Devika Mittal is pursuing Ph.D. in Department of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India. She teaches sociology as guest faculty in an undergraduate college of University of Delhi. She is convener-India of Aaghaz-e-Dosti, a peace education group and conducts interactive sessions, workshops and discussions with students and youths of India and Pakistan. S. Chaminda Padmakumara is currently reading for Ph.D. in International Relations at South Asian University, New Delhi, India. His Ph.D. thesis focuses on the historical concept of ‘mandala’ and Southeast Asian region formation. He has obtained M.A. in International Relations from University and his research interests and writing include regional integration, methodology in regional studies and theories of international relations. He has published several research papers on Southeast Asia as a region and theoretical analysis on regional integration in South Asia. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Ph.D. is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, India. She holds Ph.D. in South Asian Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. She was Asia fellow at the department of international relations, Dhaka University in 2004 and 2007 and received Kodikara Fellowship in 1999. She was also a postdoctoral fellow at CERI, Paris in 2008 and visiting fellow at PRIO in 2011. She was Visiting Professor on ICCR’s India Chair in Colombo University in 2013. She has published more than 50 articles in various journals and has more than 40 chapters in edited books. She is the author of Elite Perception in Foreign Policy: Role of Print Media in influencing Indo–Pak relations, 1989–1999 and has edited two books, South Asia: Envisioning a Regional Future (2011), India–Bangladesh Relations: Historical Imperative and Future Direction (2012). Dhurba Rizal, Ph.D. is an academic Scholar and Specialist of International Relations, Politics, Public Management, Governance, Democracy, Security, Development and Conflict. He had held academic assignments in the USA, Japan, South Korea, The Netherlands, Nepal and the United Nations University in the various capacities.

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Editor and Contributors

S.M.D.P Harsha Senanyaake, Ph.D. is currently reading for M.A. in International Relations at South Asian University, New Delhi, India. He has obtained Special Degree in International Relations from University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. His research interests and writing include Foreign Policy, Security Studies and he has authored several research papers on various topics related to International Relations. Vibhanshu Shekhar, Ph.D. is scholar-in-residence at ASEAN Studies Initiative, School of International Service, American University, Washington DC, USA. He is the author/editor of five books on India and Indonesia. Rashmi Singh, Ph.D. has a Doctorate from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She is currently working with Centre for Human Security and Studies as a Research Fellow. Prior to joining Centre for Human Security and Studies, she has worked with the PHD Chambers of Commerce and Industry as an Economist and as a Consultant at Research and Information System for Developing Countries (a think-tank under Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi). Her areas of interests primarily include political, strategic and economic relationship among ASEAN+6 nations, different aspects of Vietnam’s economic relations with China and ASEAN region as a whole, regional politics and foreign policy of Southeast Asian Countries, among others. Farooq Sulehria, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor at Beaconhouse National University (BNU) Lahore, Pakistan. Earlier, he was a Senior Teaching Fellow at SOAS University of London. He is author of Media Imperialism in India and Pakistan. He is also a columnist for Pakistani daily, The News International. In the past, he has worked as a journalist for Pakistani and Swedish press. Sangeeta Thapliyal, Ph.D. is faculty in the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. Her area of specialisation is India’s strategic interest in the Himalayas and Trans-Himalayas with a special emphasis on Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet and Water Security in Central and South Asia.

Introduction

Perceptions of respective South Asian countries in India and vice-versa are one of the major hurdles in addressing enumerable bilateral and regional challenges the region faces. Theoretically, there are many factors which determine development and construction of such perceptions; however, in post-colonial countries, they are, largely, determined by historical narratives and their interpretations, complicated inter-group relationships, and political developments since decolonization of the region. Often, positive perception of each other helps in building cordial relationships between the countries. This, in turn, helps the policy makers to resolve their bilateral issues even at the cost of making certain territorial adjustments and political compromises. Implementation of India–Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) in 2015 is an example of it. On contrary, negative perception of each other in respective countries bitter their relationships, for example, India– Pakistan behavior towards each other. The word ‘Perception’, as recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary, means ‘a way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something. Intuitive understanding and insight’. Philosophically, perception is a process by which one acquires information about the world around you by using the five senses—taste, sight, touch, smell, and sound. The qualities of objects, i.e., their color, taste, smell, sound, and texture, vary according to the condition of the perceiver or the condition under which they are being perceived.1 Therefore, often, perceptions about things are questioned. Theoretically, to draw a perception about something, it is argued, one must be aware of the concepts people represent and think about the world. However, one can engage with the world even in a non-conceptual way through perceiving things without having a structured and non-epistemic understanding of the things around oneself.2 Perceptions are not permanent, it changes according to time and space, and varies from one individual to the other. For individuals, perception of a country largely depends on narratives one believes in. For example, India–Pakistan 1 2

Bunnin and Tsui-James (2003). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018).

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Introduction

relationships can be interpreted in multiple ways. In this book, while looking at relationships India has with Pakistan and vice-versa, the respective authors have used many similar facts but interpreted them in their own ways, and therefore their conclusions are different.

India’s Perception of Its Neighbours Historically, after the British left the Indian sub-continent in 1947, India emerged as its successor state at all multilateral forums. Due to its size and resources, since its independence, India has played an important role in the world politics. Formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 in Belgrade was an initial step towards doing so. From the platform of the NAM, India called on the then newly decolonized countries to unite against the Western and Eastern Blocks led by the United States of America (USA) and the former Soviet Union, respectively. In 1991, the Cold War (1948–1991) ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and a New World Order emerged where there is now a single super power—the USA. In this economy-driven world order, a few other countries also emerged, however, all of them remained in second place to the USA whilst trying to shape a multipolar world order. Since the emergence of the new world order, another significant development in the world has been the emergence of terrorism and the fight against it. The menace of terrorism was already existing in the other parts of the world, but what happened on 11 September 2001 (popularly called 9/11) was an attack carried out inside the USA by terrorist group which changed the political discourse and global security architecture. Before it, twice in 1993 and once in 1995, the terror groups had managed to carry out attacks on the US soil. In the aftermath of 9/11 the US establishment under President George Bush launched Global War on Terrorism. Subsequently, Afghanistan, parts of the northern Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and a few countries in West Asia were attacked in a sequence by the US-led coalition forces. Earlier it was thought that the USA would achieve victory over terrorists in few days or months. However, that did not happen. It is still fighting the war on terror some 17 years after it was launched. One of the reasons to it is the extension of domestic support to the terrorists. In most of such countries, earlier only few people had supported the activities of the terrorists, but after attack, many have extended their support to them due to a large scale of collateral damage.3 One example of this is an on-going war in Afghanistan, where in the successive years after it lost power in 2001, Taliban has strengthened itself. It is believed that, at present, the Taliban controls or dominates over 48 of the roughly 400 administrative areas in Afghanistan, the greatest number since they were ousted from power in 2001.4

3 4

For reasons why this happens, see Johnson (2004). Cooper and Nordland (2017).

Introduction

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Shift in the Global World Order since 1991 and the rise of terrorism in the subsequent years had impacted the South Asia’s sub-system. Responding to the New World Order, India made unprecedented changes in its economic and foreign polices. It gave up its so-called socialist model of economy and adopted market-driven economics, and in foreign policy arena, it gradually started tilting towards the USA at the cost of NAM. Both changes had their respective influences in formulating India’s policy toward its South Asian neighbors. After India adopted New Economic Policy in 1991, it witnessed many benefits along with some of its ills.5 An open economy needed investors and markets. In a search for market and investments, India started looking towards the developed countries and the regions of the world such as the USA, China, European Union, and Southeast Asia. However, this did not mean that India entirely left its South Asian neighbours. Time and again, India has provided economic assistance and markets to the friendly South Asian neighbours such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Nepal. Correspondingly, decades of globalization also witnessed an emergence of terrorism and militancy in India’s neighborhood. Since 1989, Pakistan-supported militants have been actively engaged in a proxy war with India in the Kashmir Valley. In Afghanistan, the war between the Afghan Army, supported by the USA, and the Taliban is still going on. Even Bangladesh is witnessing a rise in militancy. Often after committing acts of terror, militants from Bangladesh cross over to the Indian side of the border. In the south, the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) engaged with the Sri Lankan state for decades before the Sri Lankan Army wiped them out in 2009. Reverberations of the LTTE was felt in India too. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by LTTE cadres in 1991. With such a disturbed neighborhood, India had to carefully navigate through many such challenges to pursue its interests. In Afghanistan, despite being called upon to send military personnel, India remained steadfast on its policy—actively providing material assistance for the reconstruction of the country. India has expressed and extended all forms of support to Bangladesh to fight against militancy. With Pakistan, the scene is different. India has been targeted by Pakistan-based militant groups many times. The worst occurred in 2008 when militants carried out an attack in Mumbai. Based on internal developments in respective countries, the spill-over effects on India and India’s bilateral relationships with individual countries facilitate certain perceptions of neighboring countries. Categorically, both institutions and people have shaped one another’s perceptions about individual neighboring countries. Such perceptions can be divided into two: basic and secondary. The basic perception is one which remains immutable, while the secondary oscillates between history and present relationships India has with the individual countries. For example, India’s official position with Pakistan remain always below normal with some short periods of ‘normal’ days. The partition-related violence still dictates the perception one country has about the other. Unlike Pakistan, in recent times, 5

See Francine (2005).

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perceptions of Bangladesh has changed since Sheikh Hasina returned into power in 2008. With growing Chinese activities in Nepal the official perception of the Indian state of Nepal oscillates; however, the people-to-people relationship is such that the Nepalis are always regarded as ‘younger’ brothers, although being treated as foreigners in many respects. Overall, the majority of Indians perceive India as a regional power, South Asia as India’s sphere of influence, and Pakistan as a trouble maker. Policy wise, since 1947, more or less, India’s policies toward its South Asian neighbors can be categorized into three overlapping phases. The first phase can be termed as the Nehruvian phase (called after the name of the first Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru) in which an attempt was made to make India play a major role in international matters, but the region was not absolutely pushed in a back burner;6 the second phase is also called as ‘interventionist’ phase which was shaped by Indira doctrine (known so after the name of the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi). In this phase, India has been alleged for making ‘interventions’ in the neighbouring countries to pursue its political and strategic interests; and the third phase being defined as one where India has been accommodative to the demands of its neighbours.7 During the last phase the Gujral doctrine was laid down by the Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral when he was Minister for External Affairs in 1996–1997 in the H. D. Devegowda government. The doctrine is based on the principles contained in his speech at Chatham House in September 1996—emphasizing India’s unilateral requirement for friendly and warm relations with its neighbors. First, unilaterally stop the daily polemic exchanges between Pakistan and India. Second, inform the people of Bangladesh that in dealing with its neighbors, India would not insist on reciprocity—later, this policy included other countries like, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Third, no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used contrary to the interests of a neighboring country. Fourth, neighbors in South Asia must dialogue tirelessly over a long period until they have found mutually acceptable solutions to their disputes and differences. The fifth principle of the doctrine says that in dialoge, neighbors must treat one another as equals, must not intervene in each other’s domestic affairs, and must respect one another’s territorial unity and integrity. At last, while entire spectrums of relationships came under sincere problem-solving dialoges, cooperation must begin on agreed terms in agreed areas even as certain disputes remained unresolved.8 Since its inception, the essence of the Gujral doctrine, with a little tweaking, has been used by all the successive Prime Ministers of India to deal with South Asian neighbors.

6

See Raghavan (2014). Alan Bloomfield in his chapter refer to this phase as the ‘Indira Doctrine’—it was never officially put that way by the Indian state, but many scholars use this term. Also see Malone (2011). 8 See Gupta (1997). 7

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Neighboring Countries’ Perception of India Like India’s perceptions of its neighbors, its neighbors’ perceptions of India are guided by many factors. India’s South Asian neighbors consider India to be a big country that, in some people’s view, engages in bullying. Most neighboring countries consider India as a ‘big brother’ which unnecessarily interferes in their affairs. In order to change such feelings India calls itself ‘elder brother’. By ‘elder brother’, as stated by the Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, India means one who loves and cares for its younger brothers—its neighbors.9 Despite the change, for most South Asian neighbors India remains ‘big brother’ rather than ‘elder brother’. India’s South Asian neighbors can be categorized into those who were once part of India, and those who have never been its part. The relationship the two categories of neighbors have with India is different because of their past. Although almost all the South Asian countries share language, culture, ethnicity, kinship, and other bonding with the bordering states of India, those who were once part of India also share territorial imagination and history. The feeling of loss is different from never being a part of it. This is why India’s relationships with Bangladesh and Pakistan are different from its relationships with other South Asian countries. Largely such relationships are based on perceptions the respective countries have of India. Before the partition of India in 1947, Pakistan and Bangladesh were part of British India. The Muslims in India, who till 1857 belonged to the ruling class, witnessed a change in their status. After defeating the last Mughal king, Bhadur Shah Zafar, and suppressing the soldiers rebellion (some calls it first war of India's independence) in 1857, when the British imperialists finally set up their rule in India, the Muslims lost their erstwhile status. They started making an issue of their lost glory. By the 1930s, Muslim nationalism in India was rising. This nationalism was led by the All India Muslim League (AIML) under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In 1940, at the AIML’s meeting in Lahore, a formal demand for Pakistan was made. Eventually, in 1947, India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Bengal and Punjab was divided between the Hindu and Muslim majority areas between India and Pakistan. The partition triggered violence—millions of people were killed, large numbers of girls were raped and killed, and millions of people displaced.10 The memories of partition-related violence dominated the minds of those who witnessed it. Likewise those who lost their homes found themselves in a foreign land. With this in the background, India and Pakistan emerged as two sovereign countries with certain perceptions of one another. Constitutionally, India emerged The author heard about ‘Elder brother’ while attending the 21st Sapru House lecture delivered by the Prime Minister of Nepal K. P. Oli. The lecture was chaired by the India’s Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj. In her introductory remarks, Swaraj used the word ‘Elder brother’ and differentiated it from ‘big brother’. The lecture was delivered on 22 February 2016 at Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi. 10 See Butalia (1998). 9

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as a secular country while Pakistan, in its early days, proclaimed itself an Islamic state. Pakistan has always seen India as a Hindu state where Muslims live. The Islamists consider the Indian Muslims as ‘lost’ brothers. Radicalized, especially since the 1980s, there is a section of the Pakistani population that think India as a ‘Hindu’ country. In the last 70 years, India and Pakistan have fought 4 wars (1947– 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999), engaged in military stand-offs many times (1987, 2002, and 2008), and involved in regular cross-border military exchanges. Such tensions have painted a negative picture of India in the minds of Pakistanis. India has always been alleged to be interfering in the internal matters of Pakistan, and has always been held responsible for the separation of East Pakistan from Pakistan. In 1998 following in India’s footsteps, Pakistan too carried out nuclear weapons testing which led to what policy makers called the ‘Islamic bomb’. Most of the anti-India perception in Pakistan is constructed by Pakistan’s military to satisfy its own interests. Contrary to this, there are those who strive for peace between the two countries. These individuals are often targeted for digressing from the constructed perceptions of India in Pakistan. Like Pakistan, Bangladesh too was a part of British India and partitioned from India in 1947. From 1947 to 1971 it was a part of Pakistan, and since 1971 it re-invented itself as Bangladesh—a land of Bangla speaking Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. It soon became apparent that religion could not be the single uniting bond between people who are different in many other aspects of their lives, like language, culture, etc. First expressions about ‘being different’ were made in 1948 and then in 1952 during the language movement when a demand was made to also make Bengali the national language of Pakistan. Eventually, Bengali attained such status in 1955. However, there were many other issues between East and West Pakistan which made the former consider itself as merely a colony of the latter. The final nail in the coffin of united Pakistan was the denial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan despite the fact that his party, the Awami League, won the largest number of seats in the general election of 1970. During the last moments of its struggle for liberation, India assisted Bangladesh by providing political support to set up a government in exile and use its embassies across the world to raise awareness of the atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army.11 India, even, entered into a war with Pakistan to liberate Bangladesh. However, over the years, differences between the two countries arose over many issues like cross-border migration into India, water resources, etc. There was a radicalization of society in Bangladesh during the military regimes of General Ziaur Rahman (1977–1981) and General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1983–1990). These successive military heads of State engaged with China, primarily, to check India’s presence in their country and balance it in the region. This was a trend which was even continued by subsequent democratic leaderships of the country. Having Chinese support and with continued tensions between India and Bangladesh linked to migration and water resources, has meant that a section of the Bangladeshi people have the perception of India as a bullying power. They feel that China can 11

See Tripathi (2014).

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check and balance India in the region. On the contrary, there are individuals and groups in Bangladesh for whom India is more acceptable than any other country of the world, mainly China. Unlike Pakistan and Bangladesh, Nepal although being another Hindu majority country, has never been part of India. Historically, the pre-2008 constitutional monarchy, under the Shah Kings of Nepal (1768–2008), can trace their roots to the Sisodia Rajputs of Rajasthan. In Nepal, they first established a state in an area marked as Gorkha, under the Drabya Shah in 1559.12 Later, after the arrival of the British in India, the Anglo-Nepalese War went on for two years and ended with the imposition of the Sugauli Treaty on Nepal in 1816. Under this treaty the British gained rights to put up residence in Nepal and use the Gorkhas as soldiers in the British Army. The soldiers from Nepal were used by the British to put down the rebellion of 1857.13 Their role during that time saw them categorized as a part of the martial race, who were sought after to fight imperial wars for the British crown. After 1947, as a successor of British India, the Indian state used their service during the integration of Hyderabad in 1948, and when the situation precipitated due to Pakistan’s tribal invasion into Kashmir.14 To maintain this sort of relationship, on 9 November, 1947 a Memorandum of Agreement was signed among the representatives from the Government of India, Nepal, and the United Kingdom over the issue of recruitment of people from an area called Gorkha/Nepal as soldiers in their respective armies. The India–Nepal friendship treaty of 1950 further substantiated the memorandum of 1947, and also secured an age-old prevailing roti-beti15 relationship between people from Terai, a part of Nepal, and north Bihar.16 Despite the treaty and such close links, India–Nepal relations has faced many ups and downs. One perception in the minds of a few Nepalese emperors was that India had always overwhelmingly dominated them. To overcome such a perception, they welcomed the Chinese footprint in their country. During 1961–1979, King Mahendra took many decisions which created tensions between the two countries. He allowed China and Pakistan to build a presence in order to counteract India’s pressure for the restoration of democratic order.17 Not only were the Chinese allowed to build a road connection with Nepal (the Kathmandu–Kodari Road) but Chinese traders and officials were also encouraged to make their presence felt in Terai, an area in close proximity to India’s Indo-Gangetic heartland, through Nepal’s newly established chain of State Trading Corporation outlets.18 The relationship between India and

12

Muni (2015). Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 A relationship based on marriage, family and food. As the people from terai and Indian state of Bihar shares common caste identity they enter into marital relationship. Even the erstwhile monarchs, prince and princess from India and Nepal had been related on the basis of marriage. 16 Malhotra (2015). 17 Muni (2015). 18 Ibid. 13

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Nepal was normalized in June 1990 after restoration of democracy in Nepal and a visit of the then Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai to New Delhi.19 Decades later, in 2005, Nepal underwent a significant change when a rebellion erupted against the monarchy and King Gyanendra. The movement was led by the Seven Party Alliance (SPA),20 and eventually succeeded in abolishing the monarchy and setting up a democratic system and second Constituent Assembly (CA). During the political transition, India did play a significant role by not extending its support to King Gyanendra. After the new government was formed under the Maoist leader Prachanda, a fear was expressed about his behavior towards India, but nothing untoward happened during his tenure. The CA, set up in 2006, passed through various phases, and came up with a final constitution in 2015. This constitution made sweeping changes to the age-old custom of roti-beti between two regions—changes which meant that Indian women marrying into the Madhes would be treated on par with other foreigners. Earlier, Indian women marrying Madhesi men could relinquish Indian citizenship and take their husbands’ citizenship along with jobs in the country. Popular support to the political campaign was primarily based on the destruction of this ancient tie.21 Madhesi carried out protests against this. What followed was an about four-and-a-half month blockade by India, from September 2015 to February 2016, although this was officially denied by the Government of India. Due to the blockade, land-locked Nepal could not receive many essential goods. This created the perception among the non-Madhesis that India was against them, while a number of Madhesis found India’s support useful—compelling the government to accept amendments to the 2015 constitution. However the constitution of Nepal was promulgated by the support from about 92 per cent of legislatures, including those representing the Madhesis.22 India and Afghanistan have had links since ancient times. A few cities like Qandahar (then known as Gandhar) and Samarkand, etc., find mention in ancient Indian texts and epics. One epic—Mahabharata—has a character called Shakuni whose sister Gandhari (named after Gandhar) was married to a king of Hastinapur (modern Delhi), Dhritrashtra. However, anthropological studies show, Gandhari was a tribal group whose members were converted to Islam by the Afghans.23 In medieval India many Afghan invaders entered India and, later, made it their home. Bahlul Khan Lodhi, who set up the Lodi dynasty after the fall of Sayyid dynasty in 1451 in Delhi, was an Afghan. The Lodhi dynasty was overthrown by Zahir-ud-din-Muhammad Babur in 1526. He defeated the last king of the Lodhi dynasty, Ibrahim Lodhi, with the help of 12,000 soldiers from Afghanistan. Arrival of the British imperialists in the Indian sub-continent in the eighteenth century once 19

Bhasin (2005). It included Nepali Congress, Nepal Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party (Anandi Party), United Left Front and People Front. 21 Malhotra (2015). 22 As informed by Keshav Bashyal. 23 Haroon (2002). 20

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again brought Afghanistan and India together. Like the Mughals, the British too wanted to establish their control over Afghanistan for security reasons. In 1919, the third Anglo-Afghan war took place. As a result of this war the Afghans won their independence from British rule. Also, the British lost their control over the Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. In 1947, with the birth of Pakistan as a sovereign state, India lost territorial connectivity with Afghanistan.24 In 1950, an Indo-Afghan Friendship Treaty was signed to promote trade and cooperation between the two countries. Under that treaty, India also promised to provide limited military training to Afghans.25 In 1959, Nehru paid an official visit to Afghanistan.26 In later years, the interactions between India and Afghanistan declined, mainly because of internal squabbles in Afghanistan. However, it cannot be maintained that India was in no way involved with what was happening in Afghanistan. In the conflict between Khalaq (masses) and Parcham (flag) factions of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) India tilted toward the latter. The years of the soviet intervention (1979–1989) in Afghanistan were followed by the engagement of the USA and Pakistan in the area. After the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban took over Afghanistan to rein in the Mujahids. India’s first interaction with the Taliban was when flight IC-814 from Kathmandu to New Delhi was hijacked by the terrorists and forced to land in Afghanistan. Decades later, after the September 11, 2001 attack on New York, when the USA launched an attack on Afghanistan, India supported the Northern Alliance27 by providing material means. India also participated in the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, 2001, and other multilateral forums to help Afghanistan in its reconstruction. India is one of the top six donors to Afghanistan. India has constructed the India–Afghanistan Friendship Dam—also called Salma Dam—in Herat, the Parliament Building in Kabul, the Zeranj–Delaram Highway, transmission lines, power stations, and innumerable smaller development projects.28 Historical relationships between India and Afghanistan have created a positive perception of India from Afghanistan’s viewpoint. An overwhelming number of Afghans, because of India’s support in recent construction activities, have a positive perception of India. However, there is a group of people who have a different perception of India. For Afghans India is, primarily, a home to the Hindus. ‘Stereotyping Hindus is common in many parts of Afghanistan’.29 In Afghanistan,

24

At present the border which connects India with Afghanistan is on the Pakistan side of Kashmir. Mullen (2016). 26 Ibid. 27 Northern Alliance was formed by a group of Afghan warlords who were against the Taliban. 28 Key note Address by Sujata Mehta (2017). 29 Rahi (2017). 25

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‘it is widely believed that Hindus are “unbelievers” and thus cowards, and that “one Muslim can overpower seven Hindus”…’30 Hindus are also referred to as ‘mis’keen’(poor), not because they are poor, but because they lack ‘imaan’ (honesty).31 Bhutan is a small landlocked country. To a large extent Bhutan occupies news headlines for its Gross National Happiness philosophy. However, it often receives news highlights because of India–China tensions playing out in the country. In 2017, India and China were engaged in a military stand-off at Doklam in Bhutan. India–Bhutan relations date back to the eighth century AD when an Indian monk named Padmasambhava arrived there to teach Buddhism. During the British colonial days in India, there were frequent skirmishes between the Bhutanese and the British Army over duars (areas of fertile alluvial land in the Brahmaputra and Ganga regions in Assam and Bengal). The skirmishes ceased after the signing of the Treaty of Sinchula in November 1865. Under the treaty Bhutan ceded a part of the duars to British India. The treaty of Sinchula was active until 1910 when the Treaty of Punakha was signed between Bhutan and British India. Under the terms of this treaty, Britain took charge of Bhutan’s foreign relations while at the same time it affirmed Bhutan’s status as an independent state. This treaty of Punakha was effective until 1947 when the British left the sub-continent. As a successor state of British India, India signed a treaty of friendship in 1949. In 2007, the Indo–Bhutan treaty was renegotiated and a new treaty was signed between the two countries. In 2008, Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited Bhutan and expressed his support for Bhutan’s move towards democracy. In 2014, soon after taking office, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a visit to Bhutan. India provides material support to Bhutan and is a leading developer in the field of hydro-electricity in Bhutan. This sort of relationships encourages a positive perception of India in Bhutan. This is one of the reasons why Bhutan stood behind India during the India–China military stand-off in 2017. Sri Lanka is a Buddhist-dominated country where Buddhism was introduced in the fourth century BC. The religion was imported from India into Sri Lanka. In modern times, the country was under the British rule till 1948. During that period, a large number of Tamils were brought in as indentured laborers to work in tea and coffee plantation sectors. In 1948, Sri Lanka attained independence. Soon after, the country was marred by ethnic tensions between the Tamils and Sinhalese. In 1976, the LTTE was formed. Violence became prevalent due to tensions in the country, with a large number of Tamils and Sinhala losing their lives in attacks and counter-attacks against each other. India tried to mediate between the LTTE and Sri Lankan state. As a result, the Sri Lankan government agreed to the devolution of its Tamil-dominated northern region according to 13th Amendment. It was also agreed that the LTTE would lay down their arms. To enforce the latter, India sent a military contingent—Indian Peace Keeping Force—to perform peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka. This backfired, and finally in March 1990, the last Indian troop withdrew from Sri Lanka. Tensions between India and the LTTE led to the assassination 30 31

Ibid. Ibid.

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of the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991. To silence the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) had launched a number of operations and fought wars against them. Eventually, in the last war, known as the fourth Eelam war (2006–2009), the LTTE were wiped out by the SLA. Almost all its cadres and leadership were killed. During the LTTE years, a number of Sinhala perceived India to be supportive of their problems. This was because of the support India had extended to the LTTE, some of whom were trained by the Indian intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing). After the LTTE days, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government has been active in constructing a negative perception of India in Sri Lanka. His government developed a relationship with China in order to check India’s influence. The Maldives is a small archipelago country in the Indian Ocean. In the nineteenth century, under threat and pressure from colonial powers, the then Sultan of the Maldives accepted an alliance with the British and his country became a British protectorate in 1887. Thereafter, the British assumed control over the Maldives’ foreign affairs and defense while the Sultan retained his hold over the domestic affairs of the country.32 During the Second World War (1939–1945), a few of the Maldivian islands were used as bases by the British Navy.33 Years later, on 26 July 1965, the Maldives attained full sovereignty. However, the British, through an agreement, retained Gan Island. This was finally returned to the government of the Maldives in 1975. India has remained an important player in the affairs of the Maldives since the 1970s. In 1978, Ibrahim Nasir was replaced by Maumoon Abdul Gayoom as President of the country. During his 30 years tenure until 2008, as President of the country, Gayoom faced three coup attempts—1980, 1983, and 1988. Relatively speaking, the first two were not too serious, however, in 1988 his political survival was significantly challenged. This attempted coup was organized by the Sri Lankan mercenaries associated with the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam.34 They were hired by Maldivian business interest groups under the leadership of Abdullah Luthufi. The coup plotters managed 80 sea-borne fighters who landed in Male and attempted to take control over government installations. To tackle the challenge Gayoom issued a request to Rajiv Gandhi who dispatched paratroopers to help him. Within 24 hours, the Indian paratroopers cleared the capital and restored law and order in Male.35 In recent times, India–Maldives relations have witnessed certain setbacks under President Abdulla Yameen. In December 2017, an editorial in the pro-Yameen newspaper, Vaguthu (in the Divehi language) described India as an enemy and called on Male to find a new best friend in China. The editorial also termed the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, as a Hindu extremist and anti-Muslim.36 However, the

32

Mitra et al. (2006). Robinson (1989). 34 Mitra et al. (2006). 35 Ibid. 36 Prashar (2017). 33

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editorial was removed from its website after it drew widespread public attention. To address India’s concerns, Yameen’s government stated that, ‘[T]he administration would never entertain negative sentiments towards India’, highlighting that Indian assistance formed an ‘invaluable contribution to the Maldives’.37 In February 2018, the Yameen government declared a state of emergency. To address the political situation in the country, the former President of the Maldives argued for India’s intervention.38 Contrary to this position, criticizing Nasheed, Dunya Maumoon, former foreign minister and daughter of incarcerated leader Abdul Gayoom, termed Nasheed’s position as ‘irresponsible’.39 The growing influence of Islamists in the Maldives is creating a negative perception of India, however, human rights activists still consider India as a country on which they can depend for support against the authoritarian government of Yameen.

How Perceptions are Constructed or Formed? Perceptions are shaped or constructed in certain contexts or, sometimes, even without any proper context. Bilateral relationships between two countries provide a context to develop perceptions of one another. Such bilateral relationships are rooted in the history of two nations which may either be full of animosity or could be cordial. This largely depends upon how the relations are narrated and which interpretation occupies maximum social and political space in the two countries. Often a country presents itself as a victim of its ‘enemies’ destructive designs toward it.40 To overcome such designs a country formulate and chart policies. For example, an enemy may be projected as being powerful, so that a country can justify spending lots of money on military defence. Also, a call against the outside enemy is being often made to unite the people from different identity groups within the country. This often leads to the militarization of a society. People are made to believe that an army is a panacea for all ills, and fighting and making sacrifices for the country is the most cherished value of society. Anyone expressing dissent is projected as a villain and branded as ‘anti-national’. Pakistan has witnessed this situation in the past when its army used this tactic to demolish the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Indian democracy is witnessing the rise of such individuals in the public sphere who, often, believes in giving preference to military values to silent the process of democratic dissent.41 Correspondingly, as myths play a significant role in constructing the imagination of others, they also have a role to play in shaping the perceptions of other countries or people. One cannot trace the origins of such myths but they exist and shape perception about the other. Then there is a 37

Ibid. The Indian Express (2018). 39 Malhotra (2018). 40 On perception and its construction, see Jervis (1976). 41 The Hindu (2017). 38

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role of fallacies which are based on false notion or misconception spread about the others. For example, in my village in Bihar, India, a number of people believe that the Chinese are cruel because they eat human flesh. For them, Pakistanis too are cruel and cannot be believed, primarily, because of their belonging to a particular religion. With the revolution of Information Technology and mushrooming of a number of media-social, print and visual-perception of the other circulate for twenty four hours. The perception may be positive, negative or an anti-thesis to the official one. Therefore, in a globalized world the race is on to acquire control over the media which has emerged as a powerful tool for disseminating information. Unfortunately, in present-day most journalists and media houses have become paean singers of the government. In his speech at the Ramnath Goenka Excellence in Journalism awards in 2016, editor of the India Express correctly made a point that ‘we have a generation of journalists who are growing up in an age of “retweets” and “likes” and they do not know that criticism from a government is a badge of honour’.42 However, there are a few journalists who still challenge and engage in questioning their respective governments, even at a cost to their personal security and safety. For example in Pakistan, the killings of many journalists have made the others fall into line to what institutions say, but, there are some who, despite threats to their safety, have not compromised in terms of their professional ethics and values. Besides internal actors and institutions, activities of extra-regional and regional actors play a part in South Asia. In the past, due to the alleged ‘Big brother’ attitude of India, most South Asian countries have invited extra-regional powers to check and balance India’s behavior toward them. During the days of the Cold War, the United States and erstwhile Soviet Union played a significant role in South Asia. Their roles have changed the geography and politics of the region. For example, the erstwhile Soviet Union–United States clash was one of the causes of the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. In addition, Soviet–United States meddling in the affairs of Afghanistan in the 1980s created havoc in South Asia, and is one of the reasons for the country’s dire condition now. Another important extra-regional power is China, which has played a role in South Asia historically, however, it became more active after the end of Cold War in 1991. Due to its economy and military might, China has a strong imprint in almost all the South Asian countries. Acceptance or invitation to China to check India by majority of South Asian neighbours has shaped respective countries perception in India. In addition to extra-regional actors’ role in South Asia, regional powers have engaged in a game of strategic one-upmanship which has its impact on the perception of India among its neighbors and vice versa. For example, India–Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan has played a role in shaping the Afghan people’s perception of India and Pakistan.

42

daily O (2016).

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In the age of globalization, like citizens of the other parts of the world, expectations of having a good life have increased among the South Asians. Economic development has become a benchmark by which respective governments are judged. Most South Asian countries depend too much on economic aid and outside investment to develop infrastructure and growth. They also lack technologies to develop their own resources. Often their economic dependence on others is exploited by donor countries in order to strengthen their strategic presence in that particular country. Yet the donors, or those who provide investments, attract a positive perception in the host country. In South Asia, mainly, India and China compete against each other to provide aid to the countries of the region. According to 2016–2017 data, Chinese investments/contracts in individual South Asian countries in US dollars is: Afghanistan: $210 million, Bangladesh: $13.87 billion, Sri Lanka: $3.11 billion, Nepal: $1.34 billion, the Maldives: $970 million, and Pakistan: $12.9 billion.43 In an attempt to match the Chinese investments, India has, over the years, increased its aid and investment in its neighboring countries. According to available figures, India’s grants and loan assistance to its neighbors in 2017–2018 and its proposed investments in 2018–2019 in US dollars are: Afghanistan, $48.15 million decreased to $44.02 million Budget Estimate (BE) for 2018–2019; Bhutan, $244.75 million increased to $249.43 million BE for 2018– 2019; Bangladesh, $8.94 million raised to $24.076 million BE for 2018–2019; Nepal, $51.59 million increased to $89.42 million BE 2018–2019; the Maldives, $17.19 million to remain at $17.19 million BE for 2018–2019; and Sri Lanka, $10.31 million increased to $20.63 million BE for 2018–2019.44 The BE will be revised and the Revised Estimate (RE) will be given to respective countries. In that RE the share of a country may increase or be slashed. An increase in any budget is mainly in order to develop infrastructure in India’s neighborhood. Moreover, the parliamentary committee in its report in 2018 also noted that China is increasing its footprint in India’s neighborhood. To monitor this, the committee, in its submission, maintained that the government must keep a close eye on internal political developments in the neighboring countries. Identifying differences between Indian and Chinese aid, the Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, during his oral evidence before the Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs stated that:45

43

The Times of India (2018). For original documents, see China Global Investment Tracker (2018). Indian currency in Rupees has been used because the value of dollar against the Indian currency is fluctuating which may not provide a clear amount India is providing as assistance to its neighbors. For the distribution of amounts, see Lok Sabha Secretariat (2018). 45 Ibid., p. 66. 44

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(India’s) Our infrastructure projects are different from Chinese infrastructure projects in that they are largely demand-driven. In other words, we wait for the Governments of our neighbours to tell us what projects are required and then we proceed to do it rather than our offering projects to them. In this regard, our projects in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh are prominent. Bangladesh, in fact, has the largest line of Credit that is eight billion in three phases. Phase one which is about 780 million dollars is more or less completed; in phase two which is about two and a half billion dollars, DPRs are being prepared on a number of projects; phase three of the LoC which was decided last year is worth five billion dollars. For that, we are going to begin work on a number of projects. In Nepal, we are building projects of 1.65 billion, in Sri Lanka 1.5 billion and in Myanmar close to 700 million. So, our efforts are to assist them in building infrastructure projects which will hopefully also be able to reduce the dependency on China in terms of infrastructure requirement, but that having been said, we have to acknowledge that at this point, the capacity of the Chinese to build those projects is far greater than our capacity, both financially and technically and this has been a constant concern of the Government. We are continuously looking at how we address that concern.

Finally, India’s sharing of religion, language, ethnicity, and other identities with its neighboring countries also plays a role in shaping the perception of India to its neighbors, as well as India’s perception of its neighbors. Constitutionally, secular India is identified, by a section of people from Bangladesh and majority from Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a Hindu country. The non-Muslims, particularly, the Hindu minorities from the respective countries look at India to find out solutions to many of their domestic issues like violence, intimidation and discriminations carried out against them by their states and religious societies. Often, Hindu groups in India raise their voices in opposition to such atrocities against minorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh. India also shares ethnicity with Sri Lanka. The atrocities committed by the Sri Lanka on innocent Tamils always attract protests against the country in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. To secure their lives many Sri Lankan Tamils had crossed into India and are still living in Tamil Nadu. After the end of the last Elam war in 2009, in 2013 the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu demanded ban on Sri Lankan cricket players from playing in Tamil Nadu. It was accepted by the Indian government because of security reasons to the players. However, shared identities do not always play an important role. Despite being a state where 90 percent of the population practices Hinduism, Nepal has maintained an on–off type of relationship with India. India–Nepal relations are closer in terms of people than at state levels. Often, all the similarities between nations which have an impact on a section of the population go on to influence an individual’s perception of India, and vice versa. From a negative point of view, the majority of communities in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and a number of people in Nepal, think that India interferes too much in their internal affairs. On the contrary, a large number of members from minority religious groups in Bangladesh and Pakistan, as well as ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, look toward India to secure their interests and protect themselves in their own countries.

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Mullen, R. D. (2016). India-Afghanistan relations. In S. Ganguly (Ed.), Engaging the world: Indian foreign policy since 1947 (pp. 105–129). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Muni, S. D. (2015). India’s Nepal policy. In D. M. Malone, C. R. Mohan, & S. Raghavan (Eds.), Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (pp. 398–411). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Prashar, S. (2017, December 26). Maldives reaches out to India, discusses high-level bilateral meet in bid to undo perceived snub. Times News Network. Retrieved January 8, 2018 from https:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/maldives-reaches-out-to-india-seeks-to-undo-perceivedslight/articleshow/62244881.cms. Raghavan, S. (2014). India as regional power. In W. P. S. Sidhu, P. B. Mehta, & B. Jones (Eds.), Shaping the emerging world: India and the multilateral order. New Delhi: Foundation Books. Rahi, A. (2017). Would India and Afghanistan have had a close relationship had Pakistan not been founded? The Dawn. Retrieved August 24, 2017 from https://www.dawn.com/news/1353172/ would-india-and-afghanistan-have-had-a-close-relationship-had-pakistan-not-been-founded. Robinson, F. (1989). The Cambridge encyclopaedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and The Maldives. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sujata Mehta. (2017). Secretary West, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. ICWA Seminar on Heart of Asia. Retrieved February 20, 2017 from http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/stmtdg/ 2014/KeynoteaddressHoA10112016.pdf. Tripathi, S. (2014). The colonel who would not repent: The Bangladesh war and its unquiet legacy. New Delhi: Aleph Publications.

Part I

India’s Perception of Its South Asian Neighbours

India’s Afghanistan Policy and Perceptions Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy

The India–Afghanistan bilateral relationship has long history, transcending political realities, time and perceptions. In contemporary times, the New Delhi–Kabul relationship has witnessed friendly and productive engagement, and the public per1 ception in both countries has been positive. Notwithstanding hiccups of the past, the relationship is viewed in a positive light and the friendly nature of exchanges between the two seems poised to become the norm for the future of the bilateral relationship as well. Even so, it is important to understand the multiple dimensions of the history of this relationship, for emerging realities in and related to Afghanistan will necessitate innovative action from both countries in at least three key spheres of engagement: 2 politics, economy and security.

Political Relationships Between India and Afghanistan Historically, India and Afghanistan have shared good relations, particularly in the cultural sphere. Notwithstanding the initial hiccups over the fate of the erstwhile North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) post the partition of British India, New Delhi–Kabul relations have remained friendly for the most part. In 1950, the government of India and the then Royal Government of Afghanistan signed the Treaty of Friend3 ship. 61 years and several political changes later, India and Afghanistan signed 1 Krishnamurthy

(2017).

2 Ibid. 3 India,

Ministry of External Affairs (1950).

R. Krishnamurthy (B) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_1

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the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2011.4 Today, the two countries are strategic partners, enjoy warm relations and support each other on various matters. However, the journey to this point was neither straightforward nor without interruptions. For instance, before India gained independence in 1947, the territory that was British India (which included present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh) shared a longer land border with Afghanistan (along the present-day Afghanistan–Pakistan border). While the political relationship between the erstwhile British India and Afghanistan witnessed problems, especially during the “Great Game” period owing to actions undertaken for geopolitical objectives by Britain and Russia, the post-1947 period witnessed the emergence of a new set of dynamics—both opportunities and complexities—ones that directly and indirectly have a bearing on India–Afghanistan relations even today. For instance, the land border issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, stemming from the demarcation of the Durand Line, was a matter on which Afghanistan expected India’s support. However, India has remained cautious over getting entangled in the issue. For New Delhi, indulging in a debate on the legitimacy of the Durand Line would mean risking opening a can of worms along India’s border with China and the McMahon Line. According to some Indian accounts, there was a perception among some Afghans that the (in)action of Indian leaders in determining the fate of the erstwhile NWFP (located in present-day Pakistan) and lack of support on the Durand Line issue were among the factors that generated a sentiment that India has not been fair to the Pashtuns. Whether such a sentiment exists among Afghanistan’s Pashtun community today has not been studied thoroughly, but it is would be worthwhile to comprehend the various aspects of such a notion. According to several accounts, different Pashtun groups made repeated requests to India to support the Pashtunistan cause, but New Delhi refused to indulge the requests. According to Ambassador (Retd) IP Khosla who served as India’s envoy to Afghanistan in the 1980s, there was a sentiment among Pashtun Afghans that “India has never been fair to the Pashtun.” And that “[t]hat feeling among Afghans was reinforced by post-independence developments.”5 A glance at the history of Indo-Afghan relations on issues involving third parties would show that the cooperation on international issues of direct consequence to each other that is demonstrated by the two countries today was not always the norm. In fact, previously, the two countries did not support each other on key issues, albeit they did not particularly oppose each other either. For instance, New Delhi did not have the support of the ruling dispensations of the time in Afghanistan during the India–China war in 1962, the 1965 India–Pakistan war, or the 1971 India–Pakistan war on Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in which India and Pakistan (both of whom Afghanistan shares borders with) clashed. In fact, in the case of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, while Kabul did not make a statement in support of India, it also refrained from commenting on Islamabad’s conduct in the then East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). According to some accounts, in the 1970s, given India’s 4 Afghanistan, 5 Khosla

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). (2011).

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policy towards East Pakistan and subsequently towards Bangladesh, the recognition of Bangladesh was a parameter New Delhi took into account while making foreign policy-related assessments.6 Ambassador (Retd) Khosla further observed that “We sign declarations, proclaim ample goodwill, highlight our traditional and historical and ancient cultural ties, convene summit meetings and other meetings. But on the key issues we have differed… in 1971 and 1972, the crucial years of Bangladesh, they never supported us; rather they were the last to recognize Bangladesh. Those days we used to judge who recognized Bangladesh how soon. The Bhutanese recognized on the second day itself. Indeed Bhutto went to Kabul in January 1972 to thank the Afghans for not supporting India. One needs to look at India-Afghanistan relations in that light. It is fine, we have very good cultural relations… They really love us very much, they are very hospitable people… The result is, India has never been a factor in their relationship with Pakistan. We have never nurtured a relationship with Afghanistan which would help us in dealing with Pakistan. What I sometimes have felt is that strategic thinking obviously was missing.”7 Yet, in 2011—ten years after the US intervention in Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime—when New Delhi and Kabul signed the Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India (SPA) during the then Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s visit to New Delhi, India was the first country with which Afghanistan signed such an agreement since 1979. Seven years since, questions are plenty on whether the all the objectives of the agreement have made progress. It might be worthwhile to also inquire if the SPA facilitated progress in bilateral engagements or if it has merely been an accessory to it. Indeed, there is a perception among some sections of both countries that the potential of the SPA has not been comprehensively harnessed. Given how the SPA has a wide scope and encompasses economy, education as well as capacity-building in addition to security, evaluating India’s actions and priorities through its past experiences and choices could shed light on developments related to the SPA and its prospects. More recently, in 2014, both India and Afghanistan held national elections. “The new dispensation in India treaded cautiously during the Afghan presidential election and also during the initial months of incumbent Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s presidency. The commonly held perception at that time was that this caution was due to President Ghani’s overtures to China and Pakistan”, which resulted in a perception in India that Kabul was prioritising India’s traditional rivals over New Delhi.8 However, India demonstrated strategic patience, gauged developments, and continued with its developmental assistance and engagement in Afghanistan, while simultaneously waiting and watching the developments as they unfolded.9 Meanwhile, as President Ghani’s disenchantment with the establishment in Pakistan grew, he began investing relatively more effort towards strengthening Afghanistan’s relations with 6 Khosla

(2011). (2011). 8 Krishnamurthy (2017). 9 Ibid. 7 Khosla

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India.10 Since May 2014, several more high-level visits took place between the India and Afghan governments, including those of India’s vice president, prime minister, external affairs minister, national security adviser (NSA), and minister of law and justice; and Afghanistan’s former president, incumbent president, chief executive officer (CEO), NSA, deputy foreign minister, and army chief.11 Interestingly, in May 2017, India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Manpreet Vohra, met Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIG), soon after the latter signed a peace deal with the Afghan government.12 Post-2001, this was the first such interaction between the two sides.13 “Given that Hekmatyar, who is now politically vocal and active in Afghanistan, has enjoyed the patronage of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) throughout his years as a terrorist”, the meeting is indicative of New Delhi’s thinking on the Afghan peace process. Simultaneously, it could also be viewed as part of India’s broader inclination to become more involved in shaping overall regional stability and cooperation via the Afghan peace process.14 “The overarching theme of Indo-Afghan political relations has thus been that of camaraderie and productive exchanges. To build on this and ensure continuity, it would be useful to diversify engagements/cooperation to multiple levels and formats.”15

Economy and Developmental Partnership “Since 2001, India has spent USD 2 billion on development assistance in Afghanistan, and this trend has continued. The previous governments in New Delhi initiated numerous infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, including the construction of Route 606, the new Afghan parliament complex and the Salma Dam (officially, the Afghan-India Friendship Dam); the establishment of the Afghan National Agricultural Sciences and Technology University (ANASTU); and investments in small development projects and skill-building-related initiatives. More recently, after taking charge in 2014, India’s National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government oversaw the completion of key pending projects such as that of the parliament and Salma Dam—both of which India’s incumbent Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi jointly inaugurated with Afghan President Ghani during his visits to Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Visas for Afghan businesspersons and tourists were further liberalised; 500 scholarships were announced for the children of the martyrs of Afghan security forces; restoration of the Stor Palace was

10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 @IndEmbKabul 13 Krishnamurthy 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

(2017). (2017).

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completed.”16 “In 2016, India pledged an additional US$1 billion in assistance to Afghanistan. To overcome the obstacle of land contiguity posed by Pakistan, the India-Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor became become operational in June 2017, which has shipped agricultural produce, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment etc. Additionally, India has steadily been working with regional countries on developing landlocked Afghanistan’s connectivity to facilitate trade and movement of goods. In 2016, India, Iran and Afghanistan signed the Trilateral Agreement on Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridor (the Chabahar Agreement).”17 “Since 2001, India has played a significant role in reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan. At present, New Delhi’s developmental assistance commitments to Kabul stand at over USD 2 billion, making India one of the biggest donors in the country.18 India has undertaken numerous medium and large infrastructure projects in its assistance programme in Afghanistan, including the construction of a 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram for facilitating movement of goods and services to the Iranian border; the construction of 220 kV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a 220/110/20 kV sub-station at Chimtala; upgrading of telephone exchanges in 11 provinces; expansion of the national television network by providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals for greater integration of the country.19 New Delhi’s position on Afghanistan has been that it that sustainable development of Afghanistan requires long-term investment in Afghanistan to help it exploit its natural resource wealth.”20 “As of 2016–17, bilateral trade stood at approximately USD 800 million, and the potential for further expansion is immense. However, New Delhi’s economic relations with Kabul have been overshadowed by the development partnership, which is characterised in part by the view that sustainable development in Afghanistan requires long-term investment in the country. Economic relations will eventually have to evolve into one where the trade and investment component is bigger in proportion than the aid money India spends in Afghanistan so that both countries can benefit. Currently, all sectors of the Afghan economy need a sustainable boost. These matters could be partially addressed by developing a conducive environment (for instance, ease of doing business on issues such as formalities and joint ventures) and encouraging businesses and educational institutions (both small and big) from India and elsewhere to expand their footprint into Afghanistan.”21 Today, India is the biggest regional donor to Afghanistan and fifth largest donor globally and its role in assistance to infrastructure development has been significant. As Ambassador Shaida Abdali, the incumbent Afghan envoy to India observed, there are “over 200 public and private schools in Afghanistan with over a 1000 scholarships sponsored by India. There are over 16,000 Afghan students in India. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 India,

Ministry of External Affairs, Embassy of India in Kabul (n.d.). Ministry of External Affairs, Embassy of India in Kabul (n.d.). 20 India, Ministry of External Affairs, Embassy of India in Kabul (n.d.). 21 Krishnamurthy (2017). 19 India,

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India has provided assistance in the construction of critical infrastructure: around 4000 km of roadways in Afghanistan, most notably the Zaranj–Delaram highway; the Salma dam and electricity transmission lines; and the Afghan Parliament building.”22 However, land contiguity issues limit options available to both countries to harness the potential of economic cooperation. For long, Afghanistan’s landlocked status has remained an impediment the country has sought to overcome. One might also deduce that this issue—at the core of which lies the Afghanistan–Pakistan dispute over the Durand Line—also has a role to play a role to play in influencing perceptions in the India–Afghanistan bilateral relationship. Geographically, Afghanistan is landlocked, flanked by Iran to its west and south, Pakistan to its east and south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the north. In matters of trade, Afghanistan’s land contiguity with Pakistan provides the latter an advantage over India. Needless to say, any cost-efficient land route connecting Afghanistan and India will pass through Pakistan and—given the uneasy relationship Islamabad and New Delhi have for long shared—such a route will remain vulnerable to Pakistani interference so long as the issues in the India–Pakistan bilateral remains unresolved. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has noted that “trade relations will realize its true potential once the Wagah–Attari route is opened for bilateral trade. So far, the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) has been restrictive in this aspect. India is the largest market in the region for Afghan products, and the blocking of transit has affected the free movement of commodities. One of the objectives of building Zaranj–Delaram road by India was to boost bilateral economic relations besides offering Afghanistan another outlet to a seaport. The successful operation of the Chabahar port in Iran would capitalize on this road to offer a new transit route of Afghan products to India while opening a new route for India, and the rest of the world, for trade with Central Asia. The inauguration of the Dedicated Air Cargo Corridor in June 2017 between Kabul–Delhi and Kandahar–Delhi has provided a fresh impetus to bilateral trade. The Air Corridor has ensured free movement of freight despite the barriers put in place due to the denial of transit by Pakistan. During the Strategic Partnership Council meeting, it was decided to further strengthen the corridor and expand it to other cities in India. Over 1000 Tonnes of cargo has already been transported in the Air Corridor since its inauguration.”23 While these policy actions do provide more alternatives to both India and Afghanistan towards reducing dependence on Islamabad, it is yet to be seen whether these options can comprehensively render Pakistan’s advantage of strategic geographical location unexceptional. Nonetheless, the fact that these alternatives are being actively pursued suggests that irrespective of whether India views these options as an equivalent substitute, New Delhi is keen to develop an alternative to Pakistan’s advantage of control on its access to Afghanistan. To realise this objective, it would be crucial for both India and Afghanistan to explore potential options and scenarios that will provide equal or more advantage compared to what the strategic benefits of Pakistan’s geography provide Islamabad. However, although Kabul might prefer to 22 Godbole 23 India,

(2017). Ministry of External Affairs (2017).

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reduce its dependence on Islamabad and diversify its options, geography is likely to remain a barrier preventing Afghanistan from reducing its dependence on Pakistan in connecting to India.

Security Aspects to India–Afghanistan Relations In the post-2001 period, bilateral engagement in security-related issues has been mostly consistent. On the multilateral front, keeping with its position of cooperation on security, India played a role in initiating a dialogue on Afghanistan such as the Afghanistan–India–US trilateral and the Afghanistan–India–Iran trilateral “that seek to bring together international partners with disparate worldviews in pursuit of the common goal of securing peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.”24 In 2013, responsibility of managing Afghanistan’s security was handed over to the 300,000 personnel strong Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) from the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission. Over the years, over 4000 Afghan military personnel have been trained in India. More recently, “although India is hesitant of supplying lethal weapons to Afghanistan, New Delhi delivered three unarmed Cheetal helicopters and four refurbished Mi-25 assault helicopters to the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in April 2015 and December 2016, respectively. Since 2016, New Delhi has been participating in multiple Russia-led regional multilateral meetings aimed at addressing the security situation in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood, in addition to participating in other ongoing initiatives.”25 While these exchanges indicate consistency in policy, they also give an impression that overall, there exists a consensus in New Delhi regarding India’s security-related engagement in Afghanistan. On the contrary however, there are two key contradicting views in India’s policymaking establishment that influence India’s security-related engagements with Afghanistan in varying degrees. One view holds that India should be more proactive in its engagement with Afghanistan, especially to address regional issues. The second holds that India should refrain from involving itself in the Afghan issue too much and should secure its own internal security before it undertakes regional-level activities on security-related matters.26 Dr. Avinash Paliwal succinctly identified that India’s policy and strategy vis-à-vis Afghanistan are driven by three key factors27 : (a) New Delhi’s desire to strike a balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan; (b) The evolving international posture on Afghanistan; (c) The fluctuating degrees to which various political factions in Afghanistan want to engage with India. 24 India,

Ministry of External Affairs, Embassy of India in Kabul (n.d.). (2017). 26 Moradian (2015). 27 Paliwal (2015a). 25 Krishnamurthy

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In his 2017 book, “My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal”, Paliwal explains the two views in India’s policymaking vis-à-vis Afghanistan as a result of an unremitting tug of war between two camps among Indian policymakers: “conciliators” and “partisans.”28 He argues that conciliators hold that India should engage with all stakeholders in Afghanistan, including those with favourable opinion of Pakistan, whereas partisans are of the opinion that India should stick to its natural allies and at best, others who are not in Pakistan’s sphere of influence.29 Since the signing of the SPA in 2011, perceptions have existed among sections of scholars and strategic analysts in both countries that the Agreement has been underutilised. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, some view this Agreement and its objectives with suspicion. However, the reality is probably in neither of the extremes. The text of the SPA outlines a multi-pronged approach to cooperation between the two countries. While a strong political and security component does exist in the Agreement, those are not the only focuses of the SPA, which also includes economy, education as well as capacity-building. There also exists a perspective in India that “if India is able to sustain such a comprehensive partnership with Afghanistan in trying circumstances, it would serve as a model for India to manage its relationships with other neighbouring countries.”30 However, as Dr. Arvind Gupta further identified, delivering to such comprehensive commitments require resources.31 And those resources will have to be smartly employed. To that end, it might be useful for India to develop a framework of engagement that envisions human security in the broader ambit of security cooperation. Periodic consultations and exchanges could be held on short- and long-term issues and involve Afghan local leaders, civil society members, police personnel and professionals from medical, telecom, education sectors. India enjoys tremendous goodwill in Afghanistan and New Delhi must try to find innovative and varied ways to enhance it, especially in the public diplomacy area.32

The Pakistan Factor in Shaping India’s Perceptions of Afghanistan For various reasons, India’s perceptions of the fate of security and stability in Afghan are influenced by its relationship with Pakistan as well as the US-led role of the West’s Afghanistan policies and Washington’s objectives vis-à-vis Kabul. In the latter matter as well, it is Pakistan’s role in that equation that plays a determining role in India’s assessments of any situation that emerges. 28 Paliwal

(2017). (2017). 30 Gupta (2011). 31 Gupta (2011). 32 Krishnamurthy (2017). 29 Paliwal

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For instance, when the Mujahideen government—comprised of various warring factions—came to power in Afghanistan—in April 1992, India chose to recognise and engage with them.33 Merely days after these developments took place, the fragile peace—that had subsequently achieved via an agreement with Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) Chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar under which he was offered the position of the prime minister—crumbled in less than a week. Although Pakistan controlled the Mujahideen in their activities to counter the Soviet forces, that a unified structure was not created for the Mujahideen suggests that Islamabad estimated early on that the Mujahideen—comprised of multiple warring factions that did not necessarily see eye to eye with each other—were unlikely to want to remain under Pakistani control indefinitely. When Jamiat-e-Islami Chief Burhanuddin Rabbani became the Afghan president later that year, he reached out to New Delhi with an offer to expand India–Afghanistan relations, especially on the economic front. This overture took place at a time when the Jamiat and other parties were actively clashing with the Hizb-e-Islami. For India, the intensification of the “civil war” that followed in Kabul must have seemed like a direct consequence of Rabbani wanting to engage with India to improve ties which upset Pakistan. Not long after Rabbani indicated his interest in reviving New Delhi–Islamabad relations, the civil war fought by the Mujahideen coalition members intensified, resulting in a conflict that inflicted severe damage and destruction on Kabul and its residents.34 This episode conceivably reinforced Indian perceptions of political alliances in Afghanistan and the existing mistrust in New Delhi of Islamabad’s motives in Afghanistan. The Mujahideen were a force created and controlled by Pakistan at the US behest. They were not particularly anti-Pakistan, and Islamabad was in control of the flow of resources to each group in the coalition. Yet, when one of the groups in this coalition controlled by Pakistan chose to revive relations with India upon assuming charge in Kabul, an infighting was triggered, resulting in the collapse of the government in Kabul followed by a civil war, ultimately culminating in the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 1996. From an Indian vantage point, this likely reinforced the notion that Pakistan was being disingenuous when peddling a narrative of only securing its “legitimate interests”—i.e. that of merely seeking a government in Afghanistan that is friendly towards Islamabad. The Rabbani episode visibly demonstrated that Islamabad was not merely seeking a friendly government in Kabul and instead sought a government in Afghanistan whose foreign policy Pakistan would control. Fundamentally, Pakistan was seeking a government in Afghanistan without an independent foreign policy—a goal it continues to pursue to this day. Among others, these dynamics certainly influenced several perspectives, worldviews and developments related to Afghanistan and India’s role and policy towards the country in the subsequent years. Over the years, India has pledged over USD 2 billion in aid and developmental assistance and has indeed delivered to a large extent. However, the outcomes of the 33 Paliwal 34 Khosla

(2015b). (2011).

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Agreement demonstrate that the big picture goals India associated with the SPA in terms of strategic benefits have not been entirely tangible in nature. If India were seeking a strategic engagement with Afghanistan to also achieve long-term strategic objectives, New Delhi’s investment of time, energy and resources in Afghanistan should have ideally resulted in the two countries working more closely and in tandem with each other as equal partners. However, while both countries are mindful of each other’s sensitivities and share tremendous goodwill, it might not be incorrect to conclude that a lot less has been achieved than could have been possible. For instance, despite India’s spending in Afghanistan far outmatching China’s, over the past few years, Beijing’s strategic importance is increasingly rising in Afghan perception. While this does not automatically mean that India’s importance in Afghan perception is on the wane, it does reflect on India’s strategic thinking on Afghanistan. This begs the question as to what led to this state of affairs. The answer to this question lies probably in how New Delhi prioritises the objectives of its engagement with Kabul and the actions resulting from those. A quick review of India’s choices vis-à-vis Afghanistan suggests that from the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the early 2000s, India’s engagement with the country was driven a lot more by New Delhi’s concerns over Islamabad’s attempts to use Afghan territory against India than also through a big picture lens of how India and Afghanistan can harness each other’s strengths to grow. India’s concerns regarding Islamabad are not misplaced; but situating those concerns in a big picture perspective—encompassing both Afghan internal dynamics, and regional and international dynamics—would have helped provide India with many more options to engage with the whole of Afghanistan, especially in the form of a sustained, longterm framework, one that is better insulated from the shocks of changes in ground realities. For instance, India will benefit from grasping the complexity of ethnic dynamics in the Afghan political milieu and engaging all stakeholders simultaneously. However, even though India attempted a somewhat engage all policies in the 1990s after the fall of the Najibullah administration, in retrospect, it was too little and too late. What emerged through the latter half of the 1990s was a pattern where India seemed inconsistent and indecisive in its policies and actions vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Although domestic politics in India had a substantial role in resulting in that pattern, what is clear is that India’s changing policies based on its national, regional and international priorities policies were not completely in sync with its threat perceptions and its Afghanistan policy and strategy, and related long-term regional goals.35 Harmonising these elements is a key to insulating India’s policy objectives in the region. This is particularly so because in Afghanistan, alliances are often flexible; enmities, impermanent; and the need of the hour influences alliance formation, and any Indian policy will need to be capable of taking shocks. For instance, up until the early 1990s, New Delhi had very limited contacts with the Mujahideen and had better relations with the Soviet backed-government in Kabul led by Mohammad Najibullah. When the Mujahideen came to power in Afghanistan, the 35 Stobdan

(2015).

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then President, Jamiat-e-Islami’s Burhanuddin Rabbani, sought better relations with India. The Mujahideen government in Afghanistan was a fragile coalition of opposing forces, but it was an opportunity for India to increase the numbers of stakeholders with whom it engaged. India did formally recognise the government and opened communication channels with all, but it pussyfooted in the process. Although India engaged with most actors in Afghanistan, it is difficult to miss that New Delhi had preferred to engage with actors who were not pro-Pakistan. Moreover, India’s policy manoeuvres suggest that there exists a tendency to think about crossing the bridge only when one came to it. Analysts have variously attributed this characteristic to policy short-sightedness, bureaucratic delays and both. From 1999–2001 The period between 1999 and 2001 saw several developments—both challenges and opportunities—to India’s Afghanistan policy and strategy. In the latter half of the 1990s, India faced several internal fluxes in the form of change of governments in rapid succession. In fact, with the introduction of the Gujral Doctrine, the strategy of engaging with Afghan actors India was pursuing in Afghanistan had to be summarily abandoned.36 Close on the heels of these changes, at the turn of the century, India had to deal with a particularly vexing challenge involving Afghanistan. On 24 December 1999, an Indian Airlines aircraft, IC-814, was hijacked and ultimately redirected to Kandahar, which was then under Taliban control. This took place at a time when New Delhi did not have a diplomatic representation in Kabul, and the hostages were freed (although the one civilian hostage was killed) only after India released three terrorists, including a Pakistani national. According to official statements, India established direct contact with the Taliban during Harkat-ul-Mujahideen’s (HuM) hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 which finally landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. While the Taliban played the role of interlocutors with the HuM during the hostage negotiations, India reportedly also conveyed to the Taliban that the fundamentals of New Delhi’s Afghanistan policy would not change. Moreover, Pakistan’s involvement in the hijacking bolstered India’s opinion that “for return to peace, normalcy and a stable government in Afghanistan which would also help in eliminating these negatives emanating from Afghanistan, it was essential that foreign interference, principally from Afghanistan’s southern borders must cease.”37 Soon enough, India concluded that the Afghan issue could not be resolved with a military solution and that Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity must be preserved. During that period, India kept in close touch with several countries that had influence and interest in Afghan affairs. Yet, although New Delhi supported UN efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan, India’s Ministry of External Affairs was of the opinion that the 6 + 2 format relied upon by the UN as the principal mechanism to bring peace to Afghanistan was inherently flawed on account of its narrow and constricted base.38

36 Stobdan

(2015). Ministry of External Affairs (2000). 38 India, Ministry of External Affairs (2000). 37 India,

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Role of International Actors in Shaping India’s Afghanistan Policy India’s Perceptions Vis-à-Vis Its Role in Afghanistan During the Soviet Invasion In the 1970s and 1980s, India and the USSR shared good relations. In fact, Moscow was a major source of arms supplies for New Delhi. When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began, it coincided with India going to polls to elect the next government in New Delhi. As a result, at that time, the Indian establishment was focused more on prioritising domestic issues rather than international developments. Over the subsequent months, India viewed with unease the substantial arms supplies Pakistan received from the USA in return for its anti-Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. However, by the early years of the 1980s, although India was wary of Islamabad’s activities in mobilising anti-Soviet militias in Afghanistan, New Delhi concluded that getting involved in the conflict was not in India’s interest. According to accounts of former Indian policymakers, although India did not prefer to pick sides between the USA and the USSR in Afghanistan at the peak of the Cold War, for strategic reasons, New Delhi could not turn its back on Moscow. As a result, during those years, therefore, India had to walk a tightrope vis-à-vis its Afghanistan policy, particularly on international platforms. To ensure India’s interests were not affected by changing geopolitical realities, New Delhi chose not to side with either the USA or the USSR regarding Afghanistan and abstained from voting whenever the issue came before the UN Security Council.39

India’s Perceptions of Its Role and Interests in Afghanistan Since the US Global War on Terror When the USA launched its “Global War on Terror” beginning with its intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, India offered its support early on.40 New Delhi made the offer based on a (then) recently emerging perception that India and the USA had shared interests in overthrowing the Taliban regime, albeit the primary objective was not the same. According to some observers, this surge in confidence in the Indian policymaking circles vis-à-vis benefits of a partnership with the USA in a military intervention abroad was probably “accrued through South Block’s intense interaction with the United States at the ministerial level and within the forum of Indo-U.S. Working Group, during the two-year period from end-1999.”41 39 Gujral

(2006). States of America, Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs (2002). 41 Bhadrakumar (2003). 40 United

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However, New Delhi’s notion of convergence of interests with Washington was short lived. It was not long before India realised that the USA had concluded that Pakistan was strategically more important to achieve Washington’s primary objectives in the war in Afghanistan, whereas this conclusion was one that was unfavourable for India in New Delhi’s perception. While Pakistan took precedence in the US South Asia policy calculus, India, which had then only recently managed to improve its relations with the USA, found itself on the sidelines of the US engagement in Afghanistan. This divergence had a bearing on India’s perceptions regarding its role in Afghanistan and presumably also came as a reality check regarding its options vis-à-vis its Afghanistan strategy. Consequently, New Delhi has been extremely cautious in its policy initiatives regarding its role and objectives in Afghanistan and has prioritised the pursuit of a soft power approach in Afghanistan compared to a hard power one. Today, as the war in Afghanistan comes a full circle to a US-Russia contestation in the region, India will have to manage its foreign policy more delicately and deftly, especially given Russia’s increasing proximity to Pakistan and India’s proximity to the USA. Not only will New Delhi have to strike a careful balance in its relations with Washington and Moscow, the balancing act will also requisite a broad-based policy taking Beijing’s inroads into the region into account as well, to ensure that India’s options in the region are not vulnerable to geopolitical reorientations involving India’s traditional allies, partners and rivals.

Conclusion Overall, what can be observed is that over the years, India and Afghanistan have not only shared good relations but have also been able to ensure that the bilateral relationship transcends the mutual differences that might exist between the two. In addition to civilisational ties and cultural linkages, mutual interests, pragmatism and practical matters too contribute to cementing the bond. This is indicative of a level of healthiness and maturity, what also emerges is that there is a lot more of which the relationship is capable. However, it appears that at present, bilateral relationship has stagnated. Stagnation may not be nearly as undesirable as regression, but it not preferable either. In 2015, Ambassador (Retd) P. Stobdan observed that India’s financial commitments for Afghanistan were made based more on the objective of “gaining goodwill” than on a sound strategic assessment. He argued that although India’s desire to help may have been genuine, not everyone viewed it that way and that it has not played out on those lines either.42 India’s perceptions of Pakistan have for long had a bearing on India’s perceptions and calculations regarding its role and perception in and regarding Afghanistan. Nonetheless, India’s policy towards Afghanistan through the years could perhaps be 42 Stobdan

(2015).

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seen not as one with an anti-Pakistan agenda but rather as an approach of caution, one that does not possess the luxury of ignoring Pakistan’s actions if the primary goal is to ensure that whichever regime is in power in Kabul does not act against New Delhi’s interests. If reviewed solely as bilateral relations between two sovereign countries, today, the contours of the India–Afghanistan relationship seem restricted to comfort zones and balancing acts, thereby limiting the two from achieving optimal results. It would require lateral thinking to help break the monotony of cyclical developments and deliver more conclusive outcomes, particularly towards mutually beneficial objectives (and associated strategies), which too need to be sustainable, long-term and well-defined with tangible milestones. India can certainly “afford” to be more proactive in Afghanistan, but proactiveness can be practised smartly.43 It will be smarter for India to demonstrate confidence strategically while also continuing its engagement with Afghanistan in an unassuming style.

References Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2011). Agreement on strategic partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of India. New Delhi, Delhi. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/Agreement%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership% 20between%20Afghanistan%20and%20India%20-%20English.pdf. Bhadrakumar, M. (2003, November 18). India’s Afghan stakes. The Hindu. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www.thehindu.com/2003/11/18/stories/2003111803661000.htm. Godbole, S. (2017, April 25). “Strengthening India-Afghanistan strategic relations in an uncertain world” Address by H.E. Shaida Abdali, Ambassador of Afghanistan to India (Rep.). Retrieved March 20, 2018, from Brookings India website https://www.brookings.edu/events/ india-afghanistan-and-connectivity-in-south-asia-address-by-h-e-shaida-abdali-ambassador-ofafghanistan-to-india/. Gujral, I. (2006, January). India’s response to the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan [Interview by IFAJ.]. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 1(1), 123–131. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www.associationdiplomats.org/Publications/ifaj/Vol1/1.1/1.1OralHistoryIndia’sResponsetotheSovietMilitaryInterventioninAfghanistan-IKGujral.pdf. Gupta, A. (2011, October 10). Strategic partnership with Afghanistan: India showcases its soft power. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://idsa. in/idsacomments/StrategicPartnershipwithAfghanistanIndiaShowcasesitsSoftPower_agupta_ 101011. @IndEmbKabul. (2017, May 18). Yesterday Amb @VohraManpreet met Hezb e Islami Chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and discussed peace and stability, security of Afghanistan [Digital image]. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://twitter.com/IndianEmbKabul/status/ 865440711306391553. India, Ministry of External Affairs. (1950). Treaty of friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government of Afghanistan. New Delhi, Delhi. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6584/TreatyofFriendship. India, Ministry of External Affairs. (2000). Annual report 1999-2000 (p. 1). New Delhi, Delhi: Government of India. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/ PublicationDocs/162_Annual-Report-1999-2000.pdf. 43 Krishnamurthy

(2017).

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India, Ministry of External Affairs. (2017, October). India-Afghanistan relations. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/1Afghanistan_October_2017.pdf. India, Ministry of External Affairs, Embassy of India in Kabul. (n.d.). Development partnership. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://eoi.gov.in/kabul/?0707?000. Khosla, I. P. (2011, January). Last days of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan [Interview by I.]. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 6(1), 87–103. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://www. associationdiplomats.org/publications/ifaj/Vol6/6.1/ORALHISTORY.pdf. Krishnamurthy, R. (2017, August 17). India-Afghanistan relations: Innovating continuity. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Retrieved June 6, 2018, from http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select. php?articleNo=5340. Retrieved on 19 August 2017. Moradian, D. (2015). Indo-Afghan relationship: Afghan expectations and Indian reluctance. In V. Chandra (Ed.), India and South Asia: Exploring regional perceptions. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://idsa.in/system/files/book/book_IndiaandSouthAsia.pdf. Paliwal, A. (2015a, September 21). Partisans vs. conciliators: The establishment politics of India’s Afghanistan policy. Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/avinashpaliwal. Paliwal, A. (2015b, October 4). Partisans vs. conciliators: India’s Afghanistan policy remains focussed on Pakistan. Scroll. Retrieved June 6, 2018, from https://scroll.in/article/758689/ partisans-vs-conciliators-indias-afghanistan-policy-remains-focussed-on-pakistan. Paliwal, A. (2017). Prologue: A curse. In My enemy’s enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal (pp. 12–13). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Stobdan, P. (2015, April 28). India should rethink its Afghan policy. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ IndiashouldrethinkitsAfghanpolicy_pstobdan_280415. United States of America, Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs. (2002, June 14). International contributions to the war against terrorism. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://20012009.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm.

India’s Perception of Bangladesh and Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Examining the Internal Dynamics in India Smruti S. Pattanaik

Perceptions play a significant role in shaping foreign policy though real politics defined by geo-politics and geo-economics determines the contour of any bilateral relationship. However, role of perception in foreign policy cannot be underplayed. Perceptions in general are shaped by events, country’s posture towards a particular issue. Popular perceptions find place in television drama, day-to-day conversation between people and crossing the border. Stringent visa regime and hurdles placed to cross the border also strengthen the imagination of the self and the other. Many factors shape this perception; textbooks in South Asia also carefully nurture perception about state, people and community. While perception is important component of how the narrative is structured and disseminated, in the era of globalisation, migration of people in search of better opportunity, exchange of ideas, barriers posed by perception are breaking. India’s perception of Bangladesh as a neighbour, its geo-strategic location and its place in India’s strategic planning plays a significant role in determining India’s policy towards Bangladesh. At the same time, the close sociocultural affinity between the people of the two countries and the long and porous border that impinges on the daily transaction between the closely connected people generate both friendship and misgiving about each other. Most importantly, India’s contribution to the war of liberation of Bangladesh has a huge influence on its relations with Dhaka. In India, perception varies. While the decision-makers in Delhi perceive Bangladesh from a national security perspective or see it as a gateway of connectivity to the region beyond, the Border States look at Bangladesh as economic opportunity and a country that can unburden their landlocked status. Interestingly, in the case of India, Border States also play important role in shaping New Delhi’s perception. Each of the Border States has different perception of Bangladesh that ranges from perceiving it as a threat to a land of economic opportunity. S. S. Pattanaik (B) Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_2

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There are several stakeholders who shape the perception apart from the governing elites of Delhi and Border States. The Border Security Force that guards the border, the people who have their relatives living across, the smugglers who are transgressing the border, the cultural connection through Rabindranath Tagore song and Nazrul Geeti that see Bengal as unified whole, all contribute to the shaping of perception which is definitely not monolithic rather incorporates a vast expanse of security, economic dependency, familial relation and cultural affinity. The contentious issue of river water sharing between the two countries generates a sharp reaction in India’s Border States, and this was very much evident in the context of Teesta. Even in the context of ratification of the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), while the centre was keen to ratify the LBA, various Border States looked at the deal that is evaluated through gains and losses of land in terms of territoriality of the sovereign state. Therefore, New Delhi’s relationship with Dhaka often gets entangled in state politics as regional political parties are on ascendant in India. While significant security cooperation between the two countries to certain extent has created a positive perception about Bangladesh in India, there is a concern whether this cooperation can be sustained if there is a change of regime in Dhaka. This chapter will focus on the convergences and divergences between the two countries and to what extent perception influences India’s policies towards Bangladesh.

Shaping India’s Perception of Bangladesh: A Delhi Dominated Discourse In the overall relationship with Bangladesh, New Delhi shapes the national discourse. In the past, the voice of Border States was not dominant because the centre–state relations were evolving post-independence and most of the states of India had Congress government. Therefore, a foreign policy towards Bangladesh lacked the regional discordant note which one is witnessing at present. This was very much evident in the context of Berubari Upazila. It was not the state but Kuchilabari Sangharsh Samiti, a local organisation, which challenged the handing over of Berubari to Bangladesh in the Supreme Court under the Article 3 of Indian constitution. Therefore, the states have always looked towards New Delhi for shaping a relationship with Bangladesh which is beneficial to both. Rather than security, most of the Border States look at India’s economic engagement with Bangladesh and the benefits that it may accrue to the Border States. Security has dominated India’s outlook towards Bangladesh. Whether it is the issue of breaching the porous border, illegal migration, the criminal nexus operational in the border area, north-east insurgents having shelter in Bangladesh, activities of external forces that are directed against India; Bangladesh remained a major concern for the security establishment in New Delhi.1 Any unfriendly policy, for example, 1 In

my interaction with BSF officers at the training academy, this is a question that is repeatedly asked. One also observes same kind of questions from Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) officers

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allowing China’s strategic presence or non-cooperation on the matter of security often raises a question whether India made a mistake in playing a decisive role in the liberation of Bangladesh if the security threats remain same or Bangladesh is reluctant to cooperate. Similarly, while the central government looks at the issue of border fencing from the security perspective, the people of West Bengal who share close sociocultural ties are not in favour of fencing. Often, the Border Security Force complains about non-cooperation from the government of West Bengal, or at least, in the border region, on the management of border in the West Bengal sector. There is also a component of illegal activities that continues in the border as the villages often share porous border that is difficult to police. The security forces also complain that shifting people inside the fence (As per Indira-Mujib Land boundary agreement of 1974 fence can be constructed 150 yards away from the zero line) is a problem, and in many places, acquiring land to build fence often leads to lengthy legal battles. The state government does not want to force people to resettle elsewhere as it fears loss of vote in the election. Therefore, while the Indian state is driven by overall security, the states look at the issues differently, that of a humanitarian problem where people cannot be displaced keeping in mind the electoral politics. This was more evident in the Burdwan blast case where the West Bengal government initially was reluctant to cooperate in investigation even though it finally relented. It can be argued that security centricism continues to dominate the discourse in Delhi; however, there is a gradual shift in the thinking and now it looks towards Bangladesh as an economic opportunity in which border can be a barrier. In this shift, there is a major question that is often asked by the Delhi centric elites: what if there is a change in the government in Bangladesh? Will there be a continuity of policy? However, Border States continue to look at Bangladesh from the peoples’ perspective as foreign policy remains a domain of the central government. To them, a change of government will not undermine the people-to-people familial relationship.

Historical Factors: Shaping India’s Perception and Its Relations with Bangladesh There are few factors that over the period of time have shaped New Delhi’s perception of Bangladesh. Bangladesh, which was part of Pakistan and was known as East Pakistan earlier, influenced the minds of the elites in Delhi post-independence in terms of the security threats that the Pakistani state can pose through its eastern wing. However, Delhi looked at East Pakistan and West Pakistan differently. New Delhi also looks at government and people separately. The East Pakistan political elite who strived for better relations with India and the sociocultural affinity which was major source of Bengali culture often played a significant role in shaping India’s perception towards East Pakistan. Though policymakers were sympathetic to the situation in East in the joint Border Security Force (BSF)–BGB training programme on why India is not generous with water and does not address trade imbalance.

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Pakistan and considered it as a victim of Pakistan’s discriminatory policy, there was a clear differentiation on how India perceived East and West Pakistan. The struggle of Bengalis to get their language recognised as a national language in the 1950s, their arguments against separate electorate in the constituent assembly and the fact that majority of the Hindu minorities resided in East Pakistan were always a consideration as India watched keenly the developments there. Pakistani government’s perception that the Bengalis are culturally closer to the Hindus in Bengal given the sociocultural and linguistic heritage only deepened over the period of time. While the wars were fought in the west; Pakistan took steps to disconnect all the physical connections that existed between India and Bangladesh. Rail and road connectivity was completely halted. There was no such connectivity with Pakistan in the western front, and the border between India and Pakistan in the western wing was fortified. Hindus were forced to migrate while Bengali language was persianised and arabised. It needs to be mentioned that the Bengali Muslim political elites were more sympathetic to their Hindu linguistic compatriot than the West Pakistan elites.2 India also realised that a non-communal politics in East Pakistan serves its own interest. Unlike the western wing of Pakistan, where the vision of Pakistan as an Islamised country with Urdu as the appropriate language of Muslims was implemented, East Pakistan resisted the representation of Pakistan as a monolithic entity with one language and one religion. What defined India’s relation with East Pakistan in the initial years was river water sharing, especially the dispute over Farakka, issue of evacuee property, dispute over Berubari and other enclaves in each other’s territory. These were some of the issues that dominated the bilateral relations. In spite of this, India’s perception of East Pakistan was different from its perception of West Pakistan. This was amply illustrated when the 1965 India–Pakistan war broke out; hostility remained confined to western sector. This is despite the fact that the East Pakistan was left “defenceless”, and India never considered of expanding the war to the eastern sector where Pakistan was militarily vulnerable. India watched with concerns the developments in East Pakistan and the unfolding political turmoil that had cross-border implications. According to J. N. Dixit, India’s approach to the war of liberation was the security implications of having a hostile country in its east. The perception was due to the fact that in the past, China exploited the Naga and Mizo insurgencies and the growing Sino–Pakistan relations would make India vulnerable where the internal problems continue to be exploited by both. As Dixit writes, “If Indian endorsement and support could result in the emergence of a friendly entity it would be beneficial. A non-hostile Bangladesh in place of a hostile East Pakistan was considered desirable”.3 India was concerned with the flow of refugees and desired for a political solution at the earliest as it was emerging that Pakistan was not keen to take back the refugees especially the 7 million 2 See

the speech of Muzaffar Ahmad, East Bengal representative who joined minority members of Constituent Assembly in opposing separate electorate and not allowing the minorities to become head of the state. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1-59-56/340, Vol. 1, No. 58, 27 January 1956, pp. 2175–2179, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s speech Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1.175-56/340, Vol. 1, No. 76, 21 February 1956, pp. 3440–3441. 3 J. N. Dixit, “Liberation and Beyond”, p. 57. Also see Subramanyam and Ayoob (1972), p. 156.

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Hindu refugees. For India, return of refugees was one of the important factors that determined India’s approach to East Pakistan crisis. Also, at the same time people of the Border States were sympathetic towards the liberation movement. They hosted the refugees and rebels providing them with all possible support initially. Therefore, it was not possible for the central government to not consider the ground situation that was sympathetic towards the cause of Bengalis in the East Pakistan. Moreover, there was a perception that the emergence of a friendly regime in Bangladesh will add to India’s security vis-a-vis its northern neighbour, China.4 Soon after independence, there was a perception in India that, unlike Pakistan, India’s relationship with Bangladesh would be excellent, given India’s contribution to the war of liberation for which nearly 2000 Indian soldiers laid their lives. Moreover, India had friendly relationship with senior leaders of Awami League and wanted to cement its ties with the newly emergent country. To secure its eastern flank, India signed the 1972 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. This treaty also addressed New Delhi’s deep security concern which was to see that Bangladesh does not become part of any security alliance with countries that are inimical to India. It also trained the newly created Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini at the request of Bangladesh, which attracted the ire of the newly emerged Bangladesh army which saw the emergence of this paramilitary force as a challenge to its institutional interest. It can be argued that India supported Mujib’s government wholeheartedly and took steps to see that the country consolidates its independence and gets political recognition as an independent nation. However, it needs to be mentioned that India’s role in the liberation created a huge expectation in some section of strategic community that Bangladesh would remain “grateful” for India’s role; it was clear from the beginning that Bangladesh’s “foreign and security policies were at variance from the general Indian expectations”.5 Such expectation continues to dominate the mind of some people though the foreign policymaking bureaucrats and strategic community are more realistic in their expectation from Bangladesh. The present thinking revolves around “what the two countries can do together for their mutual benefit”.6 While the liberation war remains a reference point, India’s relation is not based on its contribution to liberation war. However, this remains relevant as India would definitely want to see a plural and secular country in its neighbourhood.7 As a diplomat remarked India’s relations with Bangladesh is much beyond the liberation war and draws its strength from shared history and culture.8 Nonetheless, India was relieved that it no more has to face a hostile Pakistan in the eastern flank. Religious factor, large-scale smuggling across the border, India’s political visibility in helping Bangladesh to shape up its political and bureaucratic institutions post-liberation and Bangladesh’s preference for a secular constitution raised anxiety about India’s role and influence. Mujib’s one-upmanship by marginalizing the oppo4 Subramanyam

and Ayoob (1972), p. 282. p. 158. 6 This is based on my interaction with officials in the MEA. 7 In a discussion with Amb Veena Sikri, former High Commissioner of India in Bangladesh. 8 Interview with a serving diplomat who would not like to be named on 5 February 2017. 5 Dixit,

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sition within the party, denying them legitimacy of expressing their political opinion, sidelining them in any politico-economic discourse—all contributed to Mujib’s unpopularity. Later imposition of BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League) was not to India’s likening. This heightened anti-Indianism gave the perceived closeness of the regime to India. However, India had realised that its relation with Bangladesh was spiralling downward by 1974 when Z. A. Bhutto was given a rousing welcome in Bangladesh in spite of his role in 1971. Moreover, Bangladesh’s negotiating stand on Farakka remained same as Pakistan as Mr. B. M. Abbas, the person who was leading Pakistan team, was reappointed by Bangladesh government to negotiate Ganges water sharing.9 After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, India could not reconcile to a situation of post-Mujib Bangladesh and any strategic implications his death may have on India–Bangladesh relations. India, which saw Mujib as a partner, suddenly was confronted with a situation where a military regime perceived close to Pakistan and USA emerged as the ruling regime. This in fact delayed India’s recognition of General Zia ur Rahman’s regime in Bangladesh and subsequently shaped the bilateral relations between the two countries. Commenting on Mujib’s brutal assassination, Bhutto had reportedly said “…victory for Pakistan, a vindication of the idea of one Pakistan. It was as if we had regained the ground lost in 1971”.10 Later, General Zia ur Rahman during his visit to Pakistan in 1977 reported “expressed the need to free his country from its Indian dependence”.11 In the context, the loss of political influence by India, however, did not convert into Pakistan’s gain given the history of liberation war. However, China gained ground in Bangladesh and in due course of time became the largest supplier of weapons to Bangladesh army. India perception of Zia’s regime was born out of the events that followed Mujib’s assassination. Zia’s decision to introduce religion to the secular constitution and his patronage to Mujib’s killers made New Delhi extremely uncomfortable. The regime made effort to diversify its foreign policy, develop close military relationship with China, USA and Middle East while simultaneously trying to distance itself from India. India was distrustful of the military regime and its growing closeness with countries that India thought was “inimical” to its interest. Article 25(2) was inserted in the constitution which emphasised “the State shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity”.12 Role of the USA in the subsequent post-Mujib period political transition also witnessed the pro-west leanings of the emerging elite and gradual sidelining of the erstwhile Soviet Union and India from the foreign policy horizon. This shift in foreign policy and its implication was not lost to India.

9 Y.

B. Chavan who was sent as special emissary conveyed to Sheikh Mujib that “Bangladeshi negotiators were progressively reverting to negotiating postures of Pakistani times”. See Dixit (1999), p. 200. 10 Raza (1997), p. 226. 11 Burke and Ziring (1990), p. 438. 12 Constitution of People’s Republic of Bangladesh (pocket constitution), January 1999, p. 13.

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From the beginning of Zia’s regime and also given the background of the birth of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) coupled with its foreign policy orientation, India perceived General Zia’s regime as unfriendly. New Delhi nurtured a distrust of Jamaat Islami (JI) and BNP’s close relationship with JI after the 1979 election. It also convinced India of BNP’s anti-India orientation. Farakka issue was internationalised by General Zia’s regime. Though Farakka issue was resolved with the conclusion of the 3-year agreement, the issue of illegal immigration from Bangladesh became a major irritant between India and Bangladesh. India looked at Bangladesh as a source of illegal immigration that had the potential to threaten stability of the north-east. The Assam agitation and identity politics in that state became a major concern for the central government, till Assam accord was signed in 1985 that brought peace to the state.

Restoration of Democracy and Perception of India: Delving on Some Key Issues Restoration of democracy in 1990 gave India some hope of establishing good relations with Bangladesh. Post-cold war geo-politics also shaped India’s perception. India’s own economic reform, its quest for expanding its market and develop its economy convinced India that it needs to transit from a security-oriented outlook towards its neighbours to economic partnership. Within the region, regional integration was getting a priority and the countries in the neighbourhood were moving from preferential trading arrangement to free trade arrangement. India also focused on north-east in a bid to stabilize the region as it was impeding India’s overgrowth and its ability to play a larger global role. Though India expected that it could forge a close relationship, the incident of Babri Masjid demolition and communal disturbances in Bangladesh and BNP government encouraging words for the insurgent in north-east was a major stumbling block. To India’s dismay, Begum Zia raised the issue of Ganges water in the UN, repeating what her husband and former President Zia ur Rahman did in the past. All these only convinced India that BNP would not amend its policies towards India. India patiently waited for the next election with the expectation that Awami League will be well disposed to India’s sensitivities in north-east. The signing of the Ganges Water Treaty with the ruling AL in 1996 and later the conclusion of Chittagong Hill Tract Treaty of 1997 put to rest some of the bitter criticism against India. The BNP accused AL of compromising Bangladesh’s interest by signing the Ganges Water Treaty and said that once they assume power they would revise the treaty. However, it needs to be mentioned during the BNP-led fourparty rule from 2001 to 2006 no such attempt to revise was made. The issue of transit remained a major point of political controversy cautioning the AL government which instead of transit emphasised on transshipment to pacify domestic opposition. The BNP and the religious right gave a different interpretation to India’s demand for tran-

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sit. They argued that any transit treaty with India would undermine the sovereignty of Bangladesh, and in a situation of India’s conflict with China, Bangladesh will be unnecessarily dragged into it. The 1972 Treaty, which was considered as a sign of India’s hegemonic design to control Bangladesh’s foreign policy and make its military weak, lapsed after 25 years of ignominious existence in 1996. The demise of this treaty was not mourned both in Delhi and Dhaka as it had become a political albatross for the AL and India without any significant contribution to the security of either country. Though, some elites in Delhi feel that the treaty could have served India–Bangladesh relations better.

Security Challenges and Bangladesh India’s perception of Bangladesh was also shaped by the emergence of radical Islamist groups and the presence of Afghan war returnees in Bangladesh and implications of their presence on India’s security. The visibility of fundamentalist force was apparent after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some of the Bangladeshis fighting in the Afghan jihad returned home to take up the cause of religion at home. They also contributed to anti-Indianism due to ideological reasons. The rise of Harakat ul Jihadi Islami (HuJI) and its involvement in terrorist activities in India became a major security concern. The group not only targeted the secular, liberal constituency in Bangladesh but also was used by Pakistani intelligence agency ISI to fuel terrorism against India especially the 2002 attack on American Centre in Kolkata and claimed the Varanasi attack in 2006 and Delhi bombing of 2011. Though Bangladesh assured that its territory would not be used for anti-India activities but BNP continued to deny their presence and operation from its soil. Slowly and steadily the activities of radical Islamists were visible in social and political terrain. The NGOs funded by the Middle Eastern countries that worked to strengthen the Islamic values in Bangladesh to some extent contributed to the erosion of secular values and liberal attitude. This provided suitable environment to the fundamentalist force to grow. JI and other Islamic parties, like the ones led by the Ulemas, brought forth dynamics that strengthened religious forces and sustained anti-India constituency. In fact, the Islamists (both political parties and non-state actors) found an element of convergence with the nationalists who are otherwise secular in their approach to the state but anti-India in their orientation. They have always resisted any attempt to develop close relations with India or economic integration with India on the grounds of sovereignty and security. All these contributed to an opinion in India that Bangladesh is emerging as a safe haven for radical Islamists in South Asia.13 The 2001 elections and violence against minorities just after the election strengthened India’s strongly held view that it is difficult to forge close cooperation with BNP. Though the BJP government in India exercised caution in its public statement on developments in Bangladesh, bilateral relations remained mired with deep13 See

Karlekar (2005).

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seated suspicion about the intent of BNP and its Islamist allies. For the first time in Bangladesh’s political history, Jamaat emerged as an important member of the political coalition led by the BNP. This helped the Jamaat’s political expansion14 and its impact was felt in the civil society, as Jamaat student wing grew strong violence in the universities increased. Religious radicalism grew due to political patronage provided by the religious political parties, whereas the BNP government turned blind eye to their activities. The results of this policy, i.e. denial of the existence of radical Islamic groups who demonstrated their strength in the form of countrywide bomb blasts on 17 August 2005 followed by suicide attacks on Bangladesh court premises. The Harakat ul Jihadi Islami expanded its activities, and its cadres were involved in various bomb blasts in India especially the attack on the US consulate. India also perceived the regime to be close to both Pakistan and China. Its engagement with India remained lukewarm. The issue of Indian insurgent groups taking shelter in Bangladesh was a major issue between the two countries. Chittagong Arms haul in 2004, where a huge cache of arms was seized and some of the officers of intelligence agencies of Bangladesh were involved, established what India had long suspected the links between Bangladesh’s establishment and the insurgent groups operating in India’s north-east.15 Frequent border skirmishes, killing of border security personnel in 2001 Pyrduwah clash added to the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Dhaka, to save itself from domestic criticism for its failure to prevent bomb blasts and violence, accused India of trying to tarnish the image of the country. On 7 November 2003, the then Deputy Prime Minister of India, L. K. Advani, talking to media persons in Bhiwani, Haryana, voiced serious concern over what he termed the growing activities of the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Al-Qaeda in Bangladesh after BNP came to power. India also raised the issue of north-eastern insurgents having camps in Bangladesh. Even though exaggerated, the perception of India about the Islamists remained very strong at the leadership level. For example, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: “we must reckon that at least 25% of the population of Bangladesh swears by the Jamiat-ul-Islami (sic) and they are very anti-Indian and they are in the clutches, many times of the ISI”.16 Such view that Bangladesh can affect India’s security continues to dominate in a certain section of political leadership in India.17 While Bangladesh during the BNP regime was seen as a major security challenge, India pursued its Look East policy vigorously and was keen for opening transit route 14 See

Pattanaik (2009). (2004), Habib (2004). See Ray (2011), p. 403. 16 Dixit (2011). 17 BJP’s chief ministerial candidate in Delhi V. K. Malhotra in 2008 described Bangladesh as an enemy. See “Bangladesh the biggest ‘enemy’: Malhotra”, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/reportbangladesh-is-the-biggest-enemy-malhotra-1207236, Union Minister of State (Home) Hansraj Ahir also described Bangladesh as “enemy” in his address to ASSOCHAM in November 2017, see “Bangladesh as big a security threat to India as China, Pakistan: MoS Home Hansraj Ahir”, India Today, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/bdesh-poses-security-threat-besides-pak-chinamos-home-1087909-2017-11-16. 15 Hussain

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through Bangladesh. Indian policymakers emphasised “Bangladesh and Northeastern India were always an integrated political, economic and cultural space”18 while trying to cultivate Bangladesh. India also perceives Bangladesh’s China policy ostensibly aimed at replacing India. China has endeavoured to minimise India’s influence and took advantage of the deterioration of political relations. The BNP and the religious political parties perceive China as a source of strength for their policies of non-cooperation with India. Bangladesh under the BNP government tried to explore the possibilities of linking up with China through Myanmar, whereas it has refused to be integrated in any manner to India’s north-east, its geographical proximate neighbour. In August 2005 visit, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Begum Zia signed an agreement that declared Chittagong and Kunming as sister cities. Bangladesh has signed various agreements with China, and especially the Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2002 is significant. China has contributed to infrastructure development in Bangladesh which includes construction of six friendship bridges and now nearly $42 billion has been promised by government and private Chinese investors in Bangladesh. The discourse revolves around benign versus hegemonic relationship that China and India share with Bangladesh. To generate goodwill for China, Dhaka has cautiously underplayed its huge trade deficit with Beijing which has helped its bilateral relations. It can be said Beijing has benefited from huge mistrust that exists between the two countries which is often exacerbated by right-wing parties and the nationalists. India perceives that regimes in Dhaka play China against India. There is also a perception that China has benefitted from deterioration of India–Bangladesh relations.

Growing Religious Radicalism and Its Impact on India’s Policies Towards Bangladesh There are right-wing elements that have thrived on anti-India sentiments. They have often nurtured a cultivated policy where India becomes a major focus point of their ideological debate. Given the geographical proximity and lingering outstanding disputes between the two countries, it is easier for any political party to transmit these disputes in populist terms. For example, often flood and drought are attributed to Farakka barrage in spite of the fact there is a clear distribution of river water of the Ganges under the Farakka Treaty of 1996. The religious political parties, especially the Jamaat Islami which was opposed to the war of liberation and was closely allied with the Pakistan army and was responsible for the killings of freedom fighters, maintains a close relation with Pakistan for ideological reasons. In fact, Pakistan intelligence agency ISI is able to maintain close relations with the Bangladesh’s 18 See

Secretary East Rajiv Sikri’s lecture at the BEI on “India’s Relations with its Eastern Neighbours”, 31 May 2005, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2518/Indias_ Relations_with_its_Eastern_Neighbours_Address_by_Shri_Rajiv_Sikri_Secretary_Ministry_of_ External_Affairs_at_the_Bangladesh_Enterprise_Institute.

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Director General of Field Intelligence that is often accused by Indian security analysts of providing sanctuary to the insurgents from the north-east. Political patronage to various Islamic militant groups operating in India by the Islamic political parties is instructive in this context. Though anti-India constituency in Bangladesh is necessarily not pro-Pakistan, it helps the cause of both the religious political parties and Pakistan who are against any Indian influence in Bangladesh. Pakistan has augmented its role in Bangladesh through countries like Saudi Arabia and China with whom it shares close relations. The religious basis of Bangladesh’s nationhood is underpinned by the religious political parties. Opposing India suits the ideological parameter of these religious political parties. It becomes an ideological necessity for these parties to justify Pakistan having collaborated with it during the liberation war. They maintain close link with countries of Middle East and Pakistan. As their main ideological plank is antiIndia, it finds support from elements in Pakistan. This anti-Indianism provides political space to Pakistan and has helped Islamabad to cement its ties. India, therefore, perceives that religious political parties and their antagonism towards India would not help it furthering its ties with Bangladesh. One of the important issues that influence Indian decision-makers is the rising religious radicalism in Bangladesh. Some of the Bangladeshi Afghan war veterans who returned from Afghanistan and formed HuJI for the first time alarmed the Indian security agencies. The perception that shaped India’s approaches to Bangladesh was the porous border and a government that is completely unresponsive to India’s concern. Though in the early 1990s when BNP assumed power after the restoration of democracy, it was non-committal on security issues. Rather, the then Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia termed the north-east insurgent as “mukti surya” (sun of freedom). Given these difficulties, India perceived the BNP as a party that is unwilling to cooperate with India because of historical reasons. In the changed political circumstances, India’s relation with political parties in Bangladesh is changing. The ratification of Land Boundary Agreement, exchange of enclaves and resolution of maritime boundary have all brought a positive spin in the bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh. Though Awami Leagues continues to be in power since January 2009, the BNP has started mending its relations with India and seek to engage Delhi. Apart from the October 2012 visit of Begum Zia as the leader of opposition to India, senior party members often stay engaged with New Delhi to address the mutual mistrust and suspicion. Though, many in the centre continue to nurse an apprehension regarding BNP’s commitment towards a friendly bilateral relation. While political inevitability of a BNP comeback in Dhaka is factored, India feels BNP–Jamaat alliance may not allow BNP to pursue a friendly policy towards India.

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Border States and Bangladesh Border States of India look towards Bangladesh as an opportunity and gateway to prosperity. They look at Bangladesh from the larger connectivity perspective that would enable these states to reach to the countries in Southeast Asia for their economic development. This was illustrated when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his 2011 visit to Bangladesh decided to take the Chief Ministers of the Border States with him. This underlined the importance of Border States in India’s Bangladesh policy. While Tripura is the largest trading partner of Bangladesh, Meghalaya also looks at Bangladesh as an opportunity for economic investment. In the Northeast Connectivity Summit held on 22 September 2016, Tripura’s then Chief Minister said, “Our next door is Bangladesh and our relation with Bangladesh is very good. They treat us as relatives, they are helping us like anything and I think that his opportunity should be properly utilized by the government of India. It does not depend on the attitude of state government like Tripura to utilize this opportunity government of India has to come forward with positive outlook”.19 Tripura is dependent for its trade with Bangladesh. It was also the state that hosted refugees during the 1971 war. Its current Chief Minister also fought the liberation war. Therefore, Tripura always strives to have excellent relationship with Bangladesh. The perception of West Bengal is dominated by language, literature and shared culture. Yet, on the issue of Teesta, West Bengal opposes centre’s proposal on water sharing with Bangladesh. Though the relationship between the two has been institutionalised at various levels, three factors continue to influence India’s policies towards Bangladesh among host of other factors. First, development of India’s north-east, second is the stability of that region and third Bangladesh as a gateway to Southeast Asia.

Security: Perspectives of Centre and the Border States There is a strong belief in New Delhi that cooperation with Dhaka is essential to secure the north-east region as well as fight the common threat of terrorism in this part of South Asia. As terrorism emerged as a major security challenge in the postcold war period, India remained vulnerable in the security threats. In the past, India had raised the issue of terrorism with the then BNP regime (2001–2006) several times. It also exchanged a list of name containing insurgents from the north-east but there was no response from Dhaka. During Sheikh Hasina’s first regime (1996–2001) post the restoration of democracy, she took some action but

19 Reviving

pre-partition connectivity with Bangladesh discussed at Northeast Connectivity Summit, 22 September 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/agartalareviving-pre-partition-connectivity-with-bangladesh-discussed-at-northeast-connectivity-summit116092200304_1.html.

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was not successful in completing closing down the camps that were operational.20 India perceived that there are certain elements in Bangladesh military that wanted to use the insurgents to keep India embroiled in domestic problem as a part of their strategy. India’s hope to get cooperation from the BNP government did not bear any fruit. India was cautious in its approach to the BNP government which assumed power in 2001. It refrained from being critical of the election violence where minorities were targeted. It sent Brajesh Mishra as Prime Minister’s special envoy to convey to Dhaka that India is willing to extend a hand of friendship, but Dhaka’s response was lukewarm.21 The perspectives of the Border States on Bangladesh though remained same but their position was different. For example, an MP from Tripura participating in the Lok Sabha debate said the border fences are necessary to check infiltration from Bangladesh. “Tripura is being used by the extremists in the northeast as a corridor for smuggling arms, ammunitions etc. from Thailand via Myanmar and Bangladesh”.22 The issue of illegal immigration has become a major matter of concern for the centre and in the state of Assam. This was reflected in the various debates of Lok Sabha, where parliamentarian concluded that Illegal Migration (Determination by Tribunal) (IMDT) Act is not working and the issue of immigration needs to be taken up by Bangladesh. A cursory glance into the debates of Lok Sabha clearly revealed that most of the members of Parliament from the Border States were concerned about the security of the border region and raised the issue of smuggling, lack of border fence in certain areas and illegal immigration which affected the states of Assam, Bengal, Odisha and Bihar. Therefore, their outlook towards Bangladesh was not very different from the position of the centre.23 In fact, the NRC24 which was conducted under the supervision of Supreme Court of India reflects the fear of illegal immigration and the issue of citizenship in the Border State of Assam. The updation of NRC was one of the demands of Assam Gana Sangram Parishad who spearheaded the Assam agitation that was directed against illegal immigration from Bangladesh. The fear of accepting the people especially the Hindus who migrated from Bangladesh has divided opinion in Assam. There is a belief that there is a continuous flow of Hindus from Bangladesh and this is reflected in the Bangladesh Bureau of Census that is showing reducing number of Hindus. Centre’s proposal to amend Citizenship Act 1955 to provide citizenship to the minorities who have

20 An interview with a former foreign secretary of Bangladesh who said the military was reluctant to take up any operation against the Indian insurgent groups. Dhaka, 3 July 2007. 21 Interview with Brajesh Mishra, Delhi, 2009. 22 XI LOK SABHA DEBATES, Session IV (Budget), Monday, 12 May 1997/Vaisakha 22, 1919 (Saka). 23 Sixteenth Lok Sabha, http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/MainSearch.aspx?qstr= bangladesh. 24 National Register of Citizens, 1951 is a register prepared after the conduct of the Census of 1951 in respect of each village, showing the houses or holdings in a serial order and indicating against each house or holding the number and names of persons staying therein. See Financial express.

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migrated from the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan25 has again opened up the Pandora’s box of illegal immigration to Assam. Assam does not want to accept the concept of refugees for Hindus and illegal immigration for the Hindus. It is against the immigration of Bengali that poses a threat to Assam’s identity and reduces the Assamese-speaking population to a minority.

Connectivity: Looking at Bangladesh Through India’s North-East Bangladesh was also seen from the perspective of connectivity. Development of north-east to a large extent is dependent upon India’s connectivity with Bangladesh. For example, post-partition, “The blocking of access to the Chittagong port and the land route through Bangladesh, has closed the sea transportation routes for the region altogether”.26 The fortunes of the people of the region are inextricably intertwined with those of the people of Bangladesh, and there is much to be gained by removing trade barriers to enable access to seaports and inland waterways. The opening of border haats between the Border States and Bangladesh on the border for the first time created an opportunity to small trade across the international boundary without tariff. This also encouraged interaction between the people changing the local atmosphere. As new buses and trains were announced, the connectivity between the Border States and Bangladesh has increased. In 2015, Chief Minister Mamta Banerjee along with Prime Minister Modi flagged Khulna–Kolkata bus service.

Border Management For the Border States, management of the India–Bangladesh border remains extremely crucial. States in north-east have faced insurgencies and their landlocked status has often been a source of their backwardness. Therefore, their relationship with Bangladesh opens up new opportunity. Often, the border is used by criminals, smugglers, traffickers and immigrants. All the Border States do not look at the border from the security point of view. For Tripura, border is economic lifeline in terms of its dependant on Bangladesh market for import. For West Bengal, border is the story of divided family, culture and linguistic affinity that transcends the political boundary. Meghalaya has border trade with Bangladesh, the only country with which it shares international border. It looks towards Bangladesh for connectivity and greater 25 The

government passed two notifications exempting such immigrants from the Foreigners Act 1946 and the Passport (Entry into India) Act 1920—which provide for deportation—and enabling them to continue living in India if they had arrived before 31 December 2014. 26 North East Vision 2020, Government of India, 2008, p. 15.

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trade opportunity. Mizoram shares border with Bangladesh and Myanmar. And it is dependent on both for its trade. Therefore, it looks at border as enabler even though insurgents on both sides of India–Bangladesh border has taken advantage of ethnic affinity and have found shelter. India perceives border and border management from a security perspective. Terrorism continues to be a major issue for India, and in this context, managing the porous border becomes a major challenge. There are two main challenges from Indian perspective. First is the use of porous border by smugglers to smuggle arms, contraband and cattle, an extremely sensitive issue in India. Second is the issue of illegal immigration that has a demographic impact on volatile Border State of Assam that at one point of time led to a political movement in that state. The Burdwan blast only compounded India’s sense of insecurity by magnifying the challenge of cross-border network. Though India has put in place comprehensive border patrol mechanism and has introduced rubber bullets, border continues to be breached by smugglers. Some within the security community feel that border patrol, except of the joint patrol in particular sectors, has become sole responsibility of the Border Security Force (BSF), and there is no effort on the part of Bangladesh to impose night curfew or take punitive action against smugglers who breach the border in the wee hour of the day. Rather, there is an effort to blame the BSF for firing without taking into account the smuggling activities that are rampant in the border areas. India has taken several steps and have introduced border area development plan for socio-economic development.

Conclusion India’s perception of Bangladesh has multiple aspects. From being economic enabler to security threat, if relations with Dhaka is not managed properly. It needs to be noted it was during the coalition era states became more assertive in foreign policy. They want to be consulted by the centre. Both the centre and Border States are keen to establish connectivity with Bangladesh; the states also share New Delhi’s concern on issues of security and “illegal migration”. Apart from the government at centre and states, there are cultural actors who perceive Bangladesh and West Bengal as one cultural entity where one part cannot survive without the other. They draw their inspirations from Rabindranath Tagore and Nazrul Islam, the great poets of Bengal. The security agencies perception is restricted to security implications to India. In the past ten years, India–Bangladesh relations have reached greater height. There is close cooperation in infrastructure development; several bus and train services have been operationalised to help the people of the two countries connect. India’s credit line is now a total of more than USD 8 billion. The two countries are engaged in massive power trade, and Bangladesh has provided India access to Mongla and Chittagong with the BBIN framework. The armies of two countries conduct joint anti-terror exercises. There is intelligence cooperation between the two countries to deal with terrorism. Apart from this, there are high-level visits

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and regular dialogues between the two countries. All these have created a positive perception about Bangladesh in India. Though perceptions play an important role in foreign policy, states policy are based on their real interest and reality on the ground. Perception is not based on assumptions only. With relaxed visa regimes and greater cooperation between India and Bangladesh, India’s perception of Bangladesh has changed substantially. Institutionalisation of cooperation, mutuality of security and aspiration to develop their respective country go much beyond perception, and past few years have proved that the two countries can move away from perception to create a bond of friendship based on real politics.

References Burke, S. M., & Lawrence, Z. (1990). Pakistan’s foreign policy: An historical analysis (2nd ed.). Karachi: Oxford University Press. Dixit, J. N. (1999). Liberation and beyond: India-Bangladesh relations. Delhi: Konark Publisher. Dixit, S. (2011). Prime Minister’s comment on Bangladesh raises eyebrows. The Hindu, July 01, 2011. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/prime-ministers-comment-on-bangladesh-raiseseyebrows/article2148355.ece. Habib, H. (2004, May 8–21). A deadly cargo. Frontline, 21(2). Hussain, A. (2004, April 6). Whose arms are they anyway. Daily Star Weekend Magazine, 1(4). Karlekar, H. (2005). Bangladesh: Next Afghanistan. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Pattanaik, S. S. (2009, March). Ascendancy of religious Right in Bangladesh: A Study of Jamaat Islami. Strategic Analysis. Ray, J. K. (2011). India’s foreign relations, 1947–2007. Routledge. Raza, R. (1997). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967–1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Subramanyam, K., & Ayoob, M. (1972). The liberation war. Delhi: S. Chand and Co.

Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations Rajesh S. Kharat and Chunku Bhutia

It is an inspiring task for the researchers’ to see how Bhutan is coping with the political and economic developments in India. The change in India’s foreign and economic policies and programmes due to the global developments has compelled Bhutan to relook at its approach towards India. Although Bhutan has successfully been able to garner benign global attention yet it is her relation with India that would have a catalytic role in defining Bhutans role in world politics. With this background, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s maiden visit to Bhutan had surprised many academicians, policymakers and statesmen not only in India but also in the world. Even Bhutanese government did not expect this honour to their country as few months back there was public resentment against India. However, being one of the small and weak states of South Asia, Bhutan always felt that its relations with India have always been characterised as relations between unequal neighbours. In fact, geostrategic location and considerations decide Bhutan’s destiny as it is sandwiched between two powerful neighbours, India and China, who tend to be hostile towards each other. The recent Doklam issue could be pointer to this. In Bhutan, India always has an edge over China, due to its geographical proximity and more importantly—the British India’s legacy and cultural affinity. Designated Prime Minister Modi’s decision to invite all the Heads of Government (HOG) from SAARC countries for oath ceremony signalled new perspective in India’s foreign policy. Since Indian government have prioritised to develop proximity with its immediate neighbours than other countries, the speculations were made that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government might think of Nepal for Modi’s first maiden visit to any foreign country. Historically, geographically, ethnically and R. S. Kharat (B) Centre for South Asian Studies, SIS, JNU, New Delhi 110067, India e-mail: [email protected] C. Bhutia Sikkim Government College, Burtuk, Gangtok, Sikkim 737101, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_3

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culturally, India is much closer to Nepal than Bhutan. But this did not happen, and India chose Bhutan over Nepal. This sudden change in India’s neighbourhood policy, particularly, vis-à-vis Bhutan, compels the researchers to reassess Bhutan’s perception in India in the contemporary period and analyse the factors responsible for this change. Bhutan being least researched subject in South Asia, it is being observed that there is scarcity of literature on India–Bhutan Relations either by Indian, Bhutanese or Western scholars. The literatures available on Bhutan-India relations are mostly the memoirs of the personnels or officials who worked in Bhutan and India. There has not been much research on the relationship between these two nations. A serious academic work on India–Bhutan is a lacuna in the present literature available on Bhutan. The proposed chapter will fulfil the deficient literature on impact of political system, socio-economic structure and cultural background on contemporary India–Bhutan relations.

Historical Legacies Bhutan’s first contact with the British India gradually evolved into a closer bilateral relationship especially after 1907 when Ugyen Wangchuk became the King of Bhutan. A new treaty was concluded on 8 January 1910 between Bhutan and British India at Punakha. According to this treaty, the Government of Bhutan agreed to conduct its foreign relations under the guidance and advice of British India. Thus, from the Bhutanese point of view, the Treaty of Punakha 1910 changed not only the political history of Bhutan but also the social and economic life in Bhutan. It served the purpose of protecting Bhutan from China’s expansionist policies to maintain a separate political entity without the help of British India, and they found new way to modernise Bhutan and bring radical changes into the economic system of the country with British India’s assistance. On the other hand, the 1910 Treaty of Punakha served British India’s interest by extending its commercial, political and military relations with Tibet through the territory of Bhutan. This treaty made Bhutan completely independent in its internal administration, and it did not form part of the British Indian Empire.1 Accordingly, Bhutan requested the British to guarantee that its relations with the future independent India would be maintained on the same basis after 1947. Soon after independence, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru assured all neighbouring countries that his government was bound by the obligations of the treaties and agreements of former British India. So, when by the summer of 1949, the communists controlled almost all parts of the China’s mainland and established their government, it was seen as a threat both for Bhutan and India. Thus, security considerations compelled both the countries to maintain close and friendly relations with each other. India and Bhutan held negotiations, which lasted till August 1949. Whereas India agreed to assure that it would respect Bhutan’s independence, Bhutan, 1 Labh

(1974), p. 183.

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on the other hand, should maintain the kind of relationship it shared with British. Further, India also agreed to return the area of the Dewangiri hill strip, an area of thirty two sq. miles in Eastern Bhutan (Bhutan had renamed it as Deothang), after Bhutan agreed to revise the essential provisions of the Treaty of 1910.2 Both Bhutan and India signed a new treaty at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949.

The Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 From the Indian side, this Treaty was ratified at the highest level, by C. Rajagopalachari on 22 September 1949 at New Delhi and Jigme Wangchuk, the Maharaja of Bhutan, on 15 September 1949 at Tongsa.3 The Treaty conceded the independent and sovereign status of Bhutan and played a vital role in promoting and fostering friendly relations with India.4 Article 2 of this treaty says that, The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in its external relations.

Thus, India assured Bhutan of its non-interference in its internal affairs. From the Bhutanese point of view, the incorporation of Article 2 in this Treaty has a different meaning altogether. So far as the first part ‘non-interference in the internal administration of Bhutan’ is concerned, it did not create any misinterpretation concerning the sovereign and independent status of Bhutan. However, Article 2 of the Treaty put restrictions on Bhutan from extending her relations beyond India. Bhutan realised the importance of this Treaty on account of the rise of communist power in China and its claims on her lost territories, viz. Tibet, Bhutan and Nepal.5 This was brought home forcefully after the Chinese attack on Tibet took place in 1959, and China declared its suzerainty over Tibet. Hence, the Treaty of 1949 played a significant role in the formulation of the foreign policy of Bhutan. From the Indian point of view, Article 2 of this Treaty has its own significance. In the first place, the Treaty was a logical continuation of the British Indian arrangement. Bhutan is strategically located on India’s northern border. “It is crossed by three rivers: Raidak, Sankosh and Manas. A line of mountains runs through it, rising from about 5,000 feet at the Indian border to the great peak of Jula Kangri which is over 24,000 feet”.6 S. Gopal observes, “Nehru did not expect armed attack on India by China from Tibet, but he did not rule out infiltration by groups or even occupation of disputed areas”.7 Nehru had emphasised that India should take care not to get involved in the 2 Das

(1974), pp. 48–49. Policy of India, Text of Documents: 1947–59 (New Delhi: December 1959), pp. 15–20. 4 Singh (1972), pp. 131–132. 5 Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung Vol. III (1954). London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 72. 6 Kaul (1967), p. 247. 7 Gopal (1984), p. 176. 3 Foreign

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internal squabbles of Bhutan (which he thought, in turn, might encourage China or other foreign influences within its territory).8 In a private meeting with B. M. Kaul, Nehru said that how important it was from India’s point of view to strengthen Bhutan’s friendship in view of her key position on our border and how we must do everything possible to help her. He also said we must treat smaller countries like Bhutan as our equals and never give them an impression that they were being “civilised” by us.9

Thus, from the defence point of view, India benefits from this security arrangement. As an ally of India, Bhutan provides a natural barrier to protect the Himalayan frontier of India by preventing the Chinese from entering into India. Bhutan’s loyalty to India is dictated by the fact that her landlocked position of Bhutan makes her dependent on India for trade, transit and contact with the outside world. Moreover, there are mutual security arrangements like Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan. In 1958, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru during his visit to Bhutan reiterated his government’s cooperation to Bhutan and expressed his hope that Bhutan would not misunderstand Indian policies. Nehru said: Some may think that since India is a great and powerful country and Bhutan a small one, the former might wish to exercise pressure on Bhutan. It is, therefore, essential that I may make it clear to you that our only wish is that you should remain an independent country choosing your way of life and taking the path of progress according to your will. At the same time, we two should live with mutual goodwill. We as members of the same Himalayan family should live as friendly neighbours helping each other. Freedom of both Bhutan and India, should be safeguarded so that none from outside can do harm to it.10

Nehru had undertaken this trip on a pony via Sikkim and the Chumbi Valley. This visit provided an excellent opportunity to have meaningful bilateral dialogue concerning various issues including the economic and social development of Bhutan. He asked Bhutan to get modernised with India’s help and initiated the idea of Bhutan’s Five-Year Development Plans. Nehru also discussed with the Maharaja, the possibility of establishing a road link with India from Bhutan.11 As India aimed at maintaining and securing the independence of Nepal and Bhutan in order to restrict Chinese influence in that region. India was more concerned with Bhutan, “because of the Buddhist cultural background it shared with Tibet, which made Bhutan even more vulnerable to subversion than Nepal”.12 To quote Leo E. Rose, “by and large, the Bhutanese shared the Indian Prime Minister’s concerns over the strategic implications of Chinese controlled Tibet”.13 After his visit to Bhutan in 1958 and realising the import of Chinese designs in the Himalayan region including Bhutan, Prime Minister Nehru declared in the Lok 8 Ibid. 9 Kaul

op. cit., p. 248. Policy of India, Text of Documents, 1967–74 (New Delhi: 1964), p. 8. 11 Arora and Appadorai (1975), p. 81. 12 Rose (1977), p. 74. Also see Rose (1974), p. 194. 13 Ibid., p. 74. 10 Foreign

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Sabha on 28 August 1959 that “the protection of the borders and territorial integrity of Bhutan was the responsibility of India and that India would consider any aggression on Bhutan as an aggression on India”.14 In January–February 1961, the King of Bhutan, Jigme Wangchuk, visited New Delhi to maintain friendly relations with India, and especially to discuss the matter of Bhutan’s economic and defence needs. During the talks, the Bhutanese delegation sought Indian help against any possible Chinese attack. In response, the Indian government with a moral obligation to protect Bhutan introduced the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan with the objective of providing military training to the Bhutanese people and to help Bhutan to build up the Royal Bhutan Army for guarding its borders against any possible Chinese threat. During this visit, for the first time, Bhutan’s flag was flown along with the Indian flag. Thus, Bhutan maintained special relations with India. At the economic level, several economic aid agreements were concluded between the two governments, whereas politically, India helped Bhutan to project its independent identity in international affairs.

Merger of Sikkim with India and Aftermath Sikkim situated at the western border of Bhutan shares its religion and the Mahayana Buddhist tradition with Bhutan. Between 1973 and 1975, several stormy incidents took place in the internal politics of Sikkim. These led to the abolition of monarchy and the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union in 1974. Bhutan described this event as a “loss of cultural identity of a neighbouring Himalayan Kingdom”.15 The Nepali Sikkimese population had sought India’s support for providing a new political system in Sikkim and have it merged with the Indian Union.16 Apart from its apprehensions about the loss of monarchy in Sikkim, Bhutan was more concerned over the rising political consciousness among the Nepali Sikkimese, which posed threat to the monarchical system of Bhutan.17 Bhutan was also worried that the fate of Sikkim may well befall Bhutan sooner or later. One can understand Bhutan’s concerns regarding the Sikkim episode and its passive fallout affecting Indo-Bhutan relations. But, it is also a fact that it was not the 75% Nepalese population of Sikkim that forced the merger, or affected a change in the ruling pattern. It was the discrimination and economic disparity created by a feudal system for self-preservation that actually led to their agitation.18 Besides, the situations of Bhutan and Sikkim have been qualitatively different both in legal and 14 Appadorai

(1982), p. 548.

15 An interview with D. S. Soman (IPS), Internal Security Advisor to the King of Bhutan, from 1969

to 1974, who was eyewitness to many important events of Bhutan. Also see The New York Times (New York) 3 June 1974. 16 Rose, op. cit., p. 103. 17 Ibid. 18 Das, op. cit., p. 122.

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political terms. Before 1947, Bhutan was not a part of British India, unlike Sikkim. Consequently, independent India could not stake a claim to it. Bhutan was also not a protectorate of India as Sikkim had been.19 Moreover, Indo-Bhutan relations were based upon a Treaty of 1949 in which Bhutan’s independence is specifically acknowledged. Further, if Bhutan foresees any threat to its survival as a full-fledged member of the United Nations, it is free to raise its voice in international forums. Thus, Bhutan can act as an independent state.20 As a result, since the 1970s, after becoming a member of the United Nations, Bhutan intensified its efforts to diversify its relations from India. To assert its sovereign and independent status, “in the United Nations, Bhutan has voted independently and not always with India, particularly since 1973”.21 During the coronation ceremony of the King of Bhutan in June 1974, Bhutan invited more than one hundred and fifty foreign delegates. Representatives from USA, Britain, France, China, Soviet Union, Canada, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand attended this function.22 It was for the first time that Bhutan had opened its doors to the outside world. This gathering of major powers in Thimpu boosted its confidence as a sovereign power. The Royal Government of Bhutan put forward two demands before the Government of India in the same year. Firstly Bhutan proposed to open offices in Bonn, London, New York and Paris to issue visas to encourage and facilitate tourist travel to the country.23 Secondly, it wanted to resume trade with Tibet, a practice which reportedly existed before Lhasa was taken over by Beijing.24 These two demands were put forward by Bhutan in the light of the economic backwardness of that country and its urgent requirement of foreign exchange for its developmental efforts. Against this backdrop, the Government of India invited the King of Bhutan to New Delhi. The King of Bhutan visited India on 18 December 1974 and reaffirmed strong and friendly Indo-Bhutan relations on the basis of the Treaty of 1949. His visit, to quote him, was “to reaffirm the warmth and friendship that has traditionally characterised Indo-Bhutan relations”.25 It was his first visit abroad after his coronation. He met the President of India, F. A. Ahmad, and Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. He assured them that he would follow the guidelines of his father to further strengthen the bonds of friendship between India and Bhutan. Both countries expressed satisfaction with the existing arrangement between the two countries. For instance, (a) India agreed to assist and fulfil the objective of Bhutan’s Third Five-Year Plan, (b) talks were held on the issue of construction of Chukha Project and (c) a cement plant at Pagali was also planned.26 19 Jigme

Singye Wangchuk said this at an interview with Asia Week (Hong Kong) 27 September 1985, p. 47. 20 Rose, op. cit., p. 104. 21 Muni (1984a), p. 519. 22 The New York Times, 7 June 1974. 23 The Statesman, 13 November 1974. 24 Ibid. 25 The Times of India (New Delhi), 23 December 1974. 26 Ibid.

Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations

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In August 1976, the King of Bhutan again visited New Delhi to strengthen the Indo-Bhutan relations. He appreciated India for its economic and developmental assistance to Bhutan. To quote him, “The friendship, generosity and understanding, which the Government of India has shown towards my government and people is deeply appreciated”.27 The domestic upheaval in India did not alter the Indo-Bhutanese relations to any great degree. The emergence of the new regime led by the Janata Dal Government in 1977 changed the direction of India’s foreign policy and followed the “policy of genuine non-alignment and beneficial bilateralism”.28 The execution of the policy of “beneficial bilateralism” had three important dimensions, namely (i) personal rapport, (ii) economic accommodation and (iii) political neutrality and non-interference in internal affairs.29 The Janata government appointed J. R. Hiremath as Indian Representative to Bhutan. While presenting his credentials to the King of Bhutan, he assured Bhutan that “India had no interest except Bhutan’s progress and the mutual security of both the countries”.30 This assurance was significant in view of Bhutan’s apprehension regarding India’s intentions following the earlier merger of Sikkim in 1974. In response, the King of Bhutan expected that India would continue to assist it in every possible way towards the accomplishment of its goal of economic selfreliance.31 This was followed by the Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to Bhutan in November 1977. Vajpayee stated that his government would, “remove the scope for misunderstanding in our relations with our neighbours, avoid the build-up of any situation which would lead to irritants at the political level and thus contribute to the further consolidation of the basis of mutual trust and confidence in each other”.32 For instance, in the past Bhutanese students with an offer of foreign scholarships were required to obtain a “P” form from India for travel to those countries.33 During this visit, this irritant was removed by the Government of India. During his visit to New Delhi in March 1978, the King of Bhutan acknowledged generous Indian support and assistance to Bhutan’s effort at modernisation and economic self-reliance.34 He also mentioned that Bhutan and India had developed genuine friendship and trust and had based their relationship on common interests and aspirations. He said: Mr. President, I want you to know that my people and I place our complete trust and faith in our friendship with India. I am confident that both India and Bhutan will continue to do

27 Hindustan

Times, 14 August 1976. (1979), pp. 417–433. 29 Ibid., p. 418. 30 Deccan Chronicle (Bangalore), 28 August 1977. 31 Ibid. 32 Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 22, No. 11, November 1977, p. 219; The Hindu (New Delhi) 23 November 1977. 33 The Hindu, 23 November 1977. 34 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 27 March 1978. 28 Muni

42

R. S. Kharat and C. Bhutia everything possible to further strengthen Indo-Bhutan friendship which is so important to the interest of both the countries.35

India continued with its assistance to Bhutan, particularly in the survey of the Begana and Raidak hydroelectric schemes, and a number of micro-hydel power projects in Bhutan.36 However, in July 1978, Bhutan expressed its concern over the interpretation of Article 2 of the Treaty of 1949. In a statement, Bhutan reminded the Government of India that, “in regard to its external relations, it would be entirely up to the Royal Government of Bhutan to decide whether to accept such advice or not. It is not correct to say that Bhutan’s future still depends on Indian goodwill and friendship”.37 These statements reflected Bhutan’s eagerness to seek more and more independence from the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949. In the year 1979, during the Non-Aligned Summit at Havana, Bhutan took a position on the Kampuchean (Cambodian) issue which was not only contrary to that of India, but also favoured China. “India wanted to keep the Kampuchean seat vacant, while Bhutan voted to allow it to be occupied by the representation of the ousted Pol Pot government”.38 While explaining his stand on this issue, the King of Bhutan said “Our stand on Cambodia is a small step forward”.39 Thus Bhutan’s small step forward actually became a stepping stone in its independent foreign policy especially in the context of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949. The King asked for “updating” the treaty with India, during his brief stopover at Bombay on his way back home from the Havana Summit. He stated that, “There are no problems between our countries and our friendship is deeper today than in 1949. But why leave any loose interpretation? It will be to the advantage of both India and Bhutan to update the treaty”.40 Two incidents that impelled Bhutan into asserting its independence of action under the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 may be cited here. One was an occasion when the Indian Foreign Minister, S. N. Misra, passed unsavoury remarks about Bhutan’s support to the Kampuchean regime at the Havana Non-Aligned Summit. He said Bhutan had given vent to the feelings of some of the small countries by supporting Pol Pot at Havana.41 The other occasion was the circulation of newspaper reports to the effect that the Chinese were intruding into Bhutan creating a crisis situation there. It was further alleged that Bhutan was moving closer to China.42 The King of Bhutan reacted strongly to this allegation and asserted that, “it was utter nonsense to say that Bhutan was turning towards China”.43 However, this misunderstanding was removed, when the King of Bhutan clarified that Bhutan’s National Assembly 35 Ibid.

Also see the Text of King of Bhutan’s Speech. Hindustan Times, 25 March 1978. 37 National Herald (New Delhi), 24 November 1978. 38 Ram (1980), p. 32. 39 An interview with Asia Week, 27 September 1985, p. 47. 40 The Times of India (Bombay), 11 September 1979. 41 The Patriot (New Delhi), 14 September 1979. 42 New Wave (New Delhi), 28 March 1982 and The Indian Express (New Delhi), 11 November 1982. 43 Ibid. 36 The

Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations

43

had already passed a unanimous resolution in 1978 not to open trade or diplomatic missions with China.44 He said, “though Bhutan did not want trade with China, it did not wish to annoy or provoke Peking either, in any way”.45 Thus, one can say and observe that Bhutan’s foreign policy had become both more sensitive and assertive at a time when there was an absence of strong government in India. In 1979, when the Janata Government in pursuit of its policy of “beneficial bilateralism” initiated steps towards normalisation of Sino-India relations, some members of the Bhutanese National Assembly expressed the desire to establish direct contacts with China.46 So, Bhutan approached India in this regard, especially, “since the Sino-India war of 1962, Bhutan was insisting on bilateral talks with China”.47 In the meantime, India had surveyed Bhutan’s border with the Tibet region of China and helped the country establish its own Survey Department in 1972. Finally, with the establishment of a Boundary Commission in 1981, the Government of India allowed Bhutan to hold bilateral talks with China, and to make further progress in that direction, Bhutan sent a diplomatic note to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi in March 1981.48 Thus, Bhutan established informal contacts with China. All these developments show that Bhutan has gone through a gradual process of diversification in Indo-Bhutan relationship, particularly during the period 1975–80. It was a time of political instability in India due to the declaration of the Emergency, and the coming to power of the first non-Congress government. Bhutan did not lose any opportunity to assert its independent foreign policy and project its identity in world politics during this period.

Bhutan–China Relations: Bone of Contention In the process of normalisation of Sino-Indian relations, Bhutan had also shown some interest in solving its own problems. Hence, with the help of the King of Bhutan and some documents, the Government of India surveyed Bhutan’s border along with the Tibet region of China and helped the country establish its own Survey Department in 1972. The establishment of a Boundary Commission followed in 1981.49 This committee on the basis of the historical documents and survey reports decided its claims on the boundary line with China.50 Later on, with India’s approval, Bhutan started direct talks with China in 1984, to sort out its boundary problems. Also, Bhutan established informal contacts with China through a diplomatic note sent to 44 The

Times of India, n. 110.

45 Ibid. 46 Kohli

(1986), p. 149. (1984b). 48 Muni, The World Today, op. cit., pp. 515–516. 49 Muni (1984a), pp. 515–516. 50 Ibid. 47 Muni

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the Chinese embassy in New Delhi in March 1981. On this point to quote S. D. Muni, “the opening of direct talks between Bhutan and China for the settlement of their long-standing boundary dispute can be considered as the most important development in Bhutan’s steadily evolving foreign policy”.51 Bhutanese eagerness to have direct talks with China could be seen from the speech the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Dawa Tshering, at the Tshogudu in June 1981. He said that Bhutan would like to start direct and bilateral negotiations with China to delineate and demarcate the Bhutan–China boundary and that the status quo in the present Bhutan traditional border should be maintained until such time as the border negotiations were concluded.52 The first round of boundary talks was held at Beijing in 1984. At this time, the Chinese made it clear that their approach to the boundary issue with Bhutan would be the same as in the case of Pakistan, Burma and Nepal.53 This meant that China recognised the independent and sovereign status of Bhutan. The second point on which China was firm was that it would not accept Bhutanese claims on strategic points. It added that it would be more generous on less important territorial claims, but not on strategic points which are more advantageous to Bhutan and India,54 China would pressurise Bhutan into accepting the Chinese claims. The second round of talks was held in April 1985 at Thimpu, Bhutan, when both sides realised that there was not much of a dispute between the Bhutanese and Chinese positions55 over their traditional boundary. It was possible that some convenient means could be adopted to develop cordial relations between Bhutan and China. The third round of border talks was held in Beijing in June 1986. At this time, the Chinese Premier, Jiang Zemin, assured the Bhutanese delegation, Yeshi Tobgyel that Chinese would not interfere in Bhutan’s internal affairs and the two countries vowed to maintain a ‘peaceful and friendly border’ while seeking an early settlement.56

However, in India, the fear persisted that at the final stage China may bargain with Bhutan in demarcating its border with Bhutan and would ask for its direct presence in Bhutan through diplomatic facilities or/and cultural relations. The fourth round of border talks was held in 1987 at Thimpu once again. The fifth round of border talks was held in Beijing from 10 to 14 May 1988. At these talks, both the countries concurred on four-point pattern of guiding principles which would govern their mutual relations and issued a joint statement to this effect. These guiding principles of the boundary talks are as follows: (1) Observing the five principles of peaceful co-existence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality; and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. 51 Muni, 52 Muni

n. 51. (1986), pp. 17–20.

53 Ibid. 54 Muni,

n. 51. Kuensel, 2 May 1985. 56 Ram (1986), p. 28. 55 The

Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations

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(2) Treating each other on an equal footing and entering into friendly consultations on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation with a view to reaching a just and reasonable settlement. (3) Taking account of the relevant historical background based on traditions, custom, usage and administrative jurisdiction while accommodating the national sentiments of the people and the national interest of the two countries. (4) Pending final settlement of the boundary question, maintaining tranquillity on the border and status quo of the boundary as before March 1959, and refraining from unilateral action or the use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary.57

Both sides exchanged views on the demarcation of the Bhutanese–Chinese Border. The two sides reiterated their desire to maintain a peaceful and friendly border and expressed their keen determination to make every effort for an early demarcation of the boundary.58 Both expressed their satisfaction with the result of the talks. The two delegations also had a useful exchange of views on international issues of mutual interest and concern and briefed each other on the efforts of their countries towards economic development and commended the achievement made by each other.59 In this way, the first five rounds of talks were spent on finalising the four guiding principles. It is important to note that though the Chinese always give assurance of observing peaceful coexistence between them and others, in practice, they do not follow this. The question of the Sino-Indian border dispute may be recalled here where the peaceful coexistence agreement in 1954 was violated by the Chinese attack on India in 1962. The sixth round of border talks took place in Beijing in 1989 where substantive talks were initiated on the issue of demarcation of Sino-Bhutanese boundary. During these talks, both countries had claimed the 495 km2 areas of Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys as part of their territories, respectively. In particular, the Bhutanese delegation claimed that these valleys are Bhutan’s territory on the ground that these valleys are below the source of Bazaraguru chhu (river) of Kurote Dzongkhang of Bhutan.60 In response to the Bhutanese claims, the Chinese delegation offered a package proposal to Bhutan at the seventh round of talks which took place in Thimpu in August 1990. According to this proposal, the Chinese had ‘offered to give Bhutan the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys, with an area of 495 km2 in the central sector of the boundary if Bhutan agreed to concede the 269 km2 disputed area in the western sector.’ 61 This offer was made to Bhutan, as the 269 km2 area in the western sector had great strategic significance to the Chinese for their security. However, the Bhutanese delegation did not agree to the Chinese proposal. But Bhutan’s Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering, said that the border talks between the two countries, which were held in a cordial atmosphere continued to make steady progress towards a resolution of the 57 The

Times of India (New Delhi), 15 May 1988. Kuensel, 4 June 1988. 59 Ibid. 60 The Times of India, (New Delhi), 15 May 1988. 61 Ibid. 58 The

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boundary problem.62 He also said the border issue could not be resolved overnight. Both sides must show patience and tolerance and must make every effort to resolve the problem.63 On this occasion, the Chinese representative Mr. Qi Huaiyuan, Vice Foreign Minister of PRC, said that they discovered that their two countries have many similar views on international issues,64 but did not specify it. It is interesting to note that Bhutanese foreign minister said, Bhutan shared China’s aspiration for peace and stability in Asia and the world to provide a better and more dignified life for its people. He said, “Bhutan respected China’s adherence to the five principles of peaceful co-existence which was its basis for relations with other states”.65

The eighth rounds of talks were held in Beijing in 1992. During this time, some positive developments took place. During the talks, according to Foreign Minister of Bhutan, “the Chinese side have more or less agreed to concede the areas of Pasamlung, Jakarlung and Majathang to Bhutan, which was claimed by them as part of their territory”.66 The ninth round of Sino-Bhutanese boundary talks concluded in Thimpu on 30 June 1993. The two delegations issued a joint statement describing the talks, as “useful and constructive which helped it further enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the two governments and peoples”.67 The tenth round of talks took place in Thimpu in 1995. At this time, both sides explained their claims to each other in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation. On the occasion of the seventy-fourth session of the National Assembly, His Majesty, the King of Bhutan said that, the boundary talks between Bhutan and China began 1984, when there were more than 1,000 Square Kilometers of territory under dispute. After the past rounds of talks, there are essentially only three areas in the western sector which are still under negotiation. These are 89 square kilometers in Doklam, 42 square kilometers in Sinchulumpa, and 138 square kilometers in Shakhatoe, a total of 269 square kilometers.68

He also said Bhutan–China Boundary is an important issue because it affects Bhutan’s national interest and the well-being of the Bhutanese people. The eleventh round of talks concluded in Beijing in November 1996. Bhutan was represented by the Foreign Minister of Bhutan and the Secretary of Survey. They put forward Bhutan’s claims to Doklam Sinchulung, Dramana and Shakhatoe in the western sector of the northern border and stressed that these were vital as pasture 62 The

Kuensel, 1 September 1990.

63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 The

Kuensel, 10 August 1996, p. 17. Kuensel, 3 July 1993. 68 National Assembly Debates, The Kuensel, 10 August 1996, p. 17. 67 The

Changing Dynamics of India–Bhutan Relations

47

land for the people of the Haa Valley.69 The delegation also informed their Chinese counterpart that Tibetan herdsmen had been intruding into ‘Majathang and Jakarlung in the central sector of the boundary and had even constructed sheds’.70 In response, according to the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, “Chinese Officials did not make any comment on the Bhutanese territorial claims but on the question of intrusion by Tibetan herdsmen; they pointed out that since there was no agreement on the proposal (offered by the Chinese during the seventh round of talks) they could not control the activities of Tibetan herders along the borders”.71 Although the twelfth round of talks took place in Thimpu in November 1997, on the basis of the eleventh round of talks, we can surmise that the Chinese are reluctant to reduce their claims on the western sector which is strategically important for them or to interfere in the question of Tibetan yak herders’ intrusion into Bhutanese territory unless and until the Bhutanese accept the proposal of exchange of an area of 495 km2 with the pasture land an area of 269 km2 . On the other hand, Bhutan cannot accept this kind of Chinese proposal, as large numbers of Bhutanese people depend on livestock for their livelihood; these pasture lands were vital for their survival. In addition to this, the Bhutanese claim that both the areas had always belonged to the Bhutanese.72 Till 1997, twelve rounds of talks had been completed but there was no sign of permanently resolving this issue. This delay in any concrete decision by both parties creates a lot of misunderstanding in Indo-Bhutan relations, since India’s strategic interest is very much involved in the Himalayan Kingdom. On the issue of further delay in final decisions on boundary talks, Bhutan made a typical diplomatic answer: “Big Objectives take time to fullfil”.73 To quote the Foreign Minister of Bhutan “I am optimistic about the final outcome of the boundary talks”. He added “it would be better to conduct the talks without haste and with great care and patience as it involves the national interest of the country”.74 Thus, Bhutan wants to ensure that its traditional grazing land is not affected and that the boundary is demarcated according to traditional lines.75 As China is one of the largest and most powerful nations in the world today, the Foreign Minister said that a small country like Bhutan must be tactful in its approach to its boundary negotiations with its large neighbour because it cannot afford to lose even a single sq. km. of land.76 Nevertheless, the year 1998 has changed the direction of Sino-Bhutan boundary talks in more concrete manner. The talks focused on three important points: 1. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Bhutan and China; 69 National

Assembly Debates, The Kuensel, 9 August, 1997, p. 2.

70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 The

Kuensel, 16 September 1995. Kuensel, 9 August 1997. 75 Ibid. 76 The Kuensel, 16 September 1995. 74 The

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2. The establishment of trade relations with China; and 3. The question of the exchange of land.77 Bhutan and China also signed an Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity on the Bhutan–China border in 1998, which is the first Sino-Bhutanese agreement or treaty till today. There was no final decision on the exchange of territories as the proposed area to be exchanged has borders with the Indian state of Sikkim. It shows Bhutan’s concern not to jeopardise India’s interest in the Himalayan region while maintaining its formal relations with China. The thirteenth round of border talks took place in Thimpu in September 1999, and China was represented by Wang Yi, Assistant Foreign Minister. He stated that he had come to Thimpu for “signing the last year’s intergovernmental agreement between the two countries, which has special importance and significance”. On the issue of friendship between the two countries, he said: China has always pursued a policy of developing friendly relations with all its neighbouring countries on the basis of five principles of peaceful co-existence… and we hold the view that countries, big or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, should all be equal members of the international community. We have, all along, treated Bhutan as an equal neighbour.78

The fourteenth round of boundary talks was held in Beijing in November 2000. Bhutanese Foreign Minister Jigmi Thinley led a seven-member delegation to China and met Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji, and Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan. Both countries “expressed their satisfaction with the progress being made on the boundary discussions and agreed to continue the dialogue in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”.79 The Sino-Bhutan relationship thus developed steadily since the two countries had signed an agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border area in 1998. During this round of talks, Bhutan extended its claim to the line of the border beyond what the Chinese government had offered. Bhutan also proposed technical discussions, between experts from the two sides using maps. The King told the National Assembly of Bhutan on 14 July 2001 that the proposed extension of the border along the three sectors under discussion was in Doglam, Sinchulumba and Dramana areas. He expressed confidence that Bhutan being a small country and China being a very large and friendly neighbour, the demarcation of the boundary would be completed successfully in the near future.80 The fifteenth round of boundary talks was held in Thimphu, in November 2001. Vice Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, led Chinese delegation, whereas its Foreign Minister, Jigmi Thinley, represented Bhutan. Since the discussion was focused on the international boundary between the two countries, Wang Yi. Said:

77 “Bhutan-China

Border Talks”, The People’s Review, 24–31 December 1998. Retrieved from https://www.yomari.com/p-review/1998/12/241298/bhut.html. Accessed on 21 January 1999. 78 The Kuensel, 25 September–1 October 1999, p. 1. 79 The Kuensel, 2 December 2000, p. 1. 80 The Kuensel, July 2001, p 1.

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As China and Bhutan are neighbouring countries, with shared mountains and rivers, we should first of all achieve mutual understanding and, on the basis of mutual understanding, we can achieve mutual support and mutual confidence and mutual assistance. We have made a lot of achievements in this regard. We will work on this basis to make further progress.” He added. “It is my view that what counts most is that we must continue the process and, during this process, enhance the mutual understanding so we can work together to remove the outstanding relatively minor issues.”81

The sixteenth round of China–Bhutan boundary talks was held in Beijing, China, on 12 October 2002. Bhutanese Foreign Minister Lyonpo Jigme Yoeser Thinley met the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji. Chinese Premier stated that China and Bhutan are resolving their boundary issues through mutual understanding and reconciliation and the 16 rounds of talks to date had achieved successes.82 He expressed China’s appreciation of the Bhutanese government’s support on issues like Taiwan and human rights and hoped to develop cooperative relations based on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.83 In response, Bhutan’s Foreign Minister reiterated Bhutan’s consistent stand on the issues of Taiwan and human rights and emphasised that Bhutan would continue to firmly support China on the issues.84 After so many rounds of talks between Bhutan and China, one can surmise that the Chinese have been reluctant to reduce their claims on the western sector, which is strategically important for them, or to interfere in the question of Tibetan yak herders’ intrusion into Bhutanese territory unless and until the Bhutanese accept the proposal of exchange of an area of 495 km2 with the pasture lands covering an area of 269 km2 . On the other hand, Bhutan is reluctant to accept the Chinese proposal, as large number of Bhutanese people depends on livestock for their livelihood; these pasture lands are vital for their survival. The Bhutanese also claim that both the areas had always belonged to the Bhutanese.85 Bhutan wants to ensure that its traditional grazing land is not affected and that the boundary is demarcated according to traditional lines.86 Besides boundary talks with China, on the other hand Bhutan also continued to engage dialogues with China on other platforms. For instance, former Prime Minister Jigme Thinley’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao at the sidelines of the Rio +20 summit on 21 June 2012 has created furore. It was assumed that Bhutan was negotiating with China for formal diplomatic relations, and once again, one of the most sensitive and contentious issues of Bhutanese foreign policy back into the public domain. The reason behind this uproar was it was first time the two Heads of the Government met first time and discussed bilateral issues of mutual interest and multilateral cooperation including Bhutan’s bid for a non-permanent seat on UN Security Council for the term 2013–2014, elections for which were to be held in 81 Retrieved from http:www.yomari.com/p-review/1998/12/241298/bhut.html. Accessed on 21 Jan-

uary 1999. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 “National Assembly Debates”, The Kuensel, 9 August 1997, p. 2. 86 Ibid.

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that year in Bhutan. Although Bhutan refuted these allegations, it was reported that Thinley purchased a fleet of 20 buses from the Chinese motor vehicle company and the contract for his son.87 Moreover, Bhutan’s bid to establish diplomatic ties with China was confirmed by the official Press Release of PRC (People’s Republic of China) on 22 June 2012. The press release also appreciated Bhutan’s staunch support to One China Policy and her position on issues concerning Taiwan and Tibet and willing to settle border issues in an cooperative manner, enhance bilateral economic and trade cooperation and people-to-people and cultural exchanges and carry out close communication and coordination in international and regional affairs.88

In the backdrop of the meeting at Rio in June 2012, the twentieth round of border talks was held in Thimpu, between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying and acting Bhutanese Foreign Minister Khandu Wangchuk. During this meeting, Chinese Minister said China hopes to make joint efforts with Bhutan on the basis of previous talks, continue to seek fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solutions through friendly consultations and make the border line a bridge of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.89

In other words, she suggests while engaging boundary talks with Bhutan China intends to open up other channels like diplomatic relations at the moment and keep critical issues for pending. In response the Bhutanese Minister re-reiterated Bhutan firmly pursues the one-China policy, thinks highly of China’s long-term foreign policy of treating all countries as equals, no matter large or small and good-neighbourly friendship and is willing to strengthen coordination with China on the international arena.90

Thus, twentieth round of talk almost prepared the ground to establish the diplomatic relations between the two. However, the twenty-first round of talks was held in August 2013. No major decisions were taken in this meeting. Bhutan did not continue further dialogue with China about diplomatic ties. Probably, Bhutan must have realised India’s uneasiness and considered India’s strategic stakes in Bhutan vis-à-vis China. In fact, earlier, New Delhi expressed its concern over the developments on Bhutan–China borders. In Haa, as it was reported in Times of India on 26 June 2013, the Chinese army entered into Bhutan’s north-eastern region and set up three military camps. “According to intelligence reports, the PLA entered through the Sektang region in the east and Pang La in the north, and carried out a series of patrols along their shared border”.91 Bhutan was in a great difficulty either to resist China’s military advancement or to accept China’s aggressive postures in order to minimise India’s presence in Bhutan, because in both the situations, it is Bhutan who would suffer most. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid.

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Despite this dilemma in its foreign policy, Bhutan during Thinely’s period chose to continue hobnobbing. All these developments raised serious concerns in the security and foreign policy establishment of India. India expressed its unhappiness over this and discontinued the subsidy on LPG and kerosene it supplied to Bhutan when Bhutan was at the peak of its second general election campaign in July 2013. Later on, Indian government cleared the air and announced that Bhutan did not renew the agreement which was expired in June 2013 and Bhutan did not ask to renew it so India had no other option but to discontinue the subsidies given to it. However, matter was resolved immediately when new government was formed by People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Bhutan’s new Prime Minister Tsering Tobgyal took official position that his government’s priority is to maintain friendly relations with India and maintain status quo. In nutshell, Bhutan must have realised that it cannot do away with India whether they like or not. Later on, it had direct impact on Bhutan–China relations when twenty-second round of border talk was held in July 2014. In the 22nd round of boundary talks, the two countries endorsed the joint technical field survey report on the central northern disputed areas of Bayul-Pasamlung that comprised of 496 km2 of disputed areas. In the meantime, India honoured Bhutan when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose to visit it as first foreign destination. The 23rd boundary talks were held in Thimpu on 24 August 2015 based on guiding principles signed in 1998, in which both governments decided that the final phase of the joint technical field survey of disputed areas in western Bhutan will be carried out in September 2015. In fact, the first joint technical field survey of the western region was conducted in June 2015. So in continuation of this joint technical field survey, a meeting of the expert group supposed to compile a joint report of the two surveys of the western sector. The western sector comprises of 269 km2 of disputed areas in northern Haa and Paro. Then, the two governments will consider the joint report and the boundary resolution plans as proposed by the expert group, in the next round of boundary talks.

Bhutan’s Perception in India: An Analysis India’s perception of Bhutan can be analysed with the application of the game theory propounded by Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. It is understood that the study of international relations involves the study of interactions among nation states. These interactions are often governed by interdependent goal-directed activities. In this context, interdependency means that “the achievement of the goals of any nation-state does not depend only upon its own actions, but also upon those of the other nation-states”.92 So, this theory looks into the decision-making process of the decision-makers and also studies the influence of the reactions and choices of other decision-makers in it.93 These reflect that according to the theory in international 92 Correa

(2001). (2017).

93 Quackenbush

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politics, the action and strategy of a nation is contingent on the reaction and strategies of the other nations. It is on this basis that the relationship between India and Bhutan needs to be understood. As mentioned earlier about Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s maiden foreign visit to Bhutan after the 2014 general elections, there have been enormous discussions about the reason behind Bhutan being the chosen country. It has been said that Bhutan is a “zero-problem model neighbour and a zero-problem destination” for India.94 Since Bhutan has offered itself as a non-offensive neighbour to India, the latter’s perception and approach also reflects cordiality and friendliness. This is exactly the game theory talks about, wherein the actions and strategies of a nation are defined by the other nations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi defines the relationship between India and Bhutan as “unique and special”. During his maiden visit, the Bhutanese students sang a welcome song for him and the lyrics of the song were like “…people of India you are truly blessed with a great leader…whose compassion and competence will serve you well…for the kind gesture we are very grateful…”95 Such a friendly and respectful gesture on the part of Bhutan would influence India’s perception of Bhutan and so Minister of External Affairs, Government of India Sushma Swaraj describes the relationship between India and Bhutan as “a unique partnership built on shared values and aspirations, utmost trust and mutual respect. It is a unique partnership built on the historical and cultural linkages between the two countries”.96 India on one hand acknowledges the friendly relationship it shares with Bhutan, but at the same time India does not refrain from putting across some stern opinions to its neighbouring nations specifically to Bhutan. While addressing to a joint session in the Parliament in Bhutan in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi Strength of a democracy is very important for the region and its people. The stronger India will be, the better it is for Bhutan and other SAARC (South Asian Association for regional cooperation) nations. A strong and stable India is needed to make sure that we can help our neighbours with their problems.97

He also added that “If you walk a few steps, we too feel like walking those steps and supporting you”.98 These statements reflect the nature of approach and perception India holds for Bhutan. India is of the view that Bhutan would not prefer China’s close presence in its borders because as propagated by realist theory of international relations, every nation 94 Sharma

(2014).

95 https://www.news18.com/news/politics/modi-bhutanese-song-695475.html. 96 (2018,

12 Februrary) ‘Time to reflect on Advancing Ties with Bhutan: Sushma’ The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/time-to-reflect-on-advancing-tieswith-bhutan-sushma/articleshow/63013005.cms. Accessed on 18 March 2018. 97 (2014, 23 June) ‘Stronger India will be better for Bhutan, SAARC nations: PM Narendra Modi’ Hindustan Times. Retrieved from https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/stronger-india-will-bebetter-for-bhutan-saarc-nations-pm-narendra-modi/story-4NMHHGYWIFe31xugxBsK2O.html. Accessed on 18 March 2018. 98 Ibid.

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is drawn towards securing its national interest. So, the national interest of Bhutan would be to politically, economically and socially provide a safe haven for its people. In the pursuit of their national interest, India has a greater role to play as it not just shares border but India also has proved itself as its largest trading partner. In 2016, as mentioned by Sushma Swaraj the bilateral trade between the two nations stood at Rs. 8,723 crore.99 In fact, as mentioned earlier, in 2013 prior to the general election in Bhutan, the subsidised supply of kerosene and LPG was stalled by India to Bhutan. This was shocking for Bhutan but to some extent this could have been anticipated as, India was bound to react at the growing boundary talks and diplomatic relationship of Bhutan with China. Such happenings have made it clear that Bhutan cannot afford to ignore or break its ties with India. So, it needs to be understood that Bhutan in order to secure its national interest would choose rationally to maintain its ties with India. India as such is aware of Bhutan’s position as a landlocked small country in between the two Asian giants India and China and the non-conflictual relationship it shares with Bhutan which is essential for securing their respective national interest.

Conclusion In next few years, it is construed that once the issue of demarcation of boundary lines between Bhutan and China is settled down, China will try to intensify its policy of encirclement and campaign in South Asia and complete in Bhutan, by offering economic packages to Bhutan and creating situations to accept these assistance in order to make its presence in Bhutan, because strategically, China needs Bhutan more than Bhutan needs China in the Himalayan region. For instance, China needs the uninterrupted logistic facilities like surveillance to monitor the Indian military movements in the western sector to counter Indian interest in the Himalayan region while uniting the small neighbours including Bhutan. Secondly, Bhutan is the only country left out of its 14 neighbours; China could not establish diplomatic relations and resolve issues of demarcating the borders as it will create norms that will be followed in India–China border talks. Thirdly, to access Bhutan’s untapped natural resources like timber and hydropower potentials. Fourthly, to enhance bilateral economic trade and cooperation and people to people contact and carry out close communication and coordination in international and regional affairs and cultural exchanges. Nevertheless, while maintaining good and equal relations with a small state, China is able to show the world that it is peace-loving country and can never be a dictator in international relations. It helps China to improve her image in the world politics. Thus, the Chinese intentions in Eastern Himalayan region will have direct impact on India’s policy in Bhutan, like (1) constant pressure on India to resolve border 99 (2018, 12 February) ‘Time to reflect on Advancing Ties with Bhutan: Sushma’ The Times of India. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/time-to-reflect-on-advancing-tieswith-bhutan-sushma/articleshow/63013005.cms. Accessed on 18 March 2018.

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issues and also allow Bhutan to accept the package deal proposed by the Chinese. (2) Diplomatic manoeuvering by the Chinese on the Indian border states in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh region and Tezpur-Bombdila-Twang-Bum La–Tsona Dzong. Area (Tezpur-Bum La- Tsona Dzong) is very close to Bhutan, and Chinese goods in large quantities are being brought in through adjacent Mele La in Bhutan and Lhasa is also only 600 km away. (3) Many Bhutanese scholars are being invited in China with fellowships and academic exchanges. As a result, Chinese assistance may neutralise Bhutan instead of pro-India on international occasions. Therefore, there is possibility of increase in number of aspirant FDI investors in Bhutan after revision of FDI policy in 2010 (17 approved, Indian only 8), indirectly challenging India’s economic interest in Bhutan and region too. Moreover, India’s alleged economic blockade (withdrawal of subsidies) during the elections in Bhutan has damaged the century-old trust and faith and left permanent mark in minds of Bhutanese. At this critical juncture, India should respond with positive and pro-active policies such as (1) keep engaging Bhutan, economic assistance, official interactions, help in the sectors like health, education, developing infra-structure. (2) Open Multi-track Diplomacy, India-Bhutan Friendship Council, Academic Exchanges. (3) Maintain a “Non-reciprocal” relation with spirit of Beneficial Bilateralism of 1970s which was continued by Gujaral Doctrine and carry forwarded by India’s present Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (4) Develop and inculcate confidence among Bhutanese people about its friendly gestures. (5) Provide an access for Transit and Trade with other SAARC nations. (6) Respect and support Bhutan to protect its national pride and culture. Although Bhutan is not interested in using China as counterbalance for IndoBhutan relations, it is more inclined to maintain reasonable relations with it without offending India’s interest in the region. One can be reminded by the quote of Leo E. Rose, who predicted that “No doubt the Royal Government wants China as a friendly (or at least non-threatening) neighbour, but one with whom relations are correct rather than intimate”. This is how a small state like Bhutan followed a policy which works for its survival when it is sandwiched between two powerful rivals. Such a policy cannot but be ambivalent and non-antagonistic. A small state has little choice other than to maintain a low profile in dealing with its larger and more powerful neighbours. This is the strategic stand taken by Bhutan vis-à-vis China.

References Appadorai, A. (1982). Selected documents on Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–72 (Vol. I). Delhi: Oxford University Press. Arora, V. K., & Appadorai, A. (1975). India in world affairs 1957–58. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. Correa, H. (2001). Game theory as an instrument for the analysis of international relations, p. 2. Retrieved from www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/vol14-2/14-2hector.pdf. Retrieved March 18, 2018.

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Das, N. (1974). The Dragon Country: The general history of Bhutan. Bombay: Orient Longman. Gopal, S. (1984). Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography (Vol. 2, 1947–56). Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kaul, B. M. (1967). The untold story. Bombay: Allied Publishers. Kohli, M. (1986). Bhutan’s strategic environment: Changing perception. India Quarterly, 42(2) [New Delhi: Sage Publication]. Labh, K. L. (1974). India and Bhutan. New Delhi: Sindhu Publication. Muni, S. D. (1979). India’s beneficial bilateralism in South Asia. India Quarterly, 25(4) [Delhi: Sage Publications]. Muni, S. D. (1984a). Bhutan steps out. The World Today, 40(12) [London: Chatham House]. Muni, S. D. (1984b, June 12). Sino-Bhutanese boundary talks. The Indian Express. New Delhi Edition. Muni, S. D. (1986). Sino-Bhutanese boundary and implications for India. Mainstream, XXIV (41). Quackenbush, L. S. (2017). Game theory and inter-state conflict. Retrieved from http://www. oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0071. xml. Retrieved March 18, 2018. Ram, M. (1980). Bhutan: Keeping a neighbour in line. Far eastern economic review. Hong Kong: Dow Jones and Company. Ram, M. (1986). Bhutan: Solution at sight. Far Eastern Economic Review. Hongkong: Dow Jones and Company. Rose, L. E. (1974, Summer). Bhutan’s external relations. Pacific Affairs, 47(2) [Canada: Vancouver]. Rose, L. E. (1977). The politics of Bhutan. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Sharma, R. (2014, June 7). Why Modi picked Bhutan for his first visit as PM. First Post. Retrieved from www.firstpost.com/…/why-modi-picked-bhutan-for-his-first-foreign-visitas-pm-1559. Retrieved March 18, 2018. Singh, N. (1972). Bhutan: A kingdom in the Himalayas. New Delhi: Thomas Press.

Perceptions on India–Maldives Relations Over the Decades T. C. Karthikheyan

Introduction The process of advancement of a nation state towards planned objectives is greatly tilted towards development. As such, the major indicators of development are economic growth, equity in distribution and overall good quality of life, which is not possible without the cooperation of international community particularly if it is a small island state like Maldives. Maldives has a very narrow economic base and that creates economic problems. It has long been under an authoritarian rule, and its political stability is now under turbulence. Maldives is also facing severe environmental problems with regard to global warming and the ill effects of sea-level rise. It also has the problem of environmental degradation due to its huge tourism industry. Maldives faces the imminent threat of being inundated in few decades because of global warming and the resulting sea-level rise. Maldives gained its independence in 1965, India was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with it and the two settled their maritime border in 1976. Today, both nations are members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and signatories to the South Asian free-trade agreement (SAFTA). Although the two did sign a comprehensive trade agreement in 1981, the bilateral partnership between the two was limited during the initial decades. However, bilateral relations took their first major step forward following India’s intervention to defeat a coup against the Maldivian Government in 1988. Ever since, there has developed a bond between the two with minor hiccups in the relations.

This chapter draws heavily from T. C. Karthikheyan, ‘Strengthening India’s Strategic Depth in the Shallow Waters of Maldives’, Sarjana, Vol. 26, No. 2, December 2011, pp. 15–32. T. C. Karthikheyan (B) Political Science & International Relations, Tamil Nadu Open University, Chennai, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_4

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Maldives in South Asia Maldives, a 100% Muslim country by the definition of its constitution,1 has its strong Buddhist roots before its king and his subjects converted to Islam in 1153 AD.2 Maldives for long played only a dormant role with regard to its foreign policy even after its independence from the British in 1965. It was content with is sustenance economy and only after the late 1970s, it liberalised its economy and opened the tourism sector. That move helped Maldives to a greater extent to generate revenue and to hold a decent foreign exchange. Though Maldives has supported Sri Lanka’s ‘Indian Ocean Zone of Peace’ initiative at the UN, it has never gone against the core interests of India. India has also extended its help in the times of needs, both economic and military.3 One such prominent instance is launching of ‘Operation Cactus’ in 1988 when the timely intervention by the Indian armed forces that aborted a coup attempt on Maldives,4 not only reinstated the sovereignty of Maldives in the hands of Maldivians, but also strengthened its faith and friendship with India. From there on, relations between the two were more cordial and reciprocal. India also increased its interaction with Maldives to great proportions gradually. In yet another emergency situation, India sent its coast guard and Navy for rescue and relief operations immediately after the Indian Ocean Tsunami that affected the South Asian countries on 26 December 2004. It was a great gesture by India since India itself was severely affected by that tsunami. India showed its concern towards Maldives in that instance, and its capability was also visible to the world powers during the times of disasters. India also provided monetary and infrastructural assistance for Maldives to overcome serious financial difficulties on account of tsunami and related factors. Apart from this assistance, India has been playing a major part in Maldivian security like no other country. In fact, one of the India’s long-standing close military engagements is with Maldives only.5 In political sphere too, there is a better understanding between the leaders of the country and it was further reiterated when both the presidential candidates of the last election visited India, seeking India’s cooperation and goodwill, thereby showing the political understanding and involvement of both the countries for mutual benefits. Both these states have a robust maritime cooperation in place that helps in providing military equipments, training of its security personnel and offering surveillance facilities in the Maldivian exclusive economic zones.6 India has also supported Maldives in many issues consistently including health care. The biggest hospital in the country, Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital located in the capital Male, is a gift by India. All these assistance are not possible without proper understanding and continuous engagements at the highest levels. 1 The

President’s Office (2008). (1940), p. 27. 3 Sahadevan (1999), p. 266. 4 Asiaweek (1988), pp. 37–38. 5 Karthikheyan (2011a). 6 World Defence Network (2009). 2 Bell

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Nevertheless, there have been some hiccups in the relations among these two due to internal political conditions in Maldives that happened on February 2012 and the cancellation of GMR’s $500 million airport development project, the single biggest investment till date by India in the Maldivian capital city, due to domestic political conditions in Maldives. India condemned it strongly and froze its US$25 million aid to the island nation. The issue was sorted out legally when Maldives paid compensation. Some of the infrastructure commitments that India had made to Maldives earlier, including the construction of a national police academy in Maldives, were also put on the hold. Other major concern arose when Nasheed took refuge in Indian High Commission in Male briefly against his arrest by the then Maldivian regime. But the timely involvement and diplomatic skills of the Indian diplomats solved the issue without major damage. The latest contention is the Free Trade Agreement between China and Maldives, and also the imposition of national emergency in Maldives in February 2018. Maldives plays a very important role in international politics as it is located in a strategic vantage point in South Asia and also in the Indian Ocean Region that forms the important sea lines of communications (SLOCs). This importance has gained the attention of extra-regional powers on Maldives lately. USA’s interest in the region shall be gauged righty when they requested for a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with Maldives, thereby gaining access for its military ships and forces to the islands of Maldives. One of the major problems that have arisen between the two in recent times was the massive Chinese involvement in most of the spheres including economy, tourism, housing projects. China has also remarkably enhanced its presence in Maldives in a short period in many aspects particularly with its great influence on Maldives’ economy via infrastructural projects. China is also looking forward for avenues and plans to invest massively in renewable energy and environmental security projects in Maldives. China’s insistence on a new Maritime Silk Route in the IOR and the enthusiastic support given Maldives is a concern for India’s security. There is slim opportunity for the equation between India–Maldives–China to become like what existed between the USA–Cuba–Soviet Russia during the cold war period, but Maldives could not afford it due to its inherent vulnerabilities and to fulfil its security needs guaranteed particularly by India alone. Currently, Maldives tries not to antagonise India overtly, as India is capable of inflicting severe damage to its survival in terms of economy and military. It is also based on the realisation on part of Maldives that it could not turn hostile towards India as its security is greatly influenced and ensured by India in many aspects. In spite of all these realisation and relationships, Maldives is facing an imminent threat of going under the water within the next 50 years due to global warming and sea-level rise.7 That throws peculiar circumstance for India to meet the refugee crisis and also the disputes emanating from the inundation of Maldives based on the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

7 Connell

(2006).

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India–Maldives Relationship in the Past Decades India and Maldives are together located in the strategic Indian Ocean Region where the vital trade routes are criss-crossing. India, on realising the importance that it is vital to protect the sea lanes for its economic and strategic objectives to materialise, decided to strengthen its naval surveillance capabilities in the high seas on the Indian Ocean in recent times. Accordingly, cooperation with Maldives becomes prominent and important, wherein mutual assistance genuinely creates mutual benefits. Historically, India has always been more open to the demands of the Maldivian Government of its security needs. The best instance is when on receiving a distress call, India sent its Navy vessels and Air Force squadrons to Maldivian waters to thwart a coup attempt on Maldives in 1988 by mercenaries. Ever since, one of the persistent threats to Maldives is mercenary threat. It is mainly on the realisation that the small island territories of Maldives are particularly vulnerable to the assault of mercenaries, terrorists and even pirates. The arms dealers and the mercenaries could occupy some of the far-off islands for some time, complete their transactions and then move on.8 The farther most islands hold these kinds of threat scenario still unabated. To strengthen its security and to safeguard their exclusive economic zone, Maldives requested for a patrol craft from the India. India too responded swiftly and while transferring a ship as a response, the then Indian Defence Minister commented that ‘the transfer of Indian naval ship ‘Tillanchang’ to Maldives was to ensure an atmosphere of peace, stability and tranquillity in the region so that both countries could attend to socio-economic development free from external interference’.9 Here, it has to be noted, the perception of Maldives on India has again been reiterated that India is not a big-brother that flexes its muscles, but a worthwhile companion in its journey towards realising its development and security needs. These incidents were in line with India’s stated position vis-à-vis its neighbours, as the former Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, said during her visit to Maldives in 1975 that India did not subscribe to the concept of big and small nations and would always use its strength to promote peace and help neighbours and friendly countries. Even after three and a half decades later, the Indian military officials too reflected the same notion as it was evident from the statement of the Indian Navy Chief in 2010 that India has no intention of playing a headmaster’s role in the Indian Ocean Region.10 As part of the cooperation between the two nations under the broad framework of United Nations conventions in the fight against terrorism and piracy, the transfer of ‘Tillanchang’ is a major military assistance post-1988. Though India is a major security provider for Maldives and in upgrading its security, ties between the two are multi-dimensional that comprises socio-economic, cultural and educational fields, which have lot of scope for further development.

8 Zaki

and Parakh (2008), p. 105. (2012). 10 Prasad (2010). 9 Dikshit

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Impact on Bilateral Relationship India has always been sensitive to the security needs of Maldives, indeed a harbinger of real strength and stability; the later too shows paramount sensitivities towards India’s security aspects. This has been a result of the positive perception from both sides regarding the other. Maldives did not have the ‘Indophobia’—where India is seen as a hegemonic actor in the South Asian Region, rather it trusts India’s assurance to respect its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is also because of the pragmatic approach and realisation on part of Maldives arising out of its geopolitical compulsions, which is not blessed with the ways and means to counter the manoeuvres of any powerful state that threatens its security interests. Much of the context for evolving a mutually beneficial relationship is provided by the stressfree socio-historical settings under which both India and Maldives interact,11 unlike India’s relations with its other SAARC neighbours which are hindered by religious, ethnic and cultural tensions, border disputes, etc. The restrained foreign policy pursued by the then President Amir Ibrahim Nazir (1968–78) was reoriented by Maumoon Abdul Gayoom (1978–2008), who articulated his country’s security needs at the international stage pragmatically. Maldives, under Mohamed ‘Anni’ Nasheed, who was elected President by the first free and fair democratic election in 2008, also followed a pragmatic and proactive approach on its security requirements. After becoming the President, Nasheed said that he would be setting up a ‘sovereign fund’ to buy homeland for his people, in case the effects of global warming and sea-level rise causes Maldives to disappear as has been reiterated by number of reports by international agencies and organisations. One of the possible places that Maldives considers would be India due to its sociocultural ties with Maldives. It is not only a testimony of Maldives’ faith and confidence on its neighbour and the cordial relationship it has developed without the problem of ‘Indophobia’, but also a perception, nurtured by successive governments in Maldives that India is a net security provider to Maldives rather than a threat. In the past, Maldives did not subscribe to any kind of bilateral treaties/agreements on military cooperation and thus avoided a wholly dependent relationship for its security needs on any other country. Accordingly, with its perception on common security, it has always advocated multi-lateral approach for its security needs using the services available at the UN, NAM, AOSIS, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), etc., or regional approach through SAARC.12 But this has been changing in recent times with Maldives signing bilateral agreements not only with India but also with China and others covering different areas, and these developments are not of dependent nature, rather one of interdependence. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, threats due to terrorism, piracy, environment and economic vulnerability are the main driving force behind this pragmatic approach of followed by Maldives.

11 Sahadevan 12 Khurana

(1999), p. 251. (2004).

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Maritime Security in the Region To fulfil its security, development and to become a strong regional player, India has started exercising its role to its potential by forming closer ties with the littoral states in the Indian Ocean. The maritime segment of security is helping India to shape its extra-regional links. India–Maldives relation has been witnessing an increased cooperation on various aspects and the military strategic relationship stands out particularly. Cooperation to enhance mutual security forms an important component of bilateral relations between the two nations, which also helps in the stability of the region. In 2009, the Maldivian authorities expressed their concern to India that one of its luxurious island resorts could be taken over by terrorists, given its lack of military assets and surveillance capabilities. Subsequently, on the basis of an agreement that got materialised thereafter, India donated two helicopters for the Maldives to enhance its surveillance capabilities and strengthened its ability to respond swiftly to threats. India also helped to set up radars on most of the Maldivian atolls for seamless coverage of passing ships and aircraft in its vicinity and networked with the Indian coastal radar system. The radar chains of the two countries are interlinked and a central control room in India’s Coastal Command gets a flawless radar picture. In addition to that, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) also carries out regular Dornier sorties over the island nation to look out for any suspicious movements or vessels. The framework of a detailed agreement to include Maldives into the Indian coastal security grid was conceived in 2009, and it is in addition to the security cooperation agreement against sea-borne terrorism and piracy that was concluded before. The coastal security agreement is an exclusive security arrangement with India, and the Maldives will not approach other countries for similar agreements. The fear of a hostage crisis in Maldives whose economy is driven largely by tourism was the main reason behind these developments. For instance, the worst threat scenario perceived by the Maldives was the takeover of a remote island resort by a terrorist group or a successful terrorist attack on any one of the cruise ships visiting Maldives, resulting in a catastrophic number of casualties and subsequently threatening the economic viability of the entire nation.13 But perceived concerns pointed by local opposition parties in Maldives on pursuing an independent policy and the ramifications on its sovereignty had cast a shadow on the realisation of these strategic plans to its fullest potential. The perception of India being a threat to the interests of Maldives has been harboured and nurtured by some of the elements within different political parties and administrative machinery that have their interests, both business and political, tied with Maldives having a closer link with China. Despite this imbroglio, there are some concerted efforts to have cooperation on other strategic security needs between India and Maldives.

13 Neff

and Mayo (2001).

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Increased Strategic Cooperation The perception of cordial friendly relations reflecting on the tangent aspect of increased strategic cooperation has always been a hallmark of international relations. Accordingly, besides transferring the fast attack craft ‘Tillanchang’ to Maldives, many numbers of security and defence personnel from Maldives are given training regularly in various officers training academies in India. ‘Ekueuvrin’ (meaning ‘friends’) is an exercise jointly conducted by Indian Army with the Maldivian National Defence Forces (MDNF) from 2007 on counter-terrorism.14 The MNDF officials acquired some of the its invaluable operational experience through these training that also helps nurture military-to-military cooperation and enhanced interoperability, as against the 1988 operation undertaken to thwart the coup attempt, where the Indian Army was just having a tourist guide map of Maldives for its operations at that time (Group Captain Bewoor).15 It is to be noted here that the challenge was not to simply remain alert or reactive to any situations but to be proactive in dealing with possible threats and disruptions. The effective implementation of the combined Indian Navy–MNDF exercises, hydrographic surveys, integrated surveillance and coordinated patrolling would address the security concerns of both the countries extraordinarily. In addition, the Indian Coast Guard conducts ‘Dosti’ (meaning ‘friendship’) exercise that involves maritime rescue operations and patrolling of seas around Maldives. In facing the modern challenges of terrorism, poaching, piracy, etc., these joint operations are highly valuable for the MNDF. Besides, India has also opened its facilities at the tri-services Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) for the Maldivian military personnel, to observe how India manages security and surveillance of the critical island chain. Maldivian security personnel are also undergoing training at the Karnataka Police Academy in the Indian State of Karnataka on regular basis. Keeping in line with India’s commitment to deliver security equipment to Maldives according to its requirements, in April 2010, India provided the ‘Dhruv’ helicopter manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) that was re-painted with Maldivian flag and a sign saying MNDF.16 India also undertook some repairing works for the Maldivian military equipments, as in the case of the Maldivian Coast Guard Ship ‘Huravee’. After delivering the refitted ‘Huravee’ in 2010, it has greatly enhanced the defence capabilities of Maldives at high seas and it had played a key role earlier in confronting an LTTE vessel and taking it into control.17 The ship is also playing a vital role in saving a number of public lives in the Maldives through its search and rescue operations. India, to strengthen its presence on international waters, had established a listening post that is operating in northern Madagascar. India has also set up a monitoring facility at an island it has leased from Mauritius situated to the east of Madagascar.18 14 Ministry

of Defence (2009). Captain Bewoor (undated). 16 Karthikheyan (2011b). 17 The Hindu (2010). 18 Srivastava (2009). 15 Group

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To strengthen these initiatives, in 2011 the Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation Initiative was launched by India, Sri Lanka and Maldives. This was a welcome initiative involving the three littoral states to enhance maritime security in the neighbourhood. Consequently, the development of interoperability through the exercises undertaken with foreign navies offers the Indian Navy a vital tool in its security operations. These exercises develop and enhance the skill sets of the Navies for joint operations to address problems related to piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking and the smuggling of arms and people. India has plugged an important missing cog in its defence structure in the Indian Ocean by channelising Indian Navy’s capabilities to nurture lasting strategic security cooperation with the Maldives. This only strengthens valuable partnership, which shall prove critical in validating India’s strategic depth in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Chinese Interlude Nevertheless, to validate Indian Navy’s strategic advantage, it is imperative to analyse China’s efficiency on strengthening its military equipments and the possible challenge it could pose to the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean Region that could eventually affect India’s relations with its southern neighbours besides compromising India’s strategic interests. In its 2011 budget, for the first time, China’s defence expenditure ($91.5 billion) was lower than its ‘public security’ (internal security) expenditure ($95.0 billion) which was tabled in the backdrop of the Internet-spread calls for ‘Jasmine Revolution’ protests inspired by popular democratic uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East.19 In 2017, China has successfully settled its internal leadership crisis and Xi has emerged as the strongest ever leader after Mao. But China also needs to focus on its two-digit economic development to mitigate any internal discord. Given this situation, China has a difficult task ahead to augment its naval capabilities and to challenge India in the Indian Ocean. The infrastructural and connectivity projects like ports, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the twenty-firstcentury Maritime Silk Route (MSR) that the Chinese are developing on the so-called string of pearls corridor are mainly based on commercial interests, at least for the near future, which will eventually help to sustain its two-digit growth trajectory and not exclusively of military purposes. Moreover, converting these ‘soft’ commercial ports into ‘hard’ naval bases is not a simple task. Ashley Townshend, an expert on the Chinese military and international security at the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy, opines, ‘to militarise the Indian Ocean facilities, Beijing would require local air defence capabilities, munitions storage units, mine-clearing assets and a permanent military footprint. These costly renovations would probably exceed the technical, logistical and expeditionary capabilities of the Chinese military for a decade or more’. China has had little experience projecting military power abroad 19 Reuters

(2011).

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and its blue-water fleet remains a work in progress. Its ability to sustain far-flung naval bases would also be greatly hindered by distance and its military’s cumbersome internal command structure.20 As large part of China’s exports of goods and imports of energy resources are passing through the Indian Ocean, India becomes crucial in its strategic manoeuvrings. This necessitates China to solicit mutual cooperation from India to safeguard its economic interests on the high seas and not to project its military might otherwise, which is already strained in the South China Sea. It is the prime reason that China wants India to be a part of OBOR and the New Maritime Silk Route. This situation enables India to strengthen its strategic depth in the Indian Ocean Region, particularly with the kind of strategic cooperation extended to Maldives and vice versa. In February 2011, President Nasheed reiterated his stance in clear terms on the strategic security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, saying, ‘Maintaining balance in the Indian Ocean is very important. There is not enough room in the Indian Ocean for other non-traditional friends’.21 Maldives also denied reports that the Chinese are building a submarine base in Maldives and they are not receptive to any kind of military installation in the Indian Ocean, especially from un-traditional friends, adding further ‘The Indian Ocean is the Indian Ocean’. But things are not the same in 2018. There has been a systemic and continued crackdown on the democratic forces including its Judiciary, in Maldives since February 2012 and it has culminated to the extent of imposing a state of emergency in Maldives in February 2018. Maldives even had its Presidential election in November 2013 and the repression of democratic forces and practices continues. It has to be noted here that there were reports in the media that the Indian Prime Minister was scheduled to visit Maldives as part of his visit to the Three Indian Ocean countries that took place in March 2015, but the programme was cancelled at the last moment due to internal political developments in the Maldives at that juncture. Meanwhile, China has also become closer with Maldives in the last few years giving Maldives some space to manoeuvre in terms of its foreign policy though not explicitly antagonising India. However, it was a concern in India–Maldives relations when Maldivian parliament ratified a free-trade agreement (FTA) with China in December 2017. The free-trade agreement between the Maldives and China is another sign of Beijing’s success in its outreach in South Asia. After three years of considerable negotiations with the Maldives, the agreement was completed in September 2017 and ratified overnight by Parliament in Male in December 2017. India responded to the situation by referring to its strong historical and civilisational linkages with Maldives and also contacts at the people-to-people level. India reiterated it’s committed to support democracy, development and stability in Maldives and expected that as a close and friendly neighbour, Maldives will be sensitive to its concerns in keeping with its India first policy.22 There are massive infrastructure projects that are undertaken by China in 20 Townshend

(2011). (2011). 22 The Hindu (2017a). 21 Ranasinghe

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Maldives like that of the development of Hulhule Island and the ‘Friendship’ bridge connecting it to Male. Therefore, the FTA is a logical progression of China–Maldives economic relations and it was never a secret. Apart from massive investments of over $1 billion, Chinese companies are foraying into the Maldivian tourism industry by way of leasing to develop resort islands and other land reclamation projects. Maldives had recently leased one of its islands to a Chinese company for 50 years at the cost of $4 million. China is also to build a second runway in the Maldives’ only international airport at capital Male. At one point of time, Mohamed Saeed, the Maldivian special envoy to China, even requested China to provide ‘security’ to protect Chinese investments in the Maldives. One reason for the President of Maldives, Mr. Yameen, keeping India out of the loop on the FTA talks and soliciting more and more Chinese involvement in Maldives, may be New Delhi’s renewed policy of engaging with the Maldivian opposition leaders particularly with the former President Nasheed. The major problem for India here is that these kind of closer economic interaction between China and Maldives may bring these nations closer within a single security net of that of China’s. Though Mr. Yameen has positively assured that Maldives will stay as a ‘demilitarised zone’, concerns are always there that the PLA-Navy might look for a military base in Maldives. The docking of three Chinese naval warships in Male harbour in August 2017, as a ‘goodwill visit’ was significant in this respect.23 The present Yameen Government in Maldives is having a friendly relation with China. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Maldives in 2014; thereafter, Maldives and China signed various deals with Beijing’s increased participation in the infrastructure development in the atoll state. The Maldives is also actively participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China—a development strategy that India is more wary about. In July 2015, Maldives had also passed an amendment to its constitution allowing foreign ownership of freehold land24 among concerns that it could lead to improved Chinese military presence in the atoll nation. Citing the example of Sri Lanka, former president Nasheed, has also increased the perceived threat quotient for Maldives’ sovereignty saying that 80% of the Maldives’ foreign debt was owed to China and the nation could end up handing over more land and infrastructure as it may not be able to repay the loans. He even pointed to the situation of obtaining lease of some of the islands as colonisation and an act of ‘landgrab’ by China.25 Lately, the political crisis in the Maldives spiralled perilously in February 2018, with President Abdulla Yameen declaring a state of political emergency in the country on 6 February 2018, exactly after five years of a military ‘coup’ in 2012 that overthrowed the first democratically elected government of former President Nasheed. In the 2018 episode, the Maldivian Government also detained the Supreme Court Judges and the former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the half-brother of the current President as he joined hands with the opposition parties. The Supreme Court had earlier declared the 2015 trial of the exiled former president Mohamed Nasheed 23 The

Hindu (2017b). Indian Express (2018). 25 The Hindu (2018). 24 The

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on charges of terrorism as unconstitutional and has also ordered to reinstate the disqualified parliamentarians.26 The UN Secretary-General and the UNHRC Chief had urged the Maldivian Government to totally reverse the emergency situation to pave way for dialogue and democracy. The Maldivian Government also rejected an offer for mediation by the UN Secretary General. The Maldives has also dismissed ‘unwarranted and unconstructive’ calls from 41 nations at the UN Human Rights Council led by UK, to immediately address a deteriorating human rights situation.27 Meanwhile, the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) called on neighbouring India to militarily intervene to end the crisis, as it did three decades ago in 1988. But Dunya Maumoon, the former Foreign Minister and Minister of State for Health, has initially supported the declaration of emergency as a necessity in present conditions of Maldives, while pleading for the release of her father, the former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Later she resigned her post of Minister of State, stating that democracy was deteriorating in the Maldives and much work was to be done in order to strengthen the democratic rule, judiciary and independent institutions of the country. She called on everyone to set aside antagonism and work together for a peaceful solution via discussions.28 She has even criticised the international community for constantly urging Maldives to move towards the democratic fold during 2004–2008, where India’s role is substantially stronger.29 Responding to the crisis, India said it was disturbed by the declaration of emergency and the political reasons that led to it and ever since following a cautious path. Monitoring the situation in the Maldives ‘very closely’ is vital for India as it is likely to impact its standing in the South Asian Region.30 India also expected Maldives not to compromise its ‘India First’ policy, taking on account the historical relations between the two. China responded to the crisis by stating that it does not interfere in the Maldives internal affairs. China supported the Maldives Government to resolve differences via dialogue and consultation with all relevant sides, to protect the country’s independence and sovereignty. China also added that the international community should play a constructive role in promoting the Maldives’ stability and development on the basis of respecting the Maldives’ wishes.31 It is pertinent to notice here that India had offered to Maldives to participate in Milan, the biennial naval exercise, that was to be held in Port Blair in March 2018, but the Maldives Government declined the offer and that was perceived by the Indian strategic establishment as a clear snub to India by Maldives, seemingly at the behest of China. Although Maldivian authorities have ‘explained’ to India that under the current circumstances when the island nation is under a state of emergency, it wasn’t possible for Maldives to participate in the naval exercises as the Maldivian defence forces were on a standby to deal with any exigency. Maldives rapid drifting away 26 The

Hindu (2017b). Independent (2018). 28 Mihaaru (2018). 29 MinBane (2018). 30 The Economic Times (2017). 31 The Indian Express (2018). 27 Maldives

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from India and its China embrace came into sharp focus once again after news reports emerged in the Indian media that China was at the cusp of getting a military base in Maldives by way of Beijing establishing a joint ocean observation station in Maldives Makunudhoo Island, which is not very far from India.32 For India, the perception of Maldives going out of its influence and committing actions against its strategic interests stems largely from the threat it perceives from China. Maldives has also behaved in a fashion that reiterates this perception of India through its committed actions vis-a-vis China in terms of its active involvement in Belt and Road Initiative, Maritime Silk Route, FTA, etc. On the perception that Maldives was closer to China, Maldivian envoy Ahmed Mohamed said India should reach out to Maldives more often proactively, and Male and New Delhi should have close ties given that the two countries are neighbours. The recent theatrics in Maldives has shown bright signs that Maldives would be a contested nation between India and China to have an influence on the atoll nation for their economic and strategic benefits.

Perceptions on Maldives The official position of India is that Maldives is a friendly neighbouring country from historical times and the relationship between the two in the recent decades is a testimony to that effect. India also expects Maldives to uphold its stated ‘India First’ policy that doesn’t compromise the strategic interests of India. Nevertheless, it has to be probed what are the perceptions of the strategic analysts from India in general and particularly at the backdrop of the declaration of the state of emergency and lack of democratic means in Maldives. N. Sathiyamoorthy, an analyst and the Director of the Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation, is of the perception that India has not understood the needs of its smaller neighbours, particularly Maldives and most of the times contend with knee-jerk reaction.33 He further opines that Indian policymakers yielded to speculative reports and politically motivated campaign and New Delhi had not done much to erase the suspicions of the Maldives leadership post-2014. Further, during the post-2008 democracy era in Maldives, it was generally perceived that India favoured President Nasheed against his political opponents and nothing was done to counter that impression. China is projecting its soft power skills to the hilt, and Xi Jinping’s the first ever Chinese presidential visit to the Maldives in 2014 has increased the stakes in the neighbourhood. It is also construed that India is not allowing its smaller neighbours like Maldives to seek economic and other developmental advantage from China that India seeks for itself. C. Raja Mohan, prominent strategic analyst and director, Carnegie India, has observed in the context of India’s military intervention in Maldives in the present condition that Delhi surely knows one thing from its past interventions that ‘the 32 Sharma

(2018).

33 Sathiyamoorthy

(2018).

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task of fixing other people’s problems is never easy and not all consequences of intervention can really be predicted or managed’.34 Then adding, that is the burden of all major powers, especially in their own regions. Manvendra Singh, a legislator of the ruling party and editor of Defence and Security Alert, has called for India’s military intervention citing an opportunity for India to claim its role of a global leader and to start it with its neighbours first. There are also suggestions that India could implement travel restrictions for Maldivians or any range of economic sanctions paired with coercive diplomacy whenever Maldives acts against India’s interests. This kind of approach towards Maldives stems from the general perception that if Maldives could act against the strategic interests of India, particularly leaning towards China, and if left unchecked, the repercussions would be terrible for India in many spheres and other nations in the region too might follow suit taking a conducive approach towards China against the wishes of India. Accordingly, India is concerned about its authority among its small neighbours and any hesitation on part of India in the Maldives could possibly turn these neighbours to look towards China positively. Similarly, smaller neighbours in the South Asian Region will arrive at their own conclusions on India’s reliability, about whether they should rely on India to face up to China, depending on how they perceive India is behaving in its own turf.35 This may severely undermine the prominent position that India is commanding in the South Asian and the Indian Ocean Region. But there is other section of the security analysts who perceives that a military intervention today could leave Indian troops stuck in a Maldivian quagmire. This apprehension is true, as it may repeat a similar situation like India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka via IPKF three decades ago. Now the stakes are high enough, directly involving Chinese business and strategic interests in Maldives. Bhadrakumar Melkulangara, a former Indian diplomat, perceives that India should not intervene in Maldives and also vividly points out that its unpleasant experience in Sri Lanka and Nepal should have taught India that sovereignty is treasured by even smaller countries. Cmde. Uday Bhaskar, Director, Society for Policy Studies, is of the perception that during India’s military intervention in Maldives in 1988, there was ‘no opposition of any kind to the Indian initiative and the local Maldivian leadership and the citizens welcomed the Indian intervention’.36 But in the current milieu, it is not the case. He also adds, ‘India has the will to involve itself militarily, but the capacity contour is blurred and an impulsive intervention could be imprudent’. In spite of all, the reality being, China’s philosophy of aggression aided by its soft power projections and driven by Xi’s ambitions to overtake the United States as a world power jeopardises India’s strategic interests, undermines its regional influence and poses a threat to India’s national security and credibility.

34 Raja

Mohan (2018). (2018). 36 The Print (2018). 35 Rajagopalan

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Perceptions About India The perceived lack of trust or misunderstanding or threat between India and Maldives has a direct bearing in the outcomes of security and geostrategic relations between nations in the South Asian and Indian Ocean Region. The perception of some sections of Maldivians to look India as a Hindu state has some potential to cause disturbances in Maldives. This was evident during the International Yoga Day when the social media messages were circulated. For political observers, it is a part of a trend far more menacing. The executive director of Maldives Democracy Network, Shahinda Ismail explained that Maldives is having the record of using religion as a mobilising force as it’s a conscious choice on part of the government to not stop them, by increasing fear of the Islamists, the government can tap into them whenever it wants to.37 Instances like this on the perception of individuals, groups and even from within the government machinery shows how India is been looked upon in the island nation. Media has also played its part in forming Maldives’ perception on India. It has both created positive and negative perceptions supporting the administration’s views. The recent perception about India that is beamed into the Maldivian houses is that of India as anti-muslim and accusing its leadership for it. In December 2017, a Maldivian newspaper, believed to be pro-Yameen, kicked up a political storm in the Maldives by describing the Indian PM Narendra Modi as a Hindu extremist and also an antiMuslim. That particular editorial column in the local Dhivehi language went on to describe India as the biggest enemy nation and said that a ‘new best friend’ be found for Maldives in China.38 The perception of Maldivian leadership towards India has always been cordial as India has always been a first destination for the new President whoever takes oath in Maldives as India is a close neighbour that is very helpful for its economic development and security. India was one of the first countries that Yameen visited after winning elections in 2013. Prominent Maldivian politicians have always harboured the ‘India First’ policy, and they have always been wary of any extra-regional player’s role in the region. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who ruled Maldives for three decades, is one such personality in Maldivian politics. Institutional cooperation between Maldives and India has always been good as it can be seen in the case of regular exchanges between the Election Commission of India and other environmental and disaster management agencies of India. The Maldivian compatriots have always had the perception that India is one of its strongest partner day in and day out. The involvement of Indian institutions in the conduct of Maldivian elections and the post Tsunami relief operations are clear case in point. Generally, the Maldivian people perceive India as one of its greatest strength due to its assistance in economic activity. There are only few instances where on the instigation of few politicians with vested interests anti-Indian protests have taken place in Maldives. Apart from these minor incidents, Maldivian people are always cordial towards India generally. 37 Maldives 38 Parashar

Independent (2016). (2017).

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The Way Forward Today, strategic cooperation between India and Maldives is crucial in the Indian Ocean Region, based on the mutual dependence of the states and optimum utilisation of their knowledge, resources and capacities. They need to combine their assets, actions and intelligence to deter security threats through mutual cooperation with a mixture of guidelines, technology transfers, deterrence and complementing the global comprehensive defence structure. A strong Indo-Maldives maritime cooperation may provide the much-needed focus for India in improving its capability to defend its vital interests in the Indian Ocean, as well as to reinforce its regional strategic preeminence. Maldives had consistently expressed concerns over the crucial tasks of safeguarding their uninhabited islands and protecting their vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and India has been assisting Maldives, time to time in developing and enhancing its maritime surveillance and operations. This is mainly due to the realisation and assertion on part of India that national security concerns of Maldives cannot be separated from the security of the region, particularly the Indian Ocean where India has a huge stake, because security threats developing in its vicinity would have serious implications for its stability.39 Efficient joint mechanisms with high-level technology inputs should be developed and put in place on a regular basis in order to hinder the capacity and capability of the anti-national elements that jeopardises the national security and thus ensuring peaceful use of the Indian Ocean. India’s relations with the Maldives have been excellent for decades and the maritime dimension offers greater prospects for confidence-building measures and reinforcing the trust through cooperation and mutual benefits that shall grow from strength to strength ensuring a nonzero-sum matrix. For India, the strategic and investment priorities undertaken with Maldives will better enable success in today’s strategic operations, while preparing for tomorrow’s threats.

Maldives: A Shadow State or a Pivot State? The perception that since being a small atoll island state, Maldives will not have options in their strategic and foreign policy matters has to be resigned. It has to be realised that Maldives may never be the same ‘shadow state’ under the Indian influence which it used to be for decades and even before its independence. Maldives is now trying to become a ‘pivot state’—meaning, a state to be capable of exploiting new opportunities that comes its way and not dependent on a single regional heavyweight. Maldives is also on the same plane like Sri Lanka when it comes to utilising the opportunities offered by China and other countries. The only difference is that India is still having lot of leverage when it comes to Maldives, and it is in this context that any analysis and recommendations have to be seen for forging long-lasting rela39 Karthikheyan

(2011c).

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tionship and mutual cooperation in India–Maldives relationship. The recent political crisis in the island nation after the proclamation of emergency is a strong case of departure in the vision of India and Maldives. The opposition leaders in Maldives has requested for a strong Indian intervention. India shall take this opportunity to mediate between the stakeholders with a concerted effort to restore functional democracy in Maldives, equally enabled by people-to-people contact.

Conclusion India’s concrete political engagement with Maldives, apart from removing the perilous perceptions of threats and insecurity, helps in improving its capacity to defend its vital interests in the Indian Ocean, as well as to reinforce its regional strategic importance. The perceived threat or the misunderstanding between India and Maldives shall be wiped out with robust interaction and people-to-people contact wherever possible. Moreover, India has to devise appropriate policies to keep out other state’s influence in Maldives at a distance, by undertaking proactive measures on the economic front that provides monetary gains and boosts economic cooperation between the two, as it has the ability to produce tangent benefits for both the nations. India should also take that Maldives is not India’s ‘shadow state’ anymore and the enthusiasm showed by Maldives on the new Maritime Silk Route and FTA with China is a case in point. The current internal political dynamics in Maldives necessitates political prudence and intelligent manoeuvring. This in particular is very important in the backdrop of the ensuing Maldivian presidential election due for September 2018. Furthermore, India has to pin its hope on democracy and its dividends. It should also try to use its economic leverage to fulfil the needs of Maldives in its developmental agenda. Whoever leads the Maldives politically, economic cooperation combined with political engagements only could strengthen ties on mutually beneficial terms. India should also realise that in coming years, whoever may form the government in Maldives and whoever may be the leader of the country, pro-China lobby in Maldives is a reality that India has to contend with in different forms. Instead of complaining about China’s engagement with Maldives, India, without any baggage of the recent political aberrations, should use its resources and try to develop a model with more people-to-people contacts and institutional cooperation, to put in place a more balanced approach and a robust, mutually beneficial relationship with Maldives. Maldives should also realise fully that it should not antagonise India, as India is capable of inflicting severe damage to its survival economically and militarily thay may bring heavy cost on part of Maldives given its inherent vulnerabilities. Maldives should not turn hostile towards India as its security is greatly influenced and ensured by India in many ways.

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Reuters. (2011, March 5). China internal security spending jumps past army budget. Reuters. Retrieved September 15, 2017 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/china-unrestidUSTOE72400920110305. Sahadevan, P. (1999). Maldives. In D. Banerjee (Ed.), Security in South Asia. New Delhi: Manas Publications. Sathiyamoorthy, N. (2018, February 9). Maldives crisis: What is wrong with India? Outlook. Retrieved February 9, 2018 from https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/maldives-crisiswhat-is-wrong-with-india/308073. Sharma, R. (2018, February 28). Why deepening Maldives crisis should worry India. DailyO. Retrieved February 28, 2018 from https://www.dailyo.in/politics/maldives-india-snub-milannaval-exercises-abdulla-yameen-gayoom-dunya-maumoon/story/1/22604.html. Srivastava, S. (2009). India drops anchor in the Maldives. Asia Times. Retrieved October 25, 2017 from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI02Df0.html. The Economic Times. (2017, December 14). Maldives-China FTA: India breaks its silence. Retrieved December 17, 2017 from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/ foreign-trade/maldives-china-fta-india-breaks-its-silence/articleshow/62072220.cms. The Hindu. (2010, February 12). “Huravee” handed over to Maldives after refit. Retrieved August 18, 2017 from http://www.thehindu.com/2010/02/12/stories/2010021253660200.htm. The Hindu. (2017a, December 14). Maldives-China FTA: India breaks its silence. Retrieved December 15, 2017 from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/maldiveschina-fta-india-breaks-its-silence/articleshow/62072220.cms. The Hindu. (2017b, December 7). Island hopping—On Maldives-China FTA. Retrieved December 21, 2017 from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/island-hopping/article21284637.ece. The Hindu. (2018, January 22). Exiled Maldives leader accuses China of ‘landgrab’. Retrieved February 12, 2018 from http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/exiled-maldives-leaderaccuses-china-of-land-grab/article22492222.ece. The Indian Express. (2018, February 9). Maldives crisis: India’s stand, the China angle—All your questions answered. Retrieved February 12, 2018 from http://indianexpress.com/article/world/ maldives-crisis-india-china-mohamed-nasheed-abdulla-yameen-5057094/. The President’s Office. (2008). Constitution of the Republic of Maldives 2008. Male: The Republic of Maldives. Retrieved November 15, 2017 from http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/ Documents/ConstitutionOfMaldives.pdf. The Print. (2018, February 6). Can India play a decisive role in the unfolding crisis in Maldives: Talk point. Retrieved February 7, 2018 from https://theprint.in/talk-point/talk-point-can-indiaplay-decisive-role-unfolding-crisis-maldives/33797/. Townshend, A. (2011, May 27). Few reasons to fear China’s “pearls”. The Australian. Retrieved September 21, 2017 from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/few-reasons-to-fearchinas-pearls/story-e6frg6ux-1226063671201. World Defence Network. (2009). India bringing Maldives into its security net. Retrieved August 13, 2009 from http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-defence/31655-india-bringing-maldivesinto-its-security-net.html. Zaki, I. H., & Parakh, R. M. (2008). Small state security dilemma: A Maldivian perception. New Delhi: Lancer’s Books.

India and Nepal Relations: Politics and Perceptions Sangeeta Thapliyal

It is an interesting phase for Nepal’s politics. Promulgation of new constitution in 2015 and general elections in 2017 is some move towards ending two decades of political instability. The elections to the House of Representatives (lower house) took place in November/December 2017. Even before the election to the National Assembly (upper house) could take place, India’s foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj, visited Nepal in February 2018 and met leaders of the all the political parties including 1 K. P. Oli even before he took over as the Prime Minister representing left alliance. India has shared sweet and sour relations with Oli. It is generally believed that he 2 was close to India especially due to his positive role in the Mahakali Treaty in 1996 but his relations strained after taking over as the Prime Minister of the country in 2015. It began with the adoption of the new constitution and India’s response to it. A statement issued from the Ministry of External Affairs said, “We note the promulgation in Nepal today of a Constitution”. The same statement also mentioned India’s concerns, “we are concerned that the situation in several parts of the country bordering India continues to be violent. Our Ambassador in Kathmandu has spoken to the Prime Minister of Nepal in this regard. We urge that issues on which there are differences should be resolved through dialogue in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation, and institutionalized in a manner that would enable broad3 based ownership and acceptance”. India had acknowledged the new Constitution 1 The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) [CPN (UML)] and the Communist Party

of Nepal (Maoist Centre) [(CPN (MC)] had an electoral alliance. The parties have merged to form Communist Party of Nepal (CPN). 2 Dhamala (2018). 3 “Statement on the Situation in Nepal” (20 September 2015) Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/25821/Statement+on+the+ situation+in+Nepal. Accessed on 29 January 2018. S. Thapliyal (B) Centre for Inner Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_5

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and simultaneously stated its concerns in one statement. Even before the adoption of the Constitution, the Indian foreign secretary S. Jaishankar had visited Nepal advising them to consider voices of all the stakeholders.4 India’s lukewarm response to the new constitution and the last-minute visits by Indian dignitaries to hold talks with the Nepal government had given the impression of Indian interference into Nepal’s internal affairs. K. P. Oli took over as the Prime Minister after the promulgation of the Constitution but his government was short-lived due to the withdrawal of the support by the Maoists in 2016 and considered it an “Indian remote control” act.5 These political developments had resulted in an increase in nationalism and anti-India sentiment in Nepal. The new constitution was the result of people’s struggle for good governance, social justice, political representation and economic stability in a federal and secular country. To be specific, the janjatis (ethnic nationalities) had protested for ethnic federalism, madhesis (from the plains of Nepal) had demanded “one madhes, one pradesh” within the federal structure, whereas the dalits and women were asking for representation in the state structure. Federalism was the demand of the madhesis since the 1950s. Terai Congress had raised it for the first time in 1951. It was believed that federalism could provide them with sociopolitical space that could take care of their cultural space. Since the 1990s, the primary issue had been of national identity with the issue of citizenship of those who were stateless. Janjatis have also demanded for equal opportunities at the local-level development since the 1950s. Since the 1990s, janjatis considered restructuring of the state in order to get regional autonomy with the right of self-determination.6 The country had waited for too long to move from undemocratic to democratic rule. The voices for multi-party democracy that arose in 1950 were stifled by the Panchayat rule in 1960. Political parties were banned in Nepal for the next thirty years. Interestingly in 1990, the democratic movement brought in multi-party democracy without overthrowing monarchy but changed its characteristics to constitutional monarchy. The change in government structure did not bring in stability. No government completed its stipulated tenure of five years and the country witnessed weak coalition governments, people’s war by the Maoists and the overthrow of monarchy; all within twenty years of the democratic rule. The transition to democracy had gone on for too long. Constituent assemblies set up by election in 2008 and later in 2012 wrote the new constitution of Nepal declaring the country to be federal democratic republic. The present constitution has addressed certain demands of the marginalised groups such as carving of seven new provinces, proportional representation in the parliament or reservations in government jobs. There was, however, discontent on not making new provinces ethnicity based, issues related to citizenship rights, representation in state structures like army or bureaucracy based on population and delimitation of constituencies. The carving of new states did not make much sense to the janjatis and 4 “Foreign

Secretary Jaishankar visits Nepal today” (18 September 2015) Indian Express. (2018). 6 Thapliyal (2012). 5 Dhamala

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madhesis as they were not based on ethnicity. Many from the marginalized groups did black flag demonstrations on the day Constitution was adopted. These unmet expectations had led to new protests and violent agitations. Taking advantage of their geographical location of being between the plains of India and the hills of Nepal, the madhesis blocked the trade and transit points. The protestors, led by United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), did not allow goods carriers to enter Nepal which led to the shortage of fuel, food supplies and basic essential items like medicines. The economic blockade increased the sufferings of Nepalese who were already affected by the devastating earthquake earlier in the same year. Madhesi leaders had perceived the hill dominated Nepali leadership to crumble under the pressure of blockade. However, the tactic backfired as the public perception in Nepal became hostile towards the madhesis who lost support and sympathy of the people. In such heightened emotions, the divide between the hills and plains of Nepal became stark. This feeling got further aggravated because the Nepalese perceive madhesis to be Indians due to their close sociocultural relations with the adjoining Indian state of Bihar. They are often referred to as the “Indian origin madhesis” that perceptibly undermines their loyalty to the state in the nationalistic discourse. Nepalese are convinced that India had supported the blockade in order to pressurise the government to arrive at a consensual political outcome on the new constitution. It helped the Kathmandu-based political elite especially the ruling CPN (UML) to raise nationalistic slogans and blame India for the blockade and interference in the country’s domestic affairs. K. P. Oli in his address to the nation asked “India to lift ‘undeclared blockade’”.7 Addressing a delegation of the Federation of Nepali Journalists, Oli said, “Our close neighbour has opened our eyes. I will render efforts to bail the country out of the existing crisis, maintaining our national independence, dignity and national integrity”.8 The Indian government had refuted charges of blockade and had requested Nepal to take care of the political instability fearing its spillover effect into the bordering areas. In a statement in the Rajya Sabha, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said, “there is no blockade by India, which we have repeatedly clarified, of supplies going to Nepal. Obstructions are by the Nepalese population on the Nepalese side, in which GoI cannot interfere”. She further said that, “With a 1751-km long open border with the five Indian States of Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim, India is directly affected by developments in the Terai. The unfortunate use of force on 2 November, to forcibly remove protestors obstructing the Raxaul-Birganj route, and thereafter on 22 November against protestors in Saptari, has further vitiated the atmosphere”.9 Speaking at the Geneva meeting of the UNHCR to discuss Nepal’s universal periodic review, India’s Permanent Representative B. N. Reddy 7 Ghimire

(2015). blockade more inhuman than war, says Nepal PM K. P. Sharma Oli” (6 November 2015) Times of India. 9 Statement by External Affairs Minister on Calling Attention Motion on ‘Situation in Nepal and State of Indo-Nepal Relations’ (2015, 3 December) in Rajya Sabha. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ PrintRelease.aspx?relid=132407. Accessed on 4 December 2015. 8 “Indian

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said, “The people of Nepal, having endured a devastating earthquake in 2015, are facing another tough challenge during the ongoing political transition…we are concerned over the lack of political progress”.10 There was a strong reaction by Nepal on India’s statement. PM Oli said that “Neighbouring country is bullying us on the one hand and raising issues of impunity on the other”.11 Deputy Prime Minister Kamal Thapa said that “Can’t Nepal have its own authority to promulgate constitution?”12 There was rhetoric bordering nationalistic overtones. Relations that were on upswing after PM Modi’s visit to Nepal in 2014 had plummeted. From the above narrative, the article tries to understand the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy and how the perceptions have influence on foreign policy. Let us begin with the political developments within Nepal. The marker is the new constitution of 2015. The background to the constitution has been the struggle of democratic forces for an inclusive democratic constitution through constituent assembly. This has been a demand from 1940s onwards when the Nepali democratic forces were opposing the Rana regime. It would be pertinent to add here that the democratic parties were formed in India and had been influenced and charged by the Indian National movement. Praja Parishad was formed in 1939, Nepali Congress was formed in Benaras in 1947, and the Nepali Communist Party was formed in Kolkata 1949. The Nepalese leaders were fighting against the ruling Ranas and also extending support to the Indian leadership in their struggle against the British colonial rule. For Nepal to be democratic, India’s democracy was important, as the Ranas had developed working relationship with the British. India has been a supporter of democracy in Nepal be it the democratic movement against the Ranas in the forties or the movement against the Panchayat in the sixties. On the other hand, the ruling Ranas looked towards India for assistance in subsiding the anti-Rana dissension from the Indian soil. India advised for political reforms in order to subside the continued internal disorder. Subsequently, Prime Minister Padma Shumsher announced political reforms such as elections to the panchayat and municipal bodies and establishment of an independent judiciary. Act of vs 2004 (1948) was the first written constitution of Nepal based on the democratic norms.13 Political turmoil continued and King Tribhuvan, by then accepted as the leader of the democratic movement, took asylum in India on 6 November 1950. Prime Minister Mohun Shamsher sent his representatives, Vijaya Shamsher and Keshar Shamsher, to India. Later B. P. Koirala, M. P. Koirala and Suvarna Shamsher came to India.14 Through a political compromise, King Tribhuvan was back to power and the Ranas along with the Congress formed cabinet with Mohan Shumsher as the Prime Minister. This was the first time that India had directly helped the democratic parties. 10 Roy

(2015). blockade more inhuman than war, says Nepal PM K. P. Sharma Oli” (6 November 2015) Times of India. 12 “India-Nepal ties slide downhill over UNHRC move”. IndiaWrites.org. http://www.indiawrites. org/india-nepal-ties-slide-downhill-over-unhrc-move/. Accessed on 24 January 2018. 13 Gupta (1993), pp. 32–37. 14 Joshi and Rose (1966), pp. 76–78. 11 “Indian

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The democratic leaders had sought the Indian help. It was the domestic politics with in Nepal, which led the political class to look towards India. The relations that followed between the two were described as special in nature taking into consideration the sociocultural, political, economic and strategic interests. This special relationship culminated in signing of treaties such as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950, tripartite agreement on Gorkha recruitment in the Indian Army signed in 1949. However, this bonhomie between the two was rather short. First reason was the perceived highhandedness of the Indian embassy. Indian Ambassador C. P. N Singh was criticised for interfering in the domestic politics of Nepal as it is said that he was responsible for M. P. Koirala’s appointment as the Prime Minister of Nepal instead of B. P. Koirala.15 He is said to have attended Cabinet meetings in Nepal. Even today the Indian bureaucracy is labelled as highhanded and interfering in the domestic politics of the country. The role of Indian embassy is exaggerated as getting involved in all the major political developments with in the country, from changes in the government to the placement of new prime ministers. Secondly, not all the democratic leaders were satisfied with the political compromise reached in Delhi about forming government with the Ranas. They started criticising India.16 The help that was earlier sought was now being termed as interference. This is a dilemma that has remained with the Indian leadership. Where does the friendly help or advice end and interference begin? Similarly, when the elected government of B. P. Koirala was dismissed, the political parties and its activities were banned, and one-party Panchayat run government was formed in the early 1960s; India showed its inclination towards the democratic forces. India’s position on the incident was stated in the Lok Sabha by PM Nehru that “It may not be for me to criticise the actions taken there but, obviously, it is a matter for regret for all of us that a democratic experiment or practice that was going on has suffered a set back”.17 In another statement, Nehru made amply clear that King’s proclamation was not favourable to democracy. King’s charges against the government were on administrative failure. Nehru referred to them as “vague charges”. He said, “Anyhow, the basic fact remains that this is not a question of pushing out a Government even though it has a big majority. This is not clear to me that there can be going back to the democratic process in the near future. That is the main thing and naturally one views such a development with considerable regret”.18 India was the first country that was vocal on the political developments in Nepal that was its internal matter. Many leaders from Nepal had moved to India to avoid arrests. In these circumstances, King Mahendra was apprehensive of the political parties operating from India, which had shown its support to the democratic forces. 15 Thapliyal

(1998), p. 62. (2006), pp. 60–62. 17 Statement of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the Lok Sabha in response to an Adjournment Motion on the Dismissal of the Nepalese Cabinet of Mr. Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala by King Mahendra, New Delhi, 16 December 1960 in Bhasin (1994), pp. 76–77. 18 Speech of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the Rajya Sabha moving a Motion on the International Situation. New Delhi, 20 December 1960. Bhasin, ibid., pp. 78–79. 16 Sharma

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Consequently, there was a shift in the foreign policy of Nepal, which tried to look for substitute to India. Nepal made an attempt to develop relations with China, Pakistan and other countries. At the same time, a new phase emerged in Nepal where the Nepali nationalism was equated with criticising India. Thus, emerged a new trajectory in the Nepal’s foreign policy of developing relations with China as a balancer to India. The Nepalese governments tried to develop relations with China when their interests were presumably hurt by India. Nepal hurt India’s strategic sensitivities by giving projects to China or others such as construction of road linking Kodari pass near Tibet with Kathmandu in 1961. Nepal, under Panchayat, justified its stand on developing relations with China by asserting its policy of equidistance. As a landlocked country between India and China, it wanted to develop relations with both without depending on any one. Nepal considered non-alignment and friendship towards all as the cornerstone of its foreign policy under King Birendra. There was rethinking on the traditional concept of being a “buffer state” between India and China. Instead, his policy to pursue equidistance between its two neighbours found expression in the Zone of Peace Proposal in 1975. The insecurity emanating from the pro-democratic forces and the fear of alleged Indian support to these political adversaries of the regime was one of the important variables in influencing Nepal’s attempt to maintain distance from India. One such move was to support Pakistan’s proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia that was opposed by India. The major political upheaval in the country took place in 1990 with a major revolt for multi-party democracy. Monarchy was removed, and ban on political parties was lifted. The new Constitution of Nepal was promulgated in 1990, which declared the country to have constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy.19 Nepal dropped the Zone of Peace proposal and instead highlighted maintaining good relations with its neighbours in the economic, social and other spheres based on equality. Democracy, however, did not bring in political stability. Every political party was faction ridden with too many leaders struggling for power and influence. There were 10 governments with in a span of 12 years, till 2012. Barring Congress forming singleparty government from 1991 till 1994, others were coalitions that did not complete their tenure. The political instability worsened after the Maoists started people’s war in 1996. It was an armed struggle, which propagated formation of new Nepal with restructuring the country’s boundaries and advocating for one-party rule. Simultaneously, the madhesis, janjatis and other social groups had started agitating for inclusive democracy. The international and national nongovernmental organisations played a major role by financing the protesting groups in the name of democracy. The already weak, fractured governments found it difficult to control the social tensions. For Nepal’s internal security and stability, India had cooperated with military assistance, training and management of border. India had arrested Maoists from its territory and handed them over to Nepal. However, the presence of many Maoists in India and their linkages with the extreme left organisations like the People’s War 19 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 (1992) Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary, HMG. Kathmandu.

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Group (PWG) and maoist Communist Center (MCC) seemed to have created an impression amongst a sizeable section of Nepalese that the issue could be resolved only with the Indian help. During my conversation with Sahana Pradhan from CPN (UML), she said that the presence of Maoists in India and the inability of the Indian government to arrest the top maoist leadership was a calibrated move in support of the insurgents.20 Madhav Nepal is a senior leader from CPN (UML). He was general secretary of the party for fifteen years. On the issue of maoist insurgency, he held the view that “the Maoists were freely moving in India. Either they had some guarantee or were taking advantage of India’s non-seriousness on this issue”.21 Not every one shared such views. One such leader was the former Prime Minister of Nepal Lokendra Bahadur Chand from the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party. He said, “India has been supportive to help curb Maoists in Nepal and Indian Governments should not be held responsible for all the activities”.22 Late Narayan Man Singh Pun from the Samata party rubbished those talking about the Indian support to the Maoists and said, “India would not want to have a totalitarian regime in Nepal by supporting Maoists. If Nepal cannot capture maoist leadership with 23 million population, how can they expect India with a population of one billion to capture them?”23 Domestic instability and its links with India is not a new phenomenon. India has been made a factor in the domestic politics of Nepal by the political actors and it has had an adverse impact on the relations. Such as the political instability in Nepal brought by maoist insurgency threw up three power centers: the political parties, the Monarchy and the Maoists. Even though the political parties and the constitutional monarchy are the two recognised components of democracy, King Gyanendra sidelined the democratic forces by dismissing the Sher Bahadur Deuba government in 2002, which was re-nominated in 2004 to be sacked again on 1 February 2005, with an imposition of emergency and the King taking over direct power.24 The official Indian response was that the events in Nepal were set back to democracy. It said, “These developments constitute a serious setback to the cause of democracy in Nepal and cannot but be a cause of grave concern to India”.25 Even though the instability was due to the domestic factors of Nepal, all the three actors suspected India to be a party in strengthening the other. The general impression was that the Bharatiya Janata Party, the main party in the ruling National Democratic 20 Views expressed by Sahana Pradhan, Leader of CPN (UML), in a personal interview, Kathmandu, December 2003. 21 Personal Interview of Madhav Nepal, General Secretary CPN (UML), Kathmandu, December 2003. 22 Personal Interview with Lokendra Bahadur Chand, Rashtriya Prajtantra Party, former Prime Minister of Nepal, Kathmandu, March 2004. 23 Narayan Man Singh Pun, leader of the Samata Party, was facilitator for the second round of negotiations between the Government and the Maoists. Kathmandu, January 2004. 24 “Nepal’s King declares emergency” (2005, 1 February) BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/4224855.stm. Accessed on 20 January 2018. 25 ‘Statement on Developments in Nepal’ (2005, 01, February), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/5841/Statement_on_Developments_ in_Nepal. Accessed on 20 January 2018.

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Alliance, was supportive of the King. There was a feeling that different security agencies in India were supporting the three actors in Nepal and there was no one opinion even in India on the way to resolve the issue. There was an equally strong perception amongst the representatives of all the three forces that India could play an important role in resolving the conflict. All of them held this belief that India was closer to the other force and could bring them to the negotiation table.26 In all these interpretations, the focus shifted to outside foreign agency rather than on rationalizing the reasons for the political trouble and the ways to resolution. Refuting such perceptions, Home Minister Shivraj Patil issued a statement to smoothen the sharp remarks of External Affairs Ministry by saying, “India had no intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal. Nepal is our close neighbour”.27 During my interaction with the former Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar on the political disturbances in Nepal he said, “there is no attempt from our side to intervene in this situation. To be frank and objective it is also true that there is very little scope for India to intervene in the matter. My apprehension is that if an extremist activity in Nepal gets accentuated it will create an atmosphere of uncertainty and may open the area for foreign forces to intervene that will create problem for Nepal but will have implications which will jeopardize our national interest…I strongly feel that there should be some positive effort from our side to bring about reconciliation between democratic process which stand for parliamentary function and in continuing decadence that were received by a bitter struggle of more than three decades to establish democracy in that country”.28 King Gyanendra’s move to take over direct power brought the Maoists and political parties together in the name of democracy. The intense people’s movement removed King from power and multi-party democracy was reinstated. Nepal was declared Federal Democratic Republic by the interim government consisting of the political parties and the Maoists on 27 December 2007. The Constituent Assembly (CA) elections were held in April 2008, and the Maoists were voted as the largest party. Nepal was declared federal, democratic, republic, and King Gyanendra was moved out of Narayanihiti Palace. There was apprehension in the minds of the Indian policy makers as to what course would Nepal take. India’s former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal wrote that “The underlying factors complicating our relations have not changed for the better with recent developments; some have changed for the worse. Earlier the Maoists were handy instruments of the palace; now they are their own masters. Negative approaches towards India can therefore be pursued with more conviction and less opportunism. The Palace was acting out of a sense of vulnerability; the Maoists will act with the confidence of popular backing. The China factor could backstop even more strongly the policies of the new dispensation in Nepal”.29 Deviating from the established norms of visiting India after taking over office, Prime 26 Thapliyal

(2006), Vol. 13, No. 1. will not interfere” (2 February 2005) The Hindu. 28 Views expressed by Chandra Shekhar, former Prime Minister of India, in a personal interview, New Delhi, August 2002. 29 Sibal (2008). 27 “India

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Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, also known as Prachanda, visited Beijing to attend Olympics in 2008. His government emphasised on developing relations with country’s neighbours based on objective judgment of its location.30 The Maoists were particularly inclined towards China because they apprehended that India was more supportive of other traditional Nepalese forces. The Maoists, however, frittered away their energies in intra-party or inter-party power struggle, interfering in institutions like the Army and Paramilitary forces and subsequently Prachanda resigned from the post of Prime Minister. Due to interand intra-party (seen in all the parties) differences, the Constitution writing was its biggest casualty. There were certain issues on which the parties did not seem to have consensus such as on the issue of restructuring of the state as federal structure; all the parties had their own proposals based on ethnicity, geography, economy or a combination of these criteria. The form of government, whether presidential or parliamentary, was another issue that required political consensus. The Constituent Assembly (CA) was extended four times and elections for the second CA were held in 2013. After many deliberations, the draft constitution was ready and placed for a week before the people for comments. The madhesis and janjatis were against the proposed restructuring of the provinces, electoral process and representation in the parliament. At this juncture, India had sent foreign secretary S. Jaishankar to Nepal advising them to deliberate for a few more days in order to resolve the reservations of the madhesis and the janjatis.31 Despite this, the new constitution was promulgated on 20 September 2015.32 Madhesis, tharus and janjatis had called for blackouts in protest against the Constitution. India’s official response was that “We note the promulgation in Nepal today of a Constitution”.33 Explaining India’s position on the political developments in Nepal, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj in a statement to the Rajya Sabha said, “Our position, without being prescriptive, is that remaining issues about perceived under-representation, should be resolved through dialogue in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation, and institutionalized in a manner that would enable broad-based ownership of the Constitution”.34 Indian contention was that the madhesi agitation was too close to the Indian state of Bihar. The state had impending elections and the agitation could have had a spill over effect on the electoral outcome. On the other hand, there is a considerable section with in Nepal, which holds the view that the madhesi leaders had influenced the political leaders from Bihar and used them in turn to influence the Indian government for their cause. 30 “Row

over Prachanda’s China visit” (25 August 2008) Indian Express. Secretary S. Jaishankar Meets Senior Nepali Leaders”. https://www.ndtv.com/ india-news/foreign-secretary-s-jaishankar-meets-senior-nepali-leaders-1219160. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 32 Haviland (2015). 33 “Statement on the situation in Nepal” (20 September 2015) MEA, GOI. http://www.mea.gov.in/ pressreleases.htm?dtl/25821/Statement_on_the_situation_in_Nepal. Accessed on 18 January 2018. 34 Statement by External Affairs Minister on Calling Attention Motion on “Situation in Nepal and State of Indo-Nepal Relation” in Rajya Sabha (2015). Same as fn 9. 31 “Foreign

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India’s response and the last-minute visits of dignitaries was regarded as interference in Nepal’s internal affairs and flared up nationalism in response. In my personal interview to Prime Minister Oli, he expressed hurt in the manner in which Jaishankar had spoken to him belittling his stature as the head of the government.35 Social media was hyper with reactions on the role of India and it’s supposed support to the madhesis. A closer examination reveals strong nationalistic sentiments were more in the dominant hill communities. Those belonging to madhes, tharus and janjatis considered these reactions to be hype by the hill dominant communities to corner them. To meet the requirements of the people, Nepal turned to its northern neighbour and signed a few agreements such as the Nepal Oil Corporation and China United Fuel Corporation had signed a Memorandum of Understanding to import petrol, diesel and petroleum products. China had also agreed to supply 1000 metric tonnes of fuel on grant basis. Expected supplies from China could not reach Nepal due to inefficient infrastructure. Since the route from Sindhupalchok via Kodari pass was damaged due to landslide in 2013, China and Nepal tried using the new route via Kerong pass. In fact, Nepal is looking towards seven new trade routes to China.36 China has already constructed rail links till Xigaze in Tibet that is around 540 km away from Kerong.37 From there, the goods will be transported by road to Kathmandu.38 It is common knowledge that goods through ocean routes are economical than the road and rail transportation. In this way, Nepal’s attempt for alternative route seems more likely to take care of geostrategic concerns rather than purely economics. All these attempts by Nepal are a move to assert its sovereignty and independence from India. The blockade by the madhesis and the perceived Indian support to them has given opportune circumstances to Nepal to diversify its relations and lessen its dependence on India. Nepal is looking towards China as an alternative to India. Knowing well that the goods from sea are cheaper than from the land route, Nepal is keen on road and rail route from China, which gives it a window to diversify. Secondly, Nepal wants to remodel its role and be a link between India and China. During the sidelines of the BRICS summit, Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal said that “Nepal wants to act as a dynamic bridge between the two Asian giants and to reap the benefit of playing such a role”.39 K. P. Oli who has taken over as the Prime Minister of the country for the second time on 13 February 2018 indicates similar statements on Nepal’s foreign policy. He is quoted in South China Morning post on Nepal’s relations with its neighbours, “We have great connectivity with India and an open border. All that’s fine and we’ll 35 Personal

interview with Prime Minister K. P. Oli, Kathmandu 2016. has asked China to open seven new trade routes through Mustang and Larke in Gorkha; Kimathanka in Sankhuwasabha; Lamabagar in Dolakha; Yari in Humla; Mugu and Olangchungola in Taplejung. 37 “China agrees in principle to extend Qinghai-Tibet railway line to Tibet” (2014, 29 September), DNA. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-china-agrees-in-principle-to-extendqinghai-tibet-railway-line-to-nepal-border-2022371. Accessed on 10 December 2017. 38 Krishnan (2016). 39 “Nepal wants to become dynamic bridge between India, China: Prachanda” (2016, 17 October) The Indian Express. 36 Nepal

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increase connectivity even further, but we can’t forget that we have two neighbours”, Oli said. “We don’t want to depend on one country or have one option”. In the same interview, he said that “once China brings its rail network up to Shigatse and then Kyirong in Tibet, it should be easy to extend it to Nepal. It’s lower altitude than Tibet, and the terrain is actually sloping all the way down from Kyirong. Apart from that, three roads are under construction connecting China and Nepal, which should be ready in a couple of years. If we can connect this railway network to our eastwest rail project, it can revolutionise China-India trade, with Nepal in the middle” he said.40 There is a perceptible change in the emphasis on Nepal’s foreign policy. Earlier Nepal’s relations with China were seen from the prism of political elite. Those who did not get support from India used China as a balancer to the Indian influence or support to the other political actors in Nepal. Monarchy or left parties were seen from this prism. In the present circumstances, the CPN (UML) has been apprehensive of Indian influence in Nepal. Oli has blamed India on dismissal of his government in 2016. Now in his second tenure, Oli has made it clear to go ahead with the projects signed with China but he is careful to say that Nepal would like to be transit between its two neighbours. Secondly, Oli government has people’s support to develop relations with China and utilize its economic growth apart from developing relations with India.

Perceptions of the Other From the above narrative on Nepal’s domestic politics and its impact on relations with India, it is evident that political, economic, strategic and other objective factors play a substantive role but the perceptions, real or imaginary, are equally important in formulating foreign relations. While discussing the linkage between the domestic politics and foreign policy, we found that Nepal’s perception of India begins with fear psychosis. Fear emanating from geopolitical compulsions, to carefully calibrated domestic politics inflaming the fears. India’s domineering size, economy, population, military brings forth the feeling of asymmetry in power between it and its neighbours. The asymmetry per se is not a threat to any nation but Nepal’s fears are exaggerated by its landlocked status between India and China. Even though China is bigger and more developed than India on military, economic might and geography, population and size but it is India that looms large on the Nepalese psyche. Geographical contiguity with India is more amenable for the movement of population; transit to reach outside world and day-to-day interaction with the border population. The presence of India in Nepal is so overwhelming that any incident, positive or negative, is linked with it. There is an acute sense of fear that India dominates Nepal or that the Ministry of External Affairs in India is obsessed with Nepal and is conniving to take control of it or its natural resources. Certain policies in the past have established the image 40 Chowdhury

(2018).

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of India as “not a magnanimous neighbour” especially on projects related to water resources. The issues of foreign relations do tend to become a matter of domestic politics or at times the domestic politics influences the foreign relations. If this were true, how does Indian imagery conjure in Nepali domestic politics? To begin with, most of the political parties in Nepal historically had links with India and for propaganda purposes, they are still known with past connections such as the Nepali Congress is considered as close to India due to its earlier association with the socialists from Indian National Congress. On the other hand, the Communist Party in Nepal had taken birth in India but over the years CPN (UML) has built up an image independent of India. For this, it also propagated certain steps that were considered nationalistic but were vociferously against India. It raises slogans against the Treaty of Peace and Friendship or Gorkha recruitment and calls water treaties as unequal. Madhesi parties such as the Nepal Sadbhavna party representing the interests of the madhes are considered advocating India’s interests in principle. Accordingly, the people in Nepal allege each other to be pro-India or against Nepal’s interests. All the political parties in Nepal blame the Panchayat rule that began the anti-India pro-nationalist politics in order to tarnish the political parties who were alleged to be having links with India. Regime insecurity was the reason for monarchy and Panchayat regime to be propagating negative nationalism. Nepalism as anti-Indianism was consolidated during the time of King Mahendra. “Through radio broadcasts, news bulletins, pamphlets, posters and newspapers, only one theme was repeated that for the first time in recent history, Nepal had an independent government. By implication an impression was sought to be created that all governments preceding the new one had been, somehow or the other, subservient to foreign influences and that the ousted congress Government in 1960 was most emphatically so”.41 Gradually, India came to the centre stage for being responsible for all the ills befalling the Kingdom from natural disasters to price rise. “The cult of nationalism had, thus, to be carried to its logical end to prove how both in home and foreign affairs the King’s regime was nationalist and therefore independent of India”.42 King Birendra’s Zone of Peace was also in the light of acquiring domestic sympathy of being a nationalist and international support of being non-aligned vis-a-vis India. In recent times, K. P. Oli utilized the sufferings of the Nepalese from earthquake and later blockade to his advantage by being nationalistic. Instead of talking to protestors in resolving the domestic crisis, the UML was involved in using the situation to its political advantage. However, with the presence of power struggle between the political parties they indulged in such nationalistic politics to tarnish each other’s image. Parties challenged each other based on their being pro-nationalist which meant to be distant from India. All the moderate parties blame the left parties to sustain themselves on anti-India rhetoric. Such narrowly defined politics has meant that any association 41 Gupta 42 Ibid.,

(1993). Same as fn 13, pp. 243–244. p. 246.

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with India has to be criticised and claimed as contrary to Nepal’s national interest. Issues concerning India are debated through road demonstrations to bring about pressure on the government. The myth has been propagated for so long ignoring the political realities of close associations and working relations. There is a formidable perception in Nepal, which holds Indian embassy responsible for the sudden dip in relations during Prime Minister Modi’s government. It was after 17 years, an Indian Prime Minister had visited Nepal. People were euphoric but the Nepalese believe that the Indian bureaucracy, evolved and nurtured, under the Congress did not want BJP to succeed in its relations with Nepal. BJP is considered as a Hindu party closer to the King. Some sections in Nepal had anxious moments when Yogi Adityanath was made the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, as he is also the head of Gorakhnath mutt to which the monarchy has been a follower. The ruling elite in Nepal has fed its people for many years on this nationalistic propaganda that it can easily flare up passions such as during Hritik Roshan episode that was aired in a television channel. Roshan, a popular Hindi film actor, was alleged to have made remarks against Nepal. This led to widespread violence against Indian businesses and interests in and around Kathmandu in which five people were killed. The Indian Embassy issued a press release expressing concern about the “the rumours being spread by elements inimical to the warm and cordial India-Nepal relations and the age-old ties between the people of Nepal and India”.43 Defence Minister George Fernandes said that the anti-India feeling among the Nepalese was spread in a calculated manner by the ISI.44 The incident showed once again that it was easy to flare up passions of the people who have been fed long on anti-India slogans. However, this time irresponsible journalism led to such incident. The political elite and other responsible people in Nepal were against it and suppressed before it could take an ugly turn. The younger generation in Nepal is not much enamoured by the close sociocultural relations with India. They look for economic development irrespective of the source. “Nepalese now prefer Western universities for higher studies and have particularly not much idea and closeness with India. This would have a definite impact on India Nepal relations”.45 Even those who studied in India cannot be considered as Indian constituency. Once they return to Nepal, they have to live and survive amongst them and indulge in similar posturing. India is one of the preferred destinations for Nepalese diaspora but new destinations in the Middle East or South East Asia are more lucrative for the migrant workers. This has diversified labour market for the Nepalese and lessened dependence on India. There is a perceptible change amongst the Indian political leadership as well. Most of the leaders are post-independence generation who have not had close linkages with the Nepalese political leaders. Indian National Congress of yesteryears does 43 “Capital Seemingly Calm after Two Days of Unrest” (2000, 24 December) Nepalnews. www. nepalnews.com. 44 “ISI at work in Nepal- George” (2001, 2 January) Indian Express. 45 Views expressed by Ramesh Nath Pandey, He was the member of the National Assembly and also, Foreign Minister of Nepal. Kathmandu, January 2004.

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not exist and the present-day Congress leaders have very less connection with the Nepali Congress. The younger leadership in India is no longer interested in giving Nepal a special treatment and consider it as an equal and not more important than other neighbouring countries. Leaders having personal relations with Nepali political elite felt otherwise. BJP leaders emphasis on close cultural ties with Nepal. The dominant perception in Nepal is that BJP, due to its Hindutva ideology, does not support secularism in the country despite its leaders refuting it. The present Indian bureaucrats, politicians and policy planners downplay the cultural similarities between the two countries. Firstly, the overemphasis on the sociocultural ties as a historical reality is often misinterpreted in Nepal as getting submerged in the domineering often-bordering hegemonic Indian culture. Most of the present leaders in India are not overwhelmed by the sociocultural similarities. These historical ties have worked at the people’s level but have not worked at foreign policy goals or strategic interests. The anti-India rhetoric in Nepal has had an adverse impact on the Indian policy makers. It is accepted that certain political groups in Nepal base their politics on campaigns in criticising India. Another predominant perception amongst the policy makers in India is that anti-India feeling in Nepal has been pursued to gain more benefits from India. It is a sign of asking India to give more space and benefits. Hence, India has to continuously be strengthening its position in the region. There is a strong perception held by many bureaucrats and policy makers that a weak India gives confidence to Nepal to indulge in policies targeting its interests where as a strong India produces opposite results. Indian posturing during the recent economic blockade was the result of this mindset that how could a small country ignore India’s advice on Constitution. The incident exposed the efficacy of certain beliefs on India’s strengths. For one it showed that the belief held by the policy planners and bureaucrats was shaken that on trying times India had certain levers against Nepal such as the open border. During the current blockade by the madhesi agitators, it was clear that the blockade could not serve political purposes. Contrary to it, the public perception was against India for their economic sufferings. And after India tried to mend fences with the government in Nepal, the madhesis felt let down. India has been confident of the geographical links with Nepal. The policy planners feel confident that China would not be able to substitute India in Nepal as was evident in 1989 closure of trade and transit points and later 2015 border blockade. But reactions of people in 1989 were different from 2015; in the earlier episode, there was widespread discontentment within Nepal questioning King Birendra for measures he had taken to resolve the crisis and it led to intense support to the democratic movement but in 2015 even though people asked Oli for resolving the crisis, there was support to develop relations with China as an alternative. Many reasons contributed to it; such as confident Nepalese ready to take on India, active media and social networks, growth in Chinese economy. Large sections of Nepalese want to develop relations with China as an alternative to India. It would be difficult for India to deter Nepal from developing relations with any other countries including China. China has been a variable in India’s relations with Nepal and it would continue to be so. With growing

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economic developments with in China, Nepalese look towards China as an alternative to India. Nepalese often complain that India does not complete projects or takes too long to implement them. It would do well to India’s image by completing projects on time. India should strive to take lead in developing infrastructural links with Nepal. Perceptions are an integral part of foreign policy. China does not share sociocultural links with Nepal nor does it have easier terrain for easy mobility but in the common man’s perception, China does no harm and it delivers. Nepalese have not done cost-benefit analysis of road and rail links with China but consider it as an alternative to lessen dependence on India. India, on the other hand, has provided facilities to the Nepalese similar to an Indian citizen but too close a relationship brings its own complexities including fears of sovereignty and interference. This is India’s responsibility to erase such fears that can be done by emphasising on mutual interests and not reciprocity, such as Gujral doctrine had received favourable response from Nepal. Onus lies on India to smoothen relations since it is the larger country. Of course, geopolitical realities would continue to guide relations but operating them under trustworthy atmosphere should be a preferred strategy. It is important to develop people-centred interconnectedness. The linkages between the two countries would play its own determining role, irrespective of the governments and political parties. These linkages and associations form their own interests, which are not easy to ignore. Cultural linkages would still work at the people’s level and keep on giving acceptability to the Nepalese in the Indian society. In conclusion, one can argue that India–Nepal relations in reality have been going on without major hiccups. The obstacles are more due to perceptional differences but they do not obstruct the relations and only create tense environment. To acquire tension-free environment, it would require sensitive handling of each other’s sensibilities, which would include their own strengths and those of the others as well. Postscript: Two major developments took place since PM K. P. The first major development was PM Oli’s visit to India in April 2018. One, his visit to India in April 2018. Oli is perceived as nationalist in Nepal and pro-China in India. “By opting India for his maiden visit as the Prime Minister of Nepal, Oli has followed the tradition that is more ceremonial. There was a reaffirmation of the close sociocultural and political ties with an emphasis on economic development. The visit was not about major breakthroughs but about resolve to work on the existing projects”.46 Both the countries emphasised on infrastructural linkages. It was said that the rail link between Jayanagar and Janakapur would be completed by the end of this year. It was agreed to construct railway link between Raxaul and Kathmandu. It was also agreed to explore waterways for trans-shipment of goods and cooperation on the agriculture sector. PM Oli extended invitation to PM Modi to visit Nepal, which was reciprocated. The second major development in the relations was the visit of PM Modi to Nepal in May 2018. The visit was perceived by some Nepalese and Indian foreign policy analysts as enhancement of the cultural ties. Some news channels in Nepal 46 “Oli

in India: Changing Perceptions” (2018, 17 April) Nepal Foreign Affairs. http:// nepalforeignaffairs.com/oli-in-india-changing-perceptions/. Accessed on 20 May 2018.

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had captions as “Dharmik yatra ya rajnitik kootniti” or “Dharmik yatra ya ranniti bhraman”. Modi’s visit to Janakpur and Muktinath was perceived as strengthening cultural links. The emphasis on cultural connectedness began in 2014, during Modi’s visit, when India and Nepal had agreed to establish sister-city relationships between Kathmandu–Benaras, Janakpur–Ayudhya and Lumbini–Sarnath.47 He had visited Pashupatinath and performed a grand prayer ceremony donating 2500 kg of sandalwood. The sociocultural linkages were furthered in this visit by agreeing to develop Janakpurdham and link it with Ayodhya in India. It was also decided to develop Ramayan and Buddhist circuits linking the two countries. During this visit, the bus service between Ayodhya and Janakpur was started.48 Emphasis was laid on infrastructural linkages like waterways and new railway link between Raxaul and Kathmandu. Cooperation on agriculture sector was emphasised. Both the Prime Ministers laid the foundation stone of Arun III hydropower project.49 These visits confirm to the earlier discussed assertion that there are no major strains in the relations but minor hiccups, which create tense environment. With sensitive handling of each other’s sensibilities, the relations can be consolidated. Both the Prime Ministers have kept their differences aside and met with a resolve to create harmonious environment. The visits were breakthrough in people-centred policies emphasizing on sociocultural and economic ties. Cultural links have worked at the people’s level even during critical times. It is the political leadership in both the countries, which has taken it for granted. Sociocultural linkages have to be nurtured to have a positive impact on perceptions towards each other. In the recent visit of both the PMs, there has been reaffirmation of the close sociocultural and political ties with an emphasis on economic development. Since both Modi and Oli have majority in their respective parliaments and are committed to development, this should again be seen as a positive step. Both seemed committed to implement the existing projects on infrastructure linkages and economic development. Most importantly, the present trend shows investment in the political linkages between the two countries.

47 “Run up to SAARC Summit: India Nepal ink 10 pacts”, Business Standard, 26 November 2014. http://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-version?article_id= 114112600016_1; “India to work with Nepal on Tourism Promotion”, 16 January 2014. http:// www.travelbiznews.com/news/item/2850-india-to-work-with-nepal-on-tourism-promotion. 48 Earlier in 2015, direct bus services were started between Delhi-Kathmandu and VaranasiKathmandu. 49 For details, see India-Nepal Joint Statement during the State Visit of Prime Minister of India to Nepal (11–12 May 2018), MEA, GOI. http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29894/ IndiaNepal_Joint_Statement_during_the_State_Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_India_to_Nepal_ May_1112_2018. Accessed on 20 May 2018.

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References Bhasin, A. S. (Ed.). (1994). Nepal’s relations with India and China document 1947–1962. Delhi: SIBA Exim Pvt Ltd. Chowdhury, D. R. (2018, February 19). Nepal leader vows to revive Chinese dam project, open to review pact over Nepalese soldiers in India. South China Morning Post. Retrieved February 19, 2018 from http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2133845/nepal-leader-revivechinese-dam-project-open-review-pact-over. Dhamala, R. (2018, January 29). ‘Oli’s new test’, my republica. http://www.myrepublica.com/news/ 35247/?categoryId=81. Ghimire, Y. (2015, October 2). PM aspirant asks to lift Nepal blockade. Indian Express. Gupta, A. (1993). Politics in Nepal 1950–60. Delhi: Kalinga Publishers. Haviland, C. (2015, September 19). Why Nepal’s new constitution controversial? BBC News. Joshi, B. L., & Rose, L. E. (1966). Democratic innovations in Nepal. Berekely: University of California Press. Krishnan, A. (2016, May 12). China opens new trade route to Nepal amid India tensions. India Today. Roy, S. (2015, November 5). Violence, discrimination: In a first, India takes Nepal to the UN Human Rights Council. Indian Express. Sharma, J. (2006). Nepal: Struggle for existence. Kathmandu: CommInc. Sibal, K. (2008, June 11). Nepal’s tryst with India. Indian Express. Thapliyal, S. (1998). Mutual security: India Nepal relations. New Delhi: Lancers International. Thapliyal, S. (2006). Nepal at the political crossroads: Options for India. South Asian Survey, 13(1). January–June 2006. Thapliyal, S. (2012). The discourse on federalism in Nepal. In C. Mishra & O. Gurung (Eds.), Ethnicity and federalism in Nepal. Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu.

Perceptions of Pakistan in India Amit Ranjan

1

Whether one falls into a category of ‘argumentative’ or is reticent enough to not express him/her self, every speaking Indian has some or the other form of perception of Pakistan. This can be aptly experienced if one goes across India and engages in a discussion on Pakistan or use the word ‘Pakistan’ while talking to anyone in the country. Apparently, in most cases these perceptions are not based on realities rather on narrations one heard from various sources like media, from someone else, etc. These perceptions are largely guided by the narration one accepts about the colonial history of India, partition-related killings, and day-to-day relationships between India and Pakistan. Besides them, there is also a constructed dimension to the differences between the citizens from the two respective countries. As the partition of India happened, primarly, on religion basis, Pakistan is seen by many Indians as a country for Muslims. This perception has further strengthened with the rise of Hindutva politics in India since 1980s. Moreover, with the global emergence of terrorism having roots in Pakistan, rise of Islamists in Pakistan with anti-India diatribe, and increased tensions between India and Pakistan, Hindu–Muslim distances in India have further widened. This has made many Hinduised Indian middle class to develop one or the other forms of perception about their Muslim citizens, often, even without having a basic understanding about them. It is being always maintained by a large section of Indian middle class that Muslims are “different” people, and a large number of 2 them do not belong to “ours” group . They are different because of their religion, food habit, language, etc. All such differences have been constructed despite the fact

1 Professor Amartya Sen has used this word to show that debate and democracy have deep roots in India. See Sen (2006). As there are many opinions in democracy, so are perceptions of Pakistan, as sketched by the ‘argumentative’ Indians. 2 See Naqvi (2016).

A. Ranjan (B) Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_6

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that almost all Muslims in India eat what their Hindu neighbours do, and speak the same language as a Hindu speaks. This chapter discusses the perception of Pakistan in India, mainly, in present times. In past too, the perception was almost same but the difference is in degree. This difference is because, unlike earlier, there is a rise of politically assertive Hindutva since 1980s. To gather sample, I have talked to Indian citizens based in metropolitan cities such as New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad. The respondents were of different ages and communities and include both males and females.

India-Pakistan Relations-Brief History Perception of a country depends on the bilateral relationship it has with the other country. Historically, tensions between India and Pakistan goes back to the religionrelated issues between Hindus and Muslims especially during the British India when ‘divide and rule’ policy was adopted to keep the people divided. Even after centuries of living together, Muslims are still considered as an “outsiders” by a section of Hindus. They are regarded as one who invaded India and ruled over the country, mainly, in late medieval period (1206–1857). After their coming to India, a number of Hindu upper-caste converted into Islam to reap the benefits of being a part of the ruling class. On the other hand, the lower-caste Hindus converted into Islam in the hope of being treated in an egalitarian way; however, this did not happen. Instead, a caste system developed within Islam. At many places, both forms of conversions were individual’s choice, but in certain cases, it was fear of the atrocities made people to get converted. In some cases, even forceful conversions did occur in certain parts of India.3 Until 1857, the Mughals ruled over India. They were replaced by the British after their defeat in the popularly known as Sepoy Mutiny. The mutiny was carried out under the leadership of Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, but most of the rebellions were Hindu chiefs of small estates. Their aim was to march to Delhi after winning their local battles against the British. However, the mutineers could not match the East India Company’s Army which also included a number of Indian soldiers. In 1858, after suppression of the rebellion, the British monarchy took over the affairs of India. The decline of Mughal rule had affected both Hindus and Muslims, but latter suffered most because they lost the status of being a ruling class.4 Years after 1857, the declining status of the Muslims, mainly, in the United Province (UP) and other provinces proved to be a reason for the demand for Pakistan.5 This demand was made by the Muslim power elites who joined their hands together under the banner of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) which was formed in 1906 with a support from Nawab of Dakha, Salimullah Khan. The organization was 3 Cohen

(2005). Robinson (2000). 5 See Robinson (2000), Dhulipala (2015). 4 (see

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founded to represent the issues concerning the Muslims of British India.6 In 1940, the AIML passed Pakistan Resolution, and in 1947, amidst bloodshed, the British India was partitioned between India and Pakistan. The belief which caused partition was that the Hindu and Muslims are two different nations so they cannot live together. In that partition-related violence, around million people were butchered, and thousands of women were raped, abducted, and killed.7 This imagination of Pakistan as a country based on religious bonding among people from different cultural background exposed soon after its birth in 1947. In early 1950s, Bengalis from the East Pakistan realized religion is one out of many multiple identities an individual wears. As early as in 1948 and then in 1952, language movement demanding national language status to Bengali started in East Pakistan.8 Not only Pakistan, but many other postcolonial states too had faced such political and social situations. However, a few like India managed such subnationalist movements in a democratic way. Unlike democracies, authoritarian and military dictatorships failed to handle such situations. In 1958 Pakistan witnessed its first military take over when General Ayub Khan (1958–1969) came into power through a military coup. After a decade, he handed over the power to General Yahya Khan. Under the two successive military rulers, the East Pakistan found itself being “discriminated” by the country’s establishment.9 It created tensions between the two wings. An immediate cause for disintegration of Pakistan was denial to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from becoming the prime minister of Pakistan despite his party won the largest number of seats in the parliamentary elections of 1970. Eventually, Bangladesh was liberated after the end of 1971 war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan still blames India for separation of its East Wing. For Pakistan, India interfered in its domestic affairs, while India maintains that it provided humanitarian assistance to Bengali speaking East Pakistani people,10 and war began only after Pakistan launched air attack on its northern border with the country. Looking into India–Pakistan relationships in seventy years of partition, India and Pakistan have fought three full wars (1947–48, 1965, and 1971) and one limited war at Kargil sector in 1999 and have been at the brink of war (1987, 2002 and 2008) and for most of the time remain in tensions. There are only a few patches of having “normal” relationships between them. Definition wise what is called as “normal” relationship between them is not “normal” for others. One of the serious charges India slaps against Pakistan is interference in its internal matters and extending support to militant activities in India. Soon after partition of India when many subnationalist movements were bubbling, Pakistan supported a few of them. In 1956, Pakistani intelligence helped Naga National Council leader A. Z. Phizo to make escape to London via Dhaka on a fake passport.11 One of the 6 See

Hasan (2002). (2014). 8 See Fazal (2016). 9 Sobhan (2016). 10 See Sisson and Rose (1990). 11 Hauzel (2005), pp. 39–54. 7 Butalia

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first insurgent leaders, who was trained by Pakistani agencies, was Nameirakpam Bisheshwar from Manipur. He was active in 1960s and allegedly handled by Pakistani agencies.12 Then, Mizo National Front (MNF) leader P. Laldenga was given shelter by Pakistan. In 1971, Laldenga fought alongside the Pakistan Army against the Indian forces.13 After the liberation of Bangladesh, the MNF scattered in Myanmar, while Laldenga moved to Pakistan. After living in Pakistan, Laldenga moved to Europe where he was engaged by the Indian State. As a result of those engagements, peace was brokered between the Indian state and the MNF. Laldenga returned to India as a part of the deal. The MNF contested elections, and from 1986 to 1988, Laldenga was Chief Minister of Mizoram. Then, there is a case of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The first external interference was made by Pakistan in 1947–48 when the Pakistani Army backed armed groups intruded in Kashmir Valley to occupy it. They were pushed back by the Indian Army after the king of J&K Maharaja Hari Singh signed instrument of accession. In 1965, once again similar operation was carried out by Pakistan to create unrest among the Kashmiri which they found would help them to interfere and ‘liberate’ the valley. The intruders were caught, and nothing as such unrest occurred in the valley.14 The two countries also fought a war which ended with Tashkent declaration. Since 1980s, Pakistan’s engagement in Kashmir affairs has led to rise of militancy in the state. Many of the Pakistan-trained Mujahideen who fought against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan were craftily turned by the Pakistani establishment to fight against its proxy war against India.15 However, to an extent, the Indian state is also responsible for the militancy in the valley by taking certain wrong decisions which has created disgruntled elements in the valley. Some of them have been then used by Pakistani establishment. One such step which caused deep-seated resentment amongst a section of Kashmiris erupted when in the 1987 assembly elections were rigged by the Indian state to make the National Conference’s candidate Ghulam Mohiuddin Shah to defeat Muhammad Yusuf Shah who was representing a polyglot coalition of anti-establishment groups under the banner of Muslim United Front. Mohammad Yasin Malik, separatist leader from Kashmir, was Yusuf Shah’s election manager. Yusuf Shah now goes by his nom de guerre Syed Salahuddin and has since early 1990s been commander in chief of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the guerrilla force fighting in the Kashmir valley.16 Before 1987, in 1984 separatist leader Maqbool Bhatt was hanged in Delhi’s Tihar jail for masterminding the hijack of Indian airlines flight to from Delhi to Lahore in 1971. He was arrested by the Pakistani authorities and was released in 1974. In 1976, he got into Indian terroritory and was arrested by the Indian security forces. In 1984, he was hanged till death after a trial in the Supreme Court of India and rejection of the clemency petition by then President of India, Gyani Zail Singh. For a section of Kashmiris, Bhatt’s trial was not fair. 12 Ibid. 13 See

Van Schendel (2016). (2013). 15 See Hussian (2010). 16 Bose (2005), pp. 48–50. 14 Bajwa

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Over the years, he had been portrayed by the separatists as a martyr to the cause of the people from the Kashmir Valley.17 Likewise, the hanging of Afzal Guru in 2013 who was charged as a complicit in an attack on India’s parliament in 2001 has further made few Kashmiris to get disenchanted from the Indian state.18 Both Bhatt and Guru were hanged and buried in Delhi. With eruption of militancy since late 1980s, many innocent people have lost their lives in the valley. In the early days of militancy, a large number of Kashmir Pandits were killed by the militants. They were forced to run away from their homes in the valley because of fear from the gun-totting militants. To control the situation in the valley Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) was imposed in 1990. Since then, the Jammu & Kashmir is under the AFSPA.19 Not only in north-eastern states and Kashmir Valley, Pakistan has also supported the Sikh militancy in India in 1980s.20 Like past, even at present the Pakistani intelligence agency has been active in fanning up militancy in Punjab. According to Indian agencies, Pakistan is supporting Manjit Singh, leader of Khalistan Zinadabad Force (KZF). It also maintains that the KZF is getting more active in South Kashmir and Kathua region of the state and in Punjab. Besides KZF, the Sikh extremists leaders based in Pakistan belong to—Babbar Khalsa International, Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF).21 Pakistan-based terror outfits are also found engaged in other militant activities in India. Some of them have been engaged into militant acts such as attack on Indian parliament in 2001. It was an attack on the symbol of Indian democracy. Second, horrible attack was carried out by such groups in Mumbai in November 2008. The recent one was in 2016 when the Pakistan-trained militants carried out an attack on Brigade headquarter of the Indian Army at Uri. In this 20 Indian Army soldiers have lost their lives. India-Pakistan’s relationships is not marred with only bad relationships, but also has witnessed some positives when the two countries managed to sign some treaties and agreements. The two countries addressed their water-related disputes in 1960 when they signed Indus Waters Treaty after years of talks mediated by the World Bank. In 1988, the two countries agreed over exchange of information about nuclear weapons. In addition, many times the two countries made attempts or tried to do so to resolve or even manage their bilateral disputes and relationships. On Kashmir issue, there were moments in 1954, 1963, 1972, and 200722 when it was thought 17 See

Christopher Snedden (2008) and Peer (2008).

18 The disenchantment can be recorded by seeing the number of people attending the funeral prayers

of the militants killed in the valley. There are also a rise of young people engaging into stone pelting activities against the Indian security forces. Some of the stone pelting acts in 2017 has witnessed participation of even school girls which is a new development. 19 For details of AFSPA See THE ARMED FORCES (SPECIAL POWERS) ACT, 1958. http:// indianarmy.nic.in/Site/RTI/rti/MML/MML_VOLUME_3/CHAPTER__03/457.htm. 20 See Kiessling (2016). 21 Jacob (2017). 22 Soon after the partition of India in 1950s, India and Pakistan, after an interaction between the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, engaged

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that something concrete would occur on the issue from the talks. In 1999 at Lahore, the two countries came out with Lahore Declaration which charted the course of peaceful relationships between them. Unfortunately, most of their attempts proved in vain, as they failed to achieve any breakthrough. In some cases, unlike individuals, institutions behave differently. For example, the embassy officials from India and Pakistan across the world do not engage in day-today diatribes against each other, except when they are representing their respective countries.23 However, in New Delhi and Islamabad things are not like this. The officials from the other countries have been accused of engaging into spying activities, and there had been occasions when someone had been told to leave the country. Even there are examples when family members of the officials had been harassed. In 2016, Indian High Commission in Islamabad was declared as a “non-family posting”. In March 2018, the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi has accused India of allegedly “harassing” its diplomats and their families. It also accused Indian officials for “intimidation”.24

Findings on Perceptions Indians Have About Pakistan This nature of relationships between India and Pakistan constructs perception of the country in India. During my interactions, most of the respondents referred bilateral relationships as a major factor which determines their perception of Pakistan. Some also referred to Hindu–Muslim tensions and age old rivalries in their development of such perceptions about Pakistan. Some of my respondent replied via mail, while from others I gathered their respective views through informal and non-structured discussions. I tried to include people from different regions, and religious, caste, and gender groups. Mainly, I engaged with common individuals on the street. However, some of the scholars working in research institutes and universities too were part of this exercise. over the Kashmir issue. The two head of states agreed on certain points to resolve the issue. However in 1954 Ghulam Mohammad fell ill, and, subsequently, he was replaced by Iskandar Mirza. This stopped the process. See Jalalzi, M. K. The Foreign Policy of Pakistan (1947–2000). Lahore: Khan Book Centre. Second time in 1963, the two countries, unlike the past, engaged into a structured negotiations over the issue. India was represented by Sardar Swaran Singh, while Pakistan was led by Z. A. Bhutto. After five rounds of talks held in the Indian and Pakistani cities, the representatives agreed on certain issues and were all set to sign on certain documents, but at last minute something happened, and they pulled back. See Lamb (1993). Third time was in 1972 when the two countries could have resolved the issue during Shimla agreement between them. However they did not. See Guha (2007). The last such moment was in 2007 when the two countries almost agreed to resolve their dispute over Kashmir. However, this time too, like earlier they were pulled back from doing so. This was stated by Khursheed Mohammad Kasuri during his interaction with Times of India and Jang group’s Aman ki Asha programme on 23 April 2010. 23 Many Indian and Pakistani living in a foreign countries have informed about this to the author. The author himself has observed that in many functions in the foreign countries the Indian and Pakistani ambasdors exchange greetings and sometime share the same table. 24 Singh (2017a).

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Analysing them, I found that there are four main perceptions in India about Pakistan. First, Pakistan is a normal state suffering from terrorism. Second, a liberal elite who through interaction with the elites from across the borders feels that certain groups in Pakistan have created havoc. The people are good and cordial. Third is that Pakistan is a state where military reins. Terrorist groups are very strong in that country. Fourth, there are individuals for whom Indian Muslims ghetos are synonym of “mini-Pakistan” which has to be destroyed. Overwhelming number of Indians find Pakistan as a country which always remains “anti-India”. Negative perception of Pakistan is strong among the people living in communally charged regions of India. A large number of those, who favour India–Pakistan talks, and find there are positive things too in Pakistan, have some friends across the border and few of them have managed to pay visit to that country. Nevertheless, this perception about Pakistan differs from region to region and also from religion to religion. Region wise, perception of Pakistan in northeast India is a bit different from other parts of the country. It is not that people from the region does not have their perception about Pakistan, but the country does not figure out in their day-to-day affairs and conversations. One of the major issues the northeast India has is of migration, mainly, from Bangladesh. Hence, Bangladesh and not Pakistan dominates in their opinion. Dr. Rupak Bora informed me about this. As the respondents requested anonymity, I am quoting them without mentioning their names. An Assistant Professor of Hindi language and Literature in Delhi University said that “since independence, the Pakistani state has used a number of issues—unequal distribution of resources during partition, accession of Kashmir, division of water, loss of east Pakistan, unrest in Baluchistan-to develop a narrative of an existential threat posed by India. However, after 9/11 Pakistanis participation in the global war in terrorism changed the security situation drastically. For the 1st time in Pakistan’s history, the threat from an internal enemy is dominating the external threat from India.” Second participant, who teaches in English and Foreign Language University, Hyderabad, said that “Neighbouring country with administration gone bad just like us…I actually wish both countries could be friends…. Is inflicted with terrorism activities otherwise much closer India…. Politically unstable country leading to unaccountability of leadership. Political establishment divert attention of common people by raising issues against India and neglecting their part of job that is well being of the people within. …Cricket delicious food …beautiful women…mountains …conservative and cultural …friendly people”. Another respondent from New Delhi said “Pakistan is a country where terrorist protects by their Politicians and Army. Terrorist like Dawood Ibrahim, Osama bin laden and so many. Pakistan is not a safe country that’s my perception, but I am not blaming Pakistan common people who living there. They are also suffering from terrorism and they want to live in peace like us. It’s a beautiful place with wrong set of leaders.” Dr. Shamshad Ahmed Khan helped me in knowing perceptions of some of the Muslims about Pakistan living in Delhi. They strictly demanded for anonymity. Some of the perceptions as recorded were:

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Respondent A “Pakistan does not figure in my mind as I remain busy in daily life thinking about my three times meal, whether I would be able to pay rent this month or things like whether I would be able to save some money to send the money back home”. Respondent B “I do not want to talk about Pakistan. You will quote me and I would land in trouble”. Respondent C “Well, India and Pakistan were one country once before 1947. Now they are two separate states and have some unresolved problem. Because of this their relationships remain tense. Both should try to peacefully resolve these problems and live peacefully. Respondent D “I have met few people of Pakistan when they were visiting India for medical treatment. They seemed as humble as we are. Earlier my impression was that the country is full with bad people. Now I understand that there are good and bad people in both the countries”. As said above, I found that for many Hindus, Pakistan is equivalent to the Muslims or Islam. Most of such people, often, do not shy away from terming the Indian Muslims as “Pakistani” or “anti-nationalist” or “anti-India”. Naveen Kumar, who works as a supervisor in one of the many small jeans sewing companies in west Delhi, feels that “Pakistan Musalman ka desh hain, India ke khilaf hamesha rahta hain aur ladte jagharta rahta hain (Pakistan is a Muslim country. It is always against India and always engage into fight). Priyesh Tiwari, a student in Mumbai said that Muslim’s mentality can never ever change. Another student, Vaibhav Diwadkar, taking Muslims as Pakistan, said that “Growth in population main agenda in islam”. Chaitali Gujarati said that “They [Muslims] believed that if we will get chance within 2 days will change the whole world scene. Islam Zindabad force the people to accept Islam (sic)”. Another, Rinki Pal said that “to ditch anyone called Muslim (sic)”. Unlike the above, people in certain institutes express their perception nonchalantly to secure their multiple interests. There are a few individuals who even in academic conferences in India do not shy away from making a statement “I love to hate Pakistan”.25 I have my personal experience when Pakistan, Muslim, and caste identity were mixed together, to prove that north Indian upper-caste Hindu’s narration propagated, mainly, by the Hindutva political parties is the only true perception of Pakistan. If you do not follow the line, you are not “true Indian”.26 In 2012, I was called for an interview by one of the non-governmental think tanks in New Delhi. There the interviewer asked me a question about dismemberment of Balochistan from Pakistan. I replied that it is not possible because unlike Bangladesh, Balochistan is geographically linked with Pakistan. Second, Pakistan has a nuclear weapon. In case of escalation of conflict to beyond an “accepted” level, it may use it against India. Third, I said that most of the postcolonial countries till now witness subnationalist 25 In 2005 the author heard this line for the first time in a conference. In 2013 again during dinner after a public conference one of the participants used this line in an informal talk. 26 The dominant group in every country defines the character for being a member of a nation. Any challenge or question to their definition call others as not a part of the nation. In such societies, nationalism of individuals are being decided on the basis of how close they are with such definitions.

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movement. Like, Pakistan, India too has problems in Kashmir Valley, and parts of northeast India. However, unlike Pakistan, India has succeeded in managing a few of its such problems through democratic means by providing adequate representations to the disgruntled groups and development of the affected regions. To this, the interviewer asked me—Are you Indian or Pakistani? I said I am an Indian citizen. Second question was Are you Hindu or Muslim? I said I am Hindu. Then, he asked me my caste? Knowing that I am from the so-called upper caste. The interviewer advised me to “come out from fantasy”.

Constructing Perceptions Perceptions, as in most of the cases, are being systematically constructed through various means. India is a plural society where majority (80%) of the population are Hindus. In such society to get into power political leadership of the country has exploited all forms of identity to attract the voters. This is not a new phenomenon in the Indian democracy rather being practised since early days of postindependent India. However, in contemporary times, 1980s have been a crucial decade in polarization of religion and caste for democratic gain. This is a decade when the political Hinduism was rising and gaining its space. All political parties used Hinduism for its electoral benefit, but over the years, the group which most benefitted from it was the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). Its leaders under Lal Krishna Advani led rath yatra (chariot journey) from Somnath to Ayodhya in 1990. After Advani’s arrest in Bihar, other leaders from his party led the chariot journey. The yatra caused communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims in parts of the country. However, politically, the yatra benefitted the BJP in 1991 general elections. It won 120 seats which was 35 more than what the party secured in 1989 general elections. Later, on 6 December 1992, the BJP leaders addressed a big rally in Ayodhya, following which few tombs of the Babri mosque were demolished by the mob. In an aftermath effect, communal riot spread in India. Later, communal polarization has been used by many leaders to win elections. Evidently, 1992–93 communal polarisation helped the BJP to come into power in few Indian states. Consolidating itself in subsequent years, for the first time the party came into power in a coalition with regional parties in 1996 for 13 days, then for two years in 1997 (1997–1999), and then completed a 5-year term from 1999–2004. In 2014, once again the BJP come into power at the Centre and, at present, is leading government in seventeen states. Correspondingly, while spreading the space for Hindutva, the BJP has constructed a perception about Pakistan. Most of its leaders use Muslims and Pakistan as a synonym to each other. Even at public stages they have not shied away from doing so. Many of them have repeatedly made statements stating that those who do not vote for BJP should go to Pakistan. During Bihar assembly elections in 2015, BJP president, Amit Shah, in an election rally in Raxaul made a statement that “if by any chance the BJP is defeated in these (Bihar) elections,

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crackers will be burst in celebration in Pakistan. Would you like that to happen?”.27 Then in 2017 Gujarat assembly elections, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in an election rally at Palanpur, stated that Pakistan is going to play an important role in Gujarat elections. This was in context of a dinner which was hosted by exCongress leader Mani Shankar Aiyer to former Pakistani foreign Minister Khursheed Kasuri, a few days before the rally. It was also attended by former Vice-President of India, Hamid Ansari, Dr. Man Mohan Singh among others. In the rally, Modi stated that “On one hand, Pakistan Army’s former DG (Director General) is interfering in Gujarat’s election, on the other, Pakistani people are holding a secret meeting at Mani Shankar Aiyar’s house and immediately after the meeting, people of Gujarat, backward communities, poor people and Modi were insulted (Modi was called as neech aadmi (fallen man) by Mani Shankar Aiyar). Don’t you think such events raise doubts here”.28 Not only for votes rather Pakistan is also been invoked to prove one ‘criminal’ or an offender who are engaged in, thought to be, seditious activities against the Indian state. In February 2016, a group of students held a meeting over hanging of Afzal Guru in 2013. After the meeting, as alleged anti-India slogans were raised, then Jawaharlal Nehru University’s (JNU) Student Union president Kanhiya Kumar was arrested and slapped with a charge of sedition against the Indian state. Throwing light on this issue, the Union home minister, Rajnath Singh, in a press conference linked the University’s incident with Pakistan-based terrorist, Hafeez Sayed. He stated that “I also want to make it clear that the JNU incident has the support of LeT [Lashkar-eTaiba] chief Hafiz Saeed. We should also understand this reality that Hafiz Saeed has supported this incident and it is extremely unfortunate”.29 Adding to the minister, a home ministry spokesperson said that the “statements from the home minister are based on inputs available from different agencies”.30 However, later it was found that the tweeter account which the Home Minister was referring to was a fake. No evidence of its authenticity was found by the Indian security agencies.31 Print, television and social media in their new incarnations are in cut-throat competition against their rivals to construct public perception on everything on the earth. This consent manufacturing institution, unlike the past, has broadened its physical and ideological presence. It is like a chicken and an egg question of who came first. Ravish Kumar, an ace Hindi journalist from New Delhi Television (NDTV), has expressed an opinion that it is not clear that whether media shows what people wants to see or people wants to see them so media presents. Both are true. Especially, the Hindi media is more virulent. In a sense, they have become much more a ‘Hindu’

27 Pandey

(2015). (2017). 29 ‘Understand the reality… Lashkar chief Hafiz Saeed backed JNU incident: Home Minister Rajnath Singh’ The Indian Express 15 February 2015. Retrieved from http://indianexpress.com/ article/india/india-news-india/rajnath-singh-hafiz-saeed-let-jnu-protests-had-support-of-let-chiefhafiz-saeed-rajnath-singh/. Accessed on 18 February 2018. 30 Ibid. 31 Swami (2016). 28 Langa

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media than remaining a Hindi language media.32 On Pakistan, the titles of most of the programmes on Hindi channels are deliberately kept provocative like “Dekh Lo Dushman Gaur Se” (Enemy, see it carefully).33 This is just an example, and there are many such programmes telecasted on the Indian television screens where the anchors in loud voices keep on issuing warnings to Pakistan about India’s patience. They called on the government to break all political relations with Pakistan. There are some anchors in English channels too who rake up such emotions against Pakistan in their talk shows. Here an anecdote I want to share. Once I was sent by my past employer to appear on a television debate on Pakistan. After the debate where I talked about the need of tackling the situations politically, there are needs to have permanent engagement over the issues between India and Pakistan, etc., the news anchor advised me to check the realities and suggested me to read some ‘good’ books. After that, I never got any invitation from that channel or any others. Fortunately, I myself decided to not to appear again on any news channel. More interestingly, sitting in a news channel, many anchors brand an Indian citizen who is not supportive to their views as “anti-national”, “pro-Pakistan” and even advise them to “go to Pakistan”. To an extent, related to media is the role of the Indian film industry, mainly, the Hindi films. In 1947, many of the film-makers and people engaged into other activities came to Mumbai from Pakistan, and they still had emotions about their ‘homeland’. In 1973 in Hindustan ki Kasam for the first time, Pakistan was shown as an enemy country. The film was about Indian Air Force’s engagement against their Pakistani counterpart during the 1971 India–Pakistan war. In later years, as the India–Pakistan relationships entangled, many films reflecting various shades of their relationships have been made. With the rise of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir backed by Pakistan’s intelligence agency and military, the films have been made to decipher their relationships. In contemporary times, one of the early films was Mani Ratnam’s Roja (1992). According to Tejaswani Niranjana and Rustom Bharucha “The film (Roja) demonizes the Kashmiri militant as Muslim fundamentalist that it idealizes the modern middle-class Hindu male as the fount of a committed and developmentally dynamic nationalism, and that it neutralizes or at best appropriates the woman into larger project”.34 Some of the films like Sarfarosh (1999), etc., have tried to project Indian Muslims as sympathisers of their co-religionists from across the border. Not only that often the actors or singers from Pakistan who are engaged in films are being verbally attacked by the members of the Hindi film industry. In 2016, after the militant attacks on an Army camp in Uri in J&K, many of the members of film industry called on to stop engaging actors from Pakistan in the Hindi films. At that time, a film called Ae Dil Hain Mushkil starring Pakistani actor Fawad Khan in a cameo role was scheduled to release. It faced a lot of difficulty and was released after the producer promised that he will not engage Pakistani actors in future. Likewise in February 2018, Union minister and singer Babul Suprio in a meeting made a request to the makers of film called Welcome to New York to remove a song by, Pakistani 32 Singh

(2017b). can be seen on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bog2UYpFVTA. 16 January 2013. 34 Vasudevan (2010), p. 216. 33 Video

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singer Rahat Fateh Ali Khan from the film. He also asked for a ban on Pakistan-based singers in the Hindi film industry.35 However, during the ‘normal’ times the filmmakers have also made a usual love stories like Veer Zara (2004), Bajrangi Bhaijan (2015). Civil society is a difficult to define and talked about because it constitutes all forms of groups within it. These different groups represent different ideologies and politics. There are many groups who from time to time raise voices against Pakistan. They use various means like processions to display anger against anything which they think Pakistan is engaged in will harm India. They also, often, send representations to the governments to record their protests or views about Pakistan. However within the civil society, there are also groups which are engaged in promoting friendship between India and Pakistan, for example Pakistan India Friendship Groups, Aghazi-Dosti. They supports the idea of let the people from the two countries meet and reduce the hassles one face while applying for visa to cross into the other side of the border. In their pursuit to establish peace sometimes they even write a public letter to the Indian and Pakistani head of states appealing them to engage into dialogues and silence the guns at their border. These letters are signed by a few peace activists from India and Pakistan. In one of the recent letter in 2018, the group made the following appeals: We, who are citizens of India and Pakistan and support peace-building, hereby appeal to Government of India and Pakistan36 : • To start dialogue process between diplomats and political leaders of both sides immediately; • To start frequent meetings of Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of both sides immediately; • To remove heavy shelling arms, artillery from front lines immediately; • To take immediate measures to stop ceasefire violations to protect lives of soldiers and civilians on both sides; • To bring a renewed ceasefire agreement by both sides in written form and with standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide security forces for steps to be taken; • To ensure safe living for border population, including opening of schools; • To provide compensation to farmers of both sides whose crops destroyed in shelling; • To provide special provisions, weightage and concessions to students whose studies affected due to shutdown of schools for the reason of these violations. Finally, people even develop perception based on prejudices and their conceived notions about Pakistan. Some of these have no basis at all, and still they believe because they want to do it. The polarization of Hindus and Muslims has to a large extent segregated the people from two communities. Even after seventy years of 35 ‘Babul

Supriyo asks for a ban on Pakistani artists, wants Rahat Fateh Ali Khan’s voice to be removed from latest song’ The Indian Express 18 February 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/ entertainment/bollywood/babul-supriyo-ban-pakistani-artists-rahat-fateh-ali-khan-5068371/. 36 The letter was mailed to the author by Devika Mittal who is co-convener of Aghaz-i-Dosti, New Delhi chapter.

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religion-based partition of India, for a large number of Hindus, the Muslims remain outsider. The distance has further increased between the two communities because of projection of Islam as a cause of terrorism and showing the community different from the Hindus. For a large number of Indian middle class, Muslims remain nonloyal to India and ‘a part of Pakistan’. In many cities in India, and by a large number of Hindu middle class, the Muslim-concentrated spaces are popularly referred as “mini-Pakistan” or “Chhota Pakistan”.37

Conclusion Perceptions do change, but not always. In India, the history of India–Pakistan relationships and the causes of the partition have embedded in such a way that it is almost impossible to alter them. However for this, not only India but also Pakistan is responsible. Its policies towards India like engaging into a proxy war through helping militancy in the Indian side of the Jammu & Kashmir, harbouring those who have carried out killings in India, etc., have made many individuals to develop a negative perception of the country in India. Unfortunately, the sane voices from Pakistan are being little heard of by the Indians or almost ignored. A change in perception may or may not change the status of political relationships between India and Pakistan. But it will certainly help the policy makers to take some bold measures to address its disputes with the neighbours. Often a fear of political backlash makes the political leadership of the country to backtrack even from such decisions which in long term prove beneficial to the people from both India and Pakistan.

References Butalia, U. (2014). The other side of silence: Voices from the partition of India. New Delhi: Penguin Books. Bajwa, F. (2013). From Kutch to Tashkent. London: Hurst & Company. Bose, S. (2005). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard : Harvard University Press. Christopher, Snedden. (2008). Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris. London: Hurst and Company. Cohen, S. (2005). Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dhulipala, V. (2015). Creating a new medina: State power, Islam, and the quest for Pakistan in late colonial North India. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Fazal, T. (2016). Religion and Language in the Formation of Nationhood in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In S. Bandyopadhyay (Ed.), Decolonisation and Politics of Transition in South Asia (pp. 324–347). Hydrabad: Orient Black Swan. Guha, R. (2007). India after Gandhi: The history of world’s largest democracy. London: Picador. Hasan, M. (2002). Islam in the Subcontinent: Muslim in Plural Society. New Delhi: Manohar. 37 One

reference to it can be found in Singh (2018).

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Hauzel, H. (2005). Arms, drug smuggling and cross border terrorist activities. In F. Shoban (Ed.), Dynamics of Bangladesh-India relations: Dialogue of young journalists across the border. Dhaka: Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, The University Press. Hussian, Z. (2010). Frontline Pakistan: The path to catastrophe and the killing of Benazir Bhutto. New Delhi: Viva Books. Jacob, J. (2017, September 2). Pakistan supporting Sikh militants, say fresh intelligence inputs. Hindustan Times. Retrieved March 19, 2018 from https://www.hindustantimes. com/india-news/pakistan-supporting-sikh-militants-say-fresh-intelligence-inputs/storyKJTEQPdHMj9FBawDC2gOrN.html. Kiessling, H. G. (2016). Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan. New Delhi: Harper Collins. Lamb, A. (1993). Kashmir: A disputed legacy. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Langa, M. (2017, December 11). Islamabad is trying to fix Gujarat polls. The Hindu. Retrieved December 10, 2017 from http://www.thehindu.com/elections/gujarat-2017/why-does-pak-armyex-dg-want-ahmed-patel-as-gujarat-cm-asks-modi/article21385192.ece. Naqvi, S. (2016). Being the other: The Muslim in India. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company. Pandey, C. B. (2015, October 30). If BJP loses in Bihar, crackers will go off in Pakistan, Amit Shah says. Times of India. Retrieved December 12, 2017 from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ elections/bihar-elections-2015/news/If-BJP-loses-in-Bihar-crackers-will-go-off-in-PakistanAmit-Shah-says/articleshow/49584833.cms. Peer, B. (2008). Curfewed Nights. New Delhi: Random House. Robinson, F. (2000). Islam and Muslim history in South Asia. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Sen, A. (2006). The argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian history, culture and identity. London: Penguin. Singh, S. (2017a, March 12). India-Pakistan low: Diplomats and families facing ‘intimidation’. The Indian Express. Retrieved March 12, 2018 from http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiapakistan-low-diplomats-and-families-facing-intimidation-5094476/. Singh, K. P. (2017b, December 11). The time when Hindi Journalism turned into ‘Hindu’ Journalism. The Wire. Retrieved December 21, 2017 from https://thewire.in/203876/vhp-hindi-journalismbabri-masjid-demolition/. Singh, D. (2018, March 8). Notes from the Suburbs: In Nallasopara ‘Chhota Pakistan’ residents continue to fight a stigma. The Indian Express. Retrieved March 8, 2017 from http://indianexpress. com/article/cities/mumbai/notes-from-the-suburbs-in-nallasoparachhota-pakistan-residentscontinue-to-fight-a-stigma-5090111/. Sisson, R., & Rose, L. S. (1990). War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh. Oxford: California University Press. Sobhan, R. (2016). Untranquil recollections: The years of fulfillment. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Swami, P. (2016, February 15). JNU row: Behind govt claim, a fake ‘Hafeez’ Saeed tweet. The Indian Express. Retrieved March 19, 2018 from http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/ jnu-row-behind-govt-claim-a-fake-hafiz-saeed-tweet/. Van Schendel, W. (2016). A war within a war: Mizo rebels and the Bangladesh liberation struggle. Modern Asian Studies, 50(1), 75–117. Vasudevan, R. (2010). The melodramatic public: Film from and spectatorship in Indian cinema. Ranikhet: Permanent Black. Wolpert, S. (2011). India and Pakistan: Continued conflict or cooperation. California: California University Press.

‘Perceptions and Policies’: The State of India–Sri Lanka Relations N. Manoharan

Introduction The state of India–Sri Lanka relations was aptly summed up well before independence by Mahatma Gandhi as “mother and daughter”. As per this metaphoric observation, India and Sri Lanka enjoy unique bilateral relations with differing characteristics. The bilateral ties date back to two millennia in many areas like trade, diplomatic and sociocultural. Under British rule, they had similar colonial experience that influenced their common world views. However, national interests and certain strategic considerations forced them to have differing foreign and strategic policies, at times conflicting with each other. New Delhi generally stood by Colombo’s ups and downs and gave its unambiguous support to protecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity. It should be noted that despite irritations, the situation between the two countries has never been confrontational. Both countries have, over a period of time, understood each other better to the extent of leveraging each other’s strengths and weaknesses. The state of India–Sri Lanka relations since their independence can be looked at in four broad phases: 1948–1983 (pre-ethnic conflict), 1983–1990 (ethnic conflict hands-on), 1991–2009 (ethnic conflict hands-off) and post-2009. Pre-ethnic conflict phase was characterised by the issue of Indian-Origin Tamils, where leadership perceptions and interactions dominated the relations. During the ethnic conflict phase, popular sentiments in Tamil Nadu and electoral politics surrounding these perceptions dictated the ties. Post-Rajiv Gandhi assassination (from 1991 to 2009) phase saw a strange mix of popular and elite perceptions influencing the character of the bilateral ties. Post the LTTE decimation in May 2009, India confronted a confident N. Manoharan (B) Department of International Studies and History, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru, India e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_7

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Sri Lanka that used “China card” ignoring strategic and security interests of India. However, the change in leadership in Sri Lanka since 2015 brought the ties back on track. The central question of the paper is: How far perceptions, both official and popular, in India have shaped bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka?

Pre-ethnic Conflict Phase During the colonial period, the concept of “strategic unity” emerged between India and Sri Lanka as the Great Britain regarded holding of Sri Lanka important to defend India, a “jewel in the British crown”. However, such a concept instilled in the Sri Lankan political leadership an apprehension that India would replace Britain in sustaining the imperial legacy in South Asia. The trepidation impelled Colombo ink a Defence agreement with the former colonial master and also to emphasise on global and regional organisations, especially on the Commonwealth. Taking note of these Ceylonese apprehensions, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister, took a highly accommodative approach though he was not satisfied with the “limited world view” of Sri Lankan leadership and also unsympathetic handling of issues like Indian labour in Colombo and statelessness of Plantation Tamils. Nehru avoided “speaking the language of threats” and “tried to be friendly to them [neighbouring countries] even when they have acted in an improper way”. He believed that minus this apprehension, the then Ceylon would accept India in due course.1 Thus, it was the perception of Nehru ingrained with “cautious optimism” that kept the ties going devoid of confrontations in the incipient years. At the same time, the role of Sri Lankan leadership’s positive perceptions needs to be acknowledged. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, when he came to power in 1956, took Sri Lanka’s foreign policy towards the path of non-alignment by shelving the Defence agreement with Britain. There was no talk of “Indian domination”, at the governmental level. The “neutralist” and socialist world view of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, his knowledge on international affairs, and belief in cooperation and disarmament coincided with Nehru’s world views.2 This increased the personal rapport between S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and Jawaharlal Nehru and later between Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi which in turn impacted on the kind of diplomatic interactions between the two countries. Two significant issues that received immense personal diplomacy included the status of Plantation Tamils, and the maritime boundary demarcation. 1 See

Nehru’s letters to Chief Ministers of Indian states dated 05 July 1952 and 26 April 1954. Gopalakrishna Gandhi, Nehru and Sri Lanka (Ratmalana, Sri Lanka: Sarvodaya Vishva Lekha Publication, 2002). 2 S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike criticised the then UNP government’s pro-Western policies. In July 1953, in one of the Parliament debates, he observed: “I say, for heaven’s sake, be friendly with England or America or anybody else, but do not commit yourself to any one of them…. As far as I can see, the wisest foreign policy that is being followed in the world today by any leading statesman is that of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru….”.

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Two Cases Post the independence, the electoral strength of Left-leaning Plantation Tamils, created apprehensions in the right-of-the-centre United National Party (UNP) government, which stripped the community both citizenship and franchise. On moral grounds, India had to intercede to bring a compromise on sharing the stateless IndianOrigin Tamils (IOTs) through two agreements.3 But, on hindsight, New Delhi should have explored two policy options in the process of settlement. It should have pressed for local settlement of the issue instead of sharing formulae. Also, India could have consulted and taken into consideration the wishes of the IOTs, the main stakeholders of the sharing agreements. India and Sri Lanka signed two agreements in 1970s to delimit maritime boundaries between them (along the Palk Bay, the Gulf of Mannar and the Indian Ocean). Through 1974 Maritime agreement, Sri Lanka was entrusted Katchatheevu, an uninhabited island with the caveat that it could be used for drying nets or rest by the Indian fishermen. It was also a classic case of personal diplomacy between Mrs. Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi. Significantly, this was done despite Tamil Nadu’s opposition. Though traditional rights of Indian pilgrims and fishermen “to enjoy access” to the island was safeguarded (through Article 5 of the 1974 agreement), in practice there were issues since 1983 due to ethnic conflict and militant activities in the Palk Bay area. As a result, innocent fishermen were caught in between. Even after the end of the ethnic conflict with the demise of the LTTE, the fishermen issue did not come to end for the simple reason that the maritime settlements of the 1970s ignored perceptions of Tamil Nadu. Thus, during this phase, elite perceptions in both countries were responsible for conduct of relations between the two neighbours. But at the same time, provincial and popular perceptions were not taken into consideration. As a result, the issues did not receive lasting settlement.

Ethnic Conflict Phase In the early 1980s, strains in bilateral relations surfaced due to the emergence of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This was the most difficult phase in Indo-Sri Lankan ties because of involvement of perceptions of the common man in both countries that was further complicated by electoral politics. India was caught in a “dilemma”: to find a lasting solution to the ethnic question that was agreeable to all groups of the island, especially the Sri Lankan Tamil community, but at the same time without compromising the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of its southern neighbour. Tamil Nadu factor, in terms of elite and popular perceptions, in New Delhi’s calculations also could not be ignored. To settle the ethnic issue, India tried mediation and diplomacy, but in vain. The rise of Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan government’s “anti-terrorist” measures 3 Sirimavo–Shastri pact of 1964 stipulated that out of total 975,000 stateless Plantation Tamils, India

take 525,000 and Sri Lanka 300,000. According to the later agreement signed between Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi, it was agreed to equally divide the remaining stateless Tamils between the two countries.

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propelled violence level to a new high, particularly in the northern parts of Sri Lanka. Political perceptions in Tamil Nadu turned against Sri Lankan government that forced New Delhi to “intervene”. In July 1987, India entered into an agreement with Sri Lanka “to establish peace and normalcy” in the Island.4 As per the agreement, India dispatched Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to the island to help in maintaining peace through disarming Tamil militants and, at the same time, sending Sri Lankan troops to barracks. Though hastily signed, the accord had fair provisions acceptable to Tamils. The agreement, however, confronted difficulties since the very beginning because of resistance from two quarters: the LTTE and even from a section of the Sri Lankan government. The Tigers picked-up arms against the IPKF, but also tried to rally popular perceptions of the Sri Lankan Tamil community through propaganda and even by instigating collateral damages. But, appreciably, the accord could bring most of the non-LTTE Tamil militant groups to the political mainstream. Significantly, it could convince the Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan government to divide the island into various provinces and devolve certain powers to them. During this phase, both elite and popular perceptions, particularly from Tamil Nadu, impacted on the ties.

Ethnic Conflict Hands-Off Phase This phase witnessed change in regimes both in Colombo and in New Delhi; IPKF withdrew from Sri Lanka. After IPKF’s withdrawal and assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India maintained an informal “hands-off policy”. The LTTE was now a “common enemy”, in the eyes of both governments. Popular opinion in Tamil Nadu also was not favourably disposed towards the Tigers. Bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka took a positive spin in due course partly due to regime in Sri Lanka under Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike. India continued to stay out of the ethnic question, but, at the same time, extended its support to any negotiated political settlement to the ethnic issue. In this context, it did not oppose peace facilitation between LTTE and Sri Lankan government by Norway. However, the peace received a setback in 2006 with the assumption of a new government in Colombo under Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005, and partly due to LTTE’s obduracy. It should be noted, however, that there was immense support for the peace process from the people of Sri Lanka. War clouds were hovering. India desisted Sri Lankan government from exercising war option. But when Eelam War IV commenced, she did provide assistance to Colombo in the form of “non-lethal” military supplies, training of Sri Lankan security personnel and intelligence sharing. Popular sentiments in Tamil Nadu driven by political parties started gravitating towards the LTTE, but only in pockets. The footprints of China increased in Sri Lanka during the ethnic war. Rajapaksa regime did not hesitate to position China vis-à-vis India so 4 For

a detailed discussion on the background and provisions of the Accord, see Muni (1993), Suryanarayan (1991), Seevaratnam (1989).

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as to extract benefits from both. India had to balance out between maintaining good relations with Sri Lanka in all spheres, but, at the same time, taking into consideration sentiments from the southern state of Tamil Nadu and the interests and rights of Sri Lankan Tamils. These perceptions from Tamil Nadu, however, did not make India to compromise on security. It banned the LTTE and, in collaboration with Sri Lankan Navy, blocked LTTE’s supply lines.5 During this phase, although there were ups and downs in the bilateral relations due to the ethnic issue, cooperation in cultural and economic fields improved significantly. With signature of Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade agreement in 1998, economic relations received a big boost. Soon, India became Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner replacing the West and Japan. In South Asia, Sri Lanka emerged as India’s largest trading partner. Indian investments and tourists to Sri Lanka increased manifold resulting in augmented people-to-people contacts. Presence of private sector of each country in the other made significant difference in generating job opportunities and in turn shaping positive perceptions especially at the popular level.

Post-war Phase After the end of civil war in May 2009, three main issues dominated India–Sri Lanka relations: the Tamil ethnic question, the fishermen issue and the China factor.

Ethnic Question Since the LTTE was decimated in “Eelam War IV”, it is no more a factor in India–Sri Lanka relations. In this phase, India’s broad concerns have been resettlement of the conflict displaced, economic upliftment of post-war Sri Lanka and settling the ethnic issue. To address the humanitarian crisis due to the ethnic war, India offered all requisite help. Immediately, New Delhi pledged USD 100 million for the immediate relief of those displaced by the conflict.6 Interestingly, the Government of Tamil Nadu separately provided USD five million to Sri Lanka that was seen as a good symbolism by the people of the state. Apart from the financial package, India dispatched 10,400 tonnes of galvanised steel sheets for constructing relief shelters for the displaced families in the northern Sri Lanka.7 India also made arrangements for the construction of 50,000 houses to the displaced in due course. After the withdrawal

5 “Vaiko

opposes assistance to Sri Lanka”, The Hindu, 05 January 2005. Earmarks Rs. 500 crore for IDPs in Sri Lanka”, Business Standard, 22 July 2009. 7 “India awaits confirmation of Prabha’s death”, Daily Mirror, 09 July 2009. 6 “India

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of IPKF, the Indian Army stepped in for the first time to run a medical centre to take care of the war-affected.8 To help revive the economy at the local level, India instituted a programme for the renewal of agriculture with a separate funding of USD six million. The funding covered supply of agricultural seeds, new tractors and other farming equipment to the farmers of northern Sri Lanka. In addition, resettling Tamil families were given 90,000 agricultural starter packs to manage farming on their own.9 Through these extensive relief and rehabilitation assistance, India clearly conveyed that it was genuinely concerned for the conflict displaced in Sri Lanka, and also silenced critics from Tamil Nadu that the “interests of their brethren are ignored in favour of good neighbourly relations”. Through the assistance, India, to an extent, gained the lost goodwill of the Sri Lankan Tamil community. India also has been extending aid to Sri Lanka, especially for the development of infrastructure, keeping in mind the overall economic upliftment. An amount of USD 167.4 million was allocated for upgrading the Colombo–Matara rail link; USD 800 million was allocated for reconstruction of the historic Medawachchiya to Madhu, Madhu to Talaimannar and Omanthai to Pallai railway lines, which were affected by the war. Other key infrastructure projects that India has taken up for assistance include 500 MW Trincomalee power plant, interconnection of electricity grids between India and Sri Lanka, fishing equipment to cooperatives, buses for transportation especially for remote areas and improvement in education and health sectors. India has also been helping Sri Lanka with the restoration of harbour at Kankesanthurai and airfield at Palaly airfield that became dysfunctional due to the conflict.10 All these policy interventions have been made keeping in mind the popular perceptions in both countries. On the settlement of the ethnic issue, India has consistently maintained that it stood in favour of “a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights”.11 For India, the full implementation of the 13th Amendment provisions as an interim arrangement and going beyond it for the permanent settlement is practical. But, the Sri Lankan state thought differently after the war. President Rajapaksa, who initially promised to look “beyond 13th Amendment” through All Party Representative Committee (APRC), in military triumphalism, changed stance. He started advocating that “there is no ethnic issue, but only development issue”. Reconciliation was totally absent but for the pressure from the international community. In order to pre-empt the United Nations’ move over reconciliation, the government of the day appointed in May 2010 an eight-member commission to look back at the 8 “Lanka

assures India Tamils will return home from camps”, The Times of India, 24 June 2009. details, see High Commission of India in Sri Lanka, “India-Sri Lanka Bilateral Relations”, http://www.hcicolombo.org/index.php?option=com_pages&id=24. 10 Ibid. 11 Lok Sabha, Statement made by Pranab Mukherjee, the then External Affairs Minister of India, 03 March 2008. 9 For

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conflict and ahead on reconciliation. Called as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), the body made several positive recommendations.12 Yet, to India’s disappointment, both at official and popular perceptions, the Sri Lankan government had been lethargic in the implementation of LLRC recommendations. It is in this context, India’s support to US-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) counselling Sri Lanka has to be seen. India’s stand at the Human Rights Council was forward-looking and positive: to push the reconciliation process seriously so that the war-affected Sri Lankan society could rebuild itself in a sustainable manner. Without reconciliation, it is difficult to find a lasting political solution. On the lasting settlement to the ethnic issue, the process witnessed reversal as President Rajapaksa constituted a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) to look into the existing 13th Amendment framework. But, this faced challenge from the outset. Apart from non-participation of opposition parties in PSC, Sinhala hardline parties like Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), National Freedom Front (NFF) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) wanted to do away with the existing 13th Amendment that made provisions for provinces. Ironically, a dominant section of the then Rajapaksa government supported this stance of the hardline parties, in the form of “13th Amendment Minus” arrangement. India was disappointed at the turn of things. However, the Sirisena government in January 2016 had presented a plan for a new constitution and later a Constituent Assembly was established in March 2016 to draft a new constitution. The Steering Committee of the Constituent Assembly headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe submitted interim report in November 2017. The report touched on several aspects like principles of devolution, state land, provincial subjects, second chamber, electoral system and public security.13 Although the interim report talks of “aekiya raajyaya” and “orumiththa nadu” (respectively Sinhala and Tamil terms for undivided and indivisible country), opposition to the draft has already emerged from Buddhist clergy, and Sinhala hardliners. It is going to be a daunting task. But, through sheer political will and pressure from the international community, it is doable.

Fishermen Issue After “Eelam War IV”, the dynamics of the fishermen issue changed. Until then, the Sri Lankan Navy had been busy with the LTTE’s cadre movement and smuggling activities. This role changed to protecting Sri Lankan waters and marine resources. Looked at in this context, one could comprehend why fishermen from Tamil Nadu face difficulties when they venture into Sri Lankan territorial waters. 12 Full report of the LLRC is available at http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ ca201112/FINAL%20LLRC%20REPORT.pdf, Retrieved on 22 September 2017. 13 Full report of the Interim Report of the Steering Committee is available at https://english. constitutionalassembly.lk/images/pdf/interim-report/ReportE%20CRR.pdf.

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After the ethnic war, Sri Lanka relaxed fishing restrictions along its coasts. Now the Sri Lankan fishermen were free to venture into the seas as they wished without any security consideration. As result of presence of fishermen from both countries, the Indo-Lankan waters got crowded resulting in intense competition and many a times confrontations between the two fishing communities, in turn, drawing intervention of either of the naval forces and governments. It was a classic case of how popular perceptions have impacted on the foreign security policy. The Sri Lankan fishermen complained especially against mechanised Indian trawlers that severely damaged marine resources and the sea bed. Due to indiscriminate bottom trawling, the breeding grounds of several marine species—sea cucumber, chanks (conch), crabs, squids, coloured fishes, sea animals, turtles etc.—are endangered.14 It should be noted that the number of bottom trawlers in Tamil Nadu is disproportionate to the fishing population. They more or less exhausted the resources on the Indian side. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan waters have abundance of marine resources owing to fishing restrictions from the Sri Lankan armed forces during the civil war and also due to ban on bottom trawling.15 On the contrary, bottom trawlers in Tamil Nadu are mostly owned not by the local fisher folk, but by influential merchant capitalists (called “outsiders”) having strong links with politicians, film personalities and business magnates. Due to good returns, the trawler sector in Tamil Nadu is not willing to change the statuesque. The merchant capitalist owners wish to make profits rather than any consideration for conservation. Most importantly, the entry of “outsiders” and trawlers has turned fisheries in the coastal areas corporatist by turning several traditional fishermen into daily wage labourers.16 The guiding maxim is “the more the catch, the more the profit”. Apart from the above economic dimension, the most interesting aspect of the fishermen issue is the electoral dimension. Going by the statistics, victory or defeat in the electoral arena in Tamil Nadu’s 14 coastal districts relied by-and-large on how government of the day and opposition parties looked at the issue. Therefore, the electoral politics acted as one of the pressure points from the political elite of Tamil Nadu at the centre to “act decisively” on the issue. This dimension of ballot politics is also present in Sri Lanka, when any incumbent government could not afford to ignore the interests of the fishermen and in turn their electoral strength. To be fair to the fishermen, straying is not always deliberate, but also inadvertent due to various reasons like ignorance of marine boundaries, sudden disturbance in the sea, or even due to failure in the navigation. But, such reasons for straying into Sri Lankan waters are meagre. To be fair to the Sri Lankan Navy, it should be noted that not all fishermen from Tamil Nadu who venture into Sri Lankan waters are arrested or shot. They are mostly warned and turned back. But, at times, as a deterrence, their 14 For a general understanding on the impact of trawlers on marine ecosystem, see United Nations General Assembly, “The Impacts of Fishing on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems”, Report of the Secretary-General, Sixty-first session, 14 July 2006. 15 “Sri Lanka’s dilemma of bottom trawling”, The Island, 11 November 2013. 16 Vivekanandan (2017).

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nets and vessels are seized only to be released later on the intervention of Indian diplomatic officials. Sri Lankan fishermen also venture into Indian waters especially off coasts of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and even as far as Orissa. But they are predominantly Sinhalese, who are not shot at, but prosecuted for violating the maritime zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981. As trawlers are popular fleet in Tamil Nadu, multi-day off-shore fishing vessels are predominantly used especially by the Sinhala fishermen in Sri Lanka. This was mainly due to Sri Lankan government’s huge subsidies and encouragement to deep sea fishing.17 However, fishermen belonging to northern Sri Lanka did not adopt multi-day fishing for two significant reasons: one, they are have been comfortable in operating small boats and two, the subsidies of Sri Lankan government meant for multi-day fishing boats did not reach them owing to ethnic conflict. What did Indian and Sri Lankan governments do to resolve the issue? It should be acknowledged that both governments have been addressing the issue at two levels: at the governmental level and at the fishing communities level. At the governmental level, in November 2004 a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Fisheries was constituted to deal with all issues pertaining to straying of fishermen in each other’s territorial waters. The JWG was to work out ways and means of preventing use of force against fishermen, possibilities of licensed fishing in the Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar areas, status of confiscated boats, and most importantly to work out a bilateral arrangement on the issue. Although the JWG was to meet once a year alternatively in India and Sri Lanka, the meetings have not been regular. At the societal level, both the governments encouraged dialogue between the fisher communities of the two countries: Tamil fishermen from northern Sri Lanka and fishermen from Tamil Nadu. However, for various socio-economic reasons, the community-level meetings have not been regular. In addition to the dialogue process, New Delhi and Colombo have “agreed to put in place practical arrangements to deal with bona fide Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL)”18 like prevention of firing on fishermen and carrying of valid registration/permit for Indian fishing vessels. Both countries have also agreed to set up an arrangement for the release of arrested fishermen, especially who inadvertently enter Sri Lankan waters.19 Surprisingly, even though there are certain mechanisms and dialogue process, the issue continues to remain. This clearly conveys that somewhere the governmental mechanisms have not been matching with the popular perceptions.

17 For

details, see Kariyawasam et al. (2017).

18 This was agreed to during the visit to New Delhi on 26 October 2008 of Basil Rajapaksa, Member

of Parliament and Senior Adviser to the President of Sri Lanka. See Ministry of External Affairs (India), “India-Sri Lanka Joint Statement on Fishing Arrangements”, Press Statement, 26 October 2008. 19 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, “Indo-Pak Joint Working Group Meeting”, 12 July 2012.

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China Factor In the recent past, China has emerged as one of the key intervening variables in IndoLanka ties. When in 2005 “China–Sri Lanka All-round Cooperation Partnership of Sincere Mutual Support and Ever-lasting Friendship” was announced, it formed as a broad framework for Sino-Lanka relations.20 China considers Sri Lanka as “an important hub on the Maritime Silk Road”.21 China is involved in Sri Lanka in many ways ranging from infrastructure development to oil exploration. Beijing also provides economic aid, trade, investments, and requisite diplomatic support to Sri Lanka. Chinese funding for infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka is heavy: estimated to over USD six billion. The amount is more than any individual country’s contribution. Chinese infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka range from port-related ventures like Hambantota port, expansion of Colombo Harbour and Mattala Airport; roadways like Katunayake–Colombo Expressway; power generation projects like the Norochcholai Coal Power; and recreation centres like Shangri La hotel and the Centre for Performing Arts. Some of these projects, like Hambantota port, are considered to have wider strategic implications for India. Hambantota port is strategically situated so that merchant and cargo ships of China could make a stopover en route to and from Africa or Europe. Significantly, it is a dual-use port that includes wherewithal like a passenger terminal, cargo handlers, warehousing for transhipment, bunkering, maintenance and repair of any kind and category of fleet, medical facilities and customs clearing. The presence at Hambantota would give China an opportunity to have dominance over the Indian Ocean region. The most important point of concern for India is that sitting at Hambantota, the Chinese could easily monitor all Indian military and non-military ships that move between east and west coasts of India encircling Sri Lanka. Interestingly, it should be noted that Sri Lanka approached India first to build the port, but due to delay in sealing the agreement, the project went to China. According to Sri Lanka, “China offered the best terms”, and “we don’t have favourites”.22 To give a context, China has been vying for a strong foothold in the Indian Ocean region—stretching from Southeast Asia to Eastern Africa—in the name of Belt Road 20 Proposed during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005, it included “promoting traditional friendship and expanding exchanges between governments, parliaments and parties; exploring new areas for economic and trade cooperation; expanding cooperation in such fields as agriculture, fishery and tourism; and enhancing coordination in international and regional issues”. See “China, Sri Lanka set up all-round cooperative partnership”, People’s Daily, 09 April 2005, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/09/eng20050409_180198.html, Retrieved on 03 October 2017. 21 Remarks made by the visiting Chinese State Councillor and Minister of National Defence General Liang Guanglie at the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) at Sapugaskanda (Sri Lanka). Full text of the speech is available at http://www.army.lk/detailed.php?NewsId=5176, Retrieved on 03 October 2017. 22 Sri Lankan Ambassador to the USA, Jaliya Wikremasuriya, quoted by Vikas Bajaj, “India worries as China builds ports in South Asia”, The New York Times, 15 February 2010.

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Initiative (BRI). The principal aim behind the Chinese interest in the region is to make sure its sea lanes are secured so that its energy supplies from Africa and the Middle East and its trade towards rest of the world are unhindered by both state and nonstate actors. From India’s point of view, some strategic analysts see China’s maritime linkages in the Indian Ocean region as virtual encircling, what some call as “String of Pearls” construct. China’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s post-war reconstruction is also notable. Beijing immediately provided humanitarian aid to the tune of USD one million, apart from materials for tents worth USD 30,000 to the internally displaced.23 When it comes to economic engagement, trade in terms of volume has been on the upswing between China and Sri Lanka. From a mere USD 256 million in 2000 the trade volume between the two countries touched nearly USD 4.4 billion in 2016, making China the second largest trading partner of Sri Lanka. Of this figure, Sri Lanka’s export to China was mere USD 200 million as against China’s exports to Sri Lanka to the tune of USD 4.2 billion.24 The point of concern, however, is the huge trade deficit, which is likely to grow in the coming years. Yet, Sri Lankans are not complaining because of favourable political perceptions towards China. Defence cooperation between China and Sri Lanka has also been robust. During “Eelam War IV”, Sri Lanka got good supply of arms and ammunition from China. Chinese weapons ranged from Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, Type-85 heavy machineguns, Type-80 light machineguns, Type-56 rifles, 152-mm howitzer, 81mm mortar shells, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and sufficient quantities of ammunition.25 Sri Lanka justified arms supplies by China on the grounds of absence of alternatives and cost factor. In the words of the then Army Chief, Gen Sarath Fonseka, India had told us they were not in a position to sell or send offensive weapons or even equipment like radars and basic communication equipment to meet our requirements. So we had no other option…. It was readily available and comparatively cheaper – almost half the price compared to Russia. I think, we had no other option.26

The Chinese arms assistance was well appreciated in Sri Lanka, both by its government and the majority Sinhalese. On the other hand, India could provide only “nonlethal weapons” because of Tamil Nadu factor. The same factor from the southern province of India has made sure that the Defence Cooperation agreement between India and Sri Lanka did not take off.27 What Sri Lankans rate higher is China’s diplomatic support at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) when the resolution by the United States calling 23 “China

provides US$1mln in aid to Sri Lanka”, Xinhua News Agency, 05 May 2009, available at http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-05/05/content_17726609.htm, Retrieved on 03 October 2017. 24 Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, International Trade Statistics of Sri Lanka—2016 (Colombo: Department of Commerce, 2017), pp. xiv–xv. 25 Lindberg et al. (2011), p. 46. 26 “India’s refusal to supply arms turned us to China: SL”, The Indian Express, 25 May 2009. 27 “India calls off annual defence talks with Sri Lanka” The India Today, 18 March 2013.

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for international investigations on war crimes committed during “Eelam War IV” was initiated. Interestingly, India, along with China and Russia, was instrumental in defeating the West-sponsored UN resolution in May 2009. But, things changed in due course. When Sri Lanka did not move firmly on ethnic reconciliation as promised, India had to vote in favour of resolutions at UNHRC in March 2012 and 2013 asking Colombo to respect the rights of the minority communities. China, on the other hand, continued to stand by Sri Lanka in all international fora maintaining it as a domestic issue. As a result, Sri Lanka clearly saw Indian stand disappointing.28 In return, Colombo started giving more economic and strategic leeway to Beijing in the island, but at the same time tried to balance its relations with India. The then President Rajapaksa observed: We are a non-aligned country. Our neighbours are Indians. I always say, Indians are our relations. From the time of Asoka, we have had that culture… but that doesn’t mean we won’t get commercial benefits from others; from China, or Japan, or whoever. They will come here, they will build and they will go back. India comes here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference…29

Though Sri Lanka tried to offer projects to both India and China, the latter is preferred. China is preferred not only because of timely completion of projects, but mainly due to Beijing’s disregard for issues like ethnic reconciliation and long-term political settlement on the ethnic question. Also, since China is far away, any extra-regional power’s involvement in Sri Lanka is not an issue as long it serves its strategic and economic interests. India is not anxious about China’s involvement in Sri Lanka but looks at the long-term strategic implications. The possibility of military use of port and other infrastructure by Chinese in Sri Lanka against India is raised as one of the main concerns. India–Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 clearly stipulates that “Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka would not be made available for military use to any country in a manner which is prejudicial to India’s interest”.30 India is hopeful that the above provision is abided by Sri Lanka and that Colombo would not work against Indian national interests.

28 “Gotabhaya deeply disappointed with India’s stand”, Lankasiri News, 22 March 2013. The Sri Lankan Defence Secretary observed that “those wanting Sri Lanka to satisfy the global community should realise that they were adopting double-standards. In fact, they would never have tolerated external intervention in domestic issues, though Sri Lanka was being asked to give into an investigation on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. Would India address its accountability issues to the satisfaction of Western powers or the UN?”. 29 “India’s views matter, don’t care about the world: Rajapaksa”, The Times of India, 28 June 2010. 30 Exchange of Letters between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka, From the President of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 29 July 1987, clause 2 (ii).

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Conclusion Despite differences, Indo-Sri Lankan relations have never been bad to a level of confrontationist. Appreciably, both India and Sri Lanka have always strived to maintain cordial ties. In the initial years of independence, Nehru handled the ties in a matured manner; personal rapport between Sirimavo and Indira Gandhi helped bilateral ties in the 1960s and 1970s; the relations witnessed a bad patch in the 1980s and early 1990s due to ethnic issue; decimation of the LTTE and robust economic interactions and people-to-people contacts in 2000s brought the ties back on track. In sum, both elite and popular perceptions have impacted on the foreign policies mainly because of the democratic nature of political systems in both countries. In resolving Sri Lanka’s ethnic issue, India’s role cannot be undermined. India could exercise leverage on Sri Lanka to find a lasting settlement to the ethnic issue so that peace and development prevails in the neighbourhood. Meaningful solution has to go beyond the present 13th Amendment framework. The ongoing constitutional reforms could take into consideration mechanisms such as powerful parliament reflecting the voices of all the communities, an independent judiciary, separation of powers with checks and balances, justice, freedom, equality, rights and responsibilities. India, which has immense leverage on all Sri Lankan Tamil parties, could also play a vital role in unifying all the Tamil groups of Sri Lanka. New Delhi should not hesitate to make use of Tamil Nadu for this purpose. Most importantly, a suitable reconciliation method could be adopted to construct bridges among all the communities of the island. A broad and inclusive approach is required to transform from conflict to coexistence and to establish sustainable peace. On the fishermen issue, it is important that it is de-politicised, especially at the provincial levels in both countries. Solutions lie handling issues in a statesmanlike manner rather than pandering to undue sentiments. It is baffling to note that political actors in Tamil Nadu make a hue and cry over human rights violations of their counterparts in Sri Lanka, yet when it comes to fishermen issue they take exactly the opposite stand—against the interest of Sri Lankan Tamils. As and when ethnic reconciliation takes place, a significant chunk of the issue is taken care of. If the fishermen issue is not approached in a holistic manner, the marine frontiers between India and Sri Lanka will remain fishy and troubled. It is good if the maritime area between India and Sri Lanka is seen as a common heritage than a territory of contestation. When it comes to China factor, India has been dealing the issue in a subtler manner. New Delhi has to play its strength in its neighbourhood policy. Going by the past record, resettlement, tourism, cultural exchange and trade are few areas that India has distinct advantage over other countries. These areas also get enormous public goodwill to India. What is more important is to positively exploit the aspect of proximity. New Delhi needs to consciously build constituencies in the neighbourhood and could have dialogue with the concerned political, economic, social and cultural actors. If there are any apprehensions because of the role of extra-regional powers in the neighbourhood, there is nothing wrong in dealing the issue bilaterally with the countries concerned. India has to carefully balance various aspects of its neigh-

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bourhood policy: maintenance of regional peace, its own strategic interests and that of long-term peace, and development of the neighbouring countries. The key is to sustain bilateral ties with the neighbours in the long run and make up for the lost ground. India has always stood by Sri Lanka in its difficult times and extended its unambiguous support to safeguarding the latter’s unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Looking at the trajectory of ties since independence, one can assert that the ties have matured and, in the present context, serve as a model of good neighbourly relations. Popular perceptions in India and Sri Lanka did not understand these nuances mainly due to propaganda by political parties for parochial electoral ends. Media and academia could play a major role in this regard.

References Kariyawasam, L. A., Gestsson, H., & Knútsson, Ö. (2017). Deep Sea Fishing in Sri Lanka. IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings. Available online at http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/ bitstream/handle/1957/39142/313.pdf?sequence=1. Retrieved on October 02, 2017. Lindberg, J., Orjuela, C., Wezeman, S., & Åkerström, L. (2011). Arms trade with Sri Lanka: Global business, local costs. Stockholm: Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society. Muni, S. D. (1993). Pangs of proximity: India and Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Seevaratnam, N. (Ed.). (1989). The Tamil National Question and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Delhi: Konark Publishers. Suryanarayan, V. (Ed.). (1991). Sri Lankan Crisis and India’s Response. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers. Vivekanandan, V. (2017). From the margins to centre stage: Consequences of Tsunami 2004 for the fisher folk of Tamil Nadu. Planning Commission Document. Available online at planningcommission.nic.in/data/ngo/csw/csw_6a.pdf. Retrieved on September 30, 2017.

Part II

Neighboring Countries’ Perception of India —‘Elder’ or ‘Big Brother’

Overwhelming Majority of Afghans Has a Positive Perception of India Archiwal

Background of Indo-Afghan Relations Afghanistan and India enjoy centuries-old relations. Historians have traced the India–Afghanistan relations to the Indus Valley Civilizations. After the Greek’s invasion of Afghanistan, the modern-day Afghanistan came under the Seleucid Empire and ceded to Chandragupta Maurya in 305 BCE. Eventually, Emperor Ashoka came to rule parts of Afghanistan, introducing Buddhism to the region. Mauryan Empire declined after half a century and Afghanistan descended into chaos for half a century. The country saw the rise of Greco-Bactrian, then the Indo-Greek kingdoms (the Kushans and the Indo-Scythians). Given the strategic location that Afghanistan has, the country served as a route for the conquerors from different parts of the world. Afghanistan’s role in spreading Islam in India is another point of commonality between India and Afghanistan. Islam came to Afghanistan in the seventh century and spread to India in the tenth century. India was conquered by a series of conquerors some of whom were Afghans and others were simply based in today’s Afghanistan. The Afghan rulers of India influenced the history, economy, and literature of India. The famous Grand Trunk Road symbolizes this reality. The construction of this road in the sixteenth century by the Afghan ruler of India, Sher Sha Sori, is the most important commonality in the Indo-Afghan relationship. At the outset of the twentieth century, a group of Indian revolutionaries made Kabul home for their freedom struggle. The Afghan Government supported their efforts and as a result, the Indian revolutionaries established the Indian Provisional Government in exile in Kabul in 1916. The event was a watershed event in the history of Indian struggle. On behalf of Indians, the provisional government established links with other regional and international actors and accelerated its efforts to gain freedom Archiwal (B) Kardan University, Kabul, Afghanistan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_8

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from the British Raj. The Kabul-based Indian intellectuals also influenced the work of Constitutionalism Movement that helped Afghan reclaim Afghanistan’s sovereignty in 1919. Though there have been ups and downs in the relations between India and Afghanistan, the contemporary history of relations starts between the two nations in 1950, after India and Afghanistan signed a Friendship Treaty in 1950. Both the countries used the Nonaligned Movement to counter the new world order. By and large, the relations remained friendly until the Taliban took over in Kabul in 1996. Though there are reports of some covert and limited contacts between the Peshawar and Tehran-based Mujahideen and the Indian Government, overall the Indian Government was supporting the Kabul-based government during this time. However, when the Mujahideen took over in Kabul in 1992, the Indian Government entered into relations with the Mujahideen Government in Kabul. Though the Indian Embassy was closed two times it did remain open until 1996. The embassy was closed down in 1996, after the Taliban took over in Kabul. During the reign of Taliban (1996–2001), India not only had any diplomatic contacts with the Taliban but also provided support to the United Front, an anti-Taliban alliance of former Mujahideen under the leadership of Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud.

Post-2001 Afghan-Indo Relations India opened its embassy in Kabul again in 2001, after the Taliban was overthrown and a new provisional government was established in Kabul. Though there are reports of India supporting some political factions in Afghanistan after 2001, she mainly supported the Afghan Government. India’s engagement progressively increased in Afghanistan after 2001. In fact, the post-2001 era of Indo-Afghan relations should be studied as a separate chapter in the diplomatic history of the two nations. During this era, India came out of the marginalization in Afghanistan and became an important player in the affairs of Afghanistan. Signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2011 opened a new chapter in the relations of the two countries. The agreement, inter alia, provides assistance to Afghanistan to rebuild its infrastructure and institutions, education and technical assistance to rebuild indigenous capacity in Afghanistan and encourages investment in natural resources in Afghanistan. The new US Policy for Afghanistan opened a new chapter in the history of Afghan Indian diplomatic relations. The Trump Policy for South Asia gives more weight to India in dealing with Afghanistan. This is a radical change in the US’s policy for the region and Afghanistan since the 1980s. Actually, for the first time India took the center stage in the US policy for the region and Afghanistan. India did not have a significant role and say in the affairs of Afghanistan on international stage as Pakistan did during 1992–2001, when the country didn’t have a central government. This shift has equally triggered hopes for some and caused tension for others.

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With its $3 billion economic and humanitarian aid, India is the largest regional development partner for Afghanistan. India has helped Afghanistan rebuild its roads, dams, health sector, security sector and train Afghan students and professionals. Building Chabahar Port is one of the most important projects that India built to alleviate the Pakistani bottlenecks of India–Afghanistan connectivity and reduce Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan for international trade.

Afghans’ Perception About Afghan-Indo Diplomatic Relations Though the focus of this paper was to find Afghans’ perception about India, which seemed more a social discussion than a political issue, in the course of collecting data I succumbed to the pressure, change the focus and took into consideration not only social aspect of the relations but also focused on the political side of them. Afghans are divided over their perception about India and nature of Afghanistan’s relations with India. The diverse groups of Afghans—which is composed of government officials, ordinary Afghans, NGO workers and intellectuals living in various parts of the country—were targeted through one-to-one interview in the research. By and large, the target group linked their perception to realism most of the times and to their long life experience in other situation. However, broadly, Afghans can be divided into three categories: those who want Afghanistan to stay away from the rivalry between India and Pakistan, those who want Afghanistan to shift its policy completely toward India and ignore Pakistan thoroughly and those who want Afghanistan to shift its policy thoroughly toward Pakistan and completely ignore India. Majority of the target groups favor a balanced Afghan policy. They believe that Afghanistan cannot afford rivalry with any nations, particularly with the neighbors. They believe that Afghanistan should exercise neutrality between Pakistan and India, who have been archrivals for the last seventy years and who have fought four years since their creation. Supporters of the view of neutrality base their perception on realism and say that Afghanistan should follow and chase its national interest. They stated that no nation can be a permanent friend or foe and emotions shouldn’t be allowed to decide the nature of relations with other nations. The group criticizes India’s Afghan policy for lack of a stable course toward Afghanistan and considers it being motivated by its Pakistan centric approach. As an example, the group mentioned Indian’s support to the United Front in 1996–2001. They observed that while India’s relationship with Afghanistan is important, Afghanistan needs to follow its own interest in diplomatic relations with India. This group of interviewees while recognizing financing some very important infrastructure projects by India in Afghanistan they pointed out the provocation caused by the projects in Pakistan. Members of this group believe that a total inclination in foreign

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relations to India will slow down China’s support to Afghanistan in various sectors, including investment in mining sector in Afghanistan. The group criticized inconsistency in India’s foreign policies vis a vis Afghanistan. They stated that India ignored Afghanistan on a few critical junctures such as during stepping down of Dr. Najibullah and favored certain political factions over others for countering Pakistan. Other group members lamented India for not having a permanent policy approach in Kabul. They observed that although Indian support was overwhelmingly tilted toward the central government in Kabul, India, in times supported certain actors inside the respective governments instead of supporting the central government in the past 16 years. The group is concerned about the effectiveness and pace of some of the Indian supported projects such as Chabahar. The group believes that a total inclination of Afghanistan toward India causes problems not only for Afghanistan but also for India. Because of the absence of direct territorial link, India is not in a position to defend Afghanistan against the increasing threats of terrorism in the region. Overall, the group advocates a more comprehensive balanced regional policy with regional actors, with Pakistan and India in particular. They believe that major economic projects such as Central Asia-South Asia power project and Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline can only be translated into action when there is a high degree of mutual commitment and spirit of cooperation among the three nations. Member of this group believes that while India’s diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan is valuable both the sides need to take geo-political sensitivities into consideration and March toward future economic ties. The group members worry about reversal to the 1990s scenario, when Afghanistan was home to the open proxy war between India and Pakistan. India, Iran, and Russia were supporting the United Front during the Taliban Government, while Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE were supporting the Taliban Government. The second category of Afghans believes that Afghanistan should completely tilt toward India in its foreign policy and ignore Pakistan. They believe that in order to counter Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, Afghanistan needs to garner support from India. Members of this group are of the view that the insurgent groups in Afghanistan are supported by Pakistan. The group members are happy with the current status of Indo-Afghan relationship. They believe that India has supported Afghanistan in its state-building efforts, in educational and hydroelectric sectors in particular. The group considers Indian’s involvement in the mega construction projects in power and communication vital for the stability of Afghanistan. Silma hydroelectric power station is one of the Indian funded projects that was rehabilitated by India in Herat Province. Shahtoot Dam on Kabul River is another dam that India will build in the near future. The third group of Afghans believes that because of the proximity that the two countries have, Pakistan can be more effective for the stability in Afghanistan. They stated that Afghanistan should try to develop a friendly environment with Pakistan.

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70 Percentage 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 AdvocaƟng Neutrality

AdvocaƟng Complete Tilt to India

AdvocaƟng Complete Igonrance of India

Afghans’ Reaction to Diplomatic Relations with India (Sketch drawn by the Author)

Twenty-three percent of the respondents stated that they agree with the way the diplomatic relations are dealt between the two countries. Seventeen percent of them stated that they disagree with the current situation of the diplomatic relations and asked for the change in Afghan Government’s policy toward India. Sixty percent of the respondent stated that they conditionally agree with the current trend in the Afghanistan’s diplomatic policy toward India. 70 Percentage 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Agree With the CondiƟonally Agree Current Trend in Indo- Afghan Policy

Don't Agree

Afghans’ Perception regarding Status Quo (Sketch drawn by the Author)

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Afghans’ Perception About India Finding perception of the target group about India composed the second half of the questionnaire. Just like the first question, the respondents to this question also have three different types of perceptions. The first group has a positive perception about India, the second group has negative perception about India, and the third group has neither positive nor negative perception about India. Seventy-five percent of the target group has positive perception for India. They say that their positive perception is because of the Indian Government’s treatment of Afghan refugees, businessmen, and travelers in India. They praise India for its tolerant behavior and the democratic culture prevalent in India. Scholarships granted to Afghans by the Indian Government are other factors that attract the positive perception of the group. In addition, the group has a positive perception of India because of the culture of freedom, respect to human rights, and freedom of religion, functional and accountable governance in India. The group believes that Indians are a patriotic nation, hardworking, and satisfied nation. Ten percent of the respondents have a negative perception about Indians. They are of the view that Indians are of profit-centric mentality and are selfish. Fifteen percent of the respondents have a neutral viewpoint about Indians. They say that since they haven’t been to India therefore have no views about India. 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 PosiƟve PercepƟon

Neutral PercpeƟon

NegaƟve PercepƟon

Afghans’ Perception about India (Sketch drawn by the Author)

Seventy percent of the respondents stated that they strongly agree with what they stated, ten percent of them said that they agree with what they said and twenty percent of them stated that they and twenty percent of them said that they moderately agree with what they said.

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80 Intensity of PercepƟon 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Strongly Agree

Agree

Moderately Agree

Category 4

Intensity of Afghans’ Perception about the Indo-Afghan Relationship (Sketch drawn by the Author)

Afghans’ Perception About the Future of Indo-Afghan Relations Afghans are optimistic about the Afghanistan India relations. They believe that the two countries relations can help boost economic situation and security in the region. They believe that the Indian educated Afghans are a big asset for Afghanistan. According to estimates, over 50,000 Afghan youths are currently studying or have studied in India in the last 16 years. Seventy-three percent of our target group stated that they are strongly positive perception about India Afghanistan relations. Eighteen percent are pessimistic about the relations between the two countries. They believe that the India Afghanistan relation will foment rivalry in the region and trigger greater hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nine percent of the respondents are neutral about the diplomatic relations of the two countries. They are neither negative nor positive about the relations of the two countries. This group of respondents reported that it’s only the Afghan students who get the opportunity to visit India, get knowledge there and learn about India and its people and the Indian youths don’t travel to Afghanistan to study there or learn about Afghanistan, its people and its culture. They favor two-way traffic for a long and durable relationship between the two countries.

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Archiwal 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Strongly OpƟmisƟc

Neutral

PessimisƟc

Afghans' percepƟon about the Future of Indo Afghan RelaƟons

Afghans’ perception about the Future of Indo-Afghan Relations (Sketch drawn by the Author)

Conclusion Though we tried to get the target population’s perception about India and shun political discussion in the survey. However, we were forced to change the course and have discussion not only about the target population’s perception but also discuss politics with them and address a question to them about the diplomatic relations of India and Afghanistan. Interestingly, majority of the respondents did not support a total tilt of Afghanistan in its foreign policy toward India; they had a positive perception of India. They favored India as a nation and expressed their respect for Indians. Majority of the respondents supported a neutral Afghan policy toward Pakistan and India. But a limited number of them had negative perception of India as well. Though the respondents didn’t explicitly stated that they have been moved by the Indian’s support in the reconstruction of Afghanistan they expressed their high degree of satisfaction of Indians’ support in the rebuilding of infrastructure in Afghanistan. They were highly appreciative of the Building Afghan Parliament, Chabahar, and reconstruction of Salma Dam. They believe that Indian support has been vital for ending Afghanistan’s dependency for its transit on Karachi, and Karachi is not the sole port for Afghanistan’s transit with the rest of the world. Overall, the Afghans perception about India and its relations with Afghanistan and its future is positive, but there are concerns among them about the relations. Afghans favor a win-win situation in the relations and say that Afghans should generate their own financial and human resources to stand on their own feet and act as a bridge between different countries of the region.

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References Anadar, G. (2015). The Provisional Government of India in Kabul. Kabul: Azadi Press. Habibi, A. H. (2012). The movement for constitutional democracy in Afghanistan. Peshawar: Danish Press. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-iran-strategic-chabahar-port-to-be-operational-bydecember-2016-wii-give-access-to-afghanistan-765599. Retrieved January 10, 2018. Paliwal, A. (2017). My Enemy’s Enemy India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal. New Delhi: Harper Collins.

The Dynamics of Bangladesh–India Relations: From a Paradigm Shift to a Challenging Era? Delwar Hossain

Introduction Bangladesh and India have traveled a long way to build a new partnership that was not imagined a decade ago. The relations between the two countries have been identified in many different ways. ‘Comprehensive partnership,’ ‘special relations,’ ‘strategic partnership,’ ‘a fraternal relationship,’ and ‘a golden age of Bangladesh–India relations’ are a few of identifications widely mentioned to capture fundamental trends of their bilateral relations. The fact is that both the nations have profoundly improved their bilateral ties over the past decade. It is often cited as a model of bilateral relations. With a closer look at the history of Bangladesh–India relations, one can argue that both the countries have lost at least twenty-five years through noncooperation and conflict despite being the immediate neighbors. The dramatic shift toward hostility since 1975 continued in different degrees until the formation of a new government led by Awami League (AL) in Bangladesh in 1996. Again the bilateral relations started to suffer since 2002 under a political regime in Bangladesh led by Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Bangladesh and India were again entrapped in a cycle of non-cooperation, which witnessed a slow reversal during the caretaker government (CTG) in Bangladesh in 2007–2008. A quantum leap in cooperation and friendship between the two nations started in January 2009 with a return to power by AL in Bangladesh. The Congress government in India led by the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was equally supportive to a strong bilateral friendship. Subsequently, the Modi government also continued in the same direction with new initiatives and vigor. For about a decade, Bangladesh and India have charted a new course of relations based on mutuality and trust. Against this backdrop, the argument in the paper is that the structure of bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India has changed so profoundly that it has D. Hossain (B) International Relations, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_9

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generated a new paradigm. A paradigm shift is clearly visible in nature, issues, and dynamics of bilateral relations. However, over time the bilateral relations have started to suffer from ambivalence and perhaps a degree of uncertainty. The criticality of Bangladesh–India relations in subregional and regional settings requires a deeper understanding of this paradigm shift and emerging challenges that determine the perception of people particularly in Bangladesh. It begs two key questions. Why and how has there been a paradigm shift in Bangladesh–India relations? What are the factors that determine perception of people in Bangladesh in sustaining the partnership between the two countries? This paper is an attempt to understand current state of Bangladesh–India relations from Bangladesh perspective in light of the above-mentioned questions. Methodologically, the chapter is based on desk review of secondary and primary information about Bangladesh–India relations and related issues.

Conceptual Background Bangladesh’s perception about bilateral relations with India has been shaped by latter’s strategic doctrines and domestic factors. Political regimes in Bangladesh have never shown hesitation to deal with India as a top foreign policy priority. Perhaps there is no disagreement about observation of Shaukat Hassan, ‘Hardly any other factor merits greater consideration in the conduct of Bangladesh’s external relations than the ‘India factor,’ because by virtue of Bangladesh’s geographic location, its maneuverability is seriously circumscribed by India.’1 It is also a fact that India’s maneuverability in her South Asia policy is equally constrained by Bangladesh from geopolitical perspective. This mutual geopolitical interdependence constitutes a cornerstone of toady’s Bangladesh–India relations. Since its independence, India has been an important factor in the foreign policy formulation and its execution, which is often described by the scholars as ‘India factor’ in Bangladesh foreign policy.2 Bhumitra Chakma writes, ‘Dhaka’s foreign policy in the past four decades can be seen in a binary fashion: ‘pro-India’ or ‘anti-India’.’3 Conventionally, it is manifested that when AL is in power, pro-Indian foreign policy is adopted; on the other hand, non-AL governments maintain an ‘anti-Indian’ posture. India has formulated a doctrinal position in the region. Such a position not only reflects India’s abiding and fundamental interests in her bilateral relations with neighboring countries but also demonstrates her power capabilities and elite perception of external role.4 Since the 1970s, the Indian rulers followed a strategic doctrine based on three pillars which include: (i) safeguarding of the territory of the north-west frontier of India through which successive armies have made inroads into Indian 1 Hassan

(1989). (2014) p. 9; Ahmed (1984); Chauhan (2012). 3 Chakma (2015) p. 32. 4 Iftekharuzzaman (1989) pp. 18–25. 2 Sobhan

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territory; (ii) preventing the area around the Indian sub-continent from falling under the control of foreign powers; (iii) command of the Indian Ocean and its environs.5 Although these were identified in the context of the Cold War, it remains relevant even today. Bhabani Sen Gupta put it succinctly few decades ago, India has no intention of intervening in internal conflicts of a South Asian country and it strongly opposes intervention by any country in the internal affairs of any other. India will not tolerate an external intervention in a conflict situation in any South Asian country if the intervention has any implicit or explicit anti-Indian implication.6

A common reference to Indian ‘pre-dominance’ or ‘hegemony’ in South Asia as perceived by her neighbors is an outcome of the application of India’s strategic vision in the region. A popular perception about such a vision is a ‘big brother’ role. Indian rulers seem to have been aware of such kind of perception in the region. While ratifying the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) between Bangladesh and India in May 2015, Sushma Swaraj in her speech in the Indian Parliament argued that India has a caring attitude toward her South Asian neighbors and she refuted allegations about India’s ‘big brother’ role.7 This refutation of hegemonic role and upholding spirit of ‘elder brother’ appear to be the basis of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s neighborhood policy. Harsh V Pant writes that ‘Since coming to office in May 2014, the Modi government has made the immediate neighborhood a top priority. Despite the failure of its initial outreach to Pakistan, India’s engagement with other neighbors like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh has been more productive.’8 As India aspires to be a global power in the emerging multi-polar global order and intends to pursue a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, there is no alternative to gain confidence and trust from its neighbors first and foremost. Besides, a prosperous Bangladesh would be certainly in the paramount interests of India as Jayant Prasad writes in The Hindu that ‘India and Bangladesh are seminal to each other’s progress and prosperity.’9 In addition, an editorial of Hindustan Times claims that ‘Bangladesh is crucial to India.’10 For Tanvi Madan, ‘positive relations with its neighbors and a peaceful neighborhood can indeed facilitate Indian connectivity with West and East Asia and serve as a springboard for a greater role abroad.’11 Bangladesh–India relations are also influenced by India’s Act East Policy (AEP), which was launched at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. It is a transformation from the Look East Policy (LEP), which was initiated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992. AEP argues that there are several significant areas where AEP has gone far beyond the LEP. From the policy circle of Delhi, AEP is often 5 Kodikara

(1984) p. 13. Gupta, Bhabani, ‘India Doctrine’, India Today, 31 August 1983. 7 Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/parliament-approves-bill-to-settle41yearold-border-issue-with-bangladesh/article7181273.ece. Retrieved on 17 October 2017. 8 Pant (2017). 9 Prasad (2015). 10 Hindustan Times, June 25, 2014. 11 Madan (2014). 6 Sen

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seen as ‘the cornerstone of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.12 Bangladesh is often viewed as very important country to India to implement her AEP.’13 Even stronger ties with Bangladesh are viewed as imperative to counter Chinese influence in South Asia.14 Rajib Sikri notes, ‘In the subregional balance of power of East and Northeast India, Bangladesh matches up quite well with India.’15 More enduring features of Bangladesh’s pursuit of bilateral relations with India are its emphasis on two norms. First, Bangladesh highlights the principle of globalism based on global peace and regionalism based on regional peace and cooperation. Without cooperative foreign policy, the peaceful world society is out of imagination. Bangladesh has maintained its international relations based on ‘Friendship to all, malice toward none’ policy since independence in 1971. The thrust of Bangladesh foreign policy on globalism and regionalism partly emanates from its constitutional mandate and partly from its role in creating regional organizations in South Asia and beyond. Article 25 of the Bangladesh Constitution says: 1. The State shall base its international relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlements of international disputes, and respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter, and on the basis of those principles shalla) Strive for the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and for general and complete disarmament; b) Uphold the right of every people freely to determine and build up its own social, economic and political system by ways and means of its own free choice. c) Support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.16

Bangladesh was not only a pioneer of SAARC, but also played a critical role behind establishment of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar-Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) subregional cooperation. Another way to conceptualize Bangladesh’s conduct of bilateral relations with India is application of the idea of ‘balancing act’ based on a pragmatist outlook. It is an attempt to avoid ‘bandwagoning’ and a trap of being a ‘cliental state.’ At the dawn of the twenty-first century, India and China have emerged key development partners for Bangladesh. It is not only the rise of China and India, but also persistently high economic growth of Bangladesh make the latter to pursue a new approach about its relations with major powers in the region and beyond. Besides, changing nature of India–China and US–China relations further emboldens Bangladesh maintaining a balance in its relations with major powers such as India, China, and USA. 12 Ministry

of External Affairs, Government of India. (2017). 14 Kashinath (2016). 15 Sikri (2009). 16 ‘The Constitution of Bangladesh.’ Retrieved from http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_ all.php?id=367. Retrieved on 25 January 2018. 13 Kathuria

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However, both Bangladesh and India have developed a strong national mandate on special relations between the two nations over the past decade. Factors such as India’s role during Liberation War in Bangladesh in 1971 and geopolitical interdependence provide a unique basis of a strong bilateral partnership. Both the countries have demonstrated it through navigating from extremely sensitive and controversial issues to traditional mundane ones. Issues of ‘insurgents’ camps in Bangladesh’, transit facilities, border disputes, and energy cooperation are examples of such a shift in perception in both the nations commonly shared by the people and the political elite. According to an opinion survey in 2014 conducted by Pew Global, view about India in Bangladesh is 70% positive marking a substantive increase compared to 2000s.17 Another survey reveals that more than 90% of Indian electorate do not consider Bangladesh a hostile nation.18 With a high degree of positive views both at popular and regime levels, Bangladesh and India have reached a new height of partnership. This provides a necessary framework of understanding Bangladesh–India relations in today’s world.

Major Areas of Cooperation and Partnership Since 2009 Bangladesh–India relations have seen a major shift from conflict and non-cooperation to friendship and collaboration. In a less than three years, the two governments moved forward with bold initiatives of far-reaching implications at bilateral, subregional and regional levels. The long-standing land boundary dispute, for instance, has been resolved peacefully through the 1974 LBA ratification in 2015, which is often described as a new milestone in Bangladesh–India relations. In the words of Sushma Swaraj: ‘Building a comprehensive and equitable partnership with Bangladesh is essential for the realization of our vision of a stable, secure and prosperous South Asia.’19 And the visit of Narendra Modi to Dhaka in June 2015 attaches the significance that India ascribes to deepen Bangladesh–India relations. In addition, breaking protocol, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi went to the airport to receive Sheikh Hasina personally in April 2017 and thereby underscored the importance New Delhi attaches to Dhaka. In fact, one needs to call a paradigm shift in Bangladesh–India relations for a number of specific areas of cooperation and partnership as briefly identified in this section. First, there has been an unprecedented degree of interactions at summit level between the prime ministers of Bangladesh and India. At bilateral front, the Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina met her Indian counterpart on four occasions that has never happened in the past. In addition to formal bilateral sum17 Pew

Research Center, ‘How Asian View Each Other’ Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/ 2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/. Retrieved on 18 September 2017. 18 The survey was conducted in 1999. Retrieved from http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/Mcmillan/ AttitoUS.pdf Retrieved on 18 September 2017. 19 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2015).

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mits, the two prime ministers met on a number of occasions on the sidelines of regional and global meetings. Second, Bangladesh and India have successfully dealt with extremely sensitive and controversial issue of insurgents allegedly sheltered in Bangladesh. India has long been faced with security concerns arising from the insurgents sheltered in Bangladesh.20 Security cooperation has been a key feature in Bangladesh–India relations.21 To address security concerns of each other, Bangladesh and India entered into the Extradition Treaty on January 28, 2013. Bangladesh and India also pledged ‘zero tolerance toward terrorism and extremism.’ Notably, Bangladesh took serious steps in dealing with Indian insurgent organizations like United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. Bangladesh has handed over two Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT) members of Indian origin who had been operating from Bangladesh.22 Pant contends, ‘There is now greater convergence between India and Bangladesh on dealing with fundamentalist forces like the HuJI, the JMB, and Harkat-ul-Ansar.’23 Third, it was a formidable challenge for Bangladesh and India to achieve a breakthrough in decades-long talks on transit issue charged by domestic politics in Bangladesh. Transit was once equated with shedding of blood in Bangladesh not a very long time ago. The opposition leader in the national parliament of Bangladesh in 1997–2000 termed it as ‘sell out’ of Bangladesh’s sovereignty. It was almost impossible to reach any understanding on transit facilities between Bangladesh and India. Both the nations are now enjoying connectivity through all modes of transport. From 2015, there is direct sea movement of containerized/bulk/dry cargo, which has reduced shipping time between India and Bangladesh from 30–40 days to 4–10 days.24 Fourth, in an astonishing upward turn of bilateral relationship, Bangladesh and India have resolved border disputes through the ratification of the 1974 IndiraMujib LBA. India and Bangladesh share a 4,097 km long porous border, which snakes through plains, rivers, hills, and paddy fields.25 After more than four decades, Bangladesh–India implemented LBA and thereby exchanged 162 enclaves in June 2016. India handed over 111 enclaves comprising around 17,160 acres to Bangladesh while Bangladesh handed over 51 enclaves, comprising 7,110 acres to India. The implementation of the LBA has brought about positive outcomes through effective border management, counter-terrorism cooperation, and preventing smuggling and other border centric crimes. Fifth, another landmark achievement of Bangladesh–India relations is resolution of long-standing maritime boundary dispute. Two nations remained at odds over shar-

20 Sikri,

Rajib, Op. Cit. 2009. Chakma, 36. 22 ‘2 Laskar Men held Inside Indian Border’ (2009, 24 November), Dhaka: The Daily Star. 23 Pant, Harsh V, Op.Cit. 2017. 24 Bagchi (2017). 25 Ramachandran, Sudha, Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-india-bangladeshwall-lessons-for-trump/. Retrieved on February 15, 2017. 21 Bhumitra

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ing of maritime water in the Bay of Bengal for about four decades.26 Having failed to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations, Bangladesh referred it to the Law of the Sea Tribunal known as Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on October 8, 2009. The court concluded its hearings on December 18, 2013, in The Hague. Subsequently, Bangladesh won the verdict as the PCA awarded Bangladesh 19,467 km2 of the 25,602 km2 sea area of the Bay of Bengal. Sixth, there has been a considerable progress in energy cooperation between Bangladesh and India. Bangladesh is currently importing about 660 MW of power from India. In March 2016, the two Prime Ministers inaugurated the export of power from Tripura to Bangladesh as well as export of Internet bandwidth to Tripura from Bangladesh. Supply of another 500 MW is expected to begin in 2018.27 Many Indian public sector units such as Indian Oil Corporation, Numaligarh Refinery Limited, and Petronet LNG Ltd are working with their Bangladeshi counterparts in the oil and gas sector of Bangladesh. This development was hardly noticed in the past, though Indian engagement at Rampal power plant is largely viewed negatively by many Bangladeshis. Seventh, Bangladesh and India have achieved a substantive progress in trade and economic integration. Due to continued suspicion and mistrust, Bangladesh–India could not develop strong trade relations earlier.28 This has substantially changed over the past decade. For Bangladesh, India is the second largest market for total imports. India’s exports to Bangladesh reported a robust growth in 2016–17. According to the Commerce Ministry of India, Indian exports to Bangladesh amounted to $6.8 billion in the fiscal year ending March 2017, recording 13% growth. Total bilateral trade had hit an all-time high of $7.5 billion, up 11%.29 In fact, total Bangladesh trade with India grew from $US1, 690.49 million in 2005 to $US8, 248.94 million in 2017, registering a robust average annual growth rate of trade. Compared to the year of 2005, trade volume between the two countries has increased about five times.30 In addition, there is a significant amount of informal trade between Bangladesh and India. Another aspect of economic relations between the two countries is growing India’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has offered special economic zones to Indian industries and companies. Although the volume of FDI inflow is not high, it is increasing gradually. Experts agree that there is a good prospect of India’s investment in Bangladesh. In 2016–2017, India’s gross FDI in Bangladesh was US$119.32 million in Bangladesh. India has also US$491.39 million as FDI stock in Bangladesh in 2017.31 Since 2010 India also committed a line of credit of US$1.0 billion, which was increased to US$4.5 billion in April 2017. This amount of line of credit to Bangladesh is the largest ever development assistance package by 26 Rahman

(1989) pp. 114–116; Alam and Abdullah (2010). High Commission of India, Dhaka. 28 Sikri, Rajib (2009) p. 60. 29 Bose (2017). 30 Retrieved from http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/icnt.asp. Retrieved on 2 December 2017; https:// www.bb.org.bd/econdata/import/imp_pay_country_yearly.php. Retrieved on 2 December 2017. 31 Statistics Department, Bangladesh Bank (2017). 27 The

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India to any country. During this period, the number of Indian migrants in Bangladesh has substantially increased. In one estimate, Indians working in Bangladesh sent $3.7 billion, making the eastern neighbor the fifth highest contributor of remittance inflows.32 Economic Times reported in December 2016 that the ‘bulk of remittances comes from three different categories of countries: Middle Eastern monarchies, Western developed nations and next door neighbors such as Bangladesh and Nepal.’33 Last, but not the least, a new level of human mobility between the two nations could be observed. For instance, Bangladeshi people constitute the largest number of visitors to India and Indian High Commission in Dhaka issued 976,000 visas in 2016.34 According to Press Information Bureau of India, ‘the percentage share of Foreign Tourist Arrivals (FTAs) in India during September 2017 among the top 15 source countries was highest from Bangladesh 20.65%, while 10.24% from the USA followed by UK (7.04%), Sri Lanka (3.98%), Australia (3.5%), China (2.46%), and Nepal (2.3%).’35 Based on the above-mentioned factors, it may be argued that Bangladesh–India relations have transformed into a comprehensive and strategic partnership. However, the relations between the two countries face new challenges in the changed geopolitical environment. Bangladesh and India have been dealing with these challenges in different ways in the current phase. They find it as a new trajectory marked by a number of critical issues to influence perception of people and the elite in Bangladesh as well as dynamics of their bilateral relations that may lead to ambiguity and ambivalence. In this connection, the key determining factors have been identified in the following sections.

1971 and Historical Contours A unique aspect of understanding of Bangladesh–India relations is its historical dimension. It is a distinctive issue that always needs to be factored in for understanding overall perception of people in Bangladesh. The recognition of India’s role in 1971 by people from all segments in Bangladesh society is the biggest strength of Bangladesh–India relations. India’s role in the War of Liberation in 1971 decisively influenced not only the struggle for freedom in Bangladesh, but also its external relations as an independent nation. To recall India’s contribution to the Liberation War of Bangladesh, Former Indian Premier Indira Gandhi was conferred the ‘Bangladesh Freedom Honor’ on July 25, 2011, for her unparalleled support and contributions to Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971.36

32 Abdi

(2015).

33 Ibid. 34 India

Sees Highest Visitors from Bangladesh (2017).

35 Ibid. 36 Best

Friend Honored (2011).

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Besides, Bangladesh honored some 500 foreigners, including 226 Indians, for their crucial support to the Liberation War.37 India fought a war for the birth of a new nation in the map of the world—Bangladesh. India sacrificed the lives of 3630 officers and Jawans of its Army. About 9856 officers and Jawans were wounded and more than 213 officers and Jawans are missing till today.38 The sacrifice that India made is unforgettable to the people of Bangladesh. With diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh on December 7, 1971, at the fag end of the Liberation War, India demonstrated highest level of political and military support to the struggling nation. Historically, both the countries cultivated a strong fraternity at bilateral level during the Sheikh Mujib era. A high watermark of friendship and fraternity was reflected in a joint declaration in Kolkata on February 6–8, 1972, signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh announcing the Indian troops would be withdrawn from Bangladesh by March 25, 1972. As Ahmed observes, ‘there are only few instances in world history where a surrendered army was shown generosity by an authority, which came to power.’39 One can go back to the then prime minister Sheikh Mujib’s remarks as made in Kolkata, India, on February 6, 1972. I have no doubt in my mind that India, our next door neighbor, will proudly march on as the largest democracy of the world under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi. We, on our part are striving to advance ideals of nationalism, democracy, secularism and socialism at home and nonalignment in international relations.40

In a high note of friendship, Bangabandhu concluded the address saying that Bangladesh–India bhai-bhai. Domestically, the principles of socialism, democracy, nationalism and secularism and externally, principles of anti-imperialism, nonalignment, and peaceful coexistence have guided the parameters of Bangladesh–India relations in the beginning.41 It is after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur-ur-Rahman on August 15, 1975, both the countries turned more and more hostile to each other. The assumption of power by General Zia-ur-Rahman after the 1975 coup disrupted the healthy evolution of Bangladesh–India ties. Issues such as the dispute over the maritime belt, support for the pro-Mujib guerrillas, the sharing of Ganges waters, and disputes over the Muhurir Char (an islet on the river Muhuri, the boundary between Bangladesh and the Indian state of Tripura) and Purbasha Island in the Bay of Bengal, have seriously undermined friendly relations between India and Bangladesh.42 Noncooperation and hostility have characterized the bilateral relations, which created space for mistrust and suspicions in the minds of political elite as well as masses. 37 ‘Bangladesh to Honor 226 Indians for Role in 1971 ‘Liberation War’ (2010, 10 December) The Economic Times. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-andnation/bangladesh-to-honour-226-indians-for-role-in-1971-liberation-war/articleshow/7100496. cms. Retrieved on 18 November 2017. 38 Azad (2008). 39 Ahmed (2004). 40 Nair (2008). 41 Chakravarty (1988). 42 Hossain (1981).

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During the 1996–2001, Bangladesh and India re-engaged and deepened their bilateral relations in every aspect. Notably, the two nations signed historic 30-year Ganges Water Sharing Agreement in 1996. India actively supported the peace process between the Bangladesh Government and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The CHT Accord, popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord, signed on December 2, 1997, was a culmination of diplomatic understanding between the two countries. However, Bangladesh and India had again caught into a quagmire of hostile attitudes toward each other during the period of 2002–2006. Issues of water dispute, border conflict, the so-called illegal migration, trade deficit and maritime issue had mired in bilateral relations. There was no high-level meeting or a summit held between Bangladesh and India during this period except a visit by former Bangladesh Prime Minister Khaleda Zia to India in connection with invitation to a SAARC summit held in Dhaka in 2005. Tensions and hostile attitudes were visible in diplomatic exchanges. Sreeradha Datta aptly observes, ‘These five years could be described as the worst phase in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Not only were there very limited high-level contacts and exchanges, each side also freely leveled charges against the other.’43 Subsequently, with the emergence of the Caretaker Government (CTG) in January 2007, Dhaka and New Delhi started to mend bilateral ties and worked together to stabilize bilateral relations. On December 29, 2008, general elections in Bangladesh have been a watershed for Bangladesh–India relations as it brought AL-led grand alliance government to power with a landslide electoral victory.

Domestic Politics in Bangladesh There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. Scholars are also divided on this issue. One group of scholars argues that foreign policy as global outcomes are considerably influenced by global systemic factors such as Cold War or globalization.44 Another group of analysts asserts that foreign policy is primarily influenced by domestic politics.45 Putnam, Milner, and Katzenstein argue that domestic factors have enormous impact on global outcomes. Domestic politics is a powerful determinant to shape decisions and choices of a state to global arena. The Bangladesh–India relations are a good case in point. Political forces in Bangladesh have made attempts in different times to politicize the relations and use it for electoral success. One section of political forces advocates for strong and friendly ties with India.46 They emphasize common historical, cultural, and economic roots of people in India and Bangladesh. They focus on trust 43 Datta

(2018). (1978); Waltz (1959, 1967, 1979). 45 Putnam (1988); Katzenstein (1978); Keohane and Milner (1996); Milner (1997). 46 Generally, these political forces include Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and its allies. 44 Gourevitch

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and confidence at regime and popular levels. Contrarily, another section of political forces remains suspicious about India and even tend to perceive India as a hostile power.47 These political forces often cite security or sovereignty issues in support of their stance on Bangladesh–India relations. Water negotiations, transit talks, and border discussions under different political regimes are few examples in this regard. Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India also get linked with external factors in the backdrop of evolving regional and global politics. Sino-Indian rivalry, India-Pakistan conflict, US policy toward South Asia, Myanmar-South Asia relations, existing regional conflicts, and several crosscutting issues also influence the domestic political forces in Bangladesh often fueling their anti-Indian views. The Rohingya crisis is an example. The victory of the grand alliance led by AL in December 2008 in Bangladesh signaled a new beginning of Bangladesh–India relations. The enmity generated over time largely through political elite has witnessed a major shift in the direction of friendship and cooperation. Awami League’s assumption to power has given the two countries a historic opportunity to forge close cooperation. Former Ambassador M. Humayun Kabir observes, ‘Both the Prime Ministers agreed on a vision for the future in the pursuit of the common good—bilaterally, regionally and globally.’ In this context, they reiterated their commitment to work together to solve all issues through cooperation and mutual understanding.48 In addition, it may be noted that there was a huge concern about regime-level understanding in Bangladesh when Modi government came to power in India in May 2014. The opposition political parties in Bangladesh wanted to utilize this domestic political change in India in their anti-government movement while the ruling alliance was nervous about the future directions of bilateral relations. Similarly, in India there exists a concern about the regime change in Bangladesh. In fact, no bilateral relations of Bangladesh attract the kind of attention and raises emotions among its people as ties with India do. This makes it abundantly clear that the two countries are more than just close neighbors.49 Domestic politics particularly in Bangladesh remains a major determinant of shaping perception of people and elite about its bilateral relations with India.

Politics of Connectivity Bangladesh and India have carefully cultivated the root of transit or transshipment (later known as ‘connectivity’) dialogue at bilateral level. Indrani Bagchi writes, ‘India and Bangladesh have built arguably the most number of connectivity projects, almost unprecedented in the South Asian region, generally regarded as one of the 47 These political forces include Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies, mostly affiliated with religious groups. 48 M. Humayun Kabir, (2011, 8 September) The Daily Sun. 49 Times of India, January 27, 2010.

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least connected in the world.’50 Notably, Bangladesh has allowed India to use its territory to ferry food grains to Tripura.51 In an effort to further increase bilateral trade between Bangladesh and India, the two nations launched a container train service running from Dhaka, Bangladesh to Kolkata. Trial runs began in October 2017.52 These are, in fact, rare developments in Bangladesh–India relations. Connectivity through road and railways was always a sensitive and controversial issue in Bangladesh. It has been popularly known as ‘transit’ and ‘corridor’. There has been a strong political resistance in Bangladesh against transit facilities for India. Public opinion was not favorable to successful negotiations on connectivity. People were visibly divided into two extremes—pro-transit and anti-transit. The Hasina government has persistently focused on the issue and subsided the debate centering on connectivity. It involved extraordinary courage and leadership. As a result, both the countries have now achieved a considerable progress in this regard. India and Bangladesh have also agreed that Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement will be implemented between Bangladesh, India, and Nepal [BIN] through exchange of letters keeping provision for Bhutan to join later.53 As Veena Sikri observes, ‘In fact, the Prime Ministerial visits in 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2017 have brought back the focus on the need for the comprehensive, mutually beneficial operationalization of the modus operandi for transit and connectivity, with the very valuable inclusion of Nepal and Bhutan in its ambit.’54 The scope of regional connectivity has been widened through the inclusion of BIMSTEC and BCIM-EC. There was also an attempt for trilateral connectivity between Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar. Public perception in Bangladesh is still skeptical about the gains of connectivity for Bangladesh. Issues of security, sovereignty, infrastructure, and revenue sharing seem to haunt connectivity initiatives. Regional dimensions of connectivity have also added a new debate in Bangladesh. It has become a source of soft discord between Bangladesh and India due to clash of visions. While Bangladesh emphasizes all levels and forms of connectivity, India seems to be selective. Bangladesh is equally focused on SAARC, BIMSTEC, and BCIM-EC as regional forms of connectivity while India tends to rely exclusively on BIMSTEC. People in Bangladesh strongly support connectivity not only through BIMSTEC, but also through BCIM Economic Corridor. BCIM economic corridor can be a gamechanger for South Asian trade as well.55 Syed Munir Khasru views BCIM-EC is an 50 Bagchi

(2017). of External Affairs, Government of India, Op. Cit. 52 ‘Nepal Prime Minister Discusses Connectivity, Trade Enhancement with Bangladesh Prime Minister and Sri Lanka President’ (2017, 23 September). Retrieved from https://www.sasec.asia/index. php?page=news&nid=756&url=nepal-pm-discusses-connectivity-trade-with-saarc. Retrieved on 9 November 2017. 53 ‘Bangladesh Proposes New Regional Connectivity Initiatives to India’ (2017, 22 October). Retrieved from https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/10/22/bangladesh-proposes-new-regionalconnectivity-initiatives-to-india. Retrieved on 5 December 2017. 54 Sikri (2011). 55 Sahoo and Abhirup (2014); Das et al. (2013). Asia Pulse News, June 29, 2009. 51 Ministry

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economic opportunity for Bangladesh as he argues that ‘By developing connectivity with China, India, and Myanmar by roads, rail, and other ways, Bangladesh can transform itself into a part of an industrial nexus and commercial hub linking up South and Southeast Asia’.56 According to a survey, almost 89% of the respondents said that the BCIM has the potential to benefit the region’s economy, while 85% are of the view that it could be an effective multilateral forum to help India tackle its bilateral problems with immediate neighbors.57

The China Factor People in Bangladesh tend to perceive that the China factor has become a major issue in her bilateral relations with India in the recent times. Considering the geopolitical realities of South Asian and external powers’ engagement in the region there seems to be a concern in Indian policy community. During 1971–2004, India was the largest trading partner of Bangladesh, which was replaced by China since then. In addition, a growing Sino-Bangladesh security cooperation is also noticeable that is often viewed as a major concern to New Delhi. China’s growing economic and political engagement over India’s neighboring countries is termed by Varun Sahni as ‘Chinese design and India’s default’ which has made India’s position very weak regionally which ultimately hampers India’s interests and ambitions.58 For J. Mohan Malik ‘Beijing’s economic ties with South Asian states supplement and reinforce its military security objectives and goals. China’s use of economic means in its rivalry with India for influence in Nepal and Bangladesh is a case in point.’59 The visit of China’s President, Xi Jinping to Dhaka in October 2016 has created a new trajectory in this regard. During the visit, China and Bangladesh signed 27 deals worth US$24.45 billion to finance different megaprojects largely on infrastructure in Bangladesh. In addition, 13 Bangladeshi companies signed 13 joint venture agreements with Chinese entities amounting to $13.6 billion.60 Furthermore, Bangladesh’s procurement of two submarines has reinforced India’s concern about Bangladesh–China relations. Perhaps, India partly responded to Chinese economic penetration in Bangladesh through striking new deals assigned during the visit of Bangladesh prime minister to New Delhi in April 2017. During the visit, government agencies and private companies of Bangladesh and India signed 35 deals amounting US$14.5 billion including line of credit and private sector investment.61

56 Khasru

(2015). China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor Beneficial for Region’s Economy: Survey’ (2014, 25 November) The Economic Times. 58 Sahni (2007). 59 Malik (2001). 60 Azim (2016). 61 Bhattacharya (2017). 57 ‘Bangladesh,

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A strong view in Bangladesh is that India’s concern about Bangladesh–China relations contradicts her own relations with China. Despite Doklam standoff in recent days, India and China are enjoying robust economic relations. Bilateral trade between the two countries has topped the US$90 billion mark and is projected to be around US$402 billion by 2020.62 Being a friendly neighbor to both India and China, Bangladesh too wants vigorous trade and investments with them. ‘Thus, there needn’t be any reservations on such issues in this era of economic primacy.’63 Dhaka has cultivated balanced and incremental relations with India and China being two of its giant neighbors and development partners. It is not Bangladesh’s policy to become ‘one of the pearls’ in the String of Pearls rather becoming ‘the Pearl’ in global arena in terms of achieving economic prosperity.

The Challenges Continuing Apart from the above-mentioned areas, water continues to be a prime determinant of people’s perception in Bangladesh and it crucially affects bilateral relations since the 1970s.64 Sharing and managing of water and water resources from 54 international rivers have always been a challenge for Bangladesh and India. Water has often used as a political issue rather than a technical one in domestic politics of both India and Bangladesh. It hampers to deepen Bangladesh–India ties in other issues as well. India’s former envoy to Bangladesh, Pankaj Saran points out that ‘water is a major challenge for both of our countries.’65 The proposed Teesta water sharing agreement is a case in point. During the visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to India in April 2017, the resolution of Teesta water sharing dispute came in the forefront of formal and informal talks. People from every corner in Bangladesh consider water a critical challenge to deepen Bangladesh–India ties further. A critical issue lies with the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense cooperation in April 2017. Under this MoU, India has committed to provide US$500 million as a line of credit to purchase defense-related equipment. It has generated considerable debate in Bangladesh, particularly among the skeptics. Apart from the controversy with defense cooperation, people in Bangladesh show disquiet when some political leaders and professionals tend to identify Bangladesh as a source of threat. A high ranking policy maker in the Modi government observes, ‘Bangladesh, the ‘so-called friend’ of India, also poses a security threat to the country

62 Imam

(2017).

63 Ibid. 64 Islam

(2012).

65 ‘Teesta Agreement Signing

Daily Star.

India Indicates Delay Asks for Patience, Trust,’ (2015, 10 April) The

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besides China and Pakistan.’66 Such a statement makes people in Bangladesh more nervous and apprehensive about defense cooperation with India. Another emerging determinant of Bangladesh–India relations is how to manage violent extremism and radicalization at national and regional levels. Both the countries have already highlighted the threat in their bilateral talks. Analysts argue that militant groups have been using facilities in the neighboring countries particularly in the South Asian subregion connected by India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. In the words of Joyeeta, ‘While militant groups are known to have set up camps in Bangladesh and Bhutan, Nepal’s Maoists are known to harbor links in India. Bangladeshi militant organizations have also established camps in India, disturbing peace in both countries.’67 The pursuit of building a peaceful border is a major determinant of people’s perception in Bangladesh. Both the countries have achieved paradigmatic shifts in border relations through resolution of long-standing land boundary disputes. However, border fencing, informal trade, drug trafficking, cross-border terrorist links, human trafficking and border killings have been continuously influencing people’s psyche in Bangladesh. Specifically, the issue of killings of Bangladeshi nationals while trespassing into India is a serious concern as it generates outrage among the Bangladeshi people on the question of human rights. In one estimate, from January 2000 to 2014 Border Security Forces (BSF) killed 1035 Bangladeshi people. Most of them are killed by shootouts.68 Despite manifold efforts by Bangladesh and India, the problem continues without much progress on the ground. Although it has not been significantly featured in Bangladesh–India relations over the past decade, the issue of Bangladeshi migration to India has resurfaced largely due to state-level politics in India. Controversy with the number of Bangladeshi migrants, interpretation of historical facts, communal riots, threats of push-in or deportation and securitization process have made it a complex challenge for both the nations. Assam is the only Indian state that started a process to update the 1951 National Register of Citizens (IRC). The new Assamese Government led by BJP leader, Sorbananda Sonowal, started to implement the process. The first draft of NRC was published on December 31, 2017, which revealed that among 32.9 million applicants 19 million were accepted as legal Assamese. This has already been termed as a ticking ‘time bomb’ for Bangladesh–India relations.69 The publication of NRC draft report says that 13.9 million Assamese are uncertain about their citizenship just in one state. These Assamese are allegedly considered ‘illegal Bangladesh Muslim migrants’ that has troubled people and government alike in Bangladesh. Despite an increased level of human movements in the recent years, people in Bangladesh continue to highlight the problems of immigration process on India’s 66 Union minister in India, Hansraj Ahir made this remark while addressing a conference on homeland security. Retrieved from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/bangladesh-poses-securitythreat-besides-pak-china-mos-home/articleshow/61675967.cms. Retrieved on December 15, 2017. 67 Bhattacharjee (2016). 68 Meah and Rajib (2015). 69 Ranjan (2018).

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side. Movement of people is starkly restricted owing to a myriad of visa hassles. Consequently, people-to-people contact still remains at a very low level, which translates into poor human connectivity. Alongside visa complexities, the communication mode particularly air is not affordable for the majority of common people. People in Bangladesh are also disappointed about the fact that Bangladeshi television programs cannot be aired in Indian television channels and other media due to legal and practical problems. Finally, Bangladesh is facing a massive humanitarian crisis emanating from the influx of the Rohingya people in the country following the attacks on August 25, 2017, in Rakhine, Myanmar. The brutality of Myanmar security forces is compared with ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing.’ Bangladesh has stood beside the Rohingya people based on humanitarian grounds. It has become a critical diplomatic challenge for Bangladesh to mitigate the crisis through a permanent solution. Given the nature of bilateral relations and scale of crisis, people in Bangladesh expected India would provide strong diplomatic support to Bangladesh. In reality, people think that India maintains a distance from Bangladesh on this issue and rather supported the Myanmar government. Ironically, Indian Government declared to deport 40,000 Rohingyas apparently living in the country. However, India has provided with relief materials to the Rohingyas in Bangladesh. As close partners, Bangladesh and India are in delicate situation with their different views on the Rohingya crisis that poses an important challenge in coming days.

Conclusions The chapter has reviewed Bangladesh–India relations from Bangladesh perspective and argues that there is a paradigm shift in their ties and at the same time, a new ambivalence is in the offing. So, to maintain this paradigm shift, Bangladesh and India need to add further impetus to resolve the outstanding issues such as water and to prudently deal with critical issues as identified above. It is extremely important to further promote people-to-people contacts, enhance the role of academia and media, to implement the Agreements and MoUs signed during 2009–2017 and to further deepen mutual trust and understanding. Bilateral relations can be observed in three dimensions—‘government-to-government (G2G), people-to-people (P2P), and business-to-business (B2B)’. Promoting people-to-people contact is of critical importance to uplift India-Bangladesh relations in the days to come. The policy makers in both the establishments need to realize that increased level of people-topeople contacts can work to wither away misperception and to strengthen trust across borders and can boost bilateral economic relations. Second, Bangladesh and India need to redefine the role of academics. There is a lack of scholarship on Bangladesh–India relations. The role of academic community is critically important to elevate Bangladesh–India. For example, hydrodiplomacy may be considered a major tool to address water issues. And effective hydro-diplomacy can be an imperative to resolve India-Bangladesh water sharing

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and management disputes. Third, the role of media is also critically important. Indian and Bangladeshi media need to play a constructive role in resolving disputes and misperception. In fact, through creating public opinion and confidence building, media can play a crucial role to address bilateral differences and disputes. Notably, in case of LBA, media in both countries particularly Indian media played a considerably constructive role. The media in Bangladesh also played a constructive role in case of LBA. Finally, the chapter argues that there is a dominant view in Bangladesh that growing Bangladesh–China ties need to be looked at as an opportunity for an effective Indian policy toward Bangladesh. In fact, the location of Bangladesh is geostrategically important and can be a hub between South Asia, Northeast India, and Southeast Asia, which needs to be utilized for the shared regional prosperity by both New Delhi and Beijing. Both Bangladesh and India need to invest further on political will that still falls short in uplifting India–Bangladesh relations in the changed milieu. Harsh V. Pant observes, ‘Bureaucratic inertia and lack of political will on India’s part have prevented serious progress on outstanding bilateral issues.’70 Both the countries may work further to iron out differences on emerging issues such as the Rohingya crisis, the migration question, and the China factor. In fact, they need to work closely on all issues of challenges and opportunities to sustain the cooperative paradigm of bilateral relations.

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31, 2017; Retrieved from http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/2017/04/08/ india-announces-4-5b-line-credit-bangladesh/. Retrieved on December 31, 2017. Bagchi, I. B. (2017, 10 November). Connectivity projects boost India–Bangladesh ties. New Delhi: The Times of India. Bose, P. R. (2017, 22 October). India’s exports to Bangladesh bounce back, Record 13% Growth in FY17. The Hindu. Chakravarty, S. R. (1988). Indo-Bangladesh relations: The Mujib Period. In S. R. Chakravarty & V. Narain (Eds.), Bangladesh: Global politics (Vol. 3). New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Chakma, B. (2015). Sheikh Hasina Government’s India policy: A three level game. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2(1), 32. Chauhan, K. S. (2012). Foreign policy of Bangladesh. New Delhi: Kaveri Books. Das, G., Ujjwal, K. P., & Tanuj, M. (2013). Sub-regional cooperation for the development of landlocked peripheral areas: the case of BCIM. South Asian Survey, 20(1), 74–93. Datta, S. (2018). Indo-Bangladesh relations: An enduring partnership?. IDSA Issue Brief . Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/137590/IB_Indo-BangladeshRelations_060110. pdf. Retrieved on January 25, 2018. Gourevitch, P. (1978). The second-image reversed. International Organization, 32, 881–912. Hassan, S. (1989). The India factor in the foreign policy of Bangladesh. In M. G. Kabir & S. Hassan (Eds.), Issues and challenges facing Bangladesh foreign policy (p. 44). Dhaka: Bangladesh Society for International Studies. Hossain, I. (1981). Bangladesh-India relations: Issues and problems. Asian Survey, 21(11), 1115–1128. Imam, S. H. (2017, 1 December). Closer China–Bangladesh ties shouldn’t worry India. The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/pleasure-all-mine/closer-chinabangladesh-ties-shouldnt-worry-india-1498687. Retrieved on November 29, 2017. Islam, S. (2012). Bangladesh–India water sharing disputes: Possible policy responses. Journal of Bangladesh Studies 42–62. Iftekharuzzaman, (1989). The India doctrine: Relevance for Bangladesh. In M. G. Kabir & H. Shaukat (Eds.), Issues and challenges facing Bangladesh foreign policy (pp. 18–25). Dhaka: Bangladesh Society for International Studies. India Sees Highest Visitors from Bangladesh. (2017, 26 October). The financial express. Retrieved from https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/economy/india-sees-highest-visitors-from-bangladesh1509033898. Retrieved on December 17, 2017. Katzenstein, P. (1978). Between power and plenty (p. 344). Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press. Keohane, R. O., & Milner, H. V. (1996). Internationalization and domestic politics (p. 308). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Khasru, M. S. (2015, 11 March). BCIM-economic opportunities for Bangladesh. The Daily Star. Kashinath, P. (2016, 29 October). To fend off China, India must Galvanize ties with Bangladesh. The Diplomat. Kathuria, S. (2017, 27 September). Boosting business in the Bangladesh corridor is crucial to India’s ‘Act East’ policy. Hindustan Times. Kodikara, S. (1984). Strategic factors in inter-state relations in South Asia (p. 13). New Delhi. Malik, J. M. (2001). South Asia in China’s foreign relations. Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, 13(1), 73–90. Meah, M., & Rajib, N. (2015, 15 March). Killings and torture on the Bangladesh–India border, impacts and their effect on the youth of Bangladesh: A discourse on structural transformation of India–Bangladesh border relations. Retrieved from http://nordicsouthasianet.eu/sites/default/ files/meah_and_rajib_sasnetconf_paper_-_meah_and_rajib.pdf. Retrieved on January 4, 2018. Milner, H. V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations (p. 291). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Madan, T. (2014, 29 August). Indian Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy: The first 100 Days. Brookings.

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Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2015, 31 May). Transformational diplomacy: New milestones, new horizons. Retrieved from http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/ 25299_2365_1_English_final__2_.pdf. Retrieved on December 12, 2017. Nair, P. S. (2008). Indo-Bangladesh relations. New Delhi: AHP Publishing Corporation. Pant, H. V. (2017, 8 April). Delhi Woos Dhaka: Bangladesh PM Hasina gets a warm welcome in India. The Diplomat. Prasad, J. (2015, 11 May). Breakthrough in India–Bangladesh ties. The Hindu. Pant, H. V. (2015, 2 June). A long overdue foreign policy course correction by Delhi. The Diplomat. Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/a-long-overdue-foreign-policycourse-correction-by-delhi/. Retrieved on October 25, 2017. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42, 427–460. Rahman, M. H. (1989). Delimitation of maritime boundaries: Some pertinent issues for Bangladesh. In M. G. Kabir & H. Shaukat (Eds.), Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (pp. 114–116). Dhaka: Bangladesh Society for International Studies. Ranjan, B. (2018, 2 January). Assam’s citizenship list: A ticking ‘time bomb’ for Indo-Bangla ties. Retrieved from https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/2018/01/02/assam-citizenshiplist-ticking-time-bomb-india-bangladesh-ties/. Retrieved on January 4, 2018. Sikri, R. (2009). Challenge and strategy: Rethinking India’s foreign policy. New Delhi: Sage. Sobhan, F. (2014). Indo-Bangladesh relations: An overview and looking forward. In C. R. Abrar (Ed.), Bangladesh in international relations, 2012–2013 (p. 9). Dhaka: BILIA. Statistics Department, Bangladesh Bank. (2017). Foreign direct investment in Bangladesh. Survey Report. Retrieved from https://www.bb.org.bd/pub/halfyearly/fdisurvey/fdisurveyjanjun2017. pdf. Retrieved on January 14, 2018. Sahni, V. (2007). India’s foreign policy: Key drivers. South African Journal of International Affairs, 14, 21–35. Sahoo, P., & Abhirup, B. (2014) BCIM corridor a game changer for South Asian trade. East Asia Forum, July 18, 2014. Sikri, V. (2011, 4 September). It’s new neighborhood. Deccan Chronicle. Waltz, K. (1959). Man, the state, and war. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K. (1967). Foreign policy and democratic politics: The American and British experience. Boston: Little-Brown. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Bhutan–India Relations: The Shifting Bhutanese Perceptions and Geopolitical Gambit Dhurba Rizal

Introduction The strategic relation of states and their cross-border transactions of political, economic, sociocultural and security dimensions assumes a superseding imperative in contemporary global order. Small states are usually vulnerable to the actions, policies and strategic interests of powerful actors in international relations. “The international system leaves small state less room for choice in the decision-making process. The large states can make mistakes without it having existential consequences, whereas 1 small states cannot afford to do so”. The conventional wisdom has purported that small states cannot afford to have their leaders make mistakes or take needless risks due to smaller margin of error. Snyder claims that the external environment is more 2 constraining for small states. India and Bhutan share a relationship that is rooted in security, political, economic and sociocultural domains. There are certain strategic considerations and critical factors, which constrain and limit India’s leverage 3 on Bhutan. Bhutanese asserts their nationalism and sovereignty, and their primary concern is the preservation and fortification of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty, defying hegemony of big powers. The chapter intends to address the more inquiring minds and purports to provide a systematic and critical analysis of Bhutan–India relations, articulated by rulers, elites and vested interests. To contribute to debate on Bhutan–India relations and how Bhutanese discerns it, the first part of the chapter has delved with the changing political–economic–social structures of Bhutan and its impending influence on 1 Jervis

(1978); Also see Elman (1995). (1991), p. 98. 3 For detail on strategic and critical factors, see Rizal (2015a), Chapter 7. 2 Snyder

D. Rizal (B) Central Department of Public Administration, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_10

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India–Bhutan relations. The next section of the chapter has endeavoured to analyse succinctly the contemporary relations encapsulating political, economic, sociocultural and security dimensions, highlighting, shifting perceptions and the complexities between two countries and how Bhutanese insinuates it. The penultimate section of the chapter has made an attempt to crystallize the content as a conclusion.

Discourses on the Political, Economic and Social Structures of Bhutan Bhutan is small “India-locked and landlocked” country. In foreign narratives, Bhutan represents the country of a fairy tale—“Shangri-la and the land of Gross National Happiness” (GNH). Lately, this has made Bhutan a subject of interest to journalists, politicians, diplomats, academicians and the common man alike. They have looked at Bhutan as a combination of Buddhist spirituality and barefoot economics, which have been moulded into a model of GNH and ruled by the benign King, but the reality is very different than one fathoms.4 Bhutan is in geopolitical gambit and is trying to preserve a precarious independence while resisting hegemonic relations. The recent conflict between India and China on Doklam5 is the case in point about the importance of geostrategic location of Bhutan. The Bhutanese society has transformed since the 1960s. Karma asserts that “the entire Bhutanese worldview, with its value systems, ideas, behaviours and sociocultural life conditions, is in a drastic transition”.6 This has resulted with the reconstitution of the social, economic and political structures in a pyramidal form.7 At the top rested the rulers, dashos and upper bourgeoisie favoured by the political regime, high-level technocrats and bureaucrats in the public sector and the senior executives and business owners in urban centres. Beneath this, there lie middle echelon bureaucrats, technocrats, managers, small bourgeoisie and white-collar workers. And forming the huge base of this pyramidal structure are the farmers, the underemployed and the jobless in rural Bhutan and few thousand Bhutanese working in India and other countries. The new economic–social–political actors, which emerged out of the transformation process, are the educated middle stratum. One could discern some changes in social structure. Before the 1980s, almost 80% were farmers and remaining 20% King and royal family members, elites, dashos, upper bourgeoisie, professionals, middle class and students, but after the 1980s, their ratio is almost seventy to thirty. The prince’s purse and the principality’s purse are one in the same thing. Thus, the government relationship with its constituents in a “rentier state” is one of a 4 For

details on Gross National Happiness (GNH), refer Rizal (2015b), Introduction Chapter.

5 Dokalam, approximately 20-mile-wide corridor at its narrowest part, is located in territory disputed

by Bhutan and China to the north of the Siliguri. The Chinese control of the chicken’s neck corridor would isolate almost 45 million Indians of its seven north-eastern. 6 Phuntsho (2017). 7 For details, refer Rizal (2015b), Chapter 1.

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“public benefactor” of all nitty-gritty of day-to-day life. In Bhutan, we see the “familial model”—“King as father knows best, the leader must be obeyed and the individual sacrifices for the collective good” in the political life strongly articulated through “Tsa-wa-sum” (King, Country and People). This transformation has created a Bhutanese paradox of “economic prosperity, but sociopolitical suffocation”. Today, hardly anything socially consequential was left untouched by the regulatory actions of the state, and no groups or organizations or individuals in society existed without state influence and regulations. In contrast to black-box conceptualization of the state, I concur with Moravscik that the state is an expressive and associative institution persistently exposed to capture and recapture, creating and recreating by diverse societal groups. The government cannot lean on universal or dispassionate political representation; every government connotes some individuals and groups more fully than others.8 Internally, the country has moved away from absolute monarchy to a semi-democratic system of governance. It is still too early to verbalize how Bhutan’s political transformation will evolve and which ethnic groups will be the main political actors besides the King. The emerging semi-authoritarianism royal democracy has royalist political parties, dominated by royalist sympathizers with absolutely no opposition. In fact, the King and the royalist political parties are two sides of the same coin or old wine in new bottle. This process of change may create a “Triangular Politics”9 more complex having an all-inclusive impact on its ties with India. The India’s Bhutan policy has not always been the outcome of rational choices. Given the geographical imperatives of Bhutan; India is likely to remain the most important partner in its foreign policy calculus in the coming years. The political, economic, sociocultural and security perceptions of Bhutanese and its geostrategic undercurrents and their finger pointing towards India are delved into at length in the next section.

The Bhutanese Perceptions of India–Bhutan Relations Perceptions arise from the interactions and involve interpretations, which is expressively embedded in what and how of the behaviours of another party in international relations. It is subjected to circumstances, the extent of time and historical experience. The vital part of perception is coalescing and coordinating the discrete events into a whole so that a meaningful picture can emerge.10 Perceptions and self-perceptions, self-image and self-awareness of smallness, helplessness and dependence were ingeniously combined with an unshaken belief in the justice of the Bhutan’s national cause. The voluminous literature reveals how small states or states in general subordinate themselves to dominant states. For small states that find themselves located 8 See

Moravscik (1997). politics in Bhutan is a “Triangular Politics” between three major ethnic groups: Sharchop–Lhotsam–Ngalung. 10 Jervis (1976), p. 35. 9 The

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between insistent great powers reminiscent of India and China, neutrality may be the only reasonable course of action for “buffer states” resembling Nepal and Bhutan. However, being a buffer state is not easy, and they are at perennial risk of conquest by the surrounding great powers.11 Bhutan has not escaped “domination-subordination syndrome” in both their dealings with the outside world as well as their interactions with India, which has played a patronizing and paternalistic role of a “big brother” for decades. It has influenced the content, context and pattern of the foreign policies, including the security architecture of the Bhutan. The hegemonic strategy pursued by India towards Bhutan is not new to bilateral relations; the USA has been doing it for decades with Mexico.12 The dependency–dominance relation between Mexico and the USA is the testimony to such coloured official behaviour of the two governments.13 In such a relationship, the importance of both nations is not equal due to which their response to each other’s policy varies significantly.14 This proposition helps us to understand the consistency of relations between India and Bhutan. The “dependency–dominance” approach and way of thinking stem from vital variables between two nations. One is Bhutan’s location between India and China, which has military-strategic connotations and signifies an obvious limitation for the small nation. Second is the power asymmetry, which denotes that Bhutan is weaker partner in the relationship. The third variable is the historical dependence of Bhutan in India in terms of trade and commerce and dominance of Delhi in these strategic areas. Such a vicious cycle of dependence on the one side and dominance on the other generates polar opposite perceptions, which ultimately affects the pattern of relations on various issues between two nations. The contesting perceptions between two neighbours are manoeuvered mainly in the diverse areas. Weintraub asserts that “On a larger canvas, the dependency-dominance outcome of the two countries have shaped the attitudes and behavior of not only of governments, but also of the populations of each country towards each other” .15 Bhutan’s perception of India, and consequently its approach concerning India, has varied over time and under different governments; sometimes professed sanguinely, it has, at other times, been viewed as a key source of a threat. The royal governments have viewed India positively and pursued an affirmative foreign policy approach, while the times the conservative, royalist and ultra nationalist invariably perceived in varying degrees, the primarily as a source of insecurity. Variations in perception have produced changing patterns of Bhutan–India relations in the past decades. The relations are subtle, unseen, but ongoing and deeply felt collision, which has constantly created convoluted history. Surreptitious tensions between the two countries have come to influence everything from their military and security decision-making to their political, economic and diplomatic manoeuvering. This in a sense also explicates the behaviour of a Bhutanese towards the India as suspicious and cynical. The 11 Fazal

(2004). Dominguez and De Castro (2001), p. 17. 13 Weintraub (2010), p. ix. 14 Ibid, pp. 1–5. 15 Ibid, p. 1. 12 See

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conundrum is that instead of acknowledging that there is a knowledge gap between the two nations, leaders on both sides had tried to expand and foster bilateral ties on the rhetoric of “mythical commonality”. Except a few short-lived chapters of “hostility”, the two countries have been able to overcome the pitfalls of the “familiarity breeds contempt” dictum. At the same time, an objective and critical glimpses substantiate that the potential of this “unique” bilateral equation is hyped, not adequately explored and barely achieved. Public statements by both are suffused with the rhetoric of friendship, neighbourliness and mutuality. Muni argues that undue insistence on or even encouragement of bilateralism evokes avoidable fears and suspicions of Indian dominance and allows anti-Indian forces to exploit the situation to their advantage.16 This is precisely what is professed in Bhutan today. Like unique amity, a relationship between two countries is also rooted in either positive or negative perceptions, perspectives or memories. The fine points of Bhutan policy towards India are not available in the form of a hand or guidebook. The memories, effects, reflections and facts on the ground are what the author has. The consequences on the ground are the translations of such Bhutanese perceptions and policy. To provide the necessary niceties and avoid sweeping generalizations, the section focuses on the perceptions of Bhutanese on India–Bhutan relations. If one was to gauge and trace the evolution and pattern of bilateral relations, a four-tiered analysis of essentials’ edifice—polity, economy, sociocultural and security—becomes indispensable. While there has been more continuity than change in each of these pillars, there are certain emerging and shifting patterns, which need to be taken care of to decipher the perceptions of Bhutanese. The multi-layers perceptions and perspectives are delineated below.

Political Perception The coherent section of the population conscious of the history knows that the India’s operating paradigm towards Bhutan has always represented an imposing mindset and value. While a formal statement identifying India as an adversary has never been issued by Bhutan, its policy in the past has projected a shift in the position. Bhutan has always implemented pragmatic policies in the international arena, thereby sometimes clashing against India’s expectations. The gap between what Bhutan was supposed to do from India’s perspective and what it actually does between the expectation and the reality disillusioned India many times. The King and ruling elite’s views were foremost positioned in the geopolitical and strategic situation of Bhutan. Under pressing conditions, surviving in a hostile environment and widening Bhutan’s economic and political space became the essential theme of the Bhutan government and its people. This compels Bhutan to make as many friends as it can and at the same time maintain an independent course. For instance, it has expanded its diplomatic relations 16 See

Muni (2003).

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from mere 21–53 within a short span of time. Throughout that process, Bhutan and India have empathized friendship differently. India dotingly imagined an unquestionable Bhutan–India friendship. However, Kings always examined Bhutan’s alliances through the lens of Bhutan’s interests. India’s revulsion to Bhutan making direct contact with other countries, abhorrence that was especially manifest in the bilateral relationship taking shape in a changed geopolitical context, eventually created a negative reading about India in Bhutan. This mindset lingers till today. Anti-Indianism in Bhutan is either not written about prodigiously, or not written about at all. Yet, Bhutanese has been reflexively suspicious of Indian, a suspicion born of fretfulness about India irredentism and observations of how Sikkim has been annexed by India in 1975 and freshly how the 240-year-old institution of monarchy in Nepal has been consigned into the dustbin of history in 2008. Wangcha, a blogger from Bhutan, succinctly wrote: “National interests of Bhutan have to rise over and above the politics of always playing the Indian tune. Therefore Bhutan’s paramount national interests and affairs just cannot be only pleasing India”.17 This statement robustly exhibits how the conservative elites and royalist assimilates India and Bhutan relations. It was a long-standing perspicacity of Bhutanese ruler that domestic upheaval will commence in the south and with Indian support. The insight springs from the role India played during Sikkimese crisis and Sri Lanka and more recently in Nepal’s Madesh. The Bhutanese has always feared the threat of the “Macedonian syndrome”, of externally instigated domestic ethnic upheavals like one in the case of Nepal and Sri Lanka to mollify the monarchy and bring Bhutan to India’s fold, if it drifts from security umbrella or act inimical to Indian interests. The ruling elites and royalists have deep-seated reflection and fear that India sooner or later exploits the pro-democracy constituents in exile in its pursuit of geostrategic ends in the eastern Himalayas, the day Bhutan resolves to leave the Indian security umbrella. Many Bhutanese think that it is a “marriage of convenience”, which has brought Bhutan much closer to India. It is a relation, which embodies “give and take”. For instance, in the initial days of pro-democracy movement in the 1990s, the King and the ruling elite identified that it was inspired and misguided by Indians from across the borders. The ruling elites point that the Indian government had created a “Sikkim fear” among Bhutanese rulers, against its Lhotsampa population, and apparently instigated the leaders of southern Bhutan to rise against their rulers. It has led to an eviction of one-sixth of the total population of Bhutan. India acted as a valve. It used its paramilitary force to ferry the people from Bhutan borders to Nepal and prevent their return to Bhutan. When the refugees were in Nepal, the Bhutanese realizes that India used them against Bhutan as a bait of bargain for water resources and to flush out the Indian rebels hiding in Bhutan, among others. Most of the Bhutanese refugees are resettled in the third countries. With the small segment of the remaining refugees in Nepal, India feels its anchor has been watered down. The unenthusiastic and lingering perspectives among Lhotsampas and Sharchops is that India turned a Nelson’s eye, when the Bhutanese government launched crimes against humanity leading to the 17 Refer

Wangcha (2013).

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expulsion of the Lhotsampas and onslaught on Sharchops and suppression of the democratic movement in the 1990s. The little-known friction points and differing perceptions with Bhutan have arisen in the past also. The Bhutanese feels that they had surrendered to Indian leads in many peripheral fields and on core national sovereign affairs. The older Bhutanese reckons that India had accommodated Bhutan into a friendship in 1958 and then thereafter had forced her into various submissions. To counter such moves, the Kings of Bhutan slowly steered away from the Indian silhouette. For example, the UN membership, recognition of Bangladesh, the Mutual Treaty with China, the expulsion of Indian militant groups from Bhutan, premature death of BBIN Agreement and rather muted position on Doklam are the manifestations of such moves. India’s engagement in the micro management of Bhutan’s internal affairs has generated negativity towards Indian authorities. More ominously, Bhutanese feels that India flagrantly interfered in Bhutan’s elections and political processes since 2013. Many analysts contemplate that India played a crucial role in the 2013 elections, using its economic clout to sway election results and change people’s view of the ruling party. The general perception is that many of the Indian moves are not to Bhutan’s national interest, but initiated with a concealed agenda. Many Bhutanese have felt scores of times that various past and recent understandings, treaties and agreements done with India are not in the Bhutanese interest and serve the India interest. “The Bhutanese believes that they were chastised because the former Prime Minister, Thinley, was suspected of playing footsy with China. India strongly objected to former Prime Minister forging extensive new diplomatic ties and carving out an independent foreign policy without informing India. The Bhutanese view that such a move would enhance its sovereignty. However, the reality is that as long as Delhi has a clutch on Bhutan’s economy and security, the path to absolute independence is canary cry”.18 The rise in fuel prices was coupled with a credit crunch and import restrictions after the Indian rupee reserves dwindled. The contemptuous manoeuver worked, and a new government far more compliant and subservient to India’s will and interests was elected. This high-handedness of Indian authorities in micromanagement of Bhutan’s affairs via political parties, their leaders and Bhutanese bureaucracy has perturbed the Bhutanese and not taken as an acceptable behaviour by the Bhutanese. In fact, the history of Indo-Bhutan relations is riddled with such circumstances. This has generated disparagement towards Indian authorities. A 1949 treaty required Thimphu to be guided by the advice of New Delhi in regard to its external relations; the clause was removed in a 2007 only on paper. The Bhutanese has directed their criticism of the treaty around the politico-strategic aspects. The Bhutanese alleged that India has been more focused on the strategic and security interests in the Himalayas and has disregarded Bhutan’s sovereignty. The recent paradigm to counter this by Bhutan is its aggressive role in international relations apparently to assert its sovereignty. For example, Thimphu’s unsuccessful bid for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council and Bhutan’s success in convincing the UN General Assembly to unanimously adopt a resolution to put 18 See

Global Times (2017).

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“happiness” on the global agenda and empowering Bhutan to convene a high-level meeting on happiness as part of the 66th session of the Assembly in New York robustly corroborates such measures. This perhaps furthers reassured Bhutan that it deserves to be independent of Indian influence. The elite ideas, identities and preferences over social orders play a greater role in amplifying the foreign policy behaviour of small states like Bhutan. It is the common axiom that, when high politics are at stake and when power is highly asymmetric, the elite ideas are a questionably less important making the case of Bhutan even more puzzling from the point of view of structural pragmatism. During the last 60 years, powerful conservative and royalist vested interests have injected an anti-India ethos into Bhutanese nationalism to serve their narrow political and economic interests. In transitional states like Bhutan, political elites are instrumental in defining foreign policy goals and priorities than the general public. The public opinions only set the bounds of what is deemed acceptable in Bhutan. Even the kingdom’s ethnic divide between the Lhotsampa, Sharchop and the Ngalung have been linked to anti-India feelings. Such anti-India sentiments were broadened and stealthily strengthened by the various actors in the system, the outbursts of which have created a paroxysm of anti-India wave in Bhutan at different time periods to reduce its dependence on India. The trust deficit towards India is fomented by a group of the Bhutanese elites, who believe their political and economic fortunes are tied to defining their nationhood and interests in opposition to India. Clandestinely, the group in the royal family and the royalist parties tended to identify India as their strategic antagonist. Consistent ideological nourishing against India among the youths has been taking place for many years. Surreptitiously and explicitly, it was started since the late 1980s, while the successive ideology cemented further. Bhutan’s inner politics has been clouded by anti-Indian sentiments. Naturally, those conservative elites, who are sidelined or marginalized by transformation process, fuel anti-Indian sentiments. This meshes with traditional Bhutanese doubts about Indian motives vis-à-vis their country. The truth is that the Indian policy towards Bhutan follows the same recurring script, where every Indian government in the past tried highly coercive method to achieve its goals. The Bhutanese people believe that Bhutan–India relation over the decades matured to sweet at the face and sour at the back. The inner displeasure against India among Bhutanese rulers continues still today. Despite Bhutan’s dependence on India, the policymakers in Bhutan have three negative perceptions about India: a weak Bhutan is in India’s interest; India always tries to extract maximum concessions from a King and ends, supporting the royalist political parties of its choice; and it extends hospitality to political personalities or organizations to use them as leverage with the Bhutanese regime of the day. The Indian strategy to identify such groups that are willing to put pressure on regime that are germane to Indian interests is emphatically reviled by Bhutanese. This is rooted in the fact that from the late 1950s, various powerful dissident leaders are sheltered in India to bring into play against Bhutan. The late ninth Zhabdrung Rinpoche is a case in point. The Bhutanese ruler and elites take in pessimistically about India on their role to host late Rongthong Kuenley Dorji. Since the establishment of hereditary monarchy in Bhutan, India has hosted dissident leaders as well as dealt with the Bhutan government, which

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Bhutanese loathed. These perceptions are rooted in reality as well as influenced by Bhutan’s “small nation syndrome”, which tends to exaggerate India’s perceived “big brother” attitude. The Bhutan is transiting from a monarchical system to the semi-authoritarian democracy. In this context, India has to take into stride the growing presence of China in Bhutan. Moreover, the political tone of the emerging royalist parties is changing with the rise of a pro-China and anti-India lobby in Bhutan. In such a situation, India should be heedful of the changing political discourse in Bhutan.

Economic Perception Some scholars focus on “Soft colonialism”19 and “economic dependence” in trying to understand the foreign policy behaviour of the state. When economic dependence on the hegemon is high, balancing becomes both difficult and costly.20 The argument that the economic dependence affects the foreign policy preferences of states has clear domestic implications—political and economic—and this is particularly the case of Bhutan. The history is replete with evidences and research that when economically dependent small states like Bhutan made attempt to pursue foreign policies that contradict the preferences of big neighbours like India, the outcome is economic decay, ultimately pivoting on the survival of the ruling political elites. In the extreme cases, a politically induced economic crisis could cause a coup or regime change.21 This is unerringly the situation in Bhutan in the 2013 elections. Economic dependency on India combined with their geopolitical location has exposed Bhutan to extreme susceptibility to the actions of the big neighbours. India’s trade and development relationship with Bhutan continues to grow. India currently accounts for nearly almost 98% of Bhutan’s exports and 90% of its imports. India has been Bhutan’s sugar daddy since the start of the first five-year plans in the 1960s in financing the development plans. Delhi has used its economic power and monopoly on Bhutanese trade to maintain security relations. Delhi’s economic pressure enforced its rigid stance that with the “distinctive economic relationship furl the unique security relationship”. The perspective hints at certain non-comforting issues in India–Bhutan relations. One major reservation that Bhutanese people have about the India–Bhutan economic partnership regards to the “monopoly clause” that India gets with business deals.22 Discontentment among Bhutanese, particularly among business community, is slowly emerging on the surface, these days due to excessive dependence on India, a study gauge that section of Bhutanese society will lean towards China. The Bhutanese are not happy with the present policy in the hydropower sector. Lamsang states that “the hydroelectricity projects that India 19 See

Hamamoto (2006). (1997). 21 See, David (1991). 22 Refer Bisht (2012a). 20 Papayoanou

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finances have also suffered setbacks since Manmohan Singh’s time, and this also takes toll of India–Bhutan relations”.23 The previous government sets the ambitious target of “10,000 MW by 2020” as the defining guideline of Indian cooperation in hydropower to boost hugely both Bhutan’s GDP and its government revenues. The projects were to be undertaken with financing by India as a 60% grant, 40% loan on easy terms. The present government has changed the financing pattern to 30% grant and 70% loans with higher interest rates on loans. The government is insisting that some of the projects ought to be in joint ventures with Indian companies holding at least a 51% stake in them. The joint ventures are stuck because the Indian companies insist on having “more managerial control” and have “refused to come up with agreed financing”.24 The others projects Sunkosh and Kuri Gongri are stuck in the doldrums because terms are not agreed. India presently imports 1.5 GW of hydropower from Bhutan, and it is estimated that by 2022, it would be importing 8 GW of energy. Bhutanese feels that India gets the power generated by Bhutan at the “cheapest tariff ”, when the going rate within India is higher. Bhutanese negative discernments and concerns are that India takes more than what it gives. Bhutanese asserts that India should allow Bhutan to trade its electricity at free market rates based on the principle of supply and demand mechanism and not to restrict free market access to India and third country trade. Of late, Bhutan has become a hotbed of conspiracy theories. The Bhutanese has raised a serious concern alleging that virtually all India’s development assistance to Bhutan’s five-year plans is swallowed by Bhutan’s huge trade deficits with India. So, Bhutanese question: “is this Hydropower Cooperation or Colonization?” Indian financing, which has changed grant and loan composition at higher interest rates, is also the direct cause of Bhutan’s escalating debt. Moreover, the Bhutanese directs the criticism that these projects do not create employment for the Bhutanese. Another bone of contention stems from the fact that hydropower generation capacity is seasonal, which means that Bhutan has to import power from India during the winter months to meet its domestic demand at higher prices. It has been argued that this would put excessive financial pressure on Bhutan. Some people with vested interests have even tried to project through the media, a negative bias among the people that Bhutan is selling its water and power to India and then “begging” for the same from it. Bhutan single-year trade deficit amounts to more than Rs. 3,200 cores, 90% of which is with India. The Bhutan’s solvency is threatened because Bhutan’s government debt, owed mostly to India, has already nearly touched more than 120% of GDP. The IMF states that Bhutan’s government debt now stands at a whopping 118% of GDP, with India being the largest creditor, accounting for 64% of Bhutan’s total debt.25 A report on global debt lists Bhutan as one “among 14 other countries that are fast heading towards a debt crisis”. The report details hydropower’s rapid loss of economic viability and concludes: “Should the hydropower sector’s financial performance continue

23 Lamsang

(2017a). (2017b). 25 Refer Cashin et al. (2016). 24 Lamsang

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to deteriorate; Bhutan’s solvency could be threatened”.26 Bhutanese reacts that it is time to question how benign India’s intentions are in Bhutan—“cooperation” or “exploitation” or “domination”, leading mounting control and interference on one side and growing dependence and erosion of sovereignty on the other. As has been witnessed in the past few years, Bhutan has been highly vulnerable to economic developments in India. Interest rates and prices in Bhutan, for instance, are influenced greatly by commodity prices in India. This has had extensive implications for domestic prices in Bhutan because most of the country’s imports are from India. A manifestation of this was the uncertain inflationary trend in Bhutan since 2011. These price pressures, it is argued, threaten to erode the growth made in Bhutan. Most of the elites and youth groups in Bhutan blame India for not having mutual benefits on the trade treaty and agreements. Lately, the General Sales Taxes (GSTs) and demonetizations in India is becoming a nuisance for the Bhutanese. The demonetization has badly affected the Bhutanese as their economy is dependent upon India and currency is pegged with Indian currency at par. Bhutan’s trade deficit is set to worsen as the GST makes exports to Bhutan cheaper and imports from Bhutan more expensive, putting at jeopardy Bhutan’s industrial sector. Bhutan’s business community in particular argue that the main reason for the rupee crunch is the nature of India’s economic intervention, which is having the effect of making Bhutan’ excessively dependent on “auxiliary economy”.27 Bhutan has reservations on the revised treaty of 2007 and resorted to political posturing. Bhutan is apprehensive about the inflow of Indians in its territory in accordance with the Treaty provisions, but is taciturn on the outflow of its citizens to India. The government has raised the issue of an open border with India and wants the border to be regulated. Many Bhutanese condemns about the influx of Indian labourers into Bhutan. The proclivity of Indian construction companies for hiring Indian workers for the construction activities at hydroelectric project sites has led to dissatisfaction among the Bhutanese people. The great inflow of foreigners has put a lot of pressure on the limited natural resources, resulting in competition with the local communities settled near the project sites. The government has affirmed that it is difficult for Bhutan with a population of less than a million to accord national treatment to the Indians, which is more than 1 billion in population. Bhutan has taken measures to neutralize India’s overbearing influence on many occasions. One of the iconic actions is the introduction of the work permit system for the Indian workers in 1988 and many discriminatory moves vis-à-vis the Indians in violation of the spirit of the treaty. For this part, India has tried to ensure Bhutanese compliance in various ways, which have been termed by the Bhutanese as coercive and high-handed. For instance, the Ministry of Labour and Human Resources has directed people of Indian origin living and working for more than 40 years in the country to leave by Tuesday, 29 November 2011 in contravention to the India–Bhutan friendship treaty clause 5, which envisages a closer relation between the people of the two nations. However, 26 Refer World Debt Clock, “National Debt Clocks From Around The World”, Retrieved from http://

www.nationaldebtclocks.org/. Retrieved 28 September 2017. (2012b).

27 Bisht

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no Bhutanese media from inside have reported the ministry’s order, and the actual reason behind this affair has remained yet unclear.28 Bhutan’s dependency over India is certainly greater compared to China. Malone states that “Bhutan’s geographic location has helped foster its dependency on India, aside from economic asymmetry. Bhutan has been deferential to India on foreign and defence policy relative to China”. 29 A claustrophobic sense of being India-locked prevails in Bhutan. Despite the efforts at diversification of the trade and business, the transactions with India are always significantly higher. So, refusing to grant transit to the Bhutan means unparalleled economic dependency on India as a monopolist nation for Bhutan’s international trade. For instance, the interruption of energy supplies just before elections in 2013 is mull over as an economic blockade by many Bhutanese and taken as a reprimand for showing proximity to China by Thinley’s Government. Despite India’s long-standing involvement in Bhutan’s developmental efforts, there is widespread suspicion regarding India’s intentions in Bhutan, fuelled by the deep negative assessments attached to India’s role. Notwithstanding India’s stated position, many Bhutanese views India’s help as a tool for interference in the country’s internal politics and foreign policy formulations.

Security Perception India’s “Indira doctrine”, modelled on the American Monroe Doctrine, seeks to castigate countries that step out of its sphere of influence. Young Bhutanese does not understand the historical contours of India’s security relationship with Bhutan. Bhutan had sided with India and put “all its eggs in one basket” as early as 1958. Several spoken and covert agreements are in place, especially the King’s commitment to becoming a part of India’s security architecture. The defence of Bhutan is a key component of the unwritten portion of the 1949 treaty, revised in 2007 and agreement between the third King and Nehru signed in 1958. With it, Bhutan agreed to be a “part of India’s security structure with no strings, no questions and no quibbles”. The generations coming of age in Bhutan were questioning India whether it might be “pressing its security leverages too hard”. The fact, India has maintained a strong military presence throughout Bhutan for more than half a century, exercising its power and influence in every corner of Bhutanese life. The 1,000-member, strong Indian Military Training and Assistance Team (IMTRAT) was deployed in Bhutan in 1962 and has detachments in Haa, Thimphu and in the east for training of the Bhutanese military. The Hindu article states, “India’s Eastern Army Command and the Eastern Air Command both have integrated the protection of Bhutan into their role, and the Indian Military Training Team plays a critical role in training Bhutanese secu28 Bhutan news services, Editor News (29 November 2011) Bhutan asks 3,000 Indians to quit the country by today 29, Retrieved from http://www.bhutannewsservice.org/2011/11/. Retrieved 5 October 2017. 29 Malone (2011), p. 113.

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rity personnel”.30 Even in the remote and strategic areas of northern Bhutan, Indian soldiers exercise their authority and control over the Bhutanese. Convoys of Indian military trucks travel freely across Bhutan and cannot be checked for contents by the Bhutanese authorities. The IMTRAT has occupied the Haa Dzong31 for more than six decades and has given no allusion of handing it back to the Bhutanese. The major Dzongs in the district in Bhutan serve as administrative headquarter and house the monastic body. Lately, there is growing public sentiments in north-west Bhutan, particularly the discontent among some National Assembly representatives regarding the location of IMTRAT headquarters in Haa district. This issue has bred some discontent among the local people, who have been unhappy that the symbolic structure is being used by IMTRAT. Notwithstanding the extensive official ties, there continues to be deep strategic and psychological mistrust of Indian among the Bhutanese elites and the people. Such spin is not surprising and they allege that the IMTRAT General and Indian Ambassador are said to be the most powerful men in the country, even determining what does and does not get published in the national media. They claim that this Indian interference and infringement on Bhutanese sovereignty extends far beyond the military-strategic sphere into every aspect of Bhutan’s political and economic life. Project Dantak of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has done sterling work in connecting Bhutan with roads and bridges that others would shy away from constructing in difficult and complex terrain. The younger Bhutanese people perceive this presence as unwanted interferences even though they have been done commendable work. The Bhutanese also have grievances that India vetoed Bhutan for security reason, when it has acquired funding from Asian Development Bank for a strategic highway linking its east and west, to avoid the necessity of Bhutanese travel through strike-prone Assam and West Bengal. When the Delhi was expecting more “conformity” on security concerns, Bhutan had shifted its policy towards China by the early 1980s, hinting that traditional scepticism towards Beijing was replaced by pragmatism. An Indian wariness against China has resulted in a despicable simmering ruckus with Bhutan, which bursts open in 2017 over Doklam. The Bhutanese believes that the blemish lies in the historical understanding that treats Bhutan more as “buffer state” to protect Indian security concern in the Himalayan region. In fact, Bhutanese contemplates that overt security concern is one of the reasons that India can use to explain away any interference in the domestic affairs of Bhutan. The nationalist, royalist and conservative Bhutanese envisages that the IMTRAT and DANTAK itself will prove an eventual security threat and catastrophe to Bhutan’s sovereignty, if she is to establish diplomatic and bilateral trade relations with China at the cost of Indian sensitivity. India will never consent being circumvented on any matters concerning its security vis-à-vis China. 30 See Why Bhutan is special to India, The Hindu 01 July 2017, Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.

com/news/national/why-bhutan-is-special-to-india/article19195034.ece. Retrieved 16 September 2017. 31 The Dzong has since the time of Zhabdrung, the founder of Bhutan, been a seat of power and a symbol of governance.

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Under the 1949 Treaty of Friendship32 , Bhutan’s King pledged “to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations”. The treaty33 was revised in 200734 to commit both governments to “cooperate closely with each other on the issues relating to their national interests”. The recent incidents robustly reveal that beneath the diplomatic language, the intent and content of the treaty remained the same. As the patron and de facto security guarantor of Bhutan, New Delhi has obligation to defend Bhutan’s territorial claims. If for India a secure northern border is essential for its security, for Bhutan, it is sovereignty and independence. Though, many a times, regime security was equated with state security. In Bhutan–India relations, their own set of priorities and interests come in the way of mutual understanding of security interests. For instance, in the late 90s and the early 2000s, Bhutan was caught in a vicious circle regarding formation of a Joint IndoBhutan Army for purging militants hiding in Bhutanese territory. Bhutan has helped India by flushing out the militants from India’s northeast. In return, India agreed to keep muted over the eviction of over 100,000 Lhotsampa Bhutanese citizens, their rights violations and suppression of democratic movement. The analysis of India’s security arrangements with Bhutan discloses a harmony with the “Dominant-Weak” pattern of security relationship. Bhutan apprehended India’s dominance in its relationship and tried to assert its independence and an independent identity. The reaction of Bhutan is not surprising as the small state’s dependence on the dominant power for military or non-military assistance develops a psychological dependency on the latter and it attempts to assert a distinct identity of its own. In line with its typically security-oriented policy, Delhi has consistently chosen to support political and other actors, which it calculated likely to have a stabilizing effect within Bhutan, be cooperative with Indian strategic interests and minimize external involvement. The widespread use of social media and the constant flow of online information have amplified the voice of the Bhutanese people, giving them the ability to reshape the course and outcomes. The majority voice aspires to maintain the special relationship with India, yet there are calls within Bhutan for a more independent foreign policy, and a greater say regarding its border dispute with China. In the light of this legacy, the Wen Jiabao–Thinley meet in 2012 seems to be an opening political and security gambit by both sides to test the waters on how far they can push the envelope without India blocking the package deal altogether. During the stand-off at Doklam in 2017, a number of Bhutanese commentators have gone public regarding their acuity and frustrations over what they regard as India’s hegemonic attempts to block an improvement in relations between China and Bhutan. Stobdan argued that “the prevailing sentiment in Bhutan is in favour of resolving the issue with China amicably without further delay”35 Wangcha noted that “India has been controlling the SinoBhutan international boundary talks through its iron grip on Bhutan’s economic and 32 http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4d620.html 33 Blank

(2017).

34 https://mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf 35 Stobdan

(2017a).

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communication dependence on India. The Indian goal was to stall the normalisation of Bhutan’s ties with China”.36 Small states like Bhutan appear to be vulnerable entities, which can be swept from the map at any time, should a larger power choose to do so.37 The Sikkim and Tibet are living examples. While the prejudice is concentrated largely in nationalist, royalist and older populations and probably not as pronounced in daily life as other groups would like, it is clear that “China enjoys popular support among the Bhutanese people” does not hold worthy today. Though few in numbers, the vocal Bhutanese voice is growing. Emerging pressure from its own population and China could see Bhutan move gradually towards establishing formal economic and diplomatic relations with Beijing. Stobdan has succinctly noted that “Bhutanese position has been changing in a subtle way, especially the manner in which their boundary negotiation with China was proceeding without the knowledge of India”.38 Bhutanese attitudes are getting visibly louder on social media, and the growing aspirations of the people suggest that Bhutan’s ability to withstand pressures from both China and India has become overriding. Should this process stir unease in India, Delhi can be expected to force Bhutan to pull back by using any options available including, espousing exiled Bhutanese group.

Sociocultural Perception India is the holy land for both Hindu and Buddhist Bhutanese. India is adored as the land of the “Chardam and the eight Pithas” for religious and spiritual itineraries of common Bhutanese as well as the origin of Hindus and Buddhist knowledge and literature. Indo-centric Buddhist practices including Hindu tantrism continue in Bhutan, while they have become relatively eclipsed in India. The geographical reorientation of a Buddhist towards India was more reinforced by the country’s lost connections with the Tibet as the link between two has been disoriented since the 1950s. Some of the Tibetan Diaspora found homes in Bhutan, but the majority went to India. In India, the Tibetans initiated Buddhist colleges in Dehradun, Bihir, Gangtok and Byllakuppe. This vigorously renewed the status of India as the land of Buddhist learning in Tibetan languages. Many Bhutanese monks study in these monastic colleges. The Varanasi is the learning centre for Bhutanese Hindu priests and pundits. However, today both Hindu and Buddhist Bhutanese infer and underline that over the years, India’s traditional “sacred sociocultural bond” with Bhutan has been disastrously permitted to erode and the Bhutan merely remained as an object of strategic play against China, where cutting deals by using the carrot-and-stick approach became the rule of the business. 36 Refer

Kuensel, “Would India Disrupt Bhutan China Border Negotiations?” http://www. kuenselonline.com/forums/topic/would-india-disrupt-bhutan-china-border-negotiations/. 37 Clarke and Payne (1987), pp. ix–x. 38 Stobdan (2017b).

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India’s cultural connection with Bhutan germinated with the settlement of Hindu Nepalese in the south. Besides Zhabdrung, the British encouraged Nepali speakers to migrate to eastern Himalayas including Bhutan for settlement. The Nepalese, who largely followed Hinduism, formed the cultural bridge between Hindu India and Buddhist Bhutan. Today, India has lost and battered this cultural space significantly as the Bhutan government pursued an ethnic cleansing of almost 20% of the total population of Bhutan, mostly Hindus. Also with the death of 9th Zhabdrung in 2003 and untimely demise of dissident leaders Rongthng Kinley Dorji from the east and R. B. Basnet from the South, India lost a significant support and bridge between Sharchop and Lhotsampa community. India aspiration to influence Bhutan through cultural ties has been snapped at the buds. Of late, a faction of Indian establishment has realized that they received a setback, when a large Hindu population of Bhutan, who in reality had brought Bhutan closer to India, was evicted out of the country. India’s continued resistance in favour of not allowing refugees back home is gradually taking its toll. Bhutan has already resettled large number of northern Bhutanese to the southern foothills vacated after eviction, creating a sharp line of division in cultural relation between the people across the border. Buddhist has cultural affinities with Tibet, as ruling elites and Naglung are of Tibetan stock, and their language, customs and religion were much like those of the Tibetans. For example, the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in the Arunachal Pradesh in April 2017 drew thousands of followers, including some 3,000 Bhutanese, who have trekked across mountains to see the Tibetan spiritual leader.39 There is a nostalgic feeling among older Bhutanese that despite the rhetoric of cultural preservation, Bhutan’s cultural landscape is changing at an unprecedented pace. Bhutan is undergoing a generational change, which will potentially bring forth new ideals and values. These may affect the political and security agenda, as well. For instance, recent studies has substantiated that the Russian–Ukrainian relations over the years have proven that ties between sovereign entities can no longer be based on the inertia of a common history and culture, as well as on the rhetoric of “brotherly and friendly ties between neighbours”. Karma laments that “One can safely claim that Bhutan has undergone much more change in the last 50 years than it had in the 500 years before that”.40 Many older generations of Bhutanese have a depressing perception towards Hindi, Hindi movies or anything Indian. For instance, Project Dantak has a big sign at Paro Airport welcoming people into the country. That created a stir on social media and issue local representatives raised in the parliament. These and other similar issues affect people’s social perceptions of India’s intentions. The sacred relationship is turning into rhetoric. The relationship has remained at the state level between Delhi and Thimphu, based on each other’s interests as exemplified by a monarch’s recent visit to Delhi in 31 October 2017. There have not been enough social and cultural exchanges targeting the base of pyramid to augment the people-to-people relations. The circumspection and fearful of the India’s intentions as well as a deep-rooted psychological fear of big neighbours generate 39 Bhutia

(2017). (2017).

40 Phuntsho

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an apathetic perspective among Bhutanese, and its sense of insecurity is ironically fuelled by the very cultural affinities, which are also touted as a great asset in the relationship.

Conclusion Notwithstanding the age-old ties of history in political, social, cultural, religious, security and economic dealings, mushrooming anti-Indian sentiments are found among generations of Bhutanese. Even with the warming in official relations, antiIndia attitudes and sentiments continue to circulate in Bhutan’s blogosphere and public discourses. Anti-India feeling is manifested either clandestinely or explicitly in articles and in the media criticizing India’s intervention in the internal affairs of Bhutan. There are several factors—political, economic, geographical, sociocultural and psychological—apart from some external factors responsible for it. India’s coercive diplomacy in Bhutan has presumably worked to stem the overtures made by the latter towards China. The latent but unprecedented anti-India sentiments inflamed and fuelled by some royalist, nationalist and conservative groups are visibly and cogently manifested in the public discourses. The geopsychology of the Bhutanese people and ruling elites is based on insights that Bhutan has not been treated fairly by India. The deep-rooted feelings and differences emanating from a way of thinking and the realities of its “hegemonistic” past play out in Bhutan. They also point the finger at India for the so-called micro management of every issue in Bhutan and the feeling of betrayal and discriminations in international treaties and agreement between the two countries. The anti-India resentments of Thimphu’s elite and China’s growing influence have the potential to neutralize some of Delhi’s natural strategic advantages in Bhutan over the longer term. In the larger official context, the relationship has so far been a rock through time. However, with aspirations come challenges and new choices. The above deliberations give an inkling of attitudinal changes in the political elites as well as in the psyche of the masses in Bhutan. As Warrington pointed out, “it has to be understood that the habits of thought and patterns of behaviour are likely to persist as long as the circumstances that give rise to them exist and Bhutan–India relation is not exotic to this axiom”.41 When it comes to the matter of a stable relationship between two countries, both need to find “commonality and convergence of interests”. This is appropriate time for both India and Bhutan to introspect and analyse its policy to articulate a correct notion, if need be, in a continuously churning national, regional and global politics. The time has come for the India to make a careful review of its policy and formulate a comprehensive long-term Bhutan policy absolutely based on pragmatism. The predicament with the current relationship is that it has been taken for granted, but had happened in a vacuum, without any public diplomacy, targeting at the base of the emerging Bhutanese pyramidal structures. It is professed that it was not enough to deal with 41 Warrington

(1997).

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a monarch and put India’s best and the sharp-witted in Bhutan desk. To get the best results, a more realistic political lens than a narrow bureaucracy and security lens could be a preferred model to understand and deal with contemporary Bhutan. Shaping of perceptions and obliterating the Bhutanese fears should be an integral part of this strategy. Indian policymakers should be conscious that Bhutan–India relations can be better in future only if democratic forces, who are concerned about Indian sensitiveness, prevail in Thimphu. It is time for India to have knowledge of new realism in Bhutan and looks beyond the King and forged a cordial relationship with the people, political parties and dissidents of Bhutan. Paralleling in the Bhutanese side dealing with India should be based on national interest and not based on partisan regime interest. Bhutan should eliminate the feelings that India browbeats her in every issue. Bhutan’s vulnerability and dependency seem to be going on in a spiralling order—more dependency leading to more vulnerability and more vulnerability leading to more dependency. When the India and China are talk about, unsurpassed Bhutanese diplomatic tenet should be “best friend with India, no enemy with China”.

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Nepal–India Relations: At a Critical Juncture Keshav Bashyal

In case of Nepal and India, there are multiple and complex relations between them. The political, economic and social landscape of Nepal’s immediate neighbour India and her role has been always contested. Some of the major issues like big brother attitude, unfair treaties and no respect of sovereignty of Nepal have been sparking anti-India sentiment in Nepal. Citizens of Nepal think that India’s behaviour of big brother attitude resembles in interfering with internal affairs of Nepal utilizing diplomatic power for its vested interests. Nepal–India Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) and letter of exchange, Koshi, Gandaki and Mahakali water treaties provoke hostile relations between them. The ambiguous character of India and the issues of deals between Koshi, Gandaki and Mahakali water treaties created negative perceptions to peoples of Nepal. Similarly, Nepali people are not happy and furious about unwarranted objection by India over its new constitution, which was endorsed by more than 90% of, elected representatives to the constituent assembly, the body assigned to draft and approve the new constitution after declaring republic and federal Nepal. Political development of Nepal always concentrate in and around of these issues and affecting political movement of Nepal and election result as well. This article deals exclusively with their bilateral issues with focus on treaties between Nepal and India and recent development of constitution of Nepal and role played by India. Since 1950, Nepal–India relations always have been inconsistent. This situation evolves when Nepal tries to keep a closer relation with other countries or do something, which is perceived as not favourable to the Indian government. India always tries to have triumphant relations with limited political leaders rather than Nepali people to fulfil their own interests. It is considered that the largest democratic countries I am thankful to Dr. Anuj Tiwari for his constructive suggestions. K. Bashyal (B) Department of International Relation, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_11

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like India only give importance to their own security interest rather than democratic norms and values. Therefore, Indian government often supports even to dictatorship or caretaker government to achieve her goal. This kind of working modality of India is clearly seen in Nepal–India relation too. The relevance of hegemonic stability theory is portrayed in Nepal–India relations, which highlights the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state to articulate the regulations of interaction among the members of the system that India believes Nepal belongs to its sphere of influence. After 1769s unification, Nepal has always adopted neutral and independent policy. Initiator of unification of Nepal, Prithvi Narayan Shah adopted this policy. Nepal’s territory was also expanded by his successors. Nepal lost some territory in the war to British India due to own internal weak strategy. Nepal never got colonized despite being involved in several wars. Nepal achieved success in the form of a non-colonial state. The proverb of Prithvi Narayan Shah “Nepal is like yam between two giant boulders”1 is always reasonable in this circumstances. Rana dynasty ruled Nepal after Prithvi Narayan Shah due to internal conflict in the palace. King was only ceremonial during Rana rule, and they ran Nepal for 104 years and that ended in 1950. Rana Prime Ministers tried to establish a smooth relation with British and follow the appeasement policy. The kind of understanding was made with the assessment of their own safety and safety for British India from the northern border. The Sugauli Treaty of Nepal and British India determined it in 1816. Sugauli Treaty had accepted the sovereignty and independence of Nepal. Those days, Nepal was not exposed to outer world except British, despite it was good relations with Tibet since long time. After Independence of India in 1947, there was agreement on Gorkha battalion; accordingly, India got 6 and British 4 out of 10 Gorkha battalions. This agreement was contrary by itself. In that context, the Gorkha battalion should have been dismissed and soldiers have to be sent to their own country, because this raised the question on Nepal’s sovereignty and security. Using other country’s citizens to fight for different country could not be fair to keep relation with other friendly countries. For instance, that kind of problem realized when the Gorkha troops were used in Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka in 1987.2 People of different nationality to work for other countries’ army can create a precarious situation anytime. This also created social and economic inequality because some are getting more money from Britain and some are less from India. To keep sovereign and independent, it requires thinking about sending Nepali national in the army of another country. Under this pretext, this article tries to explore the treaties and agreements between Nepal and India, the effectiveness of those treaties and agreements, and also attempts to capture the recent development in Nepal–India relations. Three will be mainly three sections, namely 1950 treaty and its relevance, Nepal–India water treaties or agreements and India’s blockade and new constitution of Nepal.

1 Subedi 2 Singh

(1994, 1997), p. 220. (2017).

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1950 Treaty and Its Relevance Primarily, Nepal–India relation is based on the 1950s Peace and Friendship Treaty.3 This article discusses the time and context of the treaty before entering into their provisions. At that time in Nepal, the movement against Rana oligarchy was on the pick. It was the time to declare their end. Mohan Shumsher was prime minister of Nepal and India did 1950s treaty with him. So it should not be logical to do the treaty by largest democratic country with the outgoing prime minister. India should have done with new government after Rana regime. This process created the suspect towards the treaty, and also the signatories’ person of this treaty was not equal status. Signatories’ person from Nepal was outgoing Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher and from India was Ambassador to Nepal Chandreshwor Narayan Singh. This entire phenomenon clearly shows that India always tried to influence at the time of weaker government in Nepal.4 The main focus of the 1950s treaty was for the protection and security of Indian state. This treaty deals with the various subjects such as managing the issue of both nationalities in individual level, security issues and weapons issues. On the basis of this treaty, India often says that India has so-called special relationship with Nepal. However, Nepal bounded by India in the issue of Indian security, but there is no any reference to the foreign policy of Nepal should be guided by India. When Nepal tries to initiate bilateral relationships with other countries, then India feels anxiety and starts to exert pressure by indicating Nepal–India relations as a special relationship. India always suspects that Nepal could not make decent relationship with another country without asking them first. That implies, India always tries to treat as a guardian or big brother for Nepal. In case of 1950 treaty, the same day after treaty letter of exchange also happened but it kept secret for nine long years. There is no proof of the attachment of the letter of exchange at the time of United Nations membership. Nepal got United Nations membership in 1955.5 Despite there was a feeling of uneasiness to Nepali people since a long time, the debate and discussions on the relevance of 1950s treaty started when trade and transit treaties expired in 1989. India has closed 19 bilateral trade routes out of 21 when treaty expired. According to the 1978 treaty, 13 trade routes were functioning for an international trade out of 15. After the shutdown of trade route, Nepalese economy impacted harshly. India refused to renew the same trade and transit treaty but interested to negotiate with the new arrangement. It clearly shows that India is not maintaining stable relation with Nepal. Disputes on trade and transit issues were visible at that time but the reality was different. The incident was that Nepal bought some weapons in June 1988 from China without consulting India. Although purchased items were small, mainly anti-aircraft guns, India took the matter very seriously. The provisions in the letter of exchange 3 Text

of the 1950 treaty is in Bhasin (1970), no. 5, p. 32; for letters exchanged with the treaty, see Shaha, Nepali Politics, no. 3, p. 252 (hereafter Exchange of letters). 4 Subedi (1994, 1997), p. 220. 5 Ibid.

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(which is attached in 1950 treaty concerning the importing of weapons by Nepal says. Any arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal that the government of Nepal may import through the territory of India shall be so imported with the assistance and agreement of the government of India.6 Above provision clearly indicates that Nepal government should have to seek Indian’s approval to import weapons via India but New Delhi insisted that buying or import of arms from China accounted to a violation of the spirit of India’s treaties with Nepal. In this provision of treaty mentioned that Nepal have to consult with Indian government if the Indian route used but it is not stated that Nepal shouldn’t bring from other countries. This may be subjective thinking and it would be different for different individuals.7

At the same time, India created weird behavior on secret treaty of “secret arms assistance agreement” in 1965 to support its previous stand. It was the time of King Mahendra, who dismissed democratic elected government in 1960 and took a power. This agreement was done after the 1962 war between India and China. It includes “to supply arms, ammunition and equipment for the entire Nepalese army” and to replace the existing Nepalese stock by modern weapons as soon as available and also to provide the maintenance of and replacement of the equipment to be supplied by them. And also says in another article “free to import from or through the territory of India arms, ammunition or warlike materials and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal”. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two governments acting in consensus. According to Indian version, Nepal should not bring any weapons from outside India even it is not allowed from China too. The question comes, that Nepal could not bring any weapons from other than India in the name of modernization of Army? It is obviously not. This is not suggested by agreement. If Nepal uses Indian trade route, then they should consult with India; otherwise, it is not necessary. It implies that there will be the question of Nepal’s freedom and sovereignty. Here is the statement by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the time of 1989 crisis. He stated that two questions were for work permits for Indians and certain new taxes imposed on Indian goods. He claimed that these things were “totally against the spirits of India’s relations and the treaty of India had with Nepal”. Those were baseless arguments, which are not binding by any treaties of Nepal–India. Article VIII of the 1950 treaty that granting of national treatment in certain matters by one contracting party to the nationals of other does not imply national treatment in employment. Article VII states: The government of India and Nepal agree to grant on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other. The same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.8 6 Letter of Exchanged attached with 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, but it was disclosed after nine

years. Letter of Exchanged attached with 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, but it was disclosed after nine years (Pathak 2009). 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

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If the employment issue clearly was there, it would be the possibility to discuss on this subject. But granting equal employment opportunities to foreign nationals cannot be included in the term other privileges of a similar nature. Of course, a large number of Nepalis are working in India and Indians are also working in Nepal without acquiring permits and vice versa, but that does not mean that either nation is obliged to give national treatment in matters of employment opportunities to the nationals of the other. However, Indian nationals are prohibited from owning the land and property in Nepal but Nepali citizens are free to do such activities in India except for few states. But after 1990, it is almost impossible without showing Indian residence proof or Aadhaar Card.9 Another issue is very critical to discuss in this matter, whether 1950 treaty is political document or document for the common defence. Article II of the treaty does not say about the exchange of military information: “The two governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments”.10 If we take the practices or instances, Nepal never had any war or friction against any country so Nepal does not need to inform India. In this case, too, India went to war with Pakistan and China but did not feel to inform Nepal as otherwise mentioned in the conclusion of the 1950 treaty. It seems that Nepal has the only obligation but not to India. The controversial letters of exchange with the treaty have often cited the article, which shows that the treaty is also military pact. “Neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two governments shall consult with each other and device effective countermeasures”.11 However, this section reveals that the 1950 treaty seems more military pact rather than political. But it is not matched with the definition of general assembly aggression of United Nations in 1978. Aggression denotes the authoritative definition; according to this one country cannot use armed force for contravention of international law. But self-defence is not the aggressor, although the threat of force is illegal under international law.12 The 1950 treaty lacks all the essential characteristics of a treaty of contract. For instance, Nehru said in 1959 that the 1950 treaty was “not a military alliance by any means”. Almost that time in 1960, BP Koirala said that he did not envisage a joint defence between India and Nepal, as military alliances were “worse than useless” especially between Nepal and India. To inform each other or consultation is required of the two governments under the Indo-Nepal Treaty is to deal with threat but not 9 While

I talked with Nepali Migrants in India in March 2017. of Exchanged attached with 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, but it was disclosed after nine years. Letter of Exchanged attached with 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, but it was disclosed after nine years (Pathak 2009). 11 Ibid. 12 Subedi (1994, 1997), p. 220. 10 Letter

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to expel the aggressor. So under no circumstances can India unilaterally decide to take action to deal with any threat to the security of Nepal. Likewise, a number of arguments have frequently been raised in Nepal to make its claim. Professor Lok Raj Baral argues, “the 1950 treaty was concluded in a different setting and with a different objective. Its context is no longer relevant to the 1980s (more so in the 1990s) because of Nepal’s cordial relationship with both China and India. Similarly, Professor Kamal Prakash Malla also opined “in practice, the treaty has been modified to a considerable extent”.13 Nepal has expressed its willingness to review the 1950 peace and friendship treaty with a view to bringing it in actual practice with the context and time. India only got ready to discuss last year on this issue. Hence, both countries formed a highlevel eminent person group. This eminent person group is conducting research and organizing meeting continuously in both the countries. Now we can be hopeful that this group will reach in the depth and find out the suitable solution, and there will be new treaty according to the necessary, contextual and equal sharing and the new treaty will replace 1950 treaty.

Water Treaties and Agreements Between Nepal and India The second most debatable issue in Nepal and India is treaties in water projects. The history of negotiations between Nepal and India in water projects has been dominated by lots of controversies. Most of the Nepalese perception is that the water treaties have not equally treated them. Most of the Nepalis blame India utilizing Nepal’s watershed for its own benefit and equally blames to Nepali leaders, who signed those treaties. The Koshi and Gandaki issues have been objectionable to Nepali from the very beginning. The terms and condition of the original documents had failed to capture the demands for more irrigation water and power in Nepal. Later, to some extent, this has been revised in paper in Koshi project but not yet satisfactory to Nepalis. One could be the reason for this is the economic dependency of Nepal with India. Nepalese people think that India crafted various treaties at the time when the government is weak in Nepal; India always escalates her bargaining power when Nepalese government is in a weaker position.14 Koshi and Gandaki water projects were not considered as regional cooperation but came into force much later. Those projects essentially developed to meet the requirement for Indian interest with few benefits to Nepal. The project develops through this process and also makes an obligation to Nepal to give approval. There were poor project designs, ineffective in implementation and bad maintenance. They did not follow up on their promise, which was made at the time of the agreement.

13 Ibid. 14 Untawale

(1974).

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After huge resistance, they try to improve on the basis of peace deal but which was not sufficient.15 Koshi project signed in 1954, and Gandaki project signed in 1959 but were amended in 1966 and 1964, respectively, and without addressing Nepalese concerns. Because of this, bitterness and mistrust increased between both countries that brought unfriendly condition in the relationship. After this experience, Nepalese people blamed India for playing “big brother attitude” in relation to Nepal. Most of Nepalese realizes that India cheated Nepal on Koshi and Gandaki projects and directed to do so in other matters also. This kind of occasional blunders and stupidity by India lent a degree of credibility to such accusations. Those Koshi and Gandaki rivers are not border river; they exclusively flow through the territory of Nepal. The real practice is that, Nepalis are not getting the agreed amount of water from those dams. Anybody can see with their open eyes, and they can see how much exploited Nepali land and rivers are citing the rights of lower riparian.16 Almost same kind of mistrust to Nepali also happens with Mahakali project, which is border river of Nepal and India. After many years of negotiations and debate, finally ruled by Supreme Court of Nepal, this integrated treaty passed by two-thirds of the majority of Parliament. Mahakali treaty between Nepal and India created havoc in Nepal. Because of different views in Mahakali treaty, Nepal’s second largest party Nepal communist party (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN (UML)) split into two parties. India Nepal relation became hostile when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister of India. Nepal had a revolution for democracy at that time. People also argue that 1989 blockade impinged on the political movement of that time. Nepalese people faced 15 months of blockade at that time but did not speak much against India because they thought that it could make the movement weak. Some people had hope that democracy will bring the smooth relation between India and Nepal but Mahakali treaty ruined their hope. However, it has been started at the time of panchayat regime. It already told that this project is continuing. This is the part of the multipurpose Pancheshor project. There is the agreement in Mahakali treaty that was done in 1996 that this project should start the detailed project report (DPR) of Pancheshor after six months of the agreement. But there is no visible work even after 21 years. Nepali people have come to some suspect that did India try to take benefit from Mahakali in the name of Pancheshor? There is no doubt that this will escalate more anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal.

15 Iyer

(1999), pp. 1509–1518.

16 While visited in field on March 2017 (Gandaki and Mahakali), local people expressed their views.

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Promulgation of New Constitution in Nepal and Blockade by India New constitution of Nepal established the republic, federal, inclusive democratic system in Nepal. It was the aspirations of Nepalis since many decades. The constitution was the result of the eight years of discussion, including the failure of the first constituent assembly in 2012, and it is the seventh constitution have been adopted in Nepal and the first time by the democratically elected representatives.17 When Modi became Prime Minister of India, Nepali people were expecting positive vibe from India. His initial outreach to Nepal in 2014 tried to strike the right harmony and captured the people’s imagination and policymakers in Nepal. During his visit, he received a rousing applause for his most effective speech in the Parliament and bilateral talks with the government and also met with opposition leaders. This kind of high-level visit held after 17 years. He further said he looks forward to closer cooperation characterized by more frequent political engagement, across the full spectrum of “our extraordinarily broad-based relations, which will serve as a model and catalyst for South Asian partnership for prosperity”.18 In another statement, he said, “Nepal has made admirable progress in its peace process and political transition towards a multiparty democracy.19 The successful conduct of the Constituent Assembly-cum-Parliament elections in November 2013 is yet another tribute to the sagacity of the Nepali leadership and the people of Nepal. I am truly grateful to the people and elected representatives of Nepal for giving me the rare honour of addressing the Parliament”20 . After his visit, Nepalis were very much hoping for correction of Nepal–India relation and it would go in a right direction. But things did not happen that way, when Nepal’s new constitution promulgated in September 2015. Adoption of Nepal’s constitution by Parliament triggered alarm bells in India. According to Indian Express in a report, a day after the constitution promulgated; India expressed its displeasure about the content. India wanted to revise the content according to the demands of leaders of Madhesi-based parties. In the past few months, these communities were protesting against some provisions of the constitution. One of the demands was related to the reorganization of provinces. The Madhesi population mostly lives in the plain region that is the border of India. A clear majority passed the constitution with 507 out of the 598 constituent assembly members voting in favour. There were significant numbers of Madhesi and Janjati voted in favour to new constitution. Only 60 members of the Madhesi’s and Janjati’s community boycotted the voting procedure.21 17 Rawat

(2015). and Jaishi (2014). 19 (2014 August 3), The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Narendra-Modito-visit-Nepal-today/articleshow/39510785.cms. Accessed on 10 October 2017. 20 Mohan (2014). 21 Rawat (2015). 18 Haider

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The way Indian response came about the constitution, it was the surprise to many. As a democratic country, India has crossed the limits of suggestion and imposed its views on its small neighbouring country. As a friendly neighbour with “special relationship”, it is not reasonable for India to suggest concerns. India has to respect the will of the Nepali people and the democratic process through the constitution. There are important lessons to “world’s largest democracy” from Nepal’s recently adopted constitution.22 According to Nepal’s new constitution, it becomes the first Asian country to recognizing the rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. The provisions under right to equality clearly stated that “no discrimination shall be made against any citizens in the application of general laws on grounds of religion, colour, caste, tribe, sex, sexual orientation, bodily condition, disability, status of health, marital status, pregnancy, financial status, origin, language or region, ideological conviction or any of these”.23 Similarly, the constitution also says that nothing shall prevent the state from the providing protection and empowerment of gender-based and sexually oriented minorities “there will be special provisions for the protection, empowerment or advancement of (among others) gender-based and sexually oriented minorities.” In contrast, Sect. 377 of Indian constitution deals the Penal Code, which awards punishment of “imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall be liable to fine”. It says the same-sex relationship is a crime in India. The present political party in India, who runs the government, believes homosexuality is a crime, and it is an anti-Indian culture.24 Similarly, the case of rights to women in Nepal is much better than in India. The constitution of Nepal states, “women shall have the equal ancestral right without any gender-based discrimination”.25 India has no such provision of right for women from all faith. Ancestral property rights for women are not fundamental right in India. Likewise, Nepal’s constitution gives women the right to participate in all agency of state mechanism and in health, education, employment and social security. That kind of proportional mechanism is not ensured in the Indian constitution. Nepal is the second country after Bhutan in South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to abolish the death penalty. But in India, since 1996, around 15 people have been erroneously given the death penalty. Some of them were already hanged and others are waiting. Likewise, in case of environmental pollution and in receiving compensation and education sector also, Nepal’s constitution is much more progressive than India. A constitution is a living document, and it can be amended anytime if necessary. India’s taking stand to amend some issues of the constitution is premature behaviour. Like

22 Rawat

(2015). 18, Constitution of Nepal, Constitution can be access from www.lawcommission.gov.np/ en/documents/2016/01/constitution-of-nepal-2.pdf. 24 Rawat (2015). 25 Constitution of Nepal (2017). 23 Article

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any other constitution, it may have loopholes. Yes, India can suggest and cannot dictate to other country’s internal matters.26 There is a large section of Nepali think that India is primarily responsible for fivemonth “blockade” of the Nepal–India border right after the promulgation of the new constitution, from September 2015 to February 2016, which caused much hardship for common people. It was the time of massive earthquake and victims were trying to get back to normal life. The 7.8 magnitude earthquake and subsequent aftershocks killed more than 8,500 people and many thousands wounded. More than half million families became homeless. Economic damage was estimated at $5 billion, which is around 25% of national gross domestic product (GDP). That time, it was protesting against the new constitution in the southern parts of the country. As the part of their protest, they have set temporary camps on international borders points with India, whence Nepal imports nearly all its fuel and other daily essentials. The protestors did not allow any vehicles to enter Nepal from India, effectively closed the landlocked country’s lifeline. But those border-centric small parties organized protests would certainly have failed if they did not have the support from India. Thus, the “blockade” imposed on Nepal lasted for four and half months. It did great damage to the Nepalese economy; the blockade, according to Nepal’s finance minister, imposed greater economic damage than the earthquakes. It was the massive humanitarian crisis. “The declining stocks of gas, food and medicines, together with the closure of schools… and shortages of fuel throughout the country, are not only inflicting damage to the lives of the children now—they threaten the future of the country itself,” said United Nations Children Emergency Fund.27 The spokesmen of New Delhi blamed for the blockade upon the Madhesi unrest, they claimed, truck drivers fear for their lives. But this was not convincing idea because the Madhesi agitation was begun 40 days before the fuel blockade started. Moreover, interesting that the drivers of trucks carrying fruit and vegetables did not feel this kind of insecurity. Birgunj was only targeted for Mashedi agitators to block the border but Indian state did not allow supplying necessary items from other border points also. So, it can be easily said that it was very much calculative and guided blockade. One of the reasons could be India decided to go along with the five-months-long blockade on Nepal was because it felt the Kathmandu establishment was ignoring its concerns, especially on the issue of Madhesi rights and their “big brother attitude”. In constitution of Nepal, there are no any provisions that discriminate any community or citizens of Nepal including Madhesi. They are enjoying more rights and got special reservations than Pahade Khas Arya of Nepal. This time India was not successful to fulfil their agenda in Nepal’s constitution. People of Nepal always remember contrast of “special relations” and “blockade” imposed by India. During time of blockade imposed by India, Sushil Koirala was the Prime Minister of Nepal. He failed to resolve the issues with India. Then Communist Party of Nepal (CPN/UML) leader KP Sharma Oli became the Prime Minister of Nepal. That 26 Rawat 27 Baral

(2015). (2016).

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government was formed with the coalition of left and few other political parties. Due to the blockade by India for four and half months, to make easy transit from other countries that government did transit agreement with Chinese government. KP Sharma Oli became popular both inside and outside the country for his strong stand against blockade. Indian blockade supporter or sympathizer political parties lost recent held federal and provincial election and Maoist Party also got good position only after alliance with CPN (UML). After getting majority in federal assembly, again the new government formed in the leadership of KP Sharma Oli. New elected Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s India visit was seen as very cautiously and suspiciously. There was huge perplexity that how Indian government will treat Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli or what will be the behaviour of Indian government towards KP Sharma Oli. But Indian government offered very high respect and also showed wish to work with Oli’s government. Hence, KP Sharma Oli government has also able to overcome the suspect of Nepalese people about not beneficial new agreements with Indian government like earlier. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi currently visited Nepal to dilute the hostile relation of Nepalese people towards Indian government. However, this visit was portrayed as more religious than political. Due to non-implementation many projects assured by Modi in the past, Nepali people do not fully trust to Indian Government. Some people also have seen his visit is for to positive effect to Karnataka election. It cannot be ignored that the visit was organized to give the message about Hindu religion and good neighbouring relationship. In overall, these two reciprocal visits have been able to slightly overcome the earlier misunderstandings. It was necessary to dialogue between two countries because both countries political leadership interested to keep good relationship for sake of their own interest. Both Prime Minister’s visits evidenced that neither win nor lose from their own side.

Conclusion The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship has been a matter of controversy between India and Nepal since the long time, when a “secret” letter exchanged with the treaty was made public. There are few observations; why most of the Nepalis are unhappy to 1950 Treaty. The treaty was signed with a Rana Prime Minister who was not elected by the people, and they do not represent the Nepali political movement or aspirations and also refer to the unequal status of the signatories as an example of the build-ininequality in the treaty. The treaty is considered as a legacy of British imperialism. In 1923, British India signed treaty with Nepal and even after 1947, the relations between India and Nepal had to start on a new scale of heightened ideological passions of democracy. This Treaty of Peace and Friendship is not fitted with new development of Nepal, since both countries have not followed many of its provisions in the last 50 years, the time has come to review the treaty and replace it by a new one. Most

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of the criticism of this treaty is about the politico-strategic aspects of India, and it is alleged that India has only been more concerned about its strategic and security interests in the border as the Himalayas and has ignored Nepal’s sovereignty and equality. At the people level, water cooperation between Nepal and India does not have a friendly history. Agreements have been signed on major rivers like Koshi, Gandaki, Karnali or Mahakali, essentially for large hydroelectricity and irrigation projects by constructing dams and barrages. No agreements were fully implemented in case of Nepal side. Nepali people think, they are exploited or their water resource has been exploited and it is only benefiting to India. Nepal fought a long political movement, costly civil war to secure representative or inclusive government and civil rights. After much struggle, freedom of religion, the press, assembly, and legislated gender and caste equality have become integral parts of a federal republican Nepal. The common Nepalis are against any forms of interferences by India, and they think India always considered them as an extension of its units and not a sovereign country.28 India has lost the generosity of ordinary Nepali because of a multitude of reasons, not least because of what appears to be its authoritarian attitude towards the Nepali political process. It can repair them by using non-traditional diplomatic methods rather than presenting itself as a political hegemon or big brotherhood character. Indian neighbourhood policy needs to step back from the political process and consider the importance of building the people-to-people ties that originally shaped the modern relationship between the two countries. Recent visits of Prime Minister of Nepal to India and vice versa tried to normalize the relations between them. It requires more and more dialogues and interactions between state and people level to overcome the hostile relation of Nepal and India. Easy access to media and other communication devices reaches to common people very fast. So, without taking their aspirations or concerns, it is not easy to set the agendas in bilateral relations as well. There are different kinds of opinions of hilly originated and Terai people looking towards Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Nepal but it is difficult to dichotomize into Terai and hill’s perception. Supporters of Terai originated political parties who were initiators of blockade in few borders of Nepal and India are happy to see the visit of Janakpur and remaining are not happy to not getting an apology from Indian Prime Minister. The perception of major Nepalese is in the position to wait and see the future direction of Nepal–India relations.

28 Ranjan

(2016).

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References Baral, B. (2016, March 02). India’s ‘blockade’ has opened the door for China in Nepal. The Wire. Retrieved December 12, 2017 from https://thewire.in/23042/indias-blockade-has-openedthe-door-for-china-in-nepal/. Bhasin, A. S. (1970). Documents on Nepal’s relations with India and China 1949–66. Bombay: Academic Books. Constitution of Nepal. (2017). Retrieved December 12, 2017 from www.lawcommission.gov.np/ en/documents/2016/01/constitution-of-nepal-2.pdf. Haider, S., & Jaishi, D. (2014, August 4). Modi concludes historic visits in Nepal. The Hindu. Retrieved October 11, 2017 from http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/modiconcludes-historic-visit-to-nepal/article6280753.ece. Iyer, R. R. (1999, June 12–18). Conflict-resolution: Three river treaties. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(24), 1509–1518. Mohan, R. (2014 August 3). Modi praises Nepal’s political transition towards multiparty democracy. International Business Times. Retrieved October 11, 2017 from http://www.ibtimes.co.in/modipraises-nepals-political-transition-towards-multiparty-democracy-605978. Pathak, B. (2009). Nepal-India relations: Open secret diplomacy. Conflict Study Centre. Retrieved May 2, 2009 from http://www.pcsc.org.np/uploads/doc/100524055050_ SituationUpdate84NepalIndiarelations.pdf. Ranjan, A. (2016). Contours of India-Nepal relationship and trans-boundary rivers water disputes. Journals of International Affairs, 1(1) (Tribhuvan University, Nepal). Rawat, M. (2015, October 7). Nepal’s constitution and lesson for India. The Diplomat. Retrieved October 10, 2017 from https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/07/nepal-constitution-lesson-india. Singh, S. (2017, October 17) On Indian military decisions of today, shadow of a pyrrhic victory yesterday. The Indian Express. Retrieved December 22, 2017 from http://indianexpress. com/article/explained/indian-army-sri-lanka-ltte-liberation-tigers-of-tamil-eelam-jaffna-indianpeace-keeping-force-ipkf-in-fact-on-indian-military-decisions-of-today-shadow-of-a-pyrrhicvictory-yesterday-4887671/. Subedi, S. P. (1994) India-Nepal security relations and the 1950 treaty: Time for new perspectives. Asian Survey, 34(3). Subedi, S. P. (1997). Indo-Nepal relations: The causes of conflict and their resolution. In S. K. Mitra & D. Rothermund (Eds.), Legicimacy and conflict in South Asia. Delhi: Manohar. Untawale, M. G. (1974, August). The political dynamics of functional collaboration: Indo-Nepalese river projects. Asian Survey, 14(8), 716–732.

Understating Pakistani Perspective in the Prism of Pakistan–India Relations Wardah Irum, Devika Mittal and Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal

If anarchy is what states make of it then what Pakistan and India have made of it? International relations, between and among states, are historically and socially constructed and are neither an inevitable corollary of human nature nor essential characteristics of world politics. States are betrothed in sociopolitical interactions which often derive significance independently of the actual material environment. International relations between states, whether amiable or antagonistic, are often influenced by the construction of inter-subjective meaning and understanding of the international system and of each other as discrete actors. Thus, identities, ideas and expectations, and perceptions transpire from and are continued or transformed by the construction and re-construction of inter-subjective understanding or shared perceptions between states. Significantly, inter-subjective understanding tends to be invariable and selfreinforcing instead of being evolutionary; however, legends and narratives of discrimination can emerge, particularly if an initial and/or critical interaction between the states is negative and if further interactions strengthen a negative image. In other words, states construct identities, ideas, and interests through their interaction with each other. Recurrent interactions can lead to certain perceptions and expectations from the other state. These perceptions may progress into either positive fashion or they can create negative impression that would generate hostility and partial generalization and impede the states’ ability to trust and to perceive the relationship accurately and positively. Within the context, it is easier to analyze and understand how Pakistan perceives India in the prism of politico-economic and sociocultural ties. Relationships between both actors originate from their colonial past, and indeed, the birth of both Pakistan W. Irum (B) · M. M. Afzal School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] D. Mittal Department of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, New Delhi, India © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_12

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and India was a byproduct of Muslim and Indian nationalism. A large number of Muslims of subcontinent were uncomfortable to be living with a what the All India Muslim League leaders termed ‘perpetual Hindu majority’ and perceived it detrimental to their program to preserve their historical legacies and identity. Consequently, it led to their demand for partition of the British India in 1947. Because their aspirations could not be materialized in united India as minority. As believed by a large section of Pakistani commentators even today, Pakistan struggles to preserve its sovereignty and independence against Indian hegemonic designs in South Asia.

Historical Context Martin Luther King rightly said that ‘we are not makers of history; we are made by history.’1 In the context of Pakistan and India, history and historical narratives have played a very important role in construction of the image of other. Unfortunately, both states have been unable to overcome traditional historical narrative. Both states have created competing narratives of history and the present along nationalistic lines, where ‘us’ is noble, correct, and justified but ‘the other’ is evil and a trouble monger.2 Significantly, both are the consequence of competing interpretations of combined history where Muslims and Hindus lived together until the partition of the British India in August 1947. Both countries have used history as an important tool for nation-building and nationalism. The historiography around partition3 shapes not only one country’s past but also the present and future of the relation between the two countries. Pakistan’s understanding of India largely originates from India being considered as a ‘Hindu state’ that is determined to undo Pakistan. Pakistani leadership claims that during the early years of its birth, Indian leadership maintained the belief that Pakistan would soon be undone. A number of Pakistani scholars argues that the leadership of Indian National Congress party including Gandhi, Nehru, and Patel only reluctantly accepted the partition primarily as a strategy to speed up the departure of British Raj which has been imposed on India ever since 1857 for over two centuries, however, ideologically didn’t reconcile with the creation of Pakistan and considered it as a transitory aberration.4 Indian leadership had not accepted the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state. This has bothered Pakistan since its independence because it wanted India to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and independence. It was largely 1 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., ‘Strength to Love’, Shmoop, accessed August 21, 2017, https://www. shmoop.com/quotes/not-makers-of-history-made-by-history.html. 2 Rizvi (2011). 3 In 1947, the Indian subcontinent was partitioned on religious lines into two sovereign nations—India and Pakistan. 4 For instance, Prime Minister Nehru while talking about the demand for Pakistan in his speech on June 3, 1949, declared that ‘it may be that in this way we shall reach united India sooner than otherwise. Kripalani, the then president of Congress also held ‘neither the Congress nor the nation has given up on its claim of a united India’ see: Amin (2010), pp. 25–28.

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due to Pakistan’s such understanding and strong feelings of insecurity which gave a large role to Pakistan’s military in the country’s politics. According to Pakistan’s historical narrative, the communal riots that killed millions of people, denial of partition assets which was the due right of Pakistan, and blockage of water supply to Pakistan in 1948 by India were a few examples through which India created severe difficulties for Pakistan since the dawn of independence. Experiencing all this, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s hopes for peaceful coexistence were badly dashed and just after two months of independence he concluded: ‘It is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on…that Pakistan is merely a temporary madness and that Pakistan will have to come into the Indian Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son…it is now clear beyond doubt that it was well-planned, well-organized, and well-directed and the object of it all…was to paralyze the new-born dominion of Pakistan’.5

Within this context, Pakistan viewed India’s posture as hostile, posting an ‘existential threat’ to Pakistan. Moreover, it was further validated and reinforced as India played a vital role in dismembering Pakistan through its intervention in December 1971 civil war (known as liberation war in Bangladesh) between eastern and western wings of Pakistan. To this date, this ‘enemy image’ of India continues to be a part of nation’s psyche though to a much lesser extent. If we trace the history of Pakistan-India relations, we would see that with time, the issues of conflict have only increased. The disputed territory of Kashmir has affected the bilateral relations of both states; therefore, it is important to understand Pakistan’s perspective of Kashmir issue. Geographically, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is the continuation of Pakistan’s plains into mountains. The country’s three major rivers, i.e., River Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, flow from Kashmir into Pakistan that, in Pakistan’s understanding, makes the latter and former a single geographical unit. Not only Kashmir had its rail and road communications with Pakistan but its imports and exports were also conducted through Pakistan. Kashmir also had cultural affinity with Pakistan along with strategic, economic, and religious links.6 Pakistan still held the position that the Kashmir question defied the partition plan. As per the partition plan, Muslim majority areas would be included in Pakistan. Given that Kashmir was a Muslim majority state and geographically closer to Pakistan, it was supposed to become a part of Pakistan. However, it was forcefully annexed by India against the will of Kashmir’s population. Two factors played key role in this. Firstly, the unfair accession of the Muslim majority Tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala to India by Radcliffe. It is important to bear in mind that India had no direct communication with Kashmir, and it was the unjust accession of Gurdaspur that actually provided the link between India and Kashmir. Secondly, the Maharaja of Kashmir was Hari Singh, a Hindu ruler from Dogra clan. Although he wanted Kashmir to be an independent state, he was being manipulated by the Indian side to annex with India. The majority of population in Kashmir celebrated August 15, 1947, as ‘Pakistan 5 Amin, 6 Ali

29. (1983), 282.

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Day’ throughout the state. This triggered a series of response from the government of Maharaja, who could clearly perceive that annexation to India in these circumstances would not be possible. Thus, Maharaja resorted to violence against Muslims in Kashmir forcing thousands of people to flee to Pakistan. This narration of events in Pakistan is different from what the Indian state maintains or Indian scholars or commentators argue. Nonetheless, in Poonch, western part of Jammu, demonstrations took place against Maharaja’s likely move to become a part of India. Maharaja’s attempt to suppress this resulted in a full swing revolt. News of atrocities committed by Maharaja’s government against Muslims hit the tribesmen in Pakistan quite hard. The tribal Lashkar, without the consent of the Pakistani government, crossed into the state of Kashmir to protect their fellow Muslims brethren. They quickly overpowered the state troops, and consequently, the Maharaja fled from Jammu to Srinagar. When the Indian cabinet heard this news of tribal infiltration in Kashmir, it immediately took accession of Kashmir and sent its troops to what Pakistani establishment terms ‘occupy’ Kashmir.7 Resultantly, Pakistan lost a significant part of Kashmir to India. Pakistan proclaims that it was never consulted in all the matters related to Kashmir crisis despite the fact that Maharaja Hari Singh had signed a standstill agreement with the Pakistani government. According to Pakistan establishment, the tribal Lashkar that entered in Kashmir were not ‘Pakistani troops’ as often perceived as if they were representatives of the Pakistani state. Moreover, Pakistan emphasizes that the desires of population of Kashmir were never taken into consideration throughout the course of these events. Until today, it has been defining factor in Pakistan–India bilateral relations and the direct and indirect cause of wars and crises between the two nations.8 The war between India and Pakistan, known as the ‘First Kashmir War,’ ended with UN intervention in 1948 leading to the signing of Karachi Agreement between Pakistan and India in 1949. It led to the UN-negotiated ceasefire line called the Line of Control or LOC which divided the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and the frontier regions into regions controlled by India and those controlled by Pakistan. The LOC was a temporary line, and being so, it also formally recognized the region of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had also directed for a plebiscite that would decide the fate of Kashmir. The plebiscite is still pending as, Pakistan believes’ India is reluctant to hold it, claiming that the conditions for holding a plebiscite are not being met. For Pakistan, the Kashmir issue is the ‘unfinished business of partition’9 and it is Pakistan’s utmost desire to resolve this to the best interest of Kashmiri population. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir in 1947–1948, 1965, and 1999. However, lack of political will and expansionist motives of both states continue to evade Kashmiris their right to a life of freedom.

7 Ali,

285–295. (2016). 9 Zulqar (2016). 8 Zulqar

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Pakistan and India have been involved in four full-scale wars and innumerable and frequent border skirmishes. However, as stated earlier, the 1971 war that had dismembered Pakistan left a deep mark on the psyche of Pakistani nation. According to Pakistan’s perception, India had played a deceptive role in manipulating Bengali grievances against West Pakistan as it incited Bengali secessionists when the demand for an independence in former East Pakistan grew. Primarily, India armed and trained Bengali separatists (for Bangladesh they were liberation fighters) (Mukti Bahini) and assisted in setting up of the Bangladesh government-in-exile, in India.10 While Pakistan was fighting a civil war with Mukti Bahini, an all-out war broke out between Pakistan and India on December 3, 1971. Due to logistical difficulties to reach former East Pakistan as it was located 1,600 km away, pressure of unfavorable international public opinion, and incompetent military strategy, Pakistan Army could not prolong the war; therefore, it surrendered in Dhaka before Indian Army. Subsequently, former East Pakistan declared independence and became ‘Bangladesh.’ Pakistan felt that by playing a decisive role in the dismemberment of Pakistan, India proved that it would utilize any circumstances to destabilize Pakistan and does not respect Pakistan’s sovereignty. Consequently, it further reinforced the sense of insecurity in Pakistan. There are several other significant yet unsettled issues that define and contribute to the hostility between Pakistan and India. The rivers which flow without any boundaries demand that the neighbors cooperate with each other. However, Pakistan and India have failed to do so. To solve the water dispute, Pakistan approached the World Bank which resulted in the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 but, it believes, that India has violated the treaty by constructing dams and ignoring Pakistan’s concerns.11 There is also the issue of the undemarcated maritime boundary. The Sir Creek Dispute is another important conflict. Sir Creek is a 60-mile-long tidal estuary in the marshes of Rann of Kutch that divides Pakistan’s Sindh region from India’s Gujarat. The history of the dispute goes back to pre-independence time which involved the government of Sindh and Kutch ruler. The 1914 Resolution had sanctioned a compromise and demarcated the line. However, in 1968, India surfaced a dispute over the interpretation of the agreement concerning the actual demarcated line. India also claims that the demarcated line has changed due to geomorphic changes.12 While Pakistan and India have held several rounds of discussions for this issue, there hasn’t been any breakthrough though both states have regarded Sir Creek Dispute to be a ‘doable’ issue. The region of Sir Creek is important not just because it will delimit the maritime boundaries of the two states. It is also important geopolitically as well as for economic reasons as it is rich in gas, petroleum, and minerals.13 It is important to solve the Sir Creek Dispute as it affects the fisherfolk community of both states. According to the 2017 prisoner data accessed by Aaghaz-e-Dosti, a cross-border

10 Saleem

(2016). (2017). 12 Shah (2009), 357. 13 Ibid., 360. 11 Qureshi

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peace initiative, 494 Indian fishermen and 78 Pakistani fishermen are lodged in each other’s jails.14 The two neighbors could not even spare conflict on uninhabitable land. The point of reference is the Siachen dispute. The Siachen is a 70-km-long glacier located in the eastern Karakoram Range in the Himalayas. It is located in one of the most inhospitable terrains of the world owing to the extremely cold temperature, with temperature routinely dropping to 40° below zero and high altitudes.15 It was situated at the point where the Line of Control ended and so was not demarcated. However, the glacier remained unimportant until 1984 when India launched ‘Operation Meghdoot’ to occupy the glacier. It did so on the unsubstantiated claim that Pakistan was planning to use it to attack India.16 This led to several military clashes which resulted in a ceasefire agreement in 2003. Though none of the countries has violated the ceasefire agreement, the heavy stationing of troops in a difficult and uninhabitable land has involved huge economic, human, and environmental cost. According to a news report, between 1984 and 2012, 8,000 Pakistani and Indian soldiers have died due to adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain.17 However, both countries are adamant as they regard to control of Siachen to be of a strategic importance.18 The Siachen Conflict is also important because it found a place in the Kargil War of 1999. Some argue that the Kargil War was among other reasons a retaliation to Indian Army’s Operation Meghdoot of 1984. However, a larger reason and objective was that Pakistan had been sympathetic for the Kashmiri’s right to selfdetermination, a promise that India had made and which it not only failed to grant but was also repressing. So in order to highlight the plight of Kashmiris and their attempt for freedom, in May of 1999, Pakistani troops helped the Kashmiri militants in their struggle and occupied several important positions held by Indian forces in the Kargil–Dras region.19 This is one of the few interpretations and reasons cited by Pakistani commentators for Kargil war in 1999. The objective to capture Kargil–Dras was to block the supply for Indian forces in Siachen.20 Soon this escalated into a war between the two countries. As per Pakistan’s account, unlike in the 1971 war, it was the Indian side who suffered a major blow, with a very high number of causalities. The war came to an end in July 1999 after an international intervention. If we talk about watershed moments in the Pakistan–India relations, the nuclearization of India and Pakistan was certainly one. In 1998, India became a nuclear power. In response, Pakistan nuclearized in 1999. There are varying opinions on this. While some analysts think that the emergence of two nuclear powers will lead to 14 Pakistan

Today, ‘Detailed List of Pakistani, Indian Prisoners issued,’ https://www.pakistantoday. com.pk/2017/10/11/detailed-list-of-pakistani-indian-prisoners-issued/. 15 Khan (2012), vol. xxxi, no. 5, pp. 4–5. 16 Ibid., 17. 17 Over 8,000 Indo-Pak soldiers killed in Siachen https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/ 621545-over-8,000-indo-pak-soldiers-killed-in-siachen. 18 Khan (2012), 9. 19 Qadir (2002), pp. 24–135. 20 Abbas (2017).

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a more stable South Asia as nuclearization acts as a deterrence for escalation to a full-fledged war as both are aware of the consequences, some argue that given the ever fragile and vulnerable relations, the subcontinent has become more unsafe and unstable as ever.21

Pakistan’s Political Standpoints on Pakistan-India Relations It will be interesting to know Pakistan’s political parties perspective of Pakistan–India relations. It is imperative for two reasons. Firstly, the parties represent Pakistanis on national and international level. Secondly, the diversity of perspectives presented within political elite truly reflects the myriad strands within Pakistan. It would be fallacious to conclude that all Pakistani public holds an ‘enemy image’ of India. Therefore, perceptions of nine major political parties are discussed. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) are national parties. Whereas, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP), Balochistan National Party (BNP), Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam Faz-urRehman (JUI-F), and Pakistan Muslim League Functional (PML-F) are regional in character dealing with Urdu-speaking population in Karachi, Pashtun population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochi population and population of interior ruler Sindh, respectively. PML-N is one of the largest political parties which has a strong vote bank in Punjab. It is currently a ruling party in Pakistan. PML-N government, in an effort to reduce political tensions, granted India the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN), depending on the elimination of negative list 1,209 items. PML-N vocally rejected India’s claim over Kashmir and has termed the issue as a bilateral dispute. It argues that the resolution of Kashmir dispute should be ‘in consonance with the aspirations of the people of the territory for their inherent right of self-determination.’22 In order to establish peace, the party has validated all preceding efforts on the Kashmir dispute, which includes United Nations resolutions (1949), Simla Accord (1972), and Lahore Declaration (1999), which was signed by PML-N which was in power at that time. The party vigorously supports dialogues and negotiations as important in establishing peace. According to the party, strengthening multi-tier military and non-military confidence-building measures, people-to-people contact, cultural relationship, relaxed visa regime, improved trade ties can lead to the development of friendly relations with India.23

21 Khan,

Dr. Zulfikar and Rubina Waseem, ‘South Asian Strategic Paradox: India-Pakistan Nuclear Flux.’ 22 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (2013), 82, http://pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto.pdf. 23 Khan (2017).

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The head of PML-N and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed a new fourpoint peace initiative during his address at 70th United Nations General Assembly. The four points are as follows: We propose Pakistan and India formalize and respect 2003 understanding of a complete ceasefire in Kashmir and LoC. We propose Pakistan and India reaffirm that they will not resort to the threat of force under any circumstances. Steps must be taken to demilitarize Kashmir. Both state should Agree to mutually withdraw troops from Siachen.24

Sharif claimed that as a responsible nuclear weapon state, Pakistan aims to materialize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the region. He argues that South Asia is in dire need to establish strategic stability that includes serious dialogue to accomplish nuclear restraint, conventional balance, and conflict resolution in South Asia.25 This realization that nuclear disarmament should be initiated is necessary because nuclearization has involved both the states into a security dilemma due to which they spend billions of dollars on defense instead of devoting their resources to peace-building. At the 71st United Nations General Assembly, Nawaz Sharif made it clear that ‘Pakistan is not interested in an arms race with India.’ He further declared that confrontation should not be the destiny of South Asia. He also raised the gross human rights violations committed by India in Indian-held Kashmir and emphasized that peace cannot be established in the region without resolving the Kashmir dispute.26 The fact that Pakistan emphasizes so much on Kashmir resolution whereas India brushes it aside most of the time has led to the perception in Pakistan that India is only concerned with normalization of relations without resolving the contentious issues. PPP is a socially progressive party that has come to power in 1970, 1988, 1993, and 2008. It enjoys a stronghold in Sindh. In the party’s 2013 manifesto, it undertook to end ‘Pakistan’s isolation,’ by formulating an autonomous and multidimensional foreign policy with a particular focus on better relations with India. The party is a staunch promoter of having cordial ties with India. Honest and sincere dialogues should be held to resolve all the issues with Pakistan’s eastern neighbor.27 In PPP’s perspective, if India and China can develop cordial relations despite their rivalry on borders, then Pakistan and India too can foster better ties through negotiation and public diplomacy. It was PPP that originated the process of giving the status of MFN to India. During PPP’s last term, from 2008 to 2013, it granted MFN status to India and also removed a negative list of 1,206 items including automobile, textile, and pharmaceutical products. This unfortunately could not prove fruitful as India declined 24 ‘UNGA

Speech: Nawaz Proposes 4-Point Peace Initiative with India’, The Express Tribune, 30 September 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/965133/live-pm-to-address-70th-ungeneral-assembly-session-shortly/. 25 Haider (2015). 26 Dawn (2016). 27 Pakistan people’s party ppp, ‘Manifesto 2013’, 2013, http://www.citizenswire.com/wp-content/ uploads/2013/03/PPPP_Manifesto_14_3_13.pdf.

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to remove non-tariff barriers on the list Pakistan had provided.28 Interestingly, the chairman of PPP Asif Ali Zardari famously declared that it does not perceive India as a threat for the existence of Pakistan29 during his tenure as the president of Pakistan from 2008 to 2013. PML-Q was created by former members PML-N, in the aftermath of military coup in 1999. The party maintains that India’s aspirations to achieve regional hegemony are dangerous for peace and they should be regressed. Moreover, like other political parties, it seeks to maintain cordial relations with India but argues that ‘balance of power’ between Indian should remain intact.30 In other words, power parity in Indo-Pakistan relations will lead to peace. MQM enjoys stronghold within Sindh’s Urdu-speakers in cities such as Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkar. Interestingly, MQM has been accused of receiving funds from India and furthering ‘Indian agenda’ in Pakistan.31 However, MQM contends that issues like Kashmir dispute, Siachen glacier, and Sir Creek water strip have prevented the development of friendly relations between the two neighbors. The party believes that both states should sign ‘no war’ peace pact to ease the tensions.32 The idea of ‘no war’ treaty is brilliant given the fact that it would reduce the threat perception of both the states to a great extent. PTI that has become a third force in Pakistan is currently ruling KPK. PTI establishes that peaceful coexistence with India is based on ‘sovereign equality and a just solution of outstanding disputes.’ To establish cordial ties, India should come to the negotiating table instead of rhetorically blaming Pakistan for fighting a proxy war. PTI largely maintains the ‘enemy image’ of India given the fact that it aims to fortify Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, which is by and large Indo-centric.33 Following the realist school of thought, PTI emphasizes the development of an effective deterrent capability, to prevent India from adopting any course of action against Pakistan. PML-F has its support in the interior rural Sindh. The party argues that peaceful resolution of all the issues between India and Pakistan is incumbent for stability and peace. In party’s opinion, India has created an environment of distrust by interference in Pakistan’s internal issues such as Balochistan through Afghanistan. Similar views are held by JUI-F religio-political party that has strong vote bank in KPK and Pashtun areas of Balochistan. It maintains that Indian hegemonic aspirations impede the peace and stability in the region. It also accuses India for assisting nationalist insurgents in Balochistan and terrorist activities in Karachi. Likewise, JI, a well-organized political party across Pakistan, condemns Indian involvement in Balochistan and Karachi.34

28 Khan,

113–14. Not Military Threat to Pakistan, Says Zardari,’ The Nation, accessed August 21, 2017, http://nation.com.pk/politics/24-Jun-2009/India-not-military-threat-to-Pakistan-says-Zardari. 30 Khan, 114. 31 Bennett-Jones (2015). 32 Khan 115–16. 33 Khan, 118. 34 Khan, 119–26. 29 ‘India

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ANP, a Pashtun nationalist party, enjoys popular support in KPK and Pashtun pockets in Karachi. Asfandyar Wali Khan, head of ANP, is the grandson of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who was famously called ‘Frontier Gandhi’ owing to his non-violent resistance against British Raj in India.35 According to ANP, India is not a threat to Pakistan’s independence and freedom. ANP is a staunch supporter of peaceful ties in the larger interest of the people. It considers that Kashmir dispute should be resolved in a peaceful way to end the animosity.36 Moreover, ANP perceives that terrorism has badly affected South Asia; therefore, this menace of terrorism should be brought to an end. India and Pakistan share a lot of commonalities, in culture, civilization, history, traditions, and linguistics yet they have failed to develop friendly relations. In ANP’s opinion, this is so because the ‘deep-rooted enmity’ of India has rebuffed the efforts to normalization of bilateral ties, assenting that similar sentiments are found on the Indian side as well.37 This is true to a large extent that the creation of enemy image has badly impaired both the states to live peacefully. BNP, a ruling party in Balochistan, is a Baloch nationalist party, headed by Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch. The party seeks to create normal relation with India. It firmly believes that regional progress and prosperity is only possible when the people of the region would be living in peace and harmony. Moreover, it discourages the securitycentric mindset prevalent between the two neighbors.38 Dr. Abdul Malik strongly condemns the Indian interference in Balochistan; however, he wishes to establish peace with India through negotiations.39 Most political parties desire to establish amiable diplomatic relations with India. There is a unanimous understanding among political parties that resolution of the Kashmir dispute is mandatory to the normalization of Pakistan–India relations. Certain political groups believe in creating a balance of power with India and aspire to increase nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis India, whereas others hope to sign a ‘no war’ pact with India. Certain elements in political establishment accuse India for spreading internal insecurity in Pakistan that restrains both states from coming closer. On the contrary, a nominal section of political elite rejects the ‘enemy image’ of India altogether and aims to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone. Moreover, most of the political parties emphasize to use the platform of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to normalize Pakistan–India relations. As we see, different political parties have their own ideas and agenda around Pakistan’s relations with India. However, ‘India’ has not been a catchword during elections. This is particularly true for recent elections. The rhetoric of ‘India as an enemy nation’ no longer finds a place in the electoral process. So far, we have examined Pakistan’s position in the Pak-Indo relations by looking at the state narratives around the history of the conflict, the major issues between 35 Welle

(2017). National Party (2013). 37 Khan, 120–22. 38 Khan, 118–19. 39 ‘India, Afghanistan Fail to Achieve Nefarious Goals: Dr. Malik,’ Business Recorder (blog), accessed August 21, 2017, http://fp.brecorder.com/2016/10/2016101994457/. 36 Awami

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the two countries, and opinions of the various political groups. We will now focus on the voice of the people. The next section will explore the factors that contribute to their construction of knowledge around India and shape their perspectives around Pak-Indo relations.

People and Role of Institutions ‘What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you hear the word “India”?’ ‘Shah Rukh Khan’ ‘Cricket’ ‘Kohli (Virat)’ ‘Our Neighbor’ This was part of a discussion called Aman Chaupal in a secondary school in Lahore. The discussion was an interactive session with two Indians and members of a cross-border peace initiative, Aaghaz-e-Dosti.40 It centered on India, its image of Pakistan and Pakistani people, and the prospects and impediments to peace between the two countries. The discussion began with this question, to which there were several responses, some of which have been mentioned. The responses centered on Bollywood or Indian cinema, serials, music, and cricket, some of the things that bring the two countries together. Indian cinema has been quite popular in Pakistan. Same has been the case for Indian Television industry despite that the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) occasionally imposes a ban on Indian channels or serials, because it perceives that it has a detrimental effect on Pakistani culture. Besides, it has also become a ‘tit-for-tat’ move as Pakistani content was completely banned by India.41 However, Lahore High Court lifted a ban on Indian dramas enforced by PEMRA quoting that ‘the world has become a global village’42 therefore banning foreign content might not be a plausible action. During the discussion, a student asked about a Pakistan-based music band that was to perform in India but was opposed by a Hindu extremist group. He said, ‘We watch Indian movies but in India, our artists are not welcomed. Our music band was not allowed to perform. They even faced threats.’ On being asked the source of his information, he said that he had read it in the news. He was told that while the band did face threats, there were many who spoke in support of them and demanded action against the threatening group. Several politicians, civil society organizations, and universities welcomed the band to perform in their space. On being asked if he had heard about this as well, he refused. It shows that in the scenario of limited

40 The

data from this discussion is based on the personal recollections of Devika Mittal, one of the co-authors of this chapter. She was one of the Indian speakers in the discussion. 41 Khan (2016). 42 The Express Tribune (2017).

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interaction, media is an important source of knowledge about the other. However, the politics of media often works to mediate, intercept, and subvert the reality. On a question around the visa policy of India and Pakistan to each other, the speakers spoke about the strict visa regime. They spoke about the difficulty in acquiring a visa and the various clauses including the clause that restricts the movement to only a maximum of five cities. When asked, if the policy should be changed, a student said, ‘It is important to limit the movement of Indians or they will get information about our weapons and missiles.’ Some of the other questions in this discussion were around the Muslim community in India—a student was curious to know about the culture of Pathans/Pashtuns in India as she herself was from the community—questions around Indian culture based on what they watched in movies and the similarities between the two countries. The discussion, the questions and views of the students or the young citizens of Pakistan, conveyed that they imagined India in different ways. While we noted the mistrust and suspicion toward India, an image of India as an opposing nation, we also see that India was visualized as a land which was different but with a similar sociocultural milieu. The people’s perspective and factors that shape their process of knowledge around India and Pak-Indo relations were also attained through a questionnaire. A total of 60 responses were recorded from people hailing from different cities and towns of Pakistan, namely Chitral (KPK), Ghotki (Sindh), Gilgit (Gilgit Baltistan), Islamabad, Karachi (Sindh), Khairpur (Sindh), Lahore (Punjab), Murree (Punjab), and Sargodha (Punjab). In terms of occupation, the respondents included students, teachers, lawyers, IT professionals, journalists, and people engaged in working-class jobs. On being asked, how do you perceive India, 16% respondents said that they regard India to be an ‘Enemy Nation.’ A 32-year-old man working as a security guard and who hails from Azad Kashmir described India as a ‘neighbor but that uses military forces to disturb Pakistan.’ ‘India is a hostile nation that always opposes Pakistan,’ wrote a teacher from Karachi who is in her mid-30 s. She describes her sources of information to be social media, books, and knowledge gathered from people and their talks. Most of the respondents described India as ‘our neighbor.’ Some other responses described India as a ‘land of diversity,’ ‘A democratic nation,’ and ‘Our neighbor with people just like us.’ A middle-aged IT professional from Karachi shared his perspective of India: A neighbor and a country where many Pakistanis have roots. Want to be friendly country. Recently I found India more intolerant than Pakistan. We improved in this respect. Here in Pakistan we have to stop anti-Indian slogans because raising anti-Indian slogans causes anti-Muslim sentiments in India which defy the logic and reason of making a new country in subcontinent.

One response regarded India to be the land of his forefathers. A young student from Sargodha (Punjab) said, ‘India is my parent state. Long Live Hindustan. I wish we never had the partition.’ On the question of whether India opposes Pakistan, he wrote, ‘State level friction does exist but people have no hatred for each other,

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especially we Punjabis.’ His statement shows that even 70 years later, the memory of partition continues to live. Contrary to the official narrative around partition, partition is being visualized as an irreplaceable loss and the time before partition, a time of peace and harmony. In his statement that Punjabis will never have hatred for each other gives an idea that in the memory of a common past and culture, can be found seeds of hope for friendly relations between the two countries. The question on whether India opposes Pakistan was a multi-choice question with answers ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ While 60% respondents ‘agreed’ that India opposes Pakistan, a few of them wrote that it is the Indian State that opposes Pakistan, and not the people. Some regarded the media to be the enemy of peace. A teacher trainer from Karachi wrote, ‘Depends whom we are calling India here, if common people then No, if media or army then Yes!’ A 20-year-old student from Islamabad wrote, ‘I think both the country oppose each other and ignore the prospects of working together.’ The questionnaire tried to locate the sources of information that constructs images of India and perspectives around the future of the two countries. It establishes that media, especially the electronic and print media, continues to be the most important platform to know about India. The advent of social media is also important as it is the second-most voted response. On a question of the similarities between the two nations, a 26-year-old teacher trainer from Karachi wrote, ‘For me Hindustan was divided on paper by drawing borders but in its core these two countries are similar like two faces a coin. They share same geography, same taste for food and much more.’ The responses listed out similarities in terms of religion, language, food, customs, everyday habits, and even biases. The questionnaire also sought to find what people think is the main bone of contention between Pakistan and India and listed out the Kashmir issue, enemy narrative, borders issues, limited interaction, and interference in the internal issues as options to choose from. A majority of 62% identified the Kashmir issue to be the main issue between the two countries. In the second position was the idea that the ‘Enemy Narrative’ is the main issue. The third position was secured by ‘Limited interaction.’ There was a question around the stakeholders involved in the relations between Pakistan and India and that who all can play an important role. A majority believes that the civil society can play a positive role. The possibility of a mediator or a third country intervention also saw a good support. In the third position came the governments followed by the military establishments. On the question of how the relations should be, a majority voted for the relations to be cooperative and friendly. A student from Karachi wrote, ‘We must instill a pre-partition harmony.’ In this section, we tried to understand the various factors and processes that influence and shape the thinking of people. The role of the media, the news media, and the entertainment industry is imperative. While the entertainment industry is bringing together the people of the two countries, celebrating the oneness, and embedding

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new memories, the news media with its own vested interests can work to dilute or aggravate the situation of conflict. For all aspects, we saw that there are different opinions, opinions that uphold the state narratives and opinions that subvert them. There is no singular view of India, of the relations that Pakistan and India should have, its impediments and the stakeholders. People also remembered the partition differently. While for some partition is and remains the defining basis of Pak-Indo conflict, for others, the postpartition conflict led to or continued the hatred. We also discovered that there was curiosity and interest among people to know about India, connect with them, and, more importantly, to have friendly relations with them. Their motivations derive from several reasons, including the fact that there are more similarities than differences between them.

Conclusion Pakistan and India largely have a love–hate relationship that is impregnated with both the elements of enmity and admiration. Owing to the historical narratives and war history, Pakistan feels insecure. Pakistan wants to resolve Kashmir dispute but feels that India brushes aside this dispute, and this defines Pakistan’s attitude toward India. Besides, Pakistan feels threatened by Indian interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs and India’s hegemonic aspirations. However, Pakistan’s public opinion regarding Indian people is positive to a large extent. Pakistanis feel Indian people are just like them, sharing the same language, culture, and ethos. They, however, differ with Indian foreign policy choices and their domestic policies, especially concerning Kashmir.

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Appendix

Questionnaire Basic Information: Age Profession Gender Place/Hometown Q1. How do you perceive India Q2. How do you get to know about India. What are your sources of information? A. Electronic/Print Media memories D. Books

B. Social Media C. From people, talks and E. Any other source (write)

3. Do you think India opposes Pakistan. A. Strongly agree B. Agree C. Don't know D. Strongly Disagree E. Disagree Reason: 4. Do Pakistan and India have similarities? A. Strongly agree B. Agree C. Don't know D. Strongly Disagree E. Disagree Reason: 5. What should be the relationship between Pakistan and India A. Remove borders and reunite C. Cooperative D. Competitors

B. Enemy E. Your opinion

6. What is the main bone of contention between Pakistan and India A. Kashmir B. Enemy narrative C. Border issues D. Limited interaction E. Interference in internal issues 7. Who all should play an active role in good relations between Pakistan and India A. Governments D. Mediator/Third state

B. Military establishment

C. Civil society

8. What are the future prospects of relations between Pakistan and India A. Remain hostile

B. Amicable relations

C. Neutral

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References Abbas, Z. (2017). When Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1999. Dawn. Retrieved February 17, 2017 from https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153481. Ali, C. M. (1983). The emergence of Pakistan. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab. Amin, S. M. (2010). Amin, pakistan’s foreign policy: A reappraisal (2nd ed.). Karachi: Oxford University Press. Awami National Party. (2013). Elections Manifesto 2013—Awami National Party. http:// awaminationalparty.org/main/?p=4554. Bennett-Jones, O. (2015). Pakistan’s MQM “received Indian funding”. BBC News. Retrieved June 24, 2015, from Sec. Asia. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33148880. Dawn. (2016). Nawaz at UNGA: Pakistan wants peace with India, urges resolution of Kashmir issue. DAWN.COM. Retrieved September 21, 2016 from http://www.dawn.com/news/1285192. Haider, I (2015). UNGA address: Nawaz proposes agenda to diffuse tensions with India. DAWN.COM. Retrieved September 30, 2015 from http://www.dawn.com/news/1209979. Khan, A. U. (2012). Siachen glacier: Getting past the deadlock. Islamabad: Spotlight, Institute of Regional Studies. Khan, S. (2016). ‘Pemra requests complete ban on Indian content. DAWN.COM. Retrieved October 18, 2016 from http://www.dawn.com/news/1290738. Khan, A. (2017). Indo-Pak relations: Views of Pakistan’s political and religious parties. Retrieved July 2, 2017 from http://pakpips.com/downloads/pdf/AhmedKhan-Indo-Pak-Parties-C&PS.pdf. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. (2013). National agenda for real change: Manifesto 2013’, 82. http://pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto.pdf. Qadir, S. (2002). An analysis of the kargil conflict 1999. RUSI Journal. Qureshi, W. A. (2017) Water as a human right: A case study of the Pakistan-India water conflict. Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, 5, 374. Rizvi, H. A. (2011). Pakistan-India relations. Old problems: New initiatives. Pakistan Institute of Legislative and Transparency. Retrieved August 12, 2011 from http://www.pildat.org/ publications/publication/FP/PakistanIndiaRelations-OldProblemsNewInitiatives.pdf. Saleem, F. (2016). Mukti Bahini, the forgotten terrorists. The News. Retrieved March 14, 2016 from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/105117-Mukti-Bahini-the-forgotten-terrorists. Shah, S. A. (2009). River boundary delimitation and the resolution of Sir Creek dispute between Pakistan and India. Vermont Law Review, 34, 357. The Express Tribune. (2017). LHC scraps PEMRA’s ban on airing of Indian dramas. The Express Tribune. Retrieved July 18, 2017 from https://tribune.com.pk/story/1460942/court-quashes-pemrasban-airing-indian-dramas/. Welle, D. (2017). Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan: The muslim Gandhi. DW.COM. Retrieved August 21, 2017 from http://www.dw.com/en/khan-abdul-ghaffar-khan-the-muslim-gandhi/a-6631555. Zulqar, S. (2016). Kashmir: Nature and dimensions of the conflict. Journal of Current Affairs, 1(1 & 2), 5–65.

Contemporary India–Sri Lanka Relations from Sri Lankan Perspectives S. Chaminda Padmakumara and S. M. D. P. Harsha Senanayake

Introduction This paper focuses on the contemporary Indo-Sri Lanka relations and highlights Sri Lankan perceptions on the bilateral relations between two nations while adopting insights from functionalism for a theoretical basis. Indo-Sri Lanka relations have been differently manifested by various factors over the time. In the contemporary context, the bulk of relief materials and active contributions of India at the first sign of natural disasters in Sri Lanka is a good indication of political and regional will of India to reach out the neighbourhood in South Asian region. Most of the regional powers and great powers all around the world released their aids to Sri Lanka, but India always took the priority and leading role during these disasters to help Sri Lanka. In such position of mutual cooperation. For the Indians, Sri Lanka is a major concern point in their foreign policy and confuses the island nation’s ability and proximity in the matter with larger issues of bilateral cooperation and Sri Lanka’s sovereignty rights to choose their development and strategic partners. This was a complex reality which is influencing the Indian diplomatic community. Somehow, the history of the relations between two nations suggests that it is subject to various political ambiguities. Hence, bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka are neither systematic nor identical. Although these bilateral relations are subject to constant changes, most of the instances evidently prove that relations between two countries in the politically sensitive areas are controversial and subject to various ambivalences.

S. C. Padmakumara (B) · S. M. D. P. H. Senanayake South Asian University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] S. M. D. P. H. Senanayake e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_13

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For instance, Indian military involvement and intervention in Sri Lankan civil war and particularly, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord which was signed in 1987 has largely contributed to these political ambiguities. The presence of about 100,000 Indian soldiers and other officials caused much concern among Sri Lankans of all communities while relations between two nations were more stressful.1 Under this agreement, India had committed itself to extend military assistance to Sri Lanka upon its request. Somehow, the cost of this intervention was very heavy for all the parties. More than 1200 Indian soldiers, including good number of officers, were killed and about 2500 were injured.2 “Above all several hundreds of civilians became causalities in the IPKFLTTE conflict and there was high discontentment regarding the operation among Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese alike.3 Despite the IPKF, fishery disputes between Tamil Nadu fishermen and Sri Lankan fishermen have been largely characterized by Tamil Nadu politics, and it has strained the bilateral relations of these two nations. It must be kept in mind that due to this fishery issue, poor fishermen on both sides have negatively affected.4 At the same time, these contradictory issues have largely shaped how citizens of both countries perceive relations between their nations. In contrast, relations in the areas of functional activities such as trade, education and tourism have been relatively successful. For example, India has made Sri Lanka as the largest trade partner in South Asia while India is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner at the global level. Trade between these two countries grew particularly rapidly after the entry into force of the India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000.5 This is a positive indication of the growth of bilateral relations between two nations, and also it has contributed to develop fellow-feeling of Sri Lankans towards India. In this context, functionalism provides useful theoretical insights into more pragmatic perspectives on how to perceive cooperation among countries. This idea can be similarly applied to the case of Indo-Sri Lanka relations. “The distinctive characteristic of functionalism is the fact that economic and social problems produce their own resolutions; the usefulness and efficiency of concrete, issue-specific (technical) cooperation and its outcomes legitimize international cooperation”.6 Accordingly, what functionalists centrally believe is an issue-specific or technical cooperation that derives from non-political domains or where politics play at threshold level and its effects will sustain international cooperation. This theoretical perspective has useful implications for studying Indo-Sri Lanka relations and how both nations perceive each other. In other words, it emphasizes the need of directing relations between two countries through a functional collaboration appealing to a low political domain. Therefore, this paper argues that bilateral trade, collaborative development framework, technocratic collaboration in various fields can play a significant role in strengthening Indo-Sri Lanka relations and can develop positive sentiments among 1 Balasooriya 2 Sahadevan

and Silva (1998), p. 619. and Singh (2005), p. 165.

3 Ibid. 4 Melegoda

(2018). of External Affairs (2017). http://mea.gov.in/portal/foreignrelation/sri_lanka.pdf. 6 Kurt (2009). 5 Ministry

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Sri Lankan. Finally, it explores that strategic avoidance of excessive dealing with politically sensitive affairs and drawing much focus on functional cooperation can better sustain Indo-Sri Lanka relations and build up positive public opinion.

Insights from Functionalism Before evaluating the contemporary Indo-Sri Lanka relations and Sri Lankan perceptions on the matter in the light of the functionalism, it is worth to have a brief conceptual overview of the functionalism. “More specifically, functionalism is a theoretical approach which emerged towards the middle of the past century as an alternative to federalist designs concerning the organization of international system”.7 Further functionalism looks at the human nature and development in a very positive manner in comparison with the state-centric paradigm of “power politics” or realist way of an account of world affairs. According to functionalism, human beings have to rationally decide about what their needs are”.8 In this point of view, it is clear that functionalism has suggested a need centric approach to the world politics instead of power-centric approach. “The distinctive characteristic of functionalism is the fact that economic and social problems produce their own resolutions; the usefulness and efficiency of concrete, issue-specific (technical) cooperation and its outcomes legitimized international cooperation”.9 Accordingly what functionalists centrally believe is an issue-specific or technical cooperation that derives from non-political domains or where the politics play at threshold level and its effects would sustain international cooperation. In other words, it is a low political agenda that look for the most appropriate “spark” for a cooperative framework which can incrementally move forward. Similarly, functionalism is all about how to be organized cooperatively with a functional necessity. More importantly in the other way, it is a way of a gradual process that initiates a cooperative attempt upon the “most desired and essential needs” of the nations. Therefore, this study argues that functionalism is a “pathway approach” to international or regional cooperation. Likewise, it is a functional logic that explains how to look for a “strategic preparation” which is based on technical needs of nations that ultimately establish a long way for cooperation among nations. In this context, functionalism provides useful insights into a more pragmatic approach towards relations between counties which can be similarly applied to the case of Indo-Sri Lanka relations. More importantly, it shows how Indo-Sri Lanka relations can be further sustained based on functional necessities of both countries. In other words, it emphasizes the need of directing relations between two countries through a functional collaboration appealing to a low political domain. In this sense, bilateral trade, collaborative development framework, technocratic collaboration in 7 Alexandrescu 8 Kurt 9 Ibid.

(2009).

(2007).

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various fields can play a significant role in strengthening Indo-Sri Lanka relations while creating numerous mutual benefits. Thus, it has been evidently shown throughout the history that cooperation between two countries in politically sensitive areas is passive and controversial. For an instance, during the civil war in Sri Lanka, specifically in the 1970s and early 1980s; developments in the Indian subcontinent played an important and multifaceted role, both active and passive in the genesis of the conflict. Further internal and regional political developments in South Asia critically shaped the dynamic of Indo-Sri Lankan relations.10 From this point of view, it is clear that relations between two countries in the politically sensitive domains are hard to compromise. In contrast, “in June 2002, India offered a credit line of $100 million to Sri Lanka for purchasing capital goods, consumer services and food items from India”.11 These statistics reveal that bilateral relations between two counties in non-political or functional areas have been successful than in the political sensitive areas during last two decades.

Political Verses Functional With these concerns, Sri Lanka has to maintain healthy and strategic partnerships with India since the Independent. Majority of the Sri Lankan cultivated positive relations with India on the basis of long historical ties between two nations until Indian mediation to Sri Lanka during 1987. The political and military intervention which took place in 1987 sophisticated suspicious in popular society in Sri Lanka. However, with all these controversial political decisions, Sri Lanka has sustained the positive relations with India mainly in functional areas. While other South Asian nations have strengthened their sovereignty and detached from each other Sri Lanka has emphasized its outreached policy by signing a free trade agreement with India. With the free trade agreement, both countries have strengthened their relations and trust with each other. Sri Lanka tends to maintain these free trade agreements and other trade agreements with India due to mutual benefits. Mainly Sri Lanka believes that trade agreements and the free trade will remove the mistrust between two nations. For instance, India and Sri Lanka signed the first free trade agreement between two nations in 1998. The idea of free trade amid two nations started in 1994; Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike and the Indian government had series of negotiations regarding the free trade agreement. Both nations realized the advantages of intraregional trading. Mainly as two neighbouring nations, India and Sri Lanka recognized the advantages of their geopolitical location and the possible space to develop trade between two nations. The strong interests on the trade relations between two nations motivated them to sign a free trade agreement in 1998. According to Sikri, this was a critical juncture of trade relations between two nations and he mentioned, that “the rapid development of the economy, trade and people to people ties between Sri Lanka and 10 Venugopal 11 Sahadevan

(2003). and Singh (2005), p. 168.

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India”.12 This achievement created hopeful prospects for Sri Lankans to build up confidence on India as a credible partner in its economic development. Moreover, many Sri Lankans perceived that the free trade agreement was a necessary element to the development of the economic process of both countries, although it was attached some negative factors which powerful enough to influence the local economies. The massive trade surface of Indian economy can influence the Sri Lankan market and meanwhile, the Indian leaders realized that the free trade agreement opened up the Indian market to commercial exports of Sri Lanka. For instance, through the free trade agreement, Indian market exposed to the tea exporters of Sri Lanka and it was directly influenced by the local tea industry of India. Somehow, before the free trade agreement balance of ratio of the trade between two nations was favoured to India and after the memorandum the favouritism down 15–5. This strengthened the Sri Lankan economy. In 1998, the balance of ratio was 16: 1. In 2005, it was indicated as 2.4: 1 in favour of Sri Lanka; additionally, Sri Lankan exports surface to India increased by 717% and Indian exports to Sri Lanka increased by 139% between 2001 and 2005.13 Indeed, this has convinced Sri Lankans to accept India as a beneficial economic partner while ignoring the existing political controversies between two nations. In the recent past, both countries reinforce their neighbouring policies. Mainly post-war Sri Lankan strongly directed to India again with fresh hopes. Mainly Sri Lanka and India signed few agreements to develop the Sri Lankan IT sector with the assistance of Indian government. This was a golden opportunity for Sri Lanka to develop their IT industry to a new level. Indian IT sector subjected to revolutionary transformation during last few decades and expanded their services to Western world from the regional level. With this massive development of the Indian IT field opened up its doors for Sri Lanka to enter into Indian IT world. In Sri Lankan perspective, this is a strategic opportunity to enhance local IT technology and its usage. These relations can transfer the development face of Sri Lanka with new technological advancements. The development activities of Sri Lanka need to melt with IT and technical aspects while addressing the national interests of the country. Therefore, the technical assistant programme between Sri Lanka and India is proving a considerable support. With respect to the opportunities in the services sector, the comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA) continues to be a sticky point for the Sri Lankan government and Sri Lankans while negotiating the ETCA with India. There has been a debatable issue in Sri Lanka about the need to “liberalize” services trade with India. The reason for the CEPA deal to fall through the cracks last year was primarily because the government refused to include “services” in the trade agreement fearing a backlash from certain quarters. The CEPA, a sequel to the India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) of 2000, was being negotiated between both sides for many years. Both the countries, however, plan to ink the ETCA agreement by the end of this year. 12 Sikri 13 Ray

(2009). (2011).

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The feeling among many IT professionals in Sri Lanka is that the pact, which allows free movement of IT professionals, would increase competition with their Indian counterparts, thereby affecting job opportunities for the locals. The apex body of professionals in Sri Lanka, the Organization of Professional Associations (OPA) has expressed its deep concern over the proposed ETCA arguing that “the island nation already has sufficient professional resources. A group called the Sri Lanka Solidarity Movement has also voiced its opposition to the ETCA saying that it would create a situation where Sri Lanka will be flooded with labourers and professionals from India”. 14 The “neighbourhood first policy” is the major striking feature of Prime Minister Modi government’s diplomatic approach in the modern-day foreign policy of India. According to this narrative and Indian government strategic imagination, India’s relations with neighbouring countries much receive the topmost priority. Sri Lankan government read the dynamics of International foreign policy amply and President Maithripala Sirisena reached to India as his first foreign visit after the election. Modi paid a return visit to Sri Lanka, and he was the first Indian PM visit Sri Lanka in 28 years. With these visits and recent relations between two nations, Sri Lanka has gained some strategic advantages. Mainly, Central Government of India paid for development projects in Jaffa City, including a speciality hospital. These infrastructure development programmes strengthen the relations between two nations and particularly highlighted the commitments of Sri Lankan government to develop the post-civil war society along with commitments over the reconciliation process. The contribution of the Indian government, Sri Lanka started a new ambulance service in main cities of Sri Lanka and these services and other development aids of Indian government highly appreciate by the Sri Lankan society. Apart from the development and infrastructure development programmes, Sri Lanka warmly welcomed Indian cooperation and assistance in tourism and education sectors. The tourism industry of Sri Lanka developed rapidly developed in last few years mainly after the civil war ended. Most of the tourists reached to Sri Lanka from India and Sri Lankan tourism promotion campaigns and Sri Lankan MOUs with Indian government increase the tourists flow to Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan government understands with India and particular states of India including Kerala, Goa strengthen the local tourist’s industry. Many of the foreigner’s visits to India visited Sri Lanka as well and particularly this took place under the commitments of common tourism development agenda. Sri Lankan traditional ties with China and Chinese strategic interests over Sri Lanka cultivated the doubt in Indian mindset. Chinese investments in Hambantota, Mattala and port city and few other major developments projects in Sri Lanka increased this mistrust. From Sri Lankan perspective, these investment projects increased Sri Lankan foreign loans and debts in a way and from the regional perspective it created a power corridor to China to enter the South Asian region. Though these relations subjected to controversial foreign policy debates, it strengthens Indo-Sri Lanka relations to some degree. The Modi government is determined 14 n.a.

(2016). agreement.

http://www.dailynews.lk/2016/02/07/political/india-sri-lanka-begin-talks-new-

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to improve its ties with Colombo. Modi’s visited Sri Lanka second time and was primarily aimed at reinforcing traditional ties with Sri Lanka to counter the Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Similarly, Sri Lankan higher diplomats including Prime Minister visited India frequently. With these diplomatic ties with and track two diplomacies, Sri Lanka and India are maintaining healthy and prosperous relations with each other, especially in factionalism areas. From the perspective of Sri Lanka, these relations created a strong image about Sri Lanka while opening the capital flows to Sri Lanka and its development agendas. Therefore, it seems that Sri Lankans have more expectations on functional cooperation between two countries that principally help Sri Lanka to achieve its economic development goals and to avoid controversial political issues between two nations.

New Scopes for Cooperation Sri Lanka–India relations changes after the establishment of the “Good Governance” government in January 2015 with a significant foreign policy change in Sri Lanka. Government allows more Indian presence in Sri Lankan domestic and foreign policy arena. For example, Sri Lanka provided Indian governments with exclusive access to strategic and economic resources through jeopardizing the autonomy of foreign policy decision-making. This provision emphasizes Sri Lanka’s willingness bandwagon foreign policy towards India for the next half a decade. Under trade and economic sectors, Sri Lanka allowed India to submit their interest in so-called Port City projects through make projects open for all nation by changing the agreements. On the other hand, this created a conflict of interest for China in South Asia. Not only that present government decided to go ahead with trade and professional labour exchange programme called ECTA even the government parties and public strongly against the policy. This was aimed to create a free labour movement between India and Sri Lanka. During last year GoSL decision to handover, the Hambantota port to China also created a bilateral issue, but GoSL has to neglect Indian opinion due to the domestic economic situation. Other than that Indian willingness to bring investment in domestic infrastructure projects are minimal. To counterbalance Hambantota port issue, Sri Lanka shows good faith through agreeing on strategic access related to airport and Trincomalee Harbour. Those need to be discussed at the bilateral level. Sri Lankans think decision related to those will make substantial public unrest may be negatively contribute to future elections. In very recently, Sri Lanka and India signed an agreement related to the development of KKT port as a northern port to facilitate the goods and public transport between Jaffna Peninsula and India. When it comes to political level, India is closely monitoring SL local political developments. For example, after recent Local Poll, India directly communicates and mediates with top government officials to continue the good governance government. On the other hand, India is facilitating reconciliation works in northern and other war-affected areas. At another level, cultural exchange will grow steadily for

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next five years unless big political issue. Previously, India was one of the top Sri Lankans destinations for religious and vacation (including Shopping). However, due to increase in act of violence done by LTTE sympathisers in North India many Sri Lankans were trying to avoid the southern India shopping areas. This might be a big issue for the Indian tourism industry. Other than that, alternative travel destinations in Southeast Asia becoming more popular and attractive than India presently. Sri Lankan believes that GoSL regulations related to the Cinema and dubbing teledramas will make jiff hassle for the Indian movie industry since many will limit or use alternatives than India mega teledramas. On the other hand, Sri Lankan youth will adopt more Indian cultural features than before. For instance, Holi celebration is very famous among youth due to it attraction.

Perceptions on Power and Regional Autonomy The history of the relations between two respective nations can be traced back a long period. Both countries have marked their close relationships in trade, cultural and various other sectors. On the other hand, these bilateral transactions have been largely shaped by both geographical and historical factors. To elaborate, close geographical proximity, cultural similarities and historical bonds between two nations have laid a strong foundation for sustaining bilateral trades. In the contemporary context, as sovereign nations, two nations have formalized their trade linkages through various treaties and agreements. Although the two countries have faced controversial issues over time, the functional integrations have been gradually developed. Sri Lankans mainly think that Indo-Sri Lanka relations are inherently based on its geological proximity. Sri Lanka, being a small island, close but separated to India, entirely has made Sri Lanka’s faith and positioning as a state. In terms of contemporary relations, Sri Lankan believes that either countries’ continue their relations, keeping this geological proximity as a condition, which determine the nature of the relationship. In a globalized world, where democracy is concerned as the main pillar, and the contemporary relations between Indo-Sri Lanka has gone beyond super power–small power relations. Sri Lanka, even though many people would think, has to be all under India all the time, due to its asymmetrical power balance, proved again that problems with India needs to resolve with a greater level of diplomatic effort. However, this is not to say that Sri Lanka is in a position to go beyond the fact that India itself is a superstate (at least regionally); but Sri Lanka can negotiate with India, if it is done in a pragmatic, strategic and diplomatic way. In Sri Lankan perception, Sri Lanka always needs to remember the fact that, among those conditions that we exist, the foremost one is our geological location. This is an unchangeable fact that even though we did not choose, we happen to remain as an unequal small state underneath India, in the world map. Given our internal facts, the small market, resources, economic difficulties, political instabilities, ethnic rivalries, Sri Lanka is not in any position to make India completely unhappy. In my opinion, whatever we decide together with India, it has to be done in a smart way, keeping

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these facts in the mind. The ideal way as I assume would be having greater bilateral relations. Even though the extremist groups would protest with popular anti-Indian sentiments, in reality, Sri Lanka should not jeopardize its bilateral relations with India. In balancing India, I as a Sri Lankan citizen do not think, increasing relations with another superpowers are a bad idea. In a way it is a very smart idea. Also, people believe that Sri Lanka needs to increase its bilateral relations with other countries in the subregion further, for a healthy regional cooperation.

Conclusion and Discussion While sharing common historical ties, India and Sri Lanka both were enjoying privileges of cooperation from centuries. Geographical proximity along with cultural and religious ties have corresponded to generate strong as well as healthy relations between both countries in different spares such as economy, politics, diplomacy and cultural. These historical narratives have been shaping how Sri Lankans perceive Indo-Sri Lanka relations in multiple ways. However, what Sri Lankans’ believe is some of the major political changes occurred in both countries in recent years have triggered a spirited debate on the future prospects of Indo-Lanka bilateral relations. Historical picture of political relation among two states has experienced ups and downs in several situations. For an instance, in 1980s, Tamil question led some adverse effects on the bilateral relations and the same trend has pronounced in recent years regarding the fisheries issue. The central belief of Sri Lankans regarding India’s involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict lies on the Tamil Nadu political dynamism and its political pressure on the Central Government of India. Apart from that, Sri Lanka’s mounting dependency on China has also intensified the debate over Indo-Lanka relations. However, the perceptions of Sri Lankans on this Chinese involvement and its impact on Indo-Sri Lanka relations have been relatively more sensitive among academia, media personals and politicians, but not among the general public to the same extent. Furthermore, China’s influence in Sri Lanka is dramatically increasing in various traits like political, economic and diplomatic areas. This scenario has yield to generate amount of uncertainty in India on the subject of the emerging China’s role as an extra regional power. Nevertheless, regime changed occurred in Sri Lanka during 2008 has shed some compelling view on the Indo-Sri Lanka relations. President Maithripala Sirisena visited Indian Prime Minister several times regarding the accelerating the bilateral relations among two states. The two countries also signed an agreement on cultural cooperation. This agreement planned for 2015–18 envisages enhancing cooperation in a variety of fields including performing arts, libraries, archives and documentation, publications and professional exchange. Indeed, these initiatives have created new hopes among Sri Lankans and they consider these trends as new momentums for further cooperation between two countries. Moreover, on the other hand, both counties have taken the necessary measure to ease the ethnic tension among Tamil people and Sinhalese. This has led to a

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positive change in Sri Lankan. In regional perspective, both countries participated in several multilateral organizations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme, South Asian Economic Union and BIMSTEC. All these organizations aim to enhance their commerce. Having said that, with emergence of China, as the regional power India’s concerns for regional security and stability have begun to swing. Taking all into the account, it can be clearly stated that majority of Sri Lankans think that there is need of balancing the diplomatic relations between China and India. As a developing island state situated in the critically important Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka will need to have the assistance of both of these regional powers. Sri Lankans believe that, bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka have been differently characterized by the various factors over the time. However, what history suggests is that bilateral relations between two countries in politically sensitive areas are passive and controversial. It is evidently present in the Indo-Sri Lanka relations during the civil war in Sri Lanka. Likewise, there are many more other instances. In the contemporary period, specifically during the last decade, both countries have looked for a more pragmatic approach towards bilateral relations focusing on functional necessities of two counties. As a result of that, bilateral trade, technical collaboration and service sector cooperation have been significantly improved. More specifically trade relations between two countries have constructively shaped the bilateral relations. In other words, bilateral relations in non-political areas such as trade, tourism and technical cooperation have shown a considerable progress more than its political engagement during the recent decade. With the theoretical insights from functionalism, this study has argued that IndoSri Lanka relations can be further sustained by looking at common functional necessities between two countries. As argued by functionalists, cooperation in low-political domains with common functional interests can be further moved towards deeper cooperation. Therefore, both countries should identify and select the most important functional areas through which they can achieve mutual benefits with less political controversies. Trade relations, investments, tourism and energy sector collaboration education and technical cooperation would be the most optimal areas that would help both nations to achieve more effective and deeper functional cooperation. Probably, these areas may create numerous possibilities for both nations to strengthen their bilateral relations. At the same time, the study suggests that two countries should constructively manage the politically sensitive issues that would negatively affect the bilateral relations. Hence, such political sensitiveness should not be completely overlooked and it should be carefully handled by both countries. Finally, the study suggests that the “functional turn” in contemporary Indo-Sri Lanka relations is a positive development through which both counties can be mutually benefited with functional achievements. In this way, Indo-Sri Lanka relations would be stronger and more mutually beneficial. Therefore, the study suggests both nations should look for high functional utility in areas such as trade, tourism and IT sector while carefully managing political sensitive issues. This approach will help both nations to direct their bilateral relations towards

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the “right balance” where they can increase mutual cooperation while strategically avoiding political controversies.

References Alexandrescu, M. (2007). David Mithani from federalism to functionalism. Transylvanian Review, 16(1), 20. Balasooriya, T., & Silva, B. (1998). Sri Lanka and India relations. Economic and Political Weekly, 23(21), 619–627. Kurt, U. (2009). Europe of Monnet, Schuman and Mitrany: A historical glance to the EU from the functional perspectives. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 2(2), 45. Melegoda, N. (2018). In C. A. Josukutty & J. Prabhash (Eds.), India’s bilateral relations and foreign policy (p. 15). New Delhi: New Century Publications. Ministry of External Affairs. (2017). Indo-Sri Lanka relations. Retrieved August 7, 2017. n.a. (2016). India Sri Lanka to begin talk on new agreement. Daily News (Lake House, Colombo), February 7, 2016. http://www.dailymirror.lk/110600/Can-more-services-trade-withIndia-benefit-Sri-Lanka-. Ray, J. K. (2011). India’s foreign relations 1947–2007. New York: Routledge Publishers. Sahadevan, P., & Singh, S. (2005). India and neighbors. New Delhi: CNF. Sikri, R. (2009). Challenges and strategy: Rethinking Indian foreign policy. California: SAGE Publications. Travel & Tourism: Economic Impact 2017—Sri Lanka. World Travel & Tourism Council. Retrieved December 11, 2017 from https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/ countries-2017/srilanka2017.pdf. Venugopal, R. (2003). The global dimensions of conflicts in Sri Lanka. QEH working paper Series PS99, p. 11.

Part III

India in South Asia

India as Soft Power Farooq Sulehria

Increasingly, India’s soft power is being acknowledged in academic as well as journalistic discourses. For instance, Deputy International Editor at Time magazine, IndianAmerican journalist Bobby Ghosh lyrically penned his personal account how he saved his life by referring to Bollywood star Shammi Kapoor when a gun-totting 1 Saddam Hussain loyalist was about to shoot him. Likewise, noted Indian journalist Shekhar Gupta has documented the inclusion of film star Dev Anand in a peace delegation Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, led to Pakistan. Anand was included in the delegation mere because Mr. Vajpai’s counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, was a Dev Anand fan. According to Gupta, Dev Anand’s trip to Lahore dominated official visit as he became focus of media attention. The media were in particular hyped up when Mr. Anand brought TV cameras to the spot in Government College, Lahore, his alma mater, where he first kissed 2 a girl. Liberal Pakistani journalist Khaled Ahmed also acknowledges India’s “soft power”. India’s soft power, Ahmed observes, has not merely conquered an otherwise Jihadist Pakistan but has also disarmed textbook-poisoned Pakistani mind. In his view, India itself is not aware of positivity generated by the Bollywood stars, 3 particularly Punjabi-speaking actors, when they visit Pakistan. Beyond journalism,

1 Ghosh

(2011). (2016). 3 Ahmed (2016). 2 Gupta

F. Sulehria (B) Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS University of London, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] F. Sulehria Beaconhouse National University, Lahore, Pakistan © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_14

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India’s soft power has increasingly engaged academics. See inter alia Kugiel (2016),4 Heng (2016),5 Thussu (2013),6 Blarel (2012),7 Tharoor (2012),8 Malone (2011).9 The scholarly discourses on India’s soft power compliment an expanding repertoire on India as an emerging power or member of the BRICS family. In the face of glaring facts, the above discourses appear credible. Imagine the case of Zee TV, India’s leading television network. Accessible in 172 countries, Zee network of India offers a bouquet of 39 global channels, 13 of them in non-Indian languages. In AsiaPacific region, Zee Sine, Zee Phim and Zee Bioskop are offering content in Vietnamese, Philippine and Indonesian languages, respectively. Arabic-language Zee Aflan has emerged as the third largest film channel in the Middle East and North African region. Zee Bollymovies and Zee Magic are catering to African audiences in English- and French-dubbed entertainment fare. In Europe, Russian and German language channels have been launched. In America, Zee offers 25 dish channels including Spanish-language Zee Mundo and Zee Aflan. As of 2017, Zee had 21 international subsidiaries. Zee generated a revenue to the tune of INR 15,905 million ($243 million) out of India in a total income of INR 64,341 million ($983 million) while proceeds worth INR 48,437 million ($740 million) were generated domestically.10 Understandably, Harsh Pant, at King’s College London, suggests that India must focus on the efforts to emerge as a global soft power.11 However, the question is, can India become a global soft power? Can India’s presumed soft power catapult India to the status of global power? Without underselling the significance of Indian soft power, this chapter argues that India’s soft power is commensurate with its subimperial status and merely soft power cannot project India to the status of a global power. I argue this because soft power, as has been repeatedly stressed, is hardly effective without hard power. Secondly, Indian soft power can only secure India’s semi-peripheral interests as long as it continues playing second fiddle to metropolitan/American soft power. As a digression, this chapter flags up the class bias inherent in the notion of soft power: Indian underclasses and low castes are excluded from the construction as well as proposed benefits soft power supposedly generates. This chapter proceeds in the following manner: it delineates the notions of soft power and subimperialism in Sect. 2 before establishing the core preposition of this chapter through the case study of Indian television and film sectors in Sect. 3. Before concluding this chapter, I will flag up the class bias in the notion of India’s soft power. However, the chapter begins by succinctly X-raying the relevant literature on Indian soft power. 4 Kugiel

(2016). (2016). 6 Thussu (2013). 7 Blarel (2012). 8 Tharoor (2012). 9 Malone (2011). 10 Zee Entertainment (2017) 11 Pant (2015). 5 Heng

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Literature Review Initially, a passionate case to deploy soft power to gain “true leadership in the world” is pleaded by Shashi Tharoor, India’s former Minister of State for External Affairs. In Tharoor’s view, India’s real strength lies in its soft power springing forth from her plural culture, history and nature of the country. Flagging up Bollywood productions, Mahatma Gandhi, yoga and cricket as the signposts of Indian global attraction, he draws attention to the fact that Indian restaurants in England employ more workers than iron and steel, coal, and ship-building industries combined. He, therefore, dismisses sceptics who argue that economic liberalisation or globalisation would arrive India with a cultural and food imperialism, whereby Bharatanatyam and bhelpuri will be displaced by Baywatch and burgers. That the Indians have been drinking Coca-Cola without coca-colonised is a sign of Indian resilience, Tharoor argues. Since Big Macs, according to Tharoor, would never outnumber masala dosas in sales, he concludes India need not worry about McDonald’s or MTV. Ironically, he even discredits Joseph Nye by declaring soft power originally an Indian invention. He triumphantly draws attention to Gandhian strategy of non-violence and satyagraha as a classic use of soft power to gain Indian independence, long before “Joseph Nye was a glean in his mother’s eye”.12 A similar case for harnessing India’s soft power to project India as a global power has been pleaded by Daya Kishan Thussu at London’s Westminster University. “In a globalized networked environment, an emerging power like India can promote its soft power effectively to legitimize and disseminate its economic and political power and its aspirations for a greater say in global governance”, Thussu observes.13 According to Thussu’s optimistic perspective, the entire development discourse can be redefined and reshaped by strapping up Indian presence in sectors such as multilateral bureaucracies, the international NGO sector, and the development communication field. Hence, New Delhi can replace New York.14 He identifies the following sources of Indian soft power: benign history/civilisation, Diaspora, cultural industries (notably Bollywood) and achievements in the IT sector. There are also suggestions in the penultimate chapter to brand such products as yoga, cricket, tourism and Indian cuisine. In unencrypted words: India, hitherto unaware of its cultural and civilisational capital, requires to exploit soft power assets at a global scale commensurate with its rising economic and political status.15 Founded on Hindu–Buddhist cultural planks, Indian civilisation has benefitted from an interaction with Islam and the West; hence, India is uniquely placed to offer perspective on international interactions. In fact, the moment has already arrived to turn the gaze/discourse to proclaim Machiavelli as “the European Chanakya?” in order to “provincialise Europe”.16 12 Tharoor

(2012), “India”, 332–348. Communicating India, 194. 14 Ibid., 195 15 Ibid., 7. 16 Ibid., 188–189. 13 Thussu,

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David Malone (2011: 39)17 delineates India as an highly attractive country internationally owing to such soft power features as political inclusivity and its plurality. Nicolas Blarel,18 however, justifiably, points out the conceptual difficulties in determining India’s soft power. After all, “the conceptual relationship between hard and soft power remain unclear”. Patryk Kugiel’s recent India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy is the latest addition to a growing scholarly trope for India’s soft power. Kugiel conceptualises Indian soft power unlike other national expressions of soft power. Indian soft power, Kugiel argues, seems more benign and less offensive, and it operationalises through inspiration instead of projection.19 Roopa Swaminathan maps, in the context of soft power, the popularity of Bollywood productions in the former USSR, the Middle East, Africa and recent entry to the USA and east Asia. She argues that only Bollywood has the potential to unsettle the Hollywood monopoly.20 While a critique of the above works will be incorporated in the following sections, I will begin by conceptualising soft power and subimperialism, two notions that provide spine to the argument advanced in this chapter.

Understanding Soft Power and Subimperialism According to Nye Jr. himself, he conceptualised “soft power” in 1990 in his tome Bound to Lead to contest the then-mainstream notion that the US power was in decline by showing that the USA was not merely strongest militarily and economically but “also in a third dimension”. The so-called third dimension was described as “soft power”. He returned to the notion of soft power in his The Paradox of American Power (2001), “a book that cautioned against triumphalism, the opposite error from the declinism”.21 However, spurred on by friends and critiques, he expanded and developed the notion of soft power in his 2004 work, Soft Power: The Means To Success in World.22 In 2004, he defined soft power in the following terms: “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its examples, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it…This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them”. It is “power of attraction and seduction”. It is the “indirect way to get what you want” without “tangible threats or pay offs”.23

17 Malone,

“Soft Power”, 39 “India”, 28 19 Kugiel, India’s Soft Power, 195 20 Swaminathan (2017). 21 Nye (2004), xi 22 Ibid., xii. 23 Ibid., 5. 18 Blarel,

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And what are the sources of a given country’s soft power? Nye identifies three of them: its culture, its political values (when these values are upheld domestically and internationally) and its foreign policies (when seen as legitimate and morally authoritative) (ibid.: 11). A few years down the line, Nye made another attempt to succinctly characterise the soft power: “This is soft power: getting the outcomes one wants by attracting others rather than manipulating their material incentives. It co-opts people rather than coerce them…Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others to want what you want”.24 He warns that soft power should not be confused with influence “though it is one source of influence”.25 And finally, he posits the concept of smart power: “The ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy is smart power”.26 Since the notion of soft power and smart power has been too mainstreamed to deserve any further elaboration, I will rather focus below on the notion of subimperialism, a concept often marginalised in scholarly discourses. Subimperialism refers to “the stage of monopolies and finance capital in the dependent capitalism of the periphery countries”.27 To quote Mathias Luce, it is the highest stage of dependent capitalism. It is a policy of projecting economic power out of territorial borders albeit at a regional level.28 Theories of subimperialism are a part of a wider theoretical genre, viz. theory of imperialism. Some observers in the 1960s and the 1970s, among them the Brazilian sociologist Mauro Marini,29 argued that Brazil had achieved a kind of local economic and political power, albeit with fundamental structural limitations, that was analogous in some respects—while subordinated—to the hemispheric economic predominance of the USA. This stage in the Third World countries has been possible only after the attainment of political independence which has brought about sufficient preconditions for the emergence of subimperialism.30 Analysing the case of Brazil, for instance, Marini emphasised the ideological premeditation with which the Brazilian military state had adopted the role of a “centre” from which imperialist expansion in Latin America would radiate.31 Identifying Brazil’s development as a manifestation of imperialism, Marini characterised Brazilian subimperialism as “the extension of North American imperialism”.32 Therefore, in a way while subimperialism theories cast off Gunder Frank’s initial centre-periphery paradigm, they also validate the widely quoted definition of dependency by Dos Santos which asserts that the dependent country’s economy is “conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy” that the depen24 Nye

(2010), 29. 31. 26 Ibid., 43. 27 Varynen and Herrera (1975) 28 Luce (2015). 29 Marini (1965). 30 Varynen and Herrera, “Subimperialism”, 165 31 Marini, “Brazilian”, 21 32 Ibid., 26 25 Ibid.,

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dent country can expand and be self-sustaining only as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, “which may have either a positive or a negative effect upon their immediate development”.33 An oft-quoted illustration of the subimperialist phenomenon was the relationship Brazil had with Paraguay. According to Varynen and Herrera, while Brazilian cultural mission has hegemony over the philosophy and education departments of Paraguay universities, North America runs Brazilian higher education. Likewise, while the Paraguay military receives advice from Pentagon technicians as well as Brazilian generals, Brazilian military, in turn, is subservient to Pentagon. On the same pattern, through open contraband channels, Brazil’s industrial products dominate the Paraguayan market while the denationalised factories in Sao Paolo, producing these products, have been bought over by the US corporations.34 Subimperialism, as in the instance of Brazil–Paraguay, implies two basic components: on the one hand, a medium organic composition on the world scale of the national productive apparatus, and, on the other, the exercise of a relatively autonomous expansionist policy, which is not only accompanied by a greater integration in the imperialist productive system, but also is maintained under the hegemony exercised by imperialism on an international scale.35 More concretely, as Daniel Zirker points out, the subimperialist process basically embodies s state-led strategy to boast industrial export. This strategy in a way mirrors the pattern of capital export by a metropolitan country. This strategy ultimately entails an unequal exchange with another even underdeveloped country in the periphery.36 While Marini explored the case of Brazil, others applied the concept to India, Iran of the 1970s, Israel, South Africa, Portugal and Canada. For instance, Feroz Ahmed37 assigned the emergence of subimperialism to an era of acute crisis in the imperial bloc and relative loss of US global supremacy. This crisis necessitated new forms and methods to maintain an imperial domination. Hence, Ahmed argues certain resource-rich and strategically located countries were encouraged by imperialism as watchdogs in different regions.38 However, Varynen and Herrera assigned centrality to the economic factor. They acknowledge that “subimperialism is in other words military control by dominant actors through go-between armies, economic exploitation through go-between corporations and banks as well as political domination through go-between political elites”.39 But they point out that it would be misleading to assume that various dimensions of subimperialism carry equal importance. Instead, they have delineated a certain hierarchy between them, whereby the economic aspects of subimperialism are assigned centrality merely because the global structures that allow subimperi-

33 Do

Santos (1970) and Herrera, “Subimperialism”, 166. 35 Marini (1978). 36 Zirker (1994). 37 Ahmed (1973). 38 Ibid., 10. 39 Varynen and Herrera, “Subimperialism”, 170–171. 34 Varynen

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alism to operate have been shaped by the economic factors. They view the role of military and political control as a guarantee to sustain this structure. Hence, while subimperialism implies a trichotomy consisting of a three-tier dependence chain: centre, subimperialist countries and periphery, subimperialism is an element of the dominance structure of the international system and not an aberration. Subimperialist countries serve as nodal points in the global South for imperialist capital accumulation. “In other words, subimperialist actors are conceived as intermediaries in the relations between centre and periphery when they are simultaneously both dominant and dominated units; more dominated than dominant, however”.40 But the emergence of subimperialism requires certain preconditions born out of an ensemble of subjective and objective factors. “Dependence is a variable condition subjected to change according to time and context”.41 Imperialism reinvents itself and conceives new methods to skim surplus value and resources off the periphery. However, local ruling elites have to be incorporated in this process which lends the native rulers a “bargaining” power.42 Their bargaining power is “determined by the abundance of natural resources, the local development of the productive forces, the class basis of the local government and the relative importance of the country in the regional context”. Attempts at independent development, on the contrary, “always risk violent overthrows of governments, military interventions, subversive and economic blockade” etc. One may cite the cases of Chile, Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Indonesia, Brazil, Iran and Cuba in this regard. Hence, under especially favourable conditions, “the dependent local capital enjoys a capital accumulation process, as a meager share of the whole imperial ravage. The super exploitation of the labour force, the monopolization of the economy, and the existence of abundant natural resources are the very basis of such a process”.43 Can India, the case study in this essay, be characterised as a subimperial country? A subimperial country has three defining characteristics: firstly, a dependence on one or more than one core countries; secondly, economic and military capability outsizing most neighbouring countries in the region; finally, a policy of economic, political and military expansion in the region.44 Vayrynen defines a subimperial country “as an actor which exerts a regional hegemony akin to the global dominance of an imperial power, but at a subsystematic level”. While it dominates a region, “still being subordinate to major actors at the centre of global feudal networks”.45 How does India fit into this frame? As an economy, India ranks as the seventh largest in the world by nominal GDP and third largest by purchasing power parity (PPP). Subimperial countries are at least three times bigger in terms of their economic size than an average developing 40 Ibid.,

165. 171. 42 McMichael et al. (1974). 43 Varynen and Herrera, “Subimperialism”, 171. 44 Varynen (1979). 45 Ibid., 350. 41 Ibid.,

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country.46 National Intelligence Council, a US government’s think tank, estimated that India would be world’s fourth largest economy by 2015.47 India’s share in world military expenditure in 2014 was 2.8% (seventh largest, it was ninth largest in 2013). By importing arms worth $50 billion in 2014, India spent 2.4% of its GDP in this category.48 Finally, as an expansionist power and regional hegemon, India has militarily intervened in the neighbouring countries. For instance, Indian military intervened in 1971 to facilitate Bangladesh’s liberation struggle. In 1975, it militarily incorporated Sikkim. Indian troops were stationed in Sri Lanka to help Sri Lanka quell the Tamil guerrilla movement. Besides engaging in military interventions and military conflicts in the region, India has treaty relations with less assertive neighbours. For instance, the treaty relations with Sikkim49 (before it was incorporated in India) and Bhutan are generously in favour of India.50 With Nepal, India signed Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship that turned Nepal to a buffer zone against China. Likewise, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed between newly formed Bangladesh and India, in 1972, was restatement of Indo-Nepal Treaty. In this manner, Varynen claims India has cultivated a little empire of its own at South Asian level by way of dominated interdependence instead of coercive measures.51 A caveat is in place here. Despite apparent similarities between the notion of subimperialism and semi-periphery, there is a difference between the two. Semiperiphery is a concept attributed to World-systems theory (WST) elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein. In WST, semi-periphery plays the role of a depolarising entity. In contrast, subimperialism reproduces and reinforces global inequalities at the regional level. Secondly, semi-periphery has existed according to WST since the sixteenth century while subimperialism is a post-World War II phenomenon. Likewise, the element of dependency is a central element in subimperial characterisation, but it is not assigned a primacy in WST. Even importantly: the unit of analysis in WST is the entire globe, while in the notion of subimperialism, grounded in dependency school and Marxist theories of imperialism, a nation state/country is the unit of analysis. Since neither the aim nor the scope of this paper allows a comparison between semi-periphery and subimperialism, suffice to flag up the possibility that the case of India can also be explored from the perspective of semi-periphery if WST lens is deployed. However, the next section, in line with the aim of this chapter, explores Indian soft power by deploying the subimperialism’s lens.

46 Ibid. 47 Drezner

(2007). (2017). 49 Chaunan (1975). 50 Narayan (1972). 51 Varynen, “Economic”, 358. 48 SIPRI

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Soft Power Commensurate with Subimperial Status? All the talk of India’s soft power in the last decade is not coincidental. India’s foreign policy elite, Christian Wagner argues,52 aspires a global status mirroring India’s rising position in the global economy. These aspirations have translated into certain concrete actions. For instance, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), founded in 1950, has radically expanded its global outreach. By 2017, it had a network of ICCR branches in 35 countries. In 2006, a Public Diplomacy Division was established in India’s Ministry of External Affairs. A year before, India contributed $38 million to UN Democracy Fund, second most generous donation after the USA.53 In 2015, Modi-led BJP government constituted $20,000 International Sanskrit Award to promote Sanskrit language and Modi government zealously lobbied at the UNO for an international yoga day.54 At regional level, a host of initiatives have been launched. For instance, the 1996 SAARC Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), free trade agreement with Sri Lanka in 1998 and Afghanistan’s membership of SAARC in 2007 besides a number of concessions for weaker SAARC economies speak of Indian attempts to assert smart if not soft power in its neighbourhood.55 However, it is indeed hard to suggest if these attempts at projecting Indian soft power have achieved any tangible results. Blarel points out that foreign investment flows ($16 billion during the 1990s) have dramatically increased ($13 billion in 2006–07 alone) but one cannot say with any certainty if soft power engendered the hike in these flows.56 Therefore, critics (such as Blarel and Wagner) of India’s soft power have repeatedly levelled the critique that in general has been mounted in the case of Nye’s original conceptualisation of soft power. Soft power cannot be projected in the absence of hard power. It is smart power, not soft power that counts. It is a fact even Tharoor57 and Kugiel58 acknowledge who otherwise have vigorously advocated the use of soft power as the jack for lifting India off its low global ranking as a power. On this count, i.e. exercise of smart power, India’s balance sheet is a diverse assortment of failures and achievements reflecting, in fact, her subimperial status. In the first place, unlike other subimperial powers such as Brazil, South Africa, Israel and (possibly) Turkey, India is neighboured by China, a rival characterised as subimperial by some and emerging imperialism by others.59 Secondly, India has not been able to establish itself as an unchallenged subimperial power. For instance, despite a military victory over Pakistan in 1971, Simla Accord “did not include a 52 Wagner

(2010). “India”, 31. 54 Pant, “India”. 55 Wagner, “India’s”. 56 Blarel, “India”, 32. 57 Tharoor (2012), “India”, 341, Tharoor (2007), “Land”, 2007. 58 Kugiel, India’s Soft Power, 196. 59 See, for instance, Gilbert Achcar, International. 53 Blarel,

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permanent solution of the Kashmir issue on India’s terms”.60 The case of post-9/11 Afghanistan shows that India cannot back its soft power with hard power. While India has committed over two billion dollars, since 2001, to facilitate reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan—lyrically described by Kugiel61 as the epitome of Indian soft power—it has belligerently refused committing any boots on ground. Though, as George Perkovich highlights, India has achieved autonomy (“this capacity to do things on one’s own”) “to its great credit” yet: “it cannot make other important states comply with Indian demands. Nor can India obtain all that it desires in the international arena”.62 For instance, India teamed up with BRICS cousins to consolidate its position in the WTO negotiations.63 Indian aspirations to find a permanent berth on UNSC remain elusive, while China continues frustrating New Delhi’s efforts to isolate Pakistan, a country proving yet another stumbling block to India’s rise as a global hegemon. What about Indian potential in terms of smart power? After all India is a nuclear power. It is invited to Group of 8 (G8) and G20 meetings along with other emerging economies. Would not these factors extrapolate India to a high position in global hierarchy? The answer requires a brief analysis of approaches to power. Scholars of international relations have deployed the following approaches to assess the power of a country: 1. National power approach: power as resources available to a country; 2. Relational power approach: the power of A to make B do A’s bidding; 3. Power transition approach: depicts power as the ability to persuade an opponent to comply with one’s demands; 4. Third-dimensional approach: power as an observable policy-making mechanism; 5. Compulsory power and institutional power: the former refers to “direct control of one actor over the conditions of existence and the actions of other”. The latter implies an actor’s “indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others”. The above approaches have informed a few methods to empirically gauge the power of a country. In every approach, the economic size and military might of a country will matter as well as its natural resources and other factors such as population and geography. For instance, national power approach measures the national power through composite index of national capability (CINC) by applying the following formula:  CINC  (TRP, UPR, ISPR, ECR, MER, MPR)/6

60 Wagner,

“India’s”, 65. India’s Soft Power, 174. 62 Perkovich (2003). 63 Wagner, “India’s”, 68. 61 Kugiel,

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Table 1 India scores 3rd slot in Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) rankings owing to a large population CINC rank CINC score China USA India Japan

1 2 3 4

1.00000 0.71583 0.36985 0.21490

Russia

5

0.19777

Source Index of National Power

where TRP  total population of country ratio; UPR  urban population of country ratio; ISPR  iron and steel production of country ratio; ECR  primary energy consumption ratio; MER  military expenditure ratio; MPR  military personnel ratio. By deploying CINC method, India emerges as the third largest power (thanks to its population size). However, it is much behind China (Table 1). However, if the criterion of National Power Index (NPI) that measures basic national capacity is applied, India ranks 23rd, behind such countries as Sweden (19) and Switzerland (22). Yet another criterion would be to judge the economic might of the India-origin corporations. This criterion, according to Sean Starrs, invalidates previous criteria because “national accounts are no longer adequate for the power as resources”. In this age of globalisation, Starrs claims we must investigate the multinationals themselves because in the 1950s, “corporations home-based in particular country operated predominantly within the boundaries of that country, so it made sense to treat the weight of a country’s GDP”. However, with the expansion of Western corporation, Starrs contends, into the domestic markets worldwide, “this equivalency between the relative weights of a nation’s GDP and of corporations domiciled in that nation begins to break down”.64 Starrs has tabulated the national distribution of profit across 25 broad sectors of the top 2000 global corporations, according to Forbes ranking. The findings show that Triad simply dominate almost every sector, BRICS appear as distant runner-up, while India appears only once in the third-tier countries. India is dwarfed by countries such as Sweden and Switzerland. The former appears at least four times while the latter nine times.65 (media-related findings will be presented below). Starrs’s findings convincingly point to India’s subimperial role. It has multinationals (like Brazil, South Korea, Saudi Arabia) among the top 2000 league dominating the 25 sectors monitored by Starrs but only as very marginal players. Likewise, India’s military status mirrors its subimperial character. It has a huge military, is one of the biggest arms importers, and is among the 15 highest spending states in terms of military expenditures. However, it is a net importer of weapons. Indian military exports are negligible compared to its imports. One may also highlight 64 Starrs 65 Ibid.,

(2013). 822.

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Table 2 Top ten countries with highest military expenditures, in terms of world share, in 2016

10 highest spending states in 2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

USA China Russia S. Arabia India France UK Japan

36% 13% 4.1% 3.8% 3.3% 3.3% 2.9% 2.7%

9

Germany

2.4%

10

S. Korea

2.2%

Source SIPRI (2017) Table 3 World’s top ten exporters and importers of major weapons 2011–15 Biggest importers and exporters of weapons Exporter

Share (%)

Importer

Share (%)

1 2 3 4 5

USA Russia China France Germany

33 23 6.2 6.0 5.6

India Saudi Arabia UAE China Algeria

13 8.2 4.6 4.5 3.7

6

UK

4.6

Turkey

3.3

7

Spain

2.8

Australia

3.3

8

Italy

2.7

Iraq

3.3

9 10

Ukraine Israel

2.6 2.3

Pakistan Vietnam

3.2 3.0

Source SIPRI (2017)

the fact that Indian military expenditures are dwarfed by China let alone the USA and EU club (Tables 2 and 3). None of the indicators above suggest that a case can be made that India commands a smart power capable of catapulting it to the status of a global power at par with metropolitan countries. In fact, India is outbid by China and Russia in terms of smart power. However, India definitely emerges as a second-tier soft power even if, ironically, The Soft Power 30, a project run by USC Centre on Public Diplomacy, does not even study India for its ranking. Still, as demonstrated above, journalists and scholars go on uncritically projecting Bollywood as a major source of Indian soft power. While India as a major film producer justifiably deserves a mention, this status does not translate into economic gains (hard aspect of the smart power). For instance, in 2004, India produced 750 fea-

India as Soft Power Table 4 Top 15 media and entertainment (M&E) industries in the world in 2011. India shared last slot with Netherlands

229 S. No

Country

($ bn)

1 2

USA Japan

363 173

3 4

China Germany

89 72

5 6 7

UK France Italy

69 61 37

8 9 10 11 12

Canada Brazil South Korea Australia Spain

35 35 34 31 22

13 14 15

Russia India Netherlands

20 17 17

Source CII-PwC (2012: 5)

ture films per year compared to 400 in the USA.66 But in the same year, India’s share in the global film market was 0.2%.67 By 2008, India was producing 1100 feature films (UNCTAD-UNDP 2010: 150). However, 80% of all films shown worldwide were Hollywood productions. International box-office receipts for US films reached $18.2 billion in 2008 (ibid.: 150–152). Likewise, while “Nye could link American popular culture with the US ‘co-optive’ power, the effects of the globalisation of India’s diverse culture are not so explicitly political. For example, unlike Hollywood’s approach during the Cold War, Indians film have never really promoted a certain model political and cultural development”.68 Here is yet another evidence of Indian status as second-tier soft power: of the top 25 media houses in the world, all are headquartered in the Triad countries: 15 in the USA, 3 in the UK, 2 in each Germany, Japan and France, while one is a joint venture between the UK and Netherlands (Table 4).69 Table 5 gives the number of global media conglomerates in the top 2000 multinationals. There is not a single Indian media house (or any media house headquartered in a subimperial country). The following comparison will more concretely establish the facts demonstrated in the Table 5: the Bennett, Coleman and Company Limited (BCCL), considered one of India’s biggest media empire, consisting of over a dozen media outlets, annually 66 UNESCO

(2005). (2010). 68 Blarel, “India”, 30. 69 Leckner and Facht (2011), 122. 67 Thussu

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Table 5 There is no Indian media house among global media conglomerates in the list of top 2000 multinationals # of firms/nations

Total profit ($ bn)

#1 (%)

#2 (%)

#3 (%)

2006

55/15

32.2

US 59

UK 10

Japan 6

2012

37/9

44.5

US 67

France 11

UK 6

Source Starrs (2013)

generates a revenue of $1.5 billion. Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation generates a revenue of $33 billion, by contrast.70 In fact, BCCL’s television segment is no match for Star network—offering a bouquet of 35 channels and is the Indian arm of News Corporation—either. Times Now posts INR 1.5 billion ($30 million) annual revenue.71 Star network’s flagship channel, Star Plus alone, rakes in approximately INR 9 billion ($180 million) advertising revenue.72 In other words, India has not been able to hold out to imperialism even on the home turf. Below is the further proof of India conceding ground, at least in the television spectrum, to imperial media. It is important to point out here that despite Bollywood’s global recognition, economically Indian television is in actual the flagship of Indian media and entertainment industry. Vetting of the oft-cited FICCI-KPMG annual reports, a source of most credible data on Indian M&E shows that Indian television market is dominated by Sony, News Corporation, Viacom and other metropolitan players. Zee is the only Indian network among the top four television giants in India. Yet another aspect of a subimperial power is India semi-dependent status in the television industry. Therefore, now let me draw the attention to semi-dependent nature of the Indian television system. While India is one of the six “space-faring nations with the capability to design and launch satellites into geostationary orbit”,73 Indian TV players, however, lack adequate satellite capacities in terms of spectrum/transponders. A big majority of Indian TV channels are transmitted through foreign satellites.74 The system of audience measurement, colloquially known as “ratings”, is not merely entirely dependent upon TAM-Nielsen, a Western giant in market research and TRP business worldwide; a monopoly situation has emerged in India’s TRP business.75 Indian television set manufacturing once dominated by Indian players such as Videocon, Onida and BPL has been effectively taken over by MNCs such as LG, Samsung (the world’s two biggest television set manufacturers), Sony, Panasonic, Phillips and Toshiba. Indian players have been reduced to CRT (cathode ray tube) 70 Auletta

(2012). (2012). 72 Abhilasha Ojha “A Player in His Prime: Uday Shankar’s rise to the top of the television world”, The Caravan, http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/player-his-prime. 73 Sankar (2007), xii. 74 Casbaa (2013), 2–5. 75 FICCI-KPMG (2014), 39. 71 Bhatia

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producers catering to rural and semi-urban demand. Even in the CRT segment, they do not dominate the market. In short, in every key sector of the Indian television system, there is dependence on the metropolitan industries. The dependency perspective is simply ignored in the self-serving narratives on India’s soft power. Most ironically, the very concept of soft power symbolises theoretical and academic dependency on the Western discourses. Lastly, before concluding the chapter, let me point out the class bias concealed in the notion of India’s soft power. In the first place, Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power itself is an attempt to press Antonio Gramsci in the service of imperialism. However, in the case of Indian protagonists of soft power, the class bias is not even masked. Tharoor, for instance, hardly has any qualms while suggesting: “The government must provide the roads, Tata can make the Nano”.76 In short, expenditures of leveraging soft power should be socialised. However, gains can be made by Indian bourgeoisie symbolised by Tatas. Secondly, the purpose of soft power advocated by Messrs Tharoor & Co. is aimed at attracting investment. The foreign investments, as the evidence suggests, have benefitted the Indian bourgeoisie, while the working classes and Indian environment have paid a huge price. India’s soft power, in short, will prove hard for the subaltern classes.

Conclusion India’s economic transformation in the post-liberalisation phase, 1991 onwards, has infused a new confidence in the Indian ruling class which now aspires for a more assertive global role for Indian capital. Consequently, a focus on India’s rediscovered soft power by Indian foreign policy czars is understandable. Likewise, the notion of soft power has caught the attention of scholars working on India. While India enjoys a considerable soft power, there is an exaggerated stress on India’s ability to achieve a higher status in the global hierarchy of nations by way of yoga, cricket, Bollywood. This is, firstly, because it is not soft power but smart power that leverages a country atop the global order. However, as demonstrated above, India is only a second-tier military and economic power. This conclusion leads to the second inference. India’s soft power mirrors her mid-ranking, semi-peripheral status in the global order. This mid-ranking status can be characterised as subimperialism.

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Ahmed, K. (2016). Once we were not so bad. The Indian Express, October 4, 2016. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/surgical-strikes-indian-army-india-pakistannarensra-modi-uri-attack-saarc-summit-once-3058801/. Auletta, K. (2012). Citizens Jain: Why India’s newspaper industry is thriving. New Yorker, October 8, 2012. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/10/08/citizens-jain. Bhatia, R. (2012). Fast and furious: The turbulent rein of Arnab Goswami. The Caravan, 4(12), 26–41. Blarel, N. (2012). India: the next superpower?: India’s soft power: from potential to reality? LSE Research Online. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43445/1/India_India%27s%20soft%20power% 28lsero%29.pdf. Casbaa. (2013). Easing India’s capacity crunch: An assessment of demand and supply for television satellite transponders (pp. 2–5). New Delhi: Casbaa. Chaunan, R. S. (1975). India and Sikkim. Foreign Affairs Reports, 24(9), 140–156. CII-PwC. (2012). India Entertainment and Media Outlook 2012. New Delhi: Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) & Pricewaterhouse Cooper (PwC). Do Santos, T. (1970). The structure of dependency. American Economic Review, 60(2), 231–236. Drezner, D. W. (2007). The New New World Order. Foreign Affairs, March–April 2007. https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-03-01/new-new-world-order. FICCI-KPMG. (2014). The stage is set: FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2014. New Delhi: Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). Ghosh, B. (2011). How a Late Bollywood icon saved this correspondent’s life. Time, August 15, 2011. http://world.time.com/2011/08/15/how-a-late-bollywood-icon-saved-this-correspondentslife/. Gupta, S. (2016). Throwing away soft power, hard Battles. Business Standard, October 21, 2016. http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shekhar-gupta-soft-power-hard-battles116102101000_1.html. Heng, S. M.-I. (2016). Diplomacy and image building: India on its soft power. ORF Issue Brief . Issue No. 163. Observer Research Foundation (ORF), November 8, 2016. http://www.orfonline. org/research/diplomacy-and-image-building/. Kugiel, P. (2016). India’s soft power: Foreign policy strategy. London: Routledge. Leckner, S., & Facht, U. (2011). A sampler of international media and communication statistics. Nordicom: University of Gothenburg. Luce, M. (2015). Sub-imperialism, the highest stage of dependent capitalism. In P. Bond & A. Garcia (Eds.), BRICS: An anti-capitalist critique (pp. 27–44). London: Pluto. Malone, D. M. (2011). Soft power in India’s foreign policy. Economic and Political Weekly, 46(36), 35–39. Marini, M. (1965). Brazilian ‘interdependence’ and imperialist integration. Monthly Review, 17(7), 10–29. Marini, M. (1978). World capitalist accumulation subimperialism. Two Thirds, 1, 29–40. McMichael, P., James, P., & Rhodes, R. (1974). Industry in the third world. New Left Review, 85, 83–104. Narayan, K. R. (1972). New perspectives in Indian foreign policy: India’s growth as a regional power. Round Table, 62(248), 453–464. Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world. New York: Public Affairs. Nye, J. S. (2010). The Powers to Lead. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ojha, A. A player in his prime: Uday Shankar’s rise to the top of the television world. The Caravan. http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/player-his-prime. Pant, H. V. (2015). India’s soft-power strategy. Outlook, August 31, 2015. https://www.outlookindia. com/website/story/indias-soft-power-strategy/295206. Perkovich, G. (2003). Is India a major power? The Washington Quarterly, 27(1), 129–144. Sankar, U. (2007). The economics of India’s space programme: An exploratory analysis. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Rise of India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ Worldview Vibhanshu Shekhar

Introduction Worldviews are often understood as ‘foreign policy schools of thought’ or ‘ideational 1 variables affecting the foreign policy outcome’. Though they themselves may not be the contents of foreign policy, they provide a requisite perspective for the policy makers to understand the world and take appropriate foreign policy decisions. In other words, they are ‘lenses through which people see the world and the frame2 works within which theories of that world are built’. However, these lenses need not exhibit methodical precision nor be based on principles of international relations. The foreign policy makers do not necessarily have interests or skills to provide a clinical enumeration of their assumptions and actions. That job is left to the strategic community that is trained for that very purpose. The foreign policy makers often 3 provide broad directions within which actual policies of foreign relations are made. The extended neighbourhood narrative is a worldview that undergirds the country’s foreign policy towards countries, sub-regions and regions touching upon the South Asian subcontinental peripheries. There has been growing realization among the Indian policy makers, since the end of the Cold War that the country’s vital strategic interests lay in the contiguous regions of Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, West Asia, Central Asia, the eastern seaboard of the African continent, Indian Ocean and Oceania. These contiguous regions are collectively referred to as India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’. India’s former Foreign Minister, Yashwant Sinha, noted, ‘so we, when in the context of India, talk about extended neighbourhood, it certainly is all 1 Nau

(2012), p. 4. (1988) p. 8. 3 Mowle (2003), p. 563. 2 Goldstein

V. Shekhar (B) School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_15

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the countries including Australia and New Zealand, all the countries in East Asia, all the countries in Central Asia, all the countries in the Gulf and West Asia’.4 Though the narrative emerged in the context of the Asian neighbourhood during the mid1990s, it has, since then, acquired a much broader geostrategic canvas incorporating also the African and Australasian neighbourhood. India’s extended neighbourhood includes more than 70 countries representing nearly half of the global map with their size and significance ranging from a small and somewhat insignificant island state of Tuvalu in the South Pacific to the largest and the second most powerful state of China in East Asia.5 The debate on India’s extended neighbourhood worldview has acquired multiple facets during the last two decades as New Delhi seeks to strengthen the existing ties and forge new partnerships with countries in the regions. It is imperative that they are examined in detail to understand not only the extended neighbourhood narrative but also rising India’s foreign policy during the twenty-first century. This paper aims to discuss the rise and growth of the ‘extended neighbourhood’ worldview in the light of its origin, drivers, traits, spatial canvas and key imperatives.

Origin and Growth of the Extended Neighbourhood Worldview Worldviews often grow out of domestic debates involving the means and ends of a state’s foreign policy. Similarly, the extended neighbourhood worldview grew out of India’s own domestic debates over how to position the country amidst the changing geopolitical and geoeconomic realities in the aftermath of the Cold War era; and develop a prioritized framework for India’s relations with countries touching upon the South Asian neighbourhood. The first consideration involved the issue of intent and posture and the second consideration aimed at developing an organizing principle to categorize India’s relations with the countries in the contiguous regions. Both these processes continue to be a work in progress. The extended neighbourhood as an organizing principle remains a fungible category and its boundary continues to evolve. Moreover, India’s intent and posture within its extended neighbourhood have changed considerably during the last twenty-five years and is likely to continue to evolve as it is linked with India’s own international behaviour. The change in India’s international behaviour will reflect in the change in the intent and posture within India’s extended neighbourhood. One can identify three stages in the evolution of the extended neighbourhood worldview—a reach out stage, an intertwined interests stage, and the rising power role conception stage. The first major impetus came during the early 1990s when India sought to build deeper economic relations with the countries in what India’s former Prime Minister, P. V. Narasimha Rao referred to as ‘the Asian neighbourhood’. 4 Gaur

(2004), p. 308. (2012).

5 Shekhar

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India that had emerged as an economic laggard at the end of the Cold War and was infamously known for its bureaucratic regulation and the Hindu growth rate had begun liberalizing and opening up its economy for trade and investment. The first set of efforts can be seen in India’s push towards developing strong economic linkages with the countries in East and Southeast Asia in the form of what is known as India’s Look East policy.6 India reached out to the tiger economies in the East and Southeast Asia, sought multilateral engagement with ASEAN and repeatedly applied, though unsuccessfully for the APEC membership. Similar efforts to expand India’s geostrategic horizon led the foreign policy makers to reach out to Central Asian countries that paved the way for a Look North foreign policy and West Asian countries, resulting into a Look West policy. The geoeconomic considerations have, since then, remained a priority in the extended neighbourhood worldview. India during the 1990s was hardly a rising power, nor was power projection the sole objective of its Look East, Look North and Look West policies. In other words, the idea of power projection has been neither the original driver nor the sole objective of the extended neighbourhood worldview. Rao’s successor, Prime Minister I K Gujral took forward the momentum of India’s engagement efforts in the Asian neighbourhood while also seeking to consolidate India’s relations within the South Asian neighbourhood. He pushed forth the new foreign policy initiatives and created a two-tier prioritized framework of engagement in the Asian neighbourhood—immediate and extended neighbourhood.7 It is noteworthy that the major thrust of the Gujral doctrine was on returning to and proactively engaging the country’s South Asian neighbours without expecting any reciprocity. Viewed in this context, the extended neighbourhood worldview is rather an organizing principle of Indian foreign policy than a break out of confinement strategy. In addition to concretizing the idea of extended neighbourhood, the Gujral government also paved the way for the formation of Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), an overarching framework for cooperation among the Indian Ocean littorals.8 Taken together, an overarching framework of India’s extended neighbourhood worldview had already developed by the end of the Gujral government in 1998. The second major thrust to the extended neighbourhood worldview came during the first decade of the twenty-first century during the premierships of Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998–2003) and Manmohan Singh (2004–2014). The two governments further consolidated the extended neighbourhood worldview by continuing to lend official credence and provided an assertive outlook by contextualizing it within a rising India narrative. One might argue that the extended neighbourhood worldview has by and large resembled the outlook of India’s foreign policy. Since India’s international behaviour during the twenty-first century has acquired a rising power posture, the latter has also come to shape India’s debate on the extended neighbourhood 6 Ibid. 7 Gujral

(1997). details on the IORA, see their official Webpage—http://www.iora.net/en/about/about-iora (accessed on January 10, 2018).

8 For

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worldview. Moreover, the rising power posture came to characterize India’s various foreign policy initiatives, such as the Look East policy, Look West policy or connect Central Asia policy that were undergirding the extended neighbourhood worldview. During this phase, the rising India narrative introduced two important elements into the extended neighbourhood worldview. First, it asserted India’s Asian centrality. Minister Sinha declared in 2004, ‘if you look at the geography of this continent, India is at the heart of it. Not merely must we be geographically in the centre of things, but in our engagement also, we must be in the centre of things. Because India has this advantage geographically and otherwise, to become the lynchpin in engagement of various countries’.9 Second, it was declared that India had not only an interest but also a stake in the stability of Asia.10 According to C Raja Mohan, a noted Indian strategic affairs expert, ‘emerging India has declared that its interests now extend from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea’ that is also seen as a geographical scope of the extended neighbourhood.11 The third major impetus to the extended neighbourhood has come largely during the Modi years as India has begun to claim its legitimate role as a ‘leading power’ and ‘net security provider’ in building peace and stability in the extended neighbourhood. India has sought to project itself as a ‘net security provider’ in its maritime neighbourhood that would include Indian Ocean littorals and some countries of Southeast Asia.

Spatial Framing of the Extended Neighbourhood Worldview The extended neighbourhood is a spatial worldview, whose canvas and outlook remain nebulous. It is also seen as an outcome of India’s ‘respatialization’ of its foreign policy during the 1990s.12 New Delhi has used the extended neighbourhood narrative to bolster India’s engagement at four levels—(a) at bilateral levels with countries situated in the extended neighbourhood, (b) at sub-regional levels, such as the Bay of Bengal community and the Persian Gulf, (c) with various regions, such as Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and (d) at supraregional levels, such as East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and recently Indo-Pacific. These efforts of engagement have produced various foreign policy initiatives during the last twenty-five years, often couched as catchphrases, such as Look East/Act East, Look West, Look North, Look South and Connect Central Asia policy.13 Each of these policy initiatives is treading in different directions with divergent goals and strategies. 9 Gaur

(2004), p. 308. by External Affairs Minister Shri Yashwant Sinha at Harvard University, September 29, 2003, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/4744/Speech+by+External+Affairs+ Minister+Shri+Yashwant+Sinha+at+Harvard+University (accessed on January 20, 2018). 11 Raja Mohan (2013), pp. 5–6. 12 Chacko (2016). 13 “India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy” Keynote address by Minister (State) of External Affairs E. Ahamed at First India-Central Asia Dialogue, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic on 10 Speech

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For example, India’s policy towards Southeast Asia has different interests and goals vis-à-vis that of towards West Asia or the Indian Ocean. Interestingly, the extended neighbourhood narrative does not provide any reference point for distinguishing the Look East from the Look West foreign policy. The extended neighbourhood narrative has come to represent a new concentric circle (rajamandala) of India’s foreign policy and the metaphor has gained widespread popularity among the officials of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).14 India’s former Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukharjee noted in 2006 that ‘India’s foreign policy today looks at India’s environment in expanding circles of engagement starting with the immediate neighbourhood of Southern Asia and moving on to and beyond the extended neighbourhood of West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean Region’.15 The overarching extended neighbourhood framework not only has a specific regional context such as Southeast Asia, West Asia, eastern Africa and Indian Ocean but also subsumes all the above-mentioned regions in a ‘multi-dimensional and omnidirectional 360-degree fashion’.16 However, the Indian MEA officials seem to have divergent understanding of these concentric circles. For Salman Haider, India’s Minister for External Affairs under the Manmohan Singh government II, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, China and the ASEAN region form the second concentric circle, whereas the Indian Ocean form the largest and outermost circle.17 The extended neighbourhood is both a continental and maritime worldview. The extended neighbourhood worldview brings together India’s three neighbourhoods—continental Asian neighbourhood, maritime African neighbourhood and maritime Asian neighbourhood. As a maritime worldview, its canvas stretches from the eastern seaboard of Africa in the west, Australia in the south and the Western Pacific in the east. It stretches far and across the entire Indian Ocean and extends to parts of the Western Pacific. According to India’s 2015 maritime strategy document, India’s maritime neighbours are not only those sharing common boundaries of our maritime zones – but also nations with whom we share the common maritime space of the high seas. Accordingly, India has a vast maritime neighbourhood, which extends across the IOR. Maritime relations with the nations in our wider neighbourhood and beyond are an important facet of our broader politico-economic relations, in which the Indian Navy also plays an important role.18

It is important to highlight the continental and maritime distinction given their bearings on the methods and strategies of India’s outreach to the extended neighbourJune 12, 2012, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/19791/Keynote+address+by+ MOS+Shri+E+Ahamed+at+First+IndiaCentral+Asia+Dialogue (accessed on January 05, 2018). 14 Scott (2009a), pp. 107–108. 15 Mukherjee (2006). 16 Wadhwa (2014). 17 “External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 6th CUTS Anniversary Lecture on "India’s Economic Integration with Asia”, New Delhi, August 13, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/22153/external+affairs+ministers+speech+at+the+6th+cuts+anniversary+lecture+on+ quotindias+economic+integration+with+asiaquot (accessed on January 15, 2018). 18 India’s Maritime Military Strategy 2015.

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hood. The land-based connectivity has dominated the discourse in India’s outreach to the continental Asia that has proved far more challenging and impermeable given India’s complex history and complicated relations with its land-based neighbours.19 In contrast, India’s access to its extended maritime neighbourhood, on the other hand, has remained less complicated and required less efforts. The official narrative has, at times, suffered from arbitrary definition of the extended neighbourhood. Though the canvas of the extended neighbourhood covers all the countries in Central Asia, Yashwant Sinha, in one of his speeches, declared that ‘for us, central Asia was our immediate and strategic neighbourhood’. Similarly, the current expression of the extended neibhourhood—from the Suez Canal in North Africa to South China Sea in the western Pacific Ocean20 —has created overlapping boundaries, exposing the worldview to sometimes arbitrary interpretations. While the South China Sea limit keeps Japan and the two Koreas out of the extended neighbourhood, the East Asian canvas brings them within India’s extended neighbourhood. Moreover, the Suez Canal-South China Sea canvas does not throw light on the northern and southern limit of the extended neighbourhood. The extended neighbourhood is not always extended and includes many of the countries in its immediate neighbourhood. Though Myanmar is India’s immediate neighbour and shares both land and maritime boundaries, it has often found itself being a part of India’s extended neighbourhood as an important constituency of the Look East policy. While India shares a long and contested land border with China, the latter figures as both India’s immediate as well as an extended neighbour. Similarly, Thailand and Indonesia are India’s immediate maritime neighbours but are seen as a part of the extended neighbourhood. The same logic can be applied to most of the Indian Ocean littorals, which are widely understood as a part of the extended neighbourhood.

Historical–Cultural Context of Extended Neighbourhood Worldview The extended neighbourhood worldview churns into India’s historical and cultural connections that were built over the centuries with the countries and communities in the region. These connections provide an antecedent and an easy reference point for the twenty-first-century India to forge new ties and strengthen the existing relations. Also, the historical-cultural context provides a benign imagery to India’s strategic overtures in the Asian and African neighbourhood since a cultural garb is likely to be an effective diplomatic tool in moderating the imposing character of a rising power. One can identify two historical contexts that the Indian government has used over the decades to reinforce the idea of extended neighbourhood. First, the extended 19 Bangladesh,

China, Myanmar and Pakistan remain India’s main land-based conduits for access to continental Asia. India has had troubled relations with all of them. 20 Wadhwa (2014).

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neighbourhood forms a cultural map within which Indians connected with communities and kingdoms and left its footprint most deeply. This connection has been asserted and continuously reiterated by Indian policy makers to rationalize the imperative of rebuilding ties in the twenty-first century. This trend is conspicuous in its Look East policy, Look West policy and Connect Central Asia policy. India’s former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh categorically asserted in 2004 that ‘we wish to look east because of the centuries of interactions between us’.21 According to India’s former Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, the extended neighbourhood worldview symbolizes the ‘beginning of the reassertion of India’s historically benign and stabilizing role in these regions premised on the commerce of ideas and goods’.22 The theme of India–ASEAN silver-jubilee celebrations in 2017, ‘Shared Values, Common Destiny’, underlined ‘the close cultural and civilisational links India and countries of Southeast Asia have enjoyed over the millennia’.23 Underlining the historical context of India’s outreach to Central Asia while introducing the Connect Central Asia policy, India’s Minister (State) of External Affairs, E Ahamed, highlighted that the country’s ‘civilisational bonds with Central Asian countries have been translated into warm and friendly relations’. He declared that ‘India’s cultural heritage was deeply rooted in the Eurasian past…through movement of people, goods and ideas, including spiritual interfaces that enriched us both’.24 One can notice similar cultural pretext in India’s outreach to West Asia during the twenty-first century. A senior Indian Foreign Ministry official underscored ‘a continuum of interactions between the two sides from Indus/Dilmun civilization in ancient time to the shared belief in anti-colonialism in modern times…building new bridges of understanding and synergies to deal with the common developmental problem and new challenges of twenty first century’.25 Similar cultural catchphrases, such as ‘Africa, the “cradle of human civilization” and India, the “ancient civilization”’, have marked India’s efforts to build ties with the countries in Africa.26 In addition, the narratives of shared

21 Dr. Manmohan Singh’s Speech at the third India-ASEAN Business Summit, New Delhi, October 21, 2004, cited in Devare (2006), p. 29. 22 Mukherjee (2006). 23 ‘India and ASEAN—An Overview’, Keynote Address by Secretary (East) at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, February 06, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/28009/keynote+address+by+secretary+east+on+india+and+asean++an+overview+at+ nehru+memorial+museum+and+library+new+delhi+february+2+2017 (accessed on January 12, 2018). 24 “India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy” op.cit. 25 ‘India’s Links with West Asia: Policy, Prospects and Challenges’, Remarks by Secretary (East) at 2nd Annual West Asia Conference, January 22, 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/26285/remarks+by+secretary+east+at+2nd+annual+west+asia+conference++ indias+links+with+west+asia+policy+prospects+and+challenges (accessed on January 13, 2018). 26 ‘Remarks by External Affairs Minister at the Inauguration of India-Africa Friendship Rose garden’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 25, 2015, http://www. mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25964/remarks+by+external+affairs+minister+at+the+ inauguration+of+indiaafrica+friendship+rose+garden++october+25+2015 (accessed on January 13, 2018).

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colonial experiences and post-colonial solidarity have also been invoked to connect with the countries in Africa. Second, it is the extended neighbourhood within which the post-colonial Nehruvian India sought to position itself and project its leadership role. The main constituencies and bulwark of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s ideas of Asianism, Non-alignment, Afro-Asian solidarity and Third-Worldism came from India’s present-day extended neighbourhood. A noted Indian expert on Southeast Asia and former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, Sudhir T Devare, mentions, ‘In India, the renewed interest in forging close bonds with countries of East and Southeast Asia or India’s support to the concept of an Asian Economic Community comprising of Southeast, East and South Asia derives from the same urge for a new vision for the whole of Asia as was envisioned in 1947 and 1955’.27 In his speech in New Delhi in November 2007, Pranab Mukherjee reiterated the importance of the Look East policy in the ‘resurrection of that vision of Pan-Asian regionalism’.28 It is not a coincidence that Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, the architect of India’s Look East policy, and Prime Minister I K Gujral, the architect of the extended neighbourhood concept, sought to situate their foreign policy visions in the context of Nehru’s renascent Asia.29 While inaugurating the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 in New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru had proclaimed, ‘a change is coming over the scene and now Asia is again finding itself. We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes its rightful place with other continents’.30 Nevertheless, experts differ over the nature of connect/disconnect between the Nehruvian Asianism and the present-day extended neighbourhood worldview. The official narrative maintains that the concept of the extended neighbourhood has been ‘embedded’ in Nehru’s vision of a renascent Asia’ and ‘subliminally shaping India’s foreign policy since independence’. On the other hand, a few experts distinguish the extended neighbourhood from the Nehruvian Asianism and treat the former as a rather recent initiative.31 It is argued that the Cold War years had ‘sharply limited India’s ability to pursue the Nehruvian goal’ and ‘the policies of economic autarchy that Non-Alignment promoted’ had thwarted any movement towards regional economic integration.32 The connect/disconnect debate should not obfuscate three key characteristics of the extended neighbourhood worldview. First, the extended neighbourhood worldview is ideologically promiscuous as opposed to strong ideological overtone of the Nehruvian Asianism. It advocates engagement with countries sitting in all types of camps as India pursues the policy of multi-alignment. As a part of the Look East policy, India simultaneously reached out to Myanmar (military regime), Indonesia 27 Devare

(2006), p. 18. (2007). 29 Narasimha Rao (1994), Gujaral (1996). 30 Cited in Gujaral (1996). 31 Raja Mohan (2000), Scott (2009b), pp. 107–143. 32 C. Raja Mohan, ibid. 28 Mukherjee

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(authoritarian state), Malaysia (Islamic state), Vietnam (socialist republic), Brunei (sultanate) and the Philippines (democracy and an alliance partner of the USA). Second, the debate should not ignore the novelty of efforts put in by the architects and advocates of the extended neighbourhood worldview. Even though they were inspired by the legacy of Nehruvian Asianism, they were responding to a completely different domestic and geopolitical setting while devising the extended neighbourhood worldview. The interests of the twenty-first century India and the geopolitical realities of India’s extended neighbourhood are fundamentally different from that of the Cold War years. Finally, the debate should not ignore the depth of insularity, statism and Cold War bias that had crept in the Indian strategic thinking during the Cold War era. India under the leadership of Indira Gandhi was siding with the socialist Vietnam during the 1970s as opposed to the ASEAN countries, which later on emerged as the core of India’s Look East policy and, later on, an important part of the extended neighbourhood. One can also add that the post-reform Look East policy rested on a dismantled Nehruvian economic paradigm.

Indian Interests in the Extended Neighbourhood It is increasingly recognized that India’s vital economic and strategic interests are no longer confined to South Asia rather dependent on its extended neighbourhood, the second circle of Indian foreign policy. A senior official in the Indian MEA identified (a) geoeconomic reasons as ‘closer economic integration through trade and investment, technology transfer and innovation, and a series of concentric and interlinked free trade area arrangements’; and geostrategic reasons as ‘a host of cross-cutting challenges, including terrorism, maritime piracy, trans-national crime, disaster mitigation and combating trans-national pandemics’.33 Another senior official from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs pointed out, ‘…we believe that the security, stability and prosperity of Central Asia is imperative for peace and economic development in India. We are each other’s extended neighbourhood and the region has been a priority area of interest for Indian policymakers, practitioners and thinkers’.34 A similar assertion has been made in the context of India’s interests in other regions of the extended neighbourhood. These assertions are becoming more pronounced and frequent with the growth in India’s economic, political, military, diplomatic, non-governmental engagements in its extended neighbourhood. A brief discussion of India’s key interests and engagements is given below.

33 Wadhwa

(2014). Address by Secretary (West) at the Fourth India-Central Asia Dialogue, Ministry of External Affairs, December 01, 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/ 27736/Keynote+Address+by+Secretary+West+at+the+Fourth+IndiaCentral+Asia+Dialogue+ December+01+2016 (accessed on January 13, 2018). 34 Keynote

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Table 1 India’s trade with the extended neighbourhood Regions

Imports (US$ billions)

Exports (US$ billions)

2002

2002

2017

2017

ASEAN Oceania East Africa North Africa GCC (West Asia)

4.3 1.3 0.1 0.5 1.7

41 12 1.3 3.0 55

3.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 3.8

31 3.3 6.7 4.4 42

West Asia (Non-GCC)

1.0

25

1.2

7.8

Northeast Asia Central Asian Republics

6.6 0.02

95 0.6

5.8 0.06

35 0.3

Total

15.52

232.9

15.96

130.5

This table is based on the trade figures as provided by the Export Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India. See http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp (accessed on January 18, 2018)

Economy The economic logic has been the prime factor in shaping India’s efforts to reach out to the extended neighbourhood. The extended neighbourhood gained prominence with India’s growing economic relations with the region and trade becoming an important component of India’s international diplomacy and national strategy.35 India’s economic relations with its extended neighbourhood have increased ten times during the last fifteen years with total trade in goods going up from US$31 billion in 2002 to US$363 billion. The share of extended neighbourhood in India’s total trade in goods went up from nearly 30% in 2002 to 65% in 2017.36 Table 1 also highlights that the regions of the Asia-Pacific and West Asia have seen sharpest increase in their trade with India. India has also embarked on the process of signing FTAs with the countries and regions in the extended neighbourhood. It signed an Early Harvest Programme (EHP) with Thailand (2003); Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements (CECA) with Singapore (2005), Malaysia (2009), New Zealand (2010), Indonesia (2011), Australia (2011), and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA) with South Korea (2009) and Japan (2011). At the multilateral level, India has signed FTAs with ASEAN, Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the GCC countries. India is also a part of the 14-country FTA negotiations, known as the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (RCEP). 35 Raja

Mohan (2000).

36 Export Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India. See http://commerce.

nic.in/eidb/default.asp (accessed on January 18, 2018).

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Energy Energy fuels the economy, and therefore, India’s rise is dependent on the access to vital energy sources. The 2015 International Energy Agency report on India explains thus: ‘Energy is central to achieving India’s development ambitions, to support an expanding economy, to bring electricity to those who remain without it, to fuel the demand for greater mobility and to develop the infrastructure to meet the needs of what is soon expected to be the world’s most populous country’.37 India has emerged as the third largest consumer of crude oil in the world after the USA and China38 and the third largest importer of crude oil, importing nearly 80% of its total oil needs.39 India’s imports of crude oil went up from 145 million tonnes in 2007 to 240 million tonnes in 2017 and its imports of natural gas jumped nearly threefold from 6 billion cubic meter in 2007 to 17 billion cubic meter in 2017.40 India is the fourth largest importer of natural gas after Japan, South Korea and China.41 Majority of India’s oil and gas imports come from its extended neighbourhood in West Asia. One can see similar pattern of increased energy dependence in the coal sector. India’s imports of coal increased nearly five times from 43 million tonnes in 2007 to 200 million tonnes in 2017. Its net coal import dependency has risen from practically nothing in 1990 to nearly 23% in 2012, importing most of its coal from Indonesia, South Africa and Australia, which falls within India’s extended neighbourhood.42

Access India’s quest for market and energy has driven the country to build cross-border physical connectivity with countries and regions in the extended neighbourhood. It is argued that India’s deepening interdependence with the extended neighbourhood pushed India to prioritize ‘restoring historic physical connectivity and building new trans-border transport and energy corridors to the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Southeast Asia’.43 In this context, some of the earliest efforts were made with the countries in mainland Southeast Asia. The first project in this regard was started by India in Myanmar in 1993 that was completed in 2001. Since then India has also announced various ambitious connectivity projects, such as the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, Delhi–Hanoi rail link, the Kaladan Multi-modal project in Myanmar. These projects are at different stages of completion. 37 International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook Special Report 2015: India Energy Outlook’ (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2015), p. 3. 38 Energy Statistics 2017 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2017), p. 70. 39 Verma (2017). 40 Energy Statistics 2017 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2017), Table 5.3, p. 38. 41 Dunn (2014). 42 Ibid. 43 Raja Mohan (2015), p. 136.

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India has also sought to build various energy corridors that would connect the country with its West Asian and Central Asian energy sources. The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline project is also expected to boost India’s energy supplies. India also signed a trilateral Chabahar Trade and Transit Corridor with Iran and Afghanistan that can ‘become a potential game-changer in the inter-regional strategic matrix of Central and South Asia’.44 India is also planning to connect with the International North South Transport Corridor that can connect the country with Central Asia via Iran and the Caspian Sea.45 In this context, Myanmar and Iran have emerged as two critical nodal points through which India is seeking to physically connect itself with West Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia.

Influence It is argued that in this second circle of extended neighbourhood, ‘India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests’.46 New Delhi has sought to achieve these objectives by showcasing its military prowess and strengthening its diplomatic presence in the region. One can highlight three key aspects of India’s international posture in this region. First, New Delhi has sought to increase its military-to-military engagements in the region through programs of capacity-building, coordinated patrolling, training of security personnel, and wide-ranging military exercises. India conducts military exercises with Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Singapore, Thailand, UAE and the USA. India conducts trilateral naval exercise, known as the Malabar exercise with the USA and Japan in the Andaman Sea. The Malabar exercises started off as a bilateral exercise with the USA during the 1990s off the Malabar Coast in the Arabian Sea. India has also sought to maintain a sustained military presence in the western Indian Ocean through naval visits and maritime reconnaissance. New Delhi was also able to secure some sort of military berthing facility in Tajikistan. India and other countries of the Asia-Pacific signed a Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in November 2004 and the agreement became operational in October 2006. The ReCAAP is the first ever governmental initiative to counter armed robbery and sea piracy against ships involving countries of South, Southeast and Northeast Asia. Indian navy has also undertaken various measures of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, such as during the Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004 and the evacuation of overseas Indians from West Asia. Second, most of India’s strategic partnerships are situated within its extended neighbourhood. India has signed strategic partnerships with Afghanistan, Australia, 44 Ganguli

(2017). Wade “Watch Out, China: India Is Building A ‘New Silk Road’ Of Its Own”, Forbes Asia, June 28, 2017. 46 Raja Mohan (2006). 45 Shepard,

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China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Qatar, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Tajikistan, UAE, various countries in the extended neighbourhood. These partnerships underscore India’s growing scale of bilateral relations with the countries in the extended neighbourhood. Finally, India has sought to strengthen its diplomatic presence through memberships of various minilateral and multilateral forums. India became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1993, full dialogue partner in 1996, member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, and has shared Summit-level engagement with ASEAN since 2002. India became a member of the East Asia Summit in 2005 and the ASEAN Plus Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM Plus) in 2010. New Delhi takes part in nearly 100 meetings every year as a part of its Look East/Act East policy alone. India has also set up two sub-regional forums to connect with the mainland Southeast Asia—Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). India has been a founding member of Indian Ocean Rim Association that allows the country to interact with countries in Southeast Asia, East Africa, Southern Africa and West Asia. India, once an observer state at Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO), became its member in June 2017. The SCO connects India with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Indian Diaspora The presence of Indian diaspora has emerged as an important tool of international diplomacy and projection of India’s soft power in the extended neighbourhood during the twenty-first century. Indian government has constituted a separate ministry in charge of the overseas Indians. The Ministry of Overseas Indians conducts an annual event known as Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) to ‘connect India to its vast overseas diaspora and bring their knowledge, expertise and skills on a common platform’ since 2003.47 The extended neighbourhood is a home to the largest number of people of Indian origin. Their presence in Africa, Oceania, West Asia and Southeast Asia is largely a result of British colonialism and they are present in greater numbers in those countries which were once a part of the British Colonial Empire. There are nearly 8 million Indians in West Asia, 4 million in Southeast Asia, 2.5 million in Africa and 800 thousand Indians in Oceania.48 Indian diaspora is also an important source of foreign exchange. Indian diaspora in the Middle East alone sent nearly US$39 billion as foreign remittance back to India in 2016.49 47 Pravasi

Bharatiya Divas 2014, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www. mea.gov.in/pravasi-bharatiya-divas.htm (accessed on January 20, 2018). 48 ‘Population of Overseas Indians’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 2017 http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf (accessed on January 20, 2018). 49 Pethiyagoda (2017).

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Rising India’s Role Conception in the Extended Neighbourhood It is argued that ‘foreign policy decisions and actions (role performance) derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment’.50 Similarly, India’s foreign policy in its extended neighbourhood is being defined by what the government sees as its legitimate role as a rising power in the region. However, the rising power posture has come to mean different things for different experts and policy makers. Some see the extended neighbourhood worldview in relation to India’s new foreign policy approach as a leading power that demands deployment of considerable resources both hardware and software in its engagement with the extended neighbourhood worldview.51 For some, it involves ‘growing demand on India to take a larger role in stabilizing the extended neighbourhood and contribute to the maintenance of regional order’.52 For some it is about projection of either hard military and economic power or soft cultural and ideational power.53 For some, the extended neighbourhood narrative involves India’s projection as ‘a net security provider’ and ‘an alternative to China’.54 For some, it means protecting interests through power projection.55 One can identify two key role conceptions that have come into vogue during the last fifteen years as a part of the rising India narrative. First, both India’s policy makers and its strategic community have directly or indirectly referred to India’s role as a balancer. The balancer narrative has largely been put forth in the context of an assertive and hegemonic behaviour of China in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. However, the idea of India counter-balancing China is not a new narrative. It has been in currency since early 1990s when Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong talked about India and China being two wings of the ASEAN airbus. The rise of the Indo-Pacific narrative and the revival of the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2017 involving Australia, India, Japan and the USA has brought, once again, India’s role as a balance in the limelight. However, the balancer narrative suffers from limited regional demand and limited regional credibility. It predicates the rationale of India’s rising power posture in the Indo-Pacific region upon the regional demand for balancing role from India. China appears to have gained considerable diplomatic ground in Southeast Asia with the Philippines under Duterte deciding to engage China and Indonesia under Widodo showing preference for the Chinese investment. 50 Holsti

(1970), p. 243. (Retd) Yogendra Kumar, ‘India’s policy towards its extended neighbourhood and the larger context of national foreign policy challenges’, Distinguished Lecture Series, Sikkim University, May 13, 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?524 (accessed on January 09, 2018). 52 C. Raja Mohan, Foreign Policy after 1990s, op.cit., p. 136. 53 Scott (2009b), pp. 107–143. 54 Kanti Bajpai, ‘Modi’s Foreign Policy of Shanti and Shakti’, Seminar, no. 677, 2016, http://www. india-seminar.com/2016/677/677_kanti_bajpai.htm (accessed on January 13, 2018). 55 Ladwig (2009). 51 Amb

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In the face of both the USA and Japan ceding diplomatic grounds to China, it may be less convincing to the smaller ASEAN countries that India can be a balancer to China. Second, India has sought to project its role as a leading power that would extend to probably the entire extended neighbourhood. The idea of India as a leading power was put forth by India’s Foreign Secretary, S Jaishankar in July 2015 when he declared that India’s ‘foreign policy dimension is to aspire to be a leading power, rather than just a balancing power’.56 For him, it meant ‘shouldering greater global responsibilities as India did in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Yemen and Nepal.57 India’s leading power projection was in full display during the republic day celebrations when India invited the heads of ASEAN states to commemorate the 25 years of India–ASEAN dialogue partnership. Indian government officials were cited as saying that ‘India views itself as a stabiliser and security provider in the region and, with its growing economic clout, is an attractive economic power for the countries in the region’.58 A concomitant aspect of India’s leading power posture is its maritime projection as a net security provider. The 2015 maritime military strategy document states, ‘the Indian navy’s operational footprint has spread across India’s areas of interest, with a growing cooperative framework and contributions as a ‘net security provider’ in the maritime neighbourhood’.59 The scope of net security provider primarily includes non-traditional security issues, such as anti-piracy, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).60 The Modi government has launched two important maritime initiatives in the Indian Ocean region—Project Mausam and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region). The mandate of these two projects covers the entire Indian Ocean region.

Conclusion The extended neighbourhood worldview has emerged as an overarching framework within which India’s trans-subcontinental geopolitics is taking shape. This trend is likely to continue in the coming decades as a rising India continues to seek to augment its diplomatic capacity and debates its interests and regional roles in a supra-regional setting. Though the extended neighbourhood worldview has proved to be a useful tool 56 ‘IISS Fullerton Lecture by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary in Singapore’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 20, 2015, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25493/ IISS_Fullerton_Lecture_by_Foreign_Secretary_in_Singapore (accessed on January 21, 2018). 57 Ibid. 58 Chaudhury (2017). 59 Ensuring Secure Seas; Indian Maritime Security Strategy, [New Delhi Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015], p. 8. 60 Ibid.

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in the hands of the Indian foreign policy makers to project the rising India narrative, it continues to remain a disparate aggregate of various conceptualizations of regional worlds. These regional worlds, expressed through different policy initiatives, such as Look East, Look West and Connect Central Asia, remain disconnected and serve divergent objectives, limiting the prospect of a cohesive extended neighbourhood worldview.

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edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/15/how-indias-diaspora-affects-its-role-in-a-multipolarmiddle-east/. Raja Mohan, C. (2000). India & its extended neighbourhood. The Hindu, June 08, 2000. Raja Mohan, C. (2006). India and the balance of power. Foreign Affairs, 85(4), 18. Raja Mohan, C. (2013). India and International Peace Operations. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security (pp. 5–6), no. 2013/3. Raja Mohan, C. (2015). Foreign policy after 1990s: Transformation through incremental adaptation. In D. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, & S. Raghavan (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy (pp. 131–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scott, D. (2009a). India’s “exteded neighborhood” concept: Power projection for a rising power. India Review, 8(2), 107–108. Scott, D. (2009b). India’s “exteded neighborhood” concept: Power projection for a rising power. India Review, 8(2), 107–143. Shekhar, V. (2012). Two decades of India’s look east policy. In G. Jha & V. Shekhar (Eds.), Rising India in the changing Asia-Pacific. Pentagon: New Delhi. Verma, N. (2017). India’s oil imports hit record high in September. Reuters, October 20, 2017. Retrieved January 16, 2018 from https://www.reuters.com/article/india-oil/indias-oil-importshit-record-high-in-september-trade-idINKBN1CP1UY. Wadhwa, A. (2014). India’s extended neighbourhood: Prospects and Challenges. Keynote address at 6th IISS-MEA Dialogue, New Delhi, March 4, 2014. Retrieved January 10, 2018 from https:// idsa.in/keyspeeches/6thIISSMEADialogue_secretaryeast.

Indian Foreign Policy and Extra-Regional Powers Alan Bloomfield

Should contemporary India be considered a great power? I have argued elsewhere against doing so because New Delhi remains unwilling to consistently ‘insert itself’ into international crises or issues in ways which would enable it to shape outcomes directly. Instead, it tends to ‘free-ride’, avoiding entanglement in international contro1 versies and refusing to assume special burdens or responsibilities for solving them. But there is another reason why India should probably not be considered a great power; it does not dominate its region, South Asia. While India’s regional rival Pakistan is now significantly less powerful according to all major criteria (except nuclear weapons, where rough parity prevails), Islamabad remains powerful enough to distract India away from global affairs to an important extent. Accordingly, Stephen Cohen argued in 2015 that when comparing India to other great powers one must effectively ‘subtract’ Pakistan’s power; ‘India may be “rising” and “emerging”’, he said, ‘but these are euphemisms for being one of the strongest of the world’s middle 2 powers’. The key to Pakistan’s staying power has arguably been its ability to engage extraregional powers in South Asia, enabling Islamabad—again, as Cohen puts it—to 3 ‘borrow power to apply against India’. The argument advanced herein is that both the USA and China have ‘lent’ power which Pakistan has deployed against India. Washington has done so somewhat unwittingly (and sporadically) given its main concern was to keep Islamabad onside during the Cold War confrontation with the Soviets. But China has been since 1962, and it remains to this day, more directly 1 Bloomfield

(2018a). (2015), pp. 353–354. 3 Ibid., p 348; Bajpai (2015), p. 27. 4 Garver (1996), p. 323–347. 2 Cohen

A. Bloomfield (B) University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_16

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concerned with boosting Pakistan to offset or tie-down India in South Asia. But not all the ‘meddling’—from New Delhi’s perspective—by extra-regional powers in South Asia has ‘gone through’ Pakistan, so to speak. China, in particular, has recently sought to insinuate itself into the political–economic calculus of several other South Asian countries as part of its push to become a major Indian Ocean power. This chapter will therefore mainly explore how and why extra-regional powers involve themselves in South Asia, and India’s attitudes towards and policy responses to such. But I must first examine India’s self-conception—how it perceives its role in the world—because if India saw itself as an ‘ordinary’ state, it might be less concerned by powerful outsiders operating in its region. But India does not perceive itself as ordinary.

India’s Identity and (Self-Assigned) Regional Role Several observers of Indian foreign policy have argued that since independence in 1947, India has had a sort of ‘split personality’ in the sense of being convinced of its greatness but simultaneously concerned about its weakness.5 As Cohen explains, both [India’s first Prime Minister] Nehru and his successors believed India was a great state … [which] had something to teach the rest of the world…. Nehru also held that India’s interests are relatively permanent and unchanging (since the state is an enduring entity with extensive territory and civilizational roots)…. India would do well by doing good.6

Andrew Kennedy has called Nehru’s leadership ‘extraordinary … for the boldness with which he attempted to reshape the international system’, while also acknowledging that most of his initiatives ultimately failed.7 Nevertheless, assumptions of inherent greatness have not dissipated, and the attributes typically cited as proof include: India’s enormous population; India’s economy was for most of the past millennium either the world’s largest or its second largest; India produced several of the world’s great religions; ancient Indians made significant progress in political and moral philosophy, plus science and mathematics; and a very diverse society, ethnically and religiously, has lived in relative harmony for many centuries.8 India’s international identity thus predisposes New Delhi to believe that India should play an important, leading role on the global stage. More pertinently, the fact that India is significantly larger than all of its immediate neighbours combined (i.e. approximately three quarters of South Asia’s land, population and economic output9 ) predisposes Indians to assume that their state is the ‘natural’ South Asian hegemon,10 5 Matoo

(2012), pvi–vii, Aiyar (2012), ibid., pp. 2–3. (2001), pp. 38–39. 7 Kennedy (2015), pp. 92–101. 8 Cohen (2001), p. 51. 9 Bhasin (2008), p. 9. 10 Cohen (2001), pp. 48–51; Rajogopalan and Sahini (2008), pp. 16–18. 6 Cohen

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and therefore almost automatically react with suspicion, and often outright hostility, towards extra-regional powers’ activities in South Asia. But two additional factors related to how Indians interpret their history also help to explain this suspicious, hostile mid-set. First, many Indians have concluded that, in effect, ‘disunity is death’. Internal divisions allegedly enabled Alexander the Great, waves of Muslim invaders, the British (etc.) to deploy divide-and-conquer strategies with great success.11 Hindu nationalists, in particular, endorse this theory. They do not celebrate India’s diversity but instead see non-Hindus—and, indeed, sometimes ‘nominal-Hindus’ committed to secularism too12 —as a potential ‘fifth column’ threat.13 As Madhav Golwalkar put it in 1966 Where does [national strength] reside? We say, it lies in the organised life of the people…. They should be such as are imbued with unity of mind and thought, bound together with a common code of morality and faith in each other, and filled with absolute loyalty to the nation.14

Because Hindu nationalists believe that South Asia is ‘essentially’ Hindu (i.e. non-Hindus have been nefariously ‘enticed away’ from their ‘proper’ civilizational roots15 ) some regard the mere presence of other South Asian states as evidence of improper external meddling in Indian/Hindu affairs, with the British typically receiving the greatest opprobrium for facilitating, even encouraging, partition and therefore creating Pakistan.16 And second, most Indians believe they were unjustly exploited by the British (i.e. the ‘drain theory’17 ), which has allegedly created a collective trauma which can also help explain the hostility New Delhi directs towards extra-regional powers. As Manjari Chatterjee Miller has put it, India’s foreign policy (and China’s, incidentally) is driven by a ‘post-imperial ideology’ which has created a ‘self-definition of victimhood’ and ‘a corresponding sense of entitlement’ which is exacerbated by perceived threats to its influence or prestige.18 New Delhi therefore desires to be recognised as a great power but, as Buzan and Waever have observed, Indian policy-makers also understand that ‘India ha[s] no hope of being taken seriously outside the region until it c[an] stablise its own local environment’.19 And India will find it difficult to ‘pacify’ its region while smaller South Asian states (especially Pakistan), helped by outsiders, can resist.

11 Sagar

(2014), pp. 234–257, Karnad (2014), p. 207. (2013), chapter 3. 13 Bajpai (2014), pp. 133–135. 14 Golwalkar (1966), pp. 271–272. 15 Swamy, (2013), Chap. 2; Cohen (2001), p. 46. 16 Karnad, (2014), p. 208. 17 Naoroji (1962[1867]), Chandra (1966). 18 Chatterjee-Miller (2013), p. 9. 19 Buzan and Waever (2003), p. 120. 12 Swamy

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The Cold War Just as the Cold War was taking shape in the late 1940s, India and Pakistan were coming to blows over Kashmir. The British were wary of destabilising Pakistan by openly backing India (even though they privately blamed Islamabad), so in 1948 London, with American support, lobbied New Delhi to refer the matter to the United Nations for resolution. India soon focused its anger on ‘UN meddling’ (the Security Council’s peace plan was, from India’s perspective, too balanced given Pakistan had been the aggressor), but Nehru also characterised the Anglo powers’ lobbying in the early stages of the crisis as ‘highly objectionable’.20 This incident set the tone for Indo-American relations for much of the Cold War. Nehru believed that Washington had ‘stepped into the shoes of the British and wanted to undercut India’s natural and rightful regional dominance’ as a by-product of Washington’s overzealous, global anti-communist campaign.21 Nehru was determined to keep India out of the growing superpower confrontation, but he also realised poor relations with Washington might jeopardise India’s development aspirations. As Ashley Tellis puts it, ‘what Nehru wanted for India … [was] the material benefits that otherwise only come from an alliance relationship with stronger powers, yet without any of the constraining obligation’. Both sides were therefore left dissatisfied. New Delhi never got as much food aid or high technology as it believed it deserved, while Washington concluded India was unrealistically demanding and ungrateful.22 Neither Washington nor Moscow took much direct interest in South Asia during the 1950s—neither wanted to get entangled in Indo-Pakistani antagonism—but Washington did supply arms to Pakistan to ensure Islamabad remained a bulwark against communist expansion.23 New Delhi always viewed this with suspicion and alarm, but to placate India and buttress it against China, between 1954 and 1965 American aid to India considerably outstripped aid to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Americans began to assume India’s non-alignment rhetoric masked a ‘tilt’ towards the Communist powers. They were not entirely wrong to do so: Nehru’s own political preferences inclined him towards socialist central planning and he believed—conveniently ignoring the colony-like status of Eastern Europe—that the Soviet Union was not an imperial power.24 Indeed, and despite considerable Indian unease over China’s 1951 conquest of Tibet, Nehru sought a close relationship with Beijing, seemingly in preference to improving ties with Washington. By 1954, an accommodation which essentially gave China all it wanted in Tibet (i.e. unchallenged dominance) was reached and the Panchsheel Doctrine, or ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, became the basis for several years of positive Sino-Indian relations. However, by the late 1950s tensions were rising and the relationship foundered over three issues; rivalry for 20 Quoted

in Kapur (2010), pp. 255–256. (2001), p. 272. 22 Tellis (2015), p. 483. 23 Cohen (2001), pp. 270–271. 24 Kapur (2010), p. 257. 21 Cohen

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influence over the decolonisation process (i.e. Beijing favoured armed revolution and subsequent Stalinist development methods; New Delhi rejected both); resistance in Tibet towards Chinese rule; and disputes over the two states’ border.25 I cannot exhaustively explore the causes and course of the 1962 Sino-Indian War save to say that the outcome was devastating for India. New Delhi suffered a humiliating defeat which is commonly seen as the point at which Nehru’s grand, ‘idealistic’ foreign policy ambitions unravelled.26 More importantly for our purposes, it was after this war that China began to consistently insert itself into South Asian affairs. Consequently, India sought and received diplomatic and military assistance from Washington. But the détente was short-lived, in part because American President John F. Kennedy tried in 1962 and 1963 to mediate a solution to the Kashmir problem.27 His efforts were not welcomed because New Delhi believed (and still does28 ) that unrest in Kashmir, stirred up by Islamabad, provides extra-regional powers with an excuse to meddle in South Asia.29 In addition, emboldened by India’s defeat by China in 1962, Beijing’s strong support thereafter, and the receipt of potent American weapons (M-48 Patton tanks and F-85 jet fighters in particular), Pakistan provoked a second war with India in 1965. India’s army eventually got the upper hand, although internal appraisals of its performance were still scathing.30 Aware of New Delhi’s anger about advanced American weapons being used against Indian troops—but also upset that India had fired back with its own American weapons—Washington stopped military aid to both South Asian rivals in 1965. This war entrenched the opinion in India that ‘[w]hen neighbours … are allied to powerful intruders … their domestic and foreign policies become distorted. The US-Pakistan alliance is widely believed [in India] to have militarised Pakistani politics and foreign policy’.31 But with the USA disengaging from South Asia in the mid-1960s—partly due to Indian hostility, partly because Washington’s commitments in Vietnam were rising—China rapidly became the primary target of Indian angst towards extra-regional powers because, as Harsh Pant has put it, China, viewing India as a potential challenger in … Asia, has tended to use Pakistan to counter Indian power in the region, while Islamabad has gained access to civilian and military resources to balance Indian might…. The China-Pakistan partnership serves the interests of both by presenting India with a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either country. Each is using the other to balance India as India’s disputes with Pakistan keep India preoccupied, distracting New Delhi from the task of reaching its potential as a major regional and global player.32 25 Garver

(2010), pp. 86–92. and Pardesi (2009), p. 8. 27 Cohen (2001), p. 277. 28 Virk (2013), p. 60. 29 Cohen (2001), p. 58. 30 Ibid., pp. 135–136. 31 Ibid., p. 202. 32 Pant (2012), p. 84. 26 Ganguly

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Again, I do not have the space to exhaustively list all the assistance Beijing has provided to Pakistan since 1962, but this aid has included numerous armaments (most notably the ability to produce ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons), China has been and remains a major investor in Pakistan’s (otherwise typically moribund) economy, and since China joined the UN Security Council in 1971 Beijing has occasionally used its veto power to Pakistan’s benefit.33 India’s pretentions to regional hegemony thus suffered severe blows in the 1960s: The myth of Indian primacy [in South Asia] stood completely shattered. This led to considerable questioning on the part of India’s neighbours regarding the reliability of Indian defence guarantees. If India could not protect itself effectively, how could it protect others?34

The stage was therefore set for New Delhi to begin pursuing India’s interests in a more determined—or ‘realist’—manner, including taking a harder line towards extra-regional powers. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had flagged a move away from ‘idealism’ and ‘sentimentalism’ and towards ‘hard-headed analysis’ in 1970. But the so-called Indira Doctrine, which would provide the basic modus operandi of India’s regional policy for the best part of two decades, only began to take proper shape after India’s victory in the 1971 war against Pakistan.35 Severe internal unrest and human rights abuses in West Pakistan began in early 1971 and culminated in a decisive Indian military intervention in December after New Delhi had secured what was, in effect, an alliance with the Soviet Union which could provide it with diplomatic cover in the shape of Moscow’s Security Council veto. Pakistan’s army was routed and almost 100,000 troops were captured, paving the way for the creation of Bangladesh.36 The decisive victory emboldened India: its power now considerably outstripped Pakistan’s. But earlier that year, in March 1971, the US had begun constructing major military facilities on leased land on Britain’s island Diego Garcia. Strategically located in the centre of the Indian Ocean, this development greatly alarmed New Delhi. America’s President Nixon had also dispatched the nuclear-armed fleet carrier USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal just as the Indian army was fighting its way into Dakha in December 1971. This caused even more consternation in New Delhi: indeed, Barry Buzan has reported that while conducting research in India two decades later he ‘heard repeatedly the (what seemed to an outsider highly exaggerated) idea that the United States “threatened India with nuclear weapons” during the 1971 war’.37 India tabled a draft UN General Assembly resolution calling for the Indian Ocean to be designated a Zone of Peace, but it failed after opposition from Western powers and indifference from Moscow.38 The India–US relationship thus deteriorated sharply in 1971 amidst Indian perceptions of American meddling—indeed, of direct threats to India’s integrity—and 33 Cohen

(2001), p. 85–87. (1983), pp. 118–119. 35 Quoted in Malone (2011), p. 50. 36 Raghavan (2013). 37 Buzan and Waever (2003), p. 125. 38 Brewster (2015). 34 Bajpai

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while the Indian government never formally defined the Indira Doctrine one can clearly see the impact of America’s decision to make Diego Garcia the lynchpin of its Indian Ocean strategy,39 and its fumbling attempt to influence the outcome of the 1971 war, in Vargese Koithara’s 1975 summary of India’s core grand strategic goals. According to him, New Delhi had decided it needed to acquire military capabilities sufficient to: 1) fight China to a standstill in a non-nuclear war in the eastern theatre; 2) simultaneously inflict a rapid, decisive defeat on Pakistan in the west; and 3) dissuade any states active in the Indian Ocean region—including the United States—from allying themselves effectively with Pakistan and/or China.

The ultimate purpose was to ensure that India became the unchallenged South Asian hegemon.40 Further, any attempt by an extra-regional power to penetrate the crest of the Himalayas would automatically be met with a military response, and more generally, India would respond with hostility to an extra-regional power’s presence in South Asia unless that power publicly acknowledged New Delhi’s regional primacy.41 David Hagerty noted that for two decades after 1971 New Delhi took the view that: India strongly opposes outside intervention in the domestic affairs of other South Asian nations…. [I]f a South Asian nation genuinely needs external assistance, it should seek it from India. A failure to do so will be considered anti-Indian.42

Of course, New Delhi never overtly enunciated the Indira Doctrine in precisely this way. Nevertheless, it has been said that while India sought to justify it as necessary to ‘insulate the region from the adverse effects of the Cold War’, instead ‘the neighbours viewed it as a policy to abolish any challenge to India’s regional position.’43 The neighbours were probably right to do so given: • India successfully pressured Nepal to sign a Trade and Transit treaty which favoured India in 1971. • India’s treaty with newly-created Bangladesh (signed in 1972) ensured neither state would ally with an enemy/rival of the other, nor could their territory be used to threaten the other. Other treaties allowing the construction (in practice, mainly by Indian conglomerates) of joint power grids, plus telecommunications and transport networks, soon followed. • India detonated a ‘peaceful’ nuclear device in 1974. • Indian-backed internal unrest44 served as an excuse to annex Sikkim in 1975.

The integrity of the Indira Doctrine was tested by the Soviet Union’s 1979 military intervention in Afghanistan. New Delhi was not informed beforehand and was consequently caught badly off-balance. But while Indian officials privately acknowledged that Moscow’s move overtly contradicted the spirit of the Indira Doctrine and 39 Bloomfield

(2018b). (1975), pp. 227–237. 41 Cohen (2001), pp. 137–138. 42 Hagerty (1991), pp. 351–352. 43 Bhasin (2008), p. 13. 44 Malone (2011), p. 50. 40 Koithara

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seriously destabilised South Asia, publicly New Delhi praised the USSR as a ‘countervailing force … against imperialism and colonialism’ and maintained Moscow was a ‘factor for peace and stability’.45 It focused its criticism on Washington, which had resumed military aid to Pakistan in response to Moscow’s invasion.46 Indian regional policy was, nevertheless, still being driven by the Indira Doctrine in the 1980s. For example, India successfully intervened in the Maldives to defeat a coup attempt in 1989. But the doctrine arguably led New Delhi into a costly and traumatic debacle in Sri Lanka. Between 1983 and 1987, New Delhi simultaneously acted as mediator between the Singhalese-dominated government in Colombo and its restive Tamil minority, while also tacitly allowing Tamil rebels sanctuary in India’s Tamil Nadu state (for domestic–political reasons). Then, between 1987 and 1991, in response to ever-rising sectarian violence in Sri Lanka, India deployed up to 100,000 ‘peacekeepers’ to enforce ceasefire agreements. But they ended up fighting both Tamil rebels and Singhalese nationalist terrorists, and after suffering over 1,000 fatalities—and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former prime minister who had been responsible for ordering their deployment—India humiliatingly withdrew its troops from what some were by then calling ‘India’s Vietnam’.47

The Post-Cold War Era India’s disastrous intervention in Sri Lanka, plus the shocking collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—which contributed to India plunging into its most debilitating financial crisis48 —basically caused the collapse of the Indira Doctrine. For one thing, India had been forced to go cap-in-hand to the IMF, something which severely undermined New Delhi’s pretensions to hegemonic status in South Asia and recognition as a great power more generally. For another, the IMF imposed very tough conditions which essentially forced the Congress Party-led government to focus on pushing through a raft of economic reforms in the face of stiff domestic political and social opposition for the next five years.49 Narasimha Rao’s government fell at the 1996 elections, and it was replaced by an unstable United Front minority government made up of 13 smaller parties which lasted only 21 months. But for our purposes, this period is notable because the socalled Gujral doctrine was enunciated by I. K. Gujral. While foreign minister in 1996 (he later became prime minister for 11 months) he declared five principles would guide Indian foreign policy-making:

45 Dutt

(1990), p. 78. (2001), pp. 249–250. 47 Bloomfield (2016), pp. 77–78. 48 Frankel (2005), pp. 580–591, Ganguly and Mukherji (2011), pp. 84–91. See also ibid., fn. 65, p. 82, for numerous additional sources. 49 Tendulkar and Bhavani (2007). 46 Cohen

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First, with the neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can in good faith and trust. Secondly, no South Asian country will allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region. Thirdly, none will interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourthly, all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they will settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.50

He later explained the logic behind his move: since we had to face two hostile neighbours in the north and the west, we had to be at ‘total peace’ with all other immediate neighbours in order to contain Pakistan’s and China’s influence in the region.51

The first of the principles—that India would, in effect, give more than it got when concluding deals with its South Asian neighbours—was really the core of the Gujral Doctrine. Gujral put it into practice in a number of ways. For example, in 1996 the India–Nepal trade treaty was renewed on terms more favourable to Nepal; after a decade or more of fruitless negotiations, the issue of rights of transit through Bangladesh (i.e. to India’s northeastern states) was delinked from the issue of water rights, enabling the finalisation of a water-sharing treaty which marginally favoured Dakha; and New Delhi also extended a large line of credit to Sri Lanka on more favourable terms for Colombo.52 It is also generally accepted that the successor government (led by A. B. Vajpayee of the BJP) continued this policy in the main. For example, cognizant of the way the new government’s 1998 nuclear tests caused anxiety in the region, New Delhi unilaterally lifted import quotas on over 2000 goods for South Asian nations (including Pakistan), and in 1999 it streamlined the process by which Indian companies could invest in South Asian countries (excluding Pakistan this time).53 The 20-year period in which the Indira Doctrine prevailed had caused deep suspicions about New Delhi’s motives amongst India’s neighbours which Madhavi Bhasin argued had not fully dissipated by 2008, a decade after the Gujral Doctrine’s proclamation.54 Nevertheless, it is my impression that New Delhi’s foreign policy has for the most part continued to reflect the tenets of the Gujral doctrine. This is not to say that New Delhi never interferes in its neighbours’ internal affairs. An example was provided in 2009 when, just as Sri Lanka’s long-running civil war was reaching its bloody conclusion—with the government finally crushing Tamil rebel units under a hail of artillery which harmed thousands of civilians too—New Delhi first intervened rhetorically under pressure from the Tamil Nadu state government by expressing concern for the ‘humanitarian situation’, and later used language reminiscent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm in a more pointed statement reiterating that Colombo ‘had a responsibility to protect its own citizens’. But it is telling that India 50 Murthy

(1999), pp. 639–640. p. 641. 52 Ibid., pp. 646–647. 53 Bhasin (2008), p. 14. 54 Ibid., p. 13–15. 51 Ibid.,

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never invoked or even alluded to Pillar III of R2P (i.e. which purports to allow the deployment coercive measures, sanctions and military force, against governments which breach their Pillar I duties to protect). And after the end of the war New Delhi rapidly offered, unsolicited, a large aid and reconstruction package.55 Indeed, in 2012 India protected Colombo in the UN Human Rights Council by successfully lobbying other members to substantially water-down a draft resolution which criticised Colombo for ongoing human rights abuses against Tamils.56 However, things seem to be changing somewhat—but not radically—under the current government, led by the BJP’s Narendra Modi. Most notably, Modi concluded several long-delayed agreements with Bangladesh—over maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal, over water rights, and regarding the land boundary—substantially in Dhaka’s favour. And to dampen the persistent unrest in India’s northeastern states by stimulating economic growth New Delhi is bankrolling a concerted infrastructurebuilding program to improve links between these provinces and India’s West Bengal province via Bangladesh.57 Modi has also moved to improve ties with Sri Lanka and Myanmar by concentrating on improving infrastructure-connectivity and not hectoring them over human rights.58 And he offered immediate and generous assistance in the aftermath of Nepal’s devastating 2015 earthquake.59 He also boldly hosted Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at his own swearing-in ceremony in New Delhi in May 2014, and Modi later conducted an allegedly ‘impromptu’60 return visit to Islamabad in December 2015. But these efforts have borne little fruit; a year later the two states were exchanging artillery fire on the border as Kashmir became restive again, and India also carried out an unusually aggressive so-called surgical strike into Pakistan, targeting terrorist bases. India was also ‘implicated in’ landlocked Nepal’s crippling fuel blockade in late 2015. Kathmandu alleged61 that New Delhi had unofficially backed the blockading ethnic Madhesi Nepalese citizens (who have close kinship ties with Bihari Indians). New Delhi refuted the allegation62 and while the details of what transpired remain murky, significant damage was done to Indo-Nepali relations. Finally, India also carried out a smaller and (somewhat) less controversial surgical strike against ethnic-Naga separatist camps in Myanmar in 2015.63 In 2015, Ian Hall asked whether a ‘Modi Doctrine’ had emerged. He concluded that, on balance, there was insufficient evidence to find such and that, in effect, Modi’s approach to foreign policy was ‘essentially pragmatic, and his objectives are similar to those pursued by his two immediate predecessors’ (i.e. Vajpayee and 55 Bloomfield

(2016), p. 89. p. 166. 57 Singh (2016), pp. 112–127. 58 Anderson and Verma (2015), pp. 97–98. 59 Tandon (2016), p. 350. 60 Bagchil (2015). 61 Pokharel (2015). 62 Ministry of External Affairs (2015). 63 Haidar and Joseph (2017). 56 Ibid.,

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Manmohan Singh).64 Aakriti Tandon basically agreed in 2016, stating ‘Modi’s approach is in too nascent a stage to be able to distil it into a single doctrine-like statement’.65 But I believe that when it comes to China policy, Modi’s India is moving back towards a tougher, ‘Indira Doctrine-like’ attitude. I do not present this argument too strongly: while I agree with Mohan Malik that India has been deliberately balancing against China both internally and externally for 15 or so years,66 India also continues to engage with China, especially economically. In other words, India’s grand strategy towards China is reminiscent of classic hedging. Nevertheless, it is useful to divide India’s China policy into two rough categories; efforts to ‘insert itself’ as a factor which ‘complicates’ China’s (assumed) regional hegemonic ambitious in the Asia-Pacific; and moves to warn-off other South Asian states from becoming too close to China. Extended discussion of the first category of policy initiatives is beyond the scope of this paper; it suffices to say that Modi has energetically pursued ‘strategic partners’ in the Asia-Pacific (e.g. with Singapore, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and especially the USA). New Delhi seems to be basically playing a game of tit-for-tat: in response to China’s increasing activities in the Indian Ocean, India is pushing into China’s ‘turf’. For example, in December 2015 India’s navy broke with decades of settled doctrine and released a maritime strategic statement which outlined a greatly expanded ‘area of interest’, namely the entire Indo-Pacific region.67 But it is the way India is pressuring its South Asian neighbours to avoid becoming too closely entangled in the dragon’s coils which is directly relevant to this discussion. For example, in 2017 India boycotted a major conference designed to showcase China’s so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and alleged that the project flouted ‘international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality’ and risked creating ‘unsustainable debt burdens’ for participants. But the main concern was that one component of BRI, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, will be built through Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, land which India claims. As the Ministry of External Affairs press release put it, ‘[n]o country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity’.68 This incident, plus the well-known hostility in New Delhi towards China’s socalled strong of pearls strategy—Chinese port construction is taking place (from West to East) at Bagamoyo in Tanzania, Mahe in the Seychelles, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Maday Island in Myanmar—also helps illuminates the recent controversies over port building activity in Sri Lanka. It has been said that

64 Hall

(2015). (2016), pp. 351–352. 66 Malik (2012), pp. 345–376. 67 Ministry of Defence (Navy) (2013), pp. 31–32. 68 Ministry of External Affairs (2017). 65 Tandon

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Hambantota [i.e. on Sri Lanka’s southern coast] has the stamp of Chinese investment all over it—multi-lane highways, an industrial park and conference center, and a gleaming new cricket stadium. The only downside is that nearly everything lies empty…. [W]hat was envisioned as a booming port city … was transformed into a debt-trap of colossal proportions.

And the trap was sprung in mid-2017 when Colombo was forced to grant a 99-year lease to a China Merchants Port Holdings, a state-owned-enterprise, after admitting that it would be unable to pay off its debts to Beijing.69 New Delhi had already warned Sri Lanka off ever allowing a Chinese submarine to visit Colombo’s port again (i.e. after two visits in 2014), and after the Hambantota deal was announced New Delhi reportedly lobbied hard behind the scenes, prompting Sri Lanka’s defence minister to publicly declare ‘we can’t allow the port for military use’.70 India’s decision in April 2017 to reverse its previous stance and move ahead with developing Sri Lanka’s Trincomalee port (on the north coast) has also been attributed to New Delhi’s desire to offer credible alternatives to Beijing as an investment partner despite expert reports concluding that a port in that location may not be commercially viable.71 It is no secret that New Delhi has become increasingly concerned about, and hostile towards, China’s Indian Ocean strategy.72 It seems to perceive China’s moves as part of a nefarious grand plan to deprive India of its ‘rightful’ place in the world (i.e. as a great power and a regional hegemon), but I suspect that this is probably more a secondary concern or maybe even an unintended (but not unwelcome) effect of China’s broader goals of safeguarding its rapid economic development and burnishing its credentials as a peer-competitor of the United States. Nevertheless, given what I have said above about Indian’s long-standing suspicion of extra-regional powers no one should be surprised if New Delhi becomes ever-more hostile towards China’s activities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean more widely. And, ironically given what was said earlier about the persistent, even allegedly paranoid at times Indian attitude towards the US over many decades, Washington and New Delhi are now co-operating ever-more closely against China. We must be wary of reading too much into this development: it has been said, for example, that whenever the Americans suggest anything which might be interpreted as a ‘quasi-formal military alignment’ Indians ‘reflexively shrink from such engagement’73 given their longstanding commitment to maintaining ‘strategic autonomy’.74 Nevertheless, US$8 billion worth of American weapons have been sold to India since 2010 and major new deals are currently being negotiated. More importantly, a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement was finally signed in August 2016, giving each state in-principle access to the other’s military bases.75 69 Basu

(2017). (2017). 71 Parashar (2017). 72 Pant and Yogesh (2014), Green and Shearer (2012), Malik (2012), pp. 354–355. 73 Gupta (2011), p. 1. 74 Kilnani et al. (2012). 75 Rosen and Jackson (2017). 70 Reuters

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Conclusion I have argued that India has typically been very suspicious of, and even typically hostile-towards, extra-regional powers operating in South Asia for a range of reasons, including: the fact India is far-and-away the largest South Asian state; prevailing interpretations of India’s history; and, especially, the desire to be unquestioningly accepted into the contemporary great power club. But India’s self-conception as the regional hegemon and, concomitantly, also as a ‘rightful’ great power on the global stage, has been continually frustrated, particularly by the implacable resistance Pakistan has offered since 1947. And, crucially, Pakistan has only been able to maintain this resistance with the help of extra-regional powers; at times this has been provided by Washington—albeit somewhat ‘unwittingly’ as I argued earlier—but since 1962 Beijing has consistently and deliberately lent power to Islamabad for the express purpose of ensuring New Delhi does not emerge as a peer-competitor. As a result, India has been unremittingly suspicious of, and often quite hostile towards, extra-regional powers meddling—as New Delhi sees it—in ‘its’ region. As I have noted above, at times Indian policy-makers have perhaps overstated or mischaracterised these other powers’ motives and intent; for example, I am not convinced that President Nixon actually threatened New Delhi with nuclear attack in 1971, and nor am I convinced that China’s contemporary Indian Ocean policy is primarily designed to ‘keep India down’. Nevertheless, the Indian economy has been growing strongly ever since the reform era of the early 1990s, and its military capabilities have only grown in that time. And there is also no sign that Indians have abandoned their assumptions about their country’s inherent greatness. Accordingly, I foresee little scope for India’s basic attitude towards extra-regional powers to change; it will continue to remain suspicious of and even hostile towards outsiders operating in South Asia for the foreseeable future, with the only caveat being that because New Delhi and Washington now both see Beijing as their primary strategic competitor—meaning their interests coincide more closely than at any time since 1947—India’s angst will be primarily, and probably increasingly, directed towards China.

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India’s Maritime Security and Policy: An Imperative for the Blue Economy Rashmi Singh

Introduction Maritime security is one of the most discussed topics in academic circles. Major stakeholders in the policy domain and security have included maritime security in their areas of importance. In 2014, the UK, the European Union, and the African Union (AU) launched ambitious maritime security strategies. The North Atlantic Treaty 1 Organization (NATO) has also focused on maritime strategy. The USA was the first to pioneer the concept of National Maritime Security Policy in 2004 after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Indian government has also strengthened coastal and maritime security by successful implementation of technical, organizational, and procedural initiatives, by engaging all the maritime security agencies. Also, the International Maritime Organization has included maritime security in their tasks. The incidents related to the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia gave rise to maritime security. The dangers of piracy for growing international trade brought the maritime dimension of security to the global consciousness and lifted it high on policy agendas. Moreover, the interstate tensions in regions, such as the South China Sea or the East China Sea, and the significant investments in blue water navies of emerging powers, such as India and China, have increased attention for the oceans as a security space. Maritime security has become all the more important due to the widespread threats that prevail in the maritime domain such as maritime interstate disputes, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods, arms proliferation, illegal fishing, environmental crimes, or maritime accidents and disasters.

1 Bueger

(2014), pp. 159–164.

R. Singh (B) Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 A. Ranjan (ed.), India in South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2020-0_17

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As the threats in the domain of maritime security are manifold, India is now paying greater attention to the areas of maritime jurisdiction, partly for the future of mankind, and more specifically to undertake regenerative and restorative activities to ensure sustainable and enhanced economic development through harnessing blue industries. The blue economy is particularly aimed at supporting sustainable economic development sectors and activities which could be harnessed through oceans, while improving human wellness and environment.2 The blue economy encompasses traditional industries such as tourism and fisheries along with new sectors—such as aquaculture, seabed mining, marine biotechnology, and offshore renewable energy. In addition, some of the other important industries such as shipping, port infrastructure, services, and coastal development also rely on the oceans, seas, and coasts. These diversified sectors could support the coastal urbanization, growing population search for food, jobs, and for renewable sources of energy3 and opportunities to tap into unexploited resources. However, the potential to harness the blue economy is limited by a series of challenges. For much of human history, aquatic ecosystems have been treated as inexhaustible resources and injudiciously exploited. The coastal interface is affected by changing climate, increasing demand for food, lack of economic incentives, technological advances, and little adherence to UNCLOS laws which have often led to poorly regulated activities. This in turn has resulted in irreversible and excessive use of valuable marine resources.

The History of India’s Maritime Prowess The Indian Ocean saw the initial sailing activities by the Hindus, right across SE Asia, who also constructed powerful ships. There was also existence of ancient Hindu kingdoms, known as Suvarnabhumi, who sustained the cultural empire of India with their courageous seafaring activities for generations. However, from the fifth century AD, command of the eastern waters and Malacca Straits passed into the hands of a great Indian maritime power, known as the Sri Vijaya Empire, based in Sumatra. The Sri Vijaya kings retained mastery over the surrounding waters through a powerful navy and controlled all shipping traffic. However, in 1007 AD, the South Indian Emperor Rajendra of Chola dynasty fought a 100-year war with the Sri Vijayas and defeated them which resulted in decline of Hindu sea power. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, further the Central Asian powers conquered the rich Gangetic plain, and India’s oceanic trade passed into the hands of the Arabs. In the fifteenth century, Afghans ruled Delhi, and Southern states were ruled by the Bahamini and Vijayanagaram.4

2 United

Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2013). Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2016). 4 Admiral (Retd.) Arun (2013), Retrieved on October 16, 17. 3 United

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India’s Current Maritime Security Strategy India has a huge coastline of around 7,500 km, with 1,200 islands, and a large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of about 2 million km2 .5 Keeping in view of its vast maritime boundary, India’s current maritime security strategy focuses attention primarily on the security of the Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to prevent conflict; to persue military operations to shape a favorable and positive maritime environment along with prevention of Indian coastal and offshore assets against attacks, this holds relevance due to the fact that ocean-based assets and economic activities offer prospects for new sources of growth, jobs, and innovation. They also offer possible solutions to key environmental challenges while also being at increased risk from enhanced economic activity, demographic, and environmental pressures. India’s maritime security constitutes strategies for deterrence and strengthening the credibility, readiness posture, and communication of intent, whereas the strategy for conflict is developed for deployment of its forces during the period of conflict. The strategy includes various operational actions, including maritime strike, sea control, sea denial, SLOC interdiction, SLOC protection, coastal and offshore defense, information warfare, and escalation management. These also include naval deployments, cooperation with maritime forces of other nations, cooperation in training, and holding of maritime joint exercises with forces of other countries in the region. The coastal and offshore security stresses on prevention of threat from subconventional armed attack and infiltration with focus on indigenization, MDA, network-centric operations (NCO), force projection and protection, maintenance and logistics, and new technologies, among others. The maritime strategy encompasses a variety of factors, such as the geoeconomic, geostrategic, capabilities and resources, assessments of intensity, and the overall political direction.6

India’s Maritime Strategy vis-a-vis Maritime Powers Active in the Indian Ocean Region The Indian Ocean plays an important role in ensuring Asia’s security. As India and China have their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and as China’s trade interests coincide with India’s target of being the most important power and security provider, differences are bound to happen. However, the presence of extra-regional powers like the USA has played an important role in maintaining peace and security in the region. China sees India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands as an intrusion in the Indian Ocean due to its location and could permit India to ‘seal off Malacca’ in case of 5 Sakhuja 6 Admiral

(2017), p. 126. (Retd.) Arun (2013), Retrieved on October 26, 17.

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any mutual conflict. Further, India’s base in the Andaman and Nicobar Island’s7 has raised concerns in China about India’s intentions. Also, India’s inclination from ‘continental’ to ‘maritime’ is demonstrated by its purchase of the Russian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and the indigenous developed Arihant-class nuclear submarines and two Vikrant-class aircraft carriers.8 India’s growing ambitions to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean and to play the role of a regional maritime power and security provider is to ensure a secure and stable environment, which will enable continued economic development and social upliftment of its people. India has successfully played the role of a regional power by helping smaller regional states like Mauritius to operate a coastguard, strengthened Sri Lanka’s ability to control its waters, improved the capabilities of Mozambique, Madagascar, and Maldives to monitor their maritime domain, and transferred ships to Seychelles, Maldives, and Mauritius.9 India’s concerns in the Indian Ocean are particularly driven by the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region. The String of Pearls raises fears about the Chinese ‘containment’ of India and the fear that it may occupy the same place in the Indian Ocean as it has in the South and East China Seas. India has responded to China’s presence in the Indian Ocean, by launching a navy communication satellite and setting up a monitoring station in Madagascar. Furthermore, India has been strengthening its ties with Japan and Africa—a move with which China is not comfortable. Although India’s primary aspiration is to be the dominant power and security provider in the Indian Ocean, yet it lags behind this goal. Therefore, there is a contest going on between India’s aspirations and China’s stakes in the Indian Ocean, but the presence of extra-regional powers like the USA could ensure that the power tussle does not go out of proportion. The USA is of the view that India is expected to play a more active role in upholding the stability of its regional security environment, which includes the Persian Gulf. However, this could foster a negative reaction from China as India does not possess the capacity to serve as a net security provider, which helps illustrate the crucial role of the US Navy in the Indian Ocean.

Importance of Maritime Security to India The Indian Ocean, which caters to most of the world’s shipping transits, has a land rim on three sides, with ships passing through certain ‘choke points’ emanating from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and from the southern Indian Ocean. India flanks the first two regions and has a central position overseeing the third. Its peninsular feature provides a natural reach across wide sea spaces in all directions, extended by the islands in the Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep Island groups. India’s central position in the IOR, astride the main International Shipping Lanes (ISLs), 7 Raghuvanshi

(2013). of India (2013). 9 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (2013). 8 Times

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accords distinct advantages. India has, therefore, distinct advantages to influence and safeguard its national maritime interests, across the IOR. However, India requires abundant resources and investments to ensure its security. Additionally, India is highly dependent on international trade for its long-term development (merchandise trade stood at 28% of GDP in 2016),10 and it is carried majorly by sea, as is energy (energy imports stood at 34% of total energy use in 2014)11 which is essential for our industrial growth. It is due to these factors, along with the potential of exploiting oceanic resources such as industrial marine aquaculture, marine fishery, offshore oil and gas and exploiting ocean-based industries like shipbuilding, ship recycling, maritime and coastal tourism, ports, coastal infrastructure, offshore wind energy, ocean renewable energy, marine and seabed mining, marine biotechnology and marine R&D and education, undersea pipelines and cables, among others. Hence, maritime security has become an important determinant of blue economy. Additionally, the occurrence of rampant piracy, India’s ‘Look East’ initiative which has now become ‘Act East,’ and the assertiveness of China’s Navy have put a renewed focus on maritime security. It also becomes important due to the fact that India has 11 maritime states and island territories, and has more seafaring people than the population of most European countries.12 Therefore, maintenance of a secure maritime environment is an integral purpose of India’s maritime security strategy to ensure confidence building measures for enabling the ocean industries to invest and carry out ocean-related activities without any insecurity.

Importance of the Blue Economy for India Oceans are a major source of economic activity and contribute to approximately 5% of the world’s GDP. The Indian Ocean Region is home to rising and emerging economies. The Indian Ocean Rim constitutes between a quarter and a third of the world’s population (close to two billion) which makes it a massive market. The sea lanes account for 70% of the world traffic of petroleum products. About 40% of the seaborne crude oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and 50% of the world container ships passes through the Indian Ocean. The value of intra-trade among the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is USD 777 billion and has the potential to grow significantly.13 The blue economy is important for India as India looks to the oceans in search of energy and food security. It has 13 maritime states and island territories; therefore, it is highly dependent on seas for its growth and prosperity. Further, coastal shipping is of immense importance to India owing to its

10 World

Bank (2017). Bank (2017). 12 Dahiya (2015). 13 Kaushiva (2014). 11 World

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long coastline. The share of coastal shipping in the overall cargo movement is quite less at 7% which could be exploited if planned effectively. According to the NFDB 2016 report, fish production in India contributes about 6.3 of the global fish production, while contributing to 1.1% of the GDP and 5.15% of the agricultural GDP. Though India has huge aquaculture resources, only 14% of the potential water resources are being utilized, highlighting a huge potential for the growth of this sector.14 Furthermore, India’s energy security is majorly dependent on imports from the seas. Closely 80% of India’s crude oil is imported by sea, though another 11% is met from offshore energy sources within the Indian EEZ. India has also developed its refining capacity and earns about 15% of its gross domestic product (GDP) from exports of petroleum products to other countries. Therefore, it is estimated that the country’s cumulative ‘sea dependence’ for oil is estimated to be about 93%.15 More than 90% of India’s international trade by volume and over 70% by value is carried over the seas. The total size of the Indian shipping industry has been growing over the years, even as the relative share of Indian flagged shipping in country’s external trade has declined, from about 40% in the 1980s to approximately 8.5% by 2014. This is largely because the growth of our seaborne trade, post-economic liberalization, has been relatively higher and faster than the growth of our shipping industry. While the Indian shipping industry is set to grow, the pace and needs of national development indicate that our dependence on foreign shipping would continue over the coming years. There is also a significant presence of Indian nationals in the international seafaring community, operating on both Indian and foreign ships, with approximately 6.6% of the world’s merchant mariners being Indian. The overall safety and security of Indian seaborne trade and seafarers, on both Indian and foreign ships, require that international shipping and sea routes remain safe, secure, and free for navigation and legitimate uses. Tourism is also the largest service industry in India, with a contribution of 6.23% to the national GDP and providing 8.78% to the total employment;16 hence with the right policy measures and directives, its share in GDP is expected to increase. Keeping in view of its great potential, preservation of a safe maritime scenario is an essential purpose of India’s maritime security strategy.

Maritime Security and Blue Growth The other important dimension of maritime security is its linkage to ‘economic’ or ‘blue growth.’ India’s bulk of international trade is conducted via the sea, and shipping and fisheries are important multi-billion industries. Maritime security has become all the more important due to the economic potential of the oceans primarily of offshore resources, fossil energy, seabed mining, and coastal tourism. The ideas 14 MPEDA

(2016). Information Bureau (2016). 16 Raao (2014), p. 28. 15 Press

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of ‘blue economy’ and ‘blue growth’—proposed at the 2012 Rio + 20—were coined at associating and integrating the different areas of the economic development of the oceans and making them self-sustainable. According to the United Nations, the commercial value of various activities in the world’s oceans is projected to be between US$3 trillion and US$6 trillion (INR 20 lakh crore to 40 lakh crore). This is accrued from services and resources such as marine transport (90% of global trade moves over the seas), global telecommunications (submarine cables carry 95% of all digital data across the globe), source of food (fisheries and aquaculture feed 4.3 billion people with more than 15% of annual consumption of animal protein), oil and gas (over 30% is produced from offshore), marine tourism (5% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), and 6–7% of global employment), shore-based commercial activity (13 of the world’s top 20 megacities and over 40%, or 3.1 billion, of the world population lives within 100 km of the sea in about 150 coastal cities located along the coast and in island nations.17 According to another estimate, the value of key ocean assets is conservatively estimated to be at least US$24 trillion with an annual value of goods and services of US$2.5 trillion (INR 17 lakh crore). Further, the oceans are pegged at the seventh position among the world’s top ten economies.18

Blue Economy for India: Potential and Opportunities Land and Maritime Areas of IORA Member Countries The blue economy concept is meant to be implemented by any coastal state with interests in ocean-based industries. It is estimated that more than 3 billion people with almost 20% of their average per capita intake of animal protein depend on fish19 ; more than 350 million jobs worldwide depend on the marine sector. The blue Economy concept is also gaining momentum from the Pacific Small Island Developing States to even the Southern African region. While analyzing the land and maritime areas of IORA20 member countries, it came to light that the four biggest member countries of IORA21 ; i.e., Australia, Indonesia, India, and South Africa, have more maritime area than land area, which means that they have much wider opportunities in the oceans 17 Miriam

et al. (2015). Wildlife Fund (2015). 19 FAO (2016). 20 The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), formerly known as the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative and Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), is an international organization consisting of coastal states. 21 The IORA is a regional forum, tripartite in nature, bringing together representatives of government, business, and academia, for promoting cooperation and closer interaction among them. It is based on the principles of open regionalism for strengthening economic cooperation particularly on trade facilitation and investment. 18 World

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AREA IN MILLION KM2

8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

IORA COUNTRIES LAND

EEZ

CONTINENTAL SHELF

Fig. 1 Land and maritime areas of IORA member countries. Source Author’s calculation, compiled from various sources

than what they have on the land. We also observe from Fig. 1 that although the ratio of land area of India is higher than its maritime area India has a large coastline extending to more than 7,500 km, due to which it could explore the untapped opportunities in various domains of the blue economy.

Fisheries and Aquaculture Fisheries are an essential component of a self-sustainable blue economy, as fisheries contribute more than US$270 billion annually to global GDP.22 Aquaculture is an important sector for food security, employment generation, nutrition needs, social and economic inclusion for the poorest people in the world as it provides 58% of fish to global markets.23 India stands at third position if we compare it among the major aquaculture producers. It is also seen from Fig. 2 that aquaculture, fisheries, and catches are the highest among the Asian region, which is basically due to the increase of fishing effort, expansion of fishing areas, and good management practices. However, it is seen from Fig. 2 that aquaculture production is only substantial in case of three IORA countries such as India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. The other major countries like South Africa, Thailand, and Malaysia have not yet explored their fishing 22 World 23 FAO

Bank and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017). (2016).

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Fig. 2 World’s major aquaculture producers. Source FAO (2016)

resources, despite having greater maritime areas. The IORA countries have huge potential in aquaculture processing and preservation of catches. In order to increase the production, they need to maintain the quality, processing, and preservation in order to improve the quality of supply, leading to increased employment and higher GDPs. These can be achieved by deploying floating fish processor which may accommodate factory shops fitted with a wide variety of seafood processing equipment, workforce accommodations, offices, emergency medical facilities, freshwater makers, communication stations, fishing vessel supplies, and storage facilities. A factory ship could thus move even to seasonal fishing areas because of reduction on traveling time and helps in channeling catches as per market demand. IORA countries should deploy factory ships and sooner the better in order to enhance manufacturing capacity and quality of processing, which will ultimately increase market, and eventually contribution to the GDP will be more. It can be seen from Fig. 3 that two IORA countries, namely Thailand and India, are among the top ten exporters of fish and fishery products. Although India is behind Thailand in terms of its ranking, India has scaled the highest growth rate at 14.8% among the top ten exporters. By looking at the fishery trade statistics in the last few years, it can be concluded that the developing countries are ahead of developed countries in the share of fisheries trade (Fig. 3). In 1976, developing economies exports share increased from just 37% of world trade to 54% of total fishery export value by 2014. In the same period, their exports increased from 38 to 60% of the quantity (live weight) of total fishery exports.24 Fishery trade is a significant source of 24 FAO

(2016), 200 pp.

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Fig. 3 Top ten exporters and importers of fish and fishery products. Source Food and Agricultural Organization 2016

foreign currency earnings for many developing countries, in addition to the sector’s important role in income generation, employment, food security, and nutrition.

Maritime Transportation Shipping had contributed to the sustained rise in the world seaborne trade and carries about 80% of the global merchandise trade in volume. It has become the most costeffective mode of transportation known to mankind due to fast pace improvement in technology. Globally, about 50,000 merchant ships including container ships, bulk carriers, ferries, and cruise ships are engaged in international trade. Shipping becomes even more important for developing Asian countries as explained by rapid industrialization and liberalization of trade policies in most countries of the world; the main triggers for seaborne trade have come from increasing demand for imports of raw materials, resources, etc. Among others, economies of scale being adopted in

Liner Shipping ConnecƟvity Index

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120 100 80 60 40 20 0

IORA Countries 2005

2010

2014

2016

Fig. 4 Liner shipping connectivity index (LSCI). Source World Bank (2016)

shipping reduce the transportation cost and thereby provide access to larger markets. This is a distinct direct benefit offered by our Blue Ocean. Smart Ships are necessary for the optimal use of the latest marginal advancement in technologies in all fields of engineering in the marine world, i.e., an integration of nano, software and digital technology as well as use of sensors and sensitive composites in ships, which are aiming to reduce the risk of accidents, whole or partial, to a minimum and thereby to avoid contamination or pollution of our blue ocean. The IORA is growing rapidly, even though the rate is not sufficient to withstand poverty. The regional maritime transportation system is well linked to the global network. From 2005 to 2015, UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI), which indicates the connectivity and the capacity of the shipping sector of a country to the global shipping network, showed an increasing trend for IORA countries, such as UAE, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India, and a marked decline in Malaysia and South Africa (Fig. 4). Increased LSCI indicates reduction of cost of shipping, which in return enhances the market competitiveness and increases container traffic. India’s geographical position has certain advantages in terms of cost and time over the other countries in the region, since it provides the lowest deviations from the main shipping routes. The ‘Sagarmala’ initiatives introduced by the Indian government include port-led industrialization, short sea shipping, coastal shipping, inland waterways transportation (IWT), shipbuilding, ship repairing and ship recycling and development of new ports, which can potentially improve the trade and commerce across India and revolutionize maritime logistics and port-led development in India. Hence, India’s policies toward promoting trade by sea should be more organized and advanced for which maritime security is a precondition (Fig. 4).

Ship Breaking Industry At present, the global center for ship breaking and recycling industry is in South Asia, specifically India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. These three countries account

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for 70–80% of the international recycling market for ocean-going vessels. In 2016, around 936 ships were demolished globally; out of this, 863 were demolished in these five countries, India topping the list at 319 followed by Bangladesh and Pakistan. These countries dominate the global ship breaking industry due to their naturally favorable tidal conditions. This has enabled these countries to become the preferred ship dismantling destinations. Ship breaking industry has played a very important role in the economies of these countries. The recycling of end-of-life vessels for scrap metal and other materials is a very profitable industry for both ship owners and the owners of ship breaking yards. The ship breaking industry in India in past one year saw a steady growth. According to the annual report of the Union Ministry of Steel, steel scrap generated from ship recycling contributes to around 1–2% of India’s domestic steel demand and is primarily a source of raw material for re-rolling mills (Fig. 5).

Marine-Based Energy Energy is a major requirement for economic development and social welfare. It has been proved that energy consumption and GDP growth are positively correlated. The South Asian region has the lowest per capita energy consumption in the world, in which a vast number of people still depend on non-commercial energy sources, such as animal waste, wood, and biomass. However, the commercial energy demand of the South Asian region is growing at an annual rate of 4.2%. The commercial energy combinations majorly include coal and petroleum with minor contributions from natural gas, hydropower, and a few other sources. The World Energy Council considers that 0.1% of the ocean energy can suffice to meet all human energy needs. Tidal, wave, and ocean thermal are promising energy sources when their resource availability is quantified along with water depth, seabed, and coastal bathymetric conditions, wave and tidal load conditions, biofueling, and corrosion challenges. The energy harnessed can significantly contribute to the energy and water dependence and can provide the necessary resilience to the region.

Deep-Sea Minerals Long-term physical, chemical, and biological interactions in the deep-sea environment influence the formation of minerals in the seabed. Three main types of minerals, namely seafloor massive sulfides, cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, and polymetallic (manganese) nodules, are available and extracted from the seabed, which are rich in sulfur, nickel, cobalt, iron, and manganese (UNEP 2014). Data on the availability of the deep-sea minerals in the South Asian region is rare. However, India again is leading in this aspect. India is building a processing plant for rare earth minerals and invested US$135 million on a new exploration ship. India was also the first country

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Fig. 5 No. and gross tonnage of ships scrapped. Source NGO shipbreaking platform 2015 (NGO shipbreaking platform (2015), What a difference a flag makes, Retrieved from http://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/shipbrea_wp2011/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NGOShipbreaking-Platform-Annual-Report-2015.pdf)

to have been given the pioneer area for exploration of deep-sea mineral, namely polymetallic nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin in 1987. The International Seabed Authority which apportions ocean bed space for oceans has allocated India an area of 150,000 km2 with an estimated resource of about 380 million tons of strategic metals such as copper, nickel, cobalt besides manganese and iron. Over the next years, the Asian region will increase its expenditure on the offshore oil and gas infrastructure by 54%, with 17% contribution from the South Asian region. These are, however, lower than contributions of 64 and 19% from Southeast Asian and East Asian regions, respectively.25 According to the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ), India’s oil reserves stood at nearly 5.7 billion barrels in 201516 . Its offshore

25 Bari

(2017).

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reserves (66%) made up slightly more than half of the country’s recoverable reserves as of April 2015. India held nearly 5.7 billion barrels of proved oil reserves at the end of 2015, mostly in the western part of the country. Domestic production has not kept pace with demand in recent years, leading to exploration of deepwater and marginal fields and investment in improving recovery rates of existing fields. India was the third largest energy consumer in the world after China and the USA in 2013, and its need for energy supply continues to climb as a result of the country’s dynamic economic growth and modernization over the past several years. India’s largest energy source is coal (44%), followed by traditional biomass and waste (24%) and petroleum and other liquids (23%). Other renewable fuel sources make up a small portion of primary energy consumption, although the capacity potential is significant for several of these resources such as solar, wind, and hydroelectricity. India was the fourth largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products after the USA, China, and Japan in 2015, and it was also the fourth largest net importer of crude oil and petroleum products. The gap between India’s oil demand and supply is widening, as demand in 2015 reached nearly 4.1 million barrels per day (b/d), compared to around 1 million b/d of total domestic liquids production (Fig. 3). EIA expects demand to accelerate in the 2016 through 2017 timeframe as India’s transportation and industrial sectors continue to expand under economic development (Fig. 6).

Coastal Tourism Tourism has become the biggest employment generator as it gives job opportunity to 1 out of every 11 persons globally. As per the World Travel and Tourism Council, travel and tourism have contributed a total of 9.8% to world GDP in 2015, rising to (US$7.2 trillion). In India, travel and tourism’s contribution to India’s GDP was 9.6%, 9.3 to total employment with a market size of USD 209 billion.26 Coastal tourism is one of the fastest growing sectors in the world. For last few decades, shore-based coastal tourism was much popular, as it refers to the ‘3 S’ slogan ‘Sun, Sand and Sea.’ Nowadays, there is an emerging interest of beachgoers to enjoy the marine environment as a whole. The consumptive and non-consumptive recreational uses of the marine environment generally include fishing, shell collection, bird watching, sunbathing, windsurfing, scuba diving, and boating. The IORA countries coastal region is blessed with warm tropical climate, high coastal biodiversity, clear water, and long sandy beaches. However, the current performance of the South Asian region in the global picture is not as impressive as it is in neighboring East and Southeast Asia. South Asian countries have a lot of rooms left for development. It is also indeed a matter of hope that the future growth in this region in tourism can all be accomplished using the most befitting model of blue economy. From Fig. 7, it is also observed that India received the third largest number of foreign tourist arrivals after 26 World

Travel and Tourism Council (2017).

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Fig. 6 India’s crude oil production by region, 2015. Source India’s ministry of petroleum and natural gas, petroleum statistics

InternaƟonal Arrivals

35000000 30000000 25000000 20000000 15000000 10000000 5000000 0

Countries 2000

2005

2010

2014

2015

Fig. 7 International tourist arrivals. Source World Bank statistics

Thailand and Malaysia among the IORA countries. India has immense potential in developing coastal tourism due to its vast coastline and long list of islands.

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Interlinkage Between Maritime Security and Blue Economy The concept of blue economy is linked to maritime security since sustainable blue growth not only requires the enforcement and monitoring of laws and regulations, but a secure maritime environment that provides the precondition for managing marine resources. Two of the core dimensions in the concept to blue economy, food security, and the resilience of coastal populations are directly linked to the fourth concept, that is, human security. Human security is vital for national security as it puts focus on security considerations on the needs of people (food, shelter, sustainable livelihoods, and safe employment) rather than states. Core dimensions of human security concern food, shelter, sustainable livelihoods, and safe employment. As fisheries are an important medium of protein-rich food and employment to the mankind, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a threat impacting human security. Human security is also related to maritime dimensions, which stretches from the security of seafarers to the vulnerability of coastal populations to maritime threats. Notably, the resilience of coastal populations has been identified as a key factor in the emergence of maritime threats and is hence vital in their prevention. It is neither maritime security first nor blue economy first. Instead, we need to embrace the interconnection between both concerns. At the heart of the nexus is cooperative ocean governance, or good order at sea. The 1982 UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive framework for the regulation and management of the ocean space and addresses a broad spectrum of issues relating to regulation of navigation, marine protection, scientific research, and seabed mining. Coastal states have accrued expansive sea spaces, designated as EEZ under the UNCLOS, and they promise enormous living and non-living sea wealth. This sea space also provides for sovereign rights for commercial activity in the EEZ, be it to catch fish, recover oil and gas in the area, or mine or extract other marine resources. Although the UNCLOS regime may have brought about order at sea in terms of management of the sea spaces and resources, difficulties are encountered especially in disputed sea areas and when states seek to unilaterally exercise authority over them. In order to tackle many of these challenges, maritime law enforcement agencies such as the coast guards and marine police have been mandated to ensure safety and security of economic assets and activities such as offshore oil platforms, protection of marine wealth, prevent illegal fishing, and help uphold national environmental regulations, thereby ensuring sustainable economic growth and livelihoods of coastal populations as well as upholding national commitments to international agreements and initiatives such as the SDGs 2030. As regards maritime and territorial claims and disputes, the international community is continuously engaged in resolving the issues as is evident from developments in the South China Sea and the East China Sea in recent years. Although there are many stakeholders in maritime security, the lack of a proper framework is a challenge to coordinate between these disparate stakeholders. India’s cooperation with other countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh is good example of India’s cooperative initiatives. Another important thing for the blue econ-

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Prime Minister Dept. of Space V Dept. of Atomic Energy

Ministry of Defence (MOD) Office of the Chief Hydrographer to the GOI (CH) Indian Navy (IN)

Naonal Instute of Oceanography (NIO), GOA

Indian Air Force (IAF)

Dept of Ocean Development (DOO), GOA

Indian Coast Guard (ICG)

Ministry of Shipping (MOS)

Ministry of Finance (MOF)

DG (Shipping)

Central Board of Excise and Customs

DG Lighthouses and Lightships (DGLL) Major Port Trusts

Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare (MOAFW)

Minor Ports

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)

Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)

Dept. of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries (DADF)

Chief Marime Advisor (CMA) Naonal Marime Authority (NMA)

Ministry of Law (MOL)

Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MOEFCC)

Central Industrial Security Force Ministry of Health and Family Welfare State Marine Police Bureau of Immigraon

Port Health Officers

Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) New NEw Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) Dept. of Ocean Development (DOO), GOA

Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Directorate General of Hydrocarbons

Dept. of Ocean Technology (Tamilnadu)

Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL)

Naonal Centre for Antarcc and Ocean Research (NCAOR), GOA

ONGC

Indian Centre for Ocean Informaon Services

Fig. 8 Coordination between the NMA and other ministries. Source Sakhuja (2017), the blue economy: concept, constituents, and development

omy is to streamline the marine administration. A national-level platform is required for administering and coordinating maritime issues across various sectors. In 2014, there was much speculation over the seemingly imminent setting up of the National Maritime Authority (NMA) as an apex federal body of the current government for institutionalized linkages among the NAVY, Coast Guard, and ministries of central and state governments, with a chief maritime advisor be positioned to coordinate and

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Fig. 9 Interaction between NMA and other intergovernmental agencies. Source Sakhuja (2017), the blue economy: concept, constituents, and development

oversee the implementation of national policies. Therefore, this activity needs to be brought to fruition for streamlining of maritime administration and overseeing the activities of the entire domain of maritime security. A number of subordinate and ancillary organizational structures will also be required at the state level and within the country’s littoral belt (Figs. 8 and 9).

Challenges to the Blue Economy The blue economy concept is challenged by many issues like climate change, rising demand, ineffective governance institutions, inadequate economic incentives, technological advances, lack of or inadequate capacities, lack of full implementation of UNCLOS, and other legal instruments that has led to excessive use of marine resources. Therefore, it is a complex task to measure the damage to the ocean environment and putting value to the depleted oceanic resources. It requires a real-time data of activities at sea. Maritime domain awareness, information and technology sharing, remote sensing, ocean data acquisition devices, etc., are some of the key ocean surveillance mechanisms. These not only give a picture about the activities at

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sea, but also about the roadblocks that needs to be tackled. Some of the challenges are as follows:

Unsustainable Fishing The biggest challenge to the blue economy is poorly managed and over-exploited fish catch. Fish catches are majorly affected by illegal and unregulated fishing, which results to roughly 11–26 million tons of fish catch annually, or US$10–22 billion in unlawful or undocumented revenue. Hence, the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is therefore a grave challenge to the blue economy.

Physical Alterations and Destruction of Marine and Coastal Habitats and Landscapes This occurs mainly due to coastal infrastructure development, deforestation, and mining. Unregulated development in the narrow coastal interface and nearshore areas has led to suboptimal laying of infrastructure, overlapping uses of land and marine areas, downgrading of poor communities, and loss of critical habitats.

Marine Pollution Marine pollution from untreated sewerage, agricultural runoff, and marine debris such as plastics is a global problem that threatens wildlife and presents health and safety concerns for humans as a polluted ocean will not be able to sustain marine biodiversity and thus is a challenge for the blue economy.

Climate Change Sea-level rise and climate change impacts on ocean systems, acidity, and major oceanic currents threaten marine life, habitats, and the communities that depend on them. These conditions have become threats to the aquatic and marine resources on which the blue economy is based.

Maritime Boundary Disputes The unresolved boundary disputes between the maritime states cause insecurity to the people living or using the ocean/maritime property, besides acting as a trigger

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for unlawful activities. The blue economy business in such waters will not be costeffective due to insecurity.

Conclusion Maritime security and governance primarily require coordination between the multiple players involved in national terms, in regional terms, but also in global terms in which the strategies, laws, and action plans can be aligned. Secondly, domain knowledge, data, and information sharing are key preconditions for international cooperation. This helps in understanding about the activities, as well as the challenges at sea. Further, advancement in surveillance technology and threat detection systems are also enablers in providing good order at sea. Thirdly, strategy, knowledge, and law enforcement are only significant in so far as they actually lead to action for joint, inter-agency, and also interstate law enforcement and prosecution. The potential for economic endeavors including aquaculture, fisheries, minerals extraction, and transportation on and around the sea is enormous. The most important thing is that these activities should be in line and following the blue economy concept. The other significant economic activities are shipbuilding, shipping, and ship scrapping which can be fitting in the concept very well, but should be carried out as per the blue economy concept. Shipbuilding which involves the human effort and no release of gaseous or liquid elements fits the blue economy concept. Shipping also is the best mode of transportation in terms of cost-effectiveness and no pollution. Finally, maritime security and the blue economy concepts are intertwined and taking up any one of them in isolation will be at the risk of the other. There needs to be coordination among the maritime security practitioners and those developing the blue economy, in order to protect the oceans and the coastal populations highly dependent on them. Also, IORA has limitless potentials for implementing the blue economy but strong political commitments, enormous researches, societal awareness, and attitude are required to achieve the goals.

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